



**THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYE
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**REVISITING STRATEGIC CULTURE OF PAKISTAN IN THE
CHANGING SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY DYNAMICS**

MASTER'S THESIS

SHAMSA KHALIL

MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

AUGUST 2023



THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKİYE
SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF ANKARA
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

REVISITING STRATEGIC CULTURE OF PAKISTAN IN THE
CHANGING SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY DYNAMICS

MASTER'S THESIS

SHAMSA KHALİL

205414206

THESIS SUPERVISOR

PROF. DR. MURAT YEŞİLTAŞ

MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

AUGUST 2023



STATEMENT OF ACADEMIC INTEGRITY

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all materials and results that are not original to this work. I declare that this thesis is written according to the writing rules of the Social Sciences University of Ankara, Institute of Social Sciences.

Name and Surname: Shamsa Khalil

Signature:



ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

With profound gratitude, I acknowledge my advisor, Prof. Dr. Murat Yeşiltaş's invaluable guidance, the Head of the Department of International Relations, Prof. Dr. Muhittin Ataman's mentorship, Fatih Sultan Mehmet Vakıf University's colleagues' constant encouragement and moral support, beloved friends and seniors' camaraderie and thought-provoking discussions, and last but not the least my family's firm support.

This achievement would not have been possible without each of you. Your collective influence has left an indelible mark on my academic journey.

Thank you



DEDICATION

To My Beloved Parents

Your boundless love, unwavering encouragement, and enduring sacrifices have been the foundation of my accomplishments. This thesis is a testament to your unwavering belief in me. Thank you for shaping me into who I am today.

Your love fuels my success. This is for you, **Mama & Baba** .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF ACADEMIC INTEGRITY	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	ii
DEDICATION	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iv
ABSTRACT	xi
ÖZET	xiii
ABBREVIATIONS	xv
LIST OF FIGURES	xxii
LIST OF TABLES	xxiv
CHAPTER ONE.....	1
INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Background of the Study	1
1.2. Problem Statement.....	1
1.3. Research Questions	2
1.4. Objectives of the Study	3
1.5. Significance of the Study.....	4
1.6. Research Methodology	5
1.7. Scope and Limitations of the Study.....	6
1.8. Plan of the Thesis	8
CHAPTER TWO.....	11
CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF STRATEGIC CULTURE WITH A FOCUS ON PAKISTAN.....	11
2.1. Strategic Culture	11
2.1.1. Culture	12
2.1.2. Strategy.....	14
2.1.3. Strategic Culture as a Compound Product.....	16
2.1.3.1. Determinants of Strategic Culture	19
2.1.3.2. Discourse Apprehension of Four Generations of Strategic Culture.....	21
2.1.3.3. Debates on Strategic Culture Discourse	23
2.1.3.3.1. Cause versus Context.....	23

2.1.3.3.2. Temporal Source	24
2.1.3.3.3. Scope of Change.....	25
2.1.3.3.4. Scope of Diversity	25
2.1.3.3.5. Influence on Strategic Behavior	26
2.2. Pakistan Strategic Culture	26
2.2.1. Components of Pakistan’s Strategic culture	28
2.2.1.1. Opposition to Indian hegemonic aspirations and offensive designs	29
2.2.1.2. The primacy of Defense Requirement.....	30
2.2.1.3. Nuclear Deterrence	30
2.2.1.4. Acceptance but not reliance on outside assistance	31
2.2.1.5. Identification with traditional Islamic Cause.....	32
2.2.1.6. Stability on Western Borders.....	33
2.2.2. The Emergence of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture	33
2.2.2.1. Cognitive Aspects of Emergence of Pakistan’s Strategic Strategic Culture.....	34
2.2.2.2. Environmental/ Structural Aspects Of Emergence of Pakistan’s Strategic Strategic Culture	40
2.2.2.3. Relational Aspects of Emergence of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture	44
CHAPTER THREE.....	48
LITERATURE REVIEW: TRANSITIONAL PHASES OF STRATEGIC CULTURE OF PAKISTAN	48
3.1. Transitional Phases of Strategic Culture of Pakistan.....	48
3.1.1. First Kashmir War (1947-1948)	50
3.1.1.1. Geo-Strategic Significance of Jammu and Kashmir.....	50
3.1.1.2. Geopolitical Realities of the State of Jammu and Kashmir	51
3.1.1.3. Political and Military Landscape	54
3.1.1.4. Conclusion and After Effects of First Kashmir War	62
3.1.2. 1965 War of Pakistan	63
3.1.2.1. Contextual Insight into Significant development of the 1950s and 60s	63

3.1.2.2. Military Landscape of 1965 War of Pakistan	65
3.1.2.3. Political Landscape of 1965 War of Pakistan.....	67
3.1.2.4. Consequences of the 1965 War of Pakistan	68
3.1.3. 1971 War of Pakistan	69
3.1.3.1. Political Dimension of 1971 War of Pakistan	69
3.1.3.2. Military Dimension of 1971 War of Pakistan.....	70
3.1.3.3. Consequences of 1971 War of Pakistan	72
3.1.4. Zia Regime and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1979	74
3.1.4.1. Contextual Background	74
3.1.4.2. Zia Regime and the Domestic lieu of Pakistan.....	75
3.1.4.3. Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in the pretext of Geo-Political Realities	77
3.1.4.4. Civil War, Taliban Rise in Afghanistan , and Pakistan's Pro-Taliban policy.....	78
3.1.5. Saga of Nuclear Weapons Acquisition (1998)	80
3.1.5.1. Reservation on Pakistan's Technological Advancement.....	80
3.1.5.2. Domestic Milieu, South Asia's Nuclearization, and Response of International Community	80
3.1.5.3. Consequences of Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Pakistan	83
3.1.6. Kargil Crisis 1999.....	83
3.1.6.1. Military Landscape of Kargil Crisis 1999	84
3.1.6.2. Political Landscape of Kargil Crisis	85
3.1.6.3. Consequences of Kargil Crisis	87
3.1.7. American Invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan's Policy Shift towards Taliban.....	88
3.1.7.1. Contextual Background before American Invasion of Afghanistan	88
3.1.7.2. 9/11 and the American Invasion of Afghanistan	91
3.1.7.3. Shift in Pakistan's Afghanistan Policy	91
3.1.7.4. Counter-Terrorism Efforts of Pakistan	93
3.1.7.5. Consequences of Pakistan's Pro Taliban Policy.....	93
3.1.8. Taliban's Return to Power in Afghanistan and Pakistan's Response	95

3.1.8.1. Return of Taliban in Power and its Consequences	95
3.1.8.2. Pakistan's Policy Response on Taliban's Return in Power	97
3.2. Future Course of Action for Pakistan	99
CHAPTER FOUR	103
CHANGING SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY DYNAMICS AND PAKISTAN'S	
RESPONSE.....	103
4.1. South Asian Security Outlook	103
4.1.1. Pursuit of Dominance	105
4.1.2. Pursuit of Lopsided Approach.....	106
4.1.3. Pursuit of Appropriating and Securing Seas.....	107
4.1.4. Pursuit of Technological Hop.....	108
4.2. Dominant Security Themes	109
4.2.1 Maritime Security	109
4.2.1.1. Indian Ocean at the Crossroad of Maritime Competition.....	109
4.2.1.2. China's 21 st Century Maritime Silk Road	110
4.2.1.3. India's Maritime Strategy	112
4.2.1.3.1. India's Naval Modernization	113
4.2.1.3.2. India's Maritime Connectivity.....	114
4.2.1.3.3. India's Maritime Naval Culture.....	115
4.2.1.4. Pakistan Maritime Strategy	116
4.2.1.4.1. Pakistan Naval Modernization.....	117
4.2.1.4.2. Pakistan Maritime Connectivity	120
4.2.1.4.3. Pakistan's Maritime Culture.....	122
4.2.2 Military Security.....	123
4.2.2.1.Strategic Thinking, Doctrinal Transformation, and Military Strategy	
.....	124
4.2.2.2. Military Balance	128
4.2.2.2.1 Military Strength	128
4.2.2.2.2. Defense Budget and Spending.....	130
4.2.2.2.3. Strategic considerations.....	131
4.2.2.2.4. Nuclear Capability, Military Technology, and Equipment.....	131

4.2.2.3. Impact on Strategic Stability and Conventional Deterrence..	133
4.2.3. Nuclear Security	135
4.2.3.1. Contours of Nuclear Doctrine, Policy, Posture, and Targeting Strategy	136
4.2.3.2. Nuclear Trends in South Asia.....	138
4.2.3.2.1. Nuclear Modernization	138
4.2.3.2.2. Increased Range and Sophistication	138
4.2.3.2.3. Naval Nuclear Capabilities	141
4.2.3.2.4. Doctrine ¹ and Policy Shift	142
4.2.3.2.4.1. Nuclear Doctrine Shift.....	143
4.2.3.2.4.2. Nuclear Policy Shifts	144
4.2.3.2.5. Arms Race Dynamics	146
4.2.3.3. Technological Advancement and Challenges to Nuclear Security	146
4.2.4. Economic Security.....	150
4.2.4.1. Insight into India and Pakistan’s Economic Policies and Pathways	151
4.2.4.2. Economic Warfare in South Asia	155
4.2.4.2.1. Trade and Tariff Disputes.....	155
4.2.4.2.2. Economic Sanctions	156
4.2.4.2.3. Investment, Infrastructural Development, and Economic Cooperation.....	157
4.2.4.2.4. Cyber Attacks and Financial Crimes	157
4.2.4.2.5. Financial Assistance and Aids	158
4.2.4.3. Impacts of South Asian Dynamics on Economic Security	158
4.2.4.4. Challenges to Economic Security	160
4.3. Emerging Security Themes	162
4.3.1. Political and Social Security	162
4.3.2. Climate Security	166
4.3.3. Water Security	169
4.3.4. Food Security.....	171
4.3.5. Health Security	173
4.3.6. Cyber Security	178

4.3.7. Gender Security	181
4.3.8. Energy Security	186
CHAPTER FIVE	192
REVISITING STRATEGIC CULTURE OF PAKISTAN	192
5.1. Conceptual Framework of Analysis for Revisiting Strategic Culture of Pakistan	193
5.1.1. Cognitive Aspects of Strategic Culture of Pakistan	194
5.1.1.1. Perceptions and Interpretations	195
5.1.1.2. Decision-Making	197
5.1.1.3. Learning and Adaptation	198
5.1.1.4. Strategic Thinking and Analysis.....	199
5.1.1.5. Communication and Influence.....	201
5.1.1.6. National Identity and Narratives.....	203
5.1.1.6.1. Historical Perceptions.....	203
5.1.1.6.2. Shared Experiences and Collective Memory.....	205
5.1.1.6.3. Cultural and Linguistic Influences.....	206
5.1.1.6.4. Education and Socialization	208
5.1.1.6.5. Political Ideologies and National Narratives	209
5.1.1.6.6. Emotional Associations	212
5.1.2. Environmental/Structural Aspects of Strategic Culture	214
5.1.2.1. Geographical Factors.....	215
5.1.2.2. Socio-economic Factors	219
5.1.2.3. Technological Considerations	221
5.1.2.4. Environmental Considerations	222
5.1.3. Relational Aspects of Strategic Culture of Pakistan	224
5.1.3.1. Diplomatic Relations	225
5.1.3.2. Alliances and Strategic Partnerships	227
5.1.3.3. Multilateralism and International Engagement	229
5.1.3.4. Regional Integration, Economic Cooperation, and Trade Networks	230
5.1.3.4.1. West and Europe.....	230

5.1.3.4.2. Arab World and Israel	230
5.1.3.4.3. Africa.....	231
5.1.3.4.4. Southeast Asia	232
5.1.3.4.5. Central Asia	232
5.1.3.5. Soft Power and Public Diplomacy.....	234
CHAPTER SIX.....	235
CONCLUSION.....	235
REFERENCES	244
APPENDIX	314
Author's Profile.....	314

ABSTRACT

Revisiting the Strategic Culture of Pakistan in the Changing South Asian Security Dynamics

SHAMSA KHALIL

The underlying research study examines the strategic culture of Pakistan in the context of changing South Asian security dynamics, shifting from a state-centric and military-oriented paradigm to a people-centric security paradigm. This research study addresses a critical gap in the existing literature on Pakistan's Strategic Culture, which lacks a comprehensive understanding of its emergence, evolution, and adaptability. The current literature predominantly focuses on historical perspectives, neglecting the importance of inclusivity and pragmatism. This study contends that non-traditional threats can escalate into traditional conflicts if not adequately addressed, necessitating a comprehensive and cooperative security perspective to examine Pakistan's strategic culture. To fill this gap, this research employs qualitative research methods using a case study approach to revisit Pakistan's strategic culture and make an original contribution to the existing literature. It introduces a conceptual framework of analysis that explores the cognitive, environmental, and relational aspects of Pakistan's strategic culture. By doing so, it sheds light on the need for Pakistan to adapt to emerging security threats and proposes a shift towards a comprehensive, adaptable, and inclusive strategic culture. Emphasizing continuous learning, evidence-based decision-making, and national consensus, this revised strategic culture will enable Pakistan to effectively address emerging challenges while safeguarding its national interests and contributing to regional stability and global governance. This study challenges the Western notion of Pakistan's strategic culture as military culture by drawing upon Jack

Snyder's and Snerberg's conception of strategic culture entailing Pakistan's military culture is a subculture of Pakistan strategic culture and only took up the pertinent role from other subcultures of Pakistan strategic culture to only deal with the extraordinary situation in the strategic environment until the status quo returns which in case of Pakistan never returned. The study anticipates that Pakistan's military culture adapts to existing reality and coexists with other subcultures to strengthen the overarching strategic culture. By addressing this interplay of cultures, the research provides valuable insights into Pakistan's strategic behavior and fosters a deeper understanding of its evolving strategic culture.

Keywords:

Pakistan, Strategic Culture, South Asia, Emerging Security Threats, Strategic Environment

ÖZET

Değişen Güney Asya Güvenlik Dinamiklerinde Pakistan'ın Stratejik Kültürünün Yeniden İncelenmesi

SHAMSA KHALIL

Araştırmanın temel noktası, devlet merkezli ve askeri odaklı bir paradigmadan insan merkezli bir güvenlik paradigmasına geçiş yaparak değişen Güney Asya güvenlik dinamikleri bağlamında Pakistan'ın stratejik kültürünü incelemektedir. Bu çalışma, ortaya çıkışı, gelişimi ve uyarlanabilirliği konusunda kapsamlı bir kavrayıştan yoksun olan Pakistan'ın Stratejik Kültürü hakkında mevcut literatürde var olan önemli bir boşluğu ele almaktadır. Mevcut literatür, kapsayıcılığın ve pragmatizmin önemini göz ardı ederek ağırlıklı olarak tarihsel perspektiflere odaklanmaktadır. Bu çalışma ise, geleneksel olmayan tehditlerin yeterince ele alınmadığı takdirde geleneksel çatışmalara dönüşebileceğini ve bunun da Pakistan'ın stratejik kültürünü incelemek için kapsamlı ve işbirlikçi bir güvenlik perspektifi gerektirdiğini öne sürmektedir. Çalışmada, Pakistan'ın stratejik kültürünü yeniden değerlendirme ve mevcut literatüre orijinal bir katkı yapmak adına bir vaka çalışması yaklaşımı kullanılan nitel araştırma yöntemleri kullanılmaktadır. Pakistan'ın stratejik kültürünün bilişsel, çevresel ve ilişkisel yönlerini araştıran kavramsal bir analiz çerçevesi sunulmaktadır. Bu kapsamda, Pakistan'ın ortaya çıkan güvenlik tehditlerine uyum sağlama ihtiyacına ışık tutmakta ve kapsamlı, uyarlanabilir ve kapsayıcı bir stratejik kültüre doğru bir geçiş önermektedir. Sürekli öğrenmeyi, kanıta dayalı karar vermeyi ve ulusal fikir birliğini vurgulayan bu yeni stratejik kültür, Pakistan'ın ulusal çıkarlarını koruyup bölgesel istikrar ve küresel yönetişime katkıda bulunurken ortaya çıkan zorlukları etkili bir şekilde ele almasını sağlayacaktır. Bu çalışma, Jack Snyder ve Snerberg'in stratejik kültür anlayışından yararlanarak Pakistan'ın stratejik

kültürünün askeri kültür olduğuna dair Batılı anlayışa meydan okumaktadır. Onların anlayışına göre, Pakistan'ın askeri kültürü ülkenin stratejik kültürünün bir alt kültürüdür ve Pakistan stratejik kültürünün diğer alt kültürlerinden yalnızca statüko geri dönene kadar stratejik ortamdaki olağanüstü durumla başa çıkmak adına ilgili rolü üstlenmiştir. Pakistan durumunda ise statüko asla geri dönmemiştir. Bu noktada çalışma, Pakistan'ın askeri kültürünün mevcut gerçekliğe uyum sağladığını ve kapsayıcı stratejik kültürü güçlendirmek için diğer alt kültürlerle bir arada var olduğunu öngörmektedir. Araştırma, kültürlerin bu etkileşimini ele alarak Pakistan'ın stratejik davranışına dair değerli içgörüler sunmakta ve gelişen stratejik kültürünün daha derin bir şekilde anlaşılmasını sağlamaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler:

Pakistan, Stratejik Kültür, Güney Asya, Yükselen Güvenlik Tehditleri, Stratejik Çevre.

ABBREVIATIONS

A2/Ad	Anti-Access/Area Denial
AAGC	Asia-Africa Growth Corridor
AD	Anno Domini
AEW	Airborne Early Warning
ARF	ASEAN-Regional Forum
ATV	Advanced Technology Vehicles
AUKUS	Australia, United Kingdom, United States Security Pact
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BAMS	Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
BCIM-EC	Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor
BIMSTEC	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
BLA	Balochistan Liberation Army
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
C2	Command and Control
CAR	Central African Republic
CAREC	Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation
CASA	Central Asia-South Asia
CCDR	Country Climate and Development Report
CENTAIC	Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Computation
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CMD	Credible Minimum Deterrence
COMINT	Communication Intelligence
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

CSD	Cold Start Doctrine
CSF	Coalition Support Fund
CSIS	Chinese Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
EEU	Eurasian Economic Union.
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
FAPI	Function, Acquisition, Perception and Interaction
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FATF	Financial Action Task Force.
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FMCT	Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
FY	Fiscal Year
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HUMINT	Integrated Human Intelligence
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICBM	Inter-continental ballistic missiles
INA	Indian National Army
INDOPACOM	United States Indo-Pacific Command
INS	Indian Navy Ship
INSAT	Indian National Satellites
INSTC	International North-South Transport Corridor
IOC	Indian Ocean Commission
IONS	Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
IORA	Indian Ocean Rim Association
IPI	Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline

IPOI	Indo-Pacific Ocean's Initiative
IRNSS	Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System
IRS	Indian Remote Sensing Satellites
ISK	Islamic State Khorasan
ISPR	Inter-Services Public Relations
ISRO	Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
KSEW	Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works
LEMOA	Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement
LOC	Line of Control
LORROS	Long Range Reconnaissance and Observation System-
MDL	Mazagon Dock Limited
MDP	Military Doctrine Pakistan
MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System
MND	Minimum nuclear deterrent
NavIC	Navigation with Indian Constellation
NCAI	National Centre for Artificial Intelligence
NCCC	National Cyber Coordination Centre
NFU	No First Use
NPT	Network Time Protocol
NSAB	National Security Advisory Board
NTI	Nuclear Threat Initiative
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
OEF-MIO	Operation Enduring Freedom-Maritime Interdiction Operation
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation

PACOM	United States Pacific Command
PAKAFUZ	Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan
PDM	Pakistan Democratic Movement
PDPA	Personal Data Protection Act
PM	Prime Minister
PMLN	Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
PMP	Pakistan Maritime Policy
PNS	Pakistan Navy Ship
PPPP	Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians
PRSS	Pakistan Remote Sensing Satellite
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf.
PTM	Pashtun Tahafuz Movement
QCAL	Quantum Computing Applications Lab
QUAD	Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific Exercise
RMSP	Regional Maritime Security Patrol
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAFTA	South Asian Free Trade Area
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs
SBC	Ship Building Company
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SLBMs	Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
SLCM	Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile
SLOCs	Sea Lines of Communication
SRBMs	Short-Range Ballistic Missiles
SSBNs	Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines

STM	Savunma Teknolojileri Mühendislik
STPF	Strategic Trade Policy Framework
SU	Soviet Union
TAC	Trans-Arabian Corridor
TAPI	Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline
TAT	Thamar Al Tayyib
TF	Task Force
TKMS	ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems
TNWs	Tactical nuclear weapons
TTP	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCAV	Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNCIP	United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VCMC	Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor
WOT	War on Terror
LiFE	Lifestyle for Environment
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
ETI	Energy Transition Index
EAPI	Energy Architecture Performance Index
WETI	World Energy Trilemma Index
WPSI	Women, Peace, and Security Index

GGGI	Global Gender Gap Index
GII	Gender Inequality Index
GDI	Gender Development Index
SIGI	Social Institution and gender index
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
GCI	Global Cybersecurity Index
NCSI	National Cyber Security Index
VCI	Vaccine Confidence Index
GHSI	Global Health Security Index
GFSI	Global Food Security Index
GHI	Global Hunger Index
PIDE	Pakistan Institutes of Development Economics
PCRWR	Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources
UNDP	United Nation Development Program
ND-GAIN	Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index
SDGI	Sustainable Development Goals Index
EPI	Environmental Performance Index
CCPI	Climate Change Performance Index
EU	European Union
GHG	Green House Gas
GCRI	Global Climate Risk Index
HDI	Human Development Index
SPI	Social Progress Index
RLI	Rule of Law Index
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
FSI	Fragility State Index



LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Colin Gray’s Attributes of Culture	12
Figure 2. Sources of Strategic Culture	19
Figure 3. Components of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture.....	28
Figure 4. Conceptual Framework of Analysis of Strategic Culture of Pakistan	34
Figure 5. Major Turning points in the Transitional Phases of Strategic Culture of Pakistan	49
Figure 6. Economic Warfare in South Asia	155
Figure 7. South Asian Dynamics’ Impact on Economic Security	158
Figure 8. Climatic Change Impact on Economy.	161
Figure 9. Political and Social Security of Pakistan	164
Figure 10. Climate Security Outlook of Pakistan	167
Figure 11. Water Security Outlook	170
Figure 12. Global Hunger Index 2022.....	171
Figure 13. Food Security Outlook	172
Figure 14. Health Security Outlook	175
Figure 15 Vaccine Confidence Index.....	177
Figure 16. Cyber Confidence Index	179
Figure 17. Gender Security Outlook	182
Figure 18. Gender Security Outlook	184
Figure 19. Energy Security Outlook	187
Figure 20. Conceptual Framework of Analysis for Revisiting Strategic Culture of Pakistan.....	193
Figure 21 Cognitive Aspects of Strategic Culture of Pakistan.....	195
Figure 22. Pakistan’s National Identity	203
Figure 23. Environmental/Structural Aspects of Strategic Culture of Pakistan	215

Figure 24. Relational Aspects of Strategic Culture of Pakistan 225



LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Four Generations of Strategic Culture	21
Table 2. Flow Chart of Strategic Mapping of Transitional Phases of Strategic Culture of Pakistan	101
Table 3. Military Strength of Pakistan and India	128
Table 4. Defense Budgets of Pakistan and India.....	130
Table 5. India's Defense Strength	139
Table 6. Pakistan's Defense Strength	140
Table 7. Economic Health and Performance of India and Pakistan	154

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

The South Asian region has long been marred by security concerns and strategic tensions, driven by a complex mix of political, economic, and social factors. It has a long history of conflicts ranging from territorial issues to ideological differences. Pakistan, one of the region's key players, has always been an essential subject of study for scholars and researchers interested in South Asian security dynamics. Pakistan's strategic culture shapes its national security policies and responses to external and internal threats. Its strategic culture has played a significant role in determining the regional security landscape. Various factors, including geography, history, politics, and military considerations, have influenced the country's strategic culture. In recent years, South Asian security dynamics have been undergoing momentous vicissitudes, with new actors and emerging threats challenging the existing strategic landscape. In this context, it is critical to revisit Pakistan's strategic culture and assess its relevance and effectiveness in the changing security environment of South Asia.

1.2. Problem Statement

Various historical, ideological, and geopolitical factors influence Pakistan's security policy. In recent years, there have been significant changes in the region's security dynamics, including the rise of non-traditional security threats and increased military modernization by several countries. However, the literature on Pakistan's strategic culture and its response to these changing

security dynamics is often fragmented and lacks a comprehensive and nuanced analysis. Therefore, there is a need for a research study that provides a more detailed understanding of Pakistan's strategic culture, its evolution, and its impact on regional security dynamics in the context of changing security threats and challenges. Therefore, the study's problem statement addresses this gap in the existing literature by comprehensively analyzing Pakistan's strategic culture and its impact on regional security dynamics in the context of changing South Asian security threats and challenges. By doing so, the study aims to inform policy decisions to promote regional stability and reduce the risk of conflict in South Asia.

1.3. Research Questions

“What are the key determinants that have shaped the historical emergence, evolution, and adaptive responses of Pakistan's strategic culture, and how do these cultural influences impact Pakistan's security policies, threat perceptions, and regional engagement?”

The sub-questions are:

- How has Pakistan's Strategic Culture emerged?
- How has Pakistan's strategic culture evolved in response to changing regional and global dynamics?
- What are the critical security threats facing Pakistan in the region, and how is Pakistan's strategic culture influencing its response to these threats?
- What are the implications of changing regional security dynamics on Pakistan?
- How to revise Pakistan Strategic Culture?

This primary research question aims to comprehensively investigate the multifaceted aspects of the underlying factors, such as ideational and religious, in the partition of India and post-partition events that shape the emergence of Pakistan's strategic culture, the study will also explore the impact of the role of external actors, major powers, and regional allies and rivalries in shaping Pakistan's strategic culture through military cooperation, alliances, and security assistance. Furthermore, the research examines the interplay of domestic political dynamics, civil-military relations, and national identity in shaping Pakistan's strategic and security outlook.

Additionally, it analyzes the implications of changing regional security dynamics on Pakistan's strategic culture and how it influences the country's response to critical security threats in the South Asian region. By considering the evolving geopolitical landscape, emerging security challenges, and shifts in alliances, this research study aims to understand how Pakistan's strategic culture impacts its threat perceptions, risk assessments, and policy decisions.

Overall, these research questions emphasize conducting a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the complexities of Pakistan's strategic culture in the context of the evolving South Asian security dynamics.

1.4. Objectives of the Study

The research investigates and critically analyzes how Pakistan's strategic culture has evolved and adapted to changing regional security dynamics. The research study aims to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on strategic culture by examining the case of Pakistan in South Asia and its security policy.

Furthermore, the study aims to identify the drivers that shape Pakistan's strategic culture and offer valuable insights into the role of strategic culture in shaping foreign policy decisions and its implications for regional security dynamics. Therefore, a better understanding of Pakistan's strategic culture is essential for formulating effective policies to manage regional security challenges. Through a comprehensive analysis of Pakistan's strategic culture, this study also seeks to provide insights for policymakers in Pakistan to promote regional stability and reduce the risk of conflict.

1.5. Significance of the Study

The significance of the study is multifold. Firstly, it seeks to fill a gap in the existing literature on strategic culture in Pakistan and its impact on foreign policy decision-making, particularly in the context of the changing security dynamics in South Asia. The study aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of Pakistan's strategic culture from its emergence to transitional phases and assess how it is evolving in response to changing security threats in the region.

Secondly, the study is significant because it seeks to explore the implications of Pakistan's strategic culture for regional security dynamics and the effects of regional dynamics on Pakistan's strategic culture. With the emergence of new security threats such as terrorism, extremism, non-state actors, cyber threats, climate risks, and pandemics, the study would help policymakers understand the implications of Pakistan's strategic culture on the evolving security environment of the region. By analyzing how Pakistan's strategic culture shapes its perceptions of security threats, approach to security policy, and overall state cognition, the study can help identify potential areas of clash and cooperation domestically and in the region. In addition to cognitive attributes, examining the relational attributes under the geopolitical tradition helps to understand the role

of external actors, such as the United States and China, in shaping Pakistan's strategic culture and its impact on regional security; that's how the study can provide the picture of the complex interplay between internal and external factors in the regional security environment.

Finally, the study is significant because it has important policy implications regarding emerging security. By providing a nuanced understanding of Pakistan's strategic culture from cognitive, environmental, and relational aspects, the study would help policymakers to focus on the areas that need self-introspection, risk assessment, and critical thinking to fix the glitches in policy and decision-making.

1.6. Research Methodology

This study applies qualitative research methods that allow for the collection and analysis of data in a holistic and nuanced manner, enabling the researcher to explore the complexities and intricacies of the research topic. In terms of specific qualitative research methods, the study utilizes a mix of case studies and document analysis. Case studies would allow for examining events or situations related to Pakistan's strategic culture and South Asian security dynamics, emphasizing a detailed understanding of the context and underlying factors contributing to the phenomenon. This approach would be beneficial for studying strategic culture, a complex and multifaceted concept influenced by various historical, cultural, sociopolitical, economic, and institutional factors.

Data collection methods used in this approach include document analysis and observation. Document analysis would enable the researcher to examine primary and secondary sources related to the research topic, such as government documents, policy papers, and academic articles. These methods would provide a rich data source on the perceptions, beliefs, and values that shape Pakistan's

strategic culture and the policies and strategies implemented in response to changing security dynamics.

Overall, a case study approach utilizing qualitative research methods would be well-suited to studying Pakistan's strategic culture in the context of changing security dynamics in South Asia.

1.7. Scope and Limitations of the Study

The scope of the research study is broad, as it seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of Pakistan's strategic culture in the context of the changing security dynamics in South Asia. The study will cover a range of factors that shape Pakistan's strategic culture, including historical, ideological, social, economic, military, technological, environmental, and geopolitical influences, and the impact of external factors such as the United States, Russia, and China. The scope of the study also includes an analysis of Pakistan's relationships with its neighbors, particularly India, Afghanistan, and Iran, and how these relationships have impacted its strategic culture.

The study will also assess how Pakistan's strategic culture is evolving in response to the region's changing security threats, including traditional and non-traditional security challenges such as military modernization, non-state actors, and technological advancements. The study will also examine the implications of Pakistan's strategic culture for regional security dynamics, including potential areas of conflict and cooperation intrastate and interstate.

In terms of methodology, the study will use a case study and document analysis methods to provide a nuanced understanding of Pakistan's strategic culture and its impact on regional security by drawing upon existing research on strategic culture, security policy, and regional security dynamics in South Asia. At the

same time, the case study analysis will examine specific examples of Pakistan's response to existing and emerging security threats in the region.

Overall, the scope of the research study is ambitious, aiming to provide a comprehensive analysis of the factors shaping Pakistan's strategic culture and its impact on regional security dynamics. By providing a deeper understanding of Pakistan's strategic culture and security policy, the study can inform policy decisions to promote stability and reduce the risk of conflict in South Asia. The findings of this study can have significant implications for policymakers, analysts, and scholars interested in understanding the evolving security dynamics in South Asia and the role of Pakistan in the region. By providing a comprehensive analysis of Pakistan's strategic culture, the study can help identify areas where Pakistan can improve its security policies and strategies to respond effectively to the changing security dynamics in the region.

There are several potential limitations to the study, which could include the following. Firstly, one limitation of the study may be the availability of data. Given Pakistan's sensitive nature of security issues, there may be limited publicly available data on Pakistan's strategic culture and security policy. This could limit the scope and depth of the analysis, particularly in assessing the views of key decision-makers and other actors involved in shaping Pakistan's security policy.

Secondly, the study may be limited as no specific theoretical framework can fit into the overall picture of Pakistan's strategic culture. In that case, instead of compiling a mixture of three to four theories, the author has utilized a conceptual framework of analysis under geopolitical tradition to conduct this research.

Thirdly, the study may be limited by the potential for bias or subjectivity in the analysis. The researcher's perspectives and preferences may influence the selection of data sources, the interpretation of data, and the conclusions drawn from the study. Additionally, the researcher's cultural background and political views may influence their understanding of Pakistan's strategic culture and security policy, potentially leading to less objective analysis.

Finally, the study may be limited by the dynamic nature of security dynamics in South Asia. The security environment in the region is constantly evolving, with new threats and opportunities emerging over time. Any analysis of Pakistan's strategic culture and security policy must be considered a snapshot in time and may only partially capture the complexities and nuances of the situation over the long term.

1.8. Plan of the Thesis

The structure of the study outlines six main chapters starting from introduction to conceptual understanding, literature review, changing security dynamics, revisiting, and conclusion. Chapter One, the current introductory chapter, provides a general idea of the study's research topic, problem statement, aims, and objectives. It further presents the significance and rationale of the research and outlines the study's research questions, methodology, significance, scope, and limitations.

Chapter Two, the conceptual understanding, is divided into two sections. The first section builds upon the basic ideas of strategic culture as a compound concept and strategy and culture separately, drawing wisdom from field experts such as Clifford Geertz, Jack Snyder, Alastair Johnson, and others. It further explores the concepts related to strategic cultures, such as the determinants of strategic culture, the generational evolution of strategic cultures, and the wide-

ranging debates on its conceptual discourse. The second section of the conceptual understanding of strategic culture focuses on the case study of Pakistan's strategic culture.

First, it defines and draws the nuance of the Pakistani strategic culture and its components from the expert opinion of Pakistani thinkers Dr. Feroz Hassan Khan and Hasan Askari Rizvi, which is further endorsed by Jeannie L. Johnson, Colins Gray, and other distinguished Western thinkers. Second, the emergence of Pakistan's strategic culture is extracted by developing a conceptual analysis framework, especially for this study. It draws the trail of the emergence of strategic culture by analyzing the primary and secondary data from three aspects such as cognitive, relational, and environmental /structural.

Chapter Three, the literature review, reflects upon the evolution of the transitional phases of the strategic culture of Pakistan by exploring the decisive moments and defining junctures in its history on the premise of critical geopolitics. This chapter scrutinizes the trajectory of these critical events starting from the Kashmir war, the 1965 War, the 1971 War, the Zia Era and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, the Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons, the Kargil Crisis, the American invasion of Afghanistan and War on Terror, Return of Taliban to power post American withdrawal to find out the Relevance of Strategic Culture in understanding Pakistan's foreign and security policy, analyses how the changing domestic, regional and global politics impacted Pakistan's strategic culture by analyzing its crisis decision-making behavior, policy, alliance behavior, and the role of religion and non-state actors.

None of the literature on Pakistan's strategic culture comprehensively focuses on its history through the diverse lens of security perspective. The author has contemplated history through the military and political landscape, the

consequences, and the impacts of these critical events. Further, she has formulated a strategic mapping of the whole trajectory of critical junctures in Pakistan by utilizing the strategic toolkit discussed in the chapter.

Chapter Four, the Changing South Asian Security Dynamics, illustrates that transitioning global security culture from traditional to non-traditional and the fluctuating international order casts a broad range of impacts on South Asian Security dynamics. This chapter will address the changing aspects of South Asian Security under two main themes A) Dominant Security theme that will cover military, nuclear, economic, political, and maritime aspects of security and B) Emerging Security themes that will cover health security, gender security, climate security, energy security, food security, water security, social security, and cyber security.

Chapter Five, the Revisiting Strategic Culture of Pakistan , entails the possible blend of what Pakistan needs now in its revised strategic culture to remain relevant in the region and global politics by keeping a good hold within the country. It utilizes the conceptual framework of analysis to provide critical insight in detail from the cognitive, environmental/ structural, and relational perspectives.

Chapter Six, the final chapter of the study provides the quick recap of the research problem, questions and aim of the study. It highlights the important findings of the study that are discussed in revisiting chapter. Further, it stresses upon the potential future implication for Pakistan if it opts to revisit its strategic culture and if it doesnot. It also highlights on the academic areas for further future research and discourse development.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF STRATEGIC CULTURE WITH A FOCUS ON PAKISTAN

Broadly, Strategic culture is understood in the domain of cultural influence on the national strategy (V, 2020, p.193). It stemmed from the inability of structural realist theory to explain the behavioral pattern differences among nations during the cold war era (in specific reference to the Soviet Union's nuclear response). It spans over four generations of conceptualization with extensive debates and varied perspectives (V, 2020, p.193).

This chapter divided into two sections: 2.1 Strategic Culture and 2.2 Pakistan's Strategic Culture. Research in this study is drawn on a progression from culture to strategy, strategic culture and strategic culture of Pakistan with its peculiarities discussed by the various expert accounts. This study further examines the emergence of the strategic culture of Pakistan by means of a conceptual framework that distillates on its cognitive, relational and environmental aspects.

2.1. Strategic Culture

Primarily, to understand the essence of a compound product, "strategic culture," its constituent concepts, culture, and strategy, are inspected individually (V, 2020).

2.1.1 Culture

The term culture was first introduced in 1781 by Giovanni Andres from a Latin source, “Cultura,” which entails the meaning “tilling of the soil” (J. L. Johnson et al., 2009, p.17). Psychology and sociology (Bloomfield, 2012, p.451) were the first and second disciplines to utilize this concept to express the “circumstances of human attainment,” which was later espoused by the political discourse of World War II to contemplate the behavioral pattern of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan (Haglund, 2011, p.499). Similarly, Clifford Geertz, the champion of symbolic anthropology, defines culture as “a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form through which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life.” (Geertz, 1973, p.89). He gives prime importance to the role of thought and “symbols” in society as it guides action.

Colin Gray claims that culture provides the vision of better lives to the inhabitants of a specific place and its security community (Gray, 2007, p.15). It is extensively cohesive in their thoughts, notions, mode of life, and actions. It gives the political vision that directs the communities to devise policy, strategy, operations, and tactics, as shown in figure 1 below (Gray, 2007, p.15).



Figure 1. Colin Gray’s Attributes of Culture(Gray, 2007, p.15)

He dissented from Lawrence Freeman’s concept of narratives, where Freeman said narratives are strategic as they are deliberately constructed to gain a specific purpose/plan and do not exist simultaneously (Freedman, 2006, p.22). Colin argues that cultures cannot be built by the communities deliberately. They are

the ever-evolving byproduct of natural phenomena. Popular persuasion exists in strategic culture, but historical escorts are also there, which troupes impervious to constructivist claims (Gray, 2007, p.14)

Isobel V. Hull posits that the very nature of culture is evolving and adaptive (Hull, 2006, p.96). It can change drastically due to external shock or any traumatic blow. Moreover, the author Colin Gray upholds Hull's point that strategic and public culture can undergo dramatic vicissitudes referring to war and its consequences as the most recurrent cause. However, the basic assumptions and ideas in its several cultural identities are firmly held (Gray, 2007, p. 11). He further re-counts culture as not the mere assembly of trendy attitudes, kaleidoscopic arrays of behavior, and opinions. However, it is a challenging concept like a "strategy" to produce unanimity among cultural experts, sociologists, and anthropologists on its rudimentary definition (Gray, 2007, p. 11).

Contextualizing Isobel V. Hull's quote, "we all are cultural creatures" (Hull, 2006, p. 329). Keith B. Payne argues that this is "a cultural" and false assumption of common rationality, which sets the basis for theories of limited war, deterrence, and arms control (Payne, 2001). He argues that security communities can have a fair amount of common rationality, "does the content of rationality align with the reasonableness in the distinct/one's encultured view"? The answer is no because the degree of rationality varies in all cultures (Payne, 2001). Therefore, strategic communities can first make a joint decision and then act rationally on that within the premise of their encultured view, which is a highly probable case (Gray, 2007, p. 12)

Raymond Williams suggests the probable evidence of the presence of culture can be looked for in the archetypes of the community along with the thoughts,

concepts, notions, and designs manifested in the documents, artifacts, and behavior, even though behavior remained a highly contested factor in the definitional debate of culture, strategy, and strategic culture (Williams, 1998, p.56). It is quintessential to understand the very intricate nature of culture, which as per strategic culture experts and officials, is more convenient to illustrate than to define because it is incorporeal as it positions unspoken and unwritten assumptions, truths that set the basis for our judgments and guide us about our choices, actions, and behaviors along with many other determinants (Black, 2004, pp.13-22). Altogether, culture provides a broad picture of strategic preferences, which tend to be ignored at the behest of competing interests in the domestic political process and external nuisances (Gray, 2007, p.12).

En masse, there is a wide range of definitions of culture. However, succinctly, it can be understood as inherited conceptions, cognitive schemes, codes, symbols, mutual programming, and value-evidence-behavior compound in a social system (Gray, 1999b, pp. 5-6).

2.1.2 Strategy

The term strategy is derived from the Greek Word “Strategia,” which originates in warfare and stands for generalship (Baylis et al., 2013, p.4). John Lawis Gaddis outlines it as the route which relates ends to means, intentions to capabilities, and objectives to resources.

To think strategically implies the consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of macro-level plans of action (Haglund, 2004, p.498). David G Haglund articulates that strategy is not merely related to military matters but is commonly used in academic and administrative issues to establish a rational link between means and ends (Haglund, 2004, p.482). Gregory D foster asserts that strategy is ultimately about effectively exercising power (Cavanaugh, 2016). W.

Murray and M. Grimsley contemplate it as a process, a constant adaptation to the shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chances, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate (Owens, 2016). Robert Osgood signifies that strategy must now be understood as “nothing less than the overall plan for utilizing the capacity for armed coercion in conjunction with economic, diplomatic, and psychological instruments of power to support foreign policy most effectively by covert, overt, and tactic means" (Lider, 1980).

On a broader scale, Liddel Hart categorizes grand strategy as the coordination and direction of ‘all the resources of a nation or a band of nations, towards the attainment of the political objectives sought’ (Hart, 1967, p.335). In contrast, John Lawis Gaddis builds up on the definition of Liddel Hart and defines Grand strategy as aligning potentially unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities (Freedman, 2018) or can be characterized as the calculated relationship of means to a large end (Sayle, 2011). Colin S. Gray contemplates strategy as the bridge between military power and political purpose (Gray, 1999b). Two-way traffic must be ensured on this bridge between both the policy functioning and confirmation of military practicability (Owens, 2020). It is the policy that must take the lead. Otherwise, it will be hireling in warfare, contrary to the only legitimate terms of the relationship (holding the strategy bridge) (Gray, 1999b).

In the sum of a broad range of definitions, it can be comprehended as a calculated endeavor to achieve political objectives with an indistinctness of consensus concerning the nature of the means (V, 2020, p.195). Predominantly, strategy has gone through various ontological (whether restricted to the military domain or more comprehensive to the interpretation of power) and epistemological debates (whether it is science or arts) (V, 2020, p.196). In contemporary history, its trajectory transcends from scientific orientation in the

1950s to overreach and rectification in the 1960s to comparative historical analysis in the 1970s, which finally resulted in the occurrence of strategic culture itself at the end of the same decade (V, 2020, p.195).

2.1.3 Strategic Culture as a Compound Product

After World War II, the development of concepts like National character (Johnston, 1998, p.1), modal personality (Johnston, 1998, p.13), political culture (Lantis, 2002, p.90), and ways of wars piloted the cultural outlook in international relations and security studies (Baylis et al., 2013, pp. 44-62). Rational actor paradigms and game modeling predicted the behavioral pattern of states to respond correspondingly to identical stimuli by discounting the role of culture, which otherwise could have explained the unusual behavior of states (Biava et al., 2011, p.1228).

Every state has stated unstated, short term and long-term objectives which are set as targeted goals to be achieved by the decision-making apparatus of the state by devising critical and workable strategies or plans of action. Such a strategic plan of action concocts its strength from historical wisdom, strategic preferences, and national culture, which sets out the existence of strategic culture (V, 2020,p.197).

Scholar Jack Snyder coined the term strategic culture in 1977 in the cold war context while examining Soviet Union's nuclear response vis-à-vis the United States. He argued that there are different behavioral tendencies and patterns of the Soviet Union in its strategic issues (nuclear deterrence and arms control), which are the byproduct of its unique historical experience and geography constituting a distinct strategic culture that's why it did not opt for the American norms of rationality (Snyder, 1977). In case of failure of nuclear deterrence, Americans' response of limited nuclear strike policy and restrained retaliation

may encounter the Soviet Union's unrestrained counter-force strike because of its distinctive strategic culture (Snyder, 1977).

Jack Snyder defines strategic culture as the “total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share about [nuclear] strategy” (Kroeber et al., 1963, pp.81-88). In strategy, habitual behavior is primarily cognitive behavior noticeable in acquiring weapons, developing strategic doctrine, or crisis decision-making (Kroeber et al., 1963, pp.81-88). In this definition, Snyder stresses that the set of beliefs and attitudes defines strategic thought, influences the formulation of strategic issues, and sets the tone of discourse on the strategic debate (Snyder, 1977, p.9).

Alastair Iain Johnson builds up on Clifford Geertz's concept of culture. He defines strategic culture as “an integrated” system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.” (Geertz, 1973, p.90).

In this definition the author refers “system of symbols” is composed of two sets of principles where one is the central paradigm of strategic culture and the second is the grand strategy. The central paradigm of strategic culture is based on the orderliness of the strategic environment, which is composed of three basic stadia such as 1) the role of war in human life, 2) the nature of the adversary and threat posed by it, and 3) efficacy of the use of force. The information provided by this paradigm reduces the uncertainty in strategic information. Still, it is essential to consider here that the sources from where this information is shared

are not the contemporary environment but the history and historical experiences. Grand strategy is active at the operational level to bring out the best strategic options to cater to the threat environment (Johnston, 1995, p.46). In hard realpolitik, it is the offensive strategy to deal with zero-sum threats; in soft realpolitik, it is the accommodationist strategy to deal with low-scale threats (Johnston, 1995, p.47). At this point where the direct influence of strategic culture on behavioral choices starts through a ranked set of grand strategy preferences (Johnston, 1995, p.47).

Colin S. Gray defines strategic culture as” the world of mind, feeling and habit in behavior.” (Gray, 1999a, p.58). In this definition, he stresses that there is a cultural dimension to all that human beings think and feel about strategy and war. Culture is the context that surrounds and also the context that weaves together. By it, strategic behavior is affected by human beings who cannot help but be cultural agents (Gray, 2006, p.159).

In most Spartan forms, strategic culture codifies historical experiences and the coterminous duologue of people with antiquity. As per se, it is the manifestation of “marriage de convenance” of a community’s strategic needs and the culture which effectuates those needs (Gray, 2007, p.17). Security Communities and societies do not cherry-pick their strategic culture, but the strategic culture chooses them. It comprises the historical record, the current and probable future, which set the stage for strategic effectiveness. Strategic culture is adaptive, but neither acquired casually nor abandoned promptly (Gray, 2007, p.18). However, cultural intelligence is vital in knowing alien societies/foes. Still, the pitfalls of strategic cultural ignorance and mutual cultural miss-assessments make it a prototypical of Sun Tzu’s mantra (Gray, 2007, p.19).

2.1.3.1. Determinants of Strategic Culture

As Jeffrey S. Lantis articulates, strategic culture determinants are categorized under three significant domains, i.e., physical, political, cultural (and social) (Lantis, 2002, p.16) as shown in figure 2 below.




Figure 2. Sources of Strategic Culture (Lantis, 2002, p.16)

This figure illustrates that both material and ideational factors contribute to the origin of strategic culture. The first physical domain includes geography, climate, natural resources, technology, and generational changes. The second political domain has historical experience, political system, elite beliefs, and military organization. At the same time, the third cultural or social domain includes symbols, myths, and defining texts.

For millennia, geography, resources, and climate have contributed fundamentally to developing strategic thought and act as an essential cradle for strategic culture (Lantis, 2002). Geographical circumstances, proximity to great powers, and conflicting claims at territorial borders with multiple security dilemmas shape the strategic orientation of a country. In the changing territorial and resource landscape, geographic factors play an influential role, but access to vivacious resources remains critical to strategy (Lantis, 2002).

Technology (information and communication) and generational change have enormous consequences on empowerment and strategic reach. The dual-use nature of technology is equally an opportunity for the transformation of society and a challenge to creating disruption somewhere else (Farrell, 2001, pp. 63-102).

Historical experiences narrate the state's origin, evolution, and transformation of its identities. Newly formed states may indulge in nation-building exertions compounding insecurities that shape their strategic cultural identity. In dissimilarity, the state, with a long history of existence, prods an excellent power game and shapes policies to fit into this gray flannel (Lantis, 2002, p.17). The nature of political institutes (mature democracy, in the process of democratic transformation and consolidation stages) and Defense organizations (civil-military relations, military doctrines, procurement practices) is a critically important source of strategic culture (Neumann & Heikka, 2005, p.16). Elite beliefs/ transnational norms about military professionalism are injected into the community's culture through political victimization or social learning (Farrell, 2001, pp. 63-102).

Texts play a fundamental role in enlightening actors about strategic thoughts and actions, such as Sun Tzu's art of war, Clausewitz's observation of the

Napoleonic era, Thucydides' commentary on the Peloponnesian War, Kautilya's writing on ancient India. Text competes to influence society (Lantis, 2006). Symbols (socially recognized objects of more or less common understanding) and myths (dramatic expression of ideology) both have stabilizing and destabilizing effects on the evolving strategic cultural identities (Calvert, 2004). Symbols and texts set the stable reference point for strategic thought and actions (Glenn et al., 2004, p.63).

2.1.3.2 Discourse Apprehension of Four Generations of Strategic Culture

Table 1. Four Generations of Strategic Culture

No. of generation	Period	Proponents	Ideas
First Wave	Late 1970s and Early 1980s	Jack Snyder, Colin S. Gray, David Jones	It proposed that differences in the Strategic behavior of states stem from dissimilarities in respective political cultures, geography, and history. Colin S. Gray: Analyzed American Strategic Culture through national historical experience David Jones: Analyzed American Strategic culture on macro-environmental (geography and history), societal and micro-environmental levels (organizational). Focus: Deterministic view of the concept Critique: It is a critique of the rational actor paradigm and game modeling being unable to predict the difference in the behavioral pattern of

			USA and SU about the Cold war context and nuclear deterrence.
Second wave	The Mid-1980s	Bradley S. Klein	It proposed that strategic culture can deceive other states into believing strategic preferences align with the declared version of strategic culture. There are two strategies: Declaratory and operational. Focus: Instrumentality of the concept only. Critique: It is a critique of the deterministic view of the first generation.
Third Wave	1990s	Alastair Iain Johnson	It proposed strategic culture as a source of explanation of behavior which led to the following: -Combination of positivist approach with constructivism. - Classification of Variables: Independent Variable: Strategic culture, Politico-military, and organizational culture Dependent Variable: Strategic Behavior as well as (Classification of cultural and nonculture variables) Johnson: Analyzed Chinese strategic culture from the cultural realism paradigm.

			Focus: It functions at the Ideational level and is different from behavior. Critique: Lack of methodological preciseness.
Fourth Wave	End of the first decade of the 21 st century	Alan Bloomfield	It proposed the existence of multiple strategic cultures that compete to dominate one another in the given strategic environment. Focus: Strategic sub-culture Critique: Excessive homogeneity and continuity in earlier generations proposed strategic culture

Source: *Author, 2023*

How strategic culture influences strategic behavior is the divergent point in the first, third, and fourth generations, whereas second-generation completely negates the proposition of any direct or indirect influence of strategic culture on behavior. All these generations have conceptual and methodological problems which result in the intensely alienated discourse on strategic culture (V, 2020, pp.197-198).

2.1.3.3 Debates on Strategic Culture Discourse

Debates on strategic culture discourse include five significant aspects, i.e., cause versus context, temporal source, the scope of change, diversity, and influence on strategic behavior.

2.1.3.3.1 Cause versus Context

In this debate, Colin Gray describes strategic culture as inseparable from strategic behavior. It has mutually influential ideational and behavioral dimensions and a contextual and constitutive relationship with behavior. He

reflects upon the post-positivist approach, where he mentions that strategic culture frames the context in which strategy formulation, implementation, and understanding happen (V, 2020, p.200). In contrast, Johnston argues that culture and behavior are separable and that strategic culture shares a cause-effect relation with strategic behavior, where culture is independent. Behavior is a dependent variable (which can also be affected by many structural and non-cultural variables).

Johnston's approach is positivist, focusing on scientific understanding and causality. Johnston suspected Gray's contextual viewpoint of strategic culture would lead to the abstraction of concepts and extreme stereotyping (42). In contrast, Gray criticized the positivist approach and causal relationship and called out for derailing from reality to ensure methodological accuracy (V,2020,p.201). Cause versus context is the contemplation of explanation versus understanding. The conjunction in this debate can be explicative understanding which is not a zero-sum game (V, 2020, p.202).

2.1.3.3.2. Temporal Source

In this debate, there are two accounts concerning the temporal source of strategic culture. One report says strategic culture is deeply rooted in its formative years, early history, and ideological legacy, the nation. In contrast, the other account holds the contemporary and most recent records as the temporal source of strategic culture. If formative years are considered the temporal source, strategic culture will be in the race for continuity rather than change within a period (V, 2020, p.203).

2.1.3.3.3 Scope of Change

In this debate, there are two viewpoints. One is about the permanent nature of culture and its confrontation to change (Lord,1985). In contrast, the other viewpoint is about its non-permanent nature and gradual evolution resulting from the transformation, not through any revolution (V, 2020, p.203). Colin Gray argues that culture loses its essence if there is any radical and frequent change (Gray, 1999a, p. 65). It propagates evolution through absorbing, coding, and transmitting new experiences. Such kind of evolutionary changes make their way when nations suffer strategic dilemmas. He further argues that the dysfunctional strategic culture is obsolete, whereas the functional one will acclimate (Gray, 1999a, p. 65).

2.1.3.3.4 Scope of Diversity

There is one notion that there should be a unitary strategic culture as it is the contemplation of the national virtuoso of the country (Lord, 1985). This notion has already been rejected by the second generation, where the strategist has indicated two strategic cultures, declaratory and operational. There is the third view in which the prominent strategic theorists Snyder, Gray, and Johnson agreed on the presence of multiple strategic cultures. Colin Gray says that so far, strategic culture has been the hypernym of its associated concepts (Gray, 2007). There is an established requisite to draw a variance between strategic, public, and military cultures. Each culture has different players with unique beliefs and attitudes toward policymaking, drafting, and implementation, stating a diverse understanding of how their standpoint must be incorporated into actual strategic behavior. Hence, the inclination toward a precisely unitary strategic culture must be downcast now (Gray, 2007).

All three theorists consider these multiple strategic cultures as subcultures that are part of the broader umbrella concept of strategic culture (Snyder, 1977). They have symbiotic relations as competition with coexistence. These strategic cognitive schemas contemplate apparatuses in the toolbox (Bloomfield, 2012). Pertinent subcultures deal with the extraordinary situation in the strategic environment until the status quo returns (Sneberg, 2015).

2.1.3.3.5. Influence on Strategic Behavior

This debate ranges from determinism and instrumentalism to even skepticism. The first generation is the manifestation of determinism, where Colin Gray agreed to a quasi-deterministic interpretation of strategic culture due to the enculturation of strategic decision-makers and the all-pervasive effect of strategy on behavior (Gray, 2007, p.5). In contrast, other accounts, like Second generation theorists, provide the instrumental version of strategic culture and consider that it has no significant influence on behavior. Deception and concealment are their main focal points (Johnston, 1995, pp.56-58). Johnston showed disbelief in the degree of cross-national variance in strategy, and this stance is a manifestation of more of a structuralist version than culturalists (Bloomfield, 2012).

2.2. Pakistan Strategic Culture

Pakistan, a nascent nation-state that gained independence on 14th August 1947, is continuously ascertaining its identity and quest for security. Its domestic political culture and regional security matrix outline its strategic culture (F. H. Khan, 2005). In such cases, domestic phenomena, along with the regional dynamics, act as a prism for strategic culture to recognize patterns of retorts or

calculate responses (either strategic response or military behavior). In this fashion, regional rivalry and narrow interests decide the strategic choices, whereas the dominant elite shapes the national psyche and strategic outlook in the viewpoint of historical experiences to build a narrative about war peace, threat perception, the image of self and adversary, and try to associate domestic interest with the organizational ones (Lavoy, 1993).

Feroz Hassan Khan refers to Pakistan as “A young nation-state, with a still-evolving concept of itself and its role in the world. In the world of states, it is a teenager—internally struggling with hormones, living in a bad neighborhood, and still developing their strategic personality. It has a well-defined “strategic enclave,” however, which directs the strategic dialogue in the country” (Abraham et al., 1998).

Hasan Askari Rizvi defines strategic culture in Pakistan’s context as the “Collectivity of beliefs, norms, values and historical experiences of the dominant elite in a polity that influences their understanding and interpretation of security issues and environment shapes their responses to these” (Rizvi, 2002, p.305). The factor discussed by both the Pakistani scholars above, such as identity, norms, values, and the perceptive lens, is endorsed by Jeannie L. Johnson as the security-related output of the national culture of a country where variables like geography, history, ideology, relation with other nations, regime type, economics, type of neighbors, shared narratives, access to technology, external shocks, sacred texts, religion, health, education, customs left by invaders(colonizers), hero figures/legends, natural resources, climate, and demographics serve as the inputs to yield them (J.L.Johnson, 2006, p.15). He denotes it is the combination of national culture, national policy processes, and organizational culture that frames the domestic spectacle called strategic culture (J.L.Johnson, 2006, p.8)

Colin S. Gray refers to culture as a distinctive way of thinking and acting. Specifying it to the strategic culture, he meant applying this distinctive thinking to the threat and use of force to attain political purposes and act strategically. Here “distinctive” refers to any particular country; our case of discussion is Pakistan.

Consequently, Pakistan's Strategic Culture denotes "the Pakistani way," which is the merchandise of its geography and history inferred by the Pakistanis. Correspondingly, security communities think and behave in manners influenced by their interpretation of their history and geography which they have taught themselves repeatedly under the relevant context (Gray, 2007, p.7).

2.2.1. Components of Pakistan’s Strategic culture

Attributing Pakistan’s specific strategic context and history, six significant factors characterize Pakistan’s strategic culture, and they are as follows in figure 3 (Rizvi, 2002).



Figure 3. Component of Pakistan’s Strategic Culture (Source: Author, 2023)

2.2.1.1. Opposition to Indian hegemonic aspirations and offensive designs

Top Muslim leadership initially advocated for cordial relations between India and Pakistan. Still, fewer developments shaped Pakistan's threat perception towards India as an adversary, which includes communal riots and a massive influx of refugees, disputes, and noncooperative behavior of India over the assets of the government of British India, and most important of all, the disagreement on the accession of the princely states such as Junagadh and especially Jammu and Kashmir (Rizvi, 2002, pp.309-310). Due to its larger size, population, technological, industrial, and military advancement, India assumes itself as a guarantor of peace and security in the South Asian region in the commanding hegemonic role (Makeig, 1987, pp.271-299).

India's two-pronged strategy entails that neighboring countries' foreign policy must align with India's centrality and security imperatives. In contrast, India does not permit regional or global power to develop its presence in the neighboring South Asian countries or have any weapon supply mechanism (Tanham, 1992, pp.129-142). India's policy orientations specify India's rigid leadership model of extending its security boundaries beyond its territory, allowing interference in the adjacent states of South Asia (Chadda, 1998, pp.432-432).

Pakistan put forward the pluralist power model rejecting India's strict security and leadership model, lacking the durable accommodative approach to entertaining divergent national security interests of South Asian neighbors (Rizvi, 2002, p.313). The pluralist model recognizes the principle of sovereign equality, respect for national sensitivities, and accepting the right of each state to conduct its foreign and domestic affairs freely. Dialogue and mutual accommodation should be the modus operandi of the regional security

parameters (Rizvi, 1993). The fall of Dhaka illustrates India's offensive design and excellent power show of two-pronged leadership and power strategy, which has only strengthened the disposition of Pakistan to protect its national identity and policy autonomy by all means (Tanham, 1992, p. 133).

2.2.1.2. The primacy of Defense Requirement

Pakistan has prioritized defense requirements as a policy instrument in search of security from its inception while putting extreme pressure on the already scarce resources to cope with human needs (Rizvi, 2002, p.314). In Pakistan, the defense budget has an inverse relationship with human development. The more the defense budget has gone up, the lesser the focus share has been given to other immediate factors, including poverty, infrastructure, health, education, and social service. The budget started from a peak of 73 pc in 1949-50 to rankle at 25 pc in 2000-2001 (Lavoy, 2006, p.13), going through frequent ups and down again up to 16 pc in current FY 2022-23 with 1.53 trillion USD (Grevatt & MacDonald, 2022).

2.2.1.3. Nuclear Deterrence

Pakistan policymakers focused on limiting the war on borders by dissuading India from any military adventurism or taking it into the adversary's territory to increase the cost of the war on the adversary. First-class army with firepower, effective communication, and transport system, engaging in limited military operations or providing clandestine support to Kashmiri freedom fighters in Indian-occupied Kashmir, serve the purpose. In terms of Pakistan's strategic doctrine pursuance, it is impossible without the US and China's assistance in building strong defense capability. China's technical assistance in building the defense industry and Pakistan's nuclear and missile program is significant.

Pakistan's journey of acquiring and modernizing an operational nuclear deterrence started after the debacle of East Pakistan in 1971. Since then, Pakistan has operated under a policy of nuclear ambiguity, which remained active until May 1998. To rectify the strategic imbalance in south Asia and counter India's nuclear blackmail (military action across LOC), Pakistan opted for a nuclear explosion just 17 days after India's nuclear tests to neutralize India's superiority in conventional defense.

Keeping its security concern in hindsight, Pakistan will accept only the comprehensive restraint regime that includes both non-conventional and conventional security measures (Rizvi, 2002, pp. 317-319). Pakistan has a Nuclear first use policy and seems to move out from its early day's existential deterrence to Credible minimum deterrence to full spectrum deterrence contemplating a complex deterrence posture to maintain strategic balance (Tasleem, 2016).

2.2.1.4. Acceptance but not reliance on outside assistance

To deal with acute security problems caused by India's superiority in workforce and resources, Pakistan opted for the alignment policy. It joined with the United States of America, considering it a reliable and robust friend for weapon procurement, strengthening its defense industry, and installing military equipment and modern training. However, Pakistani policymakers avoided the diplomatic cost of alignment with the United States, which is strained relations with Russia and its veto in the UNSC on the Kashmir issue.

Pakistan considered the alignment policy a security measure against India and Afghanistan amidst the fear of a two-front war but not against the communism threat, which remained a grave American concern. From SEATO, CENTO, bilateral agreement of cooperations, and economic aid packages to the non-

assistance in the 1965 war, the Fall of Dhaka, led to non-alignment in Pakistan's foreign policy towards the West in the early 1970s back to the trustworthy client in Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the Pressler amendments. After the fall of communism, this alignment suffered a grumpy path of sanctions resulting in aggravated grievances in the Pakistan policy circle.

During the tough times in the 1970s and 1990s, China helped Pakistan build its defense capability (Lavoy, 2006, p.13). Along with this, Pakistan established cordial relations with the Islamic and Arab world, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and UAE, who stood with Pakistan diplomatically and economically in the difficult period after falling of Dhaka (Rizvi, 2002, pp,314-317).

2.2.1.5. Identification with traditional Islamic Cause

Muslim nationalism has played a significant role in shaping Pakistan's national identity. Pakistan's attempt to gauge Muslim nationalism for Islamic solidarity disturbed other Arab or Islamic countries that did not maneuver Islam in their domestic and international political force, such as Egypt, where Jamal Abdul Nasir quoted Pakistan's Islam was born on 14th August 1947. Religion is a dominant part of political identity but not the central theme in defense and foreign policy (Lavoy, 2006, p.14).

In the political (from republic to the Islamic Republic, Constitution of Pakistan, manifesto, and policy statements of the political parties) and military (shaheed (martyr), ghazi (victorious), and Jihad-e-fi-sabilallah) discourse Islam has a prominent role. Orthodox Islamic junctions, public display of religious orientation, and military-mullah nexus in Afghan Jihad against the Soviet Union followed by the heightened Kashmir freedom struggle in the 1990s, religious and cultural intolerance, and religious-sectarian killings were the result of Zia's induction of the religious conservatism and activism in the central political and

military discourse of Pakistan. It has vividly accentuated grave concern for Pakistan in its domestic, regional, and international disposition vis-à-vis extremism and terrorism following 9/11 and 26/11(Rizvi, 2002, pp,319-324).

2.2.1.6. Stability on Western Borders

Afghanistan's irredentist claims on the legitimacy of the Durand line, prerogatives of independence for the claimed territory of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and some part of Baluchistan or maximum autonomy within Pakistan to their absorption into Afghanistan (Saikal, 2006), followed by the opposition for Pakistan's entrance in UN in 1947 and intermittent clashes in the 1950s and 1960s with the increasingly strained relations (Kheli, 1974), India and USSR endorsement of Afghanistan claims on Pakistan territory (Barnds, 1972), shaped Pakistan's policy maker Afghanistan is a source of instability often in collusion with India with the looming threat of two-front war. Pakistan's perceptions of its strategic environment in Afghanistan are based on countering Indian influence and providing strategic depth to Pakistan first by sympathizing with Afghan Mujahideen by maneuvering as the friendly client to the West in the 1980s and later with the Taliban in the 1990s (F. H. Khan, 2003).

2.2.2. The Emergence of Pakistan's Strategic Culture

The emergence of Pakistan's strategic culture can be sketched under the devised conceptual framework of analysis which consists of three aspects such as cognitive, relational, and environmental or structural, as shown in Figure 4.

2.2.2.1. Cognitive Aspects of Emergence of Pakistan's Strategic Strategic Culture

To understand the cognitive aspects shaping the origin of the strategic culture of Pakistan via the Two Nations Theory, it is imperative to take a glimpse of the war of independence of 1857, its consequences, the freedom struggle of Muslims, and the Urdu Language as an instrument of identity.




Figure 4. Conceptual Frame work of Analysis of Strategic Culture of Pakistan
(Source: Author, 2023)

Political, religious, military, economic, and social factors outlining British Paramountcy, the doctrine of lapse, the introduction of infield rifles in the military (disrespecting both Muslim and Hindu beliefs), and alien influences on traditional Indian society became the utmost reasons for both Muslims and Hindus to fight against British's East India Company rule. The War of Independence was the last collective effort of traditional India to get rid of a foreign power. Still, it was unsuccessful due to mutual jealousy, disunity, and lack of central leadership. After this unsuccessful attempt, the British ruled India

directly by introducing the Government of India Act 1858, including the dissolution of the East India Company and reorganizing the army, financial, and administrative system.

Muslims ruled the Indian Subcontinent for about 800 years, and the decline of the Mughal Empire was fastened by internal weaknesses and opposition from Britishers and local Indians. Through its political manipulation and economic maneuvering before and after the war of independence, the British persuaded Hindus to side in their favor against Muslims, with whom Hindus already had huge differences but were united against the common atrocities brought to them by Britishers. So, the Indian Muslims in poor and miserable political, economic, cultural, and religious situations sank into despair and dissolution.

As a consequence of the war of independence, the British policy of exclusion of Muslims from all government, administrative and military posts led to the deprivation of jobs, social status, property, and business, making it impossible to live life under Islamic teaching, and the destruction of Muslims' political power in India (Bhatti, 2011, p.226). Despite the perks and privileges given to Hindus, they could not stop the breakdown of the traditional system of Indian society or its supersession by the western elite system, which produced a solid middle class with deepened "Indian Nationalism."

On the other hand, Muslims being the minority, were suffering under Hindu domination, and scholars like Sir Syed Ahmed Khan brought political awareness to Muslims by uplifting their educational standards, introducing science, and the quest to learn foreign languages such as English to meet their ends. He used the term "Two Nations" for Hindu Muslims, and the concept of "Muslim Nationalism" emerged from the Aligarh movement, which resulted in a separate

electorate for Muslims in 1909. In contrast, the concept of Muslim Nationhood emerged in 1906 in the formulation of the Muslim League (Bhatti, 2011, p.227).

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan realized the actual Indian design. He advocated for the two-nation theory, which denotes that Hindus and Muslims living in India were two distinct communities that could not coexist within a single state without dominating and discriminating against others or without constant conflict (Bennet, 2018). This political doctrine has an electoral background in fostering the constitutional reforms of 1909, 1919, and 1935 for a separate electorate for Muslims. With the Congress's growing nationalist movement, Sir Syed Ahmed warned Indian Muslims about the self-interest of Congress around Hindus only and discouraged them from the bandwagon. He articulated that the Indian Muslims formed a nation, and their interests did not align with Congress. His idea was welcomed by the British to thaw the Indian nationalist movement by Congress (Two Nation Theory, 2021).

This proposition was endorsed by Allama Iqbal, who put forth the idea of a Muslim State in his address at the annual session of the all-India Muslim League on 29th December 1930 at Allahabad. He explained what Sir Syed meant by actual Indian design. He expressed that Hindus conceptualize "Indian Nationalism" as the Hindu domination of India over all the minority communities. The democratic principle of rule by the majority will permanently guarantee their domination over the minorities such as Muslims, which is not possible without endangering and annihilating their separate Muslim identity, culture, and tradition. The solution Allama Iqbal proposed to preserve the distinct identity, culture, and tradition is to separate the Muslim Majority areas from the Hindu Majority areas (Bhatti, 2011, p.227). He further believed there was no future for Muslims in United India. He did not categorically elucidate

that his proposed Muslim state would construe theology despite rejecting secularism and nationalism (Khaama Press, 2010)

He led the theoretical framework of the two-nation theory:

“I would like to see Punjab, Northwest Frontier Province, Sindh, and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. In self-government within or without the British Empire, the formation of the Northwest Indian Muslim State appears to be the final destination of the Muslims, at least in Northwest India (Bhatti, 2011, p.228).”

Muhammad Ali Jinnah explained Two Nation Theory in his presidential address on 23rd March 1940:

“It is tough to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders. It is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can evolve into a common nationality. This misconception of one Indian nation has troubles and will destroy India if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two religious’ philosophies, social customs, and litterateurs. They neither intermarry nor interdine and belong to two different civilizations based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects of live and life are different. Hindus and Muslims derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes, and different episodes. Very often, the hero of one is a foe of the other; likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built for the government of such a state” (Two Nation Theory, 2021).

In the broader picture of the Two Nation Theory, one essential element is language which, along with other factors mentioned above in the addresses of famous Muslim Leaders, played a fundamental role in shaping distinct Muslim identity and struggle for a separate homeland. Urdu as a language underwent many stages of development, from outplaying geographical location in terms of invasions and conquest of the area (Rahi, 2011, p. 80). The word “Urdu” itself is derived from the Turkish word “Ordu,” which means camp or army (Rahi, 2011, p. 80).

Urdu as a distinct language emerged in 1193 AD during the peak of the Mughal Empire (Rahi, 2011, p. 83). The richness of this language can be traced to its very origin as the Muslim soldiers of Mughal Armies of different ethnicities (Turks, Persians, Pathans, Afghans, Jatt, Balochs, Persians, and Arabs) used to speak with each other in their native dialects and this became the point of convergence in all dialects to convey their meanings and led to the development of a language known as Urdu today that’s why it is referred as Lashkari zaban (the language of the soldier) or Urdu-e- Maullah (exalted army) or Rekhta (scattered) (Rahi, 2011, p. 81).

Urdu was spoken in palaces, leveled up as the official language of many Mughal states, and was spread by saints and soldiers to new areas. It is the descendant of Saur Senic Prakrit (a later version of Sanskrit) (Rahi, 2011, p. 83). As the Western Hindi dialects of Khari bol, Brij bhasa, and Haryanvi influenced the development of Prakrit, then Ibn-e-Insha tried to preserve the purity of the Urdu language through his "Darya-e- Latafat" and faced the Hindi-Urdu controversy. Urdu and Persian remain the identity of Muslims, whereas Khari bol became the identity of Hindus (Rahi, 2011, p. 84).

In the same manner, Urdu absorbed words from Persian, Turkish, and Arabic while replacing Sanskrit (Rahi, 2011, p. 84). It adopted a Persian-Arabic script

and Nastaliq calligraphic style of writing. Hindi and Urdu have phonological, grammatical, and lexical differences (Rahi, 2011, p. 84). Urdu served as an instrument for Muslims in the freedom struggle and played a fundamental role in political awareness and Muslim Awakening. It is not only a language but a bonding agent that holds the national fabric together and proudly echoes the cohesion and unity of the Indian Muslim nation (Rahi, 2011, p. 85).

Jinnah described the creation of Pakistan in his address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11th August 1947;

The creation of Pakistan and the Partition of the Indian Subcontinent is the only solution to India's constitutional problem. This would imply that the movement for Pakistan was a purely political struggle unrelated to any religious objective. The Lahore Resolution of 1940 offered a constitutional scheme as an alternative to the one embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935. Although the genesis of the idea of Pakistan lay in the religious identity of the people for whom a separate state was being demanded gave rise to the concept of Pakistan as an Islamic polity.

Jinnah neither advocated an ecclesiastical government nor completely disowned religious motivation. He unheeded Gandhi's offer to coax Congress's acknowledgment of Pakistan if it was not a religious demand. Jinnah often had a notion of a democratic state, which was what Islam stood for. At the same time, the Ulemas of India opposed Pakistan's formation and disregarded it as a religious polity. The reshuffling in the posture of the Quaid-i-Azam just three days before Pakistan's emergence as a new state is seen in his valediction to the Two Nation Theory narrative and specification of the formation of a new nation based on the people's citizenship of Pakistan. The religious parties did a

complete volte-face by calling Pakistan to be an Islamic state (I.A. Rehman, 2017).

Jinnah cited the role of the Armed forces on 14th August 1947 as follows;

“Do not forget that the armed forces are the servants of the people, and you do not make national policy; it is we, the civilians, who decide these issues, and you must carry out these tasks with which you are entrusted” (E. M. Khan, 2014).

The scrimmage between Jinnah’s democratic ideals group and religious pressure groups about “what Pakistan was meant to be” and the poor performance of quasi-democratic governments were exploited by the military dictators changing the entire political structure and national culture of Pakistan with an absolute deviation from Jinnah’s democratic and secular view of the state of Pakistan (I.A. Rehman, 2017).

2.2.2.2. Environmental/ Structural Aspects Of Emergence of Pakistan’s Strategic Strategic Culture

Environmental/structural aspects architecting the emergence of strategic culture subsists in its geostrategic landscape and its complexities, polarity schematics, enmity relations, and overall domestic and regional milieu spawned in response to the unfolding global politics rigidities.

The geographical landscape of Pakistan is the index of complex balancing of its geostrategic importance, security compulsions (national security and territorial integrity), and the vast array of domestic issues by maintaining cautious relations with immediate neighbors and global powers (Tauseef, 2013).

Pakistan is located in the exact center of the world map and geographically in South Asia. She unites with sisterly states of Central Asia through the great Karakorum and Himalayan mountains. In the North, Khunjrab Pass links Pakistan to China with a 600km Sino-Pak border. At the same time, Pakistan provides the shortest and most direct route for China to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and the Middle East in its South, where it has a 700 km sea length with the Arabian Sea. At her southwest, she meets with Iran at the Koh-i-taftan border with a 900 km length known as the Goldsmith line, and in the northwest, Khyber Pass connects her with Afghanistan through a 2250km long border historically known as the Durand line. In its Northwest, there is a 27 Km narrow Wakhan strip that links it to Tajikistan. At its east, it connects with India by a 1650 km boundary called the Radcliffe line (F. H. Khan,2022). Pakistan is not the only gateway to China and Central Asia but also India if it approaches from the West (Rahi, 2011, p. 60).

Geo-strategically, she was at the crossroads of South Asia, Southeast Asia, West Asia, and Central Asia (Rahi, 2011, p. 60), but. However, it lost its connection with Southeast Asia after its eastern wing. It has become part of the Middle East and Central Asia (Amin, 2010, p.73). Not only its ideological affinity but also its land and sea routes linked with Muslim states necessitates its geographical centrality in the Muslim world. Pakistan's geostrategic landscape renders enigmatic picturesque of great powers immediacy, transit economy, gateway ay to Central Asia, an essential link in the chain of Muslim countries, a pathway for China to the Middle East, and plummeting Indian hegemony in the Arabian sea and Indian ocean (F. H. Khan,2022).

On the one hand, it was the cold war era grating the intense rivalry between two superpowers. On the other hand, the wave of decolonization was spurring against the mighty colonizer. In the milieu of camp politics Capitalist bloc led

by the USA and the Communist Bloc by the USSR, Pakistan opted for the neutral stance to avoid siding with any bloc by implying the neutrality principle envisioned by Quaid-e-Azam. US effort to create proximity with Pakistan by slotting it in its camp came from the loan it had given to Pakistan in 1947 and assumed Pakistan siding with America in all its decisions, including the, by all means, support to Israel against Palestine. Quaid-e-Azam took a firm stand in opposition to this resolution, denied being part of any camp, and reiterated its support for the Palestinian people and their legitimate struggle by saying yes, we ask for a loan but not at the cost of our honor and ideology. We seek friendship but will not entertain dictation from anyone (Dar, 2018).

In later stages, soon after the death of Quaid-e-Azam, Pakistan's domestic and regional dynamics constrained it to opt for camp politics comprising its ruling elite (affinity towards western education and cultural outlook), integrated western economy (difficulty in transforming it along a socialist contour, maintaining the colonial legacy to consider the West as a trading partner first for supplying consumer goods for the local market at a competitive price and second for providing market to Pakistan raw material), the desire for firm political and diplomatic support by America and Britain in settlement of a dispute with India, and the quest of military support to ensure its survival (Cheema, 2006).

In the relational spectrum with the neighbors from amity to enmity, Pakistan stood tall by the vision of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah to promote peace and friendly relations despite the contesting claims by immediate neighbors on its land either the Iran-Baluchistan border or Durand line with Afghanistan. India cut Pakistan deeply, whether through the occupation of Kashmir or other forceful settlements of territories like Junagarh, Gurdaspur, Hyderabad, Jodhpur, and Manavadar.

Unrelenting Congress leader's verbal attacks on Pakistan are illustrated in Nehru's statement that nothing on earth can bring about Pakistan, which Jinnah wanted, Gandhi's statement that Congress would only accept Pakistan 'over his dead body, his other statement of Hindu Muslims' interdependent on one another, and Nehru will take them back when Muslim League Leaders ask, Nehru and Krishna Menon statement of accepting partition only to get rid of British, Sardar Patel speech of Pakistan would crash in a short period, J.B Kripalani statement of India's independence is incomplete without unity and Amrita Bazar Patrika news report of Gandhi restoring Indian unity before his retirement.

Subsequently, the uttered propaganda, India practically took concrete steps to topple the existence of Pakistan by influencing the Radcliffe award, also referred to as territorial murder. Quaid-e-Azam considered it unjust, unfathomable, and even pertinacious. He deliberated that this political, not the judicial Boundary Award, would be the 'latest blow' to the problems of Pakistan. As an honorable rule-abiding citizen, he encouraged his people to accept it to avoid agitation. Communal riots in East Punjab and other princely states, half a million Muslim massacres in less than two months, massive displacement, 6 million refugees, and military seizure of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, very dear and near to Pakistan, added fuel to the fire. Quaid-e-Azam said India was living in a fool's paradise if thinking by holding our cash balances, our share of military equipment, and financial assets, threatening unilateral stoppage of water supplies to Pakistan as an exclusive right of the upper riparian state, encouraging provincialism to weaken Pakistan by including East Pakistan back to Indian dominion would shatter Pakistan and lastly to pave the road to "Akhand Baharat." Despite all this, Quaid-e-Azam was optimistic and was ready to solve all the issues with fairness, justice, and honesty.

India's offensive design and the maneuvering of the disturbing developments in response to the emergence of Pakistan could not materialize Quaid's dream of cooperative India-Pakistan relations and peaceful coexistence in the region. It is not only Pakistan leaders who pronounce India did not accept Pakistan as a living reality of South Asia and the world with their heart, and it was proved with the confirmation of Field Marshal Auchinleck's letter to the British PM Minister, dated 28th September 1947, said Indian Government including Indian Cabinet, Indian leaders, Cabinet Ministers, along with Civil officials utilized all their resources to prohibit the formation of the dominion of Pakistan by hindering the partition plan work of armed forces afterward tried its level best to 'thwart Pakistan's due military, economic and administrative share (A.C.Johnson,1997,p.98)

2.2.2.3. Relational Aspects of Emergence of Pakistan's Strategic Culture

Relational aspects modeling the emergence of the strategic culture of Pakistan can be drawn back to the strategic vision shared by the founder of Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, along with the notion of peace, war, and relations with other countries.

Jinnah envisioned Pakistan as a forward-thinking country based on a democratic system that embodies Islamic principles, not western ones. He advocated that Pakistan not be a theocratic state ruled by Muslim priests with a divine mission because of the non-Muslim minority in Pakistan who possesses equal rights as citizens. He stressed the idea that religion, caste, and creed will not have any role to play in the affair of the state because Islam teaches equality, justice, and fair composition for everyone (Rahi, 2011, p. 94). His slogan, "Discipline, Unity, and Faith," is the best legacy he left for his nation.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah cogitates education, economic might (industrial), and defense as the pillars that make a nation earnest (Rahi, 2011, p. 95). He envisioned a progressive nation with a great moral and social ethos and accomplished chief goals of economic growth, national solidarity, and education (Rahi, 2011, p. 95). He anticipated the national character of Pakistan constructed on the premier nous of integrity, honor, selfless service, and a sense of responsibility towards one another and the country itself. He advocated for the nation to equip itself with scientific and technological knowledge to build prosperous economic life (Rahi, 2011, p. 95). Jinnah's vision is evident in the Pakistani flag and the national anthem. The Pakistani flag personifies an Islamic symbol crescent and a star that stands for progress, knowledge, and enlightenment. The national anthem envisions Jinnah's Pakistan, which aims for a strong, bright, and shining destiny. It seeks a pure land full of determination, paving its way to progress and perfection, glorifying the past and present (Rahi, 2011, p. 98).

Quaid-e Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah outlined in February 1948, while talking to the US public on a broadcast, "Pakistan's foreign policy is of goodwill and friendliness to all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the policy of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings. We are prepared to make our maximum contribution to promoting peace and prosperity among the world nations. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed of the United Nations Charter." Quaid-e-Azam stipulated steadfast adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, particularly the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's affairs, and peaceful settlement of bilateral disputes (Tauseef, 2013).

He set forth this principle straightly “enmity with none and peace with all.” Jinnah stressed establishing long-lasting brotherly relations with the Muslim and Arab countries and lent its staunch support to Palestine’s cause, opposed the Dutch attack on Indonesia and the French occupation of North African Arab areas, and provided diplomatic and material help in the freedom movement of Algeria, Morocco, Malaya, Libya, and Nigeria. Jinnah was a staunch supporter of peace all over the world.

On 14th July 1947 in Delhi, he defined the basic principles of Pakistan's foreign policy "We stand for the peace of the world. We will make our contribution whatever we can." (S.A. Khan, 2013). To establish peace, he was ready to move to any corner of the world with anyone in a lawful manner, keeping Pakistan a part of this peace with righteousness (Dar, 2018). He further strongly advocated cordial and peaceful relations with neighboring countries. On 7th August 1947, while departing for Karachi, he posited that India and Pakistan forget the past tensions and start a new chapter of friendship. For this purpose, India must shed its superiority complex and treat Pakistan on an equal footing. He wished peace and prosperity to Hindustan (Afzal, 1973, p.428).

In the practical manifestation of “peace within and peace without,” Jinnah proposed a joint defense in April 1947 based on equality to protect South Asia from outsiders” (Z. Khan, 2021). Hindu leaders of the Indian National Congress were on a different wavelength in asserting that sooner or later, Pakistan would crash till that time, and their freedom is not completed without unity in India.

Quaid-i-Azam showed discontent over propaganda and made it clear that such behavior of congress leadership would halt the restoration of good relations between states. He roared, “Pakistan was established to stay and will stay while further expounding that Pakistan will never surrender’ and will never accept any

‘constitutional reunion’ between the two dominions with ‘one common center’” (Jinnah, 1989, p.83). Similarly, despite the unfolding tempestuous circumstances with Afghanistan and Iran Quaid-e- Azam stepped forward to establish cordial relations with the immediate neighboring Muslim states and received a positive, welcoming response from both countries.

All three different aspects that contributed to the emergence of the strategic culture of Pakistan have established in detail that Pakistan’s strategic culture emerged purely defensive and was not based on any offensive design but on the impression of survival, sovereignty, protection of territorial integrity, and peaceful coexistence with others.

As a result of long series of momentous and unsettling developments after its independence, Pakistan faced an extremely offensive regional environment (immediate neighbors) with the competitive and pervasive global environment (cold war) that had its spillover effect on the domestic atmosphere turning the milieu very restrictive. All these factors shape Pakistan's decision to side with the US in different pacts, not purely against the communist threat but for its military and economic assistance. India’s offensive design and political maneuvering discussed above have guaranteed India’s obsession with utilizing all means to bring Pakistan under “Akhand Bharat,” thwarting Pakistan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty verily shapes Pakistan’s threat perception of India in its most absolute sense.

CHAPTER THREE

LITERATURE REVIEW: TRANSITIONAL PHASES OF STRATEGIC CULTURE OF PAKISTAN

The literature review utilizes an integrative writing style to deliberate upon the transitional phases of the strategic culture of Pakistan by investigating the major turning points in its history on the premise of critical geopolitics. Overall, the scheme of this chapter is to consider the contextual background, political landscape, military landscape, consequences and impacts of these critical events under the microscopic lens of the strategic toolkit.

3.1. Transitional Phases of Strategic Culture of Pakistan

This chapter analyses the trajectory of those critical events in its brief history sequenced in the figure 5 below.




Figure 5: Major Turning points in the Transitional Phases of Strategic Culture of Pakistan (Source: Author, 2023)

It is imperative to understand Pakistan's strategic culture and strategic behavior in this time frame by analyzing its crisis decision-making behavior, warfighting, and nuclear doctrine, foreign, defense, and national security policy, alliance behavior, and the role of religion in the statecraft and use of non-state actors. At this length, my main aim is to do a strategic mapping of historical turning points by gauging rejoinders to each variable of my strategic toolkit, which includes primary threat perception, means /tools, political narrative, strategic objective, strategic environment, strategic orientation, actors producing strategic culture and nature of Strategic Culture.

3.1.1. First Kashmir War (1947-1948)

It is imperative to comprehend the First Kashmir War in the strategic significance of Jammu and Kashmir and its geopolitical realities through the account of ancient and modern Kashmir in full relevance of the unfolding partition developments on both the sides of newly formulated dominions, Pakistan and India. This first Indo-Pak war has two angles to look into a) political and b) military.

3.1.1.1. Geo-Strategic Significance of Jammu and Kashmir

The state of Jammu and Kashmir is located at the extreme northwestern tip of the Indian subcontinent. On its northern side, a narrow strip called the Wakhan corridor is present, which connects Afghanistan with China. On the north of this corridor is Tajikistan, the Asiatic state of the Soviet Republic. On its east and north is Tibet (Xinjiang Province), towards the south, is India (Himanchal Pradesh and Punjab), whereas southwest is Pakistan (Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). The state of Jammu and Kashmir was divided into three distinct regions through the mighty Himalayas Mountain ranges. The regions include a) Jammu and the outer hills, b) Kashmir Valley, and c) the Mountainous north region comprising Ladakh, Baltistan, and Gilgit wazarat (Bajwa, 2003, p.64)

From a geostrategic perspective, Kashmir is significant as it acts as a bridge between South Asia and Central Asia. It has many resources ranging from gold, uranium, and oil to natural gas. Most importantly, Kashmir is the water treasure from where the Indus River flows. The Indus River and its tributaries are highly substantial for India and Pakistan, where India needs it for irrigation and Pakistan for agriculture, as rainfall is uncommon in the lower Indus valley

region. It was a common notion in those days that whosoever controls this region effectively controls the water and cuts off its supply to others (Asoori, 2020, p.2).

Physically, Pakistan has more practical contiguity with Jammu and Kashmir. Two major road routes emanated in Pakistan give muscular access to the state such as a) route from Wah on the Grand trunk road, Abbottabad – Domel (hill road from Rawalpindi via Murree joined it,) Domel along Jhelum River to Uri, Baramulla to Srinagar, b) route from Wazirabad on the Grand trunk road, Sialkot- Jammu-Banihal pas to Srinagar. Besides this, numerous minor roads and tracks provided cross-border access into adjacent areas of the state from Pakistan from the Kahuta tri-junction with Afghanistan in the extreme northwest. India's contiguity with the state of Jammu and Kashmir was from Punjab to the area of Doda, further northwards Ladakh through the inaccessible High Himalayas Mountains.

Rawalpindi-Jhelum corridor, a communication jugular of Pakistan with the State of Jammu and Kashmir, was a game-changer where India sought to launch a strategic dagger by getting control over the area west of Jammu and north of Muzaffarabad to cut off Pakistan's fortifying physical link with Kashmir or its Erstwhile in case of forfeiture in the enactment of the partition plan (Bajwa, 2003, p.74).

3.1.1.2. Geopolitical Realities of the State of Jammu and Kashmir

The geopolitical realities of the state of Jammu and Kashmir entail that it has been under continuous invasions and dynastic rules comprising Muslims (Tatars, Persians, Mughals, and Afghans), Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, and Dogra. Afghan rule (1752-1819) over Kashmir ended with a defeat in the Battle of Shopiyan by Maharaja Ranjit Singh. It marked the beginning of the most

turbulent Sikh period over Kashmir, ranging from 1819 to 1846 AD, with suppression, communal violence, religious bigotry, forced labor, and heavy taxation. On 16th March 1846 British defeated Maharaja Ranjit Singh in Anglo –the Sikh War and then traded the state of Jammu and Kashmir to Dogra Ghulab Singh through the consideration of seventy-five lakh Nanak Shahi rupees under the Amritsar treaty. That’s how the state of Jammu and Kashmir became the princely state under the British Paramountcy, with ***Dogra Ghulab Singh*** as the Maharaja. (Ali, 2015, pp.3-4).

Kashmiris, who were already frustrated with the Sikh regimes, resisted this new development with a neck-to-neck fight against the Maharaja forces until they intervened and were suppressed by British Army. Despite the British’s assurance of a new dispensation for Kashmiris, the Dogra regime surpassed its predecessors in oppressive and unjust taxation, extortion, low wages, and forced labor. The new successor ***Maharaja Ranbir Singh*** (1857) drowned famine-stricken Kashmiris in a wular lake to make it an example for others not to ask for due rights from the profit of the shawl industry. In 1852 Gilgitis already had expelled Dogras from Gilgit and dardistan by heavy arm resistance.

In contrast, now Ranbir Singh wanted to opt for a leap forward policy towards the north to take revenge for his father’s defeat, which was not regaled by the British, citing the geostrategic significance of this region to curtail any soviet expansion southwards. He fully supported the British in crushing the 1857 mutiny. Demand day, 29th April 1865, is marked as the first-ever day in India’s history of class struggle. Kashmiris protested for their due rights and were killed vehemently by the Dogra regime setting these sacrifices’ fundamental role as forerunners of the freedom struggle. With Maharaja Ranbir Singh, old Kashmir breathed its last, and a new awakening was in full swing when ***Maharaja Pratap Singh*** succeeded the throne in 1885(Ali, 2015, pp.5-10).

The *wave of consciousness* marked the dawn of modern Kashmir. Mulki campaign by Kashmiris Muslims and Hindus for due rights was on zenith. Hindu Kashmiri Pandits demanded a change in government policy to allocate non-Kashmiri shares in higher services. Dogra regime outplayed the mulki campaign, took advantage of the fragmented view of the society along communal lines, granted the claim to Hindu Pandits in higher services, and paid no heed to Muslims' demands.

At the same time, Pandits acted as Maharaja Stooge to bring more atrocities to Kashmiri Muslims by not giving those minimum wages. Instead, Pandits preferred securing their economic stability, political safety, and social status during the time of extreme profit in the industry (Ahad, 2007, pp.302-304). Gross human rights violations mismatched social equilibrium, transgression, and arrogance of officials and factory management led to worker unrest. They called for an all-out strike leading to arrests and clashes with cavalry and infantry. Still, the silk state factory strike highlighted the grievances of Muslims, and a reform catalog to viceroy Lord read in October 1924 set the staple of political thought and social actions. (Ali, 2015, pp.12-14). Hari Singh, the fourth Dogra ruler, took the throne in 1924. 1931-1933, three years of twenty centuries served as the milestone in the history of modern Kashmir. The systematized struggle against the tyrant Dogra ruler, mass killings of protesters on 13th June 1931 by police, formation of All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim conference on 21st June 1931, Pather masjid issue, Dara Shikoh masjid issue, civil disobedience movement of January 1932 set the basis for the political mobilization of Kashmiris to fight against the denial of their social, political and economic rights.

On 11th June 1939, the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conferences were changed into the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conferences to blur the

communal lines. Sheikh Abdullah, the President of the Kashmir National Conference, also served as the vice president of the All-India States People's Conference. Under this patronage, he was thriving to secure the united independence of States India from the British, but the British had a different design. In the immediate effect of the war of 1857, the British policy of annexing the indigenous state was replaced by the new policy of forcing indigenous states' rulers to sign the submissive agreement and render their sovereignty to British paramountcy. The previous policy of annexing indigenous states was brought back into full swing after 90 years one such example is the state of Jammu and Kashmir (Ali, 2015, pp. 14-16).

3.1.1.3. Political and Military Landscape

The first Kashmir war is a display of a doomed venture of Pakistan that has exposed Pakistan's susceptibility in terms of the absence of solid decision-making skills in the political and military circle occasioning ill-planned tribal incursion and deferred participation of the Pakistan army in the worsening Kashmir episode. It is equally pertinent to consider that Pakistan did not inherit the British central political, military, and administrative command structure; instead, it had to start from scratch, contributing massively to its vulnerability during this war. Contributing to its functional disability, the political capital in Karachi was 1000 miles away from Army's General Headquarters in Rawalpindi.

Although India and Pakistan maintained the British commanders as heads of their armed forces, the officers under them remained apolitical during the British era. They later got exposed to a deep political and religious divide resulting from the partition's ordeal. In the backdrop of the Maharaja of the State of Jammu and Kashmir's wavering attitude, Pakistan's young officers tried to seize the

opportunity in Kashmir through secret design without any proper strategic plan and official command from Pakistan Army, keeping the political and military leadership even the British Commander unaware of the plan. In the later stages, only a few political and military leaders were informed about the plan when things went out of control (Nawaz, 2008,p.116).

In the New Delhi power Corridor, Indian leadership was impatient to get Kashmir anyway. They released Sheikh Abdullah from jail, who openly denounced the two-nation theory and pledged its allegiance to join India. Nehru, Patel, and VP Menon insisted on Maharaja for accession with India. Lord Mountbatten was of the view to ascertain the decision of the State by the will of its people, which is majorly Muslims. On Pakistan's front, Quaid-e-Azam signed a standstill agreement not to disrupt the accession equilibrium of other pending states, including Hyderabad, Gurdaspur, etc. (Nawaz, 2008, p.117).

In Kashmir's purview, martial Poonchis returning from World War II strongly resisted their suppression, being the state subject of the Poonch maharaja and then joined by the maharaja of the state Jammu and Kashmir. They rightly rejected this subject change, heavy taxation, and Muslim exodus in East Punjab. In lieu of the exceeding pressure from the Indian side and the ground veracities from within the state, Maharaja tried to crush the political dissent of Poonchis through brute force, which escalated the clash to the Poonch uprising formally instigating the Kashmir war (Nawaz, 2008, pp.134-135).

In the strategic context, the key battles of the Kashmir war were mainly fought among critical road links and regions. The road from Jammu to Bagh Akhnoor (Chenab)-Beri Pattan, Noashera, Mendhar, and Poonch was improved before independence. But an alternate route from Bagh – Jhelum River Valley- to Srinagar Valley was premeditated by the Dogra ruler with Indian assistance for

full-year access. The track from Poonch to URI over Hajipir was also improved but remained unusable. In the western Jammu province, Poonch is at the strategic locus between Jhelum and Chenab rivers, and the Pir Panjal range borders Kashmir with Pakistan southwards with the Gujrat district. (Nawaz, 2008)

Poonchis were active fighters and shared a strong cultural, economic, military, and religious affinity with the Rawalpindi, Jhelum, and Gujarat. On the one hand, Abdul Qayyum Khan (local landlord) resisted on the ground. On the other hand, Sardar Ibrahim Khan (lawyer) lobbied with the veterans and former Indian national army officers and gathered a core group of supporters across the border from Pakistan, including Colonel Akbar Khan- the linchpin of the Kashmir campaign in Pakistan. Colonel Akbar was instructed by Mian Iftikhar Uddin (leading Muslim League representative tasked to expedite Kashmir accession to Pakistan) to design a plan to facilitate Kashmiri brethren in the case of Indian accession of Kashmir. Akbar understood the project was unofficial and that no forces of Pakistan would be part of it officially. Mohammad Ibrahim Khan informed Colonel Akbar about the ground perplexities of the revolt. Every protest was countered with repression by Dogra forces closing all options for negotiation to protect their people and prevent Maharaja from serving Kashmir to India. Ibrahim Khan demanded 500 rifles for this purpose (Nawaz, 2008, p.119).

Colonel Akbar Khan designed a plan of action named “Armed Revolt inside Kashmir.” This secret plan aimed to fortify Kashmiri internally and simultaneously take necessary steps to preclude the influx of armed civilians or military assistance from India into Kashmir. Citing all the logistic constraints and compulsion of secretive nature, the first step was to manage primary weapons from 4000 sanctioned rifles for Punjab police and condemned

ammunition. The second step is organized support in terms of trained military power. He preferred the Ex INA-officers. In his calculations, out of 9000 Dogra's state forces, 2000 were where Kashmiri Muslims wouldn't fight against their brothers, and the rest of the 7000 forces would be scattered around regions to be countered certainly.

Akbar's action plan was based on dismantling the Kathua Jammu unsettled route (via guerilla tactics until winter) and ceasing the Srinagar airport to halt any air supply from India. A high-profile meeting was held in Lahore, including Liaquat Ali Khan (Prime Minister), Ghulam Muhammad (Finance Minister), Mian Iftikhar Uddin (Muslim League leader), Shaukat Hayat (Minister in Punjab), Colonel Akbar, Zaman Kiani (INA Officer), Khurshid Anwar (Commander Muslim League National Guard) occurred on the return of Iftikhar Uddin from Kashmir who did not bring big news from Maharaja. In this meeting, the allotment of funds was discussed. Still, no proper operational strategy was devised, and Colonel Akbar learned about Khurshid Anwar and Shaukat Hayat's conflicting demeanors towards each other.

Akbar took Colonel Muhammad Sher Khan (deputy director of intelligence), Colonel Tommy, Air Commodore Janjua, and Khawaja Abdul Raheem (commissioner of Rawalpindi Division) in his confidence for intelligence and logistic aid. Colonel Sher Khan highlighted four-factor in his assessment of the increased livelihood of troublesome scenarios in Kashmir due to Maharaja's accession to India on the pressure and assurance of military aid, oppression and killings of Muslims, refugee influx in Pakistan, the regular stream of Afghan tribesman entering Kashmir to help Muslim brethren, Indian attitude over Junagarh option, and the winter weather (Nawaz, 2008, pp. 121-124).

On 23rd October, Khurshid Anwar led 2000 NWFP tribesmen to cross into Kashmir via the Jhelum River, Muzaffarabad, Domel, and Baramula to reach Srinagar. On the 24th night, Nehru informed Lord Mountbatten that nearly 5000 tribesmen landed in military transport to Rawalpindi Road, and they had captured Muzaffarabad, Domel, and were almost 35 miles away from Srinagar (125). The defense committee openly started discussing the road map to give military assistance, but Mountbatten was adamant about the official and conditional accession signed by Maharaja to proceed legally.

In this preview, VP Menon was dispatched to Jammu to convince Maharaja for immediate accession, whereas Maharaja signed the accession on 27th October, and the same day Mountbatten approved military assistance. But the many facts is India already had a planned airlift when Sardar Patel, on 7th October, asked the Defense Minister to keep preparation ready for sending arms and ammunition to Kashmir. Civil aircraft, military aircraft, and 3000 troops were immediately dispatched to Srinagar. In contrast, by November 11, more than 600 aircraft, 5000 men, and thousands of pounds of food were dispatched to Srinagar as a second consignment. On the Intelligence front, India lacked entirely. Brigadier Commander of 161 Brigade L.P. Singh said he was short of the workforce to defend Srinagar but found 1850 state troops in Badami Bagh Barracks. As per Akbar Khan's plan, 1000 men were supposed to delink Kathua Jammu road, but they returned to Pakistan as an outdated country-made rifle broke down, and the forces to take control of Srinagar airport couldn't do so because Khurshid Anwar did not supply them the 200 needed rifles. Only 100 ex-servicemen were beefing up the cover, but it was late as the plan failed, and Indian military assistance reached Srinagar. The same evening Indian forces landed in Srinagar, and an unofficial conference was held in which Akbar Khan proposed cutting Jammu-Kathua Road with three Lashkars of 1000 people; this idea was shelved, fearing cross-border attacks.

On the political front, Jinnah ordered General Gracey (Acting Commander-in-Chief) to launch the Pakistan military into Kashmir in response to India's military intervention. Gracey hesitated to intervene, citing Supreme Commander Auchinleck's stand-down order. On 28th October at 2 am, Pakistan's prime minister endorsed Akbar's idea of a liberation committee overseeing activities in Kashmir. Liberation Committee consisted of Akbar Khan, Sardar Ibrahim Khan, Major Yousaf, and Ghulam Muhammad. The military objective of Liaquat Ali Khan's plan was to elongate the conflict by up to three months (Nawaz, 2008, pp. 125-128). December later changed to March 1948 until the political objective was achieved by other means (Nawaz, 2008, p.135)

The final phase of the operation was to maintain the territory they had under their control. At 50 miles down the URI, state forces gave a tough fight to tribal warriors and blew the bridges to stop the influx, but the local Kashmiris helped through hilly trains to pave the way for tribal to Baramulla. Tribal reached Baramulla on the 26th in a tough fight with state forces. Despite being on the upper end, the fighting stopped at Baramulla for two days, which could have been influential in the step toward Srinagar, and L.P Sen took back control of Baramulla again.

On 29th October, when Akbar reached the road between Baramulla and Srinagar was much waterlogged. He requested help from his friend Colonel Tommy for a Pakistan army armor car; however, he was ready to help the high-profile meeting of military leaders Sher Khan, Lt. Col. Arbab, and Raja Guzanffar Ali Khan denied assistance through Pakistan Army, citing cross-border war. The tribal attack was halted 35 miles away from Srinagar due to a lack of logistic support. Akbar was confronting Indian forces who had spread the war theater northward and southward in Kashmir by December 1947. When Pakistan Army Chief Messervey was brought into the picture, he assured Akbar of 12 officers

volunteers for three weeks and millions of rounds of ammunition for the war. At the very same time, India lifted the issue to the United Nations (Nawaz, 2008, pp.128-130).

Initially, the Kashmir battle was run by Azad forces HQ (Commander in chief, ex-servicemen) and Tariq forces HQ (three Pak army officials, a political officer, a Pakistan audit, an account officer, and a civil supply organization). Akbar advised integrating three headquarters into one and clearing camps in Gujarat and Sialkot in case of the Pakistan Army's possible involvement in mid-February. As per Brigadier Sher Khan (new colonel Tariq), Lieutenant General K.M. Carriapa's summer offensive included the recapture of Jhangar, advance from Noashera to Rajouri, URI to Domel, and Bhimber.

On the 15th of March, Rajouri was captured, and on the 16th of March, Jhangar was seized. It was the first time on 20th April that despite a stand-down order by the supreme commander, the British commander in chief of the Pakistan army General Sir Douglas **Gracey**, summarized the essential military situation in Kashmir. In his assessment, India has eight brigades, groups of artillery, armor, engineers, bombers, fighters, and transport aircraft in Jammu and Kashmir. He stressed stopping Indian forces at the general line of URI- POONCH –Noashera; for that purpose, the Pakistan Army needed to be employed.

Otherwise, India's major offensive will be aimed at Bhimber and Mirpur, approaching the Pakistan border. Furthering the offensive in Kashmir valley along Srinagar, Baramulla, and Muzaffarabad to capture Muzaffarabad and Kohala is equivalent to knocking at Pakistan's doorstep. After the reign of terror on Muslims followed by a massive refugee influx in Pakistan, the seizure of Rajouri would be worsened by the other offensives along Mirpur, Bhimber, and Muzaffarabad, further draining Pakistan's food resources.

India mobilized Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Fakir of Ipi on the political front to stir trouble in NWFP simultaneously. As per the second policy directive given to Gracey, the primary task of the Pakistan Army was to meet Indian aggression. Whereas in the ground realities, Pakistan had ten divisions, including three fully committed brigades where 7 division was given the responsibility to defend Pakistan, and 9(F) division led by General Loftus Tottenham shifted their focus from NWFP to Kashmir. Pakistan's Government directives of defensive attitude exposed the policy of plugging the hole where Azad forces were in a difficult phase (Nawaz, 2008, pp. 133-143).

Indian Spring offensive began in May 1948. Brigadier Hari Baksh of 163 infantry advanced Handwara to capture tithwal on May 24. At the same time, L.P Sen's 161 brigades were halted to get Chakoti by Colonel Akbar on 27 May. Thimayya's plan of assisting L.P Sen advanced to Chakoti by engaging Brigadier Nair's 77 para brigade to hook the northern bank of the Jhelum River and Harbaksh to send a battalion from tithwal to increase the pressure on the Pak army and Azad forces failed due to logistic difficulty. Meanwhile, Azad forces got control of Kargil, Dras, and Leh valley.

On June 23, Pakistan Army and Azad forces halted India's attempt to link URI with Poonch. India acquired Gurais in the north, and Azad troops expelled India from Mendhar. In the light of ongoing genocides and atrocities committed by Indian soldiers, Sir Douglas Gracey complained to his counterpart General Bucher who suspended Brigadier Bikram and one more brigade commander. Simultaneously, after the Indian offensive ended, UNCIP sent his envoy to investigate the ground situation. Pakistan utilized this time to strengthen its defensive line. On the other hand, India planned a web of operations DUCK, EASY, CAMEL, CRAB, STEEL, and BLOOD.

On 20th November, India linked up to Poonch after a hard fight. In the north, on 22 November, India got control of Kargil, and in the South, on Kotli road, the Indian advance was halted by the Pakistan army. Sir Douglas Gracey planned Operation Venus to get control of Beri Pattan road to stop Indian supplies to Jhangar, Poonch, and Noashera and added up a subsidiary Little Venus operation to capture hills that would be substantial in giving access to Akhnoor while destroying 5 Indian divisions. Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan rejected Operation Venus and little Venus, citing political complications in the purview of Kashmir being served on a plate via the UN (quoted by Habibullah – Liaison officer). 10 Brigade and 14 Para Brigade's artillery attack was never followed by an infantry attack due to government restraints.

Additionally, Sher Khan's plans of surprise attack towards Jammu by implying forces beyond and around Pathankot and Gurdaspur while threatening any attack on Lahore. The concentration of Sher Khan's forces pressurized Indian divisional headquarters, which loped for Jammu immediately. In such a deciding moment sacking Sher Khan's disposition and accepting a ceasefire at 23:59 on 1 January halted Pakistan from the military breakthrough in Kashmir. On March 12, 1949, a truce was signed from Munawar in the south to Jhelum in the north. The line from Jhelum to Keran in the north and eastward Ladakh valley remains disputed (Nawaz, 2008, pp. 145-148).

3.1.1.4. Conclusion and After Effects of First Kashmir War

In short, Pakistan's higher political leadership failed to make courageous decisions. They lacked a war-fighting attitude and considered it a minor operation that aimed at internationalizing Kashmir to reach a ceasefire for a referendum. Political leadership constrained support from the military and relied

on the haphazard tribesman in guerilla operations. In the background of fear of full-scale war, the Political administration revoked Messervy's idea and Habibullah's plan. Finally, Gracey's Operation Venus produced discontent in military minds resulting in Bonapartism in Pakistan's polity. This unfinished war ensued political instability and imbalance between military and political leaders, hampering democratic polity from emerging and leading to financial bleeding in the new state (Nawaz, 2008, pp.149-152).

3.1.2. 1965 War of Pakistan

Appraising the 1965 War through the circlet of failed small-scale operations to all-out war on the Punjab and Sindh international boundary is indispensable. Contextual insight into the significant developments of the 1950s and 1960s is a prerequisite to serving this purpose. This riveting period of the 1965 war orbits around operation Gibraltar, Grand Slam, Windup, an all-out war, a reflection of heated political rhetoric, spiraling professional jealousy in military ranks, international community retort, and the ceasefire delinquencies followed by the Tashkent agreement with the attendant consequences.

3.1.2.1. Contextual Insight into Significant development of the 1950s and 60s

Pakistan's quest for security passed through multiple phases of reliance and impotence of UN to Indian stubbornness, the unwillingness of commonwealth under British patronage to discuss bilateral issues like Kashmir, stepping in and out of pan Islamism, and security anxiety mentioning Indian closeness with the US in early days after independence (Nehru Visit to the US) and Soviet

estrangement with Pakistan (ideological reservation), a decisive shift in its posture from nonaligned stance to the joining military pacts (CENTO and SEATO), cracked Sino-Indo relations from border clashes in 1959 to full-scale border war in 1962, the beginning of Chinese friendship with Pakistan, the disenchantment with the US in the 1960s due to duplicity in abidance of US-Pakistan Agreement of March 1959, issuance of military aid to India in the aftermath of 1962 war ignoring its close link with Communist Soviets as well as undermining Pakistan's security concerns being a solid ally in military pacts, cutting off economic aid to Pakistan due to budding romance with China.

Simultaneously, India turned to the US for military assistance against China. The Soviet Union revised its pro-India tilt by offering trade and air service agreements in 1963 and 1961 to explore gas and oil reserves in Pakistan (Amin, 2010a, pp.40-50). Losing political leadership at the early stage of state formation marked the beginning of fragile political tenancies and military venturesome in the 1950s (Amin, 2010a,p.41). Side by side, India's exploitation of Kashmir endeavors continues with Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad's (Head of the Constitutional Assembly of Kashmir) ratification of Hari Singh's accession to India in February 1954, abandonment of the option of plebiscite citing the risk of the Pakistan-US military pact altering the security situation of the region, January 26, 1957's formal annexation of Kashmir to India, the extension of Indian Supreme Court's jurisdiction to Indian Occupied Kashmir in January 1960, Gulzari Lal Nand (Home Minister of India) formal announcement in Indian parliament about complete annexation of Kashmir to India on 27 October 1963, the release of Kashmiri leader Sheikh Abdullah and his visit to Pakistan on Ayub Khan's invitation, Nehru's death in May 1964, Shastri's visit to Pakistan marked by the immediate U-Turn on Kashmir with imposition of articles 356(right of the Indian president to dismiss the Kashmir government)and 357(chief of state is replaced by the governor and chief

minister through pools) of the Indian constitution on Kashmir directly making Kashmir a subject state of India in December 1964 (Sattar, 2009, pp.98-102).

Concurrently, April 1965 marked the sudden eruption of clashes at Rann of the Kutch region (an old border disputed area in Sindh), resulting in the incorporation of 800 square miles of land of BeharPaith into Pakistan, leaving India on a defensive mode adding in the disgrace of 1962 War (Warraich, 2019). In contrast, Shastri threatened Pakistan with all front wars of its choice of time and place, which wasn't materialized (Amin, 2010c, p. 51).

3.1.2.2. Military Landscape of 1965 War of Pakistan

In this military adventure, the Pakistan army launched a circle of three operations to decide on Kashmir and face the Indian counter-offensive of full-scale war on international borders at Lahore, Sialkot, and Sindh Front. Operation Gibraltar was the Pakistan army's brainchild for launching an offensive campaign in Indian-occupied Kashmir to spur the popular uprising against India (Amin, 2010c, p.51).

The early start of this operation before D-Day wiped out its surprise element and alerted Indian forces to retaliate (Warraich, 2019b). Despite small wins in Jammu and Chamb, in arrears to the encirclement by Indian points due to the weak supply line within two weeks of operation, Gibraltar forces had to abort the process under strict military high command orders (Amin, 2010c, pp.52-54).

Operation Grand Slam was ordained to capture Akhnoor to cut off the Indian supply line along the ceasefire line to avenge Operational Gibraltar's defeat and Indian incursion in Azad Kashmir. It started with fire play capturing Chamb, Chakpandit, Bhorijal, and bombardment of the Pathankot airbase, ideally leading to the Jooriyan sector to occupy Akhnoor. Still, the sudden change of

command by General Musa, replacing Gen Akhtar Malik with General Yahya and Brigadier Azmat's preference for personal loyalties over professional urgency, General Yahya's adaptation in the plan of action from offensive to defensive mode, and postponement of further action till 24 hours in the very deciding minute damped the game-changing moment into a failure by halting Pakistan army's advance moment and giving India enough time to strengthen its defense of Akhnoor.

Similarly, Operation wind-up was planned on paper to get India out of Pakistan's area in Azad Kashmir, but the leadership, more specifically President Ayub Khan, agreed to a ceasefire. To relieve mounting pressure on Indian troops in Kashmir, India attacked Pakistan on Lahore, Sialkot, and Sindh front opening an all-out war. Pakistan forces retaliated and pushed back Indian forces from Wahga, Icholgil Uttar, Burki Hudyara, Kasur, and Sialkot by getting an upper end at Khem Karan front to cut deep into Indian territory around Assal Uttar to capture Amritsar (Warraich, 2019). Still, the wrong planning and poor execution due to a shortage of men's power fizzled out in an embarrassing fiasco (Amin, 2010c, p.53).

Pakistan Air force's apparent success at Chawinda, Zafarwal, and Pathankot air bases is the major success in the air. Patrolling of Pakistan Navy's submarine Ghazni in the maritime area near the coasts of Bombay dominated India's Vikrant aircraft carrier due to its capability of sinking Vikrant, which is why it did not even come out of the Bombay coasts. On Sindh Front, Pakistan successfully defended Hyderabad. It crossed the threshold into Indian territory with Hurr community volunteers and Pakistan Rangers by capturing Monaboa, Kishangarh fort, and incorporating 100 miles into Pakistan. Citing the shortage of arms and supplies with unduly international pressure, Pakistan agreed to a

ceasefire on 22nd September 1965 with effect from 23rd September 1965 sharp at noon (Warraich, 2019).

3.1.2.3. Political Landscape of 1965 War of Pakistan

India's insistence on dragging the ceasefire time nine hours earlier than the agreed time was the preparation of foul play, which managed to cut deep into Pakistan from the Dograe area without any resistance from Pakistan, resulting from Major Nazar's sudden disappearance and 8th Punjab abandonment of the defense position at Dograe. Pakistan's counterattack to get back Dograe in the open daylight proved morbid with the effect of the ceasefire's new time. (Warraich, 2019). The Tashkent agreement was signed in January 1966 with Soviet Union mediation which restored the status quo before 5th August 1965, with a peaceful solution of all issues without using force and an immediate halt on propaganda against each other (Amin, 2010c,p.55).

Pakistan enjoyed decent support from China, Iran, Turkey, Indonesia, and other friends. The US remained neutral in this all-out war but cut off economic and military aid to Pakistan in the aftermath of the circle of offensive operations (Amin, 2010c, pp. 54-55). China indirectly threatened India with a three-day ultimatum to end its illegal army posts in Sikkim state; otherwise, 2.5 million Chinese Army was standing on red alert at the Indian border, which contributed to agreeing on a ceasefire citing fear of 2 front war (Warraich, 2019).

Ayub Khan's heated rhetoric of fighting till the end for survival spirit to his double thinking style, where he was preoccupied with ending the war without settling a solution for Kashmir, proved fatal for his politico-military adventurism (Warraich, 2019), despite his excellent performance in achieving economic growth, considerable international prestige, and good rapport with the Soviet Union. Whereas Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's challenging anti-India posture and his

offensive toolkit to get Kashmir, heated speech at UNSC, and political rhetoric of “fighting a thousand-year war against India, stories of betrayal by Ayub Khan in the Tashkent agreement added up to public disappointment with the outcome of 1965 war but winning him an excellent public following resulting into an active political movement (Amin, 2010c, pp.54-56).

Similarly, Indian political leadership was way more invasive in grandiloquence and political point-scoring. India used the Tashkent agreement as a victory in Kashmir, whereas Pakistan’s stance on this agreement was not definite (Warraich, 2019).

3.1.2.4. Consequences of the 1965 War of Pakistan

The 1965 war was a gross miscalculation of ground realities on behalf of Pakistan’s military strategists and policymakers (Amin, 2010c, p.51), including Ayub Khan, who focused more on the ceasefire than the final Kashmir solution even at the beginning stage of 1965 war (Warraich, 2019). It entailed the loss of major urban and rural centers, deepened the political crisis, halted economic growth, ended special status with the US by discontinuing military aid and reducing financial assistance, widened the East and West Pakistan gap affecting national unity, and loud-mouthed India’s aspiration for the nuclear race after underperformance in the war despite being the more considerable force with tremendous resources.

The downfall of Ayub Khan in 1969, hastening separatist aspirations in East Pakistan, moved the Soviet Union to side with a much bigger power India. 1965 war created deep feelings of estrangement on being left unprotected in East Pakistan, which hastened the process of destabilization in Pakistan, affecting its internal cohesion and the psychological climate of anti-India feelings, which accelerated the next war with India in 1971 (Amin, 2010c, p.57).

3.1.3. 1971 War of Pakistan

In the postmortem of the 1971 war, the political crisis, its military dimension, and the overall consequences of war are deliberated below.

3.1.3.1. Political Dimension of 1971 War of Pakistan

In political terms, East Pakistan's plight for provincial autonomy turned into a secessionist movement with Indian backing and a constant delusional and ham-fisted attitude to the political crisis by the military regime, the political leadership of West Pakistan, and the emotionally charged Pakistani public (Amin, 2010d, p.63).

Bengali population's alienation hastened with the Bengali-Urdu controversy, the Agartala conspiracy case (turning conspirators into heroes), India's propaganda campaign accentuating grievances and disaffection towards West Pakistan, the renunciation of the political victory of Awami League in 1970 polls in East Pakistan, repudiation of Mujib-Ur-Rehman's mandate of the right of government and West Pakistan leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's obduracy to power, even by dividing the country into two power centers added with Yahya Khan's refusal to convene National Assembly session turning East Pakistan a rebel province obligated military crackdown as a harsh response and a point of no return for East Pakistan (Amin, 2010d, p.63).

Expelling foreign journalists from East Pakistan was equivalent to increasing World News Media reliance on the endorsement of India's narrative of 1971, which cast Pakistan in the negative limelight under the propaganda of Bengali

genocide, millions killed, hundreds and thousands of women raped by the Pakistan Army troops while ignoring gruesome atrocities committed by secessionists against Pro-Pakistan element in East Pakistan (Amin, 2010d, p.64).

Losing the information war was the first step toward a significant debacle in 1971 (Amin, 2010d, p .64). China, the Arab, and the Islamic world supported Pakistan, whereas US President Nixon favored Pakistan, but the American public sided with the secessionists' plight. The US military pacts were effective in 1965, but this wasn't the case in 1971 when Pakistan's reliance on a third-party US's 7th fleet to rescue East Pakistan and China's military intervention was thwarted while the Soviet Union pushed all his weight behind India through the arms supply for fighting secessionist and Indian forces (Amin, 2010d, p.67).

An episodic glimpse of Bhutto's irrational behavior and dramatic move at UNSC, rejecting the face-saving formula of the polish draft resolution while ignoring the desperate military situation in East Pakistan, fueling the Pakistani public jingoistic avatar who was unaware of ground realities with charged atmosphere of no reconciliation exposed the impoverishment of Pakistan's diplomacy with the military surrendering within two days of this in Dhaka on 16th December 1971. The upshot of the War started from blustering Bhutto's vocalization that Bangladesh was not accepted, signing the Simla Agreement in July 1972, bringing 93000 prisoners of war back, quitting the commonwealth, recognizing Bangladesh in 1974, and publicity stunt of confederal arrangements in 1975, adding the full stop to the short live jubilation of undoing Bangladesh with establishing positive relationship afterward.

3.1.3.2. Military Dimension of 1971 War of Pakistan

Belligerent feelings about handling the Indian Army heightening from the 1965 war pushed Pakistan Military to side with political leaders' Iron fisted policy of

crushing the Mujib-Ur-Rehman party (Amin, 2010d, p.63). Military strategists focused on holding back the Indian Army and secessionists along the entire border with India, which dispersed resources in front of the immense Indian Army's more organized attacks and supply line of soviet weapons (Amin, 2010d, pp. 64-65).

Instead, Pakistan's military strategist could have devised a plan to take a defensive mode of fighting the long-protracted battle to hold on to the Dacca Bowl by utilizing adequate arms stored in East Pakistan (Amin, 2010d, p.65). Eastern Command of the Pakistan Army, headed by General Tiger Niazi, was given the directive of not leaving an inch of territory to rebels by fighting along a two thousand miles border with logistic difficulties under mounting international pressure, propaganda war, and domestic pressure. General Niazi shelved his bravado of India entering Dhaka over his dead body, shedding the last drop of blood to defend his motherland into meager resistance by surrendering 93000 Pakistani troops and civilians to Indian forces clemency (Amin, 2010d, pp.65-67).

Military wisdom exhibiting defense of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan (Pakistan Army would cut through Sutlej River, reach new Delhi before India could penetrate East Pakistan) was burlesqued when Pakistan could not materialize any counter-offensive from West Pakistan to India. In contrast, China and the US warned India to continue any military adventure in West Pakistan after the fall of East Pakistan (Amin, 2010d, pp. 67-68).

At the end of the war, when Pakistan had tiny Indian territory in control to bargain, the Indians not only had 93000 prisoners of war but also the captured area of Azad Kashmir across the ceasefire line, which was formally replaced by a line of control in the Simla agreement (Amin, 2010d, pp. 68-69). Delay in the

return of prisoners of war, the insistence of Bangladesh for war crime trials was abetted by China vetoing Bangladesh's membership of the UN, strengthened Pakistan's bargaining chip with Bangladesh finally dissuading from war crime trials on 195 POWs (Amin, 2010d, p.69). Till 1971 India feared military defeat from Pakistan's small-sized army, ruminating about the Mughal army's victories. But after this war, Indian leaders confidently reasoned that it had nothing to fear from a small country like Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan's psyche of holding grounds against India worked in 1965. But it collapsed badly with poor military strategy and execution, logistic discrepancies, and a politically indicted, non-conciliatory atmosphere (Amin, 2010d, p.70).

3.1.3.3. Consequences of 1971 War of Pakistan

As an immediate consequence of this war, Pakistan lost its geostrategic linkage with Southeast Asian countries rendering it into the sphere of central Asia and the Middle East (Amin, 2010d, p. 73). Hard-earned International prestige for ten years in the Ayub era suffered in the aftermath of this war, raising queries on Pakistan's power politics and reputation in military, economic, and political stature. It was followed by Iran's obnoxious hinting of annexing Baluchistan, Gulf Countries' coldness, and moral indignation by the world, citing the exodus and repression of Bengali secessionists. Pakistan's immature approach of abandoning the commonwealth deprived it of a valuable platform for the next seventeen years (Amin, 2010d, p.72).

India described the Simla agreement as an effort to have peaceful relations with Pakistan by keeping Kashmir out of the equation. It was a win-win for India as it succeeded in restricting the Kashmir conflict as a bilateral issue by taking it to an international forum and Pakistan withdrawing from the tiny Indian territory

it occupied in war, but in response, no withdrawal of Indian forces from the territory acquired in Azad Kashmir.

At the same time, Pakistan maintained its position stating the provision without prejudice to the party part of either side on Kashmir (Amin, 2010d,p.69). Despite the brief claims, Bhutto and his government did not raise the Kashmir issue at any international forum in the next five years, with no fruitful outcome in bilateral discussions. Bhutto considered this agreement as his success in getting back prisoners of war despite having no bargaining chip in hand. Still, replacing the ceasefire line of 1949 with the line of control without getting back control of the territory of Azad Kashmir, which India occupied during the war, was considered a persistent failure (Amin, 2010d, p.69). It was the exemplification of Bhutto's dual approach of breaking diplomatic ties with former colonies of British in Asia and Africa but sparing the main actors such as Britain and the Soviet Union, who pushed propaganda war and weapon supply behind India playing an influential role in the debacle of East Pakistan (Amin, 2010d,p.71).

Bihari's repatriation to Pakistan and the division of assets remain two unresolved issues despite normal relations between both Pakistan and Bangladesh (Amin, 2010d, p.73). Overall, in the diplomatic arena and battlefield, Pakistani policymakers and military strategists exhibited irrational, self-delusional assessments of the ground realities of the 1971 political crisis (Amin, 2010d, p.66).

3.1.4. Zia Regime and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1979

This section will deliberate upon the grimy ride from 1970s Isolation to 1980s International Prestige and back to the 1990s International Isolation with its rampant repercussions for Pakistan.

3.1.4.1. Contextual Background

Pakistan resurged from the unmitigated disaster of 1971 from a demoralized, defeated country to a trusted intermediary by opening a new chapter in Sino-American relations in 1971(Amin, 2010, p.75), strategic signaling of robust stature in the Arab- Islamic World by hosting a successful Lahore Islamic summit amidst of oil boom, recognition of Palestine cause and accepting the *fait accompli* of Bangladesh (Amin, 2010, p.77-78).

Two significant developments of the late 1970s; a) progress towards acquisition of nuclear capability, b) the Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan proved to be the game changer for Pakistan into the international arena owing to its geo-strategic significance. India's nuclear explosion at Pokhran in 1974 generated intense anxiety in the nuclear club to take initiatives against nuclear proliferation.

This resulted in fallout for Pakistan regarding solid opposition, scrutiny, and sanctions on Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear technology, such as the Symington Amendment 1976 (Amin, 2010, p.79). Pakistan diverted pressure on India by tactical maneuvering of either proposing nuclear non-proliferation before the acquisition of nuclear capability or willingness to sign NPT or CTBT on equal footing with India (Amin, 2010, p.81). In the late 70s and early 80s, the perceived acquisition of nuclear capability enhanced the geo-strategic significance of Pakistan in the international arena (Amin, 2010, p.82).

3.1.4.2. Zia Regime and the Domestic lieu of Pakistan

Zia attempted to transform Jinnah's secular democratic Pakistan into a theocratic polity (I.A. Rehman, 2017) by reshaping the state's political, social, and governmental basis on Islamic values and principles (Shan et al., 2016, p.262). 1979's two significant regional developments, Iran's revolution and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, catalyzed the institutionalization of General Zia ul-Haq's efforts to merge political power and religious fanaticism (Shan et al., 2016, p.264).

His political era reflects the junction of the Mullah and military coalition using Islam as a political tool to legitimize his dictatorial rule (Shan et al., 2016,p.264). This unholy alliance reflected upon two dynamics; internal dynamics were linked to delicate right wings religious groups to stay in power, whereas external dynamics were to encourage mujahideen to fight a proxy war against Red Army to repudiate the involvement of the government in the stalemate (Shan et al., 2016,p.264). The US-initiated and Saudi-financed Jihad in Afghanistan was maneuvered on the premise of regional context for the containment of the Red Army and Iranian revolution, which produced significant repercussions for Pakistan across sectarian lines (Shan et al., 2016,p.264). He brought a significant shift in Jinnah's formula from Unity, Faith, and Discipline into Iman, Taqwa, and Jihad-e-Fisabilillah (Shan et al., 2016,p.262). He magnified the understandable security concerns for his political ambitions by introducing new meanings to the perceptions of war, conflicts, and Jihad from defensive to offensive battles (Shan et al., 2016,p.262).

Thus, the Zia regime's Jihad factor induced a whole generation of militants without any antinode(Shan et al., 2016, p.262). He devised Islam as the chief uniting factor for Pakistan (Shan et al., 2016, p.260) and introduced the

Islamization policy (supported by Saudi Royals). His Islamization policy was based on four pillars judicial reforms, Islamic penal system, economic reforms, and educational reforms (Shan et al., 2016,p.262).

He introduced Federal Sharia Court, and Islamic Ideological council, restricted Ahmadi's religious freedom, amended the penal code with the introduction of strict punishment under blasphemy laws, designated Parliament as Majlis-e-shura, arbitrarily amended the objective resolution as the preamble of the constitution, tried to subvert the democratic system by holding party-less elections, amended constitutional provisions to suggest religious criteria for qualification and disqualification of members, destabilized the education system by injecting religiosity factor by facilitating the growth of religious seminaries and downsizing literature on democratic norms, rights of citizens, brought into force the Haddood ordinance, the system of zakat and usher, Islamic financing and Ramazan ordinance(I.A. Rehman, 2017).

Restricting women to Chaddar and Chaar Devari, reducing women's status by halving her testimony compared to men, and increasing the number of witnesses to four to prove a rape status was the beginning of implanting the gender predisposition and dipping prospects for women in all spheres of life(Shan et al., 2016, p.264). His attempt to regulate his measure through the constitutional 9th amendment failed, along with the effort of forming a morality brigade for puritanical regulations(I. A. Rehman, 2017).

He Supported the Nizam-e-Mustafa movement, pitched Islamic revivalism to gain a political base, and negated democratic principles and secularism(Shan et al., 2016, p.267). In contrast, his policies instilled Islamic liberalism in the state and society regarding religiopolitical parties(Shan et al., 2016,p.261). In this last great cold war theater in Afghanistan, Pakistan attained its strategic goal of

keeping the USSR away from its border in the capacity of the front-line ally to US-Saudi funded Jihad in Afghanistan by helping Afghan Mujahidin to fight against the Red Army(Shan et al., 2016,p.264).

3.1.4.3. Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in the pretext of Geo-Political Realities

Zia considered the communist coup and the induction of the red army in Afghanistan as a broader implication of Brezhnev doctrine. He decoded the Soviet Agenda of perceiving Afghanistan as a gateway to Pakistan, access to warm waters, and rich oil resources of the Persian Gulf, which is of vital strategic interest to the West and Arab world. The US immediately operationalized the policy of containment against the increasing Soviet influence by replacing Pakistan in its Middle East policy pillars with the anti-US Iranian regime as the front-line ally and main route of supplying aid to Afghan guerilla resistance coming from West, Japan, China, and Saudi Arabia.

Zia's activism policy got solid international recognition and diplomatic, military, and financial support (Amin, 2010a, pp.83-88). Pakistan's national objective through Afghanistan policy was to attain short-term goals, i.e., soviet withdrawal and end of the communist regime in Afghanistan, and long-term goals, i.e., friendly, and peaceful Afghanistan. Pakistan's strategic consideration behind Afghan policy was to accomplish the tangible goal of nuclear weapon capability, which Pakistan covertly achieved by 1983(Amin, 2010a, p.101).

Geneva accord was signed in 1988 with the scheduled withdrawal of soviet forces in 1989; Pakistan's last-minute insistence on linking the installation of an interim government by sidelining PDPA with the accord was not approved by the Soviet Union (Amin, 2010a, p .95). Avoiding further glitches in the accord asymmetry caused by the continued military assistance from Moscow to Najib's

regime was leveled up by the positive symmetry through military service by America to the Afghan Mujahideen was agreed between both superpowers through the exchange of letters (Amin, 2010a, p .97).

The Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan because of its economic fragility, the unpopular narrative of the war in an impoverished country, the lack of patriotism in favor of war, complicated system of soviet soldier rotation of a short span with more workforce (Amin, 2010a, p .91). With the Soviet withdrawal, American dual standard towards Pakistan prevailed once again in the premise of imposition of the Pressler amendment causing substantial international pressure and sanctions to halt progress on acquiring nuclear technology immediately after the death of Zia (Amin, 2010a, p.99).

3.1.4.4. Civil War, Taliban Rise in Afghanistan , and Pakistan's Pro-Taliban policy

Pakistan's perceived threat of soviet expansionism disappeared with its disintegration and assembled strategic consideration of reviving old fraternal linkages with the six landlocked sister states through natural transit routes to sea with better logistic resources. Pakistan's strategic objective of regional cooperation with the Central Asian states entailing high political and economic require peace and stability in Afghanistan (Amin, 2010a, p.103).

Three decades of unrest first Afghan Mujahideen resistance against soviet occupation (1979-1989), followed by the political turbulence between Najib's communist regime and Seven Mujahideen parties (1989-1992), the fratricidal struggle for power among the seven Mujahideen parties (1992-1996), Taliban a new student revolutionary movement rose to the force after the ouster of Rabbani Regime in 1996 with the famous local support of Afghan population and approval of their policies by the common public(Amin, 2010a, pp.104-106).

Given the prepotency of the Taliban to power, Pakistan was accused of providing military success to the Taliban, for which neither Pakistan had enough resources nor the required political will to do so. Taliban control 90 percent of Afghanistan except the Panjshir and northeast region, with the dominant majority of Pakhtoons in the ethnically fragmented society putting Pakistan in a dilemma of either accepting or rejecting their government. Pakistan policymakers focus on the ethnic homogeneity of the Pakhtoon population on both sides of borders, the Taliban being the only thriving disposition group towards Pakistan due to their educational history in Pakistan, promoting prospects of regional cooperation through transit route via Pakistan, recognized the Taliban government to avoid any negative costs imposed by Taliban along the porous border in already ethnically charged Pakhtoon belt in case of not recognizing the Taliban regime (Amin, 2010a, p.106).

UAE and Saudi Arabia also extended recognition to the Taliban. Soon after seizing power Taliban's strict implementation of Sharia, anti-minority attitude, and anti-women education fatwas with extreme human rights violations created resentment among the common public. Pakistan tried to convince the Taliban regime to improve its human rights record and address the ethnic fragmentation by forming a broad ethnic base government to create peace at home and brotherly relations in the neighborhood. Still, the Taliban showed no malleability resulting in Pakistan into extreme international Isolation, pressure, and criticism for pursuing its strategic interest of durable peace in Afghanistan (Amin, 2010a, pp.107-108).

3.1.5. Saga of Nuclear Weapons Acquisition (1998)

Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapons in response to India's 1974 nuclear explosion is consistent with its survival, territorial integrity, and to deter any existential threat from a neighboring country bigger in size, forces, and conventional weapon superiority.

3.1.5.1. Reservation on Pakistan's Technological Advancement

Pakistan's technological advancement has gone through extreme scrutiny and rough patches. In 1996 US accused Pakistan of violating international law by procuring the Chinese missile M9 with a more than 600 Km range. China duly corrected by narrating that the range is about 300 km which verily abides by international law. Additionally, accusations of ring magnet procurement from China also stranded Pakistan–US relations. Correspondingly, Pakistan was also accused of the transfer of Nuclear Technology to North Korea in the recurrence of the Nowdom-Rowdom missile technology transfer, which Prime Minister of that time Benazir Bhutto denied insistently that the procurement was secured through money payment (Warraich, 2018a).

3.1.5.2. Domestic Milieu, South Asia's Nuclearization, and Response of International Community

The overall atmosphere in 1998 was very charged in terms of worst Indo-Pak relations alluding to Bhartiya Janta Party's government in power, whose politics run on hate campaigns and warmongering against Pakistan, resulting in the attack on Babri Masjid and the double edge sword attitude of America distancing from Pakistan and swaying towards India with the record 10-billion-dollar

trades in only five years. In such a volatile situation, Pakistan sought to balance its conventional perplexity by making short-range and long-range missiles. On 6th April 1998, Pakistan tested the Ghouri Missile, which has a 500 Km range and can hit Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Nagpur, Ahmedabad, and Jalandhar (Warraich, 2018b).

Within a month, India's three nuclear tests at Pokhran on 11th May 1998 shook Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on his visit to Kazakhstan. The global environment around the timing of India's Pokhran atomic tests was flooded with a disarmament campaign targeted at denuclearization. In the immediate reaction, America blocked twelve crore dollar aid to India, joined by Japan, New Zealand, and Denmark, who stopped military and non-military assistance to India. Without any other fear, India vociferously conducted two more nuclear tests after two days of straight eye-to-eye with quizzical disarmament campaigners. American business investors or what one can call dominant elites jumped into the overall scenario requesting the US government to not impose more strict measures which would affect India and threaten US interests there. Surprisingly, at the G8 conference, none of them bothered to condemn India, but Russia shocked all with the blunt statement that India could do more than four tests if wants. At the same time, disarmament campaigners such as America and Australia enhanced investments in India after the Pokhran tests.

In this milieu, the German Chancellors' nonserious statement of 18th May 1998 stating Pakistan did nuclear tests put Pakistan under the fireball of international pressure, warnings, and threats of severe consequences. In an immediate reaction, US President Bill Clinton called Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and America, being Pakistan's tremendous export partner threatened sanctions and cut the supply of F-16 jets to Pakistan. Using its Yardstick approach, America sent a high-profile delegation to Pakistan to convince them that not conducting

nuclear tests failed severely. Then opted the other way around with a joint call by Bill Clinton and Tony Blair to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, warning him of United Nations Security Resolution to bring sanctions for nuclear weapon tests as it did in the case of Iraq.

With India threatening China to regain its territory from China which it got in its control in the 1962 war, China bounced back by vetoing any United Nations Security Council Resolution if drafted. So that's how Pakistan got rid of the UNSC sanction resolution, but the international pressure kept mounting daily. Even the Israel Chief of Staff buffed India's conspiracy and categorically denied Israel planning any attack on Pakistan's nuclear installation, as in Iraq (Warraich, 2018b).

Attal Bihari Vajpayee's statement on 16th May 1998 of dropping nuclear bombs on its naughty neighbor (hinting toward Pakistan) heightened domestic pressure on Pakistan to go nuclear. Imran Khan's statement of 'if needs to eat dry bread but will go nuclear' resembling Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's sentiment of 'eating grass but will make a nuclear bomb' demonstrated the public mandate for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Pakistan interspersing in the hot boiling domestic pressure of going nuclear and international force of non-nuclearization, put forward a proposal for India to withdraw its atomic weapons.

Pakistan will follow it, but the global world ignored it by leaving no other option open for Pakistan. 24th May foiled hijacking incident of Pakistan International Airline's flight (from Turbat to Karachi) to land in Jodhpur for live broadcast in Delhi asking for two demands of non-nuclearization and recovery of funds of Quetta Government further pave the way for Chaghi. It is a mountainous area with no population due to hot weather and water scarcity. On 28th May 1998, Pakistan became the seventh atomic nuclear country by doing five nuclear

explosions in Chaghi I, followed by one more atomic test in Chaghi II on 30th May 1998(Warraich, 2018b).

3.1.5.3. Consequences of Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons for Pakistan

Pakistan received very different treatment from the global world vis-à-vis their response to India. The US sanctioned Pakistan, Germany halted aid, Sweden suspended weapon supply, China expressed dismay, and the Japanese came on roads to protest against Pakistan's nuclearization. World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank halted all economic aid. It imposed economic sanctions pushing Pakistan under 32 billion dollars in total debt with only 1.26 billion reserves. Pakistan's political leadership's overall handling of international pressure, balancing India's nuclear threat, achieving atomic deterrence, and winning the public mandate is creditable. Still, the economic sanctions thwarted the short-lived euphoria of the fragile financial facet (Warraich, 2018b).

3.1.6. Kargil Crisis 1999

Kargil Fiasco exemplifies hegira from naive bus diplomacy and glorifying bilateral talks in the Lahore summit in 1999 to shallow thinking of the Kargil clique, obtuse calculation of immediate political advantage along with civil-military disconnect, absence of joint and coherent institutional decision-making strategy (Sattar, 2011, p.202). The political and military landscape of the Kargil Saga is analyzed considering the nuclear milieu, diplomatic avenue, media campaign (information and intelligence), decision-making processes, dogmata of military planners, and restraint activity.

3.1.6.1. Military Landscape of Kargil Crisis 1999

Pakistan and India's engagement in defensive action 1 is the testimony of trepidation of each other's military competence and the arms race. Theoretically, the security dilemma kept the state betrothed in strengthening its muscle. Following the debacle of East Pakistan in 1971, India riding over its self-image of mighty military power took full advantage of the Zia regime's extensive focus shift to Afghan Jihad and crept into the Siachen Glacier in the Kargil sector in 1984 (Fatima, 2016, p. 629). The blasé attitude of the Zia regime towards India's aggression and intrusion in Siachen in 1984 warranted India to abscond, while violating Simla Accord (Fatima, 2016, p. 630), and achieve the final solution of its choice on Kashmir (Sattar, 2011, p. 202). So, the military junta of four powerful Generals (General Musharraf, General Mehmood, General Aziz, and Major General Javed Hassan) planned to penetrate in Kargil-Dras sector to attack the Srinagar-Leh highway to cut off the supply line of the Indian garrisons in Siachen Glaciers and Ladakh under operation "KOHPEMA."

At first, India was caught in surprise and unpreparedness vis-à-vis Pakistan Army's strong position in the forward posts; however, India retaliated strongly by bringing the Indian Air force into action with a heavy bombardment of cluster bombs and laser-guided missiles on Kargil heights, logistic tracks, command posts which halted the flow of ammunition and food to Pakistan Army (Fatima, 2016, p. 631) resulting into no more further advancement and retreat from the occupied positions (Sattar, 2011, p. 200). Pakistan military strategists once again repeated the 1965 miscalculation by not foreseeing the magnitude of the Indian response to an attempt to redraw LOC (Fatima, 2016, p. 630).

Pakistan military strategists operated on the perception of reality instead of reality itself, with false optimism through no essential homework on India's

preparedness and intent of vertical escalation of conflict, shorn of drawing any exit plan what if ‘surprise element,’ ‘timings and ‘weather’ – the presumable X-factors do not remain pragmatically instrumental in Pakistan’s favor. Kargil operation lost the strategic appeal for Pakistan with India learning about it, and opening Zojila passes one month prior, directing ammunition and troops to assist Indian ground forces in Kargil, bequeathing a strategic mess for Pakistan (Fatima, 2016, p. 630).

The rugged terrain of Kargil (13000-18000 feet in height) contributed exertion of Northern Light infantry- a defensively designed paramilitary force that befell victim of mission creep to overstretch, becoming logistically incapable, operationally incoherent, losing the integrity of defense and counter-attack (Fatima, 2016, p. 632).

3.1.6.2. Political Landscape of Kargil Crisis

The Pakistan Army has enjoyed supremacy since 1954 in the political stature of Pakistan, its foreign policy, and its security domain. Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, threw it down the gauntlet by making alterations in the military high command, such as the early dismissal of General Jehangir Karamat, which did not go well with the Army. In the domestic backdrop of vastly nervy civil-military relations, Kargil took place without a joint and coherent strategy by taking all the state organs, including political leadership, Foreign Office, Military Intelligence, Pakistan Air force, and Navy, into account the scale and latitude of operation (Fatima, 2016, p. 633).

General Musharraf gave the Premier selective information on a need-to-know basis on various occasions; even then, the Premier didn’t consider the strategic risks of discerning information (Fatima, 2016, p. 633). India used an influential media and information campaign that entirely played on the widened fissures of

Pakistan's civil-military relations by building a solid and compulsive narrative that the rogue Pakistan Army acted outside the political authority of the civil government and hindered the peace process deliberately (Fatima, 2016, p. 633).

Kargil Tapes opened the Pakistan Army's Pandora's box of Jihadi hoaxes, confirmed the contradictory claims of discrediting the Pakistan Army's presence in Kargil, and brought absolute embarrassment and disgrace to Pakistan internationally. India outstripped Pakistan in media campaigns by spinning the Indian Government narrative worldwide through coverage of multiple private news media channels of tactical victories resulting in an increased emotional bond with the nation, enhancing connectivity with the world while energizing the morale of Indian Forces.

Contrarily Pakistan, with just one state-owned news channel, the slinging spirit of denial about the Pakistan military presence in Kargil with the civil-military tug of war on ownership of the Kargil operation weakened Pakistan's case abroad (Atre, 2013). This loss of Propaganda warfare helped India to shift the focus from Kashmiris' self-determination freedom struggle to the accusation of Pakistan sponsorship, cruelties of Indian forces to the bravery of Kargil heights, callous overindulgences in Kashmir to restraint in limiting response along LOC with its well-composed, distinctive diplomatic approach, using international pressure as a force multiplier (Sattar, 2011, p.202).

Pakistan went astray at India's diplomatic offensive as only OIC supported Pakistan's stance and asked for de-escalation. From G-8 to European Union, United Nations and the United States called the Kargil operation irresponsible and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Pakistani forces to restore the status quo (Lavoy, 2009, p.200). China neither supported Pakistan nor criticized it openly; however, it was asked to respect LOC (Sattar, 2011, p.200).

Similarly, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran did not support Pakistan on the diplomatic front. Nawaz-Clinton meeting without any prior consultation and approval from the Cabinet and parliament of Pakistan depicts the repeated personalized decision-making at the behest of state institutions. Under duress, Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire on 16th July 1999 with US assurance of resolving all the bilateral issues between India and Pakistan, including Kashmir, once the LOC's sanctity is fully restored, which later US administration elucidated as Clinton's interest only in promoting the Lahore summit after cautious clearance from New Delhi (Sattar, 2011, p .201).

3.1.6.3. Consequences of Kargil Crisis

Neither learning from 1965 nor 1971, Pakistan again lost on the diplomatic, military, and information (media campaign/ propaganda war) front. India played the victim and did not engage in any other adventure across LOC to maintain its victim aura and earn the recognition of the responsible nuclear weapon state by practicing restraint. Whereas Pakistan still got all the negative limelight despite its national policy of not engaging the Pakistan Air Force in retaliation to the Indian Air Force, proving Pakistan's intent to keep Kargil a limited operation and not blow up into full-scale war or nuclear confrontation (Fatima, 2016, p. 635).

Strained political scenario, volte-face policy, and highly personalized style of decision-making at the behest of institutional processes steered to the domestic and diplomatic mishandling of the tactical bid (drawing world attention to the staling Kashmir dispute and redraw the Line of Control), furthering international isolation of Pakistan, discrediting it from responsible nuclear power status to specifying it as patron of extremism in the region (Sattar, 2011, p.201). Pakistan failed to achieve the political objective, which aimed at putting India in a

disadvantageous position via Siachen to push it to the negotiation table on Kashmir. Then again, it fired back at Pakistan by reaffirming the sanctity of the existing LOC (Fatima, 2016, p. 639).

Under the Clinton administration IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank suspended a 100 million US Dollar loan to Pakistan. Due to the Jihadi hoax, the Kashmiri freedom movement suffered a setback. The war ended with growing internal political instability leading to the military coup on 29th June 1999. Kargil's disaster corroborates that no offensive can be materialized successfully without military preparedness and effective strategic planning. Pakistan's miscalculations on all fronts ensured India's diplomatic and political victory (Fatima, 2016, p. 640).

3.1.7. American Invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan's Policy Shift towards Taliban

This section studies the fall of Kabul explicitly under the pretext of the war on terror and American Invasion of Afghanistan with the contextual background of regional developments of the late 90s. It analyses Pakistan's policy shift towards the Taliban within the scope of change in Pakistan's Strategic Culture, the ensuing spillover effects of WOT in Pakistan, its Counterterrorism efforts, and overall consequences.

3.1.7.1. Contextual Background before American Invasion of Afghanistan

The end of the Cold War marked the end of the Soviet Union as the decisive factor in US policy towards South Asia, with more focus on countries from a

regional viewpoint(I. Khan, 1999, p.48, catering to US interests and threats from within the region and a pronounced tilt towards India in the premise of a more comprehensive and institutionalized relationship in the political, military, economic, and diplomatic spheres by adopting a policy on the Kashmir issue (stressed restraint by both sides; respect for the Line of Control; renewal of dialogue; and rejection of violence) seemingly more in favor of India recognizing India's leading position in South Asia (Zhang, 2003,p.89-103), becoming its largest donor of US development and food aid, total US assistance for India counted 45 times more than Pakistan in the fiscal year 2000 only (Lum, 2002).

Bush administration's continuation of the Clinton policy of engagement in South Asia with the significant shift in de-emphasizing non-proliferation as the sole string of US policy towards India, forgoing the demand of signing of CTBT to pave ways for the new strategic framework (Feinstein, 2002) is the overall picturesque from estranged democracies of the cold war to the engaged democracies in the post-cold war era (Kux, 2000).

Pakistan's staunch stance of signing NPT and CTBT only on an equal footing with India not alone, its steadfast support for the Kashmir Freedom struggle, close link with Islamic (extremist) groups, backing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Musharraf's military dictatorial rule (Zhang, 2003, p.90) and the strong opposition from the regional players of the Central Asian great game including China, Russia, India, Iran, Tajikistan, Türkiye, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan for its pro-Taliban policy(I. Khan, 1999, pp.15-16) were the friction points that relegated Pakistan's precedence on Bush South Asian Policy Agenda.

Terrorism is not an entirely new phenomenon that emerged with 9/11. It is the culmination point of the extended continued processes from 1995 to 1998, including destroying eleven jumbo jets over the Pacific, the US Embassy bombing in East Africa, simultaneous attacks in the US and Jordan, and the efficacious killing of thousands in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania (I. Khan, 2012, p.44).

A new sense of vulnerability in the West with the asymmetric security threats intensified the lapse of the post-cold war epoch, still managing changed international relations and society in a new era with no corresponding change (I. Khan, 2012, p.45).

From 1994 to 2000, the trajectory of US policy toward the Taliban proceeded from sympathy to promote its interest in the region to gradual distancing and intensified the outright enmity with the convincing display of heavy use of military force in case of not curbing terrorist training camps and handing over Osama bin Laden to the US (I. Khan, 2012, p.50). Meanwhile, the Clinton administration stressed India first but not India only policy with a strong opposition towards terrorism in the region and extended a clear indication to Pakistan to exercise influence over the Taliban to stop harboring terrorism (I. Khan, 2012, p.49).

Dominant opinion in the Pakistan decision-making circle revolved around the Taliban as the best gamble for gaining strategic depth; withdrawal of support will heighten political unrest in Pakistan, and anti-Pakistani elements fill the power vacuum in Afghanistan (I. Khan, 2012, p.57). Despite the intense international isolation, unusual pressure of regional players, domestic friction, Pakistan's policy, and decision-makers who could not read between the lines to

act in time and change their game in Afghanistan, they suffer from poor decision-making and self-inflicted misery.

3.1.7.2. 9/11 and the American Invasion of Afghanistan

Recognition of Osama Bin Laden as the curator of 9/11, Afghanistan as the sanctuary of terrorism (The Washington Post, 2001), and Pakistan being a supporter of the Taliban regime interpreted as protectors and abettors of terrorists decided the US course of action to remove the Taliban government in Afghanistan (I. Khan, 2012, p.51), ripping off terrorists in every corner of the world, leaving no room of neutrality for any country in the narrative (Office of the Press Secretary [The White House], 2001) and step towards War on terror to secure US primacy and preponderance over an extended time (Tellis & Wills, 2004).

In the post-9/11 International System US, as the direct target of 9/11 and the world's sole superpower, took the leading role politically, economically, diplomatically, and militarily, setting the international relations and society's focus unilaterally on curbing global terrorism by initiating War on Terror (I. Khan, 2012, pp.45-46).

3.1.7.3. Shift in Pakistan's Afghanistan Policy

Lack of a system of decision-making, monopoly of the exclusive military control of foreign policy as well as over the other parts of decision-making, absence of debated and educated assessment of Pro-Taliban policy, undiscerning internal and external warnings, failure to foresee impending transformations in the international system, misapprehension of US intentions contributed to Pakistan internal systemic problems and absurdities which left Pakistan with limited options and less maneuverability. Proximity and open

support to the Taliban with the purported ties with extremist philosophies and groups created a negative impression in international society, depriving it of better bargaining positions and partnership terms, economically and politically leaving it 'with us or against us' ultimatum (I. Khan, 2012, pp.60-61).

Gen. Musharraf's liberal outlook to recreate a Pakistan with the image of a moderate Muslim State, distancing religious parties from the decision-making circles, and his influence as the final arbiter marked the departure from the Pro Taliban policy to be the front-line ally in the war on terror, citing the ferocity of unimpeded activities of various Jehadi groups, fear of Talibanization of Pakistani state and society, a strong omen of changing international system after 9/11 with US indication of zero tolerance for religious extremism and concern for growing diplomatic isolation (I. Khan, 2012, pp.58-59).

The imminent threat emanating from India's readiness to go all out in an anti-terrorism coalition to fill the gap of Pakistan's absence in WOT, target it, and get the upper hand in achieving its security goals in Kashmir resumed the balancing act of Pakistan's foreign policy to reside with the historical ally the US to be on the right side of history shaped Pakistan's decision of joining WOT (I. Khan, 2012, p.61). Pakistan joined War on terror by assuring unstinted cooperation to the USA by agreeing to its list of concrete actions. It will cooperate to its full extent by allowing its territory to be used for military strikes against the Taliban in Afghanistan, to stem extremist organizations linked with Taliban and al-Qaeda from Pakistan, and fight against terrorism without physically involving its forces in any action beyond its border (I. Khan, 2012, pp.56-57).

3.1.7.4. Counter-Terrorism Efforts of Pakistan

Due to Pakistan's geography, supply routes, and intelligence sharing, its role in the war on terror has been unavoidable. From Operation Enduring Freedom to post OEF, Pakistan has operated massively to dislodge transnational militants in its tribal areas, followed by comprehensive operations against terrorists because of increasing terror attacks in the country (Khattak & Mushtaq, 2015). First, the Musharraf era (2001-2008), in which Pakistan relied on military operations (Operation Al-Mizan (2002-2006), Operation Rah-e-Haq (2007), Operation Rah-e-Rast in Swat (2007-9), Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem (2008) (Yaseen & Naveed, 2018), banned extremist organizations, reformed Madrasahs, and drone strikes (Khattak & Mushtaq, 2015).

At the same time, the Pakistan People's Party era incorporates an irresistible dependence on Drone Warfare (Khattak & Mushtaq, 2015) and military operations in Swat and South Waziristan Agency (Operation Zalzala (2008-2009), Operation Thunderstorm (2009), Operation Rah-e-Nijat in South Waziristan till 2009, Operation Sherdil in Bajaur (2009), (Yaseen & Naveed, 2018)). During the third era, Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif initiated peace talks with the militants (Khattak & Mushtaq, 2015). In later stages, multiple operations were launched, including Operation Zarb-e-Azab (2014), Operation Khyber– (2014), Operation Khyber–II (2015), Operation Khyber–III (2016), Operation Khyber-IV (2017), Operation Rud-ul-Fasad (2017- continued (Yaseen & Naveed, 2018).

3.1.7.5. Consequences of Pakistan's Pro Taliban Policy

The pro-Taliban policy thrust in the late 1990s was more of a result of domestic processes and perceptions. Still, the policy shift against the Taliban after 9/11 was calculated to result from external concerns and domestic paradoxes of the

time (I. Khan, 2012, p.43). The disparity in the decision-making circle, incongruity with the pro-Taliban momentum of strategic culture, and abandoning strategic depth notion, diverging statements of people of deep stimulus resulted in the polarization in Pakistani state and society domestically and created an impression at the later stage of WOT of playing a double game (not fully cooperating in the WOT or giving support to the Taliban) (I. Khan, 2012, p.43).

Pakistan considered the Taliban a tool of Pakistan's foreign policy to gain strategic depth in Afghanistan and abandoned them when it became indefensible to keep them. This foreign policy choice has resulted from the immense contribution of international, regional, domestic institutional, and individual factors(inputs) (Roy, 2002).

Pakistan's journey in the war on terror from a partner to a target can be exemplified in terms of the blowback effect from the exclusive Northern Alliance minority government rejecting the representation of the majority section of Pashtun Afghan society resulted in intensified sympathies for the Taliban in the Pashtun belt of Pakistan (P. I. Cheema, 2013, p.134) proceeded by the armed revolt and insurgency in FATA also because of US drone attacks and indiscriminate bombing, the rise of Tehreek Taliban Pakistan, severe damage to socio-economic infrastructure, deteriorated security situation, ruined social fabric, do more mantra from the US, withheld and delayed release of CSF, travel advisories deterring foreign investments (P. I. Cheema, 2013, p.136) and the bad guy national image branding of Pakistan with the massive 70,000 loss of human lives, developmental losses of about 152 billion USD with only 20 billion USD as the reimbursement paid, loss of almost 3 percent of its GDP yearly(Ahmed, 2021). The Kashmiri people's freedom struggle is an indigenous movement (P. I. Cheema, 2013, p.129) that India succeeded in labeling and

portraying in the international world as cross-border terrorism in the wake of the War on Terror can be considered India's biggest win along with its increased influence and massive presence in rehabilitation and reconstruction project in Afghanistan (Kiran, 2009) earning Afghan people trust and branding India's soft image vis-à-vis Pakistan's lousy guy image.

3.1.8. Taliban's Return to Power in Afghanistan and Pakistan's Response

This section studies the return of Taliban in power in the pursuit of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the failure of the peace process, and the Taliban's ascension to power in the post-US withdrawal phase. It analyses Pakistan's response towards the Taliban within the scope of change in Pakistan's Strategic Culture, the ensuing spillover effects of the Afghan Taliban's return to power in Pakistan, regional dynamics, and the overall consequences.

3.1.8.1. Return of Taliban in Power and its Consequences

Here return of Taliban depicts the demise of the Ashraf Ghani Government and the return of the Taliban. The trajectory of US policy in Afghanistan shifted from a military victory to a prompt political settlement ending the two-decade drawn-out (Dostyar & Farahi, 2022) 'unfinished mission' (The New York Times, 2022) of annihilating the Taliban and leaving behind a pluralistic, human-rights-respecting, and economically sustainable Afghan state (Brown, 2022).

Interconnected factors like a **failure in shaping the narrative** (Taliban on the losing front), **failure in leadership for peace**(incongruity over the meaning of

peace among Afghan technocrats, former mujahideen factions and Taliban, disagreement over the timings of elections, formation of the interim government and power-sharing formula, exclusion of youth, women, civil society and media, discrepancies over the mode of negotiation with non-Taliban groups; bi-party or multi-party talks and lack of shared vision among non-Taliban faction), **technical chaos created by parallel structures** (different sections in the Afghan state's negotiations team due to rivalries, incompetence, and ideological differences, the complication of foreign intervention as US; shifting quadrilateral efforts from Dubai to Qatar, not materializing Turkey's peace talk, reshuffling negotiation team, offending stakeholders leading new logistic complexities, discontinuity) and **reducing peace to one element of a foreign deal**(US shifting its priority from counter terrorism to the end of protracted involvement, from annihilating Taliban to asking safe passage for troops, from relying on Taliban's commitment to counter terror actions to encouraging the mere start of peace talk among Afghans to including ceasefire as only a topic of discussion in intra-Afghan negotiations, preferring negotiations with Taliban than negotiations with the Afghan government resulted in shattered confidence and morale of Afghan National Defence Forces(which later on surrendered to Taliban without any resistance on their arrival), stressing Afghan authorities to release more than 5,000 dangerous Taliban detainees in 2020 who returned to the battlefield with greater resolve for revenge and Taliban rewarding as field commanders)led to the failed peace process and Taliban unilateral takeover of Kabul as a result of its military victory in August 2021 (Dostyar & Farahi, 2022).

Taliban's intent of establishing uncontested and unquestioned authority over Afghanistan's state and society is impeded by multi-faceted and interwoven humanitarian, economic, political, and security crises (Watkins, 2022) along with its transition from an insurgency to a ruler (Ponzio & Barakat, 2022) confronted with the erratic challenger IS-K.

The impending likelihood of a major humanitarian catastrophe plagued by COVID-19, food shortage, liquidity crisis (U.S. freezing USD 9 billion of Afghanistan's central bank reserves), economic spiral, hard-hitting security challenges (surges in devastating and deadly attacks of Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K), highly exclusive 'caretaker' government, fractured institutional functioning of Afghanistan's public sector due to the evacuation of highly skilled and educated Afghan. Despite pledges of moderation and reforms, draconian governance is prevalently curtailing the fundamental rights of women and girls. "Bread, jobs, freedom" (نان, کار, آزادی) is the mounting slogan that depicts the quagmire of Afghanistan in a post-US withdrawal setting (Watkins, 2022).

3.1.8.2. Pakistan's Policy Response on Taliban's Return in Power

Pakistan stands cautious of the US's lack of strategic patience. It vindicates its strategic position of first backing the Taliban, who emerged as a stabilizing force in Afghanistan in 1996, and then not turning them into mortal enemies post 9/11 as assured of the US past of overnight dumping the most allied of allies to the most sanctioned of adversaries, leaving a vicious Afghan civil war on its border threatening Pakistan's stability to the post-US withdrawal Afghanistan imbroglio (Crocker, 2021). The withdrawal of US forces revived the Pro-Taliban thrust of Pakistan's strategic culture but with a cautious approach this time.

The collapse of Ashraf Ghani's government during the withdrawal of US forces and the Taliban's ascension to power was perceived by Pakistan as a blow to persistent archrival India, which had close ties with former Afghan governments providing sanctuary to TTP and BLA for carrying out cross-border attacks in Pakistan (Z. U. Rehman, 2022). With the Taliban's victory, Pakistan's Foreign policy concerns about cross-border terrorism and India's increasing influence in

Afghanistan were supposed to be settled, but within a year things unfolded differently for Pakistan.

In the post-US withdrawal scenario, Pakistan took a firm stand in convincing the international community to continue its commitment to peace in Afghanistan (Waheed, 2022) and further plea that maximum engagement, not the isolation of the Taliban, is the solution to the prevailing quagmire in Afghanistan.

Pre and post-US withdrawal, Pakistan has played its role in bringing regional actors China, Russia, and Iran together regarding Afghanistan, where none have formally recognized the Taliban government, by conditioning it to inclusive government, democracy, and basic human rights practices (International Crisis Group, 2022). At the same time, a concurrence prevailed among three regional players on looming threats of cross-border terrorism, foreign fighter recruitments, and the spillover effect of the IS-K movement into their territories. They have agreed to engage the Taliban government via economic assistance to avert the prevailing humanitarian quagmire (International Crisis Group, 2022). Pakistan has gone all out in the evacuation program of all international diplomatic staff and Afghans in the post-US withdrawal period, where all European countries and the West except the United States well acknowledge its efforts.

Taliban has confronted Pakistan on two main fronts; first, by challenging the sanctity of the Durand line (Pak-Afghan border), and second by providing De facto political asylum to TTP (Mir, 2022). Taliban's urge for improved bilateral ties with India, the resumption of humanitarian aid, training Afghan troops, rehabilitation, and construction projects, along with their support for the Chabahar Port project in Iran, is a sign of wary for Pakistan foreign policymakers (Waheed, 2022). Pakistan adheres to the Taliban either because of the ideological inertia of perceiving the Taliban as the safest counteract to the

corroborated Indian impact in Afghanistan or the lack of a practical political substitute for the Taliban(Mir, 2022).

Despite the exasperation over counterterrorism cooperation, Pakistan's decision-makers perceive its relationship with the Taliban as positive and thriving by downplaying the TTP factor as a disruptor of ties (Gul, 2022). Pakistan advocates time and political space, maximum engagement over isolation, and pragmatism over pressure politics towards the Taliban in front of the mounting political, economic, and diplomatic challenges they face with their recent rise to power after two decades. The pro-Taliban thrust of the strategic culture of Pakistan boosted economic cooperation and tilted the balance of trade in Afghanistan's favor for the first time in history (Gul, 2022). TTP attempt to copy-pasting the Afghan Taliban's insurgency model in Pakistan, Spring Offensive AL BADR, continuous targeting of security forces, Afghan Taliban's response of direct talk, and role of mediator in reply to Pakistan's crackdown call on terrorist outfits operating from Afghanistan, a temporary ceasefire in June 2022 and carrying out invasive strikes across Pakistan breaching the armistice in September 2022 and onwards, overall contributing to 56 percent surge in attacks since Taliban arrival (Z. U. Rehman, 2022), encountered with Pakistan's use of cross-border airstrikes in retort to the month-on-month escalation in violence and growing loss of security(Mir, 2022).

3.2. Future Course of Action for Pakistan

Pakistan's alliance with Afghanistan is its significant foreign policy objective. Pakistan's initial response of an all-out plea for international support and removal of sanctions to avert the humanitarian crisis is combined now with thwarting cross-border terrorism and thoughtful restraint in its conduct due to the prevailing security situation under Taliban rule. Neither Patron- Client nor

coercive measures but soft power and diplomacy are ways to invigorate the Taliban in the route where Pakistan's security concerns are mollified (Waheed, 2022).

The turbulent political climate, woeful economic situation, unprecedented climate disaster, volatile social unrest, and the refugee influx are the stumbling block in the path of Pakistan's proactive foreign policy role. Outward lookout rather than inward, seeking new alliances and strengthening old ones to revive the economy through trade and aid, with constant diplomatic engagement with the world, can rescue Pakistan. Despite internal issues, Pakistan should continue to view Afghanistan as its policy priority as Afghanistan is too important to be ignored and extend its continuous pursuit of the world to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan (Waheed, 2022).

Pakistan's cross-border air strike in Afghanistan illustrates that it has all the coercive leverage against the Taliban in its hand if Pakistan desires to recalibrate in the future (Mir, 2022). Correspondingly, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban's takeover, and the unfolding security vacuum have increased regional powers (Russia and China) security concerns along with China's worry about its economic investment; both regional powers do not exercise the 'over the horizon strategy' that America is currently doing in the Middle East, so the lack of hegemon in the region compelled them to look for concurrence with other major regional and global stakeholders (Kapur, 2022).

Table 2. Flow Chart of Strategic Mapping of Transitional Phases of Strategic Culture of Pakistan

S · N o	Indicators	Kashmir War (1948-1949)	1965 War	1971 War	Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1979- 1989)	Kargil War (1999)	War on Terror (2001)	Fall of Kabul (2021)
1	Threat Perception	Indian Annexation of Kashmir	Indian Military Buildup and Aggression	Indian intervention, Secessionist movements	Soviet expansionism and Ideological rivalry	Territorial aggression	Terrorism backlash, Extremist spillover, Internal Security instability	Terrorism resurgence and regional instability
2	Means/ Tools	Irregular forces, Regular Army, and Kashmiri locals	Conventional military means and diplomatic channels	Armed Forces, Counterinsurgency, Diplomacy	Extensive Support (training, weapons, and logistical assistance) to Afghan Mujahideen	Combination of regular army troops and infiltrating irregular forces	Military forces, intelligence agencies, and law enforcement	Diplomatic efforts and engagement
3	Political Narrative	Self-Determination and Kashmir Independence	Territorial integrity, Defense of Pakistan.	Defending National unity and countering Bengali separatism	Anti-Soviet resistance	Strategic ambiguity and the Kashmir dispute	Counterterrorism cooperation	Regional stability, Diplomatic engagement
4	Strategic Objective	Kashmir's accession, Self-determination.	Defend territorial integrity.	Oppose Indian involvement, Retain East Pakistan.	Strategic depth, Contain Soviet influence.	Kashmir territorial gain.	Counterterrorism cooperation	Regional influence, Security buffer
5	Strategic Environment	Non-restrictive, Offensive	Non-restrictive, Ambiguous	Offensive, Non-conciliatory	Non-restrictive, Offensive	Non-restrictive, Ambiguous, Offensive	Non-restrictive, Ambiguous	Non-restrictive, Ambiguous

			us, Defensiv e				us, Conciliat ory	us, Non- conciliato ry
6	Strategic Orientation	Kashmiri self- determinatio n	Defense of Pakistan	Preserve national unity	Supporting Afghan resistance	Supporting Kashmiri freedom fighters	Counterte rrorism cooperati on.	Regional stability, Diplomat ic engagem ent.
7	Actors	India, Pakistan, Kashmir.	India, Pakistan, Kashmir.	East Pakistan, West Pakistan and India	Soviet Union, Mujahideen, Pakistan	India, Pakistan, Kashmiri freedom fighters	USA, Allied countries, Terrorist organizati ons	Taliban, the Afghan govermm ent, US.
8	Nature	Irregular conflict, Guerrilla warfare	Conventi onal Warfare	Conventio nal warfare	Asymmetric warfare (Supporting Afghan resistance)	Irregular warfare	Counterte rrorism cooperati on	Diplomat ic engagem ent

Source: Author, 2023

CHAPTER FOUR

CHANGING SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY DYNAMICS AND PAKISTAN'S RESPONSE

Global Security culture is in the transition phase which implicates the South Asian ingredients for a probable geopolitical nightmare (Kaldor,2018). Conflicting domestic and foreign policy priorities of South Asian countries in addition to their sensitive geo-strategic location entices the hindrance in driving a common pact on region's traditional security concerns whereas non-traditional security threats cut across the geographical boundaries and creates threatening implications for regional stability (Non-traditional Regional Security Architecture for South Asia).

This chapter will discourse the changing aspects of South Asian Security under two main themes A) Dominant Security theme that will cover military, nuclear, economic, political and maritime aspects of security and B) Emerging Security theme that will cover social security, climate security, food security, water security, health security, cyber security, gender security and energy security.

4.1. South Asian Security Outlook

From the 1940s to the cold war era traditional military oriented, state-centric security architecture remained a dominant paradigm revolving around notions of national security, state survival, security dilemma and military might. Post cold war and post 9/11 era marked the emergence and accommodation of non-orthodox approaches of security with an exodus from rigorous hard security

(high politick) to soft security (low politick) where Barry Buzan pitched an idea of people-centric security architecture revolving around people security, human development, and other ideological along with social security aspects like resources, food, water, climate/environment, health and employment.

This shift in the security paradigm from traditional to the non-traditional which encompasses three dimensional challenges (purely natural, semi natural and purely manmade) (R. M. Khan, 2009) have shaped the new notion of comprehensive security, conjoined by notion of cooperative security in the increasingly globalized complex world since 1990. Poverty stricken, socio-economic under-developed, interstate and intra-state conflicts ridden, nuclearized South Asia with fracture and dysfunctional regional institution ricochets dangerous strategic competition spiraling defensive and offensive capabilities, heavy military spendings as a classic security dilemma specimen (Javaid, 2008).

South Asia's precarious regional security and strategic architecture scripts twin phenomenon strategic peril and economic promise as a daunting trial (Lodhi, 2001) ensuring today's non-traditional threats can become tomorrow's traditional conflict (Karim, 2013). Security disposition of South Asia is an intricate matrix of geographical asymmetries, evolving military doctrines, quest for strategic triad, race for fissile material stocks (F. H. Khan, 2015).

In the subtle strategic competition supervened by both India and Pakistan a gradual arms race is jeopardising stakes of South Asian stability. Regional stability dilemma following seven decades of enduring rivalry and self-perpetuating vortex of security competition has entered a dangerous phase (F. H. Khan, 2015) in the current wave of great global transformation owing to following pursuits.

4.1.1. Pursuit of Dominance

Interplay of security, political, economic factors with the multifaceted landscape of territorial prerogatives and extremism in all its impression with the presence of three nuclear weapons states and involvement plus engagement of global powers, multinational corporations and global institutions picturize South Asian region into a crossroads of comprehensive focus and worsening security landscape (Mahar, 2020). Amidst of this volatile scenario the pursuit of dominance either by global powers or the regional powers sets the recipe for insecurity and instability in South Asia (Lodhi, 2001).

With the recent global power politics shift to Asia Pacific, Middle East and Ukraine with increasing rigidities at the global system level seems to cast trickle-down effects in South Asia (Alkin, 2023). Prevailing asymmetry between India's strategic objectives, military dealings, military force level, nuclear doctrine triad, nuclear sabre rattling of India with other South Asian smaller neighbouring states characterise hot front in long running cold war in nuclearized South Asia getting up to new peaks raising graph of built in instability (Lodhi, 2001).

Disparity and growth in South Asian military expenditure, enabling India of employment of more new military tactics for combined military operations and acquiring enhanced conventional capabilities (advanced combat aircraft, deep surveillance capabilities, and supersonic cruise missiles) stepping up support for its limited war fighting doctrine along with budding Indian air superiority leaving Pakistan with more reliance on nuclear weapons amidst of its critical conventional deficiencies ramifying escalation control and the stability of nuclear deterrence on the subcontinent (Krepon, 2003).

Great power competition and arms race in the Indo-Pacific intensifies Sino-America, Sino-India, Indo-Pak classic security dilemma leaving Pakistan in the most vulnerable state (F. H. Khan, 2015). This Great power competition in the Indian Ocean is exacerbating the naval upgradation and maritime modernization of India and Pakistan send-off the broader geostrategic interests at a bay when engaging with their adversary (Qazi, 2023).

4.1.2. Pursuit of Lopsided Approach

Pursuit of lopsided approach of world primary power United States in South Asia amalgams tensions and puts security at stakes. US unplanned exit and over the horizon approach in Afghanistan, leaving instability at Pakistan's doorstep threatening political stability, security, and economic venture of CPEC, (Tourangbam & Sharma, 2023), Asia-Pacific rebalancing in terms of strategic congruence of containment of China by edifying India's strategic ambition and implicitly endorsing India's military modernization and nuclear proliferation activities as counterpoise to China is a pathway to dangerous and destructive security environment (Lodhi, 2001).

In the quest of this policy new security threats are emerging since the involvement of extra-regional powers such as America, Russia, Israel, and Japan (Mahar, 2020). If decisions about the development and deployment of national missile defence and theatre missile defence system sparks renewed nuclear and missile arm race between major powers, it will definitely produce ricochet effect on South Asia by undermining any effort taken to arms control and nuclear restraint regime (Lodhi, 2001).

4.1.3. Pursuit of Appropriating and Securing Seas

Coming in terms with the prevailing strategic significance and dualities of energy security the contemporary realities of South Asian States contemplate departure from post-colonial hangout of exclusive nationalism and territoriality as primary political and a component of state identity with a gradual turn towards sea. Regional mapping and interpretation of boundaries of states primarily depends how the states imagine the region to be.

In this case South Asia's turn towards sea marked the flux in the contour of this region where South Asian States' maritime imagination neither contemplate pre-partition meta regional connections nor interactional fluidity of state for trade and community rather an attempt to replicate and multiply similar orientation of land territoriality on seas ensuing securitisation of ocean space with application of prime logic of boundaries and sovereignty to the ocean space (Das, 2022).

India and Pakistan are actively engaged to achieve strategic advantage over adversary by acquiring new naval platforms, emphasizing significance of SLOCs, expanding maritime operations by diversifying launch options for cruise and ballistic missiles on existing naval vessels, employing newly acquired and deployed technologies augmenting the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean into complex matrixes of military and naval ambitions, increasing threat perceptions and risking deterrence in South Asia (Qazi, 2023). The consequences of this unchecked India-Pakistan security race may perhaps reverberate beyond South Asia into the Asia- Pacific and Middle East regions (F. H. Khan, 2015).

4.1.4. Pursuit of Technological Hop

In the great global transformation world is at the cutting edge of a technological leap. In this tech-savvy and globalised emerging generation technologies are not risk free instead they possess huge potential of societal fragmentation leading to insecurity (Karim, 2013). In the shifting world order in digital age, global economy is coping with populism, automation, unemployment, Covid 19, environmental disasters, concerns over sovereignty and strategic autonomy, rise of globalist vs nationalist and vice versa.

Technological innovations in case of India and Pakistan are stepping up advancement in missile technology, nuclear arsenals, military modernization, naval build up accentuating expensive arms race in the region (Qazi, 2023). The dual use of mobilizing aptitude of technology across transnational boundaries and communities is further complicating and securitising the digital space with cyber-attacks confounding the political use of new media (Karim, 2013).

High risks of non-nuclear conflicts in South Asia, conventional imbalance in South Asia, “horizontal” proliferation of military technologies (including but not limited to the technologies of nuclear weapons, missiles, and ballistic missile defences), Cross-border terrorism ,intersecting social inequalities, gender and racial violence, missing gender perspective, fragile pandemic security, political volatility, promise and perils of conflictual understanding of rule based order is worsening and weakening the vexatious strategic stability of South Asia (Topychkanov, 2011).

4.2. Dominant Security Themes

In the dominant security themes Author has covered the securities that adds to the hard power of country such as military, nuclear ,maritime , as well as the economic and political security .

4.2.1 Maritime Security

Maritime Security is not a concrete term but is used regarding national interest and security with respect to seas, oceans, and maritime environment. States shifting their focus from conventional arena to Seas itself is the proof of changing dynamics in the security and strategic architecture of the Indian Ocean region (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2022).

4.2.1.1. Indian Ocean at the Crossroad of Maritime Competition

Current Shift in power dynamics from Euro-Atlantic to Indo-Pacific has revitalized the geopolitical aspirations of the stakeholders to concentrate on strategic significance of Indian Ocean(Saravanan, 2022).

From being the major theatre of competition during the cold war to relegated into the periphery of strategic consideration in the post-cold war era with US calibrated focus on Middle East within the greater context of Pacific, Indian Ocean has experienced the vacuum for great power competition meanwhile serving as a transit route for US forces (between Japan and Middle East and staggering ground for military operations (Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya) (Baruah, 2022).

India and France were embraced as the key players in the Indian Ocean and mainly India was entitled in the leading role by US as the net security provider as stated in 2009 by the US Secretary of Defence Robert Gate in Shagri-la dialogue in Singapore. As a net security provider India's departure from the place of strategic inertia to encompassing Indian Ocean as an economic and strategic theatre in its strategic calculation is direct response to the arrival of an additional (extraterritorial) player-China which is altering the geopolitical dynamics of Indian Ocean with its Maritime Silk Road initiative. Strong Chinese footprints in the Indian Ocean magnifies Sino- India rivalry in both terrestrial and marine domain (Baruah, 2022).

Under the evolving geopolitical perspective, the island and littoral states aims to expand partnership in order to reduce reliance on the single connect. In this case China emerges as an alternative security partner despite of India's net security provider role, extensive regional activism and geographical edge in Indian Ocean vis-a-vis China (Baruah, 2022).

4.2.1.2. China's 21st Century Maritime Silk Road

China pitched the idea of maritime silk road to develop and increase maritime cooperation through commercial, economic, and diplomatic means between Southeast Asian Countries via network of ports in relation to its SLOCs from port Sudan to Mainland China covering Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Maldives, and Somalia which has become a bone of contention for India referring it as 'String of Pearls' and China's great strategic design to encircle India. Chinese SLOCs traverse Straits of Mandeb, Malacca, Hormuz and the Lombok plagued with maritime terrorism and piracy making it obligatory for China to guard its commercial and energy interests.

China's naval power modernization is driven by acquiring superior operational capability, tools for strategic deterrence, counter-attack capability, planning for Anti-Access/ Anti-Denial capability, etc. which alarms India, Japan and Vietnam about China's claim of its maritime expansion for peaceful and commercial purposes only (Chand, 2014). Despite of 9 out of top 10 crude oil suppliers to China route through Indian Ocean it remained at the periphery of China's maritime ambition with its utmost focus on South China Sea due to immense engagement and security calculations of US in the Pacific region("Military and Security Development Involving People's Republic of China," 2021).

With the current shift China is instituting itself as a credible security player and partner to its friends in the region to safeguard its relevance and protect its predispositions by establishing embassies in all six island states, opening its first overseas military base in the Indian Ocean, in Djibouti, deploying Submarine in Horn of Africa for anti-piracy mission, submarine docking in Sri Lanka, increased military engagement and deal with Bangladesh (Baruah, 2022).

Further China's presence and investments in Gwadar port in Pakistan, Colombo and Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, Chittagong port in Bangladesh and ports/naval facilities in Myanmar is considered by India an encirclement attempt aimed at hindering smooth movement of essential goods during crisis and monitoring Indian Navy's ship movements and test-firing of strategic missiles (Chand, 2014).

In the evolving maritime architecture conceptual mirroring of US and India's maritime doctrine in naval aspirations for power projection and sea control ("Indian Maritime Doctrine," 2009), US lack of intent of dominating India in maritime domain, increased presence of China in Indo-pacific with the growing

naval relations with Pakistan has paved ways for US- India strategic maritime partnership for their better cooperation in the seafaring realm (Smith, 2017), (Baruah, 2022).

4.2.1.3. India's Maritime Strategy

Traditionally India views Indian Ocean as Eastern and Western Indian Ocean with its prioritized focus on the Eastern part (Baruah, 2022). India's departure from "Freedom to Use the Seas: India's Maritime Military Strategy" of 2007 to Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy" in 2015 marked the shift in configuration of India's mindset which equates aggressiveness, forthrightness, and competitiveness in its sphere of influence.

In 2015 Maritime Security Strategy Indian Navy has pinpointed the primary areas of interest as entirety of Indian Ocean from East Coast of Africa to the Lombok Strait. Secondary area of interest includes the South and East China Sea, Southeast Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, the Western Pacific Ocean, Antarctica, and the West coast of Africa. Commanding sea, controlling chokepoints, securing the sea lines, and increasing Naval presence in areas of influence are the highlights of the India's Naval doctrine 2015.

India's impetus towards marine expansion, power projection and naval modernization is prevalent in its transitioning from **"buying navy"** into **"building navy"** aligning with its 2014 campaign of Naval indigenization **"Make in India"** for attaining self-sufficiency and self-reliance at home along with providing economic incentives (Saravanan, 2022). Massive engagement of Ship building center (SBC) at Visakhapatnam and Vadodara (development of INS Arihant, Arighat, S3, S4), Larson and Turbo (production of Kilo class), Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) at Mumbai (production of Kalvari class) (NTI, 2022a) are the products of naval indigenization (Singla, 2017).

4.2.1.3.1. India's Naval Modernization

The three main objectives that constitutes India's current naval expansion and maritime strategy incorporates prevention of intrusion from hostile powers, projection of power based off India's interests and protection of the SLOCs (Basu, 2021). To achieve its naval objectives India has stepped up its naval budget from 14 percent to 19 percent (Baruah, 2022).

Largely Germany, France and Russia are traditional submarine import partner of India. Indian Navy partnership with Germany's ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) in 2016 (upgradation of two of the four Shishumar-class, arming the boats with Boeing anti-ship missile systems) and in 2018 (upgradation of the **INS Shishumar** (Type 209), Indian shipbuilder Larsen and Toubro shipbuilder partnership with Russian Zvezdochka (upgradation of the Kilo-class submarines) in 2018, Local Mazagon Dock Ltd.'s partnership with France's Naval Group (indigenously building six new Scorpène-class, **Kalvari vessels**), 2019's India and Russia deal for 10 year lease of another Akula-class nuclear submarine, **Chakra III** to India by 2025, recent construction of two new submarine bases Karwar(500 kilometres south of Mumbai) and the INS Varsha (east coast near Kakinada) to increase India's naval nuclear capabilities vis-a-vis China's recent upgrades (Pandit, 2013) are the trajectorial glimpses of India's naval modernization (NTI, 2022a), (A. Singh & Joshi, 2020).

From 1960 to 1980 India traverse from mere discussion to development of Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) submarine program which is the supremely plateful of its sea-based nuclear deterrent serving as one pronged of its triad of minimum nuclear deterrent (MND). INS Arihant (2016), INS Arighat

(2021) and the remaining S-3 and S-4 (under construction) are the testimony of operationalizing its nuclear triad. These four nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are designed to possess the capability of submerging for 50 days without surfacing and firing torpedoes as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (NTI, 2022a). From 2012, ten-year lease of a Russian Shchuka-B (Akula II) known as Chakra II class nuclear submarines to 2019 Chakra III for ten-year lease with effect from 2025 is an adamant attempt of gaining expertise in operating nuclear submarines.

Momentarily, the Indian Navy plans to have a force level of 200 ships with an increase of 50 ships by 2027. In this build up it has the support of the US, Japan, and several Western countries (S. Ali, 2021).

4.2.1.3.2. India's Maritime Connectivity

Piracy, trafficking, maritime terrorism, extra-regional presence, control of choke points, threat to SLOCs, regional uncertainty, illegal unreported and unregulated fishing are among the major maritime challenges. To address maritime security challenges in Indo-Pacific Ocean, India's attempt at maritime connectivity via interoperability by connecting into bilateral, trilateral and multi-lateral initiatives, partnerships and associations with the regional states include Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR)2015, Mausam initiative, Sagarmala initiative, Mission Sagar 2020, Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), Neighbourhood first policy, Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and AUKUS, the recent institutional relationship between India's Indo-Pacific Ocean's Initiative (IPOI) and ASEAN's Outlook on the

Indo-Pacific, Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) and US renaming its seventh fleet the PACOM, as INDOPACOM (A. Khan, 2019).

It is engaged massively in the naval training and exercises with countries of strategic convergence UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Vietnam, Britain, Philippines, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Indonesia, Singapore, Brazil, and Quad members naming a few of such exercises as MILAN and MALBAR (Saravanan, 2022), Paris New Delhi-Canberra axis, Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) (S. Ali, 2021) as well as India–Indonesia Coordinated Patrol. India is balancing China’s engagement with states at its proximity by actively involving with South China Sea State in terms of supplying Patrol vessel to Vietnam and Brahmos missile system to Philippine along with increased multipronged activism (T. L. Brown, 2022). Indian navy stepped up overseas deployment at Sabang Port (Indonesia), Duqam port (Oman), Diego Garcia base (America) and French base on reunion island (Saravanan, 2022).

4.2.1.3.3.India’s Maritime Naval Culture

From prehistoric times to early kingdoms, high Middle Ages, late Middle Ages and modern period Indian Subcontinent had versatile maritime culture which remained dormant in post decolonization period and is on upsurge once again in the contemporary era (Satish, 2023). In the British Raj era along the Indian coastline Shipbuilding has been an effective factor in enunciating Indian maritime activities in Indian Ocean such as vessel built by local craftsmen in Masulipatam and Surat were exemplary in the world market (Maritime in India, n.d.), (Sripurkar, 2023). India’s total sixteen submarine fleet are based in Visakhapatnam on the east coast and Mumbai on the west coast. Owing to Visakhapatnam’s geographical gradation, South India has a very strong maritime culture as they have been linked, engaged and active in the sea trade

whereas Indian Navy is in process of developing a strong maritime culture on the west coast Mumbai (NTI, 2022).

4.2.1.4. Pakistan Maritime Strategy

Launch of Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan (MDP) at MARSEW workshop in 2018 marked the departure of Pakistan from sea blindness to sea awareness. Titled as ‘‘preserving freedom of seas’’ it emphasises on the importance of sea tied economic and maritime security (Qayyum, 2021). **MDP** identifies North Arabian Sea as the primary area of interest whereas the western Indian Ocean as the extended area of interest and strategic area of interest varies as per evolving strategic needs. MDP portrays a comprehensive picture of protecting, preserving, and advancing maritime interest of Pakistan by implying maritime diplomacy as an absolute component of active foreign policy (A. Khan, 2019).

MDP envisios Pakistan Navy as the combat ready multidimensional force with battle readiness and professional competence (Alamuddin, 2020). Its guiding creed propagates preserving the Nation’s freedom at and from the sea during peace, uneasy peace, crisis, and war, not dominance but free and fair use of seas (A. Khan, 2019). Pakistan’s maritime doctrine is aimed at ensuring its safe passage around Western Indian Ocean and not seeking to target the presence of any other navy in the Indian Ocean (Qayyum, 2021).

Pakistan maritime policy (**PMP**) aims at creating balance in Indian Ocean region in response to Indian aggressive naval designs. It revolves around the peaceful use of the Exclusive Economic Zone, Continental Shelf, increased maritime connectivity, continued development of ports and the Gwadar Economic Zone (F. Nawaz, 2022). Pakistan has adopted a region centric model of maritime security with multilateral approach to confront maritime complexity such as

positioning SLOCs, countering proactive doctrines and oceanic nuclearization (Qayyum, 2021).

Pakistan Navy is a defensive force with the strategic objectives “to protect maritime interests of Pakistan, deter aggression at, and from the sea, provide disaster relief, participate in the development of coastal communities and contribute to international efforts in maintaining good order at sea” (S. Ali, 2021). Pakistan Navy has developed an edge over superior Indian Navy by aligning with Anti access/anti denial strategy (increased primacy of submarines and highly equipped missile based maritime aircraft), no first use policy in conflict (despite accurate targeting manoeuvring) earned a mature sea guardian state status.

With India’s aggressive hegemonic designs, naval build up and its detection in Pakistan’s water in 2016 and again in 2019 post-Pulwama increased Pakistan’s threat perception from sea. In the prevailing scenario with the addition of new equipment **Pakistan’s naval strategy** is on the trajectory from defensive to active defense further into an offensive defense strategy if only the current naval modernization is viewed in context of A2/Ad Strategy to enhance its capability and credibility to maintain a credible deterrent force (S. Ali, 2021).

4.2.1.4.1. Pakistan Naval Modernization

To maintain credible minimum deterrence posture Pakistan prospects its submarine force as crucial. Currently Pakistan Navy fleet comprises of eight submarines (five diesel-electric and three MG110 mini submarines) (NTI, 2022b). As per Modernization plan Pakistan aims to add 50 vessels including 20 major ships, increasing frigate fleet by 50 percent, and doubling the

submarine. Main objective of this plan is to develop defensive capability to deter India, ensure its maritime security comprising coastal security and freedom of navigation and facilitate its second-strike capability increasing survivability of the naval force (Alamuddin, 2020).

Pakistan's outdated partnership with US (PNS Ghazi) in 1964 , France (three Daphne-class submarines PNS Hangor, Shushuk, and Magro 1969-70, two Agosta-70-class submarines-1978, three Agosta-90B boats) in 1994, transitional partner, Italy (three Cosmo-class MG110 miniature submarines- X craft) in 1988 and Portugal (second-hand Daphne-class vessel) in 1975 either because of compliance of their restrictive laws or incentive towards India leave the vacuum for Pakistan amidst of Indo-pacific ocean competition to be majorly filled by China and Türkiye as current import and supply partner with pronounced focus on the indigenous production via technology transfer and strengthening manufacturing capability (NTI, 2022b).

Pakistan has started to explore different markets now and one such case is Polish Ship builder Techno Marine's supplied 30 Chaser TM-1226 rigid inflatable boats to Pakistan Navy and South Africa's Paramount Group for long range MPA upgrade project (to integrate systems into the Embraer Lineage 1000 aircraft) (Ansari, 2023).

Pakistan's Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW) partnered with Chinese Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIS) for (eight Type 39 Yuan-Class attack submarines, Hangor-Class 039B) in 2015 (four to be prepared by China and four Pakistan where half commissioned by 2023 and rest four one per year from 2025-2028), transferral of one extra Chinese Yuan Class submarine (to train Pakistani crews) (Alamuddin, 2020) and Türkiye's Savunma Teknolojileri Mühendislik (STM) for (upgradation of three Agosta 90 B class

submarine) in 2019 (Defence Turkey, 2023) and four MILGEM corvettes in 2018, the Pakistan Naval Supply Ship (PNS MOAWIN), "Super Mushshak" trainer (UAV) (Daily Sabah, 2022). Pakistan is at consequential consequences of the Great power competition in the Indo-Pacific Ocean.

Pakistan's Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works (KSEW) partnered with France's Naval Group SA for (enabling technology transferral to develop the Khalid-class Agosta 90B) submarine program, licensing agreement to export indigenously produced Agosta 90B vessel (yet to complete any sale), modernizing Karachi Naval Dockyard to facilitate assembly and construction of PNS Hamza (S139)- first indigenously built submarine) mark beginning of new domestic venture (Alamuddin, 2020).

Pakistan's Bahria Boat Building Yard partnered with Polish shipbuilder Techno Marine as part of technology transfer deal to launch its first 12T marine assault boat (Ansari, 2023). In 2017 India's launch of Agni-V ICBM obligated Pakistan to test fired its first nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missile, Babur-III and again in April 2018 is the testament of Pakistan Chief of Naval Staff admiral Shahid Karimullah's statement that Pakistan is arming its submarine with nuclear warheads until provoked by India (NTI, 2022b). With recent naval developments Pakistan Navy responded to INS Arihant's deterrent patrol with the Regional Maritime Security Patrol (RMSP) as well as challenging Indian naval sea-based deterrence and balance of power by testing Babur-III, Haft-VIII, and Exocets (French built) (Qayyum, 2021).

“Pakistan Navy current engagement curricula includes frigates, Hangor-class submarine replacing these directed energy weapons, underwater sonar surveillance coastal defence systems, unmanned underwater vehicles, unmanned combat aerial vehicles, planning of replacing the P-3C Orion patrol

aircraft with 10 commercial jets, the acquisition of medium-altitude; long-endurance unmanned combat aerial vehicles and 20 indigenous gunboats (commissioned up to 2025)’’ (Alamuddin, 2020).

Naval modernization plan aims to reduce our outside dependencies and satisfy our high-tech needs through a rational two-pronged developmental strategy consisting of indigenization and multiple sources of supply. But in largest-ever indigenous warship program local industry’s limited participation and dependence on foreign steel production instead of local production is a concern out of many others (Ansari, 2023).

India possesses the supersonic capability and now developing hypersonic capability along with the super aid from the western countries whereas Pakistan has only subsonic and announces to produce supersonic whereas hypersonic capability, long-range air-defense system, the increase in submarine defense and Anti-Submarine Warfare capabilities, Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, protection and security of electronic and cyber system, and developing space-based assets are important areas that needs to be focussed upon (S. Ali, 2021).

4.2.1.4.2. Pakistan Maritime Connectivity

Pakistan’s maritime challenges include threat to SLOCs, safeguarding CPEC passage, maritime terrorism (piracy, trafficking of narcotics, people and illicit goods, arms, illegal fishing, proliferation) environmental crimes, maritime accidents, and disasters along with India’s increasing influence and aggressive posture in Indian Ocean and beyond. Pakistan Navy and Chinese Navy are collectively working on three key areas to ensure Gwadar port security, vessel security, and security of sea lanes (F. Nawaz, 2022).

To address these challenges further and enlarge the reach and operative endurance Pakistan Navy attempts at maritime connectivity by promoting understanding, interoperability through bilateral, trilateral and multi-lateral initiatives, partnerships and associations with the regional states (Azmie,2017) include Naval Research and Development Institute-NRDI (S. Ali, 2021), "Force Protection Battalion" initiative,(F. Nawaz, 2022) "Regional Maritime Security Patrol" (RMSP) initiative by (A. Khan, 2019), Task Force-88 (TF-88) in 2016 (Defence Turkey, 2019), ASEAN-Regional Forum (ARF) 2004, Operation Enduring Freedom-Maritime Interdiction Operation (OEF-MIO- discontinued in 2011 due to Japanese convergence of interest with India (F. Nawaz, 2022), **multinational maritime exercises** AMAAN since 2007, (Defence Turkey, 2019), UN mandated combined maritime tasked forces CTF150, CTF151 and CTF 152 since 2004 (Mergener, 2023) and **bilateral exercises** such as THAMAR AL TAYYIB (TAT) with Oman since 1990 (DAWN, 2021), Arabian Monsoon in 2021 with Russian Navy, Lion Star-II in 2021 with Sri Lankan Navy (Archus, 2021), the Sea Guardians annually since 2020 (Zhuo, 2022) and **bilateral passage exercise** with Iranian Navy ships in 2023 (Pakistan Today, 2023), , PASSEX with Japanese Navy in 2020 (Voice of Sindh, 2020), PASSEX with South Korean Navy (Tribune, 2020),and Oman's Navy since 2022 (ZAWYA, 2022) along with **peace mission (good will visits)** to Oman, **Mauritius and Seychelles, Malaysia, China, Thailand** (HILAL English Magazine, n.d.) and **Russia** (Times, 2016) during overseas deployment.

Offshore drilling of ExxonMobil (The US firm,) with ENI Pakistan Limited (Italian firm) in Pakistan's maritime zone along Karachi coast (for oil and gas deposits) is an illustration of its multilateral collaborative maritime approach (A. Khan, 2019). India's quest of political influence through inordinate maritime power projections in Gulf countries, Indian Ocean Island states, Southeast Asian nations, and pacific nations restricted Pakistan naval ledge across these regional

countries (Azmie,2017) and its right of membership in multiple maritime arrangements, alliances, and regional initiatives such as Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), also its own financial incumbent to balance Indian efforts contributes to severing its security dilemma with relative isolation at international arena and strategic front in Indo-pacific region (Hassan,2019).

India's entrance into **LEMOA** led to its expulsion from Chahbahar (which it used to sabotage strategic worth of Gwadar as well as creates ruckus in Balochistan by strengthening ethno-sectarian, nationalist and anti-state elements i.e., Kulbhushan Yadav case) generates strategic prospect for Pakistan to manoeuvre level-headedly for strong bilateral and trilateral engagement with Iran along China (Qayyum, 2021).

4.2.1.4.3. Pakistan's Maritime Culture

Traditionally, Pakistan's most submarine fleet are located at the Karachi Naval Dockyard, whereas Jinnah Naval Base in Ormara is also under consideration for placement of submarine fleets as per naval officials' announcement in 2014 (NTI, 2022b).

From Alexander the Great's route along Makran coast to Macedonia, Battle of Daibul at shore of Pakistan to the world's first sea trade network actually established between people of deltaic region of Indus River and Mesopotamia around 2000BC stances the historical evidence of maritime affairs of today's Pakistan but its coastal communities lacked the cultural transformation from the traditionalists to modernists impacting the overall coastal development, resulting into pervasive absence of maritime culture entailing into sea blindness (Azmie, 2017).

Recurring maritime blindness and conventional mindset in the national thinking style has led to poorly developed port, harbour infrastructure, low standard ship-building industry, polluted seas, below par fishing capacity, non-existent coastal tourism, massively underdeveloped Makran coastal belt and absence of maritime/blue economy in the construct of economic set of priorities. Despite having large share of sea expanse and significant geo-strategic position at the doorstep of energy reservoirs not only it lacks maritime culture that can foster an inborn ability to think maritime but also fails to construct maritime paradigm in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean which is currently the hotspot of emerging strategic alliances, coalitions and partnerships that left Pakistan is in destitute i.e., AUKUS, QUAD (Azmi, 2017).

4.2.2 Military Security

In the post-9/11 scenario, threats arising from terrorism and nonstate actors have widened the spectrum of contemporary challenges complicating the magnitude and dimension of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security (Mustafa, 2008).

Geo historic, geo-strategic, geopolitical, geo-economic, and geo-cultural proportions shape the security construct of this heaviest militarised zone, home to interstate and intrastate wars and a corridor of instability known as South Asia (E. M. Khan, 2013). The security interests of major powers (such as the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan, US increased investment in India, and China's growing presence in South Asia) create an indestructible edge by creating irremovable imprints on the South Asian security landscape (E. M. Khan, 2013).

Contextualizing military security in South Asia refers to countries' measures and strategies to protect themselves from external and internal threats (Wright, 1994). The unresolved Kashmir issue, the threat of terrorism and cross-border infiltration, the presence of IS-K, Al-Qaeda, TTP, and the Taliban insurgency, then transitioning to state apparatus in a government role contributes to the complex military security environment of South Asia (Lodhi, 2001). To ensure military security, countries in the region have invested heavily in modernizing their armed forces, producing, and acquiring advanced weapons and technologies, strengthening their border security measures, and providing standard training to their military personnel (Zaidi, 1992).

4.2.2.1.Strategic Thinking, Doctrinal Transformation, and Military Strategy

Following the 1962 Sino-India War, India's military strategic thinking shifted towards deterrence through a conventional military build-up (Mehta, 2016). In 1980, it came up with the Sunderji doctrine to cut Pakistan into two pieces, leading to the Brasstack crisis:1986-1987 (K. Ali, 2015).

Ensuing the 1999 Kargil conflict and the Indian Parliament attack in 2001, the failure of Operation Parakram exposed the strategic constraints of the Sunderji doctrine. It proved to be a turning point in India's strategic thinking to re-evaluate its military strategy and doctrine (Jaspal, 2011). It led to the adoption of the Cold Start Doctrine in 2004, a limited war strategy under the nuclear umbrella that emphasizes swift, mobile, and joint offensive operations with the Indian Air Force and some parts of the Navy for narrow territorial gains against Pakistan to use as a bargaining chip (Gady, 2019).

CSD mainly focuses on employing network-centric and economic warfare capabilities of the Indian Army and Airforce (Hanif, 2022). After Mumbai Attack, India officially stated a hybrid warfare strategy in 2008, formulated Technical Service Division to capitalize on Pakistan's geo-economic vulnerabilities and geo-strategic weakness, flaring up ethno-political fault lines, planning regional-global isolation, and fake news/propaganda against Pakistan (M. U. Khattak et al., 2019). Ajit Doval 2014's offensive defense doctrine adopted a more proactive and aggressive approach to defending itself against potential threats by pre-emptive attacks (M. U. Khattak et al., 2019).

Understanding the cost and consequences of the limited war into a full-scale war under the nuclear overhang, the Indian strategic thinker came up with the sub-conventional warfare under the Joint Armed Forces Doctrine in 2017 (M. U. Khattak et al., 2019), propagating surgical strikes, cross-border raids, and offensive diplomacy vis-a-vis any terrorist infiltration with an announced shift from credible minimum deterrence to credible deterrence (Hanif, 2022). It further focussed on integration, interdependence, interoperability, compatibility, and precision-based operations, with sea control and sea denial strategy, indigenization of technology, and technological independence by 2035 (Hanif, 2022).

In 2018 India developed a comprehensive Land Warfare Doctrine emphasizing fighting the war on two and a half fronts (Hanif, 2022), force modernization, and integration of its military capabilities, including a focus on cybersecurity, space-based assets, and jointness across services (A. Ali, 2022). "Capability-based approach, integration of AI to facilitate network-centric warfare, producing an electronic warfare eco-system to pursue electro-optical dominance in communication intelligence (COMINT), integrated Human Intelligence

(HUMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), interception, jamming, spoofing, and deception (Hanif, 2022).”

India carried out these few exercises (Vajra Shakti-2005, Desert Strike-2005, Sanghe Shakti-2006, Ashwamedh-2007, Shatrunash-2007, Brazen Chariots-2008, Hind Shakti-2009, Vayu Shakti-2010, and Yodha Shakti-2010) to enhance its capabilities in alignment with the Cold Start Doctrine exercise. In contrast, the other three exercises Kharga Prahar-2019, Exercise HIM VIJAY-2019, and Exercise Winged Raider-2019, were carried out in response to Land warfare doctrine (M. U. R. Khattak, 2011).

Pakistan's military strategic thinking has historically focused on asymmetric warfare, given India's conventional military superiority (Z. Khan, 2021a). After the Soviet-Afghan War and the rise of the Taliban, Pakistan's military strategic thinking shifted towards utilizing militant groups to achieve strategic depth and influence in Afghanistan. Following the 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan shifted its focus towards counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations against the Taliban and other militant groups (Siddique, 2011).

In response to CSD between 2009-2013, Pakistan adopted New Concepts of War Fighting to improve its troop mobilization time and enhance cooperation among inter-services (Naz, 2019). The military strategy focused on catering to Indian threats is strategically defensive and operationally offensive (Naz, 2019). It announced the New Army Doctrine 2011- Comprehensive Response by revamping its conventional plan to align with the nuclear deterrent strategy (Abdullah, 2018).

Pakistan responded to CSD on two fronts, first by the induction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons NASR (SSBM with 70 km range, carrying nuclear warheads) to lower its nuclear threshold along with a blunt rejection of the “No First Use”

of nuclear weapons policy, second by propping up its conventional capabilities such as Azme Nou military exercises in 2009 (Naz, 2019). With this, Pakistan upgraded from Credible minimum deterrence to full spectrum deterrence to cater to Indian threats, re-establishing regional strategic stability by restraining India from operationalizing CSD (Hanif, 2022). Owing to widening conventional war-fighting asymmetries, Pakistan, under a full-spectrum nuclear strategy, integrated its conventional and nuclear deterrence to achieve strategic equivalence to avoid conventional war and restrain the conflict to the sub-conventional domain (Abdullah, 2018).

In recent years, Pakistan has emphasized the development of its nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles as a means of deterrence against India (Jalil, 2017). Pakistan carried out only these exercises: Exercise Zarb-e-Momin, Exercise Zarb-e-Azb, and Exercise Al-Mizan in the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, the Exercise Azm-e-Nau series is the only exercise series Pakistan carries out in response to India's Cold Start doctrine and the subsequent transforming doctrines (A. Jamal, 2010).

Following 2015's counter-terrorism strategy, again in the National Security Committee meeting, Pakistan Army Chief announced a new multidimensional strategy based on comprehensive operations against militants and their facilitators (Jazeera, 2023). "This zero-tolerance policy is aimed at generating cooperation of security forces, the legal community, civil society, politicians, social workers, bureaucracy, diplomats, and the media in deterring and neutralizing militant groups (Jamal, 2023)."

4.2.2.2. Military Balance

The military balance refers to the distribution of military capabilities among different countries or groups. In South Asia, the military balance is primarily an assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of India and Pakistan, the two major military powers in the region. The military balance between both the military powers is a complex and dynamic subject, shaped by various factors such as the size and strength of each country's military forces, their defense budgets, military technology and equipment, and the strategic and political considerations of both countries (The International Institute of Strategic Studies [IISS], 2021). Here are some key points to consider when discussing the military balance in the India-Pakistan context:

4.2.2.2.1 Military Strength

To assess the size and strength of Pakistan and India’s military forces, a comparison is drawn between the numbers of conventional arsenal possessed by both military powers in the below-drawn table (Global Fire Power, 2023).

Table 3. Military Strength of Pakistan and India

Indicators	Pakistan	India
Global Ranking	7	4
Active Military Personnel	654,000	1,450,000
Main Battle Tanks	3,742	4,614+(582 on order)
Armored Fighting Vehicles	77,771	100,882
Self-Propelled Artillery	1,225	100+(200 to be planned)
Towed Artillery	3,345	3,311+(559 on order)
Rocket Projectors (MLRS)	1,838	1500

Total Aircraft Strength	1,413	2,210
Fighters/Interceptors	363	577
Attack Aircraft	90	130
Transport Aircraft (Fixed-Wing)	59	254
Trainer Aircraft	550	353
Multirole Aircraft	310+(72 on order)	440+(73 on order)
AWACS	11	06+(08 on order)
UCAV (Combat Drone)	113	12
UAVs	275 plus	570 plus
Helicopters	322	807+(62 on order)
Attack Helicopters	58	36+(06 on order)
Navy Fleet Strength	114	295
Aircraft Carriers	0	02
Frigates	06+(02 on order)	12+ (02 on order)
Destroyers	02	11
Corvettes	02 + (06 on order)	19 + (03 on order)
Submarines	09 + (08 on order)	18
Patrol Vessels	48	138

Source: Author, 2023

4.2.2.2.2. Defense Budget and Spending

India's Defense budget spending is much more than Pakistan's due to its bigger economy (The World Bank, n.d.-a). However, Pakistan has sought to maximize the effectiveness of its defense spending through measures such as prioritizing the acquisition of advanced technology and equipment (The World Bank, n.d.-b). A comparison between both countries' defense spending from the last nine years is drawn in the table below, along with the increasing or decreasing percentage trend in budget. Further, it also illustrates what portion of the annual GDP marks the defense budget.

Table 4. Defense Budgets

Year	Pakistan's Defence Budget (in USD)	Increase / Decrease from Previous Year's Budget	Pakistan's Defence Budget as % of GDP	India's Defence Budget (in USD)	Increase/ Decrease from Previous Year's Budget	India's Defence Budget as % of GDP
2015	7.6 billion	11.8%	2.36%	50.7 billion	-7.9%	2.46%
2016	7.5 billion	-1.3%	2.24%	55.9 billion	10.2%	2.49%
2017	7.7 billion	2.7%	2.18%	56.1 billion	0.4%	2.43%
2018	8.7 billion	12.9%	2.77%	58.3 billion	3.9%	2.39%
2019	11.4 billion	31.0%	4.04%	62.8 billion	7.7%	2.22%
2020	11.4 billion	0.0%	4.00%	62.8 billion	0.0%	2.16%

2021	8.27 billion	-27.5%	3.11%	63.9 billion	1.8%	2.14%
2022	8.00 billion	-3.4%	2.90%	65.2 billion	2.0%	2.10%
2023	8.16 billion	2.0%	2.80%	67.1 billion	2.9%	2.07%

Source: Author, 2023

4.2.2.2.3. Strategic considerations

India and Pakistan have their own strategic considerations and priorities shaping their military policies and actions. For India, these include countering the perceived threat from China, aspiring for regional power status, modernization, and technological advancement, addressing ongoing security concerns in Jammu and Kashmir, unresolved territorial disputes, and cross-border terrorism (Shivshankar, 2016). For Pakistan, strategic considerations include countering the perceived threat from India, the unresolved Kashmir dispute (Cohen, 2004), asymmetric warfare, credible nuclear deterrence, strategic partnership with China and US, and addressing security concerns in its western provinces, particularly Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Bibi et al.,2021).

4.2.2.2.4. Nuclear Capability, Military Technology, and Equipment

India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons, varying estimates of their respective nuclear stockpiles. India is estimated to have around 150 nuclear warheads, while Pakistan is estimated to have around 165. Both countries' possession of nuclear weapons adds a significant dimension to the military balance, raising the stakes of any potential conflict (Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 2021). Modernization of Military technology and

equipment is viewed collectively in the Army, Airforce, and Navy of India and Pakistan in South Asia.

Assault rifles, sniper rifles, protective gears, modern anti-tank guided missiles, shoulder-fired air defense systems, T-90- Main Battle Tanks, the acquisition of M77 ultra-light howitzers from the US, and K9 Vajra-T self-propelled howitzers from South Korea marked the beginning of modern infantry weapons and the upgradation of the artillery system in India's Land forces (Saballa, 2022).

It is also modernizing its airpower by acquiring Rafale jets from France, 400 air defense systems from Russia, Barak 8 from Israel, and Tejas jets (indigenous production), introducing UAVs (IAI's Heron-MALE UAV and a smaller UAV-searcher MKII) and AEWACS (Weapon Locating Radar-(SWATHI, Green Pine), Battlefield Surveillance Radars, Long Range Reconnaissance and Observation System- (LORROS), Harpy Missile, UAVs and Phalcon AEW System from Israel to fill the gap in command and control, RISAT-II Satellite, along with the first-ever dedicated Indian Air Force satellite) for surveillance plus reconnaissance, acquiring and upgrading transport aircraft and helicopters, Apache, Chinook helicopters, MH-60R helicopters, Super Hercules aircraft, Globemaster III Aircraft (Brimelow, 2021),(Iqbal et al., 2018).

India is investing in its naval power build-up by expanding its submarine fleet (induction of INS Kalvari and INS Khanderi), acquiring P-8I maritime patrol aircraft from the US, and modernizing its aircraft carriers (the INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya) Ocean (Ramsay, 2018). INS Kolkata (Stealth Destroyer), INS Visakhapatnam (class destroyer), INS Kadmat (Anti-Submarine Ship), and INS Kamotra adds supreme value to India's blue navy ambition. MQ-4C Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), Saab 2000 multi-role Maritime Patrol

Aircraft, Kamov 31 AEW helicopter from Russia further enhances its maritime supremacy in the Indian Ocean (Economic Times, 2015).

To increase Land force's power, Pakistan focuses on the modernization of infantry weapons (assault rifles and sniper rifles), acquisition of modern anti-tank guided missiles and shoulder-fired air defense systems, development of indigenously produced main battle tank Al Khalid and introduction of modern tactical communication systems and night vision devices. It also enhances its air power by acquiring JF-17 Thunder fighter jets developed jointly with China, launching unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) for surveillance and reconnaissance, and advancing transport aircraft and helicopters (Ansari, 2022). It is building its naval power by expanding its submarine fleet (the induction of Agosta 90B submarines from France), Improving surface combatants (acquisition of Type 054A/P frigates from China), and developing indigenously produced fast attack craft (Ansari, 2023b).

India has a larger military force, greater conventional military capabilities, and a larger defense budget; Pakistan has sought to maximize the effectiveness of its military spending and has developed a nuclear arsenal to counterbalance India's conventional military superiority (Mason, 2016).

4.2.2.3. Impact on Strategic Stability and Conventional Deterrence

Military balance and South Asian strategic stability are closely linked as they considerably impact the region's security. A stable military balance is essential for maintaining peace and security in the region, where a balanced military capability between India and Pakistan can contribute to strategic stability. When both sides possess relatively comparable military strength, it creates a sense of mutual vulnerability. This mutual vulnerability is a deterrent, as both sides understand that any aggressive action can result in significant damage and

casualties. This stability reduces the likelihood of conflict and promotes a more cautious approach to managing disputes (Rana, 2019).

In contrast, an ensuing unstable military balance between India and Pakistan is leading to a dangerous and potentially catastrophic arms race. The arms race between India and Pakistan has also impacted conventional deterrence in the region. India's military modernization efforts and its “Cold Start” doctrine have reduced the threshold for conventional military operations, which could increase the risk of limited war (Tandler, 2012).

This arms race dynamic can contribute to escalating tensions, erode trust, strain resources, and increase the risk of conflict. Both countries' acquisition of advanced weapons systems, combined with changes in their military doctrines and force postures, has increased the risk of miscalculation and escalation in a potential conflict (Tellis, 2022). Both countries' possession of nuclear weapons has added another layer of complexity to the situation. Both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and a doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which means that they believe that the possession of nuclear weapons makes it less likely that the other side will attack them. However, nuclear weapons also create a risk of accidental or intentional nuclear escalation, which could have devastating consequences (Mills, 2022).

Military modernization can enhance conventional deterrence; it should be pursued with caution and transparency to avoid unintended consequences or destabilizing effects, which is currently the opposite case in South Asia (Krepon & Gagné, 2002). Confidence-building measures, open lines of communication, and arms control agreements can help mitigate risks and enhance the case for strategic stability and stable conventional deterrence in South Asia (Krepon et al., 2004).

4.2.3. Nuclear Security

In the post-nuclearization era, the increasingly complicated architecture of nuclear postures and technologies in South Asia widens the frightening prospects of an improbable Nuclear Armageddon with the prevailing conventional and nuclear disparity between India and Pakistan.

Perennial security volatility in terms of geographical proximity, the incongruity in size, economy, and military buildup, lack of a common strategic lexicon, emotive leadership (Salik, 2009), augmenting race of nuclear modernization, acquisition, development, and deployment of new technologies peculiarize the South Asian nuclear environment a perfect recipe of stability instability paradox (Salik, 2014). Extra regional powers US, Israel, France, and Russia's growing strategic partnership with India and regional power China's own nuclear buildup and strategic partnership with Pakistan creates a security dilemma in South Asia India and Pakistan both are apprehensive of each other one-upping strategy in the fastly changing strategic environment (Kaushal et al., 2022).

Contextualizing Nuclear Security in the South Asian context refers to steps and actions taken to safeguard nuclear resources, infrastructure, and technologies from theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, and other threats. It aims to prevent illicit nuclear material trade by securing physical, personnel, cyber, and transport security (World Nuclear Association, 2022).

As per the latest NTI nuclear security index 2020, Pakistan is ranked 19th as the most improved country with a 47 score and + 7 improvement from 2018 in the theft: secure material indicator, whereas ranked 33 in Sabotage: protect facilities, with a 58 score and +5 improvement from 2018 (*Pakistan - NTI Nuclear Security Index*, 2020). In contrast, India is ranked 20th with 41 scores and 0 improvements from 2018, whereas ranked 38th in Sabotage: protect

facilities, with a 53 score and 0 improvements from 2018 (*India - NTI Nuclear Security Index*, 2020). This is a considerable achievement for Pakistan after the unleashed global campaigns against Pakistan's nuclear weapons safety mechanism in the aftermath of the AQ Khan network (Salik, 2009).

4.2.3.1. Contours of Nuclear Doctrine, Policy, Posture, and Targeting Strategy

Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is not announced officially, but we can extract its basic principles and broader contours from the statements of the politician and security advisors, and experts.

Foreign Minister **Abdul Sattar** stated at a National Defence College in May 2000.

“For the past decade, nuclear capability has been the bedrock of our defense and security policy. Its sole purpose is to deter and prevent war. Unlike some other countries, Pakistan neither aspires to great power status or permanent membership of the Security Council nor nourishes any design for regional dominance...We support a global, non-discriminatory international regime of nuclear and missile restraints, voted for the CTBT, will participate in negotiations for FMCT, and are prepared to strengthen our existing stringent controls against exporting strategic weapons technology. Our policy of Minimum Credible Deterrence will obviate any strategic arms race...the idea of no-first-use of nuclear weapons needs to be expanded into a no-first-use of force, lest the former should be interpreted to sanction first use of conventional weapons” (N. A. Salik, 2006).

Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is aimed at deterring India from committing aggression against Pakistan and preventing the conventional victory of India. Pakistan has adopted the Nuclear First use posture under a credible minimum deterrence with a massive retaliation response, counter-value targeting strategy, and centralized command and control system.

Pakistan's policy is based on restraint and responsibility (N. Salik, 2014). Brigadier Saeed Ismat of the Pakistan Army propounded the first strike doctrine to checkmate an Indian offensive aimed at dismembering Pakistan (Kanwal, 2001). India had declaratory Drafts of the Nuclear Doctrine in 1999 and 2003, which were inconsistent, and the latter one was more aggressive and offensive (Z. Khan, 2022). It has No first use posture under credible minimum deterrence with a shift from punitive to massive retaliation response. Unilateral moratorium and commitment to a nuclear weapons-free world through global, verifiable, and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament, participation in FMCT negotiation, and strengthening of nuclear export control are commonalities between both. Among dissimilarities, Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is India's centric.

In contrast, India's nuclear doctrine and capability are based on its regional and global hegemonic ambitions and two fronts of the war, China and Pakistan. Pakistan has defacto military control, whereas India exercises pure civil political control over nuclear weapons operationalization. India's nuclear weapons are based on the TRIAD concept and have achieved second-strike capability. In contrast, Pakistan has only a land-based deterrent (Tasleem, 2016). Inam-ul-Haq, Former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, enlarged this contrast in the goals and ambitions of India and Pakistan by stating, 'Instead of a triad of nuclear forces, Pakistan seeks a triad of peace, security and progress' (N. A. Salik, 2002).

4.2.3.2. Nuclear Trends in South Asia

Several nuclear trends in South Asia have been evolving and changing due to the diverse dynamics of nuclear capabilities and regional policies with ongoing developments. Some trends and changes related to nuclear dynamics in South Asia are discussed below.

4.2.3.2.1. Nuclear Modernization

The most apparent nuclear trend viewed in South Asia is the modernization and expansion of nuclear capabilities by the nuclear weapon states India and Pakistan, focusing on developing new delivery systems, such as ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, upgrading existing capabilities, and improving command-and-control systems. The effectiveness, survivability, and credibility of the nuclear forces are the pretension behind the modernization efforts. Indian nuclear capabilities and technologies include ballistic missiles (Agni Series and Prithvi series), cruise missiles (BrahMos, BrahMos II, Nirbhay), naval components (INS Arihant-SSBN), and strategic aircraft (Mirage 2000 and the Su-30MKI- capable of delivering nuclear weapons).

Further, INS Arihant is the first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) manufactured indigenously, completes India's nuclear triad with a sea-based leg. Pakistan's nuclear capabilities and technologies include ballistic missiles (Shaheen and Ghauri Series), cruise missiles (Babur, Ra'ad), and tactical nuclear weapons (NASR-SRBM/70km) (Tellis, 2022).

4.2.3.2.2. Increased Range and Sophistication

Within the modernization efforts, the specific significance of the increasing range, precision, and sophistication of weapons makes it a viable nuclear trend in the highly technologically charged landscape. Developing long-range ballistic and cruise missiles is a step towards increasing the reach and precision of nuclear weapons, which as a result, will impact the strategic balance and stability in South Asia (Cordesman, 2023). In Ballistic Missile Development, India, and Pakistan both are focused on strengthening their deterrence capabilities and enhancing their strategic posture through sophistication which is predominant in India's Agni and Pakistan's Shaheen Series, as shown below in the table (Gluck, 2022a) & (Gluck, 2022b).

Table 5. India's Defense Strength

India		
Name	Type	Range
Agni-I	Short-range ballistic missile	700-1200 km
Agni-II	Medium-range ballistic missile	2000- 3500 km
Agni-III	Intermediate-range ballistic missile	3000-5000 km
Agni-IV	Intermediate-range ballistic missile	3500-4000 km
Agni-V	Intercontinental ballistic missile	5000-8000 km
BrahMos	Supersonic cruise missile	300-500 km / capped at 290km
Nirbhay	Subsonic cruise missile	800-1000km

Source: Author, 2023

India's erosion of doctrinal commitment to CMD, shift towards nascent Nuclear counterforce capability, growing focus on accuracy, and attempt to carry prompt strikes have been prevalent from the launch of Agni-P (MRBM/2000km), having the slightest relevance to China but is credible regards to Pakistan (Clary & Naran, 2018).

Agni-P is a two-staged missile equipped with satellite guidance, radar, and optical correlation guidance with a circular error probable of 10 m (Kaushal et al., 2022) depicts the extreme precision and accuracy trend of recent Indian defense procurement, which does not fit under the notion of minimum deterrent counter value mission under no first use doctrine (Basrur, 2005).

Additionally, Agni-P is canisterised and rail mobile, which entails its storage with warheads during peacetime, allowing strike from any terrain at short notice, putting across the deviation from the previously held policy of storing warheads in demoted form (Clary & Naran, 2018).

In contrast, Pakistan's national command authority adviser Khalid Kidwai expressed that Shaheen III has the range to target India's nascent strategic bases on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to deny India second strike capability (Kukreja, 2013).

Table 6. Pakistan's Defense Strength

Pakistan		
Name	Type	Range
Shaheen-I	Short-range ballistic missile	750 -900Km
Shaheen-II:	Medium-range ballistic missile	1500-2000km
Shaheen-III	Medium-range ballistic missile	2750 km
Babur	Subsonic cruise missile	350- 700 Km
Ra'ad	Subsonic Cruise missile	350km

Source: Author, 2023

In the current developments, India's aspiration of a joint venture with Russia to develop an upgraded version of Brahmos with the hypersonic weapon system is a game changer in speed (5mach or higher), range (300 miles), multiple launching platform (ground systems, aircraft, and submarines) and warheads

(nuclear and conventional) and maneuverability (penetrating enemy defenses) (Chaudhury, 2023).

At the same time, India has checkmated Pakistan in this modern warfare technology, which is far behind in race and at the subsonic level. India's investment in a robust ISR network, development of prompt strike capabilities, including supersonic BrahMos cruise missile (Army Technology, 2013), hypersonic Shaurya missile (The Economic Times, 2020), and fielding of Agni-P serves as a harbinger of transition towards counterforce posture aimed at neutralizing Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in the early stages of conflict.

Pakistan's flexible nuclear posture to nullify India's conventional military advantage (Ladwig III, 2007) by resorting to nuclear first use in conventional conflict has played a deterrent role in the 2001's Parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai attack and buttressed India's frustration over concerted investment in TNWs such as NASR (Yusuf, 2019). In response to Pakistan's use of tactical nuclear weapons, India retaliates by counter city which falls under CMD but is disproportionate and hollow as a perceived response from Pakistan will be of the strategic arsenal. India's planners find limited tit-for-tat response against military assets as a way out from the security dilemma. Still, it will press the button for the escalators cycle to spiral out of control (Kaushal et al., 2022).

4.2.3.2.3. Naval Nuclear Capabilities

One more nuclear trend in the South Asian nuclear security context is the development and deployment of naval nuclear capabilities, particularly in the form of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which have important implications for the security dynamics in the region (Jalil, 2018). India's development and deployment of the nuclear-powered submarines equipped with ballistic missile capabilities INS Arihant

class of SSBNs, INS Arighat, and the K-4 SLBM (capable of carrying nuclear warheads/ estimated range of around 3,500 km), K-15 (700 km range) developed by India for deployment on its Arihant-class submarines represent a significant addition to its nuclear deterrent (Patel, 2020). These capabilities enhance India's second-strike capability and provide a credible sea-based deterrent while adding complexity to the deterrence equation in the maritime domain (A. Afzal, 2021). Pakistan's development of the Babur-III submarine-launched cruise missile SLCM, designed for deployment on Pakistan's diesel-electric submarines (capable of carrying nuclear warheads/ estimated range of around 450 km), adds to its nuclear deterrent (Davenport, 2017). While Pakistan's naval nuclear capabilities focus on cruise missiles rather than SLBMs, they still contribute to its overall deterrence posture (Ullah, 2020). Still, an Indian sea-based deterrent compels Pakistan to secure this strategic vacuum, fill in the nuclear imbalance, and complete its triad to strengthen its conventional naval capabilities (M. Khan, 2018).

4.2.3.2.4. Doctrine and Policy Shift

Nuclear doctrines have been adopted by India and Pakistan to govern their strategies for nuclear deterrence and use. The most significant nuclear trend in South Asia is the shift in doctrine and policy, such as modifications to no-first-use policies or statements indicating potential use in response to non-nuclear threats, which can raise ambiguities and affect regional nuclear security dynamics. These doctrines and policies are evolving and in continuous flux because of the threat landscape, perception, and security environment variations (Shankar & Paul, 2016).

4.2.3.2.4.1. Nuclear Doctrine Shift

India has historically upheld a "no first use" policy, which commits it to not using nuclear weapons as the first resort in a fight (Cronberg, 2010). However, there have been talks and arguments concerning the possibilities of shifting this policy within India as prevalent from former Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar in 2016 questioned India's binding itself to NFU (Singh, 2016) and again, the new Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh's statement on 16th August 2019 during a visit to the Pokhran site to revisit its NFU policy (Saalman, 2020). A potential departure from a rigorous no-first-use stance could create uncertainty, raise the possibility of miscalculation, and lead to unintentional escalation (Tellis, 2022).

In February 2000, Agha Shahi, a former Foreign Minister, at an international seminar on the subject of Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons, invoked the traditional 'action-reaction syndrome' of India-Pakistan relations, arguing that since India asserts its minimum deterrence as a dynamic concept by keeping the size of its minimum deterrent flexible, open to changes with altering circumstances, Pakistan will inexorably have to keep its deterrent dynamic in the same way as India ("Disarmament Diplomacy: Pakistan Responds to India's Nuclear Doctrine," 1999).

Pakistan has a nuclear first-use policy, whereas it has now adopted a "full spectrum deterrence" doctrine to dissuade all forms of aggression, including conventional and nuclear threats. This doctrine is anticipated to concentrate on the perceived conventional imbalance with India (M. Ahmed, 2016). It involves developing and potentially applying these tactical nuclear weapons in response to conventional military threats. In the prevailing security architecture, Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, a security expert and academician, indicates that Pakistan's

nuclear posture might shift from declared recessed deterrence to active deterrence, which requires an ambiguous state of hair-trigger alert (Jaspal, 2012)

Bharat Karnad, a former member of India's National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), has branded the 'no first use doctrine' as purely a hoax that states attempt to abide by in peace but not war (Karnad, 2022). He further derided the conception of minimum nuclear deterrence as a new Maginot mentality (Karnad, 2008) and preferred that "megaton thermonuclear-ICBM" strike down and deter China (Karnad, 2005). Michael Quinlan, the strategic expert, expressed India's NFU as its political posturing only (Quinlan, 2005).

4.2.3.2.4.2. Nuclear Policy Shifts

India's pursuit of a policy of modernizing and diversifying its nuclear capabilities via developing cutting-edge delivery systems (ballistic and cruise missiles) and acquiring innovative technologies may enhance its deterrence posture on the one hand but appears to be a divergence from the "minimum" in its credible minimum deterrence (Kristensen, 2013). It is valid that what is credible in China's context cannot be the minimum for Pakistan (Z. Khan, 2022). At the same time, India continues to assert a credible minimum deterrence posture with these policy shifts, which Pakistan perceives as intriguing and potentially leading to an augmented arms race dynamic.

To counterbalance India's increasing conventional asymmetry and Cold Start Doctrine, Pakistan's policymakers opted to develop and deploy tactical nuclear weapons that are proposed for use on the battlefield in retort to a conventional military threat. The deployment of battlefield weapons exposes the risk of escalation and unintended consequences to the South Asian nuclear security environment. Its diversification of delivery means also indicates a shift from massive retaliation to graduated response, coupled with changes in future

targeting strategies. Pakistan is also expected to perceive soon a need to move away from the nondeployment of its weapons. Its evolving sea-based capabilities and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) may also necessitate shifting from centralized to delegated command and control (Tasleem, 2016).

Glen Snyder's stability instability paradox is appropriate in South Asia, where India is at the heart of a strategic dilemma of not being able to exercise its conventional superiority because of the fear of Pakistan's use of strategic arsenal (I. Ali & Sidhu, 2021).

To eliminate this strategic paralysis, India is anxious to opt for a counterforce posture leading to the top of the escalation ladder. Launching the BrahMos cruise missile into 124 km in Pakistani territory on March 2022 without prior notification could have led to significant consequences (Mughal, 2023). Similarly, Pakistan did not resort to nuclear signaling during the Pulwama crisis but made a suitable conventional response. The Pulwama crisis marked a clear shift in India's nuclear doctrine with a splendid first strike. During the Pulwama Balakot episode, Pakistan's full spectrum deterrence stopped India from all-out war (Sultan, 2019).

“Gradual Shift in Pakistan's doctrinal thinking and policy from a simplistic understanding of existential deterrence largely dependent on a massive retaliation strategy toward a complex deterrence policy with graduated response options evidenced by the ongoing development (arms build-up, continuing fissile material production, and investment in sea-based second-strike capabilities) and diversification of delivery systems may require a shift from nondeployment to a higher readiness level and a corresponding change from centralized to delegated command and control for maintaining a strategic

balance resulting into imperative implications for stability in the region” (Tasleem, 2016).

4.2.3.2.5. Arms Race Dynamics

The nuclear modernization efforts and advancements by India and Pakistan have raised concerns about a potential arms race in the region. The competition for technological superiority and strategic advantage can contribute to instability and heighten security concerns (Dalton & Tandler, 2012). The arms race dynamics between India and Pakistan in the context of nuclear weapons development and acquisition have been a notable trend in South Asia which is exemplified in the comparison of the Nuclear Arsenal Size (India 150-200 vs. Pakistan 165-175), Missile Programs (Agni, Prithvi series Vs. Ghaznavi, Shaheen, and Ghaury/ Brahmos vs. Babur), Missile Range (Agni-V having a range of over 5,000 kilometers, capable of reaching targets deep inside China vs. Pakistan's ballistic missiles the Ghaury and Shaheen series, ranges of up to 2,000 kilometers, capable of reaching targets within India), Naval Capabilities (India nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) INS Arihant equipped with the K-15 and K-4 ballistic missiles vs. Pakistan is in the process of developing its nuclear-powered submarine, the Type 041 Yuan-class, which will enable it to deploy submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the future) of both the countries (Ashraf, 2017).

4.2.3.3. Technological Advancement and Challenges to Nuclear Security

The following technological advancements could potentially pose challenges to nuclear security.

First of all, the increasing reliance on digital systems and networks in nuclear infrastructure creates vulnerabilities to cyber threats. Cyberattacks targeting nuclear facilities, command and control systems, or communication networks

could disrupt operations, compromise sensitive information, or even manipulate critical systems (Bıçakcı, 2018).

Secondly, technological advancements in missile systems, such as longer ranges, increased accuracy, and improved maneuverability, could impact nuclear security in South Asia by potentially reducing response times, increasing the difficulty of interception, and influencing the effectiveness of deterrence strategies (Barrie & Wright, 2022). Given the counter-force posture, Indian thinkers consider unilaterally targeting Pakistan's tactical and strategic arsenal will restore India's deterrent posture credibility by singlehandedly eliminating Pakistan's strategic response options (Kaushal et al., 2022). This option serves India's interest in case of any conflict sighting Pakistan's limited geographical depth and relatively limited size of arsenals (Clary & Naran, 2018). Prahaar and Prithvi (Short range ballistic missiles) hold 11 main airbases and corps command within their range with limited warning time (Kaushal et al., 2022), Agni-P can target hardened storage sites of strategic arsenals (Kristensen, 2023), corps commands and C2 nodes, and BrahMos can target soft targets such as F-16.

To neutralize the threat to major urban centers in case of possible retaliation from Pakistan as a result of Indian first strike, it has invested in domestic and international ballistic missile defense systems such as S-400 and Barak-8 with the likely boost to fissile material production capacity as a result of US- India nuclear cooperation deal and fast breeder program (N. Salik, 2014). Indian policy is in flux, which creates deliberate ambiguity about its response to put a restraint on Pakistan's crisis behavior either with its targeting posture makes a strong case for a shift to counterforce or its less than-required size of the ballistic missile for a counterforce capable country (Rajagopalan, 2021).

Thirdly, developments in space-based assets, such as satellite reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities, can enhance situational awareness and intelligence gathering (Taverney, 2022). These advancements could impact the ability of South Asian countries to conceal their nuclear activities and affect the region's stability (Hussain & Ahmed, 2019). India has made significant advancements in its space program and has developed a range of space-based assets. Some include space-based assets of India include Indian National Satellites (INSAT), Indian Remote Sensing Satellites (IRS), Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS)/ NavIC (Navigation with Indian Constellation), Chandrayaan-2, Mars Orbiter Mission (Mangalyaan) showcase the country's growing capabilities and contributions in space technology, communication, Earth observation, navigation, and planetary exploration (Ensure IAS, 2023). Pakistan is at the fundamental stage of developing its space program and space-based assets.

The Pakistan Remote Sensing Satellite (PRSS-1), also known as PakTES-1A, launched in 2018, is equipped with high-resolution imaging sensors for remote sensing purposes and disaster management capabilities (Sheldon, 2018). Pakistan has been working towards developing its indigenous satellite launch capability; despite various tests and research, it has not yet achieved full-fledged satellite launch capability (Hussain & Ahmed, 2019).

Fourthly, emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, and advanced encryption methods, may affect nuclear security. For example, AI-driven cyberattacks or using quantum computing to crack encryption codes could undermine security measures or increase the complexity of safeguarding nuclear facilities and materials, leading to potential disruptions or unauthorized access (United States Institute of Peace, 2022). India has been actively investing in AI, Quantum Computing, and advanced encryption methods with research and development, resulting in startups, initiatives

(Menon & Adhikari, 2023), and applications such as National AI Strategy and the National AI Portal (*INDIAai*, n.d.), Quantum Computing Applications Lab (QCAL) (National Center of Excellence, 2022), National Mission on Quantum Technologies and Applications (Vishnoi, 2023), National Cyber Coordination Centre (NCCC) (Nandikotkur, 2015). The Indian government promotes AI adoption and innovation in healthcare, agriculture, and education (*INDIAai*, 2023); AI-powered surveillance systems are used for border security and threat detection, quantum computing advancements, and applications in finance, logistics, and drug discovery (Painuly, 2023), while ISRO is actively working on advanced encryption methods and cybersecurity to secure satellite-based communication, monitor cybersecurity threats and implement robust encryption standards along with research and development of encryption algorithms and secure communication protocols (Kumar, 2022).

Compared to India, Pakistan is now attempting to harness its potential in AI technologies, and Quantum Computing is also in the early stages of development. It recently introduced an AI National policy focusing on the establishment of the AI market (Ministry of Information Technology & Telecommunication, 2023). In contrast, it lacks a bigger plan and looks like a wish list and PR stunt (M. Khan, 2023).

Pakistan has started investing in academic and research programs in both these areas (AI and QC), such as 92 Artificial Intelligence startups (Tracxn, 2023), the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Computation (CENTAIC), National Centre for Artificial Intelligence (NCAI) and effective measures to strengthen its cybersecurity infrastructure and encryption protocol implementation in health, agriculture, and surveillance system. The expertise and research in advanced encryption methods may be comparatively lower than in India (Saeed, 2023).

4.2.4. Economic Security

In the South Asian security paradigm, economic security is considered an essential element of national security; and according to International Monetary Fund, it is denoted as the ability of a country to maintain economic growth and stability in case of any economic shock and disruption (“Economic Security Strategy 2020-2023,” 2020). Its vital components include stable macroeconomic policies, a Diversified economy, Infrastructure development, Human capital development, and regional cooperation (“Human Development Report 2020 |the Next Frontier,” 2020), (“South Asia Economic Focus, Fall 2021|Shifting Gears,” 2021).

South Asia’s Economic landscape is shaped by both positive and negative trends, including strong economic growth, favorable demographics, regional economic integration (SAFTA, BIMSTEC), infrastructure development (CPEC, BCIM-EC), poverty, unemployment, and inequality (“South Asia Economic Focus, Spring 2023|Expanding Opportunities,” 2023). Global, regional, and domestic shocks, including COVID-19 Pandemic, the ongoing war in Ukraine, the advanced economy’s monetary tightening policy, banking sector stress, and natural disasters, have caused adverse spillover effects on South Asian economies (“Global Economic Prospects,” 2023) in terms of skyrocketing commodity prices, the mounting balance of payment pressures (Xie & Zhu, 2022) the record hit inflation, limited fiscal space, and depleting reserves (“Overview South Asia,” 2023) such as Sri Lanka’s debt default and Pakistan’s extremely vulnerable economic crisis makes it next on the list of unfortunate economies for now (The Economist, 2022).

In 2021 post-pandemic recovery, South Asia’s economic growth stood at 8.3 percent, which following the shocks mentioned above, further downsized to 6.0

percent in 2022. As per the Global Economic Prospect Report 2023, South Asia's growth is projected to average 5.9 percent in 2023, whereas it will be significantly slower in 2024, up to 5.1 percent ("Global Economic Prospects," 2023). World Bank estimates that in 2023 Inflation in South Asia will fall to 8.9 percent and below 7 percent in 2024, where weaker currencies and delayed domestic price adjustments are two factors hindering the swift decline in inflation. Additionally, the shooting up of global and domestic food prices is an indicator contributing to greater food insecurity. Rising interest rates and uncertainty in financial markets put descending compression on the region's economies ("Overview South Asia," 2023).

4.2.4.1. Insight into India and Pakistan's Economic Policies and Pathways

Through the economic growth lens, India and Pakistan have opted for different pathways and faced different challenges. Still, one commonality is the economic growth at different rates, with India at 7 percent since 1990 (World Bank Group, 2018) and Pakistan at 5 percent since 2013 (Husain, 2019).

India's journey from a near-default economy in the 1990s to the world's largest fifth economy in 2023 is credited to its economic liberalization ("Overview South Asia," 2023), trade reforms, foreign investments virtuous cycle, startup boom, innovation ecosystem (Mohammad, 2023) infrastructural development, skill development, financial inclusion, and initiatives like Make in India, Digital India (Economic Diplomacy and States Division, 2019). Indian economy is diversified with a mix of traditional sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, and services) and emerging ones (information technology, digitalization, biotechnology, and renewable energy) (INDIA@100, 2023). The service sector accounts for 55 percent of GDP, followed by manufacturing and agriculture.

India's technology and manufacturing sectors are the main attraction of foreign investments. Also, India's demographic dividend contributes in both ways: with a large and growing middle class, driving consumer spending and demands for goods and services, and poverty, illiteracy, and income inequality (Economic Diplomacy and States Division, 2018).

Among all policies, these few, named policies of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), New Economic Policy 1991, National Manufacturing Policy 2011 (Adhia, 2020), and Make in India 2014, played a magnificent role in bringing India's economy into the top five by successfully achieving high economic growth, poverty reduction, increased FDI and improved infrastructure (INDIA@100, 2023). In contrast, these policies are criticized for not reducing inequality, corruption, and lack of jobs (Kar, 2019; Kar, 2019a). Amidst uncertainty in the global financial market, India, South Asia's largest economy, faces high borrowing costs and slower income growth, lowering the GDP growth rate to 6.3 percent in FY2023/24 ("Overview South Asia," 2023).

At the same time, Pakistan's economy is driven by the traditional model based on the agriculture, textile industry, and services sector (*Overview of Pakistan's Economy*, n.d.), where agriculture accounts for 24 percent (*Agriculture Statistics*, n.d.) and the services sector 60 percent, followed by the industry sector. Pakistan's strategic location provides access to major shipping routes and paves the way to an important market for trade and investment ("Pakistan: A Land of Opportunities," n.d.).

Pakistan, a Low-income developing economy, started its journey from an economy based on private industries in the formative days to the nationalization of sectors (financial services, manufacturing, and transportation) in 1970, to the Islamic economy in 1980 by Zia, privatization in 1990, to the semi-industrial

economy (heavily depending on agriculture and textile industry, leather goods, sports equipment, chemicals, and carpets) in the late 1990s to currently undertaking economic liberalization aimed at attract foreign investment and decrease the budget deficit (Mudasar, 2021).

Import substitution industrialization (1950-1960), Export-led growth (1970-1980), Structural adjustment programs (SAPs 1980-1990), Tax reforms, agriculture policy, privatization policy (M. Afzal & Ali, 2008), Strategic Trade Policy Framework (2009, 2015-18, 2020-25),(Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan, 2021), Imran Khan's Economic reforms package 2018, and Vision 2025 (Ministry of Planning, Development and Reforms, 2018) are the few economic policies that have been enforced and changed over time in accordance to fluctuating economic conditions and the obtainability of foreign aid.

Supply Chain disruption caused by Russo Ukraine war and a catastrophic flood in Pakistan in August 2022 contributed to skyrocketing inflation, increased food and energy inflation, deteriorated investor confidence(Xie & Zhu, 2022), depreciation of Pakistani rupees by 24% against the dollar in 2022, shrinking of foreign exchange reserves more than half up to 9 billion USD, widening current account balance (The Economist, 2022), higher borrowing and input costs and falling short of budget to pay interest on its debt are consequentially spiraling Pakistan into a volatile economic crisis, with economic growth dropping to a record 0.4 percent in FY2023/2024 ("Overview South Asia," 2023).It happened previously when Pakistan could not handle external economic pressure, which led to a balance of payment crisis in 2018 with a bailout package from the IMF (AlJazeera, 2018).

In contrast, in the recent economic crisis of 2023, it still awaits an IMF bail-out package hindered further by the political crisis (Haider, 2023).

A comprehensive view of the Economic Health and Performance of India and Pakistan's economies in recent times can be evaluated from the below-mentioned indicators (India Indicators, 2023; Pakistan Indicators, 2023).

Table 7. Economic Health and Performance of India and Pakistan

S.NO	Economic Indicators	India	Pakistan
1	GDP	3.737 trillion USD	376 billion USD
2	GDP Annual Growth Rate	6.1 Percent	5.97 Percent
3	Unemployment Rate	7.8 Percent	6.5 Percent
4	Inflation Rate	4.7 Percent	38 Percent
5	Interest Rate	6.5 Percent	21 Percent
6	Balance of Trade	-15.24 billion USD	-597510 million PKR
7	Current Account	-18227 million USD	388 million USD
8	Government Budget	-6.4 % of GDP	-7.9 % of GDP
9	Foreign Direct Investments	366 million USD	122 million USD
10	Foreign Exchange Reserves	595070 million USD	9513 million USD
12	Consumer Confidence	87 Points	29.9 Points
13	Consumer Price Index	178 Points	288 Points
14	Food Inflation	3.84 Percent	48.65 Percent
16	Corruption Index	40 Points	27 Points
17	Corruption Rank	85	140
18	Military Expenditure	81363 million USD	10338 million USD

Source: Author, 2023

4.2.4.2. Economic Warfare in South Asia

Economic Warfare is the climax of the geopolitical competition (Lambert, 2017) in South Asia between India and Pakistan and global powers such as the US, China, Russia (Ghimire, 2023) and regional actors like Saudi Arabia. Global actors contribute to shaping economic warfare in the region and pave the way for far-reaching consequences of their actions (World Bank Group, 2022a). Economic Warfare is the use of or threat to use strategies aims to achieve political and strategic objectives through economic tactics and tools (Kerr, 2022).




Figure 6: Economic warfare in SouthAsia (Source : Author, 2023)

4.2.4.2.1. Trade and Tariff Disputes

Both countries have been involved in several trade and tariff disputes, including restrictions on imports and exports (ban on imports of certain goods, the requirement of non-discriminatory certificate) (Sharif & Ali, 2021), disproportionate costs, high level of informal traffic (*India-Pakistan Political Dispute*, 2020), disputes over the MFN status (India gave it to Pakistan in 1996,

and Pakistan did not reciprocate) (Beteille & Kochhar, 2011; M. Williams, 2011) and disputes over the Indus Waters Treaty (Haines, 2023).

Trade disruptions, periodic suspension and restrictions were put in place by both India and Pakistan in the wake of political tensions, cross border conflict and security incidents most specifically when India withdrew Most Favoured Nation Status from Pakistan (Khanna, 2020) while imposing 200 percent custom duty on items imported from Pakistan as a reaction to Pulwama attack (Hindustan Times, 2019), and Pakistan responded with trade boycott as a protest to India's scrapping of Kashmir's special status in 2019 (M. Ashraf, 2019). These trade and tariff disputes negatively harm bilateral trade which has reached 2.56 billion USD in 2018-2019 but as per World Bank 2018 Report possesses the potential to tap the untapped bilateral annual trade up to 37 billion USD (Kathuria, 2018).

4.2.4.2.2. *Economic Sanctions*

Economic sanctions are utilized as a means of exerting pressure on another country (Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 1988), (Haass, 1998). Pakistan has been subjected to economic sanction by India and global powers like the US (Jaishankar, 2019). Restricting Pakistani business participation in Indian government procurement contracts by India (Jaishankar, 2019), the US suspending military aid to Pakistan (Stewart & Ali, 2018) and putting economic sanctions over terror financing concerns (Jorgic et al., 2018), and India imposing economic sanctions on China over its border dispute (Rajeev & Stephenson, 2023) under the premise of economic nationalism (Xijin, 2020) and still banning Chinese technology companies and firms (Toprak, 2022) are a few examples.

Pakistan listing into FATF's grey list from June 2018 to October 2022 has limited its access to the global financial market (A. Hussain, 2022) and garnered bad limelight in the international arena (S. Jamal, 2021). With the enactment of

new laws (Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, and the Counter-Terrorism Financing Act, 2011), institutions (Financial Monitoring Unit and the National Counter-Terrorism Authority.), Training of law enforcement and financial institution and shared information with FATF, Pakistan's removal from FATF's grey list is a positive development (Peshimam, 2022).

4.2.4.2.3. Investment, Infrastructural Development, and Economic Cooperation

Due to India's already growing economic investment and financial clout in the South Asian region, and Eurasia such as BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation), development of Chabahar port in Iran (Purushothaman & Unnikrishnan, 2019), Pakistan has been pushed into separate silo instead of tapping and maximizing chances to increase regional economic collaboration (Gilani, 2019). India's Neighbourhood first (minus Pakistan) policy is one much example of its deliberate move. Similarly, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (M. Hussain, 2021), and the U.S.-supported TAPI gas pipeline (Parwani, 2021). are the investment of global powers in South Asia that have huge potential to boost the regional economy but are not free from political and strategic implications (Osmani, 2016).

4.2.4.2.4. Cyber Attacks and Financial Crimes

The frequent rise in cyber-attacks and financial crimes targeting critical infrastructure and financial institutions is today's hotspot of economic warfare for achieving strategic objectives through economic means (Elliott & Nigel Jenkinson, 2020). Pakistan has become a target of financial crimes, including money laundering and terrorism financing (The Express Tribune, 2020), denting its international reputation and negatively impacting the economy, resulting in

increased scrutiny and international pressure. FATF’s grey listing of Pakistan is one such example (FATF, n.d.). At the same time, Pakistan is adamant about India’s role in cyberattacking Pakistan’s stock exchange in 2020 and engaging in financial crimes (money laundering and terrorism financing) (Qayum, 2020).

4.2.4.2.5. Financial Assistance and Aids

To advance strategic interests in South Asia, Global powers and many other stronger regional actors have invested in the region in terms of financial assistance and aid far more relying on economic tool (Savoy & Staguhn, 2022). Time and again, China has provided significant financial assistance to Pakistan during any difficult time (Younus, 2023), including a recent 2 billion USD loan to stabilize Pakistan’s economy and pay for essential imports (Haider & Dilawar, 2023). At the same time, Saudia Arabia has provided a 1.2 billion USD oil credit facility to meet energy requirements and reduce reliance on imported energy till February 2024 (Paracha, 2023), plus pledged to increase deposits in Central Bank of Pakistan from earlier 3 billion USD to 5 billion USD with possible increase assistance around 10 billion USD in overall Pakistan (English, 2023).

4.2.4.3. Impacts of South Asian Dynamics on Economic Security

The changing South Asian security dynamics are adversely impacting the economic potential of India and Pakistan in these main domains such as:



Figure 7: Domains of South Asian Dynamics’ Impacts on Economic Security

(Source: Author, 2023)

In addition to political tensions and the bitter legacy of wars and conflicts, bureaucratic, managerial, transportation, logistic, local issues and opponent lobbies and pressure groups either political or economic are impeding India and Pakistan usually from a broader spectrum of cross-border trade (S. A. Zaidi et al., 2017).

The Security- insecurity paradox within the paradigm of the security dilemma between India and Pakistan has led to the diversion of sources from human development and social indicators, such as health, education, research, and employment, to high military expenditures, which is evident from the military spending and arms purchase of both countries (*SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*, 2022), (Ismail, 2017). Security concerns such as terrorism, religious extremism, political instability, human rights violations, and adverse international branding (Burki, 2011) deter foreign investors from investing, most specifically in Pakistan (United States Department of State, 2020). The political differences and security concerns hinder it from a much stronger region focusing on energy, transportation, and infrastructure cooperation (Desai, 2010).

Pakistan's reservations over the construction of the Kishanganga hydroelectric project in Jammu and Kashmir as violation of Indus Water Treaty (Arab News, 2018) , India's reservation over extending CPEC into areas of the disputed territory of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan (Yasin & Qasim, 2020), fractured functioning of South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) (N. Iqbal & Nawaz, 2016), mired Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, Central Asia-South Asia (CASA-1000) electricity transmission project (Symeonidis, 2022) is the fewer examples of it.

4.2.4.4. Challenges to Economic Security

Due to the difference in their demographic and economic dividend, both Countries face significant common economic challenges but at different intensities comparatively in high levels of income inequality, a large informal sector, low level of human development, and high poverty levels. High population growth, low human capital (World Bank Group, 2023), low per capita income, political instability, heavy foreign debt, corruption, high illiteracy, limited access to finance, lack of industrialization, poor governance, and a low level of productivity are the economic challenges frequently faced by Pakistan (“Challenges for Pakistan’s Economy and Way Forward,” 2023), (Chughtai et al., 2015).

Global phenomena like globalization and climate change affect India and Pakistan’s economies. On the one hand, India has maximized its benefits from globalization, being a low-wage country in IT sector outsourcing (*Impact of Globalization on Indian Economy*, 2021), improving foreign reserves and investments, and paving ways for new technologies (Balaji, 2023 comparatively Pakistan has not fully tapped this source. On the other hand, both countries are struggling to cater to Climate change which effects their economy in multiple ways as illustrated in diagram below.




Figure 8: Climatic Change Impact on Economy (Source: Author, 2023)

The World Bank Group’s Country Climate and Development Report CCDR for Pakistan states that Pakistan’s GDP is projected to reduce by at least 18 to 20% by 2050 stalling progress on economic development and poverty reduction as consequences of climate change related events (World Bank Group, 2022). Whereas The Reserve Bank of India's latest report suggests that up to 4.5 per cent of India's GDP could be at risk by 2030 as consequences of climate change. (Sharma, 2023)

Political security is a dominant theme whereas social security exists there with it, but it’s not given policy preference. That’s why author has viewed it through the lens of non-traditional security and in the category of emerging security. Presently, author has designed the infographics of social and political security together and placed them at the junction of the dominant and emerging theme.

4.3 Emerging Security Themes

Political security is a dominant theme, whereas social security exists there with it, but it's not given policy preference. That's why I have viewed social security through the lens of non-traditional security and in the category of emerging security. The author has designed the social and political security infographics together and placed them at the junction of the dominant and emerging theme.

4.3.1 Political and Social Security

Political and Social Security are distinct but interrelated concepts, whereas political security relates to the instruments and specifications that guarantee the integrity, stability, and proper functioning of a country's political system. It aims at the protection of political order, government, and its institutions both from internal and external threats by upholding the rule of law, preserving human rights, maximizing the legitimacy of government, and proper functioning of democratic institutions, preventing any conflict, and ensuring the citizens' participation in political processes without repression.

At the same time, social security is associated with assurances of necessities and opportunities for the well-being of society by creating a more stable and balanced social environment promoting social cohesion and inclusiveness through a set of policies and mechanisms. Political security stipulates the groundwork for the functioning of government. and political order, whereas social security builds upon it to ensure the well-being, safety, and protection of its citizens.

To understand a detailed picture of Pakistan and India's socio-political security author has utilized the following indices consisting of multiple indicators.

The **Global Peace Index (GPI)** measures global peacefulness and is based on three main domains: the level of societal safety and security, the extent of ongoing domestic and international conflict, and the degree of militarization. As per (GPI) 2023, Pakistan ranks at 146th position out of a total of 163 countries with a score of 2.74, whereas India ranks at 126th position with 2.31 score ("Global Peace Index," 2023).

Similarly, **Fragility State Index (FSI)** is a conflict assessment framework (CAST) measuring the vulnerability of a state to collapse by basing on four indicators, including cohesion, economic, political, and social indicators with multiple sub-indicators. In the FSI 2023, Pakistan ranks at 31st number out of a total of 179 countries with an 89.9 score, whereas India ranks at 73rd number with a 74.1 score on the scale from 1(best) to 120(alert) ("Fragile States Index Annual Report," 2023).

SOCIAL & POLITICAL SECURITY OUTLOOK




Figure 9: Political and Social Security Outlook (Source: Author, 2023)

VDem measures democracy by assessing the nature, causes, and consequences of democracy while embracing its multiple meanings. According to VDem Report 2023, Pakistan is ranked at 106 number out of a total of 179 countries with 0.26 scores on the Liberal Democracy Index 2023 and 110th number with a 0.39 score on the Electoral Democracy Index 2023 on a scale from 0(worst) to 1(best). At the same time, India is ranked at 97th number out of a total of 179 countries with 0.31 scores on the Liberal Democracy Index 2023 and 108th

number with 0.4 scores on the Electoral Democracy Index 2023(“Democracy Report,” 2023).

Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) estimates the perceived level of corruption in the public sector. Thus, the CPI of 2022 reveals that Pakistan stands at 140th rank out of 180 countries with a score of 27 on a scale of 0 to 100 (higher scores are the best) (*2022 Corruption Perceptions Index: Explore the Results*, 2023). Similarly, India’s CPI ranking is 85th out of 180 countries with 40 scores (*2022 Corruption Perceptions Index: Explore the Results*, 2023b).

The **Rule of Law Index (RLI)** measures the lawfulness of the country by considering seven domains such as constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice. RLI 2022 reveals Pakistan’s ranking at 129th position out of 140 total countries with a score of 0.39 on a scale ranging from 0.00(weaker) to 1.00 (stronger) (*WJP Rule of Law Index*, 2022a). At the same time, India stands at 77th with a score of 0.50(*WJP Rule of Law Index*, 2022).

Likewise, the **Social Progress Index (SPI)** measures the social progress of countries comprehensively by considering nutrition, medical care, shelter, safety, water and sanitation, access to basic knowledge, health and wellness, access to information and communications, inclusiveness, personal rights, personal freedom, and choice and access to advance education. The SPI 22 indicates Pakistan’s ranking at 139th number out of a total of 169 countries, with 51.32 scores on a scale of 0 (worst) to 100 (best). At the same time, India ranks at the 110th number with 60.19 scores (“Social Progress Index,” 2022).

The **Human Development Index (HDI)** is a composite index measuring success in the three main domains of human development: a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. HDI 2022 reveals that Pakistan ranks at 161st number out of a total of 192 countries with 51.3 scores (S. M. Ali, 2023), whereas India stands at 132nd position with 60.2 scores on a scale ranging from 0 (worst) to 100 (best) (Arora, 2023).

From the above-elaborated indices, it can be concluded that Pakistan's Political security sets a weak foundation for the functioning of government and Political order, which automatically ends up in disastrous social security. Comparatively, India's performance is outstanding in Political security yet better in social security than Pakistan.

4.3.2 Climate Security

Climate security is an interconnected concept that requires a comprehensive outlook of the socio-economic, political, and environmental dimensions of the country. Respectively, Climate change is significantly affecting human security, which directly impacts the national security of the country, entailing displacement, conflicts, and social unrest.

To have a broader understanding of the performance of Pakistan in the climate domain and the level of risk it faces, the author has utilized multiple indices below:

The Global Climate Risk Index (GCRI) 2021 assesses weather-caused losses, human loss, and direct economic loss. The ranking of countries' exposure to risk is based on these indicators' assessment and analysis. As per the GCRI 2021,

Pakistan ranks 8th out of total 180 countries with 29 scores, whereas India ranks 20th with 38.50 scores (Eckstein et al., 2021). The **Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI)** tracks the climate protection performance of 59 countries and the EU to enhance transparency in international climate politics. Its categorization includes an assessment of each country’s performance in GHG emissions, renewable energies, energy use, and climate policy. India is ranked number eight with 67.35 scores on the CCPI, whereas Pakistan is not graded in the index as it possesses only high-performing countries (*The Climate Change Performance Index 2023: Results*, 2023).




Figure 10: Climate Security Outlook (Source: Author, 2023)

Correspondingly, the **Environmental Performance Index (EPI)** measures the performance of a country among these three main domains ecosystem vitality, ecosystem health, and climate policy, and multiple subdomains within them. As per EPI 2022, Pakistan ranks at 176th position with a 24.60 score, whereas India ranks 180th out of a total of 180 countries with an 18.90 score (*India | Environmental Performance Index, 2022*) (*Pakistan | Environmental Performance Index, 2022*).

The **SDG index (SDGI)** gauges the overall progress of countries toward their global mission of achieving 17 SDGs. The SDGI 2023 reveals Pakistan ranks at the 128th position out of 166 countries with 58.97 scores, whereas India ranks 112th with a 63.45 score on a scale from 0 to 100 the higher the score, the better it is (*Sustainable Development Rankings, 2023*). Congruently, in the **Carbon emission** indicators 2016, Pakistan ranks 31st number from a total of 209 countries with 0.50 percent of the world share contrastingly, India ranks 3rd out of 209 countries with 7.09 percent of the world share (*CO2 Emissions by Country, 2016*).

Continuing with **Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN)** is based on two leading indicators such as vulnerability and readiness. In the vulnerability sector, it assesses the country's exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity of water, health, infrastructure, agriculture, food, and ecosystem on the other hand, the readiness sector measures the preparedness in the governance, economic and social sector. The scale for both these indicators ranges from 0 to 1, where higher scores are better in readiness, and lower is better in vulnerability. In ND-GAIN 2021, Pakistan ranks at 150th position out of total 192 countries with 39.6 scores. Similarly, its ranking in vulnerability is 150th with a score of 0.521, whereas in readiness, it ranks 146th number with a score of 0.313. In the same manner, India ranks 116th out of total 192 countries with 44.6 scores. In

vulnerability, it ranks 138th with 0.489 scores, and in readiness, it ranks 104th with 0.389 scores (*Rankings -Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative*, 2021).

4.3.3 Water Security

Analyzing water security, the author has utilized the Water risks institute Aqueduct 2019 report, as illustrated in the infographic below. Pakistan and India are facing very high overall water risks, as shown by their categorization at a 4-5 level from an overall 0-5 scale; their placement on a scale depicts they are at exceptionally high risk. As clear from the infographics, the water stress scale ranges from 0- 80 percent, where Pakistan lies at precisely 80 percent depicting its extremely high-water stress level on the other hand, India lies between 40-80 percent on the scale depicting its water stress level at high scale.

In measuring drought risk, both Pakistan and India lie between 0.6-0.8 levels at 0-1 scale placing them among the medium-high drought risked countries. In the case of water depletion India's performance is better than Pakistan scaling it as 5-25 percent at low medium, whereas Pakistan resides at medium-high level with 25-50 percent on the scale ranging from 0-75 percent (*Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas*, 2019), (*Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas*, 2019b).

WATER SECURITY OUTLOOK

WATER RISKS INSTITUTE AQUEDUCT 2019




Figure 11: Water Security Outlook (Source: Author, 2023)

Pakistan is ranked number 3 with acute water shortage. It is about to face absolute water scarcity by 2025, as per the UNDP and Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR) report (S. Ahmad et al., 2022). The Pakistan Institutes of Development Economics (PIDE)'s 2022 report reveals that more than 80 percent of Pakistan faces severe water scarcity for at least one month each year. Pakistan is designated among the 17 highly high-water-risk countries at 14th rank (Nabi & Batool, 2022).


The overall water security outlook reveals the alarming situation of water security, which requires fundamental measures to address the water stress, water depletion, and drought risk by imposing a water emergency. Further details of the water security of Pakistan are discussed in Chapter 5 in the revisiting strategic culture.

4.3.4 Food Security

The undeniably grim picture of food security is prevalent from the results of a venomous cocktail of conflict, climate change which has exposed the world to food price shocks and enhanced the vulnerability of the world population to hunger. War in Ukraine is turning the global food crisis into a catastrophe by producing a knock-on impact on global food supply, food prices, fertilizers, and fuel prices. In the last 15 years now, the world has been facing the third global food crisis exposing the weakness of the world food security system (“Global Food Security Index,” 2022).

As per **Global Hunger Index Report (GHI)** 2022, among the regions, South Asia has the world’s highest hunger level with the highest child stunting and wasting rate. Below 9.9 is graded as low and 50, and whatever above 50 is graded as highly alarming, with alarming, severe, and moderate scales lying in between. This infographic details the performance of South Asia from 2000 to 2022. Although the South Asian region has shown progress in its performance, backtracking from a 38.1 aggregate score and alarming scale in 2000 to 27.4 scores at a severe scale in 2022(“Global Hunger Index,” 2022).

Figure 12: Regional Outlook of Global Hunger Index 2022 (Source: Author, 2023)



Jumping from a regional perspective to a country’s outlook, the **Global Hunger Index (GHI)** 2022 report measures the severity of Hunger across countries based on four indicators such as undernourishment, child stunting, child wasting, and child mortality. The scale ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 shows no

hunger, and 100 is the maximum. Each country’s performance is graded on severity level from low to highly alarming. Pakistan stands at 99th rank out of a total of 136 countries with a 26.1 score, whereas India occupies 107th out of 136 countries with a 29.1 score. As per Hunger severity, both countries are designated at alarming stages. Comparatively, Pakistan’s Performance is slightly better than India’s here (“Global Hunger Index,” 2022).




Figure 13: Food Security Outlook (Source: Author, 2023)

Correspondingly, to get a better understanding of Food dynamics, the author has used the Global Food Security Index (GFSI) of 2022 as another measure that tracks the performance of countries in four different categories such as affordability, availability, quality, and safety, along with food sustainability and adaptation. As indicated in the infographics, the scale ranges from zero (least

favorable) to 100 (most favorable). As per GFSI 2022, Pakistan is ranked at 84th number out of 113 countries with 52.2 scores, whereas India is ranked at 68th number with 58.9 scores (“Global Food Security Index,” 2022).

At subcategories, it is very important to notice that Pakistan is performing worst in sustainability and adaptation with a 106 ranking and 37.7 scores, performing second worst in ensuring the quality and safety of food with a 49.4 score and 97th ranking out of 113 countries. Overall, it ranks 75th in affordability of food with 59.9 scores and 61st in availability of food with 58.3 scores. These digits pose a grim picture of food security in Pakistan which is further accentuated by the scores of 23.1 percent of children underweight, 36.7 percent of children stunted, and a prevalence of undernourishment is about 16.9 percent. Whereas India performed better in categories such as availability (62.3 scores and 42 rankings), quality and safety (62.1 scores with 67th ranking), and sustainability (51.2 scores with 71st ranking) in comparison to Pakistan with a poor performance in affordability of food by 59.3 scores and 80th ranking out 113 countries. India exceeded Pakistan in Children underweight by scoring 33.4 percent whereas performed better than Pakistan in children stunted at 30.9 percent and prevalence of undernourishment with 16.3 percent scores (“Global Food Security Index,” 2022).

4.3.5 Health Security

9/11 has brought health security under the national security paradigm and labeled it a critical component of it. It has emphasized improving the health system by enhancing preparedness and response capacity, actively strengthening international health regulation, investing in health cooperation and coordination, and paying meticulous attention to any biological threats. The outbreak of

COVID-19 reveals an uneven preparedness of the health system for pandemics, inequalities in healthcare access and equity, lacking integrated cooperation with regional and international bodies, and a balance of pandemic security with education, transportation, and economic activities. In particular, the COVID-19 pandemic has accentuated the necessity for pandemic security, and in specific reference to South Asia, it has exposed our health system challenges. Despite Pakistan and India's little progress in their health system in past years, it still faces significant challenges, as highlighted by COVID-19.

Pakistan registered a relatively successful response to COVID-19 due to its early action, targeted lockdowns, effective tracing and testing, public solid messaging, and successful vaccine rollout in comparison to India's slow initial response, inadequate healthcare infrastructure, lack of coordination, vaccine shortages, and stigma and misinformation. To have a better understanding of Pakistan and India's health system author has designed an infographic on the health security outlook as below.

HEALTH SECURITY OUTLOOK




Figure 14 : Health Security Outlook (Source: Author, 2023)

Global Health Security Index (GHSI) is based on a total of six categories such as prevention, detection and reporting, rapid response, health system, commitment to improving national capacity, financing and global norms, and risk environment. In this index, the scale starts from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the poor and 100 represents the best performance. Additionally, these categories also have rankings, as mentioned above in the infographics. GHSI 2021

determines the capacities of 195 countries to prepare, plan and face epidemics and pandemics (*GHS Index*, 2021).

Pakistan ranks 130 out of a total of 195 countries with 30.4 scores, whereas India ranks at 66 number with 42.8 scores, comparatively better than Pakistan (*Pakistan - GHS Index*, 2021) (*India - GHS Index*, 2021). In the Southern Asia regional ranking, Pakistan ranks 8 number out of nine, whereas India ranks one. In comparative trends, Pakistan and India marked a downward shift with – 0.9 and – 0.8 from 2019's performance (*Pakistan - GHS Index*, 2021) (*India - GHS Index*, 2021). Among the categorization, the most alarming reflection is Pakistan's negative performance in terms of – 9.9 in the response, –1.6 in norms, and – 0.9 in risk from 2019 performance (*Pakistan - GHS Index*, 2021). In contrast, there is a positive trend, with + 0.1 in prevention, + 4.2 in detection, and + 2.7 in health in overall Pakistan's profile (*Pakistan - GHS Index*, 2021).

In GHSI 2021, India's profile remained stagnated in the prevention, norm, and health category with zero growth and +6.3 improvement in detection, and +1.1 in risk with the most alarming -11.8 backward shift in response from the 2019 performance index (*India - GHS Index*, 2021). Altogether GHSI 2021 has revealed severe gaps in the medical workforce, facilities, healthcare access, response plans, risk communication, and linking public health with health security authorities, national planning, surveillance, or reporting for diseases, and no progress toward enhanced global coordination and commitment to international norms serving health security. GHSI means that all countries in the index remain gravely untrained for future epidemic and pandemic threats ("Global Health Security Index Report," 2021).

Vaccine Confidence Index 2022




Figure 15. Vaccine Confidence Index 2022 (Source: Author, 2023)

The **Vaccine Confidence Index (VCI)** a Vaccine Confidence Project by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, explains vaccine scepticism specific to countries. In a global health regime, a better understanding of public confidence or distrust in vaccines can help in risk analysis and early engagement of concerned authorities to prevent health disruptions (The Vaccine Confidence Project, 2023a). On this scale, 50 is very low, and 100 is very high.

The above-designed infographic of the VCI of 2022 shows Pakistan and India's performance in the vaccine domain. Pakistan has shown a negative trend in vaccine confidence in the 2022 index compared to 2015, where the vaccine's safety was trusted by 92 percent, its effectiveness by 86 percent, significance by 93 percent, and compatibility with belief by 81 percent (The Vaccine Confidence Project, 2023b). In contrast, the stark opposite trend is noticed in the case of India from 2015 results where the vaccine's safety was trusted by 90 percent, effectiveness by 89 percent, importance by 94 percent, and compatibility with belief with the belief by 74% (The Vaccine Confidence Project, 2023c).

Overall, Pakistan's downward shift from 90 and 80 percent to 50s and 60s is quite alarming; additionally, its compatibility with religious belief shifts from 81 percent to 53 percent is more upsetting (The Vaccine Confidence Project, 2023b). It necessitates multisectoral efforts to build trust at the local and community levels to promote vaccine acceptance and eliminate diseases like polio.

In conclusion, South Asian states, specifically Pakistan and India require to invest in health systems such as vaccine development and distribution, improve disease surveillance, promote vaccination campaigns, address socio-economic impacts of health, promote digital health and telemedicine, and trust international cooperation for better preparedness and response to any health emergency.

4.3.6 Cyber Security

With the proliferation of information and communication technologies, over 3.5 billion people are online, with an estimated 44 zettabytes of the digital world giving birth to Industry 4.0 and a broader digital economy. COVID-19 increased internet traffic by 30 percent and marked a shift in the usage of technology from telecommuting to remote learning. For a safe, secure, and trusted digital age, cyber security must be a preferential domain.

The author has gauged the National Cyber Security Index to trace the overall performance of the national government of countries in cyber security regimes. The national cyber security index (NCSI) analyses the national capacity and its efforts towards developing a strong cyber security regime. The NCSI consists of twelve leading indicators such as cyber security policy development, cyber threat analysis and information, education, and professional development, contribution to global cyber security, protection of digital services, Protection of essential services, e-identification and trust services, protection of personal data, cyber crisis management, fight against cybercrime and military cyber operations. In the NCSI, the scale ranges from 1-100, with the higher the score, the better it is, as can be illustrated from the below-designed infographics (National Cybersecurity Index, 2023).

CYBER SECURITY OUTLOOK




Figure 16: Cyber Security Outlook (Source: Author, 2023)

Pakistan is ranked 83 out of 176 countries with a score of 41.56, whereas India is ranked 53 with 59.7 scores. In this Index digital development level is utilized to measure the difference from the cyber security, so Pakistan has a 32.33 digital development level, whose difference from its cyber security index is 9.33. Similarly, India has a digital development level of 40.02, and its difference from its cyber security index is 19.72. Both countries need to work on digital development to fill up this gap (National Cyber Security Index, 2023).

To give a detailed understanding of the cyber security risk, the author has utilized the **Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) 2020**. It has a scale from 0 to 100 scores divided into five categories with 20 scores each, such as legal measures, technical measures, organizational, capacity development, and cooperative measures. The higher the score on the scale, the better performance it is. Overall Subcategorization accesses the country's national legislation on cybersecurity, data protection regulations, critical Infrastructure regulations, child online protection reporting mechanisms, national cybersecurity strategies, national cyber-awareness initiatives, research and development programs, national cybersecurity industries, cybersecurity public and private partnerships, bilateral and multilateral agreements ("Global Cybersecurity Index," 2020).

As per the **GCI 2020**, Pakistan is ranked 79th number out of 182 countries with a score of 64.88 out of 100. At the subcategorization level, it scores 15.97 in legal measures, 12.26 in technical measures, 11.01 in organizational measures, 17.25 in capacity development, and 08.38 in cooperative measures out of 20 each. The index reveals that Pakistan needs to comprehensively engage in cooperative measures regarding cyber security to reduce risks, invest in technical measures and enhance the organization's measure regarding cyber security risks. In contrast, India's performance is comparatively better than Pakistan with its 10th ranking out of a total of 182 countries and 97.5 scores with

20/ 20 in three subcategorizations, such as cooperative measures, capacity developments, and legal measures, whereas technical measures with 19.08 and organizational measures that address the risks stands out at 18.41 score out of 20 (“Global Cybersecurity Index,” 202

In short cyber security outlook of Pakistan is very grim as indicated by the data mentioned above. Pakistan needs an attitudinal shift and innovative mindset focus on research, development, and a skilled workforce to strengthen its nascent efforts in cyber security regime by strongly investing in the cyber industry and infrastructure, enhancing cooperation between the private sector and government, and enhancing public awareness and outreach with new technologies.

4.3.7 Gender Security

Gender security provides a broader outlook of the spectrum of the challenges faced by women, either in terms of protection and safety, discrimination, violence, or inclusion in all spheres of life.

To comprehensively analyze the gender security paradigm author has utilized multiple indices and indicators explicating the gender dynamics of Pakistan and India. Before going into the depth of the indices, the indicators such as **Women in Politics 2023** by OECD reveal that women parliamentarians are 20.50 percent, whereas, in India, they are 14.90 percent (*Inequality - Women in Politics*, 2023). The **violence against women 2019** indicator reveals that the violence ratio against women in Pakistan is over 51.0, whereas, in India, it is about 41.0 percent (*Inequality - Violence Against Women*, 2019). Prejudiced

social institutions contribute to gender inequality by curtailing women’s access to health rights (sexual and reproductive) and their participation in life activities.

As per the Social Institution and gender index (SIGI) 2023, Pakistan’s score is 60.1, whereas India’s score is 43.2 on the scale from 0 (no discrimination) to 100 (absolute discrimination) (*Inequality - Social Institutions and Gender Index*, 2023).




Figure 17. Gender Security Outlook (Source: Author, 2023)

As per **Gender Development Index (GDI) 2021**, Pakistan’s score is 0.810 and is categorized in the low human development group, whereas India is categorized in the medium human development group with a 0.849 score (*Gender Development Index*, 2021).

Consequently, **Gender Inequality Index (GII) 2021**, Pakistan is ranked at 135 number with a 0.534 score, whereas India is ranked at 122 number with a 0.490 score. Here in this index, the lower the value near zero, the better the performance is, whereas the greater the value close to 1, the poorer the

performance is. In detail subcategorization, the gender inequality gap in the share of seats in women in parliament is 60.2 percent, the gender inequality gap in labor force participation is 57.4 percent, and the gender inequality gap in the population above 25 years of age with at least some secondary education in Pakistan is 6.6 percent.

Similarly, India has a 73.1 percent gender inequality gap in the share of seats of women in parliament, a 12 percent gender inequality gap in the population above 25 years of age with at least some secondary education, and a 50.9 percent gender inequality gap in labor force participation. Comparatively, Pakistan performs better in the women's representation in parliament and secondary education gender inequality gap, but overall, the situation of both countries is grim in the gender security paradigm (United Nations, 2021).

GENDER SECURITY OUTLOOK




Figure 18: Gender Security Outlook 2 (Source: Author, 2023)

The **Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI) 2022** presents the most horrible picture of Pakistan’s gender dynamics, with 145 ranking out of 146 countries, and the score is 0.564 on the scale from 0(worst) to 1(best), whereas India ranks 135 out of 146 countries with 0.629 scores. The GGGI consists of 4 subcategorizations such as economic participation and opportunity, education attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment.

In the **GGGI's 2022** subcategorization, Pakistan ranks 145th with 0.33 scores in economic participation and opportunity, 135th with 0.825 scores in education attainment, 143rd with 0.99 scores in health and survival, and 95th with 0.156 scores in political empowerment. At the same time, India ranks 143rd with 0.350 scores in economic participation and opportunity, 107th with 0.961 scores in education attainment, 146th with 0.937 scores in health and survival, and 48th with 0.267 scores in political empowerment. Collectively, both countries have performed worst in economic participation and opportunity and health and survival with widespread gender gap (“Global Gender Gap Report,” 2022).

Intersecting the regional performance in the **GGGI 2022**, South Asia as a region ranks lowest with a 62.3 percent global gender gap. In the subcategorization of the global gender gap index, the South Asian region's gender gap in economic participation and opportunity is 35.7 percent, the second lowest in education attainment is 93.2 percent, and the lowest percent in health and survival is 94.2, whereas fourth highest regional performance in political empowerment with 26.2 percent. It marks a lack of progress and stagnation on gender parity, and the gap is enormous, which may take even 200 years to fill. Overall, Nepal and Bangladesh lead in performance with a 69 percent gender gap closed.

The **Women, Peace, and Security Index (WPSI) 2021** measure the security, inclusion, and justice given to women. As per the Women, peace, and security index 2021, Pakistan is ranked at 167th number out of a total of 170 countries with 0.476 scores, whereas India is ranked at 148th number with 0.597 scores. WPSI 2021 concludes a declining trend and widening disparities in the global improvement of women's status across countries (“Women, Peace, and Security Index,” 2022).

Resultantly, all the above-mentioned statistics reveal a grim portrayal of women's safety, security, and inclusiveness in society, necessitating a collective, coordinated, and comprehensive action focusing on reskilling, reintegrating opportunities, strengthening the cooperative and all-encompassing infrastructure with a more proactive approach to creating a sustainable environment for women and children.

4.3.8 Energy Security

Pakistan's energy security regime relies heavily on energy imports to meet its need. Its reliance on Middle Eastern countries for oil imports exposes it to significant challenges of maintaining energy security among the global risks and price fluctuations.

Contextualizing the volatile period in the energy transition from 2020-2022 consists of Covid 19, extreme weather events and the Russia-Ukraine war, the global energy crisis, and inflation. Covid 19 brought structural changes to global crude oil markets and pricing systems, which entailed a drop in energy demand by 4% worldwide, a drop in energy commodity prices by 40%, and a drop in global energy-related CO₂ emissions by 5.8%. It led to a shrinking global economy by 5.2%, with overall global energy investment plummeting by 400 billion dollars. Extreme Weather conditions caused supply chain disruptions and supply shortages, a rebound in energy demand and consumption by 5% worldwide, major outages affecting 350 million people worldwide, doubled Government support for fossil fuels in 51 countries to \$697 billion, pushed coal, oil and gas prices up (80%) due to tightening of energy markets, rise of average global temperature 1.1 °C above pre-industrial levels, and rebound in global energy-related CO₂ emissions by 6% (36.3 billion tonnes).

The Russia-Ukraine war caused energy security vulnerabilities and supply chain disruptions. The global energy crisis led to a surge in crude oil prices to \$100/barrel in mid-2022 before falling back; prices for spot purchases of natural gas exceeded the equivalent of \$250/barrel of oil, and Fossil fuel subsidies at an all-time high (\$1 trillion). Inflation led to electricity costs going up by 30%, an increase in the number of people without access to electricity (770 million) after years of decrease, and energy poverty and loss of industrial competitiveness (“Global Energy Architectance Index Report,” 2017).

To shed light upon Pakistan’s overall performance in energy security author has considered a few indices building upon indicators like energy equity, sustainability, energy system performances, and transition readiness.




Figure 19: Energy Security Outlook (Source: Author, 2023)

The **World Energy Trilemma Index (WETI) 2022** is based on three indicators as Energy security, Energy equity, and Environmental sustainability they account for a total of 90 percent, and the remaining 10 percent is allocated to the country context. As per the 2022 WETI, Pakistan Stands at 82 ranks out of a total of 125 countries with the DDDd Scale, which ranges from D (75-100%), depicting the worst in all the indicators. Whereas India stands at 63 ranks with BDDc ranging at B (25-50%) in Energy security, D (75-100%) in Energy equity, D (75-100%) in Environmental sustainability, and c (50-75%), in-country context. Among the top 10 countries' overall improvers, India is ranked at number 4 with a 53.6 score, BC grades, and 23 percent overall improvement. It scores four ranking in Sustainability with plus 19 % improvement and equity with plus 60 % improvement ("World Energy Trilemma Index," 2022).

Overall, Asia, with over half of the world's population, is facing an increase in energy demand while the region is adapting to new technologies. Despite China and India's growth in energy investments, the transition from coal-based energy markets to green and eco-friendly energy markets is a substantial challenge. Overall, when energy equity is the region's strength, adverse climate events affect progress. Tata from India and Ayala Corporation from the Philippines set as a role model for Pakistan to invest in wind and solar energy ("World Energy Trilemma Index," 2022).

The **Global Energy Architecture Performance Index (EAPI) 2017** is based on three main pillars such as a). Economic growth and development, b). Environmental Sustainability, and c). Energy Access and Security. The first pillar's sub-index measures the country's energy architecture's addition or subtraction from economic growth. The second pillar's sub-index estimates the environmental impact of energy supply and consumption. The third pillar's sub-index measures the extent of the energy supply's security, accessibility, and

diversification. As per the 2017 EAPI index report, Pakistan is categorized with the Middle East and North African countries, ranked at 101st number out of a total of 127 countries with a total score of 0.55 and subsequent scores of 0.48 in pillar 1, 0.49 in pillar 2 and 0.59 in pillar 3, with a trend of (+11) from 2009-2017 whereas India is categorized among emerging and developing Asia ranked at 87th number with a total score of 0.52 and a subsequent score of 0.54 under pillar 1, 0.49 in pillar 2 and 0.62 in pillar 3, with a trend of (+4) from 2009-2017 (“Global Energy Architecture Performance Index Report,” 2017).

The **Energy Transition Index (ETI) 2023** is based on two elements a). system performance that includes security, sustainability, and equitability, b). transition readiness consisting of regulations and political commitment, finance and investment, education and human capital, Infrastructure, and Innovation. Pakistan is ranked at 107 number out of a total of 120 countries with a total 46.9 score and a 5.13 percent improvement in its performance from 2014-2023.

Similarly, India is ranked at 67th number with a 54.3 score and a 7.97 percent improvement in performance from 2014-2022. India is among the only 2 out of 120 countries with Singapore that are advancing across the equitable, secure, and sustainable dimensions: India with its own unique transition journey Electricity (Amendment) Bill 2022, programs for energy efficiency and decarbonization, the Energy Conservation (Amendment) Bill 2022, National Green Hydrogen Mission, Lifestyle for Environment (LiFE) initiative. India aims to develop globally competitive manufacturing expertise in low-carbon niche technologies and enable a skilled workforce, public-private collaboration in innovation, and investment in research and development for sustainable energy transition (“Fostering Effective Energy Transition,” 2023).

Visioning critical insight and regional scores categorically, Pakistan is placed with the Middle East and North Africa, entailing the overall regional average score of 50.5 with 9 % of the global population, 8 % of the global total energy supply, and 7 % of the global CO₂ emissions. In the system performance, the regional insight states that the last three years flattened the 8 percent growth of the last decade, and last year alone reduced the 200 percent subsidy score improvement to 33 percent. On transition readiness, although it showcases a 20 percent gain like other regions, it lacks innovation.

The development of environmental technologies can be the savior for these countries. Categorically, India is placed with the emerging and developing Asia, entailing the overall regional average score of 53.4 with 51 percent of the global population, 39 % of the global total energy supply, and 46 % of global CO₂ emissions. With a 10 percent improvement in the equitable dimension and a 28 percent increase in transition readiness (policy framework, financing environment, innovation, renewable capacity, and diversifying the energy mix), it still lacks good performance on the sustainability dimension due to worsening carbon intensity (“Fostering Effective Energy Transition,” 2023).

To conclude, the world energy crisis is not exclusive to climate emergencies. To limit this multilayered crisis, there is a dire need for a multilayered response at all levels of society, from civil society, media, and NGOs to governments, policymakers, and decision-makers. Despite the growing private sector’s effort in renewable technologies, the political leadership is ignorant of the net zero goals. In addition to the active role of policymakers, the global energy leaders, either corporate, financial investors, cities, communities, think tanks, and philanthropists, need to step up to the challenge (“World Energy Trilemma Index,” 2022).

The above-mentioned data on energy security reveals Pakistan's extremely weak performance in the energy domain. To be on a better track and pave ways toward an improved energy security regime implies enhancing domestic energy production, attracting foreign investments, and diversifying its energy sources (“Global Energy Architecture Performance Index Report,” 2017).



CHAPTER FIVE

REVISITING STRATEGIC CULTURE OF PAKISTAN

Building upon the conceptual framework of analysis derived in the Chapter Two to analyze the emergence of the strategic culture of Pakistan, then the trajectory of historical events in the last 74 years' tenure in Chapter Three of the Literature review and Changing South Asian Security Dynamics in Chapter four accomplishes Pakistan's strategic culture throughout history has remained exclusive, restrictive, selective, devoid of learning from past experiences, military oriented, and India-centric. In other words, this narrow approach has cost Pakistan multiple disastrous wars, unresolvable conflicts, dented international image, a fractured domestic outlook, and poor social and societal development, as examined in Literature Review and Changing South Asian Security Dynamics chapters.

Currently, fast-shifting parallels in the global and regional arena necessitates Pakistan to revisit its strategic culture by modifying its strategic thinking, planning, decision-making, and overall strategic behavior to step ahead toward a comprehensive, contextually grounded, and adaptable strategic culture to cope with the new emerging and previously exacerbating traditional and non-traditional security challenges deliberated in chapter four extensively under the dominant and emerging security themes. An inclusive approach will empower Pakistan to circumnavigate complex international relations and pursue national interests while contributing to regional stability and global governance. Chapter five of this study revisits the strategic culture of Pakistan utilizing the conceptual framework of analysis.

5.1. Conceptual Framework of Analysis for Revisiting Strategic Culture of Pakistan

Here author generated framework of analysis will be utilized to revisit the Strategic Culture of Pakistan, channeling through three broad range of aspects shown in the diagram below.




Figure 20. Conceptual Framework of Analysis for Revisiting Strategic Culture of Pakistan (Source: Author,2023)

This framework of analysis consists of cognitive, environmental/structural, and relational aspects, which play a crucial role in providing a comprehensive conception of Pakistan's strategic behavior. It basically aims at revisiting the underlying thought process, geopolitical considerations, interaction, and engagement dynamics, entailing three fundamental bottom lines (a) informed policymaking, (b) strategic adjustments, (c) enhanced decision-making.

The sequence of the framework is arranged in a stepwise manner where cognitive aspects provide revised insight into the mental functioning of Pakistan, environmental/structural aspects stipulate the nonhuman agency, and contextual factors with long-term influence by setting the stage for the relational aspects, which focus on human agency and interactions with changeable effects.

5.1.1. Cognitive Aspects of Strategic Culture of Pakistan

Cognitive aspects play a primary role in addressing a country's strategic culture as they shape the country's approach toward environmental and relational perspectives.

FAP is an acronym devised by the author that stands for function, acquisition, perception, and interaction. Here it provides insight into the state's cognition by detailing how the state functions based on acquired knowledge, use it to perceive the world around it and executes interaction according to it. To revise the strategic culture of Pakistan, the fundamental step starts with state cognition. It is essential to revise cognitive biases in historical perceptions, national identity, ideologies, strategic narratives (security perceptions, threat perception, and risk assessments), and decision-making processes that have influenced Pakistan's strategic culture, as already explicated in chapters two and three.

Here's how cognitive aspects can be critical in addressing the strategic culture of Pakistan




Figure 21: Cognitive Aspects of Strategic Culture of Pakistan (Source: Author, 2023)

5.1.1.1. Perceptions and Interpretations

Policymakers' role is crucial in Pakistan's perception and interpretation of the international environment, security challenges, threats, and opportunities. It heavily depends upon the cognitive attributes and the policymakers' understanding of Pakistan's strategic landscape. Considering the history of Pakistan, cognitive bias has shaped and influenced the policymakers' assessment of strategic challenges and opportunities.

In the context of Strategic depth and the Afghanistan Conflict, Pakistan policymakers' cognitive bias towards the Pashtun tribe has led them to tunnel vision where they have overlooked the fact that the changing dynamics of the Afghan Taliban, who in 1996 emerged as the savior of the Public from Mujahideen, soon turned into evils as they entered government then became guerilla warfighters after the war on terror. Now the Taliban are back in power

after 20 years of war with much more brutal force and mentality, but this time by defeating coalition forces and with America's approval.

The shift in Pakistan's strategic culture towards a pro-Taliban approach without challenging the existing perception of Pakistan about them as friendly, pro-Pakistani (compared to the Former President Ashraf Ghani's regime) and interpreting the new developments through the same lens of preconceived notions has limited Pakistan's policymakers from developing a comprehensive understanding of complex dynamics and aftereffects of which are in terms of the Taliban's support of TTP, border skirmishes, and increasing closeness with India with non-flexible posture towards Pakistan.

Regarding complex geopolitical rivalries, Pakistan's policymakers practice anchoring bias while assessing the geopolitical dynamics. Such as Russia's close ties with India while overlooking Russia's great prospect of an energy market in Pakistan, cyber security, and defense cooperation. Pakistan's misperception and misinterpretation of the overall geopolitical rivalries cost it humongous in the 1971 war, where the USSR pushed all its weight behind India by supplying it weapons and necessary assistance. Pakistan's ideological perception of Israel (Palestine's plight) and confirmation bias towards its closed alliance with India is hijacking the possible strategic opportunities regarding technology, defense, and economy with it. Kashmir occupies a central place in Pakistan's Strategic Culture. Pakistan's perception and interpretation of bilateral relations with India is through a hostile lens based on historical experiences. In doing so, the two bordered countries' enormous potential for possible bilateral trade and cultural relations are underrated as discussed in chapter four.

In revised strategic culture, Pakistan needs to mitigate the impression of cognitive biases in its policy-making processes by considering multiple

perspectives and seeking evidence-based analysis, external insights, and reflective practices among the policymakers to initiate and promote a culture of reflection and self-awareness. Such an inward introspection will entail cognitive diversity that will lead to well-informed and effective policy responses through an accurate and comprehensive understanding of the strategic landscape aligning with long-term security and strategic objectives.

5.1.1.2. Decision-Making

In Pakistan's strategic culture, decision-making processes are profoundly influenced by cognitive aspects such as cognitive bias in information processing, perception, interplay of emotions, and risk assessment.

In the heightened situation between India and Pakistan, a divergent policy response has always been received on both sides of the border due to the confirmation bias and availability heuristic in information processing by the decision makers; one such example is the Post Pulwama episode. Risk assessment is the soul of foreign policy decision-making on national security matters. The first Kashmir war, the 1965 war, the 1971 war, and the Kargil conflict are illustrations of the overconfidence effect, which impacted the Pakistan decision-maker's risk assessment and led them to overly optimistic assumptions and underestimation of the potential for conflict escalation. Pakistan's decision makers' risk assessment approach must be upgraded to a more objective and evidence-based approach. Emotionally charged decision-making comes into display in matters related to Kashmir, depicting historical grievances, national pride, anger, and the right to self-determination. Impulsive and reactive decision-making potentially escalates the situation, as seen in the post-Pulwama scenario of boycotting trade and imposing tariffs, which doesn't

serve the long-term strategic interests. The emotional cloud must be catered with a balanced and rational approach of decision-making.

In the revised Strategic Culture to be a responsive, rational one, Pakistan needs to address cognitive bias by implementing structured decision-making through institutionalizing best practices (risk assessment, data analysis, and scenario planning), encouraging diverse perspectives (expert analysis, intelligence assessments, and research-based inputs), reviewing past decisions, and inculcating expert analysis. This approach will lead Pakistan towards well-rounded and informed decision-making regarding national security, foreign policy, and regional relations.

In terms of decision-making regarding economic matters, Pakistan needs to shift towards cognitive flexibility to optimize economic benefits and address potential risks in accordance with the changing global economic dynamics. Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts require structured and evidence-based strategic decision-making to effectively allocate resources, assess the impact of counterterrorism measures, and adapt strategies as required by addressing evolving challenges and changing the perception of the world about its efforts.

5.1.1.3. Learning and Adaptation

Learning and adaptation have a crucial role to play in the strategic culture of Pakistan. Building upon the learning from the past experiences of four wars between India and Pakistan, Pakistan adapted to the evolving security dynamics by not jumping on the escalation ladder in post-Pulwama incidents and instead advocated for escalation control based on its memory of the Kargil conflict. Pakistan's government's goodwill gesture of returning an Indian Air Force pilot on humanitarian grounds is the practice of cognitive flexibility in the highly flamed situation between both countries.

Similarly, Pakistan's shift from a military-dominated approach to a comprehensive counter-terrorism approach by involving all stakeholders such as civil society, media, and religious scholars adding up intelligence-based operations is the exemplification of its learning from failed and unsuccessful strategies to refine its approach by adopting to vastly changing dynamic and catering new security challenges. With the shift in the global polarity, Pakistan needs to adjust its foreign policy approaches by critically evaluating the successful and unsuccessful learnings from previous policies and adapting to the new ones contemplating the implications of regional developments and their impact on Pakistan's security and interests. From an economic perspective, Pakistan's joint venture with China CPEC itself is an exemplification of learning from Chinese experiences of mega-scale infrastructures and adapting their approach to utilize its successful learnings in other domestic projects. Additionally, Pakistan needs to widen its economic considerations and shift towards friendly trade policies to adapt to global market trends to grab maximum opportunities but first learning from its previous domestic economic policy failures.

In a revised Pakistan's strategic culture to be a more informed, adaptive, and learned one it is important to focus on learning lessons from both successful and unsuccessful past experiences, by critically gauging those strategies. Developing a culture of continuous learning and cognitive flexibility is indispensable for improved strategic thinking and effective response.

5.1.1.4 Strategic Thinking and Analysis

Strategic thinking and analysis are one of the most influential cognitive skills producing a prudent influence on the strategic culture of Pakistan. Pakistan's deterrence policy is an illustration of strategic thinkers' scenario planning and

anticipation of contingencies to prevent escalation by ensuring the credibility of nuclear deterrence.

Pakistan's renewed counter-terrorism approach involves critical problem-solving skills of minimizing collateral damage while addressing security and humanitarian concerns. Pakistan's strategic culture is contextualized in Changing regional and global political and security architecture which requires Pakistan policy makers' engagement in strategic thinking, analysis, and creative exercises to calculate the consequences of major powers' interests and actions along with focusing on constructive engagement with numerous players while protecting its sovereignty and security interests. CPEC brought opportunities along with the complexities providing a wide range of opportunities for Pakistan's strategic thinkers to assess its risk and benefits, anticipate future scenarios, evaluate policy options, engage in stakeholder consultation, foster creativity and innovation, invest in human capital and education (promoting critical thinking, analytical skills, and interdisciplinary approaches in academic and professional institutions) and creating a culture of strategic thinking across various sectors (government, academia, and business) through workshops, training programs, and the integration of strategic planning into policy-making processes.

In the revised strategic culture of Pakistan the centrality of strategic thinking and analysis with creativity, innovation, and problem-solving skills is embraced. Fostering strategic thinking culture will assist Pakistan's policy and decision-makers to circumnavigate geopolitical sensitivities and their broad range of future implications while making informed and effective decisions aligning with its national and strategic interests.

5.1.1.5. Communication and Influence

Communication and influences have a significant role in not only shaping strategic culture but also how it is communicated to the world. From this perspective, Pakistan's strategic culture perception in the world is viewed as insecure, military culture, and India-centric. There are multiple aspects of Pakistan's strategic culture that need to be framed consciously by focusing on the language used, referring to cultural nuances, and addressing the cognitive bias of others to influence the international perception of its strategic culture.

Pakistan's nuclear program is a fundamental element of its strategic culture. Framing its nuclear policy as credible minimum deterrence and strategy as full spectrum deterrence reassures the defensive purpose of its nuclear weapons. Pakistan needs to communicate its strategic intentions of a responsible nuclear weapon state time and again while engaging with the international community through cultural nuances of its commitment to conflict resolution and regional stability in an extremely volatile region. There is a strong need to proactively address the preconceived notions of the international community attached to Pakistan's nuclear program by providing them with an accurate picture of its nuclear policy through comprehensive diplomatic engagement, international forums, and capacity-building measures.

The Kashmir issue is an integral part of Pakistan's strategic culture. While communicating its position on Kashmir to the international community, Pakistan needs to be cognitively proactive to address cognitive biases beforehand by drawing cultural nuances of the shared value of freedom and human dignity instead of excessive focus on India's behavior that's where the world becomes deaf and underrate it to a bilateral issue or domestic matter of India.

Pakistan needs to address the one-sided narrative about terrorism by highlighting not only its successes and sufferings in counterterrorism but also reasserting its commitment to regional and global security. It is important to address the international perception by drawing a cultural nuance of shared security and building partnerships in counter-terrorism efforts. Pakistan needs to tailor its communication approaches in alignment with the cultural nuances of partners such as religious and cultural ties when it comes to the Arab countries otherwise economic growth and investment opportunities in relevant to the Western world. Pakistan needs to provide a comprehensive picture of its national identity to the international community highlighting its rich cultural heritage, music, and arts, tourism sector, enriching ethnic diversity, and natural landscape by relying on its soft power potential.

In a geopolitics context, Pakistan needs to actively engage in regional and international forums to address misperceptions and cognitive bias about its security concern communicating in a framework that is understandable to others specifically referring to the mess the United States has left in its immediate neighbourhood of Afghanistan. In this regard, Pakistan needs to highlight its efforts post US withdrawal in terms of its evacuation programs and emergency assistance that it has provided to diplomatic staff, and still assisting Afghan nationals despite the refugee influx.

In a revised Pakistan's strategic culture, effective communication by conscious language framing, keeping cultural nuances, and addressing cognitive biases mitigates the "insecure" state perception but the rest of the two perceptions military oriented and Indian centric need a ground value shift towards a more comprehensive Pakistan national strategic culture involving all stakeholder's representation where military culture should be a sub-category, not the main dominant force as stated in chapter two.

Similarly, in the evolving geopolitical undercurrents, the focus from the India-centric hard means of politics and traditional security needs to be shifted towards a comprehensive approach with more focus on non-traditional security challenges and threats that possesses the potential of becoming the crises and wars of tomorrow if not paid attention today as discussed in chapter four.

5.1.1.6. National Identity and Narratives

National Identity and narratives are central to Pakistan's national and political culture, contributing massively to the strategic culture. Specific cognitive attributes shape the identity of the Pakistani nation, and the narratives that are associated with it and how they should be corrected are as discussed below:



Figure 22: Pakistan's National Identity (Source: Author, 2023)

5.1.1.6.1. Historical Perceptions

Under the influence and perceptual filters of cognitive biases in the individual capacity and cultural values, only certain aspects and narratives are emphasized

in historical events and figures of Pakistan while shaping Pakistan's history. In contrast, other elements are downplayed or neglected.

A few such examples of cognitive bias are as follows:

- a) Quaid-e-Azam: Founder of Pakistan ----- (Heroism and Pride)
- b) Fatima Jinnah: Madre Millat----- (Rejection, Traitor)
- c) Bacha Khan: Champion of Non-Violence and Pashtun Independence Activist ----- (Rejection and Hatred)
- d) Sir Ganga Ram: Philanthropist and Chief Architect of Modern Lahore ----- (Shame and Hatred)
- e) Abdul Sattar Edhi: Philanthropist ----- (Heroism, humanity, and Pride)
- f) Dr. Abdul Salam: Physicist, Nobel Prize Laureate (Hatred, Shame, and Rejection)
- g) Atif Mian: World Leading Economist ----- (Shame, Hatred, and Rejection)

In all the above cases, cognitive aspects of pride and heroism are often associated with Quaid-e-Azam whereas his religious identity and sectarian beliefs are neglected. In contrast, Dr. Abdul Salam, Atif Mian, and Sir Ganga Ram's achievements are overlooked. Still, cognitive aspects like hatred and shame are associated with them about their religious and sectarian beliefs. In the same way, Abdul Sattar Edhi who was born in India but migrated to Pakistan and is accepted widely as a philanthropist. Still, Sir Ganga Ram, who was born in Pakistan, lived and worked for Pakistan is widely rejected as a philanthropist owing to his religious belief. One more example is Baccha Khan, whose struggle for nonviolence and women's rights is downgraded but referred to hatred due to his Pashtun independence activism.

Fatima Jinnah's political struggle and sacrifices were negated without any due credit to her equal struggle alongside her brother Mr. Jinnah, and she was referred to as a traitor by Former President of Pakistan Field Marshal Ayub Khan. In this regard, Pakistan needs to address cognitive bias and practice cognitive diversity through an inclusivist approach. The world knows Gandhi as a non-violence champion, but people rarely know Baccha Khan, who initiated it even before Gandhi and worked on it throughout his life.

Pakistan should pay its due tribute to all the faces of Pakistan without any prejudice to shape the nation's history, present, and future on an inclusivist ground that will be reflected in all other associated fabrics of a state, nation, and society.

5.1.1.6.2. Shared Experiences and Collective Memory

Shared Experience and collective memory have played a fundamental role in constructing Pakistan's national identity and influence how these memories are interpreted, remembered, and transmitted through narratives, highlighting the nation's identity. Pakistan's collective memory that shapes its national identity is based on its shared experiences, starting from the independence movement, the partition of British India, the formation of the Islamic Republic, the wars with India, the Kashmir Issue, the Nuclear Program, sports achievements, and cultural heritage.

The collective memory of the independence movement is devoid of female gender recognition as well as the Bengali leaders, the exclusivist approach to the trauma and violence associated with the partition of India, reinforcing the religious identity of the Pakistani nation by an Islamic fabric (Islamic governance, Islamic cultural values) while excluding other religious factions' presence and acceptance in the Pakistani nation as exemplified in objective

resolution, camouflaging defeat in wars with India under the national narrative of sacrifice, resilience, defense of national sovereignty and defining foreign policy image as the defender of Kashmiri self-determination, nuclear program as symbol of deterrence, self-reliance, and national pride. Narrowing the sense of national pride and unity to achievements in cricket while ignoring other sports, similarly, celebrating and preserving cultural heritage depicting Islamic values while altogether rejecting arts, music, literature, and architecture (representing other religions and ethnicities) as part of our social fabric and a source of national unity, identity, and pride. The vandalization of a 1700-year-old life-sized *statue of Buddha* in Takhtbhai, Mardan, in 2020 is one such recent example ignoring its vast historical significance as a representation of Gandhara civilization (Chaudhry, 2020).

In this regard, Pakistan needs to fix the discordance in its shared experiences and collective memories by adopting a more integrated approach as a display of broader collective memories and shared experiences with more focus on the informed process in all the perspectives stated above.

5.1.1.6.3. Cultural and Linguistic Influences

Cultural and linguistic influences have shaped Pakistan's national identity and narratives in multifaceted ways via stories, symbols, and values attributed to Pakistan, such as the Urdu language, a source of linguistic unity but is currently under a severe elitist inferiority dilemma associating it with low class, uneducated and poor class of society with English as a pretentious symbol. Islamic culture contributes to the cultural fabric of society through societal norms, customs, and practices such as Eid-ul-Fitr and Azha. In contrast, Pakistan's cultural fabric lacks any inclusive approach to integrating other **cultural and religious identities**. A broader narrative of Pakistani culture is

ingrained into its rich regional and ethnic diversity as Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun, Baloch, Gilgiti, Kashmiri, and Saraiki; instead of perceiving it as cultural diversity its exploitation as a cultural divide has harmed the national identity of Pakistan. **Both identities, either national or ethnic, must be inclusive of each other.**

Additionally, regional languages must be allowed at all educational institutes at the provincial level as the compulsory option so that the basics of every province can be implied from the ground level within the youth and future of the country, promoting an integrated pool of linguistic identity of Pakistan. Sufi influences a core of the spiritual identity of Pakistan with distinct art, music, and poetry that contributes to Pakistan's cultural and religious landscape and is also under threat of extremists. The **cultural and artistic identity of Pakistan**, although it represents a rich tradition of arts and literature with poetry, music, dance, and visual arts, comes in conflict with the religious identity and Islamic cultural values that form the very basic of the societal value. That's how this contrast produces a prejudice towards this talent and a sentiment of betrayal from Islamic values. In contrast, the fine line must be drawn between the Islamic outlook and all other identities, which is an impartial stance on the nation's history. Allama Iqbal and Faiz Ahmed Faiz are examples in this regard. Food and cuisine, traditional clothing, folklore, and festivals (Basant, Urs, and cultural events) are emblems of national unity and shared cultural heritage which must be preserved.

The interfaces between different cultural sections and the evolving nature of society continue to shape Pakistan's national narrative and identity, which, in its exclusivist style, currently depicts the extremely polarised, increasingly intolerant expression of Pakistani society to the world. In revised strategic culture of Pakistan practising all inclusive national identity approach including cultural, religious, ethnic, linguistic, regional and social identities with the primr

focus on female gender's valuable and meaningful presence, representation and acceptance.

5.1.1.6.4. Education and Socialization

The education and socialization process involves cognitive attributes such as beliefs, norms, and values that construct Pakistan's national identity through narratives and symbols and an individual's understanding of it. Pakistan's Curriculum Design is not in alignment with the current realities. Still, it is a traditional version that generation after generation has studied with a selective focus on subjects like history, Pakistan study, maths, etc. The exclusionary approach towards emotional intelligence, time management, conflict resolution, and practical life skills shapes the educational capital of Pakistan, not meeting the requirements of the current job market.

Textbooks and study materials should be upgraded, and a national curriculum must be designed by fostering a good chunk of technological developments, values and ethics education, interactions, and socialization perspective promoting critical thinking, discussions, debates, and extracurricular engagements to develop a collective sense of national identity and to shape an inclusive, diverse and socially, politically, culturally, economically and environmentally conscious character of youth contributing to a multifaceted national identity of Pakistan. Shared rituals and linguistic heritage, a national symbol and anthems, and evidence-based, impartial, and objective understanding of historical narrative can deepen the sense of belongingness and national identity.

5.1.1.6.5. Political Ideologies and National Narratives

Cognitive attributes like memory, perception, interpretation, language, learning, thinking, and reasoning play a fundamental part in shaping Pakistan's political ideologies and national narratives.

Political ideology like Islamism, two-nation theory, regional and ethnic nationalism dominates Pakistan's current political discourse, whereas conservatism and fascism remain occasionally. Voices for socialism and secularism are cornered among the attempted journey of liberalism that can be better termed Islamic liberalism.

Pakistan's current progress in climate and gender index, as discussed in chapter four, calls for active environmentalist and feminist political ideology that is remained missing from the central political discourse under patriarchy and discrimination. Pakistan's current social identity crisis is picturesque of the male-dominated, elite class, rural-urban divide, autonomy, and recognition struggle of ethnic tribal and regional identities where Punjab and Sindh dominate. In contrast, despite being rich in resources, Baluchistan suffers along with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Azad Kashmir, and Gilgit Baltistan. Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarian has successfully created this political narrative by playing the gender and class identity card to be the advocate of women and poor people and the same as PMLN as representative of industrialists and working class, whereas PTI as the modern, educated, and well-aware section of society in search of a just, progressive "NEW" Pakistan.

The **political ideology of Pakistan's ordinary religious parties** is based on using religion as a political tool and exploiting the emotional association of the masses with the religion. One such example is to pressure the PTI government to release Atif Mian (Pakistani born leading world economist) from Former PM

Imran Khan's Economic Advisory Council accredited to his Ahmadi religious minority credentials; the murder of Salman Taseer at the notion of blasphemy and celebrating the murderer's act as heroism is another example.

Using blasphemy as a personal revenge tactic against someone you dislike is an unjust course, whereas doing the same act of blasphemy with other religions is perceived as an act of heroism. Blocking roads and burning properties in the name of religion is out of proportion approach by religious parties who keep a mum on child kidnapping, rape cases in Madrasas and engage in victim blaming if it's a woman then targeting the dress code but not raising a single question on the moral code of the male-dominated society. Kasur child sexual abuse scandal, the Motorway rape case, Zainab rape case in Kasur are fewer examples where the moral default of our society is at its peak, with no mention of any religious sermon or condemnation of these acts by any religious scholar.

Emotional associations should be utilized ethically and responsibly to promote positive values and inclusivity rather than exploiting them for contentious purposes. Critical thinking and making informed choices through proper education can lead to a well-aware society that cannot fall victim to religious manipulation for political gains. Additionally, voter literacy must be in closed focus to make informed choices based on the candidate's education portfolio and commitment to a just and welfare society rather than religious or political party affiliations.

Availability heuristic, confirmation bias and cognitive bias are prevalent in Pakistan's political discourse as post-9th May 2023 events denote the struggle between PTI vs Pakistan Army siding with the latter one; as practiced by media outlets, political leaders, and many other segments of the society.

Cognitive framing is a very deliberate attempt in political ideology and narrative building to achieve a particular agenda under the cover. The dominant themes in Pakistan's political narrative discourse include us vs. them (Pakistan vs. America, Pakistan vs. Soviet Union, Pakistan vs. Israel), victimhood and persecution (Bhutto vs. Zia ul Haq, political parties vs. military establishment), security, and stability (for defense budget rise), progress and modernization (for overshadowing failures), national pride and identity (Bhutto and Bomb, Bhutto, and Constitution, 1992 world cup), populist framing (Imran khan vs PDM).

Similarly, **Cognitive dissonance** in Pakistan's political dissertation is deteriorating its international branding and image. One such case is when government and political leaders condemn terrorism and extremism but compartmentalize their beliefs, such as TTP is unacceptable, but the Taliban can be negotiated with the point to understand that both are terrorists organization with the same ideology; we highlight Modi Hindutva, but we underline Saad Rizvi, Hafiz Saeed and many other elements like him, we shifted our approach towards counter-terrorism after APS attack in 2014, but the release of the perpetrator's facilitator Mr. Ehsan Ullah Ehsan behind the doors against public aggression raises questions on State's commitment towards its people and counter-terrorism.

Other examples of implying emotional association (such as garnering public support through narratives like Pakistan army is our pride and we stand with them after attack on military installations on 9th may), symbolism and imagery (Imran khan's rosary, bat, lion, arrow as electoral symbols, "Hamein dushman ke bacchon ko parhana hai", ISPR's annual song release on Kashmir), language and rhetoric (Chor, Diesel, Mr. 10 percent, Cherry blossom, youthia, patwaris), (mujhy q nikala, ayega Imran banay ga neya Pakistan, Jiye Bhutto, Pakistan Khappay, Israeli agent, Modi ka yaar), narrative building (Bhutto as hero and

Mujeeb as villain , Pakistan Army Chief General Asim muneer as hero and Former PM Imran khan as villain, Pakistan's Former Army Chief Retd. General Qamar Javed Bajwa as villain and Former PM Imran khan as hero, Pakistan's Former Army Chief Retd. General Musharraf as villain and Former Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftilhar Chaudhry as hero), social influence, and authority (Manzur Pashteen- pashtun tahafuz movement, Imran Khan- honest man and New Pakistan, Malik Riaz- influential businessman and an above law person) in the existing Pakistan's discourse entails how the political framework lacks coherence, essential awareness and is totally agenda based serving particular political party's interests.

As a response to all the attributes stated above, in the revised strategic culture of Pakistan the awareness-based, critical thinking promoting, balanced, and coherent alternative political approach is required with cognitive restructuring in the narrative building to shape well-adaptive, inclusive, and representative political ideologies.

5.1.1.6.6. *Emotional Associations*

Sense of belongingness and attachment to a Pakistani nation comes from the narratives and sentiments attributed to an emotional association, such as patriotism(national events such as independence day, and 23rd March Parade), solidarity and unity (challenges and external threats to regional groups, natural disasters such as recent flood in 2022, 2005 earthquake of Azad Kashmir and sports events like 1992 cricket world cup), national pride (accomplishments in various fields, such as sports, arts, science, and technology, evoke a sense of pride among the populace), sacrifice and martyrdom(associated with the struggle for independence and Pakistan army and police force fighting terrorism, extremism and protecting borders), resilience and determination(overcome

adversity, rebuild and confront internal (separatist movement by BLA, PTM) and external threats from TTP, Taliban and India across LOC), hope and aspirations(social and political discourse for better future, vision of a prosperous, progressive, and just nation) collective celebrations (national days emblems of joy, enthusiasm and sense of togetherness, and emotionally charged events (Fall of Dhaka, APS attack -grief, resilience and national unity).

The interchange of emotional association is concurrent with the construction and depictions of Pakistani national identity. Although dynamic association varies from person to person, context-wise, it has been a driving force in shaping the country's narrative. Our cognitive bias is visible in our emotional association towards the fall of Dhaka by relying on our side of history and neglecting the other side. In contrast, the significant and ample responsibility for this historical failure lies in the hard-headedness of Pakistan's Former Prime Minister Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto with the offhand decision-making and all-out offensive approach of the military establishment.

Preferring to generate resilience in the nation's cognition against Balochistan Liberation Army and Pashtoon Tahafuz Movement instead of learning from the Fall of Dhaka and going all hard-handed against them is a partial approach toward their due grievances. For example, Pashtun tribes and Baloch tribe's resilience and demands for just rights are constructed and interpreted as an act of treason and duplicity, which is already raising concern in the eyes of any ordinary educated Pakistanis and is drawing regional and international attention in the already fractured domestic environment.

The recent attempt to generate an impression of treason and sedition against PTI and its worker with their run and arrest trials after the military installations attack on 9th May 2023, coupled with the sentiment of solidarity, national unity, and

resilience towards the Pakistan Army by the authorities. This overall discourse of the wall of shame further complicated the nation's emotional response to the 29th of May 2023 episode. The current episodic fall of Imran Khan's government, economic conditions, natural disasters, and military whip have reduced the hope and aspiration of the average Pakistani toward a progressive and prosperous Pakistan.

In a revised strategic culture of Pakistan, the political and social discourse of emotional association with Pakistan's national identity must be uplifting, focusing on peaceful coexistence and pluralism while discouraging the politicization of religion and education and encouraging social justice and civic engagement.

5.1.2. Environmental/Structural Aspects of Strategic Culture

Environmental/ structural aspects play a secondary role in addressing strategic culture as it sets the contextual frame for geopolitical interactions. It provides insight into the structural backdrop of Pakistan that involves the complex interplay of influences such as geography, history, economics, demographics, and technology that shapes the geopolitical landscape as mentioned in chapter three. To revise Pakistan's strategic culture the subsequent step is getting a deeper understanding and revision of our approach toward underlying settings and constraints stemming from geopolitical considerations, military capabilities, socioeconomic factors, technological advancements, environmental influences, global power dynamics, and international norms that shape the strategic behavior of Pakistan detailed elaborated in chapter four.

Here's how environmental/structural aspects can be critical in addressing the strategic culture of Pakistan.




Figure 23: Environmental/ Structural Aspects of Strategic Culture of Pakistan
(Source : Author, 2023)

5.1.2.1. Geographical Factors

Geopolitical factors produce a significant influence on Pakistan's Strategic culture by driving its national security and foreign policy choices. Geo-strategically, Pakistan is located at the crossroad of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Its proximity to the Arabian Sea adds up to its credential as a maritime state as a connector. Instead of serving its critical player role as a

connector, it is entangled in border issues, and regional rivalries, and bears the consequences of uninformed policy options amidst the global power shift depicted in the historical legacies. Pakistan's border tensions, territorial disputes, and regional rivalries with India, and Afghanistan, thrust it to adopt a defensive and security-centric strategic culture.

The **Kashmir issue** is central to Pakistan's strategic culture but the recent development of scraping Article 375 and the special status of Kashmir, an attempt of dividing into union territories and inculcating it in India in August 2019 has posed a significant challenge. On the other hand, Gilgit Baltistan's quest for proper inclusion in Pakistan as a province or a clear status is complicating options for Pakistan. In the current discourse, it is believed that there is a mild willingness on both sides of India and Pakistan governments on the maintenance of status-quo on both sides of Kashmir. This will change the outlook of Pakistan's quest on Kashmir's freedom struggle and its reason for building up defense spending.

In revisiting Pakistan's strategic culture, in response to India's status quo and increased violence in Kashmir and world silence over it; Pakistan needs to give full autonomy to the region of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan which will add value to Pakistan's global stature meanwhile Pakistan can continue its commitment to the right of self-determination of Kashmiris in Indian Occupied Kashmir. Agreeing with India's status quo as widely perceived from Bajwa's doctrine will harm Pakistan's standing on Kashmir in the longer run (Mughal, 2022).

In the case of **Afghanistan** Pakistan's strategic depth policy has become convoluted with the presence of non-state actors, terrorist groups TTP, and Islami State Khorasan (IS-K) affecting Pakistan's counterterrorism and border

security policies. Pakistan needs to adopt a comprehensive approach to deal with the Taliban government, address their backing of TTP, reviving terrorism, and refugee influx in Pakistan.

Pakistan needs to practice careful diplomatic maneuvering when it comes to **Iran** keeping its equation with India and Saudi Arabia in focus. Pakistan requires a balancing approach with Iran free from external interferences of the USA and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan should approach Iran from a prospective partner in a neighborhood approach rather than from a sectarian lens. Currently, Pakistan is not able to fight anyone's proxy war in its extreme neighborhood.

Similarly, **China** is Pakistan's most trustworthy neighbor which shares economic, and military ties. Pakistan's careless and uninformed policy statement and out-of-context approach towards China will cost Pakistan heavily in the changing geopolitical power shift. It refers to a civil-military divide in their approach towards China such as Former Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan Qamar Javed Bajwa was favoring US whereas Former Prime Minister Imran Khan was favoring China and now Army Chief Asim Munir sides with China and PDM government favoring the USA. This civil-military divide at this crucial time reminds of Pakistan's forever struggle in a global power shift. In a revised Pakistan's strategic culture, it should not offend its next-door neighbor China for the superpower USA which is miles and miles away in another part of the world.

Pakistan needs to be effective and consciously draft its policy response without taking sides if the US can maintain good relations with India despite its close connection with Russia, then Pakistan can maintain its stance of balancing relations with all great powers including Russia.

The overall episode of the Former PM Imran Khan's ousting immediately after his **Russia** visit in 2022 despite internal Dynamics of vote of no Confidence and party politics being involved has not given a positive image of Pakistan to the Russian decision-makers whereas India went all the way along to bargain and maintain its ties with both USA and Russia despite pressure from the USA not to buy Russian oil . It shows a great example of all the institutions on one page and inclusive decision making whereas the case is completely opposite in Pakistan which badly affects its image, and international stature and costs it future investments, partnerships, and alliances. Pakistan needs to carefully keep its national interest upfront in this newly unfolding regional bloc setting by China including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries along with Russia.

In a **revised Pakistan's strategic culture** based on learning from past experiences and adapting to the global power dynamics shift it needs to engage in a balancing act with major powers such as US, China, and Russia. In the existing reality, Pakistan needs to diversify its global approach to improving ties with Russia which will be an additional option for the energy market, military equipment, and diplomatic strength. Whereas Pakistan needs to fix the gaps and strengthen its relationship with China, focus on the opportunities, and address the issues in CPEC to provide an infrastructural boost to Pakistan which will add up to marine capability and economic connectivity. China's rise will reshape Pakistan's strategic outlook in the region and world if Pakistan itself manages it amicably by using its trunk cards at the right time.

Pakistan's geography possesses a vast variety of **natural resources** ranging from one of the largest coal mines, the second largest salt mine, 5th largest copper and gold reserves, and 7th largest rice and wheat production capacity with agricultural land, natural gas, and other minerals makes it a much more potential state than oil-rich gulf state. Availability of resources is one thing, but control

over them and managing effectively is a supreme quality. Despite being one of the richest countries in natural resources but meager in its management Pakistan is unable to effectively utilize these resources for growth and development due to the vicious cycle of political instability, poor governance, and corruption.

Pakistan is facing serious concerns over **resource security** within the country such as the Kalabagh Dam issue between Sindh and KhyberPakhtoonkhawa. Distribution of natural gas from Balochistan to the whole country while keeping Balochistan devoid of it and Azad Kashmir's major generator of electricity running short on electricity itself, Gilgit Baltistan rich in glaciers faces water shortages raising serious concerns over not only the availability but the just distribution of resources and the proper utilization by building infrastructures like dam, hydroelectric powerhouses. Among all the internal rifts Pakistan's dispute with India over water sharing under the Indus water treaty and Sir Creek are the major troubles that impact Pakistan's security considerations and defense priorities. Amidst of India's attempt of renewing and revising the Indus Water treaty, Pakistan needs to keep domestic issues and provincial rifts on one side and focus on designing a water-centric security policy with dams and proper water management policy as stated in chapter four Pakistan is at the verge of water scarcity.

5.1.2.2. Socio-economic Factors

Building upon the social and economic security discussed in chapter four Pakistan's Strategic culture requires to be revisited in alignment with economic diversification and reduction of its trade dependencies aiming for enhanced Pakistan's resilience to global economic shifts and geopolitical pressures. It involves strategic thinkers and planners' focus shift towards reducing reliance on single market dependencies and creating robust domestic industries by

enhancing economic buttons in different cities of Pakistan as per their peculiarities.

Amidst increasing population growth and a mega youth bulge of 65 percent of the total population, economic disparities like poverty, inequality, unemployment, and limited access to health care and quality education create social and economic instability. Addressing demographic trends requires comprehensive social and economic policies to ensure equitable development and resource distribution across regions that impact its resource demands and overall development trajectory. Pakistan's strategic culture should be inclusive of a comprehensive socio-economic perspective investing in education of all types to foster human development for a resilient society.

Civil-military beef, poor governance, weak institutions, corruption, incompetent politicians, and exploitative bureaucracy has undermined the public trust in institutions, hampered growth and development with ineffective exploitation of resources created grievances exploited by extremist actors. Governance issues need to be addressed aligning with the principle of civilian supremacy, power of vote, and proper functioning of institutes within their constitutional premise. Integrating socioeconomic development goals (Sustainable urban planning and environmental protection) into strategic planning can create a more resilient and secure nation capable of effectively tackling both internal and external challenges.

The revision of Pakistan's strategic culture must incorporate health security as a vital component. By recognizing the significance of health security challenges, strengthening healthcare infrastructure, enhancing disease surveillance and early warning systems, investing in research and development, fostering collaboration, and promoting public health education, Pakistan can better protect

the well-being and stability of its nation by integrating these measures it will enable Pakistan to respond effectively to health emergencies, mitigate risks, and enhance its overall resilience in the face of health security challenges. At a domestic level, it requires policy Integration, institutional Collaboration, Capacity Building, public health communication, education and awareness, resource allocation, and designing the legislative framework. Revised strategic culture requires an integrated response consisting of government policies, healthcare infrastructure, and socio-economic conditions.

5.1.2.3. Technological Considerations

With the technological revolution, Pakistan needs to revisit its approach toward national security, military capabilities, economic development, and foreign policy. Building upon the nascent status and growth of Pakistan in the emerging and advanced technology sphere it must be the utmost consideration of strategic thinkers and planners to devise an effective plan strengthening the cybersecurity regime, nuclear technology infrastructure, advancing space capabilities, surveillance, and intelligence. The current government's cancellation of Former PM Imran Khan's initiative of opening the first Space Observatory in Shakarparian Islamabad to increase awareness in people toward space is the reflection of an unseasoned mindset and retrograde approach which doesn't align with the current trends.

It is the age of electronic, cyber, and information warfare and we are lagging as mentioned in the cyber security portion and in nuclear security. To revisit Pakistan's strategic culture, it needs to embrace technological innovation and address associated challenges. Technology should be used as a critical junction for economic development and trade (embracing digitalization, e-commerce initiatives), intelligence gathering (counterterrorism), and energy infrastructure

development (improve energy efficiency, expand renewable energy sources, and address energy shortages) as a component in Pakistan's strategic thinking to improve connectivity and regional integration. Use of technology for civilian purposes in addition to military purpose must be in the utmost priority. Similarly, technological diplomacy must be incorporated into the revisited strategic culture to not only mitigate new challenges but enhance its competitiveness in the global market.

5.1.2.4. *Environmental Considerations*

In the past 20 years, Pakistan has been adversely affected by climate change due to fast industrialization. As per German watch out of ten adversely climate-affected countries it ranks at number eight. Frequent and intense natural disasters, shifts in agricultural patterns, and water scarcity are a few exemplifications of its vulnerability. These challenges impact the country's resilience, disaster preparedness, and resource allocation (Eckstein et al., 2021).

To revisit Pakistan's strategic culture, it needs to adopt climate-friendly multiprong strategies addressing not only humanitarian needs but also devising plans for resource management and disaster response. With the global energy shift towards renewable sources, Pakistan needs to speed up its energy transition from fossil fuel to non-fossil fuels promoting diversification agenda of the energy mix impacting energy infrastructure planning, and strengthening its energy security regime.

As reduced water availability produces serious consequences for food, energy, and overall socio-economic stability. So, water management becomes a strategic consideration in Pakistan's planning to ensure sustainable development and address potential water-related conflicts. Extreme weather conditions like the recent 2022 floods have also disrupted crop production leading to food shortage

and extreme inflation putting the food security on high alert consideration. Revised strategic culture should be the reflection of initiatives improving agricultural practices, investment in climate-resilient crop varieties, promoting water-efficient technologies, and promoting sustainable energy options (hydropower, solar, wind, green technologies) entailing improved food, water, and energy security domains.

Food systems transformation requires community action and local leaders' engagement in improving governance and accountability. It further advocates the rights-based food systems governance at all levels. Development partners must join hands with local government and assist them by investing at local levels by doing capacity building and providing funding. Citizens, through public awareness, can play a fundamental role in developing and monitoring public policies that affect food security by exercising their fundamental right to food. Investment at this crucial time may avert the future crisis that can bring more tragedy and even worse crises than we have now ("Global Food Security Index," 2022).

Disaster preparedness and response planning should be given the utmost priority to address human and economic security. It is the peak time for Pakistan to recognize the interconnectedness of nontraditional security challenges and devise comprehensive strategies based on resilience, sustainability, and cooperation advocating climate change mitigation, biodiversity conservation, and sustainable development. Pakistan's strategic thinkers and planners need to take a proactive approach to water diplomacy and climate activism to devise collaborative mechanisms to prevent conflict over shared resources and address access to climate finance and implement climate adaptation and mitigation measures. Revised Pakistan's strategic culture is adaptive to address emerging complexities in the pursuit of a safe and prosperous Pakistan.

5.1.3. Relational Aspects of Strategic Culture of Pakistan

Relational aspects dive deep into the geopolitical interactions based on cognitive perceptions and the contextual frame set by cognitive and environmental aspects.

To revise strategic culture Pakistan needs to discourse the constraints in its relational approach towards neighbors, regional and global actors by altering its approach to alliance dynamics and strategic partnerships and maximizing its engagement with multilateral organizations, mastering superlative projection of soft power, and cultural influence, reviving the focus on trade routes and relations, and preferential public diplomacy apt. Covering such a comprehensive relational advance adds up to informed policy-making, well through strategic adjustments and enrichment of strategic decision-making processes.

Here's how relational aspects can be critical in addressing the strategic culture of Pakistan giveb in figure 24 below.




Figure 24: Relational Aspects of Strategic Culture of Pakistan (Source: Author, 2023)

5.1.3.1. Diplomatic Relations

Learning from Pakistan’s conflictual history with its neighbors and adapting to the evolving geopolitical and economic realities Pakistan revisits its strategic culture by shifting toward a more proactive and upbeat approach prioritizing diplomacy, dialogue, and constructive relationship in its relational toolbox in foreign policy premise.

Instead of a trade boycott and diplomatic coldness, Pakistan emphasizes the dire necessity to be upfront with its neighboring countries seeking dialogue,

negotiation, and confidence-building measures for amicable conflict management, and peaceful conflict resolution.

Keeping in focus Pakistan's shift from geopolitical to geoeconomic as stated by Former Army Chief Retd. General Qamar Javed Bajwa in Islamabad Policy Dialogue (Rafiq, 2021), Pakistan needs to prioritize its economic and trade relations with India as it happens between China and India, the US and China, Russia and the US, and Russia and Europe despite tough competition and conflicts.

By still advocating for the right of self-determination for Kashmiris, Pakistan needs to channel great untapped annual bilateral trade potential which as per World Bank 2018 Report estimates can reach 37 billion USD (Kathuria, 2018). This trade channelization over continuous political rift will assist Pakistan's economic gain and overall will positively impact the regions. Similarly, an unstable Afghanistan is a forever threat to Pakistan's security and stability. Therefore, Pakistan needs to institute a robust approach with Taliban counterparts to address cross-border terrorism, support for TTP, and smuggling. Despite the political difference, Pakistan has a huge trade market in Afghanistan which needs to be explored on a preferential basis to maximize bilateral engagement and positivity through trade.

Pakistan requires to address the grievances of **Bangladesh** from 1971 war and find a common ground with them to acknowledge each other losses and start a fresh chapter of cordial relations based on trade, cooperation and cultural affinity. In the case of Iran Pakistan needs to shift its relational approach more towards a historical and cultural perspective rather than the exclusivist sectarian approach that has antagonized its neighbor throughout history. Additionally, Pakistan should also engage with Iran in the domain of energy and trade which

requires effective and balanced management of relations with other counterparts including Gulf States and the USA. Pakistan should be more upfront with its neutral posture and dialogue - diplomacy preferred approach to resolve any regional conflict between Iran and its Arab allies.

5.1.3.2. Alliances and Strategic Partnerships

Alliances, international partnerships, and engagements have a significant influence on Pakistan's strategic culture. International Crises and conflicts such as the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and 9/11 impacted Pakistan's strategic culture as an external shock leading to a wide range of implications for it across domestic, regional, and global stature significantly influencing its traditional alliance with the USA over the disagreement on its nuclear weapon program and do more syndrome in counter-terrorism efforts (I. Khan, 2012, p.43). Currently, Pakistan does not have any policy priority in US foreign policy as it has given to India either in terms of civil nuclear deals, Indo-pacific reorientation, trade, and diplomatic relations as stated in chapters three and four.

In the geopolitical and geoeconomic reconfiguration at the global and regional level, Pakistan is at a crossroads to choose sides between the United States, Russia, and China. Despite enjoying cordial relations with the USA, Pakistan has its own expectation from the alliance in the 1965 and 1971 wars which could not be contemplated into reality by generating unhealed grievances and a trust deficit in the alliance with the US. Pakistan's distanced relationship with Russia and the unease in it is credited to its side-picking approach in a cold war which has a wide range of implications in terms of India's strategic partnership with both the US and Russia at the same time.

Pakistan's strategic partnership with China has significantly influenced Pakistan's strategic culture in terms of the enhancement of military, nuclear, and maritime security. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) adds up to Pakistan's infrastructural, and economic development and vouch for regional connectivity necessitating stable political and security dynamics. Although China provides Pakistan a good standing in South Asia vis-a-vis India, to revisit Pakistan's strategic culture Pakistan needs to address the gap in its engagement with East Asian countries and strengthen its Look East policy on practical grounds with staunch implementation. Being a next-door neighbor to China and managing its relationships with the USA in another part of the world without antagonizing any of them is the tight balancing act that Pakistan's government and policymakers as per revised strategic culture need to be practicing amicably by expanding the sphere of dialogues and engagements with both (*Pakistan in the New Geopolitics of Asia*, 2023).

India's advanced move of enhancing its strategic oil reserves in exchange for opening its tender market for Gulf companies is deepening its energy ties and economic relations with Gulf countries, whereas Pakistan is still struggling to keep up with day-to-day energy requirements. India's this futuristic approach in case of any conflict will assist him, whereas it's already enhancing competition for Pakistan in Gulf markets and limiting its energy ties and trade scopes. In such a case scenario, Pakistan can benefit from engagement with China- KSA friendship and oil trade by embracing the opportunities for energy cooperation and infrastructural development. Additionally, the Siberian Gas pipeline from central Asia can be a catalyst in strengthening its energy cooperation, and diversification of energy sources contributing to domestic and regional energy stability along with regional integration.

5.1.3.3. Multilateralism and International Engagement

Multilateralism emphasizing collective decision-making and global governance is an essential quality of contemporary geopolitics that produces viable impacts on the strategic choice and behavior of a country. As an advocate of multilateralism, Pakistan has received less acknowledgment from the UN for its effort in peacebuilding missions and counterterrorism operations and coalitions. To revisit Pakistan's strategic culture, it needs to reassert itself as a responsible global player committed to international peace and security. Pakistan's engagement in OIC is in alignment with its Islamic identity and values (Ahmed & Akbarzadeh, 2023). SAARC dysfunctionality is attributed to India-Pakistan bilateral issues, and it is evident that Pakistan has taken a long time to realize that it has been left behind in asserting a strong role in engagement in SAARC in comparison to India's effort of disengaging Pakistan though it must disengage the whole regional organization. Pakistan should engage in bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral dialogues with member states to bring certain working agenda to cater to this dysfunctionality and foster proper working of SAARC to enrich and enhance the regional potential in all spheres (Yhome, 2019).

Membership in Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) should be utilized as a regional security and economic cooperation engagement plethora to harness its approach toward Central Asia (Government of Pakistan, 2019). Pakistan should actively advocate and opt for proactive naval diplomacy to become a member of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). Absence of these extremely important platforms devoid Pakistan of its due rights regarding any initiative taken by the states of the Indian Ocean Rim (Brewster, 2019).

Amidst global cyber security threats, increasing deadly challenges, and non-proliferation issues Pakistan looks forward to enhanced and well-integrated international cooperation towards these areas of shared interests.

5.1.3.4. Regional Integration, Economic Cooperation, and Trade Networks

To revisit Pakistan's Strategic Culture Pakistan needs to emphasize relations based on economy and cultural affinity as the main driver of its foreign policy toward different regions.

5.1.3.4.1. West and Europe

Pakistan can strengthen its strategic culture by a more liberal approach focusing on trade, investment, and technology transfer, by diversifying its partner in Europe and the West. In this regard, Pakistan needs an extremely proactive approach by utilizing commonalities and commitment toward shared interests. Currently, Pakistan's defense industry is diversifying its partner in Europe whereas it also needs to look for engagement in the social sector and development of human capital.

5.1.3.4.2. Arab World and Israel

Despite the religious and sectarian synergy with Pakistan, India enjoys more stable relations on an equal footing with Saudi Arabia, and Gulf countries, and the strategic partnership with Israel in terms of heavy trade, mega oil contracts, cultural influence via soft power and weapons procurement. In comparison, Pakistan has a client-patron relationship with these states due to a weak economy and poor governance level. Although these states rescue Pakistan economically Pakistan also provide them with military assistance such as security in Qatar

FIFA World Cup 2023 and many other important events but doesn't enjoy the relations at equal footings (Peshimam & Shahzad, 2022).

Pakistan needs to have strong economic standing and stable political dynamics to have developed regional alliance engagement with Arab countries that do not have blackmail (as Saudi Arabia pressurized Former Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr. Imran Khan to not join the trilateral summit of Türkiye, Pakistan, and Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur by putting Pakistan labor workforce at stake in Saudi Arabia) (Latif, 2019). Pakistan's engagement with the Muslim World such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as is deeply rooted in its Islamic identity and its commitment to Palestinian self-determination and defense of holy sites. Pakistan's policy towards Israel has been branded by non-recognition and support for a free Palestine (Ijaz, 2023). If the Arab world after fighting consecutive wars with Israel and Türkiye while taking a firm stand for Palestine can establish diplomatic relations with Israel and carry out trade and cooperation in another field, why can't we? In this era, this is the peak time for Pakistan to depoliticize diplomatic relations with states and pursue diplomatic relationships integrated into trade, technology, and investments.

5.1.3.4.3. *Africa*

To revisit Pakistan's strategic culture Pakistan needs to learn from past mistakes and shift its focus toward Africa as it can provide a huge market to Pakistan in terms of goods and services. Pakistan can explore the domain of capacity building and development assistance to enhance its foothold in Africa. Pakistan has an Africa Regional Countries Free Trade Agreement as well as an 'Engage Africa Policy' which lacks practical implementation and seriousness to explore this continent full of resources and opportunities (Khan, 2021). On an immediate basis, Pakistan needs to cater to and engage African countries such as Djibouti

within the CPEC and BRI (Bastos, 2018). Pakistan is in dire need to develop a practical, Coherent, and Cohesive Indian Ocean Policy with a southward focus that gives it an outreach and opening to East African, and Southeast Asian states, and Mauritius (Farid, 2020).

5.1.3.4.4. *Southeast Asia*

Before the Fall of Dhaka Pakistan shared close bonds and interactions with Southeast Asian countries and after the fall of Dhaka the direct land connection was disrupted it still has diplomatic relations with them but not in the capacity and ranges it used to be once. Pakistan has a close urge with these old neighbors only the policymakers need to take this into serious consideration as this region possesses the potential emerging economies of the near future.

5.1.3.4.5. *Central Asia*

Changing regional alignment has once again brought the Wakhan corridor, the narrow strip that shares its border with Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, and Tajikistan. Since old times it has been used as a trade route by Europeans and China to get access to the Indian Ocean under the ancient Silk Route. Whereas BRI and CPEC have again brought their geo-strategic and geo-economic significance into the limelight. Pakistan despite having the shortest route so far has been unable to tap the potential of the world's 4 percent gas reserves and 3 percent of oil reserves of the Caspian Sea (Bazai, 2023). The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) and Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline projects are facing hindrances due to multiple factors.

To cater to Chinese influence in the region and address India's lack of direct access to Central Asia it signed the INSTC agreement in 2000 to

build a 7200 km multimode transit corridor connecting Central Asia with the Persian Gulf by synchronizing the Ashgabat agreement signed in 2016.

Amidst of India's concern about the growing axis of Russia-China-Pakistan would limit India's presence in Central Asia, it aims to provide an alternative to Eurasian countries and increase its connectivity with CAR. India's probable membership in Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) will further increase India's economic influence in the region. It is cooperating in the military, energy, politics, and economic sectors while investing in technology, tourism, and pharmaceuticals. India is also concerned about the PAKAFUZ (Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan) proposal of a 573km railway project that will diffuse INSTC in its Central Asian outreach comparatively (*India-Central Asia- INSIGHTSIAS*, 2021).

India has 2019's Vladivostok-Chennai Maritime Corridor (VCMC) in the process whereas in the case of PAKAFUZ's successful initiation India may shift focus towards already proposed alternatives in other regions such as "Trans-Arabian Corridor" (TAC) by Israel and joint Indo-Japanese Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC). India is well engaged with Africa, East Asia, and Central Asia under its Look Africa, Look East, and Connect Central Asia Policy compared to Pakistan (*India-Central Asia - INSIGHTSIAS*, 2021).

Under current dynamics, Pakistan is a connector without belonging to the Indian Ocean Region and devoid of a comprehensive approach. Revised strategic culture of Pakistan necessitates active naval diplomacy aiming at all the stakeholder's engagement in the IOR. Pakistan foreign policy elites need to envision a broader perspective of CPEC beyond Gwadar to Khasgar with the growing prerequisite to look South (Bastos, 2018).

5.1.3.5. Soft Power and Public Diplomacy

Where the hard power fails, the soft power of a country comes into play. It is used as a tool to exert a soft power image of a country and shape the perception of international and regional audiences by relying on soft power tools such as culture, language and literature, arts, tourism, sports, cultural and educational exchange, peace initiative, media, and entertainment and public diplomacy events (exhibitions, galleries, and museums), and humanitarian aid.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

In this final chapter, the author has drawn together the threads of her exploration into the strategic culture of Pakistan. Throughout this thesis, author delved into the intricate web of historical experiences, beliefs, and norms that have shaped Pakistan's approach to security, foreign policy, and international relations. Her journey has uncovered the deep-rooted influences that guide the nation's decisions, reflecting a complex interplay of domestic factors, regional dynamics, and global considerations. As she reach the culmination of our study, she reflects on the insights gained, the questions answered, and the avenues yet to be explored. In this conclusion, the author synthesizes her findings, highlights the significance of her research, and offers pathways for further understanding and engagement with the evolving strategic culture of Pakistan.

In simple terms, strategic culture is the lens through which Pakistan interprets its place in the world and the challenges it faces. It incorporates a nation's deeply ingrained beliefs, norms, historical experiences, and attitudes toward its place in the world. In addition, it is an integral feature of the country's identity, threat perception, policy, and decision-making, and global connections. It outlines a nation's trajectory and its ability to traverse the intricacies of international affairs.

Building upon the importance of the strategic culture, any ignorance or misinterpretation of cultural factors may lead to misaligned policies, conflict escalation, and missed opportunities for cooperation. Therefore, recognizing and respecting Pakistan's strategic culture is not only academically relevant but also critical for regional stability and the pursuit of national security and

development goals. With this aim, the author has provided the base work for exploring the very essence of the Strategic Culture of Pakistan by providing an in-depth conceptual understanding of strategy and culture as separate terms and compound elements further entailing into its key factors, four generational discourses, and debates on strategic culture. In this study, the author has addressed one key analytical question inquiring about the key determinants that have shaped the historical emergence, evolution, and adaptive responses of Pakistan's strategic culture and how these cultural influences impact Pakistan's security policies, threat perceptions, and regional engagement.

At the same time, the study consists of a total of six chapters where except introduction, each chapter responds to a particular question as chapter two addresses the determinants of Pakistan's Strategic Culture and the very emergence of Pakistan's strategic culture tracing its roots from the 1857 war to pre-partition and freedom struggle highlighting the ideational factors dominance in the discourse whereas chapter three addresses the question on the evolution of Pakistan's Strategic Culture by analyzing the major turning points in the transitional phases of the history of Pakistan by exploring and explaining the impacts of key determinants of Strategic Culture of Pakistan on its decision making, alliance behavior, regional rivalries, nuclear policy, conflict, and peace. Chapter four addresses question four about the critical security threats facing Pakistan in the region by comparing it with India and assessing how Pakistan's strategic culture influences its response to the dominant security theme and emerging security theme in the context of changing South Asian Security dynamics. Whereas chapter five deals with the question of how to revisit the strategic culture of Pakistan, entailing what should be changed, transformed, and incorporated into the revised strategic culture of Pakistan by taking an in-depth route via cognitive, environmental, and relational attributes of the Strategyc

Culture of Pakistan. Chapters four and five collectively shed light upon the implications of changing regional security dynamics on Pakistan.

The basic argument of the study is that changing South Asian Security dynamics necessitates revisiting the strategic culture of Pakistan, which is inclusive of both dominant and emerging securities. There are three basic aims of the research study; the first is to fill the gap in the existing literature on the Strategic Culture of Pakistan, the second is to provide a counter-argument to the perception of the military culture of Pakistan as its strategic culture and third is to provide an alternative perspective to the traditional outlook of Strategic culture by highlighting the nontraditional (emerging) security threats and challenges.

This research employs qualitative research methods using a case study approach to revisit Pakistan's strategic culture, whereas in changing South Asian Security dynamics, either in dominant or emerging security themes in both cases have accessed its performance and progress in reference to India as both are the nuclear weapons state in the region. Furthermore, the **Author has made an original and significant contribution** to the existing literature on the Strategic Culture of Pakistan by introducing a conceptual framework of analysis to study and revisit the Strategic Culture of Pakistan on three basic attributes such as the cognitive, environmental, and relational aspects of Pakistan's strategic culture.

In conclusion, revisiting Pakistan's strategic culture in the context of changing South Asian security dynamics is an imperative and timely undertaking. The evolving regional and global landscape demands a nuanced and adaptable approach to effectively uphold Pakistan's security and interests. Correspondingly, this comprehensive study has yielded significant findings warranting careful consideration by policymakers and scholars.

Throughout the study, it became evident that traditional approaches to security must be reassessed, considering the evolving regional landscape. The fluidity of South Asian security dynamics calls for a departure from historical adversarial postures towards a more innovatively cooperative and constructive approach. As explained earlier in the chapter, Pakistan's strategic culture revealed **a need for greater flexibility, adaptability, and openness** in its cognitive, environmental, and relational attributes. One key finding highlights the imperative of prioritizing diplomacy, dialogue, and confidence-building measures. Engaging in sustained dialogues and building trust among regional actors can foster an environment conducive to conflict resolution and collaborative problem-solving.

Another crucial insight from the study underscores the importance of **diversifying strategic partnerships** beyond traditional allies China and KSA. Embracing cooperation with emerging global players and engaging in multilateral forums can give Pakistan greater leverage and influence in shaping the region's security architecture. This finding emphasizes the significance of a balanced and inclusive foreign policy that accounts for the complexities of the contemporary international order. Further, it underscores the region-focused policy orientation towards Africa, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Europe. Proactive Naval diplomacy and energy diplomacy can serve this purpose.

Moreover, the study emphasized the need for a **multifaceted security approach** that complements credible deterrence capabilities with investments in economic development, human capital, technology, innovation, and social resilience. Likewise, research imposes the vital inclusion of human security and resilience, public awareness and participation, early warning systems, risk assessment, and environmental sustainability.

Four military takeovers, eight incomplete democratic governments and a growing phenomenon of hybrid of regimes is the crux of Pakistan's political culture where more than military establishment civilian governments has more to be answerable for not bringing Martial Law administrators into accountability for their actions. Whereas same civilian governments play hide and seek with each other in an attempt to make each other accountable under the shadow of the hybrid regimes where the beneficiary remains military establishment.

This study demonstrates that a **robust political culture** entails solid national culture that can enhance Pakistan's overall security outlook and enable the country to respond more effectively to emerging challenges in the region. Without a solid political culture and national culture, Pakistan cannot aspire to have a stable and robust strategic culture. It necessitates strengthening political order, internal stability, and resilience by supporting civilian governments, institutions, and governance, enhancing civil-military cooperation, and promoting evidence-based policy formulation and inclusive decision-making.

Contemplating Jack Snyder's multiple strategic cultures, such as national, political, military, public, and organizational culture, as the subcultures are part of the broader umbrella concept of strategic culture, which shares symbiotic relationships entailing competition with coexistence (Snyder, 1977). As per Snerberg, strategic culture is a toolbox, and its strategic cognitive schemas are the apparatuses in it where pertinent subcultures deal with the extraordinary situation in the strategic environment until the status quo returns. (Bloomfield, 2012), (Sneberg, 2015). Anticipating Snerbeg in the case of Pakistan entails that **Pakistan's military culture** took the pertinent role in dealing with an extraordinary strategic environment situation from day one of its independence, and the status quo never returns. Here in current reality, it necessitates the pertinent military culture to reverse its role in the subcategory and strengthen

the strategic culture with its other multiple cultures. Square one approach in cognitive attributes can fundamentally contribute to correcting the course of history, reinstating it on the right track by reestablishing the national character and identity and contributing to national and public culture.

Furthermore, the research highlighted the **importance of proactive conflict resolution mechanisms** both in intra-state and inter-state affairs by focusing on peaceful coexistence and regional stability. In terms of Kashmir, instead of agreeing on India's status quo, Pakistan should be upfront in setting an example for the world by giving maximum autonomy to both Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.

Additionally, the study highlights the timely approach for Pakistan to discard the **rigidity in its strategic culture** and become more flexible to include climate, gender, cyber, energy, resource, social security to address the so far unaddressed areas, cater the challenging before they harness their potential of turning into large scale conflicts and threaten its national security and weaken its posture.

Considering these findings, it is evident that revisiting Pakistan's strategic culture is a necessity and an opportunity. Embracing change and innovation in security policy will enable Pakistan to navigate the shifting dynamics of South Asia better, positioning itself as a responsible and influential player in the region's security landscape. Pakistan must harness its historical strengths to succeed in an increasingly interconnected world while embracing a more adaptive, cooperative, and forward-looking approach. By recalibrating its strategic culture to embrace diplomacy, diversify partnerships, invest in internal development, and prioritize conflict resolution, Pakistan can effectively navigate the challenges and opportunities of changing South Asian security dynamics, fostering a more stable, cooperative, and prosperous region.

Given the broader range of security themes discussed in this research study the analysis and findings open avenues for further reflection in public perception and strategic culture, gender and inclusivity in security decision-making, economic dimensions of strategic culture, embracing cybersecurity as a strategic priority, balancing military modernization and socio-economic development, nuclear deterrence and stability, enhanced regional cooperation, non-state actors and strategic culture, maritime security and naval diplomacy.

Research and exploration in these future directions can play a fundamental role in advancing Pakistan's strategic culture to adapt to changing regional security dynamics proactively. Adopting a comprehensive approach prioritizing innovation, inclusivity, and cooperation in security policies will enable Pakistan to play a more constructive and responsible role in fostering peace and stability in South Asia and the international arena.

There are **possible future implications** in both case scenarios if Pakistan revisits its Strategic Culture or if it does not.

In the first case scenario, the study sheds light upon the **future implication** if Pakistan fails to adapt/change these aspects of strategic culture and doesn't revisit its strategic culture with changing South Asian and global security dynamics.

If the security concerns with India are not revisited, and the existing culture remains unchanged, it could extend an environment of tension and conflict, diverting resources from economic and social development. Similarly, a rigid strategic culture will further isolate Pakistan at all stages, struggling to build cooperative relationships resulting in affecting its economic and political influence.

Perceiving extremist groups (such as the Taliban, good Taliban, and bad Taliban) as a strategic asset to achieve security objectives will not only perpetuate terrorism but also challenge the already declining international credibility. Purely focusing on the military competition will detract from investing in other sectors (education, technology, health), contributing to hindrances in Pakistan's growth potential. Taking sides and deteriorating relations with allies, not reassessing nuclear concerns, neglecting soft power, and not developing a striking balance between human development and military security might, failure to adapt strategic culture will lead to diminished foreign investments, limiting socioeconomic and negative international perception entailing decreased diplomatic leverage and fewer opportunities for international cooperation and integration.

To mitigate these potential implications, Pakistan could benefit from a more nuanced and flexible approach to its strategic culture.

In the **second case scenario**, the study highlights various potential future implications if Pakistan revisits and adapts its strategic culture by reassessing long-standing beliefs, norms, and attitudes that shape a country's approach to security. Revisiting strategic culture is a complex process that requires careful planning and implementation. It involves a balance between security concerns and broader national interests. While there are potential benefits, there may also be challenges in terms of resistance to change and navigating internal dynamics. Any shift in strategic culture should be well-considered and aligned with Pakistan's long-term goals for stability, development, and cooperation.

It will take time and resilience but will entail regional stability, diversified foreign relations, increased engagement with emerging economies and non-traditional partners, expanding diplomatic footprint, and shifting the excessive

use of sources from military spending to socio-economic development. Cooperative and flexible strategic culture involves a good reputation and increased foreign investments promoting soft power projection through cultural and public diplomacy and improving international confidence in Pakistan's nuclear capabilities and intentions. Effective maneuvering of strategic thinking and behavior reduces the risk associated with military escalations by investing in diplomacy, and dialogue, prioritizing human development, improving perception, and enhancing multilateral engagement.

REFERENCES

2022 Corruption Perceptions Index: Explore the results. (2023a, July 14).

Transparency.org. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from
<https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/index/pak>

2022 Corruption Perceptions Index: Explore the results. (2023b, July 14).

Transparency.org. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from
<https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/index/ind>

Abdullah, S. (2018). Pakistan's Evolving Doctrine and Emerging Force Posture: Conceptual Nuances and Implied Ramifications. *Pakistan Horizon*, 71(1–2), 79–93. <https://pakistan-horizon.pii.org.pk/index.php/pakistan-horizon/article/view/79/70>

Abraham, I., Werbner, P., & Werbner, R. (1998). *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State (Postcolonial Encounters)* (First Paperback Edition). Zed Books.

Adhia, N. (2020, May 12). *The History of Economic Development in India since Independence*. Association for Asian Studies| Education About Asia: Online Archives. Retrieved June 26, 2023, from
<https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/eaa/archives/the-history-of-economic-development-in-india-since-independence/>

Afzal, A. (2021). Second Strike: Explaining Sea-Based Deterrence in South Asia. *South Asian Voices*. <https://southasianvoices.org/second-strike-sea-based-deterrence-in-south-asia/>

Afzal, M., & Ali, K. (2008). An Historical Evaluation Of “Export Led Growth” Policy In Pakistan. *Lahore Journal of Policy Studies*, 2(1), 69–82.
<http://111.68.102.42:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/6268>

Afzal, M. R. (Ed.). (1973). *Selected speeches and statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1911-34 and 1947-48)* (3rd ed.). Research Society of Pakistan. <https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/233404>

Agriculture Statistics. (n.d.). Pakistan Bureau of Statistics | Government of Pakistan. Retrieved June 26, 2023, from
<https://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/agriculture-statistics>

Ahad, A. (2007). *Kashmir Rediscovered*. Adam Publishers.

Ahmad, K. S., & Kureshy, K. U. (Eds.). (1978). *A geography of Pakistan* (4th ed.). Oxford University Press.

Ahmad, S., Zahra, J., Ali, M., Ali, S., Iqbal, S., Kamal, S., Tahir, M., & Aborode, A. T. (2022). Impact of water insecurity amidst endemic and pandemic in Pakistan: Two tales unsolved. *Annals of Medicine and Surgery*, 81. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amsu.2022.104350>

Ahmed, K. (2021, September 11). ‘War on terror’ has cost Pakistan more than "50bn in losses since. *Arab News*. Retrieved October 10, 2022, from
<https://www.arabnews.com/node/1927131/world>

Ahmed, M. (2016). Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on Stability. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*.
<https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-tactical-nuclear-weapons-and-their-impact-on-stability-pub-63911>

Ahmed, Z. S., & Akbarzadeh, S. (2023a). Pakistan, Pan-Islamism, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. *Religions*, 14(3), 289.
<https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14030289>

Ahmed, Z. S., & Akbarzadeh, S. (2023b). Pakistan, Pan-Islamism, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. *Religions*, 14(3), 289.
<https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14030289>

Alamuddin, B. (2020, October 26). Pakistan Navy's modernization will deter India's maritime threat. *Arab News PK*. <https://arab.news/ywetj>

Ali, A. (2022). Indian Land Warfare Doctrine & Recent Developments: Implications for Pakistan. In M. Q. Mustafa (Ed.), *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, ISSI*. ISSI. Retrieved May 8, 2023, from <https://issi.org.pk/issue-brief-on-indian-land-warfare-doctrine-recent-developments-implications-for-pakistan/>

Ali, I., & Sidhu, J. S. (2021). Strategic Dynamics of Crisis Stability in South Asia. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 57(7), 1357–1375.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096211054396>

Ali, K. (2015). An overview of Indo-Pak military doctrines. *Daily Times*.
<https://dailytimes.com.pk/98383/an-overview-of-indo-pak-military-doctrines/>

Ali, R. F. (2015). Kashmir: A Century Struggle (1846-1948). *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 1–47. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2625479>

Ali, S. (2021). Anti-Access/AreaDenial Strategy for Pakistan Navy: A Work in Progress. *CISS Insight*, 9(1), 33–51.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/353914333_Anti-AccessAreaDenial_Strategy_for_Pakistan_Navy_A_Work_in_Progress

Ali, S. M. (2023, February 10). Pakistan's depressing state of human development. *The Express Tribune*. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2400318/pakistans-depressing-state-of-human-development>

AlJazeera. (2018, October 8). Pakistan to seek IMF bailout to overcome financial crisis. *Business and Economy | AlJazeera*. Retrieved June 26, 2023, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2018/10/8/pakistan-to-seek-imf-bailout-to-overcome-financial-crisis>

Alkin, K. (2023, May 16). Concept of “strategic autonomy” rising globally. *Daily Sabah*. Retrieved July 6, 2023, from <https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/concept-of-strategic-autonomy-rising-globally>

Amin, S. M. (2010a). Pakistan's Quest for Security. In *Pakistan's Foreign Policy : A Reappraisal* (2nd ed., pp. 39–50). Oxford University Press.

Amin, S. M. (2010b). The Afghanistan Problem. In *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal* (2nd ed., pp. 83–116). Oxford Union Press.

Amin, S. M. (2010c). The First Indo- Pakistan War, 1965. In *Pakistan's Foreign Policy : A Reappraisal* (2nd ed., pp. 51–61). Oxford University Press.

Amin, S. M. (2010d). The Resurgence of Pakistan after 1971. In *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal* (2nd ed., pp. 75–82). Oxford University Press.

Amin, S. M. (2010e). The Second Indo-Pakistan War, 1971. In *Pakistan's Foreign Policy : A Reappraisal* (2nd ed., pp. 62–74). Oxford University Press.

Ansari, U. (2022, August 19). Government report reveals Pakistan's progress on military acquisitions amid financial woes. *Defense News*.
<https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2019/09/19/government-report-reveals-pakistans-progress-on-military-acquisitions-amid-financial-woes/>

Ansari, U. (2023a, February 13). How are Pakistan's naval modernization plans coming along? *Defense News*. Retrieved April 17, 2023, from
<https://www.defensenews.com/smr/defending-the-pacific/2023/02/13/how-are-pakistans-naval-modernization-plans-coming-along/>

Ansari, U. (2023b, February 13). How are Pakistan's naval modernization plans coming along? *Defense News*.
<https://www.defensenews.com/smr/defending-the-pacific/2023/02/13/how-are-pakistans-naval-modernization-plans-coming-along/>

Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas. (2019a). Aqueduct Beta. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://www.wri.org/applications/aqueduct/water-risk-atlas/#/?advanced=false&basemap=hydro&geoStore=861bb84a168465c710e443c9258f643b&indicator=a7c3ffe1-aa0e-46ed-b947-d3cbafa2a5d1&lat=40.713955826286046&lng=74.29686784744264&mapMode=view&month=1&opacity=0.5&ponderation=DEF&predefined=false&projection=absolute&scenario=optimistic&scope=future&threshold&timeScale=annual&year=2030&zoom=3>

Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas. (2019b). Aqueduct Beta. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from https://www.wri.org/applications/aqueduct/water-riskatlas/#/?advanced=false&basemap=hydro&geoStore=fb6332a2f587d86e0eb93a74727c472c&indicator=w_awr_def_tot_cat&lat=30&lng=80&mapMode=analysis&month=1&opacity=0.5&ponderation=DEF&predefined=false&projection=absolute&scenario=optimistic&scope=baseline&threshold&timeScale=annual&year=baseline&zoom=3

Arab News. (2018, May 19). Pakistan expresses concern over Indian hydroelectric project. *Arab News*. Retrieved June 24, 2023, from <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1305771/jserrors/aggregate>

Archus, D. (2021, February 27). Pakistan Navy conducts bilateral exercises with Russian and Sri Lankan warships - Naval Post- Naval News and. *Naval Post- Naval News and Information*. <https://navalpost.com/pakistan-navy-conducts-bilateral-exercises-with-russian-and-sri-lankan-warships/>

Army Technology (Ed.). (2013, April 24). BrahMos Supersonic Cruise Missile. *Army Technology*. Retrieved May 28, 2023, from <https://www.army-technology.com/projects/brahmossupersoniccru/>

Arora, S. (2023). Human Development Index (HDI): India ranks 132 out of 191 countries. *Adda247*. <https://currentaffairs.adda247.com/undps-human-development-index-india-ranks-132-out-of-191-countries/>

Ashraf, M. (2019, September 5). WATCH: Pakistan, South Korean navies conduct bilateral exercise 'PASSEX' *The Express Tribune*. Retrieved June 21, 2023, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2267527/watch-pakistan-south-korean-navies-conduct-bilateral-exercise-passex>

Ashraf, U. B. (2017). Indian Sea-Based Nuclear Developments: Impacts on Strategic Stability of South Asia. *MUSLIM PERSPECTIVES*.

[https://www.muslim](https://www.muslimperspectives.com/Publication-Detail?publication=40/Indian-Sea-Based-Nuclear-Developments:-Impacts-on-Strategic-Stability-of-South-Asia) perspectives.com/Publication-

Detail?publication=40/Indian-Sea-Based-Nuclear-Developments:-Impacts-on-Strategic-Stability-of-South-Asia

Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. (2022, March 4). *Conceptualization of “Maritime Security” in Southeast Asia: Convergence and Divergence*.

Retrieved July 5, 2023, from <https://amti.csis.org/conceptualization-of-maritime-security-in-southeast-asia-convergence-and-divergence/>

Asoori, P. (2020, October 7). A Look into the Conflict Between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. *E-International Relations*. <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/10/07/a-look-into-the-conflict-between-india-and-pakistan-over-kashmir/>

Asuncion, R. C., & Lee, M. (2017). Impacts of Sea Level Rise on Economic Growth in Developing Asia. *ADB Economics Working Paper Series*. <https://doi.org/10.22617/wps178618-2>

Atre, S. (2013). *U.S. Media Framing of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1999: Religious Framing in an International Conflict?* [Master's Thesis]. Scripps College of Communication of Ohio University.

Azmie, S. A. (2017). Maritime Awareness In Pakistan. *CISS Insight Journal*, 5(4), 62–85. <https://www.journal.ciss.org.pk/index.php/ciss-insight/article/view/40>

Bajwa, K. S. (2003). Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-1948. In *Jammu and Kashmir War (1947-1948): Political and Military Perspective* (1st ed., pp. 64–76). Har Anand Publications.

Balaji. (2023, June 23). *Describe the Impact of Globalisation on Indian Economy With Examples*. BYJU'S Exam Prep.

<https://byjusexamprep.com/upsc-exam/describe-the-impact-of-globalisation-on-indian-economy-with-examples>

Barnds, W. (1972). *India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers* (1st ed.). Praeger. <https://www.amazon.com/India-Pakistan-Powers-William-Barnds/dp/0269671994>

Barrie, D., & Wright, T. (Eds.). (2022). Missile Defence Initiative Missile Technology: Accelerating Challenges. In *The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS)*. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Retrieved May 30, 2023, from <https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/publications/strategic-dossier-delta/mdi/>

Baruah, D. M. (2022, May 12). Maritime Competition in the Indian Ocean. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Retrieved July 5, 2023, from <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/05/12/maritime-competition-in-indian-ocean-pub-87093>

Basrur, R. M. (2005). *Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security*. Stanford University Press. <https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=7125>

Bastos, M. (2018, September 19). *Pakistan's foreign policy towards the Indian Ocean Region*. Pakistanpolitico. Retrieved July 26, 2023, from

<https://pakistanpolitico.com/pakistans-foreign-policy-towards-the-indian-ocean-region/>

Basu, P. (2021). Maritime India: The Quest for a Steadfast Identity. *Observer Research Foundation*, 339, 1–30.
<https://www.orfonline.org/research/maritime-india-the-quest-for-a-steadfast-identity/>

Baylis, J., Wirtz, J. J., & Gray, C. S. (2013). *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (4th ed.). Oxford University Press.

Baylis, J., Wirtz, J. J., & Gray, C. S. (2016). *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (5th ed.). Oxford University Press.

Bazai, S. K. (2023, July 4). *Geostrategic Significance Of Wakhan Corridor: Opportunities And Implications For Region – OpEd*. Eurasia Review. <https://www.eurasiareview.com/16102022-geostrategic-significance-of-wakhan-corridor-opportunities-and-implications-for-region-oped/>

Beautiful Quran Recitation For 2 Hours / Quran is Peace / By Omar Hisham Al Arabi. (n.d.). YouTube.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zTUBmJX1gWA>

Bennet, C. (2018, January 1). *Two-Nation Theory*. Springer Link. Retrieved June 1, 2022, from https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-94-024-1267-3_2003

Beteille, T., & Kochhar, K. (2011, November 15). Pakistan's Most Favored Nation Status to India: A Win-Win for the Region? *World Bank*

Blogs. Retrieved June 24, 2023, from <https://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/pakistan%E2%80%99s-most-favored-nation-status-india-win-win-region>

Bhatti, T. H. (2011). Political Legacy of the Muslims in India: An Overview. *Journal of Political Studies*, 18(2), 225–242. <http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-files/Political%20Legacy%20-%2013.pdf>

Biava, A., Drent, M., & Herd, G. P. (2011). Characterizing the European Union’s Strategic Culture: An Analytical Framework. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 49(6), 1227–1248. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02195.x>

Bibi, G., Adnan, M., & Asif, M. (2021). Strategic Stability On the Anvil: India –Pakistan-China Triangle. *Palarch’s Journal of Archaeology of Egypt/Egyptology*, 928–943. <https://archives.palarch.nl/index.php/jae/article/download/9927/9129/19444>

Bıçakcı, S. (2018, August 16). *Introduction to Cyber Security For Nuclear Facilities - Edam*. Edam. <https://edam.org.tr/en/introduction-to-cyber-security-for-nuclear-facilities/>

Black, J. (2004). *Rethinking Military History* (1st ed.). Routledge. <https://rodrigomorenog.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/black-rethinking-military-history-routledge-2004.pdf>

Bloomfield, A. (2012). Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 33(3), 437–461.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2012.727679>

Brewster, D. (2019). Stronger institutions sorely needed in the Indian Ocean | East Asia Forum. *East Asia Forum*.
<https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/07/09/stronger-institutions-sorely-needed-in-the-indian-ocean/>

Brimelow, B. (2021, September 1). India is updating its air force for a modern war, and China isn't its only concern. *Business Insider*. Retrieved May 8, 2023, from <https://www.businessinsider.com/indian-air-force-modernization-not-only-because-of-china-2021-9>

Brown, T. L. (2022, August 13). Navigating maritime security in the Bay of Bengal. *EASTASIAFORUM*. Retrieved July 6, 2023, from <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/08/13/navigating-maritime-security-in-the-bay-of-bengal/>

Brown, V. F. (2022, March 9). Will the Taliban regime survive? *Brookings*. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/08/31/will-the-taliban-regime-survive/>

Burki, S. J. (2011, September 7). *Pakistan after 9/11*. Project Syndicate. Retrieved June 24, 2023, from <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/pakistan-after-9-11-2011-09>

Calvert, J. (2004). The Mythic Foundations of Radical Islam. *Orbis*, 48(1), 29–41. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2003.10.014>

Cavanaugh, M. L. (2016, December 9). *What is Strategy?* Modern War Institute. Retrieved November 7, 2022, from <https://mwi.usma.edu/what-is-strategy/>

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. (2021, March 15). *India and Pakistan*. Retrieved May 8, 2023, from <https://armscontrolcenter.org/countries/india-and-pakistan/>

Chadda, M. (1998). Ethnicity, Security, and Separatism in India. *Pacific Affairs*, 71(3), 432–434. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2761439>

Challenges for Pakistan's Economy and Way Forward. (2023). In *Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies*. Retrieved June 19, 2023, from <https://casstt.com/challenges-for-pakistans-economy-and-the-way-forward>

Chambers, M. R. (2002). *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances*. Army War College Press. <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/41>

Chand, N. (2014, April). China's Maritime Strategy for South Asia. *Naval Forces*. Retrieved July 5, 2023, from <https://www.spsnavalforces.com/story/?id=332>

Chaudhry, K. (2020, July 21). A hammer blow to Pakistan's Buddhist heritage. *international.la-croix.com*. <https://international.la-croix.com/news/world/a-hammer-blow-to-pakistans-buddhist-heritage/12780>

Chaudhury, D. R. (2023, April 3). India, Russia to build BrahMos hypersonic version. *The Economic Times*.

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-russia-to-build-brahmos-hypersonic-version/articleshow/99222651.cms>

Cheema, I. K. (2006). *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah as Governor-General of Pakistan* (1st ed.). Pakistan Study Centre.
<https://www.amazon.com/Quaid-i-Azam-Mohammad-Jinnah-Governor-General-Pakistan/dp/9698181032>

Cheema, P. I. (2013). Security Threats Confronting Pakistan [Chapter 10]. In *Security Outlook of the Asia-Pacific Countries and Its Implications for the Defense Sector* (Joint Research Series no.9). National Institute of Defense Studies.
http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series9/pdf/10.pdf

Chughtai, M. W., Malik, M. W., & Aftab, R. (2015). Impact of Major Economic Variables on Economic Growth of Pakistan. *Acta Universitatis Danubius. Œconomica*, 11(2), 94–106. <https://journals.univ-danubius.ro/index.php/oeconomica/article/view/2723/2604>

Clary, C., & Naran, V. (2018). India's Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities. *International Security*, 43(3), 7–52. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00340

Climate Change: Exacerbating Poverty and Inequality. (2020). In *UNDESA World Social Report 2020 | Inequality in Rapidly Changing World* (pp. 82–106). United Nations. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/world-social-report/2020-2.html>

Climate Change Impacts on Freshwater Resources | US EPA. (2022, December 13). US EPA. <https://www.epa.gov/climateimpacts/climate-change-impacts-freshwater-resources>

CO2 Emissions by Country. (2016). Worldometer. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://www.worldometers.info/co2-emissions/co2-emissions-by-country/>

Cohen, S. P. (2004). *The Idea of Pakistan*. Brookings Institution Press. <http://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/1232477>

Cordesman, A. H. (2023). The Global Nuclear Balance: Nuclear Forces and Key Trends in Nuclear Modernization. In *Center for Security and International Studies (CSIS)*. Retrieved May 30, 2023, from <https://www.csis.org/analysis/global-nuclear-balance-nuclear-forces-and-key-trends-nuclear-modernization>

Crocker, R. (2021, November 17). Afghanistan 2001-2021: U.S. Policy Lessons Learned. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/11/17/afghanistan-2001-2021-u.s.-policy-lessons-learned-pub-85814>

Cronberg, T. (2010). *Nuclear-Free Security: Refocusing Nuclear Disarmament and the Review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty*. Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved May 31, 2023, from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/115261/UPI_FIIA21_cronberg_WEB.pdf

Daily Sabah. (2022, November 27). Turkish-built corvettes to add strength to Pakistan's littoral defense: Navy commander. *Daily Sabah*.

<https://www.dailysabah.com/business/defense/turkish-built-corvettes-to-add-strength-to-pakistans-littoral-defense-navy-commander>

Dalton, T., & Tandler, J. (2012, September 13). *Understanding the Arms “Race” in South Asia*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Retrieved May 8, 2023, from

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/13/understanding-arms-race-in-south-asia-pub-49361>

Dar, F. A. (2018). Pakistan’s Foreign Policy in the Light of Quaid-e-Azam’s Vision. *Muslim Perspectives*, 3(3), 83–89. <https://www.muslim-perspectives.com/images/articles/Pakistan-Foreign-Policy-in-the-Light-of-Quaid-e-Azam-Vision7383.pdf>

Das, U. (2022, August 18). *The Making of a Maritime South Asia?* The Diplomat. Retrieved July 4, 2023, from

<https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/the-making-of-a-maritime-south-asia/>

Davenport, K. (2017, March). *India, Pakistan Escalate Missile Rivalry*. Arms Control Association. Retrieved May 30, 2023, from <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-03/news/india-pakistan-escalate-missile-rivalry>

DAWN. (2021, December 20). Pakistan, Oman take part in navy exercise.

DAWN.COM. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1664749>

Defence Turkey. (2019, May 19). “Together for Peace” AMAN-19 Multinational Naval Exercise & Pakistan – Turkey Defence Cooperation. *Defence Turkey Magazine*.

<https://www.defenceturkey.com/en/content/together-for-peace-aman-19-multinational-naval-exercise-pakistan-turkey-defence-cooperation-3454>

Defence Turkey. (2023, January 25). STM DELIVERS SECOND SUBMARINE IN PAKISTAN NAVY AGOSTA 90B PROJECT. *Defence Turkey Magazine*. <https://www.defenceturkey.com/en/content/stm-delivers-second-submarine-in-pakistan-navy-agosta-90b-project-5369>

Democracy Report. (2023). In *V-Dem Institute*. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from https://v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf

Desai, V. V. (2010). The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia. *Asian Development Group*, 54, 1–33.

Desk, W. (2023, April 4). Major Boost to Missile Technology: India and Russia to build Bramhos-II Hypersonic Missile Version. *Organiser*. <https://organiser.org/2023/04/04/167573/bharat/major-boost-to-missile-technology-india-and-russia-to-build-bramhos-ii-hypersonic-missile-version/>

Disarmament Diplomacy: Pakistan Responds To India's Nuclear Doctrine. (1999). In *The Acronym Institute*. The Acronym Institute. Retrieved May 26, 2023, from <http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/41pakis.htm>

Dostyar, A., & Farahi, Z. (2022, August 18). Why the Afghan peace process failed, and what could come next? *Middle East Institute*. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/why-afghan-peace-process-failed-and-what-could-come-next>

Eckstein, D., Kunzel, V., & Schafer, L. (2021). Global Climate Risk Index : Who Suffers Most From Extreme Events? Weather Related Loss Events in 2019 and 2000-2019. In *German Watch*. German Watch e.V. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Climate%20Risk%20Index%202021_2.pdf

Economic Diplomacy and States Division. (2018). India Surging Ahead 2019. In *Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India*. Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India. Retrieved June 26, 2023, from <https://www.indianembassyjakarta.gov.in/users/assets/pdf/menu/IndiaSurgingAhead-may1719.pdf>

Economic Security Strategy 2020-2023. (2020). In *ICRC- INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS*. ICRC Economic Security Unit. Retrieved June 19, 2023, from <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/introduction-economic-security>

Economic Times. (2015, December 29). 15 Developments in India's Defence Space. *The Economic Times*. Retrieved May 9, 2023, from <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/infrastructure/saab-offers-gripen-fighter-jets-under-make-in-india/multiple-roles/slideshow/50363597.cms>

Elliott, J., & Nigel Jenkinson, N. (2020, December 7). Cyber Risk is the New Threat to Financial Stability. *IMF Blog - Cyber Risks*. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2020/12/07/blog-cyber-risk-is-the-new-threat-to-financial-stability>

English, A. A. (2023, January 10). Saudi Arabia eyes boosting investment in Pakistan to over "0 billion. *Al Arabiya English*. Retrieved June 25, 2023,

from <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2023/01/10/Saudi-Arabia-eyes-boosting-investment-in-Pakistan-to-over-10-billion>

Ensure IAS. (2023, March 15). *Space technology in India*. ENSURE IAS. Retrieved June 2, 2023, from <https://ensureias.com/blog/space-technology-in-india>

Esherick, J. W. (1997). *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Ming China*. By Alastair Iain Johnston. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. xii, 317 pp. \$39.50. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 56(3), 769–771. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2659623>

Farid, F. (2020, February 7). *Why Pakistan Needs a Comprehensive Indian Ocean Policy* [Online forum post]. THE FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS. Retrieved July 26, 2023, from <http://www.fletcherforum.org/home/2020/2/7/why-pakistan-needs-a-comprehensive-indian-ocean-policy>

Farrell, T. (2001). Transnational Norms and Military Development: *European Journal of International Relations*, 7(1), 63–102. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066101007001003>

FATF. (n.d.). *Pakistan*. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Pakistan.html>

Fatima, M. (2016). The Kargil War: Contending Perspectives of Pakistan and India. *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 28(4), 627–644. <http://dspace.kci.go.kr/handle/kci/1555711>

Feinstein, L. (2002). A New Equation :U.S. Policy toward India and Pakistan after September 11. *Carnegie Endowment for International*

Peace, Working Paper No. 27, 5–13.

<https://carnegieendowment.org/files/wp27.pdf>

Fostering Effective Energy Transition. (2023). In *World Economic Forum*. World Economic Forum. Retrieved July 29, 2023, from https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Fostering_Effective_Energy_Transition_2023.pdf

Fragile States Index Annual Report. (2023). In *Fund for Peace*. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from https://fragilestatesindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/FSI-2023-Report_final.pdf

Freedman, L. D. (2006). Networks, culture and narratives. *The Adelphi Papers*, 45(379), 11–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/05679320600661640>

Freedman, L. D. (2018, September). *On Grand Strategy* (By J. L. Gaddis). Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 7, 2022, from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2018-08-13/grand-strategy>

Gaddis, J. L. (2019). *On Grand Strategy*. Van Haren Publishing.

Gady, F. S. (2019, January 29). *Is the Indian Military Capable of Executing the Cold Start Doctrine?* The Diplomat. Retrieved May 8, 2023, from <https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/is-the-indian-military-capable-of-executing-the-cold-start-doctrine/>

Geertz, C. (1973). *Interpretation of Cultures* (Fifth Pr.). Basic Books, Inc., New York. <https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/jaro2018/SOC757/um/clifford-geertz-the-interpretation-of-cultures.pdf>

Gender Development Index. (2021). Resource Watch. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://resourcewatch.org/data/explore/soc002rw1-gender-development-index-gdi?section=Discover&selectedCollection=&zoom=1.581155874629817&lat=3.897027755555916&lng=63.97891892379301&pitch=0&bearing=0&basemap=dark&labels=light&layers=%255B%257B%2522dataset%2522%253A%2522cf069d6d-27b0-4282-8ff3-ee04d90e841d%2522%252C%2522opacity%2522%253A1%252C%2522layer%2522%253A%252221b1bfc0-24cf-43b8-9865-d719070a5542%2522%257D%255D&aoi=&page=1&sort=most-viewed&sortDirection=-1>

Ghimire, B. (2023). War In Ukraine And Its Impact On South Asia. In *Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom*. Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://www.freiheit.org/sites/default/files/2023-02/south-asia-revised-paper.pdf>

GHS Index. (2021, December 8). GHS Index. Retrieved July 29, 2023, from <https://www.ghsindex.org/>

Gilani, S. I. (2019, May 30). *Indian diplomacy: Neighborhood first, minus Pakistan*. Anadolu Agency. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/indian-diplomacy-neighborhood-first-minus-pakistan/1493237#>

Glenn, J., Howlett, D. A., & Poore, S. (2004). *Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture*. Ashgate.

Global Cyber Security Index. (2020). In *International Telecommunication Union (ITU)*. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2021-PDF-E.pdf

Global Economic Prospects : South Asia. (2023). In *World Bank Group*. World Bank Group.

Global Energy Architecture Performance Index Report. (2017). In *World Economic Forum*. World Economic Forum. Retrieved July 29, 2023, from https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Energy_Architecture_Performance_Index_2017.pdf

Global Fire Power. (2023). *Comparison of India and Pakistan Military Strengths (2023)*. www.GlobalFirepower.com. Retrieved May 8, 2023, from <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail.php?country1=india&country2=pakistan>

Global Food Security Index. (2022). In *Economist Impact*. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://impact.economist.com/sustainability/project/food-security-index/>

Global Gender Gap Report. (2022). In *World Economic Forum*. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2022.pdf

Global Health Security Index Report. (2021). In *GHS Index*. Retrieved July 30, 2023, from https://www.ghsindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/2021_GHSindexFullReport_Final.pdf

Global Hunger Index. (2022). In *Concern Worldwide*. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://www.globalhungerindex.org/pdf/en/2022.pdf>

Global Peace Index. (2023). In *Institutes for Economics and Peace*. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GPI-2023-Web.pdf>

Gluck, M. (2022a, June 30). *Missiles of India | Missile Threat*. Missile Threat. <https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/india/>

Gluck, M. (2022b, June 30). *Missiles of Pakistan | Missile Threat*. Missile Threat. <https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/pakistan/>

Government of Pakistan, M. (2019, November 18). *Pakistan's Membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)* [Press release]. <https://mofa.gov.pk/pakistans-membership-of-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization-sco/>

Gray, C. S. (1999a). Strategic culture as context: the first generation of theory strikes back. *Review of International Studies*, 25(1), 49–69. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210599000492>

Gray, C. S. (1999b). *Modern Strategy* (1st ed.). Oxford University Press. <https://global.oup.com/ukhe/product/modern-strategy-9780198782513?cc=tr&lang=en&>

Gray, C. S. (2006). *Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice* (1st ed.). Routledge. <https://www.routledge.com/Strategy-and-History-Essays-on-Theory-and-Practice/Gray/p/book/9780415386357>

Gray, C. S. (2007). Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture. *Comparative Strategy*, 26(1), 1–20. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495930701271478>

Grevatt, J., & MacDonald, A. (2022, June 13). Pakistan increases defence spending but high inflation offsets gains. *Janes.com*.

<https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/pakistan-increases-defence-spending-but-high-inflation-offsets-gains>

Gul, A. (2022, September 30). Taliban Declares Use of Afghan Soil Against Pakistan or Others as Seditious. VOA.

<https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-declares-use-of-afghan-soil-against-pakistan-or-others-as-seditious/6770609.html>

Haass, R. N. (1998, June). Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing. *Brookings*. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from

<https://www.brookings.edu/research/economic-sanctions-too-much-of-a-bad-thing/>

Haglund, D. G. (2004). What Good Is Strategic Culture? Sage Publications, Ltd. *International Journal*, 59(3), 479–502.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/40203951>

Haglund, D. G. (2011). Chapter ‘Let’s Call the Whole Thing Off?’ Security Culture as Strategic Culture. In *European Security Policy and Strategic Culture* (1st ed., pp. 494–516). Routledge.

<https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315872964-2/let-call-whole-thing-security-culture-strategic-culture-david-haglund?context=ubx&refId=5a4dbe9d-ec5b-43c0-9c51-17283574fa30>

Haglund, D. G. (2014). What Can Strategic Culture Contribute to Our Understanding of Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific Region?

Contemporary Security Policy, 35(2), 310–328.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.927674>

Haider, K. (2023, May 25). Pakistan Growth Slows Sharply as Economic Challenges Mount. *Bloomberg.com*. Retrieved June 26, 2023, from <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-05-25/pakistan-growth-slows-sharply-as-economic-challenges-mount#xj4y7vzkg>

Haider, K., & Dilawar, I. (2023, March 3). Pakistan Seals > Billion Loan From China Amid IMF Delay. *Bloomberg.com*. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-03/pakistan-expects-1-3-billion-loan-from-china-s-icbc-in-few-days#xj4y7vzkg>

Haines, D. (2023, February 23). *India and Pakistan Are Playing a Dangerous Game in the Indus Basin*. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved June 24, 2023, from <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/02/india-and-pakistan-are-playing-dangerous-game-indus-basin>

Hanif, S. (2022). India's Quest for a Limited War-fighting Doctrine; Analyzing the Sundarji, Cold Start, Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Force and Land Warfare Doctrine. *BTTN Journal*, 1(2), 20–44. https://bttan.org.pk/ojs/index.php/BTTN_Journal/article/view/7/11

Hassaan, R. B. M. R. (1959). *The Educational Movement of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan 1858-1898* [Phd dissertation]. University of London.

Hassan, M. A. (2019). Indian Initiatives for Maritime Dominance: Pakistan's Options and Response. *Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad.*, 42, 1–19. <https://issi.org.pk/islamabad-paper-indian-initiatives-for-maritime-dominance-pakistans-options-and-response/>

HILAL English Magazine. (n.d.). *Pakistan Navy Ships Visit Ports of Friendly Countries During Overseas Deployment*. HILAL ENGLISH- the Pakistan Armed Forces Magazine. Retrieved April 15, 2023, from <https://www.hilal.gov.pk/eng-article/detail/Mjg1.html>

Hindustan Times. (2019, February 16). India raises customs duty on all imports from Pakistan to 200% after withdrawing MFN status over Pulwama attack. *Hindustan Times*. Retrieved June 24, 2023, from <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-imposes-200-customs-duty-on-all-imports-from-pakistan-after-withdrawing-mfn-status-over-pulwama-attack/story-wo3AlelWWAYcpluwrEwnYP.html>

History Pak. (n.d.). Quaid-i-Azam's Perception of Pakistan's Relations with India. *History Pak.com*. Retrieved May 1, 2022, from <https://historypak.com/quaid-i-azams-perception-of-pakistans-relations-with-india/>

Homepage - GHS Index. (2021, December 8). GHS Index. <https://www.ghsindex.org/>

Hull, I., V. (2006). *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Illustrated). Cornell University Press.

Human Development Report 2020 |The next frontier: Human development and the Anthropocene. (2020). In *Human Development Reports*. United Nations Development Program. Retrieved June 26, 2023, from <https://hdr.undp.org/content/human-development-report-2020>

Husain, I. (2019). Economic Highs and Lows of Pakistan: Analysing the Last 70 Years. *Sustainable Development Policy Institute*, 7–32.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24393.7>

Hussain, A. (2022, October 21). Pakistan removed from global ‘terrorism’ financing list. *Business and Economy News | Al Jazeera*. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/21/must-stay-on-course-pakistan-is-removed-from-fatf-gray-list>

Hussain, M. (2021). CPEC and Geo-Security Behind Geo-Economics: China’s Master Stroke to Counter Terrorism and Energy Security Dilemma. *East Asia: An International Quarterly*, 38(4).

<https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA681746726&sid=googleScholar&v=2.1&it=r&linkaccess=abs&issn=10966838&p=AONE&sw=w&userGroupName=anon%7E3ba7f97e&aty=open+web+entry>

Hussain, M. Z., & Ahmed, R. Q. (2019). Space Programs of India and Pakistan: Military and Strategic Installations in Outer Space and Precarious Regional Strategic Stability. *Space Policy*, 47, 63–75.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2018.06.003>

Ijaz, S. (2023, July 14). Pakistan, Palestine and the World Court. *Human Rights Watch*. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/14/pakistan-palestine-and-world-court>

Impact of globalization on Indian economy. (2021, August 24).

INSIGHTSIAS. Retrieved June 24, 2023, from

<https://www.insightsonindia.com/indian-economy-3/foreign-trade-and-international-organizations/impact-of-globalization-on-indian-economy/>

India | Environmental Performance Index. (2022). Environmental Performance Index. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://epi.yale.edu/epi-results/2022/country/ind>

India - GHS Index. (2021, December 4). GHS Index. <https://www.ghsindex.org/country/india/>

India - NTI Nuclear Security Index. (2020, July 18). NTI Nuclear Security Index. Retrieved May 26, 2023, from <https://www.ntiindex.org/country/india/>

India Indicators. (2023, June 11). Trading Economics. Retrieved June 11, 2023, from <https://tradingeconomics.com/india/indicators>

India test-launches new Agni-series nuclear-capable missile. (2021, June 28). Janes.com. <https://www.janes.com/defence-news/india-test-launches-new-agni-series-nuclear-capable-missile/>

INDIA@100: Realizing the potential of a US\$6 trillion economy. (2023). In *Earnst & Young*. Retrieved June 26, 2023, from https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_in/topics/india-at-100/2023/01/ey-india-at-100-full-version.

INDIAai. (n.d.). Retrieved June 1, 2023, from <https://indiaai.gov.in/national-ai>

INDIAai. (2023, May 28). National Strategy For Artificial Intelligence. *INDIAai*. Retrieved June 1, 2023, from <https://indiaai.gov.in/research-reports/national-strategy-for-artificial-intelligence>

India-Central Asia - INSIGHTSIAS. (2021, September 10).

INSIGHTSIAS. <https://www.insightsonindia.com/international-relations/bilateral-regional-and-global-groupings-and-agreements-involving-india-and-or-affecting-indias-interests/india-central-asia/>

Indian Maritime Doctrine. (2009). In *Indian Navy*. Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy). Retrieved July 6, 2023, from <https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian-Maritime-Doctrine-2009-Updated-12Feb16.pdf>

India-Pakistan Political Dispute: Affect on Trade. (2020, April 29). India-Pakistan Political Dispute: Affect on Trade. Retrieved June 19, 2023, from <https://www.cogoport.com/en-IN/blogs/india-pakistan-trade-dispute>

Inequality - Social Institutions and Gender Index. (2023). OECD. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://data.oecd.org/inequality/social-institutions-and-gender.htm#indicator-chart>

Inequality - Violence against women. (2019). OECD. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://data.oecd.org/inequality/violence-against-women.htm>

Inequality - Women in politics. (2023). OECD. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://data.oecd.org/inequality/women-in-politics.htm#indicator-chart>

Institut climatique du Canada. (2022, July 21). *The health costs of climate change - Canadian Climate Institute.* Canadian Climate Institute. <https://climateinstitute.ca/reports/the-health-costs-of-climate-change/>

Institut climatique du Canada. (2023, January 18). *The Costs of Climate Change - Canadian Climate Institute*. Canadian Climate Institute. <https://climateinstitute.ca/reports/the-costs-of-climate-change/>

International Crisis Group (Ed.). (2022, February 4). Pakistan's Hard Policy Choices in Afghanistan. *International Crisis Group*. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/pakistans-hard-policy-choices-afghanistan>

Iqbal, H., Baig, M. A., & Muhammad, S. A. (2018). India's Indigenization and Modernization of Defence and Military Technology: Strategic Ramifications for Pakistan. *Global International Relations Review*, 8–26. [https://doi.org/10.31703/girr.2018\(i-i\).02](https://doi.org/10.31703/girr.2018(i-i).02)

Iqbal, N., & Nawaz, S. (2016, March). Why has SAFTA failed to boost Pakistan–India trade? *East Asia Forum*. Retrieved June 24, 2023, from <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/03/19/why-has-safta-failed-to-boost-pakistan-india-trade/>

Ismail, S. (2017). Military Expenditure and Economic Growth in South Asian Countries: Empirical Evidences. *International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues*, 7(3), 318–325.

Jaishankar, D. (2019, February 18). India has been squeezing Pakistan economically even before Pulwama. *ThePrint*. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://theprint.in/opinion/india-has-been-squeezing-pakistan-economically-even-before-pulwama/194311/>

Jalil, G. Y. (2017). Nuclear Arms Race in South Asia: Pakistan's Quest for Security. *Strategic Studies*, 37(1), 18–41.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/48535985>

Jalil, G. Y. (2018). India's Development of Sea-based Nuclear Capabilities Implications for Pakistan. *Strategic Studies*, 38(1), 34–47.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/48539121>

Jamal, A. (2010). Pakistan's Ongoing Azm-e-Nau-3 Military Exercises Define Strategic Priorities. *Terrorism Monitor*, 8(18), 6–7.

<https://jamestown.org/program/pakistans-ongoing-azm-e-nau-3-military-exercises-define-strategic-priorities/>

Jamal, S. (2021, June 26). How FATF grey list impacts Pakistan and what progress has been made. *Pakistan – Gulf News*. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/how-fatf-grey-list-impacts-pakistan-and-what-progress-has-been-made-1.80226738>

Jamal, U. (2023, April 17). *Pakistan's New Multidimensional Strategy Against Militancy*. The Diplomat. Retrieved April 29, 2023, from <https://thediplomat.com/2023/04/pakistans-new-multidimensional-strategy-against-militancy/>

Jaspal, Z. N. (2011). The India-Pakistan Military Standoff: Crisis and Escalation in South Asia. In *Understanding the Political-Military Context of the 2002 Military Standoff—A Pakistani Perspective* (pp. 53–63).

Palgrave Macmillan.

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230118768_3

Jaspal, Z. N. (2012). The Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense in South Asia: Implications on Strategic Stability. *Nuclear Learning: The Next Decade in South Asia*, 120–130.

https://www.nps.edu/documents/104111744/106151936/11+Nuclear+Learning_Jaspal.pdf/150ce371-2c21-42ae

Javaid, U. (2008). The Changing Trends Of Security : Influence On South Asia. *J.R.S.P*, 45(1), 59–73.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309282948_THE_CHANGING_TRENDS_OF_SECURITY_INFLUENCE_ON_SOUTH_ASIA

Jazeera, A. (2023, April 7). Amid turmoil, Pakistan to launch operation against armed groups. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved April 29, 2023, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/7/amid-turmoil-pakistan-to-launch-operation-against-armed-groups>

Jinnah, M. A. (1989). *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and statements as Governor General of Pakistan, 1947-1948*. Govt. of Pakistan, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Directorate of Films & Publications.

Johnson, A. C. (1997). *Mission With Mountbatten* (second edition). New Age International Ltd. <https://www.amazon.com/Mission-Mountbatten-Alan-Campbell-Johnson/dp/8122406211>

Johnson, J. L. (2006). Strategic Culture: Refining the Theoretical Construct. *Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office*, 15. <https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/strat-culture.pdf>

Johnson, J. L., Kartchner, K. M., & Larsen, J. A. (2009). *Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking (Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies)* (1st ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.
<https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230618305>

Johnston, A. I. (1995). Thinking about Strategic Culture. *International Security*, 19(4), 32. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539119>

Johnston, A. I. (1998). *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton University Press.

Jorgic, D., Price, M., & Chatterjee, S. (2018, February 16). Pakistan could face economic pain from return to terrorist financing “gray list.” *Reuters*. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-militants-financing-economy-idUSKCN1G00PB>

Joshi, M. (2022, July 21). India’s cautious return to Afghanistan. *East Asia Forum*. <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/07/20/indias-cautious-return-to-afghanistan/>

Kaempfer, W. H., & Lowenberg, A. D. (1988). The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach on JSTOR. *The American Economic Review*, 78(4), 783–793. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1811175>

Kaldor, M. (2018). *Global Security Cultures*. John Wiley & Sons.

Kanwal, G. (2001). India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Policy. *Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA*, 26(11).
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_feb01kag01.html

Kapur, R. (2022, January 6). The Persistent ISKP Threat to Afghanistan: On China's Doorstep. *Middle East Institute*.
<https://www.mei.edu/publications/persistent-iskp-threat-afghanistan-chinas-doorstep>

Kar, D. (2019a, November 20). “*Why Let a Good Crisis Go to Waste?*”: *What India Needs to Remember to Overcome its Economic Slump*. The Wire. Retrieved June 26, 2023, from <https://thewire.in/economy/why-let-a-good-crisis-go-to-waste-what-india-needs-to-remember-to-overcome-its-economic-slump>

Kar, D. (2019b, December 8). *Economic Slump: India's Rickety Bridge Over Troubled Waters*. The Wire. Retrieved June 26, 2023, from <https://thewire.in/economy/india-economy-rickety-bridge-over-troubled-waters>

Karim, M. (2013). The Future of South Asian Security: Prospects for a Nontraditional Regional Security Architecture. In *The National Bureau of Asian Research*. Retrieved July 4, 2023, from https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/programs/nts_projectreport_april2013.pdf

Karnad, B. (2005). *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy*. Macmillan.

Karnad, B. (2008). *India's Nuclear Policy* [October 2008].

Karnad, B. (2022). India's nuclear doctrine is useless. Discard no-first-use, say nukes are for China threat. *ThePrint*.
<https://theprint.in/opinion/indias-nuclear-doctrine-is-useless-discard-no-first-use-say-nukes-are-for-china-threat/886866/>

Kathuria, S. (Ed.). (2018). A Glass Half Full: The Promise of Regional Trade in South Asia. In *South Asian Development Forum*. World Bank Group Report. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/9f3f97ac-4007-5b30-9b2d-f1d1070c16b7/content>

Kaura, V. (2022, December 2). Pakistan-Afghan Taliban relations face mounting challenges. *Middle East Institute*. <https://www.mei.edu/publications/pakistan-afghan-taliban-relations-face-mounting-challenges>

Kaushal, S., Byrne, J., Byrne, J., & Somerville, G. (2022, July 8). *India's Nuclear Doctrine: The Agni-P and the Stability–Instability Paradox*. Royal United Services Institute. Retrieved May 26, 2023, from <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/indias-nuclear-doctrine-agni-p-and-stability-instability-paradox>

Kerr, E. (2022, April 12). What Is Economic Warfare and What It Means for U.S. Consumers. *US News & World Report*. <https://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles/what-is-economic-warfare-and-what-it-means-for-u-s-consumers>

Khaama Press (Ed.). (2010, September 2). Allama Mohammad Iqbal. *Khaama Press*. <https://www.khaama.com/allama-mohammad-iqbal/>

Khalil, S. (2019, May 3). Balochistan and global high-politics. *Daily Times*. Retrieved August 2, 2023, from <https://dailytimes.com.pk/387271/balochistan-and-global-high-politics/>

Khalil, S. (2021a, November 29). *TAP Spotlight - Worldwide Terror-related Events - August 2021*. Terörizm Analiz Platformu (TAP). Retrieved August 2, 2023, from <https://tap-data.com/article/tap-spotlight-worldwide-terror-related-events-august-2021>

Khalil, S. (2021b, November 29). *TAP Spotlight - Worldwide Terror-related Events - September 2021*. Terörizm Analiz Platformu (TAP). Retrieved August 2, 2023, from <https://tap-data.com/article/tap-spotlight-worldwide-terror-related-events-september-2021>

Khalil, S. (2021c, December 17). *TAP Spotlight - Worldwide Terror-related Events - October 2021*. Terörizm Analiz Platformu (TAP). Retrieved August 2, 2023, from <https://tap-data.com/article/tap-spotlight-worldwide-terror-related-events-october-2021>

Khan, A. (2019). Pakistan launches first formal Maritime doctrine. *Global Village Space*. <https://www.globalvillagespace.com/pakistan-launches-first-formal-maritime-doctrine/>

Khan, A. A. (2021). Pakistan's Engage Africa Policy and the Future of Pak-Afro Ties. *Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research*. <https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/trade-economics/pakistans-engage-africa-policy-and-the-future-of-pak-afro-ties/>

Khan, E. M. (2013). South Asia's Strategic Security Environment. *Margalla Papers*, 21–48. <https://margallapapers.ndu.edu.pk/site/issue/download/8/178>

Khan, E. M. (2014, August 1). Quaid-e-Azam's Defence Vision. *Hilal : The Pakistan Armed Forces Magazine*. <https://www.hilal.gov.pk/eng-article/detail/MTUyNg==.html>

Khan, F. H. (2003). Rough Neighbors: Afghanistan and Pakistan. *Strategic Insights*, 2(1), 1–11. <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/25441>

Khan, F. H. (2005). Comparative Strategic Culture: The Case of Pakistan. *Strategic Insights*, IV(10).
<https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/10945/11241/3/khan2Oct05.pdf>

Khan, F. H. (2015). Security Dilemma in South Asia: Building Arsenals and Living with Distrust. *Nação E Defesa*, 84–100.
https://comum.rcaap.pt/bitstream/10400.26/24036/1/KHANFerozHassan_p84_102.pdf

Khan, F. H. (2022). *Geography of Pakistan: Geographical Location of Pakistan*. <https://www.amazon.com/Geography-Pakistan-Geographical-Location-ebook/dp/B09T1RVLJD>

Khan, I. (1999). The Taliban, Iran and Central Asia: A View from Peshawar. *Central Asia Monitor*, 2(Monthly), 15–16.

Khan, I. A. (2012). Pakistan's Afghan Policy Shift: Response to the War on Terrorism. In *Pakistan's Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Making: A Study of Pakistan's Post 9/11 Afghan Policy Change* (pp. 43–63). Nova Science Publishers. <https://www.amazon.com/Pakistans-Strategic-Culture-Foreign-Policy/dp/1621006786>

Khan, M. (2018). Understanding Pakistan's Full Spectrum Deterrence. *Strategic Studies Institute Islamabad*, 109–153.

<https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/62863946/understanding-pakistans-full-spectrum-deterrence-moiz-khan>

Khan, M. (2023, May 31). *Artificially Unintelligent: Pakistan's AI Policy - Insights by Data Darbar*. Insights by Data Darbar.
<https://insights.datadarbar.io/artificially-unintelligent-pakistans-ai-policy/>

Khan, R. M. (2009). Non-Traditional Ssecurity Threats To South Asia. *Margalla Papers*, 40–66.
<https://margallapapers.ndu.edu.pk/site/issue/download/4/218>

Khan, S. A. (2013, April 14). Quaid's Vision of Foreign Policy. *Business Recorder*. <https://fp.brecorder.com/2013/04/201304141174979/>

Khan, Z. (2021a). Military Strategies of India And Pakistan: A Perspective. *Strategic Thought*, 126–146.
<https://strategicthought.ndu.edu.pk/site/article/download/30/23>

Khan, Z. (2021b, September 11). Jinnah's vision of Pakistan's foreign policy. *The News International*. Retrieved May 2, 2022, from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/891102-jinnah-s-vision-of-pakistan-s-foreign-policy>

Khan, Z. (2022, March 8). Strategic ambiguities in India's nuclear doctrinal posturing. *The Express Tribune*. Retrieved May 28, 2023, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2346860/strategic-ambiguities-in-indias-nuclear-doctrinal-posturing?amp=1>

Khanna, A. (2020). Devising an Indian policy on Sanctions for Pakistan. *Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations*, 22, 1–31.

Khattak, M. U., Khan, M., & Qumber, G. (2019). Evolution of New Indian Military Strategy: Implications for Pakistan. *Margalla Papers*, 1, 1–39.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325723340_Evolution_of_New_Indian_Military_Strategy_Implications_for_Pakistan

Khattak, M. U. R. (2011). Indian Military's Cold Start Doctrine: Capabilities, Limitations and Possible Response from Pakistan. *SASSI Research Paper*, 32, 1–44. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/151240/RP-32-Masood-Indian-Militarys-Cold-Start-Doctrine-Mar-2011.pdf>

Khattak, M. U. R., & Mushtaq, M. (2015). Pakistan's Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2001-2014): An Analysis. *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, XXXVI(1), 29–46.

<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312174793>

Kheli, S. T. (1974). Pakhtoonistan nad its international Implications. *World Affairs*, 137(3), 233–245. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20671568>

Kiran, A. (2009). Indian Quest for Strategic Ingress in Afghanistan and Its Implications for Pakistan. *Institute for Strategic Studies, Research & Analysis*, volume 1(ISSRA Papers 2009), 12–30.

<https://issrapapers.ndu.edu.pk>

Krepon, M. (2003). The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia. In *Prospects for Peace in South Asia* (1st ed., pp. 261–279). <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503625037>

Krepon, M. (2011). THE LIMITS OF INFLUENCE. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 18(1), 85–101. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2011.549175>

Krepon, M., & Gagné, C. (Eds.). (2002). The Impact of US Ballistic Missile Defenses on Southern Asia. *Stimson Center, Report No 46*, 1–95. <https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/Impact-US-Ballistic-Missile-Defenses.pdf>

Krepon, M., Jones, R. W., & Haider, Z. (Eds.). (2004). Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia. *Stimson Center*, 1–168. https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/Escalation%20Control%20FINAL_0.pdf

Kristensen, H. M. (2013, May 10). India's Missile Modernization Beyond Minimum Deterrence. *Federation of American Scientists*. Retrieved May 31, 2023, from <https://fas.org/publication/indianmirv/>

Kristensen, H. M. (2023, May 4). *Pakistan's Evolving Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure - Federation of American Scientists*. Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved May 28, 2023, from <https://fas.org/publication/pakistan-nuclear-infrastructure/>

Kroeber, A. L., Kluckhohn, C., Untereiner, W., & Meyer, A. G. (1963). *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (cop. 1952). Vintage Books House, New York. <https://www.abebooks.com/Culture-critical-review-concepts-definitions-Kroeber/18437170541/bd>

Kukreja, D. (2013). Andaman and Nicobar Islands: A security challenge for India Read more at: <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/andaman-and-nicobar-islands-a-security-challenge-for-india/>. *Indian Defence Review*, 28(1). <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/andaman-and-nicobar-islands-a-security-challenge-for-india/>

Kumar, P. (2022, August 23). *How AI helped ISRO to reach its pinnacle*. INDIAai. Retrieved June 1, 2023, from <https://indiaai.gov.in/article/how-ai-helped-isro-to-reach-its-pinnacle>

Kux, D. (2000). India and the United States: Estranged Democracies 1941–1991. In K. Bajpai & A. Mattoo (Eds.), *Engaged Democracies: India–US Relations in the 21st Century*. Har Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd.; New Delhi.
https://books.google.com.tr/books/about/Engaged_Democracies.html?id=FyZ2AAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y

Ladwig III, W. C. (2007). A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine. *International Security*, 32(3), 158–190.
<https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/cold-start-hot-wars-indian-armys-new-limited-war-doctrine>

Lambert, N. A. (2017). Brits-Krieg: The Strategy of Economic Warfare. In *Understanding Cyber Conflict* (pp. 123–146). Georgetown University Press / Washington, DC.

Lantis, J. S. (2002). Strategic Culture and National Security Policy. *International Studies Review*, 4(3), 87–113. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1521-9488.t01-1-00266>

Lantis, J. S. (2006). *Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism* (No. DTRA01-03-D-0017). Defense Threat Reduction Agency, USA. Retrieved January 17, 2022, from <https://irp.fas.org/agency/dod/dtra/stratcult-claus.pdf>

Latif, A. (2019, December 19). *Pakistan's pullout from Malaysia summit draws criticism*. Anadolu Agency. Retrieved July 26, 2023, from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/pakistans-pullout-from-malaysia-summit-draws-criticism/1678477>

Lavoy, P. R. (1993). Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation. *Security Studies*, 2(3–4), 192–212.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419309347524>

Lavoy, P. R. (2005). Pakistan's Foreign Relation. In D. T. Hagerty (Ed.), *South Asia in World Politics* (pp. 49–71). Lanham, MD : Rowman & Littlefield Pub.

https://books.google.com.tr/books?printsec=frontcover&vid=LCCN2004022277&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false

Lavoy, P. R. (2006). *Pakistan's Strategic Culture* (No. DTRA01-03-D-0017). Defense Threat Reduction Agency, USA.

<https://irp.fas.org/agency/dod/dtra/pakistan.pdf>

Lavoy, P. R. (2009). *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict* (Illustrated). Cambridge University Press.

Liddell Hart, B. H. (Ed.). (1967). *Strategy: the indirect approach* (4th ed.). London :Faber.

Lider, J. (1980). Introduction to Military Theory. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 15(3), 151–168. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45083282>

Lodhi, M. (2001). Security challenges in South Asia. *The Non Proliferation Review*, 8(2), 118–124.

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700108436856>

Lord, C. (1985). American strategic culture. *Comparative Strategy*, 5(3), 269–293. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495938508402693>

Lum, T. (2002). US Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients. In *Congress Research Service Report for Congress*.

Mahar, I. (2020, April 22). Changing Security Dynamics of South Asia: Implication for the Security of Region. *Modern Diplomacy*. Retrieved July 4, 2023, from <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/04/16/changing-security-dynamics-of-south-asia-implication-for-the-security-of-region/>

Makeig, D. C. (1987). War, No-War, and the India-Pakistan Negotiating Process. *Pacific Affairs*, 60(2), 271–294. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2758135>

Mani, M., Bandyopadhyay, S., Chonabayashi, S., Markandya, A., & Mosier, T. M. (2017). South Asia's Hotspots: The Impact of Temperature and Precipitation Changes on Living Standards. In *Washington, DC: World Bank eBooks*. World Bank Group. <https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1155-5>

Maritime in India. (n.d.). Global Logistics. Retrieved July 6, 2023, from <https://globallogistics.co.in/maritime-in-india/>

Mason, S. (2016). MILITARY BUDGETS in INDIA and PAKISTAN Trajectories, Priorities, and Risks. In *Stimson Center*. Stimson Center. Retrieved May 8, 2023, from <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities->

studies/resources/docs/Stimson%20Military-Budgets-India-Pakistan-Trajectories-Priorities-Risks.pdf

Mehta, J. N. (2016). Restraint and Affluence. In *Arming Without Aiming: Indian Defence Modernization*. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/armingwithoutaimingrevised_chapter.pdf

Menon, V. G., & Adhikari, M. (2023). Quantum Computing in India: Recent Developments and Future. *IET Quantum Communication*, 1–3. <https://doi.org/10.1049/qtc2.12056>

Mergener, H. U. (2023). Pakistan Initiates Large-Scale International Naval Exercise. *European Security & Defence*. <https://euro-sd.com/2023/02/news/29616/pakistan-initiates-large-scale-international-naval-exercise/>

Military and Security Development Involving People's Republic of China. (2021). In *US Department of Defense*. Retrieved July 6, 2023, from <https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF>

Military Watch Magazine (Ed.). (2019, March 7). *India Signs \$3 Billion Lease for Russian Akula II Class Nuclear Submarine*. Military Watch Magazine. Retrieved July 6, 2023, from <https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/india-signs-3-billion-lease-for-russian-akula-ii-class-nuclear-submarine>

Mills, C. (2022). Nuclear Weapons at a Glance: India and Pakistan. In *UK Parliament*. House of Commons Library. Retrieved May 8, 2023, from <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9070/>

Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan. (2021, December 17). *Strategic Trade Policy Framework*. Ministry of Commerce | Government of Pakistan. Retrieved June 26, 2023, from <https://www.commerce.gov.pk/strategic-trade-policy-framework/>

Ministry of Information Technology & Telecommunication. (2023). Draft National Artificial Intelligence Policy. In *Ministry of Information Technology & Telecommunication*. Retrieved June 1, 2023, from <https://moitt.gov.pk/SiteImage/Misc/files/National%20AI%20Policy%20Consultation%20Draft%20V1.pdf>

Ministry of Planning, Development and Reforms. (2018). Pakistan 2025 : One Nation - One Vision. In *Ministry of Planning Development & Special Initiatives*. Government of Pakistan. Retrieved June 26, 2023, from <https://www.pc.gov.pk/uploads/vision2025/Pakistan-Vision-2025.pdf>

Mir, A. (2022, May 4). Pakistan's Twin Taliban Problem. *United States Institute of Peace*. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/pakistans-twin-taliban-problem>

Mohammad, K. (2023, January 17). India vs Pakistan - War of the Economies. *Islamicfinanceguru Limited*. Retrieved June 11, 2023, from <https://www.islamicfinanceguru.com/articles/india-vs-pakistan-war-of-the-economies>

Mudasar, A. (2021, August 11). An Outlook of Pakistan's Economic History: 1947-2021. *Modern Diplomacy*. Retrieved June 26, 2023, from <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/08/12/an-outlook-of-pakistans-economic-history-1947-2021/>

Mughal, M. (2022, November 18). Strengthened Pakistan through ‘Bajwa doctrine. *Pakistan Observer*. Retrieved August 1, 2023, from <https://pakobserver.net/strengthened-pakistan-through-bajwa-doctrine-by-maliha-mughal/>

Mughal, M. (2023, January 18). India’s nuclear doctrine and its global aspirations. *Pakistan Observer*. Retrieved May 28, 2023, from <https://pakobserver.net/indias-nuclear-doctrine-and-its-global-aspirations-by-maliha-mughal/>

Mustafa, M. Q. (2008). Pakistan’s Military Security and Conventional Balance of Power. *Strategic Studies*, 28, 35–44.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/48527692>

Nabi, S., & Batool, S. S. (2022, October 17). *India’s Dams and Pakistan’s Water Crisis*. Pulitzer Center. Retrieved August 1, 2023, from <https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/indias-dams-and-pakistans-water-crisis>

Nandikotkur, G. (2015, April 13). *India Opens Cyber Coordination Centre*. Bank Info Security. Retrieved June 1, 2023, from <https://www.bankinfosecurity.asia/india-opens-cyber-coordination-centre-a-8100>

National Center of Excellence. (2022, February 14). *6 Indian Quantum Security Startups Promising to Revolutionize the Way Security Is Managed - National CoE*. Retrieved May 30, 2023, from <https://www.n-coe.in/blog/6-indian-quantum-security-startups-promising-revolutionize-way-security-managed>

National Cyber Security Index. (2023). NCSI. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://ncsi.ega.ee/ncsi-index/?order=-ncsihttps://ncsi.ega.ee/indicators/>

Nawaz, F. (2022). Challenges to Maritime Security of Pakistan. *Saudi Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 73–78. <https://doi.org/10.36348/sjhss.2022.v07i02.004>

Nawaz, S. (2008). The First Kashmir War Revisited. *India Review*, 7(2), 115–154. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14736480802055455>

Naz, S. (2019). Pakistan's Military Strategy: Challenges and Response. *Electronic Journal of Social Science and Humanities*, 1(1), 58–73. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3576087>

Neumann, I. B., & Heikka, H. (2005). Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 40(1), 5–23. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836705049731>

Noor, F. H. (n.d.). *Geo-strategic Worth And Location of Pakistan -CPEC* [Slide show; Ppt.]. Slide Share. <https://www.slideshare.net/FaHadHassanNooR/geo-stargetic-worth-of-pakistan-cpec-2017>

NTI. (2022a, October 17). *India Submarine Capabilities*. The Nuclear Threat Initiative. Retrieved July 6, 2023, from <https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/india-submarine-capabilities/>

NTI. (2022b, October 18). Pakistan Submarine Capabilities. *The Nuclear Threat Initiative*. <https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/pakistan-submarine->

capabilities/#:~:text=Pakistan%20operates%20two%20Hashmat%2Dclass, torpedoes%20and%20anti%2Dship%20missiles.

Office of the Press Secretary [The White House]. (2001, November 6). *President Bush: "No Nation Can Be Neutral in This Conflict"* [Press release]. <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011106-2.html>

Osmani, R. (2016, January 19). *TAPI gas pipeline: are Sino-U.S. relations a zero-sum game?* The Central Asia - Caucasus ANALYST. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13321-tapi-gas-pipeline-are-sino-us-relations-a-zero-sum-game?.html>

Overview of Pakistan's Economy. (n.d.). Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Beijing. Retrieved June 26, 2023, from <http://www.pakbj.org/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=29&id=33>

Overview South Asia. (2023, April 4). *The World Bank*. Retrieved June 19, 2023, from <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/overview>

Owens, M. T. (2016, October 7). *On Strategy and Strategic Planning: Repairing America's Strategic "Black Hole."* The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved November 7, 2022, from <https://www.heritage.org/military-strength-topical-essays/2017-essays/strategy-and-strategic-planning-repairing-americas>

Owens, M. T. (2020, June 8). *Colin Gray: The Strategist's Strategist*. Foreign Policy Research Institute.
<https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/06/colin-gray-the-strategists-strategist/>

Painuly, H. (2023, May 29). *The Synergy of Quantum AI: How Artificial Intelligence is Revolutionizing Quantum Computing*. INDIAai. Retrieved June 1, 2023, from <https://indiaai.gov.in/article/the-synergy-of-quantum-ai-how-artificial-intelligence-is-revolutionizing-quantum-computing>

Pakistan | Environmental Performance Index. (2022). Environmental Performance Index. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://epi.yale.edu/epi-results/2022/country/pak>

Pakistan - GHS Index. (2021, December 6). GHS Index.
<https://www.ghsindex.org/country/pakistan/>

Pakistan - NTI Nuclear Security Index. (2020, July 18). NTI Nuclear Security Index. Retrieved May 26, 2023, from <https://www.ntiindex.org/country/pakistan/>

Pakistan: A Land of Opportunities. (n.d.). *Finance Division|Government of Pakistan*, 6. Retrieved June 26, 2023, from https://www.finance.gov.pk/Pakistan_A_land_of_opportunities.pdf

Pakistan in the New Geopolitics of Asia. (2023, January 30). FES Asia Editorial. Retrieved July 26, 2023, from <https://asia.fes.de/news/pakistan-in-geopolitics>

Pakistan Indicators. (2023, June 11). Trading Economics. Retrieved June 11, 2023, from <https://tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/indicators>

Pakistan may be able to avoid a full-blown economic crisis. (2022, July 28). The Economist.

https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/07/28/pakistan-may-be-able-to-avoid-a-full-blown-economic-crisis?ppccampaignID=&ppcadID=&ppcgclid=&utm_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=18151738051&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gclid=CjwKCAjwvpCkBhB4EiwAujULMkc0MRaBNX65s2ANp4dLekV9UOAPb-GjabrxB3z-Vii7Qq6E-zburBoCsOUQAvD_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds

Pakistan Today. (2023, January 28). *Pakistan Navy Flotilla ships visit Oman, Iran during overseas deployment.*

<https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2023/01/28/pakistan-navy-flotilla-ships-visit-oman-iran-during-overseas-deployment/>

Pandit, R. (2013, March 26). *India readies hi-tech naval base to keep eye on China.* The Economic Times.

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-readies-hi-tech-naval-base-to-keep-eye-on-china/articleshow/19207495.cms?from=mdr>

Paracha, S. (2023, March 12). KSA extends "1.2b deferred oil payment facility till Feb 2024. *Profit by Pakistan Today*. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://profit.pakistantoday.com.pk/2023/03/12/ksa-extends-1-2b-deferred-oil-payment-facility-till-feb-2024/>

Parakkal, P. (2021, September 28). China's reluctant Taliban embrace. *East Asia Forum*. <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/09/25/chinas-reluctant-taliban-embrace/>

Parwani, S. (2021, July 12). The TAPI Pipeline in Post-U.S. Withdrawal Afghanistan. *South Asian Voices*. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://southasianvoices.org/the-tapi-pipeline-in-post-u-s-withdrawal-afghanistan/>

Patel, D. (2020). India's Sea-Based Deterrent Evaluating the Effectiveness of India's Submarine Nuclear Deterrent. In *On the Horizon: A Collection of the Papers from the Next Generation* (pp. 74–84). Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24234.10>

Payne, K. B. (2001). *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction* (1st ed.). University Press of Kentucky.

Peshimam, G. N. (2022, October 21). Pakistan taken off global watchdog's "grey" list for terrorism financing. *Reuters*. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-taken-off-global-watchdogs-grey-list-terrorism-financing-2022-10-21/>

Peshimam, G., & Shahzad, A. (2022, August 22). Pakistan approves agreement draft to provide troops for World Cup security in Qatar - minister. *Reuters*. <https://www.reuters.com/world/pakistan-approves-agreement-provide-troops-soccer-world-cup-security-qatar-2022-08-22/>

Purushothaman, U., & Unnikrishnan, N. (2019). A Tale of Many Roads India's Approach to Connectivity Projects in Eurasia on JSTOR. *India Quarterly*, 75(1), 69–86. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48505600?seq=10>

Qayum, K. (2020, June 30). Imran Khan Blames India for Pakistan Stock Exchange Attack. *Bloomberg.com*. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-30/imran-khan-blames-india-for-attack-on-pakistan-stock-exchange#xj4y7vzkg>

Qayyum, S. (2021). The Strategic Maritime Environment Of The Indian Ocean: An Analysis Of The Challenges And Prospects For Pakistan. *Polaris - Journal of Maritime Research*, 4(1).

<https://polaris.bahria.edu.pk/index.php/ojs/article/view/39/36>

Qazi, M. S. (2023, February 8). Maritime Modernization Threatens Deterrence in South Asia. *South Asian Voices*. Retrieved July 4, 2023, from <https://southasianvoices.org/maritime-modernization-threatens-deterrence-in-south-asia/>

Quinlan, M. (2005). Thinking About Nuclear Weapons. *The Royal United Services Institute Whitehall Paper*41, 1–47.

<https://fisherp.scripts.mit.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Thinking-about-Nuclear-Weapons-RUSI-W>

Rafiq, A. (2021a, April 5). Pakistan’s Plans to Pivot from Geopolitics to Geoeconomics Are Delusional. *Foreign Policy*.

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/05/pakistans-geoeconomic-delusions/>

Rafiq, A. (2021b, April 5). Pakistan’s Plans to Pivot from Geopolitics to Geoeconomics Are Delusional. *Foreign Policy*.

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/05/pakistans-geoeconomic-delusions/>

Rahi, D. (2011). *The Pakish Identity: Re-imagining Pakistan Through Intelligent Design* (1st ed.). Outskirts Press.

<https://books.google.com.tr/books?id=5YHTygAACAAJ>

Rajagopalan, R. (2021, November 10). India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence. *ORF*. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-and-counterforce-a-question-of-evidence-66126/>

Rajeev, N., & Stephenson, A. (2023, May 31). Why We Should All Worry About the China-India Border Dispute. *United States Institute of Peace*. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/05/why-we-should-all-worry-about-china-india-border-dispute>

Ramsay, S. (2018, February). *Indian Navy's Acquisition and Modernisation Plans*. SP'S Naval Forces. Retrieved May 8, 2023, from <https://www.spsnavalforces.com/story/?id=509&h=Indian-Navys-Acquisition-and-Modernisation-Plans>

Rana, A. (2019). Challenges to Strategic Stability in South Asia: An Analysis. *Strategic Studies*, 38(2), 1–20. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48539134>

Rankings -Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative. (2021). Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/rankings/>

Rehman, I. A. (2017, July 2). 40 YEARS OF ZIA: HOW ZIA REDEFINED PAKISTAN. *DAWN.COM*. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1342697>

Rehman, Z. U. (2022, August 11). One Year Later, Pakistan's Taliban Rule Hopes Put in Check. *Voice of America*.

<https://www.voanews.com/a/one-year-later-pakistan-s-taliban-rule-hopes-put-in-check-/6696183.html>

Rizvi, H. A. (1993). *Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment: A Study of Foreign Policy* (1st ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.

Rizvi, H. A. (2002). Pakistan's Strategic Culture. In M. R. Chambers (Ed.), *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances* (pp. 305–328). Strategic Studies Institute (US Army War College Press).
<https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=monographs>

Roy, O. (2002). “The Taliban: A Strategic Tool for Pakistan. In J. Christophe (Ed.), *Pakistan: Nationalism without a nation* (pp. 149–160). Manohar Publishers & Distributors New Delhi.

Saalman, L. (2020, December 2). *India's no-first-use dilemma: Strategic consistency or ambiguity towards China and Pakistan*. SIPRI. Retrieved May 28, 2023, from <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2020/indias-no-first-use-dilemma-strategic-consistency-or-ambiguity-towards-china-and-pakistan>

Saballa, J. (2022). Indian Army Has 93 Modernization Projects in Progress: Report. *The Defense Post*.
<https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/01/26/indian-army-modernization/>

Saeed, A. (2023). Artificial Intelligence and Modern Warfare: Comparative Analysis of India and Pakistan. *Modern Diplomacy*.
<https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/04/07/artificial-intelligence-and-modern-warfare-comparative-analysis-of-india-and-pakistan/>

Saikal, A. (2006). Securing Afghanistan's border. *Survival*, 48(1), 129–142. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330600594314>

Salik, N. (2009). *The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Perspective*. Oxford University Press.
https://books.google.com.tr/books/about/The_Genesis_of_South_Asian_Nuclear_Deter.html?id=NewOQgAACAAJ&source=kp_book_description&redir_esc=y

Salik, N. (2014). The Evolution of Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine. In F. H. Khan, R. Jacobs, & E. Burke (Eds.), *Nuclear Learning : The Next Decade in South Asia* (pp. 71–84). Center on Contemporary Conflict, Naval Post Graduate School.
https://nps.edu/documents/104111744/106151936/Nuclear+Learning+in+South+Asia_June2014.pdf

Salik, N. A. (2002). Pakistan's Missile Development: Priorities, Challenges, Myths and Reality. *Strategic Studies*, 22(1), 26–40.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/45242294?seq=14>

Salik, N. A. (2006). Regional Dynamics and Deterrence : South Asia. In I. R. Kenyon & J. Simpson (Eds.), *Deterrence and the New Global Security Environment* (pp. 169–191). Routledge Taylor and Francis Group.

Saravanan, M. (2022, June 20). India's Maritime Security Strategy in the 'Century of Seas.' *Modern Diplomacy*. Retrieved July 5, 2023, from <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/06/20/indias-maritime-security-strategy-in-the-century-of-seas/>

Satish, S. (2023, March 16). *Maritime History of India*. ClearIAS. Retrieved July 6, 2023, from <https://www.clearias.com/maritime-history-india/#maritime-history-the-early-days>

Sattar, A. (2009). The Pakistan-India War, 1965. In *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2009: A Concise History* (2nd ed., pp. 98–102). Oxford University Press.

Sattar, A. (2011). *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2009: A Concise History* (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.

Savoy, C. M., & Staguhn, J. (2022). Global Development in an Era of Great Power Competition. In *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. CSIS. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://www.csis.org/analysis/global-development-era-great-power-competition>

Sayle, T. A. (2011, January 15). *Defining and Teaching Grand Strategy*. Foreign Policy Research Institute. Retrieved November 7, 2022, from <https://www.fpri.org/article/2011/01/defining-and-teaching-grand-strategy/>

Shakoor, F. (1999). The Kargil Crisis: An Analysis. *Pakistan Horizon*, 52(3), 49–65. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41394429>

Shan, A., Waris, M., & Basit, A. (2016). Islamization in Pakistan: A Critical Analysis of Zias Regime. *Global Regional Review*, I(I), 260–270. [https://doi.org/10.31703/grr.2016\(i-i\).20](https://doi.org/10.31703/grr.2016(i-i).20)

Shankar, M., & Paul, T. V. (2016). Nuclear doctrines and stable strategic relationships: the case of south Asia on JSTOR. *International Affairs*

(*Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-*), 92(1), 1–20.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/24757832>

Sharif, W., & Ali, M. (2021). Analysis Of Strategic Cooperation, Investment, and Trade A Case Study of Pakistan-German Relations. *Pakistan Journal of International Affairs*, 4(2).

<https://doi.org/10.52337/pjia.v4i2.214>

Sharma, S. (2023, May 19). *How climate change will severely hurt India's economy by end of decade*. India Today. Retrieved June 24, 2023, from <https://www.indiatoday.in/diu/story/india-climate-change-economic-impact-2381534-2023-05-19>

Sheldon, J. (2018). Pakistan's PRSS-1 and PakTES-1A Successfully Launched By China. *SpaceWatch.Global*.

<https://spacewatch.global/2018/07/pakistans-prss-1-and-paktes-1a-successfully-launched-by-china/>

Shivshankar, Menon. (2016). *Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy*. Brookings Institution Press.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1hfr205>

Siddique, Q. (2011). Pakistan's Future Policy Towards Afghanistan: A Look at Strategic Depth, Militant Movements and the Role of India and the US. In *Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS* (DIIS REPORT 2011:08). Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS. Retrieved May 8, 2023, from

https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/104706/RP2011_08_Pakistans_future_policy_web.pdf

Singh, A., & Joshi, M. (2020). From Buyer to Builder: The Indian Navy's Rocky Road to Self-Reliance. *Observer Research Foundation*, 270. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/from-buyer-to-builder-the-indian-navys-rocky-road-to-self-reliance/>

Singh, S. (2016, November 11). Manohar Parrikar questions India's no-first-use nuclear policy, adds 'my thinking.' *The Indian Express*. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/manohar-parrikar-questions-no-first-use-nuclear-policy-adds-my-thinking-4369062/>

Singla, A. (2017). Make in India: A Major National Initiative to Build Best-in-Class Manufacturing Infrastructure : (A Conceptual Analysis). *International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology (IJERT)*, 5(3), 1–6. <https://www.ijert.org/research/make-in-india-a-major-national-initiative-to-build-best-in-class-manufacturing-infrastructure-a-conceptual-analysis-IJERTCONV5IS03014.pdf>

SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. (2022). SIPRI. Retrieved June 20, 2023, from <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>

Smith, C. T. (2017). *Century Of The Seas: Unlocking Indian Maritime Strategy In The 21st Century* [MA Thesis]. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL ,Monterey ,California.

Sneberg, C. (2015). *The purpose of American strategic culture: A study of American exceptionalism and its implications for U.S. grand strategy and America's global role* [MA thesis]. UNIVERSITY OF OSLO.

Snyder, J. L. (1977). *Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations* (R-2154-AF). The RAND Corporation.
<https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R2154>.

Social Progress Index. (2022). In *Social Progree Imperative*. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://www.socialprogress.org/global-index-2022-results/>

Solis Mullen, J. M. (2022). *Waking Up to History: Articles and Essays on the State of the World and U.S. Grand Strategy*. Independently published.

South Asia Economic Focus, Fall 2021| Shifting Gears: Digitilization and Services-Led Development. (2021). In *The World Bank*. World Bank Group. Retrieved June 26, 2023, from <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/publication/shifting-gears-south-asia-economic-focus-fall-2021>

South Asia Economic Focus, Spring 2023 | Expanding Opportunities: Toward Inclusive Growth. (n.d.). World Bank.
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/publication/south-asia-economic-focus-spring2023>

South Asia Economic Focus, Spring 2023 | Expanding Opportunities: Toward Inclusive Growth. (2023). In *The World Bank*. The World Bank Group. Retrieved June 26, 2023, from <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/publication/south-asia-economic-focus-spring2023>

Sripurkar, S. (2023, July 6). *Sailing Through Centuries: A Journey into the History of Indian Shipbuilding*. Enroute Indian History. Retrieved July 6,

2023, from <https://enrouteindianhistory.com/sailing-through-centuries-a-journey-into-the-history-of-indian-shipbuilding/>

Stewart, P., & Ali, I. (2018, September 1). Exclusive: Pentagon cancels aid to Pakistan over record on militants. *Reuters*. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pakistan-military-exclusive-idUSKCN1LH3TA>

Sultan, A. (2019, April 5). *Pulwama-Balakot Crisis: The Evolving Strategic Discourse in South Asia*. Pakistan Politico. Retrieved May 28, 2023, from <https://pakistanpolitico.com/pulwama-balakot-crisis-the-evolving-strategic-discourse-in-south-asia/>

Sustainable Development Rankings. (2023). Sustainable Development Report. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://dashboards.sdgindex.org/rankings>

Symeonidis, D. (2022). Obstacles to energy security in Central and South Asia. *East Asia Forum*.
<https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/03/19/obstacles-to-energy-security-in-central-and-south-asia/>

Tanham, G. (1992). Indian strategic culture. *The Washington Quarterly*, 15(1), 129–142. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01636609209550082>

Tasleem, S. (2016). Pakistan's Nuclear Use Doctrine. *Regional Insight*, Carnegie: Endowment for International Peace.
<https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-nuclear-use-doctrine-pub-63913>

Tauseef, M. (2013, April 15). *Quaid's Vision of Foreign Policy*. Riphah Information Portal. <https://portal.riphah.edu.pk/newspaper/quaid-vision-of-foreign-policy/>

Taverney, T. D. (2022, August 10). *The Evolution of Space-Based ISR*. Air And Space Forces Magazine. Retrieved June 2, 2023, from <https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/the-evolution-of-space-based-isr/>

Tellis, A. J. (2022, July 18). *Nuclear Transitions and Strategic Stability in Southern Asia - Striking Asymmetries: Nuclear Transitions in Southern Asia*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved May 8, 2023, from <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/07/18/nuclear-transitions-and-strategic-stability-in-southern-asia-pub-87399>

Tellis, A. J., & Wills, M. (2004). *Strategic Asia 2004-05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power* (Vol. 4). The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), Seattle, Washington. <https://www.amazon.com/Strategic-Asia-2004-05-Confronting-Terrorism/dp/0971393850>

The Climate Change Performance Index 2023: Results. (2023). Germanwatch e.V. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://www.germanwatch.org/en/87632>

The Economic Times. (2019, March 8). India signs pact with Russia on Chakra-3 attack submarine. *The Economic Times*. Retrieved July 6, 2023, from <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-signs-pact-with-russia-on-chakra-3-attack-submarine/articleshow/68307218.cms>

The Economic Times (Ed.). (2020, October 4). India successfully test-fires new version of nuclear-capable Shaurya Missile. *The Economic Times*. Retrieved May 28, 2023, from <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-successfully-test-fires-new-version-of-nuclear-capable-shaurya-missile/articleshow/78460487.cms?from=mdr>

The Economist. (2022, July 28). *Pakistan may be able to avoid a full-blown economic crisis*. Retrieved June 19, 2023, from https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/07/28/pakistan-may-be-able-to-avoid-a-full-blown-economic-crisis?ppccampaignID=&ppcadID=&ppcgclid=&utm_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=18151738051&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gclid=CjwKCAjwvpCkBhB4EiwAujULMkc0MRaBNX65s2ANp4dLekV9UOAPb-GjabrxB3z-Vii7Qq6E-zburBoCsOUQAvD_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds

The Express Tribune. (2020, November 14). Pakistan presents “irrefutable evidence” of India’s sponsorship of terror to sabotage CPEC. *The Express Tribune*. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2272201/pakistan-presents-irrefutable-evidence-of-indias-sponsorship-of-terror-to-sabotage-cpec>

The History of Economic Development in India since Independence - Association for Asian Studies. (2020, May 12). Association for Asian Studies. <https://www.asianstudies.org/publications/ea/archives/the-history-of-economic-development-in-india-since-independence/>

The International Institute of Strategic Studies [IISS]. (2021). *The Military Balance 2021*. Routledge Taylor and Francis Group. Retrieved May 8, 2023, from <https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2021>

The National Bureau of Asian Research. (2022, May 21). *Nontraditional Regional Security Architecture for South Asia*. The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). Retrieved July 4, 2023, from <https://www.nbr.org/program/nontraditional-regional-security-architecture-for-south-asia/>

The New York Times (Ed.). (2022, August 15). Reflections on U.S. Withdrawal From Afghanistan. *The New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/12/us/politics/us-withdrawal-afghanistan.html>

The Vaccine Confidence Project. (2023a, March 23). *About the Vaccine Confidence Project – The Vaccine Confidence Project*. <https://www.vaccineconfidence.org/who-we-are/about/>

The Vaccine Confidence Project. (2023b, April 20). *Vaccine confidence in Pakistan – The Vaccine Confidence Project*. <https://www.vaccineconfidence.org/vci/country/pk/>

The Vaccine Confidence Project. (2023c, May 26). *Vaccine confidence in India – The Vaccine Confidence Project*. <https://www.vaccineconfidence.org/vci/country/in/>

The Washington Post (Ed.). (2001, September 17). Text: U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. *The Washington Post*.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/powelltext_091701.html

Times, D. (2016). Pakistan Navy ship visits Russia's Novorossiysk Port. *Daily Times*. <https://dailytimes.com.pk/41304/pakistan-navy-ship-visits-russias-novorossiysk-port/>

Toprak, B. (2022, September 12). *India Tightens Sanctions against Chinese Technology Companies*. Politics Today. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://politicstoday.org/india-tightens-sanctions-against-chinese-technology-companies/>

Topychkanov, P. (2011). Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Security in South Asia. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Working Paper 3*, 1–26. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/WP_3_2011-eng_Topychkanov.pdf

Tourangbam, M., & Sharma, V. (2023, January 26). Where Does South Asia Fit Now in US Security and Defense Strategies? *The Diplomat*. Retrieved July 6, 2023, from <https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/where-does-south-asia-fit-now-in-us-security-and-defense-strategies/>

Tracxn. (2023, March 24). Artificial Intelligence Startups in Pakistan. *Explore | Tracxn*. <https://tracxn.com/explore/Artificial-Intelligence-Startups-in-Pakistan>

Tribune. (2019, September 5). Pak-India trade realities. *The Express Tribune*. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2049299/pak-india-trade-realities>

Two Nation Theory. (2021, June 18). Banglapedia. https://en.banglapedia.org/index.php/Two-Nation_Theory

Ullah, S. (2020). Strategic Calculations Behind Pakistan's Pursuit of Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrence. *South Asian Voices*.

<https://southasianvoices.org/strategic-calculations-behind-pakistans-pursuit-of-sea-based-nuclear-deterrence/>

United Nations. (2021). *Gender Inequality Index*. Human Development Reports. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/thematic-composite-indices/gender-inequality-index#/indicies/GII>

United States Department of State. (2020). *2020 Investment Climate Statements: Pakistan*. Retrieved June 24, 2023, from <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-investment-climate-statements/pakistan/>

United States Institute of Peace. (2022, May). *Enhancing Strategic Stability in Southern Asia: USIP Senior Study Group Final Report*. Retrieved May 30, 2023, from <https://www.usip.org/southern-asia-strategic-stability-report>

V., A. (2020). Revisiting the Discourse on Strategic Culture: An Assessment of the Conceptual Debates. *Strategic Analysis*, 44(3), 193–207. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2020.1787684>

Vishnoi, A. (2023, March 6). India's deep tech scientific missions all set for quantum jump. *The Economic Times*. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/indias-deep-tech-scientific-missions-all-set-for-quantum-jump/articleshow/98460315.cms?from=mdr>

Voice of Sindh. (2020). Pakistan, Japanese navies conduct joint exercise. *Voice of Sindh*. <https://www.voiceofsindh.com.pk/pakistan-japanese-navies-conduct-joint-exercise/>

Waheed, A. W. (2022, November 21). Pakistan's troubled ties with the Taliban. *East Asia Forum*.
<https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/11/22/pakistans-troubled-ties-with-the-taliban/>

Waldron, A. (1996). Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. *The China Quarterly*, 147, 962–964.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000051870>

Warraich, F., [Dekho,Suno,Jano] (Director). (2018a, November 3). *History of Pakistan #32 | The Making of PTI & Benazir's Secret Mission* [Video]. Youtube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fieNqo8iK4o>

Warraich, F., [Dekho,Suno,Jano] (Director). (2019, October 12). *History Of Pakistan | What Happened in 1965 | Complete Documentary Film* [Video]. Youtube.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bePe0VPP288&t=12s>

Warraich, F., [Dekho,Suno,Jano] (Director). (2018b, December 19). *History of Pakistan #37| How did Pakistan become Atomic Power?* [Video]. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A56_Ep2mfLA

Watkins, A. (2022, August 17). One Year Later: Taliban Reprise Repressive Rule, but Struggle to Build a State. *United States Institute of Peace*. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/08/one-year-later-taliban-reprise-repressive-rule-struggle-build-state>

Wilder, B. (2019, March 11). Pakistan Maneuvers Put India on Alert - Los Angeles Times. *Los Angeles Times*. <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-11-19-mn-205-story.html>

Williams, M. (2011, November 4). Pakistan “backtracked” on granting MFN status to India. *Reuters*. Retrieved June 24, 2023, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-60319020111104>

Williams, R. (1998). The Analysis of Culture. In J. Storey, *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader* (2nd ed., pp. 48–57). University of Georgia Press, Athens,.
<https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/88660/original/Williams+-+The+Analysis+of+Culture.pdf>

WJP Rule of Law Index. (2022a). Global Insights. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global/2022/Pakistan/>

WJP Rule of Law Index. (2022b). Global Insights. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/global/2022/India/>

Women, Peace and Security Index. (2022). In *Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security*. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from <https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/WPS-Index-2021.pdf>

World Bank. (n.d.-a). *GDP- India*. World Bank Open Data. Retrieved May 8, 2023, from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=IN>

World Bank. (n.d.-b). *GDP- Pakistan*. World Bank Open Data. Retrieved May 8, 2023, from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=PK>

World Bank Group. (2018, March 14). *India's Growth Story Since the 1990s Remarkably Stable and Resilient* [Press release]. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/03/14/india-growth-story-since-1990s-remarkably-stable-resilient>

World Bank Group. (2022a, April 15). South Asia Sees Slower Growth as War in Ukraine Impedes Recovery, Worsens Existing Challenges. *World Bank*. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/04/12/south-asia-sees-slower-growth-as-war-in-ukraine-impedes-recovery-worsens-existing-challenges>

World Bank Group. (2022b, November 10). Pakistan Urgently Needs Significant Investments in Climate Resilience to Secure its Economy and Reduce Poverty. *World Bank*. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/11/10/pakistan-urgently-needs-significant-investments-in-climate-resilience-to-secure-its-economy-and-reduce-poverty>

World Bank Group. (2023, May 4). *The Silent, Deep Human Capital Crisis Facing Pakistan: The Country Needs to Substantially Increase its Investments in Human Development* [Press release]. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/05/02/the-silent-deep-human-capital-crisis-facing-pakistan-the-country-needs-to-substantially-increase-its-investments-in-huma>

World Energy Trilemma Index. (2022). In *World Energy Council*. World Energy Council. Retrieved July 29, 2023, from <https://www.worldenergy.org/publications/entry/world-energy-trilemma-index-2022>

World Nuclear Association. (2022, March). *Security of Nuclear Facilities and Material*. Retrieved May 29, 2023, from <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/security/security-of-nuclear-facilities-and-material.aspx>

Wright, C. R. (1994). Security in the Asia-Pacific Region. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 1(2), 331–344.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/24593639>

Xie, Z. L., & Zhu, X. (2022, November 4). South Asia's policy balancing act: Managing economic growth amid global shocks. *End Poverty in South Asia*. Retrieved June 19, 2023, from <https://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/south-asias-policy-balancing-act-managing-economic-growth-amid-global-shocks>

Xijin, H. (2020, August 1). *Indians can hardly afford an economic conflict with China*. The Global Times. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1196334.shtml>

Yaseen, Z., & Naveed, R. (2018). Pakistan's Countering Terrorism Efforts: An Analysis. *Orient Research Journal of Social Sciences*, 3(1), 34–46.
<https://gcwus.edu.pk/wp-content/uploads/3.-Pakistan%E2%80%99s-Countering-Terrorism-Efforts-An-Analysis.pdf>

Yasin, S. A., & Qasim, M. (2020). China Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Significance of GilgitBaltistan Constitutional Status. *PUTAJ – Humanities and Social Sciences*, 27(2), 79–93.

Yeşiltas, M., & Khalil, S. (2022). İKİNCİ TALİBAN DÖNEMİNDE AFGANİSTAN’DA TERÖRİZM: DEAŞ HORASAN. In *Yüz Yıllık Kriz Afganistan* (1st ed.). SETA Kitapları.

<https://setav.org/assets/uploads/2022/10/K90.pdf>

Yhome, K. (2019, March 2). India-Pakistan tension: Is there a role for SAARC? *ORF*. <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-pakistan-tension-is-there-role-for-saarc-48690/>

Younus, U. (2023, March 10). With Pakistan’s economy in freefall, Chinese economic and military influence is likely to grow in the country. *Atlantic Council*. Retrieved June 25, 2023, from <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/southasiasource/with-pakistans-economy-in-freefall-chinese-economic-and-military-influence-is-likely-to-grow-in-the-country/>

Yusuf, M. W. (2019, February). *The Pulwama Crisis: Flirting With War in a Nuclear Environment*. Arms Control Association. Retrieved May 30, 2023, from <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-05/features/pulwama-crisis-flirting-war-nuclear-environment>

Zaidi, S. A., Aslam, S., & Ghaffar, F. (2017). Misperceptions About India-Pakistan Trade: Beyond Politics. In *PEACEWORKS*. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved June 24, 2023, from <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-06/pw128-misperceptions-about-india-pakistan-trade.pdf>

Zaidi, Z. A. (1992). A REGIONAL APPROACH TO SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA. *Strategic Studies*, 14(4), 29–42.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/45182067>

ZAWYA. (2022, January 5). Pakistan navy ships on goodwill visit to Oman. ZAWYA. <https://www.zawya.com/en/economy/pakistan-navy-ships-on-goodwill-visit-to-oman-vh81uunb>

Zhang, G. (2003). US Security Policy towards South Asia after September 11 and its Implications for China: A Chinese Perspective. *Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA*, XXVII(2), 89.

https://iaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_apr03/sa_apr03guz01.html

Zhuo, C. (Ed.). (2022, July 10). *China, Pakistan kick off joint naval exercise “Sea Guardians - 2” in Shanghai*. Retrieved April 15, 2023, from http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/4915287.html

APPENDIX

Author's Profile

Education	
2020 – 2022	Master of Arts International Relations Social Sciences University of Ankara- Turkey
2014 – 2018	Bachelor of Science International Relations National Defence University, Islamabad- Pakistan
Publications	
1. Khalil, S. (2019, May 3). Balochistan and Global High Politics. <i>Daily Times</i>. Retrieved August 2, 2023, from https://dailytimes.com.pk/387271/balochistan-and-global-high-politics/ 2. Khalil, S. (2021a, November 29). <i>TAP Spotlight - Worldwide Terror-related Events - August 2021</i>. Terörizm Analiz Platformu (TAP). Retrieved August 2, 2023, from https://tap-data.com/article/tap-spotlight-worldwide-terror-related-events-august-2021 3. Khalil, S. (2021b, November 29). <i>TAP Spotlight - Worldwide Terror-related Events - September 2021</i>. Terörizm Analiz Platformu (TAP). Retrieved August 2, 2023, from https://tap-data.com/article/tap-spotlight-worldwide-terror-related-events-september-2021 4. Khalil, S. (2021c, December 17). <i>TAP Spotlight - Worldwide Terror-related Events - October 2021</i>. Terörizm Analiz Platformu (TAP). Retrieved August 2, 2023, from https://tap-data.com/article/tap-spotlight-worldwide-terror-related-events-october-2021 5. Khalil, S. (2023). A Display of Türkiye's Political Landscape. <i>The Friday Times - Naya Daur</i>. https://www.thefridaytimes.com/2023/05/17/a-display-of-turkiyes-political-landscape/	

Book Chapter

1. Yeşiltas, M., & Khalil, S. (2022). İkinci Taliban Döneminde Afganistan'da Terörizm: Deaş Horasan. In *Yüz Yıllık Kriz Afganistan* (1st ed.). SETA Kitapları.
<https://setav.org/assets/uploads/2022/10/K90.pdf>
2. Yeşiltas, M., & Khalil, S. (2022). Islamic States Khorasan (IS-K) : Trajectory and Broad Range Impacts. In *The Second Taliban Era in Afghanistan : Identifying Risks and Opportunities* (1st ed., pp. 207–224). Orion KİTABEVİ. <https://www.bkmkitap.com/the-second-taliban-era-in-afghanistan-identifying-risks-and-opportunities>