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**ROLE OF HUMANITARIAN AID AND PEACE BUILDING IN FRAGILE
STATES: THE CASE OF TURKEY'S HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA**

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Istanbul, 2022

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ABSTRACT

ROLE OF HUMANITARIAN AID AND PEACE BUILDING IN FRAGILE STATES: THE CASE OF TURKEY'S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

The paper offers a comprehensive review on the Somali state, humanitarian aid to the state by the international community, and the collapse of post-independent civilian-ruled Somalia leading to the militarized Siad Barre-led Somali State. Ultimately, the paper focuses on the state collapse of Somalia and the efforts of international actors in state rebuilding.

The thesis explains the state-building process of Somalia through humanitarian aid in the context of peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts in fragile states, and investigates the quality of humanitarian aid offered by the international community in the fragile state of Somalia. This aid is compared with that offered by Turkey, whose recent involvement in the Horn of Africa region has proven to help begin the process of rebuilding this fragile state.

The thesis comprises five chapters. The first chapter is an introduction highlighting the theories that underpin the provision of humanitarian aid. The second chapter focuses on the concepts of humanitarian assistance and its importance in the rebuilding of fragile states and peacekeeping. The third chapter introduces peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance in Somalia and further explores humanitarian assistance by international actors. The chapter further offers insights about the post-colonial evolution of the Somali state, from its involvement with the Cold War politics between what was then the USSR and the US to the ultimate breakdown of Somalia in its civil war. Chapter four explores the efforts that Turkey has made to reinvent itself as a Global North donor and compares Turkey's coordinated aid with that of Western donors. Chapter five is a conclusion of the study and highlights the fragility of the Somali state, and its need for further involvement by international actors to prevent a state of anarchy that provides fertile ground for extremist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab.

Keywords: Humanitarian Aid, Peace Building, Fragile States, Somalia, Turkey

ÖZET

KIRILIR DEVLETLERDE İNSANİ YARDIM VE BARIŞ İNŞASININ ROLÜ: TÜRKİYE'NİN SOMALİ'YE İNSANİ MÜDAHALE ÖRNEĞİ

Makale, Somali devleti, uluslararası toplum tarafından devlete yapılan insani yardım ve bağımsızlık sonrası sivil yönetimli Somali'nin askerileştirilmiş Siad Barre liderliğindeki Somali Devletine yol açan çöküşü hakkında kapsamlı bir inceleme sunuyor. Sonuç olarak, makale Somali'deki devletin çöküşüne ve uluslararası aktörlerin devletin yeniden inşasına yönelik çabalarına odaklanmaktadır.

Bu tez, kırılğan devletlerde barış inşası ve barışı koruma çabaları bağlamında insani yardım yoluyla Somali'nin devlet inşa sürecini açıklamakta ve kırılğan durumdaki Somali'de uluslararası toplum tarafından sunulan insani yardımın kalitesini araştırmaktadır. Bu yardım, Afrika Boynuzu bölgesinde son zamanlardaki katılımının bu kırılğan devletin yeniden inşası sürecinin başlamasına yardımcı olduğu kanıtlanmış olan Türkiye'nin sunduğu yardımla karşılaştırılıyor.

Tez beş bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölüm, insani yardım sağlanmasının temelini oluşturan teorileri vurgulayan bir giriştir. İkinci bölüm, insani yardım kavramlarına ve kırılğan devletlerin yeniden inşası ve barışı korumadaki önemine odaklanmaktadır. Üçüncü bölüm, Somali'de barış inşası ve insani yardımı tanıtmakta ve uluslararası aktörler tarafından yapılan insani yardımları daha fazla araştırmaktadır. Bu bölüm ayrıca, o zamanlar SSCB ve ABD arasındaki Soğuk Savaş siyasetine katılımından, Somali'nin iç savaşında nihai çöküşüne kadar, Somali devletinin sömürge sonrası evrimi hakkında içgörüler sunuyor. Dördüncü Bölüm, Türkiye'nin kendisini bir Küresel Kuzey bağışçısı olarak yeniden icat etme çabalarını araştırıyor ve Türkiye'nin koordineli yardımını Batılı bağışçılarıinkiyle karşılaştırıyor. Beşinci Bölüm, çalışmanın bir sonucu olup, Somali devletinin kırılğanlığını ve El Kaide ve El-Şebab gibi aşırılık yanlısı örgütler için verimli bir zemin sağlayan bir anarşi durumunu önlemek için uluslararası aktörlerin daha fazla müdahale etme ihtiyacını vurgulamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İnsani Yardım, Barışın İnşası, Kırılğan Devletler, Somali, Türkiye

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CONTENTS

Page No:

LIST OF TABLES.....	vi
LIST OF FIGURES.....	vii
ABBREVIATIONS.....	viii
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Regulation and Rationale of Humanitarian Aid.....	3
1.2 Humanitarian Aid in the Fragile Somalia State.....	4
2. HUMANITARIAN AID PEACE-BUILDING AND THE FRAGILE STATE.....	8
2.1 Brief History of Humanitarian Aid.....	9
2.1.1 Defining ‘Humanitarian Aid.’.....	11
2.2 Brief background to Peace-building.....	12
2.2.1 Role of UN in peacebuilding.....	13
2.3 State Fragility and its Character.....	15
2.3.1. First: Security threats.....	17
2.3.2. Second: Humanitarian Crisis.....	18
2.3.3 Third: Refugee flow.....	18
2.3.4. Vulnerability of health care.....	18
2.3.5 About Some of the Drivers of State Fragility.....	19
3. SOMALIA PEACE-BUILDING AND HUMANITARIAN AID: AN OVERVIEW.....	20
3.1. A Brief History of Somalia Humanitarian Aid from 1960 to1990.....	20
3.1.1. The Civilian Government and International Aid from 1960 to 1969.....	21
3.1.2. The Military Government and International Assistance from 1969 to 1990.....	22
3.1.2.1 Somalia and USSR.....	22
3.1.2.2 Somalia and the US.....	23
3.1.2.3 Somalia and Humanitarian Crisis	24
3.1.2.3.1 The ‘Abaartii-Dabadheer’.....	24

3.1.2.3.2 Influx of Refugees from the Ogaden Region.....	25
3.1.3.3 Somalia and International Humanitarian Actors.....	26
3.2. State failure, Restoring Peace, and Humanitarian aid In Somalia (1991-1995).....	27
3.2.1. A short background of the conflict in Somalia.....	27
3.2.2 Fall of Siad Barre.....	28
3.2.3 Somalia Post-Siad Barre MilitaryRule.....	29
3.2.4 Attempts to restore peace and humanitarian relief in Somalia.....	30
3.3. State Formation and Peace-building: General Overview.....	33
3.3.1 Djibouti Peace Process.....	34
3.3.2 The Mbagathi Peace Process.....	35
3.3.3 2008 Djibouti Agreement.....	39
4. TURKEY'S HUMANITARIAN AID IN SOMALIA: AN	
ASSESSMENT.....	40
4.1 A Brief History of Turkey-Somali Relations.....	41
4.2 Turkey's current involvement in the continent of Africa vis a vis Somalia.....	42
4.2.1 Turkish aid intervention in Somalia.....	43
4.3 Assessing Turkey's role in Somalia.....	48
4.3.1 Military assistance as a Sphere of influence.....	49
4.4 Comparing Turkey's aid to other International Aid	52
4.4.1 International Concerns with regards to Turkey's Help.....	55
5.CONCLUSION.....	58
REFERENCES.....	62

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1: List of Turkish Organizations and institutions present and active in Somalia.....	45
Table 4.2: Budgeted and Disbursed "On Treasury "Grants, 2016 in \$USD (World Bank, 2017)	53



LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 4.1: A section of the Recep Tayyip Erdogan Hospital (formerly known as Digfer Hospital).....	47
Figure 4.2: Members of the SNA at the Turkey's Military Base in Somalia (CAMP TURKSOM).....	51



ABBREVIATIONS

ERC- Emergency Relief Coordinator

EU -European Union

ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross

IGAD- Intergovernmental Authority for Development

IRC - International Rescue Committee

NGO- Non-governmental Organization

NATO -North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OAU – Organization of African Unity

OCHA - United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

ODA- Official Development Assistance

OECD - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

SNA- Somali National Army

TIKA-Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency

TNG - Transitional National Government

UDHR- Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UN- United Nations

UNDRO-United Nations Disaster Relief Coordination Office

UNEF- United Nations Emergency Force

UNFICYP - United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

UNGA- United Nations General Assembly

UNHCR- The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF- United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

UNITAF- Unified Task Force

UNOSOM- United Nations Operation in Somalia

UNRRA - United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

UNSG- United Nations Secretary-General

US -United States

USAID - United States Agency for International Development

USSR- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WSLF- Western Somalia Liberation Front

WFP- World Food Program

1. INTRODUCTION

Humanitarian acts involve the provision of material assistance to people in dire need of help. The circumstances are usually urgent and require a quick response by humanitarian actors in providing food or material aid to victims of warfare, famine, drought, or natural disasters (Rysaback -Smith, 2016). The modern form of humanitarianism emerged in the latter half of the 19th century when the Red Cross was established in 1863. The emergence of humanitarian aid and its related activities is strongly linked to the erraticism brought about by the complex progression of world events that needed urgent and quick responses to alleviate suffering and pain (Rysaback-Smith, 2016). Humanitarian aid is thus an important aspect of the modern world, marred as it is periodically by natural disasters, and intrastate and interstate conflicts. Modern humanitarian assistance involves the impartial independent and neutral provision of aid to populations that are in immediate danger, if such help is not made available to them by humanitarian actors. The first systematic act of modern international humanitarian aid followed World War I, with the Treaty of Versailles stating that Germany must accept responsibility for the War, and therefore make reparations to its allies (Rysaback-Smith, 2016).

Over the years, practices that define humanitarianism have evolved to reflect the current ideological worldview, and these are widely coded in many texts, the most notable being the UN Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR). Meanwhile, the evolution of technology evinced by new media and communication technologies has enabled the faster spread of information and better connectivity, thus fostering sympathy across territorial borders and facilitating the mobilization of large numbers of people willing to volunteer in humanitarian aid. Additionally, through information sharing, voluntary associations willing to help in humanitarian work have lobbied for state intervention and managed to raise large sums of money for the same purpose (Green, 2014).

The period between the early 19th century and the outbreak of World War I was characterized by imperial humanitarianism, a term which is associated with human aid advocating for equal rights. The imperialism humanitarianism movement took center stage during the antislavery movement period, which was characterized by an outrage at the lack of

concern over people's rights. A majority of the people felt that there was a need to stop all forms of overt and covert racism (Barnett, 2011). During this period, international humanitarian law was non-binding and humanitarian aid mainly revolved around the alleviation of suffering, and more so suffering concerning humanitarian rights. This period was further characterized by the coming together of people from differing political and religious traditions. Accordingly, humanitarian aid followed concepts of Christian charity that were prevalent in the Western world and also *Zakat*, an important facet in the Islamic tradition (Rysaback-Smith, 2016). Therefore, humanitarian aid during this period was more ideology- than resource-oriented due to factors such as physical constraints arising out of inferior communication and transportation infrastructure (Rysaback-Smith, 2016). Thus, humanitarian aid was characterized by a revolution in moral sentiment. This period marked the formation of the Red Cross, whose formal mandate would become the provision of neutral and impartial assistance to war victims (Rysaback-Smith, 2016). The end of the imperial humanitarianism period led to the emergence of a culture of compassion, charity and benevolence as part of everyday life (Davey et al., 2013), a period that coincidentally corresponded with the capitalist revolution and the emergence of states and territorial borders.

With World War II, the period of neo-humanitarianism began manifesting, as Europe was destroyed and the US and the USSR grew as great powers, with the former emerging economically stronger than the other major industrial countries. As World War II continued, relief agencies emerged, providing urgent emergency aid and frequently organized by volunteers. The humanitarian aid also embraced people suffering at greater distances, a fact attributed to greater developments in communication and travel (Barnett, 2011). Additionally, the neo-humanitarianism period led to a modern consensus on the need for support to war victims and this was formalized by the various Geneva Conventions. For example, the 1949 Geneva Convention highlights the appropriate treatment to be afforded to civilians during times of war. Article 89 states that expectant and nursing mothers, and children who are under fifteen years of age should be given additional food, in proportion to their physiological needs. It was also during the neo-humanitarianism period that important UN organs such as UNICEF (1946) and the UNHCR (1950) (UNHCR, n.d.) were established to help states rebuild and reconstruct their societies (Rysaback-Smith, 2016). This period also marked an increase in NGOs established for the sole purpose of providing humanitarian aid.

The post-Cold War era saw the beginning of the age of liberal humanitarianism i.e., modern humanitarianism. This is characterized by humanitarian aid that most often responds to natural and manmade disasters, whereas historically humanitarian aid involved helping innocent victims who were hurt during military conflict. During this period, aid has generally focused on underdeveloped, new post-colonial governments located mainly in Africa, Latin America and Asia (Rysaback-Smith, 2016). With the increase of NGOs during the neo-humanitarianism period, advertising campaigns with pictures of starving children have morphed into the dominant idea that Global North countries are associated with humanitarian aid. In the 21st century, humanitarian aid has shifted from the provision of food and medical aid to a focus on long-term developmental aid. This aid further complicates humanitarian aid assistance since it involves political and governmental interests (Rysaback-Smith, 2016).

1.1 Regulation and Rationale of Humanitarian Aid

Humanitarian aid traces its origins back to the Western World, and more specifically to European experiences of war and natural disasters. Humanitarian aid is concerned with responding to needs in situations of conflict or natural disaster (Davey et al., 2013), and its actors try to affect change by working to fulfil specific interests, such as tasks that the government cannot organize or perform urgently. Some humanitarian actors compete against the state while others operate parallel to the state (Aeberhard, 1996).

These actors are bound by four key concepts, meaning that an organization, body, institution, or state that provides humanitarian aid must adhere to the four basic principles formally established by the UN. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the concepts central to humanitarian aid are humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. Respectively, the first three of these were endorsed by the UN in General Assembly *Resolution 46/182 of 1991*. The resolution also led to the formation of the ERC. In 2004, UN General Assembly *Resolution 58/114* added independence as the fourth key principle (Reinecke, 2010).

Humanitarian actors who provide assistance are regulated by the *Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and Non-Governmental Organizations in disaster relief*. The code emphasizes that organizations involved in humanitarian activities

should follow a certain common standard. Accordingly, as per the principle of humanity, human suffering must be addressed where need occurs to save and protect human life, health and dignity. The principle of neutrality urges humanitarian actors to offer assistance to those who are in need irrespective of any ideological, political, racial, or religious differences. Impartiality as a principle stipulates that humanitarian actors should carry out humanitarian assistance based on need alone and that priority must be given indiscriminately to the most urgent cases of distress (Fujita, 2020, p.18; Narang, 2014, p. 450). The principle of independence states that humanitarian aid ought to be independent of the political, economic or military objectives that any humanitarian actors may hold concerning areas where humanitarian action is implemented (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1995).

According to the UDHR, all human beings deserve dignity and the right to life. Without humanitarian aid, millions of people living in war-torn or disaster-struck areas face the likelihood of lack of access to basic services such as medical care. Therefore, the object of humanitarian gestures is to alleviate the suffering of others. The effect of humanitarian aid is to support displaced populations, support livelihoods, resolve conflicts and help in peacebuilding. Actors involved in humanitarian assistance include states, non-governmental organizations, international agencies, and the Red Cross movement. These organizations coalesce into a loosely connected system working in collaboration, complement or competition (Davey et al., 2013).

1.2 Humanitarian Aid in the Fragile Somalia State

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as recent as November 2021, 5.5 million people in Eastern Africa needed access to humanitarian aid (Davey et al., 2013). In the 21st century, Somalia has faced a humanitarian disaster that has been described by various scholars as among the 'worst humanitarian crises in the world' (Abild, 2010). The country's 2009 famine crisis exposed more than three million people to starvation, a situation that needed humanitarian actors to intervene and provide assistance.

The crisis led to forced climate migration, with as many as two-thirds of Mogadishu's population estimated to have fled their homes (Abild, 2010, p.68). Before the UN declared famine in Somalia, the country had been greatly isolated by the international community and the

aid given was insufficient in alleviating the suffering – a situation that led to the emergence of Turkey and its government as key humanitarian actors in Somalia.

Furthermore, the lack of humanitarian space in Somalia i.e., lack of access to an operating environment or space for humanitarian action prevented most humanitarian actors from intervening (Abild, 2010). The problems in the country may be attributed to its fragility as a state, and such fragility means that militias had blocked humanitarian assistance. For example, one major challenge that was identified by humanitarian actors was in the transport of aid, as militias set up roadblocks to attack and hijack convoys (Abild, 2010, p.92).

Somalia is not the only state that has been marred by long term instability and conflicts. Others include South Sudan, Sudan and Afghanistan. These countries have been described by several humanitarian actors as fragile states since their governments cannot quell violence inside their territorial borders and hence cannot provide humanitarian support for their populations.

Chapter two focuses on the concepts of humanitarian assistance as an important facet of peacebuilding in fragile states. The chapter discusses the various meanings of peacebuilding as discussed by international organizations and various scholars, and underlines the concepts of peace-building in fragile states as key to maintaining regional and global stability. The absence of legitimacy, and authoritative governance institutions is linked to the emergence of militia groups who threaten international peacekeeping efforts. Additionally, Chapter two defines the meaning of fragile states and the qualities that make them so. In addition to poverty and hunger, the lack of effective governance also means that fragile states lack mechanisms to prevent crime or offer essentials to their population. Humanitarian aid and peacebuilding are recommended measures to help in the state-building process of these stricken states.

Chapter three discusses the concepts of peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance in Somalia. The chapter is important because it describes the effort of international actors during Somalia's post-colonial period. Even prior to its destruction, the Somali state lacked resources and a professional workforce to keep governance institutions in operation, and was thus highly dependent on international aid via military support and civilian assistance. The chapter highlights the role of international donors in Somalia during its civil war and its periodic droughts. The UN and the US in particular are focused on due to their role in minimizing the initial civil war in

Somalia through UNOSOM peacekeeping missions. Additionally, the chapter highlights the military assistance to Somalia by the Soviet Union, and explains how the relationship between the two deteriorated during the Ogaden war, as the USSR chose Ethiopia over Somalia. Eventually, the defeat of Somalia during this war brought about an influx of refugees from Ethiopia into Somalia, straining its economy and bringing about a humanitarian crisis. The post-Soviet Union assistance period thus led to the involvement of the US and the UN in peacebuilding through humanitarian aid. The chapter closes by highlighting the role that regional and external actors have played in Somalia's state-rebuilding process, in particular the Soviet Union, which was the primary financial contributor to the socialist military regime Siad Barre. However, the relationship soured when Barre invaded Ethiopia causing the Soviet Union to choose sides. Indeed, the chapter highlights Somalia's role during the Cold War period as an aid beneficiary from both the Soviet Union and the US.

Chapter four highlights the role that Turkey has played so far in Somalia. The chapter is the crux of the study as it investigates the deeper meaning of Somalia-Turkey engagement from the Middle Ages to the 21st century. Additionally, the chapter highlights how Turkish intervention is helping Somalia in its stabilizing process through building infrastructure and developing institutions such as the national military. The chapter concludes by analyzing the quality of help offered by Turkey to Somalia in comparison to that offered by other states and institutions.

The study relied on applied research and explanatory research. Through these methods, the author searched for explanations as to why, despite immense international humanitarian aid, Somalia is still a fragile state. Additionally, through comparative research, the author explored the differences in the quality of aid offered by Turkey with that of other international humanitarian actors. Generally, the research heavily depended on qualitative data obtained from secondary sources such as books, scholarly publications, and UN soft law instruments. The research hypothesis on which the paper is based is whether the quality of intervention offered by Turkey to Somalia is sufficient to produce change in order to rebuild the country.

Through these research methods, the thesis explains the historical connections between humanitarian aid and the building of peace. Through the use of recorded interviews obtained

from scholarly publications, the author explains how Somalis view Turkey's intervention in their country. The interviews are also important to an assessment of how Ankara's assistance has been a crucial determinant in changing the fortunes of Somalia.



2. HUMANITARIAN AID PEACE-BUILDING AND THE FRAGILE STATE

Chapter two is a further discussion on humanitarian assistance as a peace-building strategy in fragile states. The chapter first introduces the meaning of the terms humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, and fragile states as used in this chapter. It highlights how humanitarian aid and peace-building efforts are important discourses for vulnerable countries. A failed state comprises many militias who are a threat to the security of people and also contribute to the 'closed market' scenario as they block important trade routes. Therefore, fragile states frequently need military assistance for humanitarian aid, and security reasons.

As John Pringle (2015) argued, the meaning of humanitarian aid is the active supply of support to better people's lives, alleviate suffering, and restore and promote human dignity in the aftermath of disasters and large-scale emergencies. With respect to peace-building, the former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali defined it as 'actions to identify and support structures that will strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict' (Barnett et al., 2007). Bertocchi and Guerzoni define fragile states as countries where the government is unable or unwilling to perform its essential tasks for the populace (Bertocchi & Guerzoni, 2011, p. 6).

This chapter focuses on how humanitarian aid and peace-building can assist fragile governments to recover from weakness in their institutions. Further concepts about fragile governments, such as their characteristics and causes of their weaknesses, will be established. The first section of the chapter briefly discusses the history of humanitarian aid before World Wars I and II. It discusses how the establishment of humanitarian aid came about 'on the ground' and what the purpose of humanitarian assistance was before the creation of the ICRC in 1863. It also sheds light on the competition related to humanitarian aid, as well as the political issues between states as they seek out allies. Furthermore, the section describes the role of humanitarian aid organizations in assisting victims during natural disasters and conflict. The second part will elaborate on the importance to the conflict regions of peace-building efforts, and offer a discussion on the role of the UN as peacekeeping operator in war zones. The last section of the chapter describes what is meant by 'fragile states', and emphasizes the general phenomenon of fragility. The significant elements discussed concerning fragile states are poverty, lack of territorial control, large-scale conflict, and civil war.

2.1 Brief History of Humanitarian Aid

Humanitarian aid includes a wide range of activities to save lives, reduce suffering, and preserve human dignity during wars or natural catastrophes, or in areas with deteriorating human life conditions. Humanitarian aid has a long history, but what we will call modern humanitarianism began in the 19th century. In 1859, a Swiss businessman, Henry Dunant, was the first to propose the establishment of humanitarian aid missions (Bujard, 1974), having witnessed thousands of people suffering from lack of care and about to die after the battle of Solferino. Immediately, he conceived the idea of creating national relief societies and working through volunteers to provide neutral and impartial assistance to relieve suffering in times of war (Ibid).

Based on Dunant's efforts, the ICRC was set up in Geneva, and officially became the Red Cross in 1863. The ICRC has become an 'on the ground' actor, which seeks to protect the dignity of individuals, both combatant and civilian, in conflict areas (Forsythe et al., 2007, p. 2). In 1864, a signed agreement became known as the Geneva Convention, and with this and the rise of international humanitarian organizations such as the ICRC, there began a new phase of humanitarian aid, which has come to be characterized by a proliferation of global NGOs, particularly since the 1980s. Another character of 21st century period of humanitarian aid is heightened competition among the many humanitarian actors, both for funds and in the field, and intense media involvement (Paulmann, 2013).

After World War I, the low levels of humanitarian assistance initiatives to support innocent combat victims were a cause of concern for allied politicians. Even the intervention of private charities was not adequate due to difficulties in both organization and collaboration. The Wilson administration of the United States intervened and became the coordinator of massive campaign assistance and a huge rescue infrastructure in the areas of Western Europe most affected by the German war occupation (Belgrad & Nachmias, 1997, p. 3).

The mission was headed by Herbert Hoover, who would become US president during the Great Depression in the 1930s. Hoover organized two new humanitarian relief efforts, the first of which was the European Children's Fund. This collected private and government donations and delivered food and clothing to nearly eight million children until 1922. The second was the

Hoover-Nansen relief plan, aimed at aiding survivors of the civil war in Russia. These two efforts show how humanitarian aid can serve a dual purpose: to help vulnerable people while also serving a political interest, particularly for powerful countries.

During World War II, in early 1943 the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was established by then US President Franklin Roosevelt. This was funded by annual congressional appropriations, and thus subject to intense ongoing scrutiny by lawmakers. The purpose of the institution was based on international interest (Belgrad & Nachmias, 1997, pp. 4–7). Together, World Wars I and II also served to instigate the formation of many humanitarian NGOs such as Save the Children Fund (1919), the IRC (1933), Oxfam (1942), and CARE (1945) (Davies, 2019, p. 268).

However, there are many variations among humanitarian relief NGOs worldwide. For example, NGOs in the US are more professionally-based, with higher salaries than their European counterparts, while volunteerism plays a more significant role in the United Kingdom and France. In addition, the involvement of expatriates and local personnel among French and UK NGOs differs. For example, the major French NGOs arose around specific issues (medicine, nutrition) and tend to send a considerable number of expatriates abroad, while British NGOs such as Oxfam (poverty reduction), Save the Children (children's rights) and Action Aid (education) attempt to involve and develop local personnel (Davies, 2019, p. 271).

Humanitarian aid is not limited to international efforts or Western humanitarian actors (European, North American, and Australian). Countries in the neighborhood of nations where crises occur are also involved in humanitarian assistance, one recent example being Turkey's assistance to refugees from its neighbor Syria during the war. In recent times, Western countries refer to humanitarian actors in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America as 'new donors', which is in fact incorrect terminology since it ignores the help supplied by Communist countries throughout the Cold War (Davies, 2019).

The UN plays a vital role in humanitarian assistance helping to alleviate the damage of disasters in vulnerable places. Based on the United Nations Charter, the UN replaced the earlier League of Nations. The fundamental goal of its creation was to foster international collaboration, establish peace and security, and codify rules of warfare. In addition, the signing of the UDHR

by the General Assembly in 1948 was one of the key moments in the activities of the UN in the area of humanitarian aid (Harat et al., 2015, p. 66).

The UN has positioned four entities in its system to become significant participants in the most complex humanitarian crises and their operations and responsibilities: the WFP, the UNHCR, UNICEF, and the UNDP. The first three are the most potent and crucial during emergency crises and humanitarian assistance efforts (Natsios, 1995, p. 410). However, the UNDRC, formed in 1971, and the DHA, created to replace UNDRC functions, are the two key bodies currently involved in humanitarian aid around the globe. Also, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has developed into the essential entity responsible for organizing humanitarian aid worldwide. By 2012, OCHA was employing more than 2,000 people, and to date, it has provided help to over 54 million victims of crisis and destruction. The total costs of the programs and projects coordinated by OCHA'S activities are estimated to be over \$8.7 billion (Harat et al., 2015).

2.1.1 Defining ‘Humanitarian Aid.’

Humanitarian assistance serves various purposes related to all sections of social life, including providing access to clean water, medical supplies, and temporary shelter to the vulnerable. Humanitarian intervention involves building state structures, building communities, maintaining sustainable peace, disaster preparedness, peacekeeping, and peace-building (De Lauri, 2016, p. 127). Although there is no particular definition of humanitarianism, it can mean ‘supplying materials and services to people affected by a crisis to protect them from danger and help them return to their daily lives’ (de Montclos, 2014, p. 233).

During humanitarian assistance to vulnerable people, various humanitarian actors and the private sector facilitate humanitarian response (Mohd et al., 2018, p. 343). Humanitarian actors are required to observe the fundamental principles of humanitarian practices as codified in the UN Charter, the Geneva Convention, and the various international laws that govern international humanitarian rights.

2.2 Brief background to Peace-building

Peace is the backbone of human existence. The UN's Sustainable Development Goal 16 acknowledges that peace and inclusive societies are important for sustainable development. No one can live well without peace and security, both of which may be lost through conflict and civil war, causing people to flee their homes. Societies facing disasters or conflict need humanitarian assistance through intervention and peace-building. In fact, Johan Galtung (1969) differentiates two types of peace; negative and positive peace. Negative peace is simply the absence of direct violence (that kills people), while positive peace also includes the absence of both structural violence (that, for example, may cause death from poverty) and cultural violence (that, for example, includes factors that blind people to injustice or allow them to rationalize it) (Galtung, 1969).

Furthermore, the United Nations defines peace-building as 'a collection of efforts to reduce the risk of relapse into conflict by enhancing national capacities to manage conflict at all levels and establishing the foundation for sustainable peace and development' (Balthasar, 2017, p. 475). Therefore, peace-building exists as a multi-faced concept involving building post-conflict societies in terms of developing political institutions, creating institutional capacities, and improving security and socio-economic welfare. Peacebuilding helps in the re-building of fragile states through alleviating conflict and creating stable environments. The primary reason for establishing the United Nations in 1945 was to maintain peace and security globally (Sarjoon & Yusoff, 2019).

During the Cold War, rivalries frequently paralyzed the UN Security Council, thus limiting UN peacekeeping missions to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations on the ground so that political efforts could resolve conflicts by peaceful means (Ndulo, 2011). Richmond Oliver (2004) stated that the supposed role of UN peacekeeping was to prevent overt violence, prevent global and regional escalation of localized conflicts and provide conditions of stability in which peacemaking operations could occur.

With the end of the Cold War era, communities worldwide faced new security threats and challenges that threatened regional and world peace. For example, the breakout of civil war in fragile states such as Somalia ultimately led to the collapse of the state. As a result, the UN has

been involved in several peacekeeping operations across different regions, mainly in Africa and Asia, and these operations are significant in helping to maintain international peace and security. The UN itself defines peacekeeping as involving military personnel, but without power enforcement (Sarjoon & Yusoff, 2019).

2.2.1 Role of UN in peacebuilding

UN peacekeeping operations vary in nature, and include multi-dimensional activities connected with the political, the military, the economic, and the humanitarian. For example, military peacekeeping activities are associated with restoring democracy, the rule of law, and good government. In addition, peacekeepers conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) to assist local security, and help maintain law and order through operations (Ibid). The first UN peacekeeping mission was established in 1948, when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East to monitor the armistice agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors (Ndulo, 2011, p. 774).

The intensity of UN peacekeeping operations during the Suez crisis in 1956 led to the UN General Assembly establishing the first armed UN peacekeeping force (UNEF). Another vital UN peacekeeping operation was later launched in Congo, (1960-1964). Additionally, the UN operated a peacekeeping mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in March 1964 to serve as a buffer zone between the Greek and Turkish populations. Indeed, in the latter two cases of peacekeeping operations, peace agreements attempted to assist the failing governments and constitutional structures. The peace arrangement also aimed to restore law and order and effect a return to normalcy (Richmond, 2004, p. 86). These examples demonstrate that peacekeeping is not easy to launch and implement as it requires different efforts for different situations.

UN peacekeeping operations have also influenced many activities such as monitoring and running local elections in Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, the Congo, and East Timor, defending certain areas as 'safe areas' from adversary attacks so that the population feels secure at least in these areas, and also guarding weapons surrendered through DDR or taken from the parties in the conflict. In addition, the UN has ensured the smooth delivery of humanitarian relief supplies during ongoing wars, as in the case of Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, and Sudan. Finally, they also assist in reconstructing state functions in war-torn societies, as happened in Bosnia Herzegovina,

El Salvador, the Congo, and East Timor (Yilmaz, 2005, p. 18). In the 1990s, peace-building emphasized linking human security, good governance, accountability in public administration, focusing on conflict prevention measures, and creating peace and stability structures to reduce the phases of world conflicts.

Among countries to undergo civil wars, nearly two-thirds have experienced seven or more years of armed conflict in the post-World War II period (Gawerc, 2006, p. 436). Consequently, these countries are left in a debilitated state that usually requires peacebuilding. Rocha Menocal defined peacebuilding as ‘actions taken by national or international actors to identify and support structures that strengthen and consolidate peace to avoid a state relapsing into conflict’ (Rocha Menocal, 2011, p. 2). Globally, peace-building is the responsibility of various actors, including the UN, NGOs, donors, governments, and other international and local organizations. However, it is the UN itself that is umbrella organization under which all other sub-stakeholder activities are subsumed.

In 1992, the UN identified three efforts that help quell conflict i.e., preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping.

1- Preventive diplomacy: This is an action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

2- Peace-making: is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, through such peaceful means as foreseen in chapter VI of the charter of the United Nations.

3- Peace-keeping: is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/ or police personnel and frequently civilians as well (Yaman, 2018). In the following sections, the goal of peace-building in fragile states will be discussed.

After the Cold War, civil conflicts increased in frequency and there was great concern that states in conflict needed a rapid response from the international community before the situation worsened. We witnessed the breakdown of countries in regions such as the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, and, more recently, independent Kosovo, and in some cases they have

remained weak and unstable. In addition, severe and protracted conflicts and mainly internal and humanitarian crises, have affected all aspects of social life, the economy, health, security, and food. This is what happened in the early 1990s on the African continent, in states such as Rwanda, Liberia and Somalia. Peacebuilding aims to create a basis for lasting peace and to (re)build new states. Therefore, peace-building helps the UN foster sustainable peace and comprehensive support for populations that are most affected by violent conflict (Rocha Menocal, 2011).

2.3 State Fragility and its Character

There are differing opinions on the definition of state fragility. The general notion of a fragile state is of one that is weak and lacking in support domestically because it cannot render any essential services to the population. It would also be defined by instability and weak governance, extreme poverty, lack of territorial control, and a high propensity for conflict and civil war. The notion of fragility in states was first brought to the center of political discussions and international relations following the Cold War (Grävingholt et al., 2012).

Fragility is particularly pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa, where decades of civil war led to the secession of South Sudan from Sudan state as well as the collapse of Somalia. As mentioned above, there is no broad consensus on what constitutes a fragile state. However, we emphasize here that these countries are considered weak when they lack the political will and capacity to carry out the essential functions necessary for poverty reduction, development, and the protection of human security and human rights of their population (McCloughlin, 2009, p. 8).

Fragile states are those in which the government cannot deliver core functions to most people, including the poor. The most critical tasks for poverty reduction are territorial control, safety and security capacity to manage public resources, delivery of essential services, and the ability to protect and support how the poorest people sustain themselves (Andersen, 2006, p. 5). Stepputat (2007) argued that fragile states refer to countries where regions are unable or unwilling to provide safety and security, protection of a right, and essential social services. As a result, public sector reforms have proven difficult or impossible to carry out.

The World Bank has also referred to fragile states as ‘countries facing particularly severe development challenges such as weak institutional capacity, poor government, political instability, and frequently ongoing violence or legacy effects of past conflict’ (Michel, 2018, p. 13). The Government of Canada considers fragile states to be governments that lack the functional authority to provide basic security within their borders, the institutional capacity to meet the basic social needs of their populations, and the political legitimacy to represent their citizens at home or abroad effectively (Olowu & Chanie, 2016, p. 2). In parallel, the OECD defines fragility as ‘a combination of exposure to risks and the inability of the state, system, and communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks’ (Kalra & Saxena, 2021). Persistent, continuous fragility may lead to violence, the collapse of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises, or other emergencies.

Fragile states are countries where national and local authorities cannot provide essential public goods such as security and other basic services, or where their power is challenged by rival sources of governance such as territorial enclaves, ethnic secessions, or other armed non-state actors (Miraglia et al., 2012, p. 5). In both respects, such states are places where the application of global regulatory systems - including prohibitions that ban goods (such as drugs or alcohol) - tends to be weak. Fragile is thus an accurate, appropriate or fair description for these states.

Ultimately, there are two components of fragility recognized in most definitions, namely: capacity and legitimacy. ‘Capacity’ describes the ability of the state to provide public goods, services, and rights to its citizens. Legitimacy, however, refers to the state’s ability to recognize, accept and enforce its authority throughout its territory. If a state does not have this, it is unstable. Consequently, states that lack one, or both, are fragile, and in need of humanitarian aid because they cannot protect themselves during a national disaster or in the case of an internal disagreement such as a civil war or a natural disaster. In brief, fragile states are characterized by one or more of the following:

- Weak and unstable political institutions and poor governance causing a loss of state autonomy.
- Inability to exercise adequate jurisdiction over their territory, leading to a new concept of ungoverned territories.

-Legitimacy crisis due to problematic national cohesion, contested citizenship, violent disputes over state power, constant challenging of the legality and viability of the state, and massive loss and departure of citizens due to internal displacement, refugee flows, separatist agitation, civil war.

-Underdeveloped institutions for conflict management and resolution, including credible judicial structures that pave the way for conflictual, violent, non-systemic, and extra-constitutional avenues to articulate grievances and seek redress.

-Pervasive corruption, poverty, and low levels of economic growth and development resulting in a lack of financial capacity to perform the essential functions of the state, including, most importantly, obligations to citizens, such as protecting them from severe diseases and ensuring general human security (Corn wall & Eade, 2010, p. 283). Some common issues observed in the most fragile of states will be examined in detail in the following sections.

2.3.1. First: Security threats

As mentioned above, fragile states are characterized by weakness and lack of established authorities, a situation of lawlessness which facilitates the use of home-grown groups to threaten neighboring countries. Therefore, fragile states may significantly affect security in their own region, and even worldwide. With over 75 per cent of fragile states conflict-affected, they represent a primary source of refugee movements, drugs transit, and in some cases, have been used as routes for terrorist activities.

In the last two decades, most international donors have begun to pay great attention to these fragile states. This interest was boosted by various factors such as, for example, security considerations in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 on US soil. It was following this event that the idea of state fragility became a foreign policy and national security strategy, mainly in Western states (Grimm et al., 2014, p. 199). Additionally, the discourse around fragile states is informed by the need for international actors to provide protection to collapsed states so as to prevent and reduce breeding grounds for terrorist organizations (Hout, 2010, p. 3). Therefore, international efforts in assisting fragile states aim to help vulnerable states and to protect international order against transnational crimes that emanate from such states.

2.3.2. Second: Humanitarian Crisis

Humanitarian crises are prominent in fragile states, especially in countries with armed conflict and displacement. Most crises arise out of intra-group disputes within the state that force the population to flee their home country to other regions of the world. The Rwandan Genocide in 1994 and the Somali Civil War of the early 1990s are two dramatic examples that have resulted in international intervention (Menkhaus, 2010, p. 95). Furthermore, we see that the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Yemen have also brought about a humanitarian crisis. In brief, conflicts ultimately lead to humanitarian crises such as famine risk and debilitated health care, and eventually need intervention in the form of humanitarian assistance. When countries cannot deliver the most fundamental functions such as security and food, humanitarian assistance becomes paramount for the survival of its citizens.

2.3.3 Third: Refugee flow

Menkhaus (2010) wrote that fragile states which fall into prolonged armed conflict almost always produce massive refugee flows that pose considerable burdens on their neighbors. This can become a complex political problems for developed countries where refugees subsequently resettle in large numbers, legally or illegally. Indeed, in some European countries the political backlash against the influx of such immigrant communities has become a significant driver of policy towards fragile states.

2.3.4. Vulnerability of health care

Most fragile states are unable to operate a public health system, and the camps into which enormous numbers of displaced people are crammed become fertile ground for the spread of new, virulent strains of disease that can travel far into other regions and then remain undetected until they spread to uncontrollable levels. In brief, fragile states are considered incapable of performing essential functions. Characterized by inadequate policies, institutions, infrastructure, and governments, and in many cases either too poverty-stricken or too corrupt to provide essential services such as health care, any commitments they may make to providing such does not ensure the capacity to deliver. As a result, UN agencies or other non-state actors are called upon to assist (Haar & Rubenstein, 2012, p. 5).

2.3.5 About Some of the Drivers of State Fragility

Vallings and Moreno-Torres, M. (2005) argue that the central driver of fragility is weak state institutions, a factor to which all other elements associated with fragility and all other government elements are linked. We shall see that poverty is connected directly to fragility, but not all poor areas are necessarily fragile. Also, fragility occurs when poverty or economic decline are linked to inequitable resource distribution or unequal access to formal institutions. Essentially, this means that political institutions in unstable governments are incapable of successfully managing natural conflict in society (Vallings & Moreno-Torres, 2005, p. 7).

Furthermore, fragility is most apparent if a state is in the midst of economic, political, or social transition. The European University Institute (2009) contends that despite the differentiation of definitions of fragile countries, there is consensus that they are characterized by failure in authority, service entitlement, and legitimacy. In addition, previous armed conflict, poor government, political instability, militarization, ethnic and social heterogeneity and polarized population may also be drivers of fragility. All these issues have made several countries in Africa, including Somalia, fragile states in constant need of foreign aid support. In the next chapter we will discuss Somalia's humanitarian aid and peace-building issues.

3. SOMALIA PEACE-BUILDING AND HUMANITARIAN AID: AN OVERVIEW

This chapter primarily examines the process of peace-building and humanitarian aid by humanitarian actors in Somalia, and the international community's role in supporting Somalis through a humanitarian crisis. The chapter also describes how international actors' efforts have helped in the state rebuilding of Somalia, a nation that was without a functional government for several years. Also illustrated is the general situation in Somalia vis-a-vis the external aid it received prior to destruction during its civil war.

Finally, the chapter explores why post-colonial Somalia appears to continue its dependency on aid from its previous colonial masters, and acknowledges that there can be little doubt that a lack of both resources and a professional workforce to keep the post-colonial government operational must be a large factor in this situation.

As a consequence of humanitarian disasters, civil wars and bad governance, Somalia has frequently required international aid, mainly in the form of military support and humanitarian assistance aid. Most notably, in 1974-75, the international community helped Somalia generously when a severe drought hit the country. In 1977, an enormous inflow of refugees entered the country in the wake of the Ogaden War in the same year. In 1991-95, several international actors helped Somalia recover from a humanitarian crisis after the government had lost authority, making use of negotiation channels and humanitarian aid to try to restore peace. The UN's operations during these years—UNOSOM 1 and UNOSOM II—and US efforts aimed at minimizing the conflict crisis to prevent the state from crumbling entirely. In 1992, the UN estimated that four and a half million people in Somalia were on the brink of starvation, while another two million had been displaced by war (Eklöw & Krampe, n.d., p. 7).

Finally, this chapter evaluates both regional and external actors in Somalia's state rebuilding and peace-building in the period 1999-2004. After ten years of failed UNOSOM missions, the UN and the US withdrew their troops from Somalia, and what came to be known as the Djibouti Conference was organized by ethnic Somalis in Arta in Djibouti. The conference provided a platform for Somali people to discuss their issues free of international intervention except for general facilities related to financial support from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the UN. Following this conference, the Transitional National

Government (TNG), led by President Abdikaasim Salaad Hassan assumed control, but also failed in its efforts to control the country, maintain peace, and curb violence within the state. Mbagathi in Kenya became the next site of several conferences between 2001 and 2004, culminating in what became known as the Mbagathi Peace Conference for Somalia.

3.1. A Brief History of Somalia Humanitarian Aid from 1960 to 1990

3.1.1. The Civilian Government and International Aid from 1960 to 1969

In 1960, the Italian and British colonizers relinquished their rule in Somalia. What were known at the time as British Somaliland and Italian Somalia gained independence, on June 26 and July 1 respectively, of that year. However, the civilian ruled post-independent state was incapable of efficiently carrying out its state obligations, as financial constraints and a scarcity of well-trained workers and professionals limited its effectiveness in running its governmental institutions. As a result, the need for international assistance arose and some British and Italian technical professionals remained in Somalia to provide support to the newly-formed government (Mohamed Muhumed, 2021).

In the three years following independence, government incapacity led to financial difficulties, as only 31 per cent of the state's budget could be met by public funding. The outcome of this budget deficit was heavy reliance by the new Somali state on grants from its two former colonizers (Warsame, 2012). The annual average of external assistance funds Somalia received between 1961 and 1963 came to US\$23.5 million, a figure that included grants, technical support, investment, and other export subsidies (Mohamed Muhumed, 2021, p. 15). At that time, Somalia was the African country with the highest support per capita: 'Somalia received US\$90 per capita in foreign economic assistance, about twice the average for sub-Saharan Africa' (Laitin & Samatar, 1984, p. 62). This significant bilateral and multilateral development funding from the international community had the purpose of helping the country to establish state-owned industries and improve physical infrastructure (Mubarak, 1996). These included building roads, and factories to process milk, tinned meat and fish. Additionally, the funds were aimed at building numerous schools, a national theatre, and a national airline (Laitin & Samatar, 1984).

Italy's assistance to Somalia comprised two types. One was direct aid for physical infrastructure (for example, highway developments and the modernization of Mogadishu Airport), and particularly educational projects, which included establishing the University of Somalia, with a curriculum in the Italian language. The other type was commercial loans at 7.5 per cent interest with maturity periods of between ten to twelve years. The purpose of the loans was mainly for the rehabilitation of banana plantations that had been damaged by floods in 1961 and for the enlargement and development of the sugar factory at the Johor plantations.

Other international actors also provided loans to Somalia. For example, Saudi Arabian aid was used by Somalia's government to fund the construction of airports in Hargeisa, Burao, and Baidoa. In addition, Saudi Arabia also assisted in agriculture and social infrastructure. Germany too assisted, mostly in the form of concessional loans at 2.5 per cent interest and repayable over twenty years. The Germans financed industrial projects as well as highway construction. A significant project carried out by German aid was the establishment of Burao Technical Institute (Mehmet, 1971, pp. 40–41).

The 1960s was an important period for the new Somalia state in its state-building process. In 1962, the USSR began assisting Somalia in constructing port facilities at Berbera on the Red Sea. However, in 1963, Somalia experienced severe financial development problems when its relationship with the British government dramatically worsened. When the British government unilaterally decided to annex to Kenya the Northern Frontier District (NFD), a large area mainly inhabited by Somali nationals, the Somali government broke off diplomatic relations. This of course impacted financially on the young state, to the extent that its government automatically lost development aid of about £1.3 million per year from Britain (Mohamoud & Mohamoud, 2006).

3.1.2. The Military Government and International Assistance from 1969 to 1990

3.1.2.1 *Somalia and USSR*

In 1969, Somali army commander, Major General Mohamed Siad Barre took power in a coup d'état. The initial vision of the post-colonial civilian government had been leading to social and cultural reforms that advocated for the promotion of women's rights, the construction of

schools, and the creation of commercial opportunities and health facilities, but the new revolutionary government took to disregarding the West in favor of the USSR, and General Siad Barre, heading the ‘Socialist’ Supreme Revolutionary Council, developed USSR-Somali relations. In time, the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries would become the primary financial donors to the Socialist military regime in Somalia (Mohamoud & Mohamoud, 2006, p. 92). Indeed, in 1971, US\$50 million in grants was approved by the Soviets for Somalia.

By October 1977, Russia had granted more than US\$250 million in military aid to Somalia (Schwab, 2009, p. 12), and the Somali government had adopted Scientific Socialism as its ideology for economic and social development. The declared objective of this ideology was greater self-reliance, with the ultimate aim of financial independence. However, despite its slogan of self-reliance, the government was still heavily dependent on foreign grants as a domestic source of revenue, just as these had been the mainstay of the state throughout the 1960s.

From 1969 to 1990, the USSR granted a great deal of financial and technical assistance to Somalia and its military government. However, the relationship came to an end when disagreement arose over the 1977-1978 war between Somalia and Ethiopia. The war was initiated when Siad Barre’s government moved against its neighbor in an attempt to occupy the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, claiming it as part of ‘Greater’ Somalia. The Soviet Union was forced to take sides and chose to support Ethiopia, effectively ending its diplomatic ties with Somalia (Jones & Center for Domestic and International Health Security, 2006, p. 85).

The USSR’s departure led to a change in focus and the Somali government looked once again to the West for help. Consequently, new diplomatic ties were forged, or rather re-forged with the US, countries in Western Europe, and with Saudi Arabia (Warsame, 2012, p. 51). Barre’s government would, later on, play an important role in fulfilling US political agendas during the Cold War period.

3.1.2.2 Somalia and the US

The reader will recall that relations between the US and Somalia had been developing in the early days of the new Somali state in the 1960s. These had naturally become strained when

the Socialist-backed Siad Barre government came to power in 1969, and especially during the first five years of Siad Barre's rule when Somalia's government cut ties to the West in favor of the USSR. The upshot of all these developments was the US terminating ties with Siad Barre in 1974.

By 1978, ties between the two had become reestablished, meaning that US aid was once again available to Somalia. Between 1979 and 1989, the US provided Somalia with more than US\$620 million in assistance, mainly focused on agriculture, health facilities, and infrastructure projects (Jones & Center for Domestic and International Health Security, 2006).

3.1.2.3 Somalia and Humanitarian Crisis

In the 1970s, Somalia faced two crippling humanitarian crises. The 1974-75 *Abaartii-Dabadheer*, the 'long-tailed drought' (Mubarak, 1996, p. 14), followed by the influx of refugees from the Ogaden region in 1977-78, as a result of the above-mentioned Somali-Ethiopian war there.

3.1.2.3.1 The 'Abaartii-Dabadheer'

The *Daba-dheer* drought was a continuation of a severe drought throughout North Africa. Its effects in Somalia with the loss of human lives and livestock brought severe economic consequences since it affected the nation's livestock sector, a vital one for the state. In terms of human casualties, it is estimated that the drought resulted in the death of over 20,000 people and the forced movement of 10-15 per cent of the entire pastoral population to register in relief camps (Ahmed, 1999, p. 117).

An already financially constrained Somali state was further incapacitated by the *Daba-dheer*, and hence, to counterbalance its dreadful effects, the government established a fund for international contributions and revised its budget to divert project funds (Mubarak, 1996). Because of the sheer numbers at risk from the drought, the government could not provide for all its people's necessities, so foreign countries contributed both food and financial support to the country's drought-hit nomadic pastoralists. The government's emergency relief aid budget totaled \$40 million, while international sources provided food relief valued at US\$43 million,

monetary donations totaling US\$49 million, and medical supplies and other material relief items (TSUI et al., 1991, p. 132). The contributions of various countries are recorded as follows:

“By January 1975, China, the United States, the European Economic Community, the Soviet Union, Sweden, Switzerland, Sudan, Algeria, Yugoslavia, Yemen, and others had pledged 66,229 tons of grain, 1,155 tons of milk powder, and tons of other food products. Later that year, with aid from the Soviet Union, the government transported about 90,000 nomads from their hamlets to agricultural and fishing cooperatives in the south. In addition, (The KFAED), Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development] and the World Bank-supported irrigation projects in these cooperatives, in which corn, beans, peanuts, and rice were planted” (Mohamed Muhumed, 2021, pp. 18–19).

3.1.2.3.2 Influx of Refugees from the Ogaden Region:

In July 1977, the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), heavily supported by Somali troops, stormed the Ogaden province, and by October they had taken almost all the province, with the exception of Harar and Diredawa (Ododa, 1985). This event became the Ogaden War, which led to the 1977-78 influx of refugees into Somalia and left the state faced with its second great humanitarian crisis barely two years after the devastating drought and famine. Stress on the government and its resources grew as it was incapable of providing for these refugees.

According to Nkaisserry (1997), the Ogaden War, a short but costly conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, was motivated by outside intervention, mainly by the so-called superpowers of the 1970s.

Three historical legacies lie at the heart of the Ogaden war: European colonial powers, Somali irredentism, and superpower intervention. Fundamentally, in terms of the Horn of Africa, the costly Ogaden war yielded no tangible beneficial results. Indeed, the Ogaden province and other border issues between Ethiopia and Somalia remained unsolved to this day. This conflict can thus be regarded as a meaningless tragedy for the people of the region. Somalia argued that the Ogaden region, with the greater part of its population Somali, formed a part of

Greater Somalia and it was thus a national issue to defend it. The Ogaden region also had oil and natural gas deposits, which both countries desired to control (Ododa, 1985).

During the war, the USSR attempted mediation to halt the fighting. At this time, both countries were pro-Soviet. Ethiopia had just joined the Soviet Bloc after a revolution in 1974 that brought to power a new president, Mengistu Haile Mariam. Mediation talks between the two witnessed a visit by Cuban President Fidel Castro, who visited the Horn of Africa countries in March 1977. The meeting resulted in a stalemate with Fidel Castro's proposal—a confederation of Somalia and Ethiopia, that would possibly also include South Yemen and Djibouti, with the Ogaden region remaining autonomous within the confederation—was found to be unworkable. The proposed confederation would have a common revolutionary, anti-Western orientation that would transcend linguistic and ethnic differences (Valenta, 1980, p. 358). However, President Said Barre of Somalia found Castro's appeal for settlement with Ethiopian leader Mengistu on Socialist brotherhood unconvincing and rejected it (Weiss, 1980, pp. 4–5). This was the moment at which the USSR changed its mind about Somalia and began to focus instead on Ethiopia.

Consequently, in 1978 the USSR dispatched massive military equipment and well-armed troops to Ethiopia, backed by a large Cuban expeditionary corps (1500 men) and military. Within a few months, Somalia was defeated and its troops retreated to the Somali-Ethiopia border (Prunier, 1996, p. 42). The defeat in the war had numerous consequences for the state, one of which was the subsequent influx of ethnic Somali refugees from Ethiopia to Somalia. This exerted a heavy burden on the Somali economy (Mubarak, 1996), and the consequent humanitarian crisis in the country made it necessary to seek international aid from powerful countries. The US had been a close ally during the war with Ethiopia and was quick to respond by sending large amounts of aid to ease the refugee burden.

3.1.3.3 Somalia and International Humanitarian Actors

In the 1980s, annual emergency relief aid to Somalia averaged US\$400 million (Gundel, 2002, p. 259). In 1978-80, the World Food Program (WFP) supplied approximately 150,000 metric tonnes of food for an average refugee population of 700,000. In addition, at least twenty private voluntary organizations and bilateral aid agencies provided roughly \$46.5 million in

non-food aid to meet urgent needs, primarily for personnel, transportation, and health programs in Somalia (Henderson & Biellik, 1983, p. 293).

Before the civil war, other international organizations involved in health care projects and development work in Somalia included UN agencies and major NGOs. For example, in 1984, UNICEF, the UNHCR and WFP humanitarian aid addressed Somalia's refugee and food supply shortages. In 1982, the Norwegian Red Cross supported a rehabilitation program for the disabled run by the Somali Red Crescent Society, the only national organization in Somalia. In 1991, CARE also supported the WFP humanitarian assistance to Mogadishu residents (Jones & Center for Domestic and International Health Security, 2006). By 1990, just before the collapse of the Somali state, the government there received annual financial support of \$100 million (second only to Egypt and Israel) from the US (Warsame, 2012).

3.2. State failure, Restoring Peace, and Humanitarian aid In Somalia (1991-1995)

As mentioned in the previous sections, Somalia is a country that relies on international aid, and although it had a functioning government from 1960 to 1990, international assistance always helped it implement various policies on infrastructure, education, health, and security. This section will examine Somalia's collapse into failed state status.

3.2.1. A short background of the conflict in Somalia

In January 1991, the Somali State officially collapsed. International efforts to revive central government institutions effectively began in December 1992 with UNOSOM, the UN Somalia peacekeeping mission (Menkhaus, 2014, p. 155). The failure of the Somali state had come before the state's eventual collapse. Three historical conflicts instigated by ex-Somali military officers who attempted a coup to dethrone Siad Barre after the defeat of the Ogaden War define this failure which set the country on the path to civil war.

Firstly, as soon as the coup d'état failed, its leading colonel, Yusuf, fled to Ethiopia and organized an opposition guerrilla front, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). The SSDF received support from Ethiopian President Mengistu and his Communist allies (Prunier, 1996, p. 42). In response, the Siad Barre regime launched collective retaliation against all members of the SSDF with killings and the destruction of wells and livestock (Haldén, 2008).

The second major conflict was the battle between the Somali military and the Somali National Movement (SNM) for control over northwest Somalia. The SNM was established in 1981 by members of a Somali clan living in the country's northwest. The SNM accused Somali government forces and military of committing atrocities against civilians, and advocated for secession, in what eventually became the self-proclaimed independent state of Somaliland in 1991. With a worsening economy and loss of regime legitimacy, Siad Barre's government was slowly losing relevance. Both the SSDF and the SNM were backed and operated out of Ethiopia, and both constantly did battle with the Barre regime in the 1980s. Despite both experiencing heavy losses at the hands of the government, they each succeeded in establishing territorial entities in the 1990s, namely Puntland (SSDF) and Somaliland (SNM). Furthermore, the defeat of Siad Barre was in fact possible as no external intervention occurred in the northwest and northeast regions after 1991 (Haldén, 2008, p. 25).

The third armed conflict started before 1991. The Somali government had attempted to end the growing clan-based liberation movements in 1989 and 1990. Most of these movements involved the United Somali Congress and the Somali Patriotic Movement (Bank, 2005). By the end of 1990, the government controlled a mere 10-15 per cent of Somalia's national territory, the rest being in the hands of a variety of clan-based political movements; the SNM in the northwest, the SSDF in the north-east, the USC in the center, and the SPM in the south. Eventually, in January 1991, several units of these disparate forces converged on the capital, which rapidly fell into their hands, prompting President Siad Barre to flee the country (Prunier, 1996, p. 45).

3.2.2 Fall of Siad Barre

In 1980, Siad Barre had become a close ally of the West, mainly the United States and Italy, who provided large amounts of money in foreign aid as well as military and non-military aid. In 1980, the US provided Somalia with a military assistance package defined as defensive. This began at \$45 million for 1980-81 and grew to over \$500 million in 1989, the most extensive security-assistance program provided to sub-Saharan African states by the US (Menkhaus, 1997, pp. 130–131). By 1988, the country and the dictatorship had become dependent on foreign aid for survival (Haldén, 2008, p. 26). Military aid was necessary as civil

war raged against the SSDF and SNM. By 1989, nearly all international donors had suspended assistance and funding, and the government swiftly collapsed in the face of various liberation fronts and a popular uprising in Mogadishu (Haidén, 2008, p. 26).

In May 1990, attempts were made to prevent a prolonged civil war. Somali freedom fighters, well-known Somali politicians and intellectuals, and elders led by Somalia's retired first president, Aden Abdulle Osman, produced a five-page manifesto in the Somali language, urging President Major Mohamed Siad Barre to resign to avoid impending collapse. Barre ignored the proposal and persisted in his ambition to lead the country (Ingiriis, 2012). As the conflict became ever more combustible, Italy attempted mediation between the Manifesto Group and the Siad Barre government in mid-1990, but was unsuccessful (Lyons & Samatar, 2010, p. 28). By the end of the year, sporadic rebel attacks had turned into a full-fledged civil war, ultimately bringing down the government (Peace, 1995).

Unfortunately, when these movements overthrew the government and deposed President Barre, they had no clear plan to rule the country, and according to Mohamoud & Mohamoud (2006), the clan-organized forces soon turned their weapons on each other. This was the beginning of Somalia's disastrous state breakdown. A power vacuum emerged when President Barre immediately fled the capital in a convoy of tanks.

3.2.3 Somalia Post-Siad Barre Military Rule

The drought-induced humanitarian crisis and insecurity destabilized Somalia as early as 1990. The extraordinary drought led to the death of 500,000 people, forced approximately two million people to flee their homes, and resulted in a massive inflow of international aid into Somalia to relieve the hazardous situation (Abild, 2010, p. 76).

After 1991, Somalia's national government was nonfunctional and the country fragmented into different parts led by various warlords. Two of them, General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, competed for control of Mogadishu. Much of the country's infrastructure, especially in the south, was destroyed during the civil war. Agricultural communities there suffered huge damage, and thousands of Somali citizens sought refuge in neighboring countries. An estimated one to two million Somalis were evacuated internally or

across the border into Kenya and Ethiopia (Jones & Center for Domestic and International Health Security, 2006, p. 87). Meanwhile, the fighting, particularly in Mogadishu, destroyed the city. As a result of disrupted agriculture and food supply in southern Somalia, a severe famine caused approximately 3,000 reported deaths with more death unreported (Alama et al.,2018, p.67).

3.2.4 Attempts to restore peace and humanitarian relief in Somalia

With no functional government on the ground, Somalia became a failed state in the position of needing assistance from the entire world to avoid a major catastrophe. The UN's initial response was rapid and the first step undertaken by its mission was to provide the country with food and other humanitarian relief to reduce casualties and the effects of the famine. Meanwhile, in Somalia, the situation was devastating, as President Siad Barre, who had controlled the country for twenty-one years, was overthrown and huge numbers of Somalis became involved in the clan-based war. Moreover, the central provinces were also hit by austere droughts, aggravated by the civil war disrupting agricultural activity in the more productive areas in the south of the country. All these factors culminated in the disaster becoming internationalized as refugees poured into neighboring states (Thakur, 1994, p. 388).

Following the initial breakdown, the humanitarian situation in Somalia worsened day by day. When the crisis began in January 1991, the incumbent UN Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, described it as 'the most serious humanitarian crisis of our time'. Similarly, in 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, successor to Pérez de Cuéllar, declared it his purpose to make the Somalia crisis a top priority for the UN. One outcome of this was UNSC *Resolution No 733* issued on January 23, 1992. This urged international communities to provide more humanitarian aid to Somalia, and called for a total arms embargo on the country. Furthermore, it demanded the warring parties stop the conflict and resolve their differences peaceably (Mohamoud & Mohamoud, 2006).

In early March, the two Mogadishu factions fighting for control of the capital agreed to a truce under UN sponsorship. Then, in July, the UN decided to launch a humanitarian airlift to Somalia. The military operation, UNOSOM I, could not commence until September since the supply of food and efforts to lessen conflict in Mogadishu were the top UN priorities. In

October, a humanitarian conference held in Geneva approved sending one hundred thousand metric tonnes of food to Somalia by January 1993 (Augelli & Murphy, 1995, p. 340).

UNOSOM I had a mandate to provide humanitarian aid and promote the cessation of hostilities in Somalia, and UN General Secretary Boutros Ghali also sent Mohamed Sahnoun to Mogadishu for mediation. Sahnoun conducted a meeting with faction leaders, civic leader clans, and women's groups to facilitate the reconciliation process through negotiation to launch cease-fire monitoring in the state. (Peace, 1995). Also, in the early 1990s, international relief agencies such as UNICEF and the IRC were doing huge work to support the Somali people. However, continued fighting thwarted relief efforts (Tubbs, 1997, p. 31).

After several months of negotiations, the UN managed to get the warring factions to agree to a ceasefire. In return, the UN provided fifty UN observers and five hundred UN peacekeepers to aid the relief effort. The US took part in these relief efforts with a humanitarian airlift in August 1992. However, the ceasefire did not hold as faction leaders reneged on promises made, and rampant violence and looting soon made relief operations impossible (Hoar, 2022, p. 31).

Nonetheless, UNOSOM I peacekeepers tried to maintain security and safe passage for those delivering aid, but the mission failed since more troops were required as additional reinforcement to their operation. As a result, UNOSOM I was unable to carry out its mandate. Despite the arrival of thousands of tonnes of relief supplies, food and medicine could not be distributed because of looting. By November 1992, up to half a million Somalis had died due to war, starvation and disease. The town of Baidoa had lost 40 % of its population and 70 % of its children under the age of five (Peace, 1995, p. 7).

US President George Bush decided to commit US ground forces, and on December 9, 1992 Operation Restore Hope was launched. US troops occupied Mogadishu airport, creating a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations (Strednansky, 1996, p. 21). According to Klarevas (2000), Operation Restore Hope in Somalia was one of the US' first large-scale, well-publicized peace operations since the Gulf War. In a renewed effort to provide humanitarian assistance, UNOSOM collaborated with the UNITAF, a 40,000-strong multinational force that operated in Somalia for four months beginning in December 1992. With the withdrawal of

UNITAF, UNOSOM I was replaced in March 1993 by a much larger mission, UNOSOM II (Koops et al., 2015, p. 408). The UNSC passed *Resolution 794* which emphasized that the violent conflict in Somalia posed a threat to international peace and mandated the UNITAF to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations there as soon as possible. The resolution aimed to reduce or eliminate the obstacles to the development of peace operations in the country amid ongoing violence, robberies and looting of humanitarian aid by warlords and gangs, (UN Security Resolution 794 December 3, 1992).

However, there was a misunderstanding between the US and the UN on the purpose of the UNITAF operation in Somalia. The operation mainly focused on delivering humanitarian relief supplies and eliminating looting, hoarding, and the use of food as a weapon, thereby weakening the power of warlords. The UN Secretary-General and the US Secretary of State disagreed on the strategic goal of the UNITAF. The mission, according to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, was to ‘feed the hungry, defend the vulnerable, and pave the way for political, economic, and social reconstruction’. Before the UN could take authority, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali believed the mandate of UNITAF was to neutralize those militias holding heavier weaponry and disarm irregular soldiers. The US, in contrast, did not see disarmament as part of the mission, mainly since this appeared to be an impossible task in a country where every individual could be in possession of a weapon (Koops et al., 2015, p. 413).

Finally, the UNSC passed *Resolution 814* on 26 March 1993, creating UNOSOM II. The mandate of this resolution was to use military power to restore hope and peace in Somalia, and particularly in Mogadishu. In addition, it called for the disarmament of the clans as a necessary condition for the rehabilitation of the Somali political institutions.

Full operationalization of UNOSOM II came after 5 June 1993, when an ambush attack killed 23 Pakistani peacekeepers; it is then that the UNSC passed *Resolution 837* demanding the arrest of all those involved in the crime and urging Member States of the UN to contribute temporarily to military support that would provide the operation with the capability to confront and deter armed attacks. According to the UN, the armed attack of June 5 on its peacekeepers had been calculated and premeditated to intimidate UNOSOM II. Heavy fighting between US troops and General Aideed on October 3, 1993 resulted in the death of 18 US special forces

rangers in Mogadishu. Unfortunately, UNOSOM II was a failure. The peacekeepers also failed to capture General Mohamed Farah Aideed. Security in Somalia deteriorated significantly with this mission failure, and indeed all US military forces were withdrawn in March 1994.

Similarly, in March 1995, UNOSOM II secured the withdrawal of all remaining UN forces (Tubbs, 1997, p. 33). At that time, the situation in Somalia generally was worsening daily, especially throughout 1994, when the UN began its troop withdrawal. Besides the worsening humanitarian crisis and massacres, members of the Abgal sub-clan under the late Ali Madi Mohamed and the Habargidir sub-clan under the late General Mohammed Aideed (both sub-clans of the larger Hawiye clan) engaged in heavy fighting that led to Mogadishu being split into northern and southern zones (Muthuma, 2008). This situation promptly led to a number of other clan lords trying to spread the idea of 'warlordism' throughout the south of the country, with each one making specific demands as part of their plan. Therefore, it became clear that with military intervention having failed, the only path forward for Somalia was reconciliation through peace conferences. However, all negotiation attempts by Egypt and Ethiopia with the warlords to reach a consensus were unproductive.

3.3. State Formation and Peace-building: General Overview

From 1995 to 1999, conflict reigned in Somalia, and its citizens had become further accustomed to living with the problematic situation in their country. Leaving only famine relief program agencies, the UN and the USA had also withdrawn from Somalia without achieving peace or any state-building goals. The result was anarchy. After the withdrawal of international forces in 1995, Somalia as a whole did not revert to civil war. Instead, there was a stabilization process in several parts of the country. As a result, regional administrations arose to provide a degree of security and administration in several key regions: Somaliland in the northwest, Puntland in the northeast, and Bay/ Bakool in the southwest, but any and all attempts to reconstruct the entire country failed. After several years of this failure and unsuccessful national peace conferences, successful peace talks began between 1998 and 1999.

3.3.1 Djibouti Peace Process

The Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and Djibouti government proposed a Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC) that would engage with civil society as representation. However, Somali warlords did not participate (Coma et al., 2007, pp. 6–7). In 1999, President Ismail Omar Gheulle of Djibouti outlined his strategy to end Somali conflict to the UNGA. He promised to hold a national reconciliation conference in which Somali civil society and traditional leaders would participate (Elmi & Barise, 2006, p. 40), and requested support from international actors. He added that should the warlords not come to the table, then the international community should consider them ‘criminals’. The conference in Arta in Djibouti became the largest Somali-owned peace conference ever held, with 3000 Somalis in attendance (Elmi & Barise, 2006). Traditional leaders, civil society leaders, intellectuals and business leaders came together to reconcile and form a national government. Over 900 delegates were elected at the conference, and a 245-seat Transitional National Assembly (TNA) was formed, with its members enacting the Transitional National Charter (TNC). The TNA elected a new transitional president, Abdikaasim Salaad Hassan, and he appointed Dr. Ali Khalif Galaid as his prime minister (Kasaija, 2010, p. 264). As soon as Dr. Galaid formed the government in October 2000, he was faced with his first major problem, namely Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia since the collapse of the state. The Ethiopian government opposed the Arta process, claiming it was incomplete, and set about organizing all factions, regions and personalities opposed to the conference and some Arta participants who were not satisfied with the posts offered.

The Ethiopian government held a counter-conference in Awasa to form the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC), which became a new alliance against the TNG. Meanwhile, the international community, the UN, the US, and the EU openly supported the Djibouti initiative. So too did hundreds of thousands of Somalis throughout Somalia welcome the outcome, with the exception of the self-declared breakaway region of Somaliland, which still had substantive issues with the rest of Somalia (Elmi & Barise, 2006, p. 41).

Prior to the Arta Conference process, Somalia had been without a functioning government for at least ten years and had held more than thirteen peace conferences, all

concluded without any results. Significantly, in 2000, after a long time of state collapse, the TNG became the first Somali political initiative to achieve significant international recognition. As militia groups had effectively blocked and restricted the activity of the government to only a section of Mogadishu, the TNG was not in control of the whole city, particularly Villa Somalia (the President's residence), and other essential places such as seaports and international airports (Sage, 2002, p. 132). (Kasaija, 2010) At that time, the TNG faced enormous difficulties in how the government performed its duties. The warlords in the capital city, particularly those who had occupied Villa Somalia, rejected any development towards resolution in the capital. Indeed, President Abdikaasim Hasan turned his own house into a presidential palace and government offices. However, during his tenure, he could not build any institutional government because of a lack of willpower and cooperation. He also refused to seek aid from international forces to use power to capture all of Mogadishu and the rest of the country. In fact, the only significant success of the TNG was its taking Somalia's long-empty seats at the UN, OAU, IGAD and the League of Arab States (Sage, 2002, p. 132).

In 2004, the TNG was replaced by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) established in Nairobi, Kenya after prolonged talks in a comprehensive arrangement of various Somali factions facilitated by IGAD. The TFG was founded using the '4.5 formula' produced during the Djibouti process, according to which power was shared between Somali clans (Kasaija, 2010, p. 265). The Kenyan conference came about because it was clear that the previous peace-building effort in Djibouti had failed to establish a strong state capable of controlling violent actors in Somalia. As a result, the international community, led by IGAD, proposed and sponsored another reconciliation conference to bring together all political actors in Somalia, including those warlords who had not attended the Djibouti conference.

3.3.2 The Mbagathi Peace Process

According to the TFG Government, this process began in 2001 with negotiation for a new Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Kenya, now known as the Mbagathi process. This was initiated with two parallel sets of discussions between the TNG and the SRRC. However, like earlier attempts, it failed to produce a positive outcome in the conflict due to clan issues and warlord demands. Despite Kenya's best efforts at mediation, the procedure took three

phases and several years to complete. Nonetheless, the TFG was established as a result. In October 2002, all the parties accepted the Eldoret Declaration on Federal Government Structure and Cessation of Conflicts (Williams, 2018, pp. 23–24).

In February 2003, Phase Two commenced. After several months of dispute, a draft charter was eventually developed on 15 September 2003. Finally, Phase Three started in May 2004 when a new round of negotiations was launched. Between August and October of that year, the constituent parts of what would become the TFG took shape: a Transitional Federal Charter was adopted, and a 275-member Transitional Federal Parliament was selected. The Transitional Charter outlined a five-year mandate for the TFG that would, theoretically, lead to a new Somali Constitution and transition to a representative government following national elections envisaged for 2009. However, the new Charter established Islam as Somalia's national religion, based on *Shari'a* law. In addition, the highly controversial 4.5 formula, a quota system created during a 1997 Ethiopian conference, distributed power among Somalia's four majority clans (Dir, Darod, Hawiye, and Digil and Mirifle) while giving a half-share to those they identified as minority clans (such as the Gaboye, Tumal, Yibir, Shashi, Yashar, and ethnic Bantus). The '0.5' in the formula, represented groups that had historically suffered injustice from majority clans.

In October 2004, the former Puntland leader Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was elected President of the new TFG (Hoehne, 2010, p. 33). However, this government was immediately faced with a deep crisis that was entirely self-inflicted. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed's government was balanced according to clan lines based on the 4.5 formula, but it was completely unbalanced in broad groups against the SRRC faction. Yusuf had wanted to benefit from the realities of the 4.5 formula. Additionally, Some Hawiye clan leaders and clans were in Ethiopia to select a cross-clan cabinet dominated by the SRRC group. It was a mistake of Yusuf's government; the Mogadishu group was almost entirely cut out of the government. It meant he couldn't move the TFG to Mogadishu without facing a hostile group of political opponents and their militias there. However, the Kenya government compelled the TFG to move to Somalia and work in its southern cities, particularly Baidoa, then controlled by a militia backed by the Ethiopian government, and Jowhar, a town ninety kilometers from Mogadishu. In other words, at this point in time, the TFG did not control a single city in Somalia. In 2005, the

TFG succeeded in moving its headquarters to Baidoa (Mwangi, 2010, p. 89), but did not even approach Mogadishu. With concerns about the TFG failing in the same manner as the TNG had, international donors were worried about throwing much financial support behind what appeared to be simply another attempt at state revival (Menkhaus, 2018, p. 20). Furthermore, in 2005 the TFG could not freely exercise effectiveness over the country because the warlords had boosted their power. Fragility within the TFG itself was further weakened in early March 2004, when two opposing wings emerged, one led by President Yusuf and his Prime Minister Ali Ghedi, the other comprising a group of parliamentarians and cabinet members primarily based in the capital Mogadishu and mainly from the Hawiye clan. Two issues divided the government: the location of the capital city from which it would function, and the proposal to request peacekeeping forces to support it. The President and his alliance were working in the provisional capitals of Jowhar and Baidoa due to insecurity in Mogadishu, but the Mogadishu-based parliamentarians and cabinet members interpreted this as a strategy to isolate them. They were fearful that President Abdullahi Yusuf was using forces in his own interests (Kasaija, 2010, p. 265). These challenges ultimately meant that the TFG lost the opportunity to build a national institution in Somalia after relocating from Nairobi.

At a meeting in Abuja, Nigeria in January 2005 of the Assembly of Heads of State Government in the African Union (AU), the ongoing security situation in Somalia was discussed. The upshot was a decision to provide a security situation to empower the newly-established TFG to do its work effectively (Ongoma et al., 2016, p. 181), as until this time it had failed to offer even the most basic services in the form of security for itself and its governmental institutions. To support the TFG, IGAD proposed and sought authorization from the AU and the UN to deploy its peace support mission (IGASOM), and planned to begin operating in March 2006 (Ongoma et al., 2016, p. 181). When the TFG had begun working outside the capital city, new forces, known as the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), suddenly appeared in the country. After an exchange of hostilities between the UIC and the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (APR), the UIC captured Mogadishu. A coalition (APRCT) was subsequently formed by warlords in and around the city. The APR was supported, via the CIA, by the US, with the purpose of countering the threat of Islamic radicalism, which was said to have been behind the 1998 embassy attacks in Nairobi in Kenya and Dar-es-salaam in Tanzania. The CIA had identified Somalia as a hiding place for suspected Al-Qaeda terrorists. The UIC

began to function in Mogadishu in 2005, and had the support of the business community there, whose enterprises had suffered as a result of the many roadblocks throughout the city and the general lack of security. By June 2006, having defeated the APRCT, the UIC controlled Mogadishu, and rapidly extended its influence to other regions in the country (Kasaija, 2010). This inevitably brought about clashes between itself and the TFG.

The international community started negotiations on power-sharing between the UIC and the TFG in December 2006, with the Arab League, the UN and Kenya attempting to mediate. At this point, the TFG had control in only one city and the UIC had authority in mainly the southern cities of the country. Representatives of both groups met three times in Khartoum in Sudan, with no tangible results. Thus, a TFG-UIC war broke out, with the former backed by Ethiopia. In December 2006, the UIC attacked Baidoa in an attempt to take it, but a quick push by the TFG took them towards Mogadishu, from which they eventually ousted the UIC, who quickly disappeared from power (Abbink, 2008, pp. 101–104). It is worth noting that the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia at this time had no legitimacy because Ethiopians were not among African troops mandated by the AU and the UN.

In fact, a parliamentary ruling prohibited frontline governments from interfering in Somalia, but Ethiopia had support from the US for its intervention in Somalia, especially in the war against the UIC. In 2001, US-Ethiopian relationships had become stronger following the Islamic jihadist bombing in the World Trade Centre. According to the US, Ethiopia is a pro-Christian nation, and thus it was essential to work with it to defeat international terrorism. Both states shared a common fear for security in the event of Islamic-backed militias gaining ascendancy in Somalia, and although the US military base in Djibouti serves as a deterrent to such militant attacks, Ethiopia has a long border with Somalia. The war against the UIC was thus based on the shared interests of both states. Ethiopia needed to overwhelm the UIC to install the TFG, which would in turn help the US benefit from peace in the Horn of Africa (Bamfo, 2010, p. 60). When Ethiopian troops and TFG forces captured Mogadishu in 2007, they occupied important places such as the seaport, airport, and the former presidential palace. However, war soon erupted again over control of the city, pitting Ethiopian troops against those Somali citizens who had little, if any, trust in Ethiopian troops due to the bitter history of relations between the two countries. This new war yet again did massive damage to Somalia and

its people, akin to that caused by the civil war in 1990. Hundreds of thousands in Mogadishu were displaced from their homes. Most of the damage was caused by the superior Ethiopian military (For more see, Human Rights, 2007, pp-29). While fighting continued in Mogadishu, Some UIC leaders left the country to formulate a new alliance called Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), and yet again the international community began efforts to resolve Somalia's political disputes by mediation, this time between the TFG and the ARS. Then, President Yusuf Ahmed resigned from office after a dispute with his prime minister and also as a result of pressure exerted mainly from the international community. He had openly rejected the negotiations between TFG and former UIC leaders of what was now ARS. After his resignation, the UN-led Djibouti agreement ensued and the international community continued to resolve Somalia's problems through discussion. The TFG and ARS agreed on the importance of a new election with participants from both sides. At the Djibouti Conference, Sheriff Ahmed, former leader of UIC and ARS was elected president of Somalia on January 30, 2009.

3.3.3 2008 Djibouti Agreement

According to the Djibouti agreement, Ethiopian forces would leave Mogadishu, and a 20,000-strong mission (AMISOM) of AU peacekeeping forces would be deployed to maintain peace in southern Somalia. From 2009 to 2012, AMISOM and the TFG forced *Al-Shabaab* fighters from Mogadishu into the countryside. However, the *Al-Shabaab* maintained a very effective operational and spy network, the *Amniyat*, in Mogadishu. Dozens of assassinations of individuals associated with the TFG were committed by this network during this period (Menkhaus, 2018, p. 21). In the second year of President Sheriff Ahmed's rule, the UN declared a severe famine in Southern Somalia, affecting 3.1 million people (Maxwell & Fitzpatrick, 2012), and once again international communities stepped up to help.

4. TURKEY'S HUMANITARIAN AID IN SOMALIA: AN ASSESSMENT

One of the international communities which came to Somalia's aid when another famine struck two years into President Sheriff Ahmed's rule was Turkey. This chapter explores its peacekeeping role in Somalia and highlights its performance in helping to stabilize the country through the provision of humanitarian and developmental aid. Donelli and Levagi have described the nature of Turkey's support to Somalia as 'hybrid and non-traditional', meaning that it combined 'the traditional political stability perspective of western powers with the economic-trade perspective of emerging powers' (Rossiter & Cannon, 2019, p.172). Turkey's approach has relied on the use of persuasion and inducement strategies, or in other words, soft power, to help effect change in Somalia. As soft power techniques, these strategies are associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideologies and institutions. The use of soft power relies on some factors such as cultural influences (Wagner, 2014). For example, the dispersion of American culture within the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War era was a possible indication of the existence of American soft power (Wagner, 2014). Culturally, Turkey's influence stems from the fact that it is widely acknowledged as a model for other Muslim states and developing countries. (Reuters, 2012).

This chapter also investigates relations and diplomatic ties between Somalia and Turkey, and how the two are linked historically by the Ottoman Empire. It examines diplomatic ties between Turkey and African countries vis-a-vis the Somali state. The chapter highlights the progress made by Turkey in helping Somalia to rebuild its economy and foster peace and unity by providing additional security assistance.

Also in this chapter, the author explains that while Turkey's aid has no consequential effects on Somalia's governance in terms of sanctions or debts, it is still seen by the international community as a bid by Turkey to portray itself as an indispensable power in global politics (Reuters, 2012). There can be little doubt that conditions in the Somalia of today would be much worse had the world continued to completely isolate the state, which with the fall of its central government in 1991 effectively became a failed state. As such, it could neither protect its borders from threats, internal and external, nor could it cater to even the most pressing daily needs of its people, and was therefore in dire need of the presence of foreign peacekeepers and international

humanitarian aid. In fact, since 1991, the country has been the subject of both international and regional political intervention. Internationally, the Global North has tried to intervene, while regional bodies such as the AU and the IGAD have been involved in peacekeeping missions across the state. This chapter then focuses on Turkey's involvement in Somalia, highlighting the level of aid ranging from military to humanitarian and developmental. The chapter will close by drawing a comparison between Turkey's aid and that offered by other countries.

4.1 A Brief History of Turkey-Somali Relations

The first recorded interactions between Somali and Turkish peoples occurred in the Ottoman era. According to Camacho et al (2016). In fact, on May 27, 2012, at a Somali Civil Society gathering in Istanbul, Turkey's Foreign Minister remarked that the Adal Sultanate and the Ottoman Empire had a relationship that reached back to the 16th century, when Ahmed Gurey fought Christian occupying forces along the East African coast with the help and support of the Ottoman Empire (Lewis, 2019).

Since the end of the Cold War, Turkish governments have displayed a clear interest in fellow Muslim countries of the former Ottoman Empire and other African countries (Crisis Group, 2012, p.2). Somalia itself appeared on Turkey's foreign diplomacy agenda for numerous reasons; the large number of Turkish enterprises seeking export markets, Turkey's own geopolitical interests, Somalia's geographical proximity, and the countries' shared cultural, religious and historical relationship (Crisis Group, 2012, p.3).

Turkey and Somalia opened embassies on each other's soil in 1979. However, the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu closed at the outbreak of the Somali civil war in 1991 (Shire, 2019). It was famine during the holy month of Ramadan that prompted the revival of Somali-Turkish diplomacy, when in 2011, Turkey expressed its general concern about the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Somalia. In September 2012, in the UNGA, Turkish President Erdoğan allocated half of his speech to addressing the plight of Somali citizens, stating that Turkey intended to alleviate this pain by offering humanitarian aid to the country (Crisis Group, 2012, p.3). By 2017, Turkey had established itself as Somalia's fifth-largest source of imports (Rossiter & Cannon, 2019, p. 171). Additionally, what began as aid to alleviate famine

developed into a long-term state-building and peacekeeping mission. In fact, since 2011 Somalia has become a key focus of Turkey and its foreign policy.

4.2 Turkey's current involvement in the continent of Africa vis a vis Somalia

Turkey's growing humanitarian and developmental aid in Africa represents a reorientation in its foreign policy aimed at capturing the 'hearts and minds' of the African continent and its political elites (Grigoriadis and Kostaras, 2021). From the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923 through the pre-World War II years, African countries and their affairs were not a priority for the country's foreign policy agenda, so we see that modern Turkey's involvement in Africa dates back to World War II, at the end of which Turkey embarked on an expansion of its international agenda. One of the first actions the state took was to join NATO in 1952. At first, Turkey's involvement in Africa appeared to adopt a tough stance. For example, it sided with Western governments in the UN to vote against Algerian and Tunisian demands for independence (Grigoriadis and Kostaras, 2021). However, this stance changed in the 1960s when Turkey's government found itself disagreeing with the US over the Cuban missile crisis. Additionally, movements for freedom and decolonization in Africa during the 1960s appealed to anti-imperialist sentiment in Turkey (Grigoriadis and Kostaras, 2021).

Turkish current foreign policy expansion plan started by 1960 when its State Planning Organization was established by then Prime Minister Turgut Özal (Camacho et al., 2016, p.74). Later, in 1998, Turkey introduced the Africa opening plan with the intention of forming diplomatic ties with countries on the African continent (Shire, 2019). Turkey's new foreign policy included permanently engaging with countries in the Middle East and Africa. However, the plan did not come to fruition until 2002, when the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) won the Turkish general elections. From then onwards, the Turkish government became more eager to be influential in decision-making processes on international issues (Kanat, 2010). Furthermore, growing its prestige became important for the state as it had a deep desire for international recognition as an emerging power and as a G20 member state. Thus, AK Party rule in Turkey was a turning point for the state's eagerness to engage with the Middle East and Africa. Since then, Turkey has taken many steps to increase its global presence in Africa, one example being its declaring 2005 'The Year of Africa' (Akpınar, 2017). There can be little doubt

that the Turkish government's involvement in Somalia has served to strengthen Turkey's geostrategic advantage in world politics.

Since 2005, Turkey has increased its embassies across the African continent from twelve to twenty-five, placing it among countries with the highest level of embassy presence on the continent (Sıradağ, 2016). Turkey has also increased its trade relations with African countries. For example, in 2005, the total value of Turkish-African was \$2 billion, and by 2021, this figure was \$26 billion (Orakçi, 2021). Indeed, the Turkish foreign policy stance on Africa goes beyond trade only, with involvement in various humanitarian aid projects across Africa (Sıradağ, 2016). Its primary areas of cooperation include agriculture, health, education, water, sanitation, vocational training, institutional capacity, and humanitarian assistance. In 2008, Turkey established the Agricultural Development Program, which embraces over thirteen countries including East African Community countries Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda (Bergamaschi et al., 2017).

This budding relationship between African countries and Turkey culminated in 2009 with Turkey's election to a non-permanent seat on the UNSC, something the country had been desirous of since 1961 (Aral, 2009). Its diplomatic missions in Africa undoubtedly played a part in it receiving such international endorsement. However, for the Turkish political elite, Turkey's opening up to Africa is a manifestation of the evolving consensus in the country that Turkey's economic and foreign policy interests will be best served by developing multiple ties and active engagement with close and distant neighbors (Özkan & Akgün, 2010).

4.2.1 Turkish aid intervention in Somalia

In 2011, as Somalia experienced its worst drought crisis this century, the UN promptly declared that the drought and accompanying famine in Somalia was threatening the lives and livelihoods of close to four million people there (AlJazeera, 2022). On August 17, 2011 Turkey hosted members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to discuss this famine. At this meeting, US\$350 million was pledged by the states present to assist in the provision of food and necessities for Somalia (Institute for Security Studies, 2012).

On August 19, 2011, taking note of the disastrous situation in the country and disregarding the threat of the *Al Shabaab* militia, Turkey's current president—and at the time prime minister—Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Somalia accompanied by a delegation that included his family members, government officials and renowned Turkish celebrities. This visit was significant for several reasons. It was the first visit to Somalia by a non-African state representative since the Somali civil war of the early 1990s (Sıradağ, 2016). Secondly, following a long hiatus it marked the re-establishment of a diplomatic relationship with Somalia by a Eurasian country as Turkey appointed an ambassador to the country and re-opened its embassy in Mogadishu (Sıradağ, 2016). Moreover, this shrewd diplomatic move by Turkey brought forth a reaction from the Global North, specifically the renewal of diplomatic relations with Somalia by the UK, the US, and China. From a foreign policy point of view, Turkey did indeed help to end Somalia's international isolation.

Turkey's involvement in Somalia is lauded for several reasons. Importantly, Turkey helped Somalia at a difficult moment when this African state's newly-elected government, the TFG, faced both threats of insurgency from the *Al-Shabaab* militia, and its own incapacity to alleviate the crippling famine disaster (Cannon, 2017). Unlike much of what had been done previously by international actors in Somalia, Turkey developed a coordinated plan supervised by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA). Through this agency, Turkey took care not to squander money on policies that counteracted each other (Cannon, 2017). As for previous attempts by international actors, Williams (2020) attributes interrelated effects, interest asymmetry and a lack of donor coordination as the major impediments to a decade of security force assistance initiatives by global world powers to build an effective Somali National Army.

Turkey's aid to Somalia came in the form of international advocacy, involvement in humanitarian aid, provision of extra security logistics, reconstruction of infrastructure and strengthening of unity and solidarity by mediation among the Somali ethnic groups. According to Akpınar (2017), Turkey's fully-fledged involvement in Somalia began in 2010 when Turkey hosted its first Istanbul Conference on Somalia on May 21, 2010. The objective of this engagement was to establish a roadmap for peacebuilding and state-building in Somalia by implementing and following the framework of the Djibouti agreement. Explained in detail in Chapter 3, The Djibouti Agreement involved the opposition ARS and the TFG. The agreement

provided for full reconciliation and a unity government. Additionally, a ceasefire was to have come into force within a month after August 18 2008 (Relief Web, 2008).

In 2011, the Turkish Red Crescent arrived in Somalia a short time after Prime Minister Erdoğan's official visit. Since then, the Turkish Red Crescent has established and maintained camp for internally-displaced people (IDPs), which has helped to settle at least 15,000 individuals. The organization also established a health facility, built a mosque and a soccer field, and provided employment for over 250 Somalis (Crisis Group, 2012, p..4).

Table 4.1: List of some Turkish Organizations and institutions present and active in Somalia (Bergamaschi et al., 2017, p.68)

Aegean Health Association Federation (ESAFED)	Africa Brotherhood and Solidarity Association (AFKAD)	Anadolu Agency	Association of International Physicians (AID)	Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Foundation
Bashir Association	Cansuyu	Charity Stone	Deniz Feneri	Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet)

Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD)	Doctors Worldwide	Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms (IHH), Turkey	IGMG Hasana Association	IHH Europe
Ihlas Holding Foundation	International Security Research Association (ISRA)	Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality	Ministry of Health	Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB)
The Red Crescent	State Airport Authority	State Hydraulic Works	Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA)	Yardımlı

As mentioned above, using TIKA as its agency the Turkish government coordinates its humanitarian aid to Somalia and implements bilateral development agreements between the two states. The majority of TIKA employees are Somali nationals. Drilling water boreholes, fencing and rehabilitating parts of Mogadishu Airport, restoring a number of government buildings, and rehabilitating Digfer Hospital and 33km of roads in Mogadishu are just a few examples of TIKA-sponsored successes (Crisis Group, 2012, p.4).

Figure 4.1: A section of the Recep Tayyip Erdogan Hospital (formerly known as Digfer Hospital)



In addition, several Turkish NGOs have been providing humanitarian aid across Somalia. For example, the IHH and *Kimse Yok Mu* have been working on famine relief. The former is further involved in the fields of medicine, housing, and education, providing free cataract eye surgery, relocating IDPs and sponsoring orphans (Crisis Group, 2012). Indeed, Turkey's help to Somalia in growing its capacity to provide education has encouraged other international organizations such as UNICEF and the EU to become involved. Also, the Somali government has stated that the educational reforms, and even more so the scholarships provided by Turkey have contributed immensely to peace efforts. In fact, it is said that by sparking interest among some Al Shabaab associates and sympathizers, the hope and potential generated by Turkey's scholarship programs have led to these individuals abandoning Al Shabaab (Crisis Group, 2012, p.7).

In Goal 4 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, which concerns education, the UN urges each world state to ensure that all its citizens have access to inclusive and equitable quality education which promotes lifelong learning opportunities for all (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, n.d.). Turkey's Ministry of Education has been a leader in championing this Goal in Somalia. As of 2012, the Ministry of Education had partnered with the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) to provide scholarships to 421 university-level students of Somali nationality (Bergamaschi et al., 2017). In 2022, the number had risen exponentially from the initial 421 to 5000 Somali nationals studying in Turkey (Dhaysane, 2022).

4.3 Assessing Turkey's role in Somalia

The government of Turkey played a key role in facilitating peace by initiating the mediation processes between Somalia and Somaliland. The Somali Republic had broken into Somalia and Somaliland in 1991. On May 18, 1991, the people of the former British Somaliland broke away from the rest of Somali Republic and restored their independence. Effectively, the breakaway country became known as "The Republic of Somaliland." The country successfully seceded as a *de facto* separate state in 2001 when it held a referendum. An overwhelming 97.1% of voters approved a draft constitution that affirmed Somaliland sovereignty and independence from Somalia as a separate State (Muhumed, 2015).

In 2013, Turkey's president of the time, Abdullah Gül, held a consultative meeting at the Presidential Palace in Ankara with the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mahamud, and Somaliland's President, Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo. The agenda of the meeting included brokering an agreement between the two leaders which would mean they try to resolve their differences to shape the future, with the ultimate objective of reintegrating and reunifying the Somali state (Bergamaschi et al., 2017).

Additionally, Turkey's peacekeeping mission in Somalia has been important for several reasons. The mission began by providing urgently needed humanitarian aid such as food and necessities when the famine struck, but as diplomatic relations grew between the two states, Turkey has built on this relationship by providing developmental and security aid. Arguably, the most significant aid that Turkey has provided to Mogadishu is the planned revival of its Somali

Armed Forces (SAF) through training at the recently launched Turkey Military base in the country (Rossiter & Cannon, 2019, p. 173).

In short, Turkey's aid to Somalia happened at a time of greatest need, following the UN declaring famine in the country. Added to this, Turkey's continuing commitment to the country has proven to be of immense value to Somalis, and hence they do not search for any ulterior motives or intentions driving this commitment, especially given that Turkey is a Muslim democratic state, ideally a model for what the Somali state could have been, and could still be.

4.3.1 Military assistance as a Sphere of influence

Turkey's military assistance and deployment of the Turkish military in Somalia has been a much-welcomed diplomatic move there, and is clearly important for the country as it struggles to achieve unity. Somalia's inability to achieve authority over much of its territory is attributed to Puntland's political autonomy and its *de facto* independence (Rossiter & Cannon, 2019). Thus, Turkish military assistance hopes to help build the Somali National Army and help the Somali Federal Government to rebuild the Somali state and reunite it with Somaliland.

As US plans to cut down on its development aid to Africa and reduce its funding to commitments such as the USAID (Owusu et al., 2019), Turkey has emerged as a leading global hegemon in matters relating to the provision of humanitarian aid and stabilization of fragile states across the African continent. Global North to Global South humanitarian aid contains aspects of neo-colonialism. Jayawickrama contends that the US uses humanitarian assistance as a tool to extend its foreign policy, while the EU uses humanitarian aid as a substitute for foreign policy (Jayawickrama, 2018). The colonization aspect comes into play as and when the humanitarian aid offered by these countries usually has the one main goal of changing the social, cultural, political, environmental and economic aspects of the fragile states through the use of either hard or soft power.

Moreover, the humanitarian and developmental aid offered by the West and Arab nations to the African continent is usually quid-pro-quo. In exchange for humanitarian aid and development aid, the donor countries expect to develop strategic military bases in the fragile country. For example, the opening in Somalia of the largest military base outside of Turkey by

the Turkish government is a move to institute a military stronghold from the Arabian Gulf to the Gulf of Aden. As a consequence, other notable Middle Eastern countries have now invested in military bases across the Horn of Africa. For example, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has opened bases in Eritrea and plans to open another base in Somaliland. Similarly, some of the G20 countries, namely the US, China, Japan and France have all opened military bases in Djibouti (Aknipar, 2017, p.4).

Countries establish strategic military bases in foreign countries to increase their military and economic powers. A state wishing to expand its sphere of influence will usually start by expanding its military instrument in an expansion of spheres of influence that is usually more geographically-centered than weapon-based (Klin, 2020). Geographically-centered expansion encompasses aspects such as donor funding and setting up of foreign bases in different regions across the world. Klin (2020) contends that some countries have realized that threatening weaker less-developed countries using superior weapons is in fact counterproductive, and that what may be needed is a show of might. (Klin, 2020). Additionally, Klin argues that the size and technological advancement of a conventional armed force achieves nothing significant for a country on a quest to expand its sphere of influence. (Klin, 2020). In fact, for this to happen Klin (2020) indicates that a country on such a quest needs to increase its power to encompass wider geographical regions.

Military and economic power are critical factors in obtaining and maintaining a sphere of influence. Therefore, setting up military bases in countries is important as it enables the foreign state to establish its presence inside a host country to the exclusion of others. For example, the significance of US military base Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti is that the US can control both the Arabian Peninsula and African countries such as Sudan and Somalia (Klin, 2020).

Therefore, Turkey's military base in Somalia serves to strengthen Turkey's commitment and influence in Somalia, as the former becomes a major security provider and an influential player in the reconstruction of Somalia's national army. During the opening of this base, in 2017, officials from Mogadishu stated that the training school plans to train 10,000 Somali soldiers (Shire, 2019).

Figure 4.2: Members of the SNA at the Turkey's Military Base in Somalia (CAMP TURKSOM)



Since the collapse of Somalia's army in the 1990s, the country has struggled with reconstruction efforts. Help from the EU and the US has not been of any great benefit due to logistic challenges. Turkey has also offered aid that means it will play a lead role unilaterally and multilaterally through its existing UN-affiliated efforts in the training and development of the Somali Police Office (SPF).

From the Turkish military's point of view, its base in Somalia is a success story. On top of providing stability and security to Somalia and its citizens, the base helps repair its own tarnished image as the military responsible for devastating military coups that have occurred in modern Turkey's 99-year political history. The military succeeded in four of these; 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 (AlJazeera, 2017), but in 2016, a failed coup instigated by the military to topple President Erdogan's government proved to be the bloodiest. The coup led to bombardment of the Parliament, the presidential complex, the headquarters of the National Intelligence Organization and the Special Forces (Dalay, 2016). This coup ended with the defeat of the military, but only following the deaths of more than 200 people and 2000 more injured (AlJazeera, 2017).

According to Dos Santos Lersch and Sarti (2014), overseas foreign military bases serve as the first mechanisms of a mass network whose purpose is to maintain control exercised by great powers. Military bases will serve various functions such as joint defense training and the development of joint security efforts. However, Dos Santos Lerch and Sarti argue that the underlying motive of foreign military bases is to achieve certain goals such as outcomes in the War on Terror, control of markets and natural resources and strategic positioning to counter possible threats to sovereignty (Dos Santos Lersch and Sarti,2014).

In Somalia, Turkey's military base aims to maintain peace-keeping operations and help in the state-building process, and serves as a focal point for Turkey's security. Through the base, Turkey can help Somalia and her government reestablish its military and destabilize the *Al Shabaab* Militia. This aspect is an important foreign policy element for Turkey in its fight against the global threats of terrorism. Additionally, the *Al Shabaab* militia has links with the *Al Qaeda* terror group (CNN, 2012), which has claimed responsibility for several terror attacks inside Turkey's borders. For example, in November 2003, 32 people were killed by two explosions in Istanbul, Turkey in an attack claimed by *Al Qaeda* (Reuters, 2008). Therefore, destabilizing *Al Shabaab* weakens *Al Qaeda* influence across the Horn of Africa.

4.4 Comparing Turkey's aid to other International Aid

Past efforts by the international community to alleviate suffering in Somalia have proven at best ineffective and as worst disastrous. On the other hand, Turkish aid has proven different since it is more coordinated and well-intentioned (Rossiter & Cannon, 2019). Generally, Turkey is perceived as a benign donor across most countries in the African continent. According to Cannon (2017), Turkey's involvement in Somalia is viewed by African countries as nascent and positive, and Turkey itself as an alternative political and economic partner. As a result, Cannon projects that Turkey's involvement in Somalia could shift from being primarily humanitarian and economic to more political. (Cannon, 2017). According to US military researchers Kaya and Warner, Somalia considers Turkey its most steadfast ally (Camacho et al., 2016). Compared to aid received from other Western and Asian countries, Somali leaders consider Turkey's aid the most genuine because it is not linked to expected reforms i.e., not a 'pro quid pro' development aid.

Table 4.2: Budgeted and Disbursed "On Treasury "Grants, 2016 in \$USD (World Bank, 2017)

	2016 Federal Government of Somalia Budget Figures	End of Year Actuals money disbursed
AfDB - Economic and Financial Governance	2,977,067	1,513,811
Budget Support - Saudi Arabia	20,000,000	19,999,985
Police Salaries - European Union	5,850,000	1,377,761
Sector Budget Support – Turkey	14,000,000	10,000,000
SFF – Norway	1,260,113	1,260,113
UN District Rehabilitation Project	1,320,269	Not available
UN National Window - PBF	3,500,000	760,000
World Bank Multi Partner Fund - Capacity Injection Project	4,386,430	1,052,927
World Bank Multi Partner Fund - ICT Sector Support	5,733,333	1,003,978
World Bank Multi Partner Fund - Public Financial Management	10,030,000	3,808,697

World Bank Multi Partner Fund - Recurrent Costs and Reform Financing Project	30,716,667	13,023,056
World Bank Multi Partner Fund – SCORE	3,297,110	857,280
World Bank Multi Partner Fund - Special Financing Facility	3,705,000	637,291
World Bank Multi Partner Fund - Urban Investment Planning Project	800,000	Not Available

Table 4.2 highlights budget commitments made by international governments and institutions to Somalia government's 2016 budget. The table highlights that Turkey and Saudi Arabia are two of the biggest state contributors to Somalia's budgetary goals.

In its quest to collaborate with countries in the African continent, Turkey has avoided exploitative contingencies as its policy encourages civic societal development (Camacho et al., 2016). For example, Turkey's diplomatic ties with fragile Somalia bore no negative fiscal or political burden, evinced by the fact that at the time of its engagement, Somalia lacked a unitary government and its GDP per capita was ranked among the world's lowest (Statista, 2017).

In research on how Somalis perceived Turkey's stabilization efforts in Somalia, a majority of the participants showed enormous trust in and affection for Turkey. The participants stated that the civic and government-led projects were likely to be successful. Fifty Somali nationals from different regions and backgrounds living in Turkey took part in the research. Additionally, the failure of traditional donors to achieve tangible results and bring useful projects to Somalia contributed to the perception that Turkey's humanitarian aid was better (Shire, 2019).

Turkey's aid to African countries seeks to develop coordination with other international actors involved in the development of states on the continent. For example, Turkey established a strategic partnership with the African Union and the African Development Bank Foundation in 2008. This partnership made a \$200 million investment in the Least Developed Countries concept (Camacho et al., 2016).

Somalia's former prime minister has described Turkey's help as different from that provided by other countries, the reason being that Turkey performed according to the expectations of the Somali Transitional Federal Government. The political, diplomatic, and institutional support offered by Turkey was sufficient to help in Somalia's state-building process. Moreover, 'Turkey's presence on the ground ended the international isolation of Somalia and the stigma attached to the country as a no-go zone' (Crisis Group, 2012, p.3).

Some of the policy changes that countries such as the UK have demanded from Somalia include the creation of a Joint Financial Management Board (JFMB). The proposal is that the board would consist of the Transitional Federal Government, the World Bank, the UK, the US and the EU. Through this board, western donors contend that Somalia's resources will be better handled and managed, while many of the same donors are skeptical of the aid and intervention that Turkey is offering Somalia (Camacho et al., 2016), and specifically Turkey's role in assisting Somalia's military development.

However, the upshot is that Turkey's aid to Somalia is driven by the practical needs of Somalia and its citizens rather than the ideologically pre-determined Western ideologies i.e., that aid carries with it heavy baggage which should be reciprocated. Additionally, Turkey's aid is genuine and does not stem from the pressure of the constant need to maintain hegemony as is the case with countries such as the US or China.

4.4.1 International Concerns with regards to Turkey's Help

Turkey's role in providing security in Somalia by building its largest foreign military base there has been described as Turkey's projection of its military power abroad (Rossiter & Cannon, 2019). Rossiter and Cannon further argue that countries which voluntarily host foreign military

forces surrender their military exclusivity, an indication of an evolving and deep involvement between the host country and the foreign military.

Turkey's role in Somalia has been lopsided, meaning that Somalia's present and future political involvements must be aligned to Turkey's government and its wishes since Turkey's initial involvement there and its efforts to gain influence in the country resulted in its gaining control over Somalia's most critical and lucrative infrastructures. Furthermore, Turkish aid has made Somalia develop dependency (Rossiter & Cannon, 2019). Additionally, Cannon reports that in the lead up to Somalia's 2017 presidential election, former Somalia's president received millions of dollars from Turkey, which had also invested millions in developing Mogadishu's port and airport (Cannon, 2019).

The international community is particularly concerned about the unequal security relationships between the two states. The concern is that Somali state domestic authority structures will be compromised by Turkey (Rossiter and Cannon, 2019), and while Turkey's government states that it does not have a colonialist policy in Somalia, its involvement in Somalia's politics infers otherwise. Further concerns arise from the fact that training of the SNA by Turkey will eventually lead to political interference leading to clan favoritism, regionalism, and factionalism (Rossiter and Cannon, 2019).

According to Rossiter and Cannon (2019), the larger rationale that can explain why Turkey has chosen Somalia as its preferred center of international politics is because the Turkish government gains international prestige by enhancing Turkey's global image and soft power (Rossiter & Cannon, 2019). Consequently, President Erdoğan can use Turkey's involvement in Somalia as an achievement for his future political ambitions or achievements. Gullo states that Turkey's involvement in Somalia is the use of soft power via international activism. The aim of the involvement is to help Turkey achieve its wide-ranging national interest in becoming a regional and global power (Gullo, 2012). The statement is not far from the truth since the Turkish government claims that the Somali government invited Turkey to help in exploring its offshore oil (AlJazeera, 2020). Additionally, Turkish companies with strong ties to Turkey's ruling party (AK Party) operate and run the Mogadishu international airport and the port of Mogadishu. The revenues from the airport and the port are estimated to be around \$11-\$20

million monthly. Also, a 20-year port agreement between the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and Turkish firm Al-Bayrak stated that the two entities would split revenues from the port of Mogadishu on a 55:45 ratio respectively (Cannon, 2019).

With respect to the SNA, Turkey's training and capacity building of Somalia's security has reignited certain fears among East African countries, fears which stem from a likelihood that a revitalized and well-equipped SNA necessarily means that one day this army will project its force outside Somalia's territorial borders. For example, its defeat of Somalia in the Ogaden War means Ethiopia feels as though Somalia will one day wish to settle the score (Rossiter and Cannon, 2019). Rossiter and Cannon further argue that the Gulf Arab states are in race with Turkey to secure strategic interests in Somalia. Thus, Turkey's military presence there is meant to stave off threats to its influence and assets in Mogadishu.

Nonetheless, whatever the motivation that influenced Turkey's choice to help Somalia, the humanitarian and developmental aid that it has offered is laudable and suffices for recognition from the international community. At the beginning of its involvement, Turkey's government recognized that the risks in helping Somalia were high since stronger foreign powers had tried and failed. Additionally, the lack of an effective government capable of limiting the threat to humanitarian aid workers posed by *Al-Shabaab* as well as the lack of institutions to coordinate the humanitarian aid mission initially complicated Turkey's involvement in Somalia.

5. CONCLUSION

At a time when the rest of the Western powers had ostracized Somalia due to its inability to rebuild its institutions, Turkey's aid to Somalia sparked a change of fortune for the war-torn nation. Somalia had been established through heavy dependence on donor aid, and thus, international humanitarian actors, and even more so states of the Global North, had made political use Somalia as a battle ground for supremacy.

In the 1960s, Britain and Italy used Somalia to advance neo-colonialism, with each trying to exert influence. Italy introduced the Italian curriculum into schools that it helped build in Somalia, in a move that was calculated to assimilate Somalia citizens in a manner akin to the French policy of assimilation which attempted to propagate French civilization by means of education (Idowu, 1969). The British government also maintained links with Somalia, but its motives were never clear since Somalia broke off diplomatic ties three years after independence.

Later, Somalia established ties with the USSR and the US, arch rivals of the Cold War period. The USSR was successful in instilling Socialist values in Somalia using its aid as persuasion, but its ultimate motive for being in Somalia was revealed when Cuban President Fidel Castro visited the country. Castro suggested the formation of a Confederation of Somalia and Ethiopia, to possibly also include South Yemen and Djibouti, with the disputed Ogaden region remaining autonomous within this confederation. The confederation would have a common revolutionary anti-Western orientation that would transcend linguistic and ethnic differences (Valenta, 1980, p. 358).

With Somalia's rejection of the USSR's Socialist ideas, diplomatic ties between the two were broken off, a move that was naturally followed by a repair in diplomatic relations between Somalia and the US, and the latter became Somalia's largest donor. Indeed, prior to Turkey's offer of assistance, the US had tried many methods to stabilize Somalia ranging from peacekeeping operations to provision of humanitarian aid. Additionally, the US had backed Ethiopia's military in a move to threaten growing extremist groups in Somalia, a strategy that saw Ethiopia help Somalia's government regain control in the country's capital, Mogadishu.

Arguably, without Turkey's help, Somalia would have declined into worse circumstances. This is evidenced by the fact that before Turkey's aid, many peace agreements had been brokered between various warring factions that frequently reorganized and resurged across Somalia. The most important of these official agreements were the Djibouti, the Mbagathi, and the Djibouti again signed in 1999, 2001 and 2008 respectively. The first led to the formation of a transitional national government, the second to the formation of a transitional federal government, while the third led to the establishment of the AMISOM peacekeeping operation. It was at this point that Turkey began its first venture into Somalia. Its assistance was timely, since a lot of foreign governments were skeptical of backing any Somali government given their track records.

In 2011, the Transparency Index ranked Somalia as the most corrupt country in the world—with a score of 1.0 out of a possible 10.0 (Transparency International, 2011), meaning that democracy was very weak in the state and that its political elites would misuse public money with impunity. As a consequence, Somalia's government could no longer be granted money by the Global North.

Turkey's help thus established a model framework for Global North countries to emulate. Ankara's help to Africa contradicted the notion that local populations were unable to cooperate or participate with foreign countries offering help. In particular, Turkey's model emphasized institution and capacity building as opposed to cash handouts. In brief, Turkey's form of help in Somalia was more in the form of cooperation than granting aid.

Prior to Turkey's engagement in Somalia, local populations there held that stance that global corporations were blind to their needs and that development offered by Western corporations was subordinating and exploitative (Atlani-Duault & Dozon, 2011). In other words, Western powers deliberately cultivated underdevelopment in African states to benefit powerful capitalists through deliberately promoting unequal exchanges via schemes, aids and cooperation structures that promote development. Thus, development aid structures create unequal power dynamics that favor the Global North (Atlani-Duault & Dozon, 2011). This is the situation that led to Somalia's overdependence on foreign aid.

Humanitarian aid leads to a cycle of dependency. According to Theotonio Dos Santos, a leading dependency theorist, this cycle is called dependency theory. Dos Santos defines dependency theory as a situation in which the economy of a certain country is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy. As a form of humanitarianism, development centers on offering relief to endangered populations who are suffering because of inhuman practices (Skinner and Lester, 2012; Fujita, 2020). The negative consequences associated with aid dependency include weak institutions. Accordingly, aid is associated with weak governmental accountability and political instability (Knack, 2001).

Due to the competition associated with humanitarian aid, actors are often serving a political agenda. Regardless that a fundamental principle of the ICRC is that aid be impartial, more often than not humanitarian aid offered will serve a part of a foreign policy where donors are competing in their own interests. For example, the Official Development Assistance (ODA) provides grants to humanitarian agencies for the purpose of promoting soft powers as a tool for diplomatic negotiations or as part of a security-based agenda. Countries such as Turkey offer help to neighboring countries as it is beneficial to their own security. Thus, most humanitarian actors will base success of their projects on their abilities to receive funds that will help in maintaining the operational costs associated with staying afloat in the humanitarianism field (Fujita, 2020).

Additionally, there exists a racial assumption that Global South countries such as Somalia as inferior, and hence humanitarian agencies tend to operate infantilized and paternalistic policies in capacity-building. Capacity-building is associated with an assumption by humanitarian actors that the people or countries receiving aid do not have the capacity to intervene in an emergency or to recover from a disaster (Fujita, 2020, p.19). Furthermore, Global South countries are associated with an inability to figure out on their own what is missing and what needs to be done. As a consequence of this kind of thinking, vulnerable states are constantly labelled as unequal and incapable, and their national officials and state employees labeled as corrupt, lazy or incapable. In fact of course they are simply a product of their environment (Fujita, 2020, p.21), but the ultimate outcome is that Global North leaders avoid accountability.

The South- South cooperation between Turkey and Somalia led to the establishment of an increasingly comprehensive partnership. The long-term policy grew from simply food aid to developmental aid (Bergamaschi et al., 2017). As a soft power tool, Turkish development aid has been key in helping Somalia rebuild its war-torn infrastructures. In addition to recently rehabilitating Mogadishu airport, Turkey launched direct flights between Istanbul and Mogadishu. The flights are important for humanitarian actors to access Somalia, where citizens often cannot gain access to humanitarian aid since passages are blocked by militias.

Despite Turkey having no contractual commitments to protect Somalia in case of international attacks, Somalia's nationals, and more so, most of its leaders, believe that the presence of Turkey's military in Somalia is beneficial to the interior security of the country. The training provided by Turkey to Somalia is important to create capacity and enable the SNA to become a competent, and crucially, an apolitical security institution (Rossiter and Cannon, 2019). Thus, suffice it to say that cooperation between Somalia and Turkey has led to better security for the former.

The exchange between Somalia and Turkey is purely for vocational training (Bergamaschi et al., 2017), yet, in the quest to reunite Somaliland with Somalia, government skeptics view a foreign-trained SNA as intrusive. Specifically, there are questions about the capability of the SNA to stop the proliferation of militias because of clan-based and regional politics (Rossiter and Cannon, 2019). Political power brokers challenge the rationale of pooling large amounts of power in the hands of the SNA, and would rather see defragmented security forces. With the availability of many security actors in Somalia, for example the Danab-trained forces and the presidential guard (Williams, 2019), competition for control over the country's territory is set to intensify. The situation could escalate into a breakout war within the Somali Security forces. However, at this point the Somali people and its government are desirous of increased efficiency in SNA through foreign military support. Their belief is that the government will be able to control the national territory fully in the future through such military support.

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