

T.C
İSTANBUL AYDIN ÜNİVERSİTESİ
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES



CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN EGYPT AFTER 2013

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Department of Political Sciences and International Relations

Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. Özüm Sezin UZUN

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M.Sc. THESIS

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Prof. Dr. Ragıp Kutay KARACA
Enstitü Müdürü



To my parents, spouse and children,,

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABW:	Ansar Beytul Maqdes
AFEA:	Armed Forces Engineering Authority
AFLPO:	Armed Forces Land Projects Organization
ASU:	Arab Social Union
CA:	Constitution Assembly
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency
EGP:	Egyptian Pound
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
MB:	Muslim Brotherhood
MP:	Member of Parliament
NDC:	The National defence council
NDP:	National Democratic Party
NSPO:	National Service Projects Organization
PM:	Prime Minister
RCC:	Revolutionary Command Council
SCAF:	Supreme Council of Armed Forces
SCC:	Supreme Constitutional court
US:	United States
USD:	United States Dollar
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VAT:	Value Added Tax
WWII:	World War II

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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN EGYPT SINCE 2013

ÖZET

Nasır döneminden beri Mısır siyasetinde asker güçlü ve etkin aktör olmuştur. 2011 yılında halk ayaklanmasıyla sona eren Mübarek rejiminden sonra Mısır'da demokratikleşme ihtimaline dair umutlar yeşerse de Sisi yönetimine karşı yapılan askeri darbeye asker-sivil ilişkisindeki denge bir kez daha askerler lehine kaymış ve Mısır siyaseti ve ekonomisinde askerlerin başat aktör olmalarını hızlandıran bir süreç yaşanmıştır. Bu makale Temmuz 2013 yılından sonraki süreçte Mısır siyasetindeki asker-sivil ilişkisini analiz etmekte ve askerlerin hem Mısır siyasetinde hem de ekonomisinde elde ettikleri ayrıcalıklı haklarla ne kadar güçlendiklerini anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, anayasanın askerlere tanıdığı haklar, yasama-yürütme-yargı katmanlarında askerlerin edindikleri ayrıcalıklar, askerlerin ekonomik güçleri ve faaliyetleri, medya ve sivil toplum üzerindeki etkileri incelenmiştir. Makale, 2013 yılından itibaren Mısır siyaseti ve ekonomisinde askerlerin ayrıcalıklı konumlarının güçlendiğini savunmakla birlikte, bu sürecin Mısır ordusunun kurumsal ve askeri verimliliğini de azalttığını öne sürmektedir. Teorik açıdan bakıldığında, bu tez Orta Doğu teorileri tarafından önerilen argümanlar ve varsayımlar ile ilgilidir. Özellikle Ortadoğu siyasetinin benzersizliğini ve Arap devletlerinde askeri konumun uzmanlığını dikkate alanları. Tez, eleştirel duruştan hem erken hem de son kuramları tartıştı. Ayrıca, tez, sivil-asker ilişkilerinin tarihsel gelişimini analiz etmiş ve sürekliliği ve değişimleri ortaya koymaya çalışmıştır.

ANAHTAR KELİMELEER: *Mısır, asker-sivil ilişkisi, askeri darbe, El Sisi*

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN EGYPT SINCE 2013

ABSTRACT

The military has been a powerful and active actor in Egyptian politics since Nasser period. By the collapse of the Mubarak regime as a result of the popular demonstrations, hopes for democratization increased; however, the military coup against Morsi administration once again changed the balance between civil and military in favor of the military and led the military to be dominant actor in both Egyptian politics and economics. This article analyzes civil-military relations in Egypt since July 2013 and attempts to understand to what extent the military was empowered by the privileged rights in both politics and economics. Within that framework, given rights and power by the constitution to the military, gained privileged rights at the executive, legislative and judiciary levels, economic power and activities of the military, influence of the military over media and civil society were examined. This article argues that on the one hand military has been certainly consolidating its dominancy in Egyptian politics and economics since 2013, on the other hand strengthening power of the military in politics and economics has been deteriorating institutionalism and efficiency of the Army itself. From the theoretical perspective this thesis relies on the arguments and assumptions proposed by the Middle Eastern theories. Especially the ones that takes into consideration the uniqueness of the Middle Eastern politics and the speciality of the military position in Arab states. The thesis discussed the both the early and recent theorizations from critical stand. Furthermore the thesis analyzed the historical advancement of the civil-military relations and tried to outline the continuity and changes.

KEYWORDS: *Egypt, civil-military relations, military coup, El Sisi*

1. INTRODUCTION: CIVIL-MILITARY IN EGYPT AFTER 2013 COUP D'ÉTAT: FEATURES AND IMPACTS

This Thesis will examine the increased domination of military in Egypt in the period following the coup d'état of July 3rd 2013 until the end of the first term of Egyptian president El Sisi in June 2018. Studying the Egyptian case especially Egypt is one of the most influential players in the Middle East region, and as Egypt was central state in the Arab Spring. As the issue of democratization and change came with great importance after Egyptian revolution during the Arab spring wave, it became more important to closely examine the role of the military as political actor in the Arab Spring countries. The speciality in the Egyptian case was that the military controlled the power to manage the transitional state and after elected president reached power, the military again retook the power. The 2013 coup d'état and the presidency of coup leader Abdel Fatah El Sisi represented new era of military domination of politics in Egypt which grab attention to the continued crisis in civil-military relations and its impact on the Egyptian state and the military itself. The importance of this topic as it links the ongoing civil military relation crisis with its historical roots, because the current pattern of civil-military relations in Egypt cannot be understood without looking to the previous military role in Egyptian politics, which is profound. Moreover this thesis examine an important aspect of the impacts of the political intervention of military which is the impact on the military itself, this includes examining the changes that affects the military organization besides the results of these modifications on the functionality of the military. The thesis is based theoretically on the assumptions of the Middle Eastern theorists and Especially Bishara, and also it relies on Brooks theoretical frame in analysing the impact of military political intervention on the military functionality.

The research question is: What are the impact of military dominance in Egypt in the post 2013 coup period both on the Egyptian politics and also on the military itself?. The assumed hypothesis by this thesis is that: The dominant role of military in post 2013 coup period negatively affects the politics in Egypt on the

levels of constitutional, executive, legislative, judicial, economic, media, civil society and also on the military itself.

The importance of this thesis is that it defines the position of recent civil military relations in Egypt with respect to the past historical positions. Furthermore, it emphasizes the scope and extent of the military intervention in Egyptian politics, and it clarifies the negative impact of unbalanced civil military relations in Egypt both in the political field and on the military.

The field of study is Egyptian Military from the time of the coup d'état of July 3rd 2013 until the end of the first term of Egyptian president El Sisi in June 2018. The primary data sources are official statements and documents, governmental publications, public speeches, media interviews, in addition to other secondary data sources such as books and scholar articles.

The method applied in the research is composed of both qualitative and quantitative methods. The qualitative methods include literature review and content analysis. The quantitative method will include statistics such as the number of military personnel in the policy decision-making process.

The main contribution of the thesis is that it studies the current position of civil military relations in terms of continuity and changes, and this is based on the assumption that the recent patterns of civil military relations in Egypt, despite the emergence of new political realities, still can be understood in the wake of the historical advancement of the military's active and prolonged role in Egypt. The second important contribution of this thesis is that it sheds light on the negative impacts that may arise from the military intervention in politics on the military itself, and this gives the chance to study the reactions inside the military organization, especially on the level of leadership, besides it can be helpful in explaining the functional failure of the military in strategic missions like counterinsurgency as a negative result of the military's increased involvement in politics.

The thesis is composed of four main chapters and a conclusion part. The first chapter is a literature review for the different theoretical perspectives in civil military relations study; it starts by examining the classical theories proposed by Huntington and Janowitz, then the most recent ones like Desch, Feaver, and Schiff, and finishes with examining assumptions related to the Middle East region and

Arab countries and mainly Bishara arguments. Those perspectives will be contrasted with Egyptian case and define what fits and what does not fit into it.

The second chapter is examining the historical advancement of the civil military relations in Egypt since the establishment of the republic till the military coup in July 2013 and focusing on the different trends of civil military relations in Egypt among the successive presidents. This is mainly helpful in understanding the recent trends as linked to the past experiences of military in politics.

The third chapter is anatomical examination of the scope and extent of the military presences after the military coup in July 2013 until the end of the first term of Egyptian president El Sisi in June 2018 from multiple views: constitutional, executive, legislative, judicial, economic, media and civil society. This examination will show the accelerated and excessive enlarged domination of the military in politics

The fourth chapter is concerned to study the dynamics that arise inside the military itself as result of the military involvement in politics, and this covers the time period after the military coup and examines both the effects on the organisational and functional level.

The conclusion part is dedicated to introduce the conclusions derived from the thesis in the wake of the proposed theoretical assumptions and the research questions.

2. CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN MIDDLE EAST: COMPETING THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

This chapter will focus on the different theoretical perspectives that studied civil military relations. In addition, the chapter will be divided into four main parts. In the first part, I will review the early theoretical perspectives on civil military relations; which started after WWII and led by American theorists as Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. The second one will view the recent theories, while the third part will be devoted to the studies, which focused on the Middle East and Arab states as field of analysis. The fourth and last part will be composed of contrasting the previously mentioned perspectives with the Egyptian case, the thesis will examine the validity of the assumptions that had been introduced from a critical stand and try to shed the light on what it assumes as the most important variables during examining civil military relations in Egypt. Moreover, this thesis assumes that these insights from the Egyptian case can hold some valuable contribution to studying similar cases in the Middle East especially the Arab countries.

2.1 Early Theorization On Civil Military Relations

The emergence of the contemporary civil military relations theories can be referred to the beginning of the cold war, and particularly by the US theorists. While the tension between the US and USSR escalated, the fear from more dominance of the military in policy making as a reaction to the external threat was a main concern in US; theorists started to introduce their own perspectives on civil military relations. Samuel Huntington in his book 'The soldier and the state' introduced his theory which was considered as basic work in studying civil military relations and dominated the field for years. Not only building on his theory helped in the development of the recent theories but also modifying and criticizing it helped in the advancement of theorization as well.

Huntington theory is based and centred around an important concept, which is 'professionalism'. Professionalism here is a special type of work that entitles some characteristics, which is not applicable in the other works. The military professionalism is composed of three main sub-concepts: responsibility,

corporateness and expertise. By responsibility, Huntington meant the sentiment of the military concerning its responsibility towards the society it guards. The expertise resembles the military unique expertise as specialized in managing the violence. Corporateness is explained as the structure and its attached values, which holds its uniqueness over other forms of corporations (Huntington, 1957).

Huntington also examines what he called the 'military mind' reaching a conclusion that this mind can be described as conservative realist. Huntington proposes that the professionalism and the ethics arising from the 'conservative realist military mind' are positive contributor to the military efficiency (Huntington, 1957).

Huntington differentiated between two types of civilian control of the military. The first one is the 'Subjective control' which is done by minimizing the military power and maximizing the civilian power, this can done by governmental institution, constitutional form or social class. The second type is the 'Objective control', which is done by maximizing military professionalism, as Huntington describe it by militarizing the military rather than civilizing it. He viewed the approach of subjective control as harmful to the military professionalism and efficiency (Huntington, 1957).

Huntington analyse how the relations between the civilians and military are shaped by examining two levels: power and ideology. The power is resembled in the relative balance of political power between the civils and the military. It can be analysed in two important terms: the authority and the influence. The authority describes the formal direct characteristics, while the influence resembles the indirect ones. Huntington divided the ideologies as anti-military ones as: liberalism, fascism and Marxism, he assumed that those ideologies includes values which negatively affects the professionalism, and assumed that there are pro-military ideologies like conservatism (Huntington, 1957).

By matching the two cases of military political power (low and high)and the two types of military professionalism (low - high) and the type of ideology could produce five possible patterns of civil military relations according to Huntington:

Table 2.1: Huntington Civil-Military relations patters.

Subjective control	Objective control
Anti-military ideology, high military political power and low professionalism	anti-military ideology, low military political power and high professionalism
Anti-military ideology, low military political power and low professionalism	pro-military ideology, high military political power and high professionalism
	pro-military ideology, low military political power and high professionalism

Source: (Huntington, 1957)

In summary, Huntington assumes that the conservative society ideology is the best ideology for military professionalism achievement. In addition, he assumes that the presence of anti-military ideology should require separation of the military institutions from the civilian's to help achieving its professionalism (Huntington, 1957).

Huntington theory and assumptions failed to predict the pattern of civil military relations in the US during cold war. As he assumed that in divided civil liberal society and high, external threat, the objective control is hard to achieve. However, the objective control was a present norm in civil military relations in US during cold war years (Yamaguchi & Welch, 2005).

Morris Janowitz is another theorist who introduced his assumptions in his book 'The Professional Soldier' which contradicts with Huntington. He assumes that the military should follow the values and the ethics of the society and not to be differentiated from it. Janowitz also demanded the military awareness with the international contexts, and emphasized the importance of considering what he called 'political warfare'. The political warfare meant that instead of using the military as hard power tool for real war only; the military also could be used as political force to deter the enemy without using it practically (Yamaguchi & Welch, 2005).

Micheal Desch proposed some modification on Huntington theory by adding the internal threat as variable to improve the predictability power of Huntington's theory. He proposed that when the internal threat is high and the external is low the civilian

control will be weak, and vice versa, then he tested the modified theory over ranges of cases. In the Egyptian case, it can be noticed that the periods of war between Egypt and Israel especially during Nasser were accompanied by high dominations of Egyptian military in the political life. Desch's theory showed low predictability in cases of both low internal and external threats and in case of both high internal and external threats (Yamaguchi & Welch, 2005).

2.2 Recent Theorization Of Civil Military Relations

One of the major critics that faced the early theorization of Huntington and Janowitz that it is constrained by the context of the Cold War and more oriented towards the US case. Due to changes in the international context and emergence of new challenges which faced state and the military like nation building, war on terror, the need for new theoretical perspectives emerged, in this part, two of recent yet important theories on civil military relations will be discussed.

2.2.1 Agency theory

Feaver developed his theory on civil military relation in his book '*Armed Servants*'; based on viewing the relation between the civilians and the military as the relation between master and servant. Here the civilians represent the principals and the military resembles the servants. The civilians possess the supremacy by the democratic theory and the military is subordinate to the civilians (Yamaguchi & Welch, 2005).

Moreover, Feaver assumes two modes of the military behaviour. When the military is obedient and following the civilian's policies this is called 'working', but when the military is not in complete obedience to civilian policies, it is considered 'shirking' (Yamaguchi & Welch, 2005).

Feaver assumption here that the military will try to affect policies whenever it's contraindicated with its preferences. What is ought to be done in these cases ; that the civilians monitor the military and determine any 'shirking' manner and punish it (Yamaguchi & Welch, 2005). This theory focuses on the late periods in US specially Clinton and Bush terms.

2.2.2 Concordance theory

Schiff introduced her theory on civil military relations by concentrating on three main actors in the civil military relation: the military, the political elites and the

citizenry. There are four major issues, which previous three actors need to develop 'concordance' over it. Schiff "proposes that "three partners—the military, the political elites, and the citizenry—should aim for a cooperative relationship" that does not require separation". The previous mentioned view represents contrast with other theories as Huntington which stresses "the physical and ideological separation of political and military institutions". The four issues are the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style (Ari, 2007).

The importance of Schiff's theory lies in focusing on predicting the tendency of domestic intervention of the military depending of reaching or biasing from the concordance state. The other valuable addition is adding the social and cultural dimensions into the theory, as reaching 'concordance' need a dialogue between the different parties. Schiff's theory also doesn't assume specific structural form of the relation between the civilians and the military, as long as the formula reached in a given state suits its cultural and historical conditions (Ari, 2007).

The concordance theory doesn't take into account the type of the political regime i.e. whether it is democratic or not as preliminary condition to reach the state of concordance, as long as the dialogue and accommodation attributes are present and the road is pacified for the concordance. Huntington mainly focused on the US and only viewed two cases of Germany and Japan that may produce less representative model, Schiff examined diverse cases consists of western and non-western countries. Her study examined in addition to US : Israel, Argentina, India and Pakistan. While Huntington's theory application on Israel with high external threat and India with its weak institutions may give wrong predictions, Schiff's theory provides more reliable explanation of the persistence of civilian control in these two cases (Ari, 2007).

Huntington sees the military mind as conservative realist, and the professionalism ethics as prerequisite for military efficiency. When the society ideology is different from military ideology, i.e. the society adopts one of the anti-military ideologies as Huntington describes it, the solution for protecting the military ethics lies in the separation of the institutions between civilians and the military. On the other and Schiff proposes no specific form of the relative relations between the military institution and the civilian ones in a way that guarantees the military more authority over its the military affairs. There can be either separation or elimination of

boundaries between the civil and military institutions or even another form that lies in the range between those two ends. The most important question is which form of relation will be more accepted by the active actors in the civil military relations in the wake of their cultural, social and historical context (Ari, 2007).

So the unique core assumption of Schiff; is the rejection of attributing the civilian control of military or the prevention of military intervention to specific condition or form other than the 'concordance' state as target.

2.3 Civil Military Relations in The Middle East

Civil military relations in the Middle East is considered of high impact on politics in the region, it's closely linked and interrelated with the democratization process. The military coups have been repeatedly present in the Middle East until present, the last one in Egypt represents one of these coups, which is the topic of this thesis, this coup came after just two years of the Egyptian revolution that represents important phase of the Arab spring. Many theorists tried to study the uniqueness of the civil-military relations in Middle Eastern cases to escape from the constraints of the western centric theories.

Bishara states that the problem of civil military relations in the Middle East is historically rooted. The problem lies in the need for state and nation building role of the Arab armies, and the persistence of the military in power without achieving an advancement towards these crucial issue. As Huntington starts his theorization from examining the emergence of modern armies in the west, Bishara examines the emergence of the Arab armies seeing it as an extension of regional organizations of the Ottoman Army, later these armies developed under the foreign occupation. Moreover, the Arab Armies played crucial role during the independence struggle and the establishment of post-independence states (Bishara, 2017).

Besides what have been mentioned before on the historical context constraints on Huntington's theory, Bishara adds and important critique to Huntington core concept the professionalism. Huntington proposed professionalism as positive value, yet Bishara examines the side effects that may arise from the professionalism (Bishara, 2017), for example:

- Obedience even in committing illegal and unethical orders.
- Cover up the committed crimes; driven by the brotherhood linkage.

- Inferior view to the civilian politicians.

Moreover, Bishara stresses that these issues have to be considered even in the western modern militaries, and to propose solutions to the negative effects that arouse even under the most modern armies. The examples of this negative aspect of professionalism could be seen in US army practices in Iraq and Vietnam, Also for Israel, which its army was following the norm of civilian obedience and professionalism when heavily bombing Gaza Strip leading to extremely increased casualties between civilians (Bishara, 2017).

Another critique that Bishara introduce is directed to the idea of the army as modernizing tool. Huntington who considered them sharing the same western protestant values presented this idea. Halpern also proposed that the army in Middle East represents the middle class and that middle class will take the modernization role as happened in Europe (Bishara, 2017). Perlmutter sees that the army in Arab states did not resemble the middle class composition, and it gone towards individualistic role rather than class role (Perlmutter, 1969). Finer mentions the opposite of this assumption, as he sees that the army officer in Egypt was seen as different from the civil middle class, which is the 'Efendi' class (Finer, 1962).

Bishara also proposes some assumptions about civil military relations in the Middle East and especially the Arab states. First, he assumes that in the peasantry societies joining the army looked as an opportunity to advance in the social and economic level. This had started since Nahhas Pasha in Egypt who opened the doors of the military academy for peasant's sons. In addition, this is valid in Syria as Adeeb Sheshekly done the same. The impact here is present as mainly the middle rank officers who executed coups were coming mainly from this class like Nasser and the Syrian officers graduates between 1950-1952 who were active plotters of coups. Bishara considered the emergence of this class of officer and their movements as a result of the political turmoil and social contexts. These officers have shared common characters as being ideologized, affected by the humiliating defeat of 1948 against Israel and most of them later took the state rule (Bishara, 2017).

Brotherhood linkage is a social and psychological variable that emerges between the military personnel, due to the specific nature of the military lifestyle which includes spending long periods in same places as barracks and military bases. Moreover, the threats that face the military develop some sort of unity between the military

personnel. This sentiment is high between the same year mates. We can see this present in the Egyptian case of 1952 coup, Nasser and his near friend Amer were having very near friendship relation and after the coup Amer was appointed as the Egyptian army commander. During the coup plot with its high-risk consequences, the brotherhood and unity related to small numbered and secret types of organizations leads to tightening the ties between the officers. Nevertheless, later when the coup success, the coup leader who was the most risk-taking person becomes the more privileged and the competition between the coup officers begin to escalate and that may end to opposite coup plots (Bishara, 2017). After the 1967 defeat from Israel, Amer refused to pay the bill alone and demanded all responsible figure to be publicly trialed. Later Nasser accused Amer of coup plot, Amer was put under household and died in mysterious conditions. So it can be concluded that this brotherhood linkage is effective when the military as whole is facing a threat or risk, and the linkage may deteriorate when it comes to conflict of personal interests between the military officers on political power.

The ideologies and partisan conflicts of the society is reflected in the army also, in the post-colonial period ideologies like communism, nationalism, Arabism and religious ones as the Muslim brotherhood spread between officers in many Arab countries. Bishara mentions that it was more obvious in Iraq and Syria rather than Egypt, in Egypt Nasser used the communist and Muslim brotherhood officers in the coup and later performed crack down on them both. Bishara stated that the Egyptian officers showed pragmatic not ideological foreign policy with high flexibility (Bishara, 2017).

The role of the foreign powers and its relations with the military coups is of great importance. After the end of World War II and the beginning of the cold war, US viewed the agrarian reforms as hot topic because it feared the extension of the Soviet and Chinese models to the Arab states that were also similarly peasantry societies. Bishara examines the Egyptian case as an example, Roosevelt the CIA delegate to the Middle East performed a tour to Egypt, Syria and Iran, and met with the free officers, and trained fifty officers in Egypt, six of them were part of 1952 coup. Bishara mentions that evidences had been found that US preferred officers rule rather than democracy in Egypt, as it was easier to handle small group of officers rather than diverse democratic state. The US made contradictive alliance like its alliance with Israel and Baghdad pact, which lead to deterioration in its relations with Nasser.

The USSR also later supported Nasser especially militarily in the wake of the cold war, and despite Nasser's crack on communists, Soviets maintained vital relations with his regime (Bishara, 2017).

The last assumption of Bishara is that the military perform a coup to rule by itself, and there are no enough cases where military handed the power to the people again voluntarily. Maybe the clearest exception of this is Siwar Al Zahab coup in Sudan 1985 as he handed the power to civilians again (Bishara, 2017).

Moreover, Bishara differentiate between two types of coups. The first type of coup, which he calls the radical coup, small group of officer, usually middle rank perform a movement against the regime and control the state. The other type of coups is that when the military itself perform a coup against the political process that itself launched it in previous time. The early coups in Egypt, Syria and Iraq resembles the first type. While the Algerian coup in 1992, and 2013 coup in Egypt resembles the second type. Bishara views the rule in Arab states not as military rule but personalistic rule where the military is used for consolidation of the regimes and guarantee of its persistence in the face of oppositions and popular uprisings (Bishara, 2017).

2.4 Civil Military Relations In Egypt: Theoretical Perspective

This thesis proposes that the western civil military relations theories especially the early ones, supposes some sort of separation between the civil and military. What is present in Egypt now is complete dominance of the political life and full occupation of the political sphere by the military. In the second chapter, the thesis will examine this dominance from the establishment of the republic to the coup in July 2013, this thesis argues that the dominant role of military in post 2013 coup period, which reached its peak since Nasser period, negatively affects the politics in Egypt in terms of executive, legislative judiciary and freedom means. How can we measure the level of the military political power?. Despite this thesis do not fully agree with Huntington approach in analysing the patterns of civil military relations, it found that his approach for analysing the relative power of the military is very helpful. The thesis will pick what thought to be the more determinant variables proposed by Huntington to measure influence of the military: the affiliation to the army and its leaders, the economic and human resources and the prestige and popularity of the military (Huntington, 1957).

In the Egyptian army as will be discussed in the second chapter the military established trend of second careers. The second career started with Mubarak as what Bishara describes as historic deal, it was intended to render the military politically sterile. This gave the military wide spread especially in the governors, monitoring authorities as Administrative Monitoring Authority and the security apparatus; like the General Intelligence. This second career resembles what Huntington calls post service affiliation.

The second variable is the economic and human resources that are in the hands of the military. The army in Egypt have the right to open bank account and practice economic activities. The budget of the Egyptian army is considered national secret not to be discussed and no specific estimation on the volume of military share in the Egyptian economy but some reports assumes between 5 – 60% (Hauslohner, 2014). The army consists of nearly 470 thousand soldiers; many of the soldiers may spend his compulsory service in one of the military economic activities that provide the military with extremely cheap labour costing nearly 20 USD monthly as salary for every soldier.

The army in Egypt especially at the beginning of the Arab Spring gained respect of the Egyptian people as it was considered aligned with the revolution against Mubarak. During Mubarak period the military was not under heavy criticism because the National Democratic Party and the ministry of interior were more dominant politically and military role in politics was limited. The military economic activities was of less apparent in 2011 than the corrupt National Democratic Party (NDP), and less brutal than interior ministry and police forces with its bad reputation. Moreover, the Egyptians who benefited from the agrarian reformations implemented by Nasser, and those who witnessed Sadat's 'victory' in 1973 against Israel; that generation hold positive image of the military that was recalled during 2011 revolution days. In the period following Mubarak when the political tension aroused between the political parties and as consequence of economic difficulties associated with 2011 revolution pressed the citizens, some people simply seek more interventive military which was perceived as unified and (theoretically) as an institution represents the Egyptian state. While faction of the people views the competing political groups as self-interests oriented. The previously mentioned factors lies under what Huntington entitles as influence, another higher level of power analysis he proposes is the authority. If the military possess high level of authority, wide scope and greater unity

the more powerful it will be politically (Huntington, 1957). The Egyptian constitution issued after the coup guarantees many privileges to the military that will be discussed in details in the third chapter; but the most important one is that the Minister of Defence cannot be isolated from office till he completes his two terms each one of four years. The National defence council (NDC) became dominated by military.

The professionalism proposed by Huntington could on the contrary be used to explain military intervention in politics. Responsibility of the military towards the state and society have been used to explain the intervention in domestic politics. Justified by the incompetence of the civilian politicians the army makes advantages of the turmoil and control the power. This exactly what happened in 2013 coup, while the political parties didn't settle the norms of dispute resolutions between them, the army moved to oust the elected president and later the coup leader El Sisi become the president. In his extensive dialogues with the US Secretary of Defence, before the coup El Sisi told him that he cannot stand silent in the face of the ongoing political crisis (Hessler, 2017). The corporateness with the obedience value embedded in professionalism, facilitated the army officers and soldiers participation in performing military coup against the freely elected president, and later did not hesitate to open fire and kill pro Morsi protesters which yield just in one occasion nearly eight hundred casualties according to Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch, 2014). These are examples on how the professionalism could hold in itself motives for military intervention in politics.

Agency theory is built on democratic assumption where the military is subordinate to the civilians, due to immature democratic norms in Egypt, the thesis propose that Egyptians viewed its relation with the government with some kind of paternalism; the military gave the peasants the lands which have been taken from the big landowners in Nasser's agrarian reforms. In the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) period after the revolution the patriarchal stand towards the civilians grew even more. Where the SCAF extensively used the its resources including aids to the poor, pacifying roads, housing projects etc. as 'gift to the people', quoting Sayegh words 'They [SCAF] conveniently overlook the fact that the resources used ultimately come from, or should accrue to, the public purse ' and also as '[SCAF] viewing the civils as 'inferior or dependent' (Sayegh, 2012). So the thesis assume that the agency theory is completely irrelevant in the Egyptian case.

Concordance theory is useful in studying the Egyptian case, as it takes into consideration the historical, cultural and social variables. The military as would be discussed in the second chapter forced to control the power after revolution to insure it would keep its privileges in any future political arrangement. The concordance that the military seek; aimed to preserve its position. The four parameters that Schiff assume as matter of concordance may be not fully relevant here. What meant more for the military is: privileged constitutional position, protecting its economic empire and keep superiority in decision making process especially in the military affairs over the civil leaders. For example the post-coup constitution stated that the SCAF headed by the Minister of Defence who is military officer not civilian; in contrast to 2012 constitution where president headed the SCAF. Furthermore, despite the National Defence Council in 2012 constitution gave the military strong representation, 2014 post-coup constitution gave them clear dominance over it (Brooks, 2015). This reflex the dissatisfactions of military with their constitutional position in Morsi period. Moreover, the political elites represented in the presidency and the government, the political parties failed to reach the formula of resolving disputes and setting the rules of the access to power. The shocking part as Bishara describes it; is the promotion and justification of the military intervention in Egypt by the civilian intellectuals who were supposed to adopt liberal and democratic values (Bishara, 2017). One of them is Mohamed El Baradei the Nobel prize awarded who accepted the vice president office but later resigned after Rabia massacre against pro Morsi supporters. While the protests on 30th of July demanded early presidential elections, the elites cheered the coup declaration. Mona Makram Ebid in her lecture in Middle East Institute in US stated that on the morning of 30th of June 2013 she was invited to a meeting for the former minister Al Kafrawy with a group of politicians and were told that the army needs them to write a request for intervention, which was signed by about fifty political figure. She stated that they demanded the army to ‘intervene to prevent civil war in Egypt’ (Middle East Institute , 2013); this represents a clear example of civilians begging the military to take rid of their political opponents. Therefore, we can summarize that the failure to reach concordance on the military role in domestic politics between the civils and the military and division between the civilians themselves led to the exaggeration of military intervention reaching the coup as its peak.

Bishara assumes that the army was a mean for social and economic promotion in peasantry societies, yet he mentions later that this is not valid in the present. This is mainly because there are more prestigious field opened for the low class, and that accessing the army have been limited to selected or at least non-political elements. This complies with the Egyptian case, it is very regular that high school graduates who acquired higher grades to join the faculty of medicine or the faculty of engineering, rather than the military that normally requires low grades and may need special connections to facilitate joining it. As in the meantime, military could afford higher social position and authority, but relatively lower income than other professions especially for low rank officers.

Brotherhood linkage proposed by Bishara is present in a different way in the Egyptian case, the SCAF was composed mostly from one generation in 2011, which is 1973 war generation. El Sisi represents the post war generation. When El Sisi was appointed as Minister of Defence by former president Morsi, some of high rank officers linked to the former army commander Sami Anan stopped from going to their offices and resigned later. Sami Anan declared his candidacy for presidency in 2014 against El Sisi but withdraw later (Abdulla et al, 2014). Moreover, when he declared his candidacy for presidency again in 2018 he was sent to military trial. El Sisi performed major changes in the composition of the SCAF, now there is no member of the SCAF who belongs to 1973 war generation. So what is obvious here is that there is generations competition inside the military itself, El Sisi trust his generation generals, or at least feel more comfortable to work with ranks lower than him or at least equal to him, taking into consideration that he has been promoted from General to Field Marshal after the coup.

The foreign powers especially the regional ones is strongly present in the Egyptian coup, El Sisi coup have been politically supported by the Gulf States: Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. In addition, large funds in form of aids and loans was given to the Egyptian regime. following the coup the Saudi King then Abdullah announced providing of an aid package to help the Egyptians face the economic challenges, with total \$ 5 billion US dollars (masralarabia.com, 2019)., this is because the preliminary stand of these monarchies towards the Arab Spring and the democratic transition. They viewed the Arab Spring as threat to their interests and also feared the extension of the democratic popular demands to their countries. The Europeans tolerated the coup and tried to play meditative role between the Muslim

Brotherhood and the coup leader which didn't work. US did not state that it was a 'coup' as it would have required extreme measures as cutting down the aids from Egypt the important ally in the Middle East, which may have affected the US interests.

As Bishara proposes, the army do not perform a coup to make others rule, that was the case also with 2013 coup, now El Sisi the coup leader is starting his second term after winning elections with a competitor who was former supporter for him. And the more important that El Sisi did not tolerate any competition even from other military candidates as with Sami Anan who has been sent to military trial alleging that he is still in the military service, Also with the former prime minister and former Egyptian Air Force Commander Ahmed Shafiq, who has been departed from Emirates and subjected to house arrest in Egypt before declaring his resignation from the candidacy.

Finer proposes that when both the disposition and the opportunity are present for the military, it will intervene in politics, yet the level of intervention will depend on the political culture in that state (Finer, 1962). In low political culture states, he proposes that:

intervention by pressure and blackmail often occurs; but, in addition, the military are just as likely to come out into the open, overtly overturning governments and installing others (displacement) or even supplanting the civilian régime for good, installing itself in its place. (Finer, 1962)

And this what exactly happened in the recent coup in Egypt, when the military ousted elected president and the military leader came to power as new President. The civil military relations in Egypt is highly constrained by the unchallenged position of the Army as the founder of the republic, and the economic and political interests of the military represents the core issues that hinders the civilian control. Before 2011, the military was subordinate to the present who mainly came from military, now the military represented by El Sisi is dominant in nearly every field in the Egyptian state. El Sisi regime represents mixture of military and personalistic rule. In the third chapter this thesis will examine the role of the military in politics from the level of practice in the post-coup period, testing the validity of my hypothesis on the military dominance of the political sphere in Egypt concerning the following fields: constitutional, executive, legislative, judicial, economic, media and civil society.

3. CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN EGYPT

3.1 Nasser (1952-1970)

On 23rd of July 1952, Small group of middle and junior army officers calling themselves “Free Officers” executed coup against the dynasty and ousted King Farouk I (Dede, 2015). They declared their goals in opposing the foreign corrupt dynasty, ending the British occupation of Suez Canal and promoting the social justice. They viewed the civilian parties as corrupt because there were alliances between some political parties and the King. Although officers promised to implement democracy but the policies they applied were far away from democratization path, and closer to the militarization of the state. Officers also promoted that the required reforms cannot be done under democratic rule and the only capable institution to do these reforms is the army (Marfleet, 2013).

3.1.1: Dominance on State apparatus

From the 1952 coup till death of Nasser military seized power starting by the Revolutionary Command Council RCC which was composed solely of fourteen military officers. Mohammed Naguib the first Egyptian president describe it as follows: we ousted one king and brought thirteen other kings instead (Naguib, 1984). RCC was headed by Mohammed Naguib until he was put under house arrest in November 1954 over conflict on the democratization with Nasser. Nasser seized power in 1956 in popular referendum by 99.99% as president officially until his death in 1970. During this period all Prime ministers was from military. Nine out of twenty-two deputy PM came from military. In 1960, ten out of twenty-one Governors were from military and eight were from police officers. Between 1953 and 1970, 46% of ministries came from military background 99% of them were from free officers. The officers were dominating the ministries. While the average term for the civilian ministers was about three years, the average term for a minister coming from military background was approximately four and half years. Even in the ministry of foreign affairs in 1962, 72 out of 100 top position in the ministry were officers, all Egyptian ambassadors in Europe were former officers except three only.

According to some studies, number of officers between 1952 and 1964 ranged from 1000 officer to 1500 officer in top non-military positions (Nassif, 2013). While in positions lower than deputy minister in 1962, 3714 out of 5766 were of officers (Adallah, 1991).

3.1.2 : Elimination of civilian political powers

The military dominated the state during those years and marginalized the civilians in the different fields. The first decisions taken by RCC is to dissolve the parliament and abandon the parties and to freeze the constitution (Dede, 2015), the military viewed the political parties as corrupt and had interests and links with the abolished dynasty. With exception of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) that were kept by Free Officers to afford the popular support to the new elites I.e. the military (Naguib, 1984), MB were also supportive in the movement against the dynasty by participations of its members in the army in free officers movement and on the streets by mobilising its members.

The RCC showed no mercy towards any civilian protests from the first day they reached power. In 12 August group of workers made a peaceful strike against the management of the factory. Clashes arose between the workers and the army who intervened to end the protest (Marfleet, 2013). In just four days trial in front of military court; two workers were sent to death and after one month the execution was done. Those workers were viewed as part of communist movement.

Later RCC performed a crackdown on the brotherhood the only allowed political power in Egypt, the crack down came on three different occasions, first after the Mohammed Naguib ousting attempt when MB was targeted by RCC in January 1954 after being accused with connection to the Britains, and 450 member were arrested. When MB supported Mohamed Naguib during his ousting attempt in March 1954 by mobilising its member to the streets during and when Naguib returned to presidency. Even Naguib invited MB Guide deputy to stand beside him on the stage during popular demonstration. Few days later, the RCC performed a crackdown by arresting 118 member alleging that they were using the conflict between Naguib and RCC to start a counter-revolution (Naguib, 1984). They were released after short time but the two mentioned cases are emphasizing how the military received the demonstrations with high sensitivity

the second after alleged assassination trial to Nasser during public speech 1954 (Naguib, 1984), and the last one was directed towards Sayyed Qutb organization in 1965 (Marfleet, 2013). In 1954 military courts were used actively and named as the “people court” and was composed of three members of the RCC: Gamal Salem, Anwar El Sadat and Husain El Shafey. This Court decision were not subjected to any subsequent degree of retrial and had to issue its decisions in 48 hour according to its law, it was established specially for the trial of Qutb's Organisation and the result was the execution of six of MB members. Those campaigns lead to weakening the MB political power and its active members had two choices either to be jailed or to leave the country.

3.1.3: Military political organizations

When the RCC evacuated the political field after the crack down on the Muslim brotherhood and communists, It planned to establish its own organization to work as civilian support. First, they established the Liberation Rally, which become the only political entity in Egypt. It was Nasser’s idea and he justified its establishment by his doubts that old parties will never be independent, and have links with the king regime (Marfleet, 2013). Then Nasser established the National Union, which later transformed to the Arab Social Union (ASU). Concerning the Liberation rally, the high committee were composed of eight members who were completely from the free officers (Abdallah, 1991). For the ASU it was composed Organisationally of five main categories: workers, peasants, intellectuals, bourgeoisie and officers. the officers acquired larger representation over the other four categories especially in top levels in ASU (Dede, 2015). The civilians had no access to the top positions in the organization except by the officers and their close circle, for example: the general assembly was composed of 75% officers in 1962, 61.9 % in 1964, 56.3 % in 1965, 53.3 in 1967 and 42.9 in 1970 (Abdallah, 1991). The lower levels of the organization were highly attractive to civilians, not driven by ideological thoughts but rather looking for connection to acquire privileges such as job in the government and other prestigious benefits (Dede, 2015).

3.1.4: Impacts on the military

3.1.4.1 Military competence

This thesis shed a light also on the negative aspects of the military involvement in politics on the military itself. As officers realized that the biggest threat is their mates

in the army, they started to give them social and financial privileges to suppress any motives for counter coup. These privileges included appointment in the new republic bureaucratic positions as mentioned before with higher salaries. Loyalty over competence was the concept of appointment and important criteria for promotion to higher position. Officers were highly involved into economic activities as described by Soviet analysts who described Egyptian officer as businessmen; Soviet consultants were the technical supporters of Egypt army during those years (Marfleet, 2013). Abd Al Hakim Amer who was close friend of Nasser was promoted from Sergeant to General and headed the army (Naguib, 1984). In 1954, RCC ousted 450 military officers because they were viewed as politically untrusted. Nasser decided to send troops to help republicans against the kingdom in the civil war in Yemen. Low experienced officers lost 40,000 soldier in the Yemeni war as result of pan Arabism ideology adopted by Nasser and his regional ambitious (Marfleet, 2013). This pattern continued even in the hardest times after the humiliating defeat in war against Israel and occupation of Sinai Peninsula in 1967. The Egyptian air forces were totally destructed, Nasser ordered Abu El Ezz the Air force commander to dismiss ten pilots on alleged ties with Muslim Brotherhood. This step came while he was suffering from deep shortage in trained pilots (Nassif, 2013). These emphasizes the disastrous impacts of the military involvement not only on political life, and on the Egyptian democracy but also on the military itself. Another important aspect, which requires more attention, is the dynamics inside the army and its impact on the civil military relations. Cause as the army become politicalized the more the loyalty and trust become determinant of promotions and appointments over professional competence.

3.1.4.2 Conflicts over political powers

Amer who was Nasser's near man was appointed as the general commander of the army by pressures from Nasser (Naguib, 1984). Amer used his authority to appoint and promote officers to give privileges to his supporters, which gave him strong power in relative to Nasser inside the military. Nasser was more involved in internal affairs from the new project of Alsad Al Ali (High Dam), nationalization of the Suez Canal, Agrarian reforms. Internationally Nasser worked for implementing the pan Arabism as in the step of unity with Syria, war in Yemen, supporting newly independent states and the formation of non-alienation movement. Nasser tried to regain his power of appointment and promotion to get dominance over the army

again, yet the suggested reforms-initiated conflict between Nasser and Amer, as result of that Amer issued a letter in the newspapers demanding more democracy. The two men reached compromise, which guaranteed Amer's continuing his promotion and appointment authority inside the military. Upon the disastrous defeat in 1967 against Israel, Nasser resigned from presidency and returned after demonstrations, which was alleged to be fabricated movement by the regime itself. Nasser ordered Amer to resign from the Army and to be appointed as President Deputy. Amer refused the offer and after escalating tension Amer was put under house arrest, and two days later it was announced that he had suicided (Brooks, 2015), still his son accuses the regime and Nasser personally of his father's death.

3.1.5 Opposition to military control

One of the important aspects of civil military relations in that period is the democratization attempts supported by some sectors in the military itself. Naguib was the prominent name of that trials. When he resigned in March 1954 refusing his limited authorities and corruption inside RCC, knight's forces officers held a protest in their barracks and demanded Naguib return to presidency and democracy. Naguib returned to presidency under popular pressure and protests. In 25 March 1954, RCC issued decision allowing establishment of political parties and promised that RCC won't establish its own party and will be dissolved in 24 July 1954. Naguib according to his view was passionate about these steps, which have been suggested by the RCC members who were always confronting democratic steps. Later he described these steps as trap. RCC mobilised liberation rally members, transport workers and National Guard soldiers in civil outfit to the streets (Naguib, 1984). Ironically, the protesters yelled 'down the democracy' (Documentary: Egypt's modern pharaohs, Nasser, 2016). Syndicates announced their refusal return of parties and demanded RCC to continue. The military intelligence head Abdelrahman Farid confesses that officers were the initiators of these protests (Documentary: Egypt's modern pharaohs, Nasser, 2016). Soon the democratization plans were cancelled; Naguib was practically out of power and in November was under house arrest till Sadat released him later during his presidency.

After 1967 defeat against Israel the depression and anger were dominating the society. The idea promoted that the army can work as the driving force against colonial powers and the developmental driving force. These ideas which was

promoted to give legitimacy for the military society as Anwar Abde El Malak called it; came to an end with the military defeat and though big questions were raised (Marfleet, 2013). In 1968, protests sparked in the wake of the war defeat and the light sentences against air force commanders and demands for democracy started to gain momentum in Egypt. The main forces were the workers and the students, despite the demands gain no tangible change in the society except formal statement from Nasser promising for reforms, Nasser statement was put into referendum and acquired unbelievable percentage in the referendum by 99,99% Yes vote. Nasser announced the end of intelligence state rule, but what Nasser actually did was substituting old organization with more internally oriented one. For dealing with protests and popular uprisings control, he established the Central Security Forces and controlled what represented the economic power of Amer as the head of high council of general organizations that was controlling of 367 state company to the ASU. Nasser also regained his appointment and promotion power for higher levels in military. The military officers in Government ministries represented 21% in 1970 (Bisharah, 2017). the dynamics inside the army and in the society during Nasser period have had great impact on his successor Sadat both in military and in politics.

3.2 Sadat (1970-1981)

Events in the late years of Nasser period strongly shaped the era of his successor Mohamed Anwar El Sadat. The sudden death of Nasser in 1970 represented shock in Egypt, the vice president Anwar Al Sadat had been appointed as the president of Egypt after discussions in ASU followed by popular referendum. Sadat was primarily perceived as weak and passive. Sadat escaped the tremendous changes and conflicts between Nasser and RCC members and gained Nasser trust to be his deputy. It was not expected that Sadat will survive in position for long time, Ali Sabri the head of ASU and the strong man was expected to succeed Nasser (Dede, 2015). Sadat realized the danger and started a crackdown on what he called “power centres” and later he called his actions against Nasser men the “correction revolution”.

3.2.1 Sadat’s approach to control the army

On 15 May 1971, Mohamed Sadek army Chief of Staff refused to execute higher order from Mohammed Fawzi the General Commander of army to move his troops and execute plan initially intended to secure the capital Cairo. Sadek who was loyal

to Sadat realized that the step is part of military coup by Sadat opponents (Bisharah, 2017). Sadat realized the importance of controlling the promotion and appointment authority in the army to survive in presidency, Sadat implemented defined approaches to maintain his control over army. First, he used the power of appointment and promotion to purge disloyal elements inside the army, using Amer men who were marginalized after Amer death to stand in the face of Nasser's men. Also he used second level officers who were more professional and unsatisfied by the relations between the higher order officers and the Soviet consultants. Fawzi was known for his close ties and involvement in the weapons deals with the Soviets. The occupied territories and the shades of 1967 defeat raised motives inside the lower levels of officers to support Sadat actions inside the army (Nassif, 2013). Sadat continues changes in army was markedly obvious, only during his eleven years of rule; six different General commanders of army were appointed. In addition, Sadat period witnessed mysterious death of General Ahmed Badawi and group of high order officers in Helicopter crash, months later the helicopter pilot who survived the crash was found killed shot in his house. Sadat decided to have an office in the army staff headquarter and announced himself as the General Commander of the army. Saad Eldin Shazly then Chief of Staff considered this step as coup against the constitution which only gives Sadat an honourable position as the Supreme Commander of the army with no much executorial powers (Bisharah, 2017). Sadat intervention in the military affairs was a matter of critics especially his intervention during the limited war against Israel.

It's thought that Sadat was in need for the army to achieve legitimacy, Nasser was coup leader and was received as national hero who stood against the imperial and colonial powers. The national projects as Aswan Dam and nationalization of Suez Canal, agrarian reforms gave Nasser popularity among Egyptians. Sadat view was that the suitable national achievement that would afford him legitimacy would be the liberation of Sinai occupied territory. He didn't embrace pan-Arabism as his predecessor and had seen the solution lies in negotiations with Israelis following limited war. As Sadat wanted to be perceived as the sole hero he dismissed Soviet experts who were around 17,000 with no much additive value, also he dismissed leaders of the army who participated in planning for the war. Although the war didn't marked complete victory over Israel but the Egyptian army was on the eastern shore of Suez Canal. Sadat promoted himself as hero of Suez Canal and sooner hero of war

and peace (Dede, 2015). Later in the years followed the war; Sadat evacuated the military from all leaders who were part of the military leadership during the war; this was strongly clear in the changes followed signing the Camp David treaty between Egypt and Israel (Bisharah, 2017).

3.2.2 Army roles in civil politics

Sadat era was marked by relatively more political freedom, as he implemented multiparty system, and decreased relatively the numerical presence of military in government (still high 13%) (Springborg 1987), but the remarkable change is that nearly one third of those ministers coming from military were from those who acquired additional technical education other than their military knowledge. In the last cabinet of Sadat only two ministries were assigned to ex-military officers; the ministry of defence and foreign affairs. Sadat also minimized the military local governors, in 1980 only one fifth of governors were from military background. Sadat presidency marked the decrease in the military officers in the government in comparison with Nasser's period, yet this does not necessarily reflect decreased militarization of the state; for two main reasons: First, the years after 1967 defeat against Israel witnessed also lowering of military percentages as a reaction to popular pressure so this maybe extension of trend started in late Nasser years. Secondly, Sadat demilitarization was, as symptom of his crackdown on Nasser's remaining different interest groups and the army was active field for them. Sadat abolished the ASU and instead he established the National Democratic Party (NDP) the authoritarian party that was headed by Sadat himself and would dominate the political life for more than 30 years. He appointed Mohamed Hosni Mubarak who was the Air Forces Commander as his deputy. Sadat announced that the ruling legitimacy is the constitutional legitimacy not the revolutionary legitimacy in speech in the parliament. He stand in front of television cameras and burnt what was sought to be reports of tapped calls between the citizens. Sadat implemented multi party system in 1976, which doesn't made real impact on democracy as his party NDP stayed the dominant through corrupted elections. Sadat give more political freedom for the Muslim brotherhood and released them from jails. That was necessary for Sadat to oppose the communists and Nasserist elements especially in the universities (Dede, 2015).

3.2.2.1 Army's economic role

Economically Sadat adapted openness policy 'Infitah' which was shift from the statist policy of Nasser. Sadat openness opened the gates for the return of bourgeoisie 'together with a new generation of aggressive import–export merchants, commission agents and speculators'. The new economic opportunities associated with this policy represented chance for the military elites also to take their share of the cake . While the economic privileges of the army was already shaped in an organized patterns, yet Sadat years marked the emergence of historic deal, which allowed the military to participate actively in economy, not just as individual but as a corp. Army has its own companies and projects which used the soldiers who were normally spending their military service terms as manpower, besides military activities were not overseen by any institution in the state even the parliament. During the years of war with Israel military budget increased by 300% from 1952 until 1967 (Marfleet, 2013). After Sadat signed Camp David peace agreement with Israel Egypt regained its occupied territories, the Egyptian army started to receive annual military aids from US. The military faced new situation where the external threat situation that was used as justification to involve in politics was no longer convincing, So the military titled its new role as the role of army in peace which was promoted to be the contribution to the development especially economically. Sadat established the National Service Projects Organization (NSPO), which was intended to institutionalize the economic rule of the military. NSPO was part of ministry of defence, the establishing decree states clearly that it is able to do projects without applying the normal governmental rules, this exceptional position means that the military could easily escape any bureaucratic obstacles that may hinder its projects. For the first time also the law gave the ministry of defence the right to open bank account which is overseen and monitored by the defence minister . This law was issued in 1979 and represents the frame of the deal that were made between the military and the presidency, which continued also during Mubarak years. The deal represented in allowing the military economic activity, letting the political field free for the president. The last defence minister in Sadat period was Abu Ghazala, he had worked as the Military Attache of the Egyptian embassy in Washington. The man possessed economic expanding mentality and brought to focus the military new 'developmental' economic role. The Egyptian military adhered to peace agreement with Israel and furthermore it adapted Sadat ideas that Egyptian army paid enough

for the Arab-Israeli conflict and have to be more reluctant towards any involvement in conflicts.

3.2.2.2 Army repressive role

During 'Infitah' policy of Sadat, the IMF required Egypt to stop subsidizing some of the commodities including some basic ones as bread. The reaction of the Egyptian people was to go over the streets in protests and the situation progressed into violence and clashes. The police and the Central Security Forces, which was initially established to control popular movement, failed to gain control over the spreading protest. Sadat ordered the army to move and the results was deadly. The army succeeded in ending the uprising that was called 'bread uprising', Sadat cancelled his decision (Marfleet, 2013). However, these events gives as two important indicators, first whenever it was necessary for the army to protect the regime from a popular movement the army choose the regime side; secondly, this was merely because the military perceived the continuity of the regime as the grant for continuity of its own privileges in the state.. It draw the lines for the economic role of the military that will continue to affect the civil military relationship for decades and rather will guide its actions towards political changes.

3.3 Mubarak (1981-2011)

On the 6th of October 1981, Sadat was celebrating the 8th anniversary of 1973 'victory' over Israel, while the vice president Mohammed Hosni Mubarak and Defence Minister Abdelhaleem Abu Ghazala were sitting beside him. Group of Islamist soldiers assassinated Sadat in front of television cameras. Mubarak became the fourth president of Egypt; the man who was lacking charismatic appearance and influential speech abilities was previously the Commander of the Air Forces during 1973 war. He started his era with a discourse concentrating on the stability and development (Springborg 1987), He showed high commitment to Camp David accords with Israel and developed high level of normalization of relations. Moreover, he turned his face to deal with the growing islamist groups inside Egypt ranging from peaceful movements as Muslim Brotherhood to the violent ones as 'Al Jihad' and 'Al Jama'ah Al Isamiyah'.

3.3.1 Mubarak-Abu Ghazala cold war

Mubarak early years witnessed silent but strong tension between Mubarak and his minister of defence Abu Ghazala. The later possessed charismatic character and strong presence in the media and more importantly powerful connections with the United States where he previously worked as military Attache in the Egyptian embassy. In June 1986 Abu Ghazala was welcomed in the US not only by the defence minister but also the foreign affairs minister, national security advisor and Bush the vice president. During that year Abu Ghazala visited the US twice, not only discussing the military debt of Egypt but also economic reform issues related with IMF negotiations with the Egyptian government. On his return, Abu Ghazala was welcomed in the airport by the whole cabinet (Springborg 1987). These visits raised concerns about the enlarged role of the defence minister above Mubarak authority himself, especially when Mubarak planned visit to US was delayed. The Military needed economic expansion to handle the high number of officers which became less necessary and to create extra incentives to join military as its wages in comparison to private sector. Mubarak faced a strike in four military bases from air defence technicians as reaction to changing promotion systems, strikes forced Mubarak to cancel his decision (Bisharah, 2017).

Abu Ghazala was member of the National Democratic Party political committee, this position clarify the degree of the military presence of the Egyptian politics. Not only Mubarak who was the head of the NDP but his defence ministry was not only member in his political party but also member of its political committee. Abu Ghazala headed group of ministers inside the government that was called the policies ministerial committee and called later as the higher strategic committee. This committee eased the coordination of military economic activities within the government. Abu Ghazala appeared on newspapers more than the prime minister himself did. It was also normal to see Abu Ghazala attending projects launching ceremonies followed by other civilian ministers. Mubarak tried to get control over the military during Abu Ghazala years. First, through appointment and promotion power, but Abu Ghazala preserved the right to assign the head of staff, which was normally the candidate to succeed the defense minister. Mubarak used the carrot strategy by offering Abu Ghazala the vice president position, but Abu Ghazala refused it specially when the US embassy declared that it prefers Ghazala persistence as defence minister (Springborg 1987). Finally Mubarak get rid from Abu Ghazala when Abu Ghazala relations with US was deteriorated after alleged trial to develop

rockets with Iraq which required illegal export of rocket parts from US without pentagon permission, it was claimed that Abu Ghazala involved in those activities (Bisharah, 2017).

3.3.2 Army's repressive role

The enlarged role of defence minister was augmented especially after the Central Security Forces failed in containing uprising events in 1986. When the soldiers originally holding lower educational level protested upon rumors about expanding the service terms from two to three years. These forces were under the minister of Interior and he failed to contain the protests but the army intervened and killed around 100. Mubarak had no solution but calling the army to intervene. Ahmed Roshdy the Minister of Interior was removed and gave the chance for Abu Ghazala for more dominance in the cabinet over the rest of civilian ministers (Springborg 1987). This also represents continuation of the role of the military of helping the ruling authority in containing protests whenever it emerged. Another important example was Kafr Dawar workers protests, which lasted for three days, when the army finally intervened and crushed the protesters (Marfleet, 2013).

3.3.3 Army's economic role

Abu Ghazala intended to afford military officers with wide range of privileges to gain popularity inside the army and to manage the officers who no longer involved in conflict with Israel. In 1985 and 1986, 5% of the total real estate projects in Egypt was built for officers, these projects were financed by selling lands were previously assigned for military to establish military barracks. Officers also enjoyed discounts on the primary goods through markets established by the army and dedicated to serve officers and their families (Springborg 1987).

On the top level of the military, the commissions from weapon deals was chance for an extra income. As Egypt received annual military aids from US by 1.3 billion dollar, these aids are dedicated to buy weapons from the US. Egypt has the right to decide which weapons and from which company it would buy its needs, this opened the gate for commissions, it was said that even Abu Ghazala and Mubarak were involved in these businesses (Nassif, 2013). Another source of income of the military was the exports of weapons especially to Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war (Springborg 1987).

The military not only gained profits from military related economy but also from non-military activities. In 1985 and 1986 the non-military food production was estimated by 18% of the total production of Egypt. These activities were justified as mean to achieve self-sufficiency of the army needs. Other justifications were introduced as raising the abilities of the soldiers to help them when they finish their military service term, practically these were so far from truth as the technologies needed for production was not available for individuals. It is important to mention that the military gains subsidized energy and low cost workforce, which gave him competitive advantage over the private sector. The later problem was partially compromised as the army awarded the private sector companies by contracts related to non-military projects, these companies in return assigned some officers in high positions to facilitate its win bid contracts later (Springborg 1987).

During Abu Ghazala days, he aimed to get popularity among the people and to justify the ongoing and increased economic activity by using the discourse of developmental role of army in peace periods. Also at times of crisis the army appeared as hero as in the case of pollution crisis on the northern shores, when Abu Ghazala stated that army teams will clean it, also when the discussion about healthcare arose he stated that the military will help those who are in need of treatment abroad on the army expenses (Springborg 1987). This discourse emphasizes what Robert Springborg describes as obviously patron-client discourse.

3.3.4 The historic deal

Hereafter starts new era of military role in Egypt, what Bishara titles it as the historic deal. According to this deal the defence minister become the dominant inside the army and the army become a political entity that always seek its economic activities and post retirement assignment in civilian positions within the government. In return for that, the president Mubarak holds the total authority in ruling the state and politics (Bisharah, 2017). Yusuf Sabri Abou Taleb succeeded Abu Ghazala and after about year later Mohamed Tantawi was appointed to hold the position for more than twenty years. This period is considered the longest term ever in the history of modern Egypt. According to Sayegh this reflects not the professional competence of Tantawi and his officers but the proven complete loyalty to Mubarak's regime. Even when Tantawi and his officers reached the retirement age; Mubarak used his authority to keep them in their positions. This reflects Mubarak deep trust that the army won't

take any action against his authority unlike his predecessor Sadat who used continuously shuffling army to remove the danger of emergence of any rivals in the military that may threaten his power (Sayegh, 2013).

Sayegh and Nassif argument about the second career of the military officers represents an important aspect of the compromise between Mubarak and the officers. According to this deal only the officers who proved to be loyal and trustworthy were granted post retirement position with high salary compared to that of the military. During Mubarak presidency 63 of 156 of Governors came from military, four out of seven heads of National Guard were appointed as governors. Eleven out of twenty one of the second and third field army commanders were also appointed as governors. Not only in the top levels but also in the lower levels as boroughs heads, for example in 2011 fourteen out of twenty-five boroughs heads in Cairo the capital were from military officers, it is estimated that near 2000 officers were in the civilian governance body. That was always justified that this is because of the accumulated experience that military personnel acquire while in position. Although the post-retirement careers reflected some sort of specialization as navy forces and air forces who were appointed in positions in the Suez Canal or the National Navigation Company and the seaports and Airports. Nevertheless, this is considered not more than claims and actually the military officers were appointed in places has no relation with their technical expertise like Egyptian authority for Antiquities where 88 general held positions within (Nassif, 2013).

Defined bodies like the Administrative Monitoring Authority became an important entity that provided second career opportunities for the officers. The Cabinet regularly received lists from this authority and from the army that contains officers about to reach retirement age as candidates for vacancies in government. The second career may start while the officers still in duty as officers have been mandated to organizations connected to the ministries of defence or military production or as military attaché in embassies and consulates abroad. Another opportunity is the post retirement appointment as consultants in ministries or corps providing services for the government (Sayegh, 2013).

Another important aspect is the military economic activities, which continued and deepened in more effective manner following the road that Abu Ghazala draw it. The economic empire of the Egyptian military is composed of four main pillars: the

defense industry in the form of the Ministry of Military Production which 40% of its products in non military production (Nassif, 2013); Arab Organization for Industrialization which 70% of its production is also non military (Nassif, 2013); the Ministry of Defense's National Service Project Organization; and the military owned enterprises (Sayegh, 2013).

Mubarak followed more open policies in the economy, especially the privatization program – selling the public companies to private sector- which gave multiple opportunities for the military to involve in economic activities side by side with the private sector. This also gave the officers the motive to involve in economic as they were using their networks in different places in the government to facilitate their business over the other competitors (Sayegh, 2013). During the privatization process there were many cases that was related to selling state owned lands with prices lower than its real value that caused loss to the national treasure (Nassif, 2013).

Another more explicit form is the direct cash allowance to the high order officers, these are part from the military budget which is not overseen by any entity other than the president, it is titled as “loyalty allowance” which gives us a hint about the base of its giving, and it's said that even members of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) members received part of this allowances (Nassif, 2013).

During the thirty years of Mubarak presidency no political party other than NDP which was headed by Mubarak himself controlled the majority in parliament, mainly due to fraud unfree elections, “state of emergency” was active where the use of extraordinary measures allowing to detain citizens for unlimited time without trial was enabled . The police state enlarged and specially the “State Security” apparatus which operates under the minister of interior affairs, gain domination over the political parties and activists. The Muslim brotherhood were allowed to move marginally in the society but not in politics.

The privatization lead to emergence of new elites in Egypt composed of businesspersons who were also active in politics like the members of NDP (Marfleet, 2013). Perhaps the most powerful figure was Ahmed Ezz who was close friend to Gamal Mubarak the older son of Mubarak who were prepared to inherit the presidency. Those elites were representing the alliance between the money and the power, which had destructive impact on the politics especially in the absence of real legislative monitoring parliament. These situation collectively led to accumulated

refusal of the regime which erupted once the security powers failed to contain the popular movement any more during January 2011 revolution.

3.4 SCAF (February 2011-June 2012)

When the uprising of 25th of January 2011 sparked, it was a wave of protests that was inspired by the Tunisian revolution that ousted president Bin Ali. On 28th of January the Anger Day, the protesters defeated the police forces, and by the end of the day the army mobilized its forces and tanks into the streets. The army seized Tahrir square where major protests were organized during the uprising. When the army tried to enter the Tahrir square protesters laid in front of tanks, the army showed no intent to clash with the people. On the other hand, on 2nd of February the armed forces surrounding the square tolerated to open the road for pro Mubarak riots who moved as demonstration riding camels and horses towards the square, which led to violent clashes ended with successful opposition of revolutionaries against Mubarak supporters. The army actions during the eighteen days of the revolution can be interpreted as follow: first as always army was perceived as the guardian of the state from the popular movement; it stepped to recall its duty, and to fill the vacancy of the crashed police forces. Police was enlarged markedly and popularly hated under Mubarak role. Secondly, when they had doubts concerning the fate of the movements; they decided to take position, which will preserve its legitimacy for both the Mubarak and the protesters. That was because it needed to guarantee a place for itself in the transitional period mainly to preserve its own privileges.

On 11th of February, Mubarak handed the power to the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) headed by his Defence Minister Tantawi. The SCAF policy proved that it was concentrating on maintaining the military position in any new order that may arise, more precisely it seek to grant this position by constitutional power and in some times by supra constitutional decrees (Sayegh, 2013). It's also thought that SCAF find it an opportunity to remove Mubarak with his NDP enlarged businessmen that acquired more power over the military regarding economical activities (Ustun, 2014) , and also to get rid of Gamal who was prepared to inherit his father rule. First, SCAF dissolved the parliament and froze the constitution, then unilaterally formed constitutional committee to formulate the amendment that will constitute political roadmap to follow. The approved amendment opened the road for the Muslim brotherhood to gain majority in the two legislative chambers Sha'ab

(People) Council, and Shura Council. The SCAF primary showed no tendency to change the executive with more revolutionary faces, it kept Shafik who was appointed as prime minister by Mubarak during the protests, it kept the important ministries like defence, justice, interior and foreign affairs untouched while gave less important ministries like tourism to opposition parties and appointed new deputy prime minister. Later SCAF brought Esam Sharaf the transportation minister who was counted as revolutionary face as prime minister after massive protests from protesters (Ustun, 2014). In November 2011 Selmi who was deputy prime minister introduced his document which suggested giving the SCAF wide authorities over the matters related to the armed forces and after protests and deadly clashes was known as Mohamed Mahmud events, this document was drawn from discussions (Brooks, 2015). After these protests, the SCAF brought forward the defined date for presidential elections to June 2012 after it was initially planned to be in June 2013.

The SCAF also showed intentions to protect its officers from any future trial, when Tantawi issued decree that prohibits the trial of any military person whether in duty or retired from standing in front of any civilian courts in cases related to illegal profiting (Sayegh, 2013). The SCAF used popular demands to put Mubarak regime men on trial to get rid of its rivals and evacuate the political arena (Ustun, 2014). The SCAF first declared that the it won't last in power more than six month, yet it took 17 months to handle the power to new president. 19th of March referendum stated that the constitution assembly (CA) which will write the draft for the new constitution will be elected by the elected members of parliament two chamber. The first CA was dissolved as non-Islamic members withdrew and later by Supreme constitutional court decision. In April 2012, SCAF announced its desire to delay presidential elections till the constitution is finished. Here the SCAF wanted to grant its privileges to remain untouched and constrain the authorities of the newly elected president especially these related to the army (Brooks, 2015). Later in June 2012, another CA was formed after extensive negotiations between the political parties, yet it witnessed new withdrawals claiming the dominance of Islamic members. Parallel to that was the battle for the presidential elections, SCAF opened the gate for candidacy in February 2012 and on 15 April, it excluded ten candidates, the most important name was Khairat El Shater the deputy supreme guide of Muslim Brotherhood. On June 2012, On the eve of the second round of the presidential

elections SCAF issued the most shocking constitutional declaration that stated the follow:

- SCAF decides on “all issues” related to the armed forces.
- President can only declare war with SCAF approval.
- SCAF assumes all legislative powers until new parliament is elected.
- If Constituent Assembly (CA) encounters “an obstacle,” SCAF will form a new CA.
- If the SCAF, Judiciary, Prime Minister, or the President dispute an article in the proposed constitution, and are unable to resolve the disagreement, the matter is referred to the Supreme Constitutional Court to decide the outcome. (Brooks, 2015)

This step represented the last and clearer movement from SCAF to announce that it will not allow any coming president to touch its unquestioned authority. The Supreme constitutional court declared that the law of parliament elections was unconstitutional and the parliament has to be dissolved, the judges who issued this decision were appointed by Mubarak. When Morsi won the election, he was nearly without any authority over the military and without any constitutional institution like parliament where his party had held majority before its dissolution. Also the SCAF revived what was called National Security Council with majority of military officers 10-12 of 16 or 17 and then NSC even was headed by the president but practically was under military control (Brooks, 2015).

It is important to mention that the SCAF continued to concentrate its previous power in appointing more military governors as in August 2012 appointments. The military trials mainly against activists during the January uprising are estimated by 12000 citizen (Ustun, 2014). Deadly interventions against protester like in Mohamed Mahmoud, Prime Ministry events, also on Coptic activists(Masbero events) and on the popular islamic presidential excluded candidate Hazim Salah supporters (Abbasiyah events) led to tens of Casualties. Amnesty stated that ‘one repressive rule has simply been replaced with another’ .This aggressive behaviour against popular movements emphasizes that army decision to ease ousting of Mubarak was not because he wanted to represent people's interest, rather because it afforded more

power and eliminated rivals as Mubarak son, NDP powerful businessmen and ministry of interior.

3.5 Morsi (June 2012-3rd July 2013)

Morsi term began with huge challenges and nearly with very limited control over the military. Morsi tried to override the Supreme Constitutional court (SCC) and bring the parliament again but again the SCC declared that that Morsi decision is unconstitutional, that was Morsi's first failures. The most important events came in August 2012 when sixteen soldiers were killed near borders with Palestine. First, Morsi dismissed military intelligence head and some high interior ministry orders, later he dismissed the defence minister Tantawi, his Chief of Staff Sami Anan and cancelled 17th of June declaration which limited his authority over the military. The youngest SCAF members Abdelfatah El Sisi was appointed as defence minister (Brooks, 2015). Here it is difficult to explain why the military stood silent towards this vigorous shuffles, yet it can be explained as Elsis could have convinced Morsi about his loyalty especially as he was the communication officer with Muslim Brotherhood. What proves this confidence in El Sisi that Khairat Elshater described him as very religious man. On the other hand it seems that this was chance for El Sisi to skip the older generation and that was later clear in shuffles inside the SCAF and defence ministry, where general's near to Tantawi and Anan either resigned or stopped from going to their offices, which appears as silent protests against the shuffles. Morsi faced political opposition when he issued constitutional declaration that immunises constitutional assembly (CA) from any judicial dissolution. The step that initiated protests around the presidential palace, which later progressed to deadly clashes between Morsi supporters and the opposition when eleven died ten of them from Morsi supporters. The security forces didn't intervene and just at the next morning National Guard Forces arrived around the palace. On the second revolution anniversary Tahrir Square witnessed strong clashed between pro-Morsi and anti-Morsi protestors. The CA finished writing the constitutional draft and approved later in referendum, which surprisingly gave the military large privileges and kept it practically unquestioned (Brooks, 2015). While the SCAF released the pressure on it which escalated during the transitional period, Morsi started to face elevated difficulties in administering the State economically and in providing essential services and goods as electricity and petrol fuel which was seen as toppling attempt from Mubarak deep state . Here the military began to regain its position as national

power. It was strange that El Sisi invited the political opposing powers to dialogue which later cancelled and El Sisi declared that it wouldn't have discuss any political issues rather than sitting as Egyptians together. Tamarod campaign started to collect signatures for early presidential elections. MB and its party freedom and justice offices were attacked by violent groups like the 'black bloc'. Morsi appointments in the government showed decreased in the military, where in last cabinet one ministry which is the civil aviation was headed by the military officer beside he Defence ministry who had to be military officer according to constitution. Moreover in the last Governors movement Morsi appointed more 7 of MB and other Islamic parties to be total of 13, and 7 from military (BBC Arabic, 2017). Those movements represented clear threat to positions traditionally viewed as natural place for retired officers. Egypt witnessed increased polarizations, MB and pro Morsi supporters gathered in Rabia Square and on 30 June opposition in Tahrir Square, SCAF announced 48 hour for dialogue between the political Powers, Morsi appeared in long speech on TV insisting to stick to the legitimacy. On the 3rd of July El Sisi announced that Morsi was ousted and head of SCC would be the interim president, freeze the constitution and early presidential election. The coup represented return of the military to the power again after only one year from handing the power to the first freely elected civilian president in Egypt history, which represented the start of new period in civil military relations in Egypt.

4. MILITARY DOMINANCE IN EGYPT AFTER 2013 COUP D'ETAT

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will examine the most important dimensions of the military involvement in the civil fields. The levels to be investigated are as follow: constitutional, executive, legislative, judicial, economic, media and civil society. Looking at the constitutional level is important as it represent the legal base for defining the role of the military in the state and its limits. The three levels: executive, legislative and judicial; represents the main three pillar of balancing authorities in any state. By examining the previous mentioned three levels can provide insights about the degree of infiltration of the military to the state apparatus; while theoretically it should be only part of the executive authority. The economic level is very important in the Egyptian case as the Egyptian military kept practicing active economic activity apart for a long time. The examination of the influence of the Egyptian army on the civil level including the media can provide more understanding of the expanded military intervention not only in the state levels but also in the civil activities that are normally free from state interventions. In the democratic states it's more common to focus on the civilian control over the military, but in the case of states suffering from expanded military influence in the civil area it would be more reasonable to examine the military interventions as it's the most crucial phenomena.

4.2 Constitutional Basis

When Mubarak was ousted in January 2011 uprising, SCAF suspended the constitution which was active since 1971 in Sadat early days. In 19th of March referendum, the new constitution was planned to be drafted by an elected committee from the two representatives' chambers, which would be elected from the public voters. After the election of the two houses of representatives; the people assembly Majlis El Sha'b and the Consulting assembly Majlis El Shura dominated by Muslim Brothers Islamist coalition, they formed new constitution drafting committee. On 13 June, 2012 the committee was deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Supreme Court and hence dissolved. Later, another committee was formed and then witnessed political conflict between Muslim Bothers and their allies from one side

and other opposition parties from the other side and ended with wide resignations from opposition parties protesting the Islamist parties' dominance. On 22 November 2012, Morsi issued constitutional decree that fortified the committee from dissolution and the draft was approved in referendum in 2012.

When Morsi was ousted in July 3rd 2013, the coup leaders appointed committee of ten members to draft a new constitution and later committee of 50 members to draft another one based on the former. Then the new draft was approved in referendum on January 2014.

It is important while addressing the civil military relations in Egypt to closely examine the Egyptian constitution because the constitution forms the legal basis that draws the location of the military in the state and defines its authorities and position relative to other state components and also the society. Firstly in this part, the military related organizations will be tracked in the current constitution and then will be analytically compared with the preceding articles in the previous constitutions.

4.2.1 The Minister of Defence

In contrast to 1971 and 2012 constitutions, the constitutional authority to appoint the Minister of Defence was authorized to the SCAF not the president. The defence minister is the commander in chief of armed forces. In addition, the Defence Minister would stay in office for two successive four years terms. The eligibility for the office also have been more restricted. While in 1971 constitution the office was not restricted to military officers; 2012 constitution restricted it and 2014 constitution added the condition that the candidate must have had served in major branch for not less than 5 years (Brooks, 2015).

4.2.2 SCAF

While the Egyptian president in 1971 and 2012 constitutions chaired SCAF; in 2014 constitution it is headed by the defence minister. The membership of the council have been expanded to 23 members to represent security forces and the General Intelligence (Brooks, 2015).

4.2.3 National Defence Council

Composed of fourteen member and dominated by the military. Besides the main military commanders include president, PM, Interior and Foreign Affairs Ministers and the Head of the Representative's Assembly. The council oversee the military

budget only to be included in the general budget as solid figure. The council has to be consulted in and oversight all affairs related to the armed forces and national security like the war decision and sending of troops abroad (Brooks, 2015).

In 1971, this council was lacking any authority but in 2012 constitution it was given these authorities which have been cloned in 2014 with its military membership domination (Brooks, 2015).

4.2.4 National Security Council

Dominated by the civilians without any specified authorities, It is dedicated to adopt national security strategies (Brooks, 2015).

4.2.5 Military trials

While military trials for civilians was restricted to crimes against armed forces in 2012 constitution; 2014 constitutions mentions the crimes using general expressions (Brooks, 2015).

4.2.6 The president

The head of the executive power. While the vice president position was mentioned in previous constitutions it's completely absent in 2014 constitutions. The president has the right to issue decrees with the power of laws in the absence of representative house and can call the public voters for referendum. In forming the cabinet the president assign the PM who ask for trust vote from the representative assembly; in case of failure to gain vote of trust from the house twice; the president can dissolve the house. In addition, the president can dissolve the assembly following public referendum and veto its issued legislations. 2014 constitution mentions the role of the president in foreign affairs clearly; including entering treaties, appointment and dismissal of military and diplomat personnel. The president is the supreme commander of armed forces. The president has the right to shuffle the cabinet (Heliotis, 2014).

4.2.7 Civil military trends in Egypt constitution

The circumstances that surrounded the formation of the fifty committee for drafting the constitution largely explains its out product. The committee was formed in the wake of the coup against Morsi and the Muslim Brothers, accompanied by hard crack down on Morsi supporters and extensive media campaigns terrorizing any

voice opposing the mainstream. Amr Mousa the former Foreign Affairs Minister in Mubarak days who is known for strong ties to SCAF headed the fifty committee (Heliotis, 2014). The result of this committee was for sure a constitution where El Sisi and the military are the winners. The military was always supporter of the Egyptian presidents and this situation did not change for Sisi, Since Nasser period the military did not clashed with the presidents as the they were all coming from the military. Although El Sisi as president is not considered theoretically part of the military corps; practically he is considered to be in permanent relation of the military and its interests. El Sisi declared his candidacy wearing the military uniform and the SCAF declared El Sisi as their candidate for the presidency in March 2014. The proposed impacts of the new constitution on the civil military relations can be summarized in the following trends:

4.2.7.1 Independence of the military corps

Theoretically, the military in the current constitution have the power to oversight the military affairs independently from the President. SCAF appoints the defence minister and oversight the military budget. The defence minister himself is fortified from dismissal by president and heads SCAF. The military dominates the NDC, which must be consulted by the President in declaring war or sending troops abroad. However, we have to take into consideration that El Sisi during his presidency shuffled SCAF many times to assure more loyal members and less dissent ones. Above all, he dismissed the defence minister who was supposed to spend eight years in office according to the constitution. There are no civilian control over the military affairs especially the budget either from the presidency or from the legislative branch. So this can be described as institutional independence and the military is no longer considered as part of the executive branch (Heliotis, 2014).

4.2.7.2 Immunity of the military

While the constitution allows the military trials for civilians in cases descried by ambiguous broad terms, it also protects the military and the intelligence personnel restricting their legal accountability under the authority of military courts exclusively. Taking into consideration the method of appointment of judges in the military courts will raise doubts against its independence and its compliance with international standards (International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), (2016).

4.2.7.3 Powerful presidency

Taking into account that El Sisi performed the coup against Morsi and appointed the Head of the Supreme Constitutional Court and later El Sisi himself run for the residency and won; it is normal to assume that he would have granted himself strong authorities in the constitution. The President in Egypt always enjoyed wide executive authorities; but it is noticed that the position of the vice president is absent for first time since 1971 constitution. The ability to issue decrees that is considered as laws adds valuable power to El Sisi. El Sisi can simply appoint PM and if he/she could not gain trust vote of the representative assembly twice El Sisi can dissolve the assembly itself. And in any other case El Sisi can dissolve the representative assembly by referendum. The constitution stressed his authority to oversight the foreign affairs (Heliotis, 2014).

4.3 Executive Positions

The quantitative terms of military personnel presence in the executive branch strongly indicates the military influence. During Nasser's period the extensive military presence reflexed his trust in military officers as developing factors for the state; and as reward tool for the loyal entrusted officers. This pattern continued during Sadat period and became more structured during Mubarak years as deal offering second career for the army officers. Morsi one year rule did not witnessed major change in this pattern except for too late last shuffle of governors. With Field Marshal El Sisi on the top of the executive branch as the Egyptian President following the presidential elections in June 2014; He was the fourth military officer in the presidency after he ousted the only civilian president Morsi by July 3rd coup. In the following part, the presence of military personnel will be noticed in different areas including: cabinet, governors, and other governmental positions, these positions mainly involve direct appointment not elections and though can be used as indicator for the military influence and domination.

4.3.1 The Cabinet

The provisional President Adly Mansour who was the Head of Supreme Constitutional Court was assigned by El Sisi when was telling the statement of the coup. On 16th of July the economist, Hazem Al Biblawi formed his cabinet. There was only two military officers in the cabinet; El Sisi as defence minister, Reda Hafez as Minister of Military Production. It is also important to mention that the Minister of

Supply And Internal Trade was a police General Mohamed Ibrahim Abu Shady, beside General Adel Labib as the Local Development Minister, also General Mohamed Ibrahim who was in same position in Morsi cabinet held the Ministry of Interior (Mokhtar, 2013). It has been tradition that military officers hold both the minister of defence and military production, and for the police officers to hold the ministry of interior.

The first cabinet after the coup witnessed extensive presence of civil politicians from various orientations; three from the Copts the Egyptian Christian minority and from the famous Nasserists like Hussam Issa ,Kamal Abu Eita and leftists like Ziyad Baha El din as deputy prime minister (Mokhtar, 2013). It can be witnessed that there is decline of the number of ministers who have political orientation towards more technocrat ministers. This behaviour can be explained as the need to reward civilian partners of the coup from political groups that applauded the ousting of Morsi and Muslim brothers from power. The military coup leaders wanted to limit the military appearance and to stamp the coup as popular revolution. This resulted in limiting of the number of military personnel in cabinet. Nevertheless, it has also been noticed that specific ministry like the local development showed concentration of the military personnel and police officers in the office. This is because this ministry oversees the governorates and governors, which include many ex-military and police officers as result of the second career reward trend which was implemented to assure loyalty. On the higher level of administration, the military tries to overcome its technical and political weakness through usage of civilians

Politically the armed forces suffer from two crippling weaknesses. These preclude them, save in exceptional cases and for brief periods of time, from ruling without civilian collaboration and openly in their own name. Soldiers must either rule through civilian cabinets or else pretend to be something other than they are. One weakness is the armed forces' technical inability to administer any but the most primitive community. The second is their lack of legitimacy: that is to say, their lack of a moral title to rule (Finer, 1962).

On the second cabinet after the coup in February 2014 that was headed by Mubarak regime figure Ibrahim Mehleb; the number of military personnel did not exhibit any changes. El Sisi kept his position as defence minister and deputy prime minister (Mokhtar, 2014). General Ibrahim Younes replaced the military production minister

(Mokhtar, 2014). This pattern also continued when El Sisi ordered Mehleb to reform the cabinet after El Sisi became the president. The Staff chief General Sedki Sobhy succeeded El Sisi as defence minister (Alhadath.net, 2014). In September 2015, El Sisi assigned Sherif Ismail as PM. General Mohammed Al Assar one of the old and important figures of SCAF was appointed as military production minister, Sobhy kept his position as defence minister. The police officers stopped to hold the ministry of local development only to let the son of ex interior minister hold the position. Ismail's cabinet witnessed the ousting of Mohamed Ibrahim the interior minister and assignment of Magdy Abdel El Ghafar as new minister (El Gali, 2015). In cabinet limited shuffle on February 2017; the new minister of local development was a graduate of the technical military academy Mohamed Hisham El Sherif but had not serve as military officer (Mokhtar, 2017). On January 2018, military officer General Abu Bakr El Gendy replaced El Sherif (Timraz, 2018). Then police officer General Mahmoud Sharawi who headed the brutal political security apparatus 'National Security' who acquired bad reputation among Egyptians succeeded El Gendy. Sherif Ismail cabinet in sum witnessed three shuffle movement in March 2016 by ten ministers, February 2017 by nine ministers and January 2018 by 4 ministers (Mostafa, 2018).

4.3.2 The Governors

On the last days of Morsi in June 2013, He appointed seven new governors to increase the number of governors coming from Islamist parties to thirteen in total to overweight the seven ex Generals governors from military and police (BBC arabic, 2017). This step represented obvious challenge to the domination of the Generals in the Governmental positions. So one of the early actions of the coup was the reassignment of new governors. On August 2013; nineteen governors out of twenty five provincial government were Generals, thirteen were new and six continuing from Morsi period; seventeen of them from military and only two from police officers (Stevenson, 2014). It can be also attributed to the need for military expertise in provinces to strengthen the regime security and face any opposition and popular protests from Morsi supporters.

On 7th of February 2015, El Sisi made his first governors change action resulting to limiting the Generals to eleven in total from military and police (Nabil, 2015). On December 2015, eleven new governors replaced dismissed ones. Four out of eleven

were military officers and included some police generals (Alaraby, 2015). Again, on September 2016 six new governors were appointed five of them were ex-military officers (Noonpost, 2016). The last move in February 2017 produced governor's council with seventeen generals from military and police.

But looking at the level of governors may be not enough to draw the complete picture. For the positions lower than governors still the military and police officers occupy considerable percentage. For example the largest governorate and the capital Cairo; the Governor have three deputies two of them are ex-officers; one from military and one from police. Cairo is divided into four main regions; northern, southern eastern and western. The western region includes nine neighbourhoods; four out of nine is chaired by ex-military generals and one is headed by ex-police general (Cairo Governorate Official Gate, 2018). These examples demonstrates the dominance of military personnel in the top-level positions in the governorates as reward system for loyalty.

4.3.3 Seaports:

The Egyptian seaports is classified into four major areas under four organizations; Alexandria ports authority, Port Said ports authority, Red Sea ports authority and Damietta ports authority. Military Generals chair the four ports organizations; three of them are navy generals (Egyptian Maritime Data Bank, 2018). In Alexandria ports authority the board of members consists of seventeen member five of them are military officers including the chairperson (Alexandria Port Authority, 2018). This data shows the dominance of the military personnel over the high level positions inside the Egyptian Seaports administration.

4.3.4 Administrative Monitoring Authority

It was stated that the main task of the authority is to counter the corruption. Practically the authority is tool for the dominance of military over civilians. From the establishment in 1964 military generals always chaired the authority. During El Sisi first term in April 2015, he appointed new head General Mohamed Irfan after the of the previous chairman Mohamed Omar Heeba term cam to end (El Genidi, 2016).

The governmental positions shows strong presence of military officers especially at the managerial levels. This pattern is difficult to be justified by the military expertise in these fields especially in the provincial administrations. Moreover, it shows some

kind of speciality where specialized military sectors is expected to be assigned in defined positions; clear example is the assignment of navy officers in ports. This reward and second career trend originate from Mubarak period and was nearly untouched during Morsi period. Morsi also appointed military General to the Administrative authority following tradition. Nevertheless, El Sisi regime extensively used this system to reward his loyal officers and gain the required patronage over military officer to counter any negative action inside the army and assure its alignment with the coup regime.

4.4 Legislative Control

The legislative area after January 2011 uprising witnessed high competition between different political powers; the SCAF seized the legislative power after ousting Mubarak till the People Assembly with majority of Muslim Brotherhood represented in its party freedom and justice led coalition was inaugurated in January 2012. In June 2012, The Supreme Constitutional Court dissolved the Assembly deeming the election law prepared by SCAF was unconstitutional. After the military coup the upper chamber, Majlis Al Shura also dominated by Muslim Brotherhood led coalition was dissolved too by El Sisi.

El Sisi desired end product of the legislative branch was to be for sure friendly tamed one. El Sisi reached his goal through two main strategies: first, he aimed to delay the election of the legislative branch till the new constitution was approved and he became the president. Second, he designed the law of the elections to produce allied majority (Völkel, 2017). The previous represents the pre-inauguration period that will be discussed in details alongside with the evaluation of the legislative branch performance with regard to civil military relations balance.

4.4.1 Pre-inauguration period

The constitutional drafting process started with picked ten members committee chaired by SCAF near politician Amr Mousa. The committee was expanded to fifty members and the constitution was approved in January 2014. Despite the constitution was completed in only six month and El Sisi had become the President by June 2014; it required two and half years till January 2016 for the new representative assembly 'Majlis Al Nowab' to be gathered. This was because there were no political willingness to create legislative entity that strip El Sisi off from the legislative authority. El Sisi made maximum use of this period as EL Sisi himself and his

assigned provisional President Adly Mansour have issued 342 decrees, which required approval of legislative assembly once formed. These issued decrees would work for two important benefits for El Sisi, it shaped the regime legislative preferences which would be hard to be opposed, taking into consideration that the MP will be allied to the regime. Second, it will keep the assembly busy with the discussions of these decrees rather than more important issues (Völkel, 2017).

The new constitution carried crucial changes to the legislative branch; the major change was the cancellation of the upper chamber 'Majlis Al Shura' passing from double chamber system to unicameral one. The debate was already going inside the constitution drafting committee when rumours spread that Amr Mousa the head of the committee plans to chair the higher chamber 'Al Shura'. Shortly after the rumours, the committee voted in favour of adopting unicameral system. Since it was established by Sadat in 1980, 'Majlis Al Shura' was regarded as reward place for president friends and family as the president had the right to appoint two thirds of the assembly (Völkel, 2017).

The composition and the electoral law also showed critical modifications. The 50% quota for the workers and farmers was removed. The constitution aimed to exclude the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters from entering the parliament, it stated that 'excluded participation by candidates from organisations that engaged in religious discrimination or advocated violence'. Initially the parliament was to consist of total 567 seats: 420 for independents, 120 from closed party lists, and 27 appointed by the president. During Mubarak and SCAF period the appointed member number was restricted to be ten only, while 2012 constitution under Morsi required all of members to be elected. In March 2015, the supreme constitutional court cancelled the elections deeming the districts division law unconstitutional (Völkel, 2017).

The electoral law was changed again to increase independent seats from 420 to 448 and assigned members by president from 27 to 28, while lists quota remained same at 120 seat. The internal regulations of parliament was determined by legislative reform committee formed by El Sisi as his tool for legislation productions before the election of the legislative branch. It was chaired by Mehleb the PM and membered by Ali Abd El Al who was also member of the fifty committee and surprisingly the head of the parliament (Völkel, 2017). The presence of Mehleb as the head

committee as he was the major figure in the executive branch is a clear example on the intervention of the executive branch in the legislation.

The electoral divisions was also decreased from 237 to 205 producing large areas where only the more financially powerful individual would have more privileges. The vast majority of seats nearly 80% was allocated for individuals in order to exclude any political party majority. Moreover, for the party lists it adopted winner takes all system where the list that acquires voters' majority win all the seats. The business corps and interest groups were allowed to form lists leading to harden the competition for political parties. There was quota for Copts, youth, expatriates, handicapped, workers, farmers and women in the lists. The list system derived small parties to join large coalitions (Völkel, 2017).

Even after the exclusion of MB and pro Morsi parties from election, the remaining parties which supported the coup found themselves in hard positions. Internal debates within these parties sparked to decide whether to participate in the elections or to boycott. Some parties decided to boycott elections like Freedom Egypt and Strong Egypt. In general, the political atmosphere became hostile to the parties; donations that were given to these parties from businessmen intending to undermine Muslim Brotherhood became unnecessary now. El Sisi preferred to evacuate the political arena and played major role in creating inferior environment for political parties, parties were seen as undermining for the state unity (Völkel, 2017).

4.4.2 The new parliament

Not surprisingly the pro regime list won all the 120 seats; it was a coalition of Free Egyptian party and old Mubarak regime figures named Love of Egypt. Free Egyptian Party was financed by the Egyptian wealthy man Naguib Swaris and won 65 seats from list and independents. This coalition was widely claimed to be formed by security apparatus. Second winner by 53 seats was Nation's Future Party strongly tied to El Sisi. The Salafist party Al Nour, which supported the coup although it was part of Muslim Brotherhood coalition in the previous elections was supported by Gulf monarchies. It only won 11 seats after major media campaign against it. 116 of the MP were businessmen representing nearly one fifth (Völkel, 2017), besides 71 retired Generals from military and police (Hussein, 2015).

Abd El Al was elected as the Head of The Parliament on the day of inauguration. As expected from the regime-favoured man; he declared that the task of the parliament

is supporting the government. In contrast to the monitoring task of the legislative body, he demanded the representatives not to be critical to the government. Moreover, he issued gag order prohibiting discussion on the economic crisis. Abd El Al two deputies were former members of NDP Mubarak party; they showed zero resistance to Abd El Al performance. 15 out of 25 committee in the parliament was chaired by pro-Sisi Love of Egypt coalition; nine of the remaining ten were vice-chaired by the same coalition. The only exception was the human rights committee, which was headed by Mohamed Anwar Al Sadat the nephew of former President El Sadat; however, he resigned later on the basis of confrontation with Abd El Al in the wake of Sadat's participation in human rights conference in Geneva. The extreme support of Abd El Al to the regime drove Sirri Siyam one of El Sisi appointed MPs to resign protesting Abd El Al administration (Völkel, 2017).

From the functional perspective, the parliament passed several legislations in the favour of the regime and the military dominance. All of the previous 342 decrees issued by El Sisi and Mansour were approved except one regarding the public service. Even this rejection was of no importance as the government continued its reform ignoring the parliament (Völkel, 2017). The parliament approved increases in the pension of retired military officers twice; 10% in July 2016 and 15% on the following year on July 2017, and by 15% on June 2018. The parliament raised the wages of the president deputies and the parliament head and his deputies, MPs, the PM and ministers to the maximum wage 42 thousand EGP (approximately 2350 USD). Parliament gave the PM the authority to award Egyptian diplomats abroad additional increments (Alaraby, 2018). The parliament approved terrorism law that allow the military trials of civilians, apply harsh penalties and shield military officers (Völkel, 2017). On July 2018, the parliament passed a law giving El Sisi the authority to immune military officers from prosecution in events related to the period between the coup in July 2013 and the inauguration of parliament on January 2016 (Chopra and Stonestreet, 2018). When MP Sadat criticized the increase in pensions Abd El Al told him 'you are not allowed to talk about the soldiers who paid the tax of blood'' (Völkel, 2017).

The parliament approved a decree that was issued in 2014 giving immunity to government's public contracts from any prosecutions. Initially the law was voted down but week later it was brought again to discussion and approved after pressures from the parliamentary affairs minister. This law gave the government right to award

contracts without any monitor from judiciary, private sector or civil society. In 2013, the provisional government modified tendering law allowing ministers to assign contracts without competitive tendering. Two months after the decree the military linked firms was awarded 1 billion USD contracts related to infrastructure (Transparency International UK, 2018).

El Sisi modified the maritime borders with his regional ally Saudi Arabia and gave Saudis sovereignty over two islands in the Red Sea. The step sparked wide protests; El Sisi justified the step that these two islands were only under the protection of Egyptian state and did not belong to Egypt territories. After judicial conflicts, on June 2017, the parliament approved the treaty and handed the two islands to Saudi Arabia. it is also important to mention that from time to time some voices arise in the parliament demanding increasing the Presidential terms from 4 to 6 years and allow unlimited terms instead of only two (El Mansy and Hosny, 2018), despite it is difficult to judge who stands behind these moves, but apparently it would be in favour of El Sisi.

It can be summarized that the coup regime delayed the formation of the parliament and made maximum use of the legislative power before it was handed over to the parliament. Moreover, it designed the electoral process and adjusted the political environment in a way that produced completely pro-regime parliament. The composition of the parliament and the performance was clear support for the coup regime, and offered the military increased leverage over civilians and the produced legislations augmenting the civil military relations imbalance.

4.5 Judicial Support

The relation between the Judiciary and Morsi regime carried many confrontations. Just before the presidential elections second round in June 2012 the SCC dissolved the parliament dominated by Muslim Brotherhood coalition. Morsi in a symbolic refusal to the SCC decision decided to swear the oath in Tahrir square before standing in front of the SCC. Morsi quickly issued decree recalling the dissolved parliament. The latter step faced another decision from SCC deeming Morsi decree as unconstitutional. Morsi feared the dissolution of the Constitutional Assembly and Majlis Al Shura, so on November 2012 issued decree immunizing the two bodies and his decree from any judicial decision. The step sparked protests inside the judiciary and judges decided to go on strike. The SCC said it will oversight the decrees, Morsi

supporters surrounded the SCC in an attempt to stop the court from taking any opposing decision (Darwisheh, 2018).

These confrontations between Muslim Brotherhood and the Judiciary branch is not a new event, it can also be said that hostility between the two parts has deeper roots. The Judges Club chairperson Ahmed El Zend known for his hostile statements against the Islamists said in interview:

“that if the group’s members had known Islamists would win most of the seats in Parliament, they would not have supervised the voting, and he suggested that they might refuse to oversee the runoff” of the presidential elections. He added that, “We used to stand at the edge of the judiciary and not go near politics.... But now Egypt is falling. We won’t leave matters for those who can’t manage them, with the excuse that we’re not people of politics. No, we are people of politics” (Darwisheh, 2018).

This background of mutual unrest from both sides can explain the support of the Judiciary to the coup regime; this support was mainly on two levels; first by giving legitimacy to the new regime and second by being a tool of the new regime repression. El Sisi assigned the SCC head Adly Mansour as interim president till finalizing the election of the new president. El Sisi found it more convenient to put judicial figure in the front to help diluting the military nature of the coup. In fact, he could not have found more suitable figure than the head of SCC which is the highest judicial body in the country.

In practice, the Egyptian courts applied harsh sentences against Morsi supporters, these sentences were augmented by the protest law imposed by Mansour in November 2013 that banned any public protests. In September 2013, court banned the Muslim Brotherhood party the Freedom and Justice party and the government declared Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist organization on December 2013. In March 2014 Egyptian court sentenced 529 of Morsi supporters to death, after one month another court sentenced 683 to death. The Supreme Judiciary Council take disciplinary measures against any Judges opposed the coup regime. These actions imposed pressure over any judge who may issue light sentences against Morsi supporters. The judiciary on other side tolerated yet encouraged the security personnel to execute crackdown on the dissent elements. Security forces who killed hundreds of Morsi supporters in Rabia square and other clashes around Egypt were kept untouched by the judiciary and considered as heroes. One clear example of the

judiciary alignment with regime is the light sentences related with detained Morsi supporters killing accident on August 2013, when already detained Morsi supporters who were under investigation forced to stand inside prisoners trafficking car for hours then shooting them with gas bombs when started protesting. The crime resulted in 37 death, but the responsible officer was only charged with five years as considered unintended killing (Shorouknews.com, 2018).

The Judiciary crack down expanded to include any oppositions including those who were against Morsi regime. The secular 6th April Movement was banned on April 2014 and its leaders Ahmed Maher and Mohammed Adel were sentenced to prison and charged with fines claiming to violate protest law. The protest law not only applied hard measures against any public protests but also authorized the security forces to take aggressive actions against these protests (Darwisheh, 2018). Another law that deter the journalist from criticizing the government came into action in 2016 states:

“incitement against state institutions and broadcasting false information that would damage the image of the state” would be punished (Darwisheh, 2018)

While the repressions continued against powers backed January 2011 uprising; Mubarak and his regime figures were seen non guilty in cases related to killing protesters and corruption files. Mubarak himself was released on March 2017.

The military itself participated in the judicial campaign through military trials for civilians. El Sisi issued law no. 136 in 2014 that demanded the military forces to help police forces in protecting vital organizations. The deemed vital organizational included any spot that may be potential protest spot like: universities, industrial factories, roads, bridges, railways and longlist include nearly all the country. By including these spots under the military protection, the law authorized the military courts to oversight any cases related to the violations of this law. This law resulted in more than 7,000 civilian trailed in military courts only between 2014 and 2015. 3,000 out of those 7,000 were trailed in the first five months after the law (Aziz, 2016). Taking into considerations that military court judges are appointed military officers by the minister of defence (International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 2016); these courts were seen as ‘infamous for their lack of transparency and safe guards for fair litigation.’ On June 2016, El Sisi expanded the military courts authority to

include 2 km diameter around public properties. On August 2016, the parliament extended the active period of law 136 until 2021 (Aziz, 2016).

On April 2017, El Sisi declared the emergency status around the country; this brought Emergency courts into action again on January 2018 (Boutiti, 2018). These courts were linked to Mubarak regime exploitation against opposition (Boutiti, 2018). In addition, its law applies harsh sentences including lifelong prisoning and execution. Moreover, the president can add military officers to these courts (Mamdouh, 2018).

Concisely, the Judiciary showed wide support to the coup regime through legitimizing it by participation in the coup and its resulted arrangements. Practically as tool in trials of regime dissents and protections of security forces. The military itself were extensively present through expanding the authorities of military courts resulting in wide military trial for civilians.

4.6 Economic Empire

The economic factor represents crucial driver for the military intervention in politics. While Nasser and the free officers were much disposed by ideological stands, the Egyptian military is currently more derived by economic interests. The 'historical deal' which was started during Mubarak rule gave the military wide participation in the economic activity. When the January uprising escalated the military decided to take the responsibility of the rule in the transitional period. This decision was mainly based on two objectives. Firstly, because the military wanted to guarantee its privileges would be kept untouched in any rearrangement following Mubarak regime fall, being in the power during this critical period assured the military to have the upper hand in the Egyptian politics. Secondly, the military saw a chance to eliminate their business competitors; the new businessmen class that dominated the politics and were mainly high level members of the NDP of Mubarak like Ahmed Ezz. Ezz was secretary of organization and member of politics committee in NDP and famous for monopoly of steel market. The details of military budget, which was 4.5 billion USD in 2016, is considered national secret and exclusively overlooked by the SCAF (Transparency International UK, 2018). The estimations of the military acquisition of the Egyptian economy varies widely; some experts estimate it between 20 and 50%. El Sisi said that it does not exceed 2 %. El Sisi encouraged the assignment of

economic projects to military firms, justifying that the private sector would take much more time to accomplish the requested projects (Georgy & McBride, 2018).

Building on the previous conclusion it was not surprising that the military largely expanded its economic activity that was already enlarged. In this part, the military economic activity will be studied from different sides including: how the military manages his activity, what are the main fields, which the military participate in, what privileges it enjoyed, and what is the economic policies that were adapted and its effect on the Egyptian economy.

4.6.1 The economic organizations

The Egyptian army manages its economic activity through number of entities including: the ministry of defence, the military production ministry, National Service Products Organization (NSPO), National Authority for Military Production, Arab Organization for Industrialization and Armed Forces Engineering Authority. The declared objectives of these entities is mainly for military purposes, the ministry of military production was established in 1954 by Nasser to afford self-sufficiency in arms, it was abolished by Nasser and revived again by Sadat in 1971. The National Service Products Organization (NSPO) was created in 1979 by Sadat to afford the military requirements and market the surplus in the local and international market (Transparency International UK, 2018). The ministry of defence oversees dozens of commercial ventures; National Service Products Organization (NSPO) for 21 company, the ministry of military production oversees 20, and the Arab Organization for Industrialization for at least 12 (Georgy & McBride, 2018).

4.6.2 Economic activities fields

The army's economic activity penetrated nearly every single field of the Egyptian economy. The National Service Products Organization (NSPO) firms covers the following fields: 10 companies in Agriculture and Food Industry, 5 in the Industrial Field and 2 in the Engineering Field (Transparency International UK, 2018). In 2016, NSPO was awarded thousands of feddans of state lands dedicated for fish farms (Transparency International UK, 2018). New cement plant are being built in Beni Suef city south Cairo under NSPO, the plant worth 1.1 billion USD (Georgy & McBride, 2018).

Armed Forces Engineering Authority mainly controls the mega infrastructure project in partnership with major MNCs as General Electric and Mitsubishi. The AFEA was awarded a contract worth 47 billion EGP that nearly equal 266 million USD for national roads projects including 22 road, 30 bridge and 11 tunnel. AFEA played major role in the Suez Canal Development project, this project that sparked tension between the military and Morsi. The military viewed the Morsi intentions with suspicions (Transparency International UK, 2018); Suez Canal was always administrated by ex-military officer and traditionally from the navy forces.

The military owns 51% of a company responsible of the New Administrative Capital project which worth 45 billion USD. Five out of 13 members of board are from the armed forces (PropertyFinder, 2018). In 2013, El Sisi encouraged the military to establish international schools offering American and British curriculum, which become reality in March 2015 by introducing Badr International Schools (Transparency International UK, 2018). In May 2019, Military production ministry signed memorandum to build 2 billion USD solar plant in partnership with Chinese firm (Georgy & Mcbride, 2018). Military production ministry established 44 projects of installing solar panels on educational buildings, and established solar energy stations in Cairo in 2017 and declared it has another contract for another station worth 4.37 million EGP (248 thousand USD) (Transparency International UK, 2018). The military production ministry owns Maadi Co. for engineering industries; the company produces green houses, medical devices and gyms (Georgy And Mcbride, 2018). It was mainly established in 1954 to produce grenade launchers, pistols and machine guns. In the ministry of military production forecast for the fiscal year 2018/2019, it expected 15 billion EGP revenues. Heliopolis Co. for Chemical Industries also under the ministry of military production controls 20% of the paints market in Egypt and planning to control major share of the market. The latter was established in 1949 to produce hand grenades, mortars, fuses and chemicals. Abu Zaabal Engineering Industries Co. was founded in 1974 to produce artillery, now producing kitchen utensils. The ministry of military production declared in 2017 to plant 20 million palm trees in partnership with Emirati Company to extract sugar from dates (Georgy & Mcbride, 2018).

It worth noticing that the military owned firms is awarded many projects by another ministries in the government. Chairman of the Maadi Co. for Engineering Industries states that his company has orders worth 495 million Egyptian pound nearly 28

million USD project for the Ministry of Electricity. The Military Production Company for Projects, Engineering Investments and General Supplies has deals with the ministries of education and youth (Georgy & McBride, 2018).

4.6.3 Military privileges

The Egyptian army is exempted from VAT on goods that fall under the military needs and national security, the ministry of defence has the authority to decide which products is exempted. It was reported that VAT exempted activities included hotels and events halls owned by the military. It is difficult to justify how this services is related to the military needs or the national security. In 2015, the minister of defence exempted about 600 property owned by the army including hotels and resorts from real state tax. By law dates back to 1986, the military firms are exempted from import tariffs and from income taxes by law issued in 2005. the military owned firms enjoys easy access to funds, one of the military production ministry firm's chairman stated that it only requires one day to get 40 or 60 million EGP fund approval from the minister of military production (Georgy & McBride, 2018). The military benefits from compulsory military service in acquiring very cheap work force, enjoying advantage over the private sector.

“Since the expansion of military business into large industries, draftees who hold higher technical degrees have been similarly used in factories, hotels, gas stations, hospitals, trading companies and more ... Their remarkably low monthly salaries were raised to between \$34 and \$35 in 2013.” (Transparency International UK, 2018).

In 1982, The Egyptian army established the Armed Forces Land Projects Organization (AFLPO) that manages the sale of military-owned lands. The army has unlimited control over desert areas constituting 94% of the Egyptian territories. In December 2015, a decree was issued stating that revenues from selling processes will be directed to establish new military zones, this step was viewed as legalisation for the selling of lands as way for investment (Transparency International UK, 2018). Lands can be used as patronage tool over individuals or companies who can be awarded these lands.

4.6.4 Economic policies

The Egyptian economy undergoes deep crisis, which pushed the government to seek 12 billion USD loan from IMF. The IMF loan accompanied by neo-liberal policies including devaluing the local currency and cutting subsidies and led to increased inflation (Financial Times, 2016). El Sisi started mega projects without reasonable economic reward like the development of Suez Canal (8 billion USD), the New Administrative Capital (45 billion USD) and housing project (40 billion USD) investment. These projects are highly susceptible for corruption investment. These mega projects are normally awarded to army firms or its regional allies like Emirati firms as in the case of the housing project investment (Transparency International UK, 2018).

There is huge doubts about manipulation acts in the Egyptian market by the army. After severe shortage in baby milk's formula in September 2016, the military announced it had exported large quantities selling it at half price of the market (Financial Times, 2016). After drugs shortage in 2017, the army declared it would establish pharmaceutical production company (Transparency International UK, 2018). Another accident when the government imposed taxes on air conditions parts, then the army announced importing parts from China that of course will be exempted from taxes and tariffs (Boukhari, 2017).

This manner resulted in discouraging foreign investors to invest in Egypt, quoting commercial officer in western embassy in Cairo: 'investors were reluctant to invest in sectors where the military is expanding or in one they might enter'. Executive at a foreign-owned firm operating in cement production commented on the new cement plant built by the army: 'To absorb all the new capacity Egypt, already one of the world's highest per capita cement consumers, would have to double its consumption' (Georgy & McBride, 2018).

'The International Monetary Fund warned in Sept. 2017 that private sector development and job creation "might be hindered by involvement of entities under the Ministry of Defense."' (Georgy & McBride, 2018).

Apart from the economic activity the Egyptian military purchased large amounts, the armament deals reached 22 billion USD till October 2017. Egypt was ranked fourth arms importer in 2015. These deals was a tool for the coup regime to buy legitimacy from number of western countries like Germany, France US and Russia. It's highly

questioned the importance of these deals while Egypt do not experience any major external threat.

4.7 Media And Civil Society Penetration:

When El Sisi was reading the coup statement, he declared that there would be honour doctrine for the media. Once El Sisi finished his statement, security forces surrounded all pro Morsi TV channels, arrested journalists, and working personnel. El Sisi later in August 2014 stated that ‘Nasser was lucky because he had the media backing him’ (Abbas, 2014). El Sisi words reflected his preference for a supporting media, which he will successfully achieve at the end. It was contradictory that the media presenters who were key elements in the extensive opposition campaign against Morsi; were later eliminated from TV programs or from writing in journals. Among those presenters: Yousri Fouda, Mahmoud Saad and Amr El lithy. Bassem Youssef who was presenting highly popular sarcasm show was prohibited after two episodes only. Belal Fadl and Alaa Al Aswani were prohibited from writing. It worth mentioning that all those names adopt secular and anti-islamist orientation. In 2017, the government banned 114 of websites based in Qatar and Turkey, which hosts pro Morsi supporters. Moreover it banned other websites belong to registered Egyptian media organization like Egypt Daily News despite El Sisi published two articles earlier on it (Mehana, 2017). In January 2018, New York Times revealed it has leaked records from calls between intelligence officer and four media figures to spread message tolerating US president Trump decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel capital. The leaks were denied by the Egyptian state while New York Times asserted its originality.

The military came more to the front by directly acquisition of TV channels. D Media company owned directly by the military intelligence possess the promotion rights for four main TV networks: Al hayah, On TV and Al Asema. In addition, it directly owns DMC channels network that was launched in 2017 (Khairat, 2018). Leaked document shows that Abbas Kamel the head of General intelligence and El Sisi office manager were among the founders of DMC channels network (Ali, 2017). Al Motahida co., which its major stalk share, belongs to the military intelligence acquired the promotion rights in CBC channels network (Khairat, 2018).

The control of state over the media tools would provide the military with an effective weapon in the face of opposition civil activists. After the military coup in 2013, the

pro-state media kept on carrying negative propaganda campaigns against civil activists and NGOs promoting democracy or human rights. There have been continued discourse stereotyping the civil activists and NGOs as the following status: “Civil society has been falsely defamed as an ever-present de-stabilizing force, pro-democracy activists as agents of chaos and state collapse”. The crack down on the civil society activities was augmented by the laws issued after the coup like: the modification of law no. 84 of 2002 as follows: “The legislation acknowledges the right of NGOs to register with the Ministry of Social Solidarity by notification. However, it also gives the ministry the power to decline registration without judicial approval for a litany of reasons.” (Hamzawy, 2017).

This mean that the ministry would have the right to refuse the registration of any NGO without the need to justify its need and in absence of any judicial monitoring on the decisions.

From the analysis of the state policies after the coup, it could be concluded that there have been an intended marginalization and minimization of the role of media and civil society in the Egyptian politics. The main policy was the containment of the media by the security apparatus and using the legal tool as repressive instrument in the face of civil society.

5. IMPACTS OF MISBALANCED CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS ON THE MILITARY

5.1 Introduction

Most of literatures focus on the negative impacts of the military intervention in the field of civil politics. This is partly because the main goal of studying civil military relations is achieving the civilian control over the military. Accordingly, the military presence in civilian politics came under focus. Though studying the impact of military intervention in politics on the military itself can provide valuable insight about the dynamics resulting from military attempt to accommodate the unhealthy situation of intervention.

In the following part the impacts of the military intervention in Egypt politics will be examined from two main aspects; first the impact on the military corporate especially on the level of leadership: SCAF and high-level ranks, and this represents the institutional level. Secondly the impacts on the functional level and more precisely the military efficiency in the dedicated responsibilities.

5.2 Institutional Level

As mentioned before; the Egyptian military highest level is represented in SCAF. The SCAF only started to be active since January 2011 uprising; it held the power during the transitional period until they handed the power to Morsi in July 2012. SCAF undergone crucial changes after the military coup and especially during the first term of El Sisi presidency, these changes resulted in almost new SCAF members.

First on February 2014 Adly Mansour the provisional president issued decree number 18 and 20 to modify law no. 4 of 1964 (State Information Services, 2014). (State Information Services, 2014). The law was published after El Sisi was promoted as Field Marshal and his candidacy for the presidency was approved by the SCAF (Aljazeera.net, 2014). The law also expanded the SCAF membership to 23 member; it also stated that it would be presided by the defence minister except in the

presence of the president (State Information Services, 2014). The previous modification could be assessed as internal understandings for the SCAF, which would be headed by Sedki Sobhy the chief of staff, and then the defence minister as El Sisi successor. Following the decrees, El Sisi implemented changes to the SCAF before his resignation. These changes including promotions and dismissals were traditionally done twice in a year; one on January and the other on July. The step shows that El Sisi might has planned to form supporting council or at least less threatening one. The support of military is crucial to El Sisi as it represents the legitimate tool for the regime.

These changes carried expected pattern where El Sisi trusted names occupied the influential positions. Sedki Sobhy as Chief of staffs and Mahmoud Higazy as military intelligence head. It is important to mention that Higazy holds close social tie to El Sisi as they are in-laws. It also worth mentioning that the military intelligence head was El Sisi position before he became minister of defence. In addition, Ahmed Wasfy the chief of the 3rd field army was assigned to less influential role as the head of training authority (Wenig, 2014). Wasfy was famous for his comment when he was asked by TV presenter if 3rd of July 2013 was coup or not answered: “was El Sisi promoted? ... Does he become prime minister or president? No, so it’s not a coup...” (Mekameleen TV, 2017). El Sisi promoted from a General to field marshal and that followed the SCAF approval for El Sisi run for presidency. El Sisi declared that he will for presidency only if there was popular demand and if the army approved. Following campaigns demanding El Sisi to run, SCAF issued statement approving his candidacy justified by ‘the popular demand’. One important development was that ex Chief of staff Sami Anan declared his candidacy then withdraw later. Anan was major figure in SCAF since January 2011 till Morsi dismissed him alongside with Tantawi in a move that brought El Sisi as defence minister.

The second important move came nearly year later in April 2015 when Sobhy executed changes included important branches as military intelligence, Navy and 2nd field army. Mohamed El Shahat replaced Salah El Badry as head of military intelligence, Ossama Mounir replaced Ossama El Gendy as Navy forces commander, Nasser El Asy replaced mohamed El Shahat as commander of the 2nd field army (Helmy, 2017). El Gendy was famous for his role in post-coup period as he leaked

voice tape disclosed his detaining of Morsi in Navy base in Alexandria. The move came when the army was facing increased insurgency especially in Sinai.

Again, on December 2016 El Sisi issued presidential decrees resulting in a new shuffle in the armed forces. The move was important as it included the dismissal of Abd Elmonem El Tarras the Commander of the air defence forces . El Tarras was thought to be potential candidate to succeed Tantawi as defence minister when Morsi take the dismissal decision, and when El Sisi appointed Mahmoud Higazy as Chief of staff. El Tarras represented the last commander belonging to October war with Israel, one more advantage he had over El Sisi and Higazy that he comes from fighting branch unlike the special services nature of the intelligence. El Tarras belongs to the same branch of Anan, and some reports mentions that El Tarras dismissal was the end step after dismissal of 90% of high-level commanders in the branch for suspected ties with Anan. Those commanders were sent to retirement, and almost none of the brigades' commanders or air defence branch staff generals who worked with Anan kept his office. Reports referring to sources in the military stresses the tension between El Sisi and Anan and the competition between them (Alaraby, 2016).

On the same move, Ahmed Khaled Hassan replaced Ossama Mounir the Navy forces commander (Helmy, 2017). It is important to mention that the dismissed commanders traditionally get other less influential positions as compromise. For example: El Terras was appointed as consultant for El Sisi, Ossama Mounir was appointed as deputy chair of Suez Canal authority (Alaraby, 2016).

The last move was on June 2013 when El Sisi changed the defence minister Sedki Sobhy; who was Chief of Staffs during the coup, he was replaced by General Mohamed Zaki. Zaki was the commander of the republican guards during Morsi period and kept the same position after the coup (Goldberg, 2018). The republican guards is a branch which linked to the presidency. At the same time, El Sisi dismissed the interior affairs minister Magdy Abd El Ghaffar as Mahmoud Tawfik the head of National Security apparatus replaced him.

5.2.1 Loyalty before professionalism

As discussed before; the SCAF acquired independence from the civilians in the military affairs. This independency includes the institutional ones. SCAF represents the leadership of the Egyptian military and has been politically active since January

2011. While El Sisi was looking for presidency, he wanted to insure that there would not be any move from the military against him. As result all of changes inside the SCAF whether before or after El Sisi became president cannot be justified professionally. In general it was politically driven, which mean that professional characteristics was not a selection criteria.

El Terras was expected to be the Chief of Staff as he represented the last SCAF member from 1973 October war fighters. The Chief of Staff normally come from fighting branch in military. El Sisi ignored El Terras and brought his in law Higazy who headed the military intelligence. Keeping El Terras away from being the second man in the military not only initiates from the threat he owns himself; but also from linking him to Anan as they served together in air defence forces. But as removing El Terras from the SCAF may had caused conflict, so El Sisi waited till most of Anan close commanders were retired to assure easy removal of El Terras (Alaraby, 2016).

Not only ignoring El Terras; but also appointing Higazy who has social ties with El Sisi raised critics. Also as Higazy came from non fighting branch (Alaraby, 2016). El Sisi will remove Higazy later after his enlarged power inside the military. Higazy was described by western ambassador as stronger than the minister of defence himself (Soliman, 2017).

Another sign of favouring loyalty over professionalism is the continuous changes in certain branches of military seeking to get officers that are more loyal. The example that shows that is the change of the commanders of the navy forces only after nearly one year and eight months in position. Ossama Mounir was appointed in April 2015 and dismissed in December 2016 (Alaraby, 2016). His predecessor Ossama El Gendy was major figure inside the SCAF. The change may be attributed to El Sisi's attempt to decrease the influence of El Gendy and any competition or opposing action from his allies after removing him. It required El Sisi to expand his influence on the navy branch. Normally El Sisi couldn't directly appoint an officer who don't hold ties to El Gendy. That is because the second career trend created patronage inside the military, so the first level officers who would succeed El Gendy would be one of his close officers. Therefore, it requires having two-level changes to overpass two level of officers to appoint loyal one. This comes with negative impact on the military as changing the commander of major branch like the navy leads to instability which adversely affect the military professionalism.

5.2.2 Conciliation

Another important trend that can be noticed is the conciliation after the dismissal. This trend is represented in appointing the dismissed officers in symbolic nominal places or ones that include material privileges. When El Gendy was removed from navy forces he was appointed in the Suez Canal Authority as Deputy Chair, the same applies to his successor who followed his path. Removal of Salah El Badry who was military intelligence head in April 2015 and Taher Abdallah the head of Engineering Authority and then their appointment as defence minister assistants. For the more prominent figures like Higazy and El Terras, El Sisi appointed them as his consultants, this step eliminates any influence from them and keep them under El Sisi control. Even for less influential position the same trend was implanted. Ahmed Ali who was the spokesperson of the armed forces was appointed as Information Secretary in the presidency then as military attaché in one of the Egyptian embassies (Helmy, 2017).

Mohamed El Assar who was also one of prominent figures of SCAF after January 2011, he was known for his ties with USA. El Assar was known for his role in the military cooperation with US and his visit there after the coup to prevent any sanctions following the coup (El Bahrawi, 2015). El Sisi appointed him as the Military Production Minister, which represents one of the important tools that controls the army economic activities. While the position guarantees him more economic privileges, it deprives him from the membership of the SCAF, which possess both political and institutional power.

5.2.3 Shorter office terms

The post-coup period is characterized by shorter stay of officers in high-level positions in comparison with the previous periods specially Mubarak period. Concerning the Defence Minister post; during El Sisi first presidency term, Sobhy kept the position of the defence minister, but after his El Sisi started his second term he dismissed Sobhy and appointed Mohamed Zaki in a surprising move. Tantawi served as Defence Minister from 1991 till 2012, Sobhy for only four years. The last Chief of Staff before Sobhy was Sami Anan who stayed in office for nearly seven years from 2005 until 2012. Higazy was appointed in March 2014 and dismissed on October 2017 (Helmy, 2017).

This trend is also valid for the major army branches commanders. For example: the Air Defence Commander Abd EL Aziz Saif El Din stayed from 2015 until 2012. During post-coup period from 2014 to 2017, two different commanders occupied the office. Also for the navy forces, Mohab Memish stayed from 2007 until 2012, during El Sisi period 3 different commanders occupied the position (Helmy, 2017).

This trend can be attributed to different reasons, one of them is the desire to prevent any commander from forming popular base in any of the important positions which may carry threat or potential competition with El Sisi. The second reason can be the elimination of dissent members from the army especially in certain branches like the air defence. Thirdly, the shuffle prevents the formation of stable SCAF composition which could bear increased power vis a vis the presidency (Helmy, 2017). Some reports justify these moves as attempt to promote the army commanders and gain their support. Nevertheless, in fact most of the shuffles results in less influential and symbolic positions with ambiguous authorities and roles.

There are some justifications trying to explain the moves professional non-political actions. The Egyptian army have been facing increased Islamic insurgency specially in Sinai peninsula. The insurgency also extended to important cities as Cairo the capital and Alexandria. On the contrary, this threat requires more stable leadership to face it. Moreover, the highly affected branches like the navy as no direct interaction with the increased insurgency in Sinai (Helmy, 2017). So it can be concluded that these shuffles carry more political nature rather just normal movements inside a professional army.

5.2.4 The military candidates:

As the presidential election approached late 2017, speculations increased concerning the possible candidates who could challenge El Sisi. It was not surprising that the two high figure candidates were ex-military officers, but the stroking end of their run to the presidency was the interesting part.

Ahmed Shafiq came from the military corporation as he served as the Air Forces Commander the same branch of Mubarak. Later he became the aviation minister and after January 2011 uprisings sparked, he was appointed as PM by Mubarak in a desperate move to contain the change demands. After Mubarak stepped down, Shafiq was dismissed from office after wide protest in Tahrir square seeing him as connected to Mubarak regime. Later in 2012, he ran for presidency against Morsi and

lost in the second round. Shafiq moved to Emirates and stayed there and then charged by Egyptian courts with corruption. These charges were seen as attempt to prevent Shafiq from returning to Egypt as competitor to El Sisi. Shafiq connected interest groups differs from El Sisi's. Shafiq near supporters are Mubarak regime supporters which the NDP represents its backbone. While El Sisi support are mainly military based. The hosting of Shafiq in Emirates was considered as unreasonable, because Emirates is one of the regional allies of El Sisi regime. It can be justified as an Emirati attempt to gain more from El Sisi using Shafiq as potential rival.

In November 2017 Shafiq announced he still considering running for presidency (Deutsche Welle, 2018). Then he appeared on Al Jazeera claiming he was prohibited from departing Emirates by the Emirati authorities (Deutsche Welle, 2018). Shafiq was deported to Egypt where he was taken to hotel in Cairo (Deutsche Welle, 2018). Shafiq made phone interview with one of pro-regime channels and declared he was now revising his candidacy for the presidential elections (Deutsche Welle, 2018). Lastly, Shafiq published a statement on twitter declaring he was no longer interested for running to the presidency (Deutsche Welle, 2018). He justified that by his long stay out of Egypt that may kept him away from following the efforts spent despite the hard conditions and the terrorism (Deutsche Welle, 2018).

Sami Anan the ex-chief of staff who withdrew from the presidential elections in 2014 after the coup declared his intention to run for presidency on video published on Facebook. Anan demanded the civil and military organization to keep the same distance from the candidates. Anan heavily criticized the current administration policies and stressed the wrong policy of loading the military with the cost of facing all the problems in Egypt (Aljazeera Mubasher, 2018). While Anan stated he will officially apply after justifying the required military approves, he was arrested claiming his violation of military rules and claiming he was recalled for service before (Goldberg, 2018).

5.3 Functional Level

5.3.1 War on terror and military efficiency

El Sisi presented the terror as major threat to the Egyptian nation, even before he became a president. Shortly after the coup, El Sisi demanded Egyptians to step into streets to deliver popular delegation to face the possible violence and terror (Akhbar El yom TV, 2013). Despite the coup supporters responded to El Sisi request, the

situation after five years may show that El Sisi is far from being successful in fighting terrorism. The terror concept was used by the coup regime to describe the escalating insurgency that sparked after the coup. When El Sisi as defence minister demanded the popular delegation, he addressed the military as crucial tool in the counter terrorism strategy.

The increased insurgency represents major and persistent threat to the Egyptian regime after the coup. The majority of attacks targeted the security forces and respectively the majority of casualties were among the security forces. From April 2013 until April 2018; 66% of the attacks targeted security forces and the casualties among security forces represented 56% of the total casualties. All Egypt's governorate were field of attacks except Red Sea governorate. Since April 2013 until April 2018 every month one security personnel at died in attack. 1,343 attacks were claimed by various groups, which represents 44% of the total attacks, while the remaining part remained unclaimed (TIMEP, 2018).

On the first year after the coup an average of 19 attacks were reported monthly. The major insurgent group Ansar Beytul Maqdes ABW in Sinai Peninsula announced its allegiance to ISIS and changed its name to Welayet Sina on November 2014. The part that refused to join ISIS formed Al-Morabitoon group under the ex-commandos officer Hisham Ashmawy who continued to operate under Al Qaeda and fled to Libya. Following the split, Al-Morabitoon executed separate attacks on the security forces in western desert in Farafrah oasis resulting in 22 casualties. Just before joining ISIS, ABW claimed responsibility for attack on checkpoint in Sinai resulting in 30 fatalities. After joining ISIS the attacks in Sinai became more regular and more fatal. Till April 2018 Welayet Sina claimed 995 attack resulting in 558 casualties among security forces and 329 among civilians. The major attack for Welayet Sina was downing of the Russian plane over Sinai killing 224 passengers and leading to harm the Egyptian tourism sector and raising doubts about the level of security in the Egyptians airports. Welayet Sina targeted Christians and Sufis; the major attack happened on a Sufi mosque killing 311 prayer. From August 2017 until April 2018 an average of 14 attack monthly were reported (TIMEP, 2018).

Regarding attacks carried apart from Sinai; Egypt witnessed increased insurgency from the coup until the end of 2014. An average of 20 attacks were monthly reported during this period. Various groups emerged after the coup and used violence as mean

of political opposition for the coup. While the MB officially announced that they adapt peaceful policy for opposing the coup, some groups were viewed as being formed by MB youth who adopted different thoughts. Of these groups: Allied Popular Resistance Movement, Hassm and Liwaa al-Thawra. From August 2015 until January 2018 an average of 3 attacks were reported with at least one causality. This period resulted in 283 casualties nearly 57% of them were from security forces and the remaining part from civilians. After the military coup the state reported nearly 1800-security operation, 39% of them were in Sinai. Until April 2018, 27,000 were reported to be arrested in counter-insurgency operations. Those operations resulted in nearly 7,000 casualties 95% of them in Sinai (TIMEP, 2018).

Despite the military control the political power in Egypt, it faced challenges concerning its main duty, which is security. The politics again impose its impacts on the efficiency of the military in counter-insurgency. The shuffles in military always resulted in officers that are more loyal to El Sisi regardless to their efficiency. The appointments and promotions were mainly as part of political movers rather than professional ones; even it was regarded as political change when El Sisi removed Higazy the Chief of Staff after major attack in western desert that resulted in death of 23 officers and 35 soldiers on October 2017.

5.3.2 The link civil military relations and army proficiency

There are studies that explains how the unbalanced civil military relations can affect the efficiency of the military. Brooks argues that as the military became more involved in politics; its functional efficiency can be affected negatively as follows: first, the military regimes tends to develop centralized decision-making authority. This centralization result in slowing the response during battles and engagements In addition, it negatively affect the coordination between different branches. Secondly, when choosing more officers that are loyal the less charismatic ones will appear as good choice. The less charismatic leader in order is more likely to fail in the formations of any loyal base that may pose future political threat. From professional perspective those officer were be less influencers to their subordinates. Rotation patterns deprives the military from homogeneity and accumulations of expertise the adversely affect the military performance. The competition between military commanders may result in less coordination between them, as they will be more willing to show their abilities to high-level political leadership rather than

exchanging intelligence and coordination (Brooks, 2004). The above mentioned patterns applies to some events which faced the military after the military coup as would be explained in the following cases.

What happened in Oasis attack represents clear example on the impact of the centralization of decision making on the military efficiency. On 20th of October 2017, group of security forces working under the ministry of interior moved to arrest small group which was thought to be members of Hasm group. The place where the security forces targeted was thought to be training camp in the western desert. The army was not informed which maybe because the ministry of interior wanted to gain full appraisal solely. Hasm was perceived as small group which is formed of former MB members who adopted new ideologies. As the forces were on its way it was attacked from all sides resulting in more than fifty casualties. Then it was discovered that it was a trap that was prepared from Al Qaeda affiliate group. One of the major causes of the increase in casualties was the delay in sending surveillance planes to the accident place. Higazy as chief of staff was responsible for issuing order of the move to planes; the order was delayed for nearly 6 hours. The delay helped the insurgents to withdraw their injured members and take over some weapons and assets from the police forces (Alaraby, 2017).

The lack of coordination due to competition between various organizations can be also noticed in the previous accident. The police forces moved without reporting to the military forces. It was also thought that Higazy didn't ordered the planes to move as he was waiting the police forces to ask for help (Alaraby, 2017). The shuffle patterns deprived the military commander from forming accumulating expertise on counter insurgency. Counter insurgency was mainly devoted to minister of interior during Mubarak period, specially on the early 1990s when islamist militants were active against the regime. The military expertise of the Egyptian army is restricted to training in USA or participation in training practices. Despite the successive announces of military campaigns especially in Sinai like Martyr's right in 2015 and the comprehensive operation in 2018 still the insurgency representing persistent challenge. Observers raise doubts about the efficiency of the military performance concerning counter insurgency.

The continued insurgency in North Sinai, despite years of sustained military operations, including thousands of deaths and arrests, demonstrates why such an approach is unsustainable. (TIMEP, 2018)

The military campaigns announced by the military accompanied by extensive media support maybe used as political tool for the regime. The previous pattern can be noticed in Sinai 2018 operation which preceded the presidential election in 2018 which led to El Sisi second term. The operation was announced although that period witnessed a decline in attacks from insurgents (TIMEP, 2018). It is also worth mentioning that the military inefficiency reached disastrous level when both minister of defence and interior were targeted during their visit to forces Al Arish city the capital city in north Sinai on December 2017.



6. CONCLUSION

The coup of 3rd July 2013 represented new trend in the civil military relations in Egypt. Despite it is historically considered the second coup in Egypt's modern history after 1952 coup against the dynasty, it carried crucial differences in its nature. As described in the second chapter Bishara differentiated between two types of coups: one that is radical coup when the military bring completely different regime to the state and the other is coup on an ongoing political process that may be initiated by the military itself. 1952 coup is considered radical coup where it brought new regime type, new ruling elites and a newly created political organizations. Nasser and his mates abolished the dynasty and established republic, prohibited all the political parties and created political organizations as the Revolution Command Council, Liberation Rally and Arab Socialist Union. 2013 coup is considered as coup on the political process started by the military. When SCAF controlled power after Mubarak ousting it draw the roadmap for the political future. Although the roadmap witnessed some delays and changes but it reached its end step by handing the power to elected president Morsi and the approval of country's new constitution. The military unsatisfied by the resulting political product chose to and come again into power. The new regime after 2013 coup didn't show new regime type as it's continued as republic with the same political components that were before the coup. The presidency, parliament, government and constitution still there but with important changes. The presidency was controlled by the coup leader El Sisi, while Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was under deadly crack down and prohibited from exerting any political role. It is also worth mentioning that the coups normally bring the pre-coup opponents initially as part of the post-coup arrangement, not so far before it get rid from them. In 1952 Nasser initially used MB as part of the new regime at the time he abolished the political parties which was the main rivals of MB. Later it performed crack down on MB and banned its activities. This pattern is also present in 2013 coup when Morsi civil opposition were part of the regime before they were excluded and eliminated and in some cases prisoned. 6th of April movement activists like Ahmed Maher who were main constituent of opposition against Morsi, but ended in jail after protesting against demonstration law despite it

cheered the coup movement. Mohamed El Baradei was important part of the civil support to the coup as he was the Vice-President of the interim president Adly Mansour resigned after security forces crack down on Morsi supporters in Rabia Square and then faced escalated medial campaign that targeted him. The coup needs civilian face to show it both for the people and for the foreign powers. The easiest way is to bring the previous regime opponents in the initial stage and after that get rid of them as long as they oppose the regime or when the coup regime began to gain its domestic acceptance by people and international legitimacy.

From the theoretical level, there is another major difference between the two coups. The perception of the military itself inside the political process can shape the variation of the motivation towards the intervention in the political process by a coup. Finer described two self-esteem forms that both impose motivation for the military actions. The down esteem when the military feels it's down estimated by the political powers or/and the society, this applies to the Free Officers feelings after 1948 defeat against Israel and the British occupation of Suez Canal. They moved to enhance their position in the political order and gain more advanced place which is the top of the regime.

The opposite pattern is the high-esteem of the military, in this case, the military eager to move as it feels its superior positions requires specific reaction or when military feels its privileged position is challenged by another power. That pattern applies to 2013 coup when the military adopted the discourse of the military role as guardian to the state, and more obviously, when military felt its political and economic advantages would be threatened. Military coup in 2013 came after Morsi challenged the decrees issued by SCAF, appoint more civil governors than military and purge the military leadership. The changes in 2012 constitution that imposed mild civilian oversight on some military issues seems also to irritate the military. Thus it can be stated that the military high-esteem played substantial role in the army move in 2013 coup.

The role of the state in both coups was completely different approaches. 1952 coup used the military personnel directly to control the state apparatus and that was reflected in the increased percentages in the governmental positions and more importantly in the state leadership RCC then the presidency. The top political organization in 1952 coup RCC was composed of military officers and all PM were

military officers too, nearly half of ministries came also from military. This is not confined with 2013 coup where first the military used Judicial figure; the head Supreme Constitutional Court SCC to fill the interim President. The vice-president was also civilian figure Mohamed El Baradei, the government showed wide participation from different civil political orientations. While Nasser proposed the role as essential progressive tool and justified the military dominance over the state apparatus, El Sisi promoted that the military intervention as corrective action to save the county and the revolution. Thus El Sisi brought as much civil figures to the front while declaring the coup and in the post-coup government. El Sisi was only the PM deputy during the post-coup government. In order to avoid international critics' 2013 coup was obligated to hide its military nature by symbolic appointments of popular civil figures.

The military coup regime in both coups share the pattern of eliminating the civil political powers. The coup starts with eliminating the political group that was controlling the regime before the coup. In 1952 coup RCC banned all the political parties that was mainly dominating the power like Al Wafd party, while in 2013 coup the MB political party Freedom and Justice was banned with other allied parties. This represents the first stage of the political dominance of the military, the second step comes with the elimination of the political groups and parties which initially supported the coup. In 1952 coup the military cracked down on MB and the communists who provided support for the Free Officers, also in 2013 coup the military targeted the revolutionary groups that supported the coup especially those who opposed the post-coup arrangements like 6th of April movement and other figures like Mohamed El Baradei.

The military coup brought new political organization in 1952 while this was not the case with 2013 coup. The former coup abolished the dynasty and established the republic, banned the political parties and created Liberation Rally and ASU. The military coup in 2013 kept the same organizations with modification in the constitution that deepened the military dominance in the civil politics; it maintained the presidential system and the organizations related to the military like the SCAF, NDC and NSC. This can be referred to the difference between the two types of coups that was mentioned by Bisharah. El Sisi coup was against political path was planned by the military after controlling the power in 2011. The unflavoured results of the path by the presence of MB and Morsi in power was the main issue, thus the desired

changes was mainly related to the eliminating the military rivals and strengthen their position in relative to civil powers. This objectives have been achieved with modifications in the constitution rather than changes in the regime organizations or replacing them with new ones.

The coup requires guaranteeing the full military support to the coup leaders, this in turn assume that effective military positions to be awarded to loyal officers to prevent any opposite action. This can result in prioritizing the political loyalty over professional competence. This trend is clear in both coups. Nasser appointed Amer who was close friend of him as head of the army and ordered the elimination of professional officers for their opposite political stands as the elimination of pilots suspected with ties with MB. El Sisi rearranged the SCAF and the army leadership and eliminated experienced officers as he evacuated the SCAF from all officers who fought against Israel in 1973 war.

One of the historical trends that inspired El Sisi for achieving control of the army is the continuous purges inside the military. The usage of continuous shuffle in the military was mainly mark for Sadat rule, El Sisi followd Sadat's manual and that was reflected in shorter office terms for the top military positions. Sadat started his rule by facing the danger of a military coup against him what kept him alerted from the army move. El Sisi cautiousness towards the military could be originated from realizing that the army could bear potential rivals or competitors and their supporters like Sami Anan. These doubts drove El Sisi to prevent any concentration of power by the long persistence of officers in critical positions especially on the top level of the military organization.

The allowance and encouragement of economic role of the army is also shared factor between the previous presidents except Morsi and El Sisi. Sadat encouraged this role to keep the military busy with its economic benefits rather than participation in the political issues which may undermine his authority. The same justification is valid also for El Sisi, especially because the military economic activity was one of the critical issues that was hot topic during post Mubarak period. protecting its dependant and expanded economic activities maybe one of the main motivations that drove its action in 2013 coup.

The enlarged economic role can be best explained as cumulative sum of the previous periods. Nasser encouraged that role as he proposed the army as developmental

power for the emerging republic. Sadat found it as solution to best utilize the army capabilities in the post-war period following peace accords with Israel where no real military threat was facing the Egyptian army. Mubarak depended on NDP as tool for dominance of political powers during his period, and as political bribe he allowed and military to freely practice independent role and even he was part of it as mentioned in reports claiming acquiring commissions from arm deals. It also could be assumed that the economic factor may be one of the crucial elements forming SCAF decision to accept Mubarak ousting and handling the power for the transitional period. The previous decision can not be justified by political motives as the military leadership especially the head of army Tantawi was lacking this ambitiousness, while the economic motives may hold good explanatory view. The military might have decided to handle power in the transitional period after Mubarak to eliminate NDP linked economic rivals whose their power enlarged during last years of Mubarak rule. The second motive is the military fear from the ambiguous fate of the change that may threat their privileges so it preferred to be in the decision making level to assure that it would be kept untouched and unaffected by any future arrangements.

The civil military theorization started from the west and more specifically from the US during the Cold War. Therefore the early theorization was developed by US theorist like Huntington and Janowitz. These theorizations were constrained by two main variables; the specific nature of the political regime in the West and especially in the US, the second variable is the time which was witnessing silent Cold War between the US and USSR. When assessing the early civil military relations theory in the light of these two variables, it can be concluded that the theories originated at those days was constrained by the US internal debate between liberalism and conservatism over the most suitable form of the civil control over the military during exceptional time which is the Cold War. The exceptionality of the US case produced theoretical perspectives that cannot hold sufficient explanatory power for the Middle Eastern cases and more clearly the Egyptian case. In Egypt as Bishara assumes the crisis is deeply rooted in the historical advancement of the country where the military played crucial role in the political regime creation and formation. This opposition is contradicted with Huntington assumption that in the western regimes it is built on the norm of civilian supremacy over the military. The ongoing discussion was mainly to prevent the military from maximizing its political power

inside the state. These assumptions are also combined with the fact that western states mainly adopt democratic regimes, which is not the case of the Middle East and for sure Egypt also. Egypt neither excreted the norm of supremacy of civils on military neither it embraced the democracy as form of the political regime. The current political regime in Egypt started with military coup and the rule of Free Officers that was later concentrated in Nasser hands solely. Sadat also was from the Free Officers despite he adopted different political orientations internally and externally. Mubarak also came from the military; the only exception of free elected president was Morsi whose rule only lasted for one year before he was ousted by the coup.

Huntington assumed the concept of military professionalism as important factor in achieving the balance in civil military relations. Huntington assumes the as the civilian affords the conditions that helps the military maximize its professionalism this will help in getting the civil control over the military. This also could not hold true for the Egyptian case, professionalism requires the obedience of the soldiers of the orders, these obedience could include accepting the orders related to perform a coup on the regime and moreover performing crack down on specific political group or party in order to exclude it. that is what happened in Egypt during the coup where the officers and soldiers obeyed the orders concerning control of the state institutions and also in performing crack down on Morsi supporters which resulted in casualties. In that sense, the obedience of the officers and soldiers can be neither seen as professionalism nor beneficial to the balance of the civil military relations. The deviation of Huntington theory in the explanation of the civil military relations in Egypt is rooted in the basics that Huntington used to build his theory. The professionalism theory is based on the development of the armies in the west as historical basis for the theory. This view also aggravate the deficiency in explaining Middle Easter cases like Egypt, cause the armies in Middle East developed under the Ottoman empire initially and then it was also affected by the colonizing powers as it reformed the armies to serve its goals.

There are some elements that Huntington used to measure the level of the influence of military in politics; these parameters could be used in determining the influence of the Egyptian military. As discussed in the second chapter, Huntington proposed the following factors as measure of influence: the affiliation to the army and its leaders, the economic and human resources and the prestige and popularity of the officer

corp. The second career pattern that was augmented during Mubarak period enabled the military personnel to infiltrate the most important position in the Egyptian state, which afford the military wide power inside those institutions. The economic and human resources of the Egyptian army is nearly unchallenged by any other entity or group in Egypt. Concerning the third factor which is the prestige and popularity it can be said that the Egyptian people received the Egyptian military with respect and with patronage over the civilians.

Jonawiz proposed that the soldier as to embrace the same ethics and values of the society. The question that would be difficult to answer using Janowiz assumption: what would be the case if the military is not adopting any specific political ideology rather than its interest, in that case what would be the ethics and values that have to be adopted by the army too. The successive authoritarian regimes since the establishment of the republic by Nasser till Mubarak worked on minimizing the space allowing healthy political life that was emphasized in concentration of power and lack of democratic measures like the free elections. The previous mentioned condition resulted in a society which is less active politically, this was reflected in the decreased participation in political parties and voting. Generally the political groups that was competing on power before the coup represented political orientations that may not represent the population which is politically inactive. As the Egyptian army depends on the obligatory service for males as recruitment tool, thus the majority of soldiers represents the politically inactive population. Taking into consideration that the majority of Egyptian raised under the rule of authoritarian regimes headed by military figures this would may developed tolerance towards norms of accepting military intervention in politics. Supposing the validity of those assumptions, it can be concluded that the adopting of the Egyptian soldiers for the values and ethics of the society resulted in tolerating the military political actions and aggravated the imbalance of the civil military relations in the state.

The agency theory which view the relations between the civils in power and the military as the relations between the master and the servant also could not be applied to the Egyptian case. This theory requires the acceptance of civilian supremacy over the military, this could be the case in the democratic regimes in the west. This assumption do not fit the Egyptian case; that is because it is cannot be assumed that during anytime from the establishment of the republic in 1952 the norm of supremacy of the civils over military was dominant in the Egyptian politics. On the

contrary what Nasser promoted after his coup that the army is capable of administrating the state and driving it into development. Moreover Nasser prompted that the civil political parties are lacking the capability to control the power as they were motivated by their own interests and that's why he banned the parties. The patronage of the military was also promoted as described by Sayegh during SCAF rule, this patronage goes back to Mubarak early days during Abu Ghazala heading of the army as Springborg mentioned. The agency theory proposed the punishment of the military when it is trying to avoid civil orders as tool of maintain the balance in civil military relations, this cannot be achieved in the Egyptian case because there is no civilian superiority.

The concordance theory provides good insight from the sense of the desired end state of the relations between the civilians and the military. The theory also include the most important actors who have to develop concordance between them as the military, the political elite and the citizenry. The additive value of the theory that it does not specify defined form of the relation that would be reached, this is important as it gives a space for reflecting the differences between the different states with their diversity in political culture. For the Egyptian case the main drawbacks maybe that some hot topics should be the core of the dialogue as political actors, seek concordance rather than the issues addressed primarily by the theory. For Example the dependence of the military concerning its budget, economic activities and the role of the army in the domestic politics. These issues reflects the speciality of the Egyptian and Middle Easter cases.

Bishara theoretical frame for analysing the civil military relations in the Middle East holds powerful explanatory ability. As it was mentioned before the justify the current civil military issues in the Middle East by the historical roots, this holds true for the Egyptian case at was discussed in details in the first chapter. The assumption proposed by Bishara that the army makes a coup just to control the power, this also hold true as El Sisi is now controlling the state, as he became the president for the second term. It is important to address the post-coup dynamics inside the military from Bishara's perspective, as he assumes that after the coup succeeds the coup leader starts to get rid from his mates who shared him the plotting. There are no clear evidence about the tension between El Sisi and his mates, but it was noticed as in the fourth chapter mentioned that El Sisi nearly get rid of the prominent names who were

parts of the coup action. The most clear example is both Sedki Sobhy who was then the Chief of Staffs and Mohamed Ibrahim who was then the Minister of Interior.

The role of the foreign powers also is important to examine as Bishara argues, the wide support of the regional powers as Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait both politically and economically. The US also tolerated the coup and despite Obama administration criticized the movement of the army, it did not described it as a coup. Describing the action as military coup would have resulted in cutting the military aid to Egypt and that would threat the important alliance with the Egyptian army concerning the security cooperation.

Finer adds valuable insight towards assessing the role of the political culture in determining the tolerated level of the military intervention. According to Finer when the political culture is very low, it could accept even the supplanting of civil regime with military one. This is the extreme form of the military intervention in politics and represented in the military coups that aims to handle the power to military leaders. Following Finer analysis, it can be concluded that the political culture is tolerating the extreme form of the military intervention. Of course, there were opposing groups to the coup in Egypt, but at the moment of the coup El Sisi could bring wide variety of civil groups beside him like: the religious organizations as the Egyptian Church and Al Azhar, Salafist party like Al Nour besides the secular ones. The retarded political culture is a product of nearly sixty years of the dominance of military and the rule of military figures of Egypt. Thus in the near terms it is hard to witness complete exclusion of the military from politics, because it seems that the norms that facilitate the military interventions in politics is deeply rooted in the culture. Maybe the possible scenario that may afford the civilians to eliminate the enlarged military political power is the developing of a crisis related to the security that would touch the military itself. This crisis maybe external which is of low possibility as Egypt and Israel are in tight peace status, or maybe internal one represented in insurgency which is possible due to the repressive nature of the regime despite the decline of insurgent activities in the last period.

Examining the different forms of the military presence in Egyptian politics requires multilevel analysis of the political components of the Egyptian state. The constitution resembles the ground base that outline the authorities of different entities inside the state. By analysing the Egyptian constitution that was written after the military coup

and comparing it with the previous ones especially the one that was approved during Morsi time; it would provide good insight on the increased military political authority.

First, the new constitution introduced new condition that requires the minister of defence to stay in office for two successive terms as tool of immunity from dismissal. Moreover, it required that the Minister comes from major branch in the army. These modifications seems to be aiming to prevent any possibility of unexpected change in the most sensitive position in the military. Any president would be restricted by limited number of candidates who are in top positions, those officers as they reached this stage would be for sure eager to preserve the military privileges and powers. Even when the president chose his minister, he would not be able to dismiss him easily from office. These conditions creates a situation in which the president would be facing nearly independent Minister of Defence that is a major drawback in the face of civilian control over the military in the state. The basic way to make the Minister of Defence accountable to the civil president if one comes in the future would be the change of these conditions. These conditions were written to immunize El Sisi who was then the defence minister, but as El Sisi became the President, he ousted his successor from office before the end of two terms without giving much importance to constitutional bases.

The new constitution mentioned also that SCAF would be headed by the Minister of Defence except in the case of the presence of the president. This also looks to be part of El Sisi precautions before he decides to run for presidency. National Defence Council also witness change in its composition over the previous constitution to give clear domination for the military over civils. NDC during Morsi also showed strong representation of the military but not to the same degree included in the post-coup constitution. The importance of the NDC is the oversight the military budget that is not overseen by any other entity and this gives the military the upper hand in defining its budget details without any important participation of civilians. NDC according to the new constitution must be consulted regarding declaring war and sending troops abroad. It can be concluded that the new constitution afforded the NDC for more political power which is in favour of the military that dominates the council. For more balanced civil military relations NDC should be recomposed by incorporating more civil figures, and at the same time encouraging the consultation between the military and civilians on military issues but asserting the superiority of

civilians over the decision making authorities. NSC was given ambiguous authorities. The expanding of military trials over the civilians represents extreme form of the military intervention in the civil life and the judiciary. The ambiguous expressions that was used to define the scope that the military courts could see could be used as tool of political threatening for those who may oppose the military. Furthermore, the constitutions immunizes the military and intelligence personnel from standing in front of civil courts and gives that right exclusively to military ones, as military judges are appointed so the justice will be highly questioned.

The presidency in the new constitution gained nearly absolute legislative authority vis-à-vis the parliament, in absence of the parliament the president has legislative authorities and the President can veto the legislations approved by the legislative branch. The President can dissolve the parliament after referendum.

Concerning the balance of the powers between the executive and legislative powers the previous conditions could give the executive authority represented in the presidency further relative political power. At the time of writing the constitution El Sisi was strongly expected to run for presidency, adding that the constitution drafting committee was picked from figures supporting the coup action; it would not be surprising that the new constitution contains such powers of the president. It can be summarized that the new constitutions afforded the military with more independence and immunity and provided the president with vast political authorities.

It is important to examine the military presence in the executive apparatus. The executive apparatus showed the presidency assigned to El Sisi in a repressive political sphere. The presidency for El Sisi is considered guarantee of holding the maximum political power in the state against any other rivals either from civilians or inside the army. The regain of the military of the presidency after Morsi the sole civil president is a symbol of the retardation of the civilians in Egyptian politics in favour of the military dominance. This also precipitates the norm of military presidency from Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak and lastly El Sisi.

Looking at the level of the cabinet will provide good ideas about the manipulation of civilians by the military. The first cabinet after the coup witnessed wide participation of civil figures from different political orientation that backed the coup. the justification is that the military needed to show civil face to minimize critics especially from foreign powers, and bribe the civil coup partners who provide a political cover for

the coup. As the time goes, El Sisi relied more on technocrat figures more than those coming from political groups or parties. As the coup regimes became stable it get rid from political allies as they may hold contradictory political views. El Sisi keep forming cabinets from civils, this maybe because El Sisi wanted to keep the military away from the critics and let the cabinet pay the bill alone when the life conditions of the Egyptians get worse.

The post-coup period showed concentration of the ex-military officers in specific fields in the executive apparatus. The Governors positions majority was regained again by the military following Morsi period that witnessed relative decrease in numbers with regard to Mubarak period. Not only the governors but also the sub-levels of the governorates in the regions and neighbourhoods witnessing high percentage of ex-military officers besides ex-police officers. Not only the governors but also other organizations like the Sea ports exhibited the same pattern of military personnel concentration. The Administrative Monitoring Authority which was used as tool of the military dominance over the government continued to be headed by ex-military officers. These appointments is justified as tool of gaining the support of the military and gain its loyalty. The dependence on military personnel in the executive branch started with the establishment of the republic and was enlarged during Mubarak period and gained more fixed shape. This pattern aggravates the influence of the military inside the civil apparatus as it was described by Huntington as post-service affiliation.

The legislative field witnessed increased influence of the military; the influence gained more than one level. The first level of influence was the delaying of the formation of the legislative branch which afforded El Sisi with the power of issuing decrees. El Sisi used this authority actively to issue large number of decrees, which would be approved later when the legislative branch is formed. The second level is designing the election law that will create more advantageous position for El Sisi favoured political parties and groups. From the practical level the parliament worked in favour of the regime with nearly no opposition, on the contrary the parliament was a tool for full support of the regime and punishment of the oppositions. The approved legislations also favoured El Sisi and the economic activities of the military and facilitated it. The quantitative measure of the military as MP inside the parliament showed the presence of influential percentage of the military and police ex-personnel in the parliament. This also is another characteristic of the affiliation to the military

that augments its political power in the legislative field. The regime attempts to produce tamed parliament was successful, this step was important because the SCAF was clashing with MB over their control on the legislative branch. The post-coup regime favoured friendly legislative branch that would ease its control over the politics.

The Judiciary played crucial role in supporting the coup regime. There was multiple levels of the support of the Judiciary. The basic one was legitimizing the regime by accepting the coup moves and not only that but also participation of Judiciary figures in the regime. Interim president after the coup was the head of Supreme Constitutional Court. This support could be in part justified by the previous clashed between the MB and the Judiciary. The support of the Judiciary had also practical side. First, the Judiciary have been a tool of political repression over the opposition political groups who stand in the face of the coup by giving hard sentences in cases that was suspected to be of political nature. Second, the Judiciary provided the cover for the military and security forces to freely crack down on the dissents by giving light sentences even in the extreme cases that witnessed involvement of security personnel in the killing out of the law. The post-coup period witnessed the reactivation of exceptional courts related to the emergency state with special authorities and forms. Furthermore, the military judiciary itself was active after the coup after expanding the scope that lies under its authority in the new constitution.

The economic empire of the Egyptian military is considered as important variable of determining the influential power of the military. It was mentioned before by Huntington that the economic resources of military are important determinant of its influence. The economic activity of the Egyptian military has its historical roots, and preserving plays great role of defining its political actions. The military organized its economic activities through multiple organizations that handles wide number of economic enterprises. Those organizations was primarily of military nature as they were mainly established for military purposes. But as the Egyptian military devoted its capabilities to the economic activities after the peace accords wit Israel; those organizations mainly adopted non-military economic role. The economic activity of those organizations as discussed covered wide range of business fields which could not be useful for the military in any sense. The military also enjoyed special advantages while practicing its businesses, these advantages included the exemptions of tariffs and taxes which applies to others in the market. In addition the military

could easily utilize the resources of the state as the lands as profit bringing tool. These activities proved to be harmful to the market as private sector and foreign investors may be reluctant to compete with the privileged military in business. The coup regime applied tough economic measures internally including cutting subsidies and floating the currency, these actions was part of IMF program which affected the Egyptian people economics.

The Egyptian media was controlled by the military after the coup. First, the media figures even who supported the coup and played a roles in ousting Morsi and MB was prohibited from showing as soon as they criticized the regime. Secondly, the military started to acquire the media enterprises under its direct administration or under the General Intelligence. The media linked to MB and Islamists were completely prohibited. The control of the media by the military was used against the civil society by undermining NGOs. NGOs were described in the Egyptian media as destabilizing actors and linked with foreign states. This propaganda was accompanied by new legal frame that directed strengthen the state monitoring over the NGOs. In a nut shell it can be concluded that the post-coup period witnessed domination of the military over the media and marginalization of the civil society role in politics by developing harder restrictions over its work.

The study of the dynamics that comes inside the military provides an overall perception of the negative effects that may arose from imbalanced civil military relations. The fourth chapter examined these effects from two main sides. The institutional one which represents the changes that are related to the military corporate, and the functional side studies the impact of civil military relations imbalance on the functional role dedicated to the military. The institutional level examination showed that El Sisi performed successive changes on the military as he was the minister of defence and continued shuffling, as he became the president. These shuffles inside the army mainly targeted the high level of the leadership of the army as SCAF. The appointment and dismissal movements inside the army showed the pattern of superiority of loyalty over the competence and the conciliation of the dismissed personal with appointment in another positon. The movements can be justified as attempts from El Sisi to get complete dominance on the army and elimination of rivals or potential competitors and their circles. Bishara addressed the post-coup conflicts between the coup mates, there are no evidence for that as discussed but the fear from other military figures having support in specific fields in

the army could be a cause. The latter case may apply to Anan whose branch the air defence witnessed extensive changes. The conciliation trend could be as political bribe for the dismissed officers and to send the message that the dismissed officers are not in conflict with the regime. by comparing the office terms of the top leaders of the military it shows shorter terms in comparison with Mubarak period. as it was mentioned El Sisi here is following Sadat's manual for the prevention of formation of any concentrated power around any military leader that may develop to political power that threatened El Sisi in the future.

The presidential elections witnessed the conflict of the regime with to ex-military figures and ended with compromise with one of them who is Shafiq and the jailing of the other Anan. These events proved that the Egyptian politics reached a situation which any figure or group-seeking power would rely on backing from the military or at least part of it. It shows more that the military in Egypt became with political nature as it is considered as gate for reaching the power.

The examination of the functional impacts of the civil military relations after the coup is also of high importance when addressing the adverse effects on the military itself. First, the increased insurgency in Egypt following the coup was proved to be matter of importance both in terms of quantitative and qualitative measures. The generalization of the insurgency issue among the state and the ineffectiveness of the counterinsurgency policies suggests that Egypt would continue to face the insurgency. The military effectiveness is also affected by the characteristics that may come along with the imbalanced military relations. Following Brooks theoretical fame work, the issues related to the centralization of decision making, the competition between different security organs and adopting the principle of political appointments and dismissal; all these factors prove to have degenerative effect on the functionality of the military. These parameters as discussed in events like El Wahat accident emphasizes the drawbacks of military involvement in politics.

Civil military relations after the military coup in 2013 exerted negative impacts on the Egyptian politics. Those negative effects not only were harmful to the political life but also extended to the military itself resulting in deficiency of its functional duties. It also can be concluded that the study of civil military relations in the Middle East should pay more attention to the unique characteristics of the region and its political culture, the specialized theoretical frames that was built over the Middle

Eastern cases holds more explanatory power in contrast with the western ones that originates from different assumptions and theoretical bases.

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