

FRONTEX’S COOPERATION WITH TURKEY: BEYOND TECHNICALITY

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ABSTRACT

FRONTEX’S COOPERATION WITH TURKEY: BEYOND TECHNICALITY

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This thesis examines the effects of Frontex’s cooperation with Turkey in the context of EU-Turkey relations. In line with the EU’s externalization strategy, Frontex conducts several activities to improve Turkey’s border management capacity in the 2010s so that Turkey be able to restrict the migratory flows toward the EU. In this frame, the agency has conducted several activities to promote the utilization of risk analysis, data collection methods, exchange data among units and train border guards in Turkey’s border management. The thesis discusses the effects of Frontex on Turkey’s border policing through focusing on these practices. More specifically, it is argued that Frontex has promoted utilization of the elements of risk logic to the Turkish border authorities from the 2010s onwards. In this context, the thesis elaborates related technical arrangements and argues that the effects of this cooperation move beyond technicality and contains certain power effects. Thus, based on certain indicators from Turkish border units, this thesis aims to contribute the literature on Frontex’s effects on third countries.

Keywords: Frontex, Policing, Border Management, Risk, Turkey.

ÖZ

FRONTEX TÜRKİYE İŞBİRLİĞİ: TEKNİK OLANIN ÖTESİNDE

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Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez Avrupa Birliği'nin Türkiye'yle ilişkileri bağlamında Frontex Türkiye işbirliğinin etkilerini incelemektedir. Avrupa Birliği'nin dışsallaştırma stratejisi ile uyumlu olarak Frontex, Türkiye'nin AB'ye doğru olan göç akışlarını sınırlandırabilmesi için, Türkiye'nin sınır yönetme kapasitesini arttırmaya dönük çeşitli faaliyetler yürütmüştür. Bu çerçevede ajans, Türkiye'nin sınır yönetiminde risk analizinden ve veri elde etme yöntemlerinden faydalanılmasını, birimler arasında veri değişimini ve sınır görevlilerinin eğitimini teşvik edici çeşitli aktiviteleri yürütmüştür. Tez, bu pratiklere odaklanarak Frontex'in Türkiye'nin sınır polisliğine etkilerini tartışmaktadır. Daha spesifik olarak tezde, 2010'dan bu yana Frontex'in Türkiye'deki sınır yönetimi birimlerine risk mantığının unsurlarının kullanımını yaygınlaştırdığı savunulmuştur. Bu bağlamda tez ilgili teknik düzenlemeleri detaylandırmış, bu işbirliğinin etkilerinin teknik olanın ötesine geçtiğini ve belirli iktidar etkileri içerdiğini savunmuştur. Böylece, belirli göstergelere dayanarak, tez Frontex'in üçüncü ülkelere olan etkilerine dair literatüre katkı sağlamayı amaçlamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Frontex, Polislik, Sınır Yönetimi, Risk, Türkiye

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIRAM	Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model
EU	European Union
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Commission in Kosovo
EUROPOL	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
EUROSUR	European Border Surveillance System
FRONTEX	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
GDMM	General Directorate of Migration Management
IBM	Integrated Border Management
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
NACORAC	National Coordination and Joint Risk Analysis Center
NPAA	National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis
RABIT	Rapid Border Intervention Team
RAC	Risk Analysis Centre
TU-RAN	Turkey-Frontex Risk Analysis Network
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

When the Schengen agreement came into force and removed the internal borders in the European Union (EU) in 1995, common management of external borders issue arose and led to several discussions in Europe. Interestingly, although the EU has remarkably integrated its economic sectors since the Second World War, telling the same thing for security-related issues like border management is difficult since the EU member states have unwillingly approached such ‘high’ political topics.

Although there have been several small steps taken toward common border management through the introduction of common information technologies like the Schengen Information System, institutionalization practices remained limited until the early 2000s. However, as Leonard (2010) argued due to growing immigration pressure, on-going enlargement process and terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 has led to the establishment of European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in 2004 as well as again provoked the discussions concerning a common border management system at the EU level. Since then, there has been a growing literature that deals with the question to what extent has the EU established an ‘Integrated Border Management’ (IBM) which seeks to harmonize and integrate member states’ border control mechanisms. In other words, to what extent member states have co-operated with Frontex and other EU agencies to manage the union’s external borders.

In this frame, discussions have been revolving around several topics including Frontex’s legal position within the EU, its role in the decision-making processes of the EU’s policing activities, the consequences of its activities in terms of

fundamental rights and its relations to member states. Nevertheless, another, but quite a critical dimension of Frontex, i.e., its relations with third countries, has just got scant attention (Sagrera, 2014). That is to say, while Frontex's activities *at the borders* have been discussed from different points, its activities *beyond the EU borders* have not been adequately scrutinized, even though cooperation with third countries is an integral part of IBM and one of the priorities of Frontex. However, this thesis will study on this dimension, i.e., Frontex's external activities due to the fact that although existing literature ignores its activities with third countries, these practices have certain power effects for third countries. In other words, since the effects of Frontex on third countries, generally are ignored or underrated in the literature, this thesis aims to contribute to the existing studies by critically scrutinizing how the agency affects a third country's border management with reference to the case of Turkey.

1.1. Literature Review

This literature review scrutinizes the existing literature concerning Frontex's activities beyond EU borders. By doing this, this thesis aims to highlight the role of Frontex's working arrangement, which is the main 'legal' framework for external cooperation and its practical functions. To do this, first, I will briefly explain the general strategy of the EU concerning migration management; namely, externalization. After that, I will evaluate specific studies on Frontex's external activities, its tool to promote risk analysis as well as arguments that give limited room for maneuver to Frontex beyond borders. Next, I will elaborate alternative arguments that argue that Frontex's activities beyond borders matter. Finally, I will identify the research question of this thesis.

Historically, growing attention on migration as a security threat from the 1990s onwards led to two consequences; tightening the external borders and increased emphasis on "the logic of externalization of migration control" (Üstübcici & Içduygu, 2018, p. 13). In this regard, while tightening borders mostly appear through the construction of fences and walls to restrict human mobility (Fassin, 2011), externalization refers to activating third countries so that they can play a role for

dealing with the related issues. As a result, on the one hand many EU countries tighten their borders against immigrant, on the other hand (“EU countries tighten borders,” n.d.), the union assists many non-EU countries to improve their migration management capacity so that migrants can be managed outside of the EU territories (van Munster & Sterkx, 2006).

While discussing the historicity of externalization, Lavenex (2006, p. 335) claims that externalization of migration control is not a new issue for the EU. Therefore, it is possible to find early forms and apparatus of the EU concerning external activities for managing immigration. In this frame, she argues ‘coordination’ among Schengen countries regarding visa policies, ‘introduction of national liaison officers’ to the airports, ‘adoption of the safe third country rule’ for the certain countries as certain attempts to regulate migratory flows. Thus, the external dimension of the EU’s migration policies should be considered as a product of specific historical attempts, not a new phenomenon within the EU.

Despite its history, it is often stated that the role of third countries in the EU’s security governance has remained an underrated issue in the literature (MacKenzie, 2012, p. 95; Sagrera, 2014, p. 165). Moreover, existing studies mostly consider the USA as a third country that has played a significant role in the EU’s security governance (Balzacq, 2007; MacKenzie, 2012, p. 95). Basically, the reason behind focusing mostly on the transatlantic dimension of the EU’s security governance in the literature is the increasing securitization effects of 9/11.

Thierry Balzacq (2007, p. 76), for instance, studied how the transatlantic relations of the EU has affected security governance of the union through focusing on transferring new information technologies. Indeed, while discussing how the counter-terrorism activities of the EU has transformed security tools and their impacts on the EU politics, he unearths the role of data collection, retention and processing activities of the EU’s securitization practices (Balzacq, 2007, p. 77). According to him, these securitization practices have led to three main consequences: de-politicization of security issues, intelligence led-policing and cross-polarization that refers to the destruction of the boundaries between the EU

pillars which was established in 1992 and abolished in 2009 (Balzacq, 2007, pp. 94, 95). Although his remarkable account on EU's securitization tools offers an excellent framework to discuss new 'capacity tools' like Schengen Information System, EURODAC and Passenger Name Record data, the scope of this study is limited since these policing technologies are studied with the only reference to the USA. However, it is the fact that transferring policing technologies also the fact of union's relations with third countries. Nevertheless, how the EU actualizes and what are the impacts of these tools on EU neighbors in the context of border management are not studied in this work.

Before starting to discuss the place of Frontex's external activities in the literature, the sharp division between external/internal should be critically questioned since despite the conventional binaries in International Relations discipline, the case of the EU shows us that internal/external has been blurring, multiplying, transforming and but of course not simply disappearing (Vaughan-Williams, 2008, p. 64). Indeed, William Walters (2002), for instance, discusses the Schengen regime in the EU as a symptom of current territorial transformations of states and argues that Schengen shows us clearly the historicity of the nexus between borders and nation-states. In this regard, although contemporary borders of the EU still construct self vs. other and inside versus outside division, this binary understanding should not be taken for granted. Rather, as will be elaborated in the following chapters, since the EU's externalization strategy has been integrated into the union's internal security, we witness a 'Möbius ribbon' in the security issues which refers the difficulty to pointing out the line between internal and external security (Bigo, 2000). In this regard, it is possible to describe the externalization of migration control as a "double-edged continuation of the transgovernmental logic of cooperation" (Lavenex, 2006, p. 331) which refers both external and internal dimensions of the EU's security governance. Indeed, on the one hand, there is an internal harmonization regarding migration controls among member states, and on the other hand, transgovernmental units may play a role in the external dimension. Moreover, externalization activities extend the field in which new supranational actors may arise (Lavenex, 2006, p. 346).

In this frame, Frontex can be considered as a hub that manages two dimensions of the EU's security governance. According to Pollak and Slominski (2009, p. 916), such a position gives room for maneuver to the EU to 'experiment' for 'loosely coupling' member-states in the context of border management. The authors (Pollak & Slominski, 2009, p. 916) describe this form of coupling as "the EU member states produce positive interaction effects without compromising their sovereignty." They argue that this looseness comes from the Frontex's limited budgetary, administrative, and legal capacity. However, it is also the fact that while externalization of migration management gives Frontex a chance to operate at the EU level to a certain extent (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 793), it is also the fact that still "the scope for sovereignty to the European level remains limited" (Lavenex, 2006, p. 346). The same limitedness is also the case for Frontex's external activities since the agency's room for maneuver while cooperating with third countries is relying on the major bodies of the EU. Indeed, as of 2019, while replying a 'frequently asked question' 'does Frontex play a role in policy-making at the European level?', the agency (n.d.) says that:

No. It is important to underline that Frontex is a 'practitioner body.' This means that although the Agency is embedded within the EU, it does not come up with EU policy. This is in the hands of the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council.

As seen, Frontex highlights that it is simply an implementer body which has no claim on affecting the policy at the EU level.

However, certain studies question that how and why Frontex conducts external activities. Pawlak and Kurowska (2012, p. 137), for instance, highlight three practical reasons behind Frontex's relations with third countries. In this frame, the first reason is that Frontex's 'pushing-out' activities, which aim to shift the responsibility of operation over immigrants from the EU to third countries give a basis for relations. Second, 'state-building' activities which refer to the transformation of third countries practically and mentally concerning managing migration contact the Frontex and third countries. In general, they consider the EU's readmission and mobility agreements with third countries, police missions like EUBAM that assists Ukrainian and Moldavian police units, certain CSDP activities

that aims to reform security sectors of certain states like European Union Rule of Law Commission in Kosovo (EULEX) and the Frontex's 'working arrangements' with third countries that aim to structure communication and cooperation with counterparts can be considered as primary tools of this contact (Pawlak & Kurowska, 2012, pp. 138–141). As they point out, Frontex's working arrangements also include several activities like capacity-building projects, training activities such as helicopter pilot training, and detection of document falsification, promotion of a common curriculum for border guards, the participation of third countries to joint operations (Pollak & Slominski, 2009, p. 911).

Sagrera (2014), elaborates the Frontex's relations with Eastern Partnership countries; specifically Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia and details how the agency implements activities over them. In this study, he identifies three dimensions of Frontex's promotion of IBM to these countries (Sagrera, 2014, p. 168). First, he discusses this promotion in terms of Europeanization. More specifically, he questions whether the EU's 'best practices' adopted by third countries. Second, he scrutinizes the policy apparatus developed by Frontex to export IBM. In this frame, the author argues two main policy apparatuses for Frontex's external actions: border missions like 'The European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine' (EUBAM) and 'working arrangements' with third countries that aims to assist Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities to integrate their border management systems in line with the EU standards (European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, n.d.) Finally, he compares the reasons behind geographically changing choices of the EU's instruments to export IBM. In other words, Sagrera questions why the EU has failed to export IBM to its southern neighbors and but relatively succeeded in Eastern countries and argues that the degree of EU's leverage capacity concerning third countries plays a significant role (2014, pp. 180–181). In this study, Sagrera also brilliantly illustrates the role of Frontex's working arrangement with third countries as a policy instrument for the promotion of IBM (2014, p. 169) and highlights the significant consequences of the micro activities like training and capacity-building programs, seminars and so forth (2014, pp. 178–179).

Polly Pallister-Wilkins (2015, p. 65) also discusses the importance of third countries with reference to the EU's so-called dilemma between humanitarian responsibilities and security priorities. According to her, while risk rhetoric operationalized for these two policy frameworks; i.e., on the one hand, the EU labels migrants 'at risk' on the basis of its 'humanitarian' responsibilities which necessitates search and rescue operations, on the other hand, immigrants are considered as 'risky' subjects for the agency's security and need to be apprehended. In this context, while arguing that Frontex's humanitarian discourse contains a considerable emphasis on policing and vice versa, the author also suggests the pushback activities of the Frontex against immigrants, for instance, requires increasing cooperation with third countries. Thus, the overall consequence of these points emerges as the need for cooperation with Turkey in the EU. Accordingly, she (2015, p. 65) argues that Frontex assists material and logistical support for training activities of border units, expert activities for adopting surveillance technologies and information exchange technologies to third countries.

However, some critical studies did not give a place to the importance of Frontex's relations with third countries. For instance, Andrew Neal (2009b) scrutinized Frontex's policing operations with reference to 'exceptionality' through speech acts versus 'normalization' through routine practices discussion in the critical security studies literature and argued that Frontex's activities represent the normalization through risk analysis (Neal, 2009b, pp. 347–348). In terms of Frontex's activities at the EU borders and beyond borders, Neal (2009b, p. 347) considers the agency's capacity to launch operations, facilitate cooperations with member states and third countries as well as its budgetary and administrative resources as strictly limited and bounded to the EU's high authorities. Therefore, he gives little space for Frontex's capacity to implement actions by itself due to these bounds. As a result of this, while his account helps us to identify the characteristics of Frontex's policing operations; namely, normalization through risk analysis, he stays in the legal-driven framework in terms of Frontex's external relations. In other words, his study does not assess the tacit power effects of Frontex's practices like risk analysis since his practicability criteria for the agency is based on legality. However, as this thesis will illustrate, to

assess the practical influences of Frontex's external activities, one should trace the existing practices' power effects.

In the 2010s, due to the catastrophic consequences of Syrian civil war, border managements of the EU and its neighbors have become a current issue for the states again. Indeed, since the beginning of the civil war in Syria in 2011, more than 5.6 million people have sought a secure place outside Syria; mostly in European countries and Turkey. In this context, specifically, the EU's borders with Turkey has become one of the hot topics of the union. Although the EU-Turkey relations in the context of border management predates the 2010s (Kirişçi, 2007), this issue has got special attention from several scholars in the literature in the 2010s. However, most of these studies have focused on the border management issue between the EU and Turkey from a macro perspective and not assessed the effects of micro-practices. In this regard, this thesis aims to focus on the effects of micro-practices through scrutinizing Frontex's activities to fulfill this gap in the literature.

Indeed, there exist several macro studies on EU-Turkey relations in the context of migration management. For instance, İçduygu, Erder, and Gençkaya (2014, p. 279) provide a useful framework on the turning points of Turkey's migration management from 1923 to the present. Specifically, to periodize Turkey's migration policies in terms of adaptation to the international norms, they suggest three eras: pre-1994 era as ignoring the international norms, 1994-2001 era as transition to international norms era and finally from 2001 to present, Europeanization of migration policies era (İçduygu et al., 2014, p. 242). In keeping with the periodization of this study, Özçürümez and Şenses (2011, p. 243) problematize a 'contradiction' regarding the Europeanization of Turkey's border management while discussing the increasing cooperation between the EU and Turkey. From a macro point, they question why, on the one hand, Turkey resists the EU's specific predictions like establishing a civilian border control unit, and on the other hand, Turkish authorities still increase the cooperation level with the EU for combatting border crimes over the years through establishing an institution on border management and working arrangement? They have three inter-related answers for this contradiction. First of all, rather than a massive step toward institutional

transformation, cooperation between the EU and Turkey is based on gradualness that offers a room for discussions and alternatives. Second of all, such cooperation is not so much demanding economically and administratively. Finally, they claim that these minor processes do not (re)-define security priorities. Thus, they argue that existing relations between the EU and Turkey concerning the management of irregular migration can be defined as ‘moderate Europeanization’ which means “absorption with reservation” (Özçürümez & Şenses, 2011, p. 233). That is to say, although Turkey has adopted several EU *acquis*, these actions cannot be called as ‘transformation.’ This view is also compatible with İçduygu et al. (2014, p. 248). As İçduygu et al., illustrate most of the changes related to Turkish migration policies can be discussed with the concepts of retrenchment and absorption, not transformation. More precisely, while Turkey’s legal framework, definition of policy problem and technical preparation processes regarding migration management are under the high Europeanization, it is also the case that there is a relatively weak Europeanization concerning institutional transformations like establishing a civil border control units and implementing new policy tools (Özçürümez & Şenses, 2011, p. 247). Consequently, although they framed the extent of Europeanization of Turkey’s irregular migration management through certain micro activities, they see micro-practices as simply an intermediary for the EU. Thus, they do not unearth the important power effects of the micro-practices concerning border management.

In line with this perspective, İçduygu et al., have the same view on the Frontex’s role in cross-border activities. Although they brilliantly document the role of the EU is ‘highly effective’ for the changing of Turkish migration management since the 1990s, this study does not take border management issue into consideration comprehensively which occupies a critical place between the EU and Turkey for many years. Therefore, Frontex’s activities and operations concerning EU-Turkey border zones are not mentioned throughout this huge volume. Underestimating the role of Frontex shows us that they do not appraise the Frontex’s role within the cross-border activities of the EU.

Until now, I have tried to illustrate some key studies that do not consider Frontex as an active agent in terms of external activities. According to Horii (2015, pp. 100–101), two main assumptions play a role behind this view: first of all, the literature assumes that Frontex can only operate at the borders effectively, not beyond of it. Second, Frontex’s main textual framework for external cooperation; namely “working arrangement,” is seen merely as a ‘technical’ way of dealing with the problems. In parallel to this argument, it is possible to claim that these arguments take legality as a reference point while scrutinizing the importance of working arrangements. Since ‘working arrangements’ are not legally binding texts, existing literature ignores or do not care about Frontex’s external activities.

However, there is a growing literature which highlights the importance of micro activities in the context of border management such as IBM promotion of Frontex to third countries (Sagrera, 2014), the impact of risk analysis practices concerning border harmonization and decision-making processes (Horii, 2016) and the daily routines of security professionals in the context of (in)security management (Bigo, 2014). Therefore, it is possible to say there is a growing literature that unearths the effects of Frontex’s micro-practices. Indeed, based on the agency’s working arrangements’ with third countries, which requires several managerial and technological cooperations, Frontex’s practices over third countries (Horii, 2015; Sagrera, 2014).

However, these practices are not immune from normative criticisms. For instance, while arguing the technicality of Frontex’s working arrangement which is the main framework of the relationships with third countries, Fink (2012, p. 34) argues that its activities raise several problems concerning fundamental rights of migrants. Throughout the work, as he digs the notion of ‘technical relationship’ which labels the working arrangements through discussing its practical implications, the political nature of working arrangement comes to the fore visible. As he concludes (2012, p. 34), it is insufficient to consider it merely ‘technical’ due to its practical impacts on individuals and the political nature of migration management as well. Moreover, as one Frontex official says, soft law character of working arrangement, i.e., its legally non-binding status, the working arrangement gives counterparts ‘room for

maneuver' so that they can actualize their responsibilities at different speeds (Sagrera, 2014, p. 174). This view is highly compatible with the view of Pollak and Slominski (2009) concerning the practical meaning of 'weakly formalized environment' of border management. While discussing 'the lack of sufficiently precise legal framework' of Frontex, they figure out (2009, p. 917) that, only in such a condition, Frontex officials can enhance their activities without any challenge from parliaments, courts as well as member states. As a result of this environment, Frontex and the EU may invent new policy solutions without any accountability-related obstacles. All in all, technical and legally non-binding characters of working arrangement should be studied critically.

As I have tried to illustrate, there is a discussion in the literature on Frontex's external activities. On the one hand, certain scholars argue that since Frontex's capacity to implement activities to third countries is limited and bounded, the outputs of Frontex's cross-border practices are limited. On the other hand, specific scholars consider Frontex as an important agent that can affect the third countries' border management system. In this thesis, I will evaluate the latter position by illustrating the practical impacts of Frontex on Turkish border management system.

1.2. The Case of Turkey

This thesis will study Frontex's external activities on the Turkish border management system in order to assess Frontex's practical effects on third countries. While the agenda of EU-Turkey relations is almost always lively since the Second World War in terms of migration due to existing Turkish immigrants in Western European countries, this political issue has turned to be a hot topic, especially after the Syrian crisis. Indeed, since the beginning of the Syrian Crisis in 2011, many immigrants have tried to go to the EU through Turkey. Thus the EU-Turkish border zone has drawn the attention of many actors including politicians, security professionals, journalists, activists, citizens, and so forth. As a result, based on their annual risk analysis, Frontex has conducted several activities regarding the regulation of Turkey's border management. As will be elaborated later, the agency's very first liaison officer, for instance, was appointed to Ankara in 2016 ("Liaison

Officers Network,” n.d.). Therefore, it is important to study Turkey while analyzing the Frontex’s external activities.

Currently, Turkey, as an emigrant, transit, and immigrant country, occupies a significant place for the EU’s migration control mechanism. Thus, studying Turkey concerning Frontex’s external activities a promissory topic for the literature. As will be elaborated in the following chapters, Frontex and Turkey officially launched cooperation in 2012 through the working arrangement, and since then, the relations have improved. In this context, despite the relations between the EU and Turkey have fluctuated in the twenty-first century (Yabancı, 2016), we have witnessed growing cooperation between Frontex and Turkey.

My findings from the literature review suggest two inter-related points. First, while it is difficult to consider Frontex as an actor that fully determines external activities of the EU, Frontex’s growing importance can be considered as ‘cooperation broker’(Horii, 2015, p. 107). This means that despite the agency’s restricted status compared to the Commission and member states in terms of autonomous actorness, Frontex’s ‘practitioner’ character has certain room for maneuver to affect border management systems of third countries through promoting the union’s border elements like risk analysis. Second, the importance of Frontex’s working arrangement with third countries should be assessed by its practical implications, not its legal position since security is not a field that is not only constructed by the speech acts of lawyers, politicians, academics, and journalists but also practical works of security professionals (Bigo, 2002). To assess whether Frontex’s external activities matter for third countries, I will ask, “What are the main effects of Frontex’s external activities on Turkey?” as my research question.

At this point, there is a need to determine criteria to assess whether Frontex has played a role for Turkish border management or not. In this thesis, the criteria will be the adoption of risk analysis in Turkey’s border management, which has been suggested by the EU in the progress reports in many times. As will be elaborated in the following, Frontex is an agency that operationalizes and promotes risk analysis in the EU. Thus, assessing Frontex’s effects on Turkey’s border management

through scrutinizing ongoing activities on the adaptation of risk analysis by Turkish border authorities will help the thesis to answer its research question. Indeed, Frontex operationalizes risk analysis to harmonize and integrates not only member states' activities but also aims to integrate third countries' border control systems into the EU's IBM. Thus, Frontex argues that there is a need to cooperate with not only member states but also third countries to effectively operationalize risk analysis. In the scope of this thesis, the degree of Frontex's risk analysis promotion to Turkey will be scrutinized in order to deal with the thesis's research question; i.e., what are the effects of Frontex on Turkish border management system?

In order to critically scrutinize the Frontex's external activities, I will benefit from the Foucauldian theoretical perspective's toolkits throughout the thesis. As I will illustrate below, such a theoretical perspective gives highly useful and applicable 'toolkits' that unearth power effects; namely production of power techniques, subjectivities and realities (Bahçecik, 2015) of the Frontex's seemingly technical or a-political micro-practices like expert activities. In terms of methods, this thesis will be based on practice tracing which is developed and advanced by Vincent Pouliot and relevant critical scholars.

1.3. Methodological Framework

Since my research question and my theoretical framework directly address the practical implications of Frontex's external relations with Turkey, moving beyond the legal-oriented perspective and dealing with the practices is necessary. Thus, this thesis's unit of analysis is practice. In this regard, to move beyond the legal discourses on Frontex's external activities and trace the practices of security professionals, there is a need to operationalize 'practice tracing' method.

It is stated that 'practice turn' in International Relations has come to the fore since the millennium (Adler & Pouliot, 2011). Building on the works of Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu and Theodore Schatzki, studying 'international practices' has exceeded the realist understanding of practice, i.e. focusing only material dimensions of practices, as well as post-structuralist way of reading discourse that

mostly “expose the contingency, openness, and instability of discourse” (Adler & Pouliot, 2011, p. 3). As a result, according to Adler and Pouliot, (2011) practices are “socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world” (p. 4).

Pouliot (2015, p. 237) argues that practice tracing offers a researcher two tenets: While the first one offers interpretivism that may unpack singularities in the locally established social causality and the second helps the researcher to theorize and/or categorize issues to a certain extent. In his perspective, practice-tracing is an articulation of interpretivism and process tracing. These two criteria could be reference points of this method to assess how the practice-tracing method applied: first, it should ‘demonstrate local causality,’ and second, it should ‘produce analytically general insights’ (Pouliot, 2015, p. 239). Although this study is mostly based on the interpretive side of the practice tracing, there will also be specific claims concerning the near future of Turkish border management like increasing dominance of technological devices and security experts regarding border management.

By practice tracing method, a researcher can benefit from multiple data collection methods. In this frame, Pouliot (2015, p. 246) evaluates, ethnographic participant observation to ‘see,’ interviews to ‘talk about’ or textual analysis to ‘read’ practices. Nevertheless, since practices are mostly tacit and difficult to be verbalized, the researcher should be careful in interpreting results from these methods. In this thesis, primary resources for analyzing practices will be official documents. Specifically, I focus on the documents, statements, reports and publications of the EU, Frontex and Turkish border authorities to highlight subtle shifts over the 2010s.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework and the key concepts of this thesis in detail. Since this thesis focuses on the promotion of the Frontex's risk-based governance to Turkish border management system in the context of migration management, the main characteristic of the Frontex's activities and the effects of these practices should be clarified theoretically. To study the Frontex's risk analysis activities, including its promotion to third countries, I will use the governmentality perspective. As stated, immigration-related issues occupy an important place in contemporary governmentality practices in many ways from bordering activities to humanitarian practices over refugees (Fassin, 2011, p. 221). Since this thesis considers Frontex's logic within the framework of the EU's security governmentality, the concepts of governmentality, security, and risk need to be explored.

Accordingly, I will first elaborate on the governmentality concept and its relevance to the topic of this thesis. After that, I will introduce the Foucault-inspired scholars' contributions to security issues. Finally, I will present and compare three perspectives on risk; namely, rationalist, Beckian, and Foucauldian approach to make sense of Frontex's risk logic.

2.2. Governmentality

Although Roland Barthes had introduced the phrase governmentality in the 1950s, the term evolved and gained contemporary popularity in the literature thanks to Foucault's College de France lectures; especially *Security, Territory, Population* and *The Birth of Biopolitics* lectures in the late 1970s. In his oft-cited 'governmentality' lecture in 1978, Foucault (1991) clarified what the governmentality term refers as such:

The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security. The tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of savoirs. The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes 'governmentalized' (pp. 101-102).

Thus, Foucault refers to three interrelated things: governmentality as a combination of an ensemble, a historical tendency and a result of the process that emerged in the history of Western Europe. While discussing the functions of governmentality concept in Foucault's oeuvre, Lemke (2007, p. 44) suggests two points. First, the governmentality concept illustrates Foucault's in-progress hypothesis on the co-constitutive relations between power techniques and relevant knowledge forms on regimes, representations, and interventions. This can be seen as a continuum in Foucault's arguments on the nexus between power and knowledge. Second, by introducing governmentality, Foucault aims to analyze the nexus between modern statehood and modern subjectivity.

Based on Foucault's lectures, various scholars have highlighted the different aspects of governmentality. De Larrinaga and Doucet (2010, pp. 5–7), for instance, suggested that governmentality can be understood as general economy of power that includes five inter-related elements; namely, milieu, circulation, contingency, population, and apparatuses of security. Another reading of the governmentality suggests that this term referred to 'governmental rationality' that extends the

meaning of merely governing the political system (Baker & Simon, 2002, p. 16). While focusing on border policing, Fassin (2011) also provides a comprehensive governmentality definition as such:

Governmentality includes the institutions, procedures, actions, and reflections that have populations as an object. It exceeds the issue of sovereignty and complicates the question of control. It relates the power and administration of the state to the subjugation and subjectivation of individuals. It relies on political economy and policing technologies (p. 214).

As seen, governmentality is highly comprehensive, flexible, and even sometimes ‘too general’ (Joseph, 2010, p. 226) term. To be precise and systematic, my governmentality perspective will be based on Fassin’s above-mentioned description since the scope of this thesis contains various institutions, logics which aim to exert power on actors, subjects and population movement through relying on policing technologies. Moreover, harmonization of border management systems among states, which is the main topic of this thesis represents a new formation of statehood since it exceeds conventional border management of nation-states. All in all, governmentality as one of the significant ‘tool’ of Foucault is highly applicable for this thesis.

Studying social phenomena through the governmentality perspective demonstrated its usefulness in many areas. In this regard, according to Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde (2006, p. 101), governmentality unearths the very present issues concerning national and transnational governing forms that exert power in houses, workplaces, schools, regions, territories at the individual and collective levels. Thus, the governmentality concept shifts our focal point to the existing power relations in those seemingly innocent milieus through problematizing the mundane practices of the experts. Furthermore, Governmentality can be used as a tool that helps us study networked governance by taking into account state and non-state actors together (Merlingen, 2011, p. 150). Indeed, relative decentralization of the state in a governmentality analysis through unearthing the political effects of multiple power tactics and technologies in ‘non-political’ sites is one of the original contributions of this perspective (Larner & Walters, 2004, p. 1)

In this line, governmentality can be considered as a form of remote control. Rather than directly intervening in the situations or forcing actors to do something, contemporary forms of governmentality seek to regulate and govern at a distance through networks (Merlingen, 2011, p. 151). Accordingly, the governmentality perspective offers a productive framework that highlights the constitutive practices of relevant actors. In the context of mobility management, productive power understanding of governmentality, which explains how the actors transform third countries' strategically and institutionally is quite useful (Kunz & Maisenbacher, 2013). For the thesis, the productive dimension of governmentality will be especially useful when analyzing Frontex's effective practices on third countries like transferring technology, promoting risk logic, assisting training activities, and so forth.

2.3. Governmentality in International Relations

Currently, there is a growing literature on 'scaling up' governmentality concepts to International Relations via introducing global governmentality concept. Larner and Walters (2004), for instance, argue the global governmentality as an umbrella term that refers to certain studies "which problematize the constitution, and governance of spaces above, beyond, between and across states" (p.2). Therefore, rather than suggesting a given scope, they offer a 'heading' that can be applied to regional, international, and/or global practices. In the context of security, De Larrinaga and Doucet (2010, pp. 16, 17) argue that global governmentality of security refers a focal shift from conventional state-centered security understanding to a broadened and widened the view of security which takes into consideration various processes as well. In other words, they argue that such focus questions articulate (in)security with the health and welfare of the populations.

However the relevance of governmentality concept for International Relations discipline is questioned by many scholars, since 'scaling up' governmentality concept into a 'global' level by introducing 'global governmentality' has certain problems like ignoring the effects of domestic politics, structural inequalities and historical conditions (Vrasti, 2013, p. 57). Jonathan Joseph (2010, p. 233), for

instance, argued that since governmentality refers mostly advanced liberal societies of the west and the international sphere is dominated by uneven capitalist relations, i.e., many parts of the world are quite different from western societies, the application of governmentality to the international arena is only limited to advanced capitalist societies. Thus, it may be misleading to use global governmentality while analyzing global practices.

One of the aims of Michel Foucault (2007) while introducing governmentality concept is illustrating how the contemporary macro phenomena like state and security can be studied through analyzing micro issues like national public hygiene campaigns, the effects of statistical calculations et cetera. In this line, since governmentality as a way of displacing conventional micro-macro divisions (Dean, 1994, p. 179), using merely the governmentality term, rather than global governmentality is sufficient for identifying the Frontex's activities on Turkey.

As a result, following Merlingen (2003), I identify four benefits of governmentality perspective for my study; namely, illuminating the Frontex's conduct of conduct practices which are based on power relations, considering liberal and illiberal phenomena together like how pre-emptive actions of Frontex deteriorate fundamental rights, studying practices as a de-centered process involving assemblies of the EU and Turkey through taking multiple border agencies into account and finally articulating the language with practice thanks to a comprehensive analyze on discourses and activities of agencies. In short, my reasons behind operationalizing governmentality theory to study the Frontex's effective activities regarding Turkish border management are its strength on critically scrutinizing the power effects of micro-practices and unpacking the 'seemingly apolitical' devices of the Frontex.

2.4. Governmentality of Security

Based on governmentality perspective, many scholars inquired into the implications of governmentality on security issues. Within the critical security studies, scholars who operationalized Foucault's concepts on security issues called 'Paris school' (C.A.S.E., 2006). Since the 1990s, Didier Bigo, Ayse Ceyhan, Anastassia

Tsoukala and Jef Huysmans as outstanding scholars of this school, have contributed to the literature and then, the member of this school has gained new members like Andrew Neal, Rens van Munster, Claudia Aradau et cetera. Below, I will give the definitions of key concepts of their perspective on the security issue and evaluate its original contributions to the literature. By doing so, I aim to provide the theoretical background of the nexus between the EU's security approach and Frontex's risk logic.

In his *Security, Territory, Population* lectures, Foucault considered security neither as a combination of defensive or offensive strategies nor as mere protection of a given territory. Rather, his security perspective focuses on the set of instruments that aims to increase circulation and decreases the risks of circulation's possible effects (de Larrinaga & Doucet, 2010, p. 7). While studying modern ways of city planning, he (2007) identifies four characteristics of security: a) being based on tangible data, b) aiming to increase good decrease risks via calculations, c) focusing on multifunctional issues like streets in a city that hosts diseases, crime, trade and so forth d) shifting focus to the future. As I will discuss later, such perspective on security is highly compatible with contemporary characteristics of Frontex's risk logic.

In dialogue with Foucault's oeuvre, the Paris School developed a more comprehensive security analysis framework through benefitting from different bodies of literature such as international political sociology, criminology, law and international relations (C.A.S.E., 2006, p. 449) In this context, Paris school, like Copenhagen and Aberystwyth schools, does not consider security as a given fact but a constructed social phenomenon (Floyd, 2006, p. 11; Huysmans, 2006, p. 2). Furthermore, they do not consider security as a zero-sum game; namely, security is not the opposite form of insecurity (Collective, 2006, p. 457).

Based on these claims, Didier Bigo writes that "security is what the professionals of unease management make of it" (2002, p. 85). Accordingly, in compatible with Foucault's power/knowledge nexus, security professionals, as knowledge generators on security field, are quite decisive in the construction of the (in)security.

What makes the security professionals distinctive is that this concept does not only refer to military personals, police officers, intelligence services but also seemingly ‘innocent’ units like data miners, risk analysts, Information Technology specialists and so forth (Bigo, 2014). Their ‘shared ethos’ regarding the expertise of the security field construct them as a responsible actor in the field (Bigo, 2002, p. 74). Technological devices, experiences, and knowledge claims on ‘secrets’ concerning the security field can be considered as the main apparatus of this ethos. To sum up, Foucault-inspired scholars consider security as not a given, neutral, ontological fact but a special form of social construction, which is basically the results of micro-power struggles among security professionals.

While scrutinizing how post-modern societies have been governmentalized in the context of securitization of migration, Bigo (2002, p. 82) offered a new concept to understand it; namely, Banopticon that has strong relations with Foucault’s panopticon concept but with two critical differences. While analyzing power that targets bodies to render them as ‘docile’ and ‘utility’ subjects, Foucault (2005) introduced disciplinary power concept through a prison model which was introduced by Jeremy Bentham in the 18th century called as panopticon. He argued that this form of prison disciplines subjects through monitoring and self-control mechanisms, i.e., prisoners’ self-implementation of control mechanism. This disciplinary power implies a changing from the pre-modern era to the modern era in terms of power mechanisms (Fraser, 1981, pp. 277–278). However, Bigo (2002) differentiates the modern and post-modern era and claims that contemporary governance architecture is based on banopticon. In this regard, there are two critical differences between panopticon and banopticon. First, while panopticon aims to monitor everyone, banopticon only focuses on specific groups or individuals due to their ‘risky’ profiles. Second, in this form of governmentality, the focus shifts from ‘curing or promoting individual development’ to ‘mastering a chaotic future with minimalist management’ of risky or at-risk groups. Furthermore, this contemporary governmentality form paves the way for cooperation at different levels through connecting national and international bureaucracies of the security field. Indeed as Bigo (2002) claims “it transnationalizes itself in a ‘beyond’ the borders, and it structures relationship frameworks between administrations, between the ‘executive

powers' of each country" (p.83). While Bigo remarks this transnationalization processes with reference to the EU and transatlantic level, I aim to extend this view with the relations between the Frontex and Turkish border authorities in the following chapters.

Jef Huysmans (2006) provides a similar but more detailed account of Bigo's security perspective by suggesting three conceptual moves for studying security. First, to evaluate (in)security phenomenon, one should move beyond discursive interpretations. That is to say, rather than speech acts, practices matter while securitizing issues. Thus, he highlights the importance of scrutinizing practices of actors. The second move is introducing the 'technocratic view of the politics insecurity' which assumes the centrality of technology and knowledge while constructing modern societies and its governance. As illustrated above in the context of the decisiveness of knowledge, he argues that expert knowledge cannot be considered as a merely technical issue since 'the political' is embedded in technical (Huysmans, 2006, p. 10). Lastly, he suggests:

A move from interpreting the politics of insecurity as a struggle between visions of security and their respective legitimacy to a politics that invests and articulates visions of the political – of the nature and place of political community and practice. In struggles over techniques governing insecurity, something more is at stake than simply the validity of a security policy. Visions of insecurity and their institutionalization in technologies and everyday practice reiterate imaginations of the nature of politics itself (Huysmans, 2006, p. 10).

Such security view is quite different from Copenhagen School's securitization view. While the securitization theory refers to the elimination of dangers, this perspective is focusing on the management of risks. In line with three conceptual moves mentioned above, for a Foucauldian security perspective, van Munster (2005, p. 8) shows the differences between risk management and securitization perspectives with a graph as such:

Table 1. *Differences Between Securitization and Risk Management*

	Securitisation	Risk Management
Representation of threat	Friend/Enemy opposition and personification of the enemy.	Friend/Enemy Continuum and impersonal correlation of factors liable to produce risk.
Measures/ strategy	Exceptional measures that bypass normal political procedures; measures counteract existential threat.	Normal measures such as surveillance and risk profiling; measures contribute to the social control of large populations.
Objective	Elimination of threat; the elimination of a threat secures the collective survival of a socio-political order.	Management of risks against the background of uncertainty and contingency; risk management seeks to prevent risks from developing into existential threats.

Source: van Munster, 2005, p. 8.

This theoretical view also highlights the growing application of new surveillance techniques and technologies regarding policing practices. Here, Huysmans (2006) argues technique as:

(1) a particular method of doing an activity which usually involves practical skills that are developed through training and practice, (2) a mode of procedure in an activity, and (3) the disposition of things according to a regular plan or design (p 9).

In this frame, due to the fact that knowledge and technology are quite decisive to construct modern society and its governance (Huysmans, 2006, p. 9), it is necessary to put the role of technology into the theoretical background of this thesis. As actors like Frontex gets more data from different apparatuses, the problem of management and interpretation of these data emerge. As a result, new security professional segments like ‘data analysts’ or ‘risk profiling experts’ play a role in the security field. Indeed, Frontex’s policing practices mostly rely on its new border technologies like thermovision cameras, drones; radars give room for maneuver to its risk analysis units to determine the agency’s policing practices. Moreover, the working arrangement between Frontex and Turkey refers intensive transfer of technology, data, and expertise. All in all, it is necessary to clarify the role of technology regarding contemporary security governance.

A critical dimension of this security perspective is problematization of normal and routine activities. Indeed, as Huysmans (2006, p. 6) argued “the tension between claims of exceptionality and the continuous between security agencies is a central element of how insecurity is politically and socially constructed”. Especially in the war on terror era, security professionals have strongly insisted on that the “new” dangers of the world like Islamic terrorism pose more complex and dangerous challenges which require exceptional actions to prevent them. However, Bigo (2002, pp. 63, 64) suggested that such discourse should not be taken for granted and needs to be questioned since this rhetoric works for the struggle of security professionals to increase their budgets, missions and their access to information and policing technologies like databanks or risk profiling techniques. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this tension of exceptionalism versus routinization is a highly contested topic among critical scholars. While Léonard (2010), for instance, identifies Frontex’s activities in the context of exceptional measures, Neal (2009a) suggests that the establishment of Frontex proved the ‘evaporation of urgency’ in the EU’s security governance.

In conclusion, while applying security perspective of governmentality on immigration, Bigo (2002, pp. 65–66) discusses not only the role of speech acts but also combines the relevant politicians’ practices that mobilize certain groups regarding immigration as well as security professionals from policemen and intelligence officers to experts of data analysts and risk profiling. In other words, by arguing the ‘securitization of migration,’ Huysmans (2006) does not understand the final destination of speech act but a “multidimensional process in which skills, expert knowledge, institutional routines as well as discourses of danger modulate the relation between security and freedom” (p. 153). Such an approach shifts the object that should be analyzed from discourse analysis of elites, columnists and public opinions to lobbying, instituting routines, struggles over expertise, and the development of forms, databases, and other technologies also play a significant role in structuring and governing domains of insecurity. Moreover, since discourses and governmental technologies transform certain mobilizing groups like immigrants into a knowledge category which poses several problems on receiving state, society, and individuals (Huysmans, 2000, p. 770), such a technocratic concept of politics

draws attention to the importance of technology- i.e., hardware, trained skills, and expert knowledge- and professionals of security- i.e., people who claim security knowledge and do ‘security work on a daily basis.’ (p.154). After this brief overview of the Foucauldian view of the security concept, there is a need to focus on risk concept which occupies a huge place in the Frontex’s own activities and its relations with third countries like Turkey.

2.5. Governing Security Through Risk

Although the history of the risk thought goes back to the antiquity, approaching social phenomena, contemporary phenomena through risk concept has just been popularized since the end of the cold war. Since “risk is now everywhere” (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, & Van Munster, 2008, p. 147), i.e. from aviation security (Salter, 2008) and pregnant health (Thompson, Bender, Lewis, & Watkins, 2008) to analysis of the ‘war on terror’ era (Amoore & De Goede, 2005; Beck, 2002; Mythen, Walklate, & Khan, 2013), and also Frontex practices (Horii, 2016; Neal, 2009b; Paul, 2017), it is necessary to analyze how such proliferation of risk occurred and what are the main views on contemporary risk discourse for the purpose of this thesis.

In the modern era, risk has been understood as “estimation of the dangerousness of the future” (Aradau et al., 2008, p. 147). That is to say, through certain rational activities including classification, calculation, quantification and prediction, probable risky events of the future can be controlled. Nevertheless, this rationalist view of risk that basically refers to modern risks can be estimated through certain techniques has been challenged since the 1990s by scholars like Beck (2002, pp. 39–40) due to the fact that contemporary catastrophic events like Chernobyl, 9/11 or mad cow disease show us that calculating contemporary risks is impossible. Thus, there have been many discussions around risk like whether present technologies can estimate the risky events of the future; if not, how should we approach these incalculable risks and so forth. However, as will be elaborated below, governmentality scholars have also participated and changed the existing risk-related discussions in many ways.

In this context, engagement of International Relations scholars with the risk concept began in the 1990s thanks to changing discourses of major power organizations like NATO and the EU. Since then, the major powers' security discourse has gradually shifted from the elimination of 'threat' like enemy states to the management of risk. However, it is also stated that International Relations literature simply replaced this new risk notion of post-Cold War era with threat and danger vocabularies of Cold War era and did not able to assess the effects of such conceptual changings in practice (Aradau et al., 2008, pp. 147–148).

Gradually, risk concept has flourished, spread, or 'embraced' to the many parts of the modern societies. In this context, Baker and Simon (2002, p. 17) considers 'embracing risk' as a critical strategy for a governmentality practice to penetrate society at the individual, collective, state levels in the contemporary world

In the context of border policing, although taking risk into consideration predates the 9/11 era (Amoore & De Goede, 2005, p. 150), the concept became more visibly a centerpiece in the war on terror era. In this period, risk-related vocabularies such as risk assessment, risky factors, and risk management have become widely used concepts. Generally, what makes this increased focus on risk is different from pre 9/11 era is its increasing dependency on technological devices. Indeed, thanks to the new technological inventions concerning border surveillance like sensitive cameras, drones and computerized data systems, risk terminology goes hand in hand with technological developments. As a result, it can be said that many police institutions and professionals see risk analysis as an essential tool for 'policing the vulnerable spaces and suspicious populations' (Amoore, 2008).

2.5.1. What is Risk?

While there is a relative consensus on the importance of risk logic for contemporary policing practices, the same consensus is not the case for what the risk is. In the sociology discipline, for instance, there are seven, and even more, different approaches on risk (Renn, 2008, p. 24). However, for the purpose of this thesis, three

approaches to risk could be sufficient. These perspectives are rationalism, Beckian approach and governmentality approach (C.A.S.E., 2006, pp. 467–469).

2.5.1.1. Rationalist Perspective

It is stated that the rationalists' risk view was elaborated as a framework of implementing decision-making when the conditions are not clear (C.A.S.E., 2006, pp. 467–468). The very fundamental point of this view is that risk is a calculable fact which can be controlled and minimalized in a rational way. That is why based on this idea, rationalist approach to risk can be summarized as “an uncertain consequence of an event or an activity with regard to something that humans values” (Renn, 2008, p. 373). That is to say, when confronted with different options, choosing an option and excluding others requires comparison of marginal benefits of all possible actions. According to Renn (2008), rational approaches quite close to the technical meaning of risk; i.e., “The notion of risk, therefore, involves both uncertainty and some kind of loss or damage that might be received” (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981, p. 12). In line with the rational choice approach, rationalists consider risk as a given issue that can be tackled by actors' choices. Thus, it can be said that rationalist understandings of risk management refer to estimation, management and finally the elimination of possible threats thanks to classification, quantification and prediction practices (C.A.S.E., 2006, p. 468).

2.5.1.2. Beckian Perspective

By conceptualizing ‘world risk society’ thesis, Ulrick Beck (2002) has transformed the discussions in many ways in the literature. He considers risk as a fundamental characteristic of the late modernity since contemporary societies cannot solely deal with risk themselves and moreover it is almost impossible to calculate contemporary risks (C.A.S.E., 2006, p. 468).

In this regard, he identifies three characteristics of contemporary global risks which take place at three levels; namely, spatial, temporal, and social (Beck, 2006, p. 334). First characteristic is the de-localization that refers to territorially unboundedness.

In other words, its traumatic effects cannot be escaped. Thus, global risks are a fact which has no specific limited place to affect but a global phenomenon and has no specific responsible actors who cause it. Second, the consequences of global risk are incalculable, and the point for us is how to control these uncontrollable risks. As he puts it, “So, the hidden central issue in World risk society is how to feign control over the uncontrollable – in politics, law, science, technology, economy and everyday life” (Beck, 2002, p. 41). The last dimension of global risks is ‘non-compensability’ that means irreversibility of ‘climate change,’ for instance, if it reached to a certain extent. As a consequence of this irreversibility, contemporary risks are also uninsurable facts (Aradau & Van Munster, 2008, p. 24). In other words, it is impossible to estimate, and the insured costs of possible catastrophic events. As a result, this risk view suggests moving beyond from conventional national solutions to ‘cosmopolitan realism’ that means “the recognition of the legitimate interests of others and their inclusion in the calculation of one’s own interests” (Beck & Levy, 2013, p. 24).

As seen, there are certain differences between the rationalist and Beckian view of risk. First of all, while rationalists think that modern risks can be calculable and insurable, Beckian perspective thinks that we cannot calculate and cover the costs of contemporary catastrophic risks. Second, to deal with risks, while rationalists suggest ‘rational’ techniques like classification and quantification, Beckian approach argues the ‘cosmopolitan realism’ which refers to taking various actors’ legitimate interests into account when trying to overcome the so-called uncontrollable risks.

2.5.1.3. Foucauldian Perspective

Since the early 1980s, Foucault-inspired scholars have focused on the risk concept from a critical perspective (Rose et al., 2006, p. 95). Since then, there have been many studies on how the risk logic as a ‘probabilistic technique’ of contemporary welfare societies to reduce problems.

According to this view, Beck's world risk society is misleading since it takes the risk issue for granted. Rather than the so-called factual ubiquity of risk, Mitchell Dean (1999) argued that:

[r]isk is a way – or rather, a set of different ways – of ordering reality, of rendering it into a calculable form so that it might be made governable in particular ways, with particular techniques, and for particular goals. It is a component of diverse forms of calculative rationality for governing the conduct of individuals, collectives, and populations. It is thus not possible to speak of incalculable risks, or of risks that escape our modes of calculation, and even less possible to speak of a social order in which risk is largely calculable and contrast it with one in which risk has become largely incalculable (p. 25).

As can be seen from this quotation, there are several differences between Beck's world risk society thesis and Foucauldian view of the risk. The very critical difference is while Beckian perspective considers the risk as a given fact that aims to control an uncontrollable issue, Foucauldians study risk as performative i.e. "the mundane social audience, including the actors themselves, come to believe and to perform in the mode of belief" (Butler, 1988, p. 520) and socially constructed phenomenon that aims to govern what should be governed. Moreover, while Beckians discuss risk phenomenon within the limits of scientific and technological developments of the late modernity, Foucauldian analyzes the risk concept in a more complex political and social processes that move beyond technological developments (Rose et al., 2006, pp. 95, 96). In line with Foucauldian risk framework, this thesis will consider risk concept as a performative accomplishment since Frontex mobilizes many cooperation-related tactics and strategies with third countries in the name of their risk analysis which contains several political choices rather than 'objective' calculations.

2.5.2. Risk Analysis for Policing and Decision-Making

In the context of Frontex, risk analysis is using for two main issues. First, it is applied to the government of risky subjects at the borders to monitor and prevent their actions. Second, risk analysis is used for institutional decision-making processes. Since both the first one, i.e., governing subject through is defined as 'risk management' (van Munster, 2005, p. 8) and the second one, i.e., managing a decision-making process through risk is defined as 'risk-based governance' (Paul,

2017), take place within Frontex's activities, this thesis will refer both use of risk analysis.

According to Valverde and Mopas (2004, p. 240), risk management refers to a shift from disciplinary logic of the power that 'governs individuals individually while simultaneously forming and normalizing populations' to 'the new penology.' While empirically evaluating such governing form in criminology, they offer a concept for 'governing security through risk management': "targeted governance" (Valverde & Mopas, 2004, p. 245). Amoore and de Goede (2005, pp. 150, 151) evaluate two contributions of the 'targeted governance' for analyzing the war on terror era. First, targeted governance, in line with the dispersed power understanding of governmentality takes the interaction among state bodies, international institutions as well as private risk assessment companies into consideration. Second, it unearths the empirical dimension of governing methods.

This thesis argues that there are three 'strategic goals' of risk management (van Munster, 2005, p. 8) in the context of Frontex's governing activities: a) deploying pre-emptive and proactive actions thanks to previous experiences and collected data (C. H. Benam, 2011, p. 192), b) requiring the *cybernetics of control* which means specific calculation forms to manufacture social issues as calculable, monitorable, and governable things (van Munster, 2005), c) increasing the significance of security professionals as 'experts' on governing 'risky' subjects at the borders since risk analysis requires expertise.

Mark Neocleous (2016) argues the preparation for emergencies and the imagination of catastrophic events as power techniques for the 9/11 era. Through evaluating the contemporary 'scenarios' of US security departments on imagined zombie and monster attacks, he argues how the security field has been organized by imaginative performances. Thus he links the contemporary security understanding with the so-called necessity of future-oriented preparations. Here, risk and risk analysis plays a significant role to govern society by preparing them to 'potential' attacks. As a consequence, preparing risks bring the counter-measure question. More concretely, risk management manufactures migration as a technically calculable issue in order

to normalize operational activities which are generally considered as rarely exerted activities; namely, pre-emptive and preventive enforcement. As I will discuss in the following chapter, this pre-emptive logic is quite a critical issue of Frontex's policing activities.

Second, the cybernetics of control plays a significant role in the risk management field. While describing the practical meaning of risk management, Carrera (2007, p. 14) emphasized the importance of the systematical way of monitoring and evaluating "the roots, routes, *modus operandi*, patterns of irregular movements, conditions of the countries of transit, statistics of irregular flows and displacement. Growing activities of The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) in the context of border management through computerized surveillance technologies prove us the importance of cybernetics of control.

The more technological devices operate over the border zones in the name of the risk-based governance, the more we hear the voices of security professionals on decision-making, implementation, and evaluation processes of border-related activities. In this frame, the Frontex's risk-based governance has strong links to specific vocabularies like 'information,' 'evidence' and/or 'expertise.' The nexus between knowledge production and/or information exchange have two inter-related functions in the context of integrative activities of the EU. First, due to its technical requirements; namely, needs to be carried out by highly specified experts, it necessitates cooperation among member states. Second, the EU constitutes itself as a center of knowledge production concerning migration management and deepen its supranational dimension within this weakly integrated field (Paul, 2017, p. 693).

Risk analysis has also been used for the institutional harmonization of border controls. Paul (2017) stated that the existing risk analysis practices of Frontex as risk-based governance, which aims to harmonize border control mechanisms of member states without challenging their sovereignty-related rights. According to the author, based on rational promises of risk analysis, i.e. efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and de-political decision-making process, Frontex can harmonized the

member states border controls to a certain extent. The details of Frontex's risk-based governance will be elaborated in the following chapter of this thesis.

2.6. Conclusion

As stated, securitization of migration since the 1990s onwards led to tightening the external borders and externalization of migration management (Üstübcici & İçduygu, 2018, p. 13). Since the subject matter of this thesis, i.e., transforming a third country's border management to strengthen external borders represent an intersection of these two consequences, there is a need to conceptualize an activity that exceeds the conventional understanding of managing border security. For this aim, the chapter has introduced key concepts for understanding the dimensions of this issue, i.e., for a general framework of EU's border management approach, governmentality and security have been presented and risk has been introduced to understand how the Frontex implement these general frameworks in practice. At the end of the day, I argued that governmentality perspective's risk identification concerning security-related field paves the way for taking into account 'modulations of security' that refers to the social and political processes in which threat defined, articulated with different forms of 'the political' that institutionalizes fear and hostility and finally gives room for maneuver to actors so that they act together.

CHAPTER 3

EUROPEAN UNION'S BORDER MANAGEMENT

3.1. Introduction

This chapter seeks to examine the EU's border management since the 1990s. It is often stated that compared to the economic field, the union has witnessed a weak integration in the context of border management due to the several reasons like unwillingness of member states. However, it is also the fact that several issues like immigration from post-communist countries after the collapse of the USSR, growing number of member states within the EU and the globalization process all have posed common border-related problems to the union from the 1990s to the present. In this part, I will present how the EU has dealt with common border management issues through scrutinizing related treaties, summits, and events since the 1990s. Thus, while Frontex will be located within the historicity of common border management, the role of third countries concerning the union's 'common' or 'integrated' border management will also be scrutinized.

3.2. History of the Eu's Border Management

3.2.1. The Schengen Agreement

It is possible to claim that the union officially gained external borders after the Schengen agreement. Before that, although there existed the common market which was easing the labor and capital mobilities, there were still conventional border controls among member states. In such a context, the Schengen agreement was signed by Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in 1985 in

order to reduce and finally abolish internal border controls among their citizens. In 1990, it was supplemented with a convention which proposed a common, harmonized visa policy that sought to decrease “illegal” migration and also introduced the Schengen Information System for information exchange among states. Following this convention, custom controls were abolished in 1993, and finally, all the convention came to the force in 1995 (Koslowski, 2003, para. 8). As a result, while the internal borders were demolished, and the EU citizens have enjoyed control-free movements within the EU territory. The EU’s external borders have emerged as well (Walters, 2002). Thus, certain vocabularies concerning common border management have been mobilized within the EU. Regarding ‘harmonization of working methods,’ for instance, relevant state ministers and secretaries declared their intentions as such in 1990:

In view of the risks in the fields of security and illegal immigration, the Ministers and State Secretaries underline the need for effective external border controls in accordance with the uniform principles laid down in Article 6. With a view to implementing those uniform principles, the Contracting Parties must, in particular, promote the harmonization of working methods for border control and surveillance (*Schengen Agreement*, 2000, p. 62).

Despite its significance in terms of regulating the human mobility within the territories of the contracting parties in the Europe and emergence of external borders, Schengen mostly refers the collaboration among contracting parties, not with the third countries. Nevertheless, it arranged certain measures concerning nationals of the third countries which include:

Making it possible to ascertain the circumstances under which a third-country national has entered the territories of the Contracting Parties, application of the same procedures for refusing entry, the drafting of a common manual for the officials responsible for border surveillance and encouragement of an equivalent level of external border control by means of exchanges and joint working visits (*Schengen Agreement*, 2000, p. 62).

In conclusion, Schengen can be considered as the first systematic agreement that aims to regulate human mobility within Europe in the post-Cold War era. Although it had no reference to the cooperation with third countries, Schengen has significant effects on the third-country nationals. In other words, the Schengen paved the way for a ‘harmonized’ external border controls at the EU level.

3.2.2. The Maastricht Treaty

As known, the union has witnessed a massive transformation since the 1990s. One of the important turns for the EU was the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty, aka. 'Treaty on European Union', was signed on 7 February 1992 and established three pillars structure; i.e. the supranational 'Community pillar' as the first pillar; the intergovernmental pillars of 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' (CFSP) as the second and 'Justice and Home Affairs' (JHA) as the third. While the EU elites aimed to introduce an EU 'identity on the international scene' (Lavenex & Uçar, 2004, p. 417), it has also several effects on the EU and institutionalization of external border management. While the European Council turned to be a decisive body for the decision-making process, the European Parliament became a consultative mechanism. Thus, member states' resistances against the parliament's democracy-related pressures regulated on behalf of the member states.

Under the JHA, migration-related issues including asylum and immigration policies, conditions of entry, and movements of the third countries were systematically regulated. That is to say; the Maastricht institutionally focused on the cooperation within the Justice and Home Affairs field in an intergovernmental form (Kosłowski, 2003, para. 9). Despite this institutionalization regarding border management, police cooperation and information exchange mechanisms still remained among the member states. However, under the police cooperation there was an increasing emphasis on the 'creation of databases', 'centralization of analysis and assessment of information', 'Europe-wide prevention strategies', 'further training, research, forensic matters and criminal records departments' (Treaty on European Union, 1992, p. 248).

3.2.3. Amsterdam Treaty

The Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed in 1997 and came to the force in 1999, is another huge step of the EU concerning a common visa and border management framework. Indeed, this was an important turning point since the EU, hereafter, has

approached immigration issues from a long-term perspective. It is stated that the practical basis of this long-term approach is demographic problems of the European societies; namely, tendencies of the decreasing birth rates and aging populations (Koslowski, 2003, para. 10). As a result, the EU introduced the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) that contains measures of counter-terrorism activities, migration, and border management et cetera which were belonged to JHA in the Maastricht. That is to say; the EU has prioritized border management issues, especially after the Amsterdam treaty in 1999 (Kirişçi, 2007, p. 8). Lavenex (2006, p. 300) describes this gradual focus on a common framework of immigration policies as a process of ‘deepening communitarisation and widening cooperation.’ Indeed, as stated in the treaty, The Union will:

Maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime (*Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts*, 1997, s. 8).

Moreover, border management cooperation with third countries had come to the EU’s migration management agenda when the Amsterdam Treaty came to the force (Sagrera, 2014, p. 168). This treaty arranged several issues regarding the relations of the third countries and the EU. For instance, it required preparation from the candidate country regarding the conditions of the Schengen Agreement during the membership process (Sert, 2013, p. 176). Moreover, there was a direct reference to the cooperation with third countries in the context of external border controls to be more effective at the borders (*Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts*, 1997, s. 108). In conclusion, Amsterdam provided an opportunity for the EU for cooperation with third countries.

3.2.4. Tampere Meeting

In addition to the treaties, the member states came together to provide solutions for border-related problems. The European Council’s meeting in Tampere in 1999 is one of the critical points in terms of the union’s migration policy since it is the first

time that the EU officially expressed ‘external dimension’ of immigration-related issues (Lavenex, 2006, p. 333). Moreover, the role of third countries in the context of border management came to the fore in the Tampere European Council that sought to implement *acquis* about migration-related topics in 1999 (Kirişçi, 2007).

3.2.5. Impact of 9/11 Attacks

While evaluating the key historical points of the EU’s border management, there is a need to take the war on terror era into consideration since it increased the ‘securitization of migration’ concerns within the union. For instance, since 2001, the EU has strengthened its border controls through increasing use of surveillance systems at the external borders (Kosłowski, 2003, para. 12). Thus, although the EU’s reliance on surveillance techniques concerning border management predates 9/11, sea change in this field has become more visible.

There have been several consequences of the 9/11 attacks for the union’s migration-related issues. One of the results is the increasing obsession regarding data collection and construction of ‘risk’ and/or ‘threats’ as knowable, calculable phenomena. In this frame, information exchange has become a tool that operationalizes and justifies EU activities. Such reliance on information circulation led three consequences regarding policing practices: de-politicization of the data collection activities on the ‘risky’ subjects in the public sphere, increasing reliance on intelligence-led policing and cross-polarization among the above mentioned three pillars of the EU (Balzacq, 2007, p. 78).

The second result was the increasing visibility of co-ordinated activities among member state border police. In this context, there had been several co-ordinated border activities including ‘Operation High Impact’ which was conducted by 15 member states and 10 candidate countries against illegal migrants and migrants smugglers, exchange programs among member-state police units, liaison works, harmonized curriculum for border official’s training programs and a common European Border Guard School for them (Kosłowski, 2003, para. 19). Thus, both application of new information technologies and co-ordinated mundane practices of

the EU member-states, which aims to increase cooperative actions have paved the way toward a common border management agency. Nevertheless, it should also be stated that aiming a common border unit of the EU has been faced member-states' reluctance during these years (Koslowski, 2003, para. 19). Consequently, it can be said that prioritizing security issues at the borders went hand in hand discussions around a common border management system since the 9/11 attacks.

3.2.6. Hague Programme

The impacts of 9/11 can be clearly seen in the Hague Programme, which was adopted in 2004 (Léonard, 2012, p. 150). The main aim of The Hague program is:

To improve the common capability of the Union and its Member States to guarantee fundamental rights, minimum procedural safeguards and access to justice, to provide protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees and other international treaties to persons in need, to regulate migration flows and to control the external borders of the Union, to fight organized cross-border crime and repress the threat of terrorism, to realise the potential of Europol and Eurojust, to carry further the mutual recognition of judicial decisions and certificates both in civil and in criminal matters, and to eliminate legal and judicial obstacles in litigation in civil and family matters with cross-border implications (European Council, 2005, p. 1).

As a result, due to the existing insecure atmosphere of the early the 2000s, on the one hand, the Council aimed to 'realise' the capabilities of its agencies, like the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL), concerning common security issues and on the other hand, the Council, again, stated 'the need for intensified cooperation and capacity building, both on the southern and the eastern borders of the EU, to enable these countries better to manage migration and to provide adequate protection for refugees' (European Council, 2005, p. 5). In addition to this, the Union gained ten new members which were mostly part of communist countries in the Cold War era. Thus, the Union's external borders have extended and gained new neighbors. Moreover, human mobility within and outside the EU has come to the fore again in a more complicated way due to newly joined almost 75 million populations to the union.

In the same year, European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, was also established to increase coordination among member states for the external borders

of the EU. Details on the establishment of FRONTEX will be discussed in the following parts.

3.2.7. Schengen Border Code

After the establishment of Frontex, Schengen Border Code went into the force in 2006 as the legal framework of the EU border controls' internal dimension to support preventive activities regarding illegal immigration flows, human trafficking as well as internal security issues of the member states. That is to say, Schengen Border Code codified the many existing procedures of Schengen; namely many dimensions of external and internal controls (Guild, Brouwer, Groenendijk, & Carrera, 2015). In line with the security-driven logic, border management has been seen once again as a field to combat irregular migration (Sagrera, 2014, p. 170). Interestingly, this code was adopted after the establishment of Frontex. That is why, the Frontex, as the 'cooperation broker' of the EU concerning operational cooperation at the borders, was referred to in this code.

3.2.8. Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon treaty was signed in 2007, came into force in 2009, and since then, it transformed the EU in many ways. The most striking change was the abolishment of the EU's pillar system, which was established thanks to the Maastricht treaty.

In terms of border management, the most critical point is the official introduction of the integrated border management term (Sagrera, 2014, p. 170). Under Article 62, the treaty emphasized the gradual introduction of an integrated management system for external borders. As will be elaborated below, integration of the external border management is also one of the tasks of the Frontex, and such a comprehensive term has direct effects on the third countries.

Another effect of the Lisbon Treaty for the EU's border management is the reforming the Frontex to have a more sensitive legal framework in terms of human rights (Horii, 2016, p. 250). Indeed, following Lisbon treaty, Frontex's own legal

framework has been reformed through 2011 amendments and the agency's sensitiveness for fundamental rights has turned to be a more visible issue (Horii, 2016, p. 250).

3.2.9. The Stockholm Programme

The Stockholm program follows and enhances the previous two programs of the union; namely, the Tampere (1999) and Hague (2004). Here, the Council indicates the progress of its agencies that operate over the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). Furthermore, Frontex was supported by the Council to integrate border management systems of the member states.

The Council requested from the Commission a proposal that 'clarify' and 'enhance' the role of Frontex, highlighted the importance of Frontex regarding the Schengen area, specialization of the Frontex concerning sea and land operations, invited the Commission 'to initiate a debate on the long-term development of FRONTEX', In terms of third countries, the Council also requested the increasing cooperation between Frontex and third countries 'so that they can control their external borders efficiently'. Moreover, the Council sought to the continued phased development of the EUROSUR and its cooperation with third countries in the mid-term. Finally, pilot projects on the cross-border regional cooperation and risk assessment were also highlighted regarding a 'more effective European law enforcement cooperation.'

3.2.10. Frontex

As stated above, although there was a discussion on common border management system among member states in the 1990s, such intention has not swiftly realized within the Union. However, from the introduction of the Schengen to the establishment of Frontex in 2004, there had been certain steps, especially regarding collective information systems for common border management. In this context, to collect data of illegal migrants, detect document falsification and wanted or missing persons/goods, the EU has introduced the Schengen Information System. Furthermore, EURODAC also applied to migration domain in order to implement

the 1990 Dublin Convention, which restricted the asylum seeker processes of immigrants. This application has also been used while conducting counter-terrorism activities. Moreover, The EU used Europol's Information System to transmit information among units. In the same vein, the Union's reliance on risk analysis practices, which is the main activity of Frontex is also predated the establishment in 2004. Before Frontex, there was the Risk Analysis Centre (RAC) that tested the feasibility of risk analysis practices at the EU level (Horii, 2016, p. 246). In 2004, RAC was transformed to Frontex, and Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM) was introduced "on the basis of the model devised by the agency's predecessor and intended to provide a commonality of language and methods between member states for its practical application" (Horii, 2016, p. 246). As a result, it can be claimed that the growing information technologies have paved the way for common border management in the EU.

In terms of political events, Leonard (2010) argues three main factors behind the establishment of Frontex. First, as a result of the accumulation of growing migration-related tensions since the end of the Cold War, member states wanted to establish an EU-level policy on migration. Second, after the EU enlargement in 2004, which contains ten new member states, there arose an effectiveness concern on EU's new external borders. Last but not least, the impact of 9/11 that increased the fear and insecurity problems in the US and Europe was decisive for the establishment of Frontex.

Frontex, as the main actor of EU's integrated border management at the EU level, was established in 2004 in order to secure external borders as a body of the Community. The agency's headquarters is in Warsaw. The first name of the agency was the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union in 2004 ("Origin & Tasks," n.d.). Since the 2016 Amendment, the name of the agency is The European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Horii (2015, p. 7) stated that there are three basic mechanisms of Frontex: facilitating cooperation, developing common standards, and managing data in the form of risk analysis. Accordingly, the agency aims to

increase cooperation among member states, International Organizations as well as non-EU countries to secure EU's external borders.

Although Frontex has played noteworthy roles at the borders, it is not the 'responsible' agent since responsibilities at the borders still belong to the relevant member states in legal terms. Moreover, the agency's legal position was bound to the major bodies of the EU ("Key Facts," n.d.). Thus, rather than conducting political activities, Frontex has only conducted 'technical matters' among member states. However, as some critical scholars argue, these technical issues have enhanced the agency role over the years concerning border issues within the EU (Horii, 2016; Paul, 2017). At this point, scrutinizing the changing budget and task agenda of the Frontex may give an idea of how the agency enhanced its position within the union. While the budget of Frontex was 6 million Euro in 2005, as of 2018, the agency has 320 million Euro ("Key Facts," t.y.).

This transformation is also the case for the agency's institutional framework. Indeed, 2011 regulations, for instance, seek to reform Frontex through furthering the guiding role of Frontex within the joint operations, plan-making process, deployment of its expertise activities to the member states. Moreover, it made necessary the technic equipment contributions of the member states, enhanced its budget and diffused fundamental rights-sensitive approach to the institution through training activities, seminars and introducing common curriculum for border guards (Sagrera, 2014, p. 172). The process of extending Frontex's power has also continued to the present through the 2016 regulations. This latest amendment contains twenty-two tasks which vary from monitoring migratory flows, carrying out risk analysis and providing technical and operational assistance to member states and third countries to rapid border interventions and setting up forced-return escorts (Frontex, 2016, pt. 8). Accordingly, it can be said that the role of Frontex has changed over the years from an assistant to the active agent of the EU's external borders.

It is stated that the very first reference to the integrated border management (IBM) in the EU documents appeared in a planning document on Western Balkans' 2002-2006 period by the European Commission (Sert, 2013, p. 174). Basically, IBM

means that the harmonization of cross-border cooperation concerning border control activities in a modernized way which refers to the active usage of information technology among member states of the EU (Koslowski, 2003, para. 2). Moreover, it is also a system that transforms third countries' border management practices like Turkey (Sert, 2013, p. 179) as well as regulates border-issues between third countries like Ukrainian - Moldova border through EUBAM (Sagrera, 2014, pp. 170–171).

Under the article 4 of latest regulations of Frontex (2016), the IBM consists of eleven components including implementing border controls, conducting search and rescue operations, cooperation with member states, other EU agencies like EUROSUR and third countries 'which have been identified through risk analysis', use of large-scale information technologies. Moreover, trade and biology-related issues like 'good/custom controls' and 'inspection of live animals' and 'health checks for humans' are also the part of IBM (Sert, 2013, p. 174). In a way, IBM can be considered as the way of governing all inputs and outputs of the border-related issues.

3.2.11. Risk and Risk Analysis

Frontex's main political rationality is based on risk analysis. It is stated that risk analysis is the backbone of Integrated Border Management (Paul, 2017, p. 689). In other words, it is the governance tool that aims to not only manage international migration and borders but also coordinates member state activities through exercising risk analysis. Since it plays a critical role concerning Frontex's policing practices, there is a special need to evaluate what the risk and risk analysis means. These terms are officially defined in the guideline, which is called as Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM). According to CIRAM (2013), the risk is:

The magnitude and the likelihood of a threat occurring at the external borders, given the measures in place at the borders and within the EU, which will impact on the EU internal security, on the security of the external borders, on the optimal flow of regular passengers or which will have humanitarian consequences (p.4).

Thus, risk refers to three interrelated issues; a threat which can be calculated through magnitude and likelihood analysis, a vulnerability which is ‘determined by the capacity of a system to mitigate a threat’ and the impact is the practical effects of the threat on the objects that need to be secured like external borders (Frontex, 2013).




Figure 1. Frontex’s Risk Understanding
Source: Frontex, 2013, p. 5.

Frontex assesses risks based on these three factors through quantitative and qualitative methods (Frontex, 2013, p. 11). Risk analysts of Frontex use quantitative methods when there exist a large amount and sufficient data for a case. However, Frontex’s most of the risk analysis is based on qualitative methods since it is unlikely to get a sufficient amount of data for many cases. As seen, the amount of data plays a significant role in which ways risk will be assessed for Frontex risk analysts.

What do these policing practices stand for in terms of security logic? Critical Security Scholars have been discussing this question in many ways. Here, this thesis will just focus on the discussions regarding whether these practices are the way of conducting exceptionalist politics which justifies itself through the necessity for ‘urgent’ measures against offensive actions and normalization through risk logic which “represent a move away from the political spectacle of the security emergency in favour of a quieter and more technocratic approach” (Neal, 2009b, p. 348).

Sarah Leonard (2010, p. 231) argues that the main activities of Frontex can be considered as securitizing practices. She defined securitizing practices as the activities that convey the idea to those who observe them that the issue they are tackling is a security threat. In this frame, the author studied Frontex's six main tasks as different securitizing practices. According to the author, Frontex contributes the securitizing practices of the EU not just for its special activities such as training of national border guards, the conduct of risk analysis and the follow-up on border security-related research but also co-operation with the strong involvement of some EU member states (Léonard, 2010, p. 237). Although the author successfully illustrated some securitizing practices of Frontex like RABITs' (Rapid Intervention Teams) interventions to the 'urgent' crisis like sudden migratory flows, she failed to assess the effects of daily routines of Frontex.

On the other hand, according to Neal (2009b, p. 346), "FRONTEX was established not on the basis of securitization, exceptional politics, and urgency, but in response to the disintegration of a common EU response to migration, security, and borders." In other words, he challenges the idea that Frontex was not the outcome of securitization practices after 9/11 in the EU, but its failure. In line with this argument, the author (2009b, p. 349) argues that the risk analysis activities of the Frontex as evidence of normal politics, not exceptionalist since the risk is now a way of calculating the potential threats not 'intercepting' the threats. Moreover, he thinks that Frontex shows us, contrary to the assumption that 9/11 provided an exceptionalist discourse, its impact on migrants illustrates normalization and institutionalization of the so-called 'exceptional practices' or 'illiberal practices' in order to control migration and borders. Therefore, he rejects some scholars' ideas which are based on the 'securitization' concept, which directly addresses the decisiveness of exceptionalism on the political issues. This thesis agrees with the latter idea which argues that Frontex's practices embody a normalization through risk analysis since Frontex's risk-based governance is mostly about a more technocratic approach that gives an important place for security professionals' daily routines. These daily routines on risk analysis like data collection, risk assessment, and research activities mean a 'normalization' rather than exceptionalism. Indeed,

as can be seen from the table, Frontex conducts several daily routines regarding risk analysis so that be able to normalize its policing practices.




Figure 2. Periodical Risk Analysis of Frontex
Source: Lodge, 2010, p. 63.

Regine Paul (2017) provided a more systematic account of risk analysis that named as ‘risk-based governance’ regarding decision making processes on border-related issues. There, risk-based governance contains three crucial promises; a) efficiency/effectiveness, b) transparency, c) de-politicization. That is to say, while implementing risk-based governance, Frontex’s expectations are efficient and effective decisions which are aimed accountable and de-political actions to do not challenge member states in the context of border management.

Table 2. *Promises of Risk-Based Governance*

Promises of risk-based governance (RBG)	Functions associated with risk analysis in RBG literature	Risk-based institutionalisations of EU border control
Efficiency/effectiveness	Enables optimal use of scarce resources and prevention of societal risks, pre-empting blame for failure	RA 'sold' as compatible with austerity and NPM agendas in member states Explicit limitation of EU responsibility for low border risks Explicit limitation of EU-level accountability for failure
Transparency	Comparison of risks enables design of fair and predictable interventions, increases visibility of performance and entices benchmarking processes	RA used to foster benchmarking processes and incentivize member states to coordinate more and perform better
De-politicisation	RA enables 'technocratic' regulation which reduces political contestation Seeming 'neutrality' increases mutual trust in adversarial negotiations and facilitates solidarity among stakeholders	RA used to moderate conflicts between member states and EU-level actors RA used to address coordination impasses and distributional issues
Overall	Rationalisation of regulatory interventions and spending	'Rational' justification of EU-level coordination and substantiation of EU role in weakly integrated domain without challenging member state competencies

Source: Paul, 2017, p. 695.

Thanks to these promises, the EU has developed a more harmonized border control through these three 'rational' promises. Indeed, the European Union operationalizes these rationalities of risk analysis in many fields like EUROSUR activities, Schengen monitoring and evaluation practices and justifying the allocation of community funding. The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), for instance, labels certain parts of the borders as high risk and responsabilize and harmonize member states thanks to the legitimization process which is based on efficiency/effectiveness rationality. The risk assessment process also works for economic domain since the EU legitimizes allocation processes through risk analysis which are discursively based on de-politicized, transparent, efficient and effective rationalities (Paul, 2017, pp. 700–701). As a result, although the EU authorities consider risk analysis as a scientific way of governing subjects and taking decisions, it gives security professionals a room for maneuver concerning their power struggles. Moreover, these rationalities pave the way for cooperation among member states without forcing their competencies.

Before beginning the nexus between IBM and third countries, there is a need to present certain criticisms regarding Frontex's information technologies and risk analysis since they have certain problematic effects. In terms of information

technologies, Geyer (2008, pp. 10–11), for instance, claims that uneven participation of EU member states and non-EU member states raises questions about democratic control mechanisms of data systems. Moreover, these data systems treat certain irrelevant persons as potential criminals since the boundaries between crime-related issues and migration-related issues are ambiguous. In addition to this, technical problems may also occur. Control of data flows, for instance, has become a difficult issue due to the proliferation of authorities participated in these systems as source providers.

Criticisms are also the case for risk analysis. While studying the Frontex in the Greece-Turkey border zone, Burcu E. Koca (2014, p. 64) criticized the activities of Frontex due to its risk analysis methods and transparency-related problems. According to the author, grounding on risk analysis requires pre-emptive strategies which may easily deteriorate the fundamental rights of migrants since thanks to these strategies, migrants, smugglers, and terrorists may easily melt in the same pot by Frontex. The second problematic point from the point of the author is the transparency of Frontex. In this study, she criticizes invisibility of Frontex data collection methods, risk analysis systems, and reasons of actions which make difficult to question the impact of these practices on migrants.

3.2.12. Frontex' Relations With Third Countries

As stated, one of the two general consequences of securitization of migration is “the logic of externalization of migration control” (Üstübeci & İçduygu, 2018, p. 13). In parallel with this logic,

IBM has a strong focus on cooperation with third countries. Historically, since the Amsterdam treaty, there has been a growing emphasis on the cooperation with third countries (Ç. H. Benam, 2011, p. 232). Thus, cooperation with these countries has become the ‘integral part’ of IBM and ‘one of the strategic priorities’ of the Frontex (n.d.). As Ilkka Laitinen, which was the first executive director of Frontex, stated that:

We must understand that border security does not start and does not end at the border. It is just one area in which we are performing our duties. There should be no barriers between law enforcement in the Member States and Third Countries. In a way we are all on one side of the border together and on the opposite side are the criminal organizations who are exploiting and abusing people for their own purposes (Lodge, 2010, p. 13).

Ironically, although the agency always highlights that Frontex does not intervene sovereignty-rights of member states as well as third countries regarding border issues, the ex-director can argue that ‘there should be no barriers’ between law enforcement bodies.

The ‘legal’ framework of Frontex’s cooperations with third countries is based on ‘working arrangements.’ These working arrangements are also named as Memorandum of Understanding in certain cases. As of 2019, Frontex signed twenty working arrangements with third countries. In general, it can be said that main purpose of cooperations is reducing the number of people arriving the EU borders through promoting border management policies, strategies and technologies to third countries (Jones, 2017, p. 2).

The content of these working arrangements is mostly about the transfer of surveillance technologies which modernizes the border management systems of third countries (Carrera, 2007, p. 170). As will be evaluated in the following chapter, this is also the case for Turkish case, i.e. the working arrangement with Turkey which was signed in 2012 mostly focuses on technical assistance to Turkish authorities, engagement in the field of risk analysis and also information exchange like routes of migrants, new methods of smugglers, between the Frontex and Turkish authorities. Another point about these working arrangements is their non-binding character in legal terms. Thus, there is no obligation to fulfill these arrangements articles since they are not like international treaties. However, being non-binding is not the equivalent of practically ineffective. Rather, based on his interviewee from Frontex, Sagrera (2014), for instance, argued that this ambiguous character of working arrangements gives a room for maneuver to both the Frontex and its counterparts in practice. That is to say; both parts can utilize any point of the arrangement if the conditions are possible for both of them.

However, activities of the Frontex is not limited to the transfer of surveillance technologies since the agency implements many activities with third countries. The first activity is the establishment of the regional intelligence sharing and joint analysis networks including the Western Balkans Risk Analysis Network (WB-RAN), the Eastern Partnership Risk Analysis Network (EaP-RAN), the Turkey-Frontex Risk Analysis Network (TU-RAN), and the Africa Frontex Intelligence Community (AFIC). Second, the possibility of observer participation in the Frontex's operational activities. Third, the establishment of coordination points at the borders with specific countries. Fourth, Frontex offers a possibility of supporting coordinated joint operations based on the EU's international status agreement with the relevant country. Senegal's participation in the EU's joint operation HERA, for instance, is one of the examples of this form of cooperation. Fifth, the agency considers the EU funded technical assistance projects as complementary and expander activities for its cooperations. Finally, the Frontex's aims to establish liaison officers network in ten non-EU countries. In 2016, the first liaison officers came to Turkey and the next year Frontex also sent liaison officers to Niger and Western Balkans (based in Serbia). Furthermore, Frontex plays 'a cooperation broker' role between the EU member states and third countries', through the promotion of the Frontex Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM) and common training curriculums for border guards (Horii, 2015, p. 107).

However, there are two fundamental limitations for the Frontex's cooperation with third countries. These are the legally non-binding character of working arrangements, the EU and member states' right to have the last say when determining that which non-EU country Frontex should cooperate. Nevertheless, despite these structural limitations within the EU's security governance architecture, Frontex's seemingly technical activities can affect third countries through utilizing several tools like training activities, twinning projects, missions, capacity-building programs, study visits et cetera. The examples of the effects of Frontex's practices on third countries will be discussed in the next chapter, which scrutinizes the agency's cooperation with Turkey.

3.3. Conclusion

This chapter described the post-Cold War developments within the EU concerning the management of its external borders. As seen, after the introduction of the Schengen agreement, managing external borders have come to the fore. In this frame, from the 1990s to the mid-2000s, although the union did not establish an effective body for common border management, there existed several common information technologies for the Union like Schengen Information System and EURODAC, which had paved way for the establishment of Frontex. Indeed, these common information technologies can be seen as a step toward of the EU's Integrated Border Management (Neal, 2009b).

However, growing tensions in the post-Cold War era posed new problems to the union. Indeed the EU has faced with several problems like an increasing number of member states and therefore emerging new neighbors, increasing terrorist attacks to the western world after the 9/11 and so forth (Léonard, 2010). To cope with these problems, Frontex was established in 2004. Since then, the agency has conducted several activities including facilitation of cooperation among member states, management and interpretation of the huge amount of data, and so forth (Horii, 2015). In line with the EU's overall migration management strategy, i.e., tightening border controls and externalization of migration management, the agency also conducted several activities on third countries like the establishment of regional intelligence communities, deployment of liaison officers and missions.

While cooperation with member states and third countries, Frontex mostly insists on the harmonization of working methods based on its Common Risk Analysis Model like operationalizing common risk analysis. Paul (2017) argues that Frontex as 'chief risk analysts' of the Union legitimizes its decisions concerning several issues including allocation of financial resources and making joint operations and harmonizes border controls at the EU level. However, the question of whether Frontex harmonizes or at least changes third countries' border management still remains. The next chapter will scrutinize this issue with reference to Frontex's relations with Turkey.

CHAPTER 4

TURKEY'S BORDER MANAGEMENT

4.1. Introduction

From the establishment in 1923 to the present, border issues take a huge place in Turkey since there have occurred several migratory flows throughout its history (İçduygu et al., 2014). In the early days of the Republic, for instance, borders were seen as the honor of the country that should be definitely protected, and illegal circulation should be prevented (Aras, 2015, s. 23). By restricting 'illegal' circulation, state authorities have aimed to homogenize the population of this newly established nation-state. As Aras (2015) shows that, in order to construct a homogeneous population, Turkey has tried to regulate its borders through several technologies, including landmarks, mines, border control points concerning its political borders. However, the process had also witnessed certain legal regulations like settlement law (*İskan Kanunu*) in 1934 concerning encouraging migrants who had Turkish identity in the Balkans (İçduygu vd., 2014).

However, due to various reasons such as globalization process since the end of the 1970s, changing and intensifying migration patterns concerning Turkey and finally on-going Turkish accession process with the EU has changed Turkey's border management regulations. Furthermore, the existing 'Syrian refugee crisis' has once again lead to a change in Turkey's border management. As a result of all these political processes, it is possible to say that Turkey's border management is in an ongoing changing process since the late 1990s due to both domestic and international efforts. More specifically, the last few years have witnessed a relative

Europeanization concerning Turkey's migration policies (İçduygu et al., 2014; Özçürümez & Şenses, 2011).

In this chapter, Turkey's border management will be scrutinized in the context of EU-Turkey relations and discussed in reference to the research question of this thesis, i.e., what are the effects of Frontex on Turkey's border management? To do this, first, Turkish border authorities and their functions will be introduced. Then, since this thesis aims to examine Frontex's transformative practices on Turkey, the historical context of EU-Turkey relations will be presented with a specific focus on border issues. In the last part, Frontex's cooperation with Turkey will be evaluated to highlight the agency's effects on Turkish border management system.

4.2. Current Situation of Turkey's Border Management

It is often stated that Turkey has turned to be a destination and transit country thanks to the global and regional crisis like Islamic revolution in Iran, Saddam-related problems in the Middle East, the collapse of USSR and increasing globalization processes (İçduygu, 2011). As a result, Turkey's historical focus on borders has continued but intensified and changed to a certain extent since the late 1970s.

However, it is the fact that managing Turkey's borders is not easy due to several factors. In this regard, Deniz Sert (2013, p. 175) argues that Turkey's border management faces four critical problems which differentiate and complicate its management from the EU's border management. First, the physical conditions of borders, including mostly mountainous geography and harsh climate conditions, make the management of them difficult. Indeed, having 2949 km of land borders, which contains mostly harsh condition, Turkey faces a challenging situation in border management. Moreover, since Turkish coasts are quite close to the Greek Island, it is also difficult to deal with irregular human mobility in Turkey's 8,330 km sea coast (Kirişçi, 2007, pp. 19–20). Second, every border has its own local dynamics concerning control due to historical and economic relations of local border people with neighboring countries. Indeed, as Ramazan Aras (2015) shows that locals of border zone areas may deconstruct the borders through several tactics like

smuggling. Third of all, since issues of Turkey's border zone, contains several things from smuggling to terrorism, it is not always easy for border authorities to cope with them at the same time. Finally, he argues that many non-EU neighbors of Turkey have not effective border control capacity. As a result, it can be said that managing Turkish borders are quite complicated.

To manage its borders' different dimensions, several domestic bodies are responsible (Sert, 2013, p. 176). These bodies are 'Turkish National Police', 'Ministry of Interior', 'Ministry of Customs and Trade', 'Turkish Land Forces', 'Gendarmerie', 'Ministry of Agriculture', 'General Directorate of Primary Health Care Services' 'General Directorate of Border and Coastal Health', 'Turkish Coast Guard Command'. Thus, there are several bodies tasked with the management of borders in Turkey. Although all these actors play specific roles concerning different dimensions of border management, in terms of border security, critical actors are Turkish National Police, Turkish Land Forces, Gendarmerie and Turkish Coast Guard Command. Therefore, it is necessary to scrutinize them in a more detailed way. Main function of the Turkish National Police is regulating human mobility in the border gates (Akman & Kılınç, 2010, p. 19). As Passport Law of Turkey, which was introduced in 1950, requires, Turkish and Foreign citizens should present their relevant documents when they enter and exit from the Turkish territories (Sert, 2013, p. 176). In this frame, the department of border gates of Turkish police checks these documents and secure border gates. Turkish Land Forces are also responsible for border security. According to Article 2 of 3497 Law on the Protection and Security of Land Borders, one of the tasks of Turkish Land Forces is protecting and securing Turkey's land borders. Since the conflict with PKK still maintains its importance, it is possible to say that the Turkish Land Forces is one of the critical security professional concerning the management of borders. However, Turkey's border security responsibility belongs to Gendarmerie in the case of the Turkey-Iraq line and Hakkari's border with Iran (Akman & Kılınç, 2010). Thus, Gendarmerie can also affect border management of Turkey. Finally, since the application of Coastal Security Law in 1982, Turkish Coast Guard Command has become the responsible agent concerning the management of coasts, harbors, and the Bridges but not the ports (Sert, 2013, p. 177). After the huge amount of migratory flows occurred in the

mid-2010s, the importance of the Turkish Coast Guard regarding border management has once again increased.

4.3. EU - Turkey Relations in the Context of Border Management

Last two decades have witnessed important turning points for EU-Turkey relations. Indeed, from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s EU-Turkey relations, the relations had experienced its 'golden years' thanks to the EU's declaration on Turkey's status as a candidate country in the Helsinki summit in 1999, and efforts of Justice and Development Party to Europeanize Turkey (Yabancı, 2016, p. 2). As a result of these international and domestic efforts, Turkey had experienced a relative Europeanization in many policy fields (Tocci, 2005). However, the situation has gradually changed in a negative way since the mid-2000s, and the successive AKP governments have stopped Turkey's way toward the EU due to several domestic factors like the implicit or explicit conflicts between the Turkish army and AKP, violent responses against protests like Gezi Park Protests et cetera (Yabancı, 2016, pp. 2–3). At the end of the day, the voices from the EU argue that EU-Turkey relations cannot be considered with reference to accession (Saatçioğlu, 2019, p. 2). Moreover, as Şenyuva (2018) illustrates, Turkish public opinion's support for the EU membership has decreased, and now it is quite low for the last five years. All in all, it is possible to say that EU-Turkey relations have witnessed dramatic fluctuations in the twenty-first century.

In this context, one of the important dimensions of EU-Turkey relations is developing an harmonized migration policy throughout these years. In other words, Turkey has witnessed a Europeanization to certain extent regarding its migration policy. Although Europeanization is a contested term and it is difficult to determine a common definition for it (Olsen, 2002), this thesis benefits from the description of Radaelli (2006) who describes that:

Europeanisation consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies (p. 3).

In this regard, it is possible to argue that Turkey has witnessed a Europeanization to a certain extent regarding its migration policies including border management. To be more concrete on the Europeanization of Turkey's migration-related policies, this study utilizes the general framework of Özçürümez and Şenses (2011) who argue that Turkey's Europeanization can be defined as 'absorption with reservation'. As they stated, "there is 'absorption', which is the adjustment to and adaptation of European 'ways of doing things' but 'without real modification of the essential structures and changes in the "logic" of political behaviour' however, 'with reservation'" (p.246). All in all, as will be elaborated empirically below, EU plays highly important role concerning Turkey's migration-related policies.

While discussing the importance of Turkey for the EU, Kirişçi (2007, p. 2) evaluates three critical dynamics regarding the harmonization of immigration policy.. First of all, due to Turkey's geographical location, i.e., a neighbor of Middle East which contains several societal, political and economic problems, EU-Turkey borders may be easily affected by the massive migratory flows or terror-related activities. Therefore, Turkey' borders cannot be easily isolated from European borders. As Jack Straw , one of the leading British politicians said that the European borders end in Turkey's eastern borders ("Avrupa'nın sınırı Türkiye'nin doğusu," 2005). Second, in relation to the first, due to harsh conditions of Turkish borders; especially its eastern borders, there is a need for intense cooperation between two sides concerning the management of borders. The final reason for a harmonized migration policy is the existence of Turkish diaspora in the EU member states as well as concerns within the EU regarding possible membership of Turkey which will mean that the European citizenship of the huge number of Muslim people. Based on these factors, there have occurred many summits, meetings, speeches, formal or informal documents regarding Europeanization of Turkey's border management.

In this frame, Turkey's cooperation with the EU concerning combatting irregular migration can be traced back to its participation in the Budapest Process in July 1999 (1999). In the same year, the EU also declared that Turkey's candidate status and EU-Turkey relations have become more systematized. Thanks to the first 'Accession Partnership Document' in 2001, principles, priority areas for prospective

works were identified (Ç. H. Benam, 2011). The same year's 'National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis' (NPAA) document, there was an emphasis on the tightening border controls and actualization of Schengen requirements 'fully.' However, as Kirişçi (2007, p. 20) illustrates, there was no concrete strategy to accomplish such an aim in this paper. For the purpose of this thesis, one of the critical activity is Turkey's participation to the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration early warning system and deploying two army officers to monitor newly started data exchange in 2002 (Benam, 2011, p. 214). By participating in a European policing network, Turkish border guards had experienced European policing mechanisms at first hand and paved the way for contemporary activities like Turkish border officers' participation to Frontex operations as an observer in 2018. In 2003's NPAA, the emphasis has become more visible for migration management. Moreover, a newly established inter-departmental Task Force for migration management published three critical papers in 2003. These were "Strategy Paper on the Protection of External Borders in Turkey", "Strategy Paper on Activities Foreseen in the Field of Asylum within the Process of Turkey's Accession to the European Union (Asylum Strategy Paper)", and "Strategy Paper to Contribute Migration Management Action Plan in Turkey (Migration Strategy Paper)". Kirişçi (2007) considers the first document as the 'reference point for future efforts at harmonization.' Indeed, there exists a recommendation a civilian and professional border control body for Turkey which is still an issue. Moreover, the document did foresee the implementation of EU-assisted integrated border management project in 2003 ("Göç Strateji Belgesi," n.d.). In March 2006, Turkey's Integrated Border Management Strategy was introduced to absorb relevant EU standards (2006, p. 61). Moreover, in the following years, Turkey's department of border management benefited from three twinning projects called "Regional Support to the Update, Implementation and Monitoring of the Integrated Border Management Strategies and Related Action Plans and Development of Regional and Cross Border Initiatives in the West Balkans", "Action Plan on Integrated Border Management-Phase I-II" and "Training of Border Police". All of these twinning projects mostly contain training activities. It is stated that the 'Training of Border Police' had improved the international relations of border guards like specifically with Frontex (2011a, p. 37). In 2008 NPAA, the

priority was once again the implementation of Turkey's integrated border management through specifying a road map (*National Programme of Turkey for the Adoption of the EU Acquis*, 2008). More concretely, this document foresees the identification of legal challenges, determination of technical needs, improving personnel capacities, and harmonization with the EU's IBM strategy. As a result, Turkey has Europeanized its migration policy to different extents. According to findings of Özçürümez and Şenses (2011, p. 247), in terms of 'definition of the policy problem,' 'technical capacity,' and 'laws and legislation on the policy,' Turkey has experienced 'high Europeanization.' Furthermore, in terms of 'institutions' like the establishment of civilian units and 'new policy tools,' the changing speed is considered as 'low' by the researchers until 2011.

However, border management issues have once again prioritized since 2011 due to the catastrophic consequences of civil war in Syria. The demonstrations against the authoritarian Assad regime have turned out to be one of the most tragic events of the twenty-first century. Indeed, as of 2019, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (n.d.-b) announces that over 5.6 million people have fled Syria since 2011 due to the insecure atmosphere. Thus, Turkey's borders have become once again, an important topic for the EU since many Syrian have tried to seek asylum in the union. The responses toward these refugees have changed country by country in the EU as well as in the region. While Germany, for instance, has accepted many, and mostly young and skilled workforce, Syrians, the British government has accepted quite a few refugees who experienced traumatic experiences like sexually assaulted women, tortured men or unaccompanied children (Mavelli, 2017). In the region, Turkey announced its 'open door policy' for Syrian refugees, currently hosts about 3.5 million of them, while many gulf states have been criticized due to their approaches toward Syrian refugees (Stephens, 2015).

In this frame, it is possible to claim a 'tension' between EU and Turkey, i.e., one the one hand relations have gained momentum in terms of the need for harmonization of migration policies, and on the other hand, Turkey has systematically moved away from the EU accession (Karadağ, 2019). Indeed, while the Turkish government has

become more authoritarian since 2011 (“2018 Democracy Index,” n.d.), the country has experienced Europeanization of its migration policies.

More concretely, it is possible to say that the refugee crisis since 2011 has led to important changes for certain institutions and policy tools like the establishment of General Directorate of Migration Management (GDMM) and introduction of the readmission agreement between the EU and Turkey and the Law on Foreigners and International Protection in 2013. Thus, if one takes into account the latest developments concerning migration management, it is possible to argue that Europeanization has gained momentum even for institutions and new policy tools. It is also stated that the EU considers the Frontex’s role regarding EU-Turkey relations due to its flexibility even in the context of political tensions between counterparts (Dimitriadi, Kaya, Kale, & Zurabishvili, 2018). At the end of the day, Özçürümez and Şenses (2011, p. 246) argue that Turkey’s overall Europeanization of migration policies can be considered an ‘absorption with reservation.’

In terms of border policing, the EU expects three reforms from Turkey. First, there should be coordination among the responsible agents at the Turkish borders. Indeed, in many progress reports, the EU either highlighted the importance of cooperation among border units or suggested the coordination should be practically operationalized after the establishment of the coordination board for Integrated Border Management in 2010. As the Commission (2011c) stated: “Both the development of inter-agency cooperation and coordination and the establishment of a Border Security Agency are key for efficient border management” (p.92).

Second, the EU strongly emphasized the importance and implementation of risk analysis in the context of border policing. The very first emphasis on risk analysis has come to the fore in the Commission’s 2004’s progress report (2004). There, the body emphasized that:

There is a need to improve the production of statistics on law enforcement, risk analysis and performance indicators, develop crime prevention strategies in line with EU best practices, to establish a national police ethics code in line with the Council of Europe code, and to end the practice whereby *jandarma* escort prisoners to court appearances (p. 145).

Following this year, the EU has strongly suggested the application of risk analysis practices. As will be discussed in detail below, Frontex, which consider the risk analysis as the ‘brain’ of Frontex, has conducted several activities to promote risk analysis to Turkey on behalf of the union.

Thirdly, as argued, while Turkey’s legal framework, the definition of the policy problem and technical preparation processes regarding migration management are under the high Europeanization, it is also the case that there is a relatively weak Europeanization concerning institutional transformations (Ozcurumez & Şenses, 2011, p. 247). Here, the EU specifically insists that Turkey should establish a civilian unit which will be the main actor of the Turkish border management. Indeed, in its 2003, 2009, 2015 and 2019 progress reports, the Commission highlighted the importance of the establishment of civilian border units. In 2019 Progress Reports, for instance, the Comission (2019a) argued that:

In order to bring the country’s border management system more into line with the EU acquis, Turkey should adopt a law on integrated border management (IBM) and intensify its efforts to set up a civilian and professional border security agency which is specialized in border checks of persons at border crossing points and in border surveillance at land and sea borders (p. 50).

All in all, it is possible to argue that from the beginning to the present, twenty-first century have witnessed one the one hand, the EU’s regular demands on these three issues, i.e. coordination among border units, operationalization of risk analysis regarding border policing and establishment of civilian unit that will be the main actor of Turkey’s border management and on the other hand, Turkey’s efforts to reform these phenomena in line with the EU acquis.

However, these efforts are not immune from difficulties. Rather, above-mentioned Europeanization processes also contain several obstacles from both sides. While scrutinizing the EU’s twinning projects, for instance, Kirişçi (2007, p. 21) describes several problems of their implementation processes. In this frame, he claims that the EU complains about the lack of consensus on the form and timeline for the proposed national border agency. In addition to this, the Turkish side also stated several complaints about the identification of required legislative work and timeline for the

mentioned new border management institution. Moreover, Turkish officials had certain concerns about what the ‘civilian’ means since they considered the serious clashes between PKK and Turkish forces required highly militaristic preparations during the projects. In other words, while the EU conceptualize border management which focuses on regular and institutional practices that concerns the public security and order, Turkey’s perspective is more focused on the ‘narrow definition of national security’ that seeks to protect borders physically. Furthermore, he states that budgetary tensions which refer to EU’s reluctance to provide additional financial support for its proposed regulations were another reason that decreased the efficiency of twinning projects. As a result, EU-Turkey relations in the context of border management have witnessed both relative Europeanization as well as complaints from both sides.

4.4. Frontex’s Relations With Turkey

This thesis questioned whether Frontex’s external activities matter and aimed to highlight that Frontex’s micro-practices like training border guards and conducting projects can affect third countries like Turkey. To assess whether this argument is right, adoption of risk analysis was chosen as the criteria of making sense of Frontex’s external activities. In this frame, this section illustrates the activities of Frontex on Turkey and argues that Frontex’s activities change Turkey’s border management through spreading logic to a certain extent.

In this frame, although Frontex and Turkey officially agreed upon cooperation in 2012, the relations predate this year. In 2009, for instance, the Commission (2009) reported that “Turkey has shown efforts with a view to concluding a working arrangement with FRONTEX” (p. 75). In 2010, from the EU side, Frontex identified (2010, p. 3) Turkey as “the most important transit country for illegal migration to the EU.” As stated by Frontex in 2010’s ‘Annual Risk Analysis’ report:

The Eastern Mediterranean route is the route taken by illegal migrants transiting through Turkey and entering the EU through eastern Greece, southern Bulgaria or Cyprus. Turkey, due to its geographical position near the EU, is the main nexus point on this route. From Istanbul, illegal migrants may reach the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, or cross the land borders to Greece or to Bulgaria (p. 15).

As a result, in the first step, Frontex justified the deployment of the Rapid Border Intervention Team¹ (RABIT) due to the ‘vulnerabilities’ of EU-Turkey borders (2011d, p. 5). As of 2019, there exists 1500 officers and relevant equipment from Member states on the pool of RABIT’s so that they can be able to assist ‘immediately’ European states (n.d.-a).

In 2011, after the RABIT deployment, the Commission's (2011b) view on Turkey was as such:

Cooperation with Turkey is of fundamental importance. Frontex has informed the competent Turkish authorities about the launch and the scope of the RABIT operations. Bilateral talks between Greece and Turkey on both political and operational level took place as well, and there were promising signs that border control has been stepped up on the Turkish side of the border area. However, there is a clear possibility to further enhance operational cooperation with Turkey.

However, the Commission (2011c) also stated that Turkey needs to professionalize its border management, implement risk analysis at the local, national, and regional level, and be open for operational cooperation with Frontex.

As a result of the accumulations of the ‘vulnerabilities’ of Turkey’s borders, and aims of both side, counterparts conclude a working arrangement. Thus, Frontex’s cooperation with Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially, began in 2012, thanks to the “Memorandum of Understanding.” The document (2012) contains twelve points, and their overall aims are basically exchanging policing experiences, ‘strategic information,’ assisting Turkish authorities to increase their policing capacities against ‘illegal/irregular’ migrants.

What makes this document different than Frontex’s other working arrangements with third countries is its clearness. As stated, Frontex signed 20 working arrangements in total, but most of these documents simply highlight the importance of data exchange, technology transfer, and application of risk analysis. However, in the Turkish case,

¹According to Frontex, rapid intervention is “designed to bring immediate assistance to a Member State that is under urgent and exceptional pressure at its external border, especially related to large numbers of non-EU nationals trying to enter the territory of a Member State illegally” (n.d.-a). In this regard, the teams are deployed when ‘urgent and exceptional’ situations occur.

many points were elaborated in a clear way. While suggesting the exchange of strategic information, for instance, the document specifically defines what it contains as such:

- a. Activities that might be useful to improve integrated border management of the Member States of the European Union and of Turkey;
- b. Periodical statistical information related to border management;
- c. New methods challenging border security, facilitating illegal/irregular migration and cross border crime;
- d. Trends and developments in the methods used to commit cross-border crime;
- e. Observations and findings resulting from the successful application of relevant new aids and techniques;
- f. Routes and changes in routes used in particular in smuggling of migrants and illegal/irregular migration;
- g. Prevention strategies and methods for management, to define border security priorities;
- h. Threat assessments, risk analyses, and situation report.

In terms of the operationalization of risk analysis, the document (2012) suggests that “Frontex and the competent Turkish authorities may explore possibilities of increased engagement in the field of risk analysis between Frontex and the relevant Turkish authorities.” Moreover, it is also stated that “Participation of competent Turkish authorities, through appointing an expert in the field of risk analysis, in the meetings of the mutually agreed relevant regional Risk Analysis Network coordinated by Frontex, in accordance with their respective legislation” In this context, one of the four ‘regional intelligence-sharing communities’ of Frontex is Turkey-Frontex Risk Analysis Network (TU-RAN) (“Strategic Analysis,” n.d.). Following the working arrangement, firstly, data exchange started between Frontex and Turkey in 2013 (2013). Frontex justifies these regional communities as such:

Regional risk analysis networks represent an opportunity for mutually beneficial information and knowledge sharing between the EU and the participating countries on a continuous and structured basis. The knowledge generated within these networks feeds into the planning of participants’ own border management activities but also to higher level strategic and even EU funded capacity building activities (“Strategic Analysis,” n.d.).

In 2014, Frontex and Turkey signed a cooperation plan. Moreover, the EU started a 250.000 Euro budget twinning Project called “Establishment of a National Coordination & Joint Risk Analysis Center (NACORAC) and an Integrated Border Management Database.” According to justification section of this project, in case of isolation and mistrust among Turkish border authorities, ‘the only winners are the criminals, and the losers are the legal traders, rightful passengers, and the law-abiding Turkish citizens.’ Moreover, as a consequence of lack of integration and risk analysis, Turkey’s image

may be ‘tarnished.’ Thus, to overcome existing obstacles for Turkey’s border management, ‘experience of member states is needed via twinning light component.’

As a result, by activating this project, the EU aimed to:

provide the personnel, assigned at National Coordination and Joint Risk Analysis Centre (NACORAC), with proper risk and information management models, introduce the IBM concept to the assigned personnel and integrate this concept into their working methods in order to better facilitate legal movement of persons and goods while at the same time countering irregular migration and cross-border criminality through improved coordination, co-operation and collaboration in line with EU’s IBM policies and strategies.

General outcomes aimed in this project are the development of ‘efficient statistical infrastructure,’ the achievement of ‘saving of resources,’ the formation of ‘joint working culture’ and letting ‘planning for joint operations.’ More concretely, there were four expected results:

- 1- Know-how and experience regarding interagency coordination, data sharing, data protection, and risk analysis provided
- 2- Joint risk analysis/management model developed.
- 3- A guideline document which consists of coordination principles, working methodology and utilization of joint risk analysis/management model prepared.
- 4- IBM concept adopted and successfully applied, intra-service coordination improved.

Implementation of this project has utilized four activities; namely, ‘training activities’, ‘study visits’, ‘developing a joint risk/analysis/management model specific to Turkey’ and ‘preparation of a guideline document which consists of coordination principles, working methodology and utilization of joint risk analysis/management model for later use of NACORAC personnel. In the project, some of these activities were elaborated. While training activities, for instance, contains, ‘in-depth training’ on relevant EU acquis, IBM, the institutional framework of Frontex, Frontex and member state risk analysis models, study visits and the guideline are about coordination principles and working methodologies. Moreover, to assist the leader of this project, ‘Short Term Experts’ who are professional on many issues, including Frontex, information technologies, profiling of migrants, IBM et cetera were deployed. Following the end of this project, NACORAC was established in 2016. As a result of this project, the Regulation on Inter-Institutional Cooperation and Cooperation in the field of Border Management was introduced by the Turkish state. There, the tasks, duties, and institutional structure of the NACORAC was explicitly defined (*Sınır Yönetimi*

Alanında Kurumlararası İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Hakkında Yönetmelik, 2016). While the center has not ‘fully operationalized’ as of 2019, the existing gradual development efforts regarding its implementation show us that it will play a role for Turkey’s border management in the mid-term. Therefore, it is possible to claim that Frontex’s micro practice, directly and indirectly, have led to an institutional establishment in Turkey and affected the country’s border management. In other words, Frontex’s external activities matter beyond the EU borders.

In May 2015, the commission reported that Turkey improved its border cooperation with Greece and Bulgaria through signing a customs and police cooperation agreement which foresees the establishment of joint cooperation center at Capitan Andreevo border point Bulgaria. After a while, The Common Contact Centre was established on 25 November 2016 in Bulgaria’s border with Turkey. The commission promised that they will assist in implementing daily contacts between local borders. Thus, it is possible to expect that local Turkish border guards will continue to increase its relations to Frontex through socialization in local places like this Common Contact Centre.

During the mid-2010s, the Syrian refugee crisis had become more visible, and border management issues once again came to the top of the political agenda. In this context, Frontex deployed a liaison officer to Turkey to develop and facilitate operational cooperation and coordination between the counterparts in 2016. This was the first deployment of the agency to the non-EU countries. Thus, it is possible to claim that behind the decision of Frontex’ management board (2015) on the deployment of liaison officer, there existed four issues. Being an origin, transit and destination country of irregular migration, being a candidate country to the EU accession, growing importance of migration movements and Turkey’s intention to receive Frontex’s liaison officer. Thus, as the Commission (2016) stated, ‘cooperation intensified after the deployment of a Frontex liaison officer.’ Indeed, thanks to the liaison officer, operational cooperation between Frontex and Turkey was intensified in 2017 (2018a). Moreover, Frontex conducted training activities on risk analysis and data collection in 2017.

Another Frontex activity on Turkey was promoting ‘protection-sensitive migration management’ through an EU-funded Project in 2016 (n.d.). In this project, as part of the one of two chapters Project, Frontex aims to strengthen ‘identification’ and registration mechanisms and setting up a ‘referral framework’, harmonizing asylums systems with EU and finally establishing ‘appropriate non-voluntary return mechanisms’ of Turkey as well as six Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia). In other words, Frontex aimed to strengthen risk managements by illustrating how to conduct ‘screening procedures,’ data collection mechanisms, interpretation the info to identify migrants at risk as well as risky subjects. As part of this project, on May 2019, Frontex trained 250 experts from Western Balkans and Turkey (n.d.-a). Another critical step for the relations between Frontex and Turkey is Turkish border authorities participation to the Frontex-led joint operations as an observer (2019a). Thus, Turkish border guards have experienced European form of border policing at first hand through socialization. It is possible to expect that these activities will be more often than present If the on-going harmonization process continues between the EU and Turkey.

4.5. Conclusion

This thesis questioned whether Frontex matters beyond the EU borders or not. The overall findings of this chapter show that it matters. Indeed, despite the political turmoil between the EU and Turkey, Frontex’s relations with Turkey have increased over the years. As a result of ongoing cooperation, some Turkish border authorities were trained by the agency to adopt risk logic concerning policing the borders and implementing decision-making procedures. Thus, there exist certain subtle shifts in Turkey’s border management. First changing is the establishment and operationalization of NACORAC. Indeed, thanks to the center, while Turkish border authorities came together under a board, attempts on operationalization of risk analysis gained a systematical form. Second change is Turkish Gendarmerie’s and Coast Guard Command’s increasing focus on risk analysis and the elements of risk logic like preparation to the future threats, the necessity of cutting edge surveillance technology or efficient, effective and transparent decision-making procedures and

so forth. Indeed, Turkish Coast Guard Command decided to locate implementation of risk management into its 2019-2023 strategic plan (2018b). In the same vein, Turkish Gendarmerie established ‘Department for Fighting Against Migrant Smuggling and Human Trafficking’ to conduct ‘efficient’ and ‘transparent’ policing practices (2019b). In addition to this in another department, the Gendarmerie utilizes cutting-edge applications for risk profiling to unearth crime networks and smugglers. Therefore, it is possible to claim that Frontex’s main effects can be considered as spreading the elements of risk logic. Thus, the agency’s effects move beyond technicality and gains political aspects. Moreover, in line with Baker and Simon (2002, p. 18), this thesis claims that focusing on “what is done *in the name of risk*” will be more important than “what is risk” in the mid and long-term in Turkey.

However, this study contains important limitations. First of all, finding details of training activities, twinning projects, and other relevant documents are not easy to access. Thus, the study has benefitted from open access documents like progress reports, declared details of twinning projects, press releases, and so forth. Moreover, since this thesis studies a highly present issue, it is necessary to urge caution while claiming arguments due to the open-ended nature of relations between Frontex and Turkey. As a result, this thesis has just tried to highlight mostly tacit effects of Frontex on a third country like Turkey in the 2010s. Therefore, further studies with considering new data would be rewarding in the future.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis focused on Frontex's external activities to examine whether the agency's practices matter or not. In the literature, while there exist certain studies that highlight the importance of Frontex's practices on the harmonization of EU member state border controls, there are few studies which question whether the Frontex affects third countries border management systems. To fill this gap in the literature, this thesis scrutinized the agency's relations with Turkey and asked what are the effects of Frontex on Turkey's border management? In this frame, studying Turkish case considered highly rewarding issue since in the 2010s, Frontex's main focus has shifted to EU-Turkish borders due to massive migratory flows from the Middle East. In other words, since Frontex considered the EU-Turkish borders as quite 'risky' space, the agency has conducted several activities to restrict the movements of immigrants through cooperating with Turkey.

It is possible to say that the relations between Frontex and Turkey have enhanced in the 2010s. Based on the EU's insistence on data exchange and operationalization of risk analysis within Turkey's border management, counterparts have made several activities. In this frame, Turkey signed a Memorandum of Understanding, aka. the working arrangement which contains strategic information exchange and utilization of risk analysis with Turkey in 2012. Thus, Turkey and Frontex started to exchange data on immigrants' location, routes et cetera from 2013 onwards. In this period, Turkey-Frontex Risk Analysis Network (TU-RAN) was also established. Finally, the project of National Coordination and Common Risk Analysis Centre (NACORAC), which is dedicated to establishing a center for implementation of risk analysis was started in 2016. In the same year, Frontex decided to send its liaison

officer to Turkey as well. This was the first time that the agency deployed a liaison officer to the third country. Thus, the relations have once again intensified. Finally, Turkish border authorities participated in Frontex-led joint operation and experienced the agency's policing practices at first hand.

Through focusing on Frontex's micro-practices on Turkey like training activities and projects, this study argues that Frontex promotes the elements of risk logic to the Turkish border authorities. Indeed, there are certain indicators concerning the utilization of risk logic within Turkish border authorities. Indeed, the establishment of NACORAC under Turkey's Ministry of Interior, Turkish Gendarmerie's new department to combat human trafficking and migrant smuggling which utilizes some elements of risk-based governance and finally Turkish Coast Guard Command's decision to implement risk management for policing practices.

Based on Foucauldian risk view which considers risk as a performative phenomenon, this thesis claims that adaptation of risk logic regarding border management is not a technical but political issue since it changes the way of governing subjects at the borders. Indeed, it is possible to expect certain power effects from the spread of risk logic within Turkish border authorities. In this frame, border authorities may focus on pro-active policing to prevent 'possible' crimes before it occurred. Secondly, since operationalization of risk analysis requires certain amount of data, policing practices may rely more on new surveillance technologies to extract the details of human mobility. Moreover, increasing reliance on technology and data may increase the role of certain groups within security professionals like risk and data analysts. These are some possibilities of the ongoing tendencies in Turkey's border management. At the end of the day, end results will be determined by power struggles among security professionals as well as politicians in the future.

Thus, Turkish border authorities' adaptation to the Frontex-promoted risk analysis in the short, mid and long-term should be studied in a critical way. In this regard, this study only focused on subtle changes in the 2010s in Turkey.

Nevertheless, this study contains several limitations. First of all, the claims of this thesis should be checked with new practices of the Frontex and Turkish border authorities since the on-going relations are based on politically open-ended processes. That is to say; this thesis just describes a tendency within Turkey's border management; i.e., operationalization of risk logic. Secondly, since the primary resources of this thesis are based mostly on open-access state documents, finding, and claims of this thesis need different checks from other data resources like interviews and observations. Thirdly, this thesis only focused on Frontex's activities on Turkey and did not compare the agency's other relations with third countries like Ukraine or Western Balkan countries. However, the agency's relations changes country by country due to several factors like the union's political, economic, or social relations with the country. Thus, it is also necessary to discuss whether Frontex matters in other neighbor countries and compare all these findings.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

FRONTEx TRKİYE İŞBİRLİĐİ: TEKNİK OLANIN TESİNDE

Bu tez Avrupa BirliĐi'nin sınır gvenliĐinden sorumlu birimi olan Frontex'in Trkiye'yle olan işbirliĐini incelemektedir. Bu bağlamda tez, yrtlen kimi işbirliĐi pratiklerine odaklanarak, Frontex'in aktivitelerinin teknik bir mesele olmanın tesine getiĐini ve kimi iktidar etkilerinde bulunduĐunu iddia etmektedir. Bylelikle de tez, literatrde hakim grş olan, Frontex'in birlik yesi olmayan lkelerle kurduĐu ilişkilerin etkilerinin sınırlı olduĐu yaklaşımdan farklı bir argman sunmaktadır. DiĐer bir deyişle, tezde Frontex Trkiye işbirliĐinin, Trkiye'nin sınır ynetiminde risk mantıĐını yaygınlaştıarak, farklı bir ynetim tarzına doĐru evrilttiĐi savunulmuş ve Frontex'in veri deĐişimi ve risk analizi uygulamalarına ynelik mikro aktivitelerinin teknik olanın tesine geebildiĐi gsterilmeye alışılmıştır.

Bu bağlamda tezin ilk blm, literatrde Frontex'in c lkelerle olan ilişkilerine dair literatr taramasına, daha spesifik olarak ilgili alışmalarda Frontex Trkiye işbirliĐinin disiplin ierisindeki yerine ayrılmış ve Frontex'in neden 'etkili' bir aktr olarak grnmediĐinin yanıtları aranmıştır. Burada Satoko Horii'yi (2015) takiben, ana akım argmanın arkasındaki iki yaygın kanı aktarılmıştır. İlk olarak bir AB kurumu olarak Frontex'in temelde birlik yesi lkelerin sınır ynetimlerinde bir uyumu merkeze aldıĐını dolayısıyla onun etkinliĐinin ancak AB'nin sınırlarına kadar olan alanda anlamlı olabileceĐi, bu yzden de AB sınırlarının tesindeki pratiklerinde Frontex'in benzer bir etkililiĐinden sz edilemeyeceĐi kanısıdır. İkinci olarak ise, Frontex'in c lkelerle ilişki kurarken imzaladıĐı mutabakat

zaptlarının ağırlıklı olarak veri akışı, risk analizi ya da teknoloji transferi gibi teknik meselelere odaklı olmasından hareketle, ajansın pratiklerinin basitçe teknik prosedürlerin yürütülmesinden öte bir anlam taşımadığı kanısıdır. Ayrıca yine mutabakat zaptlarıyla ilgili olarak, söz konusu bu metinlerin hukuki bir bağlayıcılığı olmamasından hareketle, mutabakat zaptı çerçevesinde yürütülen Frontex pratiklerinin sınırlı etkilere sahip olduğu düşüncesidir. Bütün bu kanıların sonucu olarak da Frontex'in üçüncü ülkelerle kurduğu ilişkiler ve çoğu kez teknik gibi görünen ajansın bu ülkelere yönelik yürüttüğü aktivitelerin iktidar etkileri literatürde yeterli şekilde değerlendirilmemiştir.

Bahsi geçen bu argümanların ne derece yaşanan pratikleri anlamaya yardımcı olduğunu görmek için çalışma, Frontex'in Türkiye'yle olan işbirliği faaliyetlerine odaklandı. Avrupa Birliği'ne yönelik uluslararası göç hareketlerinde çok önemli bir geçiş ülkesi olarak Türkiye, ajansın yıllık risk analizi raporlarınca 2010'dan itibaren önceliklendirilmiştir. Türkiye'nin ajans tarafından bu önceliklendirme durumu genelde Arap baharı özelde de onun bir parçası olarak Suriye'de yaşanan gelişmeler sonucunda artan uluslararası göç hareketleriyle daha da kuvvetlenmiştir. Gerçekten de Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği'ne (BMMYK) (n.d.) göre, Suriye'de yaşanan iç savaşın yıkıcı etkileri 5.6 milyon insanın Suriye'yi terk etmesine sebep olmuş ve bu bağlamda bölgedeki insanlar, yaşamlarını sürdürebilmek için güvenli bölgelere göç etmiştir. Bu sürecin sonucu olarak da hem Suriye'ye komşu ülkeler hem de Avrupa Birliği'ne üye ülkelere yönelik önemli bir uluslararası göç akışına şahit olunmuştur. Artan uluslararası göç AB içerisinde hali hazırda var olan göçün yönetilmesinde güvenliği ön plana çıkartan stratejileri daha da yaygınlaştırmıştır. Bu çerçevede artan göç akışlarının düzenlenmesi ve sınırlandırılması için birlik hem sınır yönetimindeki polisiye tedbirleri arttırmış hem de AB'ye komşu ülkelerin sınır yönetimi kapasitelerinin arttırılmasına odaklanan pratikleri yürürlüğe sokmuştur. Sınır yönetiminde polislik pratiklerinin AB düzeyindeki uygulayıcı ajansı olarak da Frontex, mevcut göç akışını kontrol edebilmek için hem kurumsal kapasitesini güçlendirerek birlik düzeyinde uyumlu bir Entegre Sınır Yönetimi'ni uygulamaya çalışmış hem de Türkiye gibi birliğe komşu üçüncü ülkelerin sınır yönetimi kapasitesini arttırmaya yönelik uygulamaları devreye sokmuştur. Türkiye'nin bahsi geçen konjonktürdeki özel durumundan ötürü

de Frontex'in üçüncü ülkelerle olan ilişkilerinin etkilerini anlamlandırmak için kritik bir vaka olduğu tespiti yapılmıştır. Bu çerçevede tezin araştırma sorusu, 'Frontex'in Türkiye'nin sınır yönetimine etkilerinin neler olduğu' olarak belirlenmiştir. Teknik olana ve uygulayıcılık karakterine sıklıkla referans veren Frontex'in faaliyetlerinin etkilerini analiz ederken, tezde analiz birimi olarak onun pratiklerine odaklanılmıştır. Tezde bu pratikleri analiz ederken de Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplini içerisinde pratikleri analiz etmek ve yorumlamak için kullanılan 'pratiği izleme' (practice-tracing) metodu kullanılmıştır (Pouliot, 2015).

Tezin ikinci bölümü, tezin teorik ve kavramsal çerçevesine ayrılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, yönetimsellik, güvenlik ve risk kavramlarına odaklanılmıştır. En geniş çerçevede yönetimsellik, tezin konu ettiği sınır yönetiminde uluslararası işbirliği ve uyum meselelerini açıklamak için kullanılmıştır. Konvansiyonel anlamda devlet-merkezci egemenlik anlayışıyla ilişkilendirilen sınır yönetimi ile ilgili meselelerin, farklı aktörlerin taktiklerinin, stratejilerinin ve uluslararası işbirliği pratiklerinin odaklarından biri haline gelmesi sebebiyle, farklı kavramsal çerçevelerle anlaşılması gerektiği tespitinden hareketle yönetimsellik kavramının kullanımının gerekliliği savunulmuştur. Bu bağlamda, göç yönetimi üzerine çalışmalarıyla da tanınan Didier Fassin'in (2011) yönetimsellik tanımından faydalanılmıştır. Bu tanım, nüfusun farklı boyutlarına yönelik olarak işleyen kurumları, prosedürleri, eylemleri hesaba katması ve analizde çeşitli siyasal teknolojilerin fonksiyonlarını değerlendirmesi sebeplerinden ötürü çalışmanın konu ettiği meseleye uyumlu görülmüştür. Bu bölümün ilerleyen alt başlıklarında yönetimsellik kavramının tanımlanması, Uluslararası İlişkiler literatüründeki yeri ve tezdeki fonksiyonunun aktarılmasından sonra, bu genel yaklaşımın güvenlik meselelerine yansımaları detaylandırılmıştır.

Yönetimsellik kavramının güvenlik konularına yaklaşımı noktasında, yönetimselliğin sosyal bilimlerde yaygınlaşmasında anahtar figür olan Fransız sosyal kuramcı Michel Foucault'nun çalışmalarından ilham alan, başta Didier Bigo ve Jef Huysmans olmak üzere, alanın önde gelen isimlerinin güvenlik meselesine yaklaşımı ortaya koyulmuştur. Eleştirel güvenlik çalışmalarında 'Paris Okulu' olarak da adlandırılan bu yaklaşıma göre güvenlik, ontolojik bir gerçeklik olmaktan ziyade, çeşitli söylem ve pratiklerle kurulan bir fenomen olarak değerlendirilir. Bu

perspektif, Kopenhag okulunun dil edimleriyle kurulan güvenlikleştirme yaklaşımlarından farklı olması sebebiyle ayrılır çünkü Paris Okulu pratiklere, özellikle de güvenlik profesyonellerinin pratiklerine özel bir anlam atfeder. Öyle ki, Bigo (2002) güvenliğı tanımlarken ‘güvenlik tedirginlik yöneticilerinin yapıp ettikleridir’ der. Görüldüğü üzere güvenliğe dair bilginin üretilmesi ve işlemlerin uygulanmasında kurucu bir rol oynayan, ancak çoğu kez, yapıp ettiklerinin daha örtük olması sebebiyle analizlerde ihmal edilen güvenlik profesyonellerinin analize katar. Dahası bu yaklaşım güvenlik profesyonellerini yalnızca askerler ve polisler olarak değerdirmmez. Bunların yanında görünürde güvenliğin üretilmesinde doğrudan bir rol oynamayan ancak gündelik pratiklerinde yaptıkları veri üretimi, dolaşımı ve yönetimi konusundaki işlemleriyle çeşitli öznelerle dair risk değerdirmesi yapabilen veri analistleri, risk analistleri ya da konsolosluk departmanları gibi birimleri de güvenlik profesyonelleri başlığı altında değerdendirir. Dolayısıyla söz konusu güvenlik analizi konvansiyonel anlamların ötesinde bir çeşitliliğı ve derinliliğı barındırır. Böylesi bir yaklaşımla da, tezde odaklanılan Frontex’e ve onun uzmanlarınca yürütölen aktivitelere dair bir kavramsal zemin oluşturulur.

Teorik çerçevede detaylandırılan üçüncü kavram ise risk kavramıdır. Risk meselesi, hem yukarıda bahsi geçen güvenlik yaklaşımında hem de Frontex tarafından merkezi meselelerden biridir. Soğuk savaş döneminde ‘tehdit’ler ve onların yok edilmesi üzerine kurgulanan güvenlik yaklaşımından farklı olarak Soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde yaygınlaşan risklerin ‘yönetilmesi’ ve ‘azaltılması’na odaklanan yeni güvenlik yaklaşımı literatürde Frontex’in polislik pratiklerinin (Neal, 2009) ve karar alma mekanizmalarının (Horii, 2016) açıklanması için de kullanılmıştır. Gerçekten de Frontex, kendi faaliyetlerinin ‘beyni’ olarak gördüğü ‘risk’ kavramına özel bir anlam atfetmektedir (Lodge, 2010). Risk kavramının çalışmadaki bu merkeziliğinden ötürü, literatürdeki üç farklı risk yaklaşımı karşılaştırılmıştır. Bu yaklaşımlar rasyonalist, Beckci ve Foucaultcu risk yaklaşımlarıdır. Geleceğe dair bir problemin rasyonel prensiplere dayanarak tespit edilmesi ve etkilerinin kontrolüne dayanan rasyonalist yaklaşım riske yönelik geleneksel yaklaşımı tasvir eder. Diğer bir deyişle rasyonalist risk yaklaşımı, riskin teknik bir gerçeklik olduğunu ancak gelecekteki teknik problemin ölçülebileceğini ve yaratacağı negatif

etkilerin yönetilebileceğini öngörür. Ancak bu yaklaşım köklerini Ulrich Beck'in çalışmalarından risk toplumu tezi tarafından eleştirilmiştir. Beckci risk yaklaşımında çağdaş risklerin geç modern toplumlarda üç kritik öneme haiz özellik gösterdiğini iddia etmiştir (Beck, 2006). Bu üç özellikten ilki çağdaş risklerin etkilerinin belli bir toprak parçasının ötesine geçmesidir. Bu çerçevede örneğin Çernobil gibi bir nükleer sızıntının etkileri sadece belirli bir toprak parçasında değil çeşitli yollarla başka yerlerde de etkilerini gösterebilmektedir. Çağdaş risklerin ikinci özelliği ise etkilerinin rasyonel bir şekilde kolayca hesaplanamamasıdır. Dolayısıyla örneğin 11 Eylül saldırıları ve onun dünya siyasetine etkileri basit bir teknik hesabın ötesinde olmaktadır. Çağdaş risklerin üçüncü ve son karakteri ise yarattığı etkilerinin tazmin edilemeyeceğidir. Bu özelliğe örnek olarak ise iklim değişimi örnek verilebilir. Gerçekten de halen içinden geçtiğimiz iklim krizi belli bir dereceye ulaştıktan sonra hem geri dönülmez olabilecek hem de telafisi mümkün olmayan etkileri olabilecektir. Görüldüğü üzere Beck'in risk toplumu, rasyonalist risk yaklaşımından farklı bir risk anlayışı ortaya koyar. Üçüncü yaklaşım ise yine Foucault'nun çalışmalarından alan yazarların risk yaklaşımıdır. Foucaultcu risk yaklaşımı olarak değerlendirebilecek bu yaklaşımda Beckci tezlerden farklı olarak risk bir hakikat olarak görülmez. Diğer bir deyişle bu yaklaşım, riski, tıpkı güvenlik gibi, inşa edilmiş bir mefhum olarak görür. Dolayısıyla bu yaklaşımda aslolan riskin gerçekte ne olup ne olmadığından ziyade, belirli aktörlerin hangi işlemleri risk adına yürürlüğe koyduğudur (Baker & Simon, 2002). Yani risk performatif bir fenomen olarak değerlendirilir ve analizde odaklanılan husus riskin ne olup ne olmadığından ziyade risk adına harekete geçirilen taktikler, stratejiler ve aktörler bütünüdür.

Tezin üçüncü bölümünde Avrupa Birliği'nde soğuk savaş sonrasında sınır yönetimi ile ilgili yaşanan gelişmeler, Frontex'in kuruluşu ve fonksiyonları incelenmiştir. Schengen anlaşmasının yürürlüğe girdiği 1990'lı yıllardan itibaren ortaya çıkan AB'nin dış sınırlarının yönetimi olgusu aynı tarihsel periyotta ortaya çıkan yoğun uluslararası göç hareketleriyle giderek önceliğini arttırmıştır. Bu bağlamda birlik yaşanan sorunlarla mücadele etmek için dış sınır kontrollerinin sıkılaştırılması ve göç yönetiminin dışsallaştırılması olmak üzere iki temel stratejiyi yürürlüğe soktuğu tespitinden hareket edilmiştir (Üstübcü & İçduygu, 2018). Gerçekten de soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde bir yandan farklı sınır pratikleri devreye sokularak güvenlikçi bir

sınır yönetimi paradigması güç kazanırken diğer yandan da göçmenlerin birlik topraklarının dışında yönetilmesi için üçüncü ülkelerin göç yönetimi kapasiteleri arttırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu çerçevede bir dizi söylem ve pratik devreye sokulmuştur. Bölümde söz konusu bu stratejiler, birliğin tarihinde rol oynayan önemli anlaşmalar, programlar ve olaylar eşliğinde incelenmiştir. Bu incelemelerde özellikle AB üyesi olmayan ülkelere yönelik vurgular açığa çıkartılmış ve tarihsel bir bağlam içerisinde birliğin göç yönetimi konusunda üçüncü ülkelere yaklaşımı aktarılmıştır. İlgili tarihsel süreç aktarıldıktan sonra da 2004 yılında kurulan Avrupa Birliği'nin sınır koruma ajansı Frontex'in kuruluşundan bugüne işlevleri, pratikleri ve üçüncü ülkelerle kurduğu ilişkiler detaylandırılmıştır.

Frontex'e dair çerçevede ilk olarak ajansın kuruluşunun arkasındaki faktörler olarak 11 Eylül sonrası artan güvenlik endişeleri, AB'nin yaşadığı genişleme süreçlerinden sonra artan üye devlet sayısına paralel şekilde gelişen yeni dış sınırlar ve yeni komşuluk ilişkilerden söz edilmiştir (Léonard, 2010). Ayrıca, Avrupa Birliği'nin soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde biriken sınır problemlerine dair kurumsal düzeyde çözümler üretmeye çalışan Frontex'in giderek artan sayıda ve önemli görevler üstlendiği iddia edilmiştir. Gerçekten de birlik yaşadığı reformların ardından bütçesini ve kurumsal eyleme kapasitesini giderek arttırmış ve sorumluluk sahasını günümüze gelene kadar giderek geliştirmiştir. Bu çerçevede eleştirel yazını takiben Frontex'in AB üye devletlerinin sınır kontrollerinde belirli bir uyumlulaşmayı sağladığı savunulmuştur. Daha sonrasında da ajansın temel etkinlik alanları olarak üye devletler arasında ve üçüncü ülkelerle yürütülen işbirliği faaliyetleri, sınır yönetiminde ortak standartlar geliştirme ve polislik faaliyetlerinde elde edilen verilerin risk analizi vasıtasıyla yönetilmesi tespitleri yapılmıştır (Horii, 2015). Ardından ajansın hem polislik faaliyetlerinde hem de karar alma mekanizmalarında çok önemli bir rol oynayan risk ve risk analizi mekanizmaları detaylandırılmıştır ve Frontex'in riski, tehditlerin, hassasiyetlerin ve etkilelerin bir fonksiyonu olarak gördüğü aktarılmıştır. İlgili tanımları takiben risk analizi pratiklerinin Frontex içerisindeki polislik faaliyetlerine dair rolü Andrew Neal (2009)'ın eleştirel çalışmasından faydalanılarak Kopenhag okulunun güvenlikleştirme kavramının imlediği istisnailiğe dair süreçten ziyade Foucaultcu güvenlik literatürünün ortaya koyduğu gündelik pratikler normalleştirmeyle ilişkili olduğu savunulmuştur.

Frontex'in risk mantığının ikinci fonksiyonu olan karar alma mekanizmalarında 'risk-temelli yönetim' kavramı Regine Paul'ün (2017) çalışmasına referansla aktarılmıştır. İlgili başlık altında risk mantığının polisliğe ve karar alma mekanizmalarına dair ikili işlevi aktarıldıktan sonra ajansın üçüncü ülkelerle olan işbirliği faaliyetlerine dair genel bir çerçeve çizilmiştir. AB'nin dışsallaştırma stratejisi altında Frontex'in üçüncü ülkelerle yaptığı çalışmaların oldukça önemli bir yer teşkil ettiğinden söz edilmiştir. Bu bağlamda ajansın, birliğe üye olmayan ülkelerle mutabakat zaptları üzerinden ağırlıklı olarak teknoloji transferi ve veri paylaşımına dair ilişkiler geliştirdiği aktarılmıştır. Bu ilişkilerin dışında ajansın Batı Balkanlar Risk Analizi Ağı, Afrika Frontex İstihbarat Topluluğu gibi bölgesel düzeyde istihbarat ağları kurduğu, çeşitli ülkelere irtibat görevlileri gönderdiği, çeşitli ülkelere yönelik eğitim programları ve projeler yürüttüğü de aktarılmıştır. Sonuç olarak üçüncü bölüm, AB'nin sınır yönetimi konusunda üçüncü ülkelerle işbirliğine özel bir önem verdiğini ve Frontex'in de önemi gerçekleştirmek için operasyonel düzlemde önemli roller oynadığını göstererek, son bölümde gösterilecek olan Frontex-Türkiye ilişkilerine yönelik çalışmanın genel zeminini hazırlamıştır.

Tezin dördüncü bölümü genel olarak Türkiye'nin sınır yönetimine ayrılmıştır. Bu çerçevede bölüm içerisinde ilk olarak Türkiye'nin sınır yönetiminde karşılaşılan yapısal sorunlardan söz edilmiştir. Gerçekten de uzun kara ve deniz sınırları boyunca uzanan engebeli arazileri ve sert iklim koşulları, özellikle AB üyesi olmayan komşularının sınırlı sınır yönetimi kapasiteleri ve sınır bölgelerinde yaşayan insanların sınırın karşı tarafında yaşayan insanlarla olan tarihsel ilişkileri ve bundan kaynaklanan kimi düzensiz sınır geçişleri Türkiye'nin sınır yönetiminde yaşanan yapısal nedenler arasında değerlendirilmiştir. Bu sorunlardan söz edildikten sonra Türkiye'de sınır yönetiminde söz sahibi olan kurumlardan bahsedilmiştir. Burada özellikle sınır yönetiminde ağırlıklı olarak polislik faaliyetleri yürüten Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, Jandarma, Sahil Güvenlik Komutanlığı ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin görev ve yetkileri sunulmuştur. Bu bölümleri takiben AB-Türkiye ilişkilerinin 21. Yüzyıldaki dalgalı seyri özetlenmiş ve özellikle 2010'lu yıllarda yaşanan siyasi problemlere rağmen özellikle göç politikalarında yaşanan göreceli Avrupalılaşma süreçleri aktarılmıştır. Gerçekten de 2000'li yılların başındaki pozitif

siyasi atmosfer aynı on yılın sonlarına doğru giderek bozulmuş ve bugün itibariyle sık sık problemler ve krizlerle anılan bir hale gelmiştir. Buna rağmen göç yönetimi gibi iki tarafın da operasyonel işbirliğinin anlamlı olduğu kimi durumlarda Türkiye’de göç yönetiminde görece bir Avrupalılaşma yaşanmıştır. Bu işbirliği durumunun sınır yönetimine yansımaları ise çalışmada AB’nin düzenli olarak 1998’den beri yayınladığı ilerleme raporlarını takiben analiz edilmiştir. Bu bağlamda ilerleme raporlarında yapılan taramaların sonucunda birliğin sınır yönetimi konusunda Türkiye’den üç reform talebi özetlenmiştir. Bu talepler mevcut durumda çok sayıda aktörün sınır yönetimi ile ilgili konularda söz alması sebebiyle bu aktörler arasında bir entegrasyon mekanizmasının sağlanması, sınır yönetiminde çağdaş risk analizi pratiklerinin uygulanması ve günün sonunda sınır yönetiminin askeri kurumlardan ziyade sivil bir üniteye devredilmesi olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Bu süreç çerçevelendirildikten sonra bölüm Frontex-Türkiye işbirliğinin bir analizini yapmıştır.

Frontex’in yıllık risk analizi raporlarında 2010’dan itibaren göç hareketlerindeki pozisyonu nedeniyle Türkiye önceliklendirilmiştir (2010). Bunu takiben ilişkiler yoğunlaşmış ve Türkiye ile Frontex arasında mutabakat zaptı 2012 yılında imzalanmıştır. Mutabakat zaptı temel olarak stratejik bilgi değişimi ve risk analizi pratiklerinin yaygınlaşmasını hedeflemiştir. Söz konusu metnin Frontex’in diğer ülkelerle imzaladığı mutbakat zaptlarından, detayları ve somut karakteri sebebiyle ayrıldığından söz edilmiştir. Bunu takip eden yılda iki taraf arasında veri değişimi başlamıştır. Bu süreç içerisinde aynı zamanda Frontex Türkiye risk analizi ağı (TURAN) kurulmuştur. 2014 yılında da Frontex ve Türkiye arasında bir işbirliği planı imzalanmıştır. Aynı yıl, AB destekli bir eşleştirme projesi olan “Ulusal Koordinasyon ve Ortak Risk Analizi Merkezi ve Entegre Sınır Yönetimi Veritabanı Kurulumu” başlamıştır. Projede Frontex pratiklerinde merkezi konumda olan risk analizi pratiklerine yönelik bir çaba, ilgili uzmanlarca gösterilmiştir. Proje’nin 2016 yılında bitmesinin sonucunda Ulusal Koordinasyon ve Ortak Risk Analizi Merkezi (UKORAM) kurulmuş ve bahsi geçen risk analizi ve veri değişimi amaçları kurumsal bir zemin kazanmıştır. Yine 2016 yılında ‘Sınır Yönetimi Alanında Kurumlararası İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Hakkında Yönetmelik’ yürürlüğe girmiş ve hem UKORAM’ın hukuki zemini oluşturulmuş hem de riske dair kavram ve

tanımlar netleştirilmiştir. Kurum, 2019 itibariyle henüz tamamen operasyonel hale gelmemişse de yaşanan gelişmeler sonucunda UKORAM'ın orta vadede sınır yönetimi noktasında önemli roller oynayabileceğinden söz edilmiştir. Mayıs 2015'te Türkiye, Bulgaristan ve Yunanistan arasında imzalanan gümrük ve polis işbirliği anlaşmasının da Frontex-Türkiye işbirliğini arttırabileceğinden söz edilmiştir.

Frontex-Türkiye işbirliğinin önemini gösteren bir başka olay ise 2016 yılında Frontex'in Türkiye'ye gönderdiği irtibat görevlisidir. Gerçekten de Frontex'in AB üyesi olmayan bir ülkeye gönderdiği ilk irtibat memurunun adresi olması sebebiyle Türkiye'nin ilişkilerdeki önemi ortaya konulmuştur. Bu gelişme metinde, Suriye iç savaşı sonrasında gelişen yoğun uluslararası göçle ilişkilendirilmiştir. İşbirliği pratiklerinde son olarak 2016 yılında başlayan ve Frontex'in yürütücülerinden biri olduğu 'Korumaya Duyarlı Göç Yönetimi' projesinden söz edilmiştir. Batı Balkanlar ve Türkiye'deki göç yönetimlerinde çeşitli reformları hedefleyen projenin çeşitli eğitim pratiklerinden söz edilmiştir. Proje en son olarak, Mayıs 2019'da bahsi geçen ülkelerden 250 uzmanın eğitimini gerçekleştirmiştir. Aynı yıl yaşanan bir başka gelişme ise Türkiye'nin Frontex tarafından yürütülen bir operasyona gözlemci olarak katılmasıdır. Böylelikle Türk sınır güvenliği birimleri birinci elden Frontex'e ve onun polislik pratiklerine dair deneyim elde edebilme imkanı bulmuştur.

Sonuç bölümünde söz konusu pratiklerin Türkiye'deki sınır yönetime etkileri, Türkiye'deki sınır yönetiminden sorumlu aktörlerin bir kısmında yaşanan değişimler etrafında tartışılmış ve bahsi geçen risk mantığının yaygınlaştığına dair bulgular paylaşılmıştır. Bu bulgular ışığında da Frontex'in Türkiye sınır yönetiminde risk mantığını yaygınlaştırdığı iddia edilmiştir. Bu çerçevedeki ilk bulgu Ulusal Koordinasyon ve Risk Analizi Merkezi'nin (UKORAM) kurulması ve operasyonel kapasitesini henüz tamamına erdirmese de arttırmasıdır. Bugün İçişleri bakanlığı bünyesinde bulunan merkez 2019 itibariyle hala bütünüyle operasyonel bir işlev kazanmadıysa da son yıllardaki gelişmeler kurumun yakın bir zamanda belli işlevlere sahip olacağını göstermektedir. Bu işlevlerin başında da kurumlar içi ve kurumlar arasında sistematik veri edinimi, paylaşımı ve risk analizi vasıtasıyla yönetilmesi gelmektedir. Yine bununla ilgili olarak sınır yönetimi ile ilgili hukuki zeminin oluşturulması ve riske dair kavram ve tanımların yapılması da bulgular

arasında değerlendirilmiştir. Gerçekten de 2016 yılında yürürlüğe giren ‘Sınır Yönetimi Alanında Kurumlararası İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Hakkında Yönetmelik’ sayesinde hem sınır yönetimine dair işbirliği ve koordinasyon usûlleri ve ilgili kurumlar gerekli hukuki çerçeveyi kazanmıştır. Bunların dışında Sahil Güvenlik Komutanlığı’nın 2019-2023 stratejik planına dayandırılarak, sahil güvenlik pratiklerinde risk mantığının yaygınlaşma eğiliminden söz edilmiştir. Kurum bünyesinde yürütülen polislik pratiklerindeki eksiklikler risk analizinin olmaması sebebine bağlanmış ve bu sebeple ‘önleyici ve koruyucu güvenlik hizmetleri’ne önem vermek için söz konusu yıllarda harcanmak üzere önemli bir bütçe tahsisi gerçekleştirilmiştir. Burada risk analizi pratiklerinin operasyonel hale getirilebilmesi için bütçenin çeşitli teknolojik ekipmanlara ve personel eğitim proğralarına ayrılması öngörülmüştür. Son olarak da Jandarma Genel Komutanlığında yaşanan dönüşümlerden söz edilmiştir. Daha spesifik olarak ise hem Jandarma Genel Komutanlığı içerisinde kurulan ‘Göçmen Kaçakçılığı ve İnsan Ticareti ile Mücadele Daire Başkanlığı’nın risk-temelli yönetim mantığının elementleri olarak değerlendirilen ‘etkinlik’ ve ‘hesap verilebilirlik’ vurguları ele alınmış ve söz konusu risk mantığının jandarma içerisinde de yaygınlaşmaya başladığı iddia edilmiştir. Toparlanacak olursa, Frontex’in Türkiye sınır yönetimine yönelik temel etkisi olarak risk mantığının çeşitli elementlerini yaygınlaştırması olduğu iddia edilmiştir.

Çalışmada ayrıca böylesi bir değişimin teknik bir mesele olmanın ötesinde çeşitli iktidar etkileri gösterebileceğinden söz edilmiştir. Gerçekten de risk mantığının yaygınlaşması önleyici polislik stratejilerini devreye sokması, risk analizlerinin belirli miktarda veriyi gerektirmesi sebebiyle veri elde etmeye yönelik gözetleme mekanizmalarına olan ihtiyacı arttırması ve hem ortaya çıkan bu verileri yönetmeye ve işlemeye yönelik hem de bu verileri elde etmeye yarayan teknolojileri kullanmaya yönelik uzmanlık iddiaları sebebiyle güvenlik profesyonelleri içerisinde belirli birimlerin konumunu ön plana çıkarabilme olanaklarıyla teknik olanın ötesinde etkiler gösterebilmektedir. Türkiye’de de risk analizi etrafında gerçekleşen hareketliliğin böylesi iktidar etkileri göstermesinin beklenebileceği tezde savunulan hususlardan biri olmuştur. Dolayısıyla ilgili literatürdeki genel kanı olan Frontex’in

üçüncü ülkelerle kurduğu ilişkilerin sınırlı olduğu iddiasından farklı olarak Frontex'in önemli etkileri olduğu ve yakın gelecekte de olabileceği savunulmuştur.

Bütün bunların yanında çalışmanın çeşitli sınırlılıklarından da söz edilmiştir. Çalışmanın ilk sınırlılığı Frontex'in üçüncü ülkelerle ilişkisine dair bu tez çalışmasının sadece Türkiye örneğine odaklanması sebebiyle karşılaştırma imkanlarından faydalanılmamasıdır. İkinci olarak söz konusu tez çalışması yalnızca açık erişime uygun birincil kaynaklardan faydalandığı için doküman anlamında ciddi sınırlılıklarla karşılaşmıştır. Ayrıca tez yalnızca 2010'lu yıllarda yaşanan gelişmeleri ele almış dolayısıyla yalnızca kimi örtük değişimlerden ya da eğilimlerden söz edebilmiştir. Günün sonunda, tezin temel iddialarından biri olan Frontex'in Türkiye ile olan işbirliğinin iktidar etkilerine yönelik argümanlarının gelecekte yapılacak çalışmalarla sınanması gerekliliği ifade edilmiştir.

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