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**Bilkent University**  
**Department of International Relations**

**The European System and the Egyptian Question 1827-1841:**  
**A Study in the Theory of Balance of Power**

**A Dissertation submitted to the Department of International Relations in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

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
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
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
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
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Assistant Professor Hassan Ūnal







*To My Father Who Taught Me:*

*That knowledge is the essence of humanity*

*That integrity is its highest aspiration, and*

*That honesty is unidimensional.*

*You will not be forgotten.*



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## **Abstract**

This work aims at explaining the events of the Egyptian Question through the tools of balance of power theory. It is the main hypothesis of this work that the Egyptian Question affected the balance of power in Europe, i.e. Equilibrium, and therefore, was subjected to the mechanics of balance of power. It is further believed that the reactions of the major European powers were in full conformity with this mechanics.

The first chapter explains the theory of balance of power and its major concepts. In the following chapter, these concepts are applied to the European system of interstate relations, tracing it from the Treaty of Westphalia. The third chapter explains the link between Egypt and the European system, as well as the rise of the Egyptian Question. Chapter four deals with the effect of the Egyptian intervention in the Wars of Morea 1827, Anatolia 1832-3 and the European system. The final chapter is the mechanics of balance of power applied to pacify the Egyptian Question.

TURKCE ABSTRAKT:

AVRUPA'DAKI SISTEM VE MISIR MESELESİ  
1827 - 1841

GUCLER DENGESİ TEORİSİ ÜZERİNE BİR ÇALIŞMADIR.

BU ÇALIŞMA, MISIR MESELESİNİN GERÇEKLERİNİ, GUCLER DENGESİ TEORİSİ MEKANİZMASIYLA İZAH ETMEYİ AMAÇLAMAKTADIR. DİĞER BİR DEYİŞLE, MISIR MESELESİNİN, AVRUPA'DAKİ GUCLER DENGESİNİ NASIL ETKİLEDİĞİ, AYNI MEKANİZMANIN İSLETİLEREK MISIR'IN NASIL PASİFİZE EDİLDİĞİNE DAİR HİPOTEZDİR. AVRUPA'DAKİ ÖNEMLİ GÜÇ ODAKLARININ EYLEMLERİNİN BU MEKANİZMADA NE DENLİ ETKİN OLDUĞUNUN KANITIDIR.

BİRİNCİ BÖLÜM, GUCLER DENGESİ TEORİSİNİN ANA KAVRAMLARINI AÇIKLAMAKTADIR, TAKİP EDEN BÖLÜMDE, BU KAVRAMLARIN, "WESTPHALIA" ANTLASMASIYLA AVRUPA'DA BAŞLAYAN SİSTEME NASIL UYGULANDIĞINI KAPSAMAKTADIR. ÜÇÜNCÜ BÖLÜMDE, MISIR - AVRUPA BAĞLANTISI VE GUCLER DENGESİ TEORİSİNİN MISIR ÜZERİNDE İSLETİLMESİNE YÖNELİKTİR. DÖRDÜNCÜ BÖLÜM, 1827 , 1832-33 YILLARI MISIR'IN İSGAL EDİLMESİ VE BUNUN ETKİLERİ; SON BÖLÜM İSE, GUCLER DENGESİ MEKANİZMASININ İSLETİLEREK MISIR MESELESİNİN NASIL PASİFİZE EDİLDİĞİNİ ANLATMAKTADIR.

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## Introduction

### I. Understanding the Egyptian Question:

The Egyptian Question is defined here as the influence Egypt exerted on the function of the European System of balance of power and *vice-versa*. It began with the French campaign to Egypt in 1798, whereby it became an important strategic element in this interstate system. By 1805, a young Ottoman officer of Albanian origin named Mohammed Ali undermined his political opponents in Egypt and established himself as the sole ruler. His transformation of Egypt from a backward and underdeveloped Ottoman *vilayet* to a *de facto* independent, prosperous and strong Empire turned the Egyptian Question from an internal Ottoman question to an international one. However, when the Egyptian forces defeated the Ottomans in 1833 and 1839, and began to threaten the European equilibrium, the major European powers prevented Egypt from going further and worked to pacify the Egyptian Question in the framework of the mechanics of balance of power.

The historical facts of the Egyptian Question and Europe are well known to any student of diplomatic history. Many publications, whether Egyptian, French, British or Turkish provide a detailed explanation of this episode. However, there has been a lack of focus on the effect of this episode on the European security structure. Hence there is a need to approach this period from a systemic perspective to appreciate its true significance, for if the Egyptian Pasha pursued his victories, it is within the bounds of

possibilities that the European security and geopolitical structure would have been altered significantly. Moreover, this work attempts to establish the correlation between the events in Europe and Egypt and see this interdependence from a more broad perspective.

In addition, the study of the Egyptian Question by Egyptian authors was influenced by the conditions under which the writers lived. Since most of the most important books on this subject were written during the era of the British occupation of Egypt (1882-1956) there has been a general tendency to attribute the European intervention in Egypt from a unidimensional colonial perspective, or even from the perspective of inter cultural schisms. However, this work demonstrates that this is not the only way in which this historical episode could be studied. This dissertation, therefore, attempts to understand this episode from a different perspective. It does not deny the possibility that imperialism could be a factor for thwarting the rise of Egypt under Mohammed Ali, but it argues that when the European powers intervened, they did so as a result of classical balance of power mechanics that dominated the system. Since this is the main thesis of this dissertation, it is natural to adopt the theoretical framework of the Realist's concept of balance of power. This represents a new approach in studying this period as it links the Egyptian question to the European system functioning under the balance of power mechanism.

## **II: Scope and Objective:**

The aim of this dissertation is to study the impact of the Egyptian Question 1827-1840 on the European system of international relations and to offer an explanation within this context as to why Mohammed Ali's ambitious foreign policy was undermining European equilibrium, and hence failed. The hypothesis of this dissertation is that all

actions of the European powers, especially Britain, stemmed from the conscious tradition of balance of power mechanism dominating the European system of interstate relations since 1648. This work adopts as a theoretical framework the balance of power theory as postulated by some scholars of international relations, such as Morgenthau, Claude, Platzgraff and Daugherty. It is believed here that the mechanics of balance of power provides sufficient understanding and rationalization as to the consequences of the events under review. This dissertation shall include the historical events that led to the Egyptian Question, the development of the issue, the roles of the different European actors and finally, within the context of balance of power mechanism, how the European powers thwarted the ambitions of Egypt. This is an analytical case study will focus on reinterpreting this period on the basis of one of the most prominent approaches of international relations.

The sources of this dissertation are political and historical books that deal with the Egyptian Question, as well as some archival materials from the Egyptian, British, Russian and Austrian archives.

### **III Outline of the Study:**

**Chapter I: The Theoretical Framework: Balance of Power** discusses the theoretical framework of this work, *i.e.* the balance of power theory within the Realist tradition. It begins by focusing on the historical uses of this approach, and then the definition of the balance of power concept is discussed as used here. The next section will define operational perspectives, with a detailed explanation of its mechanics. Throughout

the chapter, there will be references to the other chapters in order to link theory and concepts to the practices in the European system.

**Chapter II: The European Balance of Power System** is the application of the balance of power concept to the European system from its birth at the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) until the 1820's, i.e., just before the rise of the Egyptian questions. This chapter will trace the rise of what is called the balance of power system of interstate relations in Europe. Theoretical application is the basic aim of this chapter while a secondary aim is to set the stage for the analysis of the Egyptian Question within the European system. A major section in this chapter focuses on the position of the Ottoman Empire in the European system. This section aims to establish that the Ottoman Empire was a major actor in the European system as well as a cornerstone for European equilibrium therefore making it a powerful link between the Egyptian Question and the European system. This point will be further explored in the Third Chapter.

**Chapter III: The Egyptian Question: Europe, Egypt and Mohammed Ali,** defines the Egyptian Question and explains relations between Egypt and Europe over a period of thirty years within the context of the Egyptian Question. The focus will be on two main angles, the European perspective and the internal developments in Egypt. This chapter will divide the Egyptian Question into historical phases that serve as an introduction to Egyptian politics *vis-à-vis* Europe by the third decade of the eighteenth century. This chapter will provide, A) a background to the Egyptian Question and Europe and B) the historical data needed to evaluate the events that took place afterwards.

**Chapter IV: The Development of the Egyptian Question - Wars in Morea and Anatolia** explains the nature of the Egyptian position *vis-à-vis* the European powers, primarily Britain, France, Russia, Austria and the Ottoman Empire and how these relations developed over time into the active phase of the Egyptian Question. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the active phase of the Egyptian Question that began with the Greek Campaign of 1827 and the 1832-1833 Egyptian-Ottoman war. These events will be studied carefully from a European perspective, *i.e.*, how these two events affected the different European actors, their aims, and the equilibrium within the overall system. The final part of this chapter will review the impact of the Egyptian Question on the development of the European system and how it created a dangerous disequilibrium within that delicate structure.

**Chapter V: Balance of Power Mechanics and the Pacification of the Egyptian Question** deals with the peak of the third phase of the Egyptian Question, the 1839 military campaign in Anatolia and how the subsequent Ottoman defeat opened the way for the Egyptian Pasha to conquer the Ottoman capital. The chapter will review both these tumultuous events and the European reaction at the time. In this section we shall analyze how the European balance of power could have been threatened by 1) an Egyptian conquest of the Ottoman Empire, 2) the possibility of the rise of an Egyptian power in Southern Europe, 3) the fate of the Ottoman held territory in Europe and, 4) the dangers of a possible French preponderance. Careful analysis of these possible events gives ample explanations of how they would have affected European equilibrium. Once this point is established, the next section of this chapter will deal with how the actors of the European system followed precise mechanics of balance of power, as explained in the first chapter

theoretically and in the second practically, to thwart the threat posed by the Egyptian Question in 1839.

**The Conclusion** includes a brief summary of the entire dissertation within the scope of the European system. It shall focus primarily on establishing the patterns of the Egyptian Question on the European system, arguing that it caused unity, polarization and unity once again in a time span of sixteen years. These patterns will be elaborated upon from the analytical perspective of the entire work. In addition, it will attempt to establish an explanation why the Egyptian Question should be considered a unique case in modern European diplomatic history and establish some of the effect of the Egyptian Question on modern Egyptian politics.

## Abbreviations

- (i) Documents from the Public Records Office in London are abbreviated B.A. standing for British Archives, whereas F.O. stand for Foreign Office. The first number afterward stands for the correspondences of the state involved, that is to say, the Ottoman Empire, is referred to as 78.
- (ii) The Documents from the Egyptian Archives in Daar El Kitab are referred to as E.A. The names that follow, *i.e.*, Abedeen or Maiyya Turki etc... refer to the classifications of these documents according to issues and distributions.
- (iii) All Documents of the Russian Archives, that are in the Egyptian Archives, are referred to as R.A.
- (iv) Correspondence from the Austrian Archives in Vienna -The Haus Hoff U Staatarchiv- are referred to as A.A.

## **Note on Transliterations**

All Ottoman names and places that are not identified with Egypt and Arabic language are written in modern Turkish, and for convenience, will be followed by its pronunciation in English language between brackets when first used. However, the only exception shall be the title "Pasha", which should be spelled as Pasa in Turkish language.





# Chapter I

## The Theoretical Framework

### Balance of Power

#### 1.1 The Realist Paradigm :

The Realist paradigm represents one of the basic pillars of international relations theory today and one of the most useful approaches to the understanding of relations among different nations and states. Although subject to heavy scrutiny since the early 1960's, it remains among the few approaches to survive the tides of criticism. Many approaches appeared in the past few decades with different premises regarding the functioning of the international system, especially after new factors, i.e., the communication revolution, global interdependence and a new applications to the concept of collective security, etc., appeared in world politics. Unlike many other approaches that could not survive these developments, Realism maintained itself as an independent and comprehensive approach, fostering other approaches, and yet remaining an important tool for international political analysis.

Though many scholars consider Hans J. Morgenthau to be the first Realist to set the tenets of Realism in his book, Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace; the fact remains that this is an old tradition with some of its basic assumptions expounded as early as Thucydides in describing the Peloponnesian War. Other scholars have traced the rise of this tradition to Machiavelli in the sixteenth century.<sup>1</sup> In modern times, the rise of this tradition to the level of a foreign policy approach may be found in the works of Morgenthau in the late forties and early fifties, making these publications the first comprehensive modern theory of international relations.<sup>2</sup> The works of Niccolo

Machiavelli, David Hume, Thomas Hobbes, Rheinhold Neibhur and Nicholas Spykman also serve as examples of this approach.

## **1.2 The Tenets of Realism:**

Realism, like any other approach in international relations theory, derives its focus from giving explanations for the recurring political phenomena in the international arena and attempts to shed light on the possible future behavior of the different states. It contends that there exists an international system composed of a set of political actors referred to as states.<sup>3</sup> "The state ... is the fundamental political unit in the world system and ... therefore, it is possible to analyze world politics largely in terms of interstate relations."<sup>4</sup> By focusing on the state as the center of analysis, the approach refuses to give weight to the role of any other actor in the international arena, thereby dismissing the role of international organizations, - since they merely represent the collective will of the individual states - international regimes or multi-national corporations as unimportant or secondary.

### **The Power concept:**

Central to the view of Realism is that all states pursue the fundamental aim of independence and survival at the minimum, and the domination of others as a maximum. Therefore, the concept of power becomes a cornerstone since it is the only means available to attain such aims. Power in this approach is like money in economics: its acquisition is the innate aim of all states in all their interactions. Power to them is both a means and an end in itself. Morgenthau believes that among the principles of political

realism, is the idea that states' action is the pursuance of their " interests defined in terms of power."<sup>5</sup> Thus there exists a correlation between the concept of power and interest, and both are often used interchangeably in the Realist literature as the rationale for actions of states.

Though the term "power" is a vague concept susceptible to interpretation, as well as being a subject of massive confusion in the literature of international politics, there have been many attempts to seek a single definition. <sup>6</sup> Morgenthau, for example, uses the term in politics to postulate the notion of control over the minds and actions of others.<sup>7</sup> Different scholars use this concept in terms of attributes or influences.<sup>8</sup>

Less controversial are the characteristics of power in international relations theory. Morgenthau distinguishes a set of attributes to power, ranging from environmental factors (i.e., geography or natural resources) to demography, population, leadership, national character, quality of government, diplomacy, and the military capability of a state.<sup>9</sup> Thus to Realism, power is a multidimensional phenomenon with all qualitative and quantitative attributes included.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, in so far as this paper is concerned, we shall limit the use of power to the military aspect with respect to interstate relations. Components of military power will include only such factors as armament, strategic, and territorial attributes. Power measured as military capacity is an essential cornerstone in the bid for power in the international system, thus adding the dimension of relativity of power, since this type of power is determined by the number of states in the international arena and their individual military capabilities and how each views the power of the others.

### **The International System:**

Because the Realist paradigm focuses on the state as the major unit of analysis, the international system is also important for it is considered to be a product of the web of relations among the states. In other words it is the environment in which states interact. The international system in this paradigm is a recognized, but abstract concept, that underlines the framework involving the different states and the different attributes that affect the state's actions. An international system as used here refers to a collection of independent political entities, nations or empires, that interact with considerable frequency and according to regularized patterns,<sup>11</sup> within a limited setting. Others define the international system as "a collection of recognizable units or components that hang together and vary together in a manner regular enough to be described."<sup>12</sup> In general, an international system is a framework for an event/interaction or a technique for identifying, measuring, and examining interactions among states.<sup>13</sup> Every system here had a certain geographical boundary where these units interact, and this boundary is what distinguishes it from other systems. (see pp. 12)

The international system receives its *raison d'être* from the state, however, the state is also affected by it. Thus if states form the system, they are also restricted in their actions by the nature of that system in which it interacts. If all the actors in the system are bound towards power acquisition, and there are no regulatory organs where power could be centralized, the system is described as anarchic. Anarchy here refers to the fact that there is no essential harmony of interest among the nations, for each has conflicting national objectives,<sup>14</sup> in other terms, it is a state where order is nonexistent.<sup>15</sup> If the international system is anarchic, then power is dispersed among the units without order. This was the nature of the European system during the period of our study, given that the

Treaty of Westphalia (1648) recognized the autonomy of the main principalities and laid the seeds for the independence and rise of the state system. Therefore each of those states and principalities appeared on the international arena with its own foreign policy aimed at acquiring power. (See Chapter II)

### **1.3 The Management of Power in an International System:**

The premise of anarchy in international relations leads us to a serious problem in international affairs, basically, that of power management. Inis Claude Jr. in his book, Power and International Relations, provides some insights regarding this problem.<sup>16</sup> His assumption is that this is not a problem as much as it is an eternal and ongoing phenomena in international affairs, and should be dealt with on that basis since the power factor will remain a part of the international system.<sup>17</sup> From this premise, it becomes an elementary task to observe how states in such an anarchic system secure their survival and guarantee independence. It therefore becomes a problem of how to avoid the preponderance of a state/s that could control and possibly destroy all the other states.<sup>18</sup>

The structure of the international system that recognize sovereignty only to states, plays the decisive role in respect to this problem, thereby making power distribution its main issue. This was a relatively inert problem in the European system until the Treaty of Westphalia, due to the fact that secular power was centralized to a great extent in the institutions of the Habsburg domains in central Europe and east Europe.

The international system today (as it has been since 1648) does not comprise an institution whereby power is centralized. This marks the major difference between the international system and the state system. In the state system, the concept of law and punishment plays the decisive role in deterring the use of power by one citizen against the

other. The system itself regulates power distribution. Supreme powers generally rests in the institutions of the state, the guarantor of life, liberty and property to avoid the Hobbesian notion of the *state of nature*. By nature, the international system does not comprise an institution which defends the existence of small weaker states. Therefore, power regulation and management becomes the crucial problem.

Since states have unequal distribution of power among themselves, it becomes their task to create an arrangement in which they maintain peace and security. Inis Claude mentions three such arrangements: balance of power, collective security and world government. Other scholars added additional arrangements e.g., bandwagoning. Each of these are means for power management in the international system. The means by which power is managed in each of these arrangements is different since each has a different functional mechanism.

The basic tenets of collective security is the premise that states in the international system, voluntarily enter into accords whereby they cooperate to maintain international peace and security through collective actions to deter aggression and punish it if it occurs. In theory, the present international system functions under this umbrella. The major thesis here is that "*{states}* would come to the aid of those states that have become the target of aggression." <sup>19</sup> In addition to this, the system rests on the state's condemnation of force as a tool in the conduct of relations with others, as well as the principles of conformity and universality, whereby, states share the same principles and vision with regard to many issues, including defining aggression and collective actions.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, the function of the system becomes inconceivable without the presence of an international organ to coordinate the means of defining, repelling and punishing aggression. The League of Nations and the United Nations are the examples of such organs of collective security.



Bandwagoning is another means for power management in international relations. It is in essence a means for state(s) facing the threat emanating from the differential power structures and uneven distribution of power. If collective security is the embodiment of joint power allocation among the states to thwart any aggressions, bandwagoning offers a different alternative, especially in systems that lack any kind of effective collective security. It offers a weaker state an alternative to avoid aggression through a process by which it could align itself with the state representing the source of threat either to avoid losing materially (independence or territory), or to benefit from joining this state (rewards). In other words, it embodies the common proverb *If you can not beat them, join them*. Stephen Walt asserts that, "states are attached to strength. The more powerful the state (the hegemonic power) and the more clearly this power is demonstrated, the more likely others are to ally with it. By contrast, a decline in a state's fortunes will lead its allies to opt for neutrality at best or defect to the other side at worst.." <sup>21</sup> Usually a state opts for bandwagoning when faced by a stronger state, and when the power of the latter is overwhelming, and the former state can not find allies to assist it. Waltz believes that at the stage when the hegemonic power has established its position within the system, opposition proves too costly for a weaker state, hence opting for bandwagoning. It could be also claimed that this may result from shortsightedness on part of the weaker state's leadership. The European system witnessed several bandwagoning attempts by weaker states and perhaps the best example was Prussia's decision not to join Austria and Russia against France, the result of which was the defeat of the Austrians and Russians at Austerlitz and the French defeat of the Prussians later. (See Chapter II)

The concept of world government, in very crude terms, transforms the international system into a system very similar to that of a single state where power is

vested in an international organ. All the other means for power management mentioned here and in the next section have appeared in history in one form or another. Only world government remains the unborn child of Idealists.

#### **1.4 Balance of Power as an Option for Power Management : Theory and Practice**

Central to the problem of power management in the international system is the concept of balance of power. Simply stated, it is the mechanism whereby the independent units in the system preserve their security and independence through a series of alliances with other affected actors, aiming towards containing any expansionist hegemonic power that threatens to dominate the system and centralize power.<sup>22</sup> This is a traditional concept adhered to by many scholars in the field of international relation. This theory has its place in the core of the Realist paradigm. Scholars such as Hume, Morgenthau, Kissinger, Walt, Claude, Waltz, Luard, Gullick and many others have often referred to this arrangement as the means by which the exercise of power was controlled and managed in the international system. It is often believed that all the states in the international arena have applied this concept in their foreign policy. What makes this an important element in the Realist analysis is that it has been followed in European affairs throughout the last three centuries as we shall see.

Although the concept has been subject to heavy scrutiny during the last few decades, its origins are found in the Hellenic age. Thucydides, at The Peloponessian War, used this term in his explanation of the period when the power of Athens increased and threatened Sparta. He used it in the sense of power distribution. This term also appeared during the Roman era in similar contexts. Balance of power was used to describe the



power distribution among the Italian republics during the fifteenth century, during the rule of Lorenzo De Medici. The concept, though not the term, became current by the beginning of the 17th Century when Henry VII expressed his famous statement regarding his position *vis-à-vis* king Charles V and Francis I, as "cui adhaero praeest", *the one that I join will prevail*, which meant a classical position of balance of power between the two kings (states), where Henry VII acted as balancer.<sup>23</sup>

The term was probably used officially for the first time in the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, where it stated, " ... in order that peace and tranquillity of the Christian World may be ordered and stabilized in a just Balance of Power, (which is the best and most solid foundation of mutual friendship and a lasting general concord)."<sup>24</sup> During the eighteenth century, the concept developed a new usage through the works of such philosophers as David Hume. He argued that although the terminology had only recently developed, it existed *de facto* in the past, and the debate evolved around "...whether the idea of balance of power be owing entirely to modern policy, or whether the phrase has only been invented in these latter ages?",<sup>25</sup> and throughout his work, he concludes that it was an old practice. By the beginning of the 19th century it became a recognized to the extent that it was used very frequently in the international treaties, especially during the peaceful settlement that followed the Napoleonic wars in Europe.<sup>26</sup> By the beginning of the 20th century, the concept became an integral part of the Realist paradigm, whereby emphasis was laid on it to explain how states in the international system maintained the independence of the units and preserved stability.

Although this concept endured heavy criticism by many scholars during the early decades of this century, especially the Idealists (who proposed the idea of collective security against the application of balance of power as means for power management).

The concept reappeared in the sixties as a product of the cold war and in the company of similar concepts such as "balance of terror" and "nuclear parity."<sup>27</sup> Even today, in the field of international relations theory, there exists the controversial argument as to the existence, utility and the purposes of this concept.

The concept and practice of Balance of Power is well recognized among the different authors in the field of international relations as well as history, yet there remains a great deal of ambiguity in defining this concept, and much more, in operating it. The problem with it is not that it has no meaning, but rather that it has too many.<sup>28</sup> Many scholars confront this ambiguity by claiming that it either "has so many meanings that it is virtually meaningless",<sup>29</sup> or that it is "ambiguity enshrined."<sup>30</sup> The major reason for the confusion that surrounds this concept, is not in the fact that it is not defined, but in the fact that many scholars use it in different contexts. Even firm advocates of this concept have different uses for it. Morgenthau, for example, believes that the term could be used in four different meanings, as a policy aimed at a certain state of affairs, as an actual state of affairs, as an approximately equal distribution of power or as any distribution of power.<sup>31</sup> Inis Claude argues, that the term is used as a situation of power distribution, or as a foreign policy or as a system of interstate relations.<sup>32</sup> Martin Wight, for example, categorizes the proponents of the concept of balance of power, dividing them into Griotians, Michiavellians and Kantians.<sup>33</sup> Such categorization also runs along similar lines to those of Morgenthau and Claude. Earnest Haas lists several definitions for the term balance of power, in a rather criticizing fashion ranging from descriptive and prescriptive intents to ideological and analytical ones.<sup>34</sup>

## 1.5 Defining Balance of Power : A System of Interstate Relations:

Regardless of the different usage of balance of power in international relations, there seems to be a common idea that unites the different authors using this concept. Though the term could be used in many meanings ranging from foreign policy to power configuration, or ideology, nevertheless, there seems to be a general understanding among these authors that the term can mean power configurations and arrangements among states in an international system. This common use for the term is very similar to the definition of Claude with regard to balance of power as a *system* of interstate relations. Kaplan also uses it to describe the functioning of the multipolar systems in world politics.<sup>35</sup> This seems to be the original use of the term, and in the Realist tradition, it becomes the law that governs power in the international arena and its elements could be understood in common sense, and not necessarily with sophisticated analytical tools.

In as far as the scope of this work is concerned, the concept of balance of power is used to refer to "...a situation or condition, implying an objective arrangement in which there is relatively widespread satisfaction with the distribution of power. The universal tendency or law describes a probability... that members of a system threatened by the emergence of a 'disturber of the balance' - a power seemingly bent upon establishing an international hegemony - will form a countervailing coalition ...(*against the disturber of equilibrium*)."<sup>36</sup>

Long as the definition may seem, it appears to be among the most universal of all available definitions that provide a clear cut understanding and link all the different uses of this term. It offers a core understanding to the concept, where many of the uses of the term can fall into place logically with a unified line of thought. And as we shall see it is

consistent with the general definitions of the term by the different scholars. Moreover, this definition seems to offer a good explanation of the means by which the European system was functioning during the period under study here.

The definition adopted here includes a variety of assumptions and concepts that, if carefully analyzed and understood, offer a useful analytical framework for understanding the mechanics of the European system and how the Egyptian Question in 1831-1841 affected the policies of the different states. As these assumptions and concepts are elaborated, the essence of the European structure would become more clear and subject to possible study.

First, among the most important assumptions of this definition is the notion of the existence of a system, (in this study it is the European system). Though an abstract territorial delimitation, the concept of the system here advocates the existence of a variety of states, *units*, interacting according to regular observable and identifiable patterns. In this case, the most important pattern with which we are concerned is balance of power and its mechanics. (see p.p. 4) Moreover, these units have a distinct boundary separating them from the rest of the states in world politics. Therefore, the concept of system here includes a *structural element*, the existence of a group of states, *actors* with a *fixed boundary*, i.e., a specific geographical territory. In the case of the European system, this territory extends roughly from Scandinavia in the north to the Mediterranean in the south, and from the Atlantic in the West to Russia in the East.<sup>37</sup>

Though such a concept is abstract in nature, there remains a strong emphasis on the idea that a cohesive element exists among all these states in a given system, separating it from other systems.<sup>38</sup> This idea is that the actors in a certain system are bound by commonly shared values among them, thereby giving the system its own cultural

distinction from the rest of the world. This distinction is easily identified by the idea advocated by many European philosophers who believe in the existence of a European Commonwealth that is based on similar historical, cultural and value basis distinct from the rest of the world. This is what we may call fencing the system through a cultural boundary. Henry Kissinger, for example, believes that there exists a shared value system in the European affairs that helped develop a concept of legitimacy for the European nations, thereby assisting in the restoration of peace and maintaining it in Europe.<sup>39</sup>

Such ideas were postulated by Raymond Aron more systematically when he asserted that relations between actors inside a given system does not depend entirely on military and geographical factors, but that such relations are also determined by ideas, emotions and values shared by members of the system.<sup>40</sup> If such conditions exist, then that system may be described as *homogenous*, in the sense that the actors are of a similar type and obey the same rules and conceptions.<sup>41</sup> The European system that developed after the Westphalia accords could be considered a homogenous system whereby all the states accepted the notion of sovereignty, secularization of relations among the states and a common shared value system (See Chapter II, *The Westphalia System*). A *heterogeneous system* on the other hand, is the opposite of the aforementioned system, whereby states do not share the same codes of action and "are organized according to different principles and appeal to contradictory values."<sup>42</sup>

The distinction between the homogenous and the heterogeneous system is very useful for the study at hand because it allows us to reflect on an immeasurable factor of inter-state relations, thereby guiding us to a better understanding of the system itself. Moreover, it helps us understand the functioning of the system. In our study, this distinction helps us fathom the position and interaction of the Ottoman Empire in the

European system, its presence creating the heterogeneity of the system, in as far as it was concerned. The main reason for this was that the actors in the system did not follow the same rules, conduct or intentions towards it, basically because it was "not an integral part of the transnational cultural ensemble" of Europe at that time.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, it represented an integral element in the power distribution in Europe, as well as in the general equilibrium in Southeastern Europe, and it is upon this element that the focus of this work is concerned. (See Chapter II- 2.3 *The Ottoman European Identity, and 2.4 The Ottoman Empire in the European Balance of Power System*).

Second, the definition assumes the existence of an *objective arrangement*, i.e., a mechanism within the framework of the system, among the units. This is what we consider to be the mechanics of balance of power which will be explained later in this chapter. This arrangement is compatible with all members of the system. They formulate their policies in accordance to it, with the aim of serving to regulate the interstate relations. The question here is whether this arrangement is declared or not? Though the definition does not provide a clear cut answer, but from the European system under study here, balance of power was a logical and rational practice in the European system since the Treaty of Westphalia. Later it became a declared principle in the European political dictionary especially after the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 and the Treaty of Paris in 1814. Whether it was a declared arrangement, or not, the fact remains that there was a common understanding regarding its practice in Europe since 1648, to the extent that many authors believe it to be a natural outcome of a decentralized system of states. This is consistent with the works of many of the Realist scholars that deal with balance of power. David Hume believes it to be "founded on common sense and obvious reasoning",<sup>44</sup> Kenneth Waltz believes it to be viewed by some as "akin to a law".<sup>45</sup> Others view it also as aspiring



to the condition of law.<sup>46</sup> Therefore, it is not necessarily a declared arrangement among the different states, for the threat of one state's excessive accumulation of power is so obvious to all the actors in the system to the extent that they should be bound together to contain this state. That is why the definition claims it to be a *universal tendency or law*, since it is obvious.

Third, in the definition is the concept of *distribution of power* among the states in the system. This assumption on face value could be misleading as it assumes power may be distributed among the units in the system, and since there are sufficient problems with regard to its measurement, it becomes difficult to comprehend or to operate. The assumption here is that there is a relative equity in power distribution among the different states inside the system, in the sense that no one single state could accumulate sufficient power to allow it to overrun the entire system and its actors thereby forcing its hegemony over them.

However, it should not be understood from this that a state in the system will not strive to accumulate power, for this is a natural course of event for any state. Kissinger, for example, believes that by nature, it is impossible to satisfy every actor in the international arena when it is functioning under balance of power systems.<sup>47</sup> But what actually regulates a dissatisfied state from extra power acquisition to the detriment of others, is that there is a minimum satisfaction within the state for the amount of power at its disposal through the peaceful means available to it. However, if the system functions properly, it will keep dissatisfied states below the level at which it would seek to overthrow the entire system. That is to assume, that a state would not risk striving for excessive power accumulation on the detriment of encroaching on other members in the system, if the cost would surpass the benefit or reward of this extra acquisition. In this case, through the objective

arrangement in the system-the mechanics of balance of power- the state would face a coalition against it, thereby rendering the excessive power acquisition too costly in the final account. But as mentioned, this does not necessarily dissuade a state from trying, and there are several instances, when some states in the European system actually tried this and faced with opposition from the other members. Perhaps the example of Tsarist Russia with its policy aiming at conquering Poland and fair portion of the Ottoman territory since Catherine the Great illustrate this point. These aims faced opposition from other members of the system who secured the survival of the Ottoman Empire to the extent that by the reign of Nicholas I, Russia abandoned the policy of dismembering the Ottoman Empire since the costs would have been too high in comparison with the gains, and therefore settled for a policy of active influence in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>48</sup> (See Chapter IV) Moreover, political influence on behalf of one actor with another, is also a means of power acquisition, for in many cases political influence in the court of one state could substitute for territorial acquisition and strategic advantages. Perhaps the best example was the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi in 1833 whereby Russian preponderance was established through political means, rather than military and strategic ones.

Therefore, what is meant by the distribution of power in this case, is the military capabilities of the states involved in the international arena. This distribution by nature is unequal, in the sense that different states have different military capabilities,<sup>49</sup> and creates the problem of power management.

Fourth, the concept of equilibrium is also an important assumption in the balance of power system in international relations. It is vague and misleading and there is no real consensus on the use of this term. Morgenthau for example, uses it in the sense that "...without... (it) one element ( a state or its allies), will gain ascendancy over the others,



encroach upon their interests and rights and ultimately destroy them.”<sup>50</sup> From the work of Martin Wight, we can infer that equilibrium to him could be summarized in the idea that power distribution between the different states is in such a way that no single state should ever become strong enough to dominate the rest;<sup>51</sup> i.e., to say it represents an extension to the idea of distribution of power. In his book, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22, Henry Kissinger shares the same view, yet carries the concept of equilibrium to a much higher level, by not actually separating between this concept and that of balance of power itself, since he uses them interchangeably without distinctions. Edward Gullick, for example, uses the term of equilibrium with regard to both coalition and territory. With regard to territory, he offers the idea of a geographical balance or territorial distribution that would both maintain the level of dissatisfaction of states at a low level and preserve the system’s stability.<sup>52</sup>

From the works of the above authors we can see that equilibrium is closely linked to the concept of power distribution, whereby no state is permitted to pose a threat to the existing structure of the system. Thus the concept of equilibrium here is described as the attempt to arrange and exercise relative control over the factors that affect the power accumulation of one state *vis-à-vis* the other members in the system. This is the vanguard for the stability of the security structure of the entire system. It is the outcome of precise calculations on the military, geographic, territorial, political, structural and demographic factors by the different actors to avoid the preponderance and outburst of a hegemony inside the system. We can confidently assume that equilibrium here is the ultimate aim of a balance of power system, where a states’ excessive power accumulation is controlled by a variety of means through a check and balance system.

The Vienna settlement is perhaps the best illustration and application of the general concept of equilibrium. It offered Europe an overall equilibrium by adopting a system of checks on France through the creation of a variety of independent buffer states to prevent future French adventures, while at the same time it secured a relatively strong central Europe to prevent possible future Russian threats. Simultaneously, it did not allow French power to remain at a level by which it could act as a check to Austrian and Prussian possible attempts of hegemony over certain geographic locations. (See Chapter II)

It should be noted here that the notion of equilibrium is a relative issue varying from one politician to another, according to time, space, the structure of the system and its component units. Therefore, we assume that the concept is the child of the calculation of given politicians, at given interval of time and place.

Fifth, if equilibrium is an integral part of general notion of balance of power, then does this mean that the ultimate aim of balance of power is to set exact military congruency among the different states? Certainly not, for precise equilibrium would result in equal power distribution, and this is unattainable. The notion of equilibrium here refers to the idea that the power of state "A", or its allies, should not be too great in comparison to state "B" in order to avoid possible temptations by the former to expand territorially and encroach upon the latter. This in itself is the concept of "balance." As Morgenthau explains, military equilibrium or "the scales of the balance of power will never be exactly poised nor is the precise point of equality discernible nor necessary to be discerned. It is sufficient... that the deviation not be so great" .<sup>53</sup> Accordingly, the actors in the international arena must keep a vigilant eye on the other states and monitor their power accumulation and see that the gap is not too wide between their own military capabilities and that of the collective members in the system.

A final remark with regard to equilibrium should be noted here. It is the idea that inside a *homogenous* system, equilibrium is preserved with less difficulty than the other systems. Perhaps this is a result of the fact that Raymond Aron believes that such systems are more stable than others.<sup>54</sup> However, we can contend here that this is primarily because the actors in the system obey the same code of conduct *vis-à-vis* the others, thereby limiting, though by far not, eliminating the possibility of war. If this is the case, *a fortiori*, the heterogeneous system is much more vulnerable to defects in equilibrium. Perhaps this could shed some light on the reasons as why equilibrium was barely maintained with regard to the Ottoman Empire, in the European affairs which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Sixth, if the meaning of equilibrium or balance is established, then what does the concept of *disturber of balance* refer to in the definition? Based on previous analysis and explanations, the disturber of the balance could be considered as the dissatisfied state that seeks to increase its power to the detriment of other members in the international system. However, there are other means that could cause a disturbance in the balance or equilibrium. Such actions could range from the conquest of a neighboring state to creating variations in the factors (such as an arms race) that would affect the general equilibrium. The last point could be clarified through the example of the Russian aims to overrun the Ottoman Empire and conquer Istanbul during the beginning of the last century. The success of such a policy was bound to upset the structure of equilibrium of the European system. Such a conquest would not only give Russia control over strategic locations, it also would have created a power vacuum regarding the European territories of the Ottoman Empire. This would have also created a very strong competition among the major European actors to control these territories, and the possibility of war would be

almost certain and eminent. Hence the importance of maintaining the Ottoman Empire became a pillar of equilibrium in Europe. (See Chapter II and V)

Finally, in the definition, the authors believe that in case of the rise of a disturber of power, there is "... the probability that enables one to predict...that affected states would form countervailing alliances. This poses a question of what the authors really mean, i.e., whether balance of power is a law or probability. Upon initial comprehension of the terms used by the authors, there seems to be an inherent contradiction, for if it is a law, then by stronger reason, probability is out of question. My analysis of this is that on the rational level, if a hegemony appears with aims to control the system and threaten the independence of the state/s involved, the natural reaction would be the formation of a coalition to face the hegemony collectively. However, this is not necessarily the case always. Therefore, the authors refer to the rational act, -balancing- to face a hegemonic power, as a law. It is simply a rational long sighted necessity, yet rationality is not a necessary trait for all statesmen. That is why the authors used the term, *tendency* to avoid the absoluteness of the implication of the term law, so as to account for the cases when states do not balance.

Thus far the definition of balance of power was used as a system of international relations, whereby power distribution does not permit any state to overrun the system. As long as this is possible, then the system remains in a state of equilibrium. However, as soon as a state(s) eludes this equilibrium, other states will check this growth immediately so as to restore the equilibrium. This definition gives a general theoretical idea of the nature of the European system of interstate relations during the first part of the previous century, and the next section will discuss the means of establishing a balance of power, that is to say the mechanics of balance of power.

## 1.5 The Mechanics of Balance of Power:

Equilibrium is the calculated essence of the balance in the system, which is followed by the question of how this balance is achieved and how it functions and why. The consensus found in works dealing with the concept of balance of power is that this is achieved through the *balancing process*. The mechanics of the balancing process includes such major factors as *alliances or coalition formation, intervention and proportional aggrandizement or reciprocal compensation*, as well as minor ones such as *rational estimation of other's powers*. It should be noted here that there could be a variety of other means suggested to maintain a balance of power. This work will focus on the major factors that affected the balance structure in the European system and offer a rational interpretation why the expansionist policy of Mohammed Ali threatened the equilibrium in Europe.

### I. Alliances

Alliance may be viewed as a "formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more states."<sup>55</sup> It embodies some commitments between the parties involved to share the costs and benefits of their collective actions. Walt believes that the strongest types of alliances are those based upon a perception of common threats by the parties of the alliance. The Fourth Coalition, established by the Treaty of Chaumont in 1813 against France, is a good example of such alliances.<sup>56</sup> At that time France was viewed as the common threat to Europe, and a decision to unite against it was a security arrangement between the different states involved. (See Chapter II)

There are several other definitions of an alliance that are based on different assumptions and differ in nature and scope. However, for reasons relating to the essence of this work, this analysis will be limited to the military and diplomatic aspects only.

As mentioned earlier, there exist a variety of definitions and usage of the term *alliance or coalition*, but different authors accept that it is the primary means for the mechanics of balance of power to the extent that some believe that "whenever a state forms an alliance with another against a third, a balancing of a kind takes place"<sup>57</sup> Morton Kaplan believes that the first maxim of a balance of power system would be to "oppose any coalition or single actor that seems to assure a position of predominance within the system."<sup>58</sup> Others believe a "prevailing power {threatening to become a hegemony} was sure to meet with a confederacy against it."<sup>59</sup> In simple terms, the states involved in the international system monitor the actions of the different actors, and if any of those actors were to have a predominance that could pose a future threat, they would collate against it immediately to avoid it from overrunning the system.

Closely related to these points is that alliances can take other forms so as to maintain the equilibrium inside a system, not necessarily against the disturber of the balance. On some occasions, states might enter an alliance with a certain state to restrain it from disturbing the equilibrium of the system. This was clearly manifest during two major cases during the period under study, the first was the Metternich's policy *vis-à-vis* Russia where he intentionally tried to restrict Russian ambitions towards the Greek War of Independence, while the other case was the allied attempt to restrain Russia by accepting her in the alliance during the Second Egyptian-Ottoman War (See Chapter IV).



## II Intervention

Forming an alliance or coalition does not necessarily mean that it is sufficient to deter the disturber of equilibrium, even if such an action could include certain aspects of conventional deterrence. Thus intervention becomes an important element in the functioning of the balance of power. By intervention, it is meant that the coalition or alliance would take *active measures* to remedy the disequilibrium present in the system. This could range from diplomatic to coercive measures, depending on the situation and the degree of disequilibrium caused in the system. Diplomatic measures could simply be in the form of objections, threat of alienation through severing relations or even ultimatums. However, if the disequilibrium is too acute and becomes irreversible, then members of the coalition or alliance may have to resort to force so as to reestablish the balance. It is practically impossible to set certain generalizations as to when members of alliances or coalitions would resort to diplomatic or coercive means to reestablish equilibrium. This is more a factor of the system and the priorities perceived by the actors, as well as the willingness of the disturber of balance to show flexibility in negotiations.

There are a variety of examples whereby alliances in a balance of power system resort to diplomatic and coercive measures. The case of the Greek War of Independence provides a good illustration. By 1827, the combined Ottoman-Egyptian fleet was caught in the Bay of Navarino, trapped and surrounded by the allied fleet. At this stage, the crisis could have been resolved peacefully, and there was no need to resort to coercive measures on part of the allies. However, the fear of the excessive Ottoman-Egyptian naval power was not what the allies wanted in the future, especially Russia and Britain and may explain the reasons for the Battle of Navarino (See Chapter IV).

### III. Reciprocal Compensations

Proportional aggrandizement or Reciprocal compensation is a common term in the mechanics of the balance of power systems. Edward Gullick explains that this concept was used by different authors under different names. He contends that similarly, scholars used the concept under the title of *proportional mutual aggrandizement, or reciprocal reduction*.<sup>60</sup> This term refers to the idea that if any state expands by one means or another, the rest of the units in the system also have the right to expand proportionally. Thus if the states in a system accept the transfer of a certain territory to another state, they are entitled to equal compensation to maintain equilibrium in the system. Certainly this is done under the prerequisite that the entire structure of the system would not be undermined.<sup>61</sup> Along similar lines, it could also be a state of *reciprocal non-compensation*, i.e., that states do not benefit at all from their actions. In this case, the basic spirit of the equation is maintained, for in some occasion, states would prefer to apply this formula to avoid affecting the equilibrium in the system. This was the formula functioning among the powers *vis-à-vis* the Greek War of Independence and the Second Egyptian-Ottoman war.

Whether such a practice is ethical or moral is irrelevant, for this is a practice that was adhered to by nearly all the great powers in the European system since 1648. The articles of the Treaty of Utrecht marking the end of the War of the Spanish Succession is a clear example of proportional compensation. Louis XIV of France, remained adamant that a Bourbon monarch occupy the Spanish throne, despite the coalition against him from members in the system. This insistence produced an eleven-year futile war that forced the members of the coalition to seek new means for ending hostilities. Thus the basis for peace was to compensate each of the powers involved so as to maintain equilibrium in Europe.



The French Bourbons did not gain the Spanish throne free; England received territorial compensation in Southern Iberia, primarily Gibraltar, giving its fleet the necessary strategic location to control possible future joint French - Spanish schemes against the equilibrium in Europe. Austria was also compensated territorially in Northern Italy and in Netherlands, and Prussia received similar gains. The Vienna settlement in 1815 was also an example of this mechanics, whereby Russia and Prussia's aggrandizement plans were matched with equal compensations to Britain and Austria. (See Chapter II)

This concept is a cornerstone of the mechanics of balance of power, especially with regards to the scope of this study. It was this precise concept within the structure of the European balance of power system that sustained the Ottoman Empire. Regarding the dismemberment of certain parts of the Empire, the remaining powers ensured that no state would have an influence or military presence in this region. This was the case with Greece. However, when the overall dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was suggested by Russian actions, the members of the system refused the proposition because of the problems related to the operational aspect of this concept. That is to say, who gets which territory, when and why, in addition to the problem of how to achieve proportionality among the different benefactors of the Ottoman heritage. That is why the term hereafter will be used to mean *territorial proportionality or territorial equilibrium*. (For further details, See Chapter II and Chapter V.

## 1.7 Conclusion

The previous pages examined the definitions of the term balance of power within the context of the Realist paradigm, which is believed to be the most suitable context for the study of the European system in the nineteenth century. The general idea

of balance of power as a system of international relations could be summarized along the following lines. In an international system consisting of different states, power by nature is distributed unevenly, and each state is attempting to maximize its power *vis-à-vis* the others, thereby creating patterns of opposition. Second, any state that succeeds in accumulating high levels of power and threatens to dominate the entire system will be faced with the collective power of an alliance of other states to check its power and thwart its aims. Third, equilibrium is the foundation upon which the actors in the system form their power calculations and foreign policy. Even if there is no coercive measures in the international arena, states will seek to check the power accumulation of a hegemonic state by diplomatic means, through coalitions and allies. Fourth, balance of power is not a natural born dynamic, but a voluntary choice of statesmen to safeguard their state's independence and security.

Finally, the question of how the balance of power system comes into being, that is whether it is a natural practice or a shared principle among the different statesmen in an international system remains a controversial issue in the literature of international relations. This is known as the Voluntarism vs. Determinism problem.<sup>62</sup> Authors like Kenneth Waltz believe it to be the product of nature. He claims that balance of power "is not so much imposed by the statesman on events as it is imposed by events on statesman."<sup>63</sup> Accordingly, it is believed that the choices are limited by the circumstances surrounding him. Kissinger represents the other end of the spectrum by laying the emphasis on the shrewdness of the statesman. Both his works, A World Restored and Diplomacy advocate that statesmen are the adopters of the mechanics of balance of power, or as he prefers to call it sometimes, equilibrium. Hume, Gullick and Morgenthau are also supporters of this proposition.

One may contend that balance of power is a result of the efforts by the different statesmen. The primary reason for adopting this position is that although balance of power or *equilibrant* policies are, in certain circumstances the most rational policy available for states, rationality is not a necessary trait in every statesman. Though a rational choice is more likely to impose itself on the statesman, a statesman might perceive maximum benefits to from following a policy of bandwagoning instead of balancing or remaining neutral. Therefore, if there is an alternative to balance of power, it would be too dangerous a generalization to claim that events force statesmen to adopt balance of power strategies, for there are other alternative that could be adopted.

In his study, Stephen Walt concluded that states prefer balancing to bandwagoning.<sup>64</sup> He did not lay a deterministic generalization, believing that states have a choice. Moreover, there are several instances when states prefer no policy rather than to accept a balance. Perhaps the clearest example is that of Prussia preferring to mediate with Napoleon than coming to the aid of Austria and Russia, the result of which was the defeat of the latter by the former at Austerlitz. As Kissinger noted, "in vain did Metternich preach his lesson of equilibrium (to Prussia)." <sup>65</sup> The examples of the Treaty of Tilsit between Russia and France in 1807 and the Nazi-Russo pact of 1942, are clear example of Russian bandwagoning in face of a hegemonic power. Therefore, we can that balancing in the face of a hegemonic power is the most likely policy to be adopted by states under threat.

Many believe balance of power to be an obsolete concept, and that it has failed in its aim to preserve peace and security in the international system whenever it was applied, therefore, unworthy of consideration as a system of international relations. The Wilsonians (as they have come to be known) champion this cause, as well as modern scholars such as Haas, Organski and others. A.F.K Organski refuses the correlation between peace and

balance of power, believing that it lead to war in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, and that the historic periods dominated by balance of power are periods of wars; in other words, balance of power fosters what its advocates claim it avoids. <sup>66</sup>

This criticism is not new. However, there are several points that must be mentioned. First such criticism fails to understand a basic fact that balance of power does not aim to eliminate war. It merely aims at stability of the international system and the independence of its actors. "It is the purpose of equilibrium to maintain the stability of the system without destroying the multiplicity of elements composing it."<sup>67</sup> Kissinger's reply to this criticism is powerful. He contends that "the balance of power system did not purport to avoid crises or even wars. When working properly, it was meant to limit both the ability of states to dominate others and the scope of conflicts."<sup>68</sup> In other words the aim of balance of power was not utopian peace, but the stability of the system through preserving its actors. By definition, war is a human phenomena without antidote, at best its destructive capabilities would be diluted. Balance of power has achieved this in the European concert from 1815-1914, where it helped limit the spread of wars. It was the failure of the balance of power that triggered the First World War; and in an anarchic international system, nothing is infallible. Moreover, no other means of power management in the international arena was capable of depriving any single hegemonic power from overriding the entire system than balance of power.

This chapter established a general and theoretical framework for the analysis of the European system. The following chapter will discuss the application of this theoretical framework, and how the European system function on this basis. The embodiment of the concept of balance of power shall be clearly understood and its mechanics further clarified upon the lines mentioned throughout this chapter.

## Chapter II

### The European Balance of Power System

#### 2.1 Origins of the European Balance of Power System: The Westphalia System

It had been a common belief, until the fall of the Soviet Union, that an international system or order can be changed only as a result of a major war. The European system was not different. Europe today is a product of interwoven historical, political, military, cultural and economic factors that time transformed into a system of interstate relations.<sup>1</sup> The Vienna System came into effect since 1815. It has been argued that the Vienna System is the revival of what has been called the Westphalia System, after the Treaty by the same name in 1648.

The Treaty of Westphalia marked the end of the Thirty Years War and with it the Habsburg bid for domination of Europe. Its articles were undoubtedly among the most important elements in reshaping both the political values and the modern European system. Paul Kennedy argues that both - the Treaty of Westphalia, and the Pyrenees in 1648 and 1659- between France and the Spanish Habsburgs sealed the fate of possible Habsburg hegemony over Europe.<sup>2</sup> This opened the way for the rebirth of Europe and the introduction of a new system of interstate relations.

The political impact of the peace at Westphalia<sup>3</sup> on the European pattern of interstate relations, could be summed up as follows: First, the terms of the treaty laid

down the basis for the establishment of the system's units. Thus Switzerland and the United Provinces were granted formal recognition in the form of independence from the Holy Roman Empire. The seeds of Prussia were laid in the independence of Brandenburg with designation of the Hohenzollern Dynasty as legitimate sovereigns. The German principalities were granted semi-independence *vis-à-vis* the Habsburg Emperor. The "... power of the (Habsburg) Emperor was further weakened as to make his position little more than nominal: By receiving ... the unfettered control of their foreign policy the member princes of the Empire became sovereigns".<sup>4</sup> This marks the beginning of the growth of the independent units of the system as a result of their new-born sovereignty (See pp. 4).

Second, the homogeneity of the system was reestablished, partially through the principles of sovereignty of the units. (See p.p. 13-14) Papal involvement in interstate relations diminished gradually, and the Pope was left with the fact that religion in Europe was not the force it used to be. Now the states "began to have the same conception of international politics, at least with respect to the rules of the game".<sup>5</sup> They developed common moral and political codes, i.e., the balance of power, the preservation of the defeated actors as well as a shared value system. A common understanding of legitimacy developed among the different actors in the system. The development of what we may call the *secularization of interstate relations*. Westphalia marks the division between religious wars and national wars.<sup>6-7</sup> Now relations in Europe were conducted on the basis of sovereignty and power, not religion. This factor led to the problem of power management in the European system (See pp., 7-10)



Third, the combination of all previous factors, especially the last, played the major role in the formulation of a distinct interstate relationship among these different sovereigns, that became an accepted part of their political culture. Thus the balance of power began to operate in the European system as the only means for *power management*. This marked the beginning of the appearance of a regular pattern of interstate relationships in Europe. Why did this occur ? The answer to this question is explained cogently by Kissinger when he asserts that :

*Europe was thrown into the balance of power politics {not voluntarily} when its first choice, the medieval dream of universal empire, collapsed and a host of states of more or less equal strength arose from the ashes of that ancient aspiration. When a group of states... are obliged to deal with one another, there are only two possible outcomes: either one state dominates all the others and creates an empire or no state is ever quite powerful enough to achieve that goal. In the latter case the pretensions of the most aggressive member of the international community are kept in check by a combination of others; in other words, by the operation of the balance of power mechanics.<sup>8</sup>*

This marked the characteristic of the system. (See pp. 14-15)

Fourth, the boundaries of this new European system did not differ much from its predecessor. This system extended from Italy in the South, to Scandinavia in the north, and from St. Petersburg in the east to Lisbon in the west. Thus, there were eight major powers in Europe towards the middle of the eighteenth century. These powers were- England, France, Prussia, Russia, the Habsburg Empire in central Europe, later known as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Sweden, Spain and the Ottoman Empire.<sup>9</sup> Thus in part, the geo-political divisions of the system were established. (See Chapter I, pp. 13) With regard to the Ottoman empire, it became an active member as a result of its position in the Balkans and Eastern Europe.<sup>10</sup> However, though its presence in the power distribution and equilibrium in Europe was certain, yet "it was not an integral part

in the transitional cultural ensemble" of Europe.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, it is contended that the Ottoman Empire's entrance into the new systems, made it a heterogeneous one, whereby the same code of conduct among the states was not applicable to it. That is perhaps why Russian ambitions to eliminate it as an actor in the system was not an act of political apostasy to the others, though they strove to prevent that for political reasons (See pp. 62-67)

Throughout the mid seventeenth century and nearly the whole of the eighteenth century, interstate relations functioned on the basis of balance of power. Most of the wars that the concert of Europe witnessed was characterized by this mechanism. Equilibrium in practice meant that France and Spain could not unite, and the former's appetite for land acquisition in Europe was to be checked continuously. The Holy Roman Empire could not aggrandize, and Russia was not to be allowed full control of Eastern Europe.<sup>12</sup> Britain with all its trade interest in the continent and its rising naval power surpassing that of Spain, began to play the role of the balancer of European power. As a non-continental power, British objectives "reflected the policy of an island power to which the continent, if united under a single rule, represented a mortal threat ..."<sup>13</sup> Thus it became the role of British foreign policy to ally itself with the weaker state to face the preponderant one, a policy it did not relinquish for nearly three centuries.

The interstate relations in the hundred and forty one years preceding the French Revolution functioned along this basis. An illustration of this mechanics of balance of power (See p.p. 20-29) can be viewed in the context of some of the major conflicts of the period. The expansionist aims of Louis XIV, the Sun King, were carefully thwarted by an alliance of several European states to avoid unbalance in the system. This was



clearly manifest during the war he launched to acquire the Spanish Netherlands, where his aggrandizement scheme was thwarted by an alliance of Britain, Holland and Sweden in 1665; and when he conquered Holland, he was confronted with the League of Augsburg formed by Spain, Austria, Sweden, Britain and some Germanic principalities in 1686.<sup>14</sup> The Wars of the Spanish Succession were also handled by the mechanics of balance of power. "{This war}... reflected the dilemma of the French hegemony and continental equilibrium in Europe".<sup>15</sup> The Treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt, 1713 and 1714, marked the termination of this war, along a classical equilibrium of strategic, political and military calculations. Accordingly, the French candidate, Philippe Anjou was declared monarch, however, France and Spain were not to be united.<sup>16</sup> Britain and Austria were reciprocally compensated, whereby they received territories to keep them satisfied. Thus other states formed alliances, intervening and later reciprocally compensating themselves, along the mechanics of balance of power

Another feature of the system in Europe was the shifting of alliances, or what Kennedy refers to as "volatility of alliance relationship", as a result of balance of power mechanics. Britain generally aligned itself with the weaker sides, yet this was not a rule. The decade-long animosity with France which ended by 1715, marked the beginning of alliance between France and Britain that lasted for over two decades. However, when French preponderance rose, decades after the Treaty of Utrecht, Britain aligned itself with the Habsburgs. During the Austro-Prussian War (1740-1741) France sided with Prussia to check Austria, causing Britain to side with Austria. When France shifted alliances a decade and a half later during the Seven Years War or *The Second Austro-Prussian war*, alliances reshuffled. Now it was Britain and Prussia against Russia,

Austria and France. Again, balance of power patterns were observable during these two crises in Europe. It should be noted that some states opted for neutrality like Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden at certain historical intervals.<sup>17</sup>

As illustrated by these examples, a distinct homogenous system can be traced in Europe since 1648. It was initiated by the Treaty of Westphalia, and to a lesser extent, the Treaty of the Pyrenees, whose articles helped reshape the balance of power system along the lines mentioned earlier. Relations among the members of the system were formulated along the mechanics of balance of power that functioned undisturbed until the rise of France as the sole power on the continent in the early years of the nineteenth century.

## **2.2 Imbalance and Restoration of the System 1789-1815:**

Political and philosophical developments in France in 1789 transformed the system entirely. This showed that internal problems and events in one state can have a profound effect on the system to which it belongs. The revolution, along with its slogans of liberty, equality and fraternity, and the new political institutions it included, as well as other newly injected practices as the *levee en masse* represented a threat to all members of the European system. Other states viewed these developments as political apostasy that was intolerable and must be fought. European monarchs viewed the revolution as possible threat to their own existence. Simple revolutions, or *coups d'état* were much more tolerable than ideological ones, for the latter could transform the system as a whole.

The result of these new concepts and developments affected the structure of the system as a whole, transforming it from a homogenous system to a heterogeneous one. Common moral, political and value codes changed. Exacerbating matters was that the new French system attempted to change political values shared by the members of the system. The degree of transformation in the system could be even felt when Napoleon tried to spread his Napoleonic Code, which was totally unacceptable to the other states. In other words, the European System found itself in a struggle between Liberalism and Conservatism.

The transformation of the system was not only a factor of the cultural and value schism, but such an event like the French Revolution altered the system's power distribution and equilibrium as well. Each of the actors had its distinct reason for the fear of the events taking place in France. For Britain, the reasons for fear were different. Some writers and philosophers, such as Edmund Burke, attacked the revolution on philosophical and practical grounds. However, the real fears rested in the fact that this revolution was a challenge to Britain on the continent, upsetting the equilibrium by undermining the political institutions of the system. This in itself, marked a potential danger to its trade and strategic interests, especially given the revival of French expansionist policies. Austria and Prussia, main continental forces, were anxious for similar reasons. Vienna feared particularly for the position of the French monarchy, especially since the French queen was a Habsburg, and that it formed the least homogenous political structure in Europe. Hence any spread of nationalistic ideas could easily foment problems in its domains.

Such fears, enhanced by the anxiety and tension present in the European system, led naturally to the establishment of the mechanics of balance of power on a small scale. The limited nature of the system was a factor of the lack of mobilization and expansion on the part of France. By August 1791, Prussia and Austria exacerbated tensions by their decision to join forces against the revolution in France. This was expressed through the Pilnitz Declaration in which they emphasized that the position of the French king and events in France are a matter of concern to all Europe.<sup>18</sup> In addition, they mobilized an army and penetrated French territory. In April 1792, the French Revolutionary National Assembly declared war. Events moved towards serious confrontation when France invaded Belgium and Mainz, declaring war on Great Britain, Holland and Spain in February 1793.<sup>19</sup>

So began the formal declaration of hostilities in Europe and the beginning of the rise of a disturber of balance in Europe. Interstate relations in the European system for the next two decades were marked by a series of coalitions against French ambitions in the continent. (See Chapter I, p.p. 21-2 and 25-6.). The major aim of these coalitions was to restore the European equilibrium threatened by French preponderance and conquests of minor states. Though each state had its own ambitions, they were cemented together by their common opposition to France.

The origins of the First Coalition can be traced to the Pilnitz Declaration. However, it was not until four years after the failure of the first invasion that it took serious action against the French. This is understandable given that in addition to the strength of France, Austria, Prussia and Russia were engaged in the third and final partition of Poland in 1793.<sup>20</sup> The Treaty of Campo Formio in 1796 ended this alliance

when Austria concluded a separate peace with France. Reciprocal compensation terminated the coalition. Though it would be rather uncharacteristic that a state, existing in a system of balance of power, would abandon a coalition for gains. However, if the principle of reciprocal aggrandizement is applied, the move is logical. Campo Formio, is the application of this principle (See p.p. 24). The French and the Austrians maintained equilibrium through the accord in which both secured nearly equal gains.

French steps in 1798 to seize Piedmont and Egypt caused further disturbance in the power distribution across Europe. Not only was France accumulating power by its new conquests, but also threatened India, one of Britain's main sources of power. Moreover, by 1799, the Syrian campaign threatened Ottoman existence and posed a serious threat to equilibrium. These developments resulted in the establishment of the Second Coalition.

The British and Russian rapprochement formed the core of this coalition and soon Austria joined. Russian armies, under the command of the able General Suvorov, were initially successful. However, the French military machinery proved too powerful for Russia. Austria suffered a similar defeat at the Battle of Marengo in 1800, and was forced to withdraw from the coalition in accordance with the Treaty of Luneville. Napoleon's offer of Malta to Tsar Paul I withdrew Russia from the coalition. Britain was left alone to fight a war against a very powerful foe. The French were successful as a result of their careful application of the principle of reciprocal compensation, whereby every state in the coalition secured some gains. The Treaty of Amiens in 1802 marked the restoration of temporary peace.

Had France ceased power accumulation and territorial ambitions at that time, the situation would not have changed dramatically. Instead, Napoleon shattered the equilibrium by 1802 when he annexed Piedmont to France, reoccupied Switzerland. In addition, the earlier French unification of the Germanic states into a confederation of thirty states created a surrogate for France. Such actions were viewed across Europe with suspicion and distrust. Britain viewed the French and Russian rapprochement with alarm, especially when word came that the Russians planned to send an army to India from the North, while the French were preparing an invasion by sea.<sup>21</sup> This was clearly a destabilizing factor in the European system for now France was in control of a great portion of the continent with these conquests and it was bound to face a third coalition.

The two years that followed marked a serious attempt to confine France to its territories through a series of diplomatic and military maneuvers. Britain viewed an alliance with Russia as essential. This would be impossible as long as Tsar Paul I held the throne, and the British ambassador to Moscow played a major role in the conspiracy to oust the Tsar for his son Alexander I.<sup>22</sup> Alexander established contacts with William Pitt in 1805, due in part to Napoleon's policy towards the Ottoman Empire (a detailed section in this chapter will be devoted to the position of the Ottoman Empire in the European balance of power system). Earlier, a defense agreement was concluded between Russia and Austria and Britain was left with the job of bringing Prussia into the coalition. The Battle of Trafalgar cost Napoleon control of the seas and brought these countries together.

The stage was set for the establishment of the Third Coalition. This coalition of Austria, Russia and Britain met with the same fate as its predecessors. The Battles of



Ulm in October 1805 and Austerlitz allowed Napoleon to humiliate the Austrians in the former and joint Austrian-Russian army in the latter. The Peace of Pressburg in December 1805 between France and Austria marked the end of the coalition and cost Vienna dearly: Austria surrendered territories in Germany and Italy as well as accepting a ceiling on the size of its armies.

Prussia was defeated at the Battles of Auestadt and Jenna, whereby Berlin was occupied. These overwhelming defeats brought Prussia on its knees. Although it took Napoleon two more years to alienate it from Britain, in 1807 the Russian army was defeated in Friedland and Alexander was forced to accept the Treaty of Tilsit. This treaty was a very controversial arrangement, for unlike the humbling treaties with Austria and Prussia, Tilsit divided Europe between Russia and France.<sup>23</sup> It clearly violated all the requirements for proportional aggrandizement, Austria, Prussia and Britain were not included, and it was bound to collapse.

At this point, France had shattered the equilibrium by its domination of Europe. France's dominions extended from the Atlantic to the Vistula in the East, and from the Baltic to the Mediterranean.<sup>24</sup> "His [Napoleon's] relatives and marshals occupied the thrones of kingdoms in Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Spain;... the Swiss cantons ...and a Grand Dutchy of Warsaw. Almost everywhere throughout these territories ran the writ of the Civil Code, embodying the Napoleon version of the social and political message of the French revolution".<sup>25</sup> Britain remained the sole official enemy and no single state had the power to curb French aggression. France, enjoying Europe's largest population at 28 million, possessed a military machinery of approximately 600,000 men, not counting reserves.<sup>26</sup> In addition, Napoleon's strategic and tactical innovations won

France one victory after another. Napoleon introduced the Continental System to damage England's economy, by blocking its trade in the continent. This system managed to harm the trade among the Europeans as well and was a source of continuous trouble for France. This step was the final blow to the European equilibrium. In essence, France had control of all the factors affecting the power distribution in the system.

French calculations failed when Napoleon began his Russian campaign. The catastrophic French withdrawal laid the seeds of the Fourth Coalition. In February 1813, the Fourth Coalition against France began with the Russian-Prussian alliance. Britain joined the coalition by June the same year with the Treaty of Reichenbach. Sweden, whose trade was seriously affected by the Continental System, was eager to uproot the French from the Baltic. Spain was not different. It rebelled against the reign of a Napoleon-imposed monarch in a costly campaign of civil strife.

In Austria, all of Metternich's skills were required to maintain Vienna's delicate foreign policy. On the one hand, Metternich worked to secure his country from French wrath in case he would join the coalition, while at the same time he made sure that Austria's place in the coalition remained safe. Therefore he conducted a policy of mediation between Napoleon on the one hand and Castlereagh and Alexander on the other, while pledging his country's full support to the coalition when the time was ripe for Austria to declare war.<sup>27</sup> In fact, Metternich was not convinced that European equilibrium could be achieved through a total emasculation of the French. On the contrary, he feared such a move could strengthen the Russians, a more dangerous situation, given its grand designs towards the Ottoman Empire and Eastern Europe. The dilemma was that France was the strongest counterweight to Russia, yet it was too



preponderant to be entrusted with the task.<sup>28</sup> This explains the decisions of the allies at the first Treaty of Paris and Vienna Congress, as to why France was not emasculated and alienated from the European System.

The Treaty of Chaumont marked the formal birth of the final coalition to quell French hegemony and restore equilibrium. This was to be achieved through the following steps: first, the coalition members would confront future French aggression, second, the coalition would reestablish territorial and strategic equilibrium in Europe (See Chapter I, pp., 22) through the expulsion of French forces in the adjacent territories. Holland, Spain, Portugal would be independent and an independent Germany, composed of various small states, would be created.<sup>29</sup> Third, to achieve all these aims, the allies prepared for war. All members of the coalition were obliged to offer a certain number of forces to counter France. The only exception was Britain, which presented its share in the form of financial subsidies. Thus the allies decided on intervention to restore the equilibrium (See p.p. 23) but also agreed upon diplomatic maneuvers with Napoleon in case it was possible to avoid war.

The Treaty of Chaumont marked for the first time when principles of balance of power were written down precisely in an international treaty.<sup>30</sup> Following Napoleon's refusal to accept any settlement that would return France to its 1789 borders, the stage was set for a war to liberate Europe and the restore of the system's equilibrium. Castlereagh, the British Foreign Minister, wrote in a dispatch home that this treaty should be regarded, "not only as a systemic pledge of preserving concert among the leading powers but a refuge under which all the minor states, especially those on the Rhine, may look forward to find their security upon the return of peace, relieved of the

necessity of seeking a compromise with France".<sup>31</sup> He was correct in his assumption, for this treaty was the first step in achieving equilibrium in Europe.

The Battles of Lutzen and Bautzen between the French and the combined forces of the coalition, marked the enforcement of the mechanic of balance of power, i.e., intervention. Though the French won the encounters, they were pyrrhic victories. The French troops were weakened and their stamina fading, forcing Napoleon to accept an armistice to discuss a peaceful settlement. Metternich acted as mediator but was ready at any moment to join the allied camp formally. This effort was followed by the unsuccessful Congress of Prague. Sensing that Napoleon would not accept a peaceful settlement, Austria declared war on France in August 1823. This resulted in what is referred to as the *war of nations*, and France was defeated at the Battle of Leipzig. The British, in cooperation with the Spanish resistance, closed the other end of the pincer by liberating Spain. It was only a matter of time before the French surrender and the allies occupied Paris. This occurred in March 1814 and Napoleon abdicated.

Alexander I, Castlereagh and Metternich realized the importance of France in the system while on the other hand the minor powers of Prussia, Holland and the Germanic states wanted to eliminate the French threat through a wartime indemnity, a drastic change in government and the stationing of an allied army in France. After some discussion, the opinions of Alexander I, Castlereagh and Metternich prevailed.

The Treaty of Paris, following the patterns of Chaumont, signed by the allies and France represents a classical example of political wisdom and creativity for the restoration of the equilibrium of Europe. A secret article of the treaty actually embodied the aim of the whole treaty when it stated that the settlement was to "result {in} a system

of real and durable equilibrium in Europe"; also Article III stipulated that the principle of Balance of Power was to govern relations in Europe.<sup>32</sup> France kept its 1792 boundaries, suffered no reparations, and its former colonies were returned. This represents another manifestation of balance of power principles in that France was to be left with no reasons to complain and attempt to overthrow the system in the future (See p.p. 16).

For equilibrium to be just, France had to maintain relative strength, while the surrounding states were strengthened. Thus Holland gained both Belgium and the Habsburg Netherlands. The German states were linked in a federation, Austria received territories in Italy while other areas of Italy gained their independence.

Nearly a decade earlier, William Pitt said, "Supposing the efforts of the allies to have been completely successful... H.M. would nevertheless consider this salutary work as still imperfect, if the restoration of peace were not accompanied by the most effectual measures for giving solidarity and permanence to the system...".<sup>33</sup> It remained the aim of the Congress of Vienna to achieve these effectual measures for the system's maintenance under the principle of balance of power. The Congress opened in Vienna and included representatives from most of the powers of Europe. Strange as it may appear, the Congress never had a plenary session, instead Vienna was in a state of non ending ceremonies, while at the same time, the big four, Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia assumed command.<sup>34</sup> France joined later, however, and it was among these four members that negotiations took place. Castlereagh and Metternich aimed to enforce the Treaty of Paris, in order to pacify France, as well as to establish a durable equilibrium in Central Europe. Problems regarding the first issue were resolved without serious

difficulty, leaving the problem of Poland to overshadow the Congress. Prussia wanted full control over Saxony, while Alexander I claimed the remainder of Poland.

The problems of Poland and Saxony posed a genuine threat to the restoration of equilibrium. Castlereagh viewed Poland in the hands of Russia as a "Russian appendage extending deep into central Europe {that} would constitute a constant source of disquiet".<sup>35</sup> Metternich believed that if Poland fell to Russia and Saxony to Prussia, the whole equilibrium in East and Central Europe would be threatened. These two issues created a serious problem for the Congress, and, although eventually resolved, Britain, France and Austria signed a secret protocol on January 1815 to form a military alliance against Russia to force a solution to the Polish question. By the time of its conclusion in June 1815, The Congress of Vienna created a lasting equilibrium among the different actors in the European concert. The general idea could be summed as returning Europe to the *status quo ante bellum*,<sup>36</sup> primarily through the mechanics of balance of power.

The restoration of the system was achieved as follows: First, European states were organized into a balance of power system where no state had sufficient power to overrun the entire system as was the case with Napoleon. It reaffirmed the return of France to the 1792 borders, hence reducing possible future fears of French expansion. Furthermore, the territorial balance achieved by the First Treaty of Paris was crucial to the overall settlement, therefore it was reassured in Vienna. Holland was strengthened to act as a buffer, while Germanic states were united into a confederacy so as to limit the possibilities of great power intervention. Piedmont and Sardinia were united and strengthened by the annexation of Genoa. Austria acquired several kingdoms in Italy, and was "placed in a strategic position to defend ... the entire peninsula".<sup>37</sup>

These arrangements were believed to have reestablished security in the European concert, by surrounding France with strong and stable neighbors.

However, France was not the only power that worried the allies. Russia was also a power to be monitored. Prussia was another power that played a major role in defining the security of central and eastern Europe. The two powers, Russia and Prussia were interwoven at a strategic point, Poland. Both shared parts of Poland, and their mutual power balanced each other to some extent. Austria, through the retention of Galicia, could act as a balance when necessary with the one of the two against the other.

The Germanic states were interwoven into a confederation that would hopefully act as a buffer against any power which tried to expand. At the same time, their limited powers denied them an offensive capability. As stated in the treaty, the role of the confederation linking these states was " maintenance of the internal and external safety of Germany ...". Holland, like Germany, was too weak to foster problems but could play a role in maintaining equilibrium.

Second, closely related to the first point, the treaty managed to reach proportional aggrandizement or reciprocal compensation for all of the major powers that accounted for the defeat of France. Of primary interest, Russia achieved parts of its aims in Poland. At the same time, Austria retained Galicia and the district of Tarnopol, while Prussia retained the district of Posen and the city of Thorn (allowing it control of the upper Vistula). The remainder of the Duchy of Poland became the Kingdom of Poland under the supervision of Russia.<sup>38</sup> As for Prussia, the settlement of the question of Saxony, was resolved along similar lines. Prussia retained nearly 20 percent but was

rewarded with territories in the Rhineland. Britain on the other hand received several strategic location, among which was Malta, Ionian Islands and Hanover in north Germany. These are clear manifestation of proportional aggrandizement achieved by the Congress of Vienna. (See Chapter I, p.p. 24)

Third, a new mechanism of consultation among the powers in the system was introduced. The Congress System was introduced based on the principles stated by the Treaty of Chaumont for the continuation of the alliance even after the French crisis. Now the major powers were to consult regularly with each other. This system proved useful in conducting European affairs for years to come.

This was the restored system of inter-European relations established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. "This unique state of affairs occurred partly because equilibrium was designed so well that it could only be overthrown by an effort of a magnitude too difficult to mount." <sup>39</sup> As Kissinger states, it was a system based on balance of power, yet required the least power to maintain. This may be understood within two main contexts, the first of which is the fact that there was a shared sense of legitimacy and value among all the states involved and this restricted the use of force, i.e. homogeneity. Second, the mechanics of balance of power functioned properly and were understood by the different actors in the system.

This system limited attempts at territorial aggrandizement by countering, usually at diplomatic levels, any aggressor with a coalition of states. In addition, the system witnessed numerous alliances, or rather axis formations during the Greek War of Independence, the Belgian Crisis and the Egyptian Question. (See Chapters IV and V)



### 2.3 The Development of the System after the Vienna Congress:

The Congress of Vienna settled the outstanding matters of European security, maintained a firm grasp on French aspirations and, last but not least, gave birth to the idea of maintaining peace through collective consultations and actions of the Great Powers. But its most outstanding achievement was the restoration of homogeneity to the system. Using principles derived from the Treaty of Chaumont, Britain, The Habsburg Empire (Austria), Russia and Prussia coordinated their foreign policies in what came to be called the Congresses. The purpose of these meetings were to establish a system of consultation among them for security purposes.

However, the emotional instability of the Russian Tsar Alexander I affected the process of the system by his suggestion of the *Holy Alliance*, in which members were to abide by Christian ethics and values in the conduct of their relations. In reality, this was a means of fostering the conservative values inside the system, and thereby would guarantee its homogeneity. Soon an agreement to this affect was signed by all Europe, with the exception of Britain and the Ottoman Empire. Castlereagh viewed the initiative as "mystical nonsense",<sup>40</sup> while the Ottoman Empire, being a Muslim state, could not accept a Christian-based document. At the same time both Castlereagh and Metternich viewed the Tsar with suspicion and considered this mystical liberal phase a stratagem to spread Russian influence over the continent.

The agreement created a dilemma for both Britain and Austria. Although Britain hoped to avoid costly entanglements in Europe, it was too dangerous to permit

the continental powers to unify. Austria feared that a conservative rapprochement with Russia would alienate Britain, while at the same time, proximity to Britain could strengthen the feared liberal cause. Thus Metternich concluded that he could use the congresses to achieve two of his aims of maintaining Britain and Russia as allies through the Congresses, while at the same time forcing the Tsar to accept a mechanism for consultation. Thus the conservative Metternich became the prime advocate of the Congress System.<sup>41</sup>

The congresses may be characterized as a drift towards *collective security in contrast to balance of power* (See p.p. 5-7). However, this was not the case and the gatherings were more a mechanism of consultation. The European powers neither had the institutions nor the will to implement the fundamental aims and mechanics of this power management mechanism. Their interests were not uniform and there existed a sense of suspicion amongst the powers. The mechanisms of balance of power functioned as before. Alliances and counteralliances, intervention, and reciprocal compensation continued. However, the consultation mechanism diluted crises in the system.

The first Congress took place at Aix La Chapelle. The meeting became a forum for several issues, the most important of which was the reinstatement of France into the Quadruple Alliance, transforming it into the Quintuple Alliance. This was achieved partly because France was able to pay the war indemnity much before the five years period that was enforced on it by the Second Treaty of Paris. In addition the role of Talleyrand the French Foreign Minister was crucial in incorporating his country back to the European System. Allied forces subsequently left France after they invaded it after



the Battle of Waterloo. Russian attempts to spread its influence on the continent was blocked by the major powers. An attempt to create a permanent allied army on the continent was vetoed by Britain whose refusal ended the threat of Russian military presence on West European soil as well as the suggestion of a combined Mediterranean fleet to combat piracy.

Between the Congress of Aix la Chapelle and the Congress of Trappeau in 1820, revolutionary ideas spread in Spain, Italy and Poland. The Congress of Trappeau met to discuss this threat, with Britain and France attending as observers. At this Congress, the Quintuple Alliance was transformed into a conservative police force to quell revolutions and maintain the status quo in Europe. Britain immediately rejected the idea that other powers could intervene automatically into the affairs of other states to quell revolutions. As Castlereagh noted in a private letter, "When the territorial balance of Europe is disturbed, She (Britain) can interfere with effect, but she is the last government in Europe which can be expected to or can venture to commit herself on any question of an abstract character.... We shall be in our place when actual danger menaces the system of Europe".<sup>42</sup> This, therefore, was the beginning of the end of the Congress System. Because the values and perceptions of threats to the system varied from one state to another, consensus became impossible.

The British rejection towards such interventionist policy did not prevent Metternich and the Tsar from pursuing it. The Congress of Verona in 1821 was designed to support the conservative tide further. Revolutions were quelled by Austria in Naples and Piedmont with Russian armies standing in reserve. France intervened in the Spanish liberal insurrection, though without any foreign assistance, but nonetheless

much to the dismay of the British. The Congress System slowly faded, although had it not been for the foreign policy of Canning, the British Foreign Minister, the system could have continued along these lines for some time to come. (See Chapter IV, 4.1 for further details on the undoing of the congress mechanism.)

Although the Congress System was the first European attempt towards collective security, it failed partly because each state employed the system for different purposes. The British used it to maintain territorial equilibrium, the Austrians to quell revolutions, the French to reestablish themselves on the continent, while the Russians hoped to incorporate themselves more firmly in the system, something that was sometimes regarded by other powers as attempts of expansion. It was nearly impossible to harmonize these contradictions.

However, it should be mentioned that the system never abandoned the mechanics of balance of power. Britain and Austria hindered what they perceived as Russian expansionism. Metternich occupied the Tsar in series of consultations that kept the Russian monarch from undertaking unilateral action. France received limited freedom of action. But the most serious threat to the system was the Greek War of Independence, which occurred in an area where territorial equilibrium was absent. This unleashed the mechanics of balance of power. (See Chapter IV)

#### **2.4 The Ottoman Empire and Europe : A Heterogeneous System**

The previous pages examined and explained the European system until the 1820s and how balance of power mechanics maintained the structure of the European security. As a general background, it provided insights into the mechanics of the system

and the means by which the states inside the system reacted to crises, as well as a general orientation towards their foreign policies. This section shall deal with the core of the work and establish the position of the Ottoman Empire within the framework of the European system and how the different states reacted to its presence. The hypothesis of this work is that the crises the Egyptian Question caused can only be understood within the systemic level of analysis, therefore, understanding the position of the Ottoman Empire in Europe is the only means to undertake an objective analysis.

The controversy of whether or not the Ottoman Empire is a member of the European system has remained to this day. As mentioned in Chapter I, the units that compose a system of international relations are the states. The setting of the boundary of this conceptual framework is not fixed and does not follow clear cut criteria. (See Chapter I, p.p., 4, and 13-14). Therefore the task of establishing the position of the Ottoman Empire in the European system is not an easy one. However, what is assured is that once the Ottoman Empire is included in the European system, the latter's relative homogeneity became in doubt. That could be attributed to the fact that the Ottoman Empire had a distinct cultural identity as a result of the different religions, customs, ideology and practices. The relative homogeneity of the system of Europe was partly a result of sharing common Christian values, while the Ottoman Empire was perceived by them as a Muslim entity only. Moreover, it shared nearly no common links with a Christian Europe that functioned under the basis of different cultural premises. The Ottomans and Europeans viewed each other as alien to their own value systems. These facts were demonstrated by the refusal of Congress members to admit the Ottomans into the system. The Ottoman Empire, was a member in the European

system, by *de facto* presence but not by what Aron calls the "European transnational cultural ensemble". Therefore, its presence was the reason for the transformation of the system into a heterogeneous one as far as it was concerned. An example of this was the fact that the existence of the Porte was not a necessity in as far as some actors were concerned. France, despite all the anxiety and disequilibrium it caused, was still regarded as a member in the system and was therefore allowed to rejoin. However, the Ottomans were viewed differently and indeed Russia hoped to dominate this weak country. This could be explained by the heterogeneous nature of a system that included the Porte.

This is not a unique phenomena in an international system and other examples come to mind. Israel was and perhaps remains, a good illustration. Sharing few cultural links with its Arab neighbors, it is nonetheless a *de facto* member of the system and a major pillar in its equilibrium. The Ottoman Empire was not different, and it is one of the few states that forced its presence on the European theater since the fourteenth century, to the extent that its survival and membership in the system became the cornerstone of equilibrium in eastern and central Europe. By the nineteenth century, it came to play an important role in the equilibrium of the European system.

It is difficult to establish the exact date the Ottoman Empire became part of the European system. However, a suggested date would be the moment the Ottomans set foot on European soil during the rule of Orhan in the early decades of the fourteenth century. This step towards Ottoman expansion into Europe continued through his marriage to the daughter of the Bulgarian king.<sup>43</sup> As time progressed, the military conquests of subsequent sultans allowed the Ottoman Empire to expand throughout eastern Europe. With Suleiman the Magnificent, the Ottoman Empire reached its peak,

threatened Vienna in 1529. By the end of his reign, Suleiman had extended Ottoman dominions from Buda, the capital of Hungary in the north to Basra in the south, and from the Caspian in the east to the west Mediterranean, thus forcing the Ottoman Empire on European affairs.

Although the Ottomans did not belong to the same cultural *ensemble* of the system, they were active participants in European political and military affairs. The constant wars between the Ottomans and some European powers, primarily the Holy Roman Empire, became an integral part of European politics.<sup>44</sup> There are various proofs of this; the formation of the Holy League in 1570 to expel the Ottomans from Eastern Europe and the Balkans or the Battles of Lepanto in 1571, the 16th century wars with the Venetians, the Battle of St. Gothard in 1663 and the Second Holy League in 1684 against the Ottomans. These aforementioned events verify the hypothesis that the Ottomans were accepted into the European system even though their presence transformed it into a heterogeneous one that influenced the outlook and actions of the other members to its presence.

The Ottoman Empire remained a member in the system as well as an integral part of the general mechanics of balance of power. Wars with many of these states in the Balkans and Eastern Europe were not the only marks of its presence, but it also had allies among them, making it clearly a member of the power mechanism in Europe. Perhaps the best example of this development was the alliance between the Ottoman Empire and France in 1535. Marriot, for example, believes that the privileges accorded to the French in the Ottoman Empire "...established the foundation for diplomatic friendship which operated so powerfully in the 16th century against the

dominance of the Habsburgs and for more than 300 years continued to be an essential factor in French diplomacy."<sup>45</sup> The Ottomans were to present a balance for the dominance of the Habsburgs,<sup>46</sup> something that the French foreign policy was eager to achieve until it succeeded through the Treaties of Westphalia and Pyrenees. Even during the second siege of Vienna in 1683, the French did not feel threatened and refused to give assistance to the Habsburgs. Perhaps the most striking evidence was the Ottoman full support of the Protestant movement in Europe.<sup>47</sup> Even Sweden began to be interested in the Ottoman Empire as an ally against rising Russia by the beginning of the 18th century.<sup>48</sup> Thus, from all of the above, it may be concluded that the first link of the Ottoman Empire to the European system came as a natural result of its presence in eastern Europe and its continuous wars, peace and alliances with the French, Habsburgs, Russians, Swedes, British and the other powers as well.

A second important factor that linked the Ottomans to the European system can be traced as well to the Ottoman-Russian rivalry. The rise of Russia under Peter the Great, marked the beginning of a new era in the European balance of power especially in eastern Europe. As a result of establishing itself as a strong power with interests in eastern and northern Europe, the Russian factor joined the European power calculations, therefore boosting the role of the Ottoman Empire in European affairs more and more, especially with the Russian aim to extend their control over the Ottoman Straits. This fact alarmed many European states, primarily Britain, France and the Holy Roman Empire, certainly not for the sake of the Sublime Porte, but rather the fear of Russian over-extension that could distort the European equilibrium, as well as trade. This fact remained a very important element throughout the next two hundred



years. This factor constitutes probably the second link between the Ottoman Empire and the other European units in the system, thereby making the Ottoman Empire an integral and organic part of the European system. (Further details and analysis will be viewed in chapter IV regarding the Russo-Ottoman rivalry).

A third factor that stimulated the growth of the Ottoman Empire's European identity could be traced to the problems of the Straits. As mentioned before, as long as the Ottoman Empire maintained the Black Sea as its *mare nostrum*, there was no problem. However, as Russia began to have access to this sea, immediately an international concern among the different actors in the system began to appear. At this stage, the question of the Straits became a geo-political reality in the European equilibrium. This was not only due to the fact that these straits represented a main artery of trade in the whole region, but had very important geo-political and strategic implications.<sup>49</sup> Simply, the fall of these Straits in Russian hands, meant their practical preponderance in Eastern Europe, as well as giving it access to the Mediterranean. These made the problems of the Straits a very important component in the European equilibrium, through the denial measures exercised by the great powers to check foreign expansion, primarily Russian.

The tide of history played a very important role in the reshaping of these three factors mentioned previously -the presence of the Ottoman Empire in eastern Europe as a major power, the Russian-Ottoman rivalry and the problem of the Straits. Victorious as the Ottoman Empire was throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the curve of its success began to decline and with it the whole calculations for the equilibrium of east European security, within the general framework of total



European security. If peace was maintained because of equilibrium and the functioning of balance of power on the European continent, the problems that rose in the nineteenth century in eastern Europe was a result of precisely the lack of this equilibrium. That is due to the fact that the Ottoman presence transformed it into a heterogeneous system, thereby leading some actors to attempt eliminating it, causing disequilibrium.

## **2.5 The Ottoman Empire as an Actor in the European Balance of Power Mechanism:**

The previous pages focused on establishing the political identity of the Ottoman Empire in the European system, and in the following we shall view carefully the Ottoman Empire's role in the mechanics of balance of power in Europe, both through its presence as a European power and its possession of the strategic Straits. This will be elaborated through understanding the position of the Ottoman Empire *vis-à-vis* the other powers in the system, something that gave birth to what historians refer to as the Eastern Question.

### **A. The Eastern Question:**

Peculiarly, the Ottoman Empire played its most important role in the European balance of power during the latter part of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, not when it was strong and potent, but paradoxically when it was weak and debilitated. Throughout the eighteenth century, although the tide of defeat was going

against the Ottoman Empire, it retained a very large proportion of its Empire in Europe, Asia and North Africa. Even the treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 between Vienna and the Sublime Porte and that of Passarowitz in 1718 which gave the Habsburgs substantial gains in the Balkans, were short lived, for the Ottoman Empire was capable of retrieving them back some decades later. Thus, its possessions in Europe were not substantially usurped, perhaps because the Habsburgs and the rest of the European monarchs were focusing more on the events in central and western Europe. What is important at this stage is the fact that the Ottoman Empire by the beginning of the nineteenth century was in possession of major eastern European provinces, namely Morea, Bosnia, Silistria and Rumelia, while Moldavia, Wallachia and Bessarabia were tributary states.<sup>50</sup> This constituted in modern terms, mainland Greece, the Peloponesis, Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and a portion of Montenegro. It was in control of 283,000 square miles of European territory with eight million inhabitants.

If equilibrium was stable in Western Europe, things were different towards the east. The problem of what is commonly known as the Eastern Question was already exploding prior to the imbalance that shattered the European system as a result of the French crisis in the beginning of the century. It was this problem that created a severe imbalance in the European system to the east and south of Europe for some time to come.

The Eastern Question is a term used among historians to describe the status of the Ottoman Empire in diplomatic affairs after its weakening in face of the other powers in Europe. It is primarily linked to the problems of how long the Empire was to live, especially when there were many ambitions from states inside the European system

awaiting this moment anxiously. It was primarily the problem of filling the power vacuum that resulted from the Ottoman weakness in controlling the territory that was under its sovereignty.<sup>51</sup> Brown believes the Eastern question began " ...with the decline of the Ottoman strength *vis-à-vis* Europe and the growing awareness by all the parties concerned of this decline, a process usually held to have begun in 1774 at earliest..."<sup>52</sup> Others view it as merely the relations between the European powers with the Ottoman Empire that began with the decline of the latter.<sup>53</sup> As far as this study is concerned, the Eastern Question is used to mean the position of the Ottoman Empire in the European system after it reached a stage of continuous military and political weakness *vis-à-vis* the struggle of the powers over its domains. Thus, we shall view it as a problem comprising two main elements, first, the inability of the Ottoman Empire to protect the lands under its sovereignty against the ambitions of the other powers and the problems of the Straits.

### **B. Problems of the Straits**

The Ottoman Straits were believed to be one of the most important pillars upon which the equilibrium of Europe was based with geopolitical and strategic implications on the entire system. These Straits were the basic link between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The Straits are of a very curious geographical nature, for they are two canals, the Dardanelles from the west and the Bosphorus from the east linked by the Sea of Marmara in the center. The Dardanelles is a 40 miles long water canal varying in width from 1-4 miles; the Sea of Marmara is 170 miles long while the Bosphorus extends for 18 miles with a width varying from 800 yards to 2.7 miles.<sup>54</sup> It

was upon the Bosphorus that Emperor Constantine in the Fourth century built his city Constantinopol, which was incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth century and became its capital.

The geopolitical and strategic importance of the Straits do not only lie in the fact that it links the Mediterranean with the Black Sea, but also because it was the key to the southeastern gate of the European system. The state which controlled it had perfect access to the Balkans and thereby the southeastern gates of Europe. Furthermore, it represented a key to the east of the Mediterranean as well, especially for Russia. In addition, it was a very important waterway for the trade route linking Europe with Asia, and with the advent of colonialism, its importance increased tremendously. Therefore, if this key was to fall in the hands of any of the European powers, it could easily permit it to disturb the equilibrium. However, as long as the Straits remained in the custody of the Porte, there was no immediate danger, for it had no power to cause disequilibrium in the system.

Problems regarding the possession of the Ottoman Straits was practically non-existent until the eighteenth century, primarily due to two factors. The first was the fact that it was an internal waterway, leading to territories under Ottoman sovereignty, for both the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea were Ottoman seas. The second factor was that the Ottoman Empire was strong enough to defend it. As soon as these two factors diminished, the problems of the Straits began to appear and became a very important element in the foreign policy of at least three major powers; Russia, Britain and the Habsburg Empire.

The Ottoman Straits were an important element in Russian foreign policy beginning with Peter the Great's hopes of transforming Russia into a naval power. By the time of Catherine II's rule, Russia had achieved Peter's dream and extended its territories to include much of the north of the Black Sea. Russia's interests in the Straits could be summarized as follows:

First, the Straits provided Russia's military and trade vessels the access they need to the Mediterranean. Such freedom of movement translated into naval access to the heart of Europe. This became a very important factor in Russian calculations and its leaders eventually saw the Straits as a navigation resource it had to possess.

Second, by control of the Straits, Russia could move forward its lines of defense allowing for the defense of its southeastern flank to begin at the Mediterranean and Istanbul.<sup>55</sup> Russian control of the Black Sea would be unchallenged as it would not be vulnerable to any foreign battleships. In strategic terms, this would eliminate any future naval threat by Britain and France, forcing these powers to attack through central and eastern Europe. Since Russia had already secured Poland and extended its frontiers to the Dniester, it would become almost invulnerable. The Crimean War 1854-1856 proved that if the Straits had been in Russian hands, the British and French campaign would have become nearly impossible.

Third, domination of the Straits would place east and much of south Europe at Russia's mercy. That is basically because the Russia would possess the military springboard from which it could lead its attacks on this area.

For all these reasons, the control of the Straits would practically provide Russia with access to nearly half the European system without fear of a maritime

challenge. Such a state of affairs could be a mortal threat to the European equilibrium, giving Russia the power to overcome an alliance against it. Therefore, since the entire system functioned on the principle of balance of power to maintain equilibrium, it was impossible to permit simultaneous Russian expansion and invulnerability. Thus European foreign policy for the next century aimed at opposing Russian attempts to secure the Straits.

The history of Russian indirect attempts to control the Straits may be traced through the treaties it attempted to enforce on the Porte. With the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, Russia guaranteed passage of its trade vessels. The treaty of alliance in 1798 during the war in Egypt to expel the French invasion permitted the passage for the first time of the Russian warships through the Straits so as to join the alliance against France in Egypt. The treaty of 1805 between the Porte and Russia allowed the latter's warships to pass through the Straits in time of war. This treaty also stipulated joint defense of the Straits.<sup>56</sup> Fortunately for the Porte, this treaty was terminated unilaterally by 1806 when the Russo-Ottoman war erupted as a result of French intrigues. By so doing, the Porte remained under the sole obligation of permitting the navigation of Russian merchant vessels through the Straits.

Britain was another power interested in the safety of the Ottoman Straits. Britain secured the right of passage of its merchant vessels through the unilateral declaration of Sultan Selim III in 1799.<sup>57</sup> British foreign policy primarily aimed at maintaining the *status quo* of Ottoman sovereignty over the Straits. There were, however, some instances during the Napoleonic wars, when London disregarded this principle, to allow Russia to participate in the war efforts against France. This was

entirely due to the fact that the Porte began to shift alliances towards France in 1805, therefore forcing the British to abandon their traditional policy and supported the Russians against the Porte.

The British hoped their initiatives would protect their commerce in the Levant from Russian encroachment.<sup>58</sup> At the same time, they would be able to check Russian advancement in the Mediterranean.<sup>59</sup> Since the battle of Trafalgar and the destruction of the French fleet, London considered it essential to maintain the Mediterranean at a minimum, under the control of one fleet, and at a maximum, including the possibility of a French force in future when circumstances allowed. The addition of a Russian fleet would not be permitted. Finally, Britain needed to secure its communications with India. This became a more important priority following the French campaign in Egypt. It was very important for Britain to maintain the trade routes to India open, through both the Straits and Egypt at any cost, and a Russian control over there, meant risking control over these trade routes. Following the collapse of French preponderance, Britain's commitment to its efforts to prevent the Russians from gaining control of this critical area continued.

The Habsburg Empire and France shared Britain's fears of Russian intentions to capture the Straits. These fears played a role in efforts to maintain equilibrium in eastern Europe. However, it should be noted that the degree of interest of both states were not identical. The fact that Austrian territories were adjacent to Russia made the issue a greater priority for Vienna.

The interests of different states regarding the Straits converged on two issues: to keep the Russians from controlling the Straits and restricting the passage of



Russian warships through the Straits in peacetime. At the same time, the various states did not want to see the Straits closed to their naval forces.

### **C. Ottoman's European Diplomacy:**

Ottoman diplomacy during the end of the eighteenth and the nineteenth century was marked with the gradual decline of its power *vis-à-vis* most European powers. As mentioned before, this decline resulted from poor internal administration as well as the rise in the power of the other European powers. The conjunction of these two factors forced the Ottoman Empire into a labyrinth of alliances to secure its dominions in Europe and north Africa, against any preponderant power. Furthermore, it opened the way for encroachment by other powers to its territories, a problem that confronted the Ottoman Empire until its dissolution in the twentieth century.

Although Russia was not the only state in the European system with ambitions on Ottoman territory, it played perhaps the most important role in weakening the Ottoman Empire.<sup>60</sup> Since the time of Peter the Great, the seeds for conflict between Russia and the Sublime Porte were laid. His plan of incorporating Russia into the European family required (in his view) ports such as those on the Black Sea, at the time an Ottoman lake. In 1695 Russia attempted to gain access to the Black Sea through the conquest of the port of Azov was the first step in this effort. Peter the Great's failure provided inspiration to expand the small Russian navy. By 1700, Russia secured access to the port of Azov in the Black Sea. Peter's war against Sweden in the Great Northern

War deflected his attention from the Ottoman Empire, thus preserving peace on the Ottoman front.<sup>61</sup>

Peter's successors lacked the vigor or character of their illustrious predecessor and it was not until the rule of Catherine the Great in 1762 that Russia again looked south and hoped to expand into Ottoman possessions in eastern Europe. The acquisition of Ukraine brought Russia in direct confrontation with the Porte. The labyrinthine nature of the European alliance system in the second part of the eighteenth century, *i.e.*, the relationship between the Ottomans and France, encouraged the Porte to initiate hostilities against Russia in 1768. War began along the Danube in Eastern Europe but soon spread when Russia, assisted by the British, dispatched its Northern Sea fleet to the Mediterranean to carry the war to the Ottoman coast.<sup>62</sup> British support to Russia does not deny the fact that France and other powers considered Ottoman dominion a natural buffer against Russian expansion as well as a good market for trade. With Russia turning its forces on eastern Europe, the Porte was the best option to check Russian expansion within the framework of the mechanics of balance of power, a policy even the British government adhered to in general, and abandoned under strictly special circumstances, that caused disequilibrium in the system, as when Britain supported Russian war efforts against the Porte and France.

The war proved catastrophic for the Porte and it suffered defeat both at sea at the Battle of Cesme in 1771 and on land as well. The Porte was left with no alternative but to sign the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, which dominated its relations with Russia for a long time to come. Russia increased its gains in the Black Sea region and the port of Azov, obtained useful trade and diplomatic concessions and

the Khanate of Crimea became an independent state. Moreover, Article XI granted the Russian merchant ships " ...a free passage from the Black Sea into the White Sea (Mediterranean) and reciprocally ..." <sup>63</sup> Generally, this treaty is regarded as the beginning of the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, as well as a suggested date for the beginning of the Eastern Question. <sup>64</sup> Though it is widely believed that this treaty granted Russia the right to mentorship and representation of the Orthodox citizens of the Ottoman Empire, recent works proved that this is incorrect. <sup>65</sup> But in general, the Russian Tsars worked hard for the establishment of the principle of intervention on behalf of the Ottoman Orthodox citizens.

Following this treaty, Russia increased its moves on the Slavic population of the Ottoman Empire, primarily in the Balkans and Bulgaria, and assisted those who rebelled against the Porte. "Russian objectives were to dominate the Balkans, ... Tsars... viewed southeast Europe as essential to Russian national security and the stability of Russia's frontiers in Europe." <sup>66</sup> The Tsars considered this region a natural and cultural extension of Russia and were eager to extend influence if not absorb these territories. This effort not only brought Russia into direct conflict with the Ottomans, but led to the establishment of the Ottoman Empire as the primary defense against Russian expansionism.

The Russian ambitions in Ottoman territory created fear in Vienna that the real danger could be Russian expansionism and their great designs in eastern Europe, were bound to affect the status of the Habsburgs there. This fear was further augmented as a result of the intriguing policy of Russia in the Balkans, something that was considered as the backyard of the Habsburg Empire, and foreign intervention by a strong

power was not appreciated at all. This was the main policy of Vienna during the rule of Maria Theresa, who resented Catherine of Russia and her schemes. She was reported to have exclaimed in a letter that, "The partition of the Ottoman Empire would be the most hazardous of enterprises and most dangerous for its consequences. What shall we gain by pushing our conquests even to the gates of Constantinople ?, ... save some fatal and inevitable combination of circumstances. I shall never lend myself to the partition of the Turkish Empire and I hope that our grandchildren will not see them expelled from Europe." <sup>67</sup> The weakness of the Ottomans as it became imminent from the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, led to the exaggeration of these fears in Vienna to the extent that it suggested concluding a secret treaty with the Porte to work together to halt Russian expansion. <sup>68</sup>

The French, though traditionally the allies of the Ottomans, had also special interests. Their interests were trade as well as the guardianship of the Catholic clergy in the Ottoman provinces. Furthermore, they invested in good relations with the Porte when it was strong, to check the positions of the Habsburgs. However, these traditional policies changed drastically when the French Revolution took place. The new expansionist France embarked on a course that was bound to collide with the Porte and by 1798 the French began their expansionist policy to the detriment of the Porte by the expedition to Egypt, which was part of the Ottoman Empire (See Chapter III). Napoleon believed that the Ottoman Empire's days were numbered but it was only a matter of when and how.

If three out of the four major powers began to have an interest in the Ottoman empire, it was very normal to see Britain gradually involving itself. This was a

natural prerequisite for its foreign policy based on balance of power, for it was too dangerous to leave the other powers to determine the fate of such a large empire by themselves. It is true that the British had trade interests in the Ottoman lands that extended back to the sixteenth century.<sup>69</sup> However, their interests also developed as a result of their overall foreign policy orientation of freeing the continent from a single preponderant power, whether it was France or Russia. To this end, Britain began to develop stronger relations with the Porte in the last two decades of the eighteenth century particularly since Pitt the Younger, as a means to check Russian growing influence in eastern Europe.<sup>70</sup> Thus it became the British policy to maintain the Ottoman integrity in face of other powers' ambitions.<sup>71</sup> With the French preponderance in the early years of the nineteenth century, France substituted Russia as far as Britain was concerned, and it became the British policy to check the growing French influence in the Ottoman empire.

The problem of the Ottoman Straits also occupied the minds of British and French politicians. However, French aggression diverted attention from this issue and instead, British and allied interests were aimed at checking the French. This was achieved in part through an alliance with the Porte. Traditional allied aims were focused on defeating France and expelling it from Egypt in an alliance including Britain, Russia and the Porte.

The obvious interests of these states, especially Russia, marked the beginning of the internationalization of the Eastern Question and made it an important element in the European balance of power structure. Ottoman inability to defend its possessions in Europe automatically pushed it into the labyrinth of European balance of

power mechanisms, though not as a fully recognized actor by all. From this time on, weakness forced the Porte to ally itself with one or more European power to protect its territory.

The French invasion to Egypt in 1798 could be considered among the first French attempts to dismember the Ottoman Empire. This move was undertaken within the general context of post-revolutionary Franco-British rivalry. The French expedition to Egypt was a calculated effort to threaten British control of India by cutting the trade route going through Egypt. Egypt was under the suzerainty of the Porte and thus the attack boosted the Ottoman Empire's position within the European system. Britain and Russia, assisted by the Ottomans, cooperated within the framework of the mechanics of the system and collaborate against French preponderance to expel the French from Egypt. This was in 1801 and the French lost hope of a strategic position in the southern Mediterranean. Britain recognized the importance of the Porte and its dominions and hence opposed any attempt to divide it. In addition, the French loss of prestige with the Porte, pushed an Anglo-Ottoman rapprochement.

The alliance proved brief and by 1806 French intrigues in the Porte resulted in a change of the Hospodars or vassals of the Ottoman provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte's decision to depose these Hospodars led to a breach with Russia, for this act violated the 1802 Ottoman commitment with Russia. The result was protracted war, something that the Porte hoped to avoid but could not. The British supported Russia in its Danubian and Mediterranean war efforts, believing that a long conflict would distract Russian war efforts against Napoleon.<sup>72</sup> Britain engaged immediately in an act of coercion against the Ottoman Empire through Admiral John T.



Duckworth's unsuccessful bombardment of Istanbul. In addition, the British landed an expedition to the shores of Alexandria in order to invade Egypt. This force failed as a result of their successive defeats by the Egyptian Vali Mohammed Ali. (See chapter III)

Such actions on the part of Russia and Britain threw the Porte in to the arms of Napoleon, with the latter hoping to create a defense pact with the Ottoman Empire and Persia against Russia. However, the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 reversed the situation once again, and the Ottomans were stunned to learn that Napoleon and Alexander I were preparing for the division of the Ottoman Empire. Once again, the Porte found its back against the wall. As Tilsit faced operational problems regarding the division of the Ottoman territory between France and Russia, the Ottomans gradually moved towards alliance against France.

The only hope for the Porte was British assistance against the Russians and French. The result was the Treaty of the Dardanelles in 1809, which included several important articles including British assistance in case of a French attack and an agreement to close the Turkish Straits to foreign warships in time of peace.<sup>73</sup> This made the Ottomans an important ally for the British against Russian and French ambitions.

Peace between the Ottomans and the Russians finally came in March 1812, as a result of the Russian fears of an imminent French attack. Alexander I prompted peace to prepare for the coming war with France. Following the Treaty of Bucharest, the provinces of Wallachia and Moldova, as well as some Russian held territory in the north of the Black Sea and the Caucasus, were returned to the Porte while Russia retained Bessarabia.<sup>74</sup> From that moment onward, the focus of the major powers were directed towards France and the Porte gained breathing space.



By 1814, the Ottoman role in European settlement was unnecessary, not because it was not a member in the European family, but rather since it had no place in these talks. The Vienna convention directed attention towards the containment of France and reshaping Europe territorially, a task that did not require Ottoman presence. Moreover, the Porte could not play any role with regard to the future containment of France, since it did not have any borders with France, except for the Ionian Islands. This however, did not prevent Castlereagh from unsuccessfully suggesting an invitation to the Ottoman Empire.<sup>75</sup> Other European courts did not recognize the European identity of the Porte. This did not prevent them from dealing with the Ottomans as a European state in the coming decades, for it was still considered that the "...{Sultan} had one leg over the European fence, since he controlled the Balkans (and some territory in Eastern Europe)."<sup>76</sup>

The role of the Ottoman Empire in the European structure gradually increased from this point. As the Congress system soothed possible sources of friction among the European powers, the Ottoman Empire asserted itself as an active member of the European family. The problems of imbalance in the eastern parts of the continent resulting from Russian ambitions and indigenous revolutionary movements overshadowed the Ottoman Empire. Relations with the major powers remained consistent and each secured good relations with the Porte. With the exception of Russia, none of the powers could benefit from the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, though at some stages some countries were sympathetic to the revolutionary movements in Ottoman-held territory.

This chapter analyzed how the European system developed and functioned since 1648 and how the Eastern Question fit into this framework. In the following chapters questions on how the Egyptian question developed and affected the European System, and how the mechanics of balance of power maintained the *status quo* of the Ottoman empire during the active phase of the Egyptian Question will be taken up.



**Chapter III**  
**The Egyptian Question**  
**Europe, Egypt and Mohammed Ali**

**1. What is The Egyptian Question ?**

The work of Shafik Ghorbal entitled The Beginning of the Egyptian Question and the Rise of Mohammed Ali represents a pioneer effort to understand the significance of the Egyptian Question. Historians who studied this issue encountered the same problems as other historians attempting to define the Eastern Question. Some Egyptian historians that deal with the era of Mohammed Ali appear reluctant to even use the phrase *Egyptian Question*. That may be understandable given the fact that this historical episode is not dealt with on the same level and importance as the Eastern Question. Nevertheless, it constituted an integral part of the Eastern Question,<sup>1</sup> due to the fact that it emanated from the lack of Ottoman control over its territories, and since Egypt was part of the Ottoman Empire, *ipso facto*, the Egyptian Question was to be a part of the Eastern Question (See Chapter II, 2.4).

In simple terms, the Egyptian Question is regarded here as the impact of events in Egypt during the first forty years of the nineteenth century on the European system of interstate relations. During this period, there were certain patterns of relations between Egypt and the European system, whereby each impacted on the other.

There are several reasons as to why events that took place in Egypt during this period were regarded as a "Question". To begin with, Egypt could be considered like any other Ottoman *vilayet*, or tributary state, in that it attempted revolts and achieved temporary practical independence from the Porte. But what turned developments in Egypt into a "Question" was that unlike any other *vilayet*, Egypt achieved *de facto* independence from the Porte during the second decade of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, it actively threatened the equilibrium in Europe as a result of expansion into Anatolia and its subsequent threat to Ottoman existence. It was also a "Question" because there was more than one power interested in the threat Egypt posed to the European security structure in 1833 and 1839. All of the above gave the issue and events in Egypt the international character required to receive the title of the "Egyptian Question".

The timeframe of the Egyptian Question is believed to have begun in 1798 with the French invasion of Egypt,<sup>2</sup> and ended with the Treaty of London whereby the European powers arrested Mohammed Ali's expansionist policy in 1840-1.<sup>3</sup> Within this timeframe, the Egyptian Question could be divided into phases, in accordance with political developments in Egypt and the European system at those historical intervals. Therefore the Egyptian Question here is divided into three phases. The first phase covers the events from the French campaign in 1798 to the failure of the British campaign against Egypt in 1807. This phase could well be defined as the passive phase of the Egyptian Question, primarily due to the fact that Egypt was unable impact on the European system. On the contrary it was the epoch characterized by the impact of developments in the European system on its fate. The second phase, referred to as the preparatory phase, begins when Mohammed Ali established himself as sole ruler of Egypt and initiated reforms, particularly

those of a military character, so as to shape Egypt to play the role he wanted in international affairs. The preparatory phase ended in 1825, just prior to the Egyptian involvement in the Greek War of Independence. This phase in turn is characterized by Egypt's march towards *de facto* independence from the Porte, building an empire, and acquiring the strength to influence the future of the geographic neighborhood. The third and final phase, which is the active phase, began with the involvement in the Greek War of Independence and extended through the Egyptian-Ottoman War in 1831 and ended with the evacuation of Egypt from Syria in accordance with the Treaty of London in 1840, thereby marking the demise of the Egyptian empire. Of these three phases, the active phase of the Egyptian Question will be emphasized, for it characterized the highest level of interaction between Egypt and the European system.

This chapter, however, shall focus on the first two phases, in order to give the necessary background for the rise and development of the Egyptian Question. The next chapter focuses on the how the Egyptian Question was settled in accordance with the rules of the European system, *i.e.* the balance of power.

### **3.2 The First Phase of the Egyptian Question:**

#### **A. Egypt under the Ottomans and the Shaping of European Interests:**

The victory of Sultan Selim I in the Battle of Marc-i Dabik (*Marg Dabek*) in 1516 marked the demise of the Mameluke Sultanate in Egypt, as well as the last of their Sultans, Konsowa El Ghorei. From then onward Egypt became an integral part of the Ottoman

Empire and among its most valuable far flung possessions. The Ottomans imposed upon Egypt a policy of near seclusion, severing its relations to some extent with the outside world, with the exception of some trade and limited European consular activities that began in the eighteenth century.

Throughout that period, Egypt was ruled by the Ottomans with a Mameluke administration. The defeat of the Mamelukes did not terminate their presence and rule in Egypt, for the Ottoman sultans retained them to administer the country. This was not a unique case in Ottoman administrative system, for after all some of the *vilayet* including some of the important ones in the Balkans, like Wallachia and Moldova were administered in similar ways.<sup>4</sup> Such administration was visible from the very beginning as reflected in the decision to delegate the administration of Egypt to Khaier Bek, the Mameluke who betrayed Konsowa El Ghorei to the Ottoman Sultan Selim and spied for him.<sup>5</sup> This administrative system established by Selim I, was followed by sultans after him whereby the Mamelukes administered Egypt under the *de jure* sovereignty of an Ottoman *Vali* (Viceroy) who represented the Ottoman sultan and was supported with an Ottoman *hamia* garrison.<sup>6</sup>

Over time the Ottoman Empire began its military decline, the Mamelukes accumulated sufficient power to be called the real masters of Egypt though rarely relinquishing their allegiance to the Sublime Porte. Often enough the Ottoman *Vali* was just the shadow of the Ottoman sovereignty over Egypt. Al Djabarti, mentions the year 1188 *hijra*, 1774 A.D. "... began with the *Vali* Khalil Pasha being totally isolated, with the exception of his title (as ruler of Egypt) and the seal, while all responsibilities and affairs were entirely in the hands of the Great Emir Mohammed Bey Abou El Dahab and his

Mamelukes".<sup>7</sup> Once again this was not unique to Egyptian politics, for similar events occurred in other *vilayet* in the Ottoman Empire. Certainly this did not prevent the Sublime Porte from periodically gaining the upper hand, such as after the revolt of Mameluke leader Ali Bek El Kabier. In 1769 El Kabier, with Russian assistance, declared himself sultan over an independent Egypt and sent forces to Syria. The treachery of one of his generals prevented him from attaining power and, despite Russian financial and military support, he was defeated in 1773.<sup>8</sup>

Although the Sublime Port permitted the Mamelukes to pursue their affairs provided that they send an annual tribute, the *Haraç*, (kharag) to the Sultan. There were even years when the Ottoman *Vali* was unable to do this because of Mameluke intransigence and greed. It seems that Mamelukes consolidated their power in Egypt and it became difficult and costly for the Ottomans to send armies to defeat them and regain *de facto* power.<sup>9</sup> The only exception to this was in the late 18th century when an Ottoman army was dispatched and defeated the Mamelukes who nevertheless managed to come back stronger than before.<sup>10</sup> Their strength accumulated as a result of their constant acquisition of slaves from the Caucasus to keep their race intact and stronger since they did not intermingle with the Egyptians. Thus, the Sublime Porte had to be satisfied by these conditions since by then it was too difficult to remove the Mamelukes from power in Egypt.

Prior to 1798, Ottoman Egypt had under these circumstances almost no interaction with the European system of interstate relations with the exception of some limited consular and trade activities. This isolation came to an abrupt end as a result of renewed European interest in Egypt, and the impact of such interests on the conduct of



Egyptian politics before and during the rule of Mohammed Ali. These elements were to constitute the cornerstones of the link between Egypt and the European system. It should be noted that there may have been a cultural link between Egypt and Europe (the result of the 1798 French invasion), but that is outside the scope of the present study.

Because European interaction with Egypt was limited, any state wishing to establish a diplomatic presence in Egypt had to deal with the Porte, for the Ottoman *Vali* in Cairo lacked the authority to permit the establishment of diplomatic legations. The Porte was reluctant to open Egypt to foreign diplomatic missions. It took the Austrian legation in Alexandria, for example, eighteen years, from 1763 to 1781, to gain the consent of the Porte for officially opening a Consulate.<sup>11</sup> With the exception of some trade, Egypt was not an attraction for any of the European powers. Even Britain did not view Egypt as a priority in its foreign policy until after the French campaign in 1798. The French, however, were perhaps the most interested powers in Europe to secure good trade relations with Egypt. Russia showed some interest during the reign of Catherine the Great within the context of its policy to subdue the Ottoman Empire. (See Chapter II, 2.4 ) Catherine II's aim was to strike the Ottoman Empire from the south, by establishing an alliance with the Mamelukes and secure an independent Egypt under its sphere of influence.<sup>12</sup> Catherine's attempts failed, and with it faded any possibility to use Egypt to undermine the Ottoman Empire. This was perhaps the only way in which Egypt fitted into European interests, and thereby the system.

When Bonaparte mentioned that geography is the only constant factor in history, he could not have been more correct, especially in the case of Egypt *vis-a-vis* Europe. Egypt's geographic position imposed on it certain conditions that influenced the way some

European powers perceived its presence and importance. Possessing an important geo-strategic location in North Africa, and representing a bridge between Asia and Africa, and with the Ottomans' inability to defend it, Egypt was bound to attract European political and strategic attention. Furthermore, its control of a strategic trade route that reduces travel around Africa by half as compared to the Cape of Good Hope route made it even more appealing. Despite all of this, it took the Europeans nearly three centuries to take any active measures to translate these interests into action. This occurred as a result of the French Revolution and subsequent trans-European conflict. It was only then that Egypt's strategic importance was perceived, especially with regard to France.

Active and vigorous European pursuit of their interests in Egypt appeared only with the French campaign in 1798. This was the beginning of European active interference in Egyptian affairs and since then began to exercise an influence over its fate. The French were the first to realize the value of Egypt as an important geostrategic location that, if acquired, could enhance their war efforts against Britain. The strategy of the French Directory in 1798 focused on a naval invasion against England or to deal a blow against British interests abroad as the primary means to emasculate the Second Coalition. (See Chapter II, 2.2) The French determination to break Britain from the coalition produced the French campaign in 1798, being a more attractive option to a risky invasion of England. Bonaparte believed that gaining Egypt would give France negotiation space in any future talks aimed at terminating the Second Coalition. Therefore he suggested to Talleyrand that, "If it happens and we find ourselves obliged to acquiesce to the loss of Cape of Good Hope, then it will be necessary for us to acquire Egypt".<sup>13</sup> In addition, France believed that, "Egypt would replace the Antilles; and as a route it would secure

to...(France) the commerce of the Indies."<sup>14</sup> Such a policy was in perfect harmony with the general conviction that France needed colonies to replace its losses in the Americas, and Egypt seemed attractive. Moreover, such a move could allow the French to instigate trouble for Britain in India as a result of Egypt's relative proximity to the treasured colony and its trade route.<sup>15</sup> This in itself would seriously affect the overall British position. It should be noted that France attached such importance to undermining the British position in India that in association with Russia, contemplated a joint campaign against India in 1801. (See Chapter II, 2.2). Furthermore, such a step would give the French fleet a great deal of maneuverability and power in the Mediterranean Sea, if Alexandria could be transformed into a French naval base. For all of the above reason, France embarked on a campaign to take over Egypt.

The French campaign under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte was dispatched to Egypt in the summer of 1798. This campaign marks the beginning of the Egyptian link with the European system. The French did their best to avoid the British fleet in the Mediterranean and, after a brief stay in Malta, landed safely in Alexandria in June. Bonaparte quickly issued his famous declaration whereby he claimed that the French were friends of the Sultan and came to Egypt to defeat the Mamelukes who were treating French merchants improperly and, that the French had accepted Islam.<sup>16</sup> The French, aided by their superior military power, easily defeated the Mamelukes in the Battle of the Pyramids, forcing them to flee to upper Egypt and Syria.<sup>17</sup>

This move led to hostilities between the Porte and France, as well as giving the opportunity to put into action an alliance to get the French out of Egypt. Britain, without coordination with the Porte, initiated hostilities against the French. The British fleet under

the command of Admiral Horatio Nelson destroyed the French fleet in the Battle of Abu Keir in Alexandria, thereby isolating the French in Egypt. A final maneuver undertaken by Napoleon to conquer Syria failed. The hopelessness of the French position led Bonaparte to flee to France, leaving the French expeditions in the hands of General Kleber.

The situation did not improve. The French were exhausted, demoralized, struck by the plague and surrounded by hostile forces. Kleber realized that the only option was to undertake a difficult attempt at evacuation. The chance occurred through the Treaty of El Areish with the Ottomans in January 1800. The British refused to sign the treaty because according to what Sir Sidney Smith, the commander of the British naval forces, reported to Admiral Nelson, "...the execution of the articles depended solely on the Turkish Government and on the discipline which may be preserved in the Turkish army".<sup>18</sup>

The Porte realized that they could not expel the French without foreign assistance. By 1800 the Porte, entered into an alliance with Britain and Russia to achieve this end. (See Chapter II, 2.2) Fortunately for the British, the treaty was short-lived and Kleber soon resumed hostilities against the Ottomans. The result was the Battle of Ein Shams, or Heliopolis, which saw the French defeat of the Ottoman army. Some weeks later, General Kleber was assassinated and General Menou, the third in command, assumed command of the desperate French force.

To make matters worse, the British landed in Alexandria and the Ottomans gathered a new army to expel the French from Egypt. This army consisted of several ethnic groups from the empire, the strongest of which was a unit of Albanian Ottomans under the leadership of a Tahir Pasha and included a young Albanian officer that came to be known as Mohammed Ali of Kavala.

By 1801, the French were confronted by a British force in Alexandria, an Ottoman army, a regrouped force of Mamelukes, and a British Indian army that landed (too late as events would prove) on the Red Sea coast. These armies moved towards Cairo while some British forces surrounded the French in Alexandria. The French were defeated in Cairo and surrendered. In Alexandria, General Menou accepted the terms of surrender that his commander in Cairo signed with the Ottomans and the British. Before the end of the year, the remaining French forces were provided safe transport to France, ending the French campaign to Egypt, but not their hopes to conquer this land again.

The French invasion revived the link between Egypt and the European system by breaking the near isolation that Egypt endured under the Ottoman rule. The revival of dormant European interests in Egypt became another established channel by which it began to be actively linked with the European system. Major powers such as Britain and France recognized their interests in the affairs of Egypt and were willing to pursue these interests. Furthermore, the French campaign incorporated Egypt as a geographic square in the European chessboard. The competition between Britain and France to conquer, or influence the affairs, added a further value to this square. Egypt continued after the French evacuation to be among the focal points of British interest. The British even attempted an unsuccessful campaign in 1807. Egypt was becoming a battleground in the European wars, and it continued to be so until the Vienna settlement that ended the conflict in the system.

In addition to these facts, the impact of the French campaign and the contact it established between the European political ideas and culture affected the Egyptian political culture, though this did not manifest itself for at least five years later.<sup>19</sup> This explains why

Mohammed Ali's reforms were accepted to some extent smoothly by the Egyptians. In general, the functioning of the European system, as well as the ideas and culture within it, affected Egypt from this point onward as shall be seen in the power struggle that occurred in 1801-1805.

It is for all these reasons that the Egyptian Question began in 1798 and continued for decades to come. Once events reestablished links between Egypt and the European system, it was impossible to restore the *status quo ante*.

#### **B: The Power Struggle in Egypt and the Failure of British and French Policies:**

Egypt was now under the control of the British who occupied the country until 1803. During that occupation, a serious power struggle erupted in Egypt between different parties that raged until 1805. Several factions contended for power on the eve of the British occupation in 1801 which included the Mamelukes, the Ottomans, and Ottoman Albanian troops in the Ottoman army lead by Mohammed Ali. Moreover, the British played a war by proxy through supporting one of the different contenders. A review of the contenders shows the following:

##### *The Mamelukes:*

The Mamelukes considered themselves the real owners of Egypt. They were a military oligarchy which depended on slave importation to maintain their race. Imported young slaves were transformed into strong fighters." Wars was to be their trade ... From their earliest years they were trained as horsemen and warriors, ... as a military clique".<sup>20</sup> The latest blood injected into the Mameluke body was a slave shipment numbering about



12,000 that arrived just before the beginning of the French campaign.<sup>21</sup> Their main sources of wealth were custom duties from the large amount of trade passing between Europe and far East through Egypt,<sup>22</sup> as well as taxes levied on Egyptian citizens. Both revenues vanished with the arrival of the French.

On the political level, their solidarity suffered as a result of internal divisions. There were two factions: one followed the leadership of El Bardeissy Bey who, in turn, handed over his powers to Ibrahim Bey, while the second accepted the leadership of Mohammed El Alfy Bey.<sup>23</sup> As events proved, each chose a different path. Treachery further weakened their cohesion. Al Djabarti provides a full description of this phenomena.<sup>24</sup>

Mameluke strength diminished further as a result of the defeats by the French.<sup>25</sup> They were subsequently dispersed over Greater Syria, Upper Egypt and the Sudan. By the time they returned to Egypt it proved difficult to reunite them, since many did not return, and those who did were too weak to restore the *status quo ante* 1798. Although it is very difficult to estimate their numbers in Egypt by 1801, it is safe to assume that their numbers had diminished considerably.

#### *The Ottomans:*

The presence of a rare powerful Ottoman military force in Egypt at the time of the French evacuation further weakened the Mamelukes. The Ottoman army in Egypt was estimated to be around ten thousand soldiers -excluding those of Albanian origin.<sup>26</sup> Although this army was defeated at the Battle of Heliopolis in 1800, it nonetheless was more powerful than the Mameluke forces, which at the time formed a part of this army



Hüsrev (Khusrev) Pasha, the new Ottoman Vali, was determined to exterminate the Mamelukes as soon as possible. Al Djabarti reports that after his accession to power he attempted to exterminate the Mamelukes by killing and pursuing them all over the country. His efforts included a battle between the forces of El Alfy Bey and those of the Ottoman army, which witnessed the former's defeat and escape.<sup>27</sup> Only the presence of the British forces prevented the extermination of the Mamelukes. One major, but common problem facing Hüsrev, as well as most of the leaders at the time, was the unstable and corrupt nature of the often unpaid army. This force became worse than the Mamelukes, looting and theft were commonplace and the Egyptian population was left in a worse situation than ever.

#### *The British:*

British involvement in Egyptian affairs occurred after the French campaign triggered a new principle in British foreign policy: Egypt was never to be permitted to fall into the hands of another power, especially France, given its location on the strategic trade route from Egypt to India. This became the British primary objective *vis-a-vis* Egypt that continued uninterrupted until the British occupation in 1882. The British Minister of Defense explained this idea to Lord Grenville, the Prime Minister, stating that "the possession of Egypt by any independent power would be a fatal circumstance to the interest of Britain."<sup>28</sup>

The British faced a complex situation after the French evacuation. However, the most pressing factor was the time element for they recognized that the continuation of their military presence in Egypt could possibly cost them the war in Europe, or could turn some old allies, such as Russia, into foes. The main British objective at that time was to

ensure that Egypt would not fall under the occupation or influence of the French or any other power. Therefore, if they were unable to secure Egypt through military occupation, arrangements had to be made to prevent any other European power from doing the same and to guarantee a pro-British attitude on the part of Egypt.

The policy alternatives for Britain were limited. They could either (1) continue the conquest of Egypt and suffer the resulting repercussions on the European system or (2) establish indirect rule over Egypt through the Mamelukes while maintaining Ottoman sovereignty or (3) gamble on the Albanian faction inside the Ottoman army or (4) hand over the matters to The Porte.<sup>29</sup> The situation was difficult.

The British had little choice and decided to gamble on the Mameluke horse. Strange as it may first appear, this choice was the most rational among the available options, for the Ottomans would have certainly aimed to tighten their grip on Egypt to prevent future foreign intervention. In addition, there was always the possibility of a rapprochement between The Porte and France. The weak and undisciplined Ottomans of Albanian origin were the worst choice available since they were alien to the Egyptian people and could not be trusted. After some initial hesitation, the British opted for the Mameluke card and provided them full support, especially to El Alfy Bey. Once again the European system decided the fate of Egypt.

#### *The Egyptian People:*

Although it may be very difficult to accept that the Egyptian people were a significant power themselves, they nevertheless played a vital role in deciding the outcome of the power struggle. Ignorant, devoid of political experience or nationalism for more

than seven centuries, and above all, lacking an organized military machinery like the other parties, they remained the anonymous force in the arena.

Underdevelopment was a dominant factor. The French were shocked when they first entered the ancient and historical city of Alexandria. One member of the expedition wrote that "The streets were unpaved and filthy, except for few date palms...there were no trees... the yearly epidemic of bubonic plague had just run its course".<sup>30</sup> The rest of the country was much the same. Cairo was described by the French officer Denon in the following terms, "...except for Esbekiya square,...the city was a warren of narrow unpaved streets. Rubbish lay all about on every side, the haunt of scattering dogs and cats in the worst slums"; another wrote that there was, "not a single beautiful building... they build as little as they can help, they never repair."<sup>31</sup> There was no sign of the riches or civilization of ancient Egypt and the once heart of the Islamic world lay in despair. Very often the writings of Al Djabarti mentions that a certain year was to begin with a state of drought, famine and economic hardship for the people. Fatal diseases such as the plague were widespread and local rulers made no effort to remedy this situation. Perhaps the state of isolation imposed on the Egyptians for centuries lead them to believe that "this was the best of all possible worlds".

The Egyptian people were victims of a corrupt and barren political system. Education was limited to Al Azhar and minor local schools. The people bore increasingly heavy taxes. As was the case with most of the Arab states under the Ottoman rule, the general idea was that the unity of the *gamaa*, or the Muslim community at large, superseded any sense of nationalism. Faith, obedience and loyalty to the Caliphate system was like the Trinity to a Christian. The Sunni idea of uniting the community of Islam

under the leadership of the Caliph dominated the minds of the people. Thus when the Ottomans took control in 1801, the Egyptian people shouted in the streets once again, "God grant victory to the Sultan."<sup>32</sup>

These ideas were bound to change in the face of the French political-revolutionary ideas and liberal customs. This developed further as the people endured the inefficient bureaucracy of the Ottomans and the Mamelukes once more. Moreover, the spirit of political passiveness that had plagued the Egyptian political life ended as a result of their first revolt in centuries, against the French. After the French campaign the Egyptians were never to be the same. A split had occurred between unquestionable obedience to the Sultan and Caliphate system on the one hand, and Egyptian nationalism and a sense of patriotism on the other. This was perhaps the strongest manifestation of the cultural link the French campaign introduced between the Egyptians and the Europeans.

Though weak and disorganized, they possessed the keys to power through their uncovered strength: revolts and tax paying. This fact was recognized only by a young Albanian officer in the Ottoman *nizam-i-jedid* named Mohammed Ali.

#### *Mohammed Ali and the Ottoman Albanian Faction:*

The final bidders for power in Egypt were Mohammed Ali and the Ottoman forces of Albanian origin. There is some controversy as to the date of the arrival of the Albanian troops to Egypt. Some historians claim that it was in March 1801.<sup>33</sup> However, some historians refuse to commit themselves to any fixed date.<sup>34</sup> It is, however a fact that by March 1801, Albanian forces were present in Egypt. It was in this month that the British entered into an alliance with the Ottomans and defeated the French at the Battle of El

Rahmania.<sup>35</sup> It was during this battle that Mohammed Ali impressed the Ottoman Commander and the leader of the Ottoman-Albanian group by his courage.<sup>36</sup>

The total number of their forces is also unclear and most historians devote little attention to this issue. Some suggest an overestimated figure of forty thousand men, including Ottoman Turks, Syrians, Albanians, Acreans and other ethnic forces.<sup>37</sup> Nevertheless, they were a strong force, and as soon as the Ottoman force diminished in size, they assumed control of the city. The Albanian group was led by a Tahir Pasha, an ambitious man who hoped to be designated *Vali* by the Sultan. However, he was assassinated by the mobs in Cairo and left the Albanian force to Mohammed Ali Bey and returned home.

Mohammed Ali was an Albanian born in the city of Kavala, near Salonika.<sup>38</sup> He was the only son to survive among his 17 brothers and sisters. He joined the *nizam-i-jedid* in his adolescence, and then left it to become a tobacco salesman. Later, he was chosen by the governor to be among the three hundred soldiers sent to Egypt to join the Ottoman army against the French.<sup>39</sup> He was second in command to the governor's son, a certain Ali Agha, who shortly after their arrival left command to Mohammed Ali.

As a result of the courage he displayed at the Battle of Al Rahmania, he was promoted to the rank of General (*liwaa*) by the Captain Pasha of the Ottoman fleet in Alexandria and introduced to Husrev Pasha, the appointed *Vali* of Egypt.<sup>40</sup> This promotion provided the young man with sufficient seniority to become the second in command to Tahir Pasha, the head of the Albanian division in the Ottoman army in Cairo. From that date onwards, this young Albanian began his quest to overcome his opponents and assume the viceroyalty of Egypt.

*The power struggle:*

With Egypt under the *de facto* control of Britain, the affairs were left to Yusuf Pasha El Vezir, commander of the Ottoman army in Egypt. France's influence on the events waned following its evacuation, although it later grew when Paris sided with the Mameluke faction led by Ibrahim Bey.

Although the British accepted their relationship with the Mamelukes, this policy was not without difficulty. The first problem was that of the division between El Alfy Bey and Bardeissy Bey. At the same time, British opinion was divided regarding the extent of British assistance to the Mamelukes. In 1801, the British government proposed to the Sublime Porte a policy in Egypt which included, *inter alia*, the restoration of the Mamelukes to their original role, as long as they paid tribute to the Sultan, the creation of an Egyptian army to be trained and headed by a British officer, as well as other institutional and administrative reforms which could strengthen Egypt's position.<sup>41</sup>

However the Sublime Porte rejected this offer in the hope of ridding itself completely from the Mamelukes. The British assured the Porte that they had no intentions of encroaching upon its sovereignty over Egypt, and at the same time, tried to reconcile the Ottomans and the Mamelukes. Immediately after Hüsrev Pasha's appointment as *Vali* in Egypt, he began a large scale persecution of the Mamelukes. It was alleged that he organized a gathering in order to apprehend the leaders of the Mamelukes in Cairo, including Ibrahim Bey and Bardeissy Bey, while at the same time he dispatched Tahir Pasha at the head of the Albanian forces in his army to capture El Alfy Bey in Upper Egypt.<sup>42</sup> The British reaction was swift. Hutchison, the British Military Commander in Giza, mobilized his forces to move against Cairo, and sent Hüsrev Pasha an ultimatum



demanding the immediate release of the Mamelukes.<sup>43</sup> Hüsrev had no choice but to release the Mamelukes to the British at which point they were confined to Giza before going to Upper Egypt to regain their strength, much to the dismay of Hüsrev. This temporarily removed the Mamelukes from the scene, but neither eliminated them nor lost them British support.

At this point the situation in Cairo worsened. The Ottoman army and its elements were unpaid and began massive looting campaigns in the city. What made matters even more critical was Hüsrev Pasha's practice of demanding more taxes than the Egyptians could pay. Popular resentment began to increase.

Not only had Hüsrev lost faith with the British, but he endured guerrilla warfare by the Mamelukes, resulting in a series of major defeats for the Ottomans throughout 1802. In 1803 Husrev committed the worst mistake by refusing to pay the Albanians and announcing that he planned to send them home.<sup>44</sup> This triggered a mutiny among the Albanian soldiers, forcing him to flee Cairo with some of his forces. The Albanians were now independent of the Ottoman army. Tahir knew that he needed an ally to repel Husrev, the only choice was to ally himself with the Mamelukes. Thus an alliance between El Bardeissy and Tahir Pasha was established, probably to the delight of the British.

As Tahir Pasha attempted to secure the legitimate title through a *Ferman* from the Sublime Porte, he was attacked and assassinated amidst the political and military chaos in Cairo. Some believe that he was assassinated by the Ottoman soldiers, who demanded their salaries. and when he refused to pay, they decapitated him in hope his head would win a reward from Hüsrev Pasha. Instead, they were seized and murdered by the Albanians.<sup>45</sup> With Tahir's death, the leadership of the Albanians fell to Mohammed Ali



who began to plan how to eliminate the contenders for power. When fate eliminated Tahir Pasha, Mohammed Ali was left with the Mamelukes and Hüsrev as the only contenders.<sup>46</sup>

The British were in a state of confusion. Events had taken them by full surprise and none of their officials bargained for Mohammed Ali. He was rarely mentioned in the reports of their diplomats or consuls in Egypt or Istanbul prior to the death of Tahir Pasha. This should not come as a surprise, for he was not even mentioned by most historians, not even Al Djabarti's daily and monthly accounts of the history of Egypt, except around the year 1803, when he appeared as a potential bidder for power. El Alfy Bey left Egypt with the British. This decision by the British commanding officer upon his evacuation of Egypt was described as one of personal initiative without the prior consent of London.<sup>47</sup> Although this assertion may or may not be true, the British nonetheless kept him for some time. Some claimed that the British planned to land him when the time was appropriate to facilitate their reoccupation of Egypt, or to declare him viceroy and through him rule Egypt indirectly. In the meantime, British policy was to render assistance to the other Mamelukes, who were also in contact with French consuls in Cairo and Alexandria in the hope of gaining further support.

Mohammed Ali moved to benefit from the power struggles between the different factions, as well as instigating dissension every now and then. Another policy of his was to align himself with the Egyptian population, especially *Naquib El Ashraaf* "The Dean of Nobles", Omar Makram, who organized local resistance in Cairo during the two revolts against the French. He portrayed himself as champion of their cause by appealing to their misery and aspiration. He accepted the terms of Omar Makram by accepting the right of the *Ulema and Aeyan* to depose him if he proved to be unjust. What made him more

popular was the means by which he was able to exploit every event to increase his popular support, with such examples as publicly denouncing Husrev's new taxes while breaking the grain embargo imposed by the Mamelukes on Cairo for personal gains.<sup>48</sup>

The alliance between Mohammed Ali and Bardeissy, effectively the sole leader of the Mamelukes in Egypt at the time, was immediately established. Together they fought Husrev, who fled Cairo to the port of Damietta. The result of the battle of Damietta was the defeat of the Ottomans, the arrest of Husrev Pasha and his deportation to Cairo as a political prisoner in the Citadel.<sup>49</sup> Though this seems to end the rule of Hüsrev in Egypt, it by no means terminated the struggle between him and Mohammed Ali. As Husrev's star began to reappear in the years to come, so did Mohammed Ali. Both these men were essentially enemies throughout, and the former did not forget the fact that Mohammed Ali curbed his powers in Egypt and threw him out in a very humiliating manner. This fact remained a very important element in the relationship between Mohammed Ali and the Porte, especially when Husrev was appointed Commander of the Navy during the war in Morea, and when he became Sadrazzam during the second Ottoman-Egyptian war in 1839. (Chapters IV, 4.1 and V 5.2)

The Bardeissy - Ali alliance, continued until the latter found the moment to maximize his political benefits and terminate the relationship. The Sublime Porte quickly issued a *Ferman* appointing Ali El Gezairley Pasha *Vali* over Egypt.<sup>50</sup> Bardeissey was once again put to use by Mohammed Ali, whereby he was convinced to refuse this new *Vali*. Shortly, he asked the new Pasha to come from Alexandria with only 200 men as was the custom while entering Cairo. He refused to accept this and was unable to enter Cairo. As he faced these problems, the Mamelukes, according to Al Djabarti, developed a

conspiracy that cost him his life.<sup>51</sup> The Sublime Porte was forced to issue a new *Ferman* appointing Hursit (Khourhid ) Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt.

The British, watching the developments in Egypt, decided that the time was ripe to restore El Alfy,<sup>52</sup> and landed him on the shores of Alexandria in February 1804. El Bardeissy was determined not to have any competition, but at the same time unwilling to start a war. It was left to Mohammed Ali to convince him to show animosity against El Alfy Bey. The combined forces of Ali - Bardeissy crushed El Alfy's forces shortly after he landed and forced him to escape, temporarily ending the danger.

The time was ripe to break the pact with Bardeissy, and therefore he immediately began demanding paying the Albanian soldiers, which in turn instigated a general resentment against the Mamelukes. Bardeissy responded by levying taxes and the people rebelled. This gave Ali the opportunity to rise up and defeat him. However, he was then faced with Hursit Pasha and the renewed power of Al Alfy Bey.

Hursit Pasha not only represented a threat to Mohammed Ali's aims in Egypt, but any attempt to obstruct his presence would lead to problems with the Sublime Porte which could crush his ambitions. In addition, Ali had yet to gather the necessary support to lead him to an indirect struggle with Istanbul. Therefore, he continued to align himself with the legitimate ruler of Egypt while biding for time. In doing so, he liberated Hüsrev Pasha, then a Mameluke prisoner, and displayed signs of obedience to the Porte.

Hursit Pasha was unlike his predecessor, in that he was more cautious and planned to rid himself of the the Mamelukes and the Albanians as well. Thus upon his arrival he requested the military support of nearly five thousand *Delis*, who were ruthless and undisciplined Syrian warriors, to assist him in his struggle against the Albanians and the

Mamelukes.<sup>53</sup> Mohammed Ali preoccupied himself fighting the Mamelukes who began an economic blockade over Cairo. Although he defeated them and lifted the blockade, he could not end the Mameluk threat since he was forced to focus on Hursit Pasha and his new *Delis*.

The lack of political talent of the *Vali* and the extent of the anarchy which existed in Cairo as a result of the undisciplined *Delis*, was the major cause for the establishment of Mohammed Ali in the hearts of the Egyptian people. Amidst these events, Hürşit Pasha appointed Mohammed Ali as vali to the *Vilayet* of Jedda, which was by that time boiling as a result of the Wahabby movement. Mohammed Ali intelligently enough, accepted the appointment from the Egyptian *Vali*, though he was determined to remain in Egypt.

The Egyptian people, lead by Omar Makram, reorganized themselves in military forms as they did during the French campaign and prepared for possible combat. The leaders of the *Ulema and Aeyan* entered a pact with Mohammed Ali, whereby they established him *Vali* instead of Hursit Pasha, provided that Mohammed Ali would be just and pious. It was agreed that the new *Vali* would impose no taxes without their consent and if he did, they would impeach him. In this way they could check his powers.

Refusing to recognize the *Ferman*, the leaders began a popular movement to install Mohammed Ali as *Vali*. On the twelfth of May 1805, Cairo witnessed riots in the form of popular rebellion. The French consul reported that Cairo resembled Paris during the first days of the 1789 revolution.<sup>54</sup> They demonstrated in the streets and asked for the *Vali's* removal. To add legitimacy to this decision, whether on the part of Mohammed Ali or the rioting leaders, the latter requested through letters to Istanbul, a *Ferman* appointing

Mohammed Ali as *Vali* over Egypt. In the meantime, Hursit was surrounded in the Citadel.

Hurşit being an obstinate man, refused to give in. The stalemate broke when a *Ferman* arrived appointing Mohammed Ali *Kaymakam* over Egypt. Hursit refused to accept it under the pretext that he was awaiting replies for his own letters to the Sublime Porte. Mohammed Ali refused to wait and attacked Hurşit's main forces, thereby taking his differences to the battle field. Notwithstanding the internal struggle in Cairo, the Sublime Porte dispatched its fleet under Ramiz Pasha with two thousand five hundred soldiers to Alexandria in order to officially instate Mohammed Ali. However, Ramiz Pasha was instructed to judge who should rule Egypt, and if necessary aid Hursit Pasha.<sup>55</sup> There were signs of British negotiations with Ramiz Pasha, as well as Hurşit. Mohammed Ali also began formal talks with the Ottoman captain immediately.

After fending off an attack by the Mamelukes, Mohammed Ali counterattacked the Mamelukes at Giza, liberating the city by September 1805. Ramiz Pasha left Cairo after persuading Hursit Pasha to surrender and returned with him to Istanbul. As he departed Alexandria, Ramiz Pasha allegedly claimed that, "*I have left Egypt in the hands of a man that the state {the Ottoman Empire} will find him to be one of her greatest adversary. Our Sultans have not found a similar man {Mohammed Ali} in his cunning, firmness and will*".<sup>56</sup> The battle with Hurşit was over, but Mohammed Ali's war for *de facto* control of Egypt continued.

Mohammed Ali believed the final contender was Al Alfi Bey who had arrived from Britain. Though defeated by the combined forces of Ali-Bardeissy, Ali pursued the Mamelukes of El Bardeissy viewing them as the stronger foe. Also Mohammed Ali

focused on Hursit. This allowed El Alfy sufficient time to regroup his army of Mamelukes and Bedouins. Furthermore, El Alfy was fortunate enough to learn that the Sublime Porte had substituted Mohammed Ali with a new *Vali*, Musa Pasha.<sup>57</sup> Now Mohammed Ali was forced to fight El Alfy as well as the Porte's new appointee, a task which proved to be too difficult considering his circumstances at the time.

Mohammed Ali's genius did not fail him. After considering his position, he approached the *Ulema and Aeyans* to obtain their support for his rule in Egypt. They in turn, wrote to the Captain in charge of the Ottoman fleet transporting the new *Vali*, so as to keep Mohammed Ali *Vali* over Egypt. He also procrastinated in executing the orders of the Porte and bargained for time. In the meantime, Alfy's forces were deployed in the delta to show the commander of the Turkish fleet Mohammed Ali's inability to control the situation at hand. However, he faced unexpectedly strong resistance from the delta city of Damanhour, and was unable to subdue it.<sup>58</sup> Viewing this failure, the commander of the Ottoman fleet in Alexandria reappraised developments in Egypt, and according to his instructions from Istanbul, sought to choose the *Vali* according to the circumstances.

At this stage Mohammed Ali employed bribery, a tool he mastered over time. He bribed both the Commander and the Sublime Porte. In the first case, he established contacts with Salih Pasha, Commander of the Ottoman fleet and through his envoys gave huge sums of money in form of presents to him and his crew.<sup>59</sup> As for the Sublime Porte, Mohammed Ali pledged to send an annual tribute of four thousand purses, and left his son Ibrahim as hostage in Istanbul until he fulfilled his pledge. It should be noted that bribery was not the only means employed by Mohammed Ali, for Salih Pasha was disappointed at the attitude of the Mamelukes, especially with the lack of unity between both El Alfy and



El Bardeissy, rendering them of little use to the Porte and himself. The Ottoman fleet left Alexandria with Musa Pasha as well as Ibrahim the son of Mohammed Ali in October 1806, thereby giving a temporary, but crucial victory to Mohammed Ali, leaving the Mamelukes as his only foes.

The Mameluke problem was easier now that El Alfy was demoralized as a result of the Ottoman fleet's failure to depose Mohammed Ali. Further, El Alfy's troops deserted him as it became apparent there would be no British support. Moreover, El Bardeissy refused to provide assistance thereby weakening him further. In desperation, El Alfy marched against Cairo, lifting the siege on Damanhour. His army was still intact though not as strong as before. Here fortune once again intervened on behalf of Mohammed Ali and El Alfy died as a result of cholera before he began combat with Mohammed Ali in Cairo. His death most certainly led to the dismemberment of his force, which fell to the command of the new Mameluke leader, Shaheen Bey, who lacked the charisma which El Alfy used to hold the Bedouin together. This in itself was a major victory for Mohammed Ali who appeared more as the undisputed ruler of Egypt. The death of El Bardeissy some weeks before El Alfy further strengthened his position.

The British and French governments watched developments in Egypt with perplexity. France was totally outwitted by events and its gamble on Bardeissy and Ibrahim failed. France's position with regard to the Porte was rather favorable in that Russia's continued animosity towards the Ottomans forced the latter into the arms of the French. (See Chapter II ) This increased British fears of a possible French invasion of Egypt.<sup>60</sup>

Despite the general causes that might have led the British to undertake an invasion of Egypt, it seems more probable to attribute this campaign to two major causes besides



the aforementioned. First, there existed a British fear that the French might try to regain Egypt. However, this should have been temporarily pacified given the lack of French naval power after the battle of Trafalgar. Had it not been for the insistence of Misset, the British Consul in Egypt, who in his reports continuously stressed that Mohammed Ali was allying himself further with the French Consul in Cairo, the British might not have taken this step.<sup>61</sup> Furthermore, these reports offered a rosy picture on the possibility of an alliance with the Mamelukes. Second, British relations with the Sublime Porte worsened at that point in time, due to the rapprochement between Istanbul and Paris, resulting in a state of armed conflict and the attempt of the British fleet under the command of Admiral Duckworth to enter the Dardanelles. Therefore, there was no reason for them not to undertake an Egyptian campaign, which represented both a blow to Ottoman influence, and fulfilled Britain's coveted ambitions to conquer Egypt.<sup>62</sup>

The British landed a force of five thousand men on the beaches of Alexandria in March 1807 under the command of General Fraser. Alexandria offered little resistance, but acting on the advice of Misset, the General ordered a portion of his force to take the city of Rashid. This campaign resulted in a catastrophe. The British force was surprised and its soldiers were massacred in the streets of Rashid by the local population. The failure of this expedition cost Fraser not only a great deal of men, but increased Egyptian morale and resistance.

At this point, Mohammed Ali suspended his chase of the Mamelukes and returned to Cairo to organize Egyptian forces against the British. His situation was difficult, but not critical. Once again his major allies, the Egyptian people and their leaders, furnished his army with money and materiel to resist the British advance.<sup>63</sup> Fortunately for him, Fraser

insisted on invading Rashid once again with a larger force, but, it was too late, Mohammed Ali had already dispatched a combined force of Albanians and *Delis* to resist them. The result was a second British defeat. By September there were signs of peace. The treaty of withdrawal of the British forces was completed on September 14th, 1807, after negotiations between Mohammed Ali and two British officers, General Scherbrook and Captain Fellows.<sup>64</sup>

Once again fortune played a decisive factor in the withdrawal of the British forces from Egypt and saved the rule of Mohammed Ali. Although some authors ignore the possibility of an agreement between El Alfy and the British to combine forces and synchronize an attack against the *Vali*, nevertheless, there seems sufficient evidence to point to the opposite. To begin with, the British arrived on the 17th of March, and Alfi died on the 28th of January 1807,<sup>65</sup> that is to say, forty eight days before the arrival of Fraser. It is doubtful that this was a coincidence. The number of British forces - 5000, was by no means sufficient to subdue Egypt, especially if one considers the fact that Bonaparte's forces exceeded thirty six thousand men. Hence it seems illogical to assume that General Fraser could have accomplished this task without a pre-negotiated settlement with El Alfy.

These were the reasons why the Fraser campaign, as it is known, failed. However, Ghorbal offers another explanation. He believes that the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 between Bonaparte and Tsar Alexander I, played a fundamental role in divorcing the Ottomans from France, thereby causing the British to change their policy towards the Sublime Porte, which influenced events in Egypt. (See Chapter II) Canning confirmed this policy on August 14th, 1807 by instructing Paget, his plenipotentiary on a mission to Istanbul, that,

"H.M.G was willing to recognize the government of the Porte in whatever part of its dominions its residence may be established...and maintain with it the closest friendship and connections".<sup>66</sup>

Regardless of the analysis one makes of this campaign, it still shows that the international turn of events in the European theater, as well as the fortunate timing for the death of El Alfy and the two defeats of the British, all culminated in the strengthening of Mohammed Ali's position in Egypt. In September 1807, after the British withdrawal, Ali remained the only victor in the power struggle in Egypt that lasted from 1801-1807. He was now the sole *de jure* and the *de facto* ruler of Egypt. The only remaining task was the destruction of the Mamelukes of Bardeissy and Alfi, as well as limiting the role of the leaders of the *Ulema and Aeyan*, and ridding Egypt of undisciplined soldiers.

Skirmishes continued between the Mamelukes and Ali, the last of which was the Battle of El Bahansa in 1810 where the Mamelukes were defeated.<sup>67</sup> From then onwards, the Mamelukes were pacified. Most of them made peace with Mohammed Ali and remained in Cairo while others preferred to stay in upper Egypt. Despite the pacification of the Mamelukes, Mohammed Ali wanted to expel them from Egypt. In 1810, he gathered what remained of them in Cairo to celebrate the departure of his son Toson Pasha to fight the Wahhabis in the Arabian Peninsula. As the columns advanced from the Citadel to the streets of Cairo, the Mamelukes were last in the parade, and when the last of the regular troops left, the doors of the citadel were closed and the trap sprung. Muskets appeared from every side against the Mamelukes who were exterminated to the last man,<sup>68</sup> thereby ending a political existence that lasted for eight hundred years.

Having terminated the Mameluke danger, the Mohammed Ali was convinced that any attempt to enforce his future plans in Egypt depended on ridding himself of those leaders of the people who represented a check on his powers. He put to use the principle of "divide and rule", which was not a very difficult policy to employ, because the leaders themselves were disunited. Using money or privileges to foster division, he shifted their focus from public to personal affairs. He fabricated a crisis with Omar Makram and exiled him. By 1810 he succeeded in neutralizing the *Aeyan* and became the sole ruler of Egypt.

This was the final result of the power struggle in Egypt. As a result of Mohammed Ali's political talents and good luck, he alone stood undefeated. He later commented that "Fortune could be like a storm that leads the ship into the harbor quickly, but if the captain was not clever, his ship will be wrecked easily",<sup>69</sup> thus implying that one requires more than hard work and consistency to succeed; he has to be clever. This man combined the three elements of a successful prince according to Machiavelli. He was as shrewd as a fox, strong as a lion, and "fortuna" was always his ally.

### **3.3 The Second Phase of the Egyptian Question: The Preparatory Phase:**

The second phase of the Egyptian question, or the preparatory phase, began just after the withdrawal of the British forces from Alexandria in 1807. The reason this date marks the beginning of the second phase is because it points to the settlement of the power struggle in Egypt, the beginning of a reform movement, and building an empire by Mohammed Ali. Unlike the previous stage, this one did not witness interventions by foreign powers. Moreover, Mohammed Ali reestablished relations with the main powers of Europe, Britain and France, besides avoiding problems with the Porte.

#### **A. The Foreign Policy of Mohammed Ali:**

As events in Europe influenced the fate of Egypt along the lines mentioned earlier, the new *Vali* did not attempt anything irrational. He understood that his survival depended on his association with a European state. He knew that he could not ignore the fact that the Porte wanted to get rid of him and at the same time, it proved difficult to obtain the support of a European power.<sup>70</sup> The European system at that stage was volatile as a result of the disequilibrium created by France, which made the task of aligning Egypt with a power more difficult. The development of events in Europe left Mohammed Ali no choice but to bargain for an alliance with Britain. Though he never trusted them, he thought that they might be of some assistance.

The conditions of the European system towards the end of 1808 continued to affect the status of Egypt, yet there was no impelling factor that led either the British, the French nor the Ottomans to invade Egypt. A rapprochement between Britain and the

Ottomans excluded the possibility of a British invasion, (See Chapter II, 2.4: **B The Ottoman European Diplomacy**) while the British supremacy in the Mediterranean cost the French the chance for such an invasion. The Ottomans were consumed in the Russian front, to the degree that they had trouble defending themselves, least of all prepare a campaign to depose Mohammed Ali. From then onward, Mohammed Ali did not fear the intervention of the Porte or the French as much as he feared possible British involvement in Egyptian affairs in case Britain's relations with the Porte soured. The end of the Fraser campaign did not end Mohammed Ali's fears that Britain might try a new invasion, and he lived with this concern until the British actually orchestrated the downfall of his grand designs in 1840.

Mohammed Ali's foreign policy with Britain was characterized by an approach of appeasement. This approach could be traced to the time of the Fraser campaign, for his farsightedness led him to permit the evacuation of their forces from Egypt without harassment and he did not mistreat British prisoners, for it was the custom then to decapitate them and hang their heads on sticks on the entrance of Cairo. This gesture aimed at keeping good relations with Britain for the future, since he was convinced that Britain, the sole maritime power in the world and in control of the Mediterranean, was the most influential power at least in as far as Egypt was concerned. Through 1840, Mohammed Ali feared a second British invasion, that is perhaps why he acted to terminate the Mamelukes as soon as possible to avoid a British war by proxy.

After the evacuation, he developed a policy of attracting them towards an alliance. By 1808 he proposed an alliance to their Consul in Egypt whereby Britain would help Egypt attain independence, while Egypt would provide facilities for its fleet.<sup>71</sup>

Unfortunately for him, Britain was preparing for the Treaty of the Dardanelles, and therefore, prepared for its war efforts against France on the continent. For the time being, it hoped to seduce the Porte into an alliance against France and hence rejected Mohammed Ali's offer. (See Chapter II, 65-8)

To maintain the friendship of the British, he began trading with them. He was convinced that this was the only means to avoid a possible future invasion. He supplied the British fleet with grain, and, fortuitously, grain prices and harvest sizes were high. This trade gave Mohammed Ali a profit of 500% as well as the friendship of the British, which fell short of an alliance.<sup>72</sup> Other initiatives of friendship by the Egyptian Pasha included his decision in 1808 to permit the British to have some temporary facilities in the port of Alexandria. By 1812, he suggested to the British once again an alliance provided that the British would help him gain independence from the Porte. London's reply was unfavorable, for the Minister of War emphasized, "...As long as the state of peace between H.M Government and the Porte is maintained, H.M can not authorize you to engage in any contractual obligations incompatible with good faith which it has to observe".<sup>73</sup>

It was only then that the Pasha realized that this was the extent of friendship he was to get from the British, who were unwilling to sacrifice relations with the Porte, especially during the war underway in Europe. Following the war, things remained unchanged since Britain had become the defender of the Ottoman integrity for strategic reasons. Any support for Egypt could foster a separatist movement in the Ottoman body, and be incompatible with their policy of Ottoman integration. (See Chapter II, 67-9) For this reason, relations with Egypt were unchanged for the next few decades and Britain refused Egyptian attempts at friendship. Indeed, there were even frictions with



Mohammed Ali, especially during the Hijaz campaign when Egyptian forces subdued Yemen on behalf of the Porte while the British attempted to secure the port of Mocha for their trade route in India. Further problems appeared when Mohammed Ali's forces reached the Persian Gulf, an area Britain consider out of bounds for Egypt since it affected its trade route to India. Mohammed Ali was forced to withdraw.

The French, however, were eager to consolidate their position in Egypt through diplomatic means, though at certain intervals they contemplated militarily conquest. Their Consul Drovetti was a very active man. He established good relations with the Pasha to the extent that the second language in Egypt after Arabic became French. Certainly, Drovetti and his colleagues played an important role in process of enlightenment in Egypt.

Mohammed Ali knew that attempts to obtain independence from the Porte depended upon either British or French support, therefore, he attempted to win the support of both parties. His efforts to obtain an alliance with the French were as unsuccessful as those with the British. In fact, Cairo was not high on the priority list of Bonaparte at this time. Their policy in Egypt was aimed at frustrating the British rapprochement with Mohammed Ali. Their Consuls constantly referred to the *Vali* when they felt increasing British influence.<sup>74</sup> It is recorded that when the French Consul Drovetti learned that Egypt had granted facilities to the British fleet, he immediately sought a conference with the Pasha. In his letter to Paris, Drovetti claimed that the Pasha of Egypt assured him that " He can not depend on the signs provided by the Britain... He swore upon the honor of his sword that he refused any British condition placing him under their protection..."<sup>75</sup> French consuls maintained a presence in Egypt for the day when they could play a more effective role.

However, the relationship between Egypt and France did not develop until after the Vienna Congress and the restoration of peace in Europe, once again showing the influence of the ongoing events in Europe on Egyptian politics. Since the French withdrawal in 1801, no French trade ship entered the harbor of Alexandria for years. This changed and soon European politics permitted the rapprochement between Egypt and France, especially after the reintegration of France into the European family. Mohammed Ali depended a great deal on France for the reformation movement in Egypt. He sent the Egyptian education missions to Paris and other French cities. His new army was established in the years that followed along French lines and their French assistance. The relationship developed new horizons to the extent that France sought help from Mohammed Ali in 1830 to subdue Algeria. (See Chapter IV) It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that Egypt could be considered the extension of French interests in the south, during the 1820's.

As for relations between Mohammed Ali and the Porte, he did what he could to satisfy the Porte to avoid its wrath and his possible dismissal. Since his armies were still undeveloped and his mercenaries unreliable, his position was too vulnerable for an aggressive posture. However, the Porte was focused on the Russian front and this provided the breathing space he needed. At the same time, he dreamt of an empire of his own, with Egypt at its center including the Arabian Peninsula, the Sudan, Libya, Greater Syria and if possible Anatolia. But he knew that the European system was not ready to accept these plans, and more importantly, his financial and political position was fragile. So he continued to appease the Porte as well as Britain and France.

It was within this framework that the new Pasha formulated his foreign policy. His relationship with the Porte was strained by mutual mistrust. The Porte viewed Mohammed Ali as a lawful usurper of power in Egypt. While he was appointed *Kaymakam* by an official *Ferman*, the Porte was suspicious as to his ambitions, and tried unsuccessfully to transfer him twice to another *Vilayet*.<sup>76</sup> The failure of British attempt to invade Egypt in 1807 consolidated his position as *Vali vis-a-vis* the Porte. He saved Egypt and this fact strengthened his position in the Porte which could not assist him against the British.

By 1808, Mohammed Ali's intentions of independence was known to every Consul in Egypt and the Porte as well, though he continued to perform the act of allegiance to the Sultan. Even the Porte depended on him in several occasions for assistance. He was asked to intervene to quell the Wahhabi religious movement in Hijaz in 1807 on behalf of the Porte. He was further requested in 1808 to follow the Porte's policies against France.<sup>77</sup> In June 13th 1809 the grand Vezir Yusuf Pasha wrote to Mohammed Ali requesting a considerable sum of money for the military preparations of the Porte against Russia. This was not uncommon, in that the Porte frequently requested money from her *vilayet*, however, the words in this letter, as did other ones, reflected the true position of Mohammed Ali *vis-a-vis* the Porte. It was not a letter from the superior to the subordinate, on the contrary, it was more like a letter between two equals. Youssef Pasha described Mohammed Ali as the savior of Egypt and the Porte, and very often referred to him as the "Friend of the State", "Minister of the State" and "Your Excellency".<sup>78</sup>

The policy of acquiescence with the Porte continued, and as soon as Mohammed Ali's position was consolidated, he asked for nominal independence. In 1810, he wrote to

his envoy to Istanbul, Neguib Effendi, requesting him to convey to the Porte his request "... to declare Egypt free "*serbest*" like the *Ojak* of Algiers and others, and in this case if hostilities breaks out between England and the Ottoman Empire, (he) shall be in harmony with the British, and could circulate five or ten big ships (*trade vessels* under the flag of an *Ojak*... and send Egyptian provisions to the Porte through it".<sup>79</sup> The Porte refused to grant Egypt this status, even though it could have been conditional until the cessation of hostilities with the Britain. On the contrary, his envoy to Istanbul Neguib effendi concluded that the Porte promised to fulfill all his requests if he fought against the Wahhabis.<sup>80</sup> This was clearly an attempt to stall Mohammed Ali and persuade him to go to war in Arabia. Though he abided by the Porte's decision, he was nevertheless, unhappy with the failure of his scheme.

Carrying out the war on behalf of the Porte did not alter the *Vali's* desires, but merely represented the policy of acquiescence he followed in the face of the refusal of European powers to offer their friendship. By the end of the Wahhabi war and their final defeat in 1818, the Porte gave the *vilayet* of Hijaz to his son Ibrahim Pasha, then the commander in chief of the Egyptian armies. Some believe that this was an attempt by the Porte to create a division between the Father and the son so as to weaken Mohammed Ali, especially since the Porte could not rid itself from him.<sup>81</sup> From then onward, the Egyptian Vali maintained a relationship of a semi-equality with the Porte. Moreover, the Porte used him further, especially during the Greek War of Independence though at this time under his own conditions. As time progressed, Mohammed Ali was convinced that independence had to be obtained by force and not by *Ferman*, leading to two wars with the Porte.

As is evident, Egyptian affairs were closely linked to development in the European system. Mohammed Ali's policy towards Britain, France and the Porte was to a great extent controlled by the dynamics of this system. In general, the Egyptian Question in this phase was less active than that during the previous one, because the system in Europe was more focused on the events taking place in the continent unlike the period from 1798-1807. That is attributed to British, Russian and Austrian focus on and efforts of restricting French activities on the continent. Nevertheless, the seeds for future crises and the development of this question were laid at that stage as a result of two main factors, the first of which was the Egyptian expansionist policy and the expansion of the Egyptian military machinery along modern European lines.

#### **B. Egyptian Expansion:**

Egyptian expansion began as early as 1811 with the military campaign in Hijaz-Arabian Peninsula. Traditionally the Hijaz was a very important *vilayet* in the Ottoman Empire. That was not because it represented an important asset economically or strategically. On the contrary, its value was its control of the holy places of Islam. Being the official Caliph, the Ottoman Sultans needed sovereignty over it for political purposes and as a means to preserve Islamic unity among the different Islamic *vilayet* of the Empire. The eighteenth century witnessed the development of a semi-theocratic state based on the preaching of an extremist Mohammed Ibn Abd El Wahhab and his association with the Saud family. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, this new theocratic state overwhelmed the peninsula, to the detriment of the Ottoman sovereignty.<sup>82</sup> Extremism could be tolerated in the Peninsula, however, the political repercussion of such a rightist

movement had a negative effect on the Ottomans, for it spread to Yemen, Libya and other places, thereby jeopardizing the political legitimacy of the Ottoman rule over the Islamic states. What instigated the Ottoman reaction was the decision of the Saudis to prevent the annual pilgrimage from Syria and Egypt and the expulsion of the Ottoman garrison stationed there in 1806.<sup>83</sup>

The *Valis* of Syria and Iraq were ordered to begin hostilities against the Saudis in Hijaz. Both failed, forcing the Porte to turn to Mohammed Ali to defeat the new theocratic state. Requests for the Egyptian intervention in Arabia were made for the first time in 1806-7, however, the unstable political situation in Egypt would not permit Mohammed Ali to embark on such a project. For the next four years, the Egyptian *Vali* procrastinated in following the orders of the Sultan. However by 1811 he was prepared to fulfill the orders of the Sultan and he dispatched a force consisting of Albanians, Moroccans and several other mercenaries under the leadership of his son Tuson.<sup>84</sup>

There are several interpretations as to why Mohammed Ali accepted this order. He probably realized the strategic and political importance of the Arabian peninsula for Egypt. It was what we may call the near abroad policy followed by many of the other Egyptian empires, such as the Mamelukes. Moreover, if he was to have an empire, the time was ripe for him to begin expansion especially that he was acting under the umbrella of the Porte. Mohammed Ali also found this war a useful method of ridding Egypt of his mercenary forces and to initiate a military reform movement for the establishment of a modern army. It could also be argued that the Egyptian *Vali* was in position to turn down the Porte's request but within the context of his policy of acquiescence he was forced to go.



The Arabian campaign was serious and bloody.<sup>85</sup> The Egyptian army suffered from several initial defeat, disease, and thirst but in the end they were successful as a result of the leadership demonstrated by Ibrahim, another son of Mohammed Ali, who assumed command following the demise of his brother Tuson. It took the Egyptians seven years to destroy the first Saudi state. At the final battle of Al Dereia (then capital of the Saudis) in March 1818, the leader of the Saudi state, Ibn Saud, was captured and sent to Egypt. Mohammed Ali exerted a great deal of effort to spare his life of Ibn Saud, but according to the Sultan's will, he was sent over to Istanbul where he was condemned to death on December 19, 1818.<sup>86</sup> As a reward, Ibrahim Pasha was granted the *vilayet* of Hijaz in the same year. Probably, the Sultan still needed to secure the area and therefore, he had to leave it to Ibrahim for this purpose, though some are of the opinion that he intentionally tried to sow dissension between Mohammed Ali and his son although this did not happen.

The next step of Egyptian expansion was towards south in Sudan. There were several reasons for Mohammed Ali's decision, among them the fact that the Sudan represents the geographic extension of Egypt from where the Nile river flows. In addition, he believed that there were possibilities of striking gold and other riches there. However, the most important reasons was to have black recruits for his new army.<sup>87</sup> In 1820 he sent a force of five thousand men under the leadership of his son Ismail. Unfortunately, his son died during the campaign. This was followed by another force lead by his other son Ibrahim in 1821. Another force was dispatched the following year under the command of his brother in law.<sup>88</sup> These three campaigns extended the Egyptian rule in Sudan which was completely subdued in subsequent years.



Prior to the war in Morea in 1825, the rule of Mohammed Ali extended from the Persian Gulf in the East to the Libyan borders in the West and from Alexandria in the North to the southern borders of Sudan. It was a substantial empire, further strengthened by his acquisition of Syria in 1833.

### C. Administrative and Military Reforms:

Mohammed Ali was entirely unlike the rest of the *Valis* that governed Egypt on behalf of the Ottoman Empire. He aimed to establish a hereditary empire and recognized the need to begin establishing a competent and long lasting administrative system to guarantee prosperity and continuity. He had to detach the center of his future empire from the Ottoman legacy, and begin a massive development plan. That is why he is most commonly known to the Egyptian historians as the founder of modern Egypt.

To establish a strong army and establish an effective new system of government administration, finance, and economy, Mohammed Ali began in 1814 to reshape the form of the government. He divided Egypt into thirteen governates *Muduriyet* and these were divided into sections, *Aqsam*.<sup>89</sup> The governors were Ottomans while the head of the *Aqsam* were Egyptians. In every governate there was a chief of police to maintain security. In this way, the decisions of the *Vali* were to be enforced.

On the state level, Mohammed Ali initiated a system similar to that of today's cabinet system. He installed the *Divaniya*, or a ministerial system. Each of the major fields of the government was organized under a *divan*, or ministry, in charge of executing the orders of the *Vali*. As time passed, the number of *divans* increased until there was a *divan* for interior, army, navy, public works, finance, and foreign affairs.<sup>90</sup>

The decision-taking mechanism remained in the hands of Mohammed Ali. He was what we may call an enlightened dictator. On the top of the government was the *Maiyya Saniyya* or the (vice royal). That was later called the *Sura Elmouana*, or (Assisting Consultation). The function of this body was to help the *Vali* make decisions, similar to a consultative council that did not limit his dictatorial rights.

Since the main aim of Mohammed Ali was to build an empire, he needed a strong army. However, being enlightened enough, he realized that this could not be achieved without a proper reformation movement in all the economic fields. He therefore initiated an effective economic reformation plan. In the agricultural field, he recognized that Egypt was an agricultural country above all. This led him to abolish the old agricultural system of the Ottoman Empire, commonly known as the *Illizam*. Mohammed Ali declared himself the sole owner of land, thus, he expropriated all the lands of the Mamelukes and the endowments as well. He gave the peasants land to cultivate and provided the seeds, tools and public works necessary for a good harvest. In turn, the peasants paid taxes in the form of a percentage of their products and crops such as cotton, wheat and other important products were bought by the government. That was the case for the major crops produced by Egypt such. Other products were left to the peasants. This was the system commonly known as the *Nizam al Ihtikar*, or system of monopoly. Peasants did not benefit as much from this system as the state which accumulated considerable wealth.

In the industrial field the new *Vali* made astonishing progress. The industrial revolution in Egypt was to serve the military machine and its needs. The main industry that was developed in Egypt was that of the cotton weaving and fabrication, and to this end he established around 15 factories producing approximately two million pieces a year. Cloth

production flourished and its total production was around three million pieces a year.<sup>91</sup> Industries such as sugar processing, dyes, oil extraction, soap, paper, iron and steel production also prospered. Egypt was nearly self sufficient.

Agriculture and industrial reforms were complimented by a sound fiscal policy. Although Egypt was bankrupt at the beginning of his rule, by 1821 the budget was balanced on 2,200,000 Egyptian pounds per year. This figure reached 2,500,000 in 1833 thereby scoring for the first time, a surplus of 500,000 pounds. This surplus reached 1,000,000 in the 1838 budget.<sup>92</sup> Thus, the 1838 budget of 4,500,000 *LE*, was 135,000,000 French Francs. To further understand the significance of these figures, it is sufficient to note that the losses of the entire Greek campaign (See Chapter IV) including the destruction of the entire Egyptian fleet, cost the government around 750,000 pounds. This in crude terms could shed some light on the power of the Egyptian economy which could have tolerated another defeat equal in scale to that of the Greek Campaign, without accumulating severe debts. This success was not really reflected in the foreign sector, for Egypt endured a trade deficit that was around 15 % during the 1830's.

Regardless of the criticism directed towards Mohammed Ali, his rule and administration, he transformed Egypt from total backwardness to a modern state that could easily match some European states at the time. He relied on foreigners for the development programs, but as time passed, Egyptians began to steer the different sectors of the economy and Egypt gradually became independent and more powerful militarily. Perhaps, among the best judgments of the entire reform process of Mohammed Ali was written by F. Lutski who claimed that, "these reforms were like those of Peter the Great in Russia, carrying the seeds of progress despite the fact that it was a heavy burden on the

Egyptian population .... As did Peter the Great, Mohammed Ali ... destroyed the legacy of the underdevelopment of middle ages".<sup>93</sup>

The different reforms undertaken by Mohammed Ali in Egypt aimed at consolidating and developing the power of the state. His industrial and agricultural reforms were a *sine qua non* to establish a military that could expand and defend his empire. A powerful army would also guarantee his personal safety. Being able to manipulate the different possible political groups was insufficient to maintain his rule in Egypt. His undisciplined army at hand, formed of Ottomans, Moroccans, Delis, Albanians, Armenians, Caucasians and other mercenaries could not be trusted. To secure the allegiance of the different factions and prevent their possible uprising, he needed a modern army.<sup>94</sup> Such a force would also protect Egypt from a future French, British or Ottoman invasion. All of the above contributed to the creation of a disciplined army.<sup>95</sup> (See Chapter IV)

There seems to be no record on the date when Mohammed Ali began to think about establishing a modern disciplined army. However, his first attempt to establish a disciplinary military machinery occurred during his military campaign in Arabia. Upon his return to Egypt, Mohammed Ali pushed new ideas about discipline in the army. Undisciplined mercenaries immediately revolted in Egypt and a fatal conspiracy on his life failed.<sup>96</sup> Insubordination and insurrection consumed the capital and took some time to quell.<sup>97</sup> There was however an attempt by Mohammed Ali's secretary *Katkhada* Laz oglu Bek to gather some of the vagabonds and the unemployed of the cities and establish a paramilitary group. However, little is available on this movement that eventually failed.<sup>98</sup>

The first serious attempt by Mohammed Ali to create the core of the modern Egyptian army was during 1820. Concerned about a possible rebellion, at a time when the bulk of his armies were exhausted by the Arabian war, the *Vali* turned his sight towards Aswan where he granted to a French Captain called Seves<sup>99</sup> (whom he mistakenly believed to be a Colonel) the responsibility of forming the first military school in Egypt in 1820. To this task, Mohammed Ali provided around 500 of the Mameluke children (a number he later doubled) who became the core of the modern Egyptian army. It is worth mentioning that Ibrahim Pasha the son of Mohammed Ali was trained as an ordinary soldier in the Aswan military school among the Mamelukes.

It took Captain Suleiyman three years to create the first units of the modern Egyptian army. This was a difficult task because the Mamelukes were difficult to discipline, and because they nearly succeeded in assassinating him on several occasions. Furthermore, the basic problem was in recruiting regular soldiers, for the Mamelukes were only to become officers. To overcome this problem, the *Vali* recruited Sudanese, and thus ordered his son Ismail, the commander of the Egyptian forces in Sudan, to send twenty thousand Sudanese for the purpose of recruitment.

The *Vali's plan* failed because the Sudanese were unable to adapt to the new environment, and the mortality rate among these recruits was very high. It became necessary to find another alternative. The only remaining choice was to recruit soldiers from the Egyptian peasantry. Thus, for the first time probably since the days of the Pharaohs, drafting was instituted in Egypt for an obligatory period of three years. Unfortunately, the idea was too new for the Egyptians who rioted.<sup>100</sup> However, the *Vali* controlled these riots quickly and the system was generally mandatory for peasantry.

By 1824, the Aswan school produced the first regular and disciplined Egyptian army. It consisted of six *Alai* each consisting of five *Orates*.<sup>101</sup> The French Consul Drovetti wrote to Paris explaining this new army in the following words, "This new disciplined and trained army along the lines of the French one, consists of Egyptians and Sudanese, while their officers were Mamelukes and Turks, has reached a very high level of precision in maneuvers that gives a great deal of pride to the French Officers who taught them".<sup>102</sup> At this stage, the new disciplined army consisted of twenty four thousand men in addition to ten thousand irregulars.

In the same year after the success of Captain Suleyman, a French expedition arrived to train the Egyptian army in other military fields. By the end of the 1820's, the Egyptian army was to be trained primarily by French officers assisted by Italians, Polish and Spanish. To expand, the Aswan School was not sufficient, therefore, the *Vali* established a series of new schools in all the different military fields. They ran along the following lines:<sup>103</sup>

**\* The Infantry School in Aswan:**

This school was established by Captain Suleyman and graduated the first class three years after its establishment. It was later moved to Esna in upper Egypt and later to El Khankaa in near Cairo and was called *Madraset El Gehadia*. It continued for another few years until it was replaced in 1832.

**\* The Second infantry School:**

It was established in El Khankaa and later moved to the Port of Damietta in 1834, and then back to Cairo in 1841. It aimed at graduating officers only and it had a capacity of around four hundred students.



**\* The Cavalry School:**

It was established in Giza in 1831 upon the request of Mohammed Ali. It was an essential part of the military structure of the modern Egyptian army. On average, it trained around seven hundred soldiers and recruits. However, by 1841 the total number of students and professors constituted around four *Orat*, around three thousand two hundred. The syllabus included nearly all the fields of military training, like other military schools - languages, geometry, natural sciences and military sciences. This school had a profound effect on the structure of the modern Egyptian army and played an important role in the First and Second Syrian Campaigns of 1833 and 1839.

**\*The Artillery School:**

It was established in 1831 by a Spanish officer named Antonio de Sequerra, who became its headmaster. It recruited both officers and soldiers with the full capacity of around three hundred and fifty students. As was the case with many other military schools, it had its own prints and library. The Pasha, focused considerable special attention on this institution, probably because of the fact that Bonaparte was an artillery officer.

**\* The Military Engineer School:**

It was established as a section of the Artillery school, however, it was later separated. It trained cadets in building canals, bridges, military fortifications, and mines. According to the military formations, nearly every *Alai*, had several of these graduates.

**\* The Staff College:**

It was established in 1825 and headed by a French officer named Blanna. It recruited cadets from different schools and taught military studies for three years.



**\* Military Music School:**

Since it was the aim of Mohammed Ali to establish an army along modern European lines, it was necessary to establish a military music school. It was headed by a Frenchman called M. Carre and it recruited around one hundred and sixty students. Its graduates were distributed among all the different *Alai*.

Military education was not only in the hands of these schools, for the Pasha made sure that some Egyptians were to be trained abroad as well, so that they could share their experiences with the new army. Beginning in 1813, he sent several military missions abroad.<sup>104</sup> These missions studied military matters as well as military industry and other spheres of interests related to the military aspects. Some of the members of these missions held important positions in the Egyptian military structure.

In addition to schools and the training of new cadets, Mohammed Ali, realized the need for the development in the field of armament, ammunition and logistics. It is important to note that Egypt during the early parts of the nineteenth century was backward in nearly all military industry. With exception of some small powder factories, the country lacked any kind of military production facility. Given the state of technology at the time, it was not an unthinkable task to bridge the gap with the European military production.

The policy of *military import substitution*, by Mohammed Ali if we may call it so, was successful, but in no way did it impede the necessity of importing military equipment from the west, especially naval vessels and some pieces of artillery. Once again, European ex-officers and industrialists assisted him. During his reign, he built a factory for rifle production in the Citadel and in 1831 another was established under the supervision of an

Italian called Senior Marengo. These factories, collectively, produced around thirty two thousand rifles a year, far Beyond Egyptian needs.<sup>105</sup> Artillery production was also of interest to him, so he established several high-quality factories, though these were not as efficient as their western counterparts. In the field of heavy artillery the main productions were cannons of four and eight pounds caliber, as well as twelve caliber -anti fortification, howitzers of twenty four pounds and hawns of three and a half inch caliber.<sup>106</sup> Powder production also interested the Pasha, so he established several factories under the supervision of certain Frenchman Mr. Martell.<sup>107</sup> By the third decade of the eighteenth century, Mohammed Ali had established a strong and well-equipped army.

Mohammed Ali recognized that he required a powerful navy, in both the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Since he believed that any attempt to secure Egypt from foreign invasions would require a strong army and navy, he embarked on a plan to establish a such a fleet. What added to his conviction to build a strong navy was his belief that Egypt was invaded twice in less than a decade through sea, therefore Egypt required a naval deterrent to prevent future possible aggression. He also fortified the major ports so as to assist the navy in case of an invasion.

The first attempt by Mohammed Ali to establish a navy occurred in 1810 during the wars of the Arabian peninsula when he needed a naval line of communication in the Red Sea to assist his armies in the peninsula and secure logistic deliveries. He first built a small arsenal in Beaulac on the Nile where ships were built, dismantled and transported across the desert on camel to the port of Suez where they were reassembled and launched.<sup>108</sup>

These primitive ships could serve the purpose of fighting the Wahabbis and subduing the pirates in the Red Sea, but could not face a strong enemy that might threaten Egypt, especially from the Mediterranean. Thus, the Pasha had to begin the establishment of a true navy in the Mediterranean, primarily through the purchase of several naval vessels from Marseilles, Trieste and Genoa. These few ships, as well as the ones produced locally, formed the main components of the Egyptian Mediterranean fleet. This continued to be the policy of the Pasha until the Battle of Navarino in 1827 where the Egyptian fleet was destroyed. (See Chapter IV). This defeat was actually the turning point of the Egyptian navy, for in 1829 Mohammed Ali established a large arsenal in Alexandria under the command of an Egyptian assisted by a Frenchman called Besson. Soon Egypt was producing warships that approached European quality. A naval academy was established in Alexandria to recruit Egyptian students for the new fleet. By the middle of the decade, Egypt possessed a strong and well-trained naval force.

A strong army and navy required strong administration. Therefore, all the military affairs were supervised directly by *Diywan El Gihadiyya*, or in modern terms the Ministry of War. Its first minister, or *Nazir*, was the private secretary of the Pasha Mohammed Lazoglu Bek who was followed by Mohmoud Ezzat El Arnouty, commonly known as Mahmoud Bek Bakalim.<sup>109</sup> This *Divan* was under the supervision of the Pasha himself because of his special interest in military affairs. Despite the fact that the heads of the different divisions in this new army were supervised by the *Nazir al Gihaddiyya*, they enjoyed access to Mohammed Ali himself. Besides the job of supervising the military schools, the *Nazir Al Gihaddiya* was charged with supervising other non-disciplinary or paramilitary forces, which constituted an important part of the army.

These labors gave Egypt a strong and efficient military machinery that eventually represented a threat to many powers in the area. There are several inventories of the Egyptian armies along the years since the beginning of the 1830's.<sup>110</sup> El Rafei mentions in his inventories, that the Egyptian army in 1833 reached the figure of 168,889 men, including, regulars, paramilitary forces, the navy and soldiers under call. This number reached 235,880 in 1939 including all the previous categories.<sup>111</sup> F. Mengin believes that the total number of the Egyptian army was 159,300 in the year 1837.<sup>112</sup> This figure excluded the navy and the soldiers under call and the non-regulars. Zaki's inventory was also close to El Rafei's and Claude Bek, for according to him the Egyptian army was 123,225 in 1837 and it rose to 130,300 in 1839.<sup>113</sup> These figures also excluded the paramilitary forces, the navy and the soldiers under call. We are inclined to trust the figures of El Rafei and Claude Bek, for they are very close to the other figures but include the irregular forces, the soldiers under call and others which played a role in the modern Egyptian army. Thus, we can comfortably conclude that the combined Egyptian forces reached around a quarter of a million soldiers and included the different branches of the military machinery in addition to the soldiers under call and the paramilitary .

As far as we are concerned at this stage, the Egyptian army represented a very important tool for the ambitions of Mohammed Ali's foreign policy. Egypt had surpassed the original master - the Ottoman Empire - in nearly every field. This moved the Egyptian Question from the passive phase to the active phase. Mohammed Ali's shrewd foreign policy and internal reforms that elevated Egypt to a high level. Egypt was now ready to play a role whereby its interaction with the European system became much more intense. From this point on, the Egyptian Question assumed a new dimension, and for the first

time, began to affect the European system, instead merely being affected by it.



## **Chapter IV**

### **The Egyptian Question and The European System**

#### **War in Morea and Anatolia**

The previous chapter focused on the rise and development of the Egyptian Question between 1798 and 1825 and how it moved from the passive phase to the preparatory one. In this chapter and the next we shall focus on the third and final phase of the Egyptian Question. This chapter shall discuss the transformation of the Egyptian Question from the phase when it was subject to foreign influence to the stage where it influenced events and threatened European equilibrium through the expansionist foreign policy of Mohammed Ali. This chapter could be considered a prelude to the final 1839 crisis when the European major powers united to confront the potential threat from Egypt.

#### **4.1 The Greek Insurrection : The First Challenge by the Egyptian Question to the European System**

The Greek insurrection of 1821 could have been a normal insurrection against the Ottomans, similar to the earlier Serbian or Saudi revolts, however, the fundamental difference was that the major powers began to have a vested interest in this affair. (See chapter II) The European system functioned on the premise of balance of power mechanics enshrined in the context of the Holy Alliance and the Congresses. However, since this case included a major territory of the Ottoman Empire, the system became heterogeneous once again, especially as a result of the growing suspicions of the major

powers with regard to Russian intentions in this crisis. Therefore, it was normal that the eight-years Greek insurrection drew the attention of nearly every major power in Europe, especially when it threatened to destroy the equilibrium in eastern Europe if Russia was to intervene.<sup>1</sup>

The revolution was triggered by Prince Ypsilanti, a Greek serving as a Russian officer in Moldova. Soon his Pan-Hellenic ideas spread into the peninsula of Morea, mainland Greece, and developed into a mass revolution against the Ottoman rule. It is argued in some cases, that Russia provided financial support for this movement to foment troubles for their traditional enemy - the Ottoman Empire.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, it is contended that this was not true, for Alexander I did not in any way support this revolution.<sup>3</sup> However, in reality, Russia was in a real dilemma. On the one hand, Alexander I was unable to accept the revolutionary tone of the Greek insurrection, and on the other hand, he believed it to be his duty to protect all the Christian Orthodox subject of the Ottoman Empire. This accounted for the fact that Russia did not seriously intervene on behalf of the Greek for a while. The Sultan's decision to hang the Patriarch of Istanbul and some of his bishops generated widespread violence that magnified the European sympathy for Greek aspirations and further exacerbated the heterogeneity of the system regarding the Ottoman Empire.

In addition to the emotional aspects of the issue, fear and suspicion of possible Russian intervention on behalf of the Greeks and the danger this represented to the European system focused the attention of major European capitals. What triggered further worries was the fact that Alexander I contended later on that the Greek movement was nationalist and not revolutionary in nature; occurring partly on Ottoman domains, which,



by his interpretation, was not part of the European System or the Holy Alliance.<sup>4</sup> This led him to take negative and rigid positions, to the extent of severing diplomatic relations with the Porte in the years to come.

Both Castlereagh and Metternich suspected possible future Russian unilateral intervention for the sake of aggrandizement. To them, this was an unacceptable threat to their interests in the region in that Russia would become preponderant in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire and jeopardize the equilibrium in eastern Europe. As Temperly correctly asserted, "(Britain) wished to maintain the Turkish Empire... for it held that if war occurred, Russia would gobble Greece at one mouthful and Turkey at the next."<sup>5</sup> Moreover, Russian access to Istanbul meant the possibility of Russian involvement in the Mediterranean as, "Constantinople ...was the Turkish sentry which barred the back door to the Black Sea and the front gate to the Mediterranean".<sup>6</sup> It was therefore imperative that the Greek issue be settled peacefully, without Russian interference.

At the same time, Metternich recognized the volatility of the situation in case of a Russian war against the Porte, something too dangerous even to be contemplated. He had his doubts regarding Alexander's temper, believing that "if one cannon is fired... then there will be no limits any longer as to what he will consider his divinely ordained law to do."<sup>7</sup> The situation was tense, neither could the Ottomans subdue the revolution, nor could the Greeks achieve their independence and the Russians were growing restless. Since war with Russia would prove costly and its outcome unpredictable, diplomacy was the best alternative for the other actors to avert a crisis.

In a typical Metternich move, with the assistance of Castlereagh, the threat of war between Russia and the Porte ended, primarily through limiting the Tsar's maneuverability

by exhausting him in conference diplomacy to avoid Russian unilateral intervention and gain time. (See Chapter II) As Russian aims for the mentorship over Greece and suggestions of joint military action by the powers were detailed by its diplomats, Metternich diverted Russia's aims of using the alliance to spread its influence and simultaneously restrained it from any action. The Spanish revolution shifted the attention of the Congress of Verona of 1822 but left out the possibility of a Russo-Ottoman War. To exacerbate matters, Castlereagh committed suicide and the British foreign policy rested in the hands of Canning, the new Foreign Minister.

Though he followed the general outlines of the British foreign policy inside the European system, Canning differed from Castlereagh in the sense that he did not support the Congresses to the extent of his predecessor. However this did not prevent him from sending a plenipotentiary to the Congress at Verona to discuss the Spanish and Greek questions. In a surprise move, he declared Greece a belligerent in 1823 in order to protect British Aegean trade from Greek pirates.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore he embarked on a more interventionist policy in the Greek affairs than Castlereagh might have followed. His general policy was to avoid force, so as to help the Russians restrain themselves.<sup>9</sup> Finally, he wisely separated the Greek question from the Russo-Ottoman conflict.

In the midst of these negotiations and diplomatic maneuvers, a new factor shifted the attention of the major European powers interested in a peaceful resolution of the Greek affairs. This was the intervention of Mohammed Ali on behalf of the Sultan to subdue the Greek insurrection, which not only shifted the course of the negotiations, but introduced Egypt as a new actor in the Greek affair.

The Egyptian intervention in Morea was the result of a request by Sultan Mahmut II, a move that delighted Mohammed Ali. It should be recalled, however, that Egyptian intervention in the Greek affairs dates to 1821 when Mohammed Ali assisted the Ottoman fleet against the Greeks in the Aegean and successfully relieved Ottoman garrisons in Crete and Cyprus.<sup>10</sup> The Sultan did not trust Mohammed Ali, but had few options and was forced to promise his ambitious vassal with the rule of Crete and Morea.<sup>11</sup> Mohammed Ali hoped to transform the Eastern Mediterranean into an Egyptian lake by incorporating Syria into his empire.<sup>12</sup> Mohammed Ali was not opposed to the Pan Hellenic movement, on the contrary, he was sympathetic and permitted the Philiki Heteria to operate in Egypt.<sup>13</sup> But he was willing to sacrifice sentiments if he could acquire Morea or other spoils.

The results achieved by the Egyptian intervention in the ongoing crisis in Greece was amazing. After an initial stalemate, Ibrahim, in his capacity as ground commander of the joint Ottoman and Egyptian forces, inflicted severe blows to the Greek resistance. The campaigns were active and bloody, especially the Battles of Calamata and Tripolettzi in June 1825, and Missolonghi in 1826 which dealt the final blow to the Greek resistance.<sup>14</sup> Ibrahim established the necessary prerequisites for a total defeat of the Greek insurrection, though he quarreled with the Commander of the Ottoman-Egyptian navy, Husrev Pasha, a dispute dating back to the struggle in Egypt between Ibrahim's father and the latter in 1804-5. (See Chapter III, 3.2 B. )

The Egyptian intervention shifted the military scales to the Porte's favor. The repercussions of this shift were immediately felt on the European System. The Egyptian success produced a great deal of pressure on Alexander I. He was obliged to intervene for

religious and emotional rather than political and state reasons to save the Greeks. As long as the Greeks prevail, he could avoid intervention and wrestle with the Porte over the questions of the Danubian principalities only. But as the Greeks lost ground, he risked allowing the situation to revert to the *status quo ante* 1821. That partially meant delaying Russian possible plans until the next opportunity, if ever, as well as admitting the moral defeat this could cause to his Christian prestige. Simultaneously, Britain and Austria aimed to avoid a possible Russian unilateral intervention in the Greek affairs as well as confrontation with Russia. However, Canning did not trust Metternich and his methods and therefore, the system operated differently than if Castlereagh was alive.

Still believing in the future of The Holy Alliance, Alexander hastened to host a final Congress in St. Petersburg on the level of Ambassadors. His intentions were clear: he sought the same green light for Russian intervention in Greece as the Lailbach Congress gave Austria in Italy and the Congress of Verona to France in Spain.<sup>15</sup> (See Chapter II, 2.3) The circumstances may have changed, but Alexander I could not, or would not recognize a reality that could mean the end of his beloved Holy Alliance. British evasion of this Congress as a stratagem to spoil the Tsar's chances of success produced a rupture between Russia and Britain. This left Austria in practical control and in a series of diplomatic maneuvers, suggested the independence of Greece. Alexander I refused, because this meant triumph for the liberal movement. This gave both Austria and France the pretext to deny him any other option. The ensuing rift between Alexander and Metternich buried the Congress System. Consultation was no longer part of the code of conduct that the powers obeyed to maintain the general security of Europe and the system reverted to its pre-1789 characteristics. It became every state for itself and nothing for

collectivity. The Greek affair was a point of diversion between the Russia and the rest of the European powers.

If these events affected the entire system, it also had an impact on the Egyptian position with regard Europe. At this stage, Britain and Austria began direct negotiations with the Egyptian *Vali* to undo the repercussions of his intervention in Morea. During consultations between the *Vali* and the British Consul, Mr. Salt, the latter suggested the possibility of his withdrawal several times. Initially, Mohammed Ali was reluctant to spell out his price for abandoning the Porte. At the same time, he was not eager for further intervention, since he had already proven that Egypt was a power to be recognized. Also, he knew the powers were determined to solve the Greek problem and sought to avoid incurring their wrath. An indication of Mohammed Ali's price for cooperation could be found by 1825 when, as reported by Salt in a dispatch to Canning, Mohammed Ali noted that "...he is expecting assistance with regard to his navy and money to expand his Empire".<sup>16</sup> However, Mohammed Ali's attempts were in vain since Britain was unwilling to sacrifice its relations with the Porte for his sake and his requests were refused up to the final Battle of Navarino. This was in total conformity with the British foreign policy towards Egypt since 1807. Metternich's envoys, on the other hand, urged the Egyptian *Vali* to end the Greek affair as soon as possible to avoid interventions by the powers.

Meanwhile, the alliances in the European system were becoming increasingly unstable. Clearly the system of consultation and congresses were eclipsed by the overt application of balance of power mechanics after the breach between Metternich and Alexander I opened the way for possible British rapprochement with the latter. Russian acceptance of the British overture came as a precautionary measure in case it opted for

unilateral intervention in Greece. This meant that Russia needed to rely on at least one European power, e.g., Britain. The death of Alexander and the accession of Nicholas I, who unlike his late brother, held no mystical illusions of collectivity, was immediately felt all over Europe. He was determined to intervene in the Greek affair within the general context of dismantling the Ottoman Empire if possible. He sent an ultimatum to the Porte in March 1826, requesting the immediate withdrawal of the Ottoman forces from the Danubian Principalities, the abandonment of the appointment of the police there and the immediate dispatch of plenipotentiaries to the Russian frontiers for negotiations.<sup>17</sup> The result of these negotiations was The Treaty of Akkerman in October 1826 whereby the Porte submitted to the will of Russia with regards to the Danubian Principalities as well as Serbia.<sup>18</sup>

This treaty temporarily settled the Russian aims in East Europe but not in the Greek question. This issue had to be resolved in accordance with the mechanics of the system. The first step was to create the alliance, between some of the major powers at least. British overtures towards Russia were already under way, the result of which was the signing of a crucial protocol in April 1826 regarding to the Greek affairs. This agreement could be summarized as follows: first, a British mediation effort with the Porte should be offered, whereby Greece would become a dependency of the Porte with almost complete autonomy. Second, another British mediation would begin between the Porte and Russia, on the one hand and between the Porte and Greece on the other. Third, both parties renounced any ambitions regarding Greece. Finally, Prussia, Austria and France would issue a joint guarantee of the settlement.<sup>19</sup>



Though this was the first step towards the creation of the alliance, this protocol failed to satisfy the other major European actors, primarily France which held a stake in the Greek issue and were not interested in allowing Britain to dictate the terms of the settlement in harmony with Russia. France wanted a larger role and demanded the transformation of this protocol into a European treaty, so that it may secure a role and possible dividends in the future. This represented no diversion from the rules of a system functioning under balance of power premises, since no state may achieve rewards without sharing with others. (Rule of proportional aggrandizement or reciprocal compensation, see Chapter I, 1.6). Canning had no choice but to concede, though he did not trust French intentions. France, Britain and Russia signed the treaty of London in 1827 which embodied nearly all the points laid in the April protocol. Furthermore, the signatories pledged to enforce a settlement if the Porte refused a cease-fire. Also, in accordance with the treaty, the powers assigned consular agents to Greece to work between the conflicting parties.<sup>20</sup> Thus, the alliance was achieved. The next step was intervention.

This was a pure manifestation of the first principle of balance of power, that of coalition or alliance formation. It could be argued that this embryonic alliance lacked a preponderant opponent at this stage. for it was aimed primarily towards thwarting a single-handed Russian intervention. In other words it was a preemptive diplomatic move by France and Britain that hoped to restrict the Tsar to avoid Russian preponderance in Southeast Europe and the Mediterranean should it choose to act alone and force an unrecoverable *fait accompli* - something it achieved six years later with the Treaties of Hünkâr İskelesi and Müchengratz.. Therefore, the alliance was aimed at restricting the potential preponderance of a power. Canning's words help explain this situation: "... If



force was to be used, England must act with and restrain Russia", <sup>21</sup> and that did not deviate from the basic premises of alliance formation. (See Chapter I, 1.6) In another way, it was in no power's interests to see Morea in the hands of Mohammed Ali in case of Ottoman-Egyptian victory. Such a victory would transform the Mediterranean into an Ottoman-Egyptian lake, and in case Mohammed Ali conquered Syria, as he did later, then the whole southeastern region of Europe, would be under the control of Mohammed Ali, a clear breach to the equilibrium in Europe. Intervention was required to settle the Greek crisis.

The protocol and treaty were first steps towards a more complex and interventionary policy of the powers in Greek affairs. It laid a heavy burden on the Porte as well as Mohammed Ali who had dispatched the elite of his newly formed forces to Morea and the fear of European power's joint intervention was a shadow that haunted Mohammed Ali until the destruction of his fleet at Navarino a year later. He was in a very difficult position and had to act promptly for the powers would not allow an Ottoman-Egyptian victory. That forced him to approach Britain directly.

But Britain was neither willing to sacrifice the Porte nor pay the price for an alliance with Mohammed Ali. Instead, Canning embarked on a policy aimed at securing the Egyptian withdrawal from Morea that did not require the payment of compensation. Major Cradock, a diplomatic officer in the British Embassy to Paris and an old acquaintance of Mohammed Ali, was sent to Egypt to convince his friend to withdraw.<sup>22</sup> Mohammed Ali refused, for that would have meant conflict with the Porte without any gains in return. He was convinced that he retained more maneuverability than events actually permitted. For the first time he bluntly told Salt the price for his withdrawal. He

stated that, "Syria and Damascus are within my reach. If your government should help, as I hope, and if it recognizes my independence as a sovereign prince,... I shall be fully content".<sup>23</sup> Britain refused.

Fate, misinterpretation and possibly conspiracy, denied Mohammed Ali the possibility of continued room for maneuver. On the single day of October 20, 1827 the Battle of Navarino saw the destruction of Mohammed Ali's Mediterranean fleet along with its Ottoman counterpart. This was the manifestation of the second principle of balance of power, that of *Intervention*, (See Chapter I, 1.6). This time, intervention by the powers after the formation of the alliance moved from diplomacy in the first stages to military in the next. Many Egyptian scholars believe that the Battle of Navarino was a premeditated strike by the combined British, French and Russian fleet that was supposed to observe the interposition between the warring parties but not take sides.<sup>24</sup> However, there seems to have been a blunder somewhere in the communication between the politicians and the military. Canning's instructions to Stratford Canning, his Ambassador to the Porte, were that, "The spirit of that agreement was peaceful interference, recommended by a friendly demonstration of force".<sup>25</sup> The British Ambassador's instruction were misinterpreted by Admiral Codrington, the British commander and the Allied Admiral in Chief, partly because they were vague and unclear. The Russian Admiral also pressed for action and therefore, the entrance of the combined fleet to the Bay of Navarino could be interpreted both as a provocation and an act of *gunboat diplomacy* that backfired and developed into an act of coercion. The result was war and the destruction of the Ottoman-Egyptian combined fleet. What remains true is that the news of the battle surprised politicians across Europe, but did not dissuade them from terminating the Greek affair peacefully.

Wellington, who took office following Canning's death some days prior to the battle, was more cautious than his two predecessors, and he became relatively confused by events. This allowed both France and Russia the possibility to exploit the situation. Britain remained low key but later renewed its active role in the decision of Greek independence and delimitation of the borders of this state. Following Navarino, Mohammed Ali was forced to withdraw his troops from Morea. He refused to continue the intransigence and futile resistance that drove the Porte into another defeat by Russia and its acceptance of the Treaty of Adrianopole, that guaranteed Greek autonomy and later independence. His sole gain in this affair was that Europeans henceforth treated him as a recognized semi-independent power, though a formal declaration of this point was never made.

Mohammed Ali failed to show a grasp as to the functioning of the European System. He should have realized that the European equilibrium was a paramount issue for all the powers involved, especially Britain and France. They had to settle the Greek issue in such a way as would not create Russian preponderance in Eastern Mediterranean and avoid making Greece a future Russian surrogate. As it became clear two years later, the settlement of this affair was a case for balance of power mechanics, whereby there was avocation of the principle of *reciprocal non compensation* to maintain the European equilibrium. Thus, no state gained anything acceptable in as far as equilibrium was concerned.

To this end, the French abandoned Mohammed Ali and nearly launched a war against the very army they trained. They occupied Morea with 18,000 men and as the tension was relieved after the Treaty of Adrianopole, they were withdrawn. Unlike France, Britain was more straightforward; they promised nothing to Mohammed Ali. Had

Mohammed Ali learned the lessons from the Greek campaign, with regard to the balance of power principles, especially the recognition of the factors affecting power distribution and preponderance of states, i.e. equilibrium, he may have been able to avoid the destruction of his own empire nearly a decade later. Nevertheless, the Greek War of Independence marked the establishment of Egypt as a supplementary or peripheral actor in the European system through its relationship with the Porte and in that it conducted independent relations with some European powers, especially France. Therefore, if the Porte was a part of the European balance of power system, Egypt was *a fortiori* a participant as well, since it had an important impact on the Porte's future. This indirect correlation had a tremendous impact upon the outcome of the first Egyptian-Ottoman war.

#### **4.2 The First Egyptian Ottoman War 1831-1833:**

##### **A: Mohammed Ali's Calculations with regard to Europe:**

Mohammed Ali's strategic decision to withdraw from the war in Morea after Navarino was very wise, in that it kept his armies and what was left from his Mediterranean navy intact, ready for implementing his two primary objectives: that of independence and acquisition of Syria. Both such objectives practically meant war with the Porte, for it would neither permit his independence nor the loss of its own territory. However, the time was ripe for such an action by 1831 as the Porte had reached its nadir on all fronts. The Treaty of Adrianopole in 1829, left it with the loss of its army, a heavy indemnity burden on its treasury and a state of demoralization. The massacre of the

Janissery Corps in 1826 reduced its chances of promptly building up the military machine, in accordance with the *Nizam-i-jadid*. The time was ripe for Mohammed Ali to pursue his conquest of Syria.

On the European level, Mohammed Ali knew that his expansionist policies were an anathema to the European system. But his success depended upon choosing the right time to force a *fait accompli*. By 1831 the opportunity arrived. Towards the end of this year several changes had either occurred or were occurring in the European system that permitted him some maneuverability. Many of these transformations made the timing correct for such a war and helped secure a victory for Mohammed Ali over the Porte.

As mentioned, Canning practically undermined the Congress System during the Greek Crisis, the system became more fragmented than before, functioning under his slogan "every nation for itself and God for all of us".<sup>26</sup> This meant that states were to act according to their own interests without having to resort to collective legitimacy or congresses; for such a process played a role in obstructing the lucid flow of the mechanics of balance of power. In particular, events in Belgium and to a lesser extent, in Portugal, helped revive this phenomena in the European system.

With such fragmentation, alliances and counter alliances were to a greater extent than before, the dominant phenomena in the system. This carried the system towards a conservative alliance that included Russia, Austria and Prussia against a liberal one of Britain and France. However, this was temporary and expected in a balance of power system. Despite of this each of the major actors retained the right to unilateral action. Britain undertook efforts to secure its interests, primarily by guaranteeing the continent's inability to unify, and to secure its trade all over the world. France, reintegrated into the

European system, took its place among the major actors by extending its influence in Italy, North Africa and the Levant (Syria). Austria, still following the taboo of Metternich, became a conservative force that opposed revolution throughout the continent, a policy that nearly precipitated a crisis with France in Italy in 1830.<sup>27</sup> Russia, pursued its interests in Eastern Europe and the Ottoman Empire as before, but with renewed vigor and a new strategy. Thus, the interests of the states remained the same, but the means to achieve this differed as a result of the change in the system's character.

The transformation of the system reshaped some of the actions of the actors within the system. Britain, during the Wellington and the initial years of Palmerston's era, was more concerned with the situation in Western Europe. The Belgium Crisis that coincided with the First Egyptian Ottoman War caught the attention of the new government, consuming its foreign policy and naval efforts for the next three years. In essence, the Belgian uprising, its declaration of independence from the Netherlands and the decision of its Congress to declare the second son of Louis Philippe of France as its king, required a serious British reaction. This crisis produced disequilibrium in Western Europe, where France appeared to be ready to swallow Belgium, an action averted by the Treaty of Chaumont and later by the Congress of Vienna. (See Chapter II) British fears of French preponderance, in an area it considered its backyard, decreased and gave way to the development of close cooperation against the Netherlands. The alliance between these two states isolated Russia, Austria and Prussia regarding the Belgian issue. Both France and Britain did not want the involvement of other powers in this affair, and they were able to prevent this very effectively.<sup>28</sup> The price of British involvement in this affair was the temporary neglect of its other priorities, especially in the Ottoman Empire, making them



unable or unwilling to focus on the crisis that developed into the Eastern Question. Other than that, relations with Egypt remained unchanged and they declined an offer in 1830 for alliance with it.<sup>29</sup>

France, on the other hand, expanded its foreign policy since the Greek campaign. Not only did it involve itself in the Greek affair, for the sake of its own interests and that of Russian containment, but it gradually moved to consolidate its interests in the Ottoman domains. But other problems beckoned. In 1830, prior to the end of the Greek affair, it became embroiled in the Algerian crisis, the result of the humiliation of its diplomatic envoy by the Dey of Algiers.<sup>30</sup> France contemplated the possibility of coercion and other alternatives. However, Drovetti the French consul in Egypt suggested the possibility of unleashing Mohammed Ali on Algeria to conquer it, and since the two states enjoyed good relations, this was a legitimate outcome. Negotiations between Polignac the French Prime Minister and the Egyptian government began, but Egyptian demands exceeded what France was willing to accept. The final result was French invasion to Algeria in 1830. This gave France a very good position and interest in the Ottoman Empire, for after all Algeria was a part of its domains. These events consolidated relations between Mohammed Ali and France which he interpreted as a positive sign for his future campaign to acquire Syria.

As for Russia, its foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire changed. The long traditions of Russian animosity with the Porte and its attempt to divide and conquer its domains had shifted. Tsar Nicholas was convinced, as a result of the Greek campaign probably, that the other actors in the system would not permit him to achieve any of his aims that could upset equilibrium in eastern Europe.<sup>31</sup> Even Austria, the closest of the



allies to Russia hinted on several occasions that such Russian action would be a *causis belli*. It became the policy of Russia to maintain the Ottoman Empire intact, but under its strict control. What Russia could not achieve by war and partition, it was to try to achieve by diplomacy and pressure. As illustrated in a secret circular by Russian First Secretary of State, Count Nesselrode:<sup>32</sup>

*A new era in our relations with the Ottoman Porte should date from the Treaty of Adrianopole.... Instead of overthrowing that empire, Our August Monarch decided to follow only the noble impulsion of his generosity.... If we have allowed the Turkish government to continue to exist in Europe, it is because that government under our preponderant influence of our superiority, suits us better than any of those which could be set on its ruins.*

As noted, the Russian policy towards the Porte became that of influence until the time was ripe for conquest, while at the same time seeking to exclude the influence other powers.<sup>33</sup> As Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister correctly asserted, the Russian choice was, "either admitting the preservation of the Ottoman Empire as possible or finally admitting its dissolution as inevitable,"<sup>34</sup> but they opted for the first since the second was out of reach.

This pragmatic foreign policy of Russia was much more successful, but for it to function, it needed to secure the affairs of the Straits. To this end, the Treaty of Adrianopole opened the way for a free navigation for its trade in the Black Sea, yet did not settle their old principle of extending their defensive lines to the borders of the Ottoman Empire rather than their own frontiers. (See Chapter II) Since this aim was difficult to achieve in that it required their active control over the Straits, they opted for a new alternative, that of preventing the foreign warships from using the Straits to enter the Black Sea. Though this was a general principle, Russia needed assurance. Hence, the

Russian diplomatic efforts were aimed at securing a treaty with the Porte towards this end. This they achieved in 1833 by the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi.<sup>35</sup>

Given the fragmentation of the system, British occupation in the Belgian and Portuguese affairs, Russian and Ottoman exhaustion from war, Austrian propensity for inaction and the French-Egyptian rapprochement, the way opened for the Mohammed Ali to begin his campaign to seize Syria and achieve his independence from the Ottoman suzerainty. All he needed was a pretext to initiate hostility.

#### **B: The War:**

The Egyptian conquest of Greater Syria that began in October of 1831 pursued several objectives. The first of which was the acquisition of Syria for strategic reasons. Syria had been traditionally a part of the Egyptian backyard since the dawn of time. Its importance to Egypt was beyond doubt crucial, given that Egypt generally faced invasions from the east. Therefore, occupying Syria meant safeguarding Egypt. Mohammed Ali himself admitted this to his envoy in Istanbul Naguib Bey when he stated that, "El Sham [*Greater Syria*] is very necessary for Egyptian security".<sup>36</sup> This goal had followed Mohammed Ali since 1811 when he sought the cession of Syria to assist him logistically in his wars against the Wahhabis in Arabia.<sup>37</sup>

Mohammed Ali's aims to form an Empire based in Egypt required a cultural and ideological basis. To this end, he adopted the idea of unifying the Arabs under one rule, and this practically meant the acquisition of Syria, the cradle of Arabism since the Ummayyad dynasty in the seventh century. Ibrahim himself championed the Arab cause and proclaimed himself as an Arab. He asserted on several occasions that the ultimate aim of

the Syrian campaign was to "...cut the links between the Arab speaking states and the Ottomans".<sup>38</sup> Hence, Syria was politically a *sina qua non* for his empire. Economic and demographic reasons were also part of his strategic and political objectives, for the *Vali* believed Syria's wealth would enhance his power. He needed Syria as a source of recruits for his army, timber for his Navy and taxes for his military improvements.<sup>39</sup>

These different motives led him to initiate hostilities with the Ottoman *Vali* of Acre on a trivial issue of extraditing several Egyptian peasants that escaped military service. This pretext provided the first step for the Egyptian invasion to Syria. In 1831, Ibrahim led an army to Syria. Initially numbering 25,000 men, the force gradually increased in the years to come. The Egyptian navy provided support from the sea. Since Acre was a well fortified castle, invulnerable to Bonaparte thirty years earlier, he forced a siege on it and expanded his invasion northward (following Bonaparte's plan) along the plains of Syria. Soon he sacked the major coastal cities of Sidon, Haifa and Jaffa, before overrunning Acre itself. At this point, the rest of Syria fell or surrendered to his armies. These victories were achieved rapidly and astonished many. The speed of Mohammed Ali's success may be explained in part by the fact that many Syrians saw him as the liberator from Ottoman tyranny and the hero of Islam after the war in Morea.<sup>40</sup> However, the Ottoman reaction to this campaign began to unfold in the beginning of 1832.

The Porte initially attempted to contain the crisis between the *Valis* of Egypt and Acre, but these efforts proved futile since Mohammed Ali hoped to use the issue as a pretext to conquer Syria. The Porte attempted to convince Mohammed Ali to settle the affairs amicably. Their ultimate aim was to settle the issue so as the war would not spread at a time when Mahmut II realized that he lacked the necessary resources to withstand a

war with the Egyptians. However his intransigence and arrogance in the proceeding months led him to believe that he could defeat the Egyptian armies. The next step was to declare Mohammed Ali a "rebel" against the legitimate order of Islam.

As a result of the failure of all these initiatives, Mahmut II decided to go to war to expel the Egyptians from Syria and proceed to Egypt to end the rule of Mohammed Ali. Mahmut II organized an army of sixty thousand soldiers under the command of the hero of the Janissery Massacres in 1826, Hussein Pasha and issued a royal *Ferman* appointing him *Vali* over Egypt and Acre. But the Ottoman army lacked armaments, homogeneity and integrity. In addition, Hussein Pasha made fatal mistakes in calculations and leadership that Ibrahim Pasha exploited.

The Syrian capital Damascus surrendered to Ibrahim as Egyptian forces approached in June 1832. He continued his northward march to meet the Ottoman army. At first, Hussein Pasha divided his forces, giving Ibrahim the opportunity to attack each separately. In the Battle of Homs, Ibrahim defeated the advanced forces of that army. The main army remained in Alexandretta contemplating the next move. The second battle took place on July 29, 1832 close to the Billan Straits and inflicted a heavy defeat on Hussein Pasha, costing him a large number of men.<sup>41</sup> The southern gates of Anatolia were in the hands of Ibrahim who immediately consolidated his powers along these lines. He continued his advance to Konya where he waited for instructions from his father as well as the arrival of the Ottoman army being prepared by Mahmut II to save his Empire from the outlaw pasha of Egypt.

### **C. The European Intervention and the End of the War:**

It is true that the European powers - France, Britain and Austria - had several other priorities than the Ottoman Empire, as long as its existence was secured from Russian threats, nevertheless, they played the most important role in terminating the Ottoman-Egyptian War in 1833. Britain was consumed with Belgium and Portugal, France with Italy, Belgium and her new conquests in North Africa, while Austria was involved in both Italy and consolidating her influence in Germany. These issues were soon to subside in favor of the new priority involving the Ottoman Empire and the limitless ambitions of an Ottoman subordinate. Unlike other internal revolts in the Ottoman provinces, this rebellion brought the existence of the Empire itself into question.

Initially, Britain abandoning her traditional policy of involvement, remained aloof until near the end of the crisis. This was not a result of any lack of interest in the Ottoman Empire or its role in Russian containment, but should rather be attributed primarily to its involvement in the Belgian and Portuguese problems. Also, the Cabinet of Lord Grey in office since 1830 (which included several pro-Greek Ministers), wished to avoid entangling the country in the problems of the Porte, at least in the short term.<sup>42</sup> Certainly, Britain paid for her indecision in the ongoing crisis. Moreover, British inaction played a detrimental role in the failure of the actors in the European concert to put into action the mechanics of balance of power. If the traditional balancer was absent, there was little hope the system would function as should be expected.

Moreover, it appears that the Cabinet did not realize the implication of this war on the Ottoman Empire and European equilibrium; despite the fact that British envoy to

Istanbul Stratford Canning on several occasions spelled out the dangers of a possible Russian-Ottoman alliance to thwart the aims of Mohammed Ali.<sup>43</sup> Palmerston was a strict advocate of the importance of the Ottoman role in European equilibrium, but he did not grasp of the gravity of the situation until later on. He even thought he could use the crisis to his own benefits in his negotiations with the Porte. However, Palmerston's strict instructions to his Ambassador to the Porte was to convey "*(British)* ...general wishes to maintain and uphold him *(Sultan)* as an ancient ally and old friend and as an important element in the balance of power in Europe".<sup>44</sup>

British aloofness caused them to decline a French offer to enter into joint mediations to terminate the war that was quickly spreading.<sup>45</sup> The Porte lost no time to ask for British assistance in halting the advancing armies, remarking several times to Canning the importance of an alliance, and even went as far as sending envoys to London, the last of which was Namik Pasha. The two demarches were unsuccessful in persuading the British to get involved. Clearly Palmerston was not yet willing to take sides in this conflict under the present circumstances. British refusal of assistance were transmitted to the Porte by Namik Pasha after his demarche to Britain in the form of several letters, from the King, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.<sup>46</sup> In all cases, Britain merely promised to pressure Mohammed Ali to withdraw but refused to pledge military or naval assistance.

France on the other hand, though a traditional ally of Mohammed Ali, believed that its interests would be served better with the termination of the war that was disrupting its trade in the area and threatening a Russian advance on the Porte, something that would mean Russian preponderance in Southeastern Europe. However, the government of Louis Philippe did not oppose the acquisition of Syria by Mohammed Ali and was ready to



support him on that point. They were convinced that Mohammed Ali did not aim to threaten the existence of the empire.<sup>47</sup> However, as the war developed, they changed their policy to restrict Mohammed Ali, yet never viewed him as an enemy.

The French position was clear: support for Mohammed Ali as long as he did not jeopardize the existence of the Ottoman Empire. As the war developed, the French Consul in Egypt received instructions from his Minister in 1832 that clearly explained the French position. The dispatch ran as follows, "...If Mohammed Ali wishes to consolidate his victory that he achieved, then he has to be cautious and moderate, or in other words, he should know when to stop and exploit his victory. ...The French government advises him to suppress his ambitions and accept Syria and go into negotiations with the Porte (to terminate the war)." <sup>48</sup>

Similarly, Austria suffered from the Russophobia that spread in anticipation of a possible Russian intervention to exploit the situation and establish political regency over the Ottoman Empire. Austrian worries were actually rational for they would be the first to be affected in case Russian hegemony was established over eastern Europe. (See Chapter II) Already Metternich suffered tremendously as a result of the Russian war aggrandizement in the 1828-9 war. Russian gains brought them across the Danube, the main artery that links Austria with the "outer world", and therefore, the Russians have to be denied any opportunity or pretext to cross into the Austrian neighborhood again.<sup>49</sup> However, they were plagued with the conservative viewpoint which considered any revolution against the legitimate sovereigns unacceptable. This often led them into rhetoric that did not help their peace efforts, especially during negotiations with Mohammed Ali. In general, though interested, Austria never actually played a significant role in peace efforts.



Their limited involvement did represent pressure on the Egyptian *Vali* that showed European consensus. Metternich uncharacteristically advised Namik Pasha, the Ottoman envoy seeking assistance in Vienna, to grant Mohammed Ali Syria and terminate the war.<sup>50</sup> Metternich seriously wanted to avoid Russian intervention but this did not stop him from seeking and suggesting British support or even a congress to settle the Egyptian Question. The Austrian position could be understood in light of the fact that it was a continental power, its fleet less powerful than that of Britain and France, and they wished to avoid antagonizing Russia as long as this was possible. In addition, Austrian links to Egypt were limited when compared to France and Britain. The Austrian attitude did not represent a great pressure upon Mohammed Ali compared to those of Britain and France for he knew that Austria was not the state that would act unilaterally so far from home.

Russia, on the other hand, hoped to exploit the war between the Sultan and the Egyptian *Vali*, believing that this represented a route to their regency over the Porte. They pushed an alliance on Mahmut II, which he declined as long as he had the resources to continue the war. In addition, they urged him not to accede to Mohammed Ali, feeding his intransigence and arrogance at a time when all other powers tried to persuade him to accept a peaceful solution.<sup>51</sup> Up to this point, Russia's role was limited, as was the case with other powers, for the battlefield situation was not yet considered serious.

However, after the defeat of Konya, the situation reversed and Russia sent General Muraviev to Istanbul to offer Russian military assistance and its good offices to terminate the crisis. The Porte was in a state of confusion, with the Sultan and aides opting for Russian assistance to protect his throne, while the *divan* advised the Sultan to refrain from accepting assistance from the traditional enemy which could prove costly. Although

Mahmut II accepted the offer, he reversed his decision the next day.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, Russia tried to play a role in the peace efforts on several occasions, sending Muraviev with Khalil Pasha to Egypt to convince Mohammed Ali to initiate negotiations and accept peace terms offered by the Porte.<sup>53</sup> At the same time, Muraviev's aide du camp traveled to Konya to discuss military matters with the Egyptian general staff. These diplomatic overtures failed as the Ottoman suggestion for peace were unacceptable, offering Mohammed Ali only Acre in compensation. In addition, Muraviev's arrogant and threatening attitude stimulated Ali's intransigence, who knew other powers would not accept Russian unilateral military action.

What sparked European worries was the defeat of the second Ottoman army at the Battle of Konya in December 1832 and the appearance that Russia was exploiting the situation. This defeat marked the beginning of the crisis for the powers, for it left the Ottoman Empire helpless facing Ibrahim, only 50 legions from Istanbul. The fall of the Ottoman Empire was imminent and it remained to the powers to rescue it. What worsened matters was the inability of European powers to predict the next action of Ibrahim Pasha.

Ibrahim Pasha, unlike his father, was not a man of diplomatic skills and his incautious attitude on many occasions worried the powers. He often boasted that he would terminate the Sultanate and, when intoxicated by victory, declared that he would install his father as Caliph in the Arab world. Whatever the intentions of Ibrahim or Mohammed Ali were, they would certainly affect the future of the Empire. There is sufficient evidence to show that the European powers and Russia were the only barrier to the annihilation of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, it is certain that Ibrahim was often at odds with his father with regard to the fate of the Empire.

Ibrahim's correspondence seem to bear out to these claims. Ibrahim hoped to extend his conquests to Istanbul. He wrote to his father observing that :<sup>54</sup>

*"...as long as he is on the throne (Mahmut II), we shall not be able to settle our cause along lines acceptable to us... for even if all the factors seem to be in our favor, he shall lose no opportunity to implement his treacherous tricks... Thus we shall do our best to abdicate this damned creature in favor of his heir in accordance with our previous plans".*

Mohammed Ali refused to give his consent to Ibrahim in this regard. He maintained his course of action, and wrote to him along similar lines as a previous letter where he exclaimed that, "Every advance from Konya in these present circumstances, will not be regarded positively by the powers (Europeans)".<sup>55</sup> Yet once again Ibrahim requested permission to pursue his victory and advance, and exclaimed in the end, "...why do you delay my advance, is it the fear of Europe ...?"<sup>56</sup> However, this time, Ibrahim advanced to Kutahya, against the advice of both the French and Russians.

Mohammed Ali realized that the powers were not going to permit him to become regent over the Ottoman Empire. They distrusted his intentions. Mohammed Ali never actually gave up caution when dealing with the European powers in this regard, except at a later stage when he began diplomatic maneuvers to gain support for his different plans. With the French he communicated his intentions of establishing a new Caliphate that would substitute the Ottoman one, but his overture was rejected immediately. British reactions were even worse for they believed that this division of the Porte into two sections, one in Europe and Anatolia, while the other in Syria and Mesopotamia, meant that the first would become a Russian satellite while the second was to be a French

surrogate.<sup>57</sup> This was unacceptable to them, yet still they were not actively involved as they should have.

Negotiations between the Porte and Mohammed Ali were at a standstill. A new factor that had a tremendous effect on the whole situation was Russian military assistance to the Porte. Despite initial Ottoman refusal of such Russian military assistance, it was practically a matter of time before they were bound to accept it. British decline to offer their naval assistance to the Porte left the Ottomans no choice but to accept the Russian offer. Russian forces advanced and landed in Istanbul on the 20th of February 1833 to salvage the Ottoman Empire.<sup>58</sup> Russian intentions were clear. For the first time they camped along the Ottoman Straits with an invitation to stay, and in case they ended the affair peacefully, they would seek a high price for their intervention and withdrawal. What they could not achieve over two centuries of war, they would achieve through diplomacy.

The Russian move sent a shock wave throughout Europe. The equilibrium in eastern Europe for which they worked so hard to achieve was undermined. Had not the British, French and to some extent the Austrians terminated the Greek insurgency to avoid giving Russians a military presence and springboard there? All these efforts were in vain. Equilibrium was shattered and Russia exploited the situation so as to become preponderant. It was able to elude all the arrangement and exercise of relative control on the factors affecting power acquisition by the others, to prevent a serious imbalance in power distribution that would affect the entire security structure of southeast Europe (See Chapter I, 1.5) In simple terms, it was able to achieve a relative preponderance with regard to the factors affecting power distribution. This it achieved due to the following: first and foremost, the Russians were able to extend their defensive lines to the Bosphorus,

which meant their near invulnerability to any European power and no battle could be fought on their borders (See Chapter II); second, they held a strategic position which, if exploited in the future, could be used to extend their military presence in the Balkans and Southeast Europe, threatening to become a serious challenge to other states and their domains. Third, the fear of a possible scenario whereby the Egyptian *Vali* would reach an accord with Russia and divide the Empire amongst themselves, could represent a total redistribution of power in the region. In this case, Russian strength would have expanded significantly without any compensation to the other powers, thereby violating the principles of *proportional aggrandizement* that functioned in the system. Though this was rather far fetched because the other powers were never going to permit this to happen under any circumstances, it still represented a menace. Fourth, Russia would achieve access to the Mediterranean, posing a serious threat to the interests of some powers, e.g., Britain and France, in the East Mediterranean.

Immediately after the news reached Paris of the Sultan's acceptance of Russian military assistance, the French Ambassador to Istanbul Routine tried to dissuade him from such an action. He even went as far as assuring him that if this was to happen, he could guarantee a settlement.<sup>59</sup> The British also pressured the Sultan to remove the Russian military presence and concurrently increased pressure on Mohammed Ali to accept peace.

Theoretically, the mechanics of balance of power were supposed to have been set in motion. It was expected that a concerted action among the other European powers, Britain France and Austria, would come into force to remedy this disequilibrium at once. However, as mentioned in Chapter I, this is not always the case, for some statesman do not follow the rules of the system as expected. Britain, was engaged at this stage in a

blockade over the Netherlands, Austria as usual could not act alone, and France remained distrustful of Metternich. The atmosphere of distrust played a decisive role in hindering the motion of the mechanics of balance of power. However, the members clung to the last moment to the possibility of an alliance to terminate the Egyptian Question.

There were several several attempts by the powers to engage a congress as a prelude to an *alliance* which would settle the Egyptian Question as soon as possible. These attempts were conducted both by Palmerston and Metternich yet they failed to materialize as a result of administrative and procedural problems. To begin with, Palmerston, in accordance with the French -whom he did not entirely trust -wanted the congress to be held in London, while Metternich wanted it in Vienna. Moreover, they also disagreed on the principle of intervention. Whereas Palmerston believed in the necessity of a mediation or interposition, Metternich supported the Sultan, and refused any action that did not treat the Egyptian *Vali* as illegitimate.<sup>60</sup> This practically meant open war on Egyptian forces, something that did not coincide with British or French interests. To the French, Mohammed Ali represented an extension of their influence and they were not willing to sacrifice him for the Porte's sake. In addition, Austrian, Russian and Prussian attitudes towards the Belgian crisis did not encourage neither the British nor, to a lesser degree, the French to pursue a Congress. The initial response from France and Britain was to enforce their naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean, but this was not an effective measure.<sup>61</sup>

Amidst this atmosphere of distrust and British attempts to exert efforts to terminate the crisis, despite its late involvement, the prospect of joint European action was diminishing. Instead of forming an alliance and intervening to redress the disequilibrium,



the powers presented a demarche to the Egyptian *Vali* urging him to give up his advances in Anatolia and accept a settlement.

The French, alarmed at the Russian presence and inability to reach consensus of action between the powers, raised the volume of advice to the level of a semi-threat to Mohammed Ali. France demanded Mohammed Ali compromise with the Porte. A French envoy was sent to Egypt in late February where he bluntly laid out the fears of France. He exclaimed to him, "what do you want ? the Russians are there (in Istanbul) and it is important to send them back The treaty (being negotiated) is not a humiliating one...you will receive the *vilayet* of St. Jean d'Acre and I do not doubt that with this, you will gain your independence ..."<sup>62</sup> Mohammed Ali tried to play on the French anti-Russian feelings, but they nonetheless refused to accept his point of view. At the same time, he worked to maximize gains from the Syrian campaign, which originally held the primary objectives of the conquest of Syria and his independence. He certainly abandoned his alleged plan to reform the Ottoman Empire, or, as he called it, the *Rejuvenation Project*.<sup>63</sup> Faced with European dissension, he was lucky to escape this entanglement with the *vilayet* of Syria. To this end, he was willing to test the European powers' patience.

As matters worsened, the British, Austrian and French demarches arrived in March and April 1833. The first to arrive was the British representative in Alexandria, Colonel Campbell on March 26, and upon his audience with the Pasha, he informed him the desire of Britain to see his evacuation from Asia Minor. Failure to do so would compel Britain to consider a possible embargo on Alexandria.<sup>64</sup> He explained to him the instructions of Palmerston, which boiled down to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In a classical *gunboat diplomacy* approach, Palmerston ordered the mobilization of some warships from



Greece to Alexandria as part of a military demarche to pressure Mohammed Ali.<sup>65</sup> Mohammed Ali eluded him as usual and insisted on the danger of Russian presence and the necessity of an acceptable settlement. He hoped the Sultan would bow to the pressures of the Egyptian armies who now moved on Kutahya. The issue became a question of who would back down first, the Sultan or Mohammed Ali ?

The Austrian representatives to Egypt, Prochek Osten had an audience with the Egyptian Vali on April 2nd, when he advised that "Austria will never transgress upon the principles on which the state exists (*conservatism and legitimacy*)... Austria is a friend of the Porte...and it does not want its dismemberment".<sup>66</sup> Mohammed Ali responded as he did with Campbell and neither obtained a conclusive commitment from the *Vali*.

A few days after the arrival of the French envoy on April 29, the Sultan abruptly, accepted the terms of peace with Mohammed Ali. He agreed to cede to him Syria, Crete and Acre but denied him both independence and Cyprus. Ibrahim, by now demoralized as a result of his inability to capitalize on his victory and sack the Sultan, accepted the terms of the Porte. The pressures of the French and British on the two sides lead to an Ottoman acceptance. In a high-stakes battle of patience, Mohammed Ali outlasted Mahmut II who faced battles on his own territory and his own life on the line. It is recalled that upon hearing the news of the agreement, he cried for joy in front of the Foreign consuls.<sup>67</sup>

The Peace of Kutahya was reached on the 3rd of May 1833, but it was not guaranteed by any of the major powers. In one way, Kutahya does not represent a treaty between the two parties, on the contrary, it was only a means by which the two opponents agreed on the terms to end hostilities. It consisted of the several Ottoman *Fermans* granting Mohammed Ali the *vilayet* of Syria and the rest of his demands.<sup>68</sup> It was

certainly a relief to all the powers. For Britain, France as well as Austria, it meant saving the Ottoman Empire from collapse, thereby eliminating any prospects of further imbalance in the equilibrium in Europe. The Empire was intact and in control of its European and Anatolian domains. Whether this control was nominal or not, was not important, for at least these territories were under the sovereignty of some power and not a *terra nullius* for any power to dominate. The latter condition would represent a temptation that could lure one or more of the powers to the detriment of European peace.<sup>69</sup> This point was for the first time touched upon by Palmerston when he insisted that his government, "is of the opinion that any considerable encroachment upon the Asiatic territories of the Sultan, and a consequent defalcation from the resources which... (the Empire) might bring for the defense of his European dominions, must operate in a corresponding degree upon his relative position with respect to neighboring powers, and must thereby have injurious bearing upon the general interests of Europe".<sup>70</sup> Also, peace eliminated the *raison d'être* for the Russian military presence on the Bosphorus. This was a very important factor in the European calculations, especially by Britain. The re-establishment of peace between the Porte and its *Vali* reduced the possibility for further Russian exploitation of the Egyptian Question, and this was another reason for the powers to rejoice. Finally, this peace saved these powers from having to employ force to impose a settlement, particularly on Mohammed Ali.

The crisis was over, but its consequences remained. To begin with, Sultan Mahmut II was determined to retrieve the territories lost to Mohammed Ali, and to this end he was willing to enter a war against him as soon as circumstances permitted. This was undertaken in 1839. Furthermore, this episode proved that the Egyptian Question was not

a matter of an Egyptian and Ottoman concern only, on the contrary, it was more a battle of diplomacy and deterrence between Egypt and the European powers. Clearly, Mohammed Ali was right when he realized that European security was the ultimate factor that controlled the outcome of any future wars between the Porte and Egypt. Moreover, this war established an observable link between Egyptian expansionist policy and the general balance of power in Europe. As Palmerston pointed out to his consul in Egypt, the Porte represented a " ...material element in the general balance of power in Europe",<sup>71</sup> and this practically meant that if Egypt was to affect the Porte, it affected the balance of power in Europe. In addition, this episode produced a negative effect on the Egyptian position *vis-à-vis* the European powers, especially with regard to Palmerston (as we shall see in the next section), thereby rendering any future attempts for either aggrandizement, independence or threatening the Porte, unacceptable.

#### **4.3 More Imbalance to the Equilibrium 1833-1839: Hunkar Iskelesi and Munchengratz**

The peace of Kutahya meant an uneasy peace in the east, but it marked the beginning of a turmoil in the European system. The aftermath of Kutahya caused turbulence in Europe, for now Britain and France had to suffer from a Russian preponderance in the east, that began to threaten the equilibrium in Europe. Once again effects of the Egyptian Question played a role in the functioning of the European system. Both were rather interdependent on each other. Whereas the Europeans denied Mohammed Ali some of his aims in the Egyptian-Ottoman war as a result of diplomatic

intervention and the deterrent factor of their possible military intervention against him, the war further polarized the system along *Eastern* and *Western Camps*.

It is true that the Egyptian Question played an important role in this polarization, but there were other reasons behind this state in the system. The uprisings in Belgium, Poland, France and Italy acted as factors in this regard. Britain and France, though classical rivals, were linked together against the *Eastern Camp*, composed of Russia, Prussia and Austria. Polarization was a result of ideological reasons, for the Eastern Powers clung to their conservative ideology advocating intervention to restore legitimacy, while at the same time the *Western Camp* were protagonists of non-intervention combined with a sense of liberalism.<sup>72</sup> The revolutions of 1830 marked the beginning of the divergence between the two camps, especially following the Belgian crisis, where Britain and France secured its independence against the distrust and opposition of the other powers. As Palmerston's statement revealed, "The Three -*Russia-Austria and Prussia*- and the Two -*Britain and France* - think differently and therefore they act differently".<sup>73</sup>

Certainly, within the premises of a balance of power system, such polarization does not necessarily mean the members of one camp would not use others in order to obtain favorable result in other affairs. This was true in the European system prevailing at that time. Russia for example used Britain as a temporary ally to quell the Prussian ambitions in Poland and Germany, while at the same time Austria used France to check possible Russian aggrandizement in the East. Such flexibility was always present when actors from different camps, whose policies might parallel on certain issues, could cooperate. Such cases certainly eased the polarization. However Russian actions towards the Ottoman Empire created an imbalance that intensified polarization along the lines mentioned earlier.

The general division of Europe along these two camps could have been contained, or at least temporarily averted, had Russia avoided the policy of preponderance in the east. Russian diplomacy took two steps that were liable to undermine the equilibrium in southeastern Europe, sending a shock wave through the *Western Camp*. These two steps were the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi and the Treaty of Münchengratz, only two months apart. These two diplomatic moves played a major role in cementing the coalition between France and Britain, while creating the same reaction in the *Eastern Camp*.

The Russian forces had to be evacuated as the Peace of Kutahya came into force, however, before their departure, on July 8, 1833, the Russians concluded the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi with the Ottomans.<sup>74</sup> The treaty contained several provisions of great value to Russia and included *inter-alia*: the decision of the two governments to consult each other concerning their respective security and guarantee mutual support for each other's defense, the Russian pledge to send naval and ground forces to the rescue of the Sultan in case he fell under attack or whenever the need arose and, most importantly, a secret clause whereby the Porte would close the Dardanelles to any warships attempting to enter the Black Sea as long as it was in peace.

This treaty was considered to be one of Russia's most valuable diplomatic victories in the nineteenth century, since it obtained most of its long-standing aims regarding the Porte. To Nesselrode, this was a triumph of his policy of Ottoman integrity combined with Russian preponderance that he advocated earlier to Nicholas I. This treaty had a very dangerous effect on the equilibrium in the east precisely because it achieved nearly all the Russian aims. The main reason for this was that it "...gave Russia a decided political preponderance", while at the same time securing the closure of the Straits against all

foreign warships.<sup>75</sup> This rendered Russian borders impregnable, thereby achieving their traditional aim of extending their defensive lines away from their own borders and giving them virtual control over the Straits. Also, Article III of the treaty gave them the right to send their armies for the protection of the Porte, and this could secure their presence once again in Ottoman territory without the need to go into international diplomatic maneuvers to secure such interventions. Thus, the shadows of a Russian presence in the Mediterranean and south east Europe remained as long as the Ottoman Empire felt its security jeopardized. This in fact was a recurring phenomena that increased as a result of Mohammed Ali acquiring Syria, something that haunted both Britain and France. For this reason they did what they could to avoid a second Egyptian-Ottoman war that could lead to another Russian military presence on the Bosphorous. Finally, this treaty was considered by many as the guarantee of Russian guardianship over the Ottoman Empire. That by itself was sufficient to increase Russian political leverage over the Porte, and render it a Russian surrogate. Palmerston was right when he believed that the Russians, were taking the Ottoman Empire more "by sap than by storm".<sup>76</sup>

From a strategic and military point of view Russia became the only power with overwhelming influence in the Porte and above all, became nearly impregnable to foreign naval assaults. Any future Russian military presence in the region could jeopardize the security structure of southeastern Europe. Their forces would be hundreds of miles away, while the other powers, would be forced to travel a long distance to oppose their march. In practical terms, this meant Russian preponderance and gave them strategic advantages that rendered checking Russian military preponderance a very difficult task. That was a clear case of disbalance in power distribution. (See Chapter I)



Palmerston had a particular vision for the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, for the real danger to him did not lie in the secret article blocking warships' entrance to the Black Sea, something that he perceived as, "comparatively harmless, in effect, though abundantly objectionable in spirit and intent".<sup>77</sup> His main concern was the political preponderance of Russia in the affairs of the Porte, whereby the "...mutual engagement between the two powers to consult each other confidentially upon all their respective interests and by which the Russian Ambassador becomes the Chief Cabinet Minister of the Sultan."<sup>78</sup> The French though more furious than the British perceived the whole treaty to be a menace to the equilibrium in Europe, for regardless of whether Russian preponderance was political or strategic, the Porte was believed to have become a Russian surrogate. Furthermore, the French believed that Russian intentions towards the Porte were wicked and that this treaty helped them achieve their aims.<sup>79</sup>

The British and French reaction to this treaty was instantaneous, and their Ambassadors to the Porte did their best to impede its ratification.<sup>80</sup> The two governments presented the Porte and Russia with a near identical protest, wherein they declared the treaty produced a new pattern of relationship between Russia and the Porte to which they were entitled to object, and in case of Russian military intervention in the Porte in conformity of the treaty, the two powers held themselves at liberty to act as if this treaty were not in existence.<sup>81</sup> There were even speculation of making a naval demarches in the Dardanelles to further pressure the Sultan, but Palmerston was not very fond of this idea, though the French would not have obstructed such a course of action. It was expected that Austria would join the protest, but most probably Metternich needed to keep his bridges with Russia, especially given the polarization going on in the system between the



two camps as mentioned earlier due to the crisis in Belgium and Portugal. In addition, he was partially seduced by Nicholas into a non-obstructive course of action as we shall see very shortly.

As expected, the Ottoman reply to the protests of France and Britain, though arriving late, reflected a mild response. The Porte stated that "the only objective of the treaty was to maintain tranquillity and that " ... [it] does not have any offensive purposes".<sup>82</sup> In addition the Porte emphasized throughout its reply that the treaty was done voluntarily by the Porte. The answer was simple, the Porte was now clearly in the Russian camp, though there were many officials that were not content with the present situation, including the *Reis Effendi*.<sup>83</sup> The Russian reaction however, was more aggressive. Nesselrode stated to the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg that their objections towards the treaty seemed to show bad intentions of the powers towards dismembering the Ottoman Empire.<sup>84</sup>

Who was to blame for the deterioration in the equilibrium in Eastern Europe? Certainly, the Egyptian Question triggered the major portion of the problem. But since there were other powers involved, the blame was distributed among them as well. France did its utmost to terminate the *raison d'etre* of the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, and so did Metternich, as much as the circumstances permitted. The Porte was in a very difficult position and could not afford to lose Russian protection at a time when no other power was willing to take effective measures to help. Much of the blame could be directed towards Britain and Palmerston himself for failing to assist the Porte when it needed. Had he pledged the naval assistance to the Porte, the whole affair probably would have been settled, but he did not, or could not. As he later regretted, "There was nothing that had

happened since I have been in office which I regret so much as the tremendous blunder of the English government [in 1833]. But it was not my fault- I tried hard to persuade the Cabinet to let me take the step [send naval assistance to the Porte].... and so nothing was done in a crisis of the utmost importance to all Europe when we might with the greatest of ease have accomplished a good result".<sup>85</sup> Repentance was not enough, even if was five years later, and both Britain and France faced another crisis in September 1833. This time the blow was delivered by Tsar Nicholas I as well as Metternich. The Treaty of Münchengratz, signed by Russia and Austria, regarding the fate of the Porte, undermined the remaining equilibrium in eastern Europe.

Upon securing their military presence in the Porte by its own request in February 1833, Nesselrode immediately realized the importance of incorporating another ally with him in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. He knew that even if his forces were to withdraw, a treaty of a sort was to be signed and he therefore began active consultation with Metternich to secure Austrian support. The choice of Austria was obvious. To begin with, the alliance structure in Europe at this juncture left Austria as the only potential ally due to the polarization between the *Eastern and Western Camps*. In addition, Russia and Austria were the only two states bordering the Ottoman Empire, and therefore, most concerned in the fate of this empire.<sup>86</sup> From the previous experiences with Metternich, it is probable that he tried to use this alliance to restrict Russian unilateral preponderance in the Porte, in case Mohammed Ali was successful in eliminating it in the future.

The Treaty of Münchengratz was signed on September 18, 1833 between Russia and Austria among several other treaties, some of which Prussia was involved in. It consisted of five articles, two of which were secret.<sup>87</sup> The treaty was not written

eloquently, and carried a great deal of ambiguity. In essence the treaty stipulated that both states were to act together to secure the survival of the Ottoman dynasty, though not guaranteeing the integrity of the empire, which in essence meant refusing any successor to the Ottoman state. Also, they pledged themselves to confront any internal threat against the Sultan. This point was the key to one of the secret articles which stipulated that it was directed against Mohammed Ali's ambitions with regard to Ottoman European held territory. The final secret article confirmed joint action in case it became impossible to withhold the present order in the Ottoman Empire, whereby it was agreed that they would act in solidarity concerning *l'establissement du nouvel ordre des choses*, so that any change in the internal situation of the Empire would neither affect their security nor European equilibrium.

The reasons and repercussions of this treaty with regard to the Egyptian Question and the European system are of major importance. To begin with, it is certain that the treaty came as a result of the Egyptian-Ottoman war, and the widespread fear of the possibility of an Egyptian succession to the Ottoman empire. But why did this spread fears in Vienna and St. Petersburg? It is obvious that Metternich and Nicholas were worried regarding the future of the Empire now that it became under serious threat from Egyptian expansion. This fear in return triggered their action and the Treaty of Münchengratz. There were two reasons for this, the first of which was a possible Egyptian takeover of the Sultanate which could mean that it was the eligible successor of the Porte in southeastern Europe. The second was the presence of an Arab Empire on the European borders.

Such a situation was certainly something that worried Metternich, probably more than the Tsar, given that these territories were closer to Austria than Russia. In this, he

probably followed the wise policy of Maria Theresa half a century earlier. (see chapter II, 2.4) There is sufficient evidence to point in this direction. To begin with, Metternich's first concern with regard to the rapprochement with Russia in early 1833, seemed to be directed towards the future of the Ottoman European territories. He conveyed this bluntly to Tatischeff, the Russian Ambassador to Vienna, that it was imperative to settle the fate of these territories, whereby the Christian subjects were to be ruled by Princes while the Muslim ones by Khans.<sup>88</sup> This was one of Metternich's prerequisites for an alliance and while there is no evidence to show that Nicholas accepted this logic, he probably did so. Concurrently, he wanted to ensure that these territories were not to become a battlefield for other states causing a probable war. Power vacuum in this area meant a strategic disequilibrium, something he would not permit.

In the same conversation with Tatischeff, he emphasized the fear of a new actor in the European system by proposing to him avoiding an Arab empire as the successor of the Ottoman Empire. There are several reasons to explain this fear. First, as we have come to see, most of the European states had come to a *modus vivendi* with the Ottoman Empire, even Russia accepted its existence just after the Treaty of Adrianopole. Was it really a wise idea to create a new powerful neighbor?. Secondly, this new successor, i.e. Egypt, was not a weak state and by 1833 had amassed a well-equipped. modern military force surpassing one hundred thousand men, supported by a large fleet. The reports Metternich was receiving from Egypt, seemed to influence him as well, for in May 1833 he received a dispatch from Osten his consul in Egypt which stated among other things that, "...there are a number of evidences for...the idea of the establishment of an Arab empire.... I see on the one side a weak Ottoman state, and on the other ...an Arab army and a very strong fleet.

To this we can add the awakening of the Arab World from its heavy sleep".<sup>89</sup> Such ideas worried Metternich and Nicholas, especially since Ottoman armies were routed in the battlefield with relative ease. A third factor could be added and it is the fact that Mohammed Ali was fully supported by France, and with the Franco-Austrian tensions in Italy, it certainly did not want to permit the French access to its own backyard in Europe. Mohammed Ali's preponderance meant French preponderance to them and this was neither acceptable in Vienna nor St. Petersburg. Finally, the British position was greeted with enthusiasm in the two courts, during the Egyptian-Ottoman war. If British position was better known as to whether it would come to the rescue of the Porte if future events might require that, this would have certainly alleviated some of the fears and pressures on Metternich. If Britain was idle during Mohammed Ali's move into Syria, perhaps it would remain so if the Ottoman Empire's fate was at stake in future.

These were probably the reasons behind Münchengratz. Each of the two powers settled their differences and achieved what they needed in accordance to the system's mechanics. For both Russia and Austria, Münchengratz was a milestone in the preservation of the *Eastern Camp* against the *Western Camp*. Russia on the one hand realized that she needed an ally and the only possible ally was Austria. That stems from the fact that the way the system functioned almost guaranteed that any future unilateral Russian intervention in the Porte's affairs would trigger the opposition of the other actors so as to maintain equilibrium. Moreover, such actions could be transformed into an alliance against Russia if it achieved further preponderance. Therefore, Russia needed to secure an ally so as to confront possible future alliances against it. As we mentioned earlier, the means to establish this was the application of the principle of *reciprocal*

*compensation.* (See Chapter I, 1.5) That in turn meant, that Austria was to have the same privileges as Russia in the fate of the Ottoman Empire, therefore, M<sup>u</sup>ch<sup>e</sup>ng<sup>r</sup>atz could be considered the price Russia paid to sustain her preponderance in Ottoman Empire.

From all of the above, we can clearly view a state of disequilibrium in the East of the system in that Russia and Austria were to be the preponderant powers controlling the fate of the Ottoman Empire. For Palmerston, the situation was rather confused for he lacked a plan for the British policy towards the Ottoman Empire. His assessment of the situation, however, showed the volatility of equilibrium in the east when he stated that in Britain they "...were [are] averse to any great changes in the relative distribution of political power because such changes must either be brought about by war or must have a tendency when effected to produce war".<sup>90</sup> Certainly, disequilibrium was clearly perceived in London, but the course of action was still vague, the main aim remained the need to reduce Russian preponderance in the East.

He realized that coercive intervention by both Britain and France would prove both costly and risky, especially given other alternatives, such as attracting the Ottoman Empire back to Britain by proving that it was more advantageous for the Porte to "... look for aid to England instead of leaning upon a powerful and systematically encroaching neighbor".<sup>91</sup> Nevertheless, immediately after the Treaty of M<sup>u</sup>ch<sup>e</sup>ng<sup>r</sup>atz, Palmerston directed his attention towards another policy alternative, that of using Mohammed Ali to balance the matters.

As mentioned earlier, Mohammed Ali missed no opportunity to push forward for an alliance with Britain, even at the cost of selling out the French. He had communicated previously to the British and French consuls the dangers emanating from Russian advances



and their attempts to control the Porte. He aimed to direct the interests of the powers from his conquests in Syria and Anatolia to the Russian threat. But there seems no doubt that Palmerston was willing at a certain junction to use the Egyptian *Vali* to undo the disequilibrium in the East, a view shared by Ponsonby towards the end of 1833.

In a letter by Palmerston to his brother, dated October 6, 1833, he seemed to point out the basic pillars of his thoughts.<sup>92</sup> He contends that at Münchengratz, Russia and Austria plotted the partition the Porte and that Britain and France would oppose such a project, "...and with the assistance of Mehmet Ali, [they should be able ] to offer a strong barrier against this accomplishment." His line of thought seemed to be moving towards a possible naval intervention in the Dardanelles, and to this end he wrote, that "...we should not find it easy to force the Dardanelles unless we had troops to land. Mehmet Ali, to be sure, could lend us plenty and would be ready enough to do so".

Ponsonby on the other hand, believed that the internal situation in the Porte to be very vulnerable, especially that Mahmut II faced considerable internal dissension. He feared that any attempt to dethrone Mahmut II meant a possible Russian intervention in accordance with Hunkar Iskelesi and Münchengratz. He believed that, "if Mohammed Ali could come to Constantinople and dethrone the government of the Sultan, ... he could take the necessary measures to close effectively the Bosphorus in face of the Russian forces".<sup>93</sup>

Thus, for the first time, Egypt began to fit into the context of British foreign policy as a necessity to remedy the breach to the existing equilibrium. Such a policy could have been welcomed by France, which believed Mohammed Ali to be her extension in the Mediterranean. But as events seemed to point in the future, this policy alternative was



gradually dismissed as the dust of secrecy surrounding the Treaty of Münchengratz settled and Britain realized that the treaty did not include dismembering the Ottoman Empire. At this stage, the British and the French, though never willing to ignore the possibility of joint military action, settled in favor of diplomatic channels and a policy of dissuading the Porte from leaning towards Russia. Thus their alliance decided that *intervention* would be on the diplomatic level. Therefore, Britain and France protested Münchengratz in St. Petersburg in October 1833 but to no avail.

In the meantime, Britain chose a threefold policy. First, it focused on keeping matters quiet between Egypt and the Porte. To this end, Palmerston instructed Ponsonby to do everything in his powers to prevent Mohammed Ali from breaking the peace lest he should become "the instrument of Russia, to work out his own degradation." Regarding the Porte, they should follow a similar direction for he believed that the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi was but one step in the direction of Russian "...aggrandizement towards the South", that is to say, she might use this pretext to intervene in the Porte for her own benefits in future.<sup>94</sup> Second, he believed that the reasons for this disequilibrium, besides the Egyptian Question, was the fact that the Porte was too weak to improve and defend her territories. Therefore, he embarked on a policy of assisting Mahmut II in his reformation movement, something that was bound to remove the Porte from the Russian sphere of influence. In other words, he believed in a policy of containing the Russians by raising the influence of Britain in the Porte. In this, the British policy was successful. Third, the British fleet had no clear instructions, but remained as a possible alternative to support this new policy if needed.<sup>95</sup>

France on the other hand maintained a policy of support for Mohammed Ali, and aimed to keep him as their source of influence, especially that he was in possession of the Levant and Egypt. They continued to support him militarily and financially. However, such a divergent policy between France and Britain was bound to create differences in case of an Ottoman-Egyptian war, as happened in 1839.

Meanwhile, Britain and France cooperated to remedy the disequilibrium in the system, in addition to the policies each conducted unilaterally. In a traditional balance of power mechanism, both developed a *counter-alliance* against the *Eastern Camp* which was considered to be the *disturber of the balance*. (See Chapter I, 1.5 ) Renewed stability in Portugal and Spain allowed both parties to develop this counter-alliance. A Quadruple alliance was declared between Britain, France, Portugal and Spain immediately after the political turmoil settled in the latter two states. Palmerston did not conceal the real intentions behind this alliance, stating that it would "serve as a powerful counterpoise to the Holy Alliance in the East".<sup>96</sup> This was a manifestation of the balance of power principles that dominated Europe.

Naturally, this policy produced tension, especially between Britain and Russia. The British-Russian rivalry extended to new horizons, particularly in Iran, Afghanistan, and over the Polish rebellion, and finally in the Ottoman Empire. Britain endured a bout of Russophobia in the years that followed 1833, and public opinion was very much against Russia. Many periodicals fostered the necessity of war to save the Dardanelles which some described as the "keys to Europe."<sup>97</sup> Due to British rapprochement towards the Porte, the commission of David Urquhart searched for possible areas of cooperation with the Porte and played a major role in fomenting distrust between London and St. Petersburg. In

addition, the Russians felt that the situation could deteriorate when Britain decided to opt for military intervention. Nesselrode's evaluation of the situation in 1834 was that, "Palmerston wants to avenge himself upon us for the sorry role he has played in the affairs of the east.... However, everything is possible with men so enraged and so devoid of good sense, as those who rule England.... I shall therefore not be sorry to learn that we, at all events, are busily occupied in placing Sevastopol in a state of defense".<sup>98</sup> Russian military mobilization began and by 1836 the Black Sea was ready for any potential war. By 1837, all plans were laid down to sack the Dardanelles in case of British attack on the Straits.<sup>99</sup> Nevertheless, the situation was contained. Palmerston was determined to avoid open hostilities, but it took some time for the situation to clear between the two states, something that the Second Egyptian-Ottoman war helped to develop.

From all of the above reactions, we can infer that the major reason for disequilibrium created in Europe was a result of the Egyptian-Ottoman war in 1833 which was immediately reacted against by Britain and France, together and apart. Both states followed the mechanics of balance of power collectively to counter it. But as each state began to develop its own policy in the years that followed, divergence began to appear, for Britain opted for friendship with the Porte while France for Egypt, and together they stood against Russia.

Finally, the disequilibrium in the European System had repercussions on the Egyptian Question itself. Mohammed Ali became a source of trouble to most European actors who favored the maintenance of the *status quo* to avoid Russian intervention and further disequilibrium. His expansionist policies were perceived with disfavor in Britain and his constant appeal for British alliance was generally refused. In 1834, he tried to

convince Campbell that he could fit in the British policy of Russian containment. He boasted that he had a hundred and fifty thousand soldiers at arms ready to keep the Russians off the Ottoman Empire and Iran.<sup>100</sup> However, by that time Palmerston had reverted to the traditional policy of siding with the Porte, believing that any action towards Egypt would damage British relations with the Porte, and therefore, it was better to continue attracting the Porte to the side of Britain. In a tough reply, Palmerston wrote to Campbell that he was outraged by a proposal of Mohammed Ali which "...would be an infringement on the Sultan's right".<sup>101</sup>

The ethical or moral aspect of Palmerston's refusal was merely a convenience. In reality he believed that he could use Mohammed Ali at a certain stage against the Sultan and his Russian ally. But he was concerned that the expansionist policy of Mohammed Ali brought the *Vali* closer to trade routes with India. Mohammed Ali's incorporation of Syria left him a few days' march of Mesopotamia, the backyard of Iran. Moreover, he was consolidating his position in the Red Sea, which practically became an Egyptian lake, and his armies were close to the Persian Gulf. It became the policy of Britain to thwart Mohammed Ali's ambitions and use the first available pretext to settle the Egyptian Question in a way that would secure the trade routes.<sup>102</sup> The opportunity came in 1839 with the Second Egyptian-Ottoman War.

During the four years preceding 1839, the Egyptian Question remained static. Egypt was busy subduing Syria, which proved rebellious under Egyptian rule, and increased its military strength. France consolidated her position in Egypt, Britain was unhappy with Egyptian expansion, but her policy *vis-à-vis* the Porte was successful in improving her position in the Ottoman court. By 1838, the two sides concluded a treaty

of commerce to secure further cooperation. Russia was not content with this Ottoman-British rapprochement but could do little in response to Ponsonby's diplomatic offensive.<sup>103</sup> In the meantime, the British policy differed little from that of Russia or Austria. Palmerston continued to deter the Sultan from taking revenge on Egypt. He was convinced that any such attempt could provoke Russian intervention in accordance with the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi. His instructions as transmitted by Ponsonby to the Ottoman Ministers were clear, "The British government will never allow itself to be ...forced to war by the caprice and wrongheadedness of another government, and would find means to protect her own interests by other means."<sup>104</sup> Palmerston was convinced that another attack by the Porte on Mohammed Ali would result in an Ottoman defeat. Ponsonby in reply to Palmerston's instructions pointed out that, "The British government will have no choice; it will be bound to act with arms in its hands..."<sup>105</sup> However, Palmerston, by now detested Mohammed Ali and concluded that he was the main source of trouble and that he had to be forced out of Syria and back to Egypt, putting an end to the Egyptian Question.

Metternich had his hands full trying to alleviate the tension between Britain and Russia, and creating a concerted action among the powers with regards to the Egyptian Question. At the same time he was worried about the possible outcome of a hostile outbreak, and therefore did his utmost to keep both the Mahmut II and Mohammed Ali at peaceful terms. This reality did not deter him from his favorite game of *political constructions*, whereby he began to pay more attention to the possible consequences and how to avoid the repercussion of another crisis. Finally he concluded that Greece would become the successor of the Ottoman European held territory.<sup>106</sup> Certainly, none of the

other powers were ready to accept this solution, but nevertheless, his wishful thinking continued.

The Egyptian Question, as mentioned throughout this chapter, developed a pattern of activity unlike the other two previous stages examined in Chapter III. By now it was clearly influencing events in southeastern Europe. The inability of the balancer, *Britain*, to play its major role in containing the Egyptian Question, showed the vulnerability of the system and its susceptibility to Mohammed Ali's actions against the Ottoman Empire. Clearly, he became a factor in the European system, though he should not be considered an actor in the system, for he was not linked geographically or culturally to it.

Clearly, the heterogeneity of the system, when the Ottoman Empire was involved, played a fundamental role in the power calculations and the outcome of the events taking place. The entire struggle between Britain and France on the one hand and Russia on the other could be attributed to this fact. The mere fact that Russia was perceived by the other powers as a predator willing to digest the Ottoman Empire, forced them to act in a manner whereby they did their best to guarantee Ottoman survival. Hence, the Russian factor was the driving force behind all the actions undertaken by the other powers during the Crisis of 1833.

#### 4.4. Prelude to the Crisis: Egypt Contemplates Independence :

With regard to the Egyptian Question, most European courts continued to pursue the same policy as before. Britain and Austria, were both, for reasons mentioned earlier, unable to tolerate Egyptian expansion. Russia was the ultimate benefactor of these events for it had already established itself as the dominant guardianship over the Porte, and wished to maintain the *status quo*. France, believed Mohammed Ali was the extension of her influence in the Mediterranean, and therefore supported him wholeheartedly. As for Prussia, they were not actively interested in the Egyptian Question, in as far as it did not affect the general European equilibrium. Prussia was more focused on the events in Germany and Poland. Moreover, Prussia limited her activities with the Porte to military training and trade. In the military field they provided the Porte with instructors to replace the British ones following quarrels between the Porte and British instructors.<sup>107</sup>

By 1838, British and Russian tension declined and Russophobia in London decreased. Anti-Russian feelings however, remained high in France. Louis Philippe was in total discord with Nicholas I, owing it basically to personal hatred between them. Therefore, as long as Britain maintain an alliance with France, Russia was upset. Such ideas were often communicated to the British themselves, to the extent that Count Nesselrode bluntly stated to the British Ambassador to Vienna, "Let Lord Palmerston talk less to France and more to us and things will go better".<sup>108</sup> Certainly, the splits in the European concert encouraged Mohammed Ali to start a new round of the Egyptian Question in 1838.



Since the Peace of Kutahya, Mohammed Ali waited for the precise moment to declare his independence in order to rid himself of the political and financial pressures of the Porte on his domains, and to secure the hereditary rule of Egypt for his family. This last point became increasingly important after he turned seventy. It is true that the Peace of Kutahya gave him *de facto* independence, but he continually sought ways to demonstrate complete independence. For example, he tried to avoid applying the Treaty of Balta Limani in 1838 between the Porte and Britain yet he finally gave in and abolished some of the monopolies. He also worked to strengthen his military apart from the Porte.

Mohammed Ali and Mahmut II encountered several problems that marred their relations. Since the Treaty of Kutahya, the relationship between them remained volatile. On the one hand, Mahmut II awaited the right time when he could launch an attack on Mohammed Ali, retrieve Syria and possibly sack him from the *vilayet* of Egypt,<sup>109</sup> while at the same time, Mohammed Ali was unwilling to accept the *status quo* and prepared to declare his independence. It was only a matter of time before the situation exploded between these two men. Since 1834, the two parties tried to resolve some of their irreconcilable differences. To begin with, Mohammed Ali refused to pay the arrears of the tribute for the years in which he was at war with the Porte. This refusal developed into a crisis.<sup>110</sup> The audacity of Mohammed Ali went so far as an unsuccessful attempt to bribe the entourage of Mahmut II with the amount of one million kursh to remove Husrev pasha from office.

Once again the European powers played an important role in the tensions that marked the Egyptian-Ottoman relations. French policy was directed towards securing Mohammed Ali from the Ottoman threat in the future while the British policy was the total

opposite.<sup>111</sup> Britain did its best to encourage Mahmut II to refrain from yielding to Mohammed Ali's demands. Yet both opted for the tactical maintenance of the *status quo*, each for different reasons. Whereas France wanted to keep Mohammed Ali in Syria, Britain wanted him removed, yet knew that the weakness of the Porte made this impossible for the time being. The initiative however passed to the French who immediately did their best to secure a permanent solution to the crises arising between the two. Louis Philippe offered his good offices to the two parties, and eventually negotiations were held under French auspices.<sup>112</sup> These negotiations failed to produce any permanent solution. Mohammed Ali insisted on maintaining Syria while the Porte wanted him to evacuate to the *Vilayet* of Acre. Another point of divergence between the two parties was the attitude of the Porte towards the requests of Mohammed Ali for hereditary rule in Egypt. Negotiations between the two reconvened in 1837 when Sarim Effendi was cordially received by Mohammed Ali, but his requests for an Egyptian withdrawal from Syria were denied.<sup>113</sup>

Mohammed Ali became frustrated with the Ottoman attitude in these negotiations, as well as to the fact that they constantly offered assistance to Syrian rebels. Since its defeat in 1832-1833, the Porte attempted to foment trouble for Egyptian armies in Syria, basically by supplying the rebels with weapons and money.<sup>114</sup> That was a major issue for Mohammed Ali and he was determined to sever all links with the Porte to avoid this.

For this part, Mohammed Ali a meeting for the *Divaniyya* where he discussed this issue. Most of those attending accepted his arguments except for Boughous Youssef Bey his Foreign Minister. He argued that this would trigger European intervention, and warned Mohammed Ali of the consequences.<sup>115</sup> His first step was to gather the British and French

consuls in Egypt on May 25, 1838 and declare his independence from the Porte. His main arguments were that he was getting old and wished to secure the hereditary rule of Egypt for his family. His other argument was that he wished to maintain the developments he achieved in Egypt, claiming that a return of Egypt to Ottoman sovereignty meant the undoing of all the developments.<sup>116</sup> Though this was true, but there is no doubt that his main aim was to assure hereditary rule for his family and terminate Ottoman assistance to the Syrian rebels. His gamble rested on the fact that there existed dissension among the powers in the European system, and he wished to exploit this to his advantage. Unfortunately he was misinformed, and Boughous Bey was correct, the European system with all differences between the actors, unanimously refused to accept his declaration.

Each of the major powers in the European system had its reason to refuse this step. Even Egypt's greatest ally France threatened Mohammed Ali in case he severed his legal relation with the Porte. The main reason for French animosity to this decision was that such an action could easily trigger a conflict between the Porte and the *Vali* with fatal consequences. Russia, on the other hand, was bound by the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi to offer Mahmut II any assistance he required, and was therefore prepared to send her forces and fleet to Constantinople upon the deterioration of the situation. As Nesselrode hinted to his Ambassador to London, Posso di Borga, the Russian position differed from the others because of Hünkâr İskilesi.<sup>117</sup> Metternich was no different from the rest of the group and believed Egyptian independence could cast doubt on future Ottoman integrity.

Palmerston on the other hand was furious. He was determined to block the implementation of Mohammed Ali's decision at any cost. By June 7th, the Cabinet convened in London to discuss the new phase of the Egyptian Question. It was agreed not

to permit Mohammed Ali to declare his independence. In a letter to his Ambassador to Paris, Palmerston explained the rationale behind this move in the following lines: <sup>118</sup>

*...they see that the consequences of such a declaration on his part must be either immediately... or conflict between him and the Sultan. That in such a conflict, the Turkish troops would be defeated, than the Russians would fly to the aid of the Sultan and a Russian garrison would occupy Constantinople and the Dardanelles and once in possession of these parts, they would never quit them. We are therefore prepared to give naval assistance to the Sultan against Mehmet Ali.*

His instructions to his consul in Alexandria was unequivocally straight, and reflected the decision of the Cabinet, for he stated that his government, "Feels itself bound...to declare... if he should unfortunately proceed to execute his announced intentions and if hostilities...break out, thereupon between the Sultan and the Pasha, the Pasha must expect to find Great Britain taking part with the Sultan in order to redress to the Sultan and for the purpose of preventing the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire."<sup>119</sup>

British logic was manifested by the letters and instructions of Palmerston's dispatches to his diplomats. Certainly, such a move by Mohammed Ali would rock the equilibrium. Once again the Russian factor was the most fundamental and the fear of their military intervention in the Porte caused further disturbance to the shaky disequilibrium in southeastern Europe. Once again the Ottoman Empire was facing a threat of dismemberment and most probably a threat to its existence if the situation developed into an open conflict with Mohammed Ali. More important at this stage was that once again Egypt was *a disturber* of the balance in Europe. The expected result to such a move was collective action by the major actors to contain and neutralize the threat posed by Mohammed Ali.

The system's reaction this time followed classical balance of power mechanics as expected. Though falling short of creating an alliance to handle the situation, a semi-

concerted effort by Britain, France, Austria and Russia to dissuade Mohammed Ali from pursuing his aims of independence immediately set into action. The first step was a collective demarche by their consuls to Egypt. Campbell and Couchelet the French consul, delivered their demarches and clearly emphasized the dangers of such a move by him and the intention that the European powers would intervene. The same thesis was expressed by the Russian Consul De Medem. But Palmerston was unsatisfied with his consul believing him to be too mild.

Perhaps the most severe attitude came paradoxically from France. Mole, the Prime Minister instructed his consul to inform Mohammed Ali that he "was committing a grave error and that .... France and Britain would not hesitate to use efficiently...proper measures to make him repent".<sup>120</sup> Couchelet, threatened Mohammed Ali with French naval intervention at their next meeting.<sup>121</sup> Perhaps this could be explained by the probability that they were more sympathetic to him and therefore, feared the possibility of a European alliance against him that would put them in an rather embarrassing position if they would refuse to help him. This seems the most logical explanation, especially as Couchelet several times warned him not to make an enemy of Britain.

Simple demarches were only a reflection and a fraction of what Palmerston and Metternich planned. Palmerston genuinely detested Mohammed Ali as a "barbarian" and a troublesome man, while Metternich, a slave of his conservative philosophy, considered him an illegitimate ruler. Both were willing to go as far as possible to thwart his plans.

Unlike Metternich, Palmerston was more precise in his actions. To begin with, Metternich on his part, suggested an international conference to deal with Mohammed Ali, even before the declaration of independence, but that never formalized. Nevertheless, the

burden of what should be done was planned by Palmerston, at least as long as the Egyptian *Vali* refused to give in to the demarches of the consuls of the great powers. To this end, Palmerston approached France, his ally, before initiating talks with Metternich and Di Borgia. He suggested to Granville the possibility of creating an alliance between Britain, France and the Porte to deal with Mohammed Ali in case war erupted and requested him to clarify the issue to the government of Mole. This was his vision of how to legitimize his entrance into the Porte's defense. Such a triple convention to him was necessary because he believed that he could not depend on Austria. In his dispatch to Granville, he stated clearly this purpose stressing, "I think all our eyes are open to the utter impossibility of depending upon any active assistance from Austria against Russia....". He believed that "...such a convention ...would save Turkey and preserve the peace in Europe, by its mere moral effects... it would (also) entitle the Sultan to let our fleets up to Constantinople and that of itself would be checkmate to Russia."<sup>122</sup>

Though the government of Mole was willing to cooperate with Britain, and as he clearly stated, "Qu'il etait importante que le France et l'Angleterre agissent de concert,"<sup>123</sup> the policies of the two states diverged on many issues. Hence, Granville was unable to sell this idea of a triple convention to Mole. Though Palmerston had in mind containing the possible Russian threat in particular, this act meant in one way or another the possibility of France entering into war with Mohammed Ali, in case war erupted between the Sultan and his vassal. Mole was not ready to cooperate to this extent for obvious reasons.

Some weeks later, Palmerston was forced to face French resistance to the idea of a defensive alliance with the Porte that included France. At the same time, it was practically impossible for him to initiate any step without an ally and it became clear that France



would not pressure Mohammed Ali in any form, though it threatened him so as to maintain the *status quo*. The functioning of the system therefore forced him to begin exploring the idea of a collective action -*alliance*- with the major actors of the system. But such an action needed the support of France, Austria and Russia. In the case of France he instructed Granville once again to persuade Mole to accept this idea. He instructed his Ambassador to inform Mole that he requested him to "...authorize Sebastiani (French Ambassador to London) to cooperate with me in endeavoring to effect a joint arrangement on the subject between the five powers," he rationalized his attempt by assuring him that "... if Mehmet Ali finds the least disunion between the great powers of Europe, he will endeavor to make himself independent and take his chance of the split which consequent events may produce among us."<sup>124</sup>

Palmerston's efforts with Austria and Russia were underway and he suggested the alliance between the powers to Pozzo di Borga and Esterhazy (Austrian Ambassador to London). To further cement the deal, it was suggested that efforts among the alliance's members be coordinated. British and French fleets would cruise together, while Austria was to supply infantry divisions to save the Porte in case of war. There was however a problem of the Russian role, and therefore, Di Borga suggested the British and French force be sent to Egypt, to keep them away from the Straits and Constantinople,<sup>125</sup> which by the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi they were entitled to defend. Even Metternich accepted this idea for after all it was both a means to alleviate the ongoing tension in Europe particularly between Britain and Russia, as well as giving Austria the necessary role it wished to play. To overcome British and French opposition regarding the roles of their fleet, whether it was to be coercive or bluff, approved the idea of, "sending an English and



French squadron to the Levant with orders in case of extremities, to blockade the Ports belonging to Mehmet Ali ."<sup>126</sup> Moreover, he was correct in his belief that the combined actions of the powers was purely a formal necessity.

Just as Sebastiani was instructed to cooperate with Palmerston, for some reasons, Mole refused the idea of a joint British-French demarches in the Mediterranean and believed that Sebastiani acted outside his limits.<sup>127</sup> Some attribute this refusal to jealousy while others believe it to be a rational action for this meant uprising the French public opinion which supported Mohammed Ali. Palmerston realized at this stage that it was impossible to unite France with the other powers in this affair. Strangely to him, France was more stubborn than Russia. Melbourne was right when he claimed that, "France ...will be attending to her own interests and her own policy; what those interests and that policy may be in her opinion, it is impossible to say."<sup>128</sup>

Palmerston's good fortune came to his assistance. Mohammed Ali, though not declaring his intention, backed down from his claim of independence, by simple inaction. Nevertheless, Palmerston did not miss this opportunity to use these events to counter the Russian influence in the Porte and redress the disequilibrium in eastern Europe, especially since the probability of trouble might reoccur between the Porte and Egypt at any time. Through the efforts of Ponsonby, Palmerston was able to go ahead with his plans, and instead of Anglo-French fleet cruising together, he substituted France with the Porte. Thus the British and Ottoman fleet cruised the Mediterranean together as a show of solidarity.

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Mohammed Ali was completely disappointed with the ongoing European resistance, and eventually gave up the idea of independence for the time being. He was

surprised by the French attitude in this affair. He clearly stated to Couchelet that he "...did not expect that the European states will reach a consensus on this issue, but the French attitude surprised me very much in particular." Couchelet recognized this fact and wrote to Mole stating that, "it is true my Count, we were the only ones who presented him with a note of threat".<sup>130</sup> Trying to get the best out of the situation, Mohammed Ali attempted to reach a compromise with regard to the hereditary rule of Egypt to his family. This was his major focus after failing to declare independence. He humbly declared to Couchelet that he will be satisfied with settling this issue, "as for the means, it was basically through understanding and Negotiations (with the Porte)".<sup>131</sup> By October, Mohammed Ali set out for Sudan where he spend nearly six months in a trip till March 1839.

Certainly, this episode set the stage for the future episodes of the Egyptian Question. What is certain is the fact that this crisis did not threaten European equilibrium as much as expected, for Russia did not interfere and the Ottoman existence was not jeopardized. However, certain elements were becoming clear. France came to the conclusion, from this experience, as the only state against collective military intervention towards Mohammed Ali. More important was the Russian attitude towards this event. It seemed that they were willing to mend their ties with Britain, and even opened the door for possible Anglo-Russian rapprochement in the future. This was the backbone for any future alliance to curb the powers of Mohammed Ali and set in motion the classical mechanics of balance of power to avert the disequilibrium that might be created by the Egyptian Question. Finally, this episode united the powers in Europe to accept collective action in the future with regards to the Egyptian Question and the integrity of the Porte.

Metternich accepted the principle, Russia was on its way and Prussia represented no problem. Thus, France was the only power left out.

Throughout this chapter, we followed the active phase of the Egyptian Question and how it developed from the passive and preparatory phase to the active one and how it affected European security and action. We analyzed to a great extent the position of the different powers regarding their perception of crisis and how the system's actors turned towards unanimity of decision to curb Mohammed Ali's expansionist and separationist policies. In the next chapter, we shall see how the Second Ottoman-Egyptian war led the system members to follow the mechanics of balance of power to settle the Egyptian Question once and for all.



**Chapter V**  
**Balance of Power Mechanics and the Pacification of the**  
**Egyptian Question**

**5.1 The Second Ottoman Egyptian War 1839: The Crisis**

Maintaining the *status quo* on the Egyptian-Ottoman front was among the major concerns for the powers in the European system given that war meant another disruption of the equilibrium in southeastern Europe. However, this was not to be an easy task. Foreign Ambassadors to Constantinople and their Consuls in Egypt could neither persuade Mahmut II nor Mohammed Ali to divert from the collision course they followed. The differences and level of mistrust were too acute to be remedied by the requests of the powers. Both men had their own strategy and the means to implement it. Mahmut II's plan was to recover Syria and, if possible, Egypt and dismiss Mohammed Ali. The Egyptian *Vali* planned to defend his new possessions and his empire, and establish hereditary rule over Egypt and Syria. It was only a matter of time before clashes between the two parties erupted.

Mahmut's intransigence and his inability to realize the differences in power between his own newly-trained army and that of Mohammed Ali was apparent. His only goal was to take revenge on his insubordinate vassal and erase memories of Ottoman defeats in the crisis of 1832-3. However he recognized that he, and not Mohammed Ali, had the backing of Russia by the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi and the probability of British aid in case his army was defeated again. Events proved him correct on both points.

Russia would come to his assistance to prevent Mohammed Ali from incorporating the Ottoman Empire into his rule. This policy was one of the reasons for its intervention in 1833 and the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi. (See Chapter IV) Though Russia might have hesitated to provide immediate support, it would not permit Constantinople and the Straits to fall to Egypt. Although some observers, such as Ponsonby, believed Russia fomented trouble between Mahmut II and his vassal, such fears were incorrect. Ponsonby, the British Ambassador to the Porte, thought that Russia encouraged Mohammed Ali to attack the Porte, but his perceptions were colored by his obsessions with Russia. But Mahmut was fortunate in that Palmerston did not take Ponsonby's dispatches seriously regarding Russian intrigues.<sup>1</sup> There exists sufficient evidence to show that Russia's sole goal was to maintain the *status quo*. We need only recall that Russia did not support Mohammed Ali's attempt to declare independence. At this interval, Nesselrode instructed his Consul in Egypt, Count De Medem, to work to deter Mohammed Ali. The impact of de Medem's stand was obvious and Mohammed Ali responded that "the day when (he) will be guaranteed not to be attacked by the Porte will come, (he) shall redistribute 80,000 men from Syria into canalization projects."<sup>2</sup> In addition, there is no logical explanation why Russia would create trouble for Mahmut II at this time, since such a policy could require naval activities to defend the Porte and that could lead to a showdown with Britain, which unlike the crisis of 1833, was determined to act aggressively this time. That is why Mahmut II relied on Russian support, but was not sufficiently informed about the circumstances under which such support could be extended.

As for Britain, Mahmut II depended on its support as well, at least in a worst case scenario. Though Palmerston insistently refused an alliance or defensive treaty with the

Porte and avoided being trapped next to Mahmut II into open conflict with Mohammed Ali, his choices were limited. His instruction to Ponsonby reflected the real position of Britain that if war occurred, "... (he) will have no choice, ... (for he) will be bound to act with arms in hands."<sup>3</sup> He stated on another occasion that, "Coercion of Mehmet Ali by England if war broke out appear partial and unjust; but we are partial; and the great interests of Europe require that we should be so."<sup>4</sup> Palmerston knew perfectly well that he had to act when time came, at least to avoid the complications that resulted from British inaction in 1833. (See Chapter IV, 4.4) Mahmut II understood this point very well and these factors led him to depend on British support, even if they denied their readiness to confer it.

When Mahmut felt certain of the position of these two states, he began preparations for war with Mohammed Ali. He dispatched Reşit Pasha on a European tour that included Vienna, Paris and above all London to gather international support for his offensive.<sup>5</sup> He was unable to garner support from Metternich or Mole, but he had better luck with Palmerston. Initially aiming for a defensive treaty, he was only able to get the British cabinet to approve a draft treaty that stipulated joint cruising in the Mediterranean in case of future problems with Mohammed Ali. Mahmut worked quickly to prepare the new army that would attack the Egyptian forces. In 1836 he entrusted the army to Hafiz Pasha, assisted by Prussian officer Helmut Von Moltke who acted as Consultant.<sup>6</sup> The entire Ottoman army numbered around eighty thousand men, with three hundred pieces of artillery.<sup>7</sup> Mahmut spared no money or effort to supply the army with ammunition, money and the necessary expertise.<sup>8</sup> The bulk of the army was deployed in Malatya and Diyarbakir on the southern borders, ready for action when time was ripe to cross the

Euphrates into Syria. But the army lacked homogeneity, for its members were from different ethnic origins and their morale was not as high as their adversaries. As Von Moltke later commented after their defeat, "one has to accept the fact that with such an army it is impossible to win a war."<sup>9</sup>

Mohammed Ali was aware of his situation. His son Ibrahim provided frequent reports and he advised his son to avoid instigating a conflict with Ottoman armies, but to take all necessary steps to defend Syria.<sup>10</sup> Ibrahim lost no time in preparing his armies which were scattered across Syria to handle constant rebellions. At the same time, Mohammed Ali gathered the Consuls of the major powers to inform them of Ottoman mobilization and the Porte's plans for war.<sup>11</sup> However, there was little the Consuls could do but sympathize. They had no instructions from their governments since the crisis erupted quickly and they were forced to act on their own.

It was well known to the major powers that the Porte was embarking on a war, and the only remaining questions was when the attack would begin. Ponsonby assured Palmerston that the war would begin by spring.<sup>12</sup> He attempted to avert hostilities but he knew Mahmut II, "would rather die or be the vassal of Russia than not to endeavor to destroy the rebel subject", while his entourage believed that "if (they) would be beaten (they) are still sure of the succor of Russia."<sup>13</sup> This reflected the general attitude of Mahmut who ordered his armies to cross the Euphrates and engage the Egyptian army, despite constant warnings from Von Moltke that the army was not prepared for this war.<sup>14</sup> On the 21st of April the Ottoman army crossed the Euphrates into Syria.

This move showed that British, Russian and French efforts to maintain the *status quo* failed and that war was imminent. The Ottoman army did not attack Ibrahim but



remained idle except for few skirmishes while Ibrahim massed his forces and fortified mountain passes to deny Ottoman advance. This caused Hafiz to transfer his forces to Nezib where he fomented revolts throughout Syria against Egypt. As Ibrahim prepared, he requested the immediate summoning of Ahmed El Manakeily Pasha, *Nazir El Gihadiyya* or Minister of War from Egypt. Mohammed Ali approved but Couchelet and his Austrian colleague, realizing that this meant war, requested an audience with him and asked that he postpone his decision. Mohammed Ali requested an international guarantee for the inviolability of his territories. Couchelet accepted, but the Austrian Consul could not commit his government.<sup>15</sup> Mohamed Ali sent El Manakeily immediately as a sign for war preparations if necessary.

Meanwhile Ibrahim, unable to understand why the Ottomans fortified and did not attack wrote the following to Hafiz Pasha:

*If your excellency received instructions to declare war, what is the use of continuing these affairs of intrigues and revolts. If you wish war, then let us go to the battlefield openly and courageously. I hope that you have not overlooked the fact that you are fighting real heroes who do not have fears in their hearts....*<sup>16</sup>

Obviously, the *no peace no war* situation would not continue for long and the pressures of the Consuls on Mohammed Ali to restrain himself declined in value and vigor.

On the 11th of June Mohammed Ali sent a letter to Ibrahim in which he authorized him to attack the Ottoman army in Syria. The letter stated:<sup>17</sup>

*The aggression of our enemy has surpassed the level of tolerance. If we find him in our path we have to stop him because he is sowing the seeds of revolts right and left. The more we have held our patience with him, in an effort to avoid great powers' opposition, our enemy continues penetrating our lands... This requests action. My advice to you upon receiving this letter is to attack the armies of our enemy that entered our lands to expel them from it. So do not be satisfied by this, but you have to continue to attack their main forces and fight it. With God's help, if you achieve victory, continue your march to Malatya Urfa and Diyarbakir.*

This letter was of such importance that the Consuls gathered the next day to persuade Mohammed Ali to intercept the message before reaching Ibrahim. Campbell, Couchelet, de Medem and the Austrian Consul did their best to dissuade him from initiating hostilities. Couchelet wrote on the 12th of June to his government describing their efforts, stating that he: <sup>18</sup>

*...met Count of Medem the Russian Consul General and we did our utmost effort to convince Mehmet Ali to change his mind, and we were informed that the British and Austrian Consuls have met him this morning for the same reason. So he informed us that the Turks have instigated fire in the house and we have to extinguish it, and our reply was that the fire should not be spread in the neighbors` home. He replied by assuring that his son Ibrahim is wise in his attitude... So the ship left yesterday evening with the orders to Ibrahim.*

In Paris, the new government of Soult, followed the traditional French policy of avoiding the crisis by urging the two parties to settle the affair peacefully as they did with the crisis of independence twelve months earlier. Soult immediately sent his Aide du Champs Callier, on the 28th of May, to Mohammed Ali with instructions to stop the war at any cost. At the same time he dispatched officer Foltz to Constantinople to inform the Sultan to end the state of belligerency between the two parties.<sup>19</sup>

Callier arrived on the 13th of June, too late to prevent the orders from reaching Ibrahim. He was given an audience with Mohammed Ali on the 15th and 16th of June. During his discussions, he convinced the *Vali* to accept French mediation. The question remained how to intercept the message that Ibrahim was about to receive. The only means was for Callier to reach Ibrahim before hostilities broke out with the Ottomans. Meanwhile, the mission of Foltz failed. This may be attributed to Mahmut`s intransigence and Ponsonby`s insistence that he could not assist him due to a lack of instructions from his government.<sup>20</sup> Though some Egyptian authors believe this was a premeditated British

attempt to initiate hostilities in order to foster the conditions for intervention, the fact remains that Ponsonby could not involve his government in French mediation without Consulting Palmerston and receiving clear instructions in this regard.

Upon receiving the letter from his father, Ibrahim moved against the Ottoman army stationed at Nezib. Had it not been for the efforts of Suleiman Pasha El Ferensawy, Ibrahim might have led his army into a possible defeat. The Ottoman army was well fortified against the attack Ibrahim contemplated. Suleiman, conducted a reconnaissance to find means to overcome these fortifications. Had it not been for this move, Ibrahim might have lost the battle. Hence, he undertook a risky operation by outmaneuvering Hafiz and attacking from the unfortified areas of the city. Hafiz committed the worst mistake by not attacking Ibrahim during his march around the city. The Egyptian army certainly was in the better position, and on the 24th of June 1839, the Egyptian army inflicted a tremendous defeat upon the Ottomans. Total casualties -including dead, wounded and prisoners- numbered around fifteen thousand men.<sup>21</sup> The extent of the Ottoman defeat could be understood from Ibrahim's letter to his father, where he stated, ...Here I write to you from the tent of Hafiz Pasha... We have bounted all their supplies, cannons and ammunitions. We have captured many prisoners and how much I would like to follow the rest but I find nobody." Unfortunately for Ibrahim, he received disappointing news when Callier arrived following the Battle of Nezib.

Though aiming to continue his war efforts in following the remainder of the Ottoman army and advancing northward, he was instructed by his father to halt his advances. The same scenario of 1833 after the battle of Konya was repeating itself, but this time Ibrahim was more determined to follow the pursuit of his victories. Callier brought

with him an order from Mohammed Ali that stated, "Keep your place, and do not advance."<sup>22</sup> Ibrahim was frustrated and upon receiving these orders from his father, he screamed in Callier's face and shouted, "This is impossible, this letter was written before the victory,... therefore, I shall not abide by it., and I shall bear the responsibility of my decision. You have read history, have you ever heard about a victorious leader impeded from pursuing his march? If you have heard this, I have not."<sup>23</sup> It took Callier five hours to explain the situation and calm Ibrahim. He explained the dangerous repercussions of his decision to continue the war in that the European powers would not permit the defeat or annihilation of the Ottoman state. Thus the Egyptians halted all military activities except for the occupation of Urfa which was considered necessary for military and strategic purposes, other than this, Ibrahim promised not to cross the Taurus mountains.

A final point regarding the military situation was that some authors,<sup>24</sup> claimed the road to Istanbul was open for Ibrahim. Though this contains certain elements of truth, the fact remains that Ibrahim merely engaged the larger parts of the Ottoman army. The remainder of the Ottoman army was still intact and located in Konya (25,000 soldiers with 40 pieces of artillery) and in Malatya (20,000 men with 30 pieces of artillery).<sup>25</sup> Ibrahim could have defeated those armies in short order given that his army of 46,000 men was better trained and equipped than the remainder of the Ottoman army. In practical terms, it was only a matter of time before Mohammed Ali seized the Ottoman capital and the Sultanate, had it not been for the French interference and his fears of a possible European intervention against him as we shall see shortly.

Before the news reached the capital of the defeat at Nezib, Mahmut II died and was officially succeeded on the 1st of July by his son Abdul Mejid, a seventeen-year-old

boy who lacked maturity and leadership skills. In reality, the empire rested in the hands of Mohammed Ali's old rival Husrev Pasha, the *Sadrizam*. (See Chapter III, 3.2 :B)

To make matters worse and even more alarming for the European powers, the Ottoman fleet defected to Mohammed Ali in Alexandria on July 14, 1839. The Ottoman fleet was lead by the *Captain Pasha* Ahmet Fevzi, who was supposed to have given naval support to the army in Syria. However, upon his arrival to the Dardanelles, the orders changed and he was instructed to go to Rhodes. Since Hüsrev was now in charge of the political affairs after the demise of Mahmut II, and the accession of Abdul Mejid, Fevzi Pasha perceived this as an attempt to remove him from his post, given past animosity between him and Husrev.<sup>26</sup> In addition, he believed the Russians would come to the rescue of the Porte and therefore, he thought that this meant handing over the fleet to the Russians. To him as well as some of his crew, it was better to defect to Mohammed Ali rather than deliver the fleet to the Russians. The fleet included twenty ships, twelve frigates, several corvettes and some bricks.<sup>27</sup> The crew amounted to 21,000 men and 16,000 soldiers but many escaped and refused to join Mohammed Ali.<sup>28</sup>

Hüsrev was in a very difficult position and it seemed his rival had obtained the upper hand in nearly all aspects of the crisis. The Sultan was dead and the Porte defeated and demoralized. Hüsrev decided to accept the requests of Mohammed Ali and sent him a message assuring him the hereditary rule of Egypt and Syria to his family and requesting his help to develop the empire as well as the return of Ahmet Fevzi Pasha.<sup>29</sup> Mohammed Ali's response was insolent. He demanded the resignation of Husrev, and refused to hand over Fevzi Pasha unless other conditions were met.<sup>30</sup> As the *divan* met in Constantinople, Hüsrev opted for a policy of appeasement to Mohammed Ali. The major question

remained: to what extent will the Egyptian territory extend? Should the requests of Mohammed Ali for Urfa and other southern provinces be accepted? These formalities formed the discussions in the *divan*. As the deliberations continued, the Ottoman government received a note by the European Ambassadors to the Porte instructing them not to close a deal with Mohammed Ali without their consent. This became known as the July 27 Note. This was the beginning of the European intervention in the Egyptian Question and ended with thwarting the rule of Mohammed Ali and the pacification of the Egyptian Question. Why this intervention occurred, who orchestrated it and how it proceeded was a factor of the European balance of power mechanism since the Egyptian Question threatened the equilibrium in the European System.

## **5.2 The Disturber of Balance and European Disequilibrium:**

Throughout the previous chapter, we analyzed how the Egyptian Question of 1833 caused disequilibrium in the European system by (A) threatening the existence of the Ottoman Empire, (B) jeopardizing the position of the Ottoman Straits and causing Russian preponderance in southeastern Europe and (C) French preponderance in the east Mediterranean. The repercussions of 1833 lasted years. The Crisis of 1839 was an extension of the disequilibrium caused by the Egyptian Question in 1833. Like the first crisis, it also held the danger of the rise of an Egyptian empire which appeared to be ready to inherit the Ottoman state if circumstances permitted. This section shall examine this disequilibrium and how it triggered balance of power mechanics to thwart, if not eliminate, the Egyptian Question.



### A. Threatening the Existence of the Porte:

As explained in Chapter I, the *disturber of the balance* is the state that affects the power distribution in a system by actions that harm the equilibrium, primarily through affecting the factors that regulate the power distribution inside a system. Though Egypt was not a member in the European system, representing as it did an extension of the Ottoman *de jure sovereignty*, it nevertheless became a *disturber of balance* in Europe since its forces were in Anatolia, threatening either to inherit the Ottoman Empire, or establish political preponderance over it. In other words, it threatened an important actor in the system as well the calculations of equilibrium by others in this system.

The Ottoman Empire was an essential factor, a *sine a quo non* in the equilibrium of Europe, particularly eastern Europe. (See Chapter II, *The Ottoman Empire in the European Balance of Power*, and Chapter IV, *Further disequilibrium in the system*) This was a well recognized fact by all the actors in the European system, Austria, France and above all Britain, with the only exception being Russia. British politicians were fully aware of this premise and acted upon it, regardless of whether it was Palmerston or his opposition in the Cabinet, and never cease to mention it in any occasion. Palmerston for example, stated, "That the object to be attained (with regard to Ottoman integrity) is of utmost importance, for the interest of England, for the preservation of the balance of power, and for the maintenance of peace in Europe."<sup>31</sup> He further admitted that his government's policy was to be "founded upon the basis of an endeavor to maintain the Sultan and to uphold the integrity of the Turkish Empire."<sup>32</sup> Even his foe in the Cabinet,



Clarendon correctly asserted with regard to their position in this crisis, that they "...wish(ed) to maintain the integrity of Turkey."<sup>33</sup> Clearly the continuation of the Ottoman Empire was a major aim for the British policy, without any reservation.

In as far as France and Austria, were concerned, both shared the same view as to the importance of the Porte in European equilibrium. France in particular demonstrated this, by dispatching two officers to mediate between the two powers in June 1839. This was in full conformity with its position regarding the first crisis in 1833.<sup>34</sup> For the same reason, it followed the same policy and nearly succeeded in averting the war and crisis that followed. However, they were driven by a concern over possible Russian preponderance, as reflected by cool Franco-Russian relations during the past ten years.<sup>35</sup>

As for Austria, Metternich learned that the Treaty of Münchengratz was inoperable as a result of the British and French opposition since its signature. Therefore, even his idea of what should be done with the Ottoman European territories in case of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, became inoperable. (See Chapter, IV, 4.5) Possible Ottoman dissolution worried Metternich since it would create a power vacuum that would result in either independence for the territories or Russian schemes to fill the vacuum. Therefore, the existence of the Ottoman Empire could not be compromised.

Russia did not remain aloof, sharing as it did the same concerns as Austria at one point, particularly regarding the future of the Straits and the possibility of new power's preponderance over the Porte. This fear compelled Nesselrode to plan for the future of the Straits which Russia worked so hard to dominate during the last decades. (See Chapter II 2.5) In this regard, Nicholas I went as far as to suggest European collective action regarding the possibility, in case of Ottoman dissolution, for Istanbul (Constantinople) to

become a free city, while Russia was to hold the Bosphorus, while Austria and Britain the Dardanelles.<sup>36</sup> That was a result of his recognition that Hunkar Iskelesi was obsolete along with the Munchengratz agreement. Another problem that worried the Russian statesmen, was the possibility of Mohammed Ali inheriting or even showing strong preponderance in the Porte. This would render Russia's efforts to dominate the Porte equally obsolete.

The 1839 Crisis presented European powers with the possibility of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and its substitution by an Arab Empire. As noted in Chapter III, the military might of Egypt was increased with each passing year. Egypt's strong economic and industrial structure indicated that this lack of capital could be overcome. The Egyptian military machinery was estimated to number close to two hundred thousand men, whereby at least one hundred and fifty thousand men could be massed. (See Chapter III, for details regarding the Egyptian military might) In addition, the army was well-equipped and trained along modern lines. Furthermore, its navy after the defection of the Ottoman fleet was the largest power in east Mediterranean, totaling nearly thirty two vessels,<sup>37</sup> and combined with the Ottoman fleet surpassed fifty vessels.<sup>38</sup> This inventory includes only frigates, corvettes and other worthy battleships.

This power accumulation was considered a menace by Britain and Austria. It did not pass Palmerston's attention. In 1838 he instructed Campbell to convey to Mohammed Ali that there was no need for such a buildup and asked that the forces be reduced.<sup>39</sup> This buildup concerned Metternich perhaps most of all in that should Mohamed Ali succeed, Austria would be in the shadows of a possible Arab Empire. (See Chapter IV) Moreover, if Egypt inherited the Ottoman Empire, this meant the addition of a new and powerful actor in the European system, though not equal in strength to the five major powers but

certainly possessing good prospects for the future. Interestingly, a comparison between the Egyptian army in 1833 and the Prussian army, shows that the Egyptian army nearly equaled the Prussian, at one hundred and thirty thousand men in 1830-1833.<sup>40</sup> If Prussia was a *Middle Power* as Kennedy calls it, Egypt did not lag far behind. In addition, Egypt followed a course of development and reformation that if continued, it might have permitted it sustain its military victories.

However, this is a hypothetical argument since Ibrahim halted his military advances at Urfa and was ordered to proceed no further. But this was a possible scenario that the major powers had to consider in planning for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, especially when Mohammed Ali threatened to march on Constantinople on 1833. Finally there was no guarantee this wouldn't happen again in the future. This was in one way that Egypt in 1839 became the *disturber of the balance* and a possible preponderant power on the fringes of the European system should it inherit the Ottoman Empire or even extend major political influence over it.

#### **B. The Russian Factor:**

Chapter IV reviewed the dangers perceived by the *Western Powers* and Austria regarding the Russian menace. Certainly the structure of the system was an important factor with regard to the Porte. The mere fact of the heterogeneity of the system with regard to the Porte made it totally inconceivable that any of the major powers would allow it to fall prey to Russian influence. (See Chapter IV) That was due to the fact that Russia never considered it to be a member of the European system. Even Austria shared this same

view, and that is why it attempted to limit Russian influence at the Treaty of Münchengratz. Thus, three powers, Britain, Austria and France, shared the goal of maintaining the Ottoman Empire free from Russian influence.

Certainly, the Russian threat to the Porte, whether for influence or conquest, was a major factor that united Austria, Britain and France. Since the beginning of the crisis of 1839, the British feared the Egyptian Question would trigger the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi into motion, whereby Russian forces using their Black Sea fleet, would occupy the Bosphorus in less than a week; and once there, would never withdraw. This was precisely what Britain and France tried to avert and worked so hard to neutralize since 1833. Palmerston believed that to avoid this crisis, now and in the future, the Egyptian Question had to be pacified. "The maintenance of the Turkish Empire," according to him "...is essential, for the preservation of peace, and for the upholding of the independence of eastern Europe. A partition of Turkey would be fatal to the independence of Austria and Prussia, when it was accomplished and it could be accomplished without a general war."<sup>41</sup> Writing to Palmerston, even Lord Clarendon, his worst enemy in the Cabinet, stressed the importance of Ottoman independence, adding that it "will ... be able to resist Russia, for that is after all the real question."<sup>42</sup> Such comments clearly reflected the general thoughts of Palmerston and the British policy towards the Egyptian Question. To prevent Russian preponderance, he was willing to create any alliance with whichever European power willing.

In 1839, the aims of the major actors were not different from 1833. For Austria, the question was also how to avoid the execution of the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi and a Russian presence on the Bosphorus. Metternich also recognized that Russia was extending

its influence in the Balkans through Pan-Slavism.<sup>43</sup> Though Austria was perhaps the only power in Europe with a contractual commitment to Russia on the fate of the Ottoman Empire through the Treaty of Münchengratz, it had doubts as to the future of this treaty. Britain and France worked to neutralize both Hünkâr İskelesi and Münchengratz, to make it the collective duty of the European powers to secure the survival of the Ottoman Empire. Britain, the main *balancer* in the system was not aloof as in 1833, and this by itself was sufficient to change the formula for action to Metternich. This meant that France would not be required to act alone as before. Therefore, the *Western Camp* would possess increased leverage over the situation at hand. These changes had their tremendous effect on Metternich in the months to come where he began calculating his position vis-à-vis the Western Camp.

France was also concerned over the Russian factor. In addition to the cool relations that existed between the two powers, Paris hoped to preserve the rule of Mohammed Ali and his Empire.<sup>44</sup> French goals in the 1839 Egyptian Crisis did not differ from 1833. This led Soult to try and contain the problem in May 1839 before it expanded.

### **C. Possible French Preponderance**

In a balance of power system, fear of preponderance is not necessarily limited to the common enemy, but can apply among allies as well. Russia was not the only actor in the system that generated concern, France also was not above suspicion. France was also becoming a preponderant power that could threaten the equilibrium by her own actions. This was the case of France in the Mediterranean as perceived by some of the powers, especially Britain.

In 1830 France annexed Algeria and three years later established its influence in Syria. France and Egypt were viewed by the other powers as the source of preponderance in east Mediterranean. This worried Britain, which had vested interest in maintaining its naval superiority in the Mediterranean, and therefore Egypt as a new power, would mean an extension of French influence.<sup>45</sup> It is even arguable that British concerns that Egypt could threaten the Levant and the Red Sea trade routes to India, dictated its response in the Egyptian Question,

In conclusion, if European powers believed that a state of disequilibrium existed on the eastern borders of the system, and that there existed a disturber of the balance capable of further damage, it would be a natural outcome that balance of power mechanics would be employed. The major actors in the system did not fail to follow balance of power mechanics to thwart the *disturber of the balance*, i.e., Egypt, and remedy the disequilibrium that has been growing since the Egyptian Question entered its *active phase* eight years before. All the European powers -with the exception of France- followed the exact patterns of the mechanics of balance of power. They formed an *alliance*, orchestrated an *intervention*, and settled the matter with *reciprocal non-compensation* for nearly all the powers involved.

### **5.3 Mechanics of Balance of Power in Motion: Forming the Alliance:**

The story of the formation of the alliance to terminate the state of disequilibrium that threatened southeastern Europe was materialized over time. That was due to the fact, that unlike the coalition formed by the Treaty of Chaumont in 1813 to remedy the disequilibrium created by the Napoleonic wars, (See Chapter II, 2.2), the choice over the type the means of intervention and settlement was less obvious. This was primarily a result of the defection of France from the coalition, to which it was much later admitted.

For reasons of clarity, the formation of the alliance will be divided into two main stages, the first dating from May 1839 until February 1840 (the date of the rise of the Thiers government in France). While the second extended from February 1840 to October 1840 (the date of the defeat of Mohammed Ali and the settlement of the Egyptian Question).

#### **A. The First Stage:**

There is no doubt the five courts of the major powers believed that the Sultan's order for his army cross the Euphrates would inaugurate a new and dangerous phase in the Egyptian Question. However, each state had its own views on how to remedy this disequilibrium. Palmerston, representing the extreme position in the coalition sought



an end to the crisis in terms of restoring Syria to the Porte. He believed in the necessity of creating a barrier between the sultan and Mohammed Ali and the latter's presence in Syria would mean the likelihood of future frictions. This meant that a buffer state was needed. According to Webster, Palmerston believed that "There was no barrier to the expansion of Mehmet Ali there (in Syria)."<sup>46</sup> The best choice for a buffer zone was the Negev desert and its extension in the north. This meant returning Syria to the Porte.

France could not come to accept Palmerston's position in that it believed Syria belonged to Mohammed Ali in accordance with the agreement of Kutahya in 1833.<sup>47</sup> Moreover, any attempt to evacuate Mohammed Ali from Syria meant diluting its influence in the east Mediterranean. Soult believed that "Mohammed Ali is in a position to get the best advantages. But there are limits to this advantage that could be handed to him, and this limit today as before, the death of Mahmut, is the one that could not be permitted, whereby the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire is threatened."<sup>48</sup> To France this limit was found at Anatolia, a line Mohammed Ali would not be permitted to cross. But France continued to be concerned over the possibility of Russian aggression. The dilemma of France was how to use collective action to stop Russia, while at the same time securing the inability of this coalition to affect the status of Mohammed Ali regarding Syria and hereditary rule. This was the core and the crux of the French dilemma, where ends could not meet as events reflected.

As for Austria, Metternich advocated a compromise along the proposed settlement that Prokech Osten suggested to Mohammed Ali during the 1833 crisis. The Austrians felt Mohammed Ali could receive a part of Syria, while the sultan retained the remainder.<sup>49</sup> But unlike France and Britain, who both had direct contradictory vested interests in the

affair going on, Metternich's position was more moderate, and it was left for any of the two powers to pull him over to her course of action. Prussia had no direct interest in this affair and followed Austria's policies. This fact consolidated the position of Metternich vis-à-vis both France and Britain, and gave him more leverage, for his decision was bound to affect the Prussian attitude in general.

Russia was the real mystery in this whole affair. Certainly it sought a peaceful solution to the crisis and did not mind if the settlement involved the sultan surrendering Adana and other areas to Mohammed Ali. Nesselrode assured the French Ambassador to St. Petersburg that he was willing to ....give [his] approbation to all arrangement between Turkey and Egypt",<sup>50</sup> provided that the war was terminated. This policy stemmed from Russia's aim for political preponderance over the Sultanate, in accordance with the policy adopted after the settlement of the Greek Question. (See Chapter IV, 4.1) But Britain and France were unwilling to trust this attitude.<sup>51</sup> This distrust could be attributed to the concern that Russia could gain additional influence over the Porte if the crisis continued. When Ponsonby asserted to Palmerston that Britain required the right of *equal interference* in case of Russian involvement, he could not have been more right, and his determination was shared by Soult as well. But what Palmerston did not yet comprehend was the extent to which Russia was willing to go to fracture the *Western Camp*. Since relations between France and Russia did not permit cooperation, Nesselrode relied upon Britain. Events would prove this a shrewd choice as we shall see shortly.

Though each of the powers had different visions and priorities, towards the end of June a consensus appeared over the necessity to thwart the Egyptian danger before it endangered the Porte and the system's equilibrium. Even France championed this cause.

The major problem at hand was which path these states would follow given the polarization inside the system ?

The answer to this question was to be found by the veteran of the Congress of Vienna, Metternich. Being an able diplomat, he realized the dangers of the situation at hand, even before the Battle of Nezib. He also recognized that the Treaty of Münchengratz soured his relations with Britain. His communication lines with Palmerston were not very productive, so he turned to France so as secure collective action. Metternich, by now, an expert on the formalities of how to launch collective action, suggested Vienna as the center for organized action on the Egyptian Question.<sup>52</sup> He believed such a program would not only settle the crisis, but would revive the Congress System that Canning had suffocated. In addition, Austria would once again be the center of the system. Ironically, the main supporters for this plan were the British Foreign Minister and Soult, while Russia remained cold..

Metternich knew that he could not directly induce Palmerston to accept collective action with him least of all Vienna as its center. Thus, he used France to sell his idea to London. Soult proved receptive, believing such a plan would prevent Russian unilateral action, and since the plan originated with a main partner of the *Eastern Camp*, this automatically limited Russian maneuverability. Palmerston realized that he could not risk alienation, especially in that he distrusted France on any matter concerning Mohammed Ali. So he reluctantly accepted the proposal. He and the Cabinet, believed "Metternich [to be] so feeble, timid, tricky and so much swayed by Russia, and by nature so prone to crooked paths... that I (Palmerston) greatly doubted whether the Vienna congress would lead to anything good. On the other hand, Russia might perhaps consent to a conference

there and not else where.”<sup>53</sup> Obviously his choices were limited. At the same time, he issued instructions for the British fleet to intercept the communication of Mohammed Ali in an attempt to support the sultan and strengthen his position so as to affect the outcome of the Vienna Congress by showing his will to act unilaterally if necessary.

Much to his surprise, the deliberations in Vienna between Metternich and the Ambassadors of Britain, France, Russia and Prussia, produced an impressive result. To avoid further exacerbating the crisis, the four Ambassadors and Metternich agreed to avoid any final settlement between the Sultan and Mohammed Ali without joint consent and knowledge. There was even discussion on the dispatch of a joint naval fleet to the Dardanelles. France and Britain had Austrian support, and the Russian Minister in Vienna was unwilling to challenge Metternich.<sup>54</sup> Thus, instructions were sent to Constantinople for the presentation of the Note of July 27 as mentioned earlier.

The obvious evaluation of the Congress was simple. Russia was denied unilateral action on its own, though it was obvious from the start that it did not want to be involved alone in this affair. French and British aims were fulfilled in as far as Russia was concerned. Metternich realized his dream of returning Vienna to the center of diplomatic action and steering a concerted action against the disturber of balance, recalling his role in the Napoleonic wars. Only France was unhappy and criticized the performance of its Ambassador to the Porte and his role in the Note of July 27, because he consented to matters too far, but the damage was done in as far as France was concerned. .

French reaction was a byproduct of the political indecision of the government which was torn between Louis Philippe and Soult, and confusion should have been expected. Unknowingly, Soult had placed himself at the disposition of Palmerston,

through his efforts to achieve a concerted action among the European powers. Palmerston was rather generous when he claimed that "Soult was a Jewel" when suggesting joint guarantee and action for the Ottoman Empire.<sup>55</sup> Without Soult, the joint efforts would have never materialized. France embarked on a twin policy of supporting Russian restraint and Mohammed Ali as the hereditary ruler of Egypt and Syria. Though the two policies were not necessarily incompatible, the means to achieve them placed France in conflict with those who were not concerned with accommodating Mohammed Ali. In gaining international support to fulfill the first aim, they also gathered international opposition that obstructed the fulfillment of the second aim.

What began as concerted action, gradually transformed itself into a coalition against Mohammed Ali. But France was unhappy and unwilling to continue her support. Her first aim was fulfilled and it saw no need to remain in the coalition. But the coalition Soult created, haunted both him and his successor Thiers. The powers were determined that the Egyptian Question would be settled, although harmony did not prevail within the coalition. British and Russian animosity still existed. Britain did not trust Metternich, Russia was annoyed at the idea of a combined Dardanelles fleet and France was bound to withdraw from the coalition. The future of the Egyptian Question remained far from certain.

The first problem was the growing breach between England and France. Palmerston accused the government of Soult with lack of cooperation resulting in French inaction. He wrote to Bulwer the Secretary in Paris, "That it is evident that, either from their own notion of French interests or from fears of newspapers, the French government will not willingly take the slightest step of coercion against Mehmet Ali, either for the

purpose of getting back the Turkish fleet or in order to enforce any arrangement with the five powers." He continued his dispatch claiming that "they must...take their choice between three courses, either to go forward with us, and honestly redeem the pledges they have given us and to Europe, or to stand aloof ... or lastly, to go right along and league themselves with Mehmet Ali and employ force to prevent us and those other powers who may join us from doing that which France herself is bound (to)..."<sup>56</sup> Palmerston remained unhappy with French inaction and her subversive attitude towards the embryonic coalition and collective action. However, he and Metternich were more concerned at this time with Russian intransigence.

For Russia, the crisis occurred at the same time as it confronted problems with Britain in Persia and Afghanistan. It remained interested in terminating the crisis between the Porte and the vassal, and return to the *status quo ante bellum* without having to involve itself as required by the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi.<sup>57</sup> However, failure to participate in a settlement could mean unilateral British intervention and the loss of all the advantages gained to date.

Russia initially refused the Metternich initiative of Vienna being the center, but could do little about it without coming out openly against collective action. Strangely, Nicholas I and Nesselrode, instead of breaking down the concert by open action or refusal, preferred to take the path of passive inaction by delaying the return of Tatischeff, their Ambassador to Vienna, who was represented by his deputy. This position dealt a severe blow to both Metternich and the efforts of Palmerston to establish collective action. Moreover, Nicholas I believed that Austrian cooperation with the British and French on a maritime presence in the Dardanelles was a threat to Russia more than a deterrence to



Mohammed Ali.<sup>58</sup> Certainly, the breach between Metternich and Nicholas caught the attention of Clancarde the British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, who reported in August that "Metternich is entirely wrong if he thinks he can guide the Tsar. On the contrary all the evidences at St. Petersburg shewed that the Russian government was aggrieved and irritated at his conduct. If Austria would separate from England and France, Russia might lean towards her side in a difference of policy...But such would be the case ...if England were to separate from France and Austria. ... Russia fears England more than Austria...and is more inclined to court her."<sup>59</sup>

Such complications made the establishment of a coalition a difficult task. Nevertheless, with the exception of France, all countries were inclined towards collective action and, if necessary coercion as well, against Mohammed Ali to remedy the disequilibrium. It should be noted that in a balance of power dynamic, coalitions are the product of more than a simple decision. The Final Coalition against France took a long time to be established and had it not been for the policy of Metternich and Castlereagh, it may never have materialized. (See Chapter I, 1.5 and Chapter II, 2.2) Thus Palmerston and Metternich had to find some means to accommodate Russia and keep her in the concerted action until it develops into a formal alliance or coalition.

The Russo-Austrian breach gradually pushed the maintenance of the unborn coalition into the hands of Palmerston. This shift was aided by Palmerston's determination to revive his 1838 plan to make London the center for action on the Egyptian Question. Such role was understandable in that Britain was traditionally the *balancer* of Europe when the mechanics of balance of power were implemented. Immediately, upon Metternich's failure, Palmerston began to impose his character on the arena. He began



with two actions: changing his tone of protest to France to a tone of threat, and by preparing for rapprochement with Russia.

Palmerston was willing to shift alliances provided that he would cement the embryonic coalition and pacify the Egyptian Question. This included mending bridges with Russia if necessary. Russia did not disappoint him and Nicholas sent him his emissary Brunnow with the goal of winning Palmerston to his side. What explains this Russian move, especially given the relations of animosity that existed between the two states during the past six years? (See Chapter IV, 4.4) The answer rested in the fact that Russia recognized it could not implement Hünkâr İskelesi and Münchengratz and sought an international guarantee to prevent the passage of war vessels through the Straits. Obviously, animosity with Britain could not continue. In addition, she risked alienation after losing Metternich to the *Western Camp*, and a combined action without her could easily reverse all her accomplishments with the Porte she had achieved since 1829.

Brunnow arrived in London in mid-September 1839, and met with Palmerston on many occasions. He explained the new position of his government, primarily that she was willing to give up the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi, in favor of an international agreement in return for a guarantee that the Straits would be closed to any war vessels when the Porte was at peace.<sup>60</sup> The full account of Russian views were stated in Palmerston's despatches to Bulwer where he explains that:<sup>61</sup>

*...Brunnow says that the Emperor will entirely agree to our views as to the affairs of Turkey and Egypt, and will join in whatever measures may be necessary to carry those views in effect, and that he will unite with us, Austria and Prussia either with or without France. ... if the measures of Mehmet should place Constantinople in danger and render necessary any naval or military operations in the Bosphorus or Asia Minor, he hopes we will leave that to him, and that we will ...undertake whatever is to be done in the Mediterranean and the coast of*

*Syria and Egypt...(and ) that anything he will do...shall be held to be the result of concert, and not the resolve of Russia. ...But he is ready to begin by signing a convention which shall define our object and determine our means of accomplishment and assign to each his appropriate part*

Russia sought to establish another Treaty of Chaumont to remedy the disequilibrium, while at the same time suggest a solution to the problems of the Straits. Palmerston did not respond quickly to Brunnow's suggestion, since he had to deal with the Cabinet.

Unfortunately for Palmerston, who was inclined to accept Russian rapprochement, he faced strong opposition in a Cabinet unwilling to break the alliance with France in exchange for closer relations with Russia regarding the Egyptian Question. In addition, Brunnow's suggestions meant that Russia could take unilateral action in the Bosphorus in case of war against Mohammed Ali. The problem was to get Russia to accept joint action. The Cabinet rejected the Russian proposal and Brunnow left London having failed in his mission.<sup>62</sup>

Palmerston had been annoyed by the French attitude since July. But as his lines of communications with Russia gradually opened, his tone toughened with France. Palmerston's thoughts were reflected in another despatch to Bulwer in Paris on September 24 where he stated bluntly that "probability is that they (Cabinet) will resolve to proceed in conjunction with the three Powers whether France joins or not... If Soult should hint that France would oppose the four powers, you might suggest that ...it could not be worthwhile to make war with the four Powers for the sake of endeavoring to give Mehmet a few square miles."<sup>63</sup> France was left to make her choice.

Palmerston's bitterness towards France made him all the more convinced to begin developing the concerted action into a coalition. Metternich supported Palmerston's refusal of Russian unilateral action in the Straits, and conveyed this to Brunnow, now in

Johannisberg.<sup>64</sup> Fortunately for Palmerston, Russia accepted joint action for the fleets of the powers in the Straits.<sup>65</sup>

### **B. The Second Stage:**

This new situation opened the way for Palmerston to transform London into the center of concerted action as well as providing additional ammunition to use in his arguments with the Cabinet. However, the question remained how to confront French opposition and to structure the rules for such a coalition? He was aided by the fact that the other powers were willing to cooperate and terminate the state of disequilibrium that threatened their interests. The powers sent their Ambassadors to England to begin talks.

But before the Broadland Conference began, the issue of a French invitation had to be discussed. Metternich and Palmerston remained interested in drawing the French into the coalition. However, Metternich believed it imperative while Palmerston was willing to continue without her. Metternich's overture to France at this point failed and the government of Louis Philippe rejected the idea of coercion against Egypt.<sup>66</sup> The breach between Palmerston and France was obvious. Brunnow explained this in his famous letter to Nesselrode noting that: "The Anglo French alliance is already dead. England is still not with us; but neither is she with France...England is a widow. To marry her much skill and patience are needed, for she is a handsome and capricious woman".<sup>67</sup> Everything depended on the attitude of Russia and Palmerston's flexibility at this stage.

The Broadland Meetings as it came to be known were inaugurated towards the fourth week of December. It was the essence of the future coalition and much of its

success depended on these talks. This perhaps explains how after his marriage in early December 1839, Palmerston spent his honeymoon negotiating in Broadland.

Brunnow arrived for the Broadland talks fully prepared, perhaps more than his Austrian and Prussian colleagues or even Palmerston himself. Unlike them all, he carried strict and unequivocal instructions from Nicholas I. His instructions amounted to a dozen points summed up in his letter to Tatischeff, as follows:<sup>68</sup>

A- That a solution to the present state between the Porte and Egypt had to be achieved by securing the former against the latter, because this state of affairs could easily have its affect on European peace.

B- The allies should grant Mohammed Ali hereditary rule of Egypt, and that he should accept the full sovereignty of the Porte.

C- Egyptian forces must withdraw from Syria and the Ottoman fleet must be returned.

D- If Mohammed Ali should refuse, coercive measures would be taken as follows: the British and French fleets (if France joins) were to block the province of Alexandretta, and latter Candia (Crete)- A blockade on Egyptian shores -Allied Consuls were to be withdrawn from Alexandria- The Russian forces were to intervene in Asia Minor in case Ibrahim decides to press against Constantinople.- Russian and allied fleets were not to come in contact with each other throughout the operation.

E- To sign a convention guaranteeing the closure of the Straits to any war vessel when the Porte was at war. And that this was a *sine quo non*.

These points came to be the backbone of the July 15th 1840 London Convention. Palmerston agreed to nearly all of them but there were several issues that needed to be resolved if a treaty was to formalize. Above all, the Russian proposal limited the allied

naval presence in the Straits, but it imposed no limit on Russia. Moreover, Palmerston was unwilling to sign a convention on the Straits, though he accepted the principles involved. He was also worried about how to get the Cabinet to accept this plan, with French lobby certainly opposing it. Metternich's reservations were similar to those of Palmerston but he added another that would be a point of contention between England and Austria on the one hand and Russia on the other. This was the necessity to include the Porte in any convention that required action in the name of the Sultan.<sup>69</sup>

Since London hosted the meetings, Palmerston led the discussion. He modified Brunnow's suggestion to include equal naval representation in the Ottoman Straits and adopted Metternich's position to allow the active representation of the Porte by the Sultan's plenipotentiary. Moreover, he campaigned through Neumann (Metternich's representative in these meetings), and Beauvale (Lord E. Lamb, his Ambassador to Vienna) to bring Metternich to the side of the allies in case coercive action proved necessary. Similar actions were taken through Clanricarde, his Ambassador at St. Petersburg to persuade Nicholas and Nesselrode to accept these modifications. Palmerston believed that the cabinet would not approve the plan unless he could show Austria as a full partner. While he encountered some success with Russia, Metternich remained obstinate.

Russia was satisfied with the Broadland talks in general, but displeased with the idea of bringing the Porte into the talks. Nesselrode stated that "it seems to us that its a false and dangerous move. If this Ambassador [Ottoman Representative] is destined to stay in this spectacle of peace,...then we have made him the witness of disunion of the powers."<sup>70</sup> His pretext was that this would affect allied credibility and offer an incorrect

image that could lead the Porte to conclude a separate agreement if it felt the powers could not cooperate. Actually his real reasons were enshrined in the Russian attitude towards the Porte in general which led her to consider it a non-member in the European family. (See Chapter II, 2.4.) However, Russia was willing to consent provided action began as soon as possible, believing that any delay would serve the interests of France and Mohammed Ali and would complicate the possibility of union among the powers.<sup>71</sup> Nesselrode instructed Brunnow to attempt to strengthen Palmerston's position with the Cabinet and to remain in London as Russian Ambassador to the British court.

Palmerston's problems were now limited to Austria and France only. He attempted to convince Metternich of the need for coercive action if necessary. Metternich believed they could not force Mohammed Ali to back down without the support of France.<sup>72</sup> Even worse for Palmerston, Metternich began a unilateral attempt to bring France into the unborn alliance. This was in keeping with Metternich's habit of not entering an alliance that could not be destined to succeed. This is very reminiscent of his actions in 1813-14, when Austria was the last to join the alliance and declare war against France while it continued to play the mediator between France and the powers. (See Chapter, II, 2.2 )

Metternich's timid attitude towards coercive action rested on his conviction that France might go to war to support Mohammed Ali, since he believed that for France the issue was, "not a party question but a national one."<sup>73</sup> Unless this question could be resolved, the powers would face the possibility of French mischief in Europe, especially in Italy, an action Austria would face on its own. Moreover, the presence of the French fleet in the Mediterranean would require the use of two Allied squadrons, the first to block France while the second to confront Mohammed Ali.<sup>74</sup> He informed the British



Ambassador that, "It is against the maxims of a great central power to place a large proportion of her army beyond her own country to employ it in operations when its lines of communication with herself must depend on another power;" therefore he suggested a compromise in which Mohammed Ali would receive Syria for the remainder of his life.<sup>75</sup> At the same time, he pledged sixty thousand men to defend Constantinople if this failed, so or a need to this would arise.

But immense pressures from Russia and Britain forced him to change his attitude. The confusion that dominated the Cabinet of Theirs, which came to office in February 1840, convinced him that France would not go to war and encouraged him to unify with the powers. In addition, his change of attitude was affected by the renewed concern that Russia would interfere unilaterally. As Nesselrode communicated in a rather decisive manner that, "...there are only two outcomes, either the negotiations of London would end with agreement among the powers, or it should show that any action was impossible."<sup>76</sup> The implication of this statement was obvious; Russia hinted it would go the course alone. Once he realized that neither Egypt nor France would budge, he changed his position out fear of isolating himself from Europe and/or Russian and British unilateral action. He therefore accepted a plan of coercion and contributed two Frigates to the joint force.<sup>77</sup>

Finally, it seemed that events were moving in accordance with Palmerston's plans. He had obtained Russian cooperation and lured Austria into the alliance. The Ottoman representative Nuri Effendi arrived in London by April with full authority to sign an agreement with the powers, including France if she consents, to "...assist the Sultan to carry into effect an arrangement with Mehmet Ali which shall confer upon that Pasha and his children hereditary government of Egypt."<sup>78</sup>



By later spring, the problems of French cooperation and that of the Cabinet approval still, confronted Palmerston. In the first case, he decided that he could go on without them, but needed to master the support of Austria. As Neuman stated to his minister correctly, "His colleagues -members of Cabinet- view always that cooperation with France is indispensable. It is a difficult solution with four powers only, but Palmerston will try it. ...It is essential that your Highness should prepare yourself for this request [four powers action] and Lord Palmerston seems to be decided not to postpone this affair to an uncertain future.."79 He decided however, to change his tactics towards Paris and invited Guizot, the new French Ambassador to London, to attend the negotiations, so as to have a pretext for the Cabinet in case France refuses, and go ahead with his four powers coalition. During the new talks, Palmerston and Neumann attempted to find a solution by increasing Mohammed Ali's holdings to include the Pashalik of Acre and other territories as well in return for his withdrawal from Syria. Guizot refused to commit his government and played for time to foster dissension among the alliance. Palmerston's options were dwindling as long as France procrastinated and Metternich did not consent to coercion in fear of French attitude.. Certainly, time was his enemy.

Metternich's major problem as we have mentioned earlier were the fears of France and her reaction inside the system. Thus, when Neuman wrote to him in May that Palmerston assured him that he needed their flag and two battleships for moral reasons so as to show the union between the two states in this regard, Metternich's comments were rather far sighted as he approved by saying: "Yes the union between Austria and England. Is this not a demonstration of...the disunion between two courts and the three others ?, How can we be able to avoid this evil ?"80 Clearly, his logic was that this meant throwing

himself into the arms of Britain, and this will ipso facto show the disunity with Russia, Prussia and France. To him this was a representation of an alliance inside the system, and such a move can have its repercussions on the future of the Austrian foreign policy. To this dilemma, Metternich had no direct solution, but he knew that he had to continue in the concerted action or else witness the isolation of Austria with France, for he realized that Palmerston was not going to back down. Therefore, his solution was to accept the establishment of a coalition and see in the future how to get around the problem of coercion, maybe the need to such coercion is not going to come.

Once Metternich agreed to accept a plan for coalition and his half hearted approval to coercion if necessary, Palmerston's position improved. The Cabinet, however, opposed any policy that would rupture relations with France and embark upon an alliance with Russia. At this stage Palmerston wrote to Prime Minister Melbourne on the 5th of July assuring him that as a result of this disagreement between himself and the members he would relieve them by "placing, as I do now, my office at your disposal."<sup>81</sup> In addition he put the members of Cabinet into a precarious position by further stating that "...the immediate result of our declining to go on with the three powers because France does not join us, will be, that Russia will withdraw her offers to unite herself with the other powers for a settlement of the affairs of Turkey and she will again resume her separate and isolated position with respect to those affairs, and you will have the treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi renewed under some still more objectionable form."<sup>82</sup> He was further aided when Guizot, in an attempt to pull the Porte from the alliance, presented a note to Sekib Effendi (the Ottoman prime negotiator) where he offered nothing substantial.<sup>83</sup> This move threw the Porte into the arms of the alliance, discredited the French and forced the Cabinet

to support the formation of an official alliance or coalition embodied in what came to be known as the London Convention.

In the same way that the Treaty of Chaumont cemented the alliance against France in 1813, the July 15th convention put the mechanics of the balance of power in motion to remedy the disequilibrium in the system caused by the Egyptian Question. (See Section 5.6) Also just as Castlereagh worked with Metternich to establish the Third and Fourth Coalition, Palmerston played a similar role regarding the Egyptian Question. His efforts to bring in accord and unity among the powers was unending.

The Treaty set the guidelines for the direction of the alliance.<sup>84</sup> The main stipulations of the treaty could be summarized as follows:

First, the alliance will act to force Mohammed Ali to accept arrangements offered by the Sultan (see below) according to the means available to each alliance member. But if Mohammed Ali refused to accept, the allies were to enforce the arrangement, if necessary by support to the Porte or others (e.g., Syrian rebels) or to sever his communication lines with Syria.

Second, if Mohammed Ali moved towards Constantinople, then upon the request of the Sultan, the allies would furnish support to defend the capital, the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Upon termination of the danger, their forces were to be withdrawn to the Black and Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, this defense would be considered exceptional and not a rule.

Third, the treaty members agreed to close of the Straits to all war vessels as long as the Porte was in peace and that the allies would follow the decision of the Sultan.

Fourth, the Porte would grant Mohammed Ali the *Vilayet* of Egypt for him and his family afterwards and, during his lifetime, the Vilayet of Acre and the southern parts of Syria, provided that he withdrew from all Ottoman territories and return the Ottoman fleet. If he failed to accept these conditions within ten days, the offer of the Pashalik of Acre would be withdrawn. If he failed to accept within twenty days, the Porte and the allies would be at liberty to take whatever action they deemed necessary.

As noted above, French attitude was critical to the implementation of the London Convention of July 15th. Certainly France was outraged, isolated and confused, but still could intimidate some of the members of the alliance to force them out. The French rationale is easily understood if we contemplate her position in Egypt and Syria during the rule of Mohammed Ali (See Section 5.2), as well as the moral obligations towards Mohammed Ali. The French attitude, however, should not be used as a means to discredit the theory of balance of power, because it did not join the coalition in conformity with the premises of the theory, *i.e.*, the membership in the alliance to face a disequilibrium. (See Chapter I). But it should be noticed here that, for the functioning of balance of power mechanics, there is no necessity for all the actors in the system to join in, and there are many cases when states defected from joining a coalition to face the disturber of balance. Russia committed the same act in 1800-1801 during the reign of Tsar Paul and once again during the rule of Alexander II himself, at the time of Tilsit (See Chapter II, 2.2). Prussia did the same during the Third Coalition in the Napoleonic war, but in the two cases, the two states rejoined the alliance. By the conclusion of the Treaty of London in 1841, or the Straits Convention, France was a full member in the alliance. However, the

establishment of the coalition was only the first step in solving this problem and its maintenance proved to be a prickly task.

The French felt ignored in the process. Further Paris insisted that Mohammed Ali should retain Syria. French public opinion supported Mohammed Ali, not surprising since he paid numerous newspapers to print pro-Egyptian articles. The French government was forced to strengthen and consolidate her military strength and preparations. This sentiment produced discussions of a possible French move in northern Italy against Austrian dominions and impacted on French participation in the intervention.<sup>85</sup>

#### **5.4 Intervention by the Coalition:**

As mentioned earlier, Ottoman-Egyptian negotiations witnessed a sudden change as a result of the presentation of the Note of July 27 to the Porte. Hüsrev was delighted with the turn of events and Ponsonby played a very important role in the establishment of the hard-line policy by the Porte, believing that time was in favor of the Sultan. Confronting these events, Mohammed Ali wrote to all the *Valis* in the Empire for their support to drive Hüsrev from power believing that departure of his enemy would open the way for a settlement.<sup>86</sup> His attempts failed and he was forced to deal with both Husrev and the major powers, but he still believed that he had a chance, because he knew that the alliance was not yet put together, so he played on the disunion among the powers, something that did not last very long.

The European Consuls in Alexandria attempted to convince Mohammed Ali to surrender his claims to hereditary rule in Syria to avoid the crisis. But it was clear that

Mohammed Ali had the upper hand in this affair unless the European powers were willing to rescue the Porte. Each of the Consuls passed the position of their respective governments. Whereas Campbell insisted on limiting hereditary rule to Egypt, Couchelet tried his best to secure both Egypt and Syria. These conflicting positions brought progress to a halt.

The *status quo* between the Porte and Egypt remained unchanged for nearly a year. But as Ponsonby suggested, time benefited the Porte more than Mohammed Ali. This was true, and it reflected on the position of the Egyptian army in Syria. It faced a wave of revolts in the major cities and in Arabian peninsula as well, and this had its effect on both demoralizing the Egyptian army, dispersing and weakening it. Such a situation was a direct result of the fact that the Egyptians did not settle the matter and this encouraged the Syrians revolts, especially as they had the assistance of Britain and the Ottoman Empire.

Ibrahim believed he had missed the opportunity after the Battle of Nezib and he could not withstand allied attacks in future. His letters to his father soon assumed a sarcastic tone. In September he requested additional military personnel so as to secure his defenses, but he added that he knew that the "army in the Hijaz was worn off, and in these conditions what can they offer?" He further stated that he felt unprepared to face foreign intervention. He wrote "...if the enemy would send any ships to the coast of Beirut, Tripoli and Tarsus, their simple appearance would put the land in a state where we can not guess the consequences (revolt)." Advancing towards Constantinople was out of the question. He recognized that "if we advance to the North, we shall jeopardize not only receiving munitions and the food, but also a single letter of yours."<sup>87</sup>



While the status of his army was discouraging, Mohammed Ali remained obstinate. His main source of strength was his conviction that he was the only leader who could deliver the Porte from a state of anarchy. This was a repetition of the rejuvenation project he suggested during the first crisis (See Chapter IV, 4.2) and was emphasized by Campbell.<sup>88</sup> But this asset vanished once the Porte introduced the *Hatti Cherif de Gulhane*, which Britain and Resit Pasha worked so hard to obtain.<sup>89</sup> As Ponsonby stated, ..."The enemies of Turkey and the friends of Mehmet are said to feel the weight of the blow that had fallen upon them."<sup>90</sup> This was true in as far as Mohammed Ali was concerned in that he lost any moral claims to reforming the Empire. Mohammed Ali's response to the edict and Hüsrev was that most of what was stated in the *Hatti Cherif de Gulhane* already applied in Egypt.<sup>91</sup>

The *status quo* continued but Mohammed Ali did not give up all his attempts to lead the Porte into accepting his terms without the consent of the powers. He wrote another dispatch to Hüsrev in February 1840 in which he stated that he was the faithful subject of the sultan and warned that foreigners were working to break down the Porte not the reverse, and requested hereditary rule of Egypt and Syria. Hüsrev refused and the deadlock continued. Moreover he reverted to his old practice of bribing Ottoman officials to influence the decision of the Sultan. His influence even reached the mother of the Sultan. The role of the French Ambassador to the Porte, Monsieur Pontis, was not above suspicion, especially since France aimed at thwarting the alliance. Ponsonby and Strumer, the Austrian Ambassador to the Porte, played a major role in controlling his intrigues.

Upon the substitution of Hüsrev by Resit Pasha, Mohammed Ali was claimed to have fallen to tears of joy that his old and intractable enemy had departed for good and



that a more flexible Ottoman position may be on the horizon. As he came to realize, Reşit was more pro-British than old Hüsrev in dealing with him. Immediately, Mohammed Ali used a social occasion to send his envoy Sami Pasha to the Porte to open talks with Reşit, suggesting that Mohammed Ali would soon return the Ottoman fleet. But much to the surprise of Mohammed Ali, Reşit saw the fleet as a secondary matter and focused on Syria. Moreover, he informed Mohammed Ali that if he had any suggestions, he should transmit them to the allies in accordance with the Note of 27 July 1839. Mohammed Ali responded to this saying, "If the Turks want to maintain the *status quo*, I shall remain as I am... the attempts I tried with the Porte is proof of my sincere intentions to negotiate peacefully."<sup>92</sup>

The situation in the European system did not favor Mohammed Ali. By July, his only ally France was faced with isolation as a result of events taking place in London. Paris wished to improve its position forcing Mohammed Ali to show flexibility, especially with regard to the Syrian rule. They believed that he should remain content to receive a portion of the territory, although their public position was that Mohammed Ali should receive all of Syria. To this end, Thiers dispatched Monsieur Perrier to Alexandria on the 15th of July, the day the London Convention was signed. After failing to gain Mohammed Ali's consent, he reported to Thiers that ....we have used all persuasive methods to persuade him but they were futile... he keeps saying that 'God is the prime mover of everything and what he wants will happen.'<sup>93</sup> By then every Consul believed coercion was the only means available.

At the same time, Palmerston was steadfast in his call for intervention to implement the articles of the London Convention. Preparations began among the four powers. As

Palmerston stated to his Ambassador to Vienna, "Great Britain has a large squadron in the Mediterranean which is to be applied to the purpose of the alliance, Russia holds a considerable force in the Black Sea disposable...; while Austria contributes no troops, and her cooperation is to be confined to the employment of a few frigates and sloops."<sup>94</sup> As for Prussia, she practically offered nothing to the intervention, and as her Foreign Minister stated, "Prussia would contribute nothing, nothing whatever."<sup>95</sup> This could be attributed to the fact that she feared a possible French assault, and thus, confined herself to the defense of her own territories, in addition to the fact that she was not as directly threatened by the Egyptian Question. In other words, Prussia offered only moral support.

Austrian participation in the intervention did not come smoothly. Metternich also feared the outbreak of a war with France and declined from providing any significant assistance. He informed Beauvau that .... if war breaks out, France would probably be able to revolutionize and occupy Northern Italy as far as Po, and in this state...there are reasons not to dispatch even a small corps to Syria."<sup>96</sup> Thus he embarked on a twin-pillar policy: ally himself to the coalition, while at the same time seek to accommodate France as much as possible. The application of the first policy was to be the factor of the second, for though he joined in the preparation through his fleet, he made sure that this coalition would stand by him in case of war with France. Even in the intervention, he was cautious. He instructed Archduke Bandejas, the captain of the Austrian squadron, that any action to be taken was to be within the context of the powers, as well as in the name of the Sultan.<sup>97</sup> He made sure that no Austrian action would provoke France.

This attitude did not satisfy Palmerston who was anxious to get things going and end the Egyptian Question. To make up for a lack of effective Austrian military support

for the alliance, he requested from Metternich to provide the Porte a loan to strengthen Ottoman forces for the war to come, as well as rifles and munitions to the rebels in Syria.<sup>98</sup> Even here Metternich failed to show enthusiasm and delayed a response. Palmerston realized that he could rely only upon himself, the Porte and Syrian rebels. Worries that Russia would remain in the Mediterranean prevented the use of its fleet in the coercive phase.

Ponsonby displayed considerable vigor in helping the Porte strengthen its army. Sir Charles Smith became the Ottoman Chief of Staff and under his command, the Ottoman army was gaining strength and stamina. Admiral Stopford, was the commander of the British fleet in the Mediterranean and received strict orders from Palmerston to assist the rebel movement in Syria with arms and ammunition. He initially failed and Ibrahim gained the time necessary to quell the rebellion. Ponsonby sent Richard Wood to instigate troubles in Syria to help the war efforts of Britain, Austria and the Porte.<sup>99</sup> He did not fail.

In the meantime, Palmerston dealt with French threats affecting the intervention process, as well as continued opposition in England and the Cabinet. It was a very delicate situation, leaving him no choice but to embark on a policy of coalition maintenance and prompt military activity to terminate the affair as swiftly as possible. He responded by criticizing the French, having come to believe it would not go to war for the sake of Egypt. He wrote to Bulwer stating that "I hope it will undeceive Thiers as to his notion that we are going to give up our Treaty of July 15. ...Does Thiers imagine that such menaces and reviling that he has been pleased to deal out through his irresponsible organs, have made the slightest change in our determination and intentions. If he does, he has yet to learn as to the character and habits of the English nation."<sup>100</sup> Moreover, he instructed

Bulwer to inform Thiers in the most inoffensive manner "that if France throws down the gauntlet we shall not refuse to pick it up."<sup>101</sup> He was fully convinced that the French were not going to go to war, and he had strong reasons for this. The French army in Algiers faced strong resistance from Emir Abdul Kadir, and her navy could not match Britain's. Since war against all of Europe was unthinkable, it was clear that France was bluffing.

However many Europeans believed France would go to war over Egypt, making it better to sacrifice Syria than to risk a European conflict. Russia was not far behind Metternich in believing the dangers of possible French intervention. Nesselrode, was particularly worried about the possibility of French assault on the Dardanelles to force the Sultan to surrender Syria to Mohammed Ali. He wrote ....the French fleet might enter the Dardanelles...if this should occur, the allies would consider it a violation that would have negative consequence."<sup>102</sup>

Metternich shared the same worries of his Russian colleague but, in the end, was intimidated by the French. Immediately after conferences with St. Aulaire, the French Ambassador to Vienna in August, he began talks with France, a formula we can call now a 4+1 negotiations. Palmerston refused to consider such an arrangement, writing that "It does not appear to H.M. Government the existing circumstances require such an arrangement and H.M. Government is inclined to hope and to believe that the Peace of Europe will continue uninterrupted."<sup>103</sup> In the meantime, he urged Metternich to provide financial assistance to the Porte once again.

Following the failure of Metternich's initiative, he began to secure his defensive lines against possible French aggression. He held a conference with the Prussian king in August to secure joint defenses and hoped that war could be contained. Prussia pledged an

army to cooperate with Austria, for the defense of the lines from the north of Prussia to Italy in the south.<sup>104</sup> Beauvau informed Metternich that Palmerston believed France would not go to war and succeeded in keeping Austria in the coalition.

As these developments unfolded, the Porte abiding by the articles of the treaty dispatched Rifat Bey to Alexandria on the 8th of August to convey to Mohammed Ali its propositions in accordance with the London Convention of July 1840.<sup>105</sup> French attempts to block the ratification of the treaty and work on a settlement between the Sultan and his vassal failed. Mohammed Ali was faced with either accepting the will of the powers or decline and face the consequences. By the 16th, the Ottoman envoy was received, and the following day the Consuls of the four powers as well. Mohammed Ali refused the terms of the agreement. On the 19th, the Consuls drafted a joint communiqué to him endorsing the request and suggesting that he should accept the terms of the treaty. Mohammed Ali tried to outmaneuver Rifat by assuring him that he would accept hereditary rule in Egypt, provided that the Sultan would review his position towards the rule in Syria and that this was conveyed to the Sultan by a letter.<sup>106</sup> Rifat and the Consuls viewed this position as refusal. In negotiations between Boughos Bey, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, and Sami Bey, Mohammed Ali's secretary, and the Consuls, the two advised that the Pasha accepted the terms of the treaty, but asked that the Porte allow him to retain Syria. They could not say what Mohammed Ali would do when the Sultan refused the request. Mohammed Ali was a shrewd politician and knew the consequences of his decision, but his intransigence may be attributed to his conviction that the crisis would be settled along the lines of the previous one. Moreover, he gambled on continued European disunity and French support. He was to be disappointed on all points.

In the meantime, Thiers sent Count Walewski to Egypt to assure Mohammed Ali of French support and to undermine the coalition efforts by gaining concessions from Mohammed Ali which his government would use in its maneuvers. He advised Mohammed Ali to increase Egyptian fortifications and quell any rebellion in Syria. Moreover, he succeeded in convincing Mohammed Ali to officially request the mediation of France.<sup>107</sup> The ultimate concession wrung from Mohammed Ali was his agreement to withdraw from Syria provided that it revert to his family after his death.<sup>108</sup> Walewski left for the Porte to join Pontis and end the crisis in a manner favorable to Mohammed Ali.

These diplomatic efforts proved meaningless. On September 14, Resit Pasha informed Mohammed Ali of the Sultan's decision (supported by Ponsonby) to sack him from the Vilayet of Egypt. Mohammed Ali's intransigent comment to Couchelet was that "this is the fourth time they sack me and every time I come out stronger."<sup>109</sup> However, this time circumstances were different because the Porte had the support of the powers. By September 23, the Consuls of the four powers of the alliance left Alexandria understanding that Mohammed Ali was no longer the Vali over Egypt. He believed that this decision would provide a useful bargaining chip in future negotiations.<sup>110</sup> Although greeted by some with surprise, the decision produced further intransigence on the part of Mohammed Ali.

In addition to the pressures exerted by the French, Palmerston also endured calls by the Cabinet to reconcile with Paris. Palmerston had no choice but to accept the Cabinet's decision, but he argued that any initiative required time.<sup>111</sup> He increased his pressures on Egypt. Palmerston's instructions to Stopford was to begin a full blockade, with his Austrian colleague, against both Syria and Egypt. This was the step that Ibrahim



feared most since it jeopardized his communication lines with Egypt. Ottoman forces under the leadership of Charles Smith began to penetrate Syria and the Syrian revolts weakened the Egyptian position.

Palmerston was winning, and he was aided by another event, the gradual transformation in the French position. By October, Louis Philippe indicated that he would not permit the France's isolation to continue. He wrote to the allies on October 8th that he was pulling back. Instead of insisting that Syria should be given to Mohammed Ali, he was now interested in simply maintaining the Egyptian position. He wrote that, "the removal of the viceroy would be...a disturbance of the general equilibrium," and that France is "willing to participate in any acceptable arrangement based on the guarantee of the existence of both the Sultan and the viceroy of Egypt."<sup>112</sup> France was now fighting for Mohammed Ali's existence and her place in the European concert. This attitude was followed by the resignation of the bellicose government of Thiers towards the end of October. He was followed by a more flexible government headed by Soult where Guizot became the Foreign Minister and the real power. This reduced some of the pressures from Palmerston, especially by relaxing the fears of Metternich, but he still needed to move quickly. The impending arrival of winter might mean the delay of naval actions until the spring. Palmerston never allowed this to happen.

The military campaign (as everyone expected) resulted in a series of Egyptian defeats. Several small battles took place and the combined Ottoman-British army landed on the shores of Syria. Beirut fell and was followed by the fall of other coastal cities in October. The main reason for the Egyptian defeats was that their army was dissipated in order to confront the various rebellions by the Syrians, especially the Druze. In addition,



the Egyptians were unable to predict where the Ottoman-British blow would fall. Moreover, the mere fact that the Egyptian navy was to confront the British and Austrian ones, turned the chances for its success very slim. Therefore, Mohammed Ali did not venture to risk his fleet which could be in much use in future if the alliance decided to attack Egypt itself.

The Egyptian army withdrew from Tripoli, Adana and Latakia without a fight. Coalition forces defeated the Egyptian army and the fall of Syria was only a matter of time. The only solid defense left was the Port of Acre, famous for its resistance to enemies since Napoleon. On the 29th of October Stopford, however received instructions to sack Acre.<sup>113</sup> A combined fleet of 20 ships bombarded the city and a shot exploded the entire ammunition dump, killing a number of infantry and making resistance impossible.<sup>114</sup> On the 4th of November, the allies occupied Acre. This compromised the position of the Egyptian armies in the Levant. Should the allies penetrate the desert towards the East, their lines of retreat would be cut, and surrender unavoidable.

The fall of Acre had a spectacular effect on Metternich and his Prussian counterpart. The end of the Egyptian Question was in sight. Metternich transformed from timidity to a hard-line attitude towards Mohammed Ali and France. He joined his Prussian colleagues in establishing defensive lines and showing more audacity than expected against France. This prompted Beauvau to write home that, "We are now as bold as a lion and have forgotten that we were ever afraid."<sup>115</sup>

The fall of Acre also made it obvious that Mohammed Ali's resistance was near an end although any campaign against Egypt would be difficult. Egypt was not Syria, and the 1807 campaign failed tremendously as before. A new campaign would be even more

difficult given that the Egyptian coasts were very well fortified, totally unlike Syria.<sup>116</sup> Fighting home gave the defending army the leverage and for a full scale Allied campaign against Egypt to succeed, it had to be rather massive. Such a campaign was very difficult; Palmerston would have had many obstacles in obtaining the consent of the Cabinet to send a fully-equipped army into Egypt to confront an army of more than 150 thousand men. This fact gave Mohammed Ali his card to play against the allies. He recognized this as demonstrated by his famous comment to Hodges, the British Consul to Egypt: "The British threaten to land on (the) Egyptian coast! Let them fulfill this promise. They will see that we are ready to receive them. The embryos in their mother's wombs will join in the fight against them."<sup>117</sup>

The circumstances and the situation required Palmerston to offer Mohammed Ali a way out. It was a simple equation, the more he pressures Mohammed Ali, the more desperate he shall become, and the more costly the results will be, especially in as far as the alliance was concerned. On the 14th of November, the allied powers presented to Sekib Effendi a note requesting that the Sultan reinstate Mohammed Ali, if he accepted the rules of the London Convention. The Porte had no choice but to accept this recommendation, though it procrastinated for months until it finally accepted.<sup>118</sup> Palmerston ordered Stopford to present this case to Mohammed Ali while, at the same time, provide a demonstration of British force to make him more prone to accept the settlement.

In the meantime, he needed to terminate the Egyptian Question as fast as possible so as to keep the alliance together. He was particularly worried about possible Austrian coolness if coercion was to continue. He summoned Esterhazy, the Austrian Ambassador

to invigorate Metternich to continue in the alliance. The Ambassador wrote to Metternich that "Lord Palmerston ...reassured him his improbable conviction that France does not want and can not make war: *ne peut faire la guerre.*"<sup>119</sup>

In the meantime, Stopford complying with the orders of Palmerston dispatched Commodore Napier to Alexandria to undertake the early mentioned task. As lord Palmerston clarified latter to the Ambassadors of the four powers:<sup>120</sup>

*Commodore Napier arrived on the 21st of November to Alexandria, and dispatched a letter to Boghos Bey that demanded the following:*

*1- To deliver the Sherif Prince of the Drouses that Emir Bechir has sent.*

*2- Not to send troops to Syria ...and to give the order to Ibrahim Pacha to evacuate this Province.*

*3- To return the Turkish fleet to the Sultan.*

*Boghos' replying in the name of Mohammed Ali, has precisely refused ...until he receives the official avis of that the Sultan has conferred unto him the hereditary rule of Egypt and that the powers would guarantee that. ... He asked him if he was authorized to make a treaty ?*

These were the orders given to Commodore Napier to transmit to the Egyptian side, and as is obvious, it contained nothing regarding his authorization to conclude a deal with the Egyptian *Vali*. Probably Napier's logic was that there was nothing in his orders that denied him the right to accomplish his mission as he saw fit

Still the old Pasha was unwilling to submit, but knew he had to decide quickly since his army in Syria was in danger. Napier was permitted direct contact with Mohammed Ali. In this meeting, he gave the Pasha one day to make his mind as to the acceptance of these conditions. The situation in Syria was hopeless, and it was only a matter of time before the Egyptian armies faced defeat. The main issues were settled quickly between the Commodore and Boghos Pasha by correspondence in the next few days.

Napier followed his British colleagues, Barker and Campbell and eventually fell under the spell of the charismatic Mohammed Ali. Together, both Napier and Mohammed Ali represented by his Foreign Minister agreed upon a treaty to settle the Egyptian Question and on November 27, 1840 it was signed. The terms of the treaty stipulated that Mohammed Ali was to recall his armies from Syria, restore the Ottoman fleet to the Porte immediately after the latter issued a *Ferman* reinstating him as Viceroy over Egypt. Moreover, it also approved the evacuation of the Egyptian army from Syria with all its weapons. The British navy would assist, after the cessation of all hostile activity, in implementing the administrative part of this deal.<sup>121</sup>

Stopford refused to accept this treaty. He and Ponsonby were outraged at the Commodore's attitude. Stopford's opinion was that this was a "hasty and unauthorized convention," and refused to accept it until he had clearance from Palmerston. Increasingly the quarrels between the Commodore and his Commander played an important role in the developing crisis.

Palmerston was surprised but could ill afford to refuse this treaty since he would face the cabinet and the consequences of possible escalation to the ongoing war, possibly to the extent of a full scale campaign against Egypt. Moreover, the weak Ottoman army was in no condition to face the Egyptian forces without continued allied assistance. Finally, the coalition could not withstand much more pressure, and the attitude of Metternich would have been unpredictable if France became more bellicose as events unfolded. Certainly the withdrawal of Austria would be followed by that of Prussia,<sup>122</sup> and Palmerston and the Porte would have lost the battle. Therefore, he opted for a half-hearted approval of Napier's convention and had to sell it to the representatives of the four powers.

Palmerston's reaction to the situation was transmitted by a letter to the Admiralty in which he asked "To convey to Commodore Napier the approval of Her Majesty's government of the steps taken by him ...though without any instructions to that effect, and upon his own responsibility, to carry into execution the arrangements contemplated by the of 15th of July Treaty ..." He further assured them that "...which the four powers will do, is to recommend to the Porte to make the concession specified in the communication which ...Robert Stopford has been instructed to convey to Mehmet Ali." <sup>123</sup>

Clearly these two statements indicate the state of confusion in which the British found themselves with regard to the final approval of Napier's Convention. That is why Palmerston approved his arrangement. Nevertheless, he continued to follow instructions previously delivered to Stopford. In other words, he did not take a final commitment in any regard. That could be understood in light of his position with regard to the representatives of the four powers. He was particularly embarrassed because Napier acted without the authorization of the four representatives, and therefore any approval was to be decided only in light with Thiers.

Palmerston immediately initiated a series of conversations with the representatives of the four powers in London. As Neuman unequivocally asserted in his dispatch to Metternich, "Lord Palmerston dit ensuite qu'il fallait connaitre la transaction du Commodore avant de porter un jugement sur son merite."<sup>124</sup> Moreover, he convinced the other Ambassadors without much difficulty that the best solution would be to approve the convention and terminate the crisis, especially since it did not contradict the London Convention. As Neuman stated to Metternich, "it was an improvisation on the part of Commodore Napier," and suggested its acceptance.

## **5.5 Equilibrium, Reciprocal Non Compensation and the Pacification of the Egyptian**

### **Question:**

The principles of *equilibrium and reciprocal compensation, or reciprocal non-compensation* were the main themes for the settlement of any dispute that was to be managed in accordance with the mechanics of balance of power. (See Chapter I, 1.6 and Chapter II, 2.3) The Egyptian Question, confronted throughout by these mechanics, was therefore subject to these vital principles. The solution had to maintain an acceptable distribution of power, to restore equilibrium and guarantee equal compensation or non compensation to all the members of the alliance. In this case, no state would gain any territorial privilege or preponderance without the others being subject to the same treatment. The settlement of the Egyptian Question did not fall outside this framework. When Egypt became the disturber of the balance, the allies, though differing in perspectives at various times, had to come to the settlement that would cease the menace to the equilibrium in the European system.

### **A- The Preservation of the Actors and the Territorial Balance:**

The settlement of the Egyptian Question did not differ very much from the settlement with France after its defeat. Although some members in the coalition wanted to terminate the French threat by imposing numerous restrictions, indemnities and military ceilings, the alliance decided this would not be appropriate. (See Chapter II, 2.2) The settlement of the Egyptian Question followed the same principles. Although the Porte,



Ponsonby and Stopford were unwilling to accept the conditions of Napier's Convention, (just like Prussia in 1814) they were forced to do so by the rules of the system's dynamic. The elimination of Egypt would have caused a significant negative reaction from France.<sup>125</sup> Moreover, France refused to reduce its forces on the Prussian and Austrian borders, unless the Egyptian Question was terminated and Mohammed Ali reinstated.<sup>126</sup> The French attitude was based on protecting its own interests and preponderance in the Mediterranean. Austria and Prussia wanting no problems and fearing French reaction, soon accepted Napier's settlement. Metternich went as far as threatening to withdraw from the alliance if it were not accepted. Palmerston had to yield to his pressures and sent to Ponsonby to force the Porte to accept the deal.

At the same time, the fatigued Egyptian army withdrew from Syria and Arabia and Egypt returned the Ottoman fleet in January 1841. Palmerston had no choice but to present Sekib Effendi with a note from the four powers to the Sultan in January 1841 requesting the Porte grant Mohammed Ali hereditary rule of Egypt. Ponsonby did the rest of the job, but his animosity towards Mohammed Ali enhanced the harshness of the *Ferman*.

The *Ferman* of 13 February declared Mohammed Ali to be reinstated as hereditary *Vali* over Egypt and the Sudan. However, the *Ferman* contained several conditions he refused to accept. To begin with, the *Ferman* gave the Sultan the right to choose the heir of Mohammed Ali and 25% of total Egyptian income as tribute.<sup>127</sup> Mohammed Ali refused these points outright, claiming this would lead to popular unrest.<sup>128</sup> The alliance intervened and presented a note to Sekib Effendi on March 13 suggesting that the Sultan accept hereditary rule in Egypt according to the wishes of Mohammed Ali and that the affair be



settled in accordance with the London Convention. The Porte responded on April 19, 1841 that it would grant the elder son of Mohammed Ali hereditary rule, that only 25 % of the government revenues will be taken in tribute and finally, giving Mohammed Ali the right to appoint military ranks up to the rank of *Amiralai*. Mohammed Ali accepted and a new *Ferman* was issued based on the above.

The Egyptian Question was settled in a very balanced manner as we can see. Egypt though under the *de jure* jurisdiction of the Porte, maintained its *de facto* sovereignty. The Egyptian position was unusual compared to the legal standards of this era. Though all the rules and laws of the Porte were applied in Egypt, including the *Hatti Cherif de Gulhane*, Egypt was granted hereditary rule and this in itself represented a characteristic of sovereignty by nineteenth century standards. In addition, Egypt exercised its own right to maintain relations with the other powers in Europe, again a display of limited sovereignty. This status continued uninterrupted, until the British declared Egypt a protectorate in 1914. This seems to prove that Egypt was not eliminated as an actor in the international scene. On the contrary, Egyptian independence was accepted in general and its relations with the European states functioned on a basis of semi-independence and limited sovereignty.

As for the territorial balance in the region, the settlement of the affairs restored Syria and Arabia to the Sultan. But Mohammed Ali retained Egypt. Therefore, neither of the two powers at this stage could exercise a preponderant role over the other and Egypt would no longer pose a threat to the Ottoman Empire. Though the Egyptian army remained intact, it was reduced to about a hundred thousand in the next decades.<sup>129</sup> Syria

remained as Palmerston hoped, a buffer between the two powers, similar to the Rhineland in the Vienna settlement, *mutatis mutandis* regarding its legal status.

### **B: Non Compensation for All:**

The European system was profoundly affected by the destabilizing role of the Egyptian Question in 1833-1841; but the alliance avoided altering power distributions in order to prevent further disequilibrium. Thus, it was decided that none of the actors would receive anything. This was established as a settled principle for all the members of the alliance to follow.

Realizing the dangers which would emanate from ignoring this principle in the outset, the different partners in the coalitions worked hard to achieve it. When the treaty establishing the coalition was drafted, it was obvious that the alliance was "animated by the desire to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire as a security of the peace of Europe."<sup>130</sup> In other words, the main object was the preservation of a European power. That was the first sign of reciprocal non compensation.

To further ensure this goal, another protocol was signed between the members of the alliance in London on September 17, 1840. It stated that "...in the execution of the engagement resulting to the contracting powers for the above-mentioned [London] Convention, those powers will seek no augmentation of territory, no exclusive influence, no commercial advantages for their subjects which those of every other nation may not equally obtain."<sup>131</sup> In other words the powers committed themselves not to take an advantage on the detriment of the equilibrium in Europe, thereby guaranteeing not to make any alteration to the factors affecting the power distribution.

The powers strictly followed this principle and therefore, gained no compensation for their efforts to maintain the Ottoman Empire. Immediately after the end of hostilities in the region, the powers withdrew the majority of their forces from the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. In addition, this withdrawal did not include any advantages, as was the case for example during the 1833 crisis when the Russian withdrawal was paid for by the Treaty of Hünkâr İskilesi.

It is true, however, that the British position in the Porte was enhanced as a result of its role as the prime architect of the alliance. The Porte needed Britain to balance the fact that it was a member in a heterogeneous system when its existence was threatened by Russia. The need to ally itself with another power became more apparent after the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi was revoked. Moreover, this was a natural continuation of the trend that began in 1834 when Palmerston decided on a policy of preponderance in the Porte. But in general, none of the members of the alliance gained anything other than what they possessed prior to their joining the alliance.

### **C. The Reintegration of the Actors in the European System:**

As was the case with the Vienna settlement, the actors in the system were reintroduced once the disturber of the balance was controlled by the mechanics of balance of power. A strong emphasis was laid on the French role in the pacification of the Egyptian Question and how this forced her to withdraw from the arena. Since the victory of Mohammed Ali was viewed by all the members as a victory for France, Paris played a role by simply aiding the disturber of the balance. This became evident during the crisis itself

when it appeared that France may move into northern Italy and the Rhineland to threaten the alliance and deter it from any coercive actions.

Though France was being viewed as so, she did not face the danger of isolation as a result of this factor only, but there were other powers who were interested in alienating it. Nicholas I and his Secretary Nesselrode hoped to use this episode to achieve this. Nesselrode believed any attempt by France to broker a settlement through mediation with Mohammed Ali would bring France into the European concert and claim credit for settling the Egyptian Question.<sup>132</sup> By December Nicholas I made it clear to Clarnicarde in St. Petersburg that he preferred Britain "...not object to record and establish by some sort of act the alliance which happily exists between the four Powers to serve as a security against any efforts that France might make to awaken revolutionary feelings in Europe or, against, perhaps, revolutionary feelings in Europe or against perhaps a revolutionary war."<sup>133</sup> Palmerston being conscious of the situation, Russian aims and the rules of the balance of power system, rejected this proposal promptly. He wrote to Clarnicarde that England viewed revolutionary issues in France as a matter of domestic concern that he does not wish to go into." He added that in "...an attempt of one nation to seize and appropriate to itself territory which belongs to another...because such an attempt leads to a derangement of the existing balance of power and by altering the relative strength of states,... the British Government holds to itself at full liberty to resist, upon ...the principle of self defense."<sup>134</sup> Palmerston wanted France back in the European system, as did Castlereagh twenty-four years earlier.

Naturally, the allies- with the exception of Russia- wanted to restore France to the system. Russian efforts were frustrated. In a conference in London on July 10, the

representatives of the four powers signed a treaty establishing the principle of prohibiting the entrance of war vessels through the Ottoman Straits in a treaty adhered to by all the powers of Europe, including France who officially rejoined the system on July 13, 1840. Certainly, France was a strong power and a member in the system that could not be marginalized or alienated, for this would represent a violation of the general rules of the balance of power mechanics.

#### **D. Redressing the Disequilibrium of 1833-9:**

As mentioned in Chapter IV, a state of disequilibrium in the affairs of Europe resulted from the Egyptian Question in 1833, whereby Russia and to some extent Austria gained preponderance as a result of the Treaties of Hünkâr İskelesi and Münchengratz. Now that the Egyptian Question was settled, something had to be done to redress this previous disequilibrium.

Palmerston realized that the core of the disequilibrium lay in Russia's view that the Porte was alien to the system to the extent that it hoped to absorb as much of its territory as possible. But at the same time he realized that the international guarantee proposed by Sult in 1839 was something the Tsar would not accept.<sup>135</sup> Therefore, it was imperative to ensure security for the Porte and at the same time nullify the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi. Immediately after the settlement of the Egyptian Question in June 1841, he drafted a convention on the passage of the warship through the Ottoman Straits. But once again, Brunnow wanted to soften the principle declared in the London Convention, relating to whether the Sultan was at war or peace. Palmerston refused and believed that this would

leave the Sultan at the mercy of the Tsar, restricting the ability of the British or allies to rescue the Porte in case it was attacked by Russia. Thus, Palmerston insisted on the phrase "peace," thereby allowing Britain and others to block Russian preponderance.<sup>136</sup>

Thus, the Convention of 1841 regarding the prohibition of war vessels through the Ottoman Straits was formulated and signed.<sup>137</sup> France joined at the insistence of Britain, and once again was reintegrated into the system and participated in the balancing process in the future. The treaty also played a major role in redressing the disequilibrium in the east. Hünkâr İskelesi, the nightmare of Palmerston, was replaced by a collective guarantee of the inviolability of the Straits. This automatically annulled the Treaty of Münchengratz as well, and the fate of the Porte became the collective duty of all the states minus Russia.

## Conclusion

As emphasized in the introduction of this dissertation, this is not a purely historical study, but rather an interpretation of a series of events commonly referred to as the Egyptian Question of 1831-1841 and their effect on European security and inter-state dynamics. The work followed the rise of the Egyptian Question from the French Campaign to Egypt in 1798 and elaborated on its various phases. Its main focus were the years of 1831-1841, since this period saw the Egyptian Question reach its most active phase when it affected the European system more than ever before. Moreover, we traced how the Egyptian Question created disequilibrium in the European system as a result of Mohammed Ali's foreign policy. The pacification of the Egyptian Question by the major European actors was attributed to their execution of the mechanics of balance of power to remedy the state of disequilibrium this question produced.

A significant portion of this study aimed to establish the relationship between the European System and the Egyptian Question, achieved in part, by linking the fate of the Ottoman Empire to the growing power and influence of an Egyptian Empire on the borders of the European System and eastern Mediterranean. The major emphasis, however, was given to the Ottoman factor since its strategic importance to the European powers doomed any Egyptian aspirations against it. Egyptian expansion on Ottoman territory and the threat this posed to Ottoman integrity, dominated events throughout the Egyptian Question since the failing Ottoman Empire had become the linchpin of European equilibrium in the east. This reality proved critical in the formulation of



collective action against Mohammed Ali by the major powers (excluding France). Perhaps the best illustration of this thesis may be found in the words of Palmerston during the Broadland Meetings in December 1839, when he cogently provided the essence of the Egyptian Question:

*The usurped position of Mehmet Ali, is incompatible with the Sultan. A vassal too strong than his sovereign will end by destroying the authority of the Sultan which is indispensable for the maintenance of the empire, for the general peace in Europe and political equilibrium of the great European interests.*<sup>1</sup>

Such a statement clearly explains that the Egyptian Question created systemic disequilibrium by threatening the Ottoman Empire and hence European peace. There remains little doubt from this research that this threat, triggered a reaction by the major European powers against Egypt, and resulted in the pacification of the Egyptian Question.

The portion of this study that linked the Egyptian Question, e.g., Egypt's growing power and political aspirations *vis-à-vis* the European System, provided a secondary reason as to why the European alliance was roused into collective action. No doubt the Egyptian military and political expansion threatened European power and interests in the near-east and east Mediterranean, however, we contend that this was a secondary reason for European intervention. Palmerston in particular, mentioned this several times at the Broadland meetings, in which he feared Egypt might jeopardize trade routes to Asia and India, a fear shared by Metternich and Nicholas I. Nevertheless, such concerns provide a catalyst but not a sufficient basis for intervention.

Though Egyptian historians such as Zaki, El Rafei, and Thabet presented the pacification of the Egyptian Question as a conspiracy by the European powers, and believed that this policy was a natural outcome of British imperialism, this research

demonstrates that the aims of the powers were neither imperialistic nor colonial. Further contentions of a concerted conspiracy crumble in light of any discussion of the considerable intra-alliance frictions each leader encountered. However, the European system did interact within the balance of power dynamic. This is the main thesis of the work at hand.

Establishing that the Egyptian Question posed a threat to European equilibrium, permitted the use of the theoretical framework of the balance of power in this research, This theory was an important means by which one could simplify and analyze events within a logical framework. This analytical framework presented a new basis for understanding the Egyptian Question. The impact of the Egyptian Question within the European System, when viewed through the optic of this new approach, makes it clear that Egypt, in its capacity as a marginal actor in the European system, was more influential than any other marginal actor at that time. Further, the repercussions of the Egyptian Question lingered within the courts of Europe and played an important role in the development of European diplomacy in the third and fourth decades of the nineteenth century.

The rise of the Egyptian Question in the first decade of the nineteenth century (as recounted in Chapter III) was significant. Though Egypt fell under the nominal sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, in reality it had achieved independence. To recognize the ramifications of Egypt's rise as a Mediterranean power, it is useful to recall that this is one of the few instances of the creation of a strong state in an age when European Empires dominated and even directed the development of the marginal states or

territories. The unique nature of Egypt is all the more interesting in that it became a power that influenced the course of European diplomacy for almost a decade.

Egypt's relations with Europe was strangely interdependent and deviated from the usual patterns of the Europeans controlling the weaker or marginal states outside the system. Instead it became a two-way channel in which the European system influenced an outside weaker state and vice versa. Egyptian moves encountered a reaction from Europe as demonstrated by the Egyptian involvement in the war in Morea, whereby the military scales shifted and created ripples of concern throughout Europe. Similarly, Egyptian victories in the First and Second Egyptian-Ottoman Wars sent shock waves through the European system. If one focuses on the repercussions of the Egyptian Question on the European System, one can see that between 1831-1833 they exacerbated the polarization in the European alliance system (See Chapter IV, Section 4.5). However in 1839-40, the Egyptian Question produced harmony and depolarization in the European system (with the exception of France for some months). Brunnow illustrates these themes when he stated that the aim of collective action was to create "une entente entre les puissances".<sup>2</sup> At the same time, this period saw the Egyptian Question and French intransigence threaten to split the powers causing the threat of war to loom throughout 1839-1840. All of the above illustrates that there existed no better example of a state outside the nineteenth-century European system that influenced European security as did Egypt.

The question of whether any other state outside the European system could have played this role in this period should also be considered. It is unlikely that any other state or territory in the region besides Egypt could have undertaken such a role. This may be explained by several factors, among the most important being that Egypt had become the

region's most homogenous entity, even more so than its sovereign, the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Egypt enjoyed an important geostrategic location as well as agricultural and trade advantages exploited by Mohammed Ali. Finally, Egypt was fortunate to be a *vilayet* headed by a shrewd and talented leader who elevated it from the ignorance, poverty and misery it suffered prior to his rule.

Despite Egypt's important role in shaping the European alliances, its ultimate influence was displayed in the sub-system in which it existed. The Egyptian Question laid some foundations of the Middle Eastern sub-system that developed over the next century. Egyptian rule helped establish the resurgence of nationalism that became a part of this system and its cornerstone at certain intervals. Egypt contributed to the substitution of what we may call religious affinity or obedience by ideas of Arab or local nationalism. Certainly, the case of the Egyptian struggle against Ottoman rule, and the success it achieved, accelerated the erosion of the Caliphate system, one of the main pillars of Ottoman legitimacy in the Arab region.

Egyptian rule triggered a sense of Arab nationalism in Syria more than any other *vilayet*, in the Ottoman Empire. Ibrahim Pasha identified himself with Arabism rather than any other ethnic background during his rule of Syria, often described as the *throbbing heart of Arabism*. This sense of nationalism was a recurrent theme in the struggle between the Ottomans and the Syrians in the years to come and played an important role in the development of the state system that followed the demise of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>3</sup>

In addition, the *Ferman* of 1841 gave Egypt the unique status of semi-independence, especially after the adoption of hereditary rule. This special status fostered

the rise of similar aspirations in other Ottoman provinces as well. It is for these reasons that Egypt was a catalyst in shaping the sub-system of the Middle East.

A final issue to be mentioned is the impact of the Egyptian Question on Egyptian foreign policy. True, Egypt's failure to retain its empire was attributed to systemic reasons, as a result of Egypt's territorial and political over-extension in the region. The consequences of this over-extension caused the European powers to set limits for future Egyptian intervention and expansionism in the region. Brunnow was correct when he stated that the alliance should "...oblige Mehmet Ali to re-enter the territorial [acceptable] limits...where neither he nor his successors should be able to get out from".<sup>4</sup> This was the essence of the London Convention, as well as Palmerston's conviction to create a buffer zone between Egypt and the Porte. This limitation may still exist and it may be argued that even Nasser's projects failed because he tested this boundary.

The Egyptian Question's impact on the European system and its contribution to the creation of a new sub-system in the years to come, explain why it deserves more attention than it had actually received. While many authors recognize the importance of this episode, perhaps this work will offer a new perspective on the Egyptian Question and its effects on Europe and the region and encourage further exploration of this pivotal period.

## ENDNOTES

### Endnotes to Chapter I

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- <sup>1</sup> Alan Gilbert. "Must Global Politics Constrain Democracy: Realism, Regimes and Democratic Internationalism " Political Theory Vol. 20, No 1, February 1992-93, 9.
- <sup>2</sup> John Gaddis. "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War" . International Security, Vol. 17, No 3, Winter 1992/3, 6.
- <sup>3</sup> Stephan Krasner. " Realism, Imperialism and Democracy ." Political Theory. Vol. 20, No 1, February 1992-93, 39.
- <sup>4</sup> Oran Young. " The Actors of World Politics " in James Rosnaeu, Vincent David and Maurice East, eds. The Analysis of International Politics ., (New York: Free Press: 1972), 125.
- <sup>5</sup> Morgenthau, 5.
- <sup>6</sup> For further definitions, see, Richard Stoll and Michael Ward. Power in World Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989) and Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society . (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1950).
- <sup>7</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Sixth Ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 1991), 32.
- <sup>8</sup> For further explanation on the uses of this concept see: Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr. World Politics a Menu of Choice. (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1981), 216.
- K. J. Holsti. "Power, Capabilities and Influence", in Charles Keegley and Eugene Whitkopf, ed. The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives. (New York: Random House, 1984), 8 - 20.
- Michael Sullivan. International Relations Theory and Evidence. (New Jersey : Prentice Hall, 1967), 160-173.
- <sup>9</sup> Morgenthau, 9.
- <sup>10</sup> This point will be emphasized further in section dealing with the balance of power concept.
- <sup>11</sup> K. J Holsti. International Politics: A Framework of Analysis. (New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs , 1992), 15. See also Raymond Aron. Peace and War : A Theory of International Relations. Trans. Richard Howard and Anette Fox. (Florida : Robert Kreiger Pub. Co. 1981), 95.
- <sup>12</sup> Karl Deutch. Politics and Government. (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Co. 1980), 204.
- <sup>13</sup> James Dougherty and Robert Pflatzgraff. Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. (New York: Harper and Row Publishers 1990.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid, 82.
- <sup>15</sup> Helen Milner. "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique", in David Baldwin, ed. NeoRealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 141.



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- <sup>16</sup> Inis Claude Jr. Power and International Relations. (New York: Random House Publication, 1962), 3-11.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid, 6-7.
- <sup>18</sup> Thomas Cusak. "The Management of Power in a Warring State System", in Richard Stoll and Michael Ward, ed. Power in World Politics. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 209-210.
- <sup>19</sup> Cusak, 212.
- <sup>20</sup> For further information regarding the prerequisites for the functioning of collective security, see A. F. Organski. World Politics, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1968), 408-421. Claude, 94-144.
- <sup>21</sup> Stephan M. Walt. The Origin of Alliances. (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987), 21.
- <sup>22</sup> Aron, 128 and Morton Kaplan. System and Process in International Politics (New York: 1957), 19-25.
- <sup>23</sup> Evan Luard. The Balance of Power : The System of International Relations, 1648-1815. (London: Macmillan Academic and Professional, 1992), 5.
- <sup>24</sup> Wight, 165.
- <sup>25</sup> David Hume. "On the Balance of Power", in John Vasques, ed. Classics of International Relations, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1990), 273.
- <sup>26</sup> Edward V. Gullick. Europe's Classical Balance of Power.
- <sup>27</sup> Martin Wight. International Theory: The Three Traditions. (London: Leicester University Press, 1991), 165.
- <sup>28</sup> Claude, 13.
- <sup>29</sup> C. Schiller. International Relations : Cooperation or Conflict. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1954), 356. Kenneth Waltz. Man the State and War : A Theoretical Analysis. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958).
- <sup>30</sup> Ernest Haas. "Obscurity Enshrined : The Balance of Power as an Analytical Concept." in Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, ed. International Relations Theory: Realism Pluralism, Globalism. . (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), 105-115.
- <sup>31</sup> Morgenthau, 187.
- <sup>32</sup> Claude, 13-24.
- <sup>33</sup> Wight, 164-176
- <sup>34</sup> Haas, 105.
- <sup>35</sup> Kaplan, 23.
- <sup>36</sup> Dougherty and Pflatzgraff, 31.
- <sup>37</sup> See Edward Gullick, 4.
- <sup>38</sup> See Gullick, 5.
- <sup>39</sup> See Kissinger. A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22. (Boston: Houghton and Mifflin).



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- <sup>40</sup> Raymond Aron. Peace and War : A Theory of International Relations. (Florida: Robert E. Kreiger Pub. Co. 1981). 99.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid, 100.
- <sup>42</sup> Ibid, 100.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid, 96.
- <sup>44</sup> David Hume, 275.
- <sup>45</sup> Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Politics. (New York : Random House Publications, 1979), 117.
- <sup>46</sup> Martin Wight. " The Balance of Power and International Order " in Alan James ed. The Basis of International Order., (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 92.
- <sup>47</sup> Henry Kissinger. Diplomacy. (New York: Touchstone Center, 1994), 21.
- <sup>48</sup> In spite of the fact that this was the case in many instances in the European system, there are other incidents when states were partitioned among two or more major powers in the system, as was the case of Poland during the eighteenth century and Saxony during the Vienna convention 1815. However, these rare aberrations in the balance of power systems are natural and unavoidable, since no system is infallible.
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid, 96.
- <sup>50</sup> Morgenthau, 189.
- <sup>51</sup> Wight, 99-100.
- <sup>52</sup> See Gullick, 87-88, and Chapters IX and XI.
- <sup>53</sup> Ibid, 228.
- <sup>54</sup> Aron, 100.
- <sup>55</sup> Stephan Walt, 1.
- <sup>56</sup> Gullick, 77-89, differentiates between alliance and coalition, believing that the latter is wider in scope and usually contains the seeds of coercive measures against a common enemy. However, as far as we are concerned, the two terms will be used interchangeably since the main scope of this work deals with the military and strategic aspects of balance of power.
- <sup>57</sup> Luard, i.
- <sup>58</sup> Morton Kaplan. "Some Problems of International System Research", in John Vasquez, ed. Classics of International Relations., (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992), 276-7.
- <sup>59</sup> David Hume, in John Vasquez, 278.
- <sup>60</sup> Gullick, 70-71.
- <sup>61</sup> Gullick, 70.
- <sup>62</sup> Kauppi and Viotti, 53-4.

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<sup>63</sup> Kenneth Waltz. Man the State and War. (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1959), 209-210.

<sup>64</sup> Waltz, 147.

<sup>65</sup> Kissinger. A World Restored, 15.

<sup>66</sup> A.F.K. Organski, World Politics. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1958), 292-3.

<sup>67</sup> Morgenthau, 189.

<sup>68</sup> Kissinger, Diplomacy, 21.



## Endnotes to Chapter Two:

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- <sup>1</sup> For further information regarding the factors influencing the rise of the European system, see Paul Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. (London: Fontana Press, 1988), 39-183.
- <sup>2</sup> Kennedy, 52.
- <sup>3</sup> Will and Ariel Durant. The Story of Civilization: The Age of Reasoning Begins. (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1961), 570-572.
- <sup>4</sup> Rene A. Carrie. The Diplomatic History of Europe since the Congress of Vienna. ( New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973), 5.
- <sup>5</sup> Ali Karaosmanoglu. "Islam and Its Implication for the International System," in M. Heper and R. Israeli ed. Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East. (London: Croom Helm, 1984). 104.
- <sup>6</sup> Best, 28.
- <sup>7</sup> This does not deny the fact that the Church's power was challenged at several instances even before the reformation movements, such as during the period of Phillip the Fair of France and Henry VII of England.
- <sup>8</sup> Kissinger, Diplomacy. 20.
- <sup>9</sup> For Further information, see, Luard, 30-57, also K.J. Holsti. International Politics A Framework of Analysis. (New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs, 1992), 35-42.
- <sup>10</sup> The status of the Ottoman Empire in the European system will be analyzed towards the end of this chapter.
- <sup>11</sup> Aron, 96.
- <sup>12</sup> The Cambridge Modern History. Vol. VI, 157.
- <sup>13</sup> Kissinger. A World Restored, 31.
- <sup>14</sup> Edward Fox. The Emergence of the Modern European World. (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991), 9-10.
- <sup>15</sup> Antonio Obieto et al . Intriduccion a la Historia de Espana (Barcelona: Editorial Teide:, 1987), 426.
- <sup>16</sup> Paul Kennedy, 136.
- <sup>17</sup> Luard, 314.
- <sup>18</sup> H. Peacock. A History of Modern Europe, 1789-1981. (London: Heinemann Educational, 1982), 37
- <sup>19</sup> The New Cambridge Modern History: War and Peace in the age of Upheavals. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980), Vol. IX, 254.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid, 254.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid, 260.
- <sup>22</sup> For further details, see M. Dziewanowski. Alexander I: Russia's Mysterious Tsar. (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1990). 93-112
- <sup>23</sup> Cambridge Modern History, Vol. IX, 267.

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- <sup>24</sup> Gullick, 97.
- <sup>25</sup> Anthony Wood. Europe 1815-1960. (Essex: Longman Group Lmted. 1964), 4.
- <sup>26</sup> Kennedy, 128.
- <sup>27</sup> For a detailed analysis of Austria's initial position in the coalition, see Kissinger, A World Restored, Chapter V, 68-85 and Edward Gullick, 111-118.
- <sup>28</sup> Norman Rich. The Great Power Diplomacy. (New York: Mcgraw Hill Inc., 1952). 2-3.
- <sup>29</sup> Kissinger. A World Restored. 132.
- <sup>30</sup> The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. IX, 641.
- <sup>31</sup> Rich, 4.
- <sup>32</sup> Gullick, 176.
- <sup>33</sup> Paul Hayes. The Nineteenth Century 1814-1880. (New York: St. Martin Press, 1975), 1.
- <sup>34</sup> Robert Ergang. Europe since Waterloo. (Boston: Little Brown and CO. 1956 ), Chapter II.
- <sup>35</sup> Kissinger, A World Restored, 154.
- <sup>36</sup> Carrie, 9.
- <sup>37</sup> Rich. 19.
- <sup>38</sup> Kissinger, 171.
- <sup>39</sup> Kissinger. Diplomacy, 79.
- <sup>40</sup> Peacock, 83.
- <sup>41</sup> See Kissinger. A World Restored, Chapters X and XI.
- <sup>42</sup> Kissinger. Diplomacy, 88.
- <sup>43</sup> J.A.R Marriot. The Eastern Question : A Historical Study in European Diplomacy. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), 45.
- <sup>44</sup> Halil Inalcik. "The Turkish Impact on the Development of Modern Europe" in Kemal Kerpat, ed. The Ottoman State and its Place in World History. ( Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974).
- <sup>45</sup> Marriot, 94.
- <sup>46</sup> Kennedy, 12-14.
- <sup>47</sup> Inalcik, 53.
- <sup>48</sup> The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. VI, 2-4.
- <sup>49</sup> Ference A. Vali. The Turkish Straits and NATO. (California: Hoover Institute Press, 1972), 6.
- <sup>50</sup> William Miller. The Ottoman Empire and its Successors. (London: Frank Cass and Co. 1966), 16.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid, 2.
- <sup>52</sup> Carl Brown. International Politics and the Middle East. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 21.

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- <sup>53</sup> Stanford and Ezel Shaw. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. (Cambridge University Press, 1977), Vol. II, 11-12. See also. Miller, chapter I, and Marriot, Chapter 1.
- <sup>54</sup> Mohammed Reffat. El Bahr El Mutawast wa al Tayarat el Siyasiya. (*The Mediterranean Sea and the Political Currents*). (Cairo : Daar El Maaref), 97.
- <sup>55</sup> Graves, 3.
- <sup>56</sup> For a careful review of the treaties signed by the Porte and the European powers, see Abd El Aziz El Shenawy. The Ottoman Empire: An Islamic Malign State. (Cairo: Anglo Egyptian Book shop, 1992), Vol. I, 195-223.
- <sup>57</sup> Ibid, 199.
- <sup>58</sup> Hayes, 233.
- <sup>59</sup> Ibid, 234.
- <sup>60</sup> M.E. Yapp. The Making of the Modern Middle East. (New York: Longman, 1987), 47.
- <sup>61</sup> Barbara Jelavich. A Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914. (Indiana: Lippincott, 1964), 7.
- <sup>62</sup> D. Mitchell. History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power. (New York: MacMillan Publishing Inc., 1974), 56-63.
- <sup>63</sup> J.C. Hurewitz. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record. (New Jersey Princeton : Van Norstand, 1956). Vol. I 56-7.
- <sup>64</sup> Lord Kinross. The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire. (New York: Morrow Quill, 1977), 405.
- <sup>65</sup> R. Davison. "Russian Skills and Turkish Imbecility: The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered". Slavic Review. 35-3. September 1976. 463-483.
- <sup>66</sup> Ivo Lederer. "Russia and the Balkans". in Ivo Lederer ed. Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspectives. (New Haven Yale Univ. Press, 1962), 418.
- <sup>67</sup> Graves, 87.
- <sup>68</sup> Miller, 10-11.
- <sup>69</sup> Ibid, 13.
- <sup>70</sup> Marriot, 161.
- <sup>71</sup> For a detailed analysis of British interest in The Porte, see Ali Ihasn Bagis. Britain and the Struggle for the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire. (Istanbul: I.S.I.S, 1984)
- <sup>72</sup> F. Ismail. "The Diplomatic Relations of the Ottoman Empire and the Great European Powers from 1806 to 1821" Ph.D. Dissertation (London: University of London, 1975), 76.
- <sup>73</sup> Stanford and Ezel Shaw, 13.
- <sup>74</sup> Miller 42-3.
- <sup>75</sup> Gullick, 15.

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<sup>76</sup> Gullick, 15.



## Endnotes to Chapter Three:

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<sup>1</sup> Mohammed Sabri. *L' Empire Egyptienne de Mohammed Ali. Et le Question d'Oriente*. Chapter 5.

<sup>2</sup> Shafik Ghorbal. *The Beginning of the Egyptian Question and the Rise of Mohammed Ali* (London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd. 1928). Ghorbal argues that the beginning of the Egyptian Question was in 1798, however he does not set an ending for it.

<sup>3</sup> Sinasi Altundag. *Kavalali Mehmet Ali Pasa Isyani: Misir Meselesi 1831-1841. The Revolt of Mehmet Ali from Kavala: The Egyptian Question 1831-1841* (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1945). Altundag contends that the Egyptian Question began in 1831, with the first Egyptian Ottoman War, and ended in 1841.

<sup>4</sup> Barbara Jelavich. *Russia's Balkan Entanglement 1806-1914*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

<sup>5</sup> Abd El Rahman El Djabarti. *Agaib EL Athar fi Eltragem wa El Akhbar. The Wonders of History in the Biographies and Information*. 3 Vol . (Beirut: Daar El Geil), Vol I, 37.

<sup>6</sup> Mohammed Sabry. *Tarikh Misr mn Mhmad Ali ela El Asr El Hadith. Egyptian History from Mohammed Ali to the Modern Era* (Cairo: Madbouly Book shop, 1991), 20.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 440.

<sup>8</sup> F. Lutski . *Tarikh Al Aktar El ARabia El Hadith. The Modern History of the Arab States* ( Beirut: Daar El Farabi, 1985), 38.

<sup>9</sup> Shafik, Ghorbal. *The Beginning of the Egyptian Question and the Rise of Mehmet Ali*. (London: George Routledge and son, 1928), 1.

<sup>10</sup> John Marlowe. *A History of Modern Egypt and the Anglo Egyptian Relations 1800-1953*. (New York: Praetor, 1954), 12.

<sup>11</sup> Rudolf Agstner. "The Habsburgs and Egypt: A Summary 1740-1914", in Rudolf Agstner ed. *Austria and Egypt: Essays on the History of Relations since the Eighteenth Century to 1914*. (Cairo: Austrian Cultural Institute, 1993), 3.

<sup>12</sup> Sergis Yakobson. "Russia and Africa". in Ivo Lederer ed. *Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspectives*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 456.

<sup>13</sup> Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 13 September, 1797 in Ghorbal, 13.

<sup>14</sup> J.M. Thompson. *Napoleon Bonaparte*. (London: Basil Blackwell Ltd. 1988), 92.

<sup>15</sup> Marlowe, 13.

<sup>16</sup> J. C. Herold. *Bonaparte in Egypt*. (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers , 1962), 69.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, Chapter V.

<sup>18</sup> Ghorbal, 114.



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- <sup>19</sup> Mohammed El Badri. "Khamisa Mayo 1805 fi Tarih Misr" *The Fifth of May in Egyptian History*. Al Ahram (May 4 1995).
- <sup>20</sup> W. Browne. Travels in North Africa, Egypt and Syria 1792-1798. (London: 1806), 223.
- <sup>21</sup> Alan Moorehead. The Blue Nile. (Middlesex: Penguin Books Classics, 1962).
- <sup>22</sup> Afaf Marsot. Egypt in the Reign of Mohammed Ali. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984), 2-3, and Moorehead, Chapter III.
- <sup>23</sup> Marsot, 36.
- <sup>24</sup> Al Djabarti, Vol. I.
- <sup>25</sup> Mohammed Sabri. L'Empire Egyptienne sous Mohammed Ali: La Question de l'Orient. (Paris: Librarie Orientaliste, Paul Geunther, 1930), 21.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid, 38.
- <sup>27</sup> El Djabarti, Vol III.
- <sup>28</sup> John Marlowe, 15.
- <sup>29</sup> Marlowe, 25.
- <sup>30</sup> Herold, 71.
- <sup>31</sup> Moorehead, 71.
- <sup>32</sup> Al Djabarti,
- <sup>33</sup> F. Mengin. Histoire sommaire de l'Egypte sous le gouvernement de Mohammed Ali. (Paris: 1839), Vol. 1, 97, Kareem, Thabet. Mohammed Ali. (Cairo: Matbuaat El Maaref), 21.
- <sup>34</sup> Sabry, 20
- <sup>35</sup> Lutski, 54.
- <sup>36</sup> Marlowe claims Mohammed Ali was among the Turkish forces that made an aborted landing in Alexandria in 1799, Marlowe, 59.
- <sup>37</sup> Lutski, 57.
- <sup>38</sup> Thabet, 10.
- <sup>39</sup> M, Sabry. L'Empire Egyptienne Sous Mohammed Ali, 24.
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid, 24.
- <sup>41</sup> Mohammed Sabry. L'Empire Egyptienne sous Mohammed Ali, 27.
- <sup>42</sup> Al Djabarti, Vol. II, 501.
- <sup>43</sup> Ghorbal, 171.
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid, 211.
- <sup>45</sup> Al Djabarti, Vol II , 575.
- <sup>46</sup> Although no historian has accused Mohammed Ali of orchestrating the assassination of Tahir Pasha, some, such as Al Djabarti, believe that Ali triggered the mutiny which ended in Tahir's death.

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<sup>47</sup> Ghorbal, 216.

<sup>48</sup> Marsot, 44-49.

<sup>49</sup> Ghorbal, 212.

<sup>50</sup> His real name according to El Djabarti was not El Gazairly - which meant from Algiers-, but was Ali Pasha El Taraboulsi.

<sup>51</sup> Al Djabarti, Vol II, 620-625.

<sup>52</sup> This is a controversial issue among the historians who wrote about the Mohammed Ali era. While the famous French author Menign, as well as some Egyptian historians, argue that the British planned to assist El Alfy Bey in order to extend their own influence in Egypt, Ghorbal, after carefully reviewing British Foreign Records decided that Alf's visit to London was not of much use because of personal reasons attributed to Alfi. In order to avoid problems with The Porte the British had no plans to assist him. However, as circumstances show, there seemed to be a time correlation between the British plans and El Alf's political moves in Egypt, as became apparent in 1807 during the British campaign over Egypt.

<sup>53</sup> Thabet, 28.

<sup>54</sup> Thabet, 31.

<sup>55</sup> Abd El Rahman, El Refai, Asr Mohammed Ali. *The era of Mohammed Ali* (Cairo: Daar El Maaref, 1982), 28.

<sup>56</sup> El Refai, 32. Though he has quoted this, he does not give any references as to his sources.

<sup>57</sup> It was the general custom of the Porte not to keep a *Vali* for more than a year or two.

<sup>58</sup> Menign, Vol I, 441-3.

<sup>59</sup> El Rafei, 47.

<sup>60</sup> Marlowe, 32.

<sup>61</sup> For more information on the reports of Misset to his government, see Ghorbal, Chapter III.

<sup>62</sup> El Rafei, 51.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid, 68.

<sup>64</sup> For the full text of this treaty, see Appendix I and Chapter IV.

<sup>65</sup> El Rafei, 49.

<sup>66</sup> Ghorbal, 259.

<sup>67</sup> El Rafei, 107 and Thabet, 47-50.

<sup>68</sup> El Rafei, 111.

<sup>69</sup> Thabet, 21.

<sup>70</sup> Marsot, 198.

<sup>71</sup> Sabry, 34.

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- <sup>72</sup> Henry Dodwell. Mohammed Ali the Founder of Modern Egypt. *Arabic Trans.* (Cairo: Maktabet El Adab) 33-4.
- <sup>73</sup> British Archives, Foreign Office, 24, Vol. 4. September 3, 1812.
- <sup>74</sup> Dodwell, 40.
- <sup>75</sup> Drovetti a Paris, 28 April 1810, in Thabet, 54.
- <sup>76</sup> Thabet, 43.
- <sup>77</sup> E.A. Bahr Barra, 1, 23 Rabei Awal, 1223.
- <sup>78</sup> E.A. Bahr Barra, 1, 29 Rabiee Awal, 1224 H.
- <sup>79</sup> E.A. Bahr Barra, 1, 26 Chawal, 1225.
- <sup>80</sup> Ibid, Bahr Barra, 1, Zu AL Qeida, 1225.
- <sup>81</sup> Marsot, 200-1.
- <sup>82</sup> For further information regarding the Wahhabi movement and the rise of the First Saudi state, see Ahmed Shalaby. Al Islam wa al dewal al Islamiya balgezeira el Arabia. *Islam and the Islamic States in the Arabian Peninsula*(Cairo: Maktabet El Nahda El Masria, 1992) Vol. 7, 117-138 , also see, Al Djabarti, Vol, III.
- <sup>83</sup> Shalaby, 144.
- <sup>84</sup> Zaki, 46.
- <sup>85</sup> For a full coverage of the Egyptian campaign in Arabia, and all the events and battles that took place see Zaki, Chapter III, El Rafei, Chapter V.
- <sup>86</sup> Zaki, 85.
- <sup>87</sup> El Refai, 157.
- <sup>88</sup> Sabry, 59.
- <sup>89</sup> Marsot, 101-2.
- <sup>90</sup> Sabry. Tarikh Misir Mn Mhmd Ali Ela El Asr El Hadieth. 40.
- <sup>91</sup> Ibid, 52.
- <sup>92</sup> Ibid, 44. For further information on the full budget analysis between 1820-1839, see the appendixes of El Rafei.
- <sup>93</sup> Lutski. 74.
- <sup>94</sup> Dodwell.. 70-72.
- <sup>95</sup> Mohammed Sabry. L'Empire Egyptien Sous Mohammed Ali et la question d' Orient. 32.
- <sup>96</sup> Abd El Rahman Zaki,. El Tarikh El Harby le Mohamed Ali *The Military History of Mohammed Ali* (Cairo: The Royal Association for Historical Studies, 1950), 58-60.
- <sup>97</sup> Al Djabarti, Vol III, 480.
- <sup>98</sup> Thabet, 87.

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<sup>99</sup> Seves was a member of the Napoleonic army and later traveled to Cairo where he entered the service of Mohammed Ali in 1819. He converted to Islam and became known as Suleiman El Feransawy, and a general in the ranks of the Egyptian army during the Syrian campaign.

<sup>100</sup> Zaki, 169.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid, 169-70. The Alai consisted of 4000 men headed by an officer under the title Amirelai, while the Orta consisted of 800 men headed by an officer with the rank of Bekbashi. .

<sup>102</sup> Thabet, 91.

<sup>103</sup> Zaki, Chapter VII, Thabet, 82-109. Also see: G. Weygand. Histoire Militaire de Mohammed Ali et Ses Fils. (Paris, 1936) and G. Blana. Histoire de la Regeneration d'Egypte. (Paris, 1928). 68-83.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid, 326. For further information on these missions abroad, see also Mohammed Zaki . El Geish El Misry fy Ahd Mohammed Ali. *The Egyptian Army during the era of Mohammed Ali*, (Cairo: 1954) Chapter II and III.

<sup>105</sup> Zaki, 351.

<sup>106</sup> Zaki, 349.

<sup>107</sup> El Refai, 340.

<sup>108</sup> El Rafei, 364.

<sup>109</sup> He was nicknamed so because of his bureaucratic tendency to refuse giving any kind of commitments and always said in Turkish language "bakalim", or "lets see".

<sup>110</sup> There are several inventories by different authors, however we shall focus on the figures of Mengin, Claude Bek and Zaki.

<sup>111</sup> El Rafei, 353-355. His main source is Calude Bek, who remains undoubtedly an important and trustworthy source because of his personal contacts with Mohammed Ali.

<sup>112</sup> F. Mengin, Vol. III, 140.

<sup>113</sup> Zaki, 519-525.

## Endnotes to Chapter IV:

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<sup>1</sup> Kissinger, A World Restored, 290-1.

<sup>2</sup> Harold Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822-1827. (London: Fraser Cass and Co. 1966), 320.

<sup>3</sup> Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglement, 52-4

<sup>4</sup> Kissinger, 286.

<sup>5</sup> Temperly, 335.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, 320-1.

<sup>7</sup> Kissinger, 293.

<sup>8</sup> Marriot, 209.

<sup>9</sup> Temperly, 329.

<sup>10</sup> El Rafei, 192-3.

<sup>11</sup> Sinasi Altundag, Kavalali Mehmet Ali Pasa: Misir Meselesi. {Mohammed Ali of Kavala: The Egyptian Question} (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Sasimevi, 1945), 28.

<sup>12</sup> Sabry, 91.

<sup>13</sup> Marsot, 207.

<sup>14</sup> For a full coverage of the military campaigns in Morea, see Dodwell, 85-99, Zaki, 177-242.

<sup>15</sup> Temperly, 338.

<sup>16</sup> Dodwell, 95.

<sup>17</sup> Marriot, 215.

<sup>18</sup> Zia Nur Aksun, Osmanli Tarihi. (Istanbul : Otuken Nesriyat, 1994), 193.

<sup>19</sup> For the full text of the protocol in French, see Temperly, 586-7.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 348.

<sup>21</sup> Temperly, 348.

<sup>22</sup> Temperly, 400-1.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, and Dodwell, 100.

<sup>24</sup> Ef Refai, 208-214., also, Zaki, 216-223, Sabry, 149.

<sup>25</sup> Temperly, 403.

<sup>26</sup> Kenneth Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England: 1830-1902. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970). 13.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, 33.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, 33.

<sup>29</sup> B. A. F.O. 78/192. From Barker to Aberdeen, 30 August 1830.

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- <sup>30</sup> The Algerian Dey allegedly slapped the French envoy on his face with a fly-swatter. The French considered this action a national insult and the Dey refused their subsequent demand for an official apology and the event became a crisis. For further information, see Thabet-145-159. Dodwell, 110-118
- <sup>31</sup> See Paul Hayes, 238 and Barbara Jelavich. A Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964), 59-61.
- <sup>32</sup> Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 86-7.
- <sup>33</sup> Rich, 70.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid, 71.
- <sup>35</sup> For the full text of the treaty, see Appendix II.
- <sup>36</sup> E. A. From Mohammed Ali to Naguib Pasha, Maiyya Turki. 3/8, 3 Muharrem 1248 H.
- <sup>37</sup> Marsot, 199.
- <sup>38</sup> E. A. From Ibrahim to Mohammed Ali Pasha. 236/119 20 Safar 1274 H.
- <sup>39</sup> El Refai, 217.
- <sup>40</sup> Aksun, 216.
- <sup>41</sup> For the full details of the wars of the Syrian campaign, and the military maneuvers and the consequences, see Zaki, 391-430 and El Rafei, 265-280.
- <sup>42</sup> Alan Cunningham. Eastern Questions in the Nineteenth Century. (Frank Cass, 1991), 65-6.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid, 45.
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid, 42.
- <sup>45</sup> Bourne, 28.
- <sup>46</sup> Altundag, 90.
- <sup>47</sup> Thabet, 168.
- <sup>48</sup> Ibid, 182.
- <sup>49</sup> A.J.P. Taylor. The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918. (London: Penguin Books, 1948). 41
- <sup>50</sup> Altundag, 89.
- <sup>51</sup> M. Sabry, 207.
- <sup>52</sup> Altundag, 95.
- <sup>53</sup> Dodwell, 131.
- <sup>54</sup> E. A. 243 From Ibrahim to Mohammed Ali, 13 Ramadan 1248 H. This was the letter he wrote to his father immediately after the Battle of Konya.
- <sup>55</sup> E. A. 242 From Mohammed Ali to Ibrahim, 9 Gamad Thani, 1248 H.
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid, 242, From Ibrahim to Mohammed Ali Pasha, 5 Shabaan 1248 H.
- <sup>57</sup> Sabry, 207.
- <sup>58</sup> Dodwell, 133-135

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- <sup>59</sup> Charles Webster. The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841. 2 Vol. (London: G Bell and Sons Ltd., 1951). Vol. I, 286.
- <sup>60</sup> For further information on the attempt to convene a Congress on the Egyptian Question, see Webster, 283-299.
- <sup>61</sup> Altundag, 149.
- <sup>62</sup> Sabry, 234.
- <sup>63</sup> This was the pretext with which Mohammed Ali tried to convince the European powers, to hide his real intentions. He thought that by portraying his intentions of forcing his regency over the empire as an attempt for reform, he would obtain European backing, but this was not the case.
- <sup>64</sup> B.A. F.O. 78/226. February 4, 1833..
- <sup>65</sup> Webster, Vol. I, 287.
- <sup>66</sup> A. A. From Prochek Osten to Metternich, 8 April, 1833, in Sabry, 242.
- <sup>67</sup> Marsot, 230.
- <sup>68</sup> Altundag, 134.
- <sup>69</sup> For further details on this point, see Chapter V.
- <sup>70</sup> B. A. F.O. 78/226, 4 February 1833.
- <sup>71</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>72</sup> The New Cambridge Moser History: The Zenith of European Power 1830-1870. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964.) Vol. X, 246-247.
- <sup>73</sup> Ibid, 246.
- <sup>74</sup> For the full text of the treaty and the secret clause, see Appendix II.
- <sup>75</sup> Vernon Puryear. England, Russia and the Straits Question 1844-1856. ( Connecticut: Archon Books, 1965). 14.
- <sup>76</sup> Bourne, 29.
- <sup>77</sup> Webster, 305.
- <sup>78</sup> Ibid, 305.
- <sup>79</sup> Sabry, 260-2
- <sup>80</sup> Webster 306.
- <sup>81</sup> Puryear, 20.
- <sup>82</sup> B. A. F.O. 78/223. September 20, 1833.
- <sup>83</sup> Sabry, 267
- <sup>84</sup> Frank Bailey. British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations 1826-1856. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942), 54.
- <sup>85</sup> Hayes, 239.



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- <sup>86</sup> Puryear, 15.
- <sup>87</sup> For the text of the two secret articles, see Appendix III.
- <sup>88</sup> Puryear, 18.
- <sup>89</sup> Altundag, 141-2.
- <sup>90</sup> B.A. F.O. 78/226. From Palmerston to Campbell, October 2, 1833.
- <sup>91</sup> B.A. F.O. 78/220 From Palmerston to Ponsonby, December 6, 1833.
- <sup>92</sup> Extracts from Palmerston's private letter to his brother William Temple, 6 October 1833, in Bourne, Appendix 6. 221-3.
- <sup>93</sup> B. A. F.O. 78/223. From Ponsonby to Palmerston, November 3, 1833.
- <sup>94</sup> Bailey, 60.
- <sup>95</sup> Webster, Vol. I, 309.
- <sup>96</sup> The New Cambridge Modern History. Vol. X, 253.
- <sup>97</sup> A.L. Macfee. "Opinions of the European Press on the Eastern Question, 1836". in Middle East Studies, Vol., 27, 1, January 1991. 131-139.
- <sup>98</sup> Puryear, 30-31.
- <sup>99</sup> Ibid, 31.
- <sup>100</sup> B. A. F.O. 78/246. From Campbell to Palmerston, September 3, 1834.
- <sup>101</sup> B. A. F.O 78/344. From Palmerston to Campbell, October 10, 1834.
- <sup>102</sup> Dodwell, 169.
- <sup>103</sup> For a good illustration of Ponsonby's role in this diplomatic battle, see Alan Cunningham, Vol. II, Chapter II, "The Sick Man and the British Physician", 72-108.
- <sup>104</sup> Webster, Vol., II, 599.
- <sup>105</sup> Ibid, 597.
- <sup>106</sup> Puryear, 33.
- <sup>107</sup> Bailey, 147-8.
- <sup>108</sup> B. A. F.O. 7/286. From Lamb to Palmerston. July, 3 1838.
- <sup>109</sup> Webster, 596.
- <sup>110</sup> Dodwell, 173.
- <sup>111</sup> Ibid, 187.
- <sup>112</sup> Ibid, 187-8.
- <sup>113</sup> Al Rifaci. 270.
- <sup>114</sup> Zaki, 452-9.
- <sup>115</sup> Thabet, 205.
- <sup>116</sup> Dodwell, 188.

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- <sup>117</sup> Webster, 611.
- <sup>118</sup> Palmerston to Granville. June 8, 1838. in Bourne, 229-31.
- <sup>119</sup> Marsot, 238.
- <sup>120</sup> Sabry, 414.
- <sup>121</sup> Thabet, 207.
- <sup>122</sup> Palmerston to Granville, June 8, 1838, in Bourne 231.
- <sup>123</sup> Sabry, 412-3.
- <sup>124</sup> Palmerston to Granville. July 6 1838. in Bourne, 231.
- <sup>125</sup> Webster, 609.
- <sup>126</sup> B. A. F.O. 7/284 From Lamb to Palmerston. July 3, 1838.
- <sup>127</sup> Webster, 611.
- <sup>128</sup> From Melbourne to Palmerston. June 3 1838. in Webster, Appendix C, 855.
- <sup>129</sup> Webster, 614.
- <sup>130</sup> Archives Francaise. A.E. Correspondence Politique. Egypte Vol. VII, From Couchalet to Mole, August 8, 1838. in Thabet, 208.
- <sup>131</sup> Ibid.

## Endnotes to Chapter Five:

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- <sup>1</sup> Webster, 627.
- <sup>2</sup> Sabry, 405.
- <sup>3</sup> Webster, 634.
- <sup>4</sup> Marsot, 240.
- <sup>5</sup> Altundag, Vol. II.
- <sup>6</sup> Marriot, 237.
- <sup>7</sup> Zaki, 457.
- <sup>8</sup> Aksun, 228.
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid, 229.
- <sup>10</sup> E.A. 257 Abedeen. 17 Rabei Awal 1255.
- <sup>11</sup> Thabet, 301.
- <sup>12</sup> B.A. F.O. 78/354. From Ponsonby to Palmerston, February 2, 1839.
- <sup>13</sup> B.A. 78/356. From Ponsonby to Palmerston. May 20, 1839.
- <sup>14</sup> Marriot, 238.
- <sup>15</sup> El Rafei, 273.
- <sup>16</sup> E.A. 16 El Sham. Rabi Thani, 1225.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid, 16 Elsham, Gamad Awal, 1225.
- <sup>18</sup> Thabet, 210.
- <sup>19</sup> Sabry, 433.
- <sup>20</sup> Sabry, 444.
- <sup>21</sup> For more information on military strategy in the war and casualties statistics, see Zaki, 473-9.
- <sup>22</sup> E.A. 256 Abedeen. From Mohammed Ali to Ibrahim.
- <sup>23</sup> Zaki, 483-4.
- <sup>24</sup> See Aksu, 229, El Rafei, 298-300.
- <sup>25</sup> Zaki, 485.
- <sup>26</sup> Dodwell, 197.
- <sup>27</sup> Sabry, 254.
- <sup>28</sup> Zaki, 486.
- <sup>29</sup> Dodwell, 198.
- <sup>30</sup> Aksun 240.
- <sup>31</sup> From Palmerston to Melbourne, July 5th 1840, in Bourne, 241
- <sup>32</sup> Palmerston to H. Bulwer. September 22, 1838, in Bourne, 249.

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- <sup>33</sup> From a Memorandum forwarded to Palmerston by Lord Privy Seal, 14 March 1840. In Bourne, 237.
- <sup>34</sup> See Chapter IV.
- <sup>35</sup> Jelavich, 90.
- <sup>36</sup> Puryear, 34.
- <sup>37</sup> See the inventory of El Rafei, 391.
- <sup>38</sup> Aksun, 239..
- <sup>39</sup> Dodwell. 180.
- <sup>40</sup> Source, Paul Kennedy, 197.
- <sup>41</sup> Marsot, 240.
- <sup>42</sup> From Clarendon to Palmerston, March 14, 1840. in Bourne, Appendix 22, 238.
- <sup>43</sup> Aksun, 243.
- <sup>44</sup> Sabry, 448.
- <sup>45</sup> Marsot, 240.
- <sup>46</sup> Webster, 626.
- <sup>47</sup> Sabry, 445.
- <sup>48</sup> From Soutl to Barante, August 5th, 1839.
- <sup>49</sup> Sabry, 447.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid, 445.
- <sup>51</sup> Hayes, 242.
- <sup>52</sup> Rich, 72-3..
- <sup>53</sup> Webster, 631.
- <sup>54</sup> Webster, 635.
- <sup>55</sup> Webster, 637.
- <sup>56</sup> From Palmerston to Bulwer. September 1st, 1839. in Bourne, Appendix 20, 234.
- <sup>57</sup> Ibid, 90.
- <sup>58</sup> Puryear, 34.
- <sup>59</sup> Webster. 646.
- <sup>60</sup> Rich, 73.
- <sup>61</sup> From Palmerston to Bulwer. September 24, 1839. in Bourne, appendix 21.236.
- <sup>62</sup> R.A. 1840. Varia. Despeches de Brunnow a Tatistscheff. 9, Decembre 1839.
- <sup>63</sup> Palmerston to Bulwer, September 24, 1839, in Bourne Appendix 21, 236
- <sup>64</sup> R.A. 1840. Varia. Despeches de Brunnow a Tastischeff. [Reservee] 9, Decembre 1839.
- <sup>65</sup> Webster, 659.
- <sup>66</sup> Ibid, 658

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- <sup>67</sup> Hayes, 244.
- <sup>68</sup> A.R. 1840 Varia. Brunnow a Tatischeff, Decembre 9, 1839.
- <sup>69</sup> Webster, 668.
- <sup>70</sup> A.R. Varia 1840. Nesselrode a Tatischeff. 13 Janvier 1840.
- <sup>71</sup> Ibid
- <sup>72</sup> Sabry, 481.
- <sup>73</sup> B.A. F.O. 7/290. From Beauvale to Palmerston, April 11, 1840.
- <sup>74</sup> Ibid, April 12, 1840.
- <sup>75</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>76</sup> R.A. 1840. Varia. Nesselrode a Tatischeff, 3 Mai 1840.
- <sup>77</sup> B.A. F.O. 7/291. From Beauvale to Palmerston. June 6, 1840.
- <sup>78</sup> B.A. F.O. 7/290. From Palmerston to Beauvale, 1840. April 8, 1840.
- <sup>79</sup> A.A. England, 297. From Neuman to Metternich, May 12, 1840.
- <sup>80</sup> Webster, 576
- <sup>81</sup> From Palmerston to Melbourne. July 5, 1840. in Bourne, Appendix 23, 243.
- <sup>82</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>83</sup> Webster, 692.
- <sup>84</sup> For the text of the Treaty, see Appendix 3.
- <sup>85</sup> Webster, 699.
- <sup>86</sup> Thabet, 219.
- <sup>87</sup> E.A.. 17 Elsham. 24 Gamad Thani 1225. (1839).
- <sup>88</sup> B.A. F.O. 78/375. From Campbell to Palmerston. August 16, 1839.
- <sup>89</sup> Bailey, 190.
- <sup>90</sup> Webster, 656.
- <sup>91</sup> Sabry, 474.
- <sup>92</sup> Thabet, 223.
- <sup>93</sup> Thabet, 226.
- <sup>94</sup> B.A. F.O. 7/291. From Palmerston to Beauvale, July 16th, 1840.
- <sup>95</sup> Webster, 695.
- <sup>96</sup> B.A. F.O. 7/291. From Beauvale to Palmerston, August 29, 1840
- <sup>97</sup> B.A. F.O. 7/291. From Beauvale to Palmerston. July 18th, 1840.
- <sup>98</sup> B.A. F.O. 7/291. From Palmerston to Beauvale. September 9th, 1840.
- <sup>99</sup> Webster, 704.
- <sup>100</sup> Webster, 701.

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- <sup>101</sup> Marriot, 243.
- <sup>102</sup> R.A. 1840. Varia, From Nesselrode to Tatischeff. July 27, 1840.
- <sup>103</sup> B.A. F.O. 7/291b. From Palmerston to Beauvau. 23 October 1840.
- <sup>104</sup> Ibid, August, 27 1840.
- <sup>105</sup> Thabet ,229.
- <sup>106</sup> El Rafei, 296.
- <sup>107</sup> Sabry, 502-5
- <sup>108</sup> Thabet, 229.
- <sup>109</sup> Thabet, 236.
- <sup>110</sup> Webster, 709.
- <sup>111</sup> Webster, 721.
- <sup>112</sup> Rene A. Carrie. The Concert of Europe 1815-1914. (New York: Harper and Row Publishers. 1968.142.
- <sup>113</sup> Webster, 725.
- <sup>114</sup> El Rafei, 298.
- <sup>115</sup> Webster, 728.
- <sup>116</sup> For a full account of the details of coastal defenses of Mohammed Ali. see Zaki Chapter 11, 496-508
- <sup>117</sup> El Rafei, 301.
- <sup>118</sup> Thabet, 239.
- <sup>119</sup> A.A. England, 297. From Esterhazy to Metternich. November 30th, 1840.
- <sup>120</sup> A.A. England. 297 Neuman to Metternich, December 12, 1840.
- <sup>121</sup> For the full text of the Treaty. See Appendix IV.
- <sup>122</sup> Cambridge Modern History, Vol. X. 258-9.
- <sup>123</sup> The full text of the letter is in A.A. England 297. From Neuman to Metternich, December 15, 1840.
- <sup>124</sup> A.A. England 297 From Neuman to Metternich, December 12, 1840.
- <sup>125</sup> Carrie, 142-3.
- <sup>126</sup> Webster, 755.
- <sup>127</sup> For the full text of the *ferman*, see Thabet Appendix 3, 311-14.
- <sup>128</sup> El Rafei, 313.
- <sup>129</sup> El Rafei, 318.
- <sup>130</sup> Preamble of the Treaty of July 15 1840.
- <sup>131</sup> Carrie, 142.
- <sup>132</sup> R.A. 1840 Varia. From Nesselrode to Tatischeff. October 4, 1840, also, Nesselrode, to Tatischeff. September 9, and the report by Count of Medem to Nesselrode, September 6, 1840.
- <sup>133</sup> Cambridge Modern History. Vol. X, 258.

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<sup>134</sup> Palmerston to Clarnicarde, January 11, 1841. in Bourne, Appendix, 252.

<sup>135</sup> Webster, 773.

<sup>136</sup> Webster, 773.

<sup>137</sup> Puryear, 37.





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## Endnotes to Conclusion

<sup>1</sup> A.A. 290. From Neuman to Metternich, December 21, 1839.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Mostapha El Feki. Tajdid El Fikr El Kawmy. *Reviving Nationalist Thoughts* (Cairo: Dar El Sherouk, 1994), 21.

<sup>4</sup> A.A. 290 .December 21, 1939.



## Appendices

### Appendix I:

The Convention of Hünkâr İskelesi signed on the 26th of June 1833.<sup>1</sup>

In the Name of God the Almighty.

His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of All Russias and His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottoman Empire; wishing to protect the peace and good understanding already existing between the two Empires, have decided to strengthen the Existing friendship and full confidence, by the establishment of a mutual defence Agreement.

With this aim, both Majesties have selected and nominated the fully authorized plenipotentiaries....[their names ranks and titles]... Have agreed in accordance with their with their vested authority, upon the following articles:-

**Article I** Peace, and Friendship and union will exist forever between His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and His Majesty the Ottoman Emperor and between their Empires as well as between their citizens both in land and in sea. In light of this , and since this agreement has the only goal to protect their Empires against any kind of aggression, Their Majesties have come to the agreement that they would consult each other sincerely on all matters concerning their mutual peace and security, and with the aim, to render a mutual support and strength to each other.

**Article II** The peace Treaty signed on September 2nd, 1829 in Adrianopolis as well as all other treaties which are mentioned in this Peace Treaty and also the Convention signed on

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<sup>1</sup> Unofficial Translation from The Oriental Question in Russian Foreign Policy (St. Petersburg; 1897).

the 14th of April 1830 in St. Petersburg and the agreement reached in Constantinople regarding Greece on the 21st of September 1832, are again fully confirmed by this present defence treaty, as if they have been included word by word in this present Treaty.

**Article III** In line with the principles of mutual defence which form the basis of this present treaty and stimulated with the sincere desire to secure the existence and the full independence of the Sublime Porte ; His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias in case of the appearance of conditions which would oblige the Sublime Porte to demand armed and naval help from Russia again, is promising to provide by land and by sea, all the quantity of army and powers which would be deemed necessary by both parties of this Treaty. Upon this, it has been agreed that in such a case, all land and naval forces which would be requested by the Sublime Porte for her own defences, would be ready at their disposal.

**Article IV** In accordance with the above-mentioned, in case on of the two Empires should ask for help from of the other party, then the expenses for the preparation and readiness of the land and naval forces, would be met by the Empire which demanded the aforementioned help.

**Article V** Although both parties have the sincere intentions that this present Treaty would remain in power till the furthest possible time, but taking into consideration that in case of the change of conditions, there might be the necessity of making some alternations to this Treaty, then it is decided that the validity of this present Treaty would be for eight years starting from the exchange of ratification.

Both sides will start negotiations before the expiration of this Treaty in order to renew it in line with the conditions of that time.

**Article VI** This present Defence Treaty has to be ratified by both the contracting parties and the exchange of ratification would take place in Constantinople after two months or, if possible even earlier.

This act, which contains six articles and which will be certified following the exchange of ratification, we being fully authorized, have signed and put our seals and have exchanged it with the authorized plenipotentiaries of the Sublime Porte.

Made in Constantinople, on the twenty sixth of June, 1833, The Twentieth of Safar, on thousand two hundred and forty nine.

(L.S) Butenev    (L.S) Khusrow

**A Separate and Secret Article:**

In virtue of one of the clauses of article one of the patent treaty of defensive alliance concluded between the Imperial Court of Russia and the Sublime Porte, the two high contracting parties are bound to afford to each other mutually substantial aid, and most efficacious assistance for the safety of their respective dominions. Nevertheless, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, wishing to spare the Sublime Porte the expense and inconvenience, which might be occasioned to it by affording substantial aid, will not

ask for the aid if circumstances should place the Sublime Porte under the obligation of furnishing it, the Sublime Porte instead of the aid which is bound to furnishing it, the Sublime Porte instead of the aid which it is bound to furnish in case of need, according to the principle of reciprocity of the patent treaty, will confine its action in favor of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the Straits of the Dardanelles, that is to say, to not allowing any foreign vessels of war to enter therein under any pretext whatever.

The present separate and secret article will have the same force and value as if it were inserted word for word in the treaty of alliance of this day.



## Appendix II:

### **Separate and Secret Articles of the Convention of Munchengratz**

Article I: Les hautes parties contractantes entendent appliquer spécialement au Pacha d'Égypte les stipulations de l'article II de la convention patente de ce jour, et Elles s'engagent expressément à empêcher, d'un commun accord que soit directement, soit indirectement l'autorité du Pacha d'Égypte ne s'étende sur les provinces Européennes de l'Empire Ottoman.

Article II: En signant la convention patente d'aujourd'hui, les deux Cours Impériales n'ont pas dû exclure de leurs prévisions le cas où, malgré leurs vœux et leurs efforts communs l'ordre actuel des choses en Turquie viendrait à être renversé; et il est de leur intention, que ce cas venant à se réaliser, n'apporte aucun changement au principe d'union pour les affaires d'Orient que la convention patente est destinée à consacrer entre elles. Il est entendu en conséquence, que le cas échéant, les deux Cours Impériales n'agiront que de concert et dans un parfait esprit de solidarité: pour tout ce qui concerne l'établissement du nouvel ordre de choses destiné à remplacer celui qui existe aujourd'hui, est qu'elles veilleront en commun à ce que le changement, survenu dans la situation intérieure de cet Empire, ne puisse porter atteinte, ni à la sûreté de leurs propres États et aux droits que les traités leur assurent respectivement, ni au maintien de l'équilibre Européen.

Les présents articles séparés et secrets ayant la même force et valeur que la convention patente de ce jour, seront échangés à Vienne en même temps que celles de la convention précitée.

### Appendix III

#### **Convention Between the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia on the one Part and the Sublime Porte on the Other for the Pacification of the Levant. Signed At London, July 15, 1840. And Related Instruments.<sup>2</sup>**

In the Name of the Most Merciful God:

His Highness the Sultan having addressed himself to their Majesties the Queen on the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia and the Emperor of all the Russias, to ask their support and assistance in the difficulties in which he finds himself placed by reasons of the hostile proceedings of Mehmet Ali Pasha of Egypt -difficulties which threaten with danger the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the independence of the Sultan's throne- Their said majesties moved by the sincere friendship which subsists between them and the Sultan; animated by the desire of maintaining the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire as a security for the peace of Europe; faithful to the which they contracted by the Collective Note presented to the Porte by their Representatives at Constantinople, on the 27th of July 1839; and desirous, moreover, to prevent the effusion of blood which would be occasioned by a continuance of the hostilities which have recently broken out in Syria between the authorities of the Pasha of Egypt and the Subjects of the Sultan; Their said Majesties and His Highness the Sultan have resolved for the aforesaid purposes, to conclude together a Convention, and they have therefore named as their Plenipotentiaries that is to say, [There follow the list of plenipotentiaries with their

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<sup>2</sup>rinted in Carrie, p.p. 134-136.



titles.] Who having reciprocally communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due forms have agreed upon and signed the following articles:

*Article I.* His highness the Sultan having come to an agreement with their majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the king of Prussia and the Emperor of all the Russias as to the conditions of the arrangement which is the intention of His Highness to grant to Mehmet Ali, conditions which are specified in the separate Act hereunto annexed; Their Majesties engage to act in perfect accord, and to unite their efforts in order to determine the Mehmet Ali to confer to that arrangement; each of the High Contracting Parties reserving to itself to cooperate for that purpose, according to the means of action which each may have at its disposal.

*Article I* If the *Vali* of Egypt should refuse to accept the above-mentioned arrangement which will be communicated to him by the Sultan, with concurrence of Their aforesaid Majesties; Their Majesties engage to take, at the request of the Sultan measures concerted and settled between them, in order to carry that arrangement into effect. In the meanwhile, the Sultan having requested his said allies to unite with him in order to assist him to cut off the communication by sea between Egypt and Syria, and to prevent the transport of troops, horses, arms and warlike stores of all kinds, from the one province to the others; Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, engage to give immediately to that effect, the necessary orders to their naval Commanders in the Mediterranean. Their said

Majesties further engage that the Naval Commanders of their squadrons shall, in accordance to the means at their command, afford in the name of the Alliance, all the support and assistance in their power to those subjects of the Sultan who may manifest their fidelity and allegiance to their Sovereign.

*Article III.* If Mehmet Ali, after having refused to submit to the conditions of the arrangement above mentioned, should direct his land or sea forces against Constantinople, the High Contracting Parties, upon the express demand of the Sultan, addressed to their Representatives at Constantinople, agree in such case, to comply with the requests of that Sovereign, and to provide for the defence of his throne by means of a co-operation agreed upon by mutual consent, for the purpose of the two Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, as well as the Capital of the Ottoman Empire, in security against all aggression.

It is further agreed, that the forces of which in virtue of such concert may be sent as aforesaid, shall there remain so employed as long as their presence shall be required by the Sultan; and when His Highness shall deem their presence no longer necessary, the said forces shall simultaneously withdraw, and shall return to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, respectively.

*Article IV.* It is however, expressly understood that the co-operation mentioned in the preceding Article, and destined to place the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, and the Ottoman Capital, under the temporary safeguard of the High Contracting Parties against all aggression of Mehmet Ali, shall be considered only as a measure of exceptions

adopted at the express demand of the Sultan, and solely for his defence in the single case above mentioned; but it is agreed that such measure shall not derogate in any degree from the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it had in all times been prohibited for ships of war of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus. And the Sultan, on the one hand, hereby declares that, excepting the contingency above mentioned, it is his firm resolution to maintain in future this principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his empire, and so long as the Porte is at peace to admit no foreign ships of war into the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles.; on the other hand Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of Prussia and the Emperor of all the Russias, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform to the above mentioned principle.

*Article V.* The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratification thereof shall be exchanged at London at the expirations of two months, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have signed and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done in London, the fifteenth of Day of July, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and forty.

(L.S) Palmerston. (L.S) Neumann. (L.S) Bulow. (L.S) Brunnow (L.S) Chekieb.

*Separate Act annexed to the Convention concluded at London on the 15th of July, 1840, between the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia on the one Parte and the Sublime Porte on the other .*

His Highness the Sultan intends to grant, and to cause to be notified to Mehmet Ali, the conditions of the arrangement hereinafter detailed:-

1. His Highness promises to grant Mehmet Ali, for himself and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pachalik of Egypt; and His Highness promises, moreover, to grant to Mehmet Ali, for his life, with the title of Pasha of Acre and with command of the fortress of St. John, the administration of the southern parts of Syria, the limits of which shall be determined by the following line of demarcation....

The Sultan, however, in making these efforts, attaches thereto the condition, that Mehmet Ali shall accept them within the space of ten days after the communication thereof shall have been made to him at Alexandria, by an agent of His Highness; and that Mehmet Ali shall, at the same time, place in the hands of that agent, the necessary instructions to the Commander of his sea and land forces, to withdraw immediately from Arabia, and from all the Holy Cities, which are therein situated; from the Island of Candia; from the district of Adana, and from all the other parts of the Ottoman Empire, which are

not comprised within the limits of Egypt, and within those of the Pachalick of Acre, as above defined.

2. Within the space of ten days, fixed as above, Mehmet Ali should not accept the above mentioned arrangement, the Sultan will then withdraw the offer of the life administration of the Pachalick of Acre, but His Highness will still consent to grant to Mehmet Ali for, himself the Pachalick of Egypt, provided such offer be accepted within the space of ten days next following; that is to say, within the period of twenty days, to be reckoned from the day on which the communication shall have been made to him; and provided that in this case also, he places in the hands of the agent of the Sultan the necessary instructions to his military and navel Commanders, to withdraw immediately within the limits and into the ports of the Pachalik of Egypt.

3. The annual tribute to be paid to the Sultan by Mehmet Ali, shall be proportioned to the greater or less amount of territory of which the latter may obtain the administration, according as he accepts the first or second alternative.

4. It is moreover, expressly understood that in the first as in the second alternative, Mehmet Ali( before the expiration of the specified period of ten or twenty days), shall be bound to deliver up the Turkish Fleet with the whole of its crew and equipment, into the hands of the Turkish Agent who shall be charged to receive the same. The Commanders of the Allied Squadrons shall be present at such delivery.

It is understood, that in no case can Mehmet Ali carry to account or deduct from the tribute to be paid to the Sultan, the expenses which he has incurred in the maintenance of the Ottoman Fleet, during any part of the time it shall have remained in the ports of Egypt.

5. All the Treaties, and all the laws of the Ottoman Empire, shall be applicable to Egypt and to the Pachalick of Acre, such as it has been above defined, in the same manner as to every other part of the Ottoman Empire. But the Sultan consents that on condition of the regular payment of the tribute above mentioned, Mehmet Ali and his descendants shall collect, in the name of the Sultan, and as the delegates of His Highness, within the provinces, the administration of which shall be confided to them, the taxes and imposts of their receipt of the aforesaid taxes and imposts, Mehmet Ali and his descendants shall defray all the expenses of the civil and military administration of the said provinces.

6. The military and naval forces which may be maintained by the Pasha of Egypt and Acre, forming part of the forces of the Ottoman Empire, shall always be considered as maintained for the service of the State.

7. If, at the expiration of the period of twenty days after the communication shall have been made to him (according to the stipulation of 2), Mehmet Ali shall not accede to the proposed arrangement, and shall not accept the hereditary Pachalick of Egypt, the Sultan will consider himself at liberty to withdraw that offer, and to follow in consequences such ulterior course as his own interest, and the counsels of his Allies may suggest to him.

8. The Present Separate Act shall have the same force and validity, as if it were inserted, word for word, in the Convention of this day. It shall be ratified and the ratification thereof shall be exchanged at London at the same time as those of the said Convention.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London, the fifteenth of July, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and forty.

(L.S) Palmerston. (L.S) Neumann. (L.S) Bulow. (L.S) Brunnow. (L.S) Chekieb.



Appendix IV:

**Convention between Commodore Napier, commanding Her Britannic Majesty's Naval Forces before Alexandria, on the one part and HE Boughos Joussof Bey, specially authorized by his Highness the Viceroy of Egypt on the other part; signed at Alexandria, the 27th of November, 1840.<sup>3</sup>**

*Article I* Commodore Napier, in his above-mentioned capacity, having brought to the knowledge of his Highness Mehmet Ali, that the Allied Powers had recommended the sublime Porte to reinstate him in the hereditary government of Egypt, and his Highness, seeing in this the communication a favourable occasion for putting an end to the calamities of war, he engages to order his son Ibrahim Pasha to proceed immediately to the evacuation of Syria. His Highness, engages, moreover, to restore the Ottoman fleet, as soon as he shall have received the official notification that the Sublime Porte grants to him the hereditary government of Egypt, which concession is, and remains guaranteed by the Powers.

*Article II* Commodore Napier will place a steamer at the disposal of the Egyptian Government, which will convey to Syria the officer charged by His Highness to carry to the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army the order to evacuate Syria. The Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces, Sir Robert Stopford, will on his side appoint an officer to watch over the execution of this measure.

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<sup>3</sup> Printed in Carrie, 143-4.

**Article III** In consideration of what precedes, Commodore Napier engages to suspend hostilities on the part of British forces against Alexandria, or any other portions of the Egyptian territory. He will at the same time, authorize the free passage of the vessels appointed for the transport of the wounded, the invalids, or of any other portion of the Egyptian Army, which the Government of Egypt might wish to return to that country by sea.

**Article IV** It is well understood that the Egyptian Army shall have the liberty of retiring from Syria with its artillery, arms, horses, ammunition, baggage, and in general everything that constitutes the stores of an army.

Done in duplicate, each Contracting Party to have an original.

(Signed) CH. Napier, Commodore. Boughos Joussof.

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