

T.C.
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SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
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ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER BİLİM DALI

**GÖÇ YÖNETİMİNİN YÖNETİŞİMİNE POLİTİK EKONOMİK YAKLAŞIM:
EGE DENİZİ ÖRNEĞİ**

Doktora Tezi

DİLAL ALGAN TEZCAN

İstanbul, 2022

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DİL A LGAN TEZCAN

TEZ DANIŞMANI: DOÇ. DR. SUNA GÜLFER İHLAMUR-ÖNER

İstanbul, 2022

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ÖZET

Uluslararası göç ekonomik kaygılar, siyasi baskı, savaşlar, çevresel felaketler, yoksulluk veya kıtlık gibi birden çok nedenle ilişkilendirilebilen ve siyasi, ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel alanlarda sonuçları olan kapsamlı ve çok yönlü bir olgudur. Uluslararası göçün yarattığı sonuçlar neoliberal küreselleşme çağında, özellikle göç hareketlerinin göç krizlerine evrildiği bu dönemde daha gözle görülür hale gelmiştir. Devletlerin diğer devletlerle ve devlet-dışı aktörlerle bir araya gelerek göç akımlarını düzenleme ve göç krizlerine çare arama çabaları küresel göç yönetişimi çatısı altında gerçekleştirilmektedir. Ancak ne var ki bu çalışma, uluslararası göç alanının belli bir dönemine odaklanarak devletlerin diğer devletlerle ve devlet-dışı aktörlerle bir araya gelerek yürüttüğü girişimlerin göç yönetişimi değil, göç yönetiminin yönetişimi olduğunu ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu girişimler tam anlamıyla küresel göç yönetişimine tekabül etmemektedir, ancak bu girişimlerin sonucunda ortaya devletlerin, uluslararası örgütlerin, sivil toplum kuruluşlarının ve özel şirketlerin göç yönetimi süreçlerine dahil olduğu ve her gün büyüyen bir göç endüstrisi çıkmaktadır.

Avrupa Birliği üye devletlerinin 2015 yılında deneyimlediği göçmen krizi bölgede yer alan devletlerin birbirleriyle ve devlet-dışı aktörlerle kurdugu bölgesel ve ikili ilişkileri incelemek adına örnek olay çalışması olarak seçilmiştir. Bu kapsamında Türkiye, Yunanistan ve üyesi olduğu Avrupa Birliği arasında yaşanan Ege bölgesi, bir diğer deyişle Doğu Akdeniz göç krizinin yönetilmesi ve sonrasında bölgede gelişen göç endüstrisi içinde kurulan bölgesel ve ikili ilişkiler politik ekonomik yaklaşımla ele alınmaktadır. Uluslararası göç meselesinin küresel politik ekonomik çerçeveye yerleştirilmeden anlaşlamayacağı ana fikrinden yola çıkan bu tez çalışmasında Ege bölgesi örnek olayından yararlanılarak devletlerin ve devlet-dışı aktörlerin işbirliklerinin göç yönetiminin yönetişimi olarak kavramsallaştırılması önerilmektedir.

GENERAL INFORMATION

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ABSTRACT

International migration is a comprehensive and multifaceted phenomenon that can be associated with multiple reasons such as economic concerns, political pressure, wars, environmental disasters, poverty or famine and has consequences in political, economic, social and cultural areas. The consequences of international migration have become more visible in the era of neoliberal globalization, especially in this period when migration movements have evolved into migration crises. The efforts of states to regulate migration flows and find solutions to migration crises by coming together with other states and non-state actors are carried out under the umbrella of global migration governance. However, this study, focusing on a certain period of the international migration field, aims to reveal that the initiatives carried out by states with other states and non-state actors are not migration governance, but the governance of migration management. These initiatives do not literally correspond to global migration governance, but the result of these initiatives is an ever-developing migration industry, in which governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and private companies are involved in migration management processes.

The migrant crisis experienced by the European Union Member States in 2015 has been chosen as a case study in order to examine the regional and bilateral relations established by the states in the region with each other and non-state actors. In this context, the management of Aegean region migration crisis, in other words, the Eastern Mediterranean crisis between Turkey, Greece and the European Union, of which Greece is a member state, and the regional and bilateral relations established within the migration industry that developed in the region afterward are discussed with a political economic approach. Based on the main idea that the issue of international migration cannot be understood without placing it in the global political economic framework, in this thesis, it is suggested to conceptualize the cooperation of states and non-state actors as the governance of migration management, using the case study of the Aegean region.

ÖNSÖZ

2017 yılında başladığım doktora programı boyunca ders döneminden bu tezin ortaya çıkışına ve tamamlanmasına kadar geçen süreç içinde destegini bir an olsun benden esirgemeyen, değerli görüşleriyle tezimin gelişmesine büyük katkı sağlayan çok değerli hocam ve danışmanım Doç. Dr. Suna Gülfer Ihlamer-Öner'e verdiği tüm emekler için sonsuz teşekkür ederim. Doktora tez izleme komitelerimde yer alarak tezimin her aşamasında kıymetli görüşlerini ve önerilerini sunan değerli hocalarım Prof. Dr. Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu'na ve Doç. Dr. N. Aslı Şirin'e çok teşekkür ederim. Doktora tez savunma jürimde yer alarak doktora tezimi başarıyla tamamlamama vesile olan, değerli önerilerini benimle paylaşan çok kıymetli hocalarım Doç. Dr. Gonca Oğuz Gök'e ve Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Merve Hazer Yiğit Uyar'a katkılarından dolayı teşekkürlerimi sunarım.

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Eğitim hayatım boyunca verdığım tüm kararlarda yanında olan, desteklerini benden esirgemeyen ve varlıklıyla beni asla yalnız bırakmayan annem Hale Algan'a ve babam Cengiz Algan'a sonsuz teşekkür ederim. Varlığıyla, desteğiyle, bilgi birikimiyle ve gösterdiği yolla sadece eğitim hayatımı değil tüm yaşamıma ışık tutan ablam Av. Dilşad Algan'a sonsuz teşekkür ederim.

Bu uzun ve zorlu yola çıkmaya karar verdığım andan itibaren bu yolda benimle birlikte yürüyen, desteğiyle yanında olan, umutsuzluk anlarında verdiği morale yüzümü güldüren ve beni bir an olsun yalnız bırakmayan eşim Can Tezcan'a sabrı, sevgisi ve desteği için çok teşekkür ederim.

Doktora tez yazım sürecinde dünyaya getirdiğim oğlum Tuna Tezcan, gülen yüzüne hayata kattığın tüm güzellikler için minnettarım.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMIF	Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund
BIRN	Balkan Investigative Reporting Network
CCACs	Closed Controlled Access Centers
CEO	Corporate Europe Observatory
DG ECHO	Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
ESI	Emergency Support Instrument
ESSN	Emergency Social Safety Net
ESTIA	Emergency Support to Integration and Accommodation
EU	European Union
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force Mediterranean
EUROPOL	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
FRIT	Facility for Refugees in Turkey
GCIM	Global Commission on International Migration
GCM	Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
GFMD	Global Forum on Migration and Development
HELIOS	Hellenic Integration Support for Beneficiaries of International Protection
IBM	Immigration and Border Management
IBMF	Integrated Border Management Fund
ILO	International labor Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IOs	International Organizations
IPA	Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance

ISF	Internal Security Fund
MiGOF	Migration Governance Framework
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDICI	Neighbourhood, Developement and International Cooperation Instrument
NGOs	non-governmental organizations
NIROMP	New International Regime for Orderly Movements of People
PMM	Presidency of Migration Management
RABIT	Rapid Border Intervention Teams
RCP	Regional Consultative Processes
RIC	reception and identification centers
SMS	Site Management Support
TED	Tenders Electronic Daily
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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INTRODUCTION

In the words of Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, the age of migration we live in is one of the most important phenomena that determines modern times. The term age of migration emphasizes the global character of migration, which has accelerated like never before since the 1945 post-war period. This globality characteristic has reached such a level that it not only separates the migration of modern times from all migration processes in the past, but also causes political, economic, social, and cultural consequences on the three main actors of migration, namely, migrant, migrant-sending country, and migrant-receiving country. To illustrate this situation with numbers, while the world population was 2.5 billion in the post-war period, this number reached 7.8 billion in 2020. The number of international migrants in this population has increased from 60 million to 280 million, and according to IOM's estimates, the number of international migrants is estimated to be 405 million in 2050. The reasons that lead people to migrate are numerous and all are the result of an ongoing historical accumulation in relation to each other. In its simplest form, globalization progressed in parallel with colonialism, capitalism, and imperialism, and it underwent significant transformations in political, economic, and sociocultural fields, first in the post-war period and secondly in the post-1980 period. The positive and negative consequences of these transformations constitute the causes of international migration. It should be underlined that after 1990, globalization progressed in parallel with neoliberalism. Because neoliberal policies were the remedy for the deadlocks of the welfare state in the international division of labor created after colonialism and industrial revolution. Therefore ultimately, the crushing of developing countries, which were forced to keep up with neoliberal policies, under international competition, local conflicts, civil wars, geopolitical threats, environmental disasters, poverty, and hunger, resulted in an intensification of global migration in the 21st century.

In the neoliberal globalization that intensified towards the end of the 20th century, a multi-actor structure developed in contrast to the state-centered structure in the previous period: nation-state, international organizations and institutions, supranational institutions, local governments, civil society organizations, and private companies are

the main ones. The globalization process is shaped as a result of the mutual interaction between these actors, in other words, transboundary issues that states cannot deal with alone in the field of international politics come together with other states and non-state actors and seek solutions, revealing the global governance process. Transboundary issues that are the subject of global governance processes are climate change, international migration, international market and trade, transnational crimes, terrorism, pandemia, and so on. In this context, for example, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade had been established and then turned into the World Trade Organization for the regulation of international trade, or an international regime on climate change emerged. However, when it comes to global migration, the economic and security concerns created by the developments experienced by the migrant-receiving states from the middle of the 20th century to the first quarter of the 21st century (the Second World War, the oil crisis, the end of the Cold War, the 11 September attacks and other terrorist attacks, the 2008 economic crisis, and the 2015 migrant crisis) have caused policies in the field of migration to remain at the center of the nation-state rather than shifting to a global and transnational scale, and global migration governance has remained limited. In other words, as every single state will want to control the mobility of people across its borders and want to decide which entry is permitted or not, they would be reluctant to reduce their authority to regulate migration via international institutions and regimes. At the same time, the conflict of power and interest between the global north and the global south prevents states from participating in migration governance on a global scale. In this case, it must be said that states are more satisfied with participating in migration cooperation at a regional and bilateral level rather than at a global level, with cooperating in an informal and non-binding way rather than formal and binding way. On the one hand, states are not willing to give up control in the field of migration, but on the other hand, they find it easier to transfer their migration-related responsibilities to supranational or non-state actors with bilateral and regional cooperation with the manageability mentality of migration. This mentality that migration is manageable causes migration governance to remain limited, non-binding, uncoordinated, and fragmented without any uniform institutional body. On the one hand, readmission agreements, commercial agreements, investment and financial supports within the scope of regional and bilateral cooperation increase, on the other hand, the migrant-receiving

states give priority to more qualified and educated migrants in the employment of migrant labor and encourage regular migration. However, despite all these efforts of migrant-receiving states, issues such as the intensification of irregular migration flows, the fact that asylum seekers, refugees, and displaced persons become more visible increase the economic and security concerns of migrant-receiving states. Therefore, establishing mechanisms to facilitate and control regular migration on the one hand, and trying to prevent irregular migration by strengthening borders on the other hand required states to cooperate not only with other states but also with international organizations, NGOs, or private companies. As a result of these collaborations, an ever-developing migration industry emerges.

With the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Eastern bloc and the victory of the Western bloc brought the existing globalization process into harmony with the dynamics of neoliberalism such as liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and outsourcing. The state is no longer a protectionist, interventionist, and regulatory, as it was in the old welfare state, but an entrepreneur, minimal against the market and deregulatory. This transformation has corresponded to the migration industry at the point of solving the international migration issue. In this migration industry, migration management practices, which should be a public policy under the responsibility of the state, began to be transferred to non-state actors. While the state was outsourcing the burden of migration and migrants to non-state actors or to third countries through externalization, a wide variety of non-state actors began to act as an intermediary between the state and migrants. They have assumed roles that facilitate the policy implementations of the state, ensure the control of migrants, link them with state institutions, try to induce regular migration or rescuing vulnerable migrants. Ultimately, because of this industry, the line between public and private actors became increasingly blurred while state and non-state actors provided financial gain from migration. There are many consequences of these complex networks of relationships within the migration industry: the human side migration is overshadowed by the asymmetrical power relations between the actors and hence, the migrant-receiving states can manipulate the migration politics in their own interests, or the shifting of responsibilities by the state to non-state actors and therefore the lack of transparency violates the human rights of

migrants, or migration is never taken into account only as a matter of migration, it is always linked to another policy area and tried to be solved, so again it serves the interests of the political elites who manage migration.

Emphasizing the migration industry based on the perception of economic and security concern created over migrants and the results of this industry are defined as governance of migration management throughout this study. In this study, it is suggested to use the concept of “governance of migration management” because the use of both concepts alone is insufficient. This study claims that the sum of the bilateral and multilateral interactions performed by many states and non-state actors in international migration is governance of migration management, not migration governance. The concept of migration governance to recent global migration issues is not sufficient because, on the one hand, the absence of an international binding regime and a uniform institutional body, on the other hand, the reluctance of states to transfer their sovereign rights in the field of migration causes migration governance to take place at the regional and national level, not at the global level. Also, the concept of migration management remains more state-centered. In other words, since non-state actors cannot be denied, it would not be appropriate to use only the concept of migration management for the solution of migration issues. Therefore, based on the claim that the use of both concepts alone is insufficient, the use of the conceptualization of governance of migration management is suggested. The use of this conceptualization may help to better understand initiatives to solve migration issues because migration governance is not actually beyond power and sovereignty of the state, as states do not allow the global migration regime to affect their sovereignty by transferring their power to a supranational institution. While states do not want to compromise their sovereignty in the field of migration management, they rely on non-state actors with tools such as privatization or outsourcing of neoliberalism in order to transfer their responsibilities and minimize the burden of migration. However, while the equal and democratic participation of non-state actors in the governance processes is expected, the participation of non-state actors in the decision-making processes in the field of migration is again in the interests of the state. Therefore, on the one hand the existence of non-state actors cannot be denied, but they are not effective enough to drive

governance. On the other hand, migrants, the most important part of the process, are completely excluded from the process. On the grounds that migration governance serves the interests of governing actors, like migration management under state authority, neither migration is literally managed nor is migration governance implemented. What actually happens is that the manageable mentality of migration is presented under the concept of governance. Therefore, in this study, it is claimed that the conceptualization of governance of migration management will provide better understanding. The verification of this claim will be tried to be shown by taking the 2015 migrant crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean as a case study. Greece, the European Union, of which Greece is a member state, and Turkey, which were the main actors of the migrant crisis in 2015, cooperated with each other and with non-state actors in the region to manage the crisis, resulting in the emergence of a large migration industry operating in a small region. The framework drawn for this process of governance of migration management is detailed in the following sections: aim, research questions, context, scope, limitations, and methodology.

The core of this study is based on the analysis of an article published in The Correspondent. The headline of the article is "*Europe spend billions stopping migration. Good luck figuring out where the money actually goes.*" (The Correspondent, 2019). As expressed in this article, a very significant amount of money is spent to stop migration. However, in reality, it becomes impossible to track where this money actually goes after a while. This study criticizes the economic- and security-centered approach to migrants, rather than a human-centered approach, by looking at the money that states spend on policies implemented to stop migration. In this context, it is hoped that this dissertation will contribute to the literature by bringing a different perspective to the violation of migrants' human rights and the fact that the issue of migration has never really been treated as a humanitarian issue.

- Aim of the Study and Research Questions

The aim of this study is to reveal that in the 21st century when neoliberal globalization intensifies and global migration movements evolve into migration crisis, the initiatives of states that take action with other states and non-state actors are not migration

governance, but governance of migration management. The managerial mentality that dominates neoliberal policies claims that a policy area such as migration, whose basic agent is human, is manageable. In other words, the claim that migration crises can be managed like policy areas such as economy, development, foreign policy, and security has created a ground that legitimizes the management of the migration issue by linking them with these policy areas. The most recent and striking event experienced by the Member States of the European Union, one of the actors examined in this study, is the migrant crisis in 2015. Although the 2015 migrant crisis refers to the arrival of nearly 1 million irregular migrants from Turkey to the Greek Islands in the summer of 2015, it is actually a part of the long process in which the humanitarian crisis, which started with the displacement of Syrian migrants in 2011, reached its peak. The topic of this study is to analyze the migration management practices carried out by state and non-state actors in the Aegean region after the 2015 migrant crisis within the political economic framework. In this context, the main problematic of the study is whether the regional and bilateral cooperations, which are carried out based on the migration industry arising from the cooperation of the state and non-state actors, are governance of migration management.

Since the study deals with the cooperation between the state and non-state actors, the main subjects of this study are states, non-state actors, and migrants who are directly affected by their cooperation. In this study, the definition of migrant rather than refugee is preferred and hence, the definition of migrant crisis rather than refugee crisis is preferred for 2015 crisis, because it is aimed to take into account all vulnerable people, including economic migrants, forcibly displaced people, those under temporary protection, and refugees. Contrary to the belief that the dominant actor in world politics is the nation-state, the international system consists of nation-states and non-state actors. Since the conceptual background of the study is based on Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality, throughout the study, it is aimed to refer to the state drawing from political economy, directs the conduct of the population, and provides political and economic well-being with security apparatus. On a global scale, the state becomes an actor whose behavior is conducted by non-state actors. Therefore, throughout this study, non-state actors are international organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations

(NGOs), and private companies. Although international organizations are created by the voluntary initiatives of sovereign states, funded by them, serve state's interests, and have intergovernmental characteristics, they have an important role and they pursue their own interests as well in the field of international migration (mainly UNHCR and IOM), and hence, should be included in this study from the category of non-state actors. Since many national/international and small/large-scale NGOs mentioned throughout the study are not established by nation-state initiatives, they do not have an organic connection with the nation-state and are naturally a part of the non-state actor subject. NGOs are one of the main subjects of this study due to their complex relationship networks with IOs and states during the management of migration crises. In addition to IOs and NGOs, another prominent non-state actor in this study is the private companies, the rising agent of neoliberal globalization. By private company, it is meant all companies from the multinational, international, or national private sector. It is one of the main subjects of this study with the complex relationship that private companies have with the state on many occasions and blurred the bond between the state and the private sector.

After defining the topic and the main subjects of the study, the main problematic of the study reveals two sets of questions. While the first set of questions sets out from the problematic relationship between migration management and migration governance, the second set of questions interrogate governance of migration management within a political economic context.

(1) Based on the problematic relationship between migration management and migration governance, the research questions to be answered are as follows:

- How migration is governed without a global regime within the framework of governance?
- Today international migration is a core issue of the global agenda, but is it also really a matter of global governance? Is migration governance really beyond the control and sovereignty of the state?

- Is migration less control/security-centered and more human-centered today compared to the time when migration governance initiatives started and today's migration governance?
- Is the state or the cooperation of state and non-state actors the main actor in decisions on migration policies?
- Does the migration governance serve the interests of the state just as migration management, which is under the state monopoly?

(2) The research questions for which the answers are sought based on the political economic context of the governance of migration management are as follows:

- What are the tools and economic processes behind migration management?
- Who are the actors of these economic processes?
- Under what conditions do states transfer money to non-state actors while managing migration?
- To what extent are migrants affected by the political economic background of migration management?

In order to find the answers to these research questions, the context, scope, and limitations of the governance of migration management theme, which is the main idea of the study, are discussed in the next section.

- Context, Scope, and Limitations of the Study

The scope of this study is that the study is conducted at the regional level in a way that will allow narrowing the research and examining in more detail, and the context is that the study is handled with a political economic approach. The reason why the study is carried out at the regional level and why it is not handled at the global and national level and why it is not placed in a context different from the political economy will be discussed in the limitations section.

The scope of this study is to carry out the research topic at the regional level. At this point, after clarifying the concepts such as region, regionalization, regionalism, it will be emphasized why the Eastern Mediterranean region, on which the study focuses, was chosen. Regions are not natural, they are political constructions. States come together for political, economic, and social reasons, albeit due to the proximity of natural geographical boundaries. It is necessary to distinguish between regionalization and regionalism, especially when talking about regional migration management. Just as globalization is a historical and natural process, regionalization is a natural process that develops when people, goods, and capital within a certain geographical area move across borders. It is free from government intervention as a bottom-up process maintained by market actors, individuals, or trading and investment companies. On the other hand, just as globalism is a political project and imposition of globalization with neoliberal policies, regionalism is the result of a political will that regulates official cooperation between states in a geographically determined area. In regionalism, governments, as the main actors, manage regionalism processes top-down. As the geographical area in question in this study is the Mediterranean basin, the regional process here can be directly linked to migration. Naturally developing people, goods, and capital movements among the countries in the Mediterranean basin have been transformed in the process and have led to government interventions. As a result, issues related to migration and securitization of migration have been the prerequisites for economic and commercial moves in the regionalization process in the Mediterranean basin.

In this study, while mentioning the Mediterranean basin, it is taken into account that the borders of the Mediterranean region are drawn not only by geography, but also by politics, economy, cultural and social variables. In this context, considering the area covered by the Mediterranean region, there may be a wide geography from the colonial Mediterranean of Europe (Öktem, 2010: 18) to the Black Mediterranean of Africa. The Mediterranean can be defined by many sub-regions covering all these areas: such as the Maghreb, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, southern Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey. However, at this point, the boundaries of these sub-regions should also be determined, for example, if the Mediterranean Sea is thought to include the Middle East,

then how far the borders of the Middle East extend should also be discussed. In this study, the geography taken into consideration when speaking of the Mediterranean is mainly the region that falls under Frontex's area of responsibility. This region corresponds to the external maritime borders of the Schengen area within Mediterranean Sea, which starts from Western Africa and covers the whole Maghreb and extends to the Eastern Mediterranean borders of Turkey (Frontex, 2019a: 17). The reason why Frontex is taken as a reference while drawing the borders of the Mediterranean is to emphasize the European Union's efforts to expand its borders with the migration governance carried out within the Euro-Mediterranean region and to build a new sovereignty area there. Researching the entire Mediterranean region, whose borders have been drawn, is too broad to go beyond the scope of this study. For this reason, the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, in other words the Aegean Sea (sometimes referred to as the Aegean region in the study), was chosen as a micro-field in the Mediterranean basin, narrowing the scope of the study. Another reason for this choice is the effort to select a region to focus on Turkey, since this study was conducted in Turkey.

It is possible to explain four reasons for putting regional migration management at the center of this study. First of all, when it comes to migration management, states prefer regional cooperation instead of coming together on the international ground in order to avoid binding global agreements. Therefore, it may be said that regional cooperation is more intense than international cooperation when it comes to migration. Secondly, regional lies between the national and the global, so the focus on regional migration management actually precludes ignoring both national and global migration management. In other words, most of the international migration flows take place between neighboring states, namely regions, that is, they are actually regionalized (Geddes et al., 2019: 1). Thirdly, regional migration management experiences exemplify economic and commercial cooperation. It is rare to find an economic and commercial basis in international management practices, as in bilateral or multiple agreements, but regional migration management cooperations are more convenient to look at migration management from a political economic perspective. Lastly, focusing on the migration management of a regional geography will help to reveal a more comprehensive and detailed study in a micro field.

The context of the study is the handling of governance of migration management with a political economic approach. As it is not possible to understand the issue of migration without addressing the global political economy framework, this study aims to examine the political economic approach to the governance of migration management through a regional migration management experience. Considering the migration industry, there is an immense diversity of migration industry actors and financial relations between these actors, hence it is necessary to address the governance of migration management with a political economic approach because this approach sets out from the following contradiction: on the one hand, human mobility is promoted for the permanent continuity of the neoliberal attitude and on the other hand, human mobility is controlled and limited by spending significant financial resources on the grounds that it poses a threat to the sovereignties and societies of states. As a result of this contradiction, an ever-developing migration industry emerges in the field of migration management. The study will focus on the economic background of the governance of migration management, the political economic relations between states and non-state actors to manage migration flows and financial flows, and in particular the cost of privatization and outsourcing of management tools for limiting migration in order not to hamper economic growth and security within the dynamics of neoliberal globalization.

It is possible to express why other scopes and contexts were excluded in the study with five main limitations. The first limitation is why the scope of the study is regional and not global or national. Approaching this study within the scope of global migration management requires an intense research beyond the limits of the study. It is not possible within the scope of a doctoral dissertation to examine the migration management and their political economy between all regions and states in the globe. The reason why the scope of the study is not at the national level, in other words, the study was not conducted at the level of a single state, is because such a study does not allow comparison and this study focuses on regional migration, not domestic migration. On the other hand, as aforementioned in the region definition above, as the regional lies between the national and the global, regional migration management covers also national and global migration management. Looking at the Euro-Mediterranean region

through Turkey and Greece, which is discussed in the case study chapter, allows to examine the European Union, which is an important regional/global actor in global migration governance. In this context, it seems important to examine the impact of the European Union policies on national policies on the one hand, and the European Union migration policies at the regional level on the other hand. In addition, within the scope of the study, the state is also considered as a closed box. Since this study focuses on migration management practices between state and non-state actors, these practices are primarily discussed. Therefore, the examination of the institutional structures of the states of Greece and Turkey, which are the main state actors of the study, and how migration-related policy decisions are made are excluded due to the scope of the study.

The second limitation is that only border management and externalization within the scope of regional migration management are included in this study. Therefore, other formal migration management tools such as safe regular migration, migrant protection, well-being of migrants, migration training, integration, and informal migration management tools such as migrant smuggling and trafficking are excluded. One reason why so many tools are out of scope and only two formal tools are included is that it exceeds the capacity of this dissertation, and the other reason is that it is not very possible to access the data of the excluded tools without conducting field research. In addition, border management and externalization tools fit in very well with the political economic approach.

The third limitation is the limitation of time and space. The space chosen for the case study is Eastern Mediterranean and the time is determined as 2015 and later. Although the scope of the dissertation was designed in 2019 as “governance of migration management in the Mediterranean Sea”, given the high number of countries in the region, which may exceed the scope limitations of this study, the focus was narrowed down to two states in the Aegean region. Therefore, the scope of the study was limited to Turkey and Greece, located in the Aegean Sea, within the framework of the Eastern Mediterranean. The limitation in the scope of time is due to the fact that the period is 2015 and later. This is a limitation because migration is a process and there are predecessors that determine migration flows. Although these predecessors are

mentioned in the case study chapter, this situation creates a limitation as a broader framework would exceed the limits of this study.

The fourth limitation stems from the width of the political economic approach. Global political economy has a very wide field of study with its policy areas and diversity of actors. In this study, a very micro field of political economy has been zoomed in with the necessity of narrowing the research. Within the scope of this study, the financial data of the actors of the migration industry in a region are analyzed through the two tools of migration management; border management and externalization of migration. In fact, there is much more than the financial data, funds, grants, projects, and tenders mentioned in this study. Again, due to the necessity of conducting this research within certain limits, only large amounts of funds, grants, projects and tenders have been included in the study.

Finally, the fifth limitation is the personal difficulties created by the period when the dissertation was written. This study was written between November 2019 and June 2022 in Istanbul, Turkey. Most of the writing process, which took 2.5 years, was overshadowed by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has swept the world since the first quarter of 2020. In this process, universities in Turkey remained closed for 1.5 years and there was a full or partial lockdown for most of 2021. Because of these difficulties, this dissertation was produced based on the collection of available online data. In a healthier future, based on the main theme of this dissertation, a follow-up study and field research could be conducted in order to carry out a more comprehensive study.

- Research Type and Methodology

The study basically criticizes neoliberal economic policies and describes how the line between state and non-state actors has become increasingly blurred, based on the migration management policies implemented after the 2015 migrant crisis. For this purpose, after trying to make sense of world politics with the basic principles of neoliberal theory, the governance policies involved in the process of resolving the migration issue are criticized with Michel Foucault's concepts of governmentality and biopolitics. Today, states create the perception that migration and migrants harm their

economy and security. This situation increases the tendency of an economic- and security-centered approach to the migration issue and causes moving away from the human-centered approach. The conceptual framework that Foucault established with the concept of governmentality and his emphasis on political economy and security help to explain this cause-effect relationship.

A qualitative research was conducted to answer the research question based on the main problematic of the study, its sub-questions, and the scope to be addressed, and the research method was determined as a case study. Case study is a research method that allows a comprehensive analysis of an event or events through data collection. The main problematic of this study is the questioning of the relationship between the state and non-state actors and the fact that the study is carried out at the regional level has made the case study method usable in this research. The case study to be used in the study was determined as the 2015 migrant crisis. The migration management practices of the states in the Aegean region after the 2015 migrant crisis and the political economic background of these practices were used for the case study of the research. In this context, within the scope of the data collection method, the expenditures of the states regarding the border security and externalization policies carried out within the scope of migration management in Turkey, Greece and the European Union, of which Greece is a member, after the 2015 migrant crisis were taken into account. In this context, documents and financial data regarding state policies, bilateral agreements, regional agreements, projects, tenders were collected. The main online sources used to collect this data can be listed as follows: reports published by the relevant ministries of the states, reports published by the European Union, electronic public procurement platform of Turkey, online tender database of the European Union, public disclosure platforms of Turkey and the European Union, archives of private companies, analysis and reports of independent and objective research groups, academic research articles, and investigative journalism news. Secondary sources are the books, articles, newspaper news and websites that share the similar topic. After the data were collected and analyzed in accordance with the schematization created in the first chapter of the study, it was discussed with a critical approach.

- Outline of the Study

The dissertation consists of five parts: introduction, three chapters, and conclusion. After the introduction, the first chapter of the study is devoted to the creation of the historical and conceptual background. In this chapter, it is suggested to use the concept of governance of migration management, claiming that using the concepts of migration governance and migration management alone is not sufficient. For this purpose, it was first examined how international migration movements and how international migration entered the agenda of states in the period of neoliberal globalization, which has moved to the top of the agenda since the 1990s. Then, in the conceptual background of the study, the concepts of governmentality, global governmentality, and global governance were discussed based on Foucault's concept of governmentality, which is the genealogy of the concept of governance, and this concept set was riveted with the issue of global migration. Finally, with the claim that global migration cannot be understood without understanding the dynamics of the global economy, migration management has been handled with a political economic approach at the global, regional and national level.

The second chapter of the study is devoted to the case study, namely regional migration management in the Aegean Sea. In this chapter, after first mentioning the historical dynamics in the region, the outline of the 2015 migrant crisis was drawn and the response of Greece to the crisis and Turkey's role in the crisis were examined. Then, how a regional migration management was organized in the region was discussed. In the part where the collected data is presented, that is, border management and externalization of migration practices after the 2015 crisis between public and private actors are conveyed through bilateral agreements, funds, grants, projects and tenders.

The third chapter of the study is devoted to analysis and discussion. Firstly, the presented data were analyzed in accordance with the schematization created from the conceptual framework of the study. Within the scope of this two-step analysis, the economic and security concerns that reveal the migration industry are discussed within the framework of surveillance, containment, and financial nexus. Then, the migration industry in the Aegean region is analyzed within the framework of the political economic dynamics of neoliberal globalization. By analyzing the data obtained, it has

been determined that the policies implemented in the region after the 2015 migrant crisis are far from migration governance, and the use of the conceptualization of governance of migration management is suggested. In the discussion section, the reason why the concept of governance of migration management should be used has been discussed within the framework of three claims, based on the practices applied in the Aegean region: (1) sovereignty and asymmetric power relations, (2) violation of human rights, and (3) embeddedness of migration.



1. THE GOVERNANCE OF MIGRATION MANAGEMENT AND ITS POLITICAL ECONOMIC DYNAMICS

1.1. NEOLIBERAL GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

Globalization and migration are two accompanying phenomena in world history. The existence of globalization as a process since the beginning of humanity and the making sense of migration with human mobility require two phenomena to be mentioned together. Global events such as the economic crises experienced during the Cold War, the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Eastern bloc and the victory of the Western bloc are closely related to globalization and migration. With the acceleration of globalization after the Cold War and various geopolitical developments in the world geography, a step was taken in an era where a series of economic, political, cultural, technological, and scientific transformations took place. The spread of globalization to all parts of the social sphere and the wide-ranging effects of economic crises have closely affected the function of the state. The interventionist, protectionist, regulatory state from the Second World War to the 1980s was replaced by the minimalist state with neoliberal economic policies. In all these processes until the new millennium, when globalization accelerated, international migration was directed in line with the needs of the global economy and states, but with the new millennium, international migration began to be mentioned with different dynamics than before. In this section of the study, firstly, the process leading up to neoliberal globalization and secondly, the patterns of international migration in this period will be discussed. Thirdly, how the issue of international migration entered the political agenda in international relations will be examined.

1.1.1. Neoliberal Globalization and the Changing Role of the State

It is possible to define globalization by some complex and various expressions such as increase and acceleration of the cross-border circulation of goods, services, information, and people, deepening of global interconnection, diffusion of the capitalism across the world, time-space compression, network society or space of flows. Considering these expressions, it is obvious that globalization is not a new phenomenon emerging in

recent years, but rather a result of some socio-economic processes that have been going on for many years. Although the 20th century bore witness to two world wars and the struggle of the bipolar world, it has not undergone an intense transformation like the recent period, which is described as globalization. Therefore, this recent globalization process that has come from the 1980s to the present should be understood within its own dynamics. In this period, it may be said that the dynamic synchronized with globalization is neoliberalism.¹ The diffusion and deepening of globalization have increased simultaneously with the introduction of neoliberal ideology.

One of the most important points of the introduction of neoliberal ideology in the 1980s is that the changing role of the state, which was interventionist and protectionist since the 1930s. Changing the role of the state in the economy in the capitalist system is directly related to the capitalist crises that have arisen due to the decrease in profit rates. Firstly the First World War and the economic crisis in 1929, which had an impact all over the world, changed the state's role in the economy dramatically. When the nation-states in Western Europe especially provided their political unity in the 1870s, it was seen that prosperity, capital, and labor mobility increased, technology, transportation, and communication systems advanced significantly until the First World War in this geography. It was a time when liberal regime and free exchange took place and the state did not interfere in the economy with low public spending. However, the interventionist and protectionist structure of the state started to form as of the First World War in 1914, and some measures have been taken through economic policies for the activity of the market and continuation of socioeconomic life. This situation continued increasingly in the 1920s for the recovery after the war. At this point, the year 1929 is significant due to the beginning of the economic crisis in the USA. Thus, by the 1930s, the principle of free exchange was replaced by protectionism, high customs duties were applied, and the import substitution industrialization policy was adopted to protect the national industry against international competition (Jessop, 1995: 167-168). International cooperation decreased with the rise of nationalist policies after the First

¹ At this point, it is necessary to differentiate globalism, which is the imposition of globalization together with neoliberal policies as a political project, from globalization, which is a historical process.

World War, and consequently, the international market narrowed down. The decline in the rate of profit in economy put first the USA and then the international market in crisis (Beaud, 2001: 176). The cost of the crisis increased because the states had no interference with the economy due to the belief that classical economics would bring the market to equilibrium automatically. However, it was observed that some states carried out interventionist policies since 1932 like the USA where Franklin Roosevelt put New Deal into practice. By the end of the 1930s, confidence in the invisible hand of classical economics was unsuccessful and in 1936, John Maynard Keynes claimed that the shrinkage in aggregate demand caused the crisis in *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, and predicted that the demand could be revived through state intervention as a remedy to the crisis.

Creating a revolutionary break from the previous economic understanding, Keynesian economics is based on a protectionist, interventionist, and regulatory state concept that increases aggregate demand and ensures full employment (Backhouse and Bateman, 2006: 32-36). In this sense, private property and profitability, which are the basis of capitalism, have been preserved in the welfare state where the economy is directed, but the role given to the state has been expanded by the increase of incentives, the establishment of public economic enterprises, cheap credit, and direct investment policies (Skidelsky, 2010: 134). In this period, according to the Keynesian welfare state approach, the state not only intervened in the economy as a regulator and producer but also adopted some policies aimed at a more egalitarian social structure towards injustice among social classes.

Especially with the breakthroughs in the field of industrialization, the rise of the welfare state corresponded to the aftermath of the Second World War (Munck, 2002: 25). The welfare state combined with the Fordist mode of production after the Second World War introduced a new capitalist regime of accumulation called the Fordist model of growth. Although its settlement took half-century, the Fordist system, whose start date can be considered as 1914, was disassembling the production into pieces with the assembly line system it developed (Harvey, 1991: 125-128). This regime of accumulation, which intensified after the Second World War and allowed the regular

accumulation of capital until the mid-1970s, led to mass consumption and consequently mass welfare with its mass production strategy. On the other hand, intensive employment of assembly line workers instead of qualified workers has resulted in labor-intensive production, and this situation rendered it possible to increase both productivity and rate of profits. At this point, it should be emphasized that the Fordist system, which concentrates on the demand side of the economy and aims to ensure the welfare socially, is intertwined with the Keynesian state approach (Hirsch, 1995: 267-268). This growth model has gained an international character in the short term with direct investments made by the industrially developing countries and increase of global accumulation.

While the 1970s witnessed various political, economic, social, and cultural changes all over the world, one of the most important results was the changing role of the state in the economy. On one hand, anti-communist expenses due to the Cold War and public expenses providing social welfare (such as health, education, housing benefits, and unemployment, pension insurances) cause a deficit in the budget, and on the other hand, the bureaucratic corruption of the welfare state with its expanding capacity led to the questioning of the welfare state despite economic growth. Besides, in terms of the Fordist system, it should be added that grand ramifications of new technologies, structural changes in conditions of international competition, internationalization of money, globalization, and regionalization trends in production start to hollow the Keynesian welfare state out towards the post-Fordist system (Jessop, 1993: 25-28).

The reason for the Keynesian welfare state and Fordist accumulation regime to have a crisis is that capital efficiency has decreased significantly, as all other capitalist crises had. At the national level, the decrease in capital efficiency is related to the fact that Fordism has reached its limits in terms of financial and technical aspects, and it is also linked to the fact that the productivity achieved with a technically unqualified workforce has reached its limits. Meanwhile, due to decrease in capital efficiency, the tendency of profit rates to decrease, and the fact that workers' wages and social demands increased public spending brought welfare state to the stage of blockage (Clarke, 1990: 75). At the international level, some Latin American and Asian countries were able to compete with

the industrialized countries of the West with the help of import substitution industrialization. In other words, the saturation of the domestic markets to the product both caused a search for new markets and caused inflation due to the abundance of liquidity as it could not be opened to foreign markets internationally. Besides inflation, the rise in oil prices as a result of the crisis with OPEC has led oil-importing countries to use more technology than ever before in their industries to save energy, thereby reducing employment (Harvey, 1991: 168). Thus, overcoming the stagflation period defined with both inflation and unemployment was economically attempted to be achieved through transition from the Fordist system, acting with the understanding of mass production for mass consumption, to the post-Fordist system based on flexibility, deindustrialization, and information and knowledge-based economy, and politically through the transition from the interventionist and protectionist Keynesian state to the neoliberal, global, and entrepreneur state.

The 1980s was a period when the productivity impasse that capitalism entered was restructured. At this stage, the criticism of the welfare state crisis came from the schools shaped around the idea of liberalism. The liberal school thinkers of this period who criticized the interventionist and protectionist state were thinkers like Friedrich von Hayek, Robert Nozick, and Milton Friedman. The origins of the neoliberal ideology that they represented based on the Austrian school. The Austrian school, which advocates microeconomic thinking against macroeconomic thinking and opposes all kinds of state intervention in the economy, prioritizes the actions and choices of individuals freely (Örs, 2007: 96). The planning of the free market, in which people perform their actions and choices, is oppressive because it imposes certain forms of production and consumption. Therefore, individuals are dependent on the state but not on their own free will, to ensure their prosperity. Also, state intervention prevents individual freedom and the discovery of new forms of production in market activity. Although these views of the Austrian school did not become effective in the 1930s, the liberalists' reintroduction of these views under the ideology of neoliberalism affected economic policies in the 1970s.

Neoliberalism came into prominence as a reaction to the economic policies in which the role of the state was extensive and inclusive during the crisis of the 1970s and defended the end of the state's active role in the flows of goods, money, capital, and services. In the neoliberal economic system, the state is not expected to be included in the supply-demand relationship between producers and consumers. In this economic order, it is essential to make arrangements for liberalization, to avoid interventionist policies and to leave the market on its own. As long as the state remains minimal against the market, the maximum productivity will be achieved. The tools that the neoliberal economy will use to reach this highest productivity are considered liberalization, privatization, and deregulation. The fact that the state is minimalist and does not interfere with the market does not mean that the state is neglected in neoliberalism. Rather than excluding the state, neoliberalism sees it as a mechanism to govern the rules and institutions needed for the market to function effectively and efficiently. This brings not only internationalization of the open market, but also the internationalization of the state through institutions and rules.

Neoliberal economic policies were first experienced in Chile in 1973 with the US intervention. Market reforms, initiated in the process of transition to the free market, penetrated many countries in South America such as Brazil and Argentina until 1980. And after this date, neoliberal economic policies started to be carried out with the doctrines of Reaganism and Thatcherism primarily in the USA and England and then in pioneer countries such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Neoliberalism had the opportunity to expand not only by the decisions of the new conservative governments but also through top-down reforms like shock doctrine practices or coup d'états like the 1980 military coup in Turkey or the occupation in Iraq. Furthermore, the institutions of global economic governance such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank imposed structural adjustment programs to 'third world countries' in the words of IMF to ensure their integration into the international market. These programs also accelerated the transition of the Eastern bloc countries from the centrally planned economy to free-market capitalism in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, as a class consolidation project aimed at regaining the strength and conditions of the capitalist class against the gains of the working class in the welfare state (Harvey, 2005:

19), it is not possible to consider the dynamics of neoliberalism, globalization, and capitalism separately. In the implementation of neoliberal economic policies, the transition from Fordist mode of production to post-Fordism and globalization of production processes come to the fore. In this context, although neoliberalism and globalization seem to be interchangeable concepts, they should be perceived as two phenomena that interact more with each other and simultaneously rise. For this reason, the orientation of neoliberalism to global dynamics as an economic policy may cause this process to be called neoliberal globalization.

The fact that neoliberal globalization is in tandem with liberalization, privatization, and deregulation enables the adaptation of classical liberalism to the global order (Scholte, 2005: 1). Especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Western bloc declared the victory of the global economy and the open market. After this date, it was considered as if there was no alternative other than the implementation of neoliberal policies and minimalism of the state. And in this unrivaled order, policies paved the way for repressing the labor and supporting the capital that has globalized with the circulation of goods, services, and information unlimitedly. Neoliberal globalization is a process shaped by endless mobility of capital on a global scale. More so, the attempt to overcome the crisis of capitalism through the globalization of capital can be expressed by the fact that neoliberal policy practices are the driving force in the globalization process. Prioritizing the interests of global capital, multinational corporations and international financial institutions as a requirement of neoliberal ideology explains the organic relationship between capital and neoliberal globalization (Yeldan, 2008: 79).

During neoliberal globalization, the deepening and widening of capital through globalization that is, the formation of this new capital accumulation regime, was largely the result of financialization rather than production. The phenomenon of financialization, which defines the acquisition of profit from financial activities such as banking, credit, investment rather than the trade of goods, services, and production, has become the backbone of the new capital accumulation regime. It is also possible to explain this transformation with the post-Fordist system that supports neoliberal globalization. Because when Fordism has reached its limits, there was an insufficient image of this

system such as the market's failure to respond to new demands, advanced technology, and globalization. With the advancement of information and communication technologies and the introduction of any kind of resources into the globalization process, the need for a new form in the organization of the labor and production was provided through this system called post-Fordism. In this process defined with post-Fordism, the production is flexible, demand-driven, without stocks, and it is realized with fewer employees with technological skills in flexible working hours (Harvey, 1991: 173-180). So, there was a growth in the economies of states, but there was no increase in real production and consequently employment in this growth (Jessop, 1995: 171). Economic growth, in which employment has not increased, has brought up the unemployment problem in many developed and developing states a few decades later. So, the outcome of neoliberal economic policies may be summarized as a significant change in the unemployment and labor market. Unlike the labor market in the welfare state period, workers have now a narrower field of job, they become legally vulnerable, and their working conditions have been unsecured and flexed against them. In the labor market an increase in supply occurred due to unemployment. In this case, labor has become a tool that capital can regulate as a cost element in a system where the efficiency of capital and the maximization of profit are observed primarily. Thus, precarious employment was created by limiting labor costs, wages, and assurance. The precarious employment developed within the scope of neoliberal policies supporting the post-Fordist system was particularly effective in two sectors: the service sector and the informal sector. With the globalization of capital and production processes and the development of information and communication technologies, the degrowth of the industry sector caused economic growth to shift to the service sector. As the service sector had a very wide and diverse area, the labor market serving this sector has been divided into two as qualified and unqualified. While this situation increased the welfare of the white-collar,

qualified workers relatively² in society, it caused many unqualified workers to become disadvantaged in unpleasant working conditions and even migrate to work in better conditions. On the other hand, the flexibility of production, small-scale production and moving of production from central countries to peripheral countries where the labor cost is cheap led to the development of the informal sector especially in developing countries. The increased subcontracting tendency in production caused rapid development in the informal sector and became the lifeblood of the economy and also fed the precariousness of the labor market. In brief, the elimination of the state's intervention on the market dynamics and the labor market regulations and the globalization of neoliberal policies have led to the uneven development of societies and the birth of the bilateral structure called north-south countries. While neoliberal policies continue to enrich northern countries, they inherited various problems such as poverty, unemployment, forced migration, environmental degradation and underdevelopment in southern countries.

The last quarter of the 20th century was characterized by a significant transformation of the role of the state and by economic parameters shaping market, labor, and therefore society. These economic parameters have made it impossible for the market and the state to act outside the global structure by staying within their own sovereignty. With the proliferation of political and economic non-state actors such as multinational corporations, international organizations, and civil society, the possibility of the state to exist in global politics independent of them has decreased. The state is no longer able to ignore non-state actors in terms of sovereignty and power sharing. Because, for example, while the capital of multinational corporations loses its national loyalty and evolves into transnational corporations, it has reached the size to decide where the capital, production, and technology transfer will be concentrated. On the one hand, international organizations play a role in global cooperation on issues such as energy, raw materials,

² At this point, it is necessary to use the word 'relatively' and give an explanation, because although in theory the welfare of white-collar workers increases in the society, in practice it is found that white-collar workers are also affected by precarious working conditions. On the one hand, while migration from the global South to global North intensifies, domestic labor in the global North is affected by these processes, such as the yellow vests movement protests for economic justice. On the other hand, with the economic slowdown experienced due to the pandemic started in 2019, white-collar workers are turning to precarious working conditions with the loss of jobs or income.

water, and climate, which are closely related to the economy, on the other hand, the regulations and norms needed by the expansion of the markets are provided by international organizations. The fact that non-governmental organizations, which have a lesser sphere of influence compared to the private sector and international organizations, are political pressure elements, albeit limited, and that they receive support from the society is so important that it cannot be ignored by the state power. The state is sometimes in cooperation with these actors and sometimes in opposition because its sovereignty is hollowed out. In the era of neoliberal globalization, especially in the 21st century, the role played by the state has become a multi-partner role that is no longer exclusive to the state.

Globalization, which continued rapidly in this period, brought many different developments that would affect the dynamics of the state in the 21st century: uneven development of the global economy in different geographies and center-periphery relationship between developed and developing countries, the problems generated by liberal ideology contrary to the thesis of the end of history, legitimacy crisis experienced by cooperating entities such as the European Union, experiencing migration crises as a result of geopolitical events, the rise of populism etc. Among all these facts, although the state tended to maintain its minimal role in the 21st century, it was shaken again by another crisis of capitalism that started in 2007 and peaked in 2008. With this crisis, the role of the state was once again questioned. The effects of the financial crisis, which started with the mortgage loan crisis in the USA and had an impact all over the world in a short time, brought up the state to take the role of rescuer. Because the 2008 financial crisis has been compared mostly with the depression in 1929 in terms of its scale and the effects it caused and, just like after the 1929 crisis, the state's intervention in the economy has become expected. As a matter of fact, interventions such as the regulation of financial markets, nationalization, bailout packages, and financial incentives were observed in many states where liberal policies were dominant in this period (Hassel and Lütz, 2012: 11-16). A situation similar to the 2008 economic crisis was experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic, which emerged at the end of 2019 and swept the world in 2020. Economically developed countries and developing countries took measures to protect the economy and offered aid packages to companies that steer the market and

their unemployed citizens, including many migrants amongst them, at times when markets, financial flows and economic activities came to a stopping point. In this context, governments provided support to companies such as loan deferral, financing, liquidity, and low interest loan support; and provided support to citizens such as unemployment insurance, social insurance, and social assistance. However, these measures have enabled large companies to survive, while small businesses have disappeared and workers in the informal sector who were not covered by pre-pandemic social protection have become much more vulnerable. At the same time, the temporary and long-term lack of support in developing countries caused the economies of these states to be crushed much more under global competition. Eventually, it must be said that the fact that these problems emerged as a result of globalization and neoliberal policies, and the fact that the solution to these problems were sought in ways contrary to the liberal ideology led to the loss of power of existing political actors and thus to the strengthening of radical right movements and parties, and right-wing populism.

Even though the 2008 crisis and COVID-19 period was tried to be overcome with some rescue packages that would not affect the liberal attitude of the states, this remained a theory. And in practice, active state interventionism regained vitality from this date where states seek new economic order on a global scale. Human mobility, one of the parameters that would affect this new economic order, has been an element affecting the policies and economies of the states throughout history. As this study aims to reveal new searches, contradictions, and consequences about the roles of states in the changing global conjuncture within the scope of international migration, the interventions, policies, and cooperations that the state has put forward to manage the migration phenomenon, especially in times of crisis, will be emphasized. For that, firstly a brief history of international migration during the introduction of neoliberal globalization will be handled in the next title. Then, how the role of the state has been shaped in the context of global migration, with the initiatives related to the regulation of migration into the agenda of the governments will be stressed.

1.1.2. A Brief History of International Migration During the Introduction of Neoliberal Globalization

International migration is an extensive and multifaceted phenomenon including permanent residence, temporary migration, forced migration or displacement. In other words the source of international migration has multiple motivations such as economic concerns, political persecution, wars, environmental disasters or famine. Although some of these motivations have come to the fore over the years, it is a fact that all of them are directly linked to the global economic conjuncture in principle. For example, two world wars that served the economic interests of states at the beginning of the 20th century resulted in both migration with economic anxiety and forced displacement. Efforts to improve economies after the war accelerated labor migration. Or for example, towards the end of the 20th century millions of people were subjected to forced migration due to natural disasters caused by unsustainable economic initiatives. As a result, certain important points in world history have either changed the nature of international migration or created new migration flows. To look at this situation chronologically, the timeline can be divided into two as before and after 1945.

The 19th century is mostly characterized by free migration as the obstacles such as controlling human mobility caused by mercantilism have been wiped out by economic liberalism (Rystad, 1992: 1170). There wasn't any control restraining travel abroad in Europe, North America, and Australia. Besides free immigration, other determinants of migration flows during this period were enslavement and colonialism. Both the migration from the colonial country to the exploited country and the worker immigrants collected from the conquered or colonized country constituted these migration flows. The dynamics of international migration in the last quarter of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century may be described as nation-building and industrialization. While the slave trade, which started with the discovery of the new world, gave way to the exploitation of commodity and labor over time, while the countries of USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were being built and while first England and then Europe were industrialized, labor force migrated internationally. It is obvious that the cornerstone of international migration in the transition of the century is

labor migration (Castles, Haas and Miller, 2014: 84-93). In the period before 1945 on one hand, the international circulation of the labor force served to increase the new capital accumulation, and it helped the demographic alteration to take its final shape on the other. In addition, it is necessary to mention the interwar period concerning before 1945. In this period, which symbolizes the two world wars and the depression experienced in the 1930s, international migration decreased significantly. The main reasons for this were the return of migrants who would be recruited for war, refusal to accept migrants due to xenophobia caused by wars, and the crisis that stagnated the economy (Castles, Haas and Miller, 2014: 96-97). However, it is necessary to remember the prisoners of war migrants who were taken into captivity worked as slaves during or after wars.

There was a need for getting support in the period before 1945, as this section of the first chapter will discuss the important historical points of international migration during the introduction of neoliberal globalization. After making a brief introduction about this period, it will be useful to examine three periods into the timeline of international migration: the post-1945 until 1970, between 1970s and 1990s, and from 1990s to the new millennium.

The first period of international migration may be limited from the Second World War to the oil crisis in 1973. This period is characterized by four migration flows: (1) a partially free migration of foreign workers due to high demand of labor force in Western Europe, (2) migration of Cold War migrants from Eastern Germany and the rest of Eastern bloc to Western Europe, (3) migration from decolonized countries to the former colonialist state, and (4) permanent immigration from Europe, Asia and Latin America to North America and Australia (Castles, Haas and Miller, 2014: 104; Rystad, 1992: 1171-1172; Bade, 2003: 21). Not forgetting the migrations due to political pressures in the Eastern bloc during the Cold War, it would not be wrong to claim that labor has entered the international circulation in all four cases. The main element of this first period in international migration was the new form of mass production, which would be called Fordism in Western Europe, and thus every industrialized country in Western Europe recruited foreign workers for a period between 1945 and 1973. Recruitment of

foreign workers to meet the need for low-skilled workers to work in mass production has increased at an accelerated rate from year to year. For example, the number of foreign workers in the Federal Republic of Germany increased from 95.000 in 1956 to 1.3 million in 1966 and 2.6 million in 1973 (Castles, Haas and Miller, 2014: 107).

The main motivation for migration was economic, both for migrants and migrant-receiving countries. On the one hand, the intertwining of Keynesian economic policies and the Fordist production system, on the other hand, the attempt to recover the economies that were upset by the world wars resulted in an intensive economic recovery process. The remedy that would make this process go through quickly and easily was seen as foreign, in other words guest workers. It was simply a reciprocal relationship. Immigration has grown the economies of countries and immigrants earned more in the country of immigration than they earned in their home country. These immigration policies of this period defined the immigrants who helped the country to develop as guests who would return home. By the 1970s, foreign worker recruitment had declined as economic growth began to settle, but the most significant blow was hit by the 1973 oil crisis.

The 1970s may be regarded as the beginning of the second period of international migration. As mentioned in the first section, on the way to neoliberal globalization the fact that Keynesian economic policies and Fordist production system reached their limits made a global crisis inevitable. The process that started with the first alarm of the system in the 1970s reached its peak with the oil crisis in 1973. In order to overcome this crisis, the transformations carried out in the capital accumulation processes and production systems directly changed the structure of the workforce and therefore foreign workers who came through migration were also affected by this situation. Multinational companies exported the accumulated capital surplus by moving the production facilities in industrializing countries to underdeveloped countries. Therefore, while transnational labor market and job opportunities were created in underdeveloped countries, international migration stagnated and unemployment arised in the production sector in developing countries. Especially with the developments in technology, the need for manual labor and low-skilled labor, in other words, the need for migrant

workers gradually decreased. Moreover, the fact that migrant labors were working for much lower wages in case of unemployment was a reason that increased xenophobia and again restricted migrant labors recruitment. Therefore, the migration policies of European countries that need foreign labor force left their place to strict migration control policies. This did not mean, of course, that there was an end to the migration of foreign labor, but recruitment of foreign workers was very limited.

The main element of international migration motivation in this period was now the family reunions and desire to run away from oppressive regimes in the Cold War rather than economic reasons as in the previous 30 years. Therefore, from this period, illegal migrants and asylum seekers have started to be seen more than ever. Another element of international migration motivation was the developments in the service sector and the expansion of the informal sector. On the one hand the shift of Western economies from industry to service sector and on the other hand the need to overcome the competition of offshore production in China, South Asia and South America revealed a flexible, cheap and unskilled labor gap in the labor market. So, after the 1970s in order to keep the costs low especially construction, tourism, entertainment, food services, and domestic services in urban economies required a flexible, cheap, un-unionized, and low-wage migrant labor force (Schiller, 2011: 36-40). This requirement eventually caused precarious and informal employment of migrant labor force who faced unemployment, xenophobia, and marginalization. International migration was no longer as attractive as it was in the previous 30 years.

It may be said that the third period of international migration during the introduction of neoliberal globalization started with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. In particular, technological developments in this period, the adaptation efforts of the closed economies of the Cold War to the global economy, the attempts of developed countries to control immigration strictly caused changes in target and source countries, irregular migration, and asylum movements. The rapid developments in communication technologies and the inexpensive long-distance travels led to the establishment of firstly migrant flows and then migrant networks

among human mobility, and thus, transnational communities belonging to more than one state emerged (Castles et al., 2012: 120).

On the one hand, with the dissolution of the USSR, the closed economies in the Eastern bloc began to adapt to the free market and neoliberal economic system operating in the rest of the world. The difficult economic conditions in the Eastern bloc countries, which have difficulties in adapting to this process, are another fundamental element of international migration in this period. Therefore, Western Europe and North America faced extensive east-west axis migration flows. Source countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece, which sent more immigrants to Europe in the 1990s, have become target countries that receive the migration flows from the East after this date. On the other hand, in addition to the east-west axis, migration flows from global south to global north accelerated after the 1990s. Neoliberal mode of globalization affected the political and economic attitudes of states, labor market, development and reshaped the lives of migrants. While states compete in a global economy, the impact of neoliberalism was contradictory on the global north and global south. Towards the end of the 1990s, south-north axis migration flows were added to the east-west axis migration flows. The global south (Africa, Latin America and South Asia), who had difficulty keeping up with the global economy due to factors such as poverty, hunger, and environmental degradation, started to migrate to the post-industrial global north countries (North America, Australia, Western and Southern Europe). Therefore, migrants marginalized in this environment imposed by neoliberal globalization fed precariousness and informalization by working as flexible elements of the labor market with low wages and high productivity.

Another decisive element of this period is the increase in irregular migration, refugee, asylum, human smuggling and trafficking movements. Immigrants who cannot find a way to immigrate to developed countries legally try to immigrate illegally to Europe and North America. Irregular migrants from Eastern bloc countries came to Western European states that did not implement an open door policy for immigrants as in the 1960s. Also, transnational relationships established with the development of communication technologies and illegal work have played a role in encouraging

irregular migration. In the labor market, which has become flexible in the neoliberal globalization process and is highly exempt from controls, migrant labor force who do not have a work permit feed the informal sectors by working precariously with low wages. On the other hand, in the 1990s, highly selective migration policies and programs came to the fore in regulating migration. In the early 1990s, states, especially OECD countries, that lacked economic growth and labor, eased the economic migration flows and implemented new programs. The selection of high-skilled migrant workers, especially for the hi-tech and health-care sectors, according to these selective programs triggered the remaining low-skilled migrant workers to resort to irregular migration routes.

Refugee and asylum movements increased in the 2000s more than ever after the Second World War. The biggest refugee movements after the Afghan refugee crisis in 1979 were seen in the Gulf War and Yugoslavia Wars after the end of the Cold War. These crises followed the refugee crises in some African countries (Somalia, South Sudan) and the biggest refugee movement in history was experienced in the Syrian civil war that started after the Arab Spring in 2010. These examples only mention refugees who were forcibly displaced by war. In addition, the number of refugees displaced due to reasons such as poverty, hunger, drought, natural disasters, and environmental degradation is too high to be underestimated. Since so many refugees cannot legally go to countries where they can establish a prosperous life, human smuggling and human trafficking have also been the determinants of the recent international migration.

From the 1990s towards the new millennium while neoliberal global forces were standardizing the world in political, economic, and cultural fields, the 2000s were characterized by the structural change of international migration. Migration was a political and social issue since the 1980s, but after the end of the Cold War and the redefinition of the concept of security, it was decided that the issue of migration was also a threat to security. International migration movements started to be securitized by states. From the perspective of neoliberalism, migration must be securitized by states, because in order for liberal policies to be implemented, there must not be a security gap in the country. Migration-security nexus (Faist, 2005: 4) became an international issue

with the attacks of the 11 September 2001 and the conflicts of the 21st century. The withdrawal of international migration, especially foreign labor, after the 2001 attacks continued until 2003 and after this date, it gained momentum again with the enlargement process of the European Union in 2004. The global recession created by the 2008 economic crisis affected international migration flows as in every field. For example, migration to OECD countries decreased by 7% in 2009, while temporary labor migration decreased by 16% (OECD, 2011: 34). It will be useful to look at the numbers to understand why the migration issue has entered the agenda of states and made it an international problem. While the United Nations estimated the number of international migrants worldwide to be 220 million in 2010, this number is estimated to have reached 272 million in 9 years (United Nations, 2019: 5). On the other hand, the number of forcibly displaced people due to reasons such as persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations was 43.7 million in 2010, while this number is estimated to be 79.5 million at the end of 2019 (UNHCR, 2010: 5; UNHCR, 2019: 8). Nevertheless, this increase in the migrant population should not be considered independent of the increase in the world population. It should also be noted that with the increase in the international migration population, migration has become diverse and complex, with the major economic and geopolitical shifts and the rise of new migration centers (Czaika and Haas, 2015: 314). As a result, such an intense human mobility will have a desire to be controlled by states. For that, the next section will discuss the entry of international migration into political agenda from past to present.

1.1.3. From Low Politics to High Politics: Entry of International Migration into Political Agenda

Realism as one of the dominant paradigms in International Relations divides politics into low politics and high politics. According to the realist theory of the International Relations discipline, foreign policy affairs that concern national security, war and peace issues are described as high politics, while all other economic and social policies that concern the nation are low politics. During the Cold War period where neorealism led, migration was not among the factors that ensured the balance of power in world politics based on two poles, on the contrary, the phenomenon of migration was considered to be

a low politics issue as a driving force of economic development and a reason for social transformations. As a matter of fact, the state, which intervened in the economy during the welfare state, managed regular migration flows, and its economic policies with migration by making bilateral or regional agreements on this issue, labor immigration policies were handled at administrative levels (Rogers, 1992: 33). With the end of the Cold War, many states entering into neoliberal globalization have caused the displacement of not only people but also money, investments, and finance. International migration has become more active and important than ever. The fact that international migration was unpredictable after the 1990s, it is the second largest international trade flow after oil, and instability in refugee flows have been effective in migration to become high politics (Teitelbaum, 1994: 169). On the other hand, the labor market has begun to globalize, complex migration flows have emerged and irregular migrations, which were not very intense before, have become quite evident. Moreover, in the late 1980s, the search for a sustainable solution to the refugee flows that started from the Eastern bloc countries to the West became in vain, and the migration of refugees to the West gradually increased (Rogers, 1992: 33). In this context, diplomatic activities related to international migration have increased. Although new laws and regulations have been prepared to regulate intense immigration movements, migration took place in the international agenda exactly after the attacks of 11 September 2001. And after these attacks, migration has entered international agendas more than ever as a security issue. Thus, the main shift of migration policies from low politics to high politics is related to preservation of national security and avoidance of the creation of new irregular migrant flows (Ambrosini, 2013: 1). For this reason the last two decades, many states have increased border controls at the national level, strengthened sanctions and engaged in an effort to cooperate at the international level to encourage safe and regular immigration, and prevent irregular migration flows.

It is obvious that migration has become an issue that states consider when it poses a challenge to the sovereignty of the nation-state (Castles, 2018: 160). As a requirement of globalization, immigration is described as an element that can undermine the power of states. Border control, passport regime, barriers can be listed as a state's means of controlling immigration at national level. At the international level, states need to apply

for international cooperation and take action to regulate migration flows or to avoid unwanted migration flows. Among global issues, international migration is still less institutionalized in international cooperation as there is no binding international regime (Kalm, 2010: 23). Nevertheless, it may be said that the migration issue has been in a governance process since the beginning of the 20th century. In the interwar period, refugees were sent to countries in need of labor by the ILO (International labor Organization) with the Nansen passport regime, which was guaranteed by the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. During this period, refugees were seen as economic migrants. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which was established in 1949 to solve the Palestinian refugee crisis that emerged with the Israeli intervention in Palestine, and later in 1950 took on the task of dealing with the refugees of the Second World War, published the Convention on the Status of Refugees in 1951. Also in 1951, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) which was established to help people who migrated after the Second World War, later became the International Organization for Migration (IOM). While the refugee issue was governed internationally, labor migration was mostly governed by nation-states at the administrative level. In both cases, during the Cold War, both refugees and international migrants served the power relations between the Eastern and Western blocs rather than humanitarian characteristics.

The nature of migration had changed by the end of the Cold War: millions of people started to move intercontinentally and another millions of people were displaced because of the regional conflicts after the Cold War. That's why various institutions, actors and initiatives arose to influence migration trends. The first initiative was the Regional Consultative Processes (RCP), which was established in 1985 with the support of IOM, mainly to share knowledge and produce common standards. RCPs have emerged more after the 1990s due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, sudden irregular migrant flows, and concerns related to the attacks of 11/9. It should be noted that even though RCPs help establish intergovernmental dialogue on migration all over the world and lead bilateral agreements, it did not affect the issue of migration much in the context of the global agenda, as it was not under a global umbrella like the United Nations until 2016, and it remained as a tool in the service of states for 30 years (Kalm, 2010: 23).

Besides, the fact that RCPs are flexible due to the lack of binding rules and binding decisions causes RCPs to be preferred by the cooperation of states. It offers an important platform in terms of cooperation between the global north receiving-countries in particular. Regarding the initiatives of the United Nations on migration, migrant-receiving countries, especially in the 1990s, had a reluctance to bring migration on the global agenda of the United Nations not to share responsibility. Ultimately, although the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) was established in 2003 with the initiative of Kofi Annan, there were several initiatives until this time: such as the first mention of a UN conference on international migration dated at 1993 with the resolution “Convening of a United Nations conference for the comprehensive consideration and review of the problems of refugees, returnees, displaced persons and migrants”, the Conferences on Population and Development or the World Summits in the 1990s mentioned international migration as a global issue. In 2003, GCIM was established to place migration on the global agenda with the intention of reviewing policy-making process, exploring the interlinkages between migration and other global issues and consolidating global governance of international migration (GCIM, 2005). GCIM dured until 2005 and in 2006 UN made a call for a “High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development” in order to maximize the benefits of international migration and minimize the negative effects on migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries (Betts and Kainz, 2017: 5). The main outcome of the dialogue was the setting up of a Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) in the next year. GFMD launched for the first time in 2007 and its particularity is being a state-led and voluntary arena where civil society and governments come together without taking binding decisions. So, this initiative is outside the UN system and the most visible one among the other initiatives (Betts and Kainz, 2017: 6). While GFMD is expanding the agenda on migration, the United Nations collected its 14 agencies (there are 22 agencies in the group in 2022) under the same roof of “Global Migration Group” in 2006 in order to discuss and coordinate migration-related issues inside the UN. GFMD and GMG are two platforms that are still running in 2022. However, here it is necessary to open a window regarding the entry of migration into the global agenda. Alexander Betts and Lena Kainz describe the global governance of migration at the beginning of the new millennium as an uncoordinated fragmentation (Betts and Kainz,

2020: 1-25). Although almost a quarter-century has passed, it is obvious that the global basis of migration has not yet been achieved. The presence of GFMD, which is a platform outside the UN system and GMG, which brings together 22 agencies with a different priority within the UN system evokes a fragmentation of global migration governance. Therefore, it will not be possible to talk about a common, applicable and sustainable international regime and international organization in this period when refugees and asylum seekers are at their peak.

The global agenda of international migration for the last 10 years includes the 2nd High-level Dialogue, Agenda 2030 and European refugee crisis in 2015. 2nd High-level Dialogue themed “Making Migration Work” in 2013 and its scope had widen since the first High-Level Dialogue towards the migration-related subjects such as human rights, migrant exploitation, human trafficking, stranded migrants, migrant perception in publics, migrant integration and international partnership and cooperation. These migration-related subjects had been integrated into the Agenda 2030, which launched in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals in 2015 (United Nations, 2015). Agenda 2030 is a declaration of 91 articles and 17 goals. Among 17 goals, nearly half of them targets migration issue such as human trafficking and violence against women, safety of migrant workers, reliable data of migrants, well-managed migration policies (Betts and Kainz, 2020: 9). While the UN targets these goals until 2030, politics of migration transformed globally in 2015, with the arrival of Syrian refugees on the European borders. In 2016 two facts were important in this migratory issue: firstly IOM became a related organization to the UN system in 2016 to address large movements of refugees and migrants. And its work-area is identified as (1) humanitarian, peace and security, (2) development, and (3) The Global Compact on Migration (IOM, 2019a). Secondly, in order to search for solutions of these unpredictable movements of refugees and migrants, the UN Summit on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants was held in 2016. The main outcomes of the summit are the declaration adopted in 2016 “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants” and the principles adopted in 2018 in “Global Compact For Safe, Orderly And Regular Migration”. While the New York Declaration is commonly characterized by the political will of the world states to save lives and protect rights of refugees and migrants and share the

responsibility globally, the Global Compact is related to improving a common approach to international migration in all dimensions. The common feature of these two is that on the one hand, they do not have the power of sanction or coercion and that states will be followed-up on refugee and migrant issues and the other hand, they are two examples of the neoliberal approach of the global migration governance.

The history of global migration governance signalizes two important points. The first one is that although there is still no binding international migration regime, there is a Global Compact which is an outcome of increased political importance of migration and increased dialogues globally. Inside the UN system, many states that are reluctant to bring migration to the global agenda have volunteered to discuss migration, human rights, security, and development in the last 10 years. The second important point is that the issue of migration has been handled for many years with neoliberal attitude. The North-South divide, which neoliberalism has sharpened its boundaries, has been the subject of the problems of the migrant-sending South and the interests of the migrant-receiving North in global migration governance. On the other hand, the phenomenon of migration in the international arena has been associated primarily with maximizing economic benefits, minimizing adverse effects and development, until migration began to be associated with human rights at the 2nd High-level Dialogue held in 2013. In other words, the humanitarian side of migration has been ignored in global migration governance since the 1990s. However, Global Compact appears to be an initiative that brings together many stakeholders such as migrants, NGOs, local communities, diasporas, academia, the media, human rights institutions, and opens migration governance for discussion in many different dimensions.

It is clear that in the era of neoliberal globalization, the issue of international migration is now a global issue and many global and regional cooperations have been made in this field. In this section, rather than emphasizing the concept of “migration governance” regarding these cooperations, a definition was made as “the entry of international migration into the political agenda”. In line with this deliberate choice, the next section will discuss the concepts of migration governance and migration

management, and discuss the inadequacies of both concepts in approaching migration-related issues.

1.2. MIGRATION GOVERNANCE AND/OR MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

Migration governance and migration management have often been used interchangeably in the migration studies literature. Although the theoretical and historical backgrounds in which both concepts were born and developed are similar, it will be emphasized in this section that it is not appropriate to use these two terms interchangeably. For this, firstly a theoretical examination from the Foucauldian governmentality to the concept of global governance will be made. While constructing the theoretical background, it may be explained by four reasons why Foucault's governmentality approach is used in this study: (1) critical position of Foucault to governmentality, (2) his handling of political economy as one of the tools of governmentality, (3) Foucault's taking the genealogy of the concept of government through European states and the fact that the case study will proceed through Turkey and Europe in this study, (4) it is possible to explain the approach to migrants in international relations through the biopolitics of governmentality. Secondly, the historical and theoretical background of the concept of global governance in the field of migration will be discussed. As a result of the theoretical and historical background discussions, the place of the concept of migration management in migration governance will be examined and it will be argued that the use of both concepts alone is insufficient. This study claims that the sum of the bilateral and multilateral level interactions performed by many states and non-state actors in international migration is governance of migration management, not migration governance. The approach of the concept of migration governance to recent global migration issues is not sufficient and the concept of migration management remains more state-centered. Therefore, based on the claim that the use of both concepts alone is insufficient, the use of the conceptualization of governance of migration management will be suggested. After this suggestion, in the fourth sub-section, the concept of migration management will be put at the center and its global, regional, and national levels will be examined.

1.2.1. From Governmentality to Global Governance

Migration management as the main concept of this research calls for a better understanding within the scope of global governance. Foucauldian conceptualizations of government and governmentality present a genealogy for the development of the concept of global governance. In the Foucauldian approach, the government is defined as the conduct of conduct which means two senses: one conducts oneself and one is conducted (Dean, 2010: 17). Foucault emphasizes that the concept of the government is not only about the government and possession of the territory in a political way, but also about the reality of a society that has its own regulations, laws, and mechanisms on that territory in an independent and complex manner (Rabinow, 1984: 242). According to this conduct of conduct, '*one never governs a state, a territory, or a political structure. Those whom one governs are people, individuals, or groups*' (Foucault, 2007: 122). Foucault seeks the first transition of the emergence of the modern state in the changing meaning of the concept of government in the historical and social conditions of Europe. While the 16th century's government focused on who, what, how, and with what techniques the ruler would rule, towards the 18th century the government ceased to be only the sum of governing rules but also became self-government of individuals. Therefore, as state government is not a unique form of government, governments are multiple such as the government of individuals, the government of the self, the government of souls, the government of families, and so on. Foucault underlines the concept of governmentality, which is the art of governing of the modern state, by saying that the plurality of these forms of government is implicit in the modern state and society. Because the road from the government of the state to multiple governments is a process, and when it comes to governmentality, this process should be understood.³ The

³ By this word "governmentality" I mean three things. First, by "governmentality" I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. Second, by "governmentality" I understand the tendency, the line of force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has constantly led towards the pre-eminence over all other types of power—sovereignty, discipline, and so on—of the type of power that we can call "government" and which has led to the development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses (*appareils*) on the one hand, [and, on the other] to the development of a series of knowledges (*savoirs*). Finally, by

principal elements of government within the conception of governmentality are population, political economy, and security. This population does not represent the sum of individuals, it is rather a collectivity with its own regulations, functioning, and behavior patterns, in other words, it is public. From now on in the modern state, the family has been replaced by the population and the government of the family economy by the political economy (Foucault, 1991: 101). Therefore, in the modern state, it has become a form of power that takes the governmentality knowledge from the political economy, directs the conduct of the population, and provides political and economic well-being with security apparatus. Besides, this form of power has made the population an object of conduct through analysis, calculations, tactics, institutions, and procedures. In other words, biopolitics or biopower as a power over life (Liesen and Walsh, 2012: 4) has become the most important element of the art of government of the modern state. Obtaining information about the population with new scientific techniques, such as birth rate, mortality rate, fertility rate, has become the governmental source of power. Foucault underlines in his lecture on 1st February 1978 at Collège de France that it was lived in the age of governmentality that was discovered in the 18th century. According to the governmentality understanding of this period, the limited government is the basic principle and for the natural functioning of economic structures and institutions such as markets and trade, there is a rationality that the government of political power is limited and respects individual choices and freedoms. The reflection of the free choice of individuals in the liberal governmentality understanding is control and security. Liberal art of governing plants the idea of freedom by making the society accustomed to controlling, limitation, threats, and security techniques and by conducting its behavior in accordance with rules.

Foucault's governmentality concept was scaled from the state level to the global level by Neo-Foucauldians in the following periods (Selby, 2007: 334). While governmentality is an art of government study at the micro-level, the neoliberal form of global governmentality may be qualified as a macro-level art of government. Just as the

“governmentality” I think we should understand the process, or rather, the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually “governmentalized.” (Foucault, 2007: 144)

self-government of the population is provided for the efficiency of the state at the state level, while scaling up the governmentality conception at the global level, state governmentality is expected to coincide with international norms and values, in other words, economically developed liberal states assure the efficiency of the global neoliberal system with international and regional organizations targeting states and populations. In the globalizing world, the power of political power has lost its importance due to numerous non-state actors. With the globalization of trade, goods, money, ideas, and people, political power has now become just one of the elements in this complex structure. In other words, with the inclusion of international and regional organizations within the scope of global governmentality, the rules and techniques of the art of government have now gone beyond the state. At this point, it is useful to point out that this concept is still discussable within neo-Foucauldian scholars. Some of them refuse to use the concept of governmentality regarding the functioning of the global realm. For example, Larner and Walters call *globalization* as governmentality, Kelly proposes *biopolitical imperialism*, Hindess suggests a *supra-national regime of government*.⁴

Although Foucault did not use the word of governance, in the neoliberal globalization age, the modern art of governing is expressed in the concept of governance based on the concepts of government and governmentality of Foucault. (However, governance is not a result of neoliberal globalization as there were some images of governance in the welfare state. Governance should not be taken as a metanarrative of the new millennium (Walters, 2012: 38-40).) The concept of governmentality pointed out the art of governing of Western states from the 17th to 20th centuries, and its core was to producing policies aimed at populations and societies. However, the art of governing of the neoliberal global age under the name of governance seeks to solve problems without targeting any society or population and not knowing who is governing it (Enroth, 2014: 63-66). For example, Joseph argues global governance as a neoliberal form of government may only be understood through the

⁴ For further information:

Larner and Walters, *Globalization as Governmentality in Alternatives* 29, 2014.

Kelly, M.G.E., *Biopolitical Imperialism*, 2015.

Hindess, B., *Neoliberal Citizenship in Citizenship Studies*, 2002.

international and regional organizations, such as World Bank or IMF, dominated by economically developed advanced liberal societies (Joseph, 2012: 48). Governance may be expressed in the entirety of the rules, principles, and norms that regulate state behavior. What matters here is that it has a constraining and constitutive effect on state behavior. The use of the concept of governance as “global” governance in the literature now shows that the art of governing breaks away from the absolute authority and hierarchy of the individual nation-state and becomes beyond and behind the nation-state by shaping the behavior of states by a range of actors, institutions and organizations and by operating global governance both top-down and bottom-up, unlike global governmentality. While conducting top-down global governance with supranational global organizations such as the UN, contrary to the “global” emphasis of global governance, bottom-up global governance makes it possible to go beyond the formal institutional network and ensure participation of the bottom from different levels in the process: like regional organizations, local governments, and non-state actors such as civil society organizations, companies from private and public sector. In Rosenau's words, spheres of authority offer a broad perspective on this diversity of actors in global governance (Rosenau, 2007: 89). The diversity of governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental actors in global governance (Gok and Mehmetcik, 2020: 4) expresses the changes in global politics and hence, a diversity that goes beyond the individual nation-state.

1.2.2. Global Migration Governance

Global governance is an ambiguous and frequently redefined concept. Although governance regulates the relations of states and non-state actors with various rules and principles at different levels, each new transboundary issue contributes to the definition of governance. Governance is assumed to be heterarchical, unlike government, and therefore state and non-state actors are expected to be involved in the governance processes, which have a range of stages such as agenda-setting, discussion, negotiation, execution, enforcement, without a single rule maker. Rosenau emphasizes that “*governance as the involvement of state institutions and informal, non-state actors in policymaking ‘whereby those persons and organisations within its purview move*

ahead, satisfy their needs, and fulfill their wants” (Rosenau 1992: 4). The roots of global governance in the neoliberal age may be both theoretically and politically explained (Betts, 2011: 3). Theoretically, paradigm crises of social sciences failed to explain the real world in the 1970s and 1980s. Those theories dissatisfied in explaining the collapse of the Cold War, disenchantment with the state, concentration of market deregulation, changes in production organization, intensification of capitalism, neoliberal globalization, and international institutions and regimes. Moreover, this dissatisfaction was accompanied by a nation-state crisis in which neoliberal globalization and regionalization processes threatened sovereignty. There was a need for a broader set of concepts than simple dichotomies describing social sciences as anarchy and sovereignty, market and plan, or public and private. As a result, attempts to understand the role of international organizations in international relations and their influence on the behavior of states in the 1990s were met with the broader concept of global governance.

Politically, governance found its reflection in the establishment of the Commission on Global Governance in 1992 and the definition of global governance in the report had published by the commission in 1995: “*Governance is the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.*” (The Commission on Global Governance, 1995: 4). The role of the Commission was to shed light on the fact that in a world where interaction is increasing day by day, transboundary problems cannot be solved by the individual efforts of states. In respect to this, the report discusses how states might cooperate against transboundary problems or challenges such as environment, conflict, poverty, crime, trade, or finance.

With the introduction of global governance in the 1990s the fact that intermediate institutions and practices reshaped the world economy, previously ignored by the market and the state, made it difficult for nation-states to control their economies within

their borders. This unstructured complexity of the economy (Jessop, 1998: 40) has led to increased interest in institutions and practices at all levels, from local to regional and global, to re-establish a structure and order. Market, labor, and state which are a triple structure on a national scale have lost their monopoly power against international organizations, public and private partnerships, companies, and multilateral agencies. The reconfiguration of forms and functions of the state under the impact of globalization dealt with some transboundary processes of states, interstates, and non-state institutions through the blurriness of the boundaries between national and international or private and public (Overbeek, 2002: 7). This eventually led to the hollowing out of the nation-state through supranational, regional, and local governance regimes and transboundary policies (Jessop, 1998: 42).

Global governance has been developed to negotiate transboundary issues that a single state cannot deal with. Some of these transboundary issues are climate change, international markets, international trades, transnational crimes, terrorism, pandemia, and so on. Therefore, globalization has revealed the requirement of governance beyond the nation-state (Betts, 2011: 7). Although governance should be beyond the state, just as the globalization process is directed following the strengthening of liberal trade, capital, finance, and monetary system, the global governance agenda is managed by economically developed states in the neoliberal globalization wave. Since the Second World War, all international financial institutions established for free capital mobility govern hierarchical global economic governance under the influence of advanced economies and within democratic deficit (Likić-Brborić and Schierup, 2015: 226). However, transformations at the age of the new millennium introduced a different understanding besides economic and financial issues that includes issues such as poverty, inequality, social justice, decent work, and human and labor rights into global governance discussions. In this context, in the post-Cold War period, international migration which states seek to control cross-border human mobility emerged as a new mode of challenges due to political, economic, and cultural transformations, unequal development of economies, local and regional conflicts. International migration became a part of global governance in the 1990s, but much more intensely in the 2000s, as one of the transboundary issues. This infusion of international migration into global

governance has undoubtedly been subjected to needs of free trade, finance system, and national security. For example, most of the global migration governance practices mentioned in the sub-section 1.1.3. have associated migration with development and labor. While establishing the relationship of migration with the economy, humanitarianism has been ignored and the embedded features of migration governance have been stressed for a long time (for embedded migration governance see sub-section 1.2.3).

The discussions within the scope of migration governance were about economic concerns on the one hand and security grievances on the other. The fear that the east-west migration flows, which initially concentrated especially in Europe, and the new types of migration such as irregular migration, human trafficking, and smuggling created security gaps, led states to take tighter measures to control and limit migration. Some mechanisms to take these measures have been established with the cooperation of states: such as the first inter-state consultation mechanism Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum, and Refugees (IGC), or European border management mechanism Frontex, or international organizations like International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) to share information or react migration challenges and/or crises. However, while normative debates on global governance continued between all these processes, it was debated through the changing conjuncture towards the new millennium that migration policies were now in addition to narrow and tightly controlled security realm associated with wider and flexible areas like the development of migrant-sending regions, the need for migrant labor in developed countries, and the rights of migrants. In this context, migration was moved from the security-driven migration control realm to the manageable realm. This coincides with the time of the project called New International Regime for Orderly Movements of People (NIROMP, see sub-section 1.2.4), which was established in 1997 to put Bimal Ghosh's migration management concepts into practice. In the late 1990s, the discourse of international migration management began to be mentioned in addition to the global migration governance discourse. As a regulatory dominant approach, international migration management frames migration as a governance problem to be solved (Riemsdijk, Marchand, and Heins, 2021: 5). Although the concept of migration

management is not new, its tools, such as fora, consultation processes, or surveillance systems, contribute to the formation of global migration governance discourses and practices. The actors playing a role in the production of these discourses and practices operate top-down and bottom-up as mentioned in the global governance framework. Although there is no uniform and binding international institution, migration is globally governed from the top-down by supranational actors like the UN, international organizations like IOM, and the occurrence of migration governance at the global level frames states' migration discourses, policies, and practices. At the same time, migration is governed from the bottom-up by local and regional governmental actors, non-state actors such as civil society organizations, migrant networks, or private and public sector actors. Bottom-up global governance of migration has an important place because states transfer their functions in migration management processes to bottom-up actors by outsourcing or privatization. Therefore, the enforcement from the top-down of supranational or international actors and the attempts of non-state actors from the bottom-up substitute generally governmental functions of states by fulfilling the migration-related responsibilities. At this point, the power struggles between states, interstate and non-state actors, power relations based on political and economic interests and the resulting democratic deficit should not be ignored.

1.2.3. Global Migration Governance or Migration Management?

Within the scope of global migration governance, it would be appropriate to place the concept of migration management in the genealogy of global migration governance and to consider some of the tools of migration management within the framework of governance. The migration management concept may be incorporated into global migration governance through the governmentality approach. According to the governmentality approach, migration management makes biopolitics on the migrant population. Or the actions taken by individual states against migration within the scope of migration management are an example of governmentality. For example, controlling borders by border management, counting refugees in camps, and transforming migrants into a population that is quantified and measurable by qualifications such as birth rates, death rates, fertility rates, being skilled and unskilled. Or for example in his research

that he examined refugee camps, Bulley states that refugees are known and kept under control through aggregation, calculation, and disaggregation methods (Bulley, 2014: 70). Migration management, which is equated with border management in some sources, provides both the control of migrants and the self-management of migrants at the borders through surveillance tools. The border controlling mechanisms, passport and visa requirements, and policies against irregular migration manage international migration within the framework of certain rules on the one hand and allow migrants (or travelers) to be self-managed in matters such as health, business, labor, leisure. Migration management is not only effective in conducting migrants' own behavior but also in conducting the behavior of states. International organizations such as IOM may conduct the conduct of states' migration policies. As a result, in the process from global governmentality to global governance, migration management has an exceptional place in the production of global migration governance and its massification.

It is known that the concepts of migration management and migration governance are used the same or interchangeably in the migration studies literature (Elitok, 2013: 162). However, this study proposes to use the concept of governance of migration management, rather than using migration management and migration governance as a stand-alone conceptual explanation to understand and explain the behavior of state and non-state actors regarding international migration. The concept of migration management in itself is insufficient, because, on the one hand, migration management is intensely state-centered, on the other hand, it is a general concept that legitimizes any action taken by a state in the field of migration under the umbrella of migration management (Geiger and Pécoud, 2010: 3). It is not insufficient to use the concept of migration governance in itself, but it is not a suitable concept on its own because states are independent of non-state actors, dominant, and singular as yet to be able to enter into governance in the field of migration. Today, international migration is a core issue of the global agenda, but is it also really a matter of global governance? Is migration less control/security-centered and more human-centered today compared to the time when migration governance initiatives started and today's migration governance? Is the state or the cooperation of state and non-state actors the main actor in decisions on migration policies? Isn't it possible to claim that migration governance serves the

interests of the state just as migration management is under the state monopoly? Sub-section 1.1.3 mentioned that migration governance has an uncoordinated and fragmented structure, develops usually with bottom-up initiatives and that there is no binding regime yet. But these reasons alone do not show that the concept of migration governance is problematic. By looking at the bottom of the iceberg with three basic reasoning, it may be argued that it is actually the governance of migration management, not migration governance: (1) sovereignty and power relations, (2) rights-based argument, (3) criticism of the concept of migration governance itself.

According to international law, states are sovereign in the decision-making of entry, stay, and return of migrants and travelers within their territories. As every single state will want to control the mobility of people across its borders and want to decide which entry is permitted or not, they would be reluctant to reduce their authority to regulate migration via international institutions and regimes. State sovereignty comes under pressure not only in border management but also when anti-immigrant feelings arise in society, and the dominant power over immigrants is exercised with severe immigrant policies and tighter border security. In foreign policy, the relationship of power and conflict of interests between the North and the South affect the cooperation of states in the field of migration. While economically developed countries of North America, Europe, and Oceania as receiving-countries seek to prevent irregular immigration flow and to opt for selected and wanted immigration, Southern sending-countries tolerate irregular emigration for the benefit of remittance and concern about the emigration of highly skilled labor (Hampshire, 2013: 83). In the field of migration, it would also be appropriate to separate North-North cooperation from North-South cooperation. While Northern countries cooperate as policy maker actors of migration governance to manage and regulate migration together, North-South cooperation with policy takers Southern countries is done to prevent irregular migration under unequal power relations (Betts, 2011: 22). In this case, the question must be asked whether migration governance is really beyond the power and sovereignty of the state if it does not serve interests. As long as states are more satisfied with participating in migration cooperation at a regional and bilateral level rather than at a global level, and as long as the cooperation is informal and non-binding rather than formal and binding, as Hansen states the principle

of “less is more” will prevail in migration governance (Hansen, 2011: 14). At this point, the principle of less is more coincides with migration management. The manageability of migration in migration governance makes it easier for states to delegate their migration-related responsibilities to top-down and bottom-up actors, but still, the sovereign state does not relinquish control. Rather than coming together under a global roof and regime, today's migration management takes place between the cooperation, interaction, and even contestation of these actors at many different levels. In this context, it may be stated that the manageability of migration is more useful for states and international institutions, who are reluctant to come together for a coherent framework for international migration in a period when refugee flows, irregular migration, and precarious labor increase. In summary, although top-down and bottom-up actors are the visible faces of global migration governance, states remain at the center of migration management and the sovereign concern of the states and interstate unequal power relations pose an obstacle to the necessary implementation of global migration governance.

The second issue that makes the use of the concept of global migration governance problematic is the rights-based argument. Migration is not only about the state, migration is about people, immigrants/emigrants, and citizens. Global governance is the search for solutions to global issues that states cannot manage alone, in cooperation with non-state actors, for the benefit of public good. It is an undeniable fact that state and non-state actors who cooperate for a better world should come together based on human rights as well as economic and security concerns. Migration governance initiatives have been gathered around the axes of economy, development, and security for a long time and while these axes were privileged, the human rights axis was sacrificed (Betts, 2011: 319). Basically, the prevention of access to safe territories for migrants fleeing conflict has become one of the most important human rights violations in the last decade. The lack of decent and safe work conditions of low-wage and low-skilled migrant workers, human trafficking and smuggling, the silence of the sending-countries to the irregular migration flows, and leaving irregular migrants to die in the open sea are just some of the other examples that violate the human rights of migrants. Besides, subventions given to the third sector of migration governance are actually aimed at preventing irregular

migration flows rather than being humanitarian. Likewise, allocating aid to share the burden of refugee camps or to prevent migrants from applying to irregular migration routes is not a rights-based initiative, but an initiative that serves the economy, development, and security interests of economically developed countries (Czaika and Mayer, 2007: 7-10). The protection of the human rights of migrants is one of the important challenges of global migration governance. Even if the states confirm to comply with the international human rights law, migrants, especially refugees and forced migrants, remain outside of this structure and institutional mechanisms. Therefore, the emphasis on state dominance and state interests in the field of migration governance once again shows that migration management is at the forefront rather than migration governance.

Thirdly, and finally, some criticisms of the concept of migration governance itself reveal the problems of this concept. Firstly, while the basis of neoliberal globalization is based on the circulation of goods, capital, services, information, and people, and these circulations are encouraged, human mobility is actually restricted. Neoliberal globalization has been controlling these circulations with the governance network by including international and regional organizations in the global system since the 1990s. If we need to consider the critical position that neoliberal globalization is a hegemonic project of economically developed countries, the contradictions of global migration governance may be observed. Considering that the actors that manage neoliberal globalization and governance networks are the same economically developed countries, it may be said that neoliberal globalization also fulfills the project of global migration governance. In other words, while migration is actually managed, the conception of migration governance has been turned into discourse. In this context, this study claims that in reality there is the governance of migration management. Another contradiction argument that supports this claim is that global migration governance is actually quite limited. Because the main issue in governance initiatives is not migration, but migration and “something”, as Betts calls embedded migration (Betts, 2011: 13), such as migration and economics, migration and development, migration and security. Global migration governance is limited also because of its facilitative characteristic. Migration issues are far from being discussed under formal multilateral cooperation. Facilitative

elements to simplify migration management such as dialogues, sharing information, and providing capacity-building training are highlighted.

As a result of the arguments presented above, this study characterizes states' approach to the issue of migration as governance of migration management, not migration governance. In the previous three sub-sections, emphasis has been placed on migration governance. In the next section, the concept of migration management will be examined in detail, and migration management at global, regional, and national levels will be discussed. In this context, while global and regional migration management processes refer to governance of migration management, processes at the national level refer only to migration management.

1.2.4. Migration Management Concept

It is a fact that states are more interested in the issue of migration entered into the international agenda at the point where they may manage it. In 1993, when Bimal Ghosh introduced the concept of migration management into the literature for the first time, he mentioned the creation of an international regime and a coordinated international organization that would govern the human movement and make it more orderly and predictable (Ghosh, 2000: 3-4). However, it should be stated that the term migration management, which was used for the first time in 1993, is not used today for the same purpose, but has entered into a transformation in the last 20 years. Bimal Ghosh, IOM adviser at that time, discussed migration management in a report he wrote following the request of the UN Commission on Global Governance in 1993. In the 1990s, as rising levels of migration made it increasingly difficult for states to manage it, in response to the commission's request Ghosh stressed the disparities in existing migration policies and mentioned an international regime that would lay the foundations for a more inclusive migration management. Based on this report, the project called "the New International Regime for Orderly Movements of People (NIROMP)" was launched in 1997 with the cooperation of United Nations Population Fund (UNPFA), Swiss, Swedish and Dutch governments. Just as the Bretton Woods and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system were built after the Second World War to regulate international finance and trade under certain rules and norms and to prevent possible

crises, the basis of this project was the creation of an international regime in order to prevent potential crises that could be caused by people who could move more freely due to the collapse of the Eastern and Western blocs in the post-Cold War period (Geiger and Pécoud, 2010: 2 cited from Ghosh, 2000).

The NIROMP project, along with other initiatives⁵, was the first step of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) adopted in 2018 (Pécoud, 2019: 5). The regime draft presented by Ghosh in the NIROMP had three pillars: the first is similar objectives that would enable all states to meet on a common ground, the second is a normative framework that would guide states both at home and abroad, and the third is a more coordinated, institutional, and international body against fragmented multiplicity of agencies (Ghosh, 2007: 107-112). Bimal Ghosh's draft that would make human mobility manageable has been reflected in practices of global migration governance over the years. However, none of these practices conducted under the umbrella of global migration governance gave the international regime and a single international body. The international migration issue still has an uncoordinated and fragmented structure without any binding regime.

When Bimal Ghosh first elaborated the concept of migration management in 1993, it may be argued that he actually meant migration governance as we may describe it today. The discussions of the concept of governance in sub-section 1.2.3 may remind us that Ghosh's draft about the international migration regime and international migration institution corresponds actually to build a global migration governance realm. However, states are generally the primary actors of global governance and, as mentioned in the previous section, states have always been distant to migration and have not included it on their agenda for a long time. There are many reasons why the global regime has not been produced so far: reservations of states about ceding some part of their sovereignty to a higher supranational authority and so their reluctance from the very beginning, the failure to sign and ratify the international treaties, administrative burden of any

⁵ The Hague Process on the Future of Asylum and Migration Policy (1999), the Berne Initiative (2001), the Doyle Report (2002), the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM, 2003–2005), the first High-Level Dialogue (2006), the first Global Forum on Migration and Development (2007), the New York Summit on Large-Scale Movement of Refugees and Migrants (2016).

international attempts, and the reason that the regulation of migration in accordance with international norms would affect market flexibility (Newland, 2010: 334-335). For example, Migrant Workers Convention, which was adopted by ILO in 1975, has been ratified by only 25 countries since 1978, when it came into force (ILO, 2017).⁶ Another example, the UN Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families⁷ which was adopted in 1990 but remained dormant 13 years entered into force in 2003 with the ratification of migrant-sending countries (UN Treaty Collection, 2004). These examples may show how states are unwilling to produce a global regime and that states see the work in this field as an administrative burden, rather than cooperating in the field of migration. Regarding the present, states may be willing to participate in international dialogues, but the emerging agreements are far from being binding. At this point, if there are such ruptures toward global regime, the question of how migration is governed without a global regime arises. The answer may be the governance of migration management of non-state actors, especially third sector, international and intergovernmental networks, and organizations (Robinson, 2018: 421-422). Rather than a global regime, various bilateral or multilateral agreements and conventions, legal regulations, and technical standards organize interstate relations on migration and attitude of states to migrants under the concept of migration management (Robinson, 2018: 418 cited from Aleinikoff, 2003). In this sense, it is necessary to answer the question of what migration management means. The emergence of the migration

⁶ *Migrant Workers Convention* (Convention No. 143) is the first initiative of the international community to reveal the problems due to irregular migration and illegal employment of migrants. The main aim of the Convention is the prevention of all forms of irregular migration in abusive circumstances, including the unauthorized and precarious employment of migrant workers (ILO, *Migrant Workers Convention*). The Convention is ratified by: Albania, Armenia, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cyprus, Guinea, Italy, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Montenegro, Macedonia, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Sweden, Tajikistan, Togo, Uganda, Venezuela.

⁷ *The Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families* is the first attempt of the protection of migrants workers' rights and an important step regarding the responsibility of migrant-receiving countries towards the connection between human rights and migrants. 55 countries are parties of the convention: Albania, Argentina, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belize, Bolivia, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Congo-Brazzaville, East Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela.

management concept must be considered within the context of “managerial” concepts of the 1990s where the public and private space management became hegemonic in conducting state behaviors. The classical public administration was criticized because of its inefficiency and under-performance after the fiscal crisis and the new public management mentality was introduced into the public administration in order to enhance the efficiency and performance of fiscal and administrative activities. The management trends of the neoliberal power, such as education management, healthcare management, security management, career management, stress management, gave politicians, bureaucrats, and academics the image that migration was also manageable. The introduction of the new public management eventuated in outsourcing of public services to lower public expenditures and consequently, in the field of migration management, migration-related practices were outsourced through privatization and denationalization. The services requiring financial expenditure such as establishment of reception camps, health checks, meeting the basic needs of immigrants were transferred to NGOs, intergovernmental organizations and companies from the private sector (Georgi, 2010: 56-62). Hereby migration management turned into a concept that produces technocratic and standard solutions to save the day without taking into account potential possibilities that may arise in the future. Rather than understanding, forecasting and solving migration-related problems, singular solutions are produced for each event and problem. Since the 2000s, it is a fact that the information flow about human mobility has accelerated and the awareness of the international community has increased. Although this fact seems to have contributed to the global governance of migration, in fact, both globally, regionally and nationally, migration is managed by states and intergovernmental organizations for the benefit of their own interests rather than for the benefit of all.

The 1990s were a period in which the bases of governance of migration management were laid while the 2000s witnessed a period in which governance initiatives intensified (Pellerin, 2014: 42). The first period of the governance of migration management both at regional and global level is signified by the characteristic going beyond the national state power. At the global level, the global organizations like United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or International

Organization for Migration (IOM) broadened its missions and mandate. UNHCR enlarged its missions towards not only refugees but also mix migrant populations and IOM extended its mandate from being an agency of transportation of migrants to an adviser expert for the lack of migration policies of member states. At the regional level, International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) was created as an intergovernmental organization by the attempts of Austria and Switzerland in 1993 to assist member states in managing migration. Also, the discussions on the Treaty of Amsterdam for migration and asylum policies took place among European Union states. Besides, IOM also launched some regional processes such as the Puebla and the Manila processes to develop the dialogue between sending and receiving countries. The common point of these initiatives in the 1990s is being European centered. European states made an effort to cooperate among themselves and with neighboring states across the migration concerns. The search for solutions to prevent the pressure of migration waves rather than cooperation has limited the initiatives in this period, for example, ICMPD and IOM were not in communication with each other at that time. However, these initiatives remained the states that formal migration cooperations were required at regional and global levels.

The post-2005 era attempts on international migration were more focused on migration policies and interstate cooperation (Pellerin, 2014: 44). In this period, United Nations initiatives were more common than in the previous period at the global level, such as mentioned in sub-section 1.1.3 the creation of the Global Commission on International Migration, the launching of the Global Migration Group, High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, Global Forum on Migration and Development, UN Summit on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrant, Global Compact For Safe, Orderly And Regular Migration, and so on. At the regional level, ICMPD started to collaborate Berne Initiative (established in 2001) and launched together in 2004 the International Agenda for Migration Management in order to assist states to develop capacity-building mechanisms and migration policies and legislations. Also, European Commission launched the Aeneas Programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the area of migration and asylum in 2004. Besides these global and regional initiatives, Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development (OECD) spearheaded the High-Level Policy Forum on Migration by preparing a road map for OECD member countries in 2009, which contains principles against irregular migration and to promote the development of sending countries. The second period of the governance of migration management was more aimed at improving inter-state cooperation and the areas of migration management spread to new fields such as the development of third countries or the fight against human trafficking.

In sum, explanations regarding the concept of migration management show that migration management is highly in the hands of economically developed states, who direct the governance, and that migration would be both a threat and an economic and development engine for them. Migration management is a concept that finds its reflection in the global governance and the normative power of the governance by producing soft laws on migration management agenda helps to hide these power relations and asymmetries.

The next sub-sections will elaborate on global, regional, and national levels of migration management in order to present a general overview of the details of the concept of migration management. The political economic approach of migration management, which is the main subject of analysis in this study, will be discussed in the third section of this chapter.

1.2.4.1. Global Migration Management

In contrast to the global governance activities carried out by many actors, mentioned in section 1.1.3, global migration management will be discussed in this section through the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which identifies itself with this concept. IOM is the most effective actor that ensures the reproduction of migration management at the global level every day. Accordingly, this section will bring a perspective to global migration management through the example of IOM, which uses the concept of global migration management most and justifies its existence with this concept.

International Organization for Migration is an intergovernmental organization with 174 member states and 8 observer states as of 2022. Today, IOM is the largest

intergovernmental organization in the area of migration while the second-largest one is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with operations in 132 states.⁸ In 1951, IOM was founded under the name of Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME) to help displaced people by the Second World War. Renamed International Committee for European Migration (ICEM) in 1952, the activity of the committee was limited for nearly 30 years to preventing the overpopulation of undocumented workers and refugees fleeing from Eastern Bloc countries, wars, and concentration camps and to organizing their logistics (Pécoud, 2018: 1624). The neoliberalization process that started with the oil crisis in 1973 and the crisis of the Fordist mode of production was the turning point in the history of IOM. On the one hand, the recruitment of migrant workers was reduced as a result of the unemployment that emerged with the economic crisis, but on the other hand, more conditions that would lead to an increase in international mobility was created with the neoliberal reforms. In this contradictory environment with the end of the Cold War, the need to control migration more than ever urged an increase in information network and research on migration. Hence, IOM began to transform its organizational structure between countries seeking to increase their capacity to control migration and increased human mobility as a reaction to neoliberal reforms. A few days after the collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989, the name of the committee took its present form as the International Organization for Migration. Since the 1990s, IOM has developed its capacity: providing statistics on east-west migration flows to European countries, providing historical information transfer, opening new offices in Eastern European countries, designing projects related to east-west migration flows, fighting against smuggling and trafficking, expanding its geography from Europe to the Middle East and Asia by showing its presence in emerging crises and wars after the Cold War.

IOM's massive expansion took place from 1998 to 2008, when the number of member states increased from 67 to 125. Such growth in a short period of time was actually made possible by IOM's adaptation to the "management" trend. In the 1990s, new business areas such as division against illegal migration, academic advisory board,

⁸ According to annual budgets, UNHCR is the biggest one with an annual budget of 8.9 billion USD in 2022 while IOM's annual budget is 2.5 billion USD in 2022.

business advisory board within the organization were established. And just like a transnational company, IOM decentralized organizationally and shifted some of its departments, such as human resources and IT, to Manila and Panama, where it may employ low-wage workers (IOM, 2019a). In the early 2000s, while IOM was experiencing a wide-ranging growth by adapting to neoliberal reforms, the concept of migration management, which was introduced by Bimal Ghosh in this dynamic environment with an effort to build an international regime, has also changed due to the dynamics in the international conjuncture. The fail of humanitarian interventions in Somalia and Rwanda, the falsification of liberalism's end of history thesis, the 11/09 attacks and the war against terrorism sharpened the international community's view on the issue of immigration, and at such a time both the establishment of the international regime was delayed and the NIROMP project was suspended (Georgi, 2010: 59). Therefore, after the 2000s, IOM's approach to migration management was far from being idealistic and the organization existed by serving the migration policies of industrialized, Western, and migrant-receiving states that fund the organization. Today IOM works in the four areas of migration management: migration and development, facilitating migration, regulating migration, and addressing forced migration, and the organization expresses its work as follows: *“IOM works to help ensure the orderly and humane management of migration, to promote international cooperation on migration issues, to assist in the search for practical solutions to migration problems and to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants in need, be they refugees, displaced persons or other uprooted people. The IOM Constitution gives explicit recognition to the link between migration and economic, social and cultural development, as well as to the right of freedom of movement of persons.”* (IOM, 2020a).

IOM conducts global migration management through two main areas: contributing to the migration policies of states and integrating migrants into the neoliberal system. IOM is managed and funded by its member states as an intergovernmental organization. The budget of IOM is formed by projectisation, in other words, it obtains its financial income according to the projects it carries out, so these projects —generally projects on strengthening immigration policies, developing border controls, or training state apparatus— are shaped by what member states pay for. Therefore, IOM does not have a

political effect on its member states, nor does it have a structure that criticizes its members or imposes rules on them. With its key role in the field of migration and years of knowledge and experience, it convinces states that it will be "benefit of all" and "triple-win" (win-win-win of migrant-receiving, migrant-sending, and migrant). The most important point in this convincing process is that IOM does not use the measures or applications to be taken regarding migration as an element of pressure, but depolitizes these elements and presents them as a technical requirement. Therefore, IOM does not usually deal with the root causes behind the migration decision but approaches the problem technocratically and produces solutions to save the day. Secondly, IOM plays a role in integrating migrants into the neoliberal system in global migration management. IOM supports the movement of migrant workers and resettled refugees in the perspective of the economic benefits. Although IOM seems to have a contradiction between nationalist border control strategies and the need for foreign flexible workforce in the global economy, it keeps immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers outside the migration management system that will not contribute to the economy of its member states and create an economic burden on it, and therefore has been criticized. In this way, the IOM plays its role for the benefit of some rather than the benefit of all. For example, the expansion of the IOM in the 1990s was more to solve the unexpected migration-related consequences created by neoliberal reforms, rather than serving to solve migration-related problems. To give another example of IOM's contradictory migration management, IOM has undoubtedly provided food, shelter, healthcare and transportation services to countless migrants and refugees, but this does not mean that it is doing this business for the benefit of migrants and refugees in a broader sense. Because refugees cannot reach safety due to the border control systems established by IOM's Immigration and Border Management Division in Western countries, or asylum seekers are kept in detention camps established by IOM, or illegal migrant workers are deported with 'voluntary' return programs assisted by IOM. As a result, IOM's activities are beneficial to the states that fund it and the migrant profile these states desire.

Finally, it should be emphasized that IOM is an important knowledge producer in global migration management. Reports, workshops, data and statistical information,

press releases and other written and visual activities managed by IOM produce information and manage perceptions about migration management and migrants. For example, the concept of transit migration, produced by IOM in the 1990s, was intended to legitimize the European Union's externalization and strengthening of its migration control capacity against irregular migration from neighboring countries (Düvell, 2012: 419). The effectiveness of IOM in producing knowledge and managing perception may also be seen in the text in which IOM expresses its own work at the beginning of the chapter: "*IOM works to help ensure the orderly and humane management of migration, to promote international cooperation on migration issues* (call for international cooperation to emphasize the globality of migration management), *to assist in the search for practical solutions* (technocratic solutions), *to migration problems and to provide humanitarian assistance* (softening the severity of technocratic solutions by emphasizing humanitarian) *to migrants in need, be they refugees, displaced persons or other uprooted people*. *The IOM Constitution gives explicit recognition to the link between migration and economic, social and cultural development, as well as to the right of freedom of movement of persons.*" Based on these examples, IOM is able to manage perceptions about migration and immigrants, as well as convince migrants, refugees and asylum seekers that human mobility is manageable under the discourse of contribution to economic benefit and development in the light of neoliberal understanding. IOM is an actor that can reproduce global migration management to the benefit of some. It may be argued that IOM's practices and discourses under the name of migration management distort the migration reality and depoliticize the migration issue by promoting the triple-win strategy on behalf of the migrant-receiving countries and other non-state actors (Wise, 2015: 39).

1.2.4.2. *Regional Migration Management*

Many different unions and organizations operate within the scope of regional migration management, as well as activities carried out within the scope of global migration management. In this section, apart from global migration management, why there is a need for regional migration management and the actors of regional migration management will be discussed. It may be said that regional migration management has

emerged as a response to rapidly changing international migration trends for four different reasons at the regional level. First of all, post-Cold War period caused many more countries to be involved in migration processes than the Cold War period, and the need for regional migration management by both states and organizations has arisen due to the fact that a large part of the increasing international migration is actually inter-regional (Koppenfels, 2001: 64). Especially in the post-Cold War period, irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking between regions increased significantly rather than international regular migration flows. In addition to the major sending and receiving countries of the bipolar world, the new region of origins, new destination countries, and transit countries have been included in the migration processes. Transit countries have an important place in inter-regional migration. International migration is no longer a situation where only two countries are responsible. For example, when an immigrant who migrated to European Union from Iraq by passing Turkey as a transit country, Turkey has now also become a part of this international migration flow and it interacts regionally with both the origin and destination country.

Secondly, another important point in the emergence of regional migration management is that in the 1990s, when the globalization process progressed very rapidly, the necessity of new dialogues and regulations emerged due to the fact that the existing national migration policies and bilateral agreements could not be valid and effectively implemented as before 1990. Thirdly, with the end of the bipolarity during the Cold War period, there was a shift towards regionalization (Thouez and Channac, 2006: 372). States that refrained from cooperating with regional organizations because of security concerns after the Second World War, showed a tendency to regionalize in the field of politics and security, especially in the economic field, with the neoliberal reforms escalating competition in international trade since the 1980s. Therefore, it was possible to manage new international migration flows under this mentality in a period where the regionalization trend prevailed. Fourth and lastly, regional migration processes are important in countries that are not involved in global migration management or governance processes. For example, South Asian countries (like India or Pakistan) are not a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, and refugee-related issues in these countries may be determined

by regional migration management processes (Koppenfels, 2001: 66). As a result, regional migration management has an important place in regionalization processes that progress as fast as globalization.

Among the actors involved in regional migration management, there are processes such as Inter-Regional Forums on Migration (IRFs), Regional Consultative Processes on Migration (RCPs), regional unions established under economic integration such as the EU or NAFTA (USMCA from 2020, United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement), or multilateral agreements to provide solutions to refugee/asylum-seeker crises. IRFs, one of the two dialogue processes under IOM, are state-led dialogues on migration between two or more regions and RCPs are also state-led information-sharing and policy dialogues on migration among states from a specific geographic region (IOM, 2019b). The concept “inter-regional forum on migration” was used for the first time in 2008 to distinguish some fora from RCPs. Because, while all these processes were previously called RCP, since 2008 the processes discussing the migration problems of only one region were called RCP and the processes discussing migration issues between regions, such as Africa-Europe, Americas-Europe, were separated as IRF. Today, 5 RCPs and 7 IRFs are actively working.⁹ However, both dialogue processes address migration-related issues such as irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling, migration and development, labor migration, migrant's rights, and although both are informal and non-binding processes, formal agreement is open in both processes. While RCPs and IRFs are usually non-binding and ineffective in terms of normative impact, it is clear that these processes contribute to migration dialogues and help many states take action on migration-related issues. Because regional migration management has some advantages over global migration management: administration burden is less, direct communication is more possible, and although it is difficult to meet on common ground globally, regional similarities may accelerate decision-making processes.

⁹ RCPs by Region: Europe (Eurasia), Middle East, Africa, Asia and Pacific, Americas. IRFs by Region: Currently active IRFs: Africa - Europe, Americas - Europe, Asia - Europe, Asia - Middle East, Europe - Asia - Americas, Europe - Asia - Americas - the Middle East, Intra-African. Emerging IRFs: Africa - Europe.

Regional unions established under economic integration such as the EU and USMCA are also part of regional migration management. Today, the free movement of citizens within the borders of the European Union or the uniform policy of the European Union regarding migration and common immigration policies for the citizens of third countries exemplify the regional migration management within the European continent. Besides regional migration management is carried out through migration policies and agreements (although sometimes controversial) produced within regional unions such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, from 2020 USMCA) , the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The advantage of associations' involvement in regional migration management is the focus on a narrower regional problem that needs to be resolved rather than a global problem. Although regional migration management seems advantageous in some respects, it contains two contradictions: first, in the processes of regionalization, which is the result of globalization, free movement is more encouraged under the discourse of transparent borders, but what really happens is that regional or national borders are strengthened day by day with more measures against immigrants. The most obvious example is that IOM processes both encourage free movement and strengthen the capacity-buildings of states. The second is the contradictions of the regional unions and the power relations that the states enter for their own interests. For example, Great Britain refused to sign the Schengen Agreement while completing its European Union membership in 1973 and even left the Union years later. Another example is the contradiction that NAFTA has in itself regarding free movement. While transit of labor migrants is free between the USA and Canada, it is restricted to Mexican labor migrants. Although NAFTA was revised and updated at the initiative of the Trump administration in 2020 and took the name USMCA, there was no revision on immigration in this new agreement, it remained the same.

1.2.4.3. National Migration Management

The implementation of migration management at the national level is carried out by the governmental migration policies of each state. As international migration flows increase, the policies of governments tend to develop simultaneously. However, a country may not follow an official migration policy even though it is one of the hubs of human trafficking or one of the immigration/emigration countries. In the International Migration report published by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs in 2019, there are percentages of national migration policy measures related to the level of immigration, emigration and return data. Migration policies regarding immigration, emigration and return are included in the 2019 report in the most comprehensive way. While the 2015 report does not mention national migration policies, the 2013 report generally examines immigration, emigration and return without dividing them into branches. However, in the report prepared in 2019, international migration, which is more dynamic than ever, was discussed in detail.

Table 1. Percentage of national migration policy measures related to the level of immigration, emigration and return in 2019 (Source: United Nations, 2019)

%	Raise	Maintain	Lower	No policy
Immigration through regular channels	37	26	3	34
Immigration for family reunification	21	31	6	42
Immigration of highly skilled workers	40	19	5	37
Emigration of its citizens	8	13	20	59
Emigration of highly skilled workers	9	10	25	56
Return of its citizens living abroad	33	19	1	47
Return of migrants to their countries of origin	23	25	4	48

As shown in Table 1, according to the data sent by 111 countries in 2019, the majority of states tend to raise immigration through regular channels and immigration of highly skilled workers, while the rate of states that do not have a policy on these two issues is almost the same. At the regional level, while policies to increase immigration in European and North American countries are close to 50%, almost 70% of Asian countries implement policies that encourage both to increase immigration through regular ways and to increase high skill workers (United Nations, 2019: 25). The reasons underlying the encouragement of migration policies are as follows: meet labor demands in certain sectors of the economy, retain specific categories of workers, retain the status quo on social and ethnic diversity, safeguard employment opportunities for nationals, address population ageing, counter long-term population decline (United Nations, 2019: 16).

Regarding the level of emigration within the scope of migration policies, it is seen that approximately 60% of 111 countries do not make a policy initiative regarding their own citizens or their own high skill workers. When the regional data are examined, it is striking that only Asian countries, 20% of Central and Southern Asia countries and 43% of Eastern and Southern Asia have migration policies towards emigration level (United Nations, 2019: 25). Although it is an important point that most of the sovereign states do not have any policies, whether immigration, emigration or return level, in important areas related to international migration trends, it should be remembered that these features are related to each nation's own migration flows and that national migration management is implemented with the policies produced according to the migration issues in that country. However, national migration management is largely in interaction with regional and global migration management, and they may complement and contradict each other at the same time. In general, national migration policies do not contradict the order established by regional and global migration management in order to keep up with the international system. In this context, liberalization of migration policy in favor of economic and demographic development may contradict state policies that want to put national security and interests to the fore and strengthen migration policies. At this point, it would be appropriate to mention IOM's Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF), which tries to harmonize national policies with international

practices as a tool of global governance. In 2015, IOM launched MiGOF in order to define what migration management should look like at the national level by determining Migration Governance Indicators to assess and help develop national migration policies in harmony with the global migration governance (IOM, 2019c). These indicators are under 6 headings: (1) migrants' rights, (2) whole of government approach, (3) partnerships, (4) well-being of migrants, (5) mobility dimensions of crises, (6) safe, orderly, and dignified migration. Although IOM presents this framework as a policy performance assessment, it is effective in determining national policies and makes an imposition with a top-down attitude.

1.3. POLITICAL ECONOMIC APPROACH TO THE GOVERNANCE OF MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

In the literature on migration, many economics of migration studies discuss the effects of migrants on the economies and development processes of the receiving-countries, and these studies cover a wide range of areas such as labor migration, development, remittance, aid allocations etc. As it is not possible to understand the issue of migration without addressing the global political economy framework, this study aims to examine the political economic approach to the governance of migration management through a regional migration management experience. In other words, the study will focus on the economic background of the governance of migration management, the political economic relations between states and non-state actors to manage migration flows and financial flows, and in particular the cost of privatization and outsourcing of management tools for limiting migration in order not to hamper economic growth and security. In the case study, which will be elaborated in the second chapter of the study, the economic background of regional migration management between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea will be discussed and answers will be sought to the following questions: What are the tools and economic processes behind migration management? Who are the actors of these economic processes? Under what conditions do states transfer money to non-state actors while managing migration? To what extent are migrants affected by the economy of migration management? To answer these questions throughout the study, first of all, the economic background of migration management

will be briefly discussed in this section. Secondly the main economic tools of migration management will be mentioned in the first sub-section, and finally, how the economy of migration management is executed at global, regional and national levels will be tried to be exemplified in the second sub-section.

The involvement of states and non-state actors into the governance of migration management with the changing nature of migration from the 20th century to the 21st century is mentioned in the first and second sections of this chapter. The absence of a uniform migration governance body and a binding regime leaves the migration management predominantly to the hands of states and their outsourcing. The involvement of states into regulation of human mobility revealed the understanding of criminalizing mobility across borders and especially at the state level, there is the idea that the cost of not managing this mobility will be higher (IOM, 2004: 6). As mentioned in the second section of this chapter, states intend to determine who will enter their country and for how long they will stay. In cases where migration is not regulated, not managed, and abused, the cost of this is both the economic loss and the negative view of the society on migrants. In order to prevent these losses, especially since the end of the 20th century, migration management has been a tool under the control of states and later, in the neoliberal globalization age, of non-state actors. Therefore, states manage migration flows by themselves, by cooperating with non-state actors, or by outsourcing their functions to international organizations, companies, or other states and territories in a way that does not harm their security and economy.

The magnitude of the cost of migration management cannot be ignored. Identifying and tracking regular migrants while crossing the border, deterring and repatriating irregular migrants, and combating human trafficking and smuggling require investment in both human and financial resources for migration management. These costs vary for sending, receiving, and transit countries, but ultimately intervening and regulating human mobility, whether state or non-state actor, requires a budget. Besides the budget, there is a significant diversity of actors at all national, regional, and global levels of migration management and the economic relations between these actors. Considering both the diversity of migration market actors and the financial relations between these

actors, it is necessary to address the governance of migration management with a political economic approach because this approach sets out from the following contradiction: on the one hand, human mobility is promoted for the permanent continuity of the neoliberal attitude and on the other hand, human mobility is controlled and limited by spending significant financial resources on the grounds that it poses a threat to the sovereignties and societies of states. As a result of this contradiction, an ever-developing migration industry emerges.

The term migration industry can be found in Robert Harney's work (1977: 42-53) for the first time in 1977 as "commerce of migration" and in the following 40 years, terms such as global business, migration merchants were used instead of migration industry and mostly in these analyzes illicit and/or informal initiatives are associated with the migration industry. In his study in 2005, Rubén Hernández-León has taken the term migration industry in a broader context and claimed that all actors, who make financial gains from migration, are inside the migration industry. These actors are briefly transnational companies or agencies such as travel agencies or security companies, lawyers or notaries for legal advice, employers and recruitment agencies, migrant networks/associations, non-governmental organizations and humanitarian organizations, money lenders, formal/informal remittance courier services, clandestine actors such as false document providers, smuggling and trafficking networks, or transnational criminal organizations (Hernández-León, 2005: 8; Castles, Haas, and Miller, 2014: 235; Sorensen and Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2013: 6, 8-10). These various actors of the migration industry, who act as intermediaries between migrants and institutions, play different but mutually complementary roles: facilitating, controlling, and rescue (Sorensen and Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2013: 7; Agustin, 2008: 4-8). While there is an immense market to facilitate and secure labor migrants access to border crossing and to labor markets, there is also an enormous privatization market of migration control in which private security companies play an important role for controlling borders and checking border crossings or travel documents. In many cases, migration industry actors play both a facilitating and constraining role: for example, visa application companies both provide support to migrants while preparing files during visa application, and also conduct security checks regarding monitoring and

screening procedures before submitting the visa application to the related government. In other words, facilitating and controlling functions of migration management in migration industry are either implemented as a migration policy by the states themselves or transferred to an international organization, a company, another state or territories by privatization or outsourcing. By outsourcing in this way, rather than these actors and migrants, governments themselves continue to support and fund the migration industry and the line between private and public becomes more blurred. Finally, the third role played by migration industry actors is called the rescue industry (Agustin, 2008: 4-8). Contrary to the facilitating and controlling roles of the migration industry, the rescue function mostly refers to the protection of migrants by NGOs, migrant networks, or philanthropic movements, especially women and children, who are exposed to human rights violations due to irregular migration.

It is hard to know the exact budget of the migration industry but some examples of human smuggling and trafficking industry may be given: in 1994 the estimated annual income was about \$5 billion to 7 billion (UNODC, 2011: 14) while in 2015 global annual profit is estimated to be more than \$30 billion (European Commission, 2021i: 6). And, the ILO estimated in 2014 that the illegal profit from employing illegal workers, such as forced economic exploitation, domestic work, sexual exploitation, was \$150 billion worldwide (ILO, 2014). Migrant remittance inflows may be another example: in 2000 inward remittance amount was \$128 billion, in 2010 \$473 billion, and in 2019 \$720 billion according to World Bank remittance data (World Bank, 2021). For example, in the USA, which has the most remittance outflow, although there are small decreases in crisis periods, the remittance outflow has always shown an upward trend (After the 2008 economic crisis, the 2009 remittance outflow decreased from \$55 billion to \$50 billion, reaching \$71 billion in 2019. In the crisis environment created by the 2019 pandemic, the 2020 remittance outflow decreased by 1.5% to \$70 billion. (World Bank, 2022)). However, these data do not include remittance outflows made through informal channels. Although many studies try to estimate the amount of informal remittance, it is impossible to know exactly, and in this case it is known that there is a larger but informal flow of money from the global north to the global south.

Therefore, when it comes to migration-development nexus, it shows that this money flow that also affects migration governance and the migration industry.

Migration industry is a big business area and it is well embedded in the paradigm of neoliberal globalization especially by its outsourcing and privatization tools. Migration management is a political economic affair to both facilitate and control international migration. The increasing movements of migrants and refugees in recent years and the desire of states to manage irregular migration movements are growing the scope of the migration industry day by day. Therefore, the migration industry is not only impacting migration flows, it is also an important engine of global migration governance like never before. Such that it would not be wrong to claim that the most important pillar of the migration industry is the soft law instruments, such as global compacts, readmission agreements, or bilateral/multilateral trade agreements, that are frequently used in migration governance.

Within the dynamics of neoliberal globalization, states as important actors of the migration industry in the migration management, needed a shift from hard law to soft law. It is possible to explain this for two reasons. The first reason is the conveniences offered by soft law. Soft law has almost always been effective in migration-related issues, with its feature of being flexible, oversimplified, non-binding, free from bureaucracy, that is, promptness and unchecked (Chetail, 2019: 284). The increase in irregular migrants and refugees, especially in the last 10 years, has prompted the receiving countries to take urgent, effective, and flexible measures. As a result, migrant-receiving states that want to escape from democracy and control mechanisms have focused on soft law instruments instead of hard law, especially in bilateral and multilateral agreements. The shift from hard law to soft law in European migration law is one of the best example. The governance of European migration management has been using different tools outside the legal framework drawn by European Union law in order to achieve some specific purposes in recent years. Because it is not possible to respond to the "migration crises" experienced by the European Union with a common migration policy accepted among the Member States of the Union. And some practices like externalization of migration management in third countries, with the opportunities

provided by soft law instruments, takes the legal and human responsibility over the European Union states and puts it under the obligation only to support third countries financially. With this type of management from distance, agreements with countries such as Turkey, Libya, and Morocco since 2015 have become examples of soft law far from legal procedures: the migration deal between European Union and Turkey in 2016, the memorandum of understanding signed between Italy and Libya in 2017, and the Morocco-Spain agreement in 2019 (Reviglio, 2020: 3). Considering the dynamics of neoliberal globalization, the European Union paid a certain amount of money for the containment of migrants in third countries, regardless of the need for the approval of the European Parliament in each soft law case, and thus, by creating an uneven burden-sharing away from international protection responsibility, migrants became a bargaining chip between states.

The second reason for the soft law to gain weight in the governance of migration management should be understood within the framework of neoliberal globalization dynamics. Migrant-receiving states have never approached migration from a purely humanitarian perspective. As mentioned in sub-section 1.2.3, the migration issue is linked to issues such as trade, development, security, and so on. Alongside agreements for the externalization of migration management, trade agreements also make migration a soft law instrument linked to trade. The issue-linkage matter of migration causes migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries to resort to soft law instruments because the issue of migration ultimately turns into a bargaining chip to achieve a financial and commercial purpose (Jurje and Lavenex, 2014: 323). As a result, since migration is linked to commercial and financial issues, migrant-receiving countries are shirking responsibility only by meeting their goals and not sharing the same division of labor on migration matters. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that linking migration to other issues is one of the most important pillars of the migration industry. For example, in 2002, the European Council in Seville urged about readmission agreements that “*any future cooperation, association or equivalent agreement which the European Community concludes with any country should include a clause on joint management of migration flows and on compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration*” (European Commission, 2002). Therefore, linking migration-related

issues to cooperation agreements began to be normalized as a strategy move at the beginning of the 21st century. In other words, while trade or any cooperation agreements were a way to combat unwanted migration for the European Union, such agreement clauses became a condition in the process of joining the European Union for Eastern European countries, and bargaining chip for visa, travel facilitation, and financial aid for the countries outside Europe.

The main contradiction that will be examined in this study, namely to support and limit human mobility at the same time, allowed for a brief introduction to the ever-developing migration industry. In the previous paragraph, it was stated that the actors of the migration industry play a mediation role between public and private in the management of migration flows and irregular migration and they are blurring the line between these last two. In order to draw a framework for this functioning in migration management, the outsourcing and privatization relationship between public and private or states and non-state actors in the migration industry may be characterized on three scales: upward, downward, and outward. (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000: 164 ; Lori and Schilde, 2021: 4). Upward outsourcing of state functions refers to the delegation to an international regulatory institution. For example, the EU Member States delegate the control of the external border management to European Union border regime in order to facilitate the mobility of European states within themselves and the operation of the common market. Outward outsourcing of state functions signalizes the externalization of management tools to other countries or territories. An example of outward outsourcing is a country's acceptance of refugee resettlement or detention facilities in exchange for development aid from an economically developed country. And finally, downward outsourcing of state functions points out the privatization of migration management tools and this type of outsourcing covers the largest market in the migration industry. The principal actors of downward outsourcing cover a wide spectrum from the private sector to civil society organizations or militia forces. In addition, apart from upward and outward outsourcing, there are two controversial interpretations of downward outsourcing, which causes the state to lose its power against downward actors while controlling migration, or, on the contrary, to perceive these actors as partners who keep the state out of the accountability. Although the

political economic relations between the state and non-state actors have been tried to be framed in three scales, upward, downward, and outward, it should not be forgotten that migration management includes new actors in its complex structure day by day, and the existence of some relationship types that do not fit these scales should not be neglected.

When analyzing the political economic background of migration management, first of all, it should be understood what the tools of migration management are, what money is spent on regulating human mobility, and the financial situation of the actors of migration management that develops over time. For this, first of all, border management and externalization of migration, which are the two main tools of migration management, will be handled from the perspective of commercial sectors. Secondly, the amounts spent by state and non-state actors that sustain these commercial sectors for migration management from past to present will be discussed.

1.3.1. Tools of Migration Management

The Department of Migration Management in IOM, which is in contact with migration management in the international arena, defines its fields of work as migrant protection and assistance, environment, health, labor migration, development, migration training and integration, and immigration and border management. Therefore, each and more of the areas listed here are a tool for managing and regulating international migration. However, since this study is based on the contradiction that international migration is both supported and limited by significant financial expenditures, tools of migration management in this study refer to business areas between private and public actors that legally provide financial gain within the migration industry. In other words, the focus of this study is on which actors and how they spend in which areas to limit migration movements. In order to answer these questions and examine the political economic relationship between the actors, the two main tools of migration management, border management and externalization will be discussed. Of course, there are also informal and illicit tools of migration management, but considering the difficulty of accessing these tools within the scope of this study, only border management and externalization of borders and migration controls will be considered.

1.3.1.1. *Border Management*

Border management is the set of systems established by a state or a group of states to monitor state borders and to regulate the passage of living and non-living beings across its borders. The portraying of migration and especially refugee crises as a national security problem has placed border management, especially border policing and militarization, at the center of migration policies. Border management is a large industry including security, military, and financial interests. The financial value of global border security system industry was \$39.1 billion in 2018 and it is estimated to be 67.81 billion dollars in 2025 (Global Reports Store, 2019).

In the 21st century, the increasing security needs of the states, the desire to protect their borders, and ongoing irregular migration flows have naturally led to some security and technology demands by the states. Therefore, the border management industry has become a ground where the interests of both public and private actors come together. These actors are spread over a wide spectrum such as states, international organizations, security companies, investment companies, technology companies and so on. These key players have such a main role in the growth of the border management industry with their lobbying activities. Private security, investment, and technology companies put themselves in the position of experts in border security, create a demand-oriented supply in this field with their technical knowledge, prepare expert reports on the subject by conducting market research. In short, legitimizing the need for security in order to market their products through the discourse of the “migration threat” has opened the doors of public-private partnership to these companies.

A wide spectrum of tools in border management market should be considered, including not only the technological systems that we can see on earth, but also infrastructure systems and their management, the use of artificial intelligence, arms trade and deployment, and the financial background of all these. Knowing that there are numerous technological systems related to border management and that new sectors are created every day, this study will talk about border security, smart walls, biometric systems, migrant detention and deportation sectors, where public and private key players are mainly serving or providing services (Akkerman, 2021a: 6). The **border**

security market encompasses all types of staff, tools, and technology applied to monitor, identify, stop, detain or arrest people crossing borders. Border security is provided terrestrial, aerial, and underwater by different instruments such as patrols, vessels, planes, or drones and by different systems such as unmanned, camera, laser, radar, wireless, intrusion detection, or biometric systems (Gerstein et al., 2018: 23). One of the most striking aspects in the border security sector is **smart borders or smart walls** at land borders. Smart borders stand out with the identification feature using artificial intelligence and biometric systems using technologies such as fingerprints, face, voice, and iris recognition. In other words, the **biometric technologies** and smart border technologies that have the largest share of the border management market are infrastructures that will allow desirable travelers fast entry for leisure and business without waiting at the borders, while preventing the entry of undesirable / unregistered / illegal others that may create security vulnerabilities. The global biometrics market value was estimated at \$19.5 billion in 2020 and is estimated to be \$44 billion in 2026 (Global Industry Analysts, 2021). In border management, in addition to the sectors that will stop irregular migration, another sector where public and private actors have security and financial interests is **migrant deportation and migrant detention**. Although most states refrain from privatizing all migrant deportation and detention areas, they share some of these processes with private actors, such as transferring with a private airline company during deportation or medical checks performed by private companies before placing them in a detention center. Migrant detention centers are portrayed as an administrative center to hold migrants before their deportation but in reality in many countries such as USA, UK, Canada or Australia these centers serve as a private prison (Mainwaring and Cook, 2019: 464-465). Detention centers are being run with public-private partnerships, from construction to surveillance, health, food, and communication services in the recent period when irregular migration has intensified. It should also be added that migrant detention centers are established not only within the borders of the migrant-receiving countries but also within the borders of the migrant-sending countries: migrant detention in third countries, for example, Italy and Spain, have been paying for the establishment of detention centers in Libya, Tunisia, and Mauritania since the early 2000s. With the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis, migrant detention centers were established in exchange for money, especially in non-EU

countries, the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Turkey. After detention, the migrant deportation industry organizes the transfer of migrants usually by air to detention centers or immigration offices, police stations. In the deportation industry, apart from the states, key players are commercial airlines.

After examining what the term border management means, it is necessary to mention the international organizations and companies in a downward outsourcing relation with the states, which are the main actors of this management. Making a common inference about the border policies of the states requires examining each state one by one, but the main focus of this study is to concentrate on the actors who support the states within the framework of neoliberal globalization and often fulfill the functions of the state itself under its own responsibility. Border management can be done by a state itself, or it can be provided by the state's transfer of this authority to an international organization. IOM as an international organization is one of the main key actors that provide services in this field to the states that spend for border management. The member states of IOM receive support from the Immigration and Border Management Division on policy improvement, legislation, administrative, technical, and operational systems, and human resources within the scope of border management, in return for the budgets that they transfer to IOM every year. This division serves states in border control, identifying needs and priority areas, and making necessary recommendations and reinforcements. Immigration and Border Management Division provides solutions in the following areas in two units organizationally: (1) Border and Identity Solutions Unit works in the following areas: border and information solutions, counter migrant smuggling, border management and development, humanitarian border management, readmission, and regularization; (2) Immigration and Visas Unit works in the following areas: visa/permit facilitation, immigration/visa policy support, document verification support, consular and citizen services, travel assistance. While in 2018, approximately \$124 million were spent for 250 projects carried out by Immigration and Border Management with hundreds of experts and staff around the world, this number was \$144 million for 257 projects in 2019 (IBM, 2018: 1; 2019: 1).

Besides IOM, there are a lot of private security and technology companies which occupy the border management industry in a range of areas. Some famous companies are in the border security sector Airbus, Boeing, Thales; in the biometric sector IBM, Leonardo, Thales; in the deportation and detention sector G4S, Geo Group; in the consultancy sector Deloitte, McKinsey, PriceWaterhouseCoopers. At the beginning of this section, the sectors in which these companies are active in border management were briefly explained. At this stage, it seems more important to reveal who and how these companies are financed and also their relations with the state. Mark Akkerman in his research named *Border Walls* focuses on the companies in European Union but he also says that the logic is the same everywhere (Akkerman, 2021a: 18). Border management industry is financed by funds due to issuing share, bank loans, credits, selling corporate bonds, and support of governments or development banks in form of grants, export credits or concessional loans. In addition to these financial elements, the border management industry, which is growing every year, is also financed by the world's largest investment companies who are the biggest shareholders in border security companies. As these investment companies manage important financial savings channels such as pension or insurance funds, it also invests in the rising border management industry with these funds under its management. Another important shareholder of these companies is the states. By owning some shares of these companies that provide security and technology in border management, states may realize their national, political, and security-oriented interests by using the opportunities of the companies, on the other hand, they act as a financial actor - a company - and take care of their economic interests within the company under the guise of realizing state policies. For example, the French state owns 10% of Airbus, 25% of Thales, and the Italian state owns 30% of Leonardo (Akkerman, 2021a: 20). These ratios seem to be important enough to have a say in a company and to earn a large amount of profit.

1.3.1.2. Externalization of Migration Management

International migration management is characterized recently by the externalization of migration management in third countries due to the desire to reduce costs, delegate responsibility, and the negative public opinion towards migrants in migrant-receiving

countries. The externalization of migration management refers to the extension of border and migration controls beyond the migrant-receiving countries and to the containment of the migrants in a third country, particularly in a transit country like Turkey, Libya, Mexico or Indonesia, on-shore or off-shore before they reach the migrant-receiving countries (Stock, Üstübici, and Schultz, 2019: 3). Although the externalization of migration management is embodied under different names in third countries, such as detention center, removal center, accommodation center, reception center, or residential housing, the logic of this business is the same everywhere: unwanted migrants should be detained, contained, even arrested, and returned so that the migrant-receiving countries do not have a migration-related expenditure, problem or threat. Externalization of borders and migration controls is a tool that has been used extensively in the European Union, as well as in Australia, and in the USA since the beginning of the 2000s, and even an Australian model (off-shore detention of migrants in Nauru Island or Papua New Guinea which means locating detention centers outside the Australian jurisdiction) has emerged over time, which the EU Member States tried to take as an example (Carrera et al., 2018: 10, 50). Externalization of borders and migration controls into third countries as a model of migration management requires a considerable financial resource to fund the construction of detention centers, the detention-related implementations such as staff training in third countries, and monetary aid to third countries in exchange for readmission agreements. Therefore, it is not possible to talk about the fact that the state is a monopoly actor in the externalization of borders and migration control, just like in the border management industry. At least as much as the state, international organizations, especially IOM, and private companies are key actors in this sector and externalization of borders and migration controls establish an outward outsourcing relationship between these private and public actors.

To give an example from the externalization of borders and migration control process of EU Member States at the state level, although the European Union has funded migrant detentions in third countries, it has not officially had a consolidated externalization policy on migration. New Pact on Migration and Asylum in 2020 only envisaged the establishment of detention locations outside Europe's external borders and the European Union jurisdiction for compulsive pre-entry screening for migrants

who attempt to enter European Union borders without permission (European Commission, 2020a). Therefore, as there is no official fund and budget to finance the expenses of detention centers in third countries, the money comes from national budgets of EU Member States and from some development or policy budgets such as European Neighbourhood Policy budget, EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), Development Cooperation Fund, or Common Security and Defence Policy Fund (Akkerman, 2021b: 10). It should also be underlined that the European Union does not only treat the countries around its own fortress as third countries, but also implements detention-related activities in many countries from which it receives migration flows, such as Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon, Niger, and Senegal. But the most important point here is to make detention-related issues a bargaining chip for example for the candidate countries on the way to membership in the European Union, or for example, for other countries to have monetary aid opportunities, or to seek visa liberalization opportunities to the European Union. These bargaining chips are both the European Union's trump that saves itself from taking responsibility in adverse situations, and it also causes the third countries to keep the migrants in the detention centers longer than necessary.

Regarding international organizations, ICMPD, UNHCR, IOM, or NGOs, although they are included in some externalization-related cases, the most active actor is IOM. The involvement of international organizations in the externalization of migration management in third countries both legitimizes and depoliticizes this situation. For example, the fact that IOM undertakes the training of the guards in a detention center or makes capacity-building recommendations for the management of a cross-border detention center to an EU Member State causes international organizations using human rights language to legitimize the existence of detention centers that do not coincide with human rights. From another point of view which is explained in sub-section 1.2.4.1 of this study (*Global Migration Management*), it causes organizations such as IOM to consider these policies as a technical requirement and depoliticize them and as a result, it may continue to protect its financial resources from member countries that it cannot impose legal and political sanctions. According to Mark Akkerman's research, in 2016, IOM received €357 million from EUTF, Germany, and Italy under the project launched

in Libya, named “*EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migration Protection and Reintegration*” in order to assist voluntarily returning of migrants. But in reality according to reports of Euronews, many returnees stated that they never received the reintegration support promised by the IOM (Euronews, 2020). Therefore, it is necessary to question whether the volunteering situation reflects the truth. Moreover, this way of financing international organizations on migration-related issues causes states to take their responsibilities off them and make international organizations do things the states are unwilling to in exchange for money.

Private companies are other key actors in the externalization of migration management. As mentioned in the border management section, states' externalization of migration controls to third countries varies. In general, European Union member countries have a state-oriented role in the externalization of migration controls, while states such as Australia, the UK, Canada or the USA delegate the establishment and management of detention centers in third countries to private companies. Considering the dynamics of neoliberal globalization, it may be argued that the irregular migrant population, which is constantly on the move around the globe, is an endless source of profit for the companies that manage detention centers. The more irregular migrants travel, the more detention centers will be established in third countries by migrant-receiving countries, and therefore the buildings to be constructed, the goods to be supplied and the services to be provided, and the management of all these will be a source of income for many private companies.

Looking from today, it may be said that outward outsourcing of detention centers will intensify in the future. To give an example from Turkey, which is a current case, the construction of removal or detention centers funded or to be funded by the European Union in Turkey, the supply of furniture, technological and security equipment are given to private companies from Turkey through tender offer. According to data on “EU Tenders Electronic Daily (TED)” in 2019, two Turkish construction companies won a contract to build 6 removal centers for €27 million in total. First construction company, Kemal İnşaat Turizm gıda Otomotiv Akaryakıt Ticaret ve Sanayi Ltd. Şti., won a contract to build 4 removal centres in Adana, Kütahya, Niğde, and Balıkesir for


approximately €15.8 million in total. Second construction company, İM-SA İnşaat Sanayi ve Ticaret Ltd. Şti., won a contract to build 2 removal centres in Malatya and Şanlıurfa for approximately €11.2 million in total (TED, 2021a). Again in 2019, another company from the service sector, UBM Uluslararası Birleşmiş Müşavirler Müşavirlik Hizmetleri A.Ş., won the “*Supervision Services for Refurbishment and Maintenance*” tender of these removal centers for €375.800 (TED, 2021b). Another four companies from the supply chain sector won a tender for approximately €4.5 million for the “*Supply of Equipment for Refurbishment of Removal Centers*” (furniture, electrical appliances, security equipment, and laundry equipment) in 2019 (TED, 2021c). Considering the diversity of tenders, the number of firms, and the amount of tenders, it may be determined how the externalization, in other words, the downward outsourcing of migration controls in third countries is compatible with neoliberal globalization dynamics. As long as irregular migration exists for the continuity of the system, it may be said that these "private prisons" established for migrants by considering financial rent will continue to be established, managed by avoiding state responsibility, and even the migrants here will be exposed to arbitrary and long periods of detention, contrary to human rights.

1.3.2. Economics of the Migration Management at Global, Regional, and National Levels

During the welfare state period, there was no significant budget allocated to manage migration, as the crossings between borders were restricted because of the Cold War. Increasing irregular migration flows with the neoliberal globalization age have prompted investment in migration management. Migration management has a broad range of tools such as staffing, capacity-building, land and sea operations, border controls, outsourcing, and monetary aids to third countries as mentioned in the previous sub-section. In periods when technology has not developed as much as today, migration management was carried out with staff. After the acceleration of technology in the last 30 years, it is now carried out with both staff and technological investments. Undoubtedly, with the development of technology, migration management mechanisms have also developed and it is a fact that more external enforcements are used to regulate

immigration flows than internal enforcements because of the increased irregular migration and the surge of refugees. Therefore, for managing migration a governmental budget is allocated and the management of this budget is one of the important elements of the economics of migration management. In the era of neoliberal globalization, it is possible to examine the economy of migration management at three levels, globally, regionally, and nationally together with state and non-state actors. In this sub-section only the sums spent by the most active actors at the global, regional and national level to manage migration management tools, past and present, will simply be revealed. For this, firstly, the migration management economies of IOM, which is the most active actor in migration-related issues globally, then the EU regionally, and finally the USA, which maintains its status as the country that receives the most immigrants every year in the neoliberal global age, will be briefly mentioned.

As a global migration management actor, IOM's budget is funded by two principal sources: administrative income and operational support income. The administrative part of the budget is the assessed contributions paid by the Member States and this part of the budget covers the administrative expenditures of the IOM. The second source, operational part of the budget based on formal contractual agreements, stems from the funds for specific projects or the reimbursements for provided services by IOM departments (IOM, 2020b: 53-65). If we consider 2010 as the turning point in which the increasing refugee and irregular migration flows with the beginning of Syrian civil war, the budget increases of IOM in 2010, 2015 and 2020 are as follows: in 2010 \$1.4 billion, in 2015 \$1.6 billion, in 2020 \$2.2 billion, and in 2022 \$2.5 billion (Graph 1). Over 10 years, IOM revenues have increased by more than \$1 billion. The increase in the number of members of IOM, the prevention of increasing irregular migration flows, and the return and reintegration programs in the last 10 years have been effective in this growth of the budget.



99% of IOM's revenues are voluntary contributions. These voluntary contributions are mostly earmarked for specific projects or reimbursements from governments, voluntary agencies, and sponsors (IOM, 2020b: 78). In 2020, the top 10 member state donors of voluntary contributions to IOM were respectively: the USA, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. The voluntary contribution of these 10 states to IOM constitutes 52% of all 2020 income of IOM. Although not a member state, the European Union until 2005 and European Commission after 2006 is one of the important contributors of IOM and with the contribution of the European Commission in 2020, 79% of all 2020 revenues of IOM is generated by the contributions of states that have adopted and continued the dynamics of neoliberal globalization (IOM, 2021a: 75-76).¹⁰

It would not be wrong to state that IOM has increased its expenditures on border management and capacity-building activities in the last 10 years. While the total of 11 border management-related projects was \$2.6 million in 2010, the total of 30 border management-related projects was \$29.7 million in 2020, an increase of approximately

¹⁰ United States of America \$614 million, Germany \$148 million, United Kingdom \$114 million, Australia \$56 million, Japan \$51 million, Canada \$42 million, Netherlands \$33 million, Italy \$34 million, Sweden \$29 million, Switzerland \$25 million, and European Commission \$585 million (the numbers are rounded up). Source: IOM, 2021a: 75-76.



12 times.¹¹ While the actors who upwardly outsource and finance border management projects were Australia, Belgium, Finland, the United Kingdom, the USA, European Commission, and a voluntary agency named Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 2010, the number of actors increased in 2020: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the USA, European Commission, and United Nations Funds. As for capacity-building activities such as workshops, return assistance, counter-terrorism and -trafficking, technical infrastructure, and information sharing, while \$24.2 million was spent on 48 projects in 2010, the amount spent by donor states remained approximately the same, \$25.7 million, although the number of projects decreased to 31 in 2020. The 10-year comparisons between capacity-building and border management show that the methods developed for managing international migration over the years are now settled, technological expenditures have been made and the system has become operational. Therefore, when the capacity-building expenditures are examined, there is not much difference in the 10-year period. However, just by looking at the money spent on border management, it may be said how much the need to prevent irregular migration by states and therefore, upward outsourcing its functions to an intergovernmental institution have increased.

As the principal regional migration management actor, the expenditures of the European Union may be examined. “Solidarity and management of migration flows” item was added to the expense table in 2007 according to the income and expense table of the European Union, which is published regularly by the European Commission every year. This item has been renamed as “Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund” in 2014 and is still present today. Accordingly, while the amount allocated by the European Union to migration management from its own budget was €68 million in 2007, it became €1.137 million in 2020 (Graph 2) (European Commission, 2020b). If we look at the budgets that the European Commission has transferred to IOM and UNHCR, a budget of \$73 million was allocated to IOM in 2010 on the eve of the Syrian crisis,

¹¹ While calculating these amounts, only projects containing the phrase "border management" were taken into account in the financial reports published by IOM in 2010 and 2020. These amounts increase even more when other phrases such as border control and border area are considered, apart from border management.

while \$129 million was allocated during the 2015 European refugee crisis and \$192 million in 2016 (IOM, 2011: 72, IOM, 2017c: 103). In 2020, this share has increased to \$585 million in a short period of 4 years. Likewise, the contribution of the European Union to the budget of UNHCR was \$522 million in 2020. (UNHCR, 2021a: 13).

While talking about the European Union, it is necessary to refer to the security agency, which is the protector of the Union's external borders, as a regional migration management actor. Frontex established in 2005 as the “European agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union” became the European Border and Coast Guard agency in 2016. Frontex, which had a budget of €19 million in 2006, had a budget of around €100 million until the European refugee crisis in 2015, but after 2015 its budget increased significantly every year and reached €754 million in 2022 (Graph 3) (Frontex, 2022). In such a rapid expansion of Frontex, it is also dependent on the lobbying activities of sectors such as border security, information technology, and migration externalization, as well as the member states that wish to strengthen external borders against irregular migration. This network of relations and the detailed political economy of regional migration management will be discussed further in the second chapter of this study.



Economics of migration management at the national level contains the use of economic tools by singular states. Initiatives to manage international migration are implemented by migration policies at the state level. These initiatives cover a great range of areas such as labor market, irregular migration, refugees and asylum seekers, humanitarian practices, integration, family reunification, and so on. Migration Governance Framework (MiGOF) launched by IOM defines migration policy as “*the law and policy affecting the movement of people include travel and temporary mobility, immigration, emigration, nationality, labour markets, economic and social development, industry, commerce, social cohesion, social services, health, education, law enforcement, foreign policy, trade and humanitarian policy*” (MiGOF, 2021: 2). The governance of migration management may cover all these areas with migration policies at the state level. However, these migration policies may conflict with the neoliberal attitudes of the states mentioned in this study. As noted at the beginning of this section, economics of migration management sets out from a contradiction and one of the most significant states experiencing this contradiction is the United States, which has a very important unauthorized immigrant population. 77% of immigrants reside legally in the country, but almost a quarter, 23% of them are unauthorized, which makes approximately 11 millions unauthorized immigrants among 45 millions immigrants (Center for Migration Studies Data, 2021). The contribution of the authorized immigrants to the U.S. economy is pretty important when considering their significant roles in middle-wage employment and immigrant-owned businesses. When it comes to

unauthorized immigrants, they contribute more to the U.S. economy than they take out as they pay taxes even though they do not take advantage of the government programs. In 2016, a report, issued to see the economic results of removing all unauthorized workers from the labor force, revealed that every industry would be damaged dramatically, even some industries would see up to 18% labor force loss and long-run gross domestic product (GDP) would lose tens of billions of dollars annually (Edwards and Ortega, 2016: 2-3).¹² Unauthorized immigrants are an important locomotive of the labor force without protection and legal rights, but they are also the consumers of goods and services, thus they create economic activities and job areas. Considering the contribution of irregular migrants to the economy, a significant amount of money is spent on security measures to prevent them from entering the country instead of providing them with legal status and citizenship.

The reason why the USA was chosen to exemplify the economic background of migration management is that this country receives the highest number of international immigrants in 2019 according to the data of 2020 and the immigrant population it has regularly hosted since the 1970s has increased: the number of foreign-born people residing in USA increased from 12 million in 1970 to nearly 45 million in 2018 (Pew Research, 2020). In order to process legal migrants and enforce immigration restrictions, the authority to enforce immigration laws was transferred from the Customs Bureau to the Immigration Bureau, which was established in 1891. Also with the Immigration Act of 1891, immigration enforcement authority was centralized under the federal government in order to extend border inspections to all over the country (USCIS, 2020). After funding border patrols to regulate crossings in northern and southern borders in 1924, border enforcement and services were increased through the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which came into force in 1986 to prevent irregular immigration, and the Federal Government allocated 1 billion dollars per year for each state governments in order to meet the costs of public assistance, education, and health care of illegal immigrants who have gained legal status. In 1996, IRCA was empowered

¹² In the report, following figures are from 2013 and GDP of USA in 2013 was \$16 trillion. Removing unauthorized immigrant workers in some sectors would cause losses in average annual GDP: \$48 billion in construction, \$54 billion in hospitality, \$65 billion in wholesale and retail trade, \$74 billion in manufacturing.

by “Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)” and immigration restrictions were enforced by improving border patrol agents, border inspectors, physical barriers, and roads at borders. And interior enforcement was increased by authorizing more agencies for monitoring visa applications (Public Law 104–208, 1996: 547-548). As the 11 September attacks were a turning point for the USA, the policies that actually regulated immigration gained weight after 2001 with the expansion of the budget, staffing, and bureaucracy. In 2002, with the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, the number of staff consisting of inspectors and investigators was increased, screening procedures and tracking mechanisms were strengthened. In the same year, as a reflection of the concerns created by terrorist attacks, the Department of Homeland Security was established to strengthen 22 security-related agencies. Some of these agencies which deals with immigration and border control, are Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), and the United States Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) (Public Law 107–296, 2002: 58). The year 2006 was the year when the USA started to make arrangements to strengthen its land and maritime borders with walls, fences, and surveillance. The Secure Fence Act of 2006 focused mainly on three points: “*(1) systematic surveillance of the international land and maritime borders of the United States through more effective use of personnel and technology, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, ground-based sensors, satellites, radar coverage, and cameras; and, (2) physical infrastructure enhancements to prevent unlawful entry by aliens into the United States and facilitate access to the international land and maritime borders by United States Customs and Border Protection, such as additional checkpoints, all weather access roads, and vehicle barriers, (3) construction of fencing and security improvements in border area from Pacific Ocean to Gulf of Mexico.* (Public Law 109-367, 2006: 1-4)”. Besides, in 2002 digital fingerprint application was merged with the screening process and in 2006 biometric screening programs were implemented by the US government. To express all these immigration regulations in budgetary figures, the budget allocated for the Department of Homeland Security, which was established in 2002, was \$19.5 billion, while the projected budget for 2021 is \$49.8 billion. While \$263 million was allocated for the border patrol structuring in 1990 for approximately 4.000 agents, \$3 billion for approximately 10.000 agents in 2002 and

\$3.8 billion for more than 20.000 agencies in 2015 (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2020). \$25 million was spent on surveillance technologies in 1996, \$298 million in 2006 and \$447 million in 2016 (Argueta, 2016: 10-16). As can be seen in this very brief summary, while the American migration management controlled irregular immigration with staffing in the 20th century, in the 21st century, in addition to staffing, with the development of technology, it also increased in technological control systems and allocated an important budget for these systems. The developments in these American migration management systems are only exemplified here at the state level, and the budgets transferred by the US to the regional and global cooperation for governance of migration management are not included. However, it may shed light on how much money is transferred, even at the state level only.

To finalize this first chapter, which deals with the historical and theoretical background, it was aimed to draw the framework of the governance of migration management and its political economic dynamics. In this context, the change in the role of the state, with the intensification of neoliberal globalization into the 21st century, has been instrumental in international migration becoming a global issue. International migration has entered into political agenda, and the concepts of migration management and migration governance have come to the fore. Although there is no binding international migration regime, a realm emerged that states are more willing to discuss or compelled to discuss migration-related issues. As this study claims, this realm has never had a real governance frame, because international migration has been an issue that entered into the agenda of states mostly due to power relations, security and economic concerns. In 2015, European Union states had to deal with migration-related issues more than ever before due to these security and economic concerns. With the so-called 2015 migrant crisis, EU Member States invested intensively in border management and externalization of migration, which are the two main tools of migration management. These investment areas mainly covered Spain and Morocco in the Western Mediterranean, Italy and Libya in the Central Mediterranean, and Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. The case study of this research consists of regional migration management practices and their political economy in the Eastern Mediterranean, or Aegean region, after 2015. Therefore, the next chapter, *Regional*

Migration Management in the Aegean Sea, will try to reveal how neoliberal globalization dynamics in the field of international migration affect the political economic relations between state and non-state actors on a regional scale.



2. REGIONAL MIGRATION MANAGEMENT IN THE AEGEAN SEA

“Europe spend billions stopping migration. Good luck figuring out where the money actually goes.”

(The headline of an article in The Correspondent, 9 December 2019)


It would not be wrong to say that international migration is one of the most current issues of international relations today and will be in the future. The political, economic, and social effects of international migration have become measurable at the regional and national level as well as at the global level. This chapter of the study will focus on the regional dimension of international migration and specifically its management. Before discussing the details of migration management in the Aegean Sea, it is necessary to understand the migration dynamics in the Mediterranean Sea. For this, firstly, Mediterranean migration routes and secondly, a brief history of migration management in the Mediterranean Sea will be discussed. Thirdly, by narrowing the scope of the case study, the case in the Aegean Sea, which is one of the arms of the Mediterranean, will be the focus. Within the scope of regional migration management in the Aegean Sea, the main actors of the region, Greece's response to the 2015 crisis, and Turkey's role in this crisis will be handled, and then regional actors, dynamics, and policies in the Aegean region will be discussed. The last section of this chapter will reveal the cooperation between state and non-state actors in the fields of border management and

externalization of migration management, in which the study is placed in the political and economic context.

2.1. MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATORY ROUTES

As the cradle of civilization, the Mediterranean is one of the most abundant region of human mobility. Since 2015, the significant increase in the number of migrants and refugees arriving in Europe has drawn more attention than ever to the Mediterranean basin. More than 7.000¹³ lives ended in 2014 and 2015 alone in the Mediterranean, where more than 1 million migrants crossed into Europe in 2015 (European Council, 2022a). Due to the geographical proximity within the borders of the Mediterranean basin, migrant-sending, migrant receiving, and transit countries are located together. According to Frontex's 2022 data, there are five main migration routes to Europe: the Western Mediterranean route, the Central Mediterranean route, the Eastern Mediterranean route, the Western Balkan route, and the Eastern Borders route (Map 1). While 65.200 irregular migrants were registered in 2010 through the Mediterranean migratory routes divided into three parts, this number increased to 1.046.336 in 2015. In 2021, it decreased significantly to 130.200 after six years (European Council, 2022b). Mediterranean migratory routes act as a gateway to the center of Europe for irregular migrants, human smugglers, and traffickers. In this sub-section of the study, briefly mentioning the Western, Central, and Eastern Mediterranean migratory routes will help to understand how widespread the regional migration management actually is.

¹³ The numbers under this heading are rounded up or down.



Map 1. Migratory Routes to Europe
(Source: Frontex, 2022)

- Western Mediterranean Migratory Route: The Western Mediterranean route refers to irregular transitions from North Africa to Southern Europe. Its most important feature is geographically being the shortest way to cross from Morocco to Spain via the Strait of Gibraltar. This route also includes crossings to Ceuta and Melilla, Spain's autonomous territories in Morocco. According to the data of Frontex, the Western Mediterranean route is mostly used by irregular migrants from Morocco, Guinea, Mali, and Algeria (Frontex, 2019a: 17). This route covers also the Western African route which refers to the arrivals at the Canary Islands in the Atlantic Ocean.

Until 2016, irregular migrants using the Western Mediterranean route and registered never exceeded 10.000, but 23.063 irregular migrants using this route in 2017 and 57.034 in 2018 were registered (European Council, 2022a). The reason for this increase is the existence of migrants who want to flee from failed or weak states such as Sudan, Chad, Cameroon, and Nigeria in sub-Saharan Africa in the last 10 years. In the following years, the number of registered migrants using the Western Mediterranean migratory route has never decreased significantly, and remained higher than before following a fluctuating course (24.000 in 2019, 41.860 in 2020, and 42.950 in 2021) (European Council, 2022a). But it seems still declined compared to 2018 due to

Morocco's increased measures to combat irregular migration, cooperation between Morocco, Spain, and the EU, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

- Central Mediterranean Migratory Route: Central Mediterranean route refers to the stretch in the Mediterranean Sea between Italy and North Africa, especially Libya and Tunisia since 2017. The fact that the northeastern cities of Tunisia are less than 100 km away from the Italian islands makes the Central Mediterranean route dominant. According to the data of Frontex, this route is mostly used by irregular migrants from Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Eritrea, and Iraq (Frontex, 2019a: 16).

While around 5.000 irregular migrants passing through the Central Mediterranean route were registered in 2009 and 2010, this route has been characterized mostly by irregular migration flows fleeing Arab uprisings and Libyan state failure under the Qaddafi regime since 2011 (European Council, 2022a). Although there have been fluctuations over the years due to the unstable political situation in Libya, this route came under significant pressure from 2014. During the migrant crisis in 2015, 154.000 irregular migrants were identified. But the highest number ever was registered in 2016. More than 182.000 migrants were detected using the Central Mediterranean route because the Statement agreed on between Turkey and the European Union (EU) in 2016 made it difficult to cross over the Eastern Mediterranean route, so the Central Mediterranean route became an alternative and the highest number of irregular crossings was recorded. (İçduygu and Demiryontar, 2019: 9).

This intense migration pressure on the Central Mediterranean route affected Italy the most. The number of irregular migrants using the Central Mediterranean route did not exceed 23.500 in 2018 as a result of the measures taken by Italy unilaterally, when the EU ignored Italy's densely reception of irregular migrants due to its position as the first destination country as per the Dublin Convention. Due to Italy's cooperation with Libya, departures from Libya have decreased by 87% in this period but meanwhile Libya, which was the departure point of irregular migrants who want to arrive in Italy or its islands, was replaced by Tunisia (Frontex, 2019a: 16). Although the number of irregular migrants registered in 2019 decreased to 14.000, this number doubling every year shows that the cooperation made has not prevented irregular migrants: in 2020,

35.700 and in 2021, 67.700 irregular migrants were registered on the Central (European Council, 2022a).

- Eastern Mediterranean Migratory Route: Eastern Mediterranean route involves irregular migration flows to Greece, Bulgaria, and Cyprus. Crossings are mainly from Turkey via the Aegean Sea to the Greek mainland or the Greek islands. The Eastern Mediterranean route also intersects with the Western Balkan route, which is used by irregular migrants who want to pass from Turkey to Greece and Bulgaria and proceed to the inner parts of Europe. Although Syrian irregular migrants are mostly registered in recent years on the Eastern Mediterranean route, it is also used by irregular migrants in geographies with political and economic instability such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Eritrea (Frontex, 2019a: 17).

While the irregular migrants registered on the Eastern Mediterranean route were around 50.000 until 2015, the most intense mass migration flow after the Second World War occurred on the Eastern Mediterranean route, as in the Western and Central routes, with the registration of 885.000 irregular migrants in 2015 (European Council, 2022a). Many national and regional initiatives have been taken to reduce this pressure on the Eastern Mediterranean route. Following the Turkey-EU Statement agreed on in 2016, 42.000 irregular migrants were registered on this route in 2017. And the number of lives dead or lost at sea also decreased: 71 lives were lost at sea in 2019, while 793 in 2015 (UNHCR, 2021b). In addition, Poseidon Rapid Intervention launched by Frontex as a result of Greece's request for help from the EU in order to curb the intense migration flows to its country. As a result, the incentive of migrants to take irregular migration routes and the human smuggling and trafficking networks and sectors have undermined.

When the Mediterranean basin is examined, the Eastern Mediterranean migratory route becomes important for this study. In the next sub-section of the study, it will be discussed how migration management in the Mediterranean basin has changed from the post-war period to the present, and after this broad perspective, migration management in the Eastern Mediterranean, in other words, in the Aegean Sea, will be presented as a case study.

2.2. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MIGRATION MANAGEMENT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA

The Mediterranean Sea is a transcontinental sea that separates Europe from the African continent and spans from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Asian continent in the east. Its east-west extent is from the Gulf of Iskenderun in Turkey to the Strait of Gibraltar between Spain and Morocco and its north-south extent is from Croatia to Libya (Salah and Boxer, 2019). The Mediterranean Sea includes other seas such as the Sea of Marmara, Aegean Sea, Adriatic Sea, Ionian Sea, Tyrrhenian Sea. The Mediterranean Basin covers some parts of Europe, Africa, Asia, and the following countries: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. This geographical description actually helps to understand how wide the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea that covers it are, and therefore has changing dynamics with a wide variety of actors. To understand migration management politics and its political economy in the Aegean Sea as an arm of the Mediterranean Sea, first of all with a broad perspective, it is necessary to look at the migration patterns of four period in the Mediterranean basin: post-war period, post-Cold War period, new millennium period and post-2015 period.

- From the post-war period to 1990s: Although its routes and patterns have changed over the years, the most important motivation that feeds the political, economic, and social dynamics of the Mediterranean has been the fact of migration not only for years but for centuries. As mentioned in section 1.1.2 in the first chapter, post-war migration pattern in Mediterranean is characterized by internal migration of guest workers within European Mediterranean countries: from Europe's southern countries - Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain - to Europe's northern countries - Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. In addition, southern Mediterranean countries, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, which gained their independence from the colonial system in the 1960s, and Turkey started to fill the worker shortage of northern European countries. When guest workers, thought to be temporary, turned into permanent residents and the 1973 crisis began to shake the European economies, European states began to

implement policies to control immigration flows and closed their borders to reduce immigration. However, the migration flows in the Mediterranean could not be stopped due to the non-return of guest workers and the demand for family reunification. Also between 1972 and 1981 northern Mediterranean migrant-sending countries, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain transformed in migrant-receiving countries due to their economic growth, political and economic integration into Europe (Montanari and Cortese, 1993: 221). Therefore, migration flows in the Mediterranean basin have shifted from the south-to-north direction mostly to the east-to-west direction. (İçduygu, 2007: 144). In the late 1980s, visa requirements for Maghreb immigrants who wanted to work in Italy and Spain started to search for ways to migrate irregularly. Irregular migrants were now trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea with boats led by smugglers. In this period, Mediterranean migration management consisted of policies such as integration, family reunification, and employment of immigrants who came to Europe as guest workers but became permanent residents.

- From 1990s to mid-2000s: With the tightening of border controls and the introduction of visa procedures, the migration pattern in the Mediterranean in the 1990s is mostly characterized by irregular migration flows (İçduygu, 2007: 154). The inability of regular migration flows to close the employment gap in the European economy, descending birth date together with population aging, and the fact that southern European countries rely on cheap labor in their competition with northern European countries caused both government policies to conflict with the employment market and employers in preventing irregular migration, and also enabled irregular migration to be absorbed rapidly in Mediterranean countries. Although it is impossible to know the exact number of irregular migrants, according to IOM data, there were 2 million irregular migrants in Europe in the early 1990s, while this number reached 5 million in the early 2000s (Koser, 2007: 59). As a result, some measures have been taken to curb irregular migration, both nationally and regionally. Some Mediterranean migrant-receiving countries implemented regularization policies in order to standardize immigrants' status. Some figures regarding regularization of irregular immigrants in the northern Mediterranean countries before 2000 are 60.000 in Portugal, 130.000 in Spain, 200.000 in France, 371.000 in Greece, and 800.000 in Italy (İçduygu, 2007: 150). Although the

sum of these numbers indicates that approximately 1.5 million immigrants are regularized, it would not be wrong to say that the regularization programs of the governments encouraged more irregular immigration as the number of irregular immigrants in Europe was estimated to be 5 million at the beginning of the 2000s. As a result of these developments, the EU resorted to soft power to curb irregular migration from the Mediterranean basin, in other words, EU- and state-driven regional governance initiatives have increased (Wolff, 2015: 7-8). Dialogue 5+5, which was launched in Rome in 1990 and held the first forum after its establishment in 2002, is an inter-regional initiative that deals with issues such as information exchange, joint management of borders and labor migration, migration rights among 10 countries¹⁴ in the Mediterranean basin (IOM, 2021b). Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue, another inter-regional inter-governmental forum, is a consultative initiative that brings together 45 countries¹⁵ in the Mediterranean basin on information exchange, capacity-building, mixed and irregular migration flows, smuggling and trafficking, asylum and refugee protection (IOM, 2021c). An attempt for restraining irregular migration was the Seville European Council in 2002 which introduced the clause that any future cooperation, association or agreement with non-EU country include a joint management of migration flows and compulsory readmission concerning irregular migration (European Council, 2002: 10-11). These readmission agreements are the core of the implementation of the safe third country policy and the externalization of migration management. Readmission agreements allow the rejection of the asylum request by claiming that their country of origin or transit third country is sufficient for protection without examining the asylum seeker's file. Therefore, on the one hand, regardless of the will of third countries the EU exerces its soft power as if a hard power, on the other hand, externalization of migration, which aims to transfer the migration-related responsibility to third countries by strengthening their borders, systems, and officials, is launched. Another attempt for curbing irregular migration was an intergovernmental organization, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), launched

¹⁴ Algeria, France, Italy, Libya, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia.

¹⁵ 19 non-EU participating countries: Algeria, Cabo Verde, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, Syria, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, and 27 EU Member States.

with Barcelona Process in 1995. EMP was originally designed into three pillars which are political stability, economic prosperity, and social peace for the states from Europe and Mediterranean basin. In these three pillars migration was an area for attention but in 2005, it became the fourth pillar of EMP (Portugal Presidency of the European Union, 2007). The process that foresees the realization of migration flows between EU and non-EU Mediterranean countries on a legal basis have launched two major initiatives to promote the sustainable return of migrants to their home countries: programmes called Euro-Med Migration I and II realized respectively in 2004 and 2008, with a jointed budget of €7 million worked for creating focus groups to discuss legislative procedures and migration laws in EMP countries, to assist governments in migratory policies, to update database of migration flows, and so on (Noi, 2011: 44-45). The targets in the Seville European Council and the EMP were later associated with the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Although the ENP has been the main policy framework in the bilateral relations of the EU with the Mediterranean countries since the mid-2000s, these bilateral relations were largely asymmetrical and unequal. As shifting the responsibility and burden in the region to the southern Mediterranean countries instead of sharing them is the basis of these relations, ENP has failed not only in the field of migration but also in every field. As a result, between 1990s and mid-2000s Mediterranean migration management policy was based on the governance practices between EU and non-EU Mediterranean countries on the one hand, and on the other hand it gave rise to a shift from soft control mechanisms such as the visa requirement to the establishment of harder control mechanisms such as the construction of walls and fences and surveillance technologies along borders in the following years.

- From mid-2000s to 2015: While irregular migrations from the southern Mediterranean to the north continued in the mid-2000s, the migration pattern shifted once again for two reasons. First one is the securitization process of migration management aftermath of the 11 September in the U.S., the Madrid bombings in 2004, and the 2005 London attacks. In this securitization process, measures were introduced such as strengthening the border along the Mediterranean coast, the working of the police forces on the coasts and borders with a semi-military status, the participation of European naval forces in the coastal securitization processes, the establishment of

border patrol in non-EU countries with a Mediterranean coast and training law enforcement forces and border guards there (Wolff and Hadj-Abdou, 2017: 385). Therefore, after all these security measures, the search for irregular migration routes in the region varied and smugglers and traffickers serving in this sector became more professionalized. The second one is the 2008 economic recession which shifted the migration pattern. On the one hand, migration flows from both southern Europe to northern Europe and from northern African countries to southern Europe peaked in 2008 (Castles et al. 2012: 118), on the other hand, north African countries, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, became destination and transit countries due to sub-Saharan migrants who settle in north Africa or try to pass to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea together with north African migrants. Besides north Africa, Turkey became also a destination and transit country (Düvell, 2014: 87) due to the migration flows from east and south. All these migration-related issues encouraged the EU to be a “Fortress Europe” when it comes to security. Fortress Europe consists of two types of policy: internally the EU focuses on new policies and institutions to prevent irregular migration and externally encourages neighboring countries to fight irregular migration together with it, namely externalization of migration controls. Within this policy of Fortress Europe, the Mediterranean basin was like a laboratory that opens the door to migration flows to the center of Europe and that Europe would externalize its immigration controls (Wolff and Hadj-Abdou, 2017: 386). The externalization of migration control takes place predominantly between these EU Member States and non-EU neighbors, in other terms the North-South divide passing through the Mediterranean: Spain and Morocco, Italy and Libya, and Greece and Turkey. In each cases, irregular migration was sought to be controlled by mechanisms such as border closure, visa requirement, surveillance technologies installation, and fence and wall building, regardless of the neighboring country's will or not. In this context, as a case study, externalization of migration controls between Greece and Turkey will be discussed in detail in the next sub-section. Another pillar of Fortress Europe policy and one of the most important actors of the Euro-Mediterranean border, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (European Border and Coast Guard Agency from 2016), Frontex was founded in 2004. The increase in security and border control concerns, which were effective in the

establishment of Frontex, caused Frontex to carry out joint operations with EU Member States, mainly in the Mediterranean basin, in the external borders of the European Union. Some of these operations, which have been carried out many times at different times since 2005, are as follows: on the Western Mediterranean route especially between Spain and Morocco operation Hera, Minerva, and Indalo, on the Central Mediterranean route especially between Italy and Libya operation Hermes and Nautilus, and on the Eastern Mediterranean route especially between Greece and Turkey operation Posedion and Rabit (Frontex, 2021a). Neither Frontex's joint operations nor readmission agreements nor increasingly tightened border management mechanisms within Fortress Europe policy could prevent irregular migration in the Mediterranean. Roughly, 159.000 irregular migrants using the Mediterranean migratory routes were identified in 2008, while 1.827.000 irregular migrants were registered in 2015 (Üstübici and İçduygu, 2019: 9).

2011 played an important role in reshaping migration patterns and migration management in the Mediterranean Sea. During and after the popular uprisings, which started in Tunisia at the end of 2010 and spread to Arab countries such as Egypt, Yemen, and Syria in a short time, migrants and refugees were in intense risky and dangerous situations. Especially as a result of the fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya and the ongoing conflicts within the Syrian civil war, countless migrants and refugees sought legal and illegal ways to flee from the Middle East and North Africa by crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Since 2011, in addition to the mixed migration flows created by migrants displaced for economic, political, and social reasons in the Mediterranean basin, the number of stranded migrants, that is, migrants trapped in a transit country such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, or North Africa and not supported by governments, has also increased (Wolff and Hadj-Abdou, 2017: 387). Although there was political stability, the living conditions in these countries were quite risky and inadequate for irregular migrants. Moreover, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt have declared that they will not accept Syrian refugees as from 2014. In this period, migrants from countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Eritrea, where there was no political and economic stability, were added to the migrants fleeing the Arab uprisings. As a result, although there is stability in the transit countries, due to the lack of infrastructure to

meet their needs such as shelter, food, work, education, many immigrants have turned to European countries, which they see as a destination where they can settle permanently. Therefore, in 2015, more migrants than ever before sought ways to cross the Mediterranean Sea through irregular routes to reach Europe. In 2015, 1.3 million people arrived to Europe's borderland to request asylum (Eurostat, 2016). They arrived Europe by crossing Mediterranean Sea from Libya to Italy route, Aegean Sea from Turkey to Greece route, and Balkans route by land. The EU could not act in a harmonious way and a common policy could not be established for the migrants entering the borders of the EU. At a time when migration management became so complex, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia allowed immigrants to pass through their countries and arrive in Germany and Austria from time to time in September-October 2015, and some days they closed the borders between each other and stranded migrants. Finally, as a result of the crisis in Germany 1.4 million, in France 276.000, in Italy 240.000, in Sweden 205.000, and in Austria 108.000 asylum applications have been processed until 2017 (Eurostat, 2021a). However, as a common migration policy could not be implemented, migrant rights were disregarded. Turkey, one of the Mediterranean basin countries outside the EU that hosted 2.5 million Syrian refugees in 2016 (UNHCR, 2021c). In return, Turkey agreed on a Statement in 2016 that closed the borders from Turkey to Europe, accepted the readmission of migrants, received financial aid, and made the migrants a bargaining chip. Details of the Statement will be discussed in the next section. Turkey's closure of the Western Balkan route caused irregular migrants to turn to the Central and Eastern Mediterranean routes, and thus increased deaths in the sea. To prevent this, Italy signed an agreement with Libya in 2017, promising to fund it, train guards, and improve detention centres (EU Migration Law, 2017: 2). Although there has been a decrease in the number of migrants coming to Italy, since 2018, one of every five migrants drowns and disappears, since migrants who want to reach Italy by crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Libya were not rescued by Italy. This agreement was extended for 3 years in 2019. On the other hand, with Turkey opening its border with Greece in February 2020, this route was started to be used by migrants again.

In this period, migration management policies in the Mediterranean basin focused on managing and ordering Mediterranean migration flows. In the "A dialogue for

migration, mobility and security with the southern Mediterranean countries" communication, which the European Commission released right after the Arab uprisings, it is written that by prioritizing root causes increasing the working and living conditions that would support the people in the South Mediterranean is the beginning of the measures against irregular migration (European Commission, 2011: 6). Looking at it from today, it may be said that very little has been done so far. Instead, smart border technologies were strengthened, biometric systems, surveillance, and remote-control mechanisms were established, walls and fences were erected, Frontex operations continued (Zaiotti, 2016: 6).

- 2015 - 2021: The two events that characterized the period following the migrant crisis in 2015 were Europe's inability to stop migrants from the south and east, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Since 2015, the walls and fences built between Italy and Austria, Greece and Macedonia, Greece and Turkey in Southern European countries have led irregular migrants to more deadly routes, while contributing to the rise of anti-immigrant feelings within European countries. However, despite all this, Valetta Summit on Migration with African partners in 2015, the Joint Action Plan in 2015 and the Statement in 2016 between EU and Turkey, the 2015 European Agenda for Migration, and the European Agenda on Security shows the insistence of the EU to cooperate with neighboring countries in the Mediterranean in managing and ordering irregular migration. After the 2015 crisis, this will for cooperation has continued because in 2016 Middle East and North African (MENA) countries received 39% of Syrian refugees and today MENA countries host 10% of all refugees in the world according to UNHCR data (UNHCR, 2020: 15). For these refugees, reaching basic needs, health services and adequate food has become a struggle for life. Therefore, irregular migrants will continue to come to Europe using new routes from the Mediterranean Sea and North African countries. For this, the EU has to continue its cooperation with the countries of the Mediterranean basin. Turkey, one of the countries with which the EU cooperates, agreed on the EU-Turkey Statement in March 2016, which is complementary to the EU-Turkey Action Plan in October 2015. In accordance with the one-to-one formula, it has accepted the resettlement of Syrian refugees, who will be selected by Europe according to certain criteria, from Turkey to Europe in

exchange for the return of Syrians arriving in Europe to Turkey (European Council, 2016). The so-called Refugee Deal, the details of which will be discussed in the next section, is very problematic in terms of migrant rights. Both UNHCR does not accept Turkey as a safe third country and the fact that Turkey has granted temporary protection status to Syrians, not refugee status, due to Turkey's geographical limitation from the Geneva Convention, disregard migrant rights. The European Union's externalization of migration management on Turkish territory is an example of how migrants have become a bargaining chip.

Another factor affecting migration management in the Mediterranean is the COVID-19 pandemic, which started at the end of 2019 and spread all over the world in a short time. Asylum applications, which increased after the 2015 migrant crisis, decreased significantly with the closing of borders of EU Member States affected by the COVID-19 pandemic: migration flows are estimated to fall by 46% and new asylum applications decreased by 31% in the first six months of 2020 (EASO, 2020). Many new decisions were taken in the migrant-receiving countries via the Mediterranean Sea. For example, in 2020, the right to asylum was suspended in Greece and therefore the detention periods were extended and asylum seekers were sent back. Italy and Malta announced that their ports are unsafe for migrants rescued from the sea due to the pandemic, and that these migrants will be kept under quarantine in ships located offshore (Moreno-Lax, 2021: 55). The applications of many asylum seekers were suspended for a long time due to emergencies such as lockdown, and therefore many migrants were exposed to much more vulnerable and precarious situations due to the COVID-19 pandemic. As in the 2015 migrant crisis, the unilateral decisions far from governance taken by the EU Member States in the COVID-19 crisis caused and continues to cause a disorder that affects migrants.

2.3. REGIONAL MIGRATION MANAGEMENT IN THE AEGEAN SEA

Aegean Sea as an arm of the Mediterranean Sea is located between Greece on the west and Turkey on the east. Covering an area of 215.000 km², the Aegean Sea is connected to the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea by the Straits of Dardanelles and Bosphorus in the north. Its southern border is drawn by the island of Crete and Rhodes. As an

archipelago, the Aegean Sea contains about 3000 islands, islets, or rocks (Britannica, 2021). While most of the inhabited islands, such as Crete, Rhodes, Dodecanese, Lesvos, Samos, spread from north to south in the Aegean Sea, belong to Greece, two sizable islands, Imbros and Tenedos belong to Turkey in the northeastern part of the Aegean Sea.

Irregular migration between Greece and Turkey covers two border lengths: the first is the land border along the Evros river, the second is the maritime border between the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea and the coastline in the west of Turkey. Although the city of Istanbul in Turkey is a central hub for irregular migrants, smugglers who will transport migrants to the Greek islands use Turkish western cities such as Izmir or Çanakkale as their departure point. Arrivals in Greece are usually to islands such as Rhodes, Lesvos, Kos, where the transition to Athens will be provided.

The Aegean Sea, in other words the Eastern Mediterranean, is an irregular migration route under pressure for many reasons. Among these reasons, it may be counted that geographical proximity between Greece-Greek islands and Turkey and both are a peninsula, the fact that Greece is on the southeastern external border of the EU, the fact that it is difficult to control due to the abundance of islands in the Aegean Sea, and finally the migrants from the countries in the east and south of Turkey where there is no political and economic stability (such as Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, sub-Saharan countries) to seek asylum in the EU using the Aegean Sea. Although irregular migrations from the Aegean Sea have increased and decreased from time to time, especially after the Arab uprisings, the Eastern Mediterranean migration route was under pressure as never before with the migration flows that Turkey received. This situation caused the two countries, which have coasts on the Aegean Sea, to restructure their migration management policies, and other countries, which were disturbed by the irregular migration flows passing through the Aegean Sea, to intervene in the borders of the Aegean Sea and to allocate significant financial resources.

In this study, which focuses on the political economy of migration management, the migrant crisis that occurred in the Aegean Sea in 2015 was chosen as a case study. The reason why the Aegean Sea was chosen within the scope of space restriction is that the

geography of this work produced in Turkey has been heavily kneaded with migration-related issues in the last 10 years. Secondly, the reason why the Aegean Sea, which is a sub-sea of the Mediterranean, is preferred over the Mediterranean is that it is possible to conduct a wider research on a narrower geographical area. Considering the migration management in the Mediterranean, it is beyond the capacity of this study to deal with the migration management policies of the 21 states that have a coast here. The third reason is the intensity of the migration flows experienced in this geography in 2015, which is not always encountered. On the other hand, within the scope of time restriction, the year 2015, that is, the migration crisis experienced by the EU, was chosen as the starting year. In 2015 alone, more irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands than ever before, and more migrants losing their lives in the Aegean Sea than ever before, require extra attention to this temporal period. In addition, the 2015 crisis was affecting Turkey, but since then it has started to affect Greece as well. Greece felt this crisis most deeply compared to other EU members and was already trying to cope with the economic crisis. As the Eastern Mediterranean suddenly became the center of the crisis, Greece's response capacity faced a serious test. Therefore, this "crisis" in 2015 has become one of the dynamics affecting and shaping Turkish-Greek relations. The political and economic analysis of the responses given to this crisis at the national and regional level in 2015 and after, which was the year when an ongoing humanitarian crisis peaked, constitutes the case study placed at the center of the study.

Before talking about the flow of events in the Aegean Sea in 2015 and the following period, firstly the developments in the field of migration management in the region before 2015 will be discussed. Secondly, the response of the Greek state to the 2015 migrant crisis and the role of the Turkish state in and after the 2015 crisis will be discussed. Lastly, the actors of the regional migration management who intervene in the areas where the states are insufficient and the current situation will be mentioned.

2.3.1. Migration Management Developments in the Aegean Region in the Pre-Crisis Period

In this sub-section, which will deal with the period before the 2015 migrant crisis as a result of increasing irregular migration flows in the Aegean Sea, the situation of irregular migration on the Greek-Turkish land and maritime borders before 2015 and how migration management works will be discussed. Main actors in the migration management of the Aegean region are Greece as a member state of the European Union and Turkey. Greece is one of the frontline states in the European Union's attempts to prevent irregular migration at external borders. For this reason, the infrastructure of migration management in the Aegean region mostly consists of EU-driven policies. From a national perspective, the Greek state's migration management policies were generally unprepared, inconsistent, and short-term responses to the migration pressures in the 1990s and 2000s (Skleparis, 2017: 2). From the perspective of Turkey, after obtaining the status of a candidate country for the EU, migration management policies were sought to be carried out in harmony with the EU policies in the first term of the AKP (Justice and Development Party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi in Turkish). However, in the following periods, migration management policies were sometimes at odds with the EU migration policies due to the tension caused by national interests, market pressure, and economic recession, and sometimes used as a bargaining chip on the way to become a member of the EU.

In the post-Cold War period, mixed migrant flows from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East to the West consisted of economic irregular migrants, refugees, forced migrants, and victims of smuggling and trafficking. This irregular migration and asylum seeking pressure in the Aegean region were introduced in the Greek-Turkish land and maritime borders in the early 2000s because the liberal visa policy implemented by Turkey allowed immigrants from Eastern Bloc countries to easily reach the Greek border (Kirişçi, 2011: 30-31). In this period, when Turkey was still defined as a transit country, Greece was exposed to the irregular migration challenge with its inadequate resources and tools. Within the scope of tackling this challenge, both Greece and Turkey took various initiatives.

Due to the EU candidacy status that Turkey obtained in 1999, the government was trying to align its immigration policies with the EU in the areas of visa procedures, fight against smuggling, and readmission agreements. As a tool of migration management, liberal visa policy was shifted to restrictive visa policy by the AKP government, which came to power in 2002, within the scope of the EU harmonization process. In this context, Turkey started to apply visas to many countries (such as Azerbaijan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kazakhstan) that were subject to visas by the EU but for which Turkey did not seek visa requirements in the past (Açıkgoz, 2015: 102-103). (However, due to the acceleration of economic growth in the first years of the AKP government, in order to open the economy and employment to foreign countries and to attract investors, it abolished the visa obligations to these countries in 2006, and therefore the irregular migration flows to Greece were also affected). Another pillar of this harmonization process was the Readmission Protocol signed between Greece and Turkey in 2002 (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006: 119). However, Turkey was reluctant to implement this protocol and by placing a geographical limitation, only accepted those who had a direct border with Turkey among the migrants that Greece wanted readmission. Of the irregular migrants apprehended at the Greek-Turkish border between 2006 and 2012, 12.326 of Greece's readmission requests for 122.437 cases were accepted by Turkey, and among them only 3.805 migrants physically returned to Turkey (Triandafyllidou, 2013: 11). The EU, which criticized this protocol in the following years, signed a Readmission Agreement with Turkey in 2013 in order to control the increasing irregular migration flows. The agreement was designed to be applicable only to nationals from third-countries and stateless persons with which Turkey has already signed a readmission agreement before October 2017, pursuant to Article 24¹⁶ (Official Journal of EU, 2014). However, the EU-Turkey Statement adopted in 2016 required this date to be pulled from 2017 to 2016.

¹⁶ Article 24/3: The obligations set out in Articles 4 and 6 of this Agreement shall only become applicable three years after the date referred to in Paragraph 2 of this Article. During that three-year period, they shall only be applicable to stateless persons and nationals from third-countries with which Turkey has concluded bilateral treaties or arrangements on readmission. During that three-year period, existing bilateral readmission agreements between individual Member States and Turkey shall continue to apply in their relevant parts.

Until 2006, irregular migrants crossing both land and maritime borders from Turkey to Greece did not exceed 4.000 in total (Ulusoy et al., 2019: 18). However, the increase in this number to 12.000 in 2006 and 17.000 in 2007 brought Greece to the point of taking significant measures. Greece's Aegean Sea border was the main entry point for these arrivals, so Greece first attempted to prevent arrivals via the Aegean Sea with visa procedures, paper controls, border controls, and cooperation with countries of origin or transit (Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini, 2011: 254). In 2006, Greece asked for the help of Europe and the Joint Operation Poseidon was launched by Frontex in the Aegean Sea. The scope of the operation covered the Greek-Turkish sea borders stretching along the Aegean Sea and the Greek islands. Operation Poseidon was aimed to support Greece in actions such as border surveillance, capacity-building, combating smuggling, trafficking, and cross-border crimes, saving lives at sea (Frontex, 2021b). Operation Poseidon became permanent in 2011 and expanded into the waters between Italy and Greece.

The removal of mines on the banks of the Evros river in 2009 shifted the flow of irregular migrations in the Aegean region (Angeli, Triandafyllidou, and Dimitriadi, 2014: 7). The route of irregular migration flows from Turkey to Greece was directed from the maritime border to the land border along the Evros river. In 2009, the number of irregular migrants apprehended in the Greek-Turkish land border was 8.787 and 27.685 in the sea border. After demining, the number of irregular migrants apprehended in the sea border decreased to 6.204 in 2010, while the number of those who passed through the land border increased to 47.088 (Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini, 2011: 257). According to Frontex estimates, 90% of irregular migrants entering EU territory in 2010 used the Greek-Turkish border (Frontex, 2010). As Greece was caught unprepared for these massive migration flows coming from Turkey for the second time, those crossing the border were arrested and detained under inappropriate conditions. Finally, in 2010, when UNHCR declared the situation in Greece as a humanitarian crisis (UNHCR, 2010), Greece once again requested assistance from the EU and Frontex's RABIT (Rapid Border Intervention Teams) units, which had been deployed on the Evros river border from November 2010 to March 2011, replaced Operation Poseidon.

To evaluate financially the period until 2011 Syrian uprisings, Greece received respectively €2.2 million and €4.9 million from the European Refugee Fund in 2008 and 2009, apart from the normal funding it received from the EU. Greece also received €13.7 million from the European Border Fund in 2008 to strengthen the coast guard and hire additional border patrol. In 2010, the Greek state received €9.8 million from the European Refugee Fund to meet the urgent needs in detention centers (European Commission, 2011b).

Following the 2008 global financial crisis, as in many European countries, the political realm of Greece shifted to the right. The coalition government led by center-right political party New Democracy implemented quite aggressive policies to develop border management and migration management against irregular migration. Firstly, the law on nationality and integration of immigrants enacted in 2010 (Law No. 3838 of 2010 on Current Provisions related to Greek Nationality and the Political Participation of Expatriates and Legally Residing Immigrants), and the law improving asylum procedures enacted in 2011 (Law No. 3907 of 2011 on the Establishment of an Asylum Service and a First Reception Service) were withdrawn (Skleparis, 2017: 2). Afterwards, three initiatives were launched in accordance with the National Action Plan of Greece: building a fence at Evros river, Operation Shield, and Operation Xenios Zeus (Ulusoy et al., 2019: 23-24). Greek authorities adopted in 2011 Integrated Border Management Program for Combating Illegal Immigration in order to protect national borders and EU external borders and decrease the irregular migration. One of the most important actions of this border management program was the fence construction. The fence erected on Evros river, 12.5 km long and 3 meters high, built with barbed wire, is located on Greek soil, one meter away from the Turkish border. The cost of the construction of the fence was denied funding by the European Commission and was described as "pointless" (Grigoriadis and Dilek, 2018: 175). Because Evros fence covers only 5% of the Greek-Turkish land border, and such walls or fences are defined as measures that save the day in migration management issues. For the European Commission, it would be preferable to spend the money on technological infrastructure, where it is used more effectively, such as x-rays, thermal cameras, and equipped vehicles. Completed in December 2012, the fence was built for €3.16 million by a

private company and the total cost of construction, €5.5 million was covered by Greek governmental budget under the National Program of Public Investments (Angeliki, Triandafyllidou, and Dimitriadi, 2014: 28).

Three months before the completion of the fence built on the Evros river border, a national operation, Operation Shield, was launched to intensify, militarize, and technologically strengthen the patrols on the Greek-Turkish border. During the operation, 1,881 officers who undertook border management duties, performed screening and identifying procedures, and informed migrants and asylum seekers about their rights were deployed and €24 million was spent from the Greek budget in a one-year period (Angeliki, Triandafyllidou, and Dimitriadi, 2014: 28). Operation Xenios Zeus was the internal operation of irregular migration controls. As per the "stop and search policy" applied on the street or at home, it was aimed to detect, arrest, and deport irregular migrants. Although both operations were a factor in reducing irregular migration flows, these flows were only slowed down but never stopped. Because, although irregular migrants registered at the land border decreased by 96% in 2012-2013, those registered at the sea border increased by 231% (Angeliki, Triandafyllidou, and Dimitriadi, 2014: 30-31). While crossings by land are decreasing, the increase in crossings by sea indicates that the expenditures made to strengthen the land border are pointless. These figures also indicate that the number of migrant smugglers who organize crossings over the sea has increased, and hence, cause the migration industry to expand a bit more.

The SYRIZA-led coalition government, which was established after the Greek general elections in January 2015, made many promises to reverse the migration policies of the previous coalition government: facilitate asylum procedure, shortening detention period and converting detention centers to hospitality centers, remove the wall from the Evros river border and end the push-backs at the borders, accelerating citizenship, integration and family reunification, reviewing the Dublin Convention (Skleparis, 2018: 988). However, very few of these promises were fulfilled, such as opening a hospitality center in Athens in 2015, shortening the detention period, ending the Zeus and Aspida operations due to lack of funds, and not repairing the wall damaged

by the winter conditions on the Evros river. The broader promises were not fulfilled because the increasing pressure of irregular migration on the Greek islands was so strong that these promises were not fulfilled.

Consequently, to summarize the situation before 2015, as a result of Frontex's operations on the Greek-Turkish border and the national operations of Greece, the irregular migration route in 2008 was at the maritime border in the northern Aegean region, but in 2010 it shifted to the land border along the Evros river and it returned to the maritime border in 2013, again after intense operations. Greece was generally unprepared for these constantly shifting migration flows and needed the support of the EU behind it. The measures the Greek state took on migration management were measures to save the day at the national level, which did not prevent or reduce irregular migration, but only changed its route. And another most important feature of migration management in this period was that it was security-driven. With the technological infrastructures established, Greece was able to identify and register immigrants, however, both the operations of Frontex and the national operations of Greece only intended to strengthen border management and surveillance and, by this means, to reduce irregular migration. However, there was no mention of Greece's asylum procedures or international protection. International protection lagged behind the security axis. In short, all these efforts were not actually enough to strengthen the borders, they only changed the way people who wanted to cross those borders did this and contributed to the smugglers to produce new strategies. Finally, in 2015, the European continent recorded the largest migration flow of all time and the Aegean Sea recorded the highest number of deaths.

2.3.2. Migration Management Responses to the Migrant Crisis in the Aegean Sea in 2015

In 2015, when the global migration crisis took place, the increase in irregular migration flows from the east of Europe like never before was called the “migrant crisis¹⁷” by

¹⁷ The crisis in 2015 is called the migrant crisis or the refugee crisis. In this study, the definition of migrant crisis rather than refugee crisis is preferred, because it is aimed to take into account all vulnerable

European states. Although this crisis is called the 2015 migrant crisis, it actually covers the years between 2014 and 2016 with all the reasons and results of the process. However, although the highest tragic death tolls were recorded in 2015, the 2015 migration crisis was not a *sui generis* event, but a temporal period when the ongoing humanitarian crisis peaked. With the cumulative effect of the migration management practices described in the previous section, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea witnessed a humanitarian migrant crisis like never before. In terms of migration, 2015 was the year in which the highest numbers were recorded at many points. The number of irregular migrants arriving in Europe from 2014 to 2015 increased nearly 5 times from 228.000 to 1 million (European Council, 2021a).¹⁸ However, the previous year was the portend of this major increase. According to data from Eurostat, EU Member States received the highest number of asylum applications since the 1992 Yugoslav wars: in 2014, EU Member States received almost 600.000 asylum applications, mostly from warring states such as Syria, Afghanistan, and Eritrea (Eurostat, 2021b). France, Germany, Italy, and Sweden responded positively to asylum requests of two-thirds of these applications in 2014. At the end of 2015, EU Member States received more than 1.282.000 asylum applications. Although this number shows a decreasing trend in the following years (around 600.000 applications after 2016), in 2020 there are still 765.000 pending asylum applications to EU Member States from non-EU citizens (European Council, 2021a). According to Eurostat and IOM estimates, in 2015, the deadliest year for migrants, it is estimated that 5.400 migrants died or disappeared worldwide, of which 4.054 were on the European migration route (IOM, 2016: 8).

While the majority of the 1.2 million asylum seekers who applied for asylum in 2015 were Syrians, there were significant numbers of Afghans, Eritreans, Nigerians, Iraqis, and Pakistanis among them. Therefore, the background of this migration wave to Europe was the war and/or political instability and unsatisfactory living conditions in these countries. Along with the Syrian civil war, Iraqi civil war with ISIS, the unabated

people, including economic migrants, forcibly displaced people, those under temporary protection, and refugees.

¹⁸ It should be known that these numbers may not reflect the truth because of the possibility of counting more than one entry of an irregular migrant (Laczko et al., 2016: 30-31).

Afghan war and the continuation of the Taliban insurgency, the state of terror in Nigeria, and the political and economic instability in Eritrea are the point of origin for the intensive migration wave to Europe (Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2015: 6). The migrant population, which was previously able to be absorbed in the informal sector in Turkey, had more precarious conditions in the 2010s due to the mass migration of Syrian refugees and the stagnation of the economic situation in Turkey. On the other hand, because they did not have refugee status in Turkey or the legal regulation of resettlement in a third country, they became stranded migrants in Turkey. Likewise, the increase in unemployment in the irregular migrant population due to the fact that the informal sector was in a deadlock in Greece during the euro crisis periods, led this migrant population to migrate to the west through the Eastern Mediterranean sea route and the Balkans land route.

While the Central Mediterranean route was actively used until 2014, since the vast majority of irregular migrants who wanted to cross to Europe in 2015 came from the Middle East and a fence was built on the Evros land border between Greece and Turkey in 2012, 85% of the crossings were carried out by sea to Greece via Turkey (IOM, 2015). However, although only 15% of irregular migrants crossed the Central Mediterranean route from North Africa to Italy, sea deaths on this dangerous route were higher than ever before: it is estimated that approximately 2.900 migrants died in the Central Mediterranean and 731 migrants died in the Aegean Sea (IOM, 2015). Smugglers, one of the important actors of the migration industry, also have a share in this. According to European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) data, while there were 30.000 migrant smugglers in and around Europe in 2015, this number reached 65.000 at the end of 2017 (The Citizen, 2018). As the price per journey that smugglers receive from migrants who want to cross from Turkey to the Greek islands increase, so does the level of security. For example, according to a study conducted in 2016, €1.000-2.000 is requested to pass with the most unsafe inflatable boat, while €3.500-4000 is required for a safer luxury boat (Çarmıklı and Kader, 2016: 29).

Three tragic events during 2015 caused the migrant crisis to enter the agenda of the European Union and the Union to act (UNHCR, 2015). (1) More than 600 migrants died in April when their boat capsized 180 kilometers from southern Italy. (2) In August, Austria found the dead bodies of 71 migrants in a refrigeration truck from Hungary. (3) In September, the European Union faced a turning point when the body of 3-year-old Aylan Kurdi washed up on the shore of Turkey's Aegean Sea as a result of the overturning of a refugee boat trying to reach Greece and more than 300.000 stranded refugees began to march towards Europe. After these tragic events, on September 5, Austria and Germany responded to the refugees waiting in Hungary and opened their borders, and the refugees were welcomed by the volunteers here. However, again in September, Hungary completed the razor-wire fence on the Serbian border, and Austria, Germany, Slovakia, and Netherlands temporarily restored border controls, ending the 20-year open border. For stabilizing the crisis in Europe, under the European scheme, relocation started among refugees arriving in Italy in October and refugees arriving in Greece in November.

Before moving on to the migration management practices specific to the Aegean region, it may be useful to mention what has been done at the European level in general. The European Council of the European Union has basically made three attempts to prevent these tragic events: rescue operations, relocation scheme for people in need of international protection, and external borders management by cooperation with countries of origin and transit. The migration crisis issue made a quick entry into the agenda of the European Commission on 13 May 2015 with the titles of "the need for a better migration management and better responsibility sharing", and four areas were highlighted: reducing irregular migration, saving lives, having a strong asylum policy and a new migration policy (European Council, 2021b). Immediately after, with the contribution of 26 states, the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med or Operation Sophia) was launched to prevent migrant smuggling and irregular migration on the Central Mediterranean route (EUNAVFOR Med, 2018). The operation, which aims to destroy the Mediterranean migrant smugglers' market and save the lives lost at sea, was criticized for encouraging other migrants because the migrants using the sea route were rescued by the operation. As a matter of fact, 44.916

immigrants were rescued in the 5-year period until the end of the operation on March 31, 2020 (European Council, 2021c).

While the deaths of migrants on the routes used to cross to Europe continue unabated, the European Council encourages its member states to take action against this crisis for the emergency relocation of people in need of international protection from Greece and Italy, some of the member states have chosen to strengthen their border controls, barriers, and fences. The scheme prepared for relocation remained valid for two years (September 2015-September 2017), and each Member State decided to relocate a certain number of people (European Council, 2015a). However, according to Relocation Decisions, member states reserve the right to reject the relocation request on the grounds that the person to be relocated may pose a threat to national security or public order (AIDA, 2018: 3). At the end of the two-year period, 63.302 people from Greece were foreseen to be relocated, this number remained at 19.244, and while 34.953 people from Italy were foreseen to be relocated, this number remained at 8.541 (European Commission, 2017a). Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland completely rejected this scheme. And some measures were taken to restrict the movement of migrants within Europe: Bulgaria added a new section to the fence with razor wire, which it started to build in 2013 against Turkish border, Hungary built a fence on the Serbian and Croatian borders, Austria built a fence and registration center on the Italian border and introduced border checks to Hungarian and Slovenian borders, Sweden installed rail fence on the Danish border in order to tighter border checks.

During the 2015 migration crisis, in order to strengthen external borders management by cooperation with countries of origin and transit, the European Union mainly cooperated with Libya and Turkey. As part of Operation Sophia, the EU naval forces provided training to the Libyan coastguard and navy, as well as aimed to prevent smugglers by supporting the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya in the high seas (UN Security Council, 2016). In terms of Turkey, the joint action plan prepared on October 15, 2015, before the EU-Turkey Statement agreed on in 2016, aim to address the current crisis in three ways: “*(1) by addressing the root causes leading to the massive influx of Syrians, (2) by supporting Syrians under temporary protection and*

their host communities in Turkey and (3) by strengthening cooperation to prevent irregular migration flows to the EU’ (European Commission, 2015a). This statement, which has a political and economic background for Turkey, will be discussed in detail in the *Turkey’s Role During the Crisis* sub-section 2.3.2.2.

As in many geographies of the world, the migration issue is not a temporary crisis for the EU and it may take for many years. The inharmonious and contradictory attitude of the EU during this crisis has left such side effects that each of these side effects will resurge as a separate problem for many years when the migrant crises will continue. Some of these are the questioning of the founding values of the EU (solidarity, democracy, equality, dignity, and respect for human rights), the strengthening of the separation between the countries in the west and east of the EU, hiding member states behind the Dublin Convention and the inequality in asylum and immigration policies, the rise in tension in the employment market and the informal sector, the rise of anti-immigrant feelings, end of free movement and reconstruction of the internal borders, and finally a Europe suffering from the economic crisis where tolerance is ignored with populist discourses and migration management remains in national hands.

In this section, which deals with the 2015 migrant crisis in general, the causes of the crisis, the profile of the migrants and the routes they use, and the European Union’s attitude towards the crisis are tried to be outlined. In the next two sub-sections, the migration management practices of Greece and Turkey in the face of the crisis will be examined in detail during and after the crisis, and finally, in the third sub-section, before the political economy of these migration management practices, regional migration management practices and the state of play (until the end of 2021) will be outlined.

2.3.2.1. *Greek Response to the Crisis*


In this sub-section, the measures taken and the policies implemented by the Greek state authorities against the massive migration flows in 2015 will be discussed. The Greek response to the 2015 crisis mainly covers the policies between the years 2015-2017 when the crisis peaked and slowed down.

It had been a short time since SYRIZA came to power (January 2015) when irregular migrants started to cross from Turkey to the Greek border, but SYRIZA's attitude towards this approaching crisis would be different from its predecessors. The center-right party New Democracy (ND), which was in power between 2012 and 2015, labeled immigrants as a threat to the economy and culture of Greece and implemented harsh measures against immigrants, as mentioned in the sub-section 2.3.1. Antonis Samaras, the leader of ND and the prime minister, deliberately referred to immigrants as illegal immigrants (*lathro metanastes*), associating them with lawlessness and criminality and presenting them as a security threat (Neos Kosmos, 2012). The SYRIZA government repealed harsh measures and laws against migrants, and around 1 million migrants crossed from Turkey to Greece under the SYRIZA government throughout 2015. Rather than securitizing irregular migrants as ND did, SYRIZA called this unusual event a refugee crisis and a violation of refugee rights. It had two purposes in emphasizing the refugee crisis: (1) to replace the aggressive attitude of the Greek people against the incoming wave of immigrants with the feelings of humanity and compassion, (2) to mobilize the humanitarian and right-based approach of the EU towards refugees and to Europeanize this crisis from being a crisis that Greece has to challenge (Stivas, 2021: 13). Indeed, SYRIZA leader and Prime Minister Tsipras reframed irregular migrants as refugees at every opportunity, urging the EU to urgently support Greece financially and technically, and warning that the future of the EU will be at stake if EU Member States continue to treat refugees as a threat (Hellenic Republic, 2015). Ultimately, the EU supported the SYRIZA government with financial and technical resources and sought to share the burden of Greece with the relocation scheme. Only in 2015 Greek authorities received €28 million emergency assistance from Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and Internal Security Fund (European Commission, 2022a: 4). In Greece, where the political background was outlined when the migrant crisis began in 2015, the approach of securitization of migration management was adopted during the New Democracy rule. In the SYRIZA period, the governmental discourse aimed at the regionalization of migration management by sharing the burden of migrants by all member states rather than securitization of migration and migrants at the national level.

Greece, as a party of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and as an EU Member State, must abide by the requirements of the Convention and the European Regulations to prevent refoulement of refugees, to provide accessible asylum procedures and to organize humane reception process. Not forgetting these requirements, with the arrival of approximately 850.000 maritime arrivals to Greece in 2015 and the closure of the Western Balkan route in March 2016, Greece received 13.187 asylum requests in 2015 and 51.053 in 2016 (Hellenic Republic, 2019: 1). Although Greece kept its borders open for a short time to allow migrants entering the country to pass to other EU Member States, eventually, with the borders on the Balkan route closed by Macedonia, Croatia, and Slovenia (March 2016), Greece shifted in a short time from transit country to destination country and at the external border of the EU, a containment country (Triandafyllidou and Mantanika, 2016: 20). An emergency action plan prepared in March 2016 by the Greek government for migrants in Greece who are henceforth stranded and unable to leave here, to solve the problem of accommodation and access to services for around 100.000 migrants. 60 emergency facilities on the mainland, including refugee camps and state-leased hotels, were established or leased in 2015-2016 (AIDA, 2020: 170). A total of 32 refugee camps on the mainland were established as temporary accommodation facilities to respond to urgent needs. Apart from this, the hotels and other facilities were rented by the government as part of IOM's Filoxenia project for the accommodation of the most vulnerable migrants (especially families and children). As of 2018, 79 hotels were allocated to 6.898 asylum seekers within the scope of the Filoxenia project (IOM, 2021d). The Filoxenia project was terminated in April 2021, and there are 24.529 asylum seekers on the mainland as of April 2022 (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Migration and Asylum, 2022).

After this tension at the borders, Greece has made significant progress in its institutional and legal settings within the scope of migration management. At the beginning of the institutional developments, the Greek authorities decided to establish a Ministry of Migration Policy in November 2016 to be separate from the Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform (Presidential Decree 123/2016). This ministry, which will represent Greece on all migration-related committees at EU level, is

responsible for migration policies, implementation, and governance. Immediately after, with the adoption of Law 4368/2016, the Ministry of Migration Policy established an interministerial body called Coordinating Body for the Management of the Refugee Crisis, composed by the ministries of Citizen Protection, National Defence, Migration Policy, Infrastructure, Transports and Networks, Marine and the Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace, to better manage and coordinate reception centers (Dimitriadi and Sarantaki, 2019: 12). Institutional developments continued with the establishment of the Regional Asylum Office or Units. The number of Regional Asylum Offices, which started to be opened in 2013, increased following the 2015 migrant crisis (Hellenic Republic, 2021a). Among the Greek islands, the Regional Asylum Office opened in Lesvos in 2013 and in Rhodes in 2014 was followed by offices in Chios, Samos, Leros, and Kos in 2016. Although the Attica Regional Asylum Office in the Attica region, where the capital Athens is located, started to serve in 2013, asylum offices and units increased in this region after the 2015 crisis with Piraeus and Alimos Regional Asylum Offices and Amygdaleza and Nikaia Asylum Units. Apart from Athens, there are a total of 24 Regional Asylum Offices or Asylum Units throughout Greece, including the islands and major Greek cities such as Thessaloniki, Patras, Fylakio, Ioannina, and Crete (Map 2, Blue pins are temporary reception facilities, yellow pins are regional asylum offices or units. Source: Hellenic Republic Ministry of Migration and Asylum, Map of Services).



The reception and identification centers, which started to be established in October 2015 to manage the intense migration flows, were the first step within the scope of migrant reception and location management. The first reception centers opened in Athens in September 2015 and in Lesvos in October 2015, followed by 12 reception facilities established on the Greek islands and the mainland, and there were 41 reception facilities in total in August 2016 (Velentza, 2018: 5). However, these centers were trying to be established under financial and technical difficulties with the very limited state funds provided by the Greek government, which implemented austerity policy due to the delay in the funds from the EU, and there were many deficiencies that prevented the provision of suitable living conditions. Therefore, throughout 2015, the Greek response to the migration crisis in the context of reception and location was shaped by the reduction of public expenditures with the austerity policies of Greece, and thus the limitation of personnel and equipment purchases.

In the European Agenda on Migration launched in May 2015, the EU presented “the hotspot areas approach” as a tool to help frontline Member States (European Commission, 2015b). The European Commission envisaged that Frontex, Europol, and European Asylum Support Office (EASO) should work with frontline Member States such as Greece to identify, register, and fingerprint migrants entering the EU by sea. Accordingly, EASO will support those seeking asylum, the return of those who do not need international protection will be organized by Frontex, while Europol will support

member states in cracking down on smuggling and trafficking networks. The framework of the hotspot approach was drawn with EU Regulation 2016/1624 and accordingly the hotspot area means “*an area in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders*” (EUR-Lex, 2020). In the case of Greece, the hotspot approach was adopted through Law 4375/2016 in national legal framework and according to Article 9 “*all third-country nationals and stateless persons who enter without complying with the legal formalities in the country shall be submitted to reception and identification procedures*” (European Database of Asylum Law, 2016). Accordingly, there are 6 hotspot areas or reception and identification centers (RIC), 1 on the Greek mainland and 5 on the Greek islands: RIC Fylakio was established in 2013 as the first reception and identification center in Evros, and the islands where the reception and identification centers are located are Kos, Leros, Lesvos, Chios, and Samos (Hellenic Republic, 2021b). (The center on the island of Samos was transformed into a closed and controlled access center in 2021 as the first of 5 closed refugee camps to be built within the scope of the Closed Controlled Access Centers of Islands project.) Prior to the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, hotspot areas in Greece served as open facilities for registration, screening, and assisting migrants before their transfer to the mainland. However, with the Statement, the 5 hotspot areas in the Greek Islands turned into closed or secured centers (Ilias et al., 2019: 51). Irregular migrants arriving in the Greek Islands after March 20, 2016 encountered a different reception and identification treatment here. Law 4375/2016 was also adopted by Greek government to implement the EU-Turkey Statement agreed between the European Council and Turkey on March 18, 2016. Law 4375/2016 brought about an amendment of the asylum application procedure based on fast-track border procedure. For migrants who came to the Greek islands after March 20, 2016, it was obliged to complete the entire asylum procedure at the first and second instance within 14 days, in accordance with the fast-track border procedure, subject to the Statement. In other words, fast-track border procedure rendered access to asylum uncertain (FRA, 2019: 7). Therefore, migrants who came to the Greek islands after March 20, 2016 were detained to be sent back to Turkey if they were not seeking asylum or if their asylum application

was rejected. In addition, the Greek authorities started to apply the geographical restriction rule to migrants who came to the Greek islands after March 20, 2016. Once the migrants arrive on the islands, they can either be allowed to go to the mainland if they have an appointment with the Asylum Service or have serious health problems, otherwise they are forced to stay on the island to be deported to Turkey. Therefore, the restriction of movement rule, which makes it mandatory to stay in the hotspot area and not to leave the island, has caused undecent living conditions by crowding the hotspot areas day by day, and at the same time has violated the freedom of movement by preventing migrants from reaching the mainland and the opportunities there. The reception capacity at the hotspots in the Greek islands was designed to be 7.450 (European Commission, 2016a), but as of the end of 2020, there were 14.265 people in the hotspots (AIDA, 2020: 41). In 2021, with the opening of Closed Controlled Access Centers in the Greek islands, 3.508 migrants remained in the hotspots, and as of April 2022, there are still 2.315 migrants (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Migration and Asylum, 2022).

The responses of the Greek authorities to the 2015 migrant crisis have been shaped by EU-driven policies after the 2016 Statement, that is, with an effort to prevent migrants from accessing EU territory. Within the scope of strengthening the external border management in the Aegean region, at the request of the Greek authorities, Frontex replaced Joint Operation Poseidon with Poseidon Rapid Intervention and deployed 400 officers and 15 vessels to the Greek islands on December 29, 2015 (Frontex, 2016a). The purpose of the Poseidon Rapid Intervention operation was determined to support the Greek authorities in the fields of border surveillance, identification and fingerprinting of migrants, forged documents, and interpretation. On the other hand, Greek authorities militarized the management of maritime borders with a coalition fleet sent by NATO. On February 11, 2016, NATO ordered a patrol of three warships, led by German flagship and supported by Turkish and Canadian frigates (NATO, 2016; The Guardian, 2016a). The duty of the patrol was determined as to prevent the irregular migrants who wanted to reach Greece by sea and to send them back to Turkey. In this context, the monitoring of illegal crossings along the sea area between Turkey and Greece, and the transfer of information to Frontex and the Turkish

and Greek coastguard were carried out by the NATO coalition fleet. It is the first time a NATO warship has served in international waters for migration management purposes. In 2019, Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis requested NATO to increase naval patrols in the Aegean Sea after Turkey's threat to divert migrants to Europe (Euroactiv, 2019).

It is possible to talk about a wide variety of actors that manage and regulate the 2015 migrant crisis. The national and European actors who produced the above-mentioned responses are Ministry of Migration Policy, Hellenic Police and Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Army, Greek Asylum Service and Reception and Identification Service as national Greek authorities and Frontex, EASO, Europol, Eurojust as European actors. Besides, UNHCR, IOM and other NGOs played an active role where Greek authorities were missing or unable to respond. In this sub-section of the study, the institutional and legal responses of the Greek government to the 2015 migrant crisis were discussed. In the next sub-section, the role of the Turkish state during and after the crisis will also be discussed. In the last part of this section, the complex structure of all state and non-state actors in regional migration management in the Aegean Sea and the state of play in the region will be outlined.

2.3.2.2. Turkey's Role During the Crisis

It was not only the use of Turkey as a transit country by the intense migration flows due to the rising regional political and economic turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa, but also the change in Turkey's foreign policy strategy in August 2015 and the reversal of its attitude towards Syrian migrants were also effective in the 2015 migrant crisis. Therefore, it would be appropriate to take into account the role played by Turkey in this crisis. Since the number of Syrian irregular migrants entering Greece from Turkey by sea between April and October 2015 reached 400.000, it is also necessary to emphasize the situation of Syrian migrants in Turkey. Syrian migrants in Turkey, "guest - misafir" as Turkish authorities say, fled from the civil war in Syria and entered Turkey through the unconditional open-door policy that Turkey started to implement in 2011, but never received refugee status. Due to the geographical limitation clause maintained in the 1951 Geneva Convention to which Turkey is a party (geographical limitation clause considers the application of asylum seekers from European countries), 3.7

million Syrian migrants (number as of May 2022) received temporary protection status instead of refugee status. (Law 6458/2013, art. 91). Unlike the refugee status, although Turkey tries to provide basic needs such as health, education, and social services for the Syrian migrants under temporary protection, it has deprived them of more comprehensive rights and services and Turkey is in a position to send the migrants back whenever it wants. Considering that only 50.488 of the migrants are living in the shelter centers as of May 2022, many of the remaining 3.712.723 migrants are working illegally to survive and are deprived of decent living conditions (PMM, 2022). Apart from the status of migrants, the project to strengthen the EU external borders, the fences built on the Evros river by Greece and at the Turkish border by Bulgaria, and the fact that the Central Mediterranean route recorded the deadliest numbers geographically either condemned the migrants to live in Turkey or forced them to take a boat and go to the Greek islands from the Aegean Sea. By 2015, migrants had to choose the second option and the Turkish government also played a role in this choice.

Contrary to the fact that other countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt stopped accepting Syrian refugees, Turkey continued to maintain its open-door policy and build new refugee camps at the beginning of 2015. This attitude of Turkey towards the Syrian migrants could have promised Turkey regional leadership in the Middle East and the Arab world in the field of foreign policy and made it gain a good reputation, but in a short time the attitude of the Turkish government towards the open-door policy and the Syrian migrants changed direction. On the one hand, the progress of the Islamic State on Turkey's southeastern border, on the other hand, the terrorist attacks that started in July 2015 caused Turkey to strengthen its southeastern border with modular wall with wire fencing and ditches and indirectly caused Syrian migrants to benefit less from open-door policy (The Guardian, 2015). In the same period, Turkey gave the USA permission to use the Incirlik base and in return asked the USA to cooperate in establishing a safe zone in the north of Syria (Reuters, 2015). Although the USA rejected the establishment of a safe zone, Turkey's announcement of this news reinforced the scenario that the Syrians would be sent back to their country through the safe zone, and thus became a factor in the Syrian migrants' way to Europe. In addition, the belief of Syrian migrants that the war in their own country will not end and the

insistence of the Turkish Ministry of Labor that Syrian migrants will not be given work permits were other factors that drove them to Europe. At this point, migrant smugglers, which increased tremendously in 2015, started to increase also in the Aegean coast of the country, taking advantage of the fact that the law enforcement officers in Turkey gave their full attention to the southeastern border with Syria. As a result of all these successive events, the intersection of the decrease in Turkey's support for Syrian migrants during the summer of 2015 and the increase in the push factors that led Syrian migrants under temporary protection to leave Turkey and go to Europe led to the mass migration of Syrian migrants with all other irregular migrants from different nationalities. Of the immigrants who arrived in Europe from Turkey and applied for asylum in the Member States in the summer of 2015, 362.000 are Syrian, 178.000 are Afghans and 121.000 are Iraqis (Eurostat, 2021c).

It would not be right to say that in the months of August-September, when the crisis broke out, Turkey had a strategic attitude towards the migrants who went to the Greek islands from the Aegean coast and ignored them.¹⁹ However, it should be said that this situation will later become a trump card that is expected to strengthen Turkey's hand against the EU in the next few months. The first step Turkey took with the EU in the face of the migrant crisis in 2015 was the Joint Action Plan, which was announced on October 15, 2015. Accordingly, the Joint Action Plan points to a series of joint actions that must be urgently implemented by the Republic of Turkey and the EU in order to support Turkey's efforts to manage the situation caused by the mass migration of people under temporary protection (European Commission, 2015a). The first part of the Joint Action Plan includes the support of the Syrians under temporary protection and the regions that host them, and the second part includes the steps to be taken to prevent irregular migration from Turkey to the EU. Accordingly, regarding the first part, it was foreseen that the EU should support Turkey financially and technically with various

¹⁹ "Turkey rescues 330 Greece-bound Syrians amid record surge of refugees", Hürriyet Daily News, 11.08.2015

"Turkish coast guard finds at least 500 Greece-bound migrants" Daily Sabah, 15.08.2015.

"A coastguard official told AFP around 100 people had been rescued by Turkish rescue teams..." AFP, 02.09.2015.

"Turkish coast guard saved 57 refugees..." Daily Sabah, 13.09.2015.

"The Turkish coastguard managed to rescue 211 people..." The Times of Israel, 15.09.2015.

funds, and Turkey would strengthen the legal legislation that would improve the situation of Syrians under temporary protection during their stay in Turkey and better provide them access to services. Regarding the second part, steps have been envisaged by the EU to better support Turkey in the field of migrant smuggling with the help of agencies such as Frontex, to increase its information exchange capacity, and to increase financial support for Turkey to develop asylum, immigration, visa, and integrated border management systems to meet Visa Liberalization Dialogue requirements. On the Turkish side, steps have been foreseen to strengthen the coast guard units, increase cooperation with Bulgaria and Greece on the land borders, and accelerate the procedures for the smooth readmission of irregular migrants leaving from Turkey. At the meeting of the EU heads of state or government with Turkey, held on November 29, 2015, the Joint Action Plan was adopted, and in response to this, the EU decided to provide €3 billion resources for Turkey to cope with the Syrian refugees in the country, committed to completing the visa liberalization process for Turkey and reopening the chapters within the accession negotiations. Ultimately as a result of the agreement, Turkey and the EU agreed on the implementation of the Readmission Agreement as of June 2016 instead October 2017 (European Council, 2015b). However, with the introduction of the Joint Action Plan, the flow of irregular migration towards the EU did not decrease to the desired extent, and the EU heads of state or government, which sought a more comprehensive solution, came together with Turkey on March 7, 2016 and agreed on a statement to be signed on March 18, 2016: EU-Turkey Statement.

The legal infrastructure of the EU-Turkey Statement of March 18, 2016 is based on the 2002 Greece-Turkey Readmission Protocol and the 2013 EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement. Although Turkey was reluctant to implement the Readmission Protocol it signed with Greece in 2002 and the 2013 EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement will not be implemented before 1 October 2017, this protocol and agreement played a significant role in the readmission of migrants after the EU-Turkey Statement adopted in 2016. Just after the EU-Turkey Statement was agreed on in March 2016, those who did not need international protection, were immediately sent back to Turkey, legally based on the Greece-Turkey Readmission Protocol. The legal basis of all readmission of third country nationals has been provided by bringing the effective date of the EU-Turkey

Readmission Agreement to 1 June 2016 instead of 1 October 2017 (European Commission, 2016b). According to the EU-Turkey Statement, the EU and Turkey have agreed on the following main points: All new irregular migrants arriving in the Greek Islands from Turkey after March 20, 2016 will be sent back to Turkey, for each Syrian migrant sent back to Turkey from the Greek Islands, another Syrian migrant selected according to the UN Vulnerability Criteria will be resettled to the EU, and Turkey will take the necessary measures to prevent irregular sea and land migration routes to the EU; in response to these, the EU will accelerate the allocation of €3 billion to Turkey and another €3 billion will be funded until the end of 2018, EU visa liberalization for Turkish citizens will be completed in June 2016, the customs union will be updated and Turkey's EU accession process will be revived (European Council, 2019).

After the Statement, Turkish authorities also took steps in the fields of health, education, labor market, and acquiring citizenship in order to improve the situation of Syrian migrants under temporary protection in Turkey and to prevent them from migrating to Europe. With the circular dated October 12, 2015, Syrian immigrants under temporary protection, who can only access health services in the province where they are registered, were given the opportunity to access health services outside the accommodation centers where they are registered (AFAD, 2015). With the decision taken for Syrian children to receive Turkish education in Turkish public schools, it was pointed out that the children would be permanent in Turkey in the future and a step was taken to improve the integration process (Erdoğan, 2018: 37). With the adoption of the Regulation on Work Permit of Refugees Under Temporary Protection on January 15, 2016, regulations regarding the access of those under temporary protection to the formal labor market were introduced and the opportunity to apply for a work permit was made. Finally, in mid-2016, the Council of Ministers started to work in order for Syrian migrants who did not meet the appropriate conditions to be granted Turkish citizenship (Hürriyet, 2016). In addition to these, Turkey has also worked to strengthen border security to prevent irregular migration to the EU. Within the scope of “*Agreement between the Government of the Hellenic Republic, the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Government of the Republic of Turkey on establishment and functioning of a common contact center for police and customs cooperation*” signed in

May 2015 and entered into force in 2016, it is aimed to strengthen the cooperation between police and customs units in areas such as illegal immigration, drug trade and organized crime (UN Treaty Collection, 2017). On the other hand, as understood in the Joint Action Plan, a liaison officer was appointed to Turkey by Frontex in April 2016 to strengthen border management cooperation with countries outside the EU (Frontex, 2016b). In the period following the crisis, within the scope of migration management, Turkey offered readmission agreements to 14 countries including Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Eritrea, and the number of removal centers established within the scope of irregular migration management reached 26 in 2021 (AA, 2017). After the efforts of Turkish authorities on Syrian migrants in Turkey and the implementation of EU-Turkey Statement together with increased border surveillance in the Aegean Sea, irregular entries into the EU decreased almost by 90% in 5 years, and 113.654 Syrian migrants obtained Turkish citizenship (Mülteciler Derneği, 2022).

Various political tensions between the EU and Turkey since 2016 determined the future of the agreement. First, the 2002 Greece-Turkey Readmission Protocol in 2018, and then the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement was suspended unilaterally by Turkey in 2019. After the Greek authorities released the 8 soldiers who had fled to Greece and were arrested there after the coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu emphasized that the bilateral readmission deal with Greece has been suspended in June 2018, but the Statement with the European Union continues (TRT World, 2018). Exactly one year later, in July 2019, Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu announced that the EU-Turkey readmission statement was also suspended for two reasons: (1) as a response to EU sanctions on gas drilling activities on Turkey's Eastern Mediterranean coast, and (2) due to the fact that the readmission agreement and visa liberalization for Turkish citizens were not put into effect at the same time (Daily Sabah, 2019). According to 2021 data of Presidency of Migration Management (PMM), 32.739 Syrian refugees in Turkey were resettled to an EU country under the one-to-one formula (PMM, 2022a). After the suspension of the Statement, the tension between Turkey and the EU reached its peak with the Idlib attack on February 27, 2020, and Turkey decided not to prevent the migrants crossing to Europe (Reuters, 2020). However, as a result of Greece's measures against migrants who had arrived at the border, migrants were stuck

in the buffer zone between the two countries and until March 26, 2020, 150.600 migrants crossed from Turkey's border city Edirne to Greece (Daily Sabah, 2020). During this period, the COVID-19 pandemic became the determining factor in the migration issue, and after Germany stopped the resettlement program with Turkey due to the epidemic, the migrants waiting at the Edirne border were taken to various provinces in Turkey by PMM and quarantined. Not only the political tensions between Turkey and the EU, but also the health conditions have been a factor that increased the vulnerability of migrants.

2.3.2.3. Regional Migration Management in the Aegean Sea and the State of Play

In the previous parts of the study, which deals with regional migration management in the Aegean Sea, the actions of state actors that have responded to the crisis, Ministry of Migration Policy, Coordinating Body for the Management of the Refugee Crisis, different ministries and state authorities within the scope of migration management are examined. In this part of the study, it will be discussed how non-state actors have become a part of regional migration management in the Aegean Sea, mostly in the Greek mainland and the Greek islands, at the point where the state authorities are insufficient to respond to the crisis. The available literature mainly focuses on the results of the migration governance process in Greece between 2015 and 2017. However, it seems more important to focus on how the emerging regional governance process is managed and not managed at the same time, that is, to focus on the process itself, rather than the governance-related results.

Governance of regional migration management practices in the Aegean Sea covers the Greek mainland and Greek islands in spatial terms and the years between 2015 and 2017 in temporal terms. In addition to the Greek state authorities, various actors such as local people, international volunteers, international organizations (IOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local governments have been involved in this governance process and have undertaken the responsibilities of the state. The reason for this was that Greece was in state of emergency and many IOs, especially UNHCR and IOM, and NGOs, which are the fund beneficiaries of the EU, mobilized after requesting support from EU (Dimitriadi, 2017: 17). However, the state of emergency was

terminated on July 31, 2017. Ending the state of emergency was now important in terms of transitioning from the emergency response to the integration of migrants but many non-state actors withdrew from the field and left its place to an environment in which the state apparently dominates, but in fact relies on the IOs and NGOs.

During the 2015 migrant crisis, Greece's first reception²⁰ capacity was insufficient to meet nearly 1 million migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands through the maritime border, and the national plan on reception and integration was also lacking. Therefore, although this crisis was a crisis of numbers, it was mainly a crisis of management (Dimitriadi, 2017: 17). This management crisis was basically due to two reasons: (1) the lack of the Greek government in the field, and (2) the lack of coordination among non-state actors. The crisis of regional migration management in the Greek mainland and the Greek islands caused by these two lacks may be described by dividing into 3 periods between 2015 and 2017: (1) May-August 2015, (2) September 2015-February 2016, (3) March 2016-July 2017. The first period covers the months of May and August of 2015. During this period, the number of irregular migrants entering the islands doubled every month (for example in Lesvos, end May: 7.228, end June: 14.796, end July: 23.721, end August: 56.579). In this period, the humanitarian response was provided by local and international volunteers, tourists and local people in the region in the absence of the Greek authorities and the European Union (Skleparis and Armakolas, 2016: 173). In the first months of the crisis, the Greek authorities remain unresponsive to this humanitarian crisis because the Greek government was negotiating bailout packages with the European Union and the IMF due to the austerity policies that have been going on since the 2008 financial crisis, and the political and financial restrictions prevented the Greek government from intervening in time. In addition, this government was a caretaker government during the escalation of the crisis, and the fact that the caretaker government was unable to take decisions until the general elections in September 2015 delayed the government's humanitarian aid. On the other hand, the fact that the Greek government, which came to power in

²⁰ Reception has two levels: first reception refers to shelter, food, health care, interpretation and information about rights. Secondary reception refers to the integration process in the medium or long term.

January 2015, SYRIZA, could not read the signs of the approaching mass irregular migration well and was unprepared for it in the period until its resignation in August, was another reason for the absence of the Greek authorities in the field. Volunteers mobilized in the absence of governmental authorities have provided first reception assistance to irregular migrants at their point of arrival for months. In early September, when the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition government was founded, migrants were increasingly stranded on the islands because they could not register officially due to insufficient staffing. The coalition government's response to the crisis by sending additional staff to the islands initiated the second period, which began in September 2015 and lasted until February 2016. In this period, the dimensions of the humanitarian crisis began to emerge worldwide through the international media, while international response and governmental authorities were trying to close the gap with the volunteers on the field in September-October. However, just as the Greek authorities were late, international humanitarian aid was also late to arrive. The reasons for this delay may be listed as follows: (1) the belief of international NGOs that Greece, as a European Union member, can cope with this crisis, (2) many international NGOs waiting to be officially registered in Greece as a result of the bureaucratic demands of the Greek authorities, (3) they could not work at full capacity due to their commitment to the Greek authorities on financial controls and staff, (4) instead of actually carrying out humanitarian aid operations, they spend time doing assessments (Skleparis and Armakolas, 2016: 173-175). For these reasons, IOs and NGOs, which started to be active in the second period of the migrant crisis, first appeared on the Greek islands. For example, after the disorder that started in September when the number of asylum seekers exceeded the population of the islanders in Lesvos, many national and international NGOs were mobilized and as of November 1st, 2015, 81 national and international NGOs in Lesvos started offering humanitarian assistance (Georgiopoulou, 2015). Volunteer groups in the field began to work with these NGOs, thereby the capacity to meet the needs increased. However, at the same time, the lack of coordination between the actors who were on the field before and those who were involved in this management process later, also caused tension. On the one hand, this duality caused the disruption of humanitarian aid, on the other hand, it pointed to the absence of a coordinating and monitoring mechanism that a state or state-related authority could provide. On January 5, 2016 the mayor of Lesvos

declared that “[...] more recently I have seen many NGOs and individuals coming without official registration and showing no cooperation with our municipality. [...] I would say their presence is disruptive rather than useful.” (The Guardian, 2016b) After this statement, on January 14, three volunteers from Proem-Aid and two volunteers from Danish Team Humanity were arrested while performing a rescue operation (Al Jazeera, 2016). And soon after, police investigations and interceptions against unregistered volunteers began. As a result, the humanitarian aid process entered its third period, with the state intervening in the tension created by the incoordination between non-state actors in the field and preventing the activities of unregistered organizations. With the closure of the Balkan route in March 2016, more than 50.000 migrants were stranded in Greece, but only 1.200 shelters remained in the country (UNHCR, 2021: 2). Therefore, it was the turn of the state to intervene and undertake the managerial coordination. With the joint Ministerial Decision announced in January and the subsequent Law 4368/2016 adopted in February, the Greek authorities have decided to minimize the role of volunteers and small-scale civil society actors in providing humanitarian aid to migrants and allow major national and international NGOs to continue their activities under state supervision. This period, which summarizes the governance of regional migration management to the 2015 crisis in Greece, started with the initiatives of volunteers, professionalized with major national and international NGOs, and finally, continued to be shaped in the hands of the governmental authorities with the return of the state. However, as the first reception assistance could not be provided with sufficient government resources as a result of the late intervention, most of the burden was placed on non-state actors (Greek Ombudsman, 2017: 41).

It is not possible to reach the information of how many actors are involved and which actor maintains which role in this governance process, which has been created for about 9 months. However, there are still many small or large-scale national and international NGOs and IOs known to be involved. Some of those are UNHCR, IOM as international organizations; Amnesty International, Greek Council for Refugees, Human Rights Watch, Refugee Rights Europe as human rights organizations; Red Cross, Danish Refugee Council, International Rescue Committee, Oxfam as international humanitarian organizations, Praksis, Arsis as national humanitarian organizations;

Caritas Hellas as faith-based humanitarian organization; and Lighthouse Relief, I am You, Hope Humanitarian as organizations established in Greece just after the 2015 crisis. It is worth noting that this diversity of actors mobilized for the 2015 migrant crisis can be organized from below thanks to civil society actors, albeit for a short time, has made many positive contributions to both Greek civil society life and global migration governance. Greek civil society life has been revived like never before thanks to non-state actors active in areas such as food and non-food supply, sanitation and medical services, social and legal support to migrants, offering assessments to state authorities, collecting donation (Latifi, 2016: 161). The presence of this diversity of actors on the ground also created time for government institutions to take appropriate action. For example, during the 2015-2017 state of emergency period, the informal reception of approximately 5.000 migrants were stranded in the Port of Piraeus with the closure of the Western Balkan route was provided by the initiatives of Pan-Peiraiki, a Greek local solidarity movement. According to the study carried out by George Mavrommatis in Port of Piraeus in 2016, due to the increasing number of migrants, the Pan-Peiraiki movement made an open call to all other organizations and volunteers at the point where the movement was not enough to provide humanitarian aid alone (Mavrommatis, 2016: 85). In response, IOs, national and international NGOs, associations, local people, international volunteers, civil organizations, private sector, Olympiakos football club, and municipalities gathered and managed migration through a globalized civil society to fill the void of the state. The last tent was folded in July 27, 2016 in the Port of Piraeus when the state authorities announced that the refugee applications of those who did not leave the port and did not register with the government facilities would not be accepted.

It should be noted that the structure of this governance carried out in Greece is complex. This structure may best be expressed by saying that there are formal and informal governance systems. The formal system within the governance is the signing of a cooperation agreement with international organizations such as UNHCR and IOM, which are the main collaborators of the state, and international organizations undertake many responsibilities of the state in return. Within this system, UNHCR and IOM delegate these responsibilities by making agreements with other collaborators, namely

NGOs. The informal system, on the other hand, refers to both volunteers and non-contracted NGOs, as well as the Ministry of Migration, the Head of the RIC or other Ministers directly requesting support from the heads of international organizations or NGOs within the framework of the informal coordination relationship (Dimitriadi and Sarantaki, 2019: 19). In other words, it means that the Greek authorities make informal demands in order not to be exposed to more international criticism due to the weak capacity of the first reception and the absence of an action plan to integration within the framework of secondary reception. It is possible to briefly exemplify some of these networks within the scope of implementation of first reception. Implementation of first reception refers to the provision of decent living conditions such as accommodation, catering, medical services, transport, social support. Accommodation and cash-aid assistance will be highlighted and exemplified below.

With three major projects (ESTIA, Filoxenia and HELIOS) carried out by UNHCR and IOM, the two main partners that organize the first reception implementations, most of the responsibilities of the Greek authorities were outsourced. UNHCR in collaboration with the Greek government introduced the *Emergency Support to Integration and Accommodation* (ESTIA) programme in November 2015. Within the scope of the programme consisting of two pillars, accommodation support was first provided, and then cash assistance pillar was launched in April 2017. The accommodation programme was handed over to the Greek state at the end of 2020 and the cash assistance program in October 2021. Within the scope of the ESTIA programme led by UNHCR, which lasted for about 6 years, UNHCR cooperated with 9 NGOs and 11 municipal partners²¹ and provided accommodation for 73.000 migrants (UNHCR, 2021: 11). Since 2017, the cash assistance program, which has been carried out with the support of many NGOs such as Samaritan's Purse, Mercy Corps, Metadrasi, International Rescue Committee, has found the opportunity to spread throughout the country thanks to these NGOs. 200.000 migrants benefited from the cash assistance programme funded by DG ECHO. Cash aid helps both to meet the urgent needs of

²¹ 9 NGOs: Arsis, InterSos, Omnes, Perichoresis, Solidarity Now, Praksis, Terre des Hommes, Iliachtida (ηλιαχτίδα), Catholic Relief Services. 11 municipalities: Athens, Thessaloniki, Tripoli, Livadeia, Heraklion, Larisa, Karditsa, Trikala, Piraeus, Tilos, Nea Chalkidona-Nea Filadelpheia.

migrants such as food, hygiene materials, and clothing, and to help them integrate into the society in the future. Among the responsibilities that Greek authorities outsource to another main partner, IOM, are operational tasks. Until 2017, IOM undertook the coordination and management of the migrant camps in the field as the Site Management Support (SMS). In addition, with the Filoxenia project, 6.898 migrants were hosted in hotels on the mainland to alleviate the crowds on the Greek islands. With the *Hellenic Integration Support for Beneficiaries of International Protection* (HELIOS) project managed by IOM and implemented in temporary accommodation centers between June 2019 and November 2020, it aimed to support the integration of migrants who were taken under international protection with workshops, language lessons, and accommodation support (the project is extended until June 2022) (IOM, 2022).

These projects engaged with state authorities were managed not only by UNHCR and IOM officials, but also by other national and international NGOs that they downwardly outsourced (Dimitriadi and Sarantaki, 2019: 13). For example, two national NGOs located in Greece, Praksis (Programs of Development, Social Support and Medical Cooperation) and Arsis (Association for the Social Support of Youth) have managed apartments under the ESTIA programme. At the time of the end of the state of emergency in July 2017, there were about 36 camps²² in Greece, of which only 6 (Eleonas camp in Athens and five hotspots in Greek Islands) are managed by the Ministry of Migration Policy (Dimitriadi, 2017: 25). Although the remaining 30 camps seem to be managed by the Ministry on paper, they were outsourced to NGOs such as Arbeiter Samariter Bund Deutschland (ASB), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), InterSoS, Refugee Support in cooperation with UNHCR. Another example is that IOM downwardly outsourced the management of open reception facilities through SMS agencies, namely NGOs. According to the site management report published by UNHCR in 2018, 26 open reception facilities with 16.458 migrants in 7 administrative regions²³ in Greece were managed by IOM and two other NGOs that IOM outsourced:

²² At this point, it should be stated that the number of camps changes continuously: official camps may be closed, migrants may be placed in other accommodation such as hotels or apartments from the camps, or an informal camp may be established.

²³ Attica, Central Greece, Central Macedonia, East Macedonia and Thrace, Epirus, Thessaly, West Greece.

ASB and DRC (UNHCR, 2018). There were also camps built by NGOs even before the management phase: for example, the German NGO, ASB, built a long-term accommodation center for around 1.000 people in Diavata, Thessaloniki in 2017, funded by DG ECHO and the German Federal Foreign Ministry (ASB, 2022).

Although there were actors who started to withdraw from the field gradually with the end of the state of emergency in 2017, according to the data published by the European Parliament, for example, there were 114 NGOs and 7.356 volunteers in Lesvos alone in 2018 (European Parliament, 2018). The coexistence of so many actors in a limited space brought some challenges. Since each IOs and NGOs have their own internal procedure and different execution of the workflow, being able to bring each of them together harmoniously is a significant challenge: the inability to manage the crisis and the emergence of informal structures. For example, this caused the Moria hotspot in Lesvos to be split into two: the internal camp run by state authorities and professional NGOs, and the external camp run by independent individuals and volunteers (Skleparis and Armakolas, 2016: 177). Another informal structure in this management crisis is that instead of creating an open competition environment for the subcontractors who will be involved in the provision of services for the 40 refugee camps established in 2015 with the help of the Army, all regular processes were excluded and the subcontractors in the Army's own internal pool were assigned the work (Dimitriadi and Sarantaki, 2019: 18-19). Again, only 3 of the same camps were included in the legal framework within the scope of Law 4376/2016, while the others were excluded from this legality, that is, the management and operation in these camps remained outside the state supervision.

According to available literature and field researches, there was no confusion about decision-making processes between formal and informal relationships that emerged in the governance of migration management in Greece. The central government or authorized ministers were competent in decision-making processes, they were not required to consult stakeholders, and thus the system was ostensibly centralized. Stakeholders were only required to implement the taken decisions. But in reality, Greek authorities relies on implementing partners as they lack the capacity to directly enforce reception policies themselves. Therefore, each NGO applies its own rules in the camp,

coordination decisions are taken informally by IOs and NGOs, and as a result, the way of coordination and management differs from camp to camp. Moreover, some of these NGOs do not have legal competence. This disorganized network between humanitarian actors mostly caused either duplication of aids and waste of time or preventing aid from reaching its destination effectively. For example, due to incoordination, one migrant could receive provisions from more than one NGO in a day, while another migrant could not find the opportunity to access the provisions at all. Therefore, the challenges of this governance may be briefly summarized as follows: domestic political context and national austerity measures in Greece, lack of political leadership, lack of responsibility to lead the humanitarian response, unpreparedness of the state authorities and international humanitarian organizations, lack of funding and staff to support humanitarian aid, bureaucratic complexity of institutional and funding procedures at national and EU level. While all these challenges were going on, the obligation of the Greek state to produce concrete results as soon as possible in return for all the funds provided for Greece (for example, European Commission allocated €525 million between 2015-2018 as emergency assistance or funded €644 million for 29 projects under Emergency Support Instrument) required the involvement of various types of actors. However, due to the organizational complexity and lack of coordination resulting from the failure to manage this involvement, the funds could not be used efficiently and appropriately, and some of the migrants who needed decent living conditions were stranded in fast-chancing situations, waiting for help in a more vulnerable situation.

It is worth focusing on regional migration management in the Aegean Sea in the scope of this study because the implemented policies and practices show that there is not governance, but governance of migration management. The Greek state intervention in the migrant crisis is more of a security concern than a humanitarian one. The most obvious indication of this is that the state has held back volunteers and NGOs rather than coordinating them under governance. The delayed actions of state authorities resulted in a return of the state. However, in this turn, the state outsourced downwardly and outwardly its burden and responsibilities to the major national and international NGOs and IOs rather than taking on the role of coordinator among all small-scale and

large-scale ones. Therefore, besides the emergence of the public and private actor variety, this outsourcing mechanism also has important financial reasons and consequences, which will be discussed in the next section.

Before talking about the political economy of migration management in the Aegean Sea, to briefly talk about the current state, according to the data of UNHCR, after the years of emergency, irregular migrant inflows to Greece by sea and land have gradually decreased: 50.508 in 2018, 74.613 in 2019 (the reason for the increase is the suspension of Statement by Turkey), 15.696 in 2020, and 8.935 in 2021 (UNHCR, 2022). Among the reasons for this decline are the COVID-19 pandemic, the heavy pushbacks of the Greek police in the Aegean waters, and the detention of migrants in prison-like closed detention centers in Greek islands. For these reasons, irregular migrants had to turn to other more dangerous Mediterranean routes instead of the safer Greek route. Of the irregular migrants crossing the Mediterranean in 2021, 55% arrived in Italy, 35% in Spain and only 7% in Greece (ECRE, 2022). In January 2022, there are 38.225 migrants pending pre-registration of application for international protection, 80.217 asylum seekers covered by a decision granting refugee status in first and second instance, and 31.508 migrants live in camps, including 3.354 migrants in hotspots on the islands (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Migration and Asylum, 2022a). Although the number of migrants coming to Greece and the number of refugees living in the camps have decreased relatively, it should be said that the crisis responses in the field of health have increased due to the fact that the migrants have been living in the camps for a long time and are affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.

In 2021, UNHCR transferred all its powers and responsibilities for migrant assistance to the Greek government and IOM, as an UN agency, which prepared a crisis response plan for Greece in 2021, did not prepare this plan for 2022. Therefore, the vast majority of non-state actors, including international organizations, withdrew from Greece. From the stagnation of the cash assistance program to the cessation of catering services to migrants with refugee status and the decrease in the schooling rate among children, many coordination deficiencies have started that make migration management and integration difficult. Moreover, Greece established three “Closed Controlled Access

Centers” violating migrant rights on the islands of Samos, Kos, and Leros in 2021 and started the construction of two more closed camps on the islands of Lesvos and Chios (Daily Sabah, 2021a). In the face of these restrictive and compelling policies of Greece, 8 international NGOs in March 2021 and 29 NGOs in October 2021 published an open letter to the European Union (Human Rights Watch, 2021a; Greek Council for Refugees, 2021). In both letters, there were calls to abandon the closed facilities, to treat all migrants equally and fairly, to improve the conditions in the reception centers, and to eliminate the lack of coordination. However, no noticeable progress has been made so far. In addition, financial resources that would improve the situation of migrants who arrive in Greece and have to live there for years, or that would help to minimize root causes in migrant-sending countries, spent on border security technologies that will endanger the lives of migrants and on facilities that will contain migrants in migrant-sending or transit countries. In the next section, the financial relationship networks between the actors that dominate these two fields will be tried to be revealed.

2.4. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MIGRATION MANAGEMENT IN THE AEGEAN SEA THROUGHOUT 2015 CRISIS

The political economy of migration management covers a wide range from border security to financial aid to third countries, from first and secondary reception costs of refugees to detention and deportation costs. Every actor involved in the migration industry and making financial gains from migration is worth examining within the scope of the political economy of migration management. In this sub-section of the study, the political economic background of migration management practices that emerged after the migrant crisis in the Aegean Sea in 2015 will be examined. It should be underlined that there are two main types of management in the Aegean during the crisis: the management of irregular migrants/refugee arriving in Greece and the management for the prevention of irregular migration. Refugee policies have traditionally been conducted as a state-centred public policy under international refugee law. However, it is known that private actors always play a role in refugee policies by offering their expertise and knowledge to governments (Betts, 2013: 55-58). Although in this study, the political economy of migration management will be discussed through public and

private actors of border management and externalization of migration, it is worth noting the intervention of a private actor from outside in the migration management policies implemented during the 2015 crisis in Greece: the McKinsey case. According to the article published by BIRN (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network) in 2020, the McKinsey case, which turned into a political scandal in Europe, covers the German government's agreement with McKinsey, an American consultancy and management company, for 45 million euros²⁴ in 2015 and EASO for 992.000 euros in 2017 (BIRN, 2020). Accordingly, Germany received consultancy services from McKinsey to evaluate the asylum applications of 270.000 asylum seekers and to shorten the process, and EASO to finalize the pending asylum applications accumulated in the Greek islands as soon as possible. McKinsey company, which came to the field in 2015 and made observations, interviews, and examinations in the field for a long time, first presented "pro bono projects" to Europe. With the "integrated refugee management" it has developed, the company has adopted the mentality of managing a company: reaching targeted strategies, maximizing efficiency, designing the end-to-end asylum process, implementing performance management systems to ensure rapid action, and producing systems to monitor the efficiency of the committees that examine the asylum applications. McKinsey, who was also an influential actor in the preparation of the EU-Turkey Statement, made recommendations to EU bureaucrats for the implementation of the agreement. Within the scope of management consultancy, the company has developed the fast-track procedure system in order to "maximize efficiency", that is, to process as many asylum applications as possible in the fastest way possible. In other words, it has developed the system that decides who will be sent to the Greek mainland among the approved applications and who will be deported to Turkey with a returnable migrant status. Under this system, 340 migrants per week were targeted to be deported, but in reality this number never exceeded 50. McKinsey, on the other hand, boasted in its report published in May 2017, that it reduced the processing time of an asylum application from 170 days to 11 days. In 2018, the European Court of

²⁴ "In total, between 2015 and 2018, the federal government awarded consulting firms such as McKinsey, Ernst & Young and Kienbaum contracts to advise the BAMF (*Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in Germany*) in the amount of EUR 54.8 million in order to make the authority faster, more productive and more effective. Of these, 33.7 million were not tendered. The contracts run until the end of 2020." (Translated from German) (Bild, 2018).

Auditors found EASO's agreement with McKinsey irregular (not illegal) as a single pre-selected economic actor was paid in violation of the principles of transparency and competition without complying with tender procedures (Auditors did not use the name of McKinsey in its report, but mentioned 992.000 euros). As a result of rising political pressure from the European Union, EASO had to disclose some of McKinsey reports. The full report was not published on the grounds that it would endanger public safety and international relations, as well as harm McKinsey's business interests. As an example of public-private partnership, McKinsey case points out humanitarian challenges for migrants and security and responsibility challenges for the state if the state authority outsources its responsibility to a private actor.


The McKinsey case is a unique example of the outsourcing of refugee procedures, but it should be noted that private actors take a wider role in public policies to prevent irregular migration. For the EU, the two most basic ways to prevent irregular migration are to strengthen border management and to keep migrants out of the territory of the EU. While doing this, the EU includes not only public authorities but also numerous private actors through the funds it provides. Therefore, in this part of the case study, which will reveal the political economic relationship network between public and private actors, the strengthening of border management and the externalization of migration management in the Aegean region by the EU funds in preventing irregular migration will be presented. In this context, the EU funds, the relevant budgets of the states of Greece and Turkey, the EU and national tender platforms, bilateral contracts, and business relations have been examined. Both migration management tools in the Aegean region will be examined under two separate headings: border management as (1) land management and (2) maritime management, and externalization of migration in (1) Greek islands and (2) Turkey.

2.4.1. Political Economy of Border Management in the Aegean Sea

It may be argued that the border security industry, which serves the border management policies of states, simply consists of two infinite loops feeding each other: (1) security and technology companies that provide border security solutions are also arms producers and (2) as border security technologies advance, irregular migrants find other

ways to flee, and more and more investments are made in the border security industry. Within the scope of the first loop, for example, considering the arms sales and border security relations of Europe's largest arms producing companies such as Airbus, Finmeccanica, Thales, people who seek a safer place are displaced as the arms-dealing companies feed the conflicts and the same companies are building walls to prevent these people from accessing safer places. Within the scope of the second loop, safe states that do not want to accept irregular migrants who are looking for a safer place are investing in border security, and investments in the border security industry are growing as irregular migrants seek new solutions. In between these two loops, the reasons why people become irregular migrants are ignored in order to continue to feed the border security industry. Therefore, a border is never just a border. Border walls and fences built after the Cold War may be referenced to emphasize the importance of the border and the size of this industry. The total length of the walls rising between the borders of European countries alone reaches 1000 kilometers and is six times longer than the Berlin wall (Akkerman, 2019: 11). Of the 56 modern walls or fences built all over the world after 1990, 20 of them (35%) were built for the first time after the 2015 crisis, and 11 of them are on European soil (Vernon and Zimmermann, 2021: 34-36). According to the latest data compiled in April 2022, there are 15 border walls/fences built or under construction on European soil after 2015, and 3 border walls/fences announced to be built, as Map 3 illustrates:

Map 3. Border walls and fences in Europe



The main actors of border management policies are supposed to be states. However, in reality, states make use of the knowledge of the border security industry while constructing their border management policies and make them a part of these policies. Therefore, it can be argued that private companies among non-state actors are at least as effective as state actors when it comes to the political economy of border management. In this part of the study, the political economic relations between the state and private companies will be prioritized. However, before clarifying the political economy of border management in the Aegean Sea, it would be useful to examine the budgets allocated to border management after 2015 crisis by national and regional actors playing an active role in this region. Some of these budgets are transferred to private companies that are subcontracted through tenders or contracts. As the budget allocated by the states to border management increases, it is seen that states outsource its burden and responsibility more through public-private partnership.

The Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for ensuring the security of Turkey's borders and the producer of border management policies, publishes a performance


program since 2010. Performance programs between 2010 and 2021 were examined to find out the budget allocated by the Ministry of Interior for border management. Accordingly, border security or integrated border security system understanding was not included in performance programs until 2015. In 2015, the concept of integrated border management was clearly included in the report of the Ministry of Interior and was budgeted as a separate item. Accordingly, in 2015, domestically 34 million Turkish lira (from now on only "lira") was allocated to establish an effective border security system based on inter-agency cooperation and strengthened with a technological surveillance infrastructure within the framework of integrated border management approach (İçişleri Bakanlığı, 2015: 122). After 2015 while the allocated budget remained around 30 million lira until 2020, it increased to 70 million lira in 2020, 264 million lira in 2021 and 1 billion lira in 2022. The reason for this increase in the budget is the watchtowers placed and planned to be placed on the Western and Eastern borders. While 25 watchtowers were deployed in 2018, this number increased to 324 in 2020 (İçişleri Bakanlığı, 2022: 44-45). In addition, other expenditures within the scope of border security are the installation of lighting systems at the borders, the construction of patrol roads, the installation of security walls at the borders, the installation of camera systems, the installation of high security wire-fences, the purchase of armored patrol vehicles. Apart from these domestically allocated budgets, the total budget of EU-sourced projects carried out according to the 2021 data of the Ministry of Interior is approximately €183 million, of which €160 million is the EU contribution (İçişleri Bakanlığı, 2021a).

In order to examine the border management budget of Greece, the annual budget reports published by the Ministry of Finance between 2015 and 2021 were examined. Until 2021, the phrase "border management" or "border security" is not included in the budget reports. Instead, migration flows expenditures of each ministry are included one by one. However, since this item is only described as "purchase", the expenditures made on behalf of border security are not visible. As of 2021, "marine border management" and "border security-management" items have been added to the budget report. Accordingly, the Ministry of Shipping and Island Policy allocated €26.1 million for the marine border management expenditure in 2022 (Ministry of Finance, 2021: 253).

Ministry of Citizen Protection allocated €120 million in 2021 and €59 million in 2022 to border security-management speeding (Ministry of Finance, 2020: 195, 2021: 307). Besides domestic resources, Greece received €3.38 billion support from the EU for migration management between 2015 and 2021. €2.26 billion of this support came from Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, €450 million from the Internal Security Fund (€167 million was allocated for border management, European Commission, 2021a) and €668 million from Emergency Support Instrument. €54 million from the funds transferred to Greece were used by the Greek authorities within the scope of border security (European Commission, 2021b: 3-4).

At regional level, the European Union's border management fund is subordinate to Migration and Home Affairs. Migration and Home Affairs fund is divided into 4: (1) Asylum, Migration and Integration Funds, (2) Borders and Visa Funds, (3) Internal Security Funds, and (4) Security Research Funds. The European Commission supports border management and common visa policy projects in 7-year periods. Between 2007 and 2013 (the fund was then called External Border Funds), €1.7 billion was allocated for border management. A budget of €3.9 billion has been allocated (but the payment remained at €2.2 billion) for law enforcement against cross-border and management of external borders in the 2014-2020 period (European Commission, 2021c). For the next 7-year period, a budget of €6.2 billion is planned to be allocated within the scope of the fund, which is called the Integrated Border Management Fund (European Commission, 2021c). Looking at the distribution by years, while €129 million was allocated from the budget in 2014, this amount increased to €551 million in 2015 and €735 million in 2016, and decreased to €533 million as of 2019, but the budget foreseen for the 2021-2027 period is designed to double (Graph 4) (European Commission, 2021d: 7; 2022a: 2). According to the multiannual budget of the EU, the total EU border management budget reaches €14.3 billion, with €8.1 billion allocated for European decentralised agencies in addition to the Integrated Border Management Fund. Implementations include external border management, border control infrastructures, national border surveillance, application of common visa policy, and combating cross-border.

Graph 4. EU, Allocated Budget to Internal Security Fund in 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 (€ million)
(Source: European Commission, 2021d)



Two main border management projects were carried out in the Aegean region with the financing of the EU and IOM: (1) within the scope of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) program, resources were allocated from the budget of the EU in 2007-2013 (Phase I) and 2014-2020 (Phase II) for the border management in the Turkey-Greece-Bulgaria region. €20.4 million of the €9.25 billion IPA financial aid has been allocated to Turkish authorities as part of cross-border cooperation (Turkish Directorate of EU Affairs, 2019). In this context, with the aim of establishing a surveillance system on the border of Greece and Bulgaria, electro-optical watchtowers and armored surveillance vehicles have been supplied and continue to be provided. (2) Within the scope of the “Regional Cooperation on Border Management among Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria” project initiated by IOM in 2014, it is envisaged to support cross-border cooperation with Greece and Bulgaria in a way that will bring Turkey's border management in line with the EU acquis. The project was supported with €3 million (IOM, 2017b). The border externalization policy of the EU in the Aegean region has been shaped by the 2015 Joint Action Plan and the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement. The Joint Action Plan envisaged that the EU will strengthen the capacity of the Turkish Coast Guard and other patrol and surveillance tools, and closer cooperation between Turkey and Frontex. According to the Statement, it was committed to make the necessary arrangements, which will be mentioned below, for Turkey to prevent irregular migration on land and sea routes. In addition to these projects, to briefly touch on the NACORAC (National Coordination and Joint Risk Analysis Center) project of Turkey,

to which the EU contributed €11 million, it is aimed to create a common database that provides information exchange with cooperation between institutions across the Turkey in the field of integrated border management. In this context, **7 information technology companies** from Turkey and **1 company** from Lebanon²⁵, which won the tender in 2018, prepared the infrastructure of the database for a total of €10.6 million (TED, 2022a). NACORAC is expected to be active in 2022.

One of the main beneficiaries of these budgets and funds allocated by the Turkish and Greek governments and the European Union for border management is private companies, namely defence, security, and technology companies. Budgets and funds are used by various authorities at the state level such as ministries, divisions, units and most of their designed projects are outsourced to private sector contractors through tenders. In this part of the study, after the 2015 crisis the border management expenditures and outsourcing and privatization network established between the governments of Turkey and Greece and the border security industry in the Aegean region will be revealed at two border levels: land border management and maritime border management. For this purpose, the European Union's online tender database, Turkey's online tender database, Public Disclosure Platforms and researches reported by various media organizations were consulted.

- Land Border Management in the Aegean Region:

Land border management refers to the protection of the land border against security threats with instruments such as walls or fences and its maintenance, surveillance equipment like watchtower, border patrol units, and patrol cars. One of the most significant land border management instrument in Aegean region is Evros fence. Evros fence's first phase of construction (12.5 kilometers) was completed in 2012 as aforementioned in the 2.3.1 sub-section. After the 2015 migrant crisis, the Greek government, which wanted to strengthen its land borders, decided to extend the Evros fence in 2020. The European Commission, which is against physical walls and fences,

²⁵ 7 IT companies based in Turkey: **İnnova Bilişim, Atos Bilişim, Akgün Bilgisayar, Aday Grup, Balkan Elektronik, Ado Bilişim, Verify Veri İletişimi.** 1 IT company based in Lebanon: **Intertech Group.**

did not fund the first phase construction of Evros fence in 2012 and took the same decision in 2021. The expansion works of fences started with the use of the domestic resources of the Greek government. Accordingly, the Greek prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, sent tender invitations to five major construction companies of Greece within the scope of the Evros border fence project, which will be extended by 27.5 kilometers. Four of the five major construction companies, **Avax**, **Intrakat**, **Mytilineos**²⁶, and **Terna**, submitted a joint bid forming a consortium. After this proposal, the final value of the project was determined as €62.9 million (La Politica, 2020). Completed in August 2021 and with a total length of 40 kilometers, fence also has a digital barrier feature, as understood from the 2020 financial report of **Terna**, one of the construction companies (Terna, 2021: 173). Evros fence is equipped with a long-range acoustic device, namely sound cannon, high-tech cameras, and radar to minimize irregular migration flows from Turkey to Greece via the Evros river. In addition, the watchtowers right next to the fence are equipped with detection sensors and night vision long-range cameras so that the presence of migrants can be detected before they approach the border (Al Jazeera, 2021a). In November 2021 Greek migration minister Mitarakis stated that Greece intends to extend the fence and construct a new artificial barrier according to 2021-2027 financial programme (Ekathimerini, 2021a).

A second land wall was built with the aim of reducing irregular migration in the Aegean region, although it is not located in the Aegean region. And also, this wall is an example of the externalization of border management in third countries. During the 2015 crisis, Turkey was criticized by EU countries for not giving importance to border security. This issue was also reflected as a clause in the EU-Turkey Statement.²⁷ As a result, Turkey built the Syrian security wall between 2016-2018, which it plans to indirectly help reduce irregular migrants passing through the Aegean region. Although it is implied that the EU indirectly helped the construction of the Syrian security wall with funds, there is no definite information. The construction of the Syrian security wall was

²⁶ Mytilineos is also the company that builds Closed Controlled Access Centers in the Greek islands.

²⁷ EU-Turkey Statement, March 18, 2016. Clause 3. Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU, and will cooperate with neighbouring states as well as the EU to this effect.

undertaken by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, not the Ministry of Interior responsible for border security in Turkey. **Emay Uluslararası Mühendislik ve Müşavirlik Anonim Şirketi**²⁸, which won the tender opened by the Housing Development Administration (TOKİ in Turkish) affiliated to the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, built the wall on the Syrian border in return for 5 million lira (EKAP, 2016). In addition, **Otokar**, Turkey's largest private defense company, awarded the tender which was opened in 2015 with the title of "*Supply of technological border surveillance equipment for the cleared regions*" within the scope of IPA-II program to strengthen Turkey's Eastern border. **Otokar** supplied 82 reconnaissance/surveillance vehicles (Cobra II) to Turkey's Eastern border for a total of €47.4 million (TED, 2021d). 75% of the tender financing was covered from the EU budget under the IPA program, and 25% from the domestic budget.

In the second phase of the IPA program (2014-2020), it is aimed to strengthen the Turkey-Greece-Bulgaria land border. In this context, three projects, (1) electro-optical watchtower construction, (2) armored vehicle procurement, and (3) training programs for the personnel working at the border were carried out. While watchtower construction and armored vehicle procurement were subcontracted to private defense and security companies, personnel training was delegated to an intergovernmental organization. Within the scope of electro-optical border surveillance systems, 91 watchtowers are installed on Turkey's Western border and 350 km of the 472 km Western border is observed (İçişleri Bakanlığı, 2021a: 97). There are thermal camera, laser rangefinder, radar, shooting location detection system, wireless communication system, and wireless motion and vibration detection sensor system in the watchtowers. In 2020, the installation of 324 watchtowers in the West and East was completed. The tender for the watchtowers in 2018 for €108.2 million was awarded to **Aselsan**, the largest defense electronics company in Turkey (TED, 2021e). Secondly, in order to improve Turkey's border patrols within the scope of the IPA program, an armored and non-armored vehicle tender was initiated to be deployed on the Turkish-Greek border

²⁸ The company Emay has also been one of the contractors of the 3rd bridge of İstanbul, the Northern Marmara highway and the İzmir highway in Turkey, which has been criticized in Turkey and has been the subject of political debates many times regarding public-private partnership.

(European Parliament, 2020). In 2017, the tender for 2 lots (armoured and unarmored) under the title "*Supply of mobile surveillance units for increasing border surveillance capacity of borders between Turkey and EU*" was awarded to **Aselsan** for a total of €29.6 million (TED, 2021f). 75% of the tender financing was covered from the EU budget under the IPA program, and 25% from the domestic budget. **Aselsan** subcontracted the project to **Katmerciler** for €10.5 million for the production of 57 vehicles in total (KAP, 2017a). According to this subcontract, the vehicles are manufactured by **Katmerciler** using **Aselsan** technologies such as land surveillance radar, electro-optical sensor, and firing range detection system. Thirdly, within the scope of the training project of the IPA program, **UNDP** has been the coordinator of the "*Project for Increasing the Border Surveillance Capacity at the Turkish-Greek Border*". The training project, which lasted between 2017-2019 and cost €1.82 million, provided training to nearly 1.000 personnel in the fields of migration and human rights, integrated border management, and border surveillance (UNDP, 2019).

After the 2015 crisis, land border management in the Aegean region remained limited to Greece's own national budget, while for Turkey it was developed mainly with the EU budget. It is determined that the strict attitude of the EU towards its member states against land walls or fences is not valid for third countries. In the context of public-private partnership, there is a directly downward outsourcing relationship between the Greek government and private companies in the land border management of Greece. In the examples of Turkey, there is a land border management externalization outwardly outsourced from the EU to Turkey, followed by Turkey's downward outsourcing of border management policies to private companies, and companies subcontracting each other. As may be seen in these examples, the beneficiaries of the role played by the EU in the management of Turkey's Aegean borders have been large defense and security companies.

- Maritime Border Management in the Aegean Sea:

Maritime border management includes providing security in the territorial waters of countries with the help of vehicles such as ship, vessel, aircraft, helicopter, patrol boat, search and rescue boat, and drone. When it comes to the Aegean region, it would not be

wrong to state that the border management in this region is mainly carried out over the maritime border rather than land border, since Turkey and Greece have long coasts along the Aegean Sea. For example, according to Frontex's 2017 operation spending, land border operations expenditure is €16.8 million, while maritime border operations expenditure is €108.3 million (Since Frontex did not separate the operations as "land, sea, air" in the reports published after 2017, but showed them under a single operational expenditure item, the data of 2017 was used.) (Frontex, 2018). The most significant maritime border management instrument in the Aegean Sea is Frontex sea operations. A maritime border was established on the Aegean Sea with a significant budget allocated by the European Commission for Operation Poseidon (mentioned in the sub-section 2.3.1) carried out in the Eastern Mediterranean. Accordingly, the budget allocated to Operation Poseidon Sea was €6.6 million in 2014 (Frontex, 2014) when the migrant crisis had not yet fully started, but this amount was tripled to €18 million in mid-2015 (Frontex, 2015). Finally, €46 million was allocated to Joint Operation Posedion, which lasted a full year between February 2018 and January 2019 (Frontex, 2019c). The manufacturers of the equipment used in Frontex's Operation Poseidon in the Aegean Sea are the key players of the border security industry. For example, in the serious incident reports recorded by Frontex published by Statewatch, it is determined that the Super Puma helicopters produced by **Airbus** were recorded among the equipment used during the Operation Poseidon in 2015 (Statewatch, 2016: 67, 70, 77, 110). In addition, boats and vessels produced by **Motomarine Shipyards** (Greece), **Hellenic Shipyards** (Greece), **Israel Shipyards**, and **Lürssen Gruppe** (Germany), actors of the maritime security industry, were deployed to Operation Poseidon by Member States (Akkerman, 2019).

An international shipyard group headquartered in the Netherlands, **Damen Shipyards**, one of the important players of the global maritime security industry, is another beneficiary of the maritime border management in the Aegean sea. The Obzor border ship used by Frontex in the Operation Poseidon is known to have been produced by **Damen** (BNR, 2017; Damen, 2022). Following the 2015 crisis, according to the crisis response program adopted by the EU in 2016 to strengthen the capacity of the Turkish Coast Guard, within the scope of the "*Strengthening the Operational*


Capacities of the Turkish Coast Guard” project implemented by IOM, 6 search and rescue vessels were purchased from **Damen Shipyard** for €20 million (IOM, 2017a). €20 million paid for this project, out of €3 billion transferred by EU to assist Syrian refugees in Turkey (from FRIT fund), was paid to **Damen** via **IOM** as it could not be given directly to a company or Turkey, in accordance with the EU-Turkey Statement (European Commission, 2022c). Then, in 2019, 9 more vessels were ordered, again paid by the EU (IOM, 2020c).

The budget of the Turkish Coast Guard Command, affiliated to the Ministry of Interior responsible for ensuring the security of Turkey's territorial waters, between the years 2015-2022 increased from 506 million to 1.9 billion lira, an increase of approximately 300% ²⁹ (Graph 5). One of the projects carried out by Turkish Coast Guard within the scope of maritime border management in the Aegean Sea is the Coastal Surveillance Radar System (CSRS). Within the scope of the CSRS project, which was initiated in 2017, it was envisaged to prevent irregular migration, ensure maritime security, prevent smuggling, and prevent crime by detecting it before it happens, by conducting risk analyzes with the data received from public institutions (Sahil Güvenlik Komutanlığı, 2020: 25). In 2017, the Presidency of Defense Industries, affiliated to the Presidency of the Republic, and **Aselsan** signed a contract for the CSRS project to be delivered to the Coast Guard Command. According to the report of the Ministry of Interior in 2019, the total cost of the project is 140 million lira (İçişleri Bakanlığı, 2019: 54). For the project, **Aselsan** has established a business partnership with **Havelsan** and a €37.5 million subcontract has been signed with the prime contractor **STM** (KAP, 2017b). According to the contract, radar systems were produced by **Aselsan**, software components were produced by **Havelsan**, and the implementation of the project was undertaken by **STM**. In the first phase of the project, which was completed in 2020, 11 coastal surveillance stations established on the Western border


²⁹ At the same time, it should be emphasized that the total budget of the Ministry of Interior and the budget of 5 institutions affiliated to the Ministry increased by 300% between the years 2015-2022. While it was 29 billion liras in 2015, it became 117 billion liras with an increase of 300% in the last 7 years. All 5 institutions with increased budgets are institutions that deal directly or indirectly with irregular migration and migrants: Gendarmerie General Command, General Directorate of Security, Coast Guard Command, General Directorate of Migration Management, and Disaster and Emergency Directorate (Evrensel, 2021).

and the entire coastline of the Aegean Sea were taken under surveillance. In the second phase of the project, it is envisaged that all seas will be equipped with a radar system by establishing stations in the gaps in the Mediterranean and Black Sea. Finally for Turkey's maritime management, in the second phase of the IPA program (2014-2020), in order to enhance the capacity of Turkish Coast Guard on fighting against irregular migration, mobile radars (MORADs) worth €5.3 million were supplied by the Slovenian defense company **DAT-CON** (TED, 2022c).

Graph 5. Evolution of the Turkish Coast Guard Budget (2015-2022)
(Source: **İçişleri Bakanlığı**, 2022)



Graph 6. Evolution of the Hellenic Coast Guard Budget (2015-2022)
(Source: **Hellenic Parliament**, 2022)



The annual budget of the Hellenic Coast Guard affiliated to the Ministry of Shipping and Island Policy, which is responsible for ensuring the security of Greek territorial waters, remained at more or less the same level even in emergency years,

unlike the Turkish Coast Guard: while approximately €318 million budget was allocated in 2015, it is foreseen to allocate €328 million in 2022 (Graph 6) (Hellenic Parliament, 2022). One of the most important reasons for this is the austerity policy of the Greek government, and the other is that the more active actor here is Frontex, since the Greek territorial waters are the external border of the EU. **Miltech Hellas** company provided three thermal camera systems purchased by the Ministry of Shipping and Island Policy in 2018 to be deployed on offshore vessels of the Hellenic Coast Guard for €2.85 million (TED, 2021g). 75% of the financing of this supply was covered by the EU co-financing in the ISF fund and 25% from domestic resources. The purpose of the contract is defined as strengthening of operational capacity and efficiency of offshore ships, with the ultimate goal of effective surveillance of external borders, better management of migration flows and increased security in the maritime area. Two different Italian companies **FB Design SRL** and **Elettronica Marittima SRL** won the tender of 10 patrol boats and 13 high-speed boats in 2020, opened by the Ministry of Shipping and Island Policy, which purchased the maritime systems and vehicles allocated for Hellenic Coast Guard use, for €33.8 million (TED, 2022d). **FB Design SRL** also supplied €3.2 million worth of custom surveillance boats for the Turkish Coast Guard in 2018 (TED, 2022b).

Frontex has cooperated with many private security and defense companies within the scope of migration management in the Aegean Sea. For example, with two tenders held in 2019, Frontex purchased surveillance aerostats to be used on Greek coasts, while Ministry of Shipping and Island Policy purchased three coastal patrol boats to deploy to Frontex. Accordingly, Frontex's maritime surveillance aerostat tender was awarded to the German company **Innovative Navigation GmbH** for €481.000 (TED, 2021h), while the Greek Ministry of Shipping and Island Policy's three surveillance boats tender was awarded to the Italian company **Cantiere Navale Vittoria S.P.A.** for €41.6 million (TED, 2021i). In 2019, one more boat was added to the contract, increasing the total cost of the tender to €55.5 million (TED, 2021j). One of the other equipment Frontex bought by interacting with defense and security companies for use in the Aegean region is Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems for maritime aerial surveillance. Accordingly, in 2020, **Airbus** (Airbus subcontracted to **Israel Aerospace Industries**) and **Elbit**

Systems (Israel) supplied aircraft systems to Frontex for a total of €50 million (TED, 2021k). In 2021, the German company **Innovative Navigation GmbH** and the French company **CNIM Air Space** won the tender initiated by Frontex for the rental of two surveillance aerostats to be used in Greece for €3 million. (TED, 2021m).

The land and maritime border management carried out in the Aegean region after the 2015 migrant crisis shows how many actors can come together in a very limited time and geography. Policy makers try to ensure their political and economic stability by turning their own country into an armored, technological, and digital fortress. While doing this, private security, defense, and technology companies, which can be involved in public policies thanks to the emerging migration industry, continue their existence by making financial gains from this. Although land and maritime borders are mainly emphasized within the scope of the political economy of migration management in the Aegean region, the existence of virtual and digital borders should not be ignored. The rapid development of border surveillance systems (such as Eurosor or Entry/Exit systems) with digital accessories mounted on equipment at land and maritime borders and digital systems installed at borders is also included in the border management in the Aegean region. Therefore, the existence of more political economic relations and more financial cycles should be considered.


It is understood from the intensity of the tenders and the size of the amounts that border management and border security industry have become increasingly important in the Aegean region after 2015. Almost all of the purchases and tenders in the context of border management took place after the emergency years. After the EU-Turkey Statement, with the slowdown of large migration flows, Turkey and Greece accelerated the downward outsourcing of their responsibilities of providing border security to private companies. On the other hand, the EU has outwardly burdened its responsibility of providing Eastern border's security on Turkey with funding the border strengthening projects. Projects funded by the EU to develop Turkey's Western borders are also examples of externalization of border management. It should be noted that the border management policies mentioned in this section are the high-priced ones carried out only in the Aegean region, namely on the Western border of Turkey and in Greece.

Considering all the land and maritime border management implementations of the two countries, it should not be forgotten that there is a realm where numerous public and private actors come together by spending significant money. However, even just looking at the Aegean region, it is seen that a new and strong public-private partnership of control and surveillance has developed on the Western borders of Turkey and the Eastern maritime borders of the EU.

2.4.2. Political Economy of the Externalization of Migration Management in the Aegean Region

The Aegean region is one of the regions where the effects of the EU's externalization of migration management are most clearly seen. The EU spends a significant amount of money on the management of its external borders to combat irregular migration. The asylum, migration and integration policies of the European Union are subject to Migration and Home Affairs within the scope of migration management and the European Commission funds asylum, migration and integration projects. Accordingly, a budget of €7.5 billion was allocated within the scope of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) in 2014-2020, according to 7-year periods. In the 2021-2027 period, it is foreseen to allocate €9.8 billion (European Commission, 2022d). According to the allocations by years, while the budget allocated in 2014 was €230 million, the amount allocated in the years after the 2015 crisis was generally €1 billion (European Commission, 2021e: 7), and it is predicted to approach €2 billion annually until 2027 (Graph 7). The total migration management fund is €11.1 billion, with €1.2 billion projected to be transferred to migration and asylum-related European agencies (decentralised agencies). Policy implementations within the scope of AMIF are to support regular migration and integration of third-country nationals, to combat irregular migration and to ensure the return and readmission processes of third-country nationals, to strengthen responsibility sharing and solidarity among Member States, and finally, to strengthen the common European asylum system, including its external dimension.

Graph 7. EU, Allocated Budget to Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund in 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 (€ million)
(Source: European Commission, 2021e; European Commission, 2022d)




Funds allocated to migration management in the EU are not divided into internal and external dimensions. Although the European Commission is talking about expanding the scope of migration-related funds to the external dimension, no definite decision has been taken. Although it is not possible to say the exact amount of the funds allocated to migration by the Member States and the European Commission, since the fund that is planned to be allocated to external migration management is discussed in the European Parliament, it is possible to make a calculation based on these discussions. External dimension of migration management is fed by three funds as discussed in the European Parliament: Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF), and Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). NDICI is the main instrument for the European Union's external actions in every field, so migration management collaborations with third countries are also supported within the scope of this fund. Accordingly, it is recommended that 5% of AMIF, 2% of IBMF, and 10% of NDICI may be used for the external dimension of migration management (European Parliament, 2019: 58; European Comission, 2021f: 3). According to the budgets set in the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework, 5% of AMIF's €9.8 billion budget is €490 million, 2% of IBMF's €6.2 billion budget is €124 million and 10% of NDICI's €79 million budget is €7.9 billion (European Commission, 2022b). The sum of the

external dimension accounts of migration management is €8.5 billion. In addition to these, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance fund was also used in the Turkey case. As a third country, Turkey received €234 million EU contribution for 25 migration-related projects carried out between 2002-2020 (during IPA-I and IPA-II periods) and costing €267 million in total (İçişleri Bakanlığı, 2021b: 1). The EU has allocated €14 billion to seven current beneficiaries³⁰ for the 2021-2027 IPA-III period (European Commission, 2022b). Country-based resources will not be allocated like the previous period IPA funds, instead, grants will be distributed according to the suitability of projects produced with a performance-based approach. Within the thematic frameworks determined for Turkey in the IPA-III period, there are the themes of "migration and border management" and "border and cross-border cooperation" (İçişleri Bakanlığı, 2021b: 6-7).

The fact that the EU carried out migration and asylum policies together with development aid or economic cooperation established with migrant-sending countries with the aim of externalizing migration controls dates back to 1987. In 2002, the European Council in Seville urged about readmission agreements, strict border controls became a principle in the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargement processes, and the externalization policy was strengthened with neighborhood policies and the first safe country rule in the 2013 Dublin III Regulation. The idea of detaining migrants in off-shore reception centers before reaching the EU mainland was supported by Germany, Italy, and the UK in the early 2000s, but it was never officially implemented because it did not coincide with the humanitarian and democratic values of the EU (Triandafyllidou, 2014: 9). Prior to the 2015 migrant crisis, emphasis was placed mainly on strengthening border controls on the islands of the Southern and Eastern coasts of the EU, namely the Canary Islands, Lampedusa and Linosa, Malta and the Greek Islands. However, after the 2015 crisis, the externalization of border controls was accompanied by the externalization of detention centers both in third countries and within the borders of the EU.

³⁰ Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey.

The externalization of migration management in third countries has become a powerful policy tool in the hands of migrant-receiving countries. The example in the Aegean region of keeping migrants out of EU territory in exchange for money was documented in 2016 by the EU-Turkey Statement. According to the EU-Turkey Statement, returning immigrants who entered the Greek islands to Turkey (art.1), allocating €6 billion for the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (art.6), and improving humanitarian conditions in areas within Syria near the Turkish border (art.9) is an indicator of the effort to move the responsibility of migration management outside the EU borders. However, it is not enough to limit the externalization of migration management in the Aegean region to Turkey alone. Since the beginning of the 2015 crisis, migrants have been contained in the shield of the Union, on the Greek islands. The hotspots, which were established in 2015 and are open reception and identification centers, turned into closed detention centers together with the EU-Turkey Statement to prevent asylum seekers from going to the mainland. The replacement of the hotspot approach by "Closed Controlled Access Centers (CCACs)" as of 2020 has documented the existence of a containment crisis in the Greek islands within the EU borders (Map 4, Source: made on Google Maps). Therefore, although the Greek islands are included in the borders of the EU, when viewed geographically, the islands are located as an area where migration management is externalized with their isolated structure from the EU mainland. The EU's allocation of funds to reception and identification centers in the Greek islands also shows that migration management is externalized within the Union. In this context, in this second part of the case study, it will be discussed how the Greek islands turned into a containment area with EU funds after the 2015 migrant crisis, and how Turkey as a third country detains migrants in its country by creating opportunities for them with EU funds. The main beneficiaries of the funds transferred to both Greek Islands and Turkey are ministries, UN agencies, NGOs, and public institutions. EU funds were the main reason why all these actors came together in the Aegean region after 2015. Therefore, while the political economy of the externalization of migration management in the Aegean region after 2015 crisis was presented, EU funds, the European Union's online tender database, and Turkey's online tender database were consulted.



Map 4. Centers on the Greek Islands. From North to South: Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros, Kos
 (Source: Author's own search on Google Maps)

- Externalization of Migration in the Greek Islands:

Externalization of migration has more than one facet. It covers a wide range area from the externalization of border controls and asylum policies to the projecting of integration policies in third countries. With the arrival of large numbers of irregular migrants to the Greek islands and the Greek mainland in 2015, first reception assistance capacity was increased and new facilities were built or existing facilities were expanded to accommodate these migrants. While the shelter/accommodation type in the Greek mainland is expressed as “Facility”, the shelter/accommodation type in the Greek islands is defined as “Hotspot” or “Reception and Identification Center (RIC)”, which will be transformed into CCAC with the decision taken in 2020. In this section, the

funds transferred by the EU to national authorities, international organizations and NGOs for the provision of first reception assistance and for the establishment of hotspots/RICs and CCACs in the Greek islands, as a means of externalizing migration intensively after the 2015 crisis, will be examined.

After the 2015 migrant crisis, Greece has benefited from €3.39 billion support of the EU, according to January 2022 data, in order to better manage migration and borders (European Commission, 2022a). This support comes from three funds: €2.27 billion from the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), €450 million from the Internal Security Fund (ISF), and €668 million from the Emergency Support Instrument (ESI). These funds have been used by Greek authorities, international organizations, and NGOs in various fields from border management to asylum policies, from reception centers to integration. In this part of the study, since it is not possible to examine all the funds allocated for the management of the crisis in Greece one by one, the funds allocated for the hotspots established in the Greek islands since 2015 will be examined. In this context, it would not be wrong to claim that the detention layer in the EU expanded with the Greek islands after the 2015 migrant crisis. Between 2015-2021, it is possible to examine the containment and externalization of migration and its political economy in the Greek Islands in 3 periods: (1) before EU-Turkey Statement, (2) after EU-Turkey Statement, and (3) running of closed and controlled centers.

The period before the EU-Turkey Statement covers the time from the summer of 2015 to March 2016. In this period, when the Greek government was unprepared for the irregular migration flows arriving in the Greek islands and demanded the support of the EU, it made a commitment to establish the hotspot approach adopted by the EU, as aforementioned in the sub-section 2.3.2.1. €4.13 million was awarded to **UNHCR** in July and August 2015 to deal with the first reception of irregular migrants arriving on the Greek islands until the hotspots are established (European Commission, 2022a). As the number of migrants arriving in the islands steadily increased, the EU's hotspot approach was put into practice and five hotspots were established by the Hellenic army: in Lesvos in October 2015, in Chios in February 2016, in Samos and Leros in March 2016, and finally in Kos in June 2016. The Greek Reception and Identification Service

is responsible for the management of the hotspots and major services are provided by the state authority: security by the Hellenic police, food, tents, infrastructure, and repairs by the army, and health services by the Hellenic Center for Disease Control and Prevention. In order to provide shelter and accommodation, catering, healthcare, and transportation services in hotspots, €6.6 million was awarded to the **Hellenic Ministry of Defence** in March 2016 from ISF.³¹ Following this award, 4 months later, €10.07 million of funds from ISF continued to be transferred to the **Ministry of Defense** under the same purpose. As a result, a total of €16.67 million funds were delivered to the **Hellenic army** for the provision of first reception assistance at a time when hotspots are heavily established in the Greek islands and an immediate response to the migrant crisis is most needed (Under the same purpose, €76 million was allocated to the army for the temporary open accommodation facilities in mainland). The idea of the army to establish hotspots and expand the existing reception facilities was unexpected for Greece. The army established the hotspots in a short time like 10 days, but the establishment of hotspots and the provision of services in the hotspots were excluded from all regular procedures, that is, open tenders. The army carried out these implementations through subcontractors in its own network (Dimitriadi and Sarantaki, 2019: 18-19; FRA, 2019: 28; European Commission, 2016c: 2). As a result, it does not seem possible to go further in this part, since the subcontractors with which the army cooperates are not known, apart from the amount of funds allocated to the army by the EU.

A delegation agreement was signed in December 2015 between the European Commission and UNHCR, which is planned to assist the Greek authorities in establishing and managing the hotspots. Under the delegation agreement, the necessary funding will be provided to UNHCR by the European Commission, and in return, UNHCR will support the development of Greece's hotspots, relocation scheme, and reception capacity, cooperate with the Commission, EASO, Frontex, and IOM, and provide infrastructure support to the Greek government for the establishment of hotspots in Lesvos, Samos, Leros, Chios, and Kos (European Commission, 2015c). In

³¹ Unless otherwise stated in this section, the reference of all mentioned ISF, AMIF, and ESI amounts is “European Commission, 2022a” source.

this context, in accordance with the delegation agreement, a total of €80 million was awarded to **UNHCR**, €75 million from AMIF and €5 million from ISF. Finally, in this period in order to strengthen the administrative capacity of the Greek authorities, the EU awarded €4.5 million to the **Reception and Identification Service**, €3.3 million to the **Ministry of Public Health** to respond to the public health challenges in the eastern Aegean Sea, and €1.12 million to the **EASO** to strengthen the fingerprinting capacity of the hotspots.

Until the EU-Turkey Statement, the mechanism of operation in hotspots was intended to be the identification and registration of new arrivals, but in a short time, hotspots turned into a temporary accommodation center where new arrivals were waiting for registration. Emergency Support Instrument (ESI) was activated on March 16, 2016 and EU-Turkey Statement was adopted on March 18, 2016 in order to eliminate overcrowding and slow procedural processes in hotspots, to put the relocation scheme into effect quickly, and to stop incoming migration flows from Turkey. Thus, the European Union's externalization of migration on the Greek islands entered its second period. The activation of ESI opened a new era in EU humanitarian aid because both ESI was activated for the first time and ESI was mobilized for a country within the Union under the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), which provides humanitarian aid only for non-EU countries (Dittmer and Lorenz, 2021: 4). In the case of internal crisis in the Union, AMIF or ISF should have been sufficient, but these funds could not respond to the humanitarian crisis in Greece and especially in the Greek islands, as they were based on the administrative and operational capacities of the Member States and on their voluntary offers. Therefore, the fund activated by the European Council upon the request of the European Commission was used for the first time in the Union for a Member State of the Union for humanitarian aid. On the other hand, EU-Turkey Statement, which was adopted two days after ESI, caused the hotspots on the Greek islands to turn into closed detention centers. It could be argued that the simultaneous adoption of the Statement and ESI was a deliberate step rather than a coincidence. It would not be wrong to say that ESI was activated in order to prevent the living conditions in hotspots from getting worse after knowing that the burden of hotspots would increase with the Statement, as migrants are prevented from going to the

mainland. Within the scope of ESI, 29 projects carried out over 3 years were funded for €644.8 million. ESI has been used by being allocated to international NGOs and UN agencies and 18 framework partners awarded ESI funding are: **Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund, Care, Red Cross, Danish Refugee Council, International Federation of Red Cross, IOM, International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, Medecins du Monde Belgique, Medecins du Monde Greece, Metadrasi, Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam, Save the Children, Terre des Hommes, The Smile of the Child, UNHCR, and UNICEF** (European Commission, 2018: 29). Covering shelter, food and non-food items, protection, healthcare, education, and hygiene sectors, UN agencies received 73% of the ESI fund, while 15 organizations received 27%. Of the 29 projects implemented under the ESI, 11 were designed to include hotspots on the Greek islands, so these funds were used both on the mainland and on the islands. To cite a few of these, in August 2016, the **Norwegian Refugee Council** (NRC) was awarded €16.4 million from the ESI fund to provide food aid, non-formal education, and shelter assistance and a part of this fund was used on the island of Chios, where NRC's was the operational leader from the start of the crisis until July 2017. In this process, NRC supported 35.000 migrants in Chios RIC, supplied 3.000 hot meals a day, and provided non-formal education to 300 children and youth on the island (NRC, 2018). **Oxfam** has worked on the island of Lesvos since 2015 and provided clean water, sanitation, food and non-food items to migrants in Lesvos RIC, with part of the €13.5 million granted from the ESI fund in 2016 (Oxfam, 2021). **The Danish Refugee Council**, like Oxfam, used the €14.7 million fund awarded by ESI to respond to the humanitarian emergency on the island of Lesvos. (DRC, 2022). Under the ESI fund, **UNHCR** provided humanitarian aid (€62 million), implemented the ESTIA program from the islands to the mainland (€167 million), the cash assistance program on the islands and the mainland (€42 million), and the rehabilitation of centers on the islands of Chios and Lesvos (€3 million). In this second period of the externalization, projects for the Greek islands continued to be funded from AMIF and ISF. €10 million from ISF for the provision of services to third-country nationals in the external borders, €3 million from AMIF for the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, €530.000 from ISF for infrastructural construction on the island of Samos, €7 million from ISF for provision of security services of hotspots in the Aegean Islands

were allocated to the **Hellenic Republic Ministry of Interior**. The fund, which was allocated to the **Hellenic army** in 2016 to provide shelter, accommodation and catering services, was expanded to 2017 and awarded an additional €7 million.

The second period of externalization of migration in the Greek islands is also characterized by private companies subcontracted by tenders. While migration was externalized in the Greek islands, the security was also privatized at the same time. In 2017, **EASO** contracted **G4S Technical Security Services**, one of the largest global security company, for €7 million in Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Kos, Leros, Athens, Thessaloniki, and Alexandroupoli for surveillance and patrolling (TED, 2022e). In the same year, two consortium and one company undertook the tender opened by EASO for the supply of containers and furniture to hotspots in Greece for a total of €13.75 million: **Eurotrade S.A.** (Greek modular building manufacturer), Czech consortium of **KOMA Modular s.r.o** (modular building manufacturer) and **Profil Nábytek a.s.** (furniture manufacturer), Greek consortium of **KMS Buildings A.E.** (container manufacturer) and **Promitheftiki Metalon Crete S.A.** (steel manufacturer) (TED, 2022f). Some of the tenders, which are also opened by EASO and subcontracted to private companies, for the supply of services to provide suitable living conditions are as follows: in 2018 for cleaning service in hotspots, **Manifest Services SA** for €626.000 (TED, 2022g), for information and communication technology service in 2017, **Cosmos Business System SA** for €1.06 million (TED, 2022h), and in 2018, four human resources management companies were awarded a total of €43 million tender in order to supply interim staff due to staff shortages: **Atlas HR, HCL Management, Help — Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe, and Randstat** (TED, 2022j).

Since its establishment in 2015, hotspots on the Greek islands have been criticized for overcrowding, lack of hygiene, incapacity of food and health care services, and inadequate living conditions. Hotspots were designed considering that the migrants on the islands would stay here for a short time. Instead, migrants, and especially minors, were detained for longer than expected. Therefore, poor food quality and long times in food queues, discrimination between different nationalities, the fact that the security services were located outside the camps and did not intervene in the insecure situations

inside the camp, inter-ethnic tensions and sexual harassment eventually led to riots, violence, and fires in the camps. The biggest fire was at Moria hotspot in Lesvos island in September 2020. 13.000 migrants were left without shelter in one night (BBC, 2020). In addition to the fact that living conditions have never been improved over the past 5 years, the COVID-19 pandemic has also left migrants much more vulnerable in overcrowded hotspots in 2020, with inadequate hygiene and healthcare provision. As a result, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the European Commission, EASO, Frontex, Europol, FRA and the Hellenic government based on all these reasons (European Commission, 2020c). Accordingly, new Multi-Purpose Reception and Identification Centers would replace the hotspots in the Greek islands. The European Commission allocated €276 million from AMIF and the Emergency Assistance Fund for the establishment of 5 centers, which later became Closed Controlled Access Centers (CCAC), on the islands of Samos, Leros, Kos, Chios and Lesvos. Thus, the third period of externalization of migration in the Greek islands began.




Photo 1. Closed Controlled Access Centers in Samos, Leros, and Kos.
(Source: Hellenic Ministry of Migration and Asylum, 2021)

Construction of CCACs in Samos, Leros, and Kos after an international open tender process was undertaken in 2020 by the construction, industrial and energy company **Mytilineos SA**, headquartered in Greece (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Migration and

Asylum, 2021). With a total capacity of 7.280 people, the budgets of the three centers from AMIF and the Emergency Assistance Fund are for Samos €43 million, for Leros €35 million, and for Kos €40 million. CCAC in Samos island opened in September 2021, the ones in Leros and Kos islands opened in November 2021. CCACs in Lesvos and Chios islands are under construction as of 2022. The security of the centers is provided by the **Hellenic police** and **G4S** (Al Jazeera, 2021). Under the management of Ministry of Migration and Asylum, all centers are surrounded by a NATO-type security fence, entrances and exits are equipped with identity, fingerprint, and x-rays control systems, and the entire center is equipped with a closed surveillance system. In short, centers have been securitized at least as much as a prison. As can be seen from the photographs, the centers were established in the middle of nowhere isolated from the local communities on the islands (Photo 1, Hellenic Ministry of Migration and Asylum, 2021). The Hellenic Ministry of Migration and Asylum states that the CCACs will meet the decent living conditions of the resident population with adequate infrastructure and safe accommodation, and will fulfill the reception and identification procedures appropriately. And Greek Migration Minister Notis Mitarachi declared that "*we have created a modern and safe new closed, controlled access center ... that will give back the lost dignity to people seeking international protection*" (DW, 2021b). However, the fact that these centers are equipped with all physical and social facilities (event spaces, employment spaces, sanitary facilities, playgrounds etc.) does not overshadow the fact that migrants placed here are kept in a closed prison. The establishment and operation of these centers have been criticized by many non-governmental and human rights organizations, and it has been stated that the EU funds are misused and the rights of migrants are abused (Amnesty International, 2021). In September 2021, 45 NGOs and civil society organizations published a joint policy briefing to urged EU and Greek government to abandon policies that contain migrants (DRC, 2021). Finally, in the third period of the externalization of migration management in the Greek Islands, the EU ensured that all migrants on the islands were contained at specific points and under superior security measures, with a compact structure. After these centers became permanently functional, the Greek islands have now become a containment geography where the EU externalizes its migration management in a territory of a Member State within the Union.


- Externalization of Migration in Turkey:

Before the 2015 migrant crisis, the European Union's externalization of migration in Turkey was dependent on more standardized instruments such as aligning migration and asylum policies with the EU acquis or readmission agreement. However, the introduction of the 2015 Joint Action Plan, the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, and the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey after the 2015 migrant crisis took the instruments of this externalization to a different dimension. According to the EU-Turkey Statement, in return for the revival of candidate Member negotiations and promised €6 billion, Turkey's commitment to keep Syrian migrants within Turkey, unlike previous externalization instruments, revealed the political, legal, and international aspects of the Statement (Gökalp, 2020: 29). In this part of the study, the externalization of migration in Turkey will be examined by highlighting the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey through the funds transferred by the EU to civil society and non-governmental organizations in Turkey after the 2015 migrant crisis.

According to Article 6 of the EU-Turkey Statement, the EU has committed to Turkey a fund of €6 billion divided into two equal parts in two terms.³² According to the decision taken by the Member States of the European Commission in November 2015, the first tranche to be transferred in 2016-2017, €3 billion, consisted of €500 million from the EU budget and €2.5 billion from the individual budgets of the Member States. Accordingly, in line with the calculations made according to the gross national incomes of the Member States, the states with the highest allocation were Germany €534 million, (ex-Member State) the UK €409 million, France €386 million, Italy €281 million, and Spain €191 million (European Commission, 2015d: 9). The second tranche to be transferred in 2018-2019, €3 billion, consisted of €1 billion from the EU budget

³² Article 6 of the Statement: "The EU, in close cooperation with Turkey, will further speed up the disbursement of the initially allocated 3 billion euros under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and ensure funding of further projects for persons under temporary protection identified with swift input from Turkey before the end of March. A first list of concrete projects for refugees, notably in the field of health, education, infrastructure, food and other living costs, that can be swiftly financed from the Facility, will be jointly identified within a week. Once these resources are about to be used to the full, and provided the above commitments are met, the EU will mobilize additional funding for the Facility of an additional 3 billion euro up to the end of 2018."

and €2 billion from the individual budgets of the Member States. In 2021, it has been decided to provide another €3 billion additional refugee support to Turkey. €6 billion of the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT) fund was designed by highlighting six priority areas within the scope of humanitarian and development assistance, taking into account the needs of Syrians under temporary protection and the host government of Turkey: health, education, humanitarian assistance, socio-economic support, municipal infrastructure, and migration management. The financing instruments used for the implementation of projects financed by FRIT are ECHO, IPA, IcSP (Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace), and the EUTF (EU Regional Trust Fund for Syrian Refugees) (European Commission, 2021g: 9-14). In this context, project financing instruments worked with various NGOs, UN agencies, international institutions, national agencies, and host government for the implementation of the projects in Turkey, and the funds were transferred to these channels. Looking at the priority areas in the Graph 8, the distribution of the 112³³ projects that were contracted and committed according to January 2022 data is as follows:



³³ There are 120 projects in the FRIT list, but since 8 of them are the administrative and technical expenses of financing instruments, these projects were excluded.

€6 billion committed within the scope of FRIT is not sent directly to Turkish government, but in return for the project. Since 2016, it has been divided into projects produced in the above-mentioned areas, and in December 2020, the contracting process of all €6 billion was completed. In the FRIT-I period of 2016-2017, €1.4 billion of the €3 billion contracted was allocated to humanitarian assistance, and €1.6 billion to development assistance (European Commission, 2022e). The biggest beneficiary of the first term fund is **UN agencies** with €1.4 billion, followed by **Turkish ministries** with €660 million and the **World Bank** with €205 million.³⁴ The remaining €718 million was shared among the projects to be implemented by NGOs and public institutions.³⁵ In the FRIT-II period of 2018-2019, €1 billion of €3 billion contracted were allocated to humanitarian assistance, and €2 billion to development assistance. The biggest beneficiary of the second term fund is **Turkish ministries** with €875 million, followed by **IFRC (the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Kızılay in Turkey)** with €500 million, **UN agencies** with €480 million, and the **World Bank** with €392 million. The remaining €753 million was shared between NGOs and public institutions.

Among the six priority areas, many flagship projects become prominent, for which a significant portion of the FRIT funding is allocated. Examples of projects carried out in the fields of basic needs, health, education, and social-economic support will be given respectively. Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), as the broadest humanitarian program ever funded by the EU, is a social aid program that offers multi-purpose cash assistance so that migrants can meet their daily basic needs such as rent, food, medicine, bills. While ESSN was implemented by the **UN agency World Food Program (WFP)** for a total of €998 million in the FRIT-I period, during the FRIT-II period, it was implemented by **WFP, IFRC, and Turkish Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services** (Ministry implemented **C-ESSN project**, complementary ESSN for the most vulnerable migrants) for a total of €1.1 billion. Within the project, according to February 2022 data, 1.5 million migrants living in Turkey reached with cash assistance

³⁴ Unless otherwise stated in this section, the reference of all mentioned FRIT amounts is “European Commission, 2022e” source.

³⁵ Public institutions are Agence Française de Développement, Expertise France, Council of Europe Development Bank, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German Development Bank).

according to selection criteria such as single female, single parents, elderly people, disable people (IFRC, 2022). The most comprehensive program for the health care of Syrian migrants in Turkey, the SIHHAT project (Sıhhat means health in Arabic), implemented by the **Turkish Ministry of Health**, aimed to improve the health status of Syrians under temporary protection by being funded in both FRIT periods for a total of €510 million. With the 177 Migrant Health Centers established within the scope of the project, it is aimed to deliver primary and secondary health care services to all Syrian migrants in Turkey. In the field of education, “Project of Promoting Integration of Syrian Kids into the Turkish Education System (PIKTES)” was introduced in 26 provinces to support more than 1 million school-age Syrian children. In this context, **Turkish Ministry of National Education (MoNE)** was supported with a total of €700 million in both FRIT periods. On the other hand, the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) project, which has been implemented in Turkey by **UNICEF** since 2003, has been supported by a €154 million FRIT fund since 2017, including Syrian children under temporary protection. Another actors implementing projects in the field of education, the **World Bank** aimed to build schools and strengthen existing schools with €150 million, and **Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW, German Development Bank)** received €355 million from FRIT for its project “Education for all in times of crisis” in order to build new schools, equip them and provide technical support. Finally, within the scope of the projects carried out in the field of socio-economic support, the projects of the World Bank and KfW again come to the fore. From the FRIT fund, the **World Bank** received a total of €307 million contracts in both periods, while **KfW** awarded €200 million contracts. While the **World Bank** aimed to support Syrian refugees in Turkey in fields such as agriculture employment, transition to formal employment, and social entrepreneurship, **KfW** developed two projects to carry out vocational education programs.

The projects exemplified so far are among the 112 projects that received the highest share from the FRIT fund. FRIT funds all projects to improve the living conditions of Syrian migrants under temporary protection in Turkey in certain priority areas. Some of these projects will be completed by 2025. Projects with lower budgets were mostly carried out by international NGOs. For example, in the field of basic needs, **CARE** has

implemented projects worth €4.5 million, **Deutsche Welthungerhilfe** €2.6 million and **Mercy Corps** €3 million. In the field of health, **Medecins du Monde** has carried out 4 projects for a total of €19 million, **Relief International** has carried out 5 projects for a total of €20 million, and the **World Health Organization** has carried out 3 projects for a total of €23 million. In the field of education, **Concern Worldwide** carried out 2 projects worth €20 million, while in the field of socio-economic support, the **Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey** supported the integration of Syrian migrants under temporary protection into the Turkish economy for €15 million. It should also be noted that UN agencies, NGOs, and international institutions such as the World Bank or KfW, which signed the project contract by granting funds from FRIT, generally carried out their projects with the implementing partnership of the ministries in Turkey. For example, although WFP has signed the contract for the ESSN project, implementing partners are Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services, Presidency of Migration Management, Directorate General of Population and Citizenship Affairs, and Halkbank (Kızılay, 2019: 3) or Ministry of Health, the implementing partner of the €11.5 million project carried out by the WHO for Syrian refugees to access equitable health services (Delegation of the EU to Turkey, 2020a). Therefore, it should be taken into account that there is a much more complex network of economic relationships for each project regarding the transfer of FRIT funds.

Another aspect of this complex economic relationship network is the subcontracting of funds transferred from FRIT to Turkish ministries to private companies through tenders. In this context, vocational education, PIKTES, and SIHHAT projects can be given as examples of subcontracted projects. MoNE is the implementing partner of KfW's vocational education project (Delegation of the EU to Turkey, 2020b). In 2018, MoNE awarded a contract to a consultancy company that will support the ministry for the implementation of the project, and the consortium of two consultancy services companies, **GFA Consulting Group GmbH** (based in Germany) **in consortium with ANKON Danışmanlık Hizmetleri A.S** (based in Turkey), won the tender for €2.1 million (TED, 2022k). Within the scope of the PIKTES project, MoNE has opened 36 tenders through EKAP (Electronic Public Procurement Platform of Turkey) since 2018 in the fields of the transportation and catering of Syrian students, cleaning the schools,

installing computer laboratories and libraries in schools. As of 2022, there are ongoing tenders. To give a few examples, in 2021 **Piezo Enerji** company won the tender for the establishment of computer laboratories and infrastructure of 73 schools in Ankara for 1.8 million liras (EKAP, 2021a). The tender for the printing and distribution of 38.822 book sets for the orientation classes of Syrian students was awarded to the digital printing company, **Cem Web Ofset San. Tic. A.S.**, for 2.6 million liras (EKAP, 2021b). Finally, in 2021 the tender opened by MoNE for the provision of security services to schools in 26 provinces where the PIKTES project is ongoing, was awarded to **Bengi Grup Özel Güvenlik Hizmetleri A.S.**, the leading private security company based in Turkey, for 61.9 million liras (EKAP, 2021c). Within the scope of the flagship health project SIHHAT, which is carried out to improve the health care of Syrian migrants in Turkey, 37 tenders have been opened by the Ministry of Health since 2017. As of 2022, there are ongoing tenders. The tenders were opened in various fields from the supply of medicines, supplements, vaccines to staff training and equipping Migrant Health Centers with furniture and devices. In 2018, **WEglobal Danışmanlık A.S.**, a consultancy company based in Ankara, won the tender opened by the Ministry for €2.4 million for the training of health workers (SIHHAT, 2018). Within the scope of the project, 50 public mental health center staff, 960 bilingual patient guides and 2.520 health staff were trained in 2019-2020 (WEglobal, 2021). In 2020, the tender opened by the Ministry for the supply of 430 ambulances for emergency health services was awarded to two partner companies based in Ankara, **AC Arge Endüstriyel Üretim Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S.** and **İntaş Taahhüt Yapı Sanayi Ticaret A.S.**, with a total of €27.4 million (SIHHAT, 2020). Another example is the tender opened by the Ministry in four lots for personal protective equipment and consumables at the end of 2021. Accordingly, in order to provide the necessary equipment, **Gelecek Medikal** company won two lots for €3.2 million in total and the other two lots were awarded to **Zenda Medikal** and **Divan Medikal** consortium for €9.8 million (SIHHAT, 2021). Based on these tender examples, on the one hand, the EU outwardly outsources migration management to Turkey. As an extension of this, on the other hand, organizations and institutions implementing projects in Turkey subcontract to private companies by downwardly outsourcing the responsibility of improving the living conditions of Syrian migrants.

With the decision taken in June 2021, the EU announced that an additional €3 billion will be mobilized to Turkey in 2021-2023 as an extension of FRIT (European Commission, 2021h). Accordingly, the objectives to be pursued with the additional funding are to align Turkey's migration and asylum policies with the EU acquis, to improve the situation of newly received irregular migrations at removal centers, to support PMM's capacity to implement effective migration management policies and to promote regular migration, and to support the capacity of migration and border management agencies operating in airports.

Apart from the FRIT fund, there are other funds created to prevent irregular migrants in Turkey from crossing into the EU. The total contribution achieved by UNHCR for its operations in Turkey in 2021 is €109 million. Contributions came from the USA with €69 million and from the EU with €18 million, as well as Germany, Japan, France, Korea, Norway, and Switzerland, Google and Inditex companies (UNHCR, 2021). These contributions have been used for the improvement of 4 million migrants in Turkey, of which 3.7 million are Syrians under temporary protection, COVID-19 cash assistance, social cohesion and harmonization, and education. In addition, another fund came from the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which supports democracy and human rights through civil society projects. In 2017-2019, the *When Hope Is a Fragile Seed: Access to Health and Justice for Migrants, Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Turkey* project carried out by the **Foundation for Society and Legal Studies** in Şanlıurfa, Suruç, Mardin, Van, İstanbul, and Diyarbakır was supported with €150.000. EIDHR also supported the Side by Side project, with €300.000, carried out by the **Association of Trace in Individual and Community Mental Health** in provinces where Syrian migrant children are concentrated in Turkey. In the first period of 2017-2018, psycho-social support was provided for Syrian children, and in the second period from 2019, increasing the schooling and attendance rates of Syrian children was supported (Yanyana, 2022).

In addition to the projects for migrants in Turkey carried out by non-state actors, PMM has 66 completed and 19 ongoing projects for which it receives administrative assistance and migrant integration support within the scope of strengthening migration

management. In these projects, while the implementing actors are mostly UNHCR, IOM, ICMPD, PMM, the source of the funds is budgeted by bilateral cooperation with countries such as United Kingdom, Norway, USA, Switzerland or by the European Union through the IPA fund (PMM, 2022b). To give an example of bilateral cooperation, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the UK introduced Eastern Route (Turkey) Programme. Accordingly, under the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), it has been allocated £1.78 for 5 projects that will be implemented by IOM and ICMPD between 2019-2022 and will increase the capacities of PMM's removal centers, migration policy, and voluntary return system (CSSF, 2022). To summarize, apart from the €6 billion allocated with the FRIT fund and €3 billion to be contracted in the 2021-2023 period, smaller-scale funds and bilateral agreements also cause the migration management to be externalized in Turkey, and together with the funds allocated for the future, it may be argued that the cost of this externalization will increase exponentially every year.

The commitment of the FRIT fund to projects entered its 6th year as of 2022. To make a brief assessment of these 6 years, the fund has had positive effects on meeting the needs of Syrian migrants in many areas: with benefits such as financial support, increase in schooling rate, easy access to health services, and social cohesion, the integration processes of migrants have made them permanent rather than temporary. In addition to these positive effects, the FRIT fund has been criticized on some issues. On the one hand, the amount of financial support provided through ESSN is very low (155 lira per month as of 2022), on the other hand, this may cause vulnerable Syrian migrants in need of this support not to leave the informal sector. Moreover, it is questioned whether the supported projects reach the target accurately and effectively because most of the projects are short term and mostly for small groups and thus the big problems continue to be permanent. On the other hand, control and accountability mechanisms are not applied and hence, this lack of transparency also causes the accessibility of the funds to the target to be questioned. And ultimately, it is criticized that this fund only covers Syrian migrants, excluding migrants from other nationalities (Danış, 2021: 9).

To finalize this second chapter, which deals with the case study, it was aimed to draw the political economic framework of migration management in the Aegean region. In this context, after examining the pre-crisis period, which signaled that this ongoing humanitarian crisis in the Aegean region, the focus has been shifted to the regional migration management practices and its political economy carried out after the 2015 migrant crisis. In order to emphasize the political economic background, the border management practices on the Greek and Turkish sides and the externalization of migration by the EU in these geographies were focused. The point reached in the study shows that, with the 2015 migrant crisis, the absence of a binding international migration regime and the failure to comply with the refugee convention have important consequences. Among these consequences, migrants risk their lives by resorting to illegal means such as human smuggling or informal sector, they cannot reach decent living conditions in the destination countries, and they are deprived of living an active life for years and have to live in migrant camps. The management crisis of the state authorities, which emerged simultaneously with the humanitarian crisis of the migrants, revealed these consequences. In this process, state authorities spent their financial resources on securitizing their borders and externalizing migration in third countries away from responsibility. The budgets allocated to borders and externalization were shared with private actors, primarily NGOs, IOs, and private companies. As a result, an important migration industry has been established with downward and outward privatization relations even in a micro area such as the Aegean region, and numerous actors have come together to provide financial gain from this in order to prevent migrants from moving or to contain them.



3. GOVERNANCE OF MIGRATION MANAGEMENT IN THE AEGEAN SEA: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The theoretical and historical background of the cooperation between states and non-states actors seeking solutions to emerging problems related to global migration, which has become one of the most important global issues of the 21st century, is discussed in the first chapter of this study. In the second chapter, the framework of how this cooperation worked in the Aegean region after 2015 was tried to be drawn with a case study, which was discussed in detail. This section, which constitutes the third chapter of the study, is divided into two as analysis and discussion. First of all, in the analysis part, the Aegean region case will be analyzed within the scope of the dynamics of neoliberal globalization. For this, first of all, surveillance, containment, and financial nexus, created by economic and security concerns that reveal the migration industry in the Aegean region, will be mentioned. Secondly, the functioning of this migration industry with the important tools of neoliberal globalization will be analyzed. In the discussion section, the suggestion that the practices of the actors coming together to solve the migration issue is “governance of migration management” will be discussed within the framework of three claims, put forward at the beginning of the study, causing tension between the actors of the migration issue: sovereignty and power relations, human rights and embeddedness of migration.

3.1. Analysis of the Aegean Region within the Dynamics of Neoliberal Globalization

In order to analyze the regional migration management in the Aegean region, a cause-effect relationship will be established in this section and analysis will be made in accordance with the schematization outlined in section 2.3. In this context, the migration industry, which is revealed by the regional migration management practices in the Aegean region, draws a growing and developing graph every day when the financial data is examined. Among the main reasons for this growth are the irregular migrant population, which has to be constantly on the move as the root causes in the migrant-sending countries are ignored and therefore is an endless source of profit for the migration industry, and the state and non-state actors trying to manage this irregular

migrant population with economic and security concerns in this industry. The first step analysis part of this section reveals the reasons for the cause-effect relationship to be established: states' attempts to prevent irregular migrants due to economic and security concerns create surveillance, containment, and financial nexus between state and non-state actors. In other words, this nexus results in a migration industry. This migration industry maintains its existence thanks to the dynamics of neoliberal globalization. The second step analysis part of this section will focus on the consequences part of the cause-effect relationship to be established, namely understanding the migration industry in the Aegean region within the framework of the dynamics of neoliberal globalization, such as privatization, outsourcing, and soft law instruments.

3.1.1. Economic and Security Concerns Revealing the Migration Industry: Surveillance, Containment, and Financial Nexus

The arrival of nearly 1 million irregular migrants from Turkey to the Greek islands in the summer of 2015 affected mainly the main actors of the region, Greece and the European Union, of which Greece is a member, and Turkey within the framework of political, economic, and security concerns. The same concerns have also affected non-state actors who will play an active role in the region and participate in migration policies after states during and after 2015. This massive migration flow has resulted in the strengthening of border security and surveillance in the Aegean region with the cooperation of state and non-state actors on the one hand, and the containment of migrants by the EU in a territory outside the EU, on the other. To summarize briefly, border fences and walls, surveillance vehicles, armored vehicles, watchtowers deployed with technological equipment were provided to strengthen land border security; search and rescue vessels, high-speed boats, coastal patrol boats, coastal surveillance stations were provided and Operation Sophia by Frontex was conducted to strengthen maritime border security; finally more than €10 billion funds were allocated to Greece and Turkey for the containment of migrants outside the EU mainland. Surveillance policies in border management and containment policies in the field of externalization have a two-way financial nexus, as may be determined in the Aegean region case: not only do

states have economic and security concerns from migration flows and spend money to strengthen their border security and externalize migration, but also non-state actors, especially private companies, have concerns about increasing their profits and therefore marketing their knowledge through security - threat perception. In this part of the study, which constitutes the first-step analysis part, the economic and security concerns that reveal the migration industry will be revisited from the point of state and non-state actors, and the surveillance, containment, and financial nexus among them will be analyzed. During this analysis, the Foucauldian conceptualization, which is included in the theoretical background of the study, will be referred.

After the 2015 migrant crisis, the perception of possible security concerns in the EU was met by increasing surveillance practices at the border. The state's fear of losing its control over its borders and the social and economic concerns of citizens in the European society create the perception that migrants are portrayed as a threat or danger. To concretize these concerns, in other words, the perceptions of threat, security concerns are based on the perception that among the migrant groups crossing the border irregularly, there are migrants who are criminal, prone to crime, or will pave the way for potential terrorist incidents. In addition, there is a perception that the presence of migrants poses a security threat to the society, with the thought that the structure and integrity of the society will deteriorate due to the increasing ethnicist and racist approaches in the society against migrants. On the other hand, economic concerns include threat perceptions such as irregular migrants will create an increase in labor supply and threaten economic stability, increase competition in employment and especially in the informal labor market, thus they will increase unemployment, and in addition to all these, social investments made for migrants will create additional costs to the public budget and hence, increase taxes. As a result of these perceptions, both the state's effort to establish its own authority and the social and economic protection of its citizens legitimize the state to take action to restore the security that it claims is in danger. The two tools that the states have put in place to address its economic and security concerns are the surveillance of borders and containment of migrants in the case of regional migration management in the Aegean Sea. The strengthening of border surveillance and the containment of migrants outside the EU mainland have been

legitimized by discourses and implemented through securitization practices. The Evros fence, which was extended in 2021, may be an example regarding the implementation of security practices through discourse legitimization. After the Greek government decided to extend the Evros fence from 12.5 kilometers to 40 kilometers in 2021, President Katerina Sakellaropoulou used the following statements while visiting the border region in May 2021: “*Greece respects the peaceful coexistence, good neighborly relations and international law, but at the same time does not accept unacceptable demands and threats from anyone*” (Ekathimerini, 2021b). In August 2021, while Citizens' Protection Minister Michalis Chrisochoidis made a statement after the completion of Evros fence's extension: “*We cannot wait, passively, for the possible impact. Our borders will remain safe and inviolable.*”, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis stated that “*Greece had increased the level of deterrence at our borders to the maximum with security personnel deployed to the Evros land border*” (BBC, 2021). After the decision to extend Greece's border fence once again in November 2021, Migration and Asylum Minister Notis Mitarachi said that “*Greece guards its borders. We made no secret of this, we said it clearly: we prevent illegal crossings. This is our sovereign right.*” (Hellenic News of America, 2021). These four discourses expressed by the Greek authorities basically emphasize the unwanted other, the threat of migration and migrant, and the need for maximum security. The statement that the state will use its right of sovereignty over the unwanted other shows that the securitization of migration by Greece in the Aegean region is legitimized by discourses. Following these discourses of political leaders legitimizing securitization, with administrative practices such as preemptive surveillance, security checks, border fence equipped with digital surveillance technologies, the state authority began to finance the migration industry and non-state actors began to be involved in migration management policies through the migration industry.

It is stated by the EU authorities that the EU will contain and will continue to contain migrants in Turkey through the externalization of migration management. Jean-Claude Juncker, head of the European Commission in 2017, used the following statements in the State of the Union address: “*We have managed to stem irregular flows of migrants, which were a cause of great anxiety for many. We have reduced irregular*

arrivals in the Eastern Mediterranean by 97% thanks our agreement with Turkey.” (European Commission, 2017b: 4). In other words, most of the migrants, who are a source of concern, who could reach the EU via the Eastern Mediterranean, were contained in Turkey after the EU-Turkey Statement. In the speech on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum in September 2020, European Commission Vice-President Margaritis Schinas made the following remarks about the externalization of migration policy of the EU: “*Over the past years, the European Union has invested significantly in deepening its international cooperation with countries of origin, transit and destination of refugees and migrants. Since 2015, we have dedicated over 9 billion euros to supporting refugees and migrants outside the EU, providing life-saving assistance to millions of vulnerable people, supporting host communities, and fostering sustainable, development-oriented solutions. We will continue to do so.*” (European Commission, 2020d) Even just this discourse shows that the EU has cooperated with third countries in the externalization of migration policy, especially in the fields of economy and development, in a non-humanitarian way, a significant amount of money has been spent for this, and this policy will continue. As a matter of fact, additional €3 billion allocated to Turkey in 2021 has proven this discourse. Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi stated that: “*This new funding [...] will ensure that hundreds of thousands of refugee children can continue going to school and receiving quality education, which is key to secure future job perspectives and in view of the overall socio-economic recovery. We will also provide financing to the authorities to address migratory challenges and increase border protection, not least in view of the evolving situation at the Eastern border of Turkey.*” (European Commission, 2021j) Based on this discourse, it is seen that the EU will continue to make significant expenditures to ensure the containment of migrants in Turkey. €6 billion allocated for Turkey was projected in 5 years and the fact that €3 billion to be allocated will be projected until 2024 shows that the EU's externalization policy has spread over a long period of time and the perception of migration/migrant threat against the Union will continue to be legitimated in the future. Therefore, in the field of externalization of migration management, the migration industry is financed through EU funds and non-state actors are involved in migration management policies through the migration industry.

To express regional migration management practices in the Aegean region through Foucauldian conceptualization based on discourses and practices, surveillance and containment practices as a result of economic and security concerns of the states are compatible with biopolitical control practices. While the political power reduces migrants to calculable and manageable bodies, it also aims to protect its productive population and thus to protect its own power. In the calculations made on the border between Greece and Turkey, while the Turkish side takes preemptive measures to prevent the migrants from reaching the border, the Greek side calculates to push the migrants who reach the Greek border back to the Turkish border. These calculations include mapping calculations in the deployment of border security systems, calculations of the security equipment and personnel to be deployed to prevent migrants from reaching the border, calculations of the risks of death or survival of migrants, and calculations of the risks that migrants who cross the border would become criminals in the future. All these calculations lead to two major consequences: (1) the state legitimizes all these calculations by creating a perception of protecting the productivity, security, freedom, and economic interests of its own population, (2) the state finances the emerging migration industry firsthand while implementing border and containment policies cooperating with non-state actors.

It is not only the state's perception of economic and security concerns that reveals the migration industry, but also the concerns of private companies that have started to get involved in this industry, increasing their own economic interests in pursuit of financial gain and being permanent in the sector. In particular, the discourses of some companies operating in the field of border security regarding securitization of migration and migrants are compatible with the perception created by the states. For example, Accenture, one of the largest multinational companies in information technology services and consulting, used a humanitarian tragedy related to the 2015 migrant crisis (the tragic death of 3-year-old Aylan Kurdi) in its brochure to market its biometric identification systems: "*When a young boy's body washed up on a Turkish shore, the subject of refugees became less about numbers, or a political issue, and more of a humanitarian crisis*", however, the following statements are also included in the same brochure: "*there are terrorists who choose to pose as refugees*" (Akkerman, 2019: 51).

Just like states, private companies can reproduce the discourse that characterizes migrants as a threat to security and can bring their interests to the fore by instrumentalizing migration for profit. The best example of this situation is experienced between Frontex and defense companies.

The Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO), a working group that researches and exposes companies and lobby groups that benefit exclusively from EU policymaking, has published a research on Frontex's relations with defence companies in the border security industry (Corporate Europe, 2021). These companies, which provide defense and surveillance solution systems and services, are also companies that cause major human rights violations at the borders. Since the number of defense companies that wanted to have one-to-one meetings with Frontex after the 2015 migrant crisis increased too much to cope with, Frontex introduced bi-annual industry days in sectors such as biometrics, maritime border, risk assessment, document inspection, vehicles, handguns and so on. In 2021, using the freedom of information request, the CEO published some documents of 17 industry days held by Frontex between 2017 and 2019: invitation letters from Frontex, participant lists, industry days agenda, meeting minutes, presentation files of participants. Some pages from these presentation files are shown in photos 2, 3, 4, 5. In the examples taken from the presentation files of Airbus, CLS Group, Safeshore, and Smile project³⁶, migrants are described directly cause/problem/threat for the marketing of border security systems. While Airbus draws attention to refugee camps and migrants crossing the border in its presentation on the informatics system product Altair, CLS Group defines the journeys of irregular migrants as illegal act and Safeshore company defines migrants as a "problem" in the presentation of its detection system product. The production and marketing of security systems by private companies to prevent migrants is compatible with the aforementioned states' concern to protect the freedom and economic interests of productive citizens. The "expected outcome" page taken from the presentation of the Smile project emphasizes that the safety and quality of European citizens' life will

³⁶ Project SMILE (Smart mobility at the European land borders) funded by Horizon 2020, carried out by Center for Research and Technology Hellas and Information Technologies Institute.

increase if defense and security systems are implemented. In short, the border security and defense systems developed by private companies, on the one hand, instrumentalise migration and enable them to make profit from it, on the other hand, shape the migration policies in a compatible way with the dynamics of neoliberal globalization.




Photo 2.
Airbus
Presentation
in Frontex
Industry Days
(Source:
Corporate Europe,
2021)



Photo 3.
CLS Group
Presentation in
Frontex
Industry Days
(Source:
Corporate Europe,
2021)



Photo 4.
SafeShore
Presentation in
Frontex
Industry Days
(Source:
Corporate Europe,
2021)



Expected outcomes

- Improving life quality of European and non-European people crossing European borders.
- Improving the security of European citizens
- Enhancing European policies.
- Fighting against illegal immigration and organized crime.
- Enhancing European expertise in the border security field and developing key enabling technologies for Next Generation cross border gates.
- Strengthen collaboration between different European stakeholders in the border security area.
- Link the existing systems to the Next Generation cross border checkpoints.
- Smart, sustainable & inclusive growth - *developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation.*

6/18/2020

Frontex: Workshop on EU funded border security research projects

Photo 5.
SMILE Project
Presentation in
Frontex
Industry Days
 (Source:
 Corporate Europe,
 2021)

In this sub-section, it has been tried to analyze the migration management practices in the Aegean region, creating a migration industry based on the economic and security concerns of the actors in the region, with surveillance, containment, and financial nexus. In this context, it should be emphasized that the policy in the areas served by the migration industry is highly controversial in terms of protecting the EU population and supporting migrants. These policies, under the guise of protecting the productive population and supporting migrants, actually serve the political elites of the EU and the interests of their contractors, in other words those who manage neoliberal globalization. In addition, the EU refrains from sharing the burden of migration equally and fairly with the shield countries of the Union located on its external border and with the third countries where it externalizes migration. Instead, the EU funds private defense/security/construction companies with billions of euros to develop their security systems and research, thus allowing companies to have a say in migration policies. As a result, from a political and economic perspective, the line between private and public becomes more blurred and from a humanitarian perspective, the situation of migrants becomes even more disadvantaged and fragile within the dynamics of neoliberal globalization. In addition, the system created to protect migrants at the discursive level makes them more vulnerable and unprotected. The reduction of migrants to a calculable body, to a number, is only possible when these policies violate their human rights and the improvement of their living conditions. Agamben, who takes a rights-based

approach to Foucault's conceptualization, summarizes this situation by stating that restrictive and coercive practices on migrants only operate on the violation of migrants' human rights by the sovereign power and that migrants can only be politically included on the condition that they are excluded (Topak, 2014: 820).

3.1.2. Migration Industry in the Aegean Region within the Framework of the Political Economic Dynamics of Neoliberal Globalization

The existence of a constantly growing migration industry in the Aegean region after 2015 was expressed in the case study of second chapter and in the previous sub-section, surveillance, containment, and financial nexus between the state and non-state actors in the Aegean region that established this migration industry was revealed by analyzing the economic and security concerns of the actors. In this sub-section, it is important to analyze this migration industry within the political economic dynamics of neoliberal globalization, because it is not possible to understand the issue of migration without addressing the global political economy framework. Therefore, the analysis of the migration industry in the Aegean region will be carried out taking into account the instruments of neoliberal globalization such as outsourcing, privatization and soft law, in accordance with the schematization outlined in the 2.3. section. In this context, firstly, the diversity of non-state actors in the migration industry in the Aegean region, secondly the outsourcing relationship between state and non-state actors, and finally, the roles of non-state actors will be analyzed.

The developments in the region after the 2015 migrant crisis prove the existence of a constantly growing migration industry in the Aegean region. This migration industry operates legally and illegally. In the second chapter of the study, the practices of the migration industry operating legally are included, in other words, the illegal migrant smuggling sector is not included in the migration industry in order to determine the relationship network of the state with non-state actors through soft law instruments. The financial data analyzed in the second chapter reveal the existence of a considerable migration industry with a very intense financial money flow in a small-scale region where Greece and Turkey are at the center. In this region, financial data of only two sectors of the migration industry became the focal point: the border management sector

and the externalization of migration management sector. While the aim of the border management sector is to control regular migration and prevent irregular migration; the aim of the sector of externalization of migration management is to contain irregular migrants in a certain area in return for monetary aid and political gains. It is possible to categorize the actors who implement these two migration management tools in the Aegean region as follows:

- **NGOs:** Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund, Care, Concern Worldwide, Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, Danish Refugee Council, Diakonie, International Federation of Red Cross, International Medical Corps, International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, Medecins du Monde Belgique, Medecins du Monde Greece, Metadrası, Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam, Red Crescent in Turkey, Red Cross, Relief International, Save the Children, Terre des Hommes, The Smile of the Child.
- **Private companies:** construction, defense, software, aerospace, energy companies, shipbuilders, furniture, container, steel, medical stuff manufacturers, human resources management and consulting companies.
- **EU agencies:** EASO, Frontex.
- **UN agencies:** UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, WHO, IOM, WFP, UNFPA, ILO.
- **Development banks:** World Bank, German Development Bank (KfW), French Development Agency (AFD), Council of Europe Development Bank.

It is noteworthy that the actors playing a role in the regional migration management in the Aegean region belong to quite different sectors. On the one hand, there are UN agencies, secular and religious humanitarian aid organizations, on the other hand, there are different types of EU-centered organizations such as EU agencies and public development banks. It is inevitable to say that each actor in the Aegean region has an interest in the migration policies to be implemented in this region. The reason why these actors are involved in the migration industry may be based on several different arguments: (1) the dynamics of neoliberal globalization allow for this diversity, (2) states try to transfer their responsibilities to minimize the burden of migration, (3)

non-state actors obtain financial gain to maintain their existence (in the case of NGOs) or make profits (in the case of private companies) from the funds allocated to the projects they design. As a result, in order to protect the progress of neoliberal globalization, the economic and security concerns of the actors in the region bring them together on the migration industry platform. This cooperations between state and non-state actors occur at three scales: upward, outward, and downward outsourcing.

- Upward outsourcing: Among the practices carried out after 2015 within the scope of regional migration management in the Aegean region, the externalization of migration management in Greek islands constitutes an example of upward outsourcing. Accordingly, the European Commission signed a delegation agreement with UNHCR in December 2015 on the management of hotspots on the Greek islands. According to this delegation, the authority to meet the needs of irregular migrants massing in the Greek islands without going to the mainland of the EU has been transferred by the Member States to the UNHCR through the European Commission. Although UNHCR, which transferred all its powers and responsibilities back to the Greek authorities in 2021, seemed to assist the Greek authorities for six years, in fact, it undertook many responsibilities that disabled the Greek government from accommodation, catering, financial aid to integration of migrants. On the other hand, another example of upward outsourcing is the EU Member States' decision to activate the Emergency Support Instrument (ESI) for Greece in the European Commission. With the activation decision of ESI, the Member States authorized the Union to use this fund instead of providing humanitarian aid to Greece one by one. In order to prevent irregular migrants arriving to the Greek islands and crossing to other countries of the EU, through this fund, the Member States have transferred their responsibilities in the field of migration management and the authority to use and project the fund to the Union.

- Outward outsourcing: Externalization of migration management in Turkey constitutes an example of outward outsourcing within the scope of regional migration management in the Aegean region. In this context, all projects to which the budget allocated by the EU within the scope of FRIT is transferred and the executives of these projects are part of this outward outsourcing example. Among these actors are UN

agencies, international NGOs, and development banks. Through UN agencies and international NGOs, the EU is trying to solve the problem of irregular access to Europe by migrants coming from Syria to Turkey within the borders of the Turkish state. In this context, the EU outsources responsibilities to Turkey for the improvement of living conditions and integration of Syrian migrants under temporary protection status here. Therefore, in this way, the EU takes off its accountability for the problems that may occur within the borders of the EU and its responsibility against international laws. In addition, the EU can also prevent problems before they occur such as political unrest that may arise in European countries due to migrants, discontent of citizens towards migrants and concern that migrants pose a security threat. Although the Greek Islands are within the borders of the EU, they are geographically separate from the EU mainland and Closed Controlled Access Centers which have been started to be established on the islands since 2020 are also an example of outward outsourcing. The EU contains some of the irregular migrants at the Southeastern border of the Union. Outward outsourcing examples also contain downward outsourcing relations. In the case of Turkey, UN agencies, international NGOs, and development banks, for which a budget is allocated, downwardly outsourced their projects and formed partnerships with ministries in Turkey. Or directly, the ministries in Turkey carried out projects with a budget from FRIT by downwardly outsourcing to private companies through tenders. Therefore, outward outsourcing constitutes a more complex pillar of the migration industry than upward outsourcing.

- Downward outsourcing: Almost all of the practices implemented after 2015 within the scope of regional migration management in the Aegean region constitute an example of downward outsourcing. Downward outsourcing, in other words privatization of state functions, covers the largest market within the migration industry in the Aegean region. In terms of border management, both Greece and Turkey bought services almost only from private companies to strengthen border security. All implementations that strengthen land and maritime border security, such as the fence built between Greece and Turkey, the wall built on the Turkish-Syrian border, the watchtowers and armored vehicles placed on Turkey's Western border, the ships and boats that Frontex used while building the Eastern maritime border of the EU, Turkey's coastal surveillance system

have been built by private construction, defense, software, and security companies. While governments and related ministries/units have transferred their responsibilities in the field of border management's privatization, private companies have undertaken the responsibility. In terms of the externalization of migration management, there seems to be a more complex relationship network than a direct relationship like the privatization of border management. For example, the EU stated that they did not transfer the FRIT fund directly to the Turkish government within the scope of externalizing the migration management in Turkey: *“Let's make (it) clear, the European Commission is not paying money to the Turkish government. We are supporting Syrian refugees in Turkey”* (Speech of the EU Commissioner for home affairs Ylva Johansson, Daily Sabah, 2021b). In fact, what actually happens is an outsourcing scheme like this: FRIT fund allocated to IOs and NGOs projects > IOs and NGOs collaborated with Turkish authorities like ministries > Turkish ministries opened tenders > private companies undertook the whole or a part of the FRIT project. To illustrate this schematization: KfW (German Development Bank) received funding from FRIT to run vocational education project > KfW collaborated with Turkish Ministry of National Education > the Ministry opened a tender > two consulting companies undertook some part of the project. As a result, behind the soft and kind statement of the European Commission that “we are supporting Syrian refugees in Turkey”, there is a complex financial network and money flow.

Under this complex network, it is possible for the state to transfer its functions and responsibilities in three scales as upward, outward, and downward, by using soft law instruments. Within the dynamics of neoliberal globalization, states have applied to flexible, oversimplified, non-binding, and free from bureaucracy soft law instruments that allow them to move within the migration industry while regionally managing migration in the Aegean region. Readmission agreement and trade agreements are the principal soft law instruments in the case of Aegean region. As may be determined in the EU-Turkey Statement example, Turkey unilaterally suspended the Statement in 2019. Despite this suspension, the project of the entire €6 billion fund promised by the EU has been completed. The Statement has shown that it is non-binding for Turkey, and Turkey's failure to fulfill its obligations under the Statement has not been sanctioned by the EU, on the contrary, an additional €3 billion fund has been allocated to be projected

until 2024. On the other hand, trade agreements, which have become an issue-linkage strategy between state and non-state actors, are the most used soft law instrument in the migration industry, which dominates the migration management in the Aegean region. Ignoring the humanitarian aspect of the migration issue and linking it with trade and development is at the center of the migration industry. In particular, the contents of these agreements made through tenders are not shared with the public, companies and the financial money flow to these companies are not objectively audited, and the clientelism between the state and private companies is sometimes revealed through hard news, as in the McKinsey case and Frontex industry days case. Hence linking migration issue to trade agreements allow more non-state actors to participate in migration management.

These soft law instruments reveal three different roles that cause non-state actors to act as a kind of intermediary between the state and migrants. These roles are respectively **facilitating, controlling, and rescue**. These three roles played by non-state actors should be evaluated in two contexts: (1) Roles may overlap, that is, a non-state actor may facilitate the state to alleviate the migration-related burden, thanks to its responsibility undertaken within the migration industry while helping to control and suppress migrants at the same time, or a non-state actor that undertakes the role of rescue to improve the living conditions of migrants facilitates the fulfillment of the state's responsibility, (2) it should be considered that each role of non-state actors directly affects both the state and migrants, in other words, they play the role of intermediary between migrants and state. All of the border management practices implemented by non-state actors in the Aegean region have assumed the role of facilitating the implementation of border security policies of both states. The facilitation of the implementation of border policies by the states also brings these non-state actors to assume the role of controlling the movement of irregular migrants. For example, while the Greek government's construction of the Evros fence on the Greek-Turkish land border with a consortium of four major construction companies facilitates the Greek government to strengthen border security, it causes irregular migrants who want to cross from Turkey to Greece by land, to be brought under control without crossing the border. Likewise, the defense, informatics, and surveillance systems established in

both Greece and Turkey make it easier for the state to control migrants. The non-state actors involved in the externalization of migration management in the Aegean region, while facilitating the fulfillment of the state's responsibility, fulfill the role of controlling migrants on the one hand and - relatively - rescuing migrants on the other hand. To give an example, within the scope of the ESTIA program carried out by UNHCR, the transfer of irregular migrants from the camps on the islands to the mainland and their placement in apartments there, on the one hand, enables the transfer of the burden of migration reception assistance that the state has to perform to a non-state actor, making it easier for the state to manage migration, on the other hand, it provides control of where irregular migrants arriving in the country stay and what they will do during the integration processes. In this case, it may be said that the non-state actor also, relatively, plays the role of rescuing migrants from difficult camp conditions. On the other hand, to give an example of the externalization of migration management in Turkey, non-state actors through projects carried out by NGOs and IOs under the FRIT fund (1) made it easier for the EU to take the burden off of managing migration by externalizing migration in a third country, (2) made it easier for the EU to control irregular migration in a third country, (3) made it easier for Turkey to improve the living conditions of migrants in its country and kept them under control not to head for Europe, (4) took on - relatively- the role of rescue by improving the living conditions of some migrants. These examples may be multiplied for each project funded or tendered, but the point to be emphasized here is that non-state actors are actually doing more than they seem.

The conclusions to be drawn from this schematization that analyzes the migration industry are that non-state actors are more than they seem, in other words, the line between state and non-state actors becomes much more blurred. This line has become much more blurred because, firstly, from the outside, non-state actors who simply "manage projects" actually mean more than just an organization with their diversity, the way they take on the responsibilities of the state, and the roles they play between the migrant and the state. With their organizational form, technical and personnel knowledge, they become actors who manage migration policies after a point. Consulting firms directing government authorities (as in the McKinsey case example), private


defense/security companies developing and producing equipment suitable for land and maritime borders (for example, vehicles produced by Otokar have been developed in accordance with the difficult conditions of Turkey's geography or for example, in the industry days held by Frontex, defense companies market surveillance systems suitable for the EU borders), or NGOs' decision on which migrants will receive which reception assistance (for example, WFP set the criteria for which migrants will receive monetary assistance in the cash assistance program) exemplifies the management of migration policies at one point by non-state actors. Secondly, when the outsourcing scales and the roles of non-state actors are taken into account, it is determined that the EU and the states of the region are the actors that reveal, support and fund the migration industry in the Aegean region the most. Strengthening border security policies caused the development of the migrant smuggling sector, the containment policy of migrants caused the participation of private companies such as construction and security in the migration industry, and ultimately the humanitarian crises that emerged with the ignoring of root causes in migrant-sending countries caused humanitarian organizations to become a part of the migration industry.

This situation allows to evaluate the minimized role of the state in the migration industry. According to the best case scenario, the state assumes the role of coordinator. In the worst case scenario, the state is just a spectator beyond the shadow state of non-state actors. As a coordinator, the state supports non-state actors in the migration industry. It does this by preparing the political and legal ground for non-state actors within the borders of sovereignty: such as the discourses of the political power that legitimize the migration industry, readmission or trade agreements, state tenders. For example, organizations operating in many different fields, from the French Development Bank to the Diakonie (organization of Germany's Protestant churches) through the FRIT fund, carry out projects receiving funds from the EU and earn financial gain in Turkey with the support of Turkish authorities. In another example, in Turkey or Greece, ministries open tenders for tasks under their responsibility through privatization and draw private companies into the migration industry. Although non-state actors in the Aegean region's migration industry are more numerous and complex than state actors, as outlined in this schematization, the founder of this intricate

structure reached by the migration industry are the states and their national interests, coordinator of the migration industry. From the other side of the coin, this situation of non-state actors assuming the responsibilities of the state also reminds the concept of shadow state (Trudeau, 2008: 670-671 cited from Geiger and Wolch, 1986). Greece and Turkey were also in an economic crisis during the migration management process in the 2015 crisis. In this crisis environment, while non-state actors from different sectors shouldered the responsibilities of the public sector, although Greece and Turkey could not provide or provide very limited funding to non-state actors, they tended to control these actors administratively, as in the case of Greece preventing small-scale NGOs from the Greek islands. Behind all this reality, the real state has become a spectator who allows the funds from a supranational institution to be used within its own sovereignty, but at the same time tries to control them so that its sovereignty is not hollowed out.

3.2. Discussion on the Governance of Migration Management

Until this section of the study, governance of migration management within the dynamics of neoliberal globalization has been tried to be understood through the case of regional migration management in the Aegean region. In the theoretical first chapter of the study, it was suggested that the initiatives in the field of global migration could not be expressed as either stand-alone migration management or migration governance, instead it was suggested to use the concept of governance of migration management. With the case study in the second chapter of the study, the existence of the migration industry in the region and the complex relationship between the state and non-state actors strengthened the recommendation to use this concept. Based on the case study in the Aegean region, the fact that governance of migration management consists of a process may be expressed with the following schematization:



Accordingly, mass migration flows that occur due to root causes such as war, conflict, and difficult economic conditions result in the cooperation of state and non-state actors under economic and security concerns, that is, governance. However, within the framework of the dynamics of neoliberal globalization, the networks of relations arising from this cooperation generate financial gain from migration, which creates discussion areas such as power relations, violation of human rights, and embedded migration that highlight governance of migration management.

The developments in the region after the 2015 migrant crisis show that governance efforts cannot go beyond migration management with some non-binding bilateral or regional efforts. It should be said that the migration management practices implemented in the Aegean region, in other words the initiatives of the actors of the migration industry, are firstly EU-centered and secondly state-centered regional initiatives. Non-state actors (IOs, NGOs and private companies in the case of Aegean Sea) have become the main partners of states that want to find a solution to the global migration problem and have played a key role in the globalization and regionalization of migration policies. However, their financial dependence on the states funding them has transformed them into “migration managers” who serve the interests of states, reproduce the state's discourses towards migration and migrants, and ultimately depoliticize migration. Moreover, the financial resources allocated for migration include a significant amount of flexible money to provide emergency responses. Flexibility of money makes money managers more political, whether public or private, and raises

concerns about the protection and management of money. For these reasons, when the regional initiatives implemented in the Aegean region after the 2015 migrant crisis are examined, it is seen that not only an asymmetrical power relations between the states, but also a power relation between the state and non-state actors and between migrants, violation of human rights of migrants, and finally embedded migration far from an migrant-oriented approach but close to economy and security result. Based on these results, migration management practices in the Aegean region should be defined with a governance of migration management suggestion. Discussions of this suggestion will be included in this section of the study: (1) sovereignty and power relations, (2) violation of human rights, (3) embedded migration. These claims will be discussed over the Aegean region case and the process that reaches the governance of migration management will be shown.

3.2.1. Sovereignty and Power Relations in the Case of Aegean Sea

In the first chapter of the study, it is argued that one of the reasons for recommending the concept of governance of migration management is that non-state actors can never be ignored in migration policies, but also the state does not give up its sovereignty in this policy area. For this reason, there are power relations that inevitably emerge in the migration management process among the numerous actors playing a role in the Aegean region case. Four different asymmetrical power relations are identified in the regional migration management process in the Aegean region: (1) between the EU and Turkey, (2) between the EU and Member States, (3) between state actors and non-state actors, and (4) between state actors and migrants.

Firstly, the asymmetrical power relation between the EU and Turkey is a result of the EU-Turkey Statement. The EU-Turkey Statement was introduced with the discourse of saving lives in the Aegean Sea as an emergency remedy to the migrant crisis, but it could not go beyond establishing tense relations between the actors in the region. The policy of the EU to contain Syrian migrants within the borders of Turkey in exchange for money, in other words, the EU's externalization policy of migration in Turkey, changed Turkey's position in EU-Turkey relations: the EU's risk-averse and migrant-averse attitude towards mass migration flow in 2015 has transformed Turkey

into a gatekeeper that contains migrants while it was a neighboring country on the way to become a member of the EU. While Turkish authorities continue to ask the EU for a budget to continue to contain migrants in Turkey, the EU has invested in containing migrants here with its economic power. President of the Turkish Republic, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, on the other hand, stated that the government spent \$40 billion on Syrian migrants and would not hesitate to spend the same amount of money if necessary, which strengthened the negative attitude in Turkish society towards migrants and Europe. Erdoğan described the tense relationship with the EU as follows: *"We have made invaluable contributions to the security of the entire European continent, particularly to the Balkan countries. However, we did not see the support and humanitarian attitude that we expect from our European friends during this difficult time."* (AA, 2019; DW, 2021c). While The EU-Turkey Statement was supposed to be a collaboration, Turkey tried to align the statement with its political interests as a bargaining chip for EU membership, and EU Member States tried to prevent irregular migration by reinterpreting EU law for their own national interests. As an outcome of the Statement, the contribution of €6 billion transferred by the EU to the improvement of the living conditions of Syrians in Turkey through projects is undeniably important in improving the health conditions of Syrians, the schooling of many Syrian children and the training of many Syrian adults but the transfer of the fund to NGOs and IOs through projects, not directly to the Turkish government, was another issue of tension between the EU and Turkey. In the 6th year of the Statement, in 2022, it may be said that the EU-Turkey Statement is more satisfactory for the EU than Turkey, because the EU seems to have realized its own benefit with the decrease in Syrian migrants coming to Greece from Turkey (20.567 irregular migrants crossed into the EU using the Eastern Mediterranean route in 2021, 97% decrease compared to 2015). However, for Turkey, the revitalization process for the EU accession and visa liberalization remained unfulfilled. Therefore, Turkey's use of migrants as a foreign policy leverage increased the political tension between the EU and Turkey and made it difficult to implement the Statement. Moreover, Erdoğan's discourse to open borders during the 2020 Edirne events created a new breaking point in the European Union's relations with Turkey: *"We have opened the [border] gates, we will not close these gates in the next period and this will continue."* (translated from Turkish, Hürriyet, 2020). This discourse

revealed that there is a serious mistrust about border security between Turkey and the EU. The EU-Turkey relations, which reached its lowest point with the rising Eastern Mediterranean crisis in the same year, have been reset by the EU in 2021, taking into account the millions of Syrian refugees Turkey contains. Accordingly, Ursula von der Leyen's call for a "more positive EU-Turkey agenda" was answered by the refinancing of the EU-Turkey statement. As a result, to summarize the asymmetrical power relations between the EU and Turkey, which has been going on over the migration crisis since 2015, Turkey instrumentalizes migrants as the bargaining chip in the foreign policy area and accepts the financial advantages of the European Union's externalization policy. The externalization policy of the EU is the product of a process that has been going on for decades and it is a fact that this policy will continue to intensify without lowering; in this case, it seems inevitable that Turkey will continue to be a gatekeeper that responds to the EU's policy maker role as a policy taker in return for financial support in migration management in the Aegean region.

The second asymmetrical power relation between EU and Member States are identified based on the EU-Turkey Statement and it is necessary to separate these relations into two. Firstly, the Greek government had a weak role in the preparation of the Statement, and the EU was unable to unburden the Greek government through the Statement. The Greek government was already in an economic crisis where it implemented austerity policies, and its bureaucracy was already slow and complex. Although some legal changes were made with the Statement, it was not possible to prevent the migrants from massing on the Greek islands and increasing the first reception costs. Moreover, the Greek islands became a final destination, first with Hotspots and then with Closed Controlled Access Centers, rather than as a transit route for migrants to reach other Member States on the EU mainland. As a result, the fact that euroscepticism came to the fore once again in the political arena of Greece, the Greek people felt left alone by the European Union, and the responsibility of being a shield to Greece made the EU-Greek relationship tense. Secondly, the EU-Turkey Statement was introduced through a press release on the website of the European Commission and was not subjected to a parliamentary scrutiny. The lack of judicial control over the adoption and implementation of the Statement has escalated tensions between the EU's

supranational institutions and the Member States. Although EU institutions expect a lot from the Statement, Statement is a non-binding political agreement and according to the decision of the General Court of the EU, the responsibility of the Statement belongs to the Member States, not the EU (Curia, 2017). This situation has resulted in the following results in the migration management process in the Aegean region: (1) The EU's supranational institutions have thrown off their responsibility, (2) the legitimacy of the Statement has been questioned, (3) the implementation of the Statement has depended on the political tension between the EU and Turkey, (4) since the monitoring mechanism did not work, the Member States were able to instrumentalize the statement according to their own national interests (as in the case of Germany, which hosts the highest number of refugees in the EU and led the Statement process). Therefore, after the 2015 migrant crisis and the adoption of the EU-Turkey Statement, it is determined that the power in the EU has shifted from EU institutions to nation-states. Particularly, in the process of finding a common solution to the 2015 migrant crisis, Member States strengthened intergovernmentalism through informal rather than official ways and brought national interests to the fore instead of the interests of the Union, therefore they became the main actors of this crisis-led governance (Carrera et al., 2017: 8). As a result, as the nation-states emphasized their independent policies and superiority based on their sovereign rights, the asymmetrical power relations between the EU and Member States have led to the emergence of a realm in which the EU institutions are weakened, EU values, accountability, rule of law, solidarity and harmonization are questioned.

The third asymmetrical power relation is between state and non-state actors in the Aegean region. In sub-section 2.3.2.3 (Regional Migration Management in the Aegean Sea) of the study, tensions between state and non-state actors in the region after the 2015 migrant crisis were discussed. The disorganization and uncoordination of NGOs and volunteer groups in Greece and their internal power struggles resulted in the state holding back the non-state actors from the field, with the exception of major IOs and NGOs. Since the asymmetric power relations between the state and non-state actors in the field of migration management are already mentioned, the political representation of an international organization such as UNHCR in the 2015 migrant crisis will be discussed in this part of the study. Throughout the study, it was emphasized that

UNHCR's professionalism in refugee crisis and that it is the main partner of states. However, states have excluded UNHCR from participating in decision-making mechanisms in the humanitarian crisis that began with the 2011 Syrian refugees and continued with the 2015 migrant crisis (Elitok, 2019: 8). Member states, one side of the EU-Turkey Statement, especially Germany, and Turkey, which is the other side, came together with intergovernmental meetings, summits, press conferences and participated in the preparation phase of the Statement. However, at this point, the non-state actors, especially the UNHCR, which organized the first and second step reception of migrants, were excluded from the drafting process. What actually happens is that non-state actors, from UNHCR to private companies, can work in harmony with state actors under a managerial mentality in strengthening the border policies of nation-states or using FRIT funding or managing detention centers. In other words, the state buys services from non-state actors for a certain price without any problems. Private sector actors have undertaken almost all border strengthening works in Greece and Turkey in return for their cost, and EU funds transferred to Greece and Turkey have been used by private sector, NGOs, and IOs in cooperation with the state actors to improve the living conditions of migrants. At this point, it should be emphasized that when there is a financial relationship, state and non-state actors can come together under the managerial mentality, but when it comes to political representation, participation in the decision-making process, existence in the policy-making process, the state prefers to ignore non-state actors or allows non-state actors to manipulate policies enough to use their knowledge in policy-making processes or to cover the abusive traces left by states. Although bottom-up governance initiatives took a large place in the 2015 crisis and non-state actors were successful in directing policy-making processes, the fact that they could not find an official reciprocity among state actors in terms of political visibility describes the asymmetric power relationship between states and non-state actors.

Finally, the fourth asymmetrical power relation is the relationship between the state and migrants, which should be emphasized the most. In this sub-section, the power relation between the state and migrants will be discussed through the EU-Turkey Statement, and the violation of the human rights of migrants by the state authorities through border security and externalization policy will be discussed in detail in the next

sub-section. The EU-Turkey Statement violates the human rights of migrants in many ways. Although the Statement was introduced with the discourse of saving lives in the Aegean Sea, it did not go beyond serving the EU's policy of externalizing migration. Although the number of people who lost their lives in the Aegean Sea decreased numerically, the fact that the Statement did not include clauses protecting the human rights of migrants caused migrants to die not at sea, but on land, in camps, stranded lands, and border gates. Within the scope of the Statement, returning irregular migrants who entered the Greek islands after March 20, 2016 to Turkey violates the principle of non-refoulement and therefore the right of migrants to apply for international protection. On the other hand, another subject of violation is the assumption of Turkey is a safe third country. It is against refugee rights that Turkey does not recognize the right of refugee to returned migrants, cannot provide adequate protection and host Syrians under temporary protection status due to the Geneva convention geographical limitations. Moreover, the EU violates migrant rights with a risk-averse and migrant-averse attitude by sending them back to Turkey instead of relocating migrants within its borders and starting the integration process. The suspension of the Statement in 2019 and the suspension of many transactions and procedures due to the COVID-19 pandemic have left many migrants in a much more vulnerable and fragile situation. This level of violation of the human rights of migrants, as mentioned in the previous sections, caused the migrants to struggle with the state authorities in the camps and borders.

These four asymmetrical power relations between the EU and Turkey, the EU and Member States, state actors and non-state actors, and state actors and migrants that emerged during the regional migration management in the Aegean region were discussed over the EU-Turkey Statement. The EU-Turkey Statement as a regional response to the 2015 migration crisis, when viewed through these asymmetrical power relations, is far from being an example of migration governance. Whether it is top-down or bottom-up, it is observed in these power relations that the nation-state instrumentalizes migration, migrants and bilateral agreements in pursuit of national interest, thus transferring its responsibilities to migration industry actors and shifting from governance to management mentality. In this context, since the existence of non-state actors alongside the dominance of the state in this manageable mentality

cannot be denied, it is seen that initiatives in the Aegean region are a governance of migration management based on the argument of sovereignty and power relations.

3.2.2. Human Rights Violations in the Case of Aegean Sea

After the 2015 migrant crisis, border security and externalization policies implemented in the Aegean region are inherently contradictory to human rights: while the strengthening policies implemented by the state authority at the border carry legal sovereignty status, it is also legally against human rights and international refugee law because of violating migrants at the border. The state, as the sovereign power on its borders, protects its borders or may request the protection of its borders from the other side by making agreements with neighboring countries. However, the death or injury of migrants depends on the activities carried out on both sides of these borders. But migration is not just about the state, it is about people, immigrants, emigrants, refugees, citizens and this is why human rights are one of the biggest impasses of governance. Although states confirm that they will comply with international human rights law or international refugee law, the human rights of migrants are sacrificed to relieve economic and security concerns of states. Apart from the violation of migrant rights at the border, in the sub-section 1.2.3 important points regarding the violation of the human rights of migrants were listed under general headings: the lack of decent and safe work conditions of low-wage and low-skilled migrant workers, human trafficking and smuggling, the silence of the sending-countries to the irregular migration flows, leaving irregular migrants to die in the open sea, subventions given to the third sector, and allocating aid to share the burden of refugee camps or to prevent migrants from applying to irregular migration routes. The fact that states are dealing with or whitewashing migrant rights violations while managing global migration crises by collaborating with non-state actors for the benefit of public good makes global migration governance problematic. Based on the rights-based argument, the concept of the governance of migration management may be discussed by illustrating the violation of human rights in the Aegean Sea case through the attitudes of (1) Frontex under the EU, (2) Greece, and (3) non-state actors towards migrants.

In the second chapter of this study, the political and economic background of migration management in the Aegean region, the European Union's funding of the European fortress, and its outsourcing of migration management to third countries were discussed. The most important outcome of these policies is an irreparable human cost. Externalizing the migration issue of the EU is in itself a violation of the human rights of migrants. With the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, the EU aimed to throw away the refugee responsibility and burden by externalizing the migration problem at its borders, and to solve this problem with money. The reflection of this policy within the scope of human rights is to put human values in the background, prioritize material factors, and focus on reducing the number of migrants by reducing them calculable bodies, in short, ignoring human and moral values. Frontex, as the EU agency that implements the migration policy of the EU on land and maritime borders, has taken initiatives that put the lives of migrants at risk and violate their rights, although it has often denied it. Especially since October 2020, it has been proven that Frontex violates the human rights of migrants intensively at its land and maritime borders with Turkey. Documents shared by Human Rights Watch, FragDenStaat, Statewatch or Amnesty International stated that Frontex unlawfully returned the migrants who had arrived or were about to arrive in boats at the Greek islands back into the Turkish territorial waters and also supported Greek law enforcement's violent pushbacks (Human Rights Watch, 2021b). Frontex is also accused of covering violations by Greek law enforcement.³⁷ Human Rights Watch recorded that in several incidents, armed and masked men accompanying the Greek coast guard attacked, detained, and pushed back migrants. The fact that Frontex deploys nearly 1.000 personnel to the Turkish-Greek land and maritime borders, organizes industry days with defense, security, technology, and information companies, and purchases systems that will violate the body integrity and personal information of migrants at the borders, and the lack of accountability in all these practices causes the boundaries of Frontex's real sovereignty to be questioned.

³⁷ "E.U. Border Agency Accused of Covering Up Migrant Pushback in Greece", The New York Times, 26.11.2020

"Germany's ZDF releases video of migrant pushback by Frontex in Greece" TRT World, 06.04.2021

"Frontex Involved in Illegal Pushbacks of Hundreds of Refugees", Spiegel, 28.04.2022

Greece frequently come up with practices that violate the human rights of migrants, such as delaying or preventing asylum applications of irregular migrants in need of international protection, or illegally detaining irregular migrants for a long time. Violations of rights are detected by human rights organizations in many areas, from strengthening border security to containing migrants. For example, it has been determined by experts that the powerful sound waves emitted by sound cannons, one of the equipment of Evros fence, may cause pain and shock in the human body, serious health problems and deafness (Washington Post, 2021). However, policies to strengthen border security, which put human life in the background, ignore these effects. Closed Controlled Access Centers built and under construction in the Greek islands funded by the EU are prison-like facilities when entry-exit controls, surveillance cameras, metal detectors, NATO-type barbed wires and high security measures are considered. Detention of Syrian migrants traumatized by the Syrian civil war in these centers brings with it the risk of re-trauma. Outsourcing the security of these centers to private companies is likely to lead to an irreparable human rights disaster in the future, due to the inappropriate behavior of private security personnel, the prolongation of detention periods due to the arbitrariness or the COVID-19 pandemic. In short, it may be determined that both the EU, Frontex, and Greece give priority to security-related implementations rather than human-related or migration-related ones in order to reduce economic and security concerns and prevent the EU citizens from losing their productivity and freedom, and therefore they try to cover up each others' human rights violations.

Human rights organizations and national/international media determined that the Greek law enforcement has violated migrant rights by sending back migrants in violation of the non-refoulement principle at the Turkish-Greek land and maritime borders, using violence against migrants, failing to take precautions against COVID-19 risks, confiscating migrants' personal belongings and clothes, and returning them to Turkish territorial waters in harsh weather conditions. However, in response to these accusations, Greece blames Turkey for opening the border gates and human smugglers and traffickers. Edirne events in 2020 show both how law enforcement forces use violence against migrants at their most fragile times and Turkey's attitude towards

migrants at the time of crisis. With the decease of 33 soldiers as a result of the conflicts in Idlib on February 27, 2020, Turkey decided not to prevent the passage of Syrian migrants to Europe. Some of the migrant groups that reached the Greek border the next day were able to cross the border, some were stranded on the Turkish-Greek border for a month until 27 March 2020, some were injured as a result of the intervention of the Greek law enforcement forces, and three migrants died. Following Turkey's decision to open its border gates, Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis stated that he would not allow any illegal entry into Greece and would increase border security. Turkish President Erdoğan stated that, *"We opened the doors, as of this morning, it has reached 18.000. Today, it can probably reach 25.000, 30.000. We will not close these doors in the future. We do not have to feed so many refugees."* (translated from Turkish, Hürriyet, 2020) and he ignored the humanitarian values of migrants and urged them to leave Turkey. The attitudes and violence of the Greek law enforcement officers and the Greek government against the migrants who gathered on the border within a month, may be listed as follows: three immigrants died as a result of the fire opened by the law enforcement officers, Greece did not accept asylum applications for a month, the Greek coast guard opened fire to push the boats into Turkish waters, used tear gas, water cannon and sound bombs at the border, Greece cut off financial aid to refugees, offered 2.000 Euros to migrants who want to voluntarily return to their country, detained nearly 500 migrants arriving at the island of Lesbos at the port for two weeks, detained refugees at the border, used violence, committed sexual assault, disrobed and sent them back to Turkey (HRW, 2020). In the face of these acts of violence, Greece was only verbally criticized by the United Nations and not subjected to any sanctions. The Greek government was also supported by the EU on the basis of the discourse that the Union is "determined to protect the external borders". Moreover, the European Commission opened the title of "A Robust Crisis Preparedness and Response System" in the text of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum published on 23 September 2020 and stated that the EU should be prepared in situations of crisis and force majeure. For this preparation, a new legislative instrument will be put into use to regulate temporary and extraordinary measures to be used in times of crisis. In other words, these temporary and emergency measures indicate the systematized version of the measures such as hard power and violence experienced by law enforcement officers at the Greek

border under EU legislation. Even after the Edirne incidents, a security and violence-based approach, which is far from a human and migrant-based approach, which will threaten human rights more, has been brought to the fore. These developments on the Turkish-Greek border in just one month show that the ongoing management crisis is added to the ongoing humanitarian crisis.

After the 2015 migrant crisis, another factor violating the human rights of migrants in the Aegean region is non-state actors. In the discussion of human rights violations, non-state actors will be divided into two as international organizations and private companies (NGOs that do not have an organic connection with the state actor and mostly try to support immigrants with limited funds are excluded from this scope). IOM and UNHCR, which are international organizations that provide first reception assistance support to migrants in hotspots in Greece, basically implement the migration and asylum policy of the EU. UNHCR and IOM took the lead in establishing and managing hotspots in Greece and providing cash assistance to migrants, however conditions both in the hotspots and in detention centers in mainland are not managed successfully because of unsafety, unsanitary, unprotection, lack of resources, and overcapacity and treatment of migrants are inhumane. On the other hand, the "voluntary" return of migrants is also carried out by international organizations. Therefore, it is known that international organizations whitewash the results of EU's migration and asylum policies in order to secure EU funding, not only in Greece but also in other third countries where the EU has externalized migration management. Apart from international organizations, private companies also directly or indirectly participated in the violation of migrant rights in the Aegean region case. It can be said that the technologies placed by defense industry companies to repel irregular migrants at land and maritime borders, or the private security guards in centers where migrants are held, directly violate the human rights of migrants. The vast majority of private companies, on the other hand, indirectly harm migrants by supplying equipment and infrastructure. The point that should be underlined at this point is that this organic link between private companies and the state, which is formed through migrants, becomes permanent. In other words, in the migration industry, the financial profits and political benefits created by the desire of preventing the endless source of clients, namely

migrants, lead to policies. That's why, on the one hand, international organizations want to do more to keep the flow of funds from a supranational institution like the EU, or in Greece and Turkey, the companies that won the state tender to strengthen the borders want to undertake more work so that the incoming money flow does not decrease. When there are human rights violations, cover-up is used. Ultimately, the lack of a reliable control mechanism indicates that migrants are instrumentalized by the states and thus human rights violations will intensify. In this context, the human rights violations by the EU, Greece, Turkey, and non-state actors in the Aegean region after the 2015 migrant crisis, the security-related and migrant-averse approach to the forefront rather than the human/migrant-related approach, and the fact that the EU-Turkey Statement does not contain a clause to protect the human rights of migrants constitutes an example of governance of migration management.

3.2.3. Embedded Migration in the Case of Aegean Sea

When it comes to global migration, states tend to realize their interests by collaborating with other states and non-state actors on an area other than migration and instrumentalizing migration in order to solve the migration issue. In general, it was mentioned in the sub-section 1.2.3 that global migration governance is quite limited because the main issue in globalization is not migration but migration and "something". In Betts's words, embedded migration (Betts, 2011: 13), that is, linking migration issues with other policy issues such as economy, development, security, foreign policy, has become a strategy normalized by the states leading neoliberal globalization in global migration governance. Since the 1990s, the issue of irregular migration has been intensively tried to be solved by linking it with trade agreements. The belief that poverty and unemployment will be reduced by creating foreign investment and employment, thanks to the free trade agreements concluded by migrant-receiving countries with migrant-sending countries, is accompanied by the belief that immigrants will voluntarily return to their own country. Discussing the 2015 migrant crisis in the Aegean region within the framework of embedded migration brings the necessity to link "migration and security" and "migration and foreign policy", as well as the necessity to link "migration and economy". The security concern surrounding the EU after the 2015

migrant crisis found its response in the condition that the economic parameters be stable in return for the stability of the security. The EU's land and maritime border management initiatives, which are discussed in the case study chapter of the study, prove this situation by providing financial aid to strengthen not only the borders of its own fortress, but also the borders of a third country, Turkey. In addition, linking migration with security shows that the EU is treated with a security-oriented attitude and not in a humanitarian way with a migrant-oriented approach. A humanitarian approach to migration is possible simply by providing decent living conditions to migrants, and in order to provide these conditions, it is possible to link migration with the economy, development, security, job and employment opportunity, but the difference is that if migration is linked to another policy area, it should be for the benefit and interest of migrants. As in the case of the Aegean region, not with financial money flow and profit-oriented cooperation between public and private actors. In migration management in the Aegean region, migration is embedded with economy, foreign policy, and security policies at the top level. For example, the most striking example that can be reminded in the fields of security and foreign policy is that Turkey linked the migration issue in the Aegean region to Turkey's foreign policy. On the one hand, Turkey has successfully turned this leverage into an inappropriate threat tool and invited the EU Member States to share the burden of Syrian refugees, on the other hand, it succeeded in lowering the critical voice of the EU towards Turkey's alienation from the EU due to its policies contrary to democracy and human rights values.

Embedding migration with other policy areas in the Aegean region is necessary to examine in two ways: the first embeddedness is the nation-state's realization of its own economic and security interests through concessions, tenders and commercial agreements granted to non-state actors, and the second embeddedness is economic aid such as the FRIT fund, which is implemented to improve the living conditions of migrants. In both cases, there is no focus on root causes related to the migration of Syrian refugees who migrated to Turkey, and both cases are suitable for "migration and something" characteristic. Now, the EU's handling of the situation in Turkey of the migrants who came to Turkey in the past 10 years and made a life here has become a

root cause.³⁸ Even though the improvement of the living conditions of migrants, the expansion of health services, the increase in the schooling rate of Syrian children, and vocational training programs were organized with the FRIT fund, the EU has stayed away from cooperation with Turkey, such as modernization of customs union, trade facilitation, abolition of quotas, in which the other actor of the region, Greece, would be involved.

After the 2015 migrant crisis, it was determined until this part of the study that an economic and security-centered approach rather than a humanitarian and migration-centered approach, with embedded migration relations between state and non-state actors in migration management in the Aegean region, prioritizes national interests. In this sub-section of the study, where the embedded migration characteristic is discussed, it would be useful to look at the emphasizing the necessity of linking migration with other policy areas in order to resolve the migration flow from Turkey in the discourses of the EU commissioners between 2016-2019, who gave a speech on behalf of the European Commission after the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement. Determining the years between 2016-2019 as the date range is not a choice, but a necessity, because in 2016 the interest in Turkey of the commissioners increases with the Statement and therefore their speeches. However, after the Statement was suspended by Turkey in 2019, there were no speeches about Turkey and migration management in the following years. As the method, the results of searches made with various combinations of the words Turkey, migration, refugee, security and economy (for example, Turkey-refugee-security or Turkey-migration-economy) were examined. Some of the discourses that most emphasize the embeddedness of migration are listed below:

14 April 2016, Speech of Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis at the Atlantic Council, “[...] *Political minds are focused on the refugee challenge. The terrorist threat is tangibly present. Geopolitical fragility threatens to overshadow everything else. Yet we need a strong economy [...] to cope with all of these challenges. Our place in the*

³⁸ Although, starting from April 2022, every political party in Turkey carries out a populist policy and carries out election propaganda on the grounds that they will send the Syrians in Turkey back to Syria, focusing on root causes in Syria or, more broadly, in the Middle East, is out of the question in any state policy in the region.

*world – **our soft as well as hard power** – will always depend on our ability to safeguard our economic fundamentals and on the success of our social-economic model. [...] we need more effective and unified border management, coordinated at EU level. It also demands sufficient funding to underpin agreements with countries like Turkey but also in the Middle East and across Northern Africa, [...] We won't be able to meet this challenge unless we have **strong and stable economic foundations**.[...]" (European Commission, 2016d)*

*25 April 2016, Speech by Commissioner Johannes Hahn at the Foreign Direct Investment and Investment Climate Conference, "Let me start by underlining that Turkey is our strategic partner. Given the current geopolitical situation, where **economics, migration and governance** are closely intertwined and the challenges coming from the extended region pose a threat to our common security, a comprehensive agenda between the EU and Turkey is, today more than ever, essential for our current and future relations." (European Commission, 2016e).*

*20 June 2017, Speech by Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos at the European Security, Borders and Migration Conference by Forum Europe, "I am happy to be with you here today, to open this conference on **European border management, defence, security, and migration**. We all know that these topics are at the very top not only of the European, but also of the global policy agenda. Two issues in particular, fighting **terrorism** and better **managing migration** are the two main concerns of European citizens today.[...]" (European Commission, 2017c).*

*21 June 2017, Speech by Commissioner Johannes Hahn, "[...] The drivers of migration are complex and multifaceted. There is no one-size-fits-all solution. This is why we rely on close inter-institutional collaboration, coordination with Member States and other stakeholders [...]. Supporting actions that maximise the link between **migration and development** is not only the surest way to address these issues in the long term, it is the only way. We must move away from a purely aid centered approach to real partnerships with our neighbours on all fields..." (European Commission, 2017d).*

2 October 2017, Speech by Commissioner Marianne Thyssen in European Regional Meeting of the ILO held in Turkey, “*European societies are, and will continue to become, increasingly diverse. Today, there are 20 million non-EU nationals residing in the EU. On the one hand: we must protect our borders; tackle irregular migration; and organise returns. On the other hand, we must help those in need of protection. If well integrated, migrants can contribute to the growth and competitiveness of our businesses and economies.*” (European Commission, 2017e).

8 April 2019, Speech by Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos at the Atlantic Council, “*These issues, migration and security, would decide elections, define governments, divide entire societies, and even – in our case – call into question the very fundaments of the European Union: 60-year project of peace, stability and progress.*” (European Commission, 2019).

All of the speeches made by European commissioners between 2016-2019 were speeches that included the issue of migration between Turkey and the EU and expressed how and what the EU's migration and asylum policy should be related to. Accordingly, when we look at the bolded keywords, migration management is pronounced together with other policy areas such as terrorism, economics, governance, border management, defense, security, development, growth, competitiveness, business. At this point, the point to be considered is not why migration is linked with these policy areas, but that embedding migration with these policy areas will serve the interests of the actors managing migration. Although some of the speeches here have pronounced keywords such as "the well-being of migrants" and "root causes of migration", the emphasis is not on the security of migrants or better economic conditions of migrants, but it is on the interests of state and non-state actors. In these policy attitudes where the dynamics of neoliberal globalization precedes a humanitarian and migrant-centred migration management, it will not be possible to talk about only migration governance. The “migration and something” characteristic in migration management, in other words the embeddedness of migration, highlights the necessity of using the governance of migration management conceptualization.



CONCLUSION

The fact that international migration movements have been more intense than ever before in the history of humanity in the intervening 30 years symbolizes that we still live in an age of migration. Migration is a phenomenon that has consequences in all political, economic, social and cultural fields, especially in world politics. Moreover, these outcomes of migration became more perceivable during the neoliberal globalization period, when migration movements evolved into migration crises. This study focuses on a very limited period of the international migration field with a specific approach and aims to reveal that the initiatives launched by states with other states and non-state actors to find solutions to migration issues are not migration governance, but governance of migration management. The public management mentality of neoliberalism has drawn the image that the migration field, whose main agent is human, is also manageable. Therefore, the desire of states to manage migration in order to control international migration movements and prevent irregular migration and crises has led to the establishment of a growing migration industry. The main actors of the migration industry are states and non-state actors such as international organizations, NGOs, and private companies. These actors may shape global governance, migration policies and provide financial gain through migration. Within the scope of this study, regional and bilateral relations were examined within the scope of migration management policies implemented by Greece, the European Union, of which Greece is a member, and Turkey, in the Aegean region after the 2015 migrant crisis, which was selected as a case study. In other words, the migration industry, which has been on the rise in the Aegean region after the 2015 migrant crisis, has been examined closer. Analysis and discussion of the collected data have been used to answer the main problematic of the study: whether the regional and bilateral cooperations, which are carried out based on the migration industry arising from the cooperation of the state and non-state actors, are governance of migration management.

In the study, the theoretical basis of the dissertation is the examination of the neoliberal state and its critique with the Foucauldian concept set, while its historical basis is the period in the transition from the welfare state to the neoliberal state, the

process of domination of the world by neoliberal economic policies, and the international migration movements in the period when neoliberal globalization was introduced. In the bipolar world established after the Second World War, the welfare state has been on the rise. In the welfare state combined with the Fordist mode of production, the mass production strategy and the increase in productivity and rate of profits resulted in mass consumption and hence mass welfare. The role of the state in this new regime of capital accumulation was interventionist, protectionist, and regulatory. However, the inability of the welfare state, which lived in a golden age in a short period of 30 years, to adapt to various political, economic, technological, social, and cultural changes, brought the capitalist accumulation regime into a new crisis. The remedy to this crisis of the welfare state, in which capital efficiency had come to an impasse, came from the neoliberal school. In the neoliberal economic system, the state is not expected to be included in the supply-demand relationship, but to make arrangements for liberalization, avoid interventionist policies, and leave the market on its own. In the 1990s, neoliberal economic policies' response to the crisis of capitalism, the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Eastern bloc, the acceleration and intensification of the globalization process brought neoliberalism and globalization to the same ground. Neoliberal globalization and the new capital accumulation regime led to the deepening and widening of capital through globalization, in other words, more accumulation of capital through financialization rather than production. While new financial activities such as outsourcing, privatization, denationalization, investment, banking, credit ensure the enrichment of economically developed Northern countries that are already industrialized, they caused the developing Southern countries, which could not keep up with international competition and were forced to implement neoliberal economic policies, to be crushed under poverty, unemployment, forced migration, environmental degradation, and underdevelopment. Therefore, looking from today, the burden of this whole process has been placed on the migrants fleeing from the wars, internal conflicts, and forced displacements caused by these reasons.

In this transformation of the political and economic conjuncture from the beginning of the 20th century to the beginning of the 21st century, the approach of the state to the issue of international migration has also transformed over time. Especially since the

1980s, states have come together through consultative processes, commissions, global forums, and dialogues to discuss how to better manage migration. However, at the same time in this period, the pioneering states of migration governance began to see the migrants, who came to their countries as labor reserves in the 1960s and began to become permanent, as a security threat. It is obvious that migration has become an issue that states consider when it poses a challenge to the sovereignty of the nation-state. After the 11 September attacks and various terrorist incidents in Europe, controlling the migrants who were stigmatized as a security threat and taking measures to prevent irregular migration became the dominant migration policy. When it comes to security and national interests, this made it impossible for states to come together under a single institutional roof and a binding regime. A uniform institutional body and binding regime could not be built for migration governance, but the cooperation of states with other states and non-state actors to regulate and manage migration flows led to the construction of a migration industry within the framework of the dynamics of neoliberal globalization. This emphasis on the economy and security related to the migration issue allows the study to criticize the concept of governance, to highlight the political economic approach, and to explain migration policies with Foucauldian conception of biopolitics. In the conceptual analysis of the study, the genealogy of the concept of governance was carried out through governmentality, global governmentality and global governance, and the concept of global migration governance was reached. While governance is expected to have a function that regulates state behavior based on rules, principles, and norms, it has been determined that global migration governance practices are far from this attitude. The fact that global migration governance does not go beyond dialogues, information sharing, or providing capacity-building training and therefore does not have a regulatory effect on state behavior, these governance practices are predominantly linked to economic and security concerns, and states' approach to migrants with biopolitical tools show that the management mentality rather than governance is dominant in the migration issue. Based on this argument, the study proposes the use of the concept of governance of migration management with three claims: power relations, human rights, and embeddedness of migration. These three claims are the outcome of the migration industry, which is shaped within the framework of the dynamics of neoliberal globalization. For this reason, this study focuses on the

migration industry established by the actors that came together to regulate and manage irregular migration and the diversity of actors, the relationship, and the roles between them within this industry. The scope of the study was narrowed to conduct the research at the regional level and the context of the study was based on the political economic approach.

The analysis of the migration industry was made within the scope of this dissertation by examining the regional migration management practices in the Aegean Sea as a case study after the 2015 migrant crisis. In this context, it is determined that a quite limited migration management policy was carried out in the Aegean region before the 2015 migrant crisis. Although there is a Readmission Protocol between Greece and Turkey, this protocol was not operational and low irregular migrant flows were passing through the land and maritime borders from Turkey to Greece at a level that did not cause the Greek administration to worry. Syrian migrants, who started to enter Turkey in 2011, were placed under temporary protection and reached 2.5 million in 2015, have been trying to enter the EU through Greece intensively since 2014 due to their unstable situation in Turkey and the migration of nearly 1 million migrants from Turkey to the Greek islands by sea in 2015 caused this situation to evolve into a humanitarian crisis called the 2015 migrant crisis. The main actors of the region, Greece, the European Union, of which Greece is a member, and Turkey, have included migration management into their political agendas more intensely than ever before. The 2015 migrant crisis marks a period when a humanitarian crisis has peaked since 2011, and it has been determined that the responses of the states to this humanitarian crisis aim to alleviate the security and economic concerns of the migrant-receiving countries rather than the elimination of humanitarian concerns. In the case study, which was taken at the center of the study, the two main tools of migration management; border management and externalization of migration, were examined and it was revealed how much money was spent trying to solve the economic and security concerns of the states. For this, public reports, EU reports, electronic public procurement platforms, public disclosure platforms, and archives of private companies were used. In this context, firstly, the border separating Greece and Turkey in the Aegean region was divided into two as land border management and maritime border management. In both border managements, it

is seen that states have delegated the task of strengthening border security to private defense, security, and technology companies through tenders. While irregular migration flows increase, the need for states to increase border security will increase at the same rate, so it is determined that private companies have become the primary partners of states on the one hand, and migrants have become an endless source of profit for companies on the other. Externalization of migration management, the second migration management tool of the case study, was carried out as a EU policy, by spending a significant amount of money to contain migrants both within the borders of the Greek islands and Turkey. International organizations and NGOs have been the primary partners of the EU in externalizing migration in the Greek islands and Turkey. Within the scope of the EU's policy to prevent migrants from crossing into the EU mainland through the funds it provides to Greece and Turkey, it has been determined that while Turkey is a neighboring country on the way to become a member of the Union, it has taken on the role of the gatekeeper of the EU. On the other hand, the containment of migrants in return for money in the Greek islands was used as a bargaining chip for Greece, which implemented austerity policies, and the irony created by the externalization of migration in the EU territories was determined. As a result of the examination of the financial data obtained, the existence of an ever-developing migration industry in the region has been revealed. In this migration industry, on the one hand, financial instruments such as funds, grants, and development aids occupy a large place, on the other hand, it is seen that the actors of the migration industry provide financial gain through these financial instruments. Based on the figures presented in this study, the financial volume of budgets, tenders and purchases for land and maritime border management in the Aegean Sea in a roughly 5-year period is nearly €1 billion, while the financial volume of the funds spent by the EU to Turkey and the Greek islands for the externalization of migration has reached €10 billion.

The financial data listed in the case study were subjected to a two-step analysis in the analysis section of the study. Accordingly, firstly, the migration industry revealed by the economic and security concerns of the migrant-receiving states was analyzed around the surveillance, containment, and financial nexus. Within the framework of this analysis, the diversity, relations, and roles of state and non-state actors that came

together for migration management in the Aegean region after the 2015 crisis were analyzed. From public institutions to international organizations, from NGOs to private companies, it is determined that numerous actors active in different policy areas and sectors come together. The state transfers its responsibilities by outsourcing the burden of migration and migrants in an upward, downward, and outward manner, and it is determined that among these three scales, downward outsourcing, namely privatization, has a wider place than the others. States mostly try to minimize public spending by using the privatization tool of neoliberal globalization. With the transfer of the responsibilities of the state, non-state actors, who have become intermediaries between the state and the migrant, assume the roles of facilitating, controlling, and rescue in a way that affects both the state and migrants. In the introduction part of the study, the three main subjects of this study are explained in detail: states, non-state actors, and migrants. In the conclusion part, based on the situation of these three main subjects in the migration industry emerged in the regional migration management in the Aegean Sea, the research questions of the study will be answered and the findings will be presented.

This study finds the use of the concepts of migration governance or migration management alone problematic. The approach of the concept of migration governance to recent global migration issues is not sufficient, moreover, there is no binding regime and uniform institutional body within global migration governance and the concept of migration management remains more state-centered. In that case, it is possible to respond to the question of how global migration is governed without a global regime within the framework of governance with the answer of governance of migration management. Rather than a global regime, various bilateral or multilateral agreements and conventions, legal regulations, and technical standards organize interstate relations on migration and attitude of states to migrants under the concept of migration management. Today, although global migration is a core issue of the global agenda, states' refraining from coming together for a binding regime on the global ground and their willingness to manage migration with regional and bilateral agreements show that migration is not a real global governance matter. Migration governance is not beyond power and sovereignty of the state, as states do not allow the global migration regime to

affect their sovereignty by transferring their power to a supranational institution. In addition to all these, the global society has experienced many humanitarian crises since the mid-1980s and knows how important and vulnerable human values are. On the contrary, when compared with the period when migration management initiatives started, it has been determined throughout this study that these human values only come to the fore in discourses, but that states manage migration with a security, economic, and control-centered approach in actions. On the other hand, the approach of not only the state but also non-state actors to migrants serves the interests of the state in order to eliminate economic and security concerns. While all actors mentioned are expected to participate in the governance process in an equal and democratic way, as a requirement of governance, decision-making processes in migration policies are mostly monopolized by the state. The cases where non-state actors participate in the making processes of migration policies are particularly discussed in the case study chapter of the study. However, this participation of non-state actors, on the one hand, serves the interests of the state and is under the auspices of the state, and on the other hand, this participation serves the economic and survival interests of non-state actors. In this context, migrants, who are the most important subject of all these processes, are sacrificed behind economic and security concerns. Based on all these findings, it is possible to claim that migration governance serves the interests of the state just as migration management is under the state monopoly. For this reason, neither migration is literally managed nor is migration governance implemented, what actually happens is migration management is the determining factor of global migration governance. In the governance of migration management, the state is not a monopoly power, but quite dominant; the existence of non-state actors cannot be denied, but they are not effective enough to drive governance; and migrants, the most important part of the process, are completely excluded from the process as they are included by being excluded.

Addressing the migration industry arising from the governance of migration management initiatives with a political economic approach has also provided the identification of some findings. These findings can be expressed in terms of two pillars of the migration industry. The first pillar is that the main financier of the migration industry is the state. The government finances the migration industry for two purposes:

firstly, to keep the sectors within the migration industry alive and to make a profit through the shares it owns in these sectors. Sectors such as border security, biometrics, deportation and detention within the migration industry are huge investment sectors, expressed in trillions of dollars, and governments, apart from companies, banks, investment partnerships, are the shareholders of these sectors. Secondly, with the perception that migration poses a threat to security and the economy, it finances the migration industry in order to protect its national interests at first hand and to steer the sector. The second pillar is that the state may finance the migration industry with soft law instruments such as trade agreements, readmission agreements, issue-linkage strategies. The state builds the migration industry by coming together with other states or non-state actors within the scope of soft law instruments, and just as global governance is non-binding, the flexibility of soft law instruments is used in regional and bilateral agreements, allowing the migration industry to serve its interests, as in the case of EU-Turkey Statement. In this context, the state while managing migration transfers money to non-state actors at the point where it coincides with its own interests. Therefore, it is determined that non-state actors that may take the responsibility of the state and reduce the burden of the state are promoted.

Based on all these findings, it would be appropriate to determine the roles of states, non-state actors, and migrants, which are the three main subjects of this study, within the political economic framework of the governance of migration management. In this industry, the state cannot be said to be minimalist and non-interventionist as in neoliberal thought. On the contrary, by taking the neoliberal mentality with it, it may both make maximum use of neoliberalism's tools such as outsourcing and privatization, and may be interventionist when it perceives a threat to its interests (economic crisis, migrant crisis). And although the state is the main financier of the migration industry, it is neither literally sovereign nor able to fully share its power in migration management. In this case, according to its interests, state either becomes the coordinator who prepares the political and legal ground, or it becomes a spectator behind the shadow state dominated by non-state actors. As for non-state actors, the fact that they take on the responsibilities of the state and assume intermediary role makes them one of the decision-making actors on migration policies over time. However, this decision-making

role is quite limited, because the state uses the power of non-state actors only as long as it is needed. In other words, while there is no problem in purchasing services from non-state actors and establishing financial relations, states ignore non-state actors when it comes to political representation. Finally, migrants, who are the most important part of this process, cannot participate in any of the governance of migration management processes, but they are instrumentalized by being a bargaining chip in return for economic aid or being leverage to gain profit in foreign policy. The fact that migrants are reduced to numbers, managed and calculated as a countable body by the actors who manage the process makes it clear that they will be more vulnerable and precarious in the future.

In the last section of the study, the main argument of the study was opened to discussion. Expressing the initiatives of state and non-state actors as governance of migration management for the solution of the migration issue has been tried to be verified with three claims based on the Aegean region case. The first claim is that the struggle of states and non-state actors with each other in the context of sovereignty and power relations prevents the formation of a suitable governance environment. The problematic power relations between states, states with non-state actors, states with migrants, or non-state actors with migrants prevent all actors from uniting on a common ground and making democratic, sustainable, fair, and equal decisions. In this context, management of migration comes to the fore rather than migration governance. The second claim is the violation of the human rights of migrants. Governance practices are expected to respect the human rights of migrants and support safe, orderly, and regular migration. However, the biggest challenge in front of migration governance is the violation of human rights by the main actors of governance. The third claim is that the issue of migration can never be handled as a human-centered migration issue by only taking into account the root causes and migrants, and is always linked to another policy area and instrumentalized in governance processes. In this case, the management of the migration issue is normalized, as it is the management of the economy, development, and security. Ultimately, based on these three claims and verifying these three claims in the Aegean region case, it is more appropriate to use the concept of governance of migration management instead of the concept of migration governance.

In the migration industry, a very significant amount of money is spent to stop migration and in reality, it becomes impossible to track where this money actually goes after a while. In some cases, it seems easy to keep track of physical expenditures. As in the case of the Aegean Sea, it has been determined that the states strengthen the border security with the money they transfer to private companies. However, it is not easy to follow up the expenditures made in areas such as the first reception or integration of migrants. However, although this can be followed up with some quantitative data, such as the schooling rate of Syrian migrant children or the number of migrants receiving health services, it raises a question whether the money allocated for migrants actually reaches the right targets and whether it is sustainable even if it does. In this context, it must be said that migrants can benefit from first reception and integration expenditures within the borders deemed appropriate by the states. At this point, as emphasized in the study, based on the rights-based approach to migrants some questions arise and require rethinking the effects of the migration industry: what would be the consequences if the money spent on migration management tools such as border management and externalization of migration was spent on integration, employment, and safe travel of migrants? Or could it be possible to create long-term positive effects in the lives of migrants with less money spent on migration management tools?

This study contributes to the International Relations discipline and to the migration literature in two ways. The study criticizes the concept of governance frequently used in the discipline of International Relations in which all related concepts are often included like an umbrella. This study problematizes the presentation of the managerial mentality of migration management under the guise of governance without regard to the human rights of migrants. On the one hand, states refrain from fulfilling their responsibilities in the field of migration policy and from entering under an international migration regime. On the other hand, non-state actors assume the responsibilities of the state in financial networks and begin to act like the state in areas that should be public policy. In addition to the blurred lines between state and non-state actors, the lack of accountability of non-state actors exacerbates more the violation of migrants' human rights. Therefore, the situation where the cooperation of states and non-state actors is expressed as governance, in fact, becomes a ground where mutual interests and financial relations are

carried out in the field of global migration governance. The fact that global migration governance is based on neoliberal dynamics, in other words, neoliberal migration governance is one of the main obstacles to a rights-based international migration regime. The study's contribution to the migration literature is the examination of migration management practices through the cooperation of state and non-state actors with a political-economic approach. Based on this examination, calling this cooperation with *the governance of migration management* aims to contribute conceptually to the literature. Studies with a political economic approach in the migration literature generally focus on the effects of migrants on the economy of the countries they migrated to. In this study, the financial relations in the background of migration management policies are enlightened and a contribution to the literature is made by looking at the cooperation between the state and non-state actors from a different perspective.

Rather than revealing an unknown truth, this study was actually produced by bringing together the daily life events and open source data. Although the purpose of this dissertation is to propose the use of the concept of governance of migration management, it actually aims to underline pointedly how overtly migration has been commercialized and how many different sectors have come together to establish a large business area. It may be the subject of other studies to examine how big a business area Europe and the USA have established with their investments in the migration industry and the regional and bilateral relations they have established. Although Turkey and Greece in the Aegean region are mentioned in this study, it is possible to encounter similar migration industries in other parts of the Mediterranean, Europe, Americas or different regions in the Far East. It would not be wrong to express that the migration industry will grow much more in the future. The member states of the EU, which are based on the values of solidarity, democracy, equality, dignity, and respect for human rights, stigmatize migrants as threat and now use hard power tools such as barbed wire, sound cannon, surveillance technologies instead of soft power tools such as visas and biometrics in border controls. When looking at the European territory after 2015, both the border controls and fences between the states on the internal borders and the controls of the European fortress on the external borders have increased. Considering

the situation in the world, global problems created by the pioneering states of neoliberal globalization, such as internal conflicts, famine, poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, energy and water shortage point to more relocation of fragile communities and thus more strengthening the borders of economically developed and stable states such as the EU.

This dissertation shows how states protect their interests by using the tools of neoliberal economy and how blurred the line between state and non-state actors has become. At the same time, it is based on examining migration management policies and criticizing that the migration industry exists for the interest of the state and that the state's approach to migrants is far from humanity. Unfortunately, the perception of migrants as a threat, the reproduction of this threat daily by the discourse of the state and the support of non-state actors, strengthens the migrant-averse and xenophobic attitudes towards migrants between the local people of countries where migrants are crowded. While this dissertation was about to be completed in the first half of 2022, the world witnessed the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine on February 24 and the displacement of 12 million Ukrainians (BBC, 2022). Poland, which did not accept Syrian migrants during the 2015 migrant crisis, welcomed 3 million Ukrainian migrants to its country after the Russian invasion. There is no doubt that Russia's invasion of Ukraine will strengthen the borders within European territory and increase the walls and fences. But at the same time, the fact that millions of Ukrainians have become refugees within the European continent will bring a difference to the perspective of migrants in the EU. Without going deeper into the global problems mentioned in the previous paragraph, namely the root causes of migration, humanitarian crises are inevitable as these problems are fueled by the pioneers of neoliberal globalization. Although it seems impossible to resolve migration crises with a global binding regime and a uniform institutional body in the long term, it is hoped that regional initiatives will be aimed at solving root causes of migration and protecting the human rights of migrants rather than serving the interests of states.



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