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THE ROLE OF POLITICAL SALAFISM IN THE FORMATION
OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE TALIBAN REGIME



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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL SALAFISM IN THE FORMATION OF SAUDI ARABIA AND THE TALIBAN REGIME

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This dissertation aims to analyze the role of political Salafism in the formation of early Saudi emirates, today's Saudi Kingdom and the Taliban regime (1996-2001) in Afghanistan. The study examines the formation of the Salafi creed in the Medieval Age first and then focuses on the formation of political Salafism with regard to the political developments and conflicts during the Abbasid era. Then, then it focuses on the rise of political Salafism in the 14th century with ibn Taymiyyah's struggle against the Mongol rule that destroyed the Abbasids. The intellectual heritage of Ahmad ibn Hanbal and ibn Taymiyyah formed the political Salafi tradition in Islamic history. Political Salafism emerged as a result of perception of threats in the Medieval Age. Salafi scholars regarded Shi'ites, Iranians, *Kharijites*, Sufis, *Shu'ubiyyah* and any foreign elements as threats and developed a defensive attitude and rhetoric against them. I argue that political Salafism created three instruments like perception of threat, mobilization, and unification. Ibn Abd al Wahhab

reformulated political Salafism in Arabia in the 18th century through these three instruments. The rise of political Salafism in Arabia led to the formation of the Saudi emirates and Saudi Arabia. Political Salafi ideas later spread to the Indian Muslim society and political Salafism led to a revolt against the British rule in India. The same heritage of political Salafism resulted in the rise of the Taliban in the late 20th century. Political Salafism played a key role in the formation of both Saudi Arabia and the short termed Taliban regime.

Keywords: Political Salafism, ibn Taymiyyah, ibn Abd al Wahhab, Taliban, Saudi Arabia.



ÖZ

SİYASAL SELEFİLİĞİN SUUDİ ARABİSTAN VE TALİBAN’IN OLUŞUMUNDAKİ ROLÜ

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Bu tez erken dönem Suudi emirliklerinin, Suudi Arabistan’ın ve Taliban rejiminin (1996-2001) oluşumunda siyasal Selefiliğin rolünü incelemeyi amaçlamıştır. Bu çalışma ilk olarak Selefi inancın Orta Çağda ortaya çıkışına, daha sonra Abbasi dönemi boyunca yaşanan siyasi gelişmelere ve gerginliklere göre şekillenen siyasal Selefiliğe odaklanmıştır. Çalışmada 14. yüzyılda ibn Teymiye’nin Abbasileri yıkan Moğollara karşı yürüttüğü mücadele ile yükselişe geçen siyasal Selefilik detaylı şekilde incelenmektedir. Ahmed bin Hanbel ve ibn Teymiyye’nin entelektüel mirası İslam tarihinde siyasal Selefi geleneği oluşturmuştur. Siyasal Selefilik Orta Çağda ortaya çıkan çeşitli tehdit algıları sonucunda ortaya çıkmıştır. Selefi âlimler Şiiliği, İranlıları, Haricileri, Sufileri, Şubiye hareketini ve İslam’a sonradan giren bütün yabancı unsurları tehdit olarak görmüş ve onlara karşı savunmacı bir tutum ve söylem geliştirmiştir. Bu tezde siyasal Selefiliğin tehdit algısı, harekete geçirme, ve birleştirme gibi üç araç geliştirdiğini ortaya koyuyorum. Bin Abdülvehhap

18.yüzyılda Arabistan’da bu enstrümanlar vasıtasıyla siyasal Selefilği yeniden formüle etmiştir. Siyasal Selefilğin Arabistan’da yükselişı Suudi emirlikleri ve Suudi Arabistan’ın ortaya çıkışını sağlamıştır. Süreç içinde Hint Müslüman toplumuna da yayılan siyasi Selefilik, İngilizlere karşı Hindistan’da ortaya çıkan ayaklanmaların da başını çekmiştir. Siyasi Selefilğin aynı mirası 20.yüzyılda Taliban’ın ortaya çıkışında da rol oynamıştır. Siyasi Selefilik hem Suudi Arabistan’ın hem de kısa süreli Taliban rejiminin oluşumunda kilit rol oynamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasal Selefilik, ibn Teymiye, ibn Abdülvehhap, Taliban, Suudi Arabistan.



To My Grandfather, Ramazan Gökçekaya

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

English transliteration of Arabic words follows a simplified version of the system used in the Encyclopedia Britannica. I used many Arabic words within the study therefore I tried to reflect the Arabic letters such as ξ and $\dot{\text{z}}$ in the study. I used apostrophe while emphasizing ξ such as Shari'ah or Mu'tazilah. On the other side, I always put -h at the end of the Arabic origin words like Ummah, Madinah, jama'ah, bid'ah, da'wah etc because of the Arabic word $\dot{\text{z}}$. I only made one exception while using the word Shi'a. I did not put -h at the end of the word like Shi'ah because the general scholarly literature uses Shi'a therefore I preferred not to change. I used -i while connecting the Arabic words for example Ikhan-i Muslimin but I used -e while writing the Persian words for example Hezb-e Islami or Jami'at-e Islami. I also just used -t at the end of Persian words such as Jami'at-e Islami, Jama'at-e Islami parties.

I used "al" that means "the" in English. For example al Salaf al Salih, Abd al Aziz, Abd al Wahhab. This definite article -al is generally used in front of the family names or private names such as Hafez al Assad, Anwar al Sadat etc. But, I broke the rule in some commonly used words such as Abdullah or Hezbollah. I wrote them as it is commonly written in general literature.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organization

OIC: Organization of Islamic Conference

MWL: Muslim World League

WAMY: World Assembly of Muslim Youth

NGO: Non-governmental organization

GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council

PDPA: People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

NWFP: North West Frontier Province

UNOCAL: Union Oil Company of California

JUH: Jami'at Ulama-e Hind

JUI: Jami'at Ulama-e Islam

JUP: Jami'at-e Ulama-e Pakistan

UN: United Nations

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNHRC: United Nations Human Rights Council

ARAMCO: Saudi Arabian Oil Company

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study analyzes the role of Salafism as a political tool in the formation and rise of Saudi Arabia and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Salafi creed has a long historical process and development period, which dates back to the Medieval Ages. It also gained a political form during the long periods, and was applied by especially Sunni Arabs as a tool against their enemies. The formation of political Salafism occurred particularly during the Mongolian invasion in the Abbasid Caliphate although the first origins had also been observed in the early era of the Abbasids in the 9th century. Sunni Arabs' perception of threat during the historical process helped political Salafism reshape and take its current form. Perception of threat became intertwined with Salafi teachings during its development period and after a while, became an instrument of Salafism in the formation of the Saudi states.

The first driving force behind the formation of Salafi creed and then its transformation to political Salafism happened as a result of the development of Sunni Arabs' perception of threat. Political Salafism then helped Arab society, which was in a tribal and anarchic form in Central Arabia (Najd region), and established authority and rule in the 19th century. Political Salafism under the conditions of Central Arabia in the second half of the 18th century led to the unification and centralization of the Central Arabian society through its unifying effect. The Saudi clan applied political Salafism firstly to unify the dispersed tribes, which were in strife with each other in Central Arabia, Najd, and even to unify the urbanites and Bedouin nomads there.¹ The unification of the dispersed tribes in Central Arabia

¹ David Dean Commins, *The Wahhabi mission and Saudi Arabia*, (London : I.B. Tauris, 2006), p.80 ; Khalid S. al-Dakhil, "Wahhabism as an Ideology of State Formation" in *Religion and politics in Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism and the state*, ed. Mohammed Ayoob and Hasan Kosebalaban ,(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009).p.27

under political Salafism through mobilization brought centralization, security, securitization of commerce, communication, postal services and end of banditry in the desert. The Saudi clan, which embraced political Salafism and conducted a policy of expanding political Salafism in the Peninsula, managed to construct its rule and united the Peninsula under a single banner.

After a century, the Pashtun student militants in the Northern Pakistan embraced political Salafism through the Saudi backed expansion in the Deobandi religious movement's madrasahs. The Taliban movement unified the Pashtun tribes and the dispersed mujahedeen factions, which were in chaos and fighting with each other. Taliban student militants who were affiliated with Salafism conducted the similar practice as the Salafi fighters of the Saudi clan had done in Central Arabia. They managed to get the support of the Pashtun majority in Afghanistan and established their rule over ninety percent of Afghanistan.² The most important linkage between the Saudi states and the Taliban regime was that the Saudis had exported their political Salafism to the madrasahs where the Taliban was born, and financed the Taliban movement for its rise in Afghanistan.

This dissertation develops around the research question “what role did political Salafism play in the formation of Saudi Arabia and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan”. Salafism as a religious-political opinion was one of the basic tools that were influential in the formation of Saudi Arabia in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, followed by the Taliban regime by the end of the 20th century. Political Salafism is an outcome, which was derived from the Salafi creed that is one of the most prominent faiths in Islam throughout the Islamic history. I argue that political Salafism utilized three main instruments as ‘the perception of threats against internal and external factors’, ‘unification’, and ‘mobilization’, during the formation of the Saudi States and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In the study, unification is defined as the unity among the dispersed tribes and autonomous cities due to the strong influence of political Salafism in both cases of Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. Political Salafism enforced the strong ‘*tawhid*’ understanding and Shari’ah rule over

² Brian Glyn Williams, Afghanistan after the Soviets: From jihad to tribalism, *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 25, no. 5-6, (2014) : 949; Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *Afghanistan: a cultural and political history*, (Princeton, N.J : Princeton University Press, 2010),pp.262-268.

the dispersed social groups, and enabled them to unite under a single rule. *Tawhid* means the oneness of God and refusal of other mediators. Mobilization is defined as enthusiasm provided by political Salafism to make jihad and expand the rule. The war as a form of jihad, political Salafism's teachings and threat perceptions are the basic tools for mobilization. The perception of threat is also interpreted as the threat lists that political Salafism defined. The detailed information about the threats is reviewed in Chapter 2. Perception of the threat instrument also led to the rise of political Salafism in the Medieval Age. Therefore, perception of threat can be regarded as the most important instrument of political Salafism. These threats can be either foreign or domestic ones. Political Salafism develops a defensive perception against the listed threats. The listed threats are determined based on religious sources.

In the study, the history of the development of Salafi creed and then political Salafism is reviewed at first. Chapter 3 analyzes the role of political Salafism known as Wahhabism in the rise of Saudi emirates and Saudi Arabia. Chapter 4 analyzes the role of Deobandism, which is a South Asian form of political Salafism and played a key role in the rise of the Taliban movement and rule in Afghanistan. The study tries to keep unity in terms of concepts and terms; therefore throughout the thesis the term 'political Salafism' is applied rather than different terms like Wahhabism or Deobandism. For that reason, the reader can understand Wahhabism while facing the term of political Salafism in Chapter 3, and should understand Deobandism while facing the term of political Salafism in Chapter 4.

Salafism is a crucial phenomenon in our current time in the world because the terror organizations like al Qaeda, the Islamic State, Nusra Front, Boko Haram etc. all derived their political and religious *raison d'être*s from political Salafism. But political Salafism is not just a basic argument of jihadist groups for fighting and creating chaos. On the contrary political Salafism involved in forming authority, rule, stability and unity in a defined territory in some cases. This study focuses on these cases, Saudi Arabia and the Taliban, by analyzing the unifying role of political Salafism in terms of construction of authority and centrality. Hence, the study tries to highlight a different aspect of political Salafism contrary to the popular belief in

which Salafism is identified as the source of global radical terrorism. The role of political Salafism as a religious argument is peculiar to Islamic culture and the East. The regional circumstances led to the rise of political Salafism rather than Western influence. As a specific argument of the East, political Salafism plays a key role in its formations of indigenous rules. In the study, the role of political Salafism is reviewed in both the rise of Saudi Arabia and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The two entities, the Saudi rule and the Taliban regime are analyzed comparatively as the first time in an academic study with a focus on the role of political Salafism in the formation of both. My main argument explaining the role of political Salafism as contributing to the political order is based on its utilization of three instruments: perception of threat, mobilization and unification. In the following part, I will discuss these three elements.

1.1. Perception of Threat in Political Salafism

The perception of threat in political Salafism is the most crucial instrument as it determines the list of enemies for the emerging rule and allows for the use of the two other tools: unification and mobilization. In other words, the perception of threat has been central in mobilizing the dispersed Arab society and enabling them to act in an organized form. The Salafi political movement reshaped the perception of threat by defining a list of enemies for mobilizing the Arab tribes in Central Arabia. In most general terms, the targets were the ones who did not embrace political Salafism. According to political Salafis, the ones who did not convert into Salafism were blamed for polytheism, and a Salafi jihad was launched against them. In this list, the Shi'ites were the most dangerous for the Salafis. Because of the Salafi hatred against the Shi'a, the Salafi raiders stormed al Hasa region in the east of Arabia and the Shi'ite holy cities of Iraq many times. The Ottomans, the representative of Hanafi Islam in Hejaz, and the Sharifian dynasty in Hejaz, who were of Shafi'i Islam, were other enemies in their list. The political Salafis tried to label them as polytheists too. In the political Salafi rhetoric, Sufism is classified as *bid'ah*, in other words

innovation, in Islam. The orders, tariqas or any other rational Islamic schools were regarded as idolatry in political Salafi rhetoric.

Salafism, in brief, has the claim to protect Islam from other groups, communities and nations. They are against the notion of a common Islamic civilization that was created by Arabs together with other nations. They took a defensive attitude to preserve their own defined Islam against the other, non-Arab communities.

The modern state is historically a product of a coercive force and a collective reaction against foreign elements.³ Political Salafism with its perception of threat created this coercion for the tribes, which embraced the new movement in the Peninsula, against the other tribes to suppress and then take them under its own authority. Firstly, the Salafi affiliated tribes under the leadership of the Saudi clan formed their own authority and legitimacy. The basic principle to accept the new authority was to embrace Salafism. Then, these tribes were mobilized as a military force with the religious enthusiasm of expanding political Salafism among other tribes. The war under the name of political Salafi jihad was launched against other tribes.

The Saudi rule was established first in Central Arabia through expansionist wars. The state authority was established through war rather than a peaceful, voluntary and purely romantic will of the people. People were organized by the Saudi-Salafi allied rule to fight against the challenges, problems, and enemies.⁴ The merge between coercion and ideological propaganda led to success in wars and expansion of the state authority within a given territory. In the course of the Saudi rule, the people were moved by the religious enthusiasm in Arabia. Political Salafis destroyed the old tribal system, which caused anarchy and instability in Central Arabia, and replaced it with their disciplined system. According to Altrussen, the Bolsheviks in Russia seized the power from the Tsar and the governing bourgeoisie

³ T.S.Tsonchev, "State and Ideology: Undisciplined Notes on Niebuhr and Voegelin from a Christian Realist Perspective", *The Montréal Review*, August 2014.

⁴ T.S.Tsonchev, "State and Ideology: Undisciplined Notes on Niebuhr and Voegelin from a Christian Realist Perspective", *The Montréal Review*, August 2014.

then involved in destroying the existing state apparatus. The new ideologized proletariat state led by the Bolsheviks replaced the bourgeois state with their proletariat state apparatus in a slow proceed at first then carried out a radical transformation by the destruction of the former state apparatus. The Bolsheviks defined the bourgeois state apparatus as repressive and defined its functions as ‘by violence’. But they defined their new system as the alliance of proletariat and small peasantry, and alleged that their ideological state apparatus function by ideology rather than violence and force. ⁵

The Salafis did the same by changing the former chaotic and feudal system in Arabia, in which each tribe and city were free in their acts with no ruling authority, with a Salafi unifying order. Political Salafis could not reconstruct a Salafi state apparatus during the first and second emirates because they were similar to the tribal confederal structures. It was indeed the third emirate, which later turned to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, who managed to construct a Salafi state. Arabian Peninsula before the expansion of the Saudi rule was filled with the autonomies of different Sufi tariqas, orders, Shi’ite communities and other orthodox Sunni *madhabs*. There was no a single authority providing unity in the chaotic society. In sum, it was full of anarchy therefore the expansion of Saudi authority happened through the destruction of the former anarchic structure rather than a destruction of a different authority as it occurred in the experiences of the modern nation states. At that point, the geographical features of the Arabian Peninsula were also a determining factor.

Political Salafism helped the Saudi clan to construct a state authority by converting the followers of other religious schools and orders into their unifying belief system. The tribes, who did not obey the Saudi rule and embrace political Salafism, were blamed for polytheism and were believed that Salafi armed jihad was to be launched on them. Therefore, the former sovereigns of the desert had to accept the Salafi call in order to avoid polytheist and idolatry labels.⁶

⁵ Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster, (Monthly Review Press: 1971).

⁶ Mehmet Zeki İşcan, *Selefilik: İslami Köktencilik’in Tarihi Temelleri*, (İstanbul: Kitapevi, 2006), p.37.

The Taliban applied the same method. The Taliban derived its *raison d'être* from Deobandi religious movement. It was an Indian originated movement and included strong Salafi tones within itself. Deobandi teachings defined enemies for the Taliban just like the political Salafi scholars did for Arabs. The perception of threat targeted Shi'ite Hazaras, Uzbek and Tajiks, Iranians, Hindu, Nooristanis and Sikh small minorities, in brief other ethnic, religious and sectarian minorities in Afghanistan. The perception of threat for the Taliban changed in few times. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the US gave support to the regime therefore the perception of threat and listed enemies were defined according to these supporters' interests in the beginning. For instance, the regional rivals of Saudi Arabia such as Iran was defined as the enemy of the Taliban. In a later period, al Qaeda, a global terror organization, involved in the Taliban's politics and caused the Taliban to redefine its perception of threat. The Saudis and the Americans were redefined as enemies in terms of their perception of threat.

1.2. Mobilization Instrument in Political Salafism

A religious opinion of theocratic rulers did not just provide sufficient legitimizing norms for the rulers' absolute authority but also define specific roles that the rulers and people within the state have to play. The constructed authority deriving from its legitimacy from religious opinion has both political and religious characteristics.⁷

Both the Saudi rules and the Taliban regime took their legitimacy from a religious opinion rather than a rational consent. In the experiences of Saudis and Taliban, this legitimizing opinion applied coercion to found authority over other people or social groups. After these groups converted into the new legitimizing and unifying religious opinion, they began to comprehend the threats in a way as the sovereigns and scholars framed. After a while, they were mobilized with the influence of the religious opinion and launched struggles in terms of their perception of threat. This led to the mobilization for Salafi jihad becoming a voluntary action.

⁷ Brian Nelson, *The Making of the Modern State: A Theoretical Evolution*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 12.

Such action was expressed as a reaction to foreign elements, which were defined by the legitimate religious opinion, political Salafism.

The mobilization effect in political Salafism derives from the teachings of Muhammad ibn Ab Al Wahhab, the founding scholar of political Salafism in Arabia. The ideas and teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab can be classified under three topics: the principle of strong monotheism (*tawhid*) understanding, the struggle against the innovations (*bid'ah*) and the principle of commanding the good and forbidding the evil (*Amr b'il Maruf w Nahy an al Munkar*). His teachings emanates from medieval Islamic Salafi scholars like Ahmad ibn Hanbal and ibn Taymiyyah. His ideas were based on directly applying the literal meaning of the Qur'an with no interpretation. Those who refuse to obey the principles of political Salafism should be fought and be eliminated. The punishment principle of political Salafism made it more severe and violent than the medieval version of political Salafism.⁸ The tribes that were affiliated with the Salafi movement and were mobilized by its principles and teachings expanded the rule of the Saudi clan, the banner carrier of political Salafism, throughout Arabia.

Political Salafism unified the Central Arabian tribes under one authority and against the defined enemies, which were defined by the Salafi scholars. The list of enemies covered first those in Central Arabia then outside. The perception of threat defined by political Salafism combined with the religious enthusiasm for making jihad provided a conducive mobilization environment. The Ikhwan movement, which was established by ibn Saud in the early 20th century, was the result of this mobilization. The Ikhwan soldiers were recruited from the Bedouin tribes. Special *hijars* (villages or camps) were built to prepare Bedouin tribes for war. Within these *hijars*, the Ikhwan soldiers dealt with agricultural affairs, got Salafi based education and prepared for their jihad wars against the enemies.

Political Salafism mobilized the Najdi society such enthusiastically that the invasions against the Saudi territories did not cease political Salafism and did not uproot the Saudi influence within the region. The Saudis returned back to power with

⁸ Mehmet Zeki İşcan, *op.cit.*,p.34-36 ; Zekeriya Kurşun, *op.cit.*,pp. 19-22.

the help of Central Arabians who were influenced by political Salafism.⁹ The religious and political contract made by Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab provided such a mobilization effect for the Central Arabian peoples that the destruction of the authority twice did not break off the ties of Central Arabian tribes and urban people with the Saudi clan.

The political Salafi mobilization created a strong motivation for fighting for the Saudi clan. They spread high level of violence during their Salafi jihad wars in neighboring regions. The mobilization of tribes under political Salafism resulted in jihad wars. These jihads were conceptualized as the struggle against the so-called polytheists, *shirk*, and cleansing of these so-called polytheists from the Peninsula. The political Salafis used the polytheist term for the Sunnis who embraced the Sufi tariqas, Shi'a creed, and other orthodox Sha'fis and Hanafis. For the mobilization of the Central Arabian people, the doctrine of *Amr b'il Maruf w Nahy an al Munkar* was redefined by Salafi scholars the spread of political Salafism. Salafi jihad and Salafi based advices for converting others were structured on this popular doctrine. Salafi armed jihad was devised as the basic tool of this doctrine thanks to the alliance of Saudi clan and Salafi scholars. Violence and harsh warfare tactics were applied frequently. For ibn Abd al Wahhab, the founding scholar of the movement, the sword was an indispensable element for the doctrine.¹⁰ At the beginning coercion was the basic method for the mobilization of the urbanites and tribes in Central Arabia and in the eastern part of the Peninsula. Many tribes and even pirate towns along the Gulf coast had to accept the dominance of the Salafi Saudi rule. The Saudis implemented this systematic coercion in the name of expanding Islamic call. They regarded themselves as the revivalist of the Salaf tradition.

The mobilization power of political Salafism in Arabia can be explained with ibn Khaldoun's *asabiyyah* theory the best. Ibn Khaldoun emphasized that the state emerges as an outcome of human cooperation rather than of anarchy. He pointed out that social solidarity; group consciousness and social cohesion are based on reason

⁹ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*, (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.25 and 36.

¹⁰Zekeriya Kurşun, *op.cit.*,p. 63; Ahmet Vehbi Ecer, *op.cit.*, p. 54, 70-71.

for the emergence of a state like authority. He named his approach '*asabiyyah*'.¹¹ Political Salafism broke the group selfishness and isolation of each tribe or urban groups in Arabia. It created group consciousness and cooperation among tribes by forcing them to unite under the unification call deriving from the political-religious movement of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab. Ibn Abd al Wahhab's call was a religious movement and a new challenge against the traditional Arabian society filled with orthodox beliefs, Shi'ism and Sufism. This new movement tried to oust the components of the former traditional society by blaming them for innovation, *bid'ah* within Islam.

Ibn Khaldoun also emphasized the three basic models of regimes and forms of leadership: a leadership or regime based on natural social solidarity, a leadership based on reason and natural law and a leadership based on divine law. In addition, he added that the leadership based on divine law is more superior because of its aim to maintain a balance between both life dimensions and envisaging a divine community called *ummah*.¹² When ibn Khaldoun's theory about the distinction between rational regimes and regime of divine law was taken into consideration, the regimes constructed on the divine Islamic law occur as very different from the rational regimes. For instance, while power and capacity is the main arguments of realism and neo-realism in the rational regimes, social cohesion and social unity towards a moral good is the main driving force in the divine regimes based on Islamic theories.¹³ Salafi Saudi rules are typical models of divine law based regimes as well as the Taliban regime.. The divine law, Shari'ah, which envisages a conception of order for a believer community and enthusiasm for making jihad also functions as a mobilizing force for that community. The mobilization functions as creating a social cohesion, solidarity, group consciousness and social unity for a particular society. Political Salafism in Arabia applied by the Saudi clan played a role in mobilizing the

¹¹ Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, "International relations theory and the Islamic worldview" in Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 190-191.

¹² Ibid, pp. 190-191.

¹³ Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, "International relations theory and the Islamic worldview" in Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and beyond Asia, ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, (New York: Routledge, 2010), p.191.

Arabian people, the dispersed tribes and urbanites in Central Arabia. The Taliban movement in Afghanistan applied the same method. Political Salafism first united and then mobilized the Pashtun Durrani and Ghilzai tribes, madrasah students and former dispersed mujahedeens under a single banner against their own defined threats.¹⁴ In both examples, the role of Salafi implementation of divine law, Shari'ah, are the main driving force behind the construction of their strong authorities and regimes in their own regions. According to Mehmet Zeki İşcan, the *asabiyyah* understanding of Wahhabis (political Salafis in Arabia) were so puritan that they thought everything and everyone including the Muslims outside the political Salafism's control area were to be plundered and be seized.¹⁵ Political Salafism interpreted the Qur'an and Shari'ah in a direct fashion and tried to implement the orders without analyzing them in a reasoning method. They had puritan views and applied violent ways to convert other groups who did not embrace their beliefs.

1.3. Unification Instrument in Political Salafism

For their state formations, European monarchs constructed centralization by gathering legal and administrative power in one single hand. European monarchs broke the influence of feudal lords and religious class by struggling against them, destroying their castles and limiting their power.¹⁶ But the tool of the European monarchs in providing centralization was artillery rather than a religious creed. The components of a centralized state are territoriality, sovereignty, government, coercive law, state consciousness and ideology of legitimization.¹⁷ The Saudi emirates, especially the First Emirate and the Second Emirate, fulfilled some of these

¹⁴ Olivier Roy, *Afganistan'da Direnis ve İslam*, trans. Kadri Mustafa Oragli,(İstanbul: Yonelis Yayinlari, 1990),p. 333; Mehmet Ali Buyukkara, "Dışlamacı Müslümanlığın Orta Asya'daki İzdüşümleri: Selefilik Hareketi ve Taliban", *Orta Asya'da İslam*, 3rd, ed. Mehmet Savaş Kafkasyalı, (Ankara-Türkistan: Ahmet Yesevi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2012), p.1304.

¹⁵ Zekeriya Kurşun, *op.cit.*,p.37

¹⁶ Brian Nelson, *op.cit.*,p. 1.

¹⁷ Ibid, 8.

components, so did the Taliban. But sovereignty is also related to diplomatic representation. As Rolf Schwarz points out, security, welfare and representation are the core functions of a modern state.¹⁸ The third Saudi Emirate succeeded in receiving international recognition in 1927 by their agreement with Britain.¹⁹ The Taliban's representation was limited before the US led intervention. Both the Taliban and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as official states are different from modern states based on rational consent. While the modern state is formed by rational consent, the earliest state models take their legitimacy from a legitimizing ideology based on God's verses.²⁰ The Saudis and the Taliban are similar in terms of their divine law based state practices with their religion and sectarian based legitimization.

Unification is an important condition for modern states as well. Political Salafism provided unification for the Saudi rule. This instrument is an important one along with the other two (perception of threat and mobilization) because unification means the unity of authority by abandoning anarchy. Salafi creed necessitates a strong monotheism (*tawhid*) understanding for the Central Arabian society. Political Salafism rejects other religious groups' or sectarian communities' *tawhid* understanding. In fact, all Muslims believe in *tawhid* but other *madhabs* such as Hanafi, Maliki and Sha'fi schools and Sufi orders give importance to intercession (*shafa'ah*). Intercession formulates a mediating role for the prophet, (or a religious sheikh or scholar) between the believer and God for believer's faith. Political Salafism rejects any mediating role and regards it as a sin and reason for idolatry. Salafis saw their own method of believing as the 'true' Islam.²¹ In addition, political Salafis claimed that intercession was against the *tawhid* principle. Therefore, political Salafis launched a holy jihad against others who did not embrace their way of thinking about *tawhid*. They tried to convert other people in Arabia into their own

¹⁸ Rolf Schwarz, *War and state building in the Middle East*, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012),p.15

¹⁹ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *Saudi Arabia*, (London: Ernest Benn, 1995), pp.299-300, 309; Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *İhvan'dan Cüheyman'a: Suudi Arabistan ve Vehhabilik*, (Istanbul: Rağbet Yayınları, 2016),p. 111; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *Arabia*, (London: Ernest Benn, 1930), p.341.

²⁰ Brian Nelson, *op.cit.*,p.8.

²¹ Zekeriya Kurşun, *op.cit.*,p.70.

creed. The unification of tribal society under a single creed, Salafism, provided unity and centralization under a single rule. There is a strong linkage between a creed and a political movement. The unity in faith is interconnected with the unity in authority.²² The tribes and urbanites gathered under a single authority by embracing Salafi creed.

Centralization of political power in a single authority over a defined territory is the main condition for state formation. Centralization also provides the monopoly of the means of coercion. According to Max Weber, the state is the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.²³ In Charles Tilly's article, he emphasized four elements for the formation of state: war making, state making, protection and extraction. War making is defined as eliminating or neutralizing their rivals outside their territories, state making is eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside their territories, protection is eliminating and neutralizing the enemies of their clients, extraction is acquiring the means of carrying out the other three activities (war making, state making and protection). The centralization of Saudi rule in Central Arabia proceeded with war making against other tribes, which did not embrace political Salafism. In other terms, the wars expanded the Salafi rule in Arabia. War making and state making proceeded together in the Saudi rule. They tried to expand political Salafism by using violence and Salafi call towards those, who did not yet embrace their creed inside and outside their territories. But the war and coercion were the basic methods. Unification in Central Arabia was followed by security. A tribe who did not give allegiance to the Saudi rule and did not embrace the Salafi creed was not allowed to act freely in the desert. Anarchic structure of the Najd desert left its place to the authority of the Saudis after a while and this situation brought centralization.

Unification was the main step for centralization. Human history is a historical process of development from small social groups to broader ones through growing

²² Khalid S. al-Dakhil, *op.cit.*,p.27-28.

²³ Rolf Schwarz, *op.cit.*,p. 6 ; Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime" in *Bringing the State Back*, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985),p. 172.

cooperation.²⁴ In the experiences of the Saudis and the Taliban, A religious movement contributed to this growing cooperation with its strong unification effect.

Indeed, tribal societies in Central Arabia had difficulty in establishing a political authority for centuries because of the anarchic condition of tribes. The tribes alleged superiority to each other and could not gather under one's single authority. The Bedouins were nomadic peoples and were difficult to get under the control of a single power. Under desert circumstances, they became good at warfare and were known for their courage. Political Salafism provided them with a strong religious feeling. This feeling enabled them to be zealot fighters for the cause of the Saudis. In addition, the Bedouins were willing to take side with the strong. For enabling centralization among Bedouin tribes, special headquarters and villages were built by the Saudi rule. They were gathered in disciplined and central places.²⁵ Thanks to the strong Saudi authority they became part of the central rule.

I have discussed above the three instruments of political Salafism that are crucial in establishing political authority. They are indeed intertwined with each other. In the Salafi rhetoric, the perception of threat defined a list of targeted internal and external enemies. The religious teachings of Salafism defined these enemies as the enemy of the "true" Islam, and necessitated their elimination. Then the perception of threat merged with religious enthusiasm and resulted in the mobilization of social groups against these threats. This mobilization required gathering under a single authority through unification along with, launching of war, Salafi armed jihad. In other words, the defined perception of threats and mobilization brought unification through the principles of Salafi doctrine. The same method was applied by the Deobandi religious order in Northern Pakistan and united the Pashtun tribes, former mujahedeens and madrasah students, and mobilized them under the Salafi jihad understanding against the targeted enemies.

²⁴ T.S.Tsonchev, "State and Ideology: Undisciplined Notes on Niebuhr and Voegelin from a Christian Realist Perspective", *The Montréal Review*, August 2014.

²⁵ Mehmet Zeki Işcan, *op.cit.*, p. 36 ; Zekeriya Kurşun, *op.cit.*, p.136.

1.4. The Review of the Literature

There is a growing literature on political Salafism and its role in the formation of Saudi Arabia. This literature is mainly related to the political history of Wahhabi expansion in Arabia. While the role of political salafism in the formation of Saudi Arabia is analyzed in the literature, the same role is not examined for other cases. Through studying the role of political Salafism in the formation of the Taliban in a comparative framework with that of Saudi Arabia, this dissertation aims to create a more general theoretical framework on political salafism and political order.

Salafism is a religious form. The basic pillars of this religious form consists of *tawhid*, struggle against *bid'ahs*, *Amr b'il Maruf w Nahy an al Munkar* (commanding the good and forbidding the evil). The last pillar symbolizes mobilization under the name of jihad. It is derived from Surah Al-i Imran in the Qur'an. The religious motivation originates from this principle of commanding the good and forbidding the evil. Salafism acts as a protector of Sunni faith against other religious ideas and schools in Islam. For example, Sufism, Mu'tazilah and their innovative religious schools formed a threat for Sunni faith. When these threats spilled over to the political area, Salafism also took a political shape and began growing in political sphere. Then, political Salafism began listing new enemies and began struggling with them such as Shi'ites, Iranians, and Christian minorities, Nusayris, Alawites etc. In the political realm, the protection and preservation of Sunni authority represented by the Sunni caliphs became a priority. It is the sovereignty of Sunni rule that is aimed to be protected and maintained. Political Salafis act as a vanguard of this aim in history.

Throughout this dissertation, political Salafism is treated as both an ideology under social and political conditions, and a tool for formation of political authority and rule in Arabia and Afghanistan. Political ideologies are modern constructs emerged during the French Revolution. Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) points out that ideology purposes to construct a method of correct ideas, which could be scientifically identified in order for the betterment of the society. On the other hand, some of the literature argue that ideology is not just scientific and consisted of true ideas, instead can be a group of false and dangerous. However the focus here is the

emergence of ideology; in other words how these ideas emerge from a particular set of social and economic conditions.²⁶ Ideology is also identified as an integrated set of beliefs, which explain us how the system is organized, which goals are determined, and which methods, ways, and channels are applied for reaching these goals. Each ideology has a different system, goals and methods for reaching these goals.²⁷ For example, liberal ideology consists of a set of ideas such as liberty, justice and equality. In addition, while Marx and Engels thought that ideology simply represents the ideas of the ruling class in society; for Lenin, ideology also represents the most effective weapon for the class struggle. In brief, ideology changes according to the political movements.²⁸

According to Louis Althusser, ideology plays the role of cement, which keeps human societies together. Within the political and economic life, some institutions such as churches, trade unions and families form that social and political life, and these institutions constituted ideological state apparatuses.²⁹ Althusser emphasized two different state apparatuses. According to him, the state is a repressive apparatus, in other words a tool for repression over society. The ruling class against the working class uses this tool. He then asserts two types of state apparatus: repressive state apparatus and ideological state apparatuses. Here, while the repression is the only tool for the repressive state apparatuses, the ideological state apparatuses mostly function through ideology rather than repression.³⁰

Karl Marx identified the capitalist society with a distinction between a base and a superstructure. The base refers to the means of production and the superstructure refers to ideologies. However, these ideologies are not just identified

²⁶ Roger Eatwell and Anthony Wright (ed.), *Contemporary Political Ideologies*, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), pp.3-5.

²⁷ William Connolly, *Political Science & Ideology*, (London: Routledge, 1967), p. 2

²⁸ Roger Eatwell, *op.cit.*p. 7

²⁹ Ibid, p. 6

³⁰ Louis Althusser, " Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster, (Monthly Review Press: 1971).

with –isms instead with anything which tries to defend the ruling class.³¹ The literature also focuses on the gray areas between ideology and religion. If a thought is concerned with the divine matters, it is termed as religious. If a certain religion plays a role in society in political affairs such as political Salafism has done, the religion fulfills the area of ideology.³² Althusser points out those primitive societies in which classes do not exist follow the first form of ideology, in other words, religion. In brief, religions took place of ideologies in primitive and ancient societies.³³ In addition, ideology as the product of collective beliefs and thoughts has a force of stabilization and radical change in societies. The religion as a belief, which fulfills the gray area of ideology, can play a stabilizing role and act as a radical force.³⁴

According to T.S.Tsonchev, the modern state is an outcome of coercive force or collective reaction against the “foreign”, an outcome of war rather than a positive will of man, romantic national emancipation or peaceful, voluntary action. The state is born within conflicts in order to respond to foreign challenges. The peoples and societies organize in order to defeat these so-called challenges coming from foreign enemies and then aim to preserve order, peace and status-quo.³⁵ In the study, perception of threats produced by political Salafism has the same aim. Political Salafism produces threat perception in order to struggle against the “foreign” and overcome the external challenges for bringing order, peace and authority in the regions in which the ideology expands. It tries to construct authority and bring order through coercive force, in other words, wars under the name of jihad. Hence, political Salafi ideology involves in state formation after a series of wars in its region.

³¹ Roger Eatwell, *op.cit.*, p.3

³² Ibid, p. 8

³³ Jacques Ranciere, “On the Theory of Ideology–Althusser’s Politics”, In Terry Eagleton (ed.), *Ideology*, (Longman : 1994), p. 3.

³⁴ Roger Eatwell, *op.cit.*, p. 10

³⁵ T.S.Tsonchev, “State and Ideology: Undisciplined Notes on Niebuhr and Voegelin from a Christian Realist Perspective”, *The Montréal Review*, August 2014.

This study treats political Salafism as a political ideology rather than just a belief system. Salafism originally emerged as a religious creed but later started to play a role in the field of politics through three major instruments as the perception of threats, mobilization of jihad understanding and unification of *tawhid* principle. This dissertation seek to analyze how political Salafis' state apparatuses in Arabia and Afghanistan function through the ideology of political Salafism In the following part, I will review the literature on political Salafism.

The scholarly literature generally focuses on the role of Wahhabism in the rise of the Saudi emirates and establishment of Saudi Arabia. Especially early British and French scholars, explorers and officials reviewed the birth of Wahhabism and saw Wahhabism as a new religion or a reform movement, which helped the Saudis, unite the tribes and expand their rule in Arabian Peninsula.³⁶ David Commins argued that ibn Abd al Wahhab reformulated political Salafism in Arabia by traveling in the region and making observations over Shi'ites. In other words, the rise of Shi'ite influence in the Gulf inspired ibn Abd al Wahhab to formulate a teaching based on perception of threat against the Shi'ites and Iranians in the region. Commins also argued that ibn Abd Al Wahhab spent his time in Madinah and discussed with Sufi preachers thus helped him develop his ideas.³⁷

In the scholarly literature, Natana DeLong Bas pointed out that jihad defined by ibn Abd al Wahhab was *fard kifayah*. *Fard kifayah* was collective duty upon each believer who lived in a specific territory rather than each believer in the world. *Fard kifayah* symbolizes regional jihad rather than global jihad. ³⁸ DeLong Bas emphasized the characteristic of ibn Abd al Wahhab's jihad understanding as a regional issue rather than calling all Muslims to make jihad as al Qaeda does at a global level. Thus, the regional jihad led by the Saudis helped them to expand their rule and install a strong authority in Arabia.

³⁶ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *Arabia*, (London: Ernest Benn, 1930),pp. 20 and 55 ; Ahmet Vehbi Ecer, *Tarihite Vehhabi Hareketleri ve Etkileri*, (Ankara: ASAM Yayinlari, 2001), p. 56-57.

³⁷ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, p.24 ; Natana J DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: from revival and reform to global Jihad*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004),p.20.

³⁸ Natana J DeLong-Bas, *op.cit.*,pp.201-203.

Madawi Al-Rasheed and David Commins asserted that political Salafism in Arabia is an urban movement and an installer of settlement culture. Political Salafism provided tax collection, urbanizing and taming the Bedouins. Khalid al Dakhil argued that *tawhid* understanding of political Salafism also symbolized unity in administration and authority upon social groups in Central Arabia.³⁹ The existing literature emphasizes that political Salafism penetrated into the Arabian society so strong that foreign invaders in the history could not uproot it. Political Salafism remained alive and brought the Saudi rule back each time. Zekeriya Kurşun also asserted that political Salafism rose in Arabia's difficult desert conditions because of its appropriateness for the Bedouins' life conditions. Bedouins had to be strong and violent for maintaining their lives in the desert. Political Salafism provided a discipline for the Bedouins and systematized their tradition of violence and plunder against the ones who did not embrace the principles of political Salafism. The organized Bedouin tribes gained a more profitable order with the political Salafi discipline.⁴⁰

The literature also asserts that political Salafism emerged from the internal conditions of Arabia rather than a revivalist movement like the ones in the 19th century Egypt. Islamic revivalist movements, especially in Egypt, developed as a result of the European influence and aimed to struggle against the European imperialism therefore carried an anti-colonial character.⁴¹ On the contrary, political Salafism in Arabia was indigenous and endemic and did not have any anti-colonial struggle aims. Simply, it aimed to expand the Salafi Saudi rule and unification. On the other side, Madawi al Rasheed pointed out to the anti-colonial struggle of the Saudis through political Salafism's mobilization against the British naval power in the Gulf. Al Rasheed attributed the establishment of the Saudi rule in Eastern Arabia

³⁹ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, p.80 ; Khalid S. al-Dakhil, *op.cit.*, p.27; Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*, (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.7-8 and 36.

⁴⁰ Zekeriya Kurşun, *Necid ve Ahsa'da Osmanlı Hâkimiyeti*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1998), pp.60-61.

⁴¹ Natana J DeLong-Bas, *op.cit.*, pp.7-8.

to their jihad culture against the foreigners in the Gulf.⁴² The literature points out the Ikhwan movement in Arabia. Ibn Saud applied the method of collecting all tribes in special headquarters and made them settle as an example of urbanization. The Bedouin tribes were tamed and reorganized for settlement and were prepared for the wars.⁴³

For the case of the Taliban, the literature on the Deobandi madrasahs are very important. The literature focuses on the Deobandi movement's jihad against the British in the 19th century and the Caliphate Movement led by the Deobandis in India against the British in the early 20th century. The political Salafis in India applied jihad for struggling against the foreigners, local Hindus and Shi'ites. The literature also points out the conflict between political Salafis in India under the Deobandi party, *Jama'at-e Ulama-e Islam*, and Shi'ites in Pakistan for years. In the literature, the political Salafi based political parties in Pakistan supported the rise of Taliban and enforced the Pakistani government to back the Taliban regime.⁴⁴

In the literature, the rise of the Taliban is interpreted with the Pashtun solidarity in Afghanistan. The Pashtun tribes got in alliance with each other under the vanguard of the Taliban movement. The literature emphasizes the importance of the tribal structure in Afghanistan for the stability of the country. The Afghan monarchies avoided intervening in tribes and religious circles unlike the communist

⁴² Madawi Al-Rasheed, *Kingdom without borders: Saudi political, religious and media frontiers*, (London: Hurst & Company, 2008), p.173.

⁴³ Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *İhvan'dan Cüheyman'a: Suudi Arabistan ve Vehhabilik*, (Istanbul: Rağbet Yayınları, 2016), p. 38; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *Saudi Arabia*, (London: Ernest Benn, 1995), pp.261-262 and 308.

⁴⁴ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: militant Islam, oil and fundamentalism in Central Asia*, (New Haven, CT : Yale University Press, 2000), p.88; Ashok K Behuria, "Sects Within Sect: The Case of Deobandi-Barelvi Encounter in Pakistan", *Strategic Analysis* 32, no: 1, (2008): p.60-65 ; Brannon Ingram, "Sufis, Scholars and Scapegoats: Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (d. 1905) and the Deobandi Critique of Sufism", *The Muslim World* 99, no. 3 (2009): 492 ; Sana Haroon, "The Rise of Deobandi Islam in the North-West Frontier Province and its Implications in Colonial India and Pakistan", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 18, no:1 (2008) : 49-51.

regime did. The Taliban regime also respected the autonomous position of Pashtun tribes as the former monarchies did.⁴⁵

Jihad is always a traditional method for the Afghans to rescue themselves from the foreign occupation. The literature refers to the Anglo Afghan wars and Afghan emirs' proclamation of jihad against the foreigners thus mobilized the Pashtun tribes for a common goal. The literature also points out the British support in the establishment of strong Pashtun authority in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Similarly, the Saudi and Pakistan support for the expansion of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan also takes place in the literature commonly.⁴⁶

As the current literature on political Salafism mainly focuses on its role in the formation of Saudi Arabia, it's limited in terms of its generalizability. By also examining the case of Taliban in a comparative framework with Saudi Arabia, this dissertation aims to overcome this limitation and to create a more general theoretical framework on political Salafism and political order.

1.5. The Research Methodology

This study aims to emphasize the role of Salafism in the formation of two important real actors in the world. Saudi Arabia is an official state in world politics while the Taliban rule was a state-like actor from 1996 to 2001 for a short time. Although the Taliban could not get full recognition in the international system, it was close to replacing the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Today, the UN does not list the

⁴⁵ Brian Glyn Williams , *op.cit.*, p. 949 ; Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, pp. 181, 191-192,214,226; Gilles Dorronsoro, *Revolution Unending Afghanistan*, 1979 to the Present, (London: Hurst & Company, 2005), p.26; M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani , " In Introduction: Marxist Revolution and Islamic Resistance in Afghanistan "in *Revolutions & rebellions in Afghanistan: anthropological perspectives*, ed. M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield, (Berkeley: University of California, 1984) , p 31-32.

⁴⁶ Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p . 110, 181-182, 191-192; M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani , *op.cit.*, in note 45, p.31; Brian Glyn Williams, *op.cit.*, pp.931-932 ; M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, "War, Factionalism, and the State in Afghanistan", *American Anthropologist* 104, no.3(2002): 717-720; Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p.160; Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p.245; Citha D. Maass, The Afghanistan conflict: external involvement, *Central Asian Survey* 18, no.1 (1999): pp.70-73.

Afghan Taliban in the terrorist organizations list. The US Secretary of State has never listed the Taliban in its terrorist organizations list even during the intervention in Afghanistan.⁴⁷ This study first aims to discuss the political aspect of Salafism and interprets its historical development as a political tool against the enemies of Sunni rule particularly during the Abbasid era. Salafism is reviewed under two different headings as a creed and political view. Then the study analyzes the three main instruments of political Salafism: Perception of threat, mobilization and unification. The dissertation analyzes two case studies: the Saudi emirates and Saudi Arabia, Taliban in Afghanistan under the three main instruments; the perception of threat, mobilization and unification.

Political Salafism was reformulated under the circumstances of Central Arabia in the 18th century and is influential in the formation of the Saudi States through the instruments of perception of threat, mobilization and unification. The same situation is valid in the formation of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The Salafism based Deobandi madrasahs applied the same three instruments of Salafism. In both the case of the Saudi emirates and the case of the Taliban, the case studies were analyzed under each instrument. Then, the study tries to draw a frame displaying how these three instruments of political Salafism involved in the formation of the Saudi rules and the Taliban regime.

The study focuses on Salafism as a religious creed and as a political ideology in a historical process. The study applies qualitative approach and interpretive method in order to explain the role of a politicized religious creed in the formation of Saudi Arabia and the Taliban regime. The historical cases and political historical arguments are the main elements in order to support the main aim of the study. In addition, the two case studies present a detailed historical analysis of political Salafism's role in the formation of Saudi Arabia and the Taliban.

Mostly, the study applies qualitative research method for analyzing the data. The study is based on a review of a large number of academic books and articles.

⁴⁷ "Foreign Terrorist Organizations", *US Department of State*; "Security Council votes to separate Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions lists", *UN News*, 17 June 2011; Ioannis Kosnikas, Call the Taliban What they are- Terrorists, *Foreign Policy*, 19 February 2015.

Besides it largely relies on data derived from primary and secondary sources such as a large literature of scholarly books, journals, statements, writings, memoirs, TV discussion programs and video archives. The research mostly includes books related to the history of Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban, religion, sects, jurisprudence, faith, and the Arab history in the Medieval Age, the history of Persians and modern Iran, the theology of Salafism, the history of Wahhabis, the history of Saudi Arabia, and the history of Shi'a. The study also utilizes academic journals and articles related to the same topics. Newspapers, magazines and old videotapes were reviewed in detail to catch detailed information about the research. The study benefits from the documentaries about specific historical cases. Youtube is an excellent source for finding information through historical scenes. The old short cut videos uploaded by "Associated Press" archive account on Youtube provided strong detail and significant visuals for the research. The study benefits from TV discussion programs during the early 2000s. For example, Charlie Rose's program about the Taliban, which invited Rahmatullah Hashemi, the Taliban envoy to the US for interpreting the Taliban regime's legitimacy and seeking international recognition, was contributory. Many videos, which the study benefits, maybe applied for the first time in an analysis about the Taliban politics. It took a long time for the study to review the archive of the Associated Press related to the Taliban's cases and interpretations of Taliban officials. The visual interpretations and their discourse contributed much to the written arguments about the cases.

For the fieldwork of my dissertation, I stayed in Beirut, Lebanon for seven months. I observed different sects, both Sunnis and Shi'ites in Lebanon, for comprehending the perceptions of Arabs belonging to different sects towards each other. The seven months that I spent in a multi-sectarian, multi-religious and multicultural society provided me with a wealthy perspective about both Sunni and Shi'ite Arab society. I also visited Afghanistan in June 2011 and spent two weeks there. I had an opportunity to visit Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh, Sheberghan and Andhkoy cities, during which I observed the society, talk with the representatives of different ethnic and sectarian groups.. My journey to Afghanistan contributed to my general perception about Afghanistan. Both fieldworks helped me to conduct

participant observation; talk to many locals, observe their ideas, feelings, and attitudes and discuss with them on local subjects.

1.6. The Plan of the Dissertation

In Chapter 1 (Introduction), the study draws a theoretical framework and emphasizes the main instruments of political Salafism. The Chapter introduces the instruments of mobilization, unification and perception of threat deriving from political Salafism, and reviews their roles in the formation of authority and rule in the cases of the Taliban, the Saudi emirates and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Chapter also discusses the role of political Salafism through its instruments in the replacement of old social structures, radical transformation of societies and the legitimization of rule. The Chapter reviews the differences between the formation of modern nation states and divine law based political structures on the basis of social cohesion and unity.

In Chapter 2, the study aims to review the formation of Salafism as a creed in the Medieval Age in the Sunni Arab Abbasid dynasty. It firstly explains how Salafism emerged and what its main arguments are. Ahmad ibn Hanbal is introduced in the chapter as the founder of Salafism as a creed. Ibn Hanbal's struggle was introduced in order to define what Salafism aimed in its early years. Then, the study focuses on the transformation of Salafism as a creed into a political argument for Sunni defensive Arabs against their redefined enemies. The study introduces ibn Taymiyyah as a religious and political figure, and his struggle against the invading powers. The study discusses the politicization of Salafism reaching its peak during ibn Taymiyyah's struggle and his call for jihad against the redefined enemies for Sunni Islam and Sunni rule. In brief, the Chapter presents the birth and development of Salafism and its shift to political movement in a historical process. The study reviews the main historical cases in order to establish the infrastructure behind the formation of the Saudi rule and the Taliban regime.

In Chapter 3, the study aims to review the rise of the early Saudi rule in Central Arabia with the help of political Salafism's mobilizing and unifying force.

The rise of the Saudi rule was reviewed according to the three instruments of political Salafism; unification, mobilization and perception of threats. The study reviews how these three instruments of political Salafism involved in the formation of the Saudi authority in Arabia in a historical process. There are three Saudi emirates in the history of the Saudis. The current Saudi state, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, is the continuation of the third one. In this Chapter, the three emirates are analyzed, as the early emirates are important to analyze how political Salafism played a role in the formation of the Saudi authority in terms of unification.

In Chapter 4, the study focuses solely on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and draws a more theoretical framework for analyzing the factors sustaining the Saudi Kingdom in the 20th century. The Chapter discusses the issue on the basis of the two instruments of political salafism perception of threats and mobilization.. The Chapter discusses how the perception of internal and external threats against the Saudi Kingdom enabled forming policies providing the mobilization of the state to struggle against such threats. Since the unification was already completed in the previous Saudi emirates, which the study reviews in Chapter 2, there is no more discussion of this instrument in this chapter. The perception of threats such as Nasserism, Revolutionary Iran's expansion, the radical Shi'ite groups in the Gulf, the Ka'bah siege and Camp David Treaty will be discussed in this chapter. The mobilization is defined in the framework of the Palestinian question, the collaboration with the Muslim Brotherhood, Afghan jihad and the Saudi support for the Afghan jihad in the 1980s.

In Chapter 5, the study analyzes the process of the formation of Deobandism as a form of political Salafism. The Afghan mujahedeen and the rise of the Taliban movement will also be analyzed according to the three instruments of political Salafism. In addition, the Chapter reviews other additional factors in the formation of the Taliban rule such as the jihad tradition, Pashtun historical legacy, and Saudi and Pakistani roles along with political Salafism's role. There are a variety of reasons contributing to the emergence Deobandism yet political Salafism is the main driving force. The Chapter is divided into four sub-topics such as perception of threat, mobilization, unification and the fall of the Taliban regime. The perception of threats

that will be analyzed as follows: political Salafism's interpretation of threats, Shi'ites in Pakistan, the Communist Afghan regime, tribal and ethnic fragmentation, Iranian influence in the region. Mobilization will be analyzed as the jihad tradition in Afghan politics, jihad against the British in the past as a Pashtun historical legacy, mujahedeen's Afghan jihad and the role of the Saudis and Pakistan in the rise of the Taliban. In the unification part the unity of Pashtun social groups like tribes and communist regime's former staff under the unifying Taliban regime with the help of political Salafism, the centralized rule of the Taliban and the Saudi and Pakistani involvement will be discussed. In the last part, the fall of the Taliban regime along with Taliban's search for diplomatic recognition will be examined. The Taliban's decision to protect Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda is defined as the changes in the perception of threat. While the Taliban had the same perception of threats with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the beginning and cooperated with the two; it later changed its perception of threat and sided with al Qaeda. The change in perception of threat brought the US intervention. The chapter also reviews the negotiations of the Taliban with the West in Qatar. The chapter focuses on the change of perception of threat again as the Taliban tries to put distance with al Qaeda in recent years.

In the conclusion chapter, the study will comparatively discuss both cases on the basis of the main instruments of the political Salafism. It will examine the main findings of this research including how political Salafism developed in a historical process and played a major role in the formation of the early Saudi emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Taliban regime in a comparative perspective. Conclusion chapter will also discuss the weakness and strengths of this dissertation.

CHAPTER 2

SALAFISM

The formation and development of Salafism as a creed is important to understand the infrastructure and background of the development of political Salafism. Salafism as a creed developed with the aim of defending Sunni Islam against other foreign religious interpretations. Sunni Arab scholars who pursued a traditionalist way of defending the Sunnah (practices of the Prophet) and Hadith (oral reports of the Prophet) against the rationalist interpretations in Islam are representatives of the Salafi School. Ahmad ibn Hanbal was the founding scholar of the Salafi School. The Salafi School as a creed sometimes displays defensive and sometimes offensive attitude against other rational and Sufi schools in Islam but the main aim was to preserve the originality of the religion against the innovations, *bid'ah*. In the process of development of both Salafism as a creed and political Salafism, the perception of internal and external threats played a crucial role. Mu'tazilah, Sufism and *Shu'ubiyyah* formed the main threats for the Arab defined Sunni Islam in the early Abbasid time. Salafism developed as a response to these threats to preserve originality of Islam.

2.1. Ahmad ibn Hanbal and the Origins of Salafism as a Creed

Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (780-855) is a crucial figure in the history of *madhabs*. He was the pupil of Imam Shafi'i, the founder of the Shafi'ite School of the four main *madhabs* of Sunni Islam. His students established the fourth Sunni school, Hanbalism. The main common feature of Hanbali and Shafi'i *madhabs* is the necessity of learning Arab language to understand the Qur'an literally.⁴⁸ On the other hand, Salafism is stronger in its focus on the enforcement of Arab traditionalism,

⁴⁸ Albert Hourani, *A history of the Arab peoples*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), p. 68.

reliance on the practice of *al Salaf al Salih* (the Companions of the Prophet) and trustful Hadith. Here, the tradition means the statements of companions of the Prophet and their early successors, because they are regarded as the righteous practicers of what the Prophet taught.⁴⁹ In addition, Sunnah is what the Prophet and his companions practiced in their daily life for the sake of Islam, and the people who followed the interpretations and practices of the companions of the Prophet are called Sunni. Sunnism also represents the state authority and majority in Islam. The Umayyads and Abbasids were both Sunni Arab dynasties, which represented the state and authority in comparison to the Shi'ites, who were in minority and opposition. As a Sunni scholar, ibn Hanbal highlighted the principle to check the practices and speeches of the Prophet, his Companions and early followers regarding a particular case in order to rule out whether it is acceptable for Sunnah. According to ibn Hanbal, Sunnah is based on reliance on hadith and practices of the Prophet and his friends. Ibn Hanbal saw the complex theology unnecessary for the religion. Hence, according to him, rational reasoning is unnecessary and is to be avoided to interpret Islam. For him, rational reasoning in interpretation of Islam can harm the essence of the religion.⁵⁰

Mu'tazilah creed formulated by Iranian scholars was strictly in opposition to Salafism because Mu'tazilah rejected the oral reports of the Prophet (Hadith).⁵¹ For ibn Hanbal, only the Salaf (Companions of the Prophet) and their successors can interpret hadith the best. However, Mu'tazilah rejected the hadith, the practice and interpretations of the pious ancestors (*al Salaf al Salih*). Ibn Hanbal asserts that the Salaf can only interpret the Qur'an, not the interpretations and reasoning of the new generation scholars. Therefore, it is appropriate to check how the Salaf interpreted a certain issue. Mu'tazilah was against this by supporting reasoning in the interpretation of the Qur'an. In the Salafi point of view, being against what the Salaf taught and interpreted meant being directly against the early founders of the *ummah*. During the early Islamic rule in Madinah, the Umayyads and Abbasids stood over the

⁴⁹ Christopher Melchert, *Ahmad ibn Hanbal*, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006), pp. 99-100.

⁵⁰ Ibid, pp.62-65.

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 10

shoulders of the early Arab successors and holy companions of the Prophet. The rejection of the authority of *al Salaf al Salih* means rejection of Arabs' superiority. Arab superiority was under attack by both Mu'tazilah's philosophical and rationalist approach and by the Persian based *Shu'ubiyyah* movement. *Shu'ubiyyah* claimed that Arabs had no superiority upon non-Arab Muslims, the Arabic language was not necessary for Islam, and the Islamic civilization was not a product of just Bedouin Arabs; instead, it was commonly built by other communities. *Shu'ubiyyah*'s most important feature was its strict emphasis on the Persian literature, language, old customs and traditions.⁵² Ahmad ibn Hanbal delineated *Shu'ubiyyah* as a dangerous and heretic innovation for Islam. Imam ibn Hanbal did not welcome any new teachings, doctrines or innovations, which target the Arab interpretation of Islam. For this reason, he always claimed the source of religion is the Qur'an literally and Hadith based on interpretations of the Prophet's companions and early successors of these companions, in other words the Salaf. Ibn Hanbal even played a role of defending and securing the superior position of Arabness by connecting it with the Sunni law against each innovation such as Mu'tazilah, Persian influence, the Shi'a, the *Khawarij*. In this sense, he even condemned the Hanafis, the followers of Abu Hanifah by blaming them as the adherents of rational opinion and rational interpretations rather than the literal Qur'an only.⁵³

2.2. Perception of Threats

2.2.1. Mu'tazilah Creed

Mu'tazilah creed was based on rationalist interpretations of the religion. The Salafi scholars alleged that Iranian scholars and philosophers formulated Mu'tazilah. In the Salafi perspective, Iranians tried to bring their own interpretations and reasoning into Islam and harmed Islam's originality. Salafi scholars reacted to Mu'tazilah and put it in their threat list because of its linkage to Iranian philosophers.

⁵² Christopher Melchert, *op.cit.*, p. 92 ; Monika Gronke, *Iran: a short history: from Islamization to the present*, trans. Steven Rendall, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2008), p.26.

⁵³ Christopher Melchert, *op.cit.*, pp. 89-92.

The identity clash between Arabs and non-Arabs was not only about acquiring the ruling power or having more influence on governance, but also about being influential in religious and cultural life. By the 10th century, the Abbasid Caliphate had sponsored the Salafi oriented Hanbali *madhab* in Baghdad and Damascus in order to prevent the influence of Shi'a.⁵⁴ The most important feature of Salafism was its political opposition against the Shi'a as it viewed Shi'a as a heresy and more threatening to Islam than Christianity and Judaism.⁵⁵ Salafism was sponsored in main cities when the Abbasids struggled against the Shi'a. On the other side, a counter approach, known as Mu'tazilah, emerged in the 8th century.⁵⁶ After a while, the Abbasid Caliphs, Ma'mun and Mu'tasim sponsored it due to political reasons; and it was strengthened against the traditionalist Salafi scholars. Iranian originated scholar Wasil ibn Ata (700-748), who was the pupil of Iranian Sufi Hasan al Basri, founded Mu'talizah. Wasil ibn Ata's first teaching was "*al manzila bayn al manzilatayn*" which means the intermediate position for a person, who committed a major sin, after death. Mu'tazilah claims that a person who commits a major sin is neither a true believer nor an infidel; instead he has a position between the two, and called as *fasik*. The second most important teaching of Mu'tazilah was "free will and free act" or *Qadariyah* in Arabic meaning that God does not intervene in human's fate. This principle was related to one of the five basic doctrines of Mu'tazilah, the divine justice doctrine. This doctrine means that God is so wise and just that He cannot do an evil act arbitrarily to human beings.⁵⁷

The doctrines of Mu'tazilah was written in the book "Kitab al Usul al Khamsah" by Qadi Abd al Jabbar, who was born around 935 to an Iranian family near Hamadhan. The book envisages the five basic doctrines: *tawhid* (divine unity of God), *al adl* (divine justice), *al wa'd wal wa'id* (the promise and threat), *al Amr bi'l*

⁵⁴ Amira K Bennison, *The great caliphs: the golden age of the 'Abbasid Empire*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009),p. 53.

⁵⁵ Amira K Bennison, *op.cit.*,p.54.

⁵⁶ Albert Hourani, *op.cit.*, in note 48,p.63.

⁵⁷ Richard C. Martin and Mark R. Woodward, *Defenders of reason in Islam: Mu'tazilism from medieval school to modern symbol*, (Oxford, England: Oneworld, 1997),p.184.

Maruf wa'l Nahy an al Munkar (commanding the good and prohibiting evil).⁵⁸ But, the most important claim of Mu'tazilah, which also caused a great debate within Salafis, was that the Qur'an was created by God, like human beings. While the Salafis insisted that the Qur'an was not created instead was equal to God the Creator and eternal entity, the Mu'tazilites asserted that it was created and it has logical and rational meanings as well as literal meanings.⁵⁹ In addition, they used the reasoning method to interpret the external and inner meanings of the Qur'an.⁶⁰ The Salafis opposed applying reasoning for interpreting the Qur'an, as they believed that reasoning damaged the literal and pure meaning of the Qur'an. Abu'l Hudhail al-Allaf, a Persian descent Mu'tazilah theologian, was a prominent figure with his use of Greek philosophy and reasoning method in religious affairs.⁶¹ In brief, Mu'tazilah was quite associated with rationalism, reasoning and the Greek philosophy in interpretation of revelation.⁶² In this process, the Abbasid Caliphs became strongly effective for Mu'tazilah to gain so much power. Although Mu'tazilah developed with the contribution of translations of the Greek and Persian manuscripts and sources, and indirectly affected the interpretation of the Qur'an via reasoning, the main reason of the rise of Mu'tazilah was clearly political on behalf of Iranians in Islam.

The Iranian aristocracy backed Caliph Ma'mun and then Caliph Mu'tasim whose mother was of Persian descent against the Arab elite who supported Caliph al Amin. Ma'mun and Mu'tasim sponsored this school during their caliphates in order to lessen the influence of the Arab elite, associated with the Salafi creed. The Salafis had held sway over Caliph al Mansur's Baghdad due to their puritanical position against the Shi'ites. In 827, Caliph Ma'mun declared Mu'tazilah as the official school of the Abbasids, and enforced all scholars called as ulama to show an allegiance to the new school. Even, Ahmad ibn Hanbal was put in jail when he rejected the claim that the Qur'an was created. Mu'tasim even designed committees

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 64.

⁵⁹ Amira K Bennisson, *op.cit.*, pp.34-35.

⁶⁰ Richard C. Martin and Mark R. Woodward, *op.cit.*, p.188.

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 186

⁶² Albert Hourani, *op.cit.*, in note 48, pp. 75-77.

of jurists, theologians and scholars to acknowledge and persuade that Qur'an was created. After a while, Caliph al Mutawakkil, the son of Mu'tasim, abandoned the official enforcement of Mu'tazilah as the single school upon the ulama, and the representatives of the Sunnah and Hadith scholars became independent in their determining Islamic doctrine.⁶³ But, Mu'tazilah left a great effect on other schools and *madhabs*, and caused the birth of new schools which contradicted with the literal, traditional and Salafi path of Islam. Mu'tazilah influenced Shi'ism and Sufism with its rationalism and reasoning methods. Although Shi'ism had been a political faction in the beginning, it was indoctrinated through Mu'tazilah ideas and Sufi teachings towards the 10th and 11th centuries.⁶⁴ Especially Sheikh al Mufid (948-1022), the Shi'a theologian born in Baghdad and the student of the Mu'tazilah scholar Abu Abdullah al-Husayn b. Ali al-Basri, applied rational approach to draw religious rulings out, and defended revelation by applying *kalam* (religious philosophy). The theological interpretations derived from Mu'tazilah hence shaped Shi'a jurisprudence (religious law) and theology.⁶⁵ At that point, the Shi'a scholars including al Muhaqqiq and Allama al Hilli in the 13th century in Iraq played an important role in the development of reasoning based Shi'ite school of jurisprudence. In brief, they merged rationalism and reasoning with Shi'a.⁶⁶

Mu'tazilah gave birth to a rival but offshoot school *Ash'ariyah* within itself. Imam Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari (874–936) was a former Mu'tazilah student, and he developed a distinct theology of a middle way between Salafis and rationalist Mu'tazilites.⁶⁷ Imam al Ash'ari formulated the theology of Sunni Islam upon what was given in the Qur'an and Hadith by rational arguments based upon the principles of *kalam*. He accepted the Qur'an as eternal and to be God's word but applied the

⁶³ Amira K Bennison, *op.cit.*, pp.35-36.

⁶⁴ Ibid, pp.172-173.

⁶⁵ WikiShia contributors, "Al-Shaykh al-Mufid," *WikiShia*; Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Shia revival: how conflicts within Islam will shape the future*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), p.73.

⁶⁶ Albert Hourani, *op.cit.*, in note 48, pp. 182-183.

⁶⁷ Qamaruddin Khan, *Political Thought of Ibn Taymiyyah*, (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1973), p.3.

rational method like Mu'tazilah to interpret it. Even, the follower of al *Ash'ari* and master of *Ash'ariyah*, Imam al Ghazali formulated a method of using reason and argumentation to defend the right to believe derived from the Qur'an and Hadith.⁶⁸ In other words, *Ash'ariyah* is a middle way using both arguments and tools of rationalists and traditionalists.⁶⁹ The Salafis also regarded *Ash'ariyah* as the followers of the path of Mu'tazilites, and the conflict maintained between them, too. Salafis were against the emerging of such alternative paths and *madhabs* in Islam. Salafi scholars alleged the originality of Islam was damaged with the flourishing of various *madhabs* and religious schools therefore they developed a defensive attitude against the new interpretations of Islam.

2.2.2. Sufism

Salafis viewed the Sufi tariqas as threats to the traditionalist Salafi Islam due to their different rituals, customs, and methods, which was not in the Qur'an. Sufi tradition attributes itself to mysticism, meditation and purifying heart by giving up on worldly affairs, praying with music, and advising spiritual pilgrimage to a person's own inner world, his soul instead of to Mecca and literal fulfillment.⁷⁰ There are some claims about the roots of Sufism's birth. Originally, Sufi tradition is claimed to come from eastern monasticism left by the Byzantine Orthodox culture in the East. The devout believer model who purified himself from each worldly concern and sinful practice just like eastern monks in monastery life found a new shape in the Islamic community.⁷¹ In some practices, Sufism resembles with earlier Zoroastrian rituals, too. Actually, many late converts to Islam in the Abbasid period were originally Iranians, and they preferred Sufi traditions. For example, Abu Yazid Bayazid al Bastami (d.874) was a prominent Sufi figure and the son of a Zoroastrian Iranian.

⁶⁸ Albert Hourani, *op.cit.*, in note 48, pp. 167-168.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 65.

⁷⁰ Albert Hourani, *op.cit.*, in note 48, pp. 74-75.

⁷¹ Ibid, p. 72.

His method of Sufism resembled old Zoroastrian rituals. He claimed to be the one and distinguishable with God in his Sufi interpretation. Another famous Sufi of this trend was Abu'l-Mughith al-Husayn al-Hallaj (d.922), an Iranian born in Iraq to where his father had moved from southern Iran for work. Similar to al Bastami, his grandfather was Zoroastrian, too.⁷² He defended the unity of himself with God in mystic and ecstatic manner, for that reason, he was killed with the accusation of *zandaqa* (heresy, a membership of one of old Sassanid religions, known as Mazdakism) and *shirk* (claiming partnership to God). Other well-known Sufi preachers were Al-Hasan ibn Abi-l-Hasan al-Basri (d.728) and Abu 'l-Qasim ibn Muhammad al-Junayd al-Baghdadi (d.910), both of whom were originally Iranian. Hasan al Basri was also famous as the teacher of the founder of the Mu'tazilah school, Wasil ibn Ata. These Sufi preachers were accused of *zandaqa* and maintaining Zoroastrian-Iranian rituals and traditions by the Sunni Arab ulama. In the Abbasid hinterland, many sects and earlier Persian religious movements continued to survive. Mazdak religion was popular during the Sassanid King Kawad I (488-531) and was spread forcefully to Arabian Peninsula during the *jahiliyyah* era by Sassanians. Manichaeism, an alternative religion to Zoroastrianism and regarded as heresy by the Sassanians, still survived in the Abbasid era.⁷³ One common feature of these Iranian religions was the dualistic belief in eternal rivalry between good and evil, light and darkness, truth and lie.⁷⁴ These notions also existed in the Sufi tradition, *tasawwuf*. Hence, it was commonly asserted by the Salafis that Sufi traditions carried basic features of the earlier Persian belief systems. In the Abbasid time, *Khurramite* sect, claimed to be a version of Mazdakism and a mixture of Shi'a Islam and Zoroastrianism, revived in Iran and Azerbaijan. They saw themselves as the followers of Abu Moslem al Khorasani. These kinds of religious movements flourished so commonly that the Abbasid caliphs benefited from the Turkish mercenary armies to suppress such Iranian based sectarian uprisings.⁷⁵

⁷² Amira K Bennison, *op.cit.*,p.174.

⁷³ Lawrence G Potter, *The Persian Gulf in history*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009),pp.60-61.

⁷⁴ Amira K. Bennison, *op.cit.*,p.185.

⁷⁵ Ibid, pp.37 and 185

There are many interactions among Sufism, Shi'ism and Mu'tazilah. Especially, the Shi'a tried to benefit from such kinds of religious and philosophical flows in order to lessen the heavy suppression of Salafi Sunni Arabs. Mu'tazilah helped the Shi'a to find a free domain of belief. Therefore, the Shi'ite jurisprudence, theology and belief reshaped itself with the Mu'tazilah rationalism and reasoning. Besides, Sufism was important as a transitory system of belief with its soft and sympathetic path welcoming non-Arab converts from Christianity and Zoroastrianism to Islam, as the religion of tolerance.⁷⁶ However, the Salafis regarded them as *bid'ah* in religion and struggled to keep them away from the Islamic belief. Salafism blamed Sufism for bringing pacifism and mysticism into Islam, therefore Salafis struggled against Sufi orders.

2.2.3. *Shu'ubiyah* Movement

The opposition of Iranians to the dominance of Arab culture and identity within the Abbasid dynasty was not limited to just military uprisings, dynastical strife, religious and sectarian movements. Rather, through linguistics, literature and culture; the resistance, particularly led by the vanguard of Iranian ministers, poets, courtiers in the Abbasid palace and lands, emerged as a counter movement against the Arab dominated Abbasid cultural life and Arabic language. In the era of Abbasid dynasty, Christians, Zoroastrians and Jews had governmental and administrative duties and positions within the Abbasid palace. These qualified non-Arabs were specialized in administrative, scholarly, scientific and medical services. Their descendants also converted to Islam in the following period.⁷⁷ The non-Arabs, especially Iranians converts, formulated *Shu'ubiyah* movement in order to lessen the Arab superiority over religion and administration. "Shu'ub" means "peoples" in Arabic, and through this term, the *Shu'ubiyah* referred to the Qur'an's verses (Surah al Hujurat: 13th verse) promoting diversity, equality of all believers no matter what their race,

⁷⁶ Amira K. Bennison, *op.cit.*, pp. 172-173.

⁷⁷ Amira K. Bennison, *op.cit.*, p.178.

language or tribal roots. They claimed to contribute to Islamic civilization as Bedouin Arabs did. They saw Arab culture as the Bedouin culture, and themselves (Iranians) and the Byzantines as *hadar* (urban) who played a main role in building the new and common Islamic civilization. They claimed that Islamic civilization did not only belong to Arabs, and they attempted to soften the Arab dominance in each part of the life.⁷⁸ *Shu'ubiyyah* aimed to resist the Arabization of Islam, the superiority of Arab language and culture. *Shu'ubiyyah* scholars challenged the Salafis and Arab dominance through rich Iranian history and culture by comparing their superior Persian literature and poetry with Arabic poetry. In addition, some Iranian theologians such as Qadi Abd al Jabbar tried to sever the Prophet from his Arab identity by blaming Arabs for their jahiliyyah era. Al Jabbar asserted that God gave duty to Prophet Mohammad to preach to the pagan Arabs, and the pagan Arabs did not respect his prophecy. He added that they clearly hated his mission and created many difficulties for him in early years of his holy call.⁷⁹

In the field of religious law, belief and theology, the language became a matter of dispute. Iranian theologians and scholars defended the possibility of Persian prayers next to Arabic. For example, Imam Abu Hanifah (699-767), the founder of Hanafi jurisprudence, one of the four main Sunni *madhabs* in Islam, and his followers claimed that the Prophets' hadiths allowed the Persian language in prayers.⁸⁰ Even, some hadiths were claimed to praise Persian cities and language such as

The Prophet of God said that Gabriel told him that in the hand of the East was a country called Khorasan. On the Judgment Day, three cities of Khorasan will be adorned with red rubies and coral, and their radiance shall shine about them. Around these cities (the popular Persian cities in Sogdiana: Bukhara, Veshgird and Samarkand) will be many angels praising, glorifying and exalting God. They will bring forth these cities in grandeur and pomp onto the plains, as a bride who is brought into the house of her betrothed. In

⁷⁸ Ibid, pp. 95-96.

⁷⁹ Richard C. Martin and Mark R. Woodward, *op.cit.*, p.78.

⁸⁰ Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*, p.118.

each of these cities will be 70,000 banners and under each martyr will be 70,000 believers, speaking Persian and receiving solution.⁸¹

In sum, the conflict between Arab and Iranian factions were maintained under the forms of religious schools, *madhabs*, sects, culture, literature, and philosophy. Salafi Hanbalis regarded the *Shu'ubiyah* scholars as the enemies of their Arab defined Islam and struggled to prevent them from penetrating in the Abbasid Caliphate. Promoting Persian language and literature vis a vis superiority of Arabic in the Abbasid cultural circles was a disturbing issue for the Salafis who supported the superiority of Arabs. This defensive position of Salafis prepared the formation of political Salafism.

2.3. The Formation of Political Salafism

Salafi creed spilled over the political issues in the Abbasid era. Political Salafism directly represented the interests and ruling power of Sunni Arabs in the era of the Abbasids. It was even a defensive force against the Shi'ites and Persians. The long lasting strife between Arabs and Iranians, the internal conflict between Sunnis and Shi'ites, the insurgency of the *Kharijites* contributed to the formation of political Salafism. Political Salafism was an outcome of the Salafi creed, which was against other non-Arab, mystic, ascetic or rational innovations within the religion, and reflected the similar method of perception of threat production against political groups such as Iranians and Shi'ites. Salafi creed began turning into political Salafism during the Abbasid time, and political Salafism regarded Iranians' political penetration, the internal strife within the Abbasid administration, Shi'a opposition, the *Kharijite* tradition as basic threats to the Salaf understanding based Islam. Salafism became a part of political conflict between Sunni Arabs and others. Salafi scholars regarded Iranians as responsible for expanding religious and cultural movements such as Mu'tazilah and *Shu'ubiyah*. In addition, Iranians and Shi'ites

⁸¹ Frye, Richard N., *al-Narshakhi's the History of Bukhara*, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007), 27-28.

were blamed for penetrating the Abbasid politics through their political acts, and the Salafis displayed a political reaction against these factions in a political field.

2.3.1. Politicized Salafi Movement in the Abbasids' Political Strife

In the first centuries of Islam, being an Arab and Islam were tightly interconnected; even a convert needed an Arab Muslim who gave allegiance for his conversion. Arabness was a reason for superiority than other non-Arabs.⁸² Salafis were the representatives of Arab superiority and the preserver of Arab defined Islam against the threatening factors in the Abbasid era.

The Abbasid Caliphs broke their agreement with the Shi'a after they overthrew the Umayyads. Caliph Mansur even carried his capital from Shi'a populated Kufah to his recently built city Baghdad in 762 to escape from the Shi'ite influence and insurgencies.⁸³ Ahmad ibn Hanbal's followers were very effective in the struggle against the Shi'ites by the 10th century in Baghdad, especially through their riots and attacks on Shi'ites. Especially, Caliph Amin's close affinity to Arab aristocracy enabled him to trust Imam Shafi'i and Imam ibn Hanbal, as their teachings were closer to Arab tradition than Iranians were. Imam Shafi'i offered Caliph Amin to appoint ibn Hanbal as the *qadi* (judge) for Yemen.⁸⁴ However, Caliph Amin's brother Ma'mun, supported by the Iranian aristocracy in the palace, overthrew Amin; then the Arab faction's superiority in religion, administration and daily life quickly lost its power. Salafi dominance in religious circles was replaced with alternative disciplines such as the rationalist Mu'tazilah. Imam ibn Hanbal was forced to approve that the Qur'an is created, not eternal, and to deny predestination and to agree on that determining on religious affairs was Caliph's duty, not the scholars. In the inquisition court called as "*Mihna*" set up by Caliph Ma'mun, ibn

⁸² Christopher Melchert, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

⁸³ Monika Gronke, *op.cit.*, p.21.

⁸⁴ Christopher Melchert, *op.cit.*, p. 4.

Hanbal was tortured to accept Mu'tazilah doctrine.⁸⁵ He was forced to renounce his teachings before the crowds in Baghdad, beaten until he fainted then was driven to the Byzantine border in chains. This was the start of a long conflict between Salafis and Mu'tazilites. On the other side, the conflict with Shi'a broke out with Caliph Ma'mun's announcement of Ali, a member of Ahl-i Bayt or the Alid clan, as the successor of the Caliphate to cease the conflict between two clans, the Abbasids and Alids. That caused reactions from Arab dominant circles in the Abbasid palace. The tension continued in the era of Mu'tasim and his son Wathiq. The Arabist faction in the Abbasid administration rose again in Caliph al Mutawakkil's era in 847. The new caliph ended the *Mihna* inquisitions and cut its sponsorship to Mu'tazilah.⁸⁶ Ibn Hanbal was released, then honored with the offer to teach the Caliph's son. But the long lasting conflict did not end. The conflict caused the Abbasid rule to weaken in decades.

2.3.2. Perception of Threats

2.3.2.1. Iranians

Political Salafis regarded the Iranian penetration of power into the Abbasid Caliphate as a threat to the Sunni Arab rule. Arabs and Iranians had a long historical rivalry. Iranians strengthened their position within the Abbasid administration in a time and this threat alarmed political Salafis. Political Salafis did not want to accept the Caliphate as the common rule between Arabs and Persians; instead, they alleged that the Caliphate was to preserve its Arab identity and to oust other non-Arab communities from administrative system.

The conflict between Iranians and Arabs dated back to early years of Islam. The Arabs faced the first serious challenge from Iranians during the reign of the Rashidun Caliphate (the era of the Four Caliphs after the Prophet). The united Arab

⁸⁵ Mihna means testing and trial. It is an inquisition court for judging Salafi scholars to force them to change their way of thinking about the faith and to choose Mu'tazilah. The court was founded during Caliph Ma'mun and Mu'tasim's eras in the Abbasid rule.

⁸⁶ Christopher Melchert, *op.cit.*, pp.8-14.

tribes in the era of the second Caliph Omar invaded the Sassanid Empire with the Battle of Qadisiyyah in 636 and the Battle of Nehavend in 641. However, these conquests did not mean the cessation of the Arab-Iranian conflict. Iranians continued to take part in each ethnic insurgency or dissident revolt and tried to get administrative positions to maintain their power. An Iranian prisoner of war assassinated Caliph Omar in 644.⁸⁷ It is claimed that Omar was killed as a revenge of Arab conquest of Iran. Omar was claimed to implement Arab chauvinism during his reign so strictly that there were discriminations against Iranian converts. Even, marriages with the Iranians were banned in Omar's rule.⁸⁸ Iranians used every opportunity to revolt against the Caliphate. The tension continued in the following decades during the Umayyads.

After the death of Caliph Ali, Mu'awiyah's accession to power led to the rise of the Umayyad dynasty. The new dynasty found itself ruling the regions from North Africa to Khorasan. The large borders brought many ethnic communities, various cultures, ideas and local traditions under the Umayyad rule. The Umayyads had been one of the noble Arab clans of the Quraysh tribe in Mecca. For them, Arab identity was a reason to be proud like the other Arab tribes. They were known with their strong Arab tribal *asabiyyah* and Arab-oriented policies. Indeed, Caliph Omar and Othman, the uncle of first Umayyad Caliph Mu'awiyah, had not been so different from the Umayyads in their policies against non-Arabs. Non-Arabs were named as *Mawali*, and were treated as second class Muslim in the Umayyad era.⁸⁹ That caused the accumulation of anger and hatred against the dynasty. In the eyes of Iranians, Islam's teaching on equality of all human beings before God was violated by Caliph Omar and then the Umayyads.⁹⁰ The Abbasid revolt became successful with the help of Iranian insurgent Abu Moslem in Khorasan. However, after the replacement of the dynastical rule, Caliph Abu Jafar al Mansur killed Abu Moslem to oust Iranian

⁸⁷ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Shia revival: how conflicts within Islam will shape the future*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006),p.35.

⁸⁸ Ibid,p. 64.

⁸⁹ Slave communities, especially called for Persian Muslims in the Umayyad era.

⁹⁰ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *op.cit.*,p. 64.

power from the new Caliphate. The early years of the Abbasids welcomed Iranian revolts aiming to take revenge of Abu Moslem from the Abbasids. Commander Sonbad, the Iranian warlord and close friend of Abu Moslem, insurrected against the Abbasids. His insurgent army consisted of Iranians and Shi'ite Arabs.⁹¹ Parviz S. Towfighi in his book, "From Persian Empire to Islamic Iran", divided the Persian strategy of resistance in two. One is nationalistic deriving from the old times of Sassanid and Persian Empires, and the other is the Persian use of Islam, particularly Shi'ism.⁹² Abu Moslem was the first one who used Islam for resistance. He founded an alliance among Abbasid clan, Alid - Shi'a clan and Iranians to overthrow the ultra-Arabist Umayyads. The Abbasid revolt against the Umayyads was supported by the Iranian-Khorasan aristocracy led by the Commander Abu Muslim Khorasani, and resulted in the overthrow of the dynasty tragically. A rival clan, the Abbasids needed to cooperate with non-Arabs within the empire to be successful. This was the start of the increasing importance of non-Arab parties, particularly Iranians, in the process.

The hatred of non-Arab stocks against the ruling Umayyads and the rise of non-Arabs' influence developed at the same time. Both Iranians, the former bureaucratic cadres of the Sassanians, and the Greek and Aramaic-speaking administrators continued to serve for the Umayyads.⁹³ During the Umayyads, Caliph Omar ibn Abd al Aziz applied the Theodosian and Justinian codes and Sasanian regulations of law in 717 to win the Syrian Christians' and Persians' loyalty.⁹⁴ While these policies disturbed Arab aristocracy on one hand, the racist implementations such as looking down on non-Arabs and forcing heavy tax regulations on them while giving exemptions to Arabs, disturbed the non-Arab stocks on the other hand. For the Umayyad dynasty, the Arab *asabiyyah* feeling was so strong and superior to the *ummah* understanding covering all believers from other nations that Arabs took top

⁹¹ Parviz S. Towfighi, *From Persian Empire to Islamic Iran: a history of nationalism in the Middle East*, (Lewiston NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2009), p.115.

⁹² Ibid, p. 25.

⁹³ Amira K. Bennison, *op.cit.*, p.18.

⁹⁴ Ibid, p.22.

positions and viewed Islam as their ruling elite religion, not a religion of other subjects. In addition, the Umayyads saw the conquests as a mission given by God to Arabs and did not primarily aim to change the faith of other subjects.⁹⁵ This dichotomy of taking the non-Arab subjects within the system for administrative positions while discriminating them on the other hand during the Umayyad era strengthened the tensions among the Iranian stocks in Iran and Khorasan. Therefore, the Abbasid revolt, cooperatively organized by the Abbasid clan, the Shi'a and Iranian warlord Abu Muslim Khorasani, came in 750. Actually, the main reason for the revolt was the extreme influence of Arab *asabiyyah* and the association of the Umayyad clan with strict Arabist policies and rule. However, the same conflict continued during the Abbasid era.

The clash of the Iranians with the Arab elite continued in the reign of Caliph Harun al Rashid's sons. Rashid divided the empire between his sons, Muhammad al Amin and Abdullah al-Ma'mun. Amin was the first candidate for the throne. Baghdad and its neighboring territory was given to him. On the other side, Khorasan was given to Ma'mun, the second crown prince after Amin. Amin was close to Arab elites in Baghdad because his mother were members of the Abbasid family while Ma'mun and his brother al Mu'tasim had close links with Persian local lords in Iran and Khorasan owing to their Persian origin mother. The rivalry between the two-crown brothers turned into a civil war after Amin's accession to throne. Caliph Amin saw the succession of Ma'mun to the crown prince as the rise of the Iranian faction in the Abbasid dynasty, therefore tried to appoint his own son Musa to the crown prince instead of Ma'mun. Ma'mun, supported by the Persian warlords, marched over to Baghdad and killed his brother Caliph Amin. This victory is regarded as the challenge of Iranians over the Arab ruling elite in Baghdad and revenge of the Iranian elites, who were dismissed from the administration and as a response to the murder of Iranian commander Abu Moslem after the Abbasid victory. The civilian Arab elite supporters of the murdered Caliph Amin continued to create chaos in Baghdad. The civil war between the Arab and Iranian factions increased even more. Caliph Ma'mun had to reside in Merv city instead of capital Baghdad for a while because of the anarchy and disorder in civil war. This process of civil war caused the

⁹⁵ Amira K. Bennison, *op.cit.*, pp. 21-22.

two factions to lose power. Therefore, Caliph Ma'mun and his successor and brother Mu'tasim began relying on Turkish slaves for alternative military power.⁹⁶ Political Salafis, who took side near Caliph Amin, displayed severe reactions to the Iranian affiliated Ma'mun's faction when they lost power. Political Salafis did not only regard Iranians as the responsible of changing the originality of Islam through *bid'ahs* but also of penetrating the administration of Arab Abbasid dynasty.

2.3.2.2 Shi'ites

The Shi'ites were a political group and claimed that the caliphate was the stolen right of the Alid clan, the descendants of Caliph Ali. The political Salafis were against any opposition group, which could harm the Sunni Arab rule; therefore, they regard the Shi'ites as one of the most crucial threat for the Sunni Abbasid rule.

The emergence of the Shi'a movement can be regarded as another major challenge for the official Arab ruling regime in Islamic history. This crisis started as a civil conflict and then evolved into a serious oppositional movement later. The crisis began with the murder of Caliph Othman. His successor Caliph Ali, the cousin of the Prophet Mohammad, avoided punishing the rebels and murderers, which led Othman's clan to oppose Ali's rule after a while. Othman's clan, the Umayyad, was one of the prominent clans of the Quraysh tribe, which had opposed the Prophecy and rule of Prophet Mohammad until his conquest of Mecca. The rivalry between the Umayyads and the Hashemites emerged once again with Ali's accession to the Caliphate.⁹⁷

The supporters of Ali were called as Shi'a, meaning "aider" in Arabic. In the conflict between the Governor of Sham, Mu'awiyah, the cousin of the former Caliph Othman, and the new Caliph Ali; the supporters of two sides fought in the Battle of Siffin. Late Caliph Ali's son Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet or, in other words, the representative of the Hashemite clan of the Quraysh, maintained to lead the Shi'a

⁹⁶ Amira K Bennisson, *op.cit.*, pp. 30-33.

⁹⁷ Ibid, p.15.

followers. Hussein did not show allegiance to Caliph Yazid I, the son of Mu'awiyah. He marched to Kufah city, the capital of his father Ali, for the preparation for the revolt. Kufah hosted Iranian prisoners of Qadisiyyah and Nehavend wars, who were ready to resist the Umayyad rule because of extreme discriminative policies against non-Arab stocks.⁹⁸ It was also claimed by Iranians that Hussein planned to leave for Iran to seek refugee when the Umayyad army attacked his caravan on the way. The association between the Shi'a and Persia is also derived from the marriage of Hussein and Shahbanu, the daughter of the last Sassanid King Yazigard III.⁹⁹ For Iranians, the Shi'a Imams represented the descents of the Sassanid dynasty in addition to the Prophet's descendants. While these claims may have some value, the real reason of the natural alliance between Iranians and the Shi'ite Arabs was the most probably the common enemy: the ultra-Arabist and Sunni Umayyad rule. This tension went on during the Abbasid era, too. The Shi'a partisans, Persian aristocracy and intelligentsia represented a collective opposition against the Sunni Arab ruling elite in the Abbasid era. The relations and conflicts between two groups influenced the Abbasids' policies in the region.

During the era of Caliph al Mansur (754 to 775), the Shi'a movement did not cease their revolts. Mohammad bin Abdullah, descendant of Imam Hasan and representative of the Alid clan, revolted in Hejaz while his brother Ibrahim revolted in Basra.¹⁰⁰ The construction of Baghdad could not be completed due to the Shi'a revolts and the construction process stopped twice. The revolts were suppressed in a difficult manner. For that reason, Baghdad and Damascus were filled with Salafi scholars because of the fear of Shi'a revolts by the 10th century. The anti-Shi'a violence deepened in Baghdad in the 10th century while their mosques and Ashura gatherings were attacked. The members of Shi'a were burned alive. The Salafi followers blamed and attacked the Shi'ites again when the Byzantines attacked the Abbasid borders in 971.¹⁰¹ This hatred and suspicions against the Shi'ites even rose

⁹⁸ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *op.cit.*,p. 40.

⁹⁹ Ibid,p. 63.

¹⁰⁰ Amira K Bennison, *op.cit.*,p.33.

¹⁰¹ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *op.cit.*,p. 53.

to the peak when the Mongols invaded Baghdad. The Sunnis saw the Shi'ites as the real reason of each catastrophe in the Caliphate.

The tension was so high due to the clash with the Shi'a opposition that Caliph Ma'mun tried to find radical solutions for the disorder. Firstly, Caliph Ma'mun declared to choose a member of Alid clan, Ali al Rida, also known as the eighth Shi'a Imam, as his successor for the caliphate in 817 to end the long lasting bloody rivalry.¹⁰² This decision aimed to end hostility, chaos and disorder for the next generations of Islam. Even, Ma'mun ordered the use of green Shi'a flags instead of black Abbasid flags to symbolize peace between the two clans. Indeed, Abbasid and Alid families were both part of Hashemite clan of the Quraysh tribe. The two families were close relatives. Abbas ibn Abd al Muttalib, the founding father of the Abbasid clan, was an elder brother of both Abdullah ibn Abdul Muttalib (the father of the Prophet), and Abu Talib ibn Abdul Muttalib (a father of Caliph Ali). The dynastical bond might have caused Ma'mun to take this decision. But this decision faced strong opposition within the Abbasid dynasty and was not accepted. In 818, Ali al Rida, the Shi'ite crown prince, died of poisoning.¹⁰³ The second radical decision was given by Caliph Mu'tasim, the caliph after his elder brother Ma'mun, who carried the capital from Baghdad to Samarra, the headquarters for the Turkish soldiers, to keep the dynasty secure and protect himself from political Salafis' hatred and reaction. Samarra remained as the capital for sixty years.¹⁰⁴ The rise of Shi'a faction together with Iranians within the Abbasid administration alarmed Salafis and caused them to politicize more. Salafi scholars involved in political affairs to struggle against the Shi'a and Iranians. During Caliph Ma'mun and Mu'tasim, political Salafis fell in an oppositional position and were ousted from the Abbasid court. They just tried to maintain their influence in Damascus and Baghdad cities among public.

2.3.2.3. Kharijites

¹⁰²Amira K Bennison, *op.cit.*,p.33.

¹⁰³ Ibid,p.34.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, p.36.

The Salafi Hanbalis were also against the Khajirite movement and their views about the Salaf's tradition. According to the Salafis, the *Kharijites* just considered the Qur'an but ignored the practice of the Salaf. The *Kharijite* revolt did not happen in the era when political Salafis rose. It was an earlier issue but *Kharijites* did not get lost completely after they failed in their struggle against Caliph Ali and Mu'awiyah. There is also a disputable issue that political Salafis were blamed to derive their teachings and methods from *Kharijites*. Especially the radical Salafi jihadist groups were equalized to the *Kharijites*. The study also highlights the Salafi outlook to the *Kharijite* case with the interpretations of Salafi scholars. Actually, *Kharijites* and Salafis are very diverse groups in their rhetoric and practice. The only commonality between them is that both two applied the literal meaning of the Qur'an but *Kharijites* rejected the hadith and practices of the Prophet while Salafis gave a high priority to them.

Historically, the *Kharijites* emerged as an outcome of the arbitration case between Caliph Ali and his rival Mu'awiyah. At the end of the war of Siffin, both sides decided to apply the arbitration (*Hakam*) method, which had been applied commonly during the jahiliyyah era. The arbitrators' preference for Mu'awiyah as the new caliph instead of Ali caused suspicions and the sides did not abide by the decision. This situation caused a third side to split and they were called as the *Kharijites*. The new group claimed that the arbitration method was an old pre-Islamic and pagan tradition, and therefore against the Qur'an. They referred to Verse 44 of Surah al-Madinah: "*Whoever does not dispense justice according to what has been fixed by Allah is an unbeliever*". They briefly claimed that if a Muslim did not take the Qur'an as the main source for justice, he fell in a major sin and became a *kafir* (infidel). On the other side, if a Muslim left Islamic Shari'ah and applied other laws, he turned to a *murtad* (apostate). This situation necessitates the murder of this person. This is the first main application of the *takfir* method.

The *Kharijites* declared both Ali and Mu'awiyah as apostates, and launched assassinations against them.¹⁰⁵ Ali was killed and Mu'awiyah survived from assassination. The *Kharijites* blamed them for applying to earlier pagan customs like

¹⁰⁵ Richard C. Martin and Mark R. Woodward, *op.cit.*, pp. 180-181.

arbitration to solve a dispute among themselves instead of taking the Qur'an as a reference and solving the problem according to its rules and principles. That shows that jahiliyyah traditions were still effective over Arabs in the Islamic era and a very serious dispute appeared in the attempt to replace pagan customs with the law of God. The *Kharijites* believed that even a black slave could be a caliph if he was a well-qualified Muslim.¹⁰⁶ *Kharijites*'s opinion was unacceptable for both Hashemite clan and Umayyad clan. In the internal conflict among Muslims, the real dispute was who would be the next caliph: Ali or Mu'awiyah. One was the representative of Hashemite clan and the other was of the Umayyad clan within the Quraysh tribe. Both were noble Arab clans in the Arab Quraysh tribe. When the *Kharijites* opposed the practice of Salaf's traditions, and asserted the right of a qualified black slave believer to become a Caliph, they became the target of the attacks of both Alid and Umayyad clans. In Salafi perspective, if *al Salaf al Salih*, the holy companions, applied a method or tradition; it should be accepted as holy and valid, and not be disputed over. Salafism never let disrespect to the practice of the holy ancestors. Therefore, the Salafis regarded the *Kharijites* as enemies of Sunni Islam and Salaf understanding. Especially ibn Taymiyyah as the main scholar of Salafism, who played a key role in the rise of political Salafism, blamed the *Kharijites* for disobeying the rules of the Salaf. While ibn Taymiyyah evaluated the case of the *Kharijites* and their position against Ali and Mu'awiyah, he knew that the *Kharijites* criticized the arbitration case between Mu'awiyah and Ali, which did not take place in the Qur'an and was deriving from an old pagan tradition. However, ibn Taymiyyah blamed the *Kharijites* for protesting a practice of the Salaf, companions of the Prophet, noble members of the Quraysh in Mecca and Madinah, in a particular case. He claimed that the *Kharijites* were not rightful in the beginning because they did not have any Salaf members among their followers. For him, the *Kharijites* showed disrespect to ancestors and traditions while they tried to give a legal decision about the fight between Mu'awiyah and Ali by the Qur'anic verses, Verse 44 of Sura al Madinah.¹⁰⁷ According to ibn Taymiyyah, the tradition and the Sunnah must

¹⁰⁶ Amira K. Bennison, *op.cit.*,p.16.

¹⁰⁷ Denise Aigle, The Mongol Invasions of Bilād al-Shām by Ghāzān Khān and Ibn Taymīyah's Three "Anti-Mongol" Fatwas, *Mamluk Studies Review* 11, no.2 (2007) :102 ; Richard C. Martin and Mark R. Woodward, *op.cit.*,p.181.

always come first because it is the only preserver of Arab's own identity and culture in revealed Islam and against the innovations of other late convert communities. The Sunnah also represents the Sunni authority and rule for Arabs.

2.4. The Rise of Political Salafism

Political Salafism reached its peak during the Mongol invasion of the Abbasid lands. Ibn Taymiyyah led to the rise of political Salafism against the Mongol invasion. The formation of political Salafism brought new perception of threat list in which the Mongols were the number one threat and ibn Taymiyyah's fatwas brought mobilization of Arabs under armed jihad side-by-side Mamluk army against the Mongol forces. Ibn Taymiyyah's movement benefited from ibn Hanbal's opinions and struggle. Ibn Taymiyyah's perception of threat list covers mainly Mongols, Ismaili Shi'ites, Persians, Twelver Shi'a ulama, Crusaders and any other community who cooperated with Mongols in his time and contributed to the fall of the Abbasid rule.

2.4.1. Political Salafism vs Shi'a in the time of ibn Taymiyyah

Ibn Taymiyyah's teachings depend clearly on the Sunnah, in other words, Sunni tradition. Sunni tradition means the deeds and speeches of the Salaf, pious ancestors including the Prophet, his pious Companions, and their successors in the following three generations. According to ibn Taymiyyah, only their *ijtihad*s, analogies and interpretations of the Qur'an and hadith are valid.¹⁰⁸ In fact, ibn Taymiyyah was not against *ijtihad*, instead, he focused on who made *ijtihad*. He simply asked whether the true *mujtahids* are their (Arabs') pious ancestors or newly converted Iranians,

¹⁰⁸ Ijtihad is the independent or original interpretation of problems not precisely covered by the Qur'an, Hadith and ijma (scholarly consensus). Qualified jurist had the right to exercise such original thinking, mainly ray (personal judgment) and qiyas (analogical reasoning), and those who did so were termed mujtahids (quoted from britannica.com)

Sufis and Shi'ites.¹⁰⁹ The Qur'an and Sunnah are timeless for Muslims to design their lives and decide on a juridical case but there should be other ways when they could not find their responses in these two. Ibn Taymiyyah proposed to apply to the interpretations of the pious Companions of the Prophet instead of current scholars who claimed to give *ijtihad* through philosophy, reasoning or *ray* opinion.¹¹⁰ He sanctified the Salaf because they witnessed the revelation of the holy book and they were close to the speech and deeds of Prophet Mohammad and therefore were privileged. After the Companions, the second-generation group within *al Salaf al Salih* was successors, and their deeds and practices should be applied if no sufficient response could be found in the Companions' interpretations.¹¹¹ Ibn Taymiyyah also pointed out that the Arab language is necessary for the Qur'an reading. He considered the spiritual and cultural unity of Islam being dependent on the Arabic language, and Arabic as the Islam's language could preserve the true religion. Arabic Qur'an, speeches and interpretations of the pious Arab ancestors were the preserver of Arab language and thus for Arabness and Arab community, too.¹¹² Imam Shafi'i, the teacher of Ibn Hanbal, strictly defended the learning of Arabic for understanding the Qur'an and religion differently from other scholars such as Abu Hanifah who allowed Persian language in prayers.¹¹³

The Prophet and his companions' way was adapting Arab customs of the jahiliyyah and pagan eras into Islamic Sunnah by reforming them. For example, Arab traders of particularly the Quraysh tribe had applied *mudarabah*, which means partnership in trade. According to this tradition, many traders delivered their materials to one trader who led the caravans and this was a tribal contract of

¹⁰⁹ The qualified jurist who makes *ijtihad*.

¹¹⁰ Ray is personal judgment of religious scholars in Islam.

¹¹¹ Walid A. Saleh, "Ibn Taymiyya and the Rise of Radical Hermeneutics: An Analysis of An Introduction to the Foundations of Qur'anic Exegesis" in *Ibn Taymiyya and his times*, ed. Yossef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed, (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.146-147.

¹¹² Walid A. Saleh, *op.cit.*, p. 147; Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*, p.119.

¹¹³ Albert Hourani, *op.cit.*, in note 48, p.68 ; Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*, p.118.

entrusting property to someone. The Prophet made these types of old traditions part of the principles of his Sunnah in Islamic era by reforming them.¹¹⁴

Ibn Taymiyyah also saw the different sects and schools like Mu'tazilah, Murji'ah, Jahmiyyah, Ash'ariyah, Shi'a and Sufism as the spoilers to the right path of *al Salaf al Salih* and to Arab defined Islam. Leaving the path of the Salaf was the reason for fragmentation, disorder, chaos, weakness and division in the *ummah* according to him.¹¹⁵ The most harmful groups not only to the tradition but also to Arab sovereignty and rule were close cooperators of the invading Mongols, the Shi'ites and Iranians. The rivalry between Salafists and Shi'ites continued in the 13th century during the Mongol Ilkhanid period. In his time, ibn Taymiyyah had a rival, named Al Allama al Hilli, who was the writer of "*Minhaj al Karama fi Marifat al Imamah*", a book attributed to Oljeitu Khan, the Mongol ruler.¹¹⁶ Ilkhanid court and administration was filled with the Persian and Shi'ite subjects. Mongols treated Iranians, Sufis and Shi'ites better than Sunni Arabs. Both Ghazan Khan and then Oljeitu Khan aimed to be the leader of Muslims and to become successor to the Abbasid Caliphate. For Mongols to maintain their rule and to penetrate the region, conversion to Islam was a must, but Sunni Arab Islam had so many barriers for Mongols therefore they chose to embrace the belief systems of more flexible rival schools. Sufi tariqas were allowed to spread during the Mongolian rule. Especially the Shi'ites cooperated with Mongol khans so closely that Oljeitu Khan embraced the Shi'ite Islam in 1310 with the guidance of the Shi'ite scholar al Hilli.¹¹⁷ Al Allama al Hilli and his Shi'ite followers in the Ilkhanid court became effective in this

¹¹⁴ Yossef Rapoport, "Ibn Taymiyya's Radical Legal Thought: Rationalism, Pluralism and the Primacy of Intention" in *Ibn Taymiyya and his times*, ed. Yossef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed, (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2010),p. 205.

¹¹⁵ Salman Hassan Al-Ani and Shadia Ahmad, introduction to *Ibn Taymiyyah Kitab al Iman*, trans. and ed. Salman Hassan Al-Ani and Shadia Ahmad Tel, (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2009),pp.8-9.

¹¹⁶ Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*,p.20 ; Tariq al-Jamil, "Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli: Shi'i Polemics and the Struggle for Religious Authority in Medieval Islam" in *Ibn Taymiyya and his times*, ed. Yossef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed, (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2010),p.232.

¹¹⁷ Yossef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed, "Introduction Ibn Taymiyya and his Times" in *Ibn Taymiyya and his times*, ed. Yossef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed, (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2010),p.15.

conversion. They even enabled the Ilkhanids to pursue policies on behalf of the Shi'a communities in the lands of Abbasids, even in Hejaz. Ibn Taymiyyah's doctrine developed as a reaction to the works of the Shi'ite scholars in the Ilkhanid courts. Al Hilli claimed to refute the Sunni theory of caliphate and defended the theory of *imamate* in his book "*Minhaj al Karama*" (1311).¹¹⁸ He preferred to refer to *al Ahl al Bayt* (the family of the Prophet) against *al Salaf al Salih*. On the other side, ibn Taymiyyah argued to preserve the situation of Sunnah and Sunnite sovereignty over the caliphate against the Shi'ites and Mongols in his book "*Minhaj al Sunnah al Nabawiah fi Naqd Kalam al Shiah wa'l Qadariyah*" as a response.¹¹⁹

The cooperation between Mu'tazilah and Shi'a was based on the conceptualization of *imamate* by reasoning. The Mu'tazilah scholars asserted that God did not reveal the *imamate*; instead, it emerged as a necessity and obligation through reasoning. However, Sunni theory rejects the role of reason in deciding something as obligatory or not, instead claims that only the Sunnah can enforce obligation.¹²⁰ Ibn Taymiyyah pointed out that the social order was one of the most important obligations of the religion because the nature of the religion enforces that order.¹²¹ According to ibn Taymiyyah, social order and state authority was so important that he wrote to prefer sixty years of tyranny under a tyrant leader rather than a single night without a leader and in anarchy.¹²² He also supported Caliph Yazid's rule and considered Mu'awiyah better able to rule than Ali.¹²³ He pointed out that if Ali were the best to rule, chaos and anarchy would not emerge during his reign; and Mu'awiyah was more successful to create order. Against the fallibility of Ali formulated by the Shi'a faith, ibn Taymiyyah asked how God chose someone as a

¹¹⁸ Tariq al-Jamil, *op.cit.*, p. 232.

¹¹⁹ Tariq al-Jamil, *op.cit.*, p. 235 ; Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*, p.20.

¹²⁰ Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*, p .25.

¹²¹ *Ibid*, p. 29.

¹²² *Ibid*, pp.32-34.

¹²³ Raquel M. Ukeles, "The Sensitive Puritan? Revisiting Ibn Taymiyya's Approach to Law and Spirituality in Light of 20th- Debates on the Prophet's Birthday" in *Ibn Taymiyya and his times*, ed. Yossef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed, (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2010), p.345.

leader who failed to be a caliph three times, could not control a civil war, could not prevent assassination of himself losing throne to the Umayyad.¹²⁴ According to ibn Taymiyyah, living under the order of an infidel was better than disorder.¹²⁵ For ibn Taymiyyah, state or caliphate was not an obligation of the religion but a political necessity for social order and against chaos and anarchy. The caliphate and authority was necessary for the implementation of the Shari'ah but not an essential of the faith as the Shi'a jurisprudence claimed that the *imamate* is one of the essentials of the faith.¹²⁶ He opposed to the Shi'a's *imamate* theory, and referred to the Qur'an in which there is no indication about it. He also claimed that it was not possible for a disappeared Imam (the twelfth imam Mahdi) to be influential and respond to the needs of the believers. Here, the main target of ibn Taymiyyah was the intercession (*shafa'ah*) of Shi'a Imams between people and God. He enforced to obey God and the Prophet, in other words, the Qur'an and hadith rather than the intercession of third parties like Shi'a Imams.¹²⁷ For him, the *ummah* is more important in the protection of the Shari'ah rather than the Imams and messianic beliefs.¹²⁸ The unity of *ummah*, reliance on the Shari'ah, Sunnah, and *tawhid* principle were vital, not the *imamate*.

Al Hilli, the rival of ibn Taymiyyah, points out the obligation of *imamate* as the core of the faith and attributed Imams infallibility like the prophets. Imams were regarded as the successor of the Prophet to prevent Muslims from going in the wrong direction. In other words, extraordinary powers were attributed to the *imamate* like the Prophets for defining religious rules and making *ijtihad*s about religious and jurisprudential affairs. Ibn Taymiyyah saw this situation as creating a different religion and belief system. For him, any other path rather than the Salaf's cannot be pursued.

¹²⁴ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *op.cit.*,p.96.

¹²⁵ Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*,p.38.

¹²⁶ Ibid,p.39.

¹²⁷ Tariq al-Jamil, *op.cit.*,p. 236.

¹²⁸ Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*,p.47.

Sunnah cannot be changed with the *bid'ah* (innovation).¹²⁹ Actually, the Prophet did not aim to establish a state, instead, just aimed to create a social order to provide a unity of anarchical tribes.¹³⁰ In Islam, social order is the most important thing and can only be provided via the oneness of authority. Oneness of authority means the oneness of God and oneness of the leader at the same time. In opposition to the concept of Shi'ite *imamate*, ibn Taymiyyah developed the concept of "*Khilafat al Nubuwwah*" that means successor to the prophecy. Mu'tazilite caliphs of Abbasids, Ma'mun and Mu'tasim, also claimed their caliphate as the deputy of God, not of the Prophet by deriving from Mu'tazilah teachings. Ibn Taymiyyah strictly rejected both the God's deputy (Caliph) argument of the Mu'tazilites and the *imamate* of Shi'ite theories. Ibn Taymiyyah, like earlier Salafi scholars, defended the separation of affairs of Caliph and religious scholars. According to Mu'tazilah school, the Abbasid caliphs had the authority of interpreting the Qur'an and enforcing its rule in all areas of life. On the other hand, ibn Taymiyyah ambitiously defended the importance of scholars rather than caliphs in interpretation of Qur'an and making *ijtihad*.¹³¹

At that point, the reason behind ibn Taymiyyah's defense of Islamic state ruled by the Qur'anic law and caliphate was that religion and revelation brought order to Arab society, which was built over the tradition of ancestors, the Salaf. According to ibn Taymiyyah, there must be two important factors for a strong social order and a powerful state: the unity of faith and unity of language. The unity of faith must be Sunni, because the majority of the Islamic community was composed of Sunnis following the true path of pious ancestors, hadith and the Qur'an.¹³² The Shi'a were regarded as agents of other cultures and external powers within the Islamic community. Indeed, their long lasting opposition to incumbent Arab dynasties forced them away from Arab *ummah*'s political and religious identity. Ibn Taymiyyah strongly regarded Arabic language as the only language of communication, symbol

¹²⁹ Tariq al-Jamil, *op.cit.*, pp.236-237.

¹³⁰ Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*,p.63.

¹³¹ Amira K. Bennison, *op.cit.*,p.34.

¹³² Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*p.118.

of Islam, while the use of another language was forbidden. Arabic was the language of the Prophet, and he condemned the use of another language in the state and the social life as against Islam.¹³³ For ibn Taymiyyah, Arabic as the state language and as a tool of cultural and spiritual unity of Islam could prevent the differences and provide solidarity.¹³⁴

According to Vali Nasr, Sunnism is based on the law and legalism embedded in the written message of Islam, but the Shi'ism is mostly on rituals, passions and drama. While Sunnism read the tribal sensibilities, interrelations, characteristics better and took them for granted, Shi'ism mostly ignored these realities and had expectations from saints, heroes, ascetic figures and charismatic characters such as imams, mahdis, sayyids.¹³⁵ Sunnism traced itself back to the tradition and to a sanctified past, but looked at the affairs in a realpolitik way. It does not adhere to esoteric, ascetic, mystic and inner meanings. It prefers to stick to what is written in the Qur'an and what the Prophet and the Companions told and practiced. The Shi'a as an opposition always tried to attribute knowledge to an intercessor rather than the direct message, because the direct message always serves for the established order and sovereign power. In sum, ibn Taymiyyah tried to defend the long lasting existing authority of the Sunni rule, because the Sunni rule, the Umayyads and Abbasids, always governed the *ummah*. Social order and authority were provided by these Sunni caliphates during the centuries.

The Shi'a had a different place among other listed enemy groups of political Salafis because the Shi'ites, rather than Iranians, emerged within Arabs, and thus seen as betrayers due to their cooperation with the Mongols. Even, the Isma'ili Fatimids collaborated with the Crusaders against the Abbasids, and the other Isma'ili occultationist Qarmatians had given serious harm to the Abbasids and to the holy belongings of Islam in the earlier period. The other militant mystic Isma'ili Shi'ite group, the Assassins, also harmed the Sunni Sultanate of the Seljuks, who were the protectors of the caliphate. The Shi'ite vizier of the last Abbasid Caliph, Mu'ayyid al

¹³³ Ibid, p.118.

¹³⁴ Ibid,p.119

¹³⁵ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *op.cit.*,pp.52 and 58.

Din Ibn al Alqami cooperated with the invading Mongols in 1258 for the fall of Baghdad thus betrayed the Sunni Abbasid caliphate.¹³⁶ For these reasons, the betrayal of Arabs to other Arabs was a more serious case for ibn Taymiyyah. He viewed them as a more serious threat from inside, and tried to refute their belief system, jurisprudence and their *imamate* theory by blaming them for bringing Iranian customs and archaic beliefs into Islam. Ibn Taymiyyah targeted not only Shi'ites, but also Sufis and Ash'aris. The Sufi disciples led by Muhiyyal Din al Arabi and ibn Sab'in, and believers of the mystic union (*wahdat al wujud*) were blamed for bringing innovation and pacifying the jihadist tendencies of the Muslims in their holy defense against the Mongol invasion.¹³⁷ The Ash'aris, as the middle way between Hanbalism and rationalist Mu'tazilah, spread in the Middle East and became more powerful in Syria and Egypt than the Hanbalis.¹³⁸ In Egypt, the Ayyubids and Mamluks were Ash'aris, too.¹³⁹ The political Salafis had to cooperate with other Sunni *madhabs* although they ultimately did not embrace *kalam*-based schools' belief systems insofar as they tried to ground their theologies in rational and logical methods, and free choice.¹⁴⁰ The solidarity between ibn Taymiyyah and Sultan Qalawun of the Mamluks against the Mongol invasion in Damascus was the best example about the emergent cooperation between the traditionalist Hanbalis and the Ash'ari Sunnis. Political Salafi influence in the early Abbasid Baghdad and later ibn Taymiyyah's influence over Damascus during the Mongol era was particularly clearer in periods of threat, attack, civil strife, chaos or invasion. In state of crisis and emergency, the tendency to return to the tradition and the way of pious ancestors became stronger among Sunni Arabs. This is perceived as the defense of Sunni Arabs throughout history against the defined threats.

¹³⁶ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *op.cit.*, p.82; Denise Aigle, *op.cit.*, p. 118.

¹³⁷ Denise Aigle, *op.cit.*, pp.100-101 ; Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*, p.9; Albert Hourani, *op.cit.*, in note 48, p.,72; Amira K. Bennison, *op.cit.*, p. 174.

¹³⁸ Racha el Omari, *op.cit.*, p.102.

¹³⁹ Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*, p.3.

¹⁴⁰ Racha el Omari, *op.cit.*, p.115.

2.4.2. New Perception of Threats in the Time of ibn Taymiyyah

The challenges, argumentation, and interpretation on behalf of the Iranian culture by *Shu'ubiyyah*-affiliated scholars were regarded as a menace to the unity of faith and language by the Arab Sunni ulama. In addition, Iranian autonomous local lords revolted against the Sunni Arab rule and gained their independence then began suppressing the Caliphate. The Shi'a insurgencies expanded throughout the Caliphate then the Ismailis as a different faction of Shi'ites were able to establish their own states such as the Fatimids and Qarmatis. In that atmosphere, ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328) became the voice of Arab response to uprisings, religious/sectarian and cultural movements that targeted the superiority and survival of the Sunni Arab *ummah*. Ibn Taymiyah defended the unity of faith and unity of language as representing the Arab defined Islam. Ibn Taymiyyah rejected the intercession (*shafa'ah*), common in Sufism and the Shi'a, and saw it as an obstacle to the unity of faith.¹⁴¹ Intercession causes damage to the unity of God, *tawhid*, by creating many holy people, friends of God, who claim to share the power of God in forgiving people in the Day of Judgment. Ibn Taymiyyah also saw the case of intercession as a cause of polytheism (*shirk*). According to ibn Taymiyyah, Sufism and Shi'a were the sources of intercession and polytheism, and they harmed the unity of faith and *tawhid*. Arabization of Islam and the superiority of Arabic tongue must be priority for these reasons.¹⁴² He launched some fatwas emphasizing the necessity of a state, a ruler, the *ummah* and social order in the dark and chaotic age of the Arab world. To understand the rising of ibn Taymiyyah and his Salafist movement, one needs to look at the political and social atmosphere of the Middle East in the 13th century. Ibn Taymiyyah's movement aimed to preserve the Arab defined Islam and to restore the unity of faith based on Sunnism. The birth of ibn Taymiyyah's Salafi movement reemerged because of the long lasting developments and challenges including the Shi'a uprisings and the Iranian role in revolts that lasted from the early years of Abbasid reign until its collapse. Towards the 12th and 13th century, the Abbasids

¹⁴¹ Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*,p.114.

¹⁴² Ibid,pp.114-115.

came to the brink of total destruction and fall. In this political atmosphere, ibn Taymiyyah emerged with his Salafi ideas to save the Sunni Islam.

The decline and collapse of the Abbasids damaged the unity of the *ummah* in the Muslim world, and this made the Muslims' lands vulnerable to foreign interventions and domestic revolts. The Abbasid Caliphate could not keep its borders in unity due to many local uprisings therefore survived in a fragmented form. The Tahirids in Iran and Khorasan (821-873), the Saffarids in Iran (861-1003), the Samanids in Transoxonia and Khorasan (819-999) were all Iranian dynasties. The Hamdanids in Syria and Northern Iraq (890-1004), the Idrisids in Morocco were Shi'a and the Tulunids in Egypt (868-884) was Turkic. All them fragmented the Abbasid Empire and established their rules over the Caliphate's former territories. In addition, the Buyid dynasty (943-1062) of Twelver Shi'a and Iranian-Daylamite stock revolted against the Abbasids while they were mercenaries of the Caliph in Baghdad. They captured Baghdad in 945 and ruled Iraq, Iran and Oman for years.¹⁴³ The Buyids had been Zaydiyah who then converted to Twelver Shi'ism and were Sassanid revivalist as the other Iranian stock dynasties were.¹⁴⁴ They were so keen on the revival of the Sassanids that they used the old Sassanid symbols and the title of *Shahanshah* (king of kings) for their rulers. In addition, they attributed their descent to the Sassanid Emperor Bahram Gur (421 to 439).¹⁴⁵ The same Sassanid revivalism took place in the state structure of Samanid dynasty in Khorasan. They also used the title of *shahanshah*, claimed to be the descent of the Sassanian Emperor Bahram Ghubin (590-591) and promoted *Shu'ubiyyah* movement, Persian language, literature and poetry against Arab culture and language to create a more flexible Islamic

¹⁴³ David Dean Commins, *The Gulf states: a modern history*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), p.28 ; Monika Gronke, *op.cit.*, p.27 ; Daylamites were the Iranian stock originally from the southwest area of the Caspian Sea. They were Shi'a as a sectarian identity. They served for the mercenary forces for the Abbasid rulers as Turkish mercenaries did. Tensions between Shi'ite Daylamite and Sunni Turkish mercenaries increased from time to time during the Abbasid period. The Daylamite mercenaries founded the Buyid dynasty by benefiting from the weakness of the Abbasids in 945. The Buyids survived until 1062. They even captured Baghdad and took the Sunni Abbasid Caliph under their rule. The Sunni Seljuq Turks freed Baghdad and the Abbasid caliph from the Buyids in 1055.

¹⁴⁴ Monika Gronke, *op.cit.*, p. 27

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 28

civilization for Persians.¹⁴⁶ The Shi'ite Buyids in Baghdad were despised so much in the Sunni Arab history that they were blamed for preventing the Caliph to send mujahideens against the Byzantine attacks on its former provinces in the east, and for damaging the faith and social order of the society by spreading Shi'a belief in Baghdad.¹⁴⁷ They allowed the commemorations of Ashura, celebration of Ali's designation in Ghumm to commemorate *Ghadir Ghumm* case, redesigned and saved the tombs of the Shi'ite Imams from the Bedouin Arab attacks.¹⁴⁸ The Turkic Seljuq dynasty rescued the Sunni Abbasids from the Buyid occupation. The liberation of the Abbasid Caliphate by the Turks enabled them to legitimize the Turkish sultanate throughout the *ummah*.¹⁴⁹ The alliance of Arabs and Turks were established under the banner of Sunni Islam against the Shi'a in the 11th century. This alliance was later extended towards the Sunni Mamluks. In addition to the ongoing menaces since the early decades of the Abbasids, three major challenges emerged from the 10th century to the 13th century. These were Ismaili Shi'a, the Crusaders' and the Mongol Tatars' invasion. The attacks of these three powers against the Abbasids caused the Sunni-Salafi offensive doctrine to rise again.

2.4.2.1. *Shi'ite Ismaili Rise*

Shi'a Isma'iliyah, as other religious and sectarian movements in Islam such as Sunni, Shi'a, and the *Kharijites*, emerged among the Arabs first.¹⁵⁰ In the 8th century, Imam Jafar al Sadiq, the sixth imam of Alid clan and his Shi'a followers, formulated a diverse jurisprudence of the Shi'a law apart from the Sunni legal doctrine in terms of inheritance, religious taxes, commerce and personal affairs. For example, he formulated the *Muta* marriage, the *Nass* doctrine or divine designation (the divinely

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, pp. 25-26

¹⁴⁷ Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*, p.19.

¹⁴⁸ Monika Gronke, *op.cit.*, pp. 28-29.

¹⁴⁹ Amira K Bennison, *op.cit.*, p.45.

¹⁵⁰ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *op.cit.*, p.77.

inspiration of the imam by his predecessor), *Ismah* (the infallibility of the imams) and *Taqiyyah* (the denial of religious belief under suppression and torture).¹⁵¹ Before he died, Jafar appointed his son Ismail as the following imam after him through the *Nass* doctrine but Ismail died before his father, therefore he appointed his other son Musa for the *imamate* but this event split the Shi'a followers in two. One group claimed that Ismail's son Mohammed deserved to be the seventh imam and split from the main Shi'ite group. After the split, Ismail's son Mohammad suddenly disappeared and this disappearance caused mysticism and occultation (*ghaybah*) to define the movement for following centuries. The same occultation case is also valid in the Twelver Shi'a, and the main path was represented by Jafar al Sadiq's another son Musa. When Mohammad al Mahdi, the 12th Imam, disappeared suddenly in 874, the line of imams also disappeared. It is believed that he will return to the world in a messianic way.

Imam Jafar also took up quietist path by condemning the Shi'ite uprisings led by Muhammad in Hejaz and Ibrahim in Basra during Caliph al Mansur's reign. He proposed the quietist path for followers not to lose so much power owing to extreme persecution. The rule of *Taqiyyah*, denial of the belief and act like a member of majority, was justified within this quietist form. However, the Seven Imam (Isma'ili) branch of Shi'a chose a more radical and militant approach against the Sunni Abbasids by organizing many uprisings in North Africa, Syria, Eastern Arabia and Iran.¹⁵² The Isma'ilis first had their influence areas in the southern Iraq, Syria and Arabian Peninsula, and then spread their belief by missionaries throughout the Middle East and North Africa as an underground resistance movement.

The first split between Ismailis occurred between Hamdan Qarmat and Ubayd Allah al Mahdi Billah. Both Hamdan Qarmat and Ubayd Allah were accepted as the returned imam or *hujjah*, the representative of the Mahdi.¹⁵³ The Qarmatians firstly operated in the Eastern Arabia through agents and missionaries in 894, occupied the towns of Syria in 902, and finally captured Syria in 968. They did not hesitate to

¹⁵¹ Ibid, p.69.

¹⁵² Amira K Bennison, *op.cit.*,p.40.

¹⁵³ Ibid,p.40.

attack, and plundered Mecca and pilgrims even stole the divine Black Stone from the Ka'bah. For twenty years, they kept it in their hands and were persuaded to give it back in return for ransom.¹⁵⁴ On the other side, the Fatimids, who came from the path of Ubaydullah al Mahdi Billah, founded a base in North Africa first in 909. They spread to Egypt, founded their caliphate in Fustat in 972 and then built the city of Cairo as a capital.¹⁵⁵ The name of the caliphate was derived from Fatimah, the daughter of the Prophet and the wife of Caliph Ali. The Fatimids were accused of collusion with the Crusaders against the Sunni alliance of Seljuks and Abbasids. They did not avoid surrounding Sunni Islam while the Crusaders attacked. In addition to Fatimids, the Assassins, another Isma'ili group, based in their headquarters in the fortress of Alamut in Iran, assassinated the Seljuk rulers to weaken Sunni Islam while the Seljuk forces were struggling against the Crusading attacks. The Iranian population in Iran supported the Assassins because the Assassin's opposition to the Turkic Seljuks was an expression of Iranian hatred. Each revolt against the Sunni dominance in the region found support from the Iranians. The well-known leader of the Assassins, Hasan Sabbath, chose to speak Persian in place of Arabic for religious rituals of Isma'ili in Iran.¹⁵⁶ For the Assassins, the Seljuks replaced the Abbasids in their hostility towards the Shi'ites and aimed to destroy the Fatimids, with which the Assassins had an alliance. The Isma'ilis in Syria also cooperated with the Crusaders against the Seljuks.¹⁵⁷

The Abbasids had been exposed to long proceeding Iranian, Shi'a revolts, and the attacks secret militants of Fatimids, Qarmatis and the Assassins. Besides, the Zanj Revolt in the south of Iraq by revolutionary Ali ibn Muhammad and his followers, black slaves, and destruction of irrigation and economic system of the caliphate led to the fragmentation of political union of the Abbasids into pieces in the hands of regional governors from Khorasan to Maghreb. The Abbasid dynasty came under the

¹⁵⁴ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143,p.27.

¹⁵⁵ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143,p.27 ; Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*,p.19.

¹⁵⁶ Farhad Daftary and Omar Ali-de-Unzaga, "Hasan Sabbah", *The Institute of Ismaili Studies*.

¹⁵⁷ Farhad Daftary, introduction to *The Assassin Legends: Myths of Ismailis*. (London: I.B.Tauris,1994), pp.2-9.

hegemony of Shi'ite Buyids for a while and Twelver Shi'a spread. Then, the campaigns of Crusaders to Muslim territories, Crusaders' alliance with Fatimids, Ilkhanids and Shi'ites, the Mongol invasion and penetration over Sunni Islam caused Arabs to develop temporary cures to break these surroundings and cope with these prolonged troubles. These long lasting sieges and troubles over the Sunni Abbasid rule contributed to the rise of political Salafism in a time. But, the real threat which led to the rise of political Salafism was the Mongol invasion and the fall of the Abbasid caliphate.

2.4.2.2. Mongol Invasion and Ibn Taymiyyah's Jihad Fatwas

Most of the Salafi followers moved to Damascus after Baghdad's fall in 1258. Ibn Taymiyyah's family also fled to Damascus from Harran because of the Mongol invasion.¹⁵⁸ Both his father and his grandfather were ibn Hanbal's followers, and his grandfather ibn Qudamat was a prominent Salafi scholar. Therefore, Damascus became the main base for the Salafi School after the fall of Baghdad. The last main Sunni Arab rule, the Abbasids, was invaded and the Mongols plundered Baghdad. The decline of the Turkish Seljuk sultanate as a close ally of the Abbasid caliph caused Arabs to take their own precautions for themselves. The challenge of ibn Taymiyyah was an example of Arab's response to heavy conditions imposed over them. The invasion of Baghdad led to the abolition of the last great Arab dynasty, the Abbasids, one of the great clans of the Quraysh, which ruled for five hundred years. The caliphate in Baghdad maintained its puppet position in Cairo but was not effective over the Sunni Muslims under the Mongol rule. The Mongol forces harmed the Sunni caliphate more than other Muslim hegemonies like the Shi'ite Buyids.

The Mongols headed towards Syria after Iraq and attempted to conquer Damascus from the Sunni Mamluks where they faced a great resistance from both Mamluk armies and local Arabs. Sunni people did not want to face the same

¹⁵⁸ M. Sait Özervarli, "The Qur'anic Rational Theology of Ibn Taymiyya and his Criticism of the Mutakallimun" in *Ibn Taymiyya and his times*, ed. Yossef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed, (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2010).79 ; Christopher Melchert, *op.cit.*,p.81 ; Salman Hassan Al-Ani and Shadia Ahmad, introduction to *Ibn Taymiyyah Kitab al Iman*, trans. and ed. Salman Hassan Al-Ani and Shadia Ahmad Tel, (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2009),pp.1-2.

massacre that the Arabs had faced earlier in Baghdad.¹⁵⁹ Ghazan Khan, the Ilkhanid ruler, attacked three times to Syria, and the Mamluk armies defended. In these campaigns, ibn Taymiyyah participated in the Mamluk armies against the Mongols. In 1300, he participated in the campaign against Shi'ites in Lebanon who were cooperating with the Crusaders and the Mongols. The Lebanese locals including Druzes, Maronites, Shi'ites and Nusayris resisted the Mamluk expeditions and invasions. Ibn Taymiyyah added them to the list of *takfir* together with Mongols in his second fatwa.¹⁶⁰ Ibn Taymiyyah was jailed many times when he was in Cairo, first time being in 1305, by the Mamluk authorities because of his puritan beliefs and activities against the Sufis, Mu'tazilah and other *madhabs'* scholars. The second time, he was again jailed in 1311 and was released after the succession of Mamluk Sultan Malik al Nasir Mohammad ibn Qalawun to the Mamluk throne. The new sultan ibn Qalawun respected ibn Taymiyyah and offered him to cooperate against the Mongol invasion.¹⁶¹

Damascus changed hands between the Mamluks and Ilkhanids a few times. The first invasion of Damascus led by Ghazan happened in December 1299. Even ibn Taymiyyah directly met Ghazan Khan with a delegation of Damascus notables for not plundering the city.¹⁶² As a response, Ghazan Khan promised him not to plunder and storm the city but he did not keep his promise. According to the Salafi allegations, Ghazan's converted chief vizier Rashid al Din, a Jewish descent, and the Christians in his court persuaded the Khan to storm Damascus, to have drinking parties in the streets, to occupy Damascus mosque; accordingly, to hurt the feelings of Sunni Arabs.¹⁶³ Christians of Syria and Egypt had cooperated with the Crusaders and therefore were regarded as spies and secret collaborators of Europeans and Mongols by ibn Taymiyyah. For these reasons, he added non-Muslims to the list of enemies in his fatwa. This is indeed a controversial story because the Qur'an ordered

¹⁵⁹ Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*p.18.

¹⁶⁰ Tariq al-Jamil, *op.cit.*pp. 233-234; Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*,p.90.

¹⁶¹ Salman Hassan Al-Ani and Shadia Ahmad, *op.cit.*,pp.6-7.

¹⁶² Racha el Omari, *op.cit.*,pp.100-103.

¹⁶³ Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*,p.114 ; Denise Aigle, *op.cit.*,p. 103.

Muslims to leave Christians and Jews free in their prayers and lifestyles. However, their close collaboration with the invading powers, the Crusaders and Mongols, demonstrated that they were not loyal and sincere to the Sunni Arab world.¹⁶⁴ In contrast to the Qur'an, ibn Taymiyyah did not avoid targeting them in his fatwas. The composition of Ghazan Khan's armies of Armenians and Georgians as well as Muslim soldiers infuriated ibn Taymiyyah mostly. He, as a political Salafi scholar, did not tolerate the betrayal of Christians in Muslim territories.¹⁶⁵

In 1303, the battle of Shaqhab was concluded with the Mamluk victory while Ghazan had a heavy defeat. In this battle, ibn Taymiyyah fought within the Mamluk fronts against the Mongols. He even released a fatwa for the Mamluk soldiers allowing them not to fast during Ramadan in the war.¹⁶⁶ Then, the Ilkhanids under the rule of Oljeitu Khan marched towards Damascus again in 1312. He invaded Damascus. Ibn Taymiyyah participated among the Mamluk troops against the Mongolians to defend the Levant region.¹⁶⁷ During the invasions of Ghazan and Oljeitu, Sunni notables and people in Damascus suffered much from the plunder and storming. Ibn Taymiyyah wrote three main fatwas to encourage jihad against primarily Mongols then their collaborators such as Shi'ites, local Christians, Nusayris, and the Mamluk soldiers who switched to the Ilkhanid side in the war.

In the first fatwa, ibn Taymiyyah targeted the people who did not practice the main pillars of the faith, such as groups that did not pray five times a day, fast, pay alms and perform pilgrimage, and refused to take part in jihad, did not order good and forbid evil "*al Amr bi al-Maruf wa al Nahy an al Munkar*".¹⁶⁸ This first fatwa prepared the structure of two other fatwas and *takfir* of other groups. Ibn Taymiyyah directly targeted Mongols as polytheists, and blamed them for not sincere with their conversion to Islam. Mamluk sultan Qalawun also agreed with ibn Taymiyyah and

¹⁶⁴ Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*, pp.113-114.

¹⁶⁵ Denise Aigle, *op.cit.*, p. 99.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, p.105.

¹⁶⁷ Denise Aigle, pp.90 and 118.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, p.99.

supported ibn Taymiyyah's fatwas, which aimed to create an ultimate resistance in Sunni territories against the invaders and their collaborators.¹⁶⁹ Ibn Taymiyyah firstly tried to refute Ghazan's conversion to Islam. Because there was a common belief of Ghazan's sincerity in conversion to Islam and being a good Muslim among Muslim Mamluk troops, they avoided fighting an army of a Muslim Mongol ruler. Therefore, ibn Taymiyyah firstly hit Mongol khans' conversion by fatwa. He blamed him for not being on the right path of pious followers, the Salaf, and for not enforcing the Qur'anic Shari'ah law in administrative affairs. For ibn Taymiyyah, the state must be ruled according to the religious laws. The Mongolian traditional and cultural laws "Yasa" were valid in the Ilkhanid court. According to ibn Taymiyyah, the conversion of Oljeitu to Shi'a Islam was more dangerous. That means inclusion of the Shi'ites in Mongol policy in the region and an opportunity for revenge of the Shi'ites from Sunni Arabs.¹⁷⁰ The belief of Shi'ite dominance in the Ilkhanid court was widespread in Sunni circles. The Shi'a's takeover of Ilkhanid regime directly influenced the holy places of Islam, Hejaz.

In fact, Ghazan and then Oljeitu attempted to boost their position in the Muslim world, to become the leader of *ummah* and to succeed in the Abbasids. Ghazan's claim for the leadership of the *ummah* was considered as an Iranian strategy organized by Iranian bureaucracy within Ghazan Khan's court. Ghazan's vizier Nawruz of Iranian descent encouraged him to convert to Islam and declared himself the second Abu Muslim.¹⁷¹ In addition, Iranian scholar Nasir al Din al Baydawi attributed Ghazan the bravery of Rostam, the Iranian historical heroic figure and justice of Anushirvan, King of the archaic Persian Empire. Even, Ghazan Khan began using black banners for his armies to imitate the Abbasid Caliphate, because both Nawruz and Ghazan aimed to make Ilkhanids successor to the Abbasids in the Muslim world. Probably the Shi'ites and Iranians in the Mongol court advised these policies to the Mongol rulers. Because Mongols were alien in the region after a recent conquest, they pursued political advises given by Iranians

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 97.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, *op.cit.*, pp. 96 and 118.

¹⁷¹ Abu Muslim al Khorasani, who destroyed the Umayyads and helped the Abbasids to replace the caliphate. He was a Persian descent rebellious commander.

aristocrats, scholars and administrators. Since they did not recognize the local communities and were alien to their cultures, histories, religions and life styles, they had to pursue policies and advices of some local groups, their local allies, to adapt the new regions.¹⁷² The best collaborators were the previous dissidents and sectarian, ethnic or political minorities: Iranians, Christians and Shi'ites.

While the influence of the Mongol regime accelerated in the Fertile Crescent; Hejaz, the holy cities of Mecca and Madinah were affected by the developments. In Mecca and Madinah, the traditionalist Maliki School lost its influence and was replaced with the Shi'ite beliefs because of the flow of the Shi'ite Arab immigrants from Eastern Arabia to Hejaz in early 12th century. Hudaymah, Amir of Mecca, and Oljeitu Khan got in a sectarian alliance in order to increase the Shi'ite and Mongolian regime's influence over Hejaz.¹⁷³ Ibn Taymiyyah wrote his "Minhaj al Sunnah" in 1317 as a response to this alliance.¹⁷⁴ After the conquest of Damascus, the increase of *bid'ah* in Mecca alarmed the Salafi scholars and their Mamluk allies. According to ibn Taymiyyah, the Mamluks were the only carrier of the banner of Islam in the Muslim world with their Sunni identity. After the fragmentation of the Sunni Seljuks in 1092, the Mamluks were the only Sunni power that could protect Sunni Islam from the Shi'a expansion under the Mongol patronage.¹⁷⁵

The most important fatwa related to the current time jihadist movements was perhaps the third one relating to the Mamluk renegades who switched to the Mongol side during the wars. Ibn Taymiyyah declared them as apostates and listed them at the top of the hierarchy to be fought. He interpreted their apostate situation by giving examples from the history of the Rashidun era, the case of alm (*zakat*) withholders during the era of Caliph Abu Bakr (632-634). A group of Muslims refused to pay their alms, and they were termed as apostates by the Caliph although they prayed, fasted and did not harm other Muslims. Ibn Taymiyyah asserted that these apostates

¹⁷² Denise Aigle, *op.cit.*, pp. 106-107.

¹⁷³ Tariq al-Jamil, *op.cit.*, p.234.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, p.235.

¹⁷⁵ Qamaruddin Khan, *op.cit.*, p.19.

were worse than the infidels were and deserved to be killed even.¹⁷⁶ The fatwas also aimed to persuade the Sunni Mamluk soldiers not to believe in the Ilkhanid ruler's sincerity on his conversion to Islam. Since Mamluk soldiers saw the Mongols as true Muslims, they hesitated to fight against them. Both Sultan Qalawun of the Mamluks and ibn Taymiyyah emphasized that Mongols' sincerity was tactical, and they were the enemies of Islam.¹⁷⁷ Ibn Taymiyyah compared the Mongols to the withholders (who rejected to pay alm) in the era of Abu Bakr, and to the *Kharijites*. According to ibn Taymiyyah, the Mongols did not obey the Shari'ah of the Qur'an and maintained their reliance on Genghis's Laws (*Yasa*), so their devoutness could not be accepted, and they were to be declared as apostates. Caliph Abu Bakr fought against a group among the early Muslims (*al Salaf al Salih*), who rejected some obligations of the faith like giving alms. The *Kharijites* also disobeyed the deeds of the Companions, the Salaf, and attempted to assassinate them. The position of the Mongols was equated to these two groups, betraying the pious companions.¹⁷⁸ The Mongols were believed to be the close collaborators of the Crusaders just like local Christians and Jews. Ghazan Khan contacted Pope Boniface VIII and King Philip IV of France, Henri II de Lusignan of Cyprus by sending letters for military assistance and forming a united front against the Mamluks. Oljeitu also pursued the same policy and established military alliances with England and France with the same purpose but did not refrain from claiming the leadership of Islam either.¹⁷⁹ Ibn Taymiyyah dedicated himself to find out and uncover Ghazan's secret plans, aims and hostility against the Sunnis.

In sum, ibn Taymiyyah's fatwas aimed to secure the Sunnis from attacks first. Therefore, he cooperated with the Sunni Mamluks to get their help to preserve Sunni Islam. The large composition of enemies included primarily the Mongols and the Shi'ites, Iranians and Christians in the Mongolian courts, administration and military.

¹⁷⁶ Denise Aigle, *op.cit.*,p. 103.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid*,p. 97.

¹⁷⁸ David Thomas , "Apologetic and Polemic in the Letter from Cyprus and Ibn Taymiyya's Jawab al-sahih li-man baddala din al-Masih" in in *Ibn Taymiyya and his times*, ed. Yossef Rapoport and Shahab Ahmed, (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 2010), 358; Denise Aigle, *op.cit.*,pp. 102-103.

¹⁷⁹ Denise Aigle, *op.cit.*,p. 93.

Shi'ite preacher al Allama al Hilli wrote a book named "*Minhaj al Karamah*" for the Ilkhanid ruler Oljeitu, who recently converted to Shi'a. Oljeitu's demands and attempt to penetration over the holy lands in Hejaz under the Shi'ite fifth column activities forced ibn Taymiyyah to write "*Minhaj al Sunnah*" as a counter response to refute the *imamate* belief of the Shi'ite scholar. In addition, Ghazan Khan's "*Aman*", a document written on the vision of the Mongolian ruler for the leadership of Islam forced ibn Taymiyyah to release the fatwas. The fatwas mainly pointed to the enemies listed one by one. Ibn Taymiyyah attempted to prove the current Mongolian regime and its leaders' similarities with other cases during the Rashidun era such as the *zakat* withholders and *Kharijites*, and then called them as apostates. He included the Mamluk renegade soldiers, who shifted to the Mongol side in a war, to this category. For him, a Muslim must obey the Shari'ah, the Qur'an and the true path of *al Salaf al Salih*, and participate in holy jihad and order good and forbid evil in addition to regular pray, fasting and pilgrimage. Otherwise, he could be termed as an apostate.¹⁸⁰ This doctrine was developed to legitimate the jihad against the ones who operated against the Sunni authority.

2.4.3. Conclusion: The Birth and Rise of Political Salafism in the Medieval Age

This Chapter focused on how Salafi creed emerged in the early Islamic era, especially during the Abbasid period. Salafism emerged as a reactive movement against the defined *bid'ahs* in Islam. It is believed that *bid'ahs* were brought into the religion by late converts, who were non-Arab believers, particularly Iranians. For that reason, Salafism, formulated by the traditionalist Sunni Arab scholars, displayed a reaction to these *bid'ah* beliefs and ideas within Islamic culture. Mu'tazilah creed formulated by Iranian scholars with the help of philosophy and reasoning was regarded as the first perception of threat. Then, Sufism was targeted by the Salafis because of its esoteric and mystic innovations in Islam. In addition, *Shu'ubiyyah* movement that promoted Persian language and literature was regarded as another

¹⁸⁰ The term apostate was used by Mohammad Abdel Salam Faraj, the author of *al-farida al gha'iba* (the neglected duty), in modern Egypt for the secular incumbent regime in Egypt and for legitimizing jihad against such regimes in the early 1980s.

threat against Arab superiority and culture in Islam. The conflict and rivalry in the field of religious matters and cultural affairs spilled over political issues after a while. The rivalry between the Arab and Iranian factions within the Abbasid Empire caused Salafi scholars to develop a political approach against the Iranians and rival Shi'a faction. Salafi creed developed political Salafism during this strife. The Shi'ites were regarded as the collaborators of Iranians, and were listed as number one enemy in the threat lists. Abbasid history was fulfilled with the strife and struggle between Shi'ites and political Salafis for decades. Iranians also applied religious methods such as Mu'tazilah or Sufism to struggle against political Salafism in the Abbasid era. Through that way, Iranians tried to penetrate on the Abbasid administration and even gained a success for a while. But, political Salafism became a voice and vanguard force of Sunni Arabs within the empire and maintained their opposition to the caliphs, who were Iranian oriented beliefs' sympathizers. Political Salafism took a more strong shape after the destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate in 1258 by Mongols. Political Salafi scholars led by ibn Taymiyyah applied political Salafi principles for mobilizing the Sunni Arabs against the Mongols in Syria and Levant regions. Political Salafis got in alliance with Mamluk sultans to defend Sunni territories against the Mongols. They also regarded Iranians and Shi'ites as perception of threat by blaming them for cooperating with the Mongol leaders against the Sunni rule in the region. The jihad *fatwas* released by ibn Taymiyyah for mobilizing the Sunni Arabs became effective to form a turmoil in the region and cease the Mongol expansion. In brief, political Salafism developed upon a perception of threats, which were believed to target the Sunni rule and Arab superiority. In addition, political Salafism strengthened when the Sunni Arabs were surrounded and fell in predicament in Islamic history. Political Salafism has an aim of defending the authority of Sunnis against other sectarian groups too. In the medieval age, political Salafism emerged as a protector of the Sunni rule and authority against foreign threats, and perception of threats contributed to the development of political Salafism. On the other side, political Salafism would be a founding force of the authority in the 18th century in Arabia by applying its unification, mobilization and perception of threat instruments.

CHAPTER 3

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL SALAFISM IN THE FORMATION OF SAUDI RULES IN ARABIA

Political Salafism is the main driving force behind today's Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a religious and political movement. Political Salafism helped the Saudi clan to unify all Arabian tribes under a single authority and mobilize against the redefined threats in both Central Arabia and neighboring regions via the armed jihad method. In other words, it is a sub-branch of Salafism, which developed under the conditions of Arabia in the 18th century. Political Salafism's thoughts formulated by Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab benefited from the medieval Salafi scholars like Ahmad ibn Hanbal and ibn Taymiyyah. On the other hand, different from medieval political Salafism, it involved in the construction of authority and a political rule in Arabia: the Saudi emirates and then the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Political Salafism provided three instruments like unification, mobilization and perception of threat for the Saudis in Arabia. The operationalization of these three instruments led to the birth of the Saudi rule, which still lasts.

3.1. Perception of Threats by Political Salafism in Arabia

Political Salafism in 18th century Central Arabia emerged as a result of internal and external threats. The internal and external threats prevented the unity of Arabian tribes and urbanites in a single authority and blockaded the economic functions that needed the Gulf trade. The European powers' rivalry in the Gulf caused the blockade of trade in the Gulf and gave harm to the tribes in Eastern and Central Arabia. In addition, the lack of a central authority in Arabia caused instability and chaos in Arabia. Ibn Abd al Wahhab's teachings were embraced by the Central Arabian tribal

society rapidly. The Egyptian invasion and Rashidi emirate's invasion in Central Arabia destroyed the Saudi rule in history but could not prevent the expansion of political Salafism. Political Salafism brought the Saudi rule back each time after the invasions. The Saudi rule and political Salafism was so intertwined that Saudi ruler ibn Saud used political Salafism as a political power to sustain its authority. He firstly formed the Ikhwan movement through political Salafism for expansion in the region. Then he changed the perception of threat and allied with the British for taking diplomatic recognition from Great Britain. As a result, he destroyed the Ikhwan movement who resisted ibn Saud's change of perception of threat.

3.1.1. The Regional Threats in the Pre-Saudi Era and the Formation of Political Salafism's Perception of Threat

Towards the 18th century, Arabs in the Arabian Peninsula faced new challenges again, mainly in the Arabian Peninsula and even in Central Arabia. The Arabian Peninsula encountered economic, political and commercial blockades and sieges because of the chaotic disorder in the Gulf during the 17th and 18th centuries. Political Salafism put these threats, sieges and blockades in its list of perception of threats. The European maritime powers, beginning with the arrival of the Portuguese in the 16th century, surrounded the Persian Gulf; therefore, cut the breathing space for the Arabian homeland whose doors opened to the Indian Ocean through the Gulf Sea and al Hasa (Eastern Arabian coasts) region. Al Hasa region and Eastern Arabia had crucial importance for Central Arabia in commercial and economic sense, because it provided for the inner region by trade in the Gulf. The Gulf was very crucial because of the commerce between India and Arabia. Before the emergence of political Salafism, the politics and economy of Central Arabia was closely intertwined with al Hasa and the Persian Gulf. For political Salafism to sustain in Central Arabia, the Saudi emirate had to reach the Eastern Arabia's coast. This region was vital for economic sustainability of the Salafi based Saudi rule. For a political or religious movement to sustain and expand in Arabia, it needed to penetrate and expand alongside the Gulf where trade fed the Peninsula. According to St. John Philby, that was a matter of life and death. Khalid tribal confederation of al Hasa controlled and

dominated the tribes and towns in Central Arabia for a while, until the rise of the Saudi Emirate.¹⁸¹ The developments in the Persian Gulf directly influenced al Hasa and Eastern Arabia and had an impact on the Najd region of the Peninsula. The Gulf was put under threat by the arrival of the Portuguese who captured the Hormuz strait in 1515.¹⁸² The Portuguese had a monopoly over the Indian Sea trade in the 16th century, which lasted for hundred years. The Portuguese influence secured its position in the Gulf for almost half and a century.¹⁸³ The Europeans brought new ideas to the conduct of trade by warfare and propagation of alien values to the Gulf. The Catholic Church cooperated with the Portuguese by sending priests for their service.¹⁸⁴ In addition, the Portuguese naval forces in the Gulf had taken control of the trade routes to the Gulf and the Red Sea through blocking commercial traffic to the Red Sea and diverting it to the Gulf to strengthen their monopoly. They aimed to suppress the Mamluk Sultanate and damage their economic interests in sea trade, especially spice trade, in the years of 1502 to 1509. The Portuguese naval forces were then followed by the British first, and then by the Dutch navies in the Gulf in the early 17th century.¹⁸⁵ This caused an ultimate rivalry and conflict among the Europeans, which resulted in the defeat of the Portuguese on behalf of the Dutch and British. Wars, conflicts, rivalries or any developments in the Gulf directly affected both India and Arabia due to commercial, economic and cultural ties. The entrance of the Dutch and the British to the Gulf was encouraged by Safavid Iran. Safavid Iran, under the reign of Shah Abbas, first developed a policy of intervening the conflict in the Gulf. However, at that time, Iran depended on the British naval forces of the East Indian Company to oppose the Portuguese in the Gulf. With the help of the East Indian Company, Iran began pursuing imperial maritime ambitions in the Gulf. First, Shah Abbas conquered Bahrain from the Hawala Arab tribe and founded a stronghold there in 1602. This conquest of Bahrain was the beginning of the Iranian

¹⁸¹ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36,p.58 ; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*,in note 143,p.62.

¹⁸² Monika Gronke, *op.cit.*,p.82; Lawrence G Potter, *op.cit.*,p. 15.

¹⁸³ Lawrence G Potter, *op.cit.*,p.208; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143,p. 33.

¹⁸⁴ Lawrence G Potter, *op.cit.*,p.170; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143,p.36.

¹⁸⁵ Lawrence G Potter, *op.cit.*,p. 210 ; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143,pp.32-33.

influence in the Gulf politics. Then, it removed the Portuguese from the Hormuz strait and from the other Hormuzian possessions in the Gulf in 1614 and captured Jarun Island in 1622 with the British assistance.¹⁸⁶ The Safavid naval forces attempted to intervene even in Oman but could not get enough help from the British and Dutch. After the Safavid conquest of Bahrain in 1602, the Shi'a influence in Eastern Arabia, which had old roots dating back to the Qarmatian Shi'a period in the 14th century, began to reawaken again.¹⁸⁷ Increasing influence of the Shi'ites in the Arabian Peninsula and its islands was definitely disturbing the Sunni Arab tribes in Arabia.

In the 17th century, three other major powers emerged in the Gulf together with Iran against the Portuguese: the British, the Dutch and the Yaruba Imamate of Oman. All these powers sought to take some share from the commerce of spice, pepper, textile of India, Persian silk and East African ivory as well as slaves in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. The Omani Yaruba Imamate approached the Dutch and British East Indian Companies in order to escape from the alliance of the Portuguese and Arab sheikdoms putting heavy pressure upon Oman.¹⁸⁸ The alliances and mutual interaction among the Europeans, Iran, Oman and some Arab sheikdoms near the coast of the Persian Gulf created a chaotic disorder again.¹⁸⁹ The situation in the 17th century was almost similar. Najd region was in close contact with the regions including al Hasa, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait at that time. The disorder and conflict in Eastern Arabia was felt in Najd. Iran's influence increased and Nader Shah invaded Oman in 1737 and then Muscat in 1743 by benefiting from the internal conflict between the Ibadi ulama, tribes and Sultan of Oman.¹⁹⁰ In addition, tribal migrations accelerated throughout the 1700s towards southern Iraq, to cities such as

¹⁸⁶ Monika Gronke, *op.cit.*,p.82; Lawrence G Potter, *op.cit.*,p.213 ; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*,in note 36,p.80 .

¹⁸⁷ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143,p.49; Lawrence G Potter, *op.cit.*,p.15 ; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*,in note 36,p.58.

¹⁸⁸ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143,pp.32-33,and 49.

¹⁸⁹ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143,p.18.

¹⁹⁰ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143,p.69; Charles E Davies, *The blood-red Arab flag: an investigation into Qasimi piracy, 1797-1820*, (Exeter UK: University of Exeter Press, 1997),p.173.

Najaf and Karbala therefore the area of influence of Shi'ite Twelverism expanded. The tribal people gradually began converting to Shi'ism by visiting shrines, attending the Ashura commemorations and learning from the Shi'ite clerics. Through this way, migrant Arabs in southern Iraq were proselytized into the Shi'a doctrine.¹⁹¹ This gradual proselytizing of the Arab tribes and foreign penetration over Arabia led to a crisis between the southern Iraqis and desert Arabs who embraced political Salafism in the early 19th century. The crisis resulted in massacres and assassinations. The Iranian interference in the affairs of Arabs continued in the early 19th century. The Qasimi confederacy of coastal Arabs, dealing with pearl hunting, piracy and maritime trade split into half due to internal affairs. The Iranian Shah against his Salafi affiliated rival, the Saudis, recruited the Sultan of the Sharjah Emirate. The Sultan was even honored in a ceremony in Shiraz in 1814.¹⁹² These events were regarded as intervention in the internal affairs of Arabs, damaging the social and political structure of the nomadic Bedouins. Political Salafism led by the thoughts of ibn Abd al Wahhab rose in the region under these ongoing circumstances and developments.

3.1.2. Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab as the Founder of the Arabian Political Salafism

Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab was born in Ayaina town, Najd in 1703.¹⁹³ Arabian Peninsula was chaotic in terms of various sects, flourishing Sufi orders. There was no a political authority. According to George Rentz, a new era of jahiliyyah started in the 18th century. Arabs had forgotten the monotheistic doctrine, instead, began worshipping sacred stones, trees and graves of saints as intercessors of God. Rentz defined Sufism as worshipping stones and trees but his definition is quiet simple to interpret the case. In addition, according to John Philby, Arabs returned from the path of the oneness of God to praying to living or dead saints, believing in the

¹⁹¹ David Dean Commins, *op.cit*, in note 143, p.58.

¹⁹² Charles E Davies, *op.cit.*,p.136.

¹⁹³ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*,in note 36,p. 15.

spiritual power of rocks, stones, shrines, graves, tombs and trees.¹⁹⁴ At that point, Philby alleged the flourishing of the Sufi orders in Arabia too.

Arabia was exposed to Shi'ism for a long period. The city of Hejaz was exposed to Twelverism underpinned by Mongol-Shi'a Ilkhanid regime during Ghazan and Oljeitu Khans' rule. Eastern Arabia was exposed to the Isma'ili Qarmatian rule for decades. On the other hand, the crossroad position of the Arabian Peninsula and the arrival of Europeans and Ottomans into parts of the Peninsula contributed to the rise of various religious sects, *madhabs* and orders. The long lasting wars between the Sunni Ottomans and Shi'ite Iranians in Iraq caused turbulences in the Arab community in both the Fertile Crescent and Arabia.¹⁹⁵

Before ibn Abd al Wahhab launched his new formulation of political Salafism; Sufi orders had expanded in the form of tomb visiting culture, saints, intercession of the dead saints etc.¹⁹⁶ In the middle of the 18th century, ibn Abd al Wahhab travelled through the region and participated in debates with some scholars in the main Arab cities. David Commins made two claims about the process of shaping ibn Abd al Wahhab's opinions. Ibn Abd al Wahhab traveled to Iranian towns, Basra, Hejaz, Baghdad and Mosul. He spent time in Basra and southern Iraq in the 1730s. He might have witnessed the rise of Shi'ite creed and regarded the Shi'ite expansion as a threat there. In addition, Commins claimed that ibn Abd al Wahhab spent his time in Madinah, where there was a popular trend among scholars at the time, especially around the Indian Ocean cultural basin, on the hadith-based revivalism, criticizing Sufism.¹⁹⁷ He was involved in debates with some scholars and reshaped his ideas. Natana DeLong Bas also asserted that ibn Abd al Wahhab participated in the discussions of Hadith revivalist scholars such as Najdi Sheikh Abd Allah ibn Ibrahim ibn Sayf and Indian Sheikh Mohammad Hayat al Sindi. This is

¹⁹⁴ George Rentz and William Facey, *The birth of the Islamic Reform Movement in Saudi Arabia: Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703/4-1792) and the beginnings of Unitarian Empire in Arabia*, (London: Arabian Pub, 2004), p.19; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, p.4.

¹⁹⁵ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, p.12.

¹⁹⁶ Abd Allah al-Salih Uthaymin, *Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab: the man and his works*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), p.91; Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.*, in note 19, p.268.

¹⁹⁷ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, p.24.

highly probable as it was very common that religious scholars stayed in the holy cities and maintained their studies there. The trade between Arabia and India helped many scholars to exchange ideas.¹⁹⁸ Commins' argument makes more sense as ibn Abd al Wahhab's doctrine supports extreme Shi'aphobia. His experiences in the Iranian towns and southern Iraq might have contributed to the development of his new discipline. David Commins approached the matter from one side but the surrounding menaces for Arabs in the Arabian Peninsula caused a new unitarian movement in Central Arabia to emerge. These menaces were the expansion of Shi'ite creed, and Sufi orders in Iraq and Peninsula, the commercial and military blockades of Iranians and Europeans on the Gulf and Eastern Arabia. In addition, the Arab tribes were in disorder and in an anarchic situation; therefore, could not break the blockade in the Gulf. The Gulf was very vital for Arabia's economic sustainability and for the Saudi rule to maintain itself in Arabia.

The Arabian form of political Salafism taught by ibn Abdal Wahhab cannot be separated from the chaotic developments and anarchy surrounding Arabia. Ibn Abdal Wahhab's basic emphasis was monotheism (*tawhid*). He also emphasized the rejection of all types of Sufi orders and *bid'ah* traditions in the Peninsula. His emphasis on the rejection of intercession might have stemmed from the effects of Twelver Shi'ism.¹⁹⁹ His doctrine does not include philosophical reasoning or rational opinions so similar to ibn Taymiyyah's teachings in its promotion of *al Salaf al Salih* but with a stronger emphasis. To explain briefly, some types of *bid'ahs* and intercessions, which were regarded as minor polytheism by ibn Taymiyyah, were strictly forbidden and rejected by ibn Abd al Wahhab.²⁰⁰ Desert condition might be effective in its harshness. The geographical and climate conditions in the desert, lack of authority and rule, undisciplined various tribes. These conditions forced the reformist scholar to take harsher precautions and rules in his new discipline. Rather than the issue of apostate that ibn Taymiyyah focused widely, infidelity was emphasized more in ibn Abd al Wahhab's doctrine. Like Ahmad ibn Hanbal and ibn

¹⁹⁸ Natana J DeLong-Bas, *op.cit.*, p.20.

¹⁹⁹ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, p .12 ; Natana J DeLong-Bas, *op.cit.*, p.22 ; Zekeriya Kursun, *op.cit.*, pp.19-22; Zeki Iscan, *op.cit.*, p.34.

²⁰⁰ Abd Allah al-Salih Uthaymin, *op.cit.*, p.86.

Taymiyyah's teachings, ibn Abdal Wahhab pursued the way of the Salaf tradition. His movement was regarded as the revival of *tawhid* and the Sunnah in the Peninsula.²⁰¹

According to Carstein Niebuhr (1733-1815), European travelers and Ottomans mentioned the followers of this new political Salafi movement as 'Wahhabi'.²⁰² The Ottoman authorities used the names of Wahhabi and the *Kharijite* in their diplomatic statements to Mohammad Ali of Egypt (1805-1848).²⁰³ However, ibn Abd al Wahhab himself called *al muwahhidun* (wahid means one in Arabic, *muwahhidun* means the supporter of oneness, *tawhid*) and other sympathizers in Arabia called themselves as *Da'wah al Tawhid*, *al Da'wah al Muhammadiyyah*, *al Da'wah al Salafiyyah* or merely *Da'wah*.²⁰⁴ They only viewed the Qur'an as the source and just took what it is written into consideration without any philosophical interpretation. For that reason, they were criticized for accepting all the anthropomorphic knowledge without any interpretation or commentary. This clearly emphasized their loyalty to the tradition. In the tradition of pious ancestors, an alternation or addition cannot be made with the fear of corrupting the originality, which God revealed to the Prophet.²⁰⁵ On the other side, ibn Abd al Wahhab followed a realpolitik path rather than making millenarianistic claims such as proclaiming to be messiah or Mahdi, or having occultation beliefs. According to Philby:

He (ibn Abdal Wahhab) was never tempted to assume the guise of the promised Messiah. Mahdis have been common fruit on the trees that have grown up from Islamic seed in exotic lands, but for some reason that literalism of Arabia itself has never favoured such growths. The Wahhabi seer seems to stand out as a politician of amazing astuteness, appealing to just that embryo of fanaticism innate in the hedonistic materialism of the Arab race

²⁰¹ Abd Allah al-Salih Uthaymin, *op.cit.*, p. 113; Zekeriya Kursun, *op.cit.*, pp.60-61.

²⁰² Carsten Niebuhr (1733-1815) was a German Explorer. He traveled to Arabia in the 1760s. His souvenirs and observations were translated in English in 1792.

²⁰³ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *op.cit.*, in note 42, p.159.

²⁰⁴ Abd Allah al-Salih Uthaymin, *op.cit.*, p.110-111; Da'wah means call and cause.

²⁰⁵ Abd Allah al-Salih Uthaymin, *op.cit.*, p. 119.

which would enable him to achieve success in a cause that could be scarcely popular. He seems never to have had any ambition for temporal power, nor even to have coveted any kind of titular spiritual status...²⁰⁶

Desert conditions made Arabs think and behave in a more realpolitik way in many aspects compared to the Iranians or Arabs of the Fertile Crescent.

Ibn Abd al Wahhab did not only develop a religious doctrine, but further aimed to present a political project for Arabs in the 18th century. He sought many sponsors in different Arab cities including Mecca, Damascus, Baghdad and Basra.²⁰⁷ He was forced to exile in different towns in Central Arabia because of his thoughts. His travels in the neighboring regions for his religious research and observations might have encouraged him to prepare a new formulation of political Salafism. He witnessed and observed the surroundings and blockades of foreign newcomers, the European naval powers, and regional non-Arab elements like Safavid Iranians on the Gulf and in Eastern Arabia. In the end, ibn Abd al Wahhab was welcomed to al Dir'iyah, a small town in Najd and the headquarters of the Saud tribe. Ibn Abd al Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud, the leader of the Saud tribe, made an allegiance and agreed on spreading political Salafism towards Arabia together. This pact was strengthened with reciprocal promises. In this pact, Muhammad ibn Saud as the leader of Dir'iyah was seeking interest, and firstly guaranteed his lot from harvest, trade and the rest.²⁰⁸ The religious enthusiasm formed by the new political Salafi movement merged forces of al Dir'iyah, Ayama, Manfurah, Huraimala towns to enable them marching towards Riyadh, the capital of the future Saudi Emirate.²⁰⁹ After their launch of new political Salafi doctrine, fifty-one letters were sent to various rulers in the region for invitation. Among the rulers that the letters were sent, there were the governors of Damascus and Baghdad, Supreme Ayatollah in Najaf,

²⁰⁶ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, p.55.

²⁰⁷ Louis Alexandre Olivier de Corancez, *The history of the Wahabis: from their origin until the end of 1809*, (Reading UK: Garnet Publishing, c1995), p. 112.

²⁰⁸ Louis Alexandre Olivier de Corancez, *op.cit.*, p.112 ; George Rentz and William Facey, *op.cit.*, p.50; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 19, pp. 39-40.

²⁰⁹ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, p. 15.

Ottoman Sultan Selim III and the local rulers of the Maghreb.²¹⁰ In addition, Najd was ultimately isolated from the rest of the Muslim East and there were no sufficient scholars, who might have criticized them.²¹¹ Ibn Abd al Wahhab did not take any formal education from any formal religious institute or academic scholars for guidance in his studies. Thus, he built his own original discipline of political Salafism himself deriving from his self-readings.²¹² His doctrine was a rebirth of the religious monotheism in Arabia aiming to present a new political agenda, which had unification goals for the sake of the Arabian community. Ibn Abd al Wahhab's movement was not the first and only unifying reform movement in Arabia.²¹³ This jihad concept also included the struggle against *bid'ah* and harmful innovations under the rule of "*Al amr bi al Maruf wa al Nahy an al Munkar*".²¹⁴ According to DeLong Bas, ibn Abd al Wahhab's jihad concept can be defined as a collective duty, *fard kifayah* rather than *fard ayn*, personal duty. That means jihad is not compulsory for all Muslims in the world. It should aim the well-being of the whole Muslim community without any personal gain or glory, and should be bound to some basic rules.²¹⁵ According to ibn Abd al Wahhab, there are three main conditions for launching a holy jihad: first, the Muslims should encounter the enemy in his own residence, second the enemy should enter the Muslim land and threaten the Muslim community, the last the imam or ruler should declare a holy jihad.²¹⁶ At that point, the right of declaration of jihad belonged to Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab as an imam. During the period when he was alive, he had this power as the imam, even though Muhammad ibn Saud and his son Abd al Aziz held the political power. After ibn Abd al Wahhab, the Saudi emirs declared the jihad for their military

²¹⁰ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *op.cit.*, in note 42, p.160.

²¹¹ Abd Allah al-Salih Uthaymin, *op.cit.*, p.149

²¹² Madawi Al-Rasheed, *op.cit.*, in note 42, p.167.

²¹³ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, p. 72.

²¹⁴ Zekeriya Kurşun, *op.cit.*, pp. 19-22

²¹⁵ Natana J DeLong-Bas, *op.cit.*, pp.201-202.

²¹⁶ Natana J DeLong-Bas, *op.cit.*, p.203 ; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, p.25.

expansion.²¹⁷ Actually, the families of Saudis and Abd al Wahhabs have been connected through marriages for centuries after the allegiance between the two families.²¹⁸ The Bedouins, who settled near coasts and began dealing with pearl hunting and fishing, brought ideas of political Salafism from the deserts to the overseas. In addition, the Salafi pirates continued to raid in the sea. Thus Salafi pirate Arabs were mobilized with the principles of ibn Abd al Wahhab's political Salafism in the seas.²¹⁹

Ibn Abd al Wahhab redefined jihad as an action with religious legitimization without personal glory and prestige seeking and regulated it through rules for timing and legitimacy. Converting this customary raiding into a religious responsibility, an action under the principle of "commanding good and forbidding evil", an obligation on every Muslim helped jihad gather all believers of the monotheist faith under a single goal, the well-being of the *ummah*. As John Philby emphasized in his book "Saudi Arabia", ibn Abd al Wahhab and Muhammad Ibn Saud were regarded as the ones seeking their own personal interests in making an allegiance to merge their powers in the development of political Salafism as a political tool.²²⁰ Hence, the new movement purposed social and political designs and reforms addressing particularly the Bedouins in Arabia. This new reform movement, on the other hand, created the first Saudi emirate. Political Salafi doctrine's jihad obligation on the Bedouins created a unification and a strong single authority for Arabians, town dwellers and Bedouins, for whom it had been impossible to unite under a common goal like unification and mobilization against the internal and external threats.

3.1.3. The Egyptian Invasion

The conquest of Hejaz by the political Salafis angered the Ottomans because Hejaz meant prestige for the Caliphate in Istanbul; therefore, Ottoman Sultan appointed Muhammad Ali Pasha, the governor of Egypt for punishing the Saudis. When

²¹⁷ Abd Allah al-Salih Uthaymin, *op.cit.*, p.144

²¹⁸ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, p. 223.

²¹⁹ Charles E Davies, *op.cit.*, pp.263-265.

²²⁰ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 19, p.55.

Egyptian army began invading Arabia, the ruling leader of the Saudi emirate was Saud, the youngest brother of Abd al Aziz, and was on his way to jihad towards Baghdad. His sons Abdullah and Faisal attempted to cease the Egyptian army. Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt and his son Tusun Pasha led the first Egyptian expedition and Ibrahim Pasha led the second. Ibrahim's military expedition reached out to the capital city of the Saudi Emirate, al Dir'iyah in 1818. Saud had already died before the Egyptian forces arrived. His son Abdullah was captured and was sent to Istanbul for execution. It was very difficult for the Egyptian army to cope with the Salafi Arabs in the midst of the desert. A furious population in al Dir'iyah surrounded Ibrahim's soldiers. There was a demand from the population towards political Salafism because it was not just the central authority linking the society and the ruling clan but also a political and religious movement. In 1837, Muhammad Ali led another expedition to Arabia and Egyptian forces under his command intervened in Najd. In this expedition, Egypt aimed to destroy the unity of Arabia and a central authority in not only Arabia but also in the Gulf. Muhammad Ali's aim was to leave Arabia within anarchy as it had been before.²²¹ Arabia turned into collapsed as it had been in the pre-Saudi era.

When the Egyptian forces destroyed the central authority, the remaining members of the Saudi family found refuge in Kuwait.²²² The Sabah family of Atban Arab tribe welcomed them because the Saudi assistance had enabled them to evacuate Iranians from their coastal garrisons alongside the Arabian shores in the Gulf in the past. Ra's al Khaymah pirate stronghold also became a refuge place for the Saudi family because the Salafi pirates in the sheikhdoms were close allies to the Saudis in their maritime struggle against India, Europeans and Iran. The small sheikhdoms, which were influenced by political Salafism of the Saudis, welcomed the Saudi assistance and protected the Saudi family against their enemies.

The members of the family like Emir Turki and then his son Emir Faisal ibn Turki, who took refuge in the Gulf sheikhdoms, returned to homeland to reestablish

²²¹ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, pp. 94-103; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 19, p.148.

²²² H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 19, p.163.

the authority, and this era was known as the second Saud emirate (1843-1891).²²³ For the Ottomans, Egyptian governorate and their close ally, the Rashidi emirate in north of central Arabia, it was not easy to uproot the Saudis from Arabia. Within this era, the Ottomans, Rashidi Emirate and the British shared the Wahhabi Saudi Emirate's territories. The Ottomans annexed Hejaz and then al Hasa. The Gulf, Trucial sheikhdoms and Bahrain came under the influence of the British patronage. Central Arabia was left to the Rashidi Emirate, centered in northern Najd, the city of Hail. In the region, the Qasim Sheikdom was semi-independent and Kuwait was an independent sheikdom where the remaining Saudi family was in exile.²²⁴

The Rashidi emirate could not penetrate and establish its regime effectively over Central Arabia. On the contrary, they were Salafized after a while. The unifying spirit, created by political Salafism, went underground and waited until the Egyptian threat vanished in the desert. At the same time, it assimilated the new sovereigns. The reason was that the unifying spirit of political Salafism earned the respect and hearts of the desert society.²²⁵ Even, in the siege of al Dir'iyah by Ibrahim Pasha, the peoples resisted severely. The killings of prominent scholars after tortures including Ahmad al Hanbali, the *qadi* (judge) of Madinah and Suleyman ibn Abdullah, the grandson of ibn Abd al Wahhab and the *qadi* of al Dir'iyah, created a negative impact on the society against the Egyptian forces.²²⁶ Rashidi clan was good in fighting but not very strong to stand against political Salafism's effect. It was not possible to sustain a long proceeding war against the society who embraced political Salafi teaching. However, the Saudis had known the keys of the unification codes and the magic of political Salafism owing to their long-term cooperation with the Salafi scholars since 1744. When the Rashidis occupied Riyadh and destroyed the second emirate ultimately in 1891, the Saudi family took refuge in Kuwait under the

²²³ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143,p .95 .

²²⁴ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*,in note 36,pp. 126-127.

²²⁵ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 19, p.147; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143,p .96 .

²²⁶ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*,in note 36,p. 100; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 19, p.146; Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.*, in note 19,p. 34.

protection of Mubarak ibn Sabah of Kuwait as they had done after the first invasion led by the Egyptian army in 1818.²²⁷ Thus, the second Saudi emirate failed and the Rashidis tried to fill the vacuum for a while; until the Saudis in exile in Kuwait came again once more to establish the third emirate. The Rashidis ruled the region for a while with the support of the Ottomans but they were a mercenary force in the region, on the other hand, the influence of the Saudis were still strong in Central Arabia with the power of political Salafism.²²⁸

3.1.4. The Change in the Perception of Threat: The War with the Ikhwan Movement and the Agreement with the British

Ibn Saud signed the Treaty of Jeddah with Britain for recognition of his country in 1927. This treaty enabled other countries to recognize the Saudi emirate on Hejaz and Najd, it brought international recognition for the new state. However, this was very disputable in that how a treaty with an infidel could be possible. It was well-known that ibn Saud had already signed a treaty with the British in 1915 as the ruler of the Saudi emirate of Najd and al Hasa. The Saudis agreed with the British after the British attacks on the Wahhabi pirates' ports as a response to the Salafi piracy against the British interests. Abdullah ibn Faisal ibn Turki, the ruler of the second emirate and later ibn Saud, the ruler of the third emirate, had already made agreements with the British diplomatic representative in the Gulf. The Saudis agreed not to attack Oman, the Trucial Sheikdoms and Bahrain alongside the Gulf.²²⁹ In sum, the Saudi emirate did not pursue jihad ideal every time, instead, shifted to realist policies when necessary. The formation of the Ikhwan movement in 1912 was, indeed, a project of ibn Saud's realpolitik to spread his rule through armed Salafi based jihad throughout the Peninsula and to expand territories to the early borders of

²²⁷ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, pp. 161 and 182; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143, p. 95.

²²⁸ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, pp. 182-183; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143, p. 96.

²²⁹ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143, pp. 94-96; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, p. 341.

the second emirate. After the borders were guaranteed with mutual diplomatic treaties, ibn Saud abandoned jihad for the Ikhwan and kept them in their *hijar* colonies. However, the Ikhwan was a zealous fighting force and had a social infrastructure in their colonies. Although they had economic gains from agriculture during ceasefire, jihad was a more important source of their income. Therefore, they did not obey the order of ceasefire, given by ibn Saud, and crossed the border and stormed Iraqi territories and inhabitants there. They received a counter response from the British royal forces. The Ikhwan forces were bombed and driven off the Iraqi frontiers. The Ikhwan leaders, prominently Faisal al Duwish of the Mutair Tribe, the chief of Artawiya *hijar*, and Sultan ibn Bijad of the Ataiba tribe, the chief of Ghatghat *hijar*, led the revolt. The revolt began with disobedience to the rule of ibn Saud, which was on ceasefire with the other Arab states such as Iraq and Transjordan. They insisted on maintaining the struggle against the British and their clients in the region from the perspective of the Salafi jihad. They even replied to the British air bombing with their attack on Kuwait and Iraq. The realpolitik won and ibn Saud had to fight with the Ikhwans in the end.²³⁰ Ibn Saud's decision to destroy the Ikhwan was a given guarantee to the British. The leader of the Saudi rule was eager to agree with a European power to cooperate with them and gain their support in the region.

The reasons for the contradiction and clash between Ikhwan and ibn Saud had already emerged before the Ikhwan's attack beyond Saudi frontiers and into Iraq and Transjordan. The Ikhwan members had the faith and belief in political Salafism, but just owned its religious and spiritual elements for making jihad but were not aware of international balances and politics for the purpose of international representation for the new state.²³¹ For the Saudi dynasty, religious faith and devoutness was a tool for constructing an authority in the Peninsula, not only in early 1900s but also since the middle of the 19th century. Political Salafism enabled them to realize their goal of gathering disorderly Arab community under one single flag, urbanizing nomadic Arab society, replacing the desert laws with the Shari'ah and creating a centralized

²³⁰ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 19, pp. 287 and 306-308.

²³¹ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, pp. 77-80.

rule in the heart of the desert. However, the ideal of political Salafism always had limits. If it contradicted with realpolitik, even the leader of the state might abandon the primary principle of political Salafism. Ikhwan began harming the interests of the new internationally recognized state with their zealotries. In addition to their cross border- raids, which deteriorated the relations between Britain and ibn Saud, they also attacked the *Mahmal* caravan, a traditional pilgrim caravan coming from Egypt. The Ikhwan attacked the *Mahmal* caravan and killed the pilgrims. Egypt cut its ties off with the Saudis after this diplomatic crisis.²³² Ikhwan's zealotry was not only deteriorating diplomatic relations but also disturbed King ibn Saud on domestic issues. Ibn Saud welcomed the modernization attempts such as introduction to telegram, automobiles, and spread of alcohol and tobacco consumption. He also gave some rights to the Shi'ites and let them visit Mecca for their pilgrimage. These developments disturbed the Ikhwan members. They claimed that innovations and sympathy for the Shi'ites arose from infidels. Ibn Saud sent his sons Saud and Faisal to Egypt and England for official visits. These visits were criticized as collaboration with infidels and apostate regimes and return from the path of the Salaf. Even, when the Iraqi tribes' cattle crossed over into the holy lands of the Saudi emirate, the Ikhwan criticized this for the reason of deterioration of political Salafism. Ibn Saud was the target of these criticisms. The criticisms of Ikhwan chiefs were simply excuses. To calm them down, he gathered the Ikhwan chiefs in Riyadh at a conference in January 1927. The Ikhwan members emphasized the necessity to suppress the Shi'ites instead of giving any right to them.²³³ The Shi'ite minority became a scapegoat again because of a different internal dispute. For the Ikhwan members, the Shi'ites were polytheists and worse than infidels; therefore, were not to be tolerated. The conference did not give any concrete results and did not prevent the upcoming revolt. In the battle of Sabila in March 1927, the loyal forces of ibn Saud crushed the Ikhwan. After the crush of the Ikhwan, ibn Saud signed the treaty of

²³² Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.* in note 19, p. 108 ; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, pp. 340-341.

²³³ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, pp. 78 and 88 ; Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.* in note 19, p.110.

Jeddah with Great Britain in May 1927.²³⁴ This treaty was the official recognition of the sovereign Saudi emirate by Great Britain and then other states followed Britain. However, signing this treaty two months after defeating and neutralizing Ikhwan rebels was not a coincidence. The extreme Salafi enthusiasm of the Ikhwan was an obstacle for ibn Saud's realpolitik. Ikhwan revolt's main reason was that they could not receive the administrative positions in Hejaz after the conquest, but they attempted to show their reason for revolt as expansion of foreign innovation and modern lifestyles from the recently conquered Hejaz into the country.²³⁵

3.2. Mobilization by Political Salafism in Arabia

The cooperation between political Salafism and the Saudis formed the mobilization of the tribes. The Bedouins and urbanites were united under the spiritual effect of political Salafism. The mobilization enabled the tribes to launch jihad against the defined threats in Central Arabia at first, and Hejaz and eastern Arabia later. The Saudis also attacked the Shi'ites in Iraq and plundered the holy Shi'ite cities. The mobilization of tribes and expansion in the region via jihad did not just happen in the Arabian Peninsula but also in the Gulf. Wahhabi pirates affiliated with the Saudi rule attacked the British ships and launched attacks to Indian coasts. These pirates targeted the Hindu and Shi'ite regions. The mobilization of the Arabians under the Saudi authority formed the raids in the name of jihad in the region and overseas. Jihadi raids brought expansion of the Saudi rule.

3.2.1. Mobilization via Jihad Wars: The Expansion of the First Saudi Emirate

The First Saud Emirate was born with the mutual allegiance of Muhammad ibn Saud and ibn Abd al Wahhab in 1744. The first emirate was also known as the emirate of

²³⁴ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 19, pp.299-300, 309; Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.* in note 19, p. 111; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, p.341.

²³⁵ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 19, pp.326-327 and 344.

al Dir'iyah. Its expansion began after the succession of Abd al Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn Saud, the son of Muhammad ibn Saud and son in law of ibn Abd al Wahhab. He captured Riyadh, the current capital of Saudi Arabia and heart of Najd.²³⁶ Then, the Saudi forces headed towards al Hasa, the coast of the Persian Gulf because this coastal region was vital for Central Arabia. It means that defeating the Khalid tribe was compulsory somehow for the maintenance of political Salafism.²³⁷ Both in the era of the first Saudi emirate and even in the era of the second Saudi emirate, al Hasa became the second target after the consolidation of power in Najd. For instance, Turki ibn Abdullah directly conquered al Hasa and Bahrain in 1834 after consolidating his power in Najd during the establishment of the second emirate.²³⁸ Briefly, for the maintenance of the Saudis, al Hasa, pirate sheikdoms and even Bahrain were vital. The coastal region was under the rule of Khalid tribe and was exposed to the Iranian threat in the 18th century. The control of the Gulf was another complicated case. The European powers could not share the control, particularly by the British Empire.²³⁹ There had been a historical Persia and Arab internal strife over the Arabian coast of the Gulf. The Iranians had captured Bahrain, in which Manama was a strategic port, from the Hawalah tribe in 1753. The Atban tribe, backed by the political Salafis in Najd, conquered the island from the Iranians. Persia was so dominant in the region that Oman was under the Iranian occupation from 1743 to 1759.²⁴⁰ The main families of Atban tribe were Khalifah, today's ruler of Bahrain and the Sabah, today's ruler of Kuwait, both of whom owed their rule to the Saudis. With the command of the political Salafis, Atban Arabs massacred Shi'ite subjects in al Hasa.²⁴¹ The Salafi-Shi'ite strife rose again but it was in the Gulf in this time.

²³⁶ St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, p.31.

²³⁷ St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36,p.58; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143,p.62.

²³⁸ Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.* in note 19,p. 35.

²³⁹ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143,p.60.

²⁴⁰ St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36,pp.25-26 and 80 and 86.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*,p.92

Arab migrant tribes began expanding to the region with the Salafi support by breaking the power of Iran affiliated subjects and the Shi'ite elements.²⁴²

3.2.2. Mobilization by Political Salafism via Strict Rules and Norms

After the conquest of al Hasa, the Saudi armies headed towards Hejaz and the holy cities. The political Salafis first applied the method of preaching then decided on jihad. Before the conquest, preachers of political Salafism were sent to Mecca to discuss with the Orthodox Sunni ulama in Hejaz. The discussions were about the intercession of prophets and saints with God, the necessity of daily prayers, alms giving and fasting for immunity from expulsion from religion. Political Salafis thought differently than other orthodox *madhabs* and regarded performing the religious duties as a must. Some *madhabs* like Hanafis and Shafis rejected *takfir* method. The Salafi approach is stricter in not only the social discipline of urban and tribal Arabs, but also about their required religious duties.²⁴³ Daily praying together with jama'ah, fasting, giving alms, and pilgrimage is enforced as sine qua non in Salafism. Practice is as important as believing by heart and repeating by tongue. Political Salafism also aimed to redesign and bring order and discipline to the system of the required religious duties by hardening its rules in addition to bringing order to the anarchical society. The required religious duties were closely related to the order of society. Since political Salafis in Arabia emerged from the traditional Hanbali *madhab*, it borrowed some basic rules from Hanbalism such as the indisputable necessity of praying five times in a day, fasting, giving alms in addition to the pronunciation of the formula (*Shahadah*) orally. The mere pronunciation was not enough to be a believer. This is one of the similarities between traditional Hanbali *madhab* and ibn Abd al Wahhab's political Salafism. On the other side, some cases, which were regarded as sins by Hanbalis in Islam, were regarded as a reason of *takfir* in political Salafism. Political Salafism formulated by ibn Abd al Wahhab applied the

²⁴² David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143,p.66.

²⁴³ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*,in note 36,p.72.

method of punishment rather than just condemning.²⁴⁴ Traditional Hanbali Salafism could not have a unifying order on Central Arabian society but ibn Abd al Wahhab's political Salafism with its stricter rules succeeded in bringing order and unification of people. In other words, political Salafism was more disciplined with regard to its rules and principles because it did not just address the religious sphere but also political side of the affairs more. Political Salafism in Arabia did not see itself as a different type of jurisprudent or theological school like the four main *madhabs*, instead, just claimed to be a movement of returning to the path of the pious ancestors. They also claimed to embrace the main imams of the four main schools (Hanafiyah, Malikiyyah, Shafi'iyyah and Hanbalism) in practice, but their attitude differed. They regarded Hejazi residents as polytheists although they were Hanafis and Shafi'is originally.²⁴⁵

The Saudi forces led by Abd al Aziz's son Saud entered Mecca in 1803. The redefined *bid'ahs* were forbidden in Hejaz. For example, the Ka'bah was purified from its rich coverings, the annual *Mahmal* tradition (the visitation by the hajj-pilgrimage caravans from other Muslim regions for centuries) was abolished, and the holy tombs in the city were demolished. Women's role in society was restricted, and wine drinking and singing were banned. Even tobacco and coffee were banned as the pious ancestors did not favor these things. Then Madinah and Jeddah also suffered the same fate after their fall to the hands of the Saudis.²⁴⁶

3.2.3. Mobilization via Jihad against the Shi'a: Karbala and Najaf Raids

Iranians were in Bahrain and Oman in the 18th century and were controlling marine trade ways, in opposition to the Saudis' interests. For Saudis who had been just converted to the new unifying movement, the sectarian link between Iran and Shi'ite Arabs increased their hatred against the Shi'ite Arab tribes more. On the other side,

²⁴⁴ Ahmed Vehbi Ecer, *op.cit.*, 54 and 70-71.

²⁴⁵ Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.* in note 19,p. 135 and 268 ; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*,in note 36,pp.72 and 83 and 88.

²⁴⁶ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*,in note 36,pp. 83 and 88.

the assault came from the Shi'ite tribes from the south of Iraq towards the Saudis: their caravans were attacked and plundered. Therefore, Emir Abd al Aziz stormed Karbala in April 1801. The holy shrines and tombs including Imam Hussein's were demolished and plundered. The Saudis slaughtered around five thousand Shi'ites in Karbala for revenge. This massacre and plunder created a shock impact, especially in Iran. In 1806, the second attack came to another Shi'ite holy city, Najaf in Iraq in 1806. The Saudi raids reached out to Aleppo. Many tribes and towns were sacked in Iraqi and Syrian territories. These attacks and raids were launched under the Salafi jihad call.²⁴⁷ On November 4, 1803, the son of Muhammad ibn Saud, the second leader of the the Saudi Emirate, Abd al Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn Saud was assassinated unexpectedly during a congregational prayer by a Shi'ite, who had lost his family during the Saudi raids in Karbala.²⁴⁸

3.2.4. Mobilization via Maritime Jihad: The Salafi Pirates in the Gulf

The jihad was not limited to war on land. It extended overseas. The influence of the political Salafi movement reached out to the coastal Arabs. They allied with the coastal tribes and Arab pirates in Ra's al Khaymah stronghold. The Salafi Saudis aided them for their attacks on the Iranian garrisons in the Gulf. The political Salafi influence displayed itself in the Gulf, and the Shi'ite population living in al Hasa was also massacred severely. The Qawasim pirates were Arab sailors and had strongholds in towns like Ra's al Khaymah and Qasim. In the early 19th century, pearl trade and export enchanted the European companies and attracted them to the region. As a result, a war broke out with the natural owners, the Qawasim pirates. The Qawasim pirates were Salafized and began their attacks under the jihad call, especially against the British East Indian Company's fleet. The Arab pirates tried to secure the coasts of Eastern Arabia from the Europeans. Even, the Salafi pirates sieged Oman, and the Omani sultanate asked for help from the Bombay Government

²⁴⁷ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143,p.64 ; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*,in note 36,pp.81 and 89; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*,in note 19,p. 93.

²⁴⁸ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*,in note 36,pp. 84-85.

in 1809. The assaults of pirates extended so much that it reached out to India and from Yemen to East African coasts. These pirates also served for the formation of cultural interaction among the regions through the mutual exchange of commerce, slave trade, expansion of religious faiths, languages and customs.²⁴⁹

The Qawasim pirates acted as robbers in maritime but after their allegiance to political Salafi movement in Najd, they were in touch with the Saudi rule, and their piracy gained a religious legitimization. In the early 19th century, the Qawasim piracy stormed the Iranian coasts and did not let Iranian merchants to trade in the Gulf. Iran entered into an alliance with Oman against Arab piracy affiliated to political Salafis in Najd, but failed to prevent the pirates. German traveler Carsten Niebuhr claimed that all the Iranian coasts were under the Arab dominance, even from the Shatt al-Arab of the Euphrates to the Indus River, in the 1760s.²⁵⁰ This dominance in the Gulf increased further towards the 19th century. The political Salafi pirates were so strong that they reached out to Indian coasts and attacked the Shi'ite villages in their Ashura days in December 1813 just as they had done in al Hasa, Karbala and Najaf with their raids. In 1805, Abd al Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn Saud officially proclaimed jihad against India. The jihad calls to India also benefited Central Arabia in terms of an alternative income opportunity because the famine years of 1805-1811 shook the inner part of the Peninsula. Therefore, the mass migrations expanded to Yemen, Iraq, Oman and Syria. The political Salafi jihad to India, in this respect, encouraged Arabs to support and benefit from it. The Saudis became the target of the British hatred due to their attacks on Iranian and Indian coasts, Oman and the British East Indian Company in the Gulf and Indian Ocean.²⁵¹ However, Emir Abd al Aziz I did not step back and carried on threatening the British after the British assault on Ra's al Khaymah, and continued jihad attacks against the British possessions in the Gulf and India. Abd al Aziz I wrote:

²⁴⁹ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, pp.92-93 ; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 19, p.63 ; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143, p.77; Charles E Davies, *op.cit.*, pp.151 and 241; Lawrence G Potter, *op.cit.*, p.13.

²⁵⁰ Charles E Davies, *op.cit.*, p.130-135 ; Lawrence G Potter, *op.cit.*, p.11.

²⁵¹ Charles E Davies, *op.cit.*, pp.173-188; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143, p.73.

If you choose war over peace, so be it- God is our one resource and his will be done. If you prefer peace, then I give my word that all British subjects will be free from molestation at the hands of all Muslims; but as to the people of Egypt and Jeddah, Yemen, Shihr and Mukella, Muscat, Basra and Iraq, and the Persian subjects of Sa'id bin Sultan, all these are our enemies and whenever we come across them, we seek God's help in fighting them and plundering their property.²⁵²

In his letter, Abd al Aziz listed his enemies in the list of *takfir*. Then, the Qawasim pirates followed the same way and added Hindus and Shi'ite Indians to the list. While Abd al Aziz proclaimed jihad for his own subjects, he also thought that this mission was obliged to all Arab emirates and tribes in the region, therefore wrote to the Sultan of Oman and invited him to jihad against India. Bahrain and Oman were encouraged and enforced by the Saudis to participate in jihad against India in 1809. In addition, jihad, plunder, looting and booty were closely intertwined to each other for political Salafis. The Saudis took one-fifth of the plunder as their share from the maritime jihads. This enabled the Qawasim ports and strongholds to tie to the inner sides of Arabia, Dir'iyah directly. The gains of jihad and Salafi raids united the Salafi Arabs as strongly as the spiritual influence of political Salafism. The special relation between the Saudis and Ra's al Khaymah pirate stronghold was similar to the current link between the small Gulf emirates and Saudi Arabia.²⁵³ Muslim emirates in the Gulf, which did not embrace political Salafism, were also included in the list of threats by the Saudis.²⁵⁴

In terms of struggling against the foreigners in the region under the mobilization via jihad, Natana DeLong Bas claimed that ibn Abd al Wahhab's political Salafi movement stemmed from internal conditions within Central Arabia so it was not a response to European imperialism or the Ottoman rule in the region. In other words, she pointed out that the movement was not an anti-colonial struggle or revival of Islam against Western dominance or imperialism. The anti-colonial struggles in the 19th and 20th centuries in India and in North Africa against the

²⁵² Charles E Davies, *op.cit.*,p. 244.

²⁵³ Charles E Davies, *op.cit.*,pp.244-245.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.,p. 268.

Europeans were different from the Saudis' jihad in Arabia.²⁵⁵ But, DeLong-Bas missed out the Salafi jihad against the British, Shi'ite Persia, British India in the different parts of the Peninsula. On the contrary, Madawi al Rasheed mentioned the anti-colonial struggle of the Salafi Saudis, especially by focusing on their jihad against the British in the Gulf.²⁵⁶ The struggle of the Saudis and Salafi pirates against the British and Bombay Government's fleet in the Gulf, and Indian Ocean represented the local Arabs' anti-colonial wars.²⁵⁷

When the Saudi Emirate was destroyed in 1818 by Egyptians, the British naval forces directly attacked Saudi possessions in the Gulf. Ra's al Khaymah was destroyed in 1819 after Ibrahim Pasha's victorious expedition to Arabia, while other small sheikdoms such as Sharjah, Abu Dhabi, Ajman and Qasim were forced to make maritime truce under British guarantee with the general Treaty of Peace with Arab tribes in 1820. The British fleet attacked the Saudi ports in 1866 to cease the Salafi jihad raiding to Oman.²⁵⁸ The war against the British forces in the Gulf and their client India (British Raj) was a part of the Salafi jihad concept and the purpose was to save the Peninsula and its neighborhood from foreign interventions. The Salafi pirates even reached out to Indian coasts and carried their jihad into India.

3.3. Unification by Political Salafism in Arabia

Political Salafism envisages the purification of other religious and sectarian orders and beliefs in Arabia via either religious preaching or armed jihad. Political Salafism aimed to unify the religious belief under the concept of *tawhid*. The *tawhid* understanding brought the unity of the authority and helped the Saudi clan unite other tribes and urbanites under their single rule. The first and second Saudi emirates

²⁵⁵ Natana J DeLong-Bas, *op.cit.*, pp.7-8.

²⁵⁶ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *op.cit.*, in note 42, p.173.

²⁵⁷ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, pp. 91-92 ; Charles E Davies, *op.cit.*, p.184.

²⁵⁸ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143, pp.74, 78, 92, 94 ; St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, p. 105.

unified Arabia under their rule firstly by determining the threats and then mobilized the political Salafis via armed jihad against these threats. After the expansion of the Saudi rule, the authority of the Saudis were constructed. The leader of the third Saudi emirate, ibn Saud applied a more professional method and built camp style villages called '*hijar*' for Wahhabi fighters which were collected from tribes. Through this way, the tribes were unified under the Saudi authority.

3.3.1.Unification by Political Salafism: The First Saudi Emirate

While political Salafism began to transform society through inviting them to the path of the Salaf and implementing strict rules against *bid'ahs* and sins, it also had a political agenda such as the unification of tribes and enforcement of harsh religious principles on them to be a component of the centralization of authority and rule. To mobilize the tribes was the main method in the anarchical Arab tribal society. In Central Arabia, the society was living in towns, and urban society were mostly Hanbali; therefore, they were already close to literalist, *al Salaf al Salih* interpretation of Islam. For that reason, they did not have difficulty in adapting to political Salafism. On the other hand, the Bedouins did not belong to any strict school, and they were interested in economic interest and gains from the tribal raids.²⁵⁹ After political Salafism offered them booty and loots, they became a more willing group compared to the town dwellers in the expansion of political Salafism and obligatory jihad.²⁶⁰ Political Salafism was far beyond a religious activity, and the *tawhid* understanding was more political rather than religious and reshaped under the desert conditions of Arabia for unification and centralization of political authority.²⁶¹ *Tawhid*, which was a basic issue that ibn Abd al Wahhab tried to restore, meant the unity of God or monotheism, in addition to the unity of people and the homeland of

²⁵⁹ David Dean Commins, *op.cit*, in note 1,p.80 ; Abd Allah al-Salih Uthaymin, *op.cit.*,p.149.

²⁶⁰ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*,in note 36,pp. 70-71.

²⁶¹ Khalid S. al-Dakhil, *op.cit.*,p.24.

Arabs.²⁶² St John Philby views that political Salafism formulation as a nationalist spirit, which emerged in Central Arabia. In his point of view, this national spirit helped Arabians, firstly Najdis, living in a chaotic region without any authority to gain national identity, involved in unification and centralization of authority and rule in an unprecedented way. The Bedouin Arabian society in Central Arabia had lack of discipline. In addition, they were individualistic, personal or tribal based rather than in a unified form. The new Salafi movement changed their societal characteristics and created an unprecedented religious zeal by gathering them under one banner in a unity.²⁶³ This zeal sequentially created patriotism, unity and a central authority. Arabia had been a failed region without any authority since the time of the Abbasids' collapse, even earlier perhaps since the end of the Four Caliphs era. This has been the fate of the Arabian Peninsula throughout the centuries. It was not under one authority or unified in history except the early Islamic era and the Saudi emirates. The long lasting chaotic and fragmented status of the Peninsula might led to the birth of reformist and unifying religious schools, which provided unification and centralization of authority.

3.3.2.Unification by Political Salafism: Centralization and Urbanization in the Desert

Political Salafism was an urban movement and represented the values of urban communities in autonomous Najdi towns. In other words, the movement aimed to settle the non-settled Bedouin nomads because of their potential danger and menace for the trade routes. In addition, they should be included in the tax system. In the desert, the nomads were independent; therefore, exempted from paying taxes. According to David Commins, the urbanization and taming of the Bedouins meant both conversions from infidelity to *tawhid*, and to tax-giving settlers for the new

²⁶² Ibid.,pp. 27-28.

²⁶³ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 19, p.261; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*,in note 36, pp.80 and 226.

central authority.²⁶⁴ Without settlers, it was not possible to establish a strong authority and to create a national identity in Arabia. The most crucial role in political Salafism's unifying mission was to convert Bedouins to *tawhid*, through which they would firstly believe in oneness of God and then oneness of the authority, a central rule. According to Khalid al Dakhil, it was not possible to provide *tawhid* belief truly without a central authority, because *tawhid* also symbolizes unity and authority of the Creator while a central authority does the same for administration over society.²⁶⁵ Without a central authority, it was not possible to provide *tawhid*, because the religion and faith depends on a community, the *ummah*; the *ummah* depends on the leader, the Imam; and the Imam depends on obedience of the *ummah*. This interconnectedness gave birth to unification and centralization of authority. One of the central conditions of jihad was, as known, the proclamation of jihad by the leading imam who represents the ruler. This rule necessitates obedience to the ruler in the proclamation of jihad. The obedience to God and the ruler is inseparable.²⁶⁶ The obedience to the ruler concept was attributed to the *ijtihad*s and *fatwas* of ibn Taymiyyah. As it was discussed in the previous Chapter, ibn Taymiyyah attributed great importance to the sovereignty of the imam, as the ruler of the authority. The urbanization of the nomadic desert community also helped the formation of the Saudi national identity in Arabia.²⁶⁷ The Saudi attempt for construction of a strong authority under a central rule was witnessed more clearly in the era of the third Saudi emirate led by ibn Saud rather than the previous two. For instance, in the third Saudi emirate, ibn Saud gathered tribes into *hujra*.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁴ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, p.80.

²⁶⁵ Khalid S. al-Dakhil, *op.cit.*, p. 27 ; p.s. Khalid Al-Dakhil is an assistant professor of political sociology at King Saud University in Saudi Arabia. He has been a columnist for London's Al Hayat newspaper and is now a columnist for Abu Dhabi newspaper.

²⁶⁶ Khalid S. al-Dakhil, *op.cit.*, p.28.

²⁶⁷ Ibid, pp. 27-28.

²⁶⁸ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby , *op.cit.*, in note 36, p.261; *Hujra* is the plural form of *hijar* , which was a colony village for the Bedouin tribes to settle, farm, and provide religious education and military training in order to urbanize the nomads and create a fighting force from them.

Political Salafism brought Shari'ah to the Arabs. Bedouin way of life was forced to change with settlers in towns. Religion was everything for the Arab society in the 18th century in Central Arabia. It was the only institution to have control over education, law, order, governance and lifestyle of the society.²⁶⁹ Religion meant faith, social order, and regulations in commerce, arbitration among clans, education, it was close to like an ideology. Philby expressed his astonishment with the religious bigotry and sui generis situation in Arabia. He wrote in his book "Saudi Arabia" that Central Arabia and Najd region produced so many scholars called *Alim* (scholar) but these scholars did not have any technological knowledge, did not study foreign translations or could not speak any foreign languages. Central Arabia was fertile in producing such kinds of scholars.²⁷⁰ Ibn Abd al Wahhab was one of these men. Intellectually, he was superior to his predecessors and contemporaries. His method was a reform program for urban and nomadic people of Arabia, a plan for creating an authority. Ibn Abd al Wahhab had already emphasized his views on the importance of a central authority earlier while studying over his new discipline. His intention for a central authority was so clear that he had looked for a sponsor for his project. In the end, he agreed with Muhammad ibn Saud of al Dir'iyyah in 1745 through a mutual pact.²⁷¹ As DeLong Bass argued, as long as political Salafism penetrated and gained control alongside Arabia, the security in caravan trade routes, the security of inhabitants, the institutionalization of commercial contracts between traders and the establishment of a postal system for communication alongside the country was provided as a public service by the Saudi rule. These developments improved the urban system and helped to settle the nomadic people throughout the country.²⁷²

²⁶⁹ Khalid S. al-Dakhil, *op.cit.*, pp.33-34.

²⁷⁰ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 19, pp.326-327.

²⁷¹ Khalid S. al-Dakhil, *op.cit.*, p.27; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 19, pp.39-40.

²⁷² Natana J DeLong-Bas, *op.cit.*, pp.36-37.

3.3.3. Re-Unification by Political Salafism: The Third Saud Emirate and the Ikhwan (Brothers) Movement

The main policies of Ibn Saud, the restorer of the Saudi Emirate in the early 20th century, can be exemplified with some cases: one is the formation of the Ikhwan movement, the second is the recruitment of the expatriate Arabs in the Saudi emirate administration, and third is the attempt to unify the country under the *tawhid* flag. The unity sign of the Saud Emirate, *tawhid* is observed in its green flag. The word of *shahadah* on the Saudi flag indicates the aim for unifying Arabia and Arab society. The Sharif dynasty was partly a resistance movement against the Ottoman rule, with the help of the imperialist power, the British. Political Salafism reemerged in the region despite its destruction twice in the past, in 1818 and 1891. The internal conditions, reshaped by political Salafism, encouraged Arabian Arabs to gather under the Saudi flag each time. Najdis never came under the foreign rule like Hejaz, Syria, Egypt or Iraq; instead, launched jihad to expand towards regions like Hejaz, Oman and the Gulf, which were under foreign control.

Ibn Saud was living as a political refugee in Kuwait. Najd was ruled by Rashidis, the Ottoman client regime, in the early 20th century. In 1902, ibn Saud organized a sudden night attack on Riyadh, center of Najd and conquered the city. The town was welcoming to the rule of the Saudi emirate because the dwellers were political Salafi since the late 18th century. Ibn Saud was a realist politician rather than a faithful believer or a religious zealot. He focused on unifying the disorderly Bedouin tribes and decided to organize them more disciplined than the first and second Saud emirates had done. Therefore, he launched the Ikhwan project in 1912.

Firstly, the disorderly tribal soldiers of Mutair, Harb, Ajman, Ataiba, Ruwala were gathered, then the special villages or colonies called *hijar* and *hujra* were built for these tribes. Ibn Saud supplied the money, seeds, and agricultural tools as well as arms. He also sent Salafi preachers and built schools and mosques for these tribes and carried them to *hijar* places. Through these special training and living centers, the Bedouins who were scattered in the desert life, were saved from their feckless type of life and were converted to holy warriors on the way of *tawhid*. Their nomadic way of lives was replaced with urban life, and old tribal customs and codes were

given up on behalf of religious rules.²⁷³ The word *hijar* originally comes from the word *hijrah*, meaning prophetic migration for a religious da'wah.²⁷⁴ *Hijrah* tradition was revived for political aims of ibn Saud. Therefore, the belief of jihad was kept alive among tribes. The political Salafi movement was stronger than Hanbali *madhabs* in terms of religious fanaticism, fidelity and zealotry, but Ikhwan movement was even more as a product of political Salafism. Tribal Bedouins sank in customary raiding, robbery, internal strives, and even left following Islamic Shari'ah before political Salafism forced them to reorganize. *Hijrah* colonies necessitated them to give up such old habits and traditions and rebuilt the bond between Salafi ulama and Bedouins again.²⁷⁵ This project also created a national feeling and dependence on the central authority again. The third Saudi emirate, unlike the other rules in Arabia such as the Idrisid of Asir and Rashid Emirate in Hail, prioritized the urbanization of Bedouins and the centralization of authority through reform policies.

As long as Ikhwan culture strengthened and spread to the Saudi controlled regions, Bedouins began inviting people in their milieu to the movement, and the Ikhwan soldiers enforced other Bedouins to attend their ranks. Other tribes adopted the Ikhwan way of life after a while. The Ikhwans were within closed artificial villages of *hijar*; therefore, very biased towards innovations, foreigners or any unfamiliar elements. They did not welcome Arabs outside Najd and regarded them as polytheists. Even the locals who traveled outside Najd were monitored when they came to Najd, and were not allowed to integrate to society at once. The captives were treated very harshly and violently. They were interrogated about their religious beliefs and were killed violently.²⁷⁶

The Ikhwan was the vanguard force for the conquest of the Peninsula and its re-unification. The Saudis occupied Al Hasa again in 1913. The city of Hail in north

²⁷³ Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.* in note 19, p. 38; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 19, pp.261-262 and 308.

²⁷⁴ Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.* in note 19, p. 53.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid*, p. 64.

²⁷⁶ Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.* in note 19, pp. 66-69.

was conquered in 1921, and the conquest of Hejaz was completed with the siege of Jeddah in 1925 eventually. Finally, the Asir region located in the southern side of Hejaz and north of Yemen, which was under the yoke of the Imamate of Yemen, were annexed in 1934. Eventually, the third Saud emirate took the official name of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.²⁷⁷ Ibn Saud underpinned the Arab Revolt of 1916 led by the Sharif family. However, after the Great War, he followed the footprints of realpolitik and ousted them from Hejaz. The conquest of Hejaz after a century was not very difficult for the Saudis because the local people in Hejaz were displeased with the Sharifs' corrupted rule, tyranny and collaboration with foreigners, especially the British. The army officers were not paid regularly, and disturbance within the army ranks was widespread. In addition, Sharif Hussein was not adamant in becoming a leader of the Arabs or caliph of the Muslims under the British patronage. The passion for establishing a caliphate damaged Sharif's relations with the other Muslim states. Ibn Saud condemned Sharifs' cooperation with Britain harshly. According to Ibn Saud, the Sharif dynasty was clearly apostate and collaborator of infidels. The same condemnation might be directed to Yemen, which invaded Asir in 1921. Yemen signed a treaty with the Italian authority in Eritrea for commerce and friendship.²⁷⁸

3.3.4. Conclusion: Unification and Mobilization against the Threats under the Saudi Rules

The influence of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's movement in the 18th century has continued for long centuries, even until today. The Saudis, who had a social, religious and political allegiance with the Salafi clerics and Najdi people, gained strong authority and rule with the help of the unifying power of Salafi defined *tawhid*. Although they

²⁷⁷ Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.* in note 19, p. 135; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143, p. 96; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, pp. 283, 312, 334-335; George Antonius, *The Arab awakening: the story of the Arab national movement*, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938), pp. 340-342.

²⁷⁸ Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.* in note 19, p. 46; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, pp. 302-303 and 339; George Antonius, *op.cit.*, pp. 329 and 335; Fouad Ajami, *The Arab predicament: Arab political thought and practice since 1967*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 165.

were exposed to foreign invasions such as the Egyptians at first and later Rashidi clan's in the 19th century, the Saudi Emirate managed to sustain. The influence of Egyptians and then the Rashidis was gone after some time and political Salafism took roots within the Peninsula as a religious and political idea. Political Salafism could not be uprooted from Arabia, especially from Najd; on the contrary, it expanded fast and strongly during the decades. Although the Saudi family was expelled from Najd twice, they returned after some time due to the strong and permanent influence of political Salafism among the Bedouin and urban society in Arabia. Even, the Rashidi clan that invaded Najd with the support of the Ottomans got Salafized during their reign in Najd.

Political Salafism founded three emirates in Arabia. The First Saudi emirate lasted from 1744 to 1818, the second emirate lasted from 1818 to 1891 and the third one was founded in 1902 by Abd al Aziz ibn Saud after which it became the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. Ibn Saud's project of creating an urban society from Bedouins in the form of Ikhwan warrior raiders, a type of regular army in agricultural small towns called *hijar* in 1912 was an urbanization attempt for nomadic Arabs. It was an important parameter on the way of founding a modern state in the early 20th century in the Arabian Peninsula. Through the raids of the Ikhwan jihadists throughout the Peninsula, the Saudi Emirate expanded again. In brief, the Saudi method of merging political Salafism with their policies created unification and centralization. The borders of the Saudi emirate were not drawn by a third party, instead drawn through the jihad wars launched by the Saudis with political Salafi enthusiasm. Political Salafism spread through wars around Najd, alongside the Gulf, into Hejaz and the whole Arabia. Political Salafism did not remain limited within the frontiers of the Saudi emirate. It spread towards the other Gulf sheikhdoms like Kuwait, Qatar, the Trucial-sheikhdoms and Bahrain. All of the ruling families of these monarchies were Najdi originally and had kinship ties with each other.²⁷⁹ The mobilization and unification supplied by political Salafism first helped to establish the first, second and the third Saudi emirates. Even, the creation of Trucial sheikhdoms, later transformed into the United Arab Emirates, was derived from Salafi jihad raids in maritime. The Salafi pirates responding to the Najdi call had

²⁷⁹ Madawi al Rasheed, op.cit., in note 9, p.20.

their rules in the emirates like Qawasim and Ra's al Khaymah for long years. They were backed by the Saudis and they launched jihad raids to India and the British naval forces in the Gulf. Al Khalifah clan of Bahrain owed their rule to the Saudis. Al Khalifah clan captured Bahrain from Iranians with the aid of the political Salafis in the 18th century. Bahrain sheikhdom owed its authority and rule to the Saudis. The Iranian descent and Shi'ite communities alongside the Gulf were taken under control by the Gulf sheikhdoms' Bedouin tribal ancestors with the aid of the political Salafis in Najd. The Gulf sheikhdoms' rules were cemented by the political Salafis' influential power and Saudis' support. Political Salafism was not restricted within the borders of the Arabian Peninsula but also penetrated into many religious orders and communities overseas such as in South Asia. These orders, which carried Salafi tones in their religious methods, developed similar perception of threat, unification and mobilization effects for their own communities.

CHAPTER 4

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL SALAFISM IN THE POLITICS AND SURVIVAL OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA

Political Salafism has a role in the establishment of Saudi Arabia through unification instrument and in the survival of the Kingdom through mobilization and perception of threats instruments. Political Salafism has rules and principles that both relate to a religious creed and a political movement. The religious rules and principles of political Salafism were important for determining the threat risks deriving from historical political Salafism. The Iranians and Shi'ites are also listed as enemies in political Salafism's perception of threat understanding. Political Salafism's role in mobilization of Saudi Arabs about the threat risks within both the country and in neighboring regions enabled the Saudi State to be active against the threats and survive its regime. Especially during the era of King Faisal, the perception of threat of the Saudi State enlarged by including the Palestinian question, the expansion of Nasserism and Arab socialist nationalism. The Iranian Islamic Revolution and expansion of Iran in the Gulf and the Middle East also appeared as threats perceived in the process. The Camp David Treaty of Egypt with Israel shocked the Arab states in the Middle East and this situation became another threat for the Saudis. In addition, the Ka'bah siege by the dissident Salafi activists within the Kingdom led to a perception of threat in the Saudi regime. The outbreak of Afghan jihad provided an opportunity for the Saudi regime to mobilize the Saudis and other radical groups in Arab countries, especially in Egypt for participation in jihad against the Soviets. While the perception of threats mobilize the Saudi regime to survive through security precautions, the perception of threats also mobilize Arab volunteers to a targeted enemy as it happened in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet threat.

4.1. The Perception of Internal and External Threats by Political Salafism in Saudi Arabia

The perception of threats in and outside the state enabled the Saudi regime to develop defensive and offensive policies. The Saudis blamed Nasserism for expanding Marxist and Soviet ideas within the Arab world and pursued a policy of expanding political Salafism as a counter policy against Egypt and Ba'ath Arab regimes. King Faisal led to the establishment of many international institutions to expand political Salafism in the world.

Egypt's treaty with Israel in Camp David was regarded as another perception of threat for the Saudis. Radical extremist groups in Egypt were mobilized by the Saudis to participate in the Afghan jihad. Anwar al Sadat's agreement with Israel was regarded as a betrayal to the Arab's cause. Saudi Arabia opposed to Sadat's initiative and regarded this as unacceptable.

Iranian Islamic Revolution and the rise of radical Shi'a groups in the Gulf also alarmed the Saudi regime and Salafi circles. The Islamic Republic of Iran and its client organizations in the Gulf, Iraq and Lebanon formed a new perception of threat. Revolutionary Shi'a was not just a threat in the neighboring region for the Saudis but also a potential threat within the country due to its Shi'ite minority. Political Salafi policies were imposed more and the policy of expanding political Salafism was accelerated by the Saudi regime.

For the Saudi Kingdom, the internal crisis such as Ka'bah siege by the political Salafi activists in 1979 formed another perception of threat. This was an internal threat and a warning to the Saudi regime because of the modernization policies within the Kingdom. Therefore the Saudi regime accelerated its support to the expansion of political Salafism and gave support to the Afghan jihad by sending volunteers.

4.1.1. Nasserism within the Kingdom

The expansion of Nasserism and Arab socialist nationalism in the region formed a threat for Saudi Arabia. Political Salafism were against the ideas of pan-Arabism and Arab socialism because of religious reasons. The Marxist ideas were embedded in Arab states' politics through pan-Arab socialism and nationalism. The Saudis were reactive to foreign ideas' penetration in the affairs of Arabs. Egypt tried to export Arab nationalism to other Arab states and Saudi Arabia was one of the target states. Saudi Arabia regarded Egypt and its secular and socialist Arab nationalist ideology as a threat, and pursued policies for expanding political Salafism against secular Arab nationalism. Political Salafism as a political tool was used in order to fulfill the gap Nasserism left after the 1967 defeat in the Arab world.

After the death of the founder king of the third Saudi rule, his son King Saud succeeded to the throne. He had a weak political character to deal with the enormous troubles around the Kingdom. He supported Nasser's Egypt in the Suez Crisis and financed his regime then welcomed Egyptian military experts for the Saudi army. However, the Egyptians organized a coup plot against King Saud by inspiring and cooperating with Saudi comrades within the army in 1954. Nasserist Arab Nationalism was so powerful that it quickly spread among the Saudi army officers just as it did in the whole Arab World. The underground organizations such as the National Reform Front, the Free Saudis, and the Free Officers mushroomed in the Saudi army. Many Saudi officers were executed, and Egyptian officers were expelled from the country.²⁸⁰ However, King Saud could not fix the dissatisfaction within the army. The officers and pilots attracted by Nasserism tried to overthrow the Saudi dynasty for a so-called "The Republic of the Arabian Peninsula". In 1958, General Abd al Karim Qasim in Iraq overthrew the Hashemite dynasty, and a chain of military coups led by the Ba'athist officers ensued in 1963 and 1969. The Syrian regime was overthrown with a coup in 1963 then again in 1966 and 1970. In Libya, the pro-Nasser army officers led by Muammar Qaddafi toppled the regime of old

²⁸⁰ Joseph A. Kechichian, *Faysal : Saudi Arabia's King for all seasons*, Gainesville, (FL : University Press of Florida, 2008), pp. 68 and 113 ; Tim Niblock, *Saudi Arabia: power, legitimacy and survival*, London: Routledge, (Routledge Ltd, Taylor and Francis, 2006), p. 42.

King Idris and declared an Arab Republic. It was the age of secular nationalist military officers. The toppling of the regimes ensued in Sudan and Somalia. The Arab world was in chaos. These developments encouraged many Arab officers in different Arab countries to become members of secret underground organizations.²⁸¹ In Saudi Arabia, the King was shocked with the second coup attempt on November 1962. On 27 September 1962, in the southern Saudi Arabia, an insurgency, aiming to overthrow the Saudi ally, the traditional Yemenese dynasty, broke out. The Nasserist rebels led by Abdullah Salah toppled the Hamid al Din dynasty in Yemen; and Imam Muhammad al Badr, the ruler of the old regime, was expelled from San'a. When the civil war broke out in the country, Egypt intervened in Yemen. The Egyptian forces surrounded the south of Saudi Arabia.²⁸² In the same year, a group of Saudi air force officers defected to Egypt by carrying arms for rebels in Yemen. One month later, the second coup plot came shockingly. A large number of army officers were arrested but the pilots again fled to Egypt in their war jets. Meanwhile, the Saudi princes and Salafi scholars removed King Saud from office and declared Prince Faisal as the new king. The dynasty and the Salafi ulama foresaw the decline of the regime because of the secular Arab nationalist waves. In 1969, just two years after the Six Days War, the third coup attempt came. The plotters were again the secret coup organizations such as the Popular Democratic Movement, the National Front of Liberation of Saudi Arabia and the Federation of Democratic Forces, which aimed to establish a Republic of the Arabian Peninsula.²⁸³

The 1967 Six Days War was a turning point for Arab secular nationalism. Arab nationalism represented by Nasser and Ba'ath began declining because of the defeat. Nasser and other Ba'ath regimes came to power in Arab states after the 1948 War against Israel. Before 1948, the vanguard of Arab nationalism was known as the Hashemites. But, with the defeat, the Arab monarchies like the Hashemites in Jordan and the dynasty of Mohammad Ali in Egypt lost their efficacy on Arab nationalism. Even, Nasser toppled the dynasty in Egypt. Then the Ba'ath movements also came to

²⁸¹ Joseph A. Kechichian, *op.cit.*, pp. 71, 113-114 and 174.

²⁸² Joseph A. Kechichian, *op.cit.*, p. 71, Tim Niblock, *op.cit.*, p. 44.

²⁸³ Joseph A. Kechichian, *op.cit.*, p. 114.

power in other Arab states one by one during the 1950s and 1960s. With the Soviet support, they maintained their rise in the eyes of Arab nations until the 1967 War but the defeat changed everything again. The Muslim Brotherhood, especially in Egypt, began raising their voice against their secular rivals. Egypt did not welcome the Brotherhood's opposition, but a warm welcome came from the new king of Saudi Arabia, King Faisal as a rival to Nasser. The defeat of Arab armies led by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1967 by Israel put the increasingly secular and socialist Arab nationalism in difficulty and led to its sharp decline. The Ba'ath regime in Syria fell and Hafez Assad, an Alawite officer in the air forces, captured the regime through a coup. Palestinians and King Hussein of Jordan got in a civil war, which concluded with the ousting of Palestinians after a massive bloodshed out of Jordan in September 1970, known as the Black September. Lebanon was dragged into a civil war again in 1975 after the deployment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (the PLO) in West Beirut and Beqaa just after the Black September disaster. Nasser could not bear the defeat and crush of his fame in the Arab world and died in 1970. The Arab Cold War was concluded with the triumph of King Faisal of Arabia.²⁸⁴

4.1.2. Radical Shi'ite Groups in the Arab World

The Iranian Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini, who was in exile in France, caused new radical changes to the Muslim World as of 1979. Firstly, the secular Iranian monarchy turned into a revolutionary Islamic Republic. The change in the Iranian regime was threatening for the monarchies in the Middle East especially for the Saudis and the Gulf sheikdoms and for the authoritarian secular Arab republics. Secondly, Khomeini's Iran had a potential to revolutionize Shi'a populations in Arab countries ruled by Sunni Arab republics or monarchies. In Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, Lebanon, there was a remarkable number of Shi'a people either in majority or in minority. For instance, they were majority in Bahrain and Iraq and minority in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, but would have a potential for

²⁸⁴ Fouad Ajami, *op.cit.*, in note 278, pp. 8-10.

militancy and revolt in a short time if Khomeini launched an export of regime policy. The first signs of regime export were felt with the uprisings and extraordinary events in Saudi Arabia in 1979. The Saudi Shi'a minority living in al Hasa tried to commemorate Ashura publicly on November 28, 1979 but faced with the harsh suppression of the Saudis. In the next year, 1980, Shi'ite protesters attempted to commemorate the revolution.²⁸⁵ Then, the events spread to Kuwait and Bahrain after Iraq attacked Iran; and the war began on September 22, 1980. The Hizb al Da'wa al Islamiyyah (the Party of Islamic Call in Iraq), an underground and oppositional Shi'ite organization, and recently established Hezbollah's fighters of Lebanese Shi'a began counter attacks through its branches and cells in the Gulf for supporting Revolutionary Iran.²⁸⁶ Shi'ite radical groups targeted the Kuwaiti emirate because of its financial support to the Saddam regime. Da'wah and Hezbollah branches and cells in Kuwait carried out a series of attacks in Kuwait. The ministries, airports, oil installations, industrial zones were all sabotaged, a Kuwaiti airplane was hijacked and Sheikh Jabir al Sabah, the ruler of Kuwait, survived from assassination by Shi'ite militant groups in 1983 while the war was going on.²⁸⁷

Iran had many clerics in the region since the time of the Shah, and they had been preaching in the Arab countries although their roots were in Iran.²⁸⁸ Especially in the Gulf, the people, preachers, merchants who had originally Iranian roots, different from the Arab Shi'ites are called *Ajami* (meaning Persian).²⁸⁹ Within the Arab world, especially in the Gulf, if a problem emerged among the Shi'ites, it directly spilled over the Shi'ite groups in other states, because there were close

²⁸⁵ Joseph Kostiner, "Shi'i Unrest in the Gulf," in *Shi'ism, Resistance, and Revolution*, ed. Martin Kramer (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), p. 179 ; Guido Steinberg, "The Wahhabiya and Shi'ism, from 1744/45 to 2008" in *The Sunna and Shi'a in history : division and ecumenism in the Muslim Middle East*, ed. Ofra Bengio and Meir Litvak, (New York, N.Y. : Palgrave Macmillan, c2011), p. 176 ; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143, pp. 230-231.

²⁸⁶ Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, *Graham E Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, The Arab Shi'a: the forgotten Muslims*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p.48.

²⁸⁷ Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, *op.cit.*, pp.155 and 162 ; Joseph Kostiner, *op.cit.*, p. 180; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143, p. 235

²⁸⁸ Joseph Kostiner, *op.cit.*, p. 178; Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, *op.cit.*, p. 126.

²⁸⁹ Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, *op.cit.*, pp.40 and 121.

relations among the Shi'ite tribes and communities. The probable instability in Saudi Arabia was firstly felt in Kuwait and then in Bahrain.²⁹⁰ Iran had already had this network since the 18th century. This network was constructed by the student-teacher relationships of the Twelver Shi'a School in the Middle East, which helped Persian clerics to be connected with the colleagues, and pupils in Iraq, Lebanon and the Gulf.²⁹¹ Khomeini used this linkage professionally and on behalf of the Islamic Republic during the 1980s. The Shi'a both in the Gulf region and throughout the Arab world was mobilized under the auspices of Khomeini's expanding the Islamic Revolution. Khomeini had already appointed his special representatives, Hadi al Mudarrisi, to Bahrain in 1979 and then Abbas al Mohri, his own brother in law, to Kuwait for organizing the Shi'ite groups in the Gulf on behalf of Iran. Mudarrisi founded the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain in Tehran, and his brother Taqi al Mudarrisi founded the Islamic Action Organization. In addition, the Arab Revolutionary Brigades operated in the region, and both of the organizations had their headquarters in Tehran. Iran's Revolutionary Guards, Pasdaran, trained them and the Shi'ite fighters were not only trained in Iran but also in Lebanon by Amal, Hezbollah or Lebanese Da'wah groups.²⁹² There was a close link and cooperation among revolutionary Shi'a groups. Not only in the Gulf States but also in Saudi Arabia, Hasan al Saffar, a Shi'ite cleric, established "the Organization of the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula" and aimed to revolutionize the Shi'ite minority in al Hasa region. The Ashura events in 1979 in Qatif was alleged to be organized by this organization. The Organization pursued a militant path until 1985 especially during the Iran-Iraq war.²⁹³ On the other side, Iran had partners in Lebanon and Iraq, too. Islamic Amal group, led by Amal's official spokesman Hasan al Mousawi, separated from the Amal militia, the Shi'ite militia force which was depended on the

²⁹⁰ Ibid., p.126.

²⁹¹ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143, pp.227 - 230 and 235.

²⁹² Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, *op.cit.*, pp.126 and 212 ; Joseph Kostiner, *op.cit.*, p. 179 and 183; Augustus Richard Norton, "The Origins and Resurgence of Amal," in *Shi'ism, Resistance, and Revolution*, ed. Martin Kremer, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), p.213.

²⁹³ Guido Steinberg, *op.cit.*, pp.176-177 ; Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, *op.cit.*, pp.186-187 ; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143, p. 230.

vanished Imam Musa al Sadr's Haraket al Mahrumin (the Movement of the Deprived), then merged with the Lebanese Da'wah branch whose mentor was Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah. The merging of these groups was also supported by Iran and became Hezbollah in 1982. The Shi'ite cleric Husayn Fadlallah who had close contacts with the Iraqi Da'wah movement became the spiritual leader of the new organization, Hezbollah.²⁹⁴ Iran's role was explicit in bringing many groups together and in the creation of Hezbollah because Iran's ambassador to Syria, Ayatollah Mohtashemi was active during the creation of Hezbollah. Therefore, the new organization was always regarded as the vanguard of Iran in Lebanon. Iran deployed even its own forces, Pasdaran in Beqaa Valley during the Israeli invasion in Lebanon in 1982. Ayatollah Khomeini aided Hezbollah via Syria with military material, training, ideological and technical support. It was asserted that the name of Hezbollah was given by Khomeini referring a term within the Qur'an.²⁹⁵ In Iraq, Khomeini also had close contacts with the Da'wah Party members of the Arab Shi'a. The party attempted assassinations of Saddam Hussein and his henchman Tariq al Aziz during the war years in 1980 and 1982 in addition to bombings in Kuwait in 1983.²⁹⁶

There are still tensions and major divisions between the radical Shi'ite groups in the Middle East and Saudi Arabia. In my interview with Salman al Harb, the secretary of Hezbollah Youth Education Affairs, he pointed out the tension over Lebanon between the Saudis' and Hezbollah. He told that the Saudis planned and encouraged Palestinians to set up their camps in the Shi'ite regions of Lebanon. According to al Harb, in these camps there are many people who were against

²⁹⁴ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143, p.212.

²⁹⁵ Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: the trail of political Islam*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), pp. 126-127; Eyal Zisser, "the Sunni-Shi'i struggle over Lebanon: a new chapter in the history of Lebanon" in *The Sunna and Shi'a in history : division and ecumenism in the Muslim Middle East*, ed. Ofra Bengio and Meir Litvak, (New York, N.Y. : Palgrave Macmillan, c2011), p. 150.

²⁹⁶ Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, *op.cit.*, p.101.

Hazbollah or who are Salafi jihadist Palestinians, a community that does not really represent Palestinians.²⁹⁸

4.1.3. Revolutionary Iranian Irredentism

Parviz Towfighi emphasized Iran's two-pillar policy in his book "From Persian Empire to Islamic Iran". He emphasized the strategy of Iranians for resistance in two tracks: promoting Sassanid nostalgia or grand Aryan nationalism and using Islamic identity.²⁹⁹ The strategy of Iranians can even be enlarged more: Iranian nationalism invoking Aryan identity and history of Persia, revolutionary Shi'a ideology and international Islamist identity that was applied by Khomeini during the early years of the Revolution. These all served the national interests of Iran. The Shah's policies during the 1960s and 1970s remained limited and restricted against firstly Nasser's rising Arab nationalism then King Faisal's global political Salafism, which pursued the interests of Sunni Arab nations by different methods. The Shah lost control in the Gulf and its neighborhood, encircled by Sunni Arabs or Sunni Muslim states. Under these circumstances, Iranian Islamic Revolution came. Ayatollah Khomeini pursued an Iranian Nationalist policy mostly, especially during the war years. On the other side, in order to secure the interests of Iran, he used Shi'a identity and Islamic internationalism card to encourage the opponent Arabs to take his regime as model. Saddam Hussein also imposed nationalist propaganda upon his people and in Arab world by equating the war with the Qadisiyyah cult in 637 that brought Iran to the Arab rule in the era of Caliph Omar. He blamed Iranians of "majoosi" that means Zoroastrians therefore Arab Shi'a had to support their native state against their co-sectarians.³⁰⁰ Under the atmosphere of Iranian nationalism, the exiled crown prince Reza Pahlavi, the son of the overthrown Shah, offered the regime to let him combat

²⁹⁸ Salman Harb (the responsible for the educational affairs of the Hezbollah Youth in Lebanon) in discussion with the author, April 2016.

²⁹⁹ Parviz S. Towfighi, *op.cit.*, p.25.

³⁰⁰ Gilles Kepel, *The war for Muslim minds: Islam and the West*, (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 217 ; Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, *op.cit.*, pp.102-103.

as a fighter pilot in Iran's weak air army because many pilots of the Shah either resigned or were dismissed.³⁰¹ On the other side, Saddam also got pamphlets written by his uncle Khayrallah Tulfah, who published and distributed them. The pamphlet wrote "Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews, and Flies" and they were distributed to all schools in Iraq. Saddam's uncle was a military officer and was an extreme Arab nationalist. Interestingly, he was jailed in 1941 because of his hatred of the British and sympathy to the Nazis.³⁰² The Iranians followed the same path and called Arabs as locust or lizard eaters in the desert. Especially, Iranian religious scholars made this claim. They saw themselves as the inheritors of urbanized and the ancient Iranian imperial culture.³⁰³ For example, in recent years, one Shi'a scholar of Najaf, Sayyid Ahmad al Qabbanji blamed Omar and the victorious Arab fighters of barbarism, and caused a large impact and reaction. He mentioned that Arab invaders after Qadisiyyah and Nehavand battles divided the crown of Khosrow II into pieces to share as a lot, the ganimah to emphasize their barbarism.³⁰⁴

As previously discussed, Shi'a, in the eyes of Sunni Arabs, was always regarded as a non-Arab, betrayal to Arab identity, ideology of the *Mawalis* (non-Arab slaves), against the Arab culture and supreme product of Arabs, a schism against Islam and unity of Arabs. Arabs considered Arab nationalism as linked to Sunni religious sectarian identity, and always believed the Shi'a Arabs were closely collaborating with Iranians.³⁰⁵ The scholars like Ali Shari'ati, Jalal Al- Ahmad and

³⁰¹ Parviz S. Towfighi, *op.cit.*, p. 175.

³⁰² Charlotte Scaddan, Marcin Szudek and Jean Krasno, "Saddam Hussein: Violence and Terror" in *Personality, Political Leadership, and Decision Making: A Global Perspective*, ed. Jean Krasno and Sean LaPides, (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2015), p.45.

³⁰³ Ze'ev Maghen, "Unity or Hegemony? Iranian Attitudes to the Sunni-Shi'i Divide" in *The Sunna and Shi'a in history: division and ecumenism in the Muslim Middle East*, ed. Ofra Bengio and Meir Litvak, (New York, N.Y. : Palgrave Macmillan, c2011) ,p.199 ; Graham E Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, *op.cit.*, p.79.

³⁰⁴ worldwidevideos123. "Why do Shiites hate Omar Ibn al-Khattab" . YouTube video 2:39. Posted [December 2011].

³⁰⁵ Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, *op.cit.*, pp.19, 34, 71 ; Ofra Bengio and Meir Litvak, "Introduction" in *The Sunna and Shi'a in history : division and ecumenism in the Muslim Middle East*, ed. Ofra Bengio and Meir Litvak, (New York, N.Y. : Palgrave Macmillan, c2011),p.7.

Samad Behrangi of the modern *Shu'ubiyyah* movement were affiliated with ideologies like Marxism, and developed mixed ideologies like revolutionary Islam. Khomeini as an Iranian religious scholar can be regarded as a *Shu'ubiyyah* member. Communism was an attractive ideology for the Shi'ites not only in Iran, but also in all Arab states, as in Iraq and Lebanon. General Abd al Karim Qasim, the leader of the 1958 coup in Iraq, was Shi'ite originally and had close relations with the Iraqi Communist Party predominantly composed of the Shi'ite Arabs. In Lebanon, the Shi'ites also take part in communist factions.³⁰⁶

Khomeini also applied Islamic internationalism when he could not use the Shi'ite minority in the Arab states to intervene in the Arab affairs. He was directly involved in Palestinian cause which has a vital importance for Arabs. By using this cause, Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power but also lost his popularity at home and in the Arab world and Saddam Hussein used the cause to sustain his nationalist Ba'ath regime in Baghdad. Qaddafi also used it to be effective in Arab issues, even sent soldiers for the Arab Israeli wars, and allegedly did not to kill Musa al Sadr because he could not persuade him to accept the PLO in south Lebanon during Sadr's visit in Libya in 1978.³⁰⁷ King Faisal, as previously mentioned, was directly involved in the Palestinian cause by financing the cause, sending volunteer fighters, and launching oil embargo.³⁰⁸ Khomeini saw the vital strategic importance of the Palestinian issue in Arab affairs and attempted to use it to his advantage. The Islamic Jihad organization, a Palestinian resistance group, was established with the support of Khomeini. He met Yasser Arafat and promised aid for his case. Arafat's hailing

³⁰⁶ Tudeh and Mujahedin-e Khalq groups during the Shah's reign; The author, *Participant Observation*, Beirut, 2015-2016.

³⁰⁷ Kenneth M. Pollack, *Arabs at War Military Effectiveness 1948-1991*, (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2002),p.361 ; Fouad Ajami, *The foreigner's gift: The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq*, (New York: Free Press, 2006),p. 90 ; Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, *op.cit.*, p.205.

³⁰⁸ Muhammed Hashim. "King Faisal speaks about Palestine". YouTube video 2:38. Posted [July 2014].

Khomeini in his Iranian visit was popular.³⁰⁹ Khomeini's declaration of an Islamic Republic instead of a Shi'a republic can be interpreted with his will to encompass all devout Muslim masses. Likewise, he supported the liberation of Palestine as the unification of all Muslim *ummah*. He declared the celebration of Jerusalem Day on the last Friday of the Ramadan month. Upon the Arab defeats in wars for Palestine, Khomeini tried to build a new discourse of jihad against Israel. Through this policy, he aimed to unite both Sunnis and Shi'ites under Iran's leadership and get Iran out of the focus of Sunni hatred for a while.³¹⁰ Hezbollah, an Arab Shi'a militia group was established for this project. Hezbollah operatives carried out first suicide attacks in the modern age within Islamic movements against Israel and their Western and European partner in the south of Lebanon in 1983. They justified their act that they aimed to take revenge of the massacres of refugees in Sabra and Shatila Palestinian camps. Israel had backed the Christian Phalangist militias for their massacres on Palestinians in these camps.³¹¹ Khomeini's revolutionary wave did not only influence Shi'a Arabs but also Sunni religious groups such as the ones in Egypt. Radical Egyptian jihadist groups took Khomeini's revolution as an example for their struggles and combats against apostate regimes by criticizing the Muslim Brotherhood for being passive and cooperating with the Sadat regime. One of the members of these groups assassinated Sadat in 1981.³¹² In addition, Khomeini followed a policy of revolutionary international Islamism in non- Shi'ite countries while Khomeinism spread within university circles in the Sunni and non-Arab countries, too. Even in Turkey at the time, groups called as Iranist or Khomeinist were witnessed at universities during the 1980s. The mutual interaction was always possible among the Islamist and jihadist movements even whether they were Shi'a, Sunni, or Salafi. For instance, Da'wah movement in Iraq was influenced by early Muslim Brotherhood ideas and by the thoughts of Hasan al Banna. The attitude of

³⁰⁹ Elie Rekhess, "The Iranian Impact on the Islamic Jihad Movement in the Gaza Strip" in *The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World*, ed. David Menashiri, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), pp.191-195 ; Gilles Kepel. op.cit., in note 295, p. 151.

³¹⁰ Ze'ev Meghen, *op.cit.*, pp. 185 and 206.

³¹¹ Gilles Kepel. *op.cit.*, in note 295, p. 128.

³¹² Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 299, pp.213- 214.

the Brotherhood which was comfortable within a constitutional monarchy system or direct constitutional system influenced both Da'wah movement of Iraq during the 1960s and Iranian clerics during the 1940s.³¹³ The interaction in terms of not only the ideas, but also combat tactics among different sectarian Islamic groups was possible.

The Iranian pilgrims in Mecca tried to shout slogans on behalf of the Islamic Revolution and for Ayatollah Khomeini in 1981, after which they clashed with the Saudi police. Interestingly, the case was repeated in 1987 and 402 people died of clashes with the police intervention in this event.³¹⁴ Khomeini called the Muslim world to take the holy places from Saudi Arabia and establish a common Muslim rule over the cities.³¹⁵ Implicitly, Khomeini demanded the leadership of the Muslim World and undermined the power and influence of the Saudis, built during the Faisal's era. The Saudis and Gulf Sheikdoms took immediate precautions in May 1981 by establishing the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Council aimed to create counter policies and defend the region from Iran's expansionist and revolutionist policies.

In that era, Vice President Saddam Hussein came to power in place of President Hasan al Bakr in Iraq with a fast decision of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party. Saddam saw the necessity for Iraq to launch a war against Iran and found supporters from his Arab friends in the region, primarily from Kuwait and the Saudi Arabia, as well as from the Western states. Iraqi state felt threatened by revolutionary Iran as Iraq had majority Shi'ite population and they might be influenced by Khomeini's expansionist policies. The Islamic Shi'a regime in Tehran had to be destroyed otherwise it would be difficult to stop its rising effect. The war broke out in September 1980 and lasted for eight years. As a result, an estimated more than a million people lost their lives, and hundreds of thousands suffered from casualties and many people had to leave

³¹³ Amatzia Baram, "Religious Extremism and Ecumenical Tendencies in Modern Iraqi Shi'ism" in *The Sunna and Shi'a in history : division and ecumenism in the Muslim Middle East*, ed. Ofra Bengio and Meir Litvak, (New York, N.Y. : Palgrave Macmillan, c2011), p. 109 ; Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Francke, *op.cit.*, pp.48 and 66.

³¹⁴ Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 295, p. 135 ; Eyal Zisser, *op.cit.*, p. 151; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143, p. 243.

³¹⁵ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *op.cit.*, p.151.

their places of residence. Khomeini's revolution enabled Iran to interfere in Arab affairs and to protect and strengthen Iran and its revolution more than the Shah regime. Iranians emerged on the scene of the Arab world with their revolutionary Shi'a tool and Islamic internationalism tactic. Collecting the fruits of defeats of secular nationalist Arab regimes in wars with Israel by the petro- monarch Saudis was sabotaged by Imam Khomeini's sudden rise in 1979. While secular Arab nationalism launched by Nasser in the Middle East was declining after the defeat of 1967, King Faisal's initiative for oil embargo in 1973 War hit Israel's Western supporters, especially the US economy. Faisal's embargo made the Saudis the rising star for Arab nations while Egypt's influence was declining. But, the 1979 Revolution in Iran suddenly presented the Islamic model as a new power for power vacuum and turmoil in the Middle East after Nasserism and Ba'athism declined. Khomeini's rise did not only increase Iran's influence over Arab affairs but also influenced Islamic extremist movements in Egypt and Palestine with revolutionary Islamic ideals, attempting to break the impact of the political Salafis and their allies. The division in Palestinian cause by Khomeini's inspiration for the creation of "Islamic Jihad" group stood a new Iranian affiliated group in Palestine as an Iranian interference in affairs of Arabs. The Islamic Jihad group was founded by Khomeini in 1979 and formed a third resistance front besides the PLO and Hamas. The PLO leader Arafat was even invited to Tehran for solidarity against Israel and his allies. Yasser Arafat, in his speech to the press, was gladly hailing the Revolution and thanked Khomeini for his oil embargo on Israel.³¹⁶ Salman Harb (the secretary of Hezbollah Youth Education Affairs) pointed out in our interview in Beirut that the Saudis claim that they are the real representatives of the Arabs but Arab identity does not just mean the wearing of the traditional Arab dress as they do. For him, resistance to Israel is reflective of the Arab identity and Iran resists more than the Saudi Arabia and Gulf states. Al Harb also argued that there is no monarchy in Islam as it is in Saudi Arabia. According to him, if one considers the traditional and cultural behaviors and principles of Arabs, Hezbollah represents Arabs more. In Palestine, Palestinians are more aligned with Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah but not with

³¹⁶ Hijazna. "Yasser Arafat Hails Iranian Revolution". YouTube video 3:48. Posted [August 2009].

Saudi Arabia. Even, when Arafat wanted peaceful solutions, Hezbollah supported the military option against Israel.³¹⁷ Hezbollah claimed that Iran has struggled more against Israel for the sake of Palestine than Arab states. Therefore according to him Iran is more Islamic than other Arab countries in the region.

Palestinian case was vitally important for Arabs. Both Nasser and his allies gave many costs for it as it is well known. Even King Faisal urged to mobilize not only Arabs but also all Muslims states for the cause of Palestine against Israel through their financial, educational, diplomatic NGOs and international organizations but, interestingly, they never invited the Shah to involve. But Khomeini enabled Iran to participate in the cause.

The Shi'ite identity was vital for Khomeini. If Iran's power and opportunities were sufficient to build a Shi'ite line, he would never hesitate to create it. But, Islamic solidarity was always coming behind and secondarily. For instance, in Syria, the uprisings of Muslim Brotherhoods in Hama and Aleppo were suppressed by blood and violence.³¹⁹ Although it seems the Brotherhoods were Islamic and close to the Islamic regime of Khomeini, he supported the secular Alawite Hafez al Assad's brutal regime. Khomeini helped the Alawite regime establish close links with Twelver Shi'ism, as Musa al Sadr had done once.³²⁰ Iran always preferred to act on behalf of the Alawite regime of Syria. On the other side, rebellious Syrian Brotherhood guerillas were trained within the camps in Jordan, and their leaders were sheltered in Saudi Arabia and Iraq.³²¹ Khomeini regime's principal aim was to secure and maintain the interests of the Iranian state. He even blamed the Shah for appointing disloyal minorities to the top positions within the state. He referred to the

³¹⁷ Salman Harb(the responsible for the educational affairs of the Hezbollah Youth in Lebanon) in discussion with the author, April 2016.

³¹⁹ Fouad Ajami, *The Syrian rebellion*, (Stanford, California : Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 2012),p. 39.

³²⁰ Martin Kramer, "Syria's Alawis and Shi'ism," in *Shi'ism, Resistance, and Revolution*,ed. *Martin Kramer* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), pp.251-252.

³²¹ Cengiz Candar, *Ortadoğu Cıkması*,(Istanbul: Seckin Yayıncılık, 1988),p.105.

Baha'is and strictly forced to dismiss them from the state.³²² He even brought Hasan Bani Sadr, whose motto was “firstly Iran and then Islam”, to the presidency of the new Islamic regime in Iran.³²³ Khomeini also knew well that to hold on that Arab sea, he must use the guns of Arabs like Shi'a, pan-Islamism and the Palestine cause. Iran tried to play a role in which the Saudis also were involved, but according to the Saudis, Iran was not sincere in his policies towards the Sunni Muslims. For example, during the Bosnian war, the Saudis contributed with their Salafi jihadists and financial aid around 300 million dollars while Iranians, according to Saudis, only talked and made propaganda instead of contributing in any measure.³²⁴ The Saudis, Sunni Ba'athist Iraqis, the PLO, Lebanese Sunnis, Syrian Sunnis affiliated to the Brotherhoods, and Salafi sheikhdoms of the Gulf were ultimately surrounded by revolutionary Iran's increasing penetrations and policies. Since the ancient times, Iran has been active in Arab affairs through invasion and intervention. The opponent Shi'a, inter-elite cleavage of the Abbasids, the Mongols, and the Isma'iliyyah of the Fatimids were tools for the Iranians in Arab affairs. Hence, the Saudis enforced efficient policies of defense against Iranians, actively from the Gulf to Palestine, from Syria to Iraq, from Afghanistan to Pakistan. It is quite possible that the outcomes of the Iranian revolution, by either influencing or causing, would affect the emergence of global jihad.

4.1.4. The Siege of the Ka'bah and Crisis in the Salafi Circles

The year 1979 was a very troubled year for the Middle East, especially for Saudi Arabia. Four major events with the potential to influence the world happened at the same year: the Iranian Islamic Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini, Juhayman al Otaybi and his militant friends' Ka'bah Siege, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Camp David Treaty between Egypt and Israel. Some other events ensued those:

³²² Parviz S. Towfighi, *op.cit.*, p. 183.

³²³ Cengiz Candar, *op.cit.*, p. 33.

³²⁴ Thomas Hegghammer, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: violence and pan-Islamism since 1979*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 34-35.

the outbreak of Iran-Iraq war a year later and the assassination of the President of Egypt Anwar al Sadat by the Egyptian militant Islamists in 1981. Among these developments, the Afghan War, caused by the Soviet intervention, might be the most important turning point for the emergence of global jihad as other developments were important, as well.

After the Iranian Revolution in February 1979, a group of political Salafi zealots led by a Saudi citizen Juhayman al Otaybi shocked the Muslim World once again with the siege of Ka'bah. The Saudi dynasty was shocked and was not aware that Salafi circles had the first revolt within itself for the first time after the Ikhwan revolt in the 1920s. The leader of the siege was Juhayman al Otaybi, who was an ex-army officer in the National Guards and a member of Otaibah tribe. This tribe had been a part of the Ikhwan army of ibn Saud during the early 1900s and one of the revolting tribes against the sovereignty of ibn Saud in the war of Sabila in 1929. Juhayman's grandfather was killed in the war of Sabila while he was warring against ibn Saud. In addition, his rebel friends were members of some Najd tribes like Qahtan, Anazah, Subaie and Harb, which were all Ikhwan tribes and rebelled against ibn Saud in the war. Juhayman resigned from his job six years ago before he launched a protest and attended the Madinah Islam University and became a student of the Salafi grand Sheikh ibn Baz, who was a respectable cleric in the country and even served as a grand mufti.³²⁵ On 24 November 1979, Juhayman and his 200-250 followers who called themselves Ikhwan, inspiration from the old Ikhwan movement, raided the Ka'bah.³²⁶ Their aims were political opposition against the Saud dynasty. Juhayman read an ultimatum to the pilgrims in the Ka'bah. He emphasized the necessity of returning to the precepts of Islam, eliminating Western cultural influences, cutting diplomatic relations with all Western states, and replacing the Saudi state with a true Islamic regime. He argued that the Saudi family exploited the wealth of the *ummah*, and declared the Saudi King Khalid and his family as infidels. He demanded that the country would stop oil export to the USA, decrease the oil production to the appropriate level, prevent the extreme consumption of the

³²⁵ Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.*, in note 19, p. 197 and 231.

³²⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 204 and 227.

national wealth, and expel all the foreign experts from the country. This was an open political ultimatum aiming to overthrow the dynasty and proclamation of their infidelity.³²⁷ The zealot political Salafi group led by Juhayman included expatriate Arabs, classmates from the Madinah Islam University in addition to the Saudis. The National Guards hesitated to operate against the rebels inside the Ka'bah. It had religious reasons but also there were soldiers from the same tribe, the tribe of Otaibah, with Juhayman. The resisting soldiers who were unwilling to fight against Juhayman were arrested immediately. Apparently, there was support within the Guards to Juhayman as he was an ex-officer of the Guards. This situation alarmed the Saud dynasty more. In Mecca, Madinah and Taif cities, people were banned to go out. Iranians and Pakistanis within Mecca and Madinah were ousted from the country and were sent to their own countries within two weeks. The education in the Madinah Islam University was cancelled temporarily.

The Saudi ulama declared the rebels as *Kharijites* trying to divide the Muslims. For them, they could not be Salafis.³²⁸ The Saudi regime hardly managed to suppress the rebellion. Many soldiers and rebels died in the clashes. Juhayman was captured alive, and executed along with his sixty two rebel friends. King Khalid had to ask for help from France during the events and a special anti-terror team was sent for helping the Saudi forces. The anti-terror operation, which deployed foreign and infidel soldiers to the Ka'bah became a great debate in the following days within the Kingdom.³²⁹ The allegations about Khomeini's involvement in the siege was disputed widely as Juhayman and his friends claimed one of their friends, Muhammad al Qahtani as Mahdi, the expected heroic figure in Islam. This milleniarism (expectation for Mahdi, messiah or a rescuer) was in controversy with the Salafi tradition. In Salafi theology, there is no Mahdi belief while it is a well-known belief in Twelver Shi'ism thus Iranian role within the siege was suspected.³³⁰

³²⁷ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, p. 164 ; Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.* in note 19, pp. 218-219.

³²⁸ Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.* in note 19, pp. 220-222 and 226.

³²⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 223 and 229.

³³⁰ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *op.cit.*, p.150 ; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.* in note 1, p. 163.

However, it was found out that the group was political Salafi when their background and education were reviewed. Juhayman's ideas about the Shi'ites had extreme political Salafi tones. There was another possibility that they were the product of Faisal's policy of merging political Salafism with the dissident ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Saudi universities. The Sahwa (awakening) movement emerged as a product of this merge. Even, many students in the Saudi universities in which the members of the Muslim Brotherhood served as teachers were ideologized, and graduated with those Brotherhood's dissident ideas. The Muslim Brotherhood ideas were detected in the event. According to the Salafi teaching, the obedience to the ruler was a principle and only the ruler (the king of Saudi Arabia) could declare jihad. This was a religious principle drawn by ibn Abd al Wahhab in the 19th century. The ideas of Sayyid Qutb necessitated the ruler's obedience to the path of Islam, the Qur'an and Sunnah, otherwise the rule fell in the apostate position and deserved to be toppled. Juhayman and his friends accordingly claimed that the Saudi king returned from the true path of Islam and made infidels his friends and allies.³³¹ Under these circumstances of the kingdom, this event can be the first oppositional uprising. There was a cleavage between the regime and Salafi circles, and it showed itself with Juhayman's revolt. The younger generations of early Ikhwan tribes maintained the tradition of their grandfathers and became the voice of opposition after 50 years. At that time, they found many followers from the citizens of other Arab countries through the university linkages. This linkage and organization would remind us another similar rebellious movement, al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden was also a product of this system. Juhayman's ultimatum told many things. They were against the western cultural influence, the exploitation of oil wealth for the Saud dynasty's luxurious expenses and selling oil to infidels in cheap prices, as well as cooperation with the USA. They even declared the regime as infidel and claimed it to be overthrown. This movement inspired other political Salafi circles and especially the youth to break with the Saud dynasty. However, forming an effective opposition within the state would not be possible; therefore, it would transform itself into a global level, probably under the aegis of jihad.

³³¹ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.* in note 1, pp. 164-165; Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.* in note 19, pp. 202 and 230-231.

The result of Juhayman's raid to the Ka'bah produced some outcomes for Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia did not only face Juhayman's raid shock but also the Shi'ite uprising in its eastern province a couple of days later. The Kingdom had to cope with two crises at the same time. This caused horror within the political Salafi and Saudi circles. The precautions became compulsory because both political Salafi opponents and the Shi'ites influenced by the Islamic Revolution made the regime fall in a predicament. Political Salafism was the basic element that involved in the construction of the state authority since the establishment of the state, and helped the Saudi State to survive through its mobilization and perception of threat instruments. But the break within the political Salafi circles would pose a danger for the maintenance of the Saudi regime. For that reason, the Saudi monarchy applied the acceleration of Salafi based policies fast. The Saudi Monarch King Khalid proclaimed to take the title of *Khadem al Haramayn* "the Custodian of the Two Holy Cities" to show his devout, and Salafi clerics and members of the descendants of ibn Abd al Wahhab were honored with high positions within the state. The budget for Salafi religious staff, Salafi based education, institutes and universities were increased and the police for commanding good and forbidding evil became more active in his duty to enforce people to close their stores and pray with a group at mosque. Videocassette stores were closed, restrictions were increased on the alcohol black market, and women were forbidden to study abroad and drive in public, and forced to wear *abayah* and veil outside.³³² The tribes of the rebels were given shares from oil incomes.³³³ This means that the Saudis tried not to attract hostility of the Najdi tribes after the siege. According to Commins, the Saudis decided to pursue a policy of reinforcing political Salafism in order to cope with instability and predicaments.³³⁴ That policy would cause other problems in the near future. However, the Saudis, on the other side, foresaw the probable menace. The real, strong and dangerous opposition within the Saudi nation might only come from

³³² David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, p. 169 ; Gilles Kepel, *The prophet and pharaoh: Muslim extremism in Egypt*, (London: Saqi Books, 1985), pp.178-179 ; Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.* in note 19,p. 233; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 143, p. 243.

³³³ Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 330, p.165.

³³⁴ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.* in note 143, p. 249.

inside the Salafi circles. Coping with Iran and its expansion was easier for the Saudis because all Sunni Arab states agreed on this and Saddam Hussein seemed to undertake this responsibility now. The foundation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in May 1981 in Riyadh was an important development; however, the revolt of the Salafi factions alarmed the regime once again. Maybe the coup attempt of the Nasserist Free Officers in the army and pilots during the 1960s did not frighten the Saudis as much. However, a new opportunity emerged at that time for the Saudis to legitimize their rule within the country: The Saur Revolution in Afghanistan, which enabled the communists to rise to power and the subsequent Soviet intervention on December 27, 1979. This development was both an opportunity and a threat for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. The threats that had surrounded Arabs throughout the history was now around Saudi Arabia. The Soviet intervention was the last step of surrounding of threats around the Middle East especially the Gulf. In addition, the other menaces targeting the holy Peninsula, Arabia, were the Soviet-Ethiopian treaty in November 1978, the declaration of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen via a Marxist coup, the increase of Marxist groups' impact in Oman during the 1970s, and the Shi'ite uprisings in Qatif, al Hasa region in 1979.³³⁵

Saudi Arabia called for solidarity with Muslim peoples of Afghanistan against the new Marxist regime and the Soviet intervention in the summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference in Islamabad, Pakistan in August 1980.³³⁶ This call was the beginning of the Saudi intervention in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union. Thus, the Saudi regime could divert the Wahhabi opposition and the zealot Salafi youth, who were confused by modernization and puritan religious education system at the same time, away from itself for a while. It would also strengthen its religious legitimacy by showing solidarity with a Muslim Afghans.³³⁷

³³⁵ Tim Niblock, *op.cit.*, p. 145, Lawrence G Potter, *op.cit.*, p.298 ; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.* in note 143, p. 235.

³³⁶ Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.*, in note 19, p. 234.

³³⁷ Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 330, p.84.

4.1.5. Camp David Treaty and Peace with Israel

After the death of Nasser, his successor Anwar al Sadat, an old member of the Free Officers, came to power. He was decisive about changing Nasser's socialist and Soviet oriented policies. He planned to shift to the Western bloc, repaired the relations with the Saudis and held peace with Israel. Sadat developed good relations with the Saudis, softened relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and released the jailed members of the Brotherhood. King Faisal also supported the rapprochement. Actually, the biggest contribution in Sadat's change of foreign policy towards the Soviets and his domestic policy of softening towards the Brotherhood and Egyptian Islamist movements were encouraged by Faisal. In university campuses, the Islamist youth was supported in order to balance the protests of the Nasserist youth. As a response to Sadat's softening policies, the Brotherhood began supporting Sadat's rule.³³⁸ But, Sadat's most difficult exam would be on peace with Israelis because he needed to persuade the nationalist masses and Islamist circles within Egypt and other Arab states. In order to establish peace, he needed to take the Sinai Peninsula back from Israel. In October 1973, Egypt launched a sudden attack with other Arab states once again to Israel to reestablish its lost prestige in the 1967 war. The American support to Israel through aircrafts during the war caused King Faisal to challenge the West by oil embargo at the same year. The war resulted in taking Sinai from Israel. The Arabs gained a victory despite not destroying Israel or rescuing the Palestinian lands. But, the result was a triumph for Sadat, who restored the prestige of Egypt and legitimized his rule with the 1973 war.³³⁹ After this limited victory, Sadat began to enforce his plan of peace with Israel. He visited Israel in 1977 and this visit created worries throughout the Arab world. The peace talks were concluded with a peace treaty in Camp David in 1979 via the mediation of the US President Jimmy Carter. Camp David Treaty angered the Saudis and the Brotherhood; and caused the Islamist youth in universities and within the army to adopt extremism more.³⁴⁰ Extremist

³³⁸ Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 330, pp. 94, 105, 108, 114-115, 121, 128- 129, 133.

³³⁹ Robert C Goldston, *The sword of the prophet: a history of the Arab world from the time of Mohammed to the present day*, (New York: Dial Press, 1979), pp.198-200.

³⁴⁰ Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 330, p.150-151.

groups began flourishing in campuses, in underground and even within the army. The well-known ones were Takfir and Hijrah group led by Mustafa Shukri, al Tanzim al Jihad led by Ayman al Zawahiri, the future leader of al Qaeda, and al Ja'maah al Islamiyyah of Sheikh Omar Abd al Rahman, the plotter of the 1993 World Trade Center attack. It was difficult to draw a general theoretical picture regarding the flourishing Islamist societies within Egypt. There were many of them, and each of them had various ideas and methods. For instance, Takfir and Hijrah group's approach looked like the political Salafis; they rejected the four schools of orthodox Sunnism, referred to the Qur'an and Sunnah as the single sources of Islam instead of the interpretations of religious jurists. On the other hand, they rejected to pray Friday prayers under the rule of an apostate regime, rejected state schools and their curriculums, rejected being civil servants, regarded the Egyptian intelligence as the same with the Israeli army, enforced their militants and members to live in collective houses apart from other people.³⁴¹ The flourishing of different underground societies was related to the long-term prosecution, arrestments, torture and suppression of Muslim Brotherhood members in Nasser's era. The members of the Brotherhood, for example Mustafa Shukri, who was the leader of the new society Takfir and Hijrah, went to extremism after his jail experience, and broke off his ties with the Brotherhood. Sadat released many of these prisoners, who were put in jail because of their Muslim Brotherhood membership by Nasser, along with more extremist militants.³⁴²

The release of the prisoners was welcomed well by Hasan al Hudaybi and Omar al Tilmasani, the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood who thanked President Sadat. Sadat asked the Brotherhood to support his regime. The Brotherhood obeyed and gave full support to Sadat. Sadat's intifah (opening economy to the Western capitalism) policy was supported by the Brotherhood. Sadat also supported the Saudi policy against the Soviet Union and helped for the Afghan jihad by easing the flow of Egyptian jihadists into Afghanistan, supplying them with guns and allowing

³⁴¹ Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 330, pp. 82-89.

³⁴² *Ibid*, pp. 74-79 and 202.

Islamic NGOs.³⁴³ However, the friendly relations between the Sadat's regime and Brotherhood lasted until 1979 Camp David Treaty. Saudi Arabia reacted harshly and expelled Egypt from the Organization of Islamic Conference after the treaty.³⁴⁴ The Muslim Brotherhood, other small underground extremist groups and the Gulf branch of the Brotherhood ulama, for instance Yusuf al Qaradavi blamed Sadat for betraying Palestine and Islam. Sadat tried to respond by a fatwa released by al Azhar University. Al Azhar's state supporting ulama gave the Hudaybiyyah Treaty of the Prophet with Jews in Madinah in 628 as an example case.³⁴⁵

Abd al Salam Faraj, an Egyptian ideologue of jihad and a member of al Tanzim al Jihad movement, wrote a book "Neglected Duty" which can be regarded as a masterpiece on the near enemy doctrine of the jihadist movements. He theorized the apostate regime concept by referring to Sadat's rule and focused on making jihad against apostate rulers. He referred to ibn Taymiyyah's Mongolian or Tatar fatwa. As it is reviewed in Chapter 2, ibn Taymiyyah declared the Mongols who converted to Islam as apostates because they did not follow the Qur'anic Sha'riah, instead, follow their idolatrous, traditional Genghis laws. Faraj compared Egypt's ruling elite with the Mongols of the 13th century, and emphasized the necessity of jihad as a *fard ayn* (individual obligatory) upon every believer against the Sadat regime. Faraj understood the aim of jihad as the liberation of Palestine but firstly the believers should rescue their own homelands instead of Jerusalem. Actually, the Palestinian case was an embarrassment for Arabs since the 1948 war. All groups no matter if they were seculars or Islamists prioritized the Palestinian cause, because it was the most effective method to receive public support and mobilize the masses.³⁴⁶ The Iranian Revolution also became quite influential upon the Egyptian jihadists and inspired them on success of their struggle.³⁴⁷ Actually, the psychologies of Egyptian jihadists were not well after their release from jail because of the long-term

³⁴³ Ibid, pp.105-108.

³⁴⁴ Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 295,p.74

³⁴⁵ Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 330, pp.113 and 150-151.

³⁴⁶ Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 330, pp.83 and 191-195.

³⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 213.

concentration camps, prosecutions, tortures and suppression by socialist Nasserist regime upon them. Their ideas were also based on Sayyid Qutb's theories of revolutionary ideas, resistance, and revolt against the current regime via justifications with verses in the Qur'an, and Qutb's opinions' impact could be the main reason in the preparation of their minds for jihad. To sum up, both the Nasserist suppression policies, brutality in jail by Egyptian regime and Qutbist theories they read in their prison time might have reshaped their ideas and canalized them for armed jihad.

Towards the end of the 1980s, jihadist groups flourished everywhere. In Egypt, the Nasserist Arab nationalism left its place to Islamic underground societies, for whom defending and rescuing Egypt from an apostate regime was a priority. The efficient propaganda of extremist Islamist groups became successful. The opening of the Israeli embassy in Cairo after the Camp David Treaty and the welcoming of the exiled Iranian Shah to Egypt increased tensions among Islamist militant circles.³⁴⁸ Khalid al Islambouli, a member of al Tanzim al Jihad movement and a friend to Faraj and Ayman al Zawahiri as well as an army officer, assassinated Anwar al Sadat during a military parade in 1981. Then, the Egyptian dissident Islamists were once again exposed to prosecution, arrestment, tortures and jails. Almost fifteen years ago, just as the Muslim Brotherhood members fled to Saudi Arabia with Faisal's invitation; they now fled to Afghanistan joining their Saudi and other Arab jihadist brothers. Even, the leader of al Tanzim al Jihad Ayman al Zawahiri, the future leader of al Qaeda, was one of them. The Saudi charities mobilized the Egyptian radical groups and their members for the Afghan Jihad, and many of them poured into Afghanistan in order to rescue from the prosecutions and punishments of the Egyptian government after Sadat's assassination. After a while, they were politically Salafized in the jihad fields.

³⁴⁸ Ibid, pp. 158-159.

4.2. Mobilization by Political Salafism in Saudi Arabia Against Perception of Threats

In order to struggle with Nasserist threat, the Saudis tried to mobilize Muslim Brotherhood partners against the Nasser's regime and expanding Arab nationalism. Salafi ulama circles got in close approach with the exiled intellectuals of the Brotherhood in Saudi universities under this mobilization policy. In addition, King Faisal tried to hold the Palestine Question from secular Arab nationalism for mobilizing the political Salafis by accelerating the prestige of Saudi Arabia in the Arab world. During the era of King Faisal, the Saudis tried to hold the Palestinian cause from Egypt and other Ba'athist Arab regimes. King Faisal used his oil card and posed an embargo because of the US support to Israel during the 1973 War, therefore King Faisal became the dominant supporter of the Palestinian cause rather than Egypt. On the other side, the expansion of revolutionary Shi'ism and the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan were regarded as approaching threats for the Saudis. Both Iran and the Soviets were threatening factors to the Saudi interests in the Gulf. The outbreak of Afghan jihad gave an opportunity to the Saudis. The Saudis mobilized Arabs all around the Arab world for the jihad in Afghanistan. Both Saudis in the country and radical extremist groups who tried to escape from the secular Egyptian government found an opportunity under the Saudi charities, and participated in jihad in Afghanistan. The internal increasing opposition of Wahhabi circles with the siege of Ka'bah enabled the Saudis to support the Arab jihadists to flow into the Afghan jihad. On the other side, the Saudis developed a counter policy against Iranian expansion by supporting Salafi jihadists for rescuing its prestige. In addition, the Saudis took precautions against the Soviet expansion towards the Gulf with their both financial, technical and human power support to the Afghan groups' resistance.

4.2.1. The Palestine Question

The Palestinian cause turned into a common problem of Arab states after the Israil's establishment in the region in 1948. Nasser's Egypt developed a pan-Arabist and nationalist discourse over the Palestinian question and took support of other Arab

states. Appropriating the Palestinian Question was a prestige for an Arab country and a leader. King Faisal developed a policy as a rival to Gamal Abdel Nasser during the 1970s to appropriate the Question. The Palestinian Question and the struggle against Israel then formed the perception of threats of Saudi Arabia.

The developments in the Middle East in the aftermath of the mandate era in Fertile Crescent, the recognition of the third Saudi emirate by the Western world and the decolonization era in North Africa during the 1960s opened a new path for the Arab society. Arabs worldwide were finally free and established independent states. On the other side, Arab nationalism mixed with socialist and secular tones after the decline of the Hashemite dynasty backed by the British in the Middle East. The establishment of the Israeli state in May 1948 and the break out of the first Arab-Israel war fused the increase of secular Arab nationalism. The coup d'état of the Free Officers led by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt in 1952 after the 1948 War defeat accelerated the expansion of Arab nationalism.

The Muslim Brotherhood primarily enforced King Farouk's launching of war against Israel. Hasan al Banna was a schoolteacher, an Islamist activist and an opponent to the regime for the sake of Islamic Egypt. The organization of the Muslim Brotherhood became popular with their bombing attacks, assassinations against the British and King Farouk's regime.³⁴⁹ They made propaganda to force King Farouk to launch a war against Israel in 1948. The Egyptian soldiers including General Najib and Mayor Nasser were wounded during that war.³⁵⁰ The defeat had two important consequences for Egypt: the decline of the Muslim Brotherhood's power as an opposition, and the rise of army officers' reaction to the Farouk regime. The opposition was reshaped with the establishment of the Free Officers' Association led by Gamal Abdel Nasser and his friends. In 1952 after the coup, the monarchy was replaced thus the era of Arab socialist nationalism, "Nasserism", began.³⁵¹ Nasserism was the reinterpretation of secular Arabism and socialist

³⁴⁹ Robert C Goldston, *op.cit.*, p. 157.

³⁵⁰ Robert C Goldston, *op.cit.*, p. 158-159.

³⁵¹ Bassam Tibi, *Arab nationalism: between Islam and the nation-state*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p.183

Nationalism in Egypt, but it spread to the Arab world in a short time through Nasser's personal charisma.

The establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine created a heavy impact on Arab societies from North Africa to Iraq. Jerusalem has been a sacred place for Muslims as the third holy place after Mecca and Madinah, and it was ruled by Arabs for a long period of time and by the Sunni Ottomans. All Arab states neighboring Palestine had the purpose of ousting the Jews from the region. Syria saw Palestine as their former province and the Hashemites of Transjordan aimed to seize the holy city Jerusalem for prestige.³⁵² The Arab states failed in the 1948 War after which the regimes in Syria and Egypt, the banner carrier for the war against Jews, declined. The era of socialist nationalist regimes started in the Middle East; at first the Free Officers in Egypt, the Ba'ath in Syria and Iraq later. Transjordan also declared their independence from the British rule as Kingdom of Jordan in 1948.³⁵³ However, the war demonstrated the power of Arab nationalism, and proved that Arabs could be united for a common cause. Not only Egypt, Syria and Jordan but also Saudi Arabia and Iraq sent soldiers for the war. Saudi Arabs went to Palestine to fight against Israel as groups of volunteers. King ibn Saud supported the establishment of a financial aid organization to supply money and arms for the Palestinian resistance.³⁵⁴ His son Prince Faisal was appointed to carry out this establishment and then works of the Committee for Aid to Palestine.³⁵⁵ Faisal's nationalist leanings would display itself during his rule after his eventful succession in place of his brother al Saud. Briefly, the Saudis participated in the first trans-Arab cause, the 1948 war, in the Middle East, but this was not the first involvement of the Saudis for a cause beyond their borders. They involved in the affairs of the Gulf sheikhdoms and beyond the Ocean to India during their first and second emirates. However, the Palestinian cause would develop differently for the Arab World. It would be a major issue for Arab

³⁵² Robert C Goldston , *op.cit.*, p. 174.

³⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 176.

³⁵⁴ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *op.cit.*, in note 42,p. 199; Joseph A. Kechichian, *op.cit.*,p.183.

³⁵⁵ Thomas Hegghammer, *op.cit.*, in note 322,p. 19.

nations and states for a long period of time, and even today. The Muslim Brotherhood lighted the first flame for the Palestinian cause by mobilizing Egyptian masses and pressuring the King to join the war (The 1948 War). Nasser rose the fire much more by setting his regime's *raison d'être* on Palestinian cause. King Saud, the first son of ibn Saud and the ruler after him, also gave importance to Arab cause and solidarity, and supported Nasser's regime financially from 1954 to 1957, until the first coup attempt in Saudi Arabia was found out as the product of Nasserism. In addition, the Saudis took side near Nasser in the Suez War of 1956 by threatening the West to cut off diplomatic relations and oil shipment.³⁵⁶

4.2.2.The Collaboration with Muslim Brotherhood

Muslim Brotherhood was one of the most influential dissident movement in Egypt against the ruling regimes, both during King Farouk's regime and Nasser's rule. They were targeted and prosecuted by Nasser after an assassination attempt against Nasser in 1954. The members of the movement were arrested and jailed in a concentration camp. Sayyid Qutb was one of them, and was detained in the Tura concentration camp (jails for members of Muslim Brotherhood) where he wrote his famous book "the Signposts". Sayyid Qutb equalized Nasser's regime as the state of jahiliyyah, the pagan era of Arabs before the Prophet, and preached the armed jihad in order to topple an apostate regime and build the sovereignty of God. He was executed by Nasser's regime.

The Muslim Brotherhood had been active in Egypt since 1928. His leader Hasan al Banna was a dissident figure against the Farouk's regime because of the regime's close relations and cooperation with the British. Hasan al Banna was a pupil of Rashid Rida, the Egyptian revivalist Islamist scholar. Rida had also been a pupil of Muhammad Abduh.³⁵⁷ The political tradition was Muslim revivalist and continuation of anti-colonialism, especially targeting the British imperialism. Al

³⁵⁶ Tim Niblock, *op.cit.*, p. 41 ; Joseph A. Kechichian, *op.cit.*, pp. 63 and 68 .

³⁵⁷ Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983),p. 360.

Banna was the editor of famous Islamist Manar magazine after its former editor Rashid Rida died. Muslim Brotherhood later spread to the Arab world and owned branches in Syria, Jordan and Palestine. For example, the Jordanian branch was founded in 1945. Muslim Brotherhood was very effective in Palestine and among Palestinians, too. Yasser Arafat was a member of the Brotherhood in his early youth during the 1940s. His close colleagues and legendary actors of the PLO like Salah Khalaf, known as Abu Iyad and Khalid al Wazar, known as Abu Jihad had been early Muslim Brotherhood members who then converted to al Fatah and the PLO later.³⁵⁸ Abdallah Azzam, the hero of the Afghan jihad, had also been a member of the Brotherhood in youth years. It is possible to find many figures who are popular in Islamist movements and belong to the Muslim Brotherhood School.

Members of the Egyptian Brotherhood asked shelter from King Faisal to escape from Nasser's violence and suppression, and Faisal welcomed them for his strategy of struggling against Arab socialist nationalism. Senior members including Muhammad Qutb, the brother of the executed Sayyid Qutb, Dr. Salah Shahin, Dr. Zaki Badawi, Muhammad Surur Zaynal Abidin, Saleh Azzam, and Omer Abdel Rahman all fled to Saudi Arabia.³⁵⁹ This was regarded as kind of *hijrah* (the migration of the Prophet from Mecca to Madinah). King Faisal benefited from these exiled guests because he would gain profits with the Brotherhood members' cooperation with him. Faisal's plan was to forge a strategy against Nasser with his opponents and enrich Saudi intellectual circles and ulama. The Saudi ulama were not well qualified enough to get in a rivalry with Nasserist and Ba'athist propaganda. The Muslim Brotherhood was a good ally for the Saudi Salafi ulama. Saudi Arabia produced less intellectual sources as compared to Egypt and Beirut in the Arab world. The editions and books of Sayyid Qutb and other Ikhwan intellectuals were presented to Muslim masses in various Muslim countries as the intellectual products of the kingdom. The tension between Nasser and Faisal also started in the field of intelligentsia, too.³⁶⁰ The exiled members of the Brotherhood were employed in the

³⁵⁸ Barry M Rubin, *The Muslim brotherhood: the organization and policies of a global Islamist movement*, (London: Palgrave, 2010), pp.57 and 89 ; Robert C Goldston, *op.cit.*, p. 187.

³⁵⁹ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *op.cit.*, in note 42, p.186.

³⁶⁰ Fouad Ajami, *op.cit.*, in note 278, p. 165 ; Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 299, p.86.

Saudi universities in Riyadh, Jeddah, and Madinah or in the Muslim World League or other organizations founded by Faisal. Faisal's perspective envisaging the expansion of political Salafism throughout the Muslim world would be carried out by the exiled member of the Brotherhood worldwide. They helped political Salafism to get into touch with similar Islamist groups in other parts of the Arab world, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and so on. The role of the Brotherhood was beneficial in turning the *raison d'être* of Saudi state from political Salafism in one country to political Salafism worldwide. The merge of Brotherhoods and political Salafism enabled the Saudi influence to reach other Muslim societies and Islamist groups. In sum, the Brotherhood helped the expansion strategy of King Faisal.

Nasser and his comrades in Syria, Lebanon or Iraq were regarded as the carriers of alien ideologies to the Arab Muslim World through the civil war in Yemen in 1962 and the socialist Omani rebels' acts in Oman. The Soviet influence and penetration increased with Egypt's involvement in the south of Arabia for Saudis. Nasserism and Ba'athism were also active within the kingdom through the coup plots against the dynasty. Gamal Abdel Nasser addressed to the Sunni hinterland in the Arab world. As Fouad Ajami emphasized in his book "Arab Predicament", Nasserism and Ba'athism were also comprehended as Sunni internationalism in West Beirut, among Syria's Sunni majority. He wrote, "The youth of West Beirut and pan-Arabists in Syria would respond to Nasser for both pan-Arabism and Sunni internationalism."³⁶¹

The Saudis had realpolitik views in their expansion and recruitment strategy since the time of the first and second emirates. While they excommunicated (making *takfir*) the Shi'ites by regarding them as so-called polytheists, they approached orthodox Sunnis as convertible brothers. Hence, they saw the Sunni periphery as the battlefield to penetrate the masses, as a result, Nasserism or other Arab Ba'athist socialism on Sunni Arab masses should be struggled. The cooperation between the political Salafi religious establishment and Muslim Brotherhood helped the born of a new generation: Sahwa ulama. Sahwa's role was crucial on the way to global jihad and the transformation of political Salafism to a rebellious and uncontrollable power.

³⁶¹ Fouad Ajami, *op.cit.*, in note 278, p.93.

The Saudis did not only give political refugee status and support to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, but also to the members of other branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, Iraq, Palestine and other Arab countries. For example, the members who had problems with secular PLO or with Boumedienne's secular and socialist regime in Algeria were invited to Saudi Arabia. These political exiles of the Muslim Brotherhood provided a strong tool for the Saudis in terms of cooperation. The Saudis organized its own agenda with the help of the exiled members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the struggle against secular nationalist Arab regimes. The exiled actors taught in Saudi universities and a new group of ulama and young generation emerged in the 1980s: The Sahwa scholars. Scholars like Safar al Hawali, who was a pupil of Muhammad Qutb, and Salman al Awda, who was a pupil of Muhammad Surur, became prominent representatives of the Sahwa ulama. Sahwa movement was a product of the combination of political Salafi education with Sayyid Qutb's revolutionary ideas. Gilles Kepel called it as a hybrid of Salafism and Qutbist thought. This new hybrid movement became very useful for the Saudi dynasty's legitimization of its authority upon the society domestically and among the masses in the Muslim World. These hybrid thoughts were carried to Muslim World through the Saudi based international organizations, the OIC, the MWL, and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) and so on.³⁶²

Towards the 1980s, the traditional Saudi society began a fast transformation from rural and feudal one to modernization with the help of enormous oil revenues. King Faisal's development policy was not restricted within the domain of infrastructural investments but also included the opening of the society to the global world. TV broadcasts were introduced, women speakers were seen on TV channels, and women were encouraged to get education, and to began participating in social life. However, traditional society was not ready for these rapid changes within a decade.³⁶³ Although the modernization penetrated rapidly, the Saudi education was dependent on political Salafism and on an emphasis of strong Saudi nationalism. For

³⁶² Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 330, pp. 172-179.

³⁶³ Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 330, p.164 ; Joseph A. Kechichian, *op.cit.*, p.211 ; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1,p.158.

example, curriculums of the courses at schools still mentioned the heroic jihads of the Ikhwan Brotherhood and of ibn Saud in the 1910s and 1920s.³⁶⁴ Although these Ikhwan fighters were abandoned after the Sabila War due to their disobedience, the Saudi education system was still proudly mentioning them at schools. In addition, political Salafism was in extreme opposition to modernization attempts and innovations. At the time, the ideas of the exiled members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the universities caused extremists among the students to flourish. While the classic Salafi curriculum had already communicated hatred and xenophobia of the so-called polytheists Muslims and Shi'ites, Christians and Jews; this expanded with the Brotherhood intellectuals' opinions regarding Zionists, Communists, Socialists and imported Arab secular nationalist ideologies like Ba'ath and Nasserism. The following generations in Saudi Arabia including local Saudi youth, expat-labor force from the Muslim World in the Kingdom and the Muslim youth of other countries, who got education through the Saudi funded institutions of the MWL, the WAMY and the OIC, grew up with this education model.³⁶⁵ Osama bin Laden was also a student of Mohammad Qutb and Abdallah Azzam, who had been the Egyptian and Palestinian members of different branches of the Muslim Brotherhood.³⁶⁶

The Sahwa religious scholars were trained with a combination of political Salafism and the radical ideas of the Brotherhood's exiled members, but the relationship between the two were very fragile. Political Salafism aimed to build a centralized rule by forging monotheism among dispersed tribes and clans. Sayyid Qutb and Mawdudi's ideas were shaped under the colonial rule. They were revivalist and developed a way of opposing imperialism and Western influence on their societies by opposing the current regimes that were shaped by the Western values such as secularism, socialism, democracy, capitalism or communism. They named the Western institutions and ideas in the Muslim countries as jahiliyyah and aimed to

³⁶⁴ Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 330, p.163 ; p.s. There should not be confusion between Ikhwan Brotherhood of the Saudis and al Ikhwan al Muslimun (the Muslim Brotherhood). They are completely different entities. Ikhwan is a military force of ibn Saud. The Ikhwan al Muslimin is Egyptian political movement in the early 20th century.

³⁶⁵ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, p. 202; Tim Niblock, *op.cit.*, p. 166 .

³⁶⁶ Bruce Lawrence, Introduction to *Messages to the world : the statements of Osama Bin Laden*, ed. Bruce Lawrence, and trans. James Howarth, (London ; New York : Verso, 2005), p. xii.

replace it with the one that they called Islamic. On the other side, Najd had not been under colonial rule.³⁶⁷ It is true that political Salafism fought against the British although ibn Saud agreed and received their support later, but Arabian Salafis were not exposed to colonialism as Egyptians and Pakistanis were. Actually, it was not clear with what the Egyptian or Indian Islamists, the followers of Qutb and Mawdudi, proposed to replace their apostate regimes or what kind of institutions they would build instead of the jahilliyah ones. Fawaz Gerges and David Commins called Qutb and Mawdudi as religious nationalists.³⁶⁸ The Muslim Brotherhood and similar movements in other Muslim countries regarded jihad within their countries as a way of opposition to the current regimes. Then, they benefited from the opportunity of cooperation with the Saudi Arabs to topple their regimes.

The Salafi ulama, especially Grand Mufti ibn Baz, criticized Sayyid Qutb's ideas for influencing the youth and causing them to rebel. Qutb regarded Caliph Mu'awiyah's capture of the caliphate as the beginning of returning from the right path of the Prophet and the end of the golden age of Islam. The Salafi ulama opposed to this idea because Mu'awiyah was one of the Companions of the Prophet, *al Salaf al Salih*.³⁶⁹ Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood defended the idea of rebellion and revolution against the ruler. However, the Salafi doctrine always defended the ruler in parallel to the views of ibn Taymiyyah upon social order, state and ultimate obedience to the ruler. Here, the concept of the ruler's betrayal to Islam and return from the rules of the Qur'an is a crucial issue, and rose as a major problem for the Saudis in a later period. This concept was the main cause of al Qaeda turning against the Saudi dynasty. Omar al Masri, the chief of the political bureau of Muslim Brotherhood in Beirut, emphasized that Sayyid Qutb and Azzam had their own type of jihadist opinions but these two did not represent the official Muslim Brotherhood parties. He argued that jihad must just be applied to preserve people.³⁷⁰ Al Masri

³⁶⁷ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, pp.146-149; Natana J. DeLong-Bas, *op.cit.*, p. 256.

³⁶⁸ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, p.181.

³⁶⁹ The Ash'ari impact on Qutb and Muslim Brotherhood would be effective in their negative ideas regarding Mu'awiyah.

³⁷⁰ Omar al Masri (the former head of Beirut political bureau of Jama'at Islamiyah Part, the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Lebanon), Interview with the author, Beirut: Aicha Baqqar district, April 2016.

emphasized that the official Muslim Brotherhood do not approve illegal methods and global terrorism and do not own the Qutbist ideas.

In addition, Qutb, Mawdudi or the Brotherhood members were not against Sufism, innovation or *bid'ah* as political Salafis were, and Sayyid Qutb was an interpreter of the Qur'an and authored a book "Shade of the Qur'an"; while the political Salafis were literalists and against any interpretation of the Qur'an.³⁷² In sum, the common enemies during the 1960s and 1970s brought the two groups together but maintaining the common contract did not become so, and the year of 1979 when Juheyman and his friends revolted in Ka'bah was a first turning point in that regard.

4.2.3. The Afghan Jihad

In Afghanistan, "Saur Revolution" supported by the Soviets on 27 April 1978 overthrew President Mohammad Daud. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) led by Noor Mohammed Taraki proclaimed the country as the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The new regime of the Afghan communists caused turmoil within the country. The conservative Afghan society started reacting to the reforms initiated by the new PDPA regime. When the PDPA government started implementing technical, social and economic reforms such as the redistribution of land under land reform, education reform requiring female students' attendance, reforms aiming the emancipation of women; social unrest broke out within the traditional, feudal and religious segments of the Afghan society. In 1978, the PDPA began to arrest and execute mullahs, traditional feudal lords, and other anti-revolutionary elements resisting the reforms. Throughout Afghanistan, traditional elements of the Afghan society declared jihad against the communist regime by rebelling against the regime's policies, which were against the traditions and customs of the local people.³⁷³ In addition, there was unrest within the ruling

³⁷² David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, pp.146-150 and 164-165 ; Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 330, pp.53 and 236.

³⁷³ Brian Glyn Williams, *op.cit.*, p. 933.

pro-communist government. There was an increasing power struggle between President Mohammad Taraki and Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin. In September 1979, Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin toppled President Mohammed Taraki. The increasing unrest within the country not only worried the ruling regime but also the most important international partner of the regime, the Soviets. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 caused anxiety regarding a possible pro-Islamic resistance would also happen in Afghanistan, targeting the communist Afghan regime. For this reason, the Soviet army intervened in Afghanistan in December 1979. This was the breaking point in the history of global jihad as starting the mujahedeen resistance in Afghanistan³⁷⁴.

The revolt of local Afghan people against the Soviet Union was named as jihad by the local resistance groups. The resistance created a grand impact on the Muslim world, especially Arab countries. The fighters from Arab countries began flooding to Afghanistan in order to help Afghan mujahedeen against the Soviet invasion. The Soviets were regarded as godless and infidel who invaded a Muslim territory. It was argued that all Muslims should support the jihad with their possession and power. The organizations and charities in Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries were established to collect financial aid and recruit fighters for the Afghan jihad.³⁷⁵ The Arab fighters were firstly brought to Pakistan through various charities and organizations, and then they were trained and educated in camps in Pakistan.³⁷⁶ The Arab countries in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan cooperated on enabling the mujahedeen mobility in the region against the Soviet Union's invasion in Afghanistan. General Zia ul Haq, the president of Pakistan, and his Afghan policy was also in favor of the Afghan mujahedeen, and during the 1980s, he aimed to

³⁷⁴ Pınar Akçalı, Islam as a 'common bond' in Central Asia: Islamic Renaissance Party and the Afghan mujahidin, *Central Asian Survey* 17, no.2,(1998) : 274-275.

³⁷⁵ Quintan Wiktorowicz, The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafists And Jihad, *Middle East Policy* 8, no: 4 (2001) : 22-23.

³⁷⁶ Fuad Huseyin, *Zerkavi El Kaidenin İkinci Kusagi & El-Kaide'nin 20 Yıllık Planı*, ed. Osman Akyildiz, trans. Defne Bayrak (Istanbul: Kuresel Kitap, 2014),p.167.

recruit Pakistani youth as mujahedeen for jihad against the Soviets next to Arab Salafi fighters.³⁷⁷

The Saudis decided to support Afghan mujahedeen groups against the Soviets and their communist Afghan allies in the summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference in Islamabad in 1980. This was, in other words, a declaration of jihad against the invading Soviets together with all Muslim members of the Organization. Just as the Saudis had pressed on the Palestinian cause during the 1960s and 1970s, they began enforcing support for the mujahedeen indirectly through aids. The support was not only limited to financial backing but also supplying jihadists. Abdullah Anas, the second leader of the Services Bureau after Abdullah Azzam, pointed out that the main motivation behind jihad is the concept of *shahid* and jihad was the highest issue in the Muslim world. According to Anas, Afghan Arabs regarded jihad as a duty of *umrah*. The participants of jihad were mostly Saudis. He said the Saudis were number one in jihad fields.³⁷⁸

The Saudis had domestic and external reasons for this jihad. According to Kepel, King Khalid and then Fahd planned to keep Salafi zealous youth away from the Kingdom to prevent another future Ka'bah siege and legitimate the political Salafi identity of the Kingdom by helping the Saudi youth convert into Arab Afghan jihadists. The raid of Juheyman was influential in this decision. The youth would fight for the sake of Islam and for rescuing their Muslim brothers instead of criticizing and opposing the ruling Saud regime at home. In addition, for Kepel, the expansion of the popularity of Iranian Revolution among the youth circles throughout the Arab world, not only among the Shi'ites but also among Sunnis, worried the Saudis. Saudi Arabia and other Arab states and sheikhdoms saw the Afghan War as an opportunity to repair their damaged legitimacy against the increasing popularity of the revolutionary rhetoric of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Afghan jihad, which was against the USSR, would enable the Saudis and their partners in the Gulf to gain popularity and legitimacy in front of Arab public vis-à-

³⁷⁷ Khan Zeb Burki, "Rise of Taliban in Waziristan", *The Dialogue* 5, no. 3 (2010) : 188-189.

³⁷⁸ Abdullah Anas (the former director of Services Bureau, the son in law of Abdullah Azzam and the former commander of Afghan Arabs in northern Afghanistan during the Afghan Jihad) in discussion with the author, via Skype, April 2017.

vis the popular discourse of criticizing the USA and Israel.³⁸⁰ As the study points out in Chapter 3, the Saudis were followers of *realpolitik*; therefore, their cooperation with the US and the West was understandable. For instance, ibn Saud had agreed with the British and abandoned the Ikhwan movement in 1929 then agreed with Franklin D. Roosevelt in USS Quincy cruiser in 1945 and sold oil fields to ARAMCO.³⁸¹

The Saudis and other Arab regimes did not consider Persians as true Muslims in a common sense. Especially for the Saudis, revolutionary Iran's challenge to the USA was not originally heroic because the Saudis had already done this during King Faisal's era via oil embargo in the 1973 Arab Israel War. Now, they would defend Afghanistan and prevent the Soviet expansion to the Gulf and Indian Ocean by stopping the USSR in Afghanistan as a way to stop the communist sieges in the Gulf, South Yemen, Oman, and the Horn of Africa. In brief, the Saudi response to the Soviets was multidimensional and rewarding in a short term for the Saudis. However, this policy would threaten the Saudi regime itself when the opposition to the Saud dynasty got stronger in the jihad training camps and battlefields in the Afghan mountains.

The political Salafi establishments and circles had always been in a close cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood members against the socialist Arab nationalist regimes in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. They were now willing to help the Saudi strategy in Afghanistan. The prominent figures, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood at the top positions of Islamic relief charities, began to finance and recruit fighters that actually served for the Saudi interests in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Abdullah Azzam was one of these actors affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood within the Saudi strategy against the Soviets and the ruling Afghan regime. Abdullah Azzam was born in Janin in Palestine in 1941. He traveled to Arab countries for his education. He studied theology in Damascus and graduated in 1966, after which he returned to Amman and began teaching there. He witnessed the 1967 war, fought with the Palestinian guerilla groups against Israel, and founded a base

³⁸⁰ Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 330, p.84

³⁸¹ *Ibid*, p. 153.

linked to Fatah (the most important component of the PLO). As Thomas Hegghammer pointed out, Azzam was the chief of the guerilla group linked to secular Fatah group in Jordan. Then, he remained neutral with his Muslim Brotherhood identity during the Black September, which targeted the PLO supporters. Later, he left for Cairo, attended al Azhar University for his PhD degree, and graduated in 1973. After his second return to Jordan, he could not stay long because of the governmental pressure due to his sermons; therefore, as each member of the Brotherhood did, he went to Saudi Arabia and began teaching in the King Saud University in Jeddah. The Muslim World League, one of the organizations founded by King Faisal, began involving in the Afghan jihad in the early 1980s. The connections of the Muslim Brotherhood helped Azzam get a teaching position in the International Islamic University in Islamabad where he served from 1982 to 1986. During his stay in Pakistan, he participated in the Afghan jihad and founded a charity Maktab al Khidamat or Services Bureau in 1984 to recruit jihadists, aid jihad fields and finance the jihad.³⁸² He brought the Arab youth who wanted to participate in the Afghan jihad to Peshawar through this charity, and Pakistan then helped them cross to Afghanistan. Azzam was not only a man of action and service, but also a doctrinaire. He had been called as the Sayyid Qutb of Jordan. He wrote eleven books on jihad, and they were regarded as the torch enlightening the jihadist path for the Arab youth during 1980s. Probably the Brotherhood connections helped him get a job in King Abd al Aziz University. His Palestinian and Arab identity led his writings to shape around the Palestinian cause. He regarded the Afghan jihad as a parameter on the way of liberation of Palestine. His future agenda was claimed to be freeing Palestine. If he was not killed, it was claimed that he would carry jihad to Palestine after Afghanistan.³⁸³ In addition, his role in the Islamization of the Palestine cause is very important. Although the Palestine cause's Islamization process had been continuing since King Faisal's era, Abdullah Azzam contributed

³⁸² Thomas Hegghammer, *op. cit.*, in note 322, pp. 41-42 ; Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 295, p. 145 ; Thomas Hegghammer, "Abdullah Azzam , The Imam of Jihad" in *Al Qaeda in its own words*, ed. Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh, (Cambridge, Mass. : Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008),pp.82- 93.

³⁸³ Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009),p.135; Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 295,pp. 144-151; Thomas Hegghammer, *op. cit.*,in note 322, p. 42.

much more to that process in Afghanistan with his preaches and writings. For example, one of his books is about Hamas along with his other books on Afghan jihad.³⁸⁴ Abdullah Azzam's role was important to establish a link between the Saudis, Pakistani and Afghan mujahedeen. Islamist figures in Afghanistan and Pakistan were not Arabs but had already been included in the Saudi system dating back to the early 1970s in the era of King Faisal. The Organization of Islamic Conference and the Muslim World League gathered prominent Islamic figures throughout the Muslim World including South Asia and began underpinning their charities, political parties and organizations. Abu'l Ala al Mawdudi, the leader of Jama'at-e Islami Party in Pakistan, was one of those Islamist figures. While Sayyid Qutb and his movement in Egypt has an important place in the literature, the role and impact of Mawdudi's ideas on Qutb and Egyptian stream of jihadism is generally ignored. However, the Egyptian stream of jihadism has its roots in the British controlled India. The idea among Muslims in India began to form on targeting the British and the Shi'ite community. Mawdudi developed his interpretations and works around this outlook.³⁸⁵ Mawdudi also derived ideas and inferences from ibn Taymiyyah.³⁸⁶ The most well-known inferences of Mawdudi are the theory of modern jahiliyah which means the modern industrialized societies of Europe and America is similar to the old jahiliyah of the pagan era in Arabia. The basic emphasis of Mawdudi with his jahiliyah concept is the man based modern international system rather than the God. In order to struggle with jahiliyah, Mawdudi formed a political party Jama'at-e Islami and promoted jihad understanding to found an Islamic state. He interpreted jihad as two different perceptions like jihad al-nafs, which means a struggle against the soul and a defensive war to save the *ummah*. He saw the use of force as necessary to break the oppression preventing the predomination of the truth.³⁸⁷ According to Mawdudi, the world is divided into the party of God and the

³⁸⁴ Abdullah Azzam, " Afgan Cihadında Rahman'ın Ayetleri" in *Şehid Abdullah Azzam Kulliyatı*, ed. Mustafa Yiğit and trans. Ahmed Varol, (İstanbul: Buruc Yayınları, 2013), pp.582-646.

³⁸⁵ Jihad in Islam, Islam and Jahiliyyah, and Principles of Islamic Government are his main books, and they were translated in Arabic in the 1950s.

³⁸⁶ Quintan Wiktorowicz, A Genealogy of Radical Islam, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28, (2005): 78.

³⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 79.

party of Satan, and they are always in a struggle.³⁸⁸ However, the political groups or parties led by figures like Mawdudi in South Asia were not political Salafi. Their method looks like the Egyptian Brotherhood's methods rather than that of the puritan Salafi Arabs. However, they emerged as the best collaborators of the Saudis. The members of the Brotherhood like Abdullah Azzam, who worked for the Saudi regime in their international institutions, educational institutes or universities, served as mediators between the South Asian Islamist figures, parties and groups, and the political Salafi Saudis. Therefore, Mawdudi's party, Jama'at-e Islami was the main channel for Arab financial support to the resistance mujahedeen groups. Their favorite groups among the mujahedeen, which had close relations with Jama'at-e Islami and Muslim Brotherhood, were Gulbeddin Hekmetyar's Hezb-e Islami faction and Burhaneddin Rabbani's Jamiat-e Islami faction. These factions benefitted from the financial aid and recruitment of Arab Afghans via the reference of Mawdudi and Brotherhood in the beginning of the jihad.³⁸⁹

The basic channel, which could reach to the Afghan mujahedeen factions, was the Brotherhood because the Islamist movement firstly flourished in Kabul in the 1950s with the opening of the Theology Faculty of Kabul University in 1958. Prof. Ghulam Mohammad Niyaz, the dean of the faculty, Prof. Burhaneddin Rabbani and Prof. Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the theology professors in the same faculty in Kabul University were all al Azhar graduates and had links with Egyptian Brotherhood during their education in Egypt. Burhaneddin Rabbani and Sayyaf became the prominent leaders of mujahedeen and Afghan jihad later during the 1980s. The publications of Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb were translated and were distributed among their students in the university. In 1968, Islamist students began flourishing within the university and organized meetings. In 1969, the Organization of Muslim Youth, called as Javanan-e Muslim was established under the supervision of the teachers like Rabbani and Sayyaf. This organization was turned into Hezb-e Islami faction in a later period. Gulbeddin Hekmetyar, an engineering student and the future leader of the Hezb-e Islami faction, was one of the prominent students within

³⁸⁸ Ibid.,p.78.

³⁸⁹ Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 295,p.142.

the Islamist youth in the university during the 1970s. In 1973, the Islamist student union won the elections at faculties of the Kabul University and this situation alarmed President Muhammad Daud Khan.³⁹⁰ In brief, the Muslim Brotherhood also followed the developments in student circles in Afghanistan closely via their linkages with the Afghan graduates of al Azhar. Establishing ties with those mujahedeen groups through the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated officials within the Muslim World League or the Saudi universities and the League financed universities in Pakistan helped the Saudi strategy against the Soviet expansion to South Asia.

Although Afghan jihad's goal was to save the Afghan Muslim peoples from the Soviets, it also aimed to defend the interests of Arabs in Afghanistan against the Soviets and to prevent the expansion of the Iranian Revolutionary ideas. The Saudis, who had taken the leadership of the Arab world from Egypt, and helped socialist nationalism be abandoned in Egypt, now planned to hit the Soviets from far. As King Faisal said against the secular nationalist movements around the Arab world: "We have the holy Koran...Why do we need socialism, capitalism, communism or any other ideology?". The Saudis and political Salafis planned to solve the crisis in Afghanistan via the jihad.³⁹¹ Abdullah Azzam developed the method of the Afghan jihad in his books "Jihad Caravan" and "the Defense of the Muslim Lands" by referring to the jihad verses in the Qur'an. Those books and concepts preaching the necessity of jihad for Muslim youth mobilized primarily the Arab youth in the Middle East.

4.2.4.The Saudi Support to the Afghan Jihad

The Saudis saw the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan as a threat to the Gulf and to the oil fields. Therefore, they directly involved in the Afghan jihad through financial aid, supply of fighters from their own citizens, and military backing. The Saudis reportedly supplied 1.8 billion dollars to Afghan mujahedeen groups and Arab Afghans (the Arab jihad fighters in the region) from 1987 to 1989. This amount was

³⁹⁰ Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 295,pp. 140-142 ; Abdullah Azzam, " Afgan Cihadında Rahman'ın Ayetleri" in *Şehid Abdullah Azzam Kuliyatı*,ed. Mustafa Yiğit and trans. Ahmed Pakalin, (İstanbul: Buruc Yayınları, 2013),pp.562-563.

³⁹¹ Robert C Goldston, *op.cit.*, p.196.

much more than the financial aid (992 million dollar) given to the Palestinian Liberation Organization from 1978 to 1991.³⁹² The Saudi airlines applied seventy-five per cent discount on flights to Peshawar during the Afghan jihad, Saudi newspapers released fatwas and TVs made news and programs promoting the Afghan jihad.³⁹³ Through the mobilization of the people by the pro-jihad policies of King Fahd, the people participated in jihad through the charities. Even, the wealthy businessmen were willing to participate in jihad; Osama bin Laden was one of them. Abdullah Anas, the leader of the Services Bureau after Azzam, pointed out that the jihadists were from all social classes, generally from middle class, employed, well educated.³⁹⁴ People gave their alms and donations to those charities and sent their aid to the jihad lands and to mujahedeen. The amount of aid, which was collected by the charities during the religious holidays such as eid al Fitr and eid al Adha, was sufficient for Arab jihadists. Even, Ayman al Zawahiri, the second person of al Qaeda during the 1990s after Osama, asserted that Arab-Afghans never needed American financial aid, and the donations coming from the Arab peoples were sufficient for the Arab jihadists. He blamed Pakistan and other Afghan mujahedeen for receiving the US money. Just in 1982, it was a well-known fact that Pakistan and Afghan mujahedeen received 600 million dollars as aid from the USA after the aid package was ratified in the Congress. Zawahiri's emphasis at this point was referring to this allegation.³⁹⁵ The number of Saudi jihadists was the highest within Arab states. There were various estimates on this: The Saudi Interior Ministry reported 12.000 Afghan Arabs attended jihad in 1995. According to the data given by David Commins, there were between 12.000 to 25.000 Saudi jihadists out of 35.000 Muslim fighters in Afghanistan in 1982 -1992.³⁹⁶ The Saudi strategy expanded in

³⁹² Thomas Hegghammer, *op.cit.*, in note 322, p. 25.

³⁹³ Thomas Hegghammer, *op.cit.*, in note 322, p. 28 ; Fawaz A. Gerges, *op.cit.*, in note 379, p. 69.

³⁹⁴ Abdullah Anas (the former director of Services Bureau, the son in law of Abdulah Azzam and the former commander of Afghan Arabs in northern Afghanistan during the Afghan Jihad) in discussion with the author, via Skype, April 2017.

³⁹⁵ Fawaz A. Gerges, *op.cit.*, in note 379, pp. 75-77 ; Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 295, p. 143 .

³⁹⁶ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, p. 174 ; Thomas Hegghammer, *op.cit.*, in note 322, p. 47.

more than one way for supporting jihad. They both expanded in the field through the Muslim Brotherhood's charities, Muslim World League based institutions, relief organizations, which were connected with Gulbeddin Hekmetyar's Hezb-e Islami and Burhaneddin Rabbani's Jamiat-e Islami mujahedeen faction via Muslim Brotherhood and Mawdudi's Jama'at-e Islami Party. In addition, the Saudi jihadists participated in the training camps of Abd al Rasul Sayyaf's Ittihad-e Islami faction along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in 1984. Saudi businessperson, Osama bin Laden, began recruitment for jihad in 1985 in the region. On the other side, the Saudis also began financing the Deobandi and Ahl-e Hadith madrasahs in Pakistan to recruit local jihad soldiers from Pakistanis and Afghan refugees in the camps along the Afghan-Pakistani border.³⁹⁷

The ruling regime, merchant class and urban middle class in the Arab world supported the Afghan jihad. The participants in jihad included young men from urban middle class, poor and unemployed people, and students from engineering and medical schools, qualified university graduates, children of rich families not only within the Arabian Peninsula but also from North Africa to Egypt. Briefly, it was possible to find young warriors from all social backgrounds. Especially, the fighters from Egypt were recently out of prison because of prosecutions upon Egyptian Islamist civil and underground societies. The Egyptian Afghan Arabs were more ideologically devout and pious than the Saudis or Yemenis, and had an ideological background during their civil society service or jail periods. Fawaz Gerges defined Arabians as foot soldiers while defining Egyptians as ideologues. Indeed, the Saudis were fundraisers and field soldiers with their courage and recklessness along with their Yemeni brothers, on the other side, Egyptians and Palestinians were organizers, pioneers, recruiters and the brain of jihadist doctrine.³⁹⁸

³⁹⁷ Thomas Hegghammer, *op.cit.*, in note 322, p. 42-44 ; Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 295, pp. 103 and 142-143.

³⁹⁸ Thomas Hegghammer, *op.cit.*, in note 322, pp. 59-60, 130 , 188-189 ; Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 299, p. 85 ; Fawaz Gerges, *op.cit.*, in note 379, pp. 58-59, 62, 178 ; Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 295, p. 219.

Salafi Jihad was comprehended as a cultural and customary tradition among Arabs. As Kepel pointed out, the jihad tours were organized for rich and young Arabs for a couple of weeks like a safari. They experienced hot conflict with the Soviet troops, took photos, experienced the atmosphere of the war alongside the border areas of Afghanistan-Pakistan. Interestingly, they displayed their discontent when they encountered Western humanitarian organizations or NGOs. The Arabs who were ideologically loaded with jihad responsibility were different from the local people in the region with their xenophobia against the Europeans or Westerns.³⁹⁹ As the last point, the participants of jihad coming from Arabia or other Arab states were not always devout Muslims. Many of them began fasting and praying daily only in jihad areas. They came to Afghanistan for jihad as a result of popular campaigns in their countries.⁴⁰⁰ Actually, political Salafism had brought those people to the jihad field. Political Salafism unified the youth for jihad as it had done centuries ago in Central Arabia, Najd, to forge a unification and mobilization. It aimed to mobilize a holy war for the interests of the Saudi state under the name of saving Afghan Muslim brothers. Arabs were also successful to make south Asian Muslims to believe and share their enthusiasm during their jihads: The Deobandi madrasahs funded by the Saud financial power would be the best proof. In addition, Kepel in his books “Jihad: the Trail of Political Islam” and “The War for Muslim Minds” drew analogies between Arabs of the early centuries who were expanding to different neighboring regions and raiding territories from North Africa to Fertile Crescent seasonally based on the rainfalls and droughts, and the ones who went to jihad in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Chechnya seasonally.⁴⁰¹

³⁹⁹ Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 295, p. 148.

⁴⁰⁰ Fawaz A. Gerges, *op.cit.*, in note 379, p.60 ; Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, *ISIS: the state of terror*, (London : William Collins, 2015),pp.14-17 ; Joby Warrick, *Black flags: the rise of ISIS*, (New York: Doubleday, 2015),pp.7 and 51-54 and 62-64 ; Abdal Bari Atwan, *Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate*, (London: Saqi Books, 2015), pp. 66-67.

⁴⁰¹ Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 295, p. 300 ; Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 299,pp.169-170.

4.2.5. A Showcase for Mobilization: A Saudi Billionaire in the Jihad Field

Osama bin Laden, a rapid emerging Saudi Arab actor in jihad fields, and whose name would be on global agenda for the next three decades, emerged in Afghanistan for the first time in 1979 when he brought financial and technical equipment to Afghanistan. He was a terrorist for many people, but an idealist warrior in the eyes of jihad supporter Muslims. As one of the richest men in the world, he left his treasure for mountain caves in Afghanistan and spent most of his life in jihad war fields until his death. Bin Laden was the son of Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden, who was a Yemeni descent, poor laborer in his early life then became rich when he moved to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden's father was a successful entrepreneur. He rose from a simple laborer to the ownership of one of the main construction companies in the country. The Laden family was one of the prominent merchant families in the Kingdom and very close to the Saudi dynasty. It was told that Mohammad Bin Laden paid the salaries of civil servants in the country in the first years of King Faisal when ex-King Saud in exile took the entire treasure to Egypt. King Faisal gave all the construction works to the Ladens within and outside the country. The father Laden reconstructed al Aqsa Mosque and renovated the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem after the Jews burned it in 1969. Then, he won the bids for expanding the mosque of Ka'bah and Masjid al Nabawi mosque in Madinah. Thus, the family got the honor of constructing all holy buildings in the Muslim World. According to the claims, bin Laden studied business in the King Saud University and he took Islamic courses from Abdullah Azzam and Muhammad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb.⁴⁰² Bin Laden was of Yemeni origin and was influenced by the leading figures of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jeddah, and those reshaped his character and identity.

⁴⁰² Fuad Huseyin, *Zerkavi El Kaidenin Ikinci Kusagi & El-Kaide'nin 20 Yıllık Planı*, ed. Osman Akyildiz, trans. Defne Bayrak (Istanbul: Kuresel Kitap, 2014), p. 163 ; Bruce Lawrence, *op.cit.*, p. xii ; Omar Saghi, "Osama bin Laden" in *Al Qaeda in its own words*, ed. Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh, (Cambridge, Mass. : Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 12; Osama bin Laden, "Interview with Al Jazeera" in *Al Qaeda in its own words*, ed. Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh, (Cambridge, Mass. : Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 57, Thomas Hegghammer, *op.cit.*, in note 378,p.90 ; Fawaz A. Gerges, *op.cit.*, in note 379, p.40.

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan; the mujahedeen forces and the groups linked to Muslim Brotherhood, began resisting. Osama took financial aid from the Saudis to charities in Peshawar for distribution to Afghan mujahedeen. During the Afghan jihad, the Saudi merchant families participated in the aid campaigns for the Afghan Jihad, and Osama was the representative of the Ladens.⁴⁰³ Osama firstly cooperated with Abdallah Azzam's Services Bureau but then decided to recruit just Arab warriors and established his own organization the House of Ansar that would later become al-Qaeda. The first cleavage between Abdallah Azzam and Osama bin Laden emerged after this split and Osama established a new organization. Bin Laden approached the Egyptian jihadist figure Ayman al Zawahiri with whom he shared the same view on defending global jihad rather than limited jihad within the borders of Afghanistan. While Azzam saw himself responsible in the jihad only within Afghanistan and spent all his effort through his theories to expel Russians from Afghanistan, bin Laden and Zawahiri were thinking about the post- Afghan jihad. They planned to overthrow the incumbent regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia to implement their political agendas before the flame of jihad ended. Azzam emphasized the necessity of jihad as a *fard ayn* against a foreign invader infidel. He was against the mobilization of Arab fighters against the Arab ruling regimes under the near enemy doctrine created by Ayman al Zawahiri. Azzam and bin Laden had already been in disagreement because Azzam defended the idea of war together with Afghan mujahedeen under the Services Bureau. Osama preferred to set up his own independent organization al Masadat al Ansar or known as al Bayt al Ansar (the House of Ansar). Al Qaeda means "the basis" in Arabic. The formation of al Qaeda was based on al Sijil al Qaeda or al Qaeda al Malumat (the database) where the Arab fighters' names were recorded. An Egyptian Afghan Arab Abu al Ubaida Banshiri founded the al Qaeda database, and this database covered all Arab fighters' camps and fronts including the House of Ansar, which were affiliated to bin Laden, then the name, al Qaeda, began to be common. Bin Laden saw this database issue as a necessity in order to inform the families of Arab jihadists about their sons or relatives who fought in the jihad fields. He preferred a separate organization than Azzam's

⁴⁰³ Omar Saghi, *op.cit.*, p. 17.

Bureau and did not want Afghan Arabs to mix with Afghan local fighters and form a hybrid war force.⁴⁰⁴

Abdullah Azzam supported the local and regional jihad. He did not approve jihad against a Muslim state and its ruler. He developed a theory of al Qaeda al Sulba, the solid basis. According to this theory, the territorial foundation was vital for jihad movements at first, and the main aim of the jihad must be to conquer Palestine from Israel. On the other side, Zawahiri gave the priority to revolt against apostate Muslim rulers in Egypt or Algeria first. In his view, the revolution or coups in those apostate states would enable the conquest of Palestine in the future. The road to Palestine goes over the toppling of the apostate Arab regimes.⁴⁰⁵ Among those discussions and strife, Abdallah Azzam was killed with a bomb trap in 1989 with his sons on the way to the mosque in Peshawar.⁴⁰⁶ The dispute has still been going on regarding who was behind the assassination attempt. After Azzam, bin Laden rose as the undisputable leader of the Afghan Jihad while the Soviets were withdrawing from Afghanistan with the Mujahedeen triumph. Three years after the Soviet invasion, the mujahedeen toppled the Soviet ally Najibullah regime in 1992. Burhaneddin Rabbani was elected as the new president. After a while, bin Laden witnessed the outbreak of a civil war in Afghanistan. He actually did not approve Tajik leader Burhaneddin Rabbani's regime.⁴⁰⁷ Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia in 1989. Osama witnessed two important developments: the first was the dissolution of the USSR. Bin Laden believed that the Soviets was dissolved because of their defeat in the Afghan jihad, the Afghan Arabs together with the Afghan mujahideen succeeded it. After the Soviet collapse, the communist Najibullah regime fell in the

⁴⁰⁴ Osama bin Laden, *Messages to the world : the statements of Osama Bin Laden*, ed. Bruce Lawrence, and trans. James Howarth, (London ; New York : Verso, 2005),p. 32 ; Omar Saghi, *op.cit.*,p. 19; Thomas Hegghammer, *op.cit.*, in note 378, pp.93-96 and 99-101 ; Fawaz A. Gerges, *The rise and fall of Al-Qaeda*,(Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, c2011), pp. 42-43 and 58 ; Fuad Hüseyin, *op.cit.*, p. 168 ; Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 299, p. 114.

⁴⁰⁵ Fawaz A. Gerges,*op.cit.*, in note 400, pp. 46 and 81.

⁴⁰⁶ Thomas Hegghammer, *op.cit.*, in note 378, p. 96.

⁴⁰⁷ Banafsheh Keynough, *Saudi Arabia and Iran: friends or foes?*, (New York, NY : Palgrave Macmillan, 2016),p. 146.

hands of the mujahideen. Then, the second case was the toppling of the communist South Yemen regime in 1990 just after a year from the Soviet's withdrawal from Afghanistan. Those developments inspired Osama that if a superpower behind client regimes could be defeated, the local apostate regimes could fall down. Bin Laden developed this theory together with his close colleague, Ayman al Zawahiri, during the late 1990s and started a global jihad against the far enemy, the USA.⁴⁰⁸

4.2.6. Conclusion: The Kingdom's New Perception of Threats and Mobilization

Political Salafism defended the Saudi interests against the Nasserism's expansionist policies in the region at first. The Saudi rule responded Nasser's and Arab nationalism's policies with the expansion of political Salafism in Arab and Muslim countries. Political Salafis listed Marxist, socialist and nationalist ideas as threats for Islam. Political Salafism conducted a massive exporting policy of Salafi beliefs in the Muslim countries. On the other side, Iranian Revolution and radical Shi'ite groups in the Gulf countries were regarded as threats in political Salafis' perspective. Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states were allies during the Iran-Iraq war. The Saudis and Gulf countries gave their support to Iraq in the war.

Both the Afghan war and Iran-Iraq war broke out around the same years during the early 1980s. Both the Soviets and Iran were regarded as the threatening powers for the Arab states. The Soviet expansionism was threatening the Gulf with the Red Army's entrance into Afghanistan. The Shi'a menace and revolutionary Islamic ideals also began expanding in the Middle East. When Iranian Revolution happened, it was claimed that the revolution could spill over Afghanistan so it was one of the reasons behind the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. In addition, the Soviets began threatening the Gulf more and more with the Afghan invasion as well as through its client states and opposition fronts in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. Political Salafis in Saudi Arabia made a siege in Ka'bah in order to protest the Saudi ruling dynasty by blaming them for speedy modernization, alliance with the Western countries, corruption policies and extreme luxuries. The

⁴⁰⁸ Donald Holbrook, *The Al-Qaeda doctrine: the framing and evolution of the leadership's public discourse*, (New York : Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), pp.13 and 17.

Camp David Treaty signed by an Arab state with eternal enemy Israel also shocked Arab masses and other Arab regimes in the region. The treaty alarmed the political and radical Islamic factions in Egypt. The anger caused the assassination of Egyptian President and prosecutions on Islamic radicals. Political Salafism evaluated all these developments in the end of the 1970s and early 1980s as perception of threats and developed a policy of mobilization of Salafi Arabs and radical Islamic groups for a common threat. The Afghan jihad presented a good opportunity for political Salafis. The Saudis indirectly and Salafi jihadists directly intervened in the Afghan struggle against the Soviets to defend their interests with the aim of helping Muslim brothers. Through that way, the Saudis mobilized opponent political Salafi circles within homeland against another target, the Soviet invasion and found an opportunity to repair their prestige in the Muslim world. The mobilization for jihad in Afghanistan later resulted as the rise of another local political Salafi based movement, the Taliban.

CHAPTER 5

THE ROLE OF POLITICAL SALAFISM IN THE FORMATION OF THE TALIBAN RULE

The Taliban movement rose from the Deobandi madrasahs in the Afghan-Pakistan borders and North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Deobandi order had Salafi tones and principles within its religious discipline and had close relations with the political Salafis in Arabia. In other words, Deobandis are a political Salafi version of Indian and Pakistani Muslim society. Political Salafis in South Asia are involved in political matters for example; they founded a political party in Pakistan and carried their religious and sectarian views to the political arena in Pakistani politics. Even, they became effective in Pakistani governments for years. The political Salafis also involved in the rise of the Taliban movement with financial and technical support of the Saudis and Pakistanis. It can be said that the Taliban emerged as a common product of political Salafis of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The Taliban, supported by political Salafis, succeeded in expanding within Afghanistan and established a strong authority by eliminating inter warring mujahedeen factions. Salafi ideas in terms of unification of the tribes and purging other ethnic groups with regard to political Salafi defined perception of threats. Political Salafism in the Taliban politics developed within Pashtun majority identity. Taliban supporting Pashtuns embraced political Salafism, mobilized the clans affiliated to themselves, and expanded their rule by adopting political Salafism's perception of threats. In addition, the Taliban derived their mobilizing force from the historical Pashtun legacy. The Pashtuns were the major governing ethnicity in Afghanistan's history. Jihad tradition was important for them because it led them to fight with the British and escape from their dominance three times in history. The Pashtun originated Taliban also revived the past's jihad culture in their mobilization and expansion. In addition, political Salafism played a key role in gathering the Pashtun tribes under the Taliban authority

and enabled the Taliban to revive the traditional jihad legacy against redefined threats.

5.1. The Perception of Threat by Political Salafism in South Asia

The perception of threat of the Afghan warring factions changed continuously, and the Saudis and Pakistan were always key actors in redefinition of perception of threat. During the Afghan jihad, the Soviets and the communist Afghan regime was in the threat lists of the Afghan mujahedeen backed by the Saudis and Pakistan. But, during the civil war among the mujahedeen factions, the rise of the Taliban movement caused the change in the perception of threat and to be redefined by the Saudis and Pakistanis.

The perception of threat defined by the Taliban movement primarily was derived from political Salafism. Political Salafism in the circumstances of South Asia defined their enemy lists according to its historical development and struggle. For political Salafis in Indian subcontinent; the extreme Sufi orders, Shi'ites, Hindus and esoteric beliefs were regarded as threats. Salafi ideas embedded in Deobandi order became effective in the formation of such a perception of threat. In addition, the British presence in India was also regarded as a perception of threat by political Salafis in the late 19th century and early 20th century. The merge of the Saudi influence and South Asian Salafi orders during the Afghan jihad in the 1980s also became determining for the Taliban's perception of threat. In addition, the Taliban's Pashtun fanaticism merged with the political Salafi views. In result, the Taliban expansion in Afghanistan happened through purging of other ethnic and sectarian groups. In the redefinition of perception of threat by the Taliban, two driving forces played a key role: political Salafism and Pashtun ethnicity. The threats were especially redefined as ethnic and sectarian groups within the country. For example, political Salafis' perception of threat about the Shi'ites in Pakistan were infiltrated into the Taliban's perception of threat in a time. On the other side, it is a well-known fact that the Pashtun ruling elite in Afghanistan regarded the Shi'ite Hazara ethnic minority as an internal threat during the monarchy era, too.

5.1.1.The Salafi Penetration into South Asian Muslims: The Formation of Perception of Threats in South Asia

In the 19th century, the political Salafis spread their influence into South Asian Muslim communities and the Deobandi religious orders were influenced with Salafi tones. The Deobandi orders determined on the similar threats in their lists of enemies like the political Salafi Arabians. They put Shi'ites, Sufi orders, the foreign British and Persians in their list of perception of threat therefore they reshaped their religious and sectarian understanding in a political form.

The roots of the political Salafism in India go back to the effect of the Salafi Arabian sailors, merchants, preachers or pirates in the 18th and 19th centuries in the Indian subcontinent. Since the ancient times, the Arabian Peninsula has interacted with regions, cultures, communities and states surrounding the Indian Ocean. The Arab sailors began sailing to the East African shores, beyond India including China, Indonesia, Indochina and Malaccan Peninsula, especially in the Medieval Age. The main purpose of these excursions was originally trade.⁴⁰⁹ However, over the time this interaction led to the exchange of cultures, music, languages, people (as slaves, pilgrims, traders, and travelers), religions, sects, religious schools and innovations. Even, we can feel this triangular interaction among India, Peninsula and East Africa today. In the Gulf, the Khaliji music reflects the composition of the Indian and Arabic motives and tones together in its lyrics.⁴¹⁰ We can observe many Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Ethiopian workers and labor residents in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and even in Lebanon. The Peninsula and the Arab East were the crossroads for both Indian and East African cultural basins. Arab merchants introduced the Indian Subcontinent with Islam first and then Turkic Muslim dynasties like the Ghaznavids expanded the religion of Islam to the Indian subcontinent.⁴¹¹ The Arabs' interaction in terms of trading through sailing was more active and common with

⁴⁰⁹ George Fadlo Hourani , *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times*, (New York: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 78-83 .

⁴¹⁰ Lawrence G Potter, *op.cit.*, pp.12 and 154.

⁴¹¹ Meredith L. Runion, *The History of Afghanistan*, (London: Greenwood Press, 2007),p.49 ; Fred Clothey, *Religion in India: A Historical Introduction*,(New York: Routledge, 2007),p. 125 ; Nikhat Ekbal, introduction to *Great Muslims of undivided India*, (Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2009), p. xi.

India. Sailing was the main tool for reciprocal interaction among cultures throughout the centuries in the pre-modern age.

After the birth and rise of political Salafism in the Arabian Peninsula in the mid-18th century and its rapid expansion towards the 19th century, the Salafi raiders turned into Salafi pirates in the Qawasim, Ra's al Kaima and Sharjah provinces near the Gulf, today's emirates making the UAE. These pirates, as the study mentions in detail in Chapter 3, attacked the European, and especially British navies and trade companies in the Persian Gulf and in the Indian Ocean. They even sailed to India to perform jihad against the Hindu communities and the Shi'ite regions alongside the Indian subcontinent. It is known that Abd al Aziz I of the Saudis declared jihad against nonbelievers of the Indian subcontinent, and especially Shi'ite villages on the coast of India became the targets of the Salafi pirates.⁴¹² These maritime raids left long-lasting cultural and religious influences on the Indian coastal towns, because it is quite possible that these pirates expanded their faith during their jihads, not only through sword but also preaching. On the other side, many Indian pilgrims and scholars visited Mecca throughout the centuries to perform one of the pillars of Islam, pilgrimage. In the 19th century, Indian pilgrims, merchant and scholars probably met with political Salafism in Mecca under the Saudi rule. There are also other claims such as groups of political Salafi preachers fleeing to India after the invasion of Najd by the Egyptian army that caused the fall of the first Saud emirate, and the fall of the second Saudi emirate with the invasion of the Rashid dynasty. The Indian Muslim principalities such as Hyderabad principedom welcomed and hosted Najdi Salafi scholars and gave them shelter and protection. Probably the Arab and Indian traders who always interacted through commercial within the Gulf might have influenced each other. As David Commins stated in his book "The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia", in the early 18th century, the ulama in Medina were a part of an intellectual trend that was sweeping the Indian Ocean's Muslim rim: the revival of the Hadith studies".⁴¹³ As a result, after a while, the emergence of the Salafi oriented religious schools and orders during the 18th and 19th centuries at the same time with

⁴¹² Charles E. Davies, *op.cit.*, pp. 244-245 ; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, pp. 91-92.

⁴¹³ David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, pp. 11 and 73-74 and 145.

political Salafism's rise in Arabia was observed in India. The basic features of these Salafi like groups were originally their Sufi roots. India was a stronghold of Sufism, Imam Ahmad Shirhindi Rabbani, the author of *Maktubat*, was originally Indian. But, many Sufi groups, in which the Salafi tones were embedded, deriving from Naqshbandiyyah or Qadiriyyah orders emerged in the form of madrasah system just after the 1857 revolt against the British, and began developing reformist rules and disciplines like political Salafis. For instance, they preached the destruction of tombs, forbade the visiting and kissing of tombs and trees, regarded the intercession (shafa'ah) of dead or alive saints as an idolatry, opposed to Sufi shrines and rituals. These hybrid groups composing of Sufi origins and Salafi tones opposed the major Sufi practices by refusing them as innovations, calling them as *bid'ah*. The societies, groups and sects known with these Salafi puritan characteristics and organized under the madrasah system included Ahl-e Hadith, the Tablig, and Deobandi.⁴¹⁴ They pursued the same path like political Salafis by opposing to foreign cultures. For example, they opposed to the influence of Hindu culture, dress, and lifestyle among Muslims in India. They believed many of the Sufi practices came from the ancient Hindu culture. This hatred also targeted the Shi'ites in India, the Sufi Bareilvi madrasah society along with Hindus. These Ahl-e Hadith, Tablig and Deobandi madrasah-societies adopted the rhetoric of ibn Taymiyyah. If they found the ruling state embedded in *bid'ah*, they opted for applying the path of ibn Taymiyyah and resisted the ruling state, too.⁴¹⁵ In order to explain the origins of the political Salafi movement in India, the Indian Muslim cleric named Shah Waliullah (1703-1762) is important. He lived in the same period with the Najdi Sheikh and the founder of political Salafism in Arabia, Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab. He became famous for his criticisms on the Mughal regime, which brought the British rule, and Afghan rulers from the north.⁴¹⁶ According to Madawi al Rasheed, Shah Waliullah enforced his followers to adopt Arab dress codes to look like desert Arabs. Even, the British

⁴¹⁴ Ashok K Behuria, *op.cit.*, pp. 60-63; Sana Haroon, *op.cit.*, p.48 ; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, p. 144.

⁴¹⁵ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p.51; Brannon Ingram, *op.cit.*, p.491.

⁴¹⁶ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, pp. 51-52 ; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, p. 144.

who began penetrating the region called them the “Wahhabis” called for political Salafis in Arabia.⁴¹⁷

5.1.2. The Shi’a in Pakistani Politics

The Shi’ites have always been in the list of perception of threat of political Salafism since the medieval age. Salafis in Arabia also took the Shi’ites in both Arabia and neighboring regions as a threat, and carried out attacks on them. The Saudis also regard Shi’a Iran as a threat, especially since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The Sunni majority in Pakistan also had the same perception of threat. The political Salafism based party, Jami’at-e Ulama-e Pakistan (JUP) that had a key role in the rise of the Taliban, regarded the Shi’ites in Pakistan as a threat deriving from the principles of political Salafism’s perception regarding the Shi’ites.

Jami’at-e Ulama-e Islam Party (JUI) was rival to the party of Barevis’ Jami’at-e Ulama-e Pakistan and were in competition with the Barevis, Shi’ites and Ahmadiyyah Movement (a new religion in Pakistan) for decades, especially during the 1950s.⁴¹⁸ After the military coup of General Zia ul Haq, who overthrew Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who had been democratically elected, the political Salafis in Pakistan supported the coup just like Jama’at-e Islami party of Abu Ala Mawdudi did. The coup was held by religiously devout generals against the Shi’ite Prime Minister Ali Bhutto, one of the representatives of the Shi’ite Pakistani property owners.⁴¹⁹ The Sunnis of Pakistan as in Iraq, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia were quite hostile towards the Shi’ites, which made up the 20 percent of the population in Pakistan, the largest second Shi’ite population on earth after Iran with the population of approximately 30 million.⁴²⁰ Khomeini demanded the amnesty of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from General Zia

⁴¹⁷ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p.51 ; Madawi Al-Rasheed, *op.cit.*, in note 42, p. 295.

⁴¹⁸ Ashok K Behuria, *op.cit.*, p.67-68 and 75; Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *op.cit.*, pp. 100-101.

⁴¹⁹ Ashok K Behuria, *op.cit.*, p.67-68; Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *op.cit.*, p .90.

⁴²⁰ Ashok K Behuria, *op.cit.*, p.57 ; Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *op.cit.*, p. 161.

but the junta executed him.⁴²¹ The Bhutto's party, Pakistan People Party's colors were the symbols of Shi'ism and the party had a leftist secular leaning as the other Shi'ite parties in the Arab states.⁴²² Therefore, the Sunni parties like Jama'at-e Islami, Barelvi-Sufi JUP and JUI opposed the Bhutto rule. This hatred also had deep historical roots and was related to the loss of power by the Sunnis. The same situation was witnessed in Iraq in the recent past, too. Towards the 18th century, the Shi'ites began gaining influence by expanding into Hyderabad and Bengal principalities while the Mughal rule was weakening. The position of the Shi'ites strengthened during the British Raj; thus, the Sunni Indian Muslims began seeing the Shi'ites as the reason of the decline of their power and as the collaborators of the British infidels. Truly, the betterment of the Shi'ites' condition in India during the British Raj era in terms of wealth, education and government positions was due to the support of the British.⁴²³ This was a classic example of British policy, which was conducted in the Middle East, as well. British supported the Shi'ites minority against the Sunni majority. For example, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, was an Ismaili Shi'ite originally, later he was converted to Twelverism.⁴²⁴

General Zia and his Sunni devout officer friends' coup in 1977 contributed to the Sunnification of the country. His mentor was Abu'l Ala Mawdudi, the leader of the Jama'at-e Islami, the inspirer of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The coup coincided with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which happened in 1979. The Soviet invasion alarmed the regional powers like Saudi Arabia, his Gulf partners and the US. One of the purposes of the Soviets was to reach the Indian Ocean by separating Baluchistan province from Pakistan after penetrating in Afghanistan.⁴²⁵

⁴²¹ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *op.cit.*, p .161.

⁴²² Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *op.cit.*, p .83 and 89 ;p.s. In the Arab World especially in Iraq and Labanon, the Shi'ites led the communist parties during the 1960s and 1970s. Today, Lebanese Communist Party was still consisted of Shi'ites.

⁴²³ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *op.cit.*, pp.98-99.

⁴²⁴ Ibid, pp.88-89.

⁴²⁵ Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*, (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2009), p.250 ; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1,p. 146.

This was a vital threat for the Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia. The oil fields in the Gulf were the first element, which might fall into danger. But, in the perspective of Saudi Arabia, the situation was more alarming. The Peninsula had been surrounded by the Soviet client communist regimes and rebel groups in Yemen, Ethiopia and Oman. In 1980 in the Organization of Islamic Conference held in Islamabad, the Saudis decided to support the Afghan rebels against the Soviets together with the other member states.⁴²⁶ This meant that the Saudi finance would pour into the jihad to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan. King Faisal's policy of supporting the Salafi similar sects had already led to the development of links with the Deobandi and Ahl-e Hadith madrasahs in the 1970s.⁴²⁷ The connection between the Muslim Brotherhood members in exile in Saudi Arabia and Jama'at-e Islami of Mawdudi in Pakistan under the umbrella of the Muslim World League provided the Saudis to reach these madrasahs and other religious groups in Pakistan.⁴²⁸ Briefly, the Saudi connections with these madrasahs were not new. It had a long history dating back to the 18th century sailing and piracy, then continuing with the 1970s' political Salafism worldwide policy of King Faisal.

5.1.3. The Communist Afghan Regime

Top-down reforms made by the communist regime after the Saur Revolution was not welcomed well by the Afghan people. The reaction came from traditional tribal and clerical groups in the country. The Saudis supported the resisting groups called as the mujahedeen who were representatives of clerical groups in the society. The mujahedeen resisting groups were affiliated either to the Muslim Brotherhood such as the groups of Burhaneddin Rabbani and Gulbeddin Hekmetyar or directly to the Saudis such as Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. The communist regime in Afghanistan was

⁴²⁶ Mehmet Ali Büyükkara, *op.cit.* in note 19, p. 234.

⁴²⁷ Madawi Al-Rasheed, *op.cit.*, in note 42, pp.188-189; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, pp. 153 and 158-159.

⁴²⁸ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, pp. 133 and 277; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, p.146 ; Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 295, p. 141.

regarded as a threat by the Saudis, Pakistanis, the Muslim Brotherhood and the mujahedeen.

On 27 April 1978, Khalqi and Parcham members of the army made a coup against Daud Khan. His close allies and communist officers massacred Daud and his whole family. The Musahiban dynasty ended with bloodshed with the 230-year-old Durrani rule being over. The Ghilzai Pashtun tribes, who were treated as the second class before, came to power under the Khalqi Party rule. Nur Muhammad Taraki was the first president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and originally a Ghilzai. The basic difference between Khalq and Parcham factions was their policies about the non-Pashtun groups. The Ghilzai nationalist Pashtun cadres dominated Khalqi faction and defended the fast transformation of the country at once by changing all tribal and clerical structure of the country. The urban elites and especially non-Pashtun minorities dominated the other Parcham faction. Babrak Karmal, the leader of the Parcham faction, was originally Tajik and could not speak Pashtu. Taraki was toppled from power by an internal coup within the Khalqis. He was murdered, and Hafizullah Amin replaced him.

The Soviets invaded Afghanistan on 27 December 1979 a year after the Saur Revolution. The Soviet politburo legitimized the invasion by referring to the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness between the two states signed in 1978. Spetsnaz commandoes of the Soviets in his palace killed Hafizullah Amin. He was replaced with Babrak Karmal, the leader of the Parcham faction by the Soviets. The Parcham supported the rights of the minorities, planned to pursue a policy similar to the Soviet nationalities policy, pro-Soviet and supported the transformation of the tribal society to communism by gradual reforms rather than shock therapy changes as the Khalqis had tried to pursue.⁴²⁹ Babrak Karmal was the second non-Pashtun leader after Habibullah the Bacha-e Saka, a Tajik bandit, who came to power in 1929 for a short time. The reforms in agriculture, education, women's freedom and land distribution disturbed the traditional tribal and religious networks within the country.

⁴²⁹ Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p. 170 and 213; Rasul Bux Rais, *Rasul Bux Rais, Recovering the frontier stage: war, ethnicity, and state in Afghanistan*, (Lanham, MD : Lexington Books, c2008), pp. 38, 40, 63, 73-74, 101; Stephen Tanner, *op.cit.*, pp. 235-237.

But, according to Nazif Shahrani, the tribal and religious elements in the periphery did not resist on themselves. The Muslim Brotherhood linked urban formations such as Jami'at-e Islami, Hizb-e Islami, Jawanan-e Muslimin organized the resistance in rural areas.⁴³⁰ A single headquarters or a single leader did not direct the resistance. They were fragmented and had different reasons for resistance. The general name of the resistance was jihad because the common point of all resistance groups was their Islamist vision, while they each had different ethnicities. For example, Tajik Jami'at-e Islami party revived the legacy of the Basmachi resistance dated back to the 1920s and the legacy of the Soviet invasion in Turkestan. The party published the memories of Sayyid Alim Khan in its magazines. The Central Asian communities living in Northern Afghanistan had fresh memories in their mind about the Red Army's invasion in the Bukharan Emirate and the Khivan Khanate in the early 1920s.⁴³¹

The Pashtuns' resistance was backed by Pakistan. The Soviet Union was an ally of India and was suspected to aim to invade Baluchistan from Pakistan in the long run in order to penetrate the Gulf Region. The ethnic affinities between Pakistan and Pashtuns enabled them to work closely. Zia ul Haq's religious, Sunni based government, and his close alliance with Jama'at-e Islami Party enabled Islamabad to work with the Islamist Pashtun groups like Gulbeddin Hekmatyar, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Jaleddin Haqqani, Yunis Khaled who were in close contact with Mawdudi's Jama'at-e Islami, and Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia. The Shi'ite Hazara parties also had different purposes. They were religious resistance groups but were also under the influence of Khomeini's Iran. Under these conditions, it is impossible to talk about a single jihad concept. Jihad in Afghanistan served for ethnic aims rather than being an ultimate independence revolt against a foreign invasion. The Saudi and Gulf capital, Pakistan's military aid, the USA and other Western countries' financial and military support poured into these the mujahedeen

⁴³⁰ M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, "Causes and Context of Responses in Badakhshan to the Saur Revolution" in *Revolutions & rebellions in Afghanistan: anthropological perspectives*, ed. M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani and Robert L. Canfield, (Berkeley: University of California, 1984) , p.161; Rasul Bux Rais, *op.cit.*, p.41.

⁴³¹ M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, "Resisting the Taliban and Talibanism in Afghanistan." *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* 5, no. 4 (2000 – 2001): 3-8.

groups. The Soviets failed to penetrate Afghanistan and withdrew from there in 1989 after a long going war for almost ten years. The communist client regime in Kabul did not fall down immediately after the Soviet withdrawal. Before the Soviets left, they replaced President Babrak Karmal with Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai, the ex-head of Afghan intelligence service KHAD.⁴³² Najibullah was also a Ghilzai Pastun just like Taraki and Amin. He changed the name of People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan with Patriotic Party (Watan) and abandoned communist policies, instead began using a religious and Pashtun nationalist rhetoric.⁴³³ Before Najibullah, during the reign of Karmal, the languages of various nationalities in Afghanistan were promoted and used as a broadcast language in radio broadcasts and education. In addition, during the Musahiban dynasty and Daud Khan era, Pashtun and Persian were the only languages for education. But the Karmal regime used other languages such as Uzbek, Turkmen languages in education affairs. For that reason, Karmal's legacy and sympathy is still alive among Afghan Uzbeks, especially among Abdul Rashid Dostum and his party Junbesh's members.⁴³⁴

Communist regime's top down and secular reform policies and its close alliance with the Soviets was regarded as a threat by the mujahideen groups, political Islamists and political Salafis. In addition, the promotion of other nationalities' cultures and identities during the communist regime in parallel to the Soviet nationalities policy was regarded as a threat by Pashtuns. The Mujahedeen organized a resistance to the Soviet client communist regime with the foreign support taken from the US, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries.

⁴³² KHAD means Khadamat-e Aetla'at-e Dawlati, the State Intelligence Services. It was the secret intelligence agency of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

⁴³³ Stephen Tanner, *op.cit.*, pp. 253-254; Rasul Bux Rais, *op.cit.*, p.194; Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p.239.

⁴³⁴ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p.260; Batur Dostum, the son of Uzbek General Rashid Dostum, interview with the author, November 2016.

5.1.4. The Tribal and Ethnic Fragmentation

The tribal and ethnic fragmentation caused Afghanistan to sink into turmoil. The tension between Durrani and Ghilzai tribal groups in Pashtun majority prevented the formation of a strong authority in Afghanistan during both communist and mujahedeen era. In addition, the minor ethnic groups and their fragmented situation was a serious problem for the instability in the country. Sometimes, the tribal kinship superseded the Islamic solidarity among mujahedeen groups. The mujahedeen could not establish a strong authority and cease the turmoil because of tribal and ethnic tensions. For that reason, the tribal and ethnic fragmentation was a threat for the unification of the country. The Taliban regime regarded that situation as a perception of threat distinctively than mujahideen groups.

The case of Pashtun Ghilzai General Tanai is important to understand the inter-ethnic and inter-tribal dimensions of Afghanistan politics. Tanai was the leader of the Khalqi faction, a Ghilzai Pashtun like President Najibullah. Najibullah first appointed him to the post of Khalqi party's presidency then to defense ministry. The leaders of the communist parties including Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, Najibullah, Shahnawaz Tanai, and the leaders of Pashtun mujahedeen parties like Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Gulbeddin Hekmatyar, and Jalaluddin Haqqani were all originally Ghilzai. The era just after the fall of Daud Khan's regime, Ghilzai replaced with Durrani tribal power, even the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar was from the Eastern Pashtuns, the Ghilzais. General Tanai and his tribal-kinship brother Hekmatyar secretly agreed to overthrow the Najibullah regime in March 1990, two years before the fall of Najib. Hekmatyar bombed the city outside, and Tanai from inside. KHAD took the last minute precautions and the coup failed. Tanai's soldiers shifted to the side of Hekmatyar and Tanai fled to Pakistan. Ahmed Rashid alleged that Saudi Arabia spent 100 million dollars for this coup to succeed. The coup aimed to change the communist regime with a Saudi and Pakistani backed new Pashtun regime. The clan brotherhood would change the fate of Afghanistan from a democratic to an Islamic Pashtun state. Ideologies either communist Khalqi or the fundamentalist

mujahedeen did not become as influential as kinship in Afghanistan.⁴³⁵ The supporters of Tanai and Pashtun based Khalqi party would always be in coalition with the mujahedeen Pashtun groups and in the future even with the Taliban. The ethnicity and tribal kinship sometimes overpassed the religiosity in Afghanistan and Khorasan. Pashtun ethnicity was much stronger than the religious brotherhood. A communist Pashtun was more trustful than a mujahedeen Tajik was.

Hekmatyar and Khalqi faction troops tried to capture Kabul once again in 1992 just before Najibullah fell down. Ahmad Shah Masud, the defense minister of the new regime led by Burhaneddin Rabbani, got in a coalition with Hazaras and Uzbeks, Rashid Dostum, and captured the city before Hekmatyar. This was a turning point in Afghanistan's history. For the first time in 300 years, except for limited times, the capital was captured by the non-Pashtun military forces. Hekmatyar refused the prime ministry post and bombed the capital for two years from 1992 to 1994 until the Taliban's arrival. Hekmatyar stated former communist Dostum's position in Kabul as an excuse for his bombing, but probably losing presidency and the capital city Kabul was the real reason. In Afghanistan, it is a widespread idea that Pashtuns have been superior forming to the ruling elite, the major ethnic group and the ruler of the centralized regime since the time of Iron Amir Abdul Rahman, even before him, the time of Amir Dost Muhammad.⁴³⁶ They launched a holy jihad against the British invaders during the 19th century known as the Anglo-Afghan wars and secured their sovereignty against the invaders and non-Pashtun groups. In the perspective of the Pashtuns, this situation was unacceptable. The non-Pashtun mujahedeen coalition was very weak and unsuccessful to rule the country. Warlord period emerged throughout the country. The already weak state turned into a failed state. Each warlord began ruling his own province or region and built their sub-state structures. Ismail Khan was ruling Herat with the help of Iran. Ismail was Tajik and of Jami'at-e Islami background. Masud and Rabbani were both the rulers of Kabul and strong in Badakhshan and Panshir valley. Yunis Khales ruled in Jalalabad.

⁴³⁵ Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p.226; Ahmad Rashid, *op.cit.*, p. 198, Stephen Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 274; Brian Glyn Williams, *op.cit.*, pp. 935-936; Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p .204.

⁴³⁶ Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p .248; Stephen Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 277; Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, pp. 236-239 ; Rasul Bux Rais, *op.cit.*, p. 49.

Hekmetyar was ruling Laghman, Charasiab and Wardak. Ali Mezari, the founder and leader of Shi'ite Hazara Hizb-e Wahdat Party, ruled Bamyan and Hazarajat provinces. Dostum also ruled Jawzjan and Andhkoy in the northern Afghanistan called as Janub-e Turkestan. The fragmentation and the failed state situation brought the collapse of the state.⁴³⁷ The so-called Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, presided by Burhaneddin Rabbani, could not control the whole country, and there was a lack of security, order and law. Banditry, drug trade, mafia, lawlessness was widespread. Each warlord ruled their own region according to their own laws. The ongoing top down changes in rural population, the invasion by foreign powers, the long resistance and armed struggle by the mujahedeen led to the decline of all hopes in the Afghan population. Even, the leader of Arab Afghans, Osama bin Laden and his comrades left Afghanistan for their own countries with disappointment after 1992 when they saw the inter conflict between the mujahedeen groups and the pursuing civil war.

5.1.5. The Iranian Influence in the Region

Just as Iran's revolutionary Islamic influence was a perception of threat for the Saudis and Pakistan, it was regarded a threat for the Taliban too. Not only the Taliban, the Afghan communist regimes also regarded Iran as a threat in the post-1979 period. Iran had supporters within Afghanistan such as Shi'ite Hazaras. The interests of the Saudis and the Taliban coincided against the expanding influence of Iran in the region.

The Iranian involvement in Afghanistan went beyond the 18th century when the Durrani Empire firstly emerged in Afghanistan. The Durrani tribe of Pashtuns were serving as troops to the Safavid and Afsharid Iranian dynasties. The ruler of Durrani Empire, Ahmad Shah Durrani, the founder of the modern Afghan history, inherited lands of his empire from his former ruler Nadir Shah Afshar.⁴³⁸ Amanullah Khan was a reformist like Reza Shah Pahlavi and both countries were allies and

⁴³⁷ Robert I. Rotberg, *When states fail: causes and consequences*, (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c2004), pp. 5,10,26-27; Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p .241.

⁴³⁸ Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p.11.

members of the Saadabad Pact in the late 1930s. In the 1970s, the two leaders, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Daud Khan, had good relations. Iran had given promises about projects over Afghanistan such as railway construction and two million donations as aid to the Afghan republic.⁴³⁹ Revolutionary Iran, during the early 1980s, did not avoid dealing with Afghanistan in the east although it had a war with Iraq in the western front at the same time. Many separate groups were supported by Khomeini regime and other ayatollahs. These groups were primarily Shi'ite Hazara ones but among them there were Sunni Islamist parties.⁴⁴⁰ These were Rabbani's Jamiat-e Islami and Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, because their style was revolutionary Islam, supporter of Islamic republic system and maybe because of taking modern interpretation of Islam in their rhetoric. With these features, they were different from some Salafi like fundamentalist parties like Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's group. Therefore, Iran did not avoid supporting, giving shelter, aiding them.

In the first years of the Afghan jihad, the Shi'ite Hazara groups were supported separately by powerful Iranian ayatollahs; for example, Ayatollah Ali Sheriatmedari underpinned the Shi'ite Afghan Harekat-e Islami group. On the other side, Mir Husayn Siddiqi and Ali Mezari, the future leader of the Hazara Wahdat Party, founded Sazman-e Nasr-e Islami, the Organization of Islamic Victory, in 1981. That faction was quite close to revolutionary ideals of the Iranian regime. Sepah-e Pasdaran was established directly by the Iranian military in Afghanistan.⁴⁴¹ The Shi'ite Hazara groups supported by Iran was called as Tehran's Eight in contrast to Pakistan backed Peshawar Seven. During the Iran-Iraq war, the Afghan Hazara mujahideens passed to the Iran-Iraq war front and fought against the Saddam's army then received military and financial support from the Iranian regime to resist against the communist regime in Afghanistan.⁴⁴² Saddam Hussein or Saudi Arabia did not

⁴³⁹ Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p.216.

⁴⁴⁰ Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Iranian Revolution and the Afghan Resistance" in *Shiism, resistance, and revolution*, ed. Martin Kramer, (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 264-265.

⁴⁴¹ Zalmay Khalilzad, *op.cit.*, in note 436, pp.264-265; Neamatollah Nojumi, "The Rise and Fall of the Taliban" in *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan*, ed. Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, Cambridge, (Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 96.

⁴⁴² Neamatollah Nojumi, *op.cit.*, p. 93; Brian Glyn Williams, *op.cit.*, pp. 939-940.

only comprehend Iranian revolution as a threat, but also Pashtun favored communist Khalqi faction's leader and the Secretary General of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Hafizullah Amin did. In March 1979, in Herat, an uprising broke out on behalf of Iranian revolution as it happened in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrein. Hafizullah Amin stated that "the present fanatic leaders of Iran make vain efforts to thwart our revolution..."⁴⁴³ The Shi'ite Hazara leaders were blamed for carrying Iranian regime to Afghanistan and undermining the Saur Revolution, and they were executed. The Shi'ite Hazaras had always been involved in uprisings such as the revolts of Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, nicknamed Bacha-e Gaw Sawar in Persian, the bull rider in English, and Ismail Balkhi, the head of Qiyam-e Islam, the Hazara organization for revolt in the 1940s and 1950s. Their reasons of revolt were generally based on economic, taxing and agricultural problems rather than revolutionary ideals.⁴⁴⁴ After the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran developed ties with the Hazara groups in Afghanistan, and began spreading revolutionary ideas among them. As Iran expanded its influence within the Middle East through Shi'ite Arabs by mobilizing them, it pursued the same method in Afghanistan. Although there was not any ethnic linkage between Persians and Hazaras, the Shi'ite link was favored by the Revolutionary regime to provoke Hazaras. Iranians merged the separated Hazara parties under the name of Hezb-e Wahdat (the party of unity) in 1998 and Ali Mazari was chosen as the leader. The Taliban murdered Mazari later.⁴⁴⁵

Iran also kept ties with Tajik Islamist leader Burhaneddin Rabbani. Hekmetyar was also supported besides Rabbani during the Afghan jihad by Iran although his main supporter was Pakistan. He was allowed to open an office in Iran.⁴⁴⁶ The reason might probably be Hekmatyar's revolutionary and modern interpretation of Islam like the Iranian regime. As known, he even went to exile in

⁴⁴³ Zalmay Khalilzad, *op.cit.*, in note 436, p.267.

⁴⁴⁴ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, pp.48 and 70 ; Zalmay Khalilzad , *op.cit.*, in note 436, p. 267.

⁴⁴⁵ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, oil and the new great game in central Asia*, (London ; New York : Tauris, 2002), pp.35 and 198 .

⁴⁴⁶ Zalmay Khalilzad , *op.cit.*, in note 436, p . 268.

Iran during the Taliban era.⁴⁴⁷ This policy can be defined as multi-dimensional policy of revolutionary Iran. If Iran can find Aryan stocks, it supports them by using cultural and ethnic roots but if it finds Shi'ite groups, it directly uses its spiritual Shi'ite power of influence over the focus group. However, if it cannot find any of two, it applies to revolutionary Islamic method to influence the Sunni radical groups. In Afghanistan, Khomeini's Iran used all three methods on different focus groups one by one in order to seek its interests and gains. It played over the Hazaras by sectarian brotherhood of Shi'ism, over Tajik Jami'at-e Islami by co-ethnicity and co-lingualism, and over Hezb-e Islami by revolutionary Islamist republican ideals.

Iran was so carefully seeking its interests in Afghan jihad fields that it did not provide shelter for any Afghan Sunni refugees. According to Zalmay Khalilzad, the Sunni groups that could not benefit from Iran's aid during the Afghan jihad as well as the Hazara Eight, got disappointed and suspected of Iranians' objectives in their involvement in their resistance. Especially Afghan refugees lived in Mashhad in the northeast of Iran but the one that demanded refugee in Iran must belong to one of the eight Hazara factions depended on Tehran. The other groups such as Jami'at-e Islami, Hezb-e Islami, Sazman-e Nasr-e Islami were also given military training by Iranian forces. The Qods (Jerusalem) Forces, which were responsible for extraterritorial operations, trained Iran affiliated or agreed Afghan groups.⁴⁴⁸ For all these reason, as a sum, Afghanistan became an outpost for the Saudi Arabs for fighting both the Soviet threat targeting the Gulf and Iranian threat mobilizing the Shi'a in the Middle East. For the political Salafis, not only the Middle East and Iran, but also Pakistan was an outpost for them to struggle with Iranians, as well.

5.2. Mobilization by the Political Salafism in South Asia

The perception of threats enabled the mobilization of the Afghan social groups, especially the Pashtun tribes via war, in other word, armed jihad. The Taliban movement's mobilization was influenced by three factors: The Pashtun historical

⁴⁴⁷ Abdulkader Sinno, "Explaining the Taliban's Ability to Mobilize the Pashtuns" in *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan*, ed. Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, Cambridge, (Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 65.

⁴⁴⁸ Neamatollah Nojumi, *op.cit.*, p.96 ; Zalmay Khalilzad , *op.cit.*, in note 436, p .267.

legacy, political Salafism and the foreign factor, which can be defined with the Saudis and Pakistan. In the history of the Pashtuns, there was a jihad tradition and Afghan monarchies applied jihad for mobilizing the Pashtun groups by uniting the separated tribes against a common enemy, the British or other ethnic minorities. On the other side, the political Salafis in India mobilized Indian Muslims under the name of jihad against the British. The Taliban, which emerged from the Salafi oriented Deobandi madrasahs and owned a strong Pashtun identity, are based on these two factors in its mobilization of Pashtuns through armed jihad against the threat within Afghanistan. The political interests of the Saudis and Pakistan also involved in the mobilization of the Taliban's supporters. The mobilization of the Taliban affiliated Pashtuns via armed jihad brought rapid expansion of the Taliban rule throughout the country and provision of a strong authority.

5.2.1. Jihad against the British in India

In 1857, a large-scale rebellion against the British colonizers broke out in India. The leading actors of this rebellion were Mughal Indian Muslims led by mainly tariqas, religious schools and jama'ahs especially the followers of the Naqshbandi order. Sufi Naqshbandi cleric Mullah Imdadullah revolted against the British colonizers but was suppressed harshly. Interestingly, he fled to Mecca to escape from the British troops.⁴⁴⁹ In the past, the Saudi Salafi clerics had fled to India when the Saudi emirates were destroyed. The Indian Muslim rebels fled to Arabia when their revolt failed. There was a reciprocal relation between them. The failure of the regional jihad in 1857 in India for independence led the Muslim groups to change their method. They began focusing on protecting their faith, Muslim identity and Islamic culture against the British political, economic, educational and cultural penetration. The madrasahs, based on tariqas (religious paths and societies), began flourishing throughout India such as the Deobandi, Ahl-e Hadith, Barelvi and Tablig under the form of madrasah systems as a response to the British education system in British

⁴⁴⁹ Brannon Ingram, *op.cit.*, pp. 491-492; David Dean Commins, *op.cit.*, in note 1, p. 144.

Raj.⁴⁵⁰ In 1866, in the village of Deoband near New Delhi, Indian Muslim scholars and mullahs who had Salafi leanings established Deobandi madrasahs. The founders of these madrasah systems were Mohammad Qasim Nanautawi (1833-1877) and Rashid Ahmed Gangohi (1829-1905). Rashid Ahmad Gangohi was also the disciple of Sufi Naqshbandi cleric Imdadullah.⁴⁵¹ Besides, political Salafis within Deobandi order were the main power behind the Khilafat (Caliphate) Movement in India against the British colonialism between the years 1914 and 1919.⁴⁵² They were always involved in resistance and rebellions against the British in the subcontinent by declaring jihad.

The Deobandi and Ahl-e Hadith madrasahs benefited from the curriculums similar to the political Salafis'. These religious schools, orders and madrasahs were also rivals to each other and had conflict among themselves. For example, while the Barelvis appreciated Sufi practices such as intercession and music for pray, the Deobandis had Salafi tones and opposed to Sufism by refuting it as polytheism. They also had political problems with each other in time. For example, while the Barelvis supported the idea of independent Pakistan, the Deobandis were against the separation of the Indian Muslims.⁴⁵³

The Deobandi discipline and its founders were of Naqshbandi Sufi order, just like the Barelvi School, but the Salafi influence in the Deobandi faith led them to oppose to Sufi rituals. In addition, the British policies had an effective role in the birth and expansion of these madrasahs. The British school system as one of the basic tools of colonization in India damaged the madrasah system, which had been the main state-supported institutions in the Mughals' era. The Madrasahs in India lost financial support from the state therefore they transformed into headquarters of revolt and resistance against the British rule.⁴⁵⁴ The Indian political Salafis were the leading

⁴⁵⁰ Ashok K. Behuria, *op.cit.*, pp. 59-61; Masooda Bano, "Beyond Politics: The Reality of a Deobandi Madrasa in Pakistan", *Journal of Islamic Studies* 18, no:1 (2007) : 48 ; David Dean Commings, *op.cit.*, in note 1, p. 144.

⁴⁵¹ Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p.88 ; Ashok K. Behuria, *op.cit.*, pp.60-63 ; Brannon Ingram, *op.cit.*, p. 492.

⁴⁵² Sana Haroon, *op.cit.*, pp. 49-51; Ashok K. Behuria, *op.cit.*, p.65.

⁴⁵³ Ashok K Behuria, *op.cit.*, p.61 and 65.

⁴⁵⁴ Masooda Bano, *op.cit.*, p. 48.

vanguards in these rebellions. They blamed the British for invading a Muslim land and harming Islam through their reforms. Together with the British, the British allies like Hindus and Shi'ites were also targeted.⁴⁵⁵

5.2.2. The Madrasah System as the Mobilization Tool in India

Deobandi madrasahs were the source of the Taliban fighters. The war orphans and migrants who fled from the war in Afghanistan took shelter under these madrasahs in the Afghan-Pakistan borders. The political Salafis in Deobandi madrasahs trained these Afghan migrants as a fighter during the Afghan war. The madrasah students were Pashtun in majority. The Saudis also funded these madrasahs in a cooperation with political Salafis in Pakistan. The local political Salafis in Pakistan had a key role in mobilization of the Pashtun fighters for the jihad when the Afghan mujahedeen failed to bring stability to Afghanistan.

These madrasahs established their own political parties in India. The political Salafis in South Asia founded the Jami'at-e Ulama-e Hind, which later became Jami'at-e Ulama-e Islam after the separation of Pakistan from India in 1947. Jami'at-e Ulama-e Hind was the banner carrier of the Khilafat movement in 1919 against the British colonizers and they declared jihad to oust the British.⁴⁵⁶ The political Salafis continued the alternative Islamic education system against the Western British system and financed themselves through alms and donations from people.⁴⁵⁷ At that time, the Deobandi madrasahs began hosting students from Afghanistan. When the madrasahs of Bukhara in Central Asia were closed after the Red army's invasion, the young Afghan students began getting education in Deobandi madrasahs.⁴⁵⁸ The sudden rise of the Afghan Pashtun students who got educated in the Deobandi

⁴⁵⁵ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *op.cit.*, p.99.

⁴⁵⁶ Sana Haroon, *op.cit.*, p.51; Ashok K. Behuria, *op.cit.*, p. 63 and 65; Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p.89.

⁴⁵⁷ Masooda Bano, *op.cit.*, p. 49.

⁴⁵⁸ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, pp.50-52 ; Amin Tarzi, "The Neo-Taliban" in *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan*, ed. Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, Cambridge, (Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2008) ,pp. 42-43.

madrasahs in the Northern parts of Pakistan coincided with the Afghan jihad. The number of student rose from 7500 to 78.500 between the years 1960 and 1983. In this increase, Pakistan's President Zia ul Haq's Sunni-Islamist policies had an important impact.⁴⁵⁹ The Pashtun migrants who fled across Pakistan border, especially the war orphans and refugees, began getting their education and accommodation within these madrasahs. According to the given data, 3.5 million Afghan refugees migrated to Pakistan because of the war.⁴⁶⁰ The refugee Pashtuns met with their Pashtun local brothers and relatives in the northern regions of Pakistan. The Pashtun tribal system and kinship was connected between south and east Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan's Pashtun regions. The Deobandi madrasahs in Peshawar, North Western Frontier Province (NWFP), Baluchistan, and Waziristan hosted thousands of Pashtun war migrants, and the madrasahs in these regions served as the international migrant camps during the 1980s.

5.2.3. The Jihad Tradition in the Afghan History: Anglo- Afghan Wars Case as the Mobilization of Pashtuns

Jihad concept was a unifying force among the Pashtun tribes against a common enemy in the past too. During the Anglo-Afghan Wars, the Pashtun Afghan leaders applied declaration of jihad against the British. The mobilization of the Pashtun tribes under the name of jihad did not have Salafi based jihad practices and political Salafism's tones, but traditional jihad culture was a common sense among Hanafi *madhab* affiliated Pashtuns. Both Afghan mujahedeen and the Taliban revived the jihad legacy in the mobilization of their supporter fighters.

Ahmad Shah Durrani established this first Afghan state known as the Durrani Empire in 1747. Durrani was the name of the most prominent and the founding tribe of the Pashtuns. From Ahmad Shah to the Saur Revolution of 1978, the Durrani Pashtun tribal members had ruled the country. In the same periods when Indian Muslims declared jihad and revolted against the British colonialism in the mid-19th

⁴⁵⁹ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, pp.276-277.

⁴⁶⁰ Stephen Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 255.

century, the Afghans also gave an independence war against the British expansionism. In the three Anglo-Afghan wars, the Afghans always resisted and defended their territories against the British under the concept of holy war, jihad.⁴⁶¹ Jihad enabled diverse tribes to gather for resistance against a foreign occupation as it was in the Arabs.⁴⁶² Amir Dost Muhammad, Abdul Rahman (the Iron Amir) and Amir Amanullah were known as the most prominent Afghan rulers who launched jihad against the British in all three Anglo Afghan wars. Amir Abdul Rahman was accepted as the founder of the Afghan nation state. After his victory against the British, he agreed with them and built his rule with the British support. He massacred Shi'ite Hazaras, launched military campaigns over Uzbeks tribes.⁴⁶³

Amanullah Khan was dethroned because of trying to implement a secular state system and modernize the country like Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah Pahlavi. The tribal structure and the clerical class revolted and declared jihad against the incumbent ruler who had launched jihad over the British in the Third Anglo Afghan war in 1919.⁴⁶⁴ The Tajik bandit, Habibullah the Bacha-e Saka seized the power for a short time in Kabul for the first time in Afghan history after the mullahs toppled Amanullah.⁴⁶⁵ Pashtun General Nadir Khan prevented the Tajik seizure of the capital, and then declared himself as the Shah. The new rule was called as the Musahiban dynasty from 1929 to 1978. Both Nadir and his son Zahir Shah never touched the clerical and tribal semi-autonomy in the country.⁴⁶⁶ They did not urge to change the tribal system or reform them. But this peaceful era only lasted till 1973. Daud Khan, the cousin of Zahir Shah and a member of the Musahiban dynasty, launched a coup with the backing of the communist military officers. Zahir Shah had

⁴⁶¹ Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p.110 and 181-182.

⁴⁶² Rasul Bux Rais, *op.cit.*, p.12 ; Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p.263; M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, *op.cit.*, in note 45, p. 30.

⁴⁶³ M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani , *op.cit.*, in note 45, p.31; Brian Glyn Williams, *op.cit.*, pp.931-932 ; M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, *op.cit.*, in note 46, 717-718.

⁴⁶⁴ Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p . 191-192.

⁴⁶⁵ Brian Glyn Williams , *op.cit.*, p.402; Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p . 192.

⁴⁶⁶ Rasul Bux Rais, *op.cit.*, p. 7 ; Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, pp. 214 and 219.

already declared a constitution in 1964 and adopted a parliamentary system. In that era, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (Hezb-e Demokratik Khalq-e Afghanistan) was founded in 1965. Then, the party was split into two: The Khalqi faction and the Parcham (flag) faction. Instead of democratic struggle, they allied with Prime Minister Daud Khan and dethroned Zahir by a coup in 1973.⁴⁶⁷ Daud declared a nationalist republic and pursued secular policies sympathetic to the communist elite. At that time, the first reaction to the secular and communist sympathetic regime and to its policies broke out in urban circles, primarily universities. In Kabul, an alternative student organization to communist student clubs was founded under the name of Jawanan-e Musulman (Muslim Youth) linked to the Muslim Brotherhood professors like Ghulam Niyaz and Burhaneddin Rabbani. Prominent student leaders were Ahmad Shah Masud and Gulbeddin Hekmatyar, who would be the prominent mujahedeen commanders and heroes of the Afghan Jihad in the future. In 1975, the members of the Muslim Youth had to flee to Pakistan because of Daud Khan's purge over the dissident Islamist students.⁴⁶⁸

5.2.4. The Mobilization of the Mujahedeen Factions and the Failure of Gulbeddin Hekmatyar

The Wahhabi Saudis and their close ally Pakistan supported the Afghan mujahedeen factions during the Afghan war with regard to their perception of threat. The Soviet Union's expansion into Afghanistan were threatening both Pakistan and the Saudis. For that reason, the Saudis and Pakistan involved in mobilization of the mujahedeen groups against the Soviets. The mobilization was provided by financial, arms and technical aid, and jihad concept was commonly supported. The jihad found supporters in terms of volunteer participants from other Muslim countries.

⁴⁶⁷ Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p.213; Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p.80 ; Rasul Bux Rais, *op.cit.*, pp.10-11.

⁴⁶⁸ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p.75; Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p. 215; M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, *op.cit.*, in note 45, p.41; M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, *op.cit.*, in note 46, p. 158; Rasul Bux Rais, *op.cit.*, p.69.

The roles of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were vital in the Afghan jihad due to their high proportion of aid and support. Pakistan was a neighboring state and supported the mujahedeen groups with arms and technical aid. On the other side, Saudi Arabia funded these mujahedeen groups against the Soviets and their puppet regime in Kabul. The flow of millions of dollars from the Saudis and the Gulf sheikhdoms to Afghan Jihad directly and indirectly was influential for mujahedeen groups to maintain jihad. Each state had their favorite mujahedeen groups. For example, Pakistan favored Gulbeddin Hekmatyar and his party, the fundamentalist Hizb-e Islami, the leading Pashtun group in the jihad field, because Pakistan aimed to install an Islamic regime in Afghanistan, to provide security central authority and to end anarchy through the planned Pashtun dominated regime led by Hekmatyar.⁴⁶⁹ The Saudis did not just play on only one group. They were connected with Hekmatyar and Rabbani through their linkages with the Muslim Brotherhood, and funded them. On the other hand, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's Ittihad-e Islam party was also funded. Even Osama bin Laden attended Rasul's camp when he first came to Afghanistan for jihad. In addition, Jamil Rahman's movement was funded, and Jamil established a temporary Salafi emirate in the Kunar province of Afghanistan with the help of the Saudis. Jamil was indeed a political Salafi Pashtun directly depended on the Saudis.⁴⁷⁰ But, the most important actors of the Afghan Jihad were Gulbeddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-e Islami and Burhaneddin Rabbani's Jami'at-e Islami parties. Rabbani got his education in al-Azhar University in Egypt and had connections with the Muslim Brotherhood since then. Hekmatyar had also been a member and the leader of Jawanan-e Musulman student association, the main rival group against the communist student clubs in the Kabul University in the 1970s. He was also a follower of Muslim Brotherhood in his university years.⁴⁷¹ Mawdudi had important roles in persuading General Zia of Pakistan and the Muslim World League to give

⁴⁶⁹ Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, pp.247 and 253; Rasul Bux Rais, *op.cit.*,p.71; Ahmad Rashid, *op.cit.*, pp. 26, 131,197-198 ; Banafsheh Keynoush, *op.cit.*,p. 111.

⁴⁷⁰ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, pp. 69,75-76,231-232 ; Zalmay Khalilzad, *Prospects for the Afghan Interim Government*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1991),pp. 27-30 ; Abdulkader Sinno, *op.cit.*,p. 71.

⁴⁷¹ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, pp.75-76 ; M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, *op.cit.*, in note 426, p. 158 ; M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani , *op.cit.*, in note 45 , p. 46-47.

support and to cooperate with the Muslim Brotherhood like groups in the jihad field. However, this cooperation failed towards the early 1990s just after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. The conditions in the region and the world began changing, and therefore the alliances changed, too. The fault that both Hekmatyar and President Burhaneddin Rabbani made was their decision to declare support to Saddam Hussein in his invasion of Kuwait in 1990.⁴⁷² This was a breaking point for the Saudis. The Saudi authorities suddenly cut the flow of petro dollars to the mujahedeen. The Jama'at-e Islami and his sponsored mujahedeen were ousted from the financial aid list, in addition, the cooperation with the Salafi ulama circles and the Muslim Brotherhood intelligentsia was also broken in the Peninsula in return. This cleavage between the Salafi ulama and the Brotherhood led to the revolt of Sahwa ulama and Bin Laden then to the birth of al Qaeda. Pakistan, who received a great amount of financial aid from Saudi Arabia and owed his nuclear capacity to Saudi financing, followed the same path with the Saudis.⁴⁷³ The tension between the Saudis and Muslim Brotherhood has been continuing since that time. Muslim Brotherhood was regarded as a threat by the Saudi authorities today. During my interview with Sheikh Ibrahim al Ibrahim, a member of Muslim Brotherhood affiliated Jam'at al Islami Party's administration in Lebanon, he pointed out that Muslim Brotherhood is dangerous for Saudi Arabia because Muslim Brotherhood came to power via elections in Egypt and legitimized democracy for Islamic movements and negotiated with Iran. Saudis and Gulf states became disturbed with these. They were afraid that Muslim Brotherhood- like movements would overthrow monarchies in the region.⁴⁷⁴ Also, Omar al Masri, the chief of political bureau of Muslim Brotherhood in Beirut, pointed out the idea of Muslim Brotherhood as threatening for Tunis, Egypt, Yemen, Gulf and Saudis because of Brotherhood's

⁴⁷² Stephen Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 274; Ahmad Rashid, *op.cit.*, p. 199.

⁴⁷³ Banafsheh Keynoush, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

⁴⁷⁴ Sheikh Ibrahim al Ibrahim (Imam of the central masjid of the call in Beirut and director of the charity of the call and preaching in Lebanon, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood branch Jama'at al Islamiyyah Party) Interview with the author, March 2016.

anti-monarchic and democracy based attitude in politics.⁴⁷⁵ But, it is a well-known fact that the tension goes back to the Gulf War years when Muslim Brotherhood protested the Saudis about the deployment of the US soldiers in Saudi Arabia.

The last fault of Hekmatyar also influenced the Pakistani authorities to withdraw their support from Hezb-e Islami. Benazir Bhutto's economic policy planned to reach to the recently independent Central Asian Republics in order to carry commercial goods by truck convoys over Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan's central rule could not provide order and stability throughout the country. Many warlords emerged, then founded their own authority in the provinces, and followed their own law. The Afghan state failed in the early 1990s and then collapsed during the Rabbani government, which was known as the interim mujahedeen government. There was no rule authority or order; instead, anarchy was ruling the country. Hekmatyar as a Pashtun leader was expected to consolidate the state and found a strong central authority but his public support was limited. His party Hezb-e Islami was political Islamism oriented but had modern views like competing within constitutional democratic regime like Muslim Brotherhood and had links with Jama'at-e Islami of Mawdudi.⁴⁷⁸ However, Afghanistan was not like Iran or Egypt. The masses were away from understanding the revolutionary Islam or revivalist Islamist thoughts. Both Rabbani and Hekmatyar had limited popular support from the masses.⁴⁷⁹ He could not penetrate the whole country, and lost Kabul to Tajik warlord Masud, the defense minister of Rabbani of Jami'at-e Islami, as a result, he failed to keep Pakistan's support. At the last stage, Hekmatyar's soldiers on the way to Kandahar plundered the Pakistan's trade convoy of trucks.⁴⁸⁰ Pakistan cut off all ties with him as the Saudis did. In 1994, the Saudis began supporting the political

⁴⁷⁵ Omar al Masri (the former head of Beirut political bureau of Jama'at Islamiyah Part, the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Lebanon), Interview with the author, Beirut: Aicha Baqqar district, April 2016.

⁴⁷⁸ Stephen Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 279; Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, pp. 236 and 245.

⁴⁷⁹ Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p.250 ; Ahmad Rashid, *op.cit.*, p. 51 ; Olivier Roy, "Why War is going on in Afghanistan: the Afghan crisis in perspective", *Perception* 5, no:1 (2000-2001) : 2-3.

⁴⁸⁰ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p.245; Ahmad Rashid, *op.cit.*, p. 34; Jami'at-e Islami is a different political faction than Jama'at-e Islami. Jami'at is an ethnic Tajik affiliated party in Afghanistan founded by Burhaneddin Rabbani, Jama'at is a political party in Pakistan founded by Islamic scholar Abu'l A'la Mawdudi.

Salafi Deobandi Madrasahs, which had a long history of resistance, revolt and jihad culture in South Asia.

The Saudis were always involved in the process of the Afghan jihad. The general rhetoric was to help and rescue the Muslim Afghan brothers from the Soviet invasion. This rhetoric was the same as that of the Arab Afghan fighters' led by Azzam and bin Laden. The Saudi money firstly flowed to the mujahedeen groups, to almost all of them, except the Shi'ite Hazaras. Even, the Peshawar records, which formed the Afghanistan Interim Government in Pakistan, were funded by the Saudis. Saudi ally Abdul Rasul Sayyaf was appointed as the prime minister of the interim government in 1989 in Peshawar. Sayyaf was very close to the Saudi Salafi grand cleric bin Baz and hosted bin Laden in his mujahedeen camps in the 1980s.⁴⁸¹ The Saudi finance had also supported Hekmatyar together with Pakistan's support. Hekmatyar and his secret ally in the last communist President Najibullah's government, the defense minister General Tanai received 100 million dollars for the internal coup against the Najibullah regime in March, 1990. However, the coup failed.⁴⁸² The Saudi money flowed to Pakistan and reached to the mujahedeen via the Inter Intelligence Service (ISI) of Pakistan directly or indirectly through the Saudi backed charities, organizations and relief foundations.⁴⁸³

Pakistan cut off its ties with Hekmatyar after his failure to capture Kabul in 1992, and then they searched for another Pashtun partner. Jami'at Ulama-e Islam Party (JUI) in Pakistan and its leader Maulana Fazlur Rahman emerged as the new hope. JUI was the party of the political Salafism movement in Pakistan, and there were thousands of madrasahs belonged to this party.⁴⁸⁴ After General Zia's coup, Zia underpinned the madrasahs and gave many privileges to them. For example, he let madrasah graduate students apply to universities by recognizing madrasah diplomas, let them benefit from state collected taxes as economic aid, and let them open more

⁴⁸¹ Zalmay Khalilzad, *op.cit.*, in note 466, pp.14-15.

⁴⁸² Stephen Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 274 ; Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p.204; Ahmad Rashid, *op.cit.*, p. 198.

⁴⁸³ Ahmad Rashid, *op.cit.*, p. 197-198.

⁴⁸⁴ Ahmad Rashid, *op.cit.*, p. 26 and 89- 90 ; Rasul Bux Rais, *op.cit.*, p. 72.

madrasahs in North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan.⁴⁸⁵ After the death of General Zia in 1988, Benazir Bhutto, the executed Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's daughter, came to power. In her second era in 1993, she allied with Fazlur Rahman's JUI in government just like General Zia's cooperation with Jama'at-e Islami of Mawdudi. While the ulama criticized Fazlur Rahman for cooperating with a woman, Fazlur Rahman insisted on coalition. Bhutto had a policy of transit of Pakistan's truck convoy over Afghanistan to carry medicine and goods. But, the trucks were exposed to the plunder of warlords.⁴⁸⁶ Hekmatyar's men plundered the last convoy and angered the Pakistani authorities. At that time, Mullah Omar, an ex-mujahedeen figure and a former student in the Deobandi Madrasahs in the NWFP affiliated JUI party, rescued the convoy with his student-fighters.⁴⁸⁷ This event enabled the reconstruction of Pakistan's policy over Afghanistan. Prime Minister Bhutto's interior minister Nasrullah Babar, who was an ethnic Pashtun, prepared a new policy based on supporting this new group, the Taliban.⁴⁸⁸

5.2.5. The Role of the Saudis and Pakistan in the Mobilization of the Taliban

The unification of Afghanistan was on behalf of both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in terms of political and economic reasons. A strong Sunni and ally regime was on behalf of the Saudis because of a buffer state near Iran. The Saudis also had pipeline projects common with the USA in the region therefore they needed a strong stable rule rather than a chaotic country. It was also on behalf of Pakistan. A Sunni ally regime neighboring Pakistan was a good partner against both Iran and India. Pakistan also had economic purposes such as transit way between Pakistan and Central Asian Republics under a strong and stable rule in Afghanistan. Therefore, the Taliban's construction of authority was supported by both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

⁴⁸⁵ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p.276 ; Masooda Bano, *op.cit.*, p.50.

⁴⁸⁶ Ashok K. Behuria, *op.cit.*, p . 73; Amin Tarzi, *op.cit.*, pp. 43-44; Neamatollah Najumi, *op.cit.*, pp. 101-105 ; Ahmad Rashid, *op.cit.*, pp. 89-90 ; Stephen Tanner, *op.cit.*, p .279; Rasul Bux Rais, *op.cit.*, pp.71-73.

⁴⁸⁷ Stephen Tanner, *op.cit.*, p.279; Neamatollah Najumi, *op.cit.*, p.104; Meredith L. Runion, *op.cit.*, p.121.

⁴⁸⁸ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p.245 ; Rasul Bux Rais , *op.cit.*, p.71.

Mullah Omar, a teacher of madrasah and an ex-mujahedeen, and his students at the Deobandi madrasahs were supported by Pakistan's military and technical aid. Mullah Omar began capturing the Pashtun cities one by one in a short time. This new group led by Mullah Omar was called as Taliban. Talib means student in Arabic, and Taliban is the plural form of student(s) in Persian. The movement emerged in 1994 with its blitzkrieg war and began finishing the warlord anarchy throughout Afghanistan. The popular masses, especially in the Pashtun dominated regions gave a huge support to this movement. Molla Omar was a Ghilzai Pashtun and a mysterious figure who hid himself from the cameras.⁴⁸⁹ This mystery helped him create a strong personalized rule over his fighters and Pashtun tribes and mullahs who supported him. Between 1994 and 1996 until the siege of Kabul, the Taliban moved with blitzkrieg and captured mainly Pashtun cities. Generally, Pashtun cities accepted Mullah Omar's rule and attended Taliban without fight.⁴⁹⁰

The Saudi finance's direction changed towards the Taliban. The Saudi and Gulf princes began visiting Kandahar as the special guests of Maulana Fazlur Rahman, the head of the JUI –Deobandi party. The political Salafi leaders in Deobandi circles organized special hunting parties in honor of their Saudi guests between the years 1994 and 1995. Prince Turki bin Faisal, the head of the Saudi Intelligence, visited Kandahar in July 1996 and after him, Saudi aid began pouring into the Taliban movement.⁴⁹¹ Just like Pakistanis who had projects to reach the recently independent Central Asian countries for commercial interests and needed a safe transit passage over Afghanistan, the Saudis had similar interests. The Saudi oil companies, the Delta and Ningarcho, had projects to build gas pipelines from Central Asia to Pakistan that would go over Afghanistan in cooperation with the US oil company, Unocal.⁴⁹² The Taliban movement had greater importance in these projects for both Pakistan and the Saudis and even the USA. The USA did not raise its voice

⁴⁸⁹ Abdulkader Sinno, *op.cit.*, p. 76; Robert D. Crews, *op.cit.*, p. 244.

⁴⁹⁰ Nasreen Akhtar, *op.cit.*, p.59.

⁴⁹¹ Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*,p. 201; Abdulkader Sinno, *op.cit.*, p. 71.

⁴⁹² Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*,p. 201.

against the rise of the Taliban and his conquests, its massacres of rival groups like non-Pashtuns and Shi'ites, as the Taliban seemed as the only power that would bring order, centrality, law and security to Afghanistan with its strong authority.⁴⁹³ The Saudis gave hundreds of pick up Toyotas to Taliban, mainly through the Saudi based Delta oil company in the early 1990s.⁴⁹⁴ Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia helped the new Pashtun force provide the authority in Afghanistan. Since the movement was originally from Kandahar and composed of Afghan refugee Pashtuns and Pakistani Pashtuns who studied in the Deobandi madrasahs in NWFP in Pakistan during the war years, the popular Pashtun support throughout the country stood by for the Taliban. The Pashtun dominated cities directly fell into Taliban forces without a single bullet.⁴⁹⁵ The real power behind the Taliban was Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners with their financial aids. Millions of dollars were pouring to the Taliban either through Pakistan or directly to Kandahar for war costs and repairing the infrastructure of the country. Pakistani technicians organized telephone and wireless infrastructure, repaired the Kandahar airport and modernized the Taliban army. The Saudis also sent fuel, money and Toyota pickups for the Taliban government and army. This was when the Delta oil company came forward with the idea to provide Toyota pickups for Taliban for its future project, connecting Central Asian gas to Pakistani ports.⁴⁹⁶ Saudi Arabia had already helped the mujahedeen groups before, and these groups were involved in sample state formation attempts within Afghanistan. For example, Jamil ur Rahman, the political Salafi Pashtun warlord who had close contacts with the Saudi authorities, attempted to found a Salafi state in Kunar through ethnic cleansing and purification from the Sufis, as the political Salafis had done in the Peninsula once upon a time. The Saudis supported Jamil financially but his area of influence remained very limited and micro level.⁴⁹⁷ On the

⁴⁹³ Citha D. Maass, *op.cit.*, p.75.

⁴⁹⁴ Neamatollah Najumi, *op.cit.*, p. 102, Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*,p. 201.

⁴⁹⁵ Nasreen Akhtar, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Taliban, *International Journal on World Peace* 15, no.4 (2008):59.

⁴⁹⁶ Neamatollah Najumi, *op.cit.*, p.102, Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*,p.201.

⁴⁹⁷ Zalmay Khalilzad, *op.cit.*, in note 466, pp. 27-30.

other side, both Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's Ittihad-e Islam Party and also Pakistan's best ex-ally Gulbeddin Hekmatyar and his party were lack of popular support, and they were at a very micro level of development. But the Taliban was a mass popular movement rather than a single man based organization.⁴⁹⁸ The Taliban was not a movement as other Muslim brotherhood affiliated Hizb-e Islami and Jama'at-e Islami parties, and did not have any revolutionary ideas like them. These parties were either Tajik or Pashtun rooted and followed the way of the Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistani Jama'at-e Islami. The Iranian Revolution, Jama'at-e Islami and Muslim Brotherhood in ideology also inspired them.⁴⁹⁹ They had founded the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan after capturing the regime in 1992 and 2001. However, Taliban was very different. It was a product of an urgent need for ending anarchy, strengthening order and building a central authority. The Shari'ah and its Salafi oriented implementation was the only method that Taliban could apply to and benefit from. The political Salafis, who had already founded three states and many sheikhdoms in Arabia, seemed to inspire this model to the Taliban.

The Saudis had already thrown the seeds of political Salafism by influencing the Muslim Sufi orders and Salafizing them a hundred years ago. After a century, the Saudis gathered the fruits of these seeds from the Deobandi and Ahl-e Hadith madrasahs in the form of Taliban. In addition, the creation of a similar regime in South Asia, was supposed to serve the economic, sectarian and ideological interests of the Saudis and Gulf sheikhdoms. After the decline of the Soviet Satellite Afghan regime in 1992, the new regime became a Saudi client regime; thus, the Saudis would get the outcome of their long lasting struggle, by transporting Arab jihadists, and financing the Afghan jihad. The Saudis through large amounts of petro dollars revived political Salafism in South Asia during the Afghan Jihad. After the entrance of Salafi discourse, Saudi finance had also become influential in the madrasahs and religious orders in northern Pakistan. Pakistan's devout Sunni junta was in close collaboration with the Saudis. The Saudis backed General Zia's Sunnization policies,

⁴⁹⁸ Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p. 91.

⁴⁹⁹ Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p.86; Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p.69,75-76,152,157; Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p.213; Olivier Roy, *op.cit.*, pp.2-3.

and the new nuclear program of the country that was known as the nuclear power of the Muslim world was put in process. The Saudis financed the nuclear program of Pakistan, which seemed against India but also aimed to counter Iran from the back of the scene.⁵⁰⁰ The Deobandi madrasahs created a political Salafism based new movement to bring order to Afghanistan with the help of the Saudi finance and Pakistani military aid.

The Taliban firstly gained the support of Pakistan, thus the backing of Saudi Arabia, too. The Pakistani intelligence ISI, Pakistani Bhutto government and the Saudi Intelligence Chief Prince Turki supported the movement. The Taliban troops rescued Pakistan's truck convoys from the local bandits affiliated with Hekmatyar. The strategy of the Taliban was not as aggressive as the other warlords; indeed, it helped providing order and security to a certain degree. The road to Kabul was under siege by Hekmatyar, and the capital was suffering from starvation. The Taliban broke the siege and forced Hekmatyar to flee from the region in 1995. This event made the Taliban become popular and receive massive support in the country. In 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul with the help of the local Pashtuns within the city. The era of the Islamic Republic, founded by a Tajik mujahideen intellectual Rabbani, and protected by the Tajik commander in chief Masud did not succeed in maintaining their rule, and failed. After a while in 1998, the Taliban forces entered Mazar-e Sharif. Almost ninety percent of the country fell under the Taliban rule. Just a small region called Tajik Panshir remained controlled by Ahmad Shah Masud. The other warlords and ex-mujahideen leaders fled from the country. In April 1996, Mullah Omar declared himself as the Amir al Mu'minin. Thousands of mullahs and clerics gave their allegiance to him in the ceremony in Kandahar. In October 1997, Taliban forces declared the Emirate of Afghanistan.⁵⁰¹

⁵⁰⁰ Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *op.cit.*, p.161 ; Gilles Kepel, *op.cit.*, in note 295, p. 225; Masooda Bano, *op.cit.*, pp. 48-49; Ashok K. Behuria, *op.cit.*, pp. 60-61 , David Dean Commings, *op.cit.*, in note 1, p. 144; Banafsheh Keynough, *op.cit.*, p.145.

⁵⁰¹ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p.245 and 280 ; Stephen Tanner, *op.cit.*, p.281; Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p.260; Abdulkader Sinno, *op.cit.*, pp. 60 and 68; Neamatollah Nojumi, *op.cit.*, p.107; Robert D. Crews, *op.cit.*, p. 258 ; M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani , *op.cit.*, in note 427, p. 8 ; Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p. 34; Zalmay Khalilzad and Daniel Byman, "Afghanistan: the Consolidation of a Rogue State", *Washington Quarterly* 23, no.1 (2000) : 67.

5.2.6. The Jihad of the Taliban for Expansion

The Taliban constructed its regime by making wars. As the study points out in Chapter 3, the political Salafis built the Saudi rules by making wars and drew their borders with making jihad. The Arabian urbanites made alliance with the Salafi scholars in Central Arabia in order to urbanize Bedouin tribal desert Arabs under one single flag and make them settle in towns by ousting them from desert tents in the 18th and 19th century Arabia. Now, Pashtun originated ex-Mujahedeen fighters allied with the Deobandi madrasahs and created a new generation of fighter students. At that point, with the term 'Pashtun originated ex-Mujahedeen', the study points out Mullah Omar, Jalaluddin Haqqani and their comrades who participated in the Afghan jihad against the Soviets within the factions of Mujahedeen leaders like Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi, the leader of Haraket-e Inqilab and Yunis Khales, the leader of Hezb-e Islami (a different faction than Hekmetyar's).⁵⁰² The mobilization, which emerged with the merge of Pashtun ethnic identity and political Salafism's puritanism, helped the Taliban Movement form an authority in a very short time in Afghanistan from 1994, the capture of Kandahar, to 1998, the capture of Mazar-e Sharif.

The Taliban movement was a good practice of the Afghan Pashtun rulers of the past. Dost Muhammad had a war against the British in 1839. Then, Abdul Rahman had a war with the British in 1878. Thirdly, Amanullah had war in 1919 and both of three managed to oust the British forces. But, the wars were launched under the concept of jihad. Jihad was the basic element to mobilize tribes against an infidel invader.⁵⁰³ The Taliban's jihad was a bit different from the traditional jihad of Afghans in the 19th and early 20th centuries in terms of receiving Saudi external aid and implementing Salafi rules on society to sustain the regime. But, internal colonialism that Amir Abdul Rahman implemented by killing, in other words, ethnic cleansing of Hazaras, and attacking Ghilzai Pashtuns and Uzbeks was applied by the

⁵⁰² Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p.245 ; Ahmed Rashid, *op. cit.*, p.24.

⁵⁰³ Rasul Bux Rais, *op.cit.*, p. 12; Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, pp. 181 and 191-192 ; M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, *op.cit.*, in note 45, p 31,32.

Taliban similarly. The Shi'ite Hazaras were massacred in 1997 and 1998 in both Kabul and Hazarajat, and Tajiks and Uzbeks were slaughtered and suppressed. The only difference was that Taliban was keener on Pashtun solidarity because Mullah Omar ended historical hostility between Ghilzais and Durranis through the unification of political Salafism defined *tawhid* understanding, and canalized their mobilization with religious enthusiasm to conquest the country. Internal colonialism and person centered ruling were applied by Mullah Omar like Amir Abdul Rahman who was known as the maker of modern Afghan nation state.⁵⁰⁴ In sum, the revival of Pashtun historical legacy and political Salafi principles played key roles in the expansion and construction of the Taliban rule in a very short time.

5.3. Unification by Political Salafism in Afghanistan

The Taliban rule's adoption to political Salafi principles and jihad understanding united the separate Pashtun tribes under a single authority by mobilizing them under the name of jihad. In Afghanistan, there was always a belief that the Pashtuns were a majority and ruling ethnic group and the others should be just the ruled. The Pashtun majority could not accept the rule of another ethnic minority group in both the monarchical era and the communist era. Only the Tajiks with the leadership of Habibullah Khan, Babrak Karmal and Burhaneddin Rabbani came to power three times and faced strong Pashtun disturbance and resistance. While political Salafism that the Taliban adopted unified the Pashtun tribes, the Pashtun solidarity that the Taliban revived after getting the control of the country enabled the unity of Pashtun groups including the ex-mujahedeen and even the communist staff under the Taliban's authority. The ex-communist Khalqi faction's members contributed to the Taliban's centralization of power attempt. The unification of the authority under the Taliban regime brought the security in daily life, transportation, trade and communication, and end of banditry, end of political fragmentation and end of autonomous warlord regions in Afghanistan. In addition, the Saudis and Pakistan

⁵⁰⁴ M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, "The Taliban Enigma: Person-Centered Politics & Extremism in Afghanistan" in *ISIM Newsletter* 6, Leiden: University of Leiden (2000), pp. 20-21 ; M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani , *op.cit.*, in note 46, p.718; Brian Glyn Williams, *op.cit.*, pp. 931-932 ; Ahmad Rashid, *op.cit.*, pp. 73-74.

financed the Taliban in its unification and centralization of power process in the country.

5.3.1. The Unification of the Pashtuns by the Taliban

Pashtun identity and Pashtun historical legacy was important for the Taliban's formation. It can be said that the Taliban was simply a Pashtun movement deriving from the political Salafi based Deobandi madrasahs originally. The Pashtuns had a problem in providing the unity for decades in Afghanistan. The tribal conflicts, the Soviet invasion and the mujahideens' civil war were factors preventing the unification among the Pashtun groups and tribes. In addition, there was not a unifying power for the unification of Pashtun majority in Afghanistan. Political Salafism provided this unifying role. Political Salafism firstly unified the Pashtun students and migrants under jihad camps under control of their madrasahs and then mobilized them for jihad against warring groups in Afghanistan.

In the siege of Afghan cities by the Taliban, all the students were called to fight by Mullah Omar, and the students ran to war fronts with this call.⁵⁰⁵ Mullah Omar imitated the previous Amir of the 19th century Afghanistan and founder of the Afghan nation state Iron Amir Abdul Rahman. Abdul Rahman massacred the Shi'ite Hazaras to capture their pasturelands in Hazarajat in central Afghanistan, broke the resistances of Ghilzai Eastern Pashtuns in the east and of Uzbeks in the north by mobilizing Durrani Pashtun tribes from the south. The British supported him with weapons and money and became a sponsor for his buffer state between Russian Turkestan and the British India.⁵⁰⁶ The Taliban was similar to the early Abdul Rahman's rule. It was a centralized and preferably strong authority rather than a fragmented mafia like faction that could not provide unity. This centralized power was sponsored by foreign powers, the Saudis and Pakistan. Abdul Rahman applied to the concept of jihad to create a centralized rule over many dispersed tribes and local

⁵⁰⁵ Stephen Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 282.

⁵⁰⁶ Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, pp. 155-157 and 226, M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, *op.cit.*, in note 46, pp.717-719 ; Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p. 68.

chieftains.⁵⁰⁷ Seemingly, Mullah Omar pursued the same path as Abdul Rahman, the Iron Amir. He massacred thousands of the Shi'ite Hazaras in the central Afghanistan. The Taliban mullahs declared the necessity of converting Shi'ite mosques to Sunni mosques and enforced the remained Shi'ite Hazaras to either convert to Sunnism or leave for Iran. The same types of massacres were made in the Uzbek and Tajik regions of the Northern provinces like Maimana and Shiberghan. Taliban even put stricter rules on Hindus and Sikhs about their dress codes to distinguish them in public.⁵⁰⁸ Just as Abdul Rahman followed a micro religious and micro ethnic policy by favoring Sunnis over Shi'a, Pashtuns over non-Pashtuns and Durrani over Ghilzais, and even Muhammadzai clans over other Durrani clans; the Taliban government did the same. The only difference of the Taliban was to solve the dispute between Ghilzais and Durrani and took support of both tribes. In brief, the Taliban's way of bringing peace and stability to the region was through the method of ethnic cleansing upon non-Pashtun communities and bringing power back to Pashtun majority.⁵⁰⁹ Nazif Shahrani called this policy as internal colonialism. What Abdul Rahman in the 19th century tried to do in the 19th century was the same as what Mullah Omar tried in the 1990s, and called as internal colonialism.⁵¹⁰ Mullah Omar declared himself Amir al Mu'minin in 1997 with the acceptance of large number of mullahs. This tradition was also continuation of Amir Abdul Rahman, who saw the rule as the God Given and an obligation for obedience.⁵¹¹ While Abdul Rahman got in modernizing his country through British aid for constructing railway, steam engines and telegraph lines, Mullah Omar of the Taliban got aid from Pakistan in

⁵⁰⁷ M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, *op.cit.*, in note 45, p.31 ; Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p.26.

⁵⁰⁸ Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, "Introduction" in *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan*, ed. Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, Cambridge, (Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2008), p.31 ; Abdulkader Sinno, *op.cit.*, p. 68 ; Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, pp. 73 -74 ; Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p.279.

⁵⁰⁹ M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, "State Building and Social Fragmentation in Afghanistan: A Historical Perspective" in *The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan*, ed. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986) ,p.38 ; M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, *op.cit.*, in note 498 ,pp.20-21.

⁵¹⁰ M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, *op.cit.*, in note 498, pp. 20-21.

⁵¹¹ M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, *op.cit.*, in note 426, p. 165 ; Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, pp. 8, 33, 280; Rasul Bux Rais, *op.cit.*, p.76.

order to bring telephone lines, wirelines, infrastructural services, building highways and repaired Kandahar airports. The Saudis supplied money, vehicles and fuel for reconstruction of the country. Even, Osama bin Laden as a Saudi businessman helped to build highways between cities as a donor to Afghanistan.⁵¹² Mullah Omar's policy of provision of finance was much more Saudi -based rather than British-backed Abdul Rahman. Mullah Omar and his movement also revived the old Pashtun legacies, not only Abdul Rahman's legacy but also the legacy of Pashtun King Amanullah although he was a secular Amir. His early jihad against the British in 1919 and cleaning Afghanistan from occupiers were revived in Taliban's rhetoric as an honorable case.⁵¹³ Even, the current ruling elite of the Taliban emphasized the importance of the jihad spirit and culture in their agenda. Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, the new and current leader of the Taliban, released a statement in December 2016. He stated that the religious scholars always guided by the historical conquests of the Muslim leaders and rules in both India and Afghanistan. Ulema guided Mahmud of Ghazni, Sultan Shahabuddin Ghorī and Ahmad Shah Abdali in their jihad. Religious scholars always became the source of the jihadi inspiration, motivation and guidance for the Muslims' expansion in the region.⁵¹⁴

The Taliban was directly founded on ethnicity politics. The humiliation of Pashtuns was well analyzed by Taliban mullah leaders, and a true expansion strategy was put in process by capturing Pashtun areas at first. Pashtun ethnicism was effectively felt during Zahir, Daud, even communist Khalqi leaders Taraki and Amin's eras. The non-Pashtuns felt relaxed for minority-favored reforms during Persian speaking Babrak Karmal for a few years. Najibullah followed the same suppressing Pashtunist policies.⁵¹⁶ Taliban took this inheritance and revived it during

⁵¹² M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, *op.cit.*, in note 498, pp.20-21; Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p.161.

⁵¹³ M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, *op.cit.*, in note 498, pp.20-21; Mariam Raqiba and Amilcar Antonio Barreto, "The Taliban, religious revival and innovation in Afghan nationalism", *National Identities* 16, no. 1 (2013):pp. 18-19.

⁵¹⁴ " Introduction of Sheikh Moulavi Hibatullah Akhunzada, Leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan", Al Emarah- Official Website of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, December 14, 2016.

⁵¹⁶ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, pp.40 and 280 ; M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, *op.cit.*, in note 426, p.165; Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, pp. 181-182 and 239 ; Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, pp. 86-93 ; Rasul Bux Rais, *op.cit.*, p.38

its rule. The religiosity was derived from Deobandi madrasahs and helped Taliban forces penetrate the tribal and clerical network of the region easily and successfully. Taliban was not an Islamic Republic supporter; hence, they declared an emirate. They did not embrace revolutionary and modern concepts like Rabbani and Hekmatyar.⁵¹⁷ The concepts that the Taliban applied were the Salafi tradition borrowed from the Saudis. The puritan policies, Salafi interpreted Shari'ah implementation; some Saudi reminding organizations under the Taliban rule caused the movement to be an outcome of political Salafism. On the other side, it is argued that the Islamic Shuras of the Taliban looked like the Party Central Committees of the ex-communist regime's institutions.⁵¹⁸ Taliban also looked like Khalqi when their common top-down policies upon rural masses was taken into consideration.⁵¹⁹ In addition, another proof showing Taliban's unifying side was employment of Khalqi members, officials, technicians, soldiers and pilots within Taliban bureaucracy.⁵²⁰ Both Taliban and Khalqis were originally Ghilzai Pashtuns, and their Pashtunism was the main engine of the Taliban regime. Khalqi faction's bureaucrats and soldiers were so effective in Taliban government that they tried a coup attempt in Jalalabad in 1998.⁵²¹ But, the attempt was suppressed at the last minute. In brief, political Salafism is a sufficient argument on itself for the rise of the Taliban but Pashtun ethnic solidarity, tribal kinships and foreign supports were also as effective as political Salafism's unifying force.

5.3.2. The Centralized Rule of the Taliban Regime as an Outcome of Unification

⁵¹⁷ Ahmed Rashid, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-89; Olivier Roy, *op.cit.*, pp.2-3.

⁵¹⁸ Vikash Yadav, "The Myth of the Moderate Taliban", *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 37, (2010) ,p.140; Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, oil and the new great game in central Asia*, (London; New York: Tauris, 2002), p. 95

⁵¹⁹ Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p. 262.

⁵²⁰ Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p. 258 ; Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi , *op.cit.*, pp.28-29; Robert D. Crews, *op.cit.*, pp. 254-255.

⁵²¹ Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*,p. 103.

The unification of the country by the Taliban with a series of wars against internal enemies, other ethnic groups enabled the Taliban to involve in centralization of the authority. Centralization necessitated the reestablishment of bureaucratic functions by the Taliban. The Taliban regime inherited the remaining former state bureaucracy, mostly from the Khalqi era and from the Musahiban dynasty period. The administrative divisions were reshaped according to Daud Khan's era units again. Governors (*wali*) and judges (*qadi*) were appointed to the administrative units. The Supreme Shura or the Supreme Council composing of six main members under the leadership of Molla Omar mainly directed the Taliban regime. There was also Central Shura composed of nine members, responsible for administrative and foreign affairs, and reporting to the Amir al Muminun. In addition, there was a council of ministers composed of 23 or 27 ministers acting as a cabinet of the government. Mullah Omar and his council were located in Kandahar. It was very rare when he left Kandahar. For him, staying in Kandahar was the symbol of his mystery and loyalty to the Pashtun legacy. According to Nazif Shahrani, the Taliban regime was a personalized rule in addition to its paternalistic tribal politics, the interpretation of Shari'ah law and Pashtun ethnicity, because the tradition of the Afghan nation state was derived from the political culture of the strong rulers such as Dost Muhammad and Abdul Rahman.⁵²² The Taliban was a strong supporter of political Salafism in its rhetoric, tried to reflect this to its governance, and seemed that the Shura method was an Islamic and inspiring the Rashidun era in Islamic history. The ministries were taken from previous regimes. The leading positions were always appointed from madrasah students and mullahs, the main backbone of the Taliban movement. However, the bureaucratic posts, school teachers, engineers, military officers, technical jobs within the state bureaucracy were chosen from ex-communist regime's Khalqi faction affiliated officers and members.⁵²³

Khalqi faction was close and acceptable for the Pashtun Taliban rather than non-Pashtun faction, the Parcham, because both Khalqi and Taliban had a

⁵²² Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p. 261, Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, pp. 281-283; Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, *op.cit.*, p. 45; M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, *op.cit.*, in note 498, pp.20-21.

⁵²³ Robert D. Crews, *op.cit.*, pp.254-255 ; Vikash Yadav, *op.cit.*, p.140.

commonality of Pashtun ethnicism. Even, the Khalqis were destroyed by the Soviet-Parcham alliance. The Soviet Spatsnaz commandoes murdered their leader Hafizullah Amin. Babrak Karmal, the head of Parcham faction, came to presidency with the support of the Soviets.⁵²⁴ The Taliban always referred to Abdul Rahman and Amanullah, the heroes of the Anglo-Afghan wars in Pashtuns' history.⁵²⁵ They did not have grievances with Pashtun dominated Khalqis. On the other side, non-Pashtuns were even employed in non-state jobs such as radio, local newspaper. Most importantly, the ex-Khalqis, the ex-officers of KHAD, the national intelligence, and former soldiers, affiliated to ex-head of Khalqi party and former defense minister of Najibullah and ex-comrades of Gulbuddin Hekmetyar, were appointed to army positions. They were using tanks, helicopters, fighter jets, briefly the most strategic vehicles in the army.⁵²⁶ The Taliban and Pashtun ex-Khalqis were bound to each other over clan solidarity and ethnic ties. The rule of Pashtuns in Kabul was better for a Pashtun than any other political rules of non-Pashtun Tajiks, the Rabbani-Ahmad Shah Masud government. The army was composed of 25.000 and 30.000 soldiers and madrasah students formed the 30 percent of the military power.⁵²⁷ That proved that the Taliban did not just consist of zealous madrasah students, instead, backed by more strong and coherent components such as ex-military men, ex-communist officers, Pashtun tribes, local chieftains and mullahs. The greatest triumph of the Taliban was to cease traditional rivalry between Ghilzai tribes and Durrani tribes and combined their energy under a single banner.⁵²⁸ Although Mullah Omar was a Ghilzai, he founded his headquarters in Kandahar, the historical center of the Durrani tribes, and governed from there. The strong emphasis on tribal solidarity and call for national unity was also made by the current leader of the Taliban, Haibatullah Akhundzada. Haibibullah Akhundzada pointed out that the local allies of the US

⁵²⁴ Stephen Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 237.

⁵²⁵ M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani , *op.cit.*, in note 498, pp.20-21; Mariam Raqiba and Amilcar Antonio Barreto, *op.cit.*, pp. 18-19.

⁵²⁶ Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi , *op.cit.*, p.28; Robert D. Crews, *op.cit.*, pp. 254-255.

⁵²⁷ Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p. 100.

⁵²⁸ Brian Glyn Williams , *op.cit.*, p. 949

should join the ranks of the Islamic Emirate and stop supporting the enemy. The Taliban Emirate is based on justice, equality, piety, honest. He also said *“All Afghan tribes and races need each other. Even evolution of Islamic system, independence and strength is entwined with the unity and harmony of the Afghans. Islam teaches us Islamic brotherhood, integrity and to assign responsibilities on the basis of merit.”*

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The juridical system was enforced with strict implementation of Pashtunwali, the legal code of honor and hospitality of Afghan tribes, and the Islamic Shari’ah. There is a long debate about either Shari’ah superseded Pashtunwali or vice versa. It seems that Islamic Shari’ah and Salafi tones displayed themselves in Taliban juridical enforcements, especially punishments against women, popular practices, the celebration of historical holidays like Nowruz, adultery, thieves, homosexuality but these influences were especially derived from political Salafism. On the other side, the insistence on hosting Osama bin Laden and not delivering to the USA authorities was just interpreted with Pashtunwali tradition as the honor of securing the guest at home.⁵³¹ As a conclusion, the Taliban enforced both of them, especially the similar ones taking place in both Pashtunwali and Islamic Shari’ah, but here the main aim was to restore order and prevent anarchy because the state was collapsing during the mujahedeen era. The harsh implementation of law of both Pashtunwali and Shari’ah enabled Taliban authorities to legitimize themselves by both showing their respect and commitment to Afghan –Pashtun tribal system and to the Qur’an’s Shari’ah which were effective on Afghan rural Muslim population. For instance, Hibatullah Akhundzada, the leader of the Taliban, stated that the Taliban Emirate implemented law, order and contributed to the restoration of peace. He added that the implementation of ‘Hudud’ meaning prescribed punishments has an important role in the formation of peace and stability in Afghanistan. He also alleged that the implementation of Shari’ah law can provide the restoration of peace and stability and

⁵²⁹ “Clear Political Policy of the Islamic Emirate, Al Emarah- Official Website of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”, July 14, 2016.

⁵³¹ Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p. 262-268.

the Taliban can only implement these prescribed punishments in the light of the Qur'an, traditions of the Prophet, and the Islamic jurisprudence.⁵³²

Bureaucratization is very important for a state to monitor and regulate the society. It is a vital component of centralization of the regime's power.⁵³⁴ The Taliban regime created 13.000 staff positions under its new bureaucracy. The international organizations, the UN organs and institutions like the UNESCO, the UNHCR, the UNICEF and international non-governmental organizations also contributed to the Taliban economy through external aid. They contributed 113 million dollars and provided 25.000 job posts for Afghanistan under the Taliban regime.⁵³⁵ The Taliban state also tried to extract revenues for state economy through taxation. The mujahedeen warlords caused opium cultivation based on agriculture to penetrate in the country by forcing the farmers to abandon growing other agricultural commodities. The Taliban could not change it immediately but put tax on cultivation and exportation of opium.⁵³⁶

The judges (*qadis*), provincial governors (*wali*) and district officials (*uluswals*) were appointed according to the previous administrative systems under Zahir Shah and Daud Khan.⁵³⁷ But, the hierarchy was based on personalized rule located in Kandahar rather than centralization of bureaucracy in the capital city. The governors of provinces directly gave reports and took commands from Mullah Omar staying in Kandahar rather than the government located in Kabul under Mullah Mohammad Rabbani, the prime minister of the Taliban government. This created the difficulty in issuing of the decision making process. The Taliban regime had three important Shuras (councils): the supreme council led by Mullah Omar personally, the military council led by Mullah Omar, Kabul Shura of Ministers led by Prime

⁵³² " Introduction of Sheikh Moulavi Hibatullah Akhunzada, Leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan", Al Emarah- Official Website of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, December 14, 2016.

⁵³⁴ Rolf Schwarz, *op.cit.*, p.3.

⁵³⁵ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p .282 .

⁵³⁶ Meredith L. Runion, *op.cit.*, p.126; Peter Dahl Thruelsen , "The Taliban in southern Afghanistan: a localized insurgency with a local objective", *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 21, no.2 (2010): 268.

⁵³⁷ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, pp.281-283.

Minister Mohammad Rabbani. The ministers were composed of foreign affairs, public health, interior, construction, finance, information and culture, agriculture, water and power, communications, justice, higher education, frontier affairs, commerce and planning. The Supreme Council of Omar based in Kandahar included some of the ministers, head of customs department, chief justice of Afghanistan, military chief of staff, head of army corps, governor state bank.⁵³⁸ The party center committee of the previous PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan / the Khalqis-Parchamis) regime probably inspired this two-headed mechanism.⁵³⁹

The Saudi influence was also seen in the Taliban governance. Actually, the first attempt was made in the interim government led by Burhannedin Rabbani in the establishment of the Department for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. This institution had religious police on the street, which called people to obey the principles of Islam, and it was similar to the Saudi form. It was known as *Amr Bi'l Maruf and Nahy an al Munkar* Police force. The Taliban updated this institution by founding a ministry. It aimed to organize the society by enforcing rules over people outside, forcing to pray at mosques and especially forcing dress code for women in society.⁵⁴⁰ The Salafi influence was shown in not only Saudi based bureaucratic departments, but also many Salafi style bans. The photograph of the mujahideen martyrs and commemoration events of martyrs were banned, because it was non-Islamic and similar to revolutionary Iranian practices.⁵⁴¹ The solar calendar was also replaced by lunar calendar to be Islamic.⁵⁴²

Iron Amir Abdul Rahman's state was a buffer state between the British India and the Russian Empire, which threatened British interests in India. In the early 1990s, the increasing Taliban regime was also a buffer state against Iran and Russia. Both powers funded and aided the Rabbani government and its defense minister

⁵³⁸ Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p. 98 and 220-225 ; Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p. 261.

⁵³⁹ Vikash Yadav, *op.cit.*, pp.137-138.

⁵⁴⁰ Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, *op.cit.*, pp. 46-47.

⁵⁴¹ Ibid, pp. 46-49.

⁵⁴² Ibid, p. 49.

Tajik Ahmad Shah Masud. Although Russian had fought with Masud for years, they began to cooperate against the Taliban in the late 1990s.⁵⁴³ The Saudis supported this new buffer state, because Russians had threatened Arab world and its client states around Saudi Arabia, in the Horn of Africa, and with Marxist affiliated Arab secular regimes in the Middle East during the Soviet era. In addition, Iran, the historical enemy of Arabs, threatened the Arab states that had high proportion of Shi'ite population. The rise of Taliban was beneficial for the Saudis to surround Iran from the east and was also useful to expand their religious, political and economic influences into the Central Asian republics.⁵⁴⁴

5.3.3. The Role of the Saudis and Pakistan in the Unification of the Taliban Rule

According to Rolf Schwarz, there are three core functions of the modern nation state including security, welfare and representation.⁵⁴⁵ Taliban was more successful than any other mujahedeen group in terms of providing security. For that reason, it was supported by Pakistan, Pakistan's allies Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms and the USA at one side and by local Pashtun majority at the other side. The implementation of religious law together with traditional law contributed seriously to provide security. Both Dost Muhammad and Abdul Rahman took British financial aid to maintain their rules in spite of the Anglo-Afghan wars. During the Musahiban dynasty, Nadir Shah, Zahir Shah and Daud benefited from the US financial aid but towards the 1970s, the rentier state economy shifted to the Soviets because of rivaling Pakistan's close relations to the USA under the Baghdad Pact. Both in the Daud Khan's era and communist Khalqi and Parcham eras, the Soviet external aid flew to Afghanistan. Between the years of 1956 to 1978, the Soviet Union donated 1.26 billion-dollar-economic aid and 1.25 billion-dollar-military aid to the Afghanistan. On the other side, the US external aid remained limited to 533 million

⁵⁴³ Rasul Bux Rais, *op.cit.*, pp. 68 and 70 ; Citha D. Maass, *op.cit.*, pp. 71-72.

⁵⁴⁴ Citha D. Maass , *op.cit.*, pp. 71-75.

⁵⁴⁵ Rolf Schwarz, *War and state building in the Middle East*, (Gainesville : University Press of Florida, 2012).pp. 1, 6, 15.

dollars in total aid. According to Ahmed Rashid, Daud Khan created a rentier state because the 40% of the state revenues were coming from abroad.⁵⁴⁶ In the communist era, President Najibullah received 300 million dollars for a month from the Soviets to sustain the state.⁵⁴⁷ During the civil war period, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia with its Gulf partners became main financial suppliers for the Afghan mujahedeen groups but these attempts failed. Gulbeddin Hekmetyar and other warlords' attempts to provide the authority declined.⁵⁴⁸ No one could provide superiority to one another during the two-year civil war era. Not only Saudi-Pakistani alliance tried to donate for the mujahedeen's Islamic Republic regime in Afghanistan through their partner factions, but also Russia and Iran also tried to organize Shi'ite Hazara groups, the eight Hazara factions, and Tajik warlords Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masud for formation of a strong rule according to its own interests.⁵⁴⁹ But Iran's attempts were much weaker than the Saudis. In 1994, the rise of Taliban, supported by the Saudi finance and Pakistani military aid, opened a way of a new project of construction of rule, the Taliban. This was a new and successful formation of a new rule, especially with the Saudi capital in Afghanistan.⁵⁵⁰ Zalmay Khalilzad, the ex-ambassador of the USA to Kabul and Baghdad and the adviser for UNOCAL Oil Company's project in Afghanistan, claimed that the Taliban would be a state model like Saudi Arabia and would not be hostile to the US interests like Iran. He also defended the Taliban's form of Islam as the natural and regional merge of local Pashtun culture and values with Islam in order to make the movement a bit sympathetic to the world.⁵⁵¹ Actually, the Taliban was both away from modern

⁵⁴⁶ Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p. 13 ; Willemijn Verkoren and Bertine Kamphuis, State Building in a Rentier State: How Development Policies Fail to Promote Democracy in Afghanistan, *Development and Change* 44, no.3 (2013): 512 ; M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani , *op.cit.*, in note 46, pp. 717-718 ; Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, pp. 28-29.

⁵⁴⁷ Stephen Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 273.

⁵⁴⁸ Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p. 26.

⁵⁴⁹ Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, pp. 61 and 198-200 ; Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p. 253 ; Rasul Bux Rais, *op.cit.*, p.68; Stephen Tanner, *op.cit.*, p. 251 ; Brian Glyn Williams , *op.cit.*, p. 940.

⁵⁵⁰ Abdulkader Sinno, *op.cit.*, p. 60.

⁵⁵¹ Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, *op.cit.*, p.51; Zalmay Khalilzad, "Afghanistan: Time to Reengage," *Washington Post*, October 7, 1996.

interpretation of Islam unlike Mawdudi's Jamaat-e Islami, Muslim Brotherhood and Khomeini's revolutionary Islamic Republic model, and did not have any rhetoric or aims targeting the global system or the West.⁵⁵² It gave an image of more local and regional movement carrying political Salafi tones.

In the post-2001 era, the Northern Alliance, Hamid Karzai and then Ashraf Ghani led state building attempt with the third party support of the USA. But, it also seems not very successful when compared to the Taliban regime. The Taliban's success was based on its ability to cover basic components. The components are kinship, tribal networks, and strong personalized rule in Afghan political culture, Islamic and traditional values, jihad understanding for independence, and sovereignty of the country based on Pashtun dominant identity.⁵⁵³ Taliban respected these components when compared to other previous regimes in Afghanistan. For example, both the communist regime between 1978 and 1992 and the mujahedeen government between 1992 and 1994 failed to understand traditional values of Pashtun society, especially the tribal relations. Exceptionally, Nadir Shah and his son Zahir Shah never touched upon these tribal and clerical groups' relations except taxation in the Musahiban era.⁵⁵⁴ But, the radical reformists like Amanullah, Daud, Taraki, Amin and Karmal paid a big charge by encountering resistance when they attempted to change the tribal structure and intervene in the affairs of mullahs.

5.4. The Fall of the Taliban Regime

The Taliban Regime could not maintain its perception of threats under cooperation with the Saudis. In order to survive the regime, the Taliban elites had to act in realpolitik as the Saudis did in the early 1920s. Ibn Saud chose to agree with the British in the region and abandoned his zealot military forces, the Ikhwan raiders. In return, the British recognized the Saudi rule diplomatically. Mullah Omar firstly

⁵⁵² Neamatollah Nojumi, *op.cit.*, p.108.

⁵⁵³ M. Nazif Shahrani, "Taliban and Talibanism in Historical Perspective" in *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan*, ed. Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, Cambridge, (Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2008) , pp.160, and 176-177.

⁵⁵⁴ Rasul Bux Rais, *op.cit.*, p. 12; Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, pp. 181 and 191-192; M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani, *op.cit.*, in note 45, pp. 31-32.

determined on perception of threats compatible with the Saudis, Pakistanis and indirectly the US interests. However, in the later period, the Taliban regime preferred to ally with a terrorist organization, al Qaeda by giving shelter to their members. The Taliban opted for terrorist ideals instead of realpolitik and prepared its own end.

5.4.1. The Taliban and Diplomatic Representation

The most problematic field in which Taliban had difficulty was recognition in the international arena. It forced much to make itself be recognized by the international society but the recognitions remained so limited. But it is also not true that the world just saw the Taliban as a terrorist organization. After 1998, the US and the UN tried to persuade the Taliban not to host transnational jihadists within the country. In May 1997, Taliban was recognized by Pakistan first, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.⁵⁵⁵ Sayeed Salam Shahzad even claimed in his book “Inside the Taliban” that China would recognize the Taliban in a short time if the US did not intervene.⁵⁵⁶ In order to provide the full unity, sovereignty and most importantly representation in the country, the Taliban regime invited regime’s dissidents like Burhaneddin Rabbani and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf to take positions in a cabinet while the UN had been trying to bring the sides, the National Alliance and Taliban, together for reconciliation.⁵⁵⁷

The rapid rise of Taliban was observed silently by the USA. It seemed beneficial for the USA’s pipeline projects together with Saudi Arabia, isolation of Iran, and a new ally against Russia in southern border of Central Asia. According to Ahmad Rashid, the new relationship between Taliban and the USA could have been like the special relationship between Saudi Arabia and the USA: the relations of pipelines, ARAMCO, a ruler with no parliament, Shari’ah law, no democracy and

⁵⁵⁵ Abdulkader Sinno, *op.cit.*, p. 67 ; Rasul Bux Rais, *op.cit.*, p.46 ; Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, p. 58 ; Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p. 264.

⁵⁵⁶ Seyid Saleem Şahzad, “El Kaide ve Taliban’ın İçinde”*Bin Ladin ve 9/11’in Ötesinde*”, trans. Abdullah Tatlı, (Istanbul: Kuresel Kitap, 2014), p.22.

⁵⁵⁷ Robert D. Crews, *op.cit.*, p. 262.

human rights.⁵⁵⁸ When the Taliban entered Kabul in September 1996, the Taliban's Prime Minister Mullah Muhammad Rabbani and his Foreign Minister Mullah Muhammad Ghaus, who was in office until 1997, gave a warm welcome to Norbert Heinrich Holl, the head of the UN special peace mission. The Taliban officials demanded Afghanistan's seat from the UN in this meeting.⁵⁵⁹ International aid was very important for the Taliban regime's economy. It is the second largest revenue for the economy after agriculture, and citizens in Kabul depended on international aid for food. In addition, international NGOs created job opportunities for local people. Mullah Omar was aware of the importance of good relations with the UN and Western NGOs. Therefore, he banned the killing of foreign NGO staff in the country.⁵⁶⁰ In December 1997, the Taliban sent a diplomatic crew to Washington, New York, Texas in order to introduce itself to the US. Abdul Hakim Mujahed, the de facto representative of the Taliban to the UN and senior diplomat of the regime, defended the Taliban's policies in Washington and other US cities. He claimed that the Taliban allowed the human rights monitors to enter the country and report. It was impossible for human rights agencies to monitor in Afghanistan during the warlords' chaotic era before the Taliban. He also advocated the Taliban's suppressing policies on the freedom of women. He claimed that the women had been in a terrible situation before Taliban. The women had been chased out and killed because of their party or factional links. They were exposed to rapes by lawless warlords, drug lords and looters. The Taliban brought law and order for women, too. Mujahed also added why the Islamic Republic of Iran was not condemned as well as Afghanistan in spite of enforcing hijab to women as a state policy, and claimed that there was a double standard targeting Afghanistan. He also added in his conference in London that women's honor and its protection was an Afghan self-rule in Afghans' tradition. He tried to legitimize Taliban policies on women by claiming it was part of their culture.⁵⁶¹ Indeed, Mullah Omar's legacy and the reliance that the peoples of Afghanistan

⁵⁵⁸ Vikash Yadav, *op.cit.*, pp.137-138.

⁵⁵⁹ Robert D. Crews, *op.cit.*, pp. 248-249.

⁵⁶⁰ Gilles Dorronsoro, *op.cit.*, p. 282 ; Robert D. Crews, *op.cit.*, pp.248 and 254.

⁵⁶¹ Robert D. Crews, *op.cit.*, p. 251.

had for him were frequently issued in Taliban press. The burqa dressed women gathered and cheered up in Kandahar in front of his office to show their loyalty and support to their leader. It was claimed that the women delivered their golds, jewelries and money to the Taliban by forming lines in front of Omar's offices.⁵⁶²

The Taliban did not only interact with the UN organs but also with international companies. The oil companies like Bidas of Argentine, Unocal of the USA and Delta and Ningarcho of the Saudis met, bargained and agreed with the Taliban regarding their pipeline project to carry Turkmen gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan ports. The representatives of the companies visited Kabul and in return, the Taliban delegates visited Washington to discuss with Unocal and Buenos Aires to discuss with Bidas companies. The oil companies offered the Taliban to build their roads and restructure industries in return for pipeline projects. Turkmenistan Foreign Minister Sheikmuradov visited Kandahar to meet Mullah Omar in March 1999. Even, two states signed agreements to buy gas and electricity from Turkmenistan. The UN special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi met with Omar in Kandahar in the same year, too. Even, Iranian officials met with Taliban representatives in Dubai, the UAE in 1999. The UN Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and the Taliban officials met in Islamabad about the case of Osama bin Laden on 2 February 1999. On 27 September 1996, the US embassy in Islamabad sent staff to Kabul for negotiations about opening an embassy in Kabul and Taliban envoys' visit to Washington.⁵⁶³ Even, after the bombing the Buddhas of Bamyán that attracted too much reaction from the international society, the Taliban sent its special envoy Rahmatullah Hashemi to the US, Europe and the Middle East to visit university campuses and attend conferences to talk about the Taliban cause months before 9/11. Hashemi even attended the TV program of Charlie Rose in Los Angeles in the USA. He had a chance to interview with Charlie Rose and Barnett Rubin, an expert on Afghanistan, on the TV program. In this program, Hashemi claimed that they were not perfect but they managed to unify the country under a single government, finish opium

⁵⁶² Ibid, pp. 252-253.

⁵⁶³ Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, pp. 170-171 and 232-235 and 238-242 ; Robert D. Crews, *op.cit.*, p. 249.

cultivation, and disarm gunned groups and people. He added Afghanistan had been producing 79 percent of world's opium and the UN also spent three billion dollars in 1992 on disarming people but failed in that mission. He claimed that the Taliban regime managed to solve these problems, disarmed Afghan people, and cleaned landmines but the only thing they received in return was cruise missiles. He emphasized their willingness to negotiate instead of exposing to the US cruise missiles. When he was criticized for giving shelter to bin Laden, he claimed that the West made him hero. He stated that six thousand children in Pakistan was named Osama due to his fame in the Soviet war in Afghanistan, and added if there were enough evidence about his involvement in terrorism, they would try him.⁵⁶⁴ The same offer had come from the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan Mullah Abdul Salem Zayeef in his press conferences many times. He offered the West to present evidence related to bin Laden's terror acts and they would try him justly but these offers were not so credible for the US.⁵⁶⁵ In the TV program, Hashemi acknowledged the bombing of the Bamyán Buddhas. He defended their act by blaming the West for just caring about the statues and ignoring Afghan children who died of starvation and lack of medicine. According to Hashemi, the West just cared about statues but imposed economic sanctions that led many children to die. He claimed that they had a contract with Kazakhstan for the shipment of wheat and with Bangladesh for rice yet they could not receive these products because of the aerial embargo.⁵⁶⁶

Hashemi also gave a talk in the University of Southern California and talked about the women's situation in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime. He claimed that before the Taliban rule, Afghan women had not been able to choose their husbands. There had been also honor killings among Afghan women while women

⁵⁶⁴ Suleiman Gharanai, Taliban representative in an interview with Charlie Rose - Part 2/3. Youtube video 15:00. Posted [July 2011] ; Suleiman Gharanai, Taliban representative in an interview with Charlie Rose - Part 1/3. Youtube video 15:00. Posted [July 2011].

⁵⁶⁵ AP Archive. "Kabul willing to put bin Laden on trial - if US requests". Youtube video 5:23. Posted [July 2015]; AP Archive. "Ambassador says Kabul ready for talks over bin Laden". Youtube video 3:46. Posted [July 2015].

⁵⁶⁶ Suleiman Gharanai, Taliban representative in an interview with Charlie Rose - Part 2/3. Youtube video 15:00. Posted [July 2011] ; Suleiman Gharanai, Taliban representative in an interview with Charlie Rose - Part 3/3. Youtube video 15:00. Posted [July 2011] ; Robert D. Crews, *op.cit.*, p.253.

were exchanged as gifts between Afghan warlords in the mujahedeen era. He claimed that the Taliban abandoned all these traditions and customs and increased the status of women. He denied the exclusion of women from social life, education and employment. He argued that Afghan women could find jobs in the Taliban bureaucracy. There were female employees in the Ministries of Health, Social Affairs and Education, but not just in the Ministry of Defense. He claimed that the girls could get education in all faculties in major Afghan cities, and there were no restrictions as claimed in the Western media. In addition, he added that the number of female students in Kandahar was more than the male students in the Faculty of Medicine. He said the only thing they brought, as a new policy in education, was gender based segregated education. The education system was unified under the Taliban rule. Hashemi stated that he is confused about the US definition of terrorism and compared the case of Yasser Arafat with Bin Laden. According to him, while Arafat was transformed from being a terrorist to a hero, bin Laden was transformed from being a hero to a terrorist.⁵⁶⁷

The Taliban and Saudi Arabia opened *chargé d'affaires* reciprocally. Prime Minister Mullah Mohammad Rabbani visited King Fahd in Riyadh for demanding extra aid for their new state. They reciprocally praised to each other and promised to maintain cooperation. Taliban's *chargé d'affaires* was Maulana Shehabeddin who resided in Riyadh and the Saudi counterpart was Salman al Omari in Kabul. In addition, Taliban opened an embassy in Islamabad and the ambassador was Abdul Salam Zaeef.⁵⁷² Zaeef was known as the moderate clique within the Taliban alongside with the Prime Minister and the head of Kabul Shura Mullah Muhammad Rabbani and Foreign Minister Wakeel Ahmad Mutawakkil. There were moderate groups within the Taliban who wanted international recognition, adaptation to international rules and law, to cut the links with al-Qaeda and hand over bin Laden. The moderate group met with the US and UN envoys, were against the residence of bin Laden in Afghanistan, and supported the opening of schools for girls, regulation

⁵⁶⁷ Salafiarenenemyofislam. "Taliban Spokesman in University of Southern California". Youtube video 41:29. Posted [February 2011].

⁵⁷² Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, pp.201-202 ; Banafsheh Keynoush, *op.cit.*, p.147 ; AP Archive. "Briefing by Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan". Youtube video 0:44. Posted [July 2015].

of women's employment again. Especially, Mullah Rabbani led this moderate faction, but they encountered the rejection of Mullah Omar. According to Ahmed Rashid in his book "Taliban", a coup attempt occurred based in Jalalabad city in October 1998, and the coup was tried by the ex-officer of General Shahnawaz Tanai, the leader of Khalqi party and defence minister of Najib. It seemed that Mullah Rabbani had links with the uprising of Khalqi military officers within the Taliban in Jalalabad as Ahmad Rashid tried to interpret in his book. The Kabul and Jalalabad Shuras (Councils) favored moderate policies, cooperation with the UN and the US that provided international assistance and aid, and traders in these cities demanded more liberal policies for developing their trades.⁵⁷³ Even, there was an increasing conflict between Foreign Minister Mutawakkil and Osama bin Laden. Wakeel wanted to expel al-Qaeda jihadists, Osama and Zawahiri from Afghanistan and he lobbied for extraction of global jihadists. Bin Laden was strictly hostile to Mutawakkil that it was claimed that he pointed out the Taliban's Foreign Ministry as the second target of their jihad after the USA. However, Kandahar Supreme Shura and its head Mullah Omar refused "moderate" policies and forced the state to take wrong steps by conducting anti-Western and hawkish policies, especially by not delivering bin Laden.⁵⁷⁴

5.4.2. The Change in Perception of Threat: From the US-Saudi Side to al Qaeda

The Taliban elites' shelter for Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda caused problem. The Taliban was regarded as a good ally for Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the beginning. Through that way, the new Taliban regime had a potential to contact with the USA. The perception of threats were also common for the Saudis and the Taliban for a while. However, al Qaeda blurred the good relations between the Taliban and its allies, the Saudis and Pakistan. The Taliban's perception of threat changed and al

⁵⁷³ Neamatollah Najomi, *op.cit.*, p. 110 ; Ahmad Rashid, *op.cit.*, p. 103.

⁵⁷⁴ Ahmed Rashid, *op.cit.*, pp.103-104 ; Robert D. Crews, *op.cit.*, pp.238 and 267-268; Amin Tarzi, *op.cit.*, pp. 280-281; Fawaz A Gerges, *op.cit.*, in note 400, p.182.

Qaeda's enemies like the Saudis and the US became the Taliban's new enemies. Hosting a global jihadist terror organization caused the Taliban regime to fall down.

The Taliban regime had many chances to maintain its rule and to take official international recognition in the medium run. The Taliban's upper elite ruling class was divided in two as moderates and hawkish. However, Mullah Omar was an ex-mujahedeen, a student and a teacher of Deobandi madrasahs and his life passed with wars. Briefly, he was a generation of wars (the Soviet invasion and Afghan jihad years) and was away from diplomacy. His educational background in Deobandi madrasahs prevented him from understanding the international relations. In 1996, the Taliban fighters made their first fault by executing Najibullah brutally although he was under protection in the UN office in Kabul. It was a violation of the UN rules. Then, they killed Iranian diplomats after the capture of Mazar-e Sharif in 1998. They massacred Hazara Shi'ites and showed an image of medieval war machine. However, they had a real chance because the US officials saw them as anti-modern, not anti-Western. They could have had a Saudi model and a new "Quincy agreement" could have been made with this new movement, which was successful in centralization of power, provision of security and order in chaotic region.⁵⁷⁵ However, this probability failed with Taliban's hosting to bin Laden, the leader of the global jihad. Al-Qaeda attacked Nairobi and Dar al Salam embassies of the US in August 1998. The Saudis firstly wanted Mullah Omar to expel bin Laden from Afghanistan but Omar refused and insulted Prince Turki, the head of the Saudi intelligence and Salman al Omari, the consulate of Saudi Arabia in Kabul. In return, the Saudis immediately cut off their diplomatic ties.⁵⁷⁶ That shows that the Taliban's ruling elite was not aware of realpolitik and diplomacy. In 1999, the Taliban hosted hijackers of Air India Flight, who demanded the release of jailed Islamist fighters from India. They also hosted jihadist Chechens in Afghanistan in 2000 and declared their diplomatic recognition for Chechen separatists. By the influence of al-Qaeda, all jihadists worldwide including Uzbeks, Uighurs, Indonesians, Kashmiri Pakistanis, and Chechens found a

⁵⁷⁵ The Quincy Agreement was between Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abd al Aziz ibn Saud in 1945 in a US warship Quincy. The agreement guaranteed the Saudi monarchy's military protection in exchange for access to oil.

⁵⁷⁶ Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, pp. 265-266.

shelter in Afghanistan. The country turned into a house of global and regional jihad units. In 2001, the Taliban regime bombed and destroyed the Buddha statues in Bamyan, in some claims, with the advice of bin Laden.⁵⁷⁷ Bin Laden case caused the Taliban to isolate from the world and they could not prevent this situation. The US and the UN Security Council's sanctions, the resolution 1267 on 15 October 1999, and resolution 1333 on 19 December 2000, began enforcing the regime day by day. The resolutions imposed embargo for aid and food, closing down of the diplomatic offices, the ban on Ariana Airlines flights, freezing the financial assets of the state. These embargoes caused the regime to intertwine with global jihad more and more day-by-day. On 9 September 2001, the attacks on the US shook the world, and the Taliban was the main suspected as a host country to terrorist groups. Actually, the USA tried to persuade the Taliban until the last minute, 9/11. The US officials met with Taliban thirty times during Bill Clinton's era and three times during George W. Bush's era just before 9/11 to persuade the regime to expel bin Laden.⁵⁷⁸ In October 2001, the US and the UK air forces intervened in Afghanistan with the support of the Northern Alliance. The cities were taken back by the Northern Alliance one by one. It was claimed that bin Laden's fighters shot at escaping Taliban soldiers to stop them.⁵⁷⁹ Osama bin Laden, a Saudi billionaire, caused the decline of a regional Pashtun regime with his intervention in a third party country by bringing his own political problems related to the Saudi regime. In sum, the Taliban's interpretation of Shari'ah in an anti-modern way, regional jihadist understanding, harsh implementations of mixed law system of Islamic and Pashtunwali principles, internal colonialism over non-Pashtun minorities, person centric rule and suppressions on women in every field of the society were not serious problems for the USA. However, Osama bin Laden, who then turned into the number one enemy of the USA with his attacks on the US to force it to retract its support from Saudi Arabia to topple the regime, made the local state a center of global jihad. As it is understood from the long journey of Afghan Arabs' jihad practices, the only factor for jihad to

⁵⁷⁷ Thomas Jefferson Barfield, *op.cit.*, p. 266.

⁵⁷⁸ Vikash Yadav, *op.cit.*, p.139.

⁵⁷⁹ Stephen Tanner, *op.cit.*, pp.304-305.

go global was to target the USA. When they fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, they were not blamed for being global jihadists, instead, were praised as freedom fighters. Actually, the other reason why they were not seen as transnational terrorists during the Afghan jihad could be that they did not target Moscow or St. Petersburg. Under the philosophy of Abdullah Azzam, they just defended a Muslim territory within the frontiers to rescue it from an invasion of an infidel. But it was an indisputable fact that the USA was the only decision maker on who was a terrorist and who was a freedom fighter. Targeting the US made bin Laden the most dangerous terrorist and caused the Taliban regime to lose Afghanistan.

The last state supporting the Taliban was Pakistan. After 9/11, Pakistani state retracted its support and closed its embassy in Kabul.⁵⁸⁰ The only power next to the Taliban was Osama bin Laden and his terror group al Qaeda. The Saudis opened a way for the Taliban to involve in formation of a new rule in 1994 by supplying huge amount of external aid through financing together with Pakistan. In the end of the way, Osama bin Laden hijacked the project of a Pashtun state, a close ally to the Saudi regime in South Asia that would help to expand and influence Central Asia, full of rich resources. The Taliban regime was sacrificed for the internal oppositional and power strife within the Kingdom. Bin Laden spoiled the plans of the Saudis in Afghanistan and made them lose. The pipeline project owned by the Saudi Delta company was cancelled with the retreatment of US Unocal Company. The expansion plan of political Salafism through the preaching and publishing methods into Central Asia was blurred by bin Laden and Zawahiri's jihadism targeting global. Political Salafism would be recalled with terror acts based on al Qaeda in the whole Central Asia and the Middle East.

5.4.3. The Taliban Today and the Change in Perception of Threat Again

Today, the Taliban negotiated with the official Afghan government under the mediation of Qatar and the West. Taliban cut off its ties with al Qaeda. The Taliban's perception of threat changes one more time since the topple of the regime in 2001.

⁵⁸⁰ "Pakistan closes Taliban embassy", *CNN.com*, November 22, 2001.

Especially, during the Obama administration, the Taliban shifted from a terror supporter group to a negotiable group.

The Taliban continued to remain as a fact of Afghanistan after the US operation, the Bonn Process and the formation of the Karzai's interim government. It was impossible for the US forces and Karzai's forces to control each part of the country. The popular support among the Pashtun population for the Taliban continued. The terror attacks and resistance of the Taliban did not cease today. Hamid Karzai invited the Taliban members to run for the parliamentary elections and to participate in the rebuilding of the state. He declared amnesties for the moderate Taliban members. He invited Mullah Omar to run for elections together. Some important actors within the Taliban movement accepted Karzai's offer and chose the way of normalization. Former Foreign Minister Wakeel Ahmad Mutawakkil, the minister of education Maulawi Arsala Rahmani, the former Taliban representative to the UN Abdul Hakim Mujahed, the former Taliban commanders Abdul Salam Roketi, Abdul Wahid Baghrani, the former minister of the *Amr bil Maruf wa Nahy an al Munkar* (religious street police), who were responsible for stoning women in the middle of the streets due to adultery, and more Taliban members participated in elections in 2005. Many Taliban officials benefited from Karzai's amnesty and participated in bureaucratic functions.⁵⁸¹

Zabihullah Mujahid, the spokesman of the Taliban, sent an open letter to the US administration in 2017 in the name of the Taliban. Mujahid stated that the Islamic Emirate, the Taliban, is not just a terror group, rather, it is an orderly and well-grounded movement of the people and owned a rational and understandable agenda for its political cause. He added that the Taliban has a popular and countrywide support including all ethnic groups of Afghanistan. He also added that the Taliban rules over the fifty percent of the country and has influence over a further thirty percent.⁵⁸² In addition, The Taliban administration emphasized in their statement in

⁵⁸¹ Robert D. Crews, *op.cit.*, pp.239 and 268- 271.

⁵⁸² Zabihullah Mujahid (Spokesman of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan), "Open letter by Spokesman of Islamic Emirate to the American President Donald Trump", Al Emarah- Official Website of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, January 25, 2017.

their official site Al Emarah that their Islamic and national movement works for independence and establishment of an Islamic system. He claimed that their movement gets its strength from the masses in Afghanistan. Their aim is to end the occupation and provide national goals for the Afghan people.⁵⁸³

Even today, negotiations between the Taliban and the West have still carried on. After the deterioration of relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Qatar took the initiative to deal with the Taliban issue in Arab world.⁵⁸⁶ Some officials of the Taliban, after the US operation in October 2001 and the fall of the regime, gave signals of severing ties with the al Qaeda and Taliban would not tolerate al Qaeda again within Afghanistan if it managed to come to power again.⁵⁸⁷ The basic problem of the Taliban was that it could not sever ties and expel Arab jihadists from the country or suppress them somehow. The situation into which the Taliban fell was quite similar to the third Saudi emirate of ibn Saud in the 1920s. As the study points out in Chapter 3 in detail, ibn Saud had to launch a war, the Sabila war, against his close allies the Ikhwan raiders in order to prevent them from raiding the British controlled Iraq and Transjordan. Ibn Saud had to take the official international recognition for his country from the international society but the Ikhwan raiders harmed this policy with their cross-border campaigns.⁵⁸⁸ Mullah Omar could not be as shrewd and realist as ibn Saud. He had many chances to pursue the same tactic as ibn Saud had done. He could have suppressed, detained or ousted Salafi Arab jihadists, who deteriorated foreign policy of the Taliban regime. Then, he could have received his recognition from the US and the West as it had been taken from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. His signing agreements with the American oil companies could

⁵⁸³ "Statement of Islamic Emirate regarding non-interference in internal affairs of others", Al Emarah-Official Website of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, July 18, 2016.

⁵⁸⁶ Banafsheh Keynoush, *op.cit.*, p. 157.

⁵⁸⁷ Fawaz A. Gerges, *op.cit.*, in note 400, pp. 182-183.

⁵⁸⁸ H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 36, pp.343-350 ; H. St. J. B. (Harry St. John Bridger) Philby, *op.cit.*, in note 19, pp. 306-313.

have been a start for a new special relationship with the US as the one between the US and Saudi Arabia.⁵⁸⁹

In Qatar, a new round of the talks between the Taliban and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan started in July 2015. Two years before, in June 2013, the Taliban had opened its office in Doha, Qatar. Saudi Arabia and the UAE only recognized the Taliban regime when it captured Kabul in 1996, but Qatar did not. However, Qatar always had cordial relations with the Taliban during 1996-2001 period.⁵⁹⁰ Banafsheh Keynoush defined the situation as the Saudi transferring of the role of dealing with the Taliban to Qatar. In 2008, the first meeting happened between the Taliban representatives and the officials of the Islamic Republic in Mecca. In the period of 2012-2013, the mediating role was transferred to Qatar. Qatar has taken many responsibilities in the affairs of the Middle East in recent years. It is not only the mediation role for the Afghanistan question, but also its roles in the operation against Qaddafi of Libya in 2011, in the mediation among Palestinian factions, in the Darfur peace process in 2011, in enforcing the Arab League for sanctions on Assad regime.⁵⁹¹

In Doha, the Taliban had an office resembling a de facto embassy and appointed a representative as a chief negotiator. Some sources evaluated the post as political bureau chiefdom as it is commonly used for the bureaus of HAMAS. From 2013 to 2015, Sayyed Tayyib Agha, a close nominee of Mullah Omar, had served in Doha until 2015 by the time the declaration of Mullah Omar's death. Mullah Mansour, the new leader of the Taliban after the death of Mullah Omar, appointed another representative Sher Muhammad Abbas Stanekzai to the Doha office in 2015.⁵⁹² The High Peace Council of Afghanistan had an active mediating role in the

⁵⁸⁹ Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, *op.cit.*, p.51.

⁵⁹⁰ "Afghanistan peace talks held in Pakistan", *Aljazeera*, January 12, 2016; "How Qatar came to host the Taliban", *BBC News*, June 22, 2013; "Who are the Taliban?", *BBC News*, May 26, 2016.

⁵⁹¹ Banafsheh Keynoush, *op.cit.*, p. 157; "Source: Saudi hosts Afghan peace talks with Taliban reps", *CNN.com*, October 5, 2008; "Why Qatar, world's richest nation, is hosting Taliban talks", *CNN.com*, January 4, 2012; "How Qatar came to host the Taliban", *BBC News*, June 22, 2013.

⁵⁹² "Tensions in Taliban ranks as head of militant group's Qatar office resigns", *CNN.com*, August 5, 2015; "Taliban name new political chief in Qatar", *BBC News*, November 23, 2015.

process. Taliban is still a power in Afghanistan controlling 41 districts. According to Lucy Morgan Edwards, a former political adviser to the EU Special Representative in Kabul claimed that even today the US-backed-Kabul regime could not fulfill the power vacuum and provide jobs, security, justice, and welfare, especially in the Pashtun-dominated-southern regions in Afghanistan. Instead, Taliban established a parallel administration against the Kabul regime in the post-2001 period and created employment and justice for people. They even appointed shadow governors and judges in his controlled areas. The taxation of Taliban in a semiofficial way was maintained in its controlled regions even after the fall of the regime.⁵⁹³ Briefly, the night brings the rule of the Taliban, especially Pashtun regions in east and south while the day is with the US forces and central government. Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, the recently elected leader of the Taliban in 2016 just after the killing of Mullah Mansour with a US drone attack, stipulated the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan for reaching peace with the Kabul regime. The new leader gave tolerant messages for agreement with Kabul and emphasized nationalist solidarity among Pashtuns. He pointed out the resistant and jihadist past of the Afghans and blamed the current regime for pursuing the same way as the former collaborators who had allied with the British and Soviets, and invited them to the solidarity of the Afghan tribal culture.⁵⁹⁴

5.4.4. Conclusion: Political Salafism, the Taliban and Reawakening of Jihad Spirit

Political Salafism is one of the main driving forces in the rise of the Taliban movement. Although there are other forces such as Pashtun ethnic solidarity, tribal kinship and Pashtun's traditional jihad culture against the foreigners behind the power of the Taliban, the main deriving force can be regarded as political Salafism's effect. The first emergence of the Taliban happened in the madrasahs of political

⁵⁹³ Willemijn Verkoren and Bertine Kamphuis, *op.cit.*, pp. 512-513 ; Sarah Lister, "Changing the Rules? State-Building and Local Government in Afghanistan", *Journal of Development Studies* 45, No. 6, (2009): 983-986.

⁵⁹⁴ "Taliban leader says foreigners must quit Afghanistan for peace", Reuters, July 2, 2016.

Salafism' offshoots in Pakistan. The instruments of political Salafism, perception of threat, unification and mobilization were applied by the Taliban movement. The perception of threat was similarly made by the Taliban deriving from the methods of political Salafism. The production of perception of threat in the Taliban's rhetoric was similarly inherited from the same methods of medieval political Salafism and its Arabian version. Jihad understanding based on the norms of Salafi creed was similarly applied by the Taliban in terms of mobilization against the defined threats in Afghanistan. In addition, political Salafism's strong influence and its appliance to the Shari'ah strictly enabled the unification among the dispersed Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan. The unity among the tribes enabled the foundation of strong authority under the Taliban rule. The unification of social groups, especially Pashtun ethnic majority, provided the centralization of power, securitization of the state and society, provision of public works in a short time. In addition, another political Salafi actor, Saudi Arabia contributed to the Taliban's policy of constructing a strong authority. In sum, political Salafism emerged as a main power in the rise of the Taliban and in the reconstruction of the broken authority in the country.

Political Salafism also provided a large historical heritage for the Taliban's jihad in Afghanistan in terms of its resistance and expansion strategy. Political Salafis embedded in madrasah circles in India helped Muslims revolt against the British rule in the 19th century. This heritage was an achievement for the Taliban deriving its main beliefs and ideals from political Salafism. Jihad spirit was also common and successful for the Afghan rules during the 19th and early 20th centuries in terms of unifying the country against a common enemy. Although this spirit was awakened during the Soviet invasion by the mujahedeen factions, there was not a single authority directing the mujahedeen's jihad therefore the chaos ruled the country in the end. However, the Taliban movement reawakened the jihad spirit with the help of political Salafi norms under its single authority and became successful to firstly mobilize and then unify the country. Political Salafism contributed to the reawakening of the jihad spirit in a disciplined form on behalf of the Taliban. This reawakening of jihad spirit was another achievement for the Taliban movement.



CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This dissertation aimed to answer the research question “what role did political Salafism play in the formation of Saudi Arabia and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan”. Throughout the study, I analyzed how Salafism as a religious-political opinion became one of the basic tools that were influential in the formation of Saudi Arabia in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, followed by the Taliban regime by the end of the 20th century. I examined how political Salafism is an outcome, which was derived from the Salafi creed that is one of the most prominent faiths in Islam throughout Islamic history. I argued that political Salafism utilized three main instruments as ‘the perception of threats against internal and external factors’, ‘unification’, and ‘mobilization’, during the formation of the Saudi States and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

Chapter 1 (Introduction) introduced the main research question of this study along with my main argument. In this chapter, the study aimed to establish a theoretical framework and highlighted the main instruments deriving from political Salafism. With this goal in mind, in this chapter I introduced and discussed the instruments of mobilization, unification and perception of threat concepts in detail, as these are the major instruments that allowed political Salafism to result in the political formations in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. In the same chapter, I reviewed the existing literature to underline the contribution of my own work. There is indeed a growing literature on political Salafism and its role in the formation of Saudi Arabia. This literature is mainly related to the political history of Wahhabi expansion in Arabia. While the role of political Salafism in the formation of Saudi Arabia is analyzed in the literature, the same role is not examined for other cases. By studying the role of political Salafism in the formation of the Taliban in a comparative framework with that of Saudi Arabia, I aimed to establish how this dissertation

contributes to the literature by drawing a more general theoretical framework on political Salafism and political order. Finally in Chapter 1, I discussed my main methodology to conduct this research. Along with primary and secondary sources, I examined how my field work experience in Lebanon and Afghanistan contributed to the findings of this dissertation.

Chapter 2 analyzed the formation of Salafism as a creed in the Medieval Age in the Sunni Arab Abbasid dynasty. The chapter discussed how Salafism emerged and what its main arguments are. I analyzed Ahmad ibn Hanbal as the founder of Salafism as a creed and in order to define what Salafism aimed in its early years. Salafism developed with the teachings of Ahmad ibn Hanbal and his followers in the Abbasid era. The newly converted communities such as Iranians, Turks, Daylamites, and Berbers brought their former religious beliefs and cultures into Islam. Thus, Sunni scholars defended the traditional way of interpreting Islam by only practicing the literal meaning of the Qur'an and obeying the interpretations of *al Salaf al Salihin*, the companions of the Prophet.

In Chapter 2, I discussed how the Salafi creed underlined threats that were against its traditional path for interpreting Islam dominated by strong Arab influence and Arab language. For example, Iranians developed alternative paths to interpret the Qur'an and Islamic laws in their own perspective. They developed Mu'tazilah creed based on rationalism and reasoning. The two groups, Salafis and rationalist Mu'tazilah, had a conflict over the superiority of interpreting Islam. Sufism also emerged as another threat defined by the Salafi scholars. The late convert communities especially Iranians promoted Sufism in general to develop a different path to understand Islam. Sufism was believed to carry ancient Iranian religious rituals to Islamic belief by Salafi scholars, and was regarded as a threat to the "true" Islam in the Salafi perspective. For Salafi scholars, Arabic language is a necessity to learn Islam but Iranians alleged that Islam is a common civilization, not just belonged to Arabs. They also promoted Persian language against the superiority of Arabic in religion, cultural affairs and administration. The group of scholars promoting Persian language and ethnic harmony against the Sunni Arab superiority

was called as *Shu'ubiyyah*. For Salafi scholars, *Shu'ubiyyah* was an Iranian movement and was also regarded as a threat.

Chapter 2 discussed how the strife in religious and cultural issues spilled over to political affairs with the increasing tension between Sunni Abbasid rule and rival Shi'a faction. The Shi'ites were politically rivals to the Abbasids. Therefore, Salafi scholars supported the Sunni rule and struggled against the Shi'a's propaganda in the main cities of the Caliphate, Baghdad and Damascus. The rise of the Iranian faction within the Abbasid administration and the new Caliphs who were disturbed with the strong influence of the politicized Salafi scholars in administration alarmed Salafi scholars. New Caliphs like Ma'mun and Mu'tasim promoted Mu'tazilah creed against the Salafi tradition. This was the period where Salafism entered into a political strife against the other rival groups that were against the Sunni Arab rule.

This chapter also analyzed ibn Taymiyyah's role in the politicization of Salafism and his call for jihad against the redefined enemies for Sunni Islam and Sunni rule in a later period. In this period Iranians and their allies, Shi'ites were already established as a major threat. Later due to the Mongol invasion and the destruction of the last Sunni Arab Caliphate, Ibn Taymiyyah mobilized Sunni Arabs against the Mongols and their allies. Ibn Taymiyyah defined Shi'ites, Nusayris, Twelver Shi'ites and Ismailis as the allies of the Mongols. Mongols were defined as apostates who did not rule by Shari'ah according to the ibn Taymiyyah's fatwas. In Chapter 2, I examined how the intellectual heritage of Ahmad ibn Hanbal and ibn Taymiyyah formed the political Salafi tradition in Islamic history. This chapter introduced the development of Salafism and its transformation into a political movement from a historical perspective.

In Chapter 3, the study analyzed the rise of the early Saudi rule in Central Arabia with the help of political Salafism's mobilizing and unifying force. In Chapter 4, I examined the current Saudi state, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as the continuation of the early Saudi rule discussed in the previous chapter. Both chapters examined the rise of the Saudi rule on the basis of the three instruments of political Salafism; unification, mobilization and perception of threats. These chapters

examined how these three instruments of political Salafism involved in the formation of the Saudi authority in Arabia in a historical process.

Chapter 3 mainly focused on Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab and how he revived political Salafism deriving from the rhetoric and practices of medieval Salafi scholars. Ibn Abd al Wahhab's movement proposed perceptions of threats such as major non-Salafi religious groups of the period: Sufis, Shi'ites and the dispersed tribes who resisted embracing political Salafism. This period is the one when political Salafism in Arabia emerged as a result of an alliance between ibn Abd al Wahhab's ideas and Muhammad ibn Saud's rule in Dar'iyyah in the 18th century. The chapter discussed how the spirit of political Salafism, its strict rules and norms based on Shari'ah and *tawhid* unified the dispersed Bedouin tribes and autonomous towns in Arabia. Tax collection, securitization of communication, trade and transport enabled the single authority and the Saudi rule began controlling Central Arabia. Political Salafism also led to the mobilization of Bedouins via jihad against the redefined threats in the Peninsula. The Saudi rule began expanding in the Peninsula via jihad. Salafi jihad also expanded outside the Peninsula and alarmed the foreigners. Egyptian and Rashidi emirate's invasions toppled the Saudi rule but could not uproot political Salafism from Arabia. In brief in Chapter 3, I analyzed how political Salafism thanks to its three major instruments resulted in the emergence and survival of the three Saudi Emirates.

In Chapter 4, the study focused on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and based on a theoretical framework discussed the factors sustaining the Saudi Kingdom in the 20th century. In this chapter, I mainly discussed the birth and development of the Kingdom on the basis of the two instruments of political salafism: perception of threats and mobilization. The focus was made on the perceived internal and external threats against the Kingdom and how they allowed for policies providing the mobilization of the state to struggle against such threats. This chapter evolved around the main threat perceptions of the time in a historical framework such as Nasserism, Revolutionary Iran's expansion, the radical Shi'ite groups in the Gulf, the Ka'bah siege and Camp David Treaty. Finally, I discussed the mobilization efforts of the period in the framework of the Palestinian question, the collaboration with the

Muslim Brotherhood, Afghan jihad and the Saudi support for the Afghan jihad in the 1980s.

In Chapter 5, the study analyzed the process of the formation of Deobandism as a form of political Salafism. I examined political Salafism's expansion within the Indian Muslim community via piracy and maritime jihads in the 19th century as the historical background. The chapter argued how the Deobandi madrasahs influenced by political Salafism gave birth to the Taliban movement from a historical perspective. The Afghans, especially the Pashtuns, had two important tools for resisting foreign threats: jihad spirit and Pashtun ethnic solidarity (the unity among the Pashtun tribes). Thanks to such threats and the resulting mobilization, they forced the British forces to withdraw from Afghanistan three times in history. It was this jihad spirit that played a major role in the unification of tribes under the Afghan emir and kings for the defense of the country.

Chapter 5 also analyzed the Afghan mujahedeen and the rise of the Taliban movement according to the three instruments of political Salafism. In addition, the Chapter reviewed other additional factors in the formation of the Taliban rule such as the jihad tradition, Pashtun historical legacy, and Saudi and Pakistani roles along with political Salafism's role. The Chapter is divided into four sub-topics such as perception of threat, mobilization, unification and the fall of the Taliban regime. The perception of threats that were analyzed as follows: political Salafism's interpretation of threats, Shi'ites in Pakistan, the Communist Afghan regime, tribal and ethnic fragmentation, Iranian influence in the region. Mobilization was analyzed as the jihad tradition in Afghan politics, jihad against the British in the past as a Pashtun historical legacy, mujahedeen's Afghan jihad and the role of the Saudis and Pakistan in the rise of the Taliban. In the unification part, the unification of Pashtun social groups under the unifying Taliban regime with the help of political Salafism, the centralized rule of the Taliban and the Saudi and Pakistani involvement were discussed. In the last part, the fall of the Taliban regime along with Taliban's search for diplomatic recognition were examined. The Taliban's decision to protect Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda is defined as the changes in the perception of threat. While the Taliban had the same perception of threat with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the

beginning and cooperated with the two; it later changed its perception of threat and sided with al Qaeda. The change in perception of threat brought the US intervention. The chapter also reviewed the negotiations of the Taliban with the West in Qatar. The chapter discussed the change of perception of threat as the Taliban tries to put distance with al Qaeda in recent years.

This dissertation aimed to analyze the role of political Salafism in the formations of Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan under the Taliban regime in a comparative manner. Such a comparative framework allowed me to delineate the similarities and differences between the two cases while aiming to form a more general theoretical framework. I will first discuss the similarities between the two cases. I argued that while political Salafism emerged under the conditions of Arabia; Deobandism as a form of political Salafism in South Asia performed the same duty. Also *tawhid* understanding as the main instrument of political Salafism resulted in the unification of tribes and urbanites under a single authority in Arabia as well as in Afghanistan by uniting Pashtun tribes and other dispersed political factions.

Political Salafism produced threat perceptions in both Arabia and Afghanistan for the ruling groups. Sufis, Shi'ites, Iranians, non-Salafi bedouins were defined as threats by the ruling Saudi clan. The Saudi authority expanded by fighting against these threats in a historical process. On the other hand, for the political Salafis in India it was the Shi'ites, Hindus, Sufis and British in the 19th century who formed the main threats. This form of political Salafism later expanded to Afghan Pashtuns during the Soviet-Afghan war years. At that time non-Pashtun minorities, Shi'ite Hazaras, Iranians and the foreigners were listed as threats by Afghan political Salafis. In both cases it has been the non-Sunnis and foreigners who are always regarded as threats, because the authority that political Salafis try to construct is a Sunni one.

Political Salafism in both Arabia and Afghanistan developed a mobilization instrument for expanding their authorities after the unification of social groups under a single authority via *tawhid* understanding. Mobilization was produced by the jihad spirit. Jihad is defined as a holy command given by God for war against the foreigners and non-Salafi groups. In Central Arabia, Bedouin tribes were organized

and settled with the help of unifying *tawhid* concept and then were mobilized for war in the name of jihad to expand the Saudi authority. The same situation was also observed in Afghanistan during the Taliban rule. Pashtun groups and tribes were mobilized for expansion of the Taliban's rule against the collaborators and allies of the foreign powers in Afghanistan. In both cases, Sunnism was a common vanguard force and struggle against the Shi'a was a priority. There is a difference in two cases in terms of maintaining the authority of political Salafis in the long run. While the Saudis gained international recognition, the Taliban failed to get this recognition.

In both cases, political Salafism resulted in internal massacres and suppression over other ethnic and sectarian groups. Political Salafism is a sectarian ideology in that it regards members of other sects and ethnicities as enemies. Saudis massacred the Shi'ites and other *madhabs*' members in Arabia and Iraq during the 19th century. Even today the Saudi suppression of Shi'ite minority in Arabia continues. On the other hand, the Taliban involved in internal massacres and suppression over Hazaras, Uzbeks and Tajiks. Political Salafism uses sectarian and ethnic differences as a tool for protecting its authority.

In both cases, political Salafism served as an ideology for the Saudis and Taliban to construct political authority. The Western originated ideologies, as it is known, did not exist in the Arabian Peninsula and failed in modern Afghanistan during the 70s, 80s and early 90s. Hence, political Salafism played a strong role in serving as an ideology, a tool for expansion of authority and suppression of other social groups. The jihad understanding of political Salafism helped these dominant groups, the Saudis and Afghan Pashtuns to construct their authorities. In addition, these types of religious ideas and beliefs promoted unity and solidarity among social groups and communities. Political Salafism as an ideology served this purpose and unified the tribes in Arabia and Afghanistan.

There are also differences in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. In the rise of the Taliban, political Salafism and its instruments were not the only key factors as it was in the case of Saudi Arabia. There were other key factors in addition to political Salafism. Jihad tradition was a traditional and historical concept for the Afghan society. Afghan rulers declared jihad in the 19th and early 20th century;

however this form of jihad was not similar to political Salafism defined jihad understanding. In addition, the Afghan jihad during the 1980s declared by the mujahedeen factions was not very similar to political Salafis' jihad understanding either. The groups within mujahedeen factions were not all political Salafis. The mujahedeens' jihad formed a strong resistance but lacked a single authority over the dispersed mujahedeen factions. Political Salafism not only helped the Taliban to form a jihad understanding that led to expansion but also enabled them to unify social groups.

Another difference between the two cases is the dominant role of ethnicity in the Afghan case. The Taliban emerged via the strong solidarity of Pashtun groups and their support. Even, the former communist Pashtun officials gave their support to the Taliban. Pashtun identity was stronger than the Islamic brotherhood during the Afghan jihad as it was observed in the cooperation of Pashtun Ghilzai General Shahnawaz Tanai and Gulbeddin Hekmetyar against the Najibullah regime in 1990.⁵⁹⁵ At that point, political Salafism helped the unification of Pashtun ethnic groups under the single rule of the Taliban.

Finally, foreign contribution to the Taliban's rise can be considered as another difference unique to the Afghan case. Saudi Arabia gave financial and technical aid to the Taliban. The Saudis were also influential in expanding political Salafi ideas to the madrasahs in Pakistan where the Taliban emerged. On the other hand, Pashtun minority in northern Pakistan and tribal connections between south Afghanistan and northern Pakistan became effective in Pakistan's support to the Taliban. There are also realpolitik reasons and economic interests in the Saudi and Pakistani support to the Taliban. As Zalmay Khalilzad emphasized, the Taliban was seemingly a Saudi Arabia similar regime and might be a good ally of the USA in South Asia.⁵⁹⁶ The Taliban was not a modern regime but not anti-Western either at

⁵⁹⁵ Brian Glyn Williams, *op.cit.*, pp. 935-936

⁵⁹⁶ Zalmay Khalilzad, "Afghanistan: Time to Reengage" *Washington Post*, October 7, 1996.

the beginning. The Saudis gave strong support and diplomatic recognition to the Taliban regime during the 1990s until al Qaeda stirred their relations.⁵⁹⁷

This dissertation aimed to analyze the role of political Salafism in the formation of political constructs in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. The study argued that political Salafism is not only a creed but also a political idea by showing how political Salafism developed depending on political issues and conflicts. The accelerating political conflicts between Sunni Arabs and others contributed to the development of political Salafism. The main purpose of political Salafism was to preserve the Sunni rule over others. It was the Sunni Arabs who had first applied political Salafism but other Sunni Muslim nations also followed Arab Salafis to preserve their authority by adopting the instruments of political Salafism. Political Salafism developed around an anti-Iranian and anti-Shi'a understanding. Both Iran and Shi'ites are defined as foreign threats that try to overthrow the Sunni sovereignty. Arabs under the Saudi rule regarded the Shi'ites, Iranians and other foreigners as threats, and mobilized Sunni social groups via the mobilization tools provided by political Salafism to establish their authority and unity. Likewise, Sunni Pashtuns also used the instruments of political Salafism in their expansion and reconstruction of Pashtun Afghan authority in Afghanistan. Shi'ite groups like Hazaras and other ethnic minorities like Tajiks and Uzbeks were regarded as threats.

Political Salafism played an important role for the Sunni groups through the instruments of perception of threat, mobilization and unification as it was in the cases of the Saudis and the Taliban. However the maintenance of the authority requires an understanding of realpolitik and agreement with foreign powers at the same time. The First and Second Saudi emirates constructed their authorities by the unification of tribes through political Salafisms' strong *tawhid* emphasis and by the mobilization of tribes with jihad. However, they fell down each time because of the foreign interventions. The Third Saudi Emirate under ibn Saud followed the same path to construct its authority but also pursued diplomatic negotiations with foreigners to maintain its rule. The Third Saudi Emirate agreed with the British and ceased jihad raids outside its borders. The resisting Ikhwan raiders were destroyed by King ibn

⁵⁹⁷ "Who are the Taliban?", *BBC News*, 26 May 2016.

Saud. The Taliban regime applied the same methods of political Salafism to unite the social groups under a single authority and to expand its rule in Afghanistan in a short time; but Mullah Omar made the same mistake as the early Saudis did. He did not follow *realpolitik* and agree with the West or Saudi Arabia. His regime hosted a global terrorist organization, al Qaeda. He did not oust Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan. This situation caused his regime to fall down as a result of a military operation by the US.

Political Salafism provided political legitimization deriving its power from religious teachings, rules, principles and regulations and not from rational consent. The authority was installed upon the allegiance of different Arabian tribes in Saudi Arabia and Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan to political Salafism. The *tawhid* concept enforced the belief in the unity of God and unity of authority. Coercion was also used for the ones who did not embrace political Salafism.

This dissertation treated political Salafism as an ideology as it consists of a set of integrated ideas and beliefs. According to Marx, ideology is a tool for the ruling class. Political Salafism also acted as a tool of the ruling Saudi clan in Arabia and dominant Pashtun factions in Afghanistan. The basic discussion about political Salafi ideas is their religious characters but the study also emphasized that there is a grey area between religion and ideology. The religion can also reshape the society, make a radical change, stabilize and found an order within the society as what political Salafism did. In primitive societies, the religion had the same role as the ideology has in modern societies. Under the conditions of Arabia and Afghanistan, political Salafism found an opportunity to function like an ideology. It developed instruments to transform the traditional societies and stabilize the chaotic situations in these regions. Political Salafism took the support of the local people and fulfilled the political field by organizing people, building political institutions deriving from the religious laws and norms, constructing an authority.

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APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Öztürk, Selim
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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	BİLKENT International Relations	2012
BS	METU International Relations	2009
High School	Adnan Menderes Foreign Language High School, Manisa/Akhisar	2005

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2017- Present	Turkish Police Academy	Lecturer
2011-2017	Turks Abroad and Relative Communities	Asistant Expert, Expert

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Native Turkish, Advanced English, Intermediate Arabic and Intermediate Persian

ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENTS

1. PhD Research During Thesis Writing, Lebanon, September 2015 - May 2016, Granted by TÜBİTAK.
2. Chair in the Asia Panel, 14th METU Conference on International Relations, Area Studies and International Relations: Intersecting Dimensions, METU, Ankara, June 2015.
3. Siyasal İkna ve Seçim Müzikleri: Türkiye Üzerine Bir İnceleme, *İletişim ve Diplomasi Akademik Hakemli Dergi*, Issue No: 3, ISSN: 2147-6772, July 2014.
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B. TRKE ZET / TURKISH SUMMARY

SİYASAL SELEFİLİĞİN SUUDİ ARABİSTAN VE TALİBAN’IN OLUŞUMUNDAKİ ROLÜ

Çalışma Suudi Arabistan’ın ve Taliban’ın oluşumunda Selefilik’in rolünü incelemektedir. Selefilik bir inanç, tutum ve mezhep olarak Ortaçağ dönemine kadar uzanan uzun bir tarihsel sürece ve gelişime sahiptir. Selefilik bir inanç formu olduğu kadar bu uzun tarihsel süreçte siyasal bir forma da bürünmüş ve özellikle Sünni Arapların kendilerine göre tanımladıkları düşmanlarına ve rakiplerine karşı bir araç olarak da kullanılmıştır. Selefilik’in siyasallaşması ve politik bir forma bürünmesi Abbasi hanedanlığı döneminde ünlü mezhep imamlarından Ahmet bin Hanbel döneminde başlamış, Moğolların Abbasileri işgal ederek yıkması sürecinde zirveye tırmanmıştır. Özellikle bu süreç zarfında Sünni Arapların tanımladıkları tehdit algısı siyasal Selefilik’in oluşumunda önemli rol oynamıştır. Sünni Arapların tehdit algısı oluşumu siyasal Selefilik’i oluşturarak düşmanlarına karşı da savunma refleksi geliştirmelerine yardımcı olmuştur.

Siyasal Selefilik Abbasiler döneminde ve Abbasilerin yıkılmasından sonra tehdit algısı üzerinden geliştirdiği Sünnileri mobilize etme gücü ile dış ve iç tehditlere karşı cihat anlayışını geliştirmiştir. 18.yy’da ise Arap Yarımadasının Necid bölgesinde siyasal Selefilik’e sarılan Suud kabilesi siyasal Selefilik’in tehdit algısı ve mobilizasyon (cihat) gücünden yararlanarak Orta Arabistan’daki urban ve bedevi toplumlarda birlik tesis etme yoluna gitmiştir. Siyasal Selefilik bu süreçte Arap Yarımadasında Muhammed bin Abdülvehhab’ın öğretileri doğrultusunda tehdit algısı, mobilizasyon yani cihat metodu ve dağınık Arap kabilelerinin kuvvetli bir tevhit anlayışı ile birliğini sağlama yöntemleri ile otorite tesis etme ve merkezileşme sağlamıştır. Bu otorite ve merkezileşmenin tesisi tarihte Suudi emirlikleri diye bildiğimiz üç emirlik’in ve ardından da Suudi Arabistan Krallığının kuruluşunu sağlamıştır.⁶⁰⁴

Siyasal Selefilige başvuran Suudi kabilesi Arabistan'da dağınık kabileleri birleştirme üzerinden merkezileşme, güvenlik, ticaretin, ulaşımın, haberleşmenin ve ticaretin güvenliğinin sağlanması gibi merkezi bir devlet otoritesinin sağlayabileceği imkânları sağlamıştır. Böylece Suudiler, önce Orta Arabistan'da (Necid) ve daha sonra da diğer bölgelerde hâkimiyeti tek bir bayrak altında toplamışlardır. Yüzyıllardır birleşemeyen ve siyasi bir birlik sağlamaktan yoksun olan Arap Yarımadası bu şekilde siyasi birlikteliğe kavuşmuştur.

Siyasal Selefilğin Suudilerin Arabistan'da otorite tesis etmesinden yaklaşık yüz yıl sonra da Afgan cihadı koşullarında Pakistan'ın kuzeyindeki kamplarda ve medreselerde konuşlanmış Peştun mücahitler siyasi Selefilği benimsemişler ve Suudilerin de finansal ve lojistik yardımları ile Taliban hareketini kurmuşlardır. Siyasal Selefilğin Güney Asya versiyonu diyebileceğimiz Taliban oluşumu da Pakistan'ın kuzeyindeki medrese öğrencilerini silahlandırmış, dağınık mücahit gruplarının kendilerine katılımını sağlamış ve bir şekilde asırlardır bir araya gelemeyen Afgan –Peştun kabilelerini, güçlü tevhit ve cihat anlayışını Afganistan'da uyandırarak tek bir yönetim altında toplamışlardır.⁶⁰⁵

Siyasal Selefilğin oluşumunda rol oynadığı Suudi devletleri dış saldırılarla birkaç kez yıkılmışlar fakat Üçüncü Devlet, İngilizlerle yaptığı antlaşma sonucu devamlılığını uluslararası tanınmaya da sahip olarak sürdürmüştür. Ancak Taliban rejimi Afganistan'daki beş yıllık yönetimi sonucunda Batı ve ABD ile anlaşabilmeyi başaramamış, reelpolitiki takip edememiş ve el Kaide örgütüne sığınma sağladığı için uluslararası müdahalenin hedefi olmuştur. Bir bakıma çalışmanın çıktılarında Siyasal Selefilğin otoritenin oluşumuna katkıda bulunduğu kadar mevcut otoritenin uluslararası sitemle ne kadar iyi geçinebildiği de önem arz etmektedir.

Tezin amacı Siyasal Selefilğin farklı bir yönünü ortaya koymaktır. Günümüzde dünyanın gündeminde yer alan el Kaide, IŞİD, Boko Haram ve Nusra Cephesi gibi terör örgütlerinin Siyasal Selefilik kökenli olduğu bilinmektedir. Siyasal Selefilğin özellikle 11 Eylül 2001'den sonra uluslararası terör ile özdeşleştiği algısı bilinen bir gerçektir. Aynı zamanda Siyasal Selefilik tarihsel süreç içerisinde otorite oluşumunda rol oynayan düzen ve istikrar inşa ederek devletleşme sürecine katkıda bulunan bir etkiye de sahiptir. Çalışmanın kapsamında ortaya konan tehdit algısı,

cihat yolu ile mobilizasyon ve tevhit anlayışı altında siyasi birliği sağlama enstümanları ile Siyasal Selefilik Arap Yarımadasında Suudilerin ve Afganistan’da da Taliban rejiminin siyasi otoriteyi ve merkezileşmeyi sağlamasına katkıda bulunmuştur. Siyasal Selefilik, Batı normları ve kavramlarından farklı bir şekilde gelişmiş ve tamamen Doğu’ya ait bir dini ideoloji olarak Müslüman doğu toplumlarının siyasi otorite kurma süreçlerinde etkili olmuştur.

Çalışma genel olarak “ siyasal Selefilik Suudi Arabistan’ın ve Taliban rejiminin oluşumunda nasıl bir rol oynamıştır” sorusunu cevaplandırmaya çalışmaktadır. Çalışmanın ilk bölümünde tezin hangi çalışma sorusunu cevaplandığı, tezin amacı, bu konuda daha önceden yapılmış benzer çalışmalardan bahsedildiği literatür incelemesi kısmı ve metodolojisinden bahsedilmiştir. Bunların yanında Siyasal Selefilik’in üç enstrümanı olarak sınıflandırılan perception of threat (tehdit algısı), mobilizasyon (harekete geçirme) ve unifikasyon (birleştirme) kavramları üzerinde durularak Selefilik bağlamında bu üç kavram açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Tezin ikinci bölümünde bir inanç biçimi olarak Selefilik’in nasıl oluştuğu ve ardından nasıl siyasallaştığı incelenmiştir. Bu kısımda Orta Çağda Abbasiler döneminin önemli din âlimlerinden Ahmet bin Hanbel ve ibn-i Teymiyye’nin Selefi tutum ve Siyasal Selefilik’in oluşumuna verdikleri katkılar analiz edilmiş, özellikle de Siyasal Selefilik’in tehdit algısı oluşumunun nasıl geliştiği detaylı bir şekilde anlatılmıştır. Üçüncü bölümde ise 18. ve 19.yy’da Arap Yarımadasında doğan Muhammed bin Abdülvehhab’ın öğretileri doğrultusunda gelişen Siyasal Selefilik üzerinde durularak Birinci ve İkinci Suudi Emrliklerinin oluşumunda Siyasal Selefilik’in nasıl rol oynadığı üzerinde durulmuştur. Bu dönemde Siyasal Selefilik tehdit algılarının yanında mobilizasyonu da sağlamış, Selefi temelli cihat faaliyetleri ile Suudi egemenliği Arabistan’a yayılmış ve bunun yanında güçlü tevhit anlayışı aynı zamanda siyasi alanda da otoritenin birliğini tesis etmede rol oynayarak kabilelerin Suudi kabilesinin altında birleşmesini sağlamıştır. Dördüncü bölümde Üçüncü Suudi devleti olan Suudi Arabistan Krallığının gerek kuruluşunda gerekse hâkimiyetini devam ettirebilmesinde Siyasal Selefilik’in etkisi üzerinde durulmuştur. Bu dönemde özellikle Suudi Krallığına yönelik ortaya çıkan tehdit algıları birer birer analiz edilmiş ve Siyasal Selefilik’in bu tehditlerle mücadele konusunda Suudi Krallığını nasıl yönlendirici bir güç olduğu incelenmiştir. Suudi

Krallığı döneminde Siyasal Selefilik tehdit algısı ve bu tehditlere karşı oluşturulan mobilizasyon vasıtası ile Suudi Arabistan Krallığının devamını sağlamıştır.

Beşinci bölümde ise Afgan Cihadı ve cihada Suudilerin katkısı konuları ele alınarak Afganistan'daki mücahitler arası iç savaşın ardından Taliban'ın yükselişi incelenmiştir. Taliban hareketinin de Selefilğin Güney Asya versiyonu diyebileceğimiz dini Deobandilik hareketinin medreselerinden çıktığı vurgulanarak Afganistan üzerinde egemenlik kurmasında Siyasal Selefilğin enstrümanlarından yararlandığı vurgulanmıştır. Özellikle dağınık ve birbirleri ile güç mücadelesi halinde olan Peştun kabilelerinin birleştirilmesinde Taliban'ın Selefî temelli güçlü tevhit ve cihat anlayışına başvurması kısa sürede Peştun kabilelerinin Taliban otoritesi altında birleşmesine yardımcı olmuştur.

Altıncı bölüm ise sonuç bölümü olarak tasarlanmış olup çalışmadaki bölümler arasındaki bağlantılar kurulmaya çalışılmıştır. Selefilğin nasıl geliştiği ve ardından siyasal bir forma büründüğü kısaca özetlenmiştir. Suudi emirlikleri, Suudi Arabistan Krallığı ve Taliban'ın oluşumunda oynadığı rol üzerinde de özet niteliğinde kısaca durulmuştur. Sonuç bölümünde aynı zamanda tezin zayıf noktalarından da bahsedilmiştir. Örnek verilecek olursa Siyasal Selefilğin Suudi Arabistan'ın oluşumunda reel politik ile uyumlu olduğu sürece Suudi otoritesinin devamının mümkün olabildiği fakat Taliban'ın Batı ile reel politik anlamda iyi ilişkiler geliştirememesinden ötürü dış müdahaleye maruz kaldığı belirtilmiştir. Bir bakıma Siyasal Selefilğin kendi öz argümanlarının, otoritenin tesisi ve devamlılığı konusunda yeterli olmadığı vurgulanmıştır.

Selefî inanç Abbasiler döneminde yaşamış olan Ahmet bin Hanbel'in öğretileri doğrultusunda şekillenmeye başlamıştır. Ahmet bin Hanbel ve hocası İmam Şafi, İslam dininin öğrenilmesi ve Kuran'ın anlaşılması konusunda Arap dilini öğrenmenin önemine vurgu yapmışlardır. Aynı zamanda Ahmet bin Hanbel'in öğretilerinde İslam'ın daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi ve hayata uygulanabilmesi için sadece Selef-i Salihin'in yani kutsal ataların açıklamaları ve pratiklerinin örnek alınması gerektiği vurgulanmıştır. Bunların dışındaki çağdaş kelamcılar ve mantık yolu ile dinin ve Kuran'ın açıklanmasını savunan ulemayı reddetmişlerdir. Peygamber'in sözlü açıklamaları olan hadisler ve onları nakleden Selef-i Salihin dışındakilerin

görüşleri ve mantıksal açıklamaları bidat yani dinde yenilik olarak görülmüş ve reddedilmiştir. Özellikle inanç anlamında Selefilğin şekillenmesi Mutezile mezhebinin ortaya çıkışından sonra olmuştur. Mutezile özellikle İran kökenli din bilginlerinin açıklamaları doğrultusunda formülize edilmiş olup İslam'ın açıklanması ve anlaşılmasında mantık ve rasyonel düşüncenin kullanılmasını temel almıştır. Bin Hanbel'in takipçisi olan Selefiler özellikle Mutezile mezhebini bidat görerek formülize ettiği düşüncelere karşı çıkmışlardır. Mutezile, Selefiler açısından adeta bir tehdit algısı olarak görülmüştür. Buradaki tehdit algısı İslam'ın özüne yönelik bir tehdit olarak görülmüştür. Diğer yandan Sufilik akımının Abbasiler çağında yayıldığı görülmektedir. Tasavvuf düşüncesi ve Sufi ritüeller Selefiler tarafından eski İran dini olan Zerdüştlüğün kalıntıları ve etkileri olarak görülmüşlerdir. Bu tür düşünceler ve akımlar, Selefiler tarafından dine İranlıların sokmaya çalıştıkları bidatler olarak görülmüş ve tehdit algısı olarak kodlanmıştır. Diğer yandan Şuubiye akımı da Selefi inancın tehdit algısı sıralamasında yerini almıştır. Özellikle Abbasiler döneminde Arapçanın hâkimiyetine karşı İran kökenli âlimler, ulema, şair ve edebiyatla uğraşan entelektüeller tarafından geliştirilen Şuubiye hareketi, Sünni-Arap üstünlüğüne karşı mücadele vermekte ve İslam'ın İranlıların ve dine sonradan giren kavimlerin de ortak katkıda bulundukları bir medeniyet olduğunu iddia etmekteydi. Selefiler için Sünni devlet otoritesi oldukça önemliydi ve Sünni Arap hâkimiyeti sadece devlet otoritesinde değil aynı zamanda dini meselelerde ve kültürel alanda da hâkim olmalıydı. Selefiler bu yüzden Arap kültürüne karşı faaliyet güden Şuubiye hareketini de tehdit algısı olarak görmüşler ve buna karşı refleks geliştirmişlerdir.

Her ne kadar Selefilğin siyasallaşan bir hareket haline gelmesi ibn-i Teymiyye ile birlikte zirve noktasına ulaşmış olsa da siyasal forma ilk bürünmeler yine Abbasiler döneminde Ahmet bin Hanbel önderliğinde olmuştur. İlk gelişme Abbasilerin taht kavgaları sırasında yaşanmıştır. Siyasallaşan Selefi gelenek, Halife Harun Reşit'in oğulları arasında Halife Emin'in tarafını tutmuştur. Çünkü Halife Emin Abbasiler içerisinde Arap kliğinin temsilcisidir. Hem İmam Şafi hem de ibn-i Hanbel, dönemlerinde Halife Emin'e yakınlıkları ile bilinmektedirler. Halife Emin'in rakibi olan Memun ve Mutasım ise anneleri İranlı olup daha ziyade İran ve Horasan aristokrasisini temsil eder konumdadırlar. Halife adaylarından Memun ile Emin arasında yaşanan iç savaşta Siyasal Selefiler Arap kliğine yakınlığı ile bilinen

Emin'in tarafında olmuşlar ve onu desteklemişlerdir. Siyasal Selefler özellikle Halife Harun Reşit döneminde Bağdat ve Şam gibi önemli şehirlere yerleşmeleri ve yayılmaları sağlanarak bu şehirlerde baş gösterecek Şii ayaklanmalarına karşı önleyici güç olmuşları sağlanmıştır. Bağdat ve Şam şehirlerinde Siyasal Seleflerin etkisi 10.yy'a kadar sürmüştür. Fakat taht kavgasının Halife Memun ve kardeşi Mutasım tarafından kazanılması dengeleri Siyasal Seleflerin aleyhine değiştirmiştir. Halife Memun İran kökenli Mutezile mezhebini devletin resmi görüşü ilan etmiş kendisi de bu mezhebin liderliğini üstlenmiştir. Mutezile'nin en önemli iddialarından biri olan Kuran'ın yaratılmışlığı tezini diğer ulemaya da kabul ettirmeye çalışmıştır. Fakat Selefler Kuran'ın yaratılmış değil Allah katında olduğu yani hiçbir ayetinin yorumlanıp değiştirilemeyeceği anlayışını savunmaktaydılar. Yine Selefler din işlerinin Halife'nin değil ulemanın sorumluluğunda olduğunu savunurlarken Mutezile ise Halife'yi Allah'ın yeryüzündeki vekili olarak görmekteydi. İki ekol arasındaki bu tartışma daha sonraları şiddetli bir çekişmeye dönüşmüştür. Halife Memun, Mihne adı verilen engizisyon türü mahkemeler kurdurmuş ve buralarda Selefi âlimleri yargılamaya, Kuran'ın yaratılmışlığı tezini kabul ettirmeye çalışmıştır. Ahmet bin Hanbel günlerce bu Mihne mahkemelerinde yargılanmaya tabi tutulmuş ve işkence görmüştür. Mutezile mezhebinin Abbasi devletinin resmi ideolojisi olarak işlev görmesi Halife Mütevekkil dönemine kadar sürmüştür. Halife Memun, Mutasım ve Vathik Mutezile mezhebinin ateşli savunucu olan halifeler olmuşlardır.

İranlılar ile Araplar arasındaki çekişmeler pagan döneme yani cahiliye dönemine kadar dayanmaktadır. Hz. Ömer döneminde Araplar İran yani Sasani İmparatorluğu ile 636'da Kadisiye'de ve 641'de Nihavent'de yaptıkları büyük savaşlarla İranlılara galip gelmişler ve Sasanileri yıkmışlardır. Sasani Devletinin yıkılışı İranlılardaki Arap nefreti ve karşıtlığını daha artırmıştır. Emeviler ve Abbasiler döneminde İranlıların başını çektiği pek çok isyan vuku bulmuştur. Emevi hanedanı döneminde Araplar Sünnici ve etnikçi politikalarını hâkimiyetleri altındaki topraklarda yaşayan farklı kavimlere ağır bir şekilde uygulamaya başlamışlardır. Hatta Arap olmayan ve Müslümanlığa girmiş diğer kavimlere özellikle de İranlılara Mevali yani köle adıyla hitap edilmiştir. Mevaliler her alanda ayrımcı politikalara tabi tutulmuşlardır. İranlılar Ebu Müslim Horasani önderliğinde Emevilerin rakibi olan Abbasilerle gizli ittifaklar kurmuşlardır. Diğer bir rakip fraksiyon olan Şiiilerin

de yardımı ile Emevi hanedanına isyan hareketi başlatılarak Emeviler yıkılmıştır. Fakat Abbasiler iktidara geldikten sonra ilk işleri Ebu Müslim Horasani'yi devre dışı bırakmak olmuştur. Fakat Abbasi yönetimi ve bürokrasisinde güçlü konumda olan İranlılar, Horasan'daki İran aristokrasisinin de yardımı ile Harun Reşit'in oğulları arasındaki taht mücadelesinde anneleri Fars kökenli olan Halife Memun ve Mutasım kardeşleri desteklemişlerdir. Memun'un ağabeyi Emin'i öldürerek iktidara gelişi İran kliginin zaferi olarak yorumlanmıştır. Bu dönemde İran kökenli Mutezile mezhebi de Abbasi devletinde yayılmıştır. Bu gelişmeler güçleri ve etkileri gerileyen Selefilere kızdırmış ve onları daha da siyasallaşmaya itmiştir. Siyasal Selefiler, arkasında İranlıların olduğu her türden oluşuma şiddetle muhalefet etmişler ve bunların (İranlılar) İslam dinine kendi öz kültürlerini enjekte etmeye çalıştıklarını ifade etmişlerdir.

Şiiler politik bir fraksiyon olarak ortaya çıkmışlar ve hilafetin Ali'den çalınan bir hak olduğunu savunmuşlardır. Şii'nin anlamı yardımcı ve takipçi demektir. Hz. Ali ile Muaviye arasında yaşanan Sıffin harbi ve ardından Hz. Hüseyin'in öldürüldüğü Kerbela Olayı Şia'nın iyice siyasallaşmaya başlamasına neden olan olaylardır. Siyasal Selefilerin gözünde Şiiler daima devlet otoritesine ihanet eden ve devlet otoritesine karşı düşmanlarla işbirliği yapan bir unsur olarak görülmüştür. Özellikle Şia ile İran arasındaki bağın kurulmasında esir Sasani askerlerinin Sıffin Savaşında Hz. Ali için savaşmaları ve son Sasani İmparatoru Yazgerd'in kızının Hz. Hüseyin ile evli olması gösterilmektedir. Halife Mansur döneminde Basra ve Hicaz'da Şii isyanları çıkmış, Bağdat şehri inşa edilirken çıkan Şii isyanları yüzünden şehrin inşası yarım kalmıştır. Bağdat şehrinde sık sık çıkan isyanlardan ötürü şehirde ibn-i Hanbel'in takipçisi olan Siyasal Selefilerin Abbasiler eliyle şehre yayılmaları ve nüfuzlarını artırmaları desteklenmiştir. Fakat bu isyanlar son bulmamış ve Halife Memun döneminde de başkent geçici süreliğine Samarra kentine taşınmıştır.

Hariciler genellikle Selefilerle karıştırılmasından dolayı özellikle çalışmanın bir bölümünde bahsedilme gereği duyulmuştur. Hariciler sadece Kuran ayetlerini kaynak olarak kabul edip diğer Hadis veya Selefin anlatımlarını kabule yanaşmamaktadırlar. Bu grup Hz. Ali ile Muaviye arasındaki hakem olayı denilen

vakada ortaya çıkmış ve ardından hızla siyasal bir forma bürünmüştür. Hariciler, Seleflerin uygulama ve pratiklerini pagan adetleri olarak görmekteydiler. Özellikle Hz. Ali ile Muaviye arasındaki çekişmede ikisini de suçlu bulmuşlar ve üçüncü bir şahsın gerekirse bir zencinin halife seçilmesini savunmuşlardır. Bu önerileri Kureyş kabilesi tarafından şiddetle karşılık bulmuş ve Hariciler her dönemde kaçmak ve saklanarak yer altında örgütlenmek durumunda kalmışlardır. Siyasal Selefilğin önemli temsilcilerinden İbn-i Teymiyye, Haricileri Selef'e itaatsizlikle suçlamış ve Haricileri aralarında Selef'ten hiçbir kimse bulunmamasından dolayı haksız bulmuştur. Hariciler Hz. Ali ile Muaviye arasındaki hakem olayında hakemlik geleneğinin cahiliye adeti olduğunu savunmuşlar ve bu yüzden Selef'ten tepki görmüşlerdir. İbn-i Teymiyye, Selef'in uygulamaya değer gördüğü bir yöntemin Hariciler tarafından eleştirilmesini Selef-i Salihin'e saygısızlık olarak görmüştür. İbn-i Teymiyye'ye göre gelenek ve Sünnet öncelikli gelmelidir çünkü Sünnet anlayışı Sünni Arap otoritesini de temsil etmekte ve Arap kimliğinin de koruyuculuğunu yapmaktadır.

Siyasal Selefilğin yükselişi 13. yy'nın sonları ve 14.yy'ın başlarında yaşamış olan Hanbeli mezhebi kökenli din âlimi İbn-i Teymiyye'nin Moğol işgaline karşı başlattığı cihat hareketi ile olmuştur. İbn-i Teymiyye Moğolların Abbasi devletini 1258 yılında işgal edip yıktığı döneme tanıklık etmiştir. Abbasiler Kureyş kabilesinin temsilci olan son Sünni Arap hanedanı olarak Sünni İslam dünyası için ayrı bir önem taşımaktaydılar. Özellikle bu dönemde Sünni Araplar, Moğollara ve onlarla işbirliği yapan İranlı ve Şii unsurlara karşı nefret gütmeye başlamışlardır. Bu dönemde Sünni Araplar için tek işbirliği yapılabilecek güç Mısır'daki Sünni Memlûk devleti kalmıştır. İbn-i Teymiyye'nin cihat ilanı ve Sünni Arapları bu yolla Memlûk ordusunun saflarında mobilize etmesi Abbasilerin uzun zamandan beri içine düşmüş olduğu kaotik ortamla da ilgilidir. İbn-i Teymiyye'nin hareketi adeta patlama noktasına gelen Sünni Arap direnişinin de bir dışa vurumu olmuştur. Abbasilerin son dönemlerinde isyan eden İran kökenli yerel valiler hilafet topraklarında Abbasileri parçalayarak Tahiroğulları, Saffarogulları, Büveyhoğulları ve Samanoğulları devletlerini kurmuşlardır. Bu devletlerden bazıları kendilerini Sasanilerin mirasçısı ve devamı olarak adlandırmışlardır. Yine Şiiliğin İsmaili koluna ait gruplar isyan hareketlerinde bulunmuşlar; Fatimiler, Karmatiler ve Haşhaşinler Abbasi

topraklarında kendi otoritelerini kurmuşlardır. Özellikle İsmaili Şia hareketleri Abbasilerin zayıflamasında önemli rol oynamışlardır. Siyasal Selefilik bu tür hareketleri bidat ve hilafet otoritesine karşı başkaldırı olarak görmüşler ve mücadele etmişlerdir.

İbn-i Teymiyye Siyasal Selefilğin kendi çağındaki temsilcisi olarak Sünnilerin Moğol işgaliyle birlikte düşmüş oldukları kaotik ortamdan etkilenmiştir. Bu nedenle sosyal düzen ve devlet otoritesini vurgulamış, hilafeti dinin bir gerekliliği olmaktan ziyade siyasal bir gereklilik olduğunu vurgulamış, sosyal düzeni de kaos ve anarşinin oluşmaması için zorunlu görmüştür. Diğer bir ifade ile ibn-i Teymiyye, Abbasilerde olduğu gibi Sünnilerin hâkim olduğu bir devlet otoritesi istemiştir. O dönemde Moğol hanları Şiiliği benimsemişler ve gerek Şia gerekse Sufi akımlar yayılmaya başlayarak oldukça fazla güç kazanmışlardır. Şiiliğin etkisi Moğol otoritesinin yardımı ile Hicaz'a kadar ulaşmıştır. 1258 yılında Moğolların Bağdat'ı işgali ile birlikte ibn-i Teymiyye Memlûk devleti ile ittifak yapmış ve Moğollara ve onların işbirliği yaptığı unsurlara karşı cihat fetvası hazırlayarak Sünni halkı Moğollara karşı harekete geçirmeye çalışmıştır. Bizzat kendisi Memlûk ordusu saflarında Moğollara karşı savaşmıştır. Günümüzdeki Selefi cihat hareketlerine de yol gösterici olan ibn-i Teymiyye'nin cihat fetvaları özetle Moğolların Şariat kanunlarını değil Cengiz yasalarını uygulamalarından ötürü mürted ilan etmektedir. Bunun yanında Moğollar ile işbirliği yapan Şiileri, Nusayrileri, Sufileri ve Hristiyan unsurları da tekfir ederek bunlara karşı cihat ilan etmektedir. İbn-i Teymiyye'nin bu cihat fetvaları mobilizasyonu sağlamış ve Şam yöresinde yerel Sünni halkın Memlûklerin yanında savaşmalarına yardımcı olmuştur. İbn-i Teymiyye'nin Selef anlayışına ve kuvvetli tevhit esasına dayanarak hazırladığı bu fetva ve cihat hareketi sonraki yüzyıllarda Arabistan'da Muhammed bin Abdülvehhab tarafından da uygulanacaktır.

Siyasal Selefilğin Arap Yarımadasında ortaya çıkışı bölgenin içinde bulunduğu sosyal, siyasi ve ekonomik şartlarla yakın ilişkilidir. Körfez'de Avrupalı emperyal güçlerin güç mücadelesi Arap Yarımadasının iç kısımlarını özellikle Necid bölgesini yakından etkilemekteydi. Portekiz, İngiltere ve Hollanda gibi Batılı güçlerin Körfez ticareti üzerinde mücadeleleri, Arabistan'ın doğu bölgesi olan

Hasa'dan Orta Arabistan'a yapılan ticareti etkilemekte ve Necid bölgesinin ekonomik anlamda ciddi zorluklar yaşamasına neden olmaktaydı. Körfez'deki bu kuşatmanın yarılması için de Arabistan'da siyasi bir otoritenin kurularak kendi başlarına etkili olamayan dağınık kabileleri birleştirmesi ve bir savunma gücü oluşturması gerekiyordu. Sadece Batılı güçler değil aynı zamanda İran da Arabistan'ın doğusunu ve Umman'ı işgal etmiş ve bu bölgedeki Arap kabileleri ve korsanları ile mücadele halindeydi. Bunların yanında 18.yy'da bazı Arap kabileleri Şiileşmeye başlamışlardı. Bu türden gelişmeler Arap Yarımadasındaki Sünni kabileleri tehdit eden bir gelişmeydi. Tam bu esnada Muhammed bin Abdülvehhab bölgede Siyasal Selefiligi tekrardan formülize ederek öğretilerinin yayılması için Suudi kabilesinden destek almayı başarmıştır. Muhammed bin Abdülvehhab, Ahmed bin Hanbel ve ibn-i Teymiyye'nin görüşlerinden ve öğretilerinden etkilenecek kendi hareketini geliştirmiştir. Zaten Hanbeli mezhebinin benimsemiş olan Necid halkı bin Abdülvehhab'ın görüşlerini benimsemeye zorlanmamışlardır. Bin Abdülvehhab güçlü bir tevhit inancı, bidatlarla şiddetli mücadele ve Emr bi'l Maruf ve Nehy an el Munker yani iyilikleri emretme ve kötülüklerden sakındırma prensibi çerçevesinde cihat hareketini savunmuştur.

Bin Abdülvehhab'ın formülasyonunda da tehdit algısı önemli ölçüde yer oluşturmaktadır. 1744 yılında bin Abdülvehhab, Suudi emiri Muhammed bin Suud ile karşılıklı anlaşma yapmış ve Suudi Emiri, bin Abdülvehhab'ın Siyasal Selefi görüşlerini yaymak için gayret göstereceğine söz vermiştir. Bu anlaşma hala daha yürürlükte ve Suudi Arabistan Krallığının temellerini teşkil etmektedir. Arından bin Abdülvehhab'ın güçlü tevhit ilkesi ve cihat adı altındaki savaşlarla, diğer kabileler de Siyasal Selefiligi benimsemeye başlamışlardır. Birinci Suudi Emirliği bu şekilde kurulmuş ve genişlemeye başlamıştır. Ardından Hicaz, Osmanlı'dan ele geçirilmiştir. Siyasal Selefilik burada farklı mezheplerden olan Şafilik ve Hanefilik mensuplarını baskı altına almıştır. Şefaath kavramı yasaklanmış ve tekfir yöntemi uygulanmıştır. Necef ve Kerbela gibi Şii için kutsal şehirlere cihat akınları düzenlenmiştir. Bu akınlardan pek çok Şii zarar görmüştür. Diğer yandan Suudilerin etkisi ile Selefileşen Körfez'deki korsanlar da İranlılara saldırılar düzenlemişler hatta Bahreyn İranlılardan alınmıştır. İranlıların yanında İngilizlerin Doğu Hindistan Şirketi de Siyasal Selefiliklerin hedefi olmuştur. Şirketin gemilerine Selefi korsanlarca

saldırıları düzenlenmiştir. Umman, bu korsanlar tarafından kuşatılmıştır. Korsanların akınları Hindistan, Yemen ve Doğu Afrika sahillerine kadar uzanmıştır.

Arabistan'daki Siyasal Selefilik hareketi kurguladığı güçlü tevhit inancı yoluyla Sufi akımların savunduğu şefaatçilik anlayışı ile mücadele ederken diğer yandan da otoritenin birliğini de savunmuştur. Bir anlamda Tanrı'nın birliği anlayışı yönetimin de birliği anlamına gelmiş ve Suudi otoritesi diğer kabileleri kontrol eden bir güç haline gelmiştir. Bunu da Siyasal Selefilik'in normları ve ilkeleri ile yapmıştır. Otoritenin birliği bir süre sonra merkezileşmeyi ve urbanizasyonu da getirmiştir. Devlet otoritesi kuruldukça Arabistan'da güvenlik, ticaretin, ulaşımın ve haberleşmenin güvenliği, vergi toplanması gibi pek çok düzen getirici uygulamada işlemeye başlamıştır. Üçüncü Suudi Emirliği döneminde ibn-i Suud İhvan adı verilen askeri gücü oluşturmak için hicar adı verilen koloniler kurmuş ve buralara yerleştirdiği bedevi kabilelerini tarım ile uğraştırmıştır. Bu şekilde çöldeki bedevi kabileler yerleşik düzene geçmeye ve Suudilerin askeri gücünü de karşılamaya başlamışlardır. Bedevilerin başıboş yaşam biçimi bu şekilde Şeriat ile değiştirilmeye başlamıştır. Bu da bir süre sonra birleşmeyi (unification) sağlamıştır. Birleşmeden de merkezi otorite doğmuştur. Özetle ifade etmek gerekirse Siyasal Selefilik tehdit algılarını tanımlamış ve bu tehdit algıları üzerinden mobilize etmiş olduğu dağınık Arap kabilelerini bir araya toplayarak tehditlere karşı cihat adı altında harekete geçirmiştir. Bu şekilde Suudi hâkimiyeti Arap Yarımadasına yayılmaya başlamıştır. Cihat faaliyetleri ile Suudi hâkimiyeti yayılırken Siyasal Selefilik'in diğer bir enstrümanı olan güçlü tevhit anlayışı ile de dağınık kabileler ve otonom şehirler tek bir yönetim altında birleştirilerek otoritenin birliği sağlanmıştır. Siyasal Selefilik böylece Suudi devletinin temellerini atmada etkin rol oynamıştır.

Siyasal Selefilik sadece Birinci ve İkinci Suudi Emirliklerinin kuruluşunda değil aynı zamanda Üçüncü emirliğin de devamı olan Suudi Arabistan Krallığının varlığını sürdürmesinde de önemli bir role sahip olmuştur. Dış ve iç tehdit algılarının karşılanması ve bunlara yönelik karşı -siyaset belirlenmesinde Siyasal Selefilik önemli role sahip olmuştur. Suudi Arabistan Krallığını 1932 yılında ilan edildikten sonra ilk en büyük tehdit, 1950 ve 1960'lı yıllarda tüm Arap dünyasına yayılan ve etkisi altına alan seküler Arap milliyetçiliğinden gelmiştir. Cemal Abdül Nasır'ın ve

Baas ideolojilerinin Arap milliyetçiliği rüzgârları, Suudi Arabistan'ı da etkilemeye başlamıştır. 1950'li ve 1960'lı yıllarda Suudi ordusu içerisinde Mısır'da eğitim almış subaylar, gizli Nasırcı örgütlenmeler kurarak Suudi Arabistan'da darbe teşebbüslerinde bulunmuşlardır. Suudi Arabistan'ın içine düştüğü zor durum Kral Suud'un tahttan kardeşi Faysal lehine çekilmesi durumunu doğurmuştur. Kral Faysal, Nasirizm ve Baasçılığı Marksizm ve sosyalizmin Arap dünyasına sızıışı olarak algılamış ve bunlarla mücadele edilmesi gerektiğini savunmuştur. 1967 Savaşında sosyalist-milliyetçi rejimlerin (Suriye ve Mısır) İsrail'e karşı kaybetmiş olmaları bölgede güç boşluğunu doğurmuştur. Suudi Kralı Faysal bu boşluğu doldurmak adına artan petrol gelirleri ile pek çok teşkilat ve uluslararası kurum kurma yoluna gitmiştir. Nasır'ın domine ettiği Arap Ligi'ne karşı İslam Konferansı Örgütü, İslam Kalkınma Bankası, Dünya Müslüman Ligi (Rabıta) gibi kuruluşlar kurularak Siyasal Selefilik İslam dünyasında fonlanmaya başlanmıştır. Siyasal Selefilik, milliyetçi Arap akımlarına karşı Suudi sermayesi tarafından desteklenmiş ve yayılmasının önü açılmıştır. Nasır'ın ölümünden sonra da Kral Faysal yeni devlet başkanı Enver Sedat ile iyi ilişkiler geliştirerek Mısır'ı finansal açıdan desteklemiş ve kendi tarafına çekmiştir. Fakat Siyasal Selefilik tek tehdidini Arap milliyetçi akımlarından değil 1979 yılında meydana gelen İran İslam Devriminden de görmüştür. Bu tehdit daha ciddi biçimde Suudi Arabistan'ı etkilemiş özellikle Suudi Arabistan'ın doğu eyaletinde (al Hasa) yaşayan Şii azınlığın İran Devriminin etkisinde kalarak ayaklanma faaliyetlerine girişmesine neden olmuştur. Körfez'deki Şii azınlık sadece Suudi Arabistan'ı değil diğer Körfez emirliklerini de tehdit eder bir hal almıştır. Şiiler yönünü Ayetullah Humeyni'nin yeni rejimine çevirmişler ve devrimin ihracına destek vermeye başlamışlardır. Siyasal Selefilik tarihsel oluşumundan beridir tehdit unsuru olarak gördüğü İran ve Şia'nın ideolojik anlamda ortak saldırısı altında kalmıştır. 1980 yılında Saddam Hüseyin, Suudi ve Körfez devletleri tarafından İran'a karşı desteklenmiştir. 1981 yılında Körfez'deki Arap ülkeleri Körfez İşbirliği Konseyini kurmuşlardır. Bu dönemde Suudiler ve İran diğer bir ifadeyle Siyasal Selefilik ve Devrimci Şia, Ortadoğu'da seküler milliyetçi rejimlerin çökmesi ile doğan güç boşluğunu doldurabilmek için mücadele içine girmişlerdir. İran'ın yanında diğer bir tehdit unsuru da Körfez'deki Şiilerin devrimin etkisi ile kurdukları Hizbullah hücreleri ve yine hücreleri aktive olan Dava (Davet) Partisidir. Özellikle

İran-Irak Savaşı sırasında bu tür radikal Şii örgütler özellikle Irak'ın finansal açıdan destekçisi olan Kuveyt'e saldırılar düzenlemişlerdir.

Ayetullah Humeyni İslam Devrimini sadece Körfez ülkelerine ihraç etmeye çalışmamış aynı zamanda Filistin meselesine de dâhil olmaya çalışmıştır. Bu şekilde hem Arap dünyasının hem de İslam dünyasının en önemli meselelerinden birinde söz sahibi olmaya çalışmıştır.

Filistin meselesi 1970'lere kadar Mısır başta olmak üzere Baas rejimlerinin de etkin olduğu diğer Arap ülkeleri tarafından sahiplenilirken 1973 Arap-İsrail Savaşında Kral Faysal'ın ABD'nin İsrail'e silah yardımını durdurumaması sonucunda Batı ülkelerine petrol ambargosu uygulaması ile bir nevi el değiştirmiştir. Suudiler Filistin sorunu için petrol ihracını kesme ve petrol fiyatlarını yükseltme silahını kullanarak (OPEC Krizi, 1973) Arap dünyasında liderliği Mısır'ın elinden almışlardır. Kral Faysal, Filistin meselesini sadece Arap dünyasının değil tüm İslam âleminin bir sorunu haline getirmek amacıyla kurdurduğu uluslararası teşkilatlarla Suudi Arabistan lehine tekrardan şekillendirmekte ve Siyasal Selefiligi de buna göre mobilize etmektedir.

Özellikle Nasır döneminde Mısır'daki rejimden kaçarak Suudi Arabistan'a sığınan Müslüman Kardeşler üyeleri Siyasal Selefilik ile ittifak içerisine girmişler ve Nasır'a karşı Kral Faysal'ın yanında olmuşlardır. Siyasal Selefilik Müslüman Kardeşleri de mobilize ederek Müslüman Kardeşlerle temas halinde olan Asya ve Afrika'daki dini gruplara ulaşabilme ve onları da etkisi altına alabilmek için kullanmıştır. Siyasal Selefilik aynı zamanda Müslüman Kardeşlerin entelektüel retoriğinden ve literatüründen de yararlanmış, bunları basın ve yayın yolu ile İslam ülkelerine yaymıştır. Siyasal Selefilik ve Müslüman Kardeşlerin bu işbirliğinden Sahva (uyanış) hareketi doğmuş hatta bu hareket, Körfez Savaşı sırasında ABD askerlerinin Suudi Arabistan'a konuşlandırılması kararı karşısında Suudi rejimine muhalefet ederek tehdit durumuna da gelmiştir. Sahva hareketinin Üsame bin Ladin'i de desteklediği ve bu yüzden kovuşturma ve cezalandırmalara tabi tutulduğu söylenebilir.

1979 yılında Suudiler için önem teşkil eden diğer bir önemli olay ise Cüheyman el Utaybi adındaki Siyasal Selefî bir fanatiğin, bir grup muhalif ile

birlikte Kâbe'ye baskın düzenleme olayıdır. Bu olay Suudi otoritesini derinden sarsmıştır. Cüheyman ve ekibi Suudi rejimine muhalefet gösterisinde bulunmak amacıyla bu baskını yaptıklarını açıklamışlardır. Suudi hanedanının İslam'ın ilkelerinden uzaklaştığını, Batı ve ABD etkisi altına girdiğini, lükse ve şatafata aşırı derecede bulaştıklarını, petrolü ucuza ABD'ye sattıklarını içeren bir dizi eleştiri içeren manifesto yayınlamışlardır. Yine Cüheyman ve grubu Batı ile diplomatik ilişkilerin kesilmesi gerektiğini, Suudi hanedanının İslami bir rejim ile değişmesi gerektiğini, ABD'ye petrol ihracının durdurularak Müslüman olmayan yabancıların da ülkeden çıkartılmalarını talep etmişlerdir. İsyan güçlükle bastırılmış ve Suudi rejimi bu olayı Siyasal Selefilik içerisinde baş gösteren bir kırılma olarak algılamıştır. Ülkede Kral Faysal döneminden beridir devam eden aşırı modernleşme ve Batı etkisi, radikal Siyasal Selefi grupların bu tür bir başkaldırısını doğurmuştur. Modernleşme hamleleri durdurulmuş ve ülkede muhafazakâr politikalara ağırlık verilerek Siyasal Selefilik etki alanı ve dozu artırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Tam bu esnada 1979 yılında Sovyetler Birliği Afganistan'ı işgal etmiştir.

Afganistan'ın Sovyetler Birliği tarafından işgali ve bu işgale ülkedeki İslamcı mücahit grupları tarafından direniş ile cevap verilmesi Suudilere içerideki gerilimden kurtulmak için iyi bir fırsat sunmuştur. İslam Konferansı Örgütü 1980 yılında İslamabad'da düzenlediği oturumda Afgan Cihadına destek kararı almışlardır. Suudi üniversitelerinde dersler veren Dr. Abdullah Azzam önderliğinde Mektep el Hadamat adında bir vakıf oluşturularak Afganistan'daki mücahitlere yönelik yardım kampanyaları ülke çapında ve daha sonra diğer Müslüman ülkelerde başlatılmıştır.

Suudiler tarafından Afgan Cihadına verilen destek, Sovyetlerin yayılmacılığına karşı bir tepki olarak gelişmiştir. Sovyet yayılmacılığı Suudilere jeopolitik ve Siyasal Selefilik de Marksizmin yayılması bağlamında ideolojik anlamda tehdit teşkil etmekteydi. Siyasal Selefilik bunun önlemini almak bağlamında Afganistan'a müdahalede bulunma kararı almıştır. SSCB, Afganistan'ı işgal ederek ardından Pakistan'ın Belucistan eyaletini işgal etmeyi hedeflemekte ve bu şekilde Hint Okyanusuna da ulaşmayı planlamaktaydı. Bu durum Körfez Bölgesinin ve Arap petrolünün SSCB tarafından tehdit edilmesi anlamına geliyordu. Suudi ve Körfez petrolünün tehdit edilmesi aynı zamanda ABD'nin de çıkarlarının tehdidi anlamına

gelmekteydi. Bu durum karşısında ABD ve Suudiler, Afgan mücahitleri destekleme kararı almışlardır. Abdullah Azzam'ın Afganistan'a cihatçı taşıyan Mektep el Hadamat teşkilatı desteklenmiş, Suudi havayolu şirketleri Arap ülkelerinden ucuz biletlerle cihat gönüllüleri taşımıştır. 1982-1992 yılları arasında tahminen 35 bin Afgan Arap (Arap gönüllü savaşçılar) arasından 25 bininin Suudi olduğu iddia edilmektedir.⁶⁰⁶ Siyasal Selefilik Arap dünyasından cihat için mobilize ettiği binlerce gönüllüyü Afgan mücahitlere yardımcı olmaları amacı ile Afganistan'a taşımıştır. Suudi TV kanalları ve gazeteleri günlerce cihadın faziletlerini anlatan program ve yayınlar yaparak kitleleri Afgan cihadına teşvik etmişlerdir. Afgan Cihadına Suudilerin yardımı ve bu yolda Siyasal Selefilik kitleleri mobilize etme maksadıyla cihat ilanı birtakım politik amaçlar taşımaktaydı. Bunlardan biri SSCB'nin bölgede yayılışını önlemek ve Körfez'deki petrol bölgelerini korumaktır. SSCB sadece Afganistan üzerinden değil Güney Yemen ve Etiyopya gibi Suudi Arabistan'ı çevreleyen ülkelerde de ikili dostluk antlaşmaları ile nüfuzunu yayma politikaları izlemiştir. Diğer yandan Arap ülkelerindeki Baas rejimleri de (Örn. Suriye ve FKÖ) Sovyetlerle ittifak halindeydiler. SSCB'nin Ortadoğu'daki bu etkinliği Suudiler için tehdit arz etmekteydi. Afgan Cihadı, SSCB ile Siyasal Selefilik mücadelesinde uygun bir argümandı. Diğer yandan Suudilerle Devrimci İran arasında hem Körfez'de hem de Arap dünyasında mücadele baş göstermişti. Suudiler İslam dünyası nazarında İran'a karşı prestij kazanabilmek için Afgan Cihadına destek olmuşlardır. Aynı zamanda iç savaşın başladığı Afganistan'da İran'ın da kendi müttefik mücahit grupları ile etkinlik kazanmasının önüne geçmeye çalışmışlardır. Suudiler hem Irak'a İran ile savaşında destek vererek İran'ın önünü kesmeye çalışmış hem de Afganistan'da ve Pakistan'da etkinlik kazanarak İran'ı durdurmaya çalışmıştır. Diğer taraftan Suudi iç siyasetinde Cüheyman'ın baskın olayı ile başlayan iç gerilim ve Suudi rejiminin zora düşmesinin, Afganistan'a alınan destek kararı ile aşılması hedeflenmiştir.

Siyasal Selefilik Güney Asya versiyonu Deobandi Tarikatı olarak bilinmektedir. Deobandiliğin yanında ehl-i Hadis ve Tebliğ gibi tarikatlar da Güney Asya koşullarında Siyasal Selefî olarak tanımlanabilir. Bu oluşumlar Hint alt kıtasında medrese sistemi ve ağları üzerinden örgütlenmişlerdir. Siyasal Selefilik 19.yy'da Deobandilere nüfuz ederek onları etkilemiş ve Selefî tonları bu tarikat ve

cemaatlere aşılamıştır. Deobandiler de diğer Siyasal Selefilere gibi Sufilik, Hinduizm ve Şiilik karşıtı olarak tehdit algılarını belirlemişlerdir. Retoriklerini İbn-i Teymiyye'den almışlardır. Güney Asya'daki bu Siyasal Selefî gruplar, hatta 1857 yılında İngiltere'ye karşı da ayaklanma başlatmışlardır. Bir anlamda Siyasal Selefîlik cihatçı yönünü Güney Asya'da da göstermiştir. 1940'lı yıllarda Pakistan'ın Hindistan'dan ayrılması olayında Siyasal Selefilere ayrılmamaktan yana tutum sergilemişlerdir. Pakistan'da kurdukları Cemiyeti Ulema-i Pakistan partisi ile Şii ve Sufi karşıtlığı politikalar gütmüşlerdir. Pakistan'da Sünni generallerin Zia ül Hak önderliğinde darbe girişiminde bulunmaları ile ülkedeki İslami grup ve partiler daha etkin hale gelmişlerdir. General Zia ül Hak, Şii kökenli başbakan Zülfikar Ali Butto'yu devirerek iktidara gelmiş ve Sünnici politikalar izlemeye başlamıştır. 1979 yılında İran Devrimi ile birlikte Humeyni'nin Pakistan'daki Şiiler üzerindeki mobilizasyon gücü Pakistan'daki Sünni askeri rejimi ürkütmüş ve önlemler almaya itmiştir. Aynı yıl SSCB'nin de Afganistan'ı işgal etmesi Pakistan'ı Suudilerle işbirliğine itmiştir. Pakistan'da etkinlik kazanan Cemaat-i İslami Partisi (Mevdudi'nin partisi) Müslüman Kardeşlerin Suudi Arabistan'da sürgünde yaşayan aktörleri ile yakın iletişim içerisindeydi. Bu bağlantılar Suudilerin hem Afganistan'daki mücahit gruplara hem de Pakistan'ın kuzeyinde medrese ağları ile örgütlenmiş Siyasal Selefîlere ulaşmalarında yardımcı olmuştur.

Deobandi, ehl-i Hadis ve Tebliğ gibi cemaat ve tarikatlar altında örgütlenen Siyasal Selefilere, Afgan mücahit grupların Afganistan'a istikrar ve siyasal birlik getirememelerinden sonra Suudiler ve Pakistan tarafından desteklenmiş ve bahse konu Deobandi medreselerinden Taliban Hareketi doğmuştur. Siyasal Selefîliğin bir ürünü olan Taliban 1990'lı yıllarda kısa sürede Afganistan'ı kontrolü altına alarak otorite kurmuştur.

Afganistan'da darbe ile iktidara gelen Komünist rejim (Halkçı Fraksiyon) tepeden inme seküler politikalar uygulamış ve bu da feodal halkı ve muhalif İslamcı grupların ayaklanmasına sebebiyet vermiştir. Komünist rejim hem mücahit gruplar hem de Suudiler için tehdit unsuru oluşturmuştur. Suudilerin desteği ile bölgeye gelen Arap gönüllüler Afgan mücahitlerin yanında SSCB güçlerine ve Kabil'deki Komünist rejime karşı savaşmışlardır.

Siyasal Selefiler (Taliban) için diğerk bir tehdit unsuru olan Afgan kabileleri arasındaki çekışmeler (Durani ve Gilzai kabileleri) güçlü bir Peştun otoritesinin kurulmasını hep engellemiştir. Afganistan’da otoritenin ve birleşmenin karşısına bahse konu kabileler arası mücadele bir tehdit algısı olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bunun yanında ülkedeki farklı etnik grupların (Tacik, Hazara, Özbek) Peştun hâkimiyetine karşı başkaldırı ve mücadeleleri de farklı bir tehdit algısı olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Afgan Cihadı sonrasında mücahit gruplar bu tehditleri algılamakta zorluk çekmişler ve iç savaşın içinde tıkanıp kalmışlardır. Siyasal Selefilğin ete kemiğe bürünmüş hali olan Taliban hareketi bu tehditleri algılayabilmiş ve mücadelesi sonucu otoritenin tesisini başarmıştır. Mücahitler dönemi Taliban’ın aksine kaos dönemini ortaya çıkarmıştır. Taliban için diğerk bir tehdit algısı ise İran’ın nüfuzunun bölgede yayılmasıdır. Devrimci İran, Şii kökenli Hazaralar aracılığı ile Afganistan’da etkin olmaya çalışmış, Hikmetyar ve Rabbani’ye lojistik destek sağlamıştır. Taliban’ın İran’a karşı bu tutumu Suudi desteğini de kazanmasını sağlamıştır. Suudi Arabistan finansal ve lojistik açıdan Taliban’a destek çıkmıştır.

Afganistan’da cihat geleneği Peştunların tarihsel bir mirası olarak Peştun tarihinde yer edinmiştir. 19.yy ve 20.yy başlarında üç kez Afgan kabileleri İngiltere’ye karşı savaşmak için (Anglo-Afgan Savaşları) birleşmişlerdir. Afgan emirlerinin (Dost Muhammed, Emir Abdurrahman ve Amanullah Han) ilan ettikleri cihatlar Afganistan’ın yabancı işgalden kurtulması için bütün Peştun boylarının tek çatı altında toplanarak mobilize olmalarını sağlamıştır. Aynı zamanda Hindistan’daki Siyasal Selefi grupların (Deobandi medreseleri) 19.yy’ın ikinci yarısında cihat yöntemini İngiltere’ye karşı kullandıklarını görürüz. Yine Siyasal Selefiler 1919 yılında Hilafet Hareketi adı altında İngiltere’ye ve Hindistan’daki İngiliz yönetimine karşı ayaklanmışlardır. Diğerk bir ifade ile Güney Asya’da cihat geleneği tarihsel olarak daima var ola gelmiştir. Bunun yeniden canlandırılması Siyasal Selefilğin bir ürünü olan Taliban tarafından 1990’lı yıllarda olmuştur.

Durani ve Gilzai kabileleri arasında Emir Abdurrahman döneminde büyük çekişme ve savaşlar yaşanmıştır. Emir Abdurrahman Durani kabilesine mensup olmasından ötürü Gilzailere karşı Durani üstünlüğünü sağlamaya çalışmıştır. Ardından Afgan tahtına oturan Amanullah, Nadir ve Zahir Şahlar da Durani

kebilesine mensupturlar. Saur Devriminden sonra iktidara gelen Komünist devlet başkanları ise Gilzai kabilesine mensupturlar. Komünist devrim ile Afganistan’da Peştunların yönetici kesimi el değiştirmiştir. Molla Ömer de Gilzai kabilesine mensup olmasına rağmen Durani ve Gilzai kabilelerini güçlü bir tevhit ve cihat anlayışı altında birleştirebilmiştir. Peştun kabilelerinin güçlü bir otorite altına birleşebilmesi Afganistan’da kontrolün ve güvenliğin tesisini sağlamıştır.

Taliban hareketi tekrardan bu cihat mirasını ve ruhunu uyandırarak Peştun kabilelerini (Durani ve Gilzai) tek yönetim altında toplamıştır. Cihat ve tevhit yöntemlerini Afganistan’ın bütünleşmesi ve diğer mücahit grupların pasifize edilerek ülkede istikrarın tesisi için kullanmıştır. Peştunların tarihsel sürecinde önemli bir yere sahip olan bahse konu cihat anlayışı Siyasal Selefilğin yardımı ile tekrardan canlandırılmıştır. Bunların yanında Taliban’ın Afganistan’daki Peştun grupları mobilizasyonunda dış aktörlerin de yardımlarının önemli ölçüde katkısı olmuştur. Suudilerin ve Pakistan’ın finansal, lojistik ve silah anlamında Taliban’a yardımları, Taliban rejiminin kısa sürede Afganistan’da otorite kurmasında önemli rol oynamıştır.

Peştun grupların mobilizasyonunda Pakistan’ın kuzeyindeki Deobandi medreselerinin önemi büyüktür. Siyasal Selefilğin bu medreselerden yayıldığı göz önüne alınacak olursa cihat adı altında sosyal grupların mobilizasyonunda ne denli önemli olduğu anlaşılabılır. Bahse konu medreseler Suudiler tarafından da finanse edilmiştir. Özellikle Körfez Savaşı sonrası mücahit grupların Afganistan’a istikrar getirme konusundaki başarısızlıkları ve Suudi Arabistan’ı tenkit eden tutumları (ABD askerinin Suudi Arabistan’a konuşlanması konusunda) Suudilerin tüm desteğini Deobandi medreselerine vermesine neden olmuştur. Bu destek Taliban’ı yaratmıştır. Bahse konu medreseler Afgan Cihadı sırasında Pakistan’ın kuzeyine sığınan mültecilerin sığındıkları yerler olmuştur. Buralarda savaş sırasında yetim kalan çocuklar öğrenci yani ‘talib’ olmuşlar ardından da Taliban’ı kurmuşlardır. Kısacası Taliban hareketi Deobandi medreselerinden Siyasal Selefi öğreti ile yetişen öğrenciler tarafından kurulmuştur. Pakistan yönetimi de bu medreselerin önünü açmış ve desteklemiştir. Medrese sistemi ve ağı Kuzey Pakistan ve Afganistan’a

yayılmış olan Peştun kabileleri ağı aracılığı ile Afganistan'ın güneyi ve doğusuna kadar uzanan bir etki alanına sahip olmuştur.

Taliban hareketi tıpkı Suudi emirlikleri gibi Siyasal Selefilik'in güçlü tevhit ve cihat anlayışlarını uygulayarak tek bir otoritenin oluşumunu yani siyasi birliği sağlamıştır. Birbiri ile problemlili olan Afgan kabileleri Taliban'ın Siyasal Selefilik'in öğreti ve normlarını güçlü bir şekilde uygulaması ile birleştirilmiş ve Peştun dayanışması oluşturulmuştur. Komünist rejim döneminde devlet ve bürokrasi kademelerinde önemli memuriyet kademelerinde bulunan Gilzai kabilesi mensup Peştunlar, Taliban döneminde de önemli yerlere getirilerek bahse konu Komünist Peştunlarla işbirliğine gidilmiştir. Komünist dönemden kalma pek çok devlet kurumu Taliban döneminde de devam ederek merkezileşmenin sağlanmasına çabalanmıştır. Örneğin komünist dönemdeki Merkez Komite, Taliban döneminde de Şura konseyi olarak devam etmiştir.

Taliban yönetimi Suudi Arabistan, Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri, Pakistan gibi ülkeler tarafından da resmi olarak tanınmıştır. Bu ülkeler Kabil'e diplomatik misyonlarını açmışlar ve karşılığında da Taliban bu ülkelere misyon şeflerini göndermiştir. Komşu ülkelerle de enerji ve gıda alanında ticari faaliyetler yapmaya başlayan Taliban rejimi BM'deki Afganistan'ın sandalyesini dahi istemiştir. Fakat Taliban rejiminin el Kaide'ye sığınma sağlaması ve Üsame bin Ladin'i teslim etmeye yanaşmayarak koruması kendi sonunu hazırlamıştır. ABD Afganistan'a müdahalede bulunmuş ve Taliban rejimi çökmüştür. Fakat daha sonraki yıllarda özellikle 2013 sonrasında Taliban'ın tehdit algısı değişmiş ve Katar'ın başkenti Doha'da temsilcilik açmasına müsaade edilmiştir. Doha'daki Taliban temsilciliği aracılığı ile el Kaide ile bağlarını kopartma garantisi veren Taliban, Batı ile müzakere sürecine girmiştir.

Selefilik Sünni otoriteyi korumacı bir anlayış ile ortaya çıkmış ve daima kendisine tehdit algıları bularak gelişimini sürdürmüş ve kökleşmiştir. Selefilik'in kurucu âlimi olarak Ahmet bin Hanbel'i gösterebiliriz. Ahmet bin Hanbel hem Selefilik'in dini bir tutum olarak gelişmesine hem de siyasi bir form olarak şekillenmesine katkıda bulunmuş bir din âlimidir. Her iki formun teşkilinde Arapların zihinlerindeki İran düşmanlığı ve Şii karşıtlığı algısı önemli ölçüde etkili olmuştur. Selefi dini tutumun oluşmasında Sufilik'in ve Mutezile mezhebinin Abbasi

Devletinde gitgide yayılan bir güce ulaşması etkili olmuştur. Yine Şuubiye hareketinin de güç kazanması Sünni Arap kimliğinin savunuculuğunu yapan Selefilere gelişmelerinde bir tehdit algısı olarak etkili olmuştur. Bu üç harekete de (Sufilik, Mutezile, Şuubiye) İran kökenli ulema tarafından öncülük yapıldığı bilinmektedir. Selefilik'in siyasal bir form kazanması da Abbasi tahtı üzerinde mücadeleye girişen Harun Reşid'in oğulları döneminde olmuştur. Arap ve İran klanlarının Harun Reşid'in oğulları Emin ve Memun üzerinden çekişmeye başlamaları Selefilere Arap klanının temsilcisi konumunda olan Halife Emin'in yanında durmaları ile devam etmiştir. Bu durum Selefilere siyasal bir kimlik kazandırmaya başlamıştır. Selefiler, İran nüfuzu ve etkisinin Abbasi yönetimine girmesine karşı mücadele etmeye başlamışlar fakat İran klanının desteklediği Memun'un halife olması ile birlikte şiddetli bir baskı ile karşılaşmışlardır Mutezile bir anlamda devletin resmi mezhebi haline gelmiş ve Selefiler dışlanmıştır. Siyasallaşan Selefi hareket önceden Abbasi yönetimi ile içli dışlı iken birden devlet yönetiminden uzaklaştırılmış ve tecrit edilmiştir. Abbasilerin hüküm sürdüğü ve siyasal Selefilik'in ilk oluşmaya başladığı bu dönemde daha ziyade oluşturulan tehdit algısı üzerinden Siyasal Selefilik gelişme seyri izlemiştir. Siyasal Selefilik'in asıl güçlenme dönemi Abbasilerin Moğol işgaline uğradığı dönemde olmuştur. Bu dönemde Selefi ulemadan İbn-i Teymiyye Moğol güçlerine karşı yayınladığı fetvalarla Sünni ahaliyi cihada teşvik etmiş ve bölgenin Sünni gücü olan Memlûklerle ittifak kurmuştur. İbn-i Teymiyye, fetvaları ile Moğolları mürted ilan etmiş ve yine Moğollarla işbirliği yapan İranlıları ve Şii'ileri de hedef göstermiştir.

Siyasal Selefilik 18.yy'da Arap Yarımadasında tekrardan ortaya çıkmıştır. Muhammed bin Abdülvehhab kendi öğretileri ile Suudi kabilesinin lideri Muhammed bin Suud'un siyasi gücünü birleştirerek Necid bölgesinde siyasi otoritenin kurulmasını sağlayacak yolu açmıştır. Bölgede Sufilik'i benimseyen kabileler, Şii'iler ve Siyasal Selefilik'i kabul etmeyen sosyal gruplar bir şekilde sindirilmiş ve kontrol altına alınmıştır. Siyasal Selefilik'in bayraktarlığını yapan Suudiler, Siyasal Selefilik'i kabul etmeyen kabilelere, Şii'lere ve İranlılara karşı geliştirilen tehdit algısı üzerinden mobilizasyon (cihat) uygulamış ve merkezi otoriteyi tesis etme sürecini başlatmışlardır. Suudilere yönelik gerçekleşen dış saldırılar her ne kadar Suudi emirliklerini iki sefer yıksalar da Siyasal Selefilik'in

Orta Arabistan toplumuna güçlü bir şekilde nüfuz etmesinden dolayı Suudilerin otoritesi tekrardan bölgeye hâkim olmuştur. İbn-i Suud, Siyasal Selefilikğin gücünü kullanarak üçüncü kez Suudi Emirliğini diriltmeyi başarmış ve ardından İngilizlerle anlaşma yaparak hâkimiyetinin devamını sağlamıştır. Burada Siyasal Selefilikğin pragmatik yönünü ve uzlaşmacı tutumunu görmek mümkündür. Reel politik yöntemi tercih eden Üçüncü Suudi Emirliği, Arabistan'daki otoritesinin de devamını sağlamıştır. Suudi Arabistan Krallığı ise Siyasal Selefilikğin tehdit algılarını devlet politikası ile harmanlamış ve Krallığın ayakta kalmasını bu tehdit algılarına karşı alınan önlemler üzerinden sağlamaya çalışmıştır. Nasırizm, Baas ideolojileri ve Arap dünyasına Sovyetlerin ideolojik ve siyasi etkisi, Siyasal Selefilikğin savunmacı argümanları ile önlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Bunun için Kral Faysal döneminde Suudilerin finansörlüğünde uluslararası kuruluşlar kurularak petrol gelirleri ile finanse edilmişlerdir. Bu kurum ve kuruluşlar Arap dünyası başta olmak üzere diğer Müslüman ülkelerde de Siyasal Selefilikğin etkisini yayma çalışmaları yürütmüşlerdir. Özellikle Siyasal Selefilikğin işbirliği yaptığı Müslüman Kardeşler, Suudilerin siyasi etkisinin ve nüfuzunun Güney Asya ülkelerine kadar ulaşmasını sağlamıştır. 1979 yılında İran İslam Devrimi, Kâbe Baskını, Camp David Antlaşması ve SSCB'nin Afganistan'ı işgali gibi olayların yaşanması Siyasal Selefilikğin tehdit algılarının tekrardan belirlenmesini sağlamıştır. Devrimci İran rejimi, Körfez'de ve Ortadoğu'da Devrimci Şia'nın etkisi ile faaliyet gösteren radikal Şii gruplar Siyasal Selefilikğin yeni tehdit algılarını oluşturmuştur. 1979 yılında bir grup fanatik Selefi tarafından gerçekleşen Kâbe baskını da Suudi rejimini ve rejim ile birlikte hareket eden Siyasal Selefi çevreleri kaygılandıran bir gelişme olmuştur. Bu esnada Afganistan'ın Sovyetler tarafından işgal edilmesi ve bölgede Afgan mücahitlerin direniş başlatmaları Suudilere büyük bir fırsat sunmuştur. Suudiler Afgan Cihadına yardım kararı alarak İran'daki Ayetullah rejimine karşı giriştikleri prestij mücadelesinde önemli bir aşama kat etmişler, ülke içindeki Selefi çevrelerde baş gösteren ve Kabe Baskını ile zirveye varan rahatsızlıkları önleme adına iyi bir fırsat yakalamışlar ve yine Afganistan'ı işgal ederek Hint Okyanusuna ve dolaylı olarak Körfez Bölgesine doğru ilerleyen Sovyetlere karşı da önemli bir hamle yapmışlardır. Afgan Cihadına giden binlerce Suudi gönüllü burada Afgan mücahitlere Sovyetlere karşı olan savaşlarında yardım etmişlerdir.

Suudilerin bölgedeki mücahit grupları ve ardından Pakistan sınırındaki medreseleri fonlamaları ve bunlara lojistik destek sağlamaları 1990'lı yılların başında Taliban hareketinin de doğmasını sağlamıştır. Taliban hareketi de Siyasal Selefilğin Güney Asya versiyonu olan Deobandi medreselerinden çıkmış ve kısa sürede hemen hemen Afganistan'ın tamamında otoriteyi tesis edecek düzeye gelmiştir. Taliban, Afganistan tarihinde önemli bir yeri olan cihat kültürünü tekrardan canlandırmış ve Peştun kabileleri arasındaki dayanışma ruhunu da uyandırmıştır. Pakistan ve Suudi Arabistan gibi güçlerin de finansal ve lojistik alanda destek verdikleri Taliban hareketi kısa sürede Afganistan genelinde otoriteyi sağlamakta başarılı olmuştur. Taliban'ın bir nevi resmi ideolojisini de oluşturan Siyasal Selefilik, 19. yy ve 20.yy başlarında İngilizlere karşı cihat ilanında Deobandi medreselerinin isyan hareketlerinin başını çekmesi ile önemli rol oynamıştır. Hem Deobandi medreselerinde bulunan Siyasal Selefilğin cihat anlayışı hem de Afganistan'ın tarihsel birikiminde var olan İngiliz-Afgan Savaşlarındaki cihat kültü Taliban'ın bünyesinde tekrardan canlandırılmıştır. Aynı zamanda Peştunların da iktidarı olan Taliban rejimi bir araya gelemeyen ve aralarında ihtilaflar olan Peştun kabilelerini birleştirici bir işlev görmüştür. Bunu da Siyasal Selefilğin güçlü tevhit normu ile yapabilmiştir. Bu şekilde Taliban kısa sürede siyasi birliği de sağlamış ve merkezileşmeyi de tesis etmiştir. Hatta bu süreç zarfında Komünist dönemin bürokrat, memur ve subaylarından dahi yararlanmıştır.

Ancak Taliban oluşumu el Kaide gibi uluslararası bir terör örgütüne sığınma sağlaması ve bu konuda Batı ile uzlaşmaya yanaşmamakta direnmesi üzerine ABD'nin başını çektiği uluslararası bir müdahaleyle karşılaşmıştır. Taliban, ibn-i Suud'un yaptığı gibi reel politik bir siyaset izleyemediği ve Batı ile uzlaşmakta başarılı olamadığı için varlığını devam ettiremeyerek yıkılmıştır. Ancak son yıllarda Doha'da Taliban temsilciliği üzerinden Batı ile tekrardan müzakere sürecinin başladığını da göz önüne almak gerekmektedir. Çalışmanın en önemli bulgularından biri Siyasal Selefilğin tehdit algısı, sosyal grupları mobilizasyonu ve siyasi birliği sağlayarak siyasi otorite tesis edebilen bir etkiye sahip olmasıdır. Bu şekilde hem Suudi emirlikleri, hem Suudi Arabistan hem de Taliban kurulmuştur. Fakat Siyasal Selefilğin kurulmasında rol oynadığı otoritenin devamı ise rejimlerin reel politik siyaseti takip etmesine bağlı olduğu da çalışmanın bir diğer bulgusu olarak karşımıza

çıkılmaktadır. Aynı yöntemle Siyasal Selefilğin kurulmasında rol oynadığı Suudi Arabistan reel politik bir yöntemle mevcudiyetini devam ettirebilirken, Taliban ise reel politikten uzak durarak terör grupları ile hareket etmiş ve yıkıma uğramıştır. Taliban'ın son dönemde Batı ile müzakereleri ve mevcut Afganistan yönetimi ile yürüttüğü görüşmeler onun da reel politik siyaseti uygulamaya ve uluslararası sistemin öngördüğü şekilde hareket etmeye başladığının bir işaretidir.



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