

# **The Effect of Foreign Language and Psychological Distance on Moral Judgment in Turkish–English Bilinguals**

by

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**KOÇ  
ÜNİVERSİTESİ**

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*I dedicate this thesis to all those who have been discriminated against on the basis of stereotyped beliefs...*

## **ABSTRACT**

### **The Effect of Foreign Language and Psychological Distance on Moral Judgment in Turkish–English Bilinguals**

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People’s judgements differ systematically while reading moral dilemmas in their native or their foreign language. This so-called *Foreign Language Effect (FLE)* has been found in many language pairs when tested with artificial, sacrificial moral dilemmas (i.e., Trolley and Footbridge). The first aim of this study was to investigate whether the FLE can be replicated in Turkish (native) – English (foreign) bilinguals using the same sacrificial dilemmas (Exp. 1,  $N=203$ ). These dilemmas have been criticized for being unrealistic and decontextualized in terms of protagonist’s identity, providing low external validity. The second aim of this study was (1) to address these problems by testing Turkish–English bilinguals with realistic dilemmas which included the protagonist’s age as a source of identity (child vs. adult vs. neutral), and (2) to investigate whether the FLE is present in these dilemmas (Exp. 2,  $N=467$ ). Our results revealed three main findings. First, the FLE was not present in Turkish–English bilinguals, tested either on artificial or realistic dilemmas. Secondly, moral judgments were affected by both the psychological distance of the dilemmas and the perceived age similarity with the protagonist, consistent with the *Construal Level Theory (CLT)*. Thirdly, the age information of the protagonists altered moral judgments in the opposite direction of the CLT.

## ÖZETÇE

### **Türkçe-İngilizce İki Dillilerde Yabancı Dil ve Psikolojik Mesafenin Ahlaki Yargılara Etkisi**

**Melisa Yavuz**

**Psikoloji, Yüksek Lisans**

**14 Haziran 2022**

Kişilerin okudukları ahlaki ikilemlerin ana dilde veya yabancı dilde olması yargılarında sistematik farklılıklara neden olmaktadır. *Yabancı Dil Etkisi (YDE)* olarak adlandırılan bu etki, yapay, kurbanasal (sacrificial) ahlaki ikilemler kullanılarak (Vagon ve Köprü) yapılan birçok dil karşılaştırmasında bulunmuştur. Mevcut çalışmanın ilk amacı, (Deney 1,  $N=203$ ) YDE'nin aynı kurbanasal ikilemlerle Türkçe (anadil) – İngilizce (yabancı dil) iki dillilerde bulunup bulunmadığını test etmektir. Ancak bu ikilemler, gerçekçi olmadıkları ve kahramanın kimliği açısından bağlamdan kopuk oldukları dolayısı ile de düşük dış geçerlilik sağladıkları için eleştirilmiştir. Çalışmanın ikinci amacı (Deney 2,  $N=467$ ) (1) Türkçe-İngilizce iki dillileri kimlik kaynağı olarak kahramanın yaşını (çocuk vs. yetişkin vs. nötr) içeren gerçekçi ikilemlerle test ederek bu eleştirileri ele almak ve (2) bu ikilemlerde YDE'nin mevcut olup olmadığını araştırmaktır. Çalışmanın sonucunda üç ana bulgu ortaya konmuştur. Birincisi, Türkçe-İngilizce iki dillilerde yapay veya gerçekçi ikilemlerde YDE bulunmamıştır. İkincisi, ahlaki yargılar ikilemlerin psikolojik mesafesinden ve karakterle yaş açısından algılanan benzerlikten *Kurgu Düzeyi Teorisi (KDT; Construal Level Theory)* ile tutarlı yönde etkilenmektedir. Üçüncüsü, kahramanın yaşına dair bilgi ahlaki yargıları KDT'nin tersi yönde etkilemektedir.

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

FLE	Foreign Language Effect
CLT	Construal Level Theory
LexTALE	Lexical Test for Advanced Learners of English

## Chapter 1:

### INTRODUCTION

*Imagine that a woman with a baby gets on the bus while you are on your way back home after a busy workday. You think you should offer your seat to the woman with the baby, but you do not want to remain standing all the way home. Would you offer your seat?*

Almost every day, people encounter such situations in which they have to make moral judgments. How people arrive at moral judgments has long been of interest to philosophers and psychologists (Cao et al., 2017). The dual process theory has been widely used to explain how moral judgments can be either deontological or utilitarian (Greene, 2007; Kahneman, 2003). Deontological judgments are driven by automatic processes and made in accordance with norms. In contrast, utilitarian judgments are driven by controlled processes and made by evaluating the consequences of an action. Previous research with bilingual participants has shown that moral judgments are affected by the language people use. Namely, using a native or a non-native language systematically alters judgments both in moral and non-moral contexts (Li, 2017). This effect, known as the *Foreign Language Effect (FLE)*, revealed that people are more likely to make utilitarian judgments in a foreign language when compared to their judgments in a native language (e.g., Costa et al., 2018; Geipel et al., 2015). Although the FLE has been tested in several native-foreign language pairs, this study is the first, to our knowledge, to examine whether the FLE generalizes to the Turkish (native) – English (foreign) pair in moral judgment research.

Research on moral judgments and the FLE have typically employed two moral dilemmas; the Trolley and the Footbridge dilemma (Foot, 1978; Thomson, 1976). However, the validity and generalizability of these so-called sacrificial dilemmas have been questioned by several researchers. First, sacrificial dilemmas typically lack information about the identity of the protagonist, i.e. the leading character in a moral scenario (Bloom, 2011; Hester & Gray, 2020; Schein, 2020). Secondly, sacrificial dilemmas are criticized as unrealistic, which again leads to questions about their validity (Bauman et al., 2014; Hester & Gray, 2020; Kahane et al., 2018). Realism of dilemmas might further influence moral judgments by changing their perceived psychological

distance in the hypothetical dimension (Körner & Volk, 2014; Trope & Liberman, 2010). According to the Construal Level Theory (CLT; Trope & Liberman, 2010), people's judgments become less harsher as the perceived psychological distance of the moral transgression decreases (Agerström & Björklund, 2013), thus increasing the tendency to make utilitarian judgments (Eyal et al., 2008).

To alleviate these shortcomings, the aim of the present study was threefold: (1) to investigate how information about the protagonist's identity, in this case age, may change people's moral judgments, (2) to assess the effects of psychological distance on moral judgments by developing novel realistic dilemmas, and (3) to examine the FLE to investigate whether it holds for the sacrificial, and the novel, contextualized and more realistic dilemmas by presenting them in the native (Turkish) and a foreign language (English).

### ***1.1 Moral Judgments and Dual Process Theory***

Moral judgments are defined as evaluations about who/what is good or bad based on virtues held obligatory (Cohen, 2015). There have been debates on the nature of moral judgments in various domains such as philosophy and psychology. These debates have been mainly centered on the role of emotions in moral judgments (Gill, 2007; Maibom, 2010). On the one hand, Kantian rationalists argue that moral judgments are driven by rational processes that do not involve emotions (e.g., Galotti, 1989; Kohlberg, 1971). On the other hand, sentimentalists who are the heirs of the philosopher David Hume argue that emotions play an essential role in moral judgments (e.g., Haidt, 2001). Greene (2007) brought these two distinct views together and proposed a *dual process theory* for moral judgments. This theory suggests that moral judgments are driven both by cognitive and affective processes, which lead people to make either deontological or utilitarian judgments.

*Deontological judgments* are prompted by automatic, affective processes, and they fundamentally rely on intrinsic beliefs about moral norms. That is, a judgment is regarded as deontological if it is made to be consistent with the moral norms. *Utilitarian judgments*, by contrast, are prompted by controlled cognitive processes. Since controlled cognitive processes are characterized by consciously evaluating the possible outcomes of a given situation, utilitarian judgments are the ones that are made based on the evaluations

of the consequences of actions (Hayakawa et al., 2017). The process which is more likely to be dominant while making a judgment could differ depending on various variables such as the language one uses (Costa et al., 2014), the content of the dilemma (Geipel et al., 2015), or the perceived psychological distance of the action in question (Barque-Duran, 2017).

Typically, in moral judgment research, moral dilemmas are offered to participants (Christensen et al., 2014). They can be described as hypothetical scenarios in which a situation with two conflicting but relevant moral reasons are described. Participants are first presented with a dilemma and then asked to choose one of two conflicting options. These conflicting moral options can be, for example, to save or to kill someone. One of the most used dilemmas in morality research is the '*Trolley dilemma*' introduced by Foot (1967). In the classic version of the Trolley dilemma, there is an out-of-control train heading towards five workers who are working on a track. There is also a sidetrack in which there is only one worker. The participant in this scenario is in charge of a lever to make a decision. If the person decides to pull the lever, the train will switch to the sidetrack and kill the one worker (i.e., utilitarian decision). If the lever is not pulled, the train will kill the five workers on the main track (i.e., deontological decision). The '*Footbridge dilemma*', which is another highly used scenario, is a modified version of the Trolley dilemma. There is again an out-of-control train which is headed to kill five workers. However, in this dilemma, the only way to save the five workers is to push a large man off a footbridge in order to stop the train. This action will kill the large man (i.e., utilitarian decision).

The dilemmas mentioned above are termed as 'sacrificial dilemmas' where you need to choose whether you would sacrifice one person to save more people (Crone & Laham, 2017; Kahane et al., 2018). In making a moral judgment, either deontological or utilitarian responses might be more dominant depending on the content of the moral dilemma (Geipel et al., 2015). For instance, for actions that are high in emotional salience, people are more likely to make deontological judgments via automatic processes. However, less emotional actions are mostly answered via controlled processes by making utilitarian judgments. These dilemmas are therefore commonly divided into being more personal or impersonal. More specifically, if a moral dilemma includes acts that involve direct physical contact with the victim which changes the consequence of the situation, it is referred to as a personal dilemma (Greene et al., 2009). Among the commonly used

sacrificial dilemmas, the Footbridge dilemma is a personal dilemma. This dilemma promotes deontological judgments (i.e., do not kill) by possibly leading to an increase in emotional arousal (Chan et al., 2016). On the other hand, the Trolley dilemma is an impersonal dilemma since the potential harm is conducted by using a lever rather than direct contact with the victim. The lack of direct contact reduces the emotional salience of the scenario; thereby promoting utilitarian judgments (i.e., sacrifice one to save five; Greene et al., 2004).

## ***1.2 Foreign Language Effect and the Underlying Mechanisms***

The first study on the FLE in moral judgment tested several native-foreign language pairs (i.e., English-Spanish, Korean-English, English-French, English/Spanish-Hebrew, Spanish-English; Costa et al. 2014). It was found that when people are presented with the Footbridge dilemma in their foreign language, they make more utilitarian judgments than when the same dilemma was presented in their native language. However, this effect was absent for the Trolley dilemma which implies that the presence of the effect varies depending on the context. These findings have been replicated with different native-foreign language pairs such as Italian-English/German (Geipel et al., 2015), Chinese-English (Chan et al., 2016; Geipel et al., 2015), English-German (and vice versa; Hayakawa et al., 2017), English-Spanish (and vice versa; Ciolletti et al., 2016; Hayakawa et al., 2017), Arabic-English (Andrade, 2021), and Dutch-English (Brouwer, 2020; but see Brouwer, 2019; Ćavar & Tytus, 2018; Dylman & Champoux-Larsson, 2020 for a failure to replicate the FLE).

There have been several explanations for the FLE in moral judgment. Firstly, the most prominent explanation has been that using a foreign language leads to emotional attenuation (e.g., Chan et al., 2016; Costa et al., 2014; Harris et al., 2003). Therefore, people are more likely to make utilitarian judgments when presented with moral dilemmas in a foreign language. This would then especially hold for personal dilemmas which are typically rated as more emotional than impersonal dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2007). Secondly, native and foreign languages are typically acquired in different contexts; while a native language is acquired in natural settings and through real-life experiences, a foreign language is often learned in classroom settings which are typically poor in such experiences (Keysar et al., 2012; Hayakawa et al., 2016). Consequently, it has been

argued that foreign language decreases the cognitive accessibility of moral rules and norms (e.g., Białek et al., 2019; Geipel et al., 2015; Li, 2017).

### ***1.3 Protagonist Identity and Psychological Distance in Moral Dilemmas***

#### ***1.3.1 Protagonist Identity***

Social psychological research has long established that people's judgments and attitudes are shaped by the identity of the person who is being judged (Hester & Gray, 2020), and age is a source of stereotyping in that one's age can shape expectations about that person (Hummert, 1999). For example, a study by Kwong See and Heller (2004) revealed that people set different standards for people of different ages in terms of their capabilities and performances in tasks. Similarly, previous studies have found that social categories such as ethnic background (Krings & Olivares, 2007), gender (Lunsford, 2000), immigration status (Costello & Hodson, 2010), and socioeconomic status (Qi et al., 2018) shape people's judgments and attitudes.

Although the influence of the protagonist's identity on moral judgment has not been studied extensively, Chu and Grühn (2017) investigated how moral judgments are influenced by the age and gender of the protagonist. They have found that when people are presented with moral scenarios including moral transgressions, people's judgments were perceived as less acceptable if the protagonist was old or female compared to when they were young or male. Additionally, White and Schaller (2018) investigated whether children as opposed to adults are judged differently in cases of moral transgressions. Their results suggested that children are judged less harshly as they are perceived to have less intentionality in their transgressions compared to adults. The argument regarding the intentionality and innocence is further supported by other research which also manipulated the age of the transgressor (preadolescent vs. adult; Maftai et al., 2021).

Although there are some studies that include information on the protagonist's identity, such information is often lacking in moral judgment research. For example, the only information given to the participants to make a judgment in the well-attested sacrificial moral dilemmas is the number of possible victims or broad characteristics such as 'large man' in the Footbridge dilemma. Yet, there is no given information about who these people actually are. In recent years, decontextualized methods of morality research have been criticized by questioning the validity of the moral dilemmas and the

generalizability of research findings that draw upon these dilemmas (Bloom, 2011; Hester & Gray, 2020; Schein, 2020).

In real life, people usually know the protagonist's identity (the *who* component) while making moral judgments about them, and shape their judgments accordingly (Bloom, 2011). For example, in the Trolley dilemma people tend to choose sacrificing one person to save five (Haidt, 2001). However, it is possible that those people would let the other five die if that one person to be sacrificed was a baby, an elderly or someone they know. Therefore, lack of information about the *who* component in moral dilemmas have led to a validity problem in morality research.

Another criticism of decontextualized dilemmas concerns the generalizability of research involving these dilemmas. Hester and Grey (2020) argued that when moral dilemmas do not involve any information about the protagonist's identity, people tend to imagine white, middle aged males which limits the results of moral judgment research. Thus, information regarding these characteristics might alter the results typically found in moral judgment research.

Taking into account these criticisms, we aimed to address them by creating contextualized scenarios in terms of protagonists' age.

### 1.3.2 *Psychological Distance*

Sacrificial dilemmas were recently criticized for describing events that are not likely to be encountered in our everyday lives (Bauman et al., 2014; Hester & Gray, 2020; Kahane et al., 2018). This issue led researchers to question the ecological validity of these sacrificial dilemmas and suggest further moral judgment research to construct their moral scenarios accordingly. We approach the criticism of the dilemmas being unrealistic from the perspective of the Construal Level Theory (CLT; Trope & Liberman, 2010). According to the CLT, when the self and the presence (i.e. here and now) are taken as reference points, the dimensions of psychological distance can be divided into four as temporal, spatial, social, and hypothetical. CLT argues that the psychological distance of information changes its processing; psychologically more distant construals are perceived as more abstract whereas psychologically less distant construals are perceived as more concrete. Although distances of the construals are argued to affect the type of moral judgments people make (Körner & Volk, 2014), the limited amount of research

concerning moral judgments suggests two possible patterns. First, utilitarian judgments are promoted *more* with increased distance (Aguilar et al., 2013; Amit & Greene, 2012; Gong & Medin, 2012) because the mind focuses more on the outcomes than the means due to an abstract mindset (Aguilar et al., 2013). Second, utilitarian judgments are promoted *less* with increased distance (Agerström & Björklund, 2009a, 2009b; Eyal et al., 2008; Eyal et al., 2009; Fujita et al., 2008; Körner & Volk, 2014). In this approach, the mind focuses more on the means than the outcomes due to a concrete mindset. This explanation is more consistent with the CLT because it also suggests that the focus on contextual details, thus making utilitarian judgments, is promoted more with a concrete mindset (Alper, 2020; Trope & Liberman, 2010).

In this study, we test the hypothetical dimension which corresponds to the probability of an event's occurrence. It has been argued that events are regarded as a part of one's direct experience as they are perceived as likely to occur in one's life (Wakslak et al., 2006). To our knowledge, hypothetical dimension has not been addressed before in moral judgment research. However, based on the arguments of the CLT, we would expect events with higher probability to be perceived as psychologically less distant, thereby promoting utilitarian judgments more.

#### **1.4 The Present Study**

The first aim of this study was to examine whether the FLE extends to a novel language pair, Turkish (native) – English (foreign), in two well-attested sacrificial moral dilemmas (i.e., Trolley, Footbridge). Secondly, it was examined whether the FLE can be found in novel, contextualized and more realistic dilemmas. With the use of such dilemmas, it was investigated whether having information about the identity of a protagonist, the person who is being judged, alters people's judgments. More specifically, the focus was on the age of the protagonist. Moreover, by making the dilemmas more realistic, we aimed to address the validity issues of unrealistic dilemmas while also examining the role of psychological distance on moral judgments.

In Experiment 1, the aim was to test if the FLE can be found in Turkish–English bilinguals. Given that the FLE was found in the Footbridge dilemma in a wide variety of language pairs (e.g., Andrade, 2021; Brouwer, 2020; Costa et al., 2014; but see Brouwer, 2019; Çavar & Tytus, 2018), we expected a similar effect for Turkish–English bilinguals.

We also added a question assessing the perceived psychological distance of the dilemmas to address the criticisms regarding the unrealistic nature of these dilemmas.

In Experiment 2, we tested the FLE by using novel, more realistic dilemmas in which we also manipulated the protagonist's age (i.e., child, adult, age-neutral). To assess psychological distance, we asked participants to rate the probability of the event happening in their own lives. Participants were further asked to rate the perceived similarities with the protagonist regarding age to measure how much they identify themselves with the protagonist. In terms of age, we expected that adult protagonists would be perceived as the most similar since our participants were adults; hence they would relate more to the adult protagonist. However, it was complex to have a certain expectation among child and age-neutral protagonists. If we follow the assumptions of the CLT (Liberman & Trope, 1998), it would be more appropriate to expect child protagonists to be perceived as more similar to the participants than age-neutral protagonists. That is because the child category is more concrete than the age-neutral category as CLT also suggests that contextualizing details decreases distance. On the other hand, not receiving information about the protagonists' age leads people to imagine them as adults (Hester & Grey, 2020); thus, age-neutral protagonists could also be perceived as more similar.

Overall, based on the arguments of the CLT, we expected that when the dilemmas are rated as psychologically less distant by the participants, more utilitarian judgments will be made compared to when they are rated as psychologically more distant. Additionally, we hypothesized that the age of the protagonists will have an effect on moral judgments. This effect could potentially go in both directions.

## Chapter 2:

**EXPERIMENT 1: REPLICATION OF THE FLE****2.1 Method**

Materials, data, and analyses are available online: [https://osf.io/qxr7p/?view\\_only=ce873cc1ceb74296a0acea21a5a48e1c](https://osf.io/qxr7p/?view_only=ce873cc1ceb74296a0acea21a5a48e1c)

**2.1.1 Participants**

203 participants were tested in total. Each participant was asked to answer demographic questions about their gender, age, countries of origin and residence, and native language(s). 14 participants, who reported that their native language was not Turkish, were excluded. 203 participants who were native speakers of Turkish with English as a foreign language were included in the analyses (133 females; mean age=21.03, age range=18-53). 95.1% of the participants were Koç University students, and each received an extra credit for a course. The study was approved by the IRB of Koç University Committee on Human Research.

102 of the participants were randomly assigned to the native group and 101 to the foreign group. The subjective scores of participants' self-reported English proficiency level was on average 22.55 ( $SD=3.82$ ) for the native group and 23.11 ( $SD=3.34$ ) for the foreign group. For the objective language scores as measured with *Lexical Test for Advanced Learners of English* (LexTALE; Lemhöfer & Broersma, 2012), participants in the native group scored on average 70.7 ( $SD = 12.88$ ) and the foreign group scored 71.31 ( $SD=13.17$ ). Some of the participants left the study without completing the objective and/or subjective language assessment tests. This resulted in different numbers in the measurement groups. Independent sample t-tests showed that participants in the native group were comparable to those in the foreign group, both in terms of subjective ( $t(188)=-1.079, p=0.67$ ), and objective language assessment scores ( $t(193)=-.331, p=0.99$ ).

**2.1.2 Materials**

The Trolley and Footbridge dilemmas were used as stimuli. The English versions of the dilemmas were adapted from Costa et al. (2014; Appendix A), translated into

Turkish by a Turkish–English bilingual, and checked by another Turkish–English bilingual.

### 2.1.3 Procedure and Design

The study was conducted online using Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). Participants were randomly assigned either to the native or the foreign condition (between-subjects). They then received all the instructions and the materials in a written format and in the respective language based on their assigned condition. Each participant was presented both with the Trolley and the Footbridge dilemma in a counterbalanced order (within-subjects).

Following each dilemma, participants were first asked to make a choice to decide whether or not they will pull the lever or push the man off the bridge in the Trolley and Footbridge dilemma, respectively. Sacrificing one person to save five corresponds to the utilitarian judgment whereas tolerating the death of five people corresponds to the deontological judgment. After this, participants were asked about the extent to which they evaluated the probability of the event happening in their lives on a 5-point Likert scale (1=unlikely, 5=very likely) after each dilemma to assess whether the dilemmas are perceived as realistic or not.

After providing answers to the questions for both dilemmas, participants filled out the demographic and English assessment questions. To assess their English proficiency levels, each participant filled out three questions adapted from the *Language History Questionnaire* (LHQ3; Li et al., 2019) to indicate the way they learned/acquired their non-native languages; the age at which they started using each language; and their listening, speaking, reading, writing abilities on a 7-point Likert scale (1=very poor, 7=excellent; a maximum score of 28 in total). In addition, participants were assessed on the LexTALE (Lemhöfer & Broersma, 2012; a maximum score of 100) as an objective measure of English proficiency. The experiment was self-paced and took approximately 10 minutes to complete.

## 2.2 Results

### 2.2.1 Foreign Language Effect

Table 2.1 shows the percentage of utilitarian judgments by language and dilemma type. Data were analyzed using a mixed-effects logistic regression model (Jaeger, 2008) with moral judgment as the binary dependent variable (0=deontological, no; 1=utilitarian, yes). To assess the first hypothesis - an increase in utilitarian judgments in the foreign language on the Footbridge dilemma only - the model included the direct interaction between Language (native (-1/2) vs. foreign (1/2)) and Dilemma Type (Trolley (-1/2) vs. Footbridge (1/2)) as contrast-coded fixed effects. Participants were entered as a random effect. The most parsimonious model included a random intercept only and no random slopes.

The results demonstrated an effect of Dilemma Type ( $\beta=-2.43$ ;  $SE=0.39$ ;  $z$ -value=-6.30;  $p<.001$ ), but no effect of Language ( $\beta=0.26$ ;  $SE=0.34$ ;  $z$ -value=0.77;  $p=0.44$ ) nor an interaction effect between Language and Dilemma Type ( $\beta=0.56$ ;  $SE=0.55$ ;  $z$ -value=1.03;  $p=0.31$ ) on Moral Judgment.

Table 2.1: Percentages of Utilitarian Judgments by Language and Dilemma Type in Experiment 1

	Native	Foreign
Trolley	67.6	64.4
Footbridge	21.6	31.7

### 2.2.2 Explorative Analyses


The perceived psychological distance of the Trolley dilemma was rated on average as 1.40 ( $SD=.77$ ) and the Footbridge dilemma as 1.39 ( $SD=.84$ ) on a scale from 1 to 5. A dependent samples t-test demonstrated no significant difference between these scores across dilemmas ( $t(202)=.397$ ,  $p=0.69$ ).

In addition, with a mixed-effects logistic regression, a significant effect of Psychological Distance ( $\beta=0.33$ ;  $SE=0.15$ ;  $z$ -value=2.15;  $p=0.03$ ) and an interaction effect between Psychological Distance and Language on moral judgment ( $\beta=0.81$ ;  $SE=0.31$ ;  $z$ -value=2.64;  $p=0.01$ ) were found, showing that participants responded more

utilitarian as the dilemmas were perceived as psychologically less distant when they were presented in the foreign language but not the native language (Figure 2.1).

Finally, for the participants in the foreign language condition, subjective ( $\beta=1.20$ ;  $SE=0.62$ ;  $z\text{-value}=1.94$ ;  $p=0.05$ ), but not objective ( $\beta=-0.22$ ;  $SE=0.15$ ;  $z\text{-value}=-1.44$ ;  $p=0.15$ ) language scores predicted moral judgment. More specifically, the odds of making a utilitarian judgment increased as the subjective language proficiency increased.

Figure 2.1: Interaction effect between Psychological Distance and Language on Moral Judgment



### 2.3 Discussion

The results of Experiment 1 showed four main findings. First, people make more utilitarian judgments in the Trolley dilemma than in the Footbridge dilemma. This finding is in line with previous studies which have shown that impersonal dilemmas promote utilitarian judgments (e.g., Geipel et al., 2015; Greene et al., 2004). Secondly, following previous studies (Andrade, 2021; Brouwer, 2020; Cicolletti et al., 2016; Costa et al., 2014; Geipel et al., 2015), we hypothesized that participants would choose utilitarian judgments more in the foreign than in the native language in the Footbridge dilemma (i.e. FLE). Although the descriptive pattern clearly was in line with our hypothesis, our results

did not reach statistical significance, suggesting that we could not replicate the FLE with this Turkish–English sample.

Thirdly, to assess how psychological distance affects moral judgments, we instructed participants to rate how likely the dilemmas are to happen in real life. Participants were overall more likely to make utilitarian judgments as they rated the dilemmas as psychologically less distant, which supports the hypothesis of the CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2010). More specifically, the interaction between psychological distance and language showed that the hypothesis of the CLT only holds in the foreign language condition.

Lastly, subjective assessments of foreign language proficiency showed that participants became more utilitarian in their responses as they rated themselves as more proficient in the foreign language, which indicates an increased FLE for highly proficient bilinguals. However, subjective language assessments of foreign languages could be inaccurate in the sense that they might not be representing real proficiency levels (Brantmeier, 2006; Sitzmann et al., 2010). This could, potentially explaining the contradictory finding regarding the relationship between subjective proficiency levels and the FLE.

## Chapter 3:

# **EXPERIMENT 2: FLE, PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE AND AGE EFFECTS IN REALISTIC MORAL DILEMMAS**

### **3.1 Method**

#### *3.1.1 Participants*

467 Turkish–English bilinguals ( $M=22.07$ ,  $SD=4.53$ , 73.7% females, 25.1% males, age range=18-57) took part in Experiment 2. 68.5% of the participants were Koç University students and they received an extra credit for a course for their participation. The study was approved by the IRB of Koç University Committee on Human Research. The average reported subjective scores of English reading, listening, writing and speaking abilities (measured on a 7-point Likert scale, out of 28) was 22.07 ( $SD=4.41$ ). Participants' average objective language scores were 69.23 ( $SD=12.83$ ) out of 100 points as measured by LexTALE (Lemhöfer & Broersma, 2012). 258 of the participants were randomly assigned to the native group and 209 to the foreign group. As in Experiment 1, some participants did not complete the objective and/or subjective language assessment tests, resulting in different numbers in the measurement groups. The results of the independent sample t-tests demonstrated that the participants in Turkish (L1) and English (L2) groups were comparable in terms of their total subjective language assessment scores ( $t(442)=-.722$ ,  $p=0.47$ ) and objective language assessment scores ( $t(463)=.919$ ,  $p=0.36$ ).

### **3.2 Materials**

Nine new more realistic moral dilemmas were developed for this experiment. The dilemmas were originally written in Turkish. They were then translated into English by a Turkish–English bilingual and checked by another bilingual. Each dilemma addressed a different moral norm which was identified by previous research (Aharoni et al., 2012 & Clifford et al., 2015). Each dilemma consisted of three different versions in which the protagonist's age was stated either as a child, an adult or age-neutral. Dilemmas were then followed by the question “What should the child/adult/person do in this situation?”. We did not use yes/no questions as we did in Experiment 1 since yes/no questions were argued to lead to a framing bias (Chan et al., 2016). Two options corresponding to deontological

and utilitarian responses were given. For example, the child version of the dilemma addressing the norm “do not cheat” is illustrated in Box 3.1 (see Appendix B for all scenarios).

### Box 3.1. Example dilemma in Experiment 2

A child playing a card game with a group of strangers would love to win the prize for the winner. The child who thinks s/he cannot win the game this way realizes that s/he can win if s/he cheats.

- If the child cheats, s/he will be unfair to the other players, but s/he will win the prize s/he sought.

- If the child does not cheat, s/he will not be unfair to the other players, but s/he will not be able to win the prize s/he sought.

What should the child do in this situation?

A. The child should cheat.

B. The child should not cheat.

### 3.3 Procedure

Data were collected online via Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). Participants were randomly assigned either to the Turkish (L1) or the English (L2) condition (between-subjects). Each participant was randomly presented with one version of each dilemma (e.g., either child, adult or age-neutral, within-subjects). In total, therefore, each participant read nine dilemmas. The dilemmas were counterbalanced and randomized across participants.

To assess the perceived psychological distance of the dilemmas to the participants, they were asked two questions; “*How would you evaluate the probability of this event happening in your life?*” and “*How would you rate your similarity with the hero of the story in terms of age?*”. After answering these questions, participants filled out the same demographic and the language assessment questions as in Experiment 1. The experiment lasted approximately 20 minutes.

### 3.4 Results

Data were analyzed using a mixed-effects logistic regression model (Jaeger, 2008) with moral judgment as the binary dependent variable (0=deontological, no; 1=utilitarian, yes). To investigate the presence of the FLE and the effects of age on moral judgment, the model included Language (native (-½) vs. foreign (½)) and Age Category (1=child, 2=adult, 3=neutral) as fixed effects. Adult was set at the reference level as it was perceived as the psychologically the least distant category by the participants. This resulted in two contrasts: (1) adult versus child protagonists and (2) adult versus age-neutral protagonists. Participants and Dilemma were entered as random effects. The most parsimonious model included a random intercept only and no random slopes.

#### 3.4.1 Foreign Language Effect and Age Category

The percentage of utilitarian judgments in the native condition (54.5%) was higher than in the foreign condition (45.5%), which is in the opposite direction of the FLE. There was, however, no effect of Language on moral judgment, indicating that the FLE was not found ( $\beta=0.03$ ;  $SE=0.10$ ;  $z\text{-value}=0.22$ ;  $p=0.83$ ).

Table 3.1 illustrates the percentage of utilitarian judgments by language and age category. The results demonstrated an effect of Age Category on moral judgment. More specifically, dilemmas with a child protagonist compared to an adult protagonist increased the odds of making a utilitarian judgment ( $\beta_{\text{CONTRAST1}}=0.24$ ;  $SE=0.10$ ;  $z\text{-value}=2.40$ ;  $p=0.02$ ), whereas dilemmas with an age-neutral protagonist compared to an adult protagonist did not affect participants' moral judgment ( $\beta_{\text{CONTRAST2}}=-0.07$ ;  $SE=0.10$ ;  $z\text{-value}=-0.65$ ;  $p=0.52$ ).

Finally, no interaction between Language and Age Category on moral judgment was found ( $\beta=-0.02$ ;  $SE=0.20$ ;  $z\text{-value}=-0.12$ ;  $p=0.90$ ).

#### 3.4.2 Age Similarity

Participants rated adult protagonists as most similar to themselves age-wise ( $M=3.29$ ,  $SD=1.22$ ), followed by age-neutral protagonists ( $M=3.23$ ,  $SD=1.24$ ), and then child protagonists ( $M=2.53$ ,  $SD=1.30$ ). Adult protagonists were not significantly rated less distant than age-neutral protagonists ( $p=0.38$ ,  $M_{\text{diff}}=0.063$ , 95% CI=[-0.05, 0.17]), but

both adult ( $p < .001$ ,  $M_{diff} = 0.768$ , 95% CI = [0.66, 0.88]) and age-neutral protagonists ( $p < .001$ ,  $M_{diff} = 0.705$ , 95% CI = [0.59, 0.82]) were rated as less distant than child protagonists.

The effect of Age Similarity on moral judgment showed that as participants rated the protagonists as more similar to themselves, they were more likely to make a utilitarian judgment ( $\beta = 0.10$ ;  $SE = 0.03$ ;  $z\text{-value} = 2.76$ ;  $p = 0.01$ ).

Table 3.1: Percentages of Utilitarian Judgments by Language and Age Category in Experiment 2

	Native	Foreign
Child	36.9	37.1
Adult	32.2	30.9
Age-Neutral	30.9	32.0

### 3.4.3 Psychological Distance and Language Measures

Participants rated the psychological distance of the dilemmas in Experiment 2 on average as 3.12 ( $SD = 1.39$ ) on a scale from 1 to 5. Psychological Distance had an effect on moral judgment ( $\beta = 0.15$ ;  $SE = 0.03$ ;  $z\text{-value} = 4.26$ ;  $p = 0.01$ ), as in Experiment 1, indicating that the odds of making utilitarian judgments increased as the dilemmas are perceived as psychologically less distant. This finding is in line with the CLT. Psychological Distance did not interact with Language ( $\beta = 0.02$ ;  $SE = 0.06$ ;  $z\text{-value} = 0.25$ ;  $p = 0.81$ ), unlike in Experiment 1.

In addition, subjective ( $\beta = 0.39$ ;  $SE = 0.20$ ;  $z\text{-value} = 1.97$ ;  $p = 0.048$ ), but not objective ( $\beta = -0.09$ ;  $SE = 0.06$ ;  $z\text{-value} = -1.41$ ;  $p = 0.16$ ), language scores predicted participants' moral judgments. More specifically, the odds of making a utilitarian judgment increased as the subjective language proficiency increased.

## Chapter 4:

### **GENERAL DISCUSSION**

The first aim of this study was to investigate whether we could replicate the previous studies showing a Foreign Language Effect (FLE) in sacrificial moral dilemmas (e.g., Costa et al., 2014; Geipel et al., 2015; Brouwer, 2020; Andrade; 2021) with a Turkish (native) – English (foreign) language pair. In Experiment 1, the Trolley and Footbridge dilemmas were presented to Turkish–English bilinguals either in their native or foreign language. Our results did not show the FLE, although there was a numeric trend in the expected direction. Absence of the FLE provides support for other studies which did not find a FLE either (Brouwer, 2019; Čavar & Tytus, 2018; Dylman & Champoux-Larsson, 2020). In Experiment 2, we further explored whether the FLE could be found with the Turkish–English pair in more realistic dilemmas. Our results again did not show a FLE.

Several reasons could be given why the FLE was not present for the sacrificial moral dilemmas in Experiment 1. First, our participants were highly proficient in English, as measured by subjective and objective measures. Previous studies showed that a high self-rated foreign language proficiency may reduce the FLE (Brouwer et al., 2019; Čavar & Tytus, 2018; Costa et al., 2014), possibly leading people to experience a similar emotional distance in the foreign language as in the native language. Second, most of our participants were using the foreign language regularly, mainly because their studies were in the tested foreign language. The frequent use of a foreign language in daily life has been argued as another factor that potentially reduces the FLE (Circi et al., 2021; Dylman et al., 2020). Finally, the Turkish-English pair has not been tested before for the FLE. It is possible that the effect is not present for this language pair. However, this needs to be investigated further with different samples, especially with people who are less highly proficient in English as a foreign language.

The lack of a FLE effect in Experiment 2 can also be explained with the reasons given above. In addition, characteristics of the dilemmas could have affected the FLE. Previous studies on the FLE have used artificial and highly emotional dilemmas. It is possible that the FLE typically exists for such dilemmas, but not for realistic dilemmas as we used in Experiment 2. Additionally, cultural differences could have played a role. For example, the moral norms used in Experiment 2 (e.g., “swearing”, “lying”) were different

from those used in Experiment 1 (e.g., "do not kill"). Norms in one culture may elicit different degrees of importance in another culture.

As our second aim, we addressed the criticisms regarding the use of sacrificial dilemmas as not being realistic (Bauman et al., 2014; Hester & Gray, 2020). We therefore developed more realistic moral dilemmas for Experiment 2, which test the hypothetical dimension of the CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2010). In line with the criticisms, sacrificial dilemmas in Experiment 1 were descriptively rated as less realistic, thus more distant, than the dilemmas in Experiment 2. More importantly, we found that participants tended to be more utilitarian as the dilemmas were rated as less distant. This finding supports the rationale of the CLT that people are more likely to rely on the consequences of their actions (e.g., make a utilitarian judgment) when they are faced with psychologically less distant situations (e.g., Eyal et al., 2009; Körner & Volk, 2014).

Notwithstanding, in Experiment 1, this response trend was found to prevail only in the foreign language condition, while there was no effect of language in Experiment 2. We suggest that the underlying reason might be the increased active thinking in the foreign language which promotes utilitarian judgements. Previous research has suggested that a foreign language, compared to a native language, leads to systematic thinking due to more deliberate processing in a foreign language (Keysar et al., 2012). However, in Experiment 2, language did not affect participants' response trend based on psychological distance. The reason behind these differing results regarding the effect of language might be the more realistic and contextualized nature of the dilemmas in Experiment 2. With the details provided in those realistic dilemmas, active thinking might have been promoted in general, eliminating the effect of language itself.

Addressing another criticism regarding decontextualized moral dilemmas, we manipulated the age category of the protagonists in Experiment 2. We found that providing age information of the protagonists in moral dilemmas altered moral judgments. Participants responded with more utilitarian judgments when faced with dilemmas where the protagonist was a child compared to an adult. As the child category is rated as the most distant age category, our finding supports one line of research (e.g., Aguilar et al., 2013; Amit & Greene, 2012; Gong & Medin, 2012) whereas contradicting the CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2010). The reason may be that the distant category selected for this study was the *child* category. It is possible that children and their moral transgressions are considered as morally exceptional, because previous research has

shown that children and adults tend to be judged differently in cases of moral transgressions (Chu & Grühn, 2017; Maftai et al., 2021). In particular, children are often judged less harshly than adults when they do not comply with the moral rule (White & Schaller, 2018). Perhaps if the age categories were chosen differently, we might have obtained different results. For example, future research could compare the adult category (i.e., close) with an elderly category (i.e., distant).

Our results further showed that people's moral judgments of others change based on how related they perceive themselves to be with the protagonist. Notably, utilitarian judgments increased as participants rated the protagonists' age as more similar to theirs. Participants rated adult and age-neutral protagonists as the most similar to themselves, with no statistical difference between the two age categories. This indifference confirms Hester and Grey's (2020) argument that people mostly imagine adults as the protagonists when they do not have any age information available. Moreover, the finding that both the adult category and the age-neutral category were rated as more similar than the child category confirmed our hypothesis and the assumption of the CLT.

Age similarity in our study also tests the social dimension of the CLT; the protagonist is perceived as closer to oneself as the age is rated as more similar. This closeness, in turn, increased utilitarian judgments. If we look from another perspective, we can interpret the results in the context of egocentric biases people have in moral judgments. Research suggests that people tend to favor moral transgressions more if the consequences are beneficial for them (Bocian & Wojciszke, 2014). Participants in our study might have adopted this egocentric bias more as they perceived the protagonist as closer to themselves. Consequently, their tendency to make utilitarian judgments might have been increased due to their orientation towards choosing the option that would benefit them the most.

This study has two limitations. First, we did not ask participants to explicitly state whether they have experienced the events in their own lives before. It has been previously shown that people's moral concerns could differ depending on whether they have experienced a similar event before (Carpendale & Krebs, 1995). Depending on the subjective experience of the person with the particular event, their judgments might become subject to response biases. This might be an important question to consider asking in the future, mainly for more realistic dilemmas.

Secondly, we collected our data online due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The inability to collect offline data may have had a significant impact, especially in the absence of the FLE, by preventing us from conducting a sufficiently controlled experiment. It is possible that the participants in the foreign language condition might have used dictionaries or translation devices if they had difficulty in understanding the dilemmas. The use of these tools may have in turn caused the FLE to be absent by eliminating the differences in processing type between the native and the foreign language.

In conclusion, our experiments contribute to the literature on the FLE, and more specifically, tested the role of the hypothetical and the social dimension of the CLT on moral judgments. Our findings demonstrated no FLE for Turkish-English bilinguals which was in line with some of the previous research (Brouwer, 2019; Cavar & Tytus, 2018; Dylman & Champoux-Larsson, 2020).

However, we did find two pieces of evidence in line with the CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2010). First, psychological distance was found to affect moral judgments across our two experiments, showing that psychologically less distant construals are more likely to promote utilitarian judgments. Secondly, the perception of increased similarity between the protagonist's age and oneself promoted utilitarian judgments. At the same time, providing age information of the protagonists in moral dilemmas affected moral judgments, but in the opposite direction of the CLT, which could be due to the special moral status of children.

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## Appendix A: Dilemmas in Experiment 1

### English versions

#### *Trolley*

A train is going down a track very fast towards five people. The train has a problem and cannot be stopped. Five people will die if you stay on this track. There is another track that you can use to divert the train. At the end of this track there is one man that will die if you change the track.

Would you change the track?

- a. Yes
- b. No

#### *Footbridge*

A train is going down a track very fast towards five people. The train has a problem and cannot be stopped, unless a heavy weight is dropped on the track. You are on a bridge, and there is a very fat man next to you - your only way to stop the train is to push him onto the track, killing him to save five people.

Would you push him?

- a. Yes
- b. No

### Turkish versions

#### *Trolley*

Raylarda hızla ilerleyen bir tren beş kişinin üstüne doğru yol almaktadır. Tren bir problem nedeniyle durdurulamamaktadır. Eğer bu rayda devam ederseniz beş kişi ölecektir. Ancak, trenin yolunu değiştirebileceğiniz ikinci bir ray bulunmaktadır. Yolu değiştirmeniz halinde ise bu raydaki bir kişi ölecek.

Yolu değiştirir miydiniz?

- a. Evet
- b. Hayır

#### *Footbridge*

Raylarda hızla ilerleyen bir tren beş kişinin üstüne doğru yol almaktadır. Trende bir problem vardır ve raylara ağır bir yük atılmadığı sürece durdurulamamaktadır. Siz ise bir köprüdesiniz ve yanınızda oldukça şişman biri bulunmaktadır. Treni durdurmanızın tek yolu bu adamı raylara iterek onu öldürmek ve beş kişinin kurtulmasını sağlamaktır.

Adamı iter miydiniz?

- a. Evet
- b. Hayır

**The question which was asked after each dilemma (English & Turkish versions):**

- How would you evaluate the probability of this event happening in your life? (1 = unlikely, 5 = very likely)

1 2 3 4 5

- Bu olayın kendi hayatınızda gerçekleşme ihtimalini nasıl değerlendirirsiniz? (1=hiç olası değil, 5=çok olası)

1 2 3 4 5



## Appendix B: Dilemmas in Experiment 2

\* The protagonist was not written in bold when presented to participants. They are bold in the Appendix only for clarity for the reader.

**English Versions***1. Lost Money*

<b>Child</b>	<b>Adult</b>	<b>Neutral</b>
<p>A <b>child</b> going to a pharmacy finds money on the street and takes the money. Realizing that s/he does not have enough money for the drugs s/he needs to buy, this child is considering paying with the money s/he finds.</p> <p>- If the <b>child</b> uses the money s/he finds on the street for the payment, s/he will be able to buy the drugs, but will have used someone else's money without permission.</p> <p>- If the <b>child</b> does not use the money s/he finds on the street for the payment, s/he will not be able to buy the drugs, but will not have used someone else's money without permission.</p> <p>What should the <b>child</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>child</b> should use the money. B. The <b>child</b> should not use the money.</p>	<p>An <b>adult</b> going to a pharmacy finds money on the street and takes the money. Realizing that s/he does not have enough money for the drugs s/he needs to buy, this child is considering paying with the money s/he finds.</p> <p>- If the <b>adult</b> uses the money s/he finds on the street for the payment, s/he will be able to buy the drugs, but will have used someone else's money without permission.</p> <p>- If the <b>adult</b> does not use the money s/he finds on the street for the payment, s/he will not be able to buy the drugs, but will not have used someone else's money without permission.</p> <p>What should the <b>adult</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>adult</b> should use the money. B. The <b>adult</b> should not use the money.</p>	<p>A <b>person</b> going to a pharmacy finds money on the street and takes the money. Realizing that s/he does not have enough money for the drugs s/he needs to buy, this child is considering paying with the money s/he finds.</p> <p>- If the <b>person</b> uses the money s/he finds on the street for the payment, s/he will be able to buy the drugs, but will have used someone else's money without permission.</p> <p>- If the <b>person</b> does not use the money s/he finds on the street for the payment, s/he will not be able to buy the drugs, but will not have used someone else's money without permission.</p> <p>What should the <b>person</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>person</b> should use the money. B. The <b>person</b> should not use the money.</p>

## 2. Swearing

Child	Adult	Neutral
<p>A <b>child</b> who ordered pizza gets angry because the order arrives late. The <b>child</b> wants to swear at the deliveryman who brings the pizza to release his/her anger.</p> <p>- If the <b>child</b> swears at the deliveryman, s/he will release his/her anger, but will hurt the deliveryman's feelings. - If the <b>child</b> does not swear at the deliveryman, s/he will not release his/her anger, but will not hurt the deliveryman's feelings.</p> <p>What should the <b>child</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>child</b> should swear at the deliveryman. B. The <b>child</b> should not swear at the deliveryman.</p>	<p>An <b>adult</b> who ordered pizza gets angry because the order arrives late. The <b>adult</b> wants to swear at the deliveryman who brings the pizza to release his/her anger.</p> <p>- If the <b>adult</b> swears at the deliveryman, s/he will release his/her anger, but will hurt the deliveryman's feelings. - If the <b>adult</b> does not swear at the deliveryman, s/he will not release his/her anger, but will not hurt the deliveryman's feelings.</p> <p>What should the <b>adult</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>adult</b> should swear at the deliveryman. B. The <b>adult</b> should not swear at the deliveryman.</p>	<p>A <b>person</b> who ordered pizza gets angry because the order arrives late. The <b>person</b> wants to swear at the deliveryman who brings the pizza to release his/her anger.</p> <p>- If the <b>person</b> swears at the deliveryman, s/he will release his/her anger, but will hurt the deliveryman's feelings. - If the <b>person</b> does not swear at the deliveryman, s/he will not release his/her anger, but will not hurt the deliveryman's feelings.</p> <p>What should the <b>person</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>person</b> should swear at the deliveryman. B. The <b>person</b> should not swear at the deliveryman.</p>

## 3. Pulling Hair

Child	Adult	Neutral
<p>During a flight, a <b>child</b> asks for a pillow from the flight attendant. The flight attendant takes a sarcastic attitude towards the <b>child's</b> request. The <b>child</b>, who is annoyed with this attitude, wants to pull the flight attendant's hair.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- If the <b>child</b> pulls the flight attendant's hair, s/he will react to this annoying attitude, but will cause the flight attendant to scream.</li> <li>- If the <b>child</b> does not pull the flight attendant's hair, s/he will not react to this annoying attitude, but will not cause the flight attendant to scream.</li> </ul> <p>What should the <b>child</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>child</b> should pull the flight attendant's hair.  B. The <b>child</b> should not pull the flight attendant's hair.</p>	<p>During a flight, an <b>adult</b> asks for a pillow from the flight attendant. The flight attendant takes a sarcastic attitude towards the <b>adult's</b> request. The <b>adult</b>, who is annoyed with this attitude, wants to pull the flight attendant's hair.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- If the <b>adult</b> pulls the flight attendant's hair, s/he will react to this annoying attitude, but will cause the flight attendant to scream.</li> <li>- If the <b>adult</b> does not pull the flight attendant's hair, s/he will not react to this annoying attitude, but will not cause the flight attendant to scream.</li> </ul> <p>What should the <b>adult</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>adult</b> should pull the flight attendant's hair.  B. The <b>adult</b> should not pull the flight attendant's hair.</p>	<p>During a flight, a <b>person</b> asks for a pillow from the flight attendant. The flight attendant takes a sarcastic attitude towards the <b>person's</b> request. The <b>person</b>, who is annoyed with this attitude, wants to pull the flight attendant's hair.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- If the <b>person</b> pulls the flight attendant's hair, s/he will react to this annoying attitude, but will cause the flight attendant to scream.</li> <li>- If the <b>person</b> does not pull the flight attendant's hair, s/he will not react to this annoying attitude, but will not cause the flight attendant to scream.</li> </ul> <p>What should the <b>person</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>person</b> should pull the flight attendant's hair.  B. The <b>person</b> should not pull the flight attendant's hair.</p>

## 4. Lying

Child	Adult	Neutral
<p>One of the <b>children</b> in a friend group is being wronged by the others. Realizing this, another <b>child</b> thinks that if s/he lies to the <b>children</b> in the group, s/he can save her/his friend from the injustice.</p> <p>- If the <b>child</b> lies, s/he will be able to save her/his friend, but s/he will lie to the group. - If the <b>child</b> does not lie, s/he won't be able to save her/his friend, but s/he will not lie to the group.</p> <p>What should the <b>child</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>child</b> should lie. B. The <b>child</b> should not lie.</p>	<p>One of the <b>adults</b> in a friend group is being wronged by the others. Realizing this, another <b>adult</b> thinks that if s/he lies to the <b>adults</b> in the group, s/he can save her/his friend from the injustice.</p> <p>- If the <b>adult</b> lies, s/he will be able to save her/his friend, but s/he will lie to the group. - If the <b>adult</b> does not lie, s/he won't be able to save her/his friend, but s/he will not lie to the group.</p> <p>What should the <b>adult</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>adult</b> should lie. B. The <b>adult</b> should not lie.</p>	<p>One of the <b>people</b> in a friend group is being wronged by the others. Realizing this, another <b>person</b> thinks that if s/he lies to the <b>people</b> in the group, s/he can save her/his friend from the injustice.</p> <p>- If the <b>person</b> lies, s/he will be able to save her/his friend, but s/he will lie to the group. - If the <b>person</b> does not lie, s/he won't be able to save her/his friend, but s/he will not lie to the group.</p> <p>What should the <b>person</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>person</b> should lie. B. The <b>person</b> should not lie.</p>

5. *Insulting*

<b>Child</b>	<b>Adult</b>	<b>Neutral</b>
<p>A <b>child</b> who has just joined a friend group wants to be accepted by those in the group. For this, the <b>child</b> thinks to comment loudly about how ugly the outfit of the person who is not liked by the group as s/he is passing by.</p> <p>- If the <b>child</b> comments, s/he will be accepted by those in the group, but will upset the person s/he will comment on.</p> <p>- If the <b>child</b> does not comment, s/he will not be accepted by those in the group, but will not upset the person s/he will comment on.</p> <p>What should the <b>child</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>child</b> should comment.</p> <p>B. The <b>child</b> should not comment.</p>	<p>An <b>adult</b> who has just joined a friend group wants to be accepted by those in the group. For this, the <b>adult</b> thinks to comment loudly about how ugly the outfit of the person who is not liked by the group as s/he is passing by.</p> <p>- If the <b>adult</b> comments, s/he will be accepted by those in the group, but will upset the person s/he will comment on.</p> <p>- If the <b>adult</b> does not comment, s/he will not be accepted by those in the group, but will not upset the person s/he will comment on.</p> <p>What should the <b>adult</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>adult</b> should comment.</p> <p>B. The <b>adult</b> should not comment.</p>	<p>A <b>person</b> who has just joined a friend group wants to be accepted by those in the group. For this, the <b>person</b> thinks to comment loudly about how ugly the outfit of the person who is not liked by the group as s/he is passing by.</p> <p>- If the <b>person</b> comments, s/he will be accepted by those in the group, but will upset the person s/he will comment on.</p> <p>- If the <b>person</b> does not comment, s/he will not be accepted by those in the group, but will not upset the person s/he will comment on.</p> <p>What should the <b>person</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>person</b> should comment.</p> <p>B. The <b>person</b> should not comment.</p>

## 6. Cheating

Child	Adult	Neutral
<p>A <b>child</b> playing a card game with a group of strangers would love to win the prize for the winner. The <b>child</b> who thinks s/he cannot win the game this way realizes that s/he can win if s/he cheats.</p> <p>- If the <b>child</b> cheats, s/he will be unfair to the other players, but s/he will win the prize s/he sought.</p> <p>- If the <b>child</b> does not cheat, s/he will not be unfair to the other players, but s/he will not be able to win the prize s/he sought.</p> <p>What should the <b>child</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>child</b> should cheat.</p> <p>B. The <b>child</b> should not cheat.</p>	<p>An <b>adult</b> playing a card game with a group of strangers would love to win the prize for the winner. The <b>adult</b> who thinks s/he cannot win the game this way realizes that s/he can win if s/he cheats.</p> <p>- If the <b>adult</b> cheats, s/he will be unfair to the other players, but s/he will win the prize s/he sought.</p> <p>- If the <b>adult</b> does not cheat, s/he will not be unfair to the other players, but s/he will not be able to win the prize s/he sought.</p> <p>What should the <b>adult</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>adult</b> should cheat.</p> <p>B. The <b>adult</b> should not cheat.</p>	<p>A <b>person</b> playing a card game with a group of strangers would love to win the prize for the winner. The <b>person</b> who thinks s/he cannot win the game this way realizes that s/he can win if s/he cheats.</p> <p>- If the <b>person</b> cheats, s/he will be unfair to the other players, but s/he will win the prize s/he sought.</p> <p>- If the <b>person</b> does not cheat, s/he will not be unfair to the other players, but s/he will not be able to win the prize s/he sought.</p> <p>What should the <b>person</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>person</b> should cheat.</p> <p>B. The <b>person</b> should not cheat.</p>

7. *Breaking rules*

Child	Adult	Neutral
<p>There is a certain dressing rule in a school. A <b>child</b> attending this school does not feel comfortable when dressed in a way that complies with these rules.</p> <p>- If the <b>child</b> dresses the way s/he wants, s/he will be breaking the rules, but s/he will feel comfortable.</p> <p>- If the <b>child</b> does not dress the way s/he wants, s/he will not be breaking the rules, but s/he will not feel comfortable.</p> <p>What should the <b>child</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>child</b> should dress as s/he wants. B. The <b>child</b> should not dress as s/he wants.</p>	<p>There is a certain dressing rule in a school. An <b>adult</b> attending this school does not feel comfortable when dressed in a way that complies with these rules.</p> <p>- If the <b>adult</b> dresses the way s/he wants, s/he will be breaking the rules, but s/he will feel comfortable.</p> <p>- If the <b>adult</b> does not dress the way s/he wants, s/he will not be breaking the rules, but s/he will not feel comfortable.</p> <p>What should the <b>adult</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>adult</b> should dress as s/he wants. B. The <b>adult</b> should not dress as s/he wants.</p>	<p>There is a certain dressing rule in a school. A <b>person</b> attending this school does not feel comfortable when dressed in a way that complies with these rules.</p> <p>- If the <b>person</b> dresses the way s/he wants, s/he will be breaking the rules, but s/he will feel comfortable.</p> <p>- If the <b>child</b> does not dress the way s/he wants, s/he will not be breaking the rules, but s/he will not feel comfortable.</p> <p>What should the <b>person</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>person</b> should dress as s/he wants. B. The <b>person</b> should not dress as s/he wants.</p>

8. *Breaking Promise*

<b>Child</b>	<b>Adult</b>	<b>Neutral</b>
<p>A <b>child</b> promises her/his friend to meet him. On the day of the meeting, another friend, with whom the <b>child</b> enjoys meeting more, invites her/him to his home.</p> <p>- If the <b>child</b> meets her/his friend whom he enjoys meeting more, s/he will spend his day more enjoyable, but s/he will not keep her/his promise to the other friend.</p> <p>- If the <b>child</b> does not meet her/his friend whom s/he enjoys meeting more, s/he will not have a very enjoyable day, but s/he will keep her/his promise to the other friend.</p> <p>What should the <b>child</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>child</b> should keep her/his promise. B. The <b>child</b> should not keep her/his promise.</p>	<p>An <b>adult</b> promises her/his friend to meet him. On the day of the meeting, another friend, with whom the <b>adult</b> enjoys meeting more, invites her/him to his home.</p> <p>- If the <b>adult</b> meets her/his friend whom he enjoys meeting more, s/he will spend his day more enjoyable, but s/he will not keep her/his promise to the other friend.</p> <p>- If the <b>adult</b> does not meet her/his friend whom s/he enjoys meeting more, s/he will not have a very enjoyable day, but s/he will keep her/his promise to the other friend.</p> <p>What should the <b>adult</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>adult</b> should keep her/his promise. B. The <b>adult</b> should not keep her/his promise.</p>	<p>A <b>person</b> promises her/his friend to meet him. On the day of the meeting, another friend, with whom the <b>person</b> enjoys meeting more, invites her/him to his home.</p> <p>- If the <b>person</b> meets her/his friend whom he enjoys meeting more, s/he will spend his day more enjoyable, but s/he will not keep her/his promise to the other friend.</p> <p>- If the <b>person</b> does not meet her/his friend whom s/he enjoys meeting more, s/he will not have a very enjoyable day, but s/he will keep her/his promise to the other friend.</p> <p>What should the <b>person</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>person</b> should keep her/his promise. B. The <b>person</b> should not keep her/his promise.</p>

9. *Harming*

Child	Adult	Neutral
<p>A <b>child</b> who is very afraid of dogs sees a stray dog approaching her/him as s/he walks down the street. The <b>child</b> is thinking of throwing one of the stones on the ground at the dog to drive the dog away.</p> <p>- If the <b>child</b> throws the stone, s/he will hurt the dog, but the dog s/he is very afraid of will be driven away.</p> <p>- If the <b>child</b> does not throw the stone, s/he will not hurt the dog, but the dog s/he is very afraid of will not be driven away.</p> <p>What should the <b>child</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>child</b> should throw the stone at the dog.</p> <p>B. The <b>child</b> should not throw the stone at the dog.</p>	<p>An <b>adult</b> who is very afraid of dogs sees a stray dog approaching her/him as s/he walks down the street. The <b>adult</b> is thinking of throwing one of the stones on the ground at the dog to drive the dog away.</p> <p>- If the <b>adult</b> throws the stone, s/he will hurt the dog, but the dog s/he is very afraid of will be driven away.</p> <p>- If the <b>adult</b> does not throw the stone, s/he will not hurt the dog, but the dog s/he is very afraid of will not be driven away.</p> <p>What should the <b>adult</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>adult</b> should throw the stone at the dog.</p> <p>B. The <b>adult</b> should not throw the stone at the dog.</p>	<p>A <b>person</b> who is very afraid of dogs sees a stray dog approaching her/him as s/he walks down the street. The <b>person</b> is thinking of throwing one of the stones on the ground at the dog to drive the dog away.</p> <p>- If the <b>person</b> throws the stone, s/he will hurt the dog, but the dog s/he is very afraid of will be driven away.</p> <p>- If the <b>person</b> does not throw the stone, s/he will not hurt the dog, but the dog s/he is very afraid of will not be driven away.</p> <p>What should the <b>person</b> do in this situation?</p> <p>A. The <b>person</b> should throw the stone at the dog.</p> <p>B. The <b>person</b> should not throw the stone at the dog.</p>

**Turkish versions***1. Kayıp Para*

<b>Child</b>	<b>Adult</b>	<b>Neutral</b>
<p>Eczaneye gitmekte olan bir <b>çocuk</b> yerde para buluyor ve parayı alıyor. Eczanede alması gereken ilaçlar için yanında yeterli parası olmadığını fark eden bu <b>çocuk</b> bulduğu para ile ödeme yapmayı düşünüyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>çocuk</b> ödeme için yerde bulduğu parayı kullanırsa ilaçları alabilecek fakat başka birinin parasını izinsiz kullanmış olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>çocuk</b> ödeme için yerde bulduğu parayı kullanmazsa ilaçları alamayacak fakat başka birinin parasını izinsiz kullanmamış olacak.</p> <p><b>Çocuk</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p>A. <b>Çocuk</b> parayı kullanmalı.</p> <p>B. <b>Çocuk</b> parayı kullanmamalı.</p>	<p>Eczaneye gitmekte olan bir <b>yetişkin</b> yerde para buluyor ve parayı alıyor. Eczanede alması gereken ilaçlar için yanında yeterli parası olmadığını fark eden bu <b>yetişkin</b> bulduğu para ile ödeme yapmayı düşünüyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>yetişkin</b> ödeme için yerde bulduğu parayı kullanırsa ilaçları alabilecek fakat başka birinin parasını izinsiz kullanmış olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>yetişkin</b> ödeme için yerde bulduğu parayı kullanmazsa ilaçları alamayacak fakat başka birinin parasını izinsiz kullanmamış olacak.</p> <p><b>Yetişkin</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p>A. <b>Yetişkin</b> parayı kullanmalı.</p> <p>B. <b>Yetişkin</b> parayı kullanmamalı.</p>	<p>Eczaneye gitmekte olan bir <b>kişi</b> yerde para buluyor ve parayı alıyor. Eczanede alması gereken ilaçlar için yanında yeterli parası olmadığını fark eden bu <b>kişi</b> bulduğu para ile ödeme yapmayı düşünüyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>kişi</b> ödeme için yerde bulduğu parayı kullanırsa ilaçları alabilecek fakat başka birinin parasını izinsiz kullanmış olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>kişi</b> ödeme için yerde bulduğu parayı kullanmazsa ilaçları alamayacak fakat başka birinin parasını izinsiz kullanmamış olacak.</p> <p><b>Kişi</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p>A. <b>Kişi</b> parayı kullanmalı.</p> <p>B. <b>Kişi</b> parayı kullanmamalı.</p>

## 2. Küfür etmek

Çocuk	Yetişkin	Nötr
<p>Eve pizza sipariş etmiş bir <b>çocuk</b> siparişinin eline geç ulaşması sebebiyle sinirleniyor. <b>Çocuk</b> bu durum karşısında sinirini atmak adına pizzayı getiren kuryeye küfür etmek istiyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>çocuk</b> kuryeye küfür ederse sinirini atabilecek fakat kuryenin üzülmesine sebep olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>çocuk</b> kuryeye küfür etmezse sinirini atamayacak fakat kuryenin üzülmesine sebep olmamış olacak.</p> <p><b>Çocuk</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı? A. <b>Çocuk</b> kuryeye küfür etmeli. B. <b>Çocuk</b> kuryeye küfür etmemeli.</p>	<p>Eve pizza sipariş etmiş bir <b>yetişkin</b> siparişinin eline geç ulaşması sebebiyle sinirleniyor. <b>Yetişkin</b> bu durum karşısında sinirini atmak adına pizzayı getiren kuryeye küfür etmek istiyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>yetişkin</b> kuryeye küfür ederse sinirini atabilecek fakat kuryenin üzülmesine sebep olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>yetişkin</b> kuryeye küfür etmezse sinirini atamayacak fakat kuryenin üzülmesine sebep olmamış olacak.</p> <p><b>Yetişkin</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı? A. <b>Yetişkin</b> kuryeye küfür etmeli. B. <b>Yetişkin</b> kuryeye küfür etmemeli.</p>	<p>Eve pizza sipariş etmiş bir <b>kişi</b> siparişinin eline geç ulaşması sebebiyle sinirleniyor. <b>Kişi</b> bu durum karşısında sinirini atmak adına pizzayı getiren kuryeye küfür etmek istiyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>kişi</b> kuryeye küfür ederse sinirini atabilecek fakat kuryenin üzülmesine sebep olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>kişi</b> kuryeye küfür etmezse sinirini atamayacak fakat kuryenin üzülmesine sebep olmamış olacak.</p> <p><b>Kişi</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı? A. <b>Kişi</b> kuryeye küfür etmeli. B. <b>Kişi</b> kuryeye küfür etmemeli.</p>

## 3. Saç çekmek

Çocuk	Yetişkin	Nötr
<p>Uçak yolculuğu esnasında bir <b>çocuk</b> hostesten yastık istiyor. Hostes <b>çocuğun</b> bu isteği karşısında alaycı bir tavır takınıyor. Bu tavidan rahatsız olan <b>çocuk</b> hostesin saçını çekmek istiyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>çocuk</b> hostesin saçını çekerse rahatsız olduğu bu tavra tepki göstermiş olacak fakat hostesin çığlık atmasına sebep olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>çocuk</b> hostesin saçını çekmezse rahatsız olduğu tavra tepki göstermemiş olacak fakat hostesin çığlık atmasına sebep olmamış olacak.</p> <p><b>Çocuk</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p>A. <b>Çocuk</b> hostesin saçını çekmeli. B. <b>Çocuk</b> hostesin saçını çekmemeli.</p>	<p>Uçak yolculuğu esnasında bir <b>yetişkin</b> hostesten yastık istiyor. Hostes <b>yetişkinin</b> bu isteği karşısında alaycı bir tavır takınıyor. Bu tavidan rahatsız olan <b>yetişkin</b> hostesin saçını çekmek istiyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>yetişkin</b> hostesin saçını çekerse rahatsız olduğu bu tavra tepki göstermiş olacak fakat hostesin çığlık atmasına sebep olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>yetişkin</b> hostesin saçını çekmezse rahatsız olduğu tavra tepki göstermemiş olacak fakat hostesin çığlık atmasına sebep olmamış olacak.</p> <p><b>Yetişkin</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p>A. <b>Yetişkin</b> hostesin saçını çekmeli. B. <b>Yetişkin</b> hostesin saçını çekmemeli.</p>	<p>Uçak yolculuğu esnasında bir <b>kişi</b> hostesten yastık istiyor. Hostes <b>kişinin</b> bu isteği karşısında alaycı bir tavır takınıyor. Bu tavidan rahatsız olan <b>kişi</b> hostesin saçını çekmek istiyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>kişi</b> hostesin saçını çekerse rahatsız olduğu bu tavra tepki göstermiş olacak fakat hostesin çığlık atmasına sebep olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>kişi</b> hostesin saçını çekmezse rahatsız olduğu tavra tepki göstermemiş olacak fakat hostesin çığlık atmasına sebep olmamış olacak.</p> <p><b>Kişi</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p>A. <b>Kişi</b> hostesin saçını çekmeli. B. <b>Kişi</b> hostesin saçını çekmemeli.</p>

## 4. Yalan söylemek

Çocuk	Yetişkin	Nötr
<p>Bir arkadaş grubundaki <b>çocuklardan</b> biri diğerleri tarafından haksızlığa uğruyor. Bunu fark eden diğer bir <b>çocuk</b> gruptaki <b>çocuklara</b> yalan söylerse arkadaşını uğradığı haksızlıktan kurtarabileceğini düşünüyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>çocuk</b> yalan söylerse arkadaşını kurtarabilecek fakat gruptakilere yalan söylemiş olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>çocuk</b> yalan söylemezse arkadaşını kurtaramayacak fakat gruptakilere yalan söylememiş olacak.</p> <p><b>Çocuk</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p><b>A. Çocuk</b> yalan söylemeli.</p> <p><b>B. Çocuk</b> yalan söylememeli.</p>	<p>Bir arkadaş grubundaki <b>yetişkinlerden</b> biri diğerleri tarafından haksızlığa uğruyor. Bunu fark eden diğer bir <b>yetişkin</b> gruptaki <b>yetişkinlere</b> yalan söylerse arkadaşını uğradığı haksızlıktan kurtarabileceğini düşünüyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>yetişkin</b> yalan söylerse arkadaşını kurtarabilecek fakat gruptakilere yalan söylemiş olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>yetişkin</b> yalan söylemezse arkadaşını kurtaramayacak fakat gruptakilere yalan söylememiş olacak.</p> <p><b>Yetişkin</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p><b>A. Yetişkin</b> yalan söylemeli.</p> <p><b>B. Yetişkin</b> yalan söylememeli.</p>	<p>Bir arkadaş grubundaki <b>kişilerden</b> biri diğerleri tarafından haksızlığa uğruyor. Bunu fark eden diğer bir <b>kişi</b> gruptaki <b>kişilere</b> yalan söylerse arkadaşını uğradığı haksızlıktan kurtarabileceğini düşünüyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>kişi</b> yalan söylerse arkadaşını kurtarabilecek fakat gruptakilere yalan söylemiş olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>kişi</b> yalan söylemezse arkadaşını kurtaramayacak fakat gruptakilere yalan söylememiş olacak.</p> <p><b>Kişi</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p><b>A. Kişi</b> yalan söylemeli.</p> <p><b>B. Kişi</b> yalan söylememeli.</p>

## 5. Aşağılamak

Çocuk	Yetişkin	Nötr
<p>Arkadaş grubuna yeni katılan bir <b>çocuk</b> gruptakiler tarafından kabul görmek istiyor. <b>Çocuk</b> bunun için gruptakilerin sevmediği biri yanlarından geçerken sesli bir şekilde o kişinin kıyafetinin ne kadar çirkin görüldüğü ile ilgili yorum yapmayı düşünüyor.</p> <p>-Eğer <b>çocuk</b> yorumunu yaparsa arkadaş grubuna kendini kabul ettirecek fakat hakkında yorum yapacağı kişiyi üzümüş olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>çocuk</b> yorumunu yapmazsa arkadaş grubuna kendini kabul ettiremeyecek fakat hakkında yorum yapacağı kişiyi üzmemiş olacak.</p> <p><b>Çocuk</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p>A. <b>Çocuk</b> yorumunu yapmalı. B. <b>Çocuk</b> yorumunu yapmamalı.</p>	<p>Arkadaş grubuna yeni katılan bir <b>yetişkin</b> gruptakiler tarafından kabul görmek istiyor. <b>Yetişkin</b> bunun için gruptakilerin sevmediği biri yanlarından geçerken sesli bir şekilde o kişinin kıyafetinin ne kadar çirkin görüldüğü ile ilgili yorum yapmayı düşünüyor.</p> <p>-Eğer <b>yetişkin</b> yorumunu yaparsa arkadaş grubuna kendini kabul ettirecek fakat hakkında yorum yapacağı kişiyi üzümüş olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>yetişkin</b> yorumunu yapmazsa arkadaş grubuna kendini kabul ettiremeyecek fakat hakkında yorum yapacağı kişiyi üzmemiş olacak.</p> <p><b>Yetişkin</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p>A. <b>Yetişkin</b> yorumunu yapmalı. B. <b>Yetişkin</b> yorumunu yapmamalı.</p>	<p>Arkadaş grubuna yeni katılan bir <b>kişi</b> gruptakiler tarafından kabul görmek istiyor. <b>Kişi</b> bunun için gruptakilerin sevmediği biri yanlarından geçerken sesli bir şekilde o kişinin kıyafetinin ne kadar çirkin görüldüğü ile ilgili yorum yapmayı düşünüyor.</p> <p>-Eğer <b>kişi</b> yorumunu yaparsa arkadaş grubuna kendini kabul ettirecek fakat hakkında yorum yapacağı kişiyi üzümüş olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>kişi</b> yorumunu yapmazsa arkadaş grubuna kendini kabul ettiremeyecek fakat hakkında yorum yapacağı kişiyi üzmemiş olacak.</p> <p><b>Kişi</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p>A. <b>Kişi</b> yorumunu yapmalı. B. <b>Kişi</b> yorumunu yapmamalı.</p>

## 6. Hile yapmak

Çocuk	Yetişkin	Nötr
<p>Bir grup yabancı ile kart oyunu oynayan bir <b>çocuk</b> kazanana verilecek olan ödülü kazanmayı çok istiyor. Oyunu bu şekilde kazanamayacağını düşünen <b>çocuk</b> hile yaparsa kazanabileceğini fark ediyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>çocuk</b> hile yaparsa diğer oyunculara haksızlık etmiş olacak fakat çok istediği ödülü kazanacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>çocuk</b> hile yapmazsa diğer oyunculara haksızlık etmemiş olacak fakat çok istediği ödülü kazanamayacak.</p> <p><b>Çocuk</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p>A. <b>Çocuk</b> hile yapmalı. B. <b>Çocuk</b> hile yapmamalı.</p>	<p>Bir grup yabancı ile kart oyunu oynayan bir <b>yetişkin</b> kazanana verilecek olan ödülü kazanmayı çok istiyor. Oyunu bu şekilde kazanamayacağını düşünen <b>yetişkin</b> hile yaparsa kazanabileceğini fark ediyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>yetişkin</b> hile yaparsa diğer oyunculara haksızlık etmiş olacak fakat çok istediği ödülü kazanacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>yetişkin</b> hile yapmazsa diğer oyunculara haksızlık etmemiş olacak fakat çok istediği ödülü kazanamayacak.</p> <p><b>Yetişkin</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p>A. <b>Yetişkin</b> hile yapmalı. B. <b>Yetişkin</b> hile yapmamalı.</p>	<p>Bir grup yabancı ile kart oyunu oynayan bir <b>kişi</b> kazanana verilecek olan ödülü kazanmayı çok istiyor. Oyunu bu şekilde kazanamayacağını düşünen <b>kişi</b> hile yaparsa kazanabileceğini fark ediyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>kişi</b> hile yaparsa diğer oyunculara haksızlık etmiş olacak fakat çok istediği ödülü kazanacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>kişi</b> hile yapmazsa diğer oyunculara haksızlık etmemiş olacak fakat çok istediği ödülü kazanamayacak.</p> <p><b>Kişi</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p>A. <b>Kişi</b> hile yapmalı. B. <b>Kişi</b> hile yapmamalı.</p>

## 7. Kural çiğnemek

Çocuk	Yetişkin	Nötr
<p>Bir okulda belli bir şekilde giyinme kuralı bulunmaktadır. Bu okula giden bir <b>çocuk</b> ise bu kurallara uyum sağlayacak şekilde giyindiğinde kendini rahat hissetmiyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>çocuk</b> kendi istediği şekilde giyinirse kuralları çiğnemiş olacak fakat kendini rahat hissedecek.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>çocuk</b> kendi istediği şekilde giyinmezse kuralları çiğnememiş olacak fakat kendini rahat hissetmeyecek.</p> <p><b>Çocuk</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p>A. <b>Çocuk</b> kendi istediği şekilde giyinmeli.</p> <p>B. <b>Çocuk</b> kendi istediği şekilde giyinmemeli.</p>	<p>Bir okulda belli bir şekilde giyinme kuralı bulunmaktadır. Bu okula giden bir <b>yetişkin</b> ise bu kurallara uyum sağlayacak şekilde giyindiğinde kendini rahat hissetmiyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>yetişkin</b> kendi istediği şekilde giyinirse kuralları çiğnemiş olacak fakat kendini rahat hissedecek.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>yetişkin</b> kendi istediği şekilde giyinmezse kuralları çiğnememiş olacak fakat kendini rahat hissetmeyecek.</p> <p><b>Yetişkin</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p>A. <b>Yetişkin</b> kendi istediği şekilde giyinmeli.</p> <p>B. <b>Yetişkin</b> kendi istediği şekilde giyinmemeli.</p>	<p>Bir okulda belli bir şekilde giyinme kuralı bulunmaktadır. Bu okula giden bir <b>kişi</b> ise bu kurallara uyum sağlayacak şekilde giyindiğinde kendini rahat hissetmiyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>kişi</b> kendi istediği şekilde giyinirse kuralları çiğnemiş olacak fakat kendini rahat hissedecek.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>kişi</b> kendi istediği şekilde giyinmezse kuralları çiğnememiş olacak fakat kendini rahat hissetmeyecek.</p> <p><b>Kişi</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p>A. <b>Kişi</b> kendi istediği şekilde giyinmeli.</p> <p>B. <b>Kişi</b> kendi istediği şekilde giyinmemeli.</p>

## 8. Zarar vermek

Çocuk	Yetişkin	Nötr
<p>Köpeklerden çok korkan bir <b>çocuk</b> yolda yürürken bir sokak köpeğinin kendisinde doğru yaklaştığını görüyor. <b>Çocuk</b>, köpeği uzaklaştırmak için yerdeki taşlardan birini köpeğe fırlatmayı düşünüyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>çocuk</b> taşı fırlatırsa köpeğin canını acıtacak fakat çok korktuğu köpeği uzaklaştırmış olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>çocuk</b> taşı fırlatmazsa köpeğin canını acıtmayacak fakat çok korktuğu köpeği uzaklaştıramamış olacak.</p> <p><b>Çocuk</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p>A. <b>Çocuk</b> taşı köpeğe fırlatmalı.</p> <p>B. <b>Çocuk</b> taşı köpeğe fırlatmamalı.</p>	<p>Köpeklerden çok korkan bir <b>yetişkin</b> yolda yürürken bir sokak köpeğinin kendisinde doğru yaklaştığını görüyor. <b>Yetişkin</b>, köpeği uzaklaştırmak için yerdeki taşlardan birini köpeğe fırlatmayı düşünüyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>yetişkin</b> taşı fırlatırsa köpeğin canını acıtacak fakat çok korktuğu köpeği uzaklaştırmış olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>yetişkin</b> taşı fırlatmazsa köpeğin canını acıtmayacak fakat çok korktuğu köpeği uzaklaştıramamış olacak.</p> <p><b>Yetişkin</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p>A. <b>Yetişkin</b> taşı köpeğe fırlatmalı.</p> <p>B. <b>Yetişkin</b> taşı köpeğe fırlatmamalı.</p>	<p>Köpeklerden çok korkan bir <b>kişi</b> yolda yürürken bir sokak köpeğinin kendisinde doğru yaklaştığını görüyor. <b>Kişi</b>, köpeği uzaklaştırmak için yerdeki taşlardan birini köpeğe fırlatmayı düşünüyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>kişi</b> taşı fırlatırsa köpeğin canını acıtacak fakat çok korktuğu köpeği uzaklaştırmış olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>kişi</b> taşı fırlatmazsa köpeğin canını acıtmayacak fakat çok korktuğu köpeği uzaklaştıramamış olacak.</p> <p><b>Kişi</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?</p> <p>A. <b>Kişi</b> taşı köpeğe fırlatmalı.</p> <p>B. <b>Kişi</b> taşı köpeğe fırlatmamalı.</p>

## 9. Sözüünü tutmamak

Çocuk	Yetişkin	Nötr
<p>Bir <b>çocuk</b> arkadaşına onunla görüşeceğine söz veriyor. Buluşma günü, <b>çocuğun</b> görüşmekten daha çok keyif aldığı başka bir arkadaşı onu evine davet ediyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>çocuk</b> görüşmekten daha çok keyif aldığı arkadaşıyla görüşürse gününü daha keyifli geçirecek fakat diğer arkadaşına verdiği sözü tutmamış olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>çocuk</b> görüşmekten daha çok keyif aldığı arkadaşıyla görüşmezse gününü çok keyifli geçiremeyecek fakat diğer arkadaşına verdiği sözü tutmuş olacak.</p> <p><b>Çocuk</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?  <b>A. Çocuk</b> sözünü tutmamalı.  <b>B. Çocuk</b> sözünü tutmalı.</p>	<p>Bir <b>yetişkin</b> arkadaşına onunla görüşeceğine söz veriyor. Buluşma günü, <b>yetişkinin</b> görüşmekten daha çok keyif aldığı başka bir arkadaşı onu evine davet ediyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>yetişkin</b> görüşmekten daha çok keyif aldığı arkadaşıyla görüşürse gününü daha keyifli geçirecek fakat diğer arkadaşına verdiği sözü tutmamış olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>yetişkin</b> görüşmekten daha çok keyif aldığı arkadaşıyla görüşmezse gününü çok keyifli geçiremeyecek fakat diğer arkadaşına verdiği sözü tutmuş olacak.</p> <p><b>Yetişkin</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?  <b>A. Yetişkin</b> sözünü tutmamalı.  <b>B. Yetişkin</b> sözünü tutmalı.</p>	<p>Bir <b>kişi</b> arkadaşına onunla görüşeceğine söz veriyor. Buluşma günü, <b>kişinin</b> görüşmekten daha çok keyif aldığı başka bir arkadaşı onu evine davet ediyor.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>kişi</b> görüşmekten daha çok keyif aldığı arkadaşıyla görüşürse gününü daha keyifli geçirecek fakat diğer arkadaşına verdiği sözü tutmamış olacak.</p> <p>- Eğer <b>kişi</b> görüşmekten daha çok keyif aldığı arkadaşıyla görüşmezse gününü çok keyifli geçiremeyecek fakat diğer arkadaşına verdiği sözü tutmuş olacak.</p> <p><b>Kişi</b> bu durumda ne yapmalı?  <b>A. Kişi</b> sözünü tutmamalı.  <b>B. Kişi</b> sözünü tutmalı.</p>

**Questions which were asked after each dilemma to assess the psychological distance:**

How would you evaluate the probability of this event happening in your life? (1 = unlikely, 5 = very likely)

1      2      3      4      5

How would you rate your similarity with the hero of the story in terms of age? (1 = Not similar at all, 5 = Very similar)

1      2      3      4      5

Bu olayın kendi hayatınızda gerçekleşme ihtimalini nasıl değerlendirirsiniz? (1=hiç olası değil, 5=çok olası)

1      2      3      4      5

Hikayedeki kahraman ile yaş bağlamındaki benzerliğinizi nasıl değerlendirirsiniz? (1=Hiç benzer değil, 5=Çok benzer)

1      2      3      4      5