

DOKUZ EYLÜL UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (ENGLISH) PROGRAM
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE MIGRATION
GOVERNANCE: GHANA CASE

Ishmael ADJEI

Supervisor
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sevilay Zehra AKSOY

2025

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this doctoral thesis titled as “International Climate Migration Governance: Ghana Case” has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honour.

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ABSTRACT
Doctoral Thesis
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
International Climate Migration Governance: Ghana Case
Ishmael ADJEI

Dokuz Eylül University
Graduate School of Social Sciences
Department of Political Science and International Relations
International Relations (English) Program

Recently, it has been common to witness people leaving their homes, communities and countries because of climate stress. These forced movements burden states with climate-induced migrants, who are expected to increase in the future. However, there are clear gaps between the official actions and public expectations in climate migration governance. Using Ghana as a case study, this study explores the relationships between climate change and migration governance. It examines how climate migration can be better governed by including relevant actors and institutional mechanisms for cooperation with a liberal institutionalist perspective. While Ghana recognizes climate-induced migration, it does not give the due priority to cooperating effectively with the relevant institutions and stakeholders for sustainable solutions. The study's novelty is its call to incorporate a bottom-up approach into the present top-down approach in migration governance architecture by means of including all relevant stakeholders and institutions. Also, cooperation between Ghana and other actors, especially within the sub-regional (ECOWAS) and regional (AU) levels is critical. However, this cooperation is characterized by a prisoner's dilemma (PD) situation where individual actors benefit from cooperation but have the tendency to defect (free ride) in expectation of more benefits from acting selfishly in the short-term. The PD situation is associated with the voluntary nature of agreements on migration issues and with the absence or weakness of institutional mechanisms to enforce these agreements. A prospective solution to deal with the

violations and free riding is to establish a climate migration governance with binding norms and rules supported by effective monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms. Moreover, the study defends that, structural barriers to Ghana's migration governance, such as coordination problems, inadequate funds, weak institutions and domestic political influence, should be addressed to strengthen the existing domestic frameworks and institutions, so that they can cooperate more meaningfully with their regional (and global) counterparts.

Keywords: Climate-migration, Ghana, Africa, Liberal Institutionalism, Cooperation, Governance.



ÖZET

Doktora Tezi

Uluslararası İklim Göçü Yönetiřimi: Gana Vakası

Ishmael ADJEI

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Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İliřkiler Anabilim Dalı

İngilizce Uluslararası İliřkiler Doktora Programı

Son zamanlarda, insanların evlerini, topluluklarını ve ülkelerini iklim baskısı yüzünden terk etmelerine şahit olmak yaygın hale geldi. Gelecekte daha da artması beklenen bu iklim kaynaklı zorunlu göç hareketleri devletlere yük teşkil etmektedir. Ancak iklim göçü yönetiřiminde resmi icraatlar ve kamuoyunun beklentileri arasında belirgin farklar mevcuttur. Gana'yı vaka incelemesi olarak kullanan bu çalışma, iklim deęiřiklięi ve göç yönetiřimi arasındaki iliřkileri arařtırmaktadır. Ayrıca bu çalışma, liberal kurumsalcılık çerçevesinden ilgili aktörler ve kurumsal mekanizmaların iř birlięi içine dahil edilerek iklim göçünün daha iyi nasıl yönetilebileceğini incelemektedir. Gana iklim kaynaklı göçü kabul etmekle birlikte, sürdürülebilir çözümler için ilgili kurumlar ve paydařlarla etkili biçimde iř birlięi yapmaya gerektięi öncelięi vermemektedir. Çalışmanın özgünlüęü, göç yönetiřimi yapısındaki mevcut yukarıdan-ařaęı yaklařıma ařaęıdan-yukarı bir yaklařımın dâhil edilmesi için ilgili tüm paydařlar ve kurumların içeriilmesi için bir çağrı yapmasıdır. Ayrıca, Gana ve dięer aktörler arasındaki iř birlięi, özellikle bölge-altı (ECOWAS) ve bölgesel (AU) düzeylerde, çok önemlidir. Ancak bu iř birlięi, bireysel aktörlerin iř birlięinden fayda elde ettięi, fakat bencilce hareket etmeleri durumunda kısa dönemde daha fazla fayda elde edecekleri beklentisiyle kaçma (bedavacılık) eğilimine sahip oldukları tutsak ikilemi (Tİ) durumuyla karakterizedir. Tİ durumu, göç sorunlarına iliřkin anlařmaların gönüllülük esasına dayanması ve bu anlařmaların hayata geçmesini saęlayacak kurumsal yapının eksiklięi veya zayıflıęıyla iliřkilidir. İhlâller ve bedavacılıkla bařa çıkmak için olası bir çözüm,

etkili takip ve yaptırım mekanizmaları tarafından desteklenen bağlayıcı norm ve kuralları olan bir iklim göçü yönetişiminin tesis edilmesidir. Çalışma ayrıca, mevcut yerel çerçeveleri ve kurumları güçlendirmek için Gana'nın göç yönetişiminin önündeki koordinasyon sorunları, yetersiz finansman, zayıf kurumlar ve iç politik nüfuz gibi yapısal engellerin de ele alınması gerektiğini ve ancak bu şekilde bölgesel (ve küresel) paydaşlarla daha anlamlı iş birlikleri kurulabileceğini savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İklim Göçü, Gana, Afrika, Liberal Kurumsalcılık, İş Birliği, Yönetişim



INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE MIGRATION GOVERNANCE: GHANA CASE

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ABBREVIATIONS

AfCFTA	Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement
AMR	Africa Migration Report
AU	Africa Union
AU-MPFA	AU Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action
BoS	Battle of the Sexes
CMS	Centre for Migration Studies
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FMP	Free Movement Protocol
GAYO	Green Africa Youth Organization
GCM	Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
GCIM	Global Commission on International Migration
GCM	Global Compact for Migration
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFMD	Global Forum on Migration and Development
GG	Global Governance
GIPC	Ghana Investment Promotion Centre
GIS	Ghana Immigration Service
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Government International Aid Agency)
GMG	Global Migration Groups
GNCM	Ghana National Commission on Migration
GNAP	Ghana National Adaptation Plan
GoG	Government of Ghana
GSS	Ghana Statistical Service
HLD	High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development

ICM	Inter-governmental Committee for Migration
ICMPD	International Center for Migration Policy and Development
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Center
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGC	Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum and Immigration
IGOs	International Governmental Organizations
ILO	International Labor Organization
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organizations
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IOM-WMR	International Organization for Migration World Migration Report
LI	Legislative Instrument
LNHCR	League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
NMP	National Migration Policy
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OAU	Organization of Africa Unity
PD	Prisoner's Dilemma
PDD	Platform on Disaster Displacement
PICMME	Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe
PSWPS	Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme
RCP	Regional Consultative Processes
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
STDs	Sexually Transmitted Diseases
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
WHO	World Health Organization

WRM	World Migration Report
WWII	World War Two



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INTRODUCTION

Since the dawn of humanity, migration has been one of the most common rituals in societies. Humans continue to migrate within and across borders to adapt to many stresses, such as environmental disasters, conflicts and climatic and economic conditions. Despite the other drivers of migration, climate-induced migration is becoming increasingly serious. Although the impact of climate change on human mobility is not new in many states, an alarming increase has been observed in the past few years. Some studies also report that the effect of climate change on human habitats will continue to influence migration patterns in the future (Clement et al., 2021; Oakes et al., 2023; Abu et al., 2014; Chazalnoel and Randall, 2022; Rigaud et al., 2018; Simonelli, 2016; Foresight, 2011).

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center's (IDMC) report, by the end of 2022, there were 60.9 million internal displacements globally. Of these, 32.6 million were caused by climate-related disasters and 28.3 million by conflicts, representing 53% and 47% of the total global displacement, respectively. Although conflict has been a major driver of global internal displacement, climate-related displacement has been increasing in recent years (IDMC, 2023: II-III). The alarming rate of climate mobility has increased the attention and interest of researchers, the public and policymakers (Oakes et al., 2023). While some people use migration as an adaptation strategy to climate shocks, others lack the means or are unwilling to migrate despite climate stress (Clement et al., 2021; Foresight, 2011; Teye et al., 2021). Although findings and projections indicate that many climate migrants are found within and expected to move within their national borders, many are crossing and will cross international borders, as in the case of the Pacific Islands (Simonelli, 2016:9; Clement et al., 2021:9-10).

Additionally, although there are differences in the effects of climate events, including the magnitude and severity, many places are affected by drought, desertification, rise in sea level, sea erosion, flooding, changes in rainfall patterns, tropical storms and temperature changes (Foresight, 2011:38). These slow- and sudden-onset events continue to influence migration patterns around the world. Despite the urgency of climate change and its impact on human mobility, the concept

has become a political lacuna with never-ending dialogues and no clear solution to address related issues. The question that arises is how long humanity, especially vulnerable individuals, can survive under slow and impractical policies? Also, until when can vulnerable people continue to contemplate how to move safely or wait to die? These questions probably require another century of uncountable doctoral dissertations to be investigated. It is important to remind stakeholders that climate change and its impact on migration is not a foreign zombie, unrealistic folktale, or fictional threat. Realities are felt and heard every day. Hence, using Ghana as a case study, this study examines the connection between climate change and migration, its implications and how to establish a better institutional approach to govern climate migration despite all the barriers and challenges.

While it has been established that climate-related disasters have forced more people to move over the past few years than conflicts (IDMC, 2021:8; 2022:2), there has been inadequate committed consensus to protect climate migrants like refugees. Although the climate migration situation is expected to increase (Hugo, 2008; IDMC, 2021a; Van der Vliet and Biermann, 2022; Mbow et al., 2017; Clement et al., 2021), the time of mass climate migration flow is unpredictable (Jakobsson, 2021). The unpredictability of the surge has influenced leaders' political will as well as a flexible mandate (Simonelli, 2016:7) for urgent actions. Despite the urgency of climate migration, the international community has yet to develop global legal structures and norms for its governance (Simonelli, 2016:5).

Using migration as a means of adapting to climate change has, therefore, become a major concern that needs to be addressed by global governance systems to find solutions to unpredicted as well as planned climate migration. Strategies to govern the situation must address the use of clear definitions and responsibilities (Simonelli, 2016:5-6). Global institutions are needed to support governments that do not have the capacity or fail to pay considerable attention to the needs of climate migrants (Simonelli, 2016:6-7). Moreover, the international community is responsible for climate-displaced people. Such responsibility can be exercised by joining forces for collective action (Draper, 2021:322). Collective efforts from governments and relevant local, national, regional and international actors are important to promote global governance on climate migration. Ensuring such collaboration has not gained the

attention needed from many states because of the priorities given to responsibilities to cut carbon emissions (Simonelli, 2016:7-8). The most visible effort of the international community seems to be a struggle for international compensation for migrants (Jakobsson, 2018:13).

Even though climate change threatens and forces people to move out of their places of origin, a global consensus to define the movement and collective norms for protection has yet to be established. While climate stress makes large numbers of individuals migrate either voluntarily or forcibly, not all individuals decide to migrate or have the means to migrate (Foresight, 2011; Simonelli, 2016; Clement et al., 2021; Teye et al., 2021). At this juncture of the century, the international community needs to do more to translate policies into workable and committed actions than holding many conferences, workshops or forums, which have become something like funfairs and talk shows. Due to the absence of specific global norms to effectively protect climate-displaced populations, climate migrants are currently considered under international soft and human rights laws (Kaelin, 2019:257-8). Operationalizing under this umbrella continues to expose climate migrants to incoherent regulations at national, regional and international levels.

Although the power to determine specific migration policies continues to be an autonomous domain of individual sovereign states (Betts, 2011:1-2), issues surrounding concerns have made us understand how states operate in anarchy and protect their sovereignty (Reus Smit and Snidal, 2008:33). Understanding how state and non-state actors cooperate to deal with climate change that continues to affect human migration is essential. Considering migration as a strategy for adaptation and long-term resilience is important; however, it depends on how it is managed by individual countries, origins and destinations to maximize the benefits. For instance, although people will move to adapt, rural-urban migration will be a major issue that will put much pressure on cities, especially those in developing countries that face several challenges to meet the needs of their populations (Foresight, 2011:10). Furthermore, if migration is unplanned or occurs under circumstances in which climate migrants relocate to environmentally dangerous areas, they may face additional problems. Moreover, poor governance of climate migration can lead to more irregular migration issues (Foresight, 2011, 66-67; Clement et al., 2021: xxii). Therefore, states

must enhance their governance of climate-related migration. Although some states and agencies such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are making efforts to govern migration due to climate impacts, the absence of a specific global framework for protection and a well-defined responsibility either by individual states or the international community hinders smooth governance (Simonelli, 2016:6-7). The future projections concerning climate migration as well as the current situation points to the urgent need for contemplating upon solutions (Simonelli, 2016:139).

Studies such as Betts (2010; 2011), Betts and Kainz (2017), Geiger (2020), Kainz and Betts (2021), Gisselquist and Tarp (2019), Mayer (2013), Panizzon and Van Riemsdijk (2019), Sahin-Mencutek (2022) and Geddes (2024) have concentrated on migration governance at the global level. Others, such as Cristini et al. (2020), Dick and Schraven (2018) and Geddes and Scholten (2016), pay attention to regional migration governance. Lavenex and Piper (2022) and Gisselquist and Tarp (2019), on the other hand, have paid attention to global and regional dynamics. However, a literature gap exists regarding specific institutional focus and policies on climate migration governance. Additionally, stakeholder roles have not been explicitly defined in existing studies. Therefore, Ghana is used as a case study to explore climate migration governance concerning existing realities and specific institutions. There is a need to explicitly define the roles of stakeholders and to make the case for inclusive engagement among relevant stakeholders.

In this century, climate change appearing on major news headlines has become one of the most challenging phenomena threatening human lives and mobility within and across borders (IOM, 2022; Clement et al., 2021; Foresight, 2011). Arguably, developed countries contributed more to climate change because of their industrialization process in the past and the emissions from their industries, and thus they have a historical responsibility for the current situation (Falkner, 2016: 1110). However, the least developed countries that contributed less to climate change suffer more because of their inability to cope with the adverse effects of that change (Byravan and Rajan, 2006; Teye et al., 2021; Amakrane et al., 2023). This highlights the need for *climate justice* to compensate the climate-induced displacements from the global South (Draper, 2021: 322-23).

Several claims have been made concerning the number of people who will migrate by the year 2050 and the end of the 21st century because of climate threats from drought, high temperatures, rising sea levels and floods. It is argued that many people will be forced to move because of water shortages and food crises (Foresight, 2011; Rigaud et al., 2021; Clement et al., 2021; IOM, 2023; IDMC, 2023). Since all countries are and will be affected, though differently, by climate change, they have a responsibility toward global climate governance, because of their contributions to that change in one way or another. This aligns with the "principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities" (Falkner, 2016:1116), which aims to bring together developed and developing states to address climate change and related issues (Allan et al., 2023:917).

Migration, as widely observed, can contribute to countries' development through remittances (which help to improve livelihood and reduce poverty), provides a labour force, promotes networks between individuals and states and makes other socioeconomic contributions (IOM, 2020). Arguably, effective migration governance will help yield more benefits. This research aims to focus on climate migration governance, emphasizing building upon and strengthening existing institutions with clear mandates to govern. Globally, migration governance has not been effective because migration has been overly politicized. Migration issues have been treated predominantly as individual state issues, as many countries seek to deal with migration by focusing on political, social and security issues (Betts, 2018; Delgado et al., 2013; De Haas, 2012). However, the world needs effective global migration governance to address migration concerns, especially to uplift human rights and dignity. As De Haas emphasized, migrants alone cannot address their migration issues. Effectively addressing migration-related challenges requires an active role for stakeholders (De Haas, 2012:8).

In the case of Ghana, it is observed that climate migration affects the vulnerable in hotspot areas, who mostly find it difficult to move or cope with climate extremes; governments have failed to address migration caused by climatic factors because of the weakness of institutional and cooperative mechanisms. Additionally, climate migration significantly impacts Ghana's performance in achieving Agenda 2030 UN sustainable development goals (SDGs). Climate change affects migration,

and this situation can have an adverse effect on the SDGs if stakeholders fail to implement the relevant urgent measures (see discussions in Chapter 4, subsections 4.1 and 4.2).

Ghana is experiencing frequent droughts, desertification and rising sea levels, leading to coastal erosion, flooding and high temperatures. These factors cause internal migration from the Upper West Regions to Southern Ghana, movement from coastal towns to inland and urban centres and other internal displacement issues (IOM, 2019; Prosper and Khan, 2018; Teye, 2022; Issifu et al., 2022). Nevertheless, there is inadequate internal management and stakeholder attention to regulate these movements. Hence, the associated challenges have yet to be resolved.

Human mobility in Ghana is surely not a new phenomenon; however, climate change in recent years is causing more people to move, especially from northern regions and coastal areas to inland communities. It is also projected that more people are likely to move from the Northern regions of Ghana to other parts of the country because of increase in drought (Teye, 2022; Prosper and Khan, 2018; Teye and Owusu, 2015; Abu et al., 2014). These climatic factors have caused a population increase in Southern Ghana, thereby increasing pressure on limited resources and infrastructure. The abnormalities in climatic conditions have also been noted as forcing some people to migrate and live in unbearable conditions, threatening their human rights (Abu, 2011; Teye and Owusu, 2015; Gravesen et al., 2020). It is also noted that rising sea levels continue to force people in coastal areas in the Keta district of the Volta region to migrate to inland areas of the district and other parts of the region (Teye, 2022). These changes will also continue to increase existing livelihood challenges in inland communities.

Aside from climate migrants who move within Ghana, pastoralists/herders (livestock farmers), seasonal and long-term migrants from neighbouring countries, such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Togo, move to Ghana due to climate stress. Some Ghanaian people also move from Ghana to do seasonal jobs because of climate stress (Teye and Owusu, 2015; Teye, 2021). Although there is no reliable data on their numbers, interviews revealed that cross-border migration between Ghana and its neighbouring countries has been ongoing for a long time. However, there have not been any institutional mechanisms for cooperation among neighbouring countries to

govern cross-border climate migration. Like many parts of Africa, the increasing impact of climate change on human mobility in Ghana requires a critical analysis of barriers that hinder strong institutional mechanisms and cooperation. Chapter 4 reveals that, free riding is a major issue in migration governance in Ghana. The inadequate mechanisms to address and coordinate climate-related migration make climate migrants more vulnerable in the Ghanaian context. Therefore, improving migration governance and establishing better mechanisms to govern climate migration through cooperation with and inclusion of relevant state and non-state actors are central concerns of this dissertation.

Concerned with the better governance of climate migration, collective action is considered as an important strategy to address various issues regarding climate mobility. This is particularly essential to support the weak states and poor hotspot communities. As defined by Ostrom, collective action "occurs when more than one individual is required to contribute to an effort to achieve an outcome" (Ostrom, 2004:1-2). In case of climate change, "no country is immune to the effect of climate change" (Cantor et al., 2024:15). While there is no global pact to regulate climate mobility, what then is needed is collective efforts to address both immediate and long-term issues, because the expected future impact of climate migration is unknown, in terms of which countries will be the most affected or more prone to climate shocks which may force people to migrate.

Climate change and migration problems cannot be solved in isolation in terms of protecting the environment and safeguarding vulnerable migrants (Mayer, 2016:374). Addressing issues of concern through collective efforts could help build capacities and develop relevant strategies and action plans. Individual states' strategies to obtain self-benefit will yield lesser benefits for all in the short term than joint efforts to benefit all in the long term. For Ostrom, independent action leads to less benefit compared to acting collectively. However, while collective action can help solve issues affecting partners, it is not devoid of problems (Ostrom, 2009: 186-7).

According to Hasenclever et al., "collective action problem exists when following the imperatives of individual rationality may lead, paradoxically, to collectively suboptimal outcome" (Hasenclever et al., 1997:45). Additionally, this problem occurs when specific issues such as those related to actions and attitudes of

actors raise concerns to deal with a cooperative agenda (Martin, 1992:767). Institutions may have shortcomings due to collective action problems in making decisions. However, this does not make cooperation to achieve a common goal unimportant. Also, cooperative institutions do not aim to achieve relative gains but rather help attain common benefits (Lall, 2023:1-2). Recognizing the importance of cooperation, some partners take advantage of larger groups by free riding (Ostrom, 2009:189; Martin, 1992:767). While free riders benefit from important public policies, they fail to participate in their implementations (Francisco, 2010:1). A typical example concerns the implementation of the ECOWAS free movement protocol and the AU agenda that aims to promote continental free movement of citizens. Although members of ECOWAS enjoy the benefits of free movement, contributions towards the full implementation of policies and programs are still lacking (Adaawen, 2017:8-9).

Nonetheless, despite the slow attitude toward implementing specific collective policies, establishing appropriate institutions to monitor the actions of members can help actors coordinate and cooperate better on issues of concern (Hasenclever et al., 2000:3-4). Effective institutional monitoring of state behaviour reduces certain costs such as those related to information-sharing that constitutes a barrier before genuine cooperation (Lall, 2023:4). Moreover, group cooperation helps increase the resources needed to address underlying problems (Ostrom, 2009:189-192). Although individual preferences may lead to non-cooperation sometimes, *ad hoc* agreements can be established to deal with individual-specific preferences that may influence effective cooperation (Hasenclever et al., 2000:15).

Lack of binding norms and different state preferences influence Ghana and its partners. These challenges to effective collective action are characterized by PD problems. Although, to some extent, the situation may resemble the coordination problem represented by the 'Battle of the Sexes' (BoS), where partners have different preferences but choose cooperation over separation, this is not really the case because if partners do not converge around agreed preferences, cooperation becomes meaningless. In the absence of penalties, Ghana and its partner states have tendency to free ride. On the other hand, climate migration governance itself can be considered a 'public' or 'club' good (see discussion in Chapter 1: section 1.1.2). Its provision

requires binding norms backed by threats and sanctions to punish and exclude those who cheat (Nordhaus, 2020: 14).

Conventions may help cooperation but may be ineffective without proper monitoring and enforcement measures. The latter necessitates centralized mechanisms, which, in the long run, may facilitate a strong regime to address issues of concern (Martin, 1992: 770-71). Centralization can begin at the regional level, where actors have similar issues and interests (Hollifield, 2011: 234). Cooperation in a large group is difficult because some members may free ride if it involves public goods. However, if free-riders are threatened with being deprived of benefiting from the public good, they may be forced to contribute (Snidal, 1985: 929-30).

A migration regime may be problematic sometimes; however, once cooperative partners find better means to enhance their collective efforts (in the form of rules and an understanding of desired behaviour), it can be 'self-enforcing.' Better cooperation can be facilitated and improved through international organizations that collect and share information among parties (Hasenclever et al., 1997: 47-48). Similarly, individual preferences can be openly discussed, which may result in the forgoing of immediate self-interest (Ostrom, 2009: 101). Likewise, conferences and forums can be held to allow dissatisfied partners to voice their concerns in open discussions. Also, side payments can be established with a view to enabling and rewarding the good performance of partners. As argued, specific issues can be dealt with through *ad hoc* agreements to make provisions for specific needs where necessary (Hasenclever et al., 2000: 15). As seen in climate-related agreements and crises, regulations are mostly of a voluntary and non-binding nature. However, effective cooperation can be difficult without clear sanctions for defectors and non-participants (Nordhaus, 2020: 10, 16-17).

In agreements with binding norms and rules, norm-violation may affect partners' reputation, consequently affecting their future relations with other actors. The past behaviour of actors can influence whether they can be accepted in other future cooperative business (Ostrom, 2009: 194). Notably, actors with opportunist attitudes and a bad reputation may find it difficult to join and benefit from future cooperation (Hasenclever et al., 2000: 8). Thus, the concern with bad reputation may induce actors to follow cooperative regulations (Hasenclever et al., 1997: 38). To deal with PD-like

situations requires improvement in communication and information sharing, which can be facilitated through institutions with guiding principles. This can help build trust among partners (Snidal, 1985:930-31).

Research Problem

The increase in climate mobility and its associated challenges have become major problems threatening the future of humanity in Ghana and many other countries in Africa and other continents. Overall, it is a challenge occurring predominantly in countries located in East Asia and the Pacific, Central Asia, West Africa and other sub-Saharan African countries. These areas have limited institutional mechanisms to address climate migration issues (Rigaud et al., 2021; IOM, 2019; Clement et al., 2021). As indicated in the introduction section and Chapter 1, some studies have projected the number of people likely to migrate because of climate change. In the case of Ghana, studies indicate that climate-induced migration continues to increase and has become a major issue of concern (Abu et al., 2014; Teye and Owusu, 2015; Teye and Nikoi, 2022; Issifu et al., 2022). However, these studies leave research gaps regarding the relevance of institutions in governing climate migration.

According to some studies, Less Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) are the ones that are the most vulnerable to climate migration, and, thus, are likely to be more concerned with the governance of climate migration than the less vulnerable (IOM, 2019; Wilkinson et al., 2017). Ghana is a developing country with diverse issues related to climate mobility, but it has limited institutional mechanisms. This thesis examines why climate migration governance in Ghana needs specific institutions to facilitate regular movements and to address the concerns of people on the move and vulnerable individuals in the hotspot areas. Notably, the current migration governance does not give enough and committed attention to climate-related migration; it becomes relevant for this study to explore the necessity of institutional cooperation to promote better governance of climate migration.

It is worth noting that some climate migration concerns in Ghana have been addressed by several scholars, including, among others, Abu (2011; 2014), Afifi et al. (2016), Gravesen et al. (2020), Jarawura and Smith (2015), Teye and Owusu (2015), Teye et al. (2021), Yaro et al., (2017), Prosper and Khan (2018) and Sward (2017).

They all focus on migration governance in general, looking into adaptation and mitigation measures against climate change in particular. However, the aforementioned literature does not pay much attention to the role of cooperative institutions and stakeholders. While coordination through governments and local, regional and international organizations is important to govern migration (Simonelli, 2016:7), the Ghanaian migration governance system pays less attention to these other stakeholders/actors to promote better governance of climate migration.

Climate migration is a critical issue affecting Ghana and has several implications, so an attempt to address this research gap in its governance is crucial. Although there is growing research interest in climate migration in Ghana (e.g. Abu et al. (2014) and Jarawura and Smith (2015) focusing on climate change and domestic migration motivations; Schraven and Rademacher-Schulz (2015) focusing on changes in seasonal climate migration, decline in agricultural production and food insecurity, Teye and Owusu (2015) focusing on climate change adaptation and migration issues, only a few studies (e.g. Gravesen et al., 2020; Asibey et al., 2024; Azumah and Ahmed, 2023; Teye et al., 2021, Musah-Surugu et al. 2019) have paid attention to the governance, climate change and mobility in Ghana. Despite recognizing governance issues, the importance of institutional cooperation is often overlooked. For instance, Asibey et al. (2024) studied Ghana's sub-national governance and climate change planning issues. They identified weak collaboration as a major challenge, but their study failed to account for how weak collaboration issues can be addressed. Similarly, Azumah and Ahmed (2023) discuss the impact of climate change on farmers' movement and stress the need for stakeholders to support farmers. However, like the related studies above, they all fail to underline the need for effective institutions (both state and non-state actors/institutions) facilitating collective action in governing climate mobility in Ghana. Also, while Musah-Surugu et al. (2019) and Yaro et al. (2015) discuss the relevance of local institutions and NGOs in supporting climate adaptation, they fail to identify and address collective action problems hindering climate migration governance in Ghana.

Again, in the case of Ghana, most studies on climate migration mainly focus on poverty reduction (Awumbila et al., 2014), agricultural and livelihood issues (Yaro et al., 2017; Awumbila et al., 2017; Teye et al., 2015; Teye and Owusu, 2015) and how

climate change cause conflicts over competition for natural resources (Boateng, 2015; Abu, 2011, 2012; Abu et al., 2014; Tonah, 2006; Bukari, 2017; Issifu et al., 2022). However, there is limited attention to climate migration governance in Ghana. In this regard, there is a critical need for effective climate migration governance mechanisms to address the numerous issues regarding the impact of climate mobility within, to and from Ghana. In this respect, this study focuses on climate migration governance. It draws particular attention to Ghana by adopting the neoliberal institutionalism approach (Chapter 1 subsection 1.2.3 explains the relevance of the neoliberal approach).

The inadequate attention paid to climate migration governance in Ghana motivates this research to address this research gap. The existing studies have overlooked how effective cooperation within and beyond Ghana can help with climate migration governance. Aside from the limited attention at institutional cooperation and identification of the collective action problems that prevent effective cooperation, the need for a climate migration regime is overlooked in the existing literature. This study, therefore, argues that the governance of climate migration requires serious institutional improvements in the existing migration governance mechanisms in Ghana. Also, there is a discussion on the absence of a national commission for migration in Ghana. It emphasizes the importance of the commission's role as an institution for coordinating among relevant stakeholders to govern climate migration in Ghana.

Despite focusing on Ghana as a case study, this study also examines the dynamics of climate migration governance at the global and African levels to support arguments for an interlinked global and regional approach, and to emphasize the need for Ghana to cooperate through these levels. Using Ghana's case helps us better understand the challenges associated with multiple climatic factors (slow- and sudden-onset events) influencing climate mobility. Climate-induced migrants within, to *and* from Ghana migrate because of the unexpected outcomes of changes in climatic conditions coupled with other factors that are beyond the control of affected migrants. As recognized within the introduction section and Chapter 1, migration governance is relevant for states' development, and, as such, states have obligations toward achieving the related UN SDGs. Therefore, research on the need for multi-level institutions to support climate migration governance with a key focus on hotspot areas is important

to help address problems and recommend strategies to promote long-term cooperative governance on climate mobility.

Specifically, the study discusses the causes of climate migration and governments' failure to address climate migration within global governance frameworks. Additionally, in Ghana, the causes of climate migration and the need to establish climate migration governance are analysed. Furthermore, the study discusses current problems in Ghana's migration governance and argues for the importance of institutional mechanisms for better cooperation. Although, non-binding principles influence states' obligations in the international system, Ghana's existing and expected cooperation with international actors are discussed as an important measure toward building strong institutions for better governance of climate migration.

This study differs from the existing literature by assessing how the inclusion of relevant actors, such as those at the local, national and international levels, can strengthen the role of institutions in governing climate migration. It also pays attention to the challenges in current migration governance. This helps justify why climate migration requires special focus and governance in policy domains.

Therefore, the study is guided by the following research questions:

1. What is the connection between climate change and migration internationally and in Africa and Ghana?
2. What implications does climate migration have for Ghana? How can institutions influence and promote effective climate migration governance in Ghana?
3. How does Ghana deal with climate migration? What are the roles of institutions and what are the main factors affecting the institutionalization of Ghana's climate migration governance?

Aside from these central questions, the study is also generally guided by sub-questions such as (a) why climate migration governance has not received enough space in the current migration governance system? and (b) why is climate migration governance important?

Significance of the Study

In a field where debates will never end, migration governance will continue to be at the centre of human mobility discussions. Despite recognizing climate migration, Ghana still lacks practical actions to govern it and to cooperate effectively with

relevant institutions and stakeholders to pursue long-term solutions. This study joins these discussions by helping us understand how collective institutions can play roles in climate migration governance and provide policy directions for relevant actors. In this sense, this thesis contributes to both academic literature and policymaking.

For academia, it contributes to the existing literature on the nexus between climate change and migration. It also serves as a foundation for further research on climate migration governance in Ghana and beyond. For policy domain, it contributes toward understanding the importance of effective climate migration governance and how cooperation among institutions at different levels of analysis may help address common agendas or issues. It advocates an inclusive participation and support of multiple actors to strengthen and to improve the performance of existing local, sub-regional and regional institutions. The study identifies free riding as a major barrier before collective action and draws the attention of policymakers to the need to tackle it effectively if any tangible improvement in climate migration governance is to be made.

In short, this thesis will help researchers and practitioners better understand the complexities of collective action in climate migration governance and the need to address the most critical and urgent problems through the case study of Ghana. Given the limits of space, the study does not aim to look into all related issues but rather to raise some of them. It also seeks to identify institutional mechanisms for a better governance of climate migration in Ghana and beyond.

Research Methodology

This study applies qualitative methods to achieve its objective of gaining a deeper and more thorough understanding of the research topic, which is less possible with a quantitative approach that generally aims to arrive at generalizations of the issues under study (Roselle et al., 2019; ; Yin, 2016; Marczyk et al., 2010; Crang, 2002). As noted by Yin, qualitative data collection helps in; “(1) studying the meaning of people’s lives, in their real-world roles; (2) representing the views and perspectives of the people... in a study; (3) explicitly attending to and accounting for real-world contextual conditions; (4) contributing insights from existing or new concepts that may help to *explain* social behaviour and thinking; and (5) acknowledging the potential relevance of multiple sources of evidence rather than relying on a single source alone”

(Yin, 2016:9). Accordingly, this thesis sought to obtain information, directly where possible, from policymakers, climate migrants, stakeholders and other actors. Contacting relevant research participants helped better understanding of the complex linkage between climate change and migration and the associated challenges with a view to making policy recommendations, which are presented in the Conclusion.

The primary data sources are interviews with state and non-state actors interested in migration and climate actions, academics, climate migrants, local authorities and members from hotspots and destination/host communities. Based on structured and semi-structured questions, relevant participants were interviewed from the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), the Ghana Refugee Board (GRB), migration and climate change academics, migration consultants, climate migrants/displaced people, host community members, community heads/leaders and climate action Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). The snowball sampling method was used to select 23 participants (purposeful selection). This sampling method helped the study obtain relevant feedback from targeted and relevant respondents. This method is based on non-probability and prevented the research from generalizing the results. The interview questions were open-ended and focused on the objectives of the research. Because the questions were open-ended, the research benefited from relevant feedback and contributions that the questions did not directly ask.

A focus group discussion (FGD) was also held with one community member, a local community leader and four international climate migrants/pastoralists. Participants were generally selected based on their awareness of migration issues in Ghana, climate-related migration and displacements, including migration consultancies, climate migrants and host community members. Interviews were conducted in English; local languages were used for international climate migrants who could not express themselves well in English. They were translated by a native speaker who assisted with the interview. Interviews were recorded, and, when the recording was not possible, notes were made.

In addition, the study used relevant documents, such as the Ghana National Migration Policy and the Ghana National Climate Policy Framework, as well as other documents about migration and climate change, including those from ECOWAS, the African Union, IOM and other related agencies. The research obtained figures for

climate-related displacements from the reports of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) and the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (IDTM) databases. The Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) and IOM Reports also provided the figures for Ghanaian migration.

The secondary sources were articles, books, newspapers, the internet and policy briefs related to this research. Media reports, dissertations related to the topic and other necessary published and unpublished works were also used. The study also used other relevant materials and literature, such as those related to the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), regional migration policies of the African Union (AU), AU Agenda 2063, the EU Immigration Policy, the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol, the Ghana Statistical Service Migration Report, the Ghana National Disaster Management Organization (NADMO) official reports and others related to the GCM. Stepping on these existing resources helped build insight into this dissertation.

The interviews were transcribed manually and themes were highlighted. This process helped to familiarize the participants with feedback. Relevant interviews were extracted to quote in order to explain or support the analysis and discussion. Thematic analysis strategy was applied to analyse and identify participants' views, opinions, experiences and knowledge about the study's focus. According to Braun and Clarke, thematic analysis involves researchers discovering meaning patterns and exploring potential interest issues in data. This study adopted Braun and Clarke's six phases of thematic analysis: (i) familiarization with data, (ii) code generation, (iii) searching for themes, (iv) reviewing themes, (v) defining themes and (vi) reporting themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006:86-88). This qualitative analytical strategy was applied to identify and select relevant patterns for interpretation and meaningful deductions. In addition, the analysis included noting down ideas supported by the relevant literature. In line with this analysis style, the study recorded interviews (based on participants' consent) and took notes on the main ideas from the interviews. In instances where recordings were not possible, notes of relevant sentences and phrases were taken.

The recorded interviews were transcribed and coded according to the themes of the study. Relevant themes were selected to identify statements from the participants that could support the analysis and discussions. The themes were selected based on the

connection between climate change and migration, the implications of climate migration for Ghana, the role of institutions on migration governance and challenges. Sub-themes were developed from these main themes to establish relationships with the study objective. This helped to establish the relationship between the themes and the overall aim of the study. Some scholars have argued that familiarizing with transcribed texts helps select themes by highlighting relevant sentences and phrases (Braun and Clark, 2006:87; Van Manen, 2016:20, 78-79; Yin, 2011:187-189). Therefore, the study used themes generated based on the thematic analysis process to support the discussions. The analysis section quoted verbatim some of the generated themes, such as highlighted phrases and sentences from interview transcripts, to support the discussions. The study also used some feedback to discuss general observations and enrich study discussions. This method helped achieve the research objective by obtaining in-depth details and understanding of the issues under study and contextual aspects of the research.

Structure of the Study

This study is divided into four main chapters. Chapter 1 conceptualizes and theorizes climate migration and its governance. This chapter first reviews global migration and climate migration issues. Then, it defines some key terminology that the study uses. The chapter proceeds with a discussion of the historical dynamics of global migration governance, with a key focus on the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and the Global Compact for Migration. The chapter then explains why climate migration governance requires special attention in migration governance. This chapter continues with a theoretical analysis of the realist and liberal positions on migration governance. Following the realist and liberal views, the chapter discusses the necessity of liberal institutionalism to address climate migration in a realist world. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the problems encountered in collective action with a view of their relevance to the governance of climate migration and of the possible ways of overcoming these problems, particularly the prevailing free-riding behaviour.

Chapter 2 describes African migration in general and African migration in the context of climate change. It examines African migration governance and provisions for climate mobility. Additionally, this chapter analyses the Economic Community of

West African States (ECOWAS) Free Movement Protocol and Climate Migration within the Free Movement Protocol in the ECOWAS Region. It discusses the contributions of the ECOWAS Movement Protocol and how reforming of the Protocol can support climate migration governance in the sub-region.

Chapter 3 highlights migration in Ghana. This chapter provides a historical overview of Ghana's migration and contemporary Ghana's international migration. It continues to focus on climate migration in Ghana and discusses the conflicts between climate migrants and their host communities. The chapter then discusses Ghana's migration governance and its interaction with global migration governance. Discussions in this section reveal the inconsistencies in Ghanaian migration governance and why the absence of a migration commission hinders the improvement of conditions in Ghana. Furthermore, this chapter presents a retrospective analysis of migration governance in Ghana, how it is engaging with the local authorities and the way forward.

Chapter 4 presents the study's findings through analyses and discussions of interviews, relevant documents and relevant literature. The analyses and discussions in this chapter focus on the implications of climate migration in Ghana and reveal the need for strong institutional mechanisms. This chapter elaborates on climate mobility and immobility in Ghana, the impact of climate migration on sustainable development in Ghana, climate migration governance in Ghana and what is expected concerning institutional mechanisms. The chapter discusses the Ghanaian national approach, its institutional dynamics and challenges associated with inadequate migration governance mechanisms. Subsequently, the chapter analyses regional and sub-regional efforts (AU and ECOWAS) and global collaboration. This chapter discusses collective (institutional) action on climate migration through national, regional and sub-regional units.

In Chapter 4 it is further discussed that while collective action is important to promote better migration governance, such action is problematic and difficult due to individual preferences and selfish interests of Ghana and other relevant states; free riding rather than genuine and effective collective action that describes the current situation among Ghana and its neighbours. This chapter also underlines the importance of incorporating climate migration policies into Ghana's migration governance by

focusing on the need for strong institutional standards and cooperative local authorities and institutions. Additionally, this chapter discusses the role of international NGOs and CSOs in equipping local authorities with the necessary support. Afterward, it discusses the challenges in migration governance in Ghana. It highlights the responsibilities of stakeholders vis-à-vis people's rights (rights of climate migrants) with a view to overcoming those challenges. The chapter also points to the need to reduce climate politics and promote committed responsibilities toward climate migrants.

Finally, the study concludes by explaining its contributions to the broader debate surrounding the research area. The Conclusion summarizes the study's arguments and provides policy recommendations.

CHAPTER ONE

THE CONCEPTUALIZATION AND THEORIZING OF GLOBAL CLIMATE MIGRATION AND ITS GOVERNANCE

1.1. THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF GLOBAL CLIMATE MIGRATION AND ITS GOVERNANCE

In conceptualizing climate migration and its governance, this section gives an overview of migration issues worldwide and defines some important operational terminologies used in this study. It is followed by a discussion on the global governance of migration by paying attention to the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, Global Compact for Migration and subsequently, global climate migration governance, explaining why climate migration requires special attention in migration governance.

1.1.1. Global Migration and Climate Migration: Definition and Distinction

Although human migration from one geographical area to another has existed throughout human history, the right to move was recognized globally over half a century ago with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The historical dynamics of human migration have changed over the years because of many factors, including climate change (IOM, 2018; 2022). Migration is a major factor in globalization and has contributed significantly to international investments, trade of goods and services, tourism, capital flows and dissemination of information (De Haas et al., 2020; Bevelander and Hollifield, 2022). The global migration population has been increasing since the end of the Second World War (WWII) (Hollifield, 2012; Bevelander and Hollifield, 2022).

According to the International Organization for Migration World Migration Report (IOM WMR) 2022, as of 2020, the global number of migrants estimated by the United Nations (UN) is 281 million, representing 3.6 percent of the world population (IOM, 2022: xii). By the end of 2024, the international migrants' population increased to 304 million, representing 3.7% of people globally (UN, 2024:2). Global mobility

declined for about two years due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Travel restrictions imposed by states caused unprecedented global immobility. However, before the COVID-19 pandemic, an average of 2 billion migrants travelled across the borders yearly (IOM, 2022:21). These travellers contributed to the increase in the foreign populations in the states in both the global South and North. The increase in the global migrant population has forced many states to focus on the integration of migrants as well as migration control. However, migrant integration policies vary from country to country (Bevelander and Hollifield, 2022:13).

It is noted that Europe hosts 87 million migrants currently, representing 30.9 %; Asia has 86 million, equating to 30.5%; North America has 59 million, amounting to 20.9 %; Africa contains 25 million, which is 9%; Latin America and the Caribbean hold 15 million representing 5.3% and Oceania hosts 9 million representing 3.3 % of the global migrant population (IOM-WMR, 2022:22-24). Migration is part of transforming the world's economy, politics, technology and social life. Migration also forms a part of the process that deepens globalization. The mass increase in global migration opens the door for scholars to deal with several historical and contemporary issues concerning migration (IOM, 2021:1; Hollifield and Foley, 2022).

According to the IOM 2020 World Migration Report (WRM), migration and displacement have caused trauma, loss of life and severe hardships in recent years. Millions of people have been displaced because of conflicts in Syria, Yemen, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic. Likewise, 'extreme violence' in the Rohingya and economic and political instability in Venezuela has forced many people to migrate (IOM, 2020; 2022).

Historically, global migration analysis has focused on security, political and economic issues. However, contemporary analyses reveal that the causes of migration go beyond traditional factors. The world's transformations and environmental changes have added more factors that require human mobility. Climate change undoubtedly forces millions of people to leave their communities to secure themselves in different parts of the same country or across borders. Some projections indicate that many climate migrants may settle in their own countries, but many are likely to move across borders. Some migration analysts argue that, in recent times, climate change has forced many people to move from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe and from Central America

to the United States (IDMC, 2021a; IOM-WMR, 2022; Van der Vliet and Biermann, 2022). According to the IDMC 2022 report, there were 59.1 million internally displaced people in 2021, 23.7 million of whom had escaped a disaster. 22.3 million disaster-displacements were weather- and climate-related (IDMC, 2022:2).

On the other hand, climate change effects have caused people to relocate and resettle in some communities, especially in the Pacific. Furthermore, in the Southern Pacific, some Islands of the Solomon Islands have been submerged due to rising sea levels. Aside from rising sea levels, some projections indicate that about 50 million people could be displaced globally because of desertification by the year 2027 (Behrman and Kent, 2018:3).

According to the IOM Report, the pressing effects of the environment and climate change-related issues are more serious in affecting people's movements in this century and the following centuries. For instance, weather and climate-related hazards in 2018 and 2019 caused the displacement and relocation of many people in the United States of America, India, China, Mozambique and the Philippines (IOM, 2020:1-2). Some scholars and experts have warned about future increases in climate-related migration (Hugo, 2008; McAdam, 2010, 2012; Piguet et al., 2011; Wilkinson, 2016; Wilkinson et al., 2017; Bettini, 2014; Betts, 2018; Jakobsson, 2022).

In addition, the 2021 World Bank Groundswell report estimated that without proper climate actions, the world may have over 216 million climate migrants by 2050 (Clement et al., 2021: xvi). Climate change is a critical issue for all communities worldwide. It has profound implications for an increase in displaced people worldwide. Owing to its seriousness, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and IOM have taken steps for policy and research actions (Karakir and Karacasulu, 2021).

The diverse effects of climate change on migration have received considerable attention in recent years. Climate change continues to force people to move out of their settlements. This forced movement affects people's human rights and personal development. Additionally, several projections indicate that many people will become climate migrants in the near future (Hugo, 2008; IDMC, 2021a; Van der Vliet and Biermann, 2022; Mbow et al., 2017; Clement et al., 2021). This means that climate action and urgent adaptation strategies must be a primary focus for all states.

In the views of Simon Behrman and Avidan Kent, both human and natural factors continue to worsen the changing situation. Consequently, no country or community is devoid of climate risks (Behrman and Kent, 2018). However, the situation of vulnerable populations such as those in climate change hotspot areas is more critical, and, therefore, their issues need to be the central theme for policy discussions. Additionally, due to inadequate skills, poverty and infrastructure problems in most vulnerable communities, many people find it difficult to adapt or migrate to safer places. Similarly, in places where poverty and other factors hinder the ability of climate migrants to resettle internally, people would be forced to use all irregular means to cross borders (Behrman and Kent, 2018; Teye and Nikoi, 2022; Clement et al., 2021).

During the 1990s, most of the climate-related displacements were mainly from sub-Saharan Africa, China, India, Mexico and Central America and they were associated with environmental hazards such as drought, land degradation, natural disasters and pollution. Myers and Kent projected that climate migrants could reach approximately 50 million by 2010 and increase to over 200 million. As early as 1995, climate and environmental impacts on human mobility had been considered an emergent problem of exceptional significance (Myers and Kent, 1995:1-3; Myers, 2005). Scholars have emphasized the need for world leaders to find durable solutions to address issues related to climate mobility. With caution, stakeholders' failure to address concerns with the necessary actions may result in the world having hundreds of millions of climate migrants with nowhere to go (Myers and Kent, 1995; Myers, 2005; UNU-EHS, 2005; Bierman and Boas, 2010; Rigaud et al., 2018; Clement et al., 2021).

It is estimated that by 2050, climate change could cause 25 million–1 billion people to migrate. This projection is a major concern for people in areas with high climate change risks. Although some scholars argue that the projected figures may be exaggerated, Laczko and Aghazarm argue that such projections help draw the attention of policymakers to the implications of climate change, including migration (Laczko and Aghazarm, 2009:9). According to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) 2021 report, millions of people continue to be displaced owing to the adverse effects of climate change. The report also indicates that human

mobility and displacements are set to worsen as climate change increases (IFRC, 2022).

The change in climatic conditions will force many people to be displaced by challenges in agriculture, shoreline erosion and coastal flooding. A serious point to consider is the number of people who would be affected and the rate at which the change occurred (IOM, 2015:9). Predicting the future flow of climate migrants is difficult because of inadequate baseline data (IOM, 2015:10). However, according to some experts, the global temperature is expected to increase by 2–5 °C by the end of the 21st century. This could have a significant effect on migration and displacement. This means that more attention needs to be paid to climate change to establish proper adaptation and mitigation measures (Wilkinson et al., 2017:2).

As widely observed, climate-related phenomena have already caused many people to move from their homes to safer places, while many others are at risk of being displaced at any time. For example, between 2008 and 2015, disasters caused millions of people to be displaced globally. Of this, 87% were climate-related (Wilkinson et al., 2017:2). Similarly, according to Ionesco et al., weather-related catastrophes across the globe caused approximately 157 million people to be displaced between 2008 and 2014 (Ionesco et al., 2016:7). According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) 2021 Report, climate- and environment-related disasters displaced 30.7 million people globally in 2020. In contrast, conflicts displaced only 9.8 million people (IDMC, 2021:8). The rate at which climate and environmental issues force people to migrate will likely be higher in the next few years. Although some people move out of their countries, most climate-related migrants move within their countries. Wilkinson et al. also affirmed that climate change will be a major reason for human mobility in the future because climatic conditions are constantly changing (IDMC, 2021:2-3). There is no denial of this fact because climate change-related human displacements have been increasing since 2008 (Behrman and Kent, 2018).

Clement et al. further assert that people are continuously migrating from rural areas to urban centres (cities) due to climate-related challenges such as the rise in sea levels, shortage of water and a decrease in crop production, especially in Africa (Clement et al., 2021: xvii). Similarly, the IDMC finds that environmental factors such as fire, flood and storm force people to migrate. These challenges affect people's lives.

These challenges make some places unliveable and affect livelihoods, leaving the only option for some people to migrate (IDMC, 2021). However, short-term migration as an adaptation method to avoid climate change pressure does not work for everyone. The reason for this is that some people, particularly the most vulnerable, are unable to migrate. Hence, the vulnerable have to endure the stress of climate change due to their inability to migrate (IOM, 2015:9-10; Teye et al., 2021; Teye and Nikoi, 2022).

The drivers of climate migration differ from those of traditional migration. Climate migration occurs following both sudden and slow-onset events. The sudden onset forces people to move more quickly than expected. On the other hand, the slow onset forces people to move slowly. However, in both cases, most people are affected by the high cost of living and several other livelihood challenges. In this regard, the management and governance approaches to climate migration must take a different format from those of traditional migration. It is also important to point out that there are several projections about the enormous number of climate migrants the world is expected to experience. The earlier mentioned numbers may seem exaggerated, but considering the projections since the 1990s and the climate issues the world is facing, there is no point in denying and delaying the undertaking of necessary measures.

It is worth noting that definitions are important when discussing climate change-related migration. In this regard, the followings paragraphs provide some scholarly and operational definitions of (climate) migration concepts used in this thesis. Scholars differ in their definition of climate migrants, resulting in different names, such as environmental refugees or migrants, ecological refugees or migrants, climate-change migrants, climate-induced migrants, environmentally displaced people, displaced persons, environmentally induced displaced people and so on (Karakir and Karacasulu, 2021:100). Wilkinson et al. also argue that there is no standard definition for climate-related migration (Wilkinson et al., 2017:2). The following section provides some of the most-cited operational definitions while also discussing global migration governance, stress on climate mobility and why climate migration requires special agency and governance.

There are several definitions for various concepts in migration studies. Although there is no unanimously approved definition of a particular term within the

migration discourse, many definitions are generally accepted. Some key working terminologies are defined as follows:

Migration is "the movement of persons away from their usual residence, either across an international border or within a state" (IOM, 2011:137). A migrant is "a person who moves away from his or her usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border temporarily or permanently, for several reasons" (IOM, 2011:132). In short, migration is a moving process from one place to another (IOM, 2022:28). Categories and concepts in migration are also technically defined based on legal, political, geographic, methodological, temporal and other factors (IOM-WMR, 2022).

Climate-induced migration refers to "those displaced by climate-related disasters, who often move temporarily; those forced to migrate more permanently due to recurrent events; those forced to migrate to avoid worsening slow-onset deterioration of the environment; and those who 'choose' to move as an adaptation strategy, in response to environmental pressures and other factors" (Wilkinson et al., 2017:2).

According to the IOM, climate migration refers to "the movement of a person or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment due to climate change, are obliged to leave their habitual place of residence or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, within a state or across an international border" (IOM, 2011:31).

According to UNHCR, climate refugees are "persons displaced in the context of disasters and climate change" (UNHCR, n.d.).

Environmental migrants are "persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently and who move either within their country or abroad" (IOM, 2014:13).

Environmentally Displaced Persons are defined by IOM as "persons who are displaced within their country of habitual residence or who have crossed an international border and for whom environmental degradation, deterioration or

destruction is a major cause of their displacement, although not necessarily the sole one" (IOM, 2014:13).

Climate-driven Migration, according to Clement et al., is a type of "migration that can be attributed largely to the slow-onset impacts of climate change on livelihoods owing to shifts in water availability and crop productivity, or to factors such as a sea-level rise or storm surge" (Clement et al., 2021: viii).

Internally Displaced Persons refer to "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border" (IOM, 2019:109).

Displaced Persons, on the other hand, are "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence either across an international border or within a state, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters" (IOM, 2019:55).

These definitions demonstrate that various forms of migration, including climate-related migration, can be voluntary, forced, seasonal, temporal, or permanent. They can also occur internally (within a country) or externally (across borders). Climate migration process can be gradual or happen at a time when the affected people will have nothing else to do but move or migrate to secure themselves. These working definitions are also used in this study. The following section discusses global migration governance by focusing on scholarly definitions and other discussions.

1.1.2. Global Migration Governance

Global governance (GG) is one of the most complex concepts within the international community. Some scholars and practitioners (Wapner, 1997: 82; Yunker, 2000: 27; Zurn, 2018:3) have used the concept to mean global government, international government, or world government to regulate common laws and policies, even though there is no global government or international government (Zurn, 2018:3).

Since there is no global government, this concept has been explained differently by various scholars in the field. For instance, Vayrynen defined global governance as "collective actions to establish international institutions and norms to cope with the causes and consequences of adverse supranational, transnational or national problems." In view of Vayrynen, the essence of global governance is because of global issues (Vayrynen, 1999:25). Noted by Ba and Hoffmann, GG is a mechanism for dealing with global problems such as those related to "environmental destruction, refugees, poverty, diseases" among others. GG in dealing with global issues is considered as "the set of tools that exist or needs to be designed" (Ba and Hoffmann, 2005:3). Zurn has also defined the term as "the exercise of authority across national borders as well as consented norms and rules beyond the nation-state, both of them justified concerning common good or transnational problems" (Zurn, 2018:3). Similarly, the concept is defined by the Commission of Global Governance (CGG) as "the sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs." Moreover, "it is a broad, dynamic and complex process of interactive decision-making constantly evolving and responding to changing circumstances." CGG aims to promote ways to deal with common concerns and share dignity for "human survival and prosperity" (CGG, 1995:3-4).

According to Weiss and Wilkinson, global governance has become a nickname for international organizations (Weiss and Wilkinson, 2014:207). In the views of Thakur and Weise, global governance can be understood as a standard way of coping with global issues and accommodating the diverse interests of states through common actions. Global governance is about how global affairs are managed (Thakur and Weiss, 2015:27). The concept is also used to describe how the world is organized and authority is exercised. Weiss and Wilkinson defined global governance as "collective efforts to identify, understand, or address global problems and processes that went beyond the capacities of individual states" (Weiss and Wilkinson, 2014:208). These authors focused on using international institutions to deal with global challenges and affairs. Although there is no world or global government, global governance involves various actors, including state actors, non-state actors and regional and international organizations, who deal with common agendas. That is a cooperative way of solving global problems (Weiss and Wilkinson, 2014:207-8).

Additionally, Weiss and Wilkinson stress that since the world has become a "global community, issues like migration need a global solution" (Weiss and Wilkinson, 2014:213). To Weiss and Thakur, "global governance has come to mean world governance without a world government" (Weiss and Wilkinson, 2014: 208), meaning that governance systems exist, but there is no central government for the international community. Weiss and Thakur admit that there are many challenges in global governance. However, the authors argue that improving international gaps in knowledge, norms, policies, institutions and compliance will help strengthen global governance and deal with diverse challenges within the international system. These gaps should be filled concerning the international community's major issues, such as climate change, migration and economic inequalities. Although states' sovereignty sometimes hinders some global collaborative efforts to deal with global challenges collectively, global governance is gaining ground due to interdependence and the willingness of states to collaborate to address common challenges. In this regard, great and small powers must establish decisive global action and agreements to address alarming global issues such as migration and climate change (Weiss and Thakur, 2010: xi-xii).

In the view of Alexander Betts, global governance can be defined as a range of norms, rules, principles and decision-making procedures that exist above the level of a single nation-state. Global governance, according to Betts, is concerned with states' interdependence. (Betts, 2010:2). Similarly, Nye and Donahue contend that global governance consists of different approaches for dealing with and solving common problems by adopting formal and informal processes. More importantly, solving common global problems involves state and non-state actors (Nye and Donahue, 2000:1-3).

Weiss, differentiating between governance and government, argues that the former is a process that "includes both formal and informal values, norm practices and institutions", while the latter is the structured entity that "routinely and predictably exerts authority" (Weiss, 2011:9-10). According to Smouts, "governance places emphasis on the multiplicity and diversity of actors". It originates from the national level to help with the management of global issues among "heterogeneous participants" (Smouts, 1998:84), whereas the government has a formal entity for

creating laws and implementing rules (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992:256). Notwithstanding their weaknesses and incapacities, government institutions have a straightforward way to exercise control and authority.

On the other hand, the international level is characterized by governance features. However, there is no government (Weiss, 2011:10). For Keohane, the government is a sub-unit of governance that operates based on authority (Keohane and Nye, 2002:202). According to Nye and Donahue, interdependence within the international system, which is a result of globalization, has contributed to the establishment of networks among states (Nye and Donahue, 2000:2). Keohane further emphasizes that although states are self-interested and nationalistic, they are aware that interdependence and cooperation help address various problems around the world. Therefore, institutions serving as agents of global governance involve effective collaboration, helping formulate, monitor and enforce international rules (Keohane, 2002:2-3).

While some scholars use global governance and government interchangeably, Keohane argues that global government is virtually impossible. According to Keohane, loyalty among states helps them create connections. It may be possible for some states to govern themselves through a trust established through certain bilateral or multilateral agreements. However, global government is unlikely because of states' structures and domestic politics. A global government could assist states in addressing global problems in a unified manner. However, it is unlikely that all governments worldwide will work under a single domestic paradigm (Keohane and Nye, 2002:203-204).

The Commission on Global Governance further explains global governance as a continuous process in which opposing or diverging objectives can be addressed and collective action is taken. It comprises official mechanisms and regimes authorized to enforce regulations and informal arrangements that individuals and institutions have somehow consented to or consider to be in their interest (CGG, 1995:3-4). Of course, the study does not deny that GG is a complex concept, but it is necessary to deal with numerous world issues. As Pouliot and Therien put it, GG has "impact on everyone, everywhere and all the time, yet nobody knows where to look for it and how to grasp it" (Pouliot and Therien, 2023: xi). Despite its complexity, the essence of global

governance is to deal with issues concerning the world to provide relevant solutions. The best way to deal with global issues is to focus on global policies. Such policies involve global interactions to find ways to deal with international issues. More importantly, as diverse issues continue to occur, it will be unimaginable to think about global issues without GG (Pouliot and Therien, 2023:2-3, 6).

At this point, it is necessary to elucidate *international regimes* as an important component of global governance. Due to increasing problems in the world and the necessity for cooperation, the concept of the international regime has been an essential part of discussions of global politics and international relations research, particularly since the 1970s. Although the international system is anarchical, regime theories emphasize the possibility of interstate cooperation (Aksoy, 2005:1). According to Krasner, international regimes are "principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in an issue area." Regimes have been described as "intervening variables... between basic causal factors on the one hand and outcomes and behaviour on the other". Principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures are key elements in defining regimes. These crucial components of regimes show that states can come together around specific normative values and act in line with commonly determined decision-making mechanisms to resolve common problems in a given issue area (Krasner, 1982:185-186).

On the other hand, a trans-governmental regime involves mutual recognition of interactions between governments (Nicolaidis and Shaffer, 2004:279). According to Keohane and Nye, trans-governmental regimes involve a series of direct interactions between departments of various governments which are not strictly controlled or guided by the policies of respective governments' cabinets or chief executives (Keohane and Nye, 1974:43). In the views of Nicolaidis and Shaffer, states have mutual recognition of trans-governmental regimes, but this does not mean the existence of a global government. Instead, they argue that recognizing the trans-governmental regime promotes global solidarity when dealing with global affairs. In addition, trans-governmental stakeholders acting in line with international norms and principles strengthen governance within the international arena (Nicolaidis and Shaffer, 2004). Similarly, according to Sinclair (2013), some cross-border problems

might not be solved at the intergovernmental level, where only specific government departments may be assigned to tackle them.

As it relates to migration, this study also considers the existence of migration regimes, which could be understood as the body of international agreements and organizations necessary for states to govern international migration. An international regime emerges when actors agree on resolving common global problems through free will and interest (Aksoy, 2005: 3-4). Although difficult to achieve, sometimes due to uncertainties within the international system, cooperation makes parties better off when dealing with everyday problems (Hasenclever et al., 2000:6). Migration governance is a critical area that requires cooperation between diverse actors. However, despite the necessity of global migration governance, there is no coherent international migration regime. The power to determine specific migration policies continues to be an autonomous domain of individual sovereign states (Betts, 2011:1-2).

According to Kainz and Betts, four main turning points in recent history can be identified in the evolution of international migration regimes. They are the United Nations and the Regional Consultative Process from 1985 to 2001; an increase in mandates and the first High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development from 1999 to 2006; the creation of the Global Forum on Migration and Development and the Global Migration Group, from 2006 to 2008; and the New York Declaration and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, from 2016 to 2018 (Kainz and Betts, 2021:65). More emphasis is placed on the latter (i.e. the New York Declaration and Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration), since it is the stage that has made some attempts to consider climate migration as a critical migration issue. Before delving into the details of the current migration regime, some scholarly definitions of global migration governance need to be highlighted.

Global migration governance, like global governance, is also a complex term. Alexander Betts asserts that migration governance can be understood based on three broad concepts: multilateralism, embeddedness and informal networks. Betts argues that the current migration regime lacks explicit multilateralism. Most leaders are reluctant to ratify certain multilateral agreements concerning migration, especially regarding the rights of migrant workers and their families. Concerning embeddedness,

Betts stresses that some institutions are not migration-related; however, those institutions embedded in different fields of global governance shape states' responses toward migration. Examples include World Trade Organization (WTO) law, International Law, International Human Rights Law and International Maritime Law. Informal networks, on the other hand, shape global migration governance through capacity building, information sharing and best practices. For Betts, migration is a global problem that cannot be solved using one state approach. Therefore, cooperation among states and institutions is required (Betts, 2010:2-3).

Although cooperation is essential, Betts argues that the 'one size fits all' model does not work in global migration governance. For instance, governing irregular/low-skilled migrants benefits a specific geographical area or region. Therefore, migration governance should be based on regional, interregional and trans-regional (club) cooperation. The governance of highly skilled migrants becomes a 'private good' because the benefits are for sending states, receiving states and migrants. Hence, cooperation is based on both unilateralism and bilateralism. In short, by nature there is a lack of comprehensive governance and effective management of global migration (Betts, 2010:3). Although Betts' contribution is significant, issues regarding climate migrants are missing in his arguments. However, benefiting from his framework, the governance of climate migration can be considered as a 'public or club good.'

To explain further, "a global public good is one for which (i) the benefits or costs are non-excludable between states (i.e. all states benefit equally irrespective of who contributes) and (ii) the benefits are non-rival between actors (i.e. one state's consumption does not diminish another state's enjoyment of the benefits)." A typical example is climate change mitigation for which states would be expected to cooperate (Betts, 2010:3). Migration governance can be considered a public good because of its non-excludability. It can promote freedom of movement, labour mobility and economic opportunities among states (Hollifield, 2011:225). Nonetheless, not all migration governance can be considered as global public good. For example, concerning irregular and low-skilled migrants, their governance can lead to non-rivalrous benefits, but such benefits might be specific to a region and thus partly excludable. Thus, governance of irregular and low-skilled migrants can be considered a "club good" with cooperation taking place at the regional or interregional levels

(Betts, 2010:3). McNutt also posits that club good has a characteristic of excludability. Since clubs are voluntary, the benefits go to members. A "club good can become public good *sans* non-excludability" (McNutt, 1999:927-8). According to Betts, governance of migration becomes a private good when it involves highly skilled migrants and is tackled at the unilateral or bilateral level. The costs and benefits are excludable, going mainly to the sending and receiving states and the migrants themselves. For Betts, benefits regarding high-skilled migration are 'rival' because the number of such migrants is limited. Thus, their regulation is predominantly handled at the bilateral and unilateral levels, with global forums only playing a facilitating role (Betts, 2010:3).

Considering the above distinctions, this study considers the governance of climate migration as a global public good. This is because no country is immune from climate change and its effects. Better management of climate impacts can help protect not only the fundamental rights and dignity of people on the move, but also others who are less affected and at the receiving end. Ineffective management may lead to spill-overs, which can increase irregular migration, which all states aim to avoid. On the other hand, governance of climate migration can also be considered as a club good because only members can have a chance to benefit from the collective mechanisms of the club (generally regional) with such benefits denied to non-members (further discussion is done in Chapter 4).

In the views of Betts and Kainz, "global migration governance can be defined as the norms and organizational structures that regulate and facilitate states and other actors' response to migration" (Betts and Kainz, 2017:1). Betts contends that the types of governance in various migration areas differ, resulting in differing effects. For instance, there is a robust multilateral structure for refugee governance but no such structure for labour migration (Betts, 2010:2). Similarly, there is no robust multilateral structure for climate migration. According to Kainz and Betts, the fragmented character of international migration governance influences how governments cooperate to create long-term solutions for governing migration (Kainz and Betts, 2021:66). As stressed by Betts, stakeholders' decisions regarding migration are influenced by actors' concerns about "security, rights and economy." Therefore, stakeholders prioritize their migration governance choices in win-win or trade-off situations (Betts, 2010:3).

Even though global migration governance has developed over the years through migration institutions intending to promote collective action toward migration affairs, migrants continue to face problems in the migration process. While governance on refugees has received much attention at the multilateral level, other aspects, such as labour migration, continue to be dependent on individual state decisions. However, with demand for overseas labour, especially in the field of technology, global migration governance is expected to increase. Although the states will still hold their sovereign powers in migration governance, multilateralism in migration is expected to expand toward issues related to human rights, security and development (Betts and Kainz, 2017:3, 11).

It is worth noting that over the past few years, significant transformations have occurred regarding the politics of migration (Geiger, 2020; Betts, 2018). Although migration issues have been overly politicized, some governments and non-state actors around the world have established governance systems for global migration based on their shared common interests to manage migration to reduce costs while increasing benefits (Betts, 2011:1). Environmental and climate-related issues, which have become one of the major drivers of human mobility, have also come to necessitate state and non-state actors' cooperation in global migration governance (Geiger, 2020).

According to IOM, migration governance refers to the "combined framework of legal norms, laws, regulations, policies and traditions, as well as organizational structures and relevant processes that shape and regulate states' approaches concerning migration in all its forms, addressing rights and responsibilities and promoting international cooperation" (IOM, 2011:138). Additionally, migration governance is defined as "the system of institutions, legal frameworks, mechanisms and practices aimed at regulating migration and protecting migrants." The concept is also used to refer to migration management, which is "sometimes used to refer to the narrow act of regulating cross-border movement at the state level" (IOM, 2014:15). Management of migration entails frameworks for the execution and successful implementation of policy, as well as regulatory and administrative structures developed by migration-related institutions. It also involves cooperation among national, bilateral and multilateral institutions to help public policies regarding migration (IOM, 2011:139).

According to Kainz and Betts, migration governance has emerged as a fragmented international institution. Until recently, there was a lack of a migration regime, that is, the absence of formal institutions to control and address international migration issues (Kainz and Betts, 2021). Global migration was managed solely in the jurisdictions of sovereign states, meaning states used their authority to make and implement individual migration policies (Betts, 2011:1). However, this does not mean global migration governance did not exist. There was cooperation among states on immigration control before the establishment of IOM (Betts, 2011; Betts and Kainz, 2017; Kainz and Betts, 2021).

The earlier cooperation towards migration dates to the interwar years (1919-1939). This cooperation began after the passport regime was established under the League of Nations. The passport regime was complimented by the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (LNHCR), which granted 'Nansen travel documents (passport for stateless persons and refugees- 1922-1938) for refugees and displaced persons to travel across Europe (Betts and Kainz, 2017:2). Later, the International Labor Organization (ILO) also deployed Nansen travel documents to allow refugees and displaced persons to fill labour needs within and outside Europe (Long, 2013:4). With the end of World War II, a mechanism was established for refugees and displaced people. This era began with the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) (1949) and the UNHCR, which initially sought protection for refugees from Europe. The UNHCR was assigned an oversight function to define the criteria that constituted a refugee's status in 1951. Simultaneously, in 1951, the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME), which eventually became the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) in 1980 and IOM in 1989, was formed to assist with logistics related to the transportation of displaced people (Betts and Kainz, 2017:6-7).

The current migration regime is structured through earlier frameworks for migration management, such as the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (LNHCR), Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME), Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum and Immigration (IGC), the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM),

Regional Consultative Processes (RCP) and other supportive legal and normative frameworks (Betts and Kainz, 2017). However, migration governance has remained problematic for all states despite the establishment of such frameworks over the years (Bevelander and Hollifield, 2022). Most importantly, global migration is not subjected to a coherent governance structure. Given the anarchic nature of the international system, international migration governance continues to be hampered by ineffective coordination and consensus building (Betts and Kainz, 2017:8).

The attempt to deal with the divisions in migration governance has led to the creation of migration governance coordinating mechanisms such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (HLD) and Global Migration Groups (GMG) which is made up of 21 UN agencies (Betts and Kainz, 2017:7-8). The international community's aim to ensure a better-managed migration later led to the establishment of the New York Declaration (NYD) for Refugees and Migrants and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) (Betts and Kainz, 2017:10; Kainz and Betts, 2021:65-66). The NYD and GCM (details given in the following subsection) show the international community's willingness to address migration challenges faced by migrants and refugees. These agreements include states' commitments to ensure better governance of migrants' affairs, especially migrants' human rights issues (Betts and Kainz, 2017).

Notwithstanding the mentioned efforts, there is still fragmentation in migration governance and thus, the problems concerning global migration continue to increase. One of the major factors responsible for this fragmentation is inadequate research and understanding of the subject (Kainz and Betts, 2021:66). According to some experts, fragmentation in migration governance is not adequately understood by policymakers and practitioners in migration affairs. This lack of understanding has hindered the finding of practical solutions to govern global migration. Without a better understanding of the core issues in migration governance, it becomes difficult to establish effective governance mechanisms (Newland, 2010; Kainz and Betts, 2021). Similarly, the problem of fragmentation affects how states coordinate and collaborate on migration. Regardless of whether a country is receiving, sending, or transit country,

effective coordination and cooperation between states are critical (Kainz and Betts, 2021).

Panizzon and Riemsdijk (2019) posit that migration governance has steadily been affected by the rate of migration flow, while the connections between governments, international organizations and actors at the regional level also shape the flow of migration. Additionally, the nature of the migration crisis influences how migration is governed at the national, regional, sub-regional, supranational and global levels. This means that how specific issues trigger mass movements of people influences the attention of migration governance stakeholders at different levels and how relevant measures can be taken to manage. Examples are the mass movement of people due to the Arab Spring and the Syrian War and how it directed global, regional and neighbouring states' attention to the need for planning the means to receive refugees, provide relevant humanitarian support and regulate borders to avoid potential threats. This crisis led to the EU's measures to cooperate with other organizations and states, such as the AU and Türkiye. Similarly, political instabilities in the Horn of Africa leading to displacement of people and the Rohingya refugee crisis have influenced civil societies, neighbouring states, the UN and other diverse actors in providing hospitalities and adopting measures to protect the vulnerable (Panizzon and Riemsdijk, 2019:1225-1226).

States are essential actors in dealing with all forms of complexity in migration. States play critical roles such as acting as agents of migration, making migration policies that help both the states and their respective migrants; influencing migration flows through their domestic policies; and being responsible for the external affairs of their citizens abroad (Castles, 2004:222-223). States play key roles in migration processes, such as border management and supporting citizens and non-citizens through international travel documents (Betts, 2011; Hollifield, 2012). Furthermore, states shape their political and legal institutions to manage and control migratory flow, both immigration and emigration. In this regard, states help protect migrants' rights. According to Hollifield, states are the main actors shaping migration outcomes at the international level. Therefore, states' willingness to open their borders to migrants is critical for migrants to attain their migratory rights and satisfy some of their fundamental human rights (e.g., freedom of movement) (Hollifield, 2012). States

should, therefore, understand migratory processes and the multiple factors that influence people's migration decisions to develop policies accordingly (Castles, 2004:223).

It is important to note that the governance of migration is characterized by cooperation as well as conflict among states. Conflictual issues arise because of states' interests and complexities in their migration policies (Gomez-Mera, 2015). Niemann and Zuan emphasize that domestic migration policies and laws influence international migration governance. In other words, differences in internal (domestic) and external migration politics affect the coherence of migration policy outcomes at the global level (Niemann and Zaun, 2018). In this respect, states establish relevant mechanisms to govern migration to promote their external relations with respective states. Friendly foreign policies help sending and receiving countries gain mutual benefits from their migrants in the long run (Wunderlich, 2012; Triandafyllidou, 2014).

Sahin-Mencutek et al. (2022) argue that the migration governance crisis has emerged over the years because of the mode of governance and representation. The crisis is due to the differences in interest between the global North and the South and the consequent non-binding nature of agreements signed by the states. However, the GCM presents a progressive example of migration governance under the IOM and UN. The compacts demonstrate the willingness of states in the North and South to support various roles needed for better migration governance, with concern for development, human rights and security (Betts and Kainz, 2017; Kainz and Betts, 2020). The following subsections provide insights into the current state of international migration regime.

1.1.3. The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants

The current (as of the time of writing this chapter) international migration regime was based on the New York Declaration of 2016. The UN General Assembly unanimously decided on September 19, 2016, to adopt the historic mechanism known as The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (hereafter referred to as the Declaration). This historic Declaration reiterates the importance of the international migration regime. It aims to make states commit themselves to improving the lives of

people who migrate willingly or unwillingly (UNHCR–b, *n.d.*). The Declaration seeks to ensure that the rights of refugees and migrants are protected worldwide (Gottardo and Cymment, 2019). This Declaration became significant because of the 2015 global mass migration and the consequent rise in refugee issues. It is based on human rights principles, with a strong global political will to protect the rights and dignity of migrants and refugees (Afaq and Sirohi, 2018). The Declaration emerged as an important opportunity to tackle international refugee law and global governance migration challenges. It strongly emphasizes burden sharing through cooperation, as mentioned in the 1951 Refugee Convention (The Refugee Convention, 1951, Preamble-para. 4; Afaq and Sirohi, 2018).

The New York Declaration helped pave the way for establishing the Global Compact on Refugees and GCM in 2018. The Declaration established measures and obligations based on states' diverse interests to address issues regarding sharing responsibilities toward refugees. The Global Compact on Refugees sets a framework for governments and stakeholders to protect the rights of refugees. This Compact also pays attention to stakeholder cooperation to address common issues refugees face. This was set to function through burden and responsibility sharing among stakeholders (Betts, 2018). Before the Compact on Refugees, the 1951 Convention on Refugees, with its principle of non-refoulment, prohibited states from expelling refugees who face threats from their countries of origin. However, due to the politicization of the refugee problem, most countries use several reasons to justify the number of people and the categories of people they accept as refugees (Afaq and Sirohi, 2018). Betts also argues that dimensions and approaches toward managing refugees have changed because the challenges and opportunities for refugees have changed over the years. Moreover, populist nationalism and anti-migrant politics are on the rise (Betts, 2018). Owing to the challenges that refugees face, the Compact was established to focus on four thematic areas: easing the pressures on host countries, enhancing the self-reliance of refugees, enabling access to third-country solutions; and helping improve the conditions in countries of origin to enable safe return and protect their rights (UNHCR–b, *n.d.*).

The New York Declaration demonstrates the international community's political will to cooperate and improve migration governance (Van der Vliet and

Biermann, 2022). The Compact on Refugees stresses that there cannot be a durable or sustainable solution to the refugee problems without international cooperation. According to Betts, the Compact on Refugees addresses important gaps in global migration governance. One of its notable contributions is to direct the attention of governments to focus on protecting refugees living in a third country (Betts, 2018). The Compact also serves as a framework for addressing the issue of burden sharing regarding refugees' affairs and to help countries strengthen their policies and capacity building for better conditions for refugees and other migrants (UNHCR-b, *n.d.*). Furthermore, the New York Declaration reinforces governments' obligations to global migration governance (Kainz and Betts, 2021:79).

Despite the efforts made by the New York Declaration to find sustainable solutions to refugee problems, the extent of the commitment of the stakeholders, particularly states and relevant agencies is questionable (Betts, 2018; Afaq and Sirohi, 2018). The main concern is the non-binding nature of these documents. The Declaration lacks binding principles to compel governments to adhere to the Declaration's aims or sanction countries that fail to comply (Afaq and Sirohi, 2018). Also, Betts argues that the Compact on Refugees “had to make choices to have a focus” and thus, did not touch upon new drivers of displacement such as climate crises, which are inevitable to force movements and to pose moral and legal challenges to the Compact in the future (Betts, 2018:625-26).

1.1.4. The Global Compact for Migration

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) emerged because of the global community's efforts to establish a comprehensive migration governance. The GCM is the first agreement negotiated at the intergovernmental level, covering all aspects of international migration (UN Network on Migration, 2022). The GCM also reflects a global consensus that has emerged with the notion that countries cannot manage migration issues around the globe on their own; hence, there is a need for global cooperation. This is based on the New York Declaration, which, as mentioned, was inspired by the 2015 global migration crisis. Essentially, as part of the

New York Declaration, the international community agreed to collaborate to establish a comprehensive framework for global migration governance (Newland, 2019).

The Compact is an intergovernmental strategy that aims to ensure cooperation to fill the gaps in international migration governance (Niemann and Zuan, 2018; Gottardo and Cyment, 2019). Like the UNHCR, the framework of the GCM is structured to enhance global coordination regarding international migrants' affairs and to promote diverse means of cooperation toward the governance of human mobility around the world (UNHCR–c, *n.d.*). Panizzon and Riemsdijk also stress that the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) places the United Nations (UN) in a better position to govern international migration. For these scholars, the Compact will help the IOM better manage migrants' issues, especially vulnerable migrants who do not have refugee status or specific international protection (Panizzon and Riemsdijk, 2019:1234).

According to McAdam, although the GCM is a non-binding agreement, its objectives are promising. This induces states to cooperate to achieve the common objectives listed by the GCM (McAdam, 2019). In Hoflinger's view, while the GCM is non-binding, it has the potential and legitimacy to influence international migration governance norms. More importantly, the strong political will of the participating governments is a key factor influencing the international community to adhere to the specified promises of the GCM. In other words, the GCM provides governments with political obligations and normative principles for governing international migration. Hoflinger emphasizes that governments can cooperate to manage global migration through shared efforts and objectives. Although binding principles are important, it does not mean that binding agreements are always more effective and relevant than non-binding agreements. Besides, within the international system, some countries continuously violate binding agreements and withdraw from international treaties to achieve their national interests (Hoflinger, 2020:662-664).

In addition, as argued by Hedley Bull, the leading student of English School theory, soft laws such as non-binding agreements, guidelines and standards and codes of conduct have the potential to influence governments when considering their interest within the international society (Bull, 1977). Hoflinger argues that the GCM is a migration regime that requires governments to consider their obligations to find

possible solutions to address various migration problems. In effect, the GCM binds states indirectly to fulfil their promises toward best practices in migration management (Hoflinger, 2020:671-2). For instance, states' expectations about how their citizens (migrants) should be treated elsewhere can influence their behaviour towards other states' (citizens) migrants.

The GCM assumes that migration is a global issue, not a societal burden or an individual problem. It is a global challenge that benefits all states simultaneously, however, only if managed successfully (McAdam, 2019). Migration, as is commonly acknowledged, contributes to the development of host and sending countries and their communities. Migration also provides opportunities for displaced people (Betts, 2011; 2018; McAdam, 2019; Betta and Kainz, 2017; IOM, 2022). Van der Vliet and Biermann also argue that the GCM demonstrates global stakeholders' political willingness to improve cooperation towards achieving their interests and promoting development globally (Van der Vliet and Biermann, 2022:60-61). The GCM aims to achieve a consensus on policies and ways of improving migration governance to benefit states and migrants (McAdam, 2019).

The GCM involves several pledges through various signatory governments and actors from various migration policy disciplines. In addition, the GCM contains ideas from multisectoral and interdependent groups, which is a desirable feature and contributes to the GCM framework. However, until now, the voices of migrants in policymaking have been limited (Van der Vliet and Biermann, 2022). The Compact is a human-centric and rights-based approach, but migrants' inputs into policy formulation remain minimal (McGregor, 2022). According to Afaq and Sirohi, some migrants are forced to move out of their comfort zones and, in the end, lose all their property. Migrants' opinions are important and require more attention in migration policy formulations (Afaq and Sirohi, 2018). This also suggests that migration governance must ensure that migrants, whether regular or irregular, contribute to migration policy formulations to defend their fundamental human rights.

Despite its salience, the GCM had some initial reactions from the global North countries such as Italy, Austria, Poland, Hungary, the UK and Germany with the concern that the GCM would undermine their sovereign rights such as territorial integrity and protection of nationals. Those countries' reaction was influenced by their

far-right movements who were concerned that the GCM could threaten their populations economically, socially and culturally. Most importantly, the anti-GCM activists considered immigration a problem for European identities (Rone and Fielitz, 2023:2-4). The US and Australia, on the other hand, also contributed to negotiations and drafting of the GCM. However, they raised their concerns that they have the right to determine their migration policies. This influenced Australia to abstain from voting and the US voted to reject the Compact. However, concerns about protecting migrants' rights have increased in these countries, leading to their cooperation and partnerships with other global actors (Bloom, 2019:492-3). This side of the GCM story highlights that, although the GCM looks promising, the global North holds its reservations about it.

It is worth noting that providing a concrete review of GCM and its implementation is impossible. However, it has been recognized that although some objectives of the GCM have received considerable focus, others have received less focus from some countries. According to McGregor, the GCM objectives that have high representations are 1 (data on migrants), 6 (recruitment and decent work), 7 (reducing vulnerabilities), 10 (eradicating trafficking) and 21 (return and reintegration). On the other hand, objective 8 (saving lives) has gotten a lower representation. The reason is that various states have different priorities regarding the objectives of the GCM and act accordingly. In other words, states are generally enthusiastic about cooperating toward achieving specific objectives that are important for their countries. McGregor, therefore, emphasizes that states should develop mechanisms and standards to measure their progress and cooperate with others for the general benefit of the GCM to the world (McGregor, 2022). Similarly, other scholars stress that national institutional frameworks, especially those related to migration, should play crucial roles in migration management and governance to help sustain and make the current GCM regime effective and successful (Bevelander and Hollifield, 2022; Kainz and Betts, 2021).

1.1.5. Global Climate Migration Governance: Why Does Climate Migration Require Special Attention in Migration Governance?

Over the years, migration policies have side-lined the problems associated with forced migration related to climate change. According to IOM, displaced people, including climate migrants, directly impact development. Climate migration's impacts include increased demand for urban infrastructure, destabilization of economic growth, conflicts over limited natural resources, pressure on health and education in the host communities and other social issues. Despite these problems, collective efforts at the international level to address them have not been sufficient and effective (IOM, 2015:10).

Similarly, the institutional role has been weak and there is no transparent international regime to address migration in the context of climate change. Although this study does not reveal a total absence of governance, attention has been less than expected. For instance, less attention is given to people who may seek asylum and cannot return to their original homes due to climate change threats. The absence of global legal frameworks to protect people who may cross borders due to climate impact on their livelihoods may influence the vulnerable to become irregular migrants. Also, while climate migrants or people on the move may have pre-existing livelihood challenges, the absence of protection frameworks can make them poorer and their situation worse (Martin, 2010: 407-411).

The alarming effects of climate change on human mobility have recently been coded into the migration policies of many states and resulted in the establishment of global strategic initiatives, agreements and platforms necessary to govern climate-induced migration. Although they are not legally binding on states, they aim to manage displacements associated with climate change. Typical examples are *The Peninsula Principles on Climate Displacement within States* (2013), the *Nansen Initiative on Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement* (2012-2015), the *2015 Paris Agreement* and the *Platform on Disaster Displacement*. These mechanisms and platforms aim to strengthen agreements and principles regarding climate mobility management (Van der Vliet and Biermann, 2022:60). The need to protect migrants who are affected by climate change is a critical issue. Hence, establishing the measures reflects states' and

the international community's attempts and willingness to manage climate change-related migrants (Christoff, 2016; Van der Vliet and Biermann, 2022).

According to Jakobsson (2022), in 2011, some experts and states, together with the UNHCR, attempted to establish an agency that could formally deal with people migrating because of natural disasters and climate change. However, the idea and the negotiations failed because of the complexities of forced migration and government expectations. The negotiation's failure resulted in the establishment of the *Nansen Initiative* to ensure best practices for disaster and climate-displaced people (Jakobsson, 2022:89). In addition, 2015 marks the beginning of substantial policy developments to govern climate-induced migration. The Paris Agreement, the New York Declaration and the GCM have all contributed to the governance of climate migration (Chazalnoel and Ionesco, 2018).

In general, the existing legislation for climate migration governance falls into three categories: mitigation, adaptation and protection. Mitigation mechanisms focus on strategies to combat climate change to help deal with migration. The adaptation regulations, on the other hand, focus on how to cope with and adjust to the effects of climate change, including migration as a strategy among others. Finally, the protection mechanisms seek to address climate migration challenges through human rights perspectives. These regulatory procedures are meant to guide stakeholders in identifying long-term solutions to the climate change and migration nexus (Behrman and Kent, 2018:7).

It is also worth stressing that climate change and its relationship with migration are gaining attention in several international policy agendas. According to Kaelin, policymakers have acknowledged the surge in tropical storms, tidal waves, sea level rise, erratic rainfall and the frightening effects of forced relocation. When people are subjected to unfavourable climatic circumstances and have no resilience strategy, they typically move to safer places (Kaelin, 2019:256). Through high-level stakeholder discussions, climate migration has been recognized within the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (Objective 2 of the GCM), the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Nansen Initiatives. These guide mechanisms are meant to pay critical attention to climate change as a key driver of migration in recent years. Although it has been difficult to translate these mechanisms

into practical actions, some countries such as Mauritius, Germany, Brazil, Bangladesh, Canada, Australia, Kenya and Uruguay, among others, are making progress toward climate migration governance through their national climate adaptation programs (IOM-WMR, 2022:233-4; IOM, 2018:3, 9-11).

On the other hand, some countries' policy measures to govern climate migration are in the draft stages (IOM-WMR, 2022:234). Therefore, the slow pace of policy initiatives has affected how urgent climate migration could be better governed. The Nansen Initiative, for example, was an initiative undertaken by the governments of Switzerland and Norway, along with other countries, to pay attention to human displacement in climate change. This initiative aimed to identify strategies and potential solutions for mitigating climate-related displacement. In 2015, the Nansen Initiative ended with the introduction of the "2015 Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disaster and Climate Change" to assist countries to pay serious attention to migration and displacement in the context of climate change and environmental hazards through effective practices and consensus building (Kaelin, 2019:255-256).

Nonetheless, till now, there is no explicit international convention for protecting climate migrants. The only guiding principles are soft laws (for example, the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction and the Cancun Climate Change Adaptation Framework), focusing on risk reduction and paying attention to affected people's livelihood. According to Kaelin, people's exposure to natural dangers can be mitigated by helping them move from dangerous environments. However, due to human rights concerns and the cultural bonds that certain people have with their lands (long-term habitats), this form of relocation can be challenging (Kaelin, 2019:257-8). Behrman and Kent also agree that relocation is a tough choice for mitigating the effects of climate change on human mobility. Many people are attached to their lands (hometowns), as found in their case studies from Australia and New Zealand. As a result, they do not want to be relocated regardless of whether climate change affects their settlements (Behrman and Kent, 2018).

It is important to note that climate-related challenges are expected to displace hundreds of millions of people within their own countries and beyond their borders by 2050. This problem will exacerbate urbanization issues in many countries. Unexpected

disasters, such as flooding, extreme heat waves, drought, desertification, changes in rainfall patterns and their effects on food production, may result in unplanned displacements of people. Most rural agricultural areas in Southern Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa have already witnessed significant climate migration toward large cities in recent years (Mayors Migration Council, May 2022). Various studies indicate that the countries in the global South suffer the most significant risk of climate displacement due to their inability to implement appropriate climate disaster adaptation measures such as heat-trapping, storm drain systems, flood control and drainage systems. This suggests that if stakeholders fail to enact the necessary policy actions, those countries may witness migration, with the possibility of many of the displaced being obliged to migrate to the global North (Van der Vliet and Biermann, 2022; Clement et al., 2021; Wilkinson, 2016; Wilkinson et al., 2017).

As indicated earlier, the worrisome surge in climate migration has attracted stakeholders' attention to develop policies to tackle the problems. However, policy implementations have been slow. Biermann and Boas assert that the earliest discussions on climate migration governance took place intending to create effective procedures for managing the affairs of people displaced due to the unexpected outcomes of climate change and expanding the scope of the 1951 Refugee Convention to cover such people. However, the discussion to expand the 1951 Convention's definition to include climate-displaced people has not been successful. The international community continues to define and focus on refugees in the context of wars and political instabilities, with little or no attention paid to those displaced by the devastating effects of climate change (Bierman and Boas, 2010; Behrman and Kent, 2022).

Despite the alarming impact of climate change on migration, the policies that aim to protect the rights and dignity of climate migrants have been very insufficient so far. The 1951 Refugee Convention, for instance, does not recognize climate-displaced people as refugees. Also, the principle of refoulment under international refugee law does not cover people who need protection because of their displacement due to climate change. Additionally, most governments are not committed to their responsibilities towards climate migrants, mainly due to the ineffectiveness of the mechanisms to protect climate-displaced people. Typical examples of these

international mechanisms are the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), UNFCCC Task Force on Displacement and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in East Africa (Dick and Schraven, 2018:1-2; Oakes et al., 2023:2). These mechanisms provide platforms for cooperation and policy development but do not have legal binding principles and sanctioning and enforcement mechanisms. The mechanisms are based on soft laws and encourage states to adopt measures to protect climate/disaster-related displaced people (McAdam, 2016:1524-5). States have voluntary responsibilities/commitments towards displaced people. Hence, this may be the reason for their ineffectiveness. However, they seek to promote political consensus, which can "open ways to a greater legal achievement" (McAdam, 2016: 1526).

Issues regarding climate migration remain part of the political talks within the global community (Van der Vliet and Biermann, 2022). However, policies on migration pay more attention to the prevention of migration than dealing with the consequences of climate migration. In the African context, for instance, this is the case (Schraven et al., 2019:2-4). Since climate change issues continue to be political and parties who signed the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change have not been able to establish strong legal systems to govern climate migration, it may be difficult to have effective global governance on climate migrants in the near future (Van der Vliet and Biermann, 2022).

Swain states that inter-state climate migration would increase due to water scarcity and harsh climatic conditions. Such migration would cause conflict between and among climate migrants and host community members. Owing to this, strong institutional measures to address climate change issues are critical (Swain, 2015). Furthermore, Kaelin emphasizes the urgent need for global tools to protect people forced to move due to the detrimental effects of climate change. Nonetheless, governments are reluctant to agree on binding principles to protect climate migrants. According to Kaelin, as it stands now, destination countries may refuse to accept any attempt to develop a binding regulatory instrument due to fear of overburden. Although there are some existing agreements and mechanisms, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, they have limited effectiveness due to their soft nature. Hence, there is a need to develop better mechanisms to manage climate migration through strong international norms (Kaelin, 2019).

It has also been observed that many countries lack climate migration laws and policies. Few countries, such as the Central and Southern American countries, have legislation to accommodate persons displaced by climate change (Kaelin, 2019:259). Other countries such as Ghana, Nepal, Nigeria, Haiti and Georgia include migration in their climate change policy framework, yet implementations are still lacking. The lagging implementation is primarily associated with ineffective coordination and lack of coherence regarding climate change policies and migration issues. The lack of coherence between climate change policies and human mobility negatively affects the coordination of policies that establish measures to deal with relevant issues. More importantly, there is a lack of general comprehension in regulating climate migration due to the absence of "specialized legal frameworks" defining legal mandate and authority (IOM, 2018: 8,14-15). Relevant institutions are, therefore, required to provide the necessary mechanisms to govern and offer legal apparatus for climate-induced migration.

It is important to stress that international climate agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol (UN, 1998) and the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) have important implications for climate migration. The Kyoto Protocol opened the way for international climate change agreements and was a binding document for those who signed (UN, 1998:15). It connected the historical carbon emissions to the industrialized/developed countries' developmental process, as also noted in the Preamble of the 1992 Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 1992).¹ On the other hand, the Paris Agreement shifted towards linking climate impact to human mobilities and requested the relevant authority to take the necessary measures.² However, the Paris Agreement is based on parties' voluntarism, i.e. "nationally determined

¹Quoted from the preamble of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ("the Convention" as called in the Kyoto Protocol): "Noting that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs" (UNFCCC, 1992).

²As noted in the Paris Agreement, a request was made to "the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism to establish, according to its procedures and mandate, a task force to complement, draw upon the work of and involve, as appropriate, existing bodies and expert groups under the Convention including the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group, as well as relevant organizations and expert bodies outside the Convention, to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change" (UNFCCC, 2016:36).

contributions" concerning the reduction of carbon emissions (UNFCCC, 2016:4). Such voluntarism, applying to major as well as minor polluters, limits the Agreement's seriousness towards climate migration (Falkner, 2016: 1107-8).

The assumption that states should be responsible for their national climate change mitigation measures (Falkner, 2016:1107; Depledge, 2022:685) would not enable the world to tackle climate change and its impacts, because some countries, particularly those in the global South, do not have sufficient capacities. Through collective efforts, much is needed to address the climate crisis and its impact on human mobility. Therefore, the global North needs to cooperate effectively with the global South to achieve the global agenda to mitigate the pressure from climate change (Van der Vliet and Biermann, 2022:60-61; Draper, 2021:322).

Better and more effective cooperation (further discussed in Chapter 4) may be achieved through the support from and by negotiating with multiple actors such as CSOs, major powers and developing states. The support of CSOs and other relevant actors has already contributed significantly to the success of the Paris Agreement (Falkner, 2016:1115; Allan et al., 2023:915). Further support can help create awareness and advocacy for climate migration regulations. Critics may ask how this can be achieved. In agreement with Falkner, mobilizing pressure from both domestic and international levels towards realistic expectations can be helpful (Falkner, 2016:1108). Similarly, inclusive and consultative engagement of all relevant communities and sectors can also help. As argued by McAdam, states' current preventative actions can shape what form a future climate mobility may take in the future: "humanitarian catastrophe, evacuation and return, voluntary migration or planned relocation". "While the ideal outcome may be avoiding movement altogether", a well-planned mobility will help to deal with unexpected displacements and forced migration (McAdam, 2016: 1546).

It is worth noting that the existing attempts towards climate migration governance continue to suffer from a lack of clear responsibility shared by governments worldwide. Various governments are concerned about the differences in issues and burden sharing, and, hence, how to share responsibility continues to be one of the significant barriers to effective governance on climate migration (Kaelin, 2019; Van der Vliet and Biermann, 2022). It is, therefore, important to find a possible means

to accommodate climate migrants; otherwise, the situation may become uncontrollable for many governments, especially for those in the developing world.

In 2016, the World Bank recommended that the developed countries in the South Pacific, like Australia and New Zealand, should establish regular means for people in the low-lying Pacific Islands to relocate if needed. This aimed to avoid a future unplanned migration from the Pacific Islands (Curtain et al., 2016). Considering this example, climate mobility is no longer a dream but a reality that needs to be addressed by solid actions and measures. This recommendation is an example of what must be done before climate mobility increases. Other regions need to join as well. As emphasized by McAdam, stakeholders' "pre-planned mobility strategy", especially in hotspot areas, is essential to avoid "displacement in the face of pending disaster" (McAdam, 2016:1546). Over the years, more discussions and recommendations than practical actions have characterized the attitude of the international community. However, more effective and practical actions are needed to save the planet and the vulnerable. To this end, critical adaptation strategies such as developing and promoting drought-resistant/climate-resilient crops, irrigation farming (Silchenko and Murray, 2023:2, 12) and other relevant resilience measures need to be adopted to provide livelihood opportunities to the vulnerable, especially in the hotspot areas (McAdam, 2016:1546).

Climate migration governance needs special and urgent attention, considering the current climate mobility crisis. As indicated by Biermann and Boas stakeholders need to consider the following, but not limited to these measures, in any attempt to promote better governance on climate migration: (a) a planned relocation and resettlement for the high-risk places, (b) resettlement instead of temporary asylum for those who cannot return to their original habitats, (c) collective rights for local populations such as "certain religious and ethnic groups, cities, villages, regions or province as in the case of small island states," (d) international assistance for domestic measures to assist governments and local communities in protecting climate migrants and (e) international burden sharing to help less developed countries obtain support from the international community. According to them, these recommendations should not be limited to specific institutions or agencies; instead, the international community

should consider establishing remarkable frameworks to govern climate migration effectively (Biermann and Boas, 2010:75-76).

It is worth noting that the current migration regime (e.g., Refugee Compact and GCM) demonstrates governments' determination for a collaborative framework regarding migration governance. The Refugee Compact, for instance, seeks to prevent displacement and find a better solution for displaced persons. The GCM (specifically Objective 2) also stresses the need to minimize the adverse drivers of human mobility. These migration governance mechanisms show that the existing migration regime designates sections for action plans that focus on other issues that affect human mobility, such as disasters and climate change. However, they do not provide legal pathways for forcibly displaced people who want to move to third countries if there is no opportunity in their countries of origin. Therefore, stakeholders of the current migration governance, such as government bodies and NGOs, need to consider developing legal frameworks for regulating the burden-sharing in the international community regarding climate migration. Those countries that abstained from the GCM should also be part of such endeavour due to both the increasing urgency of the issue and the fact that no country is immune from the adverse impacts of climate change. Moreover, some climate-related disasters can force people to move to countries remaining outside the GCM and they may not be able to return (Cantor et al. 2024:3); hence, protection of those peoples' rights and dignity will be needed. Additionally, the international community must strengthen the mechanisms to support and ensure accountability regarding climate migration governance (Van der Vliet and Biermann, 2022:67).

Again, in the case of the GCM, the aim is to support regular migration safely and to control irregular and unsafe human mobility. However, the GCM lacks clarification regarding mechanisms for migrants affected by climate change (Van der Vliet and Biermann, 2022:64-65). Although the GCM mentions the adverse drivers for migration, which include climate change, it lacks a concrete mechanism and substantive framework to deal with the problems of climate migrants. In this regard, there is a need for better protection mechanisms at the global, regional, sub-regional and national levels. Host countries, for example, must review their conditions for admitting climate migrants by taking into consideration the affected people's

fundamental human rights (climate migrants rights) (Van der Vliet and Biermann, 2022: 68). Karacasulu and Karakir argue that there cannot be a single solution for climate migration governance and defend a comprehensive approach to managing climate migration. Most importantly, the international community should try to amend the UN Refugee Convention or establish mechanisms to deal with climate migrants (Karacasulu and Karakir, 2021:10).

Interestingly, the Refugee Compact considers climate migrants as migrants who migrate temporarily and return when the conditions improve. According to the Compact, migrants affected by disasters and climate change require temporary humanitarian protection and shelter (the Refugee Compact, para.63). This suggests that the existing migration regime does not consider climate migrants in permanent resettlement programs (Global Compact on Refugees, para.90). Additionally, the GCM mentions the safe return of irregular migrants (GCM, para.18), meaning that temporary protection for climate migrants is the main focus as far as the current migration regime is concerned. The current migration regime does not consider climate migrants as permanent migrants in their host destination. Additionally, the GCM does not offer explicit legal resettlement options for people displaced or migrating due to climate change and does not provide strategies for group protection, even though climate-related migration may involve the mass movement of people (Van der Vliet and Biermann, 2022). The latter is a complicated factor as far as the current migration governance regime is concerned. As noted in some research, however, such as those by Teye and Owusu (2015) and Teye et al. (2021), climate migration has changed from a seasonal and short-term migration issue to a longer-term and permanent human mobility issue.

Biermann and Boas rightly posit that burden-sharing should be the basis for legal and moral responsibility toward climate change management and that support from the global North is important (Biermann and Boas, 2010). The Paris Agreement (Articles 9 and 10) only recommends that developed states assist developing states; recommendation as such is not binding (UN, 2015-Paris Agreement). It is also important to emphasize that the Paris Agreement is complicated in terms of its obligations and voluntary issues. For instance, Article 4 about “anthropogenic emission and aiming for net-zero emissions” seems to have a binding character, while

Article 5 about “greenhouse gas sinks” deals with voluntary obligations -more on soft power (Articles 4 and 5).³ As noted by Falkner, although the agreement does not legally bind states on the mitigation pledges, it obliges them to report their implementation pledges and actions periodically (Falkner, 2016:1124). This mixture of obligation and voluntary pledges makes it challenging to point out explicitly the exact nature of how to hold parties accountable for their duties, where burden sharing is not an exception.

Like Biermann and Boas (2010), Van der Vliet and Biermann also argue that the industrialized world should assist developing countries in building their capacities to protect climate migrants. Although the GCM acknowledges this, it lacks concrete plans to establish mechanisms for tackling the needs of climate migrants from the global South and how the global North should provide support (Van der Vliet and Biermann, 2022:79). In this regard, stakeholders should establish burden-sharing strategies and mechanisms within clear language for countries to be more committed to their obligations in the international arena. This can be done by linking climate migration issues to a proper codified law with a view to monitoring the parties’ protection of the rights and dignity of climate migrants. This may, however, require pressure from diverse actors at both domestic and international levels as happened for the establishment of the Paris Agreement (Falkner, 2016; Allan et al., 2023).

Also, both the Refugee Compact and the GCM fail to clarify the status of climate migrants as they lack specific legal and institutional frameworks (Van der Vliet & Biermann, 2022). In this regard, the current migration governance needs to be clear about the legal and institutional position of climate migrants. Similarly, Jakobsson stresses the need for common terminology and language of concerns to set standard norms regarding climate migration. This will guide stakeholders to create a unified policy for climate migration governance and management (Jakobsson, 2022:103).

This study agrees with Alexander Betts’ argument that although refugee protection is a global public good because all governments benefit from the security and the fulfilment of human rights, not all aspects of migration governance are ‘global public goods’, i.e., all states do not benefit equally from high-skilled migrants, for

³All the Articles (4,5,9& 10) can be accessed from this link:
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf .

instance (Betts, 2010:3). Nonetheless, this study contends that governance on all forms of migration is critical and necessary for all states and for that matter climate migration governance is considered as a global public good because in the long run climate migration will affect all states within the international system, not just those in the South. Given the uncertainties related to climate change and the alarming increase in climate mobility, climate migration governance needs to be transformed into an effective and sustainable regime. There is no certainty regarding which states will be the major sending, transiting, or receiving states in the future.

1.2. THEORIZING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE MIGRATION GOVERNANCE

Theories of International Relations (IR) help describe, explain and predict various global phenomena. Similarly, in international migration discourse, IR theories help forecast global crises and explain reality. Climate migration governance is an evolving complex issue; hence, theorizing its governance is also complex. Such complexities can be linked to the complex nature of international migration governance itself, which involves diverse international organizations, norms, legal frameworks, policies and mechanisms that are occupied, among others, with the protection of the human rights of migrants, border security, labour issues, refugee protection and so on (Ferdous, 2024:17-18). While industrialized countries try to control immigration, developing countries encourage their people to migrate to support development through remittances. As Jeffery Kaye (journalist/author in Los Angeles) remarks in Koslowski 2011, migration is a global issue that will continue forever. Some people may be disadvantaged in their places of domicile due to diverse factors such as the economy and climate hazards, so they may need to move elsewhere to survive. Lack of opportunities and hardships may naturally induce people to migrate to safeguard themselves (Koslowski, 2011: ix).

What is at stake is the humane governance of migration (Koslowski, 2011: ix). As Ish-Shalom et al. rightly put it, "We live in turbulent times." Therefore, understanding the issues around us requires a relevant approach and framework (Ish-Shalom et al., 2021: i). Cooperation and coordination, therefore, become relevant to

dealing with challenges and ascertaining the benefits, especially about migration. Although efforts have been made by international organizations such as the UN, IOM, ILO, EU and many others, several challenges, including the politicization of migration, continue when attempts to address relevant issues in migration. Hence, issue become more complicated. Undeniably, states' sovereignty and national interest can sometimes negatively influence cooperation and coordination. However, the alarming increase in vulnerability among different migrant groups and significantly displaced people demonstrates the urgency of making the necessary efforts. With partnerships, states can develop effective and humane mechanisms to protect the dignity of vulnerable migrants, such as climate migrants (Ferdous, 2024:18-19). Policymakers and citizens are faced with making decisions on questions that boil down to "how should members of 'bounded' communities, primarily nation-states, treat 'outsiders.'" The question of how to cope with outsiders is persistent, because people continue to live in bounded societies, i.e. nation-states, hence the reason for differentiating between the insiders/ members and the outsiders/ non-members (Shapcott, 2010:2). Migrants may be welcome to contribute to development in good times, while they are turned into scapegoats and blamed in bad times that often result in strict immigration rules and regulations (Koslowski, 2011: ix).

There is always tension between the need for global inclusiveness and the relevance of a community. Diverse factors influence this tension, including national and international interests. These multiple factors also impact the state's ethical and moral responsibilities globally (Dal, 2015:432). While in some places, the distinction between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' continues to prevail, in other places, friendly and welcoming relations between insiders and outsiders continue to grow (Shapcott, 2010:2-3). It is also argued that there is always ethical and moral responsibility beyond the state regarding human rights, hence the need to accommodate others (Cochran, 1999:144). Shapcott also emphasizes that although interdependence is high among states, some states isolate themselves and restrict their borders from outsiders. However, it is necessary to welcome and support others within the global international community (Shapcott, 2010:2-3). It is important to stress that states may show concern for protecting non-citizens if their human rights are in jeopardy due to their own countries' inability or unwillingness to protect them.

Similarly, some states may undermine the protection of their citizens due to scarce resources and the need to prioritize certain issues of concern and this may call for the duty of other actors to support (Cantor et al., 2024:15). Although climate change impacts vary from state to state, every state has a moral duty towards addressing climate problems and promoting the human rights of others (Shapcott, 2010:5-8) in situations where a particular state may be unwilling or unable to protect its vulnerable citizens. The international community may need to ensure that the dignity of the victims is protected. As indicated by Cantor et al., the willingness and capacity of the state to protect the vulnerable can influence how specific harm may be considered persecutory and need international protection (Cantor et al., 2024:14).

As emphasized by Zickgraf, not only should the analytical frameworks consider the issues regarding people being forced to migrate, but also those who are constrained to move due to diverse factors such as those related to finance, socio-cultural reasons and absence of legal frameworks to govern concerned issues (Zickgraf, 2021: 1-2). Migration can be used as an adaptation measure for alternative livelihoods. However, climate mobility governance is associated with complex socioeconomic, political and human rights issues. This consequently influences the theorization of climate migration and how to ascertain relevant policies and regulations to address the challenges involved (Micheal, 2023:267). Hence, attempting to theorize this issue to provide suggestions for a solution needs to point out concerns of inclusion and exclusion of outsiders (migrants) (Shapcott, 2010:2) and put forward the relevance of institutions for collective actions to govern climate migration and the challenges. Therefore, any attempt to explore collective action to address climate-related issues such as migration should point out the challenges in its governance (Partelow et al., 2020:6), particularly the tension between sovereignty and interdependence (Ikenberry, 2018:8).

While the governance of migration, primarily climate-related, is at its utmost urgency, the politics of migrants' inclusion and exclusion continue to prevail. While states' sovereignty is respected under international law, the rights of migrants, especially the rights of vulnerable, should also be respected. As immigration policies are surrounded by controversies originating from "populist ideals," considering critical measures to welcome and protect vulnerable migrants must be the ideal of an effective

and inclusive migration regime (Ferdous, 2024:28). This section, therefore, attempts to discuss issues of climate migration by looking at the general discussion in traditional IR theory, specifically, realism and liberalism and pay keen attention to the neoliberal institutionalism to analyse the relevance of institutions for a prospective solution.

Both realism and liberalism are important and relevant to the analysis of migration policies, but this thesis explains why the international community should embrace the liberal approach to govern climate migration. While realism helps explain why it is difficult to establish effective institutions as part of global migration governance (for example, states' reluctance to give up their sovereignty on decisions concerning border management), the liberal approach helps understand why the world needs practical cooperation to address the alarming increase in climate migration and provides a guide for the future. Also, liberalism helps us understand people's right to migrate, the impacts of migration on origin and destination countries and the role that the international community plays as a uniform body (cooperative entity). Again, the liberal approach helps understand the implications of international policy of migration and involves intergovernmental approaches for its governance (Meyers, 2000; Acharya, 2008). Hence, this study supports the liberal approach to advocate for practical cooperation toward climate migration governance, focusing on neoliberal institutionalism. However, different from the state-centric nature of the latter, this study also highlights the relevance of multiple actors to address climate migration-related challenges and hence its deployment of the governance concept as clarified earlier in this chapter.

1.2.1. Realism and Climate Migration Governance

The realist approach to international migration provides migration studies with never-ending questions, especially regarding moral issues in migration (Kreutz, 2023:129). Realism belongs to the anti-cosmopolitan (communitarian) school of thought with its emphasis on the bounded nature of political community, the state and the realist ethics involve moral issues that pertain to the territorial sovereignty of the state and the welfare of its citizens (Shapcott, 2010:9). From the realist perspective, migration is regarded as an issue of security and (unwanted) migrants/ outsiders as

threats to be prevented. States constantly seek to protect their internal security through border measures (Lavenex, 2001:39-40). Migration control for some countries means securing their citizens from undocumented immigrants (Geddes and Ruhs, 2019:3-4).

Realists argue that governments should limit international migration to safeguard national interests. By regulating migration, states seek to protect their citizens from various threats, such as unemployment and cultural, ethnic and racial changes in the make-up of the state. The state is a rational actor that seeks to protect the interests of its citizens (Hollifield, 1992:569-570). Protecting and maintaining the identity and security of its national community is the primary concern of the state. The anarchical nature of international system obliges states to rely on self-help rather than help others (Carr, 1946: 25-26, 63; Morgenthau, 1947:169), while pushing them to compete for power without paying much attention to the common good or the interest of international community (Carr, 1946:179-810).

Acknowledging the common good for insiders and outsiders is not an ideal for the realist (Shapcott, 2010:60-61). Realists neither consider migration as a common problem nor pay attention to the moral issues associated with outsiders (Shapcott, 2010:88-89). It is worth noting that realism does not ignore morality completely. For Morgenthau, moral action should be aimed at achieving the highest human satisfaction. However, due to the "nature of man" and states struggle to acquire more power; morality becomes secondary to power. The individual, as Morgenthau emphasized, is moral by nature but (should be) politically amoral (Morgenthau, 1947:151). As he argues, there is a "dual standard" in that man acts morally differently in the political and private domains. Man may violate moral principles in politics, which he would not violate in his private life. The age of civilization cannot be satisfied by such a moral duality. Therefore, morality is "in retarded stage of development" in realist political discourse (Morgenthau, 1947:153-154).

However, in the case of climate migration, the relevant question may be: Should states apply the same tactics to achieve their national interest by ignoring the humanitarian needs of innocent outsiders (vulnerable climate migrants)? Moreover, should the dichotomy between such humanitarian concern and national interest prevent states from cooperating? The position of this study is that it should be possible to find

ways of balancing national interest and cooperating on issues regarding vulnerable climate migrants.

For realists, a moral approach towards migration within the international system is not feasible (Pearson, 2022:951). Realism pays more attention to strategic and material gains rather than moral outcomes (Shapcott, 2010:62). Despite the humanitarian needs of vulnerable migrants (outsiders), some states pursue a policy of securitization in the name of national interest to prevent their entry (Mencütek et al., 2020:95-96). In other words, the harm and suffering of others are not considered a priority in the realist world. For instance, the US sanctions on Iraq to stop Saddam Hussein from developing weapons of mass destruction led to the suffering and death of many children and other innocent people. However, morality was not a priority for the US administration acting in the name of the US national interest (Shapcott, 2010:64). A telling example in the context of migration is the EU's sanction on Libya in 2011 for being a source of irregular migrants to Southern Europe. Another example is the US economic sanction on Haiti for being a source of irregular migrants to the US. The Haitian incident happened after the 1991 coup and as a result of sanctions, about 1000 children died each month due to malnutrition. These are examples of economically sanctioning a target country to control unwanted immigrants (Connell et al., 2021:1, 4).

The decision to exclude migrants (outsiders) is influenced by "political and cultural dangers". States are concerned about the threat posed especially by certain groups of immigrants to the political and cultural identity of their nations (Shapcott, 2010:99). Moreover, migration may be associated with drug trafficking and terrorism and lead to environmental degradation due to its stress on ecosystems. These are major concerns that lead state policymakers to restrict cross-border movements and influence the debate on open versus close borders (Hollifield, 2000:82-84).

The anti-cosmopolitans/ communitarians, which also include realists, dispute freedom of movement as a fundamental right. The anti-cosmopolitans argue that freedom of movement comes with the right to work to earn a living. In this regard, migration comes with more rights than just a fundamental right to move, equipping outsiders with other advantages such as seeking employment. The communitarian morality is such that although individuals may seek freedom of movement if their

fundamental rights are threatened, the proof of the latter is asked from the applicant and the state does not need to justify or defend its decision to reject the application for entry (Shapcott, 2010:99). However, within the context of climate migration, critical sudden-onset events such as floods and hurricanes may not allow an applicant to prove the fairness of their right to move. Hence, the conditional anti-cosmopolitan morality may not help displaced people.

Regardless of how it flows, migration has always been considered a security problem for various reasons specific to receiving countries. This affects how states make policies to deal with migrants (Huysmans, 1998:570-71). According to Bigo, the perception of migrants as a security problem influences the kind of security measures states deploy at borders. These measures include using security apparatus such as police, military intelligence, identification technology and satellite surveillance (Bigo, 2003:132). On humanitarian grounds, accepting refugees can be considered a moral obligation of states; however, in many instances, extending humanitarian assistance is just a smoke-screen attempt. In many places, including EU countries, realist tactics such as surveillance and control have become commonplace vis-à-vis migrants and refugees based on security reasons and other state interests (Sokefeld, 2017:82-84). Some states even build walls and fences to prevent asylum seekers from entering. For Ames, however, borders can be secured not by preventing the entry of forcibly displaced people through walls, but instead by considering them as fellows of humanity and protecting their dignity by fulfilling their essential needs (Ames, 2021: 169-170).

While climate change is considered a threat to migration in the sense that it impacts the lives of people on the move and causes migrant deaths (Lieven, 2020:8, Nayna-Schwerdtle et al., 2020:23), climate refugees and environmental migration are also considered security problems. The competition for resources due to climate migration also exacerbates conflicts in some places, affecting security issues. For instance, climate change forces many people to move from Bangladesh to India for livelihood resources. Due to the competition for resources, the Indian government considers climate migrants from Bangladesh as security threats. Thus, adopting measures to control climate migrants is perceived as necessary security measures to protect the Indian national interest (Ransan-Cooper, 2015:110-111). Similarly,

Southern Europe is faced with the threat of climate migration from the worst-affected regions in Asia and Africa. This has influenced Southern European countries like Italy, Greece and Spain to adopt extra measures to prevent illegal migrants (Lieven, 2020:9-10). This is in line with the realist notion that states aim to control migration to protect their national security and interests. According to Karakir and Karacasulu, climate change is constructed as a security issue in the realist discourse. However, "climate change is a threat multiplier rather than a primary threat" (Karakir and Karacasulu, 2021:112). This means climate change amplifies the already existing security issues of states.

Although some scholars consider climate change as not the main threat, many states consider climate change and many issues related to the impact of climate change as important national security problems that need to be addressed through strict security measures (Barnett, 2003:7; Brown, 2007; Lewis and Lenton, 2015:383; Daoust and Selby, 2022). For instance, some political parties in Southern Europe and other Western countries try to convince citizens to support them in dealing with existing threats such as (climate) migration as a matter of national security (Lieven, 2020:9, 11-17). The Purdon notes that the realist position on climate change governance and its related issues depends on the state's interest. The global North is reluctant to cooperate toward climate change and migration governance, partly due to the fear of losing its sovereign power to international agencies. Some states are more concerned about their relative capacities to enhance their own domestic resilience, adaptation measures and mechanisms. This priority by the global North may influence their commitment to international collaborative efforts to support the vulnerable states in the global South and others (Purdon, 2017:266-9).

The identity issues as justification to exclude migrants can be viewed from Buzan et al.'s conception of society where individuals are identified as members of a particular community. To secure society means to sustain an 'identity group' based on nationality, in the case of Europe, for example. In other cases, religious or racial groups may be in question. The defined identity often leads to the construction of *we/us*, and *those* excluded (*them*) are considered threats to the identity of *we/us* (Buzan et al., 1998:119-120). Buzan et al. frame the identity-related securitization of migration as follows: "X people are being overrun or diluted by influxes of Y people; the X

community will not be what it used to be because others will make up the population; X identity is being changed by a shift in the composition of the population" (Buzan et al., 1998:121). Arguably, the influx of immigrants (outsiders) is treated as a probable factor that can change the 'way of life' and eventually the identity of host community. Therefore, excluding outsiders (non-members) is justified on the basis of preserving national culture. A typical example is the 'White Australian' policy in 1972 (exclusion of Africans and Asians) to defend Australia as a white Anglo-Saxon country (Shapcott, 2010:101).

In sum, the realists' attitudes towards migration in general and climate-related migration in particular are closely related to states' interests and national identity (Lieven, 2020:21; De Haas et al., 2020:4). Generally speaking, states are lukewarm about international cooperation and international law on such issues as long as they are regarded as non-beneficial to their national interest. The little progress made in establishing a climate migration regime may attest to the dominance of realist perspective in policy circles.

1.2.2. Liberalism and Climate Migration Governance

Over the years, the liberal school of thought has contributed to major transformations within the international system to promote peace and security. Like realists, liberals accept that the international system is anarchical. They deem states as important actors (Keohane, 1984:25), but not the only actors (Moravcsik, 1992:8; Russett, 2011:182) who are not necessarily enemies of each other (Russett, 2011:182). Similarly, unlike the realists, the anarchical nature of the international system does not mean a "state of war" for liberals (Doyle, 2016:65). States can work with multiple intergovernmental and transnational actors (institutions) to achieve their common goals. For the liberals, although there is no central authority, there is some order because international norms characterize the international system. Therefore, states cannot behave as they like, as the realists may claim (Russett, 2011:181-182).

The relevance of a liberal approach towards global concerns (for which migration is not an exception) has been widely debated in studies such as Moravcsik (1997), Keohane and Nye (1973, 1977, 1987, ,), Keohane (2002), Nye (2020),

Hollifield (1992, 2000, 2012), Betts (2011, 2018), Milner (1997), Ruggie (1998), Acharya (2008) and McAdam (2005, 2010, 2012, 2019). Migration governance is a critical international issue that depends on support from diverse institutions for success. Likewise, cooperative institutions are essential for what should be done concerning climate migration (McAdam, 2012:210-212; Clement et al., 2021: xix; Kainz and Betts, 2021:83). Other scholars also emphasize that institutionalizing different aspects of climate migration can help with the better governance of climate migration (McAdam, 2012; Behram and Kent, 2022; Wilkison, 2016; Wilkinson et al., 2017; Bierman and Boas, 2008; Taqwadin, 2013; Van der Vliet and Biermann, 2022).

Liberalism pays key attention to the rights and freedoms of individuals. Recognizing and promoting the rights of others can enable the peaceful coexistence of diverse groups (Moravcsik, 1992:17). In this regard, liberal states take the necessary measures through laws to promote and protect individual rights and ensure representative government (Doyle, 2016:54-56). Barriers to migration are, therefore, considered on liberal grounds as an infringement of individual freedoms and rights (Maloberti, 2011:560).

Liberalism is a cosmopolitan theory that considers a universal approach to addressing global problems (Shapcott, 2010: vii-ix). For Shapcott, cosmopolitans (in this study, cosmopolitans and liberal are used interchangeably) are "moral universalists... and consider humans as one single moral community with some rules..." (Shapcott, 2010:8-9). States have duties beyond their borders to care for others and should not be indifferent to the needs and sufferings of other citizens (Shapcott, 2010:15). Liberalism contributes to understanding and appreciating the importance of global interdependence in important issues, including climate change, migration and global governance (Hollifield, 2012; Betts, 2018). For the liberals, policies, including those related to migration, can improve if institutions are strong and play their roles effectively (Moravcsik, 1997). Similarly, liberals argue that institutions must deal with conflicts of interest and foster cooperation to tackle global issues through collective gains (Keohane and Nye, 1977:229-30). Climate migration is a global issue that requires effective cooperation and strong institutions.

Liberals such as Immanuel Kant emphasize that state behaviour can be shaped toward a peaceful social life within the international system. As cited in Russett (2011),

Kant (1795) notes that the "republican constitution" provides laws across states and guides them toward their attainment and sustenance of peace. He notes that without the rule of law, there would be "horror of violence." Therefore, states (republics) were recommended to establish a "federation of interdependent republics". In doing so, states can promote the progress of social and human lives. For liberals, despite individual differences and varying self-interest, (republican) states can cooperate and live in harmony. For states to deal with any barriers to solving global challenges, they need international governance structures in the form of cooperation through concerted agreements (Russett, 2011: 181-182). To this end, supportive mechanisms and international norms such as laws of war, human rights laws, migration and environmental agreements provide legal relationships among sovereign states (Epps et al., 2023:1-2); and help promote transparency and accountability (Keohane and Nye, 2002:239).

Liberals disregard the realist notion that the states are the most important actors when dealing with global issues. For liberals, both state and non-state actors are important in addressing common problems within the international arena (Keohane and Nye, 1977:33; Dunne et al., 2013:95; Baylis and Smith, 2005:162-163). Keohane and Nye argue that actors other than states can effectively engage in global discussions without the use of force as a policy instrument (Keohane and Nye, 1977:33). In short, the relationship between states and non-state actors can be critical in dealing with global problems (Keohane and Nye, 1977:25).

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational and trans-governmental agencies and civil society organizations play important roles in advancing cooperation toward a global agenda and ensuring that cooperation difficulties are addressed. With principles and active NGOs, critical attention would be paid to the legal norms and rules governing cooperative organizations, preventing cheating and cooperation challenges (Keohane and Nye, 2002:241-242). Schweiger argues that non-state actors play significant roles in shaping migration governance (Schweiger, 2023: ix). Again, multilateral stakeholders' cooperation and collaboration are essential to establish governance on migration (Schweiger, 2023:239). States establish mutual identity through cooperation to deal with everyday problems (Russett, 2011:154). Also, argued from the cosmopolitan perspective, states have a moral

obligation to treat insiders and outsiders alike. State differences and distances should not jeopardize states' obligation to act morally (Shapcott, 2010:15-16).

Liberalism provides an optimistic global view towards common issues such as migration and climate change. Liberals emphasize the importance of international cooperation, international institutions and trans-governmentalism in dealing with common global issues, including migration (Meyers, 2000:1266). In other words, the theory focuses on international institutions and multilateralism as a framework for understanding and solving common problems within the international community. According to liberals, for states to achieve a global objective, it is necessary to have common interests that oblige them to cooperate within the international system (Russett, 2011:181-3; Keohane and Nye, 1987:725; Moravcsik, 1997:520). They also stress that states' relations with other states and transnational organizations, such as non-state institutions and civil society organizations, influence states' actions toward a common agenda within the international arena (Moravcsik, 1997:514-520).

Liberals regard cooperation among states as an important element that helps solve global problems and reject the realist notion that international politics is just about power struggles and that maximizing military power is the utmost priority of states. Instead, liberals believe in the strength of partnerships. Neoliberal institutionalism, which this study pays critical attention to, regards norms and rules of institutions as core principles that guide states' conduct to act toward common purpose and collective obligations (Russett, 2011:188-189).

It is worth mentioning that liberalism has its complexities and dilemmas. Hence, liberalism is short-sighted regarding changing conditions within the international arena. For instance, liberals often promote and support representative and pluralist governments and their partnerships. As Doyle put it, liberalism contains legacies such as "peace among liberals, imprudent vehemence towards non-liberals and complaisance towards threat" (Doyle, 2016:64-65). Although such support may be justifiable and logical, this study does not find such legacies as relevant in the case of climate migration, since climate migrants are not at war with liberals or non-liberals. Also, no state is immune to climate change and migration. Rather than pursuing a policy of securitization, multiple states' and non-state actors' attention to and aligning with the liberal concern for individual rights can help address climate change-induced

migration. In essence, individual rights and freedoms must be considered in dealing with these otherwise over-politicized issues (Chaturvedi and Doyle, 2010:97-98).

According to Draper, states, especially the global North, should protect the rights of individuals who suffer from climate shocks leading to displacement and many livelihood challenges. This is argued based on the developed states' historical contribution to climate change. As such, Draper argues that displaced people have an 'occupancy right' to live in dignity. In his conception, such rights should not only be given to those forcibly displaced but also include those that will be potentially displaced (such as people in coastal and drought communities) due to unexpected climatic events. It might be difficult for states to prevent or control all events that may lead to displacement. Nonetheless, states have core duties to provide mechanisms to protect individual rights due to climate events (Draper, 2021:322-23).

Seeking to promote the rights of individuals also means that critical global attention should be paid to the poor countries already facing challenges from diverse hardships, such as those related to economic and infrastructure development. The less developed countries are less likely to provide relevant adaptation mechanisms to protect their citizens' dignity (Kang et al., 2023: 2-3). Hence, a collaborative duty by other states can be helpful (Draper, 2021:323). Therefore, the protection of displaced people to human welfare can be linked to the liberal conception of promoting individual rights and freedoms. As argued by Draper, states' support for displaced people is a matter of "justice, not charity". This means that states have the responsibility to protect their citizens and support them to secure their well-being as state members. Also, the industrialized countries must seek to satisfy climate-displaced people from developing countries due to their own high carbon emissions during the industrialization process. Since developed countries contributed to the tragedy of climate displacement, their support is not charity but instead for making up for historical damages (Draper, 2021:325-326). Additionally, liberal states have a duty to protect the human rights of living people as well as future generations (Kang et al., 2023:3). However, it is difficult to see states acting as such due to several challenges, including realist concerns, selfish behaviour (free riding) and coordination problems discussed in the following subsection and Chapter 4.

Climate migration is a global problem that needs efforts beyond individual states to address the concerns of the vulnerable (Kang et al., 2023:3-4). Like Draper (2021:325), Kang et al. also emphasize that states need to come together to offer support for the climate-vulnerable people. Such support should be provided by the industrialized states that contributed to and benefited the most from the world's carbon-based economy. But many states fear how decarbonization may affect their economies (Kang et al., 2023:3). Nonetheless, multilateral cooperation continues to help the agenda for low carbon emissions to promote social responsibilities towards a climate-friendly environment. Similarly, states' voluntary pledges are important measures to hope for the protection of the vulnerable (Falkner, 2016:1112). Although some states do not live up to their pledges, regular monitoring mechanisms and review of implementation policies can be helpful (Falkner, 2016:1121).

The Paris Agreement removed the former Kyoto Agreement's categories of exemption, demanding from every state to reduce their carbon emissions (Falkner, 2016:1108). However, many states, including major powers in the industrialized global North, respond slowly to collective climate actions. This attitude and politicization render liberalism weak in dealing with climate change (Kang et al., 2023:4), while concerns about the human rights of the affected remain (Kang et al., 2023:6). People's right to live a dignified life after being displaced by climate events or anticipating climate displacement should be held in high esteem. This should not just be part of cheap rhetoric; serious measures should be taken to formulate and enforce norms and practical rules. As Jakobsson emphasizes, the diverse nature of climate-induced migration (such as forced displacement and voluntary movement) makes policymaking and discussion complex (Jakobsson, 2022:93-94). This study agrees with Jakobsson's complexity claim. Nonetheless, states can accept the realities and be willing to treat vulnerable people in this equation humanely despite any complexities. Climate migration includes heterogeneous groups influenced by diverse issues; therefore, related policies should aim at development, humanitarian aid, climate adaptation and mitigation measures. Also, more focus should be on how states' clearly defined solutions to climate-induced migration help with a comprehensive strategy for prospective solutions (Jakobsson, 2022:94).

Climate impact on migration is not an illusion or imaginary event. Many states are feeling the impact. Reports such as the UK's Foresight (2011) and the World Bank's Groundswell report (Clement et al., 2021) show that majority of the climate migration will be intra-state, but many people may cross borders moving forward. However, liberal norms to legally protect the rights of climate migrants are still lacking. As Goodwin-Gill emphasizes, the needs of displaced people should be taken care of per their dignity, right to integrity and human welfare. Significant mechanisms to build consensus and provide common standards to protect will pave the way for displaced people to enjoy human rights and dignity (Goodwin-Gill, 2000:161). This raises concerns about establishing effective measures for addressing the associated problems. This could be linked to the previously mentioned criticism about the voluntary nature of the Paris Agreement. To successfully govern climate migration cooperatively necessitates the adoption of binding measures with effective monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms to protect the dignity of climate-vulnerable people. As a matter of fact, that cannot be achieved through *realpolitik* but rather through liberal policies with the emphases on human dignity and rights and on diverse institutions and actors. The next sub-section discusses the relevance of the neo-liberal approach in this study and discusses the collective action problem and possible ways to address it, further analysed in Chapter 4.

1.2.3. The Necessity of (Neo)liberal⁴ Institutionalism to Address International Climate Migration in a Realist World

Since the 1950s, several intergovernmental norms have focused on migration governance. However, climate migration issues have received less attention in major migration discourses (Betts, 2011; Geiger, 2020). The international community does not have sufficient institutions that pay critical attention to climate migration governance. More importantly, there is a lack of institution (regime) that ensures legal responsibilities for climate migrants. Also, existing environmental laws do not provide specific protective measures for climate migration. Therefore, states need to find better

⁴ The concept of neoliberalism used in this study is not an economic term. Rather, it refers to the analysis of international regimes on various international issues, including climate migration.

ways of protecting their citizens displaced by the adverse effects of climate change and other environmental hazards (McAdam, 2012; Behrman and Kent, 2018; Jakobsson, 2022; Cantor et al., 2024).

The absence of specific legal mechanisms to protect and address issues of climate migrants is not just worrisome. More seriously, leaders fail to acknowledge that the dignity of those vulnerable people is at stake. To avoid being watchdogs requires serious national and international attention to establish measures for a sustainable climate migration regime. As noted by Ferdous, a sustainable migration regime is a call for the adoption of a comprehensive and collaborative approach that includes all relevant stakeholders (Ferdous et al., 2024:30). Also, according to Koslowski, contemporary migration governance requires inclusive measures to understand the dynamics about migration and institutional pathways for coherent governance (Koslowski, 2011:3). Similarly for Ghosh, the migration regime requires measures that can promote orderly and manageable movements. It may be done in a manner that can promote stakeholder capacity to govern movements in diverse circumstances and, among all other measures, should balance the interest of parties (Ghosh, 2000:221-2).

Climate migration, which has become one of the dominant topics in recent media and policy discussions, brings to the scene the need to understand how related concerns should be governed (Boas et al., 2022:3367, 3371). Governing this type of mobility requires different actors apart from the state and this dissertation considers vibrant institutions from a neo-liberal perspective meaningful. Among all other concerns, climate migration is related to irregular migration, asylum-seeking and existing concerns about protecting migrants. Nonetheless, relevant institutions to govern remain underdeveloped (Martin, 2010: 397). Without legal frameworks to migrate decently, people who lose their livelihood may migrate irregularly (Martin, 2010:410-411). Situations like this can disturb and inflict harm on individuals due to associated dangers (Cantor et al., 2024:17). While sudden- and slow-onset events pose a threat to individuals, they also weaken individual states' capacity to manage respective situations (Cantor et al., 2024:9). This is because unprepared and unexpected events may force states to divert or channel resources allocated for other emergencies. As a result, governments and other relevant actors should be more

interested in establishing relevant institutions to deal with climate migration (Boas et al., 2022:3371) and with displacement, from which no state is completely immune (Cantor et al., 2024:15). According to Boas et al., climate mobility happens with complex dynamics. Hence, it necessitates a regime that looks beyond unidirectional governance (Boas et al., 2022:3375) and includes others beyond the state for informed policies and regulations.

Arguably, states are interested in providing for the urgent needs of their citizens who suffer from climate stress. However, some states are unable to do so for technical and financial reasons. Recognizing these challenges implies the need for an effective and inclusive regime to address them and promote cooperation. This will help support stakeholders in addressing the concerns of the vulnerable through a well-defined regulation. As Hasenclever et al. argue, regimes are strategically established to promote desirable behaviour toward addressing issues of concern. Such an establishment is to help states to ensure transparency to obtain expected gains in an issue area (Hasenclever et al., 2000:3-4). Cheating and noncompliance are significant barriers in cooperative ventures (Hasenclever et al., 1997:70,119; Sterling-Falker, 2013:120). However, relevant monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms can help to deal with these problems. As argued, anarchy makes it challenging to address specific issues collectively. However, it does not stop states from cooperating toward their desired interests. Therefore, states' long-term interests may influence them to prevent cheating, build trust for future collective good and protect reputation (Sterling-Folker, 2013:119-121; Hasenclever et al., 1997:124). Similarly, for Keohane, creating a regime for an issue of concern comes with an agreement to benefit the parties and achieve mutual gains (Keohane, 1984:79).

The absence of legal mechanisms to protect climate-migrants calls for institutions (regimes) with well-defined norms, as in the case of refugees (Mayer, 2011:5). As stressed by neoliberal scholars, principles, norms and rules govern institutions. These elements are supposed to guide the conduct of state (and non-state actors) in dealing with issues of concern (Krasner, 1982:186; Keohane, 1984:29-32), including climate change and its adverse effects for both short- and long-term gains. In considering the gains, cooperative members may benefit from short-term relief such as humanitarian assistance for the immediate needs of displaced people such as food,

clothing and other necessary items and services. The long-term benefits can be the adoption of measures to build resilience against future events. Addressing the root causes can also promote long-term life-sustaining mechanisms for the climate vulnerable (Mayer, 2011:6-7).

Due to the complex nature of climate change and migration, governing them goes beyond the capacities of individual states, especially developing countries. Hence, collective mechanisms that include better information sharing among partners can help better management of issues of concern. Such mechanisms can help actors communicate and interact better as well as to detect and caution those who do not obey cooperative agreements. Through such interaction, states can exchange information that helps to monitor the behaviour of others and call them to order when necessary. The regular interactions among states and policymakers help prevent cheating within cooperative agreements (Dunne et al., 2013:120), while reputation concerns may influence some actors to cooperate better (Hasenclever et al., 1997:34-35).

Neoliberal scholars consider states as 'goal-seeking' and 'self-interested' actors who focus on utility maximization (Hasenclever et al., 1997:23); they are egoists towards their 'gains' and 'losses.' Unlike the realists who argue that relative power-maintenance or -maximization hinders cooperation, neoliberals emphasize that institutions guided by rules of conduct help states cooperate to achieve absolute gains around common goals (Hasenclever et al., 1997:26). Concerning the SDGs (Agenda 2030) discussed in Chapter 4 (for instance, Goals 10 and 13 regarding migration and climate change, respectively), stakeholders are entreated to cooperate through relevant institutions to promote people's well-being. The rights of climate migrants can only be promoted through the right institutions at both domestic and international levels. Legal frameworks can help vulnerable climate migrants and displaced people who live in dignity and have access to livelihood opportunities through well-monitored mechanisms.

Additionally, institutions are established and maintained to deal with diverse and related issues. Through established institutions, uncertainties can be minimized, improve information sharing and partners' behaviour can be monitored to prevent cheating (Hasenclever, 2000: 14). In essence, adopting the neoliberal approach in climate migration can help better understand how relevant institutions can shape

various migration policy formulations, implementations and good practices toward better governance. With these understandings, this study points out some challenges (as mentioned in the introduction section and further discussed in Chapter 4-collective action problems) stakeholders (both state and non-state actors) face in their attempt to govern migration. Although realists are sceptical about regime formation due to the concerns about relative gains (Hasenclever et al., 2000:5), states, including powerful states, cannot be immune to the consequences of climate change if agreement to control emissions is ignored.

This study argues for cooperative support towards the relative needs of partners since slow onset- and sudden-onset situations may differ from one partner to the other. There should be a specific mechanism to address the needs of the vulnerable due to specific climate events in a particular state or region. This can be possible through the necessary steps to establish *ad hoc* agreements as alternative means of addressing the specific needs of cooperative partners. Side payments can also promote cooperation by rewarding states for their good conduct and actions to address common issues. Also, forums for discussions and *ad hoc* committees on issue areas can help understand the different practices and mechanisms stakeholders adopt (Hasenclever et al., 2000:15) and challenges that may hinder the attainment of better governance of climate-related migration.

Institutions can influence and shape how states define their national interests about global problems and other states' interests. As emphasized earlier, the absence of a central government within the international system does not mean states can behave however they wish. Cooperative institutions serve as governing mechanisms to help deal with everyday challenges (Keohane, 2002:12), such as climate change and migration. With increasing globalization, migration is an important issue that has both benefits such as labour for job markets and negative effects, such as the spread of diseases from one geography to another, as evidenced by the smallpox epidemic, Black Death and AIDS, which originated from Egypt, Asia and Central Africa, respectively (Keohane and Nye, 2002:195) as well as COVID 19 which broke out in 2019 in China and spread to other parts of the world. This demonstrates that climate migration, like other forms of migration, is a global concern requiring collaborative and solidarity measures.

Liberal institutionalism can offer an explanation of the necessity and role of stakeholders (institutions and other actors) in climate migration governance and how these actors can help address issues of common interest concerns. In the context of climate migration, states can act together to maximize their capabilities to promote the welfare of their citizens through relevant institutional frameworks (Taqwadin, 2013:9). Also, support from diverse interstate institutions in migration governance can help understand better the challenges faced by states and offer strategies to achieve expected migration objectives (Acharya, 2008:4). More importantly, institutions shape states' behaviour and give them the power to achieve common good (Krasner, 1982:198). Institutions can help stabilize states' expectations through negotiations to build consensus and operate within the established norms for necessary actions (Paterson, 2005: 65, 77-78).

Migration governance requires a concrete understanding of shared responsibility. This can be attained through intergovernmental organizations and institutions (Lavenex, 2001:35). Measures to promote committed shared responsibility to govern climate migration should be a primary concern and priority in establishing a concrete migration regime. Climate migration is a major international issue, yet it has received insufficient global attention. Similarly, Ghana also pays insufficient attention to the governance of climate migration due to inadequate institutional mechanisms. Hence, it is necessary to conduct a neoliberal analysis to understand how migration institutions can help promote better governance of this critical issue of broad concern.

As a common concern among states, migration requires international, national and regional organizations to work together to provide better solutions to address related challenges, such as those presented by the adverse effects of climate change. This study agrees with Meyers' argument that climate migration can be better managed and governed through domestic and international institutions and the collaborative efforts of relevant stakeholders (Meyers, 2000:1266). Similarly, in agreement with Ikenberry, through liberal principles such as mutual gains, progressive direction, openness and cooperation (Ikenberry, 2018:11), climate migration may be better governed to ascertain mutual benefits for both destination and sending communities or countries as well as addressing related challenges. Of course, climate issues add up to the complexity of migration governance. In this regard, the 'complex interdependence'

(further analysed in Chapter 4) conception of Keohane and Nye may be helpful. This is a case where no hierarchy of issues guides states to establish relevant mechanisms to address issues. Also, different channels connect states and societies and states do not dominate each other to find better solutions (Keohane and Nye, 1987: 731).

The neoliberal analytical framework for migration governance can help understand the role institutions play in overcoming the constraints argued by the realists (discussed above; under the realist section). Also, the demand for and supply of institutions in all forms of migration governance is essential because every state faces migration challenges and as such, definite frameworks of action can help promote decency in its governance (Hollifield, 2021:101-102). In essence, establishing a relevant framework of action to govern can help protect the rights of migrants (Hollifield, 2021:105). Coalitions based on shared concerns are important in promoting good governance in migration matters (Hollifield, 2012:345). Establishing institutions with monitoring mechanisms obliges actors to live up to their responsibilities effectively. This may be achieved by establishing a task force to monitor actors' actions.

In addition, institutions can enhance the inclusion of climate migrants and all relevant actors, especially at the local level, in policy formulation and implementation. This may help stakeholders to obtain significant input to make inclusive policy formulation. Similarly, including relevant actors helps execute realistic regulations that provide better cooperation from different levels to maximize the benefits of managing climate migration. As argued by Mayer, the absence of proper governance in all forms of migration causes many problems that affect the lives of migrants and their origin and host communities. As a result, coalition through all relevant actors is necessary to manage all sorts of migration issues (Mayer, 2011:8-9).

Establishing institutions with explicit norms and inclusive actors may help clarify states' roles and obligations towards climate migrants. The neoliberal approach is important in conceptualizing governance of concerned issues by focusing on indivisibility to address common problems, norms of conduct to regulate actors' actions and respect for the set rules (Ruggie, 1993:561-2). In the case of climate migration governance, better norms of conduct and adherence to established rules are urgently needed. Even though IOM serves as a major institution across countries to

govern migration, it has not been able to address all pressing issues, including climate migration. IOM has not been able to outline specific legal norms for climate migration governance and does not give special attention to climate mobility governance (Jakobsson, 2022:98). The absence of a climate migration regime creates anxieties. It leaves climate migration in limbo, especially in emergencies that require legal pathways to protect human rights. Therefore, establishing special and inclusive institutional arrangements to ensure better and effective governance of climate migration should be a major concern of IOM and all relevant actors.

Climatic factors do not discriminate between anyone or any state. This deems it necessary to establish institutions to deal with climate mobility without leaving anyone or any state outside the rightful protection (Behrman and Kent, 2018:11; Cantor et al., 2024:3, 15). Although migration can be used as an important adaptation measure for unprecedented climate impact, the question of how to better govern that measure is a challenge for states due to the absence of clear mandates for effective cooperation (Jakobsson, 2022:87; Doyle and Chaturvedi, 2011:284-285). It is also important to note that the legal status of climate migrants is unclear, affecting legal protection (Doyle and Chaturvedi, 2011:285-6). This means that it is critical to establish measures and mechanisms that can help climate migrants to secure their human dignity. Such an attempt can help establish better options for people who face the major stress of climate change and cannot adapt to their places of domicile. As it is in the case of refugees, effective "negotiations, compromise and institutionalization of humanitarian practices" (Ames, 2021:202) may be helpful to guide the climate migration regime. As noted, those displaced people (and the potential ones) will always feel insecure and not enjoy their basic human rights without strong norms and proper practices (Ames, 2021:194).

Byravan and Rajan claim that climate migration needs better regime and policy mechanisms to support vulnerable migrants and developing countries. Even though developing countries are more affected by climate change than the global North, they do not have enough resources to deal with the challenges that come with it. Without the necessary cooperative support vulnerable citizens of developing countries will continue to suffer from poor adaptation and coping strategies (Byravan and Rajan, 2006:251-256).

According to Draper, the "anthropogenic nature of climate change" brings to the discussion actors' roles in addressing the consequences of climate change (Draper: 2018:60). The international community has the mandate to cater for the rights and dignity of the current and future generations who face the high risk of unplanned and forced migration by establishing institutional mechanisms. It is important for the global North to recognize their historical responsibilities and the need to promote climate justice. For some, climate debt must be paid to the global South to ensure climate justice. Climate-related migration is, therefore, recommended to be managed on the grounds of human rights through effective institutions and cooperation among states (Doyle and Chaturvedi, 2011:287-90; Draper, 2018: 76).

Arguably, climate justice impacts how climate migration can be governed. The reason is that promoting climate justice will help solve the systemic problems regarding burden-sharing among states (Schlosberg and Collins, 2014:359; Draper, 2018: 66). According to Schlosberg and Collins, the notion of climate justice should be based on governments' dedicated responsibilities in the form of cooperation and democratic accountability so that states' actions can be checked to be either rewarded or sanctioned (Schlosberg and Collins, 2014:359). Dedicated responsibility will entice developing countries like Ghana to pay attention to their climate change-related rhetoric and actions.

For Jakobsson, strong partnerships and effective cooperation can be attained through well-established international norms. Such norms can guide the legislation of climate migration. Also, well-established norms would serve as standards to guide the conduct and behaviours of stakeholders when it comes to managing climate migrants' concerns (Jakobsson, 2022:90-91). In Geiger's view, cooperation toward climate migration management can help address the unforeseen concerns of climate migrants. In doing so, mechanisms to govern should include all relevant state and non-state actors. Moreover, actors should depoliticize migration and make pragmatic and cooperative solutions. For Geiger, collaborative migration management and governance do not imply a loss of state sovereignty, as may be argued, but rather, they help strengthen states build capacities. Although there are challenges in working collectively to address common problems, governments can always find possible ways to overcome them. Understanding among partners can help obtain more opportunities

in cooperation compared to what actors can do or achieve independently (Geiger, 2020:157-159).

According to Wiener, migration governance has some legitimate gaps, which can be filled by international cooperative norms (Wiener, 2017:711). Similarly, Jakobsson asserts that well-structured international norms will aid in dealing with uncertainties regarding the management and governance of climate migration. Under the current migration governance, no established norms and policies exist internationally for climate migration. This makes it difficult to identify legal pathways to find solutions to the problems faced by climate migrants. Hence, there is a need for standard norms established through cooperation among governments to govern climate migration (Jakobsson, 2022:85).

It is important to emphasize that some states' lack of political will affects the collective agenda concerning climate migration (McAdam, 2019:571-2). Some states' attitudes impede efforts to develop new norms and enforce existing ones. Also, an increase in populist concerns regarding all forms of migration affects how states cooperate to establish standard norms and principles to tackle issues affecting climate migrants (Jakobsson, 2022:99). Aside from a lack of political will and populist concerns, Jakobsson observes that the international community also lacks common terminology and opinion (e.g., who is a climate migrant or refugee, or an environmental migrant or refugee?) regarding people who are migrating because of climate change, and this contributes to making it challenging to address related issues. The different opinions regarding specific terms contribute to complexity in climate mobility management and governance (Jakobsson, 2022:98-99). However, these constraints can be addressed by engaging relevant actors at all levels to clearly define concepts, raise awareness and commit to addressing the concerns of climate migrants (Chazalnoel and Ionesco, 2018:426-7). Also, for Kraemer, governments must reform their migration governance and recognize climate migrants as migrants in exceptional conditions with special needs. Climate diplomacy pursued by governments can also help promote and strengthen collective responsibilities towards the rights of climate migrants (Kraemer, 2017:1).

Despite the absence of a climate migration regime, it is important that the GCM contains some promises about climate migration.⁵ As pointed out by Jakobsson, the GCM pays attention to the drivers of climate-related migration and measures to tackle it. It points to humanitarian visas and recommends temporary work permits for people displaced by climate stress (Jakobsson, 2022:102). As stated in the Objective 5h of the GCM, states are recommended to cooperate towards a standard approach to address climate migration.⁶ However, it is challenging to persuade states to follow the GCM objectives in this regard because the GCM itself is not binding. Hence, Jakobsson stresses that norms on climate migration should be established and enforced through the collaborative efforts of states and non-state actors (Jakobsson, 2022:105).

Geiger also emphasizes that the non-binding nature of the GCM may influence states' unwillingness to cooperate. The non-binding nature may also affect how governments can collectively manage climate migration. This ignites the need to find a solution to better regulate climate migration due to the structural deficiencies within the GCM. Moreover, stakeholders need to formulate binding rules that can be agreed upon through collective acceptance to govern climate migration (Geiger, 2020:168).

The attitudes of some actors sometimes make it a challenge to build collective effort on critical issues such as climate change and migration. Well-known examples are the attitudes of China, the USA and other global North countries towards climate agreements and the GCM (Geiger, 2020:169). Nonetheless, the reluctant attitude of some states does not mean that the international community cannot make progress in cooperating on issues of critical concern like climate migration. According to Larsson, stakeholders can always find means to cooperate to manage common problems. As he stresses, cooperation can be built through networks of governments and actors by sharing knowledge and deliberating on issues of major concern through their voluntary participation to establish a relevant cooperative mechanism. Additionally,

⁵ GCM-Objective 2: *"Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin"*. This objective explains environmental/climatic conditions influencing people's mobility and some action plans.

⁶ GCM-Objective 5h: *"Cooperate to identify, develop, and strengthen solutions for migrants compelled to leave their countries of origin owing to slow-onset natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change, and environmental degradation, such as desertification, land degradation, drought, and sea level rise, including by devising planned relocation and visa options, in cases where adaptation in or return to their country of origin is not possible."*

governments and other actors' ability to agree and cooperate on concerns and interests helps stakeholders build capacities. It becomes much easier to ensure best practices in domestic and international domains (Larsson, 2020:111-2).

Byravan and Rajan also emphasize that cooperation among governments and relevant actors can help stakeholders prepare in advance to cater to the needs of climate migrants. Additionally, such preparedness through relevant institutions can help manage a large influx of climate migration that may occur unexpectedly. Furthermore, well-managed climate migration can positively impact host communities' and countries' social and economic growth by way of filling gaps in labour markets. Especially places with demographic crises and labour force shortages can benefit from hosting climate migrants (Byravan and Rajan, 2006:251). A well-managed climate migration can also serve as an adaptation strategy to deal with the effects of climate change in places where coping mechanisms may be difficult to establish. To this effect, good management of climate migration or regular pathways for climate migrants to move can help address the concerns of a vulnerable population, especially in hotspot areas (Bettini, 2014:186).

According to Bevelanderer and Hollifield, policies toward migration should be structured in a favorable direction so that all forms of migration issues can be addressed accordingly (Bevelanderer and Hollifield, 2022:13). In this respect, stakeholders need to pay much attention to integration policies as well as legal procedures to help climate migrants meet their needs of livelihood in their destination centres. Although the intensity of migration flow may influence such policies, mechanisms to ascertain detailed migrant data and relevant institutional guides such as labour laws and welfare mechanisms can help deal with the specific needs of vulnerable climate migrants (Gregurović and Župarić-Iljić, 2018:105-106).

The differences in community capacities affect how vulnerable communities can plan to deal with the nexus between climate change and migration and the respective challenges. For instance, in some places, especially in the global South, the poor climate vulnerable are forced to secure themselves through complex resilience strategies such as resettling and individual coping mechanisms without any state or external assistance, in the case of Ghana in Chapter 4. As noted by Bettini et al., the inability to cope due to poverty harms people who cannot adapt to the stress of climate

change. Considering the socioeconomic factors associated with climate migration, stakeholders should pay enough attention to 'care,' 'responsibilities,' and 'justice' to address issues related to climate impact on the vulnerable movements (Bettini et al., 2017:349-352).

Being able to deal with sudden-onset events refers to the required capacity, which, in turn, requires for its building of well-structured measures. Such established measures can be achieved through commitments and well-established institutional measures to understand the crisis and its associated challenges clearly. This can help governments and other actors better manage climate mobility, especially in the global South. Additionally, Clement et al. emphasize the need for governments to integrate climate migration into their domestic climate adaptation and development agenda. The reason is that many climate migrants move within their domestic borders, and this can help especially with the immediate adaptation at the local level. Similarly, because many climate migrants are also expected to cross borders to secure themselves elsewhere due to inadequate opportunities to adapt within their domestic borders (Clement et al., 2021:74), multilateral measures among countries and legal pathways can help deal with issues beyond the state level. Unplanned movements may negatively impact the host countries and communities, especially those that do not have the capacity and support to manage the high unexpected inflow of climate migrants (for example, among neighbouring countries).

In the context of Ghana, a liberal institutional approach is necessary because cooperating with actors at both local and international levels can help with mechanisms that can provide the necessary support in managing climate migration challenges. As noted in Chapters 3 and 4, Ghanaian migration institutions have not been effective in dealing with a variety of consequences of climate change over the years. These range from coastal erosion and flooding leading to displacement and homelessness to droughts leading to rural-urban migration and conflicts between host communities and climate migrants (herders). Although these problems have existed for a long time, effective institutions for better cooperation are missing due to collective action dilemmas; discussed in the following sub-section and Chapter 4.

There is a need to adopt an inclusive institutional approach that involves states as well as non-state actors such as the CSOs, NGOs, INGOs, local authorities and

climate migrants and pays due attention to their policy formulations and implementations to promote effective climate migration governance. As indicated by Alexander Betts, migration policies need a clear theoretical guide for their practices and necessary modification (Betts, 2018:626). In this regard, this study explores the relevance and limitations of the (neo)liberal institutional approach in analysing climate migration governance concerning Ghana's case.

In sum, although the current experience of the global North is not of a similar nature and level with that of the global South with regard to climate migration, without an effective regime to provide collective action, unexpected incidents and spill-over situations (the overflow of climate migrants from the global South to the North) may lead to uncontrollable migration crises. Hence, liberal institutionalism provides promising ground to establish a relevant regime as a prospective solution. This study takes seriously the realist concern with relative gains and agrees with Purdin's assertion that "...even if there is a long-term symmetry between costs and benefits of climate change, the upfront resource transfers implicit in climate policy are still capable of generating relative-gains concerns in the short term — precisely when action is needed" (Purdon, 2017:272). With relevant institutions, actors can build capacities and act better than in recent times to cooperate effectively toward common issues and provide mechanisms for countries' specific concerns. As argued, specific issues can be solved by establishing *ad hoc* agreements to deal with specific issues of importance (Hasenclever et al., 1997:42).

1.2.4. Dilemmas of Collective Action and Games of Cooperation

Cooperation on migration issues is like a game that requires several strategies. Aside from the different strategies necessary for such a game, achieving agreement on policies to protect migrants' dignity is also complicated. For instance, liberal ideals present an opportunity to protect the rights of migrants, but at the same time, liberal states face a collective action dilemma. Also, coalitions can be challenging to achieve because liberal states are caught up in what Hollifield refers to as the "liberal paradox"; a situation in which liberal developed countries advocate a free-market economy but restrict free movement of people due to their concerns with sovereignty-related issues

such as national security and identity (Hollifield, 2000:77), which, in turn, negatively influence the effectiveness of collective migration governance. The restrictions at borders, deportations, detentions and other illiberal practices are all reflections of the liberal paradox (Natter, 2024: 689; Wolff, 2024:1). The liberal states in this regard overlook their responsibilities to protect the human rights of other nationals (Hollifield, 2024:2-3).

States' attitudes impede the quest to promote the free movement of people to promote trade (free movement of goods and services). For instance, while most African states (over 40) have ratified the AfCFTA to promote easy trade and free movement of goods and services, the attitude towards free movement is a more illiberal attitude where states are reluctant to ratify the FMP (Hirsch, 2021b:497). In this sense, the liberal paradox in Africa reflects the disjuncture between the AU's desire for free movement and the individual policies of member states contradicting such an agenda. The African agenda for free movement is hindered by economic, political, security, legal and national interest concerns that continue to affect how the region governs its migration affairs (Okunade, 2021). Even though the AU prioritizes free movement, member states' national interests deviate from the liberal ideal the AU seeks to promote. Similarly, in the case of ECOWAS, the movement of goods and services is generally easier due to the desire to increase trade volumes in the sub-region (Peprah et al., 2016: 111-113, 120). Despite the desire to promote the free movement of people, there have been some violations due to conflict of interests, which go contrary to what the Union expects of member states (Ojo, 1980:572; Okunade and Ogunnubi, 2021:13,16). As further discussed in Chapter 2 (subsection, 2.4), some ECOWAS states, such as Liberia, Ghana and Nigeria, detained and expelled the nationals of other member states (Okunade and Ogunnubi, 2021:16), or, acting with xenophobic sentiments, excluded them from specific jobs (Teye and Oucho, 2024: 619-20, Okunade, 2021; Adaawen, 2017:9). These attitudes constitute illiberal practices that affect Africa's sub-regional and regional agenda regarding migration governance.

Migration policies are influenced by a variety of variables such as security, rights, economic interests and ideational factors. These factors also influence states' decisions about the number of immigrants and the skills required for entry, drawing a line between who qualifies to receive protection as a refugee or asylum seeker and who

does not (Hollifield, 2023). Different issues of concern bring about different collective action problems (Snidal, 1985:924). The interplays of diverse issues influence states' position vis-à-vis cooperation. Cooperation games, being part of neoliberal institutionalism, help better understand the challenges faced by states to cooperate and to develop prospective measures to address those challenges. Notable games are explained in the following paragraphs and further analysed and linked with the case study in Chapter 4.

Prisoner's Dilemma (PD): This is a situation where actors face a dilemma between maximizing their utilities in the short-term and opting for lesser but sustained utility in the long-term. Resolving issues in that situation depends on the actors' willingness to mutually adjust their policies (Martin, 1992:769). Actors in PD rationally strategize to maximize their payoff (Snidal, 1985:926). Actors in PD initially have the desire to better themselves at the expense of their partners. The incentive to defect because of individual interest makes it a challenge to achieve public good (Nordhaus, 2020:10-11). In the case of migration governance, dominant strategies are chosen based on states' political and economic interests. Those interests influence states' actions and the way they cooperate (Hollifield, 2024:4). The absence of legal mechanisms to enforce and punish defection in migration governance gives states the chance to defect to maximize their individual interests. Even though states can benefit in other ways if they cooperate, some still have the intention to defect (Hollifield, 2023). As noted by Keohane, it is not constant for states with shared interests to cooperate, which is typical in the PD scenario (Keohane, 1984:68-69).

However, repeated action with the same partners can help build better cooperation. In this regard, cooperating to regulate migration may be possible if the same partners interact repeatedly. Such repeated interactions help actors achieve their best interests. With repetition, partners focus on the best payoffs in the future. Institutions and interdependence are major influential factors that promote cooperation in this regard by facilitating regular information sharing and discussion (Hollifield, 2024:2-3; 2024). In this sense, cooperation is desirable over defection (Krasner, 1991:340; Hasenclever et al., 1997:31-32). Promoting cooperation, in turn, requires states to adjust their policies mutually (Keohane, 1984:52). States can change their strategies for achieving set goals through cost and benefit calculations. This may help

states to focus on their best possible interest for the long-term which is possible by acting cooperatively (Hasenclever et al., 1997:32).

While cooperation is possible in repeated prisoner's dilemmas, it is unlikely in the first game where prisoners/ actors are isolated from one another. In this case, each partner acting rationally aims to maximize his interest by defecting. If no agreement exists that obliges them to cooperate, they may hardly cooperate. The reason is that each player may be better off by not cooperating (Snidal, 1985: 927).

According to Martin, actors may have a common interest but can have difficulties in cooperating. Dealing with such difficulties requires actors to make sacrifices by making flexible decisions toward long-term benefits rather than short-term advantages. Again, addressing a PD-like situation requires a 'proper strategy' to focus on future benefits through a formal organization regulating partners' actions (Martin, 1992:768-70). In this regard, history plays a role (hence the importance of repetition of interactions), where past and present behaviour influences or determines whether cooperation may take place in the future. In other words, recurring attitudes and concern with reputation can shape cooperative behaviours. Improvements in communication, information sharing and monitoring are all important to build trust and look forward to among members (Snidal, 1985:930-31). These, on the other hand, can be possible through right institutions.

Aside from all odds, migration interdependence helps states to benefit from labour and associated advantages. States' interdependence and their demand for labour will increase the pressure to establish migration regimes (Hollifield, 2023) to ease cooperation and collaboration. In this regard, in a PD-like situation penalty can help parties achieve their common interest. With a contracting agreement, parties can be forced to fulfil their promises or sanctioned for failing to do so (Snidal, 1985:923).

Effectively cooperating in a situation like the prisoner's dilemma requires information sharing. This can help partners to know how others comply with the rules of the game to avoid any fear of noncompliance or cheating (Keohane, 1984:97-8). Also, since players may have a strong incentive to defect due to immediate payoffs, ensuring cooperation needs maintenance of agreement by a formal institution. Such formal institutions, which can be thought of as being constitutive of a club, can help monitor compliance and promote collaboration through incentives and sanctions

(Nordhaus, 2020:10). As noted, agreements may also help cooperation in PD but may be ineffective without proper monitoring and enforcement measures. To deal with monitoring problems requires a strong regime with centralized mechanisms to address issues of concern (Martin, 1992:770-71). Centralization can begin at the regional level, where actors have many similar issues and interests (Hollifield, 2011:234).

Again, in PD situations there can be confusion about the provision of public goods. In situations where consumption by one state does not diminish the quantity or quality of another's, there will be no need to prevent others from benefiting without full cooperation. However, in the absence of a hegemon willing to provide the public good in question, there is need for cooperation for the provision. Cooperation in a large group may be difficult due to the tendency for free riding. Excluding free riders from benefiting from the public good may force them to contribute towards its provision (Snidal, 1985:929-30). The latter is related to the principles of indivisibility and non-exclusion to address the issues of public concern. Cooperative actors can punish free riders through established sanctioning mechanisms to avoid cheating (Martin, 1992:772-73), or potential (or actual) free riders may be induced to cooperate through financial incentives (Hollifield, 2023).

The Battle of the Sexes (BoS):⁷ This refers to a situation where actors with different preferences over a shared goal give their consent to only one preference to accomplish their goal (Hasenclever et al. 1997: 47, 109). In this game, there are two likely outcomes (the number may change in line with the number of partners), one of which is eventually agreed to by each partner. The outcome depends on how the partners behave and bargain (Martin, 1992:775). A regime in such a situation may fail to be formed if actors have divergent preferences and cannot coordinate. A regime may be established if interaction among actors based on prolonged bargaining and 'compromise-building' successfully comes to an end with an agreement on the adoption of one preference only (Hasenclever et al., 1997:144, 207).

Bargaining may be intense, especially if the partners want the outcome valid for future dealings (Martin, 1992:775). Since partners expect successful coordination

⁷ The Battle of the Sexes is a game theory "where the couple would prefer to spend an evening together but have different preferences about what to do" (Hasenclever et al., 1997:47). This situation applies not only to intimate couples but also to real life situations such as coordination among unions, political parties, and inter-European policy coordination among others (Hasenclever et al., 1997, p. 109).

to be stable, they act to prevent the fearsome outcome (Hasenclever et al., 1997:48). Once coordinating is accomplished through a convention or agreement, partners may find it challenging to defect. Also, coordination situations do not demand strong measures for "surveillance and enforcement." The actors in this game pay less attention to prevent cheating because there is no gain from a partner deviating from the established outcome (Martin, 1992:775). Arguably, cheating is not a big problem. This regime does not need extensive mechanisms for monitoring because there is "no sucker's payoff to worry about." In coordination, the agreed rules are considered to benefit all (Krasner, 1991:338-9). However, bargaining can help "identify a focal point" to achieve the cooperative objective (Martin, 1992:775-76). Sometimes, power can be used tactically to link issues, and powerful states can make a move to choose focal point for other members to follow. The powerful actors can make the first move and determine the outcome (Krasner, 1991:340; Hasenclever et al., 1997:106).

Again, unlike in PD, where individual interests affect independent policy choices, in BoS, each party cannot select its best policy without information about the intentions of others. Once coordination is achieved in BoS, it becomes self-enforcing because parties expect no self-interest from non-cooperating (Snidal, 1985:931-32). Thus, coordination regimes (which look like BoS) can work without enforcement mechanism, because the preference over which compromise is reached among actors becomes self-enforcing; no central authority is necessary for enforcement. Nonetheless, formal and informal agreements may be reached to guide partners' actions (Snidal, 1985:937; Hasenclever et al., 1997:48-9). Cooperation in coordination situations depends on the socio-political context and sometimes an authority may be necessary for the codification of the convention, information sharing and communication to ease the functioning of the convention. It may also be challenging to surrender coordination to a central authority due to the presence of an alternative decentralized mechanism (Snidal, 1985: 933).

Cheating is not a desirable or expected behaviour in a coordination situation; it simply does not make sense as far as the interest of parties is concerned (Hasenclever et al., 1997:105). The reason is that parties prefer to save transaction costs that may be used to obtain such information. However, this does not mean that information is entirely unnecessary in a coordination regime. The regime instead sets a platform to

advise and avoid confusion. It focuses on partners' future plans rather than on their past non-compliance (Martin, 1992:776-77).

Although membership size may influence constructive communication and information sharing, it does not affect individual incentives not to cooperate, unlike in PD. However, larger states may have certain advantages in coordination regimes because of their voice whereas smaller states are also better off than “if no coordination was achieved”. Unlike PD, where time is an important factor, it is of less and a different concern within a coordination situation. Since “cooperation in coordination depends heavily on the ability to agree on common conventions or norms, past experience with and learning of norms and conventions will be very stabilizing for regimes”. Unlike the PD, where the prospect of repeated interactions affects future cooperation (reputational concerns), in coordination, partners' ability “to coordinate somewhere is more important than are relatively minor differences about where to coordinate”. (Snidal, 1985:936).

Suasion: This is a cooperation strategy in which persuasion or coercion is applied to promote cooperation (Martin, 1992: 783). Solving collective action problems with this strategy requires central regulatory power to maximize partners' interests. The central authority could be a hegemon or other powerful states to ensure stability (Martin, 1992:775). It can be a short-term strategy to overcome cooperation challenges. Such strategies can include financial support to help actors follow principles of regulatory conduct. The approach in suasion is, firstly, to establish a "dominant strategy" which can be achieved by powerful states or international organizations to persuade or force weaker and smaller states to abide by rules for cooperation (Hollifield, 2024:5). Also, in suasion, there is only one equilibrium by which the dominant actor obtains its preferred outcome. Moreover, cooperation or defection is the only outcome for actors who engage in this strategy. The dominant actor's presence can allow others to exploit the regime's advantages and free ride, while the dominant actor's defection can make other actors cooperate to avoid the worst-case scenario for the entire group (Hasenclever et al., 1997:51).

The dominant power (which could be a hegemon) may provide the necessary public good alone which may give the less powerful the incentive to free ride. Since this cooperation is initiated by powerful actors who can persuade or coerce others, they

are responsible for paying the high costs to provide public goods. Given that, non-cooperative actors can be threatened or sanctioned by the hegemon for their failure to contribute (Martin, 1992:778-9). The dominant player can also link issues for cooperation and tactically increase or decrease incentives for actors who cooperate or defect respectively (Hasenclever et al., 1997:51; Martin, 1992:779).

In the context of migration, the major migrant-receiving states (developed countries) can establish a 'dominant strategy' based on the rule of law to promote orderly migration and respect states' sovereignty (Hollifield, 2012:286-7). The dominant strategy can also influence partners to follow regulations by linking issues. Considering this, developed countries will need to legitimize their strategy to establish guiding regimes, especially at the regional level (Hollifield, 2024:4-5). In regard to dominant strategy, major international organizations can also provide side payments to promote cooperation by rewarding actors for their good conduct and actions to address common issues (Hasenclever et al., 1997:52).

For climate migration, the IOM (with GCM), UNHCR (with GCR) and other related agencies and programs may function as central regulatory power to apply suasion to entice effective cooperation. A central authority as such can help build trust, share information and establish mechanisms to enforce policies and programs on migration (Hollifield, 2012:238). The rising levels of displacement should trigger the international community, of which these INGOs are a part, to establish mechanisms for solutions. As Hollifield put it, "To say that my neighbour's house is on fire, but it is not my responsibility is a recipe for disaster" (Hollifield, 2024:6).

The dominant actor can help facilitate cooperation in the suasion regime, dominating the decision-making process and controlling the agenda. This strategy may be helpful in situations where the smaller or less powerful states want to enjoy the benefits provided by the hegemon without, however, contributing much to decisions (Martin, 1992:779-80). In the context of migration, since suasion strategies depend on the power of the dominant actors, developed countries (host states) can adopt this strategy, while developing countries (the sending states) will have a limited say in migration decisions. In essence, the sending states will be the 'takers,' and the receiving states will be the 'makers' of migration governance (Kainz and Betts, 2021:69). Despite the dominance by the most powerful actor/s, this strategy can help pool sovereignty to

promote coordination among the parties (Hollifield, 2011:234). In the case of Africa, for example, sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS can be the platform for the pooling of sovereignty by the members and help with the harmonization of policies in line with the AU agenda. As in the case of the EU and the WTO, these organizations lay down "generalized principles of conduct" with a view to promoting the well-being of their members and try to control free riding through complex combinations of incentives and sanctions. As stressed by Hollifield, promoting the "orderly movement of people" can be ensured by the "rule of law" that also respects members' sovereignty (Hollifield, 2011:234). However, states need to come together and construct a common political will before the organization (or the hegemon) can have power to act.

Assurance game: This is a collective action situation where cooperation is preferred. It is a one-time game where rational actors with complete information will cooperate. In assurance, since the expectation is cooperation, any actor who defects does not get any incentive. It is important to note that mutual defection is also equilibrium and no actual incentive will be given to change game strategies. For this reason, cooperation is preferred over mutual defection. States are unlikely to join this regime and waste their limited resources because institutions cannot guarantee that a particular actor (player) will continue to act rationally despite the uncertainty of payoffs from the cooperation. In other words, this regime is characterized by uncertainties regarding payoffs and information that parties will act rationally. These challenges prevent states from using their limited resources to form this regime where mutual defects are likely (Martin, 1992:780-81). Although extensive cooperation is expected in assurance, its core challenges hinder a successful regime (Martin, 1992:784).

Considering the relevance of these cooperation games to governing migration between Ghana and its partners, and, to start with the latter, the assumptions of the assurance regime do not apply to that case. It is almost impossible to obtain the necessary information from the parties in question with the seeming intention of cooperating and to assure them that they will not act irrationally throughout the process. Within the context of ECOWAS, countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal and Benin are notorious with their free-riding behaviour, e.g. expulsion of

migrants, which undermine the organization's agenda to promote free movement and integrate members (Okunade, 2021), as will be explained in Chapters 2 and 4.

Concerning suasion regime, it is yet to be seen in the case of Ghana and its partners, especially within the AU and ECOWAS. Suasion arguments may help in a PD-like situation in providing prospective solutions through the persuasive power of the hegemonic actor. However, the region has no hegemonic actor that can currently provide the public good of migration governance. Moreover, suasion, to some extent, resembles PD, because the persuaded parties may still have incentives to defect (Hasenclever et al., 1997:52-53). This is a problem in any form of cooperation, including the one for climate migration, which expects to build an effective governance for lasting solutions. Suasion can play a role in the improvement of PD situation, only if the AU and ECOWAS can establish monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms to control and punish free riding. However, since these sub-regional organizations cannot act independently of members' political will, they are not fit to play the role of hegemonic actor as described by a suasion situation. That could have been a perfect strategy on its own if a single hegemonic state or institutional actor, be it Nigeria or another, could lead in the establishment or refurbishment of climate migration governance through finance and other means to ensure members' compliance with established rules.

When there is disagreement and conflict over critical international issues such as climate migration, coordination will be a problem (Nordhaus, 2020:10). Individual state preferences and varying impact of climate change even within a bounded geography such as West Africa, make it difficult to converge around one particular constellation of preferences, which would be a coordination regime. Therefore, collective action problem as defined by BoS does not really correspond to the climate migration problem in Ghana and its surrounding.

While the interplay of various cooperation situations is a possibility in the future, PD is observed to be the prevailing collective action problem between Ghana and its partners on climate migration. Even though member states do not want to exit from ECOWAS free movement agreement due to the advantages of membership, they have a tendency to free-ride for individual interests. The voluntary nature of the climate-related provisions and regulations enable and facilitate such free-riding on the

part of Ghana and others. However, voluntarism is not a sustainable situation and cannot contribute to the governance of climate and migration nexus, with its complex dynamics. The free-riding behaviour of member states shows a need to establish a separate regime to govern climate migration as a public/ club good, especially at the sub-regional level. That regime, either supplanting or reinforcing ECOWAS, needs to be equipped with monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms to punish defectors.

In essence, in a regime to address a PD-like situation, contracts can guide members to cooperate and to punish those who defect. As Nordhaus put it, the absence of penalties will make agreements ineffective (Nordhaus, 2020:16). The free-riding problem may be addressed through “more or less” formal mechanisms. Whereas more formal institutions may be helpful against non-compliers who want to cheat and seek short-term advantages, less formal institutions can aid partners in adapting flexibly to norms of conduct (Snidal, 1985:923-24). However, given the current disappointment with overall compliance with the flexible legal instruments such as the Paris Agreement, addressing climate-related problems through mechanisms of punishment and (threat of) exclusion can be a better way to prevent or minimize free-riding and provide club goods (Nordhaus, 2020:17). For critical issues such as climate migration, high institutionalization levels can be better for dealing with related concerns and affairs.

A climate-migration regime must set pathways to address issues that climate migrants face through strong regulations backed up by incentives and sanctions alike. In this regard, a climate migration regime that can make states better at protecting the human dignity of climate migrants is what stakeholders should aim for. From this perspective, regulating players' behaviour for better cooperation in climate migration requires strict actions by institutional bodies to enforce regulations. The current institutional framework in West Africa can at best be described as a weak regime regulating freedom of movement as there is already free riding in ECOWAS. To get rid of this problem and to deal with various problems concerning climate migration, ECOWAS, as already stated, needs to restructure itself and/or be accompanied by robust institutions.

CHAPTER TWO

MIGRATION IN AFRICA

2.1. MIGRATION IN AFRICA

This chapter provides an overview of migration and climate migration issues, including internal and cross-border migration within and outside Africa. It also discusses migration governance within the region and its sub-regions. To begin with, several narratives characterize African migration. Some narratives indicate that African migrants mostly cross the oceans and most of the global migrants are from Africa. However, these narratives differ from reality because most African migrants migrate through land borders instead of oceans (Achieng et al., 2020:1). Also, high number of global migrants originate predominantly from Asia (over 40 percent) (IOM, 2024:66), while Africa accounts for about 14 percent of the global migrant population as of 2020 (Achieng et al., 2020:1).

Additionally, Africa has many international migrants who move within their countries, to other countries and out of the continent every year. The continent's migration has increased significantly since 2000. The continent has been reported to have approximately 41 million international migrants as of 2017. Among these migrants, 19 million were migrants from the continent. However, from different African countries, 17 million were African migrants residing outside the continent and 5 million were from other regions (Achieng et al., 2020:1-2). Migration to Africa increased from 2.5 million in 1990 to 5 million in 2017. According to the IOM World Migration Report, approximately 21 million Africans lived in other African states in 2020 (IOM-WMR, 2022:60-62; IOM, 2024: 56).

The number of Africans residing outside the region also increased from 17 million in 2015 to 19.5 million in 2020. Most African migrants live in Europe, Asia and North America (IOM-WMR, 2022:61-62). While African migrants are perceived to migrate to Europe irregularly, the IOM 2017 report found that regular migrants from Africa to Europe are more than irregular ones (IOM 2017a:1-2). Moreover, African migrations are predominantly intra-regional and occur mainly in East, West, and Southern Africa. Migrants from these sub-regions migrate within their sub-regions and

to other African states. On the other hand, migrants from the North African states primarily migrate to Europe and the Gulf States (IOM-WMR, 2022:60-62).

According to the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, some people use irregular routes to Europe because of the limited and strict regular migration routes. However, most African migrants move to Europe through regular means and only one-third of all African migrants live there. Although migration from Africa increased by the end of 2020, only 3% of Africans live outside their home countries. Since 2010, migration from Africa has increased more than from other continents, except for Asia. Nonetheless, most African migrants still move within Africa. Since 2010, intra-Africa migration has increased by approximately 44%, compared to intra-European migration, which is 26% (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2022:2-3).

Most people who move out of Africa are from Egypt, Morocco, South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia and Algeria. Also, the country most African immigrants prefer in the region is South Africa. It must be emphasized that between 2020 and 2022, there was a decrease in the number of migrants flowing within Africa due to COVID-19-related travel issues. Similarly, travel restrictions impeded the rate at which people moved out of the continent. In the early days of the pandemic, countries followed the international restrictions recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO), including travel restrictions, to avoid the spread of the coronavirus. In mid-2020, travel restrictions in some African countries were slightly relaxed compared to those in other regions. Although travel restrictions were relaxed in the African continent, travel restrictions in other parts of the world prevented most African migrants from moving out of the region (IOM-WMR, 2022:62-64).

There are also predominant narratives about the motivations of African migrants. While the general perception is that African migrants migrate permanently, it has been noted that approximately 80% of African migrants do not intend to leave the continent permanently (IOM, 2017a). Notably, a quarter of the world's refugee population lives in Africa. Many people within the continent, especially women, regularly travel across borders within the sub-regions to engage in different economic activities and some people in the region also migrate to seek safer lives and better opportunities elsewhere (Achieng et al., 2020:2). Neighbouring countries host most of the refugees from African countries. In 2020, the majority of the continent's refugees

were from South Sudan (approximately two million refugees) and most of them reside in Uganda. Owing to long-term conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia, these countries have the second and third-highest refugee populations on the continent, respectively. Also, due to civil wars, Sudan and the Central African Republic have refugee populations living in their neighbouring countries. Uganda is the largest refugee-host country in Africa, hosting approximately 1.4 million refugees and it holds the fourth position in the world after the Republic of Türkiye, Colombia and Pakistan. Ethiopia, Cameroon and Kenya are other major countries hosting refugees in the region (IOM-WMR, 2022:66-67).

The continent also has many internally displaced people because of ongoing conflicts in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Central African Republic and Ethiopia. In 2020, approximately 2 million and 1.6 million conflict displacements occurred in the DRC and Ethiopia, respectively. Approximately 7% of the population of the Central African Republic became displaced because of the conflict (IOM-WMR, 2022:7). Studies show that poverty, conflicts and environmental challenges are the major causes of African migration. However, because of the limited data, other mobility reasons are not clear.

Concerning cross-continental migration in Africa, some media reports have stereotyped the continent, which constantly shows people on boats crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Such media footage draws much attention to migrants from Africa to Europe and contributes to constructing African migrants as a security threat (Flauhaux and De Haas, 2016:1-2). Most Africans migrate to engage in various economic, educational and social activities that benefit the country of origin and destination. Hence, the perception that African migration is driven by poverty might not be the case (IOM, 2017a; Achieng et al., 2020).

It is also the case that many migrants move from Africa to Europe, especially Italy, irregularly. Although the data are limited, most originate from Nigeria, followed by Eritrea, Guinea, the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Senegal, Mali, Sudan and Somalia. There are also several vulnerable migrants and minors from Nigeria who use dangerous routes to move to Europe (IOM, 2017:3-4). These narratives exist; however, the continent has limited centres on migration studies focusing on core migration issues and the realities of various narratives in the region. It is noted that most

migration studies have been conducted by researchers who do not live in or have been to the continent (scholars from the West) and as such, some narratives of African migration can be biased. Efforts are being made by notable, well-established centres such as the Centre for Migration Studies (CMS) at the University of Ghana, the University of Witwatersrand (South Africa), the African Centre for Migration and the American University in Cairo, the Centre for Migration Studies. However, these centres have a limited research scope due to inadequate financial and technical resources (Achieng et al., 2020:4).

The conceptualization of African migration in research suffers from weak theorization of how migration works. The history of Africa shapes its migration (Flahaux and De Haas, 2016:4-5). Although most European states have restrictive measures on African (irregular) migration, colonial and post-colonial ties play key roles in Africa-Europe migration (Flahaux and De Haas, 2016:4-5; Cham and Adam, 2023:4). Also, because the migration discourse within a region is Eurocentric (focusing more on dynamics of African migration to Europe), the intra-migration drivers and benefits of the intra-regional migration is insufficiently discussed in research. Such inadequate research discussions contribute to how the broader public understands specific regional migration issues. Furthermore, other common perceptions of migration from the global South to the North, such as those from Africa to Europe, are about economic motivations. As such, it is perceived that people migrating from Africa aim to seek better income (Dick and Schranven, 2018: 1-2). However, this notion is not entirely true because people migrate from Africa for several reasons, including health, family reunification and political instabilities. Also, the skilled people working in Africa migrate, as do the low-skilled migrants (Achieng et al., 2020:9-10).

It is important to note that migration contributes to the African economy through remittances. In most African countries, migrants' remittances contribute to the GDP more than foreign direct investment (FDI) and Official Development Assistance (ODA) (IOM-WMR, 2022:64-65). In 2015, African migrants' remittances from Europe were at par with the ODA provided by European institutions and governments (IOM 2017a:3). Migration on the continent benefits families, communities and the respective countries. African migrants within the continent engage in several trade

activities and, as such, play a crucial role in the region's economy. Trading activities include but are not limited to farm products, clothing and basic electronics. It must be emphasized that sub-regional blocs trade among themselves, such as those in Western, Eastern and Southern Africa. The various sub-regional associations facilitate citizens' movement within the sub-regions. Borders in sub-regions are not strictly controlled, and they facilitate easy movement for citizens. However, the alarming security threats on the continent force some countries to adhere to strict border protocols (Achieng et al., 2020:2-3).

As mentioned earlier, migration contributes to development in Africa. However, the emigration of some professionals, such as doctors, engineers and nurses, affects the African labour market and threatens the socio-economic development of many African states (Teye, 2022). Emigration results in brain drains, deficient skills and family disintegration. However, those migrants continue to support the families left behind and their countries through remittances (AU-MPFA, 2018:69).

African migrants are not burden to their destinations, contrary to the perceptions of some host countries and communities. These migrants contribute to the labour force in their host countries, where labour shortages and a high aging population are problems in the job market, especially in Europe. Some studies project that by 2055, Europe would be the most dependent on foreign labour due to the aging population, whereas Africa would be the least dependent on the labour force. Most European countries face labour challenges, especially in the health sector. African migrants constitute the majority of foreign healthcare professionals in many European countries. In 2020, 13.7% of doctors in Germany were foreigners and approximately 8% were African migrants. Moreover, due to COVID-19, France and Germany hired many migrant health workers from Africa. Those migrants contribute significantly to their host countries, spend their earnings there and help their home countries' economies. For instance, in countries such as Cote d'Ivoire, Rwanda and South Africa, migration contributes 19%, 13% and 9% to their GDPs, respectively (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2022:4-5).

Other African countries also receive high annual remittances. Such support from emigrants continues to help developmental projects in respective countries (IOM-AMR, 2020:117; IOM-WMR, 2022). The remittance volume of Africa is also expected

to increase substantially because of the continent's high percentage of youth. 60% of the current African population are youths. These are people younger than 25 years old. The youth population is expected to increase significantly by the end of the century. This implies that more of them may migrate to fill gaps in regions where aging has become a problem for the labour market. The continent may benefit from a high volume of remittances in the future. It should be underlined that aside from other factors such as education and family reunification, inadequate job availability is the main factor forcing some young people to migrate outside the region. For instance, by 2030, about 30 million African youth are expected to seek jobs annually, but available jobs may be insufficient. The absence of existing jobs may increase their desire to migrate for greener pastures or look for jobs outside the continent (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2022:5).

2.1.1. Climate Migration in Africa

Climate migration in Africa has become a major concern among policymakers and the public. Although African countries' contribution to global carbon emissions is insignificant, the continent suffers disproportionately from the negative effects of climate change. The adverse effects of climate change affect human health, food, water availability and many other issues. These stresses force many people, especially those in hotspot areas, to seek alternative livelihoods and support elsewhere. This phenomenon also influences irregular migration issues in Africa. Even though climate change affects the entire continent, people who are already vulnerable and depend on climatic conditions for their livelihood suffer the most. For example, in the Sahel and Horn of Africa, where flooding, drought, temperature rise, desertification and sea level rise threaten and affect people's livelihoods forcing them to migrate (Van de Geest, 2011; Abu et al., 2014; Teye and Owusu, 2015; Boas, 2015; Rigaud et al., 2018; Clement et al., 2021; Teye et al., 2021; Mohamoud et al., 2014).

Also, the impact of the climate crisis has increased rural-urban migration. As noted, most rural dwellers depend on rain-fed agriculture; therefore, the adverse effects of climate change force the rural dwellers to seek opportunities in urban centres. Some studies also emphasize that if stakeholders fail to take the necessary precautions to

lessen the impact of climate change, it may result in high urbanization. This will consistently pressure urban infrastructures such as accommodation (Ibrahim and Mensah, 2022; Rigaud et al., 2018; Clement et al., 2021; Vinke et al., 2022; Mohamoud et al., 2014). Similarly, the rural-urban migration due to climate change heightens socio-economic conditions, such as city unemployment challenges. Such employment challenges make it difficult for rural-urban migrants to adjust to city life and pressures (Dick and Schraven, 2018:14-15). Urban employment challenges can also threaten migrants who move to urban centres permanently to search for off-farm jobs due to crises such as drought that may prevent these migrants from returning to their communities of origin (Teye and Nikoi, 2022:99).

It is on record that climate-related disasters have pushed many people to be on the move and displaced from their original inhabitants in many parts of Africa. The number of vulnerable people on the move keeps increasing alarmingly. For instance, at the end of 2014, 2020 and 2022, the number of climate-related displacements in Africa was 0.7, 3.4 and 7.4 million, respectively. Also, the latest figures recorded in the region at the end of 2023 stand at 6 million (IDMC, 2024:21-22). Most of these displacements are caused by severe floods, drought and cyclones. At the end of 2023, Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia were hit by severe floods, which caused about 1.5 million displacements (IDMC, 2024:23-26). Similarly, at the end of 2022, floods displaced about 2.4 million people in Nigeria alone. Also, flood events continue to affect many people in Chad, Mali, Niger, South Africa, and Mauritania (IDMC, 2023:19-20). Furthermore, the 2021 “World Bank Groundswell Report” estimates that, globally, there will be over 216 million climate migrants by 2050. Out of this projection, Africa is expected to have the highest number of climate migrants, accounting for 86 million, representing 4.2 percent and 19 million, representing 9 percent of the population in sub-Saharan and North Africa, respectively (Clement et al., 2021: xiv-xvi). These recorded figures and projections should warn stakeholders to devise possible measures for better actions and prospective solutions.

Additionally, changes in rainfall patterns leading to limited food production and supply (heightening famine situations) will force people to move. Moreover, water scarcity will influence peoples' movements in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Madagascar (IDMC, 2023:29-32), DR Congo and Central African Republic (IDMC,

2024:28) and significantly contribute to internal migration within the North African countries (Clement et al., 2021: xiv-xvi). Similarly, a combination of climatic events influences peoples' movement in countries such as Cabo Verde, Chad, Niger, Rwanda, Kenya, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Senegal and Sudan. Also, some parts of these countries experience low agricultural production due to long-lasting droughts and high temperatures that affect the growth of crops. Aside from the aforementioned climate events, some communities in Mozambique, Ghana and Nigeria are affected by the rising sea level, which leads to coastal erosion and forces inhabitants to move to inland communities (Ibrahim and Mensah, 2022:1-3). Again, most coastal inhabitants, especially around the coast of north-eastern Tunisia, north-western Algeria, some parts of the Nile Delta in Egypt and western and southern Morocco continue to face coastal flood challenges (Clement et al., 2021: xiv-xvi).

The adverse effects of climate change and its impact on human movement also ignite conflicts over limited resources. For instance, in West Africa, due to the search for grazing lands, herders encroach on land belonging to local farmers in climate-friendly areas to find food for their livestock. Such encroachments further cause farm destruction, leading to conflicts between the herders and host communities (Issifu et al., 2022:12-13, 15; Teye and Nikoi, 2022: 84-86; Bukari, 2017:4). Similarly, in the Horn of Africa, some local conflicts are associated with cattle owners' competitions for limited resources due to long-lasting severe drought (IDMC, 2023:17-18). Moreover, the effect of drought on livestock affects the livelihoods of the pastoralists and further increases the poverty level of the moving climate vulnerable who depend on animal farming and products for livelihood in countries such as Ethiopia and Somalia (IDMC, 2023:109-110).

It is worth noting that climate migration patterns and destinations depend on diverse factors that influence the migrants. According to Bates, as climatic conditions in some places worsen, vulnerable people consider factors such as economic opportunities in their decisions to relocate to new destinations. (Bates, 2020: 84-85). Teye and Nikoi also find that some people consider social networks before moving. While people with social support and networks are likely to migrate easily to new places and adapt, people without social networks in the destinations find it challenging to migrate (Teye and Nikoi, 2022:98). Also, climate migration patterns in African

countries have changed from temporary and short-term movement to permanent and long-term ones. These patterns are also shaped by the migrant's ability to secure livelihood and how favourable the climate is in their new destinations (Issifu et al., 2022:5-6; Teye and Nikoi, 2022:92-93).

Another noteworthy fact is that African climate migration is dominated by men, who usually migrate and leave their partners and families behind. Those who stay behind depend on the benefits such as money and food remittances to sustain their livelihood. However, some concerns have been expressed about the health and well-being of their loved ones who had to migrate and work in unbearable and dangerous conditions to support the livelihood of their families. Some health-related issues are also the contraction of diseases such as Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs) like HIV/AIDS. These health problems keep families worried, especially the stay-behind wife, whenever their partners and other members of their family migrate due to climate pressures (Vinke et al., 2022:332-335, 338).

Despite people migrating due to climate impacts in Africa, some people are also trapped and unable to migrate. The trapped problems are commonly associated with a lack of financial resources (poverty) and sociocultural norms (Teye and Nikoi, 2022:82, 97; Chazalnoel and Randall, 2022:2-3). These challenges make it difficult for vulnerable people to find livelihood and face health challenges. Additionally, women who are trapped to stay (left behind by their husbands) due to sociocultural norms find it challenging to take care of their children alone, especially when the husbands are not able to send family caring remittance as expected by the family (Vinke et al., 2022:329-30). The inability to migrate and lack of resources to cope with climate shocks worsen the existential problems of the vulnerable (Mohamoud et al., 2014:11).

Moreover, sometimes migration does not work as a good adaptation strategy, especially when it is not well-planned. Hence, it becomes 'maladaptation' without the appropriate support system, such as financial support and social ties in the host destinations (Teye and Nikoi, 2022: 88). Similarly, Vinke et al. note that in some situations, migration fails to be an adaptation strategy due to lack of economic opportunities, food insecurity and inadequate education, health and social amenities in the host communities. In other words, whenever climate migrants make wrong migration decisions by going to places without livelihood opportunities, the family

members left behind encounter several household challenges (Vinke et al., 2022:337-9). This means that planned climate migration is important to achieve better adaptation for the vulnerable on the move.

2.2. MIGRATION GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

Over the years, the African Union and African governments have managed migration by establishing and engaging stakeholders with technical assistance and capacity building (AU, 2018). Various sub-regional organizations support the AU frameworks to govern forced and voluntary movements (Teye and Oucho, 2024:612). Sub-regional blocs such as ECOWAS and IGAD also help the AU deal with migration issues such as seasonal and circular migration. The AU notes that better migration governance is important for regional development (AU, 2018:8-10). As a result, migration governance in the region is integrated with formal economic policies within the region. The region also engages in informal dialogues among the sub-regional associations and engages in interregional cooperation with external actors such as the EU (Dicks and Schraven, 2018:1, 7).

The AU set guidelines to support the region's migration institutions in their governance affairs. Such efforts help to expand platforms and frameworks for migration issues. Also, the AU develops its migration frameworks through labour migration programs and trade policies and incorporates them with the African agenda toward continental free movements (Teye and Oucho, 2024:627). Leaders on the continent also involve themselves in global migration processes such as the Global Compact on Migration and Refugees and other international partnerships. Although efforts are made, African migration policymakers still need practical mechanisms and dedicated efforts to promote efficient governance (Dick and Schraven, 2018:8).

Also, it is important to note that political factors have influenced the governance of pre- and post-independence migration in Africa. For instance, many governments made open-door policies due to political instabilities in the 1960s when most African countries were seeking political independence from the colonial administrations. Since such instabilities contributed to people moving voluntarily and being forced to move to different countries to secure themselves, some African

governments, such as Ghana, which had already gained independence, opened their doors to protect other African leaders and citizens who needed protection (Awumbila et al., 2008:2). Many countries in this era (post-independence) experience migration in-and- outflow, not only due to political instabilities but also factors such as education, business and the need to search for better livelihood opportunities due to climate stress. These dynamics have also shaped how individual governments make their migration policies (Awumbila et al., 2018:1).

Migration governance in Africa revolves around managing, controlling and ascertaining better information on migrants (data). Effectively achieving these depends on national policies and how states translate their policies into actions. It must be emphasized that while some countries, such as Ghana, Nigeria and Mali, have national migration policy frameworks, other countries, such as Zimbabwe and Malawi, do not have a comprehensive national migration policy. Also, those with migration policies do not have proper implementation plans and these challenges influence the sub-regional and regional policies on migration. These challenges influence the support for the AU migration agenda (Teye and Oucho, 2024:623-4).

Again, it is important to emphasize that effective institutions help policymakers formulate relevant policies for better migration governance. While some governments are making efforts, it is also observed that many African countries lack adequate and strong institutional mechanisms to govern migration effectively. In addition, only a few countries have dedicated ministries, sub-units and agencies to manage migration (Achieng et al., 2020:4). Other challenges are associated with a lack of inadequate financial and technical resources to implement national and regional policies (Teye and Oucho, 2024:626). These structural challenges influence how regional migration issues are prioritized and dealt with.

Furthermore, migration governance in the region is also influenced by donor countries' interests (Mouthaan, 2019; Talleraas, 2024; Cham and Adam, 2023; Dick and Schraven, 2018). African donor partners, especially those from the EU, are primarily concerned with the security of African migrants traveling through the Mediterranean Sea and other irregular routes. As noted by Achieng et al., irregular migrants from Africa to other regions constitute about 15% of African out-migration. In contrast, about 85% of the African migrants migrate regularly and contribute

through various professional and other economic activities to their host destinations. Nevertheless, irregular migrants have become the central theme for donor partners, compared to the concerns of large regular migrants who provide immense support to the donor partners' labour market. Arguably, paying more attention to the concerns of regular migrants and easing regular pathways can help to address irregular migration (Achieng et al., 2020:5).

Similarly, Dick and Schraven also note that external donor partners' supportive measures against irregular migration from Africa focus on how to contain irregular African migrants. This issue has become a key concern in many donors' political discourse, especially among EU states. As noted, about two-thirds of African migration occurs within the continent because of seasonal labour, forced displacement and other factors. However, enough attention has not been paid to the migration that happens within the continent to support measures for intra-regional migration (Dick and Schraven, 2018:1, 6). This indicates that some external partners often ignore the most critical issue, such as the intra-regional migration management in African migration. In this regard, African migration governance needs to pay considerable attention to the diverse migration issues within and outside the continent. More importantly, creating easily accessible regular paths could potentially help to prevent irregular migrants from using dangerous routes to cross borders to Europe and other regions.

As argued, regional mechanisms play crucial roles in migration governance. For instance, before the UNHCR, there was the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in Europe to deal with the people displaced across Europe because of World War II. This institution played a vital role in addressing displaced people's concerns and facilitated the establishment of the UNHCR. While regional mechanisms are important and continue to increase migration management, some regional actors do less than expected in their migration governance (Cristani et al., 2020:138). A case in point is Africa; although the AU stresses migration governance as necessary for Africa to achieve the UN Agenda 2030—Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Union's expected efforts are slow. The Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA), for instance, pays attention to SDG10 and emphasizes the need for countries to reduce inequalities and promote smooth migration (AU-MPFA, 2018:29). However,

effective collaboration on migration issues has become problematic in promoting orderly migration (Okunade, 2021; Teye and Oucho, 2024:626). Besides, the MPFA is non-binding and no states can be punished for not implementing certain migration policies (Teye and Oucho, 2024:613). Arguably, the voluntary nature of the AU's regional mechanism makes practical actions toward migration governance ineffective and allows members to free ride.

The AU-MPFA also stresses that migration is inevitable and African states need a comprehensive and inclusive approach to address various migration challenges. For this, states are entreated to work with International Organizations (IOs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and business organizations to govern migration better. Additionally, cooperation between and among different actors is important to build and strengthen states' capacities (AU-MPFA, 2018:29-30). As argued by Gazzotti, for instance, CSOs contribute significantly to migration management by supporting activities and the basic needs of migrants. While engaging with different actors is crucial for African migration governance, most migration engagement happens at the top national level, hindering the effective inclusion of relevant actors for better governance (Gazzotti, 2022:8). Therefore, there is a need for blending bottom-up and top-down stakeholders to promote effective migration governance in the region (as further discussed in Chapter 4).

Regional stakeholders' efforts and attention to the affairs of migrants help when it comes to addressing collective issues related to migrants. To this effect, regional initiatives and institutional settings for formulating and implementing migration policies should be based on inclusive actors' initiatives. Regional mechanisms also play critical roles in shaping national and global discussions and promoting inter-regional and international cooperation. For instance, GCM considers regions as laboratories where objectives for global migration governance can be discussed (Lavenex and Piper, 2021:2837-2838). This implies that African migration stakeholders' (AU and related agencies) efforts are important to deliberate on the region's concerns and support member states in addressing their challenges.

Furthermore, even though Africa has several policy frameworks to govern forced and voluntary migration (Teye and Oucho, 2024:612), in practice, most of them are not working as expected. Several factors account for the ineffectiveness and

inappropriateness of migration governance frameworks. Some observed factors are associated with states' national interests and domestic politics. These factors influence how migration is governed and managed at the national level, having an adverse impact on the regional agenda (Okunade, 2021; Gazzotti et al., 2022: 8-10). In addition, the voluntary nature of migration policies in the region hinders the region's success in better migration governance. Without sanctioning and effective monitoring mechanisms, individual states can behave how they want in dealing with the AU migration policies. Therefore, relevant solutions through well-defined monitoring mechanisms to make stakeholders follow a set agenda can be helpful.

African states are in a liberal paradox. While there is much openness in trade and other economic affairs, migration faces some restrictions. Such paradox influences effective migration governance. As observed, some member states exclude foreigners (other Africans) from doing some jobs. Such exclusion affects intra-African migration cooperation and governance. Such practices give members free ride to enjoy their selfish interests. Additionally, visa restriction in some African countries affects people's mobility patterns (Flahaux and De Haas, 2016:14-15).

Also, while policies at the regional level help shape various national migration policies, AU migration frameworks receive little attention at various national levels due to states' domestic politics and interests (Okunade, 2021). This problem can be linked to states' desire to focus on their interest, institutional weakness and lack of information sharing among regional actors (Achieng et al., 2020:5-6). These challenges also contribute to the paradox and influence members' commitments and actions toward rectifying and implementing policies concerning the region's collective migration governance. Hence affecting effective cooperation.

Integration of migrants into their host countries and communities is also a critical concern for cooperative governance on African migration. The AU and other sub-regional units have some protocols for integrating migrants, such as the Addis Ababa Action Plan, the African Union Agenda 2063 and the Common African Position on Habitat. However, many integration strategies are ill-planned (IOM- AMR, 2020: 41, 47), with no regional coordinating power, leaving individual states to act based on their interests (Okunade, 2021). Unfortunately, the absence of well-defined integration policies leaves many migrants facing challenges, such as difficulty entering the job

market of their destination countries to secure jobs. The absence of proper integration measures or poor integration governance also makes many migrants face diverse post-migration livelihood challenges (IOM-AMR, 2020:41-42; de Brauw et al., 2014:35-36).

As de Brauw et al. emphasized, the challenges affecting people's movement on the continent indicate the need for effective strategies and commitment to existing migration protocols, conventions, agreements and frameworks to achieve better migration governance. As noted, some migration issues have been ignored or less prioritized by stakeholders. For instance, domestic migration contributes to states' development in diverse ways, yet it has received less attention in policy domains. Even though migrants from rural areas engage in different informal jobs, such as cleaning services, which are crucial to the urban centres, rural-urban (internal) migrants receive less policy attention (de Brauw et al., 2014:33-34).

Similarly, the movements of skilled professionals from rural communities hinder rural developments, yet African migration governance pays less attention to some of these concerns. For instance, Mlambo finds that mass migration from rural areas in South Africa affects developmental projects in rural areas. The rural areas lose innovative and skilled inhabitants, affecting rural development. However, relevant policies to better address related concerns are less prioritized. The inequalities between rural and urban areas also force rural dwellers to migrate. In essence, African migration governance should incorporate proper planning of rural developmental policies to help rural dwellers (Mlambo, 2018:62, 68).

2.3 CLIMATE MIGRATION GOVERNANCE AND THE POLICIES OF AFRICAN UNION

Climate migration governance has recently become one of the concerns of African leaders. The continent is experiencing an increase in migration because of the shocks of climate change and other environmental hazards. Africa is also classified as the most vulnerable region with a considerable risk of climate change and its crises (Clement et al., 2021: xiv). As the region is expected to witness the harsh impact of climate change and because of the geographical nature and existential challenges that

affect the effective management of climate crisis mean that when situations become unbearable for climate-vulnerable, migrations will be their option to secure their basic survival needs (Brown and Crawford, 2008; Rigaud et al., 2018; Teye, 2022). As a result, frameworks for protection and governance need considerable attention in the region.

Although the international community lacks collective instruments to protect people forced to migrate due to climate stress, the 1969 OAU Convention on Refugees may be considered a mechanism to protect people forced to migrate due to unexpected climate events in Africa. The Organization of Africa Unity (OAU), now called the Africa Union (AU) protocol on refugees, refers to refugee as follows: "... every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality" (OAU, 1969:3).

As the above quotation, "compelled to leave," indicates, it can be argued that climate-vulnerable people who are forced to move fall within the Union's category for protection. Although climate change is not explicitly mentioned in the OAU definition, the force-displacement that climate causes is not an exception to be considered in this definition since the definition relates to something that threatens lives. As emphasized by Cantor et al., disasters such as those related to climate change can trigger or increase situations that threaten people and force them to seek refuge elsewhere. Also, since threatening events may compel victims to move, they may need protection from the external state if their home countries fail to secure them. Hence, this definition can potentially claim refugee status for climate-driven migrants (Cantor et al., 2024: 16-17).

Even though the OUA's definition is not widely applied throughout the continent, some countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia and Tanzania adopted this provision to support Somalia's climate migrants during the adverse droughts of 2011 and 2012 (Michieletto, 2022:46-47). As noted by Wood, due to drought and its effect on the Somali famine in 2011, the Kenyan government accepted over 140000 new refugees (Wood, 2014:567). Nonetheless, this definition is problematic because most climate migrants are internally displaced. The protection of internal climate migrants,

therefore, becomes the sole responsibility of the various national governments without cooperation to seek support (Michieletto, 2022:46-47). As argued, without significant national attention, governance on climate migration could be ineffective due to inadequate regulatory frameworks. As Schraven et al. observed, most climate policies in Africa ignore migration in the context of climate change. There is also a lack of integration opportunities and adequate mechanisms at the local level to accommodate climate migrants (Schraven et al., 2019:4-5). The absence of supportive mechanisms and institutions may affect how leaders can apply the above definition to protect climate migrants.

Another important instrument is the Kampala Convention. The AU adopted the Kampala Convention in 2009 to help protect internally displaced people in various African countries. This Convention seeks to ensure that people forced to move in the region are supported in a way that can protect their dignity. The Convention also stresses the provision of humanitarian assistance to support the vulnerable, including people displaced by diverse climate-related issues. Its importance cannot be disregarded as the first regional binding principle on IDPs. As stated in the Convention, the parties are obliged to protect IDPs, including those affected by climate change. Article 5(4) provides that: "States Parties shall take measures to protect and assist persons who have been internally displaced due to natural or human-made disasters, including climate change" (AU, 2009:8). Thus, the Convention seeks to facilitate the protection of people affected by climate-related migration.

African government's efforts to establish this Convention are commendable and assumed to help stakeholders with a protection mechanism and obligation guidelines to ensure the well-being of the displaced people within the region. As indicated in Article 2(d), the Convention provides "obligations and responsibilities of States Parties, for the prevention of internal displacement and protection of and assistance, to internally displaced persons" (AU, 2009:4). The Convention also serves as a guide to the protection of displaced people's rights. As stated in Article 4(4): "All people have a right to be protected against displacement" (AU, 2009:6). This provision highlights members' states duty to protect the dignity of climate-displaced people. The Convention has the potential to help African stakeholders to address climate migration concerns better. In this regard, states need to show a keen concern toward the

Convention for sustainable policies and preparedness regarding the governance of climate migration in Africa.

The continental free trade agenda is also a policy framework that may directly or indirectly help climate migration governance. In 2018, AU established the Africa Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) to reduce trade barriers in the region. This is the region's most significant trade agreement, which also aims to promote easy human mobility to facilitate trade activities. As a result, a Protocol on Free Movement of Persons (FMP) was initiated in line with the AfCFTA. Despite this historic agreement to improve trade on the continent, rectifying the region's free movement agenda has become problematic due to state national interest (Okunade, 2021; Hirsch, 2021b:497). While most countries (over forty countries) on the continent have signed and rectified the AfCFTA, little effort has been made to establish the FMP (Hirsch, 2021b:497). As of the time of concluding the study, only four countries; Rwanda, Mali, Niger and São Tomé and Príncipe—had rectified the FMP (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2022:7). Although the AfCFTA is not directly related to climate migration, the success of its provision for free movement across the continent can help climate migrants who may be stranded or lack livelihood opportunities within their countries to cross borders.

Additionally, the AU Agenda 2063 pays attention to the movement of people on the continent (AU, 2015: 17, 36). To promote free movement on the continent, AU launched the Africa Passport program in 2016 at its 27th Ordinary Session with the AU Heads of State and Government in Kigali-Rwanda (AU, 2016). These initiatives emphasize the need for free and easy migration within the region. Although states are hesitant due to similar reasons in the previous paragraph and other concerns about high immigration in member states, domestic security and economic factors (Hirsch, 2021a:3-4), the success of the AU Passport to promote free movement can help climate migrants move easier within the region through supported programs by stakeholders or individual measures to secure themselves elsewhere. To better secure climate migrants in this initiative, the AU needs to clarify specific issues, especially regarding what states should do about their domestic migration issues and measures for protecting them. Stakeholders must also pay more attention to job creation since the desire to live and work in different member states may increase if the FMP is

successfully established. Such effort may have the potential to help climate migrants secure livelihood.

AU's partnership with external actors and partners, such as the EU, is also important in promoting better governance on (climate) migration. As noted earlier in this chapter, the EU-Africa relations focus on managing migrants' irregular routes to Europe through the North, West and Horn of Africa. The focus is on strategies to prevent irregular migration to Europe. Regarding irregular migration, the EU has diverse programs to support African member states in strengthening their border security (Zanker, 2019:14-15; Cham and Adam, 2023:8). While there are complexities and the EU has been criticized as focusing on securitizing African irregular migrants or promoting its interests (Cham and Adam, 2023:8), African leaders can utilize the support of the EU in AU agenda to promote effective adaptation programs to support climate-vulnerable people. Effective adaptation programs can help reduce irregular migration from the region to promote both AU and EU interests in ensuring regular and decent migration.

Hirsch observes that African countries' travel policies are comparatively more flexible than those in other parts of the world. Since 2008, visa openness has improved, making it easier for people to travel to Africa. This openness includes visa-on-arrival, visa-free and other bilateral and multilateral agreements (Hirsch, 2021b:504-5). Within the continent, Benin, Seychelles, The Gambia, Kenya, Rwanda and Ghana are visa-free for all African citizens with appropriate travel documents. Additionally, Senegal has visa-on-arrival for other Africans and visa-free ECOWAS members. Comoros, Madagascar and Somalia offer visas upon arrival for all African citizens (Hirsch, 2021b:504). With such flexible travel policies, climate migrants who have social networks in other countries may be able to secure themselves by joining their respective families. As argued, social support and networks help climate migrants' decisions to relocate and secure themselves from climate threats (Teye and Nikoi, 2022:98).

Despite limitations, the AU has demonstrated efforts to promote its regional migration governance. As noted, aside from the continental migration frameworks and engagements with sub-regional economic blocs, notably efforts to provide technical assistance to support member states (AU, 2022). Nonetheless, it is important to

emphasize that measures to obtain accurate data on African migration can help govern migrants' affairs in the region to know migrants' contributions and keep up-to-date information on their diverse challenges. The absence of accurate migration data affects the region's migration governance and appropriate policy formulations and implementations (Achieng et al., 2020:118). Therefore, investing in migration data can help make effective, decisive migration policies and reduce misconceptions about African migration (IOM, 2017a:5-6). More so, inadequate economic /financial resources, domestic political influence and inadequate legal frameworks and national interest continue to affect how the region governs its migration affairs (Okunade, 2021). Therefore, AU migration dialogues must give the needed attention to these challenges. As Betts stresses, states have a protective function to protect the rights of migrants (Betts, 2011: 51). In this respect, African states and migration stakeholders are expected to protect people's right to manage migration efficiently, especially when people are forced to move.

In sum, since African migration policies are more flexible in welcoming migrants from other countries (Hirsch, 2021:504), the AU can establish effective measures to govern climate migration and promote orderly movements of climate migrants with serious and committed efforts supported by strong legal frameworks. Governments should, therefore, dialog better to deal with the complexities of the region's migration policies to help protect the dignity of climate migrants.

2.4. FREE MOVEMENT PROTOCOL OF ECOWAS

Leaders in West Africa aim to ease citizen's movement and foster cooperation in the sub-region has a long history. Before the formation of ECOWAS, leaders in the bloc envisioned that strengthening member states through one umbrella could help them to unite and get the ability to bargain better to address the needs of their citizens (Ojo, 1980; Hanink and Owusu, 1998; Manuh, 2005). Such unity was also aimed at strengthening the bloc against colonial influence to prevent Western political and economic domination. With this notion, the community aimed to be self-reliant in its political and economic decisions (Ojo, 1980: 599-601). Moreover, leaders aimed to solve common problems and enhance economic development and integration. Hence,

the establishment of ECOWAS was deemed important for the bloc (Garba and Yeboah, 2022).

On the 28th of May 1975, the ECOWAS Treaty, also called the Treaty of Lagos, was signed in Lagos, Nigeria. It was signed by the heads of state and governments of 15 countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo, with the declared goal of promoting economic integration within the bloc. After ECOWAS became a reality, the leadership began to give importance to governing their affairs and establishing a large trading bloc for member states. Specifically, to ensure development by integrating the member states and citizens for various opportunities (ECOWAS, n.d). Also, the institutionalization of ECOWAS was significant for harmonizing political affairs in West Africa (Ojo,1980:601).

In its earlier stage, the free movement of citizens became a major agenda for the Union. For this reason, in 1979, ECOWAS leaders established the Movement Protocol focusing on the “Free Movement of People, Right of Residence and Establishment”. This Protocol has three phases: " the right to entry, the right to residence and the right to establishment" (ECOWAS, 2008). The Protocol emphasized the necessity for borderless West Africa to allow nationals access and benefit from opportunities in other member states (Awumbila et al., 2018). As noted, the Protocol helps citizens to cross member states borders easier to engage in diverse economic activities within the bloc (IOM-AMR, 2020:3). Also, since the establishment of the Protocol, supplementary measures have been implemented to ensure improvements in the agreement due to human mobility dynamics within the sub-region (Garba and Yeboah, 2022: 21-22).

As it is in other parts of Africa, West Africa is characterized by intra-sub-regional migration. Although West Africa is one of the most dominant sub-regions in terms of human mobility, there are challenges to integrating migration into the development agenda. Several issues affect migrants' integration among West African states. Some dominant issues are associated with economic activities, such as trading and farming, while others migrate due to religious and security reasons (Teye, 2022:3-4). Together with entry rights, the Protocol seeks to ensure that members can stay and establish business without hindrance (Awumbila et al., 2018; Yeboah et al., 2021).

However, member states' domestic migration policies affect the successful implementation of citizens' right to establishment in other countries. This results from member-state national interest (Okunade, 2021). Nonetheless, the organization's vision to move citizens within the sub-region freely and easily is admirable. The organization's member states have ensured flexible relationships and movements between the Anglophone and Francophone countries, which were problematic during the colonial administration (Amadi, 2019:76-78).

Additionally, the ECOWAS-FMP has been helpful by breaking the borders created during the colonial administrations (Garba and Yeboah, 2022:23-24). It is worth noting that ECOWAS is one of the most prominent African sub-regional economic organizations with a free movement protocol for its citizens. The FMP is characterized by some countries being dominant in sending while others are receiving. The countries in the Sahel area, specifically Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, predominantly send migrants, while Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria predominantly receive migrants. It is also worth noting that people's choice of destinations is influenced by proximity, common language and ethnic relations (Awumbila et al., 2018:6).

Furthermore, it is important to note that the free movement in ECOWAS has helped to increase the flow of remittances for member states and support the livelihoods of migrants' families and communities. As the organization helps members and citizens to explore opportunities, states' trade volumes concurrently increase. The dominant states in trading, such as Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana, continue to benefit from the easy flow of their citizens through diverse opportunities and professional skills. Moreover, because of free movement opportunities, many West African migrants migrate within the sub-region rather than struggling to migrate to other parts of Africa and outside the continent to search for jobs and remit to support families (Garba and Yeboah, 2022:25-26).

Despite members' desire to promote the FMP, there have been some violations due to conflict of interest, which go contrary to what the Union expects of member states (Okunade and Ogunnubi, 2021:13). For instance, even though the FMP came into force in 1980, in 1983, Nigerian government expelled some West African migrants who were considered unskilled and illegal. The Nigerian government's action

was politically motivated and blamed migrants for their economic problems at the time. Most of the expelled migrants were Ghanaians. Due to economic problems, the Ghanaian government also expelled Nigerian migrants in 1969. As such, the Nigerian government's mass deportation of Ghanaians in the early 1980s was considered as payback. This action was unexpected because Nigeria had committed to the sub-region's integration since the 1960s, with efforts to establish Pan-Africanism (Ojo, 1980:572). Also, in 2004, Liberia expelled citizens of ECOWAS and ordered member states citizens to register at embassies. Members' unexpected actions leading to the expulsion of other citizens have happened without severe sanction from the leadership of the community. As such, a 'weak legal base' affects the total success of the FMP (Okunade and Ogunnubi, 2021: 13, 16). Such actions can also be considered as acts that sway the FMP agenda. Hence, these countries free ride and did not comply totally with ECOWAS norms of promoting freedom of movement.

Also, aside from the numerous benefits of the free movement agreement, some West African states lack comprehensive migration policies, which affects the adequate integration of the FMP in the national migration structure. More so, ECOWAS members have ratified several international agreements to protect the rights of migrants. However, implementation of the free movement protocol in the sub-region continues to face challenges, especially concerning the right to residence and establishment. There are also challenges such as harassment, extortions and a lack of understanding between national migration laws and the ECOWAS movements protocol (Garba and Yeboah, 2022:19; Awumbila et al., 2018:6). Additionally, a lack of data and inadequate information about migrants lead to improper tracking of migrants to monitor and protect them accordingly (Awumbila et al., 2018:6-7).

2.5. CLIMATE MIGRATION AND FREE MOVEMENT PROTOCOL IN THE ECOWAS REGION

Climate migration is a critical issue in the ECOWAS region and as such, free movement of the sub-region has implications for its management. As the World Bank report projects, this sub-region is expected to have millions of climate migrants by 2050 (Clement et al., 2021:322; Rigaud et al., 2018:108). This means stakeholders

require more action to help citizens cope and adapt to the stress of climate-induced migration. Climate migrants in West Africa may be able to move freely within the bloc because of the Protocol; however, migrants may face migration barriers when traveling due to the absence of specific provisions for climate migrants. This implies that there is a need for ECOWAS to develop specific *ad hoc* mechanisms to ease climate mobility challenges to help regular and unplanned migration in this context (e.g., due to events such as floods, tropical storms, coastal erosion and drought).

Also, countries in the ECOWAS region are characterized by long-term seasonal migration of agricultural workers due to drought and other climatic factors (Dick and Schraven, 2018; Teye et al., 2021; Awumbila et al., 2018). The consequence of these climatic factors is that seasonal and permanent migration issues in West Africa are expected to increase. However, the ECOWAS free movement does not pay enough attention to migrants moving due to climatic shocks. ECOWAS adopted its Visions 2020 and 2050 to ensure a better life for its citizens in all respects. However, neither Vision 2020, adopted in June 2010, nor the latest Vision 2050, which was adopted in June 2022, focuses on climate migration governance (ECOWAS (Vision 2050), 2022).

Migration is an adaptation strategy to deal with climate stress, yet governments in the sub-region pay less attention to this issue. As stressed by Teye and Nikoi, migration should be included in the sub-regional climate change adaptation and development initiatives and strategies. Such efforts to appropriately integrate mobility issues can help the union achieve the expected objective of dignifying the movement of citizens (Teye and Nikoi, 2022:79). Similarly argued by Garba and Yeboah, urgent attention on the concerns of climate migrants can help deal with the alarming effects of the climate crisis. Therefore, ECOWAS needs to strategize and provide strong complementary protocols for climate migration. Until such complementary are established, ECOWAS citizens may face diverse problems with the 90-day stay principle associated with the movement protocol (Garba and Yeboah, 2022:32) and even if climate migrants can easily settle in different countries within the ECOWAS region, the 90-day law may make climate migrants face some residence challenges. Hence, mechanisms to care for the extended stay of climate-induced migrants are deemed important.

ECOWAS leadership also needs to engage member states in addressing any inconsistencies between the Protocol and domestic laws. Although the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol permits citizens to enter other member states legally, domestic laws of member states may set barriers for climate migrants since the Protocol does not have specific provisions for people migrating due to climate stresses. Also, Awumbila et al. (2018) and Bolarinwa (2015) emphasize that member states' domestic laws may affect ECOWAS citizens' movement processes. Moreover, the lack of political will to implement migrants' rights to establishment (Garba and Yeboah, 2022:25) may affect climate migrants who may want to settle, live longer in other member states territories and may not be able to do certain jobs for livelihood (see also discussions in Chapter 4, Subsection: 4.4.3).

In sum, as drought, hot temperatures (heatwaves), fierce winds and floods continue to influence mobility in the sub-region (Teye and Nikoi, 2022:85), a reform of the ECOWAS-FMP can help with a prospective solution to protect cross-border climate migrants. As mentioned earlier, even though migration is an adaptation strategy to escape climate stress, it needs a proper mechanism. Therefore, stakeholders need to strengthen dialogs on the sub-region's free movement agenda and aim at better border management, create more awareness of climate migration and strengthen the capacities of member states and institutions to respond effectively to climate migration.

2.6. COMPLEX PAST DYNAMICS AND JUSTIFICATION FOR COOPERATIVE INSTITUTIONS FOR CLIMATE MIGRATION GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

Migration is a part of everyday life in Africa. While some people migrate outside the continent, most African migrants migrate within the continent. Historically, African migrants could migrate within the region without official barriers. Although mobility challenges (for example, means of transportation) existed in the pre-colonial era, people could travel without considering border restrictions. However, colonial and post-colonial Africa is characterized by border restrictions and official travel documents that allow movement from one territory or state to another. For instance,

colonial Africa was defined and controlled by territories of colonial administration, such as the British, Belgian, Portuguese, French, German and Italian. People could travel and migrate within their respective territories without barriers. It is also important to mention that territories were defined and restricted because of competition and the search for mineral resources. Following post-political independence, sovereign states continued to impose border restrictions based on security reasons to control illegal migration and criminals, as well as recently to control terrorism and the proliferation of armaments. Some countries have required extra travel documents, passports and visas. Border conflicts due to trans-border resources have also become an issue in some parts of the continent, such as between Somalia and Ethiopia and between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This influences the movement of people across these countries (IOM, 2020:77-79).

As in other parts of the world, migration remains an aspect of African existence, yet community and territory entry restrictions continue to affect migrants. States continue to use their sovereign power and the politics of exclusion to prevent the entry of unwanted migrants (Shapcott, 2010:88). In the case of Africa, border management has become complicated in recent years because of terrorism and organized crime issues in some parts of the region (IOM, 2020:79; Okunade, 2021). Again, from the anti-cosmopolitan perspective, states have the sovereign power to deny entry and some actors consider border openness as a false moral. In that regard, open borders are considered dangerous to state politics and culture and hence, state decisions are made to exclude others (foreigners) from entry (Shapcott, 2010:99-100). These opinions influence migration policies and border management globally; African states are no exception. Despite the complex interplay of restriction and sovereignty issues, better institutional partnerships to protect the dignity of climate migrants should be the priority of African states.

Although African states have complex migration dynamics with associated issues such as identity, security, economics and other national interests, these do not prevent collective efforts to protect the climate vulnerable better. Climate migration presents different concerns than other forms, such as economic migration, where people often plan their migration. Therefore, the justification for African states is that they need to focus on a migration regime where cooperative institutions can promote

better collective action and support the weaker states to better address their climate migration issues despite the complexities of member-state migration affairs.

From the perspective of cosmopolitanism, migrants have the right to movement, which renders states' border restrictions questionable. Some of those concerns relate to whether states have the right to impose restrictions on specific migration and whether migrants, on the other hand, have absolute freedom to travel. Other concerns can also be expressed regarding states' decisions to restrict potential migrants, such as refugees and the international implications of such decisions (as also noted in the expulsion of some African migrants, which were discussed earlier in this chapter). Nonetheless, states have a moral duty to care for vulnerable migrants who migrate to seek protection. It is also important to emphasize that states' migration policies have international implications (Shapcott, 2010:88-89). The decision to restrict vulnerable migrants over their protection cannot be entirely a national parochial decision. Therefore, for human rights reasons, unnecessary restrictive measures against vulnerable climate migrants need due attention.

In the framework of this research, African climate migration governance should be based on hospitality for the climate-vulnerable, where a better and stronger legal framework can protect migrants in this context and states should open their borders to these migrants. As argued by Shapcott with respect to Kant's notion of universal hospitality, states have a responsibility to accommodate and protect the rights of migrants. For the sake of universal hospitality, states have a moral concern about allowing the entry of external members. People must also be free to move, irrespective of where they originate. States can have strict rules about citizenship or membership; however, it is recommended that people should be able to move without restriction (Shapcott, 2010: 90-94), especially in critical situations for climate vulnerable. Therefore, due to climate shocks, African states should allow entry by subjecting themselves to universal hospitality and providing relevant institutions, including those seeking entry to other states.

As Oakes et al. observed, individual states have primary responsibility for their climate migrants; however, collaborative efforts among states and related organizations are crucial (Oakes et al., 2023:8). AU and individual African states cooperation towards the GCM and GCR, for instance, demonstrate their concerns for

better collective action to govern both voluntary and forced movements. These steps show that African states are improving their efforts through cooperative mechanisms within the sub-regions and beyond. Nevertheless, strong and better institutional mechanisms should be considered to address diverse and complex African migration issues (Teye and Oucho, 2024:624-26).

There is no denying that African governments are making efforts to cooperate better toward decent migration in the region. As frameworks such as the AU Agenda 2063 indicate, migration is important in achieving Africa's goals. Sub-regional groups such as the IGAD and ECOWAS, supportive agreements for the free movement of people across borders, demonstrate commitment in the sub-regions. Moreover, it is worth emphasizing African states aim to promote free trade and a visa-free vision within the AfCFTA is demonstrating the willingness to ensure easy movement of citizens within the continent. As noted, orderly migration for citizens can help deal with migration challenges in the region (IOM, 2020:79-81). In essence, leaders should demonstrate a high commitment to continuing the region's efforts and expectations and hope for better migration governance.

It can also be argued that better institutional support with free movement of people and residency rights in post-migration can help climate migrants who may be stranded in their own countries. Such support may also help climate victims to migrate legally elsewhere without being restricted by visas and other prohibiting requirements. Arguably, freedom of movement is a means of helping to ensure justice distribution where disadvantaged groups of people can migrate to escape their livelihood challenges, as argued by Shapcott (2010:95). Therefore, African states need to strengthen cooperative institutional norms to promote justice for the disadvantaged and vulnerable climate migrants. As Hollifield pointed out, cooperation on migrants' affairs can help states strengthen their interdependence for many gains, such as filling labour gaps and sometimes providing cheap labour (Hollifield, 1992:590-91). Climate migrants' contribution to labour shortage cannot be denied. As in the case of Ghana, climate migrants from the neighbouring countries of Ghana help in the cocoa production sectors.

Also, regional actors have core mandates to establish institutions to address climate migration issues (Cristani et al., 2020:138). As demonstrated in the discussions

in section 2.2 of this chapter, African governments are willing to cooperate on migration despite their complex individual states' self-interest. However, some inconsistencies need to be adequately considered by the AU actors, especially regarding legal measures. For instance, the Kampala Convention, the only binding principle to protect displacement and mobility related to climate disasters in the region, lacks coherence regarding sanctioning member states. Article 7(4), which provides punishment for member states, relates to sanctions based on armed conflict but not necessarily improper care for climate-displaced people (AU-Kampala Convention, 2009-Article 7 (4)). The Convention differs from realistic, legally binding principles because it does not specify kinds of sanctions and penalties for members who fail to comply. This means that well-structured climate migration norms with sanctions for noncompliance should be well-defined and applied.

This study does not disregard African states' security concerns, national interests and sovereignty issues regarding regional migration. However, these concerns should not prevent African states from cooperating better. Vibrant institutions to govern migration can help African states strengthen their capacities to promote regular and decent migration. More importantly, climate migrants in Africa need to be considered vulnerable, whose lives and livelihoods are at risk and need protection through strong collective legal mechanisms. Individual states cannot deal with challenges alone due to their existing challenges, such as inadequate funds and weak institutions. Therefore, collective actions should focus on creating specific institutions to provide the necessary support for states. As Cristani et al. argued, effective and strategic regional institutions can be helpful since no specific global framework currently governs cross-border climate (Cristani et al., 2020:137-138). Additional regional institutions are key to providing better short- and long-term measures to govern climate mobility crises because states are closer to each other and may understand their common problems. Building upon and strengthening the existing African migration governance frameworks and institutions within the region can help deal with the complex dynamics of migration. As noted, Africans are on the move. However, migrants lack several protective mechanisms (IOM, 2020:96). Therefore, guidelines to protect vulnerable migrants in Africa should be such that they do not

restrict climate migrants but rather protect their human rights and promote orderly movement.



CHAPTER THREE

MIGRATION IN GHANA

3.1. MIGRATION IN GHANA: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Migration within, to and from Ghana is as old as the concept itself. Migration was an integral part of the lives of many Ghanaians before the colonial era. History shows that many people in the olden days of Ghana largely migrated from one place to another for economic reasons, primarily agricultural and trade activities. From the pre-colonial to the colonial period, many Ghanaians from different ethnic groups migrated within the country's borders to search for safer and more fertile land to settle and engage in different agricultural and other daily activities. These migrants were predominantly farmers and farm employees migrating from their hometowns and regions to other parts of Ghana, mainly from northern to southern Ghana. While some people migrated voluntarily, others had to migrate because of family and social obligations to work and support their families back home (Simon et al., 2004; Awumbila et al., 2008; IOM, 2019; GSS, 2023). This migration was characterized as rural-rural, rural-urban and urban-rural. These migration forms have contributed to Ghana's socio-economic development through skill-sharing, acquisitions and investment projects established by some migrants (Awumbila et al., 2008:6).

In the 1400s, many Ghanaians, especially traders, farmers and fishers, began intra-regional (within the African bloc) migration. The Trans-Saharan caravan routes connecting the West African bloc to the rest of Africa were then created, allowing many Ghanaian traders, academics and religious leaders to travel across the continent. The earliest immigrants to Ghana were dominated by traders from countries such as Niger and Nigeria who migrated to Ghana temporally and seasonally to transact their businesses. Notably, most immigrants who first arrived in Ghana had language, cultural and ancestral ties with their host communities. These factors facilitated their migration and settlement in Ghana. Although some people without social ties and networks in Ghana migrated, it was easier for those who had ties to Ghana than for those who did not have any ties to their migration (Anarfi et al., 2003; Micah, 2006; Antwi-Bosiako, 2009; IOM, 2019).

Between the 15th and 18th centuries, migration in Ghana was based on seasonal movement and trade engagements. However, the emergence of colonial governance and the slave trade imperilled this practice. The colonial administration brought new dimensions and patterns of migration in Ghana because movements were within the states' respective territories (as also discussed in Chapter 2). Migrants from various parts of West Africa began to travel to Ghana in the late 19th and early 20th centuries when the Ghanaian cocoa farming and mining sectors became more sophisticated. The immigrant population increased from 1910 until shortly after Ghana gained independence in 1957. This population increase was due to the colonial administration's programs to recruit labour from other African countries to assist in the agricultural sector, especially cocoa production (Anarfi et al., 2003; Antwi-Bosiako, 2011; GSS, 2023). In addition, as part of the colonial government's attempt to exploit Ghana's resources, more labour forces were recruited from other parts of Africa. Many West African migrants took advantage of the opportunity to move to Ghana to pursue work in the mining sector (Ofosu-Mensah, 2011:13-14).

In the latter part of the colonial administration, Ghanaian migrants began migrating for seasonal trading and fishing activities within other West African countries. Also, students and other professionals began migrating, mainly to English-speaking countries, during the 1950s for education and employment opportunities. In 1957, Ghana became the first sub-Saharan African state to gain independence from Britain. Immediately after independence, the number of immigrants increased because more African nationals, mainly from West Africa, had moved to Ghana. Ghana was considered a better economy and a more peaceful country than other African countries struggling to gain independence. Furthermore, the post-independence first Ghanaian president's open-door policy for African unity attracted more people from other parts of Africa to Ghana (Anarfi et al., 2003; GSS, 2023: 9-10).

Less than ten years after Ghana's independence, its economy deteriorated and became unappealing to immigrants. Economic challenges in Ghana and the military takeover in 1966 ended the idea of an open-door policy toward international migrants from other African countries to Ghana (GSS, 2023: 10-11). As the Ghanaian economy continued deteriorating in the 1960s, immigrants without legal status were blamed for the decline. The Ghanaian government enacted "the Aliens Compliance Order" in

1969, which required all irregular migrants to return to their respective countries, which forced many immigrants to leave Ghana. Hence, the immigrant population decreased in the 1970s (Peil, 1974; Anarfi et al., 2003:5-6; Micah,2006). According to Anarfi et al. (2003:6), the percentage of immigrants in Ghana decreased from 12.3% in 1960 to 6.6% in 1970 because of the government's actions to expel all illegal and undocumented migrants. Nonetheless, other African countries implemented measures to attract Ghanaian professionals. These measures prompted countries such as Botswana, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia to hire Ghanaian professionals such as teachers, doctors, lawyers and administrators (Anarfi et al., 2003:6).

In 1975, ECOWAS was established with movement protocols that allowed Ghanaians and other West African nationals to travel to the member states. This encouraged many Ghanaians to migrate to other West African nations, particularly Nigeria. Between 1974 and 1981, after establishing the ECOWAS free movement agreement, over two million Ghanaians migrated to other West African countries, mostly to Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire, to work (Anarfi et al., 2003: 6-7). Unfortunately, for Ghanaian emigrants in Nigeria, Nigeria experienced a serious oil and economic crisis in the early 1980s, necessitating actions to expel all undocumented migrants, especially those from Ghana (this could be considered a reciprocation of what Ghana did with the 1969 Aliens Compliance Order). In 1983 and 1985, the Nigerian government's policy of returning illegal and undocumented migrants forced over 1.2 million Ghanaians to return to Ghana (Anarfi et al., 2000; Anarfi et al., 2003; Micah, 2006).


The unexpected expulsion of a large group of Ghanaian emigrants from Nigeria caused many Ghanaian emigrants to change their destinations from West Africa to other parts of Africa, North America and Europe. By the 1990s, many Ghanaians had left Ghana and were living abroad. Most of these migrants were professional and skilled workers, such as doctors and nurses. It is important to stress that most Ghanaian migrants to Europe reside in the United Kingdom, which can be attributed to the colonial ties between Ghana and the United Kingdom (Micah, 2006).

Although occasional political instabilities have been caused by a combination of democratic and military governments, Ghana has been a beacon for democracy in West Africa since establishing the Fourth Republic in 1993. Political stability in Ghana

continues to attract nationals to settle and invest in Ghana's economy (GSS, 2023:3). Although post-colonial Ghana has been associated with immigration and emigration dynamics, internal migration continues to increase. For example, urban populations in 1960 and 2000 were approximately 23% and 43%, respectively. This increase has been associated with urban industrial development since the 1960s. Nonetheless, while highly educated and skilled individuals move to regional capital cities, less educated and skilled individuals migrate to cocoa-producing areas and mining communities (GSS, 2023:20-21).



Figure 1: A Map indicating the Pattern of Migration within Ghana (North-South Movements)



Source: Designed using the website <https://www.ghanamissionun.org/map-regions-in-ghana/>. 12.9.2024

3.1.1. Contemporary Ghana's International Migration

Ghana's international migration has received significant attention in the past few years. However, migration in Ghana is primarily informal; therefore, accurate data on Ghana's migration are difficult to obtain (Awumbila, 2008:1). Most immigrants to Ghana come from the West African sub-region and many Ghanaians emigrate to neighbouring West African countries. Ghana was a popular destination for most West African migrants before and a few years after colonial rule because of its economic opportunities. During those years, the number of Ghanaians who emigrated was small compared with the number of West African migrants who moved to Ghana. Ghanaian emigrants were mainly professionals and students. Because of colonial ties and linguistic barriers, they mainly migrated to the United Kingdom and other English-speaking destinations, such as Canada, Gambia, Botswana and Sierra Leone. Some Ghanaians from fishing communities also emigrated to the Ivory Coast and Benin (GSS, 2023:20-22; Anarfi et al., 2003:6).

Migration has been recognized as one of the most important factors that help improve the lives of some Ghanaians, as well as the lives of their origin and host communities. In Ghana, migration continues to contribute to the livelihoods of both rural and urban inhabitants. Before the 1960s, many immigrants lived in Ghana. However, as indicated in the 1960s, Ghana's economic challenges and political instabilities resulted in mass out-migration. Mass migration began in the early 1980s. In this period, many high- and low-skilled Ghanaians left the country to search for better opportunities elsewhere, especially in West Africa. The early days of 1980 economic crisis rendered many Ghanaians intolerable to their living conditions. According to some sources, approximately 300 Ghanaians travelled to Nigeria every day and by December 1980, approximately 150000 Ghanaian emigrants lived in Nigeria. In addition, between 500,000 and 800,000 Ghanaians lived in Cote d'Ivoire in 1986. Between 1974 and 1981, approximately two million Ghanaians emigrated from Ghana due to poor governance and political instability. Ghana lost many professionals because of this unprecedented emigration. Many professionals were teachers, architects and university graduates (Anarfi et al., 2003:7-8; Rado, 1986:563).

Since Ghana's migration is characterized by more informal migrants, an accurate estimation of the number of migrants to and from Ghana has not been established. In the early 1990s, Ghana experienced different migration patterns regarding sources, destinations and transit countries. Ghana's new migration era has been shaped by its political stability. Political stability in Ghana attracts migrants and foreign investors to move to the country (Awumbila et al., 2008:1-2; GSS, 21-22). However, multiple factors have influenced Ghanaians to continue migrating to other countries. Although economic issues have received much attention, many noneconomic triggers cause people to migrate (GSS, 2023:24-25; Van der Geest, 2011:70). It has been found that issues such as depressed social situations in the places of origin push some individuals to migrate; nonetheless, people's choice of destination is impacted by economic opportunities (GSS, 2023:26).

Ghana remains an important source (origin), transit and host country for migrants. Changes in Ghana's migration have been shaped by historical and current dynamics in migration flow. The immediate post-colonial era was characterized by migration from other African countries to Ghana because of political stability. It is worth noting that migration between Ghana and its West African neighbours is also influenced by intercommunal and ethnic ties, particularly between the Akan and Ewe ethnic groups. Ghana and its West African neighbours have been influenced by the 1979 ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol (IOM-Ghana, 2022:12-13).

Diaspora networks in many countries also influence contemporary Ghanaian international migration. For example, the Ghanaian diaspora communities in large cities such as London, New York, Hamburg and Amsterdam influence Ghanaians' migratory patterns. For example, between 1990 and 2001, Ghana was one of the top migrant-sending countries in the United Kingdom. It is also worth noting that between 1986 and 2001, the number of Ghanaian immigrants increased in North America, especially in the United States and Canada, due to the large number of diaspora communities. Furthermore, due to diaspora communities across continents, Ghanaian emigration has become a transnational trend in recent years. This migration pattern continues to be shaped by employment, education and training (GSS, 2023:23-24). As also indicated by Anarfi et al. (2003:8-9), the government's economic policies to restructure the economy (Structural Adjustment Program) in the 1980s brought about

the redeployment of staff, withdrawal of social services, unemployment and hardships that forced many people to emigrate.


According to the UN DESA 2020 international migration report, by the end of 2020, Ghana's emigrant stock was 1,004,324. Approximately 48% of this emigrant population resides in West Africa. Aside from the West African Sub-region, Europe and North America account for 29% and 20% of Ghana's emigrant population, respectively. Economic and social factors shape Ghana's international migration. Some consider where they can find jobs and others consider family relations in their destination countries (UN DESA, 2020:46). Migrants from Ghana contribute to development through remittances. According to the 2022 IOM-Ghana report, Ghana is the second largest recipient of remittances in West Africa. Remittance contributes 5.2% of Ghana's gross domestic product (GDP) (IOM-Ghana, 2022:13). It is also important to point out that many Ghanaian emigrants have higher educational qualifications and diverse professional backgrounds. In addition, approximately 50% of Ghana's contemporary international migration are youth aged between 20 and 39 (GSS, 2023:110).

3.2. CLIMATE MIGRATION IN GHANA

Migration continues to be a major phenomenon in Ghana and is influenced by various factors, including climate change. Since the colonial era, during the dry seasons in Northern Ghana, some people migrate from Northern to Southern Ghana to engage in agriculture and several commercial activities, such as trade and head porters (locally known as *Kayayei*) (GSS, 2023:19-20; Kwankye et al., 2009). Like many other sub-Saharan African countries, many rural populations in Ghana depend on climate- or weather-based agriculture for livelihood support. Because rural communities' agricultural practices do not help them earn enough to sustain their lives, many people find dealing with extreme climatic conditions challenging. Hence, some people migrate to fend for social and economic support elsewhere (Jarawura and Smith, 2015:245; Foresight, 2011:29-30; Agyemang and Abu, 2013:74; Gravesen et al., 2020:16; Issifu et al., 2022:1-2). As observed, many internal migration issues in Ghana are associated with climatic factors such as drought, floods, changes in rainfall

patterns, coastal erosion and other human-influence hazards such as sand-winning and illegal mining activities that affect the environment (IOM, 2019:67-68).

Figure 2: Map Indicating the Climatic Factors and Mobility Patterns in Ghana.



Source of Map: IOM (2017:2)

Ghana's climatic zones favour economic activities in several ways. The environmental conditions and resources of the country contribute to the economic and livelihood activities of the country and its people. According to Gravesen et al., the agriculture, fishing and forest sectors contributed 60% of Ghana's GDP in the 1960s. It decreased to 20% in 2016 due to oil and timber production developments. However, in 2020, agriculture became a primary employment sector in Ghana, constituting 42%

of the Ghanaian employment-population (Gravesen et al., 2020:16-17). The agricultural sector continues to employ a large proportion of Ghana's population. However, this sector faces many challenges due to climate change, poor road networks and inadequate public services in rural and agricultural-dominated areas and communities. This makes people, especially farmers, face many livelihood challenges (Arndt et al., 2015:7215).

Additionally, owing to the unpredictability of climatic conditions, particularly rainfall patterns, farmers find it difficult to follow the usual patterns of their agricultural activities. Furthermore, Acheampong et al. estimated that by 2050, annual rainfall will decrease by 11% and temperatures will rise by 1-3 degrees Celsius. This threatens agricultural production if stakeholders fail to implement appropriate measures to address the situation (Acheampong et al., 2014:31-32). Consequently, people will have to find other livelihood options. Hence, migration is a major option for many people seeking support.

Similarly, aside from the economic and social factors that influence people to migrate to Ghana, climate change has become a significant migration factor, forcing some people to migrate to and from Ghana (IOM-Ghana, 2022:13). Because a large part of the Ghanaian population⁸, especially those in rural areas, depends on agriculture for their livelihoods and agriculture contributes to the Ghanaian economy, as such the impacts of climate change need critical attention. More importantly, a large proportion of the population is employed in the agricultural sector, which helps reduce unemployment to a certain extent (Gravesen et al., 2020). However, since the 1950s, Ghana has been experiencing numerous climatic changes that affect temperature, changes in rainfall patterns and agricultural activities. Climate problems also affect livelihoods because many people depend on climate-fed agriculture (Alare et al., 2022:1). In Ghana's northern regions (semi-arid areas) and deltaic zones, many young inhabitants continue migrating due to climate-related challenges. Although migration in these areas is not a new phenomenon, the adverse effects of climate change continue

⁸ The latest population census (2021) indicates a total population of 30,832,019. 71.1% are non-migrants, and 28.9 % are migrants. Non-migrants are those whose places of residence are the same as their place of birth, while migrants are those whose places of residence differ from their place of birth. 57.7 % of the population engage in Agricultural, forestry, and fishery activities in the rural areas (GSS, 2023: 30-40).

to worsen people's livelihoods, thereby increasing migration (Prosper and Khan, 2018:1).

Studies have found that despite its numerous advantages, agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa, including Ghana, depends heavily on climatic conditions (rain-fed agriculture). Therefore, changes in climatic conditions have a serious implication on the people's livelihood (Ibrahim and Mensah, 2022; Teye and Owusu, 2015; Teye et al., 2021). However, people frequently affected by climate change often do not receive the expected responses from policymakers (Van Praag, 2023). One common adaptation strategy is migration from climate hotspots to more favourable areas (Teye and Owusu, 2015; Teye et al., 2021; Van der Geest, 2011; Abu, 2011; Abu et al., 2014; Babanawo et al., 2023). Prosper and Khan observed that in climate hotspots in Ghana, there is less migration when livelihood support activities are secured. Therefore, many people migrate when they do not feel secure regarding livelihood support (Prosper and Khan, 2018:2).

It is also important to emphasize that over the past decades, Ghana has been experiencing temperature changes (increase in annual temperature) and a decline in rainfall patterns in many parts of the country (Gravesen et al., 2020; Alare et al., 2022). These changes in climatic conditions have forced many people to become climate migrants. Some studies have observed that climate migration was a seasonal issue where people migrate seasonally and for a short period to engage in agriculture and other informal work, mainly from Northern to Southern Ghana. However, the pattern has recently changed from short-term seasonal to long-term permanent migration (Teye and Nikoi, 2022:99). People move from northern to southern regions because of poor and unpredictable rainfall patterns. To find livelihoods in this alarming situation, some people consider migration an easy and only means of adapting to climate change situations in communities. Some people, especially farmers in the hotspot areas, try to adapt to climate change through irrigation farming. However, irrigation farming is expensive for most poor rural-farmers. Migration is, therefore, a survival option (Teye and Owusu, 2015; Teye et al., 2021; Abu et al., 2014).

As indicated, climate change has affected people in the northern regions of Ghana, mainly moving to the southern part of Ghana to engage in agriculture and other commercial activities. People in deltaic communities moved to the south-eastern part

of Ghana, specifically to the Ada East and West districts, to engage in fishing and other maritime industrial activities. These migrants help their families in their hometowns through cash and food remittances. Despite the advantages of migrants supporting their families back home, considerable pressure is exerted on facilities in their destination areas. Additionally, due to the lack of integration policies and programs in destination areas in terms of skill development and housing, individual migrants face challenges (Prosper and Khan, 2018:3). Additionally, due to unplanned and forced migration, some migrants live in slums and informal settlements in urban centres (King and Amponsah, 2012:285; Prosper and Khan, 2018:3).

The inability of dominant climate-based livelihood dwellers to adapt leads to various forms of irregular migration. For instance, many people in the northern regions of Ghana depend heavily on the environment for their livelihood. They are mostly affected by climate stress on their livelihood (Gravesen et al., 2020). Therefore, many of these victims migrate to southern urban cities to find jobs and alternative livelihoods. Also, people in northern regions struggle to adapt to climate change because of high poverty rates and insufficient stakeholder support. This inability to adapt forces some people to migrate (Yaro et al., 2016:76-77). Although it has been argued that climate change is not the sole factor causing migration from northern Ghana, climatic conditions play a significant role. Other factors, such as population growth, inadequate job opportunities and weak adaptation measures, also affect people's migration decisions. It is also emphasized that most people who migrate from northern regions are young and male-dominated (Teye and Owusu, 2015:239; Teye et al., 2021: 39-40). This tends to put an extra burden on women and children who are unable to migrate easily due to financial challenges and societal norms, especially when the out-migrants fail to send remittance in the form of cash and food to support the families left behind (Teye et al., 2021:38; Prosper and Khan, 2018:1-2).

Although North-South migration is male-dominated, there has been an increase in independent women and girls migrating from northern regions. Most of these women migrate from rural areas in northern Ghana to urban centres in the South to engage in different forms of work, especially low-scale and informal jobs (Awumbila, 2015:132). As observed by Prosper and Khan, changes in social norms and household structures force many young women to migrate (Prosper and Khan, 2018:1). Climate

stress contributes significantly to the movement of female migrants from rural areas in the northern regions because most of them engage in small-scale agriculture. Similarly, some social changes toward responsibilities, social support and social networks have influenced many females, especially young women, to migrate from the North to the South to contribute to supporting their families back home (Teye and Owusu, 2015:239).

Fishing and trading are major livelihood activities in the coastal areas of Ghana. Therefore, rising sea levels and coastal erosion in these areas affect people's livelihoods. Hence the decision to migrate (Prosper and Khan, 2018:2). An increase in coastal erosion and its impact on people's movement has contributed to the decline of population along the coastal areas, specifically Keta, in the Volta region. Large-scale coastal erosion affects Ghana's Central, Greater Accra, Western and Volta Regions. It has also been argued that Ghana's coastline will decline by 57% by 2060 without adequate measures. These changes can increase migration from coastal areas and influence the urban population. Although people in these areas migrate to adapt to the stress of climate change (IOM, 2019:69-70), without adequate measures to solve this problem, livelihood challenges for immobile people continue to worsen.

Again, due to drought and desertification, some people from northern Ghana have been migrating to Southern Ghana to find lands suitable for agriculture and job offers in other sectors that require labour. These migrants use their income and earnings from agricultural produce to support their livelihoods and that of families (Yaro et al., 2016:76). However, North-South migration has led to many unplanned settlements and slums in the two major cities of Ghana: Kumasi and Accra. Notable examples are in places such as Old Fadama and Akwatia Lines in the Greater Accra and Ashanti regions, respectively (King and Amponsah, 2012:285; Prosper and Khan, 2018:2-3).

Although some people try to find means to adapt, the higher poverty and underdevelopment levels in Ghana's northern regions hinder individual adaptation strategies (Yaro et al., 2015:236). The unpredictability of rainfall patterns and the increasing drought conditions in Northern Ghana continue to exacerbate people's means of supporting livelihood activities. Hence, the decision to migrate is to find possible livelihood support (Van de Geest, 2011; Teye and Owusu, 2015; Jarawura

and Smith, 2015). Despite their underdevelopment, these regions have been marginalized since the colonial era (Jarawura and Smith, 2015; Gravesen et al., 2020). Southern Ghana was favourable for colonial administration because the rich natural resources as such developmental projects were mainly established in the South. Despite the northern regions' vulnerability, necessary attention has not been paid to addressing climate migration crises. Also, efforts to bridge the development gap between the North and South of Ghana have been inadequate over the years due to poverty and a high rate of inequality (Gravesen et al., 2020:12).

It is also observed that the colonial administration consistently failed to report on climate problems and their impact on the livelihoods of the northern regions' population. Hence, the situation did not receive the expected attention. Although post-independence governments have attempted to address climate problems in northern Ghana, inadequate commitments and mechanisms by stakeholders hinder successful and sustainable solution. Also, some interventions focused on cash crops as exports and ignored subsistence cropping, which is essential for an ordinary person's survival (Grischow and Weiss, 2011:93-96). The high level of investment and favourable climatic conditions in southern Ghana, compared with structural marginalization coupled with climatic challenges in the North, continue to push people to migrate out of the northern regions to settle in the South (Gravesen et al., 2020:21).

Climate change continues to influence urban population growth in Ghana (Teye and Owusu, 2015). Urbanization and the creation of slums tend to cause several health, security and environmental problems (Prosper and Khan, 2018:3). More importantly, the influence of climate on migration of the youth and working population creates labour shortages in the origin regions and communities (Prosper and Khan, 2018:2-3; Asare, 2012:3). It has also been observed that increased male youth out-migration and an immobile female population heighten the challenges faced by female, children and the aged household members. As a result of the additional burden on stay-behind female family members, gender inequities and livelihood challenges in many parts of Ghana, especially in the northern regions continue to increase (Prosper and Khan, 2018:3). Another issue observed regarding male migrants is new wives and pregnancies in return. Some male migrants migrate seasonally and temporally, marrying extra wives or engaging in extramarital relationships in their host

communities. This leads to arguments and breakdowns in social ties with the initial families and, consequently, worsens the livelihood burden for the initial family (Jarawura and Smith, 2015:259).

Again, many farmers from northern Ghana migrate to search for land that supports agricultural activities in the middle belts. Adult men often migrate and leave their wives, children and old family members in poor condition (Abu et al., 2014: 345-346). This situation increases population and family vulnerability in northern Ghana. Climate change makes people feel insecure in diverse ways, such as food insecurity, health risks, unemployment, displacement of people and separation of families and several coping difficulties (Jarawura and Smith, 2015:250; Schraven and Rademacher-Schulz, 2015:277).

Although the climate has fluctuated for a long time in northern Ghana, some people are unaware of what is happening regarding climate change (climate change illiteracy). Many people, especially farmers, depend on rainfall to start their agricultural activities; they only predict when to plant crops. In this regard, lucky farmers obtain good harvests, and unlucky farmers are affected by unexpected flooding and harsh drought conditions that affect their farm produce (Schulz, 2015:254-255). This means that due to some farmers' inadequate knowledge of climate change, they may engage in farming activities at the wrong time. Therefore, this situation exacerbates some people's livelihood issues and forces those capable of migrating.

In several parts of Ghana, flooding force many people to migrate and become displaced. For instance, in 2007, a flood seriously damaged farmlands, livestock and homes in Northern Ghana. Also, water spillage from Burkina Faso's Bagre Dam has become an annual flooding incident that has caused significant damage in Northern Ghana. However, the government provides only temporary and inadequate support. This situation forces some people to consider short- and long-term migration. Many people are unable to move due to financial challenges and a lack of social networks and support in safer communities (Teye and Nikoi, 2022:89). As revealed during this research's consultations, some people are unable to migrate due to age constraints and social ties for long-term residences (further discussed in chapter 4).

Migration as a means of adapting to climate stress helps some households to manage some of their livelihood challenges. However, in some instances, return

migration occurs because of the absence of resources and opportunities in the new destination. Because resources in some destination centres are insufficient to accommodate new people (climate migrants), return migration occurs. Also, the climate situations of the host communities can be unreliable. Hence, some people return to finding other means of coping in their original places of residence or re-migrate to a new location where they can find possible livelihood support with their existing skills and learn new skills to find employment. While some people move to urban centres to find other means of livelihood, many face accommodation challenges, job scarcity and increased pressure for inadequate social amenities in urban centres. Furthermore, the movement to urban centres leads to a decline in agricultural activities, which has a negative impact on the agrarian sector (Jarawura and Smith, 2015:262-63).

Additionally, the Greater Accra, Central and Volta regions get flooded because of periodic and unexpected heavy rainfall, resulting in many displacements. Flooding continues to destroy farmland and causes loss of life in the Central and Greater Accra Regions (Jarawura and Smith, 2015: 90). Floods continue to displace many people in Ghana's capital, Accra, resulting in slums and informal settlements in various parts of the city. Torrential downpours flood many parts of the city, frequently leading to motorists being unable to drive in some areas, making it difficult for some citizens to complete their daily economic activities. The impact of climate change on urban transport systems has received limited attention. However, it has a major impact on people's livelihoods and the economic activities of cities. If the necessary steps are not taken, the situation is projected to deteriorate (Andreasen et al., 2022:1-2;16).

Furthermore, rising sea levels also contribute to displacement in deltaic areas such as Keta and its environs in the Volta region of Ghana (Hillmann and Ziegelmayr, 2016:120). Due to the persistent climate crisis (such as the rise in sea levels and coastal erosion), some stakeholders and researchers recommend prioritizing the relocation of coastal inhabitants, specifically coastal rural communities. However, many residents rejected the idea of relocation. Many coastal residents believe relocation will lead to social, economic and cultural problems (discussed with interview feedback in Chapter 4).

It is worth noting that international climate migration issues have been part of Ghanaian migration discussions for some time. Over the years, migrants from Burkina Faso, Togo, Mali and Niger have been migrating to the cocoa-growing areas in Ashanti, Western and Eastern regions of Ghana. Likewise, many Ghanaians have been migrating to these countries for seasonal, short-term and long-term migration because of the climate's impact on their economic and livelihood activities (Teye and Owusu, 2015; Teye, 2021). Similarly, rising sea levels have contributed to the displacement of people along the coastal towns of the Greater Accra, Central and Volta regions of Ghana (IOM, 2019; 2017). This sometimes forces some people who engage in fishing activities and transact business along coastal areas to migrate to other parts of Ghana and neighbouring countries, such as Togo and Cote d'Ivoire, to find other economic opportunities (GSS, 2023:20-22; Anarfi et al., 2003:6).

Both slow and sudden onset climate events affect movement and displacement in Ghana. Consultations for this study revealed that people who suffer from sudden onsets, such as heavy rainfall leading to flooding, sea erosion and strong winds, receive temporary responses from stakeholders. Slow-onset issues, such as drought, desertification, rising sea levels, changes in rainfall patterns and temperature increases, tend to receive slow or no attention from stakeholders in many affected areas. These events and their effect influence the migration type. Sudden-onset events may cause short-term, temporal and seasonal migration, while slow-onset events may lead to long-term and permanent migration.

Climate change forces more youths to migrate. This phenomenon heightens poverty, increases food insecurity in migrant-sending communities and leads to the loss of an active labour force. Additionally, most youths who migrate to urban centers abandon the agricultural sector. Leaving agricultural activities for elderly household members, who barely produce enough food to feed the family, affects food production and other livelihood issues. This problem, therefore, contributes to increasing underdevelopment issues in sending communities (Schraven and Rademacher-Schulz, 2015:278-79).

3.2.1. Conflict between Host Communities and (Climate) Migrants

Climate change and its adverse effects in the Sahel regions of West Africa have forced some people, especially pastoralists and some livestock farmers (commonly known in Ghana as Fulani herders), to move to other parts of West Africa, including Ghana. The harsh climatic conditions, desertification, drought and hot temperatures in the Sahel region have caused the migration of people and farm animals to the southern part of West Africa. These herders usually move to locations where they can find grazeable lands for livestock (Olaniyan, 2015; Issifu et al., 2022; Teye, 2022). Over the years, there have been several conflicts between Fulani herdsmen (climate-related migrants) and host community members in Ghana. This has caused many problems in communities where Fulani herders settle with their livestock (Issifu et al., 2022:2-3).

Fulani herders are notable international climate migrants who settled in Ghana in 1996. These herdsmen migrated from Niger and settled in the northern part of Ghana but further moved to southern Ghana because of the drought and low rainfall in Northern Ghana. These herders continue to migrate to different parts of Ghana's southern- forest zone with their families to search for better livelihoods, grazeable lands, water and easy access to veterinary services for livestock. The number of Fulani herders in the South of Ghana began to increase in the early 2000s because they realized the area was better suited for settlement with their livestock (primarily cattle). In this way, migration is considered the most viable adaptation strategy to deal with the stress and adverse effects of climate change that affect the activities of the herdsmen (Issifu et al., 2022:11-12).

The herders migrate to find better places to adapt to climate shocks (Napogbong et al., 2021:207). However, due to the scarcity of resources in the host communities, competition over resources causes conflict between the herders and host community members. In most cases, during dry seasons, herders find it challenging to find food for their livestock. Therefore, it is not easy to control the animals whenever they take them for grazing in search of food and water. This forces the animals to graze on any available farm to find food and contaminate the available water bodies meant for domestic use and crop irrigation. This situation often causes conflicts between

herders and farmers. The presence of the herds has also influenced the increase in host communities' populations. However, resources do not increase. This causes pressure on limited resources and ignites some conflicts. Also, due to host community members' perceptions of herdsmen (rape accusations, murderers and destroyers of farmlands) and weak institutional structures in the host communities, it is difficult to find durable solutions to address the long-lasting conflict between the host communities and the climate migrants (Issifu et al., 2022:5-14).

Conflicts between herders and local farmers mainly occur in Agogo in the Ashanti Region. Recently, there have been clashes in other parts of Ghana, such as the Sunyani West District of the Bono Region. For example, in August 2022, a clash between herders and community members led to the killing of some cattle by youths from the Adoe community. Local community members of Adoe in the Bono Region complained about how the influx of herders and farm animals affected their community and their sources of livelihood (farming) (Ghana Web News, 2022). In other parts of Ghana, like the Agogo environs, herders are accused of murder, rape and destruction of farm products and lands (Boateng, 2015:6). The favorable climate of the Agogo area makes it a suitable location for cattle herds. However, the presence of herders in the area has resulted in violent conflicts between herders and community farmers. The persistent clashes are associated with the competition over scarce resources in the area (Issifu et al., 2022:8; Setrana and Owusu-Kyei, 2021:340).

Also, farmers in rural areas where herders and their families settle complain about the challenges of sharing their limited natural resources. Aside from competition for limited natural resources, cattle intruded on farms to search for water and food and destroy the water bodies that some communities use for domestic consumption. The destruction of farm produce and water bodies often generates conflict between cattle herders and community members (Issifu et al., 2022:12). Other factors, such as increased cattle herders within host communities, heighten conflicts. Despite the continual conflict between the herders and the host community members, corruption, ineffective state institutions and a lack of political will (further discussed in Chapter 4) affect how the conflict could be managed (Issifu et al., 2022:14-16).

Other environmental issues cause conflicts between migrants and host community members. This issue is associated with small-scale mining activities that

also cause conflict between host communities and some immigrants whose activities affect farmlands and water bodies. This situation is about some Chinese immigrants being blamed for environmental degradation because of their engagement in illegal mining activities in Ghana. This is a major environmental problem that continues to cause conflicts between some Chinese immigrants and host community members (Kandilige et al., 2022:20). In the small-scale mining areas, some local communities' members have been engaging in conflicts with the foreign miners because of unfair management of the environment. Also, with the introduction of heavy machinery by Chinese miners, local Ghanaian miners were restricted from small-scale mining areas, which made some Ghanaians act against Chinese immigrants in the mining sector. This continues to influence the unfriendly relationship between some Chinese immigrants and local community members in mining areas (Crawford and Botchwey, 2017:450). As revealed during this research consultations, land degradation due to illegal and shallow mining activities causes conflicts between miners and community members. This situation forces some farmers to migrate due to landowners' decisions to sell their land to miners or the destruction of water bodies that aid farming in the affected communities.

In sum, conflict issues between some migrants and host communities may affect the positive sides of migration. Hence, in agreement with Issifu et al. (2022:17), the government of Ghana, together with local authorities, should find sufficient grazable land with dams for herders to resolve conflicts with host communities. The reserved dams and grazable lands would prevent herders from moving their cattle to unauthorized places, thereby preventing cattle from destroying the community's water bodies and farms and preventing conflict between herders and community members. Also, in the case of illegal mining activities that cause land degradation and force migration, conflicts should be controlled with firm and committed legal orders to deter any engagement in this practice.

3.3. MIGRATION GOVERNANCE IN GHANA

For many years, Ghana's migration laws and regulations have focused on attracting migrants to and from its territory. The institutions involved in migration

governance in Ghana include the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) under the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration (MoFARI). These ministries coordinate with various government ministries, departments, agencies, regional, sub-regional and international organizations such as ECOWAS, the European Union (EU), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). All these agencies deal with different issues ranging from legal matters to cooperation between and among regional and global organizations to deal with the affairs of migrants (Mouthaan, 2019:7).

Migration governance in Ghana is influenced by national, sub-regional, regional and international factors (i.e., internal and external factors) (Gisselquist and Tarp, 2019:248; Mouthaan, 2019:3-4). International factors are shaped by cooperation dynamics and sovereignty issues (Mouthaan, 2019:12). Other factors are shaped by different governance structures, migrants' well-being and host communities' perceptions (Gisselquist and Tarp, 2019:247). Additionally, actors have varying and competing interests regarding migration policies. This affects how stakeholders commit to adopting specific migration policies and regulations (Mouthaan, 2019:14).

The Ghanaian migration industry has been growing for years. Ghana's political atmosphere, environmental factors and governance influence its migration industry (Awumbila et al., 2018). Like many other sub-Saharan African countries, political actions shape the sub-Saharan African migration. Migration policies in Ghana differ at both domestic and external levels and governments' preferences and cooperating partners' expectations influence policies (Mouthaan, 2019:3-4). However, until 2016, Ghana had no coherent migration policy document. Before the documentation of the 2016 National Migration Policy (NMP), Ghana's internal and international migration was governed by constitutional provisions and statutory instruments, such as the Immigration Act, Labour Act, Citizenship Act and the migration unit under the Interior Ministry (GSS, 2023:3). The Ghanaian Interior Ministry, through its inter-ministerial committee on migration, facilitated the draft of the NMP. The ministry collaborated with external academics from the University of Ghana Centre for Migration Studies (CMS), migration professionals and IOM, EU and UNDP experts to draft the policy.

Although it is a comprehensive policy framework, its implementation has been slow as expected. The NMP also recommended the establishment of the Ghana National Commission on Migration (GNCM). However, the establishment of this commission has been slower than expected because of political factors and funding issues (Mouthaan, 2019:13-14; IOM, 2019:75). Changes in governments (in other words, changes in political parties) have also affected the establishment of the GNCM (Kandilige et al., 2022:3).

There have been different migration governance principles in Ghana. Over the past decades, migration issues in Ghana have been managed through different constitutional provisions and other national legislations relevant to dealing with migration affairs in the country. Some of the major provisions are; (a) The 1994 Ghana National Population Policy, which emphasized the importance of migration in national development and voluntary return of Ghanaian skilled emigrants toward the national development; (b) the 1992 Refugee Law that led to the establishment of the Ghana Refugees Board to manage refugee issues following to the UN 1951 and 1967 Refugee Convention and Protocol and in accordance with the OAU 1969 Refugee Convention ; (c) the 2001 Immigration Regulations through Legislative Instrument (L.I) 1691 which aimed to govern foreign workers entry, stay and work as well as citizenship for diaspora members; (d) the 2006 Minerals and Mining Acts that grants immigrants quota to get mining rights; (e) the 2010 National Youth Policy, which recognizes youth internal migration and emigration due to unemployment challenges; (f) the 2005 Human Trafficking Act amended in 2009 that focuses on control of human trafficking and smuggling in Ghana; and (g) 2012 National Urban Policy Framework that considers the relevance of migration toward urban centre developments in Ghana (IOM, 2019a:77- 81). These and other relevant migration policy instruments have regulated migration-related issues over the years.

Ghana's recent initiatives in migration governance include significant policy actions such as (i) the 2017 ban on Visa-20 (which was for recruitment of workers to the Gulf countries) due to the reports on domestic abuses of Ghanaian migrants in the Gulf States, (ii) collaboration with Canadian Government and UNICEF on the 2017-2021 National Plan of Action for Elimination of Human Trafficking, (iii) the 2020 National Labor Migration Policy, (iv) Development of National Migration Data

Management Strategy, (v) the 2015 Diaspora Engagement Policy supported by ECOWAS and Spanish Government, (vi) the 2017 National Migration Platform to ensure safe and orderly migration, and (vii) the 2016 National Development Planning Commission, which acknowledges the contribution of migration in development (IOM, 2019:75-76; Kandilige et al., 2022:5). Additionally, the Ghana National Commission on Migration, which is in its establishment process, will coordinate migration-related policies and issues in Ghana (Kandilige et al., 2022:6). These migration initiatives have shaped migration governance in diverse ways.

Inter-ministerial coordination challenges influence the governance of migration in Ghana. For instance, the Interior Ministry and the Foreign Affairs Ministry compete on internal and external issues related to migrants, which makes it challenging to bring the ministries together to achieve better coordination and governance. Differences in preferences among the various migration-related departments affect how they coordinate implementing programs. Furthermore, the reposting and relocation of civil servants who coordinate migration affairs under various ministries affect migration policy formulation and governance in Ghana. (Mouthaan, 2019:16). In short, institutional constraints affect migration governance in Ghana. Therefore, inter-ministerial and institutional barriers must be addressed to improve migration governance in Ghana.

Ghana's migration governance is also hindered by data accuracy and other essential information about migrants, such as people's reasons for migrating and their choice of destinations (IOM, 2019; Awumbila et al., 2008). As factors affecting migration change in Ghana and globally, the government realized the need to implement measures through cooperation with other states and non-state actors. Hence, Ghana established the national migration policy (NMP) in 2016 (Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), 2023: ii-iii). Additionally, in recognition of the significant contribution of migration to Ghana's economy, the government of Ghana is developing strategic plans to implement evidence-based migration policies and improve migration governance (GSS, 2023: ii). Additionally, the Ghana Immigration Service Legal Handbook for Migration was launched in 2017 to facilitate migration governance in Ghana (IOM, 2019a:75).

As patterns and issues in African and global migration continue to change, the government of Ghana recognizes the importance of cooperating with other governments/states and relevant actors to address issues related to internal and international migration. Together with the Ghana National Migration Policy, the government of Ghana tries to cooperate toward effective migration governance through international programs and protocols such as the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and Goods, the African Union Agenda 2063, IOM policies and other international standards. As mentioned, migration governance depends on collaboration among multiple stakeholders from state and non-state organizations (GSS, 2023:3-5).

The government of Ghana has also supported short-term and circular migration in recent times for the benefit of both Ghana and the host countries. For example, approximately 3,000 Ghanaian nurses were posted to Germany in 2019 as part of a working abroad program initiated by the Ghana Youth and Employment Agency (YEA). Similarly, 95 nurses were posted to Barbados in 2020 under the same work-abroad project. As a partner, Ghana also works with the IOM on the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) to ensure legal and safe pathways to migration (Kandilige et al., 2022:5).

Additionally, in May 2022, IOM Ghana and the Government of Ghana (GoG) launched the country's strategic migration plan. This plan emphasizes resilience, mobility and migration governance in Ghana. They aim to assess the socio-economic contribution of migrants in Ghana. To this end, the strategic plan aims to strengthen migration management in Ghana. This work plan outlines six strategies that are considered a priority. They include (i) immigration and border management, (ii) combating human trafficking, (iii) assisting voluntary repatriation and reintegration, (iv) migration and development, (v) immigration health and (vi) emergency preparedness, response and stabilization. According to the report, this strategic plan will also reflect on issues affecting the environment, climate change, gender, rights of migrants and migration data. This strategic plan aims to help Ghana achieve benefits and reduce migration costs (IOM-Ghana, May 2022). These demonstrate some of Ghana's commitments to govern migration better. External influence and priorities always affect the implementation of Ghanaian migration policy. Furthermore,

migration policy objectives are often inconsistent (Kandilige et al., 2022:1). Institutional barriers, policy implementation and commitment challenges need attention for effective migration governance in Ghana, as further analysed in Chapter 4.

3.3.1. Climate Migration Governance in Ghana

The intersection between climate change migration and governance is essential for Ghana. Although the relationship between governance and climate mobility in Ghana is complex, some efforts are being made to adapt to climate change. In addition, some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and traditional authorities help with climate change adaptation efforts and support livelihood conditions. Local authorities and informal institutions play significant roles in climate adaptation measures. Local authorities, for instance, have authority and power over land and natural resources; for that matter, they have crucial roles in protecting the environment. However, the roles of local authorities and informal institutions are less included in policy domains (Gravesen et al., 2020:17-18).

Climatic conditions continue to worsen, affecting livelihoods and other issues, including migration and development, in the country. In northern Ghana, the challenges continue to force people to migrate from many parts of the north to the south. However, the government has not given the expected attention needed to find a durable solution (Gravesen et al., 2020:34). Governing climate-related crisis requires coordinated actions and approaches to offer various adaptation strategies. However, there is a significant disparity between what institutions at the local and national levels undertake. In the case of climate adaptation, for example, there is a significant gap between what the government and stakeholders are doing and what is expected of them (Dapila et al., 2021:1-2). It has also been noted that the state-led adaptation and governance response to climate change and its consequences are determined by sponsored international organizations and that the role of local governments is limited (Dapila et al., 2021:8).

According to Gravesen et al., while several NGOs, governments and local institutions have contributed to climate adaptation efforts in Ghana, institutional

efforts are frequently hindered by the country's diverse socio-economic conditions and adaptive mechanisms. Hence, variations in the strength of institutions in different parts of the country (Gravesen et al., 2020:18). It is also important to note that the African Union (AU) has migration instruments such as the 2009 Kampala Convention, which aims to address issues of forced migration due to unexpected climatic and environmental issues (AU, 2009). Although Ghana signed the Convention in 2010, it has not yet ratified it. Ghana is an important actor in terms of international agreements and migration protocols in Africa. Therefore, Ghana's attitude toward ratifying the Kampala Convention may question Ghana's seriousness toward climate migration governance because the country faces various climatic issues that displace and force people to migrate.

As a member of ECOWAS, Ghana may have an advantage in managing its climate migration issues through the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol. In this way, Ghanaians and other West African citizens who face the threats of climate change can migrate seasonally to a favourable member state to engage in livelihood support activities. The ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol may help individuals travel to different West African countries when a threat, such as drought, is forcing them to migrate. However, climate migrants may encounter migration barriers within the ECOWAS community (Kaelin, 2019) because border officials can deny exit and entry based on climate stresses. Additionally, as noted by Kandilige et al., citizens of the ECOWAS often go through various bureaucratic procedures to live and work in a different member country. This is due to the diversity of member states' domestic immigration laws. Hence, it affects people's movement within the bloc (Kandilige et al., 2022:3-4). This means climate migrants on the edge of migrating to other member states may face similar bureaucratic challenges if the situation remains unattended with a clear stance on climate migration protocols.

It may be argued that part of the government of Ghana's attempt to address the impact of climate change on agriculture, control the increase in rural-urban migration and increase agricultural productivity led to the introduction of the *One Village, One Dam* (1V1D)⁹ Program, which was launched in 2017 to support farmers through

⁹ One Village, One Dam is the government of Ghana's policy of constructing one Dam in every village.

irrigation farming projects (Kandilige et al., 2022:26). Although the aim of the 1V1D project is not a direct migration policy, it can be understood that it may indirectly contribute to managing internal migration, especially, north-south and rural-urban climate-induced migration in Ghana. The project can help farmers who suffer from droughts and unreliable rainfall to increase their agricultural productivity. However, the program has been slow due to diverse factors, including financial and government priorities, as informed through consultation for this study.

Like many other initiatives and programs, climate migration management faces obstacles. Climate migration, governance and management face several challenges. As stated previously, climate adaptation programs are mainly state-led and state-led programs are often influenced by international partners' requirements, which frequently limit the input of local communities. Additionally, measures to address climate change are faced by the varying interests of stakeholders, with funding coupled with commitment, accountability and transparency problems (Dapilah et al., 2021:12-13). Jarawura and Smith similarly observed that although agricultural communities in rural centres are mostly affected by climate change, they have no significant role in governance decision-making on climate-related migration issues (Jarawura and Smith, 2015:264). It is also important to stress that Ghana has not ratified the 2009 Kampala Convention, which aims to deal with climate change-related displacement on the continent. Hence, Ghana could not be considered critically or practically concerned with climate migration within Ghana and Africa.

To sum up, it is important to emphasize that Ghana pays more attention to economic migrants than those forced to migrate, such as climate migrants and displaced persons (this can be linked to Ghana's preferences, see also in section 4.4.3). Although the government of Ghana has initiated projects such as the Green Ghana project to plant trees, improve irrigation and raise climate change awareness, these government interventions and initiatives lack commitment. Therefore, climate change may continue to be a threatening driver of migration in Ghana. As noted, climate change has become one of the major internal migration drivers in Ghana (Abu et al., 2014; Teye and Owusu, 2015; IOM, 2019; Teye et al., 2021). However, little has been done to address the issues better due to weak adaptation and mitigation strategies.

Therefore, the government of Ghana needs coherent and committed cooperation to address this issue.

3.4. GHANA'S INTERACTIONS WITH GLOBAL MIGRATION GOVERNANCE

Ghana cooperates and coordinates with global, regional and sub-regional migration bodies under international organizations such as the UN, the AU, the EU and ECOWAS. Ghana also engages with several international frameworks and multilateral processes, such as the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, to promote better migration governance. This positions Ghana toward the global agenda for orderly and safe migration and promotes its development agenda. Following the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNUDHR), Ghana works toward promoting both citizens and non-citizens' rights to movements. Additionally, Ghana ratified the 1990 Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and their Families and the 2002 Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants. Regarding the environment, climate change and migration, Ghana has signed the 1992 Rio Declaration, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the 2010 Cancun Agreement and the 2015 Paris Agreement (IOM, 2019a:90-92) to demonstrate its commitment to international cooperation on critical issues such as climate change and migration.

Furthermore, Ghana is associated with some African continental and sub-regional level migration governance frameworks, such as the 1981 Africa Charter on Human and People's Rights, which ensures the protection of national and non-national freedom of movement. In addition, the 2009 Kampala Convention, which Ghana signed in 2010 but has not ratified, seeks to protect persons forcibly displaced due to climate change impacts like drought and flood (IOM, 2019a:86).

Another important framework is the Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development of Africa, which focuses on regional economic integration, for which migration is no exception (IOM, 2019:86-87). Related migration governance frameworks, including those related to the ECOWAS sub-region, are discussed in Chapter 2 (sub-sections 2.2 and 2.3). As revealed in Chapter 2, even though the

ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol promotes easy movement of people within the community, bureaucratic and member state domestic politics hinder the citizens' easy movement and stay in other countries. As a result of this problem, stakeholders need to strategize this protocol better to integrate it with the domestic migration policies of Ghana (see also in Chapter 4 regarding relevance to cooperating with international institutions).

3.5 MIGRATION GOVERNANCE IN GHANA: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF LOCAL COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENTS AND THE WAY FORWARD

Local communities are important actors in migration governance. Regarding climate migration, many migrants, especially farmers, migrate to rural areas where they establish relationships with local community leaders and members for communal living. However, the role of local communities in Ghana's migration governance is often limited. For instance, local community members in some places adapt to climate change stress by migrating, while others engage in community-neighbourhood support strategies to help people cope with climate stress. However, their strategies have gained less attention in the national policy framework (Napogbong et al., 2021:212). Therefore, local community members' adaptation strategies require more attention in policy frameworks.

Although there is no accurate data on migration in Ghana to enhance migration governance at the local level, it is observed that most female migrants migrate within short distances (across rural communities). In contrast, male migrants dominate over long distances. Hence, Ghanaian female migrants dominate internal migration, whereas male migrants dominate international migration (GSS, 2023:109-110). This means that governance mechanisms at the local community level need to establish gender-friendly policies to assist female migrants migrating from one local community to another due to the impacts of climate change.

As mentioned earlier, both slow and sudden onset events characterize climate migration in Ghana. In most cases, individuals and families have no option but to migrate from one community to another to seek livelihood support. Since the situation

is complex and unpredictable, without proper strategies and adaptation to mitigate climate stress, the situation can potentially deteriorate the country's economic conditions and worsen the problems faced by the many poor people, especially rural communities in the northern regions and deltaic areas of Ghana. In line with Arndt et al. (2015:729), climate change will affect the socio-economic development of Ghana, but it may significantly impact rural farming communities in the hotspot areas. Unfortunately, farmers who migrate due to climate change face problems acquiring lands in new places due to limited land for farming in destination centres. Hence, a comprehensive governance approach to support rural climate migrants' acquisition of agricultural lands in their new destinations should get relevant attention. To help address these problems, stakeholders should have a mechanism to integrate climate migrants into their host communities. Stakeholders, therefore, need a comprehensive understanding of how climate change affects people's migration processes (Hillmann et al., 2015:288-9).

It is important to stress that, compared to other places such as the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa, Ghana's climate migration situation is not as high as those places. However, due to the unpredictability of the climate situation and how it may negatively affect the vulnerable, the sooner the stakeholders take serious action, the better. This may help control humanitarian challenges caused by slow and sudden onset events. Urgent actions can also help with adaptation strategies in different parts of the country. For example, people in the northern regions generally find it challenging to adapt to climate shocks due to existing poverty issues. In addition, households that try to adapt use strategies that bring different problems to existing environmental problems, such as land degradation and deforestation (Yaro et al., 2016:59-61). For these reasons, stakeholders' supportive mechanisms can help different groups meet their needs.

Family members who stay behind, due to their inability to migrate because of financial, socio-cultural and health reasons, always expect remittances such as food and money from those who migrate to help them cope with their livelihoods—the failure to support families left behind increases families' vulnerabilities and livelihood difficulties. As pointed out by Afifi et al., in some households, livelihood challenges increase when breadwinners of their family members migrate and cannot remit

anything to support up-keeping. In this context, migration may be considered a failure mechanism to adapt to climate stress if families left behind suffer instead of benefiting from migration (Afifi et al., 2016:256).

Establishing relevant local adaptation and coping measures can help immobile members, especially when migration fails to be an effective adaptation measure. Also, the government of Ghana's intervention programs for climate change hotspots and better resource planning to help preserve resources such as forests and water bodies are necessary. Due to the limited legal framework to protect people who migrate due to the adverse effects of climate change, the government of Ghana needs to make extra collaborative efforts and cooperate to establish strong partnership programs within ECOWAS and beyond.

Despite the need for collaboration, there are complex dynamics in Ghanaian migration discourse. Although states have sovereign authority over their migration policies, migration is sometimes restricted based on concerns such as internal security reasons. Border protection sometimes focuses on preventing unwanted immigration (Lavenex, 2001; Sosuh, 2011; Farer, 2019). Of course, Ghana's legitimacy in securing its borders cannot be ignored. However, the dignity of migrants, irrespective of their status, needs to be protected.

Notably, Ghana pays attention to border security to avoid irregular migration and threats from uncontrolled migration. However, Ghana's border security is faced with several institutional challenges and infrastructures to promote adequate border security (Sosuh, 2011:5). It is also observed that people living at the borders engage in illegal activities due to high unemployment levels among border residents and poverty issues among land border populations. These problems sometimes influence the effectiveness of border security management. While informal border practices such as irregular smuggling of goods and services are illegal, some border residents consider these informal activities as livelihood activities. Such activities continue due to Ghana's incapacity to properly manage borders and livelihood challenges among the border communities' /population (Hlovor, 2018:1-2). This means effective institutions, especially among Ghana and its neighbouring countries, must address any security concerns regarding irregular border communities' activities.

While other states in West Africa, such as Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Mali, face several cross-border threats due to terrorist activities associated with Boko Haram and its affiliated groups, Ghana is relatively calm (Hlovor, 2018:1-2). However, over the past few years, several warnings have been raised concerning the possibility of these terrorist groups' intrusion into Ghana. According to some experts, the proximity of West African states' borders and Ghana's migration relations with sub-regional states jeopardized Ghana's security. This implies that Ghana must establish the needed intervention mechanisms to secure its borders from potential threats (Suleiman, 2023:620-21). Border security and better migratory regulations, especially within the land border communities, remain vital in Ghana to protect the territory and its citizens. In July 2022, the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) emphasized the need for security agencies to collaborate to protect national security through strict immigration laws and border controls (Ghanaweb, 2022b).

Also, concerns have been expressed for actions to secure borders due to perceived threats resulting from poor border security. Similarly, the perceived threats of immigrants, especially in border towns, sometimes influence border security officers to caution Ghanaian citizens against hosting strangers (foreigners) (Ghanaweb, 2022c). These perceived threats imply that Ghana needs strong institutional structures and mechanisms to govern inflow and outflow migration. Strong and committed migration institutions can help Ghana manage border security better. Although border protection is important, it can only be effective through cooperation among relevant neighbouring communities, national stakeholders and institutions because individual states like Ghana are not strong enough to provide adequate border security (Darko, 2024:36-37).

It is important to point out that due to cultural and social ties between Ghana and its neighbouring countries and border communities, it is sometimes challenging to restrict migration between countries and neighbouring communities. Hence, the border security framework needs to pay critical attention to the socio-cultural ties among people. Also, as asserted by Sosuh, border security measures should be linked with border communities' development, where the objective of securing and managing migration can be considered beyond the ability to security but instead considers safeguarding communities' cultural identity, social relations and the human rights of

migrants (Sosuh, 2011:6-8). Cultural links, social relations and human rights concerns make securitizing migration in Ghana and other African states complex. It necessitates a critical policy focus on climate migration and factors in the relevance of climate migrants' social ties and networks to support adaptation strategies.

Most African migrants, including those from Ghana, use land routes to engage in trade and other economic activities with their neighbouring countries. These movements are associated with border malpractices among some migrants and border control officers. For instance, several smugglings of goods occur due to weak institutional structures. Again, in some instances, border residents justify illegal activities as not crimes because of their livelihood support (some border residents consider smuggling essential goods as a means of addressing livelihood challenges and reducing unemployment). Also, in many cases, people who live in border communities help irregular migrants to cross borders to obtain money from them. Additionally, smugglers who live close to the borders know the terrain better than border security personnel and hence, it is sometimes tricky for border security officers to control illegal activities (Hlover, 2018:151-160).

To promote adequate border security, stakeholders must collaborate to promote the well-being of the people in the neighbouring communities and the people on the move (Hlover, 2018:161). Hence, with strong institutional structures to govern orderly and regular movements of people, borders can be protected. Collaboration should include relevant stakeholders, especially community leaders, to formulate an inclusive policy within Ghana and among its neighbouring countries. The study also argues that security in the context of Ghanaian migration governance should be human-centric so that the dignity and rights of migrating people can be respected.

It must be noted that political instabilities in neighbouring countries such as Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire and Togo have resulted in refugee movements and other irregular migrants to Ghana over the past years. These issues sometimes undermine restrictions and make it impossible for security personnel to control all movements strictly (Sosuh, 2011:7). Securing borders is an important strategy for promoting national security and protecting states' territories and citizens. However, considering the movements of climate-related migrants to and from Ghana and the neighbouring

countries, there is a need for strong collective norms of operations to safeguard people within these countries and migrants on the move and deal with the dynamics.

Ghana's migration governance is structured in connection with various regional, sub-regional and international frameworks (IOM, 2019a:87-88). Such frameworks help Ghana cooperate with international organizations such as the ECOWAS, the AU, the EU and the IOM to govern migration affairs better. Additionally, Ghana leverages its partnerships with these institutions to discuss various migration issues, such as pathways to legal migration, human trafficking and social cohesion, in host communities and countries (Gisselquist and Tarp, 2019:247-48). Ghana also engages in multilateral cooperation to promote the human rights of migrants and maximize the benefits of migration for both countries and communities. For example, the Ministry of Justice deals with the legal issues surrounding migrants and cooperates with other international organizations to advise on treaties and protocols regulating migration. On the other hand, the Interior Ministry collaborates with international institutions such as the EU in managing migration affairs through financial assistance and technical capacity building (Mouthaan, 2019:7).

Migration issues are always influenced by competing and varying interests among governments (Mouthaan, 2019:14). However, governments can negotiate on shared interests to reduce the cost of migration governance (Betts, 2011:1). As Hollifield emphasized, discussion issues of interest offer states a more effective way to negotiate and govern migration (Hollifield, 2012:345). Similarly, strong institutions help mediate and influence decision-making and facilitate strategies to address climate mobilities and/or immobility. For example, national and local institutions may lack the resources to execute necessary policies, so cooperation with governmental and non-governmental institutions can help shape relevant policies and provide necessary resources (Webster, 2023:2).

Ghana recognizes the importance of cooperating with international organizations and emphasizes incorporating major regional and international frameworks into its migration governance structure (Ministry of Interior-Ghana, 2016:67-68). However, Ghana lacks specific partnerships and governance strategies regarding climate-related migration with regional and international bodies. Like many other African countries, Ghana's government cannot manage migration affairs within

its capacity. Therefore, Ghana must firmly commit to major agreements and collective norms that govern climate-related migration in the region. Refraining from free riding, can facilitate Ghana's effective engagement with regional and international dialog on climate-induced migration governance.

Furthermore, Ghana can bring together relevant policies to better manage migration by participating in key regional and international structures. For example, with Accra's (the Capital city of Ghana) membership of the 100 Global Resilient Cities Network, which helps cities around the world address their climate challenges and the Cities Climate Leadership Group (C40), which focuses on the impact of climate change on cities (IOM, 2019b:22), Ghana can obtain opportunities to strengthen the capacities of its cities and communities to address much climate-related crisis. The government of Ghana can establish frameworks in relations with the aforementioned international institutions to govern the climate migration issues that affect Accra and other cities. Since Ghana's current climate migration issue is dominated by internal and rural-urban trends, cities in Ghana can benefit from joining alliances with other global cities to exchange knowledge and learn from their best practices to build capacities for effective governance. Although events (slow and sudden-onset events) may differ from city to city, alternative strategies and measures can be learned. This approach may also help cities strengthen their technical approach to addressing climate migration issues.

Also, the Ghanaian government's collaborative efforts to govern climate migration are directly and indirectly recognized in many international, regional and sub-regional frameworks such as the Global Compact on Migration, UN Agenda 2030, UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Kyoto Protocol, Paris Agreement, 1969 African Union Convention on Refugees and ECOWAS Protocols on Movements of Persons (IOM, 2019b:87-90). This is consistent with neoliberal discourse, which argues that interactions with relevant actors help stakeholders exchange information, allow them to monitor the conduct of others and bring them to order when necessary. In so doing, effective monitoring mechanisms, sanctions for non-compliance and regular interactions among states and other actors on issues of concern, such as climate migration, can help to prevent cheating within cooperative agreements (Dunne et al., 2013:120) to promote better collective action.

In sum, it is worth noting that despite Ghana's efforts with several migration actors and agreements, it lacks effective institutional framework to implement its national migration policies due to absence of "National Commission on Migration" (IOM, 2019b:98). It is also observed that migration policy implementations in Ghana are sometimes hindered by financial constraints and political concerns based on priorities, change of governments and lack of continuity of previous movement's migration programs (Kandilege et al., 2023:10; Mouthann, 2019:16; IOM, 2019b:98). Additionally, Ghana should establish more bilateral and multilateral agreements with urgency to establish better coordination mechanisms, especially for climate migration governance. This may help Ghana commit to its international, regional and sub-regional norms and regulations to govern climate migration affairs better. Again, an effective central authority or institution on migration can help Ghana deal with the complex nature of its climate change and migration governance nexus.

Although Ghanaian migration governance involves diverse actors, insufficient institutional frameworks specifically pay attention to climate migration. Climate mobility is expected to be high within various national borders (more internal climate migrants than cross border); the government of Ghana and the neighbouring countries should anticipate that when conditions for climate migrants become unbearable, many may resort to crossing borders through their social networks and other irregular means to find livelihood support. Since migration means adapting to climate threats, migration is mostly an individual decision; without effective mechanisms, individual migration can shift governments' responsibilities to migrants. This means it is important for Ghana and its neighbours within the ECOWAS sub-region, notably the AU, to institutionalize strong norms that can consider establishing financial mechanisms to mitigate climate-vulnerable losses and damages. More so, people who cannot migrate due to financial challenges, lack of social networks and other factors should be considered within strong and relevant regulatory frameworks. This may help to address the inequalities and issues that already affect people experiencing poverty and the climate vulnerable. Most importantly, although the Ghana National Migration Policy (NMP) was launched in 2016, due to the lack of central migration authority, the NMP lacks effective implementation. Therefore, the National Migration Commission

must be established with urgent concern, as emphasized by earlier studies such as Kandilige et al. (2023:10-11).



CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS:

THE IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE MIGRATION FOR GHANA AND THE NEED FOR STRONG INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS

Following the previous chapters' overview of various issues, this chapter analyses and discusses the research findings by establishing the implications of climate migration for Ghana. These final analyses and discussions consider some core issues, such as climate mobility and immobility, rural-urban migration, implications for sustainable development goals and the need for institutional governance through neoliberal institutionalist discourses by considering local, national, regional and global mechanisms for migration governance. The chapter proceeds with the study's conclusion which provides policy recommendations regarding what stakeholders should do next to promote better cooperation and institutional mechanisms for climate migration governance.

4.1. CLIMATE MOBILITY AND IMMOBILITY IN GHANA

The impacts of climate change on population movements in Ghana influence rural-rural and rural-urban migration. Although some people move to rural areas to engage in agricultural activities, most farmers are gradually moving from rural areas to urban centres to find different occupations because of the harsh impact of climate change on their agricultural activities and the unpredictability of climatic conditions. Although migration can be an adaptation measure, some individuals cannot migrate due to financial and socio-cultural factors. This subsection discusses climate mobility patterns and immobility. The analysis used direct quotes from the participants of the study and other relevant reports and literature.

Climate change affects people's movements in Ghana in several ways. Proximity factors and climate-friendly conditions motivate some people to move to nearby rural areas, whereas perceived job availability and social relations influence others to migrate to urban centres. These factors shape the migration patterns of some people regarding their decision to move to other rural or urban areas. It was noted that

with all the climate extremities and pressures to move, some individuals have insufficient knowledge about climate change and its effects on migration. Nonetheless, some people prefer to migrate, especially when rainfall patterns change and the expected rainfall fails. A community leader from a farming community in the Upper West Region affirmed the following:

... there is migration, that is, the rural-urban and rural-rural migration due to the changing climate, especially among farmers... but most often, the rural people (village settlers) are unaware that this is a result of climate change. They usually say that their lands are no longer fertile and are always dry. They generally do not know the reasons for no rainfall and the rest and this is due to their educational background. However, climate change is forcing people in our community to migrate elsewhere. Their movement is usually from one rural area to another. ...but people's movements to urban areas have increased compared to some years ago... (Respondent-P- Community Leader, 21.08.2022).

According to the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), approximately 70% of the Ghanaian population depends on agricultural activities such as crops, fish and livestock farming. However, recently, some farmers in Ghana's Northern, Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo regions have been compelled to abandon farming and migrate to urban centres to find other job opportunities due to changes in rainfall patterns. Most migrants settled in Kumasi and Accra (GFMD, 2017). The Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) report also indicates that rural-urban migration has increased over the years and more than half of the Ghanaian population (56.7%) lives in cities (GSS, 2021:79), with much concern about climate change as a significant influencing factor.

A study interview with 203 former participants conducted by Van der Geest also indicated that environmental conditions significantly impact migrants from the northeast to the southern regions of Ghana. Van der Geest confirmed that, one in five people born in northern Ghana migrated to the South. Suitable agricultural land and favourable climate in the South of Ghana motivate most people to migrate from the North to the South (Van der Geest, 2011:70). These migration patterns also reveal how climatic conditions in Ghana influence migration to and from certain parts of the country. An interview with an academic and migration researcher at one of the Northern Ghana Universities (Simon Diedong Dombo University of Business and Integrated Development Studies) affirmed that, in recent times, there has been a high

increase in climate-related migration from the North to the South. According to the researcher:

... The people who are mostly affected by climate change in Ghana are mainly from northern Ghana. Since most people in the region engage in agricultural activities, climate change affects their activities., if you look at rainfall patterns..., the northern part of Ghana has only one seasonal rain compared to the southern part, which has two rainy seasons. This has attracted many people to migrate to the South to adapt to climate shocks (Respondent-Q: Academic and Migration Researcher, 21.08.2022).

Another interviewee, an environmentalist from a Civil Society Organization (Green Africa Youth Organization (GAYO)) in Ghana, also affirmed that climate change is increasing people's movements and affecting livelihoods in Ghana, especially in rural areas. As stated in the interview:

Based on our field observations, northern Ghana faces severe climate change-related problems compared to other areas. People are moving to urban centres to find employment. In the northern regions of Ghana, access to water for irrigation of crops and even for domestic uses is limited. Drought occurs in large areas in the north. These areas experience high heat waves and storms, ... crops are dying and the soil is becoming infertile due to the loss of water from the soil, making land unsuitable for crop cultivation. So, what people do, especially the youth ... to migrate to other parts of the country for job accessibility to feed themselves and their families (Respondent-G-Environmentalist from GAYO, 18.05.2022).

The movement of people from climate hotspots increases the pressure placed on existing social amenities in destination centres and host communities. In addition, some migrants engage in informal livelihood activities, such as garbage collection to extract plastic and metal for sale. This activity further contributes to environmental problems in host communities because of the uncontrolled spread of garbage in certain places. As revealed through an interview with a climate mobility researcher at the University of Ghana, in some parts of Accra, environmental pollution is increasing due to the activities of some climate-related young migrants who live in unplanned settlements and have to engage in waste collection activities to find livelihoods:

...the youths from agriculture communities ... are migrating from all agricultural communities into urban centres to look for alternative sources of livelihoods. ... without measures in place, youths will continue to migrate to cities to seek other sources of livelihood and put pressure on existing infrastructure in the cities. ... when they also move to cities, we need to ask ourselves what exactly they are engaging in to earn a living. , ...they are likely to create more environmental problems. So, I am sure you

are aware of what was happening some time ago in the Agbogbloshie area, where all these metallic and plastic waste-collecting guys pollute the environment due to their activities. These men have migrated from farming communities to some of these areas and ended up going into some of these activities to sustain themselves (Respondent I: Climate Mobility and Population Studies Researcher, University of Ghana, 12.08.2022).

Another critical issue is that the movement of climate-related migrants from rural areas affects employment in urban centres. As stated in the interviews:

The movement of the youth creates tensions on employment and job availability ... when they come to urban areas and do not find jobs, they more or less form part of the unemployment group and the devil finds work for the idle hands. Thus, they can engage in all kinds of activities, the crime rate will increase and a hungry man is an angry person. So, as for the problems we are already seeing, whether policymakers are thinking along those lines and making strong policies to ... find some ...alternative sources of livelihood is another problem. It will be better to help the rural people within farming communities with more mechanized agriculture to make agriculture attractive to them and put in some value change so that they can earn a lot from their farms (Respondent I: Climate Mobility and Population Studies Researcher, University of Ghana, 12.08.2022).

Migrants' age influences their mobility pattern. While young women and men migrate to far places from their original communities to engage in livelihood activities, older and middle-aged people prefer to migrate to rural and nearby places where the climate and ecology are better for continuing agricultural activities (Respondent-R—Policy Maker /Climate Change Researcher, 30.08.2022).

In addition to the people who migrate from the agricultural community in Northern Ghana to the forest zones, the rise in sea level and its impact on sea erosion have affected the movement and displacement of coastal settlers. According to the GFMD, rising sea levels have threatened the livelihoods of coastal populations for more than two decades. Such threats include the submersion of houses and the loss of arable land. It is also projected that the shorelines in Ghana are expected to move further, causing the collapse of coastal buildings and displacement of coastal populations (GFMD, 2017).

Despite the challenges in coastal towns, inhabitants' ability to cope and adapt depends on their financial and social capital (Codjoe et al., 2017:128). It has also been observed in coastal towns, such as Keta where some people's ability to migrate depends on their skills. Highly skilled inhabitants are more likely to migrate than low-skilled inhabitants (Codjoe et al., 2017:144). This study also found that people's ability to

migrate depends on their social networks and the presence of inland communities. However, some participants from the coastal area emphasized their cultural attachment to the land and their passion for staying despite the challenges. Additionally, some locals assert that moving their communities or relocating them to new places will collapse their traditional and informal institutional structures, such as chieftaincy.¹⁰

It is also important to note that while the rural population can use migration as an adaptation measure, it can only be successful if it promotes sustainable development for the affected and the vulnerable. Also, it should be able to reduce inequality and improves the well-being of people on the move as well as their origins and hosts communities (Szaboova et al., 2023:620). Climate-related migrants face inequality and welfare problems because of existing challenges in their destination communities. In this regard, stakeholders can conduct feasibility assessments and implement coherent regulations in destination communities to mitigate the challenges of climate mobility.

In some cases, climate migrants voluntarily move to secure their livelihoods; however, migration is the only option in other instances. In the Ghanaian context, unbearable conditions, such as harsh climatic conditions, livelihood and socio-economic challenges, force people to move without an option. Similarly, Draper observed that climatic conditions affect people's ability to make life plans. These plans include a migration decision to find life support elsewhere (Draper, 2021:322). Some people and their families in Ghana are stressed due to severe climatic conditions that put their livelihoods at risk if they stay in their current settlements. These difficulties compel people to move; nevertheless, it is observed that sometimes, social and economic limitations render some people immobile.

4.2. IMPACT OF CLIMATE MIGRATION ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA

Migration and development are interrelated in Ghana and other parts of the world. Migration may put pressure on existing amenities in destination areas and can also promote development, depending on how it is managed. People in Ghana migrate

¹⁰ Chieftaincy is the traditional leadership system. It refers to positions such as leader of a clan or community. Such traditional leaders are locally in charge of the day-to-day administration of their respective jurisdictions.

for various reasons, including environmental and climate-related economic challenges and poverty issues. These multiple factors influence how development is sustained in various ways. Migration is an important factor for sustainable development. Hence, understanding the link between migration and UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is necessary in states' migration discourse (Wilkinson et al., 2016:1-4). As part of their global agenda, the SDGs aim to leave no one behind and uphold people's right to live in diverse ways. In the context of SDGs, migration can contribute to development in diverse ways by supporting migrants' home and destination countries and community development through remittances, skills-gaining and skills-sharing and filling labour gaps. However, states' development can be negatively affected without better migration governance.

The SDGs are agendas with action plans for 'for people, planet and prosperity' to eradicate all forms of poverty. To achieve the SDGs by 2030, the UN requires all actors to collaborate to execute action plans. The agenda also considers climate change a critical issue that puts societies, humans and the planet at risk (UN General Assembly, 2015:1-5). Therefore, migration in the context of climate change cannot be overlooked when considering how countries are expected to successfully achieve their SDGs.

The SDGs have diverse focuses; some are directly or indirectly connected to issues critical to this research. Hence, this section reflects on the SDGs which are related to climate change, migration, governance and cooperation. For instance, SDG 10 aims "to reduce inequality within and among countries " and frames migration as a significant factor in achieving this goal. This goal assumes that all forms of inequality hinder global development. Therefore, the relationship between migration and sustainable development within target 10.7 aims to "facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies" (UN General Assembly, 2015:21). This target seeks to ensure that migration is well managed globally (Morsler Vidal and Laczko, 2022:29-30).

According to Aniche, migration affects sustainable development;¹¹ conversely, sustainable development affects migration. As poverty and inequality within some countries may force people to migrate, the level of development in host countries can influence migration decisions. Sustainable development increases regular migration, whereas a lack of sustainable development tends to increase irregular migration (Aniche, 2020:37-38). Menozzi also emphasized that migrants contribute to the economies of their countries of origin, destination and transit. Therefore, to reduce negative impacts and maximize the positive impacts of migration, it is important to promote well-managed migration (Menozzi, 2023:1-2). Although the patterns of climate migration in Ghana are complex, such migration contributes to the development of the originating and host communities. In an interview with a local leader (host community), he stated that climate-related migrants who settle in their communities help in diverse ways to promote the development of their communities. As the leader asserted in the interview:

...These people are herdsmen. They sell their animals, milk and meat for their livelihood in the community. They send money home to family members in their communities of origin. Some local traders obtain milk and meat from herders and sell it to support their families. We benefit from the herders and they also get benefits from this community, so it is a win-win... (Respondent-N- Local Community leader/local Chief, 20.08.2022).

As confirmed during consultations, climate migrants help some communities in Ghana with a workforce, especially in cocoa-growing communities. Immigrants to those areas help host communities fill labour shortages and help increase agricultural production in such areas. However, a high influx of climate migrants also negatively impacts recipient communities. These cases result in pressure on limited existing resources in the host community. This, combined with other factors, increases the livelihood challenges of local people in the host communities. In an interview with a community leader, he stated the following:

...despite any perception of these (climate) immigrants, they help the community fill some labour gaps... Since many of our youth migrate to the South, immigrants are important in contributing to developmental

¹¹ Drexhage and Murphy (2010:2) defined *sustainable development* as “development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” In this thesis, *sustainable development* is defined as development that meets the needs of the people in the host communities and is durable to benefit future generations. In this regard, some people may choose to live in their places of origin if development is sufficient for their livelihood. Others may migrate from their original habitats to new places where they can sustain themselves.

activities in our community. Although they put pressure on our limited resources and infrastructure, they help develop our community (Respondent-N- Local Community Leader/local Chief, 20.08.2022).

Some people are occasionally compelled to migrate or willingly migrate to adjust to climatic stress. However, lack of enough resources and accommodation facilities in the host communities prevent them from moving to secure themselves elsewhere (Menozzi, 2023:2-3). As also confirmed during the interviews:

... some people cannot move because they do not have the money to move or land to do farming activities if they decide to go to different places. Sometimes, they have problems with their families and the community. Some attempt to do anything to survive, legally or illegally. They need to be supported to help in development, but no help from anywhere... (Respondent-O- Response from Focus Group Discussions, 20.08.2022).

These incidents are common in Ghana and they have demotivated people who could otherwise migrate to contribute to their communities' development rather than become a burden to their homes and communities. Therefore, poor migration management can negatively affect sustainable development in Ghana. Hence, there is a need for Ghana and partner states to manage migration in line with the UN's aim to promote migration in a dignified way by taking into consideration target 10.7 of the SDGs. This consideration will help to promote the rights and well-being of people who aim to migrate from vulnerable communities.

Concerning climate change, migration and sustainable development, SDG 13 is dedicated to climate action, which urges states to “take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts” (UN General Assembly, 2015:23). Climate-related disasters continue to force people to move out of their homes globally and in Ghana. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) database, between 2008 and 2022, an average of 32.6 million people were displaced globally because of disasters. Out of this number, 98 % were climate-related, such as droughts, floods and storms (IDMC, 2023:9). In Ghana, climate-related disasters caused approximately 279,000 displacements between 2008 and 2022 and a total of 326,000 at the end of 2023 (IDMC, n.d.). This indicates that climate displacement is increasing in Ghana. However, adequate policies have not been implemented to reduce the impact of this incident and protect the dignity of affected people. In an interview with a climate activist, the following was confirmed:

Climate change continues to influence people's movements in different parts of the country (Ghana), but the nation still lacks a concrete policy to

govern climate-induced migration. Although this form of migration affects the development of origin and destination communities, expected policies have yet to be implemented (Respondent-E- Youth Climate Activist, 10.04.2022).

An earlier study by Teye also stressed that many people in Ghana have been displaced by periodic flooding in many parts of the country. For instance, in April 2013 and June 2015, floods caused displacement and movement of people, loss of life and property destruction in many parts of Ghana's Central and Greater Accra regions. The rise in sea level in the Keta district of the Volta region continues to displace people and destroy property (Teye, 2022:90). Nonetheless, expected policies to address these problems remain in limbo.

In 2023, Ghana experienced many flood issues that caused the displacement of thousands of people and unmeasurable destruction of property. A typical example is the Buipe flooding that happened in September 2023 and caused the displacement of approximately 3149 people in the Central Gongga District of the Northern Region and the Akosombo Dam spillage, which caused forced displacement of approximately 40,000 people in the South, Central and North Tongu Districts of the Volta Region (IDMC, n.d.; IOM Data Tracking Matrix (Ghana Profile), 2023). These events continue to impact the development of affected communities and the entire country. Hence, climate change-related movements are a critical issue requiring urgent and permanent/sustainable solutions in Ghana. One community/opinion leader in one of the communities that experienced frequent sea erosion stated:

....We experience this problem every year; many people lose their jobs and homes. Some live with philanthropists' support and others sometimes become street beggars because that is the only way to find a livelihood. It is a difficult situation—our community cannot develop under such conditions. Even though we cannot predict the future, I am sure if we do not get an immediate solution, our future generation will find it difficult to survive in this community... (Respondent-J – Community Member/opinion leader, 10.08.2022).

Climate-affected people in Ghana used to move for seasonal and temporal work. However, in recent times, the movement has shifted to long-term and permanent work in climate-favourable places and urban centres to support families left behind (Teye, 2022:90-93). Wilkinson et al. also observed that the unbearable impact of climate change makes people move involuntarily or forcefully. This movement can be a viable strategy to survive when livelihoods become a challenge for climate-

dependent people (Wilkinson et al., 2016:2). As confirmed by a farmer who migrates seasonally because of the impact of climate on his agricultural activities:

...we do off-farm jobs, sometimes for a short time, like three months, but sometimes for a long time, it can be six months or one year, depending on the job I get. However, some of my friends are staying longer and not returning to our village...(Respondent U- Returned Climate Migrant/Famer, 03.04.2023).

Although migration is used as an adaptation measure against climate stress, some people cannot migrate because of financial constraints and socio-cultural factors. In the case of Keta municipality and the coastal areas of Ghana, where frequent sea erosion due to rising sea levels continues to threaten the lives of its inhabitants, diverse reasons related to finance, and socio-cultural norms prohibit people from migrating or relocating. As indicated by a local community leader in Keta Municipality of the Volta when asked about migration and relocation during this research interview:

... for now, some people do not have the financial means to move out of the community and some of our people have a saying in our local language (Ewe)... which means 'when you go to the beach, there is a crab at the shore that can run fast and then they say that crab cannot live in the forest but can only live at the shore. Our people know and believe that they are fishermen and they want life at the beach. Therefore, relocating them to land that is not close to the sea is problematic. Some people also believe that their grandparents and family members who were buried in this community will continue to protect them, so they cannot be relocated without their families' graves. ... these are some of the challenges that have come with climate change and therefore relocation is not a possibility now ... (Respondent-K -Community Leader,14.08.2022).

These indicate that necessary adaptation measures must be implemented in coastal communities in Ghana because relocation and resettlement are not desired by the people living around the coast for socio-economic and cultural reasons. Some people expressed concern regarding the properties they may leave behind if they relocate and resettle in places other than their original habitat. Since Ghana's government does not have mechanisms to compensate for people who lose their property because of climate change events, it is difficult to adapt when their sources of income are affected. For this reason, some people are reluctant to relocate if their survival conditions are poor. However, another interview revealed that some people wish to relocate but do not have financial means. As indicated by an opinion leader in one of the coastal flood-affected communities: *"some people... prefer to move out to other places, but they do not have the means to go because floods sometimes destroy everything they have—their*

property and they do not have any insurance for their losses” (Respondent-J – Community Member – opinion leader, 10.08.2022). This implies that stakeholders must establish measures that compensate people for their losses so that people who want to be relocated out of dangerous areas.

The SDGs do not explicitly mention migration and climate change (climate-migration) in one goal. SDG13 is about climate action and it involves targets such as 13.1: “strengthening resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related disasters”; 13.2: “integrating climate change policies into national policies, strategies and planning”; and targets with a focus on climate change awareness and education, capacity building and expecting commitment from developed countries to support developing countries with finances (UN, 2015:23). Thus, adhering to these targets will help Ghana and the international stakeholders to address the climate impact on human mobility.

It is also important to note that stakeholder-committed strategies toward climate action, as indicated by SDG13, will help Ghana perform better toward the success of SDGs 1 and 2, which aim at “no poverty ” and “zero hunger ”, respectively. Climate change has affected people's sources of income and crop yields, leading to poverty and food insecurity. These situations force many people to migrate to find alternative livelihoods. That is, climate threats to people's jobs and livelihoods influence migration. As expressed by one migration consultant, people will continue to migrate to find livelihoods elsewhere and poverty issues will continue to increase because of existing challenges regarding how to adapt to climate-stress-hotspot communities. The consultant expressed concerns about climate migrants in Ghana by emphasizing the following points:

.... They are the people who have seen problems associated with agriculture and migrating from all agricultural communities into urban centers to look for alternative sources of livelihood. Therefore, in the first place, we have problems associated with food security issues. We (the entire country) cannot produce enough to feed ourselves. Once we do not put in the right mechanism to make agriculture more or less a mechanized system that the youth will be more attracted to, everybody will move into the cities to look for other sources of livelihood. Then, when they also move to cities, we need to ask ourselves exactly what they are engaging in. (Respondent I: Climate Mobility and Population Studies Researcher, University of Ghana, 12.08.2022).

The consultant also expressed concern about the environmental problems that climate migrants create and face when they do not find their expected jobs in their host cities.

As stated:

... They even create more environmental issues. So, I am sure you are aware of what was happening some time ago in the Agbogbloshie (commercial town in Accra) area where we have all these scrap guys polluting more than ever. These guys have all migrated from farming communities and ended up going into some of these kinds of activities. It also creates tension because of... the increase in unemployment. Agriculture employs most people...so when they come to urban areas and do not find jobs, they more or less form part of the unemployed group and the 'devil finds work for the idle hands.' So they can engage in all kinds of activities, the crime rate will increase and a hungry man is an angry man' ... (Respondent I: Climate Mobility and Population Studies Researcher, University of Ghana, 12.08.2022).

Some climate activists also expressed concern about poverty due to the impact of climate change on people's livelihoods and its implications for Ghana's success in SDG1. As stated:

... it... affects so much. Looking at SDG 1, which talks about ending poverty, some of the [people in the northern part depend solely on agriculture ...for themselves and their families. So now, because of climate change, farming is no longer profitable, which is pushing farmers down the poverty line. That will prevent us from achieving the SDG that talks about poverty and then looking at ... housing. Those in coastal communities are also moving out because ...the rising sea level affects their buildings and their properties, so they have to move out. Moreover, even the country itself has housing deficits.... so now the housing deficit the country ... is also going to affect sustainable development. And .. again .. climate-related disease affecting farm yields, some two or four years back, many farmers in Ghana lost their yields due to the armyworms ... My uncle was a victim and lost close to 7 acres of maize. So now imagine this was his only source of income for his family and has pushed them further down to poverty... (Respondent E, Youth Climate Activist, 10.04.2022).

Considering the interview responses and the existing literature, much attention is needed to address livelihoods still threatened by climate change. In agreement with Wilkinson et al., climate change adaptation policies are necessary to reduce risks and limit displacement (Wilkinson et al., 2016:7). Therefore, there is a need to increase strategies that aim at disaster risk reduction. This could be achieved through stakeholders' collective efforts to empower local communities through education and continuous meteorological warnings to people who are unable or unwilling to relocate from dangerous settlements.

It is also important to mention that without adequate and urgent action, Ghana will not be able to make progress toward SDG11, which aims at “sustainable cities and communities” (UN, 2015:21). With the adverse effects of climate change and people's movement to other communities and increasing urbanization, some cities, especially Kumasi and Accra, are likely to become overcrowded. This could lead to more slums and unplanned settlements (peri-urban settlements). These settlements will also pressure existing resources in host communities and cities. As mentioned in Chapter 3, increased North-South migration has caused slums and unplanned settlements in Accra and Kumasi (King and Amponsah, 2012:285; Prosper and Khan, 2018:2-3). Without swift action, Ghana will not be able to achieve decent cities and communities, as seen in SDG 11’s target 11.1, which aims at “safe and affordable housing” by 2030. One consulted academic also expressed concern about the increasing number of slums due to climate mobility in cities:

... People are moving to urban areas and problems of urban slums are on the rise. For example, our earlier research also confirmed that Old Fadama (a suburb in Accra-Ghana) other places are witnessing slums due to environmental migrants/displaced persons. ... these are some of the challenges ... cities are facing not only in Ghana but also in Nairobi (Kenya), Lagos (Nigeria) and cities in Mozambique... (Respondent-S, Climate Migration Researcher and Consultant, University of Ghana, 12.10.2022).

Slums and unplanned settlements also affect sanitation in cities, thereby affecting the goal of decent cities by 2030. One participant stated:

...Once stakeholders have not put the system together and there are no structures, they (climate migrants) will all come and live in the slum to contribute to more sanitation problems... But if the structures are set right, some companies can even move into the villages and tap the skills of some of these people into some of the sectors that need labor... these things...will help. (Respondent I: Climate Mobility and Population Studies Researcher, University of Ghana, 12.08.2022).

In coastal areas where sea erosion causes displacement, community members complain about environmental diseases such as malaria caused by mosquitoes from stagnant water. According to participants from coastal communities, stagnant water from sea erosion and flooding affects community members' development, health and well-being. As stated by a community member during the interview:

Development in our community includes health... flood due to sea erosion cause many environmental problems that affect the health development of the people ... the water we are talking about is stagnant; they do not flow from one point to the other and so ... it is contaminated water with germs

and breed mosquitos that cause malaria and other diseases to children and also...make the movement of indigenes very difficult (Respondent-J Community Member/ Opinion Leader, 10.08.2022).

In an interview with a climate researcher and policymaker, it was confirmed that climate change has an impact on sanitation issues and diseases in urban areas. As stated:

...in terms of health, for instance, ... malaria vectors are increasing due to flooding in certain conditions.... urban disease has also increased due to temperature, rainfall, sea level rise and others (Respondent-R-Academic/Policy-maker-EPA, 30.08.2022).

These health and sanitation problems have implications for SDG3, which aims to promote *good health and well-being*; target 3.3 aims to *end diseases* such as malaria and other communicable diseases (UN, 2015:16). Poor sanitation due to floods and slum settlements will increase the spread of communicable and waterborne diseases if stakeholders fail to take urgent action.

When climate migrants move from rural to urban areas to find a means of survival, most settle in poor urban communities. Because these low-income urban communities already face challenges, some migrants struggle to meet their expectations. However, some migrants find it difficult to return to their places of origin due to the lack of reintegration opportunities and the negative perceptions of migrants who return from urban centres. In line with Setrana and Tonah (2014:129-130), societies expect returned migrants to contribute to the development of local communities but not to add to existing problems. In this regard, even if migrants find it difficult to survive in urban centres, they prefer to stay there rather than return to their rural areas to avoid criticism from their communities.

While climate change forces people engaged in livestock rearing to move in search of feed and also to find a livelihood, people in the host communities, especially farmers, complain that their farms are being destroyed by the activities of herdsmen (Boateng, 2015; Bukhari, 2017; Paalo, 2020). These cases mainly occur in Ghana's southern or forest zones, where the vegetation is suitable for livestock grazing. The point here is that herders are experiencing the harsh effects of climate change and searching for pasture. Some herders migrate to the Ahafo, Accra-Keta Plains and parts of the Eastern region. Because there are no effective regulatory mechanisms to control the movements of herders in local host communities, they compete for scarce

resources. Competition for limited resources leads to conflicts between residents and newcomers (climate migrants).

It was already mentioned that extreme climate conditions influence uncontrolled livestock movements. These movements are causing pollution of scarce water resources in some host communities in Ghana. This problem affects local farmers' agricultural activities and the water resources of affected communities. Ghana's attempt to achieve "zero hunger" (SDG2) by 2030 could be hindered by climatic conditions that cause food insecurity and influence people's movements to compete for limited resources. Without an effective stakeholder approach, water contamination and drought could negatively affect Ghana's efforts to achieve SDG 6, which aims at "sustainable clean water and sanitation."

If not tackled, the above-mentioned issues can also negatively impact Ghana's expectations toward achieving SDG10, which aims to "reduce inequality". Persistent problems affecting climate migration make eliminating inequality difficult. Furthermore, diverse problems associated with climate change and people's movement will increase pressure from rural areas to urban centres, adversely affecting sustainable cities and communities, which SDG11 aims to achieve. Moreover, ineffective resilience strategies in rural areas will heighten rural-urban migration and worsen the existing slum situation in some urban centres.

The continuing challenges regarding climate change can also worsen the climate situation because, under difficult conditions, some people may have to engage in non-climate-friendly activities, such as cutting down forests to farm or getting charcoal for living. In this regard, Ghana and, to a greater extent, the international community must commit to SDG17, which aims at "partnerships to promote better cooperation to help ensure better governance", especially regarding climate migration. Although the realization of Agenda 2030 is 5 years ahead from now (2025), it seems complicated for Ghana to fully achieve Agenda 2030 (i.e., "the agenda of leaving no one behind") (UN, 2015). However, specific problems can be addressed with effective and committed effort if stakeholders commit themselves to the agenda with appropriate strategies and mechanisms.

4.3. CLIMATE MIGRATION GOVERNANCE IN GHANA: REALITY AND WHAT IS EXPECTED —GOVERNING THROUGH COLLECTIVE INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS

Currently (as of the time of concluding this dissertation), no specific structure governs climate-related migration in Ghana. Although climate-related migration has occurred in the country for decades, specific governance frameworks have not yet been established. The question to focus on now is how Ghana is addressing or attempting to address the issue of climate mobility. The long and short answer is that what Ghana is doing is unclear and complicated. The Ghana National Climate Adaptation Plan does not provide specific climate migration provisions. The adaptation plan only mentions migration by referring to the climate migration policy in the 2016 National Migration Policy (NMP), which remains unimplemented. The Ghana National Adaptation Plan (GNAP) prioritizes “agriculture, forestry, water, energy, gender and health” (GNAP, 2018: vii, 33), but not migration. Since the national migration policy is not yet implemented, adaptation strategies or governance mechanisms for climate migrants remain a mirage until relevant policies are implemented.

4.3.1. National Approach: Institutional Dynamics and Challenges

National action plans are important for the effective governance of climate migration. Policies at the national level can facilitate the implementation of external cooperative mechanisms, such as those at the regional and global levels. Although national action plans are important for promoting cooperation on climate mobility, Ghana lags behind other countries with important action plans to govern climate-related mobility. As observed in an earlier study by Mouthaan, the lack of structured mechanisms for collective agendas and individual institutions, especially at the ministerial level, leads to the pursuit of the migration agenda independently, affecting effective coordination and cooperation. The absence of well-defined institutions to lead and supervise migration affairs holistically affects Ghana's management of migration affairs. Moreover, some government institutions that deal with migration affairs prioritize the financial support they may receive from external partners before

engaging them for technical consultation regarding policy formulations and implementations (Mouthaan, 2019:14-16).

It was also confirmed during consultation interviews that coordination is a major problem due to multiple government agencies that deal with different migration issues in Ghana. This coordination problem is influenced by migration-related institutions' aim to build and strengthen their capacity to achieve their goals. Domestic politics also affects how some aspects of migration are considered critical agenda items at the expense of others. The National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) shape migration governance in Ghana (Kandilege et al., 2023; Talleraass, 2024:6). These two parties have been rotating in Ghana since the beginning of the country's Fourth Republic (1992 to present) and as a result, all migration-related policies have been championed by these parties. Hence, these parties' actions have influenced the governance of Ghanaian migration for a long time. For instance, the NDC government passed the National Migration Policy (NMP) in 2016. It recommended the establishment of the National Migration Commission (NMC) to oversee and implement the policies of the NMP. Unfortunately, the NPP government could not establish the NMC. Such domestic politics affects the continuity and urgency of the migration agenda in Ghana.

According to some migration researchers and consultants during interviews, inadequate resources to build capacity, lack of data to inform policy and policy incoherence are major challenges affecting migration governance in most African countries, including Ghana. Policy incoherence, which affects how some migration issues are managed, is also a typical feature of Ghanaian migration governance. As observed in various migration documents in Ghana, although several policy frameworks exist, it is difficult to follow what Ghana aims to achieve through some migration policies. For example, Ghana stresses the importance of promoting and protecting the interests and rights of migrants (Ministry of Interior, 2016:14). However, the interests and rights of internal migrants, especially climate-induced migrants, have received inadequate attention. Additionally, expert consultations revealed that although the Ghana Migration Policy framework recognizes climate-induced migration, no financial allocation has been set to support people forced to move to other rural or urban areas due to climate disasters. This means that the

government is failing to focus on migration, which has profound implications for the state and climate migrants who become low-skilled rural-urban migrants.

Ghana's migration governance tends to pay more attention to migration issues that contribute to development, such as remittances from migrants abroad and less attention to other aspects, such as climate migration, which affects vulnerable individuals in climate hotspots. (Ministry of Interior -Ghana, 2016:12). As revealed by Kandilige et al., the Ghanaian government organized the 2017 Ghana Diaspora Homecoming Summit and the 2019 Homecoming Celebration and Year of Return to showcase the contributions of the diaspora to Ghana's development (Kandilige et al., 2023:12). Although internal migrants' contributions are not negligible, the government of Ghana pays less attention to internal migrants needs and has not organized programs similar to those described above to appreciate their contributions. Therefore, the government must implement measures to appreciate their contribution to Ghana's development.

In addition, the absence of a migration commission has been a problem in Ghana's effective migration governance. This constitutes a barrier to holistically implementing a coherent national migration policy to govern migration issues. In agreement with the policy consultants and migration researchers interviewed, creating a central migration commission will help set up specific departments to focus on specific migration issues, including the climate-related. Moreover, such a commission will help promote inclusive migration governance and address coordination challenges. The local authorities are important but, as noted in Chapter 3, are less included in the current migration governance structure. Therefore, institutions must be strengthened based on well-defined programs and actions to ensure effective collaboration with the central government.

Also, the absence of a migration commission for migration governance in Ghana hinders effective cooperation and coordination and influences competition among the various ministries and agencies that deal with migration. Therefore, in agreement with Kandilige et al. (2023:11), there is a need for urgent action toward the central migration governance mechanism in Ghana. Establishing a central governance structure for migration will help solve problems associated with issue-specific issues and control competing interests within the existing inter-ministerial structure. Such a

national coordination mechanism should pay critical attention to the engagement of local authorities and subnational and national entities to ensure better coordination of migration activities. Additionally, the migration commission should establish concrete and comprehensive mechanisms that can effectively coordinate and cooperate with state and non-state actors at national and global levels. The establishment of this commission can also help in securing the necessary funds for the effective execution and implementation of relevant national migration policies.

4.3.1.1. Challenges: Inadequate Coordination and Understanding

This study observed that the coordination between national institutions has become a significant challenge in effectively governing climate-related migration. This problem is associated with the lack of norms of operation and the scope of existing migration-related agencies in Ghana. Most of the time, climate-related migrants move within their capacities due to the absence of precise mechanisms and government agencies to regulate climate mobility.

In an interview with one participant from the Ghana Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), inadequate coordination and a lack of clear understanding of issues surrounding the nexus between climate change and migration were mentioned as significant challenges hindering Ghana's governance of climate-related migration. From the interviewee:

.... the understanding and conceptualizing climate change and migration are problematic for some institutions but important for policymakers to implement the needed policies in Ghana.....How important is climate change for socio-economic development? Policymakers must well understand this question. For those of us who are within the technical space, the relationship is that we understand and can coordinate linkages. However, this problem occurs among decision-makers. When I say decision-makers, I mean those who have a budget to spend. What attention do they pay to these climate change-related issues such as migration?... There is a gap between the understanding of these issues and ... what is being done on the ground regarding budgeting for these issues. mobilizing resources from all angles for climate change issues has been very slow, so I am not surprised migration in the context of climate change is also suffering from the budget issue.... (Respondent-R- Policy Maker/Academic at EPA, 30.08.2022).

From the above responses, an appropriate understanding of the link between climate change and migration is necessary to formulate the policies needed and assign specific agencies in this regard.

Additionally, regulations on pastoral movements have complex dynamics. For instance, discussions about pastoralist (herders) movements revealed that local community leaders, especially local chiefs, accepted pastoralists without informing the local community about their arrival to the host communities. This situation forces some community members, especially farmers, to decide how to secure their farms when facing challenges from pastoralists whose livestock uncontrollably graze on their farmlands. This situation triggers conflicts between pastoralists [who are considered climate-driven migrants] and the local farmers in some places. Although the movement of herders *within* and *to* Ghana to find grazable lands is not new, problems associated with the herders' movement remain unresolved due to inadequate mechanisms to regulate.

Some earlier studies found that clashes between herders and host community members, especially farmers, led to the deaths and injuries of humans and livestock in Southern Ghana especially Asanti-Akim – Agogo areas in the Asanti Region (Bukari, 2017; Issifu et al., 2022). However, a complete end to such clashes remains a nightmare for some communities because of inadequate and inconsistent mechanisms to address the core issues. According to experts consulted on this issue, host communities must understand the factors that force herders to move to specific communities. Lack of understanding of how to establish cooperation between host communities and climate migrants affects how herders and community members relate. This understanding can shape how issues can be governed. As mentioned during one interview:

... all these problems are related to governance. If there had been proper advocacy and critical understanding of the situation, I am not sure some of these clashes between herders and farmers would have happened... because these people (herders).. are migrating and per the projections and all the analyses... we should have had fair knowledge that people will be moving as a result of climate-related issues. ... We also know the kind of livelihood activities that some of these people are engaged in... these are herders... apart from following their animals, they do not do any other jobs. So countries ... or receiving areas—must improve governance (Respondent-I -Academic Climate Migration, University of Ghana, 12.08.2022).

Better governance should involve adequate measures to avoid conflicts between herders and farmers. This can be done through stakeholders such as the municipalities/ local authorities and capital-intensive farmers' (large scale/ cash crop farmers such as those who produce coffee and cocoa) efforts to acquire enough pasture lands and other facilities, such as dams, to enable host communities to accommodate pastoralists in a good and friendly manner. Additionally, some participants suggested that the government needs to establish systems to tax herders so that some money could be collected to build some of the infrastructure needed in the host communities. Since herders keep looking for places for livestock to graze, establishing such a system will help obtain benefits for stakeholders, host communities, the government and herders. The absence of an effective and sustainable solution is a significant factor that influences the periodic, chaotic conflicts in some places in Ghana, especially in forest zones. Since the herdsmen keep moving to find limited grazing land for their livestock, they sometimes do not care where they find food or find it difficult to control their animals, which creates problems between them and the host community members, especially farmers.

It was also revealed during consultations that some problems between herdsmen and farmers are associated with:

... climate change education and the kind of migration governance structure ... in Ghana and once we are not able to address that, we will continue battling with this kind of problem ... because for now, they [herdsmen /climate migrants] will continue to move in because nobody wants to stay in that vulnerable environment and die... once they move ... their animals will have to eat. They will move their animals anywhere, but if stakeholders put proper mechanisms before they move in, we will have an idea as to who is moving and direct them as to where we want to position that particular person with ... proper rules for them. Our borders are very porous and people can pass anywhere they want (Respondent-I - Academic Climate Migration, University of Ghana, 12.08.2022).

Although the consultative interviews revealed that the severity of the problem had been reduced compared to previous years, some problems continued to occur in different places due to difficulties in controlling the patterns of herders' movement. This persistent problem can also be associated with the absence of a centrally coordinating authority to manage diverse and specific mobility issues, such as climate change. This also brings back the argument of the National Coordinating Commission to address problems within national and subnational cooperative mechanisms and to promote

better governance of migrant issues at various levels. Subsequently, a strong coordinating mechanism can help to deal with these conflicting issues, seek adequate budgets for various migration policy implementations and cooperate effectively with regional and sub-regional institutions within Africa and beyond.

4.3.2. Regional and Sub-regional Efforts (AU and ECOWAS)

Compared to some years ago, there has been an increase in awareness of the impacts of climate change. The increased awareness of climate issues has also influenced the rate at which climate-related mobility appears on discussion tables throughout the continent. Some experts confirmed that efforts toward climate mobility governance in Africa are increasing through migration- and migration-related frameworks for action. However, efforts to achieve commitment and implementation of necessary policies remain slow.

Also, policy incoherence, inconsistencies and a lack of proper information sharing are some of the problems among African states, including Ghana, regarding migration governance. Furthermore, most African states have signed migration agreements and protocols, but they have failed to put them fully into action. These problems hinder effective migration governance and affect climate migration governance directly and indirectly.

Although the African Union (AU) has made efforts to establish the AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (also known as the Kampala Convention) since October 2009 (which came into force in 2012), its implementation and commitments among member states have not met its expectations. This Convention has the potential to serve as a regional mechanism to address climate-related migration issues; however, ratification and implementation challenges remain. One reason is that although conflict-related internal displacements had been major issues on the continent at the time of its adoption, countries did not want to come under legal obligation to protect and accommodate conflict victims. In addition, climate migration was not a major concern for many states at that time, so ratifications of that Convention were delayed and remained limited for some time. It is also important to note that the increasing number of ratifications over the years did

not translate into meaningful implementation of the Convention. Although more than half of African states—33 out of 55—have ratified it since its adoption almost 15 years ago,¹² (at the time of completing this thesis), its practical actions have been minimal.

One consultant stated:

...The Kampala Convention... listed out some of the causes for displacement, including climate change but when it comes to real actions, then that is where the African Union has a problem. Member states have signed so many protocols and agreements that are targeting how to deal with climate change and other drivers of migration, but their implementations are lacking due to financial, coordination and institutional challenges ... (Respondent-S, University of Ghana, Migration Researcher and Consultant, 12.10.2022).

Other academic participants also emphasized that Ghana's attitude toward the ratification of the Kampala Convention was influenced by the responsibility enshrined in the agreement that obliged member states to respect the dignity and humanity of displaced persons. Since some African states, including Ghana, cannot always fulfil the expected needs of their displaced persons, they may not want to seem responsible and face possible punishment from the African Union.¹³

As a region that faces significant implications of climate change, as projected by several researchers (mentioned in Chapter 1, many projections indicate that Africa is expected to have the highest number of climate migrants compared to other regions), all member states need to sign and ratify this Convention and make the utmost commitments toward its operations. Additionally, countries that have already ratified the Convention should make adequate efforts to incorporate it into their related national laws and operate accordingly. Some interviewees asserted that most African governments are concerned about their limited resources to protect the human dignity of climate-affected people; hence, establishing effective partnerships with other states,

¹² The Convention needed ratification by 15 members of the AU for its adoption. It came into force after reaching that number on December 6, 2012 (Asplet and Bradley, 2013: 397).

¹³ Article 8(3f) of the Convention states that parties are obliged to "cooperate with the Special Rapporteur of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights for Refugees, Returnees, IDPs and Asylum Seekers in addressing issues of internally displaced persons" (Kampala Convention / AU, 2009). Since parties are already part of the Refugees Convention, they can be punished based on *non-refoulement*. Also, restrictions on people's movements due to climate disaster breaches states' obligation enshrined in Article 9(2f) of the Convention, which "...guarantee the freedom of movement and choice of residence of internally displaced persons..". Such restrictions may lead to the suspension of a member from the Union, or members may lose their reputation for not protecting the rights of the displaced persons, which they are committed to honor, if they ratified the Convention. As noted, members must "protect and fulfill the rights to which internally displaced persons are entitled" (AU, 2009:2).

international organizations and related actors will help states build their capacity. As enshrined in Article VII of the Kampala Convention, international organizations have a duty to protect internally displaced people if not appropriately addressed at the national level. Therefore, African states should engage with international organizations, sub-regional actors and other relevant actors to ensure the best possible ways to address various issues associated with climate mobility. This partnership could be better established by better understanding the incentives states gain if they cooperate and the challenges they may face without cooperating.

As explained previously, sub-regional organizations, such as ECOWAS, have provisions for citizens' free movements within member states. However, the protocol does not mention or provide specific migration provisions in the context of climate change. Operating within the ECOWAS sub-regional protocol, citizens can travel within member states for 90 days without a visa. However, this depends on migrants' reasons for traveling to member states and their ability to prove themselves to immigration officers at certain checkpoints. Interviews with some Ghanaian immigration officers revealed that ECOWAS free movement allows citizens of members to move to other member states; however, individual migrants need to show travel documents, such as passports, so that immigration officers at the borders can check, stamp and determine the number of days the migrant is eligible to stay in Ghana. Although people have the right to move, climate-related migration is not explicitly included in this free movement protocol; therefore, some migrants' entry to Ghana can be denied. Furthermore, since climate change has not been codified as a legal pathway for people to move within ECOWAS countries, travellers who identify climate issues as their reasons for traveling or migrating may not be legally accepted.

It was also confirmed that some ECOWAS travellers (specifically those who use the land borders) sometimes attempt to cross borders without the required documents because of their inadequate knowledge of the principles of free movement under the ECOWAS Protocol. Generally speaking, the introduction of ECOWAS ID card¹⁴ has made it easier to travel. It is an acceptable document and it is challenging to deny entry to the cardholder if the reason for traveling is convincing. However, since

¹⁴ ECOWAS ID cards are identity cards for ECOWAS citizens. In Ghana, they are commonly known as the Ghana Card. Except at Ghana's international airports, ECOWAS citizens can use their ECOWAS ID to travel across land and sea borders.

separate travel documents for climate victims in the form of climate passes or climate passports do not exist, migrants can be prevented from crossing the border if their movements are climate-driven. It is also difficult for immigration control officers to determine the number of days individual travellers can stay in the destination country (Respondent W, Ghana Immigration Service, 15-01-2024). However, it was also observed from an informal conversation that sometimes decisions to allow entry at the land borders depend on the officers' decisions at the post, especially when officers think they need to fulfil their moral obligation to allow the entry of the climate-vulnerable, since the person holds a card as an ECOWAS member. This can be considered as a positive measure of addressing some of the challenges encountered by climate migrants who cross land borders.

Although the ECOWAS card entails challenges in terms of citizens' mobility, it is an important step to establish a well-defined integration policy to accommodate climate migrants in member states. Additionally, it is important to mention that African governments are improving migration governance; however, the lack of specific and concrete provisions for some major migration drivers, especially climate-related ones, is a major concern. Moreover, due to differences in climatic conditions in different parts of the continent, region and sub-region, mechanisms for common and case-specific issues must be established. Attempts to apply these mechanisms should also pay sufficient attention to sub-regional dynamics and strengthen cooperation among local, national, regional and global institutions.

4.3.3. Global Collaboration

Global collaboration is essential for strengthening local, national, sub-regional and regional mechanisms. Strong cooperation between Ghana and its regional, sub-regional and global partners may facilitate migration governance at all levels. Over the years, Ghana has cooperated with international actors such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the German Government International Aid Agency (GIZ), the International Center for Migration Policy and Development (ICMPD), the European Union (EU) and many

others. These international partners have the capacity and know-how to help Ghana develop and manage its migration policy through financial and technical support.

For example, the ICMPD provides technical assistance to the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS). The GIZ helps to provide opportunities for returning migrants and prospective Ghanaian emigrants (Talleraas, 2024:7-8). Similarly, Ghana cooperates extensively with the IOM on various migration issues to protect the dignity of migrants, as already discussed in Chapter 3 (sub-sections 3.4 and 3.5). These collaborations support the efforts of Ghanaian migration agencies to overcome their shortcomings. Global partners, including state and non-state actors, are important in supporting Ghana through mechanisms to govern migration affairs. These global partnerships, coordination and support are important to influence and shape Ghana's national migration policies. For instance, global initiatives such as the Global Compact for Migration (GCM), the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), climate change agreements and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have important roles in shaping Ghana's agenda on diverse global issues.

Some interviewees also emphasized that international partners can help monitor Ghana's poorly managed migration programs and projects. This can help control domestic political influence on specific migration issues, especially where conflict of interest may occur among different state agencies. Similarly, Ibrahim and Mensah stressed that climate migration is a major challenge for vulnerable countries, especially developing countries such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, building strong partnerships with advanced economies could help vulnerable countries strengthen their capacities for better governance of climate migration (Ibrahim and Mensah, 2022:20).

Global partnership is important; however, in many other African countries, including Ghana, it sometimes dominates migration policies in the interest of donor governments and organizations. Over the years, Ghana has received financial support from developed countries and many international organizations, especially from Europe. These external supports shape and influence the implementation of migration policies in Ghana (Adam et al., 2020; Kandilige et al., 2023; Talleraas, 2024). It is also seen from the existing literature that some migration policies in some African countries

remain unimplemented due to technical and financial constraints; therefore, external partners intervene to support and influence.

Unwanted external influence occurs when African states fail to negotiate effectively with clear objectives when dealing with external partners from the global North. For instance, Adam et al. found that while the EU and its member states' interests and strategies are always clearly known in their cooperation with West African states, those of West African states are often unclear. That study also pointed out that West African states' migration cooperation is often influenced by the financial opportunities they aim to receive from the EU partners. The EU, in particular, focuses on strengthening borders and promoting the return of irregular African migrants (Adam et al., 2020:3105-9). Additionally, the EU's cooperation with African countries is based on soft law mechanisms and the EU takes advantage of soft laws to contain and prevent irregular migrants from Africa (Frasca, 2023:1-2). African countries' inability to reform their migration policies and laws makes them follow what the external partners present, especially the EU and its member states (Frasca, 2023:10).

In the case of Ghana, a similar scenario was confirmed in interviews with migration academics and policymakers. The confirmation of the influence of external partners on immigration policies in Ghana was attributed to insufficient funding by the Ghanaian government. It was indicated that the funds available to address different migration-related concerns are inadequate; therefore, external sponsors influence Ghana's migration policies. As described by the interviewee:

...the EU initiatives are necessary, yet sometimes they focus on what to do to prevent irregular migration from Ghana and other West African routes.... because Ghana cooperation sometimes focuses on finance without other clearly explained intentions and donor partners take advantage of the situation... (Respondent Q: Academic Migration Researcher, 21.08.2022).

In connection with policy initiatives and funding issues, an interview with a migration policymaker stressed that external funding influences Ghana and sometimes focuses more on donor partners' interests in meeting the sponsorship targets. As stated: *...in the case of external funding, what do we expect? Donor partners are giving our government money, so they expect the government to do what they (the donor partners) want to achieve... (Respondent V- Ghana Refugee Board / Policy Maker, 11.01.2024).*

These confirmations support that external states and donors seek to protect their national interests. However, this partnership with external actors should not only help those actors but should also seek to provide mutual benefit. This study does not agree with one-sided decisions to guide cooperation agreements but instead argues for comprehensive negotiations on issues with a focus on the parties' collaboration toward mutual interests. In other words, this study advocates external cooperation in which the cooperation agenda is not one-sided but based on a collective understanding of mutual expectations and interests among the parties involved. Of course, individual states like Ghana have a central duty to lead their migration agenda. However, due to their limited technical and financial resources, partnerships with states and other international organizations are critically important for achieving better migration governance.

Partnerships can help Ghana with technical expertise and complimentary support. Although the interests of international partners such as the EU and its member states are predominantly related to border security, Ghana and other ECOWAS states should consider such partnership as a positive cooperative step as long as it is not confined only to the EU's self-interest or EU member states' national interests. Measures about border security can help Ghana strengthen its migration governance in different ways and seek support if they align or complement the measures by national and sub-national actors when implementing policies of collective interest.

4.4. THE CASE FOR GOVERNING CLIMATE MIGRATION THROUGH LIBERAL INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS IN GHANA

The impacts of climate change on individual states' migration issues are different. At the same time, states' capacities differ, with developing countries being weaker in addressing their challenges. In essence, partnering with relevant and supportive actors can play a significant role in addressing these challenges, offering potential solutions. However, the absence of a central authority within the international system presents a fundamental challenge to states' collective action. Also, domestic politics, national interests, ideational and institutional factors all shape states' attitudes toward migration (Hollifield, 2000:76-77). However, the hindering effect of anarchy

can be overcome through effective institutional frameworks (Keohane and Nye, 1977:231).

States can always communicate to achieve their mutual interests, where promoting safe and orderly migration should be their hallmark. In this regard, Ghana can ensure that its interests are compatible with cooperative institutions and partners. Considering the liberal institutional perspective, the partnership provides more advantages in the long-term than in the short-term (Keohane and Nye, 1977:231). Hollifield argued that the collapse of the agricultural sector could lead to an increase in rural-urban migration and subsequent emigration. In such situations, affected agricultural workers may migrate to provide off-farm services to earn a living in the urban centres. This forms part of economic interdependence;¹⁵ hence, migration should be considered a transnational issue that can balance the needs of origin and host societies (Hollifield, 2000, 78-79).

Although Hollifield did not explicitly discuss climate migration or the relocation of displaced climate migrants, his explanation is relevant here. For instance, rural-urban migration is currently occurring because of the inability of people in climate hotspots to engage in agriculture or cope with climate stress. People forced to move in an attempt to find a livelihood in urban areas contribute to their communities of origin through remittances and, at the same time, contribute to the development of their host communities in many ways. In this regard, there are mutual benefits for both migrants and their host communities (Hollifield, 2000:78).

In the case of Ghana, it is observed that many people from rural communities, especially low-skilled migrants, fill labour gaps in the informal sectors of urban centres. Some engage in cleaning services, positively contributing to the host communities, especially concerning urban centres' sanitation issues. Through these jobs, these rural migrants get money to support their livelihoods and, at the same time, help clean cities. Similarly, some climate migrants from neighbouring countries help fill labour gaps in cocoa production sectors and these services help increase cocoa production output. Recognizing these mutual benefits for climate migrants and their host communities is a compelling argument for institutional norms and stakeholders'

¹⁵ Interdependence comes into play because host societies may sometimes need the services of migrants to fill in labor shortages; likewise, migrants need jobs from their host communities to support their livelihoods.

collaborative efforts to govern and provide better mechanisms to protect climate migrants.

Climate-induced migration will continue to increase with increasing global climate stress. As stated by Benoit Mayer, “Climate change is an obsession of our time ... We will suffer the consequences for centuries to come” (Mayer, 2016: ix). It is not a hidden truth; the world is witnessing the complexities and threats associated with climate change. The only safeguard against this situation is adequate institutions promoting cooperation among stakeholders and seeing the light from now through the future. The *Complex Interdependence* conception of Keohane and Nye may be a useful guide in this regard. In situations of complex interdependence, these scholars emphasized that there is no distinction is made between high and low politics issues and different channels connect states and societies and states do not dominate each other in dealing with common issues (Keohane and Nye, 1987: 731).

In this regard, complex interdependence can enable the establishment of relevant institutions to address problems associated with climate mobility. In complex interdependence, states focus not only on their own goals but also recognize the existence of other channels, such as cooperative international organizations, other actors’ objectives, government policy mechanisms, agenda formulation and issue linkages. Since states’ priorities may change, understanding the urgency of issues within domestic and international realms is important for states to cooperate effectively. Also, within this interdependence, stakeholders/actors can be guided by issue linkages, agenda formation and international organizations (Keohane and Nye, 1987:737-40).

Despite realists’ concerns about national security, cultural identity and other national interests, climate migrants are innocent and vulnerable individuals whose enemy is the changing climate. Therefore, migration governance must be considered on moral and ethical grounds to promote the rights and dignity of vulnerable migrants, especially climate migrants. Hence, collective action based on institutional norms is necessary to find durable solutions.

4.4.1. Collective Action on Climate Migration Governance

Climate migration governance, as widely discussed, is a task that a single state cannot manage. Climate migration offers an understanding of the challenges of global interdependence and arguments for governments to consider protecting vulnerable people outside their borders. Mayer stated that the impact of climate change on migration cannot and should not be dealt with in isolation from a more significant concern for protecting the environment and migrants' welfare (Mayer, 2016:374-376). Climate migration demonstrates the characteristic of global interdependence because it is a situation in which almost every state is directly or indirectly affected in the short- and long-term (Mayer, 2016:286). In a situation of uncertainty, such as the impact of climate change on migration, collective action becomes necessary.

According to Keohane and Nye, in instances where diverse issues within the international system connect societies, the distinction between domestic and external interests becomes undistinguishable (Keohane and Nye, 1987:730-31). Climate change and migration are typical examples of global issues interconnected with their impact on societies and states. Hence, there is a need to show more concern for cooperation among stakeholders, including multiple state and non-state actors and agencies (like climate migrants themselves, host community members and leaders) to formulate and implement policies that aim to promote and develop the communities of sending and destination countries of migrants. States can mutually benefit if they establish the necessary cooperative mechanisms to address migration-related issues. The receiving countries can benefit from the skills of migrants as well as from their taxes. Likewise, sending countries can benefit from the remittances and reduce their unemployed or underutilized labour. This may constitute a win-win situation for governments. A typical example is seasonal workers' cooperative mechanisms initiated by Australia and New Zealand (further explained under section 4.4.2) to support the forcibly displaced persons in the Pacific Islands. While this program benefited the host countries through labour supply and taxes, the Pacific countries benefited through remittances, skill-gaining and skill-sharing (Brickenstein and Tabucanon, 2013:9).

As emphasized by goal 17 of the SDGs and objective 23 of the GCM, partnership and cooperation among actors are key factors to better migration governance and sustainable development globally. It is through cooperation and partnership that developing countries like Ghana can effectively manage the impacts of climate change on migration and address its migration-related challenges. Furthermore, as indicated by the United Nations Agenda 2030 (SDGs), the world will not be able to achieve its objective of the overall attainment of promoting human rights and dignity without partnership and cooperation. As stated:

“...We recognize that we will not be able to achieve our ambitious goals and targets without a revitalized and enhanced Global Partnership and comparably ambitious means of implementation. The revitalized Global Partnership will facilitate intensive global engagement to support the implementation of all the Goals and targets, bringing together Governments, civil society, the private sector, the United Nations system and other actors and mobilizing all available resources” (UN General Assembly, 2015:28).

This is also an example of willingness to champion a global agenda, with partnership as a major factor in achieving expected global objectives. Therefore, migration cannot be excluded from the equation. Although states and communities may face several challenges, migration generally helps develop migrants and their host communities and countries. Migrants, especially vulnerable ones, often have specific needs that must be met under international humanitarian law. The human rights of migrants should, therefore, be respected in relation to their specific needs (UNHCR, 2017:1-2). This can only be achieved through effective institutional norms and principles.

Participants in this study expressed strong concern regarding relevant cooperation and collective action toward better migration governance in Ghana. According to them, climate migration is a multi-causal phenomenon that requires strong collaboration among different partners—state and non-state actors. Many climate hotspot communities, including those in Ghana, lack adequate resources to cope with and adapt to climate stress. Hence, partnerships among relevant actors are needed; the state and the non-state actors, especially international NGOs, can help vulnerable and poor communities build capacities. As indicated by one migration research interviewee:

...Effective cooperation is necessary for Ghana to do well in its migration governance....from our research observations, the contribution in terms of funding by local NGOs is inadequate because the local NGOs are weak,

.... they depend on international NGOs (INGOs), so forming a strong network with international organizations and getting funding and technical support will be better. Also, ... developing partners stand a lot to gain if they work with civil society groups and NGOs rather than the government because African governments are generally corrupt (Respondent-S: Climate Migration Researcher and Consultant (University of Ghana), 12.10.2022).

In the case of INGOs, the expert informants emphasized that their assistance is influenced by their moral duty to promote the human dignity of migrants. Additionally, support from INGOs is mainly through direct investments and rarely passes through government offices. These direct investments help provide entrepreneurial programs that develop the skills of migrants to support their livelihoods. This may help control corruption to a certain extent because governments are not directly involved.

It is worth noting that collective actions are not easy to undertake because of the dilemmas that states face regarding their gains from cooperation. Hence, institutional arrangements through top-down and bottom-up are needed to shape the desired migration governance. These diverse institutional arrangements can promote information sharing, monitor operational mechanisms, punish defectors and reward those who cooperate (Holahan and Lubell, 2022:21). In the case of Ghana, some participants expressed the hope that involving multiple actors in migration governance might help solve some problems that hinder cooperation; CSOs, for instance, can help monitor government actions and the dominance of political interests. As expressed by the interviewee:

...Ghana needs vibrant non-state institutions in its migration governance structure, like CSOs, to deal with any political conflicts of interest. This can also help establish a holistic framework that engages all bodies in managing migration and promotes transparency in any form of cooperation... (Respondent-Q: Academic in Migration Research and Policy, 21.08.2022).

Therefore, non-state actors such as civil society organizations, international non-governmental organizations, interest groups and religious organizations can facilitate and contribute to climate migration governance through local, national and international projects. These organizations might play a critical role in integrating migrants into host communities and drawing the attention of governments to dormant migration programs and policies (Schweiger, 2024:2).

Additionally, partnerships with international institutions and CSOs can help Ghana manage its domestic politics, which affects migration policy formulation and

implementation. Since different state government institutions are currently involved in Ghanaian migration issues, non-state actors such as private companies who provide humanitarian support in times of displacement can help deal with domestic issues that negatively affect migration governance. Those non-state actors can support the monitoring and evaluation of projects. Some local community members interviewed at coastal towns also revealed that emergency support from state agencies is often shared based on political affiliations during coastal erosion and displacement. However, NGOs and international relief agencies do not need to consider political affiliations. Similarly, as revealed by Mouthaan's earlier research, different government migration institutions in Ghana pay attention to their institutional interests when consulting external partners. These institutions focus on donor partners' financial support before seeking external technical support, even if better options for the state may be available elsewhere. (Mouthaan, 2019:16). Effective frameworks comprising state and non-state monitoring mechanisms can help deal with any clash of interests. Such frameworks should involve local authorities, international actors and other NGOs to promote transparency and fairness when providing urgent relief to the climate vulnerable. Establishing such a mechanism can help migration agencies better address climate migration management and governance issues.

More importantly, including many relevant local actors (host communities' leaders) and other non-state actors (CSOs) in policy formulation and implementation can help control national migration agencies' use of funds. Although, as indicated by Talleraas (2024) and Kandilige et al. (2023), local authorities are not entirely excluded from migration policies, their inclusion and inputs in policy formulation and implementation are less than expected. The adequate inclusion of local authorities can be improved by establishing enough migration offices at the municipal level to deal with the affairs of local migrants directly. Through such establishments, the decentralization of migration governance can also be improved.

Regarding collective inclusion for better governance actions, interviewees stressed the importance of farmers and herders. It was stressed that local actors, such as rural farmers and herders, must be involved in developing sustainable solutions related to the movement patterns of herders and their livestock. Additional concerns were raised regarding collective efforts with external partners to secure funds for local

migration institutions to coordinate activities at the local level. The aim of securing funds is to establish a financial hub at both the local and national levels and make funds available to municipalities for specific needs. This can be achieved through the government's effective partnership with other actors to allocate sufficient funds for climate mobility activities. As mentioned earlier, the government can initiate mechanisms to tax herders, which can help raise money for the mentioned financial hub. Some informants also emphasized that the government is willing to share money with local actors because district assemblies and common funds are already available to support programs at the local and district levels. What is needed at this point is to integrate climate migration issues to help find a durable solution to the herders' and farmers' issues.

Cities' inclusion is also important for collective action on climate mobility governance. It was emphasized during interviews that cities in Ghana can join international networks such as the Global Resilient Cities Network (currently only Accra, the capital city of Ghana is a member) to cooperate and learn how to build climate resilience in all affected cities. Cooperation through such a program can be championed through local governments' initiatives to facilitate collaboration and training services in vulnerable communities so that vulnerable communities can learn from cities that are doing well in building resilience.

Ghana's effort to take adequate measures toward the above-mentioned programs and planning will help the government and stakeholders save resources and high costs that may be needed for emergencies. With these committed strategies in place, Ghana can develop sustainable measures to promote the lives of climate migrants in cities. This approach can also help Ghana improve its efforts toward SDG 11, which aims to achieve sustainable cities and communities by 2030. It is, therefore, important for Ghana to engage more with multiple actors so that overly politicized migration issues can give way to the benefits of migration through alternative mechanisms.

4.4.2. Collective Institutional Action through Regional and Sub-regional Units

This study revealed from participants' and consultants' discussions that efforts to develop strong collective mechanisms from regional and sub-regional units within Africa are crucial for Ghana to perform better on climate migration governance. For Africa, especially West Africa, where Ghana is projected to have a significant impact on climate migration in the near future, it will be advantageous for the AU and sub-regional blocs like ECOWAS to establish institutional mechanisms and norms at the local and national levels to prepare for unforeseen risks and large climate mobilities in the future. This will help provide the necessary support to vulnerable people who have the least means of resilience and adaptive measures to deal with climate shocks.

Ghana, therefore, needs to establish a climate mobility governance mechanism with its neighbouring countries in the ECOWAS sub-region from where climate-related migrants primarily originate. Although the ECOWAS has a protocol for free movement, there is no specific procedure or provision for those who move within ECOWAS due to climate effects. Additionally, the current ECOWAS protocol on free movement focuses more on short-term movements up to 90 days and has not attained the full implementation of people's right to long-term residency and employment to support livelihoods. Literature reviews and interviews reveal that climate migration patterns have changed from short-term and seasonal to long-term and permanent. Therefore, there is a need to assess and reformulate the ECOWAS rules on free movement as well as the other migration-related protocols in the continent to create concrete provisions to accommodate climate migrants.

Hollifield argues that transnational social networks are important for linking sending and hosting states (Hollifield, 2000:85-86). As also confirmed by Teye and Nikoi, in West Africa, social networks and cultural similarities shape the movement of migrants (Teye and Nikoi, 2022:89). Additionally, observations from this study confirm that social and cultural ties shape the pattern of movements and destination locations in Ghana of climate migrants from Northern Ghana, as well as those who migrate from neighbouring West African countries. These transnational mechanisms facilitate migrants' social mobility. Considering the importance of transnational

mechanisms and social networks, Ghana, its neighbouring countries and the African Union can leverage these social mechanisms to establish movement cards, such as climate passes and passports. This can facilitate the movement of people who are forcibly displaced due to climate change-related events.

In addition, since Ghana and many other African countries have ethnic links with their neighbouring countries, strengthening their transnational communities through formal institutional mechanisms can positively impact cooperation on climate migration management. This can enable and facilitate the connection of climate-vulnerable individuals with their social networks in neighbouring countries and communities if they wish to use migration as an adaptation mechanism against climate shocks. Typical examples are the 2007 New Zealand's Recognized Seasonal Employer Scheme (RSE), the Australian 2008 Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWPS) and the subsequent 2012 Seasonal Worker Program (SWP) for neighbouring island countries in the Pacific to facilitate the migration to those two countries to work and adapt to frequent climate disasters in the Pacific. Transnational social and cultural ties coupled with established institutional mechanisms between the Pacific countries, Australia and New Zealand help accommodate and promote the well-being of displaced people from the Pacific regions (Brickenstein and Tabucanon, 2013:9, 20). From migrating to adapting to climate stress, people's social networks are also considered important factors for migrants' long-term stays (Brickenstein and Tabucanon, 2013:23). Schemes like this can be formalized to allow vulnerable climates to migrate within Africa and its sub-regions as well.

National interest, a common factor shared by neoliberals and neorealists, is important for establishing cooperative mechanisms. However, the differing point is that neoliberals focus more on disaggregating national interest-based social and economic groups. Neorealists focus on the individual state's interest (more on security-related interest). Hence, this study supports neoliberal institutionalism, focusing on how domestic and international factors can enable collective action. Additionally, neoliberals stress the relevance of institutions in shaping policy outcomes (Hollifield, 2000:88-89). Reflecting on domestic and international factors, Ghana can strengthen its cooperation through the existing mechanisms established by ECOWAS free movement protocols to connect with other multilateral institutions within and outside

Africa. This will help achieve both domestic and external advantages. Further, this collective mechanism can help widen regular paths for orderly migration by climate migrants, protecting them from having to use irregular pathways to secure themselves elsewhere.

This study does not disregard the likely cost of cooperation. People who are on the move, especially those who are vulnerable to climate change, for instance, may require financial support to facilitate their movement. Protecting the rights of vulnerable groups means that states have to support them financially. As recognized by Ghana, ECOWAS and AU members, addressing a common agenda is cost-effective. Ghana, in connection with the aforementioned organizations, has made a commitment toward the “2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development and other financial commitments” (ECOWAS, 2022:17). Although action may be slow, the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda is a major step, demonstrating political willingness to address a common issue. ECOWAS and the AU consensus on climate change impacts and the call for better collective action indicate their willingness to take climate action. Similarly, the 2021 ECOWAS Declaration on Climate Change (ECOWAS, 2021) demonstrates a high degree of autonomy and acceptance of responsibilities to address multiple concerns related to the impacts of climate change. Although it could be criticized for being a mere declaration, it is a major step showing ECOWAS' recognition of climate-related crises¹⁶ and acceptance of responsibility, including instructing the ECOWAS Commission to accelerate funds¹⁷ to address them.

Critics argue that burden sharing can prevent states from cooperating to take up responsibilities. However, financial mechanisms can be established to support member states by recognizing migration as a mechanism of adaptation to climate shocks. In this regard, the AU and ECOWAS Commissions can establish mechanisms with penalties to compel parties to cooperate and exclude those who do not cooperate

¹⁶ The Declaration also mentions migration as an effect of climate change. It states that “the effects and impacts of climate change will lead to... the exacerbation of conflicts linked to the scarcity and use of natural resources and a scarcity of potable water and of course with the consequences of migration” (ECOWAS, 2021:1-2).

¹⁷ The leaders also instruct ECOWAS Commission to: “Accelerate the accreditation of the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development and other interested financial entities to existing climate funds and support the accreditation process of regional institutions to climate funds” (ECOWAS, 2021:4).

from the union's opportunities. Such a punishment mechanism can help improve cooperation by deterring members from free riding. Also, stakeholders and policymakers in such cooperation can devise better strategies when consensus on the governance of climate migration is put into workable actions rather than archival documents. Furthermore, ECOWAS and AU actors can benefit from the existing frameworks on free movement to strengthen their relationships. Establishing frameworks for climate migration governance will help members cooperate to achieve long-term benefits similar to what citizens of ECOWAS enjoy concerning free movement.

Concerning the case of Ghana, the National Migration Policy (NMP) recognizes migration as an adaptation and coping mechanism to deal with climate climate-related stress (Ministry of Interior-Ghana, 2016:55-56). However, the NMP fails to mention any concrete measures to ensure financial support for climate migrants and immobile populations who cannot move due to financial reasons and/or socio-cultural factors. Additionally, stakeholders have not established effective mechanisms for internal migration; hence, climate migrants who migrate primarily from rural communities to urban centres or other rural communities continue to face challenges. The inadequate attention to climate migrants, as mentioned during the consultative interviews, results in the absence of institutional mechanisms at regional, sub-regional and national levels.

Collective action to institutionalize climate migration mechanisms can be achieved by involving and coordinating between state and non-state actors at national, regional and international levels. Such collective action may enable financial support because ECOWAS and AU have shown willingness to promote financial integration in West Africa and Africa at large, as mentioned in the ECOWAS Vision 2050 (ECOWAS, 2022:45). Furthermore, as indicated in "Agenda 2063: the Africa We Want", predictable and stable financial resources to support the cooperative agenda can be achieved through domestic financial resources and financial institutions and markets, and it is critical to channel those funds "to where they can be most effective and where there is market failure in the allocation of the needed resources" (AU, 2015:121-122). Such financial reforms and expected benefits may motivate individual

states to contribute to any financial hub that may be established to address climate-related migration issues.

Ghana can leverage the GCM, the ECOWAS movement protocol, the AU migration agenda and other international and non-state partners to establish the necessary mechanisms to govern the climate-related mobility. As Hollifield mentions, the institutional coalitions to govern migration can be weakened (Hollifield, 2000:93). This study does not reject the notion that coalitions can be weakened; however, it argues for mechanisms to strengthen institutions and build on existing migration frameworks. Similarly, as noted by Keohane, institutions can establish mechanisms to formulate, monitor and enforce cooperative rules to operate better (Keohane, 2002:2-3). It is worth noting that African leaders have shown a willingness to adopt the AU Agenda 2063. With a view to achieving the goals of Agenda 2063, the AU also emphasizes strengthening existing institutions and recommends that states monitor and commit to the shared collective agenda (AU, 2015:107-109).

Ideational and cultural factors, economic interest and human rights are important factors that influence the formation of coalitions (Hollifield, 2000:94). Ghana can, therefore, restructure its cooperation since these factors noted by Hollifield already exist in its dealings with the ECOWAS, the AU and other external bodies. As a suggestion, this can be achieved through bilateral and multilateral relations with neighbouring countries within the sub-region by assessing how neighbours will be affected if climate migration and displacement are poorly addressed in the respective countries. Additionally, guiding norms should be developed to construct a climate migration governance mechanism to promote collective action and support vulnerable populations.

This study recognizes that coalitions are difficult to achieve because democratic states are caught up in what Hollifield refers to as the “liberal paradox”, a situation in which liberal developed countries advocate a free-market economy but restrict migration due to concern with national security and identity (Hollifield, 2000:77). While promoting freedom of movement and human rights, liberal states are also constrained by national politics and national security concerns. This paradox influences their migration policies resulting in strict border controls, opening and closing of borders and integration policies (Natter, 2024: 680-82, 689). These

paradoxical issues influence global commitment to migration governance. However, the current global interest in GCM and other cooperative mechanisms indicates that states are willing to offer better global migration governance.

Furthermore, since global consensus is always questionable and difficult to achieve, Ghana, having similar cultural and political identities with the members of ECOWAS and the African Union, can seek to contribute to establishing sub-regional and regional mechanisms to govern climate migration. Such establishments can help people connect and may result in better global collaboration. Of course, the liberal paradox in Africa may be a concern. As mentioned in Chapter 1, even though African states (over 40) have ratified the AfCFTA toward free trade and to enhance the free movement of goods and services, the momentum towards free movement has gained less than the expected attention since only four countries have ratified the FMP yet (Hirsch, 2021b:497). Also, in the case of ECOWAS, while Ghana and other member states enjoy easy access to a market with easy flows of goods and services, the paradox exists when members prioritize their citizen's interests and prevent other nationals from doing certain jobs to support their livelihoods. However, Ghana's relaxed restrictions for ECOWAS citizens and other Africans' entry can be of outmost importance and may help advocacy for climate migration governance. Also, as a key member of the ECOWAS, where the free movement of people is valued, Ghana's concerns about treating climate migrants in a dignified manner can shape the actions of other members in ECOWAS and AU. Protection for vulnerable climate migrants (especially those displaced by sudden-onset events) needs to be considered against border barriers to promote the people's rights that the AU seeks to promote.

In conformity with the existing mechanisms established by the relevant UN agencies such as the IOM, UNHCR and UNFCCC, special principles of conduct can be established to safeguard climate migrants. Drawing on examples from the EU's regional migration regime,¹⁸ addressing collective action problems at the regional and sub-regional levels may be easier (Hollifield, 2000:97). Considering the EU example, the AU needs to create strong advocacy by reflecting on various projections regarding the expected climate mobility numbers in Africa. Such projections can help with policy

¹⁸ The principles of the EU migration regime include freedom of movement, human rights, political equality and assistance to member states, border protection and prevention of irregular migration, integration of migrants into host societies, and cooperation with third countries (EU, n.d.).

formulation and implementation as part of an appropriate governance mechanism. Similarly, African states can build on existing institutions to adopt and formalize regulations to govern climate migration.

Ghana, ECOWAS and the AU should adopt “central regulatory power and suasion”¹⁹ to address coordination challenges (Hollifield, 2000:100). This can be achieved by creating a rotating leadership system for migration governance like the tenure of ECOWAS and AU chairpersons, the Presidency of the UN General Assembly, etc. With centrally rotating leadership, calm and order are maintained through which issues of relevance can be discussed and addressed. More importantly, the primary objective of establishing a climate migration coalition should be to promote and protect the rights and dignity of climate migrants. This governance system can be based on what Bimal Ghosh refers to as the “principle of regulated openness”; the objective of migration governance should be to make people's movements “orderly, manageable, productive and comprehensive” to balance the interests of sending and receiving countries and migrants (Ghosh, 2000:220-221).

Moreover, as some consultants stressed that, institutionalizing climate migration can provide an orderly means for climate migrants to secure refuge elsewhere in Ghana. In the context of Ghana and many other African countries, providing orderly and manageable means of movement for climate migrants can help channel labour force towards gaps in different sectors of the economy, especially in the agricultural sectors where the youth and active labour force continue to abandon their lands and migrate to urban centres and abroad to engage in off-farms livelihood activities. In an interview with a migration policy consultant, he stated:

...promoting climate migration governance will help Ghana, legally secure migrants to fill labour gaps. For instance, climate migrants from other countries can provide cheap labour and help in cocoa-producing areas where most of the young labour force have moved to urban centres. Therefore, governments on the continent (Africa) must institutionalize climate-related mobility so climate migrants can quickly secure themselves elsewhere (Respondent-S, University of Ghana, Climate Migration Researcher and Consultant, 12.10.2022).

¹⁹ Suasion, as previously explained, is a cooperation strategy in which persuasion or coercion is applied to promote cooperation when necessary. This strategy involves linking issues to facilitate cooperation; “cooperation is achieved through issue linkages” (Martin, 1992:783).

To sum up, with specific institutions for climate-related mobility, issues of concern can be better understood and addressed. As De Haas put it, "...understanding the life experience of migrants can help provide a realistic account for migratory agency...". It is, therefore, necessary to understand migration as a livelihood event that helps improve the long-term well-being of individuals and families (De Haas, 2024:19-20). Thus, climate migration governance requires appropriate norms and mechanisms to deal with structural challenges such as those related to coordination and finance. Solving these challenges may help protect vulnerable people from threatening climate events. More importantly, with specific institutions for climate mobility, stakeholders may better understand and deal with the vulnerable people's different decisions to move or stay and movement patterns.

4.4.3. Collective Action Problem in Ghana's Migration Governance

Collective action aims to resolve common problems in a given issue-area; however, such action often faces problems due to uncertainties in the international system (Hasenclever et al., 2000:7). As noted, "collective action problem exists when following the imperatives of individual rationality may lead, paradoxically, to collectively suboptimal outcome" (Hasenclever et al., 1997:45). Concerning this, some states sometimes act to benefit from cooperation but do not fully cooperate; they become free riders (Martin, 1992:767). Upon critical examination, this study finds that Ghana's migration governance and cooperation with other actors, especially at sub-regional (ECOWAS) and regional (AU) levels, are characterized by free-riding and preference issues. This is closely related to the nature of legal frameworks within ECOWAS and the AU on migration. While a coordination problem also exists, the absence of binding norms to punish states and promote better cooperation render successful collective action toward the welfare of climate migrants difficult.

The situation resembles the prisoner's dilemma (PD) because Ghana and other members in ECOWAS and the AU may have different individual interests, which result in their free riding. Ghana and its partners enjoy the membership advantages of these organizations, for which they choose staying over separation, making the situation seem like a coordination problem. However, different preferences make

Ghana and other African countries become free riders in migration issues. This brings the collective action problem closer to PD. Coordination cannot be achieved as long as individual actors seek to achieve their most favoured outcomes at the expense of other partners (Hasenclever et al., 1997:106). Cooperation in regulating issues related to the climate crisis can only be effective if there are penalties for free-riders and punishment for non-compliance (Nordhaus, 2020:16-17).

Ghana and its cooperative partners like to cooperate but may have different concerns as to the economic, security and socio-cultural domains. A typical example is that some members of ECOWAS, including Ghana, sometimes restrict the free movement of other ECOWAS nationals to cross borders or prevent them from doing specific jobs in their countries. These are related to national interest or xenophobia in some job sectors. This attitude deviates from the ECOWAS goal of treating all nationals equally (Teye and Oucho, 2024: 619-20). Also, some ECOWAS migrants were blamed for social ills, such as increased crime rates or strain on social services, resulting in their expulsions in the 1980s and late 1990s in Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Benin and Cote d'Ivoire (Okunade, 2021). Even though members still prefer to stay to benefit from these unions (ECOWAS and the AU), differences in state concerns make coordination difficult. Although coordination does not necessitate monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms (Hasenclever et al., 1997:48), the absence of such mechanisms along with weak legal frameworks reinforces deviant behaviour from the core principles of the unions (Martin, 1992:792; Okunade, 2021).

A collective action problem characterized by lack of coordination refers to mixed preferences as to the attainment of common goal (Hasenclever et al., 1997:111-112). "Cooperation (coordination) is not achieved by mutual adjustment, but by one partner adjusting to the other" (Hasenclever et al., 1997:106). As observed, there are conflicts of interests related to migrants' employment and settlement issues among Ghana and other (West) African countries, resulting in free riding. Despite Ghana's participation in migration agreements, such as the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol and GCM, its migration policy is ruled by different preferences and conflicting interests. As long as all members of ECOWAS do not adjust their policies to the norms and principles put forward by ECOWAS, a coordination among their policies will not be possible. In ECOWAS, since there exists free riding, the collective action problem,

as explained, is closer to PD rather than BoS and thus requires "clear-cut injunction that specifies illegitimate behaviour" among actors to prevent cheating (Hasenclever et al., 1997:48).

Even if one assumes that the necessary political will to overcome the PD situation came into being and, accordingly, binding norms and rules along with strong monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms were established, there still remains a coordination problem on the continent. Coordination can sometimes be facilitated by international organizations through their collecting and sharing information among parties (Hasenclever et al., 1997:47-48). This situation also applies to Ghana's migration governance and other ECOWAS and AU members. For instance, Mouthaan revealed that in the absence of formal coordination among migration-related ministries in Ghana and Senegal, IOM acts as an external facilitator, bringing parties together to cooperate on issues (Mouthaan, 2019:15). He also observed that sometimes the EU ensures coordination among some West African states on migration affairs by providing incentives to settle differences (Mouthaan, 2019:17).

Although Ghana has committed to cooperating with partners such as ECOWAS, AU, EU and other UN agencies such as the IOM and UNHCR to promote regular and orderly migration, Ghana has not done its best in governing migration, particularly climate migration. This is due to the voluntary nature of (climate) migration agreements. On a broader note, Ghana benefits from its cooperative migration business through financial and technical support without entirely contributing to actions and practices for better migration governance, especially regarding vulnerable internal migrants. Hence, this study considers Ghana's attitude toward collective migration governance as free-riding on its cooperation agenda with ECOWAS, AU and other international actors. While Ghana and some other African countries aim to cooperate toward better sub-regional, regional and international migration governance (hoping for collective gain), some of their actions look more like free riders, especially in the case of full implementation of ECOWAS principles, such as the Free Movement Protocol and the AU programs that aim to promote the continental free movement of citizens. Ghana and its partners can be considered self-interested states that view cooperation as a means to reap absolute gains, as

demonstrated by their wanting cooperation with ECOWAS, the AU, the EU, IOM and UNHCR, among others.

It is worth noting that agreed rules are important in guiding cooperation (Hasenclever et al., 1997:61). Ghana is expected to cooperate with international migration institutions (for example, IOM) on the basis of agreed rules. However, this study observes that Ghana cooperates more on issues related to emigration because of the expected benefits from remittance, while it pays less attention to internally displaced people, such as climate migrants, who may be considered a burden. This may help explain the fact that Ghana has not yet ratified the Kampala Convention, which obliges states to pay critical attention to internally displaced people and displaced persons.

The organizations of the 2017 Ghana Diaspora Homecoming Summit, 2019 Homecoming Celebration and the Year of Return showcasing the contributions of the diaspora to Ghana's development (Kandilige et al., 2023:12) all reveal that Ghana pays less attention to internal migration, where climate migration is a significant part of the equation. Ghana adopted several migration instruments, such as the GCM, without considering a national holistic agenda (Talleraas, 2024:2). As mentioned, Ghana tends to focus on the diaspora and appreciates them more than internal migrants because of the incoming remittances from the diaspora (Kandilige et al., 2023:12). The less attention to internal migration, such as climate-related migration, is an indication of ignorance and lack of political will. The absence of legal frameworks binding states on climate migration issues can be considered both a cause and consequence of such ignorance. As Okunade argues concerning Africa, leaving it to the individual state to voluntarily implement and enforce collective agreements will not help achieve the collective goal of better migration governance (Okunade, 2021). Although the GCM and other existing migration instruments in ECOWAS and the AU, of which Ghana is a party, aim at migration governance for all (to protect the dignity of all migrants), the absence of effective monitoring on policy implementation result in ignoring vulnerable climate migrants in Ghana and elsewhere.

Ghana's free riding on migration issues results in incoherence between national and international agendas. This means that Ghana does not approach the matter with a view to achieving an integrated sub-regional, regional and global agenda to promote

orderly migration and the dignity of migrants. Different preferences of Ghana affect its commitment to the agenda of AU and ECOWAS on free movement and the international (GCM) agenda on regular and orderly migration; Ghana does not comply with the agreements it signed. For example, ECOWAS, AU and the GCM stress non-discrimination against foreign migrants; however, Article 27 of the 2003 Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) Act prohibits other nationals from engaging in jobs related to petty trading, street hawking, barbering, taxi driving and so on (GIPC, 2013:10). This demonstrates a conflict between Ghana's national regulations and those of ECOWAS, which aims to promote migrant movements and rights to livelihoods.

Other West African countries, such as Mali, do not permit foreign nationals to work in public sectors (Adaawen, 2017:8). While ECOWAS countries are trying to protect their interests, these countries are acting against the core mandate of the Unions; freedom of movement and to seek jobs and be treated equally are core mandates, especially of ECOWAS. These countries act based on their selfish interest regarding treating other member states' citizens in the job market. It may also be an issue of protectionism (Adaawen, 2017:9; Teye and Oucho, 2024: 619-20). These countries seek to benefit from the ECOWAS free movement protocol without adhering to the principle of reciprocity since they do not allow citizens from other member states to obtain livelihoods from some jobs. They can be described as free riders who benefit without contributing to the overall aim of ECOWAS to promote free movement and opportunities for other nationals to find livelihood elsewhere within the sub-region. This is a typical PD situation as actors prefer to deploy individual strategies to achieve their “selfish interests” (Snidal, 1985:926). Actors in PD desire to better themselves at the expense of cooperative members. The incentive to defect because of individual interest makes achieving public good challenging (Nordhaus, 2020:10-11).

The free-riding situation does not imply that cooperation issues cannot be remedied. Cooperation is important for strengthening weaker states. The necessary step may be establishing alternative means to address the specific needs of cooperative partners through *ad hoc* agreements. Alternatively, conferences and forums can always be held to allow dissatisfied or selfish partners to discuss their issues openly. Similarly, side payments can be established to promote and reward the good performance of partners (Hasenclever et al., 2000:15). Also, strict adherence to the norm of diffuse

reciprocity can encourage free riders to cooperate. Some states may have to compromise vis-à-vis the violating behaviours of others agreed upon by partners so as not to destroy their cooperation. This compromise strategy can be used to learn how to establish specific sanctions on certain issues. Warnings and relevant decisions can always be made to guide members to behave appropriately.

Different preferences of states need to be adjusted for the sake of collective good. The cooperative body can sanction free riders by denying them 'entitlements' or through issue linkages. This can be done through threats to cut cooperative advantages that noncooperative members enjoy (Martin, 1992:771-772). The AU and ECOWAS can apply these strategies to control free riders. Applying these strategies may persuade or force some actors to cooperate better. Strengthening institutions such as the AU and ECOWAS Commission with the power to sanction those violating agreements can help prevent cheating/free-riding. As Krasner emphasized, powerful actors /institutions can shape states' behaviours and help them achieve the common good (Krasner, 1982:198).

As to cooperation on climate migration, in situations where specific rules are needed, *ad hoc* agreements may help guide members (e.g., in cocoa production and livestock farming) within the ECOWAS sub-region. The Ghanaian cocoa sector benefits from seasonal and long-term climate migrants from neighbouring countries. These migrants and their respective communities and countries of origin benefit through remittances and other means of supporting livelihoods and families returning home. Similarly, herders contribute to the meat and milk industry in Ghana. Thus, the emphasis should be on promoting regular movements and accommodating environments through collective institutions.

Regarding the issue of coordination, changes in domestic politics can affect how coordination on some issues progresses. As revealed by consultations, changes in government affect the continuity of some migration policies and programs and how related migration institutions coordinate. This situation has negatively affected the implementation of the Ghana's NMP. Changes in the government in Ghana and Senegal affect coordination among government actors and relations with external actors, such as the EU, on migration issues (Mouthaan, 2019:19). The absence of adequate measures and mechanisms for new governments to strictly follow the

established procedures and implement the policies of previous governments is a major concern.

As stressed by Hasenclever et al. (1997), institutions that change as a result of the changes in the power status of states “lack resilience ” (Hasenclever et al., 1997:2). In this regard, ratifying an international agreement that has the power of enforcement can be helpful. Considering climate migration governance as a club good (adopting a club model) within ECOWAS or the AU with penalties to sanction defection can be a beacon of hope. This approach can foster practical cooperation (Nordhaus, 2020:10) and pave the way for collective action. Penalties under ratified climate migration agreements can help strengthen national mechanisms for a new government to follow a holistic national migration agenda rather than political parties’ (new government’s) self-interest. In this regard, specific norms and rules should be established to strictly guide governments’ behaviour toward setting goals that may help improve the governance of climate-induced migration. This may also help to deal with coordination problems and preferences regarding migration policy, whose focus is most of the time not climate migration.

One fundamental reason why institutions (regimes) with monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms enable cooperation is related to actors’ concern with reputation. States should be aware that violating norms may affect their reputation in the sense of having a negative impact on their future relations with other actors. This perception can lead them to follow cooperative regulations toward a common agenda (Hasenclever et al., 1997:38). Since states are considered rational and egoistic actors, they are expected to prefer long-term gains to short-term ones. Thus, demonstrating trustworthiness is critical for present and future partnerships with a view to long-term benefits (Hasenclever et al., 1997:35-37). States with an opportunist and bad reputation may find it difficult to join and benefit from future cooperation (Hasenclever et al., 2000:8). Ghana probably knows that its reputation can be damaged by not cooperating effectively on migration issues within ECOWAS. Compliance measures should, therefore, be enforced by relevant stakeholders (at the domestic and international levels) to induce Ghana to cooperate better.

Security and national identity concerns along with political and socio-economic factors may constitute barriers to an open-door policy. However, the right

institutions may help build collective capacity for mutual gains and address respective challenges (Hasenclever et al., 1997:83). Neither Ghana nor other countries, especially within Africa, can manage their migration affairs independently especially because of financial and technical constraints. Since the urgent need for cooperation to protect the dignity of climate migrants cannot be denied, such cooperation cannot be treated as a matter of making a particular state gain or lose; instead, it is a human rights issue that all actors should be interested in addressing.

Although common interest is one of the preconditions for cooperation, this does not mean that cooperative partners will follow immediately (Hasenclever et al., 1997:27). For this reason, some partners (actors) may choose to free ride due to certain factors, such as inadequate capacity. In dealing with ECOWAS, the AU and other international actors, Ghana prefers to free-ride on diverse issues, such as those related to free movement and the right to all forms of employment. However, how long must a grace period be considered if this assumption holds? For instance, since its establishment in the late 1970s, Ghana has benefited from the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol. Suppose Ghana and other African countries continue to behave in a manner that does not contribute to the overall objectives of their organizations. In that case, their action can be fairly described as *intentional free riders*.

Migration governance in Ghana and many other African countries is constrained by structural problems such as low capacity of the existing institutions, inadequate finance and resource allocation, incoherent and insufficient policies and policy coordination challenges. These issues, along with competing priorities among government institutions and donor partners and conflictual issues between national policies and the international agenda, create a complex landscape for migration governance. However, as Keohane put it, these do not entirely hinder cooperation because conflicting and complementary interests characterize cooperation. In this case, policies within and between states should be formulated with a view to common good in mind and converge around the norms established by regional and international institutions. Institutions are expected to facilitate cooperation through information sharing and cost reduction (Keohane, 1984:97-98). What is important in the case of Ghana and its relations with ECOWAS, the AU and other external partners is the

establishment of effective measures for policy implementation. Such measures can help better execute migration projects and programs.

Regulating issues of importance through effective institutional mechanisms can get free riders or members with diverse preferences to cooperate. In this regard, there should be the "possibility of exclusion" as a punishment strategy for members who fail to comply with the principles of cooperation. The successful application of penalties to members who violated established rules can compel members to cooperate better. As norms play a crucial role in guiding a regime, they help "delegitimize and legitimize" specific actions and behaviours of its members. Penalties can discourage undesirable or illegitimate behaviours and practices among members (Hasenclever et al., 1997:97-99; Nordhaus, 2020:10).

In the case of ECOWAS and the AU, it is urgent to develop mechanisms that effectively monitor and promote appropriate conduct among members. These mechanisms should be able to caution members who benefit without making the expected contribution to the success of better migration governance in the region. ECOWAS and AU members know the importance of these organizations and prefer to stay within but without cooperating as required. These members receive numerous advantages while, also, benefiting from the unions' bargaining power and the privileges they may receive as group members from actors such as the EU, the UN and other external partners.

To prevent Ghana and other African states from free-riding, ECOWAS, the AU and other international partners should commit themselves to setting goals and making effective and practical policies with clear strategies that are supported by effective monitoring mechanisms. Member states should be transparent about their domestic interests to negotiate better with external partners. Ghana, for example, should focus on implementing NMP by prioritizing internal and cross-border migration. Additionally, priority should be given to long-term national plans on migration, with key attention to both domestic and external migration affairs rather than domestic political influence. Norms should be established to oblige new governments to continue and implement previous governments' uncompleted migration policies. This may help solve problems of policy inconsistencies and incoherence noted in Chapter 3 and earlier in this Chapter.

Collective governance of climate migration can help Ghana and other states obtain necessary support in terms of finance and capacity building to prepare for future uncertainties and mutual gains. According to Hollifield, it may be easier to solve collective action problems related to diverse preferences and free riding at the sub-regional or regional level (Hollifield, 2012:283). ECOWAS and the AU might better address collective action problems with the relevant mechanisms. These mechanisms should critically pay attention to issues such as the lack of reliable data, weak coordination, inadequate human resource capacity (i.e. inadequate technical experts), weak institutions, financial constraints and “lack of commitment on the part of policymakers”. Additionally, there is a need to improve mechanisms for information sharing and policy coherence (Teye and Oucho, 2023:611-12, 618, 626). Addressing these challenges can help strengthen cooperation and improve the provision of climate-migrants’ needs.

In addition, at the ECOWAS level, it can be argued that the union prefers to give more importance to the economic benefits of migration rather than to the humanitarian aspect, including the needs of vulnerable groups such as climate migrants. This may explain why no concrete mechanism for climate migration has been established. The Free Movement Protocol pays more attention to economic integration. However, such an economic agenda may not fully materialize if migration governance does not promote a regular and orderly movement that may facilitate successful economic integration. While there may be cooperation costs, such as financial investments and increased tensions over limited resources, members can benefit from improved protection and sharing of best practices and resources in the long-term. These benefits can help members improve their resilience and respond better to the needs of their vulnerable nationals.

In the coordination game, players (actors) who move first can influence others toward the expected goal if they can convince others. To relate this to Africa, the free movement agenda, which may, in the long run, facilitate the movement of all migrants, including climate-induced migrants, can be motivated by actions of countries such as Benin, the Gambia, Seychelles, Rwanda, Kenya and Ghana, all of which currently have visa-free protocols for all African nationals. These first movers’ actions can be crucial in influencing other migration policies to harmonize migration policies to promote the

AU-free movement agenda. The coordination problem between Ghana and other partners, especially within the AU and ECOWAS, may also be solved “through the centralization of regulatory power and pooling of sovereignty” like the Schengen system (Hollifield, 2012:285). The central regulatory power can be exercised by the AU Commission, which oversees AU migration policies to promote effective migration governance and management in the region (AU, 2018:9). In this sense, the existing migration institutions within the member states can be strengthened through effective monitoring mechanisms to promote trust and reciprocity among partners to improve governance of climate migration.

In sum, with a view to controlling free riding to achieve better and practical cooperation, this study agrees with Nordhaus (2020: 10,16-17), Martin (1992:772-73) and Snidal (1985:923-24) that there must be penalties to punish the “non-participants”. Also, regulatory mechanisms should be able to bind cooperative member members to the rules of conduct they agree on. This can serve as a legal commitment to restrain free riding among members (Kindleberger, 1981:252). Additionally, this study agrees with Hollifield that free riding can be best controlled by sub-regional units such as ECOWAS and EAC within regional or sub-regional areas because it may be easier to monitor members’ conduct (Hollifield, 2012:283). In this regard, ECOWAS, the AU and other regional organizations should establish relevant measures to strengthen the existing frameworks for better governance of climate migration. It may also be easier to tackle structural barriers at the sub-regional and regional levels such as lack of resources and capacity and other challenges like lack of political will because of the socio-cultural similarities and the limited size of the cooperation group. In this regard, strengthening the sub-regional and respective regional migration institutions can be helpful for an effective climate regime.

4.5. INCORPORATING CLIMATE MIGRATION POLICIES INTO GHANA'S MIGRATION GOVERNANCE: THE NEED FOR STRONG INSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS

The 2013 Climate Change and 2016 National Migration Policies make provisions for people moving or being displaced because of climate change; however,

effective implementation has yet to be achieved. This study finds that the major challenges in policy implementation are associated with lack of political will, funding and ineffective coordination mechanisms regarding migration policies and institutions in Ghana. In addition, Ghana does not have a Climate Change Act or Law; hence, there is no effective regulation to govern climate change issues. For example, the National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) has no binding rules on government institutions or individuals; therefore, there is no specific obligation on parties or individuals. As Kila argued, Ghana has no statutory binding instrument or the Climate Change Act for regulation, so it is challenging to enforce climate-related actions. In addition, no legal framework regulates companies' contributions to climate change in Ghana. The National Climate Change Policy serves as a soft law, lacking principles on enforcement and sanctions to fulfil its core mandates. Also, lack of political will and funding has affected the effective implementation of the diverse issues mentioned in the NCCP (Kila, 2023:300-301).

Ghana does not have mechanisms to protect migrants who move to Ghana due to climate change events. Although affected people receive humanitarian relief, mainly within the early days of a sudden onset disaster, no specific plan exists to protect immigrants who may be vulnerable and even need support to return to their home countries. In addition, due to the absence of specific statutory provisions, it is difficult for immigrants to demand long-term humanitarian support, especially when they lose all their property. Likewise, no provision exists to support Ghanaians affected by climate change or environmental events abroad. This is another instance where Ghana needs institutional norms and collective action with regional bodies and other diaspora communities to deal with immigrant and emigrant issues during climate crises.

Furthermore, Ghana needs committed institutional mechanisms to regulate the movement of herders. For instance, countries such as Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger have legislation in place to regulate the seasonal movements of pastoralists (herdsmen) (IOM, 2019b:11). However, Ghana lacks a committed statutory act to govern pastoralist movements. Some interviewees stressed that the absence of such regulation influences how Ghana governs the movement of herders. In an interview with one local community leader, it was indicated:

...When cattle destroy a farm, they (herdsmen) either pay by cash or give cattle..... Aside from this community approach, host communities

need...working legal regulations to know their (community members) rights regarding the movement of herders... (Respondent-N- Local Community Head, 20.08.2022).

Although Ghana does not have adequate policies on pastoralism, the 1998 ECOWAS regulation on transhumance provides a framework upon which Ghana can act. According to Article 3 of the regulation, “all animals of the bovine, caprine, cameline, equine and asinine species shall be allowed free passage across the borders of all Member States under the conditions set out in this decision” (ECOWAS, 1998:4). The ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol provides a framework through which Ghana can regulate pastoral activities within and within the sub-region. Ghana introduced Livestock Development in Ghana (2004-2014) and Ghana Livestock Development Policies and Strategies (2015-2023) to support the implementation of the ECOWAS Transhumance Protocol. However, Ghana has not yet adopted the expected pastoral activity regulations (Timpong-Jones et al., 2023:121-124).

Experts interviewed also emphasized that pastoralists are less involved and poorly represented in policy formulation. Additionally, in the land tenure system in Ghana,²⁰ there is a major hindrance to allocating extensive land to herders. These problems could be major obstacles to the establishment of effective regulations. Therefore, there is a need to address these related problems to ensure the smooth formulation and implementation of relevant policies.

Similarly, at the ECOWAS level, the Transhumance Protocol fails to account for measures to address the movement of pastoralists in times of emergency, such as floods and droughts (ECOWAS, 1998). Also, due to the top-down nature of the Protocol, pastoralists are excluded from policy formulation. Moreover, the Protocol does not provide a commission to coordinate cross-border movements (Timpong-Jones et al., 2023:126). These barriers can hinder any practical cooperation. Hence, addressing these problems may provide Ghana with several benefits that can shape the governance of the pastoral movement for the benefit of both host and sending communities and strengthen the cooperation between Ghana and its neighbours as well as facilitate the implementation of the Protocol.

²⁰ The land tenure system is related to land ownership. In Ghana, most lands are owned by traditional heads, families, clans, and individuals.

4.5.1. Necessity of Including Local Authorities and Institutions in Climate Migration Governance in Ghana

Strong local authorities can play a significant role in migration governance. However, local authorities are not often included in formulating and implementing migration policy in Ghana. It is observed that Ghanaian migration policies are predominantly developed at the national level, with insufficient involvement of the local authorities in host communities. In addition, some local leaders are unaware of the migration policies and regulations adopted at the national level. During an interview with a local community about a migration policy for foreigners (herders from Mali and Burkina Faso), it was confirmed that:

... We do not know any... migration policies for them (herdsmen) in our town. The government is in Accra and he does not know the people in our community. The Burkina Faso and Mali herders have come here and we live with them. Although they complain that some people are not friendly with them, this is a human issue, so we cannot control everything. We believe that we can move to different places or countries one day. It is part of life... (Respondent-N- Local Community Head, 20.08.2022).

This implies that some local authorities are unaware of the Ghana migration policies and other frameworks that operate in Ghana. However, they want to share their opinions with policymakers about dealing with climate migrants from different countries. The exclusion of and insufficient knowledge among local authorities regarding migration issues affects migration governance at the national level. It also directly or indirectly affects the sub-regional, regional and international agendas on migration. If this exclusion continues, it will negatively affect the achievements of the GCM objectives, especially Objectives 3 and 16, which aim at obtaining accurate information about migrants so that they can make informed decisions and at ensuring the inclusion of migrants to promote social cohesion. This problem can also affect object 15, which aims to provide essential services to migrants so they can enjoy some of their fundamental human rights (GCM, 2018).

Consistent with Moutaah (2019), Kandilige (2023) and Talleraas (2024), some local stakeholders were invited to provide insights into the 2016 Ghana National Migration Policy, but many were unaware of it. Additionally, local stakeholders are situated at the lower level of policymaking, which affects effective and inclusive policy implementation (Talleraas, 2024). Ghana's migration policy implementation has a top-

down nature that sidelines local stakeholders. The exclusion of local authorities adversely affects sounding ideas that local authorities may have to contribute to community-inclusive policy agendas that may result in a better governance of all migration affairs, especially climate-related ones.

Local authorities have the potential to shape inclusive policies at the community level. Because climate migrants mostly live in rural communities and the countryside, societal or community-level policy contributions can help policymakers at the national level better understand specific issues of concern from the origin and destination communities. This could be done to strengthen local institutions through relevant norms to ensure a safer and more orderly migration process. Through intense and collaborative institutions at the local level, obtaining climate migrants' data to support policymaking can be much easier. Talleraas' consultative research on migration policies found that policymakers and migration project executers are sometimes dissatisfied with the inadequate representation of local authorities and community members in policy formulations and project designs (Talleraas, 2024:12).

In relocation plans, for example, consensus must be reached between the moving and host communities. This approach promotes an understanding of possible reasons for relocation from high-risk areas, especially among communities that live along coastal towns. Local communities' inclusion in decision-making can also help recognize details of issues faced by both the moving and host communities. Draper and McKinnon also asserted that the resettlement of climate-affected populations should be based on collective decisions by stakeholders and the individuals to be resettled. Thus, people to be resettled or relocated should have consented to stakeholders' decisions regarding their movements (Draper and McKinnon, 2018:3-4).

While local institutions are important, this study observed that barriers to establishing vibrant local institutions are associated with inadequate funds to strengthen institutional capacities and domestic politics, which affect transparency and accountability, leading eventually to corruption. Regarding transparency and accountability, because not all relevant stakeholders are involved in important decisions at the local level, certain information is kept with a limited number of decision-makers. Consequently, the local public cannot hold them accountable to

question abnormalities. As Be-Ere (2023:295) noted, local assemblies do not have the financial resources to actively involve local leaders in consultative meetings and programs, such as town hall meetings, community development planning sessions and public policy delivery evaluations. This affects the extent to which participation and inclusion can effectively be achieved to act on a common agenda at the local level. Whenever there are political changes in government, they affect the activities of local institutions because new governments generally appoint new municipal and district executives (known in Ghana as Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs)). In addition, inadequate capacity-building mechanisms and training for local leaders affect the effectiveness of institutions in Ghana (Yaro et al., 2015:244). This constrains how local leaders can effectively initiate programs and take actions toward related goals. Hence, an attempt to establish vibrant local institutions should first address the above-mentioned barriers. These can be accomplished by budgeting enough to support local initiatives, introducing elections for MMDCEs to control political influence and strengthening the capacity of local leaders through relevant training. The solution to these barriers may help establish effective local collective institutional mechanisms that help build social cohesion. Vibrant local institutions, in turn, can help provide codes of conduct to govern important social issues and facilitate the adoption of measures to shape social activities (Faist, 2004:1-2).

4.5.2. The Role of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Reinforcing Local Authorities in Climate Migration Governance

Although national policymakers are reluctant to include more local authorities in implementing policy and resilience projects, INGOs and CSOs have been influential in empowering local communities to build resilience to withstand the harsh effects of climate change. These organizations usually go to communities to educate people about diverse issues related to climate change and its impact. This form of education and community involvement helps elaborate coping and adaptation mechanisms. As indicated by one CSO climate activist:

... we empower them (the local communities and their leaders) to adapt to...some of the impacts of climate change. They do not have the means to

move; some have to stay where most of their lands and even their environment have become unbearable. ... the people should not focus so much on the government; INGOs and CSOs can make much impact from the grassroots... I realized that most of the actions that have yielded positive results are those led by private institutions because they have the money and techniques to help...without so many bureaucracies...(Respondent-E-Youth Climate Activist,10.04.2022).

Similarly, one of the executives of the Green Africa Youth Organization (GAYO) mentioned that:

...GAYO educates individuals within communities on the effects of climate change and how climate change can affect their livelihoods and future generations... concerning all the projects we embark on.....CSOs involve them (the local communities) in consultative meetings and inform them about human activities such as the burning of refuse (garbage) and how they could reduce the impact of pollution Apart from this, we also have water for the adaptation project; we help to provide water to irrigate their crops (Respondent-G -GAYO, 18.05.2022).

This study also found that CSOs and INGOs find it easier to implement policies in vulnerable communities by obtaining first-hand information from local people. This collaboration is considered better than making policies at the national level and implementing them without the contribution of local people. Hence, consultants in this study highly recommend giving enough attention to actors at the local level because supportive organizations can better understand the needs of local people and their communities. As stated by the interviewee:

... As NGOs, we need to empower and build capacity for local people. This can be done by involving stakeholders to obtain information before any resilient or adaptation project starts. stakeholders need to include local people in actions because they are the ones who feel and experience the effects. We do not want policymakers sitting in Accra (the capital city) and saying they want to build a dam for people. Let us say Dambai (a town in northern Ghana) when they have not even involved the people to know and understand their situation.... We should involve the local people ...and ... try sustainable actions... (Respondent-E- Youth Climate Activist,10.04.2022).

Based on the above reasoning, CSOs and INGOs are crucial in involving (local) residents in climate-related issues. Similarly, Yaro et al. (2015:240-241) found that INGOs in Northern Ghana help local authorities create climate awareness and assist them in building capacities to adapt to climate stress. Therefore, governments must strengthen their cooperation with these non-state actors to engage with local

communities better and establish stronger adaptation and resilience measures. This can help with the smooth operation of policies and project implementations.

In addition, when a question on establishing a special agency for climate migration was posed to the study's consultants, they pointed to the need for better collaboration with CSOs, INGOs and other international organizations. In addition, they emphasized the need to establish the National Commission on Migration and how it can help with paying attention to the inclusion of local authorities to facilitate climate migration governance. An interview with an academic and migration expert at the University of Ghana stressed the importance of establishing a national migration commission:

..... If Ghana has a migration commission, it can establish an institute within the commission to focus on climate-related migration and collaborate with local communities and other relevant actors climate migration institute can ... work with other migration agencies... and the Ministry of Environment.... That agency will be responsible for what happens at district (local) assemblies about migration due to climate change. It can work well with local governments..., local communities and academics researching climate change and migration and better cooperation with non-state actors at the local level (Respondent-S – University of Ghana, climate migration researcher and consultant, 12.10.2022).

Furthermore, mayors and district officials can play important roles at the local level and effectively collaborate with INGOs and CSOs. Building effective mechanisms at the grassroots will help the host community with relevant facilities to host migrants who mostly settle in rural areas. In line with Schweiger's argument, strong engagement with INGOs, CSOs and local authorities can help promote and bring climate migration governance closer to citizens. Engaging diverse actors will help promote information-sharing, best practices and advocate for relevant policies to address common and urgent migration issues (Schweiger, 2024:7).

In sum, strong collaboration with all relevant actors can help deal with the dominant top-down structure when managing critical issues such as climate mobility. This study endorses Schweiger's (2024:8-9) argument that multiple actors, especially non-state actors, can help promote transparency in migration governance by accessing information from stakeholders and through input and participation in the discussions of policy formulation and implementation. Prioritizing the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders (state and non-state actors, local authorities and international

organizations) can improve climate migration governance through better dialogues and negotiations. Also, due to the growing numbers of climate displacements and the expected increase in future climate migrants, connecting these actors based on the “principle of regulated openness: a principle which shuns the doctrine of exclusion but does not advocate free and unfettered movement across sovereign states” (Ghosh, 2000:25) can facilitate better policy decisions. It may help stakeholders, especially state actors, give up certain strict decisions in favour of less strict measures in emergencies.

Finally, stakeholders can strengthen their commitment to the GCM through well-structured institutions by improving cooperation with all relevant actors within ECOWAS, across Africa and other international actors. Although issue-specific implementation is required, operating with committed efforts toward the GCM objectives may help promote conformity and coherence within the international community regarding migration governance. Agreeing with Ghosh's idea of 'regulated openness', stakeholders can enhance their ability to govern inter-country movements. This will also promote transparency on policy issues (Ghosh, 2000:25).

4.6. CHALLENGES IN MIGRATION GOVERNANCE IN GHANA

Several challenges have affected migration governance in Ghana. In line with earlier works (Talleraas, 2024; Kandilige et al., 2023; Mouthaan, 2019), Ghana's migration governance lacks policy commitment and consistency. This study also finds and observes the following challenges.

First, changes in government affect migration governance in Ghana. Migration governance in Ghana is directly linked to the ruling governments' policies and programs. This study observes that because of the absence of central migration governance mechanisms, changes in the government affect how ministerial agencies manage migration affairs. As indicated by one climate activist:

... the government does not pay much attention to climate change's impact on migration... As you know, there are no government-established institutions or serious provisions on climate mobility. Since there is no long-term government policy focus on this situation ... not much has been done in this area. Also... the climate policy has a section on climate and migration, which the previous government formulated. However, the

current government has ignored or given less attention to its implementations, and this affects the adoption of any serious measure to address related problems (Respondent-E- Youth Climate Change Activist, 10.04.2022).

Another problem raised was unfulfilled political promises regarding rural resilience and adaptation projects. The participants from rural farming communities expressed concerns that, over the years, governments have promised programs such as irrigation dams for sustainable agriculture or control over the distancing of youth from the agricultural sector. However, these promises remained largely unfilled. How much attention is paid to climate-related issues in political campaigns shapes this problem. In addition, in the absence of government-specific programs that focus on climate mobility, political programs tend to shape how people adapt to and cope with climate stress. Therefore, unfulfilled climate-related projects affect climate mobility governance. Governments continuously make political promises without making the utmost effort to deliver. The NPP government's "one village, one dam project" is a typical example. Although the government introduced this project in 2017 to help rural communities solve their water crisis for domestic use and agricultural purposes, people are sceptical. In an interview with a farmer from the Upper West Region of Ghana, he stated the following:

...the government promised dams, but there is no dam, so the people are moving from our village to other areas to look for other means of living. If we have more irrigation dams, we will do farming in the village and many other things... (Respondent U- Returned climate migrant (Farmer - Upper West, 03.04.2023).

From the above, it can be deduced that failure in government promises concerning adaptation and coping strategies leaves some people with no other choice but to migrate. Although factors that influence people's movements vary, government approaches and how issues are addressed are important. With relevant measures, climate migration can be controlled with supportive and committed policies, especially in agricultural communities.

Additionally, the absence of an effective national coordination mechanism affects the implementation of migration policies. Because of an ineffective central coordination mechanism, it is difficult to build consensus on relevant governance issues (Gravesen et al., 2020; Teye et al., 2021). The absence of such effective coordination also contributes to the politicization of Ghanaian migration, in which

political parties tend to consider policies that suit their political agenda. This affects the content, consistency and effectiveness of migration policies. According to Kandilege et al. (2023:10), different governments sometimes pay attention to different priorities on migration issues. It can be argued that, while the NPP seems to focus more on international migration for remittances, as noted in the diaspora engagement programs mentioned earlier and revenue from tourists, the NDC seems to focus on both remittances and humanitarian concerns of internal migrants, including climate-induced migration and promises to pass climate change law which may help legal protection for climate migrants. These and other domestic political differences on migration affect how related policies are formulated and implemented. The political parties in power tend to influence the formulation and implementation of migration policies in the absence of a specific autonomous body to manage and coordinate migration affairs.

Last but not the least, there is inadequate government focus and investment in climate migration research. The government of Ghana pays little or no attention to climate migration research, which prevents the required attention to climate migration and the making of better-informed decisions. Since the government has not been making efforts to establish a research centre and finance to address issues related to climate change's impact on migration, Ghana, to some extent, depends more on external researchers for related policies and concerns.

4.6.1. Addressing Challenges: Stakeholder Responsibilities and People's Rights

This study recognizes that the unpredictability of some climate-related mobility patterns may make it difficult to address the related challenges. The international community has made some limited but important attempts through agreements and mechanisms, to help stakeholders address the numerous issues associated with climate change and human mobility. Agreements such as the Refugee Compact and the Global Compact for Migration attempt to protect climate-related migrants among other refugees and migrants. However, these mechanisms do not provide explicit provisions for climate mobility, resettlement and protection for large groups of climate migrants

who may be forced to move out of their communities. These Compacts do not offer specific means of protecting people on the move due to either slow-onset or sudden-onset climate events. Considering these challenges at the global level, it is therefore important that states create effective legal frameworks in their domestic domains to fill the void in international approaches. Domestic commitment can help improve the implementation of international frameworks. Demonstrating committed domestic and national efforts can also lead to local and national actions. It is crucial to seek needed support from the global community, as it underscores the significance of international cooperation.

The GCM stresses sharing information, technology and other forms of support for migration governance. However, there is no mechanism to ensure commitment to that. Therefore, there is a need to strategize through effective soft and hard laws. The GCM also emphasizes the integration of climate disasters into state migration governance strategies by stressing the need for disaster preparedness and cooperation among neighbouring countries and other countries. As stated: “Integrate displacement considerations into disaster preparedness strategies and promote cooperation with neighbouring and other relevant countries to prepare for early warning, contingency planning, stockpiling, coordination mechanisms, evacuation planning, reception and assistance arrangements and public information” (GCM, 2018: Objective 2j). Ghana should consider the importance of this provision and cooperate with neighbouring countries to establish support systems to help each other. Similarly, previous assertions about the involvement and empowerment of local actors and cooperation from grassroots and neighbouring countries will help strengthen global cooperation and facilitate access to international actors’ support. In agreement with Van der Vliet and Biermann (2022:77), climate migrants need regular pathways to migration. Although regular pathways for climate migration are a challenge at the domestic level, states need to provide better mechanisms for internal climate migrants by guiding and facilitating their movements.

Since there is no specific global agreement on climate migration and no global mechanism for the relocation of climate migrants to third countries, it is challenging to use cross-border migration as an adaptation mechanism to deal with the effects of climate change. The absence of any globally accepted specific instrument for the

permanent resettlement of climate migrants makes it difficult for those who cannot return to their original place of residency due to deteriorating climate extremities. Therefore, collective governance encompassing domestic, sub-regional and regional levels is essential to deal with climate change's current and future impacts on human mobility.

This study agrees with Draper (2021:322) that the international community has a duty toward climate-displaced people. To add to Draper's proposition, individual states should make substantial domestic efforts before resorting to the global community. States can cooperate with the international community to establish specific mechanisms, but first, they must do what they can at the domestic level. It may be difficult for the state to predict and prevent displacement in some cases, but this does not mean that the state should stay idle and ignore the habitual rights of its people. As Draper indicated, even though states cannot prevent the displacement resulting from climate change, individuals have their rights. Individuals have "... a right to the reduction of the risks of displacement to tolerable levels and ..., a right to have the background conditions of stability restored quickly and effectively when displacement does occur ..." (Draper, 2021:323). This implies that states are responsible for reducing climate-displacement-related risks by providing the necessary resources for disaster victims. Because climate events are not easily predictable and it is difficult to determine who will be climate migrants in the long term, states have the primary responsibility to establish strong frameworks at home and cooperate, when necessary, with the global community to safeguard vulnerable people. Weak states in particular need to be strengthened both financially and technically by the international community. Although not a legal duty, the international community has a collective responsibility to support states in promoting the rights and dignity of vulnerable people.

Additionally, since the Compacts on refugees and migrants do not pay specific attention to groups and communities compelled to move due to climate events, it is necessary to establish relevant bilateral, multilateral, regional and sub-regional mechanisms to deal with the collective mobility of climate migrants. This is important because climate mobility and displacement affect large groups and communities. It is difficult for countries, especially those in the global South, to effectively tackle

sudden-onset emergencies involving large groups. Although protecting climate migrants is the primary responsibility of individual states, states should be able to seek support from cooperative institutions if they lack adequate capacity and resources to care for their citizens. Through well-structured norms, the international community can help promote justice and support for disadvantaged countries. Similarly, Draper emphasizes that states cannot be left alone when it comes to protecting the human rights of their citizens. States may need different resources and help from the international community to protect their citizens from climate mobility and displacement threats (Draper, 2021:328). In this regard, there is a need for effective cooperative institutions to intervene to compensate for shortcomings at the state level.

The international community must establish effective burden-sharing mechanisms to reduce the risk of climate migration and support people's movements, relocations, or resettlement when necessary. Although strong national and regional mechanisms are needed, strong global mechanisms will facilitate support for states and regions facing challenges, such as financial and technical resources. In this regard, it is important that the GCM must be clear on the issue of sharing responsibility. Although the GCM mentions collaboration based on mutual trust, determination and solidarity (GCM, 2018:3), there is no specific framework for sharing responsibility. In addition, because climate migrants are not clearly defined in the current compact, addressing their issues may be complicated. Therefore, climate migration requires well-defined parameters because the drivers of climate migration differ from those of traditional migration. Whereas traditional migration is based on voluntary factors such as seeking better economic conditions, reunifying with families and social groups and living in a peaceful political atmosphere, climate migration is usually involuntary and forced due to unprecedented environmental destruction or degradation posing numerous physical, socio-economic and emotional risks to human lives. In this respect, the GCM needs a subsidiary instrument to fully recognize climate migration and ensure better protection of such migrants through special agencies.

It can be argued that in situations of relocation and resettlement, the individual choice to relocate may depend on the degree of damage to property (and the surrounding area) and whether people have a prospect of fair treatment if they join a relocation program. Such concerns may justify people's decision to stay; however,

sometimes choosing to stay may be more dangerous than property loss. Local people need more education to become aware of the risk of choosing to stay and the alarming impact of climate change on their communities. This study agrees with Draper and McKinnon (2018:4) that a detailed assessment of burden-bearing in host communities is also necessary and how local communities can be related to newcomers. This will help in planning and making infrastructure accessible for the needs of both migrants and the host community.

Finally, the complex nature of climate mobility requires close collaboration between different actors and institutions to find better solutions to the diverse problems associated with it (Draper, 2018:59-60). Climate change and its impact on people's movements require a strong global governance approach to protect future generations (Biermann and Boas, 2010: 60-62). This form of governance should be based on well-defined norms that require all actors and stakeholders (both state and non-state actors at local, national, regional and global levels) to play active roles in promoting the well-being of the vulnerable who are and may be affected by future climate events.

4.6.2. The Need to Reduce Climate Politics and Promote Committed Responsibilities toward Climate Migrants

Although climate change is a critical global issue, its impacts on communities, countries, regions and continents differ. The impacts of numerous climate events, such as flooding, droughts, hurricanes and wildfires differ between Africa and Europe and from Asia to America. This affects how regions and countries accord importance to these events. Likewise, this also shapes the politics of responsibility for climate migration. In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, the effect of climate change on food insecurity and people's livelihoods, coupled with many other existential challenges such as poverty, implies that African leaders need to address the situation with urgency.

Despite regional and geographic differences in the situations and impacts of climate change, leaders have begun to pay extra critical attention to the effects of climate change. This is evidenced by mechanisms and platforms such as the UNFCCC Task Force on Displacement, the GCM and the Platform on Disaster Displacement

(Oakes et al., 2023:1). In this regard, it is futile for the international community to get bogged down in discussions on historical carbon emissions while there are more urgent issues to address. Should the focus of the international community be on climate justice, or should it be more on collective responsibility to deal with the impacts of climate change? This study does not reject the claims of supporters of historical responsibilities and climate justice who support the countries in the global South. However, it does not insist upon a major transfer of resources from the global North to the global South and argues that countries should cooperate equally and rationally toward a common agenda for humankind.

Draper argues that historically high-emitting countries should assume responsibility for climate migration. For that matter, an asylum for climate migrants can be considered as a remedy for the harm caused to them. In other words, international climate migrants should be offered asylum (Draper, 2018: 76-77). Although this is a logical position, this study does not support it. If asylum as a form of compensation is forcibly demanded, many in the global North may be unwilling to accept climate migrants. Rather, this study argues that states should be able to lead and compensate for climate migrants through cooperative support.

In situations where countries cannot help their own victims, they should be able to seek support from cooperative institutions or partner organizations. In this regard, the international community needs to establish mechanisms for climate migrants, similar to those for the refugees, so that countries will be willing to host climate migrants with support coming from outside to ease their burdens. In this way, climate migrants who qualify to be relocated to third countries can also have the opportunity to be relocated through a formal application and evaluation process.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This dissertation examined the issue of climate migration governance in Ghana. It explored this issue by looking into the linkages of climate migration governance globally and in Africa. This study has discussed the alarming concerns of climate migration and established that while such migration has gained attention in various policy domains, relevant policies and actions still need to be improved. Sudden-onset climate-related events are causing unexpected mass displacement. Slow-onset events lead to short-term (temporal) migration and further become long-term and permanent if the conditions of affected individuals remain unresolved (Cristani et al., 2020:137). Although many climate migrants move internally, cross-border climate migration is expected if stakeholders fail to address the situation with urgent concern (Clement et al., 2021: xv; Foresight, 2011:12).

Also, this study observes that over the past years, there have been several discussions through climate and migration forums, conferences and other platforms to shape policies toward better ways of addressing climate migration; however, effective solutions backed by strong legal frameworks are yet to be established. Moreover, due to the unpredictability and uncertainty of the patterns of climate migration, public anxiety keeps increasing. However, practical actions to address the alarming concerns of climate migration are slow due to various constraints such as the lack of finance, political will and relevant institutions and mechanisms. Arguably, the time for stakeholders to take effective and practical actions is overdue. Individual governments, especially in the global South and the most vulnerable geographies, cannot deal with climate-related crises independently due to their limited financial and technical resources. Better collective action with committed efforts to establish and cooperate through effective institutions and monitoring mechanisms is expected from stakeholders to protect the dignity of climate-vulnerable migrants.

Chapter 1 discussed the views of two main schools of thought, Realism and Liberalism, on migration and underlined the relevance and importance of neoliberal institutionalism in governing climate migration. From the perspective of Realism, which is a communitarian approach to international politics, states are concerned about their territorial sovereignty and citizens' welfare first and foremost (Shapcott, 2010:9).

Outsiders, including unwanted migrants, are classified as threats that need to be controlled and prevented for the sake of security of states and their citizens (*insiders*). Thus, realists expect governments to limit international migration to safeguard national interests (Lavenex, 2001:39-40; Geddes and Ruhs, 2019:3-4; Hollifield, 1992:569). Protecting and maintaining the identity and security of its national community is the state's primary concern within an anarchical international system (Carr, 1946: 25-26; Morgenthau, 1947:169).

Liberalism, on the other hand, deems cooperation to be a crucial factor in promoting world peace and security. While liberals, like realists, acknowledge the anarchical nature of the international system and consider states as important actors, they refute the notion that state behaviour is necessarily or always hostile (Keohane, 1984:25; Moravcsik, 1992:8; Russett, 2011:182; Doyle, 2016:65). Liberals view the international system as both conflictual and cooperative and stress that international rules and regulations shape the international system. Therefore, states cannot behave as realists claim (Russett, 2011:182). Also, liberal discourse contributes to understanding and appreciating the importance of global interdependence on critical and complex issues such as climate change, migration and global governance (Hollifield, 2012; Betts, 2018). It helps understand that migration is not an issue that one state can independently govern. Hence, the world needs practical cooperation to address the alarming increase in (climate) migration and provide better mechanisms for the future (Kainz and Betts, 2021:83; Clement et al., 2021: xix).

This study regards liberal institutionalism as the appropriate framework to discuss critical international issues such as climate migration and their governance. Institutions, formed by states, shape, in turn, states' behaviour and give them the power to achieve a common good. Institutions can be considered as instruments moderating the effects of international anarchy and facilitating cooperation among states through shared principles and norms and mechanisms of enforcement. From the liberal perspective, the international system is not an arena of pure conflict. Cooperation, involving the state and non-state actors, for dealing with everyday issues marked with uncertainty is also a significant marker of world politics (Hasenclever et al., 2000:7). This study agrees with Keohane and Nye's assertion that institutional norms can guide cooperation and help promote good practices to address critical issues (Keohane and

Nye 2001:233-234). Such practices can promote better and more effective governance of climate migration. Again, “better institutions can help individuals to live free from fear” (Keohane and Nye, 2002:219). Better regulative institutional mechanisms can help vulnerable climate migrants avoid fear and live in dignity.

This study argues that climate migration can be governed by appropriate institutional frameworks with effective monitoring mechanisms to promote compliance with agreed principles, norms and rules. Strong partnerships and better cooperation can be achieved through well-established international norms and institutional mechanisms. Such norms may guide legislation on climate migration and serve as standards to guide stakeholders' conduct and behaviours in managing the affairs of vulnerable migrants (Jakobsson, 2022:90-91). Cooperating to govern climate migration does not result in a loss of sovereignty; however, such cooperation helps strengthen state capacity, which is critical especially for developing states (Geiger, 2020:157-159). Sudden- and slow-onset events threaten and weaken individual states' capacity to deal with their impacts (Cantor et al., 2024:9).

This study acknowledges the realist concern that “...even if there is a long-term symmetry between costs and benefits of climate change issues, the upfront resource transfers implicit in climate policy are still capable of generating relative-gains concerns in the short term — precisely when action is needed” (Purdon, 2017:272). However, it may be possible to address such a concern through alternative measures such as *ad hoc* agreements to be agreed upon under established institutional mechanisms with a view to specific concerns and needs of vulnerable states and communities (Hasenclever et al., 1997:42).

Effective monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms can prevent non-compliance and promote regime continuity for the long-term and future collective good. If cheating or non-cooperating actors become aware that they may lose their reputation, they may prefer to engage in cooperative behaviour (Snidal, 1985:939; Nordhaus, 2020:16-17). Although this does not guarantee total compliance, it can caution actors who are sensitive to their long-term interests to act cooperatively, i.e. in line with the agreed norms and rules (Hasenclever et al., 1997:34-35). Norms help “delegitimize and legitimize” specific actions and behaviours of actors. Sanctions can, therefore, be used to discourage undesirable behaviours and practices (Hasenclever et al., 1997:97-99).

Collective action can be costly, but costs can be reduced through the bargaining power of the regime (Keohane, 1984:90-91). Also, cooperation does not occur easily. Conflicts on issues should sometimes be expected, but effective institutional mechanisms can bring harmony and address collective action challenges when needed. In addition, side payments can be used as an incentive to reward cooperative members. This may help improve cooperation in issue areas by rewarding for good conduct and punishing or warning for non-compliance.

In the African context, it is understood that migration as an important aspect of people's everyday lives. Intra-regional movements dominate the region's migration within and among the East, West and Southern African states. In addition, North Africans mostly migrate to Europe and the Gulf countries. It has also been discussed that forced displacement, especially climate-driven displacement, has become a significant issue in recent times (Clement et al., 2021; IOM, 2022; Teye and Nikoi, 2022). Although climate-related forced migration has become a major problem in the region, people already in vulnerable conditions and depend primarily on climate for their livelihoods (e.g., farmers) suffer the most. However, holistic and effective migration governance has yet to be realized.

Despite a diverse range of policy frameworks to govern migration and hope to promote free movement as in the prototype of EU Schengen, African states are caught in a liberal paradox. Such paradox is due to issues associated with individual states' economic, political, security and legal concerns that continue to affect how the region governs its migration (Okunade, 2021). The same paradox prevails in the ECOWAS sub-region; despite states' desire to promote free movement through the organization's FMP, there are clashes of interest and the resulting violations with the rules regulating free movement. These have become major challenges that adversely affect the consistency and coherence of migration governance among members.

The AU and sub-regional organizations have measures to govern migration within and across the continent through strategic guidelines and norms such as the AU-MPFA, AfCFTA and Agenda 2063 along with FMPs within ECOWAS and the IGAD zones. However, the region's migration governance continues to face challenges due to weak legal frameworks, lack of political will, financial constraints, inadequate

technical resources, lack of accurate migration data, inefficient and weak institutional mechanisms and domestic political influence (Teye and Oucho, 2023:626).

As future projections expect climate-related mass cross-border movements, providing supportive border mechanisms is critical for promoting orderly movements in the region. Since climate migrants may have to cross borders in emergencies, only friendly border arrangements can support vulnerable individuals when left with no option but to cross borders. For instance, some people may not have the necessary travel documents due to sudden-onset events that may cause unplanned and involuntary migration. In such cases establishing emergency support mechanisms can help ease migration barriers for the vulnerable. In agreement with Adaawen, promoting borderless and stress-free movement can promote regular movement and decent migration (Adaawen, 2017:10). As in West Africa's case, using ECOWAS passports is a significant step that may help the movement of climate migrants to cross borders. This study does not deny that promoting well-planned migration in emergencies may be difficult; nevertheless, instituting the necessary support mechanisms can facilitate movements and protect the dignity of vulnerable migrants.

It is observed in this study that migration data is important for making an informed policy. For this reason, stakeholders must invest in obtaining reliable data. The availability of reliable data can support relevant decision-making and program arrangements. Having reliable data on climate migrants can also help with tracking the movements of migrants and ascertain accurate information about their livelihood conditions to support them when necessary. This may also help establish relevant skill-training and vocational programs that target at integrating climate migrants into their host communities.

Promoting better governance of migrant affairs requires addressing the challenges associated with migration patterns and processes through effective policy measures. Such efforts can be effective through mechanisms to identify migrants' challenges and how migration institutions coordinate issues and access to relevant resources. As Teye and Oucho also emphasized, enhancing migration governance in Africa requires effective negotiations, information gathering and resource sharing among relevant stakeholders (Teye and Oucho, 2023:626). This approach can promote effective collective decision-making and strengthen weak cooperative partners'

capacity through supportive technical and financial resources. Not disregarding states' priorities and interests, effective mechanisms to coordinate affairs can also help address individual preferences that may result in commitment problems and free riding. More importantly, relevant legal provisions to monitor compliance with rules of conduct and clearly defined sanctions for non-compliance can be helpful.

Although migration contributes to Africa's development, this depends on how migration is governed. The alarming increase in climate migration necessitates that stakeholders show enough commitment and political will to address the issues of concern that may cause adverse effects. As noted in Chapter 2, African governments are trying to ensure better regional migration governance. These attempts can be seen through the various migration policies to achieve free continental movement among member states in the region. However, states' behaviour prevents that objective from being achieved. Considering the reality and potential of slow- and sudden-onset climate events to induce increasing human mobility within and across the continent, the implementation of free movement principles can help ease the challenges that climate migrants may face in their attempt to secure themselves in countries where they see possibilities for livelihood and social ties.

Climate migration may exacerbate the livelihood challenges of many people in Africa, especially people with low-income backgrounds and who live in hotspot communities. Although migration can be an adaptation strategy for some people to escape climate stress, not all people can and may want to migrate away from their original habitat. Stakeholders' ability to find alternative measures and support the vulnerable with better decisions is crucial. Also, better governance of migration in Africa can help manage unexpected high migration flows due to climate change. Stakeholders should strengthen cooperation through effective mechanisms to ensure better border management and obtain reliable data to inform decisions and policies. It will also be helpful to create awareness about better-planned migration, strengthen weaker states' capacities and help address emergency issues such as forced migration and displacement that may occur due to extreme climate extremities.

In the case of Ghana, migration continues to be a part of people's everyday lives, just as in other African countries. Notably, pre-colonial migration was characterized by seasonal movements and trade activities. In the colonial era (between

the 15th and 18th centuries), migration in Ghana was imperilled by the emergence of colonial administration measures and the 'slave trade' by which people were forced to move within the colonial territory (Anafi et al., 2003; Micah, 2006; Antiwi-Bosiako, 2009). After gaining independence in 1957, Ghana became an immigration country, receiving many African citizens, especially political activists seeking independence in their respective countries (open-door policy toward African Unity). However, the open-door policy was jeopardized because of the military takeover in 1966 and the establishment of the "1969 Aliens Compliance Order". The ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol of 1979 helped to resume *in-* and *out-*migration from the late 1970s and early 1980s (Peil, 1974; Anarfi et al., 2003). However, the unexpected expulsion of many Ghanaian immigrants from Nigeria in the 1980s influenced their migration from West Africa to other parts of Africa, North America, Europe and other parts of the world.

Regarding climate-induced migration, it is observed that climate migration in Ghana began as seasonal movements—migrants move from the northern part of Ghana to the south during the dry season (season of limited or no rainfall). In recent years, climate change has become one of the major drivers of internal migration and displacement in Ghana due to changes in climatic conditions and consequential events such as drought, heavy rainfall, flooding and rising sea levels leading to coastal erosion in many parts of the country. Some transnational climate migrants also migrate from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to engage in seasonal jobs and livestock activities due to the existence of climate-friendly destinations in Ghana. While climate migration in Ghana is usually seasonal and short-term, the trends have changed to long-term and permanent migration, as noted by Teye and Nikoi (2022:92-93). Additionally, despite climate stress some people are forced to stay due to socio-cultural and financial constraints.

This study has also explored the diverse implications of climate change on Ghana and established that climate migration is increasing rural-urban migration, causing pressure on the limited infrastructure and resources in the host communities, increasing food insecurity and heightening conflicts between farmers and herders. Although the government of Ghana recognizes climate-related migration in its migration and climate change policy frameworks, climate migration is less prioritized and has not been given the expected attention (Gravesen et al., 2020:34). These

indicate that the government of Ghana has partially ignored the rights of climate-vulnerable persons, giving not due importance to their affairs. Poor attention to climate issues could also be due to the different priorities of migration agencies (inter-ministerial differences) and to the absence of mechanisms to effectively coordinate migration activities and programs. Therefore, the government needs to give more attention to governing climate migration with coherent measures and cooperating better with relevant actors and stakeholders for long-term solutions.

As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, climate migration significantly increases in Ghana and affects the origin and host communities. Ghana should, therefore, engage effectively with regional agreements and international platforms such as the Kampala Convention and the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD). Such an effort can help Ghana protect the rights of internally climate-displaced persons and those who may be forced to cross borders in the present and future. For instance, Ghana's effort to join and actively cooperate with the PDD may demonstrate Ghana's seriousness towards international climate mobility governance, which can help secure relevant support to manage related issues.

Also, Ghana should be extra active and cooperate better with its immediate neighbouring countries with similar climate migration issues. This effort can help Ghana integrate ECOWAS measures to promote desirable governance of climate movements. Moreover, to initiate coherent policies for climate migrants, Ghana and other ECOWAS members need to document accurate data on climate migration to understand better how households have been affected and specific actions that need to be implemented. To do so, stakeholders should establish mechanisms and set aside enough resources to train technical experts to embark on such initiatives. This can help obtain relevant data about climate vulnerability and concurrently, can help in making informed decisions and policies.

Effective international cooperation can also help strengthen agencies such as the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS). This is important to promote regular pathways for all climate migrants who may be stranded at borders due to sudden-onset events. More importantly, centres should be established to educate prospective climate migrants to understand their migration patterns and affairs better. GIS can also provide necessary information for migrants; such information should be available and

accessible online to educate respective migrants on different mobility issues. As noted, realizing the full benefits of migration depends on how it is governed and how people migrate. Regular training of immigration officers, especially those at land and sea borders, is important for maintaining up-to-date information on relevant and urgent issues such as forced migration and sudden cross-border movements.

This study affirms that climate impacts contribute to the increase in rural-urban migration (increase in internal migration); however, like many other countries in West Africa, Ghana's migration policies pay less attention to internal migration. Hence, less attention given to climate-induced migration. Ghana focuses more on international migration with the target of high remittances and perceives climate migration as a burden. Climate-related migration requires governance approach that differs from traditional migration because threats and drivers associated with this type of migration can be sudden and unexpected. In that regard, considerable attention must be given to engaging relevant stakeholders (state and non-state) to deal with the various challenges of the vulnerable. The government of Ghana and its cooperative partners should also pay considerable attention to the development and implementation of resilience, adaptation and mitigation strategies.

Although cooperation can sometimes be challenging to achieve, this study argues that a climate migration governance based on the 'principle of regulated openness' (Ghosh, 2000:25) can help enhance states' ability to govern cross-border movements by ensuring transparency on policy issues to protect the rights and dignity of climate migrants. Promoting transparency requires a committed joint effort from state and non-state institutions to check stakeholders' actions and guide them accordingly. In this regard, sufficient technical support should be provided to strengthen existing frameworks and institutions. Promoting openness and transparency can also help limit the domestic political influence that may hinder cooperation with its focus on short-term interest and result in free riding. Committed cooperative mechanisms that clearly and transparently define rules for compliance and sanction non-compliance are critical for better governance of climate mobility.

The relevance of local authority is also regarded as important for better governance of climate migration. Since climate migrants have direct contact with their host community, the local community leaders can understand their concerns better. In

this respect, stakeholders should pay attention to local integration policies and programs that support the interests of the host communities and the migrants. Community-based skill-training programs can help support newcomers (climate migrants) in adapting to conditions in the new destinations, help secure their livelihoods and improve the socio-economic well-being of the vulnerable. Such programs can help reduce the burden that may be caused by climate migrants by translating their skills so as to benefit themselves as well as their origin and host communities. Hence, a comprehensive policy program should be designed through an inclusive approach by stakeholders, involving especially local leaders and migrants.

This study also observed that because of financial and socio-cultural constraints, female and young climate migrants usually migrate to nearby rural communities where livelihood opportunities are limited. This suggests that stakeholders should establish specific gender-friendly adaptation programs (such as skill-training) to support such vulnerable groups and address their specific concerns. This approach can help female migrants to sustain their livelihood in new destinations.

The availability of facilities in cities is also crucial when hosting climate migrants. The impact of climate change on rural-urban migration means that cities must be prepared to accommodate the unexpected inflow of climate migrants. Cities in Ghana can, therefore, establish more formal associations to connect with other migration agencies and CSOs that deal with specific concerns. This can be done by joining city associations such as the C40s discussed in Chapter 3. Also, regional mechanisms can be helpful to establish formal links with the cities to discuss affairs. Partnerships with relevant international IOs can help develop initiatives to support cities. As noted, approximately 50% of Ghanaian emigrants live in other West African cities (Kandilige et al., 2023:5) and an increasing number of cross-border climate migrants in the sub-region may settle in various cities to seek better opportunities. This means that stakeholders, especially those in West Africa, should implement anticipatory programs and actions to address future urbanization through diaspora engagement programs. Hence, practical transnational city cooperation for climate-related events and collective support is essential.

Effectively coordinating and engaging, cities require a more bottom-up approach where policies can be initiated at the local levels to aid national migration

institutions. Including all relevant stakeholders at local levels who can directly deal with and live with climate migrants may help achieve this objective. Similarly, effective integration can be established through the migrants' social networks in respective cities by conforming to the migration rules of the host countries. Furthermore, city authorities must be empowered with programs and resources to implement the necessary measures to address migration-related urbanization. The measures taken by empowered city authorities can, in turn, support national and regional mechanisms.

In the case of Ghana, the absence of a central state authority to effectively coordinate migration activities has influenced its migration governance. As suggested by the consultants of this study as well as earlier studies such as Kandilige et al. (2023) and IOM (2019b), the establishment of a National Migration Commission as recommended in the NMP and inclusion of all relevant stakeholders in policy formulation and implementations can help Ghana better govern climate migration. The engagement of diverse local actors (such as rural community authorities, city authorities, farmers, herders, NGOs and CSOs) along with proper monitoring mechanisms can further support the initiation and implementation of well-structured migration programs and promote inclusive policies. This can further promote transparency and information-sharing, positively contributing to the management of migrant affairs.

More importantly, Ghana's governments should pay attention to the local integration of permanently displaced people who cannot return to their home and may find it challenging to sustain their living due to loss of property and livelihoods. This means that governments and other able stakeholders should invest in adaptation and resilience measures to manage the existential stress associated with climate events. Critically connecting the related SDGs can lead to their better implementation.

Migration can be used as an adaptation strategy to deal with the dangers associated with climate stresses. However, this study argued that this adaptation strategy should be well-planned in high-risk and vulnerable places. Planning can help address post-migration challenges for the climate-vulnerable. In this regard, governments should establish comprehensive national climate mobility frameworks that clearly define planned climate migration and relocation mechanisms for sudden

events and displacements. A well-planned climate migration can also help stakeholders to understand better and know what to do when and how to deal with specific issues. Planning climate migration in this regard means that stakeholders should have a long-term national vision no matter who is elected to office with the changes in government; climate-related migration policies and programs should have a continuity. Although there has been a stable democracy with a peaceful change of government in Ghana since 1992, government administrations (parties in power) pay more attention to the ruling government's policies and ignore or pay less attention to previous uncompleted projects and programs. A change in government, therefore, affects the continuity of migration policies and effective implementation of migration programs and policies such as the NMP. This problem must be addressed by establishing strong legal frameworks to promote long-term focus and continuity of national migration policies to protect the dignity of the climate-vulnerable without political interference.

The unpredictability of climatic patterns and their impact on mobility should be of critical concern for governments. Governments must allocate enough budget to address recurring issues, especially sea defence along coastal areas and irrigation facilities in drought communities. Development partners should also be involved in helping address these problems. Also, attention to investment in relevant adaptation measures can help vulnerable communities increase their resilience and prepare ahead to reduce the adverse impact of climate crises.

Cooperating through the existing frameworks such as the Kampala Convention can help. Thus, Ghana should demonstrate its best intention by ratifying the Convention. ECOWAS is concerned that Ghana, a key player in the sub-regional and regional affairs, has not ratified it yet. Although Ghana is making headway toward ratification, its slow and reluctant attitude has been attributed to the obligation to cater for the forcibly displaced persons. For example, the Convention obliges member states to cater for all displaced people, ranging from displacements due to road construction and slum evictions to other state-driven displacements. These obligations may have contributed to Ghana's reluctance to commit to the Convention.

It is also argued that climate-related forced displacement was not a major issue for Ghana during the Convention process and adoption. This may have influenced the

delay in the ratification. However, the situation has changed in the past few years due to the dramatic rise in floods, sea erosion and other climate crises, which have increased climate displacement and migration issues in Ghana. For instance, by the end of 2008 (the year of finalizing the Convention), Ghana recorded 12,000 internal displacements (IDMC, n.d.). In October 2023 alone, Ghana recorded 39,333 displacements (IOM-DTM- Ghana, 2023). Also, the flooding in Buiepe, the Central Gonja District of Ghana, caused the displacement of about 3149 people in September 2023. By the end of 2023 alone, Ghana recorded over 47,000 internal displacements (IDMC, n.d.). These demonstrate how the situation has changed and, therefore, the need for Ghana to cooperate under this Convention to better its position to protect by obtaining technical and other support from the AU and other international partners that support the agenda of the Convention.

This study agrees with Kealin (2019:258) that regional agreements can be more promising due to climate change differences across geographies. Hence, Ghana must effectively support relevant regional mechanisms. Similarly, this study agrees with Cristani et al. that since there is no global framework to govern cross-border climate migration, strong and strategic institutions at the regional level can be helpful (Cristani et al., 2020:137-138). Ghana and other regional actors must act better toward the Kampala Convention and other relevant protocols to address issues of concern. In addition, African governments should pay crucial attention to effective cooperation through relevant international principles to support regional mechanisms to address issues better.

Establishing relevant mechanisms to support the coordination of mechanisms at various levels within the national level can be important to sharing relevant information with regional and global issues on climate mobility issues. For instance, at the time of concluding this dissertation, no city or regional initiative supported coordination to facilitate the governance of climate migration in Ghana. Since the impact of climate change on population movements varies across regions, cities and communities, there is a critical need for an effective national framework and, more importantly, specific approaches to coordinate issues. As part of an effective national coordinating mechanism, local institutions should be strengthened to address issues at the local level, which can help reduce overdependence on national mechanisms and

strategies. Furthermore, it is observed that the strength of local institutions may differ from one geographical area to another; therefore, CSOs, INGOs and other relevant actors can help empower and support diverse programs and mechanisms at the local level. Such efforts can help reinforce the national agenda for effective governance.

Ghana has shown interest by engaging with international protocols such as the GCM and SDGs that focus on climate change and its impact on migration; yet implementation still needs to be improved. Migration may serve as a “maladaptation” strategy if not adequately managed (Teye and Nikoi, 2022:100). Therefore, if Ghana can follow the GCM objectives satisfactorily, it can hope to promote regular and orderly migration. This can be possible by setting a strong agenda to treat internal and international migration issues equally. While promoting better governance of climate migration, barriers such as inadequate funds, domestic political influence, inadequate capacity-building mechanisms and training for local authorities/leaders should be given the needed attention. The necessary funds for adaptation and coping mechanisms should be secured from the relevant sources to help with the preparation of vulnerable communities for emergencies. Prompt action can also help protect vulnerable people from unexpected challenges. In this respect, localizing the solution and seeking relevant partners and international support is essential.

It is also crucial that climate migration should be clearly defined with legal provisions to address related challenges. Clear definitions and relevant legal frameworks can help stakeholders focus on relevant issues to be addressed. More so, it is necessary for the states and regions to broaden the definition of refugee so as to include those people who are being forced to leave their homes and migrate due to climate change-related events. The international community should clearly define the climate-vulnerable so that their dignity can be protected with relevant legal mechanisms, as is the case for refugees.

It should be admitted that stakeholders are making efforts; however, their actions and commitment levels are far behind the scary images of everyday displacement and the silent traumas suffered by people, especially those living in hotspot places. Building upon existing frameworks and establishing *ad hoc* agreements to oversee specific concerns are urgent tasks. Individual states cannot unilaterally address climate migration issues; partnerships and adequate support for weaker and

vulnerable states are important. It is necessary to establish separate cooperation mechanisms to govern climate migration because of the existing overload on organizations such as the UNHCR and the IOM whose mandates do not also originally cover climate migrants. Specific institutions with clearly defined mandates can lead an effective governance of climate migration.

Similarly, in the case of Ghana, establishing vibrant institutions with a clear mandate to manage climate mobility can help address related problems. CSOs can also support such institutions in creating climate change awareness and pressure state institutions to take the necessary actions. The public needs to be educated about the reality of people moving due to climate change. Such public awareness can influence policymakers to make firm commitments to solve critical issues of concern. Climate migration and displacement have received scant attention from major stakeholders, especially political elites and this may be considered short-sightedness on their side. Treating climate migration as a critical issue can help protect the vulnerable and save the country from probable national emergencies.

Ghana's slow and reluctant action toward climate-related crises, including migration, also leaves it behind in achieving the related SDGs. Considering Ghana's performance so far and the 5 years left to realize the 'Agenda 2030', meeting its SDGs targets is impossible for Ghana. Hence, mechanisms to regulate issues and increase efforts beyond 2030 are important as well as supporting the people in rural and hotspot communities with best practices and climate-friendly farming activities. Since rural farmers have limited knowledge about climate change and its impact, some of them engage in farming practices such as cutting down trees and burning forests, that exacerbate climate challenges. Hence, there is a need to increase national climate education to create more awareness about the profound consequences of climate change, including how it affects people's livelihoods and mobility. This may help promote good practices and create a more climate-friendly environment.

More importantly, allocating enough of the national budget for climate action can be helpful. While seeking external support to finance climate migration crises, especially regarding funds to finance migration programs and policies, Ghana and other African states over-depend on external donors. Overdependence on external funders sometimes leads to the imposition of donor-partner decisions. The post-2015

European migration crisis led to EU and African partnership programs, which provided funds to pay considerable attention to preventing irregular migration to Europe and the return of undocumented African migrants from Europe (Adam et al., 2020:3102-04). While these issues are also important, such partnerships can make Ghana and other African states focus too much on donor partners' interests and ignore their climate migration issues, which are currently more of an internal problem. As noted by Frasca, external partners' soft law strategies aim to contain and prevent irregular migrants but do not promote mobility between partners (Frasca, 2023:1-2). Although controlling irregular migration from Africa is important, Ghana and other African states should be able to negotiate better to ease migration barriers between partners and promote regular migration.

This study does not disregard the controversial and political nature of climate change and migration issues at the international level. However, the question remains: How long should these controversies continue at the expense of the vulnerable? Critics may argue that states are not equally affected by climate displacement and migration and individually affected states should mind their business. No doubt, states have duties and responsibilities towards their climate migrants. However, no state can be sure how ineffective climate migration governance in one vulnerable country may trigger irregular migration to another country (spill-over effect). States should, therefore, pay attention to collaborating with diverse partners, especially among neighbouring states, to establish better norms for effective cooperation and building capacity. This should be undertaken now with seriousness rather than delayed until the occurrence of uncontrolled mass movement. In the case of ECOWAS, for instance, the 90-day free movement protocol can be replaced with total free movement backed by strong legal measures that bind states to protect climate migrants. This can help ease the stresses that climate migrants may have to go through to extend their stay in host communities, which include forced cross-border migration.

This study argues that containing migrants and establishing more restrictive measures could lead to more dangerous and irregular movement of cross-border climate migrants in the future. Suppose people are forced to move due to climate change and do not find easy and safe migration routes to secure themselves; they may decide on any possible ways, including dangerous routes. In addition, due to the

uncertainty of the climate crisis, they may be subjected to the constant desire to migrate to search for opportunities that will support their livelihood. Hence, focusing on safe migration, not just on restricting and containing migrants, can help better protect vulnerable climate migrants.

Concerning legal measures for resettlement programs, it can be argued that the international community does not have an immediate intention for permanent resettlement of climate migrants as in the case of refugees due to the politicization of migration and climate change issues. However, sudden and uncontrollable events do not need to involve a high solidarity cost for providing humanitarian support to affected states. Supportive resettlement programs can help especially those in coastal communities who experience frequent flood displacement and other disasters. Even though some of the vulnerable may return to their homes after the severity of coastal floods is reduced, there is still urgent need to plan for safe movements since it is a frequent issue. Also, political, social and economic factors influence actions; ignoring or failing to address the concerns of the vulnerable with relevant legal measures can make protection difficult.

Considering climate migration as a common problem may help not only the most vulnerable states but also the so-called safe regions because of the complexities and uncertainties of situations that may occur in the future. Climate migration governance should be considered as a public/club good. In this respect, if a particular state cannot support its citizens in adapting to climate change, cooperative actors should step in and extend their support for the benefit of all. This is essential due to the possible uncontrollable and spill-over nature of irregular migration. Collective efforts to devise practical solutions, such as supporting the rural dwellers in sustainable agriculture through irrigation programs, may also be quite helpful.

Effective state mechanisms can strengthen regional institutions to promote desirable governance. States can strengthen their own mechanisms by investing in climate migration research, decentralizing migration governance with significant inclusion of local communities (authorities) and strengthening legal climate regulation to control undesirable behaviour and practices by individuals and companies. Decentralizing migration governance within states can help balance the advantages of bottom-up and top-down governance approaches to address issues better. Moreover,

including relevant local authorities can help obtain local knowledge and information to support national policies.

Better resilience and adaptation measures such as climate-smart agriculture, coastal fencing, disaster risk management and increased infrastructure help secure vulnerable communities. In addition to these measures, funding mechanisms and rebuilding committees should be adequately instituted to secure funds from governments and other cooperative partners to resettle climate migrants away from slums and risky peri-urban settlements. As noted, Ghana lacks mechanisms to insure people who lose their land and other property due to climate events. This calls for regulations to safeguard the vulnerable, especially those living in coastal communities, because of the frequent experience of coastal erosion due to rising sea levels. Immobile individuals and trapped populations also need to be protected through disaster risk support programs to deal with the challenges threatening their livelihoods. Ensuring better adaptation for the immobile vulnerable can be possible through frequent engagement with local communities with a view to understanding their livelihood concerns and challenges and through provision of the necessary support.

Pastoralism is a common issue in West Africa; Ghana can cooperate better with neighbouring countries with statutory provisions for pastoral movement to address the structural barriers affecting livestock farming. For instance, land tenure system, discussed in Chapter 4, affects herders' settlement. Therefore, stakeholders must negotiate with relevant traditional authorities to reserve enough grazing land for pastoral use. This approach can help control conflicts between herders and host communities. Establishing relevant provisions in this regard can also help address the challenges associated with pressure on host communities' infrastructure and competition over limited resources, such as water and help monitor the movements of herders.

Climate change has increased rural-urban migration in Ghana. While some rural people can find jobs in urban centers to support their families, others cannot, ending up in slums and peri-urban settlements. Some rural-urban migrants also engage in activities that further cause environmental problems in host centers, leading to poor sanitation in those areas. Considering these and other similar problems, an improper governance of migration can cause migration in the climate context should be well-

planned. If it is left unplanned without adequate support, people on the move can increase inequality among vulnerable groups and lead to maladaptation. Hence, proper measures should be in place to facilitate migration as a means of adaptation. This may help prevent migration from being considered maladaptation, as also argued by Teye and Nikoi (2022:100).

Furthermore, national strategies must effectively engage local initiatives to structure community-specific adaptation measures. Adapting from local people's perspective can help implement alternatives to address communities' needs better. As Gbedemah (2023:15-16) found, while government adaptation measures on the southeastern coast of Ghana hinder social and community sustainability, indigenous knowledge helped with better adaptation suggestions to facilitate livelihood support for the local people. This means that traditional/ indigenous knowledge provided by the local people can support the technical knowledge offered by experts to help improve adaptation for vulnerable communities.

This study, while emphasizing the importance of cooperation in climate migration governance, it also notes that Ghana and its partners are caught up in a prisoner-dilemma-like situation where actors' national interests affect effective cooperation. This situation makes states free-ride and non-comply with regulating frameworks due to the voluntary nature of related agreements. This study argues in line with Nordhaus (2020) that, for effective collective action on climate-related crises, there should exist binding regulations with mechanisms to monitor and sanction non-compliance. Such measures can help Ghana and its partners focus on long-term benefits rather than free ride for short-term benefits. The voluntary nature of the agreements has given Ghana and other partners, especially in the West African sub-region, the opportunity to pursue their individual interests as they wish. Mechanisms to sanction free riding in different ways, including exclusion, can force members of ECOWAS to cooperate due to the advantages they will lose and reputational concerns. Ghana and its cooperating partners should be bound by the rules of conduct they agreed upon. Effective monitoring mechanisms and *ad hoc* agreements to address specific concerns can also help promote better migration governance, especially for free movement, protecting migrants' rights and mechanisms that help them secure livelihoods.

As discussed in Chapters 1 and 4, applying other principles and measures such as the *principle of regulated openness*, *central regulatory power*, *complex interdependence* and *suasion*, as explained below, can be helpful to guide relevant institutions toward better migration governance and practices:

First, cooperating governments should apply the *principle of regulated openness* – “a principle which shuns the doctrine of exclusion but does not advocate free and unfettered movement across sovereign states” (Ghosh, 2000:220-221). This study agrees with Ghosh that Ghana and its partners can enhance their ability to govern inter-state movements by applying this principle which promotes transparency in migration policies and governance. As Ghosh stressed, the objective of migration governance should be to make “people's movements orderly, manageable, productive and comprehensive” (Ghosh, 2000:25) to balance the interests of sending and receiving countries and migrants. Due to the increasing rate of climate migration and displacement and the projected increase in the future, going through 'regulated openness' may help stakeholders, especially state actors, to be more flexible in certain situations such as sudden-onset events that may lead to forced cross-border entry. Acting as such can help protect the vulnerable migrants.

Second, Ghana and its partners should shape their policies so as to form a “complex interdependence” among each other as envisioned by Keohane and Nye. This necessitates giving equal importance to internal and external (international) migration issues. In a situation of 'complex interdependence,' there is no separation between issues of high politics, such as security/ military and low politics, such as economy and human rights. In other words, the international arena is not just about security or military power; other issues are also important for states to focus on. In addition, different channels, such as informal networks, multinational cooperation and social movements / CSOs, connect states and societies to promote interactions for better cooperation (Keohane and Nye, 1987: 727-731, 737). This concept may also help reshape migration policy measures to consider climate migration as an important state issue with human rights implications and such different channels can limit governments' undesirable measures and actions toward addressing climate crises and their impact on the vulnerable. Also, the ‘complex interdependence’ concept can help Ghana and its partners address problems associated with climate mobility by

recognizing the existence of other channels, such as international organizations, different government bureaucracies, INGOs and NGOs (Keohane and Nye, 1987:738-40) to govern the affairs of their vulnerable climate migrants collectively. In addition, because of uncertainties about climate migration, understanding and support in addressing issues in this interdependent manner, especially among neighboring countries, it is important for actors to link issues to cooperate effectively to find prospective solutions.

Additionally, *suasion* can help complement binding principles, as explained in the PD situation, for better climate migration governance. Suasion strategies can help persuade non-cooperative partners (Snidal, 1985; Martin, 1992). This involves *dominant strategies* such as financial incentives to persuade partners, “tactically linking issues” of interest and further “institutionalizing” this process to establish future cooperation (Hollifield, 2012:286-7). This strategy can be used as a sanction for actors who fail to comply with agreed norms, while it provides benefits for those who comply. In addition, side payments can be used as an incentive to reward members who cooperate effectively. Rewarding cooperative actors for good conduct and punishing or warning members for unacceptable behaviours may influence governments to pay attention to the concerns of vulnerable climate migrants. The cooperative body can also sanction free riders by denying them 'entitlements' through the agreed rules. In this regard, there should be the 'possibility of exclusion' as a punishment strategy for members who fail to comply with the principles of cooperation (Martin, 1992:771-772).

In addition to the suasion strategy, this study agrees with Hollifield that governing migration based on the *centralization of regulatory power and pooling of sovereignty* can help address coordination challenges (Hollifield, 2000:100). This can help states enhance coordination and order in governing migration. This strategy can be achieved by creating a rotating leadership system for migration governance, such as leadership tenure, especially within the sub-regional and regional levels. Based on this notion, this study argues that ECOWAS and the AU should institute effective leadership on a rotating basis to monitor issues related to climate migration regularly. This can also make identifying and controlling free and potential riders easier through the leadership monitoring mechanisms.

To sum up, this study does not deny that effective cooperation with binding norms on climate migration may be difficult, but it is not an illusion. This study appeals to relevant actors and stakeholders to commit themselves to protecting the dignity of the vulnerable climate migrants and perform their moral duty in climate-related crises. It also calls on states to compromise their differences as much as possible and think about the well-being of the current and future generations in the context of the climate crisis. States are more than capable of cooperating to deal with climate migration issues. States' efforts to gear towards what this study hopes for, cooperating by compromising over differences for the common good, can help institutionalize better mechanisms to deal with climate migration.

Climate migration presents a scenario where the dynamics are complicated. Although the impacts of climate change on states are different, no state is totally immune (Cantor et al. 2024:3). Therefore, it is difficult to determine which country will suffer from climate migration as origin, transit, or destination countries in the future. Also, forced migration may continue to be a major concern as climate change issues continue to exist. Hence, better collective efforts to find pathways to address future uncertainty despite states' differences can be helpful. While some measures have been put in place in the form of soft laws, it is high time for legally binding principles to govern climate mobility better. Establishing binding laws and ensuring their enforcement can be possible with the active participation of committees from states, CSOs, INGOs and other relevant actors. Agreeing with Keohane and Nye, institutions have antidotes to deal with problems that face humanity (Keohane and Nye, 2002:242), while "better institutions will help individuals to live free from fear" (Keohane and Nye, 2002:219). It is only through a rules-based order that the dilemmas of sovereignty and interdependence can hope to be reconciled (Ikenberry, 2018:8).

Migration governance requires interdependent actions to promote host communities' development and protect migrants' rights. Neighbouring countries should, therefore, keenly focus on development opportunities and the rights of migrants. Well-managed migration can promote development in the receiving and sending states. In this regard, cooperation should focus on measures that can help maximize the contributions climate migrants can make to host communities. Also, keen attention to migrant rights should be a central theme in migration governance

(Hollifield, 2024:5-7) to treat the vulnerable, dignified and humanely. Focusing on migrant rights can help reduce inequalities among migrants, which is also important for development (Hollifield, 2024:7).

Finally, although no effective regime for climate migration exists, the international community, through agencies such as IOM, UNHCR, GFMD and UNFCCC, as well as sub/regional organizations such as ECOWAS, IGAD, AU and other organizations, can be commended for the efforts and actions on climate migration. Similarly, Ghana needs to be commended for its recognition of the impact of climate on migration in both its National Climate Change Policy and its National Migration Policy and its participation in relevant international agreements, protocols and conventions, including, among others, the GCM and the free movement protocols of ECOWAS and AU. However, since climate migrants remain a major concern in Ghana and elsewhere, until a well-defined regime with effective mechanisms is established, climate-related displacement and migration will continue to be existential threats.

Aside from the general recommendations discussed in this section for Ghana and its cooperative partners, considering the challenges in the case of Ghana, the followings are specific recommendations for the Ghanaian government:

- The government of Ghana should pay critical attention to addressing climate migrants' livelihood challenges by providing them with the necessary vocational skills training, health insurance schemes and job opportunities to support their living and protect their dignity.
- It should allocate enough domestic funds (budget allocation) for migration policies and reduce overdependence on donor sponsorship, which leads to conflicting interests in policy formulation and implementation. These funds should also focus on obtaining reliable data to support decision-making regarding climate migration.
- There should be mechanisms that can mandate new governments to ensure continuity with the migration-related policies and programs of previous governments.
- Proper national education should increase awareness of climate change and its impact on migration. This approach should be incorporated into educational programs starting with the primary level and extending to higher education. This can help educate the public and control certain practices that contribute to climate change.

- Climate migrants, hotspot communities and host communities' leaders should be allowed to participate actively in policy formulation and implementation.

- Ghana should establish climate change laws that clearly define penalties for people who violate positive measures to control climate change. These laws should also establish insurance schemes for climate-vulnerable individuals and people who lose property due to climate disasters.

- The Government of Ghana should establish a National Center for Migration Research. Establishing this center can help governments and other stakeholders conduct diverse migration research and formulate well-informed policies with better implementation strategies. This center can also help educate migrants on how to plan their migration processes and inform them of the risks and dangers of illegal migration.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: Consultation/ Interview Questions

The following questions were asked according to the participants' categories. Depending on the participants' responses, some follow-up questions were also asked. However, only the main question is listed below.

I. STATE ACTORS / POLICY MAKERS

- How would you describe the climate change situation in Ghana?
- Who /what are the actors and the institutions focusing on climate change actions in Ghana?
- How would you describe climate change effect on migration issues in Ghana?
- What are the government measures and strategies to address climate migration?
- What do you think about the conflicts issue between local communities and Fulani herdsmen (Climate migrants) in Ghana and the government strategies to deal with the situation?
- How do international institutions and regimes affect how Ghana would govern climate migration?
- How does climate migration affect sustainable development in Ghana?
- In your opinion how can both state and non-state institutions cooperate to deal with climate migration? How do you expect this cooperation to create opportunities towards the development of climate migrants and their communities?
- What are the vulnerable communities in Ghana, in terms of climate change?
- What are the government strategies for resilience in vulnerable communities prone to climate related risks?
- Regarding the government's approach to migration governance, what are some of the good practices' government adopted?

II. MIGRATION ACADEMICS /EXPERTS /PRACTIONERS

- How would you describe climate-related migration in the world and in (West) Africa and Ghana?

- What are the implications of climate migration in Ghana? And with your experience what can you think about it, for now and the future?
- Please, what are your views on migration governance and management in Ghana?
- What do you think about establishing special agencies to manage climate-related migration (human mobility) rather than managing through the general migration governance framework?
- What do you think about the conflicts issue between local communities and Fulani herdsmen in Ghana and government strategies to deal with these conflicts?
- How do you expect climate related migration to be managed in Africa/ internationally and Ghana in particular?
- What are your views on how government authorities coordinate to deal with climate – migration?
- What are the good regulatory frameworks for climate migration management?
- What are the challenges governments face to address climate migration problems?
- How can stakeholders enhance their capacity to manage climate migration? In this regard, how relevant is inter-agency cooperation in climate migration governance?
- In what significant ways(s) do you agree/ disagree with the assertion that, there should be special policies for climate migration governance? And what special policies do you think should be implemented or recommended?
- What should be done to strengthen national policies related to migration and climate change?
- What do you think stakeholders should do to improve the livelihood of climate migrants and their communities?
- How do you expect the conflict between climate migrants and the host community members to be managed? [for e.g., In the case of the conflicts between the Fulani herdsmen and their host communities]
- How can migration serve as adaptation strategies for climate change in Ghana?

- What is Ghana's position on Kampala Convention? What prevents prevent Ghana from signing the convention?

IV. GHANA IMMIGRATION SERVICE PARTICIPANT(S)

- Position/Duty
- How would you describe climate migration in Ghana?
- How many climate migrants are there in Ghana? (if data is available) / How many are Ghanaians? And, from different countries?
- How do you get data on climate migrants?
- What are some of the challenges Ghana immigration service face when gathering data on climate migrants?
- How do you manage climate-related migration?
- What do you think about establishing a special agency to manage climate-related migration (human mobility) rather than managing through the general migration governance framework?
- What are the challenges for establishing the national migration commission?
- To what extent does the ECOWAS Free movement protocol cater for people moving due to climate change?

V. NON-STATE ACTORS /CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS /NGOs

- How would you describe climate change situation in Ghana?
- What are your thoughts on current and future climate related migration in Ghana?
- How do non-state actors/ CSOs contribute to creating awareness on climate change and its implications?
- What are some of the challenges you (your institution) face in your climate change
- What do you think about the most vulnerable who are unable to use migration as strategy deal with climate stress in vulnerable communities?
- How can governments and CSO cooperate on addressing climate related crisis?

VI. CLIMATE MIGRANTS/ DISPLACED PERSONS

- Occupation?
- What climate event influences your movement or affects your community.
- How long have you been in your current location?
- What forced you to settle in your current location?
- What can you say about the climate situation in your previous community?
- Which categories of people migrate a lot in your previous community – [as in males, females, traders, farmers, employed, unemployed etc.]
- How will you describe the climate in your current location?
- Were you moving around seasonally before you settled in your current location?
- How do you feel in your current location? / How do you relate with the people in the host community?
- How common is climate-related migration in your original community?

VII. HOST COMMUNITY MEMBER(S) / LEADER (S)

- How will you describe climate conditions in your community?
- What do you know about climate migrants in your community?
- What is your perception /general impression about them?
- How do climate migrants contribute to developments in your community?
- What are some of the challenges you encounter with climate migrants in this community?
- How do you expect the government or stakeholders to deal with the flow of climate migrants in your community?
- Are there institutions/organizations that educate your community about climate change?
- How would you describe the public (local community members) awareness of climate change and its effects on migration? How can awareness be increased to solve climate related problems?

APPENDIX 2: Interviewees

These are lists of participants who provide information to support this study. Some of the responses were similar and as a result, only those quoted verbatim to support the relevant discussion are indicated with their codes in the text. Even though not all responses are quoted verbatim, the information these participants provided shaped the study's overall discussion. The respondents are coded with alphabetic in the text as indicated below.

Respondents:

A-Officer Ghana Statistical Service

B-Immigration Officer

C-Farmer Upper West Region

D-Opinion leader and Coordinator for Art and Culture -Upper West Region

E- Respondent-E- Youth Climate Activist

F- Community Member, Keta (Coastal town)

G- Environmentalist (GAYO)

H- Environmental Activist

I: Climate Mobility and Population Studies Researcher/ Academic,
University of Ghana

J- Coastal / Displaced Community Member

K- Displaced Community Leader

L- Displaced Community Leader

M- Coastal Community Leader

N- Community Head (Chief) -Host Community

O- Focus Group Discussion with 4 Herdsmen

P- Community Leader (Drought Community)

Q- Academic Migration Research and Policy (Lecture)- University of
Development Studies

R- Policy Maker /Climate Change Researcher

S- Climate Migration Researcher and Consultant, University of Ghana

T- Environmental Agency Researcher



U- Returned climate migrant (Farmer - Upper West)



V- Ghana Refugee Board / Policy Maker

W- Border town Immigration Officer



APPENDIX 3: Thematic Maps showing Themes that guided the Analysis





APPENDIX 4: ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol

PROTOCOL A/P.1/5/79 RELATING TO FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, RESIDENCE AND ESTABLISHMENT

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES

RECALLING that sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States calls on Member States to ensure by stages the abolition of the obstacles to free movement of persons, services and capital ;

RECALLING also that paragraph 1 of Article 27 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States confers the status of Community citizenship on the citizens of Member States, and also enjoins Member States to abolish all obstacles to freedom of movement and residence within the Community ;

RECALLING further that paragraph 2 of Article 27 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States further calls on Member States to exempt Community citizens from holding visitor's visa and residence permits and allow them to work and undertake commercial and industrial activities within their territories :

CONVINCED of the need to spell out in this protocol the various stages to be undergone to accomplish complete freedom of movement as envisaged by sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 2 of Article 27 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States ;

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS :

PART 1

DEFINITIONS

Articles I

In this Protocol :

"Treaty" means the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States ;

"Council of Ministers" means the Council of Ministers established by Article 6 of the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States ;

"Executive Secretary" means the Executive Secretary of the Economic Community of West African States ;

"Community" means the Economic Community of West African States ;

"Member State" or "Member States" means a Member State or Member States of the Economic Community of West African States ;

"A citizen of the Community" means a citizen of any Member State ;

"A valid travel document" means a passport or any other valid travel document establishing the identity of the holder with his photograph, issued by or on behalf of the Member State of which he is a citizen and on which endorsement by immigration and emigration authorities may be made. A valid travel document shall also include a laissez-passer issued by the Community to its officials establishing the identity of the holder.

PART II

GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, RESIDENCE AND ESTABLISHMENT

Article 2

1. The Community citizens have the right to enter, reside and establish in the territory of Member States.
2. The right of entry, residence and establishment referred to in paragraph 1 above shall be progressively established in the course of a maximum transitional period of fifteen (15) years from the definitive entry into force of this Protocol by abolishing all other obstacles to free movement of persons and the right of residence and establishment.
3. The right of entry, residence and establishment which shall be established in the course of a transitional period shall be accomplished in three phases, namely:

Phase I - Right of Entry and Abolition of Visa

Phase II - Right of Residence

Phase II - Right of Establishment

Upon the expiration of a maximum period of five (5) years from the definitive entry into force of this Protocol, the Commission, based upon the experience gained from the implementation of the first phase as set out in Article 3 below, shall make proposals to the Council of Ministers for further liberalisation towards the subsequent phases of freedom of residence and establishment of persons within the Community and phases shall be dealt with in subsequent Annexes to this Protocol.

PART III

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIRST PHASE : ABOLITION OF VISAS AND ENTRY PERMIT

Article 3

1. Any citizen of the Community who wishes to enter the territory of any other Member State shall be required to possess a valid travel document and an international health certificate.
2. A citizen of the Community visiting any Member State for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days shall enter the territory of that Member State

through the official entry point free of visa requirements. Such citizen shall, however, be required to obtain permission for an extension of stay from the appropriate authority if after such entry that citizen has cause to stay for more than ninety (90) days.

Article 4

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 above, Member States shall reserve the right to refuse admission into their territory to any Community citizen who comes within the category of inadmissible immigrant under its laws.

PART IV

MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS

Article 5

In order to facilitate the movement of persons transported in private or commercial vehicles the following shall apply :

1. Private Vehicles

A private vehicle registered in the territory of a Member State may enter the territory of another Member State and remain there for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days upon presentation of the documents listed hereunder to the competent authority of that Member State:

- i. Valid driving licence
- ii. Matriculation Certificate (Ownership Card) or Log Book.
- iii. Insurance Policy recognised by Member States
- iv. International customs documents recognised within the Community.

2. Commercial Vehicles

A commercial vehicle registered in the territory of a Member State and carrying passengers may enter the territory of another Member State and remain there for a period not exceeding fifteen (15) days upon presentation of the documents listed hereunder to the competent authority of that Member State :

- i. Valid driving licence
- ii. Matriculation Certificate (Ownership Card) or Log Book.
- iii. Insurance Policy recognised by Member States
- iv. International customs documents recognised within the Community.

During the period of fifteen (15) days the commercial motor vehicle shall however not engage in any commercial activities within the territory of the Member State entered.

PART V

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Article 6

Each Member State shall deposit at the Executive Secretariat specimen of travel documents defined in Article 1 in the present Protocol with a view to communicating them to all Member States.

Article 7

Any dispute that may arise among Member States regarding the interpretation or application of this Protocol shall be amicably settled by direct agreement. In the event of failure to settle such disputes, the matter may be referred to the Tribunal of the Community by a party to such disputes and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final.

Article 8

1. Any Member State may submit proposals for the amendment or revision of this Protocol.
2. Any such proposals shall be submitted to the Executive Secretary who shall communicate them to other Member States not later than thirty (30) days after the receipt of such proposal. Amendments or revisions shall be considered by the Council of Ministers after Member States have been given one month's notice thereof.

Article 9

Member States undertake to co-operate among themselves by exchanging information on such matters that are likely to affect the effective implementation of this Protocol. Such information shall also be sent to the Executive Secretary for necessary action in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

Article 10

The provisions of this Protocol shall not operate to the prejudice of citizens of the Community who are already in residence and established in a Member State provided they comply with the laws in general and in particular the immigration laws of that Member State.

Article 11

1. A decision to expel any citizen of the Community from the territory of a Member State shall be notified to the citizen concerned as well as the government of which he is a citizen and the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS.
2. The expenses incurred in the expulsion of a citizen shall be borne by the Member State which expels him.
3. In case of expulsion, the security of the citizen concerned as well as that of his family shall be guaranteed and his property protected and returned to him without prejudice to his obligations to third party.

4. In case of repatriation of a citizen of the Community from the territory of a Member State, that Member State shall notify the government of the State of origin of the citizen and the Executive Secretary.
5. The cost of repatriation of a citizen of the Community from the territory of a Member State shall be borne by the citizen himself or in the event that he is unable to do so by the country of which he is a citizen.

Article 12

The provisions of the present Protocol shall not affect more favourable provisions contained in agreements that have already been concluded between two or among several Member States.

PART VI

FINAL PROVISIONS : DEPOSIT AND ENTRY INTO FORCE

Article 13

1. This Protocol shall enter into force provisionally upon signature by Heads of State and Government of Member States and definitively upon ratification by at least seven signatory States in accordance with the constitutional procedures applicable for each signatory State.
2. The Protocol and all the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Executive Secretariat which shall transmit certified true copies of this Protocol to all Member States and notify them of the dates of deposit of the instruments of ratification and shall register this Protocol with the Organisation of African Unity, the United Nations and such Organisations as the Council shall determine.
3. This Protocol shall be annexed to and shall form an integral part of the Treaty.

IN FAITH WHEREOF, WE, THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES, HAVE SIGNED THIS PROTOCOL

DONE AT DAKAR, THIS 29TH DAY OF MAY, 1979 IN A SINGLE ORIGINAL IN THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH LANGUAGES, BOTH TEXTS BEING EQUALLY AUTHENTIC

APPENDIX 5: African Union Free Movement Protocol



PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY RELATING TO FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, RIGHT OF RESIDENCE AND RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT

**PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE AFRICAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY RELATING TO FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, RIGHT OF
RESIDENCE AND RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT**

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**PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE AFRICAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY RELATING TO FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, RIGHT OF
RESIDENCE AND RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT**

PREAMBLE

We, the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the African Union;

RECALLING our commitment to conclude a Protocol on the free movement of persons, right of residence and right of establishment, under article 43(2) of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, which was adopted in Abuja, Nigeria on 3rd June, 1991 and entered into force on 12th May, 1994;

MINDFUL of article 3(a) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union which promotes the achievement of greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the people of Africa; and the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community which promotes economic, social and cultural development and the integration of African economies;

REITERATING our shared values which promote the protection of human and people's rights as provided in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights which guarantees the right of an individual to freedom of movement and residence;

GUIDED by our common vision for an integrated, people-centered and politically united continent and our commitment to free movement of people, goods and services amongst the Member States as an enduring dedication to Pan Africanism and African integration as reflected in Aspiration 2 of the African Union Agenda 2063;

RECALLING our commitment under article 4 (2)(i) of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, to gradually remove obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital and the right of residence and establishment among Member States;

BEARING IN MIND the strategies of the Migration Policy Framework for Africa adopted in Banjul, in The Gambia in 2006 which encourage Regional Economic Communities and their Member States to consider the adoption and implementation of appropriate protocols in order to progressively achieve the free movement of persons and to ensure the enjoyment of the right of residence, establishment and access to gainful employment in the host countries;

RECOGNIZING the contribution and building on the achievements of the Regional Economic Communities and other intergovernmental organizations towards progressively achieving the free movement of persons and ensuring the enjoyment of the right of residence and the right of establishment by citizens of Member States;



AWARE of the challenges of implementing the free movement of persons in the regional economic communities which are at different levels of implementing the frameworks providing for free movement of persons;

ENVISAGING that the free movement of persons, capital, goods and services will promote integration, Pan-Africanism, enhance science, technology, education, research and foster tourism, facilitate intra-Africa trade and investment, increase remittances within Africa, promote mobility of labour, create employment, improve the standards of living of the people of Africa and facilitate the mobilization and utilization of the human and material resources of Africa in order to achieve self-reliance and development;

AWARE of the need to ensure that effective measures are put in place in order to prevent situations whereby upholding the freedom of movement of people will not lead to situations whereby the arrival and settlement of migrants in a given host country will create or exacerbate inequalities or will constitute challenges to peace and security;

NOTING that the free movement of persons in Africa will facilitate the establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area endorsed by the African Union 18th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government;

NOTING FURTHER the decision of the Peace and Security Council adopted at its 661st meeting (PSC/PR/COMM.1 (DCLXI) held on 23rd February 2017, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where the Council acknowledged that the benefits of free movement of people, goods and services far outweigh the real and potential security and economic challenges that may be perceived or generated;

RECALLING FURTHER the decision of the Peace and Security Council adopted at the 661st meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC/PR/COMM.1 (DCLXI) held on 23rd February 2017 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in which the Peace and Security Council underlined the need to ensure a phased approach in implementing AU policy decisions on free movement of people and goods, mindful of the variances in the legitimate security concerns of Member States;

REAFFIRMING our belief in our common destiny, shared values and the affirmation of the African identity, the celebration of unity in diversity and the institution of the African citizenship as expressed in the Solemn Declaration of the 50th Anniversary adopted by the 21st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa on 23rd May, 2013;

DETERMINED to enhance the economic development of Member States through a prosperous and integrated continent;

MINDFUL of the decision of the Assembly adopted in July, 2016 in Kigali, Rwanda (Assembly/AU/Dec.607(XXVII)) welcoming the launch of the African Passport and urging Member States to adopt the African Passport and to work closely with the African



Union Commission to facilitate the processes towards its issuance at the citizen level based on international, continental and citizen policy provisions and continental design and specifications:

HAVE AGREED as follows:

PART I – DEFINITIONS

Article 1 DEFINITIONS

For the purpose of this Protocol:

“Assembly” means the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union;

“Commission” means the Commission of the African Union;

“Dependant” means a child or other person who, a national of a Member State is required to support and maintain as defined by the laws of the host Member State;

“Executive Council” means the Executive Council of Ministers of the Union;

“Free movement of persons” means the right of nationals of a Member State to enter move freely and, reside in another Member State in accordance with the laws of the host Member State and to exit the host Member State in accordance with the laws and procedures for exiting that Member State;

“Member State” means a Member State of the African Union;

“Regional arrangement” means agreements, measures or mechanisms on free movement of persons developed and implemented by regional economic communities;

“Right of entry” means the right of a national of a Member State to enter and move freely in another Member State in accordance with the laws of the host Member State;

“Right of establishment” means the right of a national of a Member State to take up and pursue the economic activities specified in Article 17(2), in the territory of another Member State;

“Right of residence” means the right of a national of one Member State to reside and seek employment in another Member State other than their Member State of origin; **in accordance with the national law of the host Member State”.**



"State Parties" means any Member States of the African Union which have ratified, or acceded to this Protocol and deposited the instrument of ratification or accession with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission;

"Territory" means the land, airspace and waters belonging to or under the jurisdiction of a Member State;

"Travel document" means a passport which complies with the International Civil Aviation Organization standards for travel documents, or any other travel document identifying a person issued by or on behalf of a Member State or by the Commission which is recognized by the host Member State;

"Treaty" means the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community adopted in Abuja, Nigeria on 3rd June, 1991 and entered into force on 12th May, 1994;

"Union" means the African Union established by the Constitutive Act of the African Union;

"Vehicle" means any means in or by which a person travels, is carried or conveyed into, by land, the territory of a Member State;

"Visa" means the authority granted to a national of a Member State to enter into the territory of the host Member State.

PART II- OBJECTIVE AND PRINCIPLES OF THE PROTOCOL

Article 2 OBJECTIVE

The objective of this Protocol is to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community by providing for the progressive implementation of free movement of persons, right of residence and right of establishment in Africa.

Article 3 PRINCIPLES

1. The free movement of persons, right of residence and right of establishment in Member States shall be guided by the principles guiding the African Union provided in article 4 of the Constitutive Act.
2. In addition to the principles in paragraph 1, the implementation of this Protocol shall be guided by:
 - (a) non-discrimination;



- (b) respect for laws and policies on the protection of national security, public order, public health, the environment, and any other factors that would be detrimental to the host State; and
- (c) transparency.

Article 4 NON-DISCRIMINATION

1. States Parties shall not discriminate against nationals of another Member State entering, residing or established in their territory, on the basis of their nationality, race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status as provided by Article 2 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights.
2. It shall not be discrimination for a States Party, as a result of reciprocity or deeper integration, to give more favourable treatment to nationals of another States Party or region, in addition to the rights provided for in this Protocol.
3. A citizen of another States Party entering, residing or established in a States Party in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol, shall enjoy the protection of the law of the host States Party, in accordance with the relevant national policies and laws of the host States Party.

Article 5 PROGRESSIVE REALIZATION

1. The free movement of persons, right of residence and right of establishment shall be achieved progressively through the following phases:
 - (a) phase one, during which States Parties shall implement the right of entry and abolition of visa requirements;
 - (b) phase two, during which States Parties shall implement the right of residence;
 - (c) phase three, during which States Parties shall implement the right of establishment.
2. The Roadmap annexed to this Protocol serves as a guideline to help, as appropriate, with the implementation of the above phases.
3. Nothing in this Protocol shall:



- (a) affect more favourable provisions for the realisation of the free movement of persons, right of residence and right of establishment contained in national legislation, regional or continental instruments; or
- (b) prevent the accelerated implementation of any phase of free movement of persons, right of residence and right of establishment by a regional economic community, sub-region or Member State before the time set by this Protocol or the Assembly for the implementation of that phase.

PART III- FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS

Article 6 RIGHT OF ENTRY

1. In accordance with this Protocol, nationals of a Member State shall have the right to enter, stay, move freely and exit the territory of another Member State in accordance with the laws, regulations and procedures of the host Member State.
2. Member States shall implement the right of entry by permitting nationals of Member States to enter into their territory without the requirement of a visa.
3. The right to enter the territory of a Member State shall be enjoyed in accordance with articles 7.
4. A Member State permitting a national of another Member State to enter into their territory shall permit that national to move freely or stay for a maximum period of ninety (90) days from the date of entry or such further period determined by Member States or through bilateral or regional arrangements.
5. A national of a Member State who wishes to stay in the host Member State beyond the period provided in paragraph 4 shall seek an extension of stay in accordance with the procedures established by the host Member State.

Article 7 ENTRY IN MEMBER STATE

1. Entry into the territory of a Member State shall be permitted for a person:
 - (a) entering the Member State through a designated point or official port of entry;
 - (b) with a recognized and valid travel document as defined in Article 1; and



- (c) who is not prohibited from entering the Member State by the laws of that Member State for the protection of national security, public order or public health.
- 2. A host Member State may impose other conditions, which are not inconsistent with this Protocol, according to which a national of a Member State may be refused entry into the territory of the host Member State.

Article 8
DESIGNATED OR OFFICIAL POINTS OF ENTRY AND EXIT

- 1. Member States shall designate and share with other Member States information relating to their official entry and exit points or ports.
- 2. Member States shall in line with national or regional procedures keep the designated official entry and exit points open to facilitate the free movement of persons, subject to reciprocity and the protection measures a Member State may take.

Article 9
TRAVEL DOCUMENTS

- 1. Member States shall issue to their nationals valid travel documents to facilitate free movement.
- 2. Member States shall mutually recognize and exchange specimens of the valid travel documents issued by the Member State.
- 3. Member States shall cooperate in the process of identification and issuance of travel documents.

Article 10
AFRICAN PASSPORT

- 1. States Parties, shall adopt a travel document called "African Passport" and shall work closely with the Commission to facilitate the processes towards the issuance of this Passport to their citizens.
- 2. The Commission shall provide technical support to Member States to enable them to produce and issue the African Passport to their citizens.
- 3. The African Passport shall be based on international, continental and national policy provisions and standards and on a continental design and specifications.



**Article 11
USE OF VEHICLES**

1. States Parties shall permit nationals of another Member State using vehicles to enter into their territory and move freely for a maximum period of 90 (ninety) days from the date of entry, upon presentation of the following valid documents to the competent authorities in the host Member State:
 - (a) a driver's license;
 - (b) evidence of ownership or registration of the vehicle;
 - (c) certificate of road worthiness;
 - (d) certificate of axle load limit;
 - (e) an insurance policy in respect of the vehicle by the host Member State.
2. The use of vehicles by persons in the territory of a host Member State shall be subject to the laws of the host Member State.
3. Member States shall establish and contribute to a continental database on registration of vehicles to facilitate the use of vehicles in the free movement of persons.

**Article 12
FREE MOVEMENT OF RESIDENTS OF BORDER COMMUNITIES**

1. States Parties shall through bilateral or regional agreements establish measures, to identify and facilitate the free movement of residents of border communities without compromising the security or public health of host Member States.
2. States Parties shall endeavour to amicably resolve any legal, administrative, security, cultural or technical impediment likely to hamper the free movement of border communities.

**Article 13
FREE MOVEMENT OF STUDENTS AND RESEARCHERS**

1. States Parties shall permit nationals of another Member State who are holders of registration or pre-registration documents, to take up education or research in their territory in accordance with the policies and laws of the host Member State.
2. A host States Party shall in accordance with national or regional policies issue student permits or passes to nationals of other Member States who are admitted to pursue studies in the host Member State.



3. States Parties shall develop, promote and implement programmes to facilitate exchange of students and researchers among Member States.

Article 14
FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS

1. Nationals of a Member State shall have the right to seek and accept employment without discrimination in any other Member State in accordance with the laws and policies of the host Member State.
2. A national of a Member State accepting and taking up employment in another Member State may be accompanied by a spouse and dependants.

Article 15
PERMITS OR PASSES

1. A host States Party shall issue residence permits, work permits, or other appropriate permits or passes to nationals of other Member State seeking and taking up residence or work in the host Member State.
2. Permits and passes shall be issued in accordance with the immigration procedures applicable to persons seeking or taking up residence or work in the host Member State.
3. The procedures referred to in paragraph 2 shall include the right of a national of another Member State to appeal against a decision denying them a permit or pass.

PART IV - RIGHT OF RESIDENCE AND RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT

Article 16
RIGHT OF RESIDENCE

1. Nationals of a Member State shall have the right of residence in the territory of any Member State in accordance with the laws of the host Member State.
2. A national of a Member State taking up residence in another Member State may be accompanied by a spouse and dependants.
3. States Parties shall gradually implement favourable policies and laws on residence for nationals of other Member States.



Article 17
RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT

1. Nationals of a Member State shall have the right of establishment within the territory of another Member State in accordance with the laws and policies of the host Member State.
2. The right of establishment shall include the right to set up in the territory of the host Member State:
 - (a) a business, trade, profession, vocation; or
 - (b) an economic activity as a self-employed person.

PART V - GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 18
MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF QUALIFICATIONS

1. States Parties shall individually or through bilateral, multilateral or regional arrangements, mutually recognize academic, professional and technical qualifications of their nationals to promote the movement of persons among the Member States.
2. States Parties shall establish a continental qualifications framework to encourage and promote the free movement of persons.

Article 19
PORTABILITY OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS

States Parties shall, through bilateral, regional or continental arrangements, facilitate the portability of social security benefits to nationals of another Member State residing or established in that Member State.

Article 20
MASS EXPULSION

1. The mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited.
2. Mass expulsion shall be that which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious groups.



Article 21
EXPULSION, DEPORTATION AND REPATRIATION

1. A national of a Member State lawfully admitted into the territory of a host Member State may only be expelled, deported or repatriated from the host Member State by virtue of a decision taken in accordance with the law in force in the host Member State.
2. A host States Party shall notify the national of a Member State and the Government of that national of the decision to expel deport or repatriate that citizen from the territory of the host Member State.
3. The Expenses relating to:
 - (a) the expulsion or deportation shall be borne by the Member State expelling or deporting a person;
 - (b) repatriation shall be borne by the person being repatriated or by the state of origin.
4. Where entry into a territory of a Member State is refused, the person responsible for transportation, shall at the request of competent border authorities re-route the persons denied entry back to the point of embarkment, or where this is not possible, to the Member State that issued the citizen's travel documents or any other place where the admission of the citizen will be accepted.

Article 22
PROTECTION OF PROPERTY ACQUIRED IN HOST MEMBER STATE

1. A national of a Member State entering, residing or established in the territory of another Member State, may acquire property in the host Member State in accordance with the laws, policies and procedures of the host Member State.
2. Property lawfully acquired by a national of a Member State in the host Member State, shall not be nationalised, expropriated, confiscated or acquired by the host Member State except in accordance with the law and after fair compensation being paid to that national.
3. Property lawfully acquired by a national of a Member State shall be protected by the host Member State in the event of a dispute between the Member State where the national originates and the host Member State.
4. A host States Party shall not deprive a national of another Member State who is expelled, deported or repatriated by the host Member State, of his/her property lawfully acquired by that national in the host Member State except in accordance with the laws and procedures of the host Member State.



Article 23
REMITTANCES

States Parties shall through, bilateral, regional, continental or international agreements facilitate the transfer of earnings and savings of nationals of other Member States working, residing or established in their territory.

Article 24
PROCEDURES FOR MOVEMENT OF SPECIFIC GROUPS

1. States Party may in addition to the measures provided for by international, regional and continental instruments, establish specific procedures for the movement of specific vulnerable groups including refugees, victims of human trafficking and smuggled migrants, asylum seekers and pastoralists.
2. Procedures established by a Member State under this article shall be consistent with the obligations of that Member State under the international, regional and continental instruments relating to the protection of each group of persons referred to in paragraph 1.

PART VI – IMPLEMENTATION

Article 25
COOPERATION BETWEEN MEMBER STATES

1. States Parties shall in accordance with the African Union Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation coordinate their border management systems in order to facilitate the free and orderly movement of persons.
2. States Parties shall record, document, and upon request, make available all forms of aggregated migration data at the ports or points of entry or exit from their territory.
3. States Parties shall through bilateral or regional arrangements-cooperate with each other by exchanging information related to the free movement of persons and the implementation of this Protocol.

Article 26
COORDINATION AND HARMONISATION

1. In accordance with article 88 of the Abuja Treaty and guided, as appropriate, by the implementation Roadmap annexed to this Protocol, States Parties shall harmonise and coordinate the laws, policies, systems and activities of the regional economic communities of which they are members which relate to free movement of persons with the laws, policies, systems and activities of the Union.



2. States Parties shall harmonise their national policies, laws and systems with this Protocol and guided, as appropriate, by the Implementation Roadmap annexed to this Protocol.

Article 27
ROLE OF MEMBER STATES

1. States Parties shall be responsible for implementing this Protocol.
2. States Parties shall adopt necessary legislative and administrative measures to implement and give effect to this Protocol.
3. States Parties shall harmonize all laws, policies, agreements and immigration procedures and other procedures to ensure compliance with this Protocol.

Article 28
ROLE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES

1. Regional Economic Communities shall be the focal points for promoting, following up and evaluating implementation of this Protocol and reporting the progress towards free movement of persons in their respective regions.
2. Each Regional Economic Community shall submit periodic reports to the Commission on the progress of implementation of this Protocol within their respective region.
3. Regional Economic Communities shall harmonise their Protocols, policies and procedures on free movement of persons with this Protocol.

Article 29
ROLE OF THE COMMISSION

1. The Commission shall follow up and evaluate the implementation of this Protocol by the Member States and shall through the relevant Specialised Technical Committees submit periodic reports to the Executive Council on the status of implementation of this protocol.
2. The Commission shall in coordination with Member States develop and apply a continental follow up and coordinating mechanism for assessing the status of implementing this Protocol.
3. The follow up and coordinating mechanism shall include the collection and analysis of data nationally and regionally in order to assess the state of the free movement of persons.



**Article 30
REMEDIES**

1. States Parties shall provide appropriate administrative and judicial remedies in their national laws for nationals of other Member States affected by decisions of a Member State relating to the implementation of this Protocol.
2. A National of a Member State who is denied the enjoyment of the right of entry, residence, establishment or other related rights provided in this Protocol, having exhausted all legal remedies in the host Member State, may refer the matter to the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights.

PART VII- FINAL PROVISIONS

**Article 31
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES**

1. Any dispute or difference arising between States Parties with regard to the interpretation, application and implementation of this Protocol shall be settled by mutual consent between States concerned, including through negotiations, mediation, conciliation or other peaceful means.
2. In the event of failure by the disputing parties to settle the dispute or difference, the disputing Parties may:
 - (a) By mutual consent, refer the dispute to an Arbitration Panel of three (3) Arbitrators whose decision shall be binding on the Parties; or
 - (b) Refer the dispute to the African Court of Justice, Human Rights and Peoples' Rights, when operational.
3. The appointment of the Panel of Arbitrators shall be as follows:
 - (i) The Parties to the dispute shall each appoint one arbitrator; and
 - (ii) The Chairperson of the Commission shall appoint the third Arbitrator who shall be the President of the Panel.
4. Pending the operationalization of the Court referred to in sub article (2)(a) above, the decision of the Panel of Arbitrators shall be binding.

**Article 32
SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION AND ACCESSION**

1. This Protocol shall be open to Member States of the Union for signature, ratification or accession.



2. The instrument of ratification or accession to the present Protocol shall be deposited with the Chairperson of the Commission who shall notify all Member States of the dates of the deposit of the instruments of ratification or accession.

Article 33 ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. The Protocol shall, enter into force thirty (30) days after the date of receipt by the Chairperson of the Commission of the fifteenth (15th) instrument of ratification.
2. Any Member State may, at the time of adoption of the Protocol by the Assembly, declare that it will apply provisionally the provisions of the Protocol pending its entry into force.
3. For any Member State that deposit its instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession subsequent to the entry into force of this Protocol, this Protocol shall enter into force for that State thirty days (30) days following the date of the deposit of its instrument of acceptance or accession.

Article 34 RESERVATIONS

1. A State Party may, when, ratifying or acceding to this Protocol, submit in writing a reservation with respect to any of the provisions of this Protocol. Reservation shall not be incompatible with the object and purpose of this Protocol.
2. Unless otherwise provided, a reservation may be withdrawn at any time.
3. The withdrawal of a reservation must be submitted in writing to the Chairperson of the Commission who shall notify other States Parties of the withdrawal accordingly.

Article 35 DEPOSITORY

This Protocol shall be deposited with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, who shall transmit a certified true copy of the Protocol to the Government of each signatory State.

Article 36 REGISTRATION

The Chairperson of the Commission upon the entry into force of this Protocol shall register this Protocol with the United Nations Secretary General in conformity with Article 102 of the Protocol of the United Nations.



Article 37
SUSPENSION AND WITHDRAWAL

1. Any State Party may suspend, temporarily, the implementation of the provisions of the present Protocol in case of grave threats to national security, public order and public health.
2. At any time after three years from the date of entry into force of this Protocol, a State Party may withdraw by giving written notification to the Depository.
3. Withdrawal shall be effective one year after receipt of notification by the Depository, or on such later date as may be specified in the notification.
4. Withdrawal shall not affect any obligation of the withdrawing State Party prior to the withdrawal.

Article 38
AMENDMENT AND REVISION

1. Any State Party may submit proposal(s) for the amendment or revision of this Protocol. Such proposal(s) shall be adopted by the Assembly.
2. Proposals for amendment or revision shall be submitted to the Chairperson of the Commission who shall transmit such proposals to the Assembly at least six months before the meeting at which it shall be considered for adoption.
3. Amendments or revisions shall be adopted by the Assembly by consensus or, failing which, by a two-thirds majority.
4. The amendment or revision shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures outlined in Article 33 of this Protocol.


Article 39
AUTHENTIC TEXTS

This Protocol is drawn up in four (4) original texts, in Arabic, English, French and Portuguese languages, all four (4) texts being equally authentic.

**ADOPTED BY THE THIRTIETH ORDINARY SESSION OF THE
ASSEMBLY, HELD IN ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA
ON 29 JANUARY 2018**



APPENDIX 6: Map of Climate Hazards and Environmental Impact in Africa



Source of Map: IOM, 2015