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TWO WAYS OF SEEING INDIA IN THE TRAVELOGUES OF
KEMALIST ORIENTALISTS AND TRADITIONALISTS

Ph.D. DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

Fatih ESENBOĞA

June 2014

TWO WAYS OF SEEING INDIA IN THE TRAVELOGUES OF KEMALIST ORIENTALISTS AND TRADITIONALISTS

The establishment of the Turkish Republic created new perspectives on ideological, cultural and, social grounds. The new élite of the Turkish Republic disengaged with the peoples of the East, which created frustration in the lands where the Turkish Independence Movement was passionately supported. India is a notable example of such countries. This study analyzes travel texts about India during the early republican period of Turkey by the writers either from the Kemalist ideological camp or by opposing writers who were banished from the young republic because of their dissidence. First, I study the sensitivity of the peoples of India – both Hindus and Muslims – toward Turkish Independence through the historical background of the relations between the two lands. Secondly, I studied the travelogues by Falih Rıfkı Atay, Burhan Felek, Ahmet Emin Yalman, and Halide Edip Adıvar to show that after the establishment of the Turkish Republic the official radical Westernization that took shape produced typically Orientalist attitudes toward the Eastern peoples. By contrast, the dissidents of the Kemalist régime were different in their perceptions of the East and its peoples as they saw themselves as part of the East.

Key Words: India, Republic of Turkey, Kemalism, Orientalism, Halide Edip, Falih Rıfkı, Ahmet Emin Yalman, Muslims in India.

KISA ÖZET

Fatih ESENBOĞA

Haziran 2014

KEMALİST ORYANTALİST VE GELENEKSELÇİ YAZARLARIN GEZİ KİTAPLARINDA HİNDİSTAN'A İKİ FARKLI BAKIŞ

Bu tez, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulması ile başlayan radikal modernleşmenin yarattığı ideolojik, kültürel ve sosyal yeni kimlik saptama formlarının kökenlerini incelemektedir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin yeni eliti Doğu halklarından duygusal bir kopuş yaşamışlardır ve bu kopuş Türk Kurtuluş savaşını desteklemiş olan halklarda bir hayal kırıklığı yaratmıştır. Hindistan bu ülkelerden biridir. Bu çalışma Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin erken döneminde Hindistan üzerine seyahat eserleri yazmış Kemalist ve de rejimin dışladığı Türk yazarların gezi yazılarını analiz eder. İlk olarak Hindu ya da Müslüman Hindistan toplumunun Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı hakkındaki hassasiyeti tarihi bir gerçeklik olarak ortaya konmuştur. Sonra, aralarında Falih Rıfki Atay, Burhan Felek, Ahmet Emin Yalman ve Halide Edip Adivar'ın seyahat eserlerinin biçimsel olarak incelenmesine geçilmiştir. Biçimsel incelemenin amacı Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulması ile ortaya çıkan radikal batılaşmanın bir kısım aydınlarda Doğu halkları söz konusu olduğunda Oryantalist eğilimler çıkardığını göstermektir. Diğer yandan, Kemalist rejim ile uyum sağlayamayan aydınların ise Doğu'ya ve halklarına sanki kendileri Doğu'nun parçasıymış gibi bakabildikleri metinlerin biçimsel incelemelerinden anlaşılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Hindistan, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Kemalizm, Oryantalizm, Halide Edip, Falih Rıfki, Ahmet Emin Yalman, Hint Müslümanları.

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INTRODUCTION

POST-OTTOMAN/EARLY REPUBLICAN VIEWS ABOUT INDIA THROUGH TWO LENSES

The encounter with the West has created unique forms of social and cultural consequences for every Eastern society. Though the aim of Western colonialism was the same for every land it reached – i.e. to incorporate the non-Western modality into the Western socio-economic order — the reactions to that imposition from specific Eastern communities differed from each other depending on their own historical accumulation of values and traditions. What makes tracing these reactions from the East all the more difficult is the peculiar diversity of religions, ethnicity, and customs. Because of this diversity, our contemporary efforts to analyze the postcolonial histories and literatures of decolonized peoples require a deeper and, most of the time, a distinctive approach that comprises the study of the linguistic, historical, and psychological aspects of the target people or society.

The Indian subcontinent is one of the most diverse societies that bear unique insights through exchanging influences with the West. The history of ancient, medieval, and modern India has at various times been a scene of fantasy, a career, or a bountiful land of academic concerns. Above all, with respect to its internal and external influences, the prolific literary background of India is one of the most attractive subjects for students of cultural studies.

Turkey, on the other hand, is the successor of the Ottoman Empire, which first encountered the West in the early sixteenth century long before its westernization period started. As Bernard Lewis points out,

The Ottoman state was born on the frontier between Islam and Christendom. For centuries the Ottomans and other Turkish principalities of march-warriors in Anatolia cohabited with Byzantium in the tense intimacy of frontier-warfare—imitating and influencing one another in tactics and weapons, in clothing and diet, drawing

closer to one another through the subtler workings of conversion, of assimilation, and of marriage by capture.¹

In other words, the relationship between Ottoman Turks and the West had never been a mystical or doubtful one – it rather stood on a practical basis where one needed the other as an ally or despised the other as an enemy. Historical and literary sources of this relationship have been studied extensively and in an increasingly objective manner. However, the relations between the societies that were exposed to Western domination have hardly been touched. Although Turkey and India seem unrelated in 19th and 20th centuries, both countries went through a series of traumatic experiences caused by the struggles for independence from Western domination on different grounds and with varying intensities. India was officially occupied by Great Britain, which also became the archenemy of the Ottoman Empire because of its intention to colonize Ottoman lands as it did in India. The fraternal bonds between Muslims of India and the Ottomans gained strength increasingly on historical and religious grounds, since in the hearts of Muslims of South Asia, Ottoman Turks had a special place as the Sultan in Istanbul was also the seat of the caliphate of the Islamic world. Subsequently, the independence struggles of the people of Turkey and India were both painful. The Republic of Turkey overthrew nearly all traditional conceptions of its people who had been confident with long lasting triumphs, including retaining its position as the most esteemed Eastern power for centuries. After independence, India was partitioned into two countries based on sectarian criteria and one of them, Pakistan comprised most of the Muslim population of pre-partition India. This study is mostly concerned with the cultural exchanges and interactions between the Republic of Turkey and the Indian subcontinent prior to the Partition of India.

Since India and Turkey continued their Westernization in the post-independence period suggests that we can a lot from a comparative study of interactions between the two. This study aims to reveal the changing images of India during the post-

¹ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 42.

Ottoman/early republican period of Turkey, as demonstrated in the the travelogues about India by the Turkish intellectuals.

Since the main emphasis of this study is on the travel texts of Turkish writers who visited India during the first three decades of the Republic of Turkey, I will explain how the analysis of travel texts contributes to my thesis. Travel writing has increasingly been an important part of writers' repertoire especially after the Age of Enlightenment. With the emergence of more convenient means of communication and with changing attitudes toward learning about or exploiting the world, writers became more and more encouraged by the travel texts of other writers. İlber Ortaylı distinguishes between the attitudes of pre- and post-Enlightenment travelers:

.....no matter they hate or sympathize the place that they visit, the Europeans of the pre-Enlightenment period approach that place and its people as an object and with a sense of equality as they leave their biases or Christianity aside; that is, the world before them is a world that they should understand. On the other hand, after the Enlightenment the sense of Europeanness is sharpened by the scientific fervor; that is to say, the European is now aware of his pertinence to Europe which is advanced and changing. That European views the rest of the world as an essentially undeveloped place. That's why the traveler of this period develops an anthropologist character.²

This is not to condemn the prejudices of the travel writer but rather, it is necessary to be aware of the writer's subjectivity, which is the reason for the unreliable nature of travelogues. Often, the tendentiousness of the travel writer leads the readers to form deeper and rigid preconceptions, which Orhan Pamuk describes:

The vulgar biases about other cultures and the crudest sordidness which is nourished by a combination of superficial adoration and stupidity live on travelogues. Although they seem serving well for us

² İlber Ortaylı, "Türkler Hakkında Yazılmış Seyahatnameler," *I. Uluslar arası Seyahatnamelerde Türk ve Batı İmajı Sempozyumu Belgeleri* (Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi, 1987), 117.

to think, all generalizations about the nature of the cultures, nations, countries and identities turn out to be lies and mistakes in the end. Worst of all, as the liars and the swaggerers believe their own fabrications, these lies become permanent.³

In other words, travel writers' efforts to frame their journeys as challenges or adventures leads them to classify, to project, and to label the discovered place or its people. Especially, India has been one of the most exciting places for travelers and for travelogues to draw conclusions from pre-colonial or colonial features of the country. As Kate Teltscher states, "With the writer's subjectivity centrestage, India usually serves as a backdrop — be it charming, exotic, infuriating, or comic — to the narrator's travels. The journey is often framed as a quest or a challenge within self-imposed constraints."⁴ To sum up, any text that claims to be authentic while representing a form of modified reality serves many opportunities for us to indicate the essential concoction of representation.

I am aware that a study of two different societies in the light of travel writing naturally involves historical and social background on both within a comparative literature framework. Accordingly, the methodology that I pursue in this study is under the rubric of cultural studies which covers a wide range of subjects such as economics, anthropology, communication sciences, and history with regard to class, race or gender. A comparative analysis of Turkish writers who observed India through travel writing is appropriate. How this study benefited from the breadth of cultural studies can best be explained by glancing at Stephen Greenblatt's statement on cultural analysis:

To write convincing and accurate cultural analyses [...] we need to understand colonization, exile, emigration, wandering, contamination, and unintended consequences, along with the fierce compulsions of greed, longing, and restlessness, for it is these disruptive forces that

³ Orhan Pamuk, *Öteki Renkler* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), 358.

⁴ Kate Teltscher, "India/Calcutta: City of Palaces and Dreadful Night," in *The Cambridge Companion to Travel Writing*, Ed. Peter Hulme and Tim Youngs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 194.

principally shape the history and diffusion of identity and language, and not a rooted sense of cultural legitimacy. At the same time, we need to account for the persistence, over very long time periods and in the face of radical disruption, of cultural identities for which substantial numbers of people are willing to make extreme sacrifices, including life itself. Comparative literature has always questioned and often transgressed boundaries, boundaries of national literatures and national histories, of literary periods and literary genres, of disciplinary practices and critical theories.⁵

What is more stimulating in this inspiring lead is its compatibility to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's offer for the direction of comparative literature which "must persistently and repeatedly undermine and undo the definitive tendency of the dominant to appropriate the emergent."⁶ This conception instructs us "to supplement Comparative Literature with (comparative) Area Studies in order to allow us to rethink mere national-origin collectives."⁷ Through this foundational methodology, I seek to decode the unconscious of the Turkish writers who travelled to India.

In this study, I analyze the writers and their approaches to India and its people are essentially analyzed from ideological and cultural perspectives. In addition to the biographical data in their travelogues, the ideological stance of the Turkish writers is at the center of this study. To achieve this, I make an extensive background study of the Westernization of Turkey, as well as the recent development of the struggle for independence and political awakening among Indian Muslims. Moreover, to fully understand the Turkish travelers to India whom this study examines, we should be aware of Edward Said's ground-breaking book, *Orientalism*.

In Western ideology there has been a perpetual effort to define the East as a mystical and dark "other". What Edward Said calls "orientalism" is the collective —

⁵ Stephen Greenblatt "Cultural Mobility: an introduction" in *Cultural Mobility: A Manifesto*, Ed. Stephen Greenblatt, with Ines G. Županov, Reinhard Meyer-Kalkus, Heike Paul, Pál Nyíri, and Friederike Pannewick (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 2.

⁶ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *Death of a Discipline* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 100.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 53.

or archive — of manners, approaches, and ideas that are used to differentiate the East from the West. According to Said,

What bound the archive together was a family of ideas and a unifying set of values proven in various ways to be effective. These ideas explained the behavior of Orientals: they supplied Orientals with a mentality, a genealogy, an atmosphere; most important, they allowed Europeans to deal with and even to see Orientals as a phenomenon possessing regular characteristics.⁸

The function of orientalism is, in fact, to show what the West is not, rather than what the East is. In other words, the history of the modern world is the narration of the non-West's need for the adoption of the Western modernity. The Eurocentric emphasis in this view is so evident that a huge body of postcolonial literature has been dedicated to deconstruct the discursive policies of colonial strategies. In *Culture and Imperialism*, written as a sequel to *Orientalism*, Edward Said explains this process as such:

When it came to what lay beyond metropolitan Europe, the arts and the disciplines of representation — on the one hand, fiction, history and travel writing, painting; on the other, sociology, administrative or bureaucratic writing, philology, racial theory — depended on the powers of Europe to bring the non-European world into representations, the better to be able to see it, to master it, above all, to hold it.⁹

However, the West also stands for an image or a collective of images that symbolizes a peaceful meeting point of a variety of differences in race, religion or ideology. This image is elevated to a heavenly status and then the backwardness, obscurantism and fundamentalism are identified with the Eastern subject.

⁸ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 41-42.

⁹ Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 99.

What, then, is the relation of Orientalism to the writers and their travelogues that are examined in this study? Although the history of the Turkish Independence Movement is later included in the history of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, a deeper reading into the history of the post-Independence War events reveals a series of political and ideological struggles to determine the strategies of the independent state. At that time, Mustafa Kemal proved himself not only a strategist and military genius but also as an astute politician who set out a long-term and radical policy of westernization that required fundamental reforms within the state and society. As Arnold Toynbee states, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal,

[...] it was as if in our Western world, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the secularist scientific mental revolution at the end of the seventeenth century, the French Revolution, and the Industrial Revolution had all been telescoped into a single lifetime and had been compulsory by law.¹⁰

The republic that was established out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire adopted a set of principles that are now called Kemalism. By realizing the goals that Mustafa Kemal set, the legitimization of the process for radical Westernization was achieved in Turkey. Such a pretext was necessary for the Kemalist reforms that were implemented because the reformers had anticipated a strong resistance despite their need for unwavering will to transform their people. Indeed, Mustafa Kemal's character and background was best suited for such a lasting process of constant renewal, as Bernard Lewis describes his regime:

His was a dictatorship without the uneasy over-the-shoulder glance, the terror of the door-bell, the dark menace of the concentration camp.

¹⁰ Arnold Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial and The World and The West* (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), 252.

Force and repression were certainly used to establish and maintain the Republic during the period of revolutionary changes, but no longer.¹¹

Nonetheless, there is no doubt that Mustafa Kemal and the Kemalists reformed the state and society for the good of their people, as they thought there was no time to waste on the way to modernity. However, when their efforts came to nothing with regard to their belief in their people and the people's propensity to internalize the Kemalist principles, they intensified their radicalization, but they never questioned their relevance. One of the key texts for this study that leads us to see the Kemalists' Orientalist tendencies is Hasan Bülent Kahraman's article, "İçselleştirilmiş, Açık ve Gizli Oryantalizm ve Kemalizm" [Internalized, Manifest and Latent Orientalism and Kemalism].¹² In this article, Kahraman's starting point is the political aspect of Orientalism — that Edward Said bases on Foucault's "Knowledge-Discourse-Power" theory — with its relation to manifest and latent power strategies. Kahraman proposes that different "orientalisms" can be found in the Westernization policies of non-Western societies depending on their intra-social processes. For Kahraman, Kemalism that created the new citizen typology on the one hand rejects or even subdues the West, but on the other hand, it organizes the society to acquire the Western worldview in concrete and abstract terms. This contradictory relationship of Kemalism with the West is best seen when it rejected the East in the Orientalism that it created.¹³ The émigré academic Erich Auerbach's letter to Walter Benjamin describes this tendency through the eyes of an able foreigner:

But Kemal Ataturk had to force through everything he did in the struggle against European democracies on the one hand and the old Mohammedan-Pan-Islamic sultan's economy on the other; and the result is a fanatically anti-traditional nationalism: rejection of all Mohammedan cultural heritage, the establishment of a fantastic relation to a primal Turkish identity, technological modernization in

¹¹ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 290.

¹² Hasan Bülent Kahraman, "İçselleştirilmiş, Açık ve Gizli Oryantalizm ve Kemalizm," *Doğu Batı Düşünce Dergisi*, No. 20 (Ağustos Eylül Ekim 2002), 153-78. I am grateful to İsmail Aydın for introducing this article to me.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 154-55.

the European sense, in order to triumph against a hated and yet admired Europe with its own weapons.¹⁴

Elsewhere, Kahraman calls our attention to the inter-textual connection between Kemalism and global modernity. More clearly put, studying Kemalism can enable us to comprehend the discursive foundation of the global hegemony of modernity. “The inter-textual relationship of Kemalism and modernity that is established with the help of the equation of ‘Global Modernity = European Civilization = Westernization’ shows us the role of Westernization in the history of Turkish modernization.”¹⁵ One of the examples of this tendency in Kemalism can be seen in one of Falih Rıfki Atay’s description of Mustafa Kemal. For Atay, “[Mustafa Kemal] is a revolutionary who wiped away all the fetters and obstacles that prevented Turks from becoming a people of Western civilization.”¹⁶ This is a point that Kemalist intellectuals like F.R. Atay often emphasized and according to H. B. Kahraman, both Mustafa Kemal and his entourage circulated the *a priori* backwardness of the East, or that the East is doomed to remain underdeveloped because of a certain interpretation of Islam.¹⁷ This view can be seen as the starting point of the transformation of “Muslims” to “fundamentalists” by way of the commonplace Orientalism in our modern world.¹⁸ To give an example from one of the texts that this study analyzes, in the beginning of *Hind* [India], F. R. Atay expresses his views about the East and the West as well as their stereotypical manners:

The foundational basis of the West is reason: anyone who wants to get rid of reason’s domination, anyone who seeks a national unity outside Western culture and civilization, those dreamers, those *softas* are the

¹⁴ Quoted in Orhan Koçak “Westernization against the West”: Cultural Politics in the Early Turkish Republic,” in *Turkey’s Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century*, Eds. Celia Kerslake, Kerem Öktem and Philip Robins (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 310.

¹⁵ Hasan Bülent Kahraman and Fuat Keyman, “Kemalizm, Oryantalizm ve Modernite,” *Doğu Batı Düşünce Dergisi*, No. 2 (Şubat, Mart, Nisan 1998), 72.

¹⁶ Falih Rıfki Atay, *Kurtuluş* (İstanbul: Bateş Yayınları, 2000), 107.

¹⁷ Kahraman, “İçselleştirilmiş,” 163.

¹⁸ For an in-depth analysis of the role of Orientalism in demonizing Islam in the West, see, Mahmut Mutman, “Oryantalizmin Gölgesi Altında,” in *Oryantalizm, Hegemonya ve Kültürel Fark*, Ed. Fuat Keyman, Melda Yeğenoğlu, Mahmut Mutman (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 25-70.

complications of our society. And [similar ones in India] are threats for India.¹⁹

To sum up, Kemalist Orientalism is different from the other examples of intra-social “othering” that occur as the marginalization of a racial or ethnic group in a country by a dominant group. Rather, Kemalist Orientalism targets all classes and groups in society as it does not only attempt to create an imaginary West but also an imaginary East.²⁰ Therefore, in this study, the Kemalist writers and their travelogues after they visited India are critiqued with respect to their ideological stances of Kemalism.

The establishment of the Turkish Republic is frequently described as “leaving the tyranny of the Ottoman sultan and becoming a citizen of the new state;” which connotes the celebration of individuality. As Suna Kili notes, “Kemalism is a program, is a composite of ideas and actions that courageously, without hesitations and dilutions and concessions, represents a decision to completely transform a society.”²¹ However, more than what Kemalism is or what it aims, in this study I am interested in the outcomes of the radical Westernization of the régime in Turkey and how the Kemalists and non-Kemalists acquired two different perceptions of India. Instead of an ideological discussion of Kemalist claims, I focus on the strategies and policies that Kemalists set to change the Turkish people’s worldview for the new state. Parallel to this focus, a final example can be given from the writings of Peyami Safa, who was from the conservative wing of the Kemalist intelligentsia. In *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar* [Glances at The Turkish Revolution] Safa touches many issues concerning state ideology from the sources of Western civilization to the differences between Islam and Christianity. In his article “Kemalizm, Hayat ve İdeal” [Kemalism, Reality and Ideal], Safa calls Kemalism an ideology that comprises many currents before itself:

Before it was realized actively as a system, Kemalism was absent in books. The Turkish Revolution may be explained by starting from the

¹⁹ Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Hind* (İstanbul: Semih Lütüfi Kitapevi, 1943), 13.

²⁰ Kahraman, “İçselleştirilmiş,” 166.

²¹ Suna Kili, *Kemalizm* (İstanbul: Menteş Matbaası, 1969), 220.

times much earlier than its occurrence. Although Kemalism is the embodiment and advancement of some scattered currents of thought, it cannot be attributed to any idea like an ordinary ideology. Kemalism came out of two necessities: one was the national struggle that protected the integrity of the Turkish state and the Turkish homeland from turmoil and attack; the other was to construct the Turkish land and mentality with concrete. Here, the building and the brain go through the same changes. Kemalism is converting the wooden house to a concrete one.²²

Indeed, Kemalism is an ideology that is peculiar to Turkey and also that cannot be disseminated outside Turkey because such a dedication to Kemalism requires a kind of emotional bond to its founder, as seen in the Kemalist intellectuals who are covered within the scope of this study. One of the writers whose travelogue is studied is Falih Rıfkı Atay who was not only one of the closest associates of Mustafa Kemal after his presidency but also a trusted and popular propagandist of the regime. For Atay, Kemalism was a total ideology that was only applicable to Turkey. He considered Kemalism as an ideology of social organization because his dream was to see people embrace Kemalism for their own sake, not with the state forcing people to adopt it. But when the people didn't feel the need to re-invent themselves, then they had to be forced to do it. In one of his comparisons of Kemalism with Communism, he said, "In Moscow the book enforced the life; in our case the life enforced the book."²³ As one of the most eloquent writers in the Turkish language, Atay here implied that the Communist Revolution happened because intellectual and ideological struggles inspired it, whereas the Kemalist Revolution actually occurred to create its ideology and to give it a direction.

Another focus of this study is on the Muslims of India who played an important role in the struggle for Turkish for national independence. Other than the historical

²² Peyami Safa, *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar* (Ankara: Kanaat Kitapevi., 1938), 199.

²³ Quoted in Hande Özkan, "Falih Rıfkı Atay," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, Cilt 2, Ed. Tanıl Bora & Murat Gültekingil, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), 67.

data about the Muslims' mass demonstrations, fund drives in India, and their humanitarian or diplomatic efforts to contribute to the independence cause of Turks in the early twentieth century, first of all, it is necessary to study how the Muslim community of India became an influential part of Indian politics in the early twentieth century. This helps us to understand how the Muslim community of India was organized to become an influential group in the Turkish Independence Movement and the affairs of Indian politics simultaneously.

Islam reached the Indian subcontinent as early as the 8th century and its encounter with Hinduism and other polytheistic beliefs has created several tensions since then. According to Francis Robinson, among the most prevalent factors that framed the Islamic awareness in the subcontinent are the social roles that the Islamic scholars — or *ulama* — played, the increasing contact with cultures where Islamic knowledge is more widely spread and manifest, and the power of the state under Muslim rule.²⁴ However, the most fascinating social and cultural aspect of the outcomes of these factors is the dynamic nature of institutionalized education in the Indo-Muslim community. These institutions were established at a time when Muslims had lost almost all their political, social, and economic power in a country that they had ruled before the Indian Mutiny of 1857. For example, Muhammad Qasim Zaman describes the conditions at the time Deoband — also known as *Dar al-Ulum* — *madradas* were founded:

In a milieu defined by the collapse of a centuries-long Muslim rule in India, an abortive Indian effort, in 1857, to challenge the growth of British power, and the consolidation of British colonial rule in the aftermath of the 1857 Mutiny, a *madrada* was founded in the town of

²⁴ Francis Robinson, *Islam and Muslim History in South Asia* (New Delhi: Oxford India Paperbacks, 2003), 52-54. Robinson's book is an invaluable source for the researchers of the Indo-Muslim history. A great deal of Robinson's evaluations have contributed to my knowledge and understanding about the affairs of the Muslim community in India.

Deoband in 1867, in the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) in northern India.²⁵

The founders of Deoband were aware of the need for change in the traditional curriculum of the most Indian *madrasas*, so in the curriculum of the new *madrasa*, the Islamic “rational sciences” such as Greek logic and philosophy enjoyed preeminence alongside the study of Islamic law and the study of *hadith*.²⁶ In Francis Robinson’s words, “Deoband schools offered a distinct response to the problems of the loss of Muslim power, the threats presented by Hindu society, and the difficulties of being a good Muslim in the colonial state.”²⁷ The Deoband schools that apparently taught a reformed Islam spread at a dazzling pace: by the 1880s there were twelve schools, by 1900 forty odd, and within a centenary in 1967 there were apparently 8,934.²⁸

Another crucial and revolutionary attempt in education was seen in Aligarh, where Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College (later Aligarh Muslim University) was established by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. For the fate of Muslims of India, no other institution played a greater role than Aligarh Muslim University whose graduates, with their knowledge of English and access to Western learning, dominated Muslim politics in India. David Lelyveld describes the Aligarh Muslim University as an indigenous creation “despite deliberate efforts to copy features of a particular type of British education — Oxford, Cambridge and ‘public schools.’”²⁹ As Qasim Zaman states, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan was determined that loyalty to the British and the pursuit of education offered the best means for Muslims to rehabilitate themselves in the aftermath of the end of Muslim rule in India. But it was modern, Western education, not the sort of learning imbibed in *madrasas*, that he advocated, and he seldom concealed his contempt for the contemporary *ulama* and for their styles and

²⁵ Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi: Islam in Modern South Asia* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2007), 2.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁷ Robinson, 217.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 59.

²⁹ David Lelyveld, *Aligarh’s First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 103.

institutions of learning.³⁰ Sayyid Ahmad was raised in a family close to the Mughal court and by 1857 he had spent twenty years in British East Indian Company service. He was loyal during the uprising, evacuating the European residents from the town of Bijnor, where he was serving, and even working in the district on behalf of the British for some time.³¹ After he contemplated and wrote in newspapers on the reasons and the results of the Rebellion of 1857, he stayed in England from 1869 to 1870 with his son, who won a government scholarship to study in England and actually his aim to go to England was “to obtain an insight into the system of education.”³² The words that Wilfred Cantwell Smith quotes from one of the letters Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan wrote after he arrived in London show clearly the intellectual and personal crisis that he went through in England: “The natives of India, high and low, merchants and petty shopkeepers, educated and illiterate, when contrasted with the English in education, manners and uprightness, are as like them as a dirty animal to an able and handsome man.”³³ In 1882, after the college was established, he told the Education Commission of India that the aim of the college was “to form a class of persons, Muhammadan in religion, Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinions, and intellect.”³⁴ Politically, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan opposed Indian nationalism on the basis of his conception of India as a combination of unequal and mutually antagonistic ancestral groups brought to peace only by their relationship to an overarching power.³⁵ The graduates of Aligarh Muslim University, like Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Ali, dominated Muslim politics of India with a particular approach to nationalism, independence, and religion in the years to come. On the path to an independent Muslim state, as Francis Robinson states, students from Aligarh Muslim University also participated in the

³⁰ Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *Ashraf 'Ali Thanawi: Islam in Modern South Asia*, 4.

³¹ Barbara Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of Modern India* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 100.

³² Lelyveld, 105.

³³ Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis* (Lahore: Minerva Bookshop, 1943), 9.

³⁴ Robinson, 241.

³⁵ Lelyveld, 311.

Muslim League and played a major role to win the support of Muslims in towns and villages in Punjab, Sind, and Bengal.³⁶

Other scholarly movements that contributed to the awareness of the Muslim community were Lucknow-based Nadwat al-‘Ulama [“the Conclave of the *Ulama*”], which originated in the early 1890s, and the Farangi Mahall, a family of *ulama* at the forefront of Islamic scholarship in South Asia since the eighteenth century. As Qasim Zaman notes,

The Nadwat al-‘Ulama sought to bring traditionally educated Muslim scholars and other religious intellectuals of varied orientations together on a shared platform. The concern was to bridge doctrinal divisions, on full display by the closing decades of the nineteenth century, in order to provide a shared leadership to the Muslim community, and to narrow the distance between those educated in *madrasas* and the products of English institutions of learning.³⁷

As for Farangi Mahall, the scholarly emphases of the Farangi Mahall scholars were firmly on Islamic law and on the rational sciences, which they combined with a pronounced Sufi orientation, but different from the Deobandis. Qasim Zaman describes the difference of Farangi Mahall from Deoband thus,

Its [Farangi Mahall’s] scholars were widely dispersed throughout the Indian subcontinent, teaching at various *madrasas* and serving at the courts of local Muslim rulers whose “princely states” the colonial regime had allowed to remain in existence when the rest of the Indian subcontinent was brought under formal British rule. Unlike the Deobandis, Farangi Mahall did not represent a specific doctrinal orientation. This meant that there were few *madrasas* –except those

³⁶ Robinson, *Islam and Muslim History in South Asia*, 200.

³⁷ Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi: Islam in Modern South Asia*, 7.

that members of the family had themselves established – the Farangi Mahall scholars could call their own.³⁸

Therefore, Muslims of India sought and found one way or another to recover from the fatal blows of the Rebellion of 1857. As Francis Robinson points out, the prescriptions that they found were rooted in the Islamic belief that preaches the importance of solidarity of believers in the community.³⁹

It was the same sense of Islamic solidarity that the Muslims of India were obliged to keep alive within their community, that they found instructing them to be alert and vigilant to the troubles of the only independent Muslim community — the Ottoman Turks. But supporting the Turks at that time was a peculiar sentiment in India as it enabled the Turks, Hindus, and Muslims to meet in halfway. For example, Nirad Chaudhuri tells an anecdote about his father's reaction to Turks' sufferings as early as in 1911.

After the Italian attack on Tripoli in 1911 he [my father] surprised us by making the observation, as we were seated at a meal discussing the latest news, that it was downright robbery. We were shocked by this exhibition of pro-Turkish partisanship, for we had in the meanwhile acquired a violent prejudice against Muslims and wanted them to get a licking everywhere.⁴⁰

But of course it was the Muslims who were oversensitive about the events in the Ottoman lands that were under the attack from the European powers. Especially with the liveliness of the Pan-Islamic sentiment that the *ulama* in India strove to keep alive, the Muslims of India had always been sensitive about the attacks that the Ottoman state was under. As K. H. Ansari states, “the concern for the future of the Ottoman Empire as the last substantial power in a position to defend the integrity of Islam instigated worries about the future and to defend the integrity of Islam. As

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

³⁹ Robinson, 182.

⁴⁰ Nirad Chaudhuri, *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian* (New York: The New York Review of Books, 2001), 113.

time went on, Indian Muslims came more and more to perceive the British rulers as the main enemies of Islam in the world at large.”⁴¹ There were even attempts by Muslims and Hindus who tried to formulate Pan-Islamist sentiment as a basis for the independence of India as early as in 1914.⁴² After World War I, according to Francis Robinson,

[...] the Pan-Islamic feeling of the Western-educated came to focus on the preserving the Ottoman Caliphate, and the emotive concern that Islam should be linked with some kind of temporal power came uppermost. By this time, changes had taken place in some at least of the Western-educated. They grew beards, replaced their Western suits with more ‘Islamic’ dress, began to read Quran and discovered Islam.⁴³

On the other hand, the cooperation between the Muslim leaders of the Khilafat Movement and the dominantly-Hindu Indian National Congress to support the Turkish Nationalists was about to trigger a synergic collaboration of the two major entities of India toward independence. The most passionate supporter of Hindu-Muslim collaboration on the Hindu side, Mahatma Gandhi, said in 1920, “England cannot expect us to keep silent when the Muslims’ rights, which are matter of life and death, are seized.”⁴⁴ Elsewhere, Gandhi said, “It is the duty of Hindus and other religious groups not to hold themselves from the concerns of their Muslim brothers.”⁴⁵ However, the unity of Hindus and Muslims for independence failed. The first, and minor, blow came from Gandhi when he halted the non-cooperation movement. This caused a bitter disappointment on the Muslim side which Halide Edip (Adivar) would hear from nearly all Muslims during her visit. As Feroz Ahmad

⁴¹ K.H. Ansari, “Pan-Islam and the Making of the Early Indian Muslim Socialists” *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1986), 510.

⁴² Feroz Ahmad, “1914-1915 Yıllarında İstanbul’da Hint Milliyetçi Devrimcileri” *Yapıt Sayı 6: Ağustos-Eylül* (1984): 6.

⁴³ Robinson, 194.

⁴⁴ Quoted in S.A. Haqqı, “Atatürk Devrimi ve Hindistan,” *Proceedings of Türkiye İş Bankası Uluslararası Atatürk Sempozyumu 17-22 Mayıs 1981*, 12.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

states, after the halt, the opportunity to take advantage of the vulnerability of the British was missed.

After an exhausting war, the British lacked the will and the resources to suppress determined nationalist forces as the example of Turkey demonstrated [...] Thanks to Gandhi's leadership at a most critical moment, the British were not put to test. He called off the non-violent struggle in February 1922 precisely at the moment when it seemed to be acquiring popular and spontaneous dimensions.⁴⁶

But the major blow to the Khilafat Movement was Turkey's abolition of the Islamic caliphate, the pillar of the movement and the main point of interest that was holding the energies of the Muslim politicians of India at its peak. Francis Robinson states that after the Pan-Islamic cause of the Khilafat Movement was no more, Western-educated leaders of the movement, notably Mohammed and Shaukat Ali brothers, channeled their energies to other problems of the Islamic world, such as supporting the Arabs against the Jews during 1929-1930 over the Wailing Wall affair.⁴⁷

When Halide Edip came to India in 1935 to give a series of lectures in the University of Jamia Millia Islamia, the resentment of the frustrated Muslims of India was still alive. A few prominent Muslim figures like M. A. Ansari or Abu'l Kalam Azad had recovered from the traumatic experience of the abolition of the Islamic caliphate, and they were busy with the betterment of Muslims of India through education. However, despite her active role in the Turkish War of Independence and her support for Mustafa Kemal's leadership, Halide Edip was an outcast in the Kemalist régime and she had to leave Turkey because of several disagreements that she and her husband Adnan Adıvar had with Mustafa Kemal, mainly on the abolition of the Islamic caliphate.⁴⁸ From 1924 until Mustafa Kemal's death, Halide Edip and Adnan Adıvar lived in London, Paris, and New York. Halide Edip

⁴⁶ Feroz Ahmad, "The Kemalist Movement and India," *From Empire to Republic: Essays on the Late Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume 1* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2008), 274-75.

⁴⁷ Robinson, 195.

⁴⁸ Elaine D. Smith, *Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement (1919-1923)*, (Washington DC: Judd & Detweiler, 1959), 59.

accepted invitations from overseas countries to teach in universities, she wrote her memoirs of childhood and the War of Independence, and the Adivars socialized themselves within the intellectual circles, making friends with the likes of Bertrand Russel and Arnold Toynbee.

Halide Edip's idea of visiting India someday emerged in fact from the moment she met Dr. Ansari when he was a member of the Indian Red Crescent Mission to Turkey in 1913. During his stay in Turkey, Dr. Ansari wrote letters to the leading Khilafatist newspaper *Comrade*, and in his first letter he described Halide Edip as "the first Ottoman subject with whom I had long and most interesting conversation about all the present affairs in Turkey."⁴⁹ In his next letter, after saying that Halide Edip agreed to become a contributor to *Comrade*, Dr. Ansari wrote, "She hoped one day very soon, after this crisis was over, to visit India and deliver a series of lectures in different Muhammadan centers to give correct ideas about Turkey and her people to the Muhammadan public in India."⁵⁰ The appointment that Dr. Ansari and Halide Edip agreed in the tumultuous times of Turkey was realized in 1935 in the exact way that Dr. Ansari promised to his readers. Thanks to Halide Edip's promise to Dr. Ansari, the fruit of that visit, *Inside India*, constitutes a major part of this study. Mainly *Inside India* and also Halide Edip's lectures in *Conflict of East and West in Turkey* are the two sources to see an alternative view from a renowned Turkish intellectual who was not a Kemalist but a proponent of Westernization. In order to understand Halide Edip's and *Inside India*'s difference from the Kemalist-Turkish writers and their travel books that this study aims to examine, Mushirul Hasan's evaluations are insightful:

Overseas visitors often tended to 'other' India and represent its people as hopelessly archaic. They also highlighted the contest between colonialism and nationalism, the assertion of caste, communal and regional identities, and the roles and visions, often projected as blurred or distorted, of prominent political actors. But their

⁴⁹ Quoted in Mushirul Hasan, *Between Modernity and Nationalism* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 122, EN 20.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

commonest mistake was to define the oriental according to their own *weltenschaung*, to impose alien concerns on to the target culture, and to employ dual categories, such as progressive/backward, constitutional/despotic, tolerant/fanatic. They put together in words occidental, not an oriental vocabulary. In addition to their condescension towards everything oriental, their narratives tended to be repulsively arid. Halide Edip's intellectual stimulus was, on the other hand, humanized by a kindly personal touch in her India-centered books, *Inside India* and *Conflict of East and West in Turkey*.⁵¹

Indeed, Halide Edip's narrative consists of none of the essentialisms or indistinct descriptions that the Western travelers to whom Mushirul Hasan refers. Hers is a humane and intrinsic interest in people, their homes, families, and most importantly their inner-selves.

All in all, the travelogues that the Turkish writers wrote in the early republican period of Turkey about India are valuable sources for us since they not only reveal informative data about India and some important individuals at the time — politicians, leaders, artists — but also give us hints about how the ideological and cultural transformation of Turks in the post-Ottoman period contributed to — or perhaps impaired — their conception of “East” as well as their place in the “East.” This study may provide the opportunity to demonstrate that after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, in the minds of the founders and the elites of the Republic, the Eastern world and its peoples became “other”— that is, a group essentially different from the new Turkey and its Westernized people. Therefore, I propose to read the Turkish Kemalist writers' travelogues about India as evidence that Kemalism caused a break in the traditional Turkish mentality that had been confident about the place and the meaning of the “East” as well as Turkey's place in the East. I also propound that reading *Inside India* by Halide Edip, who was

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 128.

definitely not a Kemalist, shows us that an authentic observation of the Eastern peoples is possible from the eyes of an advocate of Westernization.

In Chapter 1, I give a detailed and related historical background is given in order to emphasize that there have been ancient and long-lasting ties between Turkey and India's Muslim population — including the populations of today's Pakistan and Bangladesh. In order to draw the readers' attention to the main reasons for the break in the Turkish mentality about India, the recent histories of the two communities are covered in more detail than the medieval history. Here, the events of the Turkish War of Independence and their echoes in India are considered carefully because all the writers whose travelogues are covered in this study were aware of the fact that Indian Muslims, as well as Hindus, were active in contributing to the Turkish War of Independence through fund drives and media campaigns. Therefore, this chapter aims to show that India and its people were by no means unknown and mysterious to Turkish visitors of the early-Republican period. In Chapter 2 and 3, the travel texts of the Kemalist and non-Kemalist writers are analyzed. After a short introduction of the writers with respect to their place in Turkish literature or journalism, the stylistic evaluation of the texts occupies the major part of the two chapters.

Any student of comparative literature who studies a milieu, a current, or an influential individual from the Indian subcontinent easily acknowledges that there are countless areas and topics. I hope this study may draw the attention of interested students and researchers to the issues and writers mentioned here.

CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL TIES BETWEEN INDIA AND TURKEY

Turks in India and their Sultanates

Sultanates with Turkic origins had a long lasting impact on the political and social structure of India. The fluctuation in the power struggle between Hindu, Persian, or Sunni Islamic entities can best be understood with the consideration of the impact of Islam in the area. With the advent of Islam in the Indian subcontinent, changes in the coming centuries were meant to be convulsive, not only for the subcontinent but also for the great empires that emerged and ruled much of the world later on. The first steps of Muslim *mujahids* (Islamic warriors) were seen in 711, when an Umayyad commander, Muhammed b. Kasim, conquered Sindh, which remained an Abbasid state for more than a century.¹

After the Umayyads, under the Abbasid dynasty, independent Turkish and Persian sultanates strove to take control of the land. It was under the Abbasid Caliph's sphere of influence that a Sunni unity was regarded necessary to maintain the ties between Muslim India and the Islamic world.² When Sebüktigin (977-997) succeeded Alptigin, he vigorously expanded his realms in Ghazni and this marked the beginning of a long period of active interaction between Hindus and Muslims.³

When Mahmud of Ghazni succeeded Sebüktigin, he expanded his frontiers into Iran. On the other hand, since controlling all the Hindu Kingdoms would be difficult, he was content to annex Panjab only.⁴ Nevertheless, according to Hikmet Bayur, there were at least 16 wars that his army fought with different Hindu

¹ Azmi Özcan, "Hindistan'da İngiliz Hakimiyeti ve Ulemanın Tavrı" in *Divan İlmi Araştırmalar* No. 17. (2004/2): 103; Aziz Ahmad, *Hindistan'da İslam Kültür Çalışmaları* (İstanbul: Yöneliş Yayınları, 1995), 12.

² Aziz Ahmad, *Hindistan'da İslam Kültür Çalışmaları*, 13. In order to shed light on the function of the Caliphate in the Islamic world, it should be noted that after the last Rashidun Caliph, there had been no caliph who was recognized by all Muslims. At different times, various Islamic rulers called themselves "caliph" as a result of emerging new Sultanates due to the pace of Islamic expansion.

³ I. H. Qureshi, "Muslim India Before Mughals." in *The Cambridge History of Islam Volume 2A The Indian Sub-Continent, South-East Asia, Africa and the Muslim West*. P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, Bernard Lewis, Eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

Kingdoms.⁵ Seeking the goodwill and the countenance of the Abbasid Caliphate, Mahmud (997-1030) intended to defend Sunni Islam against the Shiah Buyids.⁶ He also patronized artisans and Islamic scholars, of whom the most notable was Abu Rayhan Muhammed El-Biruni.⁷

Conflicts between Mahmud and Seljuq Turks, who inhabited the Khorasan region, started in 1027 and 1028.⁸ In fact, this was a sign that the Ghaznavid State would have to face some troubles and weaken politically. This fact became evident when Mahmud's son and successor failed to beat the Seljuq Turks in the Battle of Dandanakan (1040). The defeat did not ruin the Ghaznavid State at once but it marked the onset of uncertainties leading to wars and conflicts between the now small Ghaznavids, Ghurs, and Hindu Kingdoms until 1206, when Chengis Khan embarked on a campaign of conquests. In the same year, Qutb-uddin Aibak — a Turkish slave of the sultan of Afghanistan and, on behalf of his overlord, ruler of a large part of northwestern India — declared his independence and founded the sultanate of Delhi,⁹ which would later be called The First Delhi Sultanate.

According to I. H. Qureshi, the Delhi Sultanate refers to the various Muslim dynasties, beginning with the Mamluk [Slave] dynasty, which ruled India, roughly, from 1206 to 1526. This new Sultanate was never a very stable political entity, but it ensured the continuous presence of a number of foreign Muslim overlords in northern India, and thus connected significant parts of the country with an expanding international Islamic world. Sultanate lineages came from Turkish and Afghan military clans, initially forced into the subcontinent by tribal movements related to the expanding Islamic Empire. The Muslim dynasties that ruled under the name of the Sultanate were the Mamluk [Slave], Khalji, Tughluq, Sayyid, and Lodhi dynasties. The administration of the sultanate was based upon models that had already developed under the Abbasids and their successors.¹⁰ This period also witnessed a great effort on the part of the Sufis to reconvert the Isma'ilis in Sindh to

⁵ Hikmet Y. Bayur, *Hindistan Tarihi. Vol. 1, İlk Çağlardan Gurkanlı Devletinin Kuruluşuna Kadar (1526)*. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1946), 140-78.

⁶ Laura Etheredge, Ed. *Islamic History* (New York: Britannica Educational Publishing, 2010), 115.

⁷ I.H. Qureshi, "Muslim India Before Mughals," 4.

⁸ Bayur, *Hindistan Tarihi. Vol. 1*, 179.

⁹ Herman Kulke and D. Rothermund, *A History of India* (London: Routledge, 1998), 152.

¹⁰ I.H. Qureshi, "Muslim India Before Mughals," 31.

Sunni Islam and to spread Islam amongst non-Muslims as well. The four main Sufi orders in the subcontinent were the Chishtiyya, the Qadiriyya, the Suhrawardiyya, and the Naqshbandiyya. It was through the efforts of these orders that a Muslim community grew up. The school of jurisprudence which found favor was the Hanafiyya, which would be accepted by most of the Turks in Anatolia.¹¹

A new age began for the unification of India under the Mughal Empire, which had Turkish origins. Although the Mongol-Timurid legacy influenced the Ottoman and Safavid states, it had its most direct impact on Babur (1483-1530), the founder of the Mughal Empire. Babur's and his descendants' rule left the most enduring and memorable imprints of Turkish culture in India that would be remembered through the centuries to come. However, in the minds of Hindu or Muslim Indians, the legacy of the Mughals resonated differently and as a result of this, from time to time it would be the source of arrogance, religious fanaticism, and political biases.

Babur was Timur's grandson in the fifth generation¹² and in 1494 he took over the principedom that his father left for him after he fell off a cliff and died -. ¹³ He was only eleven years old and his father left him Fargana only, but his ambition was to seize Samarkand, the most prestigious city of Central Asia.¹⁴ He proved himself a valiant soldier and after numerous wars he ended up in Delhi and established his empire in 1526, which would leave the impact of Turkish language and culture in Indian history. Successively the most significant Mughal emperors after Babur were Humayun, Akbar, Jahangir, Shah Jehan, and Awrangzeb. According to John F. Richards,

The Mughal Empire was one of the largest centralized states known in pre-modern world history. By the late 1600s the Mughal emperor held supreme authority over a population numbering between 100 and 150 million and lands covering most of the Indian subcontinent (3.2 million square kilometers). Timurid India far outstripped in sheer size

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 34.

¹² Hikmet Y. Bayur, *Hindistan Tarihi. Vol. 2, Gurkanlı Devletinin Büyüklük Devri (1526-1737)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1946), 6.

¹³ Fernand Grenard, *Babur* (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1971), 3.

¹⁴ I.H. Qureshi, "India Under the Mughals," in *The Cambridge History of Islam Volume 2A: The Indian Sub-Continent, South-East Asia, Africa and the Muslim West* eds. P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, Bernard Lewis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 35.

and resources its two rival early modern Islamic empires – Safavid Persia and Ottoman Turkey. The Mughal emperor's lands and subjects were comparable only to those ruled by his contemporary, the Ming emperor in early modern China.¹⁵

The power and grandeur of the Mughals attracted the attention of the above mentioned rival Muslim empires, the Safavids and the Ottomans. There was tension between Shiite Safavids and Sunni Mughals, but with the Ottomans there was an uneasy compromise. There was concordance because there was hardly a conflict between the Ottomans and Mughals since they didn't share borders and their territorial goals were very different; it was uneasy because, even though the Ottomans were seen as a beacon of Islam in the Western lands by the Muslims of India since the conquest of Constantinople and its change of name to Istanbul, the size and supremacy of the Mughal emperors at their peak aroused the interest of the Ottoman Sultans and led them to be cautious.

Portuguese sea power had already been in control as far as the Indian Ocean even when Babur started his military campaign to conquer India.¹⁶ Because of this, the Mughals remained one of the greatest land powers of Asia and never attempted to build up a powerful navy. Also, according to Om Prakash, the arrival of Portuguese ships under the charge of Vasco de Gama on 20 May 1498 at Calicut marks the beginning of a new era in the history of European and Asian peoples and powers.¹⁷ The Portuguese, who managed to remain the only European power to monopolize trade in the Indian Ocean for nearly a century, disrupted the usual operation of trade that was previously carried out by Arabs, Safavids, Asian Muslims, and Ottomans — all Muslim seamen.¹⁸ Among them, the most powerful was the Ottoman navy and they were the ones who were deeply affected by the Portuguese interference in the trade in the Indian Ocean, because the Ottoman lands'

¹⁵ John F. Richards, *The New Cambridge History of India: Mughal Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 1.

¹⁶ Herman Kulke and D. Rothermund, 197.

¹⁷ Om Prakash, *The New Cambridge History of India: European Commercial Enterprise in Pre-Colonial India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 23.

¹⁸ Ahmet Asrar, *Kanuni Devrinde Osmanlı Devletinin Dini Siyaseti ve İslam Alemi* (İstanbul Büyük Kitaplık, 1972), 298.

role as a land bridge between India or China and Europe was lost. On the other hand, the Ottomans had long assumed a protectorate upon Islamic communities wherever they could reach. So the disturbance of Arab or Indian traders as well as other travelers motivated the Ottomans and prompted them to act. In addition, the Portuguese also became a growing threat for the security of the Indian Muslim Hajj travelers of Indian Muslims.

The first contact in the Indian Ocean between the Ottoman and Portuguese naval forces was in 1526,¹⁹ around the same year Babur launched his campaign in India that would turn out to be a great Islamic empire. According to Ahmet Asrar, after the Ottoman sea forces fought with the Portuguese forces in the Red Sea and then around the Gulf of Aden, Suleiman I (1520-1566) sent a fleet to the Indian coasts as Bahadur Shah of the Gujerati State was killed by the Portuguese after he sent an ambassador to Istanbul.²⁰ Unfortunately, the incompetent Hadim Suleyman Pasha, the admiral of the fleet, failed to oust the Portuguese out of Gujerat. Later, famous Ottoman admirals like Piri Reis and Seydi Ali Reis tried to complete the mission that Hadim Suleyman Pasha left unfinished, but at the end the Ottomans couldn't break the hegemony of the Portuguese.²¹ Azmi Özcan states that Seydi Ali Reis, who was sent to India in 1554, also wrote a travel book called *Mir'atü'l Memalik* in which he gives detailed descriptions of the sixteenth century India.²² It is important to note that, according to his travelogue, he was greeted with great respect as an Ottoman envoy, and this shows how the Ottoman Sultan and state were perceived by Indian Muslims at that time.

The Ottoman interest in the Indian Ocean had many aspects. First, as the protector Caliph of all Muslims, the Ottoman Sultan felt obliged to act against the Portuguese who were threatening the security of the pilgrimage journey of Muslims in India. The rulers of princedoms and sultanates weren't able to resist the

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 301.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 307.

²¹ According to Dr. Ahmet Asrar, the main reason of this failure was Suleyman I's focus on policies concerning Western issues and the only concern of Suleyman I in the East was the security of travelers of Hajj and trade. See, Ahmet Asrar, *Kanuni Devrinde Osmanlı Devletinin Dini Siyaseti ve İslam Alemi*, 337. Asrar regrets that choice of Suleyman I, since a strong Mughal-Ottoman coalition that could subsequently have prevented other European interventions, especially British.

²² Azmi Özcan, *Pan-İslamizm, Osmanlı Devleti, Hindistan Müslümanları ve İngiltere (1877-1914)* (İstanbul: İsam Yayınları, 1997), 9.

Portuguese, but the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman I could and did send the Ottoman fleet to the Indian Ocean. The second reason for the Ottoman interest in the Indian Ocean was to secure the trade routes where goods from the Far East and India were transported through and contributed to the Ottoman economy. Indeed, as an ordinary practice of *realpolitik*, Suleiman I focused more on the security of the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Hormuz than to the Portuguese threat in Indian lands because the growing Portuguese control in Aden and Hormuz would mean a diminishing Ottoman political and economic impact in the area. On the other hand, Suleiman I preferred setting a very careful policy against the Portuguese as an aggressive act could cause a worse conflict in Europe, which, in turn, could create another threat to the economy.

Relations between Ottomans and Mughals began with a slight uneasiness. According to Özcan,²³ this was partly due to the Mughals' attachment to Timur, who was the great-great-grandfather of Babur. Because Timur beat Bayezid I in the Ankara War (1402) and caused the first great shock that the Ottoman State had experienced, his descendants must have aroused an antipathy in the Ottoman palace. Another reason for the unrest was the Ottoman-Gujerati alliance that caused unpleasant feelings in the Mughal palace because Gujeratis were Mughals' long-time enemy. Because of this, no official record of relation between Mughals and Ottomans is found until Jahangir's reign (1605-1627). Shah Jehan (1627-1658) sent ambassadors in 1637 and 1652 in order to secure an Ottoman-Mughal alliance against the Safavids.²⁴ Nevertheless, it is impossible to say that warm relations were established between the two empires and influenced their domestic and international affairs. According to N.R. Farooqi, the Ottoman sultan Murad IV was uncomfortable with the title of his Mughal counterpart, Shah Jehan [King of the World]. He sent an envoy to the Mughal emperor to deliver his message, but interestingly no disrespect was shown to the Ottoman envoy. On the contrary, they were generously rewarded and allowed to return with valuable provisions. Even in

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ N.R. Farooqi, "Mughal India and The Ottoman Empire: A Study in Early Modern Diplomacy and Diplomatic Procedure," in *Tarihte Türk-Hint İlişkileri Sempozyum Bildirileri* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2006), 101.

such a politically tense situation, the two powers never treated each other in a hostile manner.²⁵

The most significant feature of Mughal and Ottoman relations is that every time the level and the quality of the contact depended on the rulers' intentions and eventually had to be changed after each ruler on either side. The Ottomans were more interested in their affairs with Europe than the opportunities in their eastern territories, while the Mughals were dealing with the difficult task of ruling a large land populated by culturally and religiously diverse peoples. The European intervention in their financial and political affairs created another difficulty in establishing a stable policy. This was the reason why steady relations never existed between Mughals and Ottomans.

Hikmet Bayur points out that during Aurangzeb's reign (1658-1707) no ambassadors were sent from either side. This means Aurangzeb did not continue what his father started and turned his back on the Ottomans. The indifference on the Ottoman side toward Mughals in that period is also interesting but can be explained by worsening political situation in Ottoman lands in Europe and the state's preoccupation with these problems. That both empires had their own priorities and problems becomes even more important when speaking about Aurangzeb's reign because after Aurangzeb, the Mughal Empire never achieved the same grandeur and fell in the hands of European powers, especially the British. Bahadur Shah I (1707-1712), Jahandar Shah (1712-1713), and the following rulers of the Mughals found themselves in constant power struggles and ceased to carry on the Mughal legacy.

Apart from the troubled diplomatic relations between the Mughals and the Ottomans, another point is the importance of artists and writers of Turkic origin and Turkish language. As Ali Fuat Bilkan states, Turkish had a remarkable place in Mughal culture, especially in the Mughal palace.²⁶ Although Persian was the official language of the Mughal Empire, the emperors were using Turkish in the palace. Turkish historian Hikmet Bayur notes that when the British first came to Gujerat with a letter from James I to Emperor Akbar in 1607, a man called William Hawkins was appointed as the second commander of the ship because he was able to

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 117.

²⁶ Ali Fuat Bilkan, "Babürlü Devleti'nde Türkçe," *Divan İlmi Araştırmalar*, No. 17 (2004/2): 163-68.

speak Turkish and communicate with the emperor without a translator. Later, Hawkins established such a close relationship with the emperor that he was given the title of “The English Khan.”²⁷ The numerous Turkish manuscripts on history, poetry, religious studies, and science that were discovered in different libraries in India indicate the importance of Turkish language in Mughal culture.²⁸ As one of the most significant indicators of culture, Turkish language plays an important role in understanding the impact of Turkish culture in India in the past and today.

Europeans in India and the Indian Rebellion of 1857

Vasco da Gama’s arrival in India on 17 June 1498 marked a turning point in the history of the peoples of India. Subsequently, the European interest in India grew incrementally and for a very long time Indians had to remain preoccupied with finding ways to get rid of oppression and colonization by European powers. The rapid seizure of the Indian Ocean by the Portuguese came at a time when the Ottomans intensified their hold on the Mediterranean and it was becoming more and more problematic for European traders to maintain their contact with ports in Egypt and the Levant. Thus, it was a remarkably fortunate moment for the Portuguese when Vasco da Gama returned to Lisbon with priceless information about Indian lands and his experience of travelling around the Cape of Good Hope. Accordingly, the Portuguese intervention in the trade between the Levant and Europe disrupted the businesses of Arab traders who controlled trade routes between India and the Levant, the economy of the Mamluk Sultanate of Cairo who were depending on the taxes coming from the trade on their trade routes, and finally the advantage of Venetians who were controlling the shipment of goods from Alexandria to ports in Europe. The Portuguese, who had previously seized the monopoly on African gold, now made the pepper trade royal monopoly that resulted in a striking betterment in state finance.²⁹ In time, the Portuguese strengthened their naval force and extended their domination in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, while the Ottomans were unaware what the new dynamics of European intervention in a faraway land would bring

²⁷ Hikmet Y. Bayur, *Hindistan Tarihi. Vol. 2, Gurkanlı Devletinin Büyüklük Devri (1526-1737)*, 181.

²⁸ For more information see, Ali Fuat Bilkan, “Babürlü Devletinde Türkçe,” 163-68.

²⁹ Kulke & Rothermund, 198.

them, the Mughals and other Islamic entities, along with the Hindus, were trying to adjust themselves to their new lives.

The events in India during the summer of 1857 are referred to as the Indian Mutiny, the First National Independence War, or the Indian Rebellion of 1857 in different sources. As the names denote, the intention of the speaker is manifest in the way one speaks about it. Today, there is no doubt that it was one of the most decisive events in the history of India, especially in the way it affected the fate of the Muslim community in the subcontinent. Before looking at the Ottoman reaction to the events, the effect on the Indians is important.

The revolt in Meerut was started by the news of the introduction of Enfield rifles and greased cartridges, but according to *The Cambridge History of Islam*, “oppressive revenue policies, the recklessness of unimaginative and inexperienced British settlement officers, the hardships of the artisans, economic distress, annoying delays in judicial proceedings, indiscreet evangelical preaching by Christian missionaries after their admission to the Company’ s territories in 1813, and the insular habits and prejudices of many British officers, all made the British power detestable in the mind of a large number of Indians”³⁰ and consequently what was started by a number of sepoys turned into a nation-wide insurrection. When the news that the Mughal King Bahadur Shah II — who was residing in Lal Qil’ah or Red Fort, Delhi — accepted the nominal leadership of the rebellion, spread around the country, thus sparking many other outbreaks in stations across northern and central India.³¹ During the revolt, property used and owned by the British was attacked and looted. In Delhi, a city of symbolic importance because of its Mughal past, the revolt was much more raving than in other places, and violent mutinous soldiers released prisoners in jails, plundered the treasury and surrendered it to the Mughal King, attacked Church property, and killed a few British ministers.³² The fierce British reaction came swiftly and in September 1857 when four military columns

³⁰ S.A.A. Rizvi, “The Breakdown of Traditional Society,” in *The Cambridge History of Islam Volume 2A: The Indian Sub-Continent, South-East Asia, Africa and the Muslim West*, ed. P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton, & Bernard Lewis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 80.

³¹ Nayanjot Lahiri, “Commemorating and Remembering 1857: The Revolt in Delhi and Its Afterlife,” *World Archeology*, Vol. 35, No 1. (June 2003): 35. Most of the information that I use here about the British reaction to the Mutiny of 1857 is from Lahiri’s article.

³² *Ibid.*, 37-38.

simultaneously attacked the city. In order to keep the morale of the British soldiers, three days of looting was allowed to the Army.³³ One of the soldiers, Captain Griffiths recounted:

We entered several of the large houses belonging to the wealthier class of natives and found everyone in the same condition, turned inside out, their ornaments torn to pieces, costly articles, too heavy to remove, battered into fragments.... To my certain knowledge many soldiers of the English regiments got possession of jewellery and gold ornaments taken from the bodies of the slain city inhabitants, and I was shown by men of my regiment strings of pearls and gold *mohurs* which had fallen into their hands.³⁴

Apparently, much of this booty became the property of those who grabbed it. As Lahiri states, for military purposes, the city of Delhi was ‘desacralized’ by altering the functions of the most important buildings including the imperial seat of Red Fort, several mosques, and bazaars.³⁵ But the most staggering result of the 1857 rebellion was the passing of the power in India from the East India Company to the direct rule of the British Crown. A new title was added to Queen Victoria, the Empress of India, in 1876. Interestingly, the celebrations were not held in the British nerve center Calcutta but in Delhi, probably to restate that the power of the British Crown over her Indian subjects would be symbolically reinforced in Indian fashion.

After the events of 1857-1858, a belief in England that India was conservative and must be governed in a conservative spirit was obvious. As Hugh Tinker states,

During the previous quarter of a century the Government of India initiated a coherent social and political economic administrative policy. Benthamite doctrine and Evangelical belief combined to work towards political and social change. But after 1857 the Government attitude was dominated by a fear that the Mutiny should ever happen again; there was a preoccupation with religion and with the susceptibilities of the people. From that time onwards, instead of

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Cited in Nayanjot Lahiri, “Commemorating and Remembering 1857: The Revolt in Delhi and Its Afterlife,” 38.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 40.

leading public opinion, the British Administration tended to act as a brake on it.³⁶

This shift in British policy and the Crown's direct rule in India not only had its echoes in the lives of millions in India but also became a new aspect of British Imperial policy in Eurasia.

The Ottoman Sultan and the Sublime Porte were aware of the situation in India from the beginning but with an important nuance: they were informed and directed by the British. Today, we are aware that one of the leaders of the rebellion, Nana Sahib, sent a representative to Europe and from there to the Ottoman capital to ask the help of the Ottoman Sultan Abdulmajid, but historical data reveal that these attempts were of no use.³⁷ More importantly, Abdulmajid supported the British intervention in the rebellion by allowing the British ships to reach India through Egypt and the Red Sea. The British benefitted from the Sultan's reputation in various ways. According to Azmi Özcan, they provided a statement of will from the Sultan that declared the British as friends of the Ottoman Empire for their help in the Crimean War (1856), and they spread this statement all around India. The British also managed to have the will announced in mosques.³⁸ The Ottoman support also continued after the British victory. The Sublime Porte announced its satisfaction with the victory and Abdulmajid donated a thousand pounds for the fund to help the British soldiers and their families who were harmed in the Indian uprising.

The disappointing reaction from the Ottoman capital to the situation of Indian Muslims can be explained by the sensitivity of British-Ottoman relations and untrustworthiness of Ottoman sources. In the Crimea, Ottoman forces were backed by the British and thus the Russians were defeated with their help, which means the Ottoman Sultan was dependent on British political and military support in future crises. On the other hand, although there were two Turkish embassies in India at the time, the effectiveness of British sources was out of question. Today, it is evident that partial information about the Rebellion of 1857 was handed to the Ottoman

³⁶ Hugh Tinker, "1857 and 1957: The Mutiny and Modern India," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January, 1958): 63.

³⁷ Azmi Özcan, "1857 Büyük Hind Ayaklanması ve Osmanlı Devleti" *İslam Tetkikleri Dergisi Prof Nihad M. Çetin Hatıra Sayısı*, Vol 9 (1995): 271. Prof. Özcan points out that the records of the demand by the Indian rebels are found in Indian and British sources but not in the Ottoman ones.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 272.

capital by either the British embassy in Istanbul or the Ottoman embassy in London, both of which conveyed the British cause to Ottoman policymakers.

Attempts of the British to Manipulate the Caliphate

The early twentieth century was a time when the British were enjoying their supreme power in the international arena but the Ottoman Empire was under the onslaught of domestic and international crises. When the 34th sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876-1909) succeeded to the throne, the empire was shrinking day by day and there was no day without bad news from inside or outside the country. Shortly after his succession, the Russo-Turkish War 1877-1878 (a.k.a. *93 Harbi*) broke out. It was followed by the losses and atrocities against the Muslim subjects in the Balkans. As the sultan emphasized his authority as the caliph of all Muslims — not only in his realm but everywhere — this was due to the need for a new and effective policy against the European powers after the great losses of the empire. The relations with the British were the most critical because it was they who had the ambition of using the sultan-caliph's influence to enforce their policies in colonies with large Muslim populations such as India or Egypt. As some experts of Ottoman history have indicated, “Abdulhamid II used his position as sultan-caliph as a defensive bargaining lever in the international arena, as a policy of destabilization against rival Christian powers who had Muslim subjects.”³⁹

Abdulhamid II's method of using the caliphate as a weapon against Christian powers is usually described as a Pan-Islamist policy. Pan-Islamism, a word of European coinage, was adopted in imitation of Pan-Slavism. Although there was no systematic plan or agenda of any sort, Pan-Islamism cannot be studied without analyzing the imperialistic rivalry of the Western Powers. Before Indian independence and shortly after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Dwight E. Lee explains the situation of Muslims under the imperialistic attacks of European powers:

³⁹ Selim Deringil, “Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909)” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Aug.,1991): 350; Also see Ş. Tufan Buzpınar, “Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate in the Early Years of Abdülhamid II: 1877-1882” *Die Welt des Islams, New Series*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (March, 1996): 59-89.

In the period between 1850 and 1880 the most serious conflict which directly affected Islam was that of Russia and England in the Near East and in Central Asia, just as at a later date other rivalries developed to a critical point in Egypt, Morocco, and Tripoli. It is not surprising, therefore, that the most willing and eager supporters of the Ottoman caliphate in the earlier period were Central Asiatic and Indian Moslems, who, at the mercy of both British and Russian expansionists, frequently discussed the idea of a Moslem league and occasionally appealed to the Turkish sultan for aid.⁴⁰

The position of the Caliphate was critical for the British due to these reasons and their *realpolitik*. Abdulhamid II was well aware of this and in his memoirs he explained how he hoped to usurp his position as the Caliph: "As long as the unity of the Islamic world continues, Britain, France, Russia, and Holland are in my hands, because in the lands under their political power, only one word of the Caliph is enough to start a jihad, and this is catastrophic for the Christians."⁴¹

According to Ş. Tufan Buzpinar, the first intimation of a hostile British interest in the caliphate came in 1877 when an unofficial debate in England on the question took place, involving publicists, scholars, and MPs.⁴² Opinions were divided as to whether the Ottoman Sultans had any right to assume the caliphate and whether it was time to transfer it to the Arabs. The opponents, who were mostly retired civil servants of the British government in India, asserted that the Ottoman Sultan, Abdulhamid II, was no longer the head of the Muslims and could not claim the caliphate. As Buzpinar states, one of the opponents to an Ottoman Caliphate, "George Birdwood, another retired civil servant, went further and suggested that the caliphate be transferred to the Amir of Mecca".⁴³ In an article in *The Times* of 12 June 1877, Birdwood wrote, "it is a great pity that we do not get the Muhammedans of India to look up to the Shareef of Mecca as the Caliph of Islam for he lives by the

⁴⁰ Dwight E. Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (January, 1942): 283.

⁴¹ Quoted in Azmi Özcan, *Pan-İslamizm, Osmanlı Devleti, Hindistan Müslümanları ve İngiltere (1877-1914)*, 73.

⁴² Ş. Tufan Buzpinar, "Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate in the Early Years of Abdülhamid II: 1877-1882," 65.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

side of our road to India and would be as completely in our power as the Suez canal."⁴⁴ Around the same time when Birdwood's article appeared, a pamphlet which discussed the legitimacy of Abdulhamid II spread. According to the pamphlet, the sultan's claim to the caliphate was illegitimate because the Abbasid caliphate in Egypt, from whom Selim I obtained the title of caliph upon conquering Egypt, was spurious or at least not proven and secondly, Ottomans had to be barred from the title because they were not the descendants of the Quraysh tribe.⁴⁵ A political mainstay of the opponents to an Ottoman caliph should have been Abdulhamid II's increasing attraction as a center from where Muslims under European control expected help. By de-legitimizing and decrying it, they were hoping to carry on imperialistic policies in Asia and the Middle East. Here it should be stated that there were other sultans who emphasized their claims to the caliphate before Abdulhamid II. For example, in a treaty he signed with the Iranian Ashraf Khan (r.1725-1729), Ottoman sultan Ahmed III (r. 1703-1730) called himself "the caliph of all Muslims" and also asked the Shah to accept the title.⁴⁶ By overemphasizing his title as caliph, Abdulhamid II shows that Pan-Islamism was not a structured policy.

It is not surprising to see that some opposition to the Ottoman caliph came from the Muslim world, exclusively under British occupation. From the Arab world, the publications that question the legality of an Ottoman caliph were being sponsored by Ismail Pasha, the former Khedive of Egypt who was deposed by Abdulhamid II in June 1879.⁴⁷ In newspapers that were published in Paris and London, such as *al-Khilafa* and *al-Ittihad*, the Khedive's campaign against Abdulhamid II denounced the Ottoman caliphate and called upon Muslims in the world to unite and depose him. Another opposition case against Abdulhamid II was Louis Sabunji's efforts and publications. According to Ş. Tufan Buzpınar, as a former Roman Catholic priest from Syria, Sabunji first showed a pro-Ottoman attitude in the early 1870s but after 1878 he displayed an increasingly anti-Ottoman attitude, through which he urged all

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 66.

⁴⁶ Azmi Özcan, *Pan-İslamizm, Osmanlı Devleti, Hindistan Müslümanları ve İngiltere (1877-1914)*, 44.

⁴⁷ Ş. Tufan Buzpınar, "Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate in the Early Years of Abdülhamid II: 1877-1882," 73.

his subjects — Muslim or non-Muslim — to revolt against Abdulhamid II before the eyes of all Muslims in the world, especially Indian Muslims because he denigrated the sacred caliphate.⁴⁸

A very curious case about the caliphate issue involves directly the British publicist and poet Wilfrid Scawen Blunt. As a retired diplomat who served in Frankfurt, Madrid, Paris, Lisbon, and Athens, he developed an interest in Arab affairs and moved to Egypt with his wife, who was the granddaughter of Lord Byron and a member of the British aristocracy. In his article about the opposition to Abdulhamid II's caliphate, Ş. Tufan Buzpinar summarizes Blunt's task in regard to the caliphate:

From the late 1870s onwards, Blunt began to develop crude plans to separate the Arab provinces from the Ottoman Empire. This shift in his thinking was sparked by his visit to the Bedouin tribes of the Euphrates during the winter of 1877-78. Prior to this visit, his sympathies had been with the Turks, and he hadn't given much thought to the position of the Arabs within the Ottoman Empire. However, while visiting the Bedouins living between Aleppo, Deyr, and Bagdad, Blunt was very impressed by their independent outlook and their nomadic culture. Thereafter, his pro-Arab sentiments grew and he developed a hatred of anything Turkish, including the Turkish rule in Arabia... It was his belief that the best place for the would-be caliph was Arabia... He argued that the caliphate in Arabia had to be taken under British protection and publicly guaranteed its political existence, undisputed by further aggression from Europe.⁴⁹

It was true that Blunt was not an official worker in Cairo and he was not there on a mission, but with the help of his links to the aristocracy, he conveyed his ideas about the Muslim world, the caliphate, and Britain's benefits in the Middle East. Later, he made these views public as Blunt published his book, *Future of Islam* (1882).⁵⁰

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 78.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 81, 87, 88.

⁵⁰ <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/17213/17213-h/17213-h.htm>

Abdulhamid II's Pan-Islamism and Reinforcing Ties with Indian Muslims

Selim Deringil states that Abdulhamid II (hereafter to be referred as Abdulhamid) was an emperor who represented the last true example of personal rule in the Ottoman Empire.⁵¹ It is well-known fact that he wanted to use his influence on the Islamic world over which he professed his authority as a weapon against the European powers. Putting that aside, there was a greater danger coming from Russia, as she was trying to extend her sphere of influence over Ottoman lands in the Balkans through Pan-Slavism policy. On the other hand, in Europe there was disinformation about the Turks and their barbarity. For example, in 1876, the leader of the Liberal Party, Gladstone published a book entitled *Bulgarian Horrors and the Eastern Question*, and the book sold more than 200,000 copies in two months.⁵² Gladstone accused the Ottomans of massacres, and rape and torture against non-Muslims, adding that:

The issue is not only Mohammadanism but the problems arising from the combination of this religion with idiosyncratic features of a particular race [Turks]. The obedient Muslims in India, Salahadin's knights in Syria or the cultivated Muslims in Spain are not the problem. They [Turks] are generally anti-human examples.⁵³

Gladstone became the Prime Minister in 1880 and then Abdulhamid had to deal with the disinformation and hostile British policies.

In his political memoirs, we see Abdulhamid's preoccupation with colonized countries, especially Islamic peoples. Also in the archives of the Yıldız Palace where the Sultan resided, Azmi Özcan studied documents in which Abdulhamid contemplates the sufferings of the people of India.⁵⁴ Nonetheless, the Pan-Islamism of Abdulhamid was ineffective because of the lack of intellectual support and also popular and emotional impact of Pan-Islamist discourse. Moreover, Abdulhamid's

⁵¹ Selim Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (August, 1991): 350.

⁵² Azmi Özcan, *Pan-İslamizm, Osmanlı Devleti, Hindistan Müslümanları ve İngiltere (1877-1914)*, 62.

⁵³ Quoted in *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ See Azmi Özcan, *Pan-İslamizm, Osmanlı Devleti, Hindistan Müslümanları ve İngiltere (1877-1914)*, 73-75, and *Sultan Abdülhamid Siyasi Hatıratım* (İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 1987), 125-66.

policy failed to hold Islamic communities under the influence of the Caliph because of his authoritarian modernism. Abdulhamid and Pan-Islamism were popular among Indian Muslims because they were in need of psychological support to continue hoping for liberation from British control. But even the dethroning of Abdulhamid or the failure of Pan-Islamism didn't lead them to despair.

According to Aziz Ahmed, Indian Muslims started to show interest in the Ottoman Caliphate issue in 1840s, especially after Islamic schools like Deoband and Nadwat al- 'Ulama sanctioned that the Ottoman caliph as the head of the Muslim world.⁵⁵ From that time on, debates about whether the Ottoman caliph's sphere of influence extended over places out of his political power went on for a long time, but according to Ahmed, the sympathy of Indian Muslims to the idea of an Ottoman caliph was unquestioned. Because the Muslims of India had been suppressed for a long time by the British, it was natural that Abdulhamid's popularity among Indian Muslims wasn't obvious only for religious reasons, but also they needed the idea of a powerful caliph who would stand against the British as morale support. There were articles in newspapers that called for people to unite around Caliph Abdulhamid, who was called *Zillulahi fi'l-arz* [successor of God on Earth], *Muzaffer* [victorious] or *Emiru'l Mü'minin* [leader of the believers].⁵⁶ Furthermore, in public demonstrations or in newspapers, intellectuals from educational institutions like Aligarh, Deoband, or Farang-i Mahall strived to encourage people to contribute to funds sent to the Ottoman capital. As a result, Abdulhamid's reign witnessed increasingly close relations between the Ottoman state and Muslims who were under political and military domination by the European powers. As for the Indians, they became intensely sympathetic to the Ottomans.

In April 1877 when the Russians declared war against the Ottomans, a series of traumatic events that would change the destiny of the Ottoman Empire began to take place. What started as a Russian military affair was backed by the Serbs, Bulgarians, and Rumanians and, as F.A.K. Yasamee puts it, the unexpected indifference of the

⁵⁵ Aziz Ahmed, *Hindistan ve Pakistan'da Modernizm ve İslam*, (İstanbul: Yöneliş Yayınları, 1990), 152.

⁵⁶ Azmi Özcan, *Pan-İslamizm, Osmanlı Devleti, Hindistan Müslümanları ve İngiltere (1877-1914)*, 174.

British.⁵⁷ As a result, the Russian army established an army camp in San Stefano (today's Yeşilköy, Istanbul). The conditions that the Ottoman sultan was forced to accept were harsh and finally the British intervened, but they convinced the Russians to revise the terms of the San Stefano Treaty to become the sole rulers of Cyprus and put forward claims to a *de facto* protectorate over Ottoman Asia.⁵⁸ All these events were being followed by people in India very closely for two reasons. First, awareness of Russia's intentions to reach southern seas; and second, the British-Ottoman relations were carefully watched because of the possible effects on Muslims of India and Britain's impact on the Muslim world. Moreover, there were other examples about the events in a faraway Muslim land that influenced the Indian Muslim community. For instance, Salim Cöhçe states that after the Greco-Turkish War of 1897, there were festivities in Mumbai to celebrate the Turkish victory. Cöhçe adds that in north-western parts of the country, these celebrations led some Muslim tribes to a point of rebellion.⁵⁹

Furthermore, psychological and military impacts of this war marked the beginning of other fateful blows to the Ottoman state, such as the Italo-Turkish War and then the Balkan Wars. Italy invaded Tripolitania in 1911 — six years after the Muslim League in India had been established as a new era for Indian Muslims. By the time Italy invaded Tripolitania, the Muslim League in India couldn't have established the capacity to be interested in the problems of Muslim communities abroad, but as Azmi Özcan puts it, from the beginning they built close relations with the Ottoman capital. Some members of the League published their insights about the Young Turk revolution.⁶⁰ Aziz Ahmed states that from the Crimean War to 1878, the British encouraged the pro-Turkish movements.⁶¹ This was probably done with the aim of usurping the Ottoman Sultan's influence, if necessary, on Muslims under British rule. After 1878, a tension between Muslims who were loyal to Britain and

⁵⁷ F.A.K. Yasamee, *Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers 1878-1888*, (İstanbul: Isis Press, 1996), 17-18.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁵⁹ Salim Cöhçe, "Türk İstiklal Mücadelesi ve Hindistan," *Proceedings of the Symposium on Turco-Indian Relations*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2006), 140.

⁶⁰ Azmi Özcan, *Pan-İslamizm, Osmanlı Devleti, Hindistan Müslümanları ve İngiltere (1877-1914)*, 200.

⁶¹ Aziz Ahmed, *Hindistan ve Pakistan'da Modernizm ve İslam* (İstanbul: Yöneliş Yayınları, 1990), 152.

Pan-Islamist Muslims emerged, because the British interventionist policy in Muslim lands was accelerated. Meanwhile, in Istanbul, although Abdulhamid was dethroned in 1909, his policy of uniting Muslims under the influence of the caliph was not abandoned in the Ottoman capital by the actual ruler, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Under these circumstances, the Italian invasion of Tripolitania caused a great indignation among Indian Muslims. Upon public calls by some newspapers, protests were organized and after each protest, charity was collected to be sent to the Ottoman Army. Azmi Özcan states that later in Calcutta, in October 1911 an aid committee to the Ottoman Red Crescent was founded to organize the charities. The committee even sent a medical mission to Tripolitania in 1912.⁶²

The historical data concerning religious and social relations between Turks in Anatolia, namely the Ottomans, and the Muslim community in the Asian subcontinent show us that when the Turkish Republic was founded upon the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, it was impossible to ignore these relations. We know that as soon as the rulers of the young republic decided to build a fresh and completely Western-oriented Turkey, these bonds with non-Western communities were neglected. The distinctive feature of India as one of those non-Western communities was the warm and self-sacrificing contributions of the Indian Muslims, especially during the Turkish War of Independence. However, it should be noted that Indian Muslims' contributions and goodwill become more valuable when their conditions at that time are better considered. Around the time when the late Ottoman Empire was struggling with domestic problems and foreign enemies and the Turkish Independence War was taking place, Hindus and Muslims set out on their own journey of independence. Although they disagreed on many issues, both groups viewed a possible Turkish independence as a promising sign of Indian independence. That's why a close analysis of the impact of Turkish independence on India is essential to comprehend the nature of Turco-Indian relations in the first half of the twentieth century.

⁶² Özcan, 202.

The Turkish Independence Movement and its Significance in India

The significance of the Turkish Independence movement for Eastern and Western nations can be analyzed according to different parameters. In the early twentieth century, most of the world had been under the military and political dominance of European Powers for centuries and not only Islamic colonized communities but also non-Islamic ones were looking for a nation in the East to stand against the British or the French or the Dutch. From this standpoint, the prospects of Turkish victories — even though rarely witnessed — had aroused about the future of Eastern peoples who were under the strain of colonization are easy to imagine. In the early twentieth century the great powers of Europe were striving to force the Ottomans to succumb to Western dominance. Each blow that required a much stronger resistance to the disagreements among the Powers was ignored as alliances and pacts were made for just one cause — to split the Ottoman lands. At the end of the 1800s there were few places left on earth over which a European Power had no direct rule or influence. Although the Ottoman state had been under the financial and economic sphere of influence of the British for a long time, the struggle against the Western powers had greater meaning for peoples in the East than was even assumed for the Ottoman state itself. Possibly India was no exception, and in fact it was the only place whose people showed the most genuine devotion to the Turkish cause.

For the sensitive Indian Islamic community, Abdulhamid always had a special place in their hearts and prayers. After the fall of Abdulhamid, the Muslim League continued to support the Young Turks and the ruling Committee of Unity and Progress (hereafter referred to as CUP). Mim Kemal Öke states that Indian Muslims' confidence in the Young Turks was evident when at the outset of the Great War the Ottoman state declared its neutrality.⁶³ That was a relief for the Indian Muslim community because the last thing they expected was being forced to take sides between their affection for the Ottomans and their rulers, the British.⁶⁴ Unfortunately, the Indian Muslims felt a deep disappointment as the Ottomans went to war in the opposite camp from the British. Muhammad Ali, one of the most eloquent figures of the Muslim League and the younger of the famous Ali brothers,

⁶³ Mim Kemal Öke, *Hilafet Hareketleri*, (İstanbul: İrfan Yayınları, 2005), 44.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 45.

tried to ease the concerns of the Islamic community of India with his articles that were published in the *Comrade* newspaper. In one of the articles that Öke quotes, Muhammad Ali stated that the obligation of Indians was to the British, but their prayers and goodwill were with the Turks and the Caliph.⁶⁵ He ends his article with these closing remarks: “Our service to our government, our soul to Allah!”⁶⁶ Certainly, this sense of dedication was strongly attached to the cause of the Turks and their leaders in their struggle against the Western Powers.

Probably the most popular Muslim ruler outside India for the people of India was Abdulhamid. As he was the Sultan of the most powerful Islamic state and, more importantly, was the ruling Caliph of the Islamic world, before his dethronement, Abdulhamid was always in the prayers of Indian Muslims and there was a relatively two-way relation between the Ottoman state and Indian Muslims. The Young Turks did not cease to find ways to establish stronger communication with the Islamic community of India, but with a different motive from Abdulhamid’s. The CUP was trying to cope with the terrible financial situation of a bankrupt treasury. Fortunately, there were constant contributions coming from the Muslim community in India and these contributions must have become remedies for some of the economic problems of the CUP government. To give an idea about the extent of these contributions, Azmi Özcan states that these contributions amounted to more than half of all the money that was sent from other Muslim communities all over the world.⁶⁷ To fully understand the scope of these contributions, we should consider that Muslims in Algeria, Egypt, Central Asia, the Balkans, Tunis, Malaysia, the Indonesian Archipelago, and even Mauritius⁶⁸ sent money and goods to help the Ottoman army. On the other hand, the intellectuals of the Muslim community in India were anticipating that, with the modern vision of the CUP, the Ottomans could have been taking a step forward to transform their state from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional one. Feroz Ahmad emphasizes that while these events were an inspiration for Muslims everywhere at the time, they meant something bigger in

⁶⁵ Özcan, 217.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 217.

⁶⁸ For detailed information about sensitivity of Mauritius Muslims, see M. Zahid Yıldırım, “Mauritius Muslim’s Aids to the Victims of Tripoli and Balkan Wars” *Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2009): 49-72.

India as they were seen as reflections of the awakening of Asia.⁶⁹ Indeed, together with the Japanese victory in 1905 against the Russians, the Turkish Independence was one of the trademark military events of Asiatic peoples. At this point it should be stressed that one of the differences between other glorious Asian examples and the Turkish case revealed itself in 1908 when the Young Turks forced the Sultan to establish a constitutional monarchy. Feroz Ahmad quotes British officials' letters that indicate their fear about the success of the Turkish constitutional reform and the possibility of its spread to British colonies like Egypt and India.⁷⁰ Despite the British propaganda about the irreligiousness of the Young Turks, the fact that Britain was struggling with the CUP in favor of Abdulhamid aroused suspicion among the Muslim community.⁷¹ But this made Indian Muslims more aware of politics and, as Salim Cöhçe states, the CUP became an example of the "rebirth of Asia" when the Young Turks expressed the fact that they were not against the pan-Islamist policy of Abdulhamid. For some time, the popularity of the Young Turks continued among the Muslims of India. There were also incidences when some Indians were directly influenced by the Young Turks. One of these events is recorded by Azmi Özcan, when Abul Kalam Azad, a leader of the Islamic community in India, met a group of Young Turks in Cairo who were there to publish their newspapers before the revolution.⁷² Abul Kalam Azad wrote in *India Wins Freedom* that after these Turks expressed their surprise at the Indian Muslims' passivity against British oppression and he "became aware of the necessity for the hard work of the Muslims as well as the search for cooperation with other groups."⁷³ The encouragement that Young Turks gave Azad motivated him to be active in politics. With this popularity among the Indian Muslim community, the names of Enver (Anwar), Niyazi, Talat, and Cemal became frequently cited.⁷⁴ These were the names of the leaders of the CUP whom Indian Muslims looked up to. Among them,

⁶⁹ Feroz Ahmad, "The Kemalist Movement and India," in *From Empire to Republic: Essays on the Late Ottoman Empire, Vol. 1* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2008), 264.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ Özcan, 188.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 186.

⁷³ Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (Madras: Orient Longman Press, 1988), 5-6. Also see <http://www.apnaorg.com/books/english/india-wins-freedom/book.php?fldr=book>

⁷⁴ Feroz Ahmad, "The Kemalist Movement and India," 260.

Enver Bey (later on, Pasha) continued to occupy a special place in the hearts and minds of Muslims whose hearts were with the Ottoman Army. François Georgeon states that Enver Bey was one of the rare characters who had equally aroused feelings of sympathy in the hearts of both modernists and conservatives because he was seen as a symbol to save the Islamic world from the yoke of the Christian world's dominance.⁷⁵ Georgeon goes on to give examples of famous individuals from the Islamic World who were given the name Enver, such as Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Enver Hodja of Albania. Enver Bey's pictures were also displayed in the shops or houses in India side by side with portraits of Abdulhamid. In addition, it was usual in India to see pictures of the CUP leaders with current information about them in the first pages of newspapers published by Muslims, including *Comrade*, *Vatan*, *Paisa Ahbar*, *Vekil*, and *Hablu'l Metin*.⁷⁶ Finally, Aziz Ahmad states that many élites of the Indian Muslim community established close contacts with Enver and Cemal Bey. Enver Bey even became a legendary figure who was depicted as an Islamic hero with the help of poetic narratives of his fights against the "Christian" armies.⁷⁷

Nonetheless, it is not right to claim that the Indian Muslims were completely dedicated to the policies of the CUP as they had been to Abdulhamid's. On the contrary, after the revolution of 1909,⁷⁸ among some groups of Indian Muslims there

⁷⁵ François Georgeon, "Kemalizm ve İslam Dünyası 1919-1938 Bazı İşaret Taşları," in *Kemalizm ve İslam Dünyası*, İskender Gökalp & François Georgeon, ed. (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007), 23.

⁷⁶ Özcan, 215.

⁷⁷ Aziz Ahmed, *Hindistan ve Pakistan'da Modernizm ve İslam*, 152.

⁷⁷ Özcan, 160.

⁷⁸ The Young Turk Revolution marked the end of the Hamidian regime. In July 1908, the CUP threatened the Ottoman government with armed intervention and succeeded in forcing the Sultan to restore the constitution and reconvene parliament. Becoming the most powerful political force in the country, the CUP faced liberal and conservative opposition and failed to maintain order in Istanbul. The ultra-conservatives stormed the capital and cheered to restore *sharia*. Although they seemed confident because the CUP troops were vanquished for the moment, from the center the Unionist troops embarked and took control of the capital. These events are known as the March 31 events because it coincides with that date according to the *Rumi* calendar. The intervention of the CUP's forces led to the dethronement of the Sultan and accusing him of supporting the extremists. To the supporters of secularism in Turkey, the "31 March incident" still serves as a constant reminder of the danger of Islamic fundamentalism. For more information about the Young Turk Revolution see J. Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Vol. II The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975* (New York: Cambridge University Press 2002), 272-340; Erik J. Zürcher, *Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk* (New York: I.B. Tauris Press, 2010), 95-124; Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908-1914* OUP London: 1969; Feroz Ahmad, "The Young Turk Revolution," in

was anger and anxiety because the dethronement of the Sultan-Caliph by *Hareket Ordusu* (a CUP force from Thessaloniki, also known as the Third Army) for them jeopardized the political influence of the head of the Islamic World. This may also indicate that, according to the Muslim perspective in India, an important aspect of the struggle against the Western world was carrying on fighting without injuring the Caliph-Sultan. This will be seen more clearly when the motives behind the Indian Khilafat Movement is studied (see below).

Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), the national hero of most Turks today and the founder of the Republic of Turkey, became a familiar Turkish figure in India from the beginning of the Turkish Independence war. Mustafa Kemal was not a Pan-Turkist like Enver Pasha, who dreamed about uniting all Turks in the world under one flag and rule or aiming to establish a neo-Ottoman Empire. Instead, Kemal wanted to save what could be salvaged from the attacks of the European Powers. When compared to Enver, Kemal⁷⁹ was a stark realist, and his strategies to lead the overwhelmed nation to salvation were ruthless. Indeed, his motivation to do whatever was needed to save the nation was the main source of his success. There were other leaders of the Turks who gave the impression of being the “savior” of the nation, such as Abdulhamid or the CUP leaders, but they failed or lacked the courage to take risks, either because of their over-motivation or tardiness to act against the domestic or foreign foes. Kemal’s strategy was different from theirs, but his relation to the Indian Muslim community was the same.

When Kemal reached Samsun on 19 May 1919 to start the Turkish Independence Movement, which was an unaffiliated initiative from the Ottoman capital, he was sure that the religious sentiment of the Turkish population in Anatolia was the only source of support for the movement. This was natural because at that time a “Turkish” identity based on the idea of a nation was absent in Anatolia. Kemal’s stance on religion and the religious spirit of the national movement that he aimed to ignite also stimulated Muslim communities around the

From Empire To Republic: Essays on the Late Ottoman Empire, Vol. 1 (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2008), 1-23.

⁷⁹ For more information on M. Kemal Atatürk’s life and ideas see Andrew Mango, *Ataturk* (London: John Murray Publishers, 1999); Patrick Kinross, *Ataturk Rebirth of a Nation* (London: Phoenix, 2001); Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk*, (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 1999); Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Çankaya* (İstanbul: Bateş Yayınları, 1980).

world, especially in India. As Öke states, shortly after the Great Assembly abolished the sultanate, M. Kemal was praised as “*mücahid-i İslam*” (warrior of Islam) and “*seyf-i İslam*” (sword of Islam) by the Muslim community in one of the meetings held by the Khilafat Committee in Gaya.⁸⁰ In another meeting, but this time held by *Cemiyet-i Ulemayı Hind* (Association of Indian Islamic Scholars), Kemal was celebrated for his contribution to save the Caliph. He was even seen as a *müctehid* (person who fortifies a religious institution or belief) because he was believed to have reformed the Caliphate.⁸¹ Furthermore, B.R. Nanda says that the Khilafat Committee wanted to present two airplanes to the nationalist Turkish government and a “special sword” to Kemal.⁸²

Interestingly, Kemal was popular not only among Muslims but also among Hindus as well. As early as October 1914, Gandhi mentioned that he was sharing the Muslims’ anxiety about the future of Turkey.⁸³ Moreover, as pro-Turkish and pan-Islamist movement in India had an institutional basis after 1919, the attitude of all the Indian intellectuals, regardless of their religion, started paying attention to the events in Turkey. Hindus, obviously, didn’t have an emotional approach to the Turkish cause, but clearly they were hopeful that drawing the attention of the British to the plight of Turks could be useful both in establishing a joint Hindu-Muslim opposition to the British as well as in benefitting from the morale of an Asian nation fighting for their freedom. Unfortunately, Hindu-Muslim cooperation in gaining independence never had a fundamental basis. Nanda states⁸⁴ that after the Treaty of Sèvres, which reduced the effectiveness of Turkish rule in Anatolia and Thrace to nearly nothing, the members and leaders of the Khilafat Movement held an All-India Khilafat Conference in Allahabad in 1920. To the conference, four Congress members, including Gandhi and Nehru, attended. Here, they witnessed the unexpected temperament and fervent nature of Muslim leaders, which led Gandhi to warn them to cool down and think reasonably.⁸⁵ Much later, Nehru described Kemal

⁸⁰ Mim Kemal Öke, *Hilafet Hareketleri*, 126.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 127.

⁸² B.R. Nanda, *Gandhi, Pan-Islamism, Imperialism and Nationalism*, (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1989), 364.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 198.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 216-17.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

as a popular figure in India with Muslims Hindus alike. According to Nehru, both as a leader of his country's independence and as a great reformer, Kemal was especially favored by young Muslims because he created a state to compete with the Western world.⁸⁶

Indian Muslims' Contributions to Turkish Independence

The assistance of Indian Muslims during the late Ottoman state is still praised in Turkey. The generosity and benevolence of India has never been forgotten as evidenced by the existence of a large body of literature and academic texts written about the meetings and especially the endowments that were collected in those meetings. Mustafa Keskin's study, *Contributions of Indian Muslims to Turkey during the Independence Struggle 1919-1923*,⁸⁷ is a valuable source from the archives of the Turkish Presidency. According to Keskin, the endowments can be divided into two groups: the endowments from the Khilafat Committee (where nature and function is analyzed below) and the endowments from various Indian individuals or groups. In the second group there were contributors also from Indian communities in Europe, the Middle East, and even Durban, South Africa. According to Keskin's research in the archives of the Turkish Presidency, the amount of registered contributions was 1,035,608 Turkish Liras, and most of this money is known to have been used in establishing the Türkiye İş Bankası (the first national bank of the Republic of Turkey) in 1924.⁸⁸ Today, it is well known that Atatürk owned a 20 % share of the bank, which he bequeathed to the CHP (Republican People's Party), and the profit of the shares to the Turkish Language Association and the Turkish History Association. It should be noted that in the archives of the Prime Minister's Office and the Department of Chief of Staff, there are still millions of untouched Ottoman documents to be translated.

More important to the Turkish people today than the financial aid is the meetings and the sentiment of Indians at the time. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Turkish-Indian relations became intense. Salim Cöhçe states that after the

⁸⁶ Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (Calcutta: The Signet Press, 1946), 303.

⁸⁷ Mustafa Keskin, *Hindistan Müslümanlarının Milli Mücadele'de Türkiye'ye Yardımları (1919-1923)* (Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1991).

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 105.

Ottoman victory against the Greeks in 1897, festivities were held and mosques were lighted up in Bombay.⁸⁹ After the establishment of the Indian Muslim League in 1906, these demonstrations were easier to organize countrywide because of the deployments of its branches. The Italian invasion of Tripoli sparked the first wave of protests. As Nehru puts it, the sympathy for the suffering Turks was from both Hindus and Muslims, but in the case of Muslims it was keener and more personal.⁹⁰ In support of Nehru's accounts, Feroz Ahmad mentions that a year after the Tripoli affair, during the Balkan War of 1912, the Hindu nationalist Bipin Chandra Pal, whose nationalism was identified with Hinduism, was among those who participated in these protests because he viewed the Balkan War in terms of pan-Asian Nationalism rather than religion.⁹¹ Therefore, each group, Hindu or Muslim, attended or organized these demonstrations with different motives, but there was extraordinary cooperation between two communities. Although this cooperation lasted for a short time, it is still important to see such common sense in both groups. In addition, Azmi Özcan points out another unusual aspect: these protests gathered different Islamic sects and congregations for the same cause for the first time.⁹² What's more, the Indian Muslims' view about supporting the Ottomans was a religious duty as it helped to raise more contributions and eventually created a much greater awareness.⁹³ Based on the examples given above, I believe that there is no need for further examples, since this is only one aspect of this study.

Worth noting here, the efforts of Indian Muslims were beyond the imagination and expectations of the Ottoman state at that time. First, the medical mission of the Indian Red Crescent Association helped the treatment of Ottoman soldiers during the Balkan Wars and second, the diplomatic Indian mission to London and then to other European capitals informed European diplomats about the sufferings of Turks and found supporters for the Turkish cause. These two initiatives were difficult for people living as subjects of a European power at that time and are a measure of the self-sacrifice of the Indian Muslim community.

⁸⁹ Salim Cöhçe, "Türk İstiklal Mücadelesi ve Hindistan," 140.

⁹⁰ Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, 300.

⁹¹ Feroz Ahmad, "The Kemalist Movement and India," 267.

⁹² Azmi Özcan, 217.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

The idea of sending a medical mission to Turkey was first put forward by Shaukat Ali, the elder of the Ali Brothers, in the *Comrade* newspaper.⁹⁴ Abu'l Kalam Azad was also calling for support for the only independent Muslim state that was under the rule of the caliph of all Muslims.⁹⁵ One month after the publication of the article, a committee to form the medical mission was established in the Indian Red Crescent Association (IRCA). IRCA was founded in 1911 to organize aid campaigns to Turkey,⁹⁶ and Dr. M. Ahmad Ansari was elected to lead the mission. Dr. Ansari was an experienced doctor who worked in Charing Cross Hospital in London.⁹⁷ Moreover, we also learn from B.R. Nanda that Ansari was known as the best physician of Northern India. Apart from his abilities, he was also famous for his charitable nature; as a doctor who attended on the wealthiest families of India, he never charged poor patients.⁹⁸ Years later, Halide Edip would describe him as “the most representative Indian.”⁹⁹ Özcan states that the mission included five doctors and nineteen nurses who left Bombay on 15 December 1912. When they arrived in İstanbul, they had the opportunity to meet many Turkish officials including Enver Pasha. They were even received by the Sultan who honored them by a badge.¹⁰⁰ In İstanbul they learned many things about the actual stages of the Ottomans’ struggle against the Western powers. With this first-hand information from Istanbul, they informed the Muslim community with articles and reports which they sent to newspapers such as *Comrade*, *Zamindar*, and *al-Hilal*.¹⁰¹ This was important for the Islamic community in India because the reports about the Ottoman State in Indian newspapers were provided mostly by British press agencies that most Muslims distrusted. Finally, after eight months of assistance to treat Turkish soldiers in İstanbul, the medical mission returned to India with a lot of knowledge about the situation in Turkey and a deep feeling of relief and joy because they did what they could do for the Turks. Soon after their return, in a conference in Aligarh, they told

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 218.

⁹⁵ P. Hardy, *The Muslims of India*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 172.

⁹⁶ Nanda, 80.

⁹⁷ Özcan, 219.

⁹⁸ Nanda, 132.

⁹⁹ Halide Edip, *Inside India*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 8.

¹⁰⁰ Özcan, 219.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

the audience that Western Powers were determined to overwhelm the Turks and Britain was one of them.¹⁰² As Özcan emphasizes, the importance of this mission lies not in the fact that it was an example of the devotion of Indian Muslims, but it was the first time that prominent Indian Muslims had the chance to have direct contact with the Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals.¹⁰³ Mim Kemal Öke states that in 1914 a CUP unit visited Indian Muslims to express the gratitude of the Turkish people. The CUP unit's visit was led by the Turkish Red Crescent and headed by Dr. Adnan Adıvar.¹⁰⁴ Dr. Adıvar and the rest travelled many cities and met prominent Indian Muslims like Mohammed Ali to exchange views upon the current situation of the Islamic world. However, we have reason to believe that the visit of the CUP unit was not a mere courtesy call, but it was a mission organized by *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, the underground organization of the CUP.¹⁰⁵ This will be elaborated in “Turkish *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*'s (CUP's Secret Organization) Mission in India.”

The other important mission that the Muslim intellectuals of India organized and headed was a diplomatic mission to London and other capitals in Europe. This topic can be included in the efforts of the Indian Muslims outside India in their struggle in favor of the Turkish cause, and it can be traced from the work of Mim Kemal Öke, *Hilafet Hareketleri* (Caliphate Movements).¹⁰⁶ To start with, a letter was addressed to Prime Minister Lloyd George in 1920, after the Treaty of Sèvres. In this letter, the demands of the Muslim community were put as follows: Muslims want the status of pre-war Turkey; the caliphate must be preserved under Ottoman rule; territorial integrity of the Ottomans must be preserved and the lives of Balkan Muslims should be protected. Prominent Indian Muslims also wrote articles in English newspapers, such as Amir Ali's article that was published in *The Times* that urged the English not to ignore the demands of pro-Turkish Muslims. More important than the efforts in England was the Khilafat Movement's delegation that traveled to Europe. In January 1920, the Khilafat Committee paid a visit to the

¹⁰² Mim Kemal Öke, *Hilafet Hareketleri*, 34.

¹⁰³ Özcan, 222.

¹⁰⁴ Öke, *Hilafet Hareketleri*, 43.

¹⁰⁵ Özcan, 243.

¹⁰⁶ Öke, 80-92. In this part of his book, Öke gives many details about that diplomatic mission which is important for the course of this study in order to show the efforts by the Muslim Indian community to help the Turkish Independence Movement.

Viceroy to give a memorandum that expressed the Muslims' attitude about Turkey's situation. The Committee members also expressed their intentions to visit his Majesty's government and to voice their ideas in London directly to the authorities. Later, at the end of February a Khilafat Conference was held in Calcutta which declared that in case of an inadequate Turkish peace, there would be no loyalty from the South Asian Muslims. In addition, a declaration of support for Mustafa Kemal and Enver Pasha was made as the two men were named as the protectors of the Caliph.

The Khilafat Delegation arrived in London in early March and headed to the office of the Secretary of State Montague, who did not receive them, but the head of the delegation, Mumammed Ali, repeated the demands that they made to the Viceroy in a more diplomatic manner. When they were told that the Prime Minister was too busy to receive them, Muhammad Ali said that he, the Prime Minister, had always time for Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, and it would be a shame for him not to grant the same time for his British subjects. That approach worked and the delegation was received by Prime Minister Lloyd George, but rather distantly. Muhammad Ali emphasized the injustice of ousting the Turks out of Istanbul and that it would look like a new crusade against the Muslim world. Moreover, the caliph could not be held as a hostage and he was not a "Pope." In response, Lloyd George claimed that because of the wretchedness of Anatolia, Turks were no longer able to rule themselves and the British intention was based on humane considerations, not religion. The brief visit of the delegation ended with Muhammad Ali's comments that if they were forced to choose between their loyalty to the Crown and their religious commitments, their priority would always be with Islam.¹⁰⁷

The delegation was invited to a number of conferences and they also visited some newspapers to express their views. First, they were invited to Anglo-Ottoman association, whose president was Marmaduke Pickthall. There, Muhammad Ali stated that their claims were not in favor of the Turks but of Islam; they were defending not a narrow-minded nationalism but an international outlook, and that

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 87.

was why they declared a *jihad* which wouldn't be fought by tanks but by logic and conviction. Their visit to the *Daily Herald* focused on the futility of the allegations of Armenians about Turkish massacres. However, the efforts of the delegation were harshly criticized as Muhammad Ali and others were unaware that they were British subjects while they challenged the imperial policies of Britain. The Khilafat Delegation left England for Paris in April. Unhappily, they were despised by the French authorities but visited newspapers, gave lectures, and even met the Ottoman Peace Committee in Versailles. The delegation also sent a telegraph to the Peace Council of the Allied Forces and asked them not to allow the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. In July, Muhammad Ali met the Italian Prime Minister Giolitti. Giolitti tried to calm Ali that their intention was not to dismantle the Ottoman state, and he supported the independence efforts of all eastern peoples. Muhammad Ali also visited the Pope and stated their demands to stop the Western Powers' atrocities, but the Pope gave no hope to him.¹⁰⁸ From Rome, Muhammad Ali traveled to Switzerland in August to visit Talat Pasha and other members of the CUP. As "a member of the Confederation of Asian Muslims" Muhammad Ali told them that Mustafa Kemal had to be supported. During a meeting in Terriet where Afghan and Egyptian nationalists were present, Muhammad Ali mentioned that Indian and Turkish independence struggles were fought against the same enemy and he guaranteed that Indian sepoy would no longer be made to fight against Turks.

The *ulama* [Islamic scholars] in India also became interested in politics because of their worries about the fate of the Islamic caliphate in Istanbul. As the Italians invaded Tripoli, the course of events went worse and worse for the Turks. The first incidence of the *ulama*'s participation in politics was the establishment of *Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Ka'ba* by the *ulama* of Farangi Mahal (an Islamic school of higher education in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh) in 1913.¹⁰⁹ But it was after World War I that the *ulama*'s concern was intensified on the issue of the caliphate. In the spring of 1919, Muslim leaders of Bombay decided to form a Khilafat Committee that became one of the most institutionalized movements initiated by a wide range of the Muslim

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 91.

¹⁰⁹ Aziz Ahmad, "India and Pakistan," in *The Cambridge History of Islam Volume 2A: The Indian Sub-Continent, South-East Asia, Africa and the Muslim West*. Ed. P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton & Bernard Lewis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 98.

community in India.¹¹⁰ The two implications of the word, in a sense, reflect the mindset of the sensitive Muslim community of India. Apart from the reference to the “*hilafet*,” which means caliphate in Arabic, an Urdu and Arabic word for “opposition” is “*khilaf*,” which makes “*khilafat*” the plural of the concept.¹¹¹ That is to say, the Khilafat Movement and its leaders were resolute to set off an opposition movement from a deliberative point of view.

A series of conferences were held by the Committee in various cities of India, and in all of these conferences, commitment to the Turkish cause was repeatedly emphasized. Also, boycotts were called for and the leaders of the movement stated repeatedly that it was the religious duty of all Muslims to withdraw co-operation with the government¹¹² whose continuation threatened the material and spiritual well-being of the Caliph. The most important contribution to the Khilafat Committee came from the Hindus and Indian National Congress. Mahatma Gandhi wanted to transform the newly-bred opposition from the Muslim community to support for an All-India independence movement. After an All-Parties Hindu-Muslim conference at Allahabad in February 1920, the leading figure of the Khilafat Committee, Muhammad Ali Jauhar, declared on behalf of the Committee that “it was religiously unlawful for Muslims to continue to serve in the British army and that if Britain attacked Turkey, the Muslims of India would declare India an independent republic.”¹¹³ This was the same Muhammad Ali who, back in 1914, before World War I broke out, wrote his famous article, “The Choice of Turks,” in his daily newspaper *Comrade*, which led to his long imprisonment afterward. In that article, Muhammad Ali pleaded with the Turks not to fight with the Germans against the British, since that would leave the Indian Muslims in a very awkward situation,¹¹⁴ which became true.

There was no question of the intention of the Khilafat Movement to be completely pro-Turkish. Be it in their conferences and meetings or in their intention to collaborate with Hindu leaders, the movement’s aim was to reinforce the

¹¹⁰ Nanda, 209.

¹¹¹ Aziz Ahmad, “India and Pakistan,” 98.

¹¹² Nanda, *Gandhi*, 209.

¹¹³ Hardy, 190.

¹¹⁴ Özcan, 253.

commitment of Indian subjects of the British Empire to help the Turkish cause of independence. More importantly, the movement's defending the Ottomans' right to hold the seat of the caliphate in İstanbul was very meaningful. As Ş. Tufan Buzpınar shows, the legitimacy of a non-Arab caliph was made a point of issue by many British agents in the Middle East as well as some members of the Arab *ulama* and nobility.¹¹⁵ Most of these objections were centered on the claim that the true caliph had to be a member of the *Quraysh* tribe, the tribe that the Muslim Prophet belonged to. Although the debate on the Islamic Caliphate is not the subject of this study, it is worth noting the views of the Khilafat leaders on this issue. In 1920, in an article by one of the most prominent leaders of the Khilafat Movement, Abu'l Kalam Azad, it was accepted that after the Prophet and the four well-guided *khalifas* (better known as *Rashidun*), the caliphate became a world monarchy.¹¹⁶ Nevertheless, for Azad, recognition of the Islamic Caliph by all Muslims remained a religious obligation. Azad holds that if Akbar (the great Mughal Emperor) had performed the *hajj* he would have heard the *khutba* read in the name of the sultan of Turkey just as if he was an ordinary Muslim. He also added that, as soon as the Mughal emperors lost authority in India, then the obligation of the Indian Muslims toward the Ottoman Caliph revived.¹¹⁷ In that respect, Azad was not different from the other members of the Committee in their fondness for the idea of a Turkish Caliphate, since in Indian mosques, after the last Mughal Emperor was expelled and the Mughal Empire ended, the *khutbahs* (Friday Sermon) during Friday prayers were delivered in the name of the Ottoman Sultans. According to Özcan, this tradition dates back to 1862-63.¹¹⁸

Interestingly, the reason for the Khilafat Movement to survive seems to be attached only to the existence and support of the idea of the Islamic Caliphate, but it was highly possible for it to turn out to be an instrument in the fight for Indian independence. Or to put it more correctly, the movement's function was ramified

¹¹⁵ Buzpınar, Ş. Tufan. "Opposition to The Ottoman Caliphate in The Early Years of Abdülhamid II: 1877-1882" *Die Welt Des Islams* Vol. 36, Issue 1 Mar.:1996 pp. 59 (59-89) Prof. Buzpınar's article skillfully proves also how the British attempted to make use of the Caliphate in favor of their policies, too.

¹¹⁶ Nanda, 191.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 192.

¹¹⁸ Azmi Özcan, 29.

with the initiative of Gandhi, who opted to collaborate with the Muslim community. After the Bengal Khilafat Conference called for a Khilafat Day on March 19, 1920, Gandhi was in a meeting at Meerut with some of the well-known Muslim leaders and announced that a joint meeting of Hindu and Muslim leaders had just been held and had approved a four-stage program of non-cooperation with the government which included a withdrawal from government service and non-payment of taxes.¹¹⁹ The Muslim leaders were not favorable or keen on non-cooperation as a strategy against the British, but some of them approved the agreement because a Hindu-Muslim alliance would mean greater pressure on the government to urge Britain to leave the Turks alone. But this quasi-reconciliation was likely to be disappointing because of India's fragile social and religious structure. First, apart from Gandhi and his supporters, there were many Hindu leaders who were skeptical about the support from the Muslim community, and they had the chance to defend their rightness when, during the Anglo-Afghan War, the Muslim leaders declared that it was the duty of all Muslims to join the *jihad* of Afghan Emir if he approached India.¹²⁰ There is no doubt that the idea of a *jihad* in India must have alarmed the Hindus about a possible fight between Muslims and non-Muslims in India. Moreover, it was Gandhi who, later in June 1920, realized that the Hindu skepticism about Hindu-Muslim collaboration was not groundless. After the Treaty of Sèvres,¹²¹ the Muslim community was shocked because the treaty nearly deprived the Ottoman state of its rights as a sovereign state by dictating painful terms. The outrage Muslim leaders expressed in an All-India Congress Committee at Varanasi irritated Gandhi, who reacted to them by saying "Impatience may any day be reduced to madness, and the latter must inevitably lead to violence."¹²²

It is clear that with the sacrifices, conferences, diplomatic and medical missions, the Khilafat Movement of India had an important impact on the Turkish forces that fought for independence. On the other hand, the movement helped the Indian

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 214.

¹²⁰ Hardy, 195.

¹²¹ For more information on the Treaty of Sèvres, see Heather Lehr Wagner, *The Division of the Middle East: The Treaty of Sèvres* (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 2004), 26-89; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 192-97

¹²² Nanda, 217.

Muslims to recover their self-confidence as an effective group in India, something they lacked since the 1857 rebellion. However, the fate of the movement dimmed after the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate by the Turkish National Assembly in March 1924.

Turkish *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*'s [CUP's Secret Organization] Mission in India

Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa was a secret organization first established as a special unit by the CUP leaders to organize local guerilla warfare in Tripolitania during the Italian invasion.¹²³ Later, it became an underground organization that acted as the Ottoman Empire's operational intelligence service during the World War I. It is known today that even though the organization members officially claimed to report to the CUP and to the Interior Ministry, in reality the organization was under the control of Enver Pasha. According to Philip H. Stoddard,¹²⁴ who studied the aims and strategies of *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, the creation of this organization was “the unconscious effort by a leader of the CUP [Enver Pasha] to introduce to the Ottoman State the idea of a political and military intelligence service along the lines of those present in the West, which would not only collect intelligence, but would also develop responses to its findings.”¹²⁵ Erol Köroğlu states that the way the organization operated was absolutely secret and was financed with secret funds. With the survival of the state being its main aim, its agents obeyed loyally and uncritically every order given by their leader, Enver Pasha. Its duty was to organize propaganda activities through operatives, especially in Istanbul but also throughout the Empire — and sometimes beyond its borders.¹²⁶ Among these far-away lands, India was an important center of support and assistance.

The data from the official archives of Turkey about the mission of *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* in India reveals little-known facts about the close relationship between the

¹²³ Ahmad, 227.

¹²⁴ In the course of this study, the resources that mention *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* point out the study that Dr. Phillip Stoddard completed as his PhD dissertation in 1963 at Princeton University, and this book remains uncontested on the subject. Dr. Stoddard's study has been published in English, but I could only find the Turkish translation. See, Philip Stoddard, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1993).

¹²⁵ Quoted in Erol Köroğlu, *Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity Literature in Turkey During WWI*, (London: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2007), 86.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 87.

Indian Muslims and the Ottoman state. Although the mission failed to prove useful to either side, the venture still deserves attention and interest. The most extensive study on this mission was made by Vahdet Keleşyılmaz, who made research in the archives of the Turkish Department of Chief of Staff. With the of the findings by Keleşyılmaz¹²⁷ and others, we understand that there was more than an emotional bond between the two sides before the World War I, insofar as some CUP leaders, especially Enver Pasha, dreamed to organize an Indian independence movement that would eventually weaken and distract British policy concerning the Ottoman state. Those proceedings by *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* both in İstanbul and India aimed to start various local uprisings in the northern part of India. Also, these relations show that a dazzling series of conspiracies were witnessed both in India and Turkey. Conspiracies of British, German and Turkish intelligence organizations are very difficult to trace today because of the hidden nature of any intelligence activity. Still, it is important to study the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* mission because it sheds light on the Indian conception and the reflection of Turkish independence.

In order to overcome the complexity of the Indian mission of *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, primarily we should recognize the bilateral nature of the intelligence that flowed to both sides. First there were the Indian nationalists in Istanbul who had contacts with other expatriate Indians in the USA, Berlin, and Geneva. According to Ahmad's article on Indian nationalists abroad, the organizations led by Indian nationalists in those places were led by an expatriate Hindu called Har Dayal who left India in 1908 because he believed that the policy of the British government was to enslave Hindus by destroying Hindu public conscience and their national character.¹²⁸ Har Dayal first went to Paris and met Egyptian nationalists and Young Turks. Then he moved to the USA and joined the anti-British *Ghadr* [revolt] movement, of which he became a prominent leader in a short time. Ahmad states that the *Ghadr* movement was first formed by the Indian peasants who migrated to the USA and their aim was to end British rule in India. Har Dayal's activities

¹²⁷ Vahdet Keleşyılmaz, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa'nın Hindistan Misyonu (1914-1915)* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 1999), 85. Especially, the third section of the Keleşyılmaz's book focuses on the strategies of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* to organize a movement for the independence of India.

¹²⁸ Feroz Ahmad, "1914-1915 Yıllarında İstanbul'da Hint Milliyetçi Devrimcileri," *Yapıt*, No. 6 (August-September 1984): 6.

disturbed the British and after he was forced to leave the country he went to Geneva. It was there that Har Dayal met the German officials who thought that he might be useful to German interests in India. Therefore, he was brought to Istanbul by the Germans to organize some *Ghadr* members who would be sent to southern Iran or Baluchistan. Moreover, Keleşyılmaz states that Har Dayal presented the Germans with a plan to establish public awareness in northern India against the British by organizing political social bodies like the Young Hindustan Association, the Sword of India Society, and the Indian Muslim Brotherhood Society.¹²⁹ The programs and aims of these associations were very similar and they were organized in a very disciplined manner. Although there is no record about earlier familiarity, according to Ahmad, it is very likely that the German authorities informed Enver Pasha about Har Dayal and these plans.¹³⁰ However, we learn from Vahdet Keleşyılmaz that in May 1915 Har Dayal introduced a three-stage program that included liberation, propagating Turkey in India and raising awareness about Pan-Orientalism.¹³¹ Har Dayal was very active and ambitious and in Istanbul, together with other members of *Ghadr*, he published a newspaper named *Cihan-ı İslam* [Islamic World] that was printed in Arabic, Turkish, and Hindi, and also an Urdu version of the newspaper was sent to India.¹³² The Anglo-Indian government later prohibited the distribution of the newspaper in India.¹³³ Meanwhile, German officials organized other Indian nationalists in Berlin to form an Indian Nationalist Party and offered them to accept a German contribution — arms and money — that would be returned after independence.¹³⁴ Everything was ready for a joint venture when Har Dayal arrived in Berlin in 1915. The objective of the Indo-German mission was to reach Afghanistan and convince Emir Habibullah to fight against the British.¹³⁵

The second important aspect of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* activity in India was carried out by Turkish officials in competition with the Germans. In order to analyze the role of *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* in India, we should pay attention to the factors that

¹²⁹ Vahdet Keleşyılmaz, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa'nın Hindistan Misyonu (1914-1915)*, 64-69.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ Keleşyılmaz, 56-62.

¹³² Öke, 49.

¹³³ Özcan, 244.

¹³⁴ Ahmad, 9.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

prepared the ground for *Teşkilat*'s agents. The most significant of these were the Ottoman consulates in India. These consulates played important roles in providing communication between two communities in India and Istanbul as well as organizing meetings and raising donations. The first Turkish consulates in India were opened as early as 1849 in Calcutta and Bombay,¹³⁶ and consulates in other cities followed in time. Özcan states that Ottoman consulates were not acting as the representatives of the Sultan but of the Muslim Caliph, a role that urged them to intervene in local policies regarding not the Turkish but the Muslim population.¹³⁷ These interventions by the Ottoman consulates caused problems to the British in India during Abdulhamid's reign. But there were also times that the Ottoman consulates sometimes helped the British to carry out policies when these policies complied with Turkish policy. For instance, during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, Abdulhamid planned to send a diplomatic mission to Afghan Emir Shir Ali Khan.¹³⁸ After counseling and getting their approval, the mission set out to convince the Emir to join the war against the Russians, who were the common enemy of the Ottomans and the British at the time. During that mission, the role of the consulates in enabling the effectiveness of the metropolitan policies was clearly seen.¹³⁹ Furthermore, especially during the Hamidian regime, Ottoman consulates in India organized the Muslim community for petitioning the Sultan-Caliph to ask for guidance and help.¹⁴⁰ The objective of these petitions which were mostly published in newspapers in Istanbul, was to show the British the significance of religious sentiment of Indian Muslims and the influence of the Ottoman state.¹⁴¹ However, the Ottoman state found it difficult to appoint consulates to each city abroad but

¹³⁶ Keleşyılmaz, 7. Additionally, in 1883 one of those Ottoman consulates to Bombay was Abdülhak Hamid (Tarhan) (1852-1937) who was the *Şair-i Azam* (the Grand Poet) of Turkish Literature. An analysis of Tarhan's friends and dealings in Bombay can be read in, Syed Tanvir Wasti, "The Indian Sojourn of Abdülhak Hamid," *Routledge Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 34 (1998): 33-43.

¹³⁷ Özcan, 79.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 116.

¹³⁹ One of the officials in that diplomatic mission, consulate Şirvanlı Ahmed Hamdi Efendi, wrote and published a travelogue concerning the visit. His accounts start with his arrival in Bombay and go on with his details about Deccan, Jaipur, Benares, Lucknow, and many more cities. The book ends with his memories of his visit to Holy places in Mecca. The details of the mission and many other interesting observations of an Ottoman scholar can be traced in the book. See Şirvanlı Ahmed Efendi, *Seyahatname Hindistan, Svat ve Afganistan* (İstanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1995).

¹⁴⁰ Özcan, 166.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

assigned honorary consulates who were chosen from the local population and who stood out with their sensitivity for the Ottoman political issues. According to Öke, the first *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* mission in India started with the help of one of those honorary consulates.¹⁴² In 1913, Tevfik Bey from the *Teşkilat* came to Rangun and appointed a resident, Ahmet Molla Davud, as the Ottoman honorary consulate. Tevfik Bey brought a pile of *Cihan-ı İslam* newspapers that covered a letter from Enver Pasha who called for Indian Muslims for help. But the main aim of Tevfik Bey's visit, which coincided with Sultan Mehmed V's notice for *jihad* against the Great Powers for all Muslims in the world, was to start uprisings in various towns of India. Öke points out that one of the closest associates of Tevfik was Ali Ahmed Siddiki, who was a member of the Indian Red Crescent Community that visited Turkey in 1912,¹⁴³ and it is probable that the Turkish side had never lost contact with Siddiki since he was in İstanbul. Tevfik Bey and Siddiki attempted to stir up Muslim locals in Rangun, contacted another *Teşkilat* member in Singapore and tried their luck there, got in touch with another member in Bangkok, and later with another in Burma to organize a revolt in China.¹⁴⁴ It was not surprising that although some revolts did take place, all their efforts failed, and each time British intelligence caught the accomplices and killed or imprisoned them. Öke also tells us that in the northwestern part of the country a militant organization called *Mujahidin* [Fighters] were in touch with another *Teşkilat* unit that was organized by Har Dayal.¹⁴⁵ Their aim was to extend the range of the *Teşkilat*'s activity to all Afghan and Iranian lands in order to gather men who would fight with the Ottoman army both at home and where needed. In another article, Mim Kemal Öke tells about a more deliberate activity of *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* that was later called "Silk Letters Conspiracy."¹⁴⁶ The objective was to coordinate an extensive revolt that would start in the northwestern part and spread to the whole country. Kazım Bey, a Turkish lieutenant, arrived in Afghanistan in August 1915 and coordinated a military force from the Pathan tribes. Muhammad Qasim Zaman states that in Kabul, even a "provisional Indian

¹⁴² Öke, 50-54.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 50.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 51.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 52.

¹⁴⁶ Mim Kemal Öke, *Mustafa Kemal Paşa ve İslam Dünyası Hilafet Hareketleri*, (İstanbul: Aksoy Yayınları, 1999), 37-39.

government” was established with a Hindu, Raja Mahendra Pratap, as its president and Ubaidullah Sindhi as the home minister.¹⁴⁷ More interestingly, in Turkey Enver Pasha decided to form an “Indian Legion” of Muslim soldiers of the Anglo-Indian army who were being held as war prisoners in Konya. Those captives would first be convinced to fight for the *Teşkilat*, and then the Ottoman officers would train them. The reason why the name Silk Letters was given to the operation was, that in order to communicate with the Indian side of the operation, Enver Pasha thought of delivering his letters by hiding them in silk handkerchiefs that looked like souvenirs and giving them to Indian associates of the plan who came to visit Mecca. Unfortunately, once again the plot on the Indian side was revealed to the British and the Indian associates were punished. On the other hand, in Istanbul, once the operation led by Enver Pasha and the *Teşkilat* alone came to light, the Germans — as Ottomans’ allies — were furious because they were not informed. And also they wanted to be aware of everything in the East since, like Britain, they had imperialist intentions and didn’t want to risk them.

The aim of this part of our study is to point out the existence of cooperation between Indian Muslims and Turks. We have already said that there is a much literature and academic studies about the collective memory between India and Turks. However, the Indian mission of *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* — already a little-known fact — shows us that there are still many untold stories and unnoticed aspects of this relation. It should be kept in mind that while the mission was in India, the Ottoman army and militias were fighting to the death the Allied Powers of Europe. The *Teşkilat*’s mission indicates a broader vision of Ottoman officers or what is usually assumed. Unfortunately, that vision was so broad that it was inevitable for the mission to fail.

The Role of the Media to Support the Turkish Independence Movement in India

We have already mentioned that Muhammad Ali’s *Comrade* and Har Dayal’s *Cihan-ı İslam* were active in invoking the Muslim community in favor of the

¹⁴⁷ Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age: Religious Authority and Internal Criticism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 12-13.

Turkish cause for independence. Also, Azmi Özcan mentions an earlier example of these Indian newspapers called *Peyk-i İslam* [Islamic Connection] in 1881.¹⁴⁸ Özcan states that, started by two Indian Muslims who were exiled from India by the British, the newspaper was published in Urdu and English to be distributed in India. Funded by Said Pasha and continued to be printed for a short time, *Peyk-i İslam* was closed down as the British put pressure on the Sultan to stop the Pan-Islamist propaganda in India.¹⁴⁹ Similarly, the Ottoman state did the same thing to the British when a newspaper in London called *Al Khilafe* [Caliphate] was established and questioned the legitimacy of the Ottoman sultans' claim for the Islamic caliphate.¹⁵⁰ The Ottoman ambassador in London, Musurus Pasha, even asked an Indian who resided in London to start a newspaper called *Al Gayret* [The Effort] that would counter to the editions of *Al Khilafe* to propagate the Ottoman sultan's righteous claim to the Islamic caliphate.¹⁵¹ It is an important note that to Musurus Pasha's *Al Gayret*, the British were not as harsh as they were to Istanbul-based *Peyk-i İslam*, perhaps to show the Ottomans that the press was free and there was freedom of speech in Britain. At any rate, it is clear that for the British and the Muslim world, the press was regarded as a weapon before the beginning of the shooting war.

In addition to these newspapers, India-based newspapers were started and managed by prominent Muslim figures that were effective in keeping Islamic sensitivity toward domestic and international politics alive. For example, Muhammad Ali Jauhar's *Comrade* and Abu'l Kalam Azad's *Al Hilal* newspapers were effective in this way. There were also other newspapers that intended to inform the public about Ottoman issues and keep religious sentiment alive at critical times during the history of the Ottoman Empire. Among the examples of these newspapers are *Zamindar* and *Paisa Akhbar* in Lahore, *Vakil* in Amritsar, *Hablu'l Metin* in Bengal, and *Hamdard* in Delhi. Apart from informing readers about the war, the main function of these newspapers was to maintain awareness about the plight of the

¹⁴⁸ Özcan, 168.

¹⁴⁹ The data about *Peyk-i İslam* was obtained by Özcan from the archive of Yıldız Palace, where many documents of the Hamidian régime can be found and studied today.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 172.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 173.

Muslim world and its oppression under the military or political hegemony of the Western powers.

In order to understand the Muslim stance during the Turkish struggle, we should first look back briefly to the development of the press in India because it is useful to see the evolution of the function of the newspapers in India as well as for the Muslim community in India. According to Qasim Nizamani, the first newspaper in the subcontinent appeared in manuscript in the 1300s.¹⁵² Nizamani also states that the first printing house was established by the British in Bombay.¹⁵³ Then a British entrepreneur, William Hickey, made the first printed newspaper *Hicky Gazette* in 1780¹⁵⁴ and the efforts of the British to control these newspapers followed.¹⁵⁵ As Urdu became the prominent language among Muslims and the effectiveness of Persian diminished, the Urdu newspapers appeared, of which the first was printed in Calcutta in 1822.¹⁵⁶ But Nizamani states that the history of Urdu journalism started with *Delhi Urdu Ahbar* which was founded in 1836.¹⁵⁷ Halil Toker states that in an article published in August 1876 in *Delhi Urdu Ahbar*, the writer called on the Muslims of India to help the Turks because the extinction of the Ottoman state would result in the negligence of the Muslim world by the West.¹⁵⁸ After the 1857 Rebellion, Urdu press in Delhi was seen as a provocateur of the events and harsh regulations were applied by the British to tame the Urdu newspapers.¹⁵⁹ As a post-1857 constituent in the Muslim intellectual world of India, Sir Seyyid Ahmed Khan's efforts are also important to note. In place of the *Aligarh Institute Gazette* that was closed after the Rebellion, he founded the *Scientific Society Magazine*, which was published in Urdu and English in 1866.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵² Qasim Nizamani, *Journalism in Sub-Continent History of Mass Media* (Jamshoro: University of Sindh Press, 2007), 4.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 5

¹⁵⁴ Alfred Spencer, *The Memoirs of Alfred Hickey. Vol II* (London: Hurst and Blackett Ltd Press, 1925), 175.

¹⁵⁵ Zekai Kardaş, *Ebu'l Kelam Azad ve El-Hilal Gazetesi Çerçevesinde Türkiye ve Türkler*, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, İstanbul University. 56.

¹⁵⁶ Nizamani, 6.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 15-21.

¹⁵⁸ Halil Toker, "Hindistan Hicret Hareketi," *Divan İlmî Araştırmalar* 17 (2004): 149.

¹⁵⁹ Nizamani, 113.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

The Indian newspapers that our subject is associated with stepped into the politics of the Muslim community shortly after the turn of the century. *Zamindar* was established in 1903 and it was run by Zafer Ali Khan.¹⁶¹ According to Zekai Kardaş, *Zamindar* became the first Indian newspaper that cited news from foreign news agencies like Reuters or Associated Press.¹⁶² Kardaş also states that at the time of Tripolitania War, the newspaper expanded its focus and started to report news that would interest Hindu readers. The reports of *Zamindar* quickly became very popular among the Muslim community.¹⁶³ Although there is a lot to mention on this subject, we will confine ourselves to giving examples from the editions of Muhammad Ali's *Comrade* and Abu'l Kalam Azad's *Al-Hilal* [the Crescent] and how they played an important role in the propaganda of the heroism and legitimacy of the Turkish struggle with European Powers. Nanda mentions that the leading figure of *Al Hilal*, Abul Kalam Azad, "was gaining an irresistible popularity among Muslims with the help of his high-flown Urdu, references from the magnificent past of Islam and ridicule of the feudal, aristocratic and sycophantic Muslim leaders in India who thrive on the bounty of the British rulers."¹⁶⁴ First published in Calcutta in July 1912, *Al Hilal* ceaselessly criticized British policies concerning the Ottomans from the beginning.¹⁶⁵ Nanda also quotes a correspondence of C.R. Cleveland, the director of the Criminal Investigation Department, in 1916 that describes Azad as follows: "I do not think there is any other personality that could arouse the same personal sympathy and fanaticism in the general Muhammedan community."¹⁶⁶ Kardaş states that in every issue of the newspaper, there was news from the Ottoman state and pictures of Turkish statesmen.¹⁶⁷ As the pressure from the government became intense through heavy fines and frequent governmental inspections, Azad

¹⁶¹ Kardaş, 62.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 63.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ Nanda, 114.

¹⁶⁵ Kardaş, 65.

¹⁶⁶ Nanda, 115.

¹⁶⁷ Kardaş, 65. In his unpublished dissertation, Zekai Kardaş quotes reports about Turkey and Turkish statesmen. According to Kardaş, during the Tripolitania War, there were 71 reports about the events in Libya or Istanbul. In addition, during the Balkan Wars 138 reports were published. The name and members of the CUP appeared 14 times, Enver Pasha's name 14 times, and Mustafa Kemal's name and deeds came up 12 times in *Al Hilal*. Other notable members of the Ottoman statesmanship also appeared 28 times.

started another newspaper called *Al Balagh* [News] which had a similar format and policy with *Al Hilal* but was short-lived.¹⁶⁸ Shortly after the publication of *Al Balagh* ceased, Azad was forced to leave Calcutta and was prevented from entering Punjab and the United Provinces. Then he went to Ranchi in the Central Provinces where he was interned until the end of 1919.¹⁶⁹

Abul Kalam Azad's *Al Hilal* tried to shape the Muslim public opinion in India into a modern and a more conscious state. In his earlier articles, Azad refused to see the nation state as the final political destiny for Muslims as he propounded the concept of "nation" as a European instrument that gathered millions, but for Muslims it was "God" [Allah] or "Islam."¹⁷⁰ In 1920, during his active participation in the Khilafat Movement, he endorsed the plan of mass movement of Muslims (*hijrat*) from India in order to give warning to the government who turned its deaf ear to the Khilafatist demands about the well-being of Turkey.¹⁷¹ But Azad did not linger on these ultra-conservative ideas during his struggle for the future of the Indian Muslim community. As the Khilafat Movement lost its momentum and the cause for a universal Muslim Caliph was lost, Abul Kalam Azad became aware of the *realpolitik* of Indian — and Turkish/Islamic — independence and turned himself into a Muslim nationalist. Nanda mentions that in 1926 when Motilal Nehru announced the formation of The Indian National Union as a "non-political" and "non-party" organization, he chose Azad as its co-founder.¹⁷² As mentioned before, he met Young Turks in Cairo and decided to set out a campaign for independence after they exchanged views. Kardaş states that Azad was familiar with modernization tendencies in North Africa and western Asia as well.¹⁷³

Comrade was a newspaper that depicted the enthusiasm and fervor of the Ali Brothers¹⁷⁴ in their active support of Turkish Independence and later the Khilafat Movement. Muhammad Ali and his brother Shaukat Ali launched a long-lasting

¹⁶⁸ Nanda, 115.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ Hardy, 180.

¹⁷¹ Nanda, 218.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 392

¹⁷³ Kardaş, 24.

¹⁷⁴ Most of the knowledge about Muhammad and Shaukat Ali brothers cited here are from Nanda, "The Ali Brothers," *Gandhi, Pan-Islamism, Imperialism and Nationalism*, from the chapter entitled as 121-145.

campaign to support Turks in their self-defense against the Great Powers. Both brothers were educated in Aligarh but only Muhammad Ali managed to go on to Oxford after graduating. That experience contributed to his ability to see world events more clearly and also gave him.¹⁷⁵ He started *Comrade* in 1911 in Calcutta, the governmental seat of India, where most of the news was expected to flow. The early tone of *Comrade* was pretty peaceful toward the non-Muslim residents of India. In one of those early articles he stated that “Islam could not teach Indian Muslims to keep aloof from a majority in this country even though its ideas are not their ideas and its gods is not their gods.”¹⁷⁶ He also thought that “it was possible to evolve out of the jealousies of today, a political entity on federal lines, a unique constitution, because in accordance to our unique situation, it would have to be a federation of faiths.”¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, Muhammad Ali’s stance on politics regarding the Muslim community at home and abroad grew stiff after the Italian invasion of Tripoli. After that, the outbreak of the Balkan Wars made Muhammad Ali and most Muslims in India alert to the news about the destiny of the Ottoman Empire as the last independent Islamic state¹⁷⁸ which was also where the spiritual leader of the Islamic faith resident. Calls for donation for the Turkish army went along the reports of *Comrade* about Turkey and the news from other Islamic lands. Özcan states that the awareness of the Muslim community increased the circulation of the newspaper, which led most of the weekly papers to publish daily.¹⁷⁹ This also bettered the financial situation of these newspapers and with the help of this financial relief Muhammad Ali started another newspaper called *Hamdard* [Fellow Sufferer] in 1913. *Comrade* also organized the medical mission mentioned above to be sent to Turkey at the time of the Tripolitania War. We have also seen that the members of this mission sent letters to *Comrade* and informed the readers about the trend of the war in order to keep the readers alert to the situation. These reports were effective to ensure the continuation of the Muslim community’s donations which were important in Istanbul.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 124.

¹⁷⁶ Hardy, 181.

¹⁷⁷ Quoted in Hardy, 182.

¹⁷⁸ Nanda, 130.

¹⁷⁹ Özcan, 201.

As it became evident that a major war would break out and Britain would definitely be a leading actor in this war, like many Muslims of prominence in India, Muhammad Ali was concerned about the possibility of an Anglo-Turkish war. At that stage, the difficulties in maintaining a healthy and timely flow of news under British propaganda and the idea of a double disaster for Turks and the Muslims of India in case of such a war led Muhammad Ali and others to panic. In *Comrade*, Muhammad Ali warned the Young Turks to be cautious for a war that would leave Turkey in a catastrophic state and Indian Muslims between two loyalties, one to their British rulers and the other to their spiritual leader.¹⁸⁰ When it was clear that Turkey chose to side with the Germans and against the British, in *Comrade* Muhammad Ali urged Muslims to pray for the Turks and continue to be alert to the events in Turkey.¹⁸¹ The *jihad* proclamation by the Sultan, who was under the control of the Young Turks, failed to achieve the targeted aim, but the efforts of the Ali brothers with their propaganda for the Turkish cause went on until the end of the war, which also continued hand in hand with the Khilafat Movement.

To sum up, India was in the forefront of the Islamic communities who were sensitive about the fate of the Ottoman state. Not only the Indian Muslims, but also the Muslims in Singapore, Bangkok, Indonesia and even in China were aware of the plight of the Ottomans thanks to the activities of *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*. We also have reason to believe that similar support was received from Iran, Egypt, and other communities in the Middle East at that time. When all aspects are considered and as the documents translated from the national archives show, there is no doubt that the most worthwhile support delivered to the Ottoman capital and Turkish nationalists was from India's Muslim community, which was unaware of the moment-to-moment political developments in Turkey because of communication difficulties. That was why the visits from both India and Turkey as equally important as the publication of the newspapers. This study shows the familiarity of Turkish intellectuals and leading politicians about the sincerity and support of Indians during late Ottoman times, which deserve attention from the scholars who study

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 248, 253.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 257.

comparative literature of India and Turkey. Especially the archival surveys and research is important for students in this field.

Apart from the donations and the meetings that were held in Delhi, Calcutta, and Bengal by the Muslim community, this study also sheds light on the short-lived but curious cooperation between Hindu nationalists and the Khilafat Movement in the struggle for Indian independence. The nature of Hindu-Muslim relations in India is such a vast subject rooted in historical struggle that it can only be glanced at here. Developed out of the political awareness and pragmatism of Mohandas Gandhi, a long-lasting collaboration between two communities against British rule could hypothetically have led India and the Eastern World in a very different direction from today's realities. Indeed, the root of this collaboration lies in the sentiment of all Indian intellectuals, regardless of faith, about the independence of Turks. This emphasizes the Turkish Independence struggle as one of the most remarkable events in the history of colonization. Though it was never officially colonized, the Ottoman state's fight against the European Powers was seen in the Eastern world as an inspiration to the colonized peoples of the East. After independence was gained, the Turkish nationalists had the chance to decide on their future by establishing a new state. It was inevitable that in the course of their revolutionary policies they would change the perceptions of their people as well as the peoples of the East.

After Independence: Kemalism and its Impact in India

In order to understand the break between the Eastern world and the changing patterns of the Turkish outlook after the establishment of the Republic, to glance at Kemalism as an ideology is necessary. The modes of life that were revolutionized by the reforms of the Kemalists brought many changes not only to the Turkish people's perception of government, of their place in their country, and their place in the world. These changes compelled Turks to leave their old sense of superiority above non-Muslims and to accept a new identity based on Turkish nationality. This was the primary break between Turks and the Eastern peoples since the Turks had long been seen as the champions of the Islamic world by the Arabs, Indonesians, Malays, Indian Muslims, etc. We have seen that especially after the conquest of Constantinople and the acquisition of the Islamic caliphate, Turks and the Ottoman

state had an uncontested place among Muslims. Therefore, the tremendous modifications in the social, political, religious, and educational lives of Turkish people after the Kemalist reforms were unsettling not only for the Turks themselves but especially for the Islamic world. The Kemalists had no concern other than their country's future. So long as the process of the Kemalist revolution in Turkey remains effective, the debate about positive and negative impacts of the Turkish revolution will continue to be debated from many aspects.

When the Turkish War of Independence was won by the Turkish nationalists, there were two paths for them to follow. One was safer and less difficult than the other: to restore the institutions of the *ancien régime*, i.e. the Ottoman state; the other was risky and strenuous: to create a new state out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. With the leadership of Mustafa Kemal¹⁸² (who later adopted the surname Atatürk- father of the Turks), the nationalists took the hard way and changed the cultural codes of the Turkish people together with the course of the history of the peoples of the East. It is important to point out a distinction at this point. Throughout this study, those Turkish nationalists who founded and led the revolutionary Turkish Republic will be referred as “reformers, modernists or Kemalists” because of their struggle to put the Turkish Republic on a new track. Also, there is another group which I choose to call “traditionalists” because of their objection not to the Westernization project of the Kemalists but to the radical and despotic nature of the reforms. That is to say, the traditionalists were not against the idea of reforming the political or social institutions that were inherited from the Ottoman state, but they had concerns that those reforms were presented to the public by force at the hands of a small élite. Moreover, the opposite attitudes toward domestic problems were the same as the approaches to foreign diplomacy, since the Kemalists had changed the institutional groundwork of the state. This change is most evident in Turkey's post-war attitude of avoiding intrusion to help Eastern peoples. This approach to foreign relations can best be described by Mustafa Kemal's dictum, “Peace at home, peace

¹⁸² The founder and the first president of the Republic of Turkey, the military and political leader of the Turkish independence movement Mustafa Kemal Atatürk will be referred as “Mustafa Kemal” in this study. Although in contemporary history writing there are several ways of referring him – such as Ghazi, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Atatürk, *Yüce Önder* (supreme) – “Mustafa Kemal” designates the leader of the independence and Nationalist Forces who liberated the country from Western military suppression.

in the world.” There were anticipated reforms which were inevitable for a polity to survive but the bewilderment of the Muslim communities after the unexpected disavowal of the Ottoman past by the new régime was obvious in many parts of the Eastern world. Instead of seeking ways to restore relations with the Western world, if Mustafa Kemal had aimed to form alliances with eastern countries and peoples to assist with the problems of non-Western countries — like the Ottoman sultans usually did — that would have a continuity in foreign policy.

The reforms of Mustafa Kemal were, for the most part, shocking to his people but were not without precedent. The reforms carried out by the Kemalists introduced many novelties into the traditional Turkish society; however, it is incorrect to assume that the Kemalists were the first who dreamed of a restored country based upon Westernization, since the history of modernization and Westernization dates back to much earlier times than the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. Niyazi Berkes tells us in *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, the first real interest in the Western modernization of the Ottoman state was felt when the treaty of Passarowitz (1718) halted the military advance of the Ottomans to the west.¹⁸³ Bernard Lewis mentions this idea and further adds that the statesman who was assigned by Ahmed III for the attempts of governmental reform was Nevşehirli Damat İbrahim Pasha, whom the Sultan sent as ambassador first to Vienna in 1719, and another to Paris in 1721 “to make a thorough study of the means of civilization and education, and report on those capable of application in Turkey.”¹⁸⁴ But the most immediate attempts of Westernization in the Ottoman era were witnessed in the *Tanzimat* [Reorganization] period.¹⁸⁵ The imperial edict of 1839 [*Tanzimat*

¹⁸³ Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (New Delhi: C. Hurst and Co. Publishers, 1998), 30-31.

¹⁸⁴ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 45-46. The Ottoman ambassador to Paris was known as Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi Efendi, who later published his travelogue. See *Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi Efendi Seyahatnamesi* (İstanbul: Hayat Tarih Mecmuası Yayınları, 1970).

¹⁸⁵ There are many historical, social, and political analyses of *Tanzimat*, both as an edict and a period. Because the issue of *Tanzimat* period in Turkey is a delicate one, it is difficult to pick the unbiased and truly academic studies on the subject. For this study, we have used the following texts whose fairness is accepted by many researchers: M. Şükrü. Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 72-109; Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (New Delhi: C. Hurst and Co. Publishers, 1998), 137-152; J. Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975* (New York: Cambridge University Press 2002), 55-172.

Fermanı] that was decreed by Abdülmecid I shook the foundational basis of the Ottoman Empire from two important aspects: first, with the edict the Sultan gave up some of his rights that were considered natural and inherent for centuries; and second, the traditional Ottoman legal categories of Muslims, *zimmi* [non-Muslim citizens] and non-Muslim foreigners to Ottomans, as well as non-Muslim Ottomans and *ecnebis* [foreigners] were all made subject to the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances and the Military Council. Later, as a product of the *Tanzimat* period and its institutions, the Young Ottomans (later to become Young Turks) movement emerged by the late 1880s. As Feroz Ahmad describes the movement, it was the first modern opposition movement that was critical of the Ottoman régime.¹⁸⁶ The members of this group were known with their negative approach to *Tanzimat* and later to the Sultan, although they were educated in the schools which were established during Abdulhamid's educational reforms.¹⁸⁷ Because they could not get along with Abdulhamid's despotism, they maintained their opposition abroad to the Hamidian rule. After the fall of Abdulhamid and the advent of a series of wars that led the country to a life-and-death struggle, the Young Turks and their followers became the champions of Turkish nationalism and later participated in the foundation process of the Republic of Turkey. In this manner, it becomes clear that the modernization and Westernization that the nationalists of Turkey fulfilled was only the last phase of the process.

When we look at Westernization during the late Ottoman period, we see that the new republic inherited several advantages. Roderic H. Davison mentions some advantages that the reforms of the *Tanzimat* period bequeathed to the Republic of Turkey:¹⁸⁸ first, the Republic inherited a Western-style central administration; second, the top-to-bottom provincial administration was effective; third, the Ottoman army was reasonably Western-style and in good shape; and finally, the nineteenth-century reforms in the Ottoman Empire turned it into a secularizing state in its ideas and institutions. In Davison's figurative delineation of the Republic,

¹⁸⁶ Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity* (Oxford: One Word Publishing, 2003), 36-39.

¹⁸⁷ Erik J. Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and the Nation Building* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 97-98.

¹⁸⁸ Roderic H. Davison, "Atatürk's Reforms: Back to the Roots," in *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History 1774-1923: Impact of the West* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990), 258.

Mustafa Kemal's republican revolution was "the child of the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918), the stepchild of the era of Abdulhamid (1878-1908), and the grandchild of the era of [*Tanzimat*] reforms (1826-1878)."¹⁸⁹ The last phase of these reforms is called 'Kemalism' and became the ideology of the Turkish state. Toynbee describes how that was accomplished and the meaning of Mustafa Kemal's reforms:

In the nineteen-twenties he [Mustafa Kemal] put through in Turkey what was perhaps as revolutionary a programme as has ever been carried out in any country deliberately and systematically in so short a span of time. It was as if, in our Western world, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the secularist scientific mental revolution at the end of the seventeenth century, the French Revolution had all been telescoped into a single lifetime and been made compulsory by law.¹⁹⁰

No doubt that it has been the most remarkable and persistent of all periods of such.

The "New People" of the Kemalists

The Kemalists did not hesitate a moment in performing their ambitious reforms so long as they obtained the ends that they dreamed of. Concisely, their dream was to create a new "people" that had "occidental" traits. There were many hard tasks for the nationalists to deal with during their foundation of the new state. The form of the state, whether it would be a constitutional monarchy or a mandate, or a democratic republic, had been a subject of debate in the Erzurum and Sivas assemblies in 1919.¹⁹¹ The partial participation of representatives in the National Assembly of 1920 from different sects of the ethnic and political spectrum was handled with the

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 259.

¹⁹⁰ Arnold Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial and The World and the West* (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), 252.

¹⁹¹ These debates were carried out by members of the Assemblies who were coming from different social backgrounds, so it was natural that various ideas were discussed and written down. For more information see Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Vol. 2* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 344-49; Patrick Balfour Kinross, *Atatürk: The Rebirth of A Nation* (Northern Cyprus: K. Rustem & Brother Publishing, 1981), 174-91; Also for an insightful account of the American mission to the Sivas Assembly to discuss mandate matters, see Seçil Karal Akgün, "The General Harbord Commission and the American Mandate Question" in *Studies in Atatürk's Turkey: The American Dimension*, ed. S. George Harris, & Nur Bilge Criss (Leiden: Brill Hotei Publishing, 2002), 55-83.

successful diplomacy of Mustafa Kemal and his friends. Also, there were international issues that were carried out with foreign committees. After all, the victorious nationalists of Turkey were founding a new state and they had to carry out their agenda in a war-stricken country in a very short time in order not to allow inner conflicts that were very easy to inflame in such a fragmented community. In short, the nationalists were faced with impossible tasks.

The Turkish nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal were in a difficult position and it is essential to study the Kemalist ideology with respect to its utopian approach to create an ideal society. We must evaluate the achievements and failures of that state ideology in its domestic and international dimensions.

The ideology of the new state is called “Kemalist” because it was named after the founder of the Republic, who was a great soldier, an astute politician, and a swift reformer at the same time. However, this shouldn’t give the impression that all nationalist leaders of the new Republic agreed with Mustafa Kemal while he was building his dream state. At the beginning, a series of political clashes took place among the nationalists upon deciding which way to follow — a revolutionary one or a reformative one. Although Mustafa Kemal gained the favor of every citizen with the help of his successful military career during and after the War of Independence, many of his close associates did not agree with him in matters concerning the aftermath of the war. In his speech at the National Assembly in Ankara in July 1920, he gave hints of the political reform he was preparing to make: “I think that the fundamental reality of our present-day existence has demonstrated the general tendency of the nation, and that is populism and people’s government. It means the passing of the government into the hands of the people.”¹⁹² Just like his further attempts, he acted quickly and presented the National Assembly his own populist program that stated “The People’s Government of Turkey is exercised by the Grand National Assembly.”¹⁹³ Simultaneous with that speech, the sultan-caliph was intact in Istanbul and was among those who admired Mustafa Kemal, and there were many who expected him to restore the authority of the Ottoman state. The best examples for that were Mustafa Kemal’s friends Rauf Bey (Orbay) and Refet Bey (Bele).

¹⁹² Quoted in, Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 256.

¹⁹³ Andrew Mango, *Atatürk* (London: John Murray Publishers, 1999), 241.

When Rauf Bey said in a speech in July 1922 that the abolition of the sultanate or caliphate would bring disaster and failure, Refet Bey agreed with him, saying that the existence of sultan-caliph could not be questioned.¹⁹⁴ But any opposition Mustafa Kemal faced during his program of revolution was easily handled by his resolute nature.

Mustafa Kemal was aware of the need for a functional device in his political strategy that would enhance his position as the leader and also that would convey his message to the communities at large. In order to achieve both ends, he founded a political party, *Halk Partisi* (People's Party, later Republican People's Party). Kinross states that he also believed that the first Grand National Assembly had outlived its purpose and a new, more moderate and "manageable" assembly was needed.¹⁹⁵ After the sultanate and caliphate were separated and the first was abolished in October 1922, the last Ottoman Sultan fled from the country on a British battleship. In Berkes' words, the Ottoman-Turkish society which believed their sultan was appointed by God to hold together the estates of the society which constituted its order¹⁹⁶ were for the first time in many centuries without a sultan. At that moment, Mustafa Kemal aimed to fill the political gap in the country with a new political order that would embrace everyone, and to fulfill this task the People's Party was founded in September 1923. He based his belief on the necessity of a political party that would appeal to all the people in the country:

The aim of a people's organization as a party is not the realization of the interests of certain classes over against those of others. The aim is rather to mobilize the entire nation, called People, by including all classes and excluding none, in common and united action toward genuine prosperity, which is the common objective for all.¹⁹⁷

He also set out on a month's tour of western Anatolia to establish close touch with the people. As Kinross points out, first-ever in Turkish history, the head of the state was leaving the capital to address his subjects directly to encourage them to believe

¹⁹⁴ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 257.

¹⁹⁵ Kinross, 364.

¹⁹⁶ Berkes, 10.

¹⁹⁷ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 463

they had a practical say in the government.¹⁹⁸ With a refreshed parliament and new political instruments, Mustafa Kemal gave another shock to the traditionalists with the proclamation of the Republic on 29 October 1923 and became the first president of the Republic of Turkey. For many people who were not ready for this change after the abolition of the sultanate, the caliph was the legitimate sovereign and head of the state — like a constitutional monarch. But Mustafa Kemal and his followers did not pay attention to these concerns because they wanted a total transformation that would encompass social, economic, and political aspects. They had no intention to rule the new state and society by traditional social conventions; they wanted to create a new, modern (i.e. secular) ideology that would lead Turkey to a place in the Western civilization of the twentieth century. Mustafa Kemal knew that in this project there was no place for anything which could create difficulties.

No wonder the abolition of the caliphate was more difficult than removing the sultanate — which was why Mustafa Kemal waited for more than a year after the abolition of the sultanate to do so. There were two important factors that urged Mustafa Kemal to take action against the most foundational institution of the Islamic world, the caliphate. First, the men of religion and the conservatives were becoming more resistant against reform and presumably would become more so against the reforms Mustafa Kemal had been planning. At that stage, Mustafa Kemal had to give the impression to his people that he was the champion of Islam. In 1923, from the pulpit of a mosque in Balıkesir, he said that Islam was the last and the greatest of all religious revelations and moreover the one that most conformed to logic and reason.¹⁹⁹ But these words and actions were nothing more than an effort to keep his popularity alive among the people. As Şükrü Hanioğlu states,

Like many Young Turks, Mustafa Kemal was profoundly influenced by the triumph of *laïcité* in France in 1905 and, viewing the French model as the authentic form of secularism, wished to apply it to the letter in Turkey. On the model of its French counterpart, Turkish *laïcité* strove to control religion and reduce it to a private affair, instead of merely creating a separation between mosque and state.

¹⁹⁸ Patrick Balfour Kinross, *Atatürk: The Rebirth of A Nation*, 365.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

Mustafa Kemal's achievements in this regard should not be underrated. He worked as if he were Leo the Isaurian, Martin Luther, the Baron d'Holbach, Ludwig Büchner, Émile Combes, and Jules Ferry rolled into one. He took a society in which religion had played a dominant role and led its transformation into a society administered by a strict scientific and secular ideology.²⁰⁰

The second factor that necessitated Mustafa Kemal to act against the post of caliphate was about the need for securing his political position. Feroz Ahmad states that as the reforms took heavy toll in the traditionalist camp, Mustafa Kemal's position became insecure because he feared losing this favor in the army, as he was falling out with popular ex-officers like Kazım Karabekir or Ali Fuat Bey (Cebesoy).²⁰¹ The disordered army that Mustafa Kemal led in the War of Independence (*Kuvva-i Milliye* or Nationalist Forces) was supported by many because of the belief that they were the army of the caliph and they were fighting for the glory of Islam. That was why the existence of the caliph was a threat to President Mustafa Kemal's authority and security. In a sense, after the Republic was founded and Mustafa Kemal was elected as the head of state, the existence of the head of Islam meant an inevitable clash between these conflicting forces. Furthermore, as Lewis states, the abolition of the caliphate also enabled him to neutralize the effect of *ulema* in large areas of jurisdiction of legal, social, and educational matters.²⁰² It was obvious that the absence in the social authority of *ulema* would have to be filled with new reforms in legal and educational practices. In addition, the Kemalists wanted to follow the materialism of the West, because its technology and its army with modern weapons, along with its ideas, were more attractive than the technological backwardness of the East. They believed that it was only by adopting this materialist worldview that the society could be transformed in the broadest sense. This could only be achieved by creating a secular society in which religion was controlled by the state, rather than being separated from it. Thus, in its historical course, the most crucial step toward the creation of Kemalist Turkey was taken by

²⁰⁰ M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 91.

²⁰¹ Feroz Ahmad, 86.

²⁰² Lewis, 265.

diminishing the impact of religion in society. In this way, more radical reforms were easy to be implemented since the opposition of the *ulema* no longer existed.

The Republic was established but it was too soon to become a fully developed democracy in the Western sense that Mustafa Kemal dreamt of. The political equilibrium was very sensitive and the opposition to the leader was experimental in different ways. First, the opposition in the Parliament formed a party called the Progressive Republican Party in November 1924, but a Kurdish rebellion (known as Şeyh Said Rebellion) in 1925 eradicated the possibility of democratic rule.²⁰³ The Progressive Republican Party was outlawed and extraordinary measures were taken by giving dictatorial powers to the government with the Law for the Maintenance of Order.²⁰⁴ But conspiracies against Mustafa Kemal continued and there was an attempted assassination in Izmir in 1926.²⁰⁵ The Independence Tribunals, which were touring courts of a state of emergency, tried many former CUP members, ex-officers, and some former close friends of Mustafa Kemal, and four would-be assassins were hanged. Hanioglu states that after the ruthless trials of the Independence Tribunals, “the opposition was either literally or figuratively dead. In October 1927 Mustafa Kemal delivered his famous thirty-six-and-a-half-hour *Speech* in which he claimed sole authorship of the War of Independence and the major reforms implemented in its wake, and condemned everyone who opposed him in the harshest terms.”²⁰⁶ Another experiment of establishing a multi-party democracy would have to wait until the 1930’s Liberal Republican Party.

As Mustafa Kemal felt that the new régime was more secure, further measures could be taken to Westernize the nation. The application of these measures seriously and without wasting time shows us how he idealized the values of the West, although a long war was fought against the countries that symbolized these values. This complicated relationship can be understood in Berkes’ words: “Mustafa Kemal's drive toward the West in spite of the West by methods contrary to Western liberalism was merely the logical consequence of his belief that the struggle for national liberation was one between advanced nations and nations that allowed

²⁰³ Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (New York: Routledge, 1993), 58.

²⁰⁴ Lewis, 266.

²⁰⁵ An insightful story of Izmir Assassination can be found in Andrew Mango, *Atatürk*, 358-69.

²⁰⁶ Hanioglu, 85.

themselves to be exploited by their insistence on their medievalism. The West was not a West of simply ‘modern sciences and techniques.’”²⁰⁷ One of the leading Kemalists and a close friend of Mustafa Kemal, F.R. Atay, clarifies the view of the new régime about the *ancien régime* thus:

This [traditional Ottoman view] was diametrically opposite to the Kemalist Revolutionary view. We were not the victims of the material superiority of the West. *We were the victims of that very moral superiority* which had given material superiority to the West. The West is an institution — the institution of freedom of the mind. The failure of the reactionaries was due to their identification of the "moral" with religion and their fear of our losing religion or nationality when the question of separating the world and religion was faced.²⁰⁸ (emphasis added)

In order to understand Atay’s claim about “being the victims of moral superiority” we should revise one of the explanations of the backwardness of the Islamic community in the face of the Western world that involves a peculiar mental state of the Muslims. According to that explanation, the Muslim world was confident about the state that Muslims were in, while the Western world was breaking new grounds with technological innovations. The roots of this confidence can be traced in the belief system — or the interpretation of Islamic view — that had been formulated through centuries by victories of rulers and studies of the *ulama*. Bedri Gencer formulates the difference between the Western and Eastern or Islamic mindset as follows: the Eastern worldview that was formed after the glorious times of the Eastern/Islamic powers could be summarized with *tedebbür* (being prudent); the Western mindset that was shaped after the 17th century could be described with the concept of *tecessüs* (inquisitiveness).²⁰⁹ Gencer attributes Eastern *tedebbür* that coincided with the technological advancements of the West to the confidence of Muslims. The source of this confidence was the fact that Islam is the last religion and because the way to salvation is apparent, what is more important is not to

²⁰⁷ Berkes, 464.

²⁰⁸ Quoted in *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹ Bedri Gencer, *İslam’da Modernleşme (1839-1939)* (Ankara: Lotus Yayınları, 2008), 45.

succeed in worldly matters but in *taqwa* (piety).²¹⁰ That is to say, because the followers of Islam were inherently superior to the non-Muslim West, the Muslims had nothing to prove about their supremacy. Clearly, this was a striking misinterpretation of their belief and caused them to value religious matters more than worldly matters such as scientific and technological advances. From the Young Turks to the Kemalists, the Western-oriented élite's avoidance of the *ulama* and the conflict between both groups can help us to comprehend the radical Westernization of the Turkish Republic. Under the light of this interpretation, the Kemalist reaction to tradition and to the extensions of the *ancien regime* was a result of their detestation of the traditional elements of late Ottoman society, whom they blamed for the backwardness and failures of the state.

In short, the Kemalists contributed to the early Westernization and modernization efforts by ending the Ottoman reign and replacing it with the Republic, by converting the old concept of *Osmanlılık* (Ottomanism) to a secular and rigid Turkish nationalism, and especially by abolishing all religious institutions like the caliphate, *tekkes* [dervish lodges] and the office of the *sheikh ul-Islam* (the chief religious officer in Ottoman Empire).

Klaus Von Beyme states that in international circulation there are three approaches to Kemalism: a) with its ungainly interpretation, Kemalism as it was practiced in the 1920s, b) Kemalism as a development model, and c) Kemalism as a praetorianist²¹¹ practice in politics.²¹² It should be stressed that these interpretations of Kemalism emerged after Mustafa Kemal's death, and a widely-accepted definition of Kemalism still does not exist. Since it is not one of the aims of this study, we are not going to attempt to define Kemalism; however, making sense of Kemalism as a state ideology is only possible by looking closely at what the Kemalists wanted to achieve in politics and especially what their social policies

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹¹ For more interpretation on the origins of praetorianism and a comparative approach toward praetorianist states, including Turkey, see Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973), 192-263; also, Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Politics," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (April, 1969): 382-404.

²¹² Klaus Von Beyme, "Batı ve Marksist Gelişme Teorilerine Göre Kemalizm," (Türkiye İş Bankası Uluslararası Atatürk Sempozyumu 1981), *Reprint*, 1-2.

were. Together with a peculiar *modus operandi*, the Kemalists executed a strategy to compose a new nation that would talk, think, dress, and live like a different folk from what they had been before the foundation of the Republic.

Although it is still debatable whether it is a doctrine or not, the ideological groundwork of Kemalism is set with the six “fundamental and unchanging” principles of the Republican People’s Party that were decided in the Third Party Congress held in May 1931.²¹³ These principles were Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Revolutionism, Statism/Etatism, and Secularism/Laicism.²¹⁴ Mustafa Kemal formulated his ideology in the aftermath the events of the second multi-party democracy trial. With the impact of the Great Depression of 1930, the Turkish economy, based largely on agriculture, was hit hard by the fall in commodity prices. Although ideological opposition had been defused for a long time, the opponents of the régime were accompanied by many whose financial situation was getting worse, and Mustafa Kemal was well aware of this.²¹⁵ As the head of the ruling Republican People’s Party and the President of the state, Mustafa Kemal personally asked his old friend Fethi Okyar to establish and lead an opposition party and called it *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (Free Republican Party; but because of the party’s economic vision, it was better known as the Liberal Republican Party). This second and last multi-party democracy experiment in Mustafa Kemal’s lifetime was ended after two unsettling events. The first one is known as the Menemen Incident, in which in the provincial town of Menemen, İzmir, a crowd led by a dervish sheikh called for the restoration of *sharia* and beheaded a reserve officer who had been sent to investigate.²¹⁶ However, there are reasons to believe that the outbreak of the Menemen Incident was due to local unrest that was unrelated to religious demands but to the financial policies of the Republican People’s Party. Second, the Anatolia visits of Fethi Okyar with a committee of the Liberal Republican Party in September 1930 ahead of the 1930 elections. According to Çetin Yetkin, Mustafa Kemal guaranteed the committee’s security, because he believed the crowd in İzmir would

²¹³ Ahmad, 88.

²¹⁴ A detailed description of these principles can be found in Shaw and Shaw, 375-95.

²¹⁵ Mango, *Atatürk*, 381.

²¹⁶ Ahmad, 88.

assault Okyar and the committee.²¹⁷ But sharply contrary to the predictions, the crowd welcomed and cheered the committee and things went out of control. Andrew Mango describes the scene:

The offices of the People's Party and of its newspaper were stoned, and İsmet's [İnönü] photographs were torn up. Security forces guarding the building opened fire, and killed a 14-year-old schoolboy. The father laid the bleeding body at Fethi's feet, with the words: 'Here is a sacrifice for you. We are ready to give others. Only save us.'²¹⁸

The elections of 1930 for local governments were mostly won by the Liberal Republican Party and Mustafa Kemal had to intervene by asking Fethi Okyar to dissolve the party. After Mustafa Kemal saw the obvious support that people gave to a party other than his, he decided to formulate his message for ordinary people to understand. This was the background for the preparation of the six principles of the Republican People's Party.

The Kemalists claimed to invest power in the people's hands, which did not seem compatible with the policies of the government, especially the policies of the ruling Republican People's Party. This was most obvious when an alternative party emerged. In fact, the power of the ruling élite was becoming increasingly double-headed. Mustafa Kemal was mostly busy with social and cultural transformation of the country, dealing with institutions like the Turkish History Association or the Turkish Language Association. One of the interpretations about the reason behind Mustafa Kemal's intention to create an opposition party with his own hands was that because the governmental offices and the Republican People's Party were run by the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, Mustafa Kemal needed a counterweight to the prime minister.²¹⁹ Whatever the reason, the three-months-old episode of the Liberal Republican Party ended in bitter failure of democracy in the young Turkish Republic. Nevertheless, this was not a big problem for the Kemalists because they

²¹⁷ Çetin Yetkin, *Atatürk'ün Başarısız Demokrasi Devrimi Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, (İstanbul: Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yayınları, 1997), 173. Yetkin's book gives detailed knowledge about the events from Liberal Republican Party's founding to its closure.

²¹⁸ Mango, 382.

²¹⁹ Lewis, 280.

had developed a distinct version of democracy. One of the leading ideologues of Kemalism, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt stated in 1931 that “Democracy means sovereignty of the people. This sovereignty depends on freedom, equality, and justice. Democracy does not mean political parties. Parties are optional for democracy; Turkey is in the process to create and perform a brand new democracy.”²²⁰ Therefore, implementing democracy was of less concern than maintaining the vulnerable Republic.

The main problem that the early Turkish Republic had to work out was to designate the formality of the citizenship of its people. Now that the country was founded in the limited territory of *Misak-ı Milli* (the National Pact), a new definition of its people living in the country and their responsibilities was needed to mark the difference of the old Ottoman social order from the republican order. One of the simplest explanations of traditional Ottoman society was made by Niyazi Berkes,²²¹ who describes the Ottoman civil order as a system based upon the *millet* system.²²² In Ottoman social hierarchy, after the ruling élite and *ulama* [body of clerics], came the largest group, *avam* [commons], and the greatest part of the *avam* was called *reaya* (as the Europeans conceived its meaning, the non-Muslim subjects of the sultan but in fact it means “tax payers”). In that society, the Muslims constituted a politically unshaped or unidentified community, while the non-Muslims (Jews and Christians) were regarded according to their religious affiliations. Those religious communities were not referred to according to their ethnic or national differences and they were called *millets*. However, as it was mentioned above, the *Tanzimat* Edict of 1839, which granted unprecedented privileges to the religious communities, resulted in the dissolution of the *millet* system by undermining the principle of the *de facto* supremacy of the Muslims. Therefore, the Kemalists, who were either

²²⁰ Quoted in Nedim Yalansız, “1930’lar Türkiye’si’nde Demokrasi ve Kemalizm Tartışmaları,” in *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* (İzmir: Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1999), 34-35.

²²¹ Berkes, 10-13.

²²² Feroz Ahmad describes the *millets* in Ottoman society: “The Muslim *millet* included all Muslims (Turks, Kurds, Arabs, and converts) regardless of their ethnicity or language; the same was true for the Greek Orthodox *millet* that included not only Greeks but Slavic peoples of the Balkans and, later on, the Arab world. The same was true for the Jewish and Armenian communities. Only in the nineteenth century, with the advent of nationalism, did the *millets* begin to acquire an ethnic coloring and Serbs, Bulgarians, Catholics, and Protestants acquired their own communal organizations.” (Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*, 9-10).

members or admirers of the Young Turks, whose ideological background was based on the discomfort about the humiliating results of the *Tanzimat* period, were resolute to create a fully local and national “Turkishness.” Paul Dumont points out that the theoreticians of the Young Turk period first assigned an important role to Islam as a factor of national cohesion that might presumably prevent the dismantling of the empire.²²³ On the other hand, the Kemalists who were the disciples of the Young Turks learned from their predecessors’ experience that it hadn’t worked, and so they totally eliminated Islam from their definition of the concept of the nation and formulated a secular national identity. Specifically, the Kemalist approach to a national mentality was closely tied to notions developed by the Turkist Ottoman intellectuals of the late nineteenth century, particularly to Ziya Gökalp’s emphasis on the principle of linguistic community that he expressed in the journal *Türk Yurdu* in 1913. About the significance of the 1928 reform of the alphabet and the adoption of the Latin alphabet, Benedict Anderson asserts that the role of this reform was to raise the national consciousness among Turkish people.²²⁴ Since the main goal of the Kemalists was to disengage Turkey from its traditional Eastern cultural and social relations, the new nation could be formed on a fresh and new basis. And the function of this nationalism would be formulated by Mustafa Kemal himself. Claiming that “the voice of the people is the voice of God,” he said,

[. . .] if the voice of the people was that of God, then the analogy attributed to society the singularity and the ultimacy that are the qualities of the divine legislator. Like God, society was one and sufficient unto itself. The nation was indivisible, and so were the people. While nationalism, as the recovered collective conscience of the Turks, guaranteed that indivisibility, it also provided the necessary concepts for meaningful action, good and evil, and salvation. Since all authority was social in origin, none but society could provide deliverance for the individual.²²⁵

²²³ Paul Dumont, “The Origins of Kemalist Ideology,” in *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, ed. Jacob Landau (Leiden: M. Westview Press, 1984), 30.

²²⁴ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 2006), 45.

²²⁵ Quoted in Frank Tachau, “The Political Culture of Kemalist Turkey,” in *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, ed. Jacob Landau, (Leiden: M. Westview Press, 1984), 66.

The non-religious nature of this new national concept was based on Mustafa Kemal's world view. Hanioglu states that the Turkish nationalism that Mustafa Kemal wanted to create was molded with scientism, fashionable racial concepts, and popular Darwinian theories of evolution — a mixture that was assumed to supersede religion in the formation of identity.²²⁶ According to this interpretation, the Turks, with their “brachycephalic skulls,” should be proud of membership in “such a great historical race that evolved into a nation,” a “great strength and honor not enjoyed by many human groups.”²²⁷ The best example of this extolled image of the “Turk” was evident in the Turkish History Thesis of 1931. According to the thesis that Mustafa Kemal personally guided,

..the cradle of human civilization was Central Asia, the Turkish homeland. From here the Turks had migrated to all Old World continents, establishing major states, such as the Sumerian and Hittite empires, and helping “backward” human groups such as the Chinese and Indians to produce impressive civilizations. Similarly, the Turks could take substantial credit for the achievements of Greco-Roman civilization, which was the product of Turkic peoples who had migrated to Crete and Italy. Although not all of the peoples of China, India, or the Mediterranean basin were racially Turkic, they owed their civilization to Turkish immigration, which had been prompted by environmental changes. This thesis, resembling the *Kulturkreise* (culture circles) hypothesis of the German diffusionist school of anthropology, further maintained that “Turks lived clothed during the stone [Neolithic] age in 12,000 BC, while Europeans reached that stage 5,000 years later.” Thus, the Turks were not merely the founders of “world civilization” but also the people who spread it throughout the world. Had there been no Turkish migration, the other regions of the world might long have continued to live in primitive conditions. In other words, the twentieth-century Turk in Anatolia was the

²²⁶ Hanioglu, 95.

²²⁷ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 96.

descendant of the race that first gave humankind fire, bread, clothing, tools, and domesticated animals.²²⁸

By praising the “Turk” to a greater extent than had ever been done before, the Kemalist régime attempted to form a nationality that the citizens could be proud of. This approach to history enabled the Kemalists to skip over Ottoman history and everything that belonged to it. When Ottoman sultans and victories were neglected, it was easy to conceive a totally new — but utterly unscientific — notion of history since there was no way to find the data concerning those eras. In the past, the Ottoman army was the army of the caliph, but now the army was responsible only to the rulers as the guardians of the régime. In this way, the religious aspect of fighting the enemy and the spirit of the not-so-distant past was easily skipped. Furthermore, Mustafa Kemal introduced his critique of the role of Islam in the formation of the “Turkish nation” in his book *Medeni Bilgiler* [Civic Knowledge]:

Turks were a great nation even before their conversion to Islam. After they became Muslim, this religion did not cause Arabs or Persians or other Islamic groups to constitute a nation. On the contrary, it loosened the national ties of the Turkish nation; desensitized national feelings and national fever. Because the goal of the religion that Muhammad established was to form a comprising *ümme* (religious community) that supersedes all nations.²²⁹

But still, there was the difficult task to determine who the “Turk” was among the bulk of the citizens. Since it was impossible and meaningless to force the Greek or Jewish citizens to profess their Turkishness, Mustafa Kemal’s solution to that problem was put in words in his famous dictum that goes “Happy is he who calls himself Turk!” This was the way to encourage the non-Turkish citizens to adopt a Turkishness that would enable them to be embraced by the new régime.

Eventually, the “new nation” that the founders of the Republic of Turkey wished to create would be one that depended on a new mentality. After all, the word

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

²²⁹ A. Afetinan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün El Yazmaları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), 21.

“Turk” used to be a derogatory term in Ottoman times²³⁰ and now it had to imply a vaunting emotion. There is no doubt that this secularized, totally scientific and instrumental nationality and “nationness,” shortly the “Turkish case”, today easily fits Benedict Anderson’s definition of the nation as an “imagined community.”²³¹ Similarly, Turkish nationalism was an imposition of a high culture, in Ernest Gellner’s illustration, to people who lack that culture.²³² Gellner explains it more broadly:

[Nationalism] is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually substitutable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of a previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves. That is what really happens.²³³

In sum, the political, social, legal, and educational reforms initiated by the Kemalists aimed to reshape the identity of Turkish citizens and to inject a Westernized outlook in all areas of their lives.

Kemalist Foreign Policy and Indian Muslim Frustration with the Abolition of the Caliphate

Turkish Independence aroused feelings of devotion in many parts of the Islamic world that were colonized by Western Powers. The restlessness among the Muslim communities of the Middle East, Northern Africa, and even Ethiopia turned out to a victorious prospect after the Battle of Sakarya (1922), which ended the Greek expectations to implement a permanent settlement in Anatolia.²³⁴ Yet, although the relations between the Indian Muslims and the prominent Ottoman figures were much stronger than those in the rest of the Muslim world, what the Turkish Independence movement connoted to the Muslims of India bears insight about the

²³⁰ Şerif Mardin, “Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire,” in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (June, 1969): 271.

²³¹ Anderson, 4-7.

²³² Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1983), 57.

²³³ *Ibid.*

²³⁴ François Georgeon, “Kemalizm ve İslam Dünyası Bazı İşaret Taşları,” in *Kemalizm ve İslam Dünyası*, ed. İskender Gökalp & François Georgeon (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007), 29.

significance of the Kemalist Movement in the East, especially in the Muslim world. As previously mentioned, the contributions by Indian Muslims to Turkish Independence were significant; therefore, reaction to Kemalist reforms in India will be useful to comprehend the Kemalist writers' new world view.

Most of the resentment by the Indian Muslims to Kemalist reforms in Turkey was the result of their lack of knowledge about the instant political developments on the Turkish side because of the difficulties in communication. The simpler emotional reason for bitter feelings among Indian Muslims after the Kemalist Republic of Turkey was established was that although the Turkish nationalists were still what they had been during the War of Independence, the Indian Muslims believed what they wanted to see in Turkey. The Muslims of India had never been under the rule of the Ottoman Turks, but they were more warmly attached to the Turkish cause than any other Muslim community in the world. Opposition in India against the British Raj and the formation of a consciousness for independence gives us clues about the Muslim communities' reactions. In his study about Indian and Turkish nationalists, Feroz Ahmad's states that the two movements had influenced each other from different perspectives because they were in different situations but heading to the same direction, i.e. independence.²³⁵ According to Ahmad, since the relations between the Ottoman Empire and Indians began on the basis of Islamic solidarity, the Indian supporters of the Turkish nationalists, both Hindus and Muslims, wanted Turks to retain a multi-national Islamic state under the sultan-caliph. But more than that, the fundamental aspect of Indian support was based upon the anti-colonial spirit of Turkish resistance to the European powers.²³⁶ Muhammad Sadiq states²³⁷ that the intensification of Indian demands for the well-being of the caliph, together with belief in cruel British schemes against Turkey, brought the Muslim community closer to Hindus. However, when the nationalists in Turkey triumphed over the European powers and set out their reform program, this caused the Khilafat leaders to question their place within the Indian Nationalist movement

²³⁵ Ahmad, "The Kemalist Movement and India," 261.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*

²³⁷ Muhammad Sadiq, "Türk Devrimi ve Hint Özgürlük Hareketi" *Atatürk'ün Düşünce ve Uygulamalarının Evrensel Boyutları Uluslar arası Sempozyum Bildirileri* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Bilimsel Yayınları, 1981), 219.

and its aim. The Muslim leaders of Khilafat in the 1930s expressed their reluctance about Indian independence since they would be a minority in a Hindu nation.²³⁸ There was also a well-known psychological factor that the Turkish struggle against the Western Powers became the embodiment of hope for a prospective Indian independence. However, when the Kemalists acted contrary to the Khilafat leaders' expectations, the motivation and the morale of Indian Muslims in favor of the Turks was lost.

The impact of Kemalist reforms in India and particularly on Indian Muslims is hard to trace when Indian Muslims sentiment toward Turkish independence is ignored. That is to say, what was felt by the Indians after the reforms of Mustafa Kemal was directly linked to the expectations and idealizations on the Indian side concerning Turkey. As Muhammad Sadiq points out, the establishment of the Khilafat Movement in India and the centralization of the concerns about the fate of the Ottoman state in that organization occurred at the end of World War I and because of the dissatisfaction about the outcome of the war for the Ottomans.²³⁹ However, as this movement led Muslim public opinion in India to a more radical politics and propelled the Muslims to cooperate with the Indian National Congress, it was not welcomed with equal warmth in Turkey. The Turks were either not concerned with the position of the Indian Muslims or they were too busy with their own problems of the young Turkish Republic. On the other hand, the Hindu-Muslim cooperation was initiated by Gandhi, who became the leader in the Congress shortly after the establishment of the Khilafat Movement. Here, Sadiq's claim seems reasonable: It is after the Hindu-Muslim cooperation that the religious stance of the Khilafat Movement began to fade.²⁴⁰ Both Gandhi and the Khilafat leaders emphasized their support for the Turkish nationalists and their cause, not necessarily because they were *mücahids* in a holy war against the non-Muslim world but because theirs was a struggle against the imperialist powers and the independence dreams of all oppressed peoples of the Eastern world. Needless to say, this doesn't

²³⁸ Nanda, 390.

²³⁹ Muhammad Sadiq, "Türk Devrimi ve Hint Özgürlük Hareketi," 219.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

mean that religious agitation did not end. In the eighth session of the Khilafat Conference of 1921, it was agreed that

Sacred *sharia* laws forbid Muslims to join and to assist the British army; in general all Muslims, particularly the *ulema* is responsible to convey this message to the Muslim soldiers in the British army [...] if the British government secretly or explicitly carries on hostility toward the Ankara government, Indian Muslims, in cooperation with the Congress, will be obliged to declare India's independence in the next session of Congress and form an Indian Republic.²⁴¹

There are two points here that attract our attention. First, the British were asked to respect the Ankara government, i.e., the Turkish nationalists. This shows that Indian attention was predominantly on the anti-imperialist struggle, not at the seat of the caliphate although they also expected the Turkish nationalists to rescue the caliph from the British yoke. Second, the Hindu-Muslim agreement and Khilafat solidarity was with the congress. The minutes of the Khilafat conference above show that there was no sign of distrust between the Hindu and Muslim communities up until the events in post-war Turkey unfolded and the Muslim community was left alone with their own problems.

While Hindus and Muslims were enjoying a *modus vivendi* that might possibly result in an independent Indian republic, abolition of the sultanate and the caliphate by Mustafa Kemal gave a deep shock to the Indian sympathizers of Turkish independence. Jawaharlal Nehru describes the situation:

[Mustafa Kemal] Ataturk partly destroyed the dream structure that had gradually grown up in the Indian Muslim mind ever since the days of the Mutiny. Again a kind of vacuum was created. Many Moslems [Muslims] filled this vacuum by joining the nationalist movement, many had of course already joined it previously; many others stood aloof, hesitant and doubtful. The real conflict was between feudal modes of thought and modern tendencies. The feudal leadership had for the moment swept by the mass Khilafat movement,

²⁴¹ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 220.

but that movement itself had no solid basis in social and economic conditions or in the need of the masses. It had its centre elsewhere, and when the core itself was eliminated by Ataturk the superstructure collapsed, leaving the Moslem masses bewildered and disinclined to any political action.²⁴²

Nehru himself admired Mustafa Kemal with respect to Turkey's transformation from a traditional society to a secular and modern republic. According to Sadiq, in a speech in 1928 Nehru said that "India had to liberate herself from being a dogmatic, defeated, backward country and imitate Mustafa Kemal Pasha's Turkey by standing up to difficulties and then eliminating them, so that she would not wait until doomsday."²⁴³ Moreover, Gandhi, who initiated the Hindu-Muslim coalition in order to prevent the Khilafat Movement from turning violent and to divert the Muslim community into the path of the nationalist movement²⁴⁴ supported the Turks and their rights to self-defense by stating that "it was a duty to support the Muslims in their Khilafat cause."²⁴⁵ Also, concerning the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres that crushed Ottoman authority in almost every area, Gandhi expressed his shock and disappointment in the newspaper: "To say that there is peace where one party forces the other to agree to something against its will, [and] crushes it under its brute strength, is a grave offense against God in the form of Truth."²⁴⁶ After the news of the abolition of the caliphate caused a shock among the Khilafat circle, Gandhi refrained from making any comment on the subject but went on to stress the importance of protecting the Hindu-Muslim unity on the way to achieve independence. In an All-Muslim League conference in Bombay in December 1924, in order to point out the aim of a Hindu-Muslim cooperation he said that "if Muslims want to help Turkey, Egypt and other Arab countries, the only way to do that is to gain our independence. It is after this; only after this we can really help Turkey, Egypt and other Arab countries. If Hindus and Muslims coalesce in their

²⁴² Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, 303.

²⁴³ Quoted in Sadiq, 225.

²⁴⁴ Nanda, 376.

²⁴⁵ Öke, 72.

²⁴⁶ Stanley Wolpert, *Gandhi's Passion: The Life and Legacy of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 107.

hearts, not in contracts or pacts, then, only then you can protect Islam inside and outside of India.”²⁴⁷

Reactions to Kemalist reforms in India and the West can be traced in the foreign press, especially the English newspapers. Bilal N. Şimşir’s study, *Atatürk and Turkish Revolution in Foreign Press*,²⁴⁸ shows how different newspapers in England covered the reactions of Indian Muslims to the reforms of the new Republic. For example, on 22 October 1922, *The Muslim Standard*, a newspaper that was based in London and published by the Indian Muslim community, announced the contentment of the Muslims in India about the abolition of the sultanate and Abdulmejid II’s appointment to the caliphate, because as long as there was a caliphate in Istanbul, the absence of a sultan would not create any difference for Muslims.²⁴⁹ The affirmation of Turkish Nationalists by India was reported in *The Times* of 10 January 1923 where the Khilafat Committee calls all Muslims of India to join in an act of civil disobedience in order to weaken British policies concerning the Islamic world.²⁵⁰ On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal was promoting his prospective reforms in Western newspapers. Nearly a month before his declaration of Turkey as a republic, he gave an interview to an Austrian newspaper, *Neue Freie Presse* on 2 October 1923 in which he said what he had started would be perfected with Turkey’s becoming a republic.²⁵¹ He also added that Ankara would be the new capital.²⁵² Mustafa Kemal concluded the interview by stating that the Turkish Republic would strive to change the Turkish image in Europe, which was barbarian, hostile to progress, and incapable of moral and intellectual development. Before the Republic of Turkey abolished the caliphate and caused a major stir in the East and the West, Aga Khan and Ameer Ali, prominent leaders of Indian Shia groups, wrote a letter which was addressed to the Turkish Prime Minister İsmet Pasha about their

²⁴⁷ R.K. Sinha, *Mustafa Kemal ve Mahatma Gandhi* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1972), 163-64.

²⁴⁸ Bilal N. Şimşir, *Dış Basında Atatürk ve Türk Devrimi Cilt 1* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1981). The book includes English and French reports and comments from English and French newspapers on the Turkish nationalist struggle and reforms.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 150-51.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 193-94.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 286-88.

²⁵² Ankara became the capital as the decision was approved by the National Assembly on 13 October. The first proposal about the replacement of the capital was made on 9 October by İsmet Pasha (İnönü).

concern for the dignity of the Muslim caliphate.²⁵³ The letter was published both in English and Turkish newspapers on 24 November before it was received by the Turkish officials. On 29 December *The Times* reported that the reaction of the Turkish government to the unrest that the letter caused was fierce, and Independence Tribunals tried several intellectuals who had appealed to the attitude of the letter.²⁵⁴ It should be noted that the reporter also pointed out the mystery of two Shias being in the center of a discussion of a Sunni institution. More interestingly, *The Times* correspondent reported that a deputy told him that Turkey would abolish the caliphate and expel the House of Ottomans from the country although the caliphate was abolished three months after this report. From this point on, the reactions to the Kemalist reforms both from the West and India were all about the abolition of the caliphate.

It can be observed from the newspapers of 1924 that the reaction of the British newspapers was at first great confusion because in all articles and reports it was stated that Turkey, or Mustafa Kemal, was making a grave mistake since without the seat of the caliphate Turkey could not maintain its position in international politics.²⁵⁵ Besides, it is apparent that the attempts to popularize King Hussein of Hijaz (a.k.a. Sharif of Mecca) in English newspapers intended to make use of the Islamic caliphate for British policies in the Middle East and India.

According to an article in the *Daily News* dated 5 March 1924, the abolition of the caliphate posed questions on the activities of the Khilafat Committee who collected nearly £ 1,500,000 for the Turkish nationalists.²⁵⁶ Even after the War of Independence and the establishment of the Republic, Turkish missions continued to travel to India to get the contributions collected by the Khilafatists. According to *The Daily Telegraph* of 12 March 1924, a Turkish Red Crescent mission was in Delhi and in contact with Khilafat leaders.²⁵⁷ The mission that had already collected

²⁵³ The English version of the letter can be read in Bilal N. Şimşir, *Dış Basında Atatürk ve Türk Devrimi*, Cilt 1, 320-22.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 335-38.

²⁵⁵ To read the reports in that sense, see Şimşir, 395-403. These reports and articles were written the day after the abolition of the caliphate and the reports were from *The Daily Mail*, *The Daily News*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *Glasgow Evening Times*, *The Morning Post*, and *The Times*.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 420-21.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 630-31.

£ 10,000 by the time the news about the abolition of the caliphate arrived in India was ordered by Mustafa Kemal to return to Turkey. Moreover, two days later, Mustafa Kemal stated in an interview to the *Daily Telegraph* that “while they [Indian Muslims] spoke on behalf of Turkey, they did not fight for her, and after all, speaking, and its consequences, in the Ghazi’s [Mustafa Kemal’s] eyes do not entail any great sacrifice. In these circumstances, Angora [Ankara, the new capital] sees no reason why Turkey in the future should sacrifice her own local interests on behalf of such peoples.”²⁵⁸

In general, a country’s domestic policy influences its foreign policy when there is involvement in the democratic process, because different demands from various parties or groups guide the relations with other countries. On the other hand, in countries where the political competition is at a low level, foreign policies are decided independent of any opposition. In early republican Turkey, where the latter was evident, the Kemalists had to contemplate foreign policy from the perspective of post-war factors, which they did as they thought best. The allied forces of Europe were frustrated by their defeat at the hands of the Turkish nationalist forces, and they watched for an opportunity to restore the Treaty of Sèvres. With these objectives, the Conference of Lausanne was held in 1922 and 1923.²⁵⁹

Although there was a Russian²⁶⁰ and an American committee²⁶¹ that visited the nationalists during the Independence War that the Turkish nationalists fought, the inception of Turkey’s recognition as an independent state begins with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. After the treaty, Turkish foreign policy between 1923 and

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 692.

²⁵⁹ A brief description of the Conference of Lausanne can be found in Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 254-55.

²⁶⁰ A Bolshevik committee visited Ankara in 1921 to seek cooperation and chances to make a pact with Turkish nationalists. Mustafa Kemal reacted quite politically as he tried not to offend the Bolsheviks and even sought their favor. In a letter to the Soviet People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin in 1920, he wrote that “Bolshevism includes the most exalted principles and rules of Islam.” He even told the Soviet envoys who met him in 1920 that he and his “comrades favor communism, but circumstances compel [them] to be silent about this fact.” See Hanioglu, 65-67.

²⁶¹ In 1919 during the Sivas Congress an American mission visited the Turkish nationalists to look for opportunities for persuading the nationalists to accept an American mandate. Officially known as the “American Military Mission to Armenia” but generally referred as “The General Harbord Commission,” the American mission first arrived in Istanbul and then travelled all the way to Sivas to meet the leaders of the movement who gathered for the Sivas Congress. Thus, throughout their journey the Americans had the chance to observe the social and psychological situation in Anatolia. An elaborate account of the General Harbord Mission can be found in Akgün, 55-83.

1930 focused on making no concessions to foreign powers that might put the new republic's sovereignty at risk. The problem with Britain regarding the status of Mosul, French loans, the border with Syria, and the population exchange with Greece took the first priority among the foreign problems in this period. Except for the problem of Mosul, Mustafa Kemal's foreign policy did not evoke disappointments in Turkey, but this does not mean that until his death Turkey did not have any problems in foreign policy. Disputes on the Dodecanese Islands and the Hatay are the most well-known of the problems that Mustafa Kemal dealt with in foreign policy.

The preoccupation of the Turkish Republic's foreign policy with Western issues and the Kemalists' goals to better Turkey's relations with Western countries was the result of a self-imposed goal of the Kemalists mentality to improve the living conditions of the Republic. The Kemalists were determined to change the scattered and unreliable image of the country. Suna Kili states that the Kemalist foreign policy was dedicated to the complete independence of Turkey and the expected result from this was political, economic, legal, and ideological integrity of the country.²⁶² Fundamentally, the new Republic of Turkey and its reforms that Mustafa Kemal initiated were welcomed warmly by the national middle class who were gaining power day by day. Although the idea of a Turkish middle class was relatively new, the Kemalists believed that a thoroughly Turkish bourgeoisie was necessary for the Republic. The roots of this necessity can be traced back to the Young Turks, for whom the implementation of institutional reforms was not enough, but modernization and Westernization could only be achieved by establishing a capitalist society with its all features.²⁶³ On the other hand, because of the lack of capital and expertise, the economic policy of Turkey through the 1920s was based on encouraging foreign investment, especially in the form of joint ventures with newborn Turkish capitalists. Feroz Ahmad points out that about a third of the companies established between 1920 and 1930 were joint ventures with foreign

²⁶² Suna Kili, *Kemalism* (İstanbul: Menteş Matbaası, 1969), 117.

²⁶³ Feroz Ahmad, "The Political Economy of Kemalism," in *From Empire to Republic: Essays on the Late Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. 1* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press İstanbul, 2008), 196. An insightful analysis of the stages of economic development in Westernization and modernization process can also be read in Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 393-400.

capital.²⁶⁴ The members of this newly-formed middle class who studied in Western-oriented schools or adopted a ‘Western’ lifestyle had long established close relations with the foreign powers as well as the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire who had easier access to the Western-related centers of power. The lifestyle and attitudes of the members of this class had long been criticized in literature and other places since the interaction with European intellectual centers became intense in the early 1900s. Moreover, it is not wrong to describe the members of this class as the product of the long period of Turkish Westernization and modernization. The mimicry of these classes is mocked by the writers of the early twentieth century as in Ahmet Mithat’s *Felâhî Bey ve Rakım Efendi* and Ömer Seyfettin’s *Efruz Bey*, to name just two. As a result of this unique experience of Westernization for an Eastern people, the Republic of Turkey presented interesting outcomes to compare with Turkey’s Muslim supporters in the East. Economic and social features played a great role in deciding the Kemalists’ attitudes and their preferences in foreign policy.

The uniqueness of the Turkish Westernization and modernization originated not only in its methods and processes, but especially in the ends that it achieved. What we may call “cultural change” in Turkey with the advent of the Kemalist reforms did not appeal to other Eastern peoples profoundly. Although the élite of the Middle Eastern peoples were mostly educated in foreign schools in the Ottoman lands as members of the Ottoman social fabric and were sensitive to issues concerning the future of the empire, not all of them were advocates of Kemalist Turkey and might have developed a distinct national sentiment.²⁶⁵ Georgeon states that before the Conference of Lausanne, there were expectations of Palestinian Muslims that Turkey would defend their rights; also the Egyptians expected the Turkish committee to fight for the removal of the capitulations on Egypt, but the Turkish committee did not interfere in the Allied Forces’ dealings in the Middle East.²⁶⁶ This can be interpreted as Kemalist Turkey’s policy of abstaining from the struggles of the colonized countries. Here another irony stands since the Kemalist defiance of the imperialist powers whose aim was to invade and colonize Anatolia was seen as an

²⁶⁴ Ahmad, 95.

²⁶⁵ François Georgeon, “Kemalizm ve İslam Dünyası 1919-1938 Bazı İşaret Taşları,” 25.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

anti-imperial struggle. Georgeon also gives one of the most distinctive examples of the Kemalist attitude towards colonized Islamic countries, including the rebellion of Abd al-Karim in Morocco.²⁶⁷ At the beginning of the rebellion, the Turkish public opinion was sympathetic and parallels were drawn between Turkish Independence and the Moroccan rebels. But when the Kemalists understood that they needed the support of the Spanish and French for the talks about Mosul in the League of Nations, the Kemalist statesmen and the newspapers publicly declared that Turkey did not have any intentions to influence matters concerning the Islamic world. Thus, the policy of the Kemalists never depended on such sympathetic tendencies but was purely realistic. Moreover, since the Islamic communities were under the duress of colonization and any attempt of cooperation or assistance should have come from the Turks, the Kemalists' reluctance to do so caused the estrangement of the Turks and Eastern peoples. Hence, the reforms that shifted Turkey toward a Westernized way of life had less effect on other Eastern peoples like Iranians,²⁶⁸ Iraqis,²⁶⁹ or Indian Muslims because there was not much to attract them to initiate a similar radical cultural change.

The changing relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Indian Muslim community was mostly attached to the results of the reforms that changed or abolished the religious institutions of Turkey, which led the Indian Muslim community to a grave disappointment about the fate of their belief worldwide. In the previous section, it was noted that especially the abolition of the caliphate not only left the Khilafatist supporters of Turkey idle, but also invalidated the Hindu-Muslim

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 46

²⁶⁸ Although it is not the primary subject of this study, Kemalists-Iranian relations deserve a short notice. The impact of Kemalist reforms on Iran after the Turkish Westernization and modernization became evident as Reza Shah deposed the Qajar dynasty and became the Shah of Iran in 1925. First a treaty of amity was signed between two countries in 1926, and then Reza Shah visited Turkey by train and met Mustafa Kemal in 1934 during an extensive visit. Reza Shah was so impressed and thrilled by the Turkish reforms that he told the Turkish Marshal Fevzi Çakmak that he wanted Çakmak to command both country's armies. Three years later, his intentions for alliance materialized as Turkey signed the Treaty of Saadabad with Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. A detailed analysis of Iran and Turkey relations with interesting anecdotes can be found here: Yann Richard, "Kemalizm ve İran," in *Kemalizm ve İslam Dünyası*, eds. İskender Gökçalp & François Georgeon (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007), 79-97.

²⁶⁹ Qassam K. Al-Jumaily and İzzet Toprak's *Irak ve Kemalizm Hareketleri (1919-1923)* is an important source on the impact of the Kemalists on the local Iraqi movements that were under the influence of British imperial policies. See Qassam K. Al-Jumaily and İzzet Toprak, *Irak ve Kemalizm Hareketleri (1919-1923)*, (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1999).

cooperation that might possibly lead British India toward an independent state. Even though there is no need to revisit the condemnations of the prominent Muslims caused by the abolition of the caliphate, there is one man who probably made the most fair-minded comment from the Muslim community of the Indian subcontinent: Muhammad Iqbal, the poet-philosopher who was the ideologue of the founding of Pakistan. As Feroz Ahmad observed, Iqbal welcomed the revolutionary reforms in the countries of the East fighting for their independence had a high regard for the activity of Mustafa Kemal, and acknowledged his right to religious reform.²⁷⁰ On the other hand, he was openly critical about Mustafa Kemal's position on the caliphate issue: "Personally I think it was a mistake to suppose that the idea of state is more dominant and rules all other ideas embodied in the system of Islam."²⁷¹ In these remarks, it is important to see that Iqbal stated his own views on Mustafa Kemal's activity and did not claim that it was a sin or that Mustafa Kemal was defying God's command. Furthermore, Öke, quoting Muhammad Iqbal's son Javid Iqbal, tells us that for Muhammad Iqbal there was nothing wrong with the Turks' wearing western clothes or using the Latin alphabet because Islam doesn't have national boundaries, so these reforms never meant Turks' distancing themselves from Islam.²⁷² There is no doubt that Iqbal's feeling and attitude for the Republic of Turkey had profound effects on the friendly relations between Pakistan and Turkey.

If we revisit British newspapers to find their reactions to the reforms that were initiated by the Kemalists, most of the analyses involved the positions of the Indian Muslims, particularly the Khilafat Committee, with respect to what was happening in Turkey. In those newspapers, the revolutionary and "ultra-modernist" act of Mustafa Kemal to abolish the caliphate was depicted as the beginning of the secularization of Turkey, with the help of the Independence Tribunals.²⁷³ It is also emphasized repeatedly that this act of the rulers would result in the breakdown of the non-cooperation movement in India which was initiated by Gandhi and the now

²⁷⁰ Ahmad, 276.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*

²⁷² Öke, 188. Öke mentions that Javid Iqbal stated these during a conference entitled "İqbal ve Türkiye'nin İmajı" [Iqbal and Turkey's Image] in Boğaziçi University in 1987. Unfortunately, the proceedings of that conference could not be accessed for this study.

²⁷³ Şimşir, 531-32. The report is from a London newspaper, *Spectator* from 8 March 1924.

defunct Khilafat Movement.²⁷⁴ After all these factors fell upon the Indian Muslim community, Khilafat leaders, especially Muhammad Ali, declared many times to British newspapers that Mustafa Kemal's act of abolishing the most fundamental institution of the Islamic world was unacceptable and anti-religious. In an interview Muhammad Ali gave to *The Daily Telegraph* on 11 August 1924 he stated that "Mustafa Kemal had been led astray by a nationalism that was misplaced in view of the general tendency of the world to united action."²⁷⁵

A great part of the Kemalists' foreign policy was related to the unsolved issues of the post-war state. Treaties and alliances were formed or appealed to in order to secure Turkey's position in the international arena, and especially to win a place in Western diplomacy. As a deservedly independent country, according to the Kemalists, Turkey had to be among the sovereign states, not among those who were under colonial rule or mandate, which was true for most of the Eastern and Islamic states. The Kemalists were expected to guide and save some of these colonized peoples,²⁷⁶ but Mustafa Kemal was a very cautious leader, so he rejected such a role without hesitation. As Lewis states, Mustafa Kemal renounced all pan-Islamic, pan-Ottoman and pan-Turkish ambitions, and he limited his actions in foreign policy to the national territory of Turkey.²⁷⁷ The Kemalists were the successors to the Ottoman legacy that had an image that can be described as "savior and protector of Islam" that had dominated the Eastern-Islamic world for centuries; Kemalist Turkey was nothing of that sort. Therefore, it was natural that the lack of a savior or protector for Islam caused resentment among the Islamic peoples to a degree that Kemalist Turkey was condemned in later years in countries like Egypt by the *ulema*. What is more, the weakening or sometimes absence of cultural and social contact between the Islamic communities can be said to be sharpened with the fall of the

²⁷⁴ To read reports about the aftermath of Hindu-Muslim cooperation in India see Şimşir, 534-35 *Yorkshire Post*; 516-18 *Irish Times*.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 785-790.

²⁷⁶ From Gökalp and Georgeon we learn that Iraqi and Syrian Arab nationalists, Algerian nationalists, and even some Malay reformists tried to copy the Kemalists but they also thought that Turkey would remain an Eastern power. See in the same book Elizabeth Picard, "Suriyeli, Iraklı Arap Milliyetçiler ve Kemalizm: Aynı Yöne Yönelme ve Birbirini Perdeleme," 56-79; Benjamin Stora, "20. Yüzyılın Başında Cezayirinin Bilincinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Türkiye," 156-84.; A.C. Milner, "Türk Devriminin Malezya'daki Etkileri," 184-200.

²⁷⁷ Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 255.

Ottoman Empire and the founding of the Republic of Turkey. There is no doubt that the reflections of this oblivion would be as evident in literature as in international politics.

It was impossible to assume that the paradigm shift in the Turkish outlook and the rising Western dominance in politics, education, culture, and all areas of life that was instigated with the foundation of the Republic of Turkey would eventually have to end the historical and emotional relations between Turks and Eastern peoples, but it did. Naturally, as part of the new vision of the Republic of Turkey, the Kemalists diverted artistic and scientific efforts of the country to validate the Westernization process. Many writers and intellectuals who were aligned with the Kemalist regime took up this revolutionary concept. Accordingly, this new elite of the regime opted to favor the despotic enlightening aspect of Kemalism but avoided realizing the profound changes that rooted out the foundational elements that constituted Turkish identity. Moreover, these Kemalist élites who were aligned with the guardians of the regime — The Republican People’s Party and the military — acclaimed and legitimized the non-democratic policies of the régime, using as an excuse the people’s need for this enlightenment. In Ernest Gellner’s description,

The Kemalist elite evidently faced a dilemma. The Kemalist heritage of firm Westernization included both democracy and secularism. The underlying syllogism had been: the West is secular and democratic. The West is strong. We must be strong. So we must be democratic and secular. We must be democratic *so as* to be strong (for the democratic West is strong). So the carrier and guarantor of national strength, the army, must watch over the preconditions of strength. If those preconditions contain elements *contrary* to a military and hierarchical organization, the army, in its loyal and disciplined way, will enforce them all the same.²⁷⁸

However, not all intellectuals and writers of the Republic of Turkey agreed with the radically Western orientation of Kemalism and not all of them kept on the right side of the new régime. These “dissenters” were not very different from the pro-

²⁷⁸ Ernest Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 84.

Kemalists in their world view and they did not oppose the direction of the revolution, but they disapproved of its methods and radicalism. For this reason, they cannot be called “anti-Kemalists” but rather traditionalists, since they disapproved the total rejection of the past and insisted on the preservation of some aspects of pre-Kemalist Turkey, like some religious institutions or the previous alphabet. Certainly, the Kemalist régime discredited those traditionalists and favored the radical modernists whom they expected to come up with works that would convince people to acquire a Kemalist view. The early phases of the Republic of Turkey witnessed the production of a huge body of literature in artistic, scientific, and political areas. In order to understand the current effectiveness of those works on a certain topic, a thorough study of the historical background is necessary. The general description of the true nature of relations between Turkey and Muslim India was given above is expected to contribute to the study of works by writers who visited India and viewed the country and its people under the influence of their “enlightened” conception of the world.

CHAPTER 2

KEMALIST WRITERS AND THEIR TRAVEL BOOKS ON INDIA

The Kemalist Republic of Turkey aimed to mold the perceptions of the "new Turkish people" about everything in the world with totally Westernized political and socio-cultural conceptions. The reforms that were imposed on the public were expected to revolutionize the way people perceived the world, and strict measures were taken against any resistance to that transformation. In the meantime, eastern Anatolia was almost neglected with regard to developments and reforms. Most of the investments and institutions that were thought to be models for the entire country were implemented around cities like Ankara, İzmir, and İstanbul. Apparently, the eastern part of Turkey received a small share of the advancements in higher education and urban or agricultural investments. The same tendency dominated the foreign interests of the new Republic. During both Mustafa Kemal's and İsmet İnönü's presidencies, Turkey sought ways to consolidate its place in the Western world and adopted a passive role in the international arena where the Eastern world was concerned. On the other hand, India remained a British colony for the most part of the early republican period in Turkey, and Indian Muslims and Hindus, who contributed in every possible way to the nationalist Turks during the long series of wars for independence, became estranged to the concerns and the support of the Republic of Turkey. Moreover, when the new régime of Turkey was founded on the basis of Western-oriented principles of Kemalism, not only political elites but also the intelligentsia had to abandon their former perception of the world, i.e., Ottoman or Islamic. Turkish traditional modality was replaced by a totally Westernized conception of world affairs, and yet dissimilarities destroyed any sense of belonging to the Eastern world or any pride in it. Subsequently, the first result of this transformation appeared as a self-inflicted inferiority complex in the Kemalist élites, growing out of the "guilt" of being once an Eastern people, so to speak. Second, exaggerated efforts and flamboyant displays of ultra-nationalism became prevalent among the Kemalists to prove that they were no longer like their ancestors. One way to examine these strained interpretations and self-expressions is by reading the travelogues of Kemalists about Eastern lands or the countries that Turks once had

strong political and religious ties with. In this and the next chapter, I will study the travel accounts of selected Turkish writers on India in the early republican period of Turkey. Their varying approaches to India both as a country that was yet a British colony and as a non-independent country will be compared. In this chapter, I will analyze the texts of writers who were either close to the leaders of the Kemalist regime or were active in literary or journalistic activities that contributed to the glorification and valorization of Kemalism. All these writers visited India as they were invited officially by Indian authorities on two different occasions. The first group that visited India in 1943 included Falih Rıfki Atay, Burhan Felek, Necmettin Sadak, Muvaffak Menemenciöđlu, Burhan Belge, and Salahattin Arbel. Among the members of this first mission, only two of them published a travel book about India: Falih Rıfki Atay's *Hind* [India] (1943) and Burhan Felek's *Hind Masalları* [Indian Fairy Tales] (1943). The second group which visited India, again upon another invitation, this time in 1953, included A. Emin Yalman, Ahmet Őükrü Esmer, Advıye Fenik, Nadi Dođan, and Refi Cevad Ulunay. From this group, Refi Cevad Ulunay published his own travel book called *İhtıŐam Diyarı Hindistan* [India: The Land of Flamboyance] (1953) and the rest of the group published a book of essays about their observations, *Hindistan'da Gördüklerimiz* [What We Saw in India] (1953).

All these writers and Turkish journalists were born before the foundation of the Republic of Turkey and they were aware of the increasingly close relations between India and the Turkish people during the Turkish War of Independence. Therefore, we have a clear understanding about their view of India as a country and the people of India. Also, now that early republican attitudes have been analyzed in detail in the previous chapter with respect to new trends in education, politics, and tradition, it is clear that these Kemalist writers traveled around India and met Hindus and Muslims while they were viewing that country from the revolutionized perspective of the Republic of Turkey. More importantly, their narratives reveal that they were trying to adapt their Kemalist perception of the world to India. In other words, in many ways, Kemalism had become the dominant factor in their self-expression and their making sense of the world around them.

As the texts are all travelogues, the nature and function of these works need to be examined briefly. Travelogues have always contained important information

related to cultural and social history. Travel writing is directly attached to time and place, and the personality, and the prejudices of the travel writer. Often, exotic scenes, irritating visions, or unusual habits appeal the readers of travel writing, and sometimes there are scandalous accounts in travelogues. Also, with the increasing convenience of travel in the nineteenth century, different motives and various aspects of travel writing appeared. Putting ourselves in place of travelogue readers of the early twentieth century is not easy because today tourism is common, travel books are varied and blogs or forums on the internet attract a more factually-driven audience. Certainly, literary travel writing is the only concern in this study.

The credibility of travel writings is naturally open to question according to the geography and the cultural background of the observer. In addition, the travel writers' approaches to places and peoples as objects of wonder –or ridicule– may give us hints about their stance: will the travelogue reflect the ideological, ethnic, or racial outlook of the writer toward a distant community, or is it written to boost the writer's success? Edward Said's approach helps us to understand the travel writers in this study:

Many travelers find themselves saying of an experience in a new country that it wasn't what they expected, meaning that it wasn't what a book said it would be. And of course many writers of travel books or guidebooks compose them in order to say that a country is like this, or better, that it is colorful, expensive, interesting, and so forth. The idea in either case is that people, places, and experiences can always be described by a book, so much so that the book (or text) acquires a greater authority, and use, even than the actuality it describes.¹

Thus, the travel writer may supersede the observer and his authority becomes twice controversial: first, the subjective influence diminishes the dependability of the when the writer emphasizes or underestimates the subject. Second, the travel writing becomes more factual than the fact itself, as the travel writer's perceptions become the central point rather than what really is.

¹ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 93.

Travel writing and travelling weren't very common in early republican Turkey for both financial and political reasons. As in other totalitarian regimes, only a small élite had easy access to international travel. This fact did not change for a long time in Turkey, and domestic politics hindered the variety in the favored élite. After the death of Mustafa Kemal on 10 November 1938, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü became the president of Turkey on 11 November 1938 and he strengthened the foundational influence of Kemalism. But İnönü's régime did not maintain the close contact with Mustafa Kemal's friends with whom he had discussed and decided on social and cultural problems. Mustafa Kemal hosted his close friends at his dinner table and the guests varied from time to time depending on the topic of discussion. Andrew Mango describes these gatherings:

Present-day Kemalists like to compare the Gazi's evening gatherings with Plato's symposium. To do them justice, there were frequent discussions of general ideas – largely on language and history, but also politics and economics. The Gazi's four favorite writers – Ruşen Eşref (Ünaydın), Falih Rıfkı (Atay), Yunus Nadi (Abalıoğlu), and Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu) – were frequent guests. But so too were 'the usual gentlemen,' who formed an unofficial bodyguard... All but one of the band was kept at the Gazi's side until he (or they) died. The exception was Recep Zühtü, who was banished from the Gazi's table in 1935 when he shot his mistress, wounding her mortally.²

The four regular and favorite members mentioned above wrote brilliantly in Turkish, both fiction and non-fiction. These men were journalists and essayists, and Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu was a successful novelist. They were the chief publicists of the Kemalist Revolution, and their main task was to promote the revolutions to the common people through their writings in newspapers, fiction, and biographies of Mustafa Kemal. Especially Falih Rıfkı Atay's works, which were accounts of his time spent around Mustafa Kemal, such as *Atatürk'ün Bana Anlattıkları* [What Atatürk Told Me] (1955) and *Çankaya* (1961), have become the primary reference

² Andrew Mango, *Atatürk* (London: John Murray Publishing, 1999), 391.

books for writers of Mustafa Kemal's biography or of the early republican era of Turkey. And Falih Rıfki Atay's *Hind* is a very valuable source for us to learn how a typical Kemalist intellectual of the young Turkish Republic saw India.

Falih Rıfki Atay (1894-1971) as a Kemalist Intellectual

As a writer who witnessed the most turbulent times of the late Ottoman period and early republican Turkey, F.R. Atay was born in the Ottoman capital in 1894. His interest in literature helped him to publish his first work at the age of fourteen in one of the leading literary magazines of his time, *Servet-i Fünun*.³ When he was twenty years old, he travelled to Anatolia for the first time, which encouraged him to write on the problem of underdevelopment of the country its solutions. In *Batış Yılları* [Years of Decay], Atay describes the scenery of Anatolia that he saw for the first time as “diseased, devastated, and worse than medieval times.”⁴ He also states the people in Anatolia were not aware of the struggles occurring on various fronts like Tripolitania, Thrace, or Hijaz.⁵ Around the same time, he started writing weekly columns in the *Tanin* newspaper which was run by a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın. While writing for *Tanin*, he also obtained a governmental office as the executive assistant of Talat Pasha.⁶ During the World War I, while assigned to military service he was also the executive assistant of Cemal Pasha, the Commander of the 4th Army that controlled Syria and Palestine. During the time he spent there, he wrote his memoirs, published under the title *Zeytindağı*, which are known as one of the most fluent and striking narrations of the Great War in the Turkish language. Following his encounter with Mustafa Kemal, he wrote in newspapers such as *Akşam*, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, *Milliyet*, *Ulus*, and *Dünya*.⁷ However, more than anything throughout his life and career he was known for his close friendship with Mustafa Kemal. As a result, he was a passionate admirer of Mustafa Kemal and an ardent spokesman of the Kemalist régime.

³ Tezcan Durna, *Kemalist Modernleşme ve Seçkinlik* (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2009), 121.

⁴ Falih Rıfki Atay, *Batış Yılları* (İstanbul: Bateş Yayınları, 2000), 39.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ A member of the CUP triumvirate. The others were Enver Paşa and Cemal Paşa.

⁷ Falih Rıfki, Halide Edip, Yakup Kadri, Mehmet Asım. *İzmir'den Bursaya* (İstanbul: Atlas Yayınları, n.d.), 11.

F.R. Atay was a voluminous writer of newspaper articles, memoirs, novels, and travelogues from a Kemalist perspective. The historical value of *Çankaya* comes from Atay's careful presentation of Mustafa Kemal. Atay explains the way he approached Mustafa Kemal's life in *Çankaya*: "[Mustafa Kemal] Atatürk was made up of a little bit of ambition, lust, anger, pride, vice or ups and downs. His achievement comes from all his human sides. His life must be taken as a whole — not piecemeal — like an object of nature."⁸ Apart from his eloquent Turkish, Atay has been cited by many writers who trusted his knowledge because he personally witnessed the tumultuous and crucial moments of Turkish history before and after the Republic was declared, and he was always close to the leadership. The duties assigned to him in his youth enabled him to closely evaluate the CUP leaders Enver, Talat and Cemal Paşas, whose fatal mistakes led the country into a series of national disasters. Atay met Mustafa Kemal just after the Greek army was defeated in İzmir, and he remained by his side until Mustafa Kemal's death.⁹ During the implementation of the Kemalist reforms, Atay maintained an important role — to popularize the régime with his newspaper articles and books. In addition, because he was one of the most trusted men of Mustafa Kemal, he was sent on various international missions as the representative of the Republic of Turkey. After his return from each of these missions or travels, Atay published books on his observations in these countries, including Brazil (1927), Italy (1928), Albania (1928), the Soviet Republic (1932), England (1934), India (1943) and the United States (1945).

Atay's travels were never only for the sake of enjoyment or to help his readers have a good time reading. Although Atay's travel books include a lot of information that gives the impression that the traveler had studied the place and its people, it is obvious that everything was studied beforehand and compared with the newly-founded Turkish Republic and the consequences of the Kemalist revolutions. For example, while Atay was in Tirana, Albania, the first thing that attracted his attention was how the Albanian government implemented the same reforms as the Kemalists which had a positive impact:

⁸ Falih Rıfki Atay, *Çankaya* (İstanbul: Bateş Yayınları, 1980), 13.

⁹ Tezcan Durna, *Kemalist Modernleşme ve Seçkincilik*, 122.

The great honor of Kemalism is seen clearly in Albania. Young Albanians have followed the Turkish revolution in order to avoid *Orientality* [*şarklılık*] that leads to colonization or semi-colonization and to abolish ancient institutions. Changes in headgear and dress and civil code have changed the appearance of Albanian towns and cities in the same way that they did in Turkish towns and cities. During the gatherings in the countryside, I saw many women in low-cut dresses together with the men.¹⁰

Here, Atay praises Albanians for following the Kemalist régime to Westernize their country, and he draws parallels between the new Turkish and Albanian cities or towns because the inhabitants now look like Westerners.

Furthermore, by equating the Albanian achievement with the achievements of the Kemalists, Atay posits *Şarklılık* [Orientality] as an arch enemy to be dealt with in both countries. *Şarklılık* is a recurring theme everywhere in Atay's writing and it is a key term to understand the motives of most Kemalists then and now. *Şark* means "Orient," but for Atay *Şarklı*, a native of Orient who is oriental, is necessarily one who is underdeveloped, lazy, a religious zealot, and incapable of comprehending events in the modern world. Thus, orient or *Şark* that Atay detested was not a particular geographical area but a mentality that Atay pairs with traditionalism. In other words, Atay's conception of oriental is characterized by a set of repulsive attitudes. Any group or society can bear these oriental characteristics, and for Atay these characteristics are associated with backwardness. In his book *Kurtuluş* [Liberation], Atay gives the antidote to orientality:

The Muslim communities outside Western civilization and culture are in a crisis of culture and civilization. Unless this crisis is eliminated through secular education, in these societies democracy can normally flourish only by the ethical and honest nature of the elite minority.¹¹

Therefore, it turns out that for Atay, the reason of this crisis is the lack of adoption to Western culture and civilization in Muslim communities by a determined group of

¹⁰ Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Gezerek Gördüklerim* (İstanbul: MEB Yayınları, 1975), 192.

¹¹ Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Kurtuluş* (İstanbul: Bateş Yayınları, 2000), 89. The book was first published in 1966.

enlightened people, if not a secular education. There are many instances where Atay emphasizes the backwardness of oriental people, and it is clear that in doing so first he alienates himself — and other Kemalists — from the impoverished majority of the people, and then he stresses that this backwardness is something to be dealt with. Elsewhere, Atay gives an example of how to equip people with necessary knowledge while he propagates the function of the *Halk Evleri* (People's Houses, community centers of the Turkish Republic) in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* newspaper in 1932:

The *Halk Evleri* are not places to see people or to make ourselves visible to others. There, we will speak to the people; we will teach whatever they do not know and we will learn from them. Those who are locked inside books and schools should admit that they have a lot to learn from the people. The people know a lot.¹²

More than any group of his writings, Atay's travel books reveal the insight and economic goals of the Kemalist single-party régime. In other words, his travelogues can be read as an attempt to determine the righteous economic policies of the Republic of Turkey. In particular, Atay's travel books on the Soviet Republic and England, which he wrote during a global economic depression, aimed to elaborate the alternative financial policies of different forms of government. At the same time, Atay continues to compare the practices of Kemalist reforms with cultural and social traits of these places. For example in Moscow, Atay was fascinated by two things: first, the way the communists maintained a clockwork precision in performing their plans; and second, how the government succeeded in convincing the people to endure difficulties to fulfill their plans.¹³ This second point is important to understand that does not praise communist Russia's ideology, but he admires the accomplishments of building a new society in the Soviet Republic that seems befitting for Kemalist Turkey.¹⁴ However, in London, Atay's tone becomes appreciative. Since Atay traveled to India before independence and his accounts consist of the peculiarities of the British Raj, his thoughts about the British bear importance for this study. In *Taymis Kıyıları* [The Shores of the Thames], Atay

¹² Quoted in Tezcan Durna, *Kemalist Modernleşme ve Seçkinlik*, 134.

¹³ Falih Rıfki, *Moskova Roma* (İstanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1932), 36-41.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

declares his admiration for the British and their way of life in a way that is different from his appreciation of any other place. He praises the British because they know how to enjoy life and how to make their society enjoyable: “Englishness is a manner. This manner is beautiful, I wish it continued. Because like the English island, it is established on prosperity as well.”¹⁵ Atay’s knowledge about the British was based on the British influence on the late Ottoman state and on British Imperialism in Asia and Africa. Although in his book Atay neither praised imperialism nor approved of the British impact on Ottoman statesmen, the orderly cities, well-groomed parks, and the enchanting scenery deeply influenced him. He tirelessly compares London with Istanbul, English people with Turks, and local institutions with the new Kemalist institutions of Turkey. Above all, as Atay harshly criticizes non-Europeans in London, it seems that for Atay the English outshine everyone in the midst of the racial diversity of London with people from Africa, China and the Caribbean. In *Taymis Kıyıları*, he slams the Chinese by saying that “The beauty of an Asian nation lies in their leadership in Asian victimhood.”¹⁶ When he visits the Foreign Office in London, Atay reveals that his admiration of the British is because of their ability to rule their colonies cleverly and with a persistent policy by referring to some renowned British diplomats. After praising Lord Curzon and Lord Lions for their perseverance to fulfill their duties in the British colonies, Atay says, “The Great English cause will continue to exist as a kind of heritage, culture and an instinct in these characters and figures.”¹⁷ Here, by “The Great English cause” Atay means the perseverance of diplomats and colonial governors of the British Empire, whom Atay admires throughout this part of his book. Atay’s sympathy for the British does not prevent him from criticizing them for their colonization of Asia and Africa, however, to Atay it is the colonized peoples who should be blamed for their yoke under Western dominance. Because these peoples failed to revolt to gain independence, for Atay they are doomed to lag behind Kemalist Turkey in development. Similarly, Atay’s attitude in *Hind* toward India and its people is condescending because they were not independent and were an underdeveloped society at the time. In order to

¹⁵ Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Gezerek Gördüklerim*, 48.

¹⁶ Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Taymis Kıyıları* (İstanbul: Akçam Matbaası, 1934), 65.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 68.

clarify the aspects of Atay's approach to India and its situation in 1943, a close analysis of *Hind* is necessary.

India as Atay Observed: *Hind* [India] (1943)

Hind was published in 1943. Mustafa Kemal had died five years earlier, and World War II was at its peak. In 1943, a Turkish mission of journalists was invited by the Indian government to visit India and hold meetings with their local colleagues, and Falih Rifkî Atay was the senior member of the group. The book was prepared in the same year and it was published following his return from the travel. At that time, Atay had been a well-known and widely-read columnist in the *Ulus* newspaper which was associated with the Republican People's Party (RPP) and its policies.

Atay starts his book with a preface in which he initially compares India with the Western world and then he compares and contrasts India with Kemalist Turkey. In this part, he disparages and disapproves of Indian nationalism because the nationalists are trying to "oust the British along with British civilization."¹⁸ For Atay, there is a conflict between the young Westernized nationalists and the conservative Hindus that is reminiscent of the conflict in Turkey. Atay adds that the uncertainty about which side would outweigh the other is the main question of Indian independence. Whether Indian nationalists achieved their independence or not is not a concern for Atay; what matters is whether Indians will manage to get rid of their old and dark past.

In this part, Atay also introduces one of his favorite concepts, the "Mediterranean Enlightenment." According to Atay, as a valuable source of development for India, Mediterranean Enlightenment first arrived in India with Aryans, then with Alexander the Great, and finally with Europeans.¹⁹ Atay supposes India is an essentially dark place that needs to be enlightened, and then he goes further and implies that the only means to get rid of this darkness is the light that comes from the West. It is clear that Islam, which reached India somewhere between Alexander the Great and the Europeans does not count. The sources to which Atay refers seem to be of European origin and thus Eurocentric, which may explain why

¹⁸ Falih Rifkî Atay, *Hind* (İstanbul: Semih Lütüfi Kitapevi, 1943), 12.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

he gives no chance for a land that is so far from the West to be sophisticated and cultivated. His approach to India in the very beginning of the book might be practical for a Kemalist interpretation of the non-West as it obviously considers the East as a place left far behind after the Revolution. Categorizing every non-Western location and culture as inferior, this approach is clearly and ironically Orientalist. Be it Hindu or Muslim “darkness,” for Atay it is darkness because it rejects the European Enlightenment that is necessarily secular and modern. Moreover, although the implication of India as a land in the dark reminds us of the title of V.S. Naipaul’s first travelogue about India, *An Area of Darkness* (1964), Atay’s attitude is much more complicated than Naipaul’s. First of all, as a descendant of a Hindu-Brahmin family, the Trinidad-Tobago-born Naipaul does not think it is the Hindu or Islamic religion that makes India a dark place and he mostly deals with India as a “decayed”²⁰ or half-made society, features of an underdeveloped community that failed to leap out of the Third World. On the other hand, Atay rejects the possibility of wisdom in the East, not only in India, and he sees the West as the only way to salvation. Atay’s bleak vision about the East and Eastern peoples is due to their “orientality” (*şarklılık*) — again, not a geographical but a cultural description — which can only be healed by the contribution of the West or a light that comes from the West. Adding that India lost many chances each time it stepped backward from this light, Atay says there are always risks for countries in progress to halt it or to regress. Here in the preface, in order to emphasize his point Atay turns his attention to Turkey and emphasizes that although there is no turning back from Kemalism, even in Kemalist Turkey the threat of mysticism inside Kemalism has always been alive. By saying that, Atay does not mean that Kemalism has a mystic aspect; rather he refers to the Kemalists who literally and culturally praised Yunus Emre, a dervish-poet of Turkish folk literature who lived in the thirteenth century.²¹ Atay’s disturbance about Yunus Emre's glorification at the time was not groundless because during İsmet İnönü’s presidency, there was a shift from Mustafa Kemal’s cultural policies and early Kemalist inventions as the Turkish History Thesis or the Sun Language Theory left their place to Turkish Humanism movement. Atay, who was

²⁰ V.S. Naipaul, *An Area of Darkness* (New York: Vintage Books, 2002), 48.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 13.

not against Turkish Humanism, had long sworn to be faithful to Mustafa Kemal's principles, but after İsmet İnönü took Mustafa Kemal's place, the Kemalists tried new theories to create "the new people" that they were committed to. The Turkish Humanism movement started in early 1940s as an idea that in order to obtain the essence of progress, schools had to teach Latin and Greek languages — an essential feature of Europeanization —and it rested on an interpretation of Kemalism that rejected the imitation of Western civilization but supported being assimilated into it. Suat Sinanoğlu defines this strategy in his work *Türk Hümanizmi* [Turkish Humanism], which is the most extensive book on Turkish Humanism in the Turkish language, thus:

Actually, an alien civilization can be imitated in every aspect — such as its educational and cultural institutions — but unless we have an enlightened humanist awareness, it is impossible to think of the possibility of accepting its ideological, moral and aesthetic configuration, because it is the humanist consciousness of a community that gives the possibility of crossing the borders of its traditional realm and the ability to evaluate the spiritual values of other civilizations.²²

Within this new movement, what bothers Atay is the formation of a new Turkish literary canon that includes the works of Sufis like Rumi or Yunus Emre.²³ Despite the fact that Kemalism was not essentially an anti-religious movement, Atay usually depicted religiosity as the arch enemy of Kemalism and as something that had to be destroyed. In the case of Indian nationalism and its future, for Atay, the impact of Hinduism there can easily be compared with the role of Islam in Turkey before the Kemalist Revolution. Accordingly for Atay, in the Muslim world and also anywhere religion is practiced passionately, religious people have to be confronted fiercely. Nevertheless, Atay does not despise Islam or any religion in his writings. Rather, his conception of Kemalism requires the detestation of "the old order" which involves a traditional and pious worldview. As a result of his generalization concerning

²² Suat Sinanoğlu, *Türk Hümanizmi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1980), 90.

²³ Kaya Ayyıldız and Barış Karacasu, "Mavi Anadolu: Edebi Kanon ve Milli Kültürün Yapılandırılışında Kemalizm ile Bir Ortaklık Denemesi," *Toplum ve Bilim*, No. 81 (Summer 1999): 39.

modernization of any place or society by means of Kemalism, in the very beginning of his travelogue, Atay scolds Hinduism as well as Islam and the Muslim community.

Atay comments on India and its problems at the very beginning of the book, even without telling anything about India. Atay writes his travelogues with a desire to guide the reader in order to determine the reader's conclusions. We have already seen this inclination in *Moskova Roma* or *Taymis Kıyıları* above. Also in *Hind*, Atay's main goal in travelling and writing or sharing his views about these places is to make comparisons between Kemalist Turkey and the rest of the world, as well as recording the shortcomings and advantages of those places in a way that he wants the readers to conceive. There is no doubt that Atay takes travel writing seriously as a medium of Kemalist propaganda. People would be interested in writings about far-away places, and instilling propaganda in this way is very easy. That is why Atay's style in his travelogues is imperious and instructive.

Another interesting approach to the Orient by Atay in the same part of the book is stated by emphasizing that Turks had similarities and differences with Eastern peoples in the past, and now these features have to be sought within the West; i.e., we and other peoples of the East "should resemble each other in the Western world."²⁴ This necessitates a total change in our conceptions toward Western ways of thinking or in Atay's words "by tearing ourselves away from our cultural roots of the Orient in our mentality."²⁵ For Atay, the same threats apply from within both the Hindu and Muslim societies of India because there was indifference to the Greek and Latin languages that were essential to grasp the Mediterranean Enlightenment while Hindus are inclined to learn Sanskrit and Muslims are eager to learn Arabic or Persian. For Atay, such indifference to learn Western languages is unforgivable and his disappointment in India is possibly a reverberation of Kemalists' frustration from their failed attempts to make Greek and Latin languages a prevalent feature of Turkish education. Because the expected interest that the Kemalists aimed to create in "the new people" did not come either from high schools or universities, Atay becomes even more disillusioned as he sees the same mistake in another people in

²⁴ Falih Rifkî Atay, *Hind*, 13.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

the Orient. As he concludes this part at the beginning of the book, Atay shows the way for India to evolve from backwardness:

The main issue of the West[ernization] is to organize for the sake of order; the question for humanity in the non-European world is whether to be colonized or to become Europeanized. People of India will be saved like us by being liberated from themselves by themselves. They will seek and find their completeness in a free and vast enlightenment, as we Turks did.²⁶

As one of the most important parts of the book, this short preface easily gives a general idea of Atay's intention to evaluate India, which is a land of many common features with Turkey. As it was shown in the previous chapter, India had an important role in supporting the Turkish War of Independence a little more than two decades before Atay was in India. Atay's approach to India and its problems from a totally renewed and Europeanized point of view is a peculiar example from which we can see the change that the Kemalists aimed to bring to Turkey. To name Atay's stance as merely "Kemalist" does not do justice to understand his worldview, but rather his approach can be defined as the same as the Orientalists. First, Atay's concept of "Oriental" or "Orientality" is one that fits Edward Said's definition of Orientalist depiction of the East:

The centuries-old designation of geographical space to the east of Europe as "Oriental" was partly political, partly doctrinal, and partly imaginative; it implied no necessary connection between actual experience of the Orient and knowledge of what is Oriental.²⁷

It is clear thwn that Atay's disdain of the Orient is rooted in his radical favoring of secularism since he identifies Orientality with mystical, spiritual, or religious ways of interpreting events in the world. In this oriental world, there are Arabs, Asian peoples, African natives and most importantly, the people of Turkey who reject the Kemalist enlightenment. Therefore, Atay's degrading Hindus and Muslims for their failure to struggle for independence struggle and their refusing to live with the British is based upon his rejection of anything that is non-Western.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 14.

²⁷ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, 210-11.

After the preface, Atay's *Hind* goes on with an 80-page introduction, which comprises detailed information about the geography, population, climate, history, religions, caste, and politics of India. The main sources for Atay's knowledge about India seem to be a few books that Atay mentioned at the beginning of his book: *A Short History of Muslim Rule in India* by Ishwari Prasad, *Les Civilisations de l'orient* by René Grousset, *Géographie Universelle* by P. Vidal de la Blance and L. Gallois, *Pakistan A Nation* by Ashfaq Ali Khan and the *Encyclopedia of Britannica*. It is difficult to take these pages as a part of a travel book since most things here are not Atay's own observations. Nevertheless, Atay does not abstain from evaluating the political and social situation of Hindus and Muslims of India. For instance, he sympathizes with Nehru more than with Jinnah as he describes Nehru as "a Westerner and a realist,"²⁸ while, for Atay, Jinnah was "one of the best-paid lawyers in the country who lived in his palace of Italian marble as he watched the bulk of his miserable neighbors."²⁹ For Atay, Nehru is a promising politician who supports European values and is an antidote to Gandhi's conservative traditionalism. Muslims, on the other hand, in Atay's view are at least half a century behind when compared with the Hindus, because they have failed to adopt English values in their education and life.³⁰ It is striking that Atay does not seem to support the nationalist and liberationist causes of the Indian National Congress or the Muslim League. On the contrary, Atay implicitly favors British rule in India by mentioning the social and political contributions of the British as well as pointing out the threat of separation and conflict in case of independence. Normally, Kemalists were expected to support any movement of nationalist struggle against Western imperialism, but since the people of India were in need of "light from the West," Atay prefers British imperialism to Indian independence.

In *Hind*, after 100 pages Atay begins his own description of India. As the long introduction ends, places that the journalists visited before arriving in India are listed, including Baghdad, Basra, and Bahrain, which were at least equally important for Atay since he had the chance to observe these places that were once under Ottoman

²⁸ Falih Rifkî Atay, *Hind*, 60.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 66.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 53-54.

rule when he was an officer in the 4th Army during World War I. That's why the scene was not altogether alien to Atay. When Atay and his fellow travellers were there, those lands were under the mandates of Britain or France. For example, Atay bitterly describes scenes at the Iraq border near Islahiye, where he sees local and French smugglers, non-Muslim Turkish citizens fleeing Turkey because of the Wealth Tax of 1942, and the rudimentary conditions at the border.³¹ Middle Eastern countries under the bondage of a foreign power is enough for the writer to despise the place as a sign of weakness and "Oriental backwardness." When he reaches Baghdad, he first praises the glory of the ancient city but then expresses his frustration because of the Muharram³² mourning. It is not that Atay does not respect Arab traditions, but he ancient traditions that people follow hypocritically.³³ It is hypocritical for Atay because for him there is no use in lamenting an ancient atrocity which cannot have any influence on the present. While he and other members of the mission are leaving a mosque, Atay is so grateful to the Turkish Revolution that he writes: "As we were getting into the car after we passed the crowd in the courtyard, I felt exultant because I realized what we saved our people from. A secular co-education can save all the orient from everything that it suffers!"³⁴ This is an ordinary example of Atay's employing his observations in his travels to praise the fruits of the Turkish Revolution. While doing this, Atay disdains "outdated" local traditions and beliefs to extol the new order in Turkey. Throughout his travels abroad, Atay despises the places and peoples that failed to adopt Western values to initiate a total renewal, as the Republic of Turkey did. In other words, as a "total ideology,"³⁵ the Kemalist mindset assumes that if certain steps are followed without hesitation, then it is possible to overcome a backward and degenerate state.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 86-87.

³² Muharram is the first month in the Muslim calendar and the name is derived from "*haram*". For Shia Muslims, the first ten days of Muharram had to be lived by mourning for the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, Hussein Ibn Ali.

³³ Atay, *Hind*, 90.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 92

³⁵ Here, I use the term "total ideology" in the sense that Karl Mannheim used it in his book, *Ideology and Utopia*. "[For a definition of total ideology] ...here we refer to the ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social group, e.g. of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group." Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 49-53.

The moment Atay reaches Karachi, India, he realizes that he is in a place unlike those he visited before: Hindus with caste signs, Muslims wearing the fez, women in saris, and cows in the streets are odd scenes for him. The next day, the Turkish press mission travels to Gwalior and their hosts display a great eagerness to show their guests around, especially the developing aspects of their country. For Atay, this kind of interest makes the Turkish mission feel like “Pierre Loti” in an Oriental land.³⁶ Agra fascinates Atay more than other cities in India. Here, Atay gives encyclopedic information about the Turkish impact on Indian culture by mostly focusing on the Mughal period. In this part, we see another example of Atay’s opportunism as he humiliates both Turkish dynasties, Ottomans and Mughals, because “sons and fathers wanted to reign by slaughtering, imprisoning or strangling each other.”³⁷ This kind of an attitude may easily be called opportunism because whenever Atay gives historical information, he uses it to denigrate the past, especially the recent past of Turkey.

In Delhi the Turkish journalists are welcomed with great enthusiasm so that in Hindu and Muslim newspapers, pieces questioning the success and performance of the hosts in helping the Turkish guests. Atay also adds that wherever they went, they met crowds demonstrating and trying to contact them:

There are a lot of young Hindus or Muslims waiting for us at our doors in the hotel, with letters in their hands. They all think that if we turn down their invitations, we won’t be able to learn anything about India. A great many of them comes only to see us; all they want is to shake our hands, a kind of salutation to Turkey. This brotherly and sincere respect is always present around us throughout our visit.³⁸

Before ending this part of Atay’s *Hind*, the conversations with local people reflect deeper insights of the writer on how he posits India and the non-Kemalist Orient in his world vision. Atay cites dialogues from the invitations and meetings that they attended, such as the one at the Viceroy’s palace, the Muslim League’s meeting, and occasional visits to prominent figures of the Indian society. The event

³⁶ Atay, *Hind*, 110.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 111.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 149.

where Atay observes the local people closely is the Viceroy's reception at the palace. Here, Atay praises the British resourcefulness and emphasizes 1943 as one of the quietest and most peaceful times of the British rule in India because Gandhi is in prison and the Japanese are in Burma. The Viceroy, General Marshall Wavell, welcomes the Turkish journalists for lunch and Atay praises the Viceroy for his "nobility and convincing sincerity."³⁹ Immediately after this part in *Hind*, Atay goes on with the events at the tea party organized by the Muslim League in Delhi. During that meeting, speakers give the Turkish journalists information about their intention to establish Pakistan under the leadership of Jinnah, and according to Atay, they expect from Turkey to support them. After thanking them for their efforts to help the Turks in the difficult times of the Turkish War of Independence, he responds to their demands as follows: "You can't expect us to judge the political sides in India in a few days. Turks can't be against independence struggle of any country; however, we must say that intervening in other nations' internal affairs never complies with the New Turkey's politics and principles."⁴⁰

Apart from the diversity of the ideas in the political scene, in several places of the book Atay expresses his amazement at the non-restraint of the politicians and the Indian journalists who enjoy asking every question and commenting on Turkish politics. This is partly because when they were in India, a democratic culture in media and politics was clearly absent in Turkey; the newspapers were not only divided according to their political positions but also according to allegiance. That is to say, it was unthinkable for certain newspapers and writers to question the integrity or the sincerity of policies and actions from their camps, especially publicly. In many parts of *Hind*, Atay propounds that any visitor to India must be aware of the intentions of the reporters and also must be careful about everything that is divulged to the newspapers: "Visitors to India should keep in mind that apart from the jungle full of tigers and elephants, [the visitors] will fall in the jungle full of politics and politicians. Besides the possibility of hunting, there is always the chance of being hunted."⁴¹ As a leading and respected figure in the Turkish media, Atay must have

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 165.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 166.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* 173.

anticipated a much more timid or apprehensive group of journalists who question their visitors' views about India. Indeed, wherever the Turkish journalists go, they are interrogated by local people, journalists, and politicians because they are curious about how the Turks see the situation of colonized India or whether Turks are willing to intervene in their problems. Of course, as the spokesperson and the senior member of the group, Atay each time evades by giving examples from the Republic of Turkey and points out that the solution to those problems is to follow the Kemalist example of Turkey, to fight against the oppression and seek allegiances with Western world.

Atay's most tedious discussion in *Hind* takes place during their visit to Lahore where the Turkish journalists were hosted by a group of local Muslims. At the meeting, Atay and other Turkish journalists are asked to explain the revolutions of the Turkish Republic in terms of their conformity with the Koran. Assuming that the interrogator wants to know if those revolutions serve the jihad or a kind of pan-Islamism, Atay clarifies to the Muslim audience that the Muslim peoples who were once Ottoman subjects have declared their independence, so there is no need to fight or even care for pan-Islamism. The next question opens a new debate on whether they feel themselves Turks, or Muslims first. Atay says "Turks" but emphasizes that Turks had their national identity even before they converted to Islam. At the end of the meeting Atay concludes that:

The conservatives among Hindu nationalists do not approve of some of the principles of Kemalism; however, except for a small young group, all the Muslims of India reject them. According to the majority of Muslims, there is an appointed caliph ruling Turkey [...] During such meetings, a Turk feels all the agony of the lost century and Empire, and in order not to stay in that pit he wants to escape.⁴²

In these words, there is an obvious effort to distance himself from the "archaic" concerns of the Muslim interviewers above and his — and modern Turkey's — new. As a member of a Westernized people, Atay seems helpless to explain to his listeners the advances of Turkey's new position since he sees no desire in them to make such a move. Here and elsewhere, Atay experiences a mixture of contempt and pride when

⁴² *Ibid.*, 193.

he observes the situation of Hindus and Muslims in India. He is proud of his own identity because the respect and affection that both Hindus and Muslims show to them is due to his belonging to the Turkish nation. For example, when Atay hears these words from the Chief Minister of Bengal, A.K. Fazlul Huq, during their visit to Calcutta, he is very proud and emphasizes that this speech is important to show the Indian people's love of the "new Turkey":

The people that you represent are historically the closest to us among the various Eastern nations that has received Westernization with open arms. We are aware of what you have achieved in politics, war, and social reform. Turkey is an essential example in many aspects for communities who shape their destiny. For us, you are the embodiment of initiative, energy, as well as all the virtues and qualities that make a nation great. Even when you are thousands of miles away from us, do not forget that in this part of India there are always people who look up to you and who admire your achievements in all areas of war and peace. We do not only hope but also have deep faith in your awareness that your accomplishments are matters of pride for all Eastern peoples.⁴³

On the other hand, in similar sessions of meetings it is also evident in Atay's words that it is useless to expect Eastern peoples to be liberated from the immaturity that they live in or even to tell what is right for them as they are not capable of comprehending — not because of a racist disdain but because of their timidity to act. He assumes that if a people deserve political and cultural independence, they have to strive for it. Otherwise, they are not worthy to grasp these enlightened ideals and are bound to live under servitude to worthier peoples. However, this typical Kemalist approach to the plight of Eastern peoples dismisses the differences in the nature of various independence movements by elevating their own struggle for independence to a sanctifying level that must be followed by all peoples under foreign rule or domination. Elsewhere, Ahmad points out the main differences in the motives of the Indian and Turkish independence movements:

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 224.

The Kemalist movement was too different from the Indian to be able to influence it. Unlike the Kemalists, the Indian National Congress was not concerned with the radical reconstruction of society. The Congress was still not united on the question of whether they were seeking dominion status or total independence. In August 1928, the All-Parties Conference accepted the [Molital] Nehru Report in support of dominion status for India. Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) and Subhas Chandra Bose (1897-1945) refused to associate themselves with this decision and came to be described as the “Young Turks” of the Congress. That was the extent of Turkey’s influence on India!⁴⁴

Whatever Kemalists like Atay expected people under the rule of a Western power to do in order to liberate themselves, there were many inescapable differences. According to Atay’s Western-oriented world view, these differences are because of the small number of thoroughgoing Westernization supporters and also the problem with both Hindus and Muslims who are reluctant to leave their traditional lives. In *Hind*, there is a striking conversation with an anonymous politician about the remedies to save India from a deep sleep. Atay informs us that he is a true Gandhist (which means, for Atay, a “traditionalist”) and we don’t know if he is a Hindu, Muslim or whether he has an important post. Atay begins without introducing the speakers, and he quotes fragments of the conversation. Atay states his ideas before citing the dialogue:

Western peoples can fight each other over different political ideas but they all unite in one principle that dates back to the Greek Sophists: Man is the measure of all things. According to your [Indian] way of thought, man is a tiny part of the great universe. The individual, be it a prince or a beggar, is a glimpse of eternal powers. The individual does not count outside the community or the groups in the community like the caste or the village. State is an artificial being but family, village or caste is natural. Peoples of the Orient are not curious about

⁴⁴ Feroz Ahmad, “The Kemalist Movement and India,” in *From Empire to The Republic. Essays on The Late Ottoman and Modern Turkey* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2008), 276.

precision and bintensity of thought. Reason and scientific certitude hardly penetrate their souls. Read the ancient Indian epics and then read *Iliad* and *Odyssey* and then you will see the difference.⁴⁵

From this point on, the short conversation starts:

Atay: Let's leave all these contentions aside. We Turks have lost nearly a century while seeking a way to reconcile two worlds, two civilizations, and two ways of thinking. Finally we found a way to salvation after we recovered ourselves from that dream.

Anonymous politician: Yes, indeed you did this because the culture that you were attached to was Persian and Arabic in essence. Our culture is ours alone and it is the source of all cultures, even of that Western culture that you exalt. You left your culture easily because it was your mistress. If it were your own wife....

Atay: But where sterility of the woman is concerned, it is reasonable to get a new wife.

Anonymous politician: Sterile woman ... (smiling) Please don't be offended by my representing your situation. You were so badly stuck in the trap of the West that you preferred to run away, leaving your tail behind.

Atay: Perhaps... (Also smiling) But keep in mind that the noblest-breed dogs have docked tails.⁴⁶

Atay does not comment on the dialogue and ends this part by adding one last event of the same day. Just after his departure from the anonymous politician, he goes to his room in the hotel and sees a letter addressed to him. The subject of the letter bears an uncanny coincidence since the writer of it praises the reforms that the modern Republic of Turkey initiated. Although it is of no use to speculate whether such a letter was actually received by Atay, we can be sure that this letter suits the propagandist goals of the writer's other travelogues. Signed as "The Central Local Council Work for Women," the letter sounds as if it were the inner voice of Atay:

⁴⁵ Atay, *Hind*, 235.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 236.

If people here talk to you against the Kemalist reforms, keep in mind that the youth are not with them. Do not believe anyone who says that the languages of India cannot be spelled by Latin script. Our languages can adapt Latin script as easily as yours does. The main reason for illiteracy in India is this long and confusing alphabet. Poor people devote so much of their lives to overcome the cost of living that they cannot find the time to learn it. I have no hope for the enlightenment of the multitude of people in India unless the Latin script is adopted.⁴⁷

Atay ends this par with a clear picture of why India is essentially an Eastern nation craving enlightenment. Keeping in mind Atay's conception of Orientality that he described in the early parts of the book, we understand that regardless of its geographical location, India and its people are doomed to remain Oriental because they are dominated by a self-incurred Orientality.

In order to give a promising example, at the end of *Hind*, Atay describes the Parsi as the most Westernized and accomplished group in India. Hosted by a wealthy Parsi businessman in Bombay, Atay expresses his admiration for these people's openness to Western influence. In Atay's words, "You can't find any difference in Parsis and Westerners when you approach them." Then he quotes a Parsi woman in order to describe an ideal instance of Westernization:

A young Parsi lady of striking beauty and deep elegance told me, "Look at me, I am smoking a cigarette. I am sure you know that fire is sacred in our culture. There was no way for my mother even to imagine such a thing that I am doing now. We were not allowed to go into our grandmother's room without our veil. Look, now it is not a problem if our saris slightly touch our hair. My grandmother got married at such an early age that her father-in-law would have her sit on his lap and play games. And now look at my age and youth. All is possible gradually with the help of Western cultivation."⁴⁸

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 237.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 275.

Clearly, what Atay prescribes for India in order to solve her problems is to find methods to implement Western institutions in all areas by rooting out the traditional ways, as seen in the example of the Parsi lady.

Although Atay's approach to social betterment seems to be against tradition in favor of modernity, as a staunch Kemalist he shares the conservatism of most Kemalists who tend to see change as a dangerous venture since it is a threat to the status quo that the Kemalist ideology enjoys. Therefore, his Westerner stance and glorification of Westernization seems a means to qualify himself as élite compared with the people of Eastern countries, such as India.

Burhan Felek's *Hint Masalları* [Indian Fairy Tales]

Burhan Felek was another member of the Turkish journalist mission that visited India in 1943. He was born in İstanbul in 1889 and finished the School of Law in 1911, but he was mostly interested in sports and journalism. Felek wrote in a number of newspapers that were either in favor of Westernization or actively propagated it after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. These newspapers include İbrahim Şinasi's *Tasvir-i Efkar* and *Tevhid-i Efkar, Vakit*, Ahmet Emin Yalman's *Vatan, Milliyet, Tan*, and *Cumhuriyet*.⁴⁹ Burhan Felek is known for his long career in journalism as he wrote in various newspapers for 72 years, until he died in 1982. *Hint Masalları* was published in 1943, after the Turkish mission returned to Turkey.

Felek's accounts of the journey starts with Karachi, which seems to demonstrate the opposite of what he expected:

Karachi made a completely unexpected impression on us. There, we encountered a rather Westernized city. With sacred cows wandering around and men in turbans, it was essentially an Eastern city, but with American cars on the streets and clean buses it was obvious that Western civilization had penetrated to this place.⁵⁰

Like Atay, Felek must have set out on the journey after some background preparation and his first observations about India show Felek's understanding of "Westernized"

⁴⁹ Cem Atabeyoğlu, *Hocamız ve Başkanımız Burhan Felek* (İstanbul: Türkiye Olimpiyat Komitesi Yayınları, 2003), 25.

⁵⁰ Burhan Felek, *Hint Masalları* (İstanbul: Ahmet Halit Kitabevi, 1943), 43.

city. However, Felek's contentment turns to bitter distaste when he goes shopping in Delhi:

I had expected a high level of a conservatively moral way of shopping in India but I must say that I am deeply disappointed. Except for some English and Indian tradesmen, the prices for the same products in the same marketplace differ greatly. This is enough for me to say that the Indian marketplace and Indian's trading habits are in the primitive stages of their development.⁵¹

Throughout the journey, Felek discovers India is not the decayed place he thought and does not possess underdeveloped, Oriental features. For instance, in Calcutta, when he learns that the bullet factory that they visit is not a government-owned but a private enterprise, he is astonished: "Every incidence, every word and every rumor grows when it goes beyond the country's borders. Just look at what we thought about India and what we have found!"⁵² In another part of *Hint Masalları*, Felek expresses his amazement more directly about the landscape he sees in Mysore: "I have to admit that I had never expected to see such a great monument of civilization in India, as well as in the center of the local government. Seeing that wonderful designation of water, flowers, and garden was a big surprise for me."⁵³ It is evident that for Felek, India is an unexpectedly attractive place because "India is a country where thousands of beliefs, myths, and characteristics are intertwined."⁵⁴

In fact, going out in India not only annoys Felek with its underdeveloped marketplace, but the inquiries of the Hindu or Muslim reporters and the freedom of the press and their questions bewilder him, as they did to Atay. In Delhi, the most sensitive political issue is the idea of Pakistan, and therefore Muslim reporters urge the Turkish visitors to comment on the future of Muslims in India. On the other hand, it is clear that Felek is deeply touched by the extreme care that his Muslim hosts show. Moreover, how each group in India identifies itself by headdress and why they need such awareness arouse his interest, especially after he receives the same questions in different places:

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 73.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 139

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 165

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 158.

In India, what people wear on their heads is very important because it is the only way to distinguish one from the others. In various places of India, I heard the same questions: “Do you wear the same clothes that the Europeans wear?” I say, “Yes.” The man goes on: “Both men and women dress like that?” And I say, “Yes, both men and women.” After that he asks: “Then, how do you distinguish yourself from the Europeans and non-Muslims?” I answer, “We do not need to.” After answering the same questions everywhere, I concluded that the problem is not women’s dresses or men’s hats, these people’s only concern is how they will be different from the others.”⁵⁵

For most Kemalist Turks, the most decisive indicator for a country in order to be Westernized is the status of women and how women look. For Felek, there is a long way for the Indian women with their *saris* and their timidity to appear like women in the West. “It seems as if Indian womanhood is in its budding stages. There is much time for it to blossom. A long period of patience is needed.”⁵⁶ In another place, Felek cites the words of a Muslim woman in Lahore. Felek pities the woman who is a reporter for a Muslim newspaper who tells how she admires the new Turkey in improving women’s status in society. The woman also adds how pessimistic she is about the same level of development for women in India. It is not a coincidence that in the section above, Atay was also preoccupied with women’s education and dress both in Turkey and India as an indication of potential Westernization. So it is clear that one reason that Kemalists distinguished themselves from the Eastern world is Kemalism’s stance on women’s active role in society and their education. Similarly, Felek emphasizes repeatedly how reforms in Turkey encourage women to participate in social life by abandoning the Islamic veil. In his visit to the Maharaja of Kapurtala, Felek proudly says that the Maharaja admires the Turks most in their abandoning the veil for women.⁵⁷ Also in Hyderabad, when they were taken to a cinema, Felek is bothered by the absence of women in the audience. Seeing only a few British women around, Felek hopes the

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 79.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 81.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 113.

time will come for his “Indian sisters to enjoy their natural rights, just like their sisters in Turkey do.”⁵⁸ In order to liberate women from the restraints of tradition and to save India from “turmoil,” Felek cites the words of one of the daughters-in-law of the Nizam of Hyderabad: “India needs her Mustafa Kemal.”⁵⁹ Like Atay, Felek also never misses an opportunity to propagate the Turkish reforms and their gains to his readers in Turkey by pointing out the backwardness of India. Here, with the help of these repetitions of the unfavorable conditions of women in India, readers are expected to admire Kemalist reforms and to denigrate the underdevelopment of India.

Burhan Felek was known as an entertaining columnist whose style essentially included many anecdotes and amusing stories. However, in his attitude toward the traditions and religious practices of local people in India, it is possible to see what Edward Said calls “latent Orientalism.” According to Said, latent Orientalism involves mostly the unchanging derogation of the East by the Western gaze:

Along with all other peoples variously designated as backward, degenerate, uncivilized, and retarded, the Orientals were viewed in a framework constructed out of biological determinism and moral-political admonishment. The Oriental was linked thus to elements in society (delinquents, the insane, women, the poor) having in common an identity best described as lamentably alien. Orientals were rarely seen or looked at; they were seen through, analyzed not as citizens, or even people, but as problems to be solved or confined or — as the colonial powers openly coveted their territory — taken over.⁶⁰

One instance in which Felek shows the same attitude that Said describes occurs during the mission’s visit to Kashi Vishwanat Temple in Benares. Felek’s bewilderment about the things he encounters reveals the contemptuous attitude that Said describes:

We entered the Vishwanat Temple after passing dark, labyrinthine, and crowded streets that I could never figure out if I were alone.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 186.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 200.

⁶⁰ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, 207.

Crippled beggars were all around us, begging for money. For Hindus, charity is a kind of compensation for one's sins. That's why rich Hindus try to compensate for their sins in this way and beggars try to find compensators. This is a matter of belief and one which is beneficial for social solidarity. In the courtyard that welcomes us, cows are wandering much more freely than we are. What is this Hindu esteem for the cows all about? Apart from the ones that walk here and there, there are a lot of statues of sitting cows. People put flowers around their necks and sometimes pour Ganges water on them. Look! There is a statue of a black, small and hideous man. This is the idol of Shiva, one of the three Hindu Gods that deals with destroying and transforming. Hindus passing by drop some flowers and water in front of him. Just in case he gets angry and does some harm! This is hard to understand. Let us not criticize, but I think I would be puzzled about which one to worship if there were so many gods. It must be annoying to be afraid of idols when you are already afraid of so many people around you.⁶¹

Felek not only despises Hindu beliefs and religious practices, but he also belittles the intellect of the Hindus because of their polytheistic faith. Like the other members of the Turkish mission, he is not a devout Muslim so his contempt is clearly not anti-Hindu, but is more cultural.

As a project of Westernization, Kemalism aims to analyze the social construction of traditional Turkish society according to the schematic features of European modernity. The élites of the new regime in Turkey disseminated the official views concerning the appraisal of the reforms through their books and columns in newspapers. Felek's *Hint Masalları*, like Atay's *Hind*, glorify the Turkish Revolution and Kemalist reforms by the stories and descriptions of the scenes from the Orient in order to prove what those reforms saved their country from and what their country achieved with the Kemalist reforms.

⁶¹ Burhan Felek, *Hint Masalları*, 124.

The Second Turkish Journalist Mission in India

In 1953, another group of Turkish journalists visited India. Because the visit was after the independence and the partition of India, that group's attention was focused on different matters from the first Turkish journalists' mission of 1943. The journalists in this group were Ahmet Emin Yalman, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, Adviye Fenik, Refi Cevad Ulunay and Doğan Nadi. These journalists wrote their observations in their newspaper columns and later their writings were compiled and made into a book, *Hindistan'da Gördüklerimiz* [What We Saw in India]. Also, Refi Cevad Ulunay published his extended travelogue, *İhtişam Diyarı Hindistan* (India: The Land of Flamboyance). The spokesperson for the group was also the most senior of them, Ahmet Emin Yalman, and most of the pieces in *Hindistan'da Gördüklerimiz* were written by him. In this part of my study, I will focus on Ahmet Emin Yalman's pieces in *Hindistan'da Gördüklerimiz*.

A Deep-Seated Liberal Kemalist: Ahmet Emin Yalman

Academic and biographical studies of Ahmet Emin Yalman are scarce both in Turkish and English. The academic studies on Yalman focus mostly on his journalism and were written by researchers from faculties of communication. Although he was an important political figure and a prolific writer, it is interesting that historians and political analysts in Turkey remain indifferent to textual and historical explorations of his writings. This indifference to Yalman and his writings can partly be attributed to his origin. Ahmet Emin Yalman was born in Thessaloniki in 1888,⁶² one of the most cosmopolitan cities of the Ottoman Empire with its Jewish, Greek, Bulgarian and Muslim populations and dynamic culture. His family is known to have been a part of the *Dönmes* [the Jewish Converts or sometimes referred as Dönmehs], a controversial and secret group that has been in the focus of many conspiracy theories in Turkey.⁶³ The *Dönmes* are thought to be active in the

⁶² Asuman Tezcan, *Ahmet Emin Yalman Dönemi ve Gazeteciliği (1918-1938)* Ankara University Institute for Social Sciences Department of Journalism, 2007. Unpublished Phd Dissertation. 12

⁶³ The term *Dönme* is used for the community of crypto-Jews who are known to follow Sabbatai Zevi who lived in the 17th century and claimed him to be the Messiah. After Zevi, Thessaloniki is referred to as the center of the community that flourished from three branches, one of which, *Yakubis*, was the one Ahmet Emin Yalman belonged to. For more on the *Dönme* community and their national identity in Turkey, see Leyla Neyzi, "Remembering to Forget: Sabbateanism, National Identity, and

intelligentsia and act in solidarity in the media and fine arts in Turkey. Fiction or non-fiction books concerning the *Dönmes* and their genealogy have become bestsellers, but because of the lack of clear evidence in those popular books, skepticism over the *Dönmes* continues today. Ahmet Emin Yalman's *Dönme* origin is worth mentioning because it was referred to many times during his polemical debates with his opponents, such as one he had with Yunus Nadi, the founder of the *Cumhuriyet* newspaper, in 1937. Also in the reports of the British ambassadors to Turkey in 1948, 1953, and 1957 his *Dönme* origin was emphasized in relation to his position in the media.⁶⁴

Yalman was interested in journalism from a very early age. His father, who was Mustafa Kemal's calligraphy teacher at the military preparatory school, was also a founder of a periodical in Thessaloniki, *Mütalâa* [Contemplation],⁶⁵ which was publishing the originals of censored articles by writers in İstanbul, including Tevfik Fikret, Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), and Halit Ziya (Uşaklıgil).⁶⁶ According to Yalman's memoirs, he prepared his first hand-written newspaper at the age of nine with the name of *Niyet* [Intention] and then renamed it a couple of years later, *Semere-i Say-i Etfal* [Fruits of Children's Efforts].⁶⁷ After he finished the German High School in İstanbul, he was sent to the Columbia University to study political science and sociology in 1911. After he completed his PhD dissertation which focused on the role of the press in the modernization of the Ottoman Empire, he returned to Turkey and his professional life in journalism started in the CUP newspaper *Tanin* as a war correspondent, a job that enabled him to visit different fronts of the war. At the beginning of the War of Independence, he supported the idea of an alliance with the

Subjectivity in Turkey" *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Jan., 2002): 137-158; Richard H. Popkin and Stephanie Chasin "The Sabbatian Movement in Turkey (1703-1708) and Reverberations in Northern Europe" *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, New Series, Vol. 94, No. 2 (Spring, 2004): 300-317; Marc David Baer, *The Dönme Jewish Converts, Muslim Revolutionaries and Secular Turks* (California; Stanford University Press, 2010), 141-259. Baer's book also reveals many insights about Ahmet Emin Yalman and is perhaps the most informative book in English language about Yalman and his *Dönme* background.

⁶⁴ Asuman Tezcan, *Ahmet Emin Yalman Dönemi ve Gazeteciliği (1918-1938)*, 12, FN 15. Also for Yalman's answer to the accusations see Marc Baer, "The Double Bind of Race and Religion: The Conversion of the Dönme to Turkish Secular Nationalism" in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), 701.

⁶⁵ Marc David Baer, *The Dönme Jewish Converts, Muslim Revolutionaries and Secular Turks*, 53.

⁶⁶ Asuman Tezcan, *Ahmet Emin Yalman Dönemi ve Gazeteciliği (1918-1938)*, 14.

⁶⁷ Quoted in *Ibid.*

United States against Britain and France, but later he became one of the intellectuals in Istanbul who joined the Turkish nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal. He was sent into exile on Malta because of his involvement in the Turkish Nationalists' fight but did not give up supporting them when he returned to Istanbul. Throughout the period of the founding of the Republic, Yalman ardently supported Mustafa Kemal and his followers and became one of the propagators of the new régime. However, his support for the Progressive Republican Party in the first democratic multi-party experiment of the Republic of Turkey in 1925 caused his banishment from the newspaper business, and he couldn't start a new newspaper until Mustafa Kemal gave his permission in 1935. He took over the *Tan* newspaper in 1936 with his friends and returned to active journalism.

Yalman was not an advocate of a totalitarian and despotic interpretation of Kemalism. Probably because of the years he spent in the United States, he favored a liberal expansion in Kemalism in order to create a more democratic political culture in Turkey. In his book *Gerçekleşen Rüya* [The Dream That Came True], which was an evaluation of the first fifteen years of the Republic, he proposes a freer political environment that would enable criticism in order to enhance the régime:

The members of the great Turkish family never lose the sight of the goals that the initiative that they took fifteen years ago promised. They compensated for everything that was left undone. But those who are assimilated in the regime do not think that their mission is only to praise and furbish whatever is done. They should not leave the responsibility of criticizing and bettering the system to the outcasts of the regime, as it used to be in the days of fanatical partisanship. Constructive criticism must be a functioning mechanism inside the régime.⁶⁸

Yalman was also in favor of a more liberal economy rather than the radical state socialism of the Republican People's Party. He favored a liberal view of state and government in *Gerçekleşen Rüya* in order to describe the best possible Kemalist regime:

⁶⁸ Quoted in Şakir Dinçşahin, "Ahmet Emin Yalman ve Türkiye'de Liberal Düşünce," *AİBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Vol. 12, Özel Sayı (2012): 119.

It is important to note that under such delicate and difficult conditions, personal considerations, arbitrary favors and personal ambitions must be avoided. The quality of service, merit, and the benefit of the country have to be the primary concerns of the state. The slightest aberration from this goal, any innocent attempt or inclination in the opposite direction can easily disrupt the balance.⁶⁹

Although he was a passionate supporter of Mustafa Kemal's reforms and the new régime according to Kemalist principles, Yalman was different from most Kemalist intellectuals as he never gave up the idea of the possibility of a liberal interpretation of Kemalism. Significantly, after İsmet İnönü became the second president of the Republic of Turkey, Yalman raised his critical tone in his newspaper *Vatan* as he watched the régime become increasingly totalitarian. He attacked Turkey's sympathy for Nazi Germany in the late 1930s by invoking his *Dönme* background and rejecting his Turkishness.⁷⁰ Finally, his newspaper *Vatan* was closed when he harshly criticized the Wealth Tax of 1942.

When he was away from journalism, Yalman went on writing about the evils of Nazism and the promising Village Institutes. His book *Yarının Türkiyesine Seyahat* [A Journey to the Turkey of Tomorrow]⁷¹ is about his observations and interviews in several Village Institutes in Turkey. In the meantime, Yalman also became an important political figure as he participated in the founding of the Democratic Party (DP), the first party other than the Republican People's Party to rule the Republic after the election of 1950, which was the third and final experiment of democratic elections in Turkey. Although Yalman did not become an MP and because of his support for the DP with his newspaper *Vatan* and the articles he wrote in it, his name was always mentioned along with the DP until 1955 when he left after he saw its break from liberal policies as it became more authoritarian. Yalman carried on his struggle against the DP until the military coup of 1960, which he supported enthusiastically. On the day of the coup, he wrote in *Vatan* that "it was a new era for

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 124.

⁷¹ This book is known as one of the most passionate promoters of the Village Institutes in Turkey as a way to modernize Anatolian villagers. See Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Yarının Türkiyesine Seyahat* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1990).

Turkey and I felt reborn.”⁷² Though the support of a liberal for a military coup that hanged three members of the government and imprisoned hundreds of politicians and journalists seems utterly ironic, Yalman nevertheless calls it a victory for democracy,⁷³ because according to him, like most Kemalists even today, 27 May 1960 was a revolution to straighten a Turkish Republic that went astray. After the coup, Yalman dedicated his life to journalism and writing his memoirs.

Yalman’s Visit to India and *Hindistan’da Gördüklerimiz* [What We Saw in India]

Yalman’s observations about India were written at a very different time from the period when the first journalist group was invited in 1943. India was a newly independent country that was experiencing a renewal when Yalman and four other journalists were invited to tour the country. Under Jawaharlal Nehru’s government, the country was in the process of strengthening its unity with a global vision and total reconstruction. In regard to the policies of the young Indian Republic, Yalman sees many aspects of India to praise. However, Yalman gives credit only to India’s success in following the path to Westernization. Apart from that, his contemptuous attitude can be defined as Orientalist.

Yalman’s observations start with what Mohandas Gandhi meant to him. Yalman starts *Hindistan’da Gördüklerimiz* with the article titled, “İnsanlığın Babası” [Father of Humaneness] in which he states that “if it had not been for the emergence of a genius like Gandhi, Indians would have never escaped servitude to the British and would have ruined themselves because of their backwardness and superstitious beliefs.”⁷⁴ For Yalman, India is a place where extremism and violence go hand-in-hand, and Gandhi’s greatness was his diverting the energy of Indian independence from the destruction of the past to building a bright future. According to Yalman, because of this attitude,

Today in India, there is an evident allegiance to the British instead of enmity. The new India sticks to the ways the British taught them and

⁷² Dinçşahin, 131.

⁷³ Ahmet Emin Yalman. *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim*, Vol. 2 (İstanbul: Pera Ticaret Yay, 1997), 1711.

⁷⁴ Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Hindistan’da Gördüklerimiz* (Ankara: Yeni Matbaa, 1953), 8.

they have thousands of British experts serving them. The people of India overcame great material adversities only with the help of their spiritual power and now they have the capability to deal with future with sympathy, rather than fighting with the haunting past.⁷⁵

Yalman praises the contribution of British rule in India and affirms of the incompetence of Eastern peoples' attempts to progress.

Yalman's travel writing is also a method of propagating the reforms and Westernization of the Turkish Republic, but with a difference from the travel writings of Atay and Felek. Yalman praises the Western and non-Western countries in which he travelled to point out the advancements of the Republic of Turkey through Kemalist reforms, by drawing parallels between the progressivism of Kemalist Turkey and the modernity of the developed world. The originality of Yalman's style of Kemalist propaganda in his travelogue lies in his emphasis on the shortcomings of the implementation of Kemalist policies — not Kemalism — in Turkey, and his desire to improve the régime in Turkey by giving positive examples of the places he visits. In addition, because of the years he spent in the United States, Yalman is known for his appreciation of liberalism. In one of his articles in *Hindistan'da Gördüklerimiz*, Yalman calls the Indian Republic “the United States of Asia” because, for Yalman, the people of India “found the way to unite and create harmony in a land of countless variety by means of tolerance for the different beliefs that their ancient civilization bears.”⁷⁶ For Yalman, the Indians praised and took the example of the Turkish Independence, Movement and although their reforms are mostly underdeveloped when compared to the Turkish ones, there are many aspects in which they surpassed Turkey. According to Yalman, the greatest superiority of the Indian reformers to those in Turkey is that “personal might does not lead them astray and they can never be influenced by flattery.”⁷⁷ Anyone reading Yalman's books and newspaper articles can see that, he not only praises Indian statesmen's consistency, but he also refers to the lack of it in Turkey's loose dedication to Westernization and

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

its essential principles, which is a problem he sees rooted in the policies of the single-party totalitarianism of the Republican People's Party.

Yalman's appreciation of the accomplishments in India is mostly due to Prime Minister Nehru and his visionary government. Nehru's invitation to the Turkish journalists and their conversations with the Indian leader constitute an important part of the book. Yalman describes Nehru as a sincere and humble leader who is also straightforward.⁷⁸ He also admires Nehru's dedication to the progressivist principles of Westernization through decentralized governance of the country. He cites Nehru's following words with great admiration: "Totalitarian ways seem desirable in order to carry out economic programs, but we will not be deceived this way, because a heavy price is paid for totalitarian operations. Arbitrary measures follow and individual differences are destroyed. Despite the quietness of the democratic principles, they are more efficient and successful."⁷⁹ Nehru's words are like a repetition of Yalman's articles in his *Vatan* newspaper as well as the issues that he wrote about in his books, and this explains plainly what Yalman applauds in Nehru's personality. Adding Nehru's admiration for Turkish Independence and Mustafa Kemal as its leader, Yalman leaves no place for the authoritarian Kemalists of the Republican People's Party who despise Yalman's liberalism.

Yalman and other Turkish journalists also visited a few universities in India in order to meet with students. Two notable examples for these visits are the ones paid to the Delhi and Jamia Millia Islamia universities which Yalman is most influenced by. Although he is satisfied with the intellectual standard of the students, one thing that Yalman finds conspicuous in the University of Delhi is the inclination of the university youth for communism, an evil for Yalman as well as for the Democratic Party that Yalman favored at the time. Apart from the questions about the Turkish Independence Movement, its leader Mustafa Kemal, secularism in Turkey, and the foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey, Yalman anticipates that "some of the university youth have been indoctrinated with communism but the sickness had not spread throughout the body."⁸⁰ Yalman tries to assuage the students' fervor by

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 79.

saying, “You, the youth who have lived far from the oppression of world affairs for a long time and have lived among people who resented the West because of years spent under the domination of Western nations who claimed their racial superiority; you may believe that Moscow is the threshold of a new and bright world. But we have known the Russians and their imperial aims well for centuries.”⁸¹ Here, Yalman implies that after India gained independence from the British, the country is about to become a prey to the imperial goals of Communist Russia but he does not suggest a better way or example for them. Yalman’s second visit was to Jamia Millia Islamia University, which was founded in 1920 as part of Aligarh College with the initiatives of Muslim leaders like Dr. Ahmad Ansari and Abul Kalam Azad.⁸² The university was established by the Muslim leaders in India with an evident political conscience during the non-cooperation movement of Mohandas Gandhi in order to protest Aligarh as a government-sponsored institution.⁸³ Therefore, the visit of the Turkish journalists can be considered more important for the students and the administration than the visits from guests of the same sort. In Jamia Millia Islamia University, Yalman was satisfied with the level of education, and he is surprised because he does not expect such educational awareness from devout Muslims.⁸⁴ Advancement in education to a great extent in an Islamic community seems only possible for him because of Nehru’s advocacy for a secular state that assumes Hindus and Muslims as equal citizens. However, there is also a threat for the Muslim community in India that could endanger the unity of the country, which is some Muslims’ choice to live in their congregational groups, refusing to blend with the rest. After he emphasizes this point, Yalman turns his attention to Turkey and attacks the obscurantist movements that are resistant to the Kemalist reforms because of their modern tendencies:

When we look at the religion in our country, the fear of fanaticism haunts our minds. Because of this, constructive areas of thought and an intellectual atmosphere that can create freedom of conscience for

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 80.

⁸² http://jmi.ac.in/aboutjamia/profile/history/historical_note-13

⁸³ David Lelyveld, *Aligarh’s First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), 340.

⁸⁴ Yalman, *Hindistan’da Görüklerimiz*, 91.

Muslim scholars cannot be established. This is a huge impairment both for the religion and for our country. Lack of a positive atmosphere and the incompetence of Muslim intellectuals cause fanaticism at every level of society, and worse than that, these deficiencies give way to the abuses of religious zealotry in internal politics as an apparatus of self-advantage. The result is failure of religion as a moral guide for the society.⁸⁵

Thus, both communism and obscurantism are fatal threats for the Turkish Republic according to Yalman in his meeting with Indian students at Delhi and Jamia Millia Islamia universities.

The last article that Yalman wrote in *Hindistan'da Gördüklerimiz* summarizes his and other journalists' three-week visit to India. Here, Yalman appeals to the readers' interest by assuming them to be imagining India only as an outlandish and exotic place, but then he draws the readers' attention to more down-to-earth issues:

I think I don't have to raise your awareness about India by telling you stories about snakes or elephants and mysterious legends. The people I saw in India have a civilization that is five thousand years old and an infinite number of customs. However, they resemble a fresh and vigorous youth on the world stage. With a population of 357,000,000 that increases five million every year, India is not a country but a continent. Primitive and advanced, poor and rich, humble and privileged; in short, every kind of mind-set exists there. A great number of beliefs are practiced and every area speaks its indigeneous language. As for the clothes, it's like a masquerade. But no one despises the other because of differences and no one imposes his attire on others because he thinks it is best.⁸⁶

The things that Yalman saw in India are of interest to the readers in Turkey, and are therefore worth reading. Yalman's attempt to identify Turkey's path in Westernization and specifically his views of democratization in India is an Orientalist venture. Although he appreciates the institutions and their advancement in

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 85.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 126.

India, he praises the Westernization process and denigrates the traditional Indian values by pointing out similar triumphs of Kemalism in Turkey. As a Kemalist who tries to incorporate liberalism into the state ideology of his country, Yalman's main goal turns into an effort to re-identify or reconstruct Kemalist-Turkish identity according to his observations in India.

Conclusion

Reading the travelogues of the Kemalist writers of the early republican period of Turkey gives the impression that the writers wrote those books in order to posit themselves in the Western world by depicting the Eastern peoples as the antitheses of the Turks after the Republic of Turkey was established. Their different approaches to Western and Eastern lands confirm that the travels they aimed to identify themselves inside or outside of any given culture. When they were in the West they were proud to be a part of that culture after the implementation of Kemalist reforms. Likewise, the travelogues of those Turkish writers about Eastern lands reveal that they always tried to distance themselves from those peoples in the East who failed to fulfill the radical westernization that Turkey realized. Falih Rıfkı Atay's *Hind* and Burhan Felek's *Hind Masalları* were written at a time when India was not an independent country⁸⁷ and the Turkish Republic was trying to reassure both itself and the West that it was no longer an Eastern country. Different from Atay's and Felek's books, Yalman's *Hindistan'da Gördüklerimiz* was written after the régime in Turkey evolved in a relatively democratic direction with the victory of the Democratic Party in the elections of 1950. This also reveals new tendencies and approaches to India in Yalman's book. For instance, Yalman not only despises things he sees in India but also refers to the failures of the Turkish Republic in achieving the goals of Westernization. Nevertheless, the Kemalist writers who visited India in 1943 and 1953 aimed to see themselves and the outcomes of the Kemalist reforms in Turkey through the lens of India's Orientality. The first group of Turkish journalists visited India as a British colony, which was enough for them to look at India with contempt, and to be proud of themselves for their history of national independence. The Indian

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 12.

nationalists and Muslims in India also indulged the Turkish journalist mission of 1943 because of their lively and positive image of Turks for the people of India. Therefore the confidence which is evident in Atay's and Felek's travel books is absent in Yalman's book because by this time India is a confident and newly independent country. All in all, the Kemalist writers' approach at different times viewed India from an Orientalist point of perspective.

CHAPTER 3

A NON-KEMALIST PROPONENT OF WESTERNIZATION IN TURKEY: HALİDE EDİP ADIVAR'S *INSIDE INDIA*

The modernization and westernization that occurred during the Republic of Turkey is the last phase of a series of attempts by several Ottoman rulers and intellectual to realize the project. What Mustafa Kemal and other nationalists fought against in the Turkish War of Independence were the enemy armies of the Western Powers that invaded the country. Yet, the institutional and cultural basis of the very countries that attacked Turkey were adopted because, for long, the West had been seen as the ultimate point in the development of civilization. After the victory in the War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal fulfilled the incomplete project of Westernization of Turkey by implementing radical reforms. These are referred to as the “Kemalist Reforms,” which are accepted as the basis of Turkish modernization. Therefore, although the terms “modernization” and “Westernization” may be used interchangeably in the historical context, “modernization” defines better Mustafa Kemal’s and the Kemalists’ endeavor to transform their country into a totally Westernized nation, since steadfast Westernization efforts can be traced back to the *Tanzimat* period.

Not only the Turkish nationalists around Mustafa Kemal, but also nearly all intellectuals of the late Ottoman period were convinced about the necessity of reforming the state in the same way that Western states operate. However, the radical limits that Mustafa Kemal and the Kemalists extended their idea of modernization were not welcomed by all intellectuals because the Kemalist regime was destined to carry out the modernization project so swiftly that many writers and thinkers were exposed to government pressure. In its early phases, the Republic was preoccupied primarily with neutralizing the opposition and also enhancing the positions of the Kemalist elites whom the regime favored. The Independence Tribunals functioned as the legitimizing means of the regime in order to prevent a functional opposition as they tried most of the prospective military or political opponents of Mustafa Kemal by means of *Takrir-i Sükun* [Law on the Maintenance of Order] that enabled the régime to fully control the newspapers. The result of these totalitarian tendencies was

dissatisfaction and frustration of some of the renowned intellectuals and politicians who contributed both to the War of Independence and to the establishment of the Republic. Among them, Halide Edip Adivar stands out with her extraordinary character and distinguished literary career.

Halide Edip Adivar's Contribution to Literature and Turkish Independence

Probably, more than any other dissident of the régime, Halide Edip's life and intellectual formation reflect the best reasons for the departure of the dissenters from the Kemalist principles and methods of modernization. The intersection of Halide Edip's life with the Kemalists do not contradiction anti-Kemalist position, but prove the worth of the principles to which she dedicated herself throughout her life. Because the autobiographical data in her novels is so apparent and her intellectual development contributes unique relevance to this study, a detailed knowledge of her life reveals many insights into her adversarial stance to Kemalism.

Halide Edip Adivar was born in İstanbul in 1882.¹ Her father, who was Abdulhamid's private treasurer, was fond of Anglo-Saxon culture and education, so she started her schooling at the American College for Girls in Üsküdar. Despite the Sultan 's declared objection to the education of Turkish girls in foreign schools and a promulgation of special decree issued against Halide Edip's registration, she became one of the first graduates of the school. She also had an English nanny who had worked in India for many years, and her interest in Indian culture first emerged with the stories her nanny told her. Halide Edip had always been a great admirer of American education and the political system, and the contacts that she established in the American College in Üsküdar were maintained throughout her life. Apart from the American teachers, she had prominent Turkish teachers including Rıza Tevfik, who was a poet and philosopher, and the renowned mathematician Salih Zeki Bey, whom she later married. She started her career in 1908 by writing weekly columns in *Tanin*, the newspaper of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), as well as

¹ The main sources in this study for Halide Edip Adivar's biography are as follows: İnci Enginün, *Halide Edip Adivar'ın Eserlerinde Doğu ve Batı Meselesi* (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaası, 1978), 18-77; İpek Çalışlar, *Halide Edip Biyografisine Sığmayan Kadın* (İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2010), 21-462. For a detailed study about Halide Edip's life these two texts are the most important since all other books that I reached about Halide Edip's life base their information on these texts.

writing pieces in some American newspapers with the help of her teachers from the college. In those articles, she mostly emphasized the Turkish women's predicament because of their traditional subordination to men. She was under the threat of death during the 31 March Incident because her name was known by many people because of her articles, so she escaped first to Alexandria, Egypt and then to London. She returned to İstanbul the same year after the political unrest was over, but at this time her life was shattered because of problems in her marriage. Halide Edip is usually referred to as the first significant figure of the women's movement in Turkey because her life is full of events that challenged social conventions that dictate an inferior role for women in society. Accordingly, she divorced Salih Zeki Bey because he married a second wife since polygamy was legally permitted, but Halide Edip protested this marriage and left her husband. Years later, her friend Arnold J. Toynbee commented on this bold action:

In parting from her husband, she had been fighting a battle for a vital human right in the teeth of the law that was then in force, and she had not been fighting simply for her own hand. It had been a battle for all the women in Turkey and, indirectly, for all the women of the rest of the Islamic world as well.²

After the divorce, Halide Edip's political and social activism began to take a more active shape. First, she led the establishment of *Teali-i Nisvan Cemiyeti* [The Association for the Betterment of Women], which is known as the first Turkish feminist organization.³ Then, she became a regular member of the CUP and became acquainted with Turkish nationalists like Ziya Gökalp, Hamdullah Suphi, and Ahmet Ağaoğlu. She was also one of the founders of the *Türk Ocakları* [Turkish Hearths, 1911], an organization that aimed to raise awareness about the significance of a Turkish nationalist state. This was a productive period for Halide Edip in which she published her well-known novels as well as political articles in newspapers. As she became famous through her writings, she established personal contact with the CUP leadership, especially with Cemal Paşa, Enver Paşa and Talat Paşa. In 1916 Cemal

² Quoted in Mushirul Hasan, Introduction to Halide Edip, *Inside India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), xxxiiii.

³ Muzaffer Uyguner, *Halide Edip Adıvar: Hayatı Sanatı Eseri* (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1968), 4-5.

Pasha was the commander of the 4th Army that controlled Syria, and he invited Halide Edip to be the superintendent of the girls' schools as well as establishing new ones in the area.⁴ There, she married Dr. Adnan Adıvar, one of the leading figures of the Turkish Nationalists.

Halide Edip's fondness for the United States and its political influence is a central point of debate when her contribution to Turkish Independence is considered. This is partly because of her leading role in the establishment of *Wilson Prensipleri Cemiyeti* [The Association for the Promotion of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points] in 1918 in İstanbul. Actually, the association was established to seek the sympathy of the American state for the defeated Ottoman state because the United States was not a member of the Allies that attacked the Ottoman lands. After the World War I, the idea of becoming an American mandate was seriously discussed by some Turkish intellectuals, but after the Republic was established, those who suggested such an alternative for the future of the devastated country were labeled as traitors, as was Halide Edip. Her political influence flourished after a series of mass demonstrations that were established jointly by the Turkish Hearths and The Association for the Promotion of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points just after the Greek invasion of İzmir in 1919. The first was in Fatih and then in Kadıköy and the next was in Üsküdar – all of them being major towns in İstanbul. But the one in Sultanahmet, İstanbul was the turning point in Halide Edip's life because a crowd estimated of two hundred thousand people was convinced by her speech that nothing was over although the war was over. From a platform that had a banner on which "12th Point of Woodrow Wilson" was written,⁵ she persuaded the crowd to expect a Turkish victory by saying that,

Governments are our enemies, nations are our friends and the legitimate rebellion in our hearts is our strength. The days that all nations will gain their rights are not far away. When that day comes, get your flag and visit the graves of your brethren who lost their lives in the fight to make this dream come true. Now, vow with me as you

⁴ Hilmi Yücebaş, *Bütün Cepheleriyle Halide Edip* (İstanbul: İnkılap ve Aka Kitabevleri, 1964), 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 32. Wilson's 12th point was as follows: "The Turkish people should be governed by the Turkish government. Non-Turks in the old Turkish Empire should govern themselves."

repeat: This sacred conviction will never end until all nations declare their right to exist.⁶

While Halide Edip was in the forefront of the publicity efforts of independence struggle, Mustafa Kemal had already been in Anatolia to organize a military movement that would start a war of independence. As İstanbul became insecure for Halide Edip and Dr. Adnan because of the espionage activities of the occupying forces in 1920, they decided to leave İstanbul and meet Mustafa Kemal in Ankara. Although a small town at that time, Ankara was a place of rattling activity with visitors from different countries like the United States and Bolshevik Russia, and training of the unorganized army.⁷ Halide Edip and Dr. Adnan were warmly welcomed by Mustafa Kemal, and he assigned the couple the jobs that they would be responsible for. Dr. Adnan became a regular member of the headquarters and Halide Edip was responsible for the relations with international visitors as well as for following the news about the Independence Movement in both the foreign and the domestic press. Although Halide Edip's first impression of Mustafa Kemal was a "Turkish version of George Washington,"⁸ Mustafa Kemal's stiff character and authoritarian tendencies caused distance between them. Yet such disagreements did not cause offence between them. When circumstances required, Halide Edip even fought at the front and was ranked first as corporal and then sergeant.⁹ She became a symbol of Turkish women whose men left them behind to fight in the War of Independence. Grace Ellison, who was a British reporter, observed that

The picture of Halidé Hanoum [*sic*] confronts us on all sides throughout Anatolia. Among the heroes of the revolution, the Turks reverence her as their Joan of Arc. No history of the Nationalist movement can ever be attempted or thought of without a full record of her courageous loyalty and untiring patriotism.¹⁰

⁶ Quoted in İpek Çalışlar, *Halide Edip Biyografisine Sığmayan Kadın*, 173.

⁷ To give an example, Halide Edip met an Afgani boy who came to join the Turkish nationalists. A graduate student from the Aligarh College, he was the first Muslim from India in whom Halide Edip witnessed the dedication and love for Turks. See İnci Enginün, *Halide Edip Adıvar'ın Eserlerinde Doğu ve Batı Meselesi*, 54.

⁸ Çalışlar, 211.

⁹ İnci Enginün, *Halide Edip Adıvar* (İstanbul: Toker Yayınları, 1998), 16.

¹⁰ Quoted in Mushirul Hasan, introduction to by Halide Edip, *Inside India*, xxxix.

When the war was won and Mustafa Kemal was the uncontested leader of the victorious Turks, he had the privilege of deciding which offices of the Republic would be assigned to whom. Halide Edip was among those who were politically eliminated, while Dr. Adnan was assigned to İstanbul. Most importantly, Halide Edip's offer to establish Western-style schools with America's help was rejected harshly and she turned to writing novels in İstanbul. However, according to Halide Edip's biographer İpek Çalışlar, the reason for Halide Edip's elimination was not political but ethical. Halide Edip was bothered with the way the money that came from Indian Muslims was used by Mustafa Kemal. Çalışlar quotes Zekeriya Sertel who was a close friend of Halide Edip:

During the National War of Independence, the people of India sent \$ 100,000 with Halide Edip. This money was given on the condition that it would be spent for the expenses of the war. Halide delivered the money to [Mustafa Kemal] Atatürk. But Atatürk didn't spend the money then and kept it. After the victory, the money was used as the capital stock to found *İş Bankası*. Halide resented the misuse of the money and told this to Atatürk personally. That made Atatürk angry.

The reason of their resentment was this.¹¹

But there were other inconsistencies that Halide Edip witnessed as the new republic was being established. She and Mustafa Kemal had discussed the aftermath of the victory or the reforms to Westernize the nation, so when she saw the new Republic moving towards a one-man rule and the opposite direction of a Western democracy, Halide Edip was disappointed. To give an example, in *Turkey Faces West*, she says Mustafa Kemal did not think about establishing a republic and seemed content not to rule the country more democratically:

The Government of the Great National Assembly was from the beginning much more democratic than any existing republic, yet there had been a strong opposition to the name of republic, particularly from Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself. In his speeches delivered in

¹¹ Quoted in Çalışlar, 283. Zekeriya Sertel adds that Halide Edip left Turkey to save her life because of this dispute between herself and Mustafa Kemal. See Zekeriya Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım* (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1977), 220.

Cilicia [Adana] on his return from Smyrna in 1922 he had more than once declared that a republic was a rotten and outworn form, and that the Great National Assembly as a government was the most suitable for the Turkish people. Yet it was he himself who proposed to the Assembly the name of republic.¹²

It wasn't only Halide Edip who was uncomfortable with the undemocratic tendencies of the new régime: a lively opposition was being formed. The Progressive Republican Party (PRP) was established by political and intellectual outcasts of the régime, and Halide Edip was one of them. During one of the meetings that the founders of the PRP came together in her house in İstanbul, she expressed her views about the future of the Republic as well as her own political stance:

They will find one or more pretexts, create reasons and close down the PRP. So be it... The real good to this country is to open a path for future political movements. The real favor is to show the country that its future is bright. Anglo-American democracy has also developed with the flourishing of auspicious and substantial ideas. I have found out this eternal truth in the chronological flow of events.¹³

Just as she anticipated, the PRP was closed and when the Law for the Maintenance of Order was passed, autocracy was unofficially enacted, as the regime did not change but the government hardened the measures to protect it. Everywhere the officials of the PRP were sought and tried in the Independence Tribunals. Although Halide Edip and Dr. Adnan were not among those who were under the threat of arrest, they decided to leave Turkey in March 1925 in order to live in Europe and the United States until the country became "normal."

Halide Edip and Dr. Adnan's destination was England, which they thought was governed by an ideal democracy. They spent their days writing and giving interviews to newspapers. Halide Edip also made friends with British intellectuals like Bertrand Russell and Arnold Toynbee.¹⁴ The most important work she wrote in England was her memoirs, *The Turkish Ordeal*. Years later, the book was translated into Turkish

¹² Halide Edip, *Turkey Faces West: A Turkish view of Recent Changes and Their Origin* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1930), 203.

¹³ Quoted in Çalışlar, 311.

¹⁴ Çalışlar, 341-42.

with the name *Türk'ün Ateşle İmtihanı* [The Turks' Trial with Fire] which was an abridged version of the original text. This was because of her offensive remarks about Mustafa Kemal in *The Turkish Ordeal*, since she started writing her memoirs after Mustafa Kemal published *Nutuk* [The Speech] in which she and Dr. Adnan were insulted. However, an unofficial and complete Turkish translation of *The Turkish Ordeal* was copied in Ankara to be given to Mustafa Kemal, and the Turkish press was attacking her through her disputed Jewish background¹⁵ or her alleged unchaste actions while she was the only woman in the headquarters of the National War of Independence. At that time, she received an invitation from the Foreign Policy Institute of the University of Massachusetts and went to America in 1928 to give a series of conferences as Dr. Adnan moved their house to Paris. Later in 1930, these conferences were compiled and published as a book named *Turkey Faces West*. In 1931, she was invited this time to Columbia University to give lectures in the History Department for a semester. This time, the International Mark Twain Society granted her the Honorary Vice-presidency of the institution.¹⁶ In 1932, her novel *Ateşten Gömlek* (translated in English with the names *The Daughter of Symrna* and *The Shirt of Flame*) was translated into Urdu and was published in Lahore. Halide Edip had already been known by the leaders of the Muslim community of India due to her active role in Turkish Independence, but the translation of her novel boosted her popularity and she was invited to India by Jamia Millia Islamia University to give a series of lectures in different cities of the country. She wrote her observations about India and published them in England with the name *Inside India*. The lectures she gave were also compiled and published by Jamia Millia Islamia under the title, *Conflict of East and West in Turkey*. On her way to Paris from India, she came to İstanbul but stayed for a very short time because of the harassments she was subjected to. She went to Paris from İstanbul and didn't come back until Mustafa Kemal died. Dr. Adnan was teaching at the Sorbonne University and among his

¹⁵ Halide Edip's father, who was Abdulhamid's private treasurer, was known to be a Jew who converted to Islam. Note that this is different from the *Dönme* people who were referred to in the previous chapter on Yalman. For detailed information about Halide Edip's father, see Enginün, 20-21. FN 4.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 73.

students were academics like Bernard Lewis and Irene Melikoff, who would later become specialists on Turkey.

Halide Edip returned to Turkey in March 1939 and wasn't actively interested in politics as the new President İsmet İnönü assigned her to establish the Department of English Language and Literature in İstanbul University in 1940. The department laid the foundations for philological studies in Turkey, and scholars like Mina Urgan and Berna Moran were Halide Edip's students. However, because she was uneasy this time with the totalitarian tendencies of İsmet İnönü, she couldn't resist her political aspirations and became a deputy for the Democratic Party in the first elections of multi-party Turkey in 1950. She was in the beginning welcomed warmly in the Parliament, and she was also hopeful that the Parliament would bring real democracy. However, after her reservations about some laws that the Democratic Party passed, such as "The Legislation Concerning Offences against Atatürk," she was ostracised and attacked by the MPs who used the familiar rhetoric emphasizing her sympathies for America as well as her femininity. She left active political life for good in 1954 and devoted her life entirely to writing novels and newspaper articles until she died in 1970.

Halide Edip's first encounter with people from India occurred in 1909. While she was on her way to England from Alexandria she met a few Indians aboard who were servants of some English passengers.¹⁷ Her interest in Buddhism started as a college student when she listened to the lecture of Swami Vivekenanda who had visited the American College for Girls in Üsküdar.¹⁸ She also met Dr. Zakir Husain of Jamia Millia Islamia University in Munich in 1923 and Sarojini Naidu in Washington DC in 1929,¹⁹ both of whom showed a great warmth and hospitality to Halide Edip when she was in India. According to Enginün, her close contact with Indian Muslims started with Dr. Ansari, who was heading the Indian Red Crescent mission that came to Turkey after the Balkan War of 1912.²⁰ Halide Edip also had promised Dr. Ansari then to write a book on India, and with *Inside India* that promise was fulfilled. It is highly probable that she met the Indian captives from the British

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 455.

¹⁸ Mushirul Hasan, introduction to Halide Edip, *Inside India*, xiii.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Enginün, 20-21, FN 4.

Army at the end of World War I as she mentioned the differences between them and other captives elsewhere.²¹ As Mahatma Gandhi's impact started to overshadow the British ascendancy in India, Halide Edip was attracted to those affairs in India like most people in the East. On the other hand, Ali Fuat Bilkan points out Dr. Ansari's more practical intention to invite one of the symbols of the Turkish Independence Movement to India as he was struggling to direct the energy of the sectional Muslim community of India to a policy that can be called "independence without separation."²² Bilkan states that in the fifth year of Gandhi's passive resistance movement, Muslims were fragmented into groups like İsmailis, Ahmadis, Khilafatists, the Muslim League, and the Muslims who supported the Indian National Congress, which Gandhi was leading, including Dr. Ansari. The main reason for Dr. Ansari's invitation, then, was to exhibit the support from a sympathetic figure like Halide Edip to the policies that would ensure the unity of India while confirming social, cultural, and religious rights to the Muslim community. That visit must have been recognized by the British officials in India because it is unrealistic to assume that the British intelligence failed to notice the reputation of the visitor. As a result, Halide Edip's two-month stay coincided with a delicate period for the Muslim community in India, and both the places she visited and the contacts of the lectures she gave reveal that the visit was not touristic or recreational.

When Halide Edip was in India in 1935, India was still a British colony and the memories of the World War I were not forgotten altogether in India because most of the leading political figures who were familiar with the contributions of Indian Muslims and nationalists to the Turkish Independence Movement were still alive. Before Halide Edip arrived in India, she had been living in a self-imposed exile. During that period, she lived mostly in London and Paris with some short periods in the US. India was the first non-Western place that she had visited in nearly ten years, and it is difficult to anticipate her feelings as she was welcomed so warmly and enthusiastically. She was also in a country with many old friends. For example, when she was in Aligarh University for a speech, she saw the portrait of one of the honorary members of the student union of the university — Abdur Rahman Qureshi,

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Ali Fuat Bilkan, "Halide Edip Adivar'ın Hindistan'daki Konferansları" *Bilig* No. 56 (Kış 2011): 34.

who was a member of the Indian Red Crescent Mission of 1912. After feeling deeply touched with the lecturers' reverential tone in their addressing the portrait, she recorded the sentimental story as follows:

He remained in Turkey after 1912, and entered the Turkish army. He fought at different fronts in the Great War. In 1920, he joined the Nationalist Struggle at Ankara and worked with the writer [herself] at headquarters. In 1923 he represented Turkey at Kabul. In 1927 he was murdered in İstanbul by an unknown person or persons. Neither the motive for this ugly crime nor the criminals have been brought to light. He himself was a brave and able officer, and a lovable person.²³

These examples can easily indicate her visit's extraordinary circumstances. Besides, she was now a renowned writer and academic at home but especially in the Western world, that is to say, more than the Kemalist writers that we looked at in the previous chapter; she seemed to have every angle to view India from an Orientalist point of view but she didn't. This point is important for the study of travelogues of Turkish writers in the early republican period of Turkey because Halide Edip's genuine approach to India and its people can only be attributed to her intention to observe India as it is, not as it should be. All in all, the reader of *Inside India* does not feel that the writer wants to give a message by despising the people and the places she saw. Although she talked in favor of the essence of the reforms of the Turkish Republic in the direction of Westernization, the audiences in various cities mostly comprised a large number of Muslims and the tone of her memoirs about India and the lectures did not aim to insult backwardness, servitude, or racial deficiency in order to glorify her own culture and homeland. The form of the superiority complex that the Kemalist writers we met earlier possess is unseen in Halide Edip's writings because the Orientalist approach of those Kemalist writers does not exist in her books. As a radical proponent of Westernization, Halide Edip's career and writings confirm her faith in humanity before her insistence in the values and the principles of Western civilization.

²³ Halide Edip, *Inside India*, 84.

Apart from *Inside India*, the second product of Halide Edip's visit to India, *Conflict of East and West in Turkey*, is comprised of eight of the lectures she gave in Jamia Millia Islamia University. We see that the lectures were about Ottoman Turks and the reasons of their decline, revolution and war, the Turkish Republic, literature and culture, and women's place in society. According to Halide Edip's lectures, a comparison between the socio-political traits of Westerners and Easterners show us that Western civilization benefitted from the East a great deal.²⁴ She also supports her arguments by giving examples from the establishment of Roman, Byzantium, Seljuq and Ottoman empires. Halide Edip's admiration for Mahatma Gandhi is most clearly manifested in the beginning of her second lecture over which Gandhi presided. After the lecture, Gandhi said, "From the lecture I believe that if we model our action according to what is right, there is a bright future for Turkey and India" and referred to Muslims as "Our brethren, the bone of our bones,"²⁵ and his sincerity made her describe Gandhi as "the New Teacher, the needed servant of humanity. No lonely guard needs fear lest there be no one to take up the watch. We thank our Creator for him. He is ours, and it is a part of his mission to say to any lonely private: Hold your torch high up in the darkness!"²⁶ In the same lecture, after pointing out the impact of the deterioration of the Ottoman army and its decadence, she evaluates the direction that the long standing reforms for westernization have given to Turkey. For Halide Edip, the West won the victory in the 700-year fight between them and the Ottomans; however this victory was due to its technical prowess, not cultural or spiritual superiority.²⁷ She also refers to the influence of Westernization on the cultural and literary life of Turks as she gives examples that range from the Tanzimat period to republican Turkey. With respect to the alphabet reform in Turkey, Halide Edip emphasizes the effect of the failure of Pan-Islamism because when there is no possibility of uniting Islamic nations under one rule, it is useless to claim the utility of a common alphabet. For Halide Edip, like Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turanism is equally vain since the cultural connections with the Turkic peoples of Central Asia are lost

²⁴ Halide Edip, *Conflict of East and West in Turkey* (New Delhi: Jamia Press, 1935), 5.

²⁵ Edip, *Inside India*, 51.

²⁶ Halide Edip, *Conflict of East and West in Turkey*, 34.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 124

because of Soviet Russia's hegemony.²⁸ The lectures ended with her comparison of women's place in society in the West and East. She points to the evolution of women's rights from Roman Empire to modern times in the West as well as from pre-Islamic times to the contemporary Eastern world. In conclusion, *Conflict of East and West in Turkey* shows Halide Edip's effort to portray the developments in Turkey objectively in her lectures. On the other hand, without intimidating the audience that was comprised mostly of Indian Muslims, it is evident that she addressed the issues that the Muslim community would have to face either in a united free India or a free independent Islamic state. Dr. Ahmad Ansari wrote a preface to the book that urges the readers to approach the sensitive issues in the lectures sympathetically rather than with hostility. The interest from the people in Halide Edip's visit and the success of *Inside India* prove that the lectures and *Conflict of East and West in Turkey* were never thought to be written by an "outsider" or an Orientalist.

A special attention should be paid to the Indian media's interest in Halide Edip's stay. From the moment that Halide Edip stepped on Indian soil, she was welcomed and watched by the local journalists who wanted to inform their readers about the famous Turkish writer. The first of these reports was in *The Bombay Chronicle* and was written by Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya,²⁹ whom Halide Edip acknowledges in the preface of *Inside India*.³⁰ In one of the reports that were written by Chattopadhyaya in *The Bombay Chronicle*, Halide Edip is reported to have said

If we go to ancient Greece to trace Western Civilization back to its roots, then we should go to India to trace Eastern Civilization back to its roots. Indeed, India is the homeland of the Eastern Civilization; however, this is a civilization which is so vast and deep and deserves more than a superficial interest.³¹

In the issue of *The Bombay Chronicle* of 12 January 1935, Halide Edip is described as one of the saviors of the Turkish Republic, but she is one of

²⁸ Edip, *Conflict of East and West in Turkey*, 94, 180.

²⁹ Osman Bülent Yorulmaz, *Halide Edip Adivar'ın Hindistan Hayatı* (Marmara University Institute of Social Sciences İstanbul, Unpublished MA Thesis, 1988), 34.

³⁰ Halide Edip, *Inside India*, 4.

³¹ Osman Bülent Yorulmaz, *Halide Edip Adivar'ın Hindistan Hayatı*, 42.

those deported, who have disagreements with Mustafa Kemal.³² A day later, Halide Edip corrected the newspaper by stating that she is not in exile and adds,

The reason that compels me to live away from my homeland is not a matter of public concern. I haven't been appointed as an official counselor of a ministry. I ask my Indian brothers and sisters to see me as nothing more than a novelist and someone who is enjoying one of the happiest moments of her life because of the hospitality of India and the people of India.³³

Also in the newspapers like *The Star of India*, *The Times of India* and *The Hindustan Times* Halide Edip is described as the Turkish Jean D'arc,³⁴ “a blend of the East and the West”³⁵ and an admirer of Gandhi.³⁶

Adıvar's *Inside India* (1937)

Halide Edip completed and published *Inside India* two years after she visited India. İnci Enginün states that because the task of writing a comprehensive book on India was hard, Halide Edip was about to give up the idea but Dr. Ansari's death pushed her to finish this project as she saw it a commitment³⁷ to him whom she called “the most representative Indian Muslim.”³⁸ On the other hand, we understand that her feelings for Dr. Ansari were obviously mutual when we read Dr. Ansari's letters before and after the visit.³⁹ In these letters it is clear that every step of the visit was planned by Dr. Ansari. The goodwill requests went on after Halide Edip went to

³² *Ibid.*, 50.

³³ *Ibid.*, 51.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 41

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 40.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 54.

³⁷ Edip, *Inside India*, 3.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

³⁹ İnci Enginün, *Araştırmalar ve Belgeler* (İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2000), 554-91. Most of the letters that Prof. Enginün sorted and published are in English and they range from famous people like Dr. Ansari or Jawaharlal Nehru to the students who were in the audiences of Halide Edip's speeches. Some of the letters are about the books that were published after the visit or are composed of good intentions to each other. Also, Prof. Enginün had published Halide Edip's letter to Nehru separately for his recovery from the prison. See İnci Enginün, “Halide Edip Adıvar'ın Nehru'ya Bir Mektubu,” in *Türk Kültürü* No. 169 (Kasım 1976): 42-44.

Paris, the newspapers in India continued to give news about her writings and she also sent few articles to those newspapers in India.⁴⁰

Halide Edip organized *Inside India* in three sections. The first section is titled “India Seen through Salam House,” and it portrays individuals such as Mahatma Gandhi, Dr. Ansari, Sarojini Naidu, Mahadev Desai, Bhulabhai Desai, Maulana Shaukat Ali, and Dr. Zakir Hussain, as Halide Edip observed them closely. With a novelist’s eye, not only their accomplishments and ideas are analyzed, but she also gives a description of their houses and families. The writer frequently refers to the Turkish or Anatolian equivalent of the things and concepts she comes across. She reached Bombay on 9 January 1935 which was the Eid and she told the *Bombay Chronicle* that she was jubilant to celebrate the Id in an “Oriental country” after being forced to live in the West for the last eight years.⁴¹ Halide Edip names this section as such because she calls Dr. Ansari’s household as “Salam House” or Dar-Es-Salam [Land of Peace]. Apart from her perception of India, for Halide Edip, “The spirit of Islam is broad enough to justify the name. But the house has its international and universal aspects as well.”⁴² These universal aspects that she pays attention to in Dr. Ansari’s house are in fact related to one thing that she yearns for in an enlightened Islamic world, namely a meeting point of West and East. Impressed by the vast Muslim culture of India that embraces not only Near and Middle East but also Far East, Halide Edip is fascinated by the fondness that she observes between the Indian hosts and the British ladies who come to visit her. Adding to the Near Eastern, Middle Eastern, and Far Eastern influences, she starts her visit contentedly as she writes: “British domination may end some time; but British influence will remain through the culture and education derived from the English, and take part in the future shaping of India.”⁴³ As a determined optimist and a tolerant person for differences other than ignorance, Halide Edip is amazed by the incredible variety of sounds and sights in India. In her words, India is “Thousands of sounds, no harmony. It was like the tuning stage of a great orchestra—a symphony-nation.”⁴⁴ In this

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Mushirul Hasan, introduction to Halide Edip, *Inside India*, xvii.

⁴² Edip, *Inside India*, 15.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

“symphony-nation” the most important point of disagreement is religious conformity and luckily she is among people from both sides of the conflict who work for the realization of a dream of peace. In order to emphasize the truth in her hopefulness, her portrayal of two leaders from each party, Mahatma Gandhi and Dr. Ansari, is necessary.

Dr. Ansari clearly shares the same internationalist stance with Halide Edip which was reflected in her speech during the Sultanahmet mass demonstration, as she said “Governments are our enemies, nations are our friends.” For Halide Edip, Dr. Ansari is a deep-rooted person in the Indian soil, and a bridge between the Muslim outlook and Western science.⁴⁵ In her view, the Khilafat Movement, of which Dr. Ansari was one of the organizers, contributed to Dr. Ansari’s political aims in uniting the Muslims and Hindus around a common activity; however the result of the movement led some organizers in the opposite direction. In a letter that Dr. Ansari wrote to Halide Edip shortly before his death, this transformation is manifest in his own words:

It is years since I have out-grown and shed my Pan-Islamism. It does not appeal to me anymore. Indeed, I have often felt that some of the protagonists of Pan-Islamism have done more harm to the cause than they realize. Pan-Islamism, Pan-Germanism, Pan-Aryanism, Pan-Turanism, Pan-Hinduism and all the isms are too narrow to appeal to me anymore. I consider the brotherhood of man as the only real tie, and partitions based on race or religion to my mind, are artificial and arbitrary leading to division and factious fights.⁴⁶

Dr. Ansari’s point of view had changed much before Halide Edip’s travel to India in 1935. As early as 1925 he celebrated Turkey’s radical efforts at Westernization when he visited İstanbul, where he stayed a short time as he was returning to India from Europe. The article that he wrote for *Comrade* newspaper in 1925 gave clues for his fall-out with the other leaders of the Khilafat Movements. Denying the charges of those pro-Khilafat about irreligiousness in Turkey, he wrote:

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁴⁶ Enginün, *Araştırmalar ve Belgeler*, 569.

I have not seen a more baseless and hollow charge... There are a number of free thinkers, agnostics or atheists, as there are in all Eastern countries... But is this phenomenon new, or peculiar to Turkey? I have talked to people of different strata of society; I have visited mosques and public places of worship at all odd hours and I am convinced that in spite of the high priests of free-thinking and modernism and laocery [*sic*], the Turk is today a good Muslim as he was ever before and more true to his faith than the Indian, the Syrian, the Palestinian or the Egyptian.⁴⁷

For Halide Edip, then, Dr. Ansari was the prototype of the Indian Muslim intellectual she idealized with his anti-separatist and liberal political approach. Halide Edip's sympathy for Dr. Ansari contributed to her sanguine expectations for the future of India as an independent and unified country.

Mahatma Gandhi plays the second important role for Halide Edip in her sympathy for India's future. Gandhi, who "represented the Hindu of Hindus... the essence of the oldest India"⁴⁸ for Halide Edip, stands for a combination of political, philosophical, spiritual and social elements of India. There are two things to point out concerning Halide Edip's observation of Gandhi. The first thing she is attracted to is not Gandhi the individual but the people's deification of Gandhi and how humbly he reacted to them. Here, Halide Edip proves herself to be capable of looking through Eastern eyes but judging the scene through the eyes of the West as well. In her first visit to Gandhi's residence, she observes people waiting for Gandhi to come out of his room to meet them. She thinks,

"If people are carried away by emotion it must be that they are excitable, and in search for emotion instead of truth." Mahatma Gandhi seemed to me the last person in the world to appeal to the emotional, to make any attempt to capture the fancy, or create fantasy and mystery around himself; though his religious nature is undeniable, and some of his talk may occasionally lead one to term him mystic...

⁴⁷ Quoted in Hasan, *Between Modernity and Nationalism* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 101.

⁴⁸ Edip, *Inside India*, 33.

He is so important a happening in twentieth-century history, I said to myself, that every witness must leave as objective and honest a report as is humanly possible.⁴⁹

Then Gandhi enters the room and the way the visitors show their respect to the great man helps her to define his greatness:

Men in all sorts of costumes came in and fell on their faces at the fringe of the mat; then sat, their hands folded on their knees. [...] This sort of salute may appear to the Western eye as servile; but it is not. It is rather the Eastern reverence for those whom they believe to be spiritually great. The wonder of it was that it should survive a modern, a scientific, a materialistically Western education. It was evident that they submerged themselves in Mahatma Gandhi's personality... It is almost inconceivable for most of the Hindus and a considerable number of Muslims to do anything without his knowledge. This applies also to political life, though Mahatma Gandhi has retired from politics.⁵⁰

It is clear that more than anywhere she visited in India, Wardha Ashrams, Gandhi's residence, a rich variety of thoughts and individuals flooded to Halide Edip's perception of India. As a writer who touched various issues like nationalism, Westernization, or obscurantism in her novels, this was a place for her to discover her sense of belonging to a spiritual aspect. That is why she reserves three chapters to Gandhi's life, Gandhi's importance for India, and basic principles of Gandhism in the third part of the book. But more directly than those chapters in *Inside India* that describe the significance of Gandhi and his ideas for India and the Eastern world, Halide Edip's last lecture in Jamia Millia Islamia University, which is titled "Review and Future Look," reveals where she posited Gandhi's philosophy in contemporaneous India:

Mahatma Gandhi's attempt is an enterprise which should interest the whole East. For he is trying to regenerate the Eastern villager economically and morally, while he is fighting against a too rapid

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 35.

industrialization... He firmly believes that the body and the spirit cannot be taken as separate things. The regeneration of one is not possible without the regeneration of another. They must co-operate and stimulate each other. Mahatma Gandhi's effort reminds me very much of the economic and moral organization of the Turkish society by the mystico-economic [*sic*] orders called the "Ahiler"⁵¹ in Anatolia in the thirteenth century.⁵²

Halide Edip does not ponder "Easternness" more than "Westernness" with their relation to the salvation of Eastern peoples from poverty and subordination. She mentions the kind of solution for those peoples that she examines in the Turkish mind and character in one of her lectures in the United States,

Somewhere in the original Turk, the initial traits seem to have more in common with the West than with the East. Herein lies the Turk's superiority as well as inferiority to the other eastern peoples; with that curious, grim realism of the West, with its ruthless matter-of-factness, he handles his problems and passes on to new stages in his development, while the vast eastern world, the real East still talks, discusses, and muses. The outcome may be that when the real East accomplishes its new and future destiny, it may have an eastern face of its own, while the Turk might look less original but more fundamentally Western.⁵³

According to Halide Edip, India can achieve a unified and peaceful nation that might be fundamentally Western she dreams with Mahatma Gandhi's spiritual leadership and moral guidance. She also suggests Gandhi's philosophy and his guidance to Muslims in India:

⁵¹ Known as Akhis, this socially and culturally-organized group "first appear in Anatolia in the years immediately following the Mongol conquest. The period was one of general anarchy and disorder. The Mongols, who had destroyed the Selçuk State, failed to provide any effective alternative, and administration crumbled away. During this period of crisis, the Akhis appeared as a strong widespread organization, willing and able to control. With "solidarity and hospitality" as its code, the artisan class as its social basis and "the slaying of tyrants and their satellite "as its task, the Akhi movement spread rapidly in town and countryside. It was a movement at once social, political, religious and military." For more information see Bernard Lewis, "The Islamic Guilds," *The Economic History Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (November, 1937): 20-37.

⁵² Edip, *Conflict of East and West in Turkey*, 246.

⁵³ Edip, *Turkey Faces West: A Turkish View of Recent Changes and Their Origin*, 35.

All Muslim Indians should support him and further his cause, for his synthesis is dominated in its fundamentals by the everlasting principles of Islam. He seems to me –If I may be permitted to say so— an ideal neo-Muslim, with his cleanliness of body and mind, his self-restraint, his readiness to co-operate and love, his respect for bodily labor, education, truth and peace.⁵⁴

The last two chapters of the first section of the book are mainly about Jamia Millia Islamia University and three popular currents of thought that are Communalism, Nationalism, and Socialism. Halide Edip identifies Jamia Millia with two aims — namely, to train the Muslim youth with definite ideas of their rights and duties as Indian citizens, and to co-ordinate Islamic thought and behavior with the Hindus. According to Halide Edip, these goals bring Jamia Millia and its mission nearer to the Gandhian Movement than any other Islamic institution.⁵⁵

Halide Edip is impressed by the teachers and the education system in Jamia Millia as she observes the teachers organize their classes in a way that emphasizes fraternity and tolerance. She notices how the minimized competition contributes to the solidarity and the development of leadership skills among students. For Halide Edip, this also enables them to focus on issues that their education further:

The students were genuinely interested in world problems, and studied them as much as opportunity would allow. In the East — in India particularly — these two points are of supreme importance. The closed-in character of Hindu mentality makes Indians more or less indifferent to anything outside India, and the enthusiasm born of their new nationalism leaves little room for objectivity. Muslims on the other hand are more international in the mind. Their interest in the outside world — when it is in the Islamic countries — leads Hindus to call them Pan-Islamists. And their interest in the West often leads to their being accused of upholding Western Imperialism. Though there may be individual cases to justify these accusations, on the whole it is merely that the Muslim mind refuses to be limited to geographical

⁵⁴ Edip, *Conflict of East and West in Turkey*, 247.

⁵⁵ Edip, *Inside India*, 60.

boundaries. This outside interest found in the Jamia, since it cannot be suspected as being disloyal to the Indian cause, is a healthy and necessary thing. For it gives the professors and the students a broad outlook, and a capacity for comparative studies.⁵⁶

Indeed, the most important characteristic that Halide Edip observes in Jamia Millia as a Muslim institution of education is the rational attitude of mind that the administration and the founders generate. According to her, this is the only way to become modern without losing the faith which is the basis of its ethics. In order to point out the dangers of corroborating scientific discoveries with the Qur'an, she compares Muslim and Christian thought with respect to their contributions and attitudes toward modern science:

Muslim thought today is not very different from Christian thought at the beginning of the Renaissance. It has two aspects.

I. It tries to explain physical knowledge by Scriptures. This is easier for the Muslim than for the Christian; for the Koran does not set out to explain the Creation as categorically as the Old Testament. Further, there are verses in the Koran which even corroborate certain scientific discoveries. This enables the Muslim thinker to retain his faith more easily than the Christian of the Renaissance period.

II. But it has its dangers as well. The habit of mind to look for an explanation for every physical phenomenon in a Book which is a guide to moral action rather than a scientific treatise, leads quite a large number of young people to a loss of faith. And this means that their moral guide as well.⁵⁷

So, with the representatives of liberal Islamic thought like Dr. Ansari or Dr. Zakir Hussain, Jamia Millia is a representation of modern Islamic thought that complies with the scientism and with a Western outlook as well.

In the Salaam House, Halide Edip realizes with the help of Dr. Ansari and his family that one of the three popular terms that attempt to embrace all India is Communalism. Though Halide Edip explains it shortly as “seeing everything in the

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 63-64.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 65.

light of one's community's interests," which are religious, social, cultural, economic, and political, according to Bipan Chandra ideologically three stages of Communalism can be named. The first stage is the belief that people who follow the same religion have common secular interests. That leads the followers of the idea to the realization of the existence of socio-political communities based on religion that is alleged to have its own leaders. The second stage is about the approval of the notion that in a multi-religious society like India, the secular interests of the followers of one religion are dissimilar from the interests of another religion. The third stage of Communalism is reached when the interests of the followers of different religions are seen to be mutually incompatible, antagonistic, and hostile. So the communalist claims that Muslims and Hindus can never have common secular interests.⁵⁸ So, communalist tendencies arise from Hindu or Muslim sides in order to secure their position in economic or political power. However, Halide Edip observes that the communalists are also nationalists because they dream of a free India in which one side — Hindu or Muslim — will rule the other and this is why Nationalism is the second most common ideology among Indian masses. For Halide Edip, Socialism, on the other hand, has an idiosyncratic double aspect. One is the Socialism that is interpreted by the Scriptures or based on religion which she sees no chance being organized on modern international lines. The other aspect of Socialism is symbolized in Jawaharlal Nehru's name,⁵⁹ about whom she wrote a complimentary chapter in the third part of her book. The importance of these observations about India's political and ideological dynamism is to emphasize the inappropriateness of India's fame for occultism in the West. For Halide Edip, this is not a healthy sign for India because being famous for people who abandon social life in a modern world has no use in a country like India which has a young and growing population with expectations for independence.⁶⁰

The second section of the book includes Halide Edip's visits to Aligarh, Lahore, Peshawar, Lucknow, Benares, Calcutta, Hyderabad, and Bombay. These visits do not have touristic or sightseeing purposes as she is greeted with crowds — sometimes

⁵⁸ Bipan Chandra, *India's Struggle for Independence* (Kolkata: Penguin Books, 1989), 398-99.

⁵⁹ Edip, *Inside India*, 75.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 76.

thousands of people — to whom she is expected to give speeches. She visits historical and religious monuments as well as universities and community clubs both from Hindu and Muslim societies. She sets out for her visit to these eight cities after she finishes her lectures in Jamia Millia Islamia University. Because this section of the book resembles a travelogue more than other sections, and therefore much of the attention for the analysis of this study will be given here. Accordingly, Halide Edip's indisputable impartiality should also be compared with the travelogues of the Kemalist writers that we looked at in the previous chapter. She never approves the colonial exploitation of India by foreign powers anywhere in the book and efforts for India's independence led by the nationalist movement always gets the most credit. Her biggest concern is the fragile nature of the nationalists' goal of forming a lasting nation. In her last lecture at Jamia Millia she says,

To the casual observer the crying need of the East in general and of India in particular seems to be inner organization. From time to time strong men and rulers have done dazzling things in the East. But a nation organized on principles which will give it the strength to hold its own at critical moments has been rare. A nation cannot be organized from above. It must develop from within, according to its own laws of growth.⁶¹

By all means, her depiction of India and her evaluation about what it needs to survive is the result of her effort to understand the country and its people thoroughly with a powerful urge to empathize with them and to conceive the ways they live, love, respect, or hate. In Halide Edip's narration of India, there's no concern to imagine or invent the place but only an attempt to see it as it is. In the introductory part of her book she guides any traveler to anywhere on how to acquire a straightforward style: "Beware of pronouncing on a country when you have only met its sons and daughters abroad. You may form a pretty good opinion, or you may be totally misled."⁶² The second part of the book includes her careful accounts of her meetings with large numbers of people who come from different cultural or social backgrounds as well as her visits to their homes and institutions.

⁶¹ Edip, *Conflict of East and West in Turkey*, 242.

⁶² Edip, *Inside India*, 7.

Aligarh University, but not the city, is her first stop in her journey. Aligarh is the forerunner of the English education colleges that were established by the Muslim community of India and the school educated many Muslim leaders in India. Aligarh did not have anything to compete with but it was the ensuing Islamic colleges like Jamia Millia Islamia that had to compete with Aligarh University. According to David Lelyveld, Aligarh was established between 1870-1875 by people who had never been exposed to English education in order to supply the Muslim youth with necessary education because the education of British-Indian schools and *madrasahs* were either not enough or wrong.⁶³ The result was Aligarh's disposition toward becoming a political center more than a university because it became a place where the political attitudes and tendencies had personal roots. Halide Edip was also aware of the importance that Aligarh had for the Muslim community and she gave detailed historical information about the university as well as its legendary founder, Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817-1898). She describes Sir Sayyid as an intellectual who "wanted to Westernize the Indian Muslims and managed it, to some extent, at the cost of great struggle and suffering, by establishing the Aligarh College."⁶⁴ However, it is interesting that she allocates in her book a long criticism of Sir Sayyid's policies and contributions from the conversation she has with a man whom she only describes as "Said, Muslim intellectual." These criticisms center on Sir Sayyid's compromising views with regard to the British policies and his alleged negligence of Urdu education. Not commenting on these criticisms, Halide Edip confidently focuses on Sir Sayyid's political tendencies that concerned the Ottoman state during his lifetime. Pondering the question of why the students of Aligarh were wearing the Turkish fez, she states that Sir Sayyid never considered the Sultan-Caliph as the legitimate head of Muslims throughout the world. Therefore, for Halide Edip, the significance of the red fez means one thing for Sir Sayyid's college:

The Turk was, at the time, the only Muslim who held his own in face of the tremendous aggressive force of the West, which was colonizing the entire Muslim world. Though the Turk Westernized himself

⁶³ David Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), 102.

⁶⁴ Edip, *Inside India*, 81.

earlier than the other Muslims, he did it of his free will. So the Indian Muslim of Sir Syed Ahmed's (*sic*) type, while content with the British domination, and even feeling it necessary, had that internal and probably unconscious urge for freedom which is in the heart of all men. Their safety and happiness did *not depend on their own efforts*. Their Westernization was a thing produced in a hothouse, under an artificial light. The fez meant the fresh air, the natural light. As such the fez had a most pathetic symbolic significance.⁶⁵

Halide Edip's comments on Sir Sayyid's and Aligarh's concessionary attitude in favor of the British may seem as if she resented Sir Sayyid's attitude but she left the university that welcomed her as a representative of the gallant race and the greatest living literary figure of Turkey⁶⁶ with warm feelings because of a surprise gesture:

When I rose to speak, I felt flowers raining upon me, so much so that I could neither open my mouth or eyes. After this avalanche of flowers ended, I looked up. From the skylight two men poured down tons of petals. A waste on a little old woman, but very beautiful nevertheless.⁶⁷

Her second visit is to the city of Lahore, which she calls "one of the principal Muslim cities," where she is welcomed with cries "Allah Akbar."⁶⁸ Like the rest of the cities she visits, she has a very tight schedule in Lahore: she gives three lectures, one in a tea-party with female students, one in the municipal hall of Lahore, and one to a community of Sikhs. As a writer who wrote and fought for the rights of women in Turkey, the thing that she pays the most attention to in Lahore is the changing attitudes of the Muslim society toward the betterment of girls and the position of women in society. Although the fragmentation that she observes in Muslim society is a dreary sign for the future of the Muslims in India, her optimism is nourished when she sees girls who are eager to foster a change:

One saw three definite generations with three definite thoughts and ways of life. Grandmothers, entirely old-fashioned; mothers, though

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 83, emphasis original.

⁶⁶ Mushirul Hasan, introduction to Halide Edip, *Inside India*, xxi.

⁶⁷ Halide Edip, *Inside India*, 84.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 85.

still absorbed in their homes, yet interested in women's education and proud of their English-speaking daughters who were out of Purdah; such daughters who were entirely emancipated.⁶⁹

Accordingly, her hostess Begam Shahnawaz⁷⁰ and her involvement in fostering women's rights in Lahore give Halide Edip hope. Begam Shahnawaz escorts Halide Edip everywhere in Lahore prepares her for her talks. For example, during the meeting with students from Muslim College of Lahore in the municipal hall, when some students ask Halide Edip irritably why Turkey abandoned the Islamic Law, she gives reasons with the information that Begam Shahnawaz gave her beforehand about Muslims' adoption of Hindu customary law in order to exclude women from inheritance.⁷¹ When she leaves Lahore, the city impressed Edip as a place that "stands between the Frontier and the rest of India, not only geographically but in mentality as well."⁷² Like the rain of petals in Aligarh, she is seen off from Lahore with a surprise when the host of the house in which she was a guest names his seven-day-old baby after Halide Edip.

In Peshawar, Halide Edip stays for two days and it gives her different feelings from what Lahore did. She is invited to give a lecture in Islamia College of Peshawar by the founder of the college,⁷³ Sir Abdul Qayyum, but she first visits Abdurrahman Qureishi's family, a man who was a member of the Indian Red Crescent Mission of 1912 and stayed in Turkey after the Republic was established but was killed in 1927 in Istanbul. After the emotional visit, Halide Edip meets Sir Abdul Qayyum and the more she observes him, the more she becomes sympathetic about Peshawaris. For Halide Edip, Peshawaris are agreeable people because they are open to communication and innovation. The best example of this tendency is seen in the character of the founder of the Anglo-Indian college of Peshawar, Sir Abdul Qayyum, who is revered by the Frontier tribes and also by the Hindus. When Halide Edip listens to Sir Abdul Qayyum and the principal of the college, who is an

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 86.

⁷⁰ Begum (Jahanara) Shah Nawaz later became a politician in British India and Pakistan. For more information see <http://www.begumshahnawaz.com/life.html>

⁷¹ Edip, *Inside India*, 87.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 89.

⁷³ For more information about Islamia College of Peshawar and its history, see <http://www.icp.edu.pk/about-icp/history-of-the-college.html>

Englishman, Dr. Holdsworth, exchanging views in order to clarify the aims of the college, her admiration for such sincerity between the two men touches her:

Though the former represent a few tribes, and latter one of the mightiest Empires of our day, neither side seemed to have a feeling of inferiority or superiority because of that. Both were unconsciously aware of the equality of man as such. And they were as man to man. And it is a mark of the English understanding of people that they have seen no other attitude possible between the frontiersmen, without constant trouble.⁷⁴

That is what Halide Edip dreams for the Muslim community of India. Namely, this expectation is not only the capacity of communication between the English and the Muslims but it is also the discovery of a mutual point in their humanity and dreams. It is this good faith that makes her feel as if she “was with the Peshawaris for a long time, and got to know them: as if they were people of my own country.”⁷⁵ This is because she is familiar with the same urge of renovation and progress as well as the sense of separateness in her own country for years. Likewise, the students and their reactions during her lecture in Islamia College create proprietary feelings of an Eastern, but pro-Westernization intellectual. After Dr. Holdsworth introduces her to the audience and says “first Koran-i Sherif will be chanted,” looking at the audience of a thousand students she thinks:

The lack of negative mysticism and exaggerated asceticism made one suppose that all of them would retain their place in life, and never abandon their fellow-creatures because of the hardness of their duties. It all indicated that they lived reasonably, obeying the rules of health, restraining themselves from excesses, but never denying or violating the laws of Nature. It seemed to me that they had the true interpretation of the “Allah supposes nothing which is beyond the strength of man.”⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Edip, *Inside India*, 94.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 95.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 98.

Not only the students or the college give her warm feelings in Peshawar, but also the hospitality of ordinary people in villages and their hospitality touches Halide Edip deeply. On her way back from a visit to the Khyber Pass, she wants to stop by one of the Muslim villages and see the houses closely. This also indicates that she never made the whole visit a formal interaction but rather she aimed to touch the lives of people in India and observe them in their daily lives. Most importantly, as she records and conveys her observations for her readers, this leads us to the reality and authenticity of her travelogue. The owner of the house she approaches receives her warmly and after learning that she is a Muslim woman from a far-off land, the people of the house offer her great hospitality. Since their language is Pushtu, they communicate with gestures and smiles but with an extraordinary sincerity. Halide Edip is touched by the reality that the strong proximity of herself with those ordinary villagers is only their belief.

They at once took me into the rooms, showing me everything, even the inside of cupboards. They neither questioned the reason, nor seemed to resent the unseemly curiosity. It was enough to be a Muslim, and believe in the One God. You were one of them. Never in my life had I such a clear perception of the freemasonic spirit of my religion.⁷⁷

Sarojini Naidu told Halide Edip in Delhi that the essence of the Muslim culture could be seen in Lucknow and Hyderabad and her next stop is Lucknow. In Lucknow, she is hosted by the family of Professor Muhammad Mujeeb of Jamia Millia. More than Professor Mujeeb who lives in Delhi, his brother Mr. Wasim and his wife help Halide Edip to look around and their household attracts Halide Edip in a way that she observes the family structure of a moderate Muslim family. Mr. Wasim is the head of the family although his father is alive; the father had abrogated his rights as the head of the family to his son, Mr. Wasim, because of the ailments of old age. Meeting the family who live together as more than fifty people in a big house, Halide Edip observes many sides of three generations. The elderly man “had the composure, the quiet dignity of the educated high-class Turk of forty years ago, a

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 97.

fragile person impeccably dressed in a European suit and a red fez. Neat, elegant, and with the courtesy and gravity which mark the gentleman of either East or West.”⁷⁸ But more than any other member of the family, Halide Edip is fond of Mr. Wasim’s wife, Begam Wasim, because she is the kind of mother, and also the mistress of this big family house, who both educates and inspires the youngsters in the house:

An excellent mother of six children, mostly boys, she did not need to train them beyond being an example, and inspiring a deep affection and admiration in them all. Besides her own children, there were nephews, nieces and their friends; quite a crowd of young people who were under her care, and lived most of their time in her house. In the East I have rarely seen this combination of camaraderie as well as respect between mother and children.⁷⁹

In addition, one of Begam’s brothers is a painter and the other, Haliq Zaman, is a promising politician who also had been a member of the Indian Red Crescent Mission to İstanbul in 1912. The Wasims also escorted Halide Edip to her first meeting where she gave a speech in the palace of the Rajah of Mahmudabad, to whom she is introduced. The second lecture is in the women’s college and the girls’ school where she thinks about the liveliness of Lucknow. Halide Edip’s eagerness to learn the political tendencies of the Muslim communities wherever she goes pays off as she meets Sheikh Mushir Hosain Kidwai, one of the leading political figures among Muslims. Halide Edip introduces Mushir Hosain Kidwai to her readers as

an aggrandized version of the Muslim of yesterday, of today, and in certain ways of tomorrow. He is representative of so many forms and aspects of Indian life that from him one gets as good an impression as from any one of the many-sidedness of India, and the way contradictory trends blend with each other.⁸⁰

This many-sidedness of the Sheikh was because of his active role in the agitations of Indian Muslims’ for the betterment of the Ottoman state in its difficult times. A pro-Turkish Muslim all his life, Kidwai visited Istanbul and received a medal from

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 102.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 104

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 106

Abdulhamid for his services to Pan-Islamic causes.⁸¹ He joined the Congress Party in 1907, established Anjuman-i Khuddam-i Qaaba in 1913 and opened a branch of it in London. When he came back to India in 1920, he became an important figure of the Khilafat Movement.⁸² Also the writer of books like *Islam and Socialism* and *The Sword against Islam or Defense of Islam's Standard-bearers*.⁸³ Mushir Hosain Kidwai is absorbed in a conversation with Halide Edip about the future of India. Kidwai was a partisan of Mahatma Gandhi during the time of the non-cooperation movement, but after Gandhi stopped the movement, Kidwai resented and condemned him. Kidwai's ideas are important for Halide Edip because she is trying to figure out a way that she can support the independence of India as a unified country. She interprets Kidwai's "approach to independence through economics. He believed that Labour was the only instrument through which India could obtain Independence."⁸⁴ For Halide Edip, although Gandhi's stance on nationalizing industry seems similar to Kidwai's support of a national industry, there is a huge difference:

Mahatma Gandhi was, and is, for hand-made goods, as against machine-made: the Sheikh believes in factories and machines, briefly mechanized industry. That is another point to note in the internal policies of Indians with regard to the economic development of their country. That industry should be home-made all agree; as to whether it should be a hand-made and mostly restricted to villages or machine-made and left to factories, such as is done in Japan, there are differences of opinion.⁸⁵

Halide Edip's next subject is relevant to their conversation with Sheikh Kidwai, which is the extreme poverty she sees in Lucknow. Just like she did in Peshawar, she visits a village in Lucknow and enters a house, but this time she is devastated with the miserable conditions that the villagers live in. "The pathetic resignation, apathy written all over them" depresses her in a way that she never felt before:

⁸¹ Mushirul Hasan, *Between Modernity and Nationalism*, 5.

⁸² Azmi Özcan, "Kidvai" *DİA* 25 (Ankara: 2002), 395-96.

⁸³ The Turkish version of this book is available. See, Müşir Hüseyin Kidwai, *Osmanlı'nın Son Dostları* (İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 2004)

⁸⁴ Edip, *Inside India*, 107.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 108.

Supposing that the greatest part of Indian humanity lives that sort of life [...] then what mockery to talk about Communalism, Nationalism, or any 'ism' at all... . So this was the 90 percent of the population of 350 million souls, most of whom live more or less in this way. And if that is the case, if 90 per cent of any humanity lives in the way I have seen in those villages, then it spells sure catastrophe for the future of such a country. And the situation interested the writer more than it would a Western observer; for the crucial problem, the axle around which life revolves in the East, is still the village.⁸⁶

Before she closes the part about Lucknow, she examines the land tenure system that is composed of the Zemindari and Ryotwari systems. The conclusion she reaches is that, without improving the peasants' situation, no country or no power can heal the social problems of India. For the misery of the peasants, Hindus, Muslims, and the British are all responsible as they all have ruled the country once or now, yet they did nothing to solve the problem.⁸⁷

Benares is the first predominantly Hindu city that Halide Edip visits. Hosted by Dr. Bhagavan Das' family, Halide Edip has the opportunity to observe closely the Hindu side of India. She is introduced to the visionary philanthropist Babu Shiva Prasad who founded Mahatma Gandhi Kashi Vidyapith, the biggest university in Benares.⁸⁸ The wisdom of this elderly man attracts Halide Edip as she learns that he builds a temple where Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Jews etc. will be able to worship their gods at the same time. Calling this attempt as the "new religion of nationalism," she thinks that this is a mystical form of patriotism.⁸⁹ Also it is peculiar to Halide Edip that the attempt to unite all creeds in one temple is not new to India, as the Mughal Emperor Akbar also built a Hall of Worship in the sixteenth century that would house all creeds in India. She emphasizes that, similarly, such an idea of reconciliation between beliefs was expressed in a poem by Muhammad Iqbal, *New Temple*.⁹⁰ Although she values the efforts, Halide Edip is not optimistic about them

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 110.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 112.

⁸⁸ <http://www.mgkvp.ac.in>

⁸⁹ Halide Edip, *Inside India*, 117.

⁹⁰ The poem by Muhammad Iqbal is as follows:

but she is hopeful about the message that Mahatma Gandhi delivers: “Yet how much freer all passing ideas, be they nationalism or anything else, were the gatherings in the open before Mahatma Gandhi’s house where the pandit sang, and no shadow of a name or ideology projected itself between the soul of the worshipper and its Creator.”⁹¹

Halide Edip visits Benares Hindu University, a Montessori-type kindergarten, and another Hindu school of which she gives no detail except its similarity in aim to Jamia Millia Islamia. More important than these visits are her observations of Hindu temples and Hindus worship. The meaning of the symbolism in the temples she visits does not disturb her as a Muslim. She watches small groups of devout Hindus in the Ganges who wash themselves and their belongings. Wondering why there is no cholera or such epidemics in the area as she sees the drainage and the dirt in the river, she is mostly amazed by the mystical and Oriental atmosphere of the land. When one of the attendants to her journey asks her “Is it not like Venice?” she responds,

New Temple

May I tell the truth O Brahman! If it does not displease you
The idols of your temple have become anachronistic

You have learnt grudge with your own people from the idols
God also has taught fighting to Muslim preachers

Becoming tired, I finally abandoned the temple and the Haram
I abandoned the preacher's sermons, as well as your stories

You take the stone idols to contain God
Every speck of the homeland's dust is holy to me

Come! Let us again roll up the curtains of strangeness
Let us unite the separated ones, let us remove the disunion

The heart's habitation is lying barren since long
Let us build a new temple in this country

Let our shrine be higher than the world's shrines
Let us make its spire as high as the sky

Let our morning's incantations be so sweet every morning
That all worshipers be ecstatic with the Love's wine

The power and tranquillity is in the devotees' song
The salvation of the denizens of the earth is in Love.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 118.

Not much. Venice is compact, definitely outlined in spite of its intricacies of design. It is Medieval Occident, and the people on its shores are very much taken up by territorial passions. They sing of love and commit all sorts of iniquitous acts of love—or for something else. This Benares is wide, indistinct in outline; and its buildings, its light and its seething crowds seem to belong to a prehistoric age when humanity had not got over the wonder and the fear of finding themselves on earth.⁹²

This is one of Halide Edip's typical exertions to define peculiar scenes in India by comparing it with the West. She does this not by looking through the differences of religion or belief but by considering reconciliatory differences which can be avoided with toleration and understanding. She is even more bewildered with the richness of Benares in spirituality as she first meets a Muslim community for a speech and then visits the remnants of a Buddhist temple. With a sense of Guenonian esotericism, Halide Edip contemplates on how the smile of great and small figures of Buddha is likely to have regenerated in the works of contemporaneous sculptors like Rodin or the smile on *Mona Lisa's* lips.⁹³ It becomes increasingly obvious that the more she travels in India, the more she is convinced about the common aspects of India, although many people in India believe that a separation is inevitable.

Her next visit is to Calcutta, which is the former capital of British India. Because Calcutta is the center of Bengal, in order to understand the Bengal temperament, which is the salt and pepper to Indian thought,⁹⁴ Halide Edip informs the reader about the Hindu-Muslim-English culture in progress. According to her, learning this dynamic culture is important because “whatever is happening in New India has been influenced, directly or indirectly, by the modern movements which have taken place in Calcutta.”⁹⁵ Actually, what she attempts to prove by this long history of recent integrationist and separative religious movements is the capacity of religion to achieve and ruin the peace in India. Ram Mohan Roy and his monotheistic *Brahmo-Samaj* [“The Friendly Association”] movement attracts her attention first and utmost.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 122.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 125.

⁹⁴ Edip, *Inside India*, 127.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 127.

According to Percival Spear's *A History of India*, Ram Mohan Roy was a wealthy Brahmin who worked for the British East India Company as the assistant tax collector of the city of Rangpur in Bengal. A man of intellect and high culture, he mastered Greek, Latin, Sanskrit, Arabic, and Persian. He published the first Indian newspaper, advocated the abolition of *Sati* (the practice of widowed women's self-immolation), worked for the promotion of civil and political rights of the individual as he attacked the Caste system, as well as implementing a religious sect.⁹⁶ Halide Edip evaluates him as a rare mediator between the old and the new in India. He died in 1833 in England, where he had gone as an emissary of the Mughal Emperor who was still the nominal sovereign of India at the time.⁹⁷ Halide Edip praises Roy's efforts at most as they resulted in the creation of the University of Calcutta, "which has had far-reaching influences. For with that university, which was the first definite medium upper-class English culture, *the West acquired a lasting foothold in India*"⁹⁸ (Emphasis original). However, after Ram Mohan Roy died, the movement withdrew its monotheistic beliefs and veered toward separatism, contrary to its prior role. Halide Edip points to this circular tendency:

It is necessary at this point to pause and consider a curious fact about India, which we have already noted on several instances. No matter how small a cross-section of Indian history one may undertake to study, one is nearly conscious of a regular beat, a particular hymn. Just as the soldiers' march is controlled by 'Left, Right, Left, Right', so the rhythm of the march on Indian history is controlled by 'Unite, Divide, Unite, Divide...'⁹⁹

According to her, the union happens when the sense of nationalist fervor is ignored for the sake of a peaceful future, but in the end the narrow nationalism of greedy and radical religious leaders finds a way to disrupt that peace.

⁹⁶ Percival Spear, *A History of India, Volume Two* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1990), 161.

⁹⁷ Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund, *A History of India* (London: Routledge, 1998), 235.

⁹⁸ Halide Edip, *Inside India*, 129.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 131-32.

In Calcutta, Halide Edip is hosted by Abdurrahman Siddiqi who was one of the prominent figures of the Khilafat Movement¹⁰⁰ and was acquainted with Halide Edip since he was a member of the Indian Red Crescent Mission to Turkey.¹⁰¹ Moreover, Halide Edip is welcomed with great enthusiasm in Calcutta University for her lecture. She finds the university where tradition and progress meet harmoniously as Hindu and Muslim students are educated together. She describes the inspiration that the scene of ten thousand students gives,¹⁰² whom she could only get a view of by speaking from the balcony that faces the court:

Though it is dominantly Hindu, it also has a considerable number of Muslim students. In Calcutta I had a feeling that the Hindu-Muslim relation is like that of an old married couple; their quarrels are daily occurrences, but I don't think they could live without each other in spite of the quarrels — perhaps they couldn't live without the quarrels either.¹⁰³

During her speech, at every point she makes, the Hindu students shout “Bande [Vande] Mataram,” which means “Live Mother” and the Muslim students shout “Allah Akbar,” which means “Allah is Great.” The scene probably leaves a certain feeling of unique sympathy over her which would be enhanced by the performance of one of the most popular singers of Calcutta, Nuri-Jihan [*sic*]. The singer, who was sitting on the cushions that are placed on the floor, performs three types of Indian music: Indian classics that were mainly Hindu, Indian folk-songs that are Hindu but modern and mixed with romantic subjects, and finally Muslim classics that are mostly from Rumi's *Mathnawi* (*Mesnevi*). Especially pieces that Nuri-Jihan sings from the *Mesnevi* reminds Halide Edip of her familiarity with Rumi and his impact on Turkish language and literature, something that is mutual to India and Turkey.

In Hyderabad, Halide Edip is welcomed and hosted by Sir Akbar Hydari, one of the best known financiers in India and the driving force behind the establishment of

¹⁰⁰ Margrit Pernau and Mushirul Hasan, *Regionalizing Pan-Islamism* (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2005), 129-30

¹⁰¹ Edip, *Inside India*, 134.

¹⁰² Quoted from *Amrita Bazaar Patrika* (Calcutta), 26 February 1935, in Mushirul Hasan, Introduction, Halide Edip, *Inside India*, xxi.

¹⁰³ Edip, *Inside India*, 134.

Osmania University. Sir Akbar is by far the second person that Halide Edip admires the most after Dr. Ansari and the reason is this:

Sir Akbar had achieved a unique cultural synthesis, and he had both intelligent and workable educational views. Whatever there was in India in the way of culture, Greek, Buddhist, Hindu or Muslim, his mind embraced as a whole. Though in age Sir Akbar belongs to the past generation, in mind he belongs to future, too. For India is to be kneaded into a nation, she must reach that unconscious synthesis of all her many-sided culture and thought.¹⁰⁴

This blend of old and new with an inclination toward the preservation of the unity of India is what Halide Edip longs for throughout her stay. Not only Sir Akbar but, even more than him, his wife Lady Amina impresses Halide Edip because she is an exceptional woman with her interest and activism for women's rights and education of girls among Indian Muslims. As a devout Muslim, Halide Edip observes, "She loved India and seemed unaware of the religious differences among them."¹⁰⁵ As a result of this, Lady Amina is free from the familiar Muslim inferiority complex that disturbs Halide Edip when she is among Muslim groups among Hindu masses.

Halide Edip also gives a lecture in Osmania University of Hyderabad. Although she doesn't point out the crowd and their attitudes in detail, according to the 16 January 1935 issue of the *Hindustan Times*, "five thousand people were jostling each other to attend her lecture."¹⁰⁶ About the education at the university, she admires the founders and administrators because they decided to provide education through the medium of Urdu. This is important for Halide Edip because in order to enrich the capacity of Urdu to express scientific terms that originated in Western languages, these philosophical and scientific terms have to be processed through translation.¹⁰⁷ Also, she gives lectures in educational institutions for women where Hindus and Muslims are educated without any racial or religious antagonism. However, her optimism is shadowed when she visits an orphanage patronized by the Nizam of Hyderabad. During the visit to the orphanage she examines the educational system

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 142.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 143.

¹⁰⁶ Quoted in Mushirul Hasan, Introduction, Halide Edip, *Inside India*, xxi.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 149.

and learns that the curriculum is taught in four different languages and the food for the Muslim and Hindu foundlings is cooked differently. She is told that there are always signs on the abandoned baby that indicate the religion its parents belong to. But then, she wonders why the need for the education in four different languages or eating different food even when some Hindu boys from meat-eating sects eat together with the Muslim boys. Sir Akbar answers “We Muslims are the rulers, and if we did these things, we would be able to take advantage of our power and of the helplessness of these children whom we desire to save and educate.”¹⁰⁸ Sir Akbar’s answer leads Halide Edip to thoughts about the impossibility of reaching a common ground politically before the acceptance of equality based on humanity:

[...] since I have been visiting India and talking with its people, everyone talked of unity, of nationhood, of co-operation between its members, and of independence at some future time. How could these children live and suffer and work hand in hand for India if they can’t even dine together in school? The fact that the Muslim minority rules over a Hindu majority, and a Hindu minority over a Muslim majority, creates strange and difficult positions. Yet, if I had been visiting a State with a Hindu ruler, I would have made the same remark. With all respect for religious feeling there must be created a common national ground for the young where they can be the builders of a common and free country in which they are destined to govern.¹⁰⁹

The last important point about Halide Edip’s time in Hyderabad is her meeting and conversation with Princess Durru Shehwar, the Ottoman Princess who was the daughter of the last Islamic Caliph Abdulmecid II, who was deported from Turkey with his family after the abolition of the Caliphate. When Halide Edip was in India, Princess Durru Shehwar married the heir apparent of Nizam of Hyderabad. Halide Edip admires her adoption of the local ways and the manners to become an ordinary Indian princess rather than an Ottoman princess. Halide Edip is not happy because Princess Durru Shehwar is no more an Ottoman princess, but she is proud of the princess since she has become a wonderful example for the Muslim women of India.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 145.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 146.

Halide Edip likens the princess to her ancestor Mehmed the Conqueror both in her interest in the arts and her appearance. During the meeting that Halide Edip delivers a speech, the princess is present and is asked to say something. About her speech, which is in Urdu, Halide Edip praises her awareness about the need for universalizing the education for all classes. Halide Edip adds,

Though a princess, her conviction is that women must be taught the dignity of work. Every woman ought to be in a position to support herself by means of an honorable livelihood should the occasion arise. It is a matter of pride and not humiliation to add to the meager family income by one's own endeavor.¹¹⁰

Halide Edip's complimentary words for the Ottoman princess are important; when we consider the Kemalist writers and their attitude to the things they came across in India, Halide Edip's difference is clear. For example, in Atay's *Hind*, we see that the Turkish journalist mission was hosted in the Nizam guesthouse for three days and we see no reference to the Ottoman princess Durru Shehwar.¹¹¹ We read that Prince Azam Jah, the husband of Princess Durru Shehwar, receives the Turkish journalists warmly, but the subject of the Princess does not come up again in the travelogues of the Kemalist writers. This is one of the best examples that show the confident and lighthearted attitude of Halide Edip while she is describing the things she sees. The reason for her confidence is mostly due to her preoccupation with seeing and citing things as they are, not the way she thinks fit or unfit, which is absent in the narratives of the Kemalist writers in India who, apparently, picked the things they wanted and used their material to alienate themselves from what they observed.

The last city Halide Edip visited is Bombay, and from Bombay she moves to İstanbul where she spent two months before she sailed to Paris. Because she has had the memories of the seven cities she has seen in India so far, looking at Bombay as a city seems to require a comparison with the other cities. The first thing that she pays attention to is the high level of urbanization — though still very low — compared to other cities. As she has observed major Indian cities, she is more convinced about the need for urban development because the peasants' faith is in the hands of the

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 148.

¹¹¹ Atay, *Hind*, 257-65.

moneylenders or tax-gatherers while the worker in the city is able to earn what he deserves:

As long as the East, I thought, had this thin surface of industrialization in the city, and makes no attempt to clear the strata on strata of misery in the rural districts where bulk of the nation lives, the destiny of the east will be incalculable. It will lie between a much more intense and degrading colonization, or a revolution or a shattering kind which will uproot the entire civilization and the people themselves.¹¹²

Also there is a cosmopolitan atmosphere in Bombay. English, Muslim, and Hindu presence in the city is intertwined. Especially, she observes that “the rigid barrier between the ruler and the ruled has gone.”¹¹³

In the chapter that is reserved for Halide Edip’s Bombay experiences there is little information about the city but more about her final thoughts about the visit. Actually the third and last section includes her detailed sociological and cultural treatises on India from many aspects, and the chapter on Bombay seems more like those chapters of the third section. Probably because Halide Edip decided this chapter as a closing chapter of the second section of her travelogue, we read her more sentimental memories in Bombay. There, she gives two speeches, one in the Victoria Mary Gymkhana Hall in which upper-class Englishwomen attend, including the wife of the Governor. Giving no detail about the meeting here, Halide Edip mentions the events of the next meeting in the Unity Club Hall. After the speech, a lady sits next to Halide Edip and sings *Vande Mataram* [“Live Mother”], the Indian anthem, playing her sitar. The emotional voice of the woman and the atmosphere touches Halide Edip’s heart:

Her voice turned one’s faculties upside down, and made one’s emotion as uncontrollable as sea-sickness. Before I knew how it had happened tears were rolling down my cheeks, and I was not only unashamed of crying in public, but also unable to wipe those tears away. I got a sense of India from her voice which nothing else so far had given me. It evoked a nation on honeymoon, in the love and peace

¹¹² Edip, *Inside India*, 159.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 152.

of its revolution, a divine folly which makes old and young hold hands, crying aimlessly, and walk up and down the street singing, “Mother land... .”¹¹⁴

The closing remarks of Halide Edip also show how contented and relieved she leaves India. Here, she cites three events that have a distinct place in her heart. The first is the garden party where she shares her table with a *Harijan*, a person who belongs to the Untouchable caste. She thinks joyfully how things can change because in the past such a thing was never dreamed.¹¹⁵ The second event happens after her lecture in the public hall where the Mayor presided. After the speech to which “a sea of faces, and all belonging to a vast number of sects and castes, even outcastes” attended, another feeling of utmost relief captures her heart as “the distinguished and charming Parsee, Mr. Narriman, spoke and said that this was a unique occasion when all the communities gathered in that hall.”¹¹⁶ The last event is the Intercommunal dinner in which four hundred men and women from all colors, faiths, and castes ate together. The atmosphere of fraternal peace during the dinner made Halide Edip so happy that she felt herself like in an earthly paradise.¹¹⁷

Halide Edip describes her whole time in India “as if a primary-grade student of life had wandered into a post-graduate class”¹¹⁸ as she has seen, heard, tasted, and looked on the “beginning of Time,” and the “end of Time.” After her speeches in Jamia Millia Islamia and dozens of speeches more in eight different cities in two months, her travelogue *Inside India* serves us with many insights of a cosmopolitan writer about India in the 1930s.

Halide Edip’s travel to India and her travelogue end here, but *Inside India* is not only a travelogue. The third section of the book is full of informative and insightful evaluations of India. Nearly all individuals and sides of the country that would play crucial roles in its destiny are touched on here. In this section Halide Edip’s main metaphor for India is a “melting-pot” and she approaches the concept from the perspective of two main communities, Hindus and Muslims. As for Hinduism and

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 154.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 159

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 160

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

the space that it covers in Indian politics, Halide Edip thinks that with the arrival of new conceptions of nationhood from the West the Indian Congress was formed and has been dominating Indian politics with a tendency that favors Hindus for the future.¹¹⁹ As for the range of Indian Muslims in the political arena, Halide Edip finds many problems, if not difficulties. First of all, for Halide Edip, “with the possible exception of Persia (which she does not know), there is no other Muslim society in the world as rigid as that of the Indian Muslims.”¹²⁰ The fact that the mindset of the separatist movement among the Muslims depends on the fear of living under Hindu rule is a harsh reality because the Muslim minority had ruled Hindu majority for centuries. Another problem is the resistance among the Muslim community to the development and the domination of Capitalism because it results in the economic deterioration of the Muslim community day by day. In order to analyze the Muslim politics of India more closely, Halide Edip mentions the Khilafat Movement and its impact on the Muslim intellectuals as well as on the internal politics of India.¹²¹ She attracts the readers’ attention to the fact that when the Khilafat Movement was functioning, although Muslims at the time had strong and remarkable leadership,

Mahatma Gandhi’s leadership was sincerely accepted by the Muslims as much as by the Hindus. And Mahatma Gandhi accepted the Khilafat question as a side issue and stood by his Muslim collaborators. Hindu and Muslim [*sic*] were merely Indians struggling hand in hand for the ultimate independence of their common motherland.¹²²

But first Gandhi’s suspension of the non-co-operation and then the abolition of the Islamic caliphate by Turkey were two powerful blows for the Muslim community. The frustration of Indian Muslims who had incorporated Khilafat agitation with already prevalent Pan-Islamism can be understood by Dr. Ansari’s description of the Indian Muslims’ temper at the time in the preface that he wrote for the *Conflict of East and West in Turkey*:

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 166.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 211.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 213.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 214.

It is not a sentiment inspired by interest, policy or worldly wisdom; it has no practical end in view. But strange to say, it is just for these reasons that the Pan-Islamist sentiment has been one of the most sacred and exalted passions. It is because he is helpless, because all his co-religionists are equally helpless, because Western imperialism is aggressive and everywhere successful, that he has become a Pan-Islamist.¹²³

Halide Edip's prescription to get over the problems among the Muslim community and between Muslims and Hindus that seem unsolvable is to be convinced by the ideals and policies of Jamia Millia Islamia and its leading figures like Dr. Ansari, Prof. Muhammad Mujeeb and Dr. Zakir Husain. This is because "though small, the Jamia center and what it stood for seemed to the writer [herself] the only clearly formulated political and Muslim social ideology. In its political aspect it seemed like an attempt to understand the *inalienable democracy* of Islam as it was in the earlier Islamic society."¹²⁴

In the third section Halide Edip writes three chapters on Mahatma Gandhi's importance for India and his philosophy in detail. Starting from Gandhi's childhood, she attempts to understand the phases of his life, such as his education and his time in South Africa that molded his personality and ideals. According to Halide Edip, "the South African activities of Mahatma Gandhi could be called a dress rehearsal for the greater drama which was acted, together with the whole of India, much later."¹²⁵ His contemplations on India's problems led him to name the shortcomings of India as inaction, inefficiency, and internal social disorder. As Halide Edip observes, Gandhi's involvement in politics mainly contributed to two things; first, the Congress became a more representative body; and second, relations between Great Britain and India changed profoundly as the two sides became aware of the need to communicate and negotiate.¹²⁶

Halide Edip also writes one chapter each on Jawaharlal Nehru and Abdul Gaffar Khan, two influential individuals from both Muslim and Hindu sides of the political

¹²³ Halide Edip, *Conflict of East and West in Turkey*, Preface by M. A. Ansari, v.

¹²⁴ Edip, *Inside India*, 216, emphasis original.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 174.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 181

spectrum. The reason she reserves a whole chapter for Nehru and Abdul-Gaffar Khan is their promising reconciliatory role that she sees in the future of India as “one nation.” As for Nehru, Halide Edip describes his policy as “He unifies all problems in India as being common to all Indians. In his mind there is no Muslim or Hindu or Parsee; every son of India is an Indian.”¹²⁷ He is a socialist who is against communalism and capitalism. For Nehru, economics must replace the religious outlook in every aspect of mass development. Moreover, nationalism is also considered by him nothing more than an expediency to get rid of foreign rule.¹²⁸ On the other hand, Abdul-Gaffar Khan and his Red Shirts Movement¹²⁹ seem like the counterpart of Nehru and his position on the Muslim side of political arena. Abdul-Gaffar Khan is a moderate and liberal Socialist who deems socialism the only political creed compatible with Islam. All things considered, for Halide Edip “...one can say that the type of Democracy Dr. Ansari advocated, and the type of Socialism Abdul-Gaffar Khan represents, are in favor of the ideal of a common Indian nationhood for all men of all faiths.”¹³⁰ Although Halide Edip does not see Socialism compatible with the rigid Muslim sense that is present in India and sees it problematic to derive a political creed from Islam,¹³¹ Abdul-Gaffar Khan’s affiliation with Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru’s complimentary words¹³² for him make Abdul-Gaffar a promising figure in Muslim politics of India.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 202.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 205.

¹²⁹ *Khuda’i Khidmatgar* [Servants of God] or Red Shirt Movement was a non-violent resistance force that was led by Abdal-Ghaffar Khan (1890-1988). It was the only organized body of Muslims in the twentieth century to fight for Indian freedom. Essentially a Pathan movement confined to the North-West Frontier Province, it was first organized in 1929 as a nationalist anti-British force, pledged to non-violence. In April 1930 British efforts to suppress the movement led to riots, considerable loss of life, and a temporary British military withdrawal from Peshawar. In August 1931 the Red shirts were formally affiliated with Congress. For more information, see P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 217.

¹³⁰ Edip, *Inside India*, 228.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 231.

¹³² Jawaharlal Nehru, speaking of Abdul-Gaffar Khan, says: “It was surprising how this Pathan accepted the idea of non-violence far more so in theory than many of us. And it was because he believed in that he managed to impress his people with the importance of remaining peaceful in spite of provocation. He had attained an amazing popularity in the Frontier Provinces by sheer dint of quiet, persevering work, undaunted by difficulties. He was, and is, no politician as the politicians go; he knows nothing of the tactics and maneuvers of politics. A tall man, straight in body and mind, hating fuss and too much talk, looking forward to freedom for his Frontier Province peoples within *the framework of Indian freedom*” (emphasis original). Quoted in Edip, *Inside India*, 219.

It is clear that Halide Edip is in favor of a “One Nation” solution that should be resolved by Hindus and Muslims together. Her speeches in Jamia Millia and the places she was invited clearly prove this inclination. However, at the end of the book she includes an interview that she made in London with Mr. Rahmat-Ali (Chaudhuri) whom she calls “the founder of the Pakistan National Movement.”¹³³ Rahmat-Ali was the Muslim Nationalist who coined the word “Pakistan” and evolved the idea of three Muslim states in the Indian subcontinent.¹³⁴ We know that the interview was made after Halide Edip returned to Europe and her including the interview in *Inside India* can easily be seen as her unbiased approach to India. Actually her ideas after the partition of India did not change and her cautious approach to the idea of two nations had not ceased years later as she wrote her ideas about the partitioning in *Akşam* newspaper:

Formerly I had my doubts about the formation of Pakistan. But later I wrote a book on this question — *Inside India*. Pakistan has another cultural and historical background, and they had to be liberated from Hindu dominance in industry and commerce. Besides, the social structure of this country is based on the principles of Islam, that means social equality, which is far away from the caste system.¹³⁵

By all means, Halide Edip never aims to influence the reader with her own conceptions of India because she tries to depict the social and political balance of India as it is.

Conclusion

Halide Edip’s two months in India was full of travels, visits to local communities, meetings with main religious and political groups, acquaintance with important individuals, speeches in different educational institutions, and many more activities. Although it was her first time in India, she was among friends and people who welcomed her warmly. Writing a book about her visit was a project that she had promised to her dear friend Dr. Ansari and she was able to fulfill that promise two

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 236.

¹³⁴ Percival Spear, *A History of India, Volume Two*, 228.

¹³⁵ Quoted in İlber Ortaylı, “The Emergence of Pakistan and the Turkish Public Opinion” in *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (July-December 1992): 28.

years after the visit. The extensive visit and its meaning to historians who study India is great, but the value of *Inside India* is much greater for students of literature because it reveals many truths to us about the conceptions of the Muslim and Hindu communities about each other, about themselves, as well as about the two groups' conception of Turkey and the Turkish intelligentsia. Halide Edip was revered as a writer who achieved international renown as well as an academic success with her deep knowledge about world affairs, but above all, she was famous in India as a hero of the Turkish Independence Movement. Two years before Halide Edip, in March 1933, another outcast of the Kemalist regime, Rauf Bey (Orbay) was in India to deliver lectures in Jamia Millia Islamia.¹³⁶ It seems that the Indians' interest in the prominent figures of the Turkish Independence Movement was not confined to Halide Edip, but Halide Edip's objective observations still stand unrivaled in their authenticity and literary worth when compared with the travelogues written by the latter visitors of India from Turkey. In that sense, the difference between Halide Edip as an outside observer of India and *Inside India* as a travelogue about India which was written in the 1930s is worthy of careful analysis.

¹³⁶ Mushirul Hasan, Introduction, Halide Edip, *Inside India*, lvii.

Conclusion: New People, New Vision, New “Others”

It is interesting that the travel texts this study analyzes can still appeal to our modern times both politically and culturally. The texts belong to the early republican era of Turkey when the administration was busy with the institutionalization of Kemalist reforms. This process seems to be over now and Turkey is an ever-growing country with its dynamic population. One reason for this durability may be the literary interest in the works of leading Turkish writers who wrote not only novels, travelogues, and essays witnessing the most restless times in Turkish recent history. The writers I chose are not only known for their literary characteristics or style, but are also seen as national symbols or heroes by many people in Turkey. They actively participated in the War of National Independence or occupied crucial posts during the war. For example, Halide Edip was responsible for international relations and provided information to the media abroad.¹

Falih Rıfıkı Atay and other writers who are introduced in Chapter II were busy with molding public opinion in Turkey in favor of the Turkish nationalists by their articles in Turkish newspapers. However, there is another side to our interest in these writers which is concerned with their attachment to the new Kemalist régime. This aspect led me to examine the style of the texts in two different chapters. Fundamentally, the writers' ideological standpoint within the Kemalist framework deserves attention to determine the factors that dominated their conceptions of the East. Only then can we see the divergence in the image of the East for the Kemalists and non-Kemalists.

Apart from functioning as an eye-catcher, the term “Kemalist Orientalism” is not a grotesque conception since the strategies that the early Kemalists legitimized were compatible with Edward Said's conceptualization of Orientalism. The representative and intellectual expedients of the Orientalists that Said examined from the colonial past of non-Western societies were in fact traceable in the Kemalist régime's domestic or international policies when issues involving the East

¹ İpek Çalışlar, *Halide Edip Biyografisine Sığmayan Kadın* (İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2010), 218-21.

were discussed. This is best seen when Kemalism is interpreted as an *episteme* in the Foucauldian sense. The Kemalist transformation of a people can be compared with Michel Foucault's definition of *episteme*:

By *episteme*, we mean, in fact, the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems; the way in which, in each of these discursive formations, the transitions to epistemologization, scientificity, and formalization are situated and operate; the distribution of these thresholds, which may coincide, be subordinated to one another, or be separated by shifts in time; the lateral relations that may exist between epistemological figures or sciences in so far as they belong to neighbouring, but distinct, discursive practices.²

Since Kemalism attempted not only a political change but also “cultural mutation,” which was only possible through revolutionaries in language, belief, education, and legislation, such a project had to be coordinated by participants from academia, the intelligentsia, politics, and many other areas of life. Essentially, Kemalism posits itself and its people as Western, while it despises the East and Eastern traits — if there is such a thing — in order to dissociate itself from history, time, and place. As Atay suggests in *Hind*, “First of all, we will root ourselves out from the East in reason and opinion.”³

In his essay “Orientalism Reconsidered,” Edward Said suggests that the changing aspects of the division between Orient and Occident must be studied as integral components of the social world.⁴ Accordingly, so must the texts from both entities be analyzed within the conditions of the historical moment in which they were written. That is to say, reading the travelogues of Kemalist writers about India does not necessarily mean to chastise the writers from our privileged position as

² Michel Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 211.

³ Atay, *Hind*, 13.

⁴ Edward W. Said, “Orientalism Reconsidered” in *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays*, ed. Edward W. Said (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 199.

critics. Rather, a re-evaluation of these texts may be an opportunity for us to comprehend our contemporary mindsets in which we judge, praise, or emulate. As for this study, more than how the Turkish writers who travelled to India viewed or interpreted the social and political state of colonial and independent India, it is also important to consider the dual worldview that the Kemalist revolution caused in the Turkish mentality and its role in the identity-building. For example, as an upholder of Western values and principles, Halide Edip's attitude towards India and its people in her travelogue stands for us as a counter example from the Kemalist writers' travelogues. Edip disavowed the perspective that Westernization is possible only with a total transformation of mind and perception as Kemalism dictates. Edip also demonstrates that it is possible to resist the conception that underlied a self-induced inferiority of being Eastern and for an intellectual to still favor the West. Likewise, re-reading these texts can shed light on the complicated attitudes about the East, then and now, as well as Westernization.

India and especially the post-independence Muslim community were no strangers to the Ottoman Turks, nor to the well-known participants of the Turkish National War of Independence, as shown by the contributions of Indian Muslims described above in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, there were also unavoidable differences between Turkey and India during the times that the Turkish writers whom I analyzed visited India. Turkey was, and has been, more homogeneous in religion, ethnicity and general culture; whereas India has always been a land of variety and more vulnerable to factionalism. One should always keep in mind that, although India was a well-recognized place for Turks in the early republican period of Turkey, these peculiar problems that India was grappling with — such as colonization, caste, or religious factions — were unfamiliar with the people of Turkey. Therefore, to do the Kemalists whose travelogues I analyzed in Chapter 1 justice, it should be stressed that these writers were not in India to other them, but rather, they viewed India from a Westernized perspective and through their self-conditioning which instructed them that was the righteous way.

Another important point about the different perspectives of the writers in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 is that the two journalist missions of 1943 and 1953 that included the Kemalist writers whose travel texts I analyzed in my dissertation were in India after they were invited as governmental representatives. On the other hand, Halide Edip Adivar, who was already a popular novelist, was invited to India by her friends and had no official responsibility. This implies the fact that Atay, Felek or Yalman were not as free as Halide Edip, since their ideological standpoint urged them to view India as an Oriental land because it was colonized and backward. It is ironic for the Kemalists to describe India, which encountered Western institutions before the Turks actively practiced radical Westernization, as an Oriental land. However, their attitude can be best understood when Kemalists' "cultural mutation" is considered, because it was that total change in abstract and concrete terms that they found the *only* remedy for national glory. Furthermore, Halide Edip's authentic approach cannot be attributed to her contacts in India who embraced her with their hospitality, because we understand from their accounts that the Kemalist writers in India were also welcomed warmly and extraordinarily by Indian Muslim community, even nearly two decades after the abolition of the Caliphate. Finally, Halide Edip might have a greater liberty in her recording her observations and experiences since she did not have any official responsibilities, but this was her choice not approving the Kemalist régime in the first hand and living in a self-imposed exile abroad. Therefore, although there were important differences between the writers that I analyzed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, there were also inevitable conflicts between their worldviews which we can observe by reading their travelogues about India.

Visiting India and meeting its people cannot be considered an ordinary visit for the Turkish intellectuals in the early republican period of Turkey, because of the recent strong historical ties with the Republic of Turkey. Thus, the awkwardness of the Turkish writers' othering the people of India becomes clear. Especially, by avoiding the damages of the British colonial system on the Hindu and Muslim communities of India, the Kemalist journalists' focused mostly on the "backward" and "rudimentary" aspects of the country. In contrast, Halide Edip's empathizing

with her hosts and her detailed descriptions of the people and places contributed to the main point of this study — that the duality of emotion and thought that the radical Westernization of Kemalism caused in the Turkish mentality can also be traced in the travelogues of Turkish writers to the Eastern lands during the early republican period.

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