

Memory of an Institution:
The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Turkish Diplomats in the 1960-1980 Period

Hüseyin Sert



A dissertation presented to the
Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History
at Boğaziçi University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

May 2018

Approvals

“Memory of an Institution: The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Turkish Diplomats in the 1960-1980 Period,” a dissertation prepared by Hüseyin Sert in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University, has been approved on May 23, 2018 by:

DISSERTATION ADVISOR

Prof. Dr. Aydin Babuna
Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History
Boğaziçi University

COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Prof. Dr. Gencer Özcan
Department of International Relations
Istanbul Bilgi University

Doç. Dr. Berna Yazıcı
Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History
Boğaziçi University

Doç. Dr. Doğan Gürpınar
Department of Human and Social Sciences
Istanbul Technical University

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Seçkin Barış Gülmek
Department of International Relations
Izmir Katip Çelebi University



Copyright © 2018 Hüseyin Sert.
Some rights reserved.



This work is licensed under the Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

To view a copy of this license, visit
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/>

Abstract

“Memory of an Institution: The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Turkish Diplomats in the 1960-80 Period”

Hüseyin Sert, Doctoral Candidate at the Atatürk Institute
for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University, 2018

Prof. Dr. Aydın Babuna, Dissertation Advisor

This dissertation scrutinizes the Cold War Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy with an emphasis on the 1960-80 period in comparison to the world examples. The study is not a narrative of Turkish foreign policy but presents the story of the transformation of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an institution and the Turkish diplomat as a professional in response to the challenges of the time.

Throughout the period following World War II, diplomatic bureaucracies were subject to criticism in national public opinions, and in some cases, the necessity of diplomacy as an institution was questioned. Nonetheless, through new and transforming scopes of work, diplomatic bureaucracies managed to consolidate their status in diplomatic processes. The Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy was influenced not only by foreign policy issues but also by significant developments in domestic politics, and as a consequence, recorded relative success by both transforming itself and influencing state practices and the views of public opinion.

With reference to an approach that evaluates diplomacy as a “social” phenomenon –, as an outcome of the interactions among various actors –, this dissertation, as well, puts forward that Turkish diplomacy was not isolated from the values and demands of the society in the aforementioned period. On the contrary, in many cases, it executed its operations in an interaction with public opinion, governments and other bureaucratic institutions.

147,000 words

Özet

“Bir Kurumun Hafızası: 1960-80 Döneminde Türk Dışişleri Bakanlığı ve Diplomati”

Hüseyin Sert, Doktora Adayı, 2018

Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü

Prof. Dr. Aydın Babuna, Tez Danışmanı

Bu çalışmada Soğuk Savaş dönemi Türk Dışişleri bürokrasisi 1960-1980 dönemi ağırlıklı olmak üzere ve dünyadaki muadilleriyle mukayeseli bir şekilde incelecektir. Çalışma, Türk dış politikasının bir anlatısı olmaktan ziyade bir kurum olarak Türk Dışişleri Bakanlığının ve bir profesyonel olarak Türk diplomatının karşılaştığı meydan okumaların sonucunda tecrübe ettiği dönüşümün bir hikayesini sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

II. Dünya Savaşı’nı takip eden dönemde, dünya genelinde dışişleri bürokrasileri ulusal kamuoyları nezdinde eleştirilere muhatap olmuş, kimi zaman bir kurum olarak diplomasının gerekliliği sorgulanmıştır. Buna karşın, dışişleri bürokrasileri sözü edilen dönemde yeni ve dönüşen görev tanımlarıyla diplomatik süreçler içerisindeki rolünü konsolide etmeyi başarmıştır. Türk Dışişleri bürokrasisi de sadece dış politika değil, o dönemde Türkiye’nin iç siyaseti açısından da belirleyici nitelikteki gelişmelerden etkilenmiş, bu sürecin sonucunda hem kendisini dönüştürmek hem de muhatabı olduğu konularda devlet uygulamalarını ve kamuoyunun görüşlerini etkilemek suretiyle görece bir başarı kaydetmiştir.

Bu çalışmada ayrıca, diplomasının farklı aktörler arasındaki ilişkilerden doğan bir “sosyal” fenomen olduğu iddiasını temel alan yaklaşımından yola çıkılarak Türk diplomatik bürokrasisinin sözü edilen dönemde toplumun değer ve taleplerinden yalıtılmış bir konumda olmadığı, bunun aksine çoğu durumda kamuoyu, bürokrasının diğer aktörleri ve hükümetler ile ilişki içerisinde faaliyetlerini yürüttüğünü ortaya koymak amaçlanmıştır.

147.000 kelime

Curriculum Vitæ

HÜSEYIN SERT

24 November 1985
in Istanbul, Turkey

EDUCATION

Ph.D.	Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History Boğaziçi University 2018
M.A.	Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History Boğaziçi University 2010
B.A.	Department of Political Science & International Relations Marmara University 2008

PUBLICATIONS

- ♦ Sert, Hüseyin. “Aynılar İçinde Bir Ayrı: Mahmut Dikerdem'in Dışişleri Memuriyeti,” *Toplumsal Tarih* 292 (April 2018): 84-92.

CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION

- ♦ Sert, Hüseyin. “İçeriden Gelen Ses: Bir Hatırat Yazarı Olarak Türk Diplomati ve Türk Hariciyesinde 1960-1980 Döneminin Hatıratlar Üzerinden Analizi,” *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyete Hatırat Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Turkey, (25-27 April 2018)

LANGUAGES

- ♦ Turkish – Native Speaker
- ♦ English – Fluent
- ♦ German – Intermediate



To a Beyoğlu Morning
on November 3, 2011

Table of Contents

Glossary of Non-English Terms	<i>xi</i>
Abbreviations and Acronyms	<i>xi</i>
Acknowledgements	<i>xii</i>
1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Definition, Aim, and Scope of the Study	1
1.2 Methodology	4
1.3 Rethinking the Turkish Diplomatic Bureaucracy	16
2 THEORETICAL AND CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK	25
2.1 Can Diplomacy Be Theorized?	25
2.2 A Busy Profession in Decline? Diplomats and Foreign Ministries in the Post-World War II Period (1945-1980)	41
2.3 Concluding Remarks	68
3 THE TURKISH DIPLOMATIC BUREAUCRACY FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE	72
3.1 Imperial Diplomatic Legacy	72
3.2 Republican Period	85
3.3 Concluding Remarks	132
4 A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE TURKISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS BETWEEN 1960 AND 1980: TENDENCIES AND TRANSFORMATIONS	135
4.1 An Outline of the Turkish MFA in the 1960-1980 Period	135
4.2 Ideology of an Institution: Was There One?	143
4.3 Institutional Features	157
4.4 Appointment Procedures	159
4.5 “Some are More Equal than Others:” The Formation of a Clique within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs	164
4.6 Gender Matters in Diplomacy: Female Diplomats and Diplomats’ Spouses in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs	176
4.7 Concluding Remarks	187

5	THE “FLAT ROOM” AND BEYOND: IMPACT OF THE 27 MAY COUP ON THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	189
5.1	A Coup and a Ministry	189
5.2	Bureaucratic “Reforms”	192
5.3	Individual Experiences and the Morale of an Institution	200
5.4	A Minister Changes, the Ministry Changes: The Sarper Effect	227
5.5	Concluding Remarks	232
6	TOUCHING THE CITIZEN, TRANSFORMING THE BUREAUCRACY: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TURKISH DIPLOMATIC BUREAUCRACY AND TURKISH CITIZENS	237
6.1	Eternal Tension between the State and Citizens in Turkey: A Reminder from Recent History	237
6.2	Turkish Migrant Workers as Addressees of the Turkish Diplomatic Bureaucracy	239
6.3	Concluding Remarks	288
7	A PROFESSION ON THE FRONTLINE: ATTACKS ON TURKISH DIPLOMATS AND THE FORMATION OF AN OFFICIAL NARRATIVE	290
7.1	Background	290
7.2	“An Old, Mad Man:” The Yanikian Affair and a Decade-Long Series of Assassinations	303
7.3	A Horrific Wait: The Daily Experience of Threatened Turkish Diplomats	318
7.4	After Assassinations: Turkish Diplomats as Constructors of the Official Turkish Narrative	329
7.5	Concluding Remarks	338

8	DIPLOMATS AS CATALYSTS FOR WAR: MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CYPRUS AND THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY	341
8.1	A Ministry Locked on an island: The Course of the Cyprus Question and Its Impact on the Turkish Diplomatic Bureaucracy	341
8.2	The July 15, 1974 Coup in Cyprus: <i>Five to Twelve O’Clock</i>	346
8.3	Covert Actors of the Intervention: The Role of the Turkish Diplomatic Bureaucracy	352
8.4	Unknown Fronts of the War: Embassies in Nicosia, Athens, and the Ministry in Ankara	366
8.5	“A Break for a Bigger Step:” Ceasefire after the First Intervention	373
8.6	The Road to the Final Action Through the Lens of Turkish Diplomats	376
8.7	Concluding Remarks	385
9	CONCLUSION	389
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	398

Glossary of Non-English Terms

Dahiliye	Interior Ministry
Enosis	Unification of Cyprus with Greece
Hariciye	Foreign Ministry
Katib-i Umumi	Secretary General
Maliye	Finance Ministry
Müsteşar	Undersecretary
Tanzimat	A Period of Political and Economic Reorganization in the Ottoman Empire (1839-1876)

Abbreviations and Acronyms

3-K	Cyprus Coordination Committee
AP	Justice Party
ASALA	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CHP	Republican People's Party
DİTİB	Turkish-Islamic Union of the Religious Affairs
EEC	European Economic Community
JCAG	Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide
MBK	National Unity Committee
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MSP	National Salvation Party
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PMRA	Prime Ministry Republican Archives
TBMM	Turkish Grand National Assembly
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
VCCR	Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
VCDR	Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to Aydin Babuna. As the advisor of both my master's thesis and dissertation, Professor Babuna has made an invaluable contribution to my studies. I also thank my committee members, Gencer Özcan, Berna Yazıcı, Doğan Gürpınar and Seçkin Barış Gülmez for their participation and eye-opening comments.

This dissertation owes its content to one of the small talks in the *Börekçi*. Hereby, I want to express my gratitude to all of my friends at the Atatürk Institute. Throughout my years as a master's and doctoral student, my conversations with friends have taught me very much. As the great poet said, "I have learnt most of what I know from them." Two of them deserve particular credit. I consider my years-long friendships with Ataman O. Aydan and H. Nezih Bamyacı among my greatest fortunes.

The research and writing process of this dissertation went hand in hand with my years as a "mischievous officer." I thank to Murat (*Ağabey*) Küru for his years-long friendship and also for his contributions during my fieldwork in Germany. I am grateful to Osman Ç. Akgül and Talha Baş for making me feel I had brothers. An evening talk in Galata with Elif Korkmaz paved the way for the completion of this dissertation, I also thank to her.

I must pay my tribute to Yiğit Kızılçım for our friendship since high school years. I thank to Samet Çelikçi for his strong encouragement at the beginning of my academic life. I have a twenty-year long brotherhood with N. Serhat Başkan. Apart from this, I am grateful to him for his encouraging stance and companionship throughout the writing process. Dr. Can Üner, the "good boy" in my life since 1997, was always with me whenever I and my family needed. Last, I am thankful to my family for all sorts of emotional and physical comfort they have provided me.

NOTE: The in-house editor of the Atatürk Institute has made recommendations with regard to the format, grammar, spelling, usage, and syntax of this dissertation in compliance with professional, ethical standards for the editing of student, academic work.

Introduction

§ 1.1 Definition, Aim, and Scope of the Study

This study scrutinizes the course of Turkish diplomats and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs throughout the 1960s and 70s in order to locate the place of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy in the world context with regard to its contemporaries. Such an effort clarifies the general characteristics of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy, an institution highly speculated about but rarely enquired, in the aforementioned period. Moreover, a modest contribution to the efforts to conceptualize diplomatic practice through the case of Turkish diplomacy in the 1960s and 70s is provided. In sum, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy as a level of analysis is introduced to the diplomatic studies literature.

This study should not be seen as foreign policy analysis. Foreign policy issues such as the Cyprus Question or relations with the Western alliance are examined in this dissertation to the extent that they clarify the general characteristics of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. Instead of analyzing foreign policy, this dissertation sheds light on the perceptions, attitudes, and operations of the Turkish diplomatic staff and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs through an examination of the phenomena with which they were preoccupied throughout the 1960s and 70s. In short, this is the story of a profession and an institution in a certain period of time. The dissertation, by a

comparative analysis of the memoirs of Turkish diplomats, also presents the opportunity to evaluate significant developments of political and diplomatic history of Turkey in the aforementioned through the experiences and observations of Turkish diplomats.

In the broadest sense, this dissertation makes a sense of the interactive and constructive nature of diplomatic practice through the Turkish case in the 1960s and 70s. Diplomats, including Turkish diplomats, did not conduct their professions in a bell-jar independent from either public opinion or government. In this regard, diplomacy is a socially-embedded, interactive phenomenon. Second, as a consequence of this, diplomacy is a constructive practice. Through interactions with its addressees – that is to say, governments, non-governmental organizations, media, and citizens –, the diplomatic profession constructs and transforms itself, its operations, and its addressees. In this regard, diplomacy is not an isolated phenomenon with no relation to time and space. It is not feasible to find generic definitions and conclusions applicable to all kinds of diplomatic practice in any given period or geography. The socially-embedded, interactive and mutually-constructive character of diplomatic practice should lead to think about the features of diplomatic practices.

The 1960s and 70s are the time interval for this study. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, certain social, political, economic phenomena transformed world politics that were not witnessed, for instance, either in the 1950s or in the 1980s. The Cold War tension diminished with the Détente process, numerous independent states emerged as a consequence of decolonization, and foreign policy issues – most notably the war in Vietnam – became a matter of concern for publics. More importantly, Turkish foreign policy faced new challenges.

Diplomatic practice passes through serious transformations in the aftermath of major events in world politics – for instance, in the post-World War I or the post-Cold War periods. This was also valid for the post-World War II period. Diplomatic staffs and foreign ministries encountered new challenges and experienced considerable transformations. Foreign ministries came under harsh criticism; the function and even necessity of diplomatic staffs in the Cold War years were questioned. Nevertheless, the diplomatic practice of the aforementioned period was redefined with new functions and foreign

ministries consolidated their positions by adapting to the changing conditions of the time.

So was the case for the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. This dissertation, in this regard, argues that the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy encountered similar challenges to those of world examples. Indeed, Turkish diplomatic staff and the foreign ministry faced the aforementioned challenges of its time more radically than counterparts in the world. The ministry entered the period with the impact of the first coup d'état of republican history which deeply influenced the ministry's certain customs and authorities. Turkey's workforce migration to Western European countries, which began in 1961 and intensified in ensuing two decades, not only imposed a new and heavy burden on the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy that was not experienced in the previous decades, but also redefined Turkey's relations with its citizens in the transnational context. Beginning from the first half of the 1970s, Turkish diplomats faced threats for their and their relatives' lives as a consequence of the terrorist attacks realized by certain Armenian organizations. Terrorist attacks towards diplomats and diplomatic missions was a "political trend" of the time which was not witnessed in that frequency before and Turkish diplomats encountered these type of attacks much frequently than their counterparts. Last but not the least, the ministry, both in the long and short terms, played an active role in Turkey's foreign policy formulation in the case of the Cyprus dispute which resulted with Turkey's intervention in the island. Beginning from the 1950s up to present, the Cyprus dispute held a central place in Turkish foreign policy. The 1960-1980 period, however, was a phase that most critical developments of the dispute was experienced. In many respects, as a consequence, the 1960s and 1970s held a unique place in the course of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy in republican history.

It can be concluded that the Turkish *Hariciye* of the 1960-1980 period came out of this process with a relative success in many respects.¹ The Turkish

¹ *Hariciye* literally means "external or foreign" in Turkish and refers to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The name comes from the Ottoman version of the institution, *Umur-ı Hariciye Vekaleti*. In time, the ministry bureaucracy was identified by this name just as the metonym *Quai d'Orsay* refers to the French Foreign Ministry, *Wilhelmstrasse* to the German

diplomatic bureaucracy was not only dramatically affected by developments of the time in domestic and global politics, but also it has been influential on state policies and narratives on issues related to the diplomatic staff. In this regard, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy of the 1960s and 70s suits the argument of a “socially interactive and mutually constructive” foreign ministry.²

§ 1.2 Methodology

With few exceptions, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy has not been subject to academic study thus far. In his article on Ottoman and Republican Foreign Services published in 1982, Kuneralp notes that “very little has been published on Turkish foreign service” and there has been quite limited contribution to the field from that day to present.³ Apart from Turkish diplomat Kemal

Foreign Office, and Foggy Bottom to the United States Department of State. Hereafter, whenever the word Hariciye is used in this dissertation, it refers to Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In some cases, the institution will be called “the ministry” or the “Turkish MFA.”

- 2 “Socially-interactive” refers to the relational character of diplomatic practice which includes the contacts of a diplomat with his government, counterparts, and citizens. The mutually constructive nature of diplomatic practice is the outcome of these interactions since any relations conducted by the diplomat not only transformed the diplomatic practice but also all other addressees of diplomatic processes.
- 3 This article does not include even a bibliographical list. Sinan Kuneralp, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic,” in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner, (London: Times Books, 1982), 510. A quick search to the Turkish academic literature reveals that the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been the subject of technical research rather than examined as a diplomatic practice. Both of the two theses examining the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs focused on its academy and training program. See Kadriye Zeynep Girgin, *Training Needs Analysis and Implementations in a Turkish Institution: Training Program for Overseas Assignments in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (MA Thesis, Ankara: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1997). Mehmet Akkaya, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Diplomasi Akademisinde Diplomat Adaylarına Verilen Mesleğe Hazırlayıcı Eğitim Programının Katılımcı Görüşерine Göre Değerlendirilmesi* (MA Thesis, Ankara: Ankara University, 2015). Nevertheless, careers of certain Turkish diplomats were subjected to studies in recent years. George Harris studied on early republican Turkish diplomats and Bilal Şimşir, a scholar and a Turkish diplomat, responded to his study via an article. George S. Harris, *Atatürk’s Diplomats & Their Brief Biographies* (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2010).

Girgin's *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi Hariciye Tarihimiz* (Ottoman and Republican Period Foreign Ministry History), the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not examined in detail in scholarly work.⁴ This, of course, can be seen as part of a global trend. Case –, period- or region-based foreign policy analysis is frequently conducted in international relations studies rather than diplomacy studies. The first studies on the institutional-basis of diplomacy in the world were published by diplomats themselves, such as Abraham de Wicquefort's *L'Ambassadeur et ses Fonctions* (1681), François de Callieres' *De la*

Bilal Şimşir, "Atatürk'ün Elçileri Üzerine," *Yeni Türkiye* 3 (March-April 1995). Yücel Güçlü published two books on the career trajectories of two prominent early republican diplomats, namely Cevat Açıkalın and Numan Menemencioğlu. See Yücel Güçlü, *Eminence Grise of Turkish Foreign Service: Numan Menemencioğlu* (Ankara: -- -, 2002), *The Life and Career of a Turkish Diplomat: Cevat Açıkalın* (Ankara: -- -, 2002). More recently, bureaucratic and political careers of certain prominent diplomats of the Cold War years were studied in a small number of master's theses. See Ferdi Uzun, *Türk Dışişlerinde Fatin Rüştü Zorlu* (MA Thesis, Hacettepe University, 2015). Turay Yayla, *Diplomat Hasan Esat İşık'ın Biyografisi* (MA Thesis, Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi, 2014), Kürşat Özdemir, *Bir Dışişleri Bakanı Olarak İlter Türkmen (1980-1983)* (MA Thesis. İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi, 2015). In her book, *Türk Diplomasisinde Kıbrıs, 1970-1991: Büyükelçiler Anlatıyor*, Gül İnanç mentioned her project concerning the preparation of a prosopographical guide of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1923-2007 period. The study would include the names, family and school backgrounds, professional assignments, language skills, and post-retirement activities of Turkish diplomats who worked in the aforementioned period. Nevertheless, such study has not been prepared or, at least, published. Gül İnanç, *Türk Diplomasisinde Kıbrıs, 1970-1991: Büyükelçiler Anlatıyor* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2007), xviii.

4 Compared to the republican period, Ottoman diplomatic institutions have been much more intensely researched. Carter Findley's doctoral thesis his other studies provide a full-fledged analysis of the evolution of the Ottoman diplomatic mechanism in time. See Carter Vaughn Findley, *From Re'is Efendi to Foreign Minister: Ottoman Bureaucratic Reform and the Creation of the foreign ministry* (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1969.) Moreover, the ISIS publishing house, directed by Sinan Kuneralp, who is also a member of a "family of diplomats," released various researches not only on Ottoman diplomatic history but also on Ottoman diplomatic institutions and Ottoman diplomats. In recent years, a couple of studies have focused on the evolution of the Ottoman diplomatic "mindset." See Namık Sinan Turan, *İmparatorluk ve Diplomasi: Osmanlı Diplomasisinin İzinde* (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2014). Doğan Gürpınar, *Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy: A Political, Social and Cultural History* (London: I.B Tauris, 2013).

Maniere de Negocier Avec les Souverains (1716), Ernest Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice (1917) and Harold Nicolson's Diplomacy (1939).⁵

Nevertheless, there is something specific to the case of Turkey. The archives of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs have not yet been opened to researchers which hinders researchers of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy.⁶ There is an ongoing technical effort to open the ministry's archives on-line, however, they have not been opened as of May 2018, and only a small and relatively neutral parts of the archives will be available to researchers once it is opened.⁷ An administrator in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted

5 See Abraham de Wicquefort, *L 'Ambassadeur et ses Fonctions* (The Hague: Veneur, 1681). François de Callieres, *De la Maniere de Negocier Avec les Souverains* (Paris: Noveau Monde Editions, 2006). Ernest Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (London: Longman Greens, 1922). Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (London: T. Butterworth, 1939). The course of efforts to conceptualize diplomatic practice will be examined in detail in the next chapter.

6 For some of criticisms on the lack of access to ministry archives from different researchers in different periods, see Cemil Koçak, *Geçmişiniz İtinayla Temizlenir* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), 432. Corry Guttstadt, *Türkiye, Yahudiler ve Holokost* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012), 326. Dilek Barlas, *Serhat Güvenç, Türkiye'nin Akdeniz Siyaseti (1923-1939): Orta Büyüklükte Devlet Diplomasisi ve Deniz Gücünün Sınırları* (İstanbul: Koç Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2014), 16. Indeed, the archives of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs are not "officially" closed to researchers. Terms of access to documents are regulated in a by-law. However, this is impossible in practice since access to documents requires a complicated confirmation process. "Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşiv Hizmetleri Yönetmeliği," TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı İnternet Sitesi, accessed March 28, 2018, available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKANLIK/Mevzuat/3-arsiv.pdf>. Many of the counterparts of the Turkish MFA, however, provide access to the archives of their foreign ministries. The Greek Foreign Ministry, for example, opened its archives to researchers in 1959. "Foreign Ministry Archive Services of European Union Member States: Greece," European Council Website, accessed March 12, 2016, available from <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/splash/?requested=%2f>.

7 "Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivi Araştırmacılara Açılıyor," CNN Turk, accessed June 20, 2015, available from <http://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/disisleri-bakanligi-arsivi-arastirmacilara-aciliyor>. Recently, the course of efforts in digitalizing the archives of the ministry has been subject to a parliamentary question. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, noticed the TBMM that the digitalization process of the ministry archives was in progress. It was projected to be completed at the end of 2015. "İstanbul Milletvekili Sayın Garo Paylan'ın Yönettiği

that “only the documents about Latin American countries are going to be opened to researchers at first.”⁸

For the scope of this study, the lack of archival sources no doubt constitutes a deficiency in terms of testifying to the outcomes. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not release publications uninterruptedly. The most durable publication of the ministry, the Foreign Affairs Bulletin (*Dışişleri Belleteni*), was published between 1964 and 1973.⁹ Published once a quarter, the bulletin consisted of analysis of international political and economic developments, notices about new procedures and programs within the ministry, and the agreements or treaties signed by the Turkish government. Although certain issues in these bulletins have been useful for this study, they present no information for the remainder of the 1970s. Apart from this bulletin, three yearbooks published by the ministry in 1960, 1964, and 1968, respectively, serve as another type of primary resource for this study.¹⁰

In recent years, ethnographic methods have been increasingly applied to international politics and foreign policy analysis. As an extension of the “Studying Up” concept, this new understanding has offered to “study [of] the cultures of the powerful as well as [of] the powerless.”¹¹ As a consequence, ethnographic methods and materials have also been adopted in the international relations discipline since the mid-1980s.¹² The main motive of this

7/12948 Sayılı Soru Önergesine Yanıt,” TBMM Resmi İnternet Sitesi, accessed March 28, 2018, available from <http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d26/7/7-12948sgc.pdf>.

8 Mesut Özcan, *Interview by the Author*. Note-taking, Ankara, September 20, 2015.

9 İsmail Soysal, *Türk Dış Politikası İncelemeleri için Kılavuz (1919-1993)* (İstanbul: Eren, 1993), 153.

10 A continuation of the *Salname* (yearbook) tradition, the ministry’s yearbooks were published to provide information about the personnel and actions of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. Although they were called *Yıllık* (yearbook), these books were never published on a yearly basis.

11 Hugh Gusterson, “Studying Up Revisited,” *Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 20, no.1 (May 1997), 114. This conceptualization was first coined by Laura Nader in the early 1970s. See Laura Nader, “Up the Anthropologist-Perspectives Gained from Studying Up,” in *Reinventing Anthropology*, ed. Dell Hymes, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 284-311.

12 Wanda Vrasti, “The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (2008), 279.

methodological approach is to “reduce these fields’ heavy reliance on formal textual sources like speeches.”¹³ Although this study presents a clarification of the course of a professional group in a certain period rather than engaging in a foreign policy analysis, this perspective shift in the study of international politics inspired the content of this dissertation.¹⁴

Wiseman notes that “for diplomatic studies, diplomatic memoirs have been a key research source.”¹⁵ So indeed, especially when a certain period or event in recent diplomatic history is to be explained, the accounts of diplomats present deeper information compared to archives and other primary resources. In many countries diplomats are “prolific writers … who … reflected [on] their own practice to an extent that few other professions can match.”¹⁶ Turkish diplomats are no exception,¹⁷ and this is useful since the dissertation

13 Merje Kuus, “Foreign Policy and Ethnography: A Skeptical Intervention,” *Geopolitics* 18, no. 1 (2013), 117.

14 An invaluable series of studies has been conducted by the United States Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST). Since 1986, ethnographic perspectives in the study of international politics have flourished, and ADST “has recorded more than 2,500 interview with former participants in the U.S. foreign affairs processes.” These interviews cover about eighty years of United States foreign affairs and “about 60 new interviews are added annually.” See “The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collections,” *Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Website*, accessed May 30, 2016, available from <http://adst.org/oral-history/>. Accounts of Turkish diplomats indeed offer a similar pool of information. This dissertation also presents a semi-ethnographic sketch of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy through a comprehensive content analysis of these accounts.

15 Geoffrey Wiseman, “Diplomatic Practices at the United Nations,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 50, no. 3 (2015), 318.

16 Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 9.

17 Indeed, writing on the observations made through professional life was inherited by Turkish diplomats from the Ottoman diplomatic tradition. Many of the Ottoman temporary or permanent ambassadors in the eighteenth and nineteenth century authored books of embassy (*Sefaretnamə*) in order to inform the Sultan and the ruling elite about the city and the state that they were assigned, and the social, political, and diplomatic developments of the time, as well. For a detailed examination of the Ottoman *Sefaretnamə* tradition, see Faik Reşit Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992). The first publications that can be considered as memoirs were written by two late Ottoman diplomats,

has been written without access to the archives of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Memoirs of diplomats related to the course of Turkish diplomacy between 1960 and 1980 were utilized as the basic research component of this dissertation.¹⁸ Nevertheless, this is not a dissertation on foreign policy through memoirs. This study is inspired by the memoirs of Turkish diplomats and the contents of the memoirs determined the issues of the dissertation's chapters

Galip Kemali (Söylemezoğlu) and Esat Cemal (Paker). Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, *Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene, 1892-1922: Mutlakiyet, Meşrutiyet ve Millî Mücadele Yıllarında Şahidi veya Âmil Olduğum Hâdiselere Ait Vesikalar* (İstanbul: Şaja Matbaası, 1949). Esat Cemal Paker, *Siyasi Tarihimizde Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2001). In the republican period, Turkish diplomats did not publish memoirs for decades. Numan Menemencioğlu is known to have an unpublished memoir written in French. In the second half of the 1970s, Mahmut Dikerdem published two books concerning his years in the Middle East and Third World countries. Mahmut Dikerdem, *Orta Doğu'da Devrim Yılları: Bir Büyükelçinin Anıları* (İstanbul Matbaası: İstanbul, 1977). *Üçüncü Dünyadan: Bir Büyükelçinin Anıları* (İstanbul Matbaası: İstanbul, 1977). Feridun Cemal Erkin's three-volume memoirs published first in 1980 probably constituted a watershed for this genre in republican history. Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Dışışlerinde 34 Yıl, vol. I, II & III* (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1980). Erkin's memoirs are of significance in two respects. First, they included information not only about his professional experiences but also featured a detailed study of twentieth century political history covering interwar, World War II, and Cold War years. Second, Erkin's memoirs inspired a generation of Turkish diplomats. Memoirs flourished beginning from the mid-1980s that were written by Turkish diplomats whose career were predominantly filled with World War II and Cold War years. Until recently, number of Turkish diplomatic memoirs surpassed seventy. Notably in the initial years of memoir-publishing, *Bilgi Yayınevi* and *Milliyet Yayınları* published diplomatic memoirs more than any publishers. Certain Turkish diplomats published memoirs through their own means revealing their eagerness to make their voices heard.

18 As a professional group, Turkish diplomats published numerous books in various genres other than foreign policy analysis or diplomatic history. These ranged from poetry to translations, from grammar books to literary texts. For a few of these examples, see İlhan Akant, *Budala* (The Idiot), *Translation from Dostoyevsky* (İstanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi), 1941. Bilal Çamlık, *Arnavutça-Türkçe Karşılaştırmalı Dilbilgisi* (Albanian Turkish Comparative Grammar) (Ankara, 1996). Fırat Sunel, *Salkım Söyütlerin Gölgesinde* (Novel) (İstanbul: Profil Yayınları, 2011). For a detailed list of publications by Turkish diplomats, see "Dışişleri Bakanlığı Mensupları ve Emekli Büyükelcilerin Eserleri," *TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı İnternet Sitesi*, accessed November 12, 2014, available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakanligi-mensuplari-ve-emekli-buyukelcilerin-eserleri.tr.mfa>.

but this research was not conducted resorting only to memoirs. As illustrated above, a variety of other primary resources ranging from the yearbooks of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the related documents of the Official Gazette (*Resmi Gazete*) and the Prime Ministry Republican Archives (*Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivleri*, PMRA) were used to better illustrate the course of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy in the aforementioned period.

In his efforts to properly define autobiography, Pascal underscores that it is hard to draw a line between autobiographies and memoirs.¹⁹ This is because, he adds, “there is no autobiography that is not in some respect a memoir, and no memoir that is without autobiographical information.”²⁰ A rough categorization can be made through the distinction that “in the autobiography proper, attention is focused on the self, in the memoir or reminiscence on others.”²¹ I prefer to categorize the accounts of Turkish diplomats as memoirs rather than autobiographies since “memoirs seem to place a greater emphasis on external rather than personal events even if the memorialists have been an integral part of those events; autobiographies, however, focus more closely on the author as subject matter.”²² Indeed, the distinction between a memoir and an autobiography is blurred in the case of an account by a statesman. The autobiography of a statesman, Mohammed Osman notes, “is nearer to his memoirs,” since it is difficult to draw a distinction between the professional and private lives of a diplomat.²³

This dissertation studies an institution without access to its official archives, and as a consequence, the study predominantly stood on the memoirs of Turkish diplomatic personnel. This constitutes a risk in terms of methodology. The basic instrument to solve this methodological problem has been to combine as many memoirs in a dialogue with each other. As Gusdorf notes,

19 Roy Pascal, *Design and Truth in Autography* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 5.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Houri Berberian, “History, Memory and Iranian-Armenian Memoirs of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution,” *Middle East Critique* 17, no. 3 (Autumn 2008), 362.

23 Mohammed Osman, “Discourse Study of Genre: Autobiography,” *English Language and Literature Studies* 5, no. 4 (2015), 155.

the “historian must … criticize [testimonies] along with other testimonies” to reach reliable conclusions.²⁴ In order to testify to the validity of an item of information or claim, I examined how frequently it was repeated in other memoirs. I also present the contradictions between two or more accounts on any given issue.

The memoirs of diplomats rarely remain silent about the most critical and traumatic parts of their professional lives. Autobiographies or memoirs of politicians, bureaucrats and other “big men” are written for “defensive or glorifying” purposes, leading the authors to raise their voices higher and higher.²⁵ This was clearly the case for this study. Turkish diplomats are eager to raise their voices on any given issue, most notably when they are victimized, for instance, in the case of Armenian political violence towards Turkish diplomats. In this regard, the contents of the memoirs presented much more information than was expected at the beginning of the research process.

The issues most frequently mentioned in the memoirs, and the most overlapping data and claims determined the basis for the content of each chapter of this study. Throughout the research process, four semi-structured interviews were conducted with former diplomats who were in charge in the 1960-1980 period. Diplomats whom were thought to contribute to the discussions in the dissertation are chosen for interviews.²⁶ Temel Iskit, for example, was the leader of a group of diplomats who offered a more balanced relationship with the Western alliance. Yalim Eralp, on the other hand, was among the diplomats who favored Turkey’s strong commitment to the West. Ömer Engin Lütem was a diplomat known for his role in establishing Turkey’s official

24 George Gusdorf, “Conditions and Limits of Autobiography,” in *Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical*, ed. James Olney, New Jersey: Princeton, 1980), 37.

25 Ibid.

26 Turkish diplomats interviewed for this study were asked about the ministry’s and its personnel’s strong commitment to the Western alliance, alleged clique formations within the ministry, relations between Turkish diplomatic and consular missions and Turkish citizens abroad, the influence of terrorist attacks on Turkish diplomats, the role of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy on Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus, and their evaluation on the Turkish MFA’s ability to adapt to changes in world politics and Turkish diplomats’ alleged distance from the social and political realities of Turkey.

discourse against genocide allegations. Also, an interview was conducted with the present head of the Diplomacy Academy of the ministry.

In the course of the research process, some of my attempts for further interviews remained inconclusive since certain former diplomats to whom I applied refused to submit to an interview. In this regard, this dissertation should not be seen as a full-fledged ethnographic effort at understanding the general characteristics of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the ethnographic perspectives quoted above strongly influenced the methodological point of view of this study and memoirs were predominantly utilized to obtain a deeper understanding of the nature of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy in a certain period.

As a specific attempt to give comparative insight on the state-citizen relationship at the transnational level, six semi-structured interviews were conducted with the Turkish migrants in Germany for chapter 6.²⁷ All of the interviewees were second generation migrants located in northwestern Germany with political affinity to the AK Party.²⁸ People close to the AK Party were chosen for interviews because Chapter 6 is also a response to the view that relations with the migrant population in Turkish diplomatic and consular missions were rehabilitated only after the AK Party's arrival to power in November 2002. These interviewees, in this regard, were asked also to compare and contrast the pre- and post-2002 periods in terms of state-citizen relations in Turkish diplomatic and consular missions.

Along with being deprived of the possibility of utilizing archival sources, this dissertation has other motives to introduce the usage of memoirs. As Le Goff suggests that "memory is the raw material of history."²⁹ In this regard, whether written or oral, the testimonies of the protagonists can be helpful for

27 The interviewees were asked about the problems that they and their relatives from the first-generation of migration faced in Turkish consular missions, political dimensions of their relations with the consular officers, and the transformation of the processes and procedures towards them as a consequence of their contacts with the state in transnational context.

28 Further efforts to expand the scope of interviews to other parts of Germany remained inconclusive rather due to technical reasons. Although it was intended to conduct interviews also in Berlin and Southern Germany, such interviews could not be organized.

29 Jacques Le Goff, *History and Memory* (New York: Columbia University Press), 21.

the historian to illustrate a picture that is close to reality. As a consequence, as Bloch puts it, “the historian must go beyond just recording the words of historian and force the witness to talk beyond its will, just in this way a historical witness or a biography can constitute a source for the historian.”³⁰ Especially in studies dealing with controversial issues of recent history, referring to memoirs is an inevitable method for researchers to conduct their studies. As depicted by Halkin, “they can be much more available than some of the modern archives that they can be permitted to reach only 50 years after the events,”³¹ which is to a great extent valid for the scope of this study. However, in this study memoirs will be examined keeping in mind Deibel’s statement that “no one comes off second best in his own memoir.”³² In the case of the process of memoir writing, this is indeed inevitable. As Berberian notes, “the recording of one’s memoirs and seeing to its publication indicate that the author is conscious of his/her importance as well as the force and weight of experiences and the era presented.”³³ In the words of George Gusdorf, “the man who takes delight in thus drawing his own image believes himself worthy of a special interest.”³⁴

Memoirs have always been treated as having a political agenda in Turkey. Authors of memoirs write their books with political motives and publishers undertake their duty also in line with their political orientations. Since they are mostly written to reveal obscure parts of recent history, or more precisely to challenge common assumptions, the number of memoirs flourished during periods of democratization in modern Turkish history. Gürpınar mentions about three waves of the flourishing of memoirs, all of which were closely related to the course of Turkish political life: 1908-1913, 1918-1922, and the post-1946 period.³⁵ Memoir writing, says Gürpınar, “was an effective way of

30 Ibid., 41.

31 Ibid.

32 Terry L. Deibel, “Teaching Foreign Policy with Memoirs,” *International Studies Perspectives* 3, no. 2 (2002), 132.

33 Berberian, “History, Memory and Iranian-Armenian ...,” 363.

34 Gusdorf, “Conditions and Limits...,” 29.

35 Doğan Gürpınar, “The Politics of Memoirs and Memoir-Publishing in Twentieth Century Turkey,” *Turkish Studies* 13, no. 3 (2012), 538-539.

pursuing political and personal polemics.”³⁶ When the political actors found a fertile ground to make their voices heard, they opted to publish their recollections in order to prove the legitimacy of their position and the unfair attitudes they allegedly have encountered. Publication preferences, on the other hand, were conducted with political motives. Tahsin Demiray’s *Türkiye Yayınevi* “undertook the publications of the memoirs of a variety of figures under the series entitled *Canlı Tarihler* (Living Histories) clearly with a motivation to pursue a political agenda.”³⁷ Similarly, adds Gürpinar, the conservative *Tercüman Yayınları* “had a self-conscious agenda to retrieve and reclaim ‘our past,’ and “*Belge Yayınları* and other socialist publishing houses published numerous ... accounts of the victims of ethnic cleansing in Anatolia,” all of which had their own political motivations.³⁸

Perhaps the most controversial of the memoirs among those published by Demiray was Kazım Karabekir’s *İstiklal Harbimizin Esasları* (Grounds of our independence war), which challenged “the official narrative of the Independence War as conveyed in *Nutuk* (Speech) delivered by Mustafa Kemal in 1927.”³⁹ Along with the memoirs of other prominent figures of the National Struggle years that were also published throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Karabekir’s memoir presented an alternate reading of the Turkish War of Independence. The book was banned and was only published in 1968 after a three-year prohibition.⁴⁰ Partly because of this skeptical attitude towards alternative readings of the Turkish War of Independence and the early republican period, memoirs were rarely utilized by Turkish researchers of recent history until the 1980s. Erik Jan Zürcher, who analyzed the memoirs of the aforementioned period in his path-breaking *The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of*

36 Ibid., 538.

37 Ibid., 540.

38 Ibid., 542 & 546. Of course, Tercüman and Belge publishing houses had considerably different motives and different political orientations; however, these two instrumentalized their memoir publishing policy to consolidate the position of their political agenda. Apart from these was *Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları* predominantly published wartime memoirs of Turkish military officers and other figures of late Ottoman and early republican history.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid., 540.

Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement 1905-1926, expresses his astonishment these memoirs “have hardly affected” the academic literature on the National Struggle years and the early republican period.⁴¹

Indeed, Zürcher’s book *The Unionist Factor* and Mete Tunçay’s *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması* (The establishment of one-party rule in the Republic of Turkey) were the first examples in their genres to introduce detailed analysis of the accounts of the protagonists of the time. Both these studies challenged the orthodox Kemalist narrative of modern Turkish history which was mostly inspired by the content of *Nutuk* (Speech). These two scholars resort to the accounts of contemporaneous witnesses and provide alternative insight to that of modern Turkish historiography.

The author of this dissertation has been inspired by the methodological approaches of the aforementioned studies of Zürcher and Tuncay. A comprehensive analysis of the concurring and contrasting views and explanations of different actors contributes to more in-depth analysis of the course of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. Memoirs of Turkish diplomats have been utilized to better clarify the issues in Turkish foreign policy, but have so far not been yet used to understand the course of Turkish diplomacy. This dissertation, in this regard, is a humble effort to understand the general characteristics of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy through the examination of the experiences and views of its own officers. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy is a rarely inquired institution in the academic field. Notably as a consequence of this, public perceptions and interpretations of the Turkish Hariciye has been inspired by journalistic approaches rather than academic research. In many respects, lack of satisfactory “insider information” caused stereotypical conclusions on Turkish diplomats and the Turkish Foreign Ministry.

41 Erik Jan Zürcher, "Young Turk Memoirs as a Historical Source: Kazım Karabekir's *İstiklal Harbimiz*," *Middle Eastern Studies* 22, no. 4 (1986), 562.

§ 1.3 Rethinking the Turkish Diplomatic Bureaucracy

The Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy has rarely been found sympathetic in Turkish public opinion. Loud criticisms have been raised often towards Turkish diplomats in many cases. In recent years, they have always been criticized for not only missing the “realities” of world politics, but also of lacking the satisfactory knowledge to serve the needs of the Turkish people and the state. A Turkish journalist, for instance, notes that

the ontology of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs is completely based on being static. Any dynamic idea or action attracts negative attention to this institution. Adopting the idea of thinking big is almost a reason to not be employed in this ministry. Pay attention to our ambassador appointments. ... Wherever there is a significant duty, people, who never strayed from the static line and those who chose for themselves the inertia of [the Ministry of] Foreign Affairs as a life-style, are being appointed there.⁴²

The critical stance towards Turkish diplomats is typical in certain debates. For example, although the course of events illustrated in chapter 7 prove the opposite, Turkish diplomats have been criticized for their impassivity vis-à-vis the so-called Armenian propaganda. A Turkish journalist criticized Turkish diplomacy’s impassivity towards this issue as follows:

In France, an act is prepared on the Armenian Genocide. [The Ministry of] Foreign Affairs sleeps. There is no precaution, no pressure put on opponents during the process, no reaction after the

42 “Bizim Dışişleri Bakanlığı’nın varoluş temel felsefesi tamamen statik olmaya dayanır. Dinamik herhangi bir düşünce, hareket bu kurumda heöem negatif anlamda dikkatleri üzerine çeker. Büyük düşünme diye bir kavrama sahip çıkılması, neredeyse bu bakanlığa personel olarak alınmama nedenidir. Bakın bizim büyükelçi atamalarımıza. Önemli ne kadar merkez varsa oraya her zaman statik çizgiden ayrılmazı mümkün olmayan, Dışişleri’nin durgunluğunu kendine yaşam biçimi olarak seçmiş ... insanlar atanır. Serdar Turgut, “Bizim Dışişleri Bakanlığı,” (Our foreign ministry) *Hürriyet*, June 2, 2000. Cited from Cemil Ünlütürk, *Monşerler: Hikaye-i Hariciye* (Ankara: İsim Yayıncılık, 2011), 71-72.

development. Our members of Foreign Affairs participate in cocktails, watch dress parades. Then, a crisis in Italy ... Foreign Affairs is again asleep; there is no effort. As a matter of fact, there is nobody who cares among our members of Foreign Affairs. Everybody knows that most of them are degenerated. For God's sake, let somebody tell them that Turkey is a big state. If they do not understand, let us abolish Foreign Affairs.⁴³

Another writer in the Turkish media renowned for his secular nationalist tendencies, accuses Turkish diplomacy of "being asleep" with respect to Armenian claims. In his words,

unfortunately, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is asleep in these cases. If the ministry encourages Turkish public opinion, our people can use lobbying opportunities as much as they can. We may find the opportunity to have our voices heard against the world even if we cannot end the operations of conspirators. ... We call on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ... Please wake up! ... And awaken the people.⁴⁴

Turkish diplomacy has also been criticized for being alien to the realities of their societies. In this regard, two authors with considerably different perspectives on Turkish diplomats and elites as a whole have suggested the

43 "Fransa'da Ermeni Soykırımı Yasası hazırlanıyor. Dışişleri uyuyor... Ne önceden adam gibi uyarı var, ne gelişmeler sonrasında karşı tarafa baskı, ne de gelişme sonrasında tepki. Dışişleri mensuplarımız kokteyllerde geziyorlar, defile izliyorlar. Ardından İtalya'da kriz... Dışişleri yine uykuda. Hiçbir çaba yok. Zaten bizim Dışişleri mensuplarını ciddiye alan da yok. Herkes biliyor ki, pek çoğu kişiliğini yitirmiştir. Allah aşkına biri şu Dışişleri'ne anlatsın. Türkiye'nin büyük devlet olduğunu. Anlamıyorlarsa, lağvedelim Dışişleri'ni." Fatih Altaylı, *Hürriyet*, October 5, 1998. Cited from Cemil Ünlütürk, *Monşerler: Hikaye-i Hariciye* (Ankara: İsim Yayınları, 2011), 55.

44 "Dışişleri Bakanlığı bu konularda uyuyor maalesef. Bakanlık Türk kamuoyunu uyarسا insanların kararınca kararınca lobi imkanlarını kullanır. Tezgahçıları yoldan döndüremesek bile tepkimizi dünyaya duyurma imkanı buluruz. Dışişleri Bakanlığı'na çağrıda bulunuyoruz... Lütfen uyanın! ... Halkı uyandırın..." Melih Aşık, *Milliyet*, 15 October 1998. Cited from Cemil Ünlütürk, *Monşerler: Hikaye-i Hariciye* (Ankara: İsim Yayınları, 2011), 78.

“assignment of Turkish diplomats to the most remote areas of the country.”⁴⁵ This was because the Turkish diplomats were identified with habits unfamiliar to the society. They face resentment from the public with their images as “social butterflies.”⁴⁶ Such a perspective on diplomats is inherent to the words of one journalist.

Let us ignore some super powers, but do our diplomats who are assigned to countries known for their friendship [with Turkey] influence the receiving country’s government, press, public opinion? Does not the representation of Turkey surpass the scope of invitations, receptions, and cocktails in these countries?⁴⁷

Interestingly, critics presented their criticisms as if these features were specific to the Turkish MFA and Turkish diplomats – as if their counterparts in other countries did not bear these features. However, evidence suggests that most diplomats elsewhere in the world face similar criticisms in public opinion.⁴⁸

45 Ortaylı, “Türk Dışşleri Memuru,” *Yeni Türkiye* 3 (March-April 1995), 538. Ahmet Kabaklı, *Bürokrasi ve Biz* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayıncıları, 1976), 429. This suggestion was indeed on the agenda of the Ministry at earlier dates. A bulletin of the Ministry published in Ankara in 1965 informed readers about the “serving of the ministry officers as interns in Anatolia.” According to the news, “preparatory endeavors were completed and a consensus was provided with the related ministries.” TC Dışşleri Bakanlığı, “Hariciye Memurlarının Anadoluda Staj Görmeleri,” (Internship of foreign ministry officers in Anatolia) *Dışşleri Belleteni* (Foreign Affairs Bulletin) 7, (Ankara: 1965), 22. As a matter of fact, the ministry was not as isolated imagined to be with respect to the realities of their country. In 1965, the Turkish MFA secretly sent three of its diplomats to Southeastern Turkey, and these officers warned the government of the time against the danger of civil war in the region in twenty-years time. According to Eralp, this proves that the ministry was not awkward but more capable of analyzing Turkey than other institutions. Yalın Eralp, *Interview by the Author*. Online Interview, January 15, 2016.

46 Kuneralp, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” 509.

47 “Haydi bazı super devletleri bir yana bırakalım ama, Türkiye’ye olan dostlukları müsellem pek çok ülkede görevli diplomatlarımız, o ülkenin hükümetlerini, basını, kamuoyunu hiç mi etkillememişler mi? Bu gibi memleketlerde, Türkiye’nin temsili davetler, resepsiyonlar, kokteyller çevresini aşmaz mı?” Mukbil Özyörük, *Hürriyet*, November 26, 1983. Cited from Cemil Ünlütürk, *Monşerler: Hikaye-i Hariciye* (Ankara: İsim Yayıncıları, 2011), 89.

48 See chapter 2.

In recent years, commentary on not only foreign policy issues but especially on diplomats and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has become more politicized. This is mostly due to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's highly critical comments towards Turkish diplomats. For the first time in recent history, Turkish diplomats were criticized during election campaigns.⁴⁹ Erdoğan's attitude, while it attracted the counter criticism of the Turkish diplomats, has been embraced especially in nationalist-conservative public opinion.⁵⁰ In other words, Turkish diplomats and the Turkish MFA became a domestic political asset, and a then-prime minister identified himself and his political movement with opposition to a professional group as a whole.

In retrospect, studying the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy must lead to the answers to some questions about the Turkish MFA and its officers. In the case of this dissertation, for the 1960-80 period,

- ♦ How did the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an institution and Turkish diplomats as professionals react to the changes in the international environment and new challenges specific to Turkish diplomacy?
- ♦ Were Turkish diplomacy and Turkish diplomats successful in adapting to new conditions? Or, more basically, did the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy act awkwardly as it has frequently been criticized for doing?
- ♦ Compared to world trends, was the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy's ability to adapt to new conditions less successful than other diplomatic bureaucracies in the world?
- ♦ Did Turkish diplomats lack the capacity to properly represent the values and needs of their society? If so, were there other diplomatic bureaucracies that were less socially exclusive than Turkish diplomats?

49 After his quarrel with Shimon Peres in the World Economic Forum in 2009, then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan strongly criticized traditional Turkish diplomacy by calling diplomats "moncheses." "Buyukelçilerin Monşer Tepkisi," *Son Sayfa Website*, accessed March 10, 2014, available from <http://www.sonsayfa.com/Haberler/Siyaset/Buyukelcilerin-monser-tepkisi-97335.html>.

50 "Monşerlerden Erdoğan'a Yanıt," (Response from the moncheses to Erdoğan) *Hürriyet*, January, 18 2010, accessed March 10, 2014, available from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/monserlerden-erdogana-yanit-15063889>.

- ♦ Did Turkish diplomatic staff conduct operations in an isolated manner with no relation to the social and domestic political realities of their own country, as they have been criticized for doing on many occasions? Or, was Turkish diplomacy an example of a “socially and politically interactive” institution involved in a continuous “mutual construction and transformation” process with its addressees?

In order to find more comprehensive, qualified answers to these questions, this dissertation presents a synchronic rather than a diachronic analysis, since simultaneous and inter-related developments determined the characteristics of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy and Turkish diplomats in the aforementioned period. Such an effort will provide a modest opinion about the functioning of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an institution and Turkish diplomats' behaviors and attitudes, as well. In other words, this dissertation is not a chronological account of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy from 1960 to 1980.

Four issues, along with other minor developments, characterized the 1960-1980 period, and each of these issues will be examined in separate chapters of this study. In this regard, the study consists of seven chapters including a theoretical and contextual framework chapter. Two of the four issues to be evaluated in this study represent short term phenomena, namely the impact of the 27 May 1960 coup d'état on the ministry and the role of the ministry in the decision-making process regarding Cyprus intervention. Two other issues, namely the relations between Turkish citizens and Turkish diplomatic and consular missions after the Turkish workforce migration to Europe and political violence actions against Turkish diplomats realized by Armenian militants, correspond to long-term processes in the 1960-1980 period.

The theoretical and contextual framework provided in chapter 2 searches the possibility of the theorization of diplomatic practice which is a scarcely conceptualized subfield of international relations. Diplomacy has frequently been immune from being explained using the premises of social theories. This chapter, nevertheless, underscores the social and interactive character of diplomatic practice which makes it feasible to theorize and conceptualize its efforts through the lens of social theory. The contextual framework in this chapter presents detailed information about general trends in foreign ministries

during the Cold War period to determine whether diplomatic bureaucracies were in decline in those years. The contextual framework of this chapter also makes sense of the similarities and differences of world examples compared to the Turkish case.

Chapter 3 traces the roots of the Ottoman-Turkish diplomacy from the early nineteenth century to the late 1950s in order to illustrate the position of Turkish diplomacy in the world context. It also locates the role of the Turkish Hariciye in modern Turkish history. These two efforts let clarify whether the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy remained backward compared to its European equivalents and analyze the unique position of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish modernization process.

Chapter 4 is an overview of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the accounts of Turkish diplomats, the yearbooks of the ministry, and critical statements about the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. In doing so, chapter 4 answers the question of whether the Turkish MFA was an adaptive or static institution. This chapter reveals some main characteristics of the ministry in the 1960-1980 period as a way of clarifying its similarities to and differences from others in the world context. This chapter also clarifies that Turkish diplomats were by no means robotic practitioners of the orders of the politicians and their governments. On some occasions, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy even attempted to give direction to the main foreign policy principles of the country, especially during periods when they had the support from government. In this regard, the content of chapter 4 uncovers the “interactive and transformative” features of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy.

In chapter 5, the impact of a coup d'état on the ministry will be examined in order to critically evaluate whether the ministry was immune to the winds of domestic politics. This chapter searches for the reasons behind the surrender of the ministry to the coup and also asks whether May 27 coup was a unique phenomenon in terms of domestic political influences over the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. As an institution, the Turkish Hariciye is often imagined as immune to the dynamics of domestic politics, but this chapter modestly challenges this general assumption. The first coup d'état of Republican Turkey dealt a blow to the ministry most notably in the “qualitative” sense via the execution of the minister, the curtailing of its authority and the

replacement of some prominent high-ranking officials. The ministry's ability to recover from the impact of the coup, in this regard, proved its flexibility as an institution.

Chapter 6 will scrutinize the state-society relationship through an examination of the experiences of Turkish migrant workers in Turkish diplomatic and consular missions. The previous chapter illustrates a phenomenon which influenced the ministry. This case, however, is a typical example of the "socially interactive" character of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. First, Turkish MFA and its members faced a new challenge that considerably increased their workload and redefined their functions. Then, they offered and implemented new procedures to better manage this process, resulting in a dramatic shift in the Turkish state's approach to its migrant population in Europe. Turkish diplomacy was not only influenced by the migration process, but also influenced the course of the state-citizen relationship in extraterritorial contexts. In other words, through the impact of "social interactions," the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy transformed both itself, the state, and even its citizens in a mutual sense.

The seventh chapter of the study concerns the encounters of Turkish diplomats with a long series of attacks realized by Armenian groups throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. Since the main motives for the attacks were rooted in Turkey's recent history, this chapter was formed in a historical perspective. Although the link between Turkish diplomats and the "Armenian Question" is most commonly evaluated only through the lens of these attacks, Turkish diplomats were actively involved in this issue long before, and as a consequence, they actively took part in the formation of Turkish official discourse after the assassinations ended. This chapter will present the capacity of Turkish diplomats for compatibility and flexibility in times of turmoil. This was another case in which Turkish diplomacy was both influenced and influential as well. The Armenian Question was perhaps the greatest taboo in Turkish public opinion for the fifty years of Republican history. Thereafter, with the advent of the Armenian attacks, the issue came to the fore both in Turkish and world public opinion. First, Turkish diplomats faced a series of terrorist attacks. Then, mostly as consequence of this victimization process, they became the forerunners of the formation of the Turkish counter-narrative against

accusations of genocide which were increasingly gaining recognition in world public opinion. Certain Turkish diplomats, in this regard, became influential actors in formulating a Turkish discourse opposed to world public opinion and world governments. This discourse would eventually become the general framework of Turkish public opinion concerning events of 1915 as well.

Chapter 8 deals with the role of Turkish diplomats in the decision-making procedure regarding Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in July 1974. Most notably focusing on the five days (15-20 July 1974) before the intervention and its aftermath, this chapter looks at a third factor in the making of this intervention apart from political power and military bureaucracy. This chapter, in this regard, clearly indicates that Turkish diplomats in this period were by no means only passive, obedient practitioners with no policy formulations. To the contrary, prominent diplomats related to the Cyprus Question influenced the mindset of the Turkish state by bargaining with government authorities. Moreover, through international bargaining and diplomatic representation, Turkey's position on the Cyprus Question was consolidated in international organizations again by Turkish diplomats. The intervention initiative also proved the ministry's capability to immediately respond to crises, contrary criticisms notwithstanding.

In line with the discussions of each chapter, this dissertation basicly argues that the Turkish Foreign Ministry was not an awkward and ineffective institution that is incapable of adapting to the changes in domestic and world politics; its diplomats, moreover, did not conduct their operations with no regard to the expectations and values of their society and realities of the world politics. It was a socially and politically interactive institution. Moreover, the Turkish Foreign Ministry not only transformed itself but also influenced its addressees such as the Turkish government, public, and international counterparts through a continuous bargaining process. In this regard, the ministry can also be named as a mutually constructive institution. Most of the criticisms towards the Turkish Foreign Ministry and Turkish diplomats were also directed to other foreign ministries and diplomats of the world. The diplomatic bureaucracies of the period came out with a relative success against significant challenges that were not experienced in previous decades and the

Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy is a typical and one of the prominent examples of this phenomenon.

Although the title seems to limit the study to the 1960-1980 period, each chapter refers to the background and aftermath of the aforementioned period. The aggressive attitude of the military junta against the Turkish Foreign Ministry during the 27 May period cannot be clarified without DP governments' last Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu's term in office, namely the years between 1957 and 1960. The attitude towards Turkish migrant workers will be misinterpreted without acknowledging the present perceptions. The attacks towards Turkish diplomats require a comprehensive understanding of the past, which inspired the Armenian groups' and Turkish diplomats' eagerness to have a word on the Armenian Question.

2

Theoretical and Contextual Framework

§ 2.1 Can Diplomacy Be Theorized?

In his article published in 1987, James Der Derian stated that “diplomacy has been particularly resistant to theory.”¹ Diplomacy is so indeed an undertheorized field, and as Abba Eban, former Israeli Foreign Minister, noted, there are “few fields in which the tension between theory is more acute than in diplomacy.”² It is “one of the lesser tools of foreign policy.”³

In line with Der Derian’s remarks, neither studies on the notion of diplomacy nor the works dealing with the practice of diplomacy, especially those focusing on the diplomats as actors, linked their cases to a detailed conceptualization effort. Numerous studies on diplomats and diplomatic institutions, most notably foreign ministries, have offered little to diplomatic theory, nor have they generally been inspired by diplomatic theory.⁴ Many of these studies

1 James Der Derian, “Mediating Estrangement: A Theory for Diplomacy,” *Review of International Studies* 13, no. 2 (April 1987), 91.

2 Abba Eban, *The New Diplomacy* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983), 384.

3 Paul Sharp, “For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations,” *International Studies Review* 1, no. 1 (Spring, 1999), 34.

4 Especially in the post-World War II period, the German foreign ministry and German diplomats were subject to various academic research. This is mostly due to the fact that Germany experienced quite different forms of governments and political circumstances in a short

were monographs of prominent diplomats or examinations of foreign ministries as the primary institutions of diplomatic operations.

Diplomacy is not only undertheorized, but it is also an understudied field in general. Diplomatic studies are peripheral in the discipline of international relations. Neumann notes that “while entire libraries are dedicated to the merchant and the soldier, the diplomat does not even have a full shelf.”⁵ Diplomats, themselves were the first analysts of their own profession. Abraham de Wicquefort’s *L’Ambassadeur et ses Fonctions* (1684) and *De la Maniere de Negocier Avec les Souverains* (1704) by the French envoy Francois de Callieres, are considered the first examples of this kind.⁶ Although such an early effort exists, diplomats predominantly inquired into their profession in the twentieth century. The first major works on diplomatic operations and processes in modern times were the works such as Ernest M. Satow’s *Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (1917) and Harold Nicolson’s *Diplomacy* (1939). These were prescriptive efforts basically including,

a narration of the progressive story of diplomatic history; the organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the formulation of foreign policy; the functions of the embassy; the qualities of the diplomat; and different accounts dealing with issues ranging from negotiation to immunities, and from international trade or law to etiquette and protocol.⁷

period of time. For example, see Paul Seabury, *The Wilhelmstrasse: A Study of German Diplomats under the Nazi Regime* (PhD. diss., Columbia University, 1953). Donald Lewis Singers, *German Diplomats at Nuremberg: A Study of the Foreign Defendants of the Ministries Case* (PhD diss. The American University, 1980.) Daniel Mayer Lewin. *The West German Foreign Office: A Study of German Diplomats under Adenauer* (PhD diss. Princeton University, 1961.)

- 5 Iver B. Neumann, *At Home with Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 5. Andrea Wiegeshoff, “The ‘New Look’ of German Diplomacy: German Foreign Service after the Second World War,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 29, no. 2 (2018).
- 6 Abraham de Wicquefort, *L’Ambassadeur et ses Fonctions* (The Hague: Veneur, 1681.), Francois de Callieres, *De la Maniere de Negocier Avec les Souverains* (Paris: Noveau Monde Editions, 2006.)
- 7 Costas M. Constantinou, “Late Modern Diplomacies,” *Millennium* 22, no. 1 (1989), 89.

The authors of these books were not scholars but career diplomats whom, according to Der Derian, sought to “maximize the professional capabilities for most notably those entering the profession rather than developing comprehensive theoretical discussions.”⁸ In recent decades, however, these books have been criticized for not undertaking comprehensive analytical examinations of diplomatic practice. Lee and Hudson criticized the inertia of the field for not having changed even three centuries after Abraham de Wicquefort’s book on diplomacy.⁹

Although these initial efforts paved the way for introducing diplomacy as a level of analysis in international relations, these books also forestalled the emergence of a field of diplomatic theory. This is because diplomats are the “chief critics” of efforts to theorize their profession since they “tend to be overwhelmed by the immediate demands of the day.”¹⁰ As Murray notes “diplomats often insist that to practice diplomacy is to theorize.”¹¹ The profession of diplomacy “has been learned by practicing the art, by apprenticeship” instead of by efforts to theorize or conceptualize.¹² More precisely, “diplomats would anytime prefer the gossip in their embassy cables and the Financial Times (FT) to the models in *International Organization* or *International Studies Quarterly*.”¹³ Those who insist that social theory or theories of international relations do not suitably explain diplomacy draw attention to its variable, ungeneralizable character. Harold Nicolson, who wrote his book on diplomacy as a diplomat, claims that “of all the branches of human endeavor, diplomacy is the

8 Ibid.

9 Donna Lee and David Hudson, “The Old and New Significance of Political Economy in Diplomacy,” *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 3 (2004), 354.

10 Stuart Murray, “The Renaissance of Diplomatic Theory,” *International Politics Quarterly* 4 (2013), 25.

11 Ibid.

12 J.W. Burton, *Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 206.

13 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Conclusion: Relationalism or Why Diplomats Find International Relations Theory Strange,” in *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*, eds. Ole Jakob Sinding, Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 284.

most protean.”¹⁴ This study proposes that the notion of diplomacy should be theorized most notably due to its dynamic character.

2.1.1 *Diplomacy as the Relationship between the Self and the Other*

Undertheorization of diplomacy is to some extent related to a problem that is inherent to international relations discipline in general. Not only is typically diplomacy but international politics studies in general have always been deprived of well-developed theoretical framework. Due to the fact that diplomacy has been intertwined with power politics, “little intellectual energy was needed to be wasted on the illumination of power’s shadow.”¹⁵

This “anti-theory,” prescriptive understanding of diplomacy notably harmed diplomatic studies by approaching the diplomatic profession as a monolithic phenomenon with no changes or transformations in any period in world history. The state-centric views of Nicolson or Satow presented prescriptions for the understanding and practice of diplomacy that were thought to be valid for all conjunctures and conditions. Diplomacy, however, is a changing, transformative process influenced by interactions among actors and environmental factors. Diplomacy is thus not characterized by “recurrence and repetition” as Wight and Butterfield argued in the mid-1960s, but by “change,” as Neumann argued in opposition to Wight and Butterfield.¹⁶

So, how can the changing nature of diplomacy be explored? In his analysis of the emergence of diplomacy through economic consultancy processes, Seabrooke offers an examination of the daily routines and work practices of diplomats to understand how existing systems transform through diplomatic

14 Barry H. Steiner, “Diplomacy and International Theory,” *Review of International Relations* 30, no. 4 (October 2004), 493.

15 Der Derian, “Mediating Estrangement...,” 92.

16 Martin Wight, “Why is There No International Theory,” in *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Relations*, eds. Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), 26. Jozef Batora and Nik Hynek, *Fringe Players and the Diplomatic Order: The New Heteronomy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 27.

practices.¹⁷ This is indeed an eye-opening perspective. Through such an analysis, it can be concluded that the definitions and functions of diplomacy evolve in time through daily diplomatic habits and practices instead of top-down regulations or laws. The change in diplomacy is in this regard inherent to the practice of it. Daily habits and interactions of diplomats lead them to shape and transform their profession. Similarly, Pouliot stresses that the day-to-day “interaction order” of diplomats characterize the nature of change in diplomatic practices.¹⁸

In his search for a theoretical explanation of diplomatic processes, procedures, and transformations, Der Derian refers to the notion of “diplomatic culture” coined by Hedley Bull.¹⁹ According to Bull, diplomatic culture refers to a “common stock of ideas and values possessed by the official representatives.”²⁰ Der Derian searches for the traces of this classical notion of diplomatic culture through investigating how this culture was formed and transformed. His answer is one of the first post-classical explanations of diplomatic theory and international relations theory more generally. According to him, “the history of diplomacy is the history of the mediation of estrangement.”²¹ Recalling that alienation by itself “cannot provide laws of development for diplomacy, nor can it explain everything there is to know about diplomacy,” Der Derian notes that “diplomacy’s origins and transformations cannot be fully illuminated without the rich history, conceptual variations, and theories of alienation.”²²

17 Leonard Seabrooke, “Diplomacy as Economic Consultancy,” in *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*, eds. Ole Jakob Sending, Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 195-219.

18 See Vincent Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy* (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

19 Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 304. Der Derian, “Mediating Estrangement...,” 92

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

In line with Der Derian, Richard Langhorne claims “diplomacy has for thousands of years been a recognizably ... privileged activity.”²³ The essence of a diplomat’s profession is its separateness. As Sharp puts it, operating as a diplomat requires a “distance bound up with their professional identity.”²⁴ They are “outsiders placed within another society of which they are not members.”²⁵ Moreover, they are also separated from their own society and their daily professional and individual habits. These explanations serve to explain the under-theorization of diplomacy. Since it is not evaluated as a social practice, social science conceptualizations have rarely been introduced in understanding diplomacy.

The estrangement of diplomacy and diplomats more specifically, from society and even from its own government in the ensuing decades constituted one of the main pillars in developing a theoretical perspective to understand the course of diplomacy. Due to the fact that social exclusiveness is evaluated as inherent to the diplomatic profession, the notion of estrangement, to some extent, helps clarify the main tenets of diplomacy in various ways. As Sofer puts it “the diplomat is concealed from the public eye, while heads of states and generals are granted the privilege of grand gestures.”²⁶ He [the diplomat] is “often misunderstood and unappreciated.”²⁷ This is indeed related to the fact that the diplomat experiences a life trajectory that is contradictory not only to the standards of the nation he represents but also to the social and economic class to which the diplomat belongs. As Clark depicts, “the standard of living for ambassadors in many countries is of a height that could otherwise be enjoyed only by a millionaire.”²⁸ So indeed, living in socially-exclusive

23 Richard Langhorne, “Current Developments in Diplomacy: Who are the Diplomats Now?” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 8, no. 2 (July 1997), 1.

24 Paul Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1.

25 Ibid.

26 Sasson Sofer, “Being a ‘Pathetic Hero’ in International Politics: The Diplomat as a Historical Actor,” *Diplomacy and the Statecraft* 12, no. 1 (March 2001), 110.

27 James Lee Ray and Juliet Kaarbo, *Global Politics* (Wedsworth: Cengage Learning, 2011), 251

28 Charles Ritchie, “What are Diplomats Made of?” *International Journal* 30, no. 1 (Winter 1974/75), 21.

surroundings in most cases becomes the main determinant image of the diplomat from outside. Again, notes Sofer,

the diplomat's style of life and practice of his art, makes him a stranger to others ... this estrangement is an inherent part of the diplomatic practice ... this estrangement, however, turns the diplomat into a natural candidate for being the "pathetic victim" of international affairs. In many senses the diplomat is the embodiment of a prominent role of modern times: the other.²⁹

The self-other dichotomy has indeed frequently been applied to recent studies aiming to understand the essence of diplomacy. Jönsson and Hall suggest that "professional diplomats experience having at least two personae: their own and that of the state that employs them."³⁰ "It is a fortunate diplomat," notes Sharp in this regard, "who finds the two entirely compatible."³¹ Nevertheless, not all thinkers are sure that the diplomat, either in terms of his distance from society or in terms of his relationship to his government, solely represents the position of "the other." On the contrary, states Faizullaev, "the ambassador has to unite himself or herself with the home state" and in this regard, "for a diplomat the state selfhood becomes an individual self-schema."³² Sofer, in a similar vein, claims that to perfect the diplomatic art, the diplomat "is called upon to refrain being his true self."³³

2.1.2 *Diplomacy as a Mutually-Constructed Social Practice*

Is it so easy or possible for the diplomat to unite or separate himself from his own state? This is another prominent dimension of the self-other dichotomy in the profession of diplomacy. The answer to this question is: hardly ever.

29 Sasson Sofer, "The Diplomat as a Stranger," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 8, no. 3 (1997), 179.

30 Jönsson & Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy...*, 98.

31 Paul Sharp, "Who Needs the Diplomats? The Problem of Diplomatic Representation," *International Journal* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1997), 609.

32 Alisher Faizullaev, "Diplomacy and the Self," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 17 (2006), 501.

33 Sofer, "The Diplomat as a Strangers...," 183.

There is a “mutual disrespect of diplomats and politicians.”³⁴ President of the United States John F. Kennedy once complained that “they [diplomats] never have any ideas over there … never come up with anything new … the Department of State is a bowl of jelly.”³⁵ Indeed, in general, American people see diplomacy as an “un-American affair … [since] they claim that America … never lost a war and never won a conference.”³⁶ Moreover, diplomats cannot be considered as pure admirers of politicians. Alexander Cadogan, a British diplomat and former undersecretary of the British Foreign Office, expressed his feelings towards elected politicians as follows,

Foreign Office: “Silly bladders! self-advertising, irresponsible nincompoops, how I hate Members of Parliament! They embody everything that my training has taught me to eschew – ambition, prejudice, dishonesty, self-seeking, lighthearted irresponsibility, black hearted.”³⁷

If Cadogan’s words seem to be expressions of exaggerated hatred, statements of George Kennan, an American diplomat renowned for his years as ambassador in Moscow at the height of Cold War, can also be considered. According to Kennan, “their [politicians’] main concern is domestic politics; and the interests they find themselves pursuing in this field of activity are not often but usually in conflict with the requirements of a sensible national diplomacy.”³⁸ It is not easy to decide which side is right, and such an effort is unnecessary for this study. The contrasting views of diplomats and politicians about each other illustrates one thing clearly: while conducting his profession, the diplomat is not only engaged in clashes with counterparts in the receiving (host) state but also with the representatives and politicians of his own state. In this regard, uniting himself with his own state as Faizulaev preached was necessary for the diplomat, is one of the most complicated components of the diplomatic

34 Sofer, “Being a ‘Pathetic Hero’...,” 107.

35 Ibid., 107.

36 Charles Roetter, *The Diplomatic Art: An Informal History of World Politics* (Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1963), 161.

37 Ritchie, “What are Diplomats Made of?” 19.

38 Sofer, “Being a Pathetic Hero ...,” 109.

profession. According to him, “having a strong personal identification with the home state and submitting his or her own selfhood to the selfhood of this state, a diplomat takes on the state’s self as his or her own self.”³⁹ At the end of the day, the diplomat inevitably identifies himself with his state; this is inherent to diplomatic profession. Nevertheless, this is not the automatic process that Faizulaev describes. While adopting his state’s identity, the diplomat also constructs how his state describes itself. The diplomat’s relationship with his state, as a consequence, is a process of mutual identity construction. Not only does the diplomat adopt his state’s selfhood and identity, the diplomatic community of a country (or some members of that community), which consists of diplomats as individuals, constructs the selfhood of their state through diplomatic practices. As Sharp summarizes, “diplomats are engaged in the construction, maintenance, and representation of different identities to one another.”⁴⁰

In this regard, the diplomatic profession is not a bureaucratic process in which ambassadors or officers of different ranks adopt and implement the orders of their governments without question. A diplomat-politician relationship without disputes seems ideal, but it is far from being widespread. Diplomat not only negotiates terms with diplomats and political representatives of other countries, but also with politicians of his own state. They are, along with political leaders, political experts, and advisors, “intellectuals of statecraft” who “comment upon, influence, and conduct the activities of statecraft.”⁴¹ Diplomacy, as Constantinou notes, is a “knowledge practice” which pursues “a range of national, cross-national, and post-national goals, negotiating interests but also social meaning and identity.”⁴² Diplomats are, thus, not ineffective actors. Diplomacy is not processed only by the influences of outside

39 Faizulaev, “Diplomacy and the Self,” 503.

40 Sharp, “For Diplomacy...,” 54.

41 Gearoid O. Tuathail and John Agnew, “Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy,” *Political Geography* 11, no. 2 (March 1992), 192.

42 Costas M. Constantinou, “Between Statecraft and Humanism: Diplomacy and Its Forms of Knowledge,” *International Studies Review* 15, no. 2 (2013), 143.

determinants. On the contrary, “diplomacy is a socially emergent phenomenon and as such it produces effects of its own on world politics.”⁴³

According to Cornut, the diplomatic profession is “the simultaneous management of three social roles: knowledge producer, representative of their country, and bureaucrat in a hierarchical institution.”⁴⁴ Representation, perhaps the main social role that the diplomat plays, must be taken into consideration. In almost all definitions of diplomacy, the function of representation is inherent. Nevertheless, this central function of diplomacy and of the diplomat is often reduced to protocol affairs. Diplomatic representation, or rather diplomacy in general, cannot be understood as a matter of courtesy or prestige. Representation is indeed a mutual, interactive process. This is because diplomats not only represent their states, at the same time, “they present the world back to their states.”⁴⁵ Representation, in this regard, is by no means a linear, rational process since neither the state that diplomat represents nor the world politics is coherent and consistent.

Representation is the engine of the profession of diplomacy. Representation is an interactive process, and the success and effectiveness of diplomatic representation depends on the diplomat’s ability to work with his addressees. How? Let us consider the case of war, for example. War is generally accepted to start where diplomacy ends. The role of diplomacy in producing and legitimizing the war narrative, however, is neglected. Nevertheless, war is “legitimated in the language of diplomatic representation.”⁴⁶ Charles Tilly’s well-known quote preaches that “states make war, wars make states,” and this

43 Ole Jakob Sending, Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann, “Introduction,” in *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*, eds. Ole Jakob Sending, Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 17.

44 Jérémie Cornut, “To Be a Diplomat Abroad: Diplomatic Practice at Embassies,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 50, no. 3 (2015), 386.

45 John Hoffman, “Reconstructing Diplomacy,” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 5, no. 4 (November 2003), 525.

46 Sending et al. “Introduction...,” 18.

stance can also be applied to the relationship between diplomatic institutions and states.⁴⁷

The diplomat maintains his career in a bargaining process, i.e. diplomat vs. foreign states, diplomat vs. public opinion(s), diplomat vs. his own state, and even diplomat's official statements vs. diplomat's individual opinions. This requires to consider the social (and also political) dimension of a diplomatic career. Sharp, defines diplomacy as "human practice constituted by the explicit construction, representation, negotiation, and manipulation of necessarily ambiguous identities."⁴⁸ In this regard, diplomacy should be seen as a social practice due to the aforementioned relationship between the diplomat and his public, state, and even himself. Diplomatic practice "as conversing with the other, entails thinking and experiencing the 'other'"⁴⁹ As noted by Constantinou, diplomacy is an "intersubjective process which takes place between two constructed subjects whose very construction relies upon the intercourse and mutual recognition of diplomacy."⁵⁰

Bernstein and Mertz argue that "actual bureaucrats in actual bureaucracies ... constantly make decisions, interact with others, exceed their own control" and, in this regard, "as a lived social world, the administrative setting is not as drab and lifeless as it appears from the outside."⁵¹ This is a valid explanation for diplomatic bureaucracies, as well, and the social dimension of diplomatic practice has been increasingly framed in recent years. The new approach evaluates diplomacy as a social practice and "a form of interaction among social actors that is framed by the existing social structures of rules, norms, and

47 For the influence of diplomacy and diplomats on wars, see Francis Neilson, *How Diplomats Make War* (New York: B.W Huebsch, 1940).

48 Sharp, "For Diplomacy...," 33.

49 Sofer, "The Diplomat as a Stranger," 184.

50 Costas M. Constantinou, "Diplomatic Representations...or Who Framed the Ambassadors?" *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 23 (1994), 23.

51 Anya Bernstein and Elizabeth Mertz, "Bureaucracy: Ethnography of the State in Everyday Life," *Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 34, no. 1 (May 2011), 7.

habits, and that is in turn productive of these structures.”⁵² This explanation does not deny that the conduct of diplomacy can be understood through the lens of the self-other approach. A diplomat’s work is foremost to encounter “the other,” including his fellow countrymen. As a matter of fact, “without social distance and enchanting strangeness, the diplomat may lose his usefulness.”⁵³ However, this case of estrangement is not experienced in isolation. On the contrary, “world politics is a relational phenomenon” and the diplomat’s job is “to make these relations work.”⁵⁴ In this regard, the diplomat’s “otherness” in a social environment is best expressed by Sofer: “The professional diplomat is a public servant entrapped in a false social position.”⁵⁵

Iver B. Neumann, a professor of political science and social anthropology, who also did field work in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, created a considerable literature on a northern European country’s diplomatic bureaucracy.⁵⁶ Neumann formulated a comprehensive conceptualization of the socially-embedded nature of diplomacy. He is inspired by the premises of the English School of International Relations.⁵⁷ According to the English School, noted Neumann, “diplomacy plays a key role ... if one views world politics ... as a social phenomenon.”⁵⁸ In this regard, diplomacy has been located to the core of “conceptualization of international relations” by the forerunners of the English School.⁵⁹

52 Ian Hurd, “International Law and the Politics of Diplomacy,” in *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*, eds. Ole Jakob Sinding, Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 35.

53 Sofer, “The Diplomat as a Stranger...,” 185.

54 Adler-Nissen, “Conclusion ...,” 286.

55 Sofer, “The Diplomat as a Stranger...,” 181.

56 See Iver B. Neumann, *At Home with Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012).

57 For the evolution of the English School of International Relations, see Barry Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 5-12.

58 Iver B. Neumann, “The English School on Diplomacy: Scholarly Promise Unfulfilled,” *International Relations* 17, no. 3 (2003), 341.

59 Ibid. 342.

Adam Watson, a member of the English School, notes that English School concentrated on diplomacy as a “practice” and aimed to “sociologise” the study of diplomacy.⁶⁰ In a similar vein as Watson, Neumann claims that like “all social practices, diplomacy is a nested phenomenon and must be studied as such.”⁶¹ According to him, “diplomatic practice is embedded in general social life” which makes diplomacy “a social fact.”⁶² Diplomacy, as a social phenomenon, is nevertheless, not a social universe that needs “diplomats from different national cultures to interact with each other in a ‘safe’ manner and in a specific ‘diplomatic culture’,” as Meertz noted.⁶³ Diplomatic profession is not conducted among only diplomats in a bell jar independent of outside influence. The socialness of the diplomatic profession does not consist only in the interaction between members of the diplomatic community. The diplomatic mediation and all forms of representation are constructed and reproduced through the interactions not only among diplomats themselves but also between diplomats and elements of the public outside the diplomatic community.

In this regard, inspired by the English School of international relations, Sharp notes that “it is diplomacy which constitutes, and diplomats (in the sense of those who act diplomatically) who produce, the international societies which put relations between separate groups on a more stable and peaceful footing.”⁶⁴ International peace, in which societies conduct their relations, is a social phenomenon constructed and reproduced by diplomatic institutions

60 Jönsson and Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy*, 20. For Watson’s views about the “socially interactive” character of the diplomatic “practice,” see Adam Watson, *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States* (London: Routledge, 2005).

61 Jönsson and Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy*, 22. In this regard, it must be noted that Neumann’s inspiration from the leading members of the English School have certain limitations. Neumann, for instance, criticizes the English School “for being statist and evolutionist.” Neumann, “The English School,” 347.

62 Iver B. Neumann, *Diplomatic Sites: A Critical Enquiry* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 6.

63 Paul W. Meertz, “The Changing Nature of Diplomatic Negotiation,” in *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, ed. Jan Melissen (New York: Palgrave, 1999), 79-93.

64 Paul Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations*, 11.

and diplomats. In this regard, the operations of the profession of diplomacy are not segregated from social life; rather, diplomacy itself is a constitutive component of international society. To summarize, the growing literature on the socially embedded character of diplomacy consists of

- 1) a focus on concrete enactments of human performance; 2) a relational or interactionist perspective on international politics; 3) a commitment to interdisciplinary, in particular political science, history, anthropology, geography and sociology; 4) an ecumenical approach to paradigms; and 5) a desire to build bridges between scholarship and actual practice.⁶⁵

This dissertation stands on the aforementioned theoretical tension. Should we see diplomacy as an isolated, socially-exclusive profession which is by nature closed to social interaction and thus to social science research? This dissertation answers this question as follows: No, the diplomatic profession, in which foreign ministries and diplomats are respectively the institutional and individual actors, is conducted in social surroundings through the mutual interaction of the actors in all sorts of diplomatic processes. Diplomatic knowledge and representation are constructed and reproduced through an interactive process in which actors and institutions mutually determine each other's character, which at the end of the day, produces all sorts of diplomatic relationships. The diplomat is not a practitioner of the state decisions with no opposition. Throughout diplomatic decision-making processes, diplomats shape state behavior through a bargaining process with politicians, officials of other state institutions, and with the public. The diplomat's attitude and preferences, on the other hand, are by no means excluded from the perceptions and expectations of the public of his home country. As noted earlier in this chapter, the diplomat's identity is mutually-constructed and public opinion plays a considerable role in the formation of the diplomat. The diplomat, in this regard, is not "concealed from the public eye." Since diplomatic practice is a strong interaction with which actors it is related, it is worth examining how all sorts

65 Vincent Pouliot and Jérémie Cornut, "Practice Theory and the Study of Diplomacy...", 298.

of others see diplomats and diplomatic institutions in order to expand our efforts to theorize the diplomatic profession.

2.1.3 *A Concealed Profession? Recognizing the Diplomat*

Although they work in uncomfortable, stressful conditions with a considerable workload to pursue the national interests of their countries, diplomats as a professional group are rarely respected. Sofer names the “lack of esteem, if not contempt, accorded to the professional diplomat” as one of the “most disturbing features of modern history.”⁶⁶ The diplomat, adds Sofer, is an “envied, criticized, and ridiculed” public servant who “becomes a ready prey for statesmen and generals in need of a scapegoat to be sacrificed on the altar of their own nation’s destiny.”⁶⁷

In 1604, even before the emergence of modern diplomatic institutions, Sir Henry Wotton defined the “ambassador” as an “honest man sent to lie abroad for the commonwealth.”⁶⁸ Ambrose Bierce, an American journalist, stylized this two centuries later as follows: “Diplomacy, the patriotic art of lying for one’s country.”⁶⁹ So indeed, the conduct of diplomacy is in most cases associated with wild Machiavellianism. This understanding is clearly embedded in the words of James Connolly.

The diplomat holds all acts honorable which bring him success, all things are righteous which serve his ends. If cheating is necessary, he will cheat; if lying is useful, he will lie; if bribery helps, he will bribe; if murder serves, he will order murder; if burglary, seduction, arson or forgery brings success nearer, all and each of these will be done.⁷⁰

66 Sofer, “Being a ‘Pathetic Hero’...,” 107.

67 Sofer, “The Diplomat as a Stranger...,” 182.

68 Robert Wolfe, “Still Lying Abroad? On the Institution of the Resident Ambassador,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 9, no. 2 (1998), 23.

69 Eric Clark, *Corps Diplomatique* (London: Allen Lane, 1973). i.

70 James Connolly, “Diplomacy,” *Workers’ Republic*, November 16, 1915, accessed May 6, 2016. Available from <https://www.marxists.org/archive/connolly/1915/11/diplmacy.htm>.

The diplomat in this regard is “the victim of his profession’s practice.”⁷¹ As Sofer notes “the diplomat has been faced with the cruel dilemma: whether to tell the truth for the sake of the nation, or to betray his expedient loyalty to rulers and politicians.”⁷² As a consequence of this dilemma, the diplomat is criticized in a dual, contradictory manner. In general, the diplomat is defined as a “cautious and conformist” professional and only few “strongly [hold] views on any important matter.”⁷³ On the other hand, when a diplomat or group of diplomats are actively involved in a diplomatic decision-making process, they are “entrapped in the image of a stonewaller.”⁷⁴

The diplomat, in this regard, operates his profession under strong suspicion. He (the diplomat) is aware of the fact that almost none of his addressees will trust of and respect for him in the aforementioned diplomatic interactions and processes. So, how will diplomat proceed in such a crooked line? How will he persuade people and institutions that do not trust him of his positions? How will such a relationship transform the diplomats, foreign ministries, and their addressees, – that is to say the representatives of other governments, other state agencies, his own government, and his people – in any kind of diplomatic practice?

There were periods in the history of modern diplomacy that such transformations were visible. The post-World War I period is the first example.⁷⁵

71 Sofer, “Being a Pathetic Hero...,” 109.

72 Sofer, “Diplomat as a Stranger...,” 179.

73 Ritchie, “What are Diplomats Made Of?” 20.

74 Sofer, “Being a Pathetic Hero...,” 109.

75 “Old diplomacy” refers to the balance of power system established among European powers of the time which existed from the Vienna Congress until the World War I. In old diplomacy, ambassadors of European Empires, who were predominantly members of aristocratic families, were influential in the formulation of the foreign policies of their states. “New diplomacy,” on the other hand, refers to the international system established after World War I, given the disappointment with old diplomacy’s inability to prevent the catastrophe of the war. In the era of “new diplomacy,” the reputation of ambassadors, who could not prevent the eruption of a world war, worsened, and their influence in the international political system was downgraded. Nevertheless, the distinction between the old and new diplomacy is not unanimously accepted by all those addressing the discussion. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador to Britain in the pre-World War I period, stated that “Expressions such as ‘old’ and ‘new’

Moreover, most of the literature on diplomatic theory emerged in the post-Cold War period as a response to major developments in world politics and communication technologies that, as a whole, radically transformed the diplomatic profession – at least people thought so.⁷⁶ This dissertation suggests another interregnum, the Cold War years, with a special emphasis on the period between 1960 and 1980, to understand the influence of mutually interactive processes on the nature and transformation of the diplomatic practice.

The increase in the number of states and thus in diplomatic staff, changing scopes of work, new modes of diplomatic representation, and increasing public interest in world affairs caused a fascinating transformation in diplomatic practice. In the following parts of this chapter, the main characteristics of diplomats and diplomatic institutions will be illustrated both to make a sense of aforementioned conceptualizations of diplomacy and to clarify the course of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy in the aforementioned period. This effort will situate Turkish diplomats and the Turkish Hariciye in a global context.

§ 2.2 A Busy Profession in Decline? Diplomats and Foreign Ministries in the Post-World War II Period (1945-1980)

2.2.1 *Diplomatic Practice during the Cold War: Not Useless but Multi-dimensional*

In the late 1960s, James Eayrs heralded the decline of the profession of diplomacy and its “melting into nothingness” while explaining the emergence of

diplomacy bear no relation to reality.” Sasson Sofer, “Old and New Diplomacy: A Debate Revisited,” *Review of International Studies* 14, no. 3 (1988), 195.

76 For the debates on the then-future of diplomacy in the 1990s, see Paul Sharp, “Who Needs Diplomats? The Problem of Diplomatic Representation,” *International Journal* 52, (1997), 609-634. For responses, see Brian Hocking, “The End(s) of Diplomacy,” *International Journal* 53, no. 1 (Winter, 1997/1998), 169-172 and Andrew F. Cooper, “Beyond Representation,” *International Journal* 53, no. 1 (Winter, 1997/1998), 173-178. Paul Sharp cites a diplomat asking, “If diplomacy is in a decline, why am I so busy?” *Ibid.*

individual and new institutional actors in the realm of international politics.⁷⁷ He had some evidence to make this claim. Multinational companies and non-governmental organizations exerted their influence in the realm of international politics in this period. Even the Quai d'Orsay, which had a traditionally predominant position in the foreign policy-making of the country, “was weakened by presidential intervention in the making and practicing of policy, the enhanced significance of economic and strategic issues in international negotiations, and the increased interest taken by other ministries in external affairs.”⁷⁸ Moreover, there were conflicts in many parts of the world that increased the influence of military mindsets at the expense of that of diplomats, as it is usual in wartime. For example, Klieman puts it for the case of Israel, “military successes doomed the influence of diplomats.”⁷⁹

Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security advisor of US President Jimmy Carter, said in 1970 that “if the [foreign] ministries did not already exist, they surely would not have to be invented.”⁸⁰ According to the national security advisor of the president, a position that prominently challenged foreign ministries in terms of foreign policy-making decisions, foreign ministries were irrelevant to the conditions of his time. Similarly, Pierre Trudeau, the Prime Minister of Canada throughout the late 1960s, the 1970s, and first half of the 1980s, noted in the 1970s that “whole concept of diplomacy today … is a little bit outmoded.”⁸¹ Foreign ministries, nevertheless, redefined their roles in the post-World War II period, most notably throughout the 1960s and 70s, adapting to the new environment of world politics and new scopes of work. For

77 Brian Hocking, “Catalytic Diplomacy: Beyond 'Newness' and 'Decline'” in *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, ed. Jan Melissen (New York: Palgrave, 1999), 24.

78 Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 215.

79 Aharon Klieman, “Israel: Succumbing to foreign ministry Declinism,” in *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*, ed. Brian Hocking (London: Macmillan, 1999), 86. The Israeli MFA was also criticized for loosing bureaucratic wars in the 1970s. Ibid.

80 Christer Jönsson, “Global Governance: Challenges to Diplomatic Communication, Representation, and Recognition,” in *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?* eds. Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking and William Maley (New York: Palgrave, 2008), 29.

81 Clark, *Corps Diplomatique*, 1.

example, in the case of the United States Department of State “some historians mark the post-World War II era as the dividing line between the Old Department and the [then] present agency.”⁸² Not only the position of the department but that of the Secretary of State position was also consolidated in the 1945-1975 period.⁸³

Although there were opposing trends in some countries as mentioned above, this chapter illustrates that foreign ministries in the aforementioned period did not tend to dissolve but rather to consolidate their presence through increases in staff, institutional reforms, and redefinitions of their duties. As Clark notes in 1972, “if the diplomat is dead, the last person to realize it is the diplomat himself.”⁸⁴ The diplomat was not dead, Nevertheless, it is impossible to challenge the fact that there were dramatic changes. As Lord Trevelyan defined the situation in 1973, it “[was] an indisputable fact that an ambassador [was] not what he [had been].”⁸⁵ Ambassadors were also aware of the situation. A German ambassador in the 1970s confessed that “I see myself more as an observer of history than a maker of it.”⁸⁶ Harold Nicolson recalls the dramatic changes that the Cold War conditions compel for the diplomatic profession as follows:

The Old Diplomacy was based upon the creation of confidence, the acquisition of credit. The modern diplomatist must realize that he can no longer rely on the old system of trust; he must accept the fact that his antagonists will not hesitate to falsify facts and that they feel no shame if their duplicity be exposed. ... A diplomatist, moreover, should not concentrate solely on conditions in the country to which

82 Candace Halo, *Globalization and the Foreign Ministry: A Comparative Study of the US, Canadian, and Slovenian Models* (PhD diss. Newark: Rutgers University, 2005), 86.

83 Ibid., 89.

84 Clark, *Corps Diplomatique*, 1.

85 Ritchie, “What are Diplomats Made Of? ...,” 22. It is worth recalling that Trevelyan thinks the importance of the diplomat was reduced with the advent of communication technologies. Whether reduced or consolidated, advancements in communication skills transformed the diplomatic profession in a radical manner.

86 Clark, *Corps Diplomatique*, 5.

he is accredited. He must at the same time be aware of conditions and opinions in his own country. ... My own advice to the junior diplomat is not to confine himself lazily to the easy circle of his own embassy but to cultivate the society of journalists both foreign and native.⁸⁷

Which conditions led the veteran diplomat advise his junior colleagues so inconsistently? First, in the post-World War II period, the management of foreign ministries became harder and complicated than ever before. As noted earlier, World War I degenerated the reputation of old diplomacy since it had not prevented the catastrophe of the war.⁸⁸ George Young noted in 1921 that “the public is revolting against orthodox diplomacy, much as it did against orthodox divinity, and for the same reason – its failure to secure peace on earth to men of good will.”⁸⁹ World War II and the Cold War years discredited diplomatic institutions further. With the advent of the nuclear age, “public interest in diplomats and their work ... sharpened.”⁹⁰ The world public throughout the world became more and more convinced that “international relations and the challenge of avoiding another war could not, and should not be left to diplomacy and diplomats.”⁹¹ Even Hans Morgenthau, who saw diplomatic statecraft as central to international peace, declared the “eclipse of diplomacy” and called it as “obsolete” during the Soviet-American Cold War years.⁹²

The profile of foreign ministries and diplomats was not weakened but actually consolidated. For the first time in modern history, the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) codified the rights and duties of diplomatic and consular corps and notably secured the immunity of diplomatic

87 Harold Nicolson, “Diplomacy: Then and Now,” *Foreign Affairs* 40 (October 1961), 39.

88 Herbert Butterfield, “The New Diplomacy and Historical Diplomacy,” in *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Relations*, eds. Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), 181.

89 George Young, *Diplomacy Old and New* (London, 1921), 15.

90 Charles Roetter, *The Diplomatic Art: An Informal History of World Diplomacy* (Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1963), 18.

91 Paul Sharp, “Diplomacy in International Relations Theory and Other Disciplinary Perspectives,” in *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World*, eds. Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman (London: Oxford University Press, 2012), 65.

92 Barry H. Steiner, “Diplomacy and International Theory,” 494.

corps.⁹³ Given such a convention, the functions of diplomatic missions could not diminish but only increase. As Rana puts it, embassies began to engage “with virtually every agent in the receiving country, official and non-official, that can influence external and even domestic policy.”⁹⁴

Indeed, efforts to codify diplomatic relations date to the interwar period. The first series of efforts took place between 1924 and 1929 under the umbrella of the League of Nations, but they were unsuccessful.⁹⁵ Although these first efforts failed, they “acted as the principal starting point from which a United Nations conference was eventually able to arrive at the Vienna Convention of 1961.”⁹⁶ Indeed, the failure of the process in the 1920s and its accomplishment in the 1960s reveal the significance attached to the conduct of diplomacy in two different phases of twentieth-century history.

The convention (VCDR) came into force in 1964 and in just a decade, 122 countries became signatories.⁹⁷ The conjuncture in which the convention was signed, served its success. The VCDR presented smaller newly independent states the opportunity to be treated fairly in an internationally-accepted charter on diplomatic relations. On the other hand, since Cold War conditions made diplomatic work more and more complex, states became more convinced of the need for the standardization of rules for diplomatic practice and more precise definitions of diplomatic immunity. States’ eagerness to sign the convention clarifies the increasing profile of diplomatic practice in international relations, contrary to the “declinist” narrative. Two years later, in 1963, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) codified the definition of the functions and duties of consular missions, and in 1969, the Vienna

93 Kishan S. Rana, “Embassies, Permanent Missions and Special Missions,” in *The Sage Handbook of Diplomacy*, eds. Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr, Paul Sharp (London: SAGE Publications, 2016), 150.

94 Kishan S. Rana, *The Contemporary Embassy: Paths to Diplomatic Excellence* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 89.

95 Richard Langhorne, “The Regulation of Diplomatic Practice: The Beginnings to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961,” *Review of International Studies* 18, no. 1 (1992), 3.

96 Ibid., 4.

97 Ibid., 17.

Convention on Special Missions was signed.⁹⁸ In the world of the 1960s, diplomatic practice was more institutionalized and globalized than ever.

2.2.2 *Expanding Staff, Transforming Responsibilities*

Especially in the 1960s and 70s, “there [was] been an increase in the number of states; the United Nations tripled its membership since its creation [in 1945] and [in 1980] numbered 155 states.”⁹⁹ Inevitably, diplomatic staffs of each country increased, too. In France, by 1978, the ministry employed four times as many agents as it had done thirty years before.¹⁰⁰ As a previously colonial empire, France had numbers of personnel as a consequence of its background. After decolonization, many officials from the civil administrations of the colonies steamed into the Quai d’Orsay enabling the Ministry to overcome its personnel difficulties.¹⁰¹ The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also capitalized on its colonial background. “A decree of 1954 arranged the transfer of the personnel of the suppressed the Ministry of Italian Africa to the other state administrations, including the foreign ministry.”¹⁰² Reassigning personnel that previously worked in the former Dutch East Indies, the Dutch Foreign Service “was staffed by people who had knowledge and experience of the Third World problems.”¹⁰³

In 1981, the British diplomatic service at home and overseas numbered 4,700 and was supported by 2,000 domestic civil servants.¹⁰⁴ The total

98 Langhorne, “The Regulation of Diplomatic Practice...,” 17.

99 Zara Steiner, “Foreign Ministries: Old and New,” *International Journal* 38, no. 3 (1982), 364.

100 Georges Dethan, “France: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the Nineteenth Century,” in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner, (London: Times Books, 1982), 218.

101 Ibid.

102 Enrico Serra, “Italy: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs,” in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner, (London: Times Books, 1982), 315.

103 C.B. Wels, “Netherlands: The Foreign Policy Institutions in the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1579 to 1980,” in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner, (London: Times Books, 1982), 383.

104 Steiner, “Foreign Ministries: Old and New...,” 365.

number was larger than the Turkish diplomatic staff today.¹⁰⁵ There was a similar trend in Austria. Already by 1960, the number of civil servants was double the 1947 figure.¹⁰⁶ Each country had new foreign policy agendas that necessitated greater numbers of and more skillful diplomatic staff. Finland was a small northern European country with an assertive diplomatic agenda to create a nuclear-free zone in its region. In 1966, the Finnish foreign ministry employed 516 people; five years later the figure was 784.¹⁰⁷ The more a country pursued active foreign policies, the more their diplomatic staffs expanded. Finland in the Cold War years was a clear example.

The increase in staff was a direct outcome of the increasing workload of foreign ministries. Foremost, the impact of the increase in overall number of countries on diplomatic profession was the increase in the mobility of diplomats. As the number of countries increased, states opened new diplomatic missions. As a consequence, diplomats began to be assigned to more countries than before. One British diplomat, for example, served in Uruguay, Lebanon, Haiti, and Britain respectively between 1962 and 1972.¹⁰⁸

Numbers reveal the increase in the workload. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the total number of telegrams sent in 1952 was 12,829.¹⁰⁹ By 1970 and 1979, however, this number had reached 65,553 and 202,381, respectively.¹¹⁰ Similarly, the number of documents produced in 1973 reached nine million in the Department of State of the United States, such that every day two thousand

105 As of the end of 2016, the total number of personnel in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including security guards, was 6,278. “2016 İdare Faaliyet Yılığı Raporu,” (2016 Administrative Operations Annual Report) *TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı* (Ankara: TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2016), 8.

106 Michael Derndarsky, “Austria: The Foreign Office since 1918,” in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner, (London: Times Books, 1982), 67.

107 Esko Antola, “Finland,” in *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*, eds. Brian Hocking and David Spencer (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 100.

108 Clark, *Corps Diplomatique*, 79.

109 Kurt Doss, “The History of the German Office,” in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner, (London: Times Books, 1982), 252.

110 Ibid.

messages poured into the department.¹¹¹ Not only did the central organizations of the foreign ministries, but the networks of diplomatic and consular missions of each country considerably expanded as well. Even in smaller countries such as Denmark, the number of “ambassadors rose from sixty-three in 1969 to ninety-eight in 1980.”¹¹² Large European powers had much broader diplomatic and consular networks: France, in 1978, had 129 resident missions, and Britain had 123. Germany had 198 in 1979.¹¹³

Responsibilities of the foreign ministries widened mostly due to the realities of the Cold War. As the new battlefields, states were represented in multi-lateral international organizations, and after World War II, each state inaugurated permanent or temporary representations in these organizations predominantly. Moreover, various long-running international conferences preoccupied the agenda of diplomatic staffs. In order to prevent political tension in the Cold War, diplomats made additional efforts in summit diplomacy. For example, as the foreign service of one of the two Cold War superpowers, the Department of State of the United States participated in an annual average of well over 300 international conferences in the 1960s.¹¹⁴ Almost 2,800 public servants, roughly forty percent of whom were employed by the Department of State, attended these conferences and meetings.¹¹⁵

Above all, summit diplomacy caused foreign services to realize their potential, which led to further administrative reforms. When, for example, Japan organized the G7 Summit in 1979, the government realized that its foreign service had a poor infrastructure compared to its economic capacity.¹¹⁶ As a consequence, the Japanese MFA launched a six-year program to “increase the number of staff from the level of 3,400 to 5,000, which would put the Japanese

111 Clark, *Corps Diplomatique*, 2.

112 Klaus Kjolsen, “The Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner, (London: Times Books, 1982), 180.

113 Steiner, “Foreign Ministries: Old and New,” 365.

114 Halo, *Globalization and the foreign ministry*, 101. Just in 1965, this number was 650. *Ibid.*

115 *Ibid.*

116 Kyoji Komachi, “Japan Towards a More Proactive foreign ministry,” in *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*, ed. Brian Hocking (London: Macmillan, 1999), 104.

foreign service on a par with the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, at least in terms of staff numbers.”¹¹⁷

Multilateral diplomacy was not limited to hosting and organizing international summits. The more prominent aspect of multilateral diplomacy was engagement with international organizations. With the trauma of the failure of the League of Nations and other international establishments’ failure to prevent the war, the post-World War II world order was structured with strong international organizations. States placed themselves under the jurisdiction of various international establishments. These processes redefined and intensified the workload of foreign ministries as well. European integration, – that is to say, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Community – led the diplomatic bureaucracies of its members to committed reorganization processes. In line with this, for example, a Service on European Integration was established within the Belgian Foreign Ministry in the 1960s.¹¹⁸ The Danish Foreign Ministry passed through two reforms. In the 1960s, the ministry was reformed as part of the preparation for accession to the European Economic Community, while in the 1970s, a second reform was initiated to adapt to life in EEC.¹¹⁹ European integration went hand in hand with another global trend: the rise of foreign economic relations in diplomacy. As a consequence, Denmark formed a “Market Secretariat” to its organize foreign economic relations, which in the 1970s was transformed into the Department of External Affairs.¹²⁰

Recruitment processes became more democratic than ever. This was both due to the increasing need for staff and the increasing number of skilled people in different strata of societies. Especially in the pre-World War I period, members of the old diplomatic system predominantly came from upper-class,

117 Ibid.

118 Rick Coolsaet and Ann-Sofie Voet, “Belgium,” in *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*, eds. Brian Hocking and David Spencer (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 61.

119 Knud Erik Jorgensen, “Denmark,” in *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*, eds. Brian Hocking and David Spencer (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 78.

120 Ibid.

aristocratic families. There was a visible change in the Cold War in this respect. As Steiner puts it “the doors had been opened though the number of men and women interested in and suitable for a foreign service career would always be limited whatever recruitment procedure was used.”¹²¹ In Greece, for example, “foreign ministry entrance exams [were] opened to those who held a university degree, [whereas] previously it was confined only to graduates of law faculty.”¹²² Democratization of foreign ministries was visible also in some other practices during the recruitment processes. Foreign ministries were aware that they were now competing with other state institutions to attract the best talent. In this regard, “some diplomatic services [had] to undertake aggressive recruitment campaigns, visiting campuses, publishing glossy literature, and sending round ambassadors to talk and answer questions.”¹²³

Foreign ministries did not only need to introduce themselves to candidate officers but they should also promote the cultures of their country or foreign policy preferences of their governments to world public opinions. Public diplomacy, a phenomenon which also gained prominence in the Cold War conjuncture, corresponds to a set of efforts by the states to publicize their cultures, accomplishments, and policies to the citizens of other nations.¹²⁴ Coined as a term in the mid-1960s by Edmund Guillion, practices of public diplomacy are as old as the diplomacy itself.¹²⁵ In the age of Cold War, however, especially the

121 Steiner, “Foreign Ministries: Old and New...,” 370.

122 Domna Dontas, “Greece: The Greek foreign ministry,” in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner (London: Times Books, 1982), 270.

123 Clark, *Corps Diplomatique*, 24.

124 Melissen makes a distinction between traditional and public diplomacy. According to him, “the former is about relationships between the representatives of states, or other international actors; whereas the latter targets the general public in foreign societies and more specific non-official groups, organizations and individuals.” Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy...,” 5. The dissertation, in this regard, evaluates the roles of “the diplomat” and “the foreign ministry” within the traditional diplomatic system, namely the intra-relationship between the diplomats and their colleagues, foreign ministries, and governments. In today’s diplomacy, however, the distinction between the traditional and public diplomacy is blurred in many ways. Certain public diplomacy initiatives, which are conducted in order to influence the public opinions of other countries, can also be influential on traditional actors of diplomacy.

125 Ibid., 3 & 6.

super powers attached significance to the promotion of their way of lives to other publics of the world.¹²⁶ The consolidation and institutionalization of public diplomacy practices, as a consequence, increased the responsibilities of the Cold War diplomat.

Not only foreign ministries, but also embassies became accustomed to the new conditions. Perhaps the most dramatic change was the “outsider effect.” Along with sharing their authority with other state institutions, many embassies of European countries such as Britain, Spain, and Norway hosted representatives from the ministries of labor, agriculture, information, culture, and notably, defense.¹²⁷ Career diplomats assigned to embassies were not pleased to work with their “guests.” A Norwegian diplomat once said, “if these people are going to do diplomatic work, they should go through proper training in diplomacy as we have to.”¹²⁸

Timing of the Norwegian diplomat’s demand was questionable. The change was inevitable in all respects. In the post-World War II period, foreign ministries tended to be less elitist and less discriminatory. In line with political developments of the time, for example, “African-Americans and women increasingly began to be appointed in ambassadorial posts” in the United States.¹²⁹ In 1970s, Sweden it was even not necessary to have a university degree.¹³⁰ Nevertheless, not all foreign ministries were democratized in the broadest sense. In the Federal Republic of Germany, “the elitist character could still be observed; the recruits were predominantly from upper-middle

126 Although the notion of public diplomacy was in demise in the aftermath of the Cold War, it gained prominence not only among the states but also in the academic literature after 9/11 attacks in the United States. L.E. Ho, Fiona McConnell, “Conceptualizing ‘Diaspora diplomacy’: Territory and populations betwixt the Domestic and Foreign,” *Progress in Human Geography* 20, no. 10 (2017), 4-5.

127 Clark, *Corps Diplomatique*, 11.

128 Ibid., 12.

129 Dayton Mak and Charles Stuart Kennedy, *American Ambassadors in a Troubled World: Interviews with Senior Diplomats* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1992), 3-4.

130 Steiner, “Foreign Ministries: Old and New...,” 370.

classed, namely 50 percent of the ministry.”¹³¹ Recruitment processes were fairly conducted, but it is difficult to say the same in terms of later promotions. In Belgium, for example, promotions were “based not on merit but on political considerations.”¹³² As it will be illustrated in the next chapter, the Turkish case in the 1960s and 70s was somewhat similar.

The aforementioned statements should not lead us to think that the meritocracy principle was completely eliminated. The professional qualities of diplomats were more prominent in foreign ministries than before. In the Soviet Union (USSR), a “generation of younger men who entered [the] Ministry since the mid-1950s ... benefited from the rigorous training programs of ... the Diplomatic Academy.”¹³³ Japan also established its first diplomatic academy in the post-World War II period: the Foreign Service Training Institute.¹³⁴ In post-World War II Germany, under the leadership of Pfeiffer, a campaign was launched to train new diplomats. The aim was also to eliminate Nazis from the German Foreign Service and to create a new type of German diplomat. However, according to a claim, there were more Nazis in the German Foreign Office (*Auswärtiges Amt*) in the 1960s than in the 1930s.¹³⁵ A diplomatic academy was also opened in Austria in 1964.¹³⁶ Such an academy opened in 1969 in Turkey, revealing that the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was aware of the diplomatic trends.

131 Kurt Doss, “The History of the German Office...,” 254. Wiegeshoff sees this trend as a democratization process because staff of the German Foreign Service was rather filled with officers from the upper classes before the 1950s. Wiegeshoff, “The ‘New Look’ of German Diplomacy,” 197.

132 Jacques Willequet, “Belgium: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner (London: Times Books, 1982), 87.

133 Teddy J. Uldricks, “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: The Tsarist and Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner (London: Times Books, 1982), 534.

134 Ian Nish, “Japan: The Foreign Ministry,” in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner (London: Times Books, 1982), 338.

135 Lewin, “The West German Foreign Service...,” 91.

136 Helmut Rumpler “Austria: The Foreign Office since 1918,” in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner (London: Times Books, 1982), 67.

Along with general trends in the post-World War II period, certain foreign ministries were preoccupied with their specific agendas. In the first decade of the Cold War, for example, diplomats of the Federal German Foreign Service were ordered to “report on even the least sign of a continued communist initiative to help the ... German Democratic Republic towards recognition as a state,” since this was a major foreign policy priority for the West German government at the time.¹³⁷ In the United States, President John F. Kennedy ordered “the restoration of the Department of State’s status as the primary co-ordinating agency in the foreign affairs bureaucracy.”¹³⁸ This meant that intelligence operations would also be coordinated by the Department of State. Kennedy was actually skeptical of the Department of State, considering it “impermeable to innovation or originality.”¹³⁹ As a consequence, in 1961 he ordered the Department of State to “ignite a renaissance” aimed at redesigning the institution as more compatible with the requirements of the new US foreign policy and as loyal to Kennedy’s leadership.¹⁴⁰ As a consequence, the Department of State, “had emerged better prepared to play a leading role in the foreign policy process and fully aware that the looming tasks ahead were more difficult than any encountered in earlier years.”¹⁴¹ While doing this, the Department of State transferred some of its duties related to domestic politics to other executive bodies.¹⁴²

Throughout the Cold War, diplomacy as an institution served the establishment and expansion of US hegemony in two ways. Barkawi explains this phenomenon as follows:

137 Thomas Malucci Jr., “The Foreign Office of the the Federal Republic of Germany and the Question of Relations with Communist States, 1953-55,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 12, no. 1 (2001), 120.

138 Hugh DeSantis, Waldo Heinrichs, “United States of America: The Department of State and American Foreign Policy,” in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner, (London: Times Books, 1982), 588.

139 David Mayers, “JFK’s Ambassadors and the Cold War,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 11, no. 3 (2000), 184.

140 Ibid.

141 Halo, *Globalization and the foreign ministry ...*, 86.

142 Ibid., 94.

First, diplomacy was (and is) central to the legitimization of military presence in subordinate states, grounding forms of rule under “advice and support” with reference to diplomatic representation among sovereign equal states, as stated in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Second, diplomacy more fundamentally enabled a vast presence of US citizens, with diplomatic immunity, on other states’ territory.¹⁴³

Moreover, with the advent of international organizations, summit diplomacy became an integral pillar of the reproduction of US hegemony in world politics. With regard to their increasing authority, secretaries of state played a pre-dominant role.

Of those who achieved the most active records during this period, Secretary [Dean] Rusk averaged approximately fifteen foreign visits per year, [John Foster] Dulles increased to eighteen, [William] Rogers to twenty-five, [Cyrus] Vance to thirty-three and the largest annual visits by Secretary [Henry] Kissinger with fifty-nine and [George] Shultz with seventy-three.”¹⁴⁴

This activism inevitably increased the workload of the Department of State staff, a trend that was by no means comparable to previous decades. A similar situation was valid for the other superpower of the Cold War. “The embassies of the USSR frequently had the largest foreign mission staff in the country to which they were accredited.”¹⁴⁵

143 Tarak Barkawi, “Diplomacy, War, and World Politics,” in *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*, eds. Ole Jakob Sinding, Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 24.

144 Halo, *Globalization and the Foreign Ministry...*, 89.

145 Uldricks, “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner (London: Times Books, 1982), 535.

2.2.3 *Reform, Reorganization, and Reorientation*

Some foreign services were in search of reorientation. As said above, the Federal Republic of Germany sought to establish a new foreign service independent of the legacy of the Nazi era. The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also sought to eliminate traces of the Mussolini period. In this regard, “a debate developed in Italy ... about how to structure the diplomatic service.”¹⁴⁶ The Foreign Service of Mao’s China underwent more revolutionary albeit inconsistent changes. In 1966, during the Cultural Revolution, “more than forty ambassadors were recalled to Beijing; relations with thirty two countries were disturbed by incidents arising out of the Cultural Revolution.”¹⁴⁷ Most notably, the British Embassy was subject to a “mob attack”¹⁴⁸ in the summer of 1967 when “an ultra-left group even took over the foreign ministry ... [which] was accused of not supporting foreign revolutionaries, in particular among the Overseas Chinese.”¹⁴⁹

France also experienced considerable political transformations in the post-World War II. The country entered the war under the Third Republic, in 1958 the Fifth Republic was proclaimed. However, the Quai d’Orsay maintained a stable course unlike the cases of Germany and China. Between 1944 and 1989, for example, only twelve foreign ministers served.¹⁵⁰ This was strongly related to the traditional influence of the ministry within the French state.

The course of foreign ministries in the Cold War years did not follow a steady path. On one hand, the functions and duties of foreign ministries expanded and consolidated, but on the other, some of their privileges were delegated to other state institutions or agencies. At the height of the Cold War, “[foreign ministries] did not have considerable authority in the direct of

146 Serra, “Italy...,” 316.

147 M.B. Yahuda, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,” in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner (London: Times Books, 1982), 157.

148 Clark, *Corps Diplomatique*, 83.

149 Yahuda, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,” 157.

150 Dethan, “France...,” 214.

foreign relations that they had.”¹⁵¹ In some cases, foreign ministries were deprived of direct links to their own governments in terms of foreign policy-making processes. In Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s Canada, Ivan Head, a law professor and an officer in the Canadian Department of External Affairs (DEA), operated as “a conduit between the Prime Minister and DEA between 1970 and 1978.”¹⁵² Yet, this does not mean the authority of foreign ministries were completely eliminated. It was rather a complex process.

In Austria, for example, the “foreign ministry underwent a further restriction of its authority. It entailed … transfer of responsibility for cultural contacts to the Ministry of Education, while the Ministry of Commerce was granted new privileges.”¹⁵³ In 1973, however, the “Ministries Act of 1973… brought an increase in the status of the foreign ministry.”¹⁵⁴ The Austrian foreign ministry in this regard, resembles the case of Turkey in the 1960s. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ wide authority over foreign policy issues diminished after the coup d’état of May 27, 1960 but its situation was reinstated a decade later.¹⁵⁵ Belgium opted to narrow the scope of work and thus the authority of its foreign ministry in foreign policy-making processes. In sum, as a general trend, foreign ministries had to “abandon claims to the exclusive control over foreign policy, opting instead for the key-coordinating role in an enlarged foreign affairs complex.”¹⁵⁶

Authority of foreign ministries was not only limited through transfers of power to other bureaucratic institutions. In some cases, the appointment of people without diplomatic careers to ambassadorial posts automatically led to a power transfer. In the Department of State of the United States, thirty-five percent of ambassadors were political appointees instead of career

151 G.R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 15.

152 Andrew H. Cooper, “Canada: Trying to Get It Right: The foreign ministry and Organizational Change,” in *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*, ed. Brian Hocking, (London: Macmillan, 1999), 47.

153 Derndarsky, “Austria...,” 69.

154 Ibid.

155 See related part in chapter 5.

156 Steiner, “Foreign Ministries: Old and New,” 367.

diplomats.¹⁵⁷ This trend was related to general distrust of diplomats in the post-World War II years. Along with a general critical attitude towards diplomacy and diplomats in the 1960s and 70s, the aforementioned social strata that diplomats were (thought to be) a part of, established the prototypical image of the diplomat – that is, people at cocktail parties drinking champagne.

In an age when popular and populist politics were gaining ground, diplomatic institutions had to take their images under consideration, too. Participation at diplomatic cocktails was not a hobby for many diplomats. Indeed, most “diplomats regard[ed] party and dinner giving and going as work,” not as a joyful occasion.¹⁵⁸ An Italian diplomat was invited to a dinner party in 1970 during a general strike in the country. The diplomat was also participating in the strike and thus, he refused to attend since he considered participation in such parties as part of his duties.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, not all diplomats evaluated parties as useful, formal way of diplomacy. An American diplomat, who claimed that it was better to talk to foreign counterparts in his office instead of at “noisy cocktails,” even wished for the “banning of cocktails.”¹⁶⁰ Nevertheless, publics in the late 1960s and 70s had their own convictions about the diplomat-party relationship. A Dutch diplomat in those years stated that “sometimes I get the feeling we are being condemned not on what we are now, but on how people think we are.”¹⁶¹ One of his British colleagues complained of being “misunderstood.”¹⁶² According to him, “foreign services would do better to spend the money on hiring public relations firms to show people what they really get up to.”¹⁶³

The British diplomat’s demand was legitimate. The work of the diplomat was under public scrutiny more than ever. They were blamed for foreign policy

157 Evan T. Haglund, “Striped Pants versus Fat Cats: Ambassadorial Performance of Career Diplomats and Political Appointees,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (December 2015), 658.

158 Clark, *Corps Diplomatique*, 89.

159 Ibid.

160 Ibid.

161 Ibid., 3.

162 Ibid.

163 Ibid.

failures for which they would not have been appreciated had the results been otherwise. The Canadian Department of External Affairs, for example, was a target of its citizens due to their practices in the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961.¹⁶⁴ In a similar vein, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was accused during the country's accession process to the European Economic Community of being a "foreign element in the national body" by opponents to accession.¹⁶⁵ Some foreign ministries indeed made much effort on rehabilitating the image of their diplomatic bureaucracies. As a catastrophic example, in the 1970s the government of Mexico aimed at rehabilitating the image of its foreign ministry. Nevertheless, this was not done through the foreign ministry but by appointing young economists as ambassadors to Latin American countries.¹⁶⁶ As a consequence, poorly paid career diplomats of the Foreign Service felt "displaced and ignored."¹⁶⁷

The Cold War conjuncture prevented a nuclear war but there were numerous local conflicts. This phenomenon also contributed to the character of the diplomatic bureaucracies in this period. In many cases, diplomatic maneuvers and processes served to emergence of conflicts rather than prevention. For example, some scholars claim that it was the Secretary of Defense of the United States who caused the changes to the Department of State during the Cold War, not the impact of globalization.¹⁶⁸ This claim is considerably true. The Israeli MFA of the 1960s and 70s was a precise example. The authority of the Israeli MFA was not curtailed by administrative reforms but by the wartime conditions of the country. The Israeli Defense Ministry, in cooperation with the intelligence units of the country, pursued a foreign policy

164 Andrew F. Cooper, "Canada Trying to Get It Right: The Foreign Ministry and Organizational Change," in *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*, ed. Brian Hocking (London: Macmillan, 1999), 46.

165 Iver B. Neumann, "Norway," in *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*, ed. Brian Hocking (London: Macmillan, 1999), 158.

166 Andres Rozental, "Mexico: Change and Adaptation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," in *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*, ed. Brian Hocking (London: Macmillan, 1999), 143.

167 Ibid.

168 Halo, *Globalization and the foreign ministry...*, 96.

independent of the foreign ministry.¹⁶⁹ In 1966, Yigal Palmor, then spokesperson of the Israeli MFA, complained about the defense ministry's indifference towards them in terms of foreign policy-making processes.¹⁷⁰

When a foreign ministry's authority was curtailed, this would generally be objected by the diplomats. As will be illustrated in chapter 5, the Turkish MFA after May 27, 1960 exemplifies this situation well. Nevertheless, there were counter examples. The Norwegian Foreign Ministry did not insist on maintaining its authority in the realm of foreign trade when the Ministry of Oil and Energy was established in 1978.¹⁷¹ Moreover, foreign ministries and diplomatic missions were not always on the losing side of authority battles vis-à-vis other state institutions. In 1979, when the prime minister reminded all departments with a decree stating "each ambassador is the sole representative, in his country of residence, of the President of the Republic and the French government," he confirmed the "central responsibility of the heads of diplomatic posts in the making of foreign policy."¹⁷² A similar decision had already been made by John F. Kennedy "to restate the role of ambassador as the supreme authority in overseas missions" at a time when almost all federal departments and agencies "were involved in the conduct of diplomacy."¹⁷³ Decisions of the president of the United States in the early 1960s and the French prime minister in 1979 indicate that the increasing number of actors in the conduct of diplomacy did not limit the role or status of the foreign ministries or career diplomats; indeed these decisions consolidated their scopes of work as supreme organs in the coordination of a variety of bureaucracies related to different specific elements of foreign policy-making.

Many foreign ministries sought to reorganize their structures. As Clark describes, in the 1970s "nations from Britain to Canada, Norway to Germany,

169 Klieaman, "Israel...," 88.

170 Ibid.

171 Iver B. Neumann, "Foreign Ministry: Bracketing Interdependence," in *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*, ed. Brian Hocking (London: Macmillan, 1999), 159.

172 Paulette Enjalran and Philippe Husson, "France: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs," in *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*, ed. Brian Hocking (London: Macmillan, 1999), 159.

173 Halo, *Globalization and the Foreign Ministry...*, 95.

[were] examining where the diplomat fit into the modern world.¹⁷⁴ As a consequence, surveys and other methods of research were widespread in order to amend the conditions and operational capacities of foreign ministries. For example, in France

the Racine Report of 1969 concentrated on internal organizational improvements and personnel reforms. New issues were assigned to the ministry (nuclear and space affairs), the Cultural, Scientific and Technical Department was reorganized and a Legal Department established. [Then] in 1976, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and his Foreign Minister, Louis de Guiringaud, launched an institutional reform aimed at adapting existing structures to new international requirements, especially the growing importance of economic interdependence in external relations. The heart of the so-called Guiringaud reform consisted of the “geographization” of the Political Department, giving more autonomy to the geographic subdirectorates.¹⁷⁵

Like France, other former colonial powers and superpowers of the Cold War were eager to transform their diplomatic bureaucracies in line with changing conditions. The Department of State of the United States also established geographic departments, and sub-departments were standardized as “country desks.”¹⁷⁶ The year 1967 was a watershed for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this year, the Italian diplomatic service initiated considerable reforms ranging from the acceptance of females in the profession to the introduction of interviews in entrance exams.¹⁷⁷ The British Foreign Office had perhaps the most intense reform agenda. The reports of the Plowden Committee

174 Clark, *Corps Diplomatique*, 3.

175 Melanie Morisse-Schillbach, “France,” in *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*, eds. Brian Hocking and David Spencer (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 113.

176 Halo, *Globalization and the foreign ministry...*, 94.

177 Mario Zucconi, “Italy,” in *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*, eds. Brian Hocking and David Spencer (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 165.

(1964), Duncan Committee (1969), and Berill Committee (1977) on the British Foreign Office (FO) were three primary examples of such efforts.¹⁷⁸

All reports underscored the increasing need for specialized training and their recommendations coincided with the increasing demand for foreign service staff as Britain became steadily involved with the European Community.¹⁷⁹ All three reports advised the categorization of scopes of work and functions for each Foreign Office elements. The report of the Duncan Committee, for example, categorized “embassies in two clusters, ‘comprehensive posts’ and ‘selective posts,’ suggesting that resources be concentrated on the former, which would be located for the great part in Western countries.”¹⁸⁰ Comprehensive posts were places like Washington whereas selective posts corresponded to cities such as San Jose (Costa Rica). The report asked “why should the spectrum of diplomatic activity, and hence, the scale of complexity, be the same?” in these two posts with two radically different workloads.¹⁸¹ The Duncan Committee (named after its chairman, Val Duncan) preached an aggressive transformation influenced by the trauma of British withdrawal from “East of Suez” in 1968.¹⁸² This report also indicated that the British Foreign Office was overstaffed.¹⁸³ The Plowden Report of 1964 was more moderate. In an age when Britain’s power was in definitive decline, the Plowden Committee interestingly respected the Foreign Office’s “policy capability of a global power.”¹⁸⁴

British Foreign Office’s transformation in the 1960s was first of all strongly related to the process of the liquidation of colonies which required immediate, comprehensive institutional evolution of the British foreign service. The British case was a radical transformation, as Allen summarizes.

178 Valerie Cromwell, “The United Kingdom,” in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner (London: Times Books, 1982), 564.

179 Ibid.

180 Rana, *The Contemporary Embassy...*, 130.

181 James Eayrs, *Diplomacy and Its Discontents* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 4.

182 Allen, “The Foreign and Commonwealth Office,” 215. “British Withdrawal from the East of Suez” refers to Britain’s withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore between 1964 and 1968.

183 Eayrs, *Diplomacy and Its Discontents*, 4.

184 Allen, “The Foreign and Commonwealth Office...,” 215.

Until the mid-1960s the UK chose to handle its imperial and post imperial relationships separately from its dealings with the rest of the world. The Colonial Office, the India Office, the Dominions Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office merged over time to form the Commonwealth Office and, in 1968, the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office themselves merged to form the present [Foreign and Commonwealth Office] FCO.¹⁸⁵

Indeed, this was the ultimate debate in foreign ministries in the post-World War II period. The German Foreign Service also considered whether technical or regional specialization best suited the German diplomatic bureaucracy and the conclusion was the adoption of the “generalist principle” that a German diplomat had to have knowledge of any given topic.¹⁸⁶ The trend nevertheless favored regional specialization. In its centenary year in 1969, the “Japanese foreign ministry was divided into regional and functional sections: Asia, America, Europe and Oceania, and the Middle East and Africa.”¹⁸⁷ As foreign economic and trade relations became predominant priorities of Japanese foreign policy, “these desks merged with the departments related to bilateral economic relations in 1970.”¹⁸⁸ This process was completed when a Latin America bureau was established in 1979.¹⁸⁹ At a relatively smaller scale, the Dutch Foreign Service regionalized its policy departments: European Affairs, Eastern Affairs, and the Western Hemisphere.¹⁹⁰ Even in Spain during the 1960s and 70s, where foreign policy and diplomatic service was under the patronage of Francisco Franco, there were “institutional efforts to respond to the increasingly multidimensional character of international relations.”¹⁹¹

185 Ibid., 207.

186 Doss, “The History of the German Foreign Service...,” 253.

187 Nish, “Japan...,” 338.

188 Komachi, “Japan Towards...,” 105.

189 Ibid.

190 Wels, “Netherlands...,” 382.

191 Denis Smyth, “Spain’s First Secretariat of State, Ministry of State and Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner (London: Times Books, 1982), 443.

In sum, the efforts to reform and reorganize foreign ministries were one of the most prominent developments of the post-World War II period, most notably in the 1960s and 70s. Contrary to the critics, the diplomat was not dead. Nevertheless, there were serious changes. The essence of reform efforts was to determine who the new diplomat was and should be.

The diplomatic staff of each foreign ministry were predominantly career officers, but foreign ministers' backgrounds were significant in some countries. It must be noted that foreign ministers in this period were mostly politicians. As a typical example, the Japanese "Foreign Ministry was filled with politicians rather than bureaucrats and in some cases after 1952 Japanese prime ministers served as the foreign minister simultaneously implying that political concerns had been more influential on the diplomatic bureaucracy than other issues."¹⁹² The Austrian Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, "was less politically saturated than that of the other ministries."¹⁹³ Dutch Foreign Ministers "were always independent of political parties" with some exceptions, and in this regard Dutch Foreign Ministers "were always in a fairly weak position in both government and parliament."¹⁹⁴ Danish foreign ministers likewise did not predominantly belong to political parties.¹⁹⁵

2.2.4 *Diplomacy of Developmentalism: Impacts on Foreign Ministries*

Development cooperation was one of the determinants of international politics throughout the 1960s and 70s because newly independent countries needed the economic and technical assistance of the developed world for their development. This phenomenon was another concern for diplomatic bureaucracies in the aforementioned period. Belgium established a Ministry of Co-operation and Development out of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁹⁶ In Britain this process was completed in 1964 with the establishment of a Ministry of

192 Nish, "Japan...," 337.

193 Derndarsky, "Japan...," 369

194 Wels, "Netherlands...," 385.

195 Kjolsen, "Denmark...," 176.

196 Willequet, "Belgium...," 85.

Overseas Development separate from the Foreign Office.¹⁹⁷ The issue of development cooperation was conducted through this ministry under Labor Party governments (1964-69, 1974-79), whereas Conservative governments (1970-74) transferred the issue to the Overseas Development Administration, a body under the jurisdiction of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.¹⁹⁸

Some countries such as Finland or Denmark conducted development cooperation efforts with underdeveloped countries through their foreign ministries. In the Netherlands, moreover, not only cooperation in development but also human rights “received increased attention” especially in the 1970s.¹⁹⁹ By 1981, “a quarter of the [Dutch Foreign] Ministry’s staff was employed in the development cooperation divisions.”²⁰⁰ Norway’s proportion was more dramatic: “From 1961 to 1978, the foreign affairs budget multiplied fourfold, and at the end of the period almost ninety percent of the total was in the area of foreign aid.”²⁰¹

2.2.5 *New States with Their New Diplomacy and Diplomatic Staff*

The existing literature on diplomacy is a Western-centric one with a dominant emphasis on the course of modern European diplomatic practice. Kishan S. Rana, a professor emeritus and former Indian ambassador, rightfully complains about the fact that diplomatic theories “are all dominated by the environment as it obtains in the West and by the concerns that flow from that.”²⁰²

The impact of decolonization on diplomacy, in this regard, was a subject of scholarly debate in the 1960s. Scholars like Ali Mazrui called for greater pluralism, whereas Martin Wight insisted on the superiority of Western values as the basis for diplomacy.²⁰³ This part of this chapter illustrates the impact of the

197 David Allen, “The Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Flexible, Responsive and Proactive?” in *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*, ed. Brian Hocking (London: Macmillan, 1999), 208.

198 Ibid.

199 Wels. “Netherlands...,” 381.

200 Ibid.

201 Neumann, “Norway...,” 157.

202 Rana, *The Contemporary Embassy*, 6.

203 Iver B. Neumann, *Diplomatic Sites...*, 56.

emergence of diplomatic staffs of then-newly independent and communist states in order to illustrate the whole of the course of the transformation of diplomatic bureaucracies throughout the 1960s and 70s.

While the foreign services of old states were being transformed through administrative reforms, changes in scopes of work, and increases in staff, newly emerging states of the decolonization process were forming their foreign services. In other words, increases in diplomatic and consular staff did not only stem from the boom in existing foreign services; the new states' foreign offices also led to increases in diplomatic personnel on the whole. The emergence of new diplomats was not only a matter of numbers. As Clark recalls, "the old diplomats were members of a small world, united by class and elitism," whereas the new diplomats of the post-World War II period "had to withstand the impact of the arrival not only of the new states but also of the Soviet diplomat, [who had] total inflexibility."²⁰⁴ Although the Convention of 1961 secured the freedom of movement of diplomats, the diplomatic game was played under different rules by the Soviet Union and other communist regimes. The British diplomats in Moscow were not permitted "to travel more than twenty-five miles from the center of city without permission," whereas in China, at the beginning of 1970s, "diplomats were confined to a fourteen-mile radius of Beijing."²⁰⁵ This was indeed another uncomfortable feature of being a diplomat in the Cold War period. Diplomats of the Cold War years conducted their work in much more ideologically-set atmosphere than their predecessors or successors.

Western diplomats assigned to Eastern bloc countries lived under strict surveillance.²⁰⁶ The two blocs of the Cold War conjuncture wished the dissolution of the other, though in a peaceful way rather than by nuclear war. This situation inevitably led the diplomat to play a key role in the ideological and information war against the possible enemy. Espionage and reporting, in this regard, were strong elements of the diplomatic profession more than ever.

Diplomatic staffs in newly emergent countries were not necessarily career diplomats. They had not inherited anything from their seniors. They were

204 Clark, *Corps Diplomatique*, 10.

205 Ibid., 210.

206 Ibid., 212.

mostly political figures who played roles in the independence struggle of their countries. As the “aristocrats” of their nations who had predominantly graduated from the Western universities or as tribal chiefs, ambassadors from Third World countries placed the survival and progress of their countries at the center of their professional work.²⁰⁷ Survival and progress meant economic survival and progress. When a post-colonial country was short of foreign currency, its diplomatic service began to be criticized in terms of its cost-effectiveness.²⁰⁸

The diplomats of Third World countries also had expectations from their colleagues in the Western World.²⁰⁹ Apart from recognition of their states’ independence, the diplomats of newly emergent states “thought that their countries deserved some compensation for the mistakes” of the colonial era.²¹⁰ This expectation was met to an extent. For example, throughout their independence processes, former colonial powers assisted their former colonies in the establishment of their diplomatic staffs through advisory committees and training programs.²¹¹

Different post-colonial countries experienced different paths with respect to the formation of their foreign services. India, for example, already possessed a quasi-foreign service before its independence, just as Nigeria had an external relations department four years before its independence.²¹² In Africa, the South African foreign service was by far the most organized diplomatic institution. Most notably, in 1969 the South African Foreign Ministry was the subject of a series of functional reorganizations. South Africa was the most successful among African foreign ministries in adapting to the new conditions

207 Ibid.

208 Robert J. Moore, *Third-World Diplomats in Dialogue with the First World* (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1985), 29.

209 Ibid., 27-28.

210 Ibid., 22.

211 Hamilton and Langhorne, “The Practice of Diplomacy...,” 211.

212 Ibid., 211.

for diplomatic bureaucracies in the 1960s and 70s.²¹³ The South African Foreign Ministry was reorganized primarily along geographical lines, though a distinction was still made between bilateral and multilateral relations.²¹⁴ During decolonization, the formation of a diplomatic bureaucracy was a matter of capability – and thus, prestige. When Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana declared the independence of his country, he opened seventy embassies to manifest the claim of his country in the world political arena, though eighteen were immediately closed due to a lack of finances.²¹⁵

Economic burdens on Third World countries inevitably led them to design diplomatic bureaucracies in line with their economic requirements of the time. In the mid-1960s, India “reactivated an economic unit in its Ministry of External Affairs.”²¹⁶ Especially after 1973, when the oil crisis caused oil prices to surge, “embassies were tasked to promote exports and go out to win project contracts for Indian companies.”²¹⁷ In addition, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs published a report in 1966 – the Pillai Report – searching for ways to make the institution function better just as Western foreign services of the time did.²¹⁸

Embassies of Third World countries were also preoccupied with economic affairs. In 1973, a Latin American diplomat assigned to the embassy in Israel stated that “trade consisted 60 to 70 percent of his workload,” whereas one of his African colleagues in the same country stressed that the main function of a diplomat of an underdeveloped country was “to get help and assistance from the country” to which he was assigned in.²¹⁹ For African diplomats, Bonn was the most favorite post in the age of development cooperation since the Federal

213 Marie Müller, “South Africa, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: From Isolation to Integration to Coherency,” in *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*, ed. Brian Hocking (London: Macmillan, 1999), 188.

214 Ibid.

215 Clark, *Corps Diplomatique*, 2.

216 Kishan S. Rana, *The Contemporary Embassy...*, 39.

217 Ibid.

218 Ibid.

219 Diane Levitt Gottheil, *National Capital Diplomacy: A Study of Diplomats and Diplomatic Community in Israel* (PhD diss. Chicago: University of Illinois, 1973), 175-176.

Republic of Germany was the most suitable country in terms of “development aid and scholarships.”²²⁰

These efforts were realized on the horns of a dilemma. Post-colonial countries needed to expand economic cooperation with developed countries which required more profound diplomatic representation. On the other hand, the oil crisis of 1973 created a heavy financial burden on the bureaucratic mechanisms of these states. As a consequence, newly emergent states opted to curtail the numbers on their embassy staffs instead of closing any diplomatic missions.²²¹ Predictably, this preference considerably increased the workload of Third World embassies. Meanwhile, the 1973 oil crisis was a watershed not only for capital and investment-seeking developing countries. When the crisis erupted in 1973, even the Japanese Foreign Ministry realized its failure “to maintain close contact with non-traditional partners such as the oil-producing countries of the Middle East.”²²²

§ 2.3 Concluding Remarks

Faizullaev notes that “diplomats interact and negotiate not only with diplomats but also with other government officials, members of parliament, representatives of professional groups and civil society, and ordinary people.”²²³ Yet, in his view, the diplomat as an individual melts in the pot of the state’s identity and the diplomat’s attitude is “determined by the characteristics of their institution or agency.”²²⁴ This dissertation suggests that the diplomat’s views and attitudes are not determined by a top-down process without any negotiation. Indeed, the diplomat, while conducting his career, is in a process of mutual interaction with his own state.

Throughout the 1960s and 70s, diplomatic bureaucracies, whether in the Western world or in the Third World, were in a state of continuous

220 Clark, *Corps Diplomatique*, 82.

221 Moore, *Third World Diplomats...*, 30.

222 Komachi, “Japan Towards...,” 104.

223 Alisher Faizullaev, “Diplomatic Interactions and Negotiations,” *Negotiation Journal* 30, no. 3 (2014), 282.

224 Ibid.

transformation. Diplomats were interacting with other state agencies, the publics of the sending and receiving countries, international organizations, and newly-emerging non-governmental actors. The course of the diplomatic profession throughout the 1960s and 70s in this regard legitimized the claim that the diplomatic profession transforms itself in continuous interaction with its addressees. Thus, diplomat is neither concealed either from the public eye nor from the realities of their time. Modern diplomacy is a product of the conjunctures into which it was born.

In discussing the course of the Department of State in the Cold War years, Halo concludes that most analysts describe the period with words like “remarkable, revolutionary, expansion, growth and change.”²²⁵ The change in the foreign service of a superpower can be expressed with such assertive words but other ministries of the period experienced similar, revolutionary degrees of transformation. First of all, diplomats of the Cold War years worked in “ideology-dominant” conditions that had never been experienced to that extent. The “ideologization” of diplomacy made its practice more complicated than ever. Moreover, with the increasing interest of the public and due to the trauma of two world wars, the diplomat was less-trusted in the 1960s compared with the times of the Old Diplomacy. Nevertheless, the role of diplomats and diplomacy did not diminish in the aforementioned period. On the contrary, diplomacy and its practitioners undertook new, more comprehensive duties ranging from multilateral diplomacy to development cooperation. One British diplomat asked in the 1990s, “if diplomacy is in decline, then why am I so busy?” This question indeed suits the diplomat of the 1960s and 70s.

In the aforementioned period, almost all foreign ministries passed through considerable reform and reorganization processes. This chapter asserted that if a country’s foreign service already constituted a prominent place in the state mechanism, then its reform, reorganizations, and reorientation (in terms of new scopes of work) consolidated the status of these foreign services within their bureaucracies. This chapter exemplified this situation most notably through the cases of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

225 Halo, *Globalization and the foreign ministry...*, 105.

Even though their foreign services transferred some of their authority to other state agencies, new reforms, decisions, and processes strengthened and redetermined the role of these institutions. To a considerable extent, this was also valid for the course of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy in the 1960s and 70s. As will be illustrated in detail in the next chapter, the Turkish MFA constituted not only a strong position in the Ottoman-Turkish state but also played prominent role in the Ottoman-Turkish modernization process. Like its counterparts, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy encountered challenges and transformations, and also faced harsh criticism. Nevertheless, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy overcame the aforementioned period with neither a considerable retreat in terms of its place in the state nor in terms of its influence over diplomatic practices (and their reflections on public opinion). Through a mutual transformation process, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy adapted itself to the changing conditions and was also influential on the transformation of the implementations of the mindset of the state in terms of diplomatic practices.

Before discussing the historical course of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy, one point needs to be clarified. In terms of diplomacy as a concept and a set of processes, this dissertation thinks on the conceptualizations, actors, and institutions of modern diplomacy. Although it is difficult to identify a milestone in the emergence of either modern or pre-modern diplomacy, this dissertation assumes that the establishment of European foreign ministries in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were the first steps in the establishment of a modern diplomatic tradition. There is a considerable literature on pre-modern forms of diplomacy ranging from studies on Eighteenth Dynasty diplomacy in Amarna, Egypt to Renaissance diplomacy.²²⁶ Moreover, this dissertation does not dismiss the fact that contemporary diplomacy inherited so much from pre-modern conceptions of diplomacy. Notions of immunity

226 See R. Cohen and R. Westbrook, eds., *Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginning of International Relations* (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), G. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955), R. Numelin, *The Beginnings of Diplomacy: A Sociological Study of Inter-tribal and International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950).

and reciprocity – centerpieces of the VCDR in 1961 – were inspired by the teachings of early Christendom.²²⁷ Yet, acknowledging that diplomatic practices of the Cold War years were the heirs of modern diplomatic institutions, the diplomacy in the aforementioned period in the world context and in Turkey were examined without reference to earlier forms of diplomacy.²²⁸



227 Neumann, *Diplomatic Sites*, 70.

228 In recent years, the notion of diplomacy has also been attributed to the “popular forms of geopolitics, everyday diplomacies, and, more generally, the role of culture in diplomatic practice.” See Magnus Marsden, et al. “Everyday Diplomacy: Introduction to Special Issue,” *The Cambridge Journal of Anthropology* 34 (Autumn 2016), 2-22. With reference to this new perspective, a challenge to the view that “diplomacy is only reserved for the work of diplomats representing sovereign states” emerged that “brought attention instead to the role played in the conduct of diplomacy by non-elite actors.” Ibid., 2. This wider understanding of diplomacy evaluates relationship patterns in Dervish Lodges in Bosnia-Herzegovina and diplomacy among Indian traders in the Chinese fabric market as diplomatic practices. This dissertation sees these efforts as invaluable contributions to a deeper analysis of the characteristics of diplomatic practice. Nevertheless, this dissertation departs from this newly emerging literature by still locating the diplomat, as the representative of a state in an interaction with a variety of other actors, at the center of the phenomenon of diplomacy.

3

The Turkish Diplomatic Bureaucracy from a Historical Perspective

§ 3.1 Imperial Diplomatic Legacy

Diplomacy has been institutionalized in modern Ottoman-Turkish history since the establishment of a foreign ministry in 1836. Bilateral permanent diplomacy was an unfamiliar phenomenon to Ottoman bureaucracy of until the late eighteenth century. The French Revolution was of considerable significance for the formation of an established diplomatic tradition in the Ottoman Empire. Along with the French Revolution, the ascension of Selim III to the throne led to the formation of a modern Ottoman diplomatic bureaucracy. Selim III wanted the first permanent diplomatic mission to be established in Paris, yet the consequences of the French Revolution persuaded the Sublime Porte to establish the first permanent mission in London.¹ Kürkçüoğlu postulates that “if the revolution had not happened in 1789,

¹ Ercüment Kuran, “1793-1811 Döneminde İlk Osmanlı Mukim Elçilerinin Diplomatik Faaliyetleri,” in *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç*, ed. İsmail Soysal (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997), 55. Kürkçü Yusuf Agah Efendi was the first permanent ambassador of the empire. Afterwards, Selim III appointed İsmail Ferruh Efendi to London, Seyyid Ali Efendi to Paris, İbrahim Afif to Vienna and Ali Aziz Efendi to Berlin in spring of 1797. *Ibid.*

France would almost certainly have been the first destination for the newly established Ottoman resident ambassadors.”²

The first Ottoman ambassadors were inexperienced in the diplomatic field since there had been no diplomatic training process prior to that and none of them were the successors of any diplomatic tradition.³ Three years after the first appointment in 1800, the Ottoman Empire ceased appointing permanent representatives in London, Vienna, and Berlin; instead, Greek Orthodox interpreters (*tercümanlar*) were appointed under the title of charge d'affairs. Paris was the exception, and Mehmed Sait Halet Efendi was appointed as the successor to Seyyid Ali.⁴ The operation of Ottoman diplomatic missions through the offices of charge d'affairs continued until 1821 when a Greek uprising occurred. When it was realized that Greek diplomats were misinforming the Sublime Porte, the diplomatic missions were abolished.⁵ The failure of this first attempt was due to the lack of experience of the first representatives, which was the consequence of appointing mid-ranking officials as diplomats in European capitals. High-ranking officials of the Sublime Porte ignored diplomacy and were not inclined to leave Istanbul, the epicenter of a bureaucratic career.⁶ Second, the failure stemmed from the insufficient language skills of the ambassadors, which led to dependency on Greek interpreters.

2 Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, “The Adoption and Use of Permanent Diplomacy,” in *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional?* ed. Nuri Yurdusev (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 133. This was because Selim III saw “the case of France” and its revolution as a model for reforms to be conducted in the Ottoman Empire. He was already in corresponding with Louis VI, the crown prince of France and had sent İshak Bey to France “to study French ways of life” even before the revolution and his sultanate. *Ibid.*

3 Yılmaz Altuğ, “The Creation of the Turkish Resident Diplomacy,” *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 42 (2015), 71. One typical example of this inexperience concerned an interaction between Talleyrand, maybe one of the founding figures of modern diplomacy, and Seyyid Ali Efendi, the Ottoman ambassador to Paris. Before Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt, Talleyrand misdirected Seyyid Ali by persuading him that France was not preparing for such a campaign in the most critical territory of Ottoman Africa. *Ibid.*

4 Kur'an, “1793-1811 Döneminde İlk Osmanlı Mukim Elçilerinin Diplomatik Faaliyetleri,” 57.

5 *Ibid.*, 58.

6 *Ibid.*

Mahmud II inherited the problems of the Selim III era and “Islamized” the Translation Bureau (*Tercüme Odası*) given the lessons learned from experience during the Greek uprising.⁷ Indeed, the new steps for institutionalizing Ottoman diplomacy and reopening diplomatic missions were the consequences of international developments at the time. The Greek uprising of 1821-1829 and its eventual independence in 1830, France’s capture of Algeria, the Egypt question and its evolution into an international dispute, and the dispute over the straits forced the Sublime Porte to pursue a more active diplomacy with more instruments. Mahmud II reappointed ambassadors to Paris, London, and Vienna in 1834, which can be evaluated as the second wave of diplomatic opening of the Ottoman Empire, the first of which was during the reign of Selim III.⁸

The most significant step of the Mahmud II era, however, was the establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Umur-ı Hariciye Nezareti*) in 1836, which was a turning point in terms of institutionalizing Ottoman diplomacy. The establishment of a ministry of foreign affairs as a separate, autonomous body within the Ottoman bureaucracy was also an integral component of the Ottoman modernization process. On March 11, 1836, Mahmud II established the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by an imperial edict (*hatt-ı humayun*).⁹ The edict, without explaining the reason for the decision, announced that the office of the *Reisülküttap* would be reformed into the *Hariciye Nezareti* (Foreign

7 Ibid.

8 İsmail Soysal, “Umur-ı Hariciye Nezaretinin Kurulması (1836),” in *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç*, ed. İsmail Soysal (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997), 72. New ambassadors were also appointed to Berlin in 1837, Athens in 1840, Tehran in 1849, Brussels, and The Hague in 1854, St. Petersburg in 1857, Washington in 1867, Bucharest in 1878, Belgrade in 1879, Stockholm in 1898, Sofia in 1909, and Copenhagen in 1917. The number of consulates also increased. Ibid.

9 Ibid. 72. Between 1839 and 1922, the office of foreign ministry changed hands for sixty-eight times and thirty-four people served as foreign minister. Mehmed Emin Ali, Mehmed Fuad, and Safvet Pashas served five times in this post. Seven foreign ministers were professional diplomats. Twelve foreign ministers served as grand vizier (*sadrazam*) before or after serving as foreign minister. Sinan Kuneralp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkan ve Ricali, 1839-1922: Prosopografik Rehber* (İstanbul: ISIS, 1999), xvii.

Ministry), and Pertev Efendi who had been serving as Head Clerk (*Reisülküt-tap*) since 1832, was appointed as the first Minister of Foreign Affairs (*Hariciye Naziri*) of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰ Pertev Efendi, an influential reformer, undertook the responsibility for internal reforms, and due to this, the operations of Internal Affairs (*Dahiliye*) and *Hariciye* were realized under the same authority until the end of the nineteenth century.¹¹ Diplomats in the Tanzimat era served in the *Hariciye* and the *Dahiliye* simultaneously; Ahmet Vefik Paşa, for instance, served simultaneously as ambassador to Tehran and as governor of Bursa.¹² Foreign trade was also under the authority of the *Hariciye Nezareti* since a ministry for economic affairs had not been established.¹³

The institutionalization of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry was not late when compared other world examples. As Berridge notes, “it was only during the eighteenth century that a recognizably modern ministry of foreign affairs became [the] general rule in Europe.”¹⁴ Leaving large European powers aside, the Ottoman experience in diplomatic bureaucracy can be considered an early example. The Iranian Foreign Office, for example, lacked continuous cadres, regional departments, and a permanent documentation system even at the turn of twentieth century.¹⁵

Due to its areas of responsibility, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became an integral actor in the Ottoman bureaucracy and in reform efforts, as well.

10 Ibid.

11 Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye (1808-1975)*, (İstanbul: E Yayınları, 1982), 66. In its initial years, the authority of the ministry was incredibly wide. Even the Chamber of Agronomy and Commerce (*Meclis-i Ziraat ve Ticaret*), an advisory body appointed to offer programs in the realms of agriculture, industry, internal trade, and public services, was under the responsibility of the *Hariciye Nezareti* for one year.

12 Ortaylı, “Türk Dışşleri Memuru,” 537. Between 1839 and 1922, 133 people served as ambassador, minister (*elçi*), and charge d'affairs in twenty-two Ottoman diplomatic missions. Forty-two of them professional diplomats. Kuneralp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı...*, xxiv.

13 Shaw and Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye (1808-1975)*, 66.

14 G.R Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, 6. For example, even Britain had to wait for the establishment of her Foreign Office until 1782 while the Department of States in the United States was created in 1789. China, Japan, and Turkey (the Ottoman Empire), argues Berridge, followed this trend initiated by Britain and the United States. Ibid.

15 Ervand Abrahamian, *Modern İran Tarihi* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2009), 13.

The appointment of Mustafa Reşid as the third foreign minister of the Ottoman Empire was a watershed in this regard. Mustafa Reşid (Pasha), according to Soysal, was “the bureaucrat to execute and modernize the Ottoman bureaucracy.”¹⁶ Mustafa Reşid, served as Ambassador to Paris and London, and would even serve as foreign minister (*nazır*) and ambassador simultaneously.¹⁷

The Ministry had a wide range of authority ranging from internal reform laws to the status of non-Muslims and foreigners.¹⁸ Moreover, various legislative issues that had previously been under the authority of head clerk (*divan-ı humayun*) were now under the control of the foreign ministry.¹⁹ In November 1836, the office of the undersecretary (*müsteşarlık*) was formed. This post was maintained until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.²⁰ According to Dikerdem, “the language, namely, French, used in the diplomatic notes and memoranda sent from the Sublime Porte to the foreign representatives were amazingly perfect.”²¹ The initial structure of the ministry was changed by a regulation (*nizamname*) announced in 1873 and by legal regulations in 1908 and 1914.²²

Abdulhamid II's reign (1876-1909), can be defined as a period in late Ottoman history in which “the Sublime Porte was knocked out and all the affairs of the state whether internal or external were managed by the sultan.”²³ The diplomatic bureaucracy was not an exception; the authority of the *Hariciye* was transferred to the sultan in many cases. The Minister of Foreign Affairs in

16 Soysal, “Umur-ı Hariciye Nezaretinin Kurulması (1836),” 73.

17 Ibid.

18 Shaw and Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye (1808-1975)*, 106.

19 Ibid.

20 Soysal, “Umur-ı Hariciye Nezaretinin Kurulması (1836),” 73. Even after the foundation of Republic of Turkey, the Office of the Undersecretary (*müsteşarlık*) was sustained under the title Secretary General (*katib-i umumi*), in line with the French model. The title Secretary General was abolished in 1980. Until this date, this title was one of the genuine features of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Whereas other ministries in Turkey had undersecretaries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs used the title Secretary General.

21 E. Zeynep Güler, ed., *Salon Verir Sokak Alırız* (İstanbul: Yazılıma, 2013), 507.

22 Carter V. Findley, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Bürokratik Reform (1789-1922)* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 2014), 264.

23 Ali Akyıldız, *Osmanlı Bürokrasisi ve Modernleşme* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2012), 165.

Istanbul and diplomats appointed abroad were of limited significance in foreign policy matters since the sultan himself was “managing the foreign relations of the empire by direct communication with the ambassadors accepted to the Palace.”²⁴ Even technical matters were an element of tension between the sultan and his bureaucrats. When, for example, the appointment of a consul caused a problem between the sultan and the Sublime Porte, and the latter opposed the former with regard to this appointment, the sultan’s office warned the Sublime Porte not to make such mistakes.²⁵ Opposition to the preference of the sultan even in the appointment of a consul could be evaluated as a mistake by the sultan’s office, and as Akyıldız states “this was an open, harsh threat since the message warned its respondent not to repeat [the mistake].”²⁶

As a man with limited or no confidence in the Tanzimat bureaucracy, Abdulhamid II “did not elevate men of diplomatic origins to critical political posts and instead, military men were appointed to ambassadorial posts in the 1890s when he was completely determined to establish his supremacy over the bureaucracy.”²⁷ Moreover, loyalty to his reign and unconditional supremacy were the foremost considerations for the sultan while appointing his ambassadors and maintaining their positions. Once an ambassador was appointed to a post and gained the trust of the sultan, he could maintain his position for a long period of time. From the 1890s until his dethronement in 1909, Abdulhamid II “retained ambassadors for terms of fifteen years due to their loyalty to him and most of the ambassadors appointed in the 1890s kept their posts until the Constitutional Revolution of July 23, 1908.”²⁸ In 1908, with the exceptions of those in the embassies in Washington and London, all Ottoman ambassadors had served more than ten years in office.²⁹ Seven of the nine ministers of the time had served more than ten years.³⁰

24 Findley, *Ottoman İmparatorluğu’nda*, 263-264.

25 Ibid., 169.

26 Ibid.

27 Doğan Gürpınar, *Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy...*, 181.

28 Ibid., 182.

29 Hasan Basri Danışman, *Artçı Diplomat* (İstanbul: Arbaya Yayınları, 1998), 28-29.

30 Gürpınar, *Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy...*, 182. A similar trend was also valid for the appointment of foreign ministers. After more than twenty changes in the office of the minister more

On the other hand, Abdulhamid II did not hesitate to broaden the diplomatic network and the cadres of the empire. Between 1871 and 1908, the number of consulates increased, and the increase in personnel was much more dramatic. The number of the people working at the center (Istanbul) of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry in the late 1880s was 467, much higher than the number of people working in the German Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the time.³¹ The number of people working in Ottoman diplomatic missions rose from seventy-six to over one-hundred between 1887-89 and 1908.³² These people were not necessarily appointed as a consequence of increasing workload. For instance, “there were fifty people assigned in the Consultation Department of the Legal Advisors of the Ministry in theory but most of these people were not aware where the Sublime Porte was.”³³ Esat Cemal Paker, who was employed in the Ottoman Hariciye in the late 1890s, depicts the atmosphere of the Ministry as follows,

In 1896, immediately after graduating from the Mekteb-i Sultani, I was sent to the Diplomatic Correspondence (Tahrirat-ı Hariciye) department. ... Back then, acceptance to the profession of Hariciye (diplomacy) was not regulated by law. ... There were hundreds of chiefs (*efendi*) in each department (*kalem*). However, there were few who regularly showed up work. Indeed, it would be impossible to fit these *efendis* in the narrow rooms of departments. The young [officers], who were rarely present, only started work in the afternoon. Among these were ones going to schools of law or language in the morning.³⁴

than twenty times between 1871 and 1885, the ministry was almost under the monopoly of two people between 1885 and 1909. Kürd Said Paşa managed the ministry between 1885 and 1895, while Ahmed Tevfik Paşa served as the foreign minister for the following fourteen years. *Ibid.*

31 *Ibid.*, 268.

32 *Ibid.*, 302-303.

33 *Ibid.*, 268-269.

34 Paker, *Siyasi Tarihimizde Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları*, 11. “1896 yılında Mekteb-i Sultani’yi... bitirir bitirmez, doğruca Tahrirat-ı Hariciye kalemine gönderildim. O zamanlar Hariciye mesleğine kabul edilmek için hiçbir kayıt ve şart mevcut değildi... Her kalemde yüzlerce efendi bulunuyordu. Fakat işe devam edenler pek azdı. Esasen herkes gelse, bu efendileri kalemlerin

Although the over-recruitment in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry was inherent to Abdülhamid II's preferences in state administration, foreign ministries of the large European powers tended to increase their capacities in the same period.³⁵ Findley states that it is reasonable to question whether the Ottomans had satisfactory revenues to meet the financial requirements for such an extensive consular organization.³⁶ As a consequence, when the Unionists took power after the revolution of 1908, the salaries of the officers of the Ottoman diplomatic bureaucracy were considerably curtailed. Indeed, many Ottoman diplomats working abroad already "suffer[ed] from financial problems arising from the financial difficulties the empire was facing."³⁷ The embassies, either, "were not financially supported [by the government] enough to be able to afford their daily works."³⁸

The process beginning with the reestablishment of constitutional order on July 23, 1908, resulted in a purge in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. The cadres of the foreign ministry, along with those of other bureaucratic institutions, had been inflated during the Hamidian era. There were over one thousand people recruited into the Ministry of Finance (*Maliye Nezareti*) and six hundred into the foreign ministry, which necessitated the elimination of these exaggerated numbers of people for the new administrators who inherited a bankrupt empire.³⁹ Apart from the elimination of unnecessary or unskilled personnel, the new administrators also had to ascertain the number of people earning more

dar odalarına sığdırmak mümkün olmazdı. Çok nadir devam eden gençler de, ancak öğleden sonra gelip işlerine başlarlardı. Sabahları bunların içinde ya hukuk ya lisan mektebine gidenler vardı."

35 Gürpınar, *Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy*, 269. The Quai d'Orsay, the French Foreign Ministry, for example, increased its staff from eighty to 170 between 1870 and 1914. By 1921, this number had risen to 600 in just seven years. The Belgian Foreign Ministry followed a similar trend. The number of its ministry's staff increased from ninety-eight to 286 between 1914 and the period immediately after World War I. Steiner, "Foreign Ministries: Old and New," 356.

36 Findley, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Bürokratik Reform*, 303.

37 Gürpınar, *Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy*..., 93.

38 Ibid.

39 Findley, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Bürokratik Reform*, 356.

than one salary.⁴⁰ The reorganization of cadres (*tensikat*) was not only a matter of numbers but also a reform to the system. Findley notes that “bureaucratic reform evolved to the ‘restructuring’ or liquidation of the emerging institutions.”⁴¹ In case of the Ottoman Hariciye, adds Findley, “the new administrators ordered the preparation of reports to reorganize all departments of the ministry.”⁴²

The members of the Hariciye were being evaluated as symbols of the “corrupt and decadent” Hamidian era.⁴³ Unionist deputies of the time openly expressed their dissatisfaction with Ottoman diplomats and questioned their skills.⁴⁴ Gürpınar notes, “the Ottoman Foreign Ministry which mastered the ‘balance of power politics’ was out of fashion in the new world of *Machtpolitik*” since “ageing diplomats who had faith in the traditional European order and inclined towards France and Britain, were alienated and marginalized.”⁴⁵ The Ottoman Empire was a multi-ethnic political entity, and at the turn of the twentieth century, this became one of the most prominent reasons for its dissolution. Widespread ethnic tensions in the empire also impacted the Ottoman diplomatic bureaucracy.⁴⁶ One late Ottoman diplomat, Esat Cemal Paker,

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., 346.

42 Ibid.

43 Gürpınar, *Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy...*, 250.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid. The European balance of power refers to arrangements accepted during the 1815 Vienna Conference. As a consequence of the Napoleonic Wars, the settlements of 1815 also the preservation of the imperial status quo vis-à-vis the nationalist awakening on the continent. As a multiethnic political entity, the Ottoman Empire and its diplomacy were positioned against nationalist challenges and sided with the balance of power politics. *Machtpolitik* (power politics) is a preference which foresees the protection of interests by means of military, political, or economic aggression. On the way to World War I, European powers tilted towards the latter at the expense of the former. This trend was inevitably reflected among Ottoman statesmen. Ibid.

46 Between 1839 and 1922, four non-Muslim Ottomans served as foreign minister. Three of them were Greek and one was Armenian. In the same period, twenty-nine non-Muslims served as ambassador, minister (*elçi*), and charge d'affairs. Eleven of them were Greeks. Kuneralp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı...*, xvii & xxiv.

remarks on the ethnically cosmopolitan structure of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry and the tension that caused.

Correspondence in [our] department was conducted in French. Our director was an Armenian. He had been doing his best to prevent Turks from learning French correspondence language. ... He did not assign us [Turkish officers] any prominent work, and did not want to educate Turkish officers.”⁴⁷

The ethnic tension, or more accurately segregation – at least in the minds of Muslim Ottoman diplomats, – was not only evidenced by the brief portrayal by Paker. Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, a late Ottoman diplomat like Paker, complained in his memoirs that “the most favored posts of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry were always filled with Armenians.”⁴⁸ Abdülhak Hamid, a colleague of Paker within the ministry and a man highly admired by Paker, also noted in his accounts that non-Muslims were predominantly recruited and promoted within the ministry. Hamid addresses one ethnic group as the one that most benefited from the favoring of non-Muslims and one man as the responsible for this phenomenon.

After he [Reşid Pasha] was replaced by [Mehmed Emin] Ali Pasha, Armenians were promoted and the Ministry became filled with Armenians. These Armenians gradually eliminated not only Muslim clerks, but also Armenians who were loyal to the state, and replaced them with Armenians sharing their views. Thus, the Foreign Ministry was dominated by Armenians.⁴⁹

47 “Tahriratı Hariciye Kalemi’nde, yazışmalar Fransızca yapılmıştı. Müdürümüz bir Ermeniydi, Türklerin Fransızca resmi yazışma dilini öğrenmelerine engel olmak için elinden geleni yapardı. Bize ehemmiyetli hiçbir iş havale etmez, Türk memur yetiştirmek istemezdi.” Paker, *Siyasi Tarihimizde Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları*, 12.

48 Söylemezoğlu, *Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene, 1892-1922: Mutlakiyet, Meşrutiyet ve Millî Mücadele Yıllarında Şahidi veya Âmil Olduğum Hâdiselere Ait Vesikalar*, 55.

49 Gürpınar, *Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy*..., 114.

Confirming Hamid, Cevdet Paşa accused Ali Pasha of converting the ministry into a place besieged by Armenians.⁵⁰ Moreover, Hamid, who peculiarly insists on the dominance of Armenian diplomats within the ministry, also describes the presence of Armenians within the higher ranks of the diplomatic bureaucracy. He asks,

why were all the undersecretaries of the foreign ministers [or prime ministers] Armenians...? For example, Midhat Pasha had one Odyan Efendi, Mahmud Nedim Pasha had one Artin Dadyan Efendi, Safvet Pasha had one Serkis Hamamciyan Efendi, and Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha had one Noradonkyan Efendi.⁵¹

Nevertheless, the predominant presence of Armenian diplomats within the various ranks of the Ottoman diplomatic bureaucracy declined. A comparison of available data from 1889 and 1902 indicates not a radical but a steady decline in the number of Armenians in the Ministry.⁵² This stemmed from the political conditions of the 1890s.⁵³

The decline of the Armenian presence continued. The Ottoman yearbook of 1906 reveals that the number of non-Muslims recruited into the Ottoman bureaucracy totaled forty, nearly half the average during the Tanzimat era.⁵⁴ In 1912, a great proportion of the staffs of Ottoman diplomatic missions were Muslims; moreover, in 1918, only seven of the fifty-two foreign ministry

50 Findley, *Osmانlı İmparatorluğu'nda...*, 239.

51 Gürpınar, *Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy...*, 114.

52 Ibid., 115.

53 Just as the Greek uprising of 1821 led to the reorganization of the Translation Bureau (*Tercüme Odası*), the Sasun revolt and the mass massacres that followed led the Ottoman government to diminish the role of Armenians in the whole of the bureaucracy and in the Hariciye, as well. However, this was not a total purge. The empire's foreign minister during the First Balkan War in 1912, a late date, was Armenian. Ibid.

54 Ibid. However, Armenians preserved their high positions in the Ottoman bureaucracy until the last days of the Ottoman Empire. Ohannes Kuyumcuyan retained his position as under-secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1912, Hrant Abro continued to serve as its legal counselor, an office of critical significance. Ibid.

officers assigned in Istanbul were non-Muslims.⁵⁵ It was not only an issue of numbers. Non-Muslims lost their supremacy within the ministry “because non-Muslims were no longer being promoted to a prominent position.”⁵⁶

Why did the Ottoman state elite prefer the presence of non-Muslims within the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs? First, the nature of diplomacy as a profession required merits that were relatively more widespread among the non-Muslim elements of the Ottoman Empire than the Muslim ones. All the non-Muslims in the bureaucracy were able to speak French, while Muslim officers were categorized as “the ones who speak” or “who do not speak” French.⁵⁷ Findley, from this point forth, concludes that main motive behind the recruitment of these people was the pro-Western cultural orientations of non-Muslim elements.⁵⁸

The second motive stemmed from an old custom of the Ottoman Empire. Non-Muslims had constructed a strong interrelationship within the state apparatus since the early days of the Ottoman Empire. Changing conditions during the Tanzimat era somewhat formalized relations between the state and non-Muslim elements. Non-Muslims had the opportunity to be a part of the bureaucracy while still preserving their religious faith. Until the Tanzimat era, Ottoman statesmen conducted relations with notable non-Muslim families in line with the needs of the empire and the capabilities of those families. The Armenian moneychanger (*sarraf*) families, for example, were the main financiers of the empire. When non-Muslims were recruited into the state bureaucracy, the first to be preferred for the Ottoman *Hariciye* were the members of notable non-Muslim families with which the empire was already in cooperation.⁵⁹ Decades after the ascension of Armenians to the higher ranks of

55 Ibid., 16.

56 Ibid.

57 Findley, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda...*, 237.

58 Ibid.

59 Gürpınar, *Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy...*, 107. Two prominent Armenians in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in this regard, were both descendants of palace subcontractors and indirect servants of the palace. Gabriel Noradonkyan, the long-time legal counselor of the ministry, was the son of Krikor Noradonkyan, the chief supplier of bread to the military, Artin Dadyan,

diplomatic bureaucracy, relations with Greek Phanariot families were also formalized. As Findley notes, some non-Muslims “could have enjoyed the privilege of being the representative of the Ottoman Empire in the Western states.”⁶⁰ Moreover, incorporation within the state was also remarkably beneficial for non-Muslim Ottoman bureaucrats in terms of establishing or consolidating their influence within their own communities.⁶¹

Nineteenth-century Ottoman diplomatic staffs, like the demographic profile of the empire, comprised of different ethnic identities. Findley’s research on the nineteenth-century Ottoman Hariciye Nezareti reveals that significant ethnic minorities were not represented in proportion to their populations in the Ottoman Hariciye.⁶² The Ottoman Foreign ministry, in general, did not represent Ottoman society proportionally, and according to Findley, this was because of the limited cadre of the Ministry and the fact that recruitment of the officers of the Hariciye was limited to inhabitants of Istanbul.⁶³ However, adds Findley, other institutions of the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire did not represent ethnic minorities proportionally, either; moreover, he claims that minorities were represented less in other state institutions than in the foreign ministry.⁶⁴ Relatively low representation of minorities in the foreign ministry, states Findley, might have been because of the reluctance of the Ottoman state elite who had not trusted the non-Muslims with the defense of the Islamic state.⁶⁵ Non-Muslim Ottoman diplomats, according to Ortaylı, were “Ottomans,” implying that non-Muslim officers of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry prioritized the interests of their state over the nationalist aspirations of

who served as undersecretary of the ministry, came from a family of fireworks suppliers (*ba-rutçubaşı*) to the palace.

60 Findley, *Osmalı Bürokrasisinde Reform*, 238.

61 Gürpınar, 113. For example, Azaryan, who served as undersecretary of the Hariciye and later as a member of the Ottoman Senate (*Meclis-i Ayan*), “assumed the position of chairman of Armenian secular assembly in 1909 and became also the chairman of the Armenian Patriarchy’s secular assembly.” Ibid.

62 Findley, *Osmalı Bürokrasisinde Reform*, 116.

63 Ibid., 117.

64 Ibid., 119.

65 Ibid.

the ethnic or religious minorities to which they belonged.⁶⁶ Here, these contrasting realities do not exclude each other. On one hand, as the numbers in Findley's study reveal, non-Muslim elements were not as overrepresented as Paker, Abdülhak Hamid, and Söylemezoglu complained in their accounts. On the other hand, non-Muslims were in many cases represented in the higher ranks of the Ottoman diplomatic bureaucracy which aroused criticism from Muslim officers in the ministry. Paker's, Söylemezoglu's, and Abdülhak Hamid's critical stances towards their non-Muslim seniors, to some extent reveal that ethnic tensions in the late Ottoman Empire were reflected within the Ottoman diplomatic bureaucracy.

§ 3.2 Republican Period

3.2.1 *A “Revolutionary” Foreign Ministry (1920-1922)*

Between 1920 and 1922, there were two foreign ministries in Turkey. The first was the Ottoman Hariciye in Istanbul, and a second was established in Ankara. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) was founded on May 2, 1920, by Decree No. 3 of the first government in Ankara.⁶⁷ The first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ankara government, Bekir Sami (Kunduh), was one of the eleven members⁶⁸ of the government and

66 Ortaylı, “Türk Dışişleri Memuru,” 537.

67 *TBMM Documents Journal (Tutanak Dergisi)*, 1st Term Records, 10th Session, May 3, 1920. accessed November 17, 2013, available from <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak-lar/TUTANAK/TBMM/doi/coo1/tbmm01001010.pdf>.

68 The first undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara was Suat (Davaz) Bey. Ahmet Muhtar (Mollaoglu) Bey, Yusuf Kemal (Tengirsek) Bey, and Yusuf Hikmet (Bayur) Bey were the other founding figures of the ministry. The ministry was established with a limited cadre in terms of both quality and quantity. However, this was only valid for low- and mid-ranking officers. Most of the aforementioned founding figures had a background in the diplomatic profession. Mehmet Münir (Ertegün) Bey, who was the first legal counselor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara, was also the first Muslim legal counselor to the Ottoman Hariciye in 1913. Recruited on December 9, 1920 by the foreign ministry in Ankara, Mehmet Münir first served as legal adviser to the Turkish mission at the London Conference of February-March 1921. Later on, during the Lausanne Peace Conference in 1922-1923, his

would serve until a “poor performance” at the April 1921 London Conference.⁶⁹

The national foreign ministry of the nationalist cabinet was revolutionary in nature. It was a wartime institution and had urgent responsibilities. In the words of Şimşir, “first, artillery; and only then diplomats spoke in the Turkish national struggle.”⁷⁰ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Hariciye Vekaleti*) began

language skills were highly utilised and appreciated by the Turkish delegation, most notably by İsmet (İnönü) Pasha. After serving successfully in Lausanne, he was appointed as Chief Legal Adviser by the Ankara government in 1924. Şimşir, “Atatürk’ün Elçileri Üzerine,” 539-547.

69 Hüner Tuncer, *Atatürk’ün Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2008), 176. A delegation under the leadership of Bekir Sami Bey, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the first national government, visited Moscow on July 19, 1920, after a two-month long journey. Throughout republican history, Bekir Sami was the minister of foreign affairs to have physically been least number of days in his office in Ankara. He and his delegation to Moscow could only have returned Ankara by January 31, 1921, and he paid a visit to London for a conference after just a one-week-long stay in the capital of the TBMM. Bekir Sami served as Minister between May 3, 1920, and May 8, 1921. Throughout this one-year five-day long term, he stayed in Ankara just twenty-seven days due to long, extensive diplomatic missions to Moscow and then London. The outcome of Bekir Sami’s journeys to Moscow and London far from satisfied the expectations of the nationalist government in Ankara. He returned from his tiring journey to Moscow without coming to an agreement with the Soviet Union. Moreover, agreements he signed with the United Kingdom, France, and Italy in the context of the London Conference without consulting the government in Ankara led to his “veiled dismissal.” Bilal Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996), 39. He resigned in May 1921 upon the demand of Mustafa Kemal and was replaced by Yusuf Kemal (Tengirsek) Bey who reached an agreement with the Soviets on March 1921, again after a long, tiring diplomatic journey. *Ibid.*

70 *Ibid.*, 60. Just as the first wars of 1920 and early 1921 “persuaded” the Soviets to come to terms with TBMM governments, the Sakarya War in October 1921 led the French to sign the Ankara Agreement with the nationalist government in Ankara. The Lausanne Treaty in July 1923, in fact, was a direct outcome of the elimination of the Greek military from Anatolia after the Turkish Grand Offensive of August 1922. Demirci argues that the [Lausanne] Peace Conference was nothing but the continuation of the national struggle in the diplomatic field until the National Oath (*Misak-ı Milli*) was accepted by Allied powers. Turkish diplomacy in this conference, adds Demirci, was relied on military successes and the power to negotiate was based on these achievements. Sevtap Demirci, *Belgelerle Lozan: Taktik, Stratejik, Diplomatik Mücadele (1922-1923)* (İstanbul: Alfa, 2013), 77.

its operations with limited capabilities. The first home of the foreign ministry, along with the other ministries of TBMM governments, was the building of the Ankara Provincial Authority. There were only three officers in the ministry on the top floor of the building.⁷¹ Yet the character of the Ministry and increasing international contacts necessitated a new building. The new home was the two floors of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (*Düyun-u Umumiye*) building, and as time passed and the number of officers increased, the whole building was given to the foreign ministry.⁷²

The young but busy foreign ministry lacked not only physical comfort. Diplomatic procedures were executed with insufficient human resources. The rumor that any person coming from Ankara railway station wearing two piece suit would be appointed as a diplomat was a consequence of these conditions.⁷³ Dikerdem notes that in those days, the ministry sent barkers to the streets of Ankara to recruit officers.⁷⁴ Dikerdem, in order to illustrate the weakness of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy in this period, states that İsmet İnönü “could only find one secretary in the foreign ministry and locked him in his hotel room to type the final draft of the Lausanne Treaty in twenty-four hours.”⁷⁵ The foreign ministry of the TBMM, in Dikerdem’s words, “recruited officers with no regard to their educational background or without making tiny distinctions.”⁷⁶

The first resident diplomatic mission was opened in the Soviet Union and Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), then Turkey’s commander-in-chief on the Western front,

71 Temel İskit, *Diplomasi: Tarihi, Teorisi, Uygulaması ve Kurumları* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), 354.

72 Ibid., 355.

73 This claim, according to Girgin, was true to an extent. In the first years of the foreign ministry, any individuals with any degree of foreign language skills were accepted into the ministry without taking their profession into consideration. Moreover, some of the Sublime Porte (*Bab-i Ali*) bureaucrats joined the ministry during the National Struggle years. Kemal Girgin, *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi Hariciye Tarihimiz: Teşkilat ve Protokol* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1994), 118.

74 Güler, *Salon Verir...*, 507.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

was appointed as Turkey's ambassador to the Soviet Union.⁷⁷ Cebesoy's notes on his appointment to Moscow reveals the frustration of the first generation of diplomats of the emerging National Struggle.

I was already on leave from command of the Western front and was appointed to Moscow as ambassador on November 21, 1920. A new, political life was beginning for me away from the fronts, the sound of guns, and the noises of artillery. I would adapt to this life of necessity and struggle to manage this heavy burden.⁷⁸

The decision to appoint Ali Fuat Pasha, Mustafa Kemal Pasha notes in *Nutuk*, was beyond a simple diplomatic assignment. Ali Fuat Pasha was the commander-in-chief of the TBMM army in the Western front, and Mustafa Kemal was not pleased with him due to either military or political concerns. In his words “Ali Fuat Pasha was appointed to Moscow because the establishment of a diplomatic mission in the Soviet Union had to be taken into consideration.”⁷⁹

Ali Fuat Pasha departed from Ankara on his way to Moscow on November 21, 1920. As said above, the ministry was established with a limited number of people. The cadre of the first diplomatic mission to Moscow, however, was relatively extensive. The group that moved from Ankara to Moscow consisted of eight officers of the embassy, four officers of the military attaché's office, and

77 Tuncer, *Atatürk'in Dış Politikası*, 176.

78 “Garp cephesi kumandanlığından yeni ayrılmış, 21 Kasım 1920'de Moskova Büyükelçiliği'ne tayin edildim. Benim için artık cepheden, silah seslerinden ve top gürültülerinden uzakta yeni bir hayat başlıyordu. İster istemez bu hayatı intibak edecek, yüklendiğim ağır ve mesuliyetli vazifeyi başarmağa çalışacaktım. The words “of necessity” in this quote implicates that this duty was an obligation for Ali Fuat Paşa. One of his letters to Mustafa Kemal supported this perception. He stated that “I said you can be sure that I will not avoid any sacrifice if this is also a national service.” (Madem ki bu da bir vatan vazifesidir, hiçbir fedakarlıktan kaçmayacağımı emin olabilirsiniz.) Ibid. Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Temel Yayıncılık), 101.

79 Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), *Nutuk*, (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1934), 256. Anyway, Mustafa Kemal paid special attention to prevent especially Ali Fuat himself from evaluating that his appointment to Moscow as a veiled exile. In this regard, he was welcomed in Ankara by Mustafa Kemal, many ministers in the cabinet, and some deputies of the TBMM making his way to Moscow. Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 56 & 63.

the delegation of representatives: Bekir Sami (Kunduh) to North Caucasia, Memduh Şevket (Esendal) to Azerbaijan, and Colonel Kazım (Dirik) to Tbilisi.⁸⁰

Cebesoy's letter of credence, moreover, presented signals of rupture from the customs of Ottoman diplomacy. Contrary to letters of credence in the Ottoman diplomatic tradition, which were written in a redundant style, Cebesoy's credential was quite simple. The letter included just one sentence: "He is the ambassador appointed to your country by Mustafa Kemal, the President of the Turkish Grand National Assembly."⁸¹

In addition to Moscow, new representations were opened in Baku, Rome, and Tbilisi. None of the chiefs of these missions had had diplomatic careers. They were either politicians or high-ranking military officers.⁸² All, in this regard, were pioneers of a tradition of non-professional ambassadors in early republican Turkey. These diplomatic missions were not called embassies by Ankara since the National Assembly was in state of war with the western states.⁸³

Among the aforementioned representations, the diplomatic mission to Baku was of special significance. First, despite the fact that the first embassy was established in Moscow, the first diplomatic mission of the government in Ankara was appointed to Baku, then capital of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.⁸⁴ Memduh Şevket (Esendal) had been appointed as Turkey's representative (*mümessil*) to Baku.⁸⁵ By the time of his appointment, a socialist republic had already been established in Azerbaijan under the leadership of Nariman Narimanov.⁸⁶ Kazım Karabekir Pasha, then commander-in-chief of

80 Ibid., 56-57.

81 Tuncer, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politikası*, 177.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid., 178.

84 Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 78.

85 Ibid.

86 Nariman Narimanov was the first head of the state and government of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Known for his generous, sincere support for the Turkish National Struggle, he acted as a catalyst for Soviet contributions to the Ankara government. Ulviyye Aliyeva, *Azerbaycan ve Atatürk* (MA Thesis, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 2015), 56.

the armies of the TBMM government on the Eastern front, requested that Ankara appoint a representative to Baku immediately.⁸⁷ Furthermore, in addition to requesting an immediate appointment, Kazım Karabekir pointed out an additional concern: “The one to be appointed should not belong to a noble or bourgeoisie family in order that he be accepted by the socialist administrators of Azerbaijan.”⁸⁸ Memduh Şevket Bey was chosen as the nationalist government’s representative to Baku for this reason.⁸⁹

The TBMM government faced problems other than just appointing the right representative to the right place. The legacy of the Ottoman Hariciye, in terms of both personnel and institutional principles, could rarely be utilized by the TBMM government in the 1920-22 period.⁹⁰ This situation put pressure

87 Ibid. 70.

88 Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 70-71. Esenç, upon his appointment to Baku, also mentions the lack of necessary diplomatic cadres in the early years of TBMM governments. He was appointed as the “diplomatic representative of the government in Ankara” because, in his words, “there were no men in those days.” Ibid. Esenç also states that he was by no means ready for the profession of diplomacy. Indeed, a serious burden awaited Memduh Şevket in Baku. He had to deal with the problems of Turkish prisoners of war in Baku; furthermore, he was responsible not only for relations with Azerbaijan but for the whole region between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Memduh Şevket also reported the Latin alphabet initiatives of the Azerbaijan government to Ankara which was useful for a similar reform that would be realized in republican Turkey six years later. This initiative, to some extent, was similar to those of nineteenth-century Ottoman ambassadors whose observations during their terms in Europe contributed to reform processes within the Ottoman Empire. His relative successes in Baku both broadened the cadre spared for the Baku representation and led Ankara to establish a representation in Tbilisi. Memduh Şevket, who, in his own words, “was not ready for the profession of diplomacy,” continued his diplomatic career with interruptions. He served as Turkey’s ambassador to Tehran (1925-1926) and Kabul (1933-1941) during the early republican period. Ibid.

89 Ibid., 82.

90 As a striking example, Ahmet Muhtar (Mollaoglu) Bey, who entered Ottoman diplomatic service in 1890 and served as Ottoman ambassador to Athens (1911-1913), was not only appointed as representative to Tbilisi and ambassador to Moscow, but also served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the national struggle years. Ahmet Muhtar, after the declaration of the republic, was appointed to Washington in 1925, as republican Turkey’s first ambassador to the United States. Ibid., 119.

on the TBMM government with regards to find required skilled personnel and to establish an organizational structure.

As said earlier, the diplomatic cadres were limited and numerous people without a diplomatic background served as diplomats either in Ankara or in the diplomatic missions of the TBMM government. This led the Ankara government to appoint representatives or ambassadors among the deputies of the TBMM. The ordinance of the TBMM prohibited deputies from simultaneously serving as civil servants. The exceptions to this regulation were for commanders of armies and army corps and diplomatic representatives, ambassadors (*sefirlilik*). Ahmed Muhtar (Mollaoglu) and Ahmet Ferit (Tek) were appointed to Tbilisi and Paris respectively, upon the decision of the TBMM.⁹¹ These two deputies were considered to be on leave in order to serve their diplomatic mission.⁹² This formula was used even after the declaration of the republic in 1923, and various army commanders and diplomats served as deputies in the TBMM until a legal regulation in 1927 altogether prohibited deputies from being engaged in civil service simultaneous with their duty in the TBMM.⁹³

91 Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 111. Thanks to this formulation, the Ankara government found a way to overcome the personnel shortage, but was difficult for the TBMM to conclude whether the government (*İcra Vekilleri Heyeti*) or the national assembly should have the authority to permit deputies to serve as diplomatic representatives. *Ibid.*

92 *Ibid.*

93 This regulation was a part of the first organizational law of the foreign ministry which was accepted in 1927. See “Hariciye Vekaleti Memurin Kanunu,” (Foreign Ministry Civil Servants Law), *Kanunum.net* Website, accessed November 17, 2014, available from http://www.kanunum.com/Kanun/1154/HARICIYE-VEKALETI-MEMURIN-KANUNU_xxciid13861. There were also those who served in two branches of the bureaucracy simultaneously. Kemalettin Sami Pasha resigned from the TBMM in August 1924 when he was appointed as Turkey’s ambassador to Berlin. Yet, Kemalettin Sami continued his military career and even played a role in the suppression of the Şeyh Said Revolt in 1925. In August 1926 he was promoted to the rank of general (*Ferik*) and retired from military service in September 1928. He continued to serve as ambassador to Berlin until his death on April 15, 1934. Muhittin (Akyüz) Pasha, while still a member of the Turkish army, served as Turkey’s ambassador to Tehran and Cairo and retired from the army on September 24, 1928. Mete Tunçay,

3.2.2 *The Republican Foreign Ministry as a Fledgling National Security Organization (1922-1939)*

In his statements on the reciprocity principle in diplomatic relations, Rana notes that “the presence of foreign embassies is seen by developing states ... as a symbol of their international status.”⁹⁴ Early republican Turkey experienced a unique, indeed radical form of this situation. When the sultanate was abolished on November 1, 1922, the government in Ankara announced that “all the diplomatic organization of the Istanbul government is abolished.”⁹⁵ This was a significant decision since a great proportion of senior Ottoman diplomats, unlike most military men, “preferred the comfort of Istanbul to the uncertainties of Ankara” and stayed in the Ottoman capital.⁹⁶ Hence, the announcement inevitably influenced the professional careers of numerous Ottoman diplomats. On his way to the Lausanne Conference in November 1922, İsmet Paşa, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, decided that Ottoman missions in West and Northern Europe would be subordinate to the Paris representation of the TBMM; Ottoman missions in Central and Eastern Europe (with the exception of the embassy in Moscow, since there was already a mission) would be subordinate to the Rome representation of the TBMM.⁹⁷ In this

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 2009), 122.

94 Rana, *The Contemporary Embassy...*, 110. For a detailed analysis on the relationship between hosting foreign representations and international status, see J. David Singer and Melvin Small, “The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System: 1815-1940,” *World Politics* 18, no. 2 (1966): 236-282.

95 Tuncer, *Atatürk’ün Dış Politikası*, 178. Ottoman diplomats were not so keen to leave Istanbul during the national struggle years. Among the 184 Ottoman Foreign Service officers, notes Harris, only thirty-nine transferred to the republican foreign ministry before November 1, 1922. Harris, *Atatürk’s Diplomats...*, 24. Moreover, the dissolution of Ottoman diplomacy was a fait accompli due to technical and financial considerations. “On August 15, 1922, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry had already instructed all its European posts because of financial difficulties, the top ranking official in each country would be put on enforced leave in a year.” *Ibid.*, 79.

96 Salahi Ramadan Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy (1918-1923)* (London: Sage Publications, 1975), 37.

97 Tuncer, *Atatürk’ün Dış Politikası*, 179. The decision was made in Paris. When Foreign Minister İsmet Pasha (İnönü) arrived Lausanne, it was announced that the conference was delayed for

regard, Ottoman ambassadors were not dismissed but they were subordinated to officers who were once their juniors.⁹⁸ Even so, these diplomats were lucky, because they could continue working as diplomats. Some Ottoman ambassadors, however, could not maintain their diplomatic career in the republican period.⁹⁹

The subordination of Ottoman embassies to the TBMM's representation in Paris was completed in two weeks.¹⁰⁰ This process also helped "the Ankara government both to monitor the actions of former Ottoman diplomatic missions and diplomats and to record the remaining estates and personnel of Ottoman Empire abroad."¹⁰¹ The TBMM government now had the opportunity

one week. Instead of returning to Ankara or staying in Lausanne, İsmet went to Paris for separate talks with his French counterparts. İsmet Pasha then declared this decision to Ahmed Ferid Bey, then the TBMM's representative in Paris. Although not with the title of ambassador, Ahmed Ferid was already overtaking enormous responsibilities as the representative to Paris. İsmet Pasha's decision to subordinate Ottoman embassies in Western Europe to his authority made Ahmed Ferid one of the most influential diplomats of his time. *Ibid.*

98 *Ibid.*, 179.

99 Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu was an Ottoman ambassador known for his open support of the TBMM government. Despite this support and his visit to Mudanya during the armistice talks in 1922, Söylemezoğlu was not permitted to continue his diplomatic career under the auspices of the new nationalist administration. In his memoirs, Söylemezoğlu links his suspension to "the gossip of some jealous and immoral people who labeled him pro-Sultan and prevented him from arranging a meeting with Mustafa Kemal." Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, *Başımıza Gelenler: Yakin Bir Mazinin Hatıraları Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya (1918-1922)* (İstanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi, 1939), 303.

100 Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 170.

101 *Ibid.* Monitoring the actions of the remnants of Ottoman the dynasty and bureaucracy was a considerable concern for the ruling elite of Republican Turkey. Suat (Davaz) Bey, the first undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was appointed as Turkey's representative to Rome on June 21, 1923. One of of Suat Bey's first tasks was to have Mehmed VI, who had fled abroad on November 17, 1922 on a British dreadnought (the Malaya), surveilled by his officers. Indeed, the Ankara government had also appointed Suat Bey's predecessor, Celalettin Arif Bey, to monitor the actions of Mehmed VI (Vahdeddin). Celalettin Arif Bey had hired an Italian detective to watch Mehmed VI. Measures taken during Suat Bey's term in Rome were stricter. The resignation of his predecessor was probably due to the need for more committed monitoring. PMRA, 7.22.01. June 21, 1923. In the last days of 1923, the Ankara government inaugurated a vice consulate in Genoa to gather information about the actions of Mehmed

to utilize all the means of Ottoman diplomacy, and in this manner, some Ottoman diplomats were recruited into the republican diplomatic bureaucracy whereas others were eliminated.

The diplomats of early republican Turkey had to deal with numerous tasks that were in most cases directly related to the domestic political conjuncture. Suat (Davaz) Bey, Turkey's ambassador to Rome between August 1923 and April 1932, spent considerable working hours on the statues of Mustafa Kemal that would be erected throughout Turkey in the 1920s and 30s.¹⁰² Mehmet Münir (Ertegün) Bey, during his term in Paris as ambassador between 1930 and 1932, was tasked to pursue book purchasing orders of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who was in a “reading campaign.”¹⁰³ Through this duty, Harris notes, Münir “played a supportive role in the effort to portray Turkey as an important source of world culture and in the language and educational reform that were associated with this effort.”¹⁰⁴ Münir was a devout proponent of nationalist “grand theories” of the time such as the Sun Language Theory (*Güneş Dil Teorisi*), and the Turkish History Thesis (*Türk Tarih Tezi*).¹⁰⁵ During his

VI. Fuat İzzet Bey, the head of the consular mission in Genoa, would have been a subordinate of Suat Bey and continued in his post until July 1926. This illustrates that the republican elite was sensitive enough to the actions of the last sultan and his family to spare the personnel of one or even two diplomatic and consular missions to follow the daily habits of these remnants of the Ottoman dynasty. Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 206.

102 Ibid., 209-212.

103 Ibid., 300.

104 Harris, “Cementing Turkish-American Relations: The Ambassadorship of (Mehmet) Münir Ertegün (1934 1944),” in *Studies in Atatürk's Turkey*, eds. George S. Harris and Nur Bilge Criss (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 80.

105 The Sun Language Theory was a pseudoscientific linguistic hypothesis developed in the early republican Turkey during the 1930s. The theory proposed that all human languages were descendants of the Turkic language. The Turkish History Thesis similarly argued that the Turks were the ancestors of all brachycephalic peoples including the Indo-Europeans, whose origins date back to Central Asia. “the Turkish race had created civilizations in all lands, to which the Turks had migrated. Consequently, the contemporary Turks were the inheritors of the glories of ancient Sumerians, Egyptians, and Greeks, among others.” Soner Çağaptay, “Race, Assimilation and Kemalism: Turkish Nationalism and the Minorities in the 1930s,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 3 (2004), 88.

ambassadorship in Washington, Mehmet Münir (Ertegün) was also accredited to Mexico. In his three-week-long trip to Mexico City, the capital of Mexico, Mehmet Münir focused on Mayan place names in order to find similarities with Turkish, which, as Harris notes, was an effort “to give support to the [Sun Language] theory that Atatürk was then investigating to the effect that Turkish was the mother language of the world.”¹⁰⁶ The common characteristic of the services of Suat Bey and Münir Bey was the personality of Mustafa Kemal. Along with civil reforms, progress in terms of military capability was on the agenda of the young Turkish Republic and also preoccupied the work agenda of Turkish diplomats. Especially Turkish diplomats in industrialized countries were responsible for “procur [ing military equipment] where they could be obtained at minimal cost.”¹⁰⁷

Perhaps one of the most interesting missions for a Turkish diplomat during the early republican period was realized by Mehmet Enis (Akaygen) during his years as minister (*elçi*) in Athens. While in charge in Athens between 1929 and 1934 as its mission chief, Mehmet Enis played a prominent role in improving Turco-Greek relations. Before his appointment to Greece as a minister, the two governments had almost frozen their relations. The ambassadors had mutually withdrawn, and mostly due to the chaotic political atmosphere in Greece, the two sides were on the verge of declaring war over unsettled disputes.¹⁰⁸ The Mustafa Kemal-Venizelos rapprochement improved Turco-Greek relations in the 1930s, and Mehmet Enis Bey was the catalyst. After a while, Akaygen was appointed as the Turkish ambassador to Tehran. His popularity among the Greek government and the public was so strong that the Greek government offered him also to deal with the affairs of the Greek population in Iran since no diplomatic missions of Greece were assigned in this

106 Harris, "Cementing Turkish-American Relations: The Ambassadorship of (Mehmet) Münir Ertegün (1934 1944)," 182.

107 Harris, "Repairing Turkish-American Relations After the First World War: Ahmet Muhtar in Washington," in *Studies in Atatürk's Turkey*, eds. George S. Harris and Nur Bilge Criss (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 164.

108 Damla Demirözü, *Savaştan Barışa Giden Yol: Atatürk-Venizelos Dönemi Türkiye-Yunanistan İlişkileri* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007), 58.

country.¹⁰⁹ This uncommon diplomatic courtesy clearly illustrates the confidence that Akaygen earned in the eyes of the Greek government.¹¹⁰ Similarly, Mehmet Münir Ertegün, during his ambassadorship in Washington (1934-44), undertook “charge of Iranian interests between 1936 and 1938, when the [Iranian] Shah ordered his legation closed and recalled his envoy.”¹¹¹ Greece and Iran, countries known for their rivalry against Turkey, deputized Turkish diplomats for their representation. This situation not only reveals the enhanced relations that the Turkish Republic had with its neighbors but clarifies the degree of the success of early republican diplomacy.

The adoption of the Latin alphabet on November 1, 1928, was among the most prominent early republican reforms that was experienced not only in Anatolia but also in countries where ethnic Turks were living as minorities. Monitoring and promoting this transformation was a primary objective for Turkish diplomats, too. During his term in Sofia as ambassador (1926-1930), Hüsrev (Gerede) Bey dealt with the accommodation of Turks in Bulgaria to Latin alphabet.¹¹² After the first Turkish National Congress was held in Bulgaria under the auspices of Hüsrev Bey, Bulgarian Turks adopted the Latin alphabet instead of Arabic letters.¹¹³ The early republican administration paid considerable attention to preventing Turks living outside the borders of early

109 Enis Tulça, *Enis Bey: Atatürk, Venizelos ve Bir Diplomat* (İstanbul: Simurg, 2003), 54.

110 This was indeed an infrequently practiced diplomatic custom. Abram I. Elkus, the last American ambassador to the Ottoman Empire between 1916 and 1917, is known to have “transferred all business with Americans to the Swedish [ambassador] in Istanbul before his departure.” Nur Bilge Criss, “By Shades of Diplomatic Recognition: American Encounters with Turkey,” in *Studies in Atatürk’s Turkey: The American Dimension*, eds. S. Harris and Nur Bilge Criss, (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 104. The case of Mehmet Enis is interesting due to the hostile relations between Turkey and Greece.

111 Harris, Cementing Turkish-American Relations: The Ambassadorship of (Mehmet) Münir Ertegün (1934-1944),” 187.

112 Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 336.

113 Ibid. The adoption of the Latin alphabet among Bulgarian Turks was not easy. The Turks living in Turkey’s northwestern neighbor were divided on the issue of whether to adopt the Latin alphabet or continuing using Arabic letters. Şimşir notes that Hüsrev Bey clearly sided with the pro-Latin alphabet group, and his support was influential for the adoption of the Latin alphabet among Turks in Bulgaria. Ibid.

republican Turkey from being influenced by political opponents of the new regime who were in exile.¹¹⁴

The political agenda of early republican Turkey was also a significant concern and an area of responsibility for early republican diplomats. Major political opponents of the period, who went to exile due to inner political disputes, were strictly monitored by Turkish diplomats assigned to the cities where these people were living. The typical example of this was the case of Mehmet Rauf (Orbay) who had to live abroad after the legal and political consequences of trials in 1926.¹¹⁵ Rauf's visit to India from the United Kingdom was reported to Ankara by Turkey's embassy in Baghdad.¹¹⁶ Koçak notes that the early republican regime perceived Rauf's journey as a matter concerning the caliphate.¹¹⁷ Fear about the revitalization of the caliphate, especially under British patronage, was a major concern for the republican elite and was thus a matter of investigation by Turkish diplomatic missions. Turkey's consulate in Jerusalem, for instance, reported to the foreign ministry that "a caliphate conference in Hyderabad had not and would not convene."¹¹⁸ Similarly, during the 1930s, Turkish diplomats closely monitored the Far East, most notably the Japanese Empire, since Abdulkерим Efendi, the grandson of Abdulhamid II, was actively trying to establish an Islamic state in Xinjiang (China) with the support

114 Cemil Koçak, *Tek Parti Döneminde Muhalif Sesler* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2011), 121-122. The Turkish consulate in Komotini, for example, alarmed prime ministry about the actions of the 150s (*150'lükler*) in a report that also illustrated that early republican Turkey was by no means reluctant to provide financial support to proponents of her secularist position vis-à-vis the influences of the regime's opponents. *Ibid.*

115 On June 14, 1926, an assassination attempt against Mustafa Kemal was prevented. The plot was claimed to have involved former ministers, deputies, and governors. The Courts of Independence (*İstiklal Mahkemeleri*) were formed in Izmir and Ankara to unearth the plot. Rauf Bey was among the alleged perpetrators. During the trials, he fled to Europe to avoid possible execution. Tuncay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, 167-169.

116 Koçak, *Tek Parti Döneminde Muhalif Sesler*, 23.

117 *Ibid.*

118 *Ibid.*, 26.

of Japanese army.¹¹⁹ Due to the fact that there were anti-Kemalist dissidents among the supporters of Abdulkерим, Turkish diplomats monitored the region carefully.¹²⁰

Apart from monitoring of members of the Ottoman dynasty, major political opponents, and critical issues such as the caliphate, relatively low-profile potential opponents of the new regime were also followed by Turkish diplomatic missions. Some of the 150 personae non gratae (*150'likler*) were also closely watched by Turkish diplomatic and consular missions in the cities and countries in which they resided in exile. Refi Cevat (Ulunay), a prominent journalist of World War I and afterwards, was included in the “150’likler” list due to his opposition to the National Struggle and his pro-British views. He was closely monitored by the Turkish embassy in Paris during his years in exile.¹²¹ Similarly, Yeşilzade Aziz Nuri, who was appointed as the governor of Bursa during the Greek invasion of the city, was closely watched by Turkey’s embassy in Athens.¹²²

During the early republican period, not only did individuals and groups constitute a threat to the political power of Mustafa Kemal, but the founder of the new republic had to face threats to his life. Şimşir notes six assassination attempts against Mustafa Kemal that were mostly led by Armenian groups.¹²³ Turkish diplomatic and consular missions undertook the responsibility of monitoring the actions of those suspected of being involved in plots against Mustafa Kemal.¹²⁴ Perpetrators of the aforementioned conspiracies were also

119 A. Merthan Dündar, “Başbakanlık Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Arşivlerinde Bulunan Kore ile İlgili Belgeler Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme,” *Azya/Pasifik Çalışmaları Türkiye Yıllığı*, (2007/2), 66.

120 Ibid., 66.

121 Koçak, *Tek Parti Döneminde Muhalif Sesler*, 116. Koçak cites this information from the work of Şadıman Halıcı on people on the “150’likler” list. The name of the group refers to the 150 people sent into exile after the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922) due to their opposition to the TBMM government. See Şadıman Halıcı, *150'likler* (MA Thesis, Eskişehir: Anadolu University, 1998).

122 Koçak, *Tek Parti Döneminde Muhalif Sesler*, 116.

123 Bilal Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000), 61-73.

124 Ibid.

tracked in some cities. When the Ministry of Interior, for example, alerted the foreign ministry to monitor the actions of an Armenian named Artin Karabet, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs alerted the Turkish embassy in Bucharest and the consulate general in Constanta.¹²⁵ Similarly, Muhittin Akyüz, then Turkish ambassador to Cairo, apprised of a gang consisting of five people which were planning a plot against Mustafa Kemal.¹²⁶ Cairo was also the city in which Rauf Orbay, one of the most prominent political opponents of Mustafa Kemal, lived for a great proportion of his years in exile. Firuz (Kesim) Bey, the Turkish consul to Komotini, Greece, also revealed a plot against Mustafa Kemal during his tenure.¹²⁷ The Turkish consulates in Skopje and Thessaloniki and the Turkish legation in Sofia warned Turkish governments of the time about plot attempts on the life of Mustafa Kemal.¹²⁸

During the early republican period, the ruling elite was skeptical of missionary activities.¹²⁹ These activities were also closely monitored by the early republican Turkey closely. Strikingly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was involved in the monitoring process along with the Ministry of Interior.¹³⁰ On the other hand, monitoring of international media for news about Turkey as well

125 Ibid., 62.

126 Ibid., 64.

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid., 68-70. During his presidency, Mustafa Kemal indeed received direct threats to his life or at least his regime and leadership. In addition to Şimşir's statements, a meeting between Nikolaos Politis, then the Greek Ambassador to Paris, and Turkish political opponents in exile reveals that political opposition against the early republican elite was actively seeking to overthrow the regime even at the end of 1920s, almost three years after the Izmir plot of 1926. Politis notes that "a group of people consisting of Turkish political opponents told him the political atmosphere in Turkey was against Mustafa Kemal and they were in preparation for a coup." The group, led by Reşit Bey, one of the prominent figures of the Hamidian period, "requested the assistance of Greek government in their effort to collapse new Turkey." This request was not taken into consideration by Eleftheros Venizelos who was strongly in favor of a rapprochement with Turkey. Demirözü, *Savaştan Barışa...*, 97-98. The remarks of Politis reveal that the efforts of Turkish diplomats to monitor the actions of political opponents abroad was by no means a useless effort.

129 Koçak, *Tek Parti Döneminde Muhalif Sesler*, 87.

130 Ibid. A document dated 22 May 1932 reported the actions of a Hungarian bishop. Ibid.

as the domestic media's foreign policy coverage was among the duties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the early republican period. This was also a practice in Ottoman diplomacy. The Press Department (*Matbuat Müdürlüğü*) of the late Ottoman diplomatic bureaucracy was responsible for informing the foreign minister (*nazır*) and undersecretary (*müsteşar*) about news in the foreign media.¹³¹ While sustaining this Ottoman legacy during the early republican period, the ruling elite demanded that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also monitor the news and articles related to foreign policy issues in the Turkish press.¹³²

Although Ankara was proclaimed the capital of the “new Turkey,” the recognition of this decision necessitated further diplomatic efforts. In 1927, diplomatic missions were still in Istanbul instead of Ankara.¹³³ Certain governments, led by the United Kingdom, insisted to maintain their embassies in Istanbul. Sir Ronald Lindsay, then the British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, “refused to accept Ankara as Turkey’s capital and … pressed other Europeans to follow.”¹³⁴ According to him, “the new Turkish state was not worth the dignity of ambassadorial representation.”¹³⁵ The British embassy remained

131 Erkan Tural, *I. Dünya Savaşı Öncesinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Avrupa Devlet Sistemi* (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2009), 166. Related news was translated every day and presented to authorities in a previously determined format.

132 Koçak, *Tek Parti Döneminde Muhalif Sesler*, 163.

133 In January 1925 there were twenty-two diplomatic missions in Turkey. Only two of them (those of Afghanistan and France) were settled in Ankara. The Turkish government suggested granting land to diplomatic missions to promote the moving of their embassies from Istanbul to Ankara. Bilal Şimşir, *Ankara... Ankara: Bir Başkentin Doğuşu* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1988), 287-328.

134 George S. Harris, “Repairing Turkish-American Relations After the First World War,” 173.

135 Ibid. In the early days of Republican Turkey, the “capital issue” was not the only problem with Britain. The latter was also stonewalling the new Republic’s diplomatic existence in Britain. Turkey appointed Zekai (Apaydın) Bey as the minister to London expecting that he would be treated as an ambassador, which did not happen. He was, instead, recognized as Minister First Class. Ahmed Ferit (Tek) was recognized by the British government as the ambassador on June 1, 1925. Harris, *Atatürk’s Diplomats*, 83.

in Istanbul although the Turkish government granted the British government land in Ankara.¹³⁶

This policy of resistance was considerably fruitful. In 1931, even after the United Kingdom had established an embassy in Ankara, there were still two major countries that had not. The United States moved its embassy from Istanbul to Ankara in 1937, whereas Mussolini's Italy became the latest country to establish an embassy in Ankara at the late date of 1941.¹³⁷

Moving diplomatic representations from Istanbul to Ankara was symbolically important not only for the young Turkish Republic but also for the Western states. Western states resisted because they opposed "the change of the Turkish government's new diplomatic course and abandonment of the Ottoman old diplomacy."¹³⁸ The only exception to Western opposition to the substitution of Ankara for Istanbul was Weimer Germany. The German government gave diplomatic support for the early republican elite's right to make that decision.¹³⁹ Turkish government was insistent on the removal of diplomatic missions from Istanbul since they were "regarded as reminiscent of the Tanzimat diplomacy in which ambassadors acted like semi-colonial governors"¹⁴⁰ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the early republican period, in this regard, declined all requests from ambassadors in Ankara to meet the Turkish Foreign Minister.¹⁴¹

Barlas & Güvenç state that the early republican foreign ministry was a mix of the remnants of late Ottoman diplomacy and those Turkish diplomats who participated in the Lausanne Conference of 1922-23.¹⁴² Indeed, members of the delegation at the Lausanne Peace Conference were the main elements of the

136 Demirözü, *Savaştan Barışa...*, 52

137 Nur Bilge Criss, "By Shades of Diplomatic Recognition...," 97-98, Having two embassies in Turkey caused also technical difficulties for the Department of State, such as "inefficient use of personnel." Ibid.

138 Gürpınar, *Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy*, 254.

139 Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, vol. I (İstanbul: İletişim, 2012), 343.

140 Gürpınar, *Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy*, 254.

141 Haldun Derin, *Çankaya Özel Kalemini Anımsarken (1933-1951)* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995), 48-49.

142 Barlas and Güvenç, 77.

early republican Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in ensuing years. Unsurprisingly, Mustafa Kemal Pasha decided the Turkish delegation to the conference. He secured the appointment of İsmet İnönü as the foreign minister to represent the TBMM in Lausanne.¹⁴³ Apart from three delegates, Turkish delegation consisted of thirty-seven advisers, secretaries, translators, and aides.¹⁴⁴ Indeed, throughout the 1920s, Turkish diplomats improved their professional capabilities through participation in critical diplomatic cases. Delegations to Moscow and London in 1921, to the Lausanne Peace Conference in 1922-1923 and, to the Turco-Greek population exchange in 1923-1924 were among these prominent and landmark diplomatic processes that not only determined the pillars of early republican foreign policy but provided Turkish diplomats with a kind of “vocational retraining.”

One typical example in the 1930s was the Montreux Conference on the Turkish Straits in 1936. Along with then-Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras, the Turkish delegation to Montreux consisted of other prominent figures such as Fethi Okyar, the ambassador to the United Kingdom, Suat Davas, the ambassador to France, Asım Gündüz, the vice president of Turkish General Headquarters, and Necmettin Sadak, the permanent representative at the United Nations.¹⁴⁵ The secretary general of the delegation was Cevat Açıkalın, while Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, who had joined the ministry just four years previously in 1932, was among the members of Turkish delegation and held the title of “secretary to the embassy.”¹⁴⁶ The experience gained throughout the

143 Demirci, *Belgelerle Lozan...*, 78-79. Mustafa Kemal's support for İsmet was so acute that his position as chief delegate was unanimously approved by the TBMM. This was not the case for the other two delegates, Rıza Nur and Hasan (Saka). Fifty-four deputies voted against the former, whereas Hasan Saka was also rejected by thirty deputies.

144 Harris, *Atatürk's...*, 57. The large number among the delegation was due to several reasons. The existence of a strong opposition faction within the TBMM forced Mustafa Kemal to include people from this group as a concession. Some members of the delegation had special duties other than diplomatic representation. Zülfü Tigrel, for instance, served as the watchdog of Mustafa Kemal during the conference. *Ibid.*

145 Semih Günver, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun Öyküsü* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985), 23.

146 *Ibid.*

conference improved the negotiation skills of early republican diplomats which would become useful, especially during World War II.¹⁴⁷

One of the indicators of the activism of early republican Turkish diplomacy was the steadily increasing need for higher budgets. On February 4, 1922, the TBMM agreed to provide an additional 165,000 Turkish lira for the budget of the foreign ministry.¹⁴⁸ In November 1922, the budget of the Ministry for 1923 was increased.¹⁴⁹ The budget allocated for the peace conference in Lausanne was 300,000 Turkish lira, however, because the conference was interrupted in spring 1923, an additional 250,000 Turkish Lira were allocated to the Turkish delegation.¹⁵⁰ The foreign ministry's budget was also used for the needs of the corps diplomatique in Turkey. This was related to the aim of persuading foreign governments to accept the new Republican Turkey as a legitimate government and Ankara as its capital.¹⁵¹ Although the ministry's budget was increased and consolidated in the early republican period, the Turkish government was reluctant to establish new diplomatic missions because of financial shortfalls.¹⁵² For instance, when the Turkish government thought to

147 A similar case was valid for the Geneva Conference on the Sancak [Hatay] Question held in 1937. The Turkish delegation headed by Numan Menemencioğlu, then secretary general, consisted of members of the younger generation such as Abdullah Zeki Polar, Tarik Emin Yenisey, Cemil Vafi, Şemseddin Mardin, and of course, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. These young diplomats, all of whom would serve as ambassadors in ensuing years, were awarded with a "letter of appreciation" for their service during the conference. The conference itself of course contributed to the merits of these young diplomats more so than official appreciation letters. Emine Esenbel also states in her memoirs that Zorlu frequently referred to his observations from the Montrœux Conference. Osman Öndeş, *Bin Renk Bir Ömür: Sefire Emine Esenbel'in Anıları* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2014), 87.

148 PMRA 1369. 30..18.1.1 4.47.5. February 4, 1922. Accessed August 2, 2014.

149 PMRA 1821. 109.17. 30..18.1.1. 5.27.17. September 5, 1922. Accessed August 2, 2014.

150 PMRA 2403. 400.5. 30..18.1.1. 7.15..4. April 10, 1923. Accessed August 2, 2014.

151 The expenses for the official car of the then-Soviet ambassador were also under the responsibility of the foreign ministry as a consequence of the military and diplomatic cooperation between the two governments. The ministry also undertook the cost of hiring the "Tophane Kasrı" allocated to the Bosphorus Commission which was established in accordance with the Lausanne Peace Treaty in 1923. PMRA 2630. 30..18.1.1. 16.65..5. October 11, 1925. Accessed August 2, 2014.

152 Harris, "Repairing-Turkish American Relations 170.

appoint an envoy to Mexico, they nominated Ahmet Muhtar for the post while maintaining his ambassadorship in Washington.¹⁵³

Diplomats in early republican Turkey were well aware that foreign ministry personnel needed discretionary funds for diplomatic operations. Ahmet Muhtar (Mollaoglu) Bey, stated at the TBMM in February 1921 that “no foreign ministry can be administrated without discretionary funds.”¹⁵⁴ When he was appointed as the Turkish ambassador to Washington in 1927, Ahmet Muhtar was insistent about receiving “at least 20,000 lira” of funding from the government to rehabilitate his country’s image in the United States.¹⁵⁵ Mehmet Münir (Ertegün), during his tenure in Paris as ambassador in 1930, requested similar funding from then Prime Minister İsmet (İnönü). Mehmet Münir “pledged poverty to request reimbursement for entertaining important British political figures to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the republic.”¹⁵⁶

The budget of the ministry during the early republican years certainly increased due to the increasing number of its personnel. For about “200 former Ottoman foreign service officers” and “twenty new members” were accepted into the ministry in 1923.¹⁵⁷ This was followed by thirty in 1924, seventy-five in 1925, thirty in 1926, and fifteen in 1927.¹⁵⁸ The conditions of the Great Depression forced the ministry to reduce the number of its personnel after 1929.¹⁵⁹

153 Ibid.

154 Harris, “Repairing-Turkish American Relations...,” 152.

155 Ibid., 157.

156 George S. Harris, “Cementing Turkish-American Relations...,” 180

157 Harris, *Atatürk’s Diplomats*, 99.

158 Ibid., 99.

159 The most dramatic difference between the Ottoman Hariciye and that of Republican Turkey was the ethnic compositions of the two ministries. While about eighty non-Muslims were working in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry in 1912, the early republican foreign ministry consisted of only Muslims. “Those with non-Muslim wives, especially those who did not convert to Islam, were also forced out after the first few years of the Republic. Non-Turkish Muslims, who had formed only a small minority in the foreign ministry, also disappeared entirely. Those who actively opposed to Mustafa Kemal and his movement were prohibited. Moreover, the shift of the ministry to Ankara discouraged some otherwise qualified from continuing.” Ibid. The de-Ottomanization of the foreign ministry, however, was never realized although there were plans for a comprehensive purge. As of 1927, for example, two-thirds of the senior

Unlike in the first decade of early republican period, the ruling elite was reluctant to recruit dozens of new officers into the ministry. Instead, between 1932 and 1937, only about five officers were recruited each year.¹⁶⁰

Budgets, in sum, influenced the operational capacity of the early republican Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was notably because of the considerable asymmetry between the financial capabilities and the active efforts in the diplomatic field. Allocating the right amount of funds to the right diplomatic operation, in this regard, was a matter of intense negotiation both among the foreign ministry and other state institutions and also between the central organization of the ministry and its personnel abroad.

In his biography of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) named *Çankaya*, Falih Rıfkı Atay notes that “discovering ‘young people’” and raising new men were among the interests of Atatürk.¹⁶¹ This was apparent in the diplomatic bureaucracy. Hüseyin Vasif (Çınar) Bey, who served as Turkey’s representative or ambassador to Prague, Budapest, Rome, and Moscow, was introduced to diplomatic life by Mustafa Kemal.¹⁶² With no diplomatic background, Hüseyin Vasif was a man of education and one of the ardent defenders of republican reforms.¹⁶³

officials in the Republican foreign ministry had begun their careers in the Hamidian era. Ibid. 101-103. Not only the personnel but also the diplomatic mission buildings of the Ottoman Empire were predominantly inherited by the young Turkish Republic. The Ottoman embassy building in London, for example, was appropriated by the Turkish Republic. A. Nuri Yurdushev, “Osmanlı Mirası ve Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine,” in *Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası: Uluslararası IV. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri*, eds. Osman Bahadır Dinçer, Habibe Özdal, Hacali Necefoğlu (Ankara: USAK Yayıncılı, 2010), 50.

160 Harris, *Atatürk’s Diplomats*, 105. In 1927, the foreign ministry consisted of the following departments and bureaus; First department (political affairs), Second department (administrative affairs), Third department (consulate and commercial affairs), the directorate-general for protocol, political advisors, legal advisors, the personal secretary to the minister, and related technical and professional offices. The structure, established by Law No. 1154, was protected from the 1930s through the late 1950s. Even in this period, two separate laws conducted for the ministry in 1933 and 1939, respectively. Girgin, *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi Hariciye Tarihimiz*, 123-134.

161 Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Çankaya* (İstanbul: Pozitif Yayıncılık, 2009), 555.

162 Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 232-238.

163 Ibid.

After gaining the confidence of Mustafa Kemal, Hüseyin Vasif began his diplomatic career in 1925 and continued until his death in Moscow in 1935 – with only a two-month interruption in 1929 when he served as the minister of education.¹⁶⁴

Mustafa Kemal also assigned people with military backgrounds to especially prominent and critical posts. Early examples of this preference were exemplified earlier through the appointment of Ali Fuat Pasha to the Soviet Union in 1921. In the early republican years, this policy, similar to Abdulhamid II's appointments, was maintained. Kemalettin Sami, one of the high-ranking commanders in the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922), served as Turkey's ambassador to Berlin between 1924 and his death in 1934. Hüsrev (Gerede) Bey was another prominent “military” figure of early republican diplomacy. As a member of the TBMM during the National Struggle years and, in the words of Mustafa Kemal, his “first revolution and struggle comrade,” Hüsrev Bey served as Turkey's ambassador to Budapest (1924-1926), Sofia (1926-1930), Tehran (1930-1934), Tokyo (1936-1939), Berlin (1939-1942), and Rio de Janeiro (1947-1949).¹⁶⁵ Contrary to Kemalettin Sami Bey, who pursued a diplomatic career in just one country, Hüsrev Gerede served as ambassador in six. The appointment of people without diplomatic careers as ambassadors primarily stemmed from the lack of human resources in this realm. Mustafa Kemal was the predominant actor in the appointment of these ambassadors.

Ambassadorial appointments were also used as a method of tacit exile. Behiç Erkin, who was Turkey's Minister of Public Works between January 1926 and October 1928, was appointed to Budapest, and in the following sixteen years, he served as Turkey's ambassador to Budapest (1928-1939) and then Paris (1939-1944). Erkin had disputes with the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, and the Minister of Finance, Şükrü Saracoğlu. In order to overcome the crisis, Erkin noted that he demanded that Mustafa Kemal appoint him as ambassador to a diplomatic mission and added that both Mustafa Kemal and İnönü were keen on this idea.¹⁶⁶

164 Ibid.

165 Ibid., 329-345.

166 Behiç Erkin, *Hatırat (1876-1958)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayımları, 2010), 312-313.

Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver) Bey, the chairman of the Turkish Hearths (*Türk Ocakları*), one of the pioneering institutions of the time for the promotion of Turkish nationalist ideology, was appointed as the Turkish ambassador to Bucharest when the Turkish Hearths were abolished in 1931 due to a series of political purges after the Liberal Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) was disbanded in 1930.¹⁶⁷

Yakup Kadri, a renowned author, man of letters, and director of the Journal *Kadro*, a publication with a leftist interpretation of the official Kemalist ideology, was appointed as Turkey's ambassador to the Albanian capital, Tirana. The reason for this appointment was a sentence in an essay in *Kadro* noting that "reforms cannot be appropriated to the nations if they remain in the hands of one person or a group."¹⁶⁸ Yakup Kadri [Karaosmanoğlu], in the following two decades, served as Turkey's ambassador to Tirana (1934-1939), Prague (1936-39), The Hague (1939-40), Bern (1942-49 and 1951-54), and Tehran (1949-51) and collected his accounts on diplomatic service in *Zoraki Diplomat* (Unwilling diplomat).¹⁶⁹ Like Erkin, he was appointed as ambassador to be distanced from daily internal political, and ideological disputes.

The most interesting story of exile by appointment concerned the cases of İnönü and Aras, respectively the longest serving prime minister and foreign minister of the Republican period. İsmet İnönü had served as the prime minister of the young Turkish Republic since 1924; however, he resigned after a series of disputes with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1937. When the latter died on November 10, 1938, İnönü was the favored candidate to succeed him. Tevfik Rüştü Aras, then-foreign minister, attempted to appoint İsmet İnönü as Turkey's ambassador to Washington in order to prevent him to be the president.¹⁷⁰

167 Hamdullah Suphi was offered to choose from among Cairo, Belgrade, and Bucharest. He decided on Bucharest in order to be involved in the affairs of the Gagavuz Turks, a Turkic minority maintaining the Christian Orthodox faith in Romania. Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 451. For a detailed account of the history, ideology and influence of the Turkish Hearths, see Füsun Üstel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları, (1912-1931)* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2010).

168 Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Zoraki Diplomat* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2014), 16.

169 Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 487-505.

170 Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi I*, 146-147.

The attempt failed and İnönü became the second president of the Republic of Turkey. In the first days of his presidency, İnönü immediately demanded that Prime Minister Celal Bayar to dismiss of Tevfik Rüştü Aras. Aras was appointed as Turkey's Ambassador to London by İnönü.¹⁷¹

Şükrü Saracoğlu replaced Aras as the new foreign minister when Aras was appointed to London as an ambassador. This was also the precursor of a broader operation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Cumhuriyet* on July 7, 1939, announced to its readers that "a wide range of reappointments would be realized among ambassadors."¹⁷² The newspaper also noted that Haydar Aktay, Ruşen Eşref Ünaydin, and Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu would be appointed to different posts. *Cumhuriyet* projected correctly. Karaosmanoğlu was appointed to The Hague, whereas Haydar Aktay and Ruşen Eşref Ünaydin were appointed to Moscow and Budapest respectively.¹⁷³

The appointment procedures were under the strict control of the ruling elite of the time. The offices of the prime ministry and especially the presidency had the authority to make final decisions on foreign policy issues. This attitude determined the role diplomats could play in this period. In words of Dikerdem,

171 Ibid.

172 "Sefirlerimiz Arasında Tebeddül İhtimalleri," (Possibilities of Change among Our Ambassadors) *Cumhuriyet*, July 17939, 1. "Sefirlerimiz arasında geniş mikyasta tayinlerin yapılmak üzere olduğu anlaşılmaktadır."

173 The newspaper projected that Haydar Aktay would be appointed to Moscow; thus, it was correct in his case. Moreover, the newspaper also informed that Yakup Kadri would be appointed to one of the Nordic countries and Ruşen Eşref Ünaydin to Belgrade. While *Cumhuriyet* was wrong in case of Ünaydin, it can also be concluded that leading elites had thought to appoint him to Belgrade, then changed their minds and appointed him to Budapest, which was of similar or equal rank for a Turkish diplomat. In any case, Şimşir is right in stating that these appointments had a political agenda after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 487-505. Other cases also evidence the claim that there was a wind of comprehensive change within the ministry after the death of Atatürk. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, then a young Turkish diplomat in the Paris Embassy of Turkey, was recalled to Ankara and assigned as the "Director of the Department of Crypto Communications" as a means of humiliation. Zorlu was one of the favorite diplomats of Atatürk and the son-in-law of Tevfik Rüştü Zorlu, the former foreign minister. Günver, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun Öyküsü*, 27.

the function of the *Hariciye* was to put into practice what the *Ebedi Şef* (the eternal chief, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) and later the *Milli Şef* (the national chief, İsmet İnönü) decided without question. ... The duty of the diplomat was limited to this. Sounding out public opinion, evaluating demands, and searching for foreign policy options were under the command and authority of the *Şef* (president). ... The diplomat did not think about such issues; [he] was not interested in political and ideological orientations and just completed the missions like a military officer.¹⁷⁴

Under these conditions, the professional merits of diplomatic staff were of secondary importance. The approach of leaders of the time is clear in a dialogue between Yakup Kadri, one of the non-professional ambassadors of his time, and the Mustafa Kemal, the president.

Sir, I said, “I’ve never been involved in civil service until now. With the exception of teaching, I neither worked as officer nor as an administrator. ... The administrative structure of the government is totally unfamiliar to me. I do not foresee to adapting to the protocol requirements of the diplomatic profession. I am afraid that...” ...

Gazi [Mustafa Kemal] again interrupted ... my words. “Give up these irrational concerns. ... After the victory so many people said, ‘you have finished your job as a commander. Leave the political and governmental affairs to their experts.’ There were so many people saying, ‘how can such an important diplomatic duty be assigned to a commander?’ when İsmet Paşa was on his way to Lausanne” ... and he pointed to Tevfik Rüştü [Aras] Bey, laughing ... “Look at this person.

174 “Önce ‘Ebedi Şef’ sonra ‘Milli Şef’ hangi dış politikayı seçmişse ... *Hariciye*’nin işlevi o politikayı körükörene uygulamaktı. Diplomatın görevi bundan ibaretti. Kamuoyunun nabzını yoklamak, özlemlerini değerlendirmek, dış politika seçeneklerini araştırmak yalnız Şefin takdir ve yetkisinde idi. Diplomat bu gibi işlere kafa yormaz, siyasal ve ideolojik akımlarla ilgilenmez, asker gibi verilen görevi yerine getirirdi.” Güler, *Salon Verir Sokak Alırız*, 530.

He is our most ‘successful’ foreign minister. He was educated as a gy-necologist.”¹⁷⁵

The leaders of early republican Turkey were more interested in the loyalty of ambassadors to the foreign policy preferences of the regime. Their qualifications to conduct diplomatic relations were of secondary significance. The critical aspect was to practice the foreign policy preferences of the leaders, most notably the president. The concern of Yakup Kadri, concerning being aware of the customs of diplomatic protocol, was of secondary importance in this regard. As Tevfik Rüştü Aras noted, the republican elite was “more interested in ... what was happening, instead of ceremonial procedures and image” in terms of foreign policy issues.¹⁷⁶

Turkish diplomats from different generations such as Kemal Girgin and Mahmut Dikerdem have also indicated that their early predecessors were without diplomatic qualifications and could not play significant roles in shaping the foreign policy decisions of early republican Turkey. This common perspective has been subject to some criticism. Bilal Şimşir, for example, criticizes this view that defines early republican diplomats as “semi-illiterate,” asking “are these people – the diplomats – gathered from [the train] stations just for wearing ties?”¹⁷⁷ Şimşir also criticizes the lack of satisfactory studies on early

175 “*Paşam, dedim.*” “Ben, bu yaşa kadar hiç devlet hizmetinde bulunmuş değilim. Hocalıktan başka, ne memurluk, ne amirlik ettim. Hükümetin idari mekanizması tamamıyla meçhüldür. Hele diplomasi meslekinin protokol icaplarına ayak uydurabileceğimi hiç umuyorum. Korkarım ki...” ...

Gazi, gene sözünü kesti: “Bırak Allah aşkına bu boş endişeleri,” dedi. “Bizim aramızda kaç kişi devlet işlerine meslekten, ihtisastan geldiğini iddia edebilir? Zaferi müteakip birçok kim-seler bana,” Sen kumandan olarak vazifeni gördün. Artık, siyaset ve hükümet umurunu erba-bına bırak,” demişlerdi. İsmet Paşa Lausanne Konferansı’na giderken, “Yahu bu kadar mühim bir diplomatik misyon bir askere nasıl tevdil edilir?” diyen diyene idi.” Ve kahkahayla gülerek Tevfik Rüştü Bey’i gösterdi. “Bak şu zata. Bizim en ‘muvaffak’ hariciye nazırımız. Kendileri kadın doktoru olarak yetişmişlerdi.” Karaosmanoğlu, *Zoraki...*, 26-27.

176 Tevfik Rüştü Aras, *Lozan’ın İzlerinde On Yıl* (İstanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1935), 110.

177 Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 542-543.

republican Turkish diplomacy and the prevention of research opportunities (by the ministry archives) for researchers interested in the period.¹⁷⁸

Şimşir's objections point to a useful discussion. Many ambassadors in the early republican period were not originally career diplomats. That is true. Yet this does not mean that these people lacked any formation. Only seven of the thirty-eight ambassadors of the period lacked a higher education; two of these, in fact, were graduates of the *Mekteb-i Sultani* (Galatasaray Lycee).¹⁷⁹ The least educated among this staff, like Memduh Şevket (Esendal) and Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), were prominent men of letters of their times. Moreover, eleven of the thirty-eight ambassadors previously served as ministers in various cabinets of early republican Turkish governments.¹⁸⁰ These people, in this regard, may have lacked experience in the diplomatic profession, but they were experienced in civil service in general.

Early republican diplomacy was mainly based on the legacy of the late Ottoman Foreign Ministry. A-third of the thirty-eight ambassadors appointed between 1923 and 1938 were members of the Ottoman *Hariciye*.¹⁸¹ Ahmet Muhtar (Mollaoglu) Bey, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and ambassador to Moscow and Washington during the Republican period, also held the position of ambassador in the closing years of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. Another similar example was Mehmet Enis (Akaygen) Bey. After being accepted into Ottoman *Hariciye* in 1902, he served as a mid-ranking diplomat in Russia, Italy, and Romania between 1906 and 1914.¹⁸² As one of the committed figures of the national struggle, Mehmet Enis Bey was appointed to Moscow on November 11, 1923, and throughout the two following decades, he served as a diplomat of the early republican administration in the Soviet Union, Greece, and Iran.¹⁸³

178 Ibid., 541-542.

179 Ibid.

180 Ibid.

181 Ibid., 543.

182 Tulça, *Enis Bey...*, 24.

183 Ibid., 28.

During the 1930s, the foreign ministry professionalized its cadres. For the first time in 1932, the foreign ministry began to recruit career officers through an examination process.¹⁸⁴ Three of the five applicants were accepted into the ministry and became the first career diplomats to be recruited through an examination process.¹⁸⁵ They were Fatin Rüştü (Zorlu), Adile Maksudi (Ayda), and Hikmet Hayri.¹⁸⁶ The exam was “only open to university graduates” and “officials without university degrees who had been admitted earlier were barred from further promotion.”¹⁸⁷

The legal basis for the recruitment of new officers was the first organizational law of the ministry enacted in 1927 and a decree regulating the examination process of candidates that was enacted in 1929.¹⁸⁸ The new competition (*concours*) system, which consisted of examining candidates in interviews in a meeting, was coined by then-undersecretary (*Katib-i Umumi*) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Numan Menemencioğlu. Menemencioğlu himself headed

184 Günver, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun Öyküsü*, 17.

185 Semih Günver, “Dışişleri Meslek Memurluğu,” in *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç*, ed. İsmail Soysal (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997), 739. There is, however, information about the recruitment process of Fatin Rüştü and others recruited in late 1932. Semih Günver, an ambassador who joined the ministry in the late 1930s, presents information about the nominees and the jury for the first exam of the early republican Hariciye. In his words, “I found a report of the Examination Committee [İmtihan Encümeni] in the archives of [Ministry of] Foreign Affairs. In the report, which was typed in Ottoman [Turkish], it was written that the head of the jury was Numan [Menemencioğlu], the secretary general and the members were Cevat [Açıklanın], Emin Ali [Türkgeldi], Abdülahat, Hulusi Fuat, Agah, and Şevket Fuat, the protocol chief. One female and four men attended the examination and among these, in successive order, Fatin Rüştü, Adile Maksudi Hanım, and Hikmet Hayri Bey passed the examination. Other two candidates [efendiler] fell short. Moreover, Fatin Rüştü was awarded a letter of appreciation. Semih Günver, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun Öyküsü*, 17.

186 Ibid. Among these three officers, Fatin Rüştü (Zorlu) would later on become a successful career diplomat and influential figure in the ministry. Zorlu also served as minister of foreign affairs from November 1957 until the coup d'état on May 27, 1960. Adile Maksudi, on the other hand, was the first female career diplomat to serve in republican history.

187 Kuneralp, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” 506.

188 PMRA 22.83.17. January 29, 1927. PMRA 6.60.3. December 11, 1929. PMRA 030.0.18.01.02.6.60.003. November 11, 1929.

the exam commissions.¹⁸⁹ After the introduction of the examination system, generally speaking two categories of career officers emerged within the ministry. The first group consisted of officers who were accepted into the ministry with neither higher education or advanced language skills but through a comprehensive examination process. The members of the second group were a new young generation accepted in annual examinations implemented starting in 1932. Along with Zorlu, young diplomats of the time Muhsin Nuri (Birgi), Seyfullah Esin, Nurettin Vergin, Settar İksel, Sadi Kavur, Cemil Vafi, and Adnan Kural were among the members of the first generation of the ministry to have both higher education and satisfactory language skills.¹⁹⁰

Early republican Turkey's representation in world capitals and cities was directly related to political realities of the time. Turkey's economic situation also played a role. In 1930, the total number of diplomatic and consular missions was forty-eight.¹⁹¹ This number included embassies, first class legations, second class legations, charge d'affairs, and consular missions. In the same year, Turkey had five embassies in world capitals.¹⁹² In 1914, the Ottoman Empire was represented in eight capitals by ambassadors.¹⁹³ Throughout Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's fifteen-year-long presidency, the maximum number of Turkish embassies and legations (excluding consulates) was twenty-six.¹⁹⁴ In these fifteen years, the total number of people assigned with the titles of envoy,

189 In some cases, Mustafa Kemal even directly intervened in the examination process. For example, Leyla Çambel was personally examined by him for entry into the ministry. Harris, *Atatürk's Diplomats*, 26.

190 Güler, *Salon Verir...*, 509. Muhsin Nuri [Birgi] was recruited into the foreign ministry in the first month of 1932. It is unclear whether he joined the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy through an examination. He later climbed to the highest ranks within the ministry and served as secretary general.

191 Kemal Girgin, *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi Hariciye Tarihimiz*, 131-132. Legations were diplomatic missions administered not by an ambassador but by a minister. Minister (*Elçi*) was a diplomatic rank above undersecretary but under ambassador. By 1960s, legations disappeared and the diplomatic rank of "minister" became obsolete.

192 Ibid.

193 Güçlü, *Eminence Grise of Turkish Foreign Service: Numan Menemencioğlu*, 19.

194 Şimşir, "Atatürk'ün Elçileri Üzerine," 540.

minister, or ambassador was thirty-eight.¹⁹⁵ Their backgrounds were equally varied; eight were of military origin, seven from civil service, seven were law graduates, and seven who graduated from schools abroad.¹⁹⁶ More than half had previously served as members of parliament, and a quarter of the ambassadors in this time period were once members of the cabinets.¹⁹⁷

3.2.3 *The 1930s, the 1940s, and the Influence of Numan Menemencioğlu*

Between April 25, 1920, and August 16, 1943, six undersecretaries, that is “second men,” served in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Suat Davaz, Tevfik Kemal Koperler, Ahmet Hikmet Müftüoğlu, Ali Şevket Berker, Mehmet Enis Akaygen, and Numan Rifat Menemencioğlu.¹⁹⁸ Numan Menemencioğlu served as secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the fourteen years between July 1, 1929, and August 16, 1943, which remains a record even today.¹⁹⁹ Mahmut Dikerdem, who was recruited into the ministry during Menemencioğlu’s years as secretary general, depicts his strong influence as follows:

Menemencioğlu was ... unarguably the number one man of the Hariciye during the presidencies of both Atatürk and İnönü. Whoever the [Foreign] Minister was, the leader of the Hariciye was Numan Menemencioğlu. Neither before nor after him, did anyone attain the honor of being “permanent secretary general.” ...

During the term of Atatürk, Tevfik Rüştü Aras was the head of the Turkish *Hariciye*, but he was not occupied with the internal affairs of

195 Ibid., 541.

196 Ibid.

197 Ibid., 543.

198 “Dışişleri Müsteşarları Listesi,” *Türk Dış Politikası Kriz İncelemeleri* Website, accessed February 26, 2016, available from http://tdpkrizleri.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=249:db-mustesarlar&catid=34:decision-makers-list&lang=tr.

199 For a detailed examination of Menemencioğlu’s strong influence on the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy, see Güçlü, *Eminence Grise of Turkish Foreign Service: Numan Menemencioğlu*, 1-160.

the ministry. Menemencioğlu, who earned the trust and respect of Atatürk – and İnönü as well – was the only power in the foreign ministry. ... It was such that any issue ranging from most important political problems to most basic administrative issues depended on a decision by Menemencioğlu.”²⁰⁰

Oğuz Gökmen, who was recruited into the Ministry in 1940 – also during Menemencioğlu’s term as secretary general –, illustrates how the influence of Menemencioğlu penetrated into the ministry as follows,

When we joined the ministry ... a distinction was being made between “hopes (*poir-umut*) and pears (*espoir-armut*).” This appeared first to be a professional joke, but it was an unlucky segregation that hurt many people unduly. ...

Mr. Menemencioğlu had great expectations from young diplomats who were five, six, seven, and even eight years older than us and called them “*Les Espoirs*” (the hopes). This generation, which was really very intelligent, capable, and well-educated, began to ignore the ones older than them with a courage and extreme confidence that stemmed from the favor and kind treatment they attracted [from Menemecioğlu]. During their conversations, they (*Les Espoirs*) were keen to call [the diplomats older than them] *Les Poirs*. (the pears) [The segregation of] “hopes and pears” would later cause the emergence of various cliques

200 “Gerek Atatürk’ün gerek İnönü’nün Cumhurbaşkanlığı sırasında Hariciye’nin tartışmasız bir numaralı adamı... Numan Menemencioğlu idi. ‘Bakan kim olursa olsun Hariciye’nin başı Numan Menemencioğlu’dur. Ne ondan once ne de ondan sonar hiç kimse ‘değişmez genel sekreter’ payesine erişememiştir.’...”

Atatürk döneminde Tevfik Rüştü Aras Türk Hariciyesinin başydı ama bakanlığın iç düzeniyle pek uğraşmazdı... Atatürk kadar İnönü’nün de güven ve beğenisini kazanan Menemencioğlu Hariciye’nin tek hakimi haline gelmişti. O kadar ki, en önemli siyasal sorunlardan tutun da en basit idari işlere kadar her konu, onun iki dudağı arasından çıkacak karara bağlanmıştı.” Güler, *Salon Verir...*, 508-510.

in the foreign ministry and also the crystallization of contrasting and contradictory ideas.²⁰¹

Selahattin Ülkümen, who was recruited into the ministry six years before Oğuz Gökmen in 1934, confirms the remarks of Gökmen in terms of the influence of Menemencioğlu. According to Ülkümen, in those days, "Foreign Affairs was identical to Menemencioğlu."²⁰² Newcomers to the ministry, in Ülkümen's words, "were aiming to gain Menemencioğlu's favor at all costs," and "the young [officers] around him were being called '*espoirs*'"²⁰³ Menemencioğlu's strong influence in the ministry, however, was not above criticism. Menemencioğlu was appointed as the new foreign minister on August 13, 1942, substituting Şükrü Saracoğlu. Behiç Erkin, then Turkish ambassador to Paris, notes that he was both saddened and pleased by this decision.²⁰⁴ In Erkin's words,

I was sad because the devastation [Menemencioğlu] caused in the ministry as second man would completely increase during his term as

201 "Biz mesleğe girdiğimizde... 'umutlar-armutlar' ayrimı yapılmaya başlanmıştı. Bu aslında mesleki bir nükte olarak ortaya çıkmış, ama pek çoklarını da boş yere kırmış, rencide etmiş talihsiz bir ayrim idi....

Numan Bey kendi zamanında mesleğe aldığı ve doğum tarihleri bizimkilerden beş, altı hatta yedi, sekiz yıl daha erken bazı gençlere büyük umut bağlamış ve onlara 'Les Espoirs' sıfatını takmıştı. Gerçekten çok zeki, kabiliyetli ve fevkalade iyi yetişmiş bu promosyon, zamanla kendilerine gösterilen bu teveccüh ve iltifatın verdiği bir cesaret ve aşırı güvenle, kendilerinden eskilere bir hor bakma, onlara adeta kücümser bir tavır almaya başladılardı. Kendi aralarında onlardan bahsederken 'Les Poires'-armutlar-demekten zevk alır olmuşlardı. Umutlar, armutlar daha sonraları Hariciye'de çeşitli kliklerin ortaya çıkmasına, birbirine zıt ve çelişkili fikirlerin kemikleşmesine yol açacaktı." Oğuz Gökmen, *Diploması: Savaşta ve Barışta Diploması: Diplomaside 40 Yıl, 11 Ay, 17 Gün* (Ankara: Yamaç Ofset, 2006), 51-52. Turgut Menemencioğlu, a career diplomat in the ministry and nephew of Numan Menemencioğlu, notes that "[Numan] Menemencioğlu was keen to engage in talks with young diplomats." Günver, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu...*, 25.

202 Selahattin Ülkümen, *Bilinmeyen Yönleriyle Bir Dönemin Dışişleri: Emekli Büyükelçi Selahattin Ülkümen'in Anıları* (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayıncılık 1993), 15.

203 Ibid.

204 Erkin, *Hatırat...*, 528.

the first man [foreign minister]. [Menemencioğlu's appointment] also encouraged my hopes because ministers do not remain in their offices for a long time, and, with this regard, the ministry would soon be rid of this person.²⁰⁵

Erkin agrees with Dikerdem's claim that even daily administrative decisions were under the control of Menemencioğlu. For example, Erkin notes "the promotion of Cevdet Dülger, then a young Turkish diplomat in Turkey's embassy in Vichy France, was a consequence of Dülger's affinity and loyalty to Menemencioğlu."²⁰⁶ Erkin's criticism of Menemencioğlu is not restricted to such examples of nepotism. According to him, "the Ministry of Foreign affairs, which refrained from building a shelter for the Turkish embassy in Paris during World War II, did not hesitate to let another building for Menemencioğlu's joy."²⁰⁷

Menemencioğlu belonged to renown families on both his paternal and maternal sides.²⁰⁸ His father, Rifat Pasha, was in the finance bureaucracy and served as Minister of Finance during the Second Constitutional Period.²⁰⁹ Following in this family tradition, Menemencioğlu entered Ottoman diplomatic

205 "Müteessir etti, çünkü Bakanlık'ta ikinci olarak yaptığı tahribatı büsbütün artıracaktı. Ümit verdi, bakanlar yerlerinde çok kalamazlar, bu suretle günün birinde Dışişleri bu zattan kurulur." Ibid.

206 Ibid., 475.

207 Ibid., 452. Menemencioğlu actually preoccupied the agenda of Turkish governments in similar cases. Menemencioğlu's gambling debts made during his term as Turkey's ambassador to France (1944-1956) were paid by a discretionary fund of the Turkish Prime Ministry. The debt amounted 105,000 Turkish lire at a time when the salary of a high school director was just 219 lire. The debt was paid by the order of then-Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. The case was revealed when the "High Court of Justice in Yassiada," an extraordinary judicial mechanism formed after the military coup of May 27, 1960, accused Menderes of abusing his authority to hide the debt of the ambassador. This was one of the few cases before the court Menderes was acquitted. Cemil Ünlütürk, *Monşerler*, 181.

208 Güçlü, *Eminence Grise of Turkish Foreign Service*, 13-14. Menemencioğlu's maternal grandson is Namık Kemal, and his mother also wrote books of poetry and learned foreign languages. Ibid.

209 Ibid., 13.

service in 1914.²¹⁰ He quickly rose up the levels of the diplomatic pyramid during the republican period. Along with his dominance of the ministry, Menemencioğlu was a highly-skilled diplomat. He, according to British historian W. N. Medlicott, “was a skilled negotiator who could sometimes have infuriated his addressee.”²¹¹ Rene Massigli, who was the French Ambassador to Turkey during World War II, remembers Menemencioğlu “as the smartest person” of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in his memoirs (*La Turquie devant la Guerre: Mission à Ankara 1939-1940*) and Franz von Papen, ambassador of the Third Reich to Ankara, informed his capital that Menemencioğlu was aware of the realities better than his Foreign Minister (Şükrü Saracoğlu).²¹² While reporting on the details of Tripartite Agreement (1939) between the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey to his government in Berlin, Papen stated that Turkey’s signing a tripartite pact instead of separate bilateral agreements with the United Kingdom and France was favorable for Germany’s interests.²¹³ This decision, according to Papen, was made by courtesy of Menemencioğlu against the will of Şükrü Saracoğlu, the Foreign Minister.²¹⁴

After his long term as the secretary general of the ministry, Menemencioğlu was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs on August 13, 1942. This was “an expected decision and there would be no serious change in foreign policy orientation.”²¹⁵ There was no serious change for Menemencioğlu himself, either. As illustrated earlier, the ministry was to a large extent under his control as secretary general, and the new situation was nothing more than a change of title. In his words,

210 Ibid., 19.

211 Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: II. Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994), 26.

212 Ibid., 49-50.

213 Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 456-457.

214 Ibid. Saracoğlu, notes Papen, was inexperienced in foreign policy affairs. Throughout World War II, Germans labelled Saracoğlu as “pro-British,” whereas the Allied powers, most notably Britain, evaluated Menemencioğlu as “pro-German.” Ibid.

215 İlhan Tekeli, Selim İlkin, *Dış Siyaseti ve Askeri Stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkiyesi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2010), 261-262.

I was by no means alien to this post. I had already been the head of the ministry for thirteen years and have been directing Turkish foreign policy due to this. My responsibility was only reshaped.²¹⁶

Menemencioğlu's term as foreign minister was realized at a critical conjuncture. During the Conference of Cairo on 22-26 November 1943, Menemencioğlu defended Turkey's position so successfully that President İsmet İnönü called him "the conqueror of negotiations" and praised him for "mercilessly checkmating Eden and Hopkins" and "defending the Turkish perspective."²¹⁷ Nevertheless, Menemencioğlu held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs only twenty-two months, much shorter than his thirteen-year-long term as secretary general. Deringil says that one of the reasons for his dismissal was his strong influence and even dominance over the ministry.²¹⁸ This is correct to a degree, though there were personal disputes as well. As again Deringil notes, "İnönü thought that it was time to end Menemencioğlu's term because of his caprices over two years despite being a good negotiator."²¹⁹ After his resignation in 1944, Menemencioğlu was appointed as Turkish ambassador to Paris and remained in that post until 1956.²²⁰

216 "Bu makama hiçbir şekilde yabancı değildim. Zira on üç senedir bakanlığın başındaydım ve bu nedenle de Türkiye'nin dış politikasına yön vermektediyim. Sorumluluğum sadace başka şekil almıştı." Deringil, *Denge Oyunu*, 50.

217 Ibid.49.

218 Ibid., 50.

219 Ibid., 49. Deringil cites these words from Suat Hayri Ürgüplü. Menemencioğlu's dismissal, however, was mostly due to the conditions of wartime diplomacy. Menemencioğlu was renowned for his pro-German tendencies among allied governments, especially the British government. This claim is questionable; his main stance was to keep Turkey out of the war at any costs, and such a struggle required "pure neutrality." Perceptions, however, mattered more than reality in times of turmoil and Menemencioğlu's term as Minister of Foreign Affairs ended upon the eruption of such a crisis. In June 1944, a development revealed that Turkey had been considerably tolerant of German "commercial" ships, and a second inspection revealed that artillery was being hidden under the shipboard. The incident resulted in the protest of Allied powers and led Menemencioğlu resign. Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de İki Partili Siyasal Sistemin Kuruluş Yılları: Rejim Krizi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2013), 63-64.

220 Güçlü, *Eminence Grise of Turkish Foreign Service*, 107-121.

3.2.4 1939-1950: The Wartime Ministry and the New World Order

Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially during the World War II, opened and closed diplomatic and consular missions as a consequence of changes in the European political map. Turkey had to temporarily close its missions in Prague, Tirana, and Warsaw until the end of World War II due to Italian and German invasions.²²¹ Some were abolished permanently, namely those in Vlore, Bari, Tbilisi, Nis, Geneva, Yerevan, Gyumri, and Odessa.²²²

The abolition of some of these diplomatic missions were not merely related to developments in European politics. Turkey's changing relations with some of the belligerents in World War II influenced the destiny of its diplomatic and consular missions in some countries. This was most clearly apparent in Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union. Relations among cordial allies in the early 1920s began to deteriorate after Montreux Treaty of 1936, an agreement that regulated the straits regime in favor of Turkey's demands. Moreover, the Nyon Treaty of 1938 negatively influenced the perception of Turkey in the Soviet Union.²²³ As Koçak puts it, "the closer Turkey moved towards the Western countries the more the relations deteriorated with the Soviet Union."²²⁴

221 Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 235.

222 Ibid. Turkey's consulates in Antioch and İskenderun were also abolished after Hatay's accession to Turkey in 1939.

223 The Soviet Union's decision to abolish most of its missions in Turkey, on the other hand, was part of a general Soviet diplomatic decision. By 1938, the Soviet Union decided to limit its relations with Western countries. As a consequence, twenty-five Soviet consulates were closed down apart from the ones in Turkey. The Soviet Union suspected that diplomatic missions in its territories were used for espionage. Turkey's situation in this case was significant in two respects. First, although the Soviet Union declared that its policy to limit the number of diplomatic missions was restricted to hostile countries, the missions of countries such as Turkey and Czechoslovakia, who were known for their friendly relations with the Soviet Union, were also included. Second, there was something specific to Turkey in this case; the Turkish government resisted closing its missions in cities such as Batumi, Tbilisi, Baku, and Yerevan, where considerable numbers of Turkic people were residing. Because of this, Turkish government wanted to preserve these missions but the Soviet government insisted on closing them. Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 235-237.

224 Ibid., 235.

When relations deteriorated even more on the eve of World War II, the Soviets closed their consulates in Turkey with the exception of the one in Istanbul. Soviet consulates shut down were located in Izmir and Kars. Turkey, as a consequence of the Turco-Soviet Treaty of 1938, closed its consular missions in Odesa, Baku, Yerevan, and Leningrad.²²⁵ Thus, with the exception of the embassies in Ankara and Moscow, the Soviet Union had one consulate in Turkey (in Istanbul) and Turkey had only one in the Soviet Union (in Batumi).²²⁶

According to Tekeli and İlkin, Turkey's foreign policy during World War II was innovative because the country, though not neutral, managed to remain out of the war.²²⁷ In this regard, Turkey was a non-neutral but non-belligerent state throughout the war.²²⁸ That unique position influenced Turkish diplomacy and Turkish diplomats. Turkish diplomats played significant roles in the "daily affairs" of the war. This was most visible when some Turkish diplomats undertook the responsibility of rescuing the lives of many Jews of Turkish origin during the war. Behiç Erkin, the Turkish Ambassador to France between 1939 and 1943, Selahattin Ülkümen, Turkish Consul General to Rhodes, and other diplomats from among the lower ranks made considerable efforts to save Jews holding Turkish citizenship from the Holocaust.

Selahattin Ülkümen, then with only nine years as a Turkish diplomat, was appointed in 1943 to Rhodes, an island under German occupation but also under an allied siege. Ülkümen rescued forty-two Jews who had Turkish citizenship in 1944 or had possessed Ottoman citizenship before 1923.²²⁹ In his

225 Ibid.

226 Ibid., 237.

227 Tekeli and İlkin, *Diş Siyaseti ve Askeri Stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkîyesi*, 54.

228 Mustafa Aydin, "Savaş Kaosunda Türkiye: Görelî Özerklik 2," in *Türk Diş Politikası I: 1919-1980*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), 393.

229 Ülkümen, *Bilinmeyen Yönleriyle*, 104. Germans launched an air raid on the Turkish consular mission in Rhodes. This bombardment, however, was not in response to the rescue of Jews by Ülkümen. The air raid was performed on February 18, 1944. The rescue of Jews, on the other hand, was achieved on 20 July 1944, five months later. Ülkümen's wife, Mihrinissa Ülkümen, was severely injured during the raid and died six months later. In addition to the rescue of forty-two Jews in Rhodes, Ülkümen also negotiated the amnesty of thirty-nine. Turkish

negotiation with Ulrich Kleemann, head of SS *Sturm-Division Rhodos*, Ülkümen demanded the release of Jews with Turkish citizenship and asserted Turkey's neutrality in the war.²³⁰ Despite Kleemann's objection, Ülkümen insisted once again referring to Turkish laws and tacitly threatening Kleemann about the possibility of an international crisis unless the dispute was resolved.²³¹ Consequently, forty-two Jews with Turkish citizenship (most of whom were Greek or Italian) were released upon Kleemann's order.²³²

The role of Turkish diplomats in the rescue of European Jews from the Holocaust, on the other hand, has been subject to question in recent years. In her detailed work on Turkish Jews and the Holocaust, Corry Guttstadt argues that the Turkish government never implemented a systematic policy of saving Jews holding Turkish passports or Jews who formerly held Turkish passports.²³³ On the contrary, adds Guttstadt, the Ankara government alerted its diplomatic missions to prevent Turkish Jews from migrating to Turkey collectively.²³⁴ According to her, the efforts of some Turkish diplomats such as Selahattin Ülkümen, Bedii Arbel, and Cevdet Dülger were individual.²³⁵ Among

boatmen who had been sentenced to death for smuggling Italian soldiers. Ülkümen managed to save the lives of the Turkish boatmen, too. *Ibid.*

230 Stanford Shaw, *Turkey and the Holocaust: Turkey's Role in Rescuing European Jewry from Nazi Persecution* (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 419.

231 *Ibid.*

232 Except forty-two of "Ülkümen's Jews" and twelve elderly, disabled Jews who were not eligible for deportation, 1673 Jews of Rhodes were deported to Auschwitz concentration camp. Ülkümen was deemed worthy of the "Righteous Among Nations," award granted to those who played a role in rescuing Jews from the Holocaust, and he was the first Muslim to be honored with this title. *Ibid.*

233 Corry Guttstadt, *Türkiye, Yahudiler ve Holokost* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2012), 366.

234 *Ibid.* Guttstadt attributes her argument to a regulation sent by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs urging Turkish missions to "prevent the mobilization of people in groups." She cites this information from the memoirs of Behiç Erkin, then-Turkish Ambassador to France. Shaw, *Turkey and the Holocaust*, 142. In the latest edition of his memoirs, Erkin states that the government in Ankara ordered them not to send "trains of people" to Turkey. Erkin, *Hatırat*, 567.

235 Cevdet Dülger, Turkey's consul general in Paris, provided for the release of sixteen Turkish Jews in September 1941. Bedii Arbel, Turkey's consul general in Marseille, saved Turkish Jews

these individual efforts that were subject to publications, Guttstadt questions one of the most renowned concerning the efforts of Turkish diplomats during the Holocaust. According to the narrative, Necdet Kent, vice consul of Turkey's consulate general in Marseille, opposed the deportation of Jews of Turkish origin. In order to prevent this, claims Kent, he boarded the train along with the deported Jews, and after a time, the Nazi officers apologized to him and permitted about eighty Jews return to Marseille.²³⁶ Guttstadt rejects Kent's depiction of the event. According to her, Kent's claims cannot be considered among the examples of individual efforts by Turkish diplomats during the World War II to save the lives of Turkish Jews.²³⁷

It would be unfair to discuss Guttstadt's point of view without taking into consideration the organizational structure of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs during World War II. Whatever its position, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs could not properly maintain communication with its embassies and consular missions even on vital diplomatic issues during World War II. The clearest example was the two-year-long ambassadorship of Rauf Orbay in the United Kingdom. Orbay was the Turkish ambassador to the United Kingdom between March 1942 and March 1944 and suffered severe communication problems with the ministry in Ankara. In her work on Orbay's ambassadorship in London, Akin concludes that the Ankara government and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "often acted negligently while informing its foreign representations, ... and ... many questions directed to the ministry

from compulsory labor service through considerable effort. Guttstadt, *Türkiye, Yahudiler ve Holokost*, 335 & 372.

236 Ibid., 379.

237 Guttstadt's position is shared by other authors. Arnold Reisman, in his study *Turkey and Turkish Jews*, states that "brave acts of heroism [of Turkish diplomats] were devised by themselves ... [not] the policy of Turkish government." Reisman's position was indeed a response to Bilal Şimşir's explanation. According to Şimşir, the efforts of Turkish diplomats to save Jews from concentration camps were initiated and ordered by the Turkish government. For a comparative analysis of works on the efforts of Turkish diplomats to save Jews from concentration camps, see İ. İzzet Bahar, *Turkey and the Rescue of Jews During Nazi Era: A Reappraisal of Two Cases, German-Jewish Scientists in Turkey & Turkish Jews in Occupied France* (PhD diss. University of Pittsburgh, 2012), 112-136.

remained unanswered.”²³⁸ It would be optimistic to imagine that a ministry unable to coordinate and direct its diplomatic missions with respect to critical issues could have a comprehensive program for the rescue of Turkish Jews and properly implement it in wartime conditions. In this regard, the Turkish MFA of the 1940s was indeed far from able to provide proper organization of any kind of humanitarian intervention. The efforts of Turkish diplomats to rescue “Turkish Jews” remained on an individual level, but this cannot be evaluated an anti-Semitic program of Turkish governments of the time.²³⁹

The legal immunities of diplomats were an issue of concern especially in the 1950s since “the increase in the number of states had also greatly increased the size of diplomatic corps.”²⁴⁰ As the number of people assigned as diplomats increased, the probability of the abuse of diplomatic immunities increased. In the case of Turkish diplomats, such a development emerged even before the 1950s, during World War II. Some Turkish diplomats were accused of abusing their diplomatic privileges during the war. Dikerdem notes that the war provided “unexpected opportunities to the Turkish diplomats in Europe; the ones who knew to benefit from the situation managed to earn much more than their salaries.”²⁴¹ In his words,

when the Germans were strictly controlling the borders, ... The German army ordered all customs stations not to apply customs duties on diplomats with Turkish passports and to provide convenience to them. Due to this, gold trafficking was being executed safely by our diplomats. ...

During the war, there were also diplomats who made their fortunes in different ways. Some smuggled the money of Jews illegally; some

238 Nur Özmel Akın, *Rauf Orbay’ın Londra Büyükelçiliği* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1999), 211.

239 Guttstadt places her argument in the context of early republican Turkey’s policies against Jews and non-Muslim minorities in general. According to her, early republican Turkey pursued policies to eliminate the non-Muslim minorities in the country, and the government’s indifference to Jews of Turkish origin was an extension of this attitude. Guttstadt, *Türkiye, Yahudiler ve Holokost*, 516.

240 Berridge, *Diplomacy...*, 18.

241 Güler, *Salon Verir...*, 535.

bought paintings and precious goods dirt cheap by exchanging gold from France, the Netherlands, and Belgium. ... Diplomats could then sell them at their real prices...²⁴²

Rauf Orbay, who was perhaps most authorized to express views on this issue, stated during a meeting, that included Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu and Foreign Minister Hasan Saka that “most of the [diplomatic couriers] were smuggling gold and foreign currency.”²⁴³ Some Turkish diplomats were subject to additional accusations in this period. The most typical example was a plane smuggling operation known as the “König affair” in modern Turkish history. The incident was revealed to the Turkish public when *Tan*, a newspaper with leftist political leanings, published that “people who bought planes from the United States for Turkey were arrested.”²⁴⁴ This “high-level smuggling” incident pioneered by Ekrem Hamdi Bakan (König) probably involved of prominent deputies and ministers of the time.²⁴⁵ What makes the incident worth examining for the purpose of this study is the probable involvement of some Turkish diplomats in the smuggling process. In June 1938, when it was time for the delivery of the “last party of the planes,” authorities in the United States warned the Turkish embassy in Washington for alleged irregularities

242 “Almanların sınırdan kuş uçurtmadıkları bir dönemde... Alman askeri makamları tüm gümrük kapılarına Türk pasaportu taşıyan diplomatların hiçbir muayeneye tabi tutulmamaları ve kendilerine her türlü kolaylığın gösterilmesi emrini vermişlerdi. Bu sayede diplomatların altın trafiği tehlikesizce yürütülebiliyordu....

Savaş sırasında başka yollardan da servet yapan diplomatlar görülmüştür. Bir kısmı yasal olmayan yollardan Yahudilerin paralarını kaçırarak komisyon almışlar, bir kısmı da Fransa, Hollanda ve Belçika'dan altın bozdurarak yok pahasına tablo ve kıymetli eşya satın almışlar, savolta sonra bunları gerçek değerine satabilmişlerdir...” Ibid., 535-6. Behiç Erkin, Turkey's ambassador to Vichy France, also notes that “all forms of conveniences were promised to the Turkish embassy” by Krug von Niedda, the representative of the Third Reich in France. Erkin, *Hatırat...*, 543.

243 Akın, *Rauf Orbay'ın Londra Büyükelçiliği*, 215.

244 Ayşe Hür, “König, İmpeks, Denizbank, Refah, Satie Olayları,” (Incidents of König, İmpeks, Denizbank, Refah, Satie) *Radikal Online*, December 22, 2013, accessed March 22, 2015, available from http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/ayse_hur/konig_impeks_denizbank_satie_refah_olaylari-1167411.

245 Ibid.

but the embassy did not take the issue seriously.²⁴⁶ However, when details of the incident came out, the responsibility of officials of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy was also revealed.²⁴⁷

3.2.5 *The Post-World War II Turkish MFA*

After the end of World War II, Turkish foreign policy tilted towards a more precise pro-Western line, as did the foreign ministry. In 1947, the first permanent representation was established at the United Nations. When Turkey was accepted into North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs took up the relations with this organization. In this regard, both the NATO department in Ankara and Turkey's permanent delegation at NATO headquarters in Paris rose to prominence within the ministry.²⁴⁸ Increasing and deepening foreign economic relations including American aid imposed new burdens on the ministry. These new burdens, on the other hand, increased the profile of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs above that of other bureaucratic institutions in Turkey.

The emergence of the Cyprus dispute was another watershed in Turkish foreign policy in the 1950s and for the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well. The Cyprus Department of the Foreign Ministry, from the 1950s

246 Ibid.

247 Sinan Kuneralp, “İspanya İç Savaşı’nda Uçak Ticareti ve Ekrem König,” *Tarih ve Toplum* 60, (December 1988), 6-7, cited from Koçak, *Türkiye’de...*, 200. Ekrem Hamdi (König) ordered the planes by forging the signatures of the undersecretaries of Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Defense. König also ordered forged seals for these two ministries. Most probably, König cooperated with more than one diplomat. However, the only individual from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be judged before the court was Ruhi Bozcalı, a low-ranking Turkish diplomat. Bozcalı intercepted documents coming from the United States and delivered them to König, for which he was paid 10,000 Turkish lire. Bozcalı was sentenced to three-months imprisonment. Ibid.

248 In parallel with the mission abroad, there was a unit established in Ankara called “NATO General Secretariat at the Center (*Merkez NATO Genel Sekreterliği*). İskit, *Diplomasi...*, 356. In 1967, this unit was renamed as the Department of Mutual Security Affairs “as a sign of changing times.” Kuneralp, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” 507.

onwards, consumed the energy of the ministry.²⁴⁹ Long before the 1970s, when dozens of Turkish diplomats would be killed by Armenian perpetrators, the foreign ministry had its first “martyrs” in the 1950s on a flight to London to talks over the Cyprus dispute. The plane carrying the Turkish delegation to the London Conference in 1959 crashed in England, and Turkish diplomats İlhan Savut and Güner Türkmen died.²⁵⁰

Between June 1950 and 1960 only two people, Fuat Köprülü (1950-1956) and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu (1957-1960), served as Minister of Foreign Affairs.²⁵¹ The latter was a career diplomat in the ministry before his political career. Gökmen, who was young diplomat during the Democrat Party (DP) governments, reflects on the considerable influence of these two powerful figures in the Ministry.

There was a distinction made frequently in the ministry between the *Fatinists* and *Fuadists* when Fuat Köprülü was the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was the Minister of State with the capability to intervene the [foreign] ministry. It is also necessary to add ... the group of opportunists [who were] neither *Fatinist* nor *Fuadist*.²⁵²

249 Ibid.

250 Melih Esenbel, the third diplomat on the plane, survived. As an outstanding diplomat, Esenbel served as the Turkish ambassador to Washington three times. (1960, 1967-74 and 1975-79). Between 1974 and 1975, Esenbel served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

251 “Dışişleri Bakanları Listesi,” *TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, accessed March 2, 2015. available from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_disisleri-bakanlari-listesi.tr.mfa. Ethem Menderes deputized foreign ministry between June 1956 and November 1957. Ibid. Even during Menderes’ term in foreign ministry, Zorlu’s influence was visible most notably in appointment processes. Uzun, *Türk Dışişlerinde Fatin Rüştü Zorlu*, 61.

252 “Fuat Köprülü’nün Dışişleri Bakanı, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu’nun da Dışişlerine sık sık müdahale imkanlarını elinde tutan Devlet Bakanı bulunduğu sıralarda, bakanlıkta Fatinistler-Fuadistler ayrımı yapılmıştır. Tabi buna bir de, ne Fatinist ne Fuadist... oportünistler grubunu da ilave etmek gerekecektir.” Gökmen, *Diplomasi...*, 52. Günver notes in his accounts that Zorlu asked him ironically – “Tell me, are you Fatinist or Fuadist?” – after a tense session in TBMM which resulted Zorlu’s dismissal from the cabinet by Menderes. Günver adds that the dispute between Köprülü and Zorlu had a “personal” dimension. According to him, “the character of Köprülü was not convenient for a foreign minister, [since] he was aviophobic. ... Yet he

Haluk Afra, who joined the foreign ministry in the second half of the 1950s, states that “a group of directors general and their ‘disciples’ were called ‘the children of Fatin.’”²⁵³ Afra’s statements present an additional example of Gökmen’s claim. The increasing influence of Zorlu in the ministry was not restricted to the operations of diplomatic bureaucracy. During his term as minister of foreign affairs between 1957 and 1960, Zorlu became influential in foreign policy decision-making processes comparable only to that of Numan Menemencioğlu in the 1930s and 1940s. Ercüment Yavuzalp, who was a young career diplomat during the DP period and personal secretary of prime minister between 1956 and 1960, claimed that Menderes was less concerned with foreign policy in the second half of the 1950s than in the first five years of his prime ministry.²⁵⁴ Yavuzalp also adds that “Menderes found it less necessary to deal with foreign policy after Zorlu became the minister of foreign affairs, and [Zorlu] proved his merit.”²⁵⁵ Yet, Yavuzalp also notes that during his term as personal secretary to Menderes, the Prime Minister undertook the leadership of Turkish delegations in international meetings while Zorlu and foreign ministry bureaucrats remained in the background.²⁵⁶

wanted to preserve the foreign ministry; it was a matter of honor. ... Köprülü immediately hated Zorlu and launched a fierce political war against him ... Köprülü endured Zorlu politely ... but waiting for an opportunity [against him].” Günver, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu...*, 47-48 & 61.

253 Haluk Afra, *Hariciyeciler Dedikodu Sever* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1999), 43.

254 Ercüment Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996), 58.

255 Ibid. Adnan Menderes was known for his trust of the professional skills of Turkish diplomats. Ambassador Muharrem Nuri Birgi was serving as the interpreter of Menderes in a meeting. Altough Menderes realized that Birgi changed some of his statements during translation, he did not react to the veteran diplomat. The prime minister was aware that Birgi sought to “diplomatize” his words. İlter Türkmen notes that converting the words of politicians to a more diplomatic tone was a tradition among Turkish diplomats which he practiced several times during his professional life. İlter Türkmen, “Muharrem Nuri Birgi,” in *Dış Politikamızın Perde Arkası: 23 Büyüükeliçinin Olaylara Bakışı*, ed. Turhan Fırat (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2005), 302-303. In chapter 2, it was noted that diplomats “construct the selfhood of their state through diplomatic practices.” See chapter 2, 30. This tradition can be considered a clear example of that situation.

256 Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, 62.

Menderes governments in most cases did not intervene in internal processes within the foreign ministry. Mahmut Dikerdem claims that “Zorlu definitely prevented domestic politics ... from influencing the management of the ministry, and for the sake of this; he clashed even with the leaders of the Democrat Party.”²⁵⁷ Taking his claims a step further, Dikerdem makes a clear distinction between the Democrat Party years and years afterwards. According to him, degeneration in the ministry began with the military coup of May 27, 1960.

After May 27, first, the ones who had ties with the National Unity Committee (*Milli Birlik Komitesi-MBK*), then the ones who managed to gain the support of either [Justice Party] AP or CHP, utilized these ties to receive a post. In that chaotic period, along with individual merit and effort, the support of family ties and the favors of influential commanders played a role in promotion. ... The customs of the extraordinary period continued when MBK governments were replaced by a parliamentary regime; the only change was the replacement of military officers with political parties.²⁵⁸

Although there is no precise information confirming Dikerdem’s assertion, Semih Günver, another diplomat of the time, also claims that during the DP years, the “winds of domestic politics did not influence the ministry.”²⁵⁹ It must be kept in mind that Günver was among those who were called, in Afra’s words, “the children of Fatin.” According to him, Zorlu’s attitude was a primary factor for the ministry’s relatively strong immunity from domestic politics during the 1950s.

257 Güler, *Salon Verir...*, 524.

258 “27 Mayıs’tan sonra ise, önce Milli Birlik Komitesi’yle yakınlığı olanlar, daha sonraları da CHP ya da AP’ye yanaşmayı becerenler bu ilişkilerinden bir post kapmak için yararlanabilmişlerdir. O karışık dönemde... kişisel yetenek ve çabaların yanında, aile ilişkilerinin desteği ve nüfuzlu komutanların teveccühü başlıca rolü oynamıştır... MBK hükümetleri yerini parlamenter demokratik rejime bıraktıktan sonra da olağanüstü dönemin alışkanlıklarını sürdürmiş, değişen tek şey askerin yerini siyasi partilerin alması olmuştur.” Ibid.

259 Günver, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu...*, 51.

[Zorlu] did not allow domestic politics to interfere with the ministry of Foreign Affairs. I worked with him for years and did not hear the word [Democrat] Party from him ... His relations with the party were limited to his personal relationship with Menderes.²⁶⁰

Günver exemplifies Zorlu's determination to preserve the foreign ministry from political considerations as follows:

On February 26, [1958], Zorlu accounted for relations with NATO, the Baghdad Pact, and especially the Cyprus dispute. The first quarrel with Faik Ahmet Barutçu, the spokesperson of Republican People's Party in foreign policy issues, increased the tension. At the time, Ecmel Barutçu, the son of [Faik Ahmet] Barutçu, was working as a career officer in the Second Department of the Ministry dealing with the most critical economic issues. DP deputies criticized Zorlu for this. Yet Zorlu retained Ecmel in office and, when pressure increased considerably, appointed him to the consulate general in New York six months before his friends [in order to protect Barutçu].²⁶¹

During the DP years of Turkish politics, Zorlu served in three different positions: high-ranking diplomat (1950-1954), deputy prime minister responsible

260 “[Zorlu] Dışişleri Bakanlığına iç politikayı sokmadı. Uzun yıllar yanında çalıştım, ağızından parti lafini duymadım... Parti ile ilişkisi Menderes'in şahsi ile olan yakınlığından ibaretti.” Ibid.

261 “26 Şubat'ta [1958] Zorlu, TBMM'de NATO, Bağdat Paktı, Balkan Paktı, Sovetlerle ilişkiler ve özellikle Kıbrıs konusunda izahat veriyor. CHP'nin dış politika sözcüsü olan Ahmet Faik Barutçu ile aralarında ilk sert münakaşa havayı gerginleştiriyor. Bu arada Barutçu'nun oğlu Ecmel Barutçu, bakanlıkta... en önemli işlere bakan ikinci Şubede meslek memuru olarak çalışmaktadır. DP milletvekilleri bu yüzden Zorlu'yu eleştirmektedirler. Fakat Zorlu, Ecmel'i görevinde muhafaza etmiş ve baskı çok artınca, New York Başkonsolosluğu kançalarlığına arkadaşlarından altı ay önce tayin etmiştir.” Günver, *Fatih Rüştü Zorlu...*, 81-82. Zorlu's sense of objectivity was more than strong. For example, when Coşkun Kırca, then a mid-ranking career officer, resigned due to a dispute with Zorlu, he tried to persuade Kırca to reverse his decision. İzzeddin Çalışlar, ed. *Ekselans: Coşkun Kırca* (İstanbul: Galatasaray Eğitim Vakfı, 2009), 306. As this example clarifies, neither political dissents nor personal disagreements prevented Zorlu acting objectively with respect to his juniors.

for economic affairs and the Cyprus dispute (1954-1957), and the minister of foreign affairs (1957-1960).²⁶² Günver, as a mid-ranking Turkish diplomat, was a close colleague of Zorlu's during route these periods. He explains Zorlu's basic foreign policy preferences and outcomes of his approach to Ministry bureaucracy as follows:

In foreign policy, he [Zorlu] prioritized the Western world – not because of an ideological preference, but because he believed that Europe and most notably the United States could be useful to the development of Turkey. His sympathy for the United States was limited to the significance of the aid provided to Turkey. He was courageous enough to oppose American policies and demands that were contrary to the interests of Turkey ... [During his term in the Commerce Department of the foreign ministry, Zorlu] aimed to prevent Turkey's isolation, provide it with foreign aid, establish an economic infrastructure, and then search for the financial resources to invest in industry and, improve agriculture at the same time. He aimed to gather a good cadre around him. ... Zorlu ... gathered ... young, gifted diplomats who later would become grand figures like Turgut Menemencioğlu, Mahmut Dikerdem, Taha Carım, Oğuz Gökmen, and Necmettin Tuncel.²⁶³

262 Contrary to his rival and predecessor, Fuat Köprülü, Zorlu was quite active during his term in office. Throughout his 949-day-long Ministry (between November 25, 1957 and May 27, 1960), Zorlu made thirty-three official visits abroad and was away from Ankara for 378 days, roughly a year. Günver, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun...*, 97.

263 "Dış politikada önceliği batı dünyasına vermektediydi. Bu ideolojik bir inanış sebebiyle değil, Türkiye'nin kalkınmasında başta ABD, Avrupa'nın faydalı olacağını düşünüyordu. ABD'ye sempatisi, Türkiye'ye sağlanacak yardımların önemi ile sınırlıydı. Ülke çıkarlarına ters düşen davranışlar veya zorlamalar karşısında Amerikalıları her defasında karşısına almak cesaretini de göstermiştir... Türkiye'yi yalnızlıktan kurtarmak, dış yardımlar sağlamak, ülkede önce bir iktisadi altyapı kurdurmak ve ikinci safhada sanayi alanında yatırımları mümkün kılmak için finansman kaynakları aramak, bir taraftan tarımı diğer taraftan sanayi geliştirmek ilk gayeleri arasındaydı... Yanına iyi bir genç kadro toplamaya çalıştı... İleride büyük isimler olacak Turgut Menemencioğlu, Mahmut Dikerdem, Taha Carım, Oğuz Gökmen, Necmettin Tuncel gibi genç ve parlak diplomatları toplamıştı." Ibid., 32, 34, 35 & 38.

§ 3.3 Concluding Remarks

Although the Ottoman Empire assigned permanent representatives at a relatively late date, – that is to say in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century – the Ottoman Foreign Ministry as a modern bureaucratic institution was an early example of its type. In an age of balance of power politics, the Ottoman Hariciye not only operated as the bureaucratic mechanism to conduct foreign relations, a duty strongly related to the empire's efforts to survive, but was also an engine of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization process from the early days of its establishment. According to Yurdusev, “diplomats were the initiators of the modernization efforts in the late Ottoman period.”²⁶⁴ The Ottoman diplomatic bureaucracy, as previously illustrated in this chapter, also featured the “ethnic tensions” of the late Ottoman Empire. In this regard, the Ottoman-Turkish Hariciye was more than an institution only responsible for conducting diplomatic relations. As a consequence, The Ottoman Foreign Ministry occupied an influential and even “first among equals” position within the state as a whole, which was also inherited by the Republican administration. Yurdusev notes that republican foreign affairs bureaucracy especially inherited the pro-Western orientation of the Ottoman Hariciye.²⁶⁵

The course the republican foreign ministry illustrates that the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy between 1920 and 1960 flourished in the hands of some grand, prominent figures. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, in this regard, was the first and foremost founding figure of the republican foreign ministry. He was influential not only in the appointment of ambassadors to prominent posts and the determination foreign policy preferences, but even interfered in the basic daily issues of the ministry such as participating in the examinations of some new candidates.²⁶⁶ This was, however, was neither unique to Mustafa Kemal nor Turkey. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs considerably resembled other foreign ministries of the interwar years. As Steiner puts it, leaders of the

264 Yurdusev, “Osmanlı Mirası ve Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine,” 51.

265 Ibid.

266 Harris, *Atatürk's Diplomats*, 109. Mustafa Kemal took part in the examining process of Leyla Çambel but turned the candidate down. Ibid.

time “either became their own foreign secretaries or found that their foreign ministries willingly served the new regimes; almost the whole of the Spanish Republic’s diplomatic service went over to Franco whereas the *Wilhelmstrasse* (German foreign ministry), with few exceptions, served Hitler.”²⁶⁷ In Japan, people with military backgrounds increased their presence within the Japanese Foreign Ministry.²⁶⁸ This trend, moreover, should not be reduced to authoritarian regimes of the time: “In the democracies, too, the politicians increasingly took the initiative not only in the making but in the execution of foreign policy.”²⁶⁹

Apart from the presidents of the early republican period, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1923-1938) and İsmet İnönü (1938-1950), some prominent figures influenced the character of the early republican foreign ministry. Numan Menemencioğlu between 1929 and 1944 and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu throughout the 1950s were other founding fathers of the republican foreign ministry. There were similar trends in other European foreign ministries during the early decades of the twentieth century. H.A. van Karnebeek in the Netherlands, Eyre Crowe in the United Kingdom, Philippe Berthelot in France and F. Edmund Schüler in Germany were leading figures in reforming foreign ministries in the twentieth century.²⁷⁰ Zorlu’s concentration on economic affairs and consolidation of the role of the foreign ministry in foreign economic relations was a derivative of Schüler’s Office of Foreign Trade, for example.²⁷¹ It was an age in which economic departments were “established and considerably strengthened within foreign ministries.”²⁷²

In sum, the late Ottoman and early republican foreign ministries were not deprived of the capabilities of their counterparts in Europe. When diplomatic representation was institutionalized among European powers, Ottoman diplomacy was also institutionalized. Leaders and their ideologies dominated foreign ministries in the interwar era, and the early republican foreign

267 Steiner, “Foreign Ministries...”³⁵⁹.

268 Ibid.

269 Ibid.

270 Ibid., 356.

271 Ibid.

272 Ibid.

ministry was not an exception. On the other hand, both the Ottoman and Turkish diplomatic bureaucracies were predominantly in an interactive relationship with the realities of domestic politics, which was the most prominent element of continuity between the two regimes.



4

A General Overview of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1960 and 1980: Tendencies and Transformations

§ 4.1 An Outline of the Turkish MFA in the 1960-1980 Period

Between May 1960 and September 1980, twenty governments were formed in Turkey. In these two decades, ten foreign ministers served. Between 1923 and 1960, only two of the nine foreign ministers were originally career diplomats. In the 1960-80 period, however, this number was six.¹ Nevertheless, it would be hard to interpret this increase as a sufficient factor for the consolidation of the ministry's power in foreign policy-making. Career diplomats were assigned as foreign ministers mostly during coup administrations or interim governments.² Political leaders preferred to appoint foreign

1 Kuneralp, "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs," 508. Selim Rauf Sarper, Feridun Cemal Erkin, Hasan Esat İşık, Osman Olcay, Ümit Haluk Bayülken, and Melih Esenbel were the career diplomats who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in this period. "List of Foreign Ministers," *TC Foreign Ministry Website*, accessed March 30, 2015, available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/list-of-former-ministers-of-foreign-affairs.en.mfa>.

2 Selim R. Sarper was appointed as the foreign minister when the first cabinet was formed after the coup d'état of May 27, 1960, and remained in this position until 1962. He maintained his position after the first democratic elections in the post-27 May period, and Feridun Cemal

ministers from within their circles instead of diplomats in the cases that their political parties came out of elections victorious. Süleyman Demirel, the leader of the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*, AP), won the elections on October 20, 1965, by a landslide, and he appointed İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil as the foreign minister. Similarly, Bülent Ecevit appointed Turan Güneş as his foreign minister in the cabinet after the CHP's victory in the 1973 elections.

With the exception of two phases, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained and even consolidated its *sui generis* position within the bureaucracy. The first phase was immediately after the coup d'état of May 27, 1960. As a consequence of certain regulations and decisions following the coup d'état, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to transfer some of its authority in the realm of foreign policy to other institutions. The details of this process will be discussed in detail in chapter 5.

Second, when Bülent Ecevit formed his second government on January 5, 1978, his foreign minister Gündüz Ökçün, sought to reshape the ideology and the administrative cadres within the foreign ministry in line with the political agenda of the government.³ Yıldırım Keskin, a diplomat of the time, notes that right wing governments were less eager to intervene in ministry affairs since they were aware of their ineptitude in diplomatic issues, whereas leftist governments were more likely to leave a strong impression on the Ministry.⁴ Yalın Eralp, a mid-ranking Turkish diplomat in the second half of the 1970s, states

Erkin, his successor, was also a career officer and would serve as foreign minister until 1965. After Turkish military's intervention in politics on March 12, 1971, this time via a memorandum rather than a coup, Osman Olcay and Haluk Bayülken served as foreign ministers in the post-12 March governments. Melih Esenbel served as foreign minister in Sadi Irmak's interim government between November 1974 and March 1975. *Ibid.*

³ Ökçün was an unfamiliar minister in various respects. During his term as foreign minister, he made considerable efforts to strengthen the ties between the ministry and School of Political Sciences in Ankara. Moreover, in his visit to New York for the United Nations General Assembly session, he included İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil in the Turkish delegation as the representative of the opposition. Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Gündüz Ökçün'ün Öğrettikleri ve Düşündürdükleri," *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 47, no. 1 (1992), 6.

⁴ Yıldırım Keskin, *Zaman Akarken: Edebiyat ve Diplomasi Anıları* (İstanbul: Dünya Kitap, 2005), 89.

that the concerns of “domestic politics penetrated the ministry under Gündüz Ökçün.”⁵ Eralp also cites that an American congress member of the time known for his sympathy to Turkey told him that “this foreign minister will lead Turkey to make enemies.”⁶ Coşkun Kırca notes in his memoirs that “the first decision of the Ecevit government in 1978 was to recall them to Ankara and leave them jobless.”⁷ Ekrem Güvendiren remarks that Ökçün issued a new regulation prohibiting “the appointment of diplomats younger than [Ökçün] as ambassadors.”⁸ Güvendiren also notes that Ökçün prevented his assignment as ambassador, labeling him a “chauvinist nationalist.”⁹ In a similar vein, Baytok notes that

technocrat cadres of the foreign ministry are the least influenced among state offices during government changeovers. When Bülent Ecevit became the prime minister and Gündüz Ökçün began to serve as the foreign minister, a radical change of staff was introduced in our ministry. A veritable reform cadre was formed with predominantly left-leaning diplomats.¹⁰

Apart from the influences of the coup d'état in 1960 and the second Ecevit government with Gündüz Ökçün being the foreign minister between January 1978 and November 1979, was the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy immune from the influence of domestic politics in the 1960-80 period? In order to

5 Eralp, Interview by the Author.

6 Eralp, *Perdeyi Aralarken: Bir Monşerin Hatıratı* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2017), 49. Eralp notes in his memoirs that Ökçün called him as “traitor” for his pro-Western worldview. *Ibid.*, 46.

7 Çalışlar, *Ekselans...*, 306. The other ambassador left idle by Foreign Minister Ökçün was İlter Türkmen, who was also known for his commitment to the NATO alliance. Eralp, *Perdeyi Aralarken*, 51.

8 Ekrem Güvendiren, *Hayat Yollarında: Londra'dan Prag'a, Washington'dan Tel-Aviv'e Uzanan Diplomatik Yolculuk* (İstanbul: Som Kitap, 2013), 165.

9 *Ibid.*

10 “Dışişleri Bakanlığı teknokrat kadrosu, devlet daireleri içerisinde siyasi değişikliklerinden en az etkilenenidir. 1978’de Bülent Ecevit Başbakan, Gündüz Ökçün de Dışişleri Bakanı olunca bizim bakanlıkta da radikal bir kadro değişikliğine gidildi. Daha çok sol eğilimde görünen memurlarla adeta bir reform kadrosu oluşturuldu.” Taner Baytok, *Dış Politikada Bir Nefes: Anılar* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2005), 248.

answer this question, it would be fair to locate the position of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs within Turkish state in the aforementioned period. This can be done by illustrating the main features of the ministry in the aforementioned period.

Although the military administration after the coup of May 1960 degraded it through certain regulations and implementations, Turkish diplomacy held a *primus inter pares* position within the Turkish bureaucracy. As a symbolic example, the highest-ranking bureaucrat's title was *undersecretary* (*müsteşar*) in other ministries, whereas in the foreign ministry, the title for the same relative position was *secretary general* (*katibi umumi* or *genel sekreter*).¹¹ Another unique feature of the Ministry better explains its first among equals position in the 1960s and 70s. Throughout these decades the foreign ministry building was an extension of the prime ministry, meaning that the two institutions worked in a close contact that was not vouchsafed to any other ministry. The decision was made in 1952, proving then-Prime Minister Menderes' precision to the prominence of the conduct of foreign policy.¹²

The influence of this practice continued in the post-1960 period. The ministry's proximity to the prime minister's office contributed to its prestige.¹³ A Turkish diplomat recalls that "İsmet İnönü did not begin his work day without calling and listening to the secretary general of the ministry of foreign affairs, whose office was adjacent to the room of the prime minister."¹⁴

11 This was not initiated at the beginning of the 1960s but rather dated back to the inauguration of the office in the late 1920s. Nevertheless, this practice was ended after the 12 September 1980 coup to eliminate disunity in the statecraft. This was also the end of one of the symbolic elements defining the supremacy of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs over other bureaucratic institutions. Girgin, *Osmani ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi Hariciye Tarihimiz...*, 150 & 152.

12 The first building of the ministry was used between 1920 and May 9, 1928 and after the ministry moved from this building, the Turkish Central Bank began to use it. The second building of the ministry was used between May 9, 1928 and September 1952 and was later used by the then-Ministry of Customs and Monopoly. Ibid., 228 & 230.

13 A young Turkish diplomat of the time depicts this prestige as follows: "The position of the ministry [building] was no doubt the symbol of its prominence within the government and state body." Ömer Altuğ, *Hatırında Kalanlar: Bir Diplomatın Ege'den Baltıklar'a Uzanan Öyküsü* (Ankara: Boyut, 2014), 87.

14 Ecmel Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru* (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 1999), 53.

Prestige was not the only concern; there were also practical outcomes of the closeness of the prime minister's office to the foreign ministry. The typical example is Turkey's military intervention to Cyprus in July and August 1974. A Turkish diplomat portrays this situation as follows:

During the Cyprus crisis, we witnessed the practicality of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Prime Ministry using the same office space. The room of the minister of foreign affairs was a maximum of ten meters from the office of the prime minister. It was possible to reach the prime minister's office from the most distant foreign affairs department in three or four minutes. Urgent and prominent telegraphs received from abroad could instantly be delivered to the prime minister. It was also possible to present the orders of the prime minister to be delivered to diplomatic missions without any wasted time. This situation, of course, constituted a great advantage where the gain of even a few minutes was of great significance.¹⁵

Ecmel Barutçu, another diplomat of the time, notes the usefulness of the proximity between the ministry of foreign affairs and the prime minister's office. For him, the proximity of the ministry, the cabinet, and the prime minister's office was a great opportunity; otherwise, the course of events could have been different.¹⁶

There was also another factor other than the proximity of the ministry building to the prime minister: the architecture of the building used between 1952 and 87 itself. Called the "corridor" due to its architectural structure, the ministry was a three-story horizontal building consisting of offices opening

15 "Kıbrıs krizi sırasında, Başbakanlıkla, Dışişleri Bakanlığının aynı binada olmasının pratik yararlarını çok yakından gördük. Dışişleri Bakanının odası, Başbakanın odasından en çok on metre mesafedeydi. Dışişleri dairelerinin en uzağından, Başbakanın bürosuna ise en çok üç ila dört dakikada ulaşmak mümkündü. Yurtdışından gelen acele ve önemli telgraflar anında Başbakan'a iletilebiliyordu. Temsilciliklere gidecek ve önemi dolayısıyla Başbakana gerekli talimatlar vakit kaybedilmeden kendisine sunulabiliyordu. Tabii bu durum, bazı hallerde birkaç dakikalık bir kazancın bile çok önemli olduğu kriz dönemlerinde büyük bir avantaj teşkil ediyordu." Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*, 171

16 Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru*, 51.

onto three corridors on the three floors.¹⁷ This horizontal structure provided easy contact and coordination of not only high-ranking but also low-ranking officers. Moreover, the corridor functioned to bring the officers closer and increase the sense of solidarity among them. As a consequence, members of the ministry met twice or three times a day.¹⁸ This structure influenced not only the operational capacity of the ministry but the relations among its members. As a Turkish journalist claimed while analyzing the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy, “the corridor ... was the expression of the ministry's collective memory.”¹⁹

In spite of the advantageous aspects of the ministry building in the aforementioned period, it was not capable of meeting all the needs of the ministry and its personnel. A report written in the bulletin of the foreign ministry published in April 1965 underscored the necessity of a new, independent building to serve just the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²⁰ If a new building was not possible, the report was suggested adding a floor to the existing building since it was incapable of meeting the needs in terms of administrative, technical, and security concerns.²¹

The prestigious position of the foreign ministry, nevertheless, did not mean the working environment was comfortable for its members in all respects. In 1964, for example, the ministry's budget only surpassed 100 million Turkish lira.²² This budget had to meet the needs of fifteen directorates general and two bureaus,²³ but in that year, the ministry was represented by fifty-two embassies, five missions, three delegations and representations, twenty-seven

17 İskit, *Diplomasi...*, 364.

18 Ufuk Güldemir, *Teksas-Malatya* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1992), 124.

19 Ibid.

20 TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, “Bina Meselesi,” (The Issue of Building) *Dışişleri Belleteni* (Foreign Affairs Bulletin) 7, (Ankara: 1965), 21.

21 Ibid.

22 Fuat Bayramoğlu, “Dışişleri Belleteni Üzerine Düşünceler,” (Opinions on the foreign ministry Bulletin) *Dışişleri Belleteni* (Foreign Affairs Bulletin) 1, (Ankara: 1964), ii.

23 TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, “Dışişleri Teşkilatı,” (Foreign Affairs Organization) *Dışişleri Belleteni* (Foreign Affairs Bulletin) 1, (Ankara: 1964), 76.

consulates general, and two consulates.²⁴ Moreover, the ministry was aiming to increase the number of its missions in Western Europe and consolidate the functional capacities of these missions due to the flow of Turkish migrants to countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, and France. The budget issue, however, complicated the conditions. Between 1961 and 1964, the ministry considerably increased the number of its consular missions, but the budget remained almost constant, rising from 123.9 million lire to only 137.8 million.²⁵

As a consequence, the budget was a significant concern for the ministry's operations throughout the 1970s. Hamit Batu, then head of the fourth department in the ministry, noted that the Quai d'Orsay, set aside half its budget for the departments of cultural relations and technical assistance.²⁶ A report published in the bulletin of the ministry drew attention to this deficiency. According to the report, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs lacked the financial resources of its equivalents in Western Europe. The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs's budget (80 million dollars) was almost six times higher than that of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (15 million dollars) in 1965.²⁷ Italy was comparable to Turkey – in that it was a member of NATO, a migrant-sending country, and a southern European element of the Western alliance. Moreover, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs's budget even fell behind the budgets of countries known for their relatively neutral positions in international politics. For example, Sweden and Switzerland's foreign ministry budgets were twice that of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²⁸ Even the budgets of relatively small states such as Denmark and Israel spared more resources for their foreign ministries.²⁹

24 Ibid. 80.

25 TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, "İdari Konular," (Administrative Issues) *Dışişleri Belleteni* (Foreign Affairs Bulletin) 4, (Ankara: 1965), 18.

26 Hamit Batu, "Dış Siyaset ve Tanıtma," (Foreign Affairs and Promotion) *Dışişleri Belleteni* (Foreign Affairs Bulletin) 2, (Ankara: 1964), 115.

27 TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, "İdari Konular," (Administrative Issues) *Dışişleri Belleteni* (Foreign Affairs Bulletin) 4, (Ankara: 1965), 17.

28 Ibid., 18.

29 Ibid., 18. Interestingly, the Greece foreign ministry, which had a similar scope of work as the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had half the budget of its Turkish counterpart. Ibid.

When examining the leading figures of the 1960s and 70s, one figure is inevitably essential to be discussed. A civil bureaucrat for more than three decades, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil became the Turkish minister of foreign affairs in October 1965 and maintained this position for six consecutive years. Çağlayangil, again served as foreign minister between March 1975 and June 1977, and between July 1977 and December 1978. He was the second-longest-serving person to serve as foreign minister after Tevfik Rüştü Aras. Perhaps one of the most trustworthy political comrades of Süleyman Demirel, Çağlayangil served in all but his last cabinet since that time he was head of the Turkish senate. The foreign minister of the last Demirel cabinet, Hayrettin Erkmen, was dismissed by interpellation. Erkmen was the first Turkish foreign minister to lose his office through such a process.³⁰ By itself, this example clarifies the unique character of the 1960-1980 period.

Çağlayangil's appointment was found odd by many people including himself. In his memoirs, he notes that "he was the first person to criticize his appointment as the foreign minister," and according to him, "many authors criticized Prime Minister [Demirel] for choosing him as the foreign minister, [though later] these people expressed their admiration of and apologies to [Çağlayangil]."³¹ The perceptions of the ministry personnel followed a similar path. Mahmut Dikerdem notes that the "assignment of Çağlayangil was met with both astonishment and disdain," and as a consequence, Çağlayangil himself "behaved with respect and modesty toward the high-ranking officials in the foreign ministry."³² Taner Baytok praises Çağlayangil's ability to negotiate and capacity to persuade his addressees.³³ According to Girgin, Çağlayangil was a "[foreign] minister open to innovations."³⁴ Çağlayangil also respected the professional accumulation of Turkish diplomats in most cases. On his first day in office, Çağlayangil ordered Yalım Eralp, then a young diplomat and his interpreter, "to say what is necessary even if he [Çağlayangil] mentioned a

30 "Erkmen Düşürüldü," (Erkmen is dismissed) *Milliyet*, September 6, 1980, 1

31 İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, *Anılarım* (İstanbul: Güneş Yayınları, 1990), 266-267.

32 Güler, *Salon Verir...*, 593.

33 Baytok, *Diş Politikada...*, 131.

34 Girgin, *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi...*, 143.

soccer match” during an international meeting.³⁵ However, his respect of Turkish diplomats did not last long during his term in office. While talking about Turkish diplomats six years after his last at the foreign ministry, Çağlayangil described the officials of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy as follows:

To my surprise, I overrated those diplomats. After I became minister, in order to know them well, I recruited some as advisors. I took some of them to international state visits with me. Do you know in the end what they did? Backbite each other ... [they] discredited their friends to replace them. Once I saw this, I lost my respect for all of them.³⁶

§ 4.2 Ideology of an Institution: Was There One?

Many foreign ministries of the time were the targets of “ideological attacks” in the 1960-80 period. As Berridge notes, “for much of the period following World War II, foreign ministries and their diplomatic services were frequently targets of attack from politicians and commissions of inquiry, and persistently sniped at by the tabloid press.”³⁷ Even after the Cold War, in 1997, George F. Kennan, an outstanding American ambassador of the Cold War period, complained that Americans wrongly believe that “the diplomatic service is dominated by effete snobs from monied and socially distinguished backgrounds.”³⁸ This was indeed one of the traditional handicaps of diplomatic practice. As Sofer recalls, “from its ... beginnings, diplomacy was surrounded by suspicion ...[because] the diplomat belongs to the category of ‘men in great places, whose lives are conducted behind barriers, ... [and] diplomatic privileges and

35 Eralp, *Perdeyi...*, 21.

36 “Meğer ben bu hariciyecileri gözümde fazla büyütmüştüm. Bakan olduktan sonra onları iyi tanımak için kimini yanına danışman aldım, kimini dış ülkelere resmi ziyarete giderken beraberimde götürürdüm. Bütün yaptıkları neydi biliyor musun? Birbirlerini çektiştirmek, arkadaşını gözümden düşürüp onun yerini almaya çalışmak. Bunu görünce hiçbirisine saygım kalmadı.” “Çağlayangil Anlatıyor,” (Çağlayangil Tells) *Milliyet*, 21 December 1984. 8.

37 Berridge, *Diplomacy...*, 18.

38 George F. Kennan, “Diplomacy without Diplomats?” *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 5 (1997), 210.

immunities set him apart from ordinary man.”³⁹ Reputations for social exclusiveness in recruitment and high living abroad” adds Berridge, are “combine[d] with the lack of domestic political base and thus, makes the antipathy towards diplomatic bureaucracy by no means surprising.”⁴⁰

As a widely-accepted principle, “ideological polarization tends to make diplomatic work more difficult.”⁴¹ Cold War conditions proved in many cases that ideological conflicts led to profound polarization, preventing diplomats from implementing their normal tasks, – that is “to permit communication [and] to maintain a dialogue across political, cultural, and ideological boundaries.”⁴² Although there were efforts to pursue a multi-dimensional foreign policy, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 1960-1980 period was, in many respects, clearly a Cold War institution. As Ömer Engin Lütem, a Turkish diplomat of the Cold War years, puts it, “there was only one policy for Turkey in the 1950s and even in the 60s: Western alliance.”⁴³ Yalim Eralp, similarly notes that

contrary to today, Turkish diplomats saw Turkey as part of NATO. Nevertheless, they did not neglect the Soviet Union. A pro-Third World current was initiated by a small group during the term of Gündüz Ökçün. [Along with ideological concerns], this was partly because of the influence of the Cyprus question.⁴⁴

Davis-Cross sees diplomats as member of an epistemic community who “have a profound effect on the broader sets of relations within which they are

39 Sofer, “The Diplomat as Stranger,” 181.

40 Berridge, *Diplomacy...*, 18.

41 Jean Robert Leguey-Feilleux, *The Dynamics of Diplomacy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 153.

42 Ibid.

43 Ömer Engin Lütem, *Interview by the Author*. Online Interview. January 20, 2017.

44 “Türk diplomatları soğuk savaş döneminde Türkiye'yi, bu günlerinin aksine, NATO'nun bir parçası olarak görürlerdi. Bununla beraber, Sovyet Rusya'yı da gözardı etmezlerdi. Bakan Gündüz Ökçün döneminde bir 3 ncü dünya akımı küçük bir grup tarafından başlatılmıştı. Bunda bir ölçüde Kıbrıs meselesinin de payı vardır.” Eralp, *Interview by the Author*.

situated ... with their own way of seeing the world.”⁴⁵ Like the case of the Ottoman diplomatic bureaucracy, Turkish *Hariciye* of the Cold War years saw pro-Western foreign policy not only as a matter of foreign and security policy but also an issue of national identity. Yilmaz and Bilgin note that “throughout the republican era, membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions has provided Turkish policymakers the opportunity to assert the country’s ‘Western’ identity.”⁴⁶ Turkish diplomats and the Turkish MFA were prominent pillars of this perspective. Çalış states that the “MFA has traditionally been one of the most important and influential institutions in Turkey, making foreign policy and actively participating in the Westernization process.”⁴⁷ Turkey’s unhesitant tilt towards the Western bloc since the first days of the Cold War was inherent to the worldview of Turkish diplomats. Zeki Kuneralp, who served as secretary general at the foreign ministry twice in the 1960s, summarizes the pure, pro-western orientation of Turkish diplomats in those years. In his words,

Turkey’s future is in the West. The prestige that Turkey possesses, even its prestige in the East is due to its proximity to the West. If Turkey

45 Sharp, *Diplomatic Theory*, 36. Although the term “epistemic community has traditionally been reserved for scientific and technical groups,” notes Davis-Cross imports this notion while exploring the nature of the diplomatic profession. Mai'a Keapuolani Davis-Cross, “A European Epistemic Community of Diplomats,” in *The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society*, ed. Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 226. According to Davis-Cross, the success of an epistemic community in terms of exerting their influence relies on the internal cohesion among its members. The internal cohesion, “a shared worldview that derives from their mutual socialization and shared knowledge,” determines an epistemic community’s success to influence decision making processes. Mai'a K. Davis-Cross “Rethinking the Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later,” *Review of International Studies* 39, no. 1 (2013), 140 & 152. Since a vast majority of Turkish diplomats were convinced that alliance and identification with the West in political, economic, and cultural terms are for the benefit of Turkey, they could be successful in influencing the mindset of the state mechanism.

46 Eylem Yilmaz and Pınar Bilgin, “Constructing Turkey’s ‘Western’ Identity during the Cold War: Discourses of the Intellectuals of Statecraft,” *International Journal* 61, no. 1 (2005-2006), 39.

47 Şaban H. Çalış *Turkey’s Cold War: Foreign Policy and Western Alignment in the Modern Republic* (London: IB Tauris, 2017), 241.

drops this pro-Western policy and this general political line, this may have harmful and dangerous outcomes for the fate of the country. Some people claim that Turkey will never be accepted as an equal to Western nations by Westerners. In my view, this is not the case. The question is whether Turkey will reach the level of civilized nations. If today, Turkey is accepted as a civilized nation even among Eastern societies, this is mostly due to the adoption of Western civilization.⁴⁸

This relatively radical orientation towards the West reflected in the minds of Turkish diplomats while conducting their profession. Nihat Dinç, for example, complains in his memoirs about the critical stance of young military officers towards the Western alliance when he briefed them about the significance of NATO for the security of Turkey.⁴⁹ Faik Melek goes further and criminalizes the defense of a political position other than pro-Westernism. Melek notes that,

an associate professor stood up and stated “we must leave from NATO. NATO has no use for Turkey.” Our ambassador [Nuri Birgi] calmly replied “Okay! We can quit NATO, sir. However, what alternative do you project in terms of Turkey’s security? You must be aware of Soviet Russia’s threatening policies and the Russian intent to reach Mediterranean? Can we defend ourselves alone against a superpower like Soviet Russia?” ... Imagine how such an associate professor brainwashes

48 “Türkiye’nin istikbali Batı’dadır. Halen haiz olduğu prestij, hatta Doğu’da bile haiz olduğu prestij, Batı’yla olan yakınlığından dolayıdır. Türkiye’nin bu siyasetten, bu umumi siyasi istikametten ayrılması, kendisi için kötü, meşum neticeler doğurabilir. Bazı kimseler Türkiye’nin bugün dahi Batılılar tarafından eşit Batılı bir millet olarak kabul edilmeyeceğini iddia etmektedirler. Mesele Türkiye’nin bugünkü dünya şartları muvacehesinde bir medeni memleketin işgal etmesi gereken mevkie yükselmesidir. Bugün Türkiye Doğulular arasında da bugün ileri bir memleket sayılıyorsa o da Batı medeniyetini bir dereceye kadar benimsemış olmasından ötürüdür” Zeki Kuneralp, *Sadece Diplomat: Anılar-Belgeler* (İstanbul: İSİS, 1999), 110.

49 Dinç, *Gönüllü Diplomat*, 51.

his hundreds of pupils with such demagogies in line with his doctrine.⁵⁰

Birgi was perhaps one of the last people to be asked such a question in the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. He was known with his fervent support of the Western alliance.⁵¹ Indeed, this was not specific to Birgi; Turkish diplomacy and diplomats have been subject to criticism precisely for this tendency. As a matter of fact, the Turkish diplomat “had always been entwined with the pro-Western ideology,”⁵² and because of this, the “Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not a sympathetic institution in Turkey” and “the common idea that diplomats were ‘mon cher’ attracts negative reaction.”⁵³

Throughout the polarized political atmosphere of the 1970s, this critical stance intensified, and the pro-Western orientation of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy began to be questioned by representatives of the nationalist-conservative ideology of the time. Kuneralp notes in 1982 that “Turkish diplomats are accused … to have lost touch with” Turkish society in recent years.⁵⁴ Such a criticism is inherent to the words of Ahmet Kabaklı. According to Kabaklı,

50 “Bir docent ortaya atılıp ‘NATO’dan çıkmalıyız. NATO’nun Türkiye’ye bir yararı yok.’ dedi. Büyükelçimiz [Nuri Birgi], gayaet soğukkanlı bir şekilde ‘Hay hay, çıkalım Beyefendi; yalnız Türkiye’nin güvenliği bakımından yerine hangi alternatif öneriyorsunuz. Zira kuzeyimizdeki Sovyet Rusya’nın bizi tehdit eden politikasını ve Rusların Akdeniz’e inme hedeflerini bilirsiniz. Bir super güç olan Sovyet Rusya’ya tek başımıza karşı koyabilir miyiz? … Bu doçentin bu demagogisi ile okuttuğu yüzlerce gencin beyinlerini kendi doktrinine uygun olarak nasıl yıkabileceğini söyle bir düşünün. Çok acı değil mi?’” Faik Melek, *Hepsi Geldi Geçti: Dışişlerinde 43 Yıl* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1994), 102-103.

51 Günver, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu...*, 17.

52 Ortaylı, “Türk Dışişleri Memuru,” 536.

53 İlhan Uzgel, “TDP’nin Uygulanması,” in *Türk Dış Politikası I: 1919-1980*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), 67. Literally meaning “my sir,” monchere is a Turkish loan word from French. The word is used pejoratively to criticise the allegedly exclusive social lives of Turkish diplomats. Turkish diplomats object to these accusations citing threats to which they were exposed by Armenian terrorist organizations. Eralp, for example, reminds Erdoğan “how those monchères [Turkish diplomats] sacrificed themselves for years.” Eralp, *Perdeyi Aralarken...*, 43.

54 Kuneralp, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” 509.

most [Turkish diplomats] lack the quality of a pride of Turkishness based on history and culture. They forgot the beauty of the homeland, ignored its devastation, [and] were carried away with the joys ... and gambling in the country in which were living. Ninety percent of them evaluate the affairs of Turkey and Turkish homeland as 'drudgery' ...

These officers of the Hariciye, the ones who earn seven times as much salary. ... the ones who smuggle goods as much as they want through diplomatic tricks ... they are subconsciously ashamed of being Turk and Muslim. In front of the diplomats of the world, they joyfully play a game making a mockery of our history, ancestors, and customs. They seem to be taking revenge for having been born Turk.⁵⁵

Aware of this stance, officers of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy complain about this "misinterpretation." A Turkish diplomat notes, for example,

receptions with alcohol and leisure come to the minds of Turkish people when diplomats are mentioned. It is thought that all diplomats waste away their working hours in such places. According to this perspective, these receptions are places where well-dressed people wine and dine and engage in small talk. There is a common perception that our diplomats never miss these receptions and always start talking with the phrase 'mon cher' when they see each other. The salary abroad is high, so many women, live it up! ... They think the lives of diplomats pass like that, in great comfort.⁵⁶

55 "Çoğu tarihe ve kültüre dayalı bir Türklik gururunu taşımak kalitesinden yoksundur. Vatanın güzelliklerini unutmuş, perişanlığa omuz silkmiş, bulundukları ülkenin zevkine, kumarına kadınlı-ichernili zevklerine kapılıp gitmişlerdir. Türkiye'nin ve Türk vatandaşının işlerini bir "Angarya" sayanlar yüzde doksanı bulur. Bu hariciyeci efendiler, bu milletin sırtından maaşların yedi katını alanlar, diplomatik dolaplarla içeriye istedikleri kadar mal ve eşya sokanlar ... Bunlar, alt şuurlarında Türk ve İslam olmaktan utanıyorlar... Ve bütün dünyanın diplomatları karşısında mazimizi, atalarımızı, hukukumuzu gülünç eden bir eseri oynamaktan zevk alıyorlar... Türk yaratılmış olmalarının özünü alıyorlar sanki." Kabaklı, *Bürokrasi ve Biz*, 439-440.

56 "Diplomat denince, Türk insanının aklına nedense içkili ve eğlenceli davetler gelir. Her diplomatın mesaisinin önemli bir bölümünü buralarda geçirdiği düşünülür. Bu anlayışa göre, söz

In the 1960-1980 period, foreign ministries and their diplomatic personnel were subject to similar criticisms. For example, a journalist in Canada accused his country's diplomats of "serving as US spies."⁵⁷ Probably unaware of such criticisms, Kabaklı's criticism similarly centered on the so-called non-national character of Turkish diplomats. His criticism targeted not only Turkish diplomats individually but also included an institutional analysis. Turkish foreign policy, according to Kabaklı, "has never been national and prudent."⁵⁸ For him, "a national[ist] Hariciye"

by assuming his country as the center of the world..., puts the leg of compass on [his country] and draws tangents to other states, ... struggles to find our interests wherever they are, ... eliminates any possibility of damage to me wherever they come from, ... keeps [his] eyes focused on distances as far as the universe and a centuries-long future.⁵⁹

Raif Karadağ, a nationalist-conservative author, claimed that diplomats "consider themselves unaccountable ... and do not esteem issues about which the public is most sensitive."⁶⁰ Like Kabaklı and Karadağ, Ergun Göze, a nationalist-conservative journalist of the Cold War years in Turkey, also paid attention to the so-called non-national character of Turkish Hariciye. The most significant way to better organize the ministry was the "nationalization of Foreign Affairs," according to Göze.

konusu davetler, sık giyinmiş insanların yiyp içikleri ve geyik muhabbeti yaptıkları yerdir. Diplomatlarımızın bu tür davetleri kaçırmadıkları, birbirleriyle karşılaşlıklarında 'mon cher' siz söyle başlamadıkları anlayışı yaygındır bizde. Dışarıda maaş yüksek, kadınların bini bir para, vur patlasın çal oynasın, işte böyle geçer diplomatların hayatı denir, büyük bir rathatlık içinde." Turgut Tülümen, *İki Mülkiyeli* (Ankara: Kavaklıdere Kültür Yayınları, 2003), 65.

57 Eayrs, *Diplomacy and Its Discontents*, 26.

58 Kabaklı, *Bürokrasi ve Biz*, 445.

59 "kendi devletini dünyanın merkezi sayarak... Ve pergelin ayağını oraya koyarak, bütün diğer devletlere 'teğetler' çizmesi demektir. Her nerede bizim için menfaat var; arayıp bulmak için gayretler harcamasıdır. Her nerede benim için ziyan ihtimali var; karakuş gibi yetişerek o zararı gidermesi... Gözünü dört açarak feza kadar mesafeleri ve asırlarca uzağı görmesi demektir." Ibid.

60 Raif Karadağ, *Türk Hariciyesinin Çetin Sınırı Kıbrıs* (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 2004), 164.

Turkish foreign policy, indeed, tended towards apologetism after Lausanne [Treaty]. The outcomes of this apology in foreign policy are western secularism, non-irredentism, [and] non-interference. Moreover, [this policy aims] to show that all relations with the past and memories of the past have been cut. This confession psychosis is ... inherent to the Turkish ambassador smoking a Cuban cigar at the Saudi King's *iftar* invitation before the call to prayer to show that he was not fasting.⁶¹

In the aforementioned period, the world was roughly divided into three camps in political and economic terms: the capitalist First World (or Western alliance), the communist Eastern Bloc, and the non-aligned Third World, most of which gained their independence in the decolonization process.⁶² Turkey, since the early days of the Cold War, chose to be part of the so-called First World. It was a part of the Western alliance. This was strongly related to Turkey's tilt towards the Western world since the beginning of its modernization process and also to national security conceptions of the time. Under the strict limitations of the Cold War conjuncture, Turkish diplomacy had little room to maneuver and improve relations with members of other alliances.

61 "Gerçekten Türk dış politikası Lozan'dan sonra bir günah çıkartma şekline dönüşmüştür. Bu günah çıkarmanın dış politikadaki neticesi batılı laik ve hiç kimsenin toprağında gözü olmayan, hiçbir şeye karışmayan... çabalamalardan ibarettir. Ayrıca gerek içerde ve gerek dışarda mazi ve mazideki hatırlalarla her türlü alakanın kesildiğini her vesile ile göstermek. Suudi Arabistan kralının iftarına çağrılan Türk sefirinin iftar vaktinden önce purosunu yakarak ve oruç olmadığını ilana ederek gitmesinde bu günah çıkartma psikozu ... vardır." Ergun Göze, "Diplomasimizin Müesseseleri," *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Dergisi* 7 (1980), 169.

62 The Oxford English Dictionary defines decolonization as "the withdrawal from its colonies of a colonial power; the acquisition of political or economic independence by such colonies." The decolonization process refers to the dismantlement of colonial empires after World War II and the emergence of new independent states on the territories of former colonial powers. States involved in the decolonization process, many of which were in Asia and Africa, generally acted in concert in international politics since they had many common interests. As a consequence, many new post-colonial states gathered under the umbrellas of the non-Aligned Movement and Third World discourse. Erin Allen, "Inquiring Minds: Studying Decolonization," *Library of Congress*, accessed October 31, 2015, available from <http://blogs.loc.gov/loc/2013/07/inquiring-minds-studying-decolonization/>.

An article written in 1965 by Hamit Batu, a mid-ranking officer in Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noted that “Turkey ... should earn the friendship of [newly independent African and Asian] states.”⁶³ Batu’s suggestion was indeed a consequence of Turkey’s needs in the the Cyprus dispute.⁶⁴ Moreover, the idea of closer relations with the Third world would soon become a policy formulation within the ministry. This was most apparent when the New International Economic Order (NIEO) concept was coined in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).⁶⁵ The new international economic order sought to consolidate the dialogue between the developed North and the developing or underdeveloped South. OECD countries comprised “Group B,” the Eastern Bloc formed “Group D,” and the non-aligned bloc formed the “77s Group.” (Derived from the number of its members, though its size reached over 130 member countries in time.) Turkey, as expected, participated in Group B meetings, which was perhaps compatible with its political preferences but not its economic interests. Yaman Başkut, then a young Turkish diplomat, depicts the difficulties they faced during the meetings.

63 TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, “Türkiye’nin Asya-Afrika Siyaseti,” (Asia-Africa Policy of Turkey) *Dışişleri Belleteni* (Foreign Affairs Bulletin) 6, (Ankara: 1965), 23.

64 The decolonization process was also related to Turkey’s Cyprus policy. The process increased the number of independent states represented in international organizations, and to gain their support was instrumental for Turkey’s cause. As a consequence, Turkish governments tended to open diplomatic missions in newly independent states in the 1960s. TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, “Yeni Elçilikler Açılması,” (Opening of New Embassies) *Dışişleri Belleteni* (Foreign Affairs Bulletin) 20, (Ankara: 1966), 70.

65 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was established in 1964 as a permanent intergovernmental body. The first conference was held in Geneva, Switzerland in 1964 and the body met quadrennially in ensuing years. The conference was formed as a consequence of the concerns of developing countries over the international market economy and the great disparity between developed and developing countries. In the 1970s, the UNCTAD was associated with the idea of the New International Economic Order. “UNCTAD Conferences,” *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Website*, accessed October 31, 2015, available from <http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Meetings/UNCTAD-Conferences.aspx>.

We had the same economic interests as the 77s group, but the group to which we belonged [- Group B, which is to say developed countries -] were at cross-purposes. For example, while stabilizing the prices of raw materials we were exporting and lifting barriers to technology transfers were to our advantage, we were in Group B, which was opposing these [measures], and we could only utter weakly during group's preparatory meetings.⁶⁶

The same diplomat notes that they faced harsh opposition from seniors when he and two colleagues sought to balance Turkey's alliance commitment and its political-economic realities.⁶⁷ The objection was a response to the efforts of diplomats within the ministry who formed a special working group and to defend Turkey's integration with the Third World. Başkut was also a member of this group of diplomats. A direct addressee of these harsh objections, on the other hand, was Temel İskit, the head of the first special working group established within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. İskit cites the meeting between him, ambassadors of the time and then-Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil as follows,

We were on the one hand ... member of the “club of the wealthy.” On the other hand, [we were] the poorest, fund-taking member of the Western alliance. Our structure was comparable to poorer countries. We offered to fix this contradiction. With the signature of Şükrü Elekdağ, we formed the first independent working group in the history of the ministry. ... We prepared a report titled “The New International Economic Order and Turkey.” I requested the ministry to discuss its content, [and] delivered it to our economics-related missions abroad. We delivered this [report], and a great reaction emerged. The first reaction came from Coşkun Kırca: “How could such a report be

66 “77'ler grubu ile aynı çıkarlara sahiptik ama mensup olduğumuz grup ayrı telden çalışıyordu. Örneğin, dünyaya ihraç ettiğimiz anamaddelerin fiyatlarının belli bir düzeyde istikrara kavuşması ve teknoloji transferindeki engellerin kaldırılması lehimizeyken, bunlara itiraz eden 'B' grubunun içindeydi ve sadece Grup içindeki hazırlık çalışmalarında cılız bir ses çıkaramıyorduk.” Yaman Başkut, *Aferin İyiydin* (İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 2004), 43.

67 Ibid.

written?" This was asked because the report suggested [Turkey] join the group of 77s. ... I was the only one from the group to be invited to the meeting held with ambassadors and the foreign minister. I presented the report and an immediate salvo began: "It is a shame to even type such a report." "This will disgrace us vis-à-vis our allies." "The authors of the report are as a matter of fact communists." Çağlayangil ended the meeting, approached me, and said, "Do you see, the report was not accepted." He could have shouted. He behaved politely.⁶⁸

The full name of the report was "The New Economic Order and Turkey: The International Negotiation Process between Developed Countries and Developing Countries."⁶⁹ Published in July 1977 as a "special working group report,"

68 "Biz... bir tarafta 'zenginler kulübünün' üyesiydik. Diğer taraftan Batı ittifakının en yoksul, yardım alan ülkesiydik. Yapımız yoksul ülkelerle uyumluydu. Bu çelişkiyi telafi etmeyi önerdik. Şükrü Elekdağ'ın imzasıyla Bakanlığın tarihindeki ilk özel çalışma grubunu kurduk.... 'Yeni Uluslararası Düzen ve Türkiye' adlı bir rapor hazırladık. Dışişleri Bakanı'na bu raporun içeriğini tartışmak üzere bir toplantı düzenlenmesini teklif ettim [ve] raporu yurtdışında ekonomik alanda faaliyet gösteren temsilciliklerimize de gönderdik. Raporu gönderdik ve büyük bir reaksiyon oldu. İlk tepki Coşkun Kırca'dan geldi: 'Böyle bir rapor nasıl yazılabilirdi?' Zira rapor Türkiye'nin 77'ler grubuna katılmasını öneriyordu.... Ben çalışma grubundan büyüğelçiler ve dışişleri bakanının katıldığı toplantıya davet edilen tek kişiydim. Raporu sundum ve hemen bir salvo başladı. 'Böyle bir raporu yazmak dahi bir utançtır.' 'Bizi müttefiklerimize rezil eder.' 'Raporun yazarları zaten komünisttir.' Çağlayan toplantıyı sonlandırdı ve bana yaklaşarak 'Gördün değil mi, rapor kabul edilmedi' dedi. Bana bağırabilirdi. Anlayışlı davrandı." Temel İskit, *Interview by the Author, Note Taking, Istanbul, March 16, 2016*. Temel İskit is a remarkable intellectual-diplomat in this respect. Currently known for his pro-EU views, İskit strongly objected to Turkey's accession to the European integration process. During his term in Brussels, he wrote a two-hundred-pages-long report explaining his objection to Turkey's accession to the then-European Economic Community. Expectedly, states İskit, his views were severely criticized by colleagues. According to opponents of İskit's view, "accession to the EEC was an aspect of Turkey's identification with the West." *Ibid.* This is another clear example of a typical Turkish diplomat evaluating the "inevitability" of Turkey's identification with the West.

69 TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Özel Çalışma Grubu Raporu (Special Working Group Report), *Yeni Ekonomik Düzen ve Türkiye: Gelişmiş Ülkeler ve Gelişme Yolundaki Ülkeler Arasındaki Uluslararası Müzakere Süreci* (Ankara: TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 1977). The dissent of diplomats to the foreign policy preferences of their governments can be declared through official

the text was authored by Temel İskit and nine other career officers.⁷⁰ The group was also allegedly have worked in cooperation with Korkut Boratav, a Marxist economist.⁷¹ Among the ten diplomats who wrote the text, which included him, İskit notes that Gündüz Aktan was the most committed to engaging with the Third World. According to him, Aktan was the only member of the group suggesting joining the 77s group at the expense of the NATO alliance.⁷² The report was 147 pages long and consisted of three chapters. An eleven-page long conclusion part offered a new route for Turkish foreign policy – that is, to be more engaged with the Third World. The report concluded that “all the vital interests of Turkey in the realm of foreign economic relations are compatible with the ideas defended by the members of the 77s.”⁷³ Group B, on the other hand, had “evolved into a formation that Turkey struggles against” in order to protect its interests.⁷⁴ Because “Turkey was alienated in Group B,” the report advised Turkey “to take a place in the 77s group in line with its political and economic power.”⁷⁵

According to İskit, this was the opinion of Gündüz Aktan; the other members of the group favored illustrating a picture of the situation instead of directing Turkey to a new, alternative path.⁷⁶ Given the content of the conclusion of the report, it is clear that Aktan played a prominent role in its authorship.

channels in some countries. The Department of State in the United States, for example, initiated a “dissent channel” for diplomats to express opposing views. Rana, *The Contemporary Embassy...*, 66.

70 The names of the diplomats were Gündüz Aktan, Uluç Özülker, Aydan Karahan, Şefik Onat, Yaman Başkut, Özcan Davaz, Ercan Özer, Mehmet Akat, and Hayati Güven. The members of the group were not necessarily from similar departments. The only requirement to join was “to study the issues examined in the report.” TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı Özel Çalışma Grubu Raporu (Special Working Group Report), *Yeni Ekonomik Düzen ve Türkiye: Gelişmiş Ülkeler ve Gelişme Yolundaki Ülkeler Arasındaki Uluslararası Müzakere Süreci*, iii.

71 Eralp, *Perdeyi Aralarken...*, 50.

72 İskit, *Interview by the Author*.

73 TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Özel Çalışma Grubu Raporu (Special Working Group Report), *Yeni Ekonomik Düzen...*, 146.

74 Ibid., 147.

75 Ibid.

76 İskit, *Interview by the Author*.

The report was, again in the words of İskit again, “the first sortie against the pro-Western political orientation of the ministry.”⁷⁷ When Bülent Ecevit formed a second government in January 1978, such a foreign policy orientation regained attraction. As a matter of fact, Third World countries were increasingly present and prominent on international platforms. “Spoiled by the Ecevit government,” notes İskit, the group organized a meeting a year after the above-stated report was presented. The meeting in 1978 was the last serious initiative of the pro-Third World group within the ministry.

The meeting was organized on 7-11 August 1978 in Istanbul and titled “The New International Economic Order: The Sum of Four Years.”⁷⁸ Opening remarks were made by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and Foreign Minister Gündüz Ökçün, proving that the activities of the group had gained the support of political authority. The meeting consisted of a general session and four panels. The meeting gathered prominent figures of the time, most notably scholars and diplomats concentrated on developmental economics. Among the participants was Gomani Corea of Senegal was the secretary general of the UNCTAD.⁷⁹ Kenneth Dadzie of Ghana was the director general of the United Nations Economic Cooperation and Development unit, and Dinesh Singh of India was president of the second UNCTAD.⁸⁰ In this regard, participants of the meeting constituted a correct sample both in terms of their nationalities and positions.

Senior officials, most notably ambassadors, objected to the efforts of the special working group “because it would be misinterpreted and even abused by some countries as if [Turkey] was challenging to the West.”⁸¹ Murat Bilhan, another young diplomat of the time, confirms this. When asked about efforts to reform the ideology of the ministry and thus Turkey's foreign policy, he replied,

77 Ibid.

78 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *New International Economic Order: Sum of the Four Years: Conference Proceedings*, 7-11 August 1978.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Başkut, *Aferin İyiydin*, 45.

during the years when we joined the [Ministry in 1965], regions neighboring Turkey were ignored. [We were] completely dancing to the tune of the West. There were pro-Third World leanings, but these were not tolerated. A movement emerged during the term of Gündüz Ökçün. ... [They were] the most talented young diplomats of the time ... They were not leftists, but [they] demanded equal relations with the West.⁸²

Bilhan, like Başkut, notes that this group of senior diplomats strongly criticized this group by underscoring “the impossibility of the Africanization of Turkey”⁸³ According to these senior diplomats, “Turkey had nothing in common with Africa.”⁸⁴ As the above-quoted words of Başkut indicate, however, Turkey had much in common with the underdeveloped world.

Although pro-Third World members of the ministry were backed and encouraged during the foreign ministry of Gündüz Ökçün, they were also supported by İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, the foreign minister of the Nationalist Front (*Milliyetçi Cephe-MC*) governments in the second half of the 1970s.⁸⁵ Başkut stated that “Çağlayangil was the only person to encourage their efforts.”⁸⁶ Another case confirms Çağlayangil’s position in terms of

82 “Bakanlığa katıldığım yıllarda Türkiye'nin yakın bölgeleri ihmal ediliyordu. Tamamen Batı'nın dümen suyundaydık. Üçüncü Dünyacılık eğilimleri vardı ama bu tolere edilmedi. Gündüz Ökçün'ün döneminde bir hareket oluştu. Dönemin en kabiliyetli genç diplomatlarıydı. Solcu değildiler ama Batı ile eşit ilişkiler istiyorlardı.” Murat Bilhan, *Interview by the Author*, Note Taking, Istanbul, February 2, 2016.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Nationalist Front Governments (*Milliyetçi Cephe, MC*) refers to the two governments formed by right-wing, nationalist-conservative parties of the time. These governments were established in March 1975 and July 1977, respectively. The first governed until June 1977 and the second MC government ended in January 1978. With a one-month interruption in June 1977, MC governments led by Süleyman Demirel, the head of the Justice Party, ruled for Turkey almost three years. The other members of the MC government coalitions were Necmettin Erbakan’s National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP*) and Alparslan Türkeş’s Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP*). The Republican Reliance Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi*) was also a member of the first MC government.

86 Başkut, *Aferin İyiydin*, 44.

strengthening ties with non-aligned or Third World countries. While talking about an international economics congress in Nairobi, Çağlayangil cited that,

the most hurting [thing] was to sit among Europeans due to being [part of] the West and NATO. I found our position strange. Thankfully, the members of our embassy, most notably Mr. [Coşkun] Kırca, contacted Third World countries and told about the realities.⁸⁷

Nevertheless, this should not lead us to think that Çağlayangil favored a tilt towards the Third World in foreign policy. Through his support of the efforts of the working group, he rather thought to establish a balance against the pure pro-Western view that had been predominantly adopted among Turkish diplomats in those years. As a matter of fact, the influence of the pro-Third World formation within the foreign ministry dissolved after the resignation of the Ecevit government in 1979.

§ 4.3 Institutional Features

The two most influential political formations of the 1960-1980 period, namely Justice Party and the Republican People's Party, were in favor of avoiding bloc politics and tended towards a more active, multi-dimensional foreign-policy orientation. Moreover, the spirit of the time made such a perspective inevitable for any government. Kabaklı criticized Turkish diplomacy by pointing out that there was no country practicing uni-dimensional foreign policy other than Turkey.

Good foreign policy is, as a matter of fact, pluralist. Foreign policy requires forming good relations with all the states of the world. Foreign policy is to protect ... the interests and the honor of the state. Look around us! Is there any state that does not pursue pluralist (multi-state, multilateral) foreign policy? ... Do the United States, Russia,

87 "En çok gücüme giden, bizim Batılı ve NATO'lu olduğumuz için Avrupalılar arasında oturmadı. Yerimizi yadırgadım. Bereket versin, başta Sayın Kırca, elçiliğimizin üyeleri, Üçüncü Dünya Devletleri arasına yayıldılar. Gerçekleri anlattılar." Çağlayangil, *Amilar*, 170-171.

Communist China, England, Israel, Greece, and Japan adhere to a “singularist” foreign policy? ...

As a matter of fact, what does “singularist” foreign policy mean? You establish relations (good or bad) with one or a few states. Then, you say the rest are none of my concern ... This is not politics but tactlessness and awkwardness, is not it?⁸⁸

The Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy was the direct addressee of this accusation. On the other hand, awkwardness, inherent in the diplomatic profession, states Bilhan, and due to this, it is meaningless to criticize diplomats in this respect.

Diplomacy and journalism are quite different from each other. Diplomacy functions awkwardly and slowly ... This may cause a loss of time. This is the outcome of cautiousness. The media writes without thinking, but the diplomat does not. The diplomat cannot compete with the journalist. Nevertheless, the information that the diplomat presents is reliable.⁸⁹

Awkwardness was not the only issue of criticism towards Turkish diplomats. As a journalist, Göze suggested a more comprehensive transformation of Turkish diplomats in line with the requirements of the time.

Turkish diplomacy, from A to Z, must reorganize itself according to the new diplomacy. ... The spiritual supremacy policy is advisable first

88 “İyi bir dış siyaset, zaten çoğulcudur. Devletin çıkarları ve şerefı korunmak...için, dünyanın bütün devletleri ile iyi münasebetler kurmaktır dış siyaset. Bakın çevrenize hele! Çoğulcu (çok devletli, çok yanlı) bir siyaset yürütmemeyen hiçbir devlet var mıdır? Amerika mı, Rusya mı, Kızıl Çin, İngiltere, İsrail, Yunanistan yahut Japonya mı “tekilci” dış siyaset gütmektedir? ...

Tekilci dış siyaset de ne demek zaten! Yani dünyada bir veya birkaç devletle (iyi, kötü) ilintiler kuracaksın. Gerisi beni ilgilendirmiyor... diyeceksin. Bunun adı siyaset falan değil, densizlik ve beceriksizlik olmaz mı?” Kabaklı, *Bürokrasi ve Biz*, 445.

89 “Diplomasi ve gazetecilik birbirinden çok farklıdır. Diplomasi hantal ve yavaş işler. Bu zaman kaybına yol açabilir. Bu, ihtiyatın sonucudur. Medya düşünmeden yazabilir ama diplomat bunu yapamaz. Diplomat gazeteciyle yarışamaz. Yalnız, diplomatın sunduğu bilgi güvenilirdir.” Bilhan, *Interview by the Author*.

and foremost. ... Turkish diplomats, aside from having no concern other for anything than status quo, are likely to confirm such rumors [about themselves]. ... Turkish diplomacy lacks ... three things. It has not intelligence, nor propaganda, nor staff ... And Turkish diplomacy is aware of nothing. It is normal that a diplomacy without objectives is also without intelligence. ... Embassies indeed should report on the countries to which they are assigned. ... Most of the ambassadors do not send reports, and if one sends many reports, he is [condemned].⁹⁰

Raif Karadağ makes similar statements to those of Göze. According to Karadağ, “the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs needed to replace existing cadres with nationalist officers.”⁹¹ Nevertheless, adds Karadağ, such an operation was impossible since there was a system of patronage within the ministry.⁹² Given that there were such criticisms towards the institutional structure of the ministry, most notably in terms of its personnel structure, it is useful to reveal the general characteristics of the ministry in terms of personnel profile and institutional procedures.

§ 4.4 Appointment Procedures

In May 1966, a report published by the ministry advised the “systematization of appointments and conveyances” on the basis of “objectivity, meritocracy, and expertise.”⁹³ Although the ministry’s operations were already regulated

90 “[Türk diplomasisi] A’dan Z’ye kadar yeni diplomasiye göre kendisini tertip ve tanzim etmelidir... Manevi üstünlük politikası ilk elde şayanı tavsiyedir... Türk diplomatlarının statükodan başka bir dertleri olmadığı gibi, hatta böyle bir söyletiyi teyit edecek durumları vardır. Türk diplomasisi üç önemli şeyden mahrumdur. Ne istihbaratı vardır ne propaganda... ne de kadrosu... Ve Türk diplomasisinin hiçbir şeyden haberi yoktur. Hedefsiz olan diplomasinin haberi olmaması da normaldir... Aslında elçiliklerin bulunduğu ülkeler hakkında raporlar vermesi lazımdı. Böyle çok rapor gönderen elçi olursa [kinanır] Birçok elçiler ise hiç rapor göndermezler...” Göze, “Diplomasimizin Müessseseleri,” 174-176.

91 Karadağ, *Türk Hariciyesinin Çetin Sınavı Kıbrıs*, 174.

92 Ibid.

93 TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, “Tayin ve Nakillerin Bir Sisteme Bağlanması,” (Systematization of Appointments) *Dışişleri Belleteni* (Foreign Affairs Bulletin) 20, (Ankara: 1966), 69.

through an organic law, the ministry needed additional efforts to standardize the appointment procedures on the basis of objectivity and expertise.

Appointment procedures have always been a matter of concern and discussion in the diplomatic profession. In most cases, arbitrary appointments of diplomats to especially prominent positions such as ambassadorships, cause distress among officers, and appointments of people without diplomatic backgrounds are notably the most unacceptable for diplomats. Appointments of people as ambassadors who are not career diplomats can also be seen as an indicator of the vulnerability of a foreign ministry to domestic political influence.⁹⁴

94 Domestic political influences were evident in the Turkish Hariciye before the 1960-1980 period not only with respect to appointments to the ministry but also before candidates entered the ministry, that is to say in the recruitment process. In the late Ottoman and early republican periods, family bonds, for example, played a role in recruitment to the Ottoman-Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. Harris notes that Said Halim Pasha, who became the Ottoman Foreign Minister in 1911, “secured the appointment of his niece’s husband Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, as Ambassador to Berlin and his brother in-law, Nusret Sadullah as Minister to Brussels.” Harris, *Atatürk’s Diplomats*, 17 & 87. Two sons of Mustafa Reşid Pasha, the great reformer of the Tanzimat era and also a minister of foreign affairs in the same period, served as foreign ministers. Ibid. Not only the members of Muslim families, but also some non-Muslim families were recruited over generations. Greek Musurus Pasha, a famous Ottoman ambassador to London, was known to have staffed the embassy with relatives. Gabriel Noradounghian Efendi, long-time Legal Counselor in the ministry who also served as minister of foreign affairs in 1912, recruited his son as first secretary in Paris. Ibid. This trend continued in the early republican period. Latife (Uşaklıgil) Hanım’s marriage with Mustafa Kemal provided her the opportunity to be influential within the ministry. Suat Davaz, who had a successful diplomatic career during early republican period, was sponsored by Latife Hanım. Davaz’s mother was her wet nurse. It is also known that Cevat Açıkalın’s family ties with Latife Hanım were a contributing factor in his career. Latife Hanım’s impact was much visible when her brother Ömer (Uşaklı) Bey was appointed as the Third Secretary to Rome. Ömer Bey was recalled to Ankara just after Mustafa Kemal divorced Latife Hanım in 1925. Vedat Uşaklı, another brother of Latife Hanım, was also recruited into the ministry while Latife Hanım was still married to Mustafa Kemal Pasha. As a general overview of the influence of family bonds in the ministry, Harris notes that “there were at least 285 senior Ottoman officials whose relatives populated the [Ministry] community at the end of the empire and the Republic that followed.” Ibid. Between 1839 and 1922, there were seventy-two father and son relationships in the Ottoman Foreign Ministry. Kuneralp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı...*, xxiii-xxiv.

Turkish diplomats of the 1960-80 period strongly objected to the appointment of such people – especially military officers – to ambassadorial posts.⁹⁵ Ergun Sav, a Turkish diplomat of the time, suggests that

the summit of our profession is to be an ambassador. ... A Turkish diplomat consumes 20-25 years of his professional life by working hard in financial shortfalls, in different climatic conditions, and in different regions nearer to or far from Turkey. His ideal is to be an ambassador. Appointments from outside the institution, by preventing diplomats who deserve it, are unfair in the most basic sense. Especially the appointment of generals as ambassadors! It is like someone landing on a mountain by parachute after you have climbed to the summit of your own mountain.⁹⁶

Günver also notes that the appointment of veteran generals or politicians as ambassadors “injures the tradition of [Turkish] diplomacy to act objectively [and independently] of domestic policy.”⁹⁷ This criticism is true to a great extent. There have been three waves of the penetration of people outside the diplomatic profession to the ministry. The first wave, illustrated in chapter 3, was the early republican period.⁹⁸ In this period, the ministry lacked trained

95 The appointment of people without diplomatic backgrounds to ambassadorial positions was not always specific to extraordinary conditions. As a typical example, “the United States has a long-tradition of recruiting its chief of missions outside the foreign service.” Leguey-Feilleux, *The Dynamics of Diplomacy*, 141.

96 “Bizim mesleğin zirvesi büyükelçiliktir. Bir Türk diplomatı meslek hayatının 20-25 yılını çok çalışarak, maddi imkansızlıklar içinde, değişik iklimlerde, Türkiye’ye uzak veya yakın bölgelerde geçirir. İdealı büyükelçi olmaktadır. Bunu hak etmiş diplomatlarımızın öünü kapayarak, tepeden inme, dışardan atama yapılmasına en hafif deyimiyle ‘hak yemek’ denir. Hele generalerin büyükelçi yapılması’ Kendi dağında zirveye çıktıktan sonra öbür dağın tepesine paraşütle inmek gibi bir şey.” Ergun Sav, *Diplomaturka: Bir Diplomat-Yazarın Anıları* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000), 21.

97 Günver, “Dışişleri Meslek Memurluğu,” 745.

98 The harshest critic of Turkish diplomats was appointed from outside the ministry and belonged to this first wave. Behiç Erkin, who served as an ambassador for fifteen years after a high-profile political career, underscores that “non-career diplomats conduct their business more carefully than career diplomats.” Non-career diplomats, adds Erkin, are appointed due

diplomats. On the other hand, political leadership of the time tended to appoint people who could be trusted to: whether they were career diplomats was not a primary consideration. Critical posts such as Berlin, Paris, and Athens were filled predominantly with ambassadors from among the military bureaucracy in the interwar years.

The second wave was the period immediately after the coup of May 27, 1960. As it will be illustrated in detail in chapter 5, members of the civil and military bureaucracies were increasingly appointed to ambassadorial posts, though this process was not maintained for a long time. The third wave is

to merit whereas career officers are promoted in compliance with the seniority principle. Erkin, *Hatırat*, 580-581. After being involved with a dispute with the ruling elite of the time due to an article he wrote, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu served more than twenty years as an “ambassador-in-exile.” According to Karaosmanoğlu, a Turkish diplomat’s only ambition was “to climb the levels of career and to reach this title [of being an ambassador] since the day he was first occupied ... They never know how to live in line with individual beliefs, principles, and tendencies. Throughout their lives, they always proceed in patterns determined by others, are shaped according to the desires and will of other people... Yes, the world consists of this career trajectory for them. They cannot even imagine there is world outside.” Karaosmanoğlu, *Zoraki Diplomat...*, 44-45. As the quote illustrates, Karaosmanoğlu depicts the career trajectory of diplomats quite different from the way any career diplomat would. According to Ergun Sav, for example, who was a career diplomat, a diplomat’s path to an ambassadorship was an agonizing process, whereas Karaosmanoğlu characterized it as selfish ambition with no regard for the world beyond. Karaosmanoğlu’s clarification of a typical Turkish diplomat has been frequently cited in the critical analysis of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. His depiction, on the other hand, was never welcomed by career diplomats. Yılmaz İkizer, another Turkish career diplomat, notes that Karaosmanoğlu’s book “is full of the wishy-washy words of a person who came from outside [our] profession.” According to İkizer, “insincerity and inconsistency is clear from the title of the book: *Unwilling Diplomat*.” Even if his first, unwilling appointment was during the 1930s, asks İkizer sarcastically, “was it possible to claim that he was held in this profession against his will for twenty years?” Yılmaz İkizer, *Şu Bizim Garip Hariciye ve Dış Politika* (İstanbul: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1992), 48. Two Turkish diplomats named their memoirs as “willing diplomats” (*gönüllü diplomat*) as a response to the title of Karaosmanoğlu’s diplomatic memoirs. Nihat Dinç, *Gönüllü Diplomat: Bir Diplomatin Meslek Yaşamından Notlar* (İstanbul: İthaki, 1998), Ali Tuygan, *Gönüllü Diplomat: Dışişlerinde Kırk Yıl* (İstanbul: Şenocak Yayınları, 2012).

recent.⁹⁹ According to a regulation enacted in August 2013, bureaucrats without diplomatic backgrounds have the right to serve as director general, deputy undersecretary, and undersecretary in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁰⁰ The new regulation not only increased the number of people appointed from outside the diplomatic bureaucracy but also allowed these people continue to serve within the central organization of the ministry in Ankara.¹⁰¹

In the case of appointment procedures throughout 1960s and 70s, nevertheless, governments remained largely loyal to the custom of assigning career diplomats to ambassadorial and consular posts. Although the post-coup period in 1960 constituted a significant exception, ambassadorial posts were predominantly filled with career diplomats in the 1960-1980 period. The 1964-1965 yearbooks of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate that just three or four years after the 27 May coup, only a tiny number of people without diplomatic backgrounds were assigned to the Ministry.¹⁰²

99 Although not as clear as the three aforementioned waves, the 1990s also witnessed the appointment of ambassadors without a diplomatic background. Günver notes that during the late 1990s, there emerged “a tendency to pull the Ministry of Foreign Affairs into domestic issues,” which he evaluated as “a very sad development.” Günver, “Dışişleri Meslek Memurluğu,” 745.

100 “Bakanlıkta Köklü Bir Gelenek Sona Mı Eriyor?” (Does an Old Tradition End in the Ministry?) Milliyet, July 14, 2013, accessed March 2, 2016, available from <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/bakanlikta-koklu-bir-gelenek-sona/dunya/detay/1736395/default.htm>.

101 For example, in August 2013, new ten people without diplomatic backgrounds were appointed as ambassadors. “Dışişleri’nde Yeni Dönem,” (New Era in Foreign Affairs) Hürriyet, August 3, 2013, accessed March 2, 2016, Available from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/24450429.asp>. These decisions resorted to Law No. 6004 which regulates the functions of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Accepted in 2010, Law No. 6004 foresees to transform the ministry in line with the requirements of the day. For an analysis of Law No. 6004 and its consequences for the ministry, see Bülent Aras, “Reform and Capacity Building in the Turkish Foreign Ministry: Bridging the Gap between Ideas and Institutions,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 17, no. 3 (2015), 69-85.

102 Yearbooks of the foreign ministry published in 1964-1965 inform us that there were only six diplomats of military origin just four years after the coup. TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yıllığı 1964-1965*, 146-242. In 1979, “only one embassy was held by a retired army officer.” Kuneralp, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” 508.

§ 4.5 “Some are More Equal than Others:” The Formation of a Clique within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In the mindset of a Turkish diplomat, the immunity of the foreign ministry to the dynamics of domestic politics basically meant keeping members of other professions out of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy.¹⁰³ Cankorel, who entered the diplomatic service in 1971, claims that “the ministry paid considerable attention to remaining objective without the influence of politics and, as a consequence, has been successful even during military administrations.”¹⁰⁴ Cankorel probably may not have made this comment if he were a career diplomat during the coup of May 27, 1960. Notably beginning in the late 1960s, some factors influenced the promotion of diplomats other than his merit. Daver Darende, a Turkish diplomat of the time, notes that

it was a privilege in the ministry to be from Galatasaray [High School] and Mülkiye [the Faculty of Political Sciences in Ankara]. The relations among [members of] these groups relied on a sound basis. ... It is essential to accept that people from Galatasaray have always been influential in the management of the ministry. Those from *Mülkiye* also belong to this group. I had to the content with witnessing the order established among these groups since I was neither a graduate of Galatasaray nor *Mülkiye*.¹⁰⁵

The yearbooks of the ministry published in 1964-65 prove that the graduates of Galatasaray and the School of Political Sciences in Ankara constituted the vast majority of Turkish diplomatic staff.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, this was understandable:

103 Günver, “Dışişleri Meslek Memurluğu,” 743.

104 Bilge Cankorel, *Bir Dönem Biterken* (İstanbul: Kirmızıkedi, 2014), 329.

105 “Galatasaraylı ve Mülkiyeli olmak Bakanlık'ta bir ayrıcalıktı. Bu gruplar arasında ilişkiler sağlam temellere dayanırdı. Galatasaraylıların Dışişleri yönetiminde her dönemde söz sahibi olduklarını kabul etmek gerekiyor. Bu gruba Mülkiyeliler de dahil bulunmaktadır. Ben Galatasaraylı ve Mülkiyeli olmadığım için bu gruplar arasında kurulan düzeni izlemekle yetinirdi.” Daver Darende, *Diplomatın Not Defteri* (İstanbul: Arkadaş, 2008), 94-95.

106 Of the 397 career officers in 1965, 229 were graduates of the Faculty of Political Sciences in Ankara (Mülkiye), whereas 137 were graduates of Galatasaray Lycee. Seventy career diplomats

in those years there were few schools eligible to produce candidates to be recruited for such a critical profession as diplomacy. Moreover, this was by no means specific to Turkey. Most outstanding universities in many countries, especially those renowned for their language education, have provided the human resources for foreign ministries. Oxford and Cambridge in Britain, Ivy League colleges in the United States, and the Ecole Lire des Sciences Politiques in France have been the “natural feeding grounds for foreign ministries in these countries.”¹⁰⁷ Similarly, “Leiden University has been the cradle for diplomats for a long time” in the Netherlands.¹⁰⁸ However, educational bonds played a role in one of the controversial issues related to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late the 1960s and 70s. A group of diplomats who were predominantly graduates of Galatasaray and *Mülkiye* allegedly formed a clique within the ministry. This clique was believed to be influential in some critical decisions such as prominent appointments and policy formulations.

School bonds played a predominant role in the formation of this group, but there were other determinants for participation. Dikerdem, a graduate of Galatasaray who was not the member of the clique, depicts the “formation” of this group as follows:

In summer 1969 ... a new cadre of administrators was emerging. [İhsan Sabri] Çağlayangil appointed an experienced Secretary General, Zeki Kuneralp, from among our generation, but [Çağlayangil] wished to give the chance to young diplomats for directorates general ... İlter Türkmen was the shining figure among these ... An intelligent, ambitious, and hardworking young officer, Türkmen not only held the

were graduates of both these schools. TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yıllığı 1964-1965*, 146-242.

107 Steiner, “Foreign Ministries: Old and New,” 357.

108 C.B. Wels, “Netherlands: The Foreign Policy Institutions in the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1579 to 1980,” in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner (London: Times Books, 1982), 386.

position of special advisor to the minister but also established a “clique” by organizing his young, promotion-seeking friends around himself.¹⁰⁹

Zeki Kuneralp, then secretary general of the foreign ministry, reveals that he was informed about the formation of such a clique in the early days of his term in office.

It was claimed that there were cliques formed among the directors and officers. It was also expressed that the formation of these cliques was causing unrest, hindering the real talents from attaining the positions that they deserved, and providing underserved career opportunities to people with limited merit. When the minister appointed me as secretary general, he emphasized this issue and ordered me to overcome it.¹¹⁰

İlter Türkmen was claimed the key actor of the so-called clique formation. The son of Behçet Türkmen, a military and national security officer, and an ambassador, İlter Türkmen was called “the wonder kid of the ministry” and was appointed as an ambassador at the age of thirty-eight.¹¹¹ Even those, who were critical of Türkmen’s activities within the ministry, gave credit to his

109 “1969 yazında... Dışişleri Bakanlığı’nda yeni bir yönetici kadrosu oluşuyordu. Çağlayangil bizim kuşaktan tecrübeli bir genel sekreteri, Zeki Kuneralp’i yanına almıştı ama genel müdürlükler için gençlere şans tanımak istiyordu... Bunların arasında sırvilen ad, İlter Türkmen olmuştu. Zeki, hırslı ve çalışkan bir genç memur olan Türkmen... Bakan’ın özel danışmanı durumuna gelmekle kalmamış, kendisi gibi genç ve çabuk ilerlemek arzusuyla tutuşan arkadaşlarını toplayıp bir ‘klik’ oluşturmuştur.” Mahmut Dikerdem, *Hariciye Çarkı: Amilar* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1989), 180-181.

110 “Bakanlıkta amir ve memurlar arasında kliklerin teşekkür ettiği iddia edilirdi. Bu hizipleşmenin huzursuzluk yarattığı, gerçek değerlerin hak ettiğleri mevkilere erişmelerini engellediği, düşük değerlere nahak yere ikballer sağladığı söylenirdi. Beni Genel Sekreterlige getirdiği vakit Bakan bilhassa bu konunun üzerinde durmuştu, benden bu durumun düzeltilmesini istemişti.” Kuneralp, *Sadece Diplomat*, 167.

111 Bilhan, *Interview by the Author*.

professional merit.¹¹² Nevertheless, almost all accounts dealing with the formation of a clique in Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirms his “negative” role.

Dikerdem’s notes reveal that the formation of the group was not only a matter of school bonds but also generational. “During the term of Haluk Bayülken as secretary general [between 1964 and 1966],” adds Dikerdem, “extreme claims about İlter Türkmen and his friends did not arouse interest but when Kuneralp began his term, clashes began between the ‘İlter clique’ and the secretary general.”¹¹³

Haluk Afra, a contemporary of the clique but neither a graduate of Galatasaray nor Mülkiye, gives a detailed account of how the group was formed. According to Afra, the background of the so-called clique goes back to two different groups that later united.¹¹⁴ The first group was called the “Bonn Mafia” because the young diplomats appointed to Bonn were going out at night altogether.¹¹⁵ The second group was formed in Ankara by a young, intelligent

112 Mahmut Dikerdem notes that Behçet Türkmen, then the head of the National Intelligence Organization, requested him to favor his two sons in the foreign ministry entrance exams.

However, claims Dikerdem, either of the sons of Türkmen needed anybody’s help and according to him, İlter Türkmen was one of the most elite, outstanding ambassadors of Turkey. Behçet Türkmen’s other son, Güner Türkmen, died in a plane crash in 1959. The plane was carrying the Turkish delegation to the London Conference. Dikerdem, *Hariciye Çarkı...*, 119. İlter Türkmen always opposed claims of corruption within the ministry. According to Türkmen there were no types of corruption in the entrance exams and even the sons of a prime minister (Recep Peker) and a president (Fahri Korutürk) could have failed. Kürşat Özdemir, *Bir Dışşleri Bakanı Olarak İlter Türkmen (1980-1983)* (MA Thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2015), 122-123.

113 Güler, *Salon Verir*, 598. Before Kuneralp, Haluk Bayülken was the secretary general at the foreign ministry between 1964 and 1966. Dikerdem attaches significance to his placement because Bayülken was a contemporary of the clique members. According to Dikerdem, there were subsequently fewer clashes between the office of the secretary general and the members of the clique. *Ibid.*

114 Afra, *Hariciyeciler Dedikodu Sever*, 193.

115 *Ibid.*, 94. This was probably a reference to the Berlin Mafia, a group of American diplomats known for their influence over American foreign policy in the conjuncture of the Cold War. See, Gary A. Oedewalt, *The Berlin Mafia: How American Diplomats in Berlin and Germany*

diplomat, İlter Türkmen. Afra's accounts reveal that the leader of the second group, İlter Türkmen, earned the sympathy of then-Foreign Minister Çağla-yangil with his work ethic in a short period of time.¹¹⁶ After consolidating his position in the ministry, this young, gifted diplomat recommended his friends from high school and the university to the minister and thus, these people were being appointed as directors general to prominent departments.¹¹⁷ The generational factor is also depicted in detail as follows,

Now, let us mention the appointments of the young diplomats attached to the clique. These diplomats did not want veteran diplomats to be appointed under their command since it would not be possible to comfortably give them orders. Thus, the veteran diplomats were being ordered to work on unessential issues and [as a consequence] a loss of human energy was emerging in all respects.

For example, I felt quite sorry when I witnessed one of our colleagues, who worked on “nuclear energy” in England, selecting the significant messages delivered to the director general and presenting them to his chief.¹¹⁸

Other accounts repeat this claim. Mahmut Dikerdem, who is elder than the members of the so-called clique, suggests that the first target of the “mafia” was “liquidating the ambassadors” by appointing them as high-level advisors,

Affected US Policy during the Early Occupation and the Berlin Crisis (PhD diss. Columbia: University of Missouri, 2005).

116 Afra, *Hariciyeciler Dedikodu Sever*, 195-6.

117 Ibid., 196.

118 “Şimdi gelelim Klik mensubu gençlerin işbaşına gelmesine. Bunlar maiyetlerine atanacak, kendilerinden daha yaşlı memurlara rahat rahat emir veremeyeceklerinden, onları istemiyorlardı. Bunun üzerine o yaşlıca memurlara fuzuli işler yaptırıyor ve tam anlamıyla insan enerjisi kaybı konusu yaşanıyordu....

Örneğin İngiltere'de iki yıl ‘atom enerjisi’ üzerinde çalışan bir meslektaşın, bir genel müdüre gelen şifrelerin önemlilerini ayıklayıp amirinin dikkatine sunduğunu görünce pek üzülmüştüm.” Ibid., 198.

which was a passive duty.¹¹⁹ In line with this policy, adds Dikerdem, there was a massive attack on diplomats from his generation.¹²⁰

Afra does not openly reveal the name of the group, but his description overlaps those of Dikerdem. Other accounts are not as tight-lipped as Afra with respect to not revealing the leader of the clique. Another diplomat of the time, Daver Darende, not only verifies Haluk Afra's tacit claims but exemplifies the influence of the group on the foreign minister and the ministry as follows,

As it was evident in all parts of the mechanism of state, political factors were playing a role in foreign affairs. As time passed, we observed that Çağlayangil was also succumbing to the opportunist behavior of some high-ranking officials. ... One morning I came to the office. ... I asked one of my colleagues when the director general was to come. My colleague answered sadly, "the director general will not come to the ministry anymore. A new director general was appointed in his place." Fahir Alaçam, a close friend of deputy secretary general İlter Türkmen, was appointed as the new director general. ... It was obvious that Çağlayangil, who wanted to reorganize the ministry, approved of this decision. ... Encouraged by Çağlayangil, Türkmen tended to reorganize the ministry. He appointed colleagues in his group to suitable posts one by one.¹²¹

119 Dikerdem, *Hariciye Çarkı*, 181. Among the numerous accounts of the clique formation within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, only Dikerdem and Afra use the word "mafia." The latter also uses the phrase "Bonn mafia" for one of the two clique formations in the ministry. Nevertheless, Dikerdem is not referring to the Bonn mafia in this statement. The "mafia" corresponds to the clique formed in Ankara [led by İlter Türkmen], which is clarified by Afra above. In other words, according to Afra's categorization, it is not the Bonn mafia but the clique formed in Ankara that is scrutinized in this study.

120 Ibid.

121 "Devlet çarkının her kesiminde olduğu gibi Dışişleri'nde de siyasal etkenler önemli rol oynuyordu. Zaman ilerledikçe Çağlayangil'in de kimi üst düzey memurların fırsatçı davranışlarına yenik düştüğü fark edildi... Bir sabah erken saatte ofise geldim... Dairedeki bir meslektaşımı genel müdürüne ne zaman geleceğini sordum. Meslektaşım üzüntülü bir ifade ile 'Beyefendi

Confirming the words of Darende, Murat Bilhan, a young diplomat of the time, claims that “webs of sympathy” “took hold of the whole management system” in the ministry. According to Bilhan, “people knew who would be appointed to London before the assignment.”¹²² The members of the clique, in this regard, “were sharing the titles and posts that were preferable for promotion in the subsequent phases of their career.”¹²³ More than one account refer to the leadership of the clique to İlter Türkmen.¹²⁴ Alaaddin Gülen, a Turkish diplomat of the time, notes that

my term in office coincides with a period in which the ministry was being ruled by the İlter Türkmen-Kamuran Gürün clique as if it was their own property. These two became the inventors and perfect practitioners of cliqueism in the ministry. They undertook alternately the leadership of the clique, and in the end, these two also fell out from each other, and the real leader – Kamuran Gürün – was defeated by the second leader – İlter Türkmen – who became foreign minister [in 1980].¹²⁵

artık Bakanlığa gelmeyecek. Yerine yeni bir genel müdür atandı. Genel Müdürlüğe genel sekreter yardımcısı İlter Türkmen'in grubundan, yakın arkadaşı Fahir Alaçam atandı... Bakanlığın iç yönetimine çeki düzen vermek isteyen Çağlayangil'in yeşil ışık yaktığı belli oluyordu... Türkmen, Çağlayangil'den de cesaret alarak Bakanlık içinde yeni yapılanmaya yöneldi. Kendi grubundaki meslektaşları tek tek boşalan yerlere yerleştirdi.” Darende, *Diplomatın Not Defteri*..., 23-24.

122 Bilhan, Interview by the Author.

123 Ibid.

124 Unfortunately, İlter Türkmen did not pen a memoir and during the research for this dissertation, his health had deteriorated too much to conduct an interview. Nevertheless, in an interview conducted for an MA thesis, Türkmen claimed that “the good ones were being favored during their terms” and “politics never penetrated into the ministry.” Özdemir, *Bir Dışişleri Bakanı Olarak*..., 125.

125 “Benim görev sürem, Bakanlığın İlter Türkmen-Kamran Gürün kliği tarafından çiftlikleri gibi yönetildiği bir devreye rastlar. Bu ikili, Bakanlıkta klikciliğin mucidi ve muhteşem uygulayıcıları olmuşlardır. Kliğin liderliğini kah bu ikiliden biri, kah öteki yapmış ve sonunda bunlar da birbirine düşmüş ve Bakan olan ikinci lider İlter Türkmen karşısında esas lider Kamran

In his memoirs, Kamuran Gürün accepts that there was a dispute between him and İlter Türkmen, but he does not call it a power struggle. According to Gürün, the reason for the unrest during his term as undersecretary and Türkmen's as foreign minister was a "difference in style."¹²⁶ If "he had obeyed all decisions of Türkmen," claims Gürün, "there would not have been any friction between him and Türkmen."¹²⁷ Moreover, notes Gürün, "there were disputes between him and Türkmen on certain prominent issues," and Türkmen, according to Gürün, "preferred not to talk to him."¹²⁸ He notes these divergences as follows,

In the Cyprus dispute, I advocated a wholesale agreement while he was in favor of a mini-package; in the Islamic Summit, the minister argued the participation of the President [Kenan Evren] while I was advocating the opposite; in terms of relations with Israel, the minister advocated the interruption of relations, while I was in favor of their continuation; in case of the Armenian question, I suggested cooperating with the Jewish lobby while he suggested not to cooperate.¹²⁹

If we accept Gürün's claims, one would think that these two diplomats did not hold the same line in all foreign policy preferences as it was stated by their critics in the ministry. Nevertheless, it is worth recalling that none of the above-quoted differences were directly related to Turkey's alliance with the West. Why is this important? In addition to educational and generational bonds, a third motive played a role in terms of participation in the clique.

Güren mağlup olarak Bakanlıktan zamanından evvel ayrılmıştır." Alaeddin Gülen, *Bellekte Kalanlar* (İstanbul, 1998), 195.

126 "Kıbrıs konusunda ben her şeyin dahil olduğu bir anlaşmayı savunuyorken o mini bir paket istiyordu; İslami Zirve'de, Bakan, Cumhurbaşkanı'nın katılımını savunuyorken ben tersini savunuyordum; İsrail ile ilişkiler konusunda Bakan ilişkilerin kesilmesini, ben sürdürülmesini istiyordum. Ermeni meselesinde ben Yahudi lobisiyle işbirliği yapılmasını istiyordum, o istemiyordu." Kamuran Gürün, *Fırtınalı Yıllar: Dışişleri Müsteşarlığı Anıları* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1995), 182.

127 Ibid., 182.

128 Ibid., 449.

129 Ibid., 459.

Especially the leading cadres of the group were committed to the Western alliance and their careers were supported by the West. Alaaddin Gülen claims the existence of this support as follows:

İlter ... proved his talents in establishing very good relations with the United States. Americans lent a hand to him and, whenever he was suspended from duty [in the Turkish MFA], they secured him positions as good as ambassadorship [in international organizations]. When he was once put on the shelf by the Ecevit government in the 1970s, he was assigned to Far Eastern immigrant affairs with title of UN Deputy-Secretary General. He was appointed to ... membership in the Palestine Commission of the United Nations after his retirement.¹³⁰

The above quoted allegations also correspond to the aforementioned “pro-Western orientation” of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to Dikerdem, “a journalist known for his close relationship with the Americans and also with the Turkish General Staff was the spokesman for the clique.”¹³¹ The 1970s, as noted above, witnessed a dispute between the dominant pro-Western group and a group of challengers in the ministry. The so-called clique, as the representatives of the pro-Western camp, were allegedly at the epicenter of this debate. Nevertheless, not all the diplomats of the time agree with this view. Ömer Engin Lütem, for example, confirms the presence of such a clique in the aforementioned period whose members graduated from same schools.

130 “İlter ... Amerika ile çok iyi ilişkiler kurmakta mahir olduğunu göstermiştir. Ne zaman açıkta kalsa derhal, Amerikalılar imdadına yetişmiş ve kendisine Büyükelçiliği aratmayacak pozisyonlar sağlamışlardır. Bir sefer 1970 yılında Ecevit hükümetince kızağa çekilince, Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Sekreter Yardımcısı unvanı ile Uzakdoğu göçmen işleriyle görevlendirilmiştir. Son defa emekli olunca da Birleşmiş Milletler Filistin Komisyonu... üyeliğine atanmıştır.” Gülen, *Bellekte...*, 198. In June 1979, Türkmen was appointed as the special representative of then UN Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim. PMRA 030.18.01..380.246.7. June 15, 1979. Türkmen accepts his pro-Western and pro-NATO but also underscores his efforts in improving relations with the Middle Eastern countries and the Soviet Union. Türkmen also reminds that Turkey rejected American demands on many occasions. Özdemir, *Bir Dışişleri Bakanı Olarak...*, 134-135.

131 Dikerdem, *Hariciye Çarkı...*, 181.

But according to Lütem, these actors were not directing the main foreign policy line of Turkey; rather, they were the implementers of the orders of İsmet İnönü and Süleyman Demirel.¹³² The reason for their promotions, adds Lütem, was their ability to implement the orders of the given prime minister better than their contemporaries.¹³³

The presence of the clique was most visible in the aftermath of the September 12, 1980, coup d'état.¹³⁴ Afra notes that “when all members of the clique were placed in all levels of the diplomatic bureaucracy [after the coup], colleagues not attached to the clique joked among themselves that ‘the coup was not thrown due to cleavages between the right and the left but for the promotion of the members of the clique.’”¹³⁵ Indeed, the two diplomats who were believed to be the leaders of the pro-Western clique, were appointed as the first and second men in the foreign ministry hierarchy. After the coup d'état of September 12, 1980, İlter Türkmen, who was already secretary general of the foreign ministry, was appointed as the foreign minister, and Kamuran Gürün succeeded him as the new secretary general.¹³⁶ Türkmen, however, does not explain his path to the office in this sense. According to Türkmen, his appointment as foreign minister and Gürün's as his undersecretary was coincidental. In his words,

days passed, and they called me at the end, and said “We have chosen the minister. The foreign minister ... [will be] Kamuran Gürün. Would you remain as the undersecretary?” I replied, “I may stay one year, not more.” Meanwhile, I was on my way to ... Morocco. ... My special consultant came and said “[General] Haydar Saltık Pasha is calling you.”

132 Ömer Engin Lütem, *Interview by the Author*.

133 Ibid.

134 The coup d'état of September 12, 1980, is remembered for its blow to the Turkish left and is evaluated as a catalyst for the consolidation of Turkey's pro-Western foreign policy orientation. İlter Türkmen's term as foreign minister can also be evaluated in this manner.

135 Afra, *Hariciyeciler...*, 199.

136 After 12 September 1980, the title “secretary general” was abolished and the second in command the foreign ministry were called “under-secretary,” as was the in other ministries. Girgin, *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet...*, 152.

Saltık Paşa said that ... “I hope you did not inform Kamuran Gürün. Because the winds have changed on your behalf, but will you recruit Kamuran Gürün as undersecretary if you serve as foreign minister?” Kamuran Gürün was one of the most valuable people in the ministry. I replied, “Of course, with pleasure.”¹³⁷

Türkmen and Gürün rejected claims of a clique led by themselves. In his three-volume memoir, for example, Gürün keeps silent and does not directly refer to such claims. On their friendship and his cooperation with Türkmen, he notes that,

I was very old friends with İlter. ... We had not worked together before [Türkmen’s foreign ministry]. Even the periods we were assigned in the ministry in Ankara at the same time, were quite limited. ... I had almost no idea about the working style of İlter.¹³⁸

As this quote implies, Gürün claims that his professional relationship with Türkmen was limited compared to their friendship. In a similar vein, confirming Türkmen’s depiction, he also states that his appointment as secretary general of the ministry was realized without his notice.

137 “Günler geçti, nihayet bir gün çağrırdılar, dediler ki: 'Bakanı seçtik, Bakan Kamuran Gürün. Müsteşar olarak kalır misiniz?' 'Bir sene kalırırm, daha fazla kalmam.'... O sırada Fas'a... gidiyordum. Özel müşavirim...geldi... 'Sizi Haydar Saltık Paşa arıyor' dedi. Saltık Paşa'yla konuştuk, dedi ki: 'İnşallah Kamuran Gürün'e haber vermediniz.' dedi... 'Çünkü ibre size döndü ama siz Bakan olursanız Kamuran Gürün'ü Müsteşar olarak alır misiniz?' dedi. Yani Kamuran Gürün Bakanlığın en değerli insanlarından biriydi. 'Gayet tabii, memnuniyetle' dedik.” *TBMM Document Services Department (Tutanak Hizmetleri Başkanlığı)*, October 15, 2012, 2.

138 “İlter ile çok eski arkadaşık... O güne [Türkmen'in bakanlığı] kadar birlikte hiç çalışmamıştık. Bakanlıkta merkezde bir arada olduğumuz dönemler bile çok kısıtlıydı... İlter'in çalışma stili hakkında hemen hemen hiç bilgim yoktu.” Gürün, *Firtinalı Yıllar...*, 126.

I did not seek to be secretary general. I even did not think of being appointed to this post. ... Nobody asked my opinion ... This duty was issued to me by İlter.¹³⁹

Gürün's appointment as secretary general, in his view, was not the outcome of years-long professional cooperation with Türkmen as claimed by some Turkish diplomats. On the contrary, Gürün's appointment was an instantaneous development, and like Türkmen's appointment to the ministry, he had no influence over in his appointment.¹⁴⁰

It is not possible to verify the claims exactly. Nevertheless, there are certain realities that overlap in the various accounts of various diplomats. According to them, a group of young diplomats formed a clique in the second half of the 1960s and maintained their influence within the ministry until the aftermath of the September 12, 1980, coup d'état. The members of this formation were predominantly graduates of Galatasaray and Mülkiye, but not all Turkish diplomats who graduated from these schools were members. In the aforementioned period, the vast majority of Turkish career diplomats were graduates of these two schools anyway.

Second, being a member of the group was also a generational matter. Veteran diplomats were being eliminated by being appointed to passive offices even if they were graduates of schools like Galatasaray or Mülkiye. However, not all in this younger generation were members of the clique. Third, the foreign minister of the time was aware of the clique and warned his secretary general against it since the early days of its formation. The above-quoted words of Çağlayangil about his diplomats should be interpreted his awareness of this split in the ministry.

139 "Ben genel sekreterliğe talip olmamıştım. Bu makama getirilmeyi aklımdan bile geçirmemiştim ... Benim fikrimi kimse sormamış ... bu tayin ... bana, İlter tarafından tebliğ edilmişti." Ibid.

140 It is known that the members of the National Security Council, the primary body that governed Turkey for three years, comparatively consulted over the names İlter Türkmen Kamuran Gürün, Kamran İnan, and Osman Olcay. After a short investigation, the council agreed on the appointment of Türkmen and Gürün as the minister and undersecretary, respectively.

Last, the clique's presence was also related to the Cold War conjuncture. Members of the so-called clique were renowned for their commitment to the Western alliance, and most of their above-stated critics were referring to the pro-Western political orientation of the members of the clique.¹⁴¹ This was perhaps the most controversial aspect of the clique even though most Turkish diplomats already favored strong commitment to the Western alliance. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that the so-called leaders of the clique reached the summit of their careers when Turkish foreign policy was most vulnerable to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the Western world – that is post-coup period in 1980. Similarly, prominent members of the clique were subject to a kind of elimination during the second Ecevit government (January 1978–November 1979) during which a more independent foreign policy line vis-à-vis the Western alliance was favored.

§ 4.6 Gender Matters in Diplomacy: Female Diplomats and Diplomats' Spouses in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs¹⁴²

Cemal Hüsnü (Taray), Turkey's first permanent representative to the League of Nations in 1932, once stated that "there is only one profession that women cannot do: diplomacy."¹⁴³ While it is not clear whether his words reliably

141 Eralp notes that there was more than one clique, and these were formed in line with both educational bonds and political orientations. Eralp, *Interview by the Author*.

142 Recently, an article has been published that analyses the status and roles of women in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This article is the first academic work on the status of Turkish female diplomats. Bahar Rumelili, Rukiye Süleymanoğlu-Kürüm, "Women and Gender in Turkish Diplomacy: Historical Legacies and Current Patterns," in *Gendering Diplomacy and International Negotiation*, eds. Karin Aggestam, Ann E. Towns (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 87–106. In their article concerning the historical course and current trends in terms of participation of females in the Turkish MFA, Rumelili and Süleymanoğlu-Kurum claim that Turkish women not only performed "informal diplomatic roles and functions in various capacities" they are also "making their presence increasingly felt" in the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy "on par with many European countries." Ibid. 88.

143 Hüner Tuncer, *Bir Kadın Diplomatın Anıları: Meksika'dan Milano'ya Norveç'ten Güney Afrika'ya* (İstanbul: Logos Yayınları, 2007), 11.

represent the views of Turkish male diplomats about their female colleagues, gender frequently came to matter in the ministry especially after the increasing presence of female diplomats in the 1960s. Throughout the 1960s and 70s, the presence of female diplomats increased in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, females, whether as diplomats or as the wives of diplomats, were a matter of discussion in the ministry long time before the 1960-80 period.

The first female diplomat was accepted into the Ministry long before the 1960s. Even at the beginning of 1920s, Halide Edip (Adıvar) was stating that there were women in Turkey who were “as capable as men of occupying high posts such as that of ambassador.”¹⁴⁴ The foreign ministry began to admit females in 1929 at the lower ranks. The first female officer was Fatma Alev Hanım who was recruited at the age of forty-six and worked in the lower ranks of the ministry until her retirement in 1948.¹⁴⁵ The first female career officer (diplomat) was Adile Ayda who was accepted into the Ministry in 1932.¹⁴⁶ As of that year, there were only thirteen countries who had female diplomats and Turkey was one of them.¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, female officers became apparent in the ministry in the 1950s. This was because Adile (Ayda) Hanım quit the ministry in 1934 when a decree prohibited the appointment of female diplomats to diplomatic missions abroad.¹⁴⁸ She returned to the ministry after this

144 Rumelili and Rahime Süleymanoğlu-Kurum, “Women and Gender in Turkish Diplomacy: Historical Legacies and Current Patterns,” 91.

145 Harris, *Atatürk's...*, 110.

146 Girgin, *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi...*, 140.

147 Rumelili and Süleymanoğlu-Kurum, “Women and Gender in Turkish Diplomacy: Historical Legacies and Current Patterns,” 91.

148 For the memoirs of Adile Ayda, see Adile Ayda, *Bir Demet Edebiyat* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2005). Girgin claims that the reason for Ayda's resignation was her marriage. Girgin, *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi Hariciye Tarihimiz*, 140. A Tatar born in St. Petersburg in 1912, her birthname was Gadile Sandreyevna Maksudova. As the daughter of Sadri Maksudi (Arsal), a Turkish-Tatar politician, lawyer, scholar and thinker, Ayda's career trajectory followed a different path. After being accepted into the ministry at a relatively young age, Ayda resigned, as noted above. Ayda then worked as a scholar of literature, first in Ankara and then at Istanbul University for about twenty years. Ibid. Barriers against the participation of women in the ranks of the diplomatic bureaucracy were not specific to Turkey. Between 1948 and

limitation against the assignment of female diplomats to diplomatic missions abroad was lifted in 1957.¹⁴⁹

Ayda's return to the ministry was an integral part of a general trend during the 1950s – the increase in the number of female diplomats within the ministry. Throughout the 1950s they remained few in number. As Girgin notes, between 1957 and 1959 five female diplomats joined the ministry.¹⁵⁰ Despite the fact that there were additional, new female diplomats especially by the late 1950s, Ayda was still a peculiarity. When she was appointed as charge d'affairs to Turkey's embassy in The Hague, Ayda became the first female diplomat to be appointed to a Turkish embassy; other female officers were assigned to consular missions and to Ankara. *Cumhuriyet* on January, 26 1960, notes that "even though previously there were one or two female diplomats working in Turkish consular missions, there have been no females assigned to the cadres of Turkish embassies, [and] Ayda is the first female diplomat to be appointed to an embassy."¹⁵¹ The "one or two diplomats appointed to consulates" that *Cumhuriyet* mentioned were Şükran Güneş and Jale Yiğit, who were appointed to Turkish consulates in Athens and London, respectively.¹⁵²

1960, women diplomats in India, for example, had to submit their resignation upon marrying. Interestingly, the situation was no different in the United States. Until 1958, without a written rule but influenced by tradition, female diplomats were demanded to resign if they married. Leguey-Feilleux, *The Dynamics of Diplomacy*, 147.

149 Girgin, *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi Hariciye Tarihimiz*, 140.

150 Ibid.

151 "İlk Kadın Diplomatımız," (Our First Female Diplomat) *Cumhuriyet*, January 26, 1960, 3.

152 *TC Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette)*, no. 10.174. April 1, 1959, 1. Milliyet of April 3, 1959, provides detailed information about these two young, female diplomats. According to the news, Şükran Güneş was twenty-six years old at the time of her appointment and had been born in Hendek, Sakarya. She was a graduate of the School of Political Sciences (*Mekteb-i Mülkiye*). Güneş was accepted into the Ministry in 1956, and prior to her appointment in Athens, she served at the "international affairs" desk of the political affairs department. Jale Yiğit, on the other hand, was from Istanbul and was a graduate of American College for Girls and the Faculty of Law in Istanbul. She was accepted into the ministry in 1957 and served in the department of international economic affairs, in the second department, and in the directorate general of protocol. *Milliyet* also informed readers that both diplomats were single. "Harice İlk Defa Kadın

While a female diplomat was first accepted to the ministry in 1932, female diplomats became visibly present only in the second half of 1950s. A female diplomat would be appointed as ambassador in 1982, two decades after Adile Ayda's appointment to the embassy in The Hague and five decades after her initial acceptance to the ministry.

This may seem a slow rate of progress. Turkey, in general, was incapable of integrating its female population into social and political life. Yet not only the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs that was reluctant to integrate female officers into its cadres. Developed Western nations were in a similar situation. Rana recalls us that "in the 1960s and even later, women were not considered suitable for executive-level diplomatic work in embassies, even while they formed the bulk of the support staff in Western foreign ministries, and their embassies."¹⁵³ As a more specific example, Iver B. Neumann depicts the course of women's accession to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Norway, a highly-developed country with considerable female participation in social and political life.

In 1905, the MFA of the newly sovereign Norwegian state had a handful of recent female arrivals who were working as typists. A woman was first listed in the MFA's calendar in 1918. She was working as an archivist. By 1960, of the 417 persons who were permanently employed, 124 were women. However, only one of these was a diplomat, i.e. a permanently employed civil servant in the foreign service with a duty to take up any post at home or abroad to which he (not she) was ordered.¹⁵⁴

Neumann's statements illustrate that the situation in Norway at the beginning of 1960s was even worse than in Turkey. There was only one Norwegian female

Temsilci Gönderiyoruz," (For the first time we send female representative to abroad) *Milliyet*, April 3, 1959, 1.

153 Rana, *The Contemporary Embassy...*, 123.

154 Iver B. Neumann, "The Body of the Diplomat," *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (September 2008), 672.

in the Norwegian MFA assigned as a diplomat in 1960.¹⁵⁵ In this regard, the position of women in Norwegian society was not proportional to their presence in the diplomatic bureaucracy of the country.¹⁵⁶ So what does the course of Turkish female diplomats tell us? In order to understand this, it is useful to refer to reactions within the ministry against the appointment of Filiz Dinçmen as ambassador.

Dinçmen was the first female diplomat to be promoted to the rank of ambassador.¹⁵⁷ Having been accepted into the Ministry in 1961, Dinçmen was first appointed as third secretary to Turkey's permanent delegation at the United Nations. When appointed as Turkey's ambassador to The Hague, Netherlands in 1982, Dinçmen became the first Turkish female diplomat to reach the rank of ambassador within the ministry.¹⁵⁸ Ergun Sav illustrates the attitude of ministry personnel to her appointment of Dinçmen as follows,

I am good friends with Filiz. We worked in the same office. ... I was abroad when she was appointed to the Netherlands as ambassador. I wrote a letter to congratulate her. ... I received a long letter after a short while. She was sad. [Some people] could not stand her appointment to The Hague as ambassador. They were gossiping: "She was appointed just because she was female. Are the Netherlands a suitable post for a first appointment? She will not overcome [this mission]."¹⁵⁹

155 Ibid.

156 The case of women is country and even region specific in this regard. For example, Dominican Republic, an island country in the Atlantic, has attached important roles to Dominican women in the diplomatic bureaucracy since its establishment in 1844. The delegate who signed the UN Charter in 1945 on behalf of the Dominican Republic was a female diplomat. Similarly, by 1974, Latin American countries had fifty-three female diplomats in their permanent missions to the UN, more than any other regional group. Leguey-Feilleux, *The Dynamics of Diplomacy...*, 147.

157 Sav, *Diplomaturga...*, 39.

158 "İlk Kadın Büyükelçimiz Lahey'e Atandı," (Our First Woman Ambassador was appointed to The Hague), *Milliyet*, June 22, 1982, 5.

159 "Filiz iyi arkadaşındır. Aynı odada çalıştık... Hollanda'ya büyükelçi atıldığı zaman ben dışarıdaydım. Tebrik mektubu yazdım... Kısa süre sonra uzun bir cevap geldi. Meğer dertliymiş Lahey'e büyükelçi olmasını bazıları hazırlamamış. Çekıştırmamış. Sırf hanım

Dinçmen was nonetheless a special case. She was the first woman to be appointed as an ambassador in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Leaving the case of Turkey aside, female ambassadors in those years were alien to most foreign ministries of even the developed world. The problems she experienced after being appointed as ambassador and the reactions to her new position may not illustrate the whole picture of the daily experiences of other Turkish female diplomats in the lower ranks. Indeed, the accounts of Hüner Tuncer, who was a newcomer to the ministry in the late 1970s, better depict the experiences of Turkish female diplomats and the attitude towards them within the ministry. Tuncer states that,

I saw myself as a very privileged person for serving as a female diplomat in the foreign ministry. Our seniors did not treat us differently than our male colleagues. In other words, male career officers and female career officers were not assigned different duties because of their genders, and it was out of question for us to be assigned to easier responsibilities because we were females. ...

I was also once assigned as a diplomatic courier to Cyprus and became the first female diplomat to be appointed abroad as a courier. Somehow the ministry was not appointing female diplomats as diplomatic couriers. This was because the courier bags were very heavy.¹⁶⁰

olduğu için atandı. İlk çıkışta Hollanda olur mu? Başaramaz,” gibi laflar dolaştırılmış.” Sav, *Diplomaturga...*, 39-40. “Female ambassadors” were latecomers even in the developed world, and female diplomats faced discrimination similar to that Dinçmen experienced. In the United States, a female career diplomat was appointed as ambassador in 1953 for the first time. Before this, Eugenie Anderson had been appointed as ambassador to Copenhagen in 1949, but she was not a career diplomat but rather a politician. Even at the relatively late date of 1976, there were claims of sexual discrimination in the Department of State, which was taken to court in 1985. Leguey-Feilleux, *The Dynamics of Diplomacy*, 147.

160 “Dışişleri Bakanlığı’nda kadın diplomat olarak görev yapmakla, kendimi çok ayrıcalıklı bir insan gibi görüyordum. Amirlerimiz, bizlere erkek meslektaşlarından farklı bir davranışta bulunmuyordu. Başka bir deyişle, erkek meslek memurlarıyla kadın meslek memurları, cinsiyetlerinden ötürü farklı görev alanlarında çalıştırılmamakta, kadın olmamız nedeniyle bizlere daha kolay sayılabilcek işlerin verilmesi söz konusu olmamaktaydı....

Although Tuncer first states that there was no distinction between her and her male colleagues, the second part of the quote reveals that, for example, being a diplomatic courier was long not considered as suitable for females. Mostly with regard to these kinds of contradictions, female diplomats have always been an issue of discussion in the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy.

Throughout the second wave of women's movements in the 1970s and 1980s, the wives of diplomats from Sweden, Canada, Britain, and the United States "created new organizations and revitalized existing organizations ... to demand the recognition for the contributions they made to their countries' foreign policy operations in their work as the wives of male diplomats."¹⁶¹ Some even demanded salaries.¹⁶² By 1972, the Department of State of the United States decided "not to demand any work from the diplomat wives" and established this as an institutional policy.¹⁶³ In Britain, a "Diplomatic Service Wives Association," was formed.¹⁶⁴ These formations and demands dated back to previous decades. Especially since the nineteenth century, diplomacy was strictly entwined with protocol; and diplomats' wives played significant roles with no official title, status, or payment. Although there were individual efforts and objections to the invisible workload on diplomats' wives, these criticisms were not expressed in an organized manner.¹⁶⁵

When the scope of work of diplomats became increasingly formalized in the twentieth century, their workload became increasingly visible. Many diplomatic spouses, most of whom were females, "did not even consider the possibility of following their own careers, but rather saw their own career as being

Ben de, bir kez kurye olarak, Kıbrıs'a gönderilmişim ve yurtdışına kurye olarak gönderilen ilk kadın diplomat olmuştum." Hüner Tuncer, *Bir Kadın Diplomatın Anıları*, 11.

161 Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Military Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Relations* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2014), 181.

162 Ibid.

163 Clark, *Corps Diplomatique*, 94.

164 Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Military Bases...*, 189.

165 Diplomats' wives were the initial defenders of their rights before women's rights activists. For the individual efforts, objections and the initiatives of diplomats' wives, see Ibid., 182-184.

a kind of ‘parallel’ one alongside their partners.”¹⁶⁶ In some cases, diplomatic wives played much stronger roles than as a decoration for diplomatic representation. Polly Lukens, a young United States Foreign Service wife assigned in the Congo during the early days of its independence, “helped refugees fleeing across the Congo River, feeding them, giving them clothes, and supplying beds.”¹⁶⁷

Wives of Turkish diplomats were also a concern for diplomatic representation and the appointment of diplomats. Enloe notes that “without a wife’s active cooperation, a male diplomat cannot perform the essential social tasks well.”¹⁶⁸ Gökmen, a male ambassador, agrees.

One of the foremost functions of diplomacy is representation. The weight of the spouse in terms of representation is at least equal to that of the diplomat. She reflects ... the tradition of the nation that she represents....

[The wives of diplomats] constitute the most complementary element of the diplomatic profession with their intelligence, manners, traditions, intuitions, and devotion. Because of this, some countries allocate separate resources to the wives of diplomats. ...

It is frequently heard in diplomatic circles: when appointing a diplomat to far or troublesome places, it is argued “let us appoint a married, easygoing officer there.” The meaning of this is clear. Along with many other factors, motives such as more easily adapting to the social and working life in the given country, preventing probable stress and troubles, and developing better social relations are taken into consideration. In general, practices and experiences up to now demonstrate that married diplomats with happy family lives ... have been more effective, successful, and stable in pursuing their duties. The

166 Annabel Hendry, “From Parallel to Dual Careers: Diplomatic Spouses in the European Context,” in *Modern Diplomacy*, Jovan Kurbalija, ed., accessed 8 May 2016, available from <https://www.diplomacy.edu/resources/general/parallel-dual-careers-diplomatic-spouses>.

167 Clark, *Corps Diplomatique*, 94.

168 Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Military Bases...*, 185.

contribution of the wives of diplomats to this, is much more than people from other professions would predict or imagine.¹⁶⁹

As the remarks of Gökmen illustrate, females also played critical roles in complementing the “representation function” of their diplomat husbands. A diplomat’s career, as Gökmen’s remarks illustrate, benefited from a happy family life. Diplomatic wives also contributed to the better functioning of the embassies. Emine Esenbel, the wife of Turkish ambassador Melih Esenbel, depicts how the absence of a married ambassador in a diplomatic mission negatively influenced protocol procedures.

Ambassador Hüseyin Ragıp Baydur was not married when we were appointed to Washington. ... [Three] other diplomats that were superior to my husband in terms of rank were all bachelors ... I witnessed how troublesome it was for protocol affairs ... Despite my lack of experience ... I considered diplomatic invitations as a course, and I

169 “Diplomasının en onde gelen bir işlevi ‘temsil’dir. Temsil’de ise Eş’in ağırlığı en azından diplomatinkine eşittir. Temsil ettiği milletin... geleneklerini çevresine o yansıtır....

[Diplomat eşleri] bilgileri, görgüleri, gelenekleri, onsezileri, özverileri ile diplomasi mesleğinin en önemli tamamlayıcı unsurunu oluştururlar. Bu yüzden bazı ülkelerde diplomat hanımlarına ayrı ödenek tahsis edildiği bile görülmektedir....

Hariciye çevrelerinde çok defa duyulmuştur. Yurt dışında uzak veya çeşitli yönlerden koşulları pek kolay olmayan görevlere atamalar yapılırken, ‘aman oraya evli, uyumlu bir arkadaş tayin edelim’ denirilir. Bunun anlamı açıktır. Bir çok sebeplerin yanı sıra, o yabancı ülkedeki toplum ve çalışma hayatına daha kolaylıkla uyum sağlamak, olası sıkıntı ve streslerden korunmak, sosyal ilişkileri daha da geliştirebilmek amaçları göz önünde tutulmuştur. Genel olarak şimdide kadarki uygulama ve deneyimler göstermiştir ki, evli ve uyumlu bir aile yaşamına sahip olan diplomatlar... görevlerinin yürütülmesinde çok daha etkin, başarılı ve istikrarlı olabilmektedirler. Bunda da hiç kuşkusuz diplomat hanımlarının payı ve katkısı diğer mesleklerin tahmin ve tasavvur edemeyecekleri kadar büyütür.” Oğuz Gökmen, *Bir Zamanlar Hariciye: Eski Bir Diplomatın Anıları 1* (İstanbul, 1999), 372-373. In the United States, for example “the performance of the diplomatic wife was [for decades] officially evaluated and taken into account when her husband was up for promotion.” This unwritten rule, however, was officially changed in 1972. The “spouse factor” was also omitted as an element of promotion for diplomats. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Military Bases...*, 199.

recorded the behaviors especially at invitations hosted by large states in my mind.¹⁷⁰

However, marriage on its own was not satisfactory enough for the ministry administration to assume one had a “suitable” family life. In other words, the question “marriage with whom?” was a larger factor than the marriage itself. Even at the beginning of twentieth century, marriage with foreigners was a matter of criticism. After his visit to European capitals in 1914, Kazım (Karabekir) observed that many Ottoman-Turkish diplomats had married foreigners and concluded that “it would have posed a threat to the secrets of the state.”¹⁷¹ This complaint intensified in the 1960-80 period. Marriages of Turkish diplomats with foreigners was of considerable concern even for Turkish foreign ministers. Gündüz Ökçün, during his foreign ministry, did not permit ministry personnel to marry foreigners and allegedly said “I am seriously concerned that one day foreign ladies will represent Turkey abroad.”¹⁷² In 1982,

170 “Washington'a ilk atandığımızda Büyükelçi Hüseyib Ragıp Baydur bekardı. Görev sırasında eşimden [önceki ve sonraki] üç isim de bekardı. Bunun protokol açısından ne denli sıkıntılara yarattığını da tanık olmuşumdur... Tüm deneyimsizliğime rağmen... her katıldığımız daveti bir ders gibi algıladım ve özellikle büyük devletlerin elçiliklerinde verilen davetlerdeki görgüyü... belleğime kaydettim.” Öndeş, Bin Renk, Bir Ömür..., 66-67. Ahmet Muhtar, Turkey's first ambassador to the United States, had Cedide Deha from the University of Chicago accompany him in his campaign to promote reforms and to present the “new face” of the newly established Turkish republic through a modern, English-speaking woman. The clearest example of the influence of diplomats' spouses in diplomatic maneuvers, especially in case of the United States, was that of Hayrünissa Rüstem, the wife of Mehmet Münir (Ertegün), the Turkish ambassador to Washington between 1934-1944. The Ertegün couple during their tenures in Washington, “requested separate meetings with Washington power brokers, including Eleanor Roosevelt, then-Secretary of State Cordell Hull and his wife Vice President John Nance Garner and his wife” and other prominent political figures of the time and their wives. Their lobbying was so successful that Eleanor Roosevelt, perhaps the strongest First Lady in American history, entertained the Ertegün couple on January 10, 1935. Harris, “Cementing...,” 182-183. In other words, women always mattered in Turkish diplomatic representation.

171 Kazım Karabekir, *I. Cihan Harbine Niçin Girdik?* vol. 1. (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 2000), 30-32.

172 Ünlütürk, *Monşerler...*, 75. This was indeed an early republican tradition in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After the ministry was nationalized in terms of its personnel, “those

Kenan Evren, during his term as president, complained about the marriage of Turkish diplomats to foreigners.¹⁷³ Marriage to foreigners for Turkish diplomats and military officers is prohibited in general. Practice has been much flexible within the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. In some cases, the ban on marrying foreigners was lifted, and even when the prohibition was in effect, Turkish diplomats resorted to a trick to marry women of foreign origin.¹⁷⁴ During the 1970s, there were about forty-three such trick marriages within the Ministry.¹⁷⁵

Interestingly, Gökmen, who made the broadest remarks in his accounts on the role and of functions diplomats' wives in terms of diplomatic representation, chose "to stop talking [with respect to] this issue" since "it could upset some of his friends" who married foreigners.¹⁷⁶ His silence on the issue of the marriage of Turkish diplomats to foreigners can be interpreted as a clear indicator that this was a critical issue within the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy.¹⁷⁷

with non-Muslim wives, especially those who did not convert to Islam, were also forced out after the first few years of the Republic." Harris, *Atatürk's...*, 101.

173 Ünlütürk, *Monşerler...*, 75. On his visit to Jakarta, Indonesia, Evren first realized that the wife of Pulat Tacer was of foreign origin. After meeting with various Turkish diplomats during his visit whose wives were foreigners, Evren asked "Why do our diplomats not marry [Turkish] girls?" Neumann claims that "until the 1990s, Turkish diplomats who married foreigners had to quit foreign service." Neumann, *At Home with Diplomats*, 131. This evidence challenge his claim. In principle, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs opposed the marriage of its members to foreigners, but this rule was by-passed on many occasions.

174 Ünlütürk, *Monşerler...*, 128.

175 Ibid. The logic of a "trick marriage" is simple. The foreign woman with whom a Turkish diplomat is in a relationship first marries another, reliable Turkish citizen. After the marriage, the woman applies for and requires Turkish citizenship on the basis of having married a Turkish man. As a consequence, the woman is no longer a foreigner, but a Turkish citizen. In this regard, the Turkish diplomat has no barrier from marrying this woman. Ibid.

176 Gökmen, *Bir Zamanlar Hariciye...*, 375.

177 In chapter 1, it was stated that Turkish diplomats rarely remained silent while talking about their experiences throughout their professional lives. This case, in this regard, constitutes an exception.

§ 4.7 Concluding Remarks

This chapter illustrated that in the 1960-1980 period, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was carrying out almost all the features of a post-World War II foreign ministry. The vast majority of diplomats were graduates of similar schools, even though acceptance into foreign ministries was more “democratic” than before WWII. Although its officers predominantly defended pro-Western foreign policy preferences, one group of officers defended Turkey’s engagement with then-newly-emerging Third World countries. As will be illustrated in the next chapter, the ministry had to share its authority with other institutions, but on the other hand, its workload broadened due to new scopes of work such as the Cyprus Question and the Turkish workforce migration to Europe.

As clarified in this chapter, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was subject to criticism from the public. Basically, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy was criticized for lacking the ability to react properly to the developments of the time and of being unable to defend the national interests of Turkey. Recalling discussions in chapter 2, criticisms of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs were similar to those of other foreign ministries. In this regard, the case of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was indeed a similar to its European and American counterparts. Nevertheless, critics made these statements as if these were specific to Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, just as in the previous decades, was influenced by ideological cleavages and developments in domestic politics. The Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy was never totally immune to developments related to domestic politics. Moreover, many global phenomena related to world’s the diplomatic bureaucracies influenced the Turkish MFA as an institution and Turkish diplomats individually. As a consequence, this study suggests that Turkish diplomacy cannot be labeled as awkward or archaic when compared to other examples in the world. In 1968, for example, a “Foreign Affairs Academy” was established for the first time in the history of

the Ministry to train young recruits.¹⁷⁸ This was not late when compared to other examples in the world. For example, Brazil introduced its diplomacy academy only in the early 1990s.¹⁷⁹



178 Girgin, *Osmanlı-Cumhuriyet Dönemi Hariciye Tarihimiz*, 143. This was a long-awaited development for the ministry. Galip Kemali Söylemezoğlu, a late Ottoman-Turkish diplomat, mentioned the necessity of a diplomatic academy in his accounts. Söylemezoğlu, *Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene*, 182.

179 Langhorne, "Current Developments in Diplomacy...," 7.

5

The “Flat Room” And Beyond: Impact of the 27 May Coup on The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

§ 5.1 A Coup and a Ministry

On May 27, 1960, a military junta consisting of mid-ranking military officials realized a coup d'état and ended the ten year-long (May 14, 1950-May 27, 1960) Democrat Party (DP) period in Turkish political life. In terms of foreign policy orientations, the military administration was committed to maintaining Turkey's basic foreign policy preferences. The announcement read by Colonel Alparslan Türkeş on the first day of the coup included a special paragraph on Turkey's foreign policy. It was announced that

we declare to our allies, neighbors, and the entire world: our aim is to fully obey the UN Charter and human rights principles. The “Peace at Home, Peace in the World” principle of Great Atatürk is our standard. We are loyal to all of our alliances and commitments. We believe in NATO and [are] committed to [it.] We are loyal to CENTO.¹

1 “Müttefiklerimize, komşularımıza ve bütün Dünyaya hitap ediyoruz. Gayemiz Birleşmiş Milletler Anayasasına ve insan hakları prensiplerine tamamıyla riayettir. Büyük Atatürk'ün Vurtta Sulh ve Cihanda Sulh prensibi Bayrağımızdır. Bütün ittifaklarımıza ve taahhütlerimize sadıkız. NATO'ya inanıyor as ve bağlıyız. CENTO'ya bağlıyız.” *TC Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette)*, June 30, 1960. no. 10539, 1632.

The leader of the National Unity Committee (*Milli Birlik Komitesi*, hereafter MBK) Cemal Gürsel, was clearer in an interview conducted by two Greek journalists.

Journalists – Will be a change in the previous foreign policy after the new revolutionary movement?

Gürsel – As I expressed on the first day of revolution, Turkey will be loyal to the United Nations Charter, to all alliances and commitments.

In this regard, any change in Turkish foreign policy is out of the question.²

Instead of evaluating Turkish foreign policy after the military coup d'état on May 27, 1960, this chapter illustrates the impact of the coup on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the bureaucratic mechanism for conducting Turkey's foreign relations. In chapter 3, Dikerdem made a distinction between the pre-1960 and post-1960 periods in terms of the penetration of the dynamics of domestic politics into the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In general, this chapter testifies to the validity of this claim.

Metin Tamkoç claims that the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs benefited from the military administration. He clarifies his position with a statistic.

Of the seven foreign ministers of the period since 1960 [until 1976], five were career diplomats – the two exceptions being İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil and Turan Güneş [which] starkly contrasts ... the period from 1920 to 1960. Of the eleven ministers of Foreign Affairs only two were career diplomats.³

2 "Soru: Yeni inkılâp hareketinden sonra, ondan evvel takip edilen dış siyasette bir değişiklik olacak mıdır? Cevap: İnkılâbin daha ilk gününde ifade ettiğim gibi, Türkiye, Birleşmiş Milletler Anayasasına ve bütün ittifak ve taahhütlerine sadık kalacaktır. Bu itibarla Türkiye'nin harici siyasetinde bir değişiklik yapılması bahis konusu değildir." *TC Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette)*, July, 27 1960. no. 10562, 1824.

3 Metin Tamkoç, *The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernization of Turkey* (Salt Lake City: Utah University Press, 1976), 254.

The appointment of Selim R. Sarper as the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the new administration, adds Tamkoç, “implied that the MBK had to rely on the expert counsel and experience of a well-known and highly-respected professional diplomat.”⁴

The first evidence that Tamkoç presents in claiming that the influence of diplomatic bureaucracy increased after 27 May is an undisputable statistic. The evaluation of Sarper’s appointment as the foreign minister as an indicator of the coup’s positive influence on the ministry is, however, questionable. As a matter of fact, the MBK first considered Fahri Korutürk, an admiral, as the foreign minister, but in the list of cabinet members announced the following day, Korutürk was replaced with Selim Sarper.⁵ Sarper was appointed “in order to establish a positive image” in the West since he “had good relations with the West.”⁶ On the other hand, Tamkoç grounds his position in a second argument: the opinions of Turkish diplomats working in the ministry during the post-27 May years. In Tamkoç’s words,

since May 1960, in addition to the inclusion of the ministers of Foreign Affairs into foreign policy decision-making circles, the secretary general, director generals of various departments, and other high-ranking career foreign service officers have exercised considerable influence in the formulation and execution of foreign policy decisions. This observation is based on this writer’s long-time association with a number of career officers and on interviews with others in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁷

Tamkoç notes that various Turkish diplomats from different ranks within the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy confirmed the increasing role of the ministry

4 Ibid.

5 Gökmen, *Diplomasi...*, 317.

6 Uzgel, “TDP’nin Uygulanması,” 78. The case of Sarper and his role in the post-27 May process will be introduced below in detail.

7 Tamkoç, *Warrior Diplomats*, 255.

in foreign policy decision-making processes in the post-27 May period.⁸ He, on the other hand, insists that “the ministry [was] immune from domestic political pressures,” and “therefore, [it was] immune from the corruptive influences which normally plague other public service officers.”⁹

Tamkoç does not reveal the positions of these officers in detail. It is not possible to verify the position of Tamkoç through new interviews; none of the influential, senior figures of the period are alive. Instead, a comprehensive, comparative content analysis of the accounts of Turkish diplomats of the time can lead to a better understanding of the influence of the coup d'état on the ministry.

§ 5.2 Bureaucratic “Reforms”

The coup d'état of May 27 1960 deeply influenced the structure and operations of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not in terms of quantity but quality. In other words, there was not purge of hundreds of officers, but administrators in the most critical positions were removed, and the authority of the foreign ministry was curbed in certain respects. Even the name of the ministry was changed. Until 1960, the ministry had been called the “Hariciye Vekaleti,” a usage inherited from Ottoman Turkish. However, to create a “new,” simplified Turkish, the name of the ministry was changed to “Dışişleri Bakanlığı.”¹⁰ Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, along with other cabinet members, was arrested on the day of the coup, and at the end of the trial process, he would be one of three people

8 Ibid. Temel İskit, who joined the Ministry in 1963, also claims that Turkish diplomats had the authority to determine the course of Turkish foreign policy's in the post-1960 period. According to İskit, the Ministry had supremacy over other institutions in diplomatic processes, and in cases when a Turkish delegation consisting of different elements of the bureaucracy paid a visit abroad, an officer from the Ministry definitely headed the delegation. İskit, *Interview by the Author*.

9 Tamkoç, *Warrior Diplomats*, 255.

10 Girgin, *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi...*, 142. Indeed, the ministry's name had already been converted to “Dışişleri Bakanlığı” in the 1930s. In the 1950s, however, it was once again regulated as “Hariciye Vekaleti.”

sentenced to the death penalty and executed. As Özcan concludes, “the foreign ministry’s influence within the state mechanism was visibly restricted.”¹¹

Despite the facts that Zorlu served only three years as foreign minister during the ten year-long rule of DP governments and that his ties with the DP organization were very loose, the ministry had been notably linked to his personality in the minds of MBK members.¹² In this regard, the first and fiercest reaction of the MBK members against the ministry was indeed a response to the personality of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. Zorlu was renowned for his concentration on foreign economic and trade affairs. As a career officer, at the beginning of the 1950s, he rose to prominence as an administrator responsible for a department assigned to economic and trade affairs.¹³ After entering politics in 1954, he served as deputy prime minister responsible for Cyprus and economic affairs.¹⁴ When appointed as foreign minister in 1957, Zorlu established a team of diplomats responsible for Turkey’s economic and trade relations with the external world.¹⁵ The ministry thus became the primary institution for conducting Turkey’s foreign economic relations. The hallmark of Zorlu’s foreign ministry to a large extent was his emphasis on foreign economic relations.

Beginning in the late 1960s, foreign ministries faced “challenges from other ministries” in terms their of authority over foreign policy issues.¹⁶ State ministries and agencies seized authority of foreign ministries especially in the realms of foreign economic relations and foreign aid programs. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was an early example of this phenomenon. Before

11 Gencer Özcan, “Altmışlı Yillarda Dış Politika,” in *Türkiye’nin 1960’lı Yılları*, ed. Mete Kaan Kaynar (İstanbul: İletişim, 2017), 226.

12 Günver notes that Zorlu’s only connection to the DP was his family ties with Prime Minister Menderes. For example, Hasan Polatkan, the Minister of Finance who was executed along with Zorlu and Menderes, was claimed to have hated Zorlu. Günver, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu...*, 109.

13 Ibid., 31-42.

14 “21. Hükümet Kabine Üyeleri,” *TC Prime Ministry*, accessed March 7, 2016, available from https://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/_Global/_Government/pg_Cabinets.aspx.

15 Günver, *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu’nun...*, 105.

16 Iver B. Neumann, “Globalization and Diplomacy,” in *Global Governance and Diplomacy: The Worlds Apart?* eds. Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking and William Maley (New York: Palgrave, 2008), 23.

the coup, other institutions – most notably the Ministry of Finance – complained about the seizure of their authority.¹⁷ Many disputes among ministries were resolved by the office of the prime ministry.¹⁸ In addition to this general situation, the case of foreign ministry, as noted above, was different. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs consolidated its position within the entire state mechanism and established a *primus inter parvis* position among the other ministries and institutions.¹⁹ Officers of other ministries, especially those of the finance bureaucracy, opposed to the supremacy of the foreign ministry over other institutions in foreign economic affairs. Kemal Kurdaş, a bureaucrat at the Ministry of Finance in the 1950s, criticizes the influence of the foreign ministry on economic and financial matters as follows:

One of the negative outcomes of the Menderes period was the intervention of the foreign ministry in economic policy. The foreign ministry was involved in what happened until 27 May and their consequences [of these]. The answer of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was most interesting when I asked him why they were interfering in decisions on foreign currency. According to Fatin, foreign relations are related to foreign currency since foreign currency belongs to foreigners; he means, because there is the word “foreign” in it. ... The 1950[-1960] period proved that Foreign Affairs should not have intervened in the economic policies of the state. ... In my opinion, Fatin Rüştü had a very negative influence on what had happened.²⁰

17 Ergun Türkcan, *Attila Sönmez'e Armağan: Türkiye'de Planlamanın Yükselişi ve Çöküşü 1960-1980* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayımları, 2010), 117-118.

18 Ibid., 130.

19 Gencer Özcan, “Ellili Yıllarda Dış Politika,” in *Türkiye'nin 1950'li Yılları*, ed. Mete Kaan Kaynar (İstanbul: İletişim, 2015), 101-102.

20 “Menderes döneminin bir sakıncası da, Türkiye'de ekonomik politikaya hariciyenin müda-hale etmesidir. 27 Mayıs'a kadar olanlarda ve neticelerinde hariciyenin dahli vardır. Fatin'e birkaç kez, döviz kuruyla ilgili kararlara neden karışıklarını sorduğumda verdiği cevap, duy-duğum en enteresan cevaplardandır. Fatin'e göre döviz kuru yabancı para olduğuna göre, dış ilişkiler de dövizle birebir ilgilidir; hani kelimenin başında ‘dış’ var ya, o kabilden! ... 1950 dönemi bana şunu göstermiştir ki, hariciye devletin ekonomik politikasına girmemelidir... Bence Fatin Rüştü'nün çok negatif rolü oldu bütün yaşananlarda.” Ibid., 103.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was involved in a tacit battle especially with the Ministry of Finance. Ayhan Çilingiroğlu, a Turkish bureaucrat assigned to prepare of a report on a planned economy in the late 1950s, depicts the causes and consequences of the tension between the foreign ministry and the ministry of finance as follows:

Hasan Esat Işık, deputy secretary general at the foreign ministry, was administrating foreign economic relations under the patronage of Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. However, the number of officers in the foreign ministry was unsatisfactory; there were almost no sectoral experts. These duties [foreign economic affairs] were being conducted by assigning the officers of other ministries and institutions. The ministry of finance was the active institution in the formation and implementation of domestic financial policies. They were in an ongoing rivalry with the ministry of foreign affairs. The root cause of the rivalry was that foreign ministry officers were paid more for assignments abroad and officers of the ministry of finance were deprived of these resources. These rivalries sometimes came to existence such as not giving necessary information to the foreign ministry or in a lack of cooperation from the ministry of finance. High level officers working in the foreign ministry and ministry of finance were, in general, friends from the School of Political Sciences. Rivalries dating back to school years, expectedly, continued in their professional lives.²¹

21 "Dışişleri Bakanlığı Umumi Katip Muavini Hasan Esat Işık, doğrudan Dışişleri Bakanı Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'dan emir alarak dış ekonomik ilişkileri idare ediyordu. Ancak Dışişleri Bakanlığı kadrosunda memur sayısı azdı, sektör uzmanları ise hemen hemen hiç yoktu; başka bakanlıkların ve kurumların memurları çalıştırılarak bu işlerle uğraşıyordu. Maliye Bakanlığı ise yurt içindeki mali politikaların oluşturulması ve uygulanmasında etkin birimdi; Dışişleri Bakanlığı ile devamlı çekişme halinde idi. Çekişmenin esası yurt dışındaki görevlerde Dışişleri memurlarının daha yüksek ücret almaları, maliye memurlarının bu imkandan yararlanamamaları idi. Bu çekişmeler bazen Maliye Bakanlığı'nın Dışişleri Bakanlığı'na gerekli bilgileri aktarmaması ve/veya işbirliği yapmaması şeklinde ortaya çıkıyordu. Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nda ve Maliye Bakanlığı'nda çalışan üst düzey memurlar genellikle Siyasal Bilgiler

As a consequence, on July 6, 1960, a temporary statute was accepted. Titled as the “Temporary Statute about the Regulation of International Economic and Financial Relations,” Law No. 13, regulated the transfer of authority over the conduct of foreign economic relations from the ministry of foreign affairs to the ministry of finance. Article 2 of the law states that

all sorts of negotiations and relations with international economic institutions, official economic groups and institutions of foreign countries, and financial institutions are conducted by the ministry of finance.²²

The text of Article 1 also stated that the International Economic Cooperation Organization would be subordinated to the directory general for the treasury in the ministry of finance.²³ These two decisions meant not only a restriction of the scope of work of the foreign ministry, but also an inevitable purge – or at least a demotion for the ministry personnel. Provisional Article 1 of the law, for example, was proposed that,

the duties of those who had been officers of the foreign ministry and had been assigned to the center or the representations of the International Economic Cooperation Organization, and officers of the foreign ministry working in the [finance] ministry in fields related to the content of [Law No. 13] are abolished.²⁴

Turhan Feyzioğlu, who served as the minister of national education, the minister of state, and the deputy prime minister in the post-27 May cabinets, confessed to Kamuran Gürün, a diplomat assigned to economic affairs, that the “foreign ministry's dismissive attitude towards other ministries caused Law No. 13.”²⁵ This regulation was a serious indication that the ministry's authority

Fakültesi'nden sınıf veya devre arkadaşları idi. Okul yıllarına dayanan rekabet ve çekişmeler, haliye, meslek hayatlarında da devam ediyordu.” Türkcan, *Attila Sönmez'e Armağan*, 117-118.

22 TC Resmi Gazete (*Official Gazette*), July 11, 1960. no. 10548. 1.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Kamuran Gürün, *Firtinalı Yıllar: Dışişleri Müsteşarlığı Anıları* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayıncılık, 1995), 116.

in the realm of foreign economic relations would be curtailed. The coup d'état of May 27, 1960, caused certain institutional changes especially with respect to the predominance of the foreign ministry in foreign economic affairs in the following days. This was because the ministry was identified with the personality of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the last foreign minister of the DP era.

The authority of the ministry of foreign affairs was curtailed not just in economic and trade affairs. The ministry of foreign affairs, in the aftermath of the coup, was subject to the outcomes of the inner contradictions among members of the MBK. In one case, the ministry of foreign affairs was instrumentalized to overcome disputes within the MBK. In November 1960, the TBMM accepted an addendum to the Law on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that proposed "the establishment of 14 consulates" (*Müşavirlik*) in the diplomatic missions of Turkey and that fourteen people who were dismissed from their tenures in the MBK be "appointed to these fourteen consulates without returning sooner than two years."²⁶ Contrary to operations concerning the role of the ministry of foreign affairs on foreign economic relations, this decision had nothing to do with the internal structure of the ministry. So how did splits in the MBK influence the ministry? The MBK, since its beginning, was not a monolithic power formation but a coalition of different juntas dedicated to overthrowing the DP government in a military coup. The cleavages between the factions within the MBK immediately became apparent. A group of members led by Cemal Gürsel, the leader of the MBK, favored a transition to democracy as soon as possible, whereas the other fourteen members (hereafter the Fourteens) of the MBK favored returning to democratic life only after the implementation of comprehensive reforms.²⁷ This was because without the

26 27 Mayıs 1960 Darbesi Raporu, *Hürriyet*, 181. TC Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette), November 17, 1960. no. 10657, 1

27 Implementation of reforms meant "not to concede power to politicians so easily" on those days. It was being rumored that Alparslan Türkeş was aiming to become the Gamal Abdel-Nasser of Turkey. Tanıl Bora, *Cereyanlar: Türkiye'de Siyasi İdeolojiler* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2017), 303. Nasser, a general of the Egyptian army, overthrew the monarchy in 1956 and remained in power until his death in 1970. Nasser's method of acquiring political authority and his reformist policies were a model to military bureaucracies, especially those of developing countries.

accomplishment of a revolutionary transition, according to the radicals, political power would be given to the political successors of the DP.²⁸

The tension between the moderates and radicals concluded with the supremacy of the former. Members of the latter group were sent as counselors to fourteen Turkish embassies.²⁹ In Turkish politics they are called the Fourteens (*On Dörtler*). There is limited information about their terms in office and influence over the operations of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy in the countries to which they were assigned. The relationship between them and Turkish diplomats also remains a mystery. We know only from the memoirs of Numan Esin, a member of the Fourteens, that neither the foreign ministry in Ankara nor the Turkish embassy in Madrid (the city to which Esin was appointed as consul) monitored them.³⁰ Furthermore, Alparslan Türkeş, by far the most renowned member of the Fourteens, was involved in a quarrel with Necdet Kent, then Turkish ambassador to New Delhi. This split, which reached the level of physical violence, stemmed from news in the Turkish media. İldeniz Divanlioğlu, then first secretary to the Turkish embassy in New Delhi, states that

one morning in 1962, I heard Ambassador Kent crying “Help!” I ran immediately. ... I remember Türkeş’s hand up ... [to] punch Kent. ... In one of the Turkish newspapers, it was written that İnönü ... tortured ... Türkeş. The foreign ministry demanded information from Kent about this article. Kent, in his reply to the ministry, reported that

28 For a detailed examination of the split between moderates and radicals, see Doğan Akyaz, *Askeri Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi: Hiyerarşî Dışı Örgütlenmeden Emir Komuta Zincirine*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), 240-248.

29 Cities in which the members of the 14'ler group were stations as follows: New Delhi (Alparslan Türkeş), Brussels (Orhan Kabibay), Mexico City (Orhan Erkanlı), Stockholm (Münir Köseoğlu), Lisbon (Mustafa Kaplan), Oslo (Muzaffer Karan), Copenhagen (Şefik Soyuyüce), Kabul (Fazıl Akkoyunlu), Tel-Aviv (Rifat Baykal), Rabat (Dündar Taşer), Madrid (Numan Esin), The Hague (İrfan Solmazer), Tokyo (Muzaffer Özdağ), and Tripoli (Ahmet Er).

30 Numan Esin, *Devrim ve Demokrasi: Bir 27 Mayısçının Anıları* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2005), 213. According to Esin, the efforts of members of the Fourteens were coordinated vis-à-vis Turkish politics. Although aware of these efforts, adds Esin, Turkish diplomatic missions tolerated them and did not inform on them to Ankara. Ibid.

Türkeş did not answer his questions. After this, Namık Yolga, then-secretary general of the foreign ministry ... personally ... called Kent and demanded he compel Türkeş answer this question: "Did you deliver this information to the newspaper?" Türkeş replied "I will not answer this question." A quarrel began between Türkeş and Kent when the latter delivered this message to the ministry and Ankara insisted on the issue.³¹

The Türkeş-Kent incident had one more witness. Taner Baytok, then a twenty-three-years-old diplomat appointed to New Delhi, also gives information about the quarrel between Alparslan Türkeş and Kent. In addition to the information Divanlioğlu presents, Baytok notes that the aforementioned article was a biographical interview conducted with Turhan Göker of *Yeni İstanbul* newspaper.³² The interview, states Baytok, was the result of a ten-day-long talk between Göker and Türkeş.³³ Thereby, Türkeş was the source of the information covered in Göker's article.³⁴ What triggered Türkeş's anger, adds Baytok, was the "insulting tone" of Secretary General Yolga's insistence.³⁵

31 "1962 yılında bir sabah... Büyükelçi Kent'in "İmdat yetişin!" diye canhıraş bağırışını duydum. Türkeş'in... bir elini havaya kaldırdığını... yumruk vurmaya hazırlandığını hatırlıyorum... Türk gazetelerinden birinde İnönü'nün Türkeş'e... işkence yaptırdığı... yazılmış. Dışişleri Bakanlığı bu konuda [Necdet] Kent'ten bilgi istemiş. Kent, bakanlığa cevabında Türkeş'in bu konuda bilgi vermediğini söylemiş. Bunun üzerinde Dışişleri Bakanlığı Müsteşarı Namık Yolga... bizzat... Büyükelçi Kent'i çağrımış ve şu sualın cevabını istemiş 'Gazeteye bu bilgileri siz mi verdiniz?' Türkeş 'Bu suale cevap vermeyeceğim' demiş. Kent bu cevabı Ankara'ya ilettilikten sonra Ankara'nın ısrarı üzerine Türkeş'le aralarında münakaşa başlamış." İldeniz Divanlioğlu, *Emekli Büyükelçi Horoz Gibi Ötünce* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2007), 37-38.

32 Baytok, *Diş Politikada Bir Nefes...*, 63.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid. Baytok's account on Türkeş's days in exile provides valuable information on internal conflicts among the members of the 27 May coup as well as his views on prominent political turmoil at the time. For instance, states Baytok, Türkeş could never forgive the behaviors of Cemal Madanoğlu in the post-27 May period. Türkeş, adds Baytok, claimed that he opposed the execution of Menderes and other prominent DP figures and instead had prepared projects along with Selim Sarper, then the foreign minister, to send the DP leaders into exile. Baytok finally claims that Alparslan Türkeş reacted negatively to Talat Aydemir's coup attempt on

Türkeş's split with the government in Ankara and the foreign ministry in particular recalls a late Ottoman and early republican diplomatic tradition that was previously illustrated in this study. A new administration created its exiles and the statements and operations of these people were again being monitored by the Ankara government through the units of foreign ministry. (Nevertheless, the post-1960 exiles were much less strictly monitored than previous examples.) Türkeş's split with Ambassador Kent and Secretary General Yolga, of course, does not present a wholesale picture of the relationship between the counselors in exile and Turkish diplomats or the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, one can conclude that the organizers of May 27, 1960, influenced the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy by exporting their inner contradictions into the ministry. This can be considered an interference in the organizational structure of the ministry.

§ 5.3 Individual Experiences and the Morale of an Institution

5.3.1 *The Ministry under Siege: Literally and Politically*

The tense political atmosphere of Turkey came on the agenda of the ministry even before the 27 May coup. Erdem Erner, who was then an undersecretary in Turkey's Embassy in London, explains in his accounts that all the officers in Turkey's London Embassy, just like the men in the streets in Turkey, were aware that there would be a military intervention.³⁶ Erner notes that a student demonstration was organized in front of the embassy building in May 1960, and he was tasked with recording what was written on the banners in the hands of the students.³⁷ Moreover, Sadi Koçtaş, then-attaché militaire in Turkey's London Embassy, was among the members of the conspiracy and knew

February 22, 1962, asking "Does he know how to throw a coup? Why did not he call me?"

Ibid., 57, 65 & 67.

36 Erdem Erner, *Davulun Sesi: Dışişlerinde 44 Yıl* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993), 82

37 Ibid.

the date of the coup.³⁸ Erner remarks that when Koçaş wore his uniform on the day of the coup, everybody at the embassy understood that the time of the coup had come.³⁹

The day of the coup was experienced at the ministry building much harsher than at the London Embassy or any other diplomatic mission of Turkey. Everything aside, the building of the ministry was sieged by tanks of the Turkish Army. Even Selim Sarper, the secretary general of the foreign ministry who would be appointed as the foreign minister in the first cabinet established a day after the coup, did not manage to reach the ministry building. Reha Aytaman cites his observations of the day of the coup as follows,

I went out when it was time to go to the ministry. ... I saw ... Ambassador Selim Sarper had gone out and was looking at his surround. ... I went to him and said that the army had taken over the administration. He had already heard it from the news and told me “We are the officers of the foreign ministry and we must go to work at all costs, tell this to any military officer you see.” ... I expressed the words of our secretary general to a military officer I happened upon. The officer said, “all official departments [and], ministries are under custody and there is curfew. You cannot go to the ministry.”⁴⁰

38 Ibid. Sadi Koçaş became a prominent figure in Turkish political life especially after the memorandum of the Turkish army against the Süleyman Demirel government on March 12, 1971. Koçaş served as the deputy prime minister in the first Nihat Erim cabinet after the memorandum. He previously had served as Turkey's military attaché in Bucharest (1954-56) and London (1959-1961), respectively. There were other examples clarifying the relations between Turkish diplomats and Turkish military officers in Turkish diplomatic missions after the May 27, 1960 coup. İlter Türkmen, for example, compares the attitude of the military officers in the 1960 and 1980 coups. According to Türkmen, the officers during the latter were more tolerant whereas in the post-27 May period, military officers behaved rudely towards them. Özdemir, *Bir Dışişleri Bakanı Olarak...*, 136.

39 Ibid.

40 “Bakanlığa gitme zamanı gelince sokağa çıktım ... Büyükelçi Selim Sarper'in de sokağa çıkmış olduğunu ve etrafına bakındığını gördüm. Yanına gittim ve ordunun yönetime el koyduğunu söyledi. O da radyodan duymuş, bana: ‘Biz Dışişleri memurlarıyız, her ne olursa olsun görevimizin başına gitmeliyiz, bunu göreceğiniz bir subaya söyleyin’ dedi. Bakanlığa doğru

Aytaman would arrive at the ministry after the curfew was lifted in the afternoon. Other diplomats who barely managed to arrive at the ministry and were shocked at the sight they witnessed upon seeing the ministry building. Mustafa Aşula, then a young career officer in the international economic affairs department, states that he only managed to enter the ministry after a control of the armed guards.⁴¹ Another young career officer in the ministry, Kemal Girgin, was also serving at the time as a reserve officer in the Turkish army. Girgin's notes on the physical siege of the ministry building was an ironic indicator of the political siege to which the ministry would be subject. Girgin depicts the outside of the building on the day of the coup as follows,

Suddenly the ministry and my department came to my mind. What happened there? What happened to the secret NATO documents and the files of the department under my responsibility? ... I had my military uniform since I was still a reserve officer. ... As there were so many military officers in the streets, I went to the ministry without facing any difficulty. I saw that a few tanks had turned their turrets toward the [prime ministry and ministry of foreign affairs] building. The holes from machinegun bullets on the adjacent walls made me feel deeply grieved. Some night sentries had fired unintentionally and they were fired upon. The building was blockaded and I could not get in.⁴²

yol alırken rastladığım bir subaya, genel sekreterimizin söylediğini anlattım. Subay: "Bütün resmi daireler, bakanlıklar control altındadır ve sokağa çıkmak yasaktır, Bakanlığınıza gidemezsiniz" dedi." Reha Aytaman, *Sinirli Yıllar: Dışişlerinde 42 Yıl* (İstanbul, 1996), 93. Sarper would be appointed as the head of the ministry the next day which he could not reach the morning of May 27.

41 Mustafa Aşula, *Dışişleri Albümü* (İstanbul, 2001), 7-8.

42 "Birden aklıma Bakanlık ve bizim daire geldi. Orada neler olmuştu? Benim sorumluluğumdaki NATO gizli dökümanları ve şubenin kasaları ne alemdeydi? ... Halen yedek subay olduğumdan üniformam vardı... Bir hayli subay ve asker ortalıkta olduğundan müşkülatla karşılaşmadan Bakanlıklara gittim. Bir de baktım ki bizim Bakanlığın önünde birkaç tank, toplarını binaya çevirmiş. (Başbakanlık ve Dışişleri) Bitişik duvarlarda makineli tüfek kurşun delikleri içimi hoplattı. Bazı gece nöbetçi askerler bilmeden ateş etmiş ve onlara karşılık verilmişti. Binalar askerlerce ablukaya alınmıştı, içeriye giremedim." Kemal Girgin, *Dünyanın Dört Bucağı: Bir Diplomatın Anıları 1957-2007* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1998), 61.

Kamuran Gürün, a mid-ranking diplomat of the time, cites a similar observation. In Gürün's words,

we went to the ministry on May, 30, Monday. [It was] difficult to decide whether to smile or cry. All the telephone wires were cut, as if enemy headquarters were being occupied. ... Work was interrupted; nobody knew what to do. Some were talking about who would be dismissed – who would replace whom. Some played the hero, busy with detecting and revealing who opposed [the coup d'état of] 27 May.⁴³

Gürün's last sentence signaled the near future of the ministry. The ministry was one of the most deeply-influenced bureaucratic institutions by the coup. Many high and mid-ranking diplomats' positions changed after the coup. State officers from outside the ministry, most notably military officers, were appointed to diplomatic posts. Some ambassadors were recalled to Ankara without being offered new responsibilities and thus left inactive. Dikerdem, who was one of the diplomats recalled to Ankara after the coup d'état, illustrates this situation and how the conjuncture in the ministry went hand-in-hand with the political atmosphere of Turkey.

A room was reserved at the ministry for those who were caught on the earthquake of 27 May. The ones disfavored for various reasons and the ones who had been dismissed, gathered in this room to chat, follow the gossip in the corridor, and [they] sometimes fell into expectations and mostly faced disappointments. The room was called the Flat Room (*Yassı Oda*) as an example of black humor. So indeed, the fate of the ones in Flat Room and Yassı Ada coincided.⁴⁴

43 “30 Mayıs Pazartesi bakanlığa gittik ki, gülmek mi lazım, ağlamak mı, karar vermek zor. Bütün telefonların telleri kesilmiş, sanki düşman karargahı işgal ediliyor... İş güç durmuş, kimse ne yapacağını bilmiyor. Bazıları, kimin görevden alınacağını, onların yerlerine kimlerin geleceğini konuşuyorlar. Bazıları, vatan kurtaran aslan rolüne girmiş, kimlerin 27 Mayıs aleyhisi olduğunu tesbit ve teşhirle meşgul.” Kamuran Gürün, *Akıntıya Kürek: Bir Büyükelçinin Anıları* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayıncılığı, 1994), 86.

44 “27 Mayıs depremine tutulanlar için Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nda bir oda ayrılmıştı. Çeşitli nedenlerle gözden düşenler, görevden alınanlar bu odada toplanıp dertleşirler, koridorlarda

The flat room embodied a hierarchy within itself. The regulars of the room were high-ranking bureaucrats recalled to the ministry after the coup; those from among the lower-ranks “were not allowed to enter the room.”⁴⁵

5.3.2 *Elimination of Zorlu’s Influence*

The level of the reaction to the foreign ministry was stemmed from some major causes. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the ministry was identified with the character of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and his style as a politician. Reha Aytaman notes that Zorlu repeated his aggressive behaviors against military officers and that the reaction of junta members after the coup, in Aytaman’s words, “was the outcome of the treatment of Zorlu vis-à-vis the military officers.”⁴⁶ İlter Türkmen, a first secretary at the ministry, confirms that “they, notably Fatin Rüştü Zorlu], treated commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, Hakkı Tunaboylu, very harshly.”⁴⁷ In response, the antipathy of the MBK members towards the ministry was first a stance crystallized on the character of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. Zorlu was found guilty at the *Yassıada* proceedings and sentenced to the death penalty along with fifteen other members of the DP. With Adnan Menderes and Hasan Polatkan, he was among the three whose death penalty was executed. In this regard, his execution, as Özcan remarks, can be interpreted as “the punishing of the foreign ministry” through the personality of Zorlu.⁴⁸

Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was also a career diplomat before his term as a politician; thus, he was dominant in the diplomatic bureaucracy. In this regard, overthrowing Zorlu at the same time meant eliminating his cadre at the

konuşulan dedikoduları izlerler, bazen umutlanır çoğu zamanda umutsuzluğa düşerlerdi. Bu odaya bir kara mizah örneği olarak Yassı Oda adını takmışlardı. Gerçekten de Yassı Oda’dakilerle Yassı Ada’dakilerin yazgısı bir yerde çakışıyordu.” Dikerdem, *Hariciye Çarkı...*, 142. Dikerdem was recalled on July 16, 1960 while serving as minister plenipotentiary in Tehran. *TC Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette)*, no. 10562, 1. Yassıada is one of numerous islands in the Sea of Marmara. The island hosted the judicial proceedings after the coup.

45 Anonymous Officer, *Hariciyemizin İç Yüzü* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınlari 1990), 53.

46 Aytaman, *Sinirli Yıllar...*, 90-91.

47 *TBMM Document Services Department (Tutanak Hizmetleri Başkanlığı)*, October 15, 2012, 8.

48 Özcan, “Altmışlı Yıllarda Dış Politika,” 226.

ministry, and it was so. Erdil Akay, a young career diplomat at that time, states that “directors general” and other high-ranking officers in the ministry had been appointed by Zorlu and were relatively young for the positions to which they were appointed.⁴⁹ Even though there was an established tradition that directors general and secretary generals should serve as ambassadors before being appointed to these posts, none of the directors general in Zorlu’s team had previously served as an ambassador.⁵⁰ The military intervention, adds Akay, shook the ministry considerably. To him, military officers were taking revenge for Zorlu’s aggressive attitude towards them.⁵¹

Akay’s claim was true to a great extent. The liquidation of Zorlu was not limited to overthrowing him and his team from the leadership of the ministry. Even his brother, Rıfkı Zorlu, was recalled to Ankara after the coup for being the elder brother of Zorlu, and he remained an idle career officer in the *Yassıoda* for a long time.⁵² He was neither on the team of Zorlu nor an outstanding diplomat within the ministry. Above all, Zorlu’s legacy was abolished with regards to professional preferences which can be regarded as an other main motive of the aggressive attitude of MBK members towards the ministry. During his three year-long-term as foreign minister, the ministry of foreign affairs gained considerable power in deciding Turkey’s economic policies and had the right to speak on domestic economic issues, as well.⁵³ Measures to curtail the power of the ministry with respect to economic and trade issues, as said above, were among the first activities of MBK members.⁵⁴ The responsibility to conduct relations with the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) was taken from the ministry of foreign affairs and granted to the ministry of finance; moreover, with Law No. 13, the monopoly of the ministry over “diplomatic representation” was limited, and the ministries of finance and

49 Erdil Akay, *Dışişlerinde 40 Yıl, 2 Ay, 21 Gün* (İstanbul: ERKO Yayıncılık, 2007), 22.

50 Ibid.

51 “27 Mayıs’ta Silahlı Kuvvetler’in yönetime el koyması Bakanlığı bir hayli sarstı. Sanki subaylar Fatin Rüştü Zorlu Bey’in askerlere biraz haşin davranışının intikamını Bakanlık’tan alıyorlardı.” Ibid.

52 *Akis*, December 10, 1966, 28-29.

53 İskit, *Diplomasi...*, 357.

54 Ibid.

trade were given the authority to represent and negotiate foreign economic relations.⁵⁵ Kamuran Gürün, who was the first secretary general of the Foreign Economic Relations Committee established just after the coup, later admitted that “he could never bear the attitude towards the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵⁶ According to Gürün, “the coup of 27 May was in fact realized against departments related to [foreign] trade.”⁵⁷ Gürün, in this regard, concludes that “the reason for the dismissal of Hasan [Esat Işık], Oğuz [Gökmen], and Semih [Günver] ... was their proximity to Fatin Rüştü Zorlu.”⁵⁸

55 Ibid.

56 Gürün, *Akıntıya Kürek...*, 161. The Committee was established by the then-Deputy Prime Minister Turhan Feyzioğlu to resolve disputes between the foreign ministry and finance ministry. The committee was consisting of representatives from the Foreign Ministry, Finance Ministry, Commerce Ministry, State Planning Organizations and Central Bank. Yayla, *Diplomat Hasan Esat Işık’ın Biyografisi*, 49. Indeed, arrangements over bureaucracy in the post-27 May period also seeded certain conflicts among different units in the state mechanism. For example, members of the State Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, DPT) questioned the necessity of the Foreign Economic Relations Committee. Günal Kansu, *Planlı Yıllar: Anılarla DPT’nin Öyküsü* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2004), 174. The State Planning Organization’s origins date back to the Investment Program Committee in the Turkish MFA which was established in 1958. In those days, foreign economic relations were under the command of the foreign ministry and ministry of finance was also excluded from this process by Zorlu. Ümit Akçay, *Kapitalizmi Planlamak: Türkiye’de Planlama ve DPT’nin Dönüşümü* (İstanbul: Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı, 2007), 69-71. As an institution which was once established under the body of the foreign ministry, the DPT became an influential organ within the Turkish bureaucracy and was engaged in authority battles with other institutions after 1960. It is known that during Turgut Özal’s term as undersecretary between 1966 and 1971, the DPT struggled against the foreign ministry to forestall the European integration process. Kansu, *Planlı Yıllar...*, 236. The State Planning Organization – with its “privileged position at the heart of economic policy making mechanism – was also involved in clashes with the ministry of finance. Sadık Ünay, *Neoliberal Globalization and Institutional Reform: The Political Economy of Development Planning in Turkey* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2006), 108. In this regard, it can be concluded that the 1960-1980 period not only witnessed an increase in the influence of the bureaucracy in decision-making processes, but also intensified clashes among the bureaucratic institutions.

57 Gürün, *Akıntıya Kürek...*, 86.

58 Ibid., 86-87.

This decision indeed was not only an outcome of the hatred of the junta or the personality of Zorlu or the ministry. The dispute between Foreign Affairs and the Finance bureaucracies (*Hariciye-Maliye*), as illustrated above, was another determinant of this devolution of authority.⁵⁹ Aşula interlinks Zorlu's attitude towards the finance and economy bureaucracy and reactions of these ministries in the immediate aftermath of 27 May.

For a long while, the [Ministry] of Finance, strongly opposed us. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, [collected] nearly all foreign economic and financial affairs in the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the authority to negotiate and finalize, [and] he had the [Ministry] of Finance and [Department] of the Treasury in tow in the pre-27 May period. The [Ministry] of Finance took this opportunity and took our authority all of a sudden by enacting Law No. 13. I remember well finance ministry authorithies coming to the Ministry [of Foreign Affairs] and taking all our files.⁶⁰

According to İskit, conducting foreign economic relations in this manner was causing confusion, and this had been fixed by Law No. 1173 in 1969.⁶¹ As a matter of fact, the above-said authority transfer did not mean that the coup

59 İskit notes that the complaints of Finance (*Maliye*) bureaucrats often determined the attitudes of MBK members vis-à-vis the foreign ministry. İskit, *Interview by the Author*.

60 "Maliye öteden beri bize dış biliyordu. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, 27 Mayıstan önceki dönemde, hemen tüm dış iktisadi ve ticari işleri, müzakere ve sonuçlandırma yetkileriyle, Bakanlıkta toplamış, Maliyeyi ve Hazineyi, bir bakıma yedeğe almıştı. İşte, Maliye, fırsat bu fırsatı diyerek, alelacele, meşhur 13 sayılı kanunu çıkararak, elimizdeki işleri bir çırpıda almıştı. Maliyenin, Bakanlığın kapısına pikapları dayayarak, bütün dosyalarımızı alıp götürdüğünü iyi hatırlıyorum." Aşula, *Dışişleri Albümü*, 9.

61 Ibid. The Law No. 1173 rehabilitated the coordinative role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in pursuing all aspects of Turkey's foreign relations. See "1173 Sayılı Kanun: Milletlerarası Münasebetlerin Yürütlmesi ve Koordinasyonu Hakkında Kanun," *E-Kanun.net* Website, accessed May 1, 2014, available from <http://www.ekanun.net/1173-sayili-kanun/index.html>. This was similar to the trend in other foreign ministries at the time. Although most had transferred some of their authority to other bureaucratic institutions in the 1960-1980 period, they maanged to consolidate their positions as the coordinative bodies of all aspects of foreign relations.

administration cut all ties with the foreign ministry. The appointment of Mehmet Baydur as Minister of Trade in September 1960 reveals the MBK administration's desire not to break all ties with the previous government, especially in the case of foreign economic relations. The intense agenda of foreign economic affairs, most notably the accession process to the Common Market, "proved that the foreign ministry could not be excluded from economic issues totally."⁶² Aşula, a young officer assigned to Baydur's department, states that

when we were about to leave the office on a Saturday afternoon, we saw two guards in the corridor. We were frightened. Would Mr. Baydur also be suspended like Günver, Gökmen and Işık? ... An hour later, Mr. Baydur appeared with an army of journalists in the corridor ... He had been appointed as the minister of trade by President Cemal Gürsel ... Cemal Pasha asked him "Mr. Baydur, do you have information about the Common Market?" When Mr. Baydur answered "a little" with his well-known modesty, Pasha said "I appointed you as the minister of trade, please begin without delay."⁶³

Apart from the above said reasons, claims Aytaman, Baydur was appointed due to proximity he had established with military officers during his term in Washington and especially upon the advice of Türkeş, who was influential in his appointment.⁶⁴ This claim was also expressed by a Turkish diplomat interviewed for this study. According to İskit, "those who were backed by the coup were being promoted."⁶⁵ Dikerdem claims that the promotion of Haluk Bayülken in the 1960s, for example, stemmed from family ties with some

62 Gürün, *Akıntıya Kürek...*, 160.

63 "Bir cumartesi günü, öğleden sonra... çıkmaya hazırlanırken, birden, koridorda iki inzibatin belirdiğini gördük. Korktuk. Acaba Mehmet Bey de mi, tipki, Semih, Oğuz ve Hasan Işık beyler gibi açığa alınacaktı... Bir saat sonra, Mehmet Bey, bu defa etrafında adeta bir gazeteci ordusuyla birlikte, koridorun başında gözüktü... Mehmet bey, Devlet Başkanı Cemal Gürsel tarafından Ticaret Bakanlığına atanmıştı... Cemal paşa sormuş, 'Mehmet bey, siz Ortak Pazardan anlar misiniz? Mehmet bey her zamanki tevazuu ile biraz deyince, Paşa 'sizi Ticaret Bakanlığına atadım, hemen başlayın' demiş." Aşula, *Dışişleri...*, 8.

64 Aytaman, *Sınırlı Yıllar...*, 96.

65 İskit, *Interview by the Author*.

military officers.⁶⁶ In the 1960-1980 period, Turkish military became increasingly influential in Turkish politics. As a consequence, diplomats who were close to the military bureaucracy could become influential in the ministry. Similar to Dikerdem's claims about Bayülken, İlter Türkmen also notes that Coşkun Kirca's influence in the ministry stemmed from his close relations with the military.⁶⁷ The views of these diplomats in this regard cast doubt on the claim that Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was immune to the dynamics of domestic politics.

There were other favorite diplomats from the DP years who were lucky enough to be assigned to new duties immediately after May 27, 1960. Ercüment Yavuzalp, a Turkish diplomat of the time, was the principal clerk of prime ministry between 1958 and 1960. In his accounts, Yavuzalp comprehensively clarifies what happened the morning of 27 May. In his words,

At four o'clock in the morning [in Eskişehir], a sentinel officer from the Prime Minister's office called me and cried "Sir, the sound of gunfire is being heard everywhere. The building of the Prime Minister has been occupied. I came to the room of Mr. Medeni Berk (the Deputy Prime Minister). I am calling you from there. They will soon come here, as well. I am leaving." ... It was not hard to understand the words of the sentinel officer. It was obvious that a coup d'état was happening. ... I awakened the Prime Minister and informed him of the situation. He was not worried or did not seem so. He asked me to call the Interior Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Chief of General Staff, and the Commander of Martial Law. It was clear that he aimed to understand the scale of the movement – whether it was a limited movement or an initiative that included all units of the Armed Forces. It was not possible to make the phone calls most probably due to the disconnection of

66 Dikerdem, *Hariciye Çarkı*..., 174.

67 Özdemir, *Bir Dışişleri Bakanı Olarak*..., 207.

the lines in Ankara. ... Hereupon, the Prime Minister decided to go to Kütahya.⁶⁸

The remainder of Yavuzalp's account of the day of the coup d'état reveals that not only Menderes but also military officials that welcomed him in Kütahya were unsure of the scope and fate of the coup. He notes that officials were still respectful towards Menderes five hours after the coup.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, puts Yavuzalp, this moderate climate ended once military officers made sure that the coup was not an adventure or a rumor, and they surrounded the building that Menderes was in.⁷⁰

Yavuzalp became the first and only Turkish diplomat to be arrested on the day of the coup; however, he was released the day after. He cites his gratitude as follows,

After being released, I returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I was appointed as the head of a directorate. ... I would have not guessed that I would have contact with high-level directors in the new administration after returning from the Prime Ministry to Foreign Affairs. Not only was my rank low, but I served as principle clerk of the prime

68 "Sabah saat dört civarı [Eskişehir'de] Başbakanlık Özel Kalemi'nden bir nöbetçi memur beni aradı ve telaşlı bir sesle bana şunları söyledi 'Beyefendi, her taraftan silah sesleri geliyor. Başbakanlık işgal edildi. Ben Medeni Berk Bey'in (Başbakan Yardımcısı) odasından arıyorum. Biraz sonra buraya da gelecekler. Ben gidiyorum... nöbetçi memurun söylediklerini anlamak güç değildi, askeri darbe olduğu belliydi... Başbakanı uyandırıp durumu anlattım. Telaşlanmadı ya da öyle göründü. Benden İçişleri ve Milli Savunma Bakanlarıyla, Genelkurmay Başkanı ve Sıkıyonetim Komutanı'ni aramamı istediler. Hareketin çapının ne olduğu, yanı bunun kısıtlı mı, yoksa bütün silahlı kuvvetleri içine alan bir hareket mi olduğunu anlamak istediği anlaşılmıyordu. *Herhalde Ankara'da telefonlar kesilmiş olduğu için istediği telefon bağlantılarını kurmak mümkün olmadı...* Başbakan bu durum üzerine Kütahya'ya gitmeye karar verdi." Yavuzalp, *Liderler ve Dış Politika...*, 88.

69 Ibid., 89.

70 Ibid.

minister overthrown by this administration. Yet, it was on the contrary.⁷¹

5.3.3 *Specific Examples*

Not all favored diplomats of the DP years came out as successfully as Baydur or Yavuzalp. Some other cases contrast the experiences of these two. In order to understand these, it is vital to summarize the situation in the ministry before May 27, 1960.

Reha Aytaman states that Fatin Rüştü Zorlu's foreign ministry did not degenerate "the immunity principle of foreign ministry from domestic politics."⁷² Dikerdem also notes that his political views did not hinder his promotion during the DP years; his career only failed after the coup.⁷³ Nevertheless, there were two exceptions to this immunity: the attendance of Yüksel Menderes in the exam for the rank of first secretary and the tolerance towards Zorlu's son-in-law when he sat for the ministry's entry exam.⁷⁴ Yüksel Menderes, the son of the overthrown Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, was a career diplomat in the ministry. The difference in the approach towards Yüksel Menderes before and after the coup reveals the dramatic change in the ministry and illustrates how hard it began to be for any officer promoted to a significant position during the last years of the DP. Afra's accounts clarify how Menderes, a remnant of the ancient regime, lost his advantageous position in the ministry after the coup. Afra first explains the "tolerant" behavior towards Menderes before the coup and in fact, even before his accession to the ministry. He expresses that,

71 "Serbest bırakıldıkten sonra Dışişleri Bakanlığı'na döndüm. Bana bir şube müdürlüğü verdiler... Başbakanıktaki görevimden [Dışişleri] Bakanlığa döndükten sonra yeni yönetimdeki üst düzey yöneticilerle bir temasım olabileceği tabii hiç aklımdan geçmiyordu. Hem derecem küçüktü hem de bu yönetimin devirdiği bir başbakana Özel Kalem Müdürlüğü yapmıştım. Durum öyle olmadı." Ibid., 90.

72 Aytaman, *Sinirli...*, 94.

73 Dikerdem, *Hariciye Çarkı...*, 146.

74 Aytaman, *Sinirli...*, 94-95. Zorlu's son-in-law (actually, son-in-law to be) was favored by accepting all the candidates to the ministry that year. Ibid.

Yüksel was two classes below me in the Faculty of Law. ... I heard that he went to Switzerland after graduating from the faculty. He was employed as an administrative officer at the ministry since the deadline for entry exams had passed. In order to employ Yüksel as a career diplomat, the exam, which was expected to be made in July, had been applied in an earlier date. On this date, the Faculty of Political Sciences and Faculty of Law had not produced [any new] graduates. Thus, Yüksel Menderes entered the exam with only a few people remaining from our cohort and was accepted in the first order. ...

He began his career in one of the economics-related departments, which were the most favored at that time. You would be surprised how our arrogant young directors general flattered him.⁷⁵

Afra's accounts give further details about how Yüksel Menderes was favored within the Ministry until May 27, 1960. He illustrates Yüksel Menderes' relations with his chiefs, how his chiefs utilized him to reach the top levels of the state hierarchy, and finally how Menderes was backed in the exam for promotion to the title of first secretary.⁷⁶ Afra draws attention to the contrast in terms of the treatment towards Yüksel Menderes before and after the coup.

I wrote these in detail to explain how they later treated [Yüksel Menderes]. ... One month [after the exam for first secretary], the coup of

75 "Yüksel Hukuk Fakültesi'nde benden iki yaş küçüktü... Hukuktan sonra İsviçre'ye gittiğini duymuştum. Oradan döndüğünde, Bakanlığa giriş imtihanlarının zamanı geçtiğinden onu idari memur kadrosu ile Bakanlığa aldılar. Bizim girdiğimiz imtihandan sonra Temmuz aylarında açılması olası imtihani, sırıf Yüksel'i bir an önce meslek memuru yapmak gayesiyle biraz erken açtılar. O sırada hukuk ve de mülkiye mezunlarını henüz vermemişi. Bu nedenle bizim imtihandan kalan üç-beş kişi le dışarıdan giren az sayıda adayla birlikte Yüksel Menderes de girdi ve birincilikle kazandı." ...

O vakitler en gözde olan ekonomi dairelerinden birinde görev'e başladı. Bizim burnu havada genç genel müdürlerin kendisine nasıl hulus çakarlardı hayret edersiniz." Afra, *Hariciyeciler Dedikoduğu Sever*, 113.

76 The aforementioned exam led to Menderes' promotion to the rank of First Secretary after a corrupt evaluation process. The minister of the time [F. Rüştü Zorlu], according to Afra, was claimed to have been deeply involved in the evaluation process and intervened in the grades given to Yüksel Menderes. *Ibid.*, 115.

27 May occurred. An interrogation committee was established after this exam scandal was noticed; all the exam commissioners were interrogated. However, nothing was proved since invisible hands had burned the exam papers. ...

Everybody abandoned Yüksel, who was being treated extremely well before the coup, as if escaping the plague. He was given a little desk at the Department of Consulate, which was ignored though it had under a huge work load.⁷⁷

Yüksel Menderes was appointed to Turkey's diplomatic mission in Belgrade with the title First Secretary on July 4, 1960, just thirty-seven days after the coup.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, in September 1960, "irregularities" were discovered in his examination process.⁷⁹ After the aforementioned interrogation process, he was recalled to Ankara in March 1961 and called as a witness in the Yassıada Proceedings.⁸⁰ The poor treatment of him started after his return to Ankara.

The blow of the coup on the ministry was not limited to the elder son of Adnan Menderes. Foreign Minister Zorlu had a "team" within the ministry and these diplomats were notably heads of departments related to foreign economic relations: Oğuz Gökmen, Hasan Esat Işık, and Semih Günver. The names of these three diplomats were even mentioned even in cabinet meetings. Abdullah Gözübüyük, then Minister of Justice, stated that "there were

77 "Bunları etraflı yazdım, sonra nasıl muamele ettiğlerini belirtebilmek için... Bir ay sonra 27 Mayıs İhtilali oldu. Bu imtihan rezaleti duyulduğundan, bir takhikat komisyonu kurulmuş, bütün imtihan heyetinin ifadesi alınmış. Ancak görünmeyen eller tüm imtihan kağıtlarını yaktığından sonunda bir şey kanıtlanamamış...."

İhtilalden önce nereleme oturtulacağı bilinmeyen Yüksel'den herkes vebadan kaçışormuş gibi kaçıyordu. En çok işi olduğu halde, pek tutulmayan Konsolosluk Dairesi'nde çocuğa küçük bir masa verdiler." Ibid., 114-115.

78 *TC Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette)*, "Bakanlıklara Dair Tayin Kararnameleri," (Decree on Appointments to Ministries), July 4, 1960, 3. It is also written in the same decree that Yüksel Menderes was reappointed from Geneva to Belgrade.

79 "Yüksel Menderes'in Başkatipliğe Terfi Usulsüz Yapılmış," (Yüksel Menderes was appointed as First Secretary illegally), *Milliyet*, September 9, 1960, 5.

80 "Yüksel Menderes Bütün Suallere Bilmiyorum Cevabını Verdi," (Yüksel Menderes answered no to all questions), *Milliyet*, April 6, 1961, 1

such people in the foreign ministry that nobody dared say anything about so long as they maintained their key positions,” and [G]ökmen, Işık, and Günver were “people who cooperated with Zorlu.”⁸¹ Gözübüyük notes these figures not as if they were bureaucrats but as if they were political collaborators in an overthrown political regime. He even thought to arrest these three diplomats.⁸² Interestingly enough, Foreign Minister Sarper was not one of the attendees in this cabinet meeting.⁸³

The main issue of this cabinet meeting was the “interrogation committees” that had been established in each ministry.⁸⁴ Gözübüyük complained about the foreign ministry since “it was such an organization that the interrogation committees were unable to drag a word out of them.”⁸⁵ After listening to Gözübüyük, the Prime Minister and President of the MBK, Cemal Gürsel, ordered “immediate dismissal of Günver, Işık, and Gökmen.”⁸⁶

Gökmen, Işık and Günver had assisted Zorlu in economic affairs. In this regard, the aggression towards them was an extension of the “policy of [the] liquidation” of the economic orientation of the ministry, which was illustrated above in this chapter. Oğuz Gökmen depicts the atmosphere of a witch hunt in the ministry through his own and his friends’ stories. Gökmen states that,

in all periods of history, lies, slanders and denunciation are a kind of “revolutionary neurosis.” It was impossible to expect that the May 27, 1960 period would constitute an exception to this situation. ... It attracted attention since no one announced us as the closest working

81 Cemil Koçak, *27 Mayıs Bakanlar Kurulu Tutanakları* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayıncıları, 2010), 400.

82 Dikerdem, *Hariciye Çarkı...*, 147.

83 Koçak, *27 Mayıs...*, 400.

84 Interrogation committees must not be confused with the Committee of Inquest (*Tahkikat Komisyonu*) which was established by the Menderes government in April 1960 to investigate the actions of the opposition party and the Turkish press against the government. The interrogation committees, however, were formed within each ministry after the coup. These committees were to eliminate the influence of the DP administration from the bureaucracy. Kamran İnan, *Bir Ömür* (İstanbul: Berikan Yayınevi, 2010), 65.

85 Koçak, *27 Mayıs...*, 400.

86 Ibid.

friends of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. ... A person who managed to join the first MBK cabinet made a prediction about us: "These three people (talking about us) most probably scared their colleagues so much that no one will denounce them. Let me leak news to the press that they may be imprisoned; then let us hear the denunciations."⁸⁷

The atmosphere in the ministry, as apparent in the remarks of Gökmen, was prone to slanderous denunciations. Gökmen also notes that diplomatic missions in Ankara were prompted not to invite him, Günver, and Işık to diplomatic receptions.⁸⁸ Gökmen, Işık, and Günver experienced two years of their careers in Ankara. After the investigation, these three diplomats acquitted from all the accusations that they were attached.⁸⁹ As the shadow of the coup over the ministry diminished, they were again appointed to new posts. Hasan Esat Işık was appointed to Brussels as ambassador, Günver to Moscow as counselor-undersecretary to work under Ambassador Fahri Korutürk, and Gökmen to Buenos Aires as ambassador.⁹⁰

As the last one to be appointed among these three diplomats, Gökmen notes that he was not so keen on his or Günver's appointment. According to him, the offers to him and Günver were a "waiver of acquired rights and a kind of 'abridgement of rank'."⁹¹ In his accounts, Gökmen clarifies that

87 "Tarihin her döneminde iftira, ihbar ve karalama akımları bir nevi ihtilal nevrozu olarak görülür. Bizdeki 27 Mayıs 1960 döneminin de buna bir ıstisna teşkil etmesi beklenemezdi. Bu arada Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun en yakın çalışma arkadaşları oan bizler için ihbarların bulunması dikkat çekmişti... Bir zat, MBK'nın ilk hükümete girebilmek becerisinden sonra... hakkımızda bir kehanette bulunmuş: 'Bu üç kişi (bizlerden bahsediyor) herhalde kendi çevrelерini öylesine ürkütmüş korkutmuş olmalıdır ki, kimse bir ihbarda bulunamıyor. Bana müsaade buyurun, onların tevkif edilebilecekleri şeklindeki bir haberi gazetelere sızdırıym. Bakın seyredin o zaman gelecek ihbarları!' demiş." Oğuz Gökmen, *Diplomasi...*, 314-315.

88 Ibid., 315. Gökmen expresses that foreign missions, on the contrary, were inviting him and his friends much more frequent than before. Ibid.

89 Kemal Girgin, *Diplomatik Anılarla Dış İlişkilerimiz (Son Elli Yıl: 1957-2016)* (İstanbul: İlgi Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2007), 140.

90 Gökmen, *Diplomasi...*, 318.

91 Ibid., 319.

after the appointment of Hasan [Esat Işık], Semih was appointed as counselor-undersecretary to Moscow to work under Fahri Korutürk. I begged him not to accept. The three of us had acquired this title before 27 May [1960]. In my opinion, it was not possible to waive it. However, Semih had lost his nerves more than any of us. He said “I cannot stand anymore.” As a matter of fact, he was guaranteed to be appointed somewhere else as ambassador in a short while....

One day [Secretary General] Feridun Cemal Erkin invited me to his room. ... He said to me “Mr. Gökmen, I know how much you worked for European integration and the Common Market. We have decided to appoint you to Brussels as permanent representative at European Economic Community (EEC). However, because the agreement with EEC has not been ratified, we cannot open a diplomatic mission there and appoint you as ambassador. We found a solution: we will appoint you as second representative to our mission at NATO. When the agreement is ratified in the assembly, your appointment to Brussels as ambassador will be realized, but you will have already started your duty in Brussels.”⁹²

Gökmen's remarks explain what he meant by “abridgement of rank.” Both he and Günver were being demanded to be content with titles that they had

92 “Hasan’ın tayininden sonra Semih’i elçi-müsteşar olarak tayin ettiler. Kabul etmemesi için çok yalvardım. Biz üçümüz daha 27 Mayıs’tan önce bu unvanı almıştık. Feragat etmemiz bence mümkün değildi. Ancak, Semih’in sınırları hepimizden çok bozulmuştu. ‘Dayanacak halim kalmadı’ diyordu. Zaten bunun muvakkat bir zaman için olduğu, en kısa sürede bir yerlere büyükelçi olarak atanacağı yönünde güvence vermişler....

[Genel Sekreter] Feridun Cemal Bey bir gün beni odasına çağırdı... Bana ‘Oğuz Bey, dedi, sizin Avrupa bütünlüğünüzü ve Ortak Pazar konusunda ne kadar emek verdığınızı yakından biliyorum. Sizi Brüksel’de AET nezdinde Daimi Delege-Büyükelçi olarak atamaya karar verdik... ama Ankara Anlaşması henüz Meclis’te tasdik edilmediği için orada bir temsilcilik açamıyor ve sizi oraya doğrudan doğruya kararname ile Büyükelçi olarak tayin edemiyoruz. Bir formül bulduk, Paris’teki NATO temsilciliğimiz nezdinde ikinci delege olarak tayin edeceğiz, Anlaşma Meclis’ten geçer geçmez Brüksel’de Büyükelçi olarak tayinininiz de derhal çıkacak ama siz şimdiden orada işinize başlamış olacaksınız.” Ibid., 318.

already acquired. On April 1962, Günver was appointed to Moscow.⁹³ According to Gökmen's accounts, he rejected the offer presented to him, but Günver accepted.⁹⁴ Gökmen also states that he was appointed to Buenos Aires voluntarily.⁹⁵ The coup of May 27, 1960, caused a two-year hiatus in the careers of Gökmen, Işık, and Günver. In this regard, there was not a wholesale purge. Instead, figures and cadres identified with the personality of Zorlu were subject to prosecutions.

After the coup, some new procedures initiated by Zorlu were also targeted. Taner Baytok, who was preparing an appointment abroad, clearly illustrates an example of these.

A program initiated by Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was offering the opportunity to improve language capabilities and intellectual accumulation to young diplomats to be appointed to their first duties abroad through assignments to embassies such as London, Paris, New York, and Bonn.

...

None of these regulations were applied in my appointment, because I was sent to abroad upon the first decree published after May 27. With the intervention, many career officers were recalled before the ends of their duties for various reasons. Thus, there were numerous vacancies in most diplomatic missions. The rule concerning going abroad for education was also abolished. Instead, a rule was issued for every officer to work in a place of deprivation for a certain period of their career, most notably during their first term abroad.⁹⁶

93 TC Resmi Gazete (*Official Gazette*) no. 11095. April 30, 1962, 1.

94 It has not been possible to find the official appointment decree of Gökmen in the Turkish Official Gazette. The website of the Turkish Embassy in Buenos Aires, also, does not indicate the exact dates of Gökmen's term in office. In this regard, I had to be content with Gökmen's own accounts.

95 Gökmen, *Diplomasi...*, 319.

96 "Fatin Rüştü Zorlu tarafından konan bir uygulamayla ilk çıkış yapan meslek memurları, Londra, Paris, New York veya Bonn gibi bir büyükelçiliğe tayin edilerek, bu genç diplomatlara oralardaki üniversitelerde lisans ve bilgilerini geliştirme imkanı verilmektedir....

Nevertheless, Baytok's case reveals that the extent of the reaction towards the legacy of the DP administration harmed the operational capacity of the ministry in some cases. Baytok's individual experience in the aftermath of 27 May also points to another dramatic impact of the coup d'état on the ministry. As a general trend, Zorlu's growing influence in the ministry led career officers, namely professional diplomats, to be appointed to ambassadorial posts.⁹⁷ As an extension of this policy, Zorlu's years in office as foreign minister were characterized by a relatively successful rejuvenation of the ministry. As Olgaçay, then a low-ranking career officer, states,

during Zorlu's term in office, the policy of allowing for young diplomats was not only maintained but accelerated. Melih Esenbel, Turgut Menemencioğlu, Hasan Esat Işık, Zeki Kuneralp, Taha Carım, Orhan Eralp, [and] Oğuz Gökmen saw themselves consigned with prominent responsibilities and [they] managed to overcome these responsibilities. Some of them reached the rank of foreign minister.⁹⁸

Benim yurtdışına tayinimde bu kurallardan hiçbiri uygulanmadı. Çünkü ben, bakanlıkta 27 Mayıs 1960 ihtilalinden sonra çıkan ilk kararnameyle yurtdışına gönderildim. İhtilalle birçok meslek memuru çeşitli nedenlerle süreleri dolmadan geri alınmışlardı. Bu yüzden birçok dış temsilciliğin kadrolarında boşluklar oluştu. Yurtdışına üniversitede eğitim görmek üzere gitmek usulü de kaldırılmıştı. Bunun yerine, her memurun mesleğin belirli bir döneminde ve kaideten ilk çıkışlarda mahrumiyet bölgelerinden geçmeleri kuralı getirilmişti.” Ibid., 318.

97 Özcan, “Ellili Yıllarda Dış Politika,” 102. Recalling the ambassadorial appointments in the early decades of Republican Turkey from the first chapter, ambassadorial and consular posts were on many occasions allocated to people without a background in diplomacy and mostly to people with military and/or political careers. The 1950s, especially under the patronage of Zorlu and Menderes witnessed a change in this preference. This was both because of the training of satisfactory diplomatic cadres and of Zorlu's insistence on strengthening the position of diplomats within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One of the most prominent changes after 27 May was indeed the reinvolvement of non-career diplomats in the Ministry, especially for ambassadorial posts.

98 “Zorlu’nun zamanında, Bakanlıkta gençlere fırsat verme politikasına sadece devam edilmedi, hız da verildi. Melih Esenbel’ler, Turgut Menemencioğlu’lar, Hasan Esat Işık’lar, Zeki Kuneralp’ler, Taha Carım’lar, Orhan Eralp’ler, Oğuz Gökmen’ler genç yaşlarda kendilerine büyük sorumluluklar emanet edildiğini gördüler ve sorumluluklarının altından kalkmasını bildiler.

Rejuvenation during Zorlu's term, adds Olgaçay, was a wholesome one that was combined with the simultaneous utilization of experienced diplomats. Changes after the 27 May coup d'état in the ministry, however, were realized in a more "revolutionary" sense, and the implementations in post-27 May foreign ministry degenerated the Zorlu era's "rejuvenation program."⁹⁹ A diplomat who entered the ministry in the 1950s was recalled to Ankara in the sixteenth month of his tenure abroad.

"The punch of the coup" also landed on my face. I was in the sixteenth month of my tenure in this embassy [in a Middle Eastern country.] It has not been even one and a half years. ... I could not make anything of this decision ... I visited the then-secretary general [Namık Yolga]. His first words to me were "Islam is a good thing."¹⁰⁰

This diplomat, as his accounts reveal, was recalled to Ankara because of his alleged proximity to the DP government.¹⁰¹ Although he rejects this

Bazları Bakanlık makamına yükseldi." İsmail Berdük Olgaçay, *Tasmalı Çekirge* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayıncıları, 1990), 159.

99 For example, Zorlu was the person to determine English as the primary foreign language of the ministry instead of French. Young diplomats of the time were the direct addressees of this approach. He was appointing young diplomats to prominent English-speaking cities for their first posts abroad so that they could earn a master's degree and improve their English skills. After the coup of 27 May 1960, critics of Zorlu called the diplomats studying and working in this program "prince diplomats" or "student princes," as if they were being favored by Zorlu. Günver, *Zorlu'nun...*, 134.

100 "İhtilalin yumruğu' benim de kafamda patladı. ... Bu sefarete gelişimin 16'ncı ayında idik. Yani daha bir buçuk sene bile olmamıştı. ... Buna evvela bir mana veremedim. ... O zaman enel sekreter olan zata gittim. Odasından içeri girince bana ilk sözü: 'İslamiyet iyi şey demek' oldu." Anonymous, *Hariciyemizin İç Yüzü*, 53. Apart from the rejuvenation issue, the disclosures of the anonymous young diplomat recall the role of Namık Yolga, secretary general of the ministry between August 1960 and 1963, in the implementation of 27 May principles in the ministry of foreign affairs. The anonymous diplomat claims that Yolga declared the initiation of a "moral-spiritual revolution" within the ministry. Ibid. Similarly, Mahmut Dikerdem claims that Yolga once told him "you can be appointed as ambassador only if Turkey experiences a communist revolution" to explain Dikerdem's "idle position" in the post-27 May period. Dikerdem, *Hariciye Çarkı...*, 158.

101 Ibid.

“accusation” with respect to his professional experience during the DP years, the perception that an officer was aligned with the overthrown government was sufficient evidence for dismissal from active duty in the post-27 May period.

Other sufferers under the new administration had specific reasons to be targeted. Kamran İnan – for his Kurdish ethnic origin – and Mahmut Dikerdem – for his Marxist world view and to some extent also his Kurdish origin – suffered from the changing decision-making mechanism after the coup.¹⁰²

According to his accounts, Kamran İnan was recalled to Ankara (*merkez*) just one day after the coup. İnan states that he was the first state officer to be recalled to Ankara after the coup.¹⁰³ He notes that he could not understand whether this fact, which he calls “unluckiness,” stemmed from his name or his birth place.¹⁰⁴ İnan also claims that his father’s duty as deputy in the assembly and his friendship with Yüksel Menderes “silenced the ring of his telephone.”¹⁰⁵ The fury and motives behind his denunciation are clearly expressed in İnan’s notes.

After the intervention, interrogation committees were working in all state institutions. The ministry of foreign affairs held a record with two sacks of complaints and denunciation letters. I could not ascribe this to my ministry. One of our young colleagues was said to have been denouncing me through frequent applications to the commission; all of his words were found groundless. Our young friend, whose words ran short, stated to the commission: “Isn’t his Eastern origin a sufficient reason to be sacked from the ministry?”¹⁰⁶

102 One of his friends told Dikerdem that one of the reasons for the attitude towards him was his father’s Kurdish origins. Dikerdem’s father was born in Palu, Elazığ. *Ibid.*, 147.

103 Kamran İnan, *Bir Ömür* (Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi, 2010), 63.

104 *Ibid.* İnan was born the son of a Kurdish religious leader in Hizan, Bitlis Province.

105 *Ibid.*, 64.

106 “Müdahaleden sonra bütün devlet kuruluşlarında tahlükat komisyonları çalışıyordu. Dışişleri Bakanlığı tam iki çuval dolusu şikayet ve ihbar mektubu ile rekor kırdı. Bu rekoru Bakanlığımı yakıştıramadım. Genç bir meslektaşımız, komisyonla sık sık başvurup benim hakkında ihbarlarda bulunmuş; her defasında söyledikleri asılsız bulunmuş. Sonunda

İnan's discontent was not limited to denunciation efforts in the ministry. Cemal Gürsel, the leader of the MBK and President of Turkey, criticized İnan, citing his Kurdish origins as a major problem. In his accounts, İnan explains Gürsel's attitude towards him as follows,

The president of the time [Cemal Gürsel], as a consequence of [inferiority] complex for his Eastern origins, was dealing with the issue of the “Eastern Question” in a continuous and insistent manner, using disturbing and even separatist words. ... When a youth asked him about the treatment of Selahattin İnan, one of the leading figures in the region, Mr. President approximately said, “I know him; he is a harmless person. The real dangerous one is his son, Kamran. First of all, why did he study so much? He plans regional leadership in his mind.”¹⁰⁷

Like the cases of İşık, Günver, and especially Gökmen, it took almost two years for İnan to be reappointed to a post. In 1962 he was appointed to Rome where he would serve for four years.¹⁰⁸ Mahmut Dikerdem, perhaps the only “self-declared” Marxist diplomat of the ministry, was appointed to a new ambassadorship almost four years after the May 27, 1960, coup d'état.¹⁰⁹ Dikerdem was recalled to Ankara just a month after the coup in July 1960.¹¹⁰ Like Gökmen and İnan, Dikerdem also complains about denunciations in the ministry after the coup. Dikerdem describes the situation of the ministry after the coup as

malzemesi tükenen genç arkadaşımız benim için komisyona, ‘Doğulu olması Bakanlık’tan atılması için yeterli bir sebep değil mi?’ diye beyanda bulunmuş.” Ibid., 65. Gözübüyük’s complaints about the tight-lipped attitude of foreign ministry officers are contradicted by İnan’s claims over denunciation efforts in the ministry.

107 “Dönemin devlet başkanı [Cemal Gürsel], Doğu olmanın kompleksi ile konuşmalarında devamlı ve ısrarlı bir şekilde “Doğu Konusu”nu işliyor, rahatsız edici, hatta bölücü anlama gelecek ifadeler kullanıyordu... Bir genç kendilerine, yörenin sevdigi Selahattin İnan'a yapılan muameleyi sorduğunda, Sayın Devlet Başkanı, mealeen, ‘Ben kendisini tanırıım, zararsız bir kimsedir. Asıl tehlikeli olan oğlu Kamran'dır. Bir defa neden bu kadar okumuş? O'nun kafasında bölge liderliği var’ diyor.” Ibid.

108 Ibid., 68.

109 Dikerdem was appointed to Accra, the capital of Ghana, which was evaluated a hardship post rather than a favored destination for Turkish diplomats.

110 *TC Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette)*, no. 10562, July 27, 1960, 1.

“like a ship abandoned by its captain.”¹¹¹ Hatred of the captain of the ship, namely Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, was revealed after the coup; furthermore, the hatred was not only directed to Zorlu’s personality but also to the favored diplomats of the “Zorlu administration,” as Gökmen noted.¹¹²

Mahmut Dikerdem, unlike Gökmen, Işık, and Günver, was not a member of Zorlu’s team dealing with foreign economic relations within the ministry. On the other hand, he experienced the peak of his career during the DP years. He was one of the youngest diplomats to be appointed as ambassador.¹¹³ Although Dikerdem was being monitored by the National Intelligence Organization (*Milli Emniyet*, MAH) due to his political views even before the coup, Prime Minister Menderes and Foreign Minister Zorlu continued to work with him. According to him, this was because of Menderes’ belief that “nobody can dictate anything to an elected government.”¹¹⁴ Dikerdem was known for his socialist political orientation within the ministry, and as a consequence, he was often reported to governments of the time by the MAH.¹¹⁵ Nevertheless, ironically, his world view did not prevent his promotion during DP governments, renowned for their anti-communist stance. His career came to a halt in a period that paved the way for wider political expression and participation in leftist political groups in Turkey.¹¹⁶

Dikerdem experienced his first surprise when he met Selim Sarper, the new minister of foreign affairs, after returning from Tehran to Ankara. According to Dikerdem, Sarper told him that “he could not even be appointed as district governor (*kaymakam*) of Çemişgezek,” adding that “the best thing for him to do was to go back to Istanbul” when Dikerdem demanded a new responsibility in Ankara.¹¹⁷ For Dikerdem, Sarper’s warning was right since

111 Dikerdem, *Hariciye Çarkı...*, 139.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid., 120. Dikerdem, at the age of forty, was appointed to Amman, Jordan on May 30, 1957. *TC Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette)*, no. 9620, May 1957, 30.

114 Güler, *Salon Verir...*, 563.

115 Ibid.

116 Aydın & Taşkın, 108-111.

117 Dikerdem, *Hariciye Çarkı...*, 141. Çemişgezek is a district of Tunceli in Eastern Anatolia. It is most frequently given as an example of a typical region of deprivation.

there was an atmosphere of terror created within and without the ministry towards diplomats known for their closeness to Zorlu.¹¹⁸ Moreover, the MBK administration did not pursue operations or initiated an investigation of him; he was simply called back from Tehran. However, Dikerdem's individual probe proved that his punishment would be harder and longer than that of other diplomats.

My special investigation told me that my situation was more serious than other friends and that it would neither be easy for me to be appointed to a position in Ankara nor one abroad. ... One of my friends from Cairo, Sıtkı Ulay, who was also a member of the MBK, relayed to me that he wanted to prevent my return from Tehran, but Selim Sarper told him that "there is a thick file on him." The reason was an official letter, and a file attached to it, typed by Ziya Selışık, the Undersecretary of National Intelligence (*MAH*) after May, 27. Selışık, who could not influence Menderes and Zorlu during the DP governments, did not want to let me slip through his fingers this time. Selışık told to our common friend Ambassador İrfan Karasar that "he is not only an extreme leftist but also of Kurdish origin."¹¹⁹

This open deposition by a senior official revealed that the political affiliations and ethnic origins of Dikerdem would hinder his promotion in his career, and it became so. Contrary to Gökmen, İşık, Günver, who were appointed to foreign posts within two years, Dikerdem would wait four.

118 Ibid.

119 "Özel olarak yaptığım soruşturma, durumumun öteki arkadaşlardan daha ağır olduğunu ve bir daha ne içerisinde ne de dışında görev almamın kolay olmayacağına bana anlatmıştı... Kahire'den arkadaşım General Sıtkı Ulay-MBK üyesi idi- Tahrان'dan geri çağrılmamı önlemek istedigini, ancak Selim Sarper'in kendisine: 'O'nun hakkında kalın bir dosya var' dediğini bana aktarmıştı. Bütün bunların nedeni, Milli Emniyet Müsteşarı Ziya Selışık imzasıyla 27 Mayıs'tan hemen sonra Milli Birlik Komitesi'ne sunulan bir yazı ile ekindeki dosya idi. DP iktidarı döneminde Menderes ve Zorlu'ya sözünü geçiremeyen Milli Emniyet bu kez beni elinden kaçırılmamaya kararlı görünüyordu. Milli Emniyet Müsteşarı Ziya Selışık ortak dosyamız İrfan Karasar'a benim için: 'O yalnız aşırı solcu değil, aynı zamanda Kürt asıllıdır' demişti." Ibid., 146.

Dikerdem thought that the situation of Gökmen, İşik, and Günver constituted a precedent in his case. Nevertheless, “the specter of communism” still haunted him. When encouraged by the appointment of the three diplomats mentioned above, he visited Namık Yolga, then secretary general at foreign ministry, to ask a question, the answer to which he knew: “Why am I the only one not to be appointed?” Yolga’s answer was even clearer than Dikerdem expected: “Turkey has never yet been communist. You will be appointed if one day a communist regime comes.”¹²⁰ It was a shocking and rude but enlightening answer. Furthermore, according to Dikerdem, Yolga was not alone in his anti-communist position. Despite not being as courteous as Yolga, even close friends told Dikerdem that he was “unfortunately leftist.”¹²¹

In 1963, Dikerdem was the only diplomat not to be appointed to a post after the coup. His last chance was the involvement of İnönü in the issue. Even Feridun Cemal Erkin, then-minister of foreign affairs, stated that “nobody could save [Dikerdem] except İnönü.”¹²² In those days, states Dikerdem, it was hard for him to reach İnönü to solve his problem.¹²³ However, his efforts beginning in mid-1964 yielded a positive outcome. Dikerdem was appointed as Turkey’s Ambassador to Accra upon the intervention of İnönü.¹²⁴ Dikerdem maintained his title (ambassador) in this assignment. Yet he was being

120 Ibid., 158.

121 Ibid., 159.

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid., 160.

124 Ibid., 164. In his memoirs, Dikerdem refers to the role of Turhan Feyzioğlu, then deputy-prime minister. According to him, Feyzioğlu aspired to be the “McCarthy” of Turkey. Moreover, Ziya Selışık, the undersecretary of the National Intelligence Service after the coup (June 3, 1960-January 21, 1961) was also appointed as the advisor on security affairs to then-Prime Minister İnönü. Dikerdem notes that the presence of Feyzioğlu and Selışık prevented him from reaching İnönü to tell him about his situation. For example, Feyzioğlu once vetoed his appointment as ambassador to Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia. Even his appointment to Accra, adds Dikerdem, was hindered by two ministers of the cabinet at the time who were known for their proximity to Turhan Feyzioğlu. İnönü, intervened just after this and ordered the completion of his appointment process to Accra. Dikerdem was appointed to Accra on October 13, 1964. Ibid. *TC Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette)*, no. 11831,” October 13, 964, 1.

appointed to a place which was deemed a “place of deprivation” in the terminology of the ministry.

The coup d'état of May 27, 1960, laid another burden on the shoulders of Turkish diplomats assigned abroad. They had to deal with the weight of being the ambassador of a coup administration. Zeki Kuneralp, who was then Turkey's ambassador to Bern (1960-1964), had the burden of an undemocratic regime on his shoulders. According to him, the initial reaction towards the coup was positive mostly due to certain policies and practices of the DP administration.¹²⁵ Western public opinion turned against the new administration with the implementation of anti-democratic decisions against members of the DP. For instance, a woman from Zurich begged Kuneralp to mediate with the government on behalf of Menderes and Zorlu whom she thought to have successfully resolved the Cyprus dispute.¹²⁶ “The turning point was the executions of Menderes, Zorlu and Polatkan” adds Kuneralp.¹²⁷ Another Turkish ambassador experienced the reflections of the coup in another European capital in a similar vein. Feridun Cemal Erkin, then-Turkish ambassador to London, encountered insistent requests to prevent the execution of Menderes, Zorlu, and Polatkan.¹²⁸ Erdem Erner, who was also in charge at the Turkish embassy in London, cites that “Erkin lived most sorrowful and troublesome moments of his ambassadorship in London during the *Yassiada* trials.”¹²⁹ Erkin, according to Erner, “made great effort in order to prevent the executions

125 Kuneralp, *Sadece Diplomat...*, 91. Historians of Turkish political life basically categorize the ten-year-long DP period into three sub-periods. According to this classification, the years between the 1950 and 1954 elections were the golden age of the DP. The period between 1954 and 1957 witnessed the emergence of a serious crisis between the government and opposition parties, the press, bureaucracy, and universities. Between 1957 and 1960, disputes between the government and critics from different segments of the public crystalized. In this period, the Menderes administration implemented some controversial, authoritarian policies that increased tensions within Turkey. Eric Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2006), 321-351.

126 Kuneralp, *Sadece Diplomat...*, 91-92.

127 Ibid., 92. A newspaper in Lausanne even stated that “Turks have always presented ‘signs of barbarism’ to the world throughout the history.” Ibid.

128 Erner, *Davulun Sesi...*, 89.

129 Ibid.

although he had had tense relations with the DP government and most notably with Zorlu.”¹³⁰

Zeki Kuneralp encountered two other challenges in the post-coup period.¹³¹ The first was the “Yüksel Menderes affair,” which was mentioned above in a different context. As we learn from the accounts of Dikerdem, Efdal Derilingil was one of two diplomats interrogated about corruption in the promotion exam of Yüksel Menderes.¹³² The other was Kuneralp. One and a half years after the coup, Kuneralp, who was the first secretary general of the ministry after May 27, was subject to an investigation for having organized an illegal promotion exam for Yüksel Menderes.¹³³ Kuneralp was sentenced in spite of his successful defense, yet he was acquitted on account of a general amnesty.¹³⁴

The second issue was not an individual concern for Kuneralp. The members of the MBK aimed to confiscate the capital accumulated by members of DP governments in Swiss banks, and because he was Turkey’s ambassador to Switzerland, Kuneralp had to deal with the issue. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the Swiss governments concerning the privacy of the accounts turned the issue into a problem. In the words of Kuneralp,

the issue surfaced two times. It was not even one month since I had come to Bern, [that] I learned that one of our citizens was deported. ... This citizen tried to acquire information about illegal accumulations in the banks by members of the previous administration, and the banks denounced him to the government. After a while, another person with the same intent but this time with an official title, came from Ankara and appealed to the banks. This person had to obtain a document of authentication from the judicial units. He had to persuade the court that the owner of the account was not a political but an ordinary, criminal prisoner. This was quite difficult since there were few people

130 Ibid.

131 Kuneralp was appointed as secretary general of the foreign ministry immediately after the coup. Gürün, *Akıntıya Kürek...*, 87.

132 Güler, *Salon Verir...*, 575.

133 Kuneralp, *Sadece Diplomat*, 92.

134 Ibid.

who believed that the Yassıada proceedings were not political. Anyway, our government understood the complication and ended its attempts.¹³⁵

Kuneralp, on the other hand, experienced two sides of the coup and this constituted a unique example. After May 27, 1960, he served as the secretary general for a short time and was then appointed to Bern, Switzerland, where he had spent his childhood and early youth. His dignity was not harmed by the “extraordinary” coup period, and his career was not subject to interruption. At the same time, he was not a pure beneficiary of the coup. He was interrogated for a corruption he was involved during the last years of the DP. In this regard, unlike Dikerdem, İnan, Gökmen, İşık, and Günver, Kuneralp’s relation with the coup followed a dual pattern, which makes his story unique compared with those of other diplomats of the time.

§ 5.4 A Minister Changes, the Ministry Changes: The Sarper Effect

Selim Rauf Sarper served as foreign minister between May 28, 1960, and February 16, 1962, until his dismissal by then-Prime Minister İsmet İnönü. Indeed, there was nothing surprising about his appointment as foreign minister on the day following the coup. He was already serving as secretary general of the ministry. He seemed the most suitable candidate for this mission. Nevertheless, Sarper’s appointment as minister of foreign affairs was a complex process. On the day of the coup, Admiral Fahri Korutürk was announced as the

135 “Bern'e geleli bir ay olmamıştı ki bir vatandaşımızın İsviçre polisi tarafından hudut harici edildiği haberini aldım... Vatandaşımız usul dışında bankalardan eskş rejim mensuplarının mevduatları hakkında bilgi edinmeye çalışmıştı, bankalar da onu polise ihbar etmişlerdi. Bir zaman sonra, yine aynı iş için ama bu sefer resmi sıfatlar, Ankara'dan birisinin gelip bankalara başvurması mevzubahis oldu. İlginin daha evvel İsviçre mahkemelerinden bir yetki belgesi alması lazım idi. Mahkemeleri de mevzuat sahibinin siyasi değil adı suç işlediğine inandırmak gerekiyordu. Bu da pek zordu, çünkü Yassıada muhakemelerinin siyasi nitelikte olmadıklarına inanan memleketimiz dışında pek kimse yoktu. Neyse, ilgili makamlarımız işin pürüzünü nihayet anladılar ve niyetlerini gerçekleştirmekten sarfınazar ettiler.” Ibid., 93.

minister of foreign affairs of the first government on the radio. The next day, however, Sarper was on the cabinet list and Korutürk was appointed as ambassador to the Soviet Union.¹³⁶ This sudden change was controversial for many officials of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy.¹³⁷

Kamil Karavelioğlu, a member of the MBK, claims that Sarper was not eager to join a military-dominated cabinet, but when he learned that the cabinet would consist of civilians, he desired the foreign ministry with great enthusiasm.¹³⁸ According to Karavelioğlu, the 27 May coup d'état was a shock for the United States intelligence service and the American embassy, as well, but Sarper's assignment to the post of foreign minister calmed authorities in the American embassy in Ankara.¹³⁹ Sarper, adds Karavelioğlu, arranged a meeting between the American ambassador and Cemal Gürsel, which paved the way for American recognition of the junta regime in Turkey on May 30, 1960.¹⁴⁰ Some witnesses of the period verify Karvelioğlu's explanation. As a young diplomat of the time, Kemal Girgin notes that,

136 Kemal Girgin, *Dünya'nın Dört Bucağı: Bir Diplomatın Anıları* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 1998), 62.

137 Ibid.

138 Kamil Karavelioğlu, *Bir Devrim, İki Darbe: 27 Mayıs, 12 Mart, 12 Eylül* (İstanbul: Gürer Yayınları, 2007), 88-90.

139 Ibid., 88. Sarper was a prominent figure for the Western public opinion. It was such that Lauris Nordstad, then NATO Commander-in-chief, visited Sarper's house to show the West's support to him. Gencer Özcan, "Altmışlı Yillarda'Dış Politika," in *Türkiye'nin 1960'lı Yılları*, ed. Mete Kaan Kaynar (İstanbul: İletişim, 2017), 253. Dikerdem also notes that Sarper's proximity to the United States "played a role in his appointment as the foreign minister." Güler, *Salon Verir...*, 580.

140 The New York Times of May 28, 1960 states that the coup was a surprise for the Department of State's high-level authorities. Despite the discontent in Turkey, the Department of State of the United States was sure that the Menderes government could overcome possible future demonstrations since Rüştü Erdelhun, the head of Turkish General Headquarters, was loyal to Menderes. After getting over the initial shock, the American government quickly adapted to the new conditions. This was what the new regime in Turkey needed especially in economic terms. In response to American recognition of the new regime on May 30, Foreign Minister Selim Sarper declared the next day that the new regime would be loyal to all the agreements signed during the Menderes governments. Ümit Özdağ, *Menderes Döneminde Ordu-Siyaset İlişkileri ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali* (İstanbul: Boyut Yayın Grubu, 2004), 345.

Selim Sarper, who had been secretary general in the ministry for a while, at first hesitated to accept the position of minister of foreign affairs but then accepted it when the situation became more precise. The revolutionaries thought that it would be suitable that Selim Sarper, whose reputation in Ankara was positive, to be appointed to this position.¹⁴¹

Fahri Korutürk was a high-ranking military officer and had no direct or close contact with diplomats; thus, it would be hard to expect Korutürk to pursue an individual revenge on high-ranking diplomats in the ministry. Selim Sarper, however, was a career diplomat and was involved in personal disputes with his colleagues. In this regard, some diplomats even preferred a minister from outside the ministry. Oğuz Gökmen, for example, states that

sometimes I wonder whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ... would have been torn apart as much as it was [if Korutürk had been the foreign minister]. ... My answer to this question, especially after getting to know [Fahri Korutürk] and joining diplomatic visits with him, would be “never” with no reluctance.¹⁴²

Sarper was indeed so in favor of some operations within the ministry, and his designs were not limited to high-level career officers but also to other, non-career diplomats. When Turgut Bayar, then Turkish ambassador to Mexico, wrote a letter containing anti-May 27 sentiments, Sarper sought to recall not only Bayar but also other ambassadors, such as Suat Hayri Ürgüplü and Faiz

141 “Bir süredir Dışişleri katibi umumisi olan Selim Sarper, ihtilalin ilk günü tereddüt geçirmiştir, kendisine önerilen Bakan pozisyonunu istememiş, daha sonra durum belirginleşip vaziyet aydınlanınca Dışişleri Bakanı olmayı kabul etmiştir. İhtilalciler de Ankara'daki imajı iyi olan Sarper'in bu pozisyonda bulunmasının faydalı olacağını düşünmüştürlerdi.” Girgin, Dünyanın Dört Bucağı..., 62.

142 Gökmen, *Diplomasi...*, 318.

Yörüköglü, to Ankara.¹⁴³ He was not able to implement this “little purge” because of the intervention of another member of the cabinet.¹⁴⁴

Sarper, however, was not totally loyal to the directives of the MBK. As a matter of fact, he was not criticized by all members of the ministry. In Aytaman’s words, “Sarper led the ministry get through the storm with the least possible harm.”¹⁴⁵ Although many high-ranking diplomats of the previous administration were left idle, Sarper resisted some of the arbitrary applications of the MBK administration. The MBK appointed Colonel Vefa Baha Karatay to guide a comprehensive operation within the ministry, but Sarper managed the crisis by first appointing Karatay as ambassador to Vienna.¹⁴⁶ Aşula depicts this story in detail as below,

In the first days of the coup, Colonel Baha Vefa Karatay, who was an advisor to the MBK, ... [was] appointed as ambassador to Canberra. Mr. Karatay was ordered to prepare a secret report on his experiences. Who was performing unsatisfactorily in the ministry; who should be purged? The report reached Mr. [Namık] Yolga. Honestly, he was quite keen. However, it was not only up to him. Mr. Sarper ... also had to approve it. Mr. Sarper would not sacrifice anybody. ... He kept the report for a long time and then left his office for other reasons. Mr. Mehmet Baydur, who deputized him for a short while, stalled the MBK members, and after the establishment of the Constituent Assembly the report disappeared and everybody relaxed.¹⁴⁷

143 Koçak, *27 Mayıs Bakanlar Kurulu Tutanakları...*, 173. These ambassadors were not career diplomats but political appointees.

144 Ibid.

145 Aytaman, *Sınırlı Yıllar*, 96.

146 Ibid., 96. Aytaman, in his accounts, recalls that Karatay was appointed as ambassador to Baghdad. However, he was appointed to Baghdad in 1964, when Sarper was not the foreign minister. As Dikerdem states, Karatay was appointed to Vienna in January 1961; Sarper was keen for this since the dual structure at the head of ministry had ended. Güler, *Salon Verir...*, 580.

147 “İhtilalin ilk günlerinde Milli Birlik Komitesine danışmanlık yapmış olan Albay Baha Vefa Karatay, emekli edilerek, Kanberra’ya büyükelçi olarak gönderilmişti. Baha beye, tecrübesine binaen, Bakanlık hakkında gizli bir rapor hazırlatıldı. Meslekte kimler yetersiz, kimler

Ironically, Sarper's dismissal from office as foreign minister again stemmed from his reluctant attitude. He was indeed in close contact with counter-junta initiatives throughout his term as foreign minister and he was claimed to be willing to accept the presidency of the Turkish Republic in the case a new coup d'état led by some members of the Fourteens (On Dörtler) was realized.¹⁴⁸ During Colonel Talat Aydemir's unsuccessful coup attempt on February 22, 1962, Sarper was the only minister not to obey then-Prime Minister İnönü's decision to continue the cabinet meeting at the Radio House.¹⁴⁹ When İnönü learned of Aydemir's attempt, he wanted to continue an ongoing meeting with his cabinet at the Radio House, which had symbolic and strategic meanings in the course of a military intervention. Sarper, however, refused to join the meeting. He sought to see the outcome of the February 22 attempt.¹⁵⁰ İnönü did not forgive Sarper and appointed Feridun Cemal Erkin as the new

ayıklanmaliydi? Rapor Namık beye ulaştı. Doğrusu, hazzına diyecek yoktu... Tabiatıyla, iş sadece Namık Beyle bitmiyordu... Selim Sarper beyin de evet demesi gerekiyordu. Selim Bey, kimseye kiyamıyordu. Tasfiye raporunu uzun süre elinde tuttu ve sonunda da, başka sebeplerden, istifasını verip aurıldı. Yerine, bir süre vekalet eden Mehmet Baydur bey de, Milli Birlikçileir oyaladı ve Kurucu Meclisin teşkilinden sonra rapor ortadan kalktı ve herkes derin bir nefes aldı." Aşula, *Dişşileri Albümü*, 10. (Aşula's memory misleads him. Karatay was appointed as ambassador to Canberra in March 1967.) Yolga, as secretary general in the post-27 May period, again became influential in the appointment decisions. Aytaman notes that he was appointed as secretary general under the pressure of military officers. Aytaman, *Sinirli Yıllar*..., 95. According to Aşula, as a consequence, Yolga was keen about the possible influence of the report because he, personally, hoped to get even for what he suffered in the hands of Galatasaray graduates. For example, adds Aşula, Settar İksel, one of the Galatasaray graduates in the ministry, was subjected to a financial inspection initiated by Yolga due to the expenditures of the Turkish embassy in Bonn. İksel, without waiting until the end of the investigation, returned to Ankara and resigned one year later. As the ultimate intention was completed, the inspection was closed after his retirement. Ibid., 15. Given that the most renowned victims of the post-27 May period such as Gökmen, Günver, and Dikerdem were also graduates of Galatasaray Lycee, it can be concluded that Aşula's predictions are correct to a considerable extent.

148 Kurtul Altuğ, *27 Mayıs'tan 12 Mart'a* (İstanbul: Yılmaz Yayınları, 1991), 166.

149 İzzet Sedes, *Bir Dönem Babiali ve Avrupa Konseyi* (İstanbul: Toroslu Kitabevi, 2009), 31.

150 Ibid.

minister of foreign affairs in Sarper's stead.¹⁵¹ Dikerdem claims Namık Yolga would have been appointed as the new minister of foreign affairs if Aydemir's coup initiative succeeded.¹⁵²

Selim Sarper served as minister of foreign affairs between May 28, 1960, and March 16, 1962.¹⁵³ In this manner, he was the "minister of the revolution." During his term in office, the ministry had to deal with the consequences of a military intervention. All the dismissals, investigations, and power struggles explained in this study were experienced during Sarper's term in office.

The reason he was offered this position is ambiguous. Girgin says he was chosen for ministry since he had a good reputation due to his successful terms in Turkey's permanent missions to the United Nations and NATO.¹⁵⁴ Dikerdem, on the other hand, claims that Sarper was offered this position because he had good relations with the United States and was supported by them.¹⁵⁵ When we take the story of Sarper into consideration as a whole, his memory is predominantly negative among colleagues in the ministry.

§ 5.5 Concluding Remarks

Most of the witnesses from within the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy claim that the May 27, 1960, coup d'état left a relatively negative impact on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, there were counterarguments. İsmail Berduk Olgaçay claims that neither Sarper nor the coup administration as a whole left a devastating impact on the ministry. He exemplifies this through his experience.

After May 27, three of my friends at the London embassy were appointed to other posts, namely Libya, Israel, and Sudan, and naturally these assignments were regarded as changes made by the new

151 Sedes notes that he saw "that magnificient minister in a poor, pitiable situation." *Ibid.*, 31.

152 Güler, *Salon Verir...*, 584.

153 "İnönü Sarper ile Vedalaştı," (İnönü said goodbye to Sarper) *Milliyet*, March 17, 1962, 5.

154 Girgin, *Dünyanın Dört Bucağı...*, 62.

155 Dikerdem, *Hariciye Çarkı...*, 151.

administration. These were already planned by Zorlu together with [Muharrem Nuri] Birgi – [the Turkish embassy in] London was informed about it –, and Selim Sarper, who was secretary general when [they occurred] ... did not feel the need to change these appointments [after the coup].¹⁵⁶

Olgaçay's thinking on post-27 May period presents a different position compared to those of Günver, Gökmen, İnan, Baytok, and Dikerdem. Contrary to the clarifications of his colleagues, Olgaçay argues that the May 27, 1960, coup and its Foreign Minister Sarper did not cause a drastic change within the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. In this regard, the question "who said what, under which circumstances?" is worthy of attention rather than "who is right?" Olgaçay served in five different posts and was promoted in each appointment. In his words, "[his] destiny began to present him as the man of the new administration even though he did not seek this out."¹⁵⁷ Most of the diplomats, whose stories of May 27 are quoted in this chapter, faced a hiatus in their careers. Can the divergent views between Olgaçay and these diplomats stem from individual experiences rather than a full-fledged analysis of the period? The answer is "yes" to a certain extent. Although there are few accounts of those who were promoted after the coup, at least fewer than the ones whose careers failed, it is clear that individual experience played a role in determining the ideas of the Turkish diplomats about the coup. This fact, however, does not nullify the general picture. The May 27, 1960, coup influenced the ministry in institutional and legal terms, and affected the careers of some of its outstanding diplomats at least for a while.

A comprehensive purge within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the coup was never realized. Such operations were conducted in other

156 "27 Mayıs'tan hemen sonra, Londra Büyükelçiliğindeki meslektaşlarından üçü başka yerlere, Libya, İsrail ve Sudan'a atandılar ve doğal olarak bu atamalar, yeni yönetimin yaptığı değişiklik sanıldı... Bunlar, çok daha önce, Zorlu tarafından, [Muharrem Nuri] Birgi ile birlikte tasarlanmıştı-hatta haberi bile Londra'ya [Büyükelçilik] ulaşmıştı-ve kararname hazırlanırken Genel Sekreter olan Selim Sarper, kendisi bakan olunca, bu atamaları değiştirmek gereği duymamıştı." Olgaçay, *Tasmalı Çekirge...*, 289-290.

157 Ibid., 290.

institutions of the bureaucracy especially in the judicial branch. Half of the judges of the Administrative High Court (*Danıştay*), a quarter of the judges of the Supreme Court (*Yargıtay*) – including its president and deputy president –, and one sixth of local court judges were subjected to obligatory retirement.¹⁵⁸ Although there were rumors that “387 people would be dismissed from the ministry,”¹⁵⁹ this frightening scenario did not occur. Instead, the “purge decree” regulated the liquidation of thirty to thirty-five officers, some of whom were elderly officers without a remarkable diplomatic career and they had no close links to Zorlu.¹⁶⁰

Moreover, other occasions influenced the ministry similar to the post-27 May period. As a comparable example, the leaders of the September 12, 1980, coup d'état also ordered the retirement of “public officers who had served more than twenty years in order to narrow oversized bureaucratic cadres.”¹⁶¹ This order not only targeted the foreign ministry personnel, but some applications of the 12 September coup were directly related to the ministry. The title of the second man in the ministry after the foreign minister had been “secretary general” since the 1930s. In order to equalize the position of the foreign ministry with other ministries, the title was “relegated” to undersecretary. Moreover, İlter Türkmen, the foreign minister between 1980 and 1983 and an outstanding former ambassador, learned of “Evren’s confirmation of the

158 Osman Doğru, *27 Mayıs Rejimi* (İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 1998), 98-100 & 122-123.

159 Aytaman, *Sınırlı Yıllar*, 96.

160 Ibid. Aytaman also notes that these people returned to the Ministry through judicial processes after the normalization of conditions. Ibid., 97.

161 Gürün, *Akıntıya Kürek*, 370-372. Turgut Özal, the prime minister of Turkey, was complaining about foreign ministry bureaucrats. In most cases, he favored by-passing Turkish diplomats in foreign policy-making procedures. In one of his statements about the Cyprus dispute, Özal noted “bureaucrats led the Cyprus Question to a stalemate. The best way is ... to resolve this ... without diplomats.” Lale Dündar, “Özal Dönemi Türk Diş Politikasında Turgut Özal’ın Kişisel Özelliklerinin Rolü,” *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* 58, (Spring 2016), 7.

Rogers Plan from the radio.”¹⁶² Turkish diplomats, especially ones assigned in Europe, had to tackle the burden of representing a “non-democratic regime.”¹⁶³

The most important functional change within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the post-27 May period was the transfer of authority to other state agencies in terms of foreign economic relations. Apart from the ones discussed above in detail, one of the most controversial applications of the ministry was initiated during the post-27 May period. According to this, a career diplomat who served in a “favored post” would be assigned to a so-called “hardship post” in their next appointment.¹⁶⁴

The experience of 27 May must lead us to question the perception that the ministry of foreign affairs was the last unit in the Turkish bureaucracy to be influenced by domestic political conditions in the country. The favorite diplomats of the DP years, the members of Zorlu’s main team, were dismissed from their positions. Some diplomats would have to wait two years to be appointed to a new post. There was an exceptional case that one diplomat had to wait four years to be reappointed as ambassador. Roughly speaking, the two other military interventions did not influence the ministry as deeply as was the case after 27 May.¹⁶⁵ The main motive for this was hidden within the absolute reactionary character of the coup. Just as the constitution of 1961 was a clear reaction to the ten-year-long policies and practices of the DP, what happened in

162 Eralp, *Perdeyi Aralarken...*, 43. In the aftermath of Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus, Turkish-Greek relations were poisoned due to a variety of problems ranging from sovereignty claims in the Aegean Sea to Greece’s return to the NATO alliance. Previously, as a reaction to the “indifference” of NATO to Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus, Greece withdrew from the military wing of NATO. In 1980, after the coup in Turkey, Kenan Evren, the leader of the military administration, accepted the Rogers Plan proposing Greece’s return to NATO. Çağrı Erhan, Ersin Embel, “Türk Dış Politikasında Karar Alıcıları Yönlendiren Yapısal Faktörler,” *Bılıg* 72 (September 2015), 162-163.

163 Afra, for example, notes that a German lawyer complained about the Turkish consulate in Dusseldorf to German officials labelling as “the fascist consulate of the fascist regime” in the aftermath of the September 12, 1980 coup d’état. Afra, *Hariciyeceiler...*, 224.

164 Akay, *Dışişlerinde*, 76. The regulation was evaluated as controversial by Akay since it was not implemented properly in most cases.

165 See the words of Türkmen in footnote 38 in this chapter.

the ministry of foreign affairs after the coup was also an attempt to overthrow the legacy of the DP, most notably Zorlu's legacy. In sum, the experience of May 27 for the ministry falsifies the claim that the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy is minimally influenced by the realities of domestic politics in the country. On the contrary, the military intervention of May 27, 1960, was an "earthquake" for the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – though an earthquake with short-term influences.



Touching the Citizen, Transforming the Bureaucracy: Relations between the Turkish Diplomatic Bureaucracy and Turkish Citizens

Beginning in the early 1960s, Turkish workforce migration to Western Europe gained systematic momentum with various workforce agreements. The status, motives, and degree of migration changed over the years, yet Turkish migrant workers were always an issue for the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy to consider.

Kishan S. Rana states that “consular diplomacy is the ‘citizen service’ end of diplomacy” since “it deals directly with ordinary people, not the privileged entities such as the ministries, official agencies of foreign governments, or people holding high appointments.”¹ Clark notes that while “the ordinary citizen many never set foot in a foreign ministry or see a political diplomat, he has a good chance of needing the help of a consular officer.”² In line with this, throughout the migration process of Turkish citizens to Western Europe, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Turkish consular missions more

1 Kishan S. Rana, *21st Century Diplomacy: A Practitioner’s Guide* (New York: Continuum International Publishing, 2011), 213.

2 Clark, *Corps Diplomatique*, 155.

specifically were the points of first and most intense contact between expatriate citizens of Turkey and the Turkish state.³

In his efforts to understand the changing nature of diplomacy, Vincent Pouliot attaches significance to the face-to-face interactions of diplomatic mission personnel. Daily encounters and the challenges faced by diplomats, according to Pouliot, were important aspects of micro-level change in the diplomatic profession.⁴ Despite the fact that his research was based on multilateral diplomacy – namely Russia’s representation at NATO – his approach suits the changing attitude of the Turkish diplomacy towards its citizens. Although there were considerable efforts even in the early years of the migration process, the policies and practices of the Turkish government and the bureaucracy of the time fell short of providing full-fledged service to its citizens. As a consequence, in the following decades, the Turkish government aimed to rehabilitate its implementations for migrant citizens and form a sustainable state policy in this realm. This chapter will scrutinize this process by illustrating the relationship between the Turkish migrant population and Turkish diplomatic and consular missions, most notably those in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Apart from focusing on its significance for Turkish economic history or its unique features in contrast with other migration studies, Turkish workforce migration to Europe will be examined through the lense of state-society relationship in a transnational, extraterritorial context. The Turkish migrant population in Europe will be analyzed as an addressee of Turkish diplomacy.⁵

3 In recent years, the term “consular diplomacy” was coined in the diplomatic studies. Although it is a scarcely studied sub-field, there are a few prominent approaches understanding the nature of state-citizen relationships through consular missions. See Jan Melissen and Ana Mar Fernandez, Eds. *Consular Affairs and Diplomacy* (Leiden: Brill, 2011). Halvard Leira and Iver B. Neumann, “Consular Diplomacy,” in *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World*, eds. Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 160–174.

4 Vincent Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy* (Cambridge University Press, 2010).

5 In a recent effort, the term “diaspora diplomacy” was coined to evaluate states’ abilities and efforts to use their diasporas as a soft power, public diplomacy asset through diplomatic practices. Elaine L.E. Ho, Fiona McConnell, “Conceptualizing ‘Diaspora diplomacy’: Territory and

§ 6.1 Eternal Tension between the State and Citizens in Turkey: A Reminder from Recent History

On May 25, 2006, then-Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with the Turks living in Germany in Berlin.⁶ Together with him was, Mehmet Ali İrtemçelik, Turkey's then-Ambassador to Germany. As memoirs related to this dissertation reveal, such rallies were common in previous decades as a way of establishing a link between the state and its citizens abroad. For example, İhsan Çağlayangil, then-Minister of Labor, met with Turkish workers in Federal Germany in 1965.⁷ A similar visit was paid by Bülent Ecevit, then-Turkey's Prime Minister, in May 1978 in order to transcend the boundaries and distance between the state and its citizens abroad.⁸ The tradition was repeating itself.

The meeting of Prime Minister Erdoğan with Turks living in Germany began with criticism of so-called Islamic foundations and corporations active in the country. Most participants in the meeting were there to express complaints about such organizations. A woman begged Erdoğan "to resolve the problem of holding companies" that "had stolen the money of their children."⁹ This complaint signaled that the meeting would proceed with a tense atmosphere. Prime Minister Erdoğan responded to the young Turkish woman that "these

populations betwixt the Domestic and Foreign," *Progress in Human Geography* 20, no. 10 (November 2017), 1-21. This chapter of the study, on the other hand, can be considered a story of the state's changing attitude and practices toward its own citizens abroad as a consequence of contact between the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy and Turkish citizens. In this regard, this chapter neither measures the influence of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy's actions on other states nor their citizens, but rather on its own citizens. Even so, the "diaspora diplomacy" notion is a path-breaking approach for understanding the social implications of diplomatic practices.

6 "Berlin'de de Türban Sorunu," (Headscarf Crisis in Berlin) *Sabah*, May 2006, 26

7 Erdem Erner, *Davulun Sesi*, 118.

8 Gökmen, *Diplomasi...*, 222.

9 "Kombassan Zulüm Yaptı," (Kombassan Persecuted) *Sabah*, May 26, 2006, accessed 17 April 2014, available from <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2006/05/26/siy112.html>.

holding companies tyrannized people. Yet, you were silent when you benefited from thirty-five to forty percent interest rates.”¹⁰

Despite the confirmation of most of the audience, Erdoğan’s words triggered tension in the rally, and he was involved in a quarrel with Muhammed Demirer, head of the Foundation for Solidarity with the Turks in Europe.¹¹ This quarrel, however, was not what made the rally a concern among the Turkish public. The words of another Turkish woman living in Germany, Nuran Zeyrek, brought to the surface a hidden tension between the Turkish state and Turks living abroad. Zeyrek stated,

Mr. Prime Minister, I acquired German citizenship. They attached my photograph with a head scarf to my identity card. They gave me citizenship in a Christian country in my situation [wearing headscarf]. Yet, when I go to the consulate here to obtain passport, they tell us “you must wear it as our grandmothers did; at least a part of your hair should be seen.” They insult us. Please save us from this persecution.¹²

The addressee of these words was Prime Minister Erdoğan. İrtemçelik, the ambassador, was also there. Erdoğan asked İrtemçelik about the validity of this claim, and the latter confirmed it since “there was a written memorandum on the issue.”¹³ When İrtemçelik stated that the procedure “was not exactly the same as [the Turkish citizens] claimed,” the audience booed him. Prime Minister Erdoğan harshly criticized the procedure.¹⁴

A veiled, young Turkish woman complaining about the ambassador of Turkey in Germany, an audience booing the ambassador, and a prime minister criticizing the ambassador before a tense audience. This was definitely an

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 "Sayın Başbakan'ım bakın ben Alman vatandaşım oldum. Başörtülü fotoğrafımı da kimliğime yapıştırırlar. Hıristiyan bir ülkede bu halimde bana vatandaşlık verdiler. Ancak buradaki konsolosluga pasaport almak için gittiğimiz de, 'başını babaannelerimiz gibi örteceksin. Saçında önden az bir şey görünecek' diyorlar. Bizi horluyorlar. Bizi bu eziyetten kurtarın" "Berlin'de de Türban Sorunu," (Headscarf Crisis in Berlin) Sabah, May 2006, 26, 1.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

unfamiliar scene. For the first time in modern Turkish history, a prime minister and a high-ranking bureaucrat were involved in a quarrel in front of the cameras and an audience consisting of “ordinary citizens.” This unfamiliar scene revived a familiar debate among the Turkish public. The following day, *Vakit*, an Islamist newspaper, called Ambassador İrtemçelik’s attitude as “meddlesome.”¹⁵ *Yeni Asya*, also an organ of the Islamic fundamentalist press, pleaded the case to its audience as a “Berlin Wall against the headscarf.”¹⁶

On his way back to Ankara, Prime Minister Erdoğan, with reference to his quarrel with İrtemçelik, stated, “I apologize if there is any whom I hurt.”¹⁷ Nuran Zeyrek, the woman who complained about the procedure being applied in Turkey’s diplomatic missions in Germany about wearing the headscarf, pointed out that “Erdoğan misunderstood her,” and she was also “sorry for İrtemçelik being booed.”¹⁸ The issue, however, was politicized. Reaction to Erdoğan came from two aspects of the public. Since the dissent between Erdoğan and İrtemçelik emerged due to the complaints of a woman wearing headscarf, secular elements of the Turkish public evaluated the clash as part of a wider debate on Islamic conservatism and secularism, which was being intensely discussed in Turkey in 2006. *Gözcü*, then a hardliner secular, and nationalist newspaper, blamed Erdoğan for “shouting and insulting everybody without information on the issue and without listening to his counterpart.”¹⁹ On the same day, Emin Çölaşan, a columnist known for strong secular tendencies and his objection to political Islam, criticized Erdoğan for allowing and

15 “Büyükelçinin Tavrı İşgürarlık,” (Attitude of the Ambassador is Meddlesomeness) *Vakit*, May 27, 2006, 1.

16 “Başörtüsüne Karşı Berlin Duvarı,” (Berlin Wall against the Headscarf) *Yeni Asya*, May 27, 2006, 1.

17 “Kirdiklarım Olduysa Özür Diliyorum,” (I Apologise If There is Any I Hurt) *Milliyet*, Mayıs 27, 2006, 1, “Başbakan Beni Yanlış Anladı,” *Hürriyet*, Mayıs 27, 2006, accessed May 1, 2014, available from <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=4482297&tarih=2006-05-27>.

18 “Başbakan Beni Yanlış Anladı,” *Hürriyet*, Mayıs 27, 2006, accessed May 1, 2014, available from <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=4482297&tarih=2006-05-27>.

19 “Bilmeden Dinlemeden Herkese Bağıriп Çağırıyor,” (Shouts at Everybody with no Information) *Gözcü*, May 27, 2006, 1.

even causing insult to an ambassador for the first time in Turkish and even world history.²⁰ Semih İdiz, a foreign policy columnist, underscored that the prime minister's attitude towards İrtemçelik was an "insult against the state," even as he also provided examples of a few cases from his past experience that illustrated poor treatment of Turkish citizens by Turkish officials in diplomatic and consular missions.²¹

What about the reactions of those who were once officials of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy? They unified around the common idea that Erdoğan insulted the republic and sabotaged İrtemçelik's working capacity. Onur Öymen, a former ambassador and then deputy of the Republican People's Party (CHP), stressed the uniqueness of the debate, claiming that "there is no example of an ambassador in Turkish history being booed in front of a prime minister."²² İnal Batu, who was also a former ambassador and a deputy of the CHP, underscored that "the ambassador was the representative of the state and the president there."²³ Nüzhet Kandemir, a former ambassador and then a deputy from the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*, DYP), focused on the unprecedented nature of the case and noted that "the prime minister cannot ignore and insult the person representing the president."²⁴ Even a deputy from the

20 Emin Çölaşan, "Şimdi de Almanya Rezaleti," (This Time, Scandal in Germany) *Hürriyet*, May 27, 2006, accessed 1 May 2014, available from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/4482058.asp>. Oktay Ekşi, who was also in similar political orientation to Çölaşan, blamed Erdoğan for being unaware of general customs of Turkish political-bureaucratic life. Oktay Ekşi, "İyi ki Gerilim İstemiyor," (Thank God, he does not Want Tension) *Hürriyet*, May 27, 2006, accessed May 1, 2014, available from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/4482486.asp>.

21 Semih İdiz, "İrtemçelik'e Yapılan Devlete Hakarettir," (What has been done to İrtemçelik is an Insult against the State) *Milliyet*, May 27, 2006, accessed May 1, 2014, available from <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/05/27/yazar/idiz.html>. İdiz's accounts on the aforementioned poor treatment of Turkish officials towards its citizens will be illustrated later in this part of the study.

22 "Devletin İtibarını Zedeledi," (He damaged the dignity of the State) *Milliyet*, accessed May 1, 2014, Available from <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/05/27/siyaset/siyo1.html>.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

AK Party, Ersönmez Yarbay was pointing out that the ambassador's behavior was correct in the case there was a written order.²⁵

As explained in chapter 1, Erdoğan's relations with the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy have always followed a problematic path. The split with Ambassador İrtemçelik in front of Turkish citizens living in Germany and the cameras of Turkish national press unearthed a clash between Erdoğan and the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy that would reach its peak with the usage of the word "mon cher" which was central to Erdoğan's rhetoric criticizing Turkey's alleged foreign policy orientation in the pre-AK Party period.²⁶

This split, as manifest in the "boos" of the audience listening to Erdoğan and İrtemçelik, also had a basis among the Turkish public. Throughout modern Turkish history, the state-citizen relationship followed a tense, fragile path. Turkish state's continuous efforts to regulate the ideas, beliefs, and everyday practices of citizens encountered various forms of the resistance of citizens. The split between Erdoğan and İrtemçelik and the reaction among different aspects of the public to the clash can be interpreted as a different, rarely-considered aspect of this state-citizen divergence in Turkish history.

In order to understand the nature of this hidden – or in some cases explicit – dichotomy, the roots of the clash between the state and citizens will be traced through the expressions of Turkish diplomats about their relationships to the Turks living abroad. This relationship is reciprocal, thus, it is essential to consider the views of citizens living (or who once lived) abroad. Interestingly, since there is no written account of the relationship of Turkish citizens living abroad with Turkish diplomatic missions, the outcomes of the interviews conducted with them will be compared to the views of Turkish diplomats.²⁷ In this

25 Ibid.

26 For a criticism of Erdoğan's strong divergence with Turkish diplomats, see Hasan Cemal, "Erdoğan'ın 'Monşer Kompleksi' Dışşleri'ne Darbe Vuruyor," (Erdoğan's Complex of Monchères Damages [Ministry of] Foreign Affairs] *T24*, July 17, 2013, accessed Jun 1, 2014, available from <http://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/hasan-cemal/erdoganin-monser-kompleksi-disislerine-darbe-vuruyor,7064>.

27 For example, an edited volume published in honor of the fiftieth anniversary of the Turkish-German Workforce agreement consisted of interviews with Turkish migrants from different generations and social classes. None of the accounts included migrants' experiences in

regard, by considering Turkish diplomats as an extension of the Turkish state abroad and by considering Turks living abroad as part of the whole of Turkish society, it will be possible to analyze and understand the representations of the state-citizen tension in Turkish society in a transnational context.

§ 6.2 Turkish Migrant Workers as Addressees of the Turkish Diplomatic Bureaucracy

On October 30, 1961, the Turkish government signed a “Bilateral Workforce Agreement” with the Federal Republic of Germany.²⁸ This was the first in a series of workforce treaties signed by Turkey – with Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, France, and Sweden, respectively.²⁹ Turkish workers, as Abadan Unat remarks, evolved from being individual workers into *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) in this process.³⁰ Between 1960 and 1961, the number of Turkish workers jumped from 2,700 to 6,700, which meant a threefold increase in just one year.³¹ According to the census of 2011, the number of Turks residing in Germany reached 2.7 million, which is 3.3 percent of the total population of the country.³²

Migration of skilled and unskilled Turkish workforces to Europe and elsewhere has most frequently been evaluated in the framework of migration studies. Migration to Europe has also been a prominent subject matter for modern Turkey’s economic history. In Turkey, in accordance with the First

Turkish diplomatic or consular missions. See Cem Özdemir and Wolfgang Schuster. Ed. *Almanya'nın Ortasında: Alman-Türk Başarı Öyküleri* (İstanbul: İBB Kültür AŞ, 2011.)

28 Nermin Abadan Unat, *Bitmeyen Göç: Konuk İşçilikten ulus Ötesi Yurtaşlığı* (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2002), 42.

29 Ibid. The dates of the agreements signed with other European countries were as follows: Austria (May 15, 1964), Belgium (July 16, 1964), the Netherlands (August 19, 1964), France (April 8, 1965), and Sweden (March 10, 1967). Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., 42-43.

32 “Almanya’da Yaşayan Türk Kökenlilerin Sayısı Açıklandı,” (Number of the Turks in Germany has been Revealed) *Zaman*, May 31, 2013, accessed May 1, 2014, available from http://www.zaman.com.tr/dunya_almanyada-turk-kokenlilerin-resmi-sayisi-aciklandi_2095897.html.

Five-Year Development Plan (1963-67), the export of an “increasing work-force” was accepted as a target along with other measures aiming to control population growth.³³ Moreover, Turkish migrant workers delivered their capital accumulations as foreign currency back to Turkey and this fed Turkey’s import-substitution economy model.³⁴

The relationship between workers and their states in consular and diplomatic missions has rarely been examined. This chapter contributes to studies on the Turkish workforce migration process by illustrating how Turkish migrants contacted their state and how they shape and are shaped by the policies and practices of the governments of the time. Turkish diplomatic and consular missions served as the spaces for the construction and reproduction of the state-citizen relationship in the transnational context.

The state most frequently contacts its citizens in the transnational/extraterritorial context through its diplomatic, and consular missions. Article 3 of the 1961 Vienna Convention assigns five prominent functions to diplomatic missions.³⁵ In public international law, consulates general have a limited role compared to embassies, which is precisely explained in the Article no. 3(e) of the same convention as “... promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations.”³⁶ This may sound reductionist and limits the duties of consular missions to the abstract framework of economic, cultural, and scientific cooperation. Article 3(b) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, on the other hand, gives a broader definition of diplomatic missions

33 Nermin Abadan Unat, “Türk Dış Göçünün Aşamaları: 1950’li Yillardan 2000’li Yıllara,” in *Kökler ve Yollar: Türkiye’de Göç Süreçleri*, eds. Ayhan Kaya and Bahar Şahin (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), 5.

34 For studies dealing with the impact of Turkish migrant workers’ currencies on Turkey’s import substitution economy, see Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-2009* (İstanbul: İmge Yayınevi, 2009), 117-145. Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet Küreselleşme, İktisat Politikaları ve Büyüme* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2008), 239-264.

35 See “Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,” UN International Law Commission Website, accessed May 3, 2014, available from http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf.

36 Ibid.

that, in daily practice, coincides with the functions of consulates rather than embassies. Article 3(b) describes the functions of a diplomatic mission as “protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law,” along with other four determining functions.³⁷

Considering the accounts of Turkish diplomats on their relationship to their citizens living abroad, the difference between embassies and consulates is clear. Haluk Afra, who served as the Turkish consul general in Essen (1976-80) and Düsseldorf (1981-86) draws attention to the difference between working embassies and consulates.

In my view, consulates are the windows of the [Ministry of] Foreign Affairs opening to the world. Only the ministry knows that an embassy is performing successfully. The consulates, however, serve to thousands of citizens. If the citizen is not treated well, he first gets furious with the official there, then swears at the consul, and finally talks against the government.

Unlike work in an embassy, my efforts in the consulates made me feel happy. This is because it was possible to see the immediate results when you do something in favor of the citizens. In the embassies, on the other hand, you had to encounter the never-ending arrogant speeches of your foreign counterparts.³⁸

37 Ibid. The other four functions were as follows: "(a) representing the sending State in the receiving State; (c) negotiating with the Government of the receiving State; (d) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State; (e) promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations. Ibid.

38 "Bence konsolosluklar Dışşleri'nin dışarıya açılan pencereleridir. Bir büyükelçiliğin başarılı çalışmalar yaptığı sadece Bakanlık bilir. Ama konsolosluklar binlerce vatandaşla iç içedir. Vatandaş iyi muamele görmezse önce oradaki memura kızar, sonra konsoloslara küfreder, sonunda hükümete dil uzatır." ...

Büyükelçilik çalışmalarından ziyade konsolosluk çalışmaları beni çok mutlu ederdi. Çünkü bir vatandaşla yardımınız dokunduğunda, bunun sonucunu derhal gördünüz.

Afra's words clearly reveal that consulates, rather than embassies, are the "exposed face" of a state before its citizens at the transnational level. A clear outcome of this is that the accounts of those who worked in consulates present deeper, more diverse information about the state-citizen relationship when compared to those of embassy officers.³⁹ A prominent example of this situation is manifest in the career trajectory of Fırat Sunel, who worked as consul general to Dusseldorf. The son of a first-generation Turkish migrant worker, Sunel decided to be a diplomat as a freshman in high school. What makes Sunel's ambition interesting is his desire to be a consul general rather than an ambassador since, in his words, "the ordeal is being experienced in the consulates."⁴⁰

So how do diplomats and citizens connect? What are the main points of tension between them in Turkish diplomatic and consular missions? Where, when, and in what context do the preferences and perceptions of officials in Turkish diplomatic missions and of Turkish citizens clash?

While explaining the striking social consequences of Turkish workforce migration to Western Europe, Max Frisch stated "we were expecting a workforce, the ones who came were humans."⁴¹ This confusion, indeed, was also valid for the relations between Turkish diplomatic officers and citizens living abroad. This confession was clear in the accounts of Oğuz Gökmen, Turkey's ambassador to Bonn between 1966 and 1972. Gökmen describes his first experiences with Turkish citizens as follows,

Büyükelçiliklerde ise, yabancı meslektaşlarımızın, bitip tükenmeyen ukalalıklarını dinlemek zorunda kalırsınız." Afra, *Hariciyeciler...*, 206 & 213.

39 It is, of course, necessary to note that most diplomats worked in consulates and embassies in the early years of their professional lives. What is meant here is that years worked in consulates offered more experience to diplomats than years in embassies in terms of contact with citizens of their own countries.

40 Kenan Mortan and Monelle Sarfati, *Vatan Olan Gurbet: Almanya'ya İşçi Göçünün 50. Yılı* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011), 26. As a second-generation migrant to Germany, Sunel completely achieved his objective. He was appointed as vice consul to Essen and served as the Turkish Consul General to Dusseldorf between 2009 and 2013.

41 "Wir riefen Arbeitskräfte und es kamen Menschen." "Gastarbeiter: "Wir riefen Arbeitskräfte, und es kamen Menschen" *Der Spiegel Online*, October 30, 2011, accessed March 1, 2014, available from <http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/gastarbeiter-wir-riefen-arbeitskraefte-und-es-kamen-menschen-fotostrecke-74565-2.html>.

I recoiled from the leitmotiv of an arabesque folk song coming from a tape in a car. [sic] “Germany... Germany...! You cannot find a one more stupid than me.” Obviously this was a Turkish worker. He turned on the tape in his car while waiting for his friend and listened to the story of a Turkish worker in a sorrowful, ironic folk song. I felt sorry and we went to him altogether. ... I felt grief stricken after I left him. I realized there for the first time that my work in Germany would not proceed easily in any respect. Traditional friendship relations with Germany, mutual assistance and solidarity under the framework of NATO, improvement of economic relations, and similar stereotypical words and ideas were left behind. People were the issue in Germany. Our people, who comprised of ... a body and a spirit would be our priority and it became so.⁴²

The human concerns stated above by Gökmen, who was a veteran diplomat, were also shared by his colleagues. In their accounts, Turkish mission chiefs insistently state that they paid attention to treating these people kindly and claim that they ordered their officers to behave the same way towards Turkish citizens. In the words of Afra,

When I began my term in Essen, I first taught the officers to smile. I said: “Albert Camus says ‘we must have commanded over our facial expressions.’ If you rudely order the citizens, your work will be for nothing. When you say no, the citizen demands that you explain the reason. Officers, after such briefings, changed so much that the positive

42 “Bir otomobilden arabesk bir türkünü başlığa koyduğum nakaratiyla (ALAMANYA... ALAMANYA..! BENDEN APTAL BULAMANYA..!) irkildim. Bu besbelli bir Türk işçisi idi. Arkadaşını beklerken arabanın teyibini açmış, Türk işçisinin Almanya'daki macerasını hüzünlü hicivli bir türküden dinliyordu. Üzüldüm. Hep beraber yanına gittik... Ayrılırken içim burkuldu, Almanya'daki görevimin hiç de kolay olmayacağı gerçeğini ilk defa oracıkta idrak ettim. Almanya ile geleneksel dostluk ilişkileri, NATO çerçevesinde karşılıklı yardımlaşma ve dayanışma, ekonomik ilişkilerin geliştirilmesi ve benzeri parlak ve klişeleşmiş sözler ve düşünceler arka planda kalıverdi. Almanya'daki asıl konu insandı. Etten kemikten, saçtan tırnaktan bir beden ile ruhtan oluşan insanımız ilk planda ve en ön sırada olacaktı ve öyle de oldu.” Gökmen, *Diplomasi...*, 366-367.

outcome of this approach was realized immediately. Hundreds of people came to me saying, “Thanks to you, we receive good treatment.”⁴³

The notion of “treating people with a human face” was at the same time a major complaint of Turkish citizens living abroad with respect to their contact with Turkish diplomatic and consular missions. One interviewee, a middle-aged male, stated that “I acquired German citizenship for two reasons: first, to rid of the foreigner police … and to not be obliged to go to the Turkish consular missions. … They were tough people.”⁴⁴ As a diplomat, Bilhan claims that he aimed to prevent poor treatment by “monitoring administrative officers and dealing with the problems of the Turkish citizens.”⁴⁵ Baytok also notes that he prohibited officers from saying “no” to citizens. In his words,

I forbidded my officers to say “no” to citizens. I could say “no” to them if it was necessary. In the case a request by a citizen was accepted, the documents came to me for signature, and as a matter of course, I was informed. The citizens were sent to me directly in the cases they were requesting something that was impossible. I tried to find a way to resolve the problem and if this was not possible, I informed the people

43 “Essen’de de işe başlayınca memurlarına önce gülmeyi öğretmiştim. Derdim ki: ‘Albert Camus, ‘Yüzümüzün ifadesine hâkim olmaliyız’ der. Eğer siz vatandaşsa sert bir şekilde ‘al-ver-olmaz’ derseniz, çalışmalarınızın semeresi boş gider. Olmaz dediniz mi, vatandaş sizden bunun nedenini izah etmenizi ister.’ Bu gibi aydınlatmalarla memurlar üç ay sonra öyle bir kıvama geldiler ki, bunun sonuçları hemen alındı.... Yüzlerce kişi gelip, ‘Sizin sayenizde hoş muameyle karşılaşıyoruz,’ diye teşekkür etmiştir” Afra, *Hariciyeciler Dedikodu yu Sever*, 207.

44 “Ben Alman vatandaşlığına iki sebette dolayı geçtim: Yabancılar polisinden kurtulmak ve Türk konsolosluğuna gitmek zorunda kalmamak için... Çok zor insanlardı.” Mustafa A. *Interview by the Author*, Note-taking, Bremen, May 21, 2014. Sahin-Mentucek and Başer’s recent article on Turkey’s diaspora policies illustrates a similar example. A Turkish emigrant living in Essen (Germany) stated to the authors that “there were cases where people gave up Turkish citizenship because they just wanted to be rid of bad treatment in consulates.” Zeynep Şahin-Mentucek & Bahar Başer, “Mobilizing Diasporas: Insights from Turkey’s Attempts to Reach Turkish Citizens Abroad,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 20, no. 1 (2018), 91.

45 Bilhan, Interview by the Author.

about the impossibility of filling the request. I can say that this measure worked quite successfully.⁴⁶

Both Baytok and Afra agree that whether citizens' requests were justified or not, officers should treat them well, and they insisted that they ordered their mid- or low-ranking officials to behave accordingly. The human dimension was only part of the problems that emerged as a consequence of migration. There were other concerns. Some implementations realized in good faith had harmful outcomes. Aziz Yakın, a diplomat who long served in Turkish consulates in Germany, exemplifies this situation.

We were subsidizing migrants, who were returning Turkey, as if handing out a charity, in the cases in which they requested assistance. For instance, we were saying to a worker en route from Dusseldorf to Istanbul: "We will give you thirty German Marks; make do with this money until Munich. Request money from the consulate general in Munich to continue along your way." This was because our budget for assistance and loans was limited. Citizens were being sent from one consulate to another like beggars. I reported this to bring about change in the system.⁴⁷

Some of the general institutional distresses of the ministry prevented its personnel from meeting the needs of citizens abroad. The ministry was known

46 "Başkonsoloslukta çalışan memur arkadaşımın ellerinden, vatandaş'a "olmaz" deme hakkını aldım. Gerekirse "hayır"ı vatandaş'a ben söyleyecektim. İş yapılrsa, imza için zaten bana geliyor ve haberim oluyordu. Olmayacak bir şey isteniyorsa vatandaşımız bana gönderebiliyordu. İşin yapılması için bir yolunu bulmaya çalışıyor, ancak hiçbir yolu yoksa, o zaman hayır'ı daha münasip bir lisanla ben bildiriyordum. Bu önlemin de çok işe yaradığını söyleyebilirim" Baytok, *Diş Politikada...*, 84.

47 "Türkiye'ye dönükte olan işçilere yardım istemeleri halinde kendilerine sadaka verir gibi para [veriyorduk] Sözgelimi, Nürnberg'ten İstanbul'a gidecek olan kişiye 'sana 30 mark veriyoruz, Münih'e kadar bu parayla idare eti Münih başkonsolosluğundan yoluna devam etmek için para iste' diyoruk. Bunun sebebi yardım ve ödünç verme ödeneğimizin devede kulak olması idi, vatandaş, dilenci vapuru gibi, konsolosluktan konsolosluğa gönderiliyordu. Bu sistemin değiştirilmesi gerektiğini yazdım." Aziz Yakın, *Göçmen Diplomat* (İstanbul: Kanes Yayınları, 2012), 105.

for its lack of a well-organized archive. This deficiency prevented the ministry from responding to even little, daily requests of citizens abroad. Again, notes Yakın,

the Consul-General in Munich told me when I was in the Department of Treaties: “One of our citizens says that a translation fee was demanded for his testimony in court, and, with regard to an agreement, adds the citizen, this order was illegal. We do not know of such an agreement. We cannot answer the request of our citizen. We asked the embassy in Bonn; the consulates in Germany. Nobody knows. Is there such an agreement?”⁴⁸

Institutional insufficiencies were not limited to these kinds of failures. Throughout the 1960s and 70s, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy faced new challenges not been experienced before, and the consequences of Turkish workforce migration to Western Europe was an integral component of this phenomenon.⁴⁹ As noted above, the number of Turkish migrant workers in Germany was 6,700 in 1961. Only a decade later, in 1972, the number of Turkish gastarbeiter (migrant workers) hit 500,000, with the exception of Turks in other Western European countries.⁵⁰ This was an unprecedented workload for Turkey’s diplomatic and consular missions in Germany.

48 “Münih başkonsolosu, anlaşmalar dairesinde bulduğum zaman bana teefon ederek şunları söyledi: ‘Bir vatandaşımız, mahkemedede ifadesinin Almancaya çevrilmesi ücretinin kendisinden talep edildiğini, halbuki bir anlaşma gereğince bunun talep edilmemesi gerektiğini söylüyor. Elimizde böyle bir anlaşma metni yok. Vatandaşa cevap veremiyoruz. Bonn büyükelçiliğine, Almanya’daki konsolosluklarımıza sorduk. Bilen yok. Böyle bir anlaşma var mı?’” Ibid., 107-108. Legal problems of Turkish citizens abroad were a major concern, adds Yakın. In order to overcome this, he notes, “he translated related legal documents, published them in the ministry and delivered them to consulates in France, Germany, and Austria.” Ibid.

49 The other considerations were the 27 May 1960 military coup d'état and its impact on the Ministry, the Cyprus dispute and intervention, terrorist attacks on members of the ministry, and pressure to pursue a multidimensional foreign policy due to clashes with Western allies.

50 Grocer Necati Güven, was the 500,000th Turkish migrant worker to leave Turkey to work in Germany. Adnan Özyalçiner, Adnan. “Sirkeci-Münih Hattı,” accessed May 4, 2014, available from <http://www.yenihatay.de/kultur/sirkeci-munih>

At the beginning of the 1960s, the capacities of Turkish diplomatic and consular missions in the the Federal Republic of Germany and elsewhere in Europe were insufficient in terms of both quality and quantity. Turkish diplomatic and consular missions were deprived of the necessary minimum number of personnel, fiscal resources, and the organizational capability to meet the demands of its migrant population. A report written by the foreign ministry to the prime ministry in 1966 advised not only the opening of new consular missions but also improving the personnel capacity of existing consulates.⁵¹ Erdem Erner, who was Turkey's Consul General in Hamburg, Federal Germany's second most populous city, depicts the disorganized character of daily services presented to Turkish migrant workers living in the city.

1964 was one of the years in which flow of workers to Germany most accelerated. Our officers opened a catalog of names, recorded the new applicants according to their surname, and gave them a file code. When the flow of workers increased, there was no place left in the alphabetical list of the catalog, and, file codes of the citizens were ordered by the initials of their surnames.

I woke up from the noise of our citizens gathered in front of the garden gate at five o'clock on the first day I started working. There was an incredible crowd in front of the consulate general. I felt very sorry that these poor people were queuing up at 5:30 in the morning because the gate was opened at 9. When I walked down to the chancery, I encountered the angry faces of our workers. They were justified because their demands were being met too late. Leaving the factory meant sacrificing their daily wage. I was surprised when I saw unopened letters heaped up in the corner of the department in which officers worked. The letters were decorated with red labels as if they had caught measles. Nearly all had the label "urgent." Five secretaries working in the consulate general were dunking their hands in this mountain of letters and

51 "Almanya'da Çalışan İşçilerimizin Konsolosluk Sayılarının Artırılması Konusundaki İstekleri," (Requests of our Workers in Germany for the Opening of New Consulates" PMRA 0.1.0.0..64.398.3. February 21, 1976.

choosing one like a lottery ticket to work on. There was no order. Lucky letters were attached to the file of the related person and left for the officer to work on the issue.⁵²

Erner's remarks reveal that the Turkish state was not prepared to organize the flow of its citizens abroad. Lütem confirms this. In his words, "Turkish consulates were organized for far fewer numbers of workers."⁵³ Another Turkish diplomat notes, "it was thought that not Turkish authorities but the receiving (host) countries were responsible for the workers' problems."⁵⁴ The Turkish government's decision to send a considerable number of Turkish citizens abroad was planned as part of the First Five-Year Plan (1963-1967).⁵⁵ The possible future problems of Turkish citizens were not planned or foreseen in all

52 "1964 yılı Almanya'ya işçi akınının en hızlandıgı yillardan biriydi. Görevli arkadaşlar bir fihrist defteri açmışlar, yeni müracaat edenlerin soyadı esasına göre adlarını buraya kaydetmişler ve onlara bir dosya numarası vermişler. İşçi akını hızlandıgıında, fihristteki alfabetik sırada yer kalmamış, vatandaşların dosya numarakarı soyadının başladığı harf altına kaydedilmiş....

İşe başladığım ilk gün sabah beşte bahçe kapısı önünde biriken vatandaşlarımızın gürültüsünden uyandım. Başkonsolosluk önünde inanılmaz bir kalabalık vardı. Kapı dokuzda açıldığı için bu zavallıların saat beşlerde gelip kuyruğa girmelerine çok üzüldüm. Kançılıraryaya indiğimde işçilerimizin kızgın bakışlarıyla karşılaştım. Haklıydılar, işleri çok geç yapıliyordu. Fabrikadan ayrılmak demek bir günlüklerinden olmak demekti. Memurların çalıştığı kısmın köşesinde, açılmamış mektupların oluşturduğu bir küçük ağı andıran kümeyi görünce şaşırdım. Mektuplar, adeta kızamığa yakalananmışlar gibi kırmızı etiketlerle donanmıştı. Hemen hemen hepsi "ekspres" etiketini taşıyordu. Başkonsoloslukta görevli beş sekreter, bu dağa ellerini daldırıyorlar ve piyango biletini çeker gibi bir zarfi alıp işleme koyuyorlardı. Sıra diye bir şey söz konusu değildi. Talihli mektuplar o vatandaşın dosyasına iliştirilip, işlemi yapacak memurun masasına bırakılıyordu." Erner, *Davulun Sesi*, 116.

53 Lütem, *Interview by the Author*.

54 Eralp, *Interview by the Author*.

55 Workforce migration to Europe was significant for Turkey's import-substitution economy since the accumulation of foreign currency by its citizens fed Turkish economy's shortage of exchange. When foreign currencies by Turkish citizens abroad came to Turkey, the Turkish import-substitution model strengthened. However, when the foreign currency flow decreased, it became one of the factors in the recession of Turkish economy in the 1970s. Boratav, 117-145. See "Birinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı (1963-1967)," *Turkish Ministry of Development Website*, accessed May 4, 2015, available from <http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Lists/Kalkinma%20Planlar/Attachments/9/plan1.pdf>.

respects. An interviewee, who was a migrant worker and the owner of a translation office near Turkey's consulate general in Hannover, claimed that "there were sometimes hundreds of people a day gathering before the consulate general." These people were "so dissatisfied with their treatments that the [consulate] was no different than the 'wailing wall'"⁵⁶

In the first years of migration, general situation in Turkish diplomatic missions Western Europe, most notably in Germany, were by no means different. Murat Bilhan, a diplomat who served in Germany three times with different diplomatic titles, states that "a Turkish diplomat could not enjoy the life in Germany ... since there was a very heavy workload."⁵⁷ Because of this, Bilhan "wrote a petition to Ankara not to be appointed to Germany again after three times."⁵⁸ Kemal Girgin, who served only two months in Düsseldorf as Turkey's consul general, illustrates the unbearable workload in the Turkish consulate general in Düsseldorf.

I worked only two months in Düsseldorf. I was signing the passports that were heaped up every day in the hundreds (maybe close to a thousand); this was all I did. Of course, I was glancing at all these processes as quickly as possible. ... Citizens were forming long queues before the consulate early in the morning, and we were working like beavers.⁵⁹

Some low-ranking Turkish officers in consular missions were not ready to "kindly serve" people that they evaluated inferior. Everyday cultural, ethnic, and religion-based discrimination patterns embedded in Turkish society were

56 "Bazen bir günde yüzlerce insan konsolosluk binasının önünde toplanıyordu. Muamele o kadar kötüydü ki konsolosluk önünün ağlama duvarından farkı yoktu." Murat K. *Interview by the Author*. Note-taking, Bremen, May 20, 2014.

57 Bilhan, *Interview by the Author*.

58 Ibid.

59 "Düsseldorf'ta sadece iki ay kaldım. Memurların hazırladığı tepeleme yiğilmiş pasaportlara her gün ve yüzlerce (belki bine yakın) imza çakıyorum, bütün işim buydu. Tabi imzalarken yıldırım hızıyla bu işlemlere söyle bir göz atıyorum... Vatandaşlar sabah erkenden konsolosluk önünde uzun kuyruklar oluşturuyor, akşamda kadar arı gibi çalışıyordu." Girgin, *Dünyanın Dört Bucağı*, 173.

played out in the contacts of officers with Turkish migrant workers. Afra illustrates one of the most dramatic examples of this situation.

Since I adopted the good treatment of citizens as a principle, I initially corrected the behavior of officers when I was appointed to a place. For example, when I went to Düsseldorf, I saw three officers who called to the people: "You, *lazo*, come! You, *kurdo*, go" which was not suitable for rules of courtesy. I called them at lunch and scolded them: "How can you address our citizens with words like *lazo*, *kurdo*, *kara herif*?"⁶⁰ And I put them on idle work.⁶¹

Bilhan's remarks confirm Afra's. According to Bilhan, there were "hundreds of examples of insults in Germany ... and great barriers between [diplomats] and citizens."⁶² In some cases, different preferences in daily life could be a basis for discrimination and refusing an applicant's demand. One of my interviewees, a Turkish migrant worker with an Islamist background, stated that,

we, the Islamists, had problems in diplomatic missions. This changed especially after 2002 or 2004. Apart from us, the Kurds also had serious problems with officers in consular missions. A Kurd faced unbearable problems with Turkish diplomatic missions that he would probably not have encountered in the bureaucratic institutions in Turkey such

60 *Lazo* is pejorative to designate people of the Eastern Black Sea region. *Kurdo* is used to denigrate people of Kurdish origin. *Kara herif* literally means "black man" which is mostly used to insult people of Eastern Anatolian origin. This type of discrimination, according to the accounts of Afra, was widespread among low-ranking administrative officers.

61 "Vatandaşlara iyi muameleyi şiar edinmiş olduğumdan, bir yere atandığımda önce memurların davranışlarını düzeltirdim. Örneğin Düsseldorf'a gittiğimde, ilk gün baktım pasaportlarla ilgili üç memur bir bankoya sıralanmışlar ve halka, "Sen *lazo* gel, *kürdo* sen bekle gibi hiçbir nezakete uymayan bir tarzda hitap ediyorlar. Öğle tatilinde aldım karşımı onları, "Siz nasıl vatandaş *lazo*, *kürdo*, *kara herif* gibi tabirlerle hitap edersiniz?" diye haşladım ve geri plana aldım." Afra, *Hariciyeciler Dedikodu*yu Sever, 214-215.

62 Bilhan. *Interview by the Author*.

as the land registry office, the tax office, or while during military service. They were being investigated for almost everything.⁶³

A Turkish journalist recalls his own experience confirming the above-quoted interviewee.

Those were the 1970s. My brother had business at our consulate general in Paris. Our father was a “high-ranking” diplomat. However, as a democratic person, my brother did not want to exploit this. He applied as an ordinary [citizen]. A low-ranking, intolerant officer was obsessed with my brother’s ring. The ring consisted of his initials, EFİ. The officer, who insisted that the letters symbolized a “encrypted cross,” tried to hinder the business of my brother claiming that “you’ve become a *gavur*⁶⁴ here.”⁶⁵

The contacts of Turkish citizens residing abroad with the state took various shapes in different parts of the world. In Western European countries, as both the accounts of diplomats and interviewees revealed, everyday discrimination stemmed from biases towards ethnic backgrounds rather than ideological marginalization. At Turkish diplomatic and consular missions in Arabic

63 “Biz Müslümanlar 2002-2004 dönemine kadar konsolosluklarda ciddi sorunlar yaşadık. Bizim dışımızda Kürtler de konsolosluklarda ciddi sorunlar yaşadı. Bir Kurt buradaki konsolosluklarda Türkiye’de bir tapu dairesinde, vergi dairesinde veya askerlik hizmetinde yaşama-yacağı kadar dayanılmaz sorunlarla karşı karşıya geliyordu. Hemen hemen her şey için soruya çekiliyorlardı.” Ekrem B., *Interview by the Author*. Note-taking, Bremen, May 20, 2014.

64 *Gavur* is a pejorative for non-Muslims in Turkey.

65 “Yine 70’li yıllarda. Kardeşimin Paris Başkonsolosluğumuzda görülecek bir işi vardı. Babamızın kıdemli bir diplomat olmasına rağmen, demokrat biri olarak “torpil” kullanmak istemedi. Normal bir vatandaş olarak başvurdu. Konsoloslukta otorite taslayan küçük ve hazırlıksız bir memur kardeşimin yüzüğe taktı. Adının baş harflerinden oluşan EFİ motifli bir yüzüktü. Memur bunun “gizlenmiş bir haç” olduğunda ısrar ederek, “Sen buralarda gâvurlaşmışsun” diye kardeşimin işini yokuşa sürmeye kalktı.” Semih İdiz, İrtemçelik’e Yapılan Devlete Hakarettir,” (What has been done to İrtemçelik is an Insult against the State) *Milliyet*, May 27, 2006, accessed May 1, 2014, available from <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/05/27/yazar/idiz.html>.

countries, in which the official Turkish secular view was distant, the story was different. An interviewee who long lived in Egypt to study Islamic theology and who was also a migrant worker in Germany, compared his treatment in Turkish diplomatic missions in Western Europe with the ones in the Arabic world. According to him, the poor treatment in Turkey's diplomatic missions in Germany "was nothing compared to [that of] the consular posts in Arabic countries."⁶⁶ There were officers in Turkey's diplomatic missions in Egypt "behaving towards people as if they were not humans."⁶⁷ The Turkish officers, in his depiction, "were men full of vanity."⁶⁸

Turkish migrant populations were also subjected to difficulties during their voyages from or to Turkey. This, as might be expected, added a burden on Turkish consular missions in and the diplomats assigned to the transit countries. Reha Aytaman, who served in Belgrade in the first half of the 1960s, complains in his accounts about the "bandit-like behaviors of Yugoslav customs and police authority with respect to Turkish migrants who were passing through Yugoslav territories in transit to Western Europe."⁶⁹ Bulgaria, Turkey's neighbor to the northwest, was known for its unfriendly attitude towards people on their way to Western Europe. During his term in Sofia as the Turkish ambassador, Ecmel Barutçu witnessed firsthand the challenges that Turkish migrant workers faced while passing through Bulgarian territory.

Bulgarian police indeed treated our worker citizens passing through Bulgaria poorly. They seemed to be involved in a continuous man hunt. They hid behind trees, stopped cars in random places to fine people. ... Turkish citizens were about to be tired of their lives. As a consequence, they passed through Bulgaria without stopping ... seeing neither the face of a Bulgarian nor Bulgaria.⁷⁰

66 Mustafa B., *Interview by the Author*. Note-taking, Bremen, May 22, 2014.

67 "Almanya'da olanlar ne ki? Mısır'da insan değilmiş gibi davranıyorlardı." Ibid.

68 Ibid. "Sırf kibirden oluşan insanlardı."

69 Aytaman, *Sınırlı* ..., 119.

70 "Gerçekten de Bulgar polisi Bulgaristan'dan geçen işçi vatandaşımıza çok kötü muamele yapıyordu. Devamlı insan avcılığına çıkışmış gibi idi Bulgar polisi. Ağaçların arkasına gizlenip

These kinds of problems were also a concern for and a professional consideration of Turkish diplomats. As the Turkish ambassador to Bulgaria, Ecmel Barutçu notes that he managed to overcome this specific problem by proposing a win-win solution to Bulgarian authorities according to which Turkish migrants provided additional revenues to Bulgarian customs and, in response, Bulgarian authorities were responsible for better treating Turkish citizens passing through their country.⁷¹

Moreover, some Turkish citizens could not reach the target country in which they planned to become migrant workers. This also became a concern for Turkish diplomats, especially those who were assigned to transit countries. İsmail Berdük Olgaçay, during his term as consul general in Milan, faced such work because of Turkish citizens unable to enter Germany or Switzerland and those deported from these countries.

For a while, the workload stemming from workers fleeing to Europe reached such a level that a second vice-consul was appointed to the consulate general. People unable to enter Germany [and] Switzerland or the people deported from these countries, were perished at the mercy of traffickers. ... We had to lift the barriers in front of them and open up their way either forward or backward. ...

A scene that Milanese people faced one morning in those days will probably present the atmosphere of the time. ... A group of workers from ... the same village were in flux after failing to cross the Alps, and they camped under the trees in a city that they entered one night. ... These poor people in the center of the city were carried to the consulate

olup olmadık yerde araçları durdurarak ceza kesiyorlardı... Türk vatandaşları hayatlarından bezmişti adeta. Bu yüzden ne Bulgar'ın ne de Bulgaristan'ın yüzünü görmeden hududun bir tarafından girip hiç durmaksızın Bulgaristan'ı kat ederek hududun öbür yanından çıkıyorlardı." Barutçu, *Hariciye...*, 169.

71 Ibid.

general in a truck. In Milan, we were ... tasked to deal with a social explosion.⁷²

Turkish diplomatic and consular missions faced the multifaceted challenge of overcoming the problems that emerged from the massive workforce migration from Turkey to Western European countries. Turkish diplomats had to monitor the social and political actions of its citizens abroad. The lives of Turkish migrants in the countries in which they resided, their trips for vacation, and unsuccessful illegal migration attempts were sources of preoccupation for the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. With such a wide, deep burden, Turkish missions were continuously in need of expansion.

6.2.1 *Increase in Consular Representation*

Initial examinations of Turkish citizens' experiences in Turkish diplomatic and consular missions verify both the complaints of migrant workers and the critical statements of Turkish diplomats. In her analysis of the first three years of Turkish workforce migration to Germany, Nermín Abadan-Unat shed light on the enormous workload of Turkish consular missions in the Federal Republic of Germany. Among the then-four consulates, Abadan-Unat illustrates that the Turkish consulate general in Köln had the heaviest workload with "100-150 oral and sixty written applications a day."⁷³ Abadan-Unat added that in the absence of a special organization directly assigned to the resolution of the problems of migrant workers, which the Italian, Spanish, and Greek

72 "Bir ara, Avrupa'ya koşan işçilerin yarattığı iş hacmi öyle bir düzeye erişti ki, Başkonsolosluğumuza ikinci bir yardımcı konsolos kadrosu eklendi. Almanya'ya, İsviçre'ye giremeyen ya da oralardan hudut dışı edilenler, işçi simsarlarının elinde perişan oluyorlardı. ... Onların önlerindeki engelleri kaldırıkmak, yollarını ya leriye ya da geriye doğru açmak zorundaydık. ...

O günlerde bir sabah, Milano halkın karşılaştiği bir görüntüyü anlatırsam zamanın bir tablosunu belki sunmuş olabilirim... Hepsi aynı köyden olan bir işçi grubu, Alpleri aşamaya yinca ortada kalmış, bir gece girdikleri bir kentte ağaçlar altında kamp yapıp yayılmıştı. ... Bu zavallı vatandaşlarımız kamyonla başkonsolosluğa taşınmıştı. Milano'da uğraşımız ... bir sosyal patlamanın... bize yüklediği görevlerdi." Olgaçay, *Tasmalı Çekirge*, 302-303.

73 Nermín Abadan Unat, *Batı Almanya'daki Türk İşçileri ve Sorunları* (Ankara: DPT Yayınları, 1964), 163.

foreign ministries had, Turkish migrant workers “see the consulates as the primary unit to defend their rights for all their troubles,” making it “impossible [for Turkish consular officers] to deal with the problems of workers along with their other responsibilities.”⁷⁴

Another research conducted by Orhan Tuna and Nusret Ekin two years later, in 1966, arrived at similar conclusions to those of Abadan-Unat. In the final report on the research, Tuna and Ekin claim that “it is certain that the Foreign Affairs organization is under a heavy burden because of operations related to our citizens working abroad,” and “it is an urgent need to reorganize consular missions in terms of space, cadres, duties, and responsibilities.”⁷⁵ In line with Abadan-Unat’s analysis, Tuna and Ekin stated that “it was impossible in many cases for Turkish consulates to resolve problems related to Turkish workers due to the complexity of these problems” and suggested “increas[ing] the number of consular missions in Germany which was far from satisfactory” when compared to the numbers of consulates of countries such as Spain, Italy, and Greece.⁷⁶ Like Abadan-Unat’s suggestion for a special organization assigned to the management of the migration process, Tuna and Tekin also

74 Ibid.

75 Orhan Tuna and Nusret Ekin, *Türkiye'den Federal Almanya'ya İşgücü Akımı ve Meseleleri* (İstanbul: Sermet Matbaası, 1966), 72.

76 Ibid., 72-73. As of 1966, Italy already had fourteen consulates in the Federal Republic of Germany, whereas Spain and Greece had thirteen and fourteen consulates, respectively. In the same year Turkey had nine diplomatic and consular missions in the Federal Republic of Germany, which indicates the opening of four new consular missions in the previous two years. What makes Tuna and Ekin’s analysis interesting was “the unsatisfactory number of consular missions leading additional costs for Turkish citizens due to travel and accommodation expenditures.” For example, a migrant worker living 250 kilometers from the Turkish consulate in Frankfurt had to set aside at least three days to manage his undertakings in the consulate, which meant not only travel and accommodation costs but also the loss of three days’ salary. Such financial losses, according to Tuna and Ekin, prevented Turkish migrants from “building up satisfactory savings,” and thus, Turkey “was being deprived of the foreign currencies it needed.” Ibid. Their analysis, in this regard, takes Turkey’s import substitution economy model into consideration as seriously as the concerns of Turkish migrant workers living abroad.

prescribed “the establishment of a central organization to deal with all the problems of migrant workers.”⁷⁷

Turkey’s first reaction to increase the quality of services in Turkish diplomatic missions in Western Europe, most notably in Federal Germany, was to increase the number of Turkish consulates in Germany. Indeed, even before the 1960s, Turkish governments made efforts to increase the number of “symbolic” Turkish diplomatic representatives in Germany. In this regard, a decree was issued to promote Turkey’s “honorary consulates” in Bremen, Düsseldorf, and Hannover and its “honorary consulates general.”⁷⁸ After 1960, however, Turkish diplomatic presence in the Federal Republic of Germany and elsewhere in Western Europe became considerably more visible.

The massive influx of workers after the 1961 agreement complicated Turkey’s diplomatic presence not only in Germany but also in other countries in Western Europe. İskit, who was assigned to Bonn between 1965 and 1968, notes that “[Turkish] consulates were unable to cope with” the outcomes of migration.⁷⁹ As a consequence, it became a concern for the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deal with the early results of migration. In the words of Erner,

we, the consuls general, who attended the meeting of consulates general in Bonn (1964), mentioned solutions to ease the processes of our citizens. The most significant of these formulas was to open new consulates general. It was decided to open a consulate general every one hundred kilometers in southern Germany. We had no missions in the north except for the consulates general of Hamburg and Berlin. After my intense insistence, we also agreed to open a consulate general in

77 Ibid., 71.

78 “Federal Almanya'daki Bremen, Düsseldorf ve Hannover Fahrî Konsolosluklarımıza Fahrî Başkonsolosluğa yükseltilmelerine Dair Kararname,” (Decree on the Promotion of Our Honorary Consulates in Bremen, Dusseldorf and Hannover to Honorary General Conulates) T.C Official Gazette (Resmi Gazete), April 16, 1956, available from [=http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/9286.pdf](http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/arsiv/9286.pdf).

79 İskit, *Interview by the Author*.

Hannover, the capital of Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony). At present, fourteen Turkish consulates general serve in Germany.⁸⁰

The lack of capacity was not only discussed among mission chiefs of Turkey in Western Europe. The government of the time was aware of the situation. In his speech in the TBMM, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, the foreign minister at the time, stated that “the foreign ministry organization was not satisfactory in terms of personnel and fiscal capabilities” and added that six new missions would be opened including the one in Hannover.⁸¹

All of these influenced Turkey’s eagerness to initiate a wave of new diplomatic mission openings in the Federal Republic of Germany. In this regard, a consulate general was opened in Köln, the largest city of North-Rhine Westphalia, on April 1, 1964. This was followed by the opening of general consulates in Stuttgart in 1965 and in Nuremberg and Essen in 1966.⁸² In Hannover, about which Erner claimed to have intensely advised for opening a consulate general, a Turkish consulate general was opened in July 1966.⁸³

The second wave of the opening of new Turkish consulates in Germany was realized in the first half of the 1970s. This, along with the decision at meeting of 1964, was the result of the considerable increase in the number of Turkish migrants in Germany. From 1961 to 1973, the number of Turkish migrants

80 “1964 Bonn’daki Başkonsoloslar Toplantısı Toplantıya katılan biz Başkonsolos, işçi vatandaşlarımızın işlemlerini kolaylaştırma formüllerini dile getirdik. Bunların arasında en önemli olanı da yeni Başkonsoloslukların açılması söz konusuydu. Güney Almanya’da ne redeyse her 100 km’de bir, bir Başkonsolosluk açılması kararlaştırıldı. Kuzeyde, Hamburg ve Berlin konsolosluklarından başka temsilciliğimiz yoktu. Şiddetli ısrarım üzerine Niedersachsen’ın (Aşağı Saksonya) merkezi Hannover’de de bir Başkonsolosluk açılması kararlaştırıldı... Bugün Almanya’da 14 Başkonsolosluk görev yapmaktadır.” Erner, *Davulun Sesi*, 120.

81 TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, “Dışişleri Bakanı İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil’in Yaptığı Konuşma,” (The Speech of İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, the Foreign Minister) *Dışişleri Belleteni* (Foreign Affairs Bulletin) 16, (Ankara: 1966), 93.

82 “Turkish Representations,” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed December 1, 2017, available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-representations.en.mfa>.

83 Ibid.

in Germany surpassed 900,000.⁸⁴ Turkey, as a consequence, inaugurated consulates general in Düsseldorf, the seat of the state of North-Rhine Westphalia, and in Karlsruhe in 1973, and in Mainz in 1974.⁸⁵ Turkey's last consulate general to be opened in then-the Federal Republic of Germany, was in Munster, which was opened in 1982.⁸⁶

Inauguration of new consular missions during the 1960s and 70s was not limited to the Federal Republic of Germany. Increasing numbers of Turkish migrants necessitated such a decision. In other countries to which people of Turkish origin intensely migrated, new consular missions were opened. Such was the case in Rotterdam in 1968, in Bregenz in 1974, and in Lyon in 1979.⁸⁷

In line with the prescriptions quoted above, a special bureau was established at the ministry in Ankara to deal with future possible workloads stemming from Turkish workforce migration to Europe. Called the “Worker Issues Coordination Bureau,” (*İşçi Meseleleri Koordinasyon Bürosu*) in the 1960s, this unit was upgraded under the custody of a directorate general in the 1970s.⁸⁸ In addition to the problems in Turkish diplomatic and consular missions, “within Turkey there was a fragmented institutional structure in which seven ministries ... and many other state offices were responsible for carrying out various migrant-related services.”⁸⁹ As a response, an “inter-ministerial commission”

84 “Yurtdışındaki Vatandaşlarımızın Sorunları ve ÇSGB’nin Sunduğu Hizmetler,” 313 (July-August-September 2011), 54.

85 “Turkish Representations,” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed December 1, 2017, available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-representations.en.mfa>. The preparation for the opening of new consular missions was an additional workload for Turkish diplomats. In many cases, a Turkish diplomat would have to deal with almost all the details of the opening of a new consular mission. For example, for description of how the search for a new consular building became a painful undertaking for a Turkish diplomat, see Yakin, *Göçmen Diplomat...*, 121-123.

86 “Turkish Representations,” Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed December 1, 2017, available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-representations.en.mfa>.

87 Ibid.

88 Girgin, *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi...*, 148-150.

89 Şahin-Mentucek & Başer, “Managing Diasporas...,” 91.

was established to “simplify proceedings in the consulates.”⁹⁰ The commission met three times in September 1964 and concluded that “some of the proceedings could be immediately simplified or even abolished while others could be simplified over a certain period of time.”⁹¹ The ministry instructed its personnel “to treat the Turkish citizens who were temporarily or permanently living abroad well.”⁹²

The “worker problem” was not only a matter of numbers; it was also an issue of management. There were various, complicated issues awaiting solutions. One ambassadorial appointment deserves special attention. Ziya Müezzinoğlu, originally a financial bureaucrat, was appointed as the Turkish ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany in August 1964. The appointment of Ziya Müezzinoğlu as the ambassador in Bonn in August 1964, states Aşula, was a watershed.

He prompted workers to form unions and then a federation. He made regulations to deal with the various problems of our workers. In order to preserve the bonds of our workers with the motherland, he initiated a massive cultural campaign. He protected worker savings. He prepared the infrastructure for the transformation of these savings to investments into Turkey.⁹³

The statements of another young diplomat of the time overlap with those of Aşula. According to Temel İskit, it was hard to “manage the revenues of the

90 TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, “Türk Alman Teknik İşbirliği Anlaşması,” (Turkish-German Technical Cooperation Agreement) *Dışişleri Belleteni* (Foreign Affairs Bulletin) 2, (Ankara: 1964), 92.

91 Ibid.

92 TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, “Vatandaşlara İyi Muamele Olunması,” (Well Treating of the Citizens) *Dışişleri Belleteni* (Foreign Affairs Bulletin) 7, (Ankara: 1965), 23.

93 “Önce işçilerimizi dernekleşmeye ve arkasından da federasyon kurmaya teşvik etti. Daha sonraları, işçilerimizin çeşitli sorunları ile meşgul olacak düzenelemeler yaptı. Bunların üstüne, işçilerin Anavatanla bağlarını muhafaza için masif kültür faaliyeti kampanyası başlattı. İşçi tasarruflarına sahip çıktı. Tasarrufların Türkiye’de yatırıma dönüştürülmesinin gerekli altyapısını hazırladı.” Aşula, *Dışişleri Albümü*, 20. According to Aşula, Müezzinoğlu was not welcomed in the ministry since he was not a career diplomat but a finance bureaucrat. Moreover, adds Aşula, people in the ministry were concerned about his active style. Ibid.

workers,” and there were “various foundations corrupting the workers.”⁹⁴ Müezzinoğlu, states İskit, was the diplomat to overcome these problems. He led the adoption of a law concerning “the ease of transfer of the revenues of workers to Turkey.”⁹⁵ The appointment of Müezzinoğlu and his initiatives explains what the Turkish government understood about organizing the influx of workers to Western Europe. Like Tuna and Ekin’s prescriptions, part of Müezzinoğlu’s actions also stemmed from the desire to benefit from the wealth accumulation of Turkish workers for Turkey’s import substitution economy model.

Neither the meeting of consuls general in 1964, nor Müezzinoğlu’s initiatives were improvisational. Such initiatives responded to the needs and expectations of the Turkish migrant population. So what did the first generation of Turkish workers think and propose with respect to the amendments to the services offered to them? Abadan-Unat’s comprehensive survey provides a handful of information on the views of Turkish migrants, if not a wholesale picture. For example, 26.7 percent of Turkish workers labeled the services of Turkish consulates “completely unsatisfactory,” whereas 19.2 percent stated that they had been “taken care of closely.”⁹⁶ A quarter of workers visiting consulates stated in the survey that they had been treated “politely,” whereas only four percent of the workers complained about being treated “rudely.”⁹⁷ Surprisingly, almost half the interviewees (46.8 percent) preferred to leave this question unanswered. The degree of silence is considerable and can be interpreted that the people remaining silent were also unpleasant of the conditions in Turkish consular missions.

Abadan-Unat’s survey also reveals that most dissatisfaction was concentrated around consular missions in the regions of North Rhine Westphalia and Baden Württemberg in which Turkish migrants were residing most densely.⁹⁸ To put it differently, wherever the workload of Turkish consular missions

94 İskit, *Interview by the Author*.

95 Ibid.

96 Abadan-Unat, *Batı Almanya'daki Türk İşçileri* ..., 164.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid.

increased, Turkish citizens were more dissatisfied with the services presented them.

6.2.2 *The Mindset of the State: Multifaceted Nature of Turkish Migration to Europe*

The increasing presence of Turkish diplomatic and consular missions in Western Europe throughout the 1960s and 70s is worth examining. The state, with regard to the rising number of its citizens outside its borders, sought to extend its bureaucratic units to serve their needs and expectations. This was neither a reactionary nor an unplanned attempt. On the contrary, Turkey's opening towards Western Europe was the consequence of a planned initiative decided through consultations within the state mechanism.

Turkey's attempt to inaugurate new diplomatic missions in Western Europe (especially the second wave in 1970s) coincided with another phenomenon. The attacks of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), which will be examined in the next chapter of this study, coincided with the years in which the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy opened its doors and cadres to Western Europe. The outcomes of attacks on Turkish diplomatic missions indeed contrasted with Turkey's intent to open new diplomatic missions. These actions resulted in high security measures that caused a heavy financial burden and prevented the Turkish state from opening new diplomatic missions elsewhere in Europe. In practice, however, the encounter of the inauguration of new diplomatic missions and the actions of the ASALA were related to each other. Turkey, instead of avoiding the establishment and consolidation of new diplomatic missions in Western Europe, began to instrumentalize these new diplomatic missions by ideologically and politically combating the increasing awareness due to a propaganda war of the 1915 Armenian deportation. In this respect, the March 1979 opening of a Turkish consulate general in Lyon, where many Armenian migrants lived, and the attack by the ASALA on

this diplomatic mission just sixteen months after its opening, are worth recalling.⁹⁹

The Turkish migrant population did not pose a challenge for the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy only due to the workload they caused. Increasing social and political mobilization on the part of migrants became a concern for Turkish diplomats, as well. A meeting in 1966 was organized to tackle the social mobility and the level of political polarization among Turkish migrant workers in the Federal Republic of Germany. Erner's statements below clarify the political agenda and atmosphere of the meeting.

The second meeting of consul generals in Köln was organized by Ambassador Oğuz Gökmen. Ambassador Gökmen asked us for information on these issues: the number of our citizens in our areas of responsibility and harmful ideologies among them. These were grouped into three: communism, Kurdism, and the Nur movement.¹⁰⁰ Consuls general informed that Kurdism was strong in some areas whereas Nurists were influential in other areas. When it was my turn, I said "communism is flourishing in my region (in and around Hamburg) but I do not think that it will hit a dangerous level."¹⁰¹

99 On July 19, 1980, Two gunmen shot up the Turkish Consulate in Lyon, killing two people and seriously wounding two others. "Fransa'daki Lyon Konsolosluğu'na Saldırıya Uğradı," (Our Consulate in Lyon, France has been Attacked) *Milliyet*, August 6, 2014, 1

100 The *Nur* movement is an Islamic movement strongly committed to the Kurdish Islamist thinker, Said-i Nursi. The movement, along with its strong presence in Turkey, has also been influential among Turks living in Europe. See Şerif Mardin, *Bediuzzaman Saidi Nursi Olayı: Modern Türkiye'de Din ve Toplumsal Değişim* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2015).

101 "Bonn'daki ikinci Başkonsoloslar toplantısı yeni Büyükelçi Oğuz Gökmen'in başkanlığında yapıldı... Büyükelçi Gökmen bizden şu noktalarda bilgi rica etti: havzai memuriyetimiz (görev bögümüz) içindeki vatandaşların sayısı ve buradaki muzır cereyanlar. Bunlar da üçe ayırmıştı: Komünizm, Kürtçülük ve Nurculuk... Bazı bölgelerde Kürtçülük olduğu, bazlarında Nuruların geniş eylemlerde bulunduğu belirtildi. Sıra bana geldiğinde, bölgemde komünizmin yeşermeye başladığını, ancak bunun tehlikeli bir düzeye geleceğini sanmadığımı söyledim." Erner, *Davulun Sesi*, 121. The agenda of the first meeting in 1964 was to cope with the increasing workload of consular missions. The content of the second meeting, which took

High levels of political mobilization in Turkey during the mid-1960s found direct and quick responses among the Turkish migrant population in Europe. Turkish diplomatic and consular missions, as is clear in the example above, were on high-alert to react against these. Once again Erner notes,

[İhsan Sabri] Çağlayangil, as the minister of labor (February-November 1965), visited Hamburg after determining the problems of other consulates-general. Our first task was to organize a meeting with Turkish workers. I said to Çağlayangil, “The first workers who came to Germany settled in Hamburg. They learned to rigorously seek out their rights from the Germans. There are many leftist workers among them. They will probably want to make get angry. ... The workers put pressure on the minister, especially on the issues of social affairs.¹⁰²

As the two quotes above clarify, the Turkish migrant population began to be politicized shortly after their arrival in Western Europe. What makes this case interesting is that the political tendencies of the Turkish migrant population in Europe were an immediate issue of concern for the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy.¹⁰³ In his speech at the TBMM, Seyfi Öztürk, the Minister of Labor between 1969 and 1971, informed parliament that three state institutions – the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National

place in 1966, proves that Turkish diplomats realized the complicated aspects of the migration process.

102 “Çağlayangil, Çalışma Bakanı olarak diğer Başkonsolosluklarımızın sorunlarını saptadıktan sonra Hamburg'a geldi... İlk işimiz de Türk işçileriyle bir toplantı düzenlemek oldu. Çağlayangil'e “Beyefendi, Almanya'ya ilk gelen işçilerimiz Hamburg'a yerleşmişlerdir. Haklarını titizlikle aramayı Almanlardan öğrenmişlerdir. Aralarında da bir hayli solcu işçi vardır. Sorularıyla sizi zor duruma düşürmek ve hatta sinirlendirmek isteyeceklerdir” dedim. Çağlayangil gülümseyerek “Merak etme Başkonsolos, beni diğer Başkonsolosluklarda da soru yağmuruna tuttular, gerekli cevapları verdim,” dedi. İşçiler özellikle sosyal konularda bakanı bir hayli sıkıştırdılar.” Ibid., 118.

103 This was not a groundless concern. Emre categorizes the acts of the Turkish Communist Party under three headings: Radio broadcasts from the Eastern Bloc, publishing a journal titled *Yeniçağ* (New age), and organizing the Turkish workers in Europe. Yunus Emre, *CHP, Sosyal Demokrasi ve Sol: Türkiye'de Sosyal Demokrasinin Kuruluş Yılları (1960-1966)* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2013), 144.

Intelligence Organization (MIT), “were closely monitoring the actions of the Turkish Communist Party established in East Berlin and the actions of this political formation in the Federal Republic of Germany, as well.”¹⁰⁴ Turkish diplomatic missions, from the beginning, were assigned the task of coping with leftist political formations that were popular among Turkish citizens living in Europe. Haluk Bayülken, the Foreign Minister between 1971 and 1973, complained that the liberal democratic system of the Federal Republic of Germany prevented them from banning the recruitment of leftist interpreters in diplomatic and consular missions despite the fact that their actions were closely monitored.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, Oğuz Gökmen complained about the “tolerant attitude” of German institutions towards not only Germans but also the migrant population, a preference which he correlates with the German government’s desire to clean the memory of the Nazi era.¹⁰⁶ The Turkish government and officials of the time, were focused “selectively” on “to manage what migrants can and cannot do.”¹⁰⁷

Even so, Turkish consular officers did their best to resolve the “problem of communist propaganda.” Yakın, who like Bayülken also complained about the tolerant political atmosphere of the Federal Republic of Germany, illustrates a story of denaturalization as follows,

I denaturalized a pro-Moscow person ... who made propaganda to [Turkish] citizens in his so-called office. ... We were unable to prevent his actions (since it was not forbidden to make communist

104 Zeynep Selin Artan, *From Village Turks to Euro Turks: Turkish State’s Perceptions of Turkish Migrants in Europe* (MA Thesis, Istanbul: Boğaziçi University, 2009), 44.

105 Ibid., 45. On the other hand, ironically, some consular missions were utilizing these left-leaning officers in consular missions for monitoring purposes. An interviewee, a middle-aged worker, claimed “there was a guy who I knew was a member of the FIDEF. (a left wing political organization popular among Turkish migrant workers in Germany). Afterwards, he was employed in the Turkish Consulate General in Bremen. He was watching and reporting on our actions in the name of the state.” Enver C., *Interview by the Author*. Note taking, Bremen, May 20, 2014.

106 Oğuz Gökmen, *Federal Almanya ve Türk İşçileri* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1972), 270.

107 Liza Mügge, “Managing Transnationalism: Continuity and Change in Turkish State Policy,” *International Migration* 50, no. 1 (2011), 20.

propaganda). This person was organizing people, imposing his views through giving conferences. Once, he led our workers to make a demonstration before consulate building; he made them throw stones at the chancery.¹⁰⁸

Western European countries offered a more liberal atmosphere for politically-mobilized Turkish citizens, and this was perceived as a threat by the Turkish government. In this regard, Turkish diplomatic and consular missions focused on the political orientations of its citizens abroad. Turkish governments of the time also tried to play different groups off one another. Aşula depicts the policies of governments as follows,

Some of our people were coming to us and showing letters delivered to them from Helsinki, Stockholm. ... [In these letters] it was mentioned that the government was exploiting them, and under these conditions, it was time to rebel against the order in Turkey. ... Counter and protective measures were taken many years later. However, it was too late. This time, religious foundations were promoted to counterbalance harmful leftist formations and [Islamist organizations] gathered the people to them with the services they offered. Not much could be done against them, and these foundations ... were tolerated according to the formation of coalitions in Turkey.¹⁰⁹

108 "Nürnberg civarında sözde işyeri olarak açtığı yerde vatandaşlara komünizm propagandası yapan ve (Almanya'da komünist propagandası yapmak yasak olmadığı için) faaliyetini önleyemediğimiz... Moskova yanlışı birini vatandaşlıktan attırdım... Bu kişi Nürnberg'te açtığı bir büroda işçilerimizi topluyor, onlara konferans verip fikirlerini aşılıyordu. Bir kere topladığı işçilerimizi başkonsolosluk binasına getirip nümayiş yaptırdı, konsolosluğun camalarına taş attırıp kırdırdı." Yakın, *Göçmen Diplomat...*, 113-114.

109 "İnsanlarımızın bazıları, kendilerine, Helsinki'den, Stokholm'den postalanın mektupları getirip, Büyükelçilikte bize gösteriyorlardı... [Bu mektuplarda] hükümetin kendilerini istismar ettiğinden bahsediliyor ve bu koşullarda, Türkiye düzene karşı başkaldırmalarının zamanının geldiği anlatılıyordu... Çok sonraki yıllarda bazı mukabil ve koruyucu önlemler alınmak istendi. Ancak, geç kalınmıştı. Bu defa, zararlı ve solcu cereyanlara karşı koymak için, dinci kuruluşlar meydana atılmış ve geliştirdikleri çeşitli hizmetlerle, insanlarımıza etraflarına

Gökmen, on the other hand, also warned against religious political currents of thought that he saw as dangerous as the leftist orientations. He, in this regard, attaches a prominent role to “well-educated, enlightened, nationalist” religious officials in tackling the possible future harmful influences of Islamist political orientations.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, he is pleased by the fact that Turkish migrants “were opposed to leftist propaganda.”¹¹¹ When we consider the Turkish government’s attempts control Islamist orientations among Turkish citizens abroad through official and semiofficial religious institutions, it can be concluded that these views influenced the official Turkish stance towards migrant worker populations.¹¹²

6.2.3 *Changing Patterns of the State-Citizen Relationship: A Transformation Story*

The need for comprehensive institutional changes apart from inaugurating new diplomatic and consular missions was loudly voiced in the Turkish public even in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Ergun Göze, a right-wing columnist renowned for his opposition to what was known as “traditional Turkish diplomacy,” proposed the establishment of a “ministry of foreign workers” recalling the “poor treatment of workers in embassies” as one of the many distresses faced by the Turkish migrant population in Western Europe.¹¹³ According to

toplamlışlardı. Bunlara karşı bir şey yapılamadı ve hatta... içerisindeki koalisyonların oluşuma göre, müsamaha bile edildi.” Aşula, *Dışişleri...*, 23.

110 Gökmen, *Federal Almanya ve Türk İşçileri*, 269.

111 Ibid., 268.

112 Ibid., 269. The views of Aşula and Gökmen may seem contradictory in the case of the attitude towards Islamist political orientations. Aşula opposed the promotion of Islamist groups to eliminate left-leaning political views among Turkish citizens whereas Gökmen solely suggested the monitoring of the spread of Islamist ideology through religious officials and official institutions. Gökmen does not point out the link between Islamist and leftist currents of thoughts. Both diplomats attached the same level of danger to Islamist formations in Western Europe.

113 Ergun Göze, *Dışişleri Kavgası* (İstanbul: Serda Matbaacılık, 1975), 272. This was indeed also the expectation of Turkish citizens in Europe. In her study focusing on the socioeconomic integration of Turks in Europe, Birsen Şahin quotes the words of two migrants on the necessity

him, it was a travesty to think that a “small bureau” (the Worker Issues Coordination Bureau) could cope with migrant workers numbering almost 1.5 million, whereas the problems of workers inside the borders of Turkey were being followed up by a directorate general at the ministerial level.¹¹⁴ Similar to Göze, Vassaf, for example, states that,

the officers of the foreign ministry, who have been assigned to be interested in the problems of our workers abroad, are even punishing them [migrant workers] for living abroad, increasing the passport fees and generally do not deal with their problems.

Turkish workers in Europe and Turkish diplomats representing them are like the citizens of two different countries. They are so distant that Turkish diplomats living in the most expensive districts do not even know the names of the districts, in which thousands of workers live. In official affairs, on the other hand, they exclude citizens instead of understanding them. For Turkish diplomats in Europe, the state of their people is a disgrace [for Turkey] Diplomats do not want to deal with workers; they leave them to their fates.

As if millions of citizens were not living outside Turkey, the foreign ministry’s organization abroad still maintains the mindset of the eighteenth century diplomacy, and nothing more is put into operation other than increasing the number of personnel for documentation processes.¹¹⁵

of establishing a “ministry of European Turks.” See Birsen Şahin, *Almanya’daki Türkler: Misafir İşçilikten Ulusötesi (Transnasyonel) Bağların Oluşumuna Geçiş Süreci* (Ankara: Phoneix, 2010), 222-223.

114 Göze, *Dışişleri Kavgası*, 272. He also notes that “even” Yugoslavia established a ministry for her migrant workers. *Ibid.*

115 “Görevlerinden biri yurt dışındaki yurttAŞlarımızın sorunlarıyla ilgilenmek olan Dışişleri Bakanlığı ... yetkilileri adeta yurt dışında oturmalarını cezalandırırcasına, her yıl milyonlarca işçi ve ailesinin pasaport uzatma süresine zam yapmakta, sorunlarıyla ise genellikle ilgilenmemektedirler. Avrupa’daki Türk işçileri ile onları temsil eden Türk diplomatları sanki ayrı iki ülkenin yurttAŞlarıdır. Birbirlerinden o denli uzaktırlar ki, en pahalı mahallelerde outran Türk diplomatları binlerce ... işçi yurttAŞının oturdukları mahallenin ... adını bile bilmez.

Written in 1983, Vassaf's statements present a wholesale criticism of Turkey's policies towards its citizens in Europe with a special emphasis on the attitudes of Turkish diplomats towards the Turkish migrant population. Although his remarks, as will be illustrated below in detail, reflect the truth to some extent, Turkey's attitude towards its migrant population was already changing during the period in which he wrote this passage. Turkey's attitude towards the Turkish migrant population in Europe gradually changed over the following decades.

While at present a ministry responsible for migrant populations has yet to be established, the Turkish state acted considerably in parallel with the words of Göze and Vassaf. Their views were shared also by some diplomats. Mustafa Aşula, a Turkish ambassador, notes in retrospect that,

we [the state] neither had non-governmental organizations to guide the [workers] nor had we presented them with a sufficient, minimum education. ... While sometimes statistics published by State Statistics Institute proudly revealed the savings that our workers have delivered [to Turkey], we forgot a prominent [social] deficit and destruction. Our people, because of being neglected, were first falling into the clutches of extreme religious and other groups, and moreover, [they] were going into the orbit of anarchist groups located in certain European centers. It was such that, our people, who had a median age of between twenty-five and forty, ... found themselves in the sphere of influence of terrorist formations after returning [to Turkey].¹¹⁶

Resmi ilişkilerinde ise kendisini halkıyla özdeşleştirmek yerine, onları dışlar. ... Avrupa'daki Türk diplomatları için kendi halklarının durumu bir yüz karasıdır. ... Diplomatlar, işçilerin muhatabı olmak istemez, onları kendi kaderiyle baş başa bırakırlar. ... Sanki Türkiye dışında milyonlarca yurtaş yaşamamış gibi, Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nın yurt dışı örgütlenmesi hala 18. Yüzyılın diploması anlayışı içerisinde sürdürülmemekte, evrak işlemlerinin yürütülebilmesi için kadro artırımdından başka pek bir şey yapılmamaktadır.” Gündüz Vassaf, *Daha Sesimizi Duyurmadık: Avrupa'da Türk İşçi Çocukları* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1983), 191.

116 “Diğer yabancı işçiler misali, ne onlara yol gösterecek sivil toplum kuruluşlarımız vardı, ne de [devlet olarak] kendilerini asgari bir ön eğitimden geçirmiştik ... Zaman zaman Devlet

Not all diplomats were critical of state policies. Some of them put forward that the distress stemmed from the incapability of the migrants themselves. Alaeddin Gülen, a consul-general who served in both Germany and Austria, noted that in the absence of education offered to Turkish migrant workers, their presence in Western Europe harmed Turkey's and the Turkish people's image on the continent.

We became unsuccessful in managing the issue of sending workers to Europe. It cost us a lot to send our workers to Europe by taking them from their villages without any education. Even though people coming from rural areas to Istanbul face problems, it was not taken into consideration how the same people would live when they were taken directly to Europe. The reason for this failure was our wrong policy concerning workers. We only evaluated our people as foreign currency machines; however, we never thought that they were at the same time our instruments of publicity.¹¹⁷

Gülen criticizes the instrumentalization of Turkish migrant workers in Europe by facilitating their capital accumulation while simultaneously instrumentalizing the same people by their ability to contribute the promotion of the

Planlama Teşkilatınca yayımlanan istatistiklerle, işçilerimizin yurda gönderdikleri tasarruflarından övgüyle bahsederken, çok önemli bir açığı ve hatta tahribatı unutuyorduk. İnsanımız sahipsizlikten, önce kendi içindeki dinci vesair nitelikli ideolojilerin ağına düşüyor ve bu da yetmiyormuş gibi, Avrupa'nın muhtelif merkezlerinde yuvalanmış bulunan anarşist mihrakların yörüğesine giriyorlardı. O kadar ki, yaş ortalaması 25-40 olan insanımı ... yurda dönüşlerinde, kendilerini terör mihraklarının çemberi içinde buluyorlardı.” Mustafa Aşula, “Misafir İşçiler,” in *Dış Politikamızın Perde Arkası: 23 Büyükelçinin Olaylara Bakışı*, ed. Turhan Fırat (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2005), 207-208.

117 “Avrupa'ya işçi gönderme işini yüzümüze gözüümüze bulaştırdık. Hiçbir eğitime tabi tutmadan işçilerimizi köylerden alıp Avrupa'ya yollamamız, bize pahaliya maloldu. Köylerden İstanbul'a gelenler bile uyumsuzluk çekerken, aynı insanlar doğrudan Almanya'ya götürülürse bunların aynı insanlar doğrudan Almanya'ya götürülürse bunların ne duruma düşecekleri hiç düşünülmemiştir. ... Bundaki fiyaskonun sebebi tamamen bizim yanlış işçi politikamızdır. Biz işçilerimizi sadece döviz makinesi olarak gördük, oysa onların aynı zamanda ülkemiz için bir tanıtma aracı olduğunu hiç düşünmedik.” Gülen, *Bellekte Kalanlar...*, 207.

Turkish image in Europe. As a measure of better “image making,” Gülen states that it was essential “to educate the people to be sent abroad, to teach them minimum behavioral norms and to adapt their clothing to the European standard.”¹¹⁸ In other words, he suggests a kind of “top-down reform process” to rehabilitate Turkey’s image in Europe. Murat Bilhan, a consul general of the time, also underscores the lack of formal education among the Turkish migrant population.

They should have been upgraded culturally. [However,] we were ordered to do just the opposite. In order not to break their connections to the homeland, teachers and religious officers were being appointed. People were encouraged to underscore their differences from the Germans.¹¹⁹

The aforementioned quotes are clear expressions of the motives behind the Turkish state’s changing attitude towards the Turkish migrant population. Turkish governments realized that the migrant population was not only a burden on Turkish diplomatic and consular missions; but also it became clear that these people also posed a more complicated challenge. In response, the Turkish state “introduced a law that allowed dual citizenship for the first time.”¹²⁰ In 1969, thirteen years before this law was passed, Süleyman Demirel, then-prime minister, stated “why should we grant dual citizenship? If they feel they are Turks, they must live in Turkey.”¹²¹ The change in the mindset of the state was clear.

This was followed by another step which was being realized for the first time in modern Turkish history: article 62 of the 1982 Constitution mandated

118 Ibid.

119 Bilhan, *Interview by the Author*. “Onların kültürel düzeyini yükseltmeliydi. Ancak bize bunun tam tersi yönünde talimat verildi. Anavatanla bağlarını koparmamak adına öğretmenler ve din görevlileri tayin edildi. İnsanlar Almanlarla aralarındaki farkın altın çizmeleri yönünde teşvik edildi.”

120 Damla Aksel, “Kins, Distant Workers, Diasporas: Constructing Turkey’s Transnational Members Abroad,” *Turkish Studies* 15, no. 2 (2014), 203.

121 Ayşem Sezer Şanlı, “Türkiye’de ‘Alamancı Almanya’da ‘Türk’: Araftaki Gurbetçiler,” in *Türkiye’nin 1960’lı Yılları*, ed. Mete Kaan Kaynar (İstanbul: İletişim, 2017), 677.

that the Turkish state would be responsible for the measures required for the wellbeing of Turkish citizens working in foreign countries.¹²² The article was concerning the quality of life of Turkish migrant population and their ability to return home. The Turkish government paid special attention to shape the religious tendencies of its citizens abroad. In 1985, the government of the time “initiated the establishment of a religious organization, the Turkish-Islamic Union of Religious Affairs (DİTİB) … under the auspices of the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs.”¹²³ DTİB was centered in the Federal Republic of Germany, but similar structures were also established in Austria, Belgium, France, and other European countries.¹²⁴

The experiences of especially first-generation migrants in Europe, which were most visible to the Turkish state through encounters in its diplomatic and consular missions, persuaded Turkish governments to make a revision to their relationship with their citizens. As illustrated through a comparative analysis of the accounts of both Turkish diplomats and migrant workers, one of the main sources of distress among the Turkish migrant population was Turkish diplomatic and consular bureaucracies themselves. As a response, Ünver notes that “Turkish consulates in all receiving countries offered new forms of service – such as assisting Turkish citizens in the fields of labor and social issues, educational problems, and legal status in the receiving countries.”¹²⁵ In this sense, the scope of work of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also evolved in terms of the Turkish migrant population in Europe. According to a statement by the ministry on its official webpage, the ministry defines its responsibility as

122 The full text of the article is as follows: “The State shall take the necessary measures to ensure family unity, the education of the children, the cultural needs, and the social security of Turkish citizens working abroad, and to safeguard their ties with the home country and to help them on their return home.” Since the ratification of the Constitution, this article has never been subject to amendment. “Constitution of the Republic of Turkey,” TBMM Website, Accessed March 25, 2015, available from https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf.

123 Ömer C. Ünver, “The Changing Diaspora Politics of Turkey and Public Diplomacy,” *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 12, no. 1 (Spring 2013), 185.

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid., 184.

managing and taking a position concerning the integration processes of Turkish citizens living abroad. The ministry's current focus regarding the Turkish diaspora living abroad is to assist them in overcoming integration problems with regard to political participation, education, employment and cultural maintenance.¹²⁶

The Turkish migrant population in Western Europe became more and more politicized in the decades after 1980. The coup d'état of September 12, 1980, caused a new wave of politically-motivated migration from Turkey to Europe. This was on one hand a challenge for Turkey since the new wave of migration consisted of people who were dissidents of the new military administration in Turkey. On the other hand, governments of the time discovered the potential that the Turkish migrant population offered. The organized, politicized Turkish migrant population, unlike in the initial years of migration, had begun to be considered as partners for cooperation.¹²⁷

126 Özge Bilgili and Melissa Siegel, "Understanding the Changing Role of the Turkish Diaspora," *UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series*, (2011), accessed March 1, 2015, available from <https://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/.../wp2011-039.pdf>.

127 Ho & Connel's term "diaspora diplomacy" makes sense of Turkey's changing attitude in this regard. The Turkish migrant population attracted the attention of the Turkish public in two respects. First, most notably for Turkish governments, the Turkish population in Europe is thought to counterbalance "anti-Turkish" sentiments in Europe led by Armenian, Kurdish, and extreme leftist groups. In recent years, Turkey tended to "instrumentalize" the Turkish population en masse against critics of Turkey. See Zafer Çağlayan, "Türk Diasporası En Büyük Şansımız," (Turkish Diaspora is Our Greatest Opportunity) *Anadolu Ajansı*, October 18, 2011. In some cases, Turkish statesmen mobilized the Turkish population against the governments of their host countries in order to reach the targets of Turkish foreign policy. For instance, Mesut Yılmaz, then-prime minister of Turkey, advised Turkish migrants in Germany not to vote for Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Union, which he believed was a hinderance to Turkey's EU accession process. See "Seçim Kartı," (Election Card) *Milliyet*, September 27, 1998. Political parties in Turkey made considerable efforts on attracting the interest of Turkish organizations in Western Europe for their increasing role in Turkish elections. Today, the Turkish migrant population is more organized than ever before. However, they do not constitute a monolithic bloc that can be easily managed and manipulated by any given government or political party. For a list and an analysis of Turkish and Turkish-origin groups in Western Europe, most notably in Germany, see Bahar Başer, *Diasporada Türk-Kürt Sorunu: Almanya ve İsveç'te İkinci Kuşak Göçmenler* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2013), 64-67.

6.2.4 *Everyday Causes of the Evolution of the State-Citizen Relationship: Encounters of Turkish Diplomats and Turkish Citizens*

Turkish diplomatic missions in Europe became the sites of cleavage between Turkish diplomats as representatives of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy and Turkish migrant citizens. In this regard, the distance between Turkish state and its citizens was constituted, redefined, and reproduced in the trans-national context. The main points of disagreements between Turkish citizens abroad and the bureaucracy consisted of daily practices. These clashes reflect the gap between the expectations of the state and citizens from each other. These clashes, which were indeed embedded in state-citizen relations in Turkey as a whole, are depicted in the accounts of Turkish diplomats. Baytok's notes, for example, illustrate both why citizens have "never" been satisfied with the practices of Turkish diplomatic missions and why meeting all the requests of citizens was impossible. In his words,

It is not possible to change the ideas of our citizens living abroad about consulates and embassies. Our citizens, who are extremely obedient before local authorities abroad, begin to glare when they enter the gates of national institutions such as consulates and THY offices. In some cases, they exaggerate by behaving considerably emotionally to legitimize their unjustified requests. It is impossible to prevent this. ...

Most of the unpleasant habits in consulates occurred when our officers declared to our citizens that it was impossible to fulfill their requests legally and formally, which they assumed to be justified. In addition, our people ... could not endure to wait.¹²⁸

128 "Yurtdışındaki vatandaşlarımızın konsolosluklar ve elçiliklerle ilgili görüşlerini değiştirmek mümkün değildir. Yurtdışında yerel makamlar karşısında boyunları kıldan ince olan bu vatandaşlar, konsolosluklar ve THY gibi milli müesseselerimizin daha kapılarından adımlarını attıkları anda her şey gözlerine batar. Bazen bu haksız taleplerinin mazereti veya gerekçesi olarak ileri götürecek kadar hissi davranışları. Bunun önüne geçmek abesle istigaldir.

...

Konsolosluklarda çıkan tatsızlıkların büyük çoğunluğu, vatandaşlarımızın hak saydıkları veya zannettikleri bazı işlemlerin, memurlarımız tarafından kanunen veya usulen mümkün

Baytok, who worked as a mid-ranking consulate officer in London during the mid-1960s, reduced the objections of Turkish citizens abroad to their unawareness of laws and customs and their lack of regard for the daily working and service conditions of Turkish diplomatic and consular missions. Baytok, moreover, links the conflicts in the daily life of consulates to the impatience of Turkish citizens. Contrary to colleagues like Afra or Erner, he does not take into consideration the fact that each day spent in a consulate implied wage losses for migrant citizens. Yılmaz İkizer, who worked in Turkey's consul general in Geneva during the early 1960s, expresses a similar complaint to Baytok's with a more precise example. In his words,

When I saw a man's head appear [in the door] while I was working in my room, I called him. ... He claimed to have gone abroad three days earlier. He missed very much speaking in Turkish. To that end, he visited the consulate in Geneva. He complained about my colleague in Geneva saying "how polite you are. The vice consul there in Geneva kept me waiting for half an hour." ... I did not have any requests. I intended keep him company." What can be said about the attitude of this citizen who does not even think of the impropriety of visiting our diplomatic missions to chat?¹²⁹

İkizer presents an extreme case that can hardly be accepted as a satisfactory example representing the relations between Turkish citizens abroad and Turkish diplomatic missions en masse. Moreover, this case has little to say about the tense relations between Turkish migrant citizens and diplomatic missions. İkizer, even so, concludes that the "problem occurs due to the lack of our

olamayacağının kendilerine söylemesi üzerine çıktı. Bir de... insanların beklemeye tahammülleri yoktu." Baytok, *Diş Politikada...*, 83.

129 "Bir gün odamda çalışırken bir erkek başının kapıda gözüktüğünü görünce seslendim. ... Üç gün önce yurt dışına çıkmış. Türkçe konuşmayı çok özlemiştir. Bu amaçla, bir gün evvel gittiği Cenevre'de Başkonsolosluğa uğranmıştır. 'Siz ne kadar nazıksiniz. Orada Muavin Konsolosun işi varmış, beni yarı saat bekletti. Halbuki hiçbir talebim yoktu. Şöyledir bir yarı saat yarenlik edeyim diye düşünmüştüm' sözleriyle Cenevre'deki meslekdaşımı bana şikayet etti. Diplomatik misyonlarımıza gevezelik için gitme fikrinin sakatlığını dahi düşünmemeyen vatandaşımızın tutumuna ne demeli dersiniz?" İkizer, *Şu Bizim Garip Hariciye...*, 33.

citizens' knowledge about the duties of the ministry's institutions abroad.”¹³⁰ İkizer, in this regard, is in line with Baytok with respect to explaining the disputes between Turkish citizens abroad and officers of diplomatic missions. One diplomat who ended his career as a consul general also complains that “hundreds of migrant workers earning their livelihoods all around the world made the workload of Turkish diplomatic officers even heavier.”¹³¹ According to him, Turkish diplomats abroad “became mentors to the workers.”¹³² Contrary to İkizer and Baytok, this anonymous consul general does not blame the “ignorance” of Turkish citizens; nevertheless, he points out that the increasing number of Turkish migrants in Europe had a negative impact on the functionality and scopes of work of Turkish diplomats.¹³³ İkizer also complains that this lack of knowledge about procedures led Turkish citizens “to try to resolve their problems with Armenian and Greek interpreters even in cases that diplomatic missions could easily have assisted them.”¹³⁴

Turkish diplomats explain the problems in Turkish diplomatic and consular missions as a lack of knowledge among the citizens. Nevertheless, they also insist that bureaucratic mechanisms did not make the processes easier. The accounts of some Turkish diplomats illustrate the bureaucratic constraints that hindered the establishment of a sustainable relationship between the state and its citizens in the transnational context. In Afra's words,

[the Ministry of] Finance sometimes made such ridiculous decisions that citizens became furious with the government, saying that “they once again made a decision to rip us off.” ... For example, one day a circular announced that “additional, daily fees will be collected from citizens who forget to extend the validity of their passports.” And what fees? Like 1.11 Deutsche Mark (DM) or 2.14 DM. On the first day, we pulled our hair out trying to calculate these crazy amounts and obtain the coins. A few weeks later, it was announced that fractions (*küsurat*)

130 Ibid.

131 Anonymous, *Hariciyemizin İç Yüzü*, 19 & 76.

132 Ibid., 19.

133 Ibid.

134 Ibid. These Armenian and Greek interpreters were fluent since they previously resided in Turkey.

would no longer be demanded, and, instead, we were ordered to collect three months' additional fees in advance. Citizens reacted mostly to this additional fee. . . .

In another case, citizens were demanded to pay 250 DM to the consulates for relatives invited from Turkey. These fees would later be repaid. This also caused chaos. . . . A thousand people came to take the reimbursement on the day following the day that these fees were collected. These decisions were causing the consulate disgrace [among foreign consular missions]. Those in the capital [Ankara] were preparing these circulars without taking into consideration the chaos that they would cause.¹³⁵

As a representative of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy, Afra criticizes the bureaucratic practices and procedures for not taking into account the future outcomes. He also asks, “I wondered whether [the Ministry of] Finance consulted Foreign Affairs or not,” which is indeed an expression of dissatisfaction with respect to the cooperation between two components of the Turkish bureaucracy.¹³⁶ Even Baytok, who criticized Turkish citizens abroad for their lack of knowledge about procedures, blames bureaucratic failures and shortcomings for the problematic state-citizenship relationship. Baytok’s notes are worth examining since they inform us that state-citizen tensions in Turkish

135 “Bazen maliyenin o kadar mantıksız genelgeleri gelir ki, vatandaş, ‘İşte yine bizi yolmak için böyle bir karar almışlar,’ diye hükümete düşman kesilir. Kendi kendime merak ederdim, acaba Maliye böyle acayıp genelgeler hazırlarken Hariciyenin görüşünü alıyor mu? Örneğin bir gün bir genelge geldi: ‘Pasaport süresini uzatmayı unutan vatandaştan, gecikme günleri için ek bir harç alınacak,’ deniyordu. Ama ne harçlar: 1,11 DM. Veya 2,14 DM gibi. Birinci gün hem bu delice miktarları hesaplamak hem de bozuk para tedarik etmek için saçımızı başımızı yoluşturduk. Birkaç hafta sonra bu küsurattan vazgeçildiği, bunun yerine, bir gün gecikme olsa dahi üç aylık erken harç alınması bildirildi. Vatandaşın en büyük tepkisi bu ek harca karşı oldu. Hükümet yine “para tırtıklaşmakla” itham edildi. Gel de vatandaşla hak verme. . . .

Bir başka sefer, Türkiye’den davet edilen akrabalar için vatandaşların başkonsolosluklara 250 mark yatırmaları istendi. Bunlar sonra iade edilecekti. Bu da kargaşa yarattı. . . . Bu paraların toparlanması ertesi günü, bu kere parayı geri almak üzere bin kişi geldi. Bunlar gerçekten konsoloslukları civara rezil eden kararlardı. Merkezdekiler kararların yaratacağı keşmekeşi dikkate almadan bu genelgeleri kaleme alıyorlardı.” Afra, *Hariciyeciler* . . . , 206-207.

136 Ibid., 207.

consular and diplomatic missions were not limited to the demands and applications of Turkish migrant citizens.

In the 1960s, students and patients coming to London were the main customers of the consulate general. Our students got tired of their lives because of problems stemming from a shortage of cash. When illogical problems due to legal regulations were added in, these young people could not spare the time and energy for their courses. Unfortunately, our consulate and student inspectorship offices were ordered to stone-wall our children instead of support them. I was against this. In this respect, I tried to interpret the regulations in their favor. ...

There was a student inspection office in London attached to the embassy. Students had registered with this office to acquire official status. Otherwise, their deadlines for military conscription would not be postponed and they would be conscripted. And if they did not join [the army], [the students] were ascribed the status of deserter. On the other hand, these children were asking to postpone their conscription deadlines in order to register with the student inspection office. I mean ... a kind of chicken and egg situation.¹³⁷

This contradiction was widespread among Turkish diplomatic missions elsewhere in Europe. Aziz Yakın, a mid-ranking Turkish diplomat assigned to the Bonn embassy for consular affairs, mentions an inspector of the Ministry of

137 “1960’lı yıllarda başkonsolosluğumuzun başlıca müşterileri öğrencilerimiz ve tedavi için Londra’ya gelen hastalarımızdı. Döviz sıkıntısı yüzünden maruz kaldıkları güçlükler birçok burslu öğrencimizi bezirdi. Buna bir de mevzuattan doğan akıl almaz problemler eklenince, bu gençlerimizin derse ayıracak takat ve zamanları kalmazdı. Maalesef, konsolosluk ve öğrenci müfettişliklerimiz adeta bu çocuklara destek değil, köstek olmaya memur edilmişlerdi. Ben buna karşıydım. Bu yüzden onlara, mevzuatı lehlerine yorumlayarak uyugulamaya çalışıyordum. ...”

Londra’da büyükelçiliğe bağlı bir öğrenci müfettişliği vardı. Öğrenciliklerinin resmiyet kazanılması için öğrencilerimizin müfettişliğe kayıtlı olmaları gerekiyordu. Yoksa askerlikleri tecil edilmiyor ve askere çağırılıyorlar gitmeyince de asker kaçağı durumuna düşüyorlardı. Öğrenci müfettişliğine kayıt olabilmek için de, bu çocuklardan, askerliklerinin tecil edilmiş olması şartı aranıyordu. Yani bir nevi tavuk yumurta durumu.” Baytok, *Diş Politikada...*, 85.

National Education who, in the words of Yakın, was a “student enemy.”¹³⁸ According to Yakın, the inspector requested him not to consider Turkish people as students unless the Ministry of National Education had recognized the title from the beginning.¹³⁹ However, claims Yakın, he rejected the request of the inspector and delivered student passports to young Turkish citizens who suffered financial shortcomings during their educations in the Federal Republic of Germany.¹⁴⁰ The statements of witnesses of the time from “the other side of the desk” also verify that the process of being a Turkish student abroad caused considerable difficulties. An interviewee who settled in Germany for educational purposes said that,

I went to Germany in the 1970s. I wanted to study at the university there. The Turkish army ordered me to prove that I was a university student in Germany. The Turkish consulate, on the other hand, wanted me to postpone my military service in order to be accepted as a Turkish student abroad. It was a totally vicious cycle.¹⁴¹

In his critical reassessment of Thomas Hobbes’ portrayal of the notion of the state, in *Leviathan*, Pierre Bourdieu draws a distinction between what he calls “the right hand” and “the left hand of the state.” The left hand of the state, in Bourdieu’s conception, is

“the set of agents of the so-called spending ministries which are the trace, within the state, of the social struggles of the past. … [They are] “opposed to the right hand of the state, the technocrats of the ministry

138 Yakın, *Göçmen Diplomat...*, 65-66

139 Ibid.

140 Ibid. The students were coming to the Federal Republic of Germany for educational purposes, but they were obliged to work due to financial troubles.

141 “1970’lerde Almanya’ya gittim. Orada üniversite eğitimi almak istiyordum. Ordu askerliğimi tecil etmek için Almanya’dı öğrenci olduğumu kanıtlamamı istiyordu. Türk başkonsolosluğu ise beni bir üniversite öğrencisi olarak kabul etmek için askerliğimi tecil ettirmemi istiyordu. Tam bir kısır döngü” Ahmet B., *Interview by the Author*. Note-taking, Bremen, May 19, 2014.

of finance, the public and private banks and the ministerial cabinets.”¹⁴²

This conceptualization was made by Bourdieu in order to clarify the devastating impact of neoliberalism on social democracy policies in general. Foreign policy and ministry of foreign affairs of the states are not considered as aspects of this dichotomy. Even so, ministry of foreign affairs of a state would be on the sidelines of the right hand of the state with its concentration on diplomacy and security concerns.

The critical accounts of Turkish diplomats conjure up Bourdieu’s above-said categorization. Without falling into the trap of anachronism, it is useful to rethink state-citizen relationship on the basis of the metaphor of “the right hand and the left hand of the state.” Turkish diplomats opposed the inconsistent and in most cases unfeasible demands of the Turkish bureaucracy, positioning themselves in line with the citizens even though they are the representatives of the Turkish bureaucracy in the transnational context. Such a preference leads diplomats, whose main responsibility is to mediate between their state and the receiving state, to mediate between its citizens and the state. Baytok notes that

at the consulates, we were mostly busy with the procedures of our [Turkish] patients coming to London. ... People, who were unaware of the regulations and did not speak a foreign language, were coming to London when they had a serious illness. Throwing them to the wolves would neither suit the principles of work nor those of humanity. It was a divine duty for me to help these people during my term in London.

...

142 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Left Hand and the Right Hand of the State,” *Variant* 32 (2008), accessed May 11, 2014, available from <http://www.variant.org.uk/32texts/bourdieu32.html>.

The sorrow of such consulate work affected me rather than its difficulty. During their treatments and surgeries, patients were taking strength from me calling me “my brother” or “my son.”¹⁴³

The notion of “being together with the citizens” is widespread among Turkish diplomats; moreover, such a behavior is considered a “must” in their jobs. Afra states that

I was assisting passport processes along with the officers when I was assistant consul. I did not give up this routine when I was promoted to consul general....

There are colleagues who close their doors to the public and sign documents through an assistant. I get very angry especially when a young officer behaves in such a manner. Are you a king?¹⁴⁴

Turkish migrant workers and citizens living abroad generally express their reactions and criticisms towards the Turkish bureaucratic system through their contacts with Turkish diplomats. Turkish diplomats, as clarified in the statements above, position themselves between the state and citizens; thus, they do not define themselves as purely obedient elements of the state applying the orders of the central government without hesitation or criticism. Instead, the humanitarian aspects of their profession were openly emphasized by Turkish diplomats. Afra states that social aspects of working in diplomatic and consular missions dominate their careers.

143 “Konsoloslukta bizi en çok, tedavi için Londra’ya gelen hastaların işlemlerinin meşgul ettiğini söyleyebilirim. Lisan, yol yordam bilmeyen insanlar menfur bir hastalığın pençesine düşünce, son bir ümit olarak Londra’lara kadar gelmekteydiler...”

Onları yüzüstü bırakmak, ne görev anlayışına ne insanlığa siğardı. Kaldığım sürece Londra’da her hastanın yardımına koşmayı en ulvi görev saydım. Konsolosluk görevinin bu yanının meşakkatinden çok üzüntü beni yıklardı... Hastalar sen benim kardeşimsin veya oğlumsun diyerek beni muayeneleri ve ameliyatları sırasında yanlarında görmekten güç alırlardı.” Baytok, *Diş Politikada...*, 85.

144 “Muavin konsolos iken, kalabalık günlerde memurların arasına girer ve pasaport doldurulmasına yardım ederdim. Başkonsolos olduğumda da bu huyumdan vazgeçmedim. ...”

Kapılarını halka kapatıp, belgeleri bir odacı vasıtasıyla imzalayan meslektaşlar da vardır. Hele böyle bir tavrı genç bir memur yaptığında pek sınırlenirim. Sen kral misin yahu!” Afra, *Hariciyeciler...*, 214 & 228-229.

Turkish workers sometimes left their children with a German family, and the German families, who began to feel attached to the child, did not want to give him back. Many people had to apply to the courts because of this. ...

In Essen, there was such an incident and the Family Court gave custody of the child to his German family in order to prevent him from suffering psychological collapse. The father of the child took the notice and requested help. The words “psychological collapse” in the decision did not affect me, but I felt disturbed [when the court] labelled Sinop – the family was from Sinop – underdeveloped and polluted. I wrote a polite letter to the judge. ... The judge changed his decision and surrendered the child back to his Turkish family. He also informed me in a short letter – a kind of apology.¹⁴⁵

As clarified by Baytok and Afra, Turkish diplomats were keen and motivated to contact citizens. Furthermore, they define assisting the citizens as an integral part of their profession. Girgin, who was Turkey’s charge d’affairs in East Berlin, the capital of the German Democratic Republic, states that he was mostly busy with the “affairs ... of citizens who reside in West [Berlin] and have a child from a relationship [with someone] in the East or people who die in this city.”¹⁴⁶ Yaman Başkut, who was a young career diplomat in Turkey’s consulate general in Paris, states that “in a place where there were so many citizens, one of the most important duties of a consulate was marriage procedures.”¹⁴⁷

145 “Türk işçiler bazen çocukların bir Alman ailesinin bakımına bırakırlar, aradan beş-altı yıl geçince çocuğa ısrınan Almanlar geri vermek istemezlerdi. Birçok kişi bu nedenle mahkemelere düşmüştü. ...

Essen’de, böyle bir olay olmuş ve Aile Mahkemesi çocuğun ruhi bir çöküntüye uğramaması için, onu Alman ailesine bırakmış. Baba, ilamı alarak bana gelip yardım istedi. İländaki “çocuğun ruhi durumu” için sözleri dokunmadı ama, Sinop (aile Sinopluydu) kentini az gelişmiş, kötü havalı gibi kelimelerle nitelendirmesi kanıma dokundu. Oturup hakime nazik bir mektup yazdım. ... Hakim kararını değiştirdi ve çocuğu Türk aileye geri verdi. Bana da kısa bir mektupla bilgi verdi, bir nevi özür dileme gibi.” Afra, *Hariciyeciler...*, 226.

146 Girgin, *Dünyanın Dört Bucağı...*, 178.

147 Başkut, Aferin, *İyiydin...*, 32-33.

Turkish diplomatic missions were fields of mutual interaction between citizens and officials of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. Turkish diplomats were not dissatisfied by their roles. For instance, Afra notes that he also “filed passports at the counters on busy days.”¹⁴⁸ İkizer also illustrates how interaction with citizens was a source of professional satisfaction for diplomats.

When you do the simplest works such as extending a passport or preparing of document, – leaving aside that we are abroad and earn salaries for this – their grateful expressions make you forget your fatigue.

...

The problems of the migrants have no end, [but] their gratefulness is limitless.¹⁴⁹

When İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, then-minister of labor, visited the Federal Republic of Germany to meet with the mission chiefs in this country in 1965, Erner claims that his citizen-friendly attitude surprised the minister. In his words,

At the end of the meeting, the minister asked me “Consul General, what did you do to these people? They complain about official institutions, but here, in your mission, they cheer as if we are at soccer match.” I answered “Two things, sir. We have smiling faces and complete their procedures quickly. Our citizens, as a matter of fact, do not expect anything different.”¹⁵⁰

148 Afra, *Hariciyeciler Dedikodu* Sever, 228.

149 “Pasaport temdidi veya bir belge tanzimi gibi en basit işlerini yaptığımızda-aslında bu işler için yurt dışında bulduğumuzu ve bunun için para aldığımızı göz ardı ederek- bir teşekkürlerini ifade ediş tarzları vardır ki sadece bu dahi bütün yorgunluğunuza unutmanıza yeter de artar bile.

Aslında gurbetçinin derdi bitmez, gösterdiği kadirşinaslığın da sonu gelmez.” İkizer, *Su Bizim Garip Hariciye...*, 34-35.

150 “Toplantı sonunda “Yahu Başkonsolos, sen bu adamlara ne yaptın? Şimdiye kadar gittiğim her yerde resmi makamları şikayet ettiler senin burada ise futbol maçında gibi lehte tezahürat yaptılar!” dedi. “İki şey efendim: Güler yüz gösterdik ve işlemlerini çabuk yaptık, zaten vatandaşımız da bundan başka şey beklemiyor” cevabını verdim.” Erner, *Davulun Sesi...*, 119.

§ 6.3 Concluding Remarks

Beginning in the early 1960s, Turkey sent a considerable migrant population to Western Europe. The flow of workers, which began with a tiny number of people in 1961, reached more than a million people almost a decade later. This flow of people produced a new type of relationship between the Turkish state and its citizens. Officers of Turkish diplomatic and especially consular missions stood at the center of this relationship which was experienced in a trans-national context. This process inevitably redefined the responsibilities of Turkish diplomats and increased their scope of work. Turkish diplomats encountered not only challenges stemming from state-citizen relationships abroad but also faced problems that were the consequences of domestic political realities.

The Turkish state's measures in reaction to the challenges as a consequence of Turkish workforce migration ranged from quantitative to qualitative. When the Turkish population dramatically increased, most notably in the Federal Republic of Germany, Turkey opened new consular missions. Shortcomings in terms of the quality of services offered to Turkish citizens abroad was another challenge. Beginning in the initial years of migration, the Turkish state inquired into the reasons behind the problems through research. As a consequence of these efforts and with the lessons learned from the experiences of Turkish diplomatic and consular officers with their citizens, the services and attitudes toward the Turkish migrant population were rehabilitated. This process also influenced the Turkish state's attitude towards the Turkish migrant population abroad. The state's responsibility towards its citizens abroad was protected constitutionally. This gradual shift was a direct outcome of interactions between Turkish diplomatic and consular officers and Turkish citizens throughout the 1960s and 70s.

On May 24, 2014, almost eight years after his troublesome 2006 meeting with Turkish migrants in Germany, then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was again in this country. This time, his supporters did not declare any complaints about fraud by Islamic companies or poor treatments in Turkish diplomatic and consular missions. Attendees of Erdoğan's rally in Köln

fully supported the then-prime minister. These people whose votes were demanded in Turkey's presidential elections of August 2014 were highly grateful.

My interviewees, with whom I attended the rally of Erdoğan together, were convicted that the treatment towards them had changed drastically after AK Party's coming to power in 2002. One claimed that the 2002-2004 period was a watershed. Another stated that even an information note on the walls of Turkish consulates was meaningful and made the citizens feel safer. The information note stated that "we are trying to bring your procedures to an end as soon as possible. If you still face difficulties, please contact us immediately."¹⁵¹ An interviewee, who lived in North African countries for years, also insisted that the treatment in Turkish diplomatic missions had dramatically changed under the AK Party administration.¹⁵² This chapter of this study suggests that mindset of the state towards the Turkish migrant population in Europe changed long before the 2000s. Indeed, from the early days of Turkish workforce migration to Europe, contemporaneous Turkish governments and the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy made efforts to overcome problems faced due to the migration process. In this regard, the Turkish state had already redefined its relations with the migrant population in Europe in the 1970s. As noted above, this shift was most clearly characterized by the inclusion of the state's responsibilities to its Turkish citizens abroad in the Turkish Constitution of 1982.

In sum, the flow of Turkish people to Western Europe was an unpredicted shock to the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. No one projected that these people would cause such a workload and change in the scope of work of the officers in Turkish diplomatic and consular missions. In this sense, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy grasped the situation relatively quickly and responded successfully in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

151 Murat K., *Interview by the Author*.

152 Enver C., *Interview by the Author*.

A Profession on the Frontline: Attacks towards Turkish Diplomats and the Formation of an Official Narrative

§ 7.1 Background

Turkish diplomats have always been on the frontline of the century-long Turkish-Armenian political tension. Most notably between 1973 and 1986, Turkish diplomats were preeminent targets of Armenian political violence with twenty-seven attacks resulting in the death of forty-two Turkish diplomats, their relatives or workers in Turkish missions.¹ According to one evaluation, this number corresponded to 4.5 percent of the total personnel of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time.² This part of the study examines the impact of this organized crime on its targets – that is, on Turkish diplomats and the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy as an institution. On the other hand, this chapter analyzes the issue by locating it within Turkish-Armenian relations in the twentieth century as a whole.

Despite the fact that diplomats of other countries were subject to similar attacks in those years, attacks targeting Turkish diplomats were characteristic in two respects. First, the continuity of attacks caused the death of numerous Turkish diplomats – more than the casualties of any other country. Second,

1 Bilal Şimşir, *Ermeni Meselesi: 1774-2005* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 2013), 212.

2 Ibid.

contrary to the attacks on diplomats of other countries, Turkish diplomats were not targeted because of their political preferences or the actions of their government. The attacks were realized due to a dispute that had its roots in history. In this regard, Turkish diplomacy's engagement with the "Armenian Question" will not be examined only through an account of the violent atmosphere of the 1970s and early 80s, rather the issue will be settled in its historical context. The Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy did not touch on the Armenian Question for the first time after the attacks. On the contrary, they had been at the frontline of this battle since its emergence at the turn of twentieth century.

As it can be remembered from chapter 2, the Cold War diplomat was tasked to influence the public opinions of other nations in order to gain support for his government at the international platforms. The Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy's involvement in the "Armenian Question" can also be examined through the lense of public diplomacy. Melissen states that "the United States, the former Soviet Union, and Europe's three major powers (Britain, France, and Federal Germany) invested particularly heavily in their 'communications with the world' during the Cold War."³ This process established the basis of public diplomacy, although states' efforts to influence foreign publics date back centuries.⁴ In a similar vein, Turkish diplomats, by publications and lobbying efforts, established and publicized an official Turkish position in the debates over "1915," launching perhaps the first serious public diplomacy campaign in the republican history. Turkish diplomats were actively involved in the establishment of a Turkish counter narrative against the genocide allegations with respect to the deportation of Ottoman Armenians in 1915. Prominent officials of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy championed this

3 Jan Melissen, "The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice," in *The New Public Diplomacy*, ed. Jan Melissen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 4.

4 The term "public diplomacy" "entered the lexicon of international affairs in the Cold War environment of the 1960s." Nevertheless "the essence of the practice," that is to say "the communication of governments with foreign publics" dates to earlier centuries. Joumane Chahine, *Public Diplomacy: A Conceptual Framework* (PhD diss. Montreal: McGill University, 2010), iii. The campaign of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy against "genocide" allegations vis-à-vis deportations in 1915, in this regard, can be categorized as one example of a comprehensive public diplomacy effort in modern history.

campaign, which was a direct outcome of serial assassinations of their colleagues throughout the 1970s and early 80s. Throughout the century-long “Armenian Question,” Turkish diplomats have not only been victims of terrorist attacks but also active proponents in the formation of an official narrative campaign against genocide allegations.⁵

7.1.1 *An Eternal Dispute: Turkish Diplomacy’s Engagement with the Armenian Question before 1973*

Preoccupation of Turkish/Ottoman diplomatic posts with “Armenian affairs” dates to the last decade of nineteenth century. Armenian insurgencies in Eastern Anatolia in the 1890s resulted in casualties of Armenians in Sason and Bitlis were directly reflected in the Washington mission of the Ottoman Empire. Throughout the 1890s, the activities of Armenians in the United States became “the principle preoccupation of the [Ottoman] embassy in

5 During the writing process of the dissertation, three studies were published on the formation of the official Turkish position vis-à-vis genocide allegations with regard to the deportation of Ottoman Armenians in 1915. Thomas De Waal labels Turkey’s efforts to respond the claims of Armenians after attacks on Turkish diplomats as “Turkey’s counter-narrative.” Thomas de Waal, *Büyük Felaketten Sonra: Soykırımından Sonra Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2016). Fatma Müge Göçek’s book illustrates the “narrative of denial” by a comprehensive examination of over three-hundred memoirs of the actors related to the “Armenian Question.” Fatma Müge Göçek, *Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present and the Collective Violence against the Armenians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). Ömer Turan and Güven Gürkan Öztan focuses on how the Turkish reason of state against genocide allegations was constructed through political processes, state reports, and books in a-century-long period following the deportations of 1915. Ömer Turan Gürkan Öztan, *Devlet Akı ve 1915: Türkiye’de “Ermeni Meselesi” Anlatısının İnşası* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2018). These studies locate the role of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy in the broader context of official Turkish narrative formation process. This study contributes these discussions with a special emphasis on the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy’s influence in determining Turkey’s position vis-à-vis genocide allegations, claiming that participation of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy in the aforementioned initiative was considerably related to the continuous political violence vis-à-vis Turkish diplomats in the 1970s and early 80s. Efforts of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy differed from Turkey’s previous initiatives in two respects. These efforts, first formed a systematic official narrative, and then popularized it among the Turkish public.

Washington".⁶ The Ottoman embassy in Washington mainly dealt with the legal problems of Ottoman Armenians obtaining American citizenship; furthermore, the embassy was "specially tasked to monitor the Armenian activities, namely rallies, demonstrations, publications and organizational works, in the United States."⁷ The Armenian press in the United States was monitored, and in response, the embassy had published refutations (*tekzips*) of the content and images published in these Armenian newspapers, most notably with respect to alleged massacres by the Ottoman government of the Armenians.⁸

One of the first and most symbolic figures of the tension between Ottoman resident missions and the Armenian community in the United States was Ahmed (Alfred) Rüstem Bey, who served three terms in Washington at different ranks, the last being Ottoman ambassador to the United States. The son of a Polish emigré who fled the Ottoman Empire after the 1848 revolutions, Ahmed Rüstem Bey joined the Ottoman diplomatic staff in 1881.⁹ Known for his upfront and short-tempered character, Ahmed Rüstem faced problems and disputes throughout his diplomatic career and afterwards.¹⁰ After serving in the United States twice as a mid-ranking Ottoman diplomat, he was appointed as

6 Gürpınar, *Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy...*, 143.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Şenol Kantarcı, "Osmanlı'da Onurlu Bir Diplomat ve Milli Mücadelenin Önemli Siması: Ahmed Rüstem Bey," *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* 42, (2008), 249.

10 For example, during his term as First Secretary in the Washington Embassy, Ahmed Rüstem wrote an article in the British newspaper, *Daily News*, complaining about the extravagant expenditures of Ottoman diplomats at a time the government was suffering from financial shortcomings. He did not remain his term in Washington as first secretary and was recalled to Istanbul to undertake the investigating of a corruption affair within the ministry. He was also known for engaging in two duels with Greek diplomats on different dates. As one of the prominent figures in the National Struggle years, Ahmed Rüstem was also known for challenging Mustafa Kemal to a duel after a dispute. Not because of this, but because of another clash, he resigned from his duty as deputy of the TBMM and moved to Europe. Throughout his years in Europe, Rüstem became an active proponent of the propaganda initiatives of early republican Turkey. See Mine Erol, A. Rüstem Bey: *Osmancı İmparatorluğu'nun Amerika Büyükelçisi* (Ankara: Bilgi Basımevi, 1973), 7-68.

ambassador to Washington in May 1914, a date that signals that his term in office would be preoccupied with “Armenian affairs.” Ahmed Rüstem made highly-critical statements to an American newspaper, the *Evening Star*, harshly condemning allegations by the American public towards the Ottoman government with respect to its treatment of Ottoman Armenians. In his statement, Ahmed Rüstem commented

Armenians who lived in peace and serenity for centuries under Ottoman administrations revolted with the support of the British, French, and Russian Empires and cooperated with states that engaged in wars with the Ottoman Empire in order to weaken it.¹¹

Ahmed Rüstem, after comparing French treatment of Algerians, British of Indians, and Russians of Jews, claimed that the Ottoman government was right and just in its position against Armenians.¹²

Ahmed Rüstem Bey’s remarks would constitute the core of the official thesis of republican Turkey about the Armenian question in the following decades, and this narrative was reproduced by other diplomats. Despite the fact that his declaration was before 1915-16 and was more precisely at the onset of the Armenian deportation –, Ahmed Rüstem already linked the Ottoman attitude towards the Armenians to their betrayal. His book, *La Guerre Mondiale et la Question Turco-Armenienne* (1918) (World war and the Turco-Armenian question), which was written in French, was also an effort to justify Ottoman policies towards Armenians during World War I. In this regard, he can be considered the first Ottoman diplomat to have an interest in the Armenian issue and indeed, apart from its being a counter-propaganda initiative, Ahmed Rüstem’s work was one of the first efforts to formulate an official perspective against the accusations of the world publics with respect to Armenian massacres.¹³

Ahmed Rüstem’s remarks did not cause a direct clash between him and the Armenian community in the United States; instead, he encountered the

11 Şenol Kantarcı, “Osmanlı’da Onurlu Bir Diplomat...,” 257.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., 258.

reaction of the government of the United States, notably that of President Woodrow Wilson since he also criticized the American government's activities with respect to indigenous communities both in the United States and the Philippines, which was then a United States colony.¹⁴

Ahmed Rüstem Bey was the first Turkish diplomat to take a stance in terms of the "Armenian Question." In addition to this, Turkish diplomats were preoccupied with assassination attempts by Armenian organizations long before the 1970s. Cemal Pasha, one of the members of the Unionist Triumvirate, was assassinated in Tbilisi just after leaving the Turkish (TBMM) representation in the city. While in Tbilisi, Cemal had been staying in a hotel, but on the day of his assassination he had dinner with Ahmet Muhtar Bey at the Turkish mission and he was ambushed by Armenian militants minutes after leaving Turkish the residence.¹⁵ His murder influenced the ideas of Turkish diplomats towards the newly-emerging "Armenian threat" and the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy would become much alarmed. Ahmet Muhtar was the TBMM's envoy to Tbilisi at the time of assassination, and the "psychological effects of experiencing terrorism at such close" was in his mind when he met with demonstrations after his appointment to Washington as ambassador in 1927.¹⁶

Ahmet Muhtar's appointment to Washington and the tension before and after his arrival was a clear precursor of future relations between Armenian communities throughout the world and Turkish diplomatic missions.¹⁷ The first actions of Armenians against Turkish diplomats, as a matter of fact, were realized in the United States a half century later. Even before the appointment of Ahmet Muhtar, anti-Turkish groups in the United States, which predominantly consisted of the members Armenian communities in the country - strongly opposed the Turco-American Friendship and Trade Agreement on August, 6 1923.¹⁸ An influential "No to the Lausanne Agreement" campaign

14 Ibid., 257.

15 Bilal Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*, 55.

16 Harris, "Repairing...", 154.

17 Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar*, 119-120.

18 Ibid., 119.

was put into operation and generally targeted the improvement of Turkish-American relations at any cost.¹⁹

Ahmet Muhtar arrived the United States late since there were reactions both to the appointment of a Turkish ambassador to the United States and also to the choice of Ahmet Muhtar. According to leaders of the anti-Turkey camp, Ahmet Muhtar was “responsible for the death of 30,000 Armenians by promoting the Turkish invasion of Armenia while Acting Foreign Minister in 1920.”²⁰ Ahmet Muhtar, against all odds, arrived in Washington on November 28, 1928, but he was not met with a welcoming atmosphere. On the contrary, by the time he landed to the United States, both American public opinion and certain groups were antagonistic with respect to his arrival, and he had to be accompanied by well-equipped American security forces.²¹ Deeply influenced by the assassination of Cemal seven years earlier, Ahmet Muhtar recounts his first minutes in Washington: “we arrived the American soil under these circumstances in a tense atmosphere.”²²

Harris states that “Muhtar exaggerated the power and danger of the Armenian protests,” but the security precautions that the American government took proves that he was not alone in his concerns.²³ Tension between Turkish diplomatic missions and Armenian communities in the United States and elsewhere in the world was not limited to threats of physical violence; there was a struggle between the two sides in the propaganda field that would repeat itself numerous times throughout the twentieth century. The first example of the propaganda war between a Turkish diplomatic mission and Armenian community in the United States emerged with a book – Franz Werfel’s *The Forty Days in Musa Dagh* –, which was a story of Armenian militants in Southern Anatolia.²⁴ When Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer, a titanic American

19 Ibid.

20 Harris, “Repairing...,” 156.

21 Şimşir, *Bizim Diplomatlar...*, 123-125.

22 Ibid., 125.

23 Harris, “Repairing...,” 156.

24 The issue was brought to the agenda of the Turkish public by Falih Rıfkı Atay in the last days of 1933. Beginning on December 25, 1933, Atay frequently dealt with the book in his column in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* daily newspaper. Public awareness through his articles increased so

filmmaking firm, planned to use the book as the script for a new film, the issue became a matter for Mehmet Münir Ertegün, Turkey's ambassador to the United States. Ertegün, "protested to [the Department of State] asking that all possible steps ... be taken to prevent the production of this film ... because it risked triggering hostility toward Turkey by presenting a distorted picture of Turkish treatment of Armenians."²⁵

As Turkey's delegate at the 5th Conference for the Unification of Penal Law in Madrid in 1933, Ertegün witnessed "Raphael Lemkin making his historic appeal for an international statute recognizing crimes of barbarity, a proposal that the Nazi delegation then prevented from being adopted but which would later reemerge as the Genocide Convention" in 1948.²⁶ Ertegün, as a witness of Lemkin's appeal, was aware that discussion of the 1915 deportations in the context of genocide conception would harm the image of the young Turkish republic.²⁷ He, in this regard, served out his term in Washington with this awareness.

Ertegün's demand brought about a continuous dispute between the Turkish government and filmmakers with the implicit or explicit mediation of the

much that the novel was prohibited even in Germany by the Third Reich. Mithat Kadri Vural, "Sedat Laçiner, Ermeni Sorunu, Diaspora ve Türk Dış Politikası," *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 6 (2007), 362.

25 Harris, "Cementing..." 184.

26 Harris, *Atatürk's Diplomats...*, 61. Ertegün's familiarity with the "Armenian Question" dates to his years as a legal counselor in the Ottoman diplomatic bureaucracy. On January 19, 1919, Mehmet Münir Bey prepared a report on the reasons of deportations of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915. Mehmet Münir's justification of the deportations was remarkably similar to those of Ahmed Rüstem Bey. The report focused on the cooperation of Armenian groups with the Russian army during the Great War. Ahmed Rüstem's book and Mehmet Münir's report can be considered as the constitutive sources of Ottoman-Turkish *Hariciye*'s contribution to the official Turkish narrative on the deportation decision in 1915. Ömer Turan and Güven Gürkan Öztan, *Devlet Aklı ve 1915: Türkiye'de "Ermeni Meselesi" Anlatısının İnşası* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2018), 107-108.

27 Indeed, it was not only a matter of prestige. Turkish governments were also concerned with the fact that remembrances of 1915 would inevitably bring the issue of reparations to the agenda. See Giray Saynur Derman, "Ermeni Sorununun Türk Dış Politikasına Etkisi," *Yeni Türkiye* 60 (2014), 13.

Department of State.²⁸ The book never became a source for the script of a movie as planned during the tenure of Ertegün. The Department of State of the United States blocked such initiatives twice in 1935 and once in 1938.²⁹ Yet just as threats against Ahmet Muhtar constituted a precursor for political violence against Turkish diplomats by Armenians five decades later, Münir Ertegün's struggle against the production of a film about Armenian massacres would be the precursor of similar efforts of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy in the following decades.

George Mardikian was an Ottoman-born Armenian and a restaurant owner in San Francisco. Mardikian was the official caterer of the San Francisco Conference in 1945 and owner of the Omer Khayyam restaurant, which was preferred by the Turkish delegation led by Hasan Saka. Despite the sincere relationship between Mardikian and the members of the Turkish delegation in San Francisco, he revealed to an American newspaper that

it came to my mind for many times, to poison the meals of these enemies of the Armenians, send them all to hell. Then, I abandoned this idea: that [they were] the guests of the American government.³⁰

Whether Mardikian was serious or not, his statements reveal that Turkish diplomatic representatives would always be the first addressees of the hostility of Armenians towards Turkish governments due to the deportations of 1915-16. As a matter of fact, Armenian communities elsewhere in the world had posed threats to the lives of Turkish diplomats before. For example, on July 7th, 1926, a telegraph sent by the Turkish consulate in Komotini (Greece) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that a conspiracy had been planned against the Turkish minister³¹ to Athens, Cevat (Ezine) Bey.³²

28 Harris, "Cementing...", 184.

29 Ibid., 185-188. The book was finally filmed by John Kurkjian in 1982 "without the sponsorship of a major movie studio," and thus, "the final product would not have the lasting negative impact... that Münir [Ertegün] had forecast." Ibid.

30 Erkin, *Dişşlerinde 34 Yıl*, vol. I, 152.

31 Minister was a diplomatic rank used until the 1960s. In the case that the mission of a country did not have "ambassadorial status," the chief of the mission was called a "minister."

32 Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız...*, 67.

There were other examples of “hostile encounters” between Turkish diplomats and members of Armenian communities before the first assassination in 1973. One day in the mid-1960s, a colonel from the United States Army with an Armenian background came to the Turkish embassy in Washington and asked Erdil Akay, a mid-ranking Turkish diplomat “I would be pleased if you explain why you destroyed my family with genocide.”³³ Erner cites in his memoirs how he felt afraid when an Armenian guest died just outside of his house.³⁴ His guest was the priest of one of two Armenian churches in Chicago. Had the Armenian guest of the Turkish diplomat not been late for the dinner, he may have died while eating his meal or drinking coffee. Erdem Erner, the host of the dinner, claims that Armenians would have started a “Barbarian Turk story” and his ministry would have questioned him why he had invited an Armenian priest to his home.³⁵

7.1.2 A “Mainstream” Political Expression of its Time: Revolutionary Violence and Diplomats as Targets

Throughout the 1960s and 70s, revolutionary urban guerilla organizations flourished all around Europe and the Middle East. Choosing armed resistance as the means of realizing a proletarian revolution, these groups were involved in attacks on civilians, state servants, and military bases. Among these, the Red Army Fraction (*Rot Armee Fraktion*) in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Red Brigades (*Brigate Rosse*) in Italy, and the 17 November Organization in Greece were among the most active. The Irish Republican Army in the United Kingdom and the ETA (*Euzkadi Ta Atasuna*) in Spain also used violent attacks to realize their nationalist and separationist ambitions. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was already in a war with Israeli Defense

33 Akay, *Dışişlerinde...*, 85.

34 Erner, *Davulun Sesi...*, 27-28.

35 Ibid., 28.

Forces to throw them off Palestinian soil while its elements were organizing attacks against mainly Israeli targets elsewhere in Europe.³⁶

One of the revolutionary organizations of the time was the ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberalization of Armenia). The organization, in line with its revolutionary agenda which was similar to other violence-prone organizations in Europe, fought against colonialism – which they called Turkish colonialism –, imperialism, and Zionism.³⁷ However, they had a motive that had historical origins: the recognition of Anatolian Armenian casualties during World War I as a genocide.³⁸ Actually, as De Waal puts it, the “ASALA was more popular than its real capability.”³⁹ Many attacks on Turkish diplomats were realized by the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), which was politically positioned against the ASALA, not as its partner.⁴⁰ As a consequence of the Cold War, notes de Waal, the “Turkish state preferred to focus on [the] ASALA which was at the left-wing of the political spectrum and backed by the Soviet Union.”⁴¹

With reference to Sir Henry Wotton’s statement, Eayrs noted at the beginning of 1970s that “the diplomat is an honest man sent to [d]ie for his country,” not (at least only) to lie.⁴² Despite the fact that attacks on diplomatic missions were familiar phenomena in modern history, these attacks intensified in the 1970s, and attacks on diplomatic missions emerged as a form of political

36 The best known of these activities were the assassination of members of the Israeli Olympic team in Munich 1972. See Kavin Macdonald, *One Day in September* (London: BBC Films & Passion Pictures, 1999), DVD.

37 For a detailed documentation of ASALA attacks in a historical context, see Can Dündar, *Kan Davası*, (Istanbul: ATV, 1999), DVD.

38 According to its constitution, ASALA aimed “to compel the Turkish Government to acknowledge publicly its responsibility for the Armenian Genocide in 1915, pay reparations, and cede territory for an Armenian homeland.” A. Hunsicker, *Understanding International Counter Terrorism: A Professional’s Guide to the Operational Art* (Boca Raton, Florida: Universal Publishers, 2006), 41.

39 De Waal, *Büyük Felaketten Sonra...*, 203.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., 205.

42 Eayrs, *Diplomacy and Its Discontents...*, 12. To remember Wotton’s words, see footnote 68 in chapter 2.

violence frequently observed in various parts of the world. The results of a research conducted in 1981 reveal that there had been forty-three seizures of diplomatic missions around the world and five additional attempts.⁴³ These were realized in at least twenty-seven countries and diplomatic missions. Missions of the United States and Egypt were the most targeted with five each.⁴⁴ In almost half of these seizures – namely twenty – the perpetrators addressed their demands to the receiving (host) country whereas a third of them – sixteen – were realized in order to take concessions from the sending (home) country.⁴⁵ Demands by attackers varied, but the release of political prisoners and ransoms were the most frequent.⁴⁶

In the 1970s, attacks on diplomatic and consular missions were not the only forms of violence against diplomats. Some diplomats were kidnapped with most being assassinated in the end. American diplomats, like their diplomatic missions, were the most frequent targets. Between 1973 and 1983, nine American diplomats were either assassinated, shot, or kidnapped.⁴⁷ “Gordon Mein was assassinated in Guatemala in 1968, Cleo Noel in Sudan in 1973, Rodger Davies in Cyprus in 1974, Francis Meloy in Lebanon in 1976, and Adolph Dubs in Afghanistan in 1979”⁴⁸

There were other examples from different countries. In one of the first and clearest cases, Karl von Spreti, the West German Ambassador to Guatemala in the late 1960s, was kidnapped by leftist FAR (*Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldas*)

43 Brian M. Jenkins, *Embassies Under Siege: A Review of 48 Embassy Takeovers, 1971-1980* (RAND, 1981), iii.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 The most dramatic attack against an American embassy, was realized on April 18, 1983. The United States embassy in Beirut was attacked by a suicide bomber resulting in the killing of sixty-three officers, thirteen of whom were diplomats. “List of Attacks on American diplomats and Congressional Responses, 1973-2012,” *Center for American Progress*, accessed March 26, 2015, available from <https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/diplomats-spreadsheet-v6.pdf>.

48 Donald Mak and Charles Stuart Kennedy, *American Ambassadors in a Troubled World: Interviews with Senior Diplomats* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1992), 2.

Armed Rebel Forces) guerrillas and killed six days later. This attack did not stem from political or historical tensions between the sending (home) and receiving (host) country.⁴⁹ Instead, given the conditions of Guatemalan Civil War, von Spreti was kidnapped and killed. There were similar kidnapping attempts with different motives. Vladimir Rolovic, the Yugoslav ambassador to Sweden, was not kidnapped but attacked and assassinated by Ustasas – Croatian ultra-nationalist – in 1971.⁵⁰ Perpetrators of the attack had no demands on the host country, their main motive was to attract the interest of the world to the Croatian nationalist cause.⁵¹

The above-quoted examples reveal that Armenian attacks on Turkish diplomats were part of a global trend of the time. This is true to a considerable extent. Nevertheless, diplomats of other countries were never targeted as frequently as their Turkish counterparts. The only comparable example to the Turkish case was those of the United States embassies diplomats. These attacks, on the other hand, originated from history, from the political expression methods of time, and from the Cold War conjuncture. In this regard, they deserve a multidimensional analysis including their outcomes for the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy.

Attacks on diplomatic personnel intensified throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, most notably in Latin American countries but also in other parts of the world. As a prominent reaction to international public opinion, the United Nations accepted the “UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 1973.”⁵² The convention “builds on the inviolability of diplomatic personnel by providing not only for their protection but also by requiring parties to make punishable, by appropriate penalties.”⁵³ Paradoxically, attacks on

49 J. Craig Barker, *The Protection of Diplomatic Personnel* (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), 4.

50 “İki Hırvat’ın Vurdugu Elçi Öldü,” (The Ambassador shot by two Croats is dead) *Milliyet*, April 16, 1971, 3.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

Turkish diplomats by Armenian individuals or groups began the year that the convention was adopted and intensified while the Convention was in force.

§ 7.2 “An Old, Mad Man:” The Yanikian Affair and a Decade-Long Series of Assassinations

Turkish diplomats were the addressees of the efforts Armenian organizations to have the deportations of 1915 recognized as genocide. Taha Carim, who in the late 1960s was the Turkish ambassador to Beirut, Lebanon, a city that was the epicenter of the Armenian diaspora in the post-1915 period, warned his government about preparations for massive attacks against the units of the Turkish government by Armenian groups.⁵⁴ Although there was an early signal, claims Lütem, “nobody predicted that Armenian demands would result in terrorist attacks.⁵⁵

The early awareness of Turkish diplomats led them to be the first debaters of a long-term “question.” Baytok, for example, notes that the biggest failure in his professional life was his opposition to Carim’s views about possible activities of Armenian groups.⁵⁶ Bilal Şimşir also notes that Armenian activities were being discussed among Turkish diplomats in the 1960s. According to Şimşir, Ambassador Zeki Kuneralp warned him “not to exaggerate” when he mentioned the threat that Armenians could pose in the near future.⁵⁷

The first assassin, Gourgen Yanikian, was a 76-year-old Armenian-American engineer born in Erzurum, Turkey. On January 25, 1973, Yanikian signaled his action in a 118 pages-long letter to *California Courier*. Yanikian wrote,

54 Baytok, *Diş Politikada...*, 125. For example, in 1966, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested the ministry of the interior to prevent the circulation of five books in Turkey. All books were related to deportations in 1915, and three of them were published in Beirut, Lebanon. PMRA 030.18.01.02.195.32.7.1 May 3, 1966.

55 Lütem, *Interview by the Author*.

56 Baytok, *Diş Politikada...*, 126.

57 Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*, 257.

I will be inventing and practicing a new way of war at the time you read this letter. I am the pioneer: may the Armenians follow me. It is time to awaken the Armenians from their long-lasting sleep and fight fire with fire with the Turks. No nation should establish relations with the Turkish government, and their administrators must be perished: there is no way back from now on.⁵⁸

This was not the only signal. Turkish diplomatic missions in the United States were subject to demonstrations and even physical attacks by Armenian perpetrators. A group of Armenians, for example, attacked the Turkish Consulate General in Los Angeles on April 24, 1972.⁵⁹ On October 29, 1972, again in Los Angeles, a rally on the occasion of the Republic Day was attacked by a group of Armenians.⁶⁰

Yanikian assassinated Mehmet Baydar, the consul general of Turkey in Los Angeles, and consul Bahadır Demir on January 27, 1973. He invited the Turkish diplomats to a hotel in Santa Barbara saying that he had a portrait from the era of Abdulhamid II he wished to donate to the Turkish government.⁶¹ This incident awakened not only the Turkish public but also most of the Turkish diplomats from their years-long indifference with respect to the Armenian

58 "Sizler bu mektubu okuduğunuzda ben yeni bir savaş biçimini icat etmiş ve uygulamış olacağım. Önden gidiyorum, Ermeniler peşinden gelsin. Ermenileri uzun uykularından uyandırmanın ve Türklerle onların anlayacağı dille konuşmanın vakti geldi. Türk hükümeti ile hiçbir millet ilişki kurmamalı ve onların temsilcileri yok edilmeli, artık dönmek yok." Ayşe Hür, "Bir Zamanlar ASALA ve PKK," (Once Upon a Time ASALA and PKK) *Taraf*, 17 October 2010, accessed 19 November 2013, available from <http://www.taraf.com.tr/ayse-hur/makale-bir-zamanlar-asala-ve-pkk.htm>.

59 Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*, 84.

60 Ibid.

61 Yanikian introduced himself to the Turkish Consulate-General in Los Angeles as an Iranian named "Gourg Yaniki." Turkish officials were not suspicious about his offer and asked the permission of the ministry in Ankara. After confirmation from the ministry, two Turkish diplomats agreed to meet Yanikian. After the assassination, Yanikian did not attempt to escape from the crime scene and showed no sign of regret. On the contrary, he waited for police and he is claimed to have said, "I destroyed two evils." Ibid., 85-87.

question. Murat Bilhan, a diplomat of the time and a contemporary of Bahadır Demir, illustrates this.

Bahadır Demir was my friend. His death was a shock. Nevertheless, it taught me that there was such a question. I criticize this severely. ... After this trauma, I read many books. We were not educated about this. I joined the ministry ignorant about this issue.⁶²

After the assassinations of Baydar and Demir, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs alarmed Turkish diplomatic and consular missions twice (first on January 28, 1973, and then on February 10, 1973) against future possible similar acts.⁶³ Baydar and Demir were the first Turkish diplomats to be killed while in service and in this regard, the attack was a shock to the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy.⁶⁴

Shortly after Yanikian's assassination of two Turkish diplomats, in February 1973, Hasan Esat Işık, the Turkish Ambassador to Paris, resigned after it was decided to erect a monument in Marseille commemorating "the victims of the Armenian Genocide."⁶⁵ Işık was not ordered to do so by his

62 "Bahadır Demir benim dostumdu. Ölümü bir şok oldu. Diğer yandan, böyle bir sorun olduğunu da öğretti. Bunu affedemiyorum. Bu travmadan sonra çok sayıda kitap okudum. Bu [konu] bize öğretilmemişti. Bakanlığa bu konuda cahil bir adam olarak girdim." Bilhan, *Interview by the Author*.

63 Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*, 86.

64 Ibid., 99. The unpreparedness of the Turkish state vis-à-vis the new form of "Armenian question" was not only a security matter. It was also a case of lobbying. During the trial of Yanikian, notes Şimşir, Turkish authorities found no written materials defending the Turkish position in the Armenian case in any foreign languages. In ensuing decades, Turkish diplomats were on the frontline of the propaganda war against the claims of the Armenian diaspora. Ibid., 108.

65 İrfan Aktan, "Ahmet İnsel ile Söyleşi: Milliyetçilik Sorunlu Bir Onurdur," (Interview with Ahmet İnsel: Nationalism is a Problematic Honor) *Birikim Online*, accessed May 28, 2016. available from <http://www.birikimdergisi.com/guncel-yazilar/317/ahmet-insel-ile-soylesi-milliyetcilik-sorunlu-bir-onur-dur#.WSrzhxPyhmA>.

government, but the issue had become a “matter of honor” for officials of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy.⁶⁶

The acts on members of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy and their families were nevertheless not limited to that of Yanikian. On the contrary, Yanikian’s request in his long letter came true in the following two decades. The influence of Yanikian’s act on successive attacks of Armenian organizations on Turkish diplomats has not been fully explored. Nevertheless, armed attacks on Turkish diplomatic missions elsewhere in the world were adopted as a main method by the Armenian organizations in the 1970s and 80s. The first attack linked to the ASALA was the assassination of Daniş Tunalıgil, then Turkey’s ambassador to Vienna, on October 22, 1975.⁶⁷

The attacks on Baydur and Tunalıgil intensified an almost century-long debate among members of the Armenian diaspora. Khacig Tololyan refers to two waves of political assassinations by which Armenians promoted and consolidated the “Armenian Cause.” The first was between 1896 and 1908, in which Armenian insurgents sought to establish autonomy for the Armenian

66 Turkish diplomatic and consular missions in France were informed about the erection of a monument in memory of 1915 deportations already at the beginning of 1972. Initial attempts resulted in success and the ceremony for the opening of the monument was cancelled. Nevertheless, a year later in the beginning of 1973, Turkish consulate general in Marseille informed the embassy in Paris that the opening ceremony of the monument was to be made in three days. This time the ceremony couldn’t have been prevented and, moreover, it was realized with the attendance of a French minister. In response, Hasan Esat Işık, as the Turkish ambassador in France, left the country without asking the permission of his government. Yayla, *Diplomat Hasan Esat Işık’ın Biyografisi*, 64-65.

67 Three Armenian attackers managed to enter the Turkish embassy in Vienna and ask Tunalıgil “are you the ambassador?” Despite his denial, the attackers insisted, repeating “you are the ambassador.” They fired on Tunalıgil with machine guns. The details of the incident reveal that more than two years after the assassinations of Baydar and Demir, the Turkish state was by no means ready to protect even its most central diplomatic missions. Şimşir criticizes not only the Turkish state but also the Turkish public for their indifference and lack of awareness of previous terrorist attacks and attempted attacks by Armenians at the beginning of the 1920s. According to him, the assassination of Tunalıgil in Vienna, also revealed “the ignorance and negligence of the Turkish people with respect to Armenian terrorism.” Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*, 152.

population of the Ottoman Empire, while the second wave of political assassinations were realized under the *Nemesis* plan. This was a series of assassinations between 1919 and 1923 against the leaders of the Unionist government who were allegedly influential in the deportation of Anatolian Armenians in 1915.⁶⁸

According to Tololyan, the Yanikian incident and killing of Tunalıgil were precursors of the third wave of political assassinations used by Armenian organizations as a way of struggle for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide.⁶⁹ Indeed, there was no consensus among Armenian communities on the “methods of their struggle against Turkey and the Turks.”⁷⁰ On the eve of the serial assassinations of Turkish diplomats, “some Armenians insisted on the recognition of the events as genocide through political means while some extremists committed high profile terrorist attacks and assassinations of Turkish diplomats.”⁷¹ The second tendency became popular among the members of the Armenian diaspora mostly because the idea of armed struggle suited the spirit of the time.

Besides pioneering a series of violent attacks, Tunalıgil’s assassination was the precursor of a similar attack organized only in a few days later. Attacks in January 1973 and October 1975, in this regard, influenced the mindset of Turkish diplomats, especially those appointed to critical posts. Günver reports in his memoirs that

on October 22, [1975,] a terrible, sad news came. ... Ambassador Daniş Tunalıgil was shot by an Armenian terrorist in his office in Vienna. ... On October 24, I called İsmail Erez, the ambassador to Paris. My friend and brother İsmail was excited as always. “My brother” he said, “I know it is my turn. I feel it. They have followed me since my term as ambassador in Beirut. We will bear our fate. I am now going to the

68 Khacig Tololyan, “Terrorism in Modern Armenian Political Culture,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4, no. 2 (1992), 20.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Hakan Yavuz, “Orientalism, ‘the Terrible Turk,’ and Genocide,” *Middle East Critique* 23, no. 2 (2014), 119.

Austrian embassy for national day celebrations. I will call you after I return and we can talk longer.”⁷²

The call that Erez promised would never be realized. He was right to worry. He was assassinated on his return from the Austrian Embassy the same day (on October, 24).⁷³ Just as the letter of Yanikian was a signal for the assassination of Baydur and Demir, the attack towards Tunalıgil foretold the assassination of Erez. These attacks were the first two of various attacks against Turkish diplomats and diplomatic and consular missions over almost a decade.

The acts were not solely linked to the ASALA or any other Armenian organizations. Since nobody officially claimed responsibility, in the very aftermath of the events the Turkish government suspected the EOKA-B (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), Carlos the Jackal (Ilich Sanchez Ramírez), or the THKO (Turkish People’s Salvation Organization).⁷⁴ Nevertheless, suspicions focused on Armenian organizations already after Tunalıgil’s assassination. Just one day after his assassination, Turkish newspapers covered information that “a person in New York called a US-based news agency and claimed that [the] ‘Armenian Liberation Organization’ killed Tunalıgil.”⁷⁵

72 “22 Ekim günü korkunç ve acı bir haber geldi. Arkadaşım, Büyükelçi Daniş Tunalıgil, Viyana’da, büyikelçilikteki makam odasında işbaşında bir Ermeni terrorist tarafından vurulmuştu... 24 Ekim öğle vaktine doğru telefonla Paris Büyükelçisi İsmail Erez’I aradım. Dostum, kardeşim İsmail, her zamanki gibi heyecanlı idi: ‘Kardeşim’ dedi. ‘Biliyorum sıra bende. Bunu çok iyi hissediyorum. Adamlar Beyrut’taki büyikelçilik zamanımdan beri peşimdeler. Mukkaderata katlanacağız. Şimdi, Avusturya sefarethanesine, milli bayrama gidiyorum. Dönüşte seni ararım, daha uzun konuşuruz.’” Semih Günver, *Kızgın Dam Üzerinde Diplomasi: Avrupalı Olabilmenin Bedeli* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayıncıları, 1989), 40.

73 The attackers ambushed Erez’s car on his return from a reception at the Austrian embassy in Paris. When his car slowed at an intersection on the Bir Hakeim Bridge in Paris, attackers first shot the driver, and then Erez. Two days after the assassination of Tunalıgil, Turkish diplomatic missions – even those at greater risk – were far from being protected properly. Simple methods of attack were enough to kill high-ranking Turkish diplomats. Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*, 163-166.

74 Göcek, *Denial of Violence...*, 431.

75 Mehmet Ali Birand, “Üç Meçhul Kişi Viyana’da Büyükelçimizi Öldürdü,” (Unknown three people killed our ambassador in Vienna) Milliyet, October 23, 1975. 6.

After the assassination of Erez two days later, on the other hand, the Turkish government and public were more and more confused. Armenians were not the only suspects in the headlines. *Milliyet* reported that either the Greek organization EOKA or the Armenians were responsible for the murder.⁷⁶ The same day *Cumhuriyet* informed its readers that the Austrian police had issued an arrest warrant for a Greek citizen.⁷⁷ In ensuing years, the Turkish public and officials continued to be skeptical of the possibility that Armenians were the perpetrators of these incidents. This stemmed from the decades-long indifference of the public towards the Armenian question as well as the actuality of the Cyprus dispute throughout the 1970s. However, Göçek claims that this indifference was not coincidental. According to her, this was due to the Turkish state's efforts to not allow the deportation of 1915 to come up on the agenda in Turkey and the world.⁷⁸

On the surface, the reaction of the Turkish government to these four assassinations was awkward. Although the Turkish state had been on alert against the actions of Armenians since 1965, Lütem notes that "they were considered marginal since no country supported them."⁷⁹ Even eight years after 1965, on the fiftieth anniversary of 1915 deportations, the Turkish government and foreign ministry were far from having developed a full-fledged policy. As Dixon puts it, the initial responses of Turkish governments to terrorist attacks were restricted to "condemnation of the terrorist attacks, denial of ... genocide

76 Milliyet, "Ya EOKA-B ya Ermeniler..." (Either EOKA-B or Armenians) October 25, 1975, 1.

77 Cumhuriyet, October 25, 1975, 1

78 Göçek, *Denial of Violence...*, 431. In her study, Göçek repeats this claim twice more. In a contradictory manner, she concludes that the Turkish government only revealed the real perpetrators of the incident in 1980 after an attack on Turkey's consul-general in Sydney. In another part of the book, she repeats this claim, stating that the state faced reality only as late as 1982 after a series of attacks perpetrated by Armenian assailants. Nevertheless, there are numerous statements that prove that Turkish governments of the time realized the "Armenian dimension" of the attacks. For example, after the assassination of İsmail Erez on October 25, 1975, the third person to be killed by Armenian assailants, a mainstream Turkish newspaper postulated that Armenian groups were potential perpetrators. "Ya EOKA-B Ya Ermeniler," (Either EOKA-B or Armenians) Milliyet, 26 October 1973, 1.

79 Lütem, *Interview by the Author*.

claims and the heightening of security measures [in Turkish diplomatic missions.]”⁸⁰ Süleyman Demirel, the prime minister at the time, was confident that the Turkish government would reveal and catch the assassins.⁸¹ The explanations by the government of the time, however, were by no means satisfactory. Ali Zülfikaroğlu, a deputy of the TBMM, issued a parliamentary question asking about “measures for the protection of Turkish diplomatic missions abroad.”⁸² A year later, in March 1976, Kemal Sarıibrahimoğlu, a member of the senate, issued a more aggressive parliamentary question. In his statement Sarıibrahimoğlu criticized the government of the time for “not informing the TBMM about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ efforts and measures vis-à-vis the massacres and attacks.”⁸³

The reactions of the TBMM and the Turkish public did not stop the assassinations of Turkish diplomats. Oktar Cirit, first secretary at the Turkish Embassy in Beirut, was assassinated on February 16, 1976.⁸⁴ Just sixteen months later, on June 9, 1977, Taha Carım, the Turkish ambassador to the Vatican, was assassinated in front of his home.⁸⁵ The assassination of Carım increased concern and criticism in public opinion. As a response, an official from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that “the government has spent fifty million dollars since 1975 to take necessary measures to prevent Turkish diplomats and diplomatic missions from further attack.”⁸⁶ The official also repeated that “the government has appointed guards for the protection of

80 Jennifer M. Dixon, “Defending the Nation? Maintaining Turkey’s Narrative on the Armenian Genocide,” *South European Society and Politics* 15, no. 3 (2010), 471.

81 Milliyet, October 23, 1975, 6.

82 Şimşir, *Şehit...*, 180.

83 Ibid.

84 Cirit was taken to hospital by two local Armenians of Beirut, a businessman and a taxi-driver. This just that not all members of the Armenian diaspora favored of the attacks on Turkish diplomats, at least in the early stages of the incidents. Şimşir, *Şehit ...*, 194-196.

85 Indeed, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy was more prepared in 1977 than two or four years before. The Turkish government assigned guards to protect Turkish ambassadors in Europe. Ibid., 217.

86 Ibid., 226.

ambassadors, ... but Ambassador Carım requested that the guard appointed to him be withdrawn.”⁸⁷

The Turkish public was not satisfied because attacks continued and the perpetrators were reaching their goals. On June 2, 1978, Necla Kuneralp, the spouse of Zeki Kuneralp who was then-Turkish Ambassador to Madrid, and Beşir Balcioğlu, the brother-in-law of Zeki Kuneralp and a former ambassador, were killed in their car.⁸⁸ Ambassador Kuneralp was the probable target.⁸⁹ This incident was the first of a series of attacks that resulted in the deaths of relatives of Turkish diplomats.

Yalim Eralp notes that “the security of families was a major concern.”⁹⁰ On October 12, 1979, for example, Ahmet Benler was assassinated in a car of the Turkish embassy in The Hague. He was the son of Özdemir Benler, Turkish Ambassador to The Hague. In July 1980, during an attack on Galip Özmen, administrative attaché at the Turkish embassy in Athens, his daughter Neslihan Özmen was also killed.⁹¹ The wife and son of Özmen were also in the car and subjected to the attack. This incident also indicated a change in the tactics of Armenian terrorists.

With the intensification of attacks on high-ranking Turkish diplomats, Turkish governments began providing partial protections such as armored cars.⁹² These measures, as one Turkish diplomat noted, “came slowly and step by step.”⁹³ As a consequence of the increasing measures to protect high-ranking diplomats such as ambassadors as well as embassy buildings, attacks were subsequently directed towards mid- or low-ranking officials. Yılmaz Çolpan,

87 Ibid.

88 “Madrid Büyükelçimize Suikast Yapıldı, Eşi Oldü,” (Our Ambassador to Madrid was Assassinated, His Wife Died), *Milliyet*, June 3, 1978, 1.

89 Kuneralp was deeply influenced from this assassination and retired a year after the incident. Kuneralp, *Sadece...*, 198.

90 Eralp, *Interview by the Author*.

91 “Lahaye Elçimizin Oğlu Öldürüldü,” (Son of Our Ambassador to The Hague is Killed) *Cumhuriyet*, October 13, 1979, 1. Interestingly, news of ASALA attacks was given not in headlines but in subheads. The Turkish public was gradually getting used to such incidents.

92 Eralp, *Interview by the Author*.

93 Bilhan, *Interview by the Author*.

then counselor for tourism and promotion at the Paris embassy was assassinated in December 1979.⁹⁴

Although low- or mid-ranking diplomatic staff also began to be targeted, high-ranking Turkish diplomats continued to be targets. Şarık Aryak, Turkish consul general to Sydney, was assassinated on December 17, 1980.⁹⁵ Similarly, on September 24, 1981, Kaya İnal, the subordinate consul general in Paris, was injured during an attack on the Turkish consulate general.⁹⁶

On January 28, 1982, Kemal Arıkan became the second Turkish consul general in Los Angeles to be assassinated.⁹⁷ Orhan Gündüz, Turkey's honorary consul in Boston, was assassinated the same year. These two assassinations revealed a new pattern. Both Arıkan and Gündüz were Turkish representatives actively involved against the Armenian campaign for the recognition of genocide claims.⁹⁸

Among the targets of Armenian terrorist organizations in the 1980s, Galip Balkar had the highest profile. İlter Türkmen, then foreign minister of Turkey, states that Galip Balkar “was so outstanding ... that ... he was predicted as the future secretary general [at the foreign ministry] or the ambassador to Washington.”⁹⁹ Reha Aytaman, then Turkish ambassador to Bangkok, remarks in his memoirs that himself was chosen for the Belgrade ambassadorship instead of Balkar. In his words,

Indeed, they could have appointed me to a more active post. However, the clique to which [İlter Türkmen] belonged was influential in my appointment to an unfavorable mission. At the same time, Galip Balkar, who was my junior ... at NATO, was appointed to Belgrade, and in any case this post was much important to us than Thailand. However,

94 “Paris’teki Türk Tanıtma Müdürinü Ermeniler Öldürdü,” (Armenians Killed the Turkish Promotion Director in Paris) *Milliyet*, December 23, 1979, 1.

95 Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*, 339.

96 In the early 1980s, Paris was the most dangerous location for Turkish diplomatic and consular officers. The September 1981 attack was among five in less than a year.

97 *Ibid.*, 464.

98 Göçek, *Denial of Violence...*, 605.

99 De Waal, *Büyük Felaketten Sonra...*, 206.

everybody's destiny is determined by God ... As a consequence of his appointment, poor Galip Balkar was the target of an Armenian bullet.¹⁰⁰

Balkar's assassination was not coincidental. When Krikor Levonian, one of his two assassins, spoke to a Serbian newspaper in 1998, he revealed that Balkar was a deliberate choice. According to Levonian, the reason they chose Balkar as a target was his involvement in efforts against the recognition of the "Armenian Genocide."¹⁰¹ Balkar was chosen, adds Levonian, because he was active in Turkish politics and was expected to become prime minister of Turkey in the future.¹⁰²

Balkar was assassinated on March 9, 1983.¹⁰³ He was the last ambassador to be killed by Armenian terrorist organizations. During the 1970s, socialist countries were more secure for Turkish diplomats than Western European countries, the United States, and Lebanon.¹⁰⁴ Eastern Bloc countries were more determined for the protection of Turkish diplomats. Kemal Girgin, who was undersecretary at Turkey's embassy in East Berlin, states that East German police immediately took the necessary measures after the first attack – on Tunalıgil – without waiting for a request from the Turkish embassy.¹⁰⁵ After

100 "Aslında beni daha faal bir yere gönderilebilidi, fakat mensup olduğu 'clique'in de beni böyle pasif bir yere gönderilmemde rolü olsa gerekti. Aynı zamanda NATO'da görevli olan benden ki demsiz Galip Balkar Belgrad'a tayin ediliyordu ve orası bizim için herhalde Tayland'dan çok daha önemli idi. Fakat herkesin kaderini Allah tayin eder... bu tayin sonucu, zavallı Galip Balkar bir Ermeni kurşununa hedef oldu." Aytaman, *Sinirli Yıllar...*, 265.

101 Göçek, *Denial of Violence...*, 608.

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid., 606.

104 Bilhan evaluates this in a more realistic way. According to him, the protection granted by the security units of Eastern bloc countries were due to monitoring by their intelligence organizations. As a consequence, while monitoring the actions of Turkish diplomats, security forces of Eastern Bloc countries were actually providing them with more protection. Bilhan, *Interview by the Author*.

105 Girgin, *Dünyanın Dört Bucağı...*, 82.

the third attack, namely assassination of Erez, adds Girgin, East German police broadened the protection measures.¹⁰⁶

With the assassination of Balkar, however, Armenian groups expanded their operational capacity to socialist countries. The Yugoslav government could not prevent the assassination of the Turkish ambassador, but his assassins were arrested, tried, and respectively sentenced to twenty and fifteen years in prison.¹⁰⁷ After Balkar's assassination, Armenian militants directed their attacks on mid- or low-ranking Turkish officers. Bora Süelkan, administrative attaché to Turkish consulate general in Burgas, was assassinated on September 9, 1982.¹⁰⁸ After this attack, Armenian militants continued to perpetrate attacks on other low-ranking Turkish diplomats. For instance, Dursun Aksoy, the administrative attaché to the Turkish embassy in Brussels, was assassinated on July 14, 1983.¹⁰⁹ High-level diplomats and diplomatic missions were still targeted despite increasing precautions. Just thirteen days after the Brussels attack, the Turkish embassy in Lisbon was subject to an attack that resulted in the death of Cahide Mihçioğlu, the spouse of Yurtsev Mihçioğlu, who was charge d'affairs at the embassy.¹¹⁰

106 "Böylece, bir polis teğmeniyle iki uzun tüfekli polis ve bir şöförden oluşan oluşan ekip devamlı peşime takılmaya başladı." *Ibid.*

107 The two assassins, Haroution Levonian and Raffia Elbekian were sentenced to twenty and fifteen years of imprisonment, respectively. However, the former, who was seriously injured in the attack, was released after four years due to health conditions, whereas the latter was released in 1990. Ömer Engin Lütem, who was the head of the intelligence and research department of the Turkish MFA, a unit established mainly in response to Armenian "activities," expressed that the assassination of Balkar was his biggest crisis and shock during his term in office especially due to Balkar's outstanding professional capabilities. Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*, 668. Lütem, *Interview by the Author*.

108 Şimşir, *Şehit...*, 584.

109 *Ibid.*, 694.

110 Ten days before the attack, İsmail Soysal completed his term in Lisbon and returned to Turkey. Suat Bilge, the new ambassador had yet to begin his new term. Yurtsev Mihçioğlu was acting ambassador, and as a consequence, the Mihçioğlu family was targeted in the attack on the chancery of the embassy. Yurtsev Mihçioğlu and his son Atasay Mihçioğlu were injured, whereas Cahide Mihçioğlu died. *Ibid.*

One characteristic of Armenian attacks on Turkish diplomats and diplomatic and consular missions was the intensification of incidents in certain cities and countries. Numerous attacks were realized in Los Angeles, which was also the venue of the first attack, in ensuing years, for example. Due to the danger Los Angeles posed for Turkish officials given its considerable Armenian population, Bilhan notes that “it was hard for the ministry to find diplomats to appoint as consul general in Los Angeles.”¹¹¹

Vienna, the cosmopolitan capital of Austria, was another dramatic example. In June and November 1984, two attacks occurred in Vienna. The city was the location of the first assassination of a Turkish diplomat in 1975 organized by an Armenian group. The city’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks was criticized by Turkish diplomats and government officials on various occasions. Erdem Erner, in his accounts, draws attention to the fact that such incidents frequently occurred in Vienna.

Is it a coincidence? Or was this because the city constituted a safe haven for terrorists since no terrorists had been caught to date? ... Vienna assassination 1: October 22, 1975: Daniş Tunalıgil, our ambassador to Vienna, was assassinated in his office. Vienna assassination 2: June 20, 1984: Erdoğan Özen, the deputy counselor for labor at the Vienna Embassy, was assassinated via a bomb placed in his car. Vienna assassination 3: November 19, 1984: Evner Ergun, the only Turkish director in the Vienna bureau of the United Nations, was killed. Armenian assassination organizations claimed responsibility for these three incidents. All three assassinations were realized in the Austrian capital in broad daylight. Vienna, the capital of Austria, began to be viewed as a city in which terrorists could easily mobilize and commit murder. The Austrian authorities, claimed how secure Vienna was for foreign diplomats while promoting their capital.¹¹²

111 Eralp, *Interview by the Author*.

112 “Bu bir tesadüf mü? Yoksa şehir şimdije kadar hiçbir terrorist yakalanmadığı için onlara bir sigınak mıydı? ... 1. Viyana Cinayeti: 22 Ekim 1975: Viyana Büyükelçimiz Daniş Tunalıgil odasında öldürüldü. 2. Viyana Cinayeti: Viyana Büyükelçiliği Çalışma Ataşesi Erdoğan Özen

Erner's statements are significant to understand the reactions of officials of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. His words indeed reflect widespread distress in this period. Bilhan, in a similar vein, insists that "the countries in which the attacks took place did not take the issue under consideration seriously."¹¹³ In most cases, public opinions in European countries did not evaluate the incidents through the lens of combatting terrorism as Turkish authorities wished. Each attack was being linked to the deportation of Armenians in 1915. The deportation of Ottoman Armenians in 1915 was seen as the justifying factor for the assassinations. This attitude hurt officials of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. In the words of Hamit Batu,

in commentaries in the media it was mentioned that terrorists could find no other way except for this ... to publicize about a problem forgotten for more than half a century. ... These acts could be pardoned and even considered fair. We even read this statement in the editorial of a prominent newspaper: "What can these poor kids do? How can they make their voices heard otherwise?" The people who lived through those years will not forget that "poor kids" statement easily. Along with this, we were subject to the inimical attitudes [of local authorities] that neglected the rules of logic and courtesy, and [their attitudes] were incompatible to any customs of international relations.¹¹⁴

arabasında konan bir bomba ile öldürdü. 3. Viyana Cinayeti: BM'nin Viyana bürosundaki tek Türk müdürü Evner Ergun öldürdü. Ermeni cinayet örgütleri üç olayda da sorumluluğu üstlendi. Üç cinayette Avusturya'nın başkentinde güpegündüz işlendi. Avusturya'nın başkenti Viyana teröristlerin kolaylıkla hareket ettiği ve cinayete kalkışıkları bir şehir olarak görülmeye başladı. Avusturyalı yetkililer şehirlerini tanıtırken Viyana'nın diplomatlar için ne kadar güvenilir olduğunu söylüyorlardı." Erner, *Davulun Sesi*, 242-243. Erner's father, Ahmet Fayık (Erner), was a late Ottoman and early republican bureaucrat accused of being involved in massacres of Armenians. Göcek, *Denial of Violence...*, 453.

113 Bilhan, *Interview by the Author*.

114 "Medyada çıkan yorumlarda, teröristlerin yarımyüzünden uzun bir süreden beri unutulan bir sorunu duyurmak için... bu eylemlerden başka çare bulamadıklarından söz ediliyor ... Bu hareketler mazur görülebilirdi, hatta belki haklı sayılabilirdi. Önemli bir gazetenin başyazısında şu ifadeyi de okumuştuk: "Ne yapsınlar, zavallı çocuklar, başka türlü nasıl seslerini duyabilirler!" O yılları yaşayanlar, bu "zavallı çocuklar" sözlerini kolayca

European public opinion about the assassinations of Turkish diplomats by Armenian organizations was a serious matter of distress for Turkish diplomats. Like Batu, Şimşir complains that the European media concentrated on what he called Armenian propaganda. After the assassination of Ambassador Taha Carım in Italy, states Şimşir, “some Italian newspapers covered Armenian propaganda,” and “newspapers even tolerated the assassination instead of condemning it.”¹¹⁵ Lütem also recalls that political conditions of the time played a role in the European perception of Turkey in those years. Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and the coup d’état of 1980, according to him, negatively influenced the willingness of European countries to cooperate Turkey on this issue.¹¹⁶

In addition to Vienna, there were some other cities in which attacks on Turkish diplomats intensified. Two attacks were realized in Lisbon in June 1982 and, as stated above, in July 1983. Paris was another capital that frequently witnessed attacks by Armenian organizations. Selçuk Bakkalbaşı, press counselor at the Paris Embassy, was injured on September 26, 1980, and a bomb placed in the car of Ahmet Erbeyli on January 13, 1981.¹¹⁷ Similarly, Turkish diplomats and diplomatic missions in Ottawa, Canada, were targeted twice in the 1980s. Kemalettin Kani Güngör, the trade counselor at the Ottawa Embassy, was injured in an attack on April 8, 1982, and Coşkun Kırca, the Turkish ambassador

unutmayacaklar. Bunlarla birlikte, mantık ve nezaket kurallarını yok sayan, uluslararası ilişkilerin hiçbir usulüne siğmayan, düşmanca tavırlara hedef olduk.” Hamit Batu, *Diş Görevde: Avrupa’yla Bunalımlı Yıllar* (İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1995), 108-109.

115 Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*, 229.

116 Lütem, *Interview by the Author*.

117 Paris and France along with Beirut and Lebanon were the cities and countries in which any Armenian group easily have been involved in attacks. One of these attacks also led to a split within the ASALA which would later be influential in bringing about the end of the organization. On July 15, 1983, ASALA militants arranged to explode a Turkish Airlines plane in the air but the bomb exploded while on the baggage ramp causing the death of eight people. Of the people who died in the attack, four were French, two were Turkish, one was from the United States, and one was a Swedish citizen. After this attack, not only did French authorities launch a committed campaign to eliminate the activities of the ASALA in France, but a split occurred within ASALA between those who strictly opposed any forms civilian casualties and those who favored attacks on civilians.

to Ottawa, was injured in an attack on the Turkish embassy on March, 12 1985.¹¹⁸ The latter was the last attack by an Armenian group on a Turkish ambassador.¹¹⁹ Up to then, Daniş Tunaligil, İsmail Erez, Taha Carım, and Galip Balkar were the ambassadors assassinated by Armenian organizations, while Vecdi Türel, ambassador to the Vatican and Doğan Türkmen, ambassador to Bern, survived attacks in 1980.¹²⁰

§ 7.3 A Horrific Wait: The Daily Experience of Threatened Turkish Diplomats

The attacks were shocking for Turkey, and the degree of frustration prevented the application of needed security measures for a long time. Remarks by Semih Günver, who was Turkey's permanent representative at Council of Europe in Strasbourg (1975-1982), reflects the atmosphere in Turkey's diplomatic missions, especially in Western Europe.

We waited for years for the first measures to be taken. Even today [1989], these measures have not been implemented completely. The strongest weapon of the bodyguards ... is their good faith. These officers are incapable of overcoming their missions. They were not specifically trained. Various factors played a role in the appointment of bodyguards sent to work abroad along with their families. The fortification of diplomatic mission buildings is far from satisfactory due to financial

118 A group of members of the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA) attacked and occupied the Turkish embassy in Ottawa. This was the third attack by Armenians on this Turkish diplomatic mission in three years. Turkish Ambassador Coşkun Kırca, the probable target of the attack, managed to hide from the attackers by climbing down into the garden of the embassy. Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*, 943-947.

119 The Turkish embassy in Tehran was attacked by a group of Armenians before the Ottawa incident, and Tanşuğ Bleda, then Turkish ambassador to Tehran, survived by lying to an Armenian who asked him whether he was the ambassador. Tanşuğ Bleda, *Maskeli Balo* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2000), 119-120.

120 Şimşir, *Şehit...*, 899 & 909.

considerations. No serious measures were taken for officers other than ambassadors.¹²¹

It is not easy to verify the validity of Günver's illustration of the situation. The following incidents, however, support his claims. Most of the time, Western European security units were criticized for not being determined enough against the threat of the ASALA and JCAG. Turkish diplomatic missions, in this regard, had to take matters into their own hands in most cases. Because any diplomatic mission could be targeted by militants, Turkish diplomats had to adapt to a new life and working style. Eralp states that "morale within the Turkish diplomatic corps plummeted as everyone started to live in a state of constant anxiety."¹²² Some Turkish diplomats, adds Eralp, "took out life insurance" given the possible threats.¹²³

A securitized atmosphere often resulted in less-comfortable working conditions for them. Hamit Batu was appointed as Turkey's ambassador to Paris in August 1978, almost three years after the assassination of İsmail Erez. Batu portrays the conditions that he and his colleagues elsewhere in Western Europe faced in the late 1970s as follows:

In that period, I searched for ways to ease the security pressure that was leaving our missions in the West heavily burdened a bit. I was getting bored going out in the accompaniment of two police officers like a prisoner. Sometimes I tried to "get lost" through the back door and mingle freely with the crowd. ... French authorities politely informed that they did not approve of these escapes: "They were mobilizing 60-

121 "İlk tedbirlerin alınması için yıllarca bekledik. Bugün bile, bu tedbirler tam manası ile alınmış değildir. Güvenlik memurlarının en kuvvetli silahı iyi niyetleridir. Bu görevliler, işinin ehli değildirler. Özel bir eğitime tabi tutulmamışlardır. Çoluk çocukları ile dış görevde yollanan emniyet mensuplarının atanmalarında çeşitli faktörler rol oynamaktadır. Sefaret binalarının dışarıya karşı tahkim edilmeleri işi de mali nedenlerle tatmin edici düzeye ulaşamamıştır. Büyükelçinin dışındaki memurların güvenlikleri için ise hiçbir ciddi tedbir alınmamıştır." Günver, *Kızgın Dam Üzerinde Diplomasi...*, 42.

122 Göçek, *Denial of Violence...*, 431.

123 Eralp, *Interview by the Author*.

70 police to protect Turkish missions in France. I shouldn't set a bad example." ... I made a better evaluation after realizing the situation.¹²⁴

Batu's discomfort was shared by other Turkish diplomats. Mete Akkaya, then a fifteen-year Turkish diplomat, states it was boring and tiring to "not be able to do what you want to" due to security concerns.¹²⁵ Nevertheless, there were other reactions to the situation. Batu felt disturbed and like a captive due to the strict monitoring of French police for his security. There were others who were uneasy due to the obligations of self-defense measures. These were diplomats raised with civilian customs, and now they were being commanded to carry guns and have the ability to use them properly as necessary. Ömer Altuğ, who was a young diplomat during the most severe days of the attacks of Armenian organizations on Turkish diplomats, illustrates their unusual tasks.

As a precautionary measure, our ministry delivered guns to the officers working abroad. We were ordered to always carry the guns with us and test fire-them periodically. ... One day we were taken to the target range under the leadership of our ambassador. There were many pleased about of this situation [of carrying guns], most notably Ambassador [Tevfik] Saraçoğlu. Mr. Saraçoğlu ... realized that I was not firing. ... Mr. Saraçoğlu was a tolerant superior; I did not attend the test-firing sessions again.¹²⁶

124 "O dönemde Batı'daki temsilcilerimizi çok ağır bir baskı altında bırakan bu güvenlik sorununun sıkıntısını biraz hafifletmek çarelerini araştırdım. Her dışarı çıkışında, tutsak gibi iki polisin koruması altında yürümekten çok sıkılıyordum. Arada bir, haber vermeden arka kapıdan 'kaybolmak' çaresine başvurarak halkın içine karışmayı, biraz serbest dolaşmayı denemiştim. Fransız makamları, bu kaçamak çıkışları hiç uygun bulmadıklarını nazik bir şekilde duyurdular: 'Fransa'daki Türk temsilciliklerini ve kurumlarını korumak için, her gün 60-70 polisi seferber ediyorlardı. Kötü bir örnek olmamam gerekiyordu...' Ben de, durumu daha iyi anladıkta sonra, kemdime göre bir değerlendirme yapabildim." Batu, *Avrupa'yla Bunalımlı Yıllar...*, 15-16.

125 Mete Akkaya, *Ters Akan Sefareti* (İstanbul: Dama Yayınları, 2011), 50.

126 "Bakanlığımız, bir önlem olarak, yurt dışındaki görevlilere birer zimmetli tabanca vermişti. Tabancanın her zaman yanımızda bulundurulması ve belirli aralıklarla atış talimi yapılması isteniyordu... Bir gün Büyükelçimizin onderliğinde atış poligonuna götürüldük. Başta

Altuğ was never keen on the idea of permanently carrying a gun, a method which, according to him, would by no means be useful.”¹²⁷ Akkaya also notes that he neither carried his gun nor wore his bulletproof vest during his term in Ottawa in 1974.¹²⁸ Similarly, a Turkish bureaucrat of the time assigned to France, notes that he rejected French officers’ offer to carry a gun.¹²⁹ Indeed, the French officer requested him to submit to variety of security measures: not to leave home at the same time every morning, to use different routes on his way to work, not to park his car in the same place every time he went to the city center, and to pay attention to his surroundings.¹³⁰ These measures were more strict than a diplomat could manage while doing his job.

However, not all diplomats responded to the new conditions in the same manner. A Turkish diplomat notes that he and his wife practiced shooting at a firing range.¹³¹ Taner Baytok was appointed to Vienna as a member of Turkey’s delegation to the Multiple and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations just a few days after the assassination of Tunaligil. While describing the situation in Turkey’s embassy in Vienna as “shock” after the assassination of Tunaligil, Baytok states that he did not “let terrorism shape his life and poison the lives of the people around him.”¹³² Baytok insists that he never paid

Büyükelçi [Tevfik] Saraçoğlu olmak üzere bu işten hoşnut olanların sayısı fazlaydı... Tevfik Bey ... benim atış yapmadığımı gördü... Tevfik Bey anlayışlı bir amirdi; bir daha atış talimine falan gitmedim.” Altuğ, *Hatırında Kalanlar...*, 95-96. Turkish diplomats seemed to be both dissatisfied from the level of security measures and uneager to obey the existing precautions requested by the Turkish government and authorities of host countries.

127 Altuğ’s projection was true. Taha Carım, the third ambassador to be assassinated by Armenians, was perhaps among the Turkish diplomats most eager to use the gun assigned for his protection. The terrorists “should struggle and pay the bill if they wanted to end his life,” according to Carım. Known for his courageous character, he was neither eager to be protected by Turkish nor by Italian security forces. On the day of his assassination, nevertheless, Carım did not even have the chance to pull his gun and was assassinated by three bullets. Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*, 217-218.

128 Akkaya, *Ters Akan Sefareti...*, 49.

129 Sedes, *Bir Dönem Babıali*, 115.

130 Ibid., 115-116.

131 Göcek, *Denial of Violence...*, 455.

132 Baytok, *Dış Politikadar Bir Nefes...*, 14.

attention to the danger; however, he also notes that an atmosphere of fear surrounded Turkish diplomatic missions in Western Europe. A car stopped at a traffic light, an ordinary man walking behind a Turkish administrative officer in the street, or just a loud noise could easily cause panic in the embassy building due to a fear that persisted even six months after the assassination of Ambassador Tunalıgil.¹³³ The threat of an attack by an Armenian group not only influenced the daily habits of Turkish diplomats but also their everyday perceptions of their surroundings. Officers of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy, in short, were experiencing the securitization of daily life in a unique way. Bilge Cankorel, a young career diplomat in the late 1970s, states that

the terror atmosphere that began in the first days of my career and continued for years became the reality of our lives. During my terms in Europe, carrying a service pistol, sometimes wearing a mesh vest, and living with other security precautions without awakening our little children, were the routines of our daily lives.¹³⁴

Although security measures became integral to their lives, Cankorel adds that this situation “strengthened their work ethic and motivation.”¹³⁵ Security measures encircled the everyday lives of the Turkish diplomats. The situation of alert that Turkish diplomats were in, notes Cankorel, “could not prevent them from monitoring the Armenians during their demonstrations.”¹³⁶ Nonetheless, attacks clearly had a paralyzing impact on the daily habits of Turkish diplomats. Başkut exemplifies the paranoid situation with an anecdote from those days.

One night, while I was going home after completing my work at the mission ... a little, white Fiat was following me. I sped up; he sped up,

133 Ibid., 14 & 205-206.

134 “Mesleğimin ilk yıllarda başlayan ve yıllarca devam edecek olan bu terör havası, yaştanlığımızın bir gerceği haline gelmişti. O tarih ten sonra Avrupa'daki görevlerim sırasında da beylik tabanca taşımak, zaman zaman çelik yelek giymek ve küçük çocuklara hissetirmeden sürekli diğer güvenlik tedbirleriyle yaşamak, günlük hayatlığımızın rutini olacaktı.” Cankorel, *Bir Dönem Biterken...*, 27.

135 Ibid.

136 Ibid.

too. I did not stop at a red light; he did not, either. I entered the garage which was accessed by key and was two floors down from the main floor; he also entered. I parked the car and began to run away. A man was running behind me. I began to hide and wait since I could not run fast enough. If I had had my gun, I would have definitely used it to protect myself. In its absence, I held the throat of the man and lifted him up so strongly that ... What I saw when I relaxed a little bit was terrible. The man was crying in French, "You're crazy!" He was coming to the Mexican Consulate, which was in an adjacent apartment in our complex. I could not decide how to apologize. I mentioned the Armenian terror threat, but I do not think that he understood given his panic.¹³⁷

Afra mentions similar anecdotes about his days as consul general in Düsseldorf, Germany.

I received a package from Munich from a person that I did not know. Moreover, the name was Armenian. Since the ASALA increased its actions in those days, telegraphs from Ankara warned "look out for suspicious packages." ...

We put the bomb detector on the package, the detector's alarm went off. I notified German police immediately. Experts came. They also checked the package and placed the "bomb" in the middle of a large public park next to the building to explode it. ... The package was

137 "Bir gece Misyon'daki işimi tamamlayıp evime giderken... Ufak, beyaz, Fiat marka bir araba beni takip ediyor. Hızlandım, o da hızlandı. Kırmızı ışıkta geçtim, o da geçti. Garajdaki arabayı kenara çekip, koşarak kaçmağa başladım. Evin anahtarla girilen ve zeminden iki kat aşağıdaki geniş parkına girdim, o da girdi. Arkamdan da koşan biri vardı. Yeterince hızlı koşamadığımdan, merdiven girişindeki bir yere saklanıp beklemeye başladım. Tabancam olsa, mutlaka çıkarıp kendimi koruyacaktım... Önümden hızla geçmeye çalışan adamın boğazını öyle yakalamış ve kendisini yukarı kaldırılmışım ki... Kendime biraz geldiğimde gördüğüm tablo dehşet vericiydi. Adam Fransızca olarak 'Siz delisiniz diye bağıriyor... Kaldığımız sitede, yakınımızdaki bir dairede Meksika Konsolosluğu'na geliyormuş. Nasıl özür dileyeceğim, bilemedim. Ermni teröründen bahsettim ama o telaşla anladığını hiç sanmam.' Başkut, *Aferin İyiydin...*, 52-53.

a big plate from Paşabahçe with Arabic decoration. ... On the following day, the question was resolved. My younger uncle ... thought to send me this plate. He gave the package to his Armenian friend since his friend was going to Munich.¹³⁸

Not all the threats were funny or tragicomic. Others were real and frightening. Daver Darende was a young Turkish diplomat in the mid-1970s. Oktar Cirit, the first secretary at Turkey's embassy in Beirut, had already been assassinated in February 1976. Darende received a letter during his preparations for the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, İhsan Çağlayangil to Oslo, Norway. The letter included a note: "You will be killed in Oslo."¹³⁹ In his memoirs, Darende notes that even though nothing significantly suspicious occurred during Çağlayangil's visit, the time between receiving the letter and the end of the visit passed with a considerable sense of unrest.¹⁴⁰

Each attack brought new warnings from the ministry to diplomatic missions. Every new telegraph from the ministry ordered stricter measures. Moreover, "a special section [the Intelligence and Research Department] was established to deal with the security matters for the protection of diplomatic staff."¹⁴¹ Physical security measures were taken in diplomatic missions and it became harder for Armenian organizations to attack Turkish mission chiefs.¹⁴² Even at the relatively late date of 1988, the ministry was warning its personnel

138 "Düsseldorf'ta başkonsolos iken, Münih'ten hiç tanımadığım birinin adını taşıyan bir paket geldi. Üstelik ad bir Ermeni'nin adı. O sıralarda ASALA faaliyetlerine hız vermiş olduğundan, merkezden gelen telgraflarda "Şüpheli paketlere dikkat edilmesi denmekteydi....

Paketin üstünde elektronik dedektörü gezdirdim, paket deli gibi ötüyor. Hemen Alman polisine haber verdim. Ekspeler geldi, onlar da kontrol ettiler ve 'bomba'yı patlatmak üzere, binanın karşısındaki çok geniş bir parkın ortasına yerleştirdiler... Paşabahçe'nin cam üzerine arabesk renkli süsler olan büyükçe bir tabak ... Ertesi gün sorun çözüldü ... Küçük dayım ... bana bu tabağı göndermeyi düşünmüştür. Bir Ermeni dostu Düsseldorf'a gittiğinden paketi ona vermiş." Afra, *Hariciyeciler Dedikodu yu Sever*, 218-219.

139 Darende, *Diplomatın Not Defteri*, 66-70.

140 Ibid.

141 Kuneralp, *Sadece Diplomat...*, 507.

142 Şimşir, *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*, 79.

with a brochure that included information about necessary measures against possible attacks.¹⁴³

The attacks did not come to an end; on the contrary, attacks continued instead on mid-ranking diplomats who were still unsatisfactorily protected. After the assassinations of five Turkish diplomats in four cities on three continents, both the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy and some journalists were convinced that attacks on Turkish diplomats could not be overcome using conventional methods.¹⁴⁴ Şükrü Elekdağ, the Turkish ambassador to Washington, reported to Ankara that

it is impossible to overcome Armenian terrorism through the physical security measures applied up until now. It is inevitable for us to abandon classical measures and apply methods that will deter and frighten perpetrators, disturb the ones committed to their causes, and prevent them from increasing tensions. Please take note of the sentence I write below. Of course, it is of great significance that these counter-measures be implemented via front organizations without the marks of the Turkish state.¹⁴⁵

Elekdağ was offering an asymmetric war against the ASALA, and he was by no means alone in prescribing this to overcome the political violence on Turkish diplomatic missions and diplomats. A year after his suggestion to Ankara,

143 Sedes, *Bir Dönem Bab-ı Ali...*, 116.

144 Göçek notes that Orhan Birgit in *Dünya*, Örsan Öymen in *Milliyet*, and Ergun Göze in *Tercüman*, suggested covert actions and the implementation of extralegal violence against the assailants. Göçek, *Denial of Violence...*, 603.

145 “Bugüne kadar başvurulan fiziki güvenlik önlemleriyle Ermeni tedhişçiliğinin üstesinden gelmek kabil değildir. Klasik önlemlerin dışına çıkmak ve eylemcileri sindirecek, onlara gözdağı verecek, davalarına bağlı olanları rahatsız edecek, işi tırmanmaya götürmekten onları engelleyecek yöntemlere başvurmamız kaçınılmazdır. Aşağıda yazacağım cumlenin altını çiziniz lütfen. Kuşkusuz, bu karşı önlemlerin Türk devletinin simgesi bulunmadan paravan örgütlerle yönetilmesi çok büyük önemi haizdir.” TC Washington Büyükelçiliğinden Dışişlerine tel. Acele, (*Telegraph from the Washington Embassy to Foreign Affairs: Urgent*) October 13, 1979, cited from Şimşir, *Şehit...*, 279.

Adnan Bulak, then-Turkish ambassador to Beijing, also reported to the ministry.

Although it can be evaluated as an emotional, even hateful reaction, I do not foresee a more effective precaution than responding to violence with violence. Moreover, it is certain that this is the only way of deterrence. ... We must charge the perpetrators of the assassinations in Vienna, Paris, and Beirut. Otherwise, unfortunately, we will not be wrong in predicting that these assassinations will not end.¹⁴⁶

Turkish diplomats were convinced that illegal methods in the struggle against the attacks of Armenian perpetrators were necessary. At the turn of the 1980s, fifteen people (diplomats and their relatives) had already been killed by the ASALA and JCAG, and none of the perpetrators were found by the police of the related country. The Turkish state and diplomats complained that the police departments in the countries where Turkish diplomats have been assassinated, were not acting with satisfactory determination. Even when the perpetrators were found, they were given minimum sentences.¹⁴⁷ Above all, the methods which Elekdağ called classical measures had allegedly left Turkish diplomatic missions and diplomats without full protection.

The ideas of Elekdağ and Bulak reflected a change in point of view of the mindset of the Turkish state vis-à-vis the attacks of Armenian organizations. This does not imply that Turkish diplomats were the initiators of counterterrorism actions against Armenian militants; however, the remarks of Elekdağ and Bulak reveal that some prominent officers of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to see no way of struggling with “Armenian terrorism” except via unconventional methods. In an interview with the mainstream

146 “Ne kadar hissi hatta müfrit bir tepki şeklinde görülsün, şiddete şiddetle karşılık vermekten daha etkili bir tedbir olduğunu sanmıyorum. Üstelik bunun vazgeçiricilik bakımından tek çıkar yol olduğunda da tereddüt edilemez. Viyana, Paris ve Beyrut cinayetlerinin faillerini mutlaka bulup çıkarmamız ve bu çok alçakça saldırıların hesabını behemehal istememiz gerektiği kanıtsındayım. Aksi halde ve maalesef bu cinayetlerin arkasının gelmesini beklemek yanlış bir tahmin olmayaacaktır.” TC Büyükelçiliğinden Dışşülerine tel. (*Telegraph from the Embassy to Foreign Affairs*) July 21, 1980, cited from Şimşir, *Şehit...*, 207-208.

147 The assassin of Ahmet Benler, son of the Turkish Ambassador Özdemir Benler, for example, was acquitted by Dutch judicial authorities. Şimşir, *Şehit...*, 296.

Turkish newspaper *Sabah*, Osman Nuri Gündes, a high-ranking official at Turkish Intelligence Organization (MIT) responsible for operations against the ASALA, notes that,

we were assigned to struggle with these traitors. It is a state secret; I cannot explain. Yet operations conducted in Turkey and abroad were influential in ending the bloody actions of the ASALA. ... I supervised these operations. ... It is in the state archives how the ASALA was terminated, but these are not being explained in order not to cause international problems. If you terminate the will of the soldiers of an army or organization to make war, you can terminate that organization. This was what we did in the case of the ASALA.¹⁴⁸

Diplomats such as Elekdag and Bulak offered their ministry and government deterring and frightening the perpetrators in order to eliminate the operational power of the ASALA (and JCAG). Similarly, Gündes notes that counter-terrorism operations against the ASALA were aimed at “terminating their willingness” to fight. The Turkish state, in this regard, “responded to violence with violence,” as Bulak suggested to his ministry in 1980.

The Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy was once again at the center of the Turkish-Armenian dispute. The “Armenian Question,” as a consequence, had the capability to influence and even determine the attitude and operations of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In other words, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy developed reactionary stances against the actions of Armenian organizations hoping for the recognition of the 1915 deportation as genocide.

148 “Bu hainlerle uğraşma görevi bize verilmişti. Devlet sırrıdır, açıklayamam. Ama yurtdışında ve yurtçısında yapılan operasyonlar ASALA'nın kanlı eylemlerinin durdurulmasında etkili olmuştur... Bu operasyonları ben yönettim... ASALA'nın nasıl bitirildiği devletin ilgili kayıtlarında bellidir ama uluslararası sorunlara yol açmamak nedeniyle bunlar açıklanmıyor. Bir ülkenin askerinin ya da bir örgütün militanının savaşma arzusunu bitirirseniz örgütü de bitirirsınız. Biz ASALA konusunda işte bunu yaptık.” “ASALA'yı Kuru Kafa Resimleriyle Çözdük,” (We dissolved ASALA with skull pictures) Interview with Osman Nuri Gündes, *Sabah*, July 9, 2009, accessed June 14, 2015, available from http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2009/07/09/asalayi_kuru_kafa_resimleriyle_cozduk.

By the time Armenian armed groups perpetrated their last attacks in 1991, the organization had caused forty-six fatalities and 299 injuries, thirty-seven of which involved Turkish diplomats.¹⁴⁹ Attacks of Armenian organizations on Turkish diplomats constitute a specific case in the global terrorism literature. No profession in either public or private sector was targeted so densely over a given period of time by a single group and ideology. These attacks, on the other hand, deeply influenced the mindset and even the operational capability of Turkish diplomatic missions, mainly those in Western Europe, the United States, and Lebanon. As the above-quoted remarks of Turkish diplomats illustrate, assassinations even impacted the daily habits of Turkish diplomats. The Turkish government had to invest in the securitization of diplomatic and consular missions. Diplomats had to become accustomed to living with guns and learn how to use them.¹⁵⁰ The ASALA and JCAG attacks, finally, brought the “Armenian Question” back onto again to the agenda of the Turkish public. Newspapers began to deal with the Armenian question. Turkish diplomats, even before Turkish academia, produced works on the course of events leading to the deportation and casualties of Ottoman Armenians in the early twentieth century.

149 “Patterns of Global Terrorism,” *MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database*, accessed May 20, 2015, available from <https://web.archive.org/web/20071115020146/http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=258>, 56-57.

150 Gökberk Ergenekon, then-first secretary at Turkey’s embassy in Rome, was shot while getting in his car in front of his home. After being shot, Ergenekon took his gun and ran after the militant. Many other Turkish diplomats also were trained in gun use. “Yaralı Diplomatımız Saldırganı Kovaladı,” (Our Injured Diplomat Followed the Attacker) *Milliyet*, October 26, 1981, 11.

§ 7.4 After Assassinations: Turkish Diplomats as Constructors of the Official Turkish Narrative

Especially in the 1960s and 70s, diplomats were seen as “symbolic targets of political violence.”¹⁵¹ Geoffrey Jackson, a former British diplomat who was also the victim of a failed kidnapping attack, once said that “it is the special status of the diplomatic agent which renders him unsafe.”¹⁵² His remarks suit the Turkish case.

After Kemal Arıkan’s assassination on January 28, 1982, the perpetrators left a tape recording at the crime scene with a sentence: “Our revolutionary struggle began in 1975 and our only targets are Turkish diplomats and Turkish institutions.”¹⁵³ In the eyes of Armenian militants, therefore, officers of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy were entwined with the Turkish state and the Turkish mindset. Jean-Pierre Richardot’s book *Arméniens: Quoi Qu'il En Coûte* (Armenians: Whatever It Costs) depicts how Armenian communities in Europe perceived Turkish diplomats and diplomatic missions as symbols of the Turkish state and Turkishness as a whole. One of the hundreds of Armenians interviewed for the book called Turkish diplomats the “sons of Talat [Paşa]” implying that the attacks on them were legitimate.¹⁵⁴ Ara Toranian, one of the witnesses in the trial following an attack realized in Switzerland in 1981, stated that attacks on Turkish diplomats had meaning since “Turkish consulates in Europe were really police organizations: military bases with control over the Turkish community.”¹⁵⁵ In this regard, adds Toranian, “those who attempted to kill a Turkish diplomat would be hero in 1981.”¹⁵⁶

The revelations of members of the Armenian community illustrate that the accessibility and defenselessness of Turkish diplomats and Turkish diplomatic

151 Nathalie K. Hevener, *Diplomacy in A Dangerous World: Protection for Diplomats Under International Law* (New York: Westview Press, 1986), 5.

152 Geoffrey Jackson, *Concorde Diplomacy: The Ambassador's Role in Today's World* (London: Hamish Hamilton Books, 1981), 92.

153 Şimşir, *Şehit...*, 468.

154 Mehmet Perinçek, “Asala ve ‘Talat’ın Çocukları,” *Yeni Türkiye* 60 (2014), 1761.

155 Ibid., 1764.

156 Ibid.

and consular missions were not the only reasons they were chosen for attacks by Armenian groups. On the contrary, Turkish diplomats and diplomatic and consular missions were identified with the mindset of the Turkish state and the “denial of the genocide.” This paved the way for the legitimization of attacks on Turkish officials and institutions.¹⁵⁷ As Yavuz notes,

... in every court case that dealt with the killings of Turkish diplomats in the 1980s ... by Armenian terrorists, defense lawyers regularly invoked Morgenthau's Story as evidence to explain the source of this feeling of collective revenge to kill the Turks, since they had killed the Armenians.¹⁵⁸ Being the victim, in this regard, “inadvertently justifies and provides the moral ground to be a victimizer.”¹⁵⁹

Ironically or as it is expected, Turkish diplomats accepted the role of being identified with the Turkish state to a great extent. Recalling Faizulaev's approach, the diplomat unites his self-hood with the state's identity.¹⁶⁰ Göçek notes

given that the Turkish diplomatic community was so badly hit by the assassinations, the most significant long-term consequence was the production of an entire cohort of Turkish diplomats whose friends had been violently murdered, leading [them] to take an anti-Armenian stand, strongly opposing any engagement in bettering Turkish-Armenian relations.¹⁶¹

157 Asociating the “enemy state” with its diplomats was widespread among urban guerrilla groups in those years. “When Geoffrey Jackson was the British ambassador to Uruguay, he was taken hostage by urban guerrillas who told him that he was ‘being punished as the national symbol of institutional neocolonialism.’” Sharp, “Who Needs Diplomats,” 5.

158 Yavuz, “Orientalism...,” 115. *Morgenthau's Story* was the title of a memoir written by Henry J. Morgenthau, who served as the United States Ambassador to Istanbul between 1913 and 1916. Dealing in detail the Armenian atrocities during World War I, the book is a primary source for groups who describe the incidents as genocide. *Ibid.*

159 *Ibid.*

160 See footnote 39 in chapter 2.

161 Göçek, *Denial of Violence...*, 428.

The attacks, adds Göcek, “polarized a whole generations of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials.”¹⁶² The violence, according to her, was “etched forever in the memory of the Turkish diplomats who were eyewitnesses, had served with the victims, or had attended school with them.”¹⁶³

In the course of time, Turkish diplomats constructed and reproduced the Turkish counternarrative to the efforts to have the “Armenian Genocide” recognized not only in terms of a legal struggle but also in the intellectual field. Various Turkish diplomats wrote books on the “Armenian Question” that influenced the determination of the official Turkish position.¹⁶⁴ The basic tenants of the counternarrative to genocide claims are clearly summarized by Dixon.

The charge of genocide was baseless; claims of genocide were based on false propaganda by Armenians; Armenians had constituted a small minority of the population in the Ottoman Empire; Armenians were well treated under Ottoman rule; Armenians had collaborated with the Ottoman Empire’s enemies during World War I and rebelled to gain independence; and Armenians had committed massacres and atrocities against Ottoman Turkish citizens, using terrorist methods that were again being used in attacks on Turkish diplomats.¹⁶⁵

Indeed, in the initial years of the attacks, the Turkish government was willing to compromise in order to prevent further assassinations of Turkish diplomats. İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, then-foreign minister, met with the leaders of three Armenian political parties in Zurich on November 27, 1977.¹⁶⁶ Çağlayangil proposed that the Turkish government could agree on reparations,

162 Ibid.

163 Ibid., 450. This reaction, however, should not be interpreted as an anti-Armenian stance. At the zenith of the incidents, one Turkish diplomat refused to fire an Armenian employee when the government advised him about the danger that this employee could potentially pose. Ibid.

164 Even at the zenith of violence activities of Armenians, Turkish diplomats were involved in an “intellectual battle” against the Armenian diaspora. For example, İldeniz Divanlioğlu was subjected to verbal harassment during a meeting to which he was invited by an NGO in Rome. Divanlioğlu, *Emekli Büyükelçi...*, 126.

165 Dixon, “Defending the Nation,” 471.

166 De Waal, *Büyük Felaketten Sonra...*, 211.

resettlement, and the recognition of certain privileges for Armenians, but territorial demands would by no means be accepted.¹⁶⁷ The organization of the meeting was initiated in spring 1976 and proceeded in an informal manner.¹⁶⁸

The outcome of the meeting was inevitable disappointment, and the sides did not reach a consensus. This rarely reported meeting is interesting for two reasons. First, in retrospect, it is surprising that a government of the 1970s would have accepted conditions that are presently out of the question. The increasing aggressiveness of Armenian organizations clearly radicalized the Turkish point of view. Second, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an institution was probably outside of the process. In their statements, Şükrü El-ekdağ, then secretary general of the ministry, and İlter Türkmen, an outstanding ambassador of the time, reveal that they were not aware of the meeting.¹⁶⁹ It was a political initiative that bypassed the ministry bureaucracy. In ensuing years, however, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy would take the lead in determining Turkey's attitude towards the Armenian question. Göçek notes that

for the first time in 1979, the Turkish state and the foreign ministry started to discuss what course of action to take in order to counter the Armenian violence and three decisions were reached: to prepare a totally scientific and objective white book, to establish a Turkish lobby in the United States and to form Turkish research centers in foreign countries.¹⁷⁰

Although there were efforts before the September 12, 1980, coup, political conditions enabled a more active stance in this case. Again, notes Göçek,

A month after the September 1980 military coup, [a] diplomat met with a general in relation to the collection of existing archival documentation ... including those in the American, British and French

167 Ibid. De Waal attributes his claim to Ambassador Oktay Aksoy, who served as Çağlayangil's interpreter during the meeting.

168 Ibid.

169 Ibid.

170 Göçek, *Denial of Violence...*, 436.

archives as well as published books and documentation in the Ottoman archives.¹⁷¹

Some retired diplomats who knew the Ottoman script were actively involved in the transliteration process.¹⁷² Ambassador Nejat Ertüzün was one of them. Ertüzün also notes that their work began even before the coup. He depicts their work as follows:

After retirement ... I was called by the office of the secretary general of the foreign ministry to conduct research in the ministry archives along with other ambassadors who read the old script. ... We began on September 1, 1980. ... When the coup was realized, the new government approved the continuation of our mission. ... In sum ... we examined 7,134 documents.¹⁷³

The continuation of Armenian attacks fed the process. In 1981, the Department of Study (*Etüd Dairesi*) was upgraded to the Directorate General for Intelligence and Research (*İstihbarat ve Araştırma Genel Müdürlüğü*), and it held a central position in determining the “mindset of the state” on the Armenian Question.¹⁷⁴ Additionally, a Coordination Committee for Intelligence and Planning (*İstihbarat ve Planlama Kurulu*) was established under the Turkish MFA.¹⁷⁵ It was clear that the foreign ministry was playing a central role in leading and determining the official Turkish position about the course of incidents that occurred during the Armenian deportation in 1915.

171 Ibid., 438-9.

172 Dixon, “Defending the Nation,” 473.

173 “Emekli olup İstanbul'a yerleşikten sonra ... Dışişleri Bakanlığı Genel Sekreterliğinden aranılarak Dışişleri Hazine-i Evrak'ında eski yazı bilen diğer büyükelçilerle birlikte araştırma yapabileceğim söyledi. ... 1 Eylül 1980'de işe başladık. ... askeri müdahale yaptığından yeni hükümetten de muvafakat al[dık]. Toplamda ... incelenen belge adedi 7,134'e yükselmektedir.” Nejat Ertüzün, “Ermeni Sorunu ile İlgili Çalışmalar,” in *Diş Politikamızın Perde Arkası: 23 Büyükelçinin Olaylara Bakışı*, ed. Turhan Fırat (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2005), 231-233.

174 Güven Gürkan Öztan and Ömer Turan, “Türkiye'de Devlet Akı ve 1915,” *Toplum ve Bilim* 132 (2015), 99.

175 Ibid.

The first publication prepared by Turkish diplomats about the “realities of the Armenian Question” was a brochure written by three members of the Turkish embassy in Washington. When members of the Armenian community wrote letters to increase awareness of the deportations of 1915, Turgut Menemencioğlu, İlter Türkmen, and Erdil Akay prepared a thirty-page brochure “to respond to Armenian claims,” which was published by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara.¹⁷⁶ In the course of time, a massive literature written by Turkish diplomats emerged to “reveal the truth about 1915.” Within this literature, Bilal Şimşir’s studies are unique. Also a scholar, Şimşir published numerous studies questioning the “genocide thesis” and justifying official Turkish positions on various occasions.¹⁷⁷

The works of Turkish diplomats, in most cases, has taken academic concerns into consideration. The main motive for the preparation of these studies was to answer the massive literature dealing with the details of the “Armenian Genocide.” For instance, in his book titled *Ermeni Dosyası* (Armenian File), Turkish Ambassador Kamuran Gürün states that his study did not sought “to insult the Armenian nation or attribute the actions of one group to a whole nation.”¹⁷⁸ Instead, Gürün underscores the necessity of writing a scientific work on the Armenian problem since no one in Turkey has any substantive knowledge of the issue.¹⁷⁹ This lack of knowledge, adds Gürün, causes Turkish academics to recognize what he calls “imaginary Armenian claims.”¹⁸⁰

176 Erner, *Davalun Sesi...*, 86-87.

177 For Şimşir’s studies on the “Armenian Question,” see Bilal Şimşir, *British Documents on Ottoman Armenians. Volume I* (1856-1880,) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1982, 1989). *The Genesis of the Armenian Question* (Ermeni Gailesinin Doğuşu) (Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınevi, Serial VII, no. 84, Ankara: 1983). *The Deportees of Malta and The Armenian Question* (Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara: 1984). *Aperçu Historique sur la Question Arménienne* (Publication de la Société Turque d’Histoire /Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınevi, Seri VII, no. 85, Ankara: 1985.) *Osmanlı Diplomatik Belgelerinde Ermeni Sorunu* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınevi, 1985). *İngiliz Belgelerinde Osmanlı Ermenileri (1856-1880)* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1986).

178 Kamuran Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1988), 20.

179 Ibid.

180 Göçek, *Denial of Violence...*, 443. The Turkish state in general and the foreign ministry were particularly disappointed by the lack of active participation of Turkish scholars in the intellectual campaign against genocide claims. When the ministry wrote letters to scholars at

According to Gürün, Turkish diplomats needed to “know clearly all aspects of this question,” since they were both “researchers and unfortunately targets of it.”¹⁸¹ His evaluation and eagerness led Gürün to be the most active among Turkish diplomats searching for the “truth” of the Armenian question. For example, he briefed Kenan Evren, the leader of the September 1980 military coup, on the Armenian question and persuaded him to develop and publish a brochure explaining the official Turkish narrative.¹⁸² Gürün visited the United States in 1982 as a lobbyist.¹⁸³

Gürün developed a strongly critical stance towards Armenian claims. His intention to engage in such an effort was indeed a “state decision.”¹⁸⁴ In line with the official Turkish position, Gürün gives a detailed account of the actions of Armenian insurgents up until the deportation of Ottoman Armenians in 1915, proving the inevitability of the decisions taken that year.

In the case of the deportation decision, Gürün again attaches significance to the mobilization of Ottoman Armenians under the Russian Army in Eastern Anatolia against their own country.¹⁸⁵ Deportation, adds Gürün, was designed to eliminate the Armenian insurgents’ ability to revolt, and only those directly involved in revolts against the government were subject to the deportation process.¹⁸⁶ Relying on official correspondence, Gürün concludes that official texts that have been labeled “deportation orders” did not even include

Istanbul, Hacettepe, and Bogaziçi universities, only a tiny proportion of the invitees took part in the ministry’s efforts to create an official, intellectual Turkish position. *Ibid.*

181 Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, 291.

182 *Ibid.* 448.

183 *Ibid.* There was a type of division of labor among the diplomats. His visit to the United States notwithstanding, Gürün undertook intellectual responsibilities, namely establishing the official Turkish narrative. In his place, Şükrü Elekdağ, was active in lobbying operations. Elekdağ’s attempts “led to the formation of [the] American Turkish Association of America [which] ... has taken the initiative in promoting the official Turkish stand.” Göçek, *Denial of Violence...*, 607.

184 *Ibid.* 450.

185 *Ibid.*, 304.

186 Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, 306-307.

the word “deportation;” instead, Gürün states that the orders referred to “expedition and habitation to other locations.”¹⁸⁷

Gürün’s book and point of view guided subsequent studies in ensuing years.¹⁸⁸ Initiating a new thesis in the early 1980s onwards, Gürün’s and others’ like-minded views on the issue did not “dismiss the great loss of life, but put it into the context of civil war, [as] mutual victimization.”¹⁸⁹ As Öztan and Turan put it, “it was a justification of deportation.”¹⁹⁰ Gürün’s views were shared by many colleagues. Şükrü Elekdağ, for example, notes that the deportations were “an obligatory military precaution to safeguard the Ottoman army which was under severe threat from the Russians.”¹⁹¹ Similarly, another Turkish Ambassador Ayhan Kamel refers to the “Armenians who joined the Russian army in order to fight against the Ottoman Empire.”¹⁹² According to Kamel, the Ottoman Empire, “which always approached non-Muslims with a great tolerance,” could not have been involved in genocide against Armenians; rather, the Armenians themselves attempted an ethnic cleansing “to establish an Armenian majority in the Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire in order to establish an independent state and prepare evidence for land claims.”¹⁹³

Turkish diplomats, on the other hand, not only opposed the Armenian interpretation of the deportations – or what they call the “Armenian Thesis” – they are also skeptical about the sincerity of Armenians’ motives for the remembrance of 1915. For example, the reemergence of Armenian political violence against Turkish citizens not only intended to put the recognition of genocide on the agenda in the world. Bilge Cankorel, in this regard, draws

187 Ibid.

188 Öztan and Turan, “Türkiye’de Devlet Aklı,” 103.

189 Richard G. Hovannisian. “Denial of the Armenian Genocide 100 Years Later: The New Practitioners and Their Trade,” *Genocide Studies International* 9, no. 2 (2015), 228.

190 Öztan and Turan, “Türkiye’de Devlet Aklı,” 103.

191 Şükrü Elekdağ, “Tarihsel Gerçekler ve Uluslararası Hukuk Işığında Ermeni Soykırımı İddiası,” *Assembly of Turkish American Associations Website*, 15, accessed March 27, 2015, available from <http://www.ataa.org/reference/ermenisoykirimiddiasi.pdf>.

192 Ayhan Kamel, *1923’ten Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası ve Diplomasisi* (İstanbul: İnkılap, 2013), 70.

193 Ibid.

attention to the timing of the first Armenian attacks. Cankorel states that “the beginning of the ASALA terror [in 1975] just followed Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus [in 1974]” was meaningful.¹⁹⁴ Hamit Batu, who continued his diplomatic career in Western Europe and notably in France, stresses the simultaneous emergence of “Greek and Armenian propaganda campaigns after the 1974 Cyprus intervention.”¹⁹⁵ Similar to Cankorel, Batu, was also suspicious about the concurrence of Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus and the beginning of Armenian propaganda against Turkey.¹⁹⁶ According to him, while this does not mean that “Greek and Armenian propaganda cordially and consciously united,” “... the propaganda of these two nations fed on each other’s achievements.”¹⁹⁷ Underscoring the fact that attacks by Armenian groups emerged in the years following Turkish intervention in Cyprus, Daver Darende also notes that the initial attacks were predominantly realized in NATO countries.¹⁹⁸

Certain Turkish diplomats claim that “the case of 1915” was instrumentalized by Armenians for other purposes. Ömer Engin Lütem, a Turkish ambassador, was one of the prominent figures who “reproduced the official narrative” along with Gürün and Şimşir.¹⁹⁹ Ambassador Ömer Engin Lütem thinks that remembrance of 1915 was considerably influential in cementing Armenian communities in different parts of the world.²⁰⁰ Moreover, according to Turkish diplomats, the increasing demands for the recognition of Armenian Genocide were planned to be the precursors for reparation and land

194 Cankorel, *Bir Dönem Biterken...*, 26.

195 Batu, *Avrupa'yla Bunalımlı Yıllar*, 109.

196 Ibid., 114.

197 Ibid., 114-115.

198 Darende, *Diplomatın Not Defteri...*, 65. Unlike Şimşir, who interprets the emergence of attacks in predominantly Western European countries as a result of the tolerant social and legal structures of these countries, Darende is skeptical about the fact that the first ASALA attacks took place in NATO countries. Ibid.

199 Öztan and Turan, “*Türkiye’de Devlet Aklı...*,” 101.

200 Ömer Engin Lütem, *Erməni Sorunu: Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler* (Ankara: ASAM Erməni Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2007), 1. Lütem was the first chief of the “Intelligence and Research Department” in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This unit was founded in 1975 to react to the Armenian threat to Turkish diplomats.

demands.²⁰¹ This argument is expressed by former ambassador Onur Öymen. According to Öymen, the recognition of Armenian genocide would not end attacks on Turkey. Such a decision would be followed by land and reparation demands.²⁰²

§ 7.5 Concluding Remarks

Beginning in the late nineteenth century, dealing with Armenian dissidents and terrorist groups was a source of concern for Ottoman-Turkish diplomatic and consular missions. One of the duties of Hamidian era diplomats was to monitor the actions of Armenian insurgents in various parts of the world.²⁰³ Ahmed Rüstem Bey, the Ottoman Ambassador to Washington between 1914 and 1916, was the first to write a book challenging Armenian allegations. In the early republican period, the actions of Armenian groups were monitored, and prominent figures of the early republican elite were on alert with respect to possible assassination attempts by Armenian organizations.²⁰⁴ Assassinations of Turkish diplomats were indeed a continuation of this legacy. Turkish

201 This claim was indeed not baseless. On July 5, 2013, Avghan Hovsepian claimed that “the Republic of Armenia should have its lost territories returned and the victims of the Armenian Genocide should receive material compensation.” “Turkey Angry at Yerevan Over ‘Land Claim’ Remarks,” *Asbarez News*, July 15, 2013, accessed March 20, 2016, available from <http://asbarez.com/111487/turkey-angry-at-yerevan-over-land-claim-remarks/>.

202 Öymen formulates these demands as “3T” since the words in Turkish – tanınma, toprak, and tazminat – mean recognition, land, and reparations, respectively. “Sirada Tazminat ve Toprak Var,” (The next step will be reparation and land [demands].) *Yeniçağ*, October 11, 2007, accessed March 20, 2016, available from <http://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/sirada-tazminat-ve-toprak-var-2461h.htm>.

203 This implementation must have remained in the minds of American Armenians. During the trial of Gurgen Yanikian in 1973, his lawyer asked Turkish authority whether they had opened a consular mission in order to monitor the acts of Armenians in the city. *Şimşir, Şehit...*, 111.

204 For example, the Swiss police warned İsmet Pasha, head of the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne Conference in 1922 and 1923, about possible suicide attacks of which Armenian groups were suspected. Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), the founder of the modern Turkish Republic, was also threatened with suicide attacks especially in the 1923-1927 period. *Ibid.*, 154-161.

diplomacy was the first bureaucratic unit to encounter the “Armenian case” abroad. Therefore, Turkish diplomats were always on the frontline.

Continuous assassinations of Turkish diplomats throughout 1970s and 1980s, however threatened the lives of this group of people. Turkish diplomats also began to become aware of events that occurred in the last years of the Ottoman Empire and became inevitable actors in the dispute between the Turkish state and Armenian organizations and the Armenian diaspora more generally. One Turkish diplomat confessed that he learned about the details of what happened in 1915 only after attacks by the ASALA and JCAG began.²⁰⁵ After the attacks on their colleagues, Turkish diplomats became active in the intellectual and diplomatic battle against the Armenian diaspora. As illustrated above in this chapter, Turkish diplomats, as a professional group, contributed significantly to the formation of a Turkish counternarrative to genocide allegations regarding 1915. High-ranking Turkish diplomats such as undersecretary Kamuran Gürün authored books that established the basis for Turkey’s counter arguments against genocide claims. Şükrü Elekdağ, another high-ranking Turkish diplomat, made considerable efforts forming a Turkish lobby including a research institute to institutionalize the Turkish counternarrative.

Turkish diplomats’ encounters with the Armenian Question can be evaluated from two aspects. First, terrorist attacks by Armenian groups throughout the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s located Turkish diplomats in a unique place. In the aforementioned period, as illustrated above, diplomatic personnel from many other countries were also subject to such terrorist attacks. Turkish diplomatic personnel, nevertheless, were more frequently targeted than their counterparts throughout the world. Moreover, if we consider the whole course, – beginning in the late nineteenth century – Turkish diplomats played a constructive role in the formation of Turkey’s official Armenian policy and the public’s perception of what happened in 1915. This is not to say that the opinions and prescriptions of Turkish diplomats were accepted by the state mechanism and the public without question. Turkish diplomats were

205 This diplomat was Volkan Vural, a former Turkish ambassador. Hasan Cemal, 1915: *Ermeni Soykırımı* (Istanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2012), 159.

themselves members of the Turkish public and officers of the Turkish state. They were aware of the probable reaction of the state and public opinion with respect to 1915. On this point, however, they were involved in a mutual interaction with the government and the public to determine the dominant point of view in Turkey about the deportations in 1915.



Diplomats as Catalysts for War: Military Intervention to Cyprus and The Role of Diplomacy

§ 8.1 A Ministry Locked on an island: The Course of the Cyprus Question and Its Impact on the Turkish Diplomatic Bureaucracy

On July 20, 1974, Turkish armed forces realized an amphibious operation on the northern coast of Cyprus, an island that had been the theater of a bloody ethnic clash between Greek Cypriots and Turks for almost two decades. This chapter scrutinizes the influence of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and certain Turkish diplomats in the decision-making process of this military intervention. The political authority of the time initiated the intervention whereas the actions of the armed forces determined the degree of its success. The preferences and activities of the officials of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy are frequently neglected. This part of the study, in this regard, will focus on the interpretations of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy regarding the Cyprus dispute and their influence over the decision-making process leading to the July 20, 1974, military intervention.

Martin Wight describes the task of diplomacy as “circumventing the occasions of wars.”¹ States “compromise without the use of force by peaceful means” through the conduct of diplomacy.² In this regard, proponents of the traditional understanding of diplomacy claim that “the resort to force represents a defeat for diplomacy.”³ Nevertheless, on many occasions, diplomats served to legitimize the war narratives of their states. A consideration of the political and military necessity or legitimacy of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus is beyond the scope of this study. Yet this chapter presents the efforts of certain diplomats in the course of the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in July 1974 which constituted an example of how diplomatic representation can become an integral asset in the war legitimization process.

The Cyprus Question preoccupied the agenda of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs long before the intervention. Throughout the 1960s and 70s, the unit responsible for Cyprus affairs continuously grew in terms of both quality and quantity. Before the 1960s, Cyprus affairs were conducted by a desk, while in the 1960s it was upgraded to a bureau.⁴ In the 1970s, the bureau was upgraded to a directorate general that which also handled relations with Greece.⁵ In other words, Turkish-Greek relations were then being evaluated as a branch of the Cyprus dispute instead the Cyprus dispute being seen as a component of Turkish-Greek relations.⁶ The prominence of the Cyprus dispute also increased the value of the Cyprus department within the ministry. As Özcan notes, “throughout the 1960s and 70s, being occupied with Cyprus affairs was the most advantageous, and shortest route for the promotion of Turkish career diplomats for career within the ministry.”⁷ Also, the first

1 Barry H. Steiner, “Diplomatic and International Theory,” 499.

2 Sasson Sofer, “Old and New Diplomacy: A Debate Revisited,” *Review of International Studies* 14 (1988), 196.

3 Hoffman, “Reconstructing Diplomacy,” 532.

4 Girgin, *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi Hariciye Tarihimiz*, 149.

5 Ibid., 150.

6 In 1981, relations with Greece and the Cyprus affairs were conducted with a directorate-general. This unit had one Cyprus-Greece division, one Greek section, and Cyprus policy coordination division. Kuneralp, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” 513.

7 Özcan, *Interview by the Author*.

serious turmoil in late 1963 brought about “twenty-four-hour sentry duty to the Ministry.”⁸

Not only the ministry in Ankara but also Turkish diplomatic and consular missions, notably the ones in Nicosia, were frequently involved in Cyprus affairs. Afra, then a young consul in Nicosia, cites that the Turkish Consulate General in Nicosia sent 1951 telegraphs to Ankara in 1959, the record in that year when compared to those of other diplomatic and consular missions of the Turkish government.⁹ Although there was a heavy workload, the ministry had yet to allocate sufficient personnel for this issue. For example, the consulate general in Nicosia recruited only one career officer in those days.¹⁰ Moreover, Turkish diplomats were not only assigned to diplomatic and consular duties. Ercüment Yavuzalp, the Turkish ambassador to Nicosia between 1967 and 1970, notes that employees of the Turkish embassy in Cyprus were taking serious risk in the completion of their duties.¹¹

Employees of the Turkish embassy between 1964 and 1974 ... functioned as a [point of contact with] Turkish territories that were almost cut off due to Greek Cypriot checkpoints and blockade. ... My colleagues from the embassy were traveling around the island not only when there were incidents but also in normal times. This was done on one hand to address needs in-situ, and on the other to strengthen ... the morale of [our] kin.¹²

8 Kamuran Gürün, *Bükreş, Paris, Atina: Büyükelçilik Anıları* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1994), 175.

9 Afra, *Hariciyeciler...*, 47.

10 Ibid.

11 Ercüment Yavuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik (1967-1970)* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993), 243.

12 “1964-1974 arası dönemde görev yapan büyükelçilik mensupları... Lefkoşa ile Ada sathına yayılmış Rum kontrol ve ablukası yüzünden birbirile bağlantısı hemen hemen kesilmiş Türk bölgeleri arasında bir tür irtibat görevi de yapmıştır... Büyükelçilik mensubu arkadaşlarım, sadece olay çıktığında değil, herhangi bir olay olmadığı hallerde de Ada sathında dolaşıyorlardı. Bu bir yandan ihtiyaçları yerinde saptamak, diğer yandan da soydaşlara, kaderlerine terkedilmediklerini göstererek morallerini güçlendirme amacını taşıyordu.” Ibid., 241

Intervention in Cyprus by military means was on the agenda of the Turkish government. The Treaty of Guarantee, signed between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, authorized the signatories to “ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution,”¹³ a statement that Turkey interpreted as the right to intervene on the island if the security of Turkish Cypriots living there was in danger. As a consequence, the Turkish government planned to use military means whenever intercommunal conflicts in Cyprus reached threatening levels.

Turkey first tilted towards the idea of military intervention in December 1963 when Greek Cypriot militias initiated attacks on Turkish settlements.¹⁴ This did not result in a Turkish military deployment to the island, but was a watershed in Turkey’s alliance with the West – for Turkish-American relations, in particular. Then-Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and his government posited June 6, 1964, as the date for intervention in Cyprus, and İnönü called Raymond Hare, then-the United States Ambassador to Ankara, and delivered his cabinet’s decision to intervene in Cyprus.¹⁵ Twenty-four hours later, an interval requested by Ambassador Hare, Prime Minister İnönü received a letter from the United States President Lyndon B. Johnson. This letter, namely the “Johnson’s Letter,” urged Turkey to avoid one-sided intervention in Cyprus and reminded that Turkey to seek the opinion of its allies.¹⁶ Otherwise, Johnson stated, such intervention might cause Soviet involvement in the dispute, and in that event, NATO would be unwilling to protect Turkey.¹⁷ The letter also noted Turkey that the United States would not allow Turkey to use its weapons for such an intervention.¹⁸ As a result, Turkey did not launch a

13 Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Treaty of Guarantee,” 1960, accessed June 1, 2015, available from http://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/kypriako/treaty_of_guarantee.pdf.

14 Fırat, “Yunanistan’la İlişkiler...,” 722.

15 Can Dündar, *O Gün: Johnson Mektubu*, (Istanbul: CNN Türk, 2002), DVD.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid. The content of the letter caused considerable shock in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Feridun Cemal Erkin, then-foreign minister of Turkey, gave the original letter to Erdem Erner, a Turkish diplomat, and “ordered him to make only two copies of it but not to file them.” Erner, *Davulun Sesi...*, 105. The contents of the letter were also kept from the Turkish

comprehensive military operation but initiated an air raid of the island in August 1964. Nevertheless, the crisis left a deep scar on Turkey's relations with the United States which would significantly affect Turkish foreign policy's orientation in ensuing years.

Turkey thought to (more seriously) intervene on Cyprus a second time when Greek Cypriots launched an offensive under the leadership of Giorgios Grivas against the Turkish villages of Geçitkale and Boğazköy in November 1967.¹⁹ The Turkish government proved its "commitment" to intervene and this persuaded the Greeks since they not only accepted a ceasefire but also extradited Grivas from Cyprus.²⁰ Although Dr. Fazıl Küçük, leader of the Turkish Cypriots, declared disappointment saying, "there are few people in Cyprus who believe that Turkey will intervene on the island,"²¹ the 1967 crisis opened the way for the intervention in July 1974 both legally and militarily.²² In the words of İlter Türkmen, the 1967 crisis, with its causes and outcomes, "was a factor in paving the way for the intervention in 1974."²³

public for one and a half years. On June 13, 1966 *Hürriyet*, a mainstream newspaper, published the letter. The next day *Milliyet*, another mainstream Turkish daily, published İnönü's answer to Johnson. We learn from the accounts of Yalın Eralp that he gave this information to journalist Cüneyt Arcayürek on the order of İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, then-foreign minister. Eralp, *Perdeyi Aralarken...*, 23. The Turkish attorney general at the time, however, interrogated İzzet Sedes and Cüneyt Arcayürek, the publishers of the two letters. Sedes, 34. The letter was also a shock for the public, and its content increased anti-Western sentiment in Turkey in those years.

19 Ercüment Yavuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik* (1967-1970) (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993), 70.

20 Niyazi Kızılıyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kışkıtında Kıbrıs* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), 277.

21 Ibid.

22 Mehmet Ali Birand, *Kıbrıs'ın Elli Yılı*, vol 2. (İstanbul: CNN Türk, 1999), DVD.

23 Ibid.

§ 8.2 The July 15, 1974 Coup in Cyprus: *Five to Twelve O’Clock*²⁴

Around eight thirty this morning, the alarm sirens of the Greek Cypriot police were heard among the noises of bombs and machine guns in the Greek Cypriot sector. It is speculated that the incident is happening around the Palace of the Archbishop, which is close to Turkish sector. It is rumored that some Greek Cypriot armored corps are mobilizing and that the Greek regiment [in Cyprus] are coming out of their camps. It is being investigated whether or not the conflict is local. ... The broadcast of the Greek Cypriot radio has been interrupted [and] later continued with the Greek national anthem without any announcement. There is an impression that communication via telex and telephone with the external world has been stopped. By nine o’clock, smoke is seen rising up over the Palace of the Archbishop and the sound of gunfire continues.²⁵

These are the remarks of a cyphered telegraph sent by Asaf İnhan, Turkey’s ambassador to Nicosia, on July 15, 1974.²⁶ In the remainder of his report, İnhan

24 This was the title of the book written by Rauf Denktaş in the 1960s. In this book, Denktaş was basically calling for immediate action of the Turkish government before being too late. Rauf R. Denktaş, *12’ye 5 Kala* (Butik Matbaa, 1966).

25 “Bu sabah 08.30 civarında Rum kesiminde bomba sesleri ve makinalı tüfek darbe atışları arasında Rum polisinin alarm veren siren düdükleri işitilmiştir. Hadisenin Türk kesinine yakın bulunan Başpiskoposluk binası etrafında cereyan ettiği tahmin olunmaktadır. Bazı Rum zırhlı birliklerinin hareket halinde olduğu ve Yunan alayının da kampından çıktıığı haberleri dolaşmaktadır. Çatışmanın mahalli olup olmadığı... tahkik edilmeğe çalışılmaktadır. Rum radyosunun yayını kesilmiş, arkasından Yunan milli marşı ile anonssuz devam etmiştir. Dış dünya ile teleks ve telefon irtibatının kesildiği intibâr alınmaktadır. Saat 9 olduğu şu sıralarda atışların devam ettiği iştilmekte, Başpiskoposluk binası üzerinde dumanlar görülmektedir.” Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru*..., 43.

26 Asaf İnhan was the Turkish ambassador to Nicosia between 1970 and 1976. During his term in Cyprus, Turkish troops intervened in the island. İnhan remarks that the accomplishment of such a significant duty was the greatest honor of his professional life.” İnanç, *Türk Diplomasinde Kıbrıs, 1970-1991*..., 7-8. Dean Brown, a United States ambassador, describes him as having “a hard character with not much charity in his soul.” Jan Asmussen, *Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis* (London: IB Tauris, 2008), 258. According to

interpreted developments in the Greek Cypriot sector of Cyprus as “definitely Enosis (unification of Cyprus and Greece),” and according to him “declaration of Enosis was to be expected.”²⁷ As his remarks illustrate, an official of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy, more precisely an ambassador in Nicosia, was urging Ankara to interpret the developments as a precursor to Enosis and trying to persuade decision-makers to intervene.²⁸ From the first moments, some prominent members of Turkish diplomacy were in favor of a military solution.²⁹

Rauf Denktaş titled his book *On İkiye Beş Kala* (Five to Twelve o’Clock) to criticize Turkey’s passive attitude towards the conflicts in Cyprus and its reluctance to intervene on the island. In terms of a military operation, the bell rang for the Turkish government on July 15, 1974. On the morning of this day, an extreme right wing group among Greek Cypriots, under tutelage of the junta in Greece, led a coup and overthrew Archbishop Makarios, the president of the Republic of Cyprus. The incident was the final phase of a longstanding

Asmussen, the Turkish approach in Cyprus was “personified by his character.” Ibid. Some Turkish Cypriots remember him “accusing the Turkish community in Cyprus of laziness and lack of sacrifice.” Hasan Hastürer, “Asaf İnhan’dan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'a,” *Kıbrıs Postası*, February 5, 2011, accessed July 15, 2014, available from <http://www.kibrispostasi.com/print.php?col=98&art=10547>. Both İnhan and his wife, Maali İnhan, were awarded the “meritorious service medal” and the title of *Gazilik* after the intervention. His six year-long service in Nicosia was indeed uncommon. The intervention in 1974 and the establishment of the federated state in 1975 prolonged İnhan’s term in Cyprus by one year upon the request of the foreign ministry and the commander-in chief of Turkish Headquarters. İnanç, *Türk Diplomasisinde Kıbrıs...*, 7-8.

27 Ibid., 28.

28 For example, İnhan claims that Turkey would never have intervened in on the island unless a pro-Greek coup had been realized. According to him, the Turkish embassy in Nicosia did not have such information, either. Ibid., 37. As it will be illustrated below, the words of other diplomats reveal that Turkey was already undertaking serious preparation in diplomatic terms. The coup in Cyprus accelerated the decision-making process.

29 İnhan notes that his report was influential for the evaluation and decision-making meetings in Ankara on 16 and 17 July. Because of this, adds İnhan, General Muhittin Füsunoğlu sent him an appreciation letter. Ibid., 28.

dispute between Makarios and the junta administration in Greece and its extensions in Cyprus.

In his letter to Athens, which was leaked and published in the *London Times* on July 2, 1974, Makarios blamed the Greek military presence, the Greek Cypriot National Defense Guards, and the Greek government for the chaos in Cyprus.³⁰ Makarios, on the other hand, had taken some precautionary measures to limit the influence of Athens in Cyprus, such as decreasing the length of military conscription from twenty-four to fourteen months and made conscription obligatory to all Greek Cypriots on the island.³¹ The police organization of the Republic of Cyprus was on alert against a possible coup d'état. The ultimatum and measures of Makarios resulted in his overthrow and the end of the constitutional regime in Cyprus established under London and Zurich Agreements.

According to Denktaş, the coup overthrowing Makarios and the constitution was an internal dispute among Greek Cypriots and he warned his people of not becoming involved in an “internal crisis” of Greek Cypriots.³² This impression lasted neither among Turkish Cypriots nor in Ankara for a long time. The coup in Cyprus implied for many actors that it was now five to twelve o’clock for Turkey’s cause in Cyprus. In the first moments of the coup, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit called the incident a “Greek conspiracy.”³³ One of the first things for the government in Ankara to do, in this regard, was to synchronize its position and statements with those of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent ciphered messages to Nicosia urging that the developments “were not internal disputes in Cyprus, but [that] there was an external intervention to which Turkey would committedly react.”³⁴

30 Birand, *Kıbrıs’ın Elli Yılı*.

31 “Makarios’un Ültimatomuna Atina’nın Cevabı Darbe Oldu,” (Athens Responded Makarios’ Ultimatum with a Coup) *Cumhuriyet*, July 16, 1974, 1.

32 Birand, *Kıbrıs’ın Elli Yılı*.

33 “Ecevit: Bu Bir Yunan Müdahalesidir,” (Ecevit: This is a Greek Intervention) *Milliyet*, July 16, 1974, 10.

34 Mehmet Ali Birand, *30 Sicak Gün* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), 52.

Turkey should immediately respond, but how? Previously, in 1963-4 and 1967, there was similar turmoil. In 1967, for example, the Turkish parliament authorized a military intervention in Cyprus.³⁵ These previous attempts, however, did not result in actual military intervention. What would happen in July 1974? Was there something different in terms of Turkey's military capability and political and diplomatic commitments? Was the international conjuncture more suitable for such an operation?

When the coup d'état was underway in Nicosia, Turan Güneş, then-minister of foreign affairs, was on his way to Beijing for an official visit. The chief of general headquarters was in Istanbul, while the chief of naval forces was in Mersin conducting inspection.³⁶ Kamuran Gürün, Turkish ambassador to Athens, was in the Mediterranean on vacation together with his colleague İlter Türkmen, ambassador to the Soviet Union.³⁷ Despite the fact that Ankara was aware of the tense relations between Athens and Nicosia, none of the elements of the state mechanism in Turkey predicted that the dispute would result in such a manner with the exception of a few people in the Turkish-Greek department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For example, according to Birand, the officials of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) of Turkey had halted the monitoring of the military preparations of Greek Cypriots for a while.³⁸ Furthermore, Ankara did not seem pyschologically ready for comprehensive and efficient military intervention even if an extraordinary, threatening situation in Cyprus were to arise. Birand, an experienced correspondent in Ankara, illustrates the mindset of Turkish the public and the state with respect to Cyprus.

The state mechanism, indeed, was not ready for such a situation. A few ministries knew what to do, how to take measures in such a state of war. ... Denktaş informed Ankara of the disputes, but he neither

35 Sharon Wiener, *Turkish Foreign Policy Decision-Making on the Cyprus Issue: A Comparative Analysis of Three Crises* (PhD Dissertation, Duke University, 1980), 184.

36 Birand, 30 *Sıcak Gün*, 29.

37 Wiener, *Turkish Foreign Policy Decision-Making on the Cyprus Issue...*, 265. This would later be a case of criticism among the Turkish public.

38 Birand, 30 *Sıcak Gün*, 28-29.

expected such a coup d'état nor Ankara's response to it (given his previous experiences). He did not even predict that Turkey would intervene. ... As a journalist, I definitely did not believe that Turkey would intervene. My friends at the newspaper had become accustomed to what was happening. Even though I lived with the developments in Ottawa and Brussels, I could not believe that Turkey would make ... such an unusual decision. We were brainwashed with awkward policies.³⁹

The feelings of Denktaş and Birand were to a large extent right. Throughout a decade-long period full of conflict, Turkey acted reluctantly in terms of intervening in Cyprus. Even at times when Turkish Cypriots faced massacres, as was the case in 1963 and 1967, Turkey had been content with serious diplomatic pressure but limited military action. Nevertheless, the Turkish government surprised Denktaş, politicians, and the public by launching a military operation in Cyprus on July 20, 1974. Why did Turkey act so "courageously" this time? What were the factors and conditions that diverged from previous crises? Was the international conjuncture more suitable than a decade or seven years earlier?

39 "Aslında Devlet mekanizması böyle bir durum için hazır değildi. Çok az Bakanlık bir savaş halinde ne yapacağını, nasıl tedbirler alabileceğini biliyordu. Aslında Denktaş, karışıklıkları önceden Ankara'ya bildirmiştir, ancak böylesine bir darbe ve buna Ankara'nın kesin ve ciddi tepki gösterebileceğini (eski tecrübelerinden dolayı) hesaplamamıştı. Türkiye'nin müdahale edebileceğini aklından dahi geçirmemiştir... Bir gazeteci olarak ben de katyeni Türkiye'nin bir müdahalede bulunacağına inanmıyorum. Gazetede de arkadaşlar arasında olan bitene alışık bir hava esiyordu. Ottawa ve Brüksel'de gelişmelerin içinde yaşamış olmama rağmen Türkiye'nin böylesine alışılmamış ... bir karar verebileceğine inanmıyorum. Hantal bir politika ile adeta beynimiz ykanmıştır." Ibid., 40 & 63. Contrary to Birand's statement, however, Denktaş notes in his memoirs that he had sent a message to Ecevit: "The last step for Enosis has been taken. There is no solution other than intervention." Also written in his remarks is that Ecevit answered his message, saying "May Mr. Denktaş do not worry. The government is forming the basis [for an intervention.]" Rauf Denktaş, *Rauf Denktaş'ın Hatıraları: Arşiv Belgeleri ve Notlarla O Günler* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1996), 362 & 364.

First, in terms of military capability, Turkey was much more prepared than in 1964 and 1967 due to the increase of its military capacity.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the content and style of the Johnson's letter led Turkey to consolidate its military capacity. Especially after the 1967 crisis, Turkey increased its military capacity in line with the requirements of an amphibious operation.⁴¹

The international conjuncture was suitable for Turkey for two reasons. First, the Cold War was in a détente phase in which superpowers were less apt to become involved in regional disputes. To put differently, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would react militarily against an offender in Cyprus. Furthermore, the Soviet Union opposed the junta in Greece and its attitude towards Archbishop Makarios. As a consequence, intervention against the Greece-backed, extreme nationalist administration in Cyprus would be acceptable to the Soviets.⁴² Last, Turkish intervention in Cyprus coincided with turmoil in the domestic politics of the United States, which impeded greater reaction on the part of the United States. The American government and public were shaken by the Watergate scandal which caused the resignation of President Richard Nixon on August 8, 1974.⁴³ Nixon was succeeded by Gerald Ford, and his first executive appointment – the assignement of Jack Bloom Kubisch as ambassador to Athens – was closely related to the Cyprus Question.⁴⁴

40 Birand, *Kıbrıs'ın Elli Yılı*.

41 Ibid.

42 Apart from strategic interests in the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union had prominent ties to Archbishop Makarios who was a favored actor in Third World politics. Moreover, the junta and its extensions in Cyprus, for the Soviets, were direct potential allies of the United States. In this regard, any offensive realized by the Greek junta was evaluated as a threat to the Soviet Union. In the first moments of the coup in Cyprus, the Soviet Union condemned the action through its official news agency. "Moskova Darbeyi Takbıh Etti," (Moscow Condemned the Coup) *Milliyet*, July 16, 1974, 1.

43 Asmussen, *Cyprus at War...*, 3. Despite Joseph Sisco's shuttle diplomacy between July 15 and 20, Greek Cypriots were never satisfied with the level of American efforts to stop Turkey's intervention. As a consequence of this dissatisfaction, Roger Davies, the United States ambassador to Nicosia, was killed by sniper fire during demonstrations in Nicosia on 19 August 1974 (four days after the second Turkish intervention).

44 Mak and Kennedy, *American Ambassadors...*, 30. The Cyprus Question was Ford's first diplomatic task. Ibid.

Bülent Ecevit, the prime minister, was aware of the convenience of national and international factors, and he linked Turkey's achievements during the military operations in Cyprus to the combination of these realities. In a television program on August 17, 1974, when Turkey declared a ceasefire after its second intervention on the island, he stated that a

reason for the success of Turkey's [intervention] is that we did not assess the Cyprus question as an intangible national cause by isolating it from international conditions. We always attached importance to international conditions, [and] world peace, and [we] conducted all our initiatives, whether diplomatic or military, by taking world and regional peace, [and] balance in our region under consideration. We did not only consider Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. ... Another factor that was as important as this: Turkey was perfectly prepared for the Cyprus operation in military terms.⁴⁵

§ 8.3 Covert Actors of the Intervention: The Role of the Turkish Diplomatic Bureaucracy

There were some political, strategic, and military calculations to be made. To put it in a different way, along with political will and military preparation, intervention required an intellectual, and strategic infrastructure – that is a co-ordination mechanism to evaluate the political, diplomatic, and military aspects of the dispute. In this regard, a committee had already been established

45 “Türkiye'nin başarı[sının] ... bir nedeni... Kıbrıs sorununu kendimiz için soyut bir milli sorun olarak görüp de dünya koşullarından soyutlamaya, ayrı düşünmeye kalkışmamış olmamızdır. Dünya koşullarını, dünya barışını, bölge koşullarını ve barışını daima göz önünde tutmaya önem verdik ve bütün diplomatik girişimlerimizi olsun askeri girişimlerimizi olsun, yalnız Türkiye'yi ve Kıbrıs Türklerinin haklarını gözterek değil, dünya ve bölge barışını da, bölgemizdeki dengeyi de göz önünde tutarak yürümeye çalıştık... Bunun kadar önemli bir etken de Türkiye'nin askeri bakımdan bir Kıbrıs harekatı için çok iyi hazırlanmış olmasiydı.” Bülent Ecevit, *Diş Politika ve Kıbrıs Dosyası* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2013). 64-65.

during Haluk Bayülken's term in as foreign minister (December 1971-January 1974).⁴⁶

The Cyprus Coordination Committee, which was called the 3-K (with reference to the capitals of the Turkish Kibris Koordinasyon Komitesi), functioned intensely after the coup d'état on July 15, 1974, until the beginning of the military intervention on July 20, 1974. The unit anticipated possibility of such a day and prepared against a coup, which was tantamount to realization of a tacit Enosis, that might occur in Cyprus. Ecmel Barutçu, who was head of the Cyprus-Greek Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a member of the committee, remarks that they were by no means unprepared for the possibility of an undesired fait accompli in Cyprus.⁴⁷

I suggested a briefing at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The committee called "3-K" was established to evaluate the political and military aspects of the Cyprus dispute together. ... As the Cyprus department, we were working in close cooperation with General Headquarters. ... During the ministry of Haluk Bayülken, [after] months-long collective efforts, with the related units of General Headquarters, we had already determined how Turkey should react against to the possibility ... of ... Enosis. As a result of these efforts, we passed [along these decisions] from the National Security Council. In this regard, by determining ... all possibilities, we ... determined how Turkey could react to these possibilities – ranging from bombardments ... to intervention.... Consequently, we were not unprepared. The incident that happened was foreseen. Now we had to evaluate the situation and determine which attitude we should recommend to the government.⁴⁸

46 Bayülken was the minister of foreign affairs between December 1971 and January 1974. The exact date the committee was established is not known.

47 In this regard, Barutçu opposes the above-stated illustration of Birand about the unpreparedness of the state mechanism to the developments in Cyprus. See footnote 39 in this chapter. Nevertheless, the aforementioned unpreparedness was rather related to the situation immediately before the coup in Cyprus. The 3-K committee, however, was a long-term formation.

48 "Dışişleri Bakanlığında durumu gözden geçirmek için, Kıbrıs Koordinasyon Komitesi olarak toplanmamızı teklif ettim. '3 K' diye adlandırılan bu komite Kıbrıs meselesinin askeri ve siyasi

Barutçu's remarks reveal that the Turkish civil and military bureaucracies had considerably prepared for the worst possibilities in Cyprus. His words also illustrate that during Bayülken's term in office, namely between December 1971 and January 1974, Turkey had evaluated more aggressive policies towards Cyprus including military intervention.⁴⁹

While tracing Turkey's immediate reaction to the military coup in Cyprus, it is essential to examine the bureaucratic efforts behind it. In order to understand how Turkish foreign policy adapted itself to emerging conditions so quickly in July 1974, the opinions and actions of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy are worth examining. Just as military preparations enabled Turkish General Headquarters launch an amphibious intervention in less than five days, the commitment of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy to the necessity of an intervention more easily persuaded the government of the time to undertake a military intervention.⁵⁰ This situation was expressed by prominent politicians of the time. Birand quotes a minister⁵¹ in the "cabinet"

veçheleriyle birlikte gözden geçirilmesi için kurulmuştu. ... Kıbrıs Dairesi olarak Genelkurmay ile sıkı bir işbirliği halinde çalışıyorduk ve Haluk Bayülken'in Dışişleri Başkanlığı sırasında Kıbrıs Dairesi ile Genelkurmay Başkanlığıının ilgili birimleriyle aylarca süren müşterek çalışmaları neticesinde ... Enosis'e yönelik muhtemel gelişmeler karşısında Türkiye'nin hareket tarzının ne olması lazım geldiğini tespit etmiş ve bu [kararları] Milli Güvenlik Kurulu'ndan geçirmiştir. Böylece bütün ihtimaller tespit edilerek, bu ihtimaller karşısında Türkiye'nin ne şekilde hareket edeceğini ... bombardımandan ... müdahaleye kadar olmak üzere, ayrıntılarıyla kağıt üzerine dökülmüştü. ... Binaenaleyh, hazırlıksız değildik. Kıbrıs'ta öngördüğümüz bir hadise vuku bulmuştu. Şimdi bunu ddeğerlendirip hangi hareket tarzını hükümete tavsiye edeceğimizi saptamalıydık." Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru...*, 46.

49 Mesut Özcan, a scholar and current head of the Diplomacy Academy of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, notes that the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy becomes more involved in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy under more unstable political conditions and during the terms of weak governments. Considering the political atmosphere of the 1970s, his words suitably explain the influence of the ministry bureaucracy over governments of the time. Moreover, Bayülken's foreign ministry, given that he was a veteran diplomat, probably increased the influence of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy over foreign policy-making processes. Mesut Özcan, *Interview by the Author*.

50 Yalın Eralp claims that "Ecme Barutçu played a prominent role in the decision-making process whereas military officers were hesitant." Eralp, *Interview by the Author*.

51 The name of the minister is unknown.

Ecmel [Barutçu] came and said that this [coup in Cyprus] meant nothing but Enosis and warned us about the necessity of intervening without hesitation. Barutçu's words were indeed of great significance at that moment. If he had hesitated, ... like other diplomats and ministers, and said "one of them is out and the other is in, let them harm each other; this is to our benefit," it would have been more difficult for us to make the decision [to intervene]. I can say that Ecmel played a historic role at that moment.⁵²

What were the ideas of Turkish diplomats and how committed were they to the idea that Turkey should go beyond its ordinary foreign policy and make the decision to intervene on the island in a very short period of the time? How did Turkish diplomats contribute to the intervention decision?

A Turkish diplomat of the time, cites Wiener, claimed that "there was no consensus in the ministry on Turkey's Cyprus policy."⁵³ Nevertheless, some diplomats assigned to critical posts in terms of the Cyprus Question, were clearly in favor of intervention. Perhaps not as an institution, but through individual diplomats working on the Cyprus Question, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributed to the decisionmaking process leading to the military intervention in Cyprus.

After word of the coup in Cyprus got out, an "evaluation meeting" was held in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to the accounts of Barutçu, the meeting was held in the afternoon of July 15, 1974, and the attendees, along with high-ranking commanders from Turkish General Headquarters, were Secretary General İsmail Erez, Director General of Political Affairs İsmail Soysal, Director General of Mutual Security Affairs Ercüment Yavuzalp, and Director General of the Cyprus-Greece Department Ecmel Barutçu⁵⁴ Certain

52 "Ecmel geldi ve bunun tamamen Enosis anlamına geldiğini, derhal müdahale edilmesi gerektiğini, hem de hiç tereddüsüz söyledi. Doğrusu Barutçu'nun sözlerinin o anda büyük önemi vardı. Eğer tereddüt etse, bazı diplomatlar veya Bakanlar gibi, 'canım ne olacak biri gitti diğeri geliyor, birbirlerini yesinler bizim daha lehimizedir' deseydi bu kararı almamız güçleşebilirdi. Ecmel o anda tarihi bir rol oynadı diyebilirim." Birand, 30 *Sıcak Gün*, 31.

53 Wiener, *Turkish Foreign Policy Decision-Making on the Cyprus Issue*, 317.

54 Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru*, 47.

actors influenced the position of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy and Turkish foreign policy in general throughout this evaluation meeting. As demonstrated earlier, Barutçu was one. According to him, the incidents in Cyprus was nothing but Enosis.⁵⁵ He added that

Turkey has a golden opportunity. Sympathy towards Makarios in the international realm will be directed toward Turkey. In no phase of the Cyprus dispute did Turkey have such suitable conditions. If this opportunity is missed, history will not forgive those who cause this loss for Turkey. The incident in Cyprus is tacit Enosis. Turkey should intervene in the situation immediately.⁵⁶

Barutçu's last two sentences would be the basis of the Turkish position against the post-coup status quo in Cyprus. He was not alone in holding this position. According to his accounts, one other attendee, Haluk Bayülken, also favored immediate intervention.⁵⁷ Bayülken was already involved in a pro-intervention position in the case of Cyprus. As a consequence, the papers and reports of Barutçu and the Cyprus-Greece department of the ministry were approved by the National Security Council during Bayülken's term as minister of foreign affairs (December 1971-January 1974).⁵⁸ Another participant in the same meeting, Ercüment Yavuzalp, who served as Turkey's Ambassador to Nicosia between 1967 and 1970, also favored immediate action against what he called a *fait accompli*.⁵⁹

The meeting was organized by then-secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the chair was Hasan Esat Işık. The Minister of National

55 Ibid., 48.

56 "Türkiye'nin ... önüne bulunmaz bir fırsat çıkmıştır. Makarios'a karşı yapılan darbe, uluslararası alanda bu şahsa beslenen sempatiyi Türkiye'nin yanına çekecektir. Kıbrıs ihtilafının hiçbir devresinde Türkiye'nin önüne bu derece elverişli şartlarla bir fırsat çıkmamıştır. Bu fırsat kaçırılırsa, Türkiye'ye bu fırsatı kaçırılanları tarih hiçbir zaman affetmeyecektir. Kıbrıs'ta olan gizli Enosis'tir. Türkiye duruma süratle müdahale etmelidir." Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Barutçu and Yavuzalp represented a similar or even same the hardliner positions in favor of immediate intervention. These two diplomats sat side-by-side at the meeting table.

Defense Işık had been deputizing Turan Güneş, the minister of foreign affairs of the time, because Güneş was paying an official visit to China.⁶⁰ Yavuzalp clarifies his views on the coup and his projection concerning its aftermath as follows:

The situation that the coup caused is Enosis. Turkish governments repeatedly declared that they would not accept any change to the status quo in Cyprus. Now they were presented a *fait accompli*, not the changing of the status quo but its total termination, which meant the annexation of the island by Greece. If our capabilities are sufficient to intervene, it is impossible to imagine a worse situation that would require such intervention. Not exercising our right to intervene to contest with this *fait accompli* means ... sacrificing Cyprus, and we will have neither prestige nor credibility in that case. If we put up with such a development, our discourse in the Aegean will lose its credibility and Greece will be further encouraged to become involved in bold initiatives in this region. In short, we will be “paper tigers.”⁶¹

It is inferred from the accounts of Baruşçu and Yavuzalp that the “wing of diplomacy” strongly favored an immediate, committed action against the coup. If we take into account that the attendees at the meeting from the “military wing” also favored military intervention, though Eralp claims that they were

60 “Güneş Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti’ne Gitti,” (Güneş Pays a Visit to People’s Republic of China) *Milliyet*, July 14, 1974, 6.

61 “Darbenin ortaya çıkardığı durum Enosis demektir. Türkiye Hükümetleri Kıbrıs’ta yerleşmiş statüde en ufak değişikliği bile kabul etmeyeceğini, her vesile ile ilan edegelmiştir. Adamlar şimdi bir statü değişikliği değil, statünün tamamını ortadan kaldırıp, Ada’yı Yunanistan'a ilhak anlamına gelen bir olup bitti yapmaktadır. Eğer bizim olanaklarımız bir müdaħale için yeterliyse, böyle bir müdaħaleyi gerektirmek için, bugün ortaya çıkan durumdan daha vahimi düşünülemez. Bu oldu bittiye rağmen müdaħale hakkımızı kullanmamak, Kıbrıs’tan vazgeçmektir... ve bu konuda ne ağırlığımız, ne de inandırıcılığımız kalır. Ayrıca böyle bir gelişme bile sineye çekilirse, Ege’deki tutumumuzun da bir inandırıcılığı kalmaz ve Yunanistan bu bölgede de cüretkar hareketlere girişmek için cesaret kazanır. Kısacası ‘kağıttan kaplan’ haline düşeriz.” Yavuzalp, *Liderler ve Dış Politika...*, 159.

cautious,⁶² it can be concluded that the first “evaluation meeting” concluded in favor of intervention. Barutçu and Yavuzalp also add that the participants from the military wing personally expressed pro-interventionist views.⁶³

Confirming the above-quoted depictions, Hitchens concludes that “the state of affairs in Ankara was far less complicated than it was in any of the other capitals concerned.”⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the pro-interventionist point of view was not without challenge. Hasan Esat Işık, the minister of national defense and a veteran diplomat, opposed such a strong expression of the pro-interventionist view. During the first cabinet meeting after the coup in Cyprus, a witness claims, “Işık left the meeting saying that ‘the United States will destroy us if we make such a decision’ in response to Oğuzhan Asiltürk (the minister of the interior and a deputy of the MSP) who defended urgent intervention without waiting for confirmation from any other country.”⁶⁵ Işık’s objection was clear in his above-quoted meeting with the representatives of the diplomatic and military bureaucracies. In the words of Barutçu,

during the meeting at the ministry, Hasan Işık was treating in order not to let our [pro-intervention] side talk. When Ercüment Yavuzalp attempted to speak the second time, [Işık] did not let him speak. ... I neither liked the way Hasan Esat Işık, the minister of national defense, managed the meeting nor his attitude during the talks. His actions suggested that he desired the issue to hang in the balance. However, this

62 Eralp, *Interview by the Author*.

63 Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru*, 49. Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika...*, 50. According to Barutçu, instead of expressing their views during the meeting, military participants in the meeting personally declared their support of Barutçu and Yavuzalp. *Ibid.*

64 Christopher Hitchens, *Hostage to History: From the Ottomans to Kissinger* (New York: The Noonday Press Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1989), 96-97.

65 İsmail Müftüoğlu, *Bilinmeyen Yönüyle Kıbrıs Barış Harekati Ve Perde Arkası* (İstanbul: Alioğlu Yayınevi, 2009), 131. This dialogue was cited from the memoirs of İsmail Müftüoğlu, who was then a deputy of the coalition partner the National Salvation Party. In his memoirs, Müftüoğlu does not mention the name of the witness. *Ibid.*

meeting needed to result in a decision, or at least with a direction [towards intervention].⁶⁶

Yavuzalp clarifies why he insisted on speaking at the meeting a second time. İşik, notes Yavuzalp, wondered and asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whether the Greek Regiment in Cyprus or the Greek Cypriot National Guard had realized the coup. If the latter realized the coup, added İşik – according to Yavuzalp –, the event could be assessed as an internal affair.⁶⁷ Yavuzalp opposed İşik's position in this respect. According to him, it was not important whether the Greek regiment in Cyprus or the National Guard realized the coup; in either case, noted Yavuzalp, Greece was the power behind it.⁶⁸ “Greece presented us a golden opportunity and if military conditions are convenient for an intervention,” added Yavuzalp “we should not lose time and [must] utilize this.”⁶⁹

According to Yavuzalp, İşik was not pleased with his and Barutçu's views, and this was “clear from the expression of his face.”⁷⁰ Both Yavuzalp and Barutçu claim that there were reasons behind İşik's attitude. Yavuzalp, for example, states that İşik “was perhaps of the same mind as he and Barutçu but expected bureaucrats to provide information, not commentary.”⁷¹ Barutçu's explanation differed to some extent. In his words, “İşik could not bear the fact that Foreign Minister Turan Güneş was far from Ankara on such a critical day.”⁷² Barutçu, nevertheless, indulges İşik because “the responsibility of involving a country in war was on his shoulders.”⁷³

66 “Dışişlerindeki toplantıda Hasan Esat İşik bizim tarafı pek konuşptomak istemeyen bir davranış içindeydi. Ercüment Yavuzalp yeniden söz almak istediginde kendisini ikinci kez konuşptomak istemedi. ... Milli Savunma Bakanı Hasan Esat İşik'in görüşmelere vermek istediği istikameti ve görüşmelerdeki tutumunu beğenmedim. İşin sürüncemede kalmasını tercih eder bir tarzda hareket ediyordu. Oysa bu toplantıdan bir kararın veya en azından bir temayılunması gerekiyordu.” Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru...*, 47-48.

67 Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz...*, 160.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru...*, 48.

73 Ibid., 48-49.

The “evaluation meeting” in the foreign ministry ended with no precise conclusion. A large proportion of the participants favored immediate intervention. Some like the attendees from the foreign ministry, clearly expressed their opinions. The chair of the meeting, İşık, nevertheless opposed the expression of pro-interventionist view such explicitly, at least according to two attendees of the meeting. So what happened? Given that Turkey realized a military operation just five days after the coup in Cyprus, what was the role of the predominantly pro-interventionist policy of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy, in the decision-making process?

Earlier in this chapter it was stated that another “evaluation meeting” was held in the prime ministry with cabinet members. This was an extraordinary cabinet meeting, but not all members of the thirty-seventh Turkish cabinet attended. Necmettin Erbakan, deputy prime minister, was in another meeting that he did not think it necessary to interrupt for the new developments in Cyprus; thus, the second man in the government did not attend the first “evaluation meeting” even though he was in Ankara.⁷⁴ Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit was in Afyon, a city renowned for its opium fields, and Foreign Minister Turan Güneş was in Beijing, China.⁷⁵

Barutçu was also invited to join this meeting and on this occasion reiterated his views in favor of intervention. As quoted previously from a minister who attended this meeting, Barutçu’s words impressed those in favor of intervention. Deniz Baykal, minister of finance, and İsmail Hakkı Birler, minister of state, immediately supported the views of Barutçu.⁷⁶ Baykal, according to

74 Birand, *30 Sicak Gün*, 30.

75 Opium fields in the city were a source of political tension between the United States and Turkey. The United States demanded the immediate suspension of opium production in Turkey in order to leave a positive impression on American public opinion. Previously, the Süleyman Demirel government limited but sustained production, whereas the Ferit Melen government suspended production in 1972. Bülent Ecevit, about three weeks before the intervention in Cyprus, lifted the suspension. He was in Afyon for the promotion of the resumption of opium production in the region. Along with the Cyprus dispute, the opium crisis also negatively influenced the United States’ perception of Ecevit. Mehmet Ali Birand, *12 Eylül Belgeseli*, vol. 2. (Istanbul: Show Tv, 1999), DVD.

76 Birand, *30 Sicak Gün*, 30.

Birler's accounts, defined the aim of the government as "to place Cyprus in a better condition than it was before the coup."⁷⁷ The aim of Turkey, added Baykal, was not to "restore the conditions of July 14, and bring Makarios back."⁷⁸ Baykal also noted that the "agreements of Zurich and London were no longer satisfactory in 1974" and it was necessary "to reach a further point."⁷⁹

Other cabinet members participating in the meeting were skeptical of intervention, and instead, they were suggested pursuing energetic diplomacy. According to Birand, the mindset of these cabinet members was full of questions: "What would the big states say? Was intervention easy? Can the army accomplish this job?"⁸⁰

In the two meetings realized on the afternoon of the day of the coup in Cyprus, a pro-interventionist tendency emerged, and Ecmel Barutçu as the head of the Cyprus Department at the foreign ministry, played a prominent role in the decision-making process. Yet, these meetings were consultations and could have led only to a tend towards intervention and not have determined the final decision. What made the pro-interventionist position visible for the government was a paper presented to the cabinet after Prime Minister Ecevit's return to Ankara. After his return from Afyon, Ecevit gathered the cabinet. Before the meeting, he ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to present a paper about the incident in Cyprus through İsmail Erez, then-secretary general. Erez assigned Barutçu to prepare this paper. In the words of Barutçu,

I projected two possibilities for this paper. The first was to implement the intervention mechanism in accordance with the Article 4 of the Guarantee Treaty, and the other was to invite the United Nations Security Council to a meeting. Greece should not have been taken into consideration because it was the aggressor state. By the way, I did not

77 İsmail Hakkı Birler, *İsmail Hakkı Birler'in Anılarında CHP'li Yıllar* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası yayınları, 2010), 554.

78 Birand, *30 Sicak Gün*, 30.

79 Ibid. These words were not expressed in the aforementioned meetings. Baykal's statements were a response to a question by Ferruh Bozbeyli, then-chairman of the Democratic Party, during a meeting between opposition party leaders and government authority led by Deniz Baykal.

80 Birand, *30 Sicak Gün*, 31.

hesitate to state that the option of applying to the Security Council would limit our space to maneuver. I knew that as a technocrat I should not act in a way to influence the government, but I think everybody was aware that we could not trust the United Nations. If given the opportunity ... the countries on the Security Council would hamper the process. ... As the justification for an initiative under the [framework] of the Treaty of Guarantee, I asserted that the constitutional order had been totally abolished with the coup. I intended to illustrate that the coup was changing the status of the island.⁸¹

The cabinet meeting was held at five o'clock on July 16, 1974, and took one and a half hours.⁸² It is not clear how many times the cabinet gathered that day, but it was more than once. On the previous day, the cabinet had already gathered three times.⁸³ Barutçu attended one of these meetings, and according to his accounts, Prime Minister Ecevit asked him how to act in case an obligation to intervene emerged. Barutçu answered as follows:

I explained my views on this issue by basing them on Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee and added that if Turkey opted to exercise its right to intervene, first and foremost it would be convenient to consult with

81 "Bu kağıtta ben iki imkan görüyordum. Biri, Garanti Antlaşmasının 4. Maddesi gereğince müdahale mekanızmasını işletmek, diğeri de Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyini toplantıya çağrımaktı. Yunanistan mütecaviz durumda olduğu için garantör devlet olarak artık nazara alınmamalıydı. Bu arada Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyine müracaat şıklığının hareket serbestimizi elimizden alacağını da belirtmekten geri kalmadım. Bir teknisyen olarak hükümete tesir edecek şekilde hareket etmemem gerektiğini biliyordum ama Birleşmiş Milletler bel bağlanamayacağı, Güvenlik Konseyinde işi yozlaştmak isteyecek olan yabancı ülkelere bu imkani ... verdikten sonra bundan yakamızı kurtarmamızın mümkün olmayacağı herhalde kimsenin meşhulu değildi. ... Türkiye'nin Garanti Antlaşması altında inisiyatif almasına gerekce olarak, Kıbrıs'taki darbe ile anayasa nizamının artık tamamen ortadan kalkmış olmasını göstermiştim. Kastım darbenin Ada'nın statüsünü değiştirmekte olduğunu göstermekti." Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru*..., 53.

82 Ibid.

83 "Ankara'da Durum," (The Situation in Ankara) *Milliyet*, July 16, 1974, 10.

the United Kingdom since it was necessary to put into effect the mechanism that the Treaty of Guarantee had foreseen.⁸⁴

Due to the above stated approach, states Barutçu, he was again confronted by Hasan Esat Işık after the cabinet meeting. Işık opposed the perspective that the coup had changed the status quo in Cyprus. Işık asked “if the constitutional order has been overthrown with the coup, what changed with the incidents in 1963?”⁸⁵ After the cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Ecevit made a press statement in line with Barutçu’s pro-interventionist view. The Prime Minister stressed that “Greece itself was violating the independence of Cyprus determined by international treaties, and in this regard, it would be useless to consult with it as a signatory of the Treaty of Guarantee.”⁸⁶ When a journalist asked whether the conditions for the exercise of Turkey’s right to intervene had emerged, Ecevit answered “if the rights and security of Turkish Cypriots are at risk, Turkey will do what is necessary and has made the preparations required for such an initiative.”⁸⁷

In retrospect, it is not clear what was the main motive behind the Ecevit government’s decision to intervene, but the path that the prime minister followed after July 17, 1974 was similar to what Barutçu had projected. The Turkish government, similar to Barutçu’s prescriptions, consulted with the United Kingdom and ordered Turkish General Headquarters to prepare for intervening on the island in the shortest possible period of time. A Turkish delegation led by Prime Minister Ecevit left for London at three thirty in the afternoon on July 17, 1974. Both the MSP wing of the coalition and Foreign Minister Turan Güneş strictly opposed this decision.⁸⁸ For both, negotiation with the

84 “Ben bu konudaki görüşümü Garanti Antlaşmasının 4. maddesine dayanarak izah ettim ve Türkiye müdahale hakkını kullanacak ise her şeyden önce Garanti Antlaşmasının öngördüğü mekanizmayı harekete geçirmek lazım geldiğini söyleyerek İngiltere ile danışma yapmamızın doğru olacağını ifade ettim.” Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru...*, 55.

85 Ibid., 52.

86 “Ecevit’in Açıklaması,” (Statement of Ecevit) *Cumhuriyet*, July 17, 1974, 7.

87 Ibid.

88 Müftüoğlu, *Bilinmeyen Yönleriyle...*, 141, Birand, *30 Sicak...*, 76.

United Kingdom was nothing more than a waste of time since the addressees in London would not consent to a joint intervention in Cyprus.

Diplomats holding the pro-interventionist perspective since the beginning of the incidents in Cyprus, namely Barutçu and Yavuzalp, were also members of the delegation. The decision to make the visit was made so suddenly that some members of the Turkish delegation borrowed clothes such as dress shirts and socks from their colleagues at the Turkish embassy in London.⁸⁹ What was the aim of Ecevit's visit to London for consultations? Was he optimistic about the possible cooperation of the United Kingdom? Did he decide to intervene on the island even before his visit to London?

As one member of Turkish delegation to London, Yavuzalp claims that "neither Ecevit nor İşik, then-acting foreign minister, had hope that the United Kingdom would have a positive response to [Turkey's] demands."⁹⁰ Moreover, adds Yavuzalp, the aim of Prime Minister Ecevit was to prevent criticisms that all peaceful methods were not consumed before intervention.⁹¹ In this regard, Ecevit's main motive was not cooperation with the United Kingdom, but to refer to any possible diplomatic efforts. Yavuzalp does not declare in his accounts whether Ecevit had already decided to intervene even before flying to London, but another Turkish diplomat from the London delegation claims that most people in the delegation, if not all, were unaware of the commitment of the government to intervene in Cyprus. In the words of Birand,

the feelings of a diplomat on the plane in his way to London: "I did not know what the prime minister thought in those moments, but we predicted that a diplomatic offensive would be initiated with the visit to Britain. Nobody had a clue about the idea of an intervention. To be honest, we did not believe that the government would act so courageously."⁹²

89 Birand, *30 Sicak...*, 68.

90 Yavuzalp, *Liderler...*, 162.

91 Ibid.

92 "Bir diplomatın uçak hareket ettiği sıradaki hisleri: 'Başbakan o sırada ne düşünüyordu bilmiyorum, ancak biz İngiltere gezisiyle uluslararası diplomatik bir taarruzun başlatılacağını

Asaf İnhan, then Turkish ambassador to Nicosia, confirms that the embassy in London was not informed of the intervention until the morning of July 19, 1974.⁹³ The accounts of Barutçu also reveal that even he was not aware of Ecevit's exact ideas and commitment to intervention until the first dinner in London. Ecevit, states Barutçu, expressed his ideas for the first time at this dinner.⁹⁴

Melih Esenbel, then-Turkish ambassador to Washington, however, was aware of the decision to intervene. Ekrem Güvendiren, then a mid-ranking Turkish diplomat at the embassy in Washington, notes that Esenbel stalled the American officials to prevent their intervention in Turkey's operation on the island.⁹⁵ Esenbel ordered junior colleagues, notes Güvendiren, "not to awaken him for a while for he was tired." And so, his counterparts in the Department of State of the United States could not deliver their opinions to Esenbel.⁹⁶ In doing so, he sought to give Turkish troops time before American involvement.⁹⁷ Esenbel aside, other diplomats at the Turkish embassy in Washington like those in London, were not aware of the intervention plan, either.

Meanwhile, there was a state of emergency at the ministry building in Ankara. The "lights of the ministry were not turned off for a week," states a Turkish diplomat of the time.⁹⁸ Yılmaz Altuğ, then a young diplomat assigned to the office of the foreign minister illustrates, the measures to prevent leaks of information from the ministry.

On the evening of July 19, those ordered to stay remained at the ministry after working hours, and as a measure to prevent any information

sayıyorduk. Kimsenin müdahale konusunda fikri yoktu. Hükümetin böyle bir cesareti gösterebileceğine doğrusu inanamıyorduk." Birand, *30 Şıkkı...*, 67-68.

93 İnanç, *Büyükelçiler Anlatıyor...*, 28.

94 Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru...*, 56.

95 Ekrem Güvendiren, *Hayat Yollarında...*, 143.

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid.

98 Bilhan also notes that officers assigned in Ankara during the days of the intervention still reminisce about the sacrifices they made when they come together at reunions. Bilhan, *Interview by the Author*.

leaks, the entrances and exits of the ministry were locked. Turan Güneş undertook the responsibility of stalling press officers, who understood that there was an extraordinary situation and had gathered in front of the ministry.⁹⁹

§ 8.4 Unknown Fronts of the War: Embassies in Nicosia, Athens, and the Ministry in Ankara

The British did not welcome the idea of intervention from the Turkish government. James Callaghan, then-secretary of state for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, stated that “it was practically problematic to facilitate the British bases” for military intervention and added that the United Kingdom desired “to see less military presence in Cyprus, not more.”¹⁰⁰ The United Kingdom, the Common Market, and the United States – through Henry Kissinger, secretary of state – were already putting pressure on Greece, added Callaghan.¹⁰¹

In his statement in response to a question concerning whether Turkish troops were beginning to act, Ecevit underscored that “they made efforts to find peaceful solutions to the problem” and “still at the stage of finding peaceful solutions.”¹⁰² The option of intervention, even if mentioned, was not on the table during the consultations. Reminiscent of Cyrus Vance in 1967, Joseph Sisco, as representative of Kissinger, was visiting London for trilateral talks with the United Kingdom and Turkey.¹⁰³ The United States sought to prevent

99 “19 Temmuz akşamı mesai bitiminden sonra içeride sadece kalma talimatı verilenler kalmış ve bilgi sızmasına karşı bir önlem olarak Bakanlığın giriş-çıkış kapıları kilitlenmişti. Olağanüstü bir durumun olduğunu fark ederek Bakanlığın önünde toplanan basın mensuplarını oyalamak görevini Turan Güneş üstlenmişti.” Altuğ, *Hatırında Kalanlar...*, 86.

100 Ibid., 57.

101 Ibid., 57.

102 “Ecevit Londra’da Wilson’la Görüştü,” (Ecevit Met Wilson in London), *Cumhuriyet*, July 18, 1974, 1.

103 Barutçu claims that the dominant view among the Turkish delegation concerning Sisco’s inclusion in the talks in London was negative. Ecevit also declared to the United Kingdom that he would not accept trilateral talks with Sisco’s participation but that he could meet with him

Turkey's plans to intervene as they had in 1963-4 and 1967. Meanwhile, military preparations for an intervention continued. When Prime Minister Ecevit gave Joseph Sisco forty-eight hours to negotiate with Athens, Emin Alpkaya, then commander of Turkish Air Force, expressed his astonishment to Yavuzalp saying that "How can this happen? Our troops have boarded the ships and will be deployed tomorrow."¹⁰⁴

Turkish troops who would take part in the intervention were indeed being deployed to the Port of Mersin on the Eastern Mediterranean coast of Turkey. Political and bureaucratic signals of the intervention were also drawing closer one by one. Ecevit requested the meeting of the TBMM be postponed from Saturday, July 20 to Monday, July 22.¹⁰⁵ A decision to intervene on the island had already been approved by the TBMM in 1967,¹⁰⁶ and a second decision was not legally necessary. Ecevit's request for this postponement, states Barutçu was actually to stall the international public opinion.¹⁰⁷ The diplomatic bureaucracy realized that intervention was about to occur when they received an encrypted message from Ankara at eight o'clock in the evening on Friday, July 19. The message ordered the "embassies to adopt a 24-hour working schedule and keep open radio communications with the ministry."¹⁰⁸ Turkey's ambassador to Greece, Kamuran Gürün reveals the atmosphere in the embassy during the first minutes of the intervention.

We, at the embassy, including military attachés, all the officers of the mission spent the night of July 18 on our feet. When we were ordered

at the Turkish Embassy in London for separate bilateral talks. Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru...*, 59. Cyrus R. Vance was the secretary of state of the United States between 1964 and 1967 and forestalled a potential Greco-Turkish War in 1967 again due to the escalation of the crisis in Cyprus.

104 Yavuzalp, *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika...*, 164.

105 Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru...*, 63.

106 Clashes intensified in Cyprus in autumn 1967, and the TBMM authorized the Turkish government of the time to conduct a military intervention outside the borders of Turkey. "Türkiye Savaşa Hazır," (Turkey Ready for War) *Milliyet*, November 19, 1967, 1.

107 Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru...*, 63.

108 Gürün, *Bükreş, Paris, Atina...*, 317.

to implement a twenty four-hour work schedule, actually none of our friends thought of going home that night.

Our radio and the one in Nicosia were operating on the same frequency. Since our radio was open permanently, it also received the telegraph sent to Nicosia. The news which we read in the encrypted message was informing that the operation would begin that morning [July 20]. Our military attaches immediately began estimations. They concluded that contrary to predictions ... the operation would start not in Famagusta but on the Kyrenia coast and at about five o'clock in the morning. Then we began to wait. Meanwhile, Nicosia went silent. No sound at all. We lived through a terrible ten minutes without understanding what was happening. To my surprise, they were changing the circuits in their generator. During those ten minutes not only me but all the other people in the embassy may have lost a kilo of weight.¹⁰⁹

In these minutes, the Turkish embassy in Nicosia, from which the other diplomatic missions and ministry officials in Ankara were awaiting urgent information, were preoccupied with their own troubles. In the words of İnhan,

the embassy building was about a hundred meters away from the Greek Cypriot sector. Four soldiers from the Turkish regiment were standing guard. We had two or three guns and a machine gun passing

109 "Biz büyükelçilikte, askeri ataşeler de dahil, bütün Büyükelçilik mensupları 18 Temmuz gecesini ayakta geçirmiştik. 19 Temmuz Akşamı, 24 saat çalışma talimatını alınca, tabiatıyla o gpgece de, hiçbir arkadaş evine gitmeyi aklından bile geçirmedi.

Bizim Büyükelçilikle Lefkoşa Büyükelçiliği Telsizleri aynı frekans üzerinde çalışırıdı. Telsizimiz devamlı dinlemede olduğu cihetle, saat 03.00'te Lefkoşa'ye çekilen bir telgrafı bizim telsiz de aldı. Şifreyi açtığımızda okuduğumuz haber, hareketin o sabah başlayacağı idi. Askeri ataşelerimiz derhal hesaba koyuldular. Çıkarmanın herkesin beklediği şekilde Magos'da değil, Girne kıyılarında ve saat 05.00 civarında olacağı sonucuna vardılar. Ondan sonra beklemeye başladık... Derken 04.30 sularında Lefkoşa susuverdi. Ses seda yok. Ne olduğunu anlamadan korkunç bir 10 dakika geçirdik. Meğerde jeneratörde devre değiştirirlermiş. O on dakika süresince, sadece ben değil, telsiz başındaki tüm kançılaryla, birer kilo zayıflamış olabiliriz." Ibid., 317-318.

from hand to hand, which could hardly ensure our security. A machine gun provided to my wife could be evaluated as consolidation. The security power of the embassy consisted of this. It was such that my wife stood guard in the troublesome first two nights of the intervention.¹¹⁰

Turkey's intervention in Cyprus, as expected and clear from the accounts of Gürün, caused great enthusiasm and a feeling of commitment among the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. They had been after all, the operators of Turkey's foreign policy in the Cyprus dispute for nearly two decades and now they were living through history. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an institution had favored intervention in Cyprus especially after the coup. The intervention on July 20, 1974, in this regard, was to be celebrated. Gürün's statement about the excitement in Turkey's embassy in Athens is clarified above. The situation was no different in Ankara. Yavuzalp notes that "the news of the intervention was met with happiness and excitement at the ministry."¹¹¹ According to him, Sisco's failure to persuade the Greeks to compromise was a welcome development.¹¹² In his accounts, Barutçu hails the intervention as "the end of eleven years of disappointments."¹¹³

In the second part of his statement on the morning of the intervention, Gürün mentioned that a simple technical failure had interrupted their communications with Nicosia for a while. There were also other coordination failures during the intervention. A similar situation was true in the headquarters

110 "Büyükelçilik binası... Rum kesimine 100 metre kadar yakındı. Türk Alayı'ndan dört asker ... nöbet tutardı. Bazı arkadaşlarla birlikte kendimize ait iki üç tabancamız ve elden ele dolaşan bir otomatik tüfek, ancak güvenimizi yüksek tutmaya yeterli olabilirdi. Eşime getirilen otomatik tüfek de takviye sayılabilirdi. Büyükelçiliğin koruma gücü bundan ibaretti. Öyle ki, harekatın kriz dolu birinci ve ikinci gecelerinde eşim de nöbetlerde sıra tutmuştur." İnanç, *Büyükelçiler Anlatıyor...*, 28-29.

111 Yavuzalp, *Liderler ve Dış Politika...*, 165.

112 He was "thanking God that Sisco ... could not wheedle anything considerable from the Greeks" which he thought in turn could be a barrier or to harm the legitimacy of Turkey's intervention to Cyprus. Ibid., 164. "... Sisco Atina'dan döndü. Allah'tan Yunanlılardan fazla bir şey koparamamıştı." Ibid.

113 Barutçu, 68. He refers to the period between 1963 and 1974. In 1963, Turkey, for the first time, considered military intervention in Cyprus.

of the ministry in Ankara. Deniz Böyükbaşı was a young career diplomat in Ankara assigned to strengthen the information department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹¹⁴ He depicts the chaotic atmosphere in the capital on the first day of the intervention as follows:

There was a great hurry, rush, and traffic at the [Ministry of] Foreign Affairs. State institutions were absolutely ... disorderly in terms of coordination. During the first days of the intervention, nobody knew what to do. Officers at the ministry were busy answering ringing telephones. The night before the beginning of the intervention, lights were dimmed in the ministries region [in Ankara] where [Ministry of] Foreign Affairs was also located. With the beginning of the intervention towards morning, a chaos was experienced in the corridors of the ministry that is hard to relate.¹¹⁵

There were also coordination problems also among various elements of the state mechanism. As quoted earlier, Barutçu underscored the strong coordination between the officials of the civil-diplomatic and military bureaucracies, particularly under the framework of the 3-K mechanism. This coordination, however, did not continue as perfectly as desired during the intervention. Taner Baytok, who was then assigned to the NATO Department of the ministry in Ankara, depicts the lack of coordination and communication between the military and diplomatic bureaucracies as well as those between the military bureaucracy and the government.

I was one of the people with some other colleagues who were detained in the ministry. Even though we were free to go after the intervention began, we did not leave the ministry until morning and from our rooms tried to understand what was happening. Ercüment Yavuzalp

114 Deniz Böyükbaşı, *Dışişleri İşkelesi: Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2011), 62-63.

115 "Dışişleri'nde inanılmaz bir telaş, koşturmaca ve trafik yaşandı. Devlet kurumları koordinasyon bakımından tam anlamıyla... savruluyordu... Kıbrıs Barış Harekati'nın ilk günlerinde kimse ne yapacağını bilmiyordu. Dışişleri memurları hiç durmadan çalan telefonlara cevap verebilmek için sürekli koşturuyordu. Harekatın başlamasından önceki gece Dışişleri'nin de bulunduğu Bakanlıklar bölgesine karartma uygulandı. Sabaha karşı ... çıkarmaya birlikte bakanlık koridorlarında anlatılması güç bir keşmekeş yaşanmaya başladı." Ibid.

and Faruk Şahinbaş had served in our embassy in Cyprus. They knew the island and the developments. However, it was neither possible for them to follow the developments via the telegraphs delivered from our embassy in Nicosia nor from information that we obtained ourselves. We were not the only ones unable to follow the operation. Towards morning, the door of my office opened and Turan Güneş, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, came in. ... Once he was in, Güneş asked "Baytok what are those commanders doing? We cannot get any information. Neither the government nor the embassy in Nicosia are aware of what is happening. Go, learn something, and inform us."¹¹⁶

Baytok's quote is a significant disclosure. The foreign minister was complaining about insufficient information about military actions on the intervention's most critical day. According to Baytok, the armed forces were definitely willing to inform the foreign ministry, but the command-staff could not get the process under control.¹¹⁷

The developments were confirming Baytok's approach. The most prominent example was the *Kocatepe* incident. On July 21, 1974, aircraft of the Turkish Air Force bombed and sank a Turkish destroyer called *Kocatepe* thinking that it was a Greek destroyer posing as a Turkish battleship.¹¹⁸ On July 20,

116 "Harekat başlayana kadar, bazı diğer arkadaşlarla birlikte bakanlığa kapatılanlardan biri de bendim. Harekat başladıkтан sonra da çıkışımız serbest bırakılmasına rağmen, olayları takip için sabaha kadar bakanlığı terk etmedik ve odalarımızda ne olup bittiğini anlamaya çalıştık. Ercüment Yavuzalp ve Faruk Şahinbaş, ikisi de Kıbrıs Büyükelçiliğimizde görev yapmışlardı. Adayı ve olayları biliyorlardı. Buna rağmen, Lefkoşa Büyükelçiliğimizden gelen telgraflardan ve kulaktan duyduklarından sağladığımız bilgilerle harekatı izlemek onlar için dahi mümkün olamamaktaydı. Harekatı takip edemeyen bir tek biz değilmişiz. Sabaha karşı bir ara büromun kapısı açıldı ve içeriye Dışişleri Bakanı Turan Güneş girdi... Girer girmez, 'Baytok, senin şu askerler ne yapıyorlar, bir türlü bilgi alamıyoruz. Olanlardan ne hükümetin ne de Lefkoşa Büyükelçiliğinin haberi var, git bir şeyler öğren de bize bildir' dedi." Baytok, *Diş Politikada Bir Nefes...*, 196.

117 Ibid.

118 Aydın and Taşkın, *1960'tan Günümüze...*, 260. In those days, Kemal Girgin was the head of the protocol department at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He depicts what he witnessed in this case as follows: "He [Hasan Esat Işık] was talking excitedly to someone abroad

information was received that a Greek military convoy had been deployed from Rhodes towards Cyprus, yet there was no such convoy.¹¹⁹ The Turkish Air Force bombed the destroyer although it had Turkish flag and its crew spoke Turkish.¹²⁰ Two other Turkish battleships, *Fevzi Çakmak* and *Adatepe*, were severely damaged in attacks by Turkish Armed Forces due to a lack of coordination.¹²¹

Lack of coordination among the related units of the state mechanism during the intervention was not limited to the sinking of the *Kocatepe*.¹²² There were similar cases. Although the second intervention in the island proceeded more successfully than the first one in July 1974, there would have been troublesome moments also in the second intervention in August 1974. For instance, Nurettin Ersin, the commander of the Cyprus intervention, which was called Operation Attila, depicts the disorderly state of Turkish forces in Cyprus as follows:

It was not determined where our troops landing in Cyprus would be deployed. We proceed in a rough, deserted land. We capture a hill

(probably our delegate at NATO or our ambassador to Washington) and shouting, insistently stressing: “Tell them a Greek convoy is approaching the island. We will bomb and sink it unless it turns back.” Despite the fact that the crew in Kocatepe introduced themselves in Turkish, authorities in Ankara claimed that the Turkish-speaking soldiers of the battleship were Istanbulite Greeks aiming to mislead Turkish side. Girgin, *Dünyanın Dört Bucağı...*, 169-170.

119 Aydin and Taşkın, *1960'tan Günümüze...*, 260.

120 Ibid., 261. The attack on Kocatepe was realized without verifying the information received. This decision can thus be evaluated as a clear failure of the operational and informational units of the Turkish Armed Forces. Furthermore, Prime Minister Ecevit, relying on non-verified information from Turkish General Quarters, also insisted that the battleship belonged to the Greek navy. Kissinger cites a telephone conversation on the issue as follows “Ecevit said Greeks deployed ships towards Cyprus that are full of Greek soldiers who learned speaking Turkish. I told Ecevit, who was already deadly tired, that nobody would blame Turkey for Turkish-speaking ships.” Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York: Touchstone Books, 2000), 518.

121 Aydin and Taşkın, *1960'tan Günümüze...*, 260.

122 There are counter arguments in this case. According to İnhan, the operation was realized with the harmonious cooperation of land, sea, and air forces of the Turkish military, and it thus became a strong military initiative. İnanç, *Türk Diplomasisinde Kıbrıs...*, 16.

[and] say “let’s stop here.” Then we say “let’s move on; it is easy to walk down the hill. This time we say “trenches are not suitable for border; they are hard to defend. Let’s capture this hill, too, and stop there.” We begin walking again. It continued like this for a while. We reached a point. If we proceeded further, we would reach the sea on the southern part of the island. We asked Ankara. We were ordered to eastward. We answered that there were British bases in the east. If so, they said, proceed west. The air force was not informed and we were shelled over our heads. We delivered a message to the Air Force asking what they were doing. Since there was the incident of the *Kocatepe*, they believed us and stopped bombing.¹²³

§ 8.5 “A Break for a Bigger Step:” Ceasefire after the First Intervention

The Turkish government complied with the resolution of the United Nations calling for an urgent ceasefire and stopped the military action at five o’clock in the evening on July 22, 1974.¹²⁴ There was no consensus among the partners

123 “Kıbrıs'a çıkan kuvvetlerimizin nerede duracağı, önceden tespit edilmiş değildi. Engebeli, boş arazide ilerliyoruz. Bir tepeyi alıyoruz. Burada duralım diyoruz. Sonra tepeden aşağıya yürümek kolay, biraz daha gidelim diyoruz. Bu sefer işte, cukurda hudut olmaz, savunması zordur, şu tepeyi de alalım, orada dururuz, diye yine yürüyoruz. Bu böylece bir süre gitti. Bir yere geldik. Biraz daha gitsek, Ada'nın güneyinden denize çıkacağız. Ankara'ya sorduk. Doğuya ilerleyin emri aldık. Ama doğuda İngiliz üsleri var, dedik. Öyleyse batıya ilerleyin dendi. Batıya ilerlerken, [Türk]hava kuvvetlerine bilgi verilmemiş, başımıza bomba yağmaya başladı. Hava kuvvetlerine bilgi verilmemiş, başımıza bomba yağmaya başladı. Hava kuvvetlerine, ne yapıyorsunuz, diye mesaj yolladık. Önümüzde Kocatepe misali olduğundan, inandılar ve bombardımanı durdurdular.” Baytok, *Diş Politikada Bir Nefes Anılar...*, 196-197.

124 The United States had already stepped into the crisis, and then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger requested Prime Minister Ecevit “to stop the operation, not to proceed anymore and to organize a conference in Geneva.” After consulting his Foreign Minister Turan Güneş, Ecevit accepted the offer of the United States and the Geneva Process began after the ceasefire. Sedes, 36-37. Although the Watergate Scandal prevented more active American involvement in the crisis, which caused a reaction among the Greek and Greek Cypriot publics against the United States, this incident by itself illustrates the American factor in the management of the process.

of the coalition to make the decision for ceasefire. Oğuzhan Asiltürk, then-minister of interior, remarked years afterward that “first Turkey should have seized the whole island and then we would be in an advantageous position during diplomatic talks as the side controlling the whole territory of Cyprus.”¹²⁵ The ceasefire was indeed the outcome of a split among the partners of the coalition government. Since the beginning of the coup in Cyprus, Necmettin Erbakan, then-deputy prime minister and leader of the MSP, claimed that “the coup authorized Turkey to intervene in all respects ... in accordance with the treaties of 1960,” while Prime Minister Ecevit was in favor of “introducing negotiations.”¹²⁶ The MSP wing of the coalition was always been assertive about the Cyprus cause. İsmail Müftüoğlu, then deputy of MSP, remarks that

neither the CHP government in 1963 nor the Justice Party governments took measures to prevent bloodshed. Governments with liberal, leftist tendencies could not solve the problems of Cyprus. ... The first courageous attempt occurred during the CHP-MSP coalition. ... Although the formation of the 1974 Peace Offensive, the decision-making, and the landing in Cyprus was realized with the predominant pressure of the MSP team, it is impossible not to be surprised by the efforts of the CHP to appropriate the achievement. The CHP mindset formed governments many times before, [yet] even their glorious İsmet [İnönü] Pasha did not attempt such an operation.¹²⁷

The decision of ceasefire was indeed made under serious international pressure. Turgut Tülümen, the charge d'affairs at NATO headquarters in Brussels, notes that “he and the Greek delegate were invited by Joseph Luns, then-secretary general of NATO, for a meeting.”¹²⁸ Even Orhan Eralp, Turkey’s permanent representative to NATO, was pressured to “not object to a NATO

125 Birand, *12 Eylül Belgeseli*.

126 Menter Şahinler, *Türkiye'nin 1974 Kıbrıs Siyaseti* (İstanbul: Rumeli Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği, 1979), 41.

127 Müftüoğlu, *Bilinmeyen Yönleriyle...*, 126-127.

128 Tülümen, *İki Mülkiyeli...*, 31.

statement condemning Turkey's intervention to Cyprus."¹²⁹ Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit was in close contact with the United States and the United Kingdom.¹³⁰ Tülümen was the Turkish diplomat to convey Luns' ceasefire request to Ankara at midnight on July 21.¹³¹

The intervention, which started at five o'clock in the morning on July 20, took exactly sixty hours. Perhaps influenced by the above-said coordination problems, Turkey captured only a small portion of Cyprus. Nevertheless, the atmosphere among the public was different. *Cumhuriyet* on July 23 informed its readers that "the operation was completed successfully."¹³² On the same day, the headline in *Hürriyet* cheered "Victory, Victory" and suggested that its readers hang flags from their homes stating that "today is a day to celebrate."¹³³ Throughout the intervention, Turkish casualties were limited. Counter-attacks by Greek Cypriots were repelled and the Kyrenia-Kioneli (Gönyeli)-Nicosia triangle was captured.¹³⁴ If viewed from this perspective, the operation was successful. Yet Turkish troops captured only seven percent of the island, and since Turkish Cypriots were scattered around the whole island, sixty-five percent of the Turkish population in Cyprus remained within the Greek Cypriot-controlled areas and under threat of massacre by the EOKA-B.¹³⁵ Rauf Denktaş complained that Greek Cypriots did not obey the terms of ceasefire.¹³⁶ Finally, forty thousand Turkish soldiers involved in the operation were crowded

129 Eralp, *Perdeyi Aralarken*, 41.

130 Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 519-520.

131 Tülümen, *İki Mülkiyeli...*, 31. Tülümen was informed by Barutçu on the morning of July 22 that Turkey "would comply with the ceasefire." The ceasefire, nevertheless, did not decrease the level of international pressure on Turkey. *Ibid.*

132 "Harekat Başarıyla Sonuçlandı," (Operation Completed with Success) *Cumhuriyet*, July 23, 1974, 1.

133 "Zafer, zafer!" "Bu bi bayramdır, evlerinize bayrak asın." (Victory, victory! It is a festival. Hang flags in your houses) *Hürriyet*, July 23, 1974, 1.

134 Melek Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası I*, ed. Baskın Oran, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), 742.

135 *Ibid.*, 743.

136 "Ateş Dün Saat 17.00'de Kesildi," (Ceasefire began yesterday at 17.00) *Milliyet*, July 23, 1974, 1.

together in a 348 square kilometer area, and their ability to move was considerably limited.¹³⁷

§ 8.6 The Road to the Final Action Through the Lens of Turkish Diplomats

Turkey's first intervention in Cyprus did not attract considerable international criticism despite the fact that the United Nations Security Council's Resolution No. 353 of July 20, 1974, demanded the immediate withdrawal of foreign military personnel from the Republic of Cyprus, in which they were present on the island in contravention of paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter.¹³⁸ Although "Pakistani newspapers announced the success of the Turkish offensive as if it were their own accomplishment,"¹³⁹ the reactions of the international public were complicated. Nevertheless, Turkish diplomats perceived a kind of tacit approval from their foreign counterparts. Haluk Afra, who was then the charge d'affairs at Turkey's embassy in The Hague, states that, the

Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs angrily stated: "We condemn Turkey's invasion of Cyprus; please inform your government of our opinion." Then, he relaxed and said "let us talk personally now, I am sympathetic with your operation."¹⁴⁰

Baytok, in Ankara, witnessed a similar dialogue between Hasan Esat Işık and his American counterpart Melvin R. Laird. Baytok quotes the dialogue and his interpretation of it as follows:

On the third day I witnessed personally a message sent by the United States Secretary of Defense Laird to his Turkish counterpart Hasan

137 Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler," 743.

138 "UN Resolution 353," *United Nations Website*, accessed January 20, 2017, available from [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/353\(1974\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/353(1974)).

139 Aytaman, *Sinirli Yıllar...*, 223.

140 "Bakan asık suratla, 'Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs'ı işgal etmesini resmen protesto ediyoruz, lütfen görüşümüzü hükümetinize bildirin,' dedikten sonar gevşedi. 'Şimdi de özel olarak konuşalım. Bu harekatı sempati ile karşıladım.' Afra, *Hariciyeciler*, 166.

Esat Işık stating “Get your boots on and finish this operation,” and I accepted it as proof of the United States’ approval of the legitimacy of our intervention in Cyprus. When we tried to realize the intervention in two parts instead of getting our boots on, this legitimacy unfortunately did not continue for long.¹⁴¹

Baytok's last sentence is of critical significance. Turkey's intervention to Cyprus indeed gradually began to be evaluated as less legitimate in international public opinion. Turkish diplomats witnessed this shift clearly from their posts. Semih Günver, then-Turkey's permanent representative to the Council of Europe, cites that “the first intervention was met positively in Europe since it was thought to have saved the Republic of Cyprus and Makarios, as well.”¹⁴² However, the second intervention, states Günver, led Europe “stand against Turkey.”¹⁴³ This is a proper evaluation. Western countries and the Soviet Union had their own reasons for being cautious about the new administration in Cyprus after the coup on July 15, 1974. In this regard, as Dodd puts it, “the ‘intervention,’ or ‘invasion’ was not ill regarded by world public opinion, especially when it led to the demise of military juntas in both Greece and Cyprus.”¹⁴⁴ For the West, most notably for Great Britain, Nicos Sampson, the leader of the coup, had a considerably bad reputation since his days as a “freedom fighter.”¹⁴⁵ For the Soviet Union, as well, an ultra-nationalist coup backed by

141 “Çıkarmanın üçüncü gününde ABD Savunma Bakanı Laird'in Türk meslektaşı Hasan Esat Işık'a gönderdiği ‘Hadi artık elinizi çabuk tutun da bitirin şu harekatı’ mesajına bizzat şahit oldum ve bunu, Kıbrıs Harekatımızın meşruiyetinin ABD tarafından benimsendiğinin ... bir delili olarak kabul ettim. Biz elimizi çabuk tutmak bir yana, çıkarmayı bir de iki takşitte gerçekleştirince, bu meşruiyet maalesef uzun sürmedi.” Baytok, *Dış Politikada...*, 195.

142 Günver, *Kızgın Dam Üzerinde Diplomasi...*, 14.

143 Ibid.

144 Clement H. Dodd, *The Cyprus Imbroglio* (London: Eothen Books, 1998), 30.

145 Hichens, *Hostage to History...*, 83. At a younger age, Samson was known for his involvement in the Greek Cypriot independence struggle against British colonial rule. Samson was engaged in murders of British officers. Believed to be responsible for at least fifteen killings, Samson was sentenced to death, but this was commuted to life imprisonment. One and a half years later, he facilitated the general amnesty as part of the 1959 Zurich and 1960 London

the fascist junta in Greece posed a great threat because such a development could have made Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean vulnerable to American influence. This was not a baseless fear. When news of the coup began to be public, Henry Kissinger claimed that “the coup was realized without an external influence.”¹⁴⁶

The Turkish government knew that a second intervention would harm the legitimacy of Turkey’s military involvement on the island. The government, in this regard, considered sending special envoys to “friendly and neutral countries to explain the real motives for the Cyprus Intervention to the governments of these states.”¹⁴⁷ Mahmut Dikerdem, who once served as ambassador to prominent countries of the non-aligned world such as India and Ghana, was assigned to contact the governments of India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and other pro-Greek Cypriot governments of the Non-Aligned Movement.¹⁴⁸ The Cyprus dispute, as a matter of fact, influenced Turkey’s attitude towards Third World countries. Turkey’s main motive for inaugurating embassies in East Berlin, Kuala Lumpur, Havana, Darussalam, Doha, and Mogadishu in the second half of the 1970s, was to influence these countries in support of Turkey’s

Agreements. His past inevitably caused a skepticism among the British towards a new regime in Cyprus under his leadership. *Ibid.*

146 *Ibid.*, 84.

147 Güler, *Salon Verir...*, 609.

148 *Ibid.*, 609. The world “non-aligned” was used for the first time at the United Nations by then-Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1953. “The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) came into existence during the first conference of Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries that took place in Belgrade in September 1961. Representing newly-independent developing countries, the movement and its policies can be directly linked to the decolonization process with the initial years of political engagement in world affairs characterized by anti-imperialist slogans and the denunciation of colonialism, apartheid, racism, and Zionism.” Hennie Strydom, “The Non-Aligned Movement and the Reform of International Relations,” in Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 11, eds. A. Von Bagdandy and R. Wolfrum, (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 1. As a consequence, members of the movement felt more sympathetic to the discourse of Greek Cypriot independence than the Turkish position, which in those years was considered as a colonialist attitude. Turkish governments of the time attempted to gain the support of these countries because of their increasing number, and thus, the increasing influence of these countries in world politics.

position in the Cyprus dispute, and if possible, to change the voting behaviors of these countries in international organizations during sessions on Cyprus.¹⁴⁹

This was an intelligent step. Members of the Non-Aligned Movement were concerned about the individual and political fate of Archbishop Makarios who was an influential, respected figure among Third World countries.¹⁵⁰ This concern was expressed by ambassadors of some non-aligned countries in Ankara. Barutçu cites such a dialogue with the Yugoslav Ambassador.

While the intervention was going on, ambassadors and notably the Yugoslav ambassador came and asked “What will happen to Makarios? My government asks and wishes to know this.” ... Yugoslavs were pre-occupied with this issue more so than other [states] due to their claim to lead the Third World. They expected us to promise that the pre-coup status quo would be restored. Yet it was impossible for us to consider this and sacrifice Turkish soldiers to bring back the illegitimate regime of Makarios.¹⁵¹

149 Girgin, *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemi Hariciye Tarihimiz...*, 150. As illustrated in chapter 4, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted its operations with a considerably limited budget compared to its counterparts. Nevertheless, developments such as workforce migration, the Cyprus dispute, and security measures against the threat of terrorism necessitated the increase in expenditures of the diplomatic staff. This was another complicated feature of the Turkish Foreign Ministry in the 1960-80 period.

150 When the Western world opposed the unification of Cyprus and Greece in the 1950s, Makarios appealed to the Non-Aligned Movement and established friendships with Tito and Nasser. Since then, he became an influential figure in the non-aligned world. Joseph Fitchett, “Makarios: Cypriot Nationalism Incarnate,” *The Washington Post*, August 4, 1977, accessed November 19, 2017, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/08/04/makarios-cypriot-nationalism-incarnate/24ef5cf9-3d6a-40b8-ae59-28206e5ec588/?utm_term=.fcfffo59fb28.

151 “Harekatın devam ettiği günlerde odama gelen bazı büyükelçiler ve özellikle Yugoslav Büyükelçisi, ‘Makarios ne olacak? Hükümetim bunu soruyor ve bilmek istiyor’ diyordu... Yugoslavlardan üçüncü dünyanın liderliği iddiası ile bu konu ile diğerlerinden daha fazla meşgul düler. Bizden illa [müdahaleden sonra] darbeden önceki Makarios düzenini getireceğimiz sözünü almak istiyorlardı. Bizim bunu düşünmemiz ve Türk askerinin Makarios’un gayrimeşru düzenini yeniden kurmak için kan akitacığını kabul etmemiz aklın alacağı bir şey değildi.” Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru...*, 65-66.

Barutçu's statement clearly illustrates that from the beginning of the intervention, Turkey's intent was not to restore the status quo before the coup in Cyprus – that is a Cyprus Republic under the framework of the Zurich (1959) and London (1960) agreements. In accordance with Baykal's statement cited above, the Turkish government rather intended to change also the status quo of July 14, 1974. Nevertheless, stating this aim explicitly would inevitably harm the legitimacy of the military intervention. Turkey could be seen as abusing post-coup conditions in Cyprus to acquire territory. In this regard, the government declaration after the first intervention made a strong reference to the basic provisions of the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.¹⁵² Even so, Turkish intervention in Cyprus faced an increasing legitimacy deficit each passing day.

The loss of the legitimacy of the intervention in the eyes of the international public opinion had external and internal causes from the Turkish point of view. The external causes date back to July 23, 1974, a day after the ceasefire was initiated in Cyprus. A dramatic change emerged in Greece as a consequence of the Turkish intervention to Cyprus. The military junta in Greece, which had long been suffering a considerable legitimacy, collapsed, and a civil government was established in Athens. Gürün, the Turkish ambassador to Athens, illustrates the political atmosphere in the Greek capital on the 23rd and 24th of July as follows:

On Tuesday, July 23, 1974, towards afternoon, a rumor spread that military officers had organized a meeting with the politicians. ... At seven forty-five, [Greek] Armed Forces announced that power would be abdicated to a civil government.... [Konstantinos] Karamanlis came to

152 Ibid., 65. The first five articles of the 1960 Constitution discuss the general provisions. Basically, these articles foresaw the equal status of Greek and Turkish Cypriots under one state and flag. "The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus," 1, *Presidency of Cyprus Website*, accessed May 29, 2016, available from [http://www.presidency.gov.cy/presidency/presidency.nsf/all/1003AEDD83EED9C7C225756F0023C6AD/\\$file/CY_Constitution.pdf](http://www.presidency.gov.cy/presidency/presidency.nsf/all/1003AEDD83EED9C7C225756F0023C6AD/$file/CY_Constitution.pdf).

Greece on the night of July 24 at two o'clock, was sworn in at four thirty-five and became the prime minister.¹⁵³

This was a dramatic change in terms of the legitimacy of Turkey's position. Previously, Turkish armed forces were operating against a coup administration backed by a junta regime in Greece. Now, after a democratic era was beginning in Greece, international public opinion about Greece inevitably changed. Karamanlis was a respected political figure in the West and he did not favor cooperation with the Sampson administration in Cyprus.¹⁵⁴

Nevertheless, a second operation was not only a diplomatic necessity. Turkish troops, as illustrated earlier, were trapped in a small pocket of Cyprus and further fortification and expansion was thought to be essential for the security of Turkish troops and Turkish Cypriots living on the island. Moreover, a two-stage operation had been planned even before intervention began.¹⁵⁵ As Hitchens noted "once the first intervention was ordered, the generals knew that a second, decisive invasion would have to follow."¹⁵⁶ A second intervention would have been conducted on the island since it had been planned from the beginning.¹⁵⁷

153 "23 Temmuz Salı günü, öğleye doğru, askerlerin sivil politikacılarla bir toplantı yaptıkları haberi çıktı... 19.45'te de Silahlı Kuvvetler bir tebliğ yayinallyarak ülkenin sivil iktidara devredileceğini açıkladı... Karamanlis, 24 Temmuz sabahı saat 02.00'de gelip, 04.35'te yemim edere Başbakan oldu." Gürün, *Bükreş, Paris, Atina...*, 328-330.

154 Birand, *Kıbrıs'ın Elli Yılı*.

155 Ibid.

156 Hitchens, *Hostage to History...*, 97.

157 İnhan, as then-Turkish ambassador to Nicosia, however, claims that the second intervention was a direct consequence of conditions that emerged after the first. The second intervention, notes İnhan, was an inevitable security measure since "ceasefire was a hasty decision that left the Turkish people on the island without protection." İnanç, *Türk Diplomasisinde Kıbrıs*, 17. Even İnhan, on the other hand, reveals that the second intervention was positive "in terms of shaping the political situation on the island more efficiently and sparing the Turkish government a troublesome position in international politics." Ibid. Similarly, Barutçu notes that Turkish troops controlled only five per-cent of Cyprus; the remainder of the island was now being captured by the Greeks. Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru...*, 88.

The democratization of politics in Greece, however, rendered a second intervention less explainable in terms of political legitimacy, leaving aside military necessity. The relative silence of the international public in response to the first intervention was mostly due to the fact that the coup was led by ultra-nationalist Greek Cypriots and their anti-democratic supporters in Greece. The former had overthrown the legitimate President of Cyprus, whereas the latter had been ruling Greece with an undemocratic regime for seven years. After the resumption of democratic politics in Greece, the Turkish government was left defending a cause against legitimate regimes.

The occasion on which Turkey would defend its case against legitimate actors was the Geneva Conference organized between the 25th and 30th of July 1974. Haluk Ülman, a scholar and Prime Minister Ecevit's advisor in foreign policy, appreciates the work ethic and professional capabilities of Turkish diplomats assigned in the conference.¹⁵⁸ According to Ülman, the Geneva Conference was a great accomplishment for Turkish diplomats who "made the greatest efforts of their careers."¹⁵⁹ Ülman also notes that the Turkish delegation in Geneva – namely the politicians and diplomats – worked in harmony rather than in a hierachial order, proving that the diplomatic profession is not conducted in a top-down order but through continuous negotiations also among politicians and bureaucrats of the same country.¹⁶⁰

Diplomatic correspondence between Greek and the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracies reveal that the Greek and Turkish prime ministers were ready to lead their delegations in Geneva in the case their respective counterparts participated in the conference.¹⁶¹ Yet Karamanlis expressed Ecevit that he was busy establishing the government, whereas Ecevit stated that he could not leave Ankara at such a conjuncture.¹⁶² As a consequence, Greek and Turkish delegations were led by their foreign ministers. The Turkish delegation

158 Erol Mütercimler, *Satılık Ada Kıbrıs: Kıbrıs Barış Hareketinin Bilinmeyen Yönleri* (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2007), 460.

159 Ibid.

160 Ibid.

161 Gürün, *Paris, Bükkres, Atina...*, 330.

162 Ibid., 330-331.

consisted of Haluk Bayülken, Suat Bilge, author of the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus, Orhan Aldıkaçtı, a professor of constitutional law, Ercüment Yavuzalp, and Ecmel Barutçu.¹⁶³ Turkey's main position even before coming to Geneva, cites Barutçu, was in favor of partitioning Cyprus.

In my view, it was unimaginable for the two communities to coexist. ... In Cyprus, I said, "everybody witnessed and experienced how peace was endangered by the incidents and turmoil that had happened so far. In this situation, we will not have difficulty in imposing the necessity of a complete partition of the two communities on the world." ... "The Turkish community must be gathered in the north and the Greek Cypriots in the south," I added. The thesis of a federation with two zones was born in this way.¹⁶⁴

According to Barutçu, this plan did not intend partition, but a federation with two regions. The MSP, coalition partner of Ecevit's CHP, adds Barutçu, was in favor of partition, but according to him it would have been impossible for Turkey to convince its addressees for this.¹⁶⁵ Barutçu suggested a "federation of two separate entities model" which would not only constitute continuity with the Cyprus Republic but also imply the possibility of a future division.¹⁶⁶ Barutçu's ideas were clear and were to a considerable extent the views of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A status emerged after Turkey's intervention on the island and as a consequence of this, Turkey could pose the approach of a federation of two entities. This would not be partition, – that is to say, not two independent states in two separated regions – but a federation in which the two communities live in isolation from the other. This method had much in common with partition. The possibility (or fear) of partition,

163 Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru...*, 85.

164 "Bence Kıbrıs'ta iki cemaatin bir arada yaşaması artık düşünülemezdi... Kıbrıs'ta dedim, şimdije kadar vuku bulan olayları ve geçirilen buhranlarla barışın nasıl tehlikeye düştüğünü herkes gördü ve yaşadı. Bu durumda, artık iki cemaatin birbirinden tamamen ayrılması gerektiğini dünyaya kabul ettirmekte güçlük çekmeyiz. Türk cemaati kuzeyde, Rum cemaati güneyde toplanmalı, dedim. İki bölgeli federasyon tezi böyle doğdu." Ibid.

165 Ibid.

166 Ibid.

moreover, would function in favor of this plan. The situation after the intervention had already brought partition onto the international agenda. In this regard, the possibility or more precisely the fear of partition would lead Turkey's counterparts and the international public to come to terms with a federation of two entities.

Korkut Özal, a cabinet member from the MSP, according to Barutçu, was not pleased with his opinions. Özal, like other deputies of the MSP, was in favor of partition.¹⁶⁷ However, Barutçu's formulation indeed was almost the same as Erbakan's "curtain federation thesis." This thesis projected that

there should be a constitution that it may seem like a federation from outside, but when the curtain is drawn, a definitely separated Cyprus must be revealed.¹⁶⁸

This policy formulation would establish a "new" situation that would guarantee the isolation of the two communities in Cyprus. If this approach was the main stance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it meant that the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy had grown apart from its position in 1960. The difference is clear with reference to the words of Emin Dırvana, Turkey's ambassador to the newly independent Republic of Cyprus between 1960 and 1962. Denktaş cites the following dialogue between he and Dırvana on August 16, 1960:

When the day comes and Makarios disobeys the agreements, we wish you to leave Cyprus as governor, where you have been appointed as ambassador." ...

My words angered Dırvana. He banged his fist on the table ... and ... loudly ... said "Turkey is the signatory of these agreements. Nobody has the right to abolish these agreements. These agreements will survive.¹⁶⁹

167 Ibid.

168 Kızılıürek, *Milliyetçilik Kışkıtında Kıbrıs*, 282. Cited from Rauf R. Denktaş. Rauf Denktaş'ın Hatıraları, vol. 5 (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1997), 166.

169 "O gün geldiğinde ve Makarios anlaşmaları yıkıldığından, Büyükelçi olarak geldiğiniz Kıbrıs'tan Vali olarak ayrılmmanızı temenni ediyoruz. ...

About fifteen years after this quarrel, the Turkish ambassador in Athens, Gürün, offered the formation of a “bi-cantonal federation” in a telegraph delivered to Ankara.¹⁷⁰ This offer was distant from the status quo established in 1960 but was also far from a declaration of an independent Turkish entity in Cyprus. In his memoirs, Gürün states that “he did not know whether his ideas were taken into consideration,” but the Turkish side offered a cantonal system during the Geneva talks.¹⁷¹ Despite the fact that the Greek delegation did not reject the offer outright and instead requested thirty six hours to consider it, the second Turkish offensive in Cyprus was initiated on the morning of August 14, 1974.¹⁷²

§ 8.7 Concluding Remarks

With the second military intervention to Cyprus between 14 and 16 August 1974, Turkey reached the territorial targets (thirty-seven percent of the whole island) that were planned as part of Operation Attila.¹⁷³ This set the basis for

Sözlerim [Emin] Dırvana'yı kızdırmıştı. Yumruğunu masaya vurarak ... ve ... yüksek sesle ... 'bu anlaşmalarda Türkiye'nin imzası vardır. Bunları yok etmek kimsenin haddi değildir. Bu anlaşmalar yaşayacaktır.' Ibid. Dırvana was a former military officer and his words can be considered not representing the view of the diplomatic bureaucracy. However, as Cemal Gürsel stated the military administration did not distance itself from the foreign policy preferences of the previous administration. In this regard, statements of Dırvana was capable of representing the institutional point of view of the Turkish Foreign Ministry in the beginning of the 1960s.

170 Gürün, *Paris, Büyükelçi, Atina...*, 339.

171 It must be noted that the content of Gürün's offer to establish a cantonal system did not completely overlap with the one proposed by Turkey in Geneva. Barutçu notes that the Turkish delegation in Geneva felt disappointed when they were ordered to offer this cantonal system. According to him, the Turkish government was only persuaded by the strong pressure of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru*, 101. In this regard, the divergence between Gürün and Turkish diplomats in Geneva is clear.

172 According to Gürün, the Greek counter-offer could have been accepted, but cabinet members in Turkey notably opposed the delay of the second offensive for an additional thirty-six hours. Barutçu, however, states that he insisted on “not to give the permission to Greeks to consider the cantonal solution offer for thirty-six hours.” Barutçu, *Hariciye Koridoru...*, 103.

173 Fırat, “Yunanistan’la İlişkiler,” 748.

the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1975 and then the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on October 15, 1983. These two entities were established in the territories gained during the two military interventions in July and August 1974 respectively. The outcomes of the intervention occupied Turkish foreign policy for the next four decades. Given that the Cyprus dispute had already been a dominant concern of Turkish foreign policy since the mid-1950s, the decision to intervene on the island militarily can be evaluated as one of the most critical initiatives in diplomatic history of Turkey, if not the most important.

This chapter of this study crystallizes the role of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy in the decision-making leading to such an intervention and also relates the observations of Turkish diplomats about the aforementioned process. Examples illustrated in this chapter may not be satisfactory, nevertheless, the available evidence reveals that certain officials of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs assigned to the Cyprus dispute played a prominent role in directing the government of the time towards the decision to intervene. Do the views and actions of “some diplomats” represent the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an institution?

In her dissertation on the decision-making process leading to the Turkish military intervention, Wiener claims that the “foreign ministry was not included in the decision-making process, but a few individuals within the ministry ... were involved ... primarily in an advocacy role.”¹⁷⁴ Nevertheless, it is not suitable to distinguish between the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its diplomats in terms of policy formulation. Barutçu, as head of the Cyprus-Greek department, was speaking on behalf of his institution as were other diplomats. Had other Turkish diplomats attended the evaluation meetings or had other ambassadors been assigned to Athens and Nicosia instead of Gürün and İnhan, they would probably have advocated for military intervention in Cyprus after the coup on July 15, 1974.¹⁷⁵ This is because the two-decades-long institutional memory of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

174 Wiener, *Turkish Foreign Policy Decision-Making...*, 317.

175 Although Wiener cited from a Turkish diplomat that there was no consensus among Turkish diplomats on Cyprus policy, diplomats who were experienced in the Cyprus dispute predominantly favored military intervention to the island. See footnote 53 in this chapter.

with respect to the Cyprus dispute preached to Turkish diplomats to “resolve” the crisis through military means. In this regard, “a few Turkish diplomats” who favored military intervention, were representing the general tendency concerning the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy in the Cyprus dispute. As the “intellectuals of statecraft,” Turkish diplomats do not “directly shape the foreign policy decisions of the Turkish state, but they contribute[d] to shaping of foreign and security agenda through what is and is not a security problem.”¹⁷⁶ This was clearly the case in the decision-making process of the military intervention to Cyprus in July 1974.

In his above-quoted statement, Kamuran Gürün was unsure whether his words were taken into consideration in terms of the search for a solution to the Cyprus dispute. In my view, this explanation is modest. As evidence in this chapter clarifies, Turkish diplomats were on the forefront within the Turkish state in defending the necessity of military intervention. Not only on the issue of military intervention but also throughout the process of the Cyprus dispute, the views, perceptions, and policy formulations of Turkish diplomats were influential. Temel İskit, a diplomat of the time, explains the reciprocal influence of Turkish diplomats on the course of the Cyprus dispute as follows:

[We had] some friends who could be called freaks about the Cyprus Question. The most radical views originated from [the Ministry of] Foreign Affairs. These views to a great extent influenced in Turkey's Cyprus policy.¹⁷⁷

This clarifies the influence of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy over the official attitude of the Turkish state's mindset on the Cyprus issue. This, indeed, is a strong disconfirmation of claims that the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy was awkward or ineffective. As discussed in chapter 2, diplomatic representation can on some occasions lead to the waging of war instead of its prevention, and this does not amount to a failure of diplomacy. On the contrary, influencing the government decision-making leading to war can in some cases be an

176 Yılmaz & Bilgin, “Constructing Turkey's Western Identity during the Cold War,” 42.

177 “Kıbrıs sorununun delisi diyebileceğimiz bazı arkadaşlarımız vardı. En radikal görüşler Dışişlerinden çıkmıştır. Bu görüşler Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs politikasında büyük oranda etkili olmuştur.” İskit, *Interview by the Author*.

accomplishment of the diplomatic process. The Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy, in the long run, shaped the mindset of the state in a way that kept alive the possibility of a military offensive. In the short run – that is in the immediate aftermath of the coup in Cyprus in July 1974 – some prominent officials of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy acted as catalysts in the decision-making process that led to a military intervention in Cyprus. The case of “Cyprus, July 1974,” in this regard, was an accomplishment of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy in terms of their influence over decision makers.



Conclusion

Diplomacy and diplomats predominantly hold peripheral positions in the massive international relations and foreign policy literature. However, some periods – such as post-World War I and the Cold War – and some processes – such as the diversification of actors – have increased scholarly interest in the diplomatic profession. Throughout the twentieth century, great transformations in world politics and improving communication technologies have led the world's publics to question the functionality and the esteem of diplomacy and diplomats. As illustrated in chapter 2, some thought that diplomacy was “melting into nothingness” in the Cold War years. Finally, in the post-Cold War period, scholars debated transformations in the diplomatic profession.

This dissertation has been prepared in a period in which the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy has been subject to more daily political debates than in any other periods. This is because then-Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan severely criticized officials of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy as part of his narrative of “reforming traditional foreign policy” of Turkey. Indeed, his words were reflections of an already present criticism of certain figures of the Turkish public towards Turkish diplomats.

Some of the discussions in this dissertation reveal that the words of critics of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy are neither new nor specific to Turkey. Especially in the post-World War II period, diplomats of other countries were

targeted as being alien to the society with lacking the capability and motivation to represent their country. The first part of the criticism is true to a limited extent. Due to the nature of the profession of diplomacy, indeed, it was inevitable. Being a diplomat, as can be expected, required satisfactory language and educational skills, limiting the profession of diplomacy to members of certain social classes in any given country. In this regard, not only in Turkey but also in other countries, diplomatic cadres were filled with graduates of certain schools and members of the upper-middle classes. As a consequence, although it can be accepted to an extent that diplomats in Turkey were members of certain classes, this was valid for nearly all countries. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to overestimate the socially exclusive character of the diplomatic profession. Especially the post-World War II conjuncture indicates that operating for a diplomatic or consular mission in the foreign ministry building was a socially embedded effort.

In modern, post-1789 history, the Ottoman-Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy was formed no later than its equivalents. Established in 1836, the *Umur-I Hariciye Vekaleti* (Ottoman Foreign Ministry) was a relatively early example of modern diplomatic bureaucracy institutions. As a modern institution, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry and its foreign ministers were pivotal elements of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization process. Moreover, the ministry more or less experienced the ethnic tensions of the late Ottoman period.

The dynamics of domestic politics continued to influence the diplomatic bureaucracy in the early republican period. The Republican Foreign Ministry was familiar with the political developments of its time. For example, possible opponents of the new regime and the reform efforts of the early republican administration in many cases occupied the agendas of Turkish diplomats and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, radical reforms by the political leadership in the aforementioned period often influenced the scope of work of early republican diplomats. The torments of transition from an empire to a nation-state were tangibly experienced by Turkish diplomats in the early republican period. The late Ottoman and early republican experiences, in sum, reveal that relations with the realities of domestic politics were inherent to the professional practices of Turkish diplomats.

This was the case for the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy in the post-World War II period. In the post-coup period throughout the early 1960s, although no wholesale purge was realized, developments in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs prove that the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy was not immune from the influence of domestic politics. May 27 was not a “revolution” in the classical sense as it was called in those days. Moreover, wholesale change of the cadres of the foreign ministry was not suitable because the profession required skills that prevented the replacement of previous cadres with new ones. If this situation were otherwise, perhaps more people would have been subject to purges in the post-coup period, as was the case for the judicial bureaucracy. Indeed, what happened after the coup was a matter of quality rather than quantity. Few people were purged or replaced, but the heads of the most critical and favored units of the ministry lost their positions due to their proximity to the foreign minister of the time. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the Foreign Minister before the coup, who would be executed following a trial, was targeted by the coup administration. The Foreign Ministry was identified with him and his foreign policy preferences. The ministry’s authority related to foreign economic relations were also transferred to other state agencies as a consequence of domestic political and bureaucratic clashes.

This dissertation illustrated other examples of the influence of domestic political developments on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When Büyünt Ecevit took over the office of prime ministry in 1978, Gündüz Ökçün, his foreign minister, took a stance against diplomats known for pro-Western foreign policy preferences. Outstanding diplomats such as İlter Türkmen and Coşkun Kırca were left idle since they were renowned for their strong commitment to a Western alliance. Likewise, Mahmut Dikerdem, a socialist diplomat, suffered from political pressure in most phases of his professional career. In this regard, stating that the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was always immune to domestic political cleavages far from represents the whole story of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. Even diplomats, who claimed that the ministry was immune to the political developments of the time, can confirm that closeness of a diplomat to military bureaucracy was increasing his influence within the ministry. If we consider that the military of the 1960-

80 period in Turkey was one of the pivotal components of political life, this confession proves the impact of domestic politics on the foreign ministry.

Throughout the 1960s and 70s, other foreign ministries and their officers experienced incidents that were also encountered by Turkish diplomatic and consular staff. American diplomats were also subject to assassinations; Italian and Yugoslavian diplomatic and consular missions also faced considerable workloads due to massive workforce migrations; and the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well, was preoccupied with Cyprus affairs. The case of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy was specific and worth examining due to the intensity of the experiences compared to other foreign ministries. The United States diplomatic corps were not subject to assassination attempts as often as Turkish diplomats. Italian consular missions did not have to deal with as many citizens as their Turkish counterparts.¹ The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs's story, in this regard, should also be evaluated considering the quantity of the challenges it faced in the 1960-80 period.

The case of Armenian attacks and the interaction between Turkish diplomats and Armenians is worth discussing for another reason. In the introductory chapter of this dissertation, it is illustrated that some members of the Turkish media blamed Turkish diplomats of passivity and awkwardness, especially in the case of “Armenian propaganda” against Turkey. Determining the success of Turkish diplomats in preventing the spread and recognition of Armenian claims is a “relative” issue and, as such, beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, chapter 7 of this dissertation develops a modest objection to these allegations. Turkish diplomats and the Ottoman-Turkish *Hariciye* as an institution was actively involved in Turkish-Armenian relations from the beginning. Setting aside their being subject to continuous terrorist attacks for

1 According to data of the German Ministry of Labor, there were 170,200 Italian migrant workers in Federal Germany in 1961, whereas the number of Turkish migrant workers was 2,400. Thirteen years later, in 1974, the official number of Turkish workers climbed to 617,500, whereas the Italian migrant worker population was 340,900. Ahmet Akgündüz, “Labor Migration from Turkey to Western Europe (1960–1974): An Analytical Review,” *Capital and Class* 17, no. 3 (1993), 161. Nevertheless, the number of Italian and Turkish consulates general was the same. In other words, the workload assigned to Turkish consular posts was two times heavier than that of their Italian counterparts.

more than a decade, Turkish diplomats were the main actors in constructing, reproducing, and promoting Turkey's official stance and counternarrative to the recognition of the deportations of Armenians in 1915 as genocide. In contemporary Turkey, both the state and vast majority of the Turkish public have adopted the views expressed in Kamuran Gürün's and Bilal Şimşir's books with regard to 1915, probably including the authors who criticized the ineffectiveness of Turkish diplomats in this case.

It can be claimed that diplomats must persuade the world public rather than Turkish citizens and the Turkish state. After all, more and more parliaments have adopted resolutions and laws recognizing the 1915 deportations as a genocide. However, as can be appreciated, the prevention of the adoption of such decisions is more dependent on factors ranging from political initiatives to lobbying abilities in the aforementioned countries. Even so, the efforts of certain Turkish diplomats can be considered as an early example of public diplomacy in the Cold War. This phenomenon also indicates the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy's ability to adapt to the diplomatic trends of the time.²

The content of chapter 8 rethinks the claim that the foremost task of the modern diplomat is to secure peace among his country and its counterparts through negotiations and bargaining processes. Throughout a decade-long process between 1963 and 1974 – and especially during the week before the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in July 1974 – Turkish diplomats negotiated for the use of arms to consolidate their state's position in the Cyprus dispute. Moreover, Turkish diplomats not only negotiated with foreign counterparts but also with politicians of their own state. This recalls that foreign policy making processes are not always conducted in a hierachial order, in which the diplomats put into practice the orders of their governments without any

2 In his discussion on the Turkish Foreign Ministry's ability to engage with the new "foreign policy openings" in the AK Party era, most notably Ahmet Davutoğlu's term as foreign minister, Aras argues that the Turkish Foreign Ministry came out successful in adapting Turkey's "new geopolitcal thinking." Aras, "Reform and Capacity Building in the Turkish Foreign Ministry," 273. In this regard, given the discussions about the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy's ability to adapt to changing conditions and preferences, it can be concluded that the Ministry's adaptability capacity has been preserved in different phases of modern Turkish history.

objections. On the contrary, the state mechanism's decision to intervene in Cyprus was an outcome of a negotiation process between government authorities and officials of the civil and military bureaucracy. This is not to say that each had equal authority with respect to the "final say." Turkish diplomats, nevertheless, were influential in the decision-making process for military intervention, along with other actors.

General trends in foreign ministries of the other countries were illustrated in the chapter 2 of this dissertation. Nevertheless, this dissertation lacks a more detailed, comprehensive comparative analysis of the cases examined in each chapter. For example, the military junta of Greece (1967-1974) undermined the role of Greek Foreign Ministry in foreign policy decision-making procedures.³ Moreover, like the presence of non-Muslims in the late Ottoman Foreign Ministry, the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Empire was predominantly filled with Baltic Germans.⁴ In this regard, a comparative analysis of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the post-1960 period and the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1967 and 1974 would crystallize the degree of influence of the coup d'état of 1960 on the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similarly, an evaluation of Italian, Spanish, and Yugoslavian foreign services, whose citizens also intensely migrated to Western European countries, would better reveal the degree of success of the implementations of Turkish diplomatic and consular missions with respect to their migrant worker citizens in Western European countries. In this regard, further comparative research would present an in-depth analysis and better locate the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the world context in the aforementioned period.

On the other hand, it is worth recalling that the literature on the diplomatic bureaucracies of the Cold War years rarely covered issues such as the experiences of diplomatic and consular missions vis-à-vis massive workforce migration or the influence of military administrations – a widespread phenomenon of the period – on diplomatic bureaucracies. Throughout the

3 For example, Byron Spyropoulos, a high-ranking Greek diplomat assigned to the Turkish desk of the Greek MFA, states that he was informed about the meeting between the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers in Dedeağac (Alexandropolis) in 1967 by his Turkish colleagues, not by the Greek government. Birand, *Kitbris'in Elli Yılı*.

4 Henry Kissinger, *Diplomasi* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2000), 193.

research process, especially for the content of chapter 2, it has been found out that the aforementioned issues were not categorized as the most prominent challenges experienced by foreign ministries and diplomats of the Cold War years. This study, at least in the case of Turkey, revealed that coup administrations, workforce migration, and ideological cleavages were significant concerns for the diplomats of the time.

This dissertation owes these findings to its methodological approach. Although utilizing the memoirs of diplomats is a risky research process and has limits in terms of knowledge production, the contents of the accounts of Turkish diplomats made it possible to gather information from firsthand actors. Such an effort allowed us to know and analyze what were the main issues of concern for these Turkish diplomats. In this regard, this dissertation underscores the importance of referring to the experiences, observations, and opinions of diplomats for a deeper-analysis of diplomatic processes.⁵

As noted earlier, throughout the 1960s and 70s, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy conducted its operations with international and country-specific burdens. Diplomatic practice, with regard to changes in world politics, passed through considerable transformations such as increases in staff, new types of diplomacy, the emergence of new actors, and increasing public interest. Moreover, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy had its own specific burdens. The ministry began the aforementioned period with a strong blow from the military administration. Then, the diplomatic and consular staff faced increasing workloads due to workforce migration to Europe. Like other world examples, the lives of Turkish diplomats came under threat as a consequence of a series of terrorist attacks. Finally, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy was directly involved in the decision-making process of a military intervention outside the borders of Turkey – an action realized for the first time in Republican Turkey.

5 The research of this dissertation was conducted in a period that the observations and analyses of diplomats gained worldwide attention due to the contents of the WikiLeaks documents. The leaked cables revealed the “high professionalism of US diplomats” with their ability to “write good policy analysis, make distinguishing judgements, and to have a sense of humor.” Jovan Kurbalija, “Wikileaks and the Future of Diplomacy,” *DIPLO Foundation Website*, accessed March 25, 2017, available from <https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/policy-briefing-wikileaks-and-future-diplomacy>.

In this regard, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy was strongly influenced by the most prominent developments in Turkish political life in the 1960-1980 period. Moreover, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy, in the aforementioned period, has influenced in the determination and transformation of state policies and practices.

In the late Ottoman, early Republican, and also Cold War years, the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy has been one of the main cradle's of Turkey's pro-Western orientation. This is one of the most prominent aspects of continuity between the Ottoman, early republican, and Cold War periods. Turkish diplomats, with few exceptions that are illustrated in this study, saw Turkey's alliance with the West not only as a foreign and security policy preference, but also a component of Turkey's identification with the West. In this regard, as clarified in chapter 4, Turkish diplomats were criticized in some cases for the inability to properly represent the values and meet the needs of their own society. Indeed, many foreign ministries were criticized using the same words, especially in the post-World War II period, as a consequence of the increasing public interest in foreign policy matters and diplomatic practice. Turkish diplomats were claimed to be removed from the realities of their society living in bell jars. This dissertation diverges from this assumption. As made visible in different parts of this dissertation, Turkish diplomats were either influenced by or influenced the course of some of the most prominent developments and discussions of twentieth-century modern Turkish history. In light of these, it would be hard to conclude that Turkish diplomats conducted their profession isolated from the social, political, and ideological realities of their society throughout the 1960s and 70s.⁶

This dissertation presents a pure success story neither for the Turkish *Hariciye* nor for other foreign ministries. Throughout the dissertation, indeed, problematic and contradictory aspects of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy were illustrated as far as possible. This study reveals that diplomatic staffs elsewhere in the world adapted themselves to the new conditions and new

6 This criticism is not only limited to the public. As a scholar, also Karpat noted in 1974 that "the foreign service personnel represented a group of ... the most aristocratic and farthest removed from the country's realities among the civil service." Kemal Karpat, "Introduction," in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition*, ed. Kemal Karpat (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), 7.

challenges in the post-World War II world. Moreover, foreign ministries redefined their duties, functions, and capabilities. The Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy, as well, constituted a significant example of adaptation and transformation, especially given the magnitude of the challenges it faced.

In this regard, this study argues that the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy worked in relation with its society, its state, and counterparts in the world, not in an isolated atmosphere. As a consequence of these socially-interactive processes, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs not only redefined and transformed itself but actively exerted its influence on a wide range of issues. As clarified in this dissertation, some of the most prominent issues of modern Turkish history such as Turkey's traditional pro-Western foreign policy orientation, the changing nature of state-citizen relationship in the transnational context, the decision-making behind a military offensive outside the borders of Turkey, and the formation of an official Turkish discourse against Armenian allegations about 1915 cannot be properly understood without acknowledging this influence. This fact by itself is a clear indicator of Turkish diplomacy's strong interaction with its citizens and the state, in which each side has transformed the others through interaction.

This dissertation cannot be considered as a response to an existing academic literature about the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy. It is rather an objection to the assumptions on Turkish diplomats that is widespread among different components of the public opinion. Although academic studies on the characteristics of the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy is quite limited, recent studies also attribute a degree of success to the Turkish Hariciye and diplomats. In this regard, it is likely that further scholarly works on the Turkish diplomatic bureaucracy will probably rehabilitate perceptions on the ministry.

Bibliography

MEMOIRS

Afra, Haluk. *Hariciyeciler Dedikodu Sever*. İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1999.

Akay, Erdil. *Dışişlerinde 40 Yıl, 2 Ay, 21 Gün*. İstanbul, ERKO Yayıncılık, 2010.

Akkaya, Mete. *Ters Akan Sefareti*. İstanbul: Dama Yayıncıları, 2011.

Altuğ, Ömer. *Hatırımda Kalanlar: Bir Diplomatın Ege'den Baltıklar'a Uzanan Öyküsü*, Ankara: Boyut, 2014.

Anonymous Officer. *Hariciyemizin İç Yüzü*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayıncıları, 1990.

Aralov, Semyon, İ. *Bir Sovyet Diplomatının Türkiye Anıları*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayıncıları, 2014.

Aras, Tevfik Rüştü. *Lozan'ın İzlerinde On Yıl*. İstanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1935.

Aşula, Mustafa. *Dışişleri Albümü*. Ankara: 2000.

Aytaman, Reha. *Sinirli Yıllar: Diplomaside 42 Yıl*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayıncıları, 1996.

Barutçu, Ecmel. *Hariciye Koridoru: Hatıralar*. Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayıncıları, 1999.

Başkut, Yaman. *Aferin, İyiydin: Bir Diplomatın Anıları*. İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 2004.

Batu, Hamit. *Diş Görevde: Avrupa'yla Bunalımlı Yıllar*. İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1995.

Baydur, Melahat. *Bir Sefirenin Anıları*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayıncıları, 1998.

Baytok, Taner. *Bir Asker Bir Diplomat*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2001.

———. *Diş Politikada Bir Nefes: Anılar*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2005.

Bleda, Tanışuğ. *Maskeli Balo*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2000.

Bölükbaşı, Deniz. *Dışişleri İskelesi: Dışişlerinde 34 Yıl*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2011.

Cankorel, Bilge. *Bir Dönem Biterken*, İstanbul: Kırmızıkedi, 2014.

Cebesoy, Ali Fuat. *Moskova Hatıraları*. İstanbul: Temel Yayınları, 2007.

Çağlayangil, İhsan Sabri. *Anılarım*. İstanbul: Güneş Yayınları, 1990.

Çalışlar, İzzeddin. Ed. *Ekselans: Coşkun Kırca*. İstanbul: Galatasaray Eğitim Vakfı, 2009.

Danışman, Hasan Basri. *Artçı Diplomat: Son Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırlarından Mustafa Reşit Paşa*. İstanbul: Arbaya Yayınları, 1998.

Darende, Daver. *Diplomatın Not Defteri*. Ankara: Arkadaş Yayınevi, 2008.

Dikerdem, Mahmut. *Hariciye Çarkı: Anılar*. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1989.

———. *Orta Doğu'da Devrim Yılları: Bir Büyükelçinin Anıları*. İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1977.

———. *Üçüncü Dünyadan: Bir Büyükelçinin Anıları*. İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1977.

Dinç, Nihat. *Gönüllü Diplomat*. İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 1998.

Divanlioğlu, İldeniz. *Emekli Büyükelçi Horoz Gibi Ötünce*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2007.

Eralp, Yalın. *Perdeyi Aralarken: Bir Monşerin Hatırağı*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2017.

Erkin, Behiç. *Hatırat 1876-1958*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2010.

Erkin, Feridun Cemal. *Dışişlerinde 34. Yıl: I. Cilt*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2008.

Erner, Erdem. *Davulun Sesi: Dışişlerinde 44 Yıl*. İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993.

Esenbel, Melih. *Kıbrıs-1: Ayağa Kalkan Adam*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993.

Esin, Numan. *Devrim ve Demokrasi: Bir 27 Mayısçının Anıları*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2005.

Girgin, Kemal. *Diplomatik Anılarla Dış İlişkilerimiz (Son Elli Yıl: 1957-2016)*. İstanbul: İlgi Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2007.

———. *Dünya'nın Dört Bucağı: Bir Diplomatın Anıları*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 1998.

Gökmen, Oğuz. *Bir Zamanlar Hariciye: Eski Bir Diplomatın Anıları 1*. İstanbul, 1999.

———. *Diplomasi: Diplomaside 40 Yıl, 11 Ay, 17 Gün*. İstanbul: Yamaç Ofset, 2006.

———. *Federal Almanya ve Türk İşçileri*. Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1972.

Güçlü, Yücel. *Eminence Grise of Turkish Foreign Service: Numan Menemenlioğlu*. Ankara: -- -, 2002.

———. *The Life and Career of a Turkish Diplomat: Cevat Açıkalın*. Ankara: 2002.

Gülen, Alaeddin. *Bellekte Kalanlar*. İstanbul, 1998.

Günver, Semih. *Fatin Rüştü Zorlu'nun Öyküsü*. İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985.

———. *Kızgın Dam Üzerinde Diplomasi: Avrupalı Olabilmenin Bedeli*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1989.

Gürün, Kamuran. *Akıntıya Kürek: Bir Büyükelçinin Anıları*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1994.

———. *Bükreş-Paris-Atina: Büyükelçilik Anıları*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1994.

———. *Fırtınalı Yıllar: Dışişleri Müsteşarlığı Anıları*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1995.

Karaosmanoğlu, Yakup Kadri. *Zoraki Diplomat*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2014.

Karavelioğlu, Kamil. *Bir Devrim, İki Darbe. 27 Mayıs, 12 Mart, 12 Eylül*. İstanbul: Gürer Yayıncıları, 2007.

Keskin, Yıldırım. *Zaman Akarken: Edebiyat ve Diplomasi Anıları*. İstanbul: Dünya Kitap, 2005.

İkizer, Yılmaz. *Şu Bizim Garip Hariciye ve Dış Politika: Anılar ve Olaylar*. Ankara: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1990.

İnan, Kamran. *Bir Ömür*. İstanbul: Berikan Yayınevi, 2010.

Kuneralp, Zeki. *Sadece Diplomat: Anılar-Belgeler*. İstanbul: İSİS, 1999.

Melek, Faik. *Hepsi Geldi Geçti: Dışşlerinde 43 Yıl*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayıncıları, 1994.

Olgaçay, İsmail Berdük. *Tasmalı Çekirge*. İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1998.

Öndeş, Osman. *Bin Renk Bir Ömür: Sefire Emine Esenbel'in Anıları*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2004.

Paker, Esat Cemal. *Siyasi Tarihimizde Kırk Yıllık Hariciye Hatıraları*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2001.

Sav, Ergun. *Diplomaturka: Bir Diplomat-Yazarın Anıları*. İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000.

Söylemezoğlu, Galip Kemali. *Başımıza Gelenler: Yakın Bir Mazinin Hatıraları Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya 1918-1922*. İstanbul: Kanaat Kitabevi, 1939.

—————. *Hariciye Hizmetinde Otuz Sene, 1892-1922: Mutlakiyet, Meşrutiyet ve Millî Mücadele Yıllarında Şahidi veya Âmil Olduğum Hâdiselere Ait Vesikalar*. İstanbul: Şaja Matbaası, 1949.

Tulça, Enis. *Atatürk, Venizelos ve Bir Diplomat: Enis Bey*. İstanbul: Simurg, 2003.

Tuncer, Hüner. *Bir Kadın Diplomatın Anıları: Meksika'dan Milano'ya Norveç'ten Güney Afrika'ya*. İstanbul: Logos Yayıncıları, 2007.

Tuygan, Ali. *Gönüllü Diplomat: Dışişlerinde Kırk Yıl*. İstanbul: Şenocak Yayınları, 2012.

Tülümen, Turgut. *Hayat Boyu Kıbrıs*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1998.

—————. *İki Mülkiyeli*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1976.

Yakın, Aziz. *Göçmen Diplomat*. İstanbul: Kanes Yayınları, 2012.

Yavuzalp, Ercüment. *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993.

—————. *Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika*. İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996.

PUBLICATIONS OF TURKISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(YEARBOOKS, BULLETINS AND REPORTS)

TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı. *Yeni Ekonomik Düzen ve Türkiye: Gelişmiş Ülkeler ve Gelişme Yolundaki Ülkeler Arasındaki Uluslararası Müzakere Süreci*. Ankara: TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 1977.

TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı. Dışişleri Belleteni 1. Ankara: 1964.

TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı. Dışişleri Belleteni 2. Ankara: Ankara: 1964.

TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı. Dışişleri Belleteni 4. Ankara: 1965.

TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı. Dışişleri Belleteni 6. Ankara: Ankara: 1965.

TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı. Dışişleri Belleteni 7. Ankara: 1965.

TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı. Dışişleri Belleteni 16. Ankara: Ankara: 1966.

TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı. Dışişleri Belleteni 20. Ankara: 1966.

TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yıllığı 1959 (Yearbook of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 1963.

TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı. TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yıllığı 1960 (Yearbook of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 1959.

TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı. TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yıllığı 1964-1965 (Yearbook of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 1964.

TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı. TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yıllığı 1967 (Yearbook of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 1966.

TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı. 2016 İdare Faaliyet Yıllığı Raporu. Ankara: TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2016.

Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “New International Economic Order: Sum of the Four Years.” Conference Proceedigs. 7-11 August 1978.

ARCHIVES

PMRA (Prime Ministry Republican Archives) 1369. 30..18.1.1 4.47..5. 4 February 1922.

PMRA (Prime Ministry Republican Archives) 1821. 109.17. 30..18.1.1. 5.27..17. 5 September 1922.

PMRA (Prime Ministry Republican Archives) 2403. 400.5. 30..18.1.1. 7.15..4. 10 April 1923.

PMRA (Prime Ministry Republican Archives) 2630. 30..18.1.1. 16.65..5. 11 October 1925.

PMRA (Prime Ministry Republican Archives) 22.83.17. 29 January 1927.

PMRA (Prime Ministry Republican Archives) 6.60.3. 11 December 1929.

PMRA (Prime Ministry Republican Archives) 030.18.01.02.195.32.7.1 3 May 1966.

PMRA (Prime Ministry Republican Archives) 0.1.0.0.64.398.3. 21 February 1976.

TC Resmi Gazete (Republic of Turkey Official Gazette). no. 9286. 16 April 1956.

TC Resmi Gazete (Republic of Turkey Official Gazette). no. 9620, May 30, 1957.

TC Resmi Gazete (Republic of Turkey Official Gazette). no. 10174. April 1, 1959.

TC Resmi Gazete (Republic of Turkey Official Gazette). no. 10539. June 30, 1960.

TC Resmi Gazete (Republic of Turkey Official Gazette). no. 10542. July 4, 1960.

TC Resmi Gazete (Republic of Turkey Official Gazette). no. 10548. July 11, 1960.

TC Resmi Gazete (Republic of Turkey Official Gazette). no. 10562. 27 July 1960.

TC Resmi Gazete (Republic of Turkey Official Gazette). no. 10657. November 17, 1960.

TC Resmi Gazete (Republic of Turkey Official Gazette). no. 11831. October 13, 1964.

TC Washington Büyükelçiliğinden Dışişlerine tel. Acele, (Telegraph from the Washington Embassy to Foreign Affairs: Urgent) October 13, 1979.

TC Büyükelçiliğinden Dışişlerine tel. (Telegraph from the Embassy to Foreign Affairs) July 21, 1980.

INTERVIEWS

Bilhan, Murat. *Interview by the Author*. Istanbul, February 2, 2016.

Eralp, Yalın. *Interview by the Author*. Online Interview. January 15, 2017.

İskit, Temel. *Interview by the Author*. Istanbul, February 17, 2016.

Lütem, Ömer Engin. *Interview by the Author*. Online Interview. January 20, 2017.

Özcan, Mesut. *Interview by the Author*. Ankara, September 20, 2015.

Ahmet B., *Interview by the Author*. Bremen, May 19, 2014.

Ekrem B., *Interview by the Author*. Bremen, May 20, 2014.

Enver C., *Interview by the Author*. Bremen, May 20, 2014.

Murat K. *Interview by the Author*. Bremen, May 20, 2014

Mustafa A. *Interview by the Author*. Bremen, May 21, 2014.

Mustafa B., *Interview by the Author*. Bremen, May 22, 2014.

NEWSPAPERS

Akis, December, 10 1966

Cumhuriyet, January 1960-September 1983.

Gözcü, May 2006.

Hürriyet, May 2006, July 2010, and August 2013.

Milliyet, May 1960-September 1983, September 1998, and July 2013.

Sabah, April-May 2006.

Vakit, May 2006.

Yeni Asya, May 2006.

Zaman, May 2013.

SECONDARY RESOURCES

1173 Sayılı Kanun: Milletlerarası Münasebetlerin Yürütlmesi ve Koordinasyonu Hakkında Kanun. (Law on the Execution and Coordination of International Relations) 5 May 1969. Available from <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.1173.pdf>.

Abadan-Unat, Nermin. *Batı Almanya'daki Türk İşçileri ve Sorunları*. Ankara: DPT Yayınları, 1964.

———. *Bitmeyen Göç: Konuk İşçilikten Ulusötesi Yurttashlığı*. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2002.

_____. “Türk Dış Göçünün Aşamaları: 1950’li Yillardan 2000’li Yıllara.” In *Kökler ve Yollar: Türkiye’de Göç Süreçleri*, edited by Ayhan Kaya and Bahar Şahin, 3-18. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007.

Abrahamian, Ervand. *Modern İran Tarihi*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayıncılığı, 2013.

Adler-Nissen, Rebecca. “Conclusion: Relationalism or Why Diplomats Find International Relation Theory Strange.” In *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*, edited by Ole Jakob Sønding, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver B. Neumann, 284-307. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Aggestam, Karin and Ann E. Towns, eds. *Gendering Diplomacy and International Negotiation*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

Akant, İlhan. *Budala* [The Idiot]. İstanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi, 1941.

Akçay, Ümit. *Kapitalizmi Planlamak: Türkiye’de Planlama ve DPT’nin Dönüşümü*. İstanbul: Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı, 2007.

Akgündüz, Ahmet. “Labour Migration from Turkey to Western Europe (1960-1974): An Analytical Review,” *Capital and Class* 17, no. 3 (1993): 153-194. doi 10.1177/030981689305100107.

Akin, Nur Özmel. *Rauf Orbay’ın Londra Büyükelçiliği: 1942-1944*. İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1999.

Akkaya, Mehmet. “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Diplomasi Akademisinde Diplomat Adaylarına Verilen Mesleğe Hazırlayıcı Eğitim Programının Katılımcı Görüşерine Göre Değerlendirilmesi.” Master’s thesis. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 2015.

Aksel, Damla. “Kins, Distant Workers, Diasporas: Constructing Turkey’s Transnational Members Abroad.” *Turkish Studies* 15, no. 2 (2014): 195-219. doi 10.1080/14683849.2014.926233.

Aktan, İrfan. "Ahmet İnsel ile Söyleşi: Milliyetçilik Sorunlu Bir Onurdur." *Birikim Online*. Accessed May 28, 2016. <http://www.birikimdergisi.com/guncel-yazilar/317/ahmet-insel-ile-soylesi-milliyetcilik-sorunlu-bir-onur-dur#.WSrzhxPyhmA>.

Akyaz, Doğan. *Askeri Müdahalelerin Orduya Etkisi: Hiyerarşî Dış Örgütlenmeden Emir Komuta Zincirine*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2009.

Akyıldız, Ali. *Osmanlı Bürokrasisi ve Modernleşme*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2012.

Aliyeva, Ulviyye. "Azerbaycan ve Atatürk." MA Thesis. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 2015.

Allen, David. "The Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Flexible, Responsive and Proactive?" In *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*, edited by Brian Hocking, 207-224. London: Macmillan, 1999.

Allen, Erin. "Inquiring Minds: Studying Decolonization." *Library of Congress*. Accessed October 31, 2015. <http://blogs.loc.gov/loc/2013/07/inquiring-minds-studying-decolonization/>.

Altuğ, Kurtul. *27 Mayıs'tan 12 Mart'a*. Ankara: Yılmaz Yayınları, 1991.

Altuğ, Yılmaz. "The Creation of the Turkish Resident Diplomacy." *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 42, no. 1 (2015): 67-74.

Antola, Esko. "Finland," in *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*, edited by Brian Hocking and David Spencer, 100-110. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

Aras, Bülent. "Reform and Capacity Building in the Turkish Foreign Ministry: Bridging the Gap between Ideas and Institutions." *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 17, no. 3 (2015): 69-85.

Artan, Zeynep Selin. "From Village Turks to Euro Turks: Turkish State's Perceptions of Turkish Migrants in Europe." Master's thesis. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University, 2009.

Asbarez News. "Turkey Angry at Yerevan Over 'Land Claim' Remarks." July 15, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://asbarez.com/111487/turkey-angry-at-yerevan-over-land-claim-remarks/>.

Asmussen, Jan. *Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis*. London: IB Tauris, 2008.

Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. "The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collections." Accessed May 30, 2016. <http://adst.org/oral-history/>.

Aşula, Mustafa. "Misafir İşçiler." In *Diş Politikamızın Perde Arkası: 23 Büyükelçinin Olaylara Bakışı*, edited by Turhan Fırat, 206-209. Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2005.

Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal. *Nutuk*. İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1934.

Atay, Falih Rıfkı. *Çankaya: Atatürk'ün Doğumundan Ölümüne Kadar*. İstanbul: Pozitif Yayıncılık, 2009.

Ayda, Adile. *Bir Demet Edebiyat*, İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2005.

Aydın, Mustafa. "Savaş Kaosunda Türkiye: Göreli Özerklik 2." In *Türk Dış Politikası I*, edited by Baskın Oran, 385-476. İstanbul: İletişim, 2001.

Aydın, Suavi and Yüksel Taşkın. *1960'tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2014.

Bagdandy, A. Von and R. Wolfrum, eds. *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law* 11. Leiden: Brill, 2007.

Bahar, İ. İzzet. "Turkey and the Rescue of Jews During Nazi Era: A Reappraisal of Two Cases, German-Jewish Scientists in Turkey and Turkish Jews in Occupied France." PhD diss. University of Pittsburgh, 2012.

Barker, J. Craig. *The Protection of Diplomatic Personnel*. Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006.

Barkawi, Tarak. "Diplomacy, War, and World Politics." In *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*, edited by Ole Jakob Sending, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver B. Neumann, 55-79. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Barlas, Dilek and Serhat Güvenç. *Türkiye'nin Akdeniz Siyaseti (1923-1939): Orta Büyüklükte Devlet Diplomasisi ve Deniz Gücünün Sınırları*. İstanbul: Koç Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2014.

Başer, Bahar. *Diasporada Türk-Kürt Sorunu: Almanya ve İsviç'teki İlkinci Kuşak Göçmenler*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2013.

Batora, Jozef and Nik Hynek. *Fringe Players and the Diplomatic Order: The New Heteronomy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

Berberian, Houri. "History, Memory and Iranian-Armenian Memoirs of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution." *Middle East Critique* 17, no 3 (2008): 261-292. doi.org/10.1080/10669920802405456.

Bernstein, Anya and Elizabeth Mertz. "Bureaucracy: Ethnography of the State in Everyday Life." *Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 34, no. 1 (May 2011): 6-10.

Berridge, George. *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. London: Palgrave, 2010.

Bilgili, Özge and Melissa Siegel. "Understanding the Changing Role of the Turkish Diaspora." *UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series*, 2011. Accessed March 1, 2015. <https://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/.../wp2011-039.pdf>.

Birand, Mehmet Ali. *30 Sıcak Gün*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990.

_____. Vol 2. *12 Eylül Belgeseli*. İstanbul: Show TV, 1999.

_____. Vol 2. *Kıbrıs'ın Elli Yılı*. İstanbul: CNN Türk, 1999.

Birler, İsmail Hakkı. *İsmail Hakkı Birler'in Anılarında CHP'li Yıllar: 1946-1992*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2010.

Bora, Tanıl. *Cereyanlar: Türkiye'de Siyasi İdeolojiler*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2017.

Boratav, Korkut. *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-2009*. İstanbul: İmge Yayınları, 2009.

Bourdieu, Pierre, "The Left Hand and the Right Hand of the State." *Variant* 32 (2008): 3-4.

Bull, Hedley. *The Anarchical Society*. New York: Palgrave, 2002.

Butterfield, Herbert. "The New Diplomacy and Historical Diplomacy." In *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Relations*, edited by Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield, 181-192. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966.

Buzan, Barry. *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: The Societal Approach*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014.

Cemal, Hasan. "Erdoğan'ın Monşer Kompleksi Dışışlerine Darbe Vuruyor." *T24*, July 17, 2013. Accessed Jun 1, 2014, <http://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/hasan-cemal/erdoganin-monser-kompleksi-disislerine-darbe-vuruyor,7064>.

———. 1915: *Ermeni Soykırımı*. İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2012.

Center for American Progress, "List of Attacks on American Diplomats and Congressional Responses," *Center for American Progress Website*. Accessed March 26, 2015. Available from <https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/diplomats-spreadsheet-v6.pdf>.

Chahine, Joumane. *Public Diplomacy: A Conceptual Framework*. PhD diss. Montreal: McGill University, 2010.

Clark, Eric. *Corps Diplomatique*. London: Allen Lane, 1973.

Cohen, Raymond and R. Westbrook. Eds. *Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginning of International Relations*. Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.

Connolly, James. "Diplomacy." *Workers' Republic*, November 6, 1915. Accessed May 6, 2016. <https://www.marxists.org/archive/connolly/1915/11/diplomacy.htm>.

Constantinou, Costas M. "Between Statecraft and Humanism: Diplomacy and Its Forms of Knowledge," *International Studies Review* 15, no. 2 (2013), 141-169.

_____. "Diplomatic Representations...or Who Framed the Ambassadors?" *Millenium: Journal of International Studies* 23, no 1. (1994): 1-23. doi 10.1177/03058298940230010201.

_____. "Late Modern Diplomacies." *Millennium* 22, no. 1. (1989): 89-96. doi 10.1177/03058298930220010701.

Coolsaet, Rick and Ann-Sofie Voet. "Belgium." In *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*, edited by Brian Hocking and David Spencer, 60-74. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

Cooper, Andrew F. "Canada, Trying to Get it Right: The Foreign Ministry and Organizational Change, *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*, edited by Brian Hocking, 40-58. London: Macmillan, 1999. doi 10.1007/978-1-349-27317-1

_____. "Beyond Representation." *International Journal* 53, no. 1 (Winter, 1997/1998), 173-178. doi.org/10.1177/002070209805300111.

_____. F. Brian Hocking and William Maley. Eds. *Global Governance Diplomacy: The Worlds Apart*. New York: Palgrave, 2008. doi 10.1057/9780230227422

Cornut, Jérémie. "To Be a Diplomat Abroad: Diplomatic Practice at Embassies." *Cooperation and Conflict* 50, no. 3 (2015): 385-401. doi.org/10.1177/0010836715574912.

CNN Turk, "Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşivi Araştırmacılara Açılıyor." *CNN Turk Website*. Accessed June 20, 2015. Available from <http://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/disisleri-bakanligi-arsivi-arastirmacilara-aciliyor>.

Criss, Nur Bilge. "By Shades of Diplomatic Recognition: American Encounters with Turkey." In *Studies in Atatürk's Turkey: The American Dimension*, edited by George S. Harris and Nur Bilge Criss, 97-144. Leiden: Brill, 2009. doi 10.1163/ej.9789004174344.i-234.

———. "Repairing Turkish American Relations after the First World War: Ahmet Muhtar in Washington." In *Studies in Atatürk's Turkey: The American Dimension*, edited by George S. Harris and Nur Bilge Criss, 145-176. Leiden: Brill, 2009. doi 10.1163/ej.9789004174344.i-234.

Cromwell, Valerie. "United Kingdom: The Foreign and Commonwealth Office" in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, edited by Zara Steiner, 541-573. London: Times Books, 1982.

Çalış, Şaban H. *Turkey's Cold War: Foreign Policy and Western Alignment in the Modern Republic*. London: IB Tauris, 2017.

Çağaptay, Soner. "Race, Assimilation and Kemalism: Turkish Nationalism and the Minorities in the 1930s." *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 3 (2004): 86-101. doi.org/10.1080/0026320042000213474.

Çağlayan, Zafer. "Türk Diasporası En Büyük Şansımız." (Turkish Diaspora is Our Greatest Opportunity) *Anadolu Ajansı*, 18 October 2011.

Çamlık, Bilal. *Arnavutça Türkçe Karşılaştırmalı Dilbilgisi* (Albanian Turkish Comparative Grammar) Ankara, 1996.

Çilingiroğlu, Ayhan. "Attila Sönmez'e Armağan: Türkiye'de Planlamanın Yükselişi ve Çöküşü 1960-1980." edited by Ergun Türkcan, 113-152. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010.

Davis-Cross, Mai'a Keapuolani. "A European Epistemic Community of Diplomats." in *The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society*, edited by Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, 221-245. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

———. "Rethinking the Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later." *Review of International Studies* 39, no. 1 (2013): 137-160.

De Callieres, François. *De la Maniere de Negocier Avec les Souverains*. Paris: Noveau Monde Editions, 2006.

DeSantis, Hugh and Waldo Heinrichs. "Department of State and American Foreign Policy." In *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, edited by Zara Steiner, 575-604. London: Times Books, 1982.

De Waal, Thomas. *Büyük Felaketten Sonra: Soykırımdan Sonra Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2016.

De Wicquefort, Abraham. *L 'Ambassadeur et ses Fonctions*. The Hague: Veneur, 1681.

Deibel, Terry L. "Teaching Foreign Policy with Memoirs." *International Studies Perspectives* 3, no. 2 (2002) : 128-138. doi 10.1111/1528-3577.00085.

Demirci, Sevtap. *Belgelerle Lozan: Taktik, Stratejik, Diplomatik Mücadele (1922-1923)*. İstanbul: Alfa, 2013.

Demirözü, Damla. *Savaştan Barışa Giden Yol: Atatürk-Venizelos Dönemi Türkiye-Yunanistan İlişkileri*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2007.

Denktaş, Rauf R. *12'ye 5 Kala*. Butik Matbaa, 1966.

———. *Rauf Denktaş'ın Hatıraları: Arşiv Belgeleri ve Notlarla O Günler*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1996.

Der Derian, James. "Mediating Estrangement: A Theory for Diplomacy." *Review of International Studies* 13, no. 2 (April 1987): 91-110. doi 10.1017/S0260210500113671.

Der Spiegel Online, "Gastarbeiter: Wir Riefen Arbeitskräfte Und Es Kamen Menschen," *Der Spiegel Website*. Accessed March 1, 2014. <http://www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/gastarbeiter-wir-riefen-arbeitskraefte-und-es-kamen-menschen-fotostrecke-74565.html>.

Derin, Haldun. *Çankaya Özel Kalemini Hatırlarken*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995.

Deringil, Selim. *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994.

Derman, Giray Saynur. "Ermeni Sorununun Türk Dış Politikasına Etkisi." *Yeni Türkiye* 60 (2014): 1-27.

Derndarsky, Michael. "Austria: The Foreign Office since 1918." In *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, edited by Zara Steiner, 59-74. London: Times Books, 1982.

Deathan, George. "France: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the Nineteenth Century." In *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, edited by Zara Steiner, 203-224. London: Times Books, 1982.

Dinçer, Osman Bahadır. Habibe Özdal, Hacali Necefoğlu. Eds. *Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası IV*, Ankara: Usak Yayınları, 2010.

Dixon, Jennifer. "Defending the Nation? Maintaining Turkey's Narrative on the Armenian Genocide." *South European Society and Politics* 15, no. 3 (2010) : 467-485. doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2010.513605.

Dodd, Clement H. *The Cyprus Imbroglio*. London: Eothen Books, 1998.

Doğru, Osman. *27 Mayıs Rejimi*. İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 1998.

Dontas, Domna. "Greece: The Greek Foreign Ministry." In *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, edited by Zara Steiner, 259-274. London: Times Books, 1982.

Doss, Kurt. "The History of the German Office." In *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, edited by Zara Steiner, 225-258. London: Times Books, 1982.

Dündar, A. Merthan. "Başbakanlık Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Arşivlerinde Bulunan Kore ile İlgili Belgeler Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme." *Asya/Pasifik Çalışmaları Türkiye Yıllığı* 2 (2007): 57-68.

Dündar, Can. *Kan Davası*. İstanbul: ATV, 1999.

_____. *O Gün: Johnson Mektubu*. İstanbul: CNN Türk, 2002.

Dündar, Lale. "Özal Dönemi Türk Diş Politikasında Turgut Özal'in Kişisel Özelliklerinin Rolü." *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* 58, (Spring 2016): 1-20.

Eayrs, James. *Diplomacy and Its Discontents*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971.

Ecevit, Bülent. *Diş Politika ve Kıbrıs Dosyası*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayıncılıarı, 2013.

Elekdağ, Şükrü. "Tarihsel Gerçekler ve Uluslararası Hukuk Işığında Ermeni Soykırımı İddiası." Accessed March 27, 2015. <http://www.ataa.org/reference/ermenisoykirimiddiasi.pdf>.

Enjalran, Paulette and Philippe Husson, "France: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs." in *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*, edited by Brian Hocking, 59-74. London: Macmillan, 1999. doi 10.1007/978-1-349-27317-1.

Enloe, Cynthia. *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Relations*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2014.

Erol, Mine. A. Rüstem Bey: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Amerika Büyükelçisi. Ankara: Bilgi Basımevi, 1973.

Ertüzün, Nejat. "Ermeni Sorunu ile İlgili Çalışmalar." In *Diş Politikamızın Perde Arkası: 23 Büyükelçinin Olaylara Bakışı*, edited by Turhan Fırat, 230-234. Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2005.

European Council, "Foreign Ministry Archive Services of European Union Member States: Greece." *European Council Website* March 12, 2016. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/splash/?requested=%2f>.

Faizullaev, Alisher, "Diplomacy and Self." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 17, no. 3 (2006): 497-522. doi.org/10.1080/09592290600867578.

Fırat, Melek. "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler." In *Türk Diş Politikası I*, edited by Baskın Oran, 716-768. İstanbul: İletişim, 2001.

Fırat, Turhan. Ed. *Diş Politikamızın Perde Arkası: 23 Büyükelçinin Olaylara Bakışı*. Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2005.

Findley, Carter V. "From Re'is Efendi to Foreign Minister: Ottoman Bureaucratic Reform and the Creation of the Foreign Ministry." PhD diss. Harvard University, 1969.

———. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Bürokratik Reform: Bab-ı Ali (1789-1922)*. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2014.

Fitchett, Joseph. "Makarios: Cypriot Nationalism Incarnate," *The Washington Post*, August 4, 1977, accessed November 19, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/08/04/makarios-cypriot-nationalism-incarnate/24ef5cf9-3d6a-4ob8-ae59-28206e5ec588/?utm_term=.fcfffo59fb28.

Girgin, Kadriye Zeynep. "Training Needs Analysis and Implementations in a Turkish Institution. Training Programme for Overseas Assignments in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs." MA Thesis. Ankara: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1997.

Girgin, Kemal. *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemleri Hariciye Tarihimiz: Teşkilat ve Protokol*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994.

Gottheil, Diane Levitt. "National Capital Diplomacy: A Study of Diplomats and Diplomatic Community in Israel." PhD diss. Chicago: University of Illinois, 1973.

Göze, Ergun. *Dışişleri Kavgası*. Istanbul: Serda Matbaacılık, 1975.

———. "Diplomasimizin Müesseseleri." *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Dergisi* 7 (August 1980): 167-183.

Göcek, Fatma Müge. *Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present and the Collective Violence against Armenians*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Treaty of Guarantee (1960)," Accessed June 1, 2015. *Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website*. Available from http://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/kypriako/treaty_of_guarantee.pdf.

Gusdorf, George. "Conditions and Limits of Autobiography." In *Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical*, edited by James Olney, 28-48. New Jersey: Princeton, 1980.

Gusterson, Hugh. "Studying Up Revisited." *Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 20, no. 1 (May 1997): 114-119. doi 10.1525/pol.1997.20.1.114.

Guttstadt, Corry. *Türkiye, Yahudiler ve Holokost*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2012.

Güldemir, Ufuk. *Teksas-Malatya*. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1992.

Güler, E. Zeynep. Ed. *Salon Verir Sokak Alırız*. İstanbul: Yazılıama, 2013.

Gündeş, Osman Nuri. *Sabah*, July 9, 2009. Accessed June 14, 2015. http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2009/07/09/asalayi_kuru_kafa_resimleriyle_cozduk.

Günver, Semih. "Dişşleri Meslek Memurluğu." In *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisinde 200 Yıllık Süreç*, edited by İsmail Soysal, 739-745. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997.

Gürpınar, Doğan. *Ottoman Imperial Diplomacy: A Political, Social and Cultural History*. London: IB Tauris, 2014.

_____. "The Politics of Memoirs and Memoir-Publishing in Twentieth Century Turkey." *Turkish Studies* 13, no. 3 (2012): 537-557. doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2012.717443.

Gürün, Kamuran. *Ermeni Dosyası*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayıncılık, 1983.

Haglund, Evan T. "Striped Pants versus Fat Cats: Ambassadorial Performance of Career Diplomats and Political Appointees." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (December 2015): 653-678. doi 10.1111/psq.12223

Halıcı, Şadıman. "150'likler." MA Thesis. Eskişehir: Anadolu University, 1998.

Halo, Candace. "Globalization and the Foreign Ministry: A Comparative Study of the US, Canadian, and Slovenian Models." PhD diss. Newark: Rutgers University, 2005.

Hamilton, Keith and Richard Langhorne. *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*. New York: Routledge, 2010.

Harris, George. *Atatürk's Diplomats*. Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2000.

_____. "Cementing Turkish American Relations: The Ambassadorship of (Mehmet) Münir Ertegün (1934-1944)." In *Studies in Atatürk's Turkey: The American Dimension*, edited by George S. Harris and Nur Bilge Criss, 177-196. Leiden: Brill, 2009. doi 10.1163/ej.9789004174344.i-234.

_____. and Nur Bilge Criss. Eds. *Studies in Atatürk's Turkey: The American Dimension*. Leiden: Brill, 2009. doi 10.1163/ej.9789004174344.i 234.

Hastürer, Hasan. "Asaf İnhan'dan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'a." *Kıbris Postası*. 5 February 2011. Accessed July 15, 2014, <http://www.kibrispostasi.com/print.php?col=98&art=10547>.

Hendry, Annabel. "From Parallel to Dual Careers: Diplomatic Spouses in the European Context." In *Modern Diplomacy*, edited by Jovan Kurbalija. Accessed May 8, 2016. <https://www.diplomacy.edu/resources/general/parallel-dual-careers-diplomatic-spouses>.

Hevener, Natalie K. *Diplomacy in a Dangerous World: Protection for Diplomats Under International Law*. New York: Westview Press, 1986.

Hitchens, Christopher. *Hostage to History: From the Ottomans to Kissinger*. New York: The Noonday Press Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1989.

Ho, Elaine L.E. Fiona McConnel, "Conceptualizing 'Diaspora diplomacy': Territory and populations betwixt the Domestic and Foreign." *Progress in Human Geography* 20, no. 10 (2017), 1-21. 10.1177/0309132517740217.

Hocking, Brian. "Catalytic Diplomacy: Beyond 'Newness' and 'Decline'" in *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, edited by Jan Melissen, 21-42. New York: Palgrave, 1999. doi 10.1007/978-1-349-27270-9.

_____, ed. *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*. London: Macmillan, 1999. doi 10.1007/978-1-349-27317-1

_____, ed. *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Intergrating Diplomats*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

_____. "The End(s) of Diplomacy." *International Journal* 53, no. 1 (1997/1998): 169-172. doi 10.2307/40203277.

Hoffman, John. "Reconstructing Diplomacy." *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 5, no. 4 (2003): 525-542. doi 10.1111/1467-856X.00118.

Hovannisian. Richard. "Denial of the Armenian Genocide 100 Years Later: The New Practitioners and Their Trade." *Genocide Studies International* 9, no. 2 (2015): 228.245. doi 10.3138/gsi.92.04.

Hymes, Dell. Ed. *Reinventing Anthropology*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972.

Hunsicker, A. *Understanding International Counter Terrorism Understanding International Counter Terrorism: A Professional's Guide to the Operational Art*. Boca Raton, Florida: Universal Publishers, 2006.

Hurd, Ian. "International Law and the Politics of Diplomacy." In *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*, edited by Ole Jakob Sending, Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann, 31-54. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Hür, Ayşe. "Bir Zamanlar ASALA ve PKK," (Once Upon a Time ASALA and PKK) *Taraf*, October 17, 2010. Accessed November 19, 2013. <http://www.taraf.com.tr/ayse-hur/makale-bir-zamanlar-asala-ve-pkk.htm>.

_____. "König, İmpeks, Denizbank, Refah, Satie Olayları," *Radikal*, December 22, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2015. http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/ayse_hur/konig_impeks_denizbank_satie_refah_olaylari-1167411.

Hürriyet. *27 Mayıs 1960 Darbesi Raporu*. (Report for the Coup of May 27, 1960).

İdiz, Semih. "Irtemçelik'e Yapılan Devlete Hakarettir" *Milliyet*. May 27, 2006. Accessed May 1, 2014. Available from <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/05/27/yazar/idiz.html>.

İnanç, Gül. *Büyükelçiler Anlatıyor: Türk Diplomasisinde Kıbrıs (1970-1991)*. İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2007.

İskit, Temel. *Diplomasi: Tarihi, Teorisi, Kurumları ve Uygulaması*. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007.

Jackson, Geoffrey. *Concorde Diplomacy: The Ambassador's Role in Today's World*. London: Hamish Hamilton Books, 1981.

Jenkins, Brian M. *Embassies Under Siege: A Review of 48 Embassy Takeovers. 1971-1980*. RAND, 1981.

Jorgensen, Knud Erik. "Denmark." In *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*, edited by Brian Hocking and David Spencer, 75-54. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

Jönsson, Christer and Martin Hall. *Essence of Diplomacy*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005.

_____. "Global Governance: Challenges to Diplomatic Communication, Representation, and Recognition." In *Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds Apart?*, edited by Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking and William Maley, 29-38. New York: Palgrave, 2008.

Kabaklı, Ahmet. *Bürokrasi ve Biz*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1976.

Kamel, Ayhan. *1923'ten Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası ve Diplomasisi*. İstanbul: İnkılap, 2013.

Kantarci, Şenol. "Osmanlı'da Onurlu Bir Diplomat ve Milli Mücadelenin Önemli Siması: Ahmed Rüstem Bey." *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* 42. (November 2008): 247-285.

Kanunum.com, "Hariciye Vekaleti Memurin Kanunu, " *Kanunum Website*. Accessed November 17, 2014.
http://www.kanunum.com/Kanun/1154/HARICIYE-VEKALETI-MEMURIN-KANUNU_xxid13861.

Kansu, Günal. *Planlı Yıllar: Anılarla DPT'nin Öyküsü*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayıncıları, 2004.

Karabekir, Kazım, I. *Cihan Harbine niçin Girdik?* İstanbul: Emre Yayıncıları, 2000.

Karadağ, Raif. *Türk Hariciyesinin Çetin Sınavı Kıbrıs*. İstanbul: Emre Yayıncıları, 2004.

Karpat, Kemal. "Introduction." in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition*, edited by Kemal Karpat, 1-12. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975.

_____. Ed. *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975.

Kaya, Ayhan and Bahar Şahin. Eds. *Kökler ve Yollar: Türkiye'de Göç Süreçleri*. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayıncıları, 2007.

Kaynar, Mete Kaan, ed. *Türkiye'nin 1950'li Yılları*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2015.

_____. *Türkiye'nin 1960'lı Yılları*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2017.

Kennan, George F. "Diplomacy without Diplomats?" *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 5 (1997):198-212. doi 10.2307/20048209.

Kerr, Pauline and Geoffrey Wiseman. *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices*. Oxford University Press, 2012.

Keyder, Çağlar. *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2004.

Kızılırek, Niyazi. *Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2002.

Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomasi*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayıncıları, 2000.

_____. *Years of Renewal*. New York: Touchstone Books, 2000.

Kjolsen, Klaus. "The Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs." In *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, edited by Zara Steiner, 163-184. London: Times Books, 1982.

Klieman, Aharon. "Israel: Succumbing to Foreign Ministry Declinism." In *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*, edited by Brian Hocking, 75-101. London: Macmillan, 1999. doi 10.1007/978-1-349-27317-1

Koçak, Cemil. *27 Mayıs Tek Parti Dönemi Tutanakları*. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayıncıları, 2010.

_____. *Geçmişiniz İtinayla Temizlenir*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncıları, 2009.

_____. *Tek Parti Döneminde Muhalif Sesler*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncıları, 2011.

_____. *Türkiye'de İki Partili Siyasi Sistemin Kuruluş Yılları: Rejim Krizi*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncıları, 2010.

_____. *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi I: Dönemin İç ve Dış Politikası Üzerine Bir Araştırma*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncıları, 2003.

Komachi, Kyoji. "Japan Towards a More Proactive Foreign Ministry." In *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*, edited by Brian Hocking, 102-116. London: Macmillan, 1999. doi 10.1007/978-1-349-27317-1.

Kuneralp, Sinan. "İspanya İç Savaşı'nda Uçak Ticareti ve Ekrem König." *Tarih ve Toplum* 60, (December 1988).

_____. *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkan ve Ricali, 1839-1922: Prosopografik Rehber*. İstanbul: ISIS, 1999.

_____. "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic." In *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, edited by Zara Steiner, 493-512. London: Times Books, 1982.

Kuran, Ercüment. "1793-1811 Döneminde İlk Osmanlı Mukim Elçilerinin Diplomatik Faaliyetleri." In *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisinde 200 Yıllık Süreç*, edited by İsmail Soysal, 55-59. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997.

Kuus, Merje. "Foreign Policy and Ethnography: A Skeptical Intervention." *Geopolitics* 18, no. 1 (2013): 115-131. doi 10.1080/14650045.2012.706759.

Kurbalija, Jovan. "Wikileaks and the Future of Diplomacy." DIPLO Foundation Website. Accessed March 25, 2017. Available from <https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/policy-briefing-wikileaks-and-future-diplomacy>.

Kürkçüoğlu, Ömer. "Gündüz Ökçün'ün Öğrettikleri ve Düşündürdükleri." *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 47, no. 1 (1992): 5-7.

_____. "The Adoption and Use of Permanent Diplomacy." In *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional?* edited by Nuri A. Yurdusev, 131-150. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Langhorne, Richard. "Current Developments in Diplomacy: Who are the Diplomats Now?" *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 8, no. 2 (July 1997): 1-15. doi 0.1080/09592299708406040.

_____. "The Regulation of Diplomatic Practice: The Beginnings to the Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relations." *Review of International Studies* 18, no. 1 (1992): 3-17.

Le Goff, Jacques. *History and Memory*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.

Lee, Donna and David Hudson. "The Old and New Significance of Political Economy in Diplomacy." *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 3 (2004): 343-360. doi.org/10.1017/S0260210504006102.

Leguey-Feilleux, *The Dynamics of Diplomacy*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009.

Leira, Halvard and Iver B. Neumann "Consular Diplomacy," in *Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and Practices*, edited by Pauline Kerr and Geoffrey Wiseman, 160-174. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Lewin. Daniel Mayer. "The West German Foreign Office: A Study of German Diplomats under Adenauer." PhD diss. Princeton University, 1961.

Lütem, Ömer Engin. *Ermeni Sorunu: Temel Bilgi ve Belgeler*. Ankara: ASAM Ermeni Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2007.

Macdonald, Kavin. *One Day in September*. London: BBC Films & Passion Pictures, 1999.

Mak, Donald and Charles Stuart Kennedy. *American Ambassadors in a Troubled World: Interviews with Senior Diplomats*. Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1992.

Malucci Jr., Thomas. "The Foreign Office of the the Federal Republic of Germany and the Question of Relations with Communist States, 1953-55." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 12, no. 1 (2001): 113-134. doi 10.1080/09592290108406192.

Mardin, Şerif. *Bedüzzaman Saidi Nursi Olayı: Modern Türkiye'de Din ve Toplumsal Değişim*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2015.

Marsden, Magnus. *et al.* "Everyday Diplomacy: Introduction to Special Issue." *The Cambridge Journal of Anthropology* 34, no. 2 (Autumn 2016): 2-22. doi 10.3167/ca.2016.340202.

Mattingly, Garrett. *Renaissance Diplomacy*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1955.

Mayers, David. "JFK's Ambassadors and the Cold War." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 11, no. 3 (2000): 183-211. doi 10.1080/09592290008406176.

Meertz, Paul W. "The Changing Nature of Diplomatic Negotiation." In *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, edited by Jan Melissen, 79-93. New York: Palgrave, 1999. doi 10.1007/978-1-349-27317-1.

Melissen, Jan and Ana Mar Fernandez, Eds. *Consular Affairs and Diplomacy*. Leiden: Brill, 2011.

_____. Ed. *The New Public Diplomacy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

_____. "The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice." In *The New Public Diplomacy*, edite by Jan Melissen, 3-27. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. doi 10.1057/9780230554931.

MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database. "Patterns of Global Terrorism." Accessed May 30, 2015. <https://web.archive.org/web/20071115020146/http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=258>.

Moore, Robert J. *Third-World Diplomats in Dialogue with the First World*. Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1985.

Morisse-Schillbach, Melanie. "France." In *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*, edited by Brian Hocking and David Spencer, 111-131. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

Mortan, Kenan and Monelle Sarfati, Eds. *Vatan Olan Gurbet: Almanya'ya İşçi Göçünün 50. Yılı*. Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011.

Müftüoğlu, İsmail. *Bilinmeyen Yönleriyle Kıbrıs Barış Harekati Ve Perde Arası*. Istanbul: Alioğlu Yayınevi, 2009.

Mügge, Lisa. "Managing Transnationalism: Continuity and Change in Turkish State Policy." *International Migration* 50, no. 1 (2011): 20-37.

Müller, Marie. "South Africa, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: From Isolation to Intergration to Coherency." in *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*, edited by Brian Hocking, 188-206. London: Macmillan, 1999. doi 10.1007/978-1-349-27317-1.

Mütercimler, Erol. *Satılık Ada Kıbrıs: Kıbrıs Barış Harekatının Bilinmeyen Yönleri*. İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2007.

Nader, Laura. "Up the Anthropologist-Perspectives Gained from Studying Up." In *Reinventing Anthropology*, edited by Dell Hymes, 284-311. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972.

Neilson, Francis. *Diplomats Make War*. New York: B.W Huebsch, 1940.

Neumann, Iver B. *At Home with Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012.

———. *Diplomatic Sites*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

_____. "Foreign Ministry: Bracketing Interdependence." In *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*, edited by Brian Hocking, 152-169. London: Macmillan, 1999. doi 10.1007/978-1-349-27317-1.

_____. "Globalization and Diplomacy." In *Global Governance Diplomacy: The Worlds Apart?* edited by Andrew F. Cooper, Brian Hocking and William Maley, 15-28. New York: Palgrave, 2008. doi 10.1057/9780230227422_2.

_____. "The Body of the Diplomat." *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4 (2008): 671-695. doi 10.1177/1354066108097557.

_____. "The English School on Diplomacy: Scholarly Promise Unfulfilled" *International Relations* 17, no. 3 (2003): 341-369.

Nevakivi, Jukka. "The Finnish Foreign Service." In *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, edited by Zara Steiner, 185-202. London: Times Books, 1982.

Nicolson, Harold. *Diplomacy*. London: T. Butterworth, 1939.

_____. "Diplomacy: Then and Now." *Foreign Affairs* 40 (1961): 39-49.

Nish, Ian. "Japan: The Foreign Ministry." In *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, edited by Zara Steiner, 327-344. London: Times Books, 1982.

Numelin, Ragnar. *The Beginnings of Diplomacy: A Sociological Study of Intertribal and International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950.

Oberling, Pierre. *The Cyprus Tragedy*. Nicosia, Northern Cyprus: K. Rustem & Brother, 1989.

Oedewalt, Gary A. *The Berlin Mafia: How American Diplomats in Berlin and Germany Affected US Policy during the Early Occupation and the Berlin Crisis*. PhD diss. Columbia: University of Missouri, 2005.

Olney, James, ed. *Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical*, James Olney, New Jersey: Princeton, 1980.

Oran, Baskın, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası Cilt 1: 1919-1980*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014.

Ortaylı, İlber. "Türk Dışşleri Memuru." *Yeni Türkiye* 3 (March-April 1995): 536-539.

Osman, Mohammed. "Discourse Study of Genre: Autobiography." *English Language and Literature Studies* 5, no. 4 (2015): 154-158.

Özcan, Gencer. "Ellili Yillarda Dış Politika." In *Türkiye'nin 1950'li Yılları*, edited by Mete Kaan Kaynar, 97-134. İstanbul: İletişim, 2015.

_____. "Altmışlı Yillarda Dış Politika." In *Türkiye'nin 1960'lı Yılları*, edited by Mete Kaan Kaynar, 17-56. İstanbul: İletişim, 2017.

Özdağ, Ümit. *Menderes Döneminde Ordu Siyaset İlişkileri ve 27 Mayıs*. İstanbul: Boyut Yayın Grubu, 2004.

Özdemir, Cem and Wolfgang Schuster. Ed. *Almanya'nın Ortasında: Alman-Türk Başarı Öyküleri*. İstanbul: İBB Kültür AŞ, 2011.

Özdemir, Kürşat. "Bir Dışşleri Bakanı Olarak İlter Türkmen (1980-1983)," MA Thesis. İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi, 2015.

Öztan, Güven Gürkan and Ömer Turan. "Türkiye'de Devlet Aklı ve 1915." *Toplum ve Bilim* 132 (2015): 78-131.

Özyalçiner, Adnan. "Sirkeci-Münih Hattı." *Yeni Hayat Almanya*. Accesed May 4, 2014. Available from <http://www.yenihayat.de/kultur/sirkeci-munih>.

Pamuk, Şevket. *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Küreselleşme, İktisat Politikaları ve Büyüme*. İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2008.

Pascal, Roy. *Design and Truth in Autography*. New York: Routledge, 2016.

Perinçek, Mehmet. "Asala ve 'Talat'ın Çocukları,"" *Yeni Türkiye* 60 (2014): 1761-1766.

Pouliot, Vincent. *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

_____. and Jérémie Cornut. "Practice Theory and the Study of Diplomacy: A Research Agenda." *Cooperation and Conflict* 50, no. 3 (2015): 297-315. doi 10.1177/0010836715574913.

Presidency of Cyprus "Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus." *Cyprus Presidency Website*. Accessed May 29, 2016. [http://www.presidency.gov.cy/presidency/presidency.nsf/all/1003AEDD83EED9C7C225756Foo23C6AD/\\$file/CY_Constitution.pdf](http://www.presidency.gov.cy/presidency/presidency.nsf/all/1003AEDD83EED9C7C225756Foo23C6AD/$file/CY_Constitution.pdf).

Rado, Şevket, ed. *Paris'te Bir Osmanlı Sefiri: Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi'nin Fransa Seyahatnamesi*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014.

Rana, Kishan S. *21st Century Diplomacy: A Practitioner's Guide*. New York: Continuum International Publishing, 2011.

_____. *The Contemporary Embassy: Paths to Diplomatic Excellence*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Ray, James Lee and Juliet Kaarbo. *Global Politics*. Wedsworth: Cengage Learning, 2011.

Ritchie, Charles. "What are Diplomats Made Of?" *International Journal* 30, no. 1 (1974/75): 15-23. doi 10.1177/002070207503000102.

Roetter, Charles. *The Diplomatic Art: An Informal History of World Diplomacy*. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, 1963.

Rozental, Andres. "Mexico: Change and Adaptation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." *Foreign Ministries: Adaptation and Change*, edited by Brian Hocking, 133-151. London: Macmillan, 1999. doi 10.1007/978-1-349-27317-1.

Rumelili, Bahar and Rukiye Süleymanoğlu-Kürüm, "Women and Gender in Turkish Diplomacy: Historical Legacies and Current Patterns." In *Gendering Diplomacy and International Negotiation*, edited by Karin Aggestam, Ann E. Towns, 87-106. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

Satow, Ernest. *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*. London: Longman Greens, 1922.

Seabrooke, Leonard. "Diplomacy as Economic Consultancy." In *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*, edited by Ole Jakob Sending, Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann, 195-219. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Seabury, Paul. "The Wilhelmstrasse: A Study of German Diplomats under the Nazi Regime." PhD diss. New York: Columbia University, 1953.

Sedes, İzzet. *Bir Dönem Babiali ve Avrupa Konseyi*. İstanbul: Toroslu Yayınevi, 2009.

Sending, Ole Jakob, Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann. Eds. *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Serra, Enrico. "Italy: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs." In *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, edited by Zara Steiner 197-226, London: Times Books, 1982.

Sezer Şanlı, Ayşem. "Türkiye'de 'Alamancı Almanya'da 'Türk': Araştıki Gurbetçiler." In *Türkiye'nin 1960'lı Yılları*, edited by Mete Kaan Kaynar, 667-686. İstanbul: İletişim, 2017.

Sharp, Paul. *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

_____. "For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations." *International Studies Review* 1, no. 1 (1999): 33-57.

_____. and Geoffrey Wiseman, eds. *The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

_____. "Who Needs the Diplomats? The Problem of Diplomatic Representation." *International Journal* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 609-634. doi 10.1177/002070209705200407.

Shaw, Stanford. *Turkey and the Holocaust: Turkey's Role in Rescuing Turkish and European Jewry from Nazi Persecution*. Hounds Mills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1993.

Shaw, Stanford and Ezel Kural-Shaw. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye (1808-1975)*. İstanbul: E Yayınları, 2004.

Singer, David and Melvin Small, "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System: 1815-1940." *World Politics* 18, no. 2 (1966): 236-282.

Singers, Donald Lewis. *German Diplomats at Nuremberg: A Study of the Foreign Defendants of the Ministries Case*. PhD diss. The American University, 1980.

Smyth, Denis. "Spain's First Secretariat of State, Ministry of State and Ministry of Foreign Affairs." In *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, edited by Zara Steiner, 423-454. London: Times Books, 1982.

Sofer, Sasson. "Being a 'Pathetic Hero' in International Politics: The Diplomat as a Historical Actor." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 12, no. 1 (2001): 107-112. doi 10.1080/09592290108406191.

_____. "Old and New Diplomacy: A Debate Revisited." *Review of International Studies* 14, no. 3 (1988): 195-212.

_____. "The Diplomat as a Stranger." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 8, no. 3 (1997): 179-186. doi 10.1080/09592299708406061

Sonyel, Salahi Ramadan. *Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the National Movement*. London: Sage Publications, 1975.

Son Sayfa. "Büyükelçilerin Monşer Tepkisi." Accessed March 10, 2014. Available from <http://www.sonsayfa.com/Haberler/Siyaset/Buyukelcilerin-monser-tepkisi-97335.html>.

Soysal, Ismail. Ed. İsmail Soysal, Ed. Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisinde 200 Yıllık Süreç. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997.

_____. *Türk Dış Politikası İncelemeleri için Kılavuz (1919-1993)*, İstanbul: Eren, 1993.

_____. "Umur-u Hariciye Nezaretinin Kurulması (1836)." In *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisinde 200 Yıllık Süreç*. İsmail Soysal. Ed. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997.

Steiner, Barry H. "Diplomacy and International Theory." *Review of International Relations* 30, no. 4 (October 2004): 493-509. doi 10.1017/S0260210504006199.

Steiner, Zara. "Foreign Ministries: Old and New." *International Journal* 37, no. 3 (1982): 349-377. doi 10.1177/002070208203700301.

_____, ed. *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*. London: Times Books, 1982.

Strydom, Hennie. "The Non-Aligned Movement and the Reform of International Relations." In *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law* 11, eds. A. Von Bagdandy and R. Wolfrum. Leiden: Brill, 2007.

Sunel, Fırat. *Salkım Söyütlerin Gölgesinde*. İstanbul: Profil Yayıncıları, 2011.

Şahin, Birsen. *Almanya'daki Türkler: Misafir İşçilikten Ulusötesi Bağların Oluşumuna Geçiş Süreci*. Ankara: Phoenix, 2010.

Şahin-Mencutek, Zeynep and Bahar Başer. "Mobilizing Diasporas: Insights from Turkey's Attempts to Reach Turkish Citizens Abroad." *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 20, no. 1 (2018): 86-105.

Şahinler, Menter. *Türkiye'nin 1974 Kıbrıs Siyaseti*. İstanbul: Rumeli Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği, 1979.

Şimşir, Bilal. *Ankara... Ankara: Bir Başkentin Doğuşu*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1988.

_____. "Atatürk'ün Elçileri Üzerine." *Yeni Türkiye* 3 (March-April 1995): 539-547.

_____. *Bizim Diplomatlar*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996.

_____. *Ermeni Meselesi: 1774-2005*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayıncıları, 2013.

_____. *Şehit Diplomatlarımız*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000.

Tamkoç, Metin. *The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of National Security and Modernization of Turkey*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976.

TBMM, “I. İcra Vekilleri Heyeti.” https://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/_Global/_Government/pg_Cabinets.aspx.

TBMM, “Constitution of Republic of Turkey.” *TBMM Website*. March 25, 2015. https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf.

TBMM, “İstanbul Milletvekili Sayın Garo Paylan’ın Yönelttiği 7/12948 Sayılı Soru Önergesine Yanıt,” *TBMM Resmi İnternet Sitesi*, accessed March 28, 2018, available from <http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d26/7/7-12948sgc.pdf>.

TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Turkish Grand National Assembly Journal of Report), 1st Term Records (23.04.1920-10.08.1920).

TBMM Tutanak Dergisi (Turkish Grand National Assembly Journal of Report), 2nd Term Records (11.08.1923-26.06.1927).

TBMM Tutanak Hizmetleri Başkanlığı (TBMM Department of Documentation Services). “Komisyon: Darbe (12 Eylül).” October 15, 2012. Accessed November 1, 2015. [https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/arastirma_komisyonlari/darbe_muhtira/docs/tutanak_son/12_eylul_alt_komisyonu/15.10.2012/%C4%80T%C3%BCrkmen-15.10.2012.pdf](https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/arastirma_komisyonlari/darbe_muhtira/docs/tutanak_son/12_eylul_alt_komisyonu/12_eylul_alt_komisyonu/15.10.2012/%C4%80T%C3%BCrkmen-15.10.2012.pdf).

TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı “Dışişleri Bakanlığı Arşiv Hizmetleri Yönetmeliği.” Accessed March 28, 2018. Available from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKANLIK/Mevzuat/3-arsiv.pdf>.

TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı. “Dışişleri Bakanları Listesi.” *Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, Accessed March 3, 2015. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_disisleri-bakanlari-listesi.tr.mfa.

TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı. “Dışişleri Bakanlığı Mensupları ve Emekli Büyükelçilerin Eserleri.” Accessed November 12, 2014. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakanligi-mensupları-ve-emekli-buyukelcilerin-eserleri.tr.mfa>.

TDP Krizleri.org. "Dışşleri Müsteşarları Listesi." *TDP Krizleri Website*. Accessed February 26, 2016. http://tdpkrizleri.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=249:db-mustesarlar&catid=34:decision-makers-list&lang=tr.

Tekeli, İlhan and Selim İlkin. *Dış Siyaseti ve Askeri Stratejileriyle İkinci Dünya Savaşı Türkîyesi*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncıları, 2009.

Tololyan, Khacig. "Terrorism in Modern Armenian Political Culture." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4, no. 2 (1992): 8-22. doi 10.1080/09546559208427146.

Tuathail Gearoid O. and John Agnew. "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy." *Political Geography* 11, no. 2 (March 1992): 190-204.

Tuna, Orhan. *Türkiye'den Federal Almanya'ya İşgücü Akımı ve Meseleleri*. İstanbul: Sermet Matbaası, 1966.

Tuncer, Hüner. *Atatürk'ün Dış Politikası*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayıncıları, 2008.

Tunçay, Mete. *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayıncıları, 2009.

Tural, Erkan. "I. Dünya Savaşı Öncesinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Avrupa Devlet Sistemi. İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2009.

Turan, Namık Sinan. *İmparatorluk ve Diplomasi: Osmanlı Diplomasisinin İzinde*. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayıncıları, 2014.

Turan, Ömer and Güven Gürkan Öztan, *Devlet Akı ve 1915: Türkiye'de "Ermeni Meselesi" Anlatısının İnşası*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2018.

Türkcan, Ergun, ed. *Attila Sönmez'e Armağan: Türkiye'de Planlamanın Yükselişi ve Çöküşü 1960-1980*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayıncıları, 2010.

Türkmen, İlter. "Muharrem Nuri Birgi." In *Dış Politikamızın Perde Arkası: 23 Büyükelçinin Olaylara Bakışı*, edited by Turhan Fırat, 296-306. Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2005.

Turkish Ministry of Labor and Social Security, “Yurtdışındaki Vatandaşlarımızın Sorunları ve ÇSGB’nin Sunduğu Hizmetler.” *31* 3 (2011): 53-55.

United Nations. “UN Resolution 353.” Accessed January 20, 2017. Available from [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/353\(1974\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/353(1974)).

United Nations. “Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.” Accessed May 3, 2014. http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. “UNCTAD Conferences.” Accessed October 31, 2015. <http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Meetings/UNCTAD-Conferences.aspx>.

Uldricks, Teddy J. “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: The Tasrist and Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” In *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, edited by Zara Steiner, 513-540. London: Times Books, 1982.

Unat, Faik Reşit. *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kuruşu Basımevi, 1992.

Uzgel, İlhan. “TDP’nin Uygulanması.” In *Türk Dış Politikası I: 1919-1980*, edited by Baskın Oran, 54-93. İstanbul: İletişim, 2001.

Uzun, Ferdi. “Türk Dışşlerinde Fatin Rüştü Zorlu.” MA Thesis. Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi, 2015.

Ünay, Sadık. *Neoliberal Globalization and Institutional Reform: The Political Economy of Development Planning in Turkey*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2006.

Ünlütürk, Cemil. *Kapat Kokmasın, Sus Duyulmasın, Ört Görünmesin: Monşerler, Hikaye-i Hariciye*. Ankara: İsim Yayınları, 2011.

Ünver, Ömer C. “The Changing Diaspora Politics of Turkey and Public Diplomacy.” *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 12, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 181-190.

Üstel, Füsün. *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları (1912-1931)*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2010.

Vassaf, Gündüz. *Daha Sesimizi Duyurmadık: Almanya'da Türk İşçi Çocukları*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1983.

Vrasti, Wanda. "The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 37, no. 2 (2008): 279-301. doi 10.1177/0305829808097641.

Vural, Mithat Kadri. "Sedat Laçiner, Ermeni Sorunu, Diaspora ve Türk Dış Politikası," *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 6 (2007): 361-368.

Watson, Adam. *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States*. London: Routledge, 2005).

Wels, C.B. "Netherlands: The Foreign Policy Institutions in the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1579 to 1980." In *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, edited by Zara Steiner, 363-390. London: Times Books, 1982.

Wiegeshoff, Andrea. "The 'New Look' of German Diplomacy: German Foreign Service after the Second World War." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 29, no. 2 (2018): 187-207.

Wight, Martin. "Why is There No International Theory." In *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Relations*, edited by Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield, 17-34. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966.

Wight, Martin and Herbert Butterfield, eds. *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Relations*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966.

Willequet, Jacques. "Belgium: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs." In *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, edited by Zara Steiner 75-94. London: Times Books, 1982.

Wiseman, Geoffrey. "Diplomatic Practices at the United Nations." *Cooperation and Conflict* 50, no. 3 (2015): 316-333. doi 10.1177/0010836715574916.

Wolfe, Robert. "Still Lying Abroad? On the Institution of the Resident Ambassador." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 9, no. 2 (1998): 23-54. doi 10.1080/09592299808406082.

Yahuda, M.B. "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China." in *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, edited by Zara Steiner, 153-162. London: Times Books, 1982.

Yavuz, Hakan. "Orientalism, 'the Terrible Turk,' and Genocide." *Middle East Critique* 23, no. 2 (2014): 111-126. doi 10.1080/19436149.2014.905082.

Yayla, Turay. "Diplomat Hasan Esat Işık'ın Biyografisi (1916-1989)." MA Thesis. Istanbul: Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi, 2014.

Yılmaz, Eylem and Pınar Bilgin. "Constructing Turkey's 'Western' Identity during the Cold War: Discourses of the Intellectuals of Statecraft." *International Journal* 61, no. 1 (2005-2006): 39-59.

Young, George. *Diplomacy Old and New*. London, 1921.

Yurdusev, Nuri A. "Osmanlı Mirası ve Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine." In *Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası IV*, edited by Osman Bahadır Dinçer, Habibe Özdal, Hacali Necefoğlu, 47-54. Ankara: Usak Yayıncıları, 2010.

_____, ed. *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional?* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Zucconi, Mario. "Italy." In *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*, edited by Brian Hocking and David Spencer, 163-176. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

Zürcher, Eric Jan. *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, Istanbul: İletişim, 2006.

_____. "Young Turk Memoirs as a Historical Source: Kazim Karabekir's *İstiklal Harbimiz*." *Middle Eastern Studies* 22, no. 4 (1986): 562-575.