

**ATILIM UNIVERSITY**  
**GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
**DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MASTER'S PROGRAMME**

**A CRITICAL REALIST EXPLANATION OF THE TRAJECTORY OF MAIN  
DEBATES IN THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
THEORIES**

**Master's Thesis**

**Ođulcan KÖKSAL**

**Ankara-2023**



**ATILIM UNIVERSITY**  
**GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
**DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MASTER'S PROGRAMME**

**A CRITICAL REALIST EXPLANATION OF THE  
TRAJECTORY OF MAIN DEBATES IN THE HISTORY OF  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES**

**Master's Thesis**

**Ođulcan Kksal**

**Thesis Advisor**

**Prof. Dr. Faruk YALVAÇ**

**Ankara-2023**

## ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

This is to certify that this thesis titled “A Critical Realist Explanation of the Trajectory of the Main Debates in the History of International Relations Theories” and prepared by Oğulcan Köksal meets with the committee’s approval unanimously as Master’s Thesis in the field of International Relations following the successful defense conducted on 25/05/2023.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Klevis KOLASI (Chair)

Prof. Dr. Faruk YALVAÇ (Advisor)

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Duygu DERSAN ORHAN (Member)

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şule TUZLUKAYA

Director

## ETHICAL STATEMENT

I accept and acknowledge that I have prepared this thesis study, prepared in line with the Thesis Writing Guidelines of Atılım University Graduate School of Social Sciences;

- within the framework of academic and ethical rules;
- presented the information, documents, evaluations, and results in a way that meets the rules of scientific ethics and morality,
- I have referenced each work from which I have benefited while preparing my thesis, and that
- I hereby present a unique study.

I hereby also understand that I shall accept any loss of rights against my behalf in cases otherwise.

Date and Signature

---

Name SURNAME

## ÖZ

KÖKSAL, Oğulcan. Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri Tarihindeki Temel Tartışmaların Yörüngesinin Eleştirel Realist Bir Açıklaması, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2023.

Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplinine, özellikle (neo-)Realizm ve (neo-)Liberalizm gibi pozitivist varsayımlar tarafından desteklenen belirli teoriler ve bu teoriler arasındaki tartışmalar hâkim olmuştur ve diğer teoriler ya bu ana akım teorilere karşı çıkmak ya da pozitivist bilim anlayışına uyumlu olmak durumunda kalmıştır. Ancak, 1980’lerde Uİ disiplininde pozitivism/post-pozitivism olarak adlandırılan yeni bir dönem başlamıştır. Buna rağmen, bütün temel tartışmalar disipline önemli etkilerde bulunmuş olsalar da hiçbiri ontolojiyi ve bilim felsefesini tartışmalarının merkezine almamıştır. Post-pozitivistlerden gelen yanıt bile pozitivist bir bilim, yapı ve nedensellik anlayışı sebebiyle yanlış yorumlanmıştır. Kısaca, disiplinindeki temel tartışmaların ontolojiye odaklanmamaları konusunda bir devamlılık mevcuttur. Bu tez, ilk kez Roy Bhaskar (1977) tarafından ortaya konan ve Uİ disiplininde Faruk Yalvaç, Colin Wight, Jonathan Joseph gibi kuramcılar tarafından geliştirilen bir meta-teori olarak işleyen eleştirel gerçekçiliği kullanarak, disiplinindeki belirli teoriler ve bilim felsefelerinin, temelde de pozitivism/post-pozitivism tartışmasının nasıl tarihsel olarak şekillendiğini ve disiplinindeki temel tartışmalar ve teori anlayışını nasıl bir çıkmaza soktuğunu, disiplinin tarihinde özellikle ontolojik bir devamlılık olduğunu vurgulayarak geliştirmek amacını gütmektedir. Dolayısıyla bu tez, Uluslararası İlişkiler içerisindeki temel tartışmaların ortaya çıkma ve gelişmelerinin tarihselleştirilmesinin ve doğallıktan çıkarılmasının gerekli olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Uİ teorileri arasındaki temel tartışmaların eleştirel gerçekçi bir açıklaması, disiplinindeki ontolojik tartışmanın eksikliğini sebeplerinin ortaya çıkarılmasını, neden ontolojiyi merkeze aldığını iddia eden dördüncü tartışmanın bile sadece epistemoloji ve metodolojiye odaklandığının anlaşılmasını ve böylece toplumsal gerçekliğin bir katmanı olarak uluslararasılığın dinamiklerinin daha iyi anlaşılmasını sağlayacaktır.

**Anahtar Sözcükler:** Eleştirel Gerçekçilik, Bilim Felsefesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri, Pozitivism, Post-pozitivism.

## ABSTRACT

KÖKSAL, Oğulcan. A Critical Realist Explanation of the Trajectory of Main Debates in The History of International Relations Theories, Master' Thesis, Ankara, 2023.

It is widely accepted that the history of the discipline of IR has been dominated by certain theories and debates, especially by (neo-)Realism and (neo-)Liberalism both underpinned by positivist assumptions, and that all other theories have to challenge these mainstream IR theories or need to be conform with positivist understanding of science. Yet, around 1980s a new era of philosophical debate in the discipline of IR which is called positivism/post-positivism debate started. But, although all of the main debates have had important implications for the discipline of IR, none of them has put the ontology and philosophy of science in their center of inquiry. Even the post-positivist response has been misled by positivist understanding of science, reality and causation. In short, there is a continuity in that main debates in the discipline do not focus on ontology. This thesis aims to show that using the critical realism introduced by Roy Bhaskar (1977) as a meta-theory for science and developed in IR by scholars such as Faruk Yalvaç, Colin Wight, Jonathan Joseph and Milja Kurki, it is intelligible to explain how the main debates between certain theories or philosophies of social science, especially the debate between positivism and post-positivism have been shaped historically and puts the debates and theories in the discipline into a dead end by emphasizing and demonstrating the ontological continuity in the discipline. Thereby, the study claims that the emergence and development of the main debates in IR need to be historicized and denaturalized. A critical realist explanation of the main debates between IR theories will enable to reveal causes of the lack of ontological debates in the history of IR, to understand why the debates, even the fourth debate which claims to center to ontology focus only on epistemology and methodology and, thus, to grasp the dynamics of the internationality as a *strata* of social reality.

**Keywords:** Critical Realism, Philosophy of Science, International Relations Theories, Positivism, Post-positivism.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç for the time he devoted to me and his endless efforts to improve me. It would have been impossible for me to write this thesis and stay motivated without his valuable works, suggestions and constructive criticisms. Benefiting from wisdom and knowledge is of immeasurable importance and pleasure to me.

I would also like to thank Assoc. Prof. Klevis Kolasi for his significant role on my academic and intellectual development. His concerns and efforts have always kept me excited and eager both for this thesis and for reading, writing and questioning more about International Relations.

I would like to thank Assoc. Prof. Duygu Dershan Orhan for the courses on my graduate period and for being on my thesis committee and her helpful feedback and suggestions.

A special thanks belong to my family and my beloved for their endless patience and support during this period. Without the opportunity and support they provided me, such a delighted and enlightening thesis process would not have been possible.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>ÖZ</b> .....	<b>i</b>
<b>ABSTRACT</b> .....	<b>ii</b>
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</b> .....	<b>iii</b>
<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS</b> .....	<b>iv</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1: CRITICAL REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>1.1. Main Arguments of Critical Realism</b> .....	<b>9</b>
1.1.1. Ontological realism .....	9
1.1.2. Stratification and emergence .....	11
1.1.3. Reconceptualizing causation .....	12
<b>1.2. Structure-Agent Debate in Social Science</b> .....	<b>13</b>
<b>1.3. Critical Realism and International Relations</b> .....	<b>17</b>
1.3.1. Why do we need philosophy for International Relations?.....	18
1.3.2. Irreducibility and reality of international as an emergent stratum.....	20
<b>CHAPTER 2: THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISCIPLINE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE</b> .....	<b>23</b>
<b>2.1. Rise of The International Relations as A Discipline of Social Science</b> ...24	
2.1.1. Influence of the First World War on the Origins of the Discipline.....	25
2.1.2. Positivism and Its Influence on the Rise of the Discipline .....	26
2.1.2.1. Separation of IR from other disciplines based on positivist understanding of disciplinarity .....	28
2.1.2.2. A-historicized theorizations in the discipline .....	30
<b>2.2. Hegemonic Origins of the Discipline</b> .....	<b>32</b>
<b>CHAPTER 3: MAIN DEBATES IN THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS</b> .....	<b>37</b>

3.1. Rethinking the Theories of International Relations .....	37
3.2. On Great Debates in the Discipline of IR .....	39
3.3. The First Debate: Idealism vs Realism or Idealism vs Idealism? .....	41
3.4. The Positivist Basis of the Second Debate .....	44
3.5. Inter-paradigm Debate and Commitment to Positivism Continued.....	46
3.6. Towards the Fourth Debate in the Light of the First Three Debates .....	48
<b>CHAPTER 4: POSITIVISM AND POST-POSITIVISM DEBATE .....</b>	<b>50</b>
4.1. Origins of the Debate Between Positivism and Post-Positivism .....	51
4.2. What is the Debate Between Positivism and Post-Positivism About? ....	53
4.3. Critical Realist Critique of Positivism and Post-Positivism Debate.....	54
4.3.1. Legacy of positivism and disadvantages of the fourth debate .....	55
4.3.1.1. Positivism .....	56
4.3.1.2. Post-positivism and its philosophical similarities with positivism .....	57
4.3.1.3. From IR as a science to IR as a mere discourse .....	59
4.3.2. Beyond positivism/post-positivism debate .....,.....	61
<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY .....</b>	<b>69</b>
<b>TURNITIN REPORT .....</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>CURRICULUM VITAE .....</b>	<b>85</b>

## INTRODUCTION

There is not much doubt that International Relations as a discipline has rather short but at the same time varied and contending history in social sciences in terms of theories and debates. Ever since the disciplines has established as a US dominated social science the history of the discipline has faced and been dominated by different theories -such as (neo-)Realism, (neo-)Liberalism, Constructivism- and by famous debates between competing theories (like Realism-Liberalism debate) or between different understanding of science for the discipline (like Rationalism vs. Reflectivism or positivism vs. post-positivism). Although they are apparently distinct from each other and divide the discipline into chronologically different era of debates, the emergence of (the language of) debates are neither linear and deterministic way of development in the discipline nor the arbitrary choices of IR scholars but are the results of historically and socially, and still scientific, constructed interactions between social structure and actors acting in such structures. But the positivist understanding of science, first formulated by David Hume through his empiricist understanding of causation and then by Immanuel Kant through his distinction between phenomenal and noumenal world, has dominated social science and the discipline of IR (Kurki, 2007, pp.191-193; Patomaki & Wight, 2000, pp. 219-221; Yalvaç 2010b p. 6) so deeply that the main debates in the history of discipline has remained and focused only on epistemological and methodological level. Even the post-positivism which is considered as the most radical approach about positivist understanding of science, shifting its criticism towards more philosophical level, has misled by positivism since its understanding of causation, science and explanation was still influenced by positivism, which led post-positivists reject doing science at all without thinking about any alternative other than positivism to do social science or without re-conceptualizing the terms causation and science itself (Patomaki & Wight, 2000).

International Relations theories, just as every social theory, implicitly or explicitly, have to deal the ontological questions and agent-structure debate. In that, they inevitable have an ontological assumption about their objects and an argument on how they position agents and structures in it. Thereby, by using critical realism as a meta-theory which offers a realist, but not positivist nor post-positivist understanding

of science and which shifts the focus to its stratified ontology, the study argues that if we are to explain how the discipline of IR has developed towards the debate between positivism and post positivism and whether such debate has advantages for the discipline or not, we need to historicize and analyze the theories and the discipline itself. Therefore, the thesis will introduce critical realism as a philosophy of social science and its relations to International Relations theories in order to explain why there are many different theories but not many *philosophies of science* underlying these theories. As seen, the main argument of the thesis is that there is continuity between the great debates of IR from the very beginning of the discipline to this day. And only a meta-theory like critical realism can explain the unseen relations between the debates in IR.

It is true that every great debate in IR has contributed the discipline in a way. But the dominance of positivism has hindered the ontological questions about the discipline itself and created a couple of dualisms such as domestic/international, hierarchy/anarchy, micro/macro and so on. The dominance of positivism is being criticized by post-positivist approaches in what it is called the fourth debate in IR. But even in this debate it can be seen that positivism is still influencing the discipline and its trajectory in terms of the object of study and scientificity of IR. Although this debate is considered about the ontology of IR and different philosophies of sciences, namely positivism and post-positivism, both approaches still start their questioning from epistemology towards ontology, thus lead the discipline of IR into a dead end in terms of theories and development of the discipline. Therefore, the main aim of the thesis is that positivism/post-positivism debate does not represent an ontological break from previous. Moreover, it creates an obstruction for the development of discipline in terms of theories and new debates. Critical realism plays a key role in revealing why this debate poses a problem for the discipline, though it has some advantages brought by post-positivism.

The main arguments of critical realism and why it is important for IR will be the topic of the first chapter. The following chapters will try to demonstrate the rise of the discipline with certain philosophical stance (positivism) and its development through the so-called unique debates that define and isolate the discipline from other social sciences. In the last chapter it will be argued that instead of categorizing the

discipline of IR by the debates and theories as they are seen it is needed to analyze and classify the discipline by their ontological assumptions (how they define the “international” itself) and the epistemological assumptions derived from their ontology, not by doing the opposite as both positivism and post-positivism do.

According to critical realism first formulated by the works of Roy Bhaskar (Bhaskar, 1979), just as our knowledge about the world itself is a social process in which both structures and agents take place and interact each other, the theories are also social processes and the products of such processes. Hence, our theories about social world -especially about international in this case- and the debates in which these theories conflict are deeply related to how the social world is stratified ontologically and to how actors surrounded by social structures are (re-)act in it. So, rather than neglecting the philosophical questions, especially the ontological ones, and accepting the dominance understanding of science the study puts philosophy of science into the heart of the development of the discipline itself.

In the lights with the arguments of critical realism the study questions that why certain theories and debates in the history of IR Theory have dominated the discipline in certain decades, thus establishes a link between the rise of the discipline as a social science underpinned by US policy concerns and its impacts on the trajectory of the theories in the discipline. Thereby, the thesis argues that although the language of debates has important implications for the discipline of IR, the main debates also create dichotomies such as causal/non causal or explain/understand, thus reproduce Humean/Kantian way of positivist science (even visible in post-positivism) and what Bhaskar calls as epistemic fallacy (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 6) which can be defined as the reduction ontology (the realm of objects) to epistemology (the realm of knowledge of objects). Using critical realism first formulated by Roy Bhaskar with his book titled *A Realist Theory of Science* (1979) as a meta-theory for realist science and using its stratified ontology, concept of emergence and underlying structures this thesis tries to show that as the theories, in that case ones for IR, have been shaped both historically and socially the trajectory of main debates in the history of IR theories can be (and should be) explained without neither fall into positivistic way of chrono-fetishism and determinism nor post-positivistic reflectivism. By doing so the thesis argues that the history of the main debates has also been the results of the interactions between

causally real powers independent from human mind. Thus the thesis claims that the main debates between theories and philosophies in the discipline developed with relations to certain dominant understanding of philosophies of science, especially of positivism, and critical realism as a meta-theory shifting the focus of social inquiry from epistemology to ontology (Joseph, 1998, pp. 76-77) can offer a depth and irreducible explanation of the trajectory of main debates in the discipline and of why even the third debate between positivism/post-positivism has not gone beyond the epistemology.

The thesis will progress through three main chapters. The first chapter will briefly explain the main arguments of critical realism as a meta-theory for social science and how it shifts the focus from epistemology to ontology (Yalvaç, 2010a, p.3), thus go beyond the positivism/post-positivism dichotomy by offering an irreducible understanding of doing (social) science (Yalvaç, 2010a, p.3; Yalvaç 2017b). Briefly, Critical Realism is not a theory of science but is a way of thinking about social science (Wight & Joseph, 2010, p. 3). Its main concern is to shift focus towards ontology in order to reveal -hidden or apparent- ontological assumptions of theories and, thus, to provide an irreducible understanding of social science by going beyond both positivism and post-positivism. Hence, the chapter continues with critical realism's criticism directed to both positivism and post-positivism, arguing that the debate between these two philosophies of science has not moved IR forward since both share ontological anti-realism and anthropocentric approach to social science with still positivist understanding of science and causation (Patomaki & Wight, 2000; Kurki, 2006). The chapter also shows that the terms causation, science and reality are derived from positivist understanding of them and even the radical criticism towards positivism by post-positivists accept such definition of the terms and thus reproduce the traditional understanding rather than thinking of alternatives. By re-conceptualizing the terms causation, science and reality critical realism goes beyond positivist understanding of terms and does not reject the terms at all as most post-positivists do. Therefore, a critical realist explanation of such terms will open space for more conclusive explanation of the trajectory of the main debates in the discipline.

The second chapter questions the rise of the discipline of International Relations and argues that the discipline was developed and shaped by US

understanding of world politics, which shape and determines the subject of study and the trajectory of theories in the discipline (Smith, 1987, p. 189). The chapter also challenges the traditional understanding of the rise of the International Relations as a discipline, mostly with the reference to Westphalian narrative, and its chronologic positioning certain theories and debates into the center of the discipline. By doing that the thesis argues that although the history of debates between specific theories that questioned some assumptions of other theories has developed and flourished the discipline of IR, they synchronously have limited the focus of the discipline on how to make science and thus what should be considered as a legitimate theory in the discipline. The dominance of Liberalism and Realism -and the famous debate between them- in the discipline has shaped the way the international relations was studied and led scholars to overcome such theories only by challenging their normative understanding of IR. The chapter also argues that despite their apparent differentiation in the history of IR Theory, both (neo-)Liberalism and (neo-)Realism share similar ontologies about the world and their disagreements are methodological and epistemological in nature.

It can be said that the third debate between positivism and post-positivism to some extent has differed from previous so-called debates in the sense that it has focused its criticisms directly on the positivistic assumptions of International Relations theories offering instead a methodological pluralist IR (Lapid, 1989, p. 236). Although there are some breaks from previous debates and theories in the history of discipline, the post-positivist approaches still share a similar understanding of causation, reality and doing science (Kurki, 2006). Hence, the chapter also shows that the reason why even the third debate has not gone beyond this traditional conceptualization can be better explained by focusing on critical realism's stratified ontology and its historicization of such ontology through the concept of emergence (Leon, 2010, pp.38-39).

In the light of the criticisms directed to positivist understanding of the development of the discipline and by using critical realism's main understanding of *reality*, *causation* and *science*, the third chapter explains why certain theories and debates have dominated the discipline for a certain period, to what extent these theories and debates have influenced the discipline's self-understanding and explains how

these debates with their underlying conception of philosophy of science have restrained our understanding of studying the “international”.

For critical realism there is a reality independent from thought and human mind (ontological realism). This reality is “stratified and has depths” (Yalvaç, 2010b, p. 5). As mentioned in Bhaskar’s Transformational Model of Social Action, society always a necessary condition for and a result of human action (Bhaskar, 1998, p. 39). Thereby, the thesis claims that not only the events or actions but also International Relations theories are conditioned by certain social structures and the results of actors acting in such structures, whether actors are aware of these *real* social structures or not. Thus, to explain why certain theories or debates emerged in certain periods of the history of discipline requires explaining them by reference to *real* structures and underlying mechanisms that make actions and thoughts possible.

The thesis concludes by arguing for an IR discipline as a real and ontologically *emergent* field of social world with its irreducible features, without reducing the discipline neither to the positivistic field of law-like regularities and repetitiveness nor to post-positivism’s inter-subjectivity. Thereby the thesis claims that to define International Relations as a distinct and real social science, we do not need to adopt the positivist understanding of cause, explanation, reality and science nor reject them totally. As in the still continuing debate between positivism and post-positivism, dividing the discipline into two main camps and directing scholars to choose one of them will cause one to neglect the ontological assumptions of such approaches reproducing the positivist assumptions of the mainstream. By questioning and revealing the ontological assumptions of theories or philosophies of the mainstream, it will be possible to develop a more ontologically sensitive IR which focusing on those underlying mechanisms that make the discipline appear as it is.

## CHAPTER 1: CRITICAL REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

For social science disciplines to what extent they are considered as a science is a pivotal question. At the root of this question lies the issue of what “science” actually is. But for most people there is a consensus about the terms science and how to do science since the dominance of positivist understanding of science have left the discussion about the philosophy of science behind (Yalvaç,2010a, p. 4). As a result, science and positivism have become misused interchangeably (Wight, 2013, p. 31).

For most of the twentieth century positivism has been considered as the only way of doing science. But its dominance has been criticized in 1960s and new approaches has been emerged regarding the philosophy of science (Yalvaç,2010b, p. 4). Scientific Realism has been one of them and in IR its importance has continued to increase since its emergence. Scientific Realism was first formulated by Roy Bhaskar with his *A Realist Theory of Science* (1978). Scientific Realism (SR) is mostly used in relation to natural sciences. Its application to social sciences is called critical realism (CR). In his *Possibility of Naturalism* Bhaskar (1998) first introduced the critical realism especially for social sciences. For the discipline of IR, critical realism is still growing with the contribution of many scholars (Patomaki and Wight, 2000; Patomaki, 1996; Yalvaç,2010 a and b; Kurki,2007; Joseph, 2007; Wight, 2006).

The first thing to say about critical realism is that it is not a theory but a philosophical stance that produce meta-theoretical claims (Joseph, 2006, pp. 345-346). Many social theories can be applied by using the critical realism’s arguments, which makes critical realism a methodological pluralist approach for social science. By offering a non-positivist but still a scientific understanding, CR tries to overcome the positivist/post-positivist debate since it criticizes positivism’s foundationalism and determinism as much as post-positivists’ relative understanding and denial of science (Yalvaç,2010 a, p.6). These two philosophies of science (positivism and post-positivism) position themselves on the opposite side of the other and exclude each other. The reason for that is that even the post-positivism has inherited the positivist understanding of science and still treat concepts such as science and causation in a positivist sense. Positivist understanding of science and its legacy on post-positivism

has created many dualisms in social sciences: explanation/understanding, matter/ideas, structure/agent, out/in, international/domestic, West/East.

To overcome these challenges and to go beyond dualisms based on positivism/post-positivism, CR shift the focus from epistemology towards ontology. It differs from both positivism and post-positivism by arguing that social science can be studied like the natural sciences but not in a non-positivist way (Bhaskar, 1998, p. 2; Yalvaç, 2010b, p. 5). It separates itself from positivism since positivism reduces the reality only to the observable things and to experiences, and from post-positivism because post-positivism, rather than re-conceptualizing “science”, reduces everything to being perceived or to intersubjectivity (Yalvaç, 2010b, p. 6). Both philosophies share anthropocentric assumptions about reality, that is always related to the human’s attribute. As Patomaki and Wight puts:

“For positivists the real is defined in terms of the experienced (*esse est percipi*) and for many post positivists in terms of language/discourse (*esse est dictum esse*). What can be considered real always bears the mark, or insignia, of some human attribute.” (Patomaki and Wight, 2000, p. 217).

In short, critical realism as a meta-theory for social science questions and re-conceptualizes the main terms in science that is used or rejected without even think about their historical backgrounds, such as causation, structure, agency, reality, science. To better understand the main differences and similarities between International Relations theories and to locate their position in the field of philosophy of science requires going beyond the epistemology to ontology of IR. This is only possible by using a non-positivist but still scientific meta-theory, which is critical realism.

Why do we need critical realism for analyzing the history of the discipline of IR? To answer this question the main arguments of critical realism as a philosophy of science and how does it relate to IR should be explained, which is the main issue of this chapter. First, the main arguments of CR, which are ontological realism, emergence, stratification and emancipation, will be discussed briefly. Then CR’s contribution to structure/agent debate, one of the main (in a sense inevitable) debate in

social sciences will be explained. In last part of the chapter, How CR's relation to International Relations will be evaluated.

### **1.1. Main Arguments of Critical Realism**

There are different kind of knowledge in real life. Whether a scientist, journalist, politician or a kid claims to know something, it can be considered as a kind of knowledge. Scientific knowledge is only one of it. But this does not mean that every knowledge is equally true or related to the reality. Therefore, what makes scientific knowledge different from other kind of knowledge is that it tries to go beyond what we see or perceive (Wight, 2006, p. 18). We cannot see the force of gravity or how the earth moves around the sun or itself. However, the force of gravity does not function anymore or earth's movement does not stop just because we cannot perceive it. So, critical realism as a philosophy of science does move from this point and shift to focus to ontology rather than reducing the reality to what we experience or what we think of it (Kolasi, 2016, p. 68).

In order to go beyond the appearance and to explain how things work in social reality, critical realism provides and re-thinks some key concepts and terms such as emergence, stratification, tendency and causation. Before we move to its relations to International Relations these concepts and main arguments of critical realism requires at least brief explanation

#### **1.1.1. Ontological Realism**

Critical realism adopts an ontological realist perspective. The realist philosophies of science, as Colin Wight and Jonathan Joseph explain, have some basic acceptance about the ontology of social:

“They maintain (or at least do not deny) the view that there is a social reality which consists of multiple forces that condition individuals' lives; that some of these forces may well be unobservable, but nonetheless real; that these forces are structured by forms of internal and external relations, power structures and social roles; that the social sciences merely through empirical investigation; that social and political sciences are fundamentally social and political in nature and reflect, in part, the inquirer's position in social reality; and that the interaction of agents and structures

and material and ideational forces is an important question to be settled empirically and not by theoretical fiat (Wight and Joseph, 2006, pp. 2-3).”

According to these assumptions, there is an underlying mechanisms and structural relations beyond the appearance and human understanding. This does not mean that knowledge is not possible and reality is not intelligible. Contrary, knowledge can be possible only if we accept that there is a reality because knowledge has to be knowledge of something and if there is nothing real then the knowledge of it also does not exist. Therefore, critical realism separates thought and objects, epistemology and ontology (Joseph, 1998, p. 76). For this very reason, scientific knowledge ground this separation. Because if the real and the knowledge of the real are same there would be no need to do science and no difference between scientific knowledge or other kind of knowledge (Yalvaç, 2010b, p. 9).

Positivism, as opposed to ontological realism, is epistemological realist and sees no difference between ontology and epistemology, a mistake called “epistemological fallacy” by Roy Bhaskar (Collier, 1994, pp. 76-85). On the other hand, post-positivist approaches like hermeneutics, constructivism and post-structuralism reduce reality to discourse and language and cut the link between object and knowledge (Yalvaç, 2010b, p. 10). In fact, both of these approaches share idealist and anthropocentric philosophy of science as both put human attributes (either experience or discourse) over the object itself.

For differentiating the object and the knowledge of objects critical realism offer two terms: transitive and intransitive. While the transitive dimension of reality consists of socially and historically produced knowledge based on human mind and experience, intransitive dimension of object cannot be reduced to our understanding and theories about it (Kolasi, 2020, p. 96). This intransitive dimension of object are real things, underlying mechanisms, processes and possibilities about the world and generally are independent from human mind (Bhaskar, 1998, p. 22). The purpose of science is to seek and reveal these features of intransitive objects.

### 1.1.2. Stratification and emergence

Critical realism's ontology is also stratified. Critical realism has no flat ontology nor reduce ontology only to the empirical field as positivism does. There is an ontological difference between events and mechanisms that make events emerge. For Bhaskar, there are differences between the domain of real, the domain of actual and the domain of empirical (2008, p. 47).

The biggest problem of positivism is that it limits the science only with the domain of empirical (Yalvaç, 2010b, p.11). This is also the result of "epistemic fallacy". Because positivism starts its inquiry with epistemology. The epistemological question prioritizes the ontological ones, leading to claim that there is no difference between epistemology and ontology. Excluding the ontological question and focusing (and beginning by) only epistemological claim is the legacy of Humean understanding of *causation*. For Hume, the question "how do we know x" is improperly related to the question "what is x". In this way of understanding, ontology is defined by epistemology (Collier, 1994, p. 75). This leads to flat ontology that reduces the reality or ontology of objects only to their epistemological implications made by human mind and rationality. In this way, structures, mechanisms and processes are excluded and not considered as real things.

Critical Realism, on the other hand, criticizes this empirical realism. For CR, the reality cannot be reduced to human cognition. The fact that human cannot know everything directly does not mean that there are no other things that we know. There might be things, mechanisms and entities that exist and operate independently of our ability to know them (Wight and Joseph, 2006, p. 10). Moreover, what we experience or what we think is the result of complex structures that lie under the apparent of social world.

*Stratification* and *emergence* are keys concepts for critical realism's ontology. Contrary to idealism, human experience and cognition is dependent on the external (more accurately, material) world and emerges as a result. According to this, the world is stratified in terms of levels of reality and some levels are more basic than (cause of and necessary for) complex levels (Wight and Joseph, 2006, p. 11). For instance, It can be said that material world is more basic than life but it is necessary for life to

emerge. Life (biology) is a result of such material world. But this stratified feature of reality also suggest that each level has unique, causative and irreducible features (Kolasi, 2016, p. 77). Life has emerged from material life but is not reducible to it. Science and disciplines are also stratified (Collier, p. 107). They are divided into different kind of department such as physics, chemistry, biology, sociology, etc. Also some are more basic than other and necessity for more complex one to emerge. But explanations of more complex ones cannot be reduced to the basic ones. For example. Humans are biological and have to obey biological rules but everything about humans cannot be explained by biology and has unique and irreducible features of their own. There is a one-way relation of explanation. All humans have biological features but all biological entities are not human. In short, every stratum has their own mechanisms, rules, unique features, causativeness and power to impact other stratum.

### **1.1.3. Reconceptualizing causation**

Stratification and emergence also historicize and de-naturalize ontology. As explained above, more complex stratum are emerged and derived from more basic ontological levels. Another explanation of this is basic levels *cause* more complex ones. But critical realism cannot accept the classical understanding of causation that dominated sciences from Hume and Kant (Kurki, 2006, pp. 191-193). Humean understanding of cause is more related to the deterministic and epistemological conceptualization of the term cause. The legacy of Hume on causation with positivism has dominated the philosophy of science so violently that post-positivism rejected the term causation without touching or altering the term (Kurki, 2006, pp. 193-195). Causation is used as a deterministic way and it is thought that its meaning has been emptied. The concept has been used by empiricists to reveal the general patterns and law-like regularities that are waiting to be discovered (Kurki, 2007, p. 362).

In a critical realist sense, causation means the causative powers or tendencies interior to the structures or relations between objects (Kolasi, 2016, p. 83). It shows us the underlying mechanisms that generate the empirical events or discourses. For a critical realist, the causes do not have to be shown or experienced by humans. Whether we are experience or not, causes still function and are exist. Causes do not have to be exercised by people. There is no direct link between cause and its results. Causes can

be seen as possibilities or tendencies (Sayer, 1992, p. 105). Therefore, the aim of doing science is to explain the causative powers of structures. Because explanation is not to reduce everything to be ordered or discover universal law-like regularities. Explanation is related to how the underlying mechanisms function under which conditions and how they make empirical events possible (Kolasi, 2016, p. 85).

In this way the explanation/understanding debate between positivism and post-positivism (Kurki, 2006, p.189) can be dealt with. Because it is this misuse of the terms causation that lead Martin Hollis and Steve Smith to write their book *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (1990). The dichotomy between explaining and understanding or between casual and non-casual is the result of positivist understanding of causation. Causation in a Critical Realist sense is to key to develop more embracive and irreducible understanding to events, human activities, social structures by revealing the underlying mechanisms and generative powers of stratum that exist and functions independently of human cognition and condition (not determine) the possibility of humans' agential features.

As a result, critical realism can offer a deep and stratified realism. For CR, there are three level of reality and each has their own ontological features. Also, there is no end for doing science since every time science has explained the causative powers and uniqueness of a stratum, this will lead another ontological realm to emerge. The results will become causes for newly emergent levels.

## **1.2. Structure-Agent Debate in Social Science**

When being occupied in social science the structure-agent debate is almost inevitable to ignore. The reason is that social science, as the term implies, is social and human interference is necessary condition for science. But there is a difference between doing science and the reason of science. While doing science is socially constructed and depended on human action the objects of science, such as mechanisms, causes and structures, exists independently of human cognition. This brings the question how structures and agents are related to and impact each other.

All social science theories implicitly or explicitly have a solution to agent-structure debate (Wendt, 1987, p. 337). It can be said that two different approaches have dominated the agent-structure debate, which are methodological individualism

and more holistic structural theories (Kolasi, 2016, pp. 94-97). While individualistic theories give priority to agents over structures and does not see structures as real things, structuralist theories reject the freedom of human actions (Kolasi, 2016, p. 101).

The problem about this debate is that both solutions have been developed under the influence of positivism. Therefore, the problem has been seen as a methodological problem rather than ontological (Wight, 2006, p.62). Hence, as mentioned above, both approaches (individualism and structuralism) can be labelled as methodological individualism and methodological structuralism. What innovation critical realism has brought to this problem is to lift this methodological cover and to try to solve it by focusing on the ontological distinctness of both structure and agents (but still related to each other).

It was Alexander Wendt who first problematized the agent-structure debate in his well-known article *The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory* (1987). Although he used critical realism as an anchor for his theory, Wendt has developed his arguments fundamentally through Anthony Giddens's structuration theory (Giddens, 1984). But Wendt's arguments were mostly the critics of Waltzian structuralism in IR theory. Wendt was wright to claim that neorealism or Waltz's structuralism was ontologically individual (Wendt, 1987, 336). The structures for Waltz are just instruments to analyze the states' behavior in international system. Structures and the mechanism in such structures are not real ontologically for neo-realism (Kolasi, 2016, p. 151). Wendt have denied the materialist and structuralist analysis of Waltz. But the material capability and material capacity in Waltz's analysis are the positivist understanding of materialism and a very narrow materialism as well. Hence, rather than re-thinking the materialism in a Critical Realist sense, Wendt developed his arguments by denying the materialism at all. This has led him to give intersubjective relations a generative and aprioristic role. In short, Although Wendt also inherited the legacy of positivism regarding the philosophy of science and the dualisms created by positivism, He was the first who directly challenge the agent-structure debate on the base of philosophy of science.

This brief outline shows that positivism has created a dichotomy also on the agent-structure debate. Because positivism has not only methodological or epistemological claims but also it has defined the framework and the concepts related to philosophy of science, to get away from positivism and criticize it can only be possible also at the ontological debate. Thus, the agent-structure debate cannot be seen as a matter of choice, which force theorists choose either one or the other (Wight, 2006, p. 72). It is not also possible to easily blend these two ontological distinct entities (Wight, 2006, p. 72).

The positivist legacy on agent-structure debate has continued ever since several alternative theories have started to criticize positivism. To overcome the agent-structure debate and to find alternatives to positivist theories post-positivism and post-structuralism has emerged in 1980s. In IR this criticism of positivism has been pioneered by Jim George and Yosef Lapid to find a “thinking space” (Jim George, 1989; Yosef Lapid, 1989). What Post-structuralist and post-positivist theories did is that they have changed the flat ontology of positivism based on empiricism with their flat ontology based on discourse (Kolasi, 2020, p. 86).

Since the agent-structure debate was accepted as a methodological and epistemological problem (Wight, 2006, p. 62) both positivist and post-positivist theories did not seek “the solution” on ontological level. Moreover, post-positivism has reproduced the flat ontology of positivism by putting another flat ontology. Therefore, either agents or structures have been reduced to or melted into each other.

For critical realism, this debate is a philosophical one and can only be surmounted by focusing on the ontology of both structure and agents without reducing one to the other (Dessler, 1989). It can be said that for a critical realist, structures cannot exist without people but cannot be reduced to people (Yalvaç, 2010b, p. 18). According to Roy Bhaskar, all human actions requires existed social structures (Bhaskar, 1989, p. 43). Structures like language, rules, geography, matter, resources are the condition for humans to act. Social structures or society are both the necessary condition and the result of human actions (Bhaskar, 1998, pp. 34-35). Social structures cannot reproduce or change themselves. Both reproduction and change of social structures can only be possible through human actions. But critical realism differs itself

from constructivism in that while constructivists claim that both agents and structures *construct* each other, critical realism claims that ontologically the human actions are conditioned by structures (Wight and Joseph, 2006, p. 21) and that constructivists ignore why certain structures and actions are made possible in what condition (Yalvaç, 2010, p. 19).

Structures does not limit or determine the human action as positivism argues and structures does not have to be realized by humans. They exist and function independently of our awareness of them. Moreover, it is structures that enable human action. Both agents and structures have *sui generis* ontological properties. While Agents have cognition, ability to act, self-consciousness and emotions, structures have the powers of enablement, causal powers and constraints over agents (Wight and Joseph, 2006, p. 20; Yalvaç, 2010, p. 34).

The ontological differences between agents and structures are foremost related to the element of temporality (time). (Yalvaç, 2010a, p. 35). With her *morphogenetic approach*, Margareth Archer put emphasis on the times that structures are formed differently (Archer, 1995). Archer make a distinction between before, *during* and *after* of social structures (Yalvaç, 2010a, p. 35). This means that structures exist before human actions, that they interact with social structures when they act and that structures may or may not endure after human action. Thus, the structures before actions and after actions cannot be conflict with each other. This approach historicize and temporalize the ontology of structure. It is important to indicate that agents act consciously only within their already positioned practices but their actions unconsciously and unintendedly have impact on social structures (Wight and Joseph, 2006, p. 21). They may act to change their practices but they may reproduce a social structure they are surrounded by.

This account of the agent-structure debate asserted by critical realism does not reduce agents only to the bearers of structures. It also does not reduce (social) structures to the result of the interaction between agents through their language and practices. It claims that actions can only be possible by certain conditions. Actually, it gives agents the power to transform structures. If the aim of science is to reveal the underlying mechanisms and causative powers of social structures, then, science could

be an emancipatory power for humans (Yalvaç, 2010, p. 19). Because only by knowing the dominant social structures and their conditions to emerge and endure can humans play a transformative role. On agent-structure debate, maybe the best explanation was made by Marx by saying that: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under conditions chosen by themselves” (Marx, 1962).

In summary, with its stratified and realist ontology scientific disciplines should be analyzed as they have their ontological and irreducible features but still related to other disciplines. When it comes to social sciences the situation can become more complex since every discipline is seen to be deeply related to each other and every social science can claim that their isolated field and topic are much more important than other disciplines. International Relations can be counted as one of them since its emergence generally considered as a combination of history, law and politics. But in the next chapter I will try to explain how critical realists define International Relations and why it is an irreducible and real social science discipline.

### **1.3. Critical Realism and International Relations**

Every scholars or scientific disciplines do not focus on the philosophy of science. They claim that they only interest with their own concepts and with their own problems. But this does not necessarily follow that they do not accept certain philosophical assumptions or they have consensus about their object of inquiry. Also, although every discipline is keen to be considered as a science what the science is and how a discipline can be a science are not questioned that much. The reason is that the philosophical questions are seen unrelated to the development of a discipline. But every theory of knowledge presupposes an ontological theory (Bhaskar, 1989, p.2; Patomaki and Wight, 2000, p. 223).

International Relations as a social science has many contesting theories and approaches than it first emerged in the early years of 20<sup>th</sup> century. Some of them have been part of the great debates in the history of IR and they still are to some extent. Whether these theories and debates in IR are not related to the philosophy of science or not, there are ontological and epistemological assumptions behind them. They also implicitly or explicitly have to deal with the agent-structure debate. But their

assumptions and claims about the importance of critical realism for IR, then, is to reveal these ontological and epistemological assumptions and question if there are really that much philosophical difference between competing theories in the discipline.

To better understand the relation between critical realism and International Relations and how critical realism can be helpful for IR theorization, first we need to answer the question why we need philosophy of science for IR. Then, using critical realism's stratified ontology, it will be shown that IR has its own ontological existence and causative powers both conditioning and enabling the state, international organizations and other international actors, which are not reducible to other social science.

### **1.3.1. Why do we need philosophy of science for IR?**

While modern natural science has been established only after they abandon the philosophy behind, in social science philosophy has been used to legitimize the disciplines (Wight, 2013, p. 31). It is because science and positivism has become interchangeable terms (Bhaskar, 1986, pp. 52-64). In this respect the disciplinarity and scientific position of IR has been questioned in this manner. But the ontology of IR and its concepts have not been questioned and been used with little consideration (Wight, 2013, p. 32). Because positivism as a philosophy of social science has lost its dominance accordingly but in IR it still continues to dominate (Schmidt, 2005, p. 14). Therefore, the criticisms about the disciplinarity of IR has been took place whether in positivist way. Rather than thinking the IR in a non-positivist understanding of science, anti-scientific approaches have been emerged (Yalvaç, 2020, p. 5). As a result

When engaging with social science and complex social actions in an open-ended world, the conceptualizations become more important. But in IR, the phenomena are used without reconceptualizing them. For example, even the term "international" has not been questioned in an ontological manner. This has led IR scholars to de-historicize and naturalize the discipline, often resulting with a commitment to the Westphalian narrative about the discipline.

International Relations theories and debates are generally based on either positivism or post-positivism. In fact, the discipline has stuck between these two competing philosophies of social science. But in the history of International Relations

theories, the ontological assumptions of these two philosophies have been neglected and their impacts on the theorization of IR have been left only at the epistemological level. But for critical realism, the agents, structure and the relations between them are taken together in a more holistic and inclusive way. The contribution of critical realism to IR is that it overcomes the obstruction created by positivism/post-positivism and focuses on structural, agential and ideological dimension of international relations together without reducing one of them to another (Yalvaç, 2010b, p. 26).

Critical Realism's refocusing on ontology enable an escape from unnecessary question of problem field in IR and direct attentions to the ontologies of IR theories (Patomaik and Wight, 2000, p. 226). Rather than dividing theories into explanation or understanding, critical realism offers to question and compare their ontological positions. Because different theories of IR work only at epistemological levels and differentiate from each other only by their epistemology and methodology, their solution to level of analysis problem in IR are misleading rather than and illuminating (Patomaik and Wight, 2000, p. 233). A critical realist philosophy of science reveals the real disagreement between competing IR theories and open the way for more productive debate for IR (Wight, 2007, p. 394).

It looks like one should choose a theory and explain everything or understand every event that happens in international relations and exclude other theories. But the social world and also international relations have stratified ontology and different ontologies can emerge. This allow us to historicize the ontologies and put every ontology at different level. Therefore, it is not possible that using a theory in IR will explain everything. It is because every time and ontological field emerge (like biology, sociology or international relations) it will have its own emergent powers and irreducible mechanisms. Science and theories always seek those emergent powers and mechanism of these ontologically irreducible objects. But our theories and scientific knowledge can be mistaken. Although ontologies of things exist independently from human mind, our knowledge production of object is always socially constructed (Wight and Josph, 2010, pp. 12-13). Thus, the theories of IR should be historicized and why have certain theories were constructed in certain social structures should be studied. The critical realist philosophy of science will help us to historicize the IR theories and their relations with ontologically existing and independent objects of IR.

In conclusion, the main concepts of IR such as anarchy, power, nation-state, structure, agency, realism, liberalism, causation should be re-conceptualized and this can only be possible by using a stratified ontology which does not reduce everything to one single theory and using an epistemological relativism which claims that knowledge (of objects) is socially constructed and we can be wrong about what we know. But there is a difference between “we do not know” and “we cannot know”. And also, all theories are not equal in terms of their power to explain the objects that they study. Since all theories are in relation with the intransitive object all the time, there is a judgmental rationalism about theories (Kolasi, 2020, p. 96; Wight, 2006, p. 26). With an ontologically realist theory it is possible to deepen our scientific knowledge and to transform the social structures towards human emancipation.

### **1.3.2. Irreducibility and reality of international as an emergent stratum**

International Relations as a social science discipline are varied in terms of different theories through the years and it seems like many other inter-disciplinary approaches have started to enter the IR theorization. Although this has advantages for any discipline it also raises the disciplinary questions about IR: is IR still a social science discipline? Or should IR be studied under political science? Or are we at the end of IR? The questions can be increased in number. But the main issue about the IR is that it is considered only as either the playground of actors or as a sub-field of sociology and political science. The reason why it is thought that IR is losing its disciplinary power to different social sciences is that for many years IR and other disciplines have excluded each other as if they all have their untouchable and sacred scientific safe zones and when other disciplines talk about their concepts and terms they would be accused of interfering other's affairs.

The best example of this is between sociology and International Relations. Both disciplines have their isolated framework and exclude each other. While classical sociology emphasizes the social without reference to the international, international relations study its categories through an abstraction from the social (Yalvaç, 2013, p. 6). Both disciplines have framed their disciplinarity by standing at the other side of the dualities (in/out, hierarchy/anarchy, internal/international) that emerged due to the flat ontology of positivism. With the legacy of positivism, it is thought that disciplines

should find their own level of analysis and find law-like regularities within their frameworks. But this level of analysis approach is based on a positivist understanding of social science that forces the disciplines to find correlations between their units (Joseph, 2010, p. 51).

For critical realism, international is emergent and “it is much more than its constituent parts, that is in fact irreducible to these parts” (Joseph, 2010, p. 61). It is true that International Relations was derived from other levels of social and material world. But it does not mean that we can reduce international to those parts that it was derived. If the social world is a combination of different structures and social relations that completely overdetermined (Joseph, 2010, 61), then international relations is one of the parts of this complex social world and has irreducible power and causative mechanisms itself. Therefore, critical realism focuses on the historical and transformable social worlds of international relations which have producing effects on other structure and agents (Patomaki, 1996, p. 106).

International Relations, then, is another level of ontologically stratified reality of world. For many IR theories, international relations is understood as the relations between the parts and the ontology of international has been neglected. But IR, for critical realists, has been emerged and derived from other levels of reality such as biology, sociology or political science but cannot be reduced neither to these levels nor its parts (Patomaki and Wight, 2000, p. 232). It also means that there are many complex and competing mechanisms and structural relations that operates on the international level (Kolasi, 2016, p. 239).

It has been tried to show that whether we have specific position or not philosophy of science works and impacts the scientific disciplines and, moreover, it defines the what is considered as scientific discipline. But it is not always easy to reveal the philosophical background of disciplines due to the positivist legacy of Kantian and Humean approaches that left ontology behind in the sake of epistemology. In IR theories,

Critical realism, contrary, focus on ontology and thus put emphasis on the stratified ontology of the world. Because only by focusing on ontology we can rethink

find a non-positivist account on science, disciplines, causation and agent-structure debate, which are the main concepts of IR and any social science discipline.

Engaging with the philosophy of science in IR has been considered as the weakness of the discipline. It was thought that importing theories from political science and sociology into the IR would solve the theoretical problems in IR. As we see, complete isolation of IR from other discipline (based on positivism) and explaining IR phenomenon only by using other social sciences disciplines (post-positivism) has created many dualisms in the discipline. Critical realism try to overcome this dualisms without excluding both empiricism and discourse analyzing by claiming that they are transitive knowledge (epistemology) and cannot be misused as if they are intransitive knowledge (ontology). As a result, rather than losing the discipline of International Relations, its reality and existence as a real phenomenon in social world is explained through the concept of emergence and irreducible mechanisms that belongs only to the international relations. But critical realism also does not deny the inter-disciplinary relations between IR and other disciplines (both natural science and social science) since IR is derived from other levels and sciences, it has some features that can be explained by other disciplines. But the ontology of IR is unique and what is needed for IR is to put philosophy of science based on Critical Realist arguments works in IR.

## CHAPTER 2: THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISCIPLINE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE

It is accepted that in the 21st century there are numerous IR theories or approaches, either developed as the results of inter-disciplinary understanding, reformulations of traditional theories or the products of the philosophical debates on social sciences at all. The term 'international' is, probably, in the demand more than ever in its history. The international political economy, international social movements, international climate changes are just some of the concepts that we hear, talk or listen almost every day. However, the rise of the discipline and considering it as a (social) science has rather short history and can be dated around a hundred years ago, following the end of the First World War. But this does not mean that the subject was not studied before (Smith, 1987, p. 190). Before the discipline has separated itself, in a positivist sense, from other social sciences it was studied in relations to international law, history and philosophy (Smith, 1987, p. 190). In other words, International Relations as a discipline has emerged under the dominance of positivism in order to separate and legitimize itself as a *science* since the definition of science was understood in relation to arguments of positivism that only the observable things are real and that certain regularities and law-like patterns should be find out if a field are to recognized as science. This positivist understanding of science led IR scholars, mostly those in US, to anchor a flat and ahistorical ontology of international with the concepts of anarchy and balance of power.

From a Critical Realist perspective, it can be said that 'international' is one of the *strata* that has its emergent and irreducible powers in social world and has been emerged historically and socially. Hence, its powers and influences over actors and its unique features should be historicized rather and seen as ahistorical and natural as mainstream IR theories do. Thus, first the rise of the discipline of IR as a Social Science with US concerns underpinned by positivist notions then how this has influenced the theories and debates in the history of the discipline will be explained by using critical realism's concept of emergency and stratification to better understand the rise of the discipline of IR.

## **2.1 Rise of The International Relations as A Discipline of Social Science**

Although there were some concerns and studies about world politics and international relations in the Social Science, the afterward of First World War was the foremost motivation for establishing a discipline of IR in order to prevent another big scaled war among nations and to find out the causes of the war (Smith, 2010, p. 1). Having considered the dominance of positivism in science and the increasing power of US both politically and economically, such establishment has been influenced by certain assumptions and concerns of certain actors. Moreover, the main assumptions and the understanding of international has been left untouched and unquestioned. From a Critical Realist perspective, the rise of the discipline has been made possible on the ground of dominance of positivist understanding of science with the international structure enabling for US to establish a discipline in line with its concerns. “The philosophy of science has played an important role in the formation, development and practice of IR as an academic discipline.” (Kurki and Wight, 2010, p. 14) and has shaped the ways in which theories and debates between them have emerged. Thus, the thesis claims that the positivist understanding of science and of disciplinarity led the discipline to position itself without any critique against the positivist way of doing science. Positivism dominated the discipline for most of its history (Smith, 1992, p. 489) so that even the post-positivist approaches have not questioned but rejected certain concepts of positivism such as causation, science and it’s anthropocentric understanding of reality, often underpinned by Immanuel Kant (Patomaki and Wight, 2000, pp. 219-223).

For critical realism there is depth and stratified ontological realism, as opposed to positivism’s flat and empiric realism that reduces the statements about being to our knowledge about them. Realist ontology of CR claims that being is independent from our experiences and there are things “operate and exist independently of our ability to know or manipulate them” (Wight and Joseph, 2010, p. 10). The aim of science is to reveal the things that operate and make the experience possible. Otherwise, “all science would be superfluous if the outward appearances and essences of things directly coincided” (Marx, 1971, p. 817). Thereby, it is argued that the theories, debates in the discipline and their apparent arguments and criticisms against each other must be explained on the base of what makes them possible as they are rather than other. So,

critical realism can offer an explanation on the rise and development of the discipline in order to show that theories about international and debates between them has been underlined by certain philosophical and real social structures rather than emerged arbitrary and randomly. Briefly, to better understand why certain theories and assumptions have dominated the discipline and how this have shaped the trajectory of debates in the history of discipline the establishment of International Relations as a separate discipline and the philosophical ground that the disciplined have built on should be examined at first.

### **2.1.1. Influence of the First World War on the origins of the discipline**

Although the concept of international has been recognized with law, history and diplomacy the aftermath of the First World War has played significant role on the establishment of the discipline of International Relations (Burchill and Linklater, 2013, p. 6). In the book titled *Cataclysm 1914*, Anievas and several scholars (2015) explain how the First World War defined and constituted International Relations in relation with the issue of imperial conflict and empire building process. Since the main aims were to prevent another war and to bring about peace thinkers have not tended to concern with theoretical questions nor with ontological or epistemological assumptions about the international relations. They have directed towards methodology of how to establish a continuing peace (Smith, 1987, p. 191). It can be said that the International Relations as a discipline has started its life with deeply grounded normative thoughts that war should be prevented and world peace should be established. All efforts were made to think about the *causes* of war but the concepts of anarchy, states and war have been accepted ontologically untouched and ahistorical. It can be said that the discipline has emerged with an idealistic and normative mission. This mission has led scholars to formulate IR theories which only consist of explanation for the causes of war and procedures to world peace. Other questions, theories, topics that do not have anything to say about the war would not be a legitimate in the discipline. In short, thinking of the cause of the war has led to neglect ontological question about international relations and to accept the dominant understanding of disciplinarity, cause and science, underpinned by positivism with the legacy of Humeanism in International Relations (Kurki, 2006, pp. 195-196.). While the

‘international’ itself needs to be historicized and explained by revealing its emergent and separation from other discipline like sociology and economy on the basis of Weberian understanding of social ontology (Teschke, 2014) the discipline of IR has been occurred and positioned itself by defining and accepting certain concepts as they are.

Rather than questioning or historicizing the concepts such as states, anarchy and international the discipline has emerged to find quick solutions to the events which was thought that caused by the actions of decision-makers involved (Smith, 1987, p. 192.) As we will see in later pages of this thesis, the so-called “Great Debate” between Idealism and Realism was on methodological questions such as how the statesmen should act or how they maximize their power. Both have agreed on what was international and its features. For sure, to say that while establishing the discipline the philosophical questions, especially the ontological ones, were not foremost for scholars like Morgenthau, Carr, Keohane does not mean that the discipline has been built without any philosophy of science. That will bring us to the dominance of positivism on the rise of the discipline.

### **2.1.2. Positivism and its influence on the rise of the discipline**

Dominance of positivism on the rise of the discipline should be carefully discussed since, as we will see in third chapter, it has also shaped the level and the extent of philosophical debates between IR theories. The dominance of positivism in the history of the discipline and of science at all was so explicit that even in the third debate between positivism and post-positivism, the definition of science and causation have not been challenged but rejected and a dichotomy between causal and non-causal approaches has been created on the base of positivism’s definition of *cause* (Kurki, 2006, p. 200).

Although the term positivism is often used very easily and without thinking much about it (since it is considered is the only way of doing science), positivism can be defined as a philosophy of science that reduces the reality and the object of study to the observable things and that tries to find law-like, regulative patterns in the world. For positivists the real is that of observed, thus defined in terms of human attribute

(Patomaki and Wight, 2000, p. 217.). While most positivists consider themselves as ontologically realist they are actually anti-realist as they position human experience prior to the object which is itself the condition for human to experience (Bhaskar, 1989, p. 147). Thereby for positivists, scientists should concern with the observable things if their studies should be treated as *scientific*. The reason for such a definition of reality, causality and the history of positivism can be dated back to Hume and, then, Kant. (Kurki, 2006, p. 193). While for Hume there is nothing outside of human's perception, Kant have posited two worlds: phenomena (the world humans experience) and noumena (the world of reality) (Patomaki and Wight, 2000, p. 219). From since science have been grounded on empiricist/positivist assumptions.

The dominance of positivism as a social science have put the debates on philosophy of science into the background (Yalvac, 2012, p. 4.) From the rise of the discipline to the 1960s theoretical debates within the discipline have remained on the epistemological and methodological level. The discipline has risen within the context in which positivism was considered as the only way of doing science. Shortly, positivism have not determined only the trajectory of the history of IR theory but also what should be considered as a theory, knowledge or evidence (Kurki and Wight, 2014, p. 15.). This acceptance of positivism have led scholars for long period to stay in the positivist framework because positivism with the excluding science from world of object and reducing it into anthropocentric assumptions such as experience and observation (Patomaki and Wight, 2000, pp. 219-223) has created a dichotomy between being scientific and non-scientific. The only challenge to positivism could have come within accepted positivist assumptions, which would be resulted as the triumph of positivism again. From a Critical Realist perspective, the rise of the discipline and theories of IR was conditioned by the dominance of positivism. The early scholars, whether they were aware of or not, constructed their theories and tried to find uniqueness of IR in positivist manner which was seen the only way to establish a distinct discipline of IR.

### **2.1.2.1. Separation of IR from other disciplines based on positivist understanding of disciplinarity**

Disciplines and theories are not self-generated and reified but historically and socially (re-)produced. The rise of a discipline and constructing a theory within such discipline are also social practices which was taken by actors surrendered by social structures that enable and give possibility to such practices. Thereby, disciplines and discipline-constitutive questions or the theories at all are not value-free. It means that even without an explicit and intentional theoretical question the discipline of IR has been grounded on an existing understanding of disciplinarity, which was positivism. Since positivism have constituted the definition of science itself (Wight and Joseph, 2010, p. 2.) the discipline has tended to rise in parallel with the positivist understanding of science.

According to positivist understanding of science a discipline is needed to construct its position in social science on the base of observable things and unique object of study. Thereby, although the IR has always been fed by history and sociology even in instrumentalist way (Yalvac, 2014) the discipline has separated itself from classical sociological tradition by constructing its own analytical concepts such as war and anarchy in order to be treated as a distinct science in a positivist manner. Hence, as classical sociology tradition has been ‘methodological internalist’, excluding the inter-societal context in the concept of ‘social’ (Anievas and Matin, 2010, pp. 1-4) the discipline of IR has defined itself on the basis of ‘methodological internationalism’, excluding ‘social’ from international (Yalvac, 2014, p. 311). As a result, mainstream IR theories have started to look for law-like regularities in the international field in order to differentiate the discipline from sociology or political science.

For critical realism, there is a distinction between our knowledge of the social world (epistemology) and the world out there (ontology). But positivism does not make any difference between epistemology and ontology and misses the point that every epistemological and methodological inquiry does include and, in fact, derive from an ontological assumption about the world itself (Wight and Joseph, 2010, p. 10). It fails to see that our experience and concept of experience are also molded by the world out there and it is neither self-authenticating nor self-explanatory (Collier, 1994,

p. 72). Having reducing the reality to the knowledge derived from human observation positivism does not consider social structures working independently from human perception as real and effective. Thus, positivism has a flat ontology which sees the world as a-historical and consists of unchangeable regularities which need to be explained by human observation. In a Critical Realist sense, this flat ontology of positivism has *structured* the rise of the discipline in that the only way to establish IR as a distinct field of social science was seen to find nomological-deductive laws and a unique object of study, which was considered as neglected in traditional sociological theories which were grounded on positivism.

The discipline of IR has been established on the premises of positivism. Positivism has been the philosophical structure that theorization in the discipline had to obey or challenge, though it would not be likely for couple of decades. Because of the positivist understanding of disciplinarity the theorization in IR has been tend to build on the assumption that there is always a distinction between society and international and that an IR theory is legitimized to the extent that it accepts this dichotomy.

What I claim is that because the concept of reality is defined as that it is independent from human mind and observation, and that if something has influences and impacts, whether we are aware of or not, it is considered as real in Critical Realist terms, positivist understanding of science, though it is problematic in many ways and has flat ontology, has *real* impacts on the rise and the development of the trajectory of the theories within the discipline. Such impacts have played an important role on the emergence of the disciplinarity understanding of ‘the international’. Since the positivism has shaped the structure of international the debates between theories have remained within the framework of the positivist assumptions. Positivism can be considered as a social and philosophical structure that underlies the apparent features and assumptions of International Relations when the discipline was established. In short, to explain why certain theories emerged and have dominated the discipline we need to go beyond the appearances and reveal the underlying mechanisms which make theories occurred as they are. Because IR as a discipline has emerged out of deeper social relations and developed with its irreducible characteristics and features (Joseph, 2010, p. 67.), to reveal these social relations IR has been built on becomes more

important if we are to understand why certain debates between theories have occurred in certain period in the history of the discipline.

#### **2.1.2.2. A-historicized theorizations in the discipline**

Since positivist understanding of science has dominated the emergence of the discipline of IR, what positivism understands from theory has shaped the theorizations for IR. For positivism the ultimate objective of science is to find law-like regularities and, thus, to predict (Kolasi, 2017, p. 56.). For this purpose, theories are used to reveal so-called regularities by applying the value-free observations and to find the formula to prevent the wars among nations.

As positivists adopt the Humean understanding of causation that whenever A happens, B happens theories, for them, explain A to predict B. As it seen, theories are treated not as *real* but as *instruments* for science. Since positivism does not consider non-observable things as real, to work with non-observable concepts they adopt instrumentalism that sees theories only as a useful fictions (Wight, 2013, p. 29).

With the flat ontology of positivism claiming to find law-like regularities, patterns and to formulate never changing concepts by giving reality only to those are observables the theorization within the discipline of IR has neglected the ontological questions. The meaning of theory in positivist sense was conceived in terms of its explanatory power and the causal qualification. But the problem was that this causality was understood as a Humean empiricist regularities (Kolasi, 2017, p. 123). This has led IR theories to find the regularities in the international field and to explain the actions of states. Rather than historicizing the international itself and asking the ontological questions explicitly the IR theories, especially Liberalism and Realism which will be discussed in the next chapter, has built their arguments by a-historicizing the concepts of international, anarchy, war, state and power as if they were always there to be waiting for someone to observe and reveal.

The reason for accepting such a-historicized ontologies for IR theory is that, in critical realist terms, actors trying to establish a distinct discipline of IR was surrounded by positivist environment and they were tended to theorize the discipline in a positivist manner if they wanted not to be in the prison of political science or sociology (Rosenberg, 2016, pp. 1-27).

I will try to underline the structures when the discipline and theories have emerged and how these structures have shaped the trajectory of theories and debates between them. This structuralism should not be understood in positivist sense which means a narrow determinism nor as a Waltzian structuralism -also will be discussed later in this thesis- where structures are thought as an instrument, a tool to understand the actors' behaviors but as a Critical Realist sense which claims that structures precedes actors. This does not mean that actors are the bearers of the structural features without having means to change such structures. Rather, for social actions to be possible there must be a structural condition in which such actions are made (Dessler, 1989, p. 443). Thus, the emphasize here is the structural conditions of the emergence of IR as a distinct discipline. Only actors have the power to produce social actions. But their actions are not shaped arbitrary or randomly. Structures make actions possible, rather than determining them in a positivist sense. Thereby, the rise of the discipline of IR and the theorizations within it are also social actions and, thus, have been conditioned by the social and philosophical structures in the time. It means that actors making theories for the discipline of IR following the rise of the discipline have been formulating their arguments under the dominance of positivism.

What I want to emphasize by mentioning the dominant positivist structure in the philosophy of science is that this structure has shaped the trajectory of IR theory and conditioned the way in which social process of theorization have been made in IR. As it will be discussed in later pages, these structures positivism has established in science are still being neglected in the current debate between positivism and post-positivist theories and continue to make a more exclusive social process of theorization for the discipline of IR harder. In short, with the critical realism reconceptualization of *real* and *cause*, to treat such structures the discipline has been established within as real since they have emergent and irreducible power to influence the actors and the rise of the discipline and causative -since the way IR theories to be what they are is caused by dialectical relations of different structures- will help us to explain the trajectory of the current debates in the discipline of IR.

## **2.2. Hegemonic origins of the discipline**

As explained above, positivism was the social and philosophical structure when the discipline of IR was emerged. So, the emergence of IR was only possible under the positivist understanding of science. But for critical realism, the actors do not play a passive role when they are surrounded by social structures. These structures both enable and limit each actors or individuals differently as the structures that actors faced are multifarious and generally function together. Therefore, every actor is positioned differently in social structures, which give them different level of opportunities to reproduce or alter the social structures.

Regarding the agent-structure debate in the social science, the concept of hegemony also should be examined in order to explain why certain theories and debates between them have dominated the discipline for time to time. Since scientific disciplines are not something that is waiting out there to be explored as positivists defend but rather a social process in which both structure and agents take place, the concept of hegemony and its relations to agent-structure debate is important. Because the rise and the development of theories in a discipline are shaped by the underlying structures, hegemonic actions must not be understood only in terms of the material capabilities or the physical armament of a state or actor. Hegemonic actions are also deeply related to the rise and development of a discipline. For instance, the economic and political structure of the United States were different in the early years of 20<sup>th</sup> century, the discipline of IR would arise also differently or another discipline would arise rather than IR. So what is important in our case about hegemony is that hegemonic activities of actors and their relations to the underlying structures have influenced the framework of the discipline of IR. Thus, hegemonic activities and how they reproduce or, under certain conditions, alter social structures play a significant role if we are to explain the trajectory of debates in the discipline of IR.

But the concept of hegemony used here is differed from its traditional usages in the discipline of IR. For Jonathan Joseph the concept of hegemony in IR has two distinct meanings: one used by mostly realist approaches in terms of state dominance within the international system and other used by the neo-Gramscian approach which focus mostly on ideological or consensual element of hegemony (Joseph, 2008, p.

109). Yet, in this thesis the concept of hegemony will be explained by using critical realist assumptions which go beyond both narrow materialism that reduces the term to material capabilities and inter-subjective approaches. Rather, the concept of hegemony advocated here is much more related to the agent-structure debate and the main argument is that it is the structural conditions that the hegemonic actions are made possible. It does not mean that actors are reduced to the bearers of structures but that actors act -and also transform social structures- in compliance with their positions within the structures surround them. With this dialectic interactions both between structures and between structures and agents, hegemony and hegemonic activities become something that mediates between reproduction of social structures and attempts to transform or alter these structures (Joseph, 2008, p. 120). In this respect, as Roy Bhaskar (1989) puts:

Society is both the ever-present condition and the continually reproduced outcome of human agency. And praxis is both work, that is conscious production, and (normally unconscious) reproduction of the conditions or production, that is society. (pp. 34-35)

Therefore, the concept of hegemony, in a critical realist perspective, is ontologically related to pre-existing social structures that enable or constrain (but, in any case, condition) actors to act in order to be hegemon consciously or unconsciously.

In short, hegemony has two aspects, which are agential and structural, and hegemonic actions of actors can only take place when they are enabled by underlying structural mechanisms as they are dependent upon these structures for their expression through concrete actions (Joseph, 2000, 191). However, the concept of hegemony used here also differ from its traditional usage in a way that it links the concept to its influence on the reproduction or transformation of the dominant structures of the philosophy of science implemented by disciplines. Since the disciplines and their developments are defined as a social process in relation to the agent structure debate, the concept of hegemony also is deeply rooted to the rise and development of the discipline of IR and theories (and of course the manner of debates between them) of IR. Given that the discipline has risen and separated itself from other social sciences in parallel with the positivist assumptions, the implementation and re-production of such assumptions can be understood as hegemonic activities positioned within different social structures.

The concept of hegemony, then, with critical realist re-conceptualization by ontologically distinguishing between agents and structures and by focusing on the underlying structures that condition hegemonic activities of agents, becomes much more important if we are to explain why the discipline of IR has been established on the base of certain assumptions and understanding rather than other. Because it is the (generally unconscious) results of hegemonic activities of certain actors acting within social structures that reproduce the positivist understanding of science, theorization and disciplinarity and condition the manner and extent of criticisms directed to positivism. Therefore, the concept of hegemony, in terms of critical realism, has played significant role for the rise of the discipline of IR.

The main focus here about the concept of hegemony and its relations to the discipline of IR is that, whether we agree or not, US has dominated the way the discipline of IR has been established (Smith, 1987, 190). But this does not mean that it is only the US itself, as an actor, that defines and determines the disciplines trajectory. The social structures of international and in the philosophy of science have made hegemonic activities of US possible to establish the discipline on the behalf of itself. Thereby, the most important point about the relation between the concept of hegemony and US concern is the aspect of social structures in which the hegemonic projects are grounded on. The social structures in the international sphere have opened the way for US to bring its positivist understanding of science and international relations to establish the discipline of IR. Such hegemonic activities, enabled by the social structures, have led American thinkers to shape the discipline and the frameworks of scientific knowledge by using the terms and subjects imported from political science (Rosenberg, 2016, pp. 1-27). Thereby, hegemonic activities of US in terms of both political concerns and positivist understanding of science have *caused* the discipline to rise and been reproduced on the base of positivism. Most importantly the philosophical assumptions for scientific inquiry in the discipline have not been challenged, not even questioned (Wight, 2013, pp. 32-34). As a result of the hegemony of US when the discipline has been built, positivism has been entirely accepted as the only way to establish the discipline of IR *scientifically*. In a critical realist sense, it is the structural features of international -as an emergent of social reality- that enable US to be the dominant power for the rise of the discipline of IR with both its political

concerns and philosophical assumptions on the international itself. Otherwise, without revealing the underlying mechanisms conditioning US policies and actions, it would be meaningless to claim that US has dominated the discipline from start to today. Because in this subject oriented explanation the problem arises: Why could US have the power to build the discipline on behalf of its concerns when the discipline has begun to emerge, rather than different actors, country or than different period of the history? Without emphasizing the structural conditionings, the concept of hegemony for the rise of disciplines leads us to arbitrary and inter-subjective explanations.

Using the concept of hegemony in critical realist sense allows us to go beyond the rigorous dichotomy between agent and structure and, thus, enables to examine the real social structures in which hegemonic activities of US to establish the discipline for the sake of -and reproduce- its political concerns have been taken place. From this perspective neither agents nor structures are reduced to each other. Rather, it is claimed that both are ontologically distinct but related to each other dialectically. Ultimately the main argument of this chapter about the importance of the concept of hegemony is that it is the US that dominated the rise and development of the discipline of IR by putting its own political concerns and understanding of science to the hearth of the discipline but only under certain structural mechanism and possibilities.

After examining, questioning and reconceptualizing the concept of hegemony from a critical realist perspective it is argued that another reason why the discipline of IR has developed without grounding itself on the ontological questions about the international is because of the dominance and hegemonic activities of US enabled by social structures. As Rosenberg claims, “IR has never been established as a field *in its own right*” (2016, p. 2). As a result, hegemonic activities in the early years of the discipline have played important role both politically and philosophically for the discipline of IR to take form and become what it is today. If the discipline has passed from several period of debates and if some theories and philosophical assumptions dominated the discipline the hegemonic activities enabled by and thus positioned in social structures are important aspects of the history of the discipline of IR and have explanatory power for our following claims concerning the critics of language of great debates in the discipline’s self-image.

## **CHAPTER 3: CRITICIZING MAINSTREAM INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES AND DEBATES BETWEEN THEM**

### **3.1. Rethinking the Theories of International Relations**

Throughout its history the discipline of IR has witnessed different theories and debates in different eras. There is no doubt that all of the theories and debates between them have contributed IR in one way or other. But the discipline has risen with relations to different social structures. Such structures have tended to shape the trajectory of discipline. Whether it is evident or not, the theories in the discipline reflect, reproduce and, in certain structural conditions, alter the discipline's trajectory. Because every theory about knowledge and social world must contain "a theory of what the world is like for the knowledge to be possible" (Wight and Joseph, 2010, p. 9), the very ontology of the discipline is also reproduced or, again, with the possibility given by structures, transformed. Therefore, theories also can be theorized in terms of their emergence, development and dominance over other theories. In order to achieve this, it is needed to bring the meta-theoretical discussion about the ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions of theories. The concept of meta-theory can be summarized as the theory of theories or a theory that reveal the main assumptions of theories (Yalvaç, 2017b, p. 38). The discipline of IR did not engage with meta-theoretical questions for many years because of the dominance of positivism as the only philosophy for science in the discipline (Yalvaç, 2017b, p. 39). Thus, IR theories could not develop freely or randomly. Positivism has shaped the framework of the developments of both theories and the debates in the discipline. Therefore, there are strong relations between each debate and theories in terms of their relevance to positivism. The only way to analyze and criticize the debates and theories in IR, thus, is to approach the history of IR through asking the meta-theoretical questions.

By using the critical realist arguments about the stratified ontology of social world the aim of this chapter, thus, is to reveal the ontological assumptions of IR theories and to explain why and on what philosophical grounds they have developed their arguments. It is argued that the trajectory of main debates in the history of IR should be analyzed in terms of their ontological assumptions as the way that theories and debates between them have developed is the key point to understand why IR have

confronted with positivism/post-positivism debate after its establishment as a discipline around a hundred years ago. With the critical realist philosophy of science and focusing on the ontology of IR, the chapter will also argue that despite under the different names and components, there are ontological and philosophical similarities between the great debates in the history of IR. It is these similarities that led IR to confront the positivism/positivism debate. The only thing that new in positivism/post-positivism debate is that it directly focuses on the philosophy of science in IR. But the positivist assumptions about the key concepts and the analytical logic of putting epistemology over ontology remains untouched even in this fourth and current debate.

Together with and related to (and, thus, as a result of) the positivist understanding of disciplinarity and the role of hegemonic activities the historiography of international relations should also be re-examined in order to explain why the discipline has developed in this way rather than other. Because it is generally thought that the history of the discipline of IR has already been known and that there is no alternative way of looking at the past of the discipline (Schmidt, 2013, p. 3). But these common arguments have not remained unchallenged. As the discipline has become wider in terms of different approaches, inter-disciplinary research objects and criticisms the disciplinary questions have brought to surface by several scholars who have questioned the linear and orthodox understanding of the historiography of IR as a discipline (Hofmann, 1977; Ashwort, 2002; Schmidt 1994, 2000; Buzan & Lawson, 2013; de Carvalho, Leira & Hobson, 2011).

While it is true to say that the history of IR has not risen and developed simply by certain and simple debate between two theories, the main aim of this chapter is to reveal the structural continuity between debates on the base of philosophy of science supported by critical realist arguments. The chapter also claims that the myths the discipline has still been built on about the Westphalia and 1919 (de Carvalho, Leira & Hobson, 201) are reproduced through mainstream IR theories to strengthen the positivist understanding of science. However, critical realism's focus on ontology explains the underlying structures that *cause* to establish the language of debates since this traditional understanding of disciplinary has shaped the manner of both theories and debates between them.

If we are now in an era of the debate between positivism and post-positivism it is because of the relations between actors, structures and causal mechanisms existing in the history of IR, rather than arbitrary choices of theorists or policy makers. Because the extent and scope of how a theory of IR criticizes and tries to overcome the dominant theories or even philosophy of science are also part of agent-structure debate in philosophy of social science. Thereby, rethinking the history of the discipline becomes a crucial point since only by doing so we can accurately explain why the discipline have become what it is today. Without reducing the history of the discipline neither to positivist determinism nor intersubjectivism, critical realism can offer more deep and inclusive explanation for the historiography of IR.

In short, theories are not static and unchangeable truths about the world. They rise in a social and political environment and have strong bonds with power relations (Yalvaç, 2017b, p. 64). When we analyze and compare the great debates in IR, it should be remembered that every debate and its aftermaths have shaped the disciplinary environment in which the next debate would emerge.

### **3.2. On Great Debates in the Discipline of IR**

In every discipline there are competing theories that in some way create, maintain and develop disciplines. This also applies in IR since it is thought that IR has separated itself from other disciplines, especially from political sciences, by creating a Realism/Liberalism debate (Eralp, 2003, p. 57). The difference of IR in terms of great debate is that IR legitimize and creates a self-image of itself by three great debates (Schmidt, 2010, p. 13). It is usual for disciplines that there are numerous competing approaches and theories but IR displays a *sui generis* feature in terms of specifically defined and clean-cut debates. Moreover, the discipline of IR present itself as a series of great debates (Guilhot, 2011, p. 3). The language of great debates in IR is generally thought as it is the best way to illuminate the discipline's history and its development through the years. Also, there is a common and linear understanding that considers each debate is much more different than the previous one and contribute the discipline.

It is generally accepted that there are four great debates in the history of IR, which have played an important role in shaping the discipline (Kurki and Wight, 2013, p. 16; Waever, 1996). The more detailed explanation and criticisms about the debates from

critical realism's perspective will be the topic of the next part of this chapter but it requires to remind the general features and information about the great debates in IR's history. The first debate was between Realism and Idealism and took place in the era of Second World War. The second debate emerged in 1960s between traditionalists and behaviorists around the rhetoric arguments about science and methodology of IR. The third debate is not accepted as debate between theories and was about the scientific paradigms. Since it is called paradigm debate and took place in early 1980s among realists, pluralists and structuralists. Finally, there is the fourth debate between positivism and post-positivism, which is still influencing the discipline. Even the debates about the number of great debates indicate that there is not clear distinction about the debates and that there is a problem about the language of debates in IR (Schmidt, 2010, p. 15).

For critical realism, the existence and main focuses of great debates should be analyzed in terms of their ontological assumptions. All these debates have emerged historically and socially constructed. The philosophy of science has not entered the discipline until the second debate but even after the second debate, the philosophy of science in IR has focused around the problem of whether IR could develop as a social science in a positivist sense (Yalvaç, 2010, p. 36). For critical realists, even the fourth debate between positivism and post-positivism on science, causation, explanation and understanding are being made under the positivist understanding of science (Kurki 2007; Patomaki and Wight, 2000; Yalvaç, 2010, p. 15). Because the philosophical questions are stuck at the epistemological level that gives human interpretations priority over the ontology of objects. For Rivas, "positivists and interpretivists share much in common and are much more analogous to each other than either is to realism" (Rivas, 2010, p. 211). For both philosophies of sciences, the reality always bears the mark of human attribute and is related to anthropocentric philosophy (Patomaki and Wight, 2000, p. 217).

As a result, the language of greate debates does not always refer to the big differences in terms of the ontological assumptions of theories in IR. But the only way to reveal the similarities between IR theories is to apply the critical realism's meta-theoretical assumptions. It can be said that the language of debates hinders more than it illuminates the historiography of International Relations.

Now we can analyze the great debates in International Relations in terms of their ontological assumptions and relations with philosophy of science in order to show that there is an ontological and philosophical continuity in IR theories and debates, which still breathe in the fourth debate between positivism and post-positivism.

### **3.3. The First Debate: Idealism vs Realism or Idealism vs Idealism?**

It can be said that the first debate between Idealism and Realism has also shaped the framework of the discipline and can be counted as the constituent factor for International Relations. While idealists were motivated by the fear of another world war like the First World War and to put emphasis on the importance of international discipline and organizations which prevent the ignorance and lack of knowledge of humans, realist critique of the idealists was to their value-driven and unscientific methods for IR (Kurki and Wight, 2013, pp. 16-17).

Idealism as a first theoretical approach for IR was driven by Enlightenment ideas based on scientific knowledge and reason (Wight, 2013, p. 33). This belief to positivism as a legacy of Enlightenment has also caused IR to rise as a discipline (Yalvaç, 2017a, p 44). For idealists IR could be a social science and prevent possible wars only by improving human knowledge about the world and the cumulative scientific interaction among peoples. It can be said that idealist approaches have been emerged under the condition of the horror of wars and the main issue war idealists was to find solution to the wars through an international scientific discipline.

For classic narratives of the first debate, realists have responded the idealists' thoughts and they have achieved victory over idealists. Realism as a school of thought was pioneered by E. H. Carr (1946) and H. Morgenthau (1947) as a critic of idealism in the interwar period. For many realists, idealists were accused of not seeing the world as it is but as it ought to be (Schmidt, 2013, pp. 13-14). Though many realists opposed the idealism's normative assumptions, they could not develop a clear understanding of a scientific IR (Yalvaç, 2017b, p. 45).

But there are several problems about this narrative of the first debate. First of all, the language of debate, especially the first debate, has created a misleading myth about the discipline of IR. In that, with reference to the Westphalian system of 1648, the debate between idealism and realism has helped to naturalize and un-historicize IR

through locating its origins in relations to the date of the First World War (de Carvalho, Leira and Johnson, 2011, pp. 745-46). It also legitimized the language of debates as if debates are the healthiest way to progress in scientific disciplines (de Carvalho, Leira and Johnson, 2011, p. 746). Actually, rather than having a real debate between these two camps, the first debate was constructed and conceived as real. This story of the first debate still continues to influence the discipline's own history (Schmidt, 2013, p. 14).

For some scholars the first debate never occurred and was created by realist school to criticize the theories with which they disagree (Wilson, 1998, p. 1). This debate was marginalized and reduced to only two opposite camps (Ashworth, 2022, p. 33) since in a positivist sense it was thought that the discipline could be considered as scientific only if it is specifically defined and isolated from other disciplines.

The other misleading future of this debate is that it leads us to think that idealism is based on idealist philosophies and realism on realist philosophies. These terms "idealism" and "realism" are generally misused in IR and often confused with ontological positions. Classical Realism in IR theory is ontologically idealist. Because what realism sees out there in international field (nation state, wars, power, human nature, balance of power) is considered as idealistic assumptions that they will exist independent from time and space. The idealist origins of post war realism can be dated back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century idealism (Palan and Blair, 1993, p. 397). Therefore, the first debate between liberalism and realism mislead IR by confusing the concepts of idealism and realism without its meaning in the field of philosophy of science.

But from the perspective of critical realism, if we are accepted that there were only "idealists" and "realists" in that time, their difference was only at the methodological and epistemological level. Even for Morgenthau, the concept of state was taken granted without questioning its foundation (Palan and Blair (1993, p. 398). The realist philosophers in IR had philosophically idealist assumptions about international and the concept of state. Both approaches have the same positivist assumptions about the "international". With the influence of positivism and Enlightenment ideas that based on Hume's account of causation and Kant's disapproval of the ontologically independent world (Patomaki and Wight, 2000, pp. 219-21), both idealism and realism

in IR share similar ontological positions. They both have adopted positivist understanding of science and the discussion of whether IR should be studied scientifically or not did not include the definition of science itself (Wight, 2013, p. 34). Although H. Morgenthau was criticizing idealists, he did not accept that IR could be a science like natural sciences (1947; Yalvaç, 2017b, p. 45).

Both approaches had a commitment to the Westphalian system as the origins of the discipline, the role of the war and the international system based on anarchy and nation-states. They differed only on how to proceed forward in such system. Also, in terms of agent-structure debate, since both share positivism flat ontology that focuses only on empirical level of social world and naturalize the international structure as it is there to be discovered by actors, they both reduce everything to the actor's choices or their perceptions. As we will discuss after, IR has tended to presentism and conceptualism that lead the discipline away from philosophy of science and that keep the myths to be self-evident discipline of social sciences (de Carvalha, Leira and Johnson, 2011, pp. 755; Schmidt, 2013, pp. 8-13).

Thus, the early years of IR and the first debate was mostly concerned with the empirical events and with the problem of preventing wars. And while realists accused idealists, who does not form a homogeneous group of scholars, to be loaded with values and wishful thinking about the world peace, realists also had normative arguments such as maximization of power in an anarchic system or national interest and security. These concepts cannot be considered as value-free but normative claims. As Steve Smith puts, International Relations, when it was emerged, was prescriptive, normative and focused on the decision-makers and it developed as a response to the world events (Smith, 1987, p. 192).

The disciplinary questions were revolved around the problem-solving explanations rather than theorizing the historical ontology of international. The theories and solutions were imported from political sciences but the legitimization of IR was made through isolating it from other disciplines (Rosenberg, 2016, pp. 1,27).

#### **3.4. The Positivist Basis of the Second Debate**

The second debate in the discipline emerged around 1960s between behaviouralism and traditionalism, typically represented in the works of Hedley Bull

(1966) and Mortan Kaplan (1966). It can be said that the discussion on the philosophy of science has been started to take place in that time (Yalvaç, 2017b, p. 45). For behaviouralists, IR could move forward if it followed the methods of natural sciences. The model of science behaviouralists embrace was positivism and its empirical methodology (Kurki and Wight, 2013, p. 18). Traditionalists, on the other hand were criticizing the behaviouralists in that social science and political science is not amenable to the empirical methods of natural science (Knorr and Rosenau, 1969). It was a debate between traditionalist approach and scientific approach (Schmidt, 2013, p. 14).

At first sight, this debate is seen as a philosophical debate on the nature of science. While behaviouralists advocate the application of natural sciences for IR, traditionalists criticize them for social world cannot be studied by the empirical methods of natural sciences (Yalvaç, 2010; 2012; 2014; 2019;). Even there is a debate on the methods to use in political science and IR, there was a consensus on what does “scientific methods” mean. Both behaviouralists and traditionalists, despite their differences, are based on realist perspective and the debate between them took place only at methodological level (Yalvaç, 2017, p.46).

Here again, it is seen that positivism was understood as the only way of doing science. Traditionalists were right to object the empirical methods advocated by positivism but rather than proposing a scientific method which has no relations with positivism, they have rejected being scientific and turned to the classical hermeneutic approaches and isolated self-image of IR. Even after this debate, the positivist’ methods of data collection and the measurement of observables have continued to dominate the discipline (Kurki and Wight, 2013, p. 18).

For critical realism the main reason why the second debate, although it is related to science in some way, remains in the dilemma of accepting or rejecting scientific methods only in a positivist sense is that positivism has failed to distinguish epistemology and ontology since its emergence. The most important impact of the emergence of the positivism as a philosophy of science was its separation between material and ideal world. Since Both Hume and Kant have unlinked the relations of this two, science has emerged on the base of anti-realism and epistemology have

replaced ontology (Patomaki and Wight, 2000, pp. 219-221). This anti-realist and individualistic determinism have never been questioned in the first debate and the discussion between Liberalism and Realism has been made without any interference of philosophy of science into the IR. The uniqueness of the second debate is that the philosophy of science was introduced to IR and the importance of the philosophy of science was legitimized in the discipline (Wight, 2013, p. 36) but with many problems. It is true that positivist understanding of natural science was questioned by traditionalists, including Morgenthau as they accused the behaviouralists by being obsessed with data collection (Kurki and Wight, 2013, p. 18). But they are left to choose either to be positivist and scientific or reject science and methods all together. This was the legacy of positivism (that will be discussed in detail in the fourth chapter). Therefore the dualisms such as science/anti-science, explanation/understanding, rationalism/reflectivism created by Humean and Kantian account of empiricist theories and ontologies have been come to light in the second debate of the history of IR (Patomaki and Wight, 2000, p. 222).

Rather than focusing on stratified ontology of critical realism, both traditionalists and behaviouralists have neglected the ontology of IR and tended to reduce the discipline either to the interpretation of events or field of data collection. As a result the second debate also has reproduced the positivist understanding of science and for many, this debate has had an effect on the very limited level of methodology for IR (Wight, 2013, p. 36). Here again, in the second debate it is seen that the discipline continued to develop without questioning its self-image in social science. In short, second debate, just as the first great debate, has failed to focus on ontology of international and continued to influence the discipline on the basis of positivism.

### **3.5. Inter-paradigm Debate and Commitment to Positivism Continued**

Inter-paradigm debate is different from the other two debates in the history of IR in the sense that it was not related to methodological questions as the first debate implicitly was and the second debate explicitly. Because when the inter-paradigm debate took place in the early 1980s there was a consensus about the question of science and a commitment to positivism (Kurki and Wight, 2010, p. 19). Realists,

pluralists and structuralists have accepted the methodology of positivism, which are data collection, measurement and testing of hypothesis.

The most acceptable reason for the third debate to emerge in 1980s was the fall of realist assumptions about the inter-state relations and international phenomena in 1970s (Schmidt, 2013, p. 14). Therefore, realism was attacked by alternative approaches, especially by Keohane and Nye's complex interdependence theory (1977) and Wallerstein's world system theory (1974).

These critics of realism was assisted by the arguments of Thomas Kuhn. He introduced the inter-paradigm debate to IR through his concepts of paradigm and scientific development (Yalvaç, 2010a, p. 23) For Kuhn, there are two phases of science: revolutionary phase and normal science phase. In revolutionary phase, new paradigms and thought would arise and challenge the classical thinking (Kurki and Wight, 2010, p. 19). In this phase science could not move forward since there are several competing theories. Science, thus knowledge, could only develop under the periods of what he called normal science (Thomas Kuhn, 1962; Kurki and Wight, 2010, p. 19). Kuhn used the term paradigm to define the dominant thought in these periods of normal science. What is interested in this approach is that by arguing that paradigms cannot criticize each other as there is no way to choose between different paradigms, Kuhn has opened the way for alternative theories to exist together without eliminate the others (Yalvaç, 1991). For Waeber, unlike other two debates in IR, the third debate was "seen as a debate not to be won, but a pluralism to live with" (Waeber, 1996, p. 155).

The main issue surrounding the inter-paradigm debate, thus, was its incommensurability of different theories (Kurki and Wight, 2010, p. 19). With Kuhn's different paradigms understanding, competing theories such as traditionalist and scientific approaches (both were the parts of the second debate) can now describe themselves as studying in different paradigms, therefore isolate themselves from any criticism coming from other theories (Kurki, 2013, p. 36).

Moreover, as explained above, the third debate emerged as a challenge to the realism's state-centric assumptions in IR in order to provide alternative approaches. But it resulted with the legitimization of realism again since realism could now portray

itself as it focuses on the state's behaviors, thus it is occupied with different paradigm which cannot be criticized (Yalvaç, 2010a, p. 24). In the end, it can be said that inter-paradigm debate has become the protective barrier of each theories, that protect themselves from both realists and other schools of thought (Guzzini, 1993, p. 473; Wight, 2013, p. 37).

What the inter-paradigm debate and Kuhn's concept of paradigm did in IR is that it only changed the face of epistemological and methodological discussion in the social science and IR and unite every epistemological theory under the same roof by giving them an untouchable safe zone to exist independently. For critical realism, inter-paradigm debate is related to the different aspects in the transitive objects of reality rather than intransitive objects (Yalvaç, 2010a, pp. 24-5). Therefore, Inter-paradigm debate has also stuck in the epistemological level and could not move beyond it towards the ontological field. If we focus only on epistemological level of ontological objects, every paradigm and theory seem different from each other. But in fact, they are just different epistemological approaches of the very same ontological relations of reality.

With the inter-paradigm debate, the philosophy of science has entered the discipline of IR in some way, although the debate was not explicitly about the nature of science. The result of the inter-paradigm debate was the emergence of different, competing and alternative approaches to IR but with the shared positivist understanding of the philosophy of science. From Kuhnian perspective, it was impossible to compare different theories and this has created an uncertainty on scientific development in the discipline by giving relativity to each theory (Yalvaç, 2017b, pp. 48-9). Thus, even in the third debate the main focus was leveled on epistemology and methodology by commitment to positivism. With the influence of Karl Popper (1959) and Imre Lakatos (1970), positivism was accepted as *the* scientific method.

### **3.6. Towards the Fourth Debate in the Light of the First Three Debates**

The language of debate in the history of IR is considered as the main pillars of the discipline and there is almost no IR textbook that does not start with these debates. It is clear that there are advantages of the language of debates for a discipline to

understand its development, focuses, objects of study through years. But it is needed to position these debates in IR with the relations of the developments in the philosophy of science (Yalvaç, 2014, pp. 44-60). From critical realist perspective, the underlying mechanisms and depth ontological conditions for certain debates and theories to rise should be studied. Since every theory is socially constructed and could only occur within certain structural conditions. Otherwise, all debates and the parties in these debates could appear as they are emerging randomly. Therefore, we need to focus the ontological assumptions and positions of these theories in certain debates to understand why they have occurred when and how they occurred.

The most important aspect of these debates is that we cannot completely be sure about the certain boundaries of debates. There is no clear evidence that these debates ever took place (Schmidt, 2013, p. 16). The language of debate itself is a theorization for IR that tries to legitimize the discipline to be scientific in terms of positivist philosophy of science. These three debates inevitable forces scholars to analyze the history of discipline in terms of debates and but move us from questioning the nature of these debates. For instance, why do we have these debates rather than others? Although neorealism and neoliberalism have much more impacts on the development of IR the discussion and competing arguments between these two theories does not counted as one of the great debates in the discipline. Hence, the language of debate and all typologies are to some extent problematic for the discipline's self-conceptualization (Waeber, 1996, p. 149). Therefore, before moving to the fourth debate between positivism and post-positivism it is required to reveal the linkage that lead IR to go into the fourth debate that we are still facing.

The first debate between Liberalism and Realism, though liberalist school of thought compared to the relative consensus among realists has never been occurred, has established the border and the objects of study for IR. Even the first thinkers have only focused on war and the role of states they were based on positivist understanding of science, thus led to the discipline develop through isolated and naturalized concepts such as war, balance of power and even "international" itself. The historical and sociological backgrounds and emerging conditions of such concepts could not be pointed out. From critical realist perspective, positivism has conditioned the early IR scholars to build a discipline on certain concepts without questioning their ontological

emergences. The first debate also has helped the discipline to create a self-image to differentiate itself from other disciplines by the discourse of the myth of 1648 (Benno Teschke, 2003) and of 1919 (Carvalho, Leira and Johnson, 2011). This determined the framework of the basic issues that all other theories had to explain or at least address, and excluded the other approaches from the discipline of IR.

Inter-paradigm debate, through the concept of paradigms that cannot be compared to each other, have created an environment that leads to the structures in which fourth debate between positivism and post-positivism could emerge. Because once every theory and approach have found a place for themselves without being criticized by other theories and approaches in the inter-paradigm debate it was enabled to accept more relativist theories for IR.

## **CHAPTER 4: EXPLANATION OF THE TRAJECTORY OF MAIN DEBATES IN IR**

The classical narrative of the history of IR is based on the great debates. These debates have shaped the framework of the discipline and created a linear understanding of the history of IR. Also, the debates have directed our attention towards only what these debates focused on. Because of the language of debates, only the apparent issues of these debates and their arguments were considered as most important things in IR. What these debates hinder and why IR has developed in this way were often neglected since the historical development of IR is understood in terms of debates. Even the language of debate itself can be misleading to understand a discipline's development but this is a discussion beyond this thesis. The thesis tries to claim that the way of development and construction of the great debates in IR's history are inaccurate to grasp the discipline's development as the current categorization of debates have been influenced by positivism and, as we will see in the following pages, even the positivism/post-positivism debate is another reflection of the legacy of positivism. Therefore, there is a continuity in the history of IR in terms of great debates, although it is claimed that all debates are different and took place in completely different manner.

All debates in the history of IR have been emerged in relation with the existing social structures. They also have been conditioned by these structures in which they emerged from. This means that all three debates have been made possible by existing social structures, thus, could not be emerged randomly. The main focuses, arguments, questions and critics of each debates are related to the certain social structures that are also the result of the previous debates and so on. For instance, these debates and the development of IR theorization cannot be considered independently from the influences of USA and the differentiation of publication systems in USA, Europe and other parts of the world (Waeber, 2010, pp. 312-16; Smith, 1987, 189-205). The rising of USA as a great power in the early 1900s in parallel with the development of capitalist way of production relations has shaped the rise of IR on the basis of positivism that reduce social relations to the observation and quantitative methods.

Another important aspect of the great debates in IR is that, ironically, the three debates that were explained in the previous chapter have shaped the fourth debate between positivism/post-positivism, which is considered as the end of the great debates in IR.\* Even in the fourth debate that challenged positivism explicitly, the legacy of positivism endures. To get out of this unnecessary cycle of positivism and dualisms it created it is needed to go beyond the epistemological level that positivism imprisons every social theory. This is only possible by critical realism since only CR focuses on the ontology and tries to redefine basic concepts that have come to this day without being questioned since the Enlightenment. Otherwise, positivism/post-positivism debate is seen either as another debate that will be replaced by other debate in the future or as the debate that wipes the science out and clears the way for every discourse to exist without comparing them with each other.

This chapter focuses on the positivism/positivism debate which is still ongoing and its relation with previous debates, and then, claims that the history of IR on the base of great debates is misleading and there is a great continuity in terms of philosophy of science which is still been reproduced through positivism/post-positivism debate. Following part of the chapter evaluates the history of IR theorization and explains the possible contribution of CR for future discussions between theories. Here, it will be argued that only the CR can reveal the ontological similarities of the four debates and thus, can take IR theorization forward without losing its disciplinarity and scientific position. Therefore, the origins and development of the fourth debate between positivism/post-positivism will be explained at first. Then using critical realism' concepts the future of IR and its theories will be discussed as a way to go beyond positivism and post-positivism.

#### **4.1. Origins of the Debate Between Positivism and Post-Positivism**

The debate between positivism and post-positivism has been emerged in the 1980s. Actually, this debate has focused more on the issue of science in the history of IR.

---

\* Generally, inter-paradigm debate is not considered as one of the great debates in IR and the positivism/post-positivism debate is called as the third debate. But as we focus on the continuity in the debates in terms of their relations with the philosophy of science and as the inter-paradigm debate is one of the debates that was criticizing positivist understanding of science, inter-paradigm debate is accounted as the third debate and positivism/post-positivism debate as the fourth debate in IR.

Also, positivism/post-positivism debate is known as the debate between explaining and understanding or rationalism and reflectivism (Kurki and Wight, 2010, p. 20). The debate was pioneered by Jim George (1989, pp. 269-79) and Yosef Lapid (1989, pp. 235-54) with the aim of criticizing positivism's assumptions directly. It can be said that positivism has been challenged directly by post-positivist scholars and the scientific nature of IR has been questioned without reducing the discussion into certain theories. In fact, it was Alexander Wendt who opened way for alternative philosophies in IR by focusing on the agent-structure debate (Wendt, 1987, pp. 335-70). Since then, positivism have started lose its legitimacy in IR.

The main question about this debate should be why the discipline of IR has not faced the positivism/post-positivism debate in different period of the history of the discipline or why positivism has not been questioned directly in other debates. The structural conditions in the history of IR, from its emerging as a social science discipline to the paradigm debate, have created a base for the positivism/post-positivism debate to occur in 1980s. This means that positivism could not be challenged in the early years of IR since the scholars and early thinkers that had role in shaping IR have been surrounded by different social structures in which positivism was seen as the only way of doing science and developing a scientific discipline. The social structures have enabled the early thinkers of IR to established the discipline with certain assumptions and aims, which was based on positivism. Therefore, only by critical realism's concept of reality and underlying mechanism it is possible to see the pattern that lead to the positivism/post-positivism debate. Because every debate has resulted in and created a different social structure in the discipline that condition different possible debates. In this sense, inter-paradigm debate, which itself was a result of social structures that have created by previous debates, has made possible positivism/post-positivism debate to emerge. Because inter-paradigm debate has introduced the incommensurability of paradigms for IR and different approaches have started to enter the discipline without being questioned by other approaches.

As a result of the inter-paradigm debate the commitment to science and positivism has been criticized often by reference to Kuhn (Wight, 2013, p. 39). These critical approaches could not exist immediately after the Second World War or between two wars periods. Because they could have been excluded under the influence of the strict

law-like definitions and methodology of positivism. But after the inter-paradigm debate these critical theories could find a way to enter the discipline by criticizing positivism. Therefore, the main focus and the chronology of great debates are also the deeply related to the structure/agency problem in Social Science. But if we analyze the debates through their epistemological and methodological claims there is a high possibility to miss the connection and relations between debates in IR. Critical realism and its focus on ontology and underlying real structural mechanisms give us the most efficient way of comprehending the positivism/post-positivism debate in the history of IR theorization. Because critical realism goes beyond the methodological and epistemological assumptions of theories towards their ontological claims.

#### **4.2. What is the Debate Between Positivism and Post-Positivism About?**

During the 1980s, several post-positivist approaches that were radically critical about the main-stream theories in IR have emerged. It can be said that we are still in the middle of this debate. For Kurki and Wight this debate can be characterized as a debate between explaining and understanding, positivism and post-positivism or between rationalism and reflectivism (Kurki and Wight, 2010, p. 20). As it can be seen, the concepts such as rationalism and explaining are considered as they belong to positivist understanding of science. Therefore, many post-positivists have also challenged the structuralism, ontological realism, causation and even the term science itself as these concepts also have been thought from positivist perspective (Yalvaç, 2017b, p. 51).

The dualism of explaining and understanding was the main motive of Martin Hollis and Steve Smith to analyze the debate between positivism and post-positivism in their famous book called *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Hollis and Smith, 1990; Yalvaç, 2017b, p. 49). This dualism can be extended to another dualism: rationalism and reflectivism. This terminology was introduced by Robert Keohane (1988) to make distinction between rational choice theory that is used mostly by positivist and theories that radically criticize the positivism by emphasizing the non-neutral nature of IR (Kurki and Wight, 2010, p. 24). While explanatory theories based on positivism reduce the reality only to those that can be observed and measured hermeneutic approaches based on post-positivism give priority to meanings, language

and the belief of actors (Kurki and Wight, pp. 20-21). Scientific approaches have advocated the causative analysis to explain international relations but reflectivist theories challenge this understanding by claiming that explaining and causation are not necessary to understand the world politics (Kurki, 2006, p. 189).

The other important aspect of this debate is the acceptance of different realities by positivism and post-positivism. Although it will be argued in the next chapter that both share anthropocentric understanding of reality, they exclude each other because of the different definition of reality. For positivism, only the observable things are 'real' and this account prevents them from analyzing the unobservable things like discourse or social structures or underlying mechanisms (Kurki and Wight, pp. 22). Thus, things that cannot be observed were either excluded or seen as instrumentalist way. But for post-positivism real is defined as language and discourse. For many post-positivists, there is nothing exists independent from discourse (Campbell, 1989, pp. 24-25;).

Even though both positivism and post-positivism have unequal definition of realities and ontologies, the main differentiation of them was mostly epistemological and methodological, rather than ontological (Smith, 2010, p. 5). Rather than redefining some key concepts and questioning the ontology itself, it can be said that post-positivists embrace what is excluded and left by positivism. Therefore, they implicitly have tended to reproduce the mistakes that positivism did. Because they have also focus only on epistemology and methodology, their similarities on the ontological field of philosophy of science have been neglected and they were considered as the opposite side of each other. At this point, critical realism will help us to reveal the ontological similarities of positivism and post-positivism and to establish a scientific IR. Because only critical realism have developed a stratified ontology in which discourse, observable things and inobservable social structures have played important roles. But before we move to critical realism possible contribution to the history of IR theorization and debates, it is needed to show the disadvantages and the limitations of positivism and post-positivism debate that force IR scholars to choose one of them.

#### **4.3. Critical Realist Critique of Positivism and Post-Positivism Debate**

In this section, positivism and post-positivism debate will be criticized by their sharing of same mistake, namely epistemic fallacy. And it will be argued that both

positivism and post-positivist theories reproduce the certain dualisms in science emerged from Humean and Kantian philosophies. Therefore, the main argument of this section is that although post-positivist, post-modernist and post-structuralist theories have separate themselves from previous theories in the great debates in IR regarding their radical criticisms of positivism and science itself, they have been influenced by the legacy of positivism when they attack positivism, thus they continue to reproduce the precedence of epistemology over ontology, this time replacing the positivist anthropocentrism with post-positivist one by reducing the reality only to the discourse and language.

First, the legacy of positivism and its continuity in the debate between positivism and post-positivism will be revealed by using critical realism's arguments about reality, causation, structure, agents and the importance of ontological priority in social science. The aim is to show the limitation and disadvantages of the positivism/post-positivism debate. Following part of the thesis will discuss how social science can (and should) move beyond this dualism of positivism and post-positivism without refusing the scientific research and social change to human emancipation.

#### **4.3.1. Legacy of positivism and the disadvantages of the fourth debate**

Though positivism is generally conceived as a methodology associated by natural sciences on the base of quantitative research, it is a philosophy of science that define the term science itself (Wight, 2006, p. 14). This means that a theory can be counted as scientific only if it uses the premises of positivism. This legacy of positivism still continues even in the fourth debate, the debate directly about the positivism itself. Because all the key concepts in science that are used almost in every scientific research or article were defined and used by positivists since Hume, Kant and Descartes. Structure, causation, reality, knowledge, science, actors are just some of the concepts that were defined by positivists. It is innovative that these concepts are being challenged and questioned by post-positivism. However, there is another legacy of positivism that even post-positivism overlooks and causes a huge inconsistency in post-positivist theorization in IR. It is that post-positivism has also accepted the positivist understanding of science, epistemological priority. Thus, rather than they reconceptualize key concepts, they reject them all.

Before we move to criticize the debate between positivism and post-positivism in terms of how they stuck IR theorization, positivism's key assumptions and definitions that even accepted by post-positivism should be discussed. For they are the main reason why this debate inevitable takes us to dead end rather than to useful and diverse theories as post-positivism claims. Therefore, positivism and its deterministic and static understanding of world and science will be criticized from the point of critical realism.

#### **4.3.1.1. Positivism**

For positivism international relations is based on a close and naturalized system that each state's position and power are recognized by the system and there is not much possibility of the change of this system. Therefore, positivism adopts a flat ontology that reduce objects to their appearances (Wight, philosophy of science, p. 51). This led positivism to claim that there are law-like regularities in international relations that can be explained through the correct methodology (Kolasi, 2016, p. 55). Positivism creates an artificial condition to find regularities in the world and then impose its laws to the open and social world (Joseph, 2006, pp. 349-50). As it is seen, positivism tends to naturalize and historicize the reality and falls into strict determinism in which actors have no power to change the system.

However, the bigger problem lies in positivism's definitions of structure and causation. For more than three hundred years the term causation has been understood in relation to empiricism and used to define the observed patterns of appearances (Kurki, 2007, p. 362, 363). Its root can be dated to Hume's analysis of causation. For Hume, causation is just the conjunction of events that we experience (Patomaki and Wight, 2000, p. 220). Therefore causation as a concept. has been used mostly by positivism to find the law-like regularities in world.

Defining structure and its relations with agents are another legacy of positivism that led post-structuralist to deny the ontological existence of structure. It can be said that there are four different theories that deal with the structure/agent problem and the first three approaches base on positivist understanding of structure (Yalvaç, 2010a, p. 31). Therefore, the concept of structures in International Relation theories have been understood in positivist sense by many post-positivist and post-structuralist theories.

As a result, structures are either reduced to the behaviors of states or used as a instrumentalist way without having real existence or conceived as the result of the interaction with the actors (Yalvaç, 2010a, pp. 31-33).

This positivist approaches of structure, science and causation have important role in the fourth debate between positivism and post-positivism. Since positivism has dominated the philosophy of science and defined the key concepts in its own sake, in the fourth debate all of these concepts have been accepted in positivist sense, thus they have been rejected at all. Here we see that from the first debate to fourth debate positivism has influenced not only the context of the debates but also shape the trajectory of future debates and the framework of the criticism against itself. The post-positivism' critics of positivism is the great example of how positivism is still shaping the discipline even if its directly rejected. Hence, in the light of the criticisms of positivism, we can move on to post-positivism and its relationship with positivism.

#### **4.3.1.2. Post-positivism and its philosophical similarities with positivism**

Post-positivism differentiates itself from positivism's reality in that they define the reality as intersubjective which is depending on language and discourse (Yalvaç, 2010b, p. 6). Post-positivist theories can be categorized as subjectivism, interpretivism, hermeneutic, constructivism and other kinds of anti-realist philosophies (Bunge, 1993, p. 207). They argue that if we do not know the outside world with our knowledge, then we cannot posit that it exists independent from our interpretation of it (Rivas, 2010, p. 210). It seems very different from positivism's empirical claims that only the observable things are real and to *observe* them is the only methodology for science. But we will see that post-positivism has its roots derived from positivism and rather than being a completely different philosophy of science, it only replaces one kind of anti-realism with another one.

Post-positivism also has emerged from the critics of structuralism based on positivist understanding (Yalvaç, 2010a, 32). Positivism does not give an ontological reality to social structures since they are not observable. And for many years system and structure are used as reciprocal and defined as a static and unchangeable pattern in order to find law-like regularities both in natural science and International Relations. Kenneth H. Waltz can be counted as a founder of structural realism in IR but even in

his structuralism structures are just a tool and instrument to explain the state's behaviours (Kolasi, 2016, pp. 140-52). While criticizing Waltz's structuralism and materialism, Alexander Wendt gives importances the sociality and generative features of structures (Joseph, 2010, pp. 56-57). But the problem of Wendt is that he still believes that structures have no effects nor existence without interactions of agents (Wendt, 1992, p. 12). He criticizes Waltz being materialist and neglecting the social aspects of the world (Joseph, 2010, p. 57) because both Waltz and Wendt could not escape from positivist understanding of materialism and structure. For positivism does not deal with the ontological field, every arguments of positivism are at the epistemological level but have impacts on its ontology that even post-positivist and constructivists such as Wendt cannot realize. Therefore, we do not extravagante to say that post-positivism has much more in common with positivism than it differs. They both have anthropocentric understanding of reality, fall into epistemic fallacy by prioritize epistemology over ontology and have flat ontology focusing only on one level of reality, thus melting everything in it.

Because post-positivist theories such as constructivism, post-structuralism, interpretivism and post-colonialism also fall into the epistemic fallacy inherited from positivism, they only replaced determinism embedded in positivism with relativism. As a result of their epistemic fallacy, the ontology of post-positivist theories also have become ontological relativism (Rivas, 2010, p. 209).

Just as positivism reduces reality only to the observable, interpretivist theories reduce reality to discourse and social practices. In other words, for post-structuralists and interpretivists there are nothing real beyond human language and mind. They also reject the possibility of causal and scientific explanation and a-historicize discourses and social practices (Kolasi, 2020, p. 92). What they overlook is that there is difference between the knowledge of reality and reality itself, and that things can exist whether humans are aware of them or not (Yalvaç, 2017b, p. 55). Post-positivism is asking the right questions to the positivism in terms of its ontology. But its answers to these questions is still influenced by positivism. The main reason for this is the legacy of positivism that starts inquiry from epistemology to ontology. It is right to claim that epistemology is constructed. But this does not have to lead us to ontological realism (Bunge, 1993, 215). Thus, under the influence of positivism, post-positivist theories

do not develop IR theorization, it lead discipline to be stick with in ontological relativity in which there is no mean of or need to compare with different theories since they are all individually right and unquestionable for each person who perceives it with his/her own understanding.

#### **4.3.1.3. From IR as a science towards IR as a mere discourse**

The fourth debate is not that much different from the previous three debates if we focus on the ontological assumptions of both sides. Since both share anti-realist ontology (Patomaki and Wight, pp. 216-19) and positivist understanding of causation, structure and science (Kurki, 2006, pp. 199-200). They are different in terms of the epistemological assumptions in that positivism has commitment to epistemological objectivism and post-positivism to epistemological relativity (Rivas, 2010, p. 209). Therefore, just as in the other debates, there is neither an ontological difference nor a questioning.

All the discussion between the positivism and post-positivism is related to the epistemological difference of each side. This time the debate is directly about the “science” itself (Wight and Kurki, 2013, p. 20, 24). This has resulted with the dividing the discipline into new dualisms: science/anti-science, rationalism/reflectivism, explaining/understanding (Wight, 2013, p. 42). This means that post-positivism has not challenged positivism literally, they have chosen to stand at the opposite side of positivism. But reluctantly or unreluctantly, post-positivism has become exactly what it opposes. Post-positivism itself falls into the reification of discourse and linguistic determinism. For discourse is everything for individuals and their actions (Kolasi, 2016, pp. 90-91). As Patomaki and Wight put correctly, “two wrongs do not make a right” (Patomaki and Wight, 2000, 213). They just worsen the develop the discipline of IR.

It is clear that post-positivism has brought a new breath for IR theorization and opened the way for many different approaches to enter the discipline by focusing on different aspect of social world, most of them neglected by positivism. But this does not mean that post-positivism has all the benefits and help scholars to get away from positivism. From a critical realist perspective, the emergence of post-positivist critique of positivism should be historicized and associated with existing social structures that

enable post-positivism to emerge. Moreover, post-positivism cannot be isolated from positivism completely. Rather, it carries many legacies of positivism that cannot be seen when one focuses on only its epistemological relativity. Therefore, it is argued that for the sake of criticizing the positivism, post-positivism distract our focus from science and lead us to new kind of idealism in which there is nothing except the ideas, languages and discourse, and every theory or discourse is equally right or wrong. As a result of this it is perceived that either IR is coming to its end as a scientific discipline or everything we say can be counted as a topic of IR. Shortly, when trying to escape from prison of positivism, the discipline has found itself in the middle of nowhere. It seems that we need to select either be positivist or post-positivist philosophy of science for IR. Because for many post-positivists, the idea of science is still related to positivism (Wight, 2013, p. 41).

With the post-positivist intervention to IR, only the foreign policy analysis based on actors' ideas, discourses and internal worlds are respected as the main topic of IR. Structures, realities and causes are still understood in positivist and determinist sense, thus being neglected. We can say that philosophy of church that explains everything in reference to divinity has ended with the positivism that loaded the human reason with divinity in 17<sup>th</sup> century. The rise of positivism in parallel with Enlightenment movement pioneered by Hume, Kant and Descartes has dominated the field of science by putting the human reason over everything for more than three hundred years. What post-positivism did is the enlargement of this divinity to all individuals. Thus, anti-realism has been reproduced by post-positivism. This enables every individual to legitimize their discourse, language and action without being questioned or opposed. Therefore, post-positivism naturalizes, reifies and un-historicizes the social world by reducing everything to inter-subjective anti-realism. Therefore, the fourth debate and the response from post-positivists are misleading for the development of IR since it directs us to leave science for IR and engage only with the ideas and choices of actors.

#### **4.3.2. Beyond positivism/post-positivism debate**

Positivism/post-positivism debate in IR has created a series of dichotomy for social science, which are misleading and prevent scholars to get away from it. But critical realism directs our focus to move beyond epistemological and methodological individualism shared by both positivism and post-positivism towards ontological realism. Because the rejection of positivist understanding of structure, reality of only observables and Humean causation does not have to follow the rejection of these concepts completely. This is the mistake made by post-positivism. Both philosophies do not grasp the stratified ontology of social and material world and reduce the real to either experiences or discourse. Both transpose the epistemological arguments into ontological ones and assumes that all of existence is susceptible to human cognition (Wight, 2006, p. 28). Therefore, rather than being completely different philosophical stance, both positivism and post-positivism lead us to embrace an anti-realist ontology. This results with the naturalization, mystification and anthropocentrism. On the other hand, critical realism argues that scientific knowledge often goes beyond appearances and contradict the observed outcomes (Wight and Kurki, 2013, p. 25). It offers to look at the underlying structures, generative mechanisms and causative relations that make the appearance possible (Joseph, *Philosophy*, p. 346). Critical realism can have possibilities to move away from the epistemological obstruction created by positivism/post-positivism debate (Kolasi, 2016, p. 71). Only by critical realism International Relations can be studied in a scientific way without positivism and relativism. Depth ontological realism of CR also provide a base for science to possible. Because it means that there will be always something to require explanation and to criticize (Yalvaç, 2010a, p. 36).

Another reason why we need to go beyond positivism/post-positivism debate is that this debate mirrors and reproduce the dualistic world of Kant and Hume, rather than resolve it (Patomaki and Wight, 2000, p. 234). This means that the problem-field of IR is not solved and agent-structure debate still continues since both positivism and post-positivism position themselves in the opposite side of dualisms. For critical realism has stratified ontology, both agents and structures are considered as ontologically distinct and there is no need to reduce one to another. Ontologically structures precede agents because all social actions need a social structure to be

realized. It is the structured nature of world itself that make knowledge possible and meaningful (Wight and Joseph, 2010, p. 24). From this perspective critical realism seems the only philosophy of science that can able to explain both social transformation and the continuing social structures.

Moreover, critical realism's concept of emergence can be useful for IR since international is considered as emerged out of underlying social structures with its own irreducible characteristics (Joseph, 2010, p. 67). With the critical realism's depth ontology and the concept of emergence we can develop a discipline of IR which has relations with other discipline but also have its own irreducible features. Because only critical realism can give IR an ontological existence in complex social world with its own causality and irreducible features that impacts international actors. For instance, when analyzing why a state behaves in a certain way, critical realism directs the focus on the underlying mechanisms that generates the possibilities for states to act (Kolasi, 2016, p. 87). Therefore, critical realism prioritize social structures that enable and limit actors but it rejects the positivism's deterministic understanding of structure and post-positivism's inter-subjectivism.

Another important contribution of CR to IR is its epistemological relativism and judgemental rationalism. Despite its realist ontology claiming that there is an independent world outside from human mind and that the world is stratified, critical realism advocates epistemological relativism and judgemental rationalism. Since our knowledge and our theories about the world is socially constructed and should be take place in certain structure different societies and people can develop different epistemological claims and the knowledge and science that produced socially can be wrong about its object (Wight and Joseph, 2010, p. 13). This means that all of our knowledge can be overturned at some point.

Therefore, there are always more than one theory and knowledge claims about the International Relations and in fact the science of IR can develop only by epistemological relativism. Since our knowledge and theories of international have the potential to be mistaken by other theories, it means that we can improve our theories and knowledge claims about the discipline and there is always room for different theories for IR. Actually, it is this possibility of being wrong make science carries

forward. But it is important to say that critical realism is epistemologically relativist, not the ontologically. Hence, some claims and theories may be better than others for science and theories is about the transitive objects of knowledge and can be compared with the intransitive objects of knowledge.



## CONCLUSION

Theories and debates are essential for any discipline's development and growth. Disciplines themselves are socially constructed and being shaped by social structures. The end of Cold War, for instance, has created a different structure, leading to the emergence of different theories. With the impact of neoliberalism and individualism many micro topics and different aspect of human beings are being discussed in relation with International Relations, such as new gender policies or human rights.

Having different theories focusing on different aspect of international relations is significant for the discipline of IR. But such theories do not emerge overnight. They have social and historical backgrounds. Their emergence and context are related to the social structures and actors' activities in these structures. The language of great debates of theories also have limitations and advantages for IR. Although they reveal main subjects of discussion in different periods in the history of the discipline, they can also move our focus away from some significant questions about the discipline. The most important issue is that the language of great debates break the links between different debates by naturalizing and de-historicizing them. Therefore, one of the main arguments of the thesis has been to draw attention to the importance of socializing and historicizing the main debates of IR by focusing on their ontological assumptions using critical realist philosophy of science. It is argued that critical realism best serves this purpose as it is the main philosophy of science giving priority to ontology.

This argument has been discussed in the context of the positivist / postpositivist debate to demonstrate the shortcomings of both and to indicate to the contribution of critical realism to this debate. Accordingly, the emergence and separation of social science disciplines have been discussed first. In this respect, the thesis argues that positivism as the philosophy of science from Enlightenment era have shaped the scientific discipline's framework and their object of study by forcing discipline to isolate from each other in order to find law-like regularities in their isolated field. Therefore, IR as a social science discipline has been established after the First World War with its object of study that isolate itself from political science or sociology: to find solutions for (and the causes of) war to prevent the future wars. The first theory of IR, namely idealism, is brought to the discipline under these conditions. Whether the first great debate

between idealism and realism was of a philosophical nature, it can be asserted that both were dominated by philosophical and ontological idealism that also shaped the future trajectory of the discipline. Since positivism was the only acceptable way of doing science, neither idealists nor realists can be considered as advocates of scientific IR.

It is not correct that realism has won a victory against liberalism and classical liberal theory was replaced; however, it is true that realist assumptions about the international have gained more importance. Therefore, after the Second World War the role of US on IR theory has particularly increased and a second alternative debate in the discipline has emerged. The second debate between behavioralists and traditionalists was much more about the nature of science. With the impact of the hegemonic activities of US and technological advances, positivism with its data collection methods has pervaded almost all disciplines. Here, the main discussion was not to challenge the positivist understanding of science but whether positivism could be applied for IR (Yalvaç,2010b; 2012). Positivism was taken granted and its dominance was reproduced.

The third debate, the paradigm debate deepened the questions of science. Kuhn has introduced important concepts to the philosophy of science. Even in the third debate, which was completely about science and scientific theories, the link between positivism and science could not be broken. The third debate was emerged in order to criticize the realism in IR. But with the concept of incommensurability of different theories, many theories or narratives have entered the discipline without being criticized and realism also found a way for itself in IR theories. Therefore, rather than challenging the ontological assumptions of positivism and redefine the positivist concepts, the inter-paradigm debate has paved the way for every discourse, ideas and every kind of thought to be considered as IR theory at the expense of losing scientificity of IR. In short, the inter-paradigm debate also did not overcome the positivist understanding of science. Because positivism since 17<sup>th</sup> century has defined not only a methodology or epistemology for science, it also defined what the science is.

The lack of opportunity to compare different theories due to the inter-paradigm debate, post-positivist theories could be introduced into the discipline of IR without being questioned whether their arguments and assumptions are scientific or not. The solution for post-positivist theories was to reject science itself and direct themselves towards ideas, discourses and cultures of each individuals, thus creating infinite subjective realities. As it is seen, it was the result of whole history of IR theorization and the dominance of positivism in each debate that brought the discipline to choose either to be positivist and deterministic or to be completely relativist and reject any kind of structures.

It is true that great debates have made easier to categorize and organize the discipline. Because theories are also shaped by the existing social structures (Ole Waever, 2010, p. 317). By looking at the history of great debates we can, to some extent, understand the focus of the discipline. But with the fourth debate between positivism and post-positivism the language of great debates is decreasing since post-positivism has suppressed any systematic thinking and theories for IR. It seems like the discipline will not need any great debates because of post-positivist intervention to IR theorization, which let any thought and claims enter into the discipline.

Post-positivist critique of positivism also should be understood in terms of the certain structures and underlying mechanisms that enable post-positivism to be the part of fourth debate. It is the dominance of positivism in the history of the philosophy of science and the rise of neoliberalism in 1980s that makes the emergence of post-positivism. But the main problem of the great debates and history of IR is that all the debates, including the positivism/post-positivism debate, could not escape from the mistake of epistemic fallacy, the confusing the epistemology (to be experienced or to be perceived) with the ontology (to be exist).

This does not mean that we need to stop the great debates between theories. Debates and contesting theories help disciplines to develop. But we need to question the ontological assumptions of theories rather than their apparent arguments about the phenomenon of international. It is true that IR is increasingly taking an interdisciplinary form. However, this is not to say that we do not need IR. Contrary, the international aspects of the social world is becoming more important and

influencing the people's life. With the stratified ontology of critical realism every scientific discipline gains irreducible power of their own and at the same time are related to each other. It is the positivism which isolate the disciplines from each other and naturalized them. Critical realism directs us to think more dialectically about both material and intellectual world in which human and sciences take place. As a result, critical realism will pave the way for us to regain the International Relations as a social science discipline with its irreducible characteristic and the power of influence. In this way, the trajectory and focus of the debates in the discipline will shift to a direction that our knowledge about the world will get deeper in order for social transformation and human emancipation.

In short, this thesis tried to show that disciplines and philosophical discussions in disciplines does not generate a linear and progressive pattern about the disciplines. The relations between structures and agents does also apply for scientific disciplines. Because disciplines are socially constructed within certain structures. They do not emerge and develop randomly or without the context. In a critical realist sense, there are dialectical relations between great debates in IR. For instance, the first debate is a result of the dominance of positivism in science generally. But it is also one of the causes for second debate to emerge. Every great debate is conditioned by the social structures and these structures can be transformed or reproduced by actors. Therefore, the emergence, context and trajectory of the great debates in IR are historically and most importantly structurally related to each other.

As a result of the accumulation of all three main debates, the fourth debate has emerged. The criticisms against positivism deepened by subjective approaches with several ontological questions about the nature of positivism. However, post-positivist theories take us from one wrong edge of positivist determinism and objective idealism to the other wrong edge which can be called as subjective idealism. Therefore, the fourth debate between positivism and post-positivism has asked the right questions about positivism but answered them inadequately and wrongly because of the epistemic fallacy that post-positivism falls into. As a result, the discipline has been moved to ontological relativism and lost its place as science. Idealism has been resurrected by subjective theories but this time with an endless reality based on everyone's own interpretation and subjectivity.

Critical realism, on the other hand, shows post-positivist theories did not solve the problem of the ontology of IR since their “discourse” about the focus on ontology hides their “real” ontological positions. According to critical realism, post-positivist theories based on subjective realities and hermeneutics still confuse the reality of object with the knowledge of objects. It is true that our knowledge and our thinking are constructed but this does not follow that the reality consist only of what we think or perceive. Therefore, the discipline of IR cannot be reduced to decision making process or actors’ choices. International aspect of social world has irreducible powers, unique features and impacts to actors. What IR need is a holistic and irreducible ontological position in social sciences and that only be possible by critical realism rather than post-positivism’s relativistic and unscientific interpretivism.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anievas, A. & Martin K. (2015). Introduction: Historical sociology, world history and the 'problematic of the international'. In A. Anievas & K. Martin (Eds.), *Historical Sociology and World History Uneven and Combined Development over the Longue Durée* (pp. 1-16). Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd.
- Anievas, A. (2015). The First World War and the Making of Modern World Politics. In A. Anievas (Ed), *Cataclysm 1914: The First World War and the Makin of Modern World Politics* (1-20). Brill.
- Archer, M. (1998). Introduction: Realism in the social sciences. In M. Archer, R. Bhaskar, A. Collier, T. Lawson, & A. Norrie (Eds.), *Critical Realism: Essential Readings* (pp. 189-206). Routledge.
- Ashworth, L. (2002). Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Ever Happen? A Revisionist History of International Relations. *International Relations* 16(1), 33-51.
- Bhaskar, R. (1998). *The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences* (3rd ed.). Routledge.
- Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A Realist Theory of Science*. Routledge.
- Burchill, S. & Linklater, A (2013). Introduction. In S. Burchill, A. Linklater, R. Devetak, J. Donnelly, T. Nardin, M. Paterson, C. Reus-Smit, J. True (Eds.), *Theories of International Relations* (pp. 1-31). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Buzan, Barry & Lawson, G. (2013). Global Transformation: The Nineteenth Century and the Making of Modern International Relations. *International Studies Quarterly* 57(3), 620-634.
- Callinicos, A., & Bhaskar, R. (2003). Marxism and Critical Realism, *Journal of Critical Realism*, 1(2), 89-114.
- Collier, A. (1994) *Critical Realism An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar's Philosophy*. London, Verso.
- Creaven, S. (2000). *Marxism and Realism: A materialistic application of realism in the social sciences*. Routledge.
- de Carvalho, B., Leira, H., & Hobson, J. M. (2011). The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919. *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* 39(3), 735-758.
- Dean, K., Joseph, J., Michael, J. R., & Wight, C. (2006). Realism, Marxism and method. In K. Dean, J. Joseph, J. R. Michael, & C. Wight (Eds.). *Realism, Philosophy and Social Science*, (pp. 1-31). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Dessler, D. (1989). What's at stake in the agent-structure debate? *International Organization*, 43(3), 441-473.
- Elder-Vaas, D. (2005). Emergence and the Realist Account of Cause. *Journal of Critical Realism*, 4(2), 315-338.

- Elder-Vaas, D. (2012). Toward a realist social constructionism. *Sociologica, Problemas e Práticas*, 70, 5-24.
- George, J. (1989). International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate. *International Studies Quarterly*, 33(3), 269-279.
- Guilhot, N. (2011). Introduction: One Discipline, Many Histories. In N. Guilhot (Ed.). *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 1954 Conference on Theory*, (1-32). Columbia University Press.
- Hoffmann, S. (1977). An American Social Science: International Relations. *Daedalus* 106(3), 41-59.
- Joseph, J. (1998) In Defence of Critical Realism. *Capital & Class*, 22(2), 73-106.
- Joseph, J. (2007) Philosophy in International Relations: A Scientific Approach. *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 35(2), 345-359.
- Joseph, J. (2010). The international as emergent: Challenging old and new orthodoxies in international relations theory. In J. Joseph & C. Wight (Eds.), *Scientific Realism and International Relations*, (pp. 51-68). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kolasi, K. (2016). *Uluslararası Politikanın Yapısal Teorisi*. Ankara, Siyasal Kitabevi.
- Kolasi, K. (2020). Postyapısalcılığın Söylemsel Ontolojisinin Eleştirisi: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Söylem Dışı Alan ve Eleştirel Gerçekçilikç *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 17(65), 83-100.
- Kurki, M. (2006). Causes of a divided discipline: rethinking the concept of cause in International Relations. *International Studies*, 32(2), 189-216.
- Kurki, M. (2007). Critical Realism and Causal Analysis in International Relations: Cause All the Way Down. *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 35(2), 361-378.
- Kurki, M., & Wight, C. (2010). International relations and social science. In T. Dunne, M. Kurki & S. Smith (Eds.), *International Relations Theory* (pp. 14-35). Oxford University Press.
- Lapid, Y. (1989). The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era. *International Studies Quarterly*, 33(3), 235-254.
- Leon, D. (2010). Reductionism, emergence and explanation in international relations theory. In J. Joseph & C. Wight (Eds.), *Scientific Realism and International Relations*, (pp. 31-50). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Loughlin, N. (2012). The Benefits and Disadvantages of Post-positivism in International Theory. Retrieved 12 November 2021, from <https://www.e-ir.info/2012/01/20/what-are-the-benefits-and-disadvantages-of-post-positivism-for-international-theory>
- Palan, R. and Brook M. Blair. (1993). On the Idealist Origins of the Realist Theory of International Relations. *Review of International Studies*, 19(4), 385-399.

- Patomäki, H. (1991). Concepts of “Action”, “Structures” and “Power” in “Critical Social Realism”: A Positive and Reconstructive Critique. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 21(2), 221-250.
- Patomäki, H., & Wight, C. (2000). After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism. *International Studies Quarterly*, 44(2), 213-237.
- Rivas, J. (2010). Realism For *real this time*: Scientific realism is not a compromise between positivism and interpretivism. In J. Joseph & C. Wight (Eds.), *Scientific Realism and International Relations*, (pp. 203-227). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rosenberg, J. (1990). What’s the matter with realism? *Review of International Studies*, 16, 285-303.
- Rosenberg, J. (2006). Why is There No International Historical Sociology? *European Journal of International Relations*, 12(3), 307-340.
- Rosenberg, J. (2016). International relations in the prison of Political Science. *International Relations*, 30(2), 1-27.
- Schmidt, B. C. (1994). The Historiography of Academic International Relations. *Review of International Studies* 20(4), 349-367.
- Schmidt, B. C. (2000). Resurrecting International Political Theory. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29(1), 153-163.
- Schmidt, B. C. (2002). Anarchy, World Politics and the Birth of the Discipline: American International Relations, Pluralist Theory and Myth of Interwar Idealism. *International Relations* 16(1), 9-31.
- Smith, S. (1987). Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science. *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 16(2), 189-206.
- Smith, S. (1992). The Forty Years’ Detour: The Resurgence of Normative Theory in International Relations. *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 21(3), 489-506.
- Smith, S. (2010). Introduction: Diversity and disciplinarity in international relations theory. In T. Dunne, M. Kurki & S. Smith (Eds.), *International Relations Theory* (pp. 1-13). Oxford University Press.
- Smith, S., Booth, K., & Zalewski, M. (Eds.). (1996). *International theory: positivism and beyond*, Cambridge University Press.
- Waeber, O. (1998). The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations. *International Organization* 52(4), 687-727.
- Waeber, O. (2010). Still a discipline after all these debates. In T. Dunne, M. Kurki & S. Smith (Eds.), *International Relations Theory* (pp. 306-328). Oxford University Press.
- Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Addison-Wesley.

- Wendt, A. (1987). The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory. *International Organization*, 41(3), 335-370.
- Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Wight, C. (2006) Realism, science and emancipation. In K. Dean, J. Joseph, J. R. Michael, & Wight, C. (Eds.). *Realism, Philosophy and Social Science*, (pp. 32-64). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wight, C. (2006). Agents, Structures and International Relations. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Wight, C. (2007). A Manifesto for Scientific Realism in IR: Assuming the Can-Opener Won't Work! *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 35(2), 379-398.
- Wight, C. (2013). Philosophy of Social Science and International Relations. In W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, Beth. A. Simmons (Eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (pp. 29-56). London, Sage.
- Wight, C., & Joseph, J. (2010). Scientific realism and international relations. In J. Joseph & C. Wight (Eds.), *Scientific Realism and International Relations*, (pp. 1-30). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Williams, M. C. (2005). *The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations*. Cambridge.
- Wilson, P. (1998). Myth of the First Great Debate. *Review of International Studies* 24(5), 1-16.
- Yalvaç, F. (1991). The Sociology of the State and the Sociology of International Relations. In Martin Shaw and Michael Banks (eds.). *State and Society in International Relations* (pp. 111-113). Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Yalvaç, F. (2010a). Critical realism, international relations theory and Marxism. In J. Joseph & C. Wight (Eds.), *Scientific Realism and International Relations*, (pp. 167-185). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Yalvaç, F. (2010b). Eleştirel Gerçekçilik: Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramında Post-Pozitivizm Sonrası Aşama. *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 6(24), 3-27.
- Yalvaç, F. (2012). Uluslararası ilişkilerde temel tartışmalar ve eleştirel gerçekçilik. In T. Arı (ed.), *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Post Modern Analizler – 1*, (pp. 1-37). MKM Yayıncılık.
- Yalvaç, F. (2013) Tarihsel Sosyoloji ve Uluslararası İlişkiler: Jeopolitik, Kapitalizm ve Devletler Sistemi. *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 10(38), 3-28.
- Yalvaç, F. (2014). Uluslararası tarihsel sosyoloji yapı, tarih ve diyalektik. In T. Arı (Ed.), *Postmodern Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri 2: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Eleştirel Yaklaşımlar* (pp. 306-338). MKM Yayıncılık.
- Yalvaç, F. (2017a). *Marksizm ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramları*. Ankara, İmge Kitabevi.

Yalvaç, F. (2017b). Uluslararası İlişkilerde Teori Kavramı ve Temel Teorik Tartışmalar. In R. Gözen (Ed.). *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri*, (31-65). İletişim Yayınları.

Yalvaç, F. (2018). *Tarihsel Sosyoloji ve Uluslararası İlişkiler*. Ankara, Nika Yayın



## TURNITIN REPORT

20317511005 Ogulcan Köksal Master Thesis

### ORJİNALLİK RAPORU

% **8**

BENZERLİK ENDEKSİ

% **7**

İNTERNET KAYNAKLARI

% **4**

YAYINLAR

% **2**

ÖĞRENCİ ÖDEVLERİ

### BİRİNCİL KAYNAKLAR

<b>1</b>	<b>Submitted to Atilim University</b> Öğrenci Ödevi	% <b>1</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>epdf.pub</b> İnternet Kaynağı	% <b>1</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>www.scribd.com</b> İnternet Kaynağı	<% <b>1</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>archive.org</b> İnternet Kaynağı	<% <b>1</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>docshare.tips</b> İnternet Kaynağı	<% <b>1</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>vdoc.pub</b> İnternet Kaynağı	<% <b>1</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>library.unisel.edu.my</b> İnternet Kaynağı	<% <b>1</b>
<b>8</b>	<b>J. Joseph. "In Defence of Critical Realism", Capital &amp; Class, 01/01/1998</b> Yayın	<% <b>1</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>theses.lse.ac.uk</b> İnternet Kaynağı	<% <b>1</b>

10 [www.aghalibrary.com](http://www.aghalibrary.com) <% 1  
İnternet Kaynağı

11 [epdf.tips](http://epdf.tips) <% 1  
İnternet Kaynağı

12 [idr.abu.edu.ng](http://idr.abu.edu.ng) <% 1  
İnternet Kaynağı

13 [hdl.handle.net](http://hdl.handle.net) <% 1  
İnternet Kaynağı

14 Hasan Yükselen. "Strategy and Strategic Discourse in Turkish Foreign Policy", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2020 <% 1  
Yayın

15 [www.e-ir.info](http://www.e-ir.info) <% 1  
İnternet Kaynağı

16 Submitted to Regent's College <% 1  
Öğrenci Ödevi

17 TORSTEN MICHEL. "In Heidegger's shadow: a phenomenological critique of Critical Realism", Review of International Studies, 2012 <% 1  
Yayın

18 [core.ac.uk](http://core.ac.uk) <% 1  
İnternet Kaynağı

19 [dlib.scu.ac.ir](http://dlib.scu.ac.ir) <% 1  
İnternet Kaynağı

[ebin.pub](http://ebin.pub)

20	İnternet Kaynađı	<% 1
21	oxfordre.com İnternet Kaynađı	<% 1
22	unsworks.unsw.edu.au İnternet Kaynađı	<% 1
23	www.researchgate.net İnternet Kaynađı	<% 1
24	studylib.net İnternet Kaynađı	<% 1
25	Maren Wagner. "Social Emergence in International Relations", Springer Nature, 2016 Yayın	<% 1
26	repository.bilkent.edu.tr İnternet Kaynađı	<% 1
27	www.tandfonline.com İnternet Kaynađı	<% 1
28	datospdf.com İnternet Kaynađı	<% 1
29	www.cssforum.com.pk İnternet Kaynađı	<% 1
30	Submitted to University of Malaya Öđrenci Ödevi	<% 1

31	<a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com">onlinelibrary.wiley.com</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
32	<a href="http://scholar.sun.ac.za">scholar.sun.ac.za</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
33	<a href="http://www.db-thueringen.de">www.db-thueringen.de</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
34	<a href="http://amsdottorato.unibo.it">amsdottorato.unibo.it</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
35	<a href="http://core-cms.prod.aop.cambridge.org">core-cms.prod.aop.cambridge.org</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
36	<a href="http://orca.cf.ac.uk">orca.cf.ac.uk</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
37	<a href="http://vdocuments.site">vdocuments.site</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
38	A.J. Paolini. "Foucault, realism and the power discourse in international relations", Australian Journal of Political Science, 2007 Yayın	<% 1
39	Juha Käpylä, Harri Mikkola. "A Critical Look at Critical Realism: Some Observations on the Problems of the Metatheory", World Political Science, 2010 Yayın	<% 1
40	TORSTEN MICHEL. "Pigs can't fly, or can they? Ontology, scientific realism and the	<% 1

metaphysics of presence in international relations", Review of International Studies, 2009

Yayın

41	<a href="http://documents.aucegypt.edu">documents.aucegypt.edu</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
42	<a href="http://dspace.lboro.ac.uk">dspace.lboro.ac.uk</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
43	<a href="http://pure.manchester.ac.uk">pure.manchester.ac.uk</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
44	<a href="http://www.defence.lk">www.defence.lk</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
45	<a href="http://www.oxfordpoliticstrove.com">www.oxfordpoliticstrove.com</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
46	Michiel van Ingen. "Conflict Studies and Causality: Critical Realism and the Nomothetic/Idiographic Divide in the Study of Civil War", Civil Wars, 2017 Yayın	<% 1
47	<a href="http://acikbilim.yok.gov.tr">acikbilim.yok.gov.tr</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
48	<a href="http://theses.whiterose.ac.uk">theses.whiterose.ac.uk</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
49	"Scientific Realism and International Relations", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2010	<% 1

Yayın

- 
- 50 Submitted to University of New South Wales <% 1  
Öğrenci Ödevi
- 
- 51 Submitted to University of Sheffield <% 1  
Öğrenci Ödevi
- 
- 52 Submitted to Cardiff University <% 1  
Öğrenci Ödevi
- 
- 53 Submitted to University of Bristol <% 1  
Öğrenci Ödevi
- 
- 54 Submitted to University of St. Gallen <% 1  
Öğrenci Ödevi
- 
- 55 Faruk Yalvaç. "Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy: A Critical Realist Analysis", Turkish Studies, 2014 <% 1  
Yayın
- 
- 56 H. PATOMAKI. "How to Tell Better Stories about World Politics", European Journal of International Relations, 03/01/1996 <% 1  
Yayın
- 
- 57 eprints.soas.ac.uk <% 1  
İnternet Kaynağı
- 
- 58 C. Heine. "Sleeping Beauty and the Dialectical Awakening: On the Potential of Dialectic for International Relations", Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 06/01/1996 <% 1  
Yayın
-

59	Caroline Kuhn. "Chapter 8 Exploring Possible Worlds: Open and Participatory Tools for Critical Data Literacy and Fairer Data Culture", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2023 Yayın	<% 1
60	Christian Kimmich, Ferdinand Wenzlaff. "The Structure–Agency Relation of Growth Imperative Hypotheses in a Credit Economy", New Political Economy, 2021 Yayın	<% 1
61	Submitted to Dublin City University Öğrenci Ödevi	<% 1
62	JONATHAN JOSEPH. "Hegemony and the structure-agency problem in International Relations: a scientific realist contribution", Review of International Studies, 2008 Yayın	<% 1
63	Kathryn Dean, Jonathan Joseph, John Michael Roberts, Colin Wight. "Realism, Philosophy and Social Science", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2006 Yayın	<% 1
64	afrasia.ryukoku.ac.jp İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
65	ejpap.revues.org İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1

66	<a href="http://jultika.oulu.fi">jultika.oulu.fi</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
67	<a href="http://philpapers.org">philpapers.org</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
68	<a href="http://www.markfoster.net">www.markfoster.net</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
69	<a href="http://www.polito.ubbcluj.ro">www.polito.ubbcluj.ro</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
70	<a href="http://www.scielo.br">www.scielo.br</a> İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
71	Anthony Leysens. "The Critical Theory of Robert W. Cox", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2008 Yayın	<% 1
72	David J. F. Maree. "Realism and Psychological Science", Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2020 Yayın	<% 1
73	F. Chernoff. "Critical Realism, Scientific Realism, and International Relations Theory", Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 03/01/2007 Yayın	<% 1
74	Jonathan Pass. "Gramsci meets emergentist materialism: Towards a neo neo-gramscian	<% 1

perspective on world order", Review of  
International Studies, 2018

Yayın

---

75 Lisa Dühring. "Reassessing the Relationship  
between Marketing and Public Relations",  
Springer Science and Business Media LLC,  
2017

Yayın

---

76 MILJA KURKI. "Causes of a divided discipline:  
rethinking the concept of cause in  
International Relations theory", Review of  
International Studies, 2006

Yayın

---

77 [dspace.cuni.cz](https://dspace.cuni.cz)

İnternet Kaynağı

---

78 [historyandtheory.blogspot.co.uk](http://historyandtheory.blogspot.co.uk)

İnternet Kaynağı

---

79 [jfsdigital.org](http://jfsdigital.org)

İnternet Kaynağı

---

80 [journals.sagepub.com](http://journals.sagepub.com)

İnternet Kaynağı

---

81 [ndl.ethernet.edu.et](http://ndl.ethernet.edu.et)

İnternet Kaynağı

---

82 [open.library.ubc.ca](http://open.library.ubc.ca)

İnternet Kaynağı

---

[ora.ox.ac.uk](http://ora.ox.ac.uk)

83	Internet Kaynağı	<% 1
84	pdfcoffee.com Internet Kaynağı	<% 1
85	researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz Internet Kaynağı	<% 1
86	scholars.wlu.ca Internet Kaynağı	<% 1
87	ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk Internet Kaynağı	<% 1
88	ujdigispace.uj.ac.za Internet Kaynağı	<% 1
89	www.etd.ceu.edu Internet Kaynağı	<% 1
90	www.mgdc-chararisharief.com Internet Kaynağı	<% 1
91	wydawnictwo.ignatianum.edu.pl Internet Kaynağı	<% 1
92	Emmanuel Navon. "The 'third debate' revisited", Review of International Studies, 2001 Yayın	<% 1
93	Jonathan Joseph. "A Realist Theory of Hegemony", Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 2001	<% 1

94	Tanja E Aalberts, Rens van Munster. "From Wendt to Kuhn: Reviving the 'Third Debate' in International Relations", International Politics, 2008 Yayın	<% 1
95	Brian C. Schmidt. "Lessons from the Past: Reassessing the Interwar Disciplinary History of International Relations", International Studies Quarterly, 9/1998 Yayın	<% 1
96	Richard Saull. "Capital, Race and Space, Volume I", Brill, 2023 Yayın	<% 1
97	Scott Hamilton. "A genealogy of metatheory in IR: how 'ontology' emerged from the inter-paradigm debate", International Theory, 2016 Yayın	<% 1
98	Yalvac, F.. "Strategic Depth or Hegemonic Depth? A Critical Realist Analysis of Turkey's Position in the World System", International Relations, 2012. Yayın	<% 1
99	livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk İnternet Kaynağı	<% 1
100	Submitted to University of St Andrews Öğrenci Ödevi	<% 1

## CURRICULUM VITAE

**Name and Surname:** Oğulcan Köksal

**Place and Date of Birth:**

**Education:**

Degree	Field	University	Year
Undergraduate	International Relations	Ankara University	2015-2019
Graduate	International Relations	Atilm University	2020-

**Work Experience:**

Work Place	Position	Year
Social Science University of Ankara	Research Assistant	2022-

**Foreign Language:** English (YDS: 90,000)

**Publication:**

**E-mail:**

**Phone:**

**Date:** 25.05.2023