

SHIFTING ALLIANCES AMONG NATIONALIST ELITES: FACTORS THAT
SHAPE ELITE COOPERATION IN NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS



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SHAPE ELITE COOPERATION IN NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS

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Factors That Shape Elite Cooperation in Nationalist Movements

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ABSTRACT

Shifting Alliances Among Nationalist Elites: Factors That Shape Elite Cooperation in Nationalist Movements

What are the factors that facilitate or hinder cooperation among nationalist elites? To answer this question, this thesis studies nationalist movements that are composed of various factions at different points in time. I deploy an original network dataset of the nationalist elites in late Ottoman Empire from three different ethnic backgrounds and observe their relations over a period of 25 years from 1895 to 1920. To analyze the network data on the period, I use pooled temporal exponential random graph models (TERGM) and study two kinds of impacts on the socialization of the nationalist elites. I initially test the impact of factors that are endogenous to the group and focus on the role of popularity of individual elites and dense organizational patterns. Then, I analyze the effect of elements external to the network of elites. The thesis suggests that the impact of ideological factions, foreign support, and threat perception among the elites provide strong indicators for the likelihood of tie formation within the nationalist network. While ideological similarity and threat perception generally increase the likelihood of cooperation among nationalist elites, more radical factions tend to be less popular with fewer chances of cooperation. Periods of repression on nationalist elites tend to mitigate the negative effect of radical ideologies and favor tighter organizational patterns across different ideological factions within the movement.

ÖZET

Milliyetçi Elitler Arasında Değişen İttifaklar:

Milliyetçi Hareketlerde Elitler Arası İşbirliğini Şekillendiren Etkenler

Milliyetçi hareketlerin içinde bulunan elitler arasında iş birliğini kolaylaştıran ya da zorlaştıran faktörler nelerdir? Bu soruya cevap vermek için bu tez farklı zaman dilimlerinde çeşitli fraksiyonların meydana getirdiği milliyetçi hareketleri mercek altına almaktadır. Tez, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda 1895'ten 1920'ye kadar olan 25 yıllık dönemde üç farklı etnik kökene mensup milliyetçi elitlerin ilişkilerini özgün bir veri seti aracılığıyla gözlemlemektedir. Döneme ait sosyal ağ verilerini analiz etmek için zamansal üstel rastgele grafik modelleri (TERGM) kullanılarak milliyetçi elitlerin sosyalleşme örüntüleri üzerindeki iki tür etki incelenmektedir. İlk olarak, sosyal ağa endojen olarak adlandırılan faktörlerin etkisi test edilmekte ve elitlerin bireysel popülaritesinin ve sıkışık organizasyon örgülerinin rolüne odaklanılmaktadır. Ardından elit sosyal ağına eksojen unsurların etkisi analiz edilmektedir. Bu bağlamda tez, ideolojik fraksiyonların, yabancı ülkelere gelen desteğin ve elitler arasındaki tehdit algısının milliyetçi sosyal ağ içinde iş birliği oluşumuna güçlü etkileri olduğunu öne sürmektedir. İdeolojik benzerlik ve tehdit algısının genellikle milliyetçi elitler arasındaki iş birliği olasılığını artırdığı, daha radikal fraksiyonların ise daha az popüler olduğu ve iş birliği şanslarının daha az olduğu görülmektedir. Milliyetçi elitlere yönelik baskı dönemleri, radikal ideolojilerin hareket içindeki negatif etkisini hafifletmekte ve farklı ideolojik fraksiyonların birbirine yakınlaştığı örgütlenme kalıplarını teşvik etmektedir.

To my dearest mother and father.



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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The emergence and development of nationalism have long been the focus of scholarly debates in social sciences. Despite the insightful nature of these studies, the current literature has been suffering from several gaps in the study of nationalist movements. In particular, the question of how and why cooperation among factions with radically different ideological positions take place is a question that awaits an answer. A solution to this puzzle lies in the further study of the coalitional dynamics within nationalist movements that are composed of various factions at different points in time. To answer this question, I deploy original network dataset of the nationalist elites in late Ottoman Empire from three different ethnic backgrounds and observe their relations over a period of 25 years from 1895 to 1920. To analyze the network data on the period, I follow Taraktaş's approach to coalition building patterns in opposition movements (2022) and use pooled temporal exponential random graph models (TERGM) to study two kinds of impacts on the socialization of the nationalist elites. I initially test the impact of factors that are endogenous to the group dynamics where I analyze the role of popularity of individual elites and dense organizational patterns. Then, I analyze the effect of elements external to the network of elites, such as ideological positions of the elites, the regime's approach towards the minority expressions, the foreign military support for the nationalist elites, and the threat as it is perceived by the minority elites. In line with Taraktaş's findings (2022), the thesis suggests that the impact of ideological factions, foreign support, and threat perception among the elites provide strong indicators for the

likelihood of tie formation within the nationalist network. While ideological similarity and threat perception generally increase the likelihood of cooperation among nationalist elites, more radical factions tend to be less popular with fewer chances of cooperation. In particular, secessionist ideological positions decrease the chances of cooperation for the nationalist elite. The last significant finding of the analysis is that impact of different factors varies in relation to the regime dynamics. Periods of repression on nationalist elites tend to mitigate the negative effect of radical ideologies and favor tighter organizational patterns across different ideological factions within the movement.

Factionalism within nationalist and ethno-political movements has been hard to identify due to a lack of data and attention. Even in cases where such factionalism is well documented, such as the case of Macedo-Bulgarian nationalism, a comparative approach where the reasons behind different organizational patterns are studied is still limited to a small number of influential studies. Despite the lack of attention, factionalism among the nationalist elites becomes a crucial element in the formation of nationalist institutions in their various forms. As it is widely suggested in the literature on institutionalism, especially in moments of institutional openings such as those where the formation of nation-states take place, the decisions and calculations of the elite groups shape the turn of event. Contrary to the bulk of studies on the period and early nationalist movements, Taraktaş's framework provides insights for a novel theoretical orientation where the focus is shifted to the collective action mechanisms among the elite, examining the impact of various factors at the center of which lies the ideological factions. Network analysis enables us to measure the impact of ideological factions on the socialization of the elites in addition to various other factors that are considered to be essential in the literature.

In addition to this gap in the literature, the study of nationalist movements deserves special attention in the case of Ottoman politics. The late Ottoman Empire provides us with the fertile ground with its large variance and heterogeneity when it comes to the comparison of different varieties of nationalism. The case of Ottoman Empire contains various ethnic identities and even a larger number of elite groups competing to represent and transform these identities. While some of these groups demand an overall increase in representation for identity that is spread across different regions of the Empire, others may as well urge for territorial secession with the claim of representing a geographically contained identity. Besides, recent scholarly research reveals that, as opposed to the earlier decades, the late 19th and early 20th centuries had striking similarities with contemporary politics where the elites from across different parts of the Ottoman Empire were able to act in close cooperation and contact to each other enabling the functioning of politics in its modern fashion. These findings, considered together with the studies on ethnopolitical movements, point to the direction that the elite perceptions and positions were a crucial element not only for understanding the period but also for theory building on the dynamics of nationalist movements.

1.1 Puzzle

The conventional approach as it is embraced by the nationalist projects in the region analyzed nationalist movements as monolithic units that are bound to their secessionist ideals (Frashëri 2013; Izady 1992; Bego 2019). Hence, once an ethnopolitical movement emerges with its claims on a certain ethnic group and territory, it is assumed that the necessary outcome of this development is adopting a secessionist outlook even if the secessionist project does not reach a successful conclusion. The conventional point of

view is also in line with certain approaches in the study of nationalism on the issue of the relationship between ethnic identities and national units. According to this line of thought, ethnic groups are seen as pre-national forms of the groups out of which, later on, the nation would emerge (Smith 1986; Hasting 1997; Geertz 1993). The set of early theoretical works in this category implies a direct relationship between nationalism and the urge for a separate nation-state.

Recent literature, however, questions the conventional approach in two aspects. First, works reveal that nationalist movements, rather than being monolithic structures with a single aim, often consist of various parties with different opinions on the issues pertaining to the territorial conditions of their claimed homeland (Mylonas 2014). Not only do their opinions regarding the territorial regime of their homeland and its limits differ, but also the configuration of the movements, their strategies, and forms of the coalition are also varied (Mylonas & Shelef, 2017). Beyond containing a variety of alternative opinions, nationalist movements often split into different factions that in turn form various organizations with similar aims. Secondly, rather than single-mindedly pursuing an ideological position, the aims of the elite and the content of the nationalist project are subject to transformation in reaction to the elites' environment and various organizational dynamics. Thus, factions not only try to further their agendas against an existing government but also compete and conflict with each other for further domination of the movement (Seymour et. al., 2015).

While it is established that nationalist movements have a fragmented and dynamic structure, the impact of different factors on the movements' organization is still unclear. In particular, the question of why certain contexts proves to be more favorable for cooperation among nationalist elites and how factionalism plays a role in this

remains unanswered. These questions provide the main motivation behind this thesis. While I primarily aim at identifying the impact of certain ideological positions among the elite on organizational patterns, I also take into consideration other elements that are referred to in the literature.

The relevance of this puzzle lies not only in its significance for the relevant literature but also in its practical implication. As it is succinctly put by Cunningham (2015), over 100 movements across the globe continue to pursue self-determination for their acclaimed group of representation currently (Cunningham, 2015). Understanding the dynamics of ethno-political movements bears practical implications regarding these movements both in terms of identifying various patterns in their emergence and development and also forecasting their role in violent conflicts. Besides, the in-depth study of the Ottoman ethno-political movements improves our understanding of the institutionalization of various nation-states and ethnic politics in an area that collectively comprise a large proportion of the countries in the Balkans and the Middle East ranging from Romania to Lebanon. To my knowledge, while there are studies that focus on the emergence and transformation of various nationalist movements in the region, a comparative study of them is not provided to date.

1.2 Theoretical framework

To answer the above-mentioned questions, the framework of the thesis largely follows Taraktaş's previous research (2022) on the opposition movements in the Ottoman Empire and France. Taraktaş focuses on the impact of a different form of collective action patterns on the prospects of regime change (2022, p. 18). Accordingly, if movements manage to set aside their long-term ideological differences and align their

strategies, rather than vice versa, they are more likely to succeed in overthrowing the regime. Despite this condition, however, even actors with similar long-term projects might still be diverging in their strategies due to unequal information flows. Thus, diverging and merging strategies and ideologies lead to different patterns of collective action for opposition groups. This argument shapes my thesis in various ways. First, I follow a similar logic in deploying network analysis in a way to identify cooperation ties among the elites. In this framework, edges between the nodes are coded as the relationship of political cooperation among the elite. The details regarding the coding of variables related to network analysis and the application of TERGM to the question will be provided in the section on design and methodology.

Second, and perhaps more significantly, at the core of the argument put forward by the thesis lies a distinction borrowed from Taraktaş's framework. I find the distinction between long-term ideologies and strategies embraced by the elite (Taraktaş, 2022, p. 16) to be especially convenient for understanding the calculations faced by the nationalist elites. Taraktaş draws on two strands of literature in applying this distinction to collective action. She refers to discussions on game theory and more specifically to bounded rationality to integrate preference updates in social movements and the differences in their short term strategies (Taraktaş, 2022, p. 68). Along this line, the thesis applies Taraktaş's approach to the nationalist movements in a more simplistic format, focusing on the impact of strategic and ideological positions embraced by the elites in a given period without incorporating the shapes of different coalitions into the picture. In this framework, I also consider the elites as pragmatic decision-makers acting in response to the information at their disposal and with reference to the risks and opportunities they are faced with. I appeal to this framework, in specifying my

expectations regarding the particular variables in line with Taraktaş's arguments. Yet, as much as accounting for coalition shapes in addition to individual cooperation patterns, as done by Taraktaş, would enrich the analysis, it remains beyond the limits of this thesis.

In addition to following this larger framework, my study diverges from Taraktaş's research in several ways. Firstly, as mentioned above, I limit my study to three nationalist movements in the Ottoman Empire. While also Taraktaş's work includes secessionist groups (2022, p.20), because she incorporates opposition groups with a wider range of characteristics, the categories are designed in a way to capture the larger variation in long-term ideologies and strategic decisions. In this regard, the thesis focuses on a more limited group in a more specific way which is the nationalist elites and their interactions. Thus, the variation along the strategy-ideology axis is also more specific which concerns the positions regarding the territorial administration of the identified homeland. By specifying the ideology variable to a particular aspect of the long-term aspirations and projects of the elite regarding territorial design, I also integrate the discussions on early nationalist movements and provide a more detailed account of the nationalist ideology (Mylonas & Shelef, 2017).

Taraktaş's analysis focuses on the groups and factions in a way to conceptualize them as "organized contenders who advocate for a distinct preference set and purposefully work to overthrow the government" (2022, p.20). This conceptualization provides a better fit for the analysis of coalition patterns among the groups, where each node represents a group rather than an individual. While borrowing the use of factions as the key element in the movement, I conceptualize this element through ideological positions without taking into consideration group memberships. The reason behind this lies in my focus on the nationalist movements and the nature of such movements. Since I

focus on the reasons how and why elites with certain ideological positions move to the center of the movement, I follow a conceptualization of factions that centers on the ideology of the elites rather than groups of people. As in the emphasis on territorial designs, the emphasis on factions also constitutes a link between the social movements literature that is followed by Taraktaş (2022) and the recent discussion on ethnopolitical movements. The literature review and sections on the variables will provide a more detailed pathway from Taraktaş's research to the recent discussions on nationalist movements and ethnic conflict. In that regard, the next sections will also constitute an application of Taraktaş's framework to these domains.

1.3 Terminology

Politics around the nationhood of the groups that are the subject of this thesis remain controversial to the day. Considering a possible impact of the contemporary discussions on the interpretations of the work at hand, a number of clarifications regarding the use of various terms is timely. To begin with, a controversial issue concerns the concepts used to describe the ethnic identity of the inhabitants of the region that is historically referred as Macedonia. More specifically, a question that was central to the thesis is whether to refer to the group of elites whose claim was to represent the Slavic speaking and orthodox communities of the region as Bulgarian, Macedonian, or to opt for terms that somehow seek to capture both of those elements such as Ultra-Bulgarian. The reason why this question gains prominence lies at the differences of opinion regarding IMRO members on the historiographical traditions that are based in Sofia and Skopje and the contemporary aspects of politics of nation-building in both countries. Being aware of this discussion, scholars appeal to different options to refer to the communities in the

region. Brown (2013) uses the concept of Macedonian, with an emphasis on the transformative impact of the Ilinden Uprising in the region. However, as opposed to the Skopje based scholars, Brown underlines the idea of a non-national historiography of the uprising from below. I believe this approach is problematic for a number of reasons considering the focus of this thesis. First of all, focusing on the elites that are a part of the movement, as opposed to the entire communities in the region, requires a conceptual differentiation. Many of the prominent elites that are a part of this study (such as Ivan Tsonchev who played an important role in the process of the uprising) are born in Bulgaria outside the region that is referred to as Macedonia by the contemporaries of the period. Beyond this, a significant proportion of the elites that were a part of either IMRO or other groups that were operating in the region had no long or short-term preference regarding a separate entity of Macedonia as region. Rather, their ultimate aim was to ensure the annexation of the region by an independent Bulgaria. Boris Sarafov was a leading figure among elites with this stance. But as Yosmaoglu points out (2013), even those who urged for the autonomy of the region in the short-term incorporated new members to the movement through the exarchate or still preferred joining Bulgaria in the long-term. For similar reasons, using the concept of Macedonian alone to refer to the elites under the focus of the thesis does not capture the actual dynamics on the ground.

On the other hand, it is also documented in the literature (as in this thesis) that some of the elites in these groups have been aiming at an autonomous region of Macedonia with an explicit care about the diversity of the ethnic groups that were residing in the region. To give an example, members of the left-wing of IMRO after 1905 pursue this position, even to the point of forming a political party that reflected this position under the leadership of Sandanski. The reason I quote this fact is that, following

Yosmaoglu (2013), I do not mean to embrace the stance of conventional Sofia-based historiography in rejection of the distinct ideological positions of the prominent elites or the idea of a Macedonian nation in total. Nor it is among the concerns of this thesis to apply a given test on nationhood to any of the communities involved in the thesis. Rather, under light of developments in the disciplines of history and political science, the approached embraced in the process of writing the thesis was the acceptance of the competing nationalist projects in all three movements. This notion is succinctly formalized by Yosmaoglu (2013, p.16) and also emphasized in contemporary studies on nationalism (Mylonas & Shelef, 2014). Namely, that nationalist movements exist in multiple competing projects, transform and interact with their environment and do not take place as representations of an immutable nation. With the fluid features of nationalist movements in mind, I consider groups that claimed the representation of the Slavic speaking communities of the region to contain a continuum of positions on the given issue of territorial regime where elites move along to different positions in long and short terms.

For the lack of a better word, I followed Hanioglu (2001) in using the concept of Macedo-Bulgarian nationalists. This choice lies more in practical considerations of the scope of the thesis rather than an attempt to remain “politically correct” and to find the middle ground in contemporary discussions. The fact that Bulgarian nationalist movement consists of a wider range of groups and generations than the Albanian and Kurdish nationalists requires the limitation of the scope of the concept. I use the concept to refer to the elites that have been operating in the region of Ottoman Macedonia with the projects that concern this region rather than already existing political factions and movements in the Bulgarian principality of the period. In that sense, the concept is not

used to identify an ethnic group or to make room for the future prospects of another nation-state. The emphasis is on the relationship of rebellion and antagonism towards the Sublime Port as these concepts occupy a central role in the thesis.

Another issue surrounds the concept of autonomy as it is used in diverse ways in the literature on the period regarding all three of the nationalist movements.

Occasionally, the literature on the period refers to the demands for an independent nation-state under the rubric of “autonomy” (Skendi, 1967). To add to the complexity of the already diverse amalgam of individual positions, this problem is sometimes reproduced in the way of referring to an entire group of elites with different agendas through demands for “autonomy” in a rather vague use of the concept. The use of the concept of autonomism and territorial autonomy is aimed to function in the exact opposite way to differentiate this position from demands for an independent nation-state. What I mean by being autonomist is to demand a regional administration whereby the territory is governed in the name of a given ethnic group without the formation of an independent nation-state. The exact criteria for the application of this definition to the sources and the distribution of the sample of elites with respect to the criteria will be provided in the sections below.

Lastly, using the concept of nationalism, or nationalists to refer to a movement also demands some clarification. Especially in quantitative studies, contemporary political science literature does not often deploy the concept of nationalism. Rather, concepts such civil war and ethnic conflict, (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Cederman et. al., 2011) , rebellion (Gurr, 1970), or ethnopolitical movements (Gurr et. al., 1997; Asal. et. al., 2012) are occasionally referred to. The sections below will provide the exact definition of the concept of nationalist movements as it is used in this thesis. During the

process of writing this thesis, I found out that different concepts are used in literatures that develop in parallel to each other in order capture similar notions and phenomenon. To follow the bulk of studies that focus on the period, I used the concept of nationalism more often than others, and in this regard, I predominantly followed the discussions in the disciplines of sociology and history. However, I also occasionally used different terms to refer to the same movements interchangeably with aim of avoiding repetition.



CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The thesis builds on a number of discussions that have been developing in parallel but remaining distinct until recently. To connect these works, I will provide an overview of various strands of literature. Firstly, I will focus on the literature on the early nationalist movements and why it needs to be revisited in my case. The discussion of these works will include a review of the literature on the emergence of nationalism and its pitfalls. In the second part of the chapter, I will delve deeper into the discussions on ethnic conflicts. The study of factionalism in ethnic conflicts came to the fore in relatively recent discussions. However, these discussions usually focus on the conditions of conflict and neglect the fact that such movements usually exist before conflicts take place and, in some cases, continue to be relevant factors after the end of violence. Hence, while the emphasis on the conditions of armed conflict is insightful, it does not suffice to provide a comprehensive account of the coalitional dynamics in nationalist movements and their organization. Lastly, I will focus on the literature on coalition building in social movements and enquire about how factors identified in this literature can translate into insights for a particular form of the political phenomenon, nationalist movements. While there is growing literature on coalition building in movements, its application to those with ethno-political claims remains to be an understudied and undertheorized area.

2.1 Nationalism and ethno-political movements

Famously, there are several approaches to the study of emergence nationalism in the literature. This literature focuses on either the emergence of nations as a continuous outcome of various ethnic groups (Smith 1986, Hastings 1997) or on the structural factors associated with the rise of capitalism and the modern state (Anderson 1983, Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983). Both strands of the early generation of studies on nationalism focus on the features and building blocks of nations as a collective entity and how to understand it. While this literature also provides explanations for the emergence of nations, the nationalist movements and elites remain to be underemphasized in general. To be more precise, the approach put forward by scholars such as Anderson and Hobsbawm & Ranger puts a larger emphasis on the modern nature of the nations, and their emergence is explained mostly through structural transformation related to modern capitalism. While this approach makes room for variety in the content of the idea of nation and is insightful for understanding the contingent nature of nationalism, it remains inadequate to explain the dynamics of the agency behind them.

Recent discussions emphasize the role of possible alternatives and various nationalist projects for the emergence of a nation, moving away from the structuralist approaches. Recently, Mylonas and Shelef (2014, 2017) shift the lenses of the studies in the area to the movement level and the nationalist elites rather than the nation or the nation-state as a unit. In that regard, they emphasize the environment of the elites and their impact on the institutional designs henceforth. The studies on the nationalist projects of the early nationalist elites reveal the importance of different elite factions and their role in the process of institution building, clarifying a missing step in the modernist

approach. Thinking through the elites is related to the fact that before the institutionalization into different nation-states, nationalism plays out as a set of projects negotiated by different groups of elites. Focusing on the movement rather than the large-scale phenomenon also fixes the teleological tendencies of the early studies according to whom the substitution of the nation-states for the empire was almost an inevitable outcome (Malesevic, 2021).

A recent line of discussion on the different nationalist orientations of these movements relates to the changing territorial claims in the international arena (Abramson & Carter, 2016; Atzili & Kadercan, 2017), as well as the territorial claims of nationalist movements (Mylonas & Shelef 2014, 2017). Territorial claims constitute one of the core elements of an ethnopolitical movement's set of ideals alongside the representation of a given ethnic group. Yet even such a central matter is often subject to changes depending on the environment of the nationalist elites. A shared emphasis in this literature concerns the persistence of institutional precedents as well as the interaction between the elites and their environments. In sum, recent studies put forward that the elites' claims and positions are often shaped by interaction with their political environment.

The insights in this literature provide a fruitful source of theory-building. Hence, the point that nationalist projects are subject to change constitutes a central emphasis for my thesis. Yet, I also argue that the ideological positions of the elites are not only subject to transformation as a result of the environmental impact, but elites' positions in turn have affected the elites' socialization. In line with recent arguments, I assert that various conditions favor certain ideological positions and facilitate or hinder cooperation among the nationalist elites. I propose two novelties to this literature. Firstly, studies

strongly argue that the elite constantly interacts with their environment in the search for novel opportunities while calculating their actions and changing their ideological positions significantly (Mylonas 2012; Mylonas & Shelef 2014, Darden & Mylonas 2016). This notion is also shared with the literature on social movements and has a significant impact on the approach I embrace. Moving beyond this emphasis, I deploy network analysis to focus both on the impact of dynamics that are inherent to the movement such as ideological orientation or the inner disagreements, and the role of the external political context in the elite's decisions such as the regime conditions.

Secondly, since one of the variables of this study is the ideological stance of the elites regarding territorial claims, one should also touch upon the discussions regarding territoriality and nationalism. The nationalist project is necessarily also a territorial project as it is identified by the concept of territorial designs (Atzili & Kadercan, 2017). Thus, nationalism reorganizes space and territory in a way to transform the conceptualization of the relationship between the land and the people who populate it. This insight was one of the earliest notions that the nationalist literature has established and continues its relevance to the day (Murphy, 2013; Breuilly, 1994). While studies such as those of Mylonas focus on the change of territorial claims throughout a given period, I emphasize the possible frameworks of administrations as an important independent variable in the nationalist projects of the elites rather than the borders of the homeland. Hence, with regard to the changes in the borders of the homeland, the territoriality of the claims remains secondary to my concerns in this research. Rather, claims for secession or autonomy, while pertaining to the territoriality of the nationalist project, constitute a specific form of administrative position. At the center of this ideological position lies the acknowledgment of its relationship to a given ethnic group

but the proposed form of this relationship, I hypothesize, has a significant impact on the cooperation patterns of the elites.

2.2 Ethnic conflicts and ethnic identities

Another discussion that is also relevant to my question lies in the literature on ethnic conflict. Rather than the emergence of nationalism and the following dynamics of nation-state mechanisms, the literature on conflict and ethno-political movements focuses on the dynamics that shape the course of a conflict. Although focusing on similar questions, the two literatures develop in parallel to each other. Traditionally, the earliest studies in the discussion have been focusing on the transformation of ethnic identities into an ethnic insurgency. Famously, Gurr studies insurgency through the perspective of deprivation and collective grievances as the main factors leading to collective action (Gurr, 1970). A later line of thought developed with similar questions in mind focuses on the rational calculations of those who join the insurgency through large-n studies, rather than the perceptions of collective deprivation of an ethnic group (Grossman, 1991; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). As the two approaches interact in various ways in contemporary studies on insurgency, an account of the recent condition of these debates is timely at this point.

Through the early 2000s, the distinction between the two approaches is conceptualized as greed vs. grievances approaches to the issue. The approach that focuses on the opportunities and costs of the insurgents through rational choice modeling emerges as a marginal discussion in economic theory, conceptualizing rebellion as an industry (Grossman, 1991). The approach that focuses on the conditions favorable for rebellion from the perspective of participants moved to the center of the

field with a number of articles in the early 2000s. Accordingly, the line of studies seeks to challenge the idea that the existence of multiple ethnic or religious groups and grievances is a major factor in the onset of ethnic insurgency. Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004) argued that “objective grievances” are worse predictors of the onset and longitude of civil war compared to opportunities that face the participants as modeled by the authors. This core idea is developed by Fearon and Laitin (2003) to argue that low state infrastructure, mountainous terrain, and foreign support significantly increase the likelihood of civil war in a country. Although Collier and Hoeffler, and Fearon and Laitin differ in their emphasis on economic or political/infrastructural conditions respectively, they share the main idea that it is not the groups' perceptions that are the key explanatory variable. These arguments met in a line of studies that emphasize natural resources (Ross, 2004; Dunning 2005), or political institutions (Gates et. al. 2006; Goldstone et. al., 2010). The shared element of these studies was to emphasize the notion that little evidence is found in evaluating the claim that ethnic or demographic grievances are key factors in the civil war onset (Lewis 2016).

Yet, grievances against a state remain one of the most appealing mechanisms in contemporary studies for explaining individuals' motivations to fight. This is mostly due to a revival of quantitative studies in the early 2010s. The qualitative emphasis on collective grievances continues until the early 2000s (Sambanis, 2005; Stewart 2008). During the early 2010s large-n cross-national studies revive the grievances approach by providing large-n data on ethnic-group-level measures (Cederman et. al., 2011, 2013; Wucherpfennig et. al. 2012). The results of these studies indicate that several ethnic-group-level variables such as exclusion (Ostby, 2008), inequality (Cederman et. al. 2011), and geographical concentration (Cederman et. al., 2013), etc. that are used as

proxies for grievances exert a significant impact on the likelihood of civil war. To give an example, Cederman et. al. (2011) provide worldwide data that focuses on “horizontal inequalities” and ethnic conflicts from 1991 through 2005. Comparing the per capita income of ethnic groups above and below national averages in their countries, Cederman et. al. argue that such inequality based on ethnic group identity contributes significantly to the likelihood of civil war. In particular, the authors' emphasis on testing the groups included and excluded in decision-making processes increases the strength of the study. On the other hand, despite the aim of exceeding the arguments developed from the demographic data, they are unable to directly test the role of grievances.

The contemporary research on the area builds upon both these strands. There are a number of developments that characterize contemporary studies. Firstly, while building on both strands of literature, the recent research aims to detect sophisticated identification techniques to reach stronger arguments regarding causal connections (Huff, 2023). Secondly, especially after Kalyvas' groundbreaking study, the research on civil wars seeks increasingly refined and dis-aggregated variables that are better oriented to capture the complexity of violence dynamics. Thus, rather than the efforts to capture effects on civil war onset that are relevant for worldwide datasets with little nuance in the variables, contemporary studies aim to underline particular aspects of insurgencies through evidence from local dynamics (Lewis 2017, Hall et. al. 2019).

While both these approaches have been insightful in understanding the nature of ethnic insurgency, a recent set of studies seeks to shift the analytical lenses focusing on the study of conflicts. As opposed to the conventional research on nationalism that are reviewed above, this literature delves deeper into the inner dynamics of the ethno-political movements, underlining the factionalism within the movement (Pearlman

& Cunningham, 2012; Seymour et. al., 2015). As it is argued by this literature, the armed movement needs to be disaggregated into its various factions in order to better understand the dynamics of the conflict. As opposed to the predominant accounts in the literature, in most cases of secessionist movements, the antagonists to the state authority are constituted of shifting coalitions of different groups conflicting not only with the state but also among each other, rather than being coherent entities. Hence, the conventional literature on ethnic conflict fails to capture the fragmented nature of the secessionist movements which play a central role in the turn of events. (Pearlman & Cunningham, 2012, p.4)

Besides, taking disaggregation of the state antagonists as the main premise of research, this literature also provides a possible source of methodological innovations in the study of ethnopolitical movements (Pearlman & Cunningham, 2012, p6).

Traditionally, large-N research on the area has been focusing on the national-level variables which also sustains the understanding of the unity of contenders (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). On the contrary, the recent line of literature has been focusing on the sub-state level dynamics of the conflict with the aim of disaggregation of the conflict (Pearlman & Cunningham, 2012; Fjelde & Nilsson, 2018, Perkoski, 2019, Joo & Mukherjee, 2021). Such an approach clears the ground for a refined understanding of the calculations of the elite and the responses of the groups to their environments. Not only do antagonists to the state operate in different factions, but as Pearlman & Cunningham argue, unpacking different groups of actors also reveals there are different kinds of organizational patterns too (2012). Hence, while some of these groups consist of loose networks, others are centralized organizations with a clear chain of command (Pearlman

& Cunnighman, 2012, p.7). This point constitutes a significant finding in parallel with those in the social movements literature and opens new domains for research.

One of the studies that bear theoretical significance in terms of my thesis is the one by Seymour et. al. (2015) which is focusing on the reasons behind the division of ethnopolitical movements. Different from other studies, Seymour et. Al. focus on the social movement aspects of the ethnopolitical movements and derive their hypotheses from the literature on social movements. While Seymour et. al. also argue that ethnopolitical movements divide as a result of interaction with their environment and among each other, they also emphasize the competitive dynamics within the movement (Seymour et. al., 2015, p.4). Accordingly, within-group repression and accommodation are key mechanisms behind the fragmentation of ethnopolitical movements.

While Seymour et. al. identifies reasons behind fragmentation, they offer little in terms of forming new coalitions. Building on the existing literature I look at the impact of various factors on the cooperation of the elites within the ethnopolitical movements and aim to fill an important gap in the literature. While factionalism is an issue that is increasingly studied in the literature, the ideological dimensions of factions which are a key element of future institution-building are left out of the picture. Secondly, not only the splits but also the coalition-building processes are fundamentally important for understanding these processes, and a network analysis approach provides fertile ground for this.

2.3 Coalitions in social movements and nationalist movements

Discussion in the social movements literature provides a ground for filling the missing step in understanding ethnopolitical movements. The study of collective behavior and its

development has a long history in the discipline of sociology some of whose foundational works are shared in political science literature as well. Despite remaining unattended by the discussions in political science literature, early social movements theory resembles civil war literature in its emphasis on the difference between social movement behavior from institutionalized behavior (Turner and Killian 1957; Lang and Lang, 1961; Smelser, 1963; Couch 1968). More particularly, early resource mobilization theory largely reverberates in its implications for collective behavior in political science. Especially, Tilly's work (1978) is regarded as the early root of rational choice approaches to civil wars in political science. Accordingly, Tilly emphasizes the role of the internal organization of collective action. Tilly sees members of collective action emerging as a result of actors in pursuit of common ends coming together (1978). The movement is carried forward by rational actors each in an endeavor to realize their ends (Tilly 1975; Morris 1981). Moreover, Morris argues that actors within a collective movement are not only rational but also there is an interaction between the internal organizational model and the adaptation of different strategies and tactics within the movement (1981, p.746).

In a similar fashion, collective grievances are also underlined in the literature on social movements as a fundamental cause of the emergence of movements (Klandermans, 1997; Tyler and Smith 1998). Yet, as in the case of civil war discussions, the mere existence of perceptions of deprivation does not prove enough to trigger a movement on itself. Thus, various elements ranging from the density of existing organizational patterns to the ideological topology and resources available to the protestors are added to the picture to provide a more nuanced explanation of the development of social movements (Klandermans 2015).

Recent scholarly works on social movements explore factors that both facilitate and hinder alliances among movement groups (Van Dyke and McCammon, 2010). Despite the relevance of these factors for the study of ethnic movements, there is a relative disengagement on both sides of these discussions. While the studies on nationalism and ethnicity to a large part do not appeal to the theories of coalition building in social movements literature, the scholarly debates on social movements often do not refer to the insights from the studies of ethno-political movements except a few numbers of studies (Conversi, 2004; Olzak, 2013; Muro, 2015).

A line of research that strived to integrate social movements and mobilization discussions into the study of rebellion and ethnic politics can be identified among those focusing on violent conflicts (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Brubaker and Laitin, 2004; Collier and Hoefler, 2004), yet the study of nationalist or ethno-political movements under nonviolent conditions is largely ignored from this perspective and ethno-nationalist politics and social movements have remained distinct areas awaiting further study (Beissinger, 2002; Yashar, 2005).

A possible link between the two domains can be found in the central questions on whether and how social movements frame their grievances in ethnic or national terms. This question while critical for both literatures (Gurr, 1970; Muro, 2015), remains beyond the scope of my thesis. Rather I aim to incorporate insights regarding factions in social movements into the analysis of nationalist movements. To this aim, I incorporate certain variables and their identified mechanisms of functioning in social movements to my hypotheses and test if they produce similar results in nationalist movements too. A line of studies that is closer to my questions focuses on the impact of regime dynamics or the threat element for the emergence of ethnic mobilization rather than grievances

(Yashar 2005; Vom Hau and Wilde; 2010). Accordingly, whether a country is an autocracy or a democracy often has an impact on the recognition of a group's right to ethnic self-determination (Wimmer & Schiller, 2002). The discussions also underline the fact that ethnopolitical movements do not engage with their environment only in terms of threat but also in terms of their ability to influence the processes of agenda setting in a given context. Social movements interact with government institutions and agents to compel them for pursuing their attended goals (Muro, 2015, p.194). This line of approach also opens room for the study of representation and regime dynamics where a regime more open to the demands of the ethnopolitical movements can become a decisive factor (Gamson, 1990). Following this line of thought, I also test the significance of these variables for my data.

CHAPTER 3

DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Case selection

To select my cases I follow some of the recent works that aimed to analyze nationalist movements from the perspective of social movements theory (Vom Hau & Srebotnjak, 2021). For such an endeavor, Wimmer & Feinstein's (2010) definition of nationalist movements comes forth as an appealing tool. Yet, while it contains insightful elements, I believe it also imposes certain limitations on the issue. Wimmer & Feinstein limit their analysis of the nationalist contenders to the nationalist organizations that share certain features. According to them, a nationalist organization is one where (1) "membership is formally defined", (2) "leadership roles must be institutionalized independent of individuals" and (3) "the organization claims to represent the national community in the name of which the territory eventually becomes governed." (Wimmer & Feinstein, 2010, p.775) This definition is in line with the classical works on the issue in terms of incorporating the element of territoriality and the claim to represent a national community. In addition, the territoriality aspect of the definition makes room for variability which suits a refined conceptualization. A nationalist movement, from this perspective, can contain a scale of positions from autonomy to independence to include a variety of nationalist organizations with different ideologies.

However, I suggest that the emphasis on the organizational structure brings a limitation that excludes significant cases of early nationalist movements, especially for the Ottoman Empire. The elites in the Albanian nationalist movement, for instance, form

various organizations at various points which last for short periods of time without considerable institutionalization. However, this does not prevent the formation of an intact network of elites that collectively compose the movement as it is famously argued by Clayer (2007). Rather than Wimmer & Feinstein (2010), I follow Mylonas & Shelef's argument that such movement can appear in different fashions. Hence, for the purposes of this study, I do not apply the necessity for a unified organization as a criterion for identifying the ethno-political movements (2017, p.152). Rather, following the existing literature, I presume that a nationalist movement can consist of various organizations taking action at the same time and even possibly, in contradiction to each other, as well as being devoid of a centralized social organization (Mylonas & Shelef, 2017; Cunningham et. al., 2012).

Making room for loose organizations within my definition enables me to compare and consider factionalism within movements with various types of organizations. While the Bulgarian movement consists of various strictly defined organizations from the late 19th century on, for instance, Kurdish nationalist movements lack such an organizational body until 1908. Both groups of elites and their competitions are included in the data for comparison. Yet, this does not mean that their organizational patterns are not taken into consideration. On the contrary, the BTERGM model that I deploy for my analysis accounts for different patterns of organization among the elite and their impact on cooperation. Hence, I do not only suggest enlarging the limits of the definition of nationalist movements, but I also offer a more rigorous tool for measurement where the impact of different organizational types can be systematically analyzed.

I selected the three such movements and coded their members as the nationalist elites in my data. These movements occasionally share similar patterns of organization, but they also imply significant variation in my variables. Firstly, the Macedo-Bulgarian nationalist movement is well organized compared to the other two movements, and the Macedo-Bulgarian elite also are members of a minority religious group and enjoy the support/intervention of a patronizing state. Rather than using only using the concept of Bulgarian or Macedonian elites, I follow a line of historical studies in using the term “Macedo-Bulgarian” to identify the groups that inhabited Ottoman Macedonia and urged for either an autonomous Macedonian region or to annex the region to the Bulgarian administration with the claim of representing the Slavic speaking population of the region (Hanioglu, 2001; Zürcher, 2010; Sohrabi, 2018). On the contrary, Kurdish elites mostly come from a Sunni Muslim background and are devoid of any state support until the late 1910s. Albanian elites, on the other hand, manage to bring into a coalition diverse linguistic and religious groups through the late 1900s in the absence of a patronizing state or violent conflict. Despite their variability, all three movements unite under a coalition prevailed by the secessionist faction within the movement at different points in time. One might think that since these groups act under the same Ottoman polity, the overlap in their organizational patterns also results from the changes in Ottoman politics that is shared by all these groups. Although this approach is partially accurate, as I hypothesize, later on, the groups experience similar large-scale conditions in different ways. At a moment when a given group of elites is perceiving no tolerance from the regime, such as the Albanian elites’ demands regarding the Albanian language, another group might be selectively tolerated, such as Bulgarian elites relatively autonomously controlling significant regions. Hence, the question of why, given

numerous differences, the elites act in similar patterns requires a comparative study of the conditions of the movements and cannot be answered straightforwardly.

In order to avoid cherry-picking by selecting on dependent variables, I should delve deeper into the organizational patterns and my case selection. My independent variables are ideological positions, the perception of threat, foreign support, appeals to violence, and the regime condition. The groups under my focus are chosen to sustain significant variation in terms of these conditions. Then, I aimed at bringing together a representative sample of each group by following the cooperation patterns of the elites from the most popular to the least in each group. At the beginning of the period under my focus, while the Bulgarian nationalists receive foreign support, Albanian and Kurdish elites are devoid of this support, which will only be viable after 1910 and 1914 respectively. When it comes to the perception of threat, all groups experience this phenomenon at different periods, while for the Bulgarian nationalist such a threat is perceivable after the Ilinden uprising and with the incursion of the Serbian nationalists to the Macedonian territories, the Albanian nationalists express the perceived threat of “slavicization” of the region or living under the Greek control with the Balkan wars and the defeat of the Ottoman army. When it comes to the Kurdish elites, the possibility of living under Armenian control is openly visible during WWI, and not significant until this period, despite the existence of skirmishes in the region.

3.2 Data

My data is a discrete temporal network data where one can observe the network of elites from 1889 to 1925 on a yearly basis. This data enables us to apply TERGM for a study of the possible impacts of the transformation of the elite network. While the timing of

cooperation is essentially continuous data, following the literature I collected them in the format of yearly discrete temporal data for both facilitating statistical analysis and the nature of the elite cooperation (Cranmer et. al., 2021, p.119). The network dataset collected through a period of approximately 1.5 years from resources in different languages includes over 2000 interactions with 606 elites from different ethnic and political backgrounds over 30 years. The data is coded as an unweighted and undirected network and the form of cooperation among the elite (such as membership to an organization, shared publication, collectively conducted protests or etc.) is included in the data. While the direction of weights of edges could have been a significant element in the analysis, since the main focus of this study is the patterns of cooperation, these features are left out of the data collection process. This choice was in line with other studies in the literature that focus on cooperation between actors through network analysis (Leifeld et. al., 2018).

The dataset brings together the political cooperation of the nationalist elites in addition to individual-level features for each of them for the period they are a part of the movement. The individual features include their ideological position, whether they receive foreign support and what form, whether they cooperate with elites from other ethnic groups, how they experience the regime conditions, their threat perception regarding the homeland, and demographics such as religion, ethnicity, and place of birth at the individual level. The cooperation dataset contains an edge list of all interactions divided according to the years in which they take place. Other variables are coded as either categorical or ordinal variables in the form of matrices that identify the condition of the elite for the given year. Defining the limits for the elites is a problematic and understudied issue in political science despite the widespread use of the term (Mikecz,

2012). In different lines of literature, the concept has been used in various and excessively diverse ways. During the process of data collection, for my study, I used the concept of elites to include people who take part in active cooperation within the movement, share the nationalist ideology regarding the administration of the identified homeland, and share the same ethnic background. These criteria are applied to exclude ordinary people who occasionally cooperate with the elite (such as during an insurgency) or bureaucrats whose interests might intersect with those of the nationalists for a moment. To give an example, the fact that Enver Bey (later Pasha), a prominent figure of the Committee of Union of Progress, cooperates with Macedo-Bulgarian nationalists at various times would not lead us to code him as a Macedo-Bulgarian nationalist. Political cooperation is on the other hand coded as any kind of interaction that includes these elites and is done for the sake of the nationalist project, be it the publication of a manifesto, or taking part in a violent attack.

Lastly, following the development of the Ottoman nationalist movements, I collected the data moving initially from the autonomist elites to the secessionists. Hence, the autonomist factions in all these moments or secessionists operating with them within the empire and their decisions in the face of different events are followed thoroughly. On the other hand, individuals who act in cooperation with secessionists from outside the Empire are mostly left out. To give an example, some of the higher echelons of the Bulgarian Army whose main aim was to support the secessionist factions in the Empire are left out of the data. While this does not mean that only the autonomist elites are included in the data, it indicates that for reasons of data availability, the data collection process was designed in a manner to put a larger emphasis on the elites who were initially autonomists. Yet, a closer look at the Ottoman case reveals that due to the

political structure of the empire most of the nationalist elites began their political call as initially autonomist actors. Hence, both the interactions of these actors with those who were initially secessionists and their positions after they change their positions -if ever- to secessionists are included in the data. Thus, the design of the data collection process, in line with my hypotheses, does not constitute a bias.

3.2.1 Data collection and the sample

Network sampling is a process that is distinct from non-network data collection efforts. The major source of the difference of network sampling lies in the fact that in the former, “two interrelated sets of units” are sampled at the same time. Namely, both the vertices (individual objects of concern that are connected among each other), and edges (the relationship between vertices that is under examination) are collected as related but distinct information (Kolaczyk, 2009). As opposed to conventional regression models where random sampling is preferred to avoid bias, network structures require different techniques for creating the sample. On the contrary, for the measurement of statistics regarding the network structure, random sampling leads to bias since it does not preserve the network structure. Snowball sampling can be a possible solution to this problem by preserving the network structure (Chan 2015).

In snowball network sampling, an initial vertex sample is defined at the first step. The initial sample is not required to be a random sample. Then, all the vertices that are connected with those included in the initial sample of vertices are collected. This step is called the first iteration with the resulting set of vertices. Then, the same procedure is repeated in iterations whereby all edges are followed until termination. The resulting sample consists of the unity of vertices collected in each iteration such as the sample of

all vertices $V =$ where k is the total number of iterations (Kolaczyk, 2009). Each set of vertices resulting in the k th iteration is called the k -th wave of the sampling.

How is this procedure applied to the Ottoman elites? After the selection of the 3 cases that are defined above, I collected an initial sample of prominent elites that are leading figures in their movements. The initial list of names is created with respect to the recent historiography of the 3 movements with the aim of incorporating the identified factions and if factions are not openly identified the members whose actions are often accounted for. To give a concrete example, the initial sample of Macedo/Bulgarian elites contained members of both the left and the right wings of the movements as conventionally identified by Pandevski (1978). On the other hand, figures that are occasionally referred to but whose faction is not clearly identified such as Said Kurdi (later Nursi) from the Kurdish movement are also included in the initial sample. In order to ensure the existence of an unbiased network structure and due to the loose definition of prominence, I kept this initial group of elites as large as possible not to fall into historiographical bias while avoiding a statistical bias. Thus, while different waves of historiography on nationalist movements emphasize different elite figures (such as the emphasis shifting from left-wing to right-wing in Macedonian nationalist historiography), such figures are represented in the sample. Appendix A provides a list of the initial sample of the first-step elites alongside their ideological positions. Then, in each iteration, a list of elites that are incorporated with the first group is reached and this iteration is continued until the names in referred resources are terminated. The resulting shape and content of networks for each year can be seen as visualized in Appendix B. Figure 1 represents the waves of vertex samples from the Bulgarian movement.

addressed. In particular, two main pathways can lead to such distortion in the data for this study.

First, certain key elites or groups, despite playing key roles in the events of the period, might end up being systematically ignored and remain absent in the dataset. As the explanatory variables of the analysis heavily depend on the individual features of the elites, disregarding a key group of elites would lead to major problems regarding the validity of the results. As such elites would also be categorized under the rubric of the main definition of nationalist elites, the idea that the measurements produce results that capture the variation in the actual phenomenon would remain a weak claim. Similarly, another kind of difficulty, comparable in its results to the first one, emerges regarding the ties between the elites as well. Given different narratives regarding the period ties of cooperation between a certain group of elites may be given priority rather than the other. To give an example, as the historiography on Albanian nationalist movements often emphasizes the events on the eve of the declaration of independence, relations that concern remaining autonomist elites might be systematically ignored.

Both these problems can be addressed under the rubric of non-random missing data in social network analysis (Smith et. al., 2017, 2022). The statistical tools that are developed to address problems of non-random missingness in network analysis remain non-standard at this point with a variety of approaches. Different approaches that suggest techniques such as imputation (Smith et. al., 2022), network correlation (Hart et. al., 2022), or subgraph induction step (Blagus et. al., 2017) are deployed yet remain experimental at the moment.

Rather than these statistical techniques, I prefer a more historically oriented approach to problems of data sampling which comes to the fore as more plausible given

the nature of the research at hand. To overcome the above-mentioned problems, I aimed at consuming information from the canonical works both conventional and more recent ones. While reaching completion in such an endeavor is immensely difficult, I have managed to collect a significantly high proportion of the existing nodes and edges in the secondary works. The main aim that lies behind this approach is to bring the data to a level that is commensurate with the latest state of the discussions in the discipline of history. Providing additional that surpasses this level is beyond the scope of this thesis. Although prominent primary sources such as memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey of Ibrahim Temo have been consulted during the data collection process some provided some additional node and edge information, they were already mostly accounted for in the secondary sources with slight modifications. Another major criterion is to provide a detailed account of the sources that shape the dataset and their proportional contribution. Beyond reporting the quality of the dataset, information regarding the data ensures that it remains upgraded with the development of new trends in the discipline.

The figures 2,3, and 4 display the distribution of the sources for each group of elites. The fact that a given book is the one with the most entries represented in the dataset does not indicate that the entries are solely mentioned in the given book. Rather, often times despite their existence in other sources the sampling strategy that is explained above gives primacy to the source in the data collection process. Once the relationship and the elite are coded from a given source, other mentions of the same information for the same year are cleaned from the data in the cleaning process as duplications. The data sources are distributed more evenly in Albanian and Bulgarian

cases. One can see that in each case, the data contains entries of a significant proportion of studies that are a part of different historiographical trends.




Figure 2. Data source distribution of the Albanian network dataset




Figure 3. Data source distribution of the Bulgarian network dataset

In the Albanian case, approximately 43% of the entries are from the books of Hanioglu (1995, 2001) which focus on the Young Turks. This is not a result of language barriers (memoirs and Albanian sources are also consulted) but of the fact that

prominent Albanian nationalists at the center of the movement such as Ismail Qemali (Kemal) or Hasan Prishtina (Berisha) have also been influential figures in the Young Turk movement and the CUP. A possible bias that could result from the well-documented nature of CUP is matched with an emphasis on Clayer's work on Albanian nationalism as well. While other prominent historians of Albanian nationalism are also included in the list (such as Blumi, and Gawrych), Clayer's book on the emergence of Albanian nationalism (2007), provides encyclopedic information on different generations of the movement. In addition, Clayer also emphasizes the role of Albanian nationalists across a wide range of regions and more marginal figures in the movement such as Jashar Sadik Erebera. The dataset on Bulgaria is predominantly from sources on biographical accounts of individual elites and memoirs (approximately 52%). This is commensurate with the nature of the movement and the fact that members of the movement were mostly çeta members with underground operations. Nevertheless, in addition to the biographical works on the movement that follow the nationalist historiography of the period (MacDermott, 1988), later revisionist works on the period (such as Yosmaoglu, 2014; Hacısalihoğlu 2012) and books on the Macedonian question in general (Adanır, 2001; Hacısalihoğlu 2008) are also added to the list of sources.

Lastly, the data on the Kurdish movement is dominated by the information in Göldaş's (1993) book which brings together a plethora of documents and names regarding the movement. The book enjoys the privilege of being the first to publish not only a full list of members to the main Kurdish association of the period (Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti) but also a list of important documents that include the cooperation of the elites around the organization. Beyond this, the biographical works of Malmisanij provide a valuable source of data. Malmisanij's works do not only concern individual

elites of the major families such as Abdurrahman Bedirhan (Malmisanij, 2009), but also focus on different families such as Cemilpasazades (Malmisanij, 2004), individual elites such as Said Nursi (Malmisanij, 1991). In particular, Malmisanij’s work on secessionist organizations before 1925 provides invaluable documentation for this study as it contains lists of secessionist elites of the period (Malmisanij, 2020). Lastly, major works that shape the recent historiography such as Özoğlu (2004), and Klein (2007) were also used extensively during the process.




Figure 4. Data source distribution of the Kurdish network dataset

One last point must be added to the discussion of the historiographical trends present in the dataset. While a wide range of sources is used to be able to represent the entirety of the existing factions within different movements, the ideological positions of the individuals and their perceptions require special attention. The coding criteria for these variables will be detailed in the following sections. Nevertheless, the content of these variables is subject to interpretations of the historians that provide the related narratives. My general aim with regard to the data has been to represent the most recent

trends in the debates. Also, as a general point, the notion that each movement consists of different factions with varying preferences for the future of the claimed homeland although seems like a straightforward point can be underemphasized in the nationalist historiographies. My intention has been to increase the appeal to the studies that have been able to represent this nuance in long- and short-term preferences. To this aim, concerning the Albanian nationalist movement, I largely followed Clayer's (2007) approach and appealed to scholars of the same generation such as Blumi and Gawrych for the missing parts of the ideological positions. Similarly, the main axis of understanding regarding the preferences of the Bulgarian elites has been Brown's (2013) and Yosmaoglu's (2012) approach to the matter at hand. Lastly, for the Kurdish movement, Özoğlu (2004) and Klein (2007, 2010) shaped the understanding regarding the position of the individual elites within the movements.

3.3 Models

To analyze the data, I use an estimation of a pooled TERGM model. While the pooled model provides a better fit to compare the elites' cooperation under different regime conditions, following the literature I also estimate an un-pooled TERGM to see the overall impact of the variables (Cranmer et. al., 2012). At this point, it would be timely to provide some information regarding the ERGM models and the specific type of them that appeal to my analysis. An ERGM model aims to measure the impact of various factors on the formation of edges and to this aim reports the significance of variables on "the probability of tie forming" between nodes (Cranmer et. al., 2021). The probability of tie formation can depend on various aspects of a network which are widely distinguished under the concepts of endogenous and exogenous factors in the literature

on network analysis (Cranmer et. al., 2021). Endogenous variables refer to the factors that emerge as a result of the interaction and interdependency dynamics within the network. Generic examples can be found in the idea of a “friend of a friend”, in a network. The idea behind this notion is the fact that apart from other variables that can intervene in a process of friendship, being a friend of a friend might have a positive impact on the formation of a new tie. Whether the elites organize in dense or loose networks, for instance, would be an endogenous factor in my analysis. On the other hand, exogenous variables are considered to be factors other than those shaped by the network. These may include node and edge attributes. To give another example, in my data, I expect nationalist elites from the same ethnic groups to have a higher probability of cooperation. In this case, ethnicity would refer to a node attribute that varies from elite to elite and is not a feature endogenous to the network dynamics. Or, an exogenous variable can be an edge-level attribute such as one classifying the form of cooperation among the elites. Lastly, an exogenous variable can also be a network-level attribute which I will not appeal to in this thesis.

The TERGM is a relatively recently developed form of ERGM which aims at incorporating the temporal aspects of a network, in a move comparable to one from cross-sectional to panel data models. While the ERGM treats a network as a one-time shot as in cross-sectional data, TERGM takes into consideration “inter-temporal dependence in longitudinally observed networks” (Cranmer et. al., 2021). To do this, TERGM provides an “ERG-type modeling” with additional dimensions. While TERGM provides solutions to an important challenge in applying ERGM to longitudinal networks, it also introduces a new set of questions. Taking the analysis one step further from the likelihood of forming ties, TERGM requires applying theoretical expectations

regarding the transformation of the network in time (Cranmer et. al., 2021). Lastly, I use temporal exponential graph models (TERGM) with the BTERGM package in R software. BTERGM deploys a novel method of bootstrapping to create confidence intervals that produce accurate results with less computational power (Leifeld et. al., 2018). The bootstrap-corrected maximum pseudolikelihood estimate (MPLE) is developed by Desmarais and Cranmer and provides an alternative to the MC-MLE method (Cranmer et. al. 2021, p. 80)

Using network analysis fixes the problems that arise from the assumptions of independence in regression models that are widely appealed to in statistical analysis in political science (Cranmer et. al. 2012). As opposed to the regression models, network models are built on the ideas of the interdependence of the individual actors within a network. In addition, appealing to TERGM enables me to take into consideration not only the network dynamics that are included in exponential graph models (ERGM) but also to see the temporal impact of my independent variables.

I appeal to the temporal exponential graph formula, defined as the following by Leifeld and Cranmer (2018):

$$P(N^t | N^{t-K}, \dots, N^{t-1}, \theta) = \frac{\exp(\theta^T h(N^t, N^{t-1}, \dots, N^{t-K}))}{c(\theta, N^{t-K}, \dots, N^{t-1})} \quad (1)$$

Where N^t is the observed network N at some discrete time point t . θ refers to the vector of parameters, and $h(N)$ is the vector of statistics computed on the observed network. Here, K refers to number of the previously observed set of networks which alongside t ensures that the complete while the probability model of N^t depends on the number of

previously observed networks, it is independent of the previously observed network in the series (Cranmer et. al. 2021, p.124). And by simplification:

$$P(N^{K+1}, \dots, N^T | N^1, \dots, N^K, \theta) = \prod_{t=K+1}^T P(N^t | N^{t-K}, \dots, N^{t-1}, \theta) \quad (2)$$

provides pooled TERGM model that shows the “joint likelihood of observing networks K+1 through T.” (Cranmer et. al. 2021, p.124)

3.4 Unit of analysis

Traditionally, scholars in the area have been widely focusing on the development of nationalism at the state level. Yet, a state-level analysis comes with a number of pitfalls which also apply to my research question (Mylonas & Shelef 2017, Mylonas 2014).

Among other problems, such an approach risks a possibility of a teleological approach centered on the emergence of a nation-state. However, nation-states emerge only as a result of other factors which might not always be bound to happen in a given way.

Rather, besides the structural transformations that make it possible, nationalist projects put forward by different groups of elites and their success shapes the emerging nation-states with their varying features. To give an example, while the Bulgarian and Albanian nationalist movements reach their aims in the form of a nation-state, for the Kurdish nationalist movement no such end result takes place.

For similar concerns, the individual and movement level of elite orientations is much more suited when it comes to the study of nationalism (Mylonas & Shelef, 2017). First and foremost, the nationalist movements and projects emerge in various factions with divergent positions on central issues. Thus, Mylonas asserts that the individual

level of analysis would take into consideration these differences among the early nationalist movements. Following the developments in the literature, my data is able to focus on the individual-level data of the elites within the nationalist movements. This enables me to compare the impact of different factors on individual elites across different organizations, ethnic identities, and political conditions. Such a focus on individual and network-level data provides a better-oriented approach to the recent literature.

3.5 Variables

My dependent and independent variables are largely coded following the procedure applied by Taraktaş (2016). The source of the difference lies in the focus of this thesis on the individuals rather than the organizations, and the specific emphasis on the projects of territorial designs. This brings about a number of challenges regarding the sampling and coding of the data which are addressed in the related sections.

3.5.1 Dependent variable: Cooperation for the nationalist cause

The criteria for cooperation and its operationalization follow the procedure identified by Taraktaş (2016) with the exception of aiming at the specified nationalist territorial designs rather than overthrowing the regime. While positions regarding territorial designs are also included in Taraktaş's article (2016), her measurement brings together a larger group of dimensions in a through a holistic approach. To this approach, I adopt the an approach that is frequently appealed in measures of issue positions of various actors. Since Taraktaş (2016, 2022) also focuses on the Ottoman elites, the available operationalization of the variables proves advantageous for the coding process. I follow

the same indicators identified by Taraktaş (2016, p. 14). According to her, the indicators of such political cooperation would include (1) “co-participation in the organization of some protest activity (such as demonstrations, rebellions, riots, strikes)”, (2) “the process of mobilization of citizens against the regime”, (3) “the generation of anti-regime propaganda”, (4) “or the plotting and carrying out of a coup” (Taraktaş, 2016, p.14). The accomplishment of any of the above-mentioned actions between the two elites is coded as a cooperation relationship between the two.

3.5.2 Independent variables

In addition to the question of focusing on the movement level, a particular emphasis on ideological fragmentation and factionalism within movements is also a critical point to account for. As the literature underlines, internal divisions of self-determination movements change the outcomes of events and create a set of new dynamics where the groups compete among each other and against the state (Cunningham et. al. 2012). On the other hand, the ideology variable, although not emphasized as much in the literature on civil wars has a large part in the literature on social movements discussions. Various aspects that can be summarized under the rubric of shared ideologies, identities and goals are commonly argued to have a positive impact on the likelihood of alliance formation (Bandy and Smith 2005; Di Gregorio 2012).

My study contributes to the existing discussions on ethno-political movements in two ways, first, it takes part in a recent line of studies that disaggregate the ethno-political movement into various factions. In addition, my design introduces another trajectory to the study of ethno-political movements. The above-mentioned line of studies largely focuses on the dynamics and impact of the existence of various organizations in a given

ethnopolitical movement. Instead of focusing on various organizations, I shift my analytical lenses to the fragmentation in ideological positions of the elite regarding the territorial design of the homeland. Thus, I aim to achieve a clearer picture of the shifting positions of the elite. This choice is in line with my emphasis on the questions of whether the elite unites or remains in separate groups and under what policy conditions.

In coding and analyzing the orientations of the elite, I followed Taraktaş (2022) and refrained from conceptualizing it as a binary variable. Especially under conditions of political repression, the elite might not openly express their political views or take positions accordingly. The distinctions that play a central role in terms of measurement that is put forward by Taraktaş (2022) is between the long-term ideals the practical decisions that are made by the elites. With reference to the literature on social movements, Taraktaş differentiates between short-term changeable tactics and repertoire of the participants from the beliefs and goals that are stickier in the long run (2022, p.15). The variable used in this thesis provides an aggregated version of the Table 1 displays the categorical variable coded as the following in three categories where 0 refers to tactically and ideologically autonomist, 1 refers to tactically autonomist but ideologically secessionist, and 2 describes the position of both tactically and ideologically secessionist elites.

The coding process of the variable on ideological positions is more demanding compared to other variables. First, it requires detailed information at the individual level which is difficult to extract from the context for all of the elites. Secondly, as opposed to the other variables that convey information with either well-established or objective criteria, the ideological position of an elite involves interpretation regarding an elite's position. Contrary to what one might expect at the first sight, the most demanding aspect

of the coding process does not often lie in the differentiation of the tactical and ideological positions of the elite as this information is embedded in the character of the Ottoman movements due to regime conditions.

Faced with these challenges, I have followed a number of criteria for the coding process. To begin with, as a rule of thumb, I avoided providing interpretations myself as much as I can and rely on secondary sources for this information. This information is provided for most of the prominent individuals that are included in the initial sample of elites. In terms of historiographical trends, I followed the most recent secondary work that provides an account of the actions of the elites. This can often be the case with Bulgarian nationalists where nuances regarding the left's ideas of autonomy within the Ottoman polity are often understated in the nationalist historiographies. A good example of this is MacDermott's biographical works of prominent Bulgarian nationalists where the changes in ideological positions of the elites are virtually non-existent through the accounts. Above the general accounts of periods and movements, I prioritized research on individual elites. Namely, if a thesis or article is published by an individual member, the information on such research is given superiority to more famous works that give a more general picture. This was the case for elites such as Dervish Hima from the Albanian movement where despite the encyclopedic information provided in the famous works of Clayet, I favored a number of unpublished theses that focused solely on the elite.

As in the course of sampling, the procedure of coding also follows a process that resembles a snowball method. I first code the ideological and tactical positions of the initial list of prominent elites that is provided in Appendix A. There is ample information regarding the group of elites that are included in this list. Therefore, I begin

coding the elites from the first group whose positions are more clear. Then, I move to the elites that are added to the data by virtue of being connected to the initial group and the same criteria of coding are applied if the information is available. However, after this 1st wave of sampling, I introduce second-order criteria for elites of less prominence where individual information is not necessarily available. If an elite is operating under another elite regarding whose position information is conveyed and with whom he has a direct connecting edge, then I assume that the elite shares his superior's position. To give an example, especially within the Kurdish movement, a large number of elites would operate under the leadership of their prominent family members whose tactical and ideological positions would be documented. I coded these elites according to the second-order criteria but with the limitation of the requirement for a direct link of cooperation. Then, for each wave of sampling the procedure is followed.

The coding rule for being ideologically autonomist or secessionist is found in the expressions regarding the long-term goals of either the elite or the organizations they are a part of. Categorizing an individual as a secessionist requires the information that either the elite or the organization in that he is an active member has a goal of either reaching an independent nation-state or being annexed by another state. Otherwise, the elite's ideological position is coded as autonomist. Since this is a sample of nationalist elites, by definition, even in the absence of open remarks, elites are presumed to be autonomists as a base category. Namely, they all share an ideology where “the organization (or the elite) claims to represent the national community in the name of which the territory eventually becomes governed” (Wimmer & Feinstein, 2010). In the absence of secessionist claims, I deem this as a sufficient criterion for ideologically

autonomist positions no matter what the specifics of organizational policy suggestions are.

Criteria for coding the strategic/tactical positions follow a similar path. As in ideological positions I take strategic autonomism as the base category in the Ottoman polity. In addition to their ideological long-term projects, the elites must take place in political actions in line with the nationalist projects to qualify for the sample. To qualify for tactical secessionism an elite or the organization that the elite takes part in should actively be seeking secession in their actions at that particular time period. This indicates that beyond certain demands for territorial representation, the urge for secession should actively be stated.

One can think that under this definition it can be difficult to classify as a tactically and ideologically secessionist elite. Given the conditions of Ottoman politics, this would be an accurate expectation in that even the elites that had a long-term shared vision of secession, either had to operate underground or adapt to short-term autonomism as a first step in their goals. This was openly visible in Bulgarian nationalists some of whom shared the aim of the region of Macedonia being annexed to an independent Bulgarian nation-state, on the other hand, clarified their urge for autonomy as their first step operational goal. In a similar vein, the many of the Kurdish elites while shifting to ideological secessionism at an earlier period, openly operate for a separate Kurdish nation-state only after the end of WWI.

Table 1. Variable: Ideological Position

Score	Ideological Position
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0	Tactically and ideologically autonomist
1	Tactically autonomist but ideologically secessionist
2	Tactically and ideologically secessionist

3.5.3 Foreign support

One of the focal points of the literature on social movements is the existence or lack of resources at the disposal of members of the movement. It is largely argued that collaboration is more likely when resources are plentiful (Van Dyke, 2003) and when the sources of partner groups' funding are distinct and non-competitive (Hathaway & Meyer, 1993). This general insight is also reflected in the literature on nationalist movements (Almeida & Chase-Dunn, 2018). However, while the dynamics of foreign support from the perspective of supporting countries is a widely studied issue (Griffiths 2021; Huang, 2016; Jo, 2015; Stewart, 2018), its impact on the internal dynamics of the movement in ethno-political movements is still understudied. While it is important to identify whether an individual elite receives support, it is also significant to identify whether this support includes military assistance which is closely related to the emergence of armed conflict. Foreign support variable has higher reproducibility compared to the ideological position. Namely, that the probability of different coders reaching same results would be considerably higher as the information conveyed does not require interpretation most of the time. To address the issue of foreign support, I created a categorical variable differentiating the existence and kind of support given to the individual elites. Table 2 summarizes the variable where 0 refers to the non-existence of foreign support, 1 refers to financial or diplomatic support from a foreign

state, and 2 identifies the existence of both financial and military support for a given elite during the period of cooperation. Operationalization of the variable is rather straightforward, the base category captures the elites with either no identifiable foreign sources or whose organization does not engage in foreign support from other countries. Existence of any kind of support in the forms of arms or manpower is coded as military support. As military support usually indicates higher engagement from the supporting foreign actor, it is categorized as the 3rd category that also contains the mere existence of financial or diplomatic support. The second category, on the other hand, is coined to capture the cases where a certain group is diplomatically supported in the international arena by a country, or funded by outside actors.

Table 2. Variable: Foreign Support

Score	Foreign Support
0	No foreign support
1	Financial or diplomatic foreign support
2	Financial or diplomatic, and military foreign support

3.5.4 Perception of threat

According to the existing literature, the existence of threats to the agendas and goals of the activists plays an important role in facilitating coalition-building (Van Dyke, 2003; Meyer & Corrigan-Brown, 2005; Dixon & Martin, 2012). However, in terms of nationalist movements, it is also hard to identify and operationalize the perception of threat. In order to operationalize the threat element in the ethnopolitical movements, I look at the existence of alternative nationalist projects for the identified homeland

territory, as it is argued by the nationalist elites. However, this would be a specified enough definition as there can always be alternatives to the nationalist project of the movement. Hence, to identify this, I appeal to the individual accounts from the primary and secondary sources with two criteria. In order for the existence of the perception of threat for an elite, I look at the elite group in general and the existence of accounts clarifying that the identified homeland is under the threat of being captured by another nationalist movement. For both the Macedo-Bulgarian and Albanian elites, this threat comes from the Serbian and Greek nationalists. For the Kurdish elite, however, the threat is caused by the plans of an independent Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia. Yet, the nationalist elites can always refer to such concepts for mobilization purposes or tactical matters. Therefore, to verify the genuine perception among the elite, I also look for the actual existence of contestation on the ground between different parties that support alternative nation-state projects. Hence, the binary variable identifies the existence of both these conditions at the same time. Table 3 displays the variable where 0 refers to the non-existence of the threat and 1 refers to its existence.

Table 3. Variable: Perception of Threat

Score	Threat Perception
0	No threat perception regarding the homeland
1	Threat perception regarding the homeland

3.5.5 Regime conditions

Although I incorporated regime conditions into the dataset, the impact of regime conditions as an exogenous factor is not easy to estimate. The primary reason for that is

the shared conditions for all the elites within a year lead to problems of collinearity due to lack of variability for that particular year. This problem prevents the BTERGM functions from producing a meaningful outcome, and its solution, although theoretically viable, has not yet been incorporated into the package. Hence, following Cranmer et. al., I account for these large-scale conditions by pooling the data according to different regime conditions (2012). While not focusing on regime dynamics, Cranmer et. al. pool their data with reference to the international system of the day (p. 316). For purposes of research design, I suggest the scope and impact of regime conditions can be comparable to that of the international system on the country.

I follow two steps for deciding the years where different regime conditions and prevalent. Firstly, I create a binary variable at the individual level identifying the elites' experience of regime repression. If the elites have to carry out their political actions underground due to the repression by the central authorities and being caught for their actions would result in serious punishments, then I code the elite experience as one that is under repression. The absence of these conditions, on the other hand, is coded as the absence of repression. However, when it comes to deciding on the general regime conditions, such a binary variable would not give an accurate picture. Hence, secondly, I categorize the periods according to the experience of the elites inhabiting them. If all nationalist elites of the year experience repression in that year, I code the period as one of indiscriminate repression which would cover the year between 1893-1907 and 1917-1921. On the other hand, the periods where a group of elites experiences repression while others do are not is coded as one of selective repression which is the case between 1911-1913. Lastly, when the nationalist elites' political actions are left free unless violence is induced, then I code this period as one of no repression which would include

only the years between 1908-1919. As expected, my approach, which is moving from the individual level to the general regime conditions, is in line with the already existing literature on the Ottoman regime and the measures of the regime conditions (Coppedge et. al., 2021).

3.6 Hypotheses

The section below will specify two main types of hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses concerns the endogenous attributes of the network structure such as the popularity or organizational patterns of the elites. And then I will move to another set of hypotheses that relate to the features of the individual elites such as ideology or resources that are analyzed under the rubric of exogenous attributes in the literature on network analysis. The use of the concept of exogeneous in network analysis terms should not be confused with the use of exogeneity of effects in causal inference analysis, especially in quasi-experimental models. Rather, the function of exogenous attributes is to be able to identify the impact of the different features on the formation of the network in a relational approach (Cranmer et. al., 2021).

The last point that should be addressed before an explanation of the hypotheses is the question of whether to incorporate regime dynamics as a separate hypothesis. Following studies that use similar models and conditions, I refrained from putting forward the regime dynamics as another hypothesis (Cranmer et. al. 2012a). The reasons for this are twofold. While I treat the regime dynamics as a feature that concerns the entirety of the network for the given period, I will not be able to deploy any statistical tests that can measure the impact of this change. This is mostly due to the time constraints that face the thesis. Although the btergm models that are identified below can

measure the impact of various elements under given regime conditions. Carrying out statistical tests for the question of how significant the difference of the same effects is under changing regime conditions would require additional measures that remain beyond the scope of the thesis. Secondly, I qualitative comparison of the dynamics of the organization with different regime variables could have been a viable option for nested analysis of the period. Yet, the latter option would require a lengthy analysis of the causal dynamics that relate to the regime changes which remains beyond the scope of the thesis. Under consideration of these factors, I followed similar studies in refraining from testing regime dynamics under a separate hypothesis (Cranmer et. al. 2012a).

3.6.1 Endogenous hypotheses

I begin my hypothesis by accounting for the factors that are endogenous to the network of elites. Especially under conditions of regime repression, which covers the larger part of the period under investigation, I expect certain organizational patterns to be among the major factors in shaping the cooperation of the elite. This notion is reflected in both the relevant literature regarding the period (Yosmaoglu, 2014) and the discussion on cooperation ties in general (Cranmer & Desmarais, 2011). For antagonists against the state, adding more individuals to widen the network of cooperation often contains additional risks regarding the safety of elites. On the other hand, elites also need to further their agenda and find reliable and loyal partners despite the risks involved with enlargement. This would be the dilemma of such an organization. To disentangle the complex condition of elite networks from their different counterparts I develop two specific hypotheses regarding their organizational patterns.

Firstly, the bulk of the literature underlines the popularity of prominent figures in all three movements, such as Jane Sandanski in IMRO and Ismail Qemali in the Albanian movement. In line with other studies on cooperation (Cranmer et. al., 2012), I expect the popularity of an elite to play a major role in solving this dilemma and have a positive impact on the formation of cooperation ties. Hence:

H1a: The popularity of an elite has a positive impact on the probability of the formation of cooperation ties.

It is previously argued in the literature that security reasons lead to the formation of closed triangles to sustain credible commitments (Cranmer et. al., 2011). Hence, once a close relationship of cooperation is established the elites would have the tendency to make use of this relationship to the furthest (Thurner et. al., 2019). Theoretical foundations of this argument can also be found in the literature covering the period. The fact that Kurdish elites utilize their family ties indicates that such a relationship is a crucial factor to sustain cooperation on crucial issues such as ideological goals or ensuring resources (Özoğlu, 2004). But such structures are not limited to family ties as in the case of the Kurdish elites. The relationship between the prominent figures who took part in the formation of the IMRO such as Gyorche Petrov and Gotse Delchev who included many others in the groups in a triangular cooperation structure. Thus, the second hypothesis regarding internal dynamics of the movement will be the following:

H1b: Elites with cooperation ties among themselves will have a higher probability to share many partners.

3.6.2 Ideological factions

To move forward with the exogenous effect, I seek to measure the impact of ideological positions on the probability of tie formation. A starting point for such an endeavor is the insight that groups that are sharing similar features such as ideological orientations, ethnic identities, or common interests would be more likely to be in alliance with each other rather than those who do not share these features (Bandy & Smith, 2005; Di Gregorio, 2012; Park, 2008). The effect of similarity identified in the social movements literature is underscored as the network homophily in network analysis research. While homophily is a key element for coalition building this does not mean that it is a sufficient condition for the formation of a coalition. On the contrary, as it is exemplified above, individuals with diverse ideological orientations can sometimes override their difference in come together for collaboration while vice versa is also possible (Mccammon & Moon, 2015). A similar observation regarding the nationalist movements under scrutiny is also provided in the relevant substantive literature (Özoğlu, 2004). Yet, these findings have not been applied to the discussions on nationalist movements in a systematic manner. I expect that after controlling for violence, foreign support, regime conditions, threat perception, ethnicity, and religion, ideological similarity would still be a major factor of homogeneity among nationalist elites facilitating cooperation. Hence, my first hypothesis regarding ideological positions is:

H2a: If nationalist elites share a similar ideological position in terms of the administrative design of the homeland, they are more likely to cooperate with each other.

Besides, the variable also enables us to test whether certain ideological positions divide or unite the elites and whether a given faction is more likely to engage in cooperation. Here, in line with the above-mentioned hypotheses, I expect that a position less stigmatized by the central authorities would induce fewer risks and increase the probability of cooperation for the elite. Thus, I put forward the hypothesis that:

H2b: If a nationalist elite has a secessionist ideological position, the elite is less likely to engage in political cooperation.

3.6.3 Perception of threat

Similarly, it is identified in the literature on social movements that threats to the actor's goals have a decisive impact on the formation of coalitions (Grossman, 2001; Van Dyke, 2003; Meyer & Corrigan-Brown, 2005; Dixon & Martin, 2012). I also follow Taraktaş's emphasis on threat as a unifying factor among the elites. As put forward by her, threat is conceptualized as a factor that spurs collective action and diminishes the cost of participation (2022, p.17,25). A similar argument is also made in the literature on nationalist movements identifying the significance of the threat on the nationalist projects for the elite (Almeida, 2018). This would have two results for elite socialization. Firstly, I expect the perception of threat to be a significant element that brings nationalist elites together even if they share different ideological positions or religious identities. In addition, I also suggest that threat perception would lead the elites to seek further cooperation at the individual level. So, I hypothesize that:

H3a: If nationalist elites share a similar perception of threat regarding the identified homeland territory, they are more likely to cooperate with each other.

H3b: If a nationalist elite is under the perception of a threat regarding the identified homeland territory the elite is more likely to engage in political cooperation.

3.6.4 Resources

Lastly, the literature suggests that in any social movement, bringing together the existing resources to support a shared political goal among the members is a crucial element (Levi & Murphy, 2006; Tarrow, 2005; Zald & Ash, 1966). Hence, it is argued that the actors are more likely to be in cooperation when there is a larger amount of resources available (Van Dyke 2003). For nationalist movements too, financial or military support is identified to be a decisive element in the course of events (Nelson, 2021). Hence, my hypothesis is:

H4a: If a nationalist elite reaches military or financial support from abroad, the elite is more likely to engage in political cooperation.

3.7 Operationalization of effects

As is underlined above, to analyze the data and test my hypothesis I appeal to a pooled TERGM model that includes both endogenous and exogenous variables. While the endogenous variables are a part of the analysis, the main focus of this study remains on hypotheses that are related to exogenous effects on tie-formation. Firstly, the edges term is added to the model which is the count of the number of cooperation ties in the network (Cranmer et. al., 2021). The number of edges is treated as an equivalent to the

intercept value in regression results and assumed to be a central element explaining the network in general (Cranmer et. al., 2012b).

For the measurement of endogenous effects, I add the k-star and the geometrically weighted edgewise shared partners (GWESP) statistic to the model, which is traditionally deployed in the literature (Frank & Strauss, 1986; Barabasi & Albert, 1999; Cranmer et. al., 2012a). Popularity or preferential treatment effects are widely operationalized through k-star statistics in the literature (Cranmer & Desmarais, 2011; Cranmer et. al., 2012a). The k-star examines how vertices connect to the focal vertex depending on the number of edges (Leifeld et. al., 2018; Cranmer et. al., 2021, p.77), meaning that it calculates the probability of tie-formation in the existence of 2 ties. I employ this term to measure the impact of the popularity of the elites following the bulk of the studies. Accordingly, preferential treatment effects are widely operationalized through k-star statistics in the literature (Cranmer & Desmarais, 2011; Cranmer et. al., 2012a). The term measures the tendency of vertices with a given number of connections to form more ties, which is treated under the category of preferential attachment (Cranmer et. al., 2021). The numbers to be accounted for in the k-star depend on the specific literature and the form of the data. Considering the data at hand, I used k-star (2) to account for the preferential attachment around the focal vertices in the network. My approach was that elites who have a central position with 2 or more connections of cooperation, will increase their chance of developing further cooperation. The advantage of the 2-star statistic is that it also captures the impact of having a 3 or 4-star as they include respectively two and three 2-star structures and so on (Cranmer et. al., 2012a). Such structures of cooperation often happen in the case of figures with high sociability

or popularity in the position of leadership in the movement which often takes place in nationalist movements. Figure 5 illustrates the k-star structures within a network.




Figure 5. Star structures
Source: [Cranmer et. al., 2012b]

In addition to the preferential attachment, I also add a higher-order dependency element which is the geometrically weighted edgewise shared patterns (GWESP). GWESP can be thought of as a form of k-triangle, in comparison to k-star, where the impact of each triangular pattern of cooperation, as it is shown in Figure 5, is measured. GWESP terms add geometric probability weights to the k-triangle pattern and provide a way to measure the transitivity in the network. Snijders et. al. intuitively explain this term as a measure to capture “clique-ish” structures in the network (2006, p.11). Similarly, Cranmer et. al. (2012a) describe GWESP through the idiom of “the friends of my friends are my friend”. In addition to capturing a central aspect of the network, GWESP also keeps problems related to degeneracy under control (Cranmer et. al. 2021,

p.84). I expect the cooperation between two elites to have a positive impact on the formation of a new shared cooperation. Yet, as GWESP captures it, with each addition to the triangle, its impact on the likelihood of tie-formation would decrease. After experimentation with the GWESP argument, I set the GWESP model to 1 as a value that keeps degeneracy under control while also providing more explanatory power.

To account for the impact of exogenous nodal attributes, I use the *nodefactor* and *nodematch* arguments which respectively measure degree prediction and homophily. Both terms are specially designed to measure the impact of categorical variables on the probability of tie formation. I use my variables regarding the ideological position, engagement with violence, threat perception, and regime conditions with both of these arguments to include both the homophily and degree probability in the model. However, due to problems related to collinearity which cannot be addressed at the moment by the *BTERGM* package, some of the variables are only tested with either *nodematch* or *nodefactor* depending on the period under examination. To give an example, I added the *nodematch* terms with violence for the period between 1917-1921. The idea behind this was to control and measure the impact of homophily on the issue of the use of violence because this was a major point of debate among the Kurdish elites in the period.

When it comes to degree prediction, however, rather than a homogenous impact, I differentiate between the variables. In general, I expect the rising risk elements to negatively affect the probability of tie formation. As it is mentioned above, I expect an ideological position that is less tolerable by the government, the inclination to violence, and the regime pressure to decrease the probability of tie-formation. Yet, this does not apply to my expectations regarding threat perception as literature identifies a positive impact. Lastly, again I expect a positive impact of the increasing resources when it

comes to the foreign support. These expectations and the related hypotheses identified in the above section are operationalized through the nodefactor argument in the BTERGM package.




Figure 6. Triangle structures
Source: [Cranmer et. al., 2012b]

Lastly, I control for the impact of ethnic and religious identity as two exogenous nodal attributes. Since the process of data collection was centralized on the existence of

three distinct ethnic movements, I add a control variable for the impact of sharing the same ethnic identity. Since I examine nationalist movements, sharing an ethnic background is a key element for the elite. In addition, for the Ottoman case, since the main axis of social organization from the perspective of the legal applications was in religious lines, I wanted to control the religious identity of nationalist elites too. I control for the impact of both these variables through the nodematch argument in the package to account for the impact of ethnic and religious homophily.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

4.1 Model results

I tested multiple hypotheses regarding the cooperation patterns of nationalist elites through the estimation of a pooled TERGM for the years between 1889 and 1925. The results are displayed in Table 5 for the pooled models where the brackets identify the 95% confidence intervals. In order to see the overall impact of some of the variables and see possible implications for periods where variables could not be included in the model for reasons of collinearity, I also estimate an un-pooled model whose results are included in Table 5. While the results regarding the ideological position, threat perception, and regime transition were in line with my expectations, the foreign support variable produced counterintuitive results. The goodness-of-fit plots for each period are provided in the Appendix C indicate that the models reflect the network topography without major problems of overfitting. In general, models provide better out-of-sample fits which increase the predictive power of the models and the hypotheses put forward (see Appendix C).

To begin with, both the k-star(2) and GWESP variables produce statistically significant and substantial positive effects on the probability of cooperation. The sustained significant results for two-stars across all periods indicate that in line with my expectations, the popularity of an elite of cooperation increases the possibility of having more ties. Elites with many ties of cooperation are indeed attractive to others in terms of

the prospects for future cooperation. Regarding transitivity, the results for the GWESP variable indicate the existence of a positive impact of transitivity among the elites in terms of nationalist cooperation. In the literature, such an amount of transitivity is interpreted as a strong indication of the shared perceptions among the actors and a “friend-of-a-friend-is-my-friend” relationship (Turner et. al., 2018). The results provide evidence that elites have a positive tendency towards triadic closures. The only exception to this is in the period of no-repression where GWESP does not produce significant results. This is in line with the expectations of H1b that edge-wise shared partners are primarily a security measure and that under the absence of repression, it loses significance. On the contrary, as identified in H1a, popularity sustains its positive impact across various regime dynamics. Table 5 confirms the overall positive impact of both variables.

When it comes to the exogenous variables, firstly, the ideological position provides a strong indicator for the tie formation of the nationalist elites both in terms of homophily and degree prediction. As opposed to my expectations, ideological homophily does not constitute a significant factor in the cooperation ties among the elites. These results are counterintuitive. But they indicate against H2a that sharing a similar ideological position regarding the administrative design of the homeland is not significant overall compared to dissimilarity in this aspect. This finding is also confirmed in Table 5. However, there is an exception to this trend in the period between 1911-1913 under selective repression by the state authorities. Again, the results are against the H2a and ideological homophily has a negative impact on the probability of tie formation. Although I do not theorize about this phenomenon, the results might indicate that conditions of selective repression lead the elites to seek new alliances with

elites who do not share their ideological positions. Indeed, while against H2a, the results bear critical significance for questions of alliance formation and factionalism.

In terms of degree prediction, the results for ideological positions are significant and substantial in line with H2b. The results of having a tactically and ideologically secessionist position are relatively straightforward. Compared to being an autonomist, Ideology = 2 decreases the prospects of cooperation for the nationalist elites. In line with the finding regarding homophily, the only exception to this is the period under selective repression. This lends support to the notion that such periods might be that of a re-alignment among the elites. The effect size of Ideology = 2 ranges from -.80 to -2.60 approximately indicating its substantial impact. Even more so, under no repression Ideology = 2 decreases the chances of further cooperation for an elite.

When it comes to Ideology = 1, the results are more difficult to interpret but in general in line with the H2a. Under conditions of no-repression or selective repression having a secessionist ideology decreases the chances of cooperation for an elite compared to the autonomist ideology. This is in line with the expectation that avoiding risky positions is a predominant mechanism among the elites. However, the fact that under repression, elites appeal to the secessionist ideology with a tactically autonomist outlook deserves more attention. It is not immediately clear why under repression secessionism becomes an advantage after controlling for other variables. To interpret these results, I follow Cranmer et. al. (2012) who prioritize the systemic conditions and argue that it lends support to the explanation of repression rendering secessionism a more viable outcome for the elites. However, the phenomenon requires further attention for a thorough explanation. The results in Table 5 also reveal that Ideology = 1 requires further research as they indicate a significant positive impact.

Table 4. Pooled BTERGM Results

	Pooled Models			
	1893-1907	1908-1910	1911-1913	1917-1921
Edges	-5.35 [-6.83; -3.91]*	-9.37 [-23.55; -9.10]*	-23.86 [-24.62; -23.86]*	-4.72 [-13.43; -3.22]*
Two-Stars	0.23 [0.19; 0.27]*	0.36 [0.32; 0.37]*	0.34 [0.33; 0.43]*	0.18 [0.17; 0.32]*
GWESP	0.37 [0.08; 0.53]*	0.37 [-0.02; 0.46]	0.37 [0.27; 0.50]*	0.13 [0.04; 0.65]*
Ideology (Homophily)	-0.10 [-0.75; 0.27]	0.45 [-0.39; 0.76]	-0.36 [-0.73; -0.19]*	0.00 [-6.63; 0.49]
Ideology = 1 (Degree Prediction)	1.30 [0.82; 1.68]*	-0.23 [-0.39; -0.23]*	-17.69 [-19.48; -15.83]*	
Ideology = 2 (Degree Prediction)	-0.82 [-1.25; -0.35]*	-2.62 [-18.54; -1.32]*	-1.23 [-19.00; 0.99]	-1.85 [-15.30; -0.99]*
Foreign Support (Homophily)				0.04 [-0.30; 0.98]
Foreign Support = 1 (Degree Prediction)	0.38 [0.05; 0.66]*	0.10 [-0.21; 0.40]	0.45 [-18.56; 1.99]	
Foreign Support = 2 (Degree Prediction)	0.74 [-0.35; 1.20]	0.50 [-0.10; 1.48]	0.97 [-1.14; 1.48]	
Threat = 1 (Degree Prediction)	1.61 [1.11; 2.83]*		0.53 [0.12; 0.53]*	
Threat (Homophily)			0.10 [0.10; 1.33]*	
Violence (Homophily)				0.35 [-0.14; 1.03]
Ethnicity (Homophily)	-0.19 [-0.69; 0.25]	5.13 [4.73; 19.84]*	19.08 [18.64; 20.05]*	
Isolates	1.14 [0.69; 3.01]*	0.33 [0.19; 0.33]*	-0.70 [-1.84; -0.37]*	0.66 [0.09; 0.89]*
Memory Term	0.42 [0.09; 0.89]*	0.77 [0.67; 0.87]*	0.70 [0.38; 2.13]*	0.39 [-0.67; 1.79]
Num. obs.	76442	11564	18338	23256

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval of 95%.

Table 5. Un-pooled BTERGM Results

	Un-Pooled Models
	1893-1921
Edges	-5.12 [-5.71; -4.46]*
Two-Stars	0.19 [0.17; 0.28]*
GWESP	0.27 [0.12; 0.47]*
Ideology = 1 (Degree Prediction)	1.13 [0.67; 1.64]*
Ideology = 2 (Degree Prediction)	-0.80 [-1.22; -0.54]*
Foreign Support = 1 (Degree Prediction)	0.29 [0.09; 0.60]*
Foreign Support = 2 (Degree Prediction)	0.73 [0.31; 0.91]*
Threat = 1 (Degree Prediction)	1.52 [1.09; 2.00]*
Ideology (Homophily)	-0.07 [-0.54; 0.32]
Ethnicity (Homophily)	1.06 [0.56; 1.59]*
Religion (Homophily)	-0.06 [-0.43; 0.28]
Isolates	0.41 [0.03; 0.85]*
Memory Term	0.73 [0.49; 1.01]*
Num. obs.	150488

* Null hypothesis value outside the confidence interval of 95%.

Focusing on foreign support, problems of collinearity make room for the inclusion of homophily effects only in the period between 1917-1921 where the variable does not produce significant outcomes. I find results that are somewhat counterintuitive when it comes to the impact of resources on the network. Neither in terms of degree prediction, do the results lend support to H4a except for the period of repressive regime conditions between 1893-1907. For this period too, it is striking that only financial or diplomatic support without military support increases the possibility of cooperation among the nationalist elites. At first sight, the results might seem to go against the literature on nationalist and social movements. I would disagree with this contention with reference to the refinement that my data is able to offer. While financial or diplomatic support significantly increases the possibility of cooperation under regime repression adding military support to this, does not have a similar impact. A possible explanation for this would be that despite the positive effect of financial resources, different kinds of resources might increase the risk of cooperation. As the risk of cooperation with the elite that receives foreign support increases, the elite's prospect of further nationalist cooperation decreases in a way that makes receiving support disadvantageous. I suggest this could be the case, especially with military support. The fact that Table 5 indicates that foreign support is significant in all its forms if we do not take into consideration the regime dynamics, displays the crucial role of the regime conditions in shaping the calculations of the nationalist elites.

Threat perception was one of the central elements in my hypotheses. Unfortunately, problems regarding collinearity lead me to think about this concept with a larger emphasis on the Table 5, especially in the case of homophily. H3a was emphasizing the homophily effect of the perception of threat. Results in Table 5 indicate

that this is a significant element increasing the probability of cooperation where the perception of threat is shared compared to when it is not. Considering the regime conditions of the period, this can be a chief element for explaining the unanticipated results for the period where elites might be prioritizing threat rather than ideology. In terms of degree prediction, the results lend support to the H3b with threat perception increasing the probability of cooperation significantly for both the results in Table 5 and Table 5. The insight from these results is that elites who perceive a threat regarding the identified homeland are more likely to engage in cooperation than those who do not. This finding strongly supports the existing studies on nationalist movements which identify the threat as a strong element.

Lastly, looking at the control variables, we see both significant and substantially large positive homophily effects for ethnicity variable. This was an anticipated result for nationalist movements which consist of people from similar ethnic backgrounds. While this might appear as a closed circuit and redundant as shared ethnicity is part of the definition of a nationalist movement, I still needed to control for the variable as there was not any other clear viable way for including this into the BTERGM model. Yet, the fact that results for the period under repression do not produce a significant impact is worth taking note of. I suggest an interpretation for this would be that under repression, elites do not always prioritize cooperation with people from the same ethnic group and are open to cooperation with people from diverse ethnic backgrounds. The finding is critical considering the fact that even under no-repression, nationalist elites are more inclined to cooperate with people from the same ethnic background. Also minding that I control for various forms of differences among the elite, results indicate that ethnic

background matters even in the face of large-scale ideological diversity, and elites are more likely to cooperate when they share their background.

4.2 Discussion

Studies on nationalist movements largely disregarded the network dynamics of the movements until recently. While it has been argued that their environment and coalitional dynamics have a decisive impact on the decisions of the nationalist actors, the two aspects mainly remained to be separate. With this study, I provide an analysis of the cooperation dynamics within nationalist movements considering both the endogenous and exogenous factors affecting the elite. The network analysis approach provides a valuable tool for such a task by considering the entirety of the network and the relational aspects of the elite decisions. As it is numerously put forward in the literature on research methods, bringing together an account of individual cases with a large-n quantitative analysis can be done in various ways but is subject to continuing discussion in political science (Lieberman, 2005; Collier & Brady 2010; Goertz & Mahoney 2012). In this part, my aim is not to provide an in-depth qualitative comparison of the particular aspects of nationalist movements in the Ottoman Empire. Such an endeavor would require going beyond the average effects that are measured by the model and providing a different design from the scratch. While producing robust results, the average effects does not necessarily indicate an explanation for the actual causes of each individual elite's pattern of socialization (Goertz & Mahoney 2012). This part is rather aimed at revealing some of the implications of the results for our understanding of the period in an inexhaustive fashion and display the ways in which the

relatively abstract variables can be in play in the practical environment of the elites. Ultimately, the goal remains in increasing the causal leverage for the BTERGM results. To begin with, a well-documented aspect of various political movements in the late Ottoman Empire, especially before the 1908 Young Turk revolution, is their clandestine character (Hanioglu, 1995, 2001). Hanioglu, for instance, provides voluminous evidence on the methods followed by the Young Turks and the CUP in their effort to establish an organization that spreads to various parts of the Empire without attracting the attention of the central government (Hanioglu, 2001). In the same vein, nationalist organizations of the period such as IMRO were organized in an underground fashion often by developing painstaking methods to prevent the possible disclosure of the organizational structure (MacDermott, 1988; Yosmaoglu, 2014). IMRO stands out among other organizations as a well-studied case where the activists had acquaintance with only a limited number of members in the organization and the organizational hierarchy was clearly defined. Such measures were aimed at preventing a possible breakdown in the face of a key activist getting caught (Brown, 2013). Such organizational patterns under repressive regime conditions are in line with the findings regarding the GWESP variable. Except for the circumstances where nationalist elites are not faced with repression from the central government, triangular socialization with a tight network of cooperation is prevalent among the nationalists.

My thesis is aimed to be a step toward filling a major gap in the literature regarding the comparative study of nationalist movements in the period. While all these movements have been studied extensively with respect to their interactions with the central government and its agents on the ground, the dynamics that shape them in relation to each other, and the shared features of these groups are left out so far. One of

such shared central elements to bear in mind is the ideological factions that bring about the movement. The significance of ideological positions for the elite network after controlling for central factors provides insightful empirical evidence for the centrality of the factions in such movements. Operating in various factions brings practical and long-term ideological consequences that cannot be summarized in a single variable at the individual level. However, focusing on individual-level positions can still reveal what kind of ideological position could create an advantage for the cooperation of a given individual. Hence, elites that are a part of a given ideological faction can rise in popularity under given conditions with serious results for the entire movement.

A clear example of this can be found in the Macedo/Bulgarian movement where the two factions become separated after the Ilinden Uprising in 1903. The autonomist faction under the leadership of Sandanski develops increasingly closer relations with CUP during the period going to the 1908 Young Turk revolution and its aftermath (Hacısalıhoğlu, 2020). As the regime opening provides more space for the autonomist elites in the movements, a figure like Sandanski become increasingly milder in their ideological position towards the central government and keeps rising in power in the movement until the Balkan wars. This shared phenomenon is captured by the impact of Ideology = 1 and Ideology = 2 under repressive and tolerant regime conditions. As the autonomist outlook that reduces the risks gained the autonomist factions popularity before 1908, after this point, the faction mostly abandons their long-term secessionist ideology under the leadership of figures such as Dimo Hadzhidimov. As these figures get more popular within the network, they also shape the general outlook of the Macedo/Bulgarian nationalist movement, limiting the impact of the secessionist elites. Figure 7 displays the popularity of two leading figures with Ideology = 1 value

throughout the period before 1908. After 1903, while the leadership of the autonomist faction of the left-wing IMRO passes to Sandanski, the overall popularity of the faction keeps increasing until 1908.




Figure 7. Number of cooperation ties for Gyroche Petrov and Yane Sandanski by year

What happens after 1908 in terms of the ideological factions of the Macedo/Bulgarian is also worth discussing. The results for pooled models reveal that as the regime opens to minority representation in 1908 to be followed by a gradual decline in repression, secessionist ideology decreases the likelihood of the elites for cooperation. As various groups form coalitions for elections after 1908, the federalists in IMRO such as Sandanski, Hadzidimov, Panitsa and etc. shifted to the People’s Federative Party and then joined the coalition with the CUP until before the Balkan Wars. The fact that the leading figures of the Bulgarian movement at the period shifted to an autonomist

ideological position, is in line with the results that the implications of secessionism had a negative impact on the period.

Strikingly, the foreign support variable does not produce significant results except for the financial (and not military support) in the period before 1908. It is well-established that especially until 1904, all the Macedo/Bulgarian factions enjoy large-scale financial and logistical support from the Principality of Bulgaria (MacDermott, 1988; Tokay, 1996). Until this point, however, federalists' relationship with the principality is severed leaving the faction devoid of the resources formerly at its disposal. Then again, closer to the network of elites until 1908 reveals dynamics beyond the lack of significance for the variable. While the network of nationalists grows in size substantially until 1908, the number of individuals in cooperation per elite remains more or less the same. In other words, the number of individuals in the movement increases through the period, yet each individual remains with similar numbers of connections. Figure 8 provides insight into the dynamics of foreign resources for the network. While a limited number of autonomists such as Gruev, especially those with financial support, increase their reach and incorporate new members to the movement, increasing violence on the part of the secessionists does not help them to increase their numbers of connections despite the arms support. Thus, the right wing of IMRO remains devoid of virtually almost all of its support base in Ottoman Macedonia and retreats to Bulgaria after its failure in 1903.

One should also consider the impact of the mostly non-armed Albanian and Kurdish nationalist elites through the period until the Balkan Wars. While the Macedonian region had many Albanian armed groups with occasional insurgencies, the Albanian nationalist elites remained to a large extent to be a group of intellectuals and

statemen who refrained from the armed movement until the increasing CUP repression in 1911 (Skendi, 1967; Gawrych 2006). While the regions populated by Albanian ethnic groups have been susceptible to occasional outbursts of violence, these have not been




Figure 8. Number of cooperation ties total and per elite

motivated by nationalism or secessionist demands as defined above (Gawrych, 2006).

Meaning that, as opposed to Macedo/Bulgarian nationalist groups, insurgencies dominated by ethnically Albanian groups were devoid of the claim to represent a given ethnic group in whose name the territory must be governed. This was in striking contrast to the Bulgarian nationalists who were mostly consisting of armed members with a high appeal to indiscriminate violence in the region. A reason behind this dynamic which was relevant for both Albanian and Kurdish elites can be the access to government positions

and resources and the lack of foreign supporters for armed movement, which was the opposite of the Bulgarian elites.

When it comes to the threat variable, its presence rises significantly for the Macedo/Bulgarian nationalist after the Illinden Uprising in 1903. While there is a general sense of uncertainty among the Macedo/Bulgarian and Albanian elites after the congress of Berlin, which is transferred to the generations of activists, the Illinden Uprising presents an actual threat and rivalry for the Macedo/Bulgarian factions. Figure 10 displays the dynamic that emerges with Melnik insurrection in 1895 led by the secessionist faction of Sarafov which resulted in the political instability of the region and crippled the efforts of nationalist activists further increasing the risk for more radical political positions (Adanır, 2001, p.126). Yet the urge for non-selective violence and secessionist position would be continued by a faction of the movement despite failure led to a strong push in the movement until the Illinden uprising in 1903. At this point, while there were disputes regarding the future of the movement, the short-term consensus was still to keep the Ottoman presence in the region (Adanır, 2001, p.133). According to Adanır, in the process leading to Illinden Uprising in 1903, Macedonian elites were mainly concerned with the weakness of the Ottoman state and the possibility of reaching Aya Stefanos affairs (Adanır, 2001, p.150). The Mürzsteg reforms become a turning point for the perception of threat among the elites. After this point, with the rising turmoil in the region, an environment emerged where numerous groups from several ethnic backgrounds embracing different ideological stances compete and conflict with each other for the nationalist projects put forward (Adanır, 2001, p.219). This

explains the large significant impact of the threat variable for the period. Both Albanian and Macedo/Bulgarian elites which are active in this part face serious turmoil in their identified homelands. Elites that perceive this threat where elites with the perception of threat have a higher chance of socialization than others.




Figure 9. Proportion of elites with threat perception in the network

Contrary to the Macedo/Bulgarian elites, in the Kurdish movement, the development of ties of cooperation was intertwined with family relations and displayed a clearer cut for the existence of threat perception among the nationalist elites. The Kurdish movement is differentiated from the Albanian and Macedo/Bulgarian movements as it is initiated at a later period. While the nationalist historiography traces back Kurdish nationalism all the way to the 18th century, and the tribal uprisings in the region, an emergence of a modern nationalist movement sustaining my criteria takes place only in the late 19th and early 20th century. As in other cases, emerging as a

predominantly autonomist movement, Kurdish elites spread into various factions only a decade after the publication of the first journal in Kurdish with nationalist claims in Cairo along the lines of various influential families (Malmisanij, 2009). While focusing mainly on issues of education and infrastructure in its early period (Özoğlu, 2004), issues of centralism had a central place in the post-1908 period of the movement (Duman, 2010).

The ideological division between the secessionist and autonomist strands among the Kurdish elites becomes clear with the end of WWI. After 1917, especially the faction led by the Bedirkhan family increasingly re-shaped its agenda from the promotion of national culture and values to the formation of an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Anatolia (Özoğlu, 2004). This transformation is crystallized in the shift from the Society for the Mutual Aid and Progress of Kurdistan (SMPK)(Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti) to the Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan (SAK)(Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti) as the dominant organization of the movement. Although both movements had similar leadership cadres around Şemdinans, Bedirkhans, Cemilpasazades, and Babanzades their agendas were different where the former was focused on cultural promotion and the latter was focused on ensuring the existence of a Kurdish nationalist legal entity either in the form of autonomy in the Empire of as an independent state (Özoğlu, 2004).

While, on the other hand, prominent families led by elites such as Seyyid Abdülkadir of the Şemdinan family remained in opposition to the secessionist position until the late 1910s. By 1920, the secessionist faction becomes the dominant ideological position in the movement containing various major families except for a number of elites such as Said Nursi (Malmisanij, 1991; Özoğlu, 2004). Hence, the question of the impact

of ideological positions on the socialization of the elites remains to be a central one for the Kurdish movement. Despite that Ideology = 2 secessionist positions increases in relevance compared to previous periods, it continues to have significant negative impact under the conditions of both selective repression and non-selective repression. The findings might seem counterintuitive at the first sight; however, the statistics do not reflect the shift among the elites to secessionism but rather the likelihood of cooperation for individual secessionist elites within the nationalist network. Thus, while the individuals change their ideological positions, elites that remain autonomists for a longer period such as Seyyid Abdülkadir remain more popular in the movement overall.

As opposed to the Macedo/Bulgarian and the Albanian movements the Kurdish elites are faced with the threat of the formation of another nation-state in their homeland at the end of WWI. The threat perception among the Kurdish elites becomes clear in their expressions of the need to avoid the formation of an Armenian state in the region (Özoğlu, 2004, p.83). While such a threat becomes apparent in the Albanian and Macedo/Bulgarian cases with the loss of central government's authority in the region, for the Kurdish case, in addition to the turmoil in the region, the international conferences at the period also point to the possibility of formation of an Armenian state in the areas identified as their homeland by the Kurdish elite. While the region had been a scene for ongoing conflicts between Armenian and Kurdish militias in the region (Klein, 2011), the Paris Conference establishes the idea of certain partitions and the possibility of an Armenian nation-state among the elites. After WWI, the possibility of an Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia in the regions populated by the Kurdish people creates an urgent sense of threat for the identified homeland among the Kurdish elite, resulting in a sudden increase in the number of cooperation ties in the period. This is

reflected both in the discussion of the period and individual memoirs, and the international conferences after WWI.

Lastly, the regime also becomes an important element in the decisions of the elite. To examine this dynamic, focusing on the elites in the late Ottoman Empire provides us with ample variation in terms of the elites' relations with the regime. The regime in the period until 1908 is homogeneously non-compromising for the nationalist elites in the Ottoman Empire. Until this period, nationalist organizations and publications continue their actions illegally and underground. After the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, a major regime opening takes place for minority organizations to the point of formation of political parties with minority agendas (Hacısalihoglu, 2020). After 1908, Sandanski and his friends take up the formation of a new political party the name of People's Federative Party, while other Bulgarian nationalists participate in the election in cooperation with the Exarchate (Hacısalihoglu, 2020). Albanian and Kurdish elites initially fill the ranks of the CPU. After 1910, they cooperate with Ottoman Liberty Party (Ahrar Fırkası) under the leadership of Prince Sabahaddin (Tunaya, 1984; Birinci, 1990) or organize associations outside the parliament (Hacısalihoglu, 2008; Özoğlu, 2004). Hence, how the regime trends played out in their impact was similar in all three cases. Before 1908, all three movements pursued underground organizational patterns. The period between 1908 and 1910 was marked by a regime opening and the formation of legal organizations even for the elites embracing more radical ideological positions within the movement. After 1910, the regime gradually increased its grip on the organizations of minority elites with a selective repression. While Albanian elites experience the increasing authoritarianism of the CPU after 1910, for Macedo/Bulgarian elites, the regime keeps its tolerance until 1911. The Kurdish elites, on the other hand,

keep the nationalist associations intact almost until the end of WWI. Hence, the period provides us with multiple options for the regime's approach to the nationalist elites interacting with other variables too.



CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

My thesis aimed to explain the dynamics of cooperation among the nationalist elites in the early nationalist movements. The dynamics of cooperation in nationalist and ethno-political movements both in violent and non-violent contexts has been a topic under scrutiny in recent scholarly debates. The original dataset on late Ottoman politics provides an opportunity to focus on key questions of this literature while also providing a much-needed comparative analysis of the individual nationalist movements. Thus, I focus on the cooperation of nationalist elites in Macedo/Bulgarian, Albanian, and Kurdish nationalist movements in the late Ottoman empire. Results of the BTERGM show that ideological factions among the elites, organizational patterns, and threat perception exert a significant impact on the likelihood of cooperation among nationalist elites. While all factors display significant impact, the form of their impact and their scale are subject to variation. In general, the results reveal the risk-averse behavior of the elites when it comes to ideological factions. More radical ideological positions decrease the likelihood of cooperation for nationalist elites while regime pressure increases the appeal to such positions. Regime repression also increases the impact of dense organizational patterns. Lastly, threat perception proves to be an overall significant factor where its existence increases the likelihood of cooperation for an elite. The results, while produced through an analysis of all three movements, also apply to individual cases, in line with the literature, as it is pointed out in the discussion. Despite the limitations of the period, the size of the dataset and the variations included produce

results that are promising for generalization regarding the larger debates on nationalism and ethnic conflict.



APPENDIX A

INITIAL SAMPLE OF ELITES ACCORDING TO ETHNIC GROUPS

Table A1. Initial Sample of Albanian Elites

Code	Name	Initial Ideological Position
DH	Dervis Hima (Maksut Ibrahim)	0
HAM	Halil Muvaffak	0
HAP	Hasan Pristina	0
IK	ismail Kemal	0
IT	Ibrahim Temo	0
MIFR	Midhat Frasheri	0
NEXHD	Nexhib (Necib) Draga	0
SHK	Shahin Kolonja	0
YSE	Yasar Sadik (Jashar Sadik) Erebera	0

Table A2. Initial Sample of Macedo/Bulgarian Elites

Code	Name	Initial Ideological Position
BORSAR	Boris Sarafov	2
DAMGUR	Damyán Gruev	1
DIMBLNI	Dimitar Blagoev	2
	Nikolov	
DIMHDIM	Dimo Hacı Dimov	1
DIMVLAH	Dimitar Vlahov	0
EVSPRO	Evtim Sprostranov	2
GEPET	George (Gyorche)	1
	Petrov	
GODEL	Gotse Delchev	1
HRICHE	Hristo Chernopeev	1
HRISDAL	Hristo Dalcev	0
IVGAV	ivan Garvanov	0
JANSAN	Jane Sandansky	1
KHT	Hristo Tatarchev	1
MARLER	Marko Lerinski	1
NIKAR	Nikola Karev	0
PANDAR	Pancho Dorev	1
PAVDEL	Pavel Deliradev	0
PERTOS	Pere Naumov Tosev	1
PETPE	Petko Penchev	1

Table A3. Initial Sample of Kurdish Elites

Code	Name	Initial Ideological Position
ABB	Abdurrahman Bedirhan	0
ABDBED	Abdurrezzak Bedirhan	2
AC	Abdullah Cevdet	0
ALISE	Aliser	1
ASBED	Asaf Bedirhan	0
BABAZ	Babanzade (Abdul)Aziz	0
BH	Bedirhanzade Huseyin Kenan	2
BIH	(babanzade) ismail Hakki	0
CELBED	Celadet Bedirhan	0
CEMKB	Cemilpasazade Kasim Bey	0
CEMKEB	Cemilpasazade Kerim Bey	0
CIHB	Cibranli Halit Bey	0
DAZP	(Musir) Damat Zulkuf Pasa	0
EKCEM	Ekrem Cemilpasazade	0
EMALBED	Emin Ali Bedirhan	0
ENYEM	Encum Yemulki	0
HARABED	Halil Rami Bedirhan	0
KADCE	Kadri Cemil	0
KAMAB	Kamuran Ali Bedirhan	0
KAMBED	Yusuf Kamil Bedirhan	0
KURDAR	Kurdizade Ahmed Ramiz	0
MARMUAP	Mardinizade Muhammed Arif	2
MESEL	Memduh Selim Bey	0

MOLHI	Molla Hidir	0
MOLSEL	Molla (Mela) Selim (Gonigi)	0
MUHSERP	Muhammed Serif Pasa	0
MUKH	Mukuslu (Molla) Hamza	0
MURBED	Murat Bedirhan	1
MZGOK	Mehmet Ziya (Gokalp)	0
NECHUS	Necmettin Huseyin (Kerkuk)	0
NURDE	Nuri Dersimi (Colikzade)	0
OMCE	Omer Cemil	0
SABH	Salih Bege Heni	0
SEYABBAR	Seyh Abdulselem Barzani	0
SEYABD	Seyyid Abdulkadir	0
SEYABDS	Seyyid Abdullah (Semdinan)	2
SEYAL	Seyyid Ali	1
SEYTA	Seyyid Taha (Semdinan)	0
SK	Said Kurdi (Nursi)	0
SUKBA	(Huseyin) Sukru Babanzade	0
SUKME	Sukru Mehmet (Sekban)	0
SULABD	Suleymaniyeli Abdulkerim	0
SULMT	Suleymaniyeli M. Tefik	0
YUZX	Yuzbası Xeyreddin Berazi	2

APPENDIX B

VISUALIZATION OF NETWORK GRAPHS FOR EACH YEAR




Figure B1. Network graph visualization for years 1893 to 1896




Figure B2. Network graph visualization for years 1897 to 1900




Figure B3. Network graph visualization for years 1901 to 1904




Figure B4. Network graph visualization for years 1905 to 1908




Figure B5. Network graph visualization for years 1909 to 1912




Figure B6. Network graph visualization for years 1913, 1914, 1978 and 1918




Figure B7. Network graph visualization for years 1919 to 1922




Figure B8. Network graph visualization for years 1923 to 1925

APPENDIX C
GOODNESS OF FIT PLOTS




Figure C1. Period 1, out-of-sample goodness of fit plots




Figure C2. Period 1, in-sample goodness of fit plots




Figure C3. Period 2, out-of-sample goodness of fit plots




Figure C4. Period 2, in-sample goodness of fit plots




Figure C5 Period 3, out-of-sample goodness of fit plots




Figure C6. Period 3, in-sample goodness of fit plots




Figure C7. Period 4, out-of-sample goodness of fit plots




Figure C8. Period 4, in-sample goodness of fit plots

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