



**T.C.
YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**THE NATURE OF THE BAGHDAD PACT AND
TURKEY’S MIDDLE EAST POLICY**

by

ZAFER YAZKAN TALU

Submitted to the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD of Political
Science and International Studies



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
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
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	I
LIST OF TABLES.....	III
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	IV
ABSTRACT.....	V
ÖZET	VI
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Scope.....	1
1.2 Objective of the Research	7
1.3 Methodology	9
1.4 Theoretical Framework	12
1.5 Outline.....	24
2. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR	27
2.1 Truman Presidency: End of Wartime Cooperation?	28
2.2 Soviet Encroachment Along the Northern Tier	32
2.2.1 Iranian crisis	33
2.2.2 Greek crisis.....	35
2.2.3 Turkish crisis.....	35
2.3 Birth of Containment Policy	43
3. MIDDLE EAST: A REGION OF RIVALRY	48
3.1 Importance of the ME and Historical Background	48
3.2 Politics of Oil	53

4.	TURKEY ALLIGNS WITH THE WEST IN SEARCH OF SECURITY	56
4.1	Internal Dynamics	56
4.1.1	Political factors.....	57
4.1.2	Economic factors.....	63
4.2	External Dynamics.....	65
4.2.1	Republican Turkey’s improving relations with the West	65
4.2.2	Turkish foreign policy during the Second World War.....	70
4.2.3	Turkish-Soviet relations and the US response	76
4.3	Truman Doctrine and Implications for Turkey	76
5.	THE ME ON THE WAY TO THE BAGHDAD PACT: US STARTS TO TAKE OVER FROM BRITAIN	84
5.1	Turkey: Incorporation Into the West is Complete	86
5.1.1	NATO and Turkey	86
5.1.2	Korean War and Turkey.....	89
5.1.3	Quid pro quo: Turkey enters NATO in exchange for MEC membership 94	
5.1.4	Turks and Arabs	101
5.2	Rise of Nationalism and Domestic Instability in the Arab World	105
5.2.1	Egypt: Failure of British led MEC&MEDO	107
5.2.2	Iran: Nationalization of Abadan oil refinery.....	112
5.2.3	Iraq: Rising nationalism	114
5.2.4	Jordan: In line with Britain	114
5.2.5	Syria and Lebanon: End of French mandate	115
5.3	Arab-Israel Hostility	116
5.4	Rise of the “Northern Tier” with Dulles	118
5.5	Operation Alpha.....	122
6.	THE BAGHDAD PACT (25 FEBRUARY 1955)	125
6.1	Formation.....	126
6.2	Covenant of the Pact	129
6.3	International Repercussions	131
6.3.1	Egypt: Disdained the Pact	131
6.3.2	Syria and Saudi Arabia: In line with Egypt	135

6.3.3	Jordan and Lebanon: Reluctant to join	139
6.3.4	Israel: Increased perception of threat	141
6.4	The Baghdad Pact and Turkey's Expectations	143
6.5	The Reasons for US Non-Entry to the Pact	149
7.	THE USSR AND VIEW OF THE BAGHDAD PACT	152
7.1	Reorientation in Soviet Policy After 1953.....	153
7.2	The USSR and Reactions to the Pact.....	158
8.	SUEZ CRISIS: FIRST TEST OF THE BAGHDAD PACT	160
8.1	Nationalization of the Canal	162
8.1.1	European view.....	163
8.1.2	US view	165
8.1.3	The Baghdad Pact and Turkey during nationalization.....	166
8.2	Suez War.....	169
8.2.1	The Israeli attack on the Canal and the European plot.....	169
8.2.2	US response.....	170
8.2.3	The Baghdad Pact and Turkey during the Suez war	171
8.3	Consequences of the Suez War.....	176
8.3.1	Eisenhower Doctrine.....	179
8.3.2	Deeper penetration of the USSR into the ME.....	184
9.	REGIONAL CRISES AND DECLINE OF THE BAGHDAD PACT	187
9.1	Jordan-Syria Crisis.....	187
9.2	Turkey-Syria Crisis.....	188
9.3	Formation of the United Arab Republic and Arab Union.....	195
9.4	Iraq Crisis (Qasim Coup).....	201
9.5	Lebanon Crisis	202
10.	TURKEY IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1950 DECADE.....	204
10.1	Turkey in Iraq and Lebanon Crises.....	204
10.2	General Instability.....	209
10.2.1	Economics	209

10.2.2 Foreign and domestic policies.....	211
11. DEMISE OF THE BAGHDAD PACT	216
11.1 Middle East State System until 1960	216
11.2 Weaknesses of the Baghdad Pact.....	221
11.3 Demise of the Pact and New Initiatives	228
12. CONCLUSION.....	234
APPENDIX A: MAP OF THE MIDDLE EAST	245
APPENDIX B: TEXT OF THE BAGHDAD PACT (FEBRUARY 24, 1955).....	246
APPENDIX C: THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE (JANUARY 5, 1957).....	249
BIBLIOGRAPHY	255
CIRRICULUM VITAE.....	269

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIOC	Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
ARAMCO	Arab-American Oil Company
ALCSP	Arab League Collective Security Pact
AU	Arab Union
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance of Eastern Bloc
DP	Democrat Party
EDC	European Defense Community
EE	Eastern Europe
EM	Eastern Mediterranean
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
GNA	Grand National Assembly (of Turkey)
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPC	Iraqi Petroleum Company
ME	Middle East
MEC	Middle East Command
MEDO	Middle East Defense Organization
MESC	Middle East Supply Centre
MP	Member of Parliament
PM	Prime Minister
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEA	Near Eastern Affairs
NUC	National Unity Council
NSC	National Security Council
PRC	Palestine Reconciliation Commission
PM	Prime Minister
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council (Egypt)
RPP	Republican People's Party
SAVAK	Iran's Intelligence Agency
SCUA	Suez Canal Users' Association

SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organization
UAR	United Arab Republic
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCOP	United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
SOE	State Owned Enterprise
TGNA	Grand National Assembly (of Turkey)
TPC	Turkish Petroleum Company

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1 British and American oil production in the ME in early Cold War years.....	54
Table 5.1 Percentages (%) of Gross Available Resources Allocated to Investment, National Defense and Consumption	90
Table 11.1 Soviet arms to the UAR before the 1967 war.....	232
Table 11.2 Long term external aid to Egypt.....	232

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ABSTRACT

This descriptive dissertation is an attempt to analyze the establishment and the structure of the Baghdad Pact (1955) as a Western effort to contain Soviet expansionism in the Middle East in the critical after-War years until the end of the first decade of the Cold War with careful consideration of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

As the Second World War drew to a close, Turkey's traditional security deficit from the USSR resurrected. While bipolarity was taking shape, Turkey's security considerations overlapped with those of the West. Turkey's alignment with the West was complete with NATO membership in 1952 but was conditional on her participation in Western defense schemes for the region. The subsequent Baghdad Pact was a "Northern Tier" initiative under the tutelage of the US. This research investigates the goals of the Baghdad Pact, its enlargement and its eventual collapse with a view of its weaknesses, the reasons for hostility from non-members as well as the emerging struggle for the Middle East between the superpowers.

Turkey as a co-founding member of the Baghdad Pact aimed to be pro-active in the region to enhance her importance to the West. However, she in the end remained alienated in the Middle East as the Pact changed into a weapon that backfired on its own members. The USSR gained a competitive edge, penetrated deeper into the region through exploitation of "anti-imperialism" and "peaceful coexistence" and contributed to its radicalization. Western effort on the other hand was not able to respond to the rapidly changing structure of the elusive politics of the Middle East during the time frame in consideration.

ÖZET

Bu betimleyici tezin amacı, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın bitiminden 1960'a kadar olan dönemde, Sovyetler Birliği'nin yayılmasını engellemek amacı ile Batı dünyasının inisiyatifiyle kurulan Bağdat Paktı'nın yapısını bu dönemdeki Türk Dış Politikası'nın Ortadoğu açılımını da değerlendirerek analiz etmektir.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonunda Türkiye'nin geleneksel Rus tehdidi algısı tekrar ortaya çıkmıştır. İki kutuplu bir dünya şekillenirken, Türkiye'nin durumu Batı'nın tehdit algısıyla birebir örtüşmüştür ve Batı ile işbirliği 1952 yılında NATO'ya girmesi ile doruğa ulaşmıştır. NATO üyesi olma karşılığında, Türkiye Batı'nın Orta Doğu'da kuracağı güvenlik örgütlerine katılma sözü vermiştir. 1955'de ABD'nin inisiyatifiyle oluşan “Kuzey Kuşağı” stratejisi bu politikaların bir devamı niteliğindedir. Bu tez Bağdat Paktı'nın hedeflerini, genişleme çabalarını ve çöküşünü, paktın zayıflıkları, üye olmayan ülkelerin tepkisi ve Orta Doğu'da süper güçler arasındaki rekabet itibarıyla irdelemektedir.

Türkiye, Batı dünyasındaki önemini arttırmak amacıyla, bölgede aktif bir rol oynamış ve söz verdiği üzere Bağdat Paktı'nın kurucu üyelerinden biri olmuştur. Ancak, sonunda, Türkiye Batı yanlısı politikaları nedeniyle bölgede yalnızlaşmıştır. Sovyetler Birliği ise Paktı'a rağmen Orta Doğu'ya “anti-emperyalizm” ve “barış içinde beraber yaşama” söylemlerinden faydalanarak nüfuz edebilmiştir ve bölgeyi radikalleştirebilmiştir. Batılı güçler ise Soğuk Savaşın bahsedilen döneminde Ortadoğu'nun istikrarsız ve kaygan zemininde zorluklarla karşılaşmış ve bekledikleri siyasaları üretememiştir.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Scope

The Middle East (ME) embodies values varying from holy lands to ancient civilizations; from the vast reserves of petroleum to water which are invaluable resources for the world at large. However, these so called advantages and wealth of the region are also its curse and disadvantage because throughout history, the peoples of the region have lived under the control of various empires that exploited their resources as well as aimed to deny the riches of the region to their rival.

“In an area of the world where history began, i.e. the ME, it is often necessary to go back an extended period of time to find the origins of contemporary problems.”¹

Although the region has little land suitable for cultivation and is covered with deserts with little forests and rivers, its geostrategic importance has made it crucial in world trade. At least since the Roman days, it has been the crucial gateway in history due to its location between Europe and the riches of the East. The spectacular economic expansion of the West in the sixteenth century has increased the primacy of the ME as the route of international trade and communication to India.² Finally, discovery of oil at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century had a dramatic effect on the prominence of the region.

The time period that will be investigated in this research starts with 1945 which is the end of the Second World War. It is essential to start with 1945 because the nature of the Baghdad Pact and understanding the “birth” of Containment policy that has given rise to the Pact demands a thorough understanding of the origins of the Cold War and the emergence of a bipolar international setting. The research extends until 1959 when Iraq,

¹ United States Interests in the ME, Special Analysis, American Enterprise institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, 1968, p. 7.

² Brands, H. W., *Into the Labyrinth, the United States and the ME, 1945-1993*, McGraw-Hill, 1994, pp. 44-5. In the late fifteenth century, circumnavigation of Africa gave way to an alternative route to the East but with the opening up of the Suez Canal in 1869, ME's importance was restored. Within a decade of the opening of the Canal, Britain occupied Egypt for controlling the safer and much shorter alternative to India.

the only Arab member of the Baghdad Pact leaves the Pact as a result of Qasim Coup (that took place in 1958). Actually, the Pact survived until the Iranian revolution in 1979 under the name Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) but it shattered detrimentally after Iraq's withdrawal. Hence, the analysis will not go beyond 1960 since the Pact ceases its importance.

Bearing in mind that Turkey, Iraq, Britain, Pakistan and Iran were the members of the Pact, now a geographical definition of the ME will be provided. When the ME is referred to in this dissertation, core Arab states and non-Arab states of the region are under consideration as may be seen in the map in Appendix A. The core Arab states, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Jordan have a common Arab identity, language and culture. During the period under investigation here, the core Arab states were in the process of consolidating their power as sovereign states.³ They were highly jealous of their newly attained sovereignty and were disturbed by the creation of Israel. Hence, the overwhelming aim of the new Arab regimes at the time was to abolish the preponderance of greater powers in the region.⁴ These states however were not uniform among themselves as there were great differences in attaining state formation. For example in Egypt, the Sunni clergy had subordinated to the state and there was a degree of ethnic and religious homogeneity. On the other hand in Iraq, there was no state tradition and people lacked homogeneity which made it difficult for any government to remain in power.

The non-Arab states located in the periphery of the region (Turkey, Iran, Israel and Pakistan) are integral parts of the ME with their involvement in regional matters.⁵ In the early Cold War period in question, these states were regarded as threats for the core Arab states because they acted in alliance with Western powers. In terms of Turkey's foreign relations with the ME for the purposes of this research, particular attention will be paid to

³ State building in the Arab world may be said to start in Egypt and hence was seen as the leader of the Arabs.

⁴ However, the supra-state identity of the Pan-Arab ideal makes the ME states only territorial (esp. Syria and Jordan) and not national as understood in Western sense. This is why on many occasions; Arab states lacked the coherent national identity.

⁵ Hinnebusch, R., Introduction and the Middle East Regional System (Ed.) Hinnebusch, R. and Ehteshami, A., the Foreign Policies of Middle East States, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2002, pp. 7, 29.

three core Arab states. These are Iraq, Egypt and Syria triangle. With regards to the as periphery states, Turkey's foreign policy towards Israel is will be analyzed.

The title of this dissertation "Nature of the Baghdad Pact and Turkey's ME Policy" concentrates on two main themes. Firstly, in analyzing the "nature" of the Baghdad Pact, the reader will be carried on a historical journey to the circumstances that led to the creation of the Pact. For this the international setting of post-War world (bipolar) will be analyzed to set the basis for US Containment policy. This is important in determining the British sponsored attempts of defending the ME and why an alliance against the Soviets was regarded necessary in the first place.

As the Second World War came to a close, bipolarity in the international system seemed to emerge almost automatically. While the USSR suffered immense losses in the war, she alone possessed a great army after the Anglo-American demobilization of 1945-1946. The US on the other hand had the largest industrial capacity in the world and held the monopoly of the atomic weapon. In such a world where two rivals become the leaders of power coalitions, Aron argues that the goal is to attract secondary actors. The aim of each superpower is to maintain the cohesion of her own power bloc while keeping an eye on the growth of the other bloc. When an ally changes sides or even shifts to neutrality, this could mean power loss for a camp and gain for the other. Hence, in the post war period, while understanding that a global war had to be avoided, both superpowers were in a race to control strategic parts of the world and aimed to provide answers to each other's moves. The constitution of a Soviet zone of influence in the EE provoked a regrouping of the West, which in turn created a reply from form the USSR and her zone of interest in the form of tightening of Soviet grasp of EE.⁶ Hence, the subsequent Cold War was a strategic global rivalry between the two blocs and the ME was drawn into this competition due to its importance as the oil region of the world.

⁶ Aron, R., Peace and War, A Theory of International Relations, Praeger, New York, 1966, pp. 127-8, 369-74.

It should be added that with the decline of the British Empire⁷ and her economy after the war, the US first “lent a hand” to Britain and later replaced her in the ME, which had traditionally been an area dominated by the British. This is where Turkey came into the picture. With Truman Doctrine of 1947, the US replaced Britain to provide aid to Greece and Turkey because their future was to determine the faith of the ME at large. The world would decide if the West had the willingness to resist communist infiltration based on the Western response in these two countries and Iran. Turkey’s strategic importance for Soviet interests (defense, navigation and geographic proximity) was obvious and would use all the means to gain control or at least neutralize Turkey.⁸ While initially Truman Administration was mainly concerned with the defense of Europe and Pacific, as the Korean War (1950) broadened defense concerns, US interests became global (and defense expenses quadrupled). The US believed that if Korea was left to its own devices the Soviet appetite would swallow Asia altogether, which would lead to the loss of Near East and lead to the collapse of the West.⁹

⁷ Bayly, C., *Atlas of the British Empire, The Rise and Fall of the Greatest Empire the World Has Ever Known*, Hamlyn Publishing, New York, 1989, pp. 182-213. The British system in the ME dating back two centuries had been aimed at preserving her paramount empire and barring the southward expansion of Russia toward Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Until the end of nineteenth century, this aim required Britain to protect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire which controlled the ME. With the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, Britain had not granted the region freedom but in fact had attained a tighter grip through the mandate arrangements under the League of Nations. The bilateral treaties signed with the regional states during the mandate years allowed Britain to control the foreign relations of these countries as well as having bases there with British troops. She also controlled the internal forces at work in the ME, the most important one being nationalism. During the Second World War, this control over the region tightened further with increased importance of oil and harsh punishment of any signs of pro-Axis alignment. After the War, however, even the British Empire could not stand in the way of the wave of nationalist fervor (multiplied further with the proclamation of Israel in 1948) that overwhelmed the ME (as well as other colonies throughout the world). The progressive regimes of the ME could not compromise their newly won independence and sovereignty with their former masters. Hence the great powers attempted to realign and in a way to satisfy the needs of the people rather than controlling them directly. Yet this policy was an extension of the Great Power’s historical conditioning and did not involve accepting the countries as equal partners despite their rhetoric otherwise. Solid steps for the improvement of the region were not taken which generated ambiguity as to their genuine intentions and was constantly questioned by Arab nationalists. Hence, British plans backfired as Arabs refused to cooperate in for defense of the region.

⁸ Kemal K. H., *Turkish Soviet Relations* (Ed.) Karpas, K. H., *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974* (Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East), Brill Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 1975, pp. 74-5.

⁹ Leffler, M. P., *A Preponderance of Power, National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War*, Stanford University Press, California, 2001, p. 366.

Moving into the second component of the title, it will be clear that Turkey's ME policy became an extension of her Western policy in the 1950 decade. While Turkey¹⁰ had kept neutral during the Second World War, Soviet demonstrations of encroachment from Turkey exposed her to a genuine danger. Looking for some kind of rapprochement with the West and scared that she had entered the war on the side of the West only as a formality despite repeated calls, Turkey stood against the USSR threat by herself for about nine months until May 1946.

Gradually Turkey aligned the course of her foreign policy by promoting her geo-strategic importance between East and West in the rising bipolarity. At this juncture, Turkey's security concerns overlapped with those of the West. As the US Containment policy against the USSR was taking shape in 1946, the initial step to form bonds with the West was enhanced with Truman Doctrine in March 1947 at a time when Turkey was still under mono-party rule of Republican Peoples Party (RPP). The newly founded Democrat Party (DP) which came to power in the first democratic elections in May 1950 was also committed to anti-communism (and was ready to reap the economic benefits expected from cooperation with the West.) Turkey's security from the USSR was to be provided through North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership in 1952 while she would be entitled to modern warfare and economic aid from the US. This was also the quick and easy solution to DP's development and industrialization plans.

In this respect, Turkey and Iraq were encouraged to form an alliance whereby the West would achieve the means to maintain their crucial interests in the ME at a time when the old imperial order was in the process of crumbling mainly as a result of nationalism (coupled anti-imperialism.) The negative Arab response to the Baghdad Pact led by Abdel-Nasser (Nasser) of Egypt, who saw it as another means for interfering in Arab affairs and break the solidarity of the Arabs will be analyzed in depth.

¹⁰ Turkey, literally in the middle of Asia and Europe, has been attaining to reach the Western civilization since the Ottoman Era. It was established as the formal policy of the Turkish Republic since its proclamation in 1923.

The Arabs were not worried about the threat from “alleged” aggressiveness of the Soviets. Rather, they were threatened and intimidated by the West for reasons deeply inherent in contemporary history. Their preoccupation was due to the presence of former imperialists in the ME with their troops. Hence, Turkey had identified a completely different set of priorities (and threats¹¹) in comparison to the Arabs who nurtured deep rooted resentment to the West. Arab priority was breaking free from European domination at whatever the cost while Turks favored Western friendship against the Eastern bloc. As a result, Turkish and Arab policies diverged at high pace.

The entry of superpower conflict to gain and promote allies and clients in the oil well-region of the world also complicated the already complicated politics after Stalin’s death in 1953 (with revised policies targeting the Third World). From the regional states point of view, the superpower rivalry for the region turned into a contest of how to best exploit this rivalry to attain the most benefit for their countries. The specifics of the region also show that policies were not taken with a long-term view and usually aimed to prolong the lifespan of the governments in power through securing economic/military aid from one or both superpowers in exchange for some concessions.

Soon, the Pact along with other factors opened the door for Soviet penetration into the ME starting with Egyptian arms deal in 1955. The volatile nature of politics is demonstrated in the rise to power of progressive regimes through coups in for example Syria, Iraq, Algeria and Yemen, which in a short time also became clients of Soviet arms. Throughout 1950s, the ME was one of the areas where the tug of war between the superpowers was razor-sharp. Another important detail to note is that regional countries each had domestic problems ranging from transition from a traditional society toward a modern one, where there state traditions hardly existed and domestic instability (coupled with economic hardship and immense unequal distribution of wealth) prevailed as violence and coups

¹¹ Turks secured an independent country in Asia Minor through an Independence War between 1919 and 1922 and had never been under direct colonial rule unlike the Arabs, which may be an explanation for the absence of anti-Western sentiment in the immediate post-War period.

became every day events. Whether any pact in this region could be a success given the particular circumstances of 1950s is a question mark.

1.2 Objective of the Research

The objective of this dissertation is to shed light on the following questions;

- What were the reasons for Turkey's alignment with the West after the Second World War with reference internal and external dynamics? What were the conditions that made her form and promote the Baghdad Pact?
- Why was there a need for alliances in the Middle East in the initial years of the Cold War?
- What were the aims of the Baghdad Pact? Was the Pact successful in its main aim of containing the ME from Soviet infiltration?
- How effective were the Pact members in influencing the course of events or the crises in the region?
- What were its shortcomings that led to the Pact's rapid collapse within three years?
- What were the reasons for regional hostility towards the Pact?

The hypothesis claimed in this research is that Baghdad Pact, as a Western defense scheme for the ME, was transposed on the region by the West without proper assessment of Arab perception of threat and national consciousness. Although the US and members hoped to project an image that the Pact emerged from the region, that is from the Northern Tier countries, the Arabs knew that the West was involved. Timing for such a pact was not ripe either since Arab leaders could not control the rising nationalization demands, throes of decolonization, effects of Palestine dispute and calls for Arab unity. Hence, an enhancement of the Pact by Arabs did not look realistic. In fact in most Arab regimes, anti-imperialist leaders had replaced the traditional elites. The hypothesis also claims that Turkey as a co-founder of the Pact failed to access or accept the basic realities and the internal dynamics taking place in the Arab society. Instead Turkey exclusively approached the issue in a Cold War perspective and focused on her alliance with the West for reasons of self-interest. Initially the security deficit from the USSR was the reason for the search for Western backing but as the Soviet threat contracted with peace offensive towards the Third World, Turkey still continued to feed on strained relations between the blocs. After

a point, the success of Turkish foreign policy was tightly correlated on the continuation of the rivalry between the superpowers, which may be exemplified by the fact that Turkey aimed to keep the tension high in the region such as seen in the disputes with Syria and in Turkey's response to the Iraqi coup in 1958. Turkey pursued a foreign policy that targeted to extract the maximum economic benefit and strategic rent-seeking for the support she provided to the West. Time and again, Turkey did not hesitate to show her enthusiastic support for the West and prove her indispensability, which at the end led to her alienation by the Arab world.

This research aimed to fill the gap in earlier academic literature on the Baghdad Pact through a comprehensive account of the reasons for its collapse with regard to the three contingencies specific for the ME; anti-imperialism, Arab-Israel hostility and mounting rivalry between the superpowers in the 1950 decade. It is the interplay of these forces that paved the way for the failure of the Pact. In a world of extremes like the ME, where governments in the initial years of the Cold War were unstable and power was elusive, mutual trust and cooperation were difficult to build. It certainly was difficult for Britain, which had intimidated the people of the ME for centuries and for the US, who seemed to be teaming up with the former imperialists in the eyes of the Arabs. The pan-Arab ideal reached a peak with the union of Egypt and Syria in 1958, though it did not last long. However, it lasted long enough to see the failure of the Baghdad Pact. This detailed analysis improves the findings of previous works within this field of study. As such, the "Gestaltig" approach, which will be discussed in the next section, adds to the importance and originality of this research.

This descriptive study of Turkish Foreign Policy towards the ME in early Cold War can be a stepping stone for today. It may be seen that the politics of the ME is still highly volatile and elusive burning with pains for enhancing higher forms of democracy as witnessed only recently in the Arab Spring. The ME is still a pivotal part of the world with crucial oil reserves. Hence, it is only natural that greater powers aim to establish control of the region or deny its riches to their rivals. Certainly, Turkey policy makers have lessons to learn from the era in question. As a descriptive research, the reader will be presented with a detailed account of the events of the early Cold War decade.

1.3 Methodology

This is a descriptive dissertation and is organized chronologically. It is based on a periodization of events between 1945 and 1960, a time for immense change in the ME as well as in the world.

This research is constructed with a “Gestaltig” approach. It has been conducted by projecting this approach into the field of international relations. Due to this formulation, international actors, institutions and the peoples of the region have been handled as essential parts of a whole. Even so, the whole (the bipolar world) is also assessed separately. The analysis presented here aims to evaluate the Cold War as a global rivalry between superpowers and view it as exclusive as well as dissect it to regional dimensions.

Hence, the regional countries, the West and the USSR are analyzed as essential parts of a puzzle. Some global events in other parts of the world had a direct impact on the intensity of the bipolarity (which translated into increased rivalry in the ME) and will be touched upon briefly when required. Only, after understanding the full shape of the global puzzle and interaction among the actors, can the course of events in the specific ME region that is focused on make sense.

The periphery regions such as the ME had other priorities than the Cold War of the superpowers who aimed to superimpose their own agenda onto the region. The region on the other hand had its own dynamics and each country had its own complex perception of threat or of Cold War which differed from others’. While these were tightly tied to the legacy of the past, they could not be controlled by a leader or even the superpowers. This may be an explanation for the crises (most of them military as the regional states gained freedom from colonial rule for the time period in question) that erupted in the region. As a result, alliances did change rapidly during the course of the Cold War. Beliefs and actions of world leaders such as H. Truman, D. Acheson, W. Churchill, G. Kennan, J. Stalin, D. Eisenhower, N. Khrushchev, A. Eden, E. Bevin, J. F. Dulles as well as regional leaders such as A. Nasser, Nuri Said, İ. İnönü, A. Menderes and C. Bayar, who have shaped the region will also be considered.

Nevertheless, the general nature of the Cold War varying from hard to soft did affect the course of events in the ME. The research aims to concentrate not only on the relationship between the members of the Baghdad Pact but also on their interactions with a larger set of other actors. The West and the USSR are of course the most significant ones as their actions determine the international environment. This was a time when the US was faced with the choice between returning to isolationism and undertaking global responsibility against the USSR. Europe, on the way to recovery from the war, was in shambles. The USSR on the other hand had a large army in Europe and aimed to make sure that an entry deep into Russia through the Polish Corridor would never be repeated as well as ensure that the Soviets would not be subject to capitalist encirclement. In Turkey, there were great internal demands for the formation of an opposition party after twenty-seven years of RPP rule. Additionally, Turkish statesmen believed that political liberalization would certainly receive support from the West and would provide the backing needed to face up to the Soviet encroachments and give an initial push to economic development.

In terms of primary sources, the author has made extensive use of University of Wisconsin Digital Collections (available on site: digicoll.library.wisc.edu) that is an account of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) for the period in question. This is the official documentary record of US foreign policy that has been declassified regarding the time period. This research includes the relevant parts of this correspondence between US Embassies and the US State Department. Each document used has been specified in detail in the footnotes to shed light on the exact date and the content of the data extracted. TGNA Parliamentary Discussions for the period in question (available on site: http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_dergisi_pdfler.meclis_donemleri?v_meclisdonem=0) have also been used for understanding Turkish government's approach to the ME. The ones that were used are specified in the footnotes.

Secondary sources have also been consulted. For shaping the theoretical framework, the traditional alliance literature of realist writers such as H. Morgenthau and K. Waltz has been considered. K. Waltz's "Balance of Power" theory modified by S. Walt as "Balance of Threat" theory has also been applied within general framework of the Cold War and the specific time period of the ME. For general information on the Cold War, the author has resorted to J. L. Gaddis, W. LaFeber and H. Kissinger among a number of other key

authors. In dealing with the specifics of the Northern Tier in the first years of the Cold War, B. Kuniholm has been a useful guide. M. P. Leffler and his critical view of the Cold War have also been considered. In developing the historical background with regard to the ME, the works of G. Lenczowski, D. Campbell, J. C. Hurewitz and E. Kedourie as well as others have been analyzed. Within the Turkish context, the works of F. Ahmad, B. Lewis, Ö. Kırkçüoğlu, C. Eroğul and B. Oran have been investigated. Last but not least, the data has been crosschecked from different sources.

The dissertation has also drawn information from academic journals related to the topic. Also many newspaper articles as well as periodicals have been resorted to gain hindsight of the mood of the day. Memoirs of key statesmen such as G. Kennan, H. Truman, D. Acheson and S. Lloyd have been obtained from various libraries and have been analyzed. While they have also been useful, still they were treated with caution since they could be biased.

The author has also conducted interviews with Hamit Batu and Cahit Kayra to assess the views of two statesmen who have had firsthand experience in the course of events. Their own interpretations of the Cold War have been effective to understand the time in question. Objectivity of the author of this dissertation is maintained throughout the study in line with academic neutrality.

It should be born in mind that the roots of contemporary problems in the region stretch back at least two centuries. The emerging Eastern Question of the nineteenth century points at the significance of the ME and to the fact that underlying reasons for confrontations and disputes may be found in history. Hence a brief account of the historical rivalry for the ME (which was at the time ruled by the Ottoman Empire) between the British and the Russian Empires to attain control of this crucial part of the world is provided. Also some historical data on how regional countries moved towards independence may be presented when required.

1.4 Theoretical Framework

It is important to understand the essentials of international relations and alliance literature to assess the rationale and success of various Western defense arrangements for the ME, particularly the Baghdad Pact. In forming the theoretical framework of this dissertation, the author has configured both the realist and the neo-realist schools. Then the research is elaborated to the world systems analysis of Wallerstein to depict its applicability to the core-periphery analysis between the ME and West in the 1950s at the background of intense superpower rivalry. Lastly, Walt's modification of the "Balance of Power" theory to "Balance of Threat" theory is introduced where threat is a function of power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and perceived intentions. His findings point that balancing is more common than bandwagoning.

Classical realism dating back to antiquity has been popular from the end of the Second World War into the early 1980s. Realists identify that politics is a struggle for power and believe that abstract moral principles cannot rule the international order, where the international system is anarchic, which means that there is no mechanism above the state system. Moreover, it is not only the anarchic nature of the international system but also "human nature" that is flawed and power-maximizing. Derived from political practice and actual history, the realist belief asserts that the survival of a state from enemies in such an international system may push the leader to adopt policies that may not be acceptable by a civilized state. To answer threats, classical realists such as H. Morgenthau emphasize balance of power as a regulatory mechanism to prevent any one state from achieving hegemony (or to maintain the status quo) over others in the anarchic international system.¹² When the world is viewed in this context, the ME is a regional sub-system where there is abundant anarchy since state borders are still not quite set and there is not even one single state that does not perceive threat from one or more of its neighbors.

¹² Dougherty, J. E. and Pfaltzgraff, R. L. Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations*, A Comprehensive Study, Longman, New York, 2001, pp. 63-74; Paul, T. V., *The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory and their Contemporary Relevance* (Ed.) Paul, T. V., Wirtz J, Fortmann M., *Balance of Power, Theory and Practice in the 21st century*, Stanford University Press, California, 2004, pp. 6-7.

R. Aron, a key figure in international relations defines the international system as “the ensemble constituted by political units that maintain regular relations with each other and that are all capable of being implicated in a generalized war.”¹³ He sees foreign policy as power politics and believes that the concept of equilibrium-balance applies to all international systems up to the Atomic age. Equilibrium is attained through maneuvering in order to prevent a state from accumulating forces superior to those of its allied rivals. A state that wishes to maintain the equilibrium will take a position against a state or a coalition of states that aims to reach superiority and the international system may be modelled as multipolar or bipolar. In a multipolar equilibrium, there were several actors whose forces are quite close in strength to each other (for example France, Germany, Russia, England, Austria, Hungary and Italy in 1910) whereas in a bipolar equilibrium, there exist two rivals (as in the post-War world the two superpowers were, the US and the USSR) that aim to attract secondary actors.¹⁴ The formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 corresponds to the early years of the Cold War, when the international system was bipolar.

While realists place the state as the main actor in international politics (and identify that survival is its main goal and force is the most significant instrument available to a state that operates in an anarchical setting), neo-realists such as K. Waltz place emphasis on the anarchical structure of the international system.¹⁵ The structure of the international system, with its anarchic nature (meaning the absence of a greater authority above the state) is

¹³ Aron, p. 94.

¹⁴ *ibid*, pp. 127-38. Aron distinguishes three kinds of actors in a bipolar world; leaders of the coalition, the states that have to lend allegiance to either one of the leaders and the states which can remain outside the conflict. Each actor has to behave according to different rules. Coalition leaders must maintain the cohesion of her own power bloc while keep an eye on the growth of the other power bloc. When an ally changes sides or even shifts to neutrality, this means power loss for a camp and power gain for the other camp. The leader has two tools to maintain her own power coalition: 1) policies to protect and 2) policies to punish. The first displays advantages to allies while the second holds the threat of sanctions over dissidents or traitors. If a state which is fearful of a bloc leader, the other great power may give a guarantee of security. To a state, which has nothing to fear from the rival great power, it may offer economic aid. A state, which cannot be won over by the former two methods, may be threatened by the superpower. Aron argues that while a bipolar system may not be more unstable or more belligerent than a multipolar system, there is more tendency of a threat of general war. Especially if all political units belong to one of the two camps, it is very easy for local conflicts to turn to generalized war. Hence, balance between the camps may easily be threatened.

¹⁵ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, pp. 81-2. The structural distribution of capabilities is a key factor that limits cooperation among states through fears of relative gains of other states.

taken as the ordering principle. Hence, states¹⁶ operate in a self-help environment where survival pushes them to uniform patterns of behavior, that is seek security through increasing capabilities or balancing against more powerful states. Waltz expects that this security dilemma to be true for all states regardless of their domestic situation.¹⁷

However, neo-realist explanation falls short of giving a unit level of analysis, that is it does not include the fact that a state's response to a threat or opportunity from the international system structure may be related to the states own structure, that is domestic policy. Hence Waltz's work has been broadened by B. Buzan, C. Jones and R. Little (structural realists) to include the fact that states or policymakers not only face constraints imposed by the structure of the international system but also constraints imposed by the structure of the state itself. Their work links neo-realist theory with neo-liberal institutionalism and aims to include competition and cooperation (that includes alliances, coalitions, regimes, norms and institutions) in neo-realist theory.¹⁸ In short, in structural realism, even if a state can determine what it wishes to do, the systemic level and the state's capabilities will determine what it can actually do.

After the Second World War, in a few years the world was divided into two camps as the Free world and the Soviet bloc. The free world in itself was not uniform and contained two very distinct sets. The North Atlantic Community (US-Western Europe), where higher forms of democracy and political freedoms, rule of law and high standards in socio-economics prevailed. The rest of the world not governed by the Soviets, which may also be called the Third World (included Latin America, Africa, Asia and the ME) was the

¹⁶ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, pp. 571-2. G. Allison argues that when realists and neo-realists model about governmental behavior, they tend to use the rational actor model (RAM) where states are rational and calculate costs and benefits of policy choices with the aim to maximize their utility. The other two models are organizational process and governmental politics.

¹⁷ Burchill, S., Devetak, R., Linklater, A., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, C., True, J., *Theories of International Relations*, Palgrave, New York, 1996, pp. 90-1.

¹⁸ *ibid*, p. 94.

second component of this group. They were underdeveloped¹⁹ and after 1955 most of them were to adopt a third way called non-alignment (neutrality within the blocs).

Marxist-inspired Dependency Theories have been established in 1970s to lay the framework for analyzing the gap between these two groups of countries. In this respect, I. Wallerstein's World Systems Theory which aims to combine realist theory and Marxism has been considered. Wallerstein agrees with neo-realists that the international system is anarchical and but he asserts that realism's anarchy in the modern world has turned into the hierarchy of the capitalist mode of production. He dates the capitalist world system back to 1600 and argues that the "world system is a world economy that is tied together by economics not politics." He differentiates between the core, industrialized capitalist states and the periphery of underdeveloped states that provide raw materials to the core. There are also semi-periphery states that are in between the two and act as buffers. Hence, the economic dependency of periphery on the core constrains their sovereignty and reinforces the system. Eventually Wallenstein expects the formation of a socialist global government.²⁰

Dependency theories come in handy to explain core-periphery relations in the ME. The transformation of the ME under imperialism has produced an outcome that is similar to Galtung's model of "Structural Theory of Imperialism." Even after the end of colonialism, especially in the immediate after Second World War years, Western interference in the ME continued as a result of the importance of oil and Western ownership of Israel. For many in the ME, like Nasser, imperialism had simply acquired new forms. In the first stage, imperialism fragmented the region into relatively weak and artificial states (drawing of artificial borders after the two Great Wars). In fact, most of these new regimes were dependent on former imperialists for their security, against internal opposition. In the second stage, the incorporation of the regional economy into the world capitalist system has turned the ME into a dependent economy by the export of primary products (including

¹⁹ Lenczowski, G., *Soviet Advances in the Middle East*, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, 1972, pp. 55-7.

²⁰ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, pp. 458-9.

oil) to the Western core and import of secondary and technological goods from the Western core. Economic dependency, which means that a state is more responsive to the demands of global powers than to its domestic opinion in shaping their foreign policies, prevailed in the ME. To sustain the region's subordination to the core, compradors-collaborators have emerged, who fostered the economic interest between the core and the dominant local classes. These agents usually did not allow the development of national bourgeoisies. Considering the Arab oil monarchies, most of them have more economic interests in the core countries than their own economies. Hence, the foreign policies of regional states and the core tended to overlap. In case of dispute, the core may also use economic means to punish states, such as through sanctions, and withdrawal of aid. Military force may be available as a last resort. In the ME, the control of oil has also been a recurring theme in core-periphery relations as will be witnessed in the Mossadeq coup.²¹ Hence, in the ME, the periphery states are dependent on the core but are loosely connected to each other.

Another consideration when studying a military pact such as Baghdad Pact is to relate it to the theories of the how and why states collaborate or form alliances/coalitions? The most traditional explanation of alliances is derived from balance of power theory where realists see alliance formation as a result of balance of power politics. Realist thinkers measure a state's power relative to the power of a different state and believe that an alliance is an agreement between two nations to cooperate on national security.²² Hence, Balance of Power theory states that the most important motive of a nation is to prevent any other one from achieving hegemony and the obvious way to counter this is to join the weaker coalition of states to prevent the formation of a dominant nation. Through balancing, the country in question will create a difference in the outcome rather than if it were to bandwagon, that is joining the dominant side. Classical realists such as H. Morgenthau,

²¹ Hinnebusch, Introduction, pp. 2-4.

²² Morgenthau, H. J., *Politics among Nations, the Struggle for Power and Peace*, McGraw-Hill, US, 1993, p. 405.

W. Churchill and H. Kissinger believe that balance of power may be developed voluntarily by wise and prudent leaders.²³

“How could the immediate post war world prove to be so stable when considering that Stalin was a psychotic and the US isolationist and not experienced in international relations? Ideological interests were worlds apart and competing interest could lead to permanent conflict between the two.”²⁴

Neo-realists believe that the tendency to equilibrium is automatic and irrespective of state behavior. Hence, balance of power is structured at the core of the international system and states may choose to balance either internally or externally against another state that displays hostility. Internal balancing occurs as states increase their own capabilities such as through increasing economic growth and/or military spending. External balancing occurs as states enter into alliances with each other to increase their security and decrease the level of threat from another and to keep other states in check.²⁵

Considering the bipolar post-War world, H. Morgenthau and M. Kaplan point that it is this structure that led to the disappearance of flexibility of the balance of power. Allies of the superpowers could shift their alignment but this would not cause significant alternation in the power balance thanks to their relative weakness in comparison to the superpowers.²⁶ Waltz takes this one step further arguing that the inflexibility of a bipolar world is the check on the other power and hence promotes a greater stability than multi-polarity. He assesses that three factors encouraged the limitation of violence in the bipolar world that emerged after the Second World War. First, a loss for one power would be a gain for the other since no other rival to the US and the USSR existed. The two sides were indexed to each other's expected moves and leader of each block was engaged in effective alliance management since one side's loss would only be the other side's gain. Hence, communists

²³ Hinnebusch, Glossary, p. 351.

²⁴ Waltz, K. N., (Summer 1964), “The Stability of a Bipolar World”, *Population, Prediction, Conflict, Existentialism*, the MIT Press, Daedalus, Vol. 93, No. 3, pp. 881-2.

²⁵ Hinnebusch, Glossary, p. 351.

²⁶ Morgenthau, p. 189; Kaplan, M. A., *System and Process in International Politics*, Wiley, New York, 1957, p. 37.

fighting in Greece gave the push for the Truman doctrine, the Soviet control over EE led to NATO, which in turn led to the emergence of Cominform and the Warsaw Pact. The establishment of the West German government led to Berlin blockade. Second feature of this bipolarity was the constant pressure and repeated crises in different regions of the world. A provocative move would almost certainly receive a united response from the other bloc. Lastly, bipolarity has led to the emergence of opposing nuclear weapons (which was the result of superpower capabilities) and was a major deterrent of war.²⁷

G. Liska in his “Nations in Alliance: the Limits of Interdependence” argues that states enter into alliances to add to each other’s capabilities and share the difficulties of resisting a common foe. He also states that an alliance has to have an ideology which rationalizes it and in joining an alliance costs and benefits are compared.²⁸ Alliances may consist of great and small powers. Smaller states enter into alliances because they cannot tackle another state alone and great powers align with smaller states or political and military gains as well as to make sure that the small power does not engage in an activity without the consent of the greater power.²⁹

The author has made extensive use of S. Walt’s book, “the Origins of Alliances”, to understand which forces lead to alliance formation. While analyzing what causes a state to balance against another country or to bandwagon with the country that threatens it, he believes that the perceptions of the statesmen are important. In the early years of the Cold War, despite the belief that alliances were formed to oppose strong states, both the US and the USSR argued that looking weak would cost them allies. Hence, if balancing is believed to be more likely than bandwagoning, then states are more secure because an aggressor state will have to face combined opposition and thus will be less aggressive. But if bandwagoning is expected to be the dominant practice, then security is scarce because an aggressor state will increase her influence in the expectation to increase influence.³⁰ The

²⁷ Waltz, pp. 882-6, 899.

²⁸ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, pp. 532-5.

²⁹ *ibid*, p. 534.

³⁰ Despite evidences of balancing with the traditional role of Great Britain in continental Europe’s balance of power, bandwagoing has also been widespread throughout history as it secured more immediate gains.

issue was especially critical during the Cold War, where there was fierce competition for allies. Walt argues that US statesmen believed that the second school of thought prevailed as seen in the justification of NSC-68 in 1950 and once more in the Basic National Security Policy in 1953. The policy stated if US' allies were uncertain about her ability and determination to counter Soviet aggression, they could be tempted to adopt a neutralist position, which seemed as bad as lost to the other camp. What followed in US policy formulation was 'pact-mania', solidified in the formation of NATO, SEATO, Balkan Pact³¹ and the Baghdad Pact. The US assessment was that allies were attracted and pursued to the US camp by shows of strength/willingness and hence she aimed to achieve a credible image and military superiority despite the large costs this brought. The USSR also believed bandwagoning would prevail when she exerted pressure on Norway and Turkey against joining NATO. In reality, both countries were pushed towards the West against the USSR. There was also the belief that states with similar internal characteristics are more likely to ally than states whose domestic orders are different. In early Containment period Kennan correctly assessed that the Communist bloc could experience problems within itself while others in the State Department believed that Communist block held a close ideological alliance. Different beliefs about Soviet alliance system gave rise to different policies.³²

Walt's analysis of cases from the ME between 1955 and 1979 in his book leads him to reformulate "Balance of Power" theory as "Balance of Threat" theory because at the core of national security definition lays the concept of threat, i.e. What are its targets, its sources and its nature? Both, balancing or bandwagoning, are derivatives of the perceived threat from another country. Walt defines threat as the sum of aggregate power (resource and capability), geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions and depicts

³¹ Another aim of DP was to be a leader in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the Balkans, the US encouraged the formation of the Balkan Pact in 1953, including Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia to complete the chain from Atlantic to Pakistan encircling the USSR. The Pact itself was not effective but it provided US the means to control the anti-Soviet communists of Yugoslavia. This pact was much weaker than 1934 Balkan Pact and almost right after it was signed tension grew between Turkey and Greece regarding Cyprus. Moreover, Tito's neutrality and Stalin's death and the consequent change in Russian foreign policy regarding Yugoslavia made the Pact was completely irrelevant.

³² Walt, S. M., *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1987, pp. 3-4.

this as more crucial than power alone. His findings confirm the general tendency of states to balance against the most threatening state rather than bandwagon with it because balancing allows a state to keep its freedom and does not mean subordination to the stronger one. He also asserts that the stronger the state and the greater the expectation of support from allies, the greater is its tendency balance. The more aggressive a state is the greater is the tendency for others to ally against it.³³

Iran, Turkey and Greece tended to balance against the threat perceived from the USSR in the immediate post war period and aimed to enter into some sort of alliance or at least understanding with the USSR's "antitheses", the US. If states were concerned with mere power, then they would not have allied with the US so extensively. The US on the other hand, was interested in keeping the global balance of power while it was to react to the regional balance by responding to the threats.³⁴

The bipolar nature of the international system throughout the Cold War has been the determining factor in setting the policies of small-medium sized states like Turkey. W. Hale suggests that when threatened by a great power, small powers must either receive help from the outside or exploit the balance between the superpowers.³⁵ On the eve of the Cold War, receiving a threat to its sovereignty (as Soviet bases meant having Soviet soldiers on Turkish soil), Turkey aimed to enter into alliance with the West and balance against the more threatening power, the USSR. However, there may be reservations in allying with a dominant ally, as Hale also draws attention to Machiavelli's classic warning that the ruler of a small state should be cautious when forming an alliance with a more powerful one as he may end up at the mercy of his ally. Parallel to this, R. Rothstein evaluates that "the small power may not move from insecurity to security but from insecurity to the status of a satellite"³⁶, an accusation that was made for Turkey by Arabs in the 1950 decade since she was an ardent supporter of US policies. M. Handel draws attention to the same issue saying that "when treaties are made by the free choice of two

³³ Walt, pp. 32-3.

³⁴ *ibid*, p. 231.

³⁵ Hale, W., *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, Frank Cass Publishing, London, 2000, p. 2.

³⁶ *ibid*, p. 2.

unequal partners, the issues of maintaining the sovereignty, independence and integrity of the weak state are secondary.”³⁷ This also seems to be true for Turkey in the post-War world.

Now, let us investigate some alliance decisions in the Arab ME bearing in mind R. Hinnebusch’s assertion that “the foreign policies of the ME states are shaped by the way their leaders negotiate the conflicting pressures that arise from there distinct environments, 1) the domestic level, 2) the regional systemic level and 3) the international level.”³⁸

While Arab states acquiring sovereignty after the Second World War were conscious of their independence, they still were successful in exploiting great power competition for their own purposes, such as developing their economies. This may explain the fact that none of the two superpowers has achieved complete domination of the region. Hence, bargaining power of the Third World depended on the degree of hostility between the superpowers that is to say when rivalry increased; smaller states were more able to play off one power against the other. As the polarization of the international system deepened, Third World countries were more likely to manipulate and extract concessions from both of the superpowers. Such was the case for Egypt, which received significant aid in the 1950-1960 decade from both superpowers.³⁹ H. Barkey states that the structural context of the Cold War has led to “rent-seeking”. Because challenges often arose from domestic conflicts and regime survival often depended on the ruling elite’s ability to manipulate domestic groups and lobbies, bipolar competition provided a fertile ground for such states to appeal to superpowers.⁴⁰

Even when the rivalry in the ME had less to do with the two power blocs, such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, it gained a Cold War coloring with the hope to gather support from one of the superpowers which in turn increased the regional arms race. Interstate rivalries

³⁷ Handel, M., *Weak States in the International System*, Frank Cass, London, 1981, p. 122.

³⁸ Hinnebusch, Introduction, p. 2.

³⁹ Gerges, F. A., *the Superpowers and the Middle East, Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967*, Oxford, Westview Press, 1994, pp. 2-3.

⁴⁰ Barkey, H. J., *Turkey and the New Middle East, A Geopolitical Exploration* (Ed.) Barkey, H. J., *Reluctant Neighbor, Turkey’s Role in the Middle East*, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 2005, pp. 27-9.

between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Syria have also acquired Cold War characters. The ME became the home of competitive alliance systems. These alliances were the results of mixture of national interest, ideology and enforcement. The conservative Arab regimes aligned with the US while progressive states chose the USSR.⁴¹ Furthermore, R. Rothstein argues that if small powers can agree within their group they can make it hard for a great power to diffuse into their region⁴² (esp. in a bipolar setting). This is also exemplified in the reality that when the Arab world had a strong leader (Egypt's Nasser), Arab world implemented a hostile foreign policy towards the West as witnessed in the reaction against the Baghdad Pact and the Suez Canal.

Turkey was in a different situation in comparison to the Arab states. While her crucial geographical position did provide flexibility not open to some other countries, it also made a non-alignment policy option unrealistic. This was because her strategic asset (control of the Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus) always alerted the possibility of an attack by Turkey's traditional rival, Russia, who was simultaneously the leader of the other power coalition. Besides, Turkey retained her importance since having air bases on Turkish soil and access for ground forces in time of war would provide the West a crucial advantage for actual or potential action in the northern part of the ME, the Balkans and Transcaucasia against blocking any Soviet aggression against the Gulf, the petrol region.⁴³

In fact having left crucial foreign policy decisions to Washington especially after NATO membership, Turkey was alarmed by Moscow's more conciliatory tone with peaceful coexistence rhetoric. This could create confusion in Western willingness to fortify defenses against the Soviets. If the West ever became less committed to contain the USSR, it could lead to a reduction in Turkey's strategic importance and in the amount of aid to be allocated. Hence, while other countries such as Egypt could exploit Soviet offers, devise and follow a non-alignment strategy in a bipolar world and in fact play the

⁴¹ (Ed.) Sayigh, Y. and Shlaim, A., *The Cold War and the Middle East*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, pp. 10-6.

⁴² Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p. 534.

⁴³ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 7-8.

superpowers off one another, Turkey could not do the same. Her situation was made worse by mid-1950s as she was tied to the US to keep her economy from bankruptcy.⁴⁴

The realist approach to alliances has been criticized by several sources and a new school of thought regarding Third World has emerged. The main criticism is that that these countries are dominated by a small group of authoritarian rules, who are interested in pursuing their own regime rather than national interest. Hence it is the security of the regime at risk and is usually threatened by internal sources than by outside powers. In this respect, the supporters of this new school such as S. David believe that it is the leadership that should be the unit of analysis rather than the state, which realists claim. M. Barnett and J. Levy suggest that regimes may join alliances to achieve additional material resources that they can utilize against domestic threats to their regime. Gaining support from this L. Brand has developed budget security theory which rests on the fact that alliance formation by a small state is not a response about balancing or bandwagoning but rather is a reaction to keep the economy intact.⁴⁵

Constructivist school, attempting to find the middle ground in international relations believes that the world is socially constructed by the perceptions of the people and is more complex than actual material reality. Hence, on top of objective and subjective realities there is intersubjective reality that is what people believe in. Barrett in this school claims that Walt's definition does not show how one can determine threat, suggesting that identity may be a critical factor and actors with a shared identity may share the same threat. Hence, Barrett believes that identity may be a more crucial factor in alliance formation in contrast to material reasons suggested by realists.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Sanjian, A., (April 1997), "The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 228.

⁴⁵ Brown, C. S., (2008), "The One Coalition They Craved to Join: Turkey in the Korean War", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 34, pp. 89-91.

⁴⁶ *ibid*, pp. 91-3.

1.5 Outline

In Chapter 2, an analysis is on the international setting of the post-War world is conducted to understand how the international world evolved into a bipolar status with special attention on the Soviet encroachments along the Northern Tier countries, especially Turkey. The subsequent US response formalized in the Containment policy took shape in 1946 and 1947.

In Chapter 3, an overview of historical importance of the ME which has been a source of rivalry between the large powers, especially between Russia and Britain, in the last centuries will be given. A discussion of the development of politics of oil into the first half of the twentieth century will also follow.

Chapter 4 will analyze the internal and external dynamics that prompted Turkey to look for an alignment with the West immediately after the Second World War. This support perquisite from the West in a way induced Turkey to democratize. On top of the external push for democratization (security deficit from the USSR after the War through the Truman Doctrine and its implications for Turkey, there were also internal dynamics at play, such as the breakdown of the traditional alliance (since the Independence War) between the bureaucracy and landlords for social and economic reasons). The interplay of such complex pressures gave way to the formation and carrying to power of a new party in the country, DP.

Chapter 5 will present how the Baghdad Pact came into being and how power politics prevailed as USA took over Britain. Turkey's incorporation into the West is completed with NATO membership in 1952 and rising importance of the ME in globalization of American strategic planning. Still, the ME was considered a British area of interest and with Britain's request Turkey's NATO membership was made conditional on her support to Western initiatives in the ME. In the attempt to prove her value to the West, Turkey did not hesitate to extend wholehearted support to Western policies or defense initiatives for the region. Nevertheless, MEC and MEDO based on core Arab participation were futile attempts and failed as a result of the interplay of two main sources of conflict, anti-imperialism and Arab-Israel hostility (which was closely tied to the first because it was seen as imperialist deed). With Eisenhower and Dulles coming to power in the US,

America became more involved in the ME game. In fact, Dulles trip in 1953 showed that it was only the Northern Tier countries were in line with the West about the danger of the Soviets, not the core Arab states. Hence, the evolving new strategy had two dimensions, an alliance between the Northern Tier states (Iraq, Turkey and Iran) against the Soviet threat that led to the formation of the Baghdad Pact (with the membership of Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, the gravity center of Western ME policy moved from the core Arab region to the northern periphery) as well as Operation Alpha which aimed for a once and for all settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute.

Chapter 6 concentrates on the coming to life of the Baghdad Pact and the terms of the agreement. It also discusses the international repercussions from especially Egypt and Israel, which constituted good enough reasons for the non-entry of the US into the Pact. In this chapter, there is also an analysis of Turkey's expectations from the Pact.

Chapter 7 deals with the re-orientation of Soviet foreign policy through the new leadership's enhancement of non-alignment (after Stalin's death in 1953). While the Pact's main aim was to contain the Soviets from penetrating into the ME, it managed to do exactly that through Soviet's carefully planned friendship with progressive regimes, such as Egypt. Together, they succeeded in exploiting the Baghdad Pact as a tool of imperialism.

Chapter 8 gives an account of the Suez Crisis and Baghdad Pact and members' ineffectiveness during the crisis. In fact, it is the Suez Crisis which elaborated Nasser into a dominant Arab leader as well as caused the gross alienation of Iraq through Soviet and Egyptian manipulation of the crisis. It also investigates the rise of Eisenhower Doctrine, devised to keep the Pact alive (without actual US adherence) although it failed to halt deeper USSR penetration into the region.

Chapter 9 investigates a number of subsequent crises in the ME after Suez (including the Iraq crisis of 1958 which effectively killed the Pact) and the shortcomings of the members' in tackling them.

Chapter 10 is a final account of Turkey in the latter part of 1950 decade, where her policies regarding Iraq and Lebanon Crisis are discussed pointing to the failure of Menderes

government's Middle East policies despite their aggressiveness. The instability in the country as a result of the government's repressive measures and unpleasant economic realities are also considered.

Chapter 11 explains the demise of the Pact, with special concentration on its weaknesses and the new initiatives that came with its collapse after the Iraq crisis of 1958.

Finally, Chapter 12 draws a set of conclusions from the findings of the dissertation with regard to Turkish foreign policy towards the ME and global easing of bipolarity.

2. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

During the war, F. D. Roosevelt's main emphasis had been trying to make the Grand Alliance survive Hitler's defeat by creating relationships of mutual trust among the leaders while also hoping to build friendly peacetime relations.⁴⁷ In a memorandum dated Jan 1945, while the final victory in the Pacific was not secured, President Roosevelt declared that

“Russia continues to be a major factor in achieving the defeat of Germany. We must therefore continue to support the USSR by providing the maximum amount of supplies which can be delivered to her ports. I consider this a matter of utmost importance second only to the operational requirements in the Pacific and the Atlantic.”⁴⁸

London had been responsible for communicating with the Russians since July 1941 for the war effort and so, over time Churchill got more familiar with Soviet dream of the post-War world. Stalin hoped to hold on to his gained territories through the Nazi-Soviet Pact by creating a Russian sphere of influence that would serve as a buffer against the West and be available for economic exploitation for rebuilding the Soviet economy. While the reason for Britain's entry into war had been to defend Poland, USSR was interested in retaining her control over the same country. In the second meeting (the first was Tehran Conference) of the Big Three which took place in Yalta (February 4-11, 1945) outlook of post-War Europe was on the agenda, i.e. the future of Poland. The Anglo-American line was clear as they demanded the pro-Western Poles to be part of the government. While

⁴⁷ Gaddis, J. L., *Strategies of Containment, A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982, pp. 11-2; LaFeber, W., *America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-1992*, McGraw-Hill Higher Education, New York, 1993, pp. 9-12. As the end of Second World War approached, Washington knew that another depression could only be avoided if global markets and raw materials were open to the world. If this was not granted, prosperity would once again be in danger as everyone remembered the high quotas and tariffs of the 1930s set out by the Europeans' desire to protect their own economies and cast out other countries' goods. This was the essence of Article IV of the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, so early in the war. The Bretton Woods Conference also aimed to enhance the system through the creation of the World Bank and the IMF.

⁴⁸ FRUS, 1945, Vol. V, *Diplomatic Papers, Europe, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic*, Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State, January 5, 1945, p. 944.

Roosevelt by principle understood Moscow's insistence of a friendly Polish government⁴⁹, Stalin's move of recognizing the communist dominated Polish government before Yalta was too much. The final agreement of Yalta Conference was that the new Polish government should include a larger set of views as well as the acceptance of a Declaration of Liberated Europe (that was amended by Stalin pretty harshly), applying self-determination to the newly liberated Europe.⁵⁰

By and by, Poland had become a test case for the Americans of Soviet intentions. As Russia refused to allow any more than three Western poles into the 18 member Polish government, even, Roosevelt was getting tougher about the issue evident in his letter to Churchill on April 6, 1945 where the Anglo-American armies point to an advantage in the military effort.⁵¹ On the other hand, the American administration hoped that Moscow would understand that she did not need a security ring along her borders due to the existence of the United Nations (UN), this expectation did not materialize. Soon Roosevelt was dead.

2.1 Truman Presidency: End of Wartime Cooperation?

Becoming President after Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, Truman was inclined to continue with Roosevelt's foreign policy of wartime cooperation and establish friendly post-War relations with the USSR.⁵² However, as Vienna was captured by the Red Army on April 13, one day after Roosevelt's death to be followed by the final Russian assault on Berlin, a deep sense of mistrust was shaping up at the top echelons of power in the US State Department. Chief of Staff William Leahy and US Secretary of the Navy James

⁴⁹ LaFeber terms Stalin's suspicion of West as realistic. It was the West that sent troops into Russian between 1917 and 1920, refused to cooperate with the Soviets in the 1930s, tried to turn Hitler against Stalin in 1938 and did not open the second front. In year 1945, Stalin wanted full grasp of EE, deemed crucial for security as Soviets was invaded through the Polish Corridor two times in the last thirty years.

⁵⁰ Gaddis, J. L., *the US and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1972, pp. 222-3.

⁵¹ LaFeber, pp. 14-5.

⁵² There are differences in opinion on whether Truman reversed Roosevelt's Russian policy once he became president or there was continuity between Roosevelt and Truman. Gaddis believes the latter as he remarks that the former President's death did not give way to a sudden dramatic change in US foreign policy although Truman's assertive personality and his manner of executing policy (dependent on the Department of State) may have led the Russians to think that wartime cooperation was under pressure.

Forrestal (to be appointed as the first Secretary of Defense in September 1947) and Chief of US Military Mission in the USSR, Deane (except Secretary of War Stimson who sympathized with the Soviet desire to form a protective ring in the EE⁵³) all shared the view that “Stalin had interpreted the quiet American tone on Eastern Europe as a sign of weakness” and would not implement Yalta agreements in the EE.⁵⁴

On April 21, in the Secretary of State’s Staff Committee meeting, Harriman declared that

“Russian plans for establishing satellite states are a threat to the world and to us. The excuse offered that they must guard against a future German menace is only a cover for other plans... Also suggesting that Soviet policy might cause further trouble in Macedonia, Turkey and especially China.”⁵⁵

As Poland issue seemed to be settled with Hopkins’ trip⁵⁶, the main problems at Potsdam Conference (16 July-2 August 1945) was Germany and reparations.⁵⁷ Attaining the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe however failed as the Soviets likened the EE situation to

⁵³ Ataöv, T., *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye*, Aydınlık Yayınevi, Ankara, 1969, pp. 26-7.

⁵⁴ FRUS, 1945, Vol. V, *Diplomatic Papers, Europe, Poland*, Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, Meeting at the White House, April 23, 1945, p. 254; Gaddis, the US, pp. 202, 206; LaFeber, p. 16.

⁵⁵ FRUS, 1945, Vol. V, *Diplomatic Papers, Europe, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic*, Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Committee, April 21, 1945, p. 843.

⁵⁶ FRUS, 1945, Vol. V, *Diplomatic Papers, Europe, Poland*, pp. 299-331; Gaddis, the US, pp. 199-235; Kuniholm, B. R., *the Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece*, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 245. Truman who was less experienced in international politics than his predecessor did take the advice of State Department officials and was harsh to Molotov on their meeting held on April 23, 1945. Nevertheless, in May, he sent Harry Hopkins, one of Roosevelt’s main advisors known to be sympathetic to Soviets, to Moscow to communicate to Stalin that the failure to carry out the Yalta Agreements on Poland was creating mistrust in Washington. Hopkins explained that Poland was a symbol of American ability to work with the USSR and US was upset about exclusion of London Poles in the government (as well as arresting some of them) and was interested in seeing free elections reported to the US by a free press. Stalin in turn explained that the detrimentality of a friendly government in Poland as the Germans used the Polish Corridor twice in the last thirty years to attack his country. The two agreed that the Warsaw government would form the basis of the future Polish provisional government but representatives from other Polish groups were also to be included.

⁵⁷ US Secretary of War Stimson had earlier pointed out the likelihood of being driven to revolution or communism by famine, making the reparations issue critical. If the Russians were allowed to take away what they wanted, Germany would be pushed into economic chaos. If on the other hand, Russians did not get satisfactory reparations, they could deny badly needed food shipment from their zone to West Germany that would push the US to undertake an expensive food delivery to Germany.

that of Italy and Greece for the West. Already, Stalin had established some control over EE and had a long list stretching from Germany and reparations to Italian colonies and from a base on Bosphorus to having the right to pass through the Turkish straits to the Mediterranean.⁵⁸ The Conference turned into a no-result generating meeting as the Soviets and the Allies vetoed the demands of each other wherever they had the opportunity.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the main result of Potsdam was to establish a Council of Foreign Ministers to begin work on peace treaties with former Axis countries.⁶⁰

In the second half of 1945, Truman's advisors were getting more and more convinced that the Soviet leader had unlimited ambitions and could use his predominance in Central and Eastern Europe⁶¹ to project his influence into Western Europe, the Mediterranean and the ME. Hence, although it was early to expect a significant departure in the wartime allied coalition, State Department officials still believed that the Polish case was not an isolated issue, but was part of a unilateral action the Soviets had taken in Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Greece. Moreover, Soviet preponderance over EE could project what could follow in the Pacific. If the USSR filled the global power vacuum that emerged as a result of the defeat of Germany and Japan, this would be detrimental for US interests.⁶²

The failure of appeasement policy towards Hitler on the way to the Second World War was still fresh in memories and US administration in Moscow Foreign Minister's Conference in

⁵⁸ Bohlen, C. E., *Witness to History 1929-1969*, Norton & Company, New York, 1973, pp. 239-40.

⁵⁹ Kissinger, H., *Diplomacy*, Touchstone, New York, 1995, pp. 432-9. Towards the end of the Conference, Truman disclosed the existence of the atom bomb to Stalin (which Stalin knew about through his spies probably before Truman as vice-president was ever informed). It seemed as though the Soviet leader was not particularly impressed, leaving the Truman administration no choice but to actually use it. Kissinger argues that due to the fragility of the USSR, Stalin could not allow his people to be at ease and pretended that the USSR was acting from strength not weakness when he kept the Soviet army in the middle of Europe (while America was interested to "bring the boys home" as quick as possible resulting in the fastest demobilization in history), placed Soviet puppet governments in the EE and underrated the atomic bomb.

⁶⁰ Gaddis, the US, pp. 241-2.

⁶¹ In July 1945, US sent Mark Ethridge to investigate the elections in Rumania and Bulgaria. The mission confirmed that the new governments were not representative of the population and the US called for a change in the composition of the governments

⁶² Leffler, M. P., *the Specter of Communism, the United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, Hill and Wang, New York, 1994, pp. 116-7; Kuniholm, *the Origins*, pp. 244-249, 257; Gaddis, *the US*, p. 240; Truman, H. S., *Memoirs By Harry S. Truman: 1945 Year of Decisions*, W. S. Konecky Associates, 1999, US, p. 323.

December 1945 seemed to do exactly that.⁶³ In hindsight, partition of Poland and the events that led to that the climax such as the Munich Agreement of 1938, pushed Truman administration to decide how not to act when confronted by a totalitarian leader. A political compromise with the USSR seemed no longer feasible as Secretary of State Byrnes was under attack from Republicans as well as his own colleagues as the 1946 Congressional elections approached. On February 27, 1946, A. Vandenberg asked in the Senate;

“What is Russia up to now? We ask it in Manchuria. We ask it in Eastern Europe and the Dardanelles. We ask it in the Baltic and the Balkans. We ask it in Poland. We ask it in Japan...”⁶⁴

The Congressmen now believed that the US could only negotiate from “a position of strength” to get the peace settlement that was desirable. The concessions that Byrnes had made in Moscow were interpreted as signs of weakness, which could not be accepted, especially since the US was the sole possessor of the atomic bomb. Hence, the toughening approach towards the Soviets translated into two policies, control of the atomic bomb and Germany.⁶⁵

Simultaneously, Truman’s popularity seemed to be decreasing as Republicans gained control of both the Senate and Congress for the first time since 1928 and it looked like there was little chance for a large scale economic and military program to rebuild Europe. Already communist parties, particularly in France and Italy were getting stronger. Moreover, the former British, French and Dutch colonies in South East Asia and the ME were also crying out loud for their independence and revolutionary movements were rising.

⁶³ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp. 17-8.

⁶⁴ Gaddis, *the US*, p. 295.

⁶⁵ LaFeber, pp. 40-2. Since Hiroshima, control of atomic energy was a question mark. The Acheson-Lilienthal report (that suggested giving the atomic weapons into international control while keeping the US in a favored position) was modified into the Baruch Plan. The new plan aimed to keep the American monopoly and hence was not acceptable for the USSR. On the other hand, the American suggestion for a unified Germany was not picked up by the USSR, which now ended the removal of machinery from East Germany but decided to produce in the country to be moved to the USSR later. In effect, each power would develop her own zone.

Hence, in the first three months of 1946, the US moved into a fundamental reorientation of policy toward the USSR as President Truman cried out loud “I’m tired of babying the Soviets.”⁶⁶

2.2 Soviet Encroachment Along the Northern Tier

There are different answers to who started the Cold War and why it started. While traditionalists argue that it was Stalin and the USSR, revisionists argue that it was American expansionism that imposed the Cold War on the USSR. The post-revisionists of the late 1970s and 1980s, such as John Lewis Gaddis, on the other hand believe that the answer lies at the structural level. In fact, it was the structural breakdown of power that led to the start of the Cold War. Bipolarity of the US and USSR power coupled with the weakness of Europe has led to the power vacuum that drew the superpowers into it. The rift at the end of the war was inevitable. The security dilemma of states in an anarchic system would eventually draw the superpowers into this situation as both would not allow the domination of Europe by the other.⁶⁷

The genuine danger that the US Administration perceived from the USSR in the core issues such as the Polish question, the future of Germany and Japan and the atomic monopoly coincided with the actual Soviet encroachments along the “Northern Tier” in 1946 and 1947, contributing to the gradual toughening of US towards the USSR. It may be said that it was the set of Northern Tier crises that finally triggered the way to Containment policy and Truman Doctrine. The Northern Tier, a concept that gained more popularity in the 1950s, encompassed the Near and Middle Eastern countries that bordered or were very close to the USSR, namely Greece, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. The US grouped these countries under the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA) in the State

⁶⁶ Truman, pp. 551-2; Gaddis, the US, pp. 281-3, 288-9. The US started to export to Western Europe as of early 1946 but Europe could soon run short of dollars to pay for the goods. The real scare was that if stagnation came about there would be fertile ground for communism to develop in Europe.

⁶⁷ Nye, Joseph S., *Understanding International Conflicts*, Pearson Longman, New York, 2005, pp. 114-6.

Department.⁶⁸ A memorandum prepared in the US State Department in November 1947 argued that

“Should the Eastern Mediterranean (EM) and the ME fall under Soviet domination, a process of deterioration would be initiated, which, if not successfully resisted, would constitute a disastrous blow to the preservation of world peace under UN...Italy, Greece, Turkey and Iran constitute a bastion in both the political and strategic sense, which if breached would create a situation, the virtually inevitable result of which would be Soviet domination of the entire EM and ME.”⁶⁹

2.2.1 Iranian crisis

After the surrender of Japan on August 14, 1945, the deadline to leave Iran⁷⁰ for allied powers was mid-February 1946. While Britain complied with the withdrawal promise, the Soviets used their military power to further political and revolutionary aims in the region. Stalin’s policy of keeping Soviet troops in northern Iran after the war was not in line with earlier negotiations among the Allies. In fact, the propaganda he carried in Iran was against the Western Allies, not the Germans.⁷¹ They pressured landowners and upper bourgeoisie, protected local Communist elements of the Tudeh Party and publicized the Soviet war effort. At the end of 1945, Soviet agents helped by the Red Army set up a pro-Soviet separatist government; People’s Republic of Azerbaijan in Iranian Azerbaijan as

⁶⁸ Kuniholm, the Origins, p. xvi-xvii

⁶⁹ FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, the Pentagon Talks of 1947 between the US and the UK concerning the ME and the Eastern Mediterranean, Memorandum by the Chief of South Asian Affairs (Hare), November 5, 1947, p. 577.

⁷⁰ Kuniholm, the Origins, pp. 207-215; Campbell, J. C, Defense of the Middle East, Problems of American Policy, Praeger, New York, 1961, pp. 20-3; Mansfield, P., A History of the Middle East, Viking Press, New York, 1991, pp. 210-3. Lying at the south of Russia, Iran had traditionally been subject to Russian encroachment through territorial and military attacks to gain a political edge. While Russia dominated Northern Persia by the twentieth century, Britain dominated southern Persia and the Gulf, where Abadan oil refinery was located. On the way to the Second World War, authoritarian Shah’s ties with Germany had alarmed Great Britain and was forced to abdicate in favor of his son Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1941. After the shift of the USSR to the Allied camp in the same year, Iran was jointly occupied by the Britain and the USSR in early 1942 regulated by the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. This treaty required the evacuation of both counties’ troops within six months after the end of the war (as was renewed in Tehran Conference of November-December 1943 and at Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in September 1945). The first aim of the joint occupation was to make sure that large oil resource in Abadan would not fall to the hands of the Axis and second aim was to control the railroads to ensure that lend and lease help would flow to Russia without problems.

⁷¹ Brands, p. 9.

well as a Kurdish People's Republic (not Communist but more nationalist) in Western Azerbaijan.⁷² Hence, the reports that reached Washington in the final months of 1945 were to confirm that the Soviets aimed to add Iran to Moscow's sphere of influence after the British leave.⁷³

As British forces left Iran at the deadline of March 1946, the US policy against the USSR, now armed with Kennan's telegram (Section 2.3), took a sharp reorientation. Churchill's pessimistic speech also suggested Truman administration's getting tough with Russia policy⁷⁴ and on the same day, Secretary of State sent a harsh note to Moscow calling for the immediate removal of Soviet forces from Iran. The Soviet troop movements in the region were reported not towards Russia but towards Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Iran (backed by US) was inclined to take the matter to the UNSC in March 25. The Russians responded to taking the matter to the Council as an unfriendly act since bilateral negotiations continued. Finally, negotiations led to the promise of evacuation in exchange for a Soviet entry to Iranian oil sector through the formation of an oil company (oil concessions). After Soviets left, Iran crushed the two rebel republics.⁷⁵

Despite the threat of the Russian Ambassador in Tehran that if the oil concessions were rejected by the Iranian Majlis, the Soviets would undertake guerrilla activity against the government along the lines of the Greek rebel operations⁷⁶, the Majlis rejected them⁷⁷, leading to a major diplomatic defeat for the USSR.⁷⁸ The US decision not to take the matter out of the UNSC agenda esp. after the Soviet pledge, points to US' determination in

⁷² Lenczowski, Soviet p. 26.

⁷³ Kuniholm, the Origins, pp. 270-80.

⁷⁴ Gaddis, the US, pp. 303-8.

⁷⁵ Brands, p. 11. Some Tabriz leaders managed to escape to the USSR while Iraqi Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani led his men through mountains to Soviet territory where they remained until 1958. After Qasim coup, they returned to Iraq.

⁷⁶ FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, the Pentagon Talks of 1947 between the US and the UK concerning the ME and the Eastern Mediterranean, Memorandum prepared in the Department of State, p. 529.

⁷⁷ Lenczowski, Soviet, pp. 26-7.

⁷⁸ LaFeber, p. 35.

abandoning appeasement of Stalin and the adherence to ‘getting tough with the Russians policy’.⁷⁹

2.2.2 Greek crisis

The second event on the Northern Tier that led to a war of nerves between the US and the USSR was the Greek Crisis. The polarization between the right (monarchy) the left (National Liberation Front with its communist leadership) led to a civil war in Greece in 1943-1944. Britain actively aided monarchy supporters since she did not want the communists to come to power. In October 1944, the percentages agreement between Churchill and Stalin settled the Greek issue with Britain securing 90% domination over the country and the Soviets 10%. As the Germans retreated in the summer-autumn of 1944, British troops entered Greece. However, after March 1946 elections in the country, the situation destabilized and civil war erupted once again. By then, the USSR was in control of the EE and communist Yugoslavia (Marshall Tito with the aim of annexing parts of Greece), Albania and Bulgaria were accused of aiding Greek communists. Stalin kept out of Greece partly to honor 1944 pledge and partly because Tito was helping the Greeks.⁸⁰ During the Pentagon Talks of 1947, it was declared that the gravest danger would arise if a Free Greek Government recognized and supported by the USSR and her satellites would start a full scale civil war in Greece, similar to the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939.⁸¹ Concurrently, the Greek civil war was escalating and the economic burden of sponsoring the Greeks made already fragile British economy unsustainable. Hence, the US became involved in Greece through the large Truman Doctrine allocations in Section 4.3.

2.2.3 Turkish crisis

For Churchill, Turkey was both “necessary to and expendable in” the maintenance of the British Empire. While Turkey had always been historically important in containing the Soviets, some Turkish rights, such as the Straits could be subject to concessions to satisfy

⁷⁹ Gaddis, *The US*, pp. 308-12

⁸⁰ Brands, p. 15.

⁸¹ FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, the Pentagon Talks of 1947 between the US and the UK concerning the ME and the Eastern Mediterranean, Memorandum prepared in the Department of State, p. 529.

Stalin's appetite. Turkey was somewhat relieved when Britain liberated Athens in October 1944 interpreting that Britain still considered the Eastern Mediterranean (therefore Turkey) important. The restarting of the civil war in Greece and subsequent Pan-Slavic rhetoric of the Bulgarians worsened Ankara's fears of Soviets.⁸² As the war drew to a close, Turkey aimed to secure some protection from the USSR, who now emerged from the war more powerful than ever as a praised victor that has done away with the beast of Nazism. In fact, the Soviets enjoyed great popularity in the US.⁸³ Britain on the other hand was struggling to maintain the status quo and to consolidate her power. In this worrying situation, Turks made a parallel between their own interests and those of the Western Allies and renounced claims to the Dodecanese islands. Subsequently, Ankara accepted the Western Allies communiqué to allow passage of lend-lease material through the Straits to Russia, justifying that shipments were now possible due to the end of German domination of the Aegean.⁸⁴ In the Yalta Conference between 4-11 February 1945, Stalin agreed to the British stance that if Turkey declared war before the end of February, she would be invited to San Francisco.⁸⁵ However, Stalin also insisted that the outmoded Montreux Convention was to be revised since he could not "accept a situation in which Turkey had a hand on Russia's throat" anymore. The issue was to be discussed in the Foreign Ministers Meeting, the first one to be held in London while preliminary preparations were to be taken to revise Montreux.⁸⁶

As the war entered its last days, Turkey formally declared war against Germany on February 23, 1945 and adhered to the UN Declaration on February 27 (after Yalta).

In March 1945 (two months before Germans surrendered to the Allies), V. Molotov invited S. Sarper, Turkish Ambassador to Moscow and gave him a note imparting that the 1925 Soviet-Turkish Non-Aggression Treaty ending in November 1945, was not to be

⁸² Kuniholm, the Origins, pp. 60-5, 69-70.

⁸³ Erhan, Ç., SSCB'yle İlişkiler (Ed.) Oran, B., Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt I, 1919-1980, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2009, pp. 499-500.

⁸⁴ Kuniholm, the Origins, pp. 217-218.

⁸⁵ Howard, H. N., Turkey, the Straits and US Policy, the Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1974, p. 213.

⁸⁶ FRUS, 1945, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, Vol. XXVIII, Seventh Plenary Meeting, February 10, 1945 p. 903; Ataöv, Amerika, p. 55; Howard, p. 214-5.

prolonged. Instead, the USSR would negotiate a new agreement in the light of changing world conditions. Soon in June 7, 1945 Sarper was informed that the conditions were:⁸⁷

- 1) “A new straits convention, negotiated solely between Turkey and the USSR providing for the free passage of Soviet warships through the straits and the closure of the straits to non-Black Sea states,
- 2) Establishment of Soviet bases at the Straits,
- 3) Ceding of Kars and Ardahan.”⁸⁸

In response, Sarper answered that the last two claims were unacceptable and for the first claim, only an international conference could decide the status of the Straits, not a bilateral one.⁸⁹ Pecker’s (the Charge in Ankara) telegram to the Secretary of State informs that Sarper stated that,

“Relations between three big powers is a matter for transcending in importance for Turk-Soviet relations, which seemed not to be running smoothly. Turkey had stood firm in the face of Russian and German demands in 1939 and could not be coerced now.”⁹⁰

The British Ambassador in Ankara was informed of Soviet claims on June 13. Britain proposed to support Turkey since the Russian position seemed to be in conflict with Yalta while the US Ambassador declared that Russian proposals are incompatible with the spirit of participation in the new world organization.⁹¹ In fact, in line with the Potsdam

⁸⁷ FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The Near East and Africa, Turkey, the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, March 21, 1945, p. 1221-2; Ulus, April 7, 1945.

⁸⁸ These were Ottoman cities in the eastern border of the Ottoman Empire, which had been part of Tsarist Russia from 1878 to 1914, but were returned to Turkey by the Bolsheviks through the Treaty of Friendship signed on 16 March 1921.

⁸⁹ Aydın, M., İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye 1939-1945 (Ed.) Oran, B., Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt I, 1919-1980, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2009, p. 473-4; Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 111-2; Howard, p. 219. In fact these claims were not significantly different from what the Soviets had put forward to the Germans in November 1940, claimed in 1943 late November-early December from the Allied Powers during Tehran Conference and finally in Moscow talks in October 1944.

⁹⁰ FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, the Near East and Africa, Turkey, the Charge in Turkey (Packer) to the Secretary of State, April 28, 1945, pp. 1233-4.

⁹¹ Howard, p. 220.

Conference results the US embarked a note to the Turkish government on November 2, 1945, to hold an international conference to revise the Montreux Convention suggesting:

- “1) Straits to be open to merchant vessels of all nations at all times (a relatively small change from Montreux regime where in war Turkey may refuse passage of merchant vessels of her enemy or limit them to day light)
- 2) Straits to be open to the warships of Black Sea powers at all times (Under Montreux regime, this is the case in time of peace. In time of war, the Straits are closed to the warships of any belligerent power if Turkey is neutral. Turkey may close the Straits to all warships if she considers herself threatened to prevent any hostility between belligerents in Turkish waters.)
- 3) Straits to be closed to the warships of non-Black Sea powers at all times, (Under Montreux regime, a maximum of certain tons of non-Black Sea warships may be in the Black Sea at one time.)
- 4) Update the Montreux Convention in line with present day, such as substitute the UN for the League and eliminate Japan as a signatory.”⁹²

The proposal excluded the establishment of Soviet bases in the Straits and was important in demonstrating that the US did not support Soviet demands exclusively. This provided some relief to the Turkish government.⁹³

Turkey believed that to countervail the Soviet threat, Soviets had to face the threat of a credible military response that could only be delivered by the West. Turkey was not sure whether her only alliance, Turkish-Britain-France Agreement of October 1939 was still intact because she kept her neutral position during the War. Not having joined the War on the Allied side (despite intense pressure exerted by the Allied countries), could Turkey

⁹² FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, the Near East and Africa, Turkey, the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, November 2, 1945 and Proposal of the United States for Changes in the Montreux Convention of 1936, pp. 1269-70 and 1243-5.

⁹³ Lenczowski, Soviet, pp. 45-6.

expect international backing by the West against the victorious Soviets who had the lion share in defeating the Nazis? The US Ambassador in Turkey Wilson's telegram on September 25 notes that

“Rather it seems to me question of Straits as raised by USSR instead of being crux of matter appears merely façade behind which lies real Soviet objective. This objective as regards Turkey is to bring about change in Turkey's internal regime. In chain of countries bordering USSR on west and south from Baltic to Black Sea, Turkey is sole country which is not governed by “friendly” regime. A “friendly” regime in Turkey under Soviet domination would mean actual control by USSR of Straits. But more important than this, it would mean termination of Turco-British alliance and end of western liberal influence in Turkey and probably ultimately in ME.”⁹⁴

In the months exactly corresponding to rising fear of Ankara from Soviet threats, the US administration was at the point of deciding how to handle her relations with the Soviets. While the US still continued negotiations with the USSR to settle pressing issues of the War, such as Germany, Poland, atomic energy, Japan and Iran, she nevertheless hesitated to take a confrontational stand⁹⁵ on the Soviet demands regarding Turkey. Hence in this initial period, Turkey faced the Soviet threat alone in confronting the USSR for nine months between June 1945 and April 1946.⁹⁶

In the Potsdam Conference (held between July 17 and August 2, 1945) being aware of Soviet desires, Churchill raised the question of Straits. In the October meeting with Stalin in 1944, it had been agreed that the “outmoded” Montreux Convention would be modified through a meeting of the signatories except Japan. Churchill also drew attention to the point that different questions were raised at the same time, the bases and the Straits believed that Turkey would not agree to Soviet overtures. In the final protocol, it was

⁹⁴ FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, Diplomatic papers, 1945, the Near East and Africa, Turkey, the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, September 25, 1945, pp. 1248-9.

⁹⁵ Brown, p. 99.

⁹⁶ Karpat, Turkish Soviet, p. 79.

agreed that the next step would be the subject of direct conversations between the three governments and the Turkish government (but in the Soviet version, it was agreed that it would be the direct negotiations between each of the three powers and the Turkish government.⁹⁷

During the months after Potsdam when the issue was discussed, the negative shift in US sentiment towards the Soviets in early 1946 (Section 2.3) had already turned the tide to Turkey's advantage, evident in the visit of USS Missouri (to bring the remains of Turkey's late ambassador M. M. Ertegün who had died in November 1944) to Istanbul in April 1946. This in itself was an important symbolism of US support for Turkey⁹⁸ and Greece (as similar visits were designed to Greece by the US Navy). What Turkey eventually aimed, i.e. to balance the Soviet threat with securing some form of American alliance⁹⁹ was accomplished. The event was translated by the Turks as

“the US has now decided that its own interests in this area require it to oppose any effort by USSR to destroy Turk independence and integrity. This is because if USSR was allowed to destroy Turk independence and set up friendly regime here nothing could then prevent Soviets from ascending to Suez and once this occurs another world conflict becomes inevitable.”¹⁰⁰

The USSR's long awaited response to the US note of November 2, 1945 arrived on August 7, 1946. It explained that Montreux Convention failed short of meeting the interests of the Black Sea powers by giving examples of the entry of Axis powers through the Straits into the Black Sea during the Second World War. The USSR proposed to establish a new Straits regime where,

“1) The Straits should be always open to merchant ships of all countries.

⁹⁷ Howard, pp. 225-31.

⁹⁸ Ahmad, F., the Historical Background of Turkey's Foreign Policy (Ed.) Martin, L. G., Keridis, D., The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, The MIT Press, London, 2004, p. 25.

⁹⁹ Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 113.

¹⁰⁰ FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, the Near East and Africa, Turkey, the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, March 23, 1946, pp. 821-2.

- 2) The Straits should always be open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea Powers.
- 3) Non-Black Sea Powers shall not be permitted to pass from the Straits
- 4) The regime of the Straits should come under the competence of Turkey and the Black Sea Powers.
- 5) Turkey and the USSR shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits.”¹⁰¹

A favorable development was that “ceding of Kars and Ardahan” was taken out of the agenda.

Meanwhile, Iran and Greece were also pressurizing the US to take a harsh stand against the Soviets on the extended stay of Soviet troops in Iran as well as the oil concessions and on the alleged support given to the communists in the Greek civil war. By August 1946, US policymakers had come to see the Soviet threat to Turkey as both imminent and extremely threatening to US interests which is depicted in the crucial memorandum prepared by the US State, War and Navy Departments regarding Turkey and the USSR,

“The primary objective of the USSR is to obtain control of Turkey. We believe that if the USSR succeeds in introducing into Turkey armed forces with the ostensible purpose of enforcing the joint control of the Straits, the USSR will use these forces in order to obtain control over Turkey. If the USSR succeeds in its objective obtaining control of Turkey it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prevent the USSR from obtaining control over Greece and the whole Near and Middle East. In our opinion, therefore, the establishment by the USSR of bases in the Dardanelles or the introduction of Soviet armed forces into Turkey would result in Greece and the whole Near and Middle East, including the Eastern

¹⁰¹ FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, the Near East and Africa, Turkey, the Soviet Charge (Orekhov) to the Acting Secretary of State, August 7, 1946, pp. 827-8.

Mediterranean, falling under Soviet control and being cut off from the Western world.”¹⁰²

On August 19, 1946, the Acting Secretary of State, Acheson responds to the Soviet Charge (Orekhov) stating that the US is in agreement with the three Soviet proposals of August 7, however cannot accept the fourth proposal,

“Because the regime of the Straits is a matter of concern not only to the Black Sea powers but also to other powers, including the US”

and the fifth proposal,

“It is the firm opinion of the US that Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits. Should the straits become the object of attack by an aggressor, the resulting situation would constitute a threat to international security and be a matter for the Security Council of the UN.”¹⁰³

Paterson on the other hand gives the view that the frequent exchange of ideas between American and Turkish diplomats in the 1945 and 1946 period has increased the Soviet worry that the US might be seeking a base in Turkey (also in Iran). The gradual toughening of the US stand on Turkey and the Straits issue was the result of the assessment that a vigorous reply was needed to show US interest in the issue.¹⁰⁴

The Soviet Ambassador to the US, N. Novikov analyses in September 1946 that incidents such as,

“The visit by the American battleship USS Missouri to the Black Sea straits, the visit of the American Fleet to Greece and the great interest that US diplomacy

¹⁰² FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, the Near East and Africa, Turkey, the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, August 15, 1946, pp. 840-1.

¹⁰³ FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, the Near East and Africa, Turkey, Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Soviet Charge (Orekhov), August 19, 1946, pp. 847-8.

¹⁰⁴ Paterson, T. G., *Soviet-American Confrontation, Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War*, the John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1973, pp. 190-2.

displays in the problem of the straits have a double meaning. On the one hand, they indicate that the US has decided to consolidate its position in the Mediterranean basin to support its interests in the countries of the Near East and it has selected the navy as the tool for this policy. On the other hand, these incidents constitute a political and military demonstration against the USSR. The strengthening of US positions in the Near East and the establishment of conditions for basing the American navy at one or more points on the Mediterranean Sea (Trieste, Palestine, Greece and Turkey) will therefore signify the emergence of a new threat to the security of the southern regions of the USSR.”¹⁰⁵

Later Moscow suggested holding bilateral talks, preparatory to the revision of the Montreux Convention, toning down her interest in the fourth point but still insisting on the fifth. Having analyzed the communication between the US and Turkish (and also British) governments, one can see the close cooperation between them and at critical points the US conveys the final reply to the Soviets. Finally on October 26, the Soviet government informed Britain that it did not consider an international conference for a new straits regime because it did not expect Ankara or the West to accept the designs.¹⁰⁶

2.3 Birth of Containment Policy

On February 9, 1946, Stalin gave a speech where he stressed the incompatibility of communism and capitalism declaring that the world would never be safe from war so long as capitalism survived.¹⁰⁷ While some circles in the US even interpreted it as declaration of World War III, in general it was seen as publicizing the Soviet aim to export the communist ideology to the rest of the world, which would be detrimental to American open door policies worldwide.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Telegram from N. Novikov (Soviet Ambassador to the US) to the Soviet Leadership on September 27, 1946, available on site: <http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/novikov.htm>.

¹⁰⁶ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, p. 115.

¹⁰⁷ Brands, p. 9-10.

¹⁰⁸ Gaddis, *The US*, pp. 299-300; Kuniholm, *The Origins*, pp. 309-10. Few people who were still sympathetic to the Soviets interpreted the speech as an attempt to accumulate support for the second Five Year Plan.

At the height of the elevation of tension in Iran and Turkey¹⁰⁹ two weeks after Stalin's above mentioned speech, the US *charge* in the USSR, George Kennan (who opposed any compromises to the Soviets in EE affairs¹¹⁰), sent a long telegram¹¹¹ to the US State Department on February 22, 1946. At the request of the State Department, Kennan presented an analysis of Russian-Soviet behavior, which was to become the main pillar of Containment policy. Kennan's evaluation underlined that "At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity." Kennan asserted that the US

"1) must apprehend, and recognize for what it is the nature of the movement with which we are dealing...2) must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation...3) must recognize that much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue... 4) must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. The people of Europe are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will... 5) must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society."¹¹²

The timing of Kennan's telegram was very crucial as it arrived when Soviet actions had been frustrating American administration for some time and pressures on the President to get tough with the Soviets intensified from different directions.¹¹³ On the other hand,

¹⁰⁹ Brands, p. 10.

¹¹⁰ Stephanson, A., Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1992, p. 39.

¹¹¹ It was later to be published as an article in Foreign Affairs in July 1947 named 'the Sources of Soviet Conduct'.

¹¹² FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, the Near East and Africa, Turkey, the Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, February 22, 1946, pp. 696-709.

¹¹³ Gaddis, the US, pp. 323-35. These pressures were from the Northern Tier (the Soviet moves in Iran, encroachment on Turkey and alleged involvement in Greece), both houses of the government and Truman's advisor. During the Foreign Ministers' Conferences held in 1945 and 1946, Russian intentions seemed to exceed Potsdam and the West perceived that the USSR could be aiming to solidify her positions in Eastern Germany. In the meantime, making use of French resistance to German unification, the USSR conveyed the

Paterson suggests that in 1945-1946, the USSR did not have a master plan regarding the EE since he had mixed attitude towards the states. The treatment of Finland and Czechoslovakia (until 1948) was democratic, free elections were held in Hungary in 1945 fall where communists gained less than 20%, elections were held in Austria in 1945 and independence was granted to Yugoslavia in contrast to tighter control of Poland and Rumania. Not until 1947-1948 did the USSR tighten his grip of EE.¹¹⁴

Following Kennan's long telegram came Churchill's "Sinews of Peace" speech on March 5, 1946 where he stated;

"...The Russian-dominated Polish Government has been encouraged to make enormous and wrongful inroads upon Germany and mass expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale grievous and undreamed-of are now taking place. The Communist parties, which were very small in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control...Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts - and facts they are - this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor is it one which contains the essentials of permanent peace."¹¹⁵

In an interview to the Pravda reprinted in the New York Times on March 14, 1946, Stalin criticized Churchill's speech saying;

"Mr. Churchill and his friends in England and the US present nations not speaking the English language with something like an ultimatum: "Recognize our lordship voluntarily and then all will be well. In the contrary case, war is

impression of being the champion of German unification which could in time push Germany under Russian influence. By September 1946, it was clear that the US and West would aim to achieve maximum possible unification if not attain full unification with East Germany but not allow a unified Germany under Soviet control.

¹¹⁴ Paterson, p. 116.

¹¹⁵ Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech, available on site:
<https://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/120-the-sinews-of-peace>.

inevitable”...There is no doubt that the setup of Mr. Churchill is a setup for war, a call to war with the Soviet Union.”¹¹⁶

Molotov in Foreign Ministers Meeting in Paris (April-July 1946) declared the Soviet view of what was occurring;

“When Mr. Churchill calls for a new war and makes militant speeches on two continents, he represents the worst of twentieth century imperialism. Britain has troops in Greece, Palestine, Iraq, Indochina and elsewhere. Russia has no troops outside of security zones and their lines of communication. This is different. We have troops only where provided by treaties. Thus we are in Poland, for example as our Allies are in Belgium, France and Holland.”¹¹⁷

Nevertheless, this section showed that Soviet maneuvering over the Northern Tier countries, namely, Iran, Greece and Turkey, in the first few years of the Cold War had a profound effect on the course of the American foreign policy. It is through the Soviet encroachments in Iran and Turkey, the US statesmen got familiar with Soviet tactics. Washington also recognized that the UN had serious limitations and bilateral negotiations¹¹⁸ between the USSR and the Northern Tier was as good as accepting the eventual encroaching of Soviets. It seemed that the preponderance of Soviet power would effectively wear down the resistance of these relatively smaller Northern Tier states. What the Soviets eventually had in mind was political control over these states. The resolution of the Iranian Crisis showed the importance of firm responses in dealing with Soviets and led to the renormalization of foreign policy towards the Northern Tier, as seen in the Turkish case. This in fact evolved into a formal policy declaration in the Truman Doctrine and developed into the more far reaching Containment policy that became a main pillar of US foreign policy for the coming decades.¹¹⁹ Faced by firm responses, it seemed that the Soviets dropped their insistence. Britain and American policies for this part of the world

¹¹⁶ <http://caho-test.cc.columbia.edu/ps/10099.html>, interview in Pravda, reprinted in The New York Times, March 14, 1946; LaFeber, p. 39.

¹¹⁷ LaFeber, pp. 37-8.

¹¹⁸ Iranian crisis, the first complaint to be filed to the UN by a country, had been a test case in this respect.

¹¹⁹ Kuniholm, the Origins, pp. 206-215, 378-82.

converged with US slowly overtaking Britain's commitments. Although Iran was not mentioned in the Truman Doctrine, she was encompassed and upholding her territorial integrity and sovereignty was in line with the Containment policy.¹²⁰

¹²⁰ Lenczowski, Soviet, p. 27; (Ed.) Sayigh, Y. and Shlaim, A., p. 10.

3. MIDDLE EAST: A REGION OF RIVALRY

3.1 Importance of the ME and Historical Background

The term ME was first used by naval historian Alfred T. Mahan to cover the area between Arabia and India as late as 1902. Later, the term was extended to cover a larger piece of land from India to the Mediterranean. While its precise location may still be debated, it is generally accepted that it covers the land from Libya in the west to Pakistan in the east and from the southern borders of Russia in the north to the Persian Sea in the south.¹²¹

The ME lies at the intersection of the three oldest continents of the world; Europe, Asia and Africa and has been the birthplace of the three great religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. While these three religions coexist today in the region, Islam has dominated and the origins of the Arab world as is defined today can be said to be formed in the seventh century with the birth of Islam in Mecca. Traditionally, the ME has been the home of Arabs across the Fertile Crescent into North Africa, whose common language, Arabic and traditions bind them. East of the Perso-Iraqi border, Persians were Islamized by Arab conquerors but kept their identity that differed from the Arabs, in speech and sentiment. They regained independence after the ninth and tenth centuries and were ruled through Persian dynasties. Simultaneously, Turks, the third of the three major peoples of the Islamic heartland entered the region from Central Asia. They converted to Islam and pushed for conquest and settlement in Asia Minor. Hence, the “common historical memory of Muslims” and the “classic Islamic identity” evolved in the ME. By the sixteenth century, Turkish Ottoman rule prevailed over the ME and dominated the region for four hundred years.¹²²

In the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was lagging behind the West and was losing her earlier power which increased the Russian appetite for expansion believing that she was the heir of the Byzantine Empire.

¹²¹ Lewis B., *The Shaping of the Modern Middle East*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 3.

¹²² *ibid*, pp. 5-14.

“Russia’s drive to warm water ports was a constant in international affairs. In the west this led to conflict with Sweden, in the east with Japan and in the south with the Ottoman Empire and Britain.”¹²³

Britain on the other hand was committed to keeping the European balance of power. In this respect, it was trivial that a Russian influence over the Turkish Straits would provide an unmatched advantage to the Tsar over any other country in Europe. Moreover, the Russian dream also contradicted with the vitality of India for the British Empire and created the need to protect India and all the routes that led to her. Hence, gateways to India were regarded as top priority in British imperial strategy and had to be secured under British control¹²⁴, summarized as

“If the ME has not become the cock pit of rival European powers this is due to the protective measures taken by Great Britain during the last century...we went to the ME in pursuit of trade with that area and to ensure that no other great power was astride of communications with India. It was in Britain’s interest that the whole area and transit routes should be stable and unhampered.”¹²⁵

London’s concern was to simply prevent the fall of the Ottoman Empire to the Russians as she aimed to see the Ottomans as a buffer between her own interests and expansionist Russia as formulized in the Palmerstone Doctrine. The result was a nineteenth century cold war between Britain and Russia in which both powers aimed to cut each other’s expansion in Asia through diplomacy, and subversion.¹²⁶ With the defeat of Russia leading her to temporarily let go of Black Sea and Romanian principalities, the Ottoman Empire established closer relations with the West signing the Paris Treaty and the Reform Edict of 1856¹²⁷ (prepared without Ottoman participation by England and France) giving

¹²³ United States Interests in the Middle East, p. 9.

¹²⁴ Bayly, pp. 139-141; United States Interests in the Middle East, p. 8.

¹²⁵ FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, the Pentagon Talks of 1947 between the US and the UK concerning the ME and the Eastern Mediterranean, Introductory Paper on the ME Submitted Informally by the United Kingdom Representatives, p. 570.

¹²⁶ The only exception to this Cold War was probably the Crimean war between 1853 and 1856.

¹²⁷ The 1856 Reform Edict dealt with the status of the Christians in the Ottoman lands and aimed to get rid of the Russian pretext to interfere in Ottoman affairs. However, social tensions in the Empire did not subside.

way to an Europeanization in Ottoman Empire. The Greek independence followed by Russia's exploitation of the nationalist passion of the Slavs in the Balkans led to the introduction of the first Ottoman constitution and first Ottoman Parliament (by Turks) in 1877. The dramatic Ottoman defeat in the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War was followed by London's intervention into the San Stefano Treaty to balance the significant increase in Russian power.¹²⁸ While Ottomans kept Macedonia and Thrace, the Empire was forced to give up large territories to Montenegro, Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria while Bosnia-Herzegovina was occupied by Austria.¹²⁹

The Europeanization in the Empire however had created an Islamic reaction against the government with complex social-cultural and political agendas, namely the Young Ottoman movement. Coupled with large territorial losses in the Balkans, Sultan Abdulhamid II (reign: 1876-1909) adopted Pan-Islamism which had some anti-Western connotations. The aim was to at least preserve the Muslim elements to enable survival of the Ottoman Empire.¹³⁰

Concurrently, confidence in the British to uphold Ottoman territorial integrity was shattered as Britain took Cyprus in 1878, Egypt in 1882 and as hearsay about Gladstone willing to establish an independent Armenia in Eastern Anatolia rose. Gradually, Britain had been backsliding from the Palmerstonian doctrine of preserving Ottoman integrity with the aim to secure (for herself) the crucial parts of an empire that was doomed to collapse.¹³¹ Hence, the British military strategy was being revised to breaking up of the

¹²⁸ Karpat, K. H., *the Ottoman Rule in Europe from the Perspective of 1994* (Ed.) Mastny, V. and Nation, R. C., *Turkey between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power*, Westview Press, US, 1997, pp. 18-24.

¹²⁹ Okyar, O., *Turco-British Relations In the Inter-War Period: Fethi Okyar's Missions to London* (Ed.) Hale, W. and Bağış, A. İ., *Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations*, Eothen Press, North Humberside, 1984, pp. 64-5.

¹³⁰ Kemal K. H., *Turkish and Arab-Israeli Relation* (Ed.) Karpat, K. H., *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974* (Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East), Brill Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 1975, pp. 108-10; Okyar, pp. 66-7.

¹³¹ Karpat, *the Ottoman*, p. 26.

Ottoman Empire¹³² and required siding with Russia against the larger threat of a uniting Germany and her military power.¹³³

This was because, at the onset of the twentieth century, suspiciously arming Germany's domination over Europe had weighed more in British concerns than the expansionist fervor of Russia. Now it was the intention of European powers to dismember the Ottoman Empire and bring the end of the sick man of Europe, a wish that had been denied to Russia for long. The Ottoman Empire had little option against the newlywed allies and would have to align herself with the German Reich during the First World War. Rising nationalism in the Ottoman Empire had by then activated the Young Turk movement bringing the end of Abdulhamid's reign. The new government in charge¹³⁴ adopted a nationalist-secularist policy with the purpose of bureaucratizing the multinational Ottomans into a centralized state through secular policies. This challenged the autonomy of local rulers in the East (embedded in the Arab culture), leading to discontent with Turkish rule and took its final form in the Arab revolt of 1916.¹³⁵

As the world approached the First World War, Britain had

“consolidated her position in the Mediterranean and the ME through a complex defensive system to hold her interests in the strategic corridor running from the Strait of Gibraltar to the mouth of the Red Sea with two naval fortresses at Gibraltar

¹³² Campbell, *Defense*, p. 12.

¹³³ Karpas, *The Ottoman*, p. 24. The situation was exacerbated for Ottomans as the British Liberal party leader Gladstone turned defending of the Christian Bulgarians issue into a public debate. The PM and leader of the Conservative Party was Benjamin Disraeli, who was a converted Jew, whom Gladstone accused of as not being receptive to the Christians living in the Ottoman Empire. Through a series of secret treaties (including Sykes Picot in May 1916) signed among themselves during the First World War, all entente powers had claims from the Ottoman Empire. Russia demanded Constantinople as war booty; France was to receive Lebanon, Syria and Northern Iraq. The British were to take Palestine and the rest of Iraq overlooking the Persian Gulf with a view to secure the Abadan oil station. Through French presence in the Levant and Northern Iraq, the British hoped to create a buffer between herself and Russia.

¹³⁴ There was a growing German sentiment among the ruling elite supported by economic (railway lines) and military (exchange programs) arrangements.

¹³⁵ Karpas, *Turkish and Arab-Israeli Relations*, p. 110.

and Malta as well as Cyprus and garrisons in Egypt (which became a British protectorate in 1914 taking advantage of the First World War) and Aden”¹³⁶.

With the final collapse of Ottoman front in Palestine during the War, Britain assumed control of the area while French army entered South Anatolia. The Ottoman Empire was to be dismembered by the Sevres Treaty signed in 1920. All of Europe previously under Ottoman control was given away while only a small portion of Thrace around Istanbul remained to the crippled Ottoman State. The Arab lands were granted to the League of Nations, only to be allocated to Britain and France as mandates later. The region around Izmir was appropriated to the Greeks for their *Megalo Idea* while south and southwest Anatolia was to be ceded to the French and Italians, respectively. Eastern Anatolian provinces were to be divided between a US mandated Armenia and a referendum was to decide the future of Kurdistan.¹³⁷

As the First World War drew to a close, Russia was taken out of the equation with the Bolshevik revolution and was entangled in her own civil war with Stalin aiming to consolidate his power internally (the earlier focus on a global revolution seemed to have faded). This coupled with the US opting not to join the newly established League of Nations and going back to her isolationism gave a free hand to the winning parties of the war, Britain and France in defining the destinies of the Middle Eastern people over the remains of the Ottoman Empire. In what emerged as the mandate system¹³⁸, France was to be in control of the Levant, namely, Syria and Lebanon¹³⁹ and Britain was to be the paramount power in the ME assuming mandatory rights over Palestine (with the aim to protect the Suez Canal from any attack that came from the north), Transjordan and Iraq (including Mosul) as well as protectorate status in Egypt. The Greater Syria of Arabs

¹³⁶ Bayly, pp. 189-90

¹³⁷ Kinross, Patrick, Atatürk, the Rebirth of a Nation, Phoenix, London, 2003, p. 140.

¹³⁸ Bayly, p. 182.

¹³⁹ Following Germany's defeat at El Alamein until the end of the war, British power was at its height and was once more concentrated on driving the French out of the Levant similar to the aftermath of World War I, only this time it was successful. When the Lebanese government was against the Free French towards the end of 1943 and France responded with force, Britain was on the Lebanese side, ending the French dominance in the country. The termination of French rule in Syria came in 1945 leaving the British as the only great power in the ME.

covering Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon and Palestine, which the Ottomans ruled as one for centuries was now being divided into smaller states.¹⁴⁰ Not having been granted independence after the fall of the Ottomans and Arab nationalism was to start an exhaustive war against the Western powers, their former allies.¹⁴¹

3.2 Politics of Oil

The discovery of oil reserves in the ME at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century¹⁴² had a dramatic effect on the region. Oil in the ME was first discovered in Persia, which remained the only country producing oil until 1930s. The concessions belonged exclusively to the British. In early 1900s, Gulbenkian, an American financier knew that there was oil in north Mesopotamia. Before the First World War erupted, the Ottoman government granted oil concessions to the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) in which the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (50%) and Royal Dutch Shell and the German Deutsche Bank (together 50%) had stakes. Taking Germany and Turkey out of the equation after the War, British government had acquired a majority share in the Mesopotamian oil.¹⁴³ Although the Sykes-Picot agreement had placed Mosul in the French zone, France was persuaded to transfer Mosul to the British. France also agreed to the construction of two pipelines to transport the oil of Gulf and Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean through the French zones. The US then entered the picture claiming a share in Iraq's oil as important oilfields were discovered in Kirkuk in 1927. The British had shown little interest in potential oil fields on the western shores of the Gulf, Kuwait, Bahrain or Saudi Arabia believing that the lands lacked a specific component present in the earlier fields. Britain did not allow the amirs of these lands to grant concessions to non-British companies with the aim to control oil price through controlling supply.

¹⁴⁰ Şen, S., Ortadoğu'da İdeolojik Bunalım, Suriye Baas Partisi ve İdeolojisi, Sis Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2010, pp. 79-81. Conquering four-fifths of the Arabian Peninsula, the Saudi family arose in Central Arabia.

¹⁴¹ Kürkçüoğlu, Ö., Development of Turkish-Arab Relations: A Historical Appraisal (Ed.) Karaosmanoğlu, A. L. and Taşhan, S., The Middle East, Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, TISA, 1987, p. 10.

¹⁴² Ovendale, R., the Longman Companion to the Middle East since 1914, Longman, London, 1992, p. 43.

¹⁴³ Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, p. 4.

Nevertheless, Standard Oil of California entered Bahrain¹⁴⁴ and found important reserves in 1938. The same company approached King Ibn Saud and received concessions. This was the start of close cooperation between the US and Saudi Arabia. When it was understood by 1941 that Saudi Arabia possessed quarter of the global oil reserves, the Saudi-US ties were tightened. During the War, the US understood the urgency of making sure that the US controlled the Saudi concessions. In 1944, Standard Oil of California sold its shares in Saudi Arabia to Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) as American companies started to take part in the development of Saudi infrastructure. Eventually, the US became one of two significant players in ME oil by 1948 as seen below.¹⁴⁵

Table 3.1 British and American oil production in the ME in early Cold War years (mn tonnes) (Source: Kuniholm, *the Origins*, p. 398)

Year	Arabian-American	Anglo-Iranian
1944	1,1	13,5
1945	2,9	17,1
1946	8,2	19,5
1947	12,3	20,5
1948	19,3	25,2

The American dominance of the West after the Second World War rested on its control of international oil as well as (economics and military) which was the result of strategic planning on the side of American policy makers. Considering the international political economy of petrol, US supremacy can be investigated as below: American efforts to control Arab oil between 1943 and 1948; the sterling dollar oil problem of 1949-50; American intervention in Iran between 1951-1954 (Section 5.2.2) and reshaped structure of Iranian Consortium in 1954¹⁴⁶ and the Emergency Oil Lift Program of the US during the Suez Crisis in 1956. American hegemony in petroleum prices rested on more than one

¹⁴⁴ In 1932, after the example of Bahrain, Britain had to finally give in to US pressure for an open-door policy for US oil companies to Kuwait, where Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) was established at equal US and UK shares.

¹⁴⁵ Mansfield, pp. 213-8; Keohane, R. O., *Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984, pp. 151-9.

¹⁴⁶ Bromley, S., *American Hegemony and World Oil: the Industry, the State System and the World Economy*, the Pennsylvania State University Press, US, 1991, pp. 112-4.

source of influence such as close political ties with the Saudi Arabia, the capacity to intervene in the domestic politics of ME, military and technical aid provided to Iran, Saudi Arabia and other oil rich state as well as military preponderance over the Mediterranean.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ Keohane, p. 141.

4. TURKEY ALLIGNS WITH THE WEST IN SEARCH OF SECURITY

The alliance between Turkey and the West may be attributed to a set of internal and external dynamics that have evolved after the foundation of the Republic. However, there are significant differences in the way Turkish statesmen viewed the West in the mono-party and multi-party politics periods. These differences are of course closely related to the changing structure of the international setting between the interwar years and the bipolar structure in the after war period.

While Turkey followed a carefully balanced foreign policy in the interwar years, in the Cold War period, the alignment with the West seemed almost automatic with the contingencies of the new world order and the realization of the Russian threat on Turkey. Hence, the security deficit from the USSR overrode any other in the first years of the end of the War. Although this threat subsided in a few years, Turkey could not adopt itself to a new policy line such as for example non-alignment.¹⁴⁸ Republican Turkey's mission of establishing herself as part of Europe would constrain her from non-alignment when there was the choice of alignment with the West. Besides Turkey had never been colonialized like the third world and there was not large scale enmity towards the West (at least not in the 1950s). It only seemed natural for Turkey to follow the US lead. Moreover, Western capital to be injected to the economy was the key to the fast economic growth that the governments had in mind as both RPP and DP welcomed Western allocations to Turkey. Hence, in an attitude more "Western than the West", Turkey had an interest in the Cold War and hoped (as well as promoted) its continuation through the 1950s.

4.1 Internal Dynamics

In an effort to consolidate against the increasing perception of the Soviet threat mentioned in Section 2.2.3, Turkey reformed her political system and enhanced parliamentary

¹⁴⁸ Hale, W., Turkey (Ed.) Sayigh, Y. and Shlaim, A., the Cold War and the Middle East, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, pp. 250-1.

democracy based on free elections and an economic system that was based on free enterprise.¹⁴⁹

4.1.1 Political factors

With the victory of the War of Independence, on November 1, 1922, the Ottoman Sultanate was abolished. After signing Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923, the Turkish Republic was promulgated on October 29, 1923 and Mustafa Kemal was elected as the first president by the Grand National Assembly (GNA). After the disposal of the caliph in March 1924 from Turkish politics, a new constitution was adopted on April 20, 1924 where essentially the GNA possessed legislative and executive powers. The executive powers were to be exercised by the President and the ministerial council. Judicial authority was vested in the tribunals acting “in the name of the nation”. The constitution and the framework of the state was, at least in name, democratic along Western lines and the hierarchical organization of the ulema was crushed by a series of reforms. However, the application of the civil rights into actual policy would naturally take many more decades. Nevertheless, instead of moving towards a totalitarian state (that was witnessed in the USSR and in some European countries), the ruling elite aimed to attain Western standards in all aspects of life.¹⁵⁰ Despite the tendency to undertake authoritarian measures, the goal was to draw the young republic away from superstition that had trapped Islam in the last centuries of Ottoman rule.¹⁵¹

Mustafa Kemal during his rule as President until his death in 1938 exercised vast powers¹⁵² but G. Lenczowski states that he was tempered by at least three factors, 1) basic Western

¹⁴⁹ Karpas, Turkish Soviet, pp. 84-5; Rustow, D. A., Modernization of Turkey, in Karpas, K. H. and Contributors, Social Change and Politics in Turkey, A Structural-Historical Analysis, Brill, Belgium, 1973, p. 111.

¹⁵⁰ Lewis, B., the Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 260-5.

¹⁵¹ Carley, P., Turkey's place in the World (Ed.) Barkey, H. J., Reluctant Neighbor, Turkey's Role in the Middle East, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 2005, pp. 4-5; Ahmad, F., the Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975, Westview Press, Colorado, 1977, pp. 1-3.

¹⁵² Tamkoç, M., the Warrior Diplomats, Guardians of the National Security and Modernization of Turkey, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 1976, pp. 296-8. Tamkoç states that in the mono party system until at least 1950, Turkish Presidents were very dominant and authoritarian. Prime Ministers were merely implementer of their directives. Hence, political power was concentrated in a very small circle and super structural changes carried the highest priority. On the way to modernization and industrialization, foreign

inclination, 2) benevolence and unselfishness and 3) power sharing with RPP (*Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası*). RPP was the first political party in Turkey established in 1923. It had evolved from the Association of the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, which had organized the Turkish nation for the Independence War. RPP had the task of regenerating Turkey hand in hand with nationalism (with no irredentist aspirations such as Pan-Islamism or Pan-Turanism).¹⁵³ While it could be that the Kemalists did not aim to establish a mono-party state (only one party present in the system coupled with no separation between party and government, which was formalized in the RPP Congress of 1935), it is what the system evolved to (considering the two unsuccessful attempts towards a multi-party democracy both of which dismally failed). The counter revolutionary movement that could undermine the system was so great that the regime had to be protected from its own people. Ahmad also states that the tacit alliance between the urban middle class, the intelligentsia, army and state officers and the landowners of Anatolia that had saved the nation was fortified until 1946 through the indirect electoral law. It was this law that made sure that only representatives whom the local elite approved, could be elected to the Assembly. These representatives “supported modernist reforms as long as they did not threaten the existing social and economic structure.” The most important example of this alliance was the non-implementation of a land reform.¹⁵⁴

In time, bonds between state and party were loosened at the Fifth Great Congress (May 29-June 3, 1939) and an Independent Group (*Müstakil* Group) was permitted to act as a loyal

and domestic policies were regarded as inseparable parts of national interest. Presidents (after 1950, also the Prime Ministers) looked upon foreign policy making as their own area of privilege. Foreign policy was regarded as very important and above any daily political discussion and dispute. Hence, the opposition, the intelligentsia and the public at large never challenged the basic tenets of foreign policy or Turkey's international commitments. The most that could happen was that the opposition would comment on the way how a foreign policy was pursued. For example, when the Turkish decision to send troops to Korea was taken in 1950, RPP criticized not the act itself but rather the fact that the Parliament was not consulted. After 1960s, with increasing importance of public opinion, foreign policy decision-making circle enlarged to include the military civilian leaderships as well as some top bureaucrats and GNA members. Criticisms of foreign policy by the opposition and the press had started. With the easing of tensions in the detant period, strategies and tactics softened to an extent but there was no dramatic alteration in Turkey's foreign policy orientation towards the West.

¹⁵³ Lenczowski, G., *The Middle East in World Affairs*, 4th Edition, Cornell University Press, 1980, p. 115. The aim was to live in good neighborly relations with especially, the USSR.

¹⁵⁴ Ahmad, *The Turkish*, pp. 3-6.

opposition. However, the onset of the Second World War led to dramatic measures to freeze all rights and freedoms in Turkey. National Defense Law (*Milli Koruma Kanunu*) of January 18, 1940 gave emergency powers to the government leading the government to control both prices and the supply of goods and introduced forced labor for example in mines. The Capital tax (*Varlık Vergisi*) in November 1942 was created to tax those who have accumulated wealth during the War but was disproportionately applied to minorities. The Tithe (*Ayniyat Vergisi*) on agriculture, which had been abolished in 1925 was retrieved. In general, the economic policies led to difficulties for the whole nation in the form of shortages and black profiteering. The national defense law had enforced a police regime which was repelled by the nation but the party deemed them necessary as the War continued. With the repression of all individual freedoms, the resistance and resentment towards the RPP and its leaders was immense. The tacit alliance that had saved the nation in the War of Independence had weakened considerably and was in search of a new political system in which the landlords could be heard. The state on the other hand realized that this would mean the end of its power and hence initiated “Allocating Land to Farmers Law” in January 1945 to topple the power of landowners. However, it was subject to criticism from within the RPP voiced openly by C. Bayar, A. Menderes, F. Köprülü and R. Koraltan, who understood that to voice the interests of the forces they represent and to be safe from the power of the ruling party, they had to be in power. They also relied on the masses that were already fed up with RPP.¹⁵⁵

A laxing of Turkish political life was to follow as President İnönü briefed on 19 May 1945,

“As the contingencies of war disappear, democratic principles will prevail more in political and intellectual life.”¹⁵⁶

On top of these internal pressures, in a world where the US, the strongest democracy of the world was the victor of the war, Turks looked up to their friendship with the West for the backing required to face the USSR as seen in Section 2.2.3. Responding to the liberal

¹⁵⁵ Ahmad, the Turkish, p. 8; Eroğul, p. 3.

¹⁵⁶ Ayn Tarihi, May 1945; İnönü, İ., Briefing on 19 May 1945, p. 23, available on site: <http://www.ismetinonu.org.tr/tek-dereceli-ilk-secimler.htm>

ideology of the US, Turkey announced the need for an opposition party.¹⁵⁷ President İnönü believed that if Turkey retained its non-pluralistic mono-party regime, the US would not give her support. Hence, expecting and striving to receive Western backing in the face of the Soviet enmity towards the close of the War, the RPP government was ready to allow the existence of an opposition party, to show that basic principles of democracy prevailed. İnönü's presidential speech on November 1, 1945 was a manifestation that mono-party system was to be reformed in line with the changing after war conditions. Despite the attempt to block the "Allocating Land to Farmers Law", the four critics asked for more liberty and adherence to democratic principles as of June 1945. They were however refused on the ground that such proposals could not be brought to the group. In January 1946, Democrat Party (DP) was established as a formal opposition party. While the programme of the new party was not very different than RPP's, there was more emphasis on increasing individual freedom and decreasing the power of the state as well as the recognition that agricultural sector would be the driving force of economic growth.¹⁵⁸ RPP on the other hand was aiming to reform itself as it accepted direct general elections as well as laws to free universities, restrict the government's authority to censor and close newspapers and forgave press charges as of June 1946. Nevertheless, heavy handed methods of RPP were seen in the maintenance of the martial law and the advancing of the general elections by one year to July 1946. Because the organizational structure of DP was not completed yet, RPP victory was inevitable. The elections (which DP claimed to be biased¹⁵⁹) gave way to a RPP victory and brought to power a government that was authoritarian towards the opposition party as hardliner R. Peker assumed the post of prime minister.¹⁶⁰ The government's authoritarian measures faced fierce criticism from DP and the press (tilted towards opposition were Vatan, Tan and Son Posta) which had been repressed for too long. The devaluation of September 1946 deteriorated RPP's standing further and the party undertook more repressive activities esp. against what remained of the

¹⁵⁷ Bromley, S., *Rethinking Middle East Politics*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1994, p. 127.

¹⁵⁸ Ahmad, *the Turkish*, pp. 8-14; Lenczowski, *the Middle East*, pp. 138; Eroğul, pp. 5-14.

¹⁵⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, July 23, 1946.

¹⁶⁰ Eroğul, pp. 15-9.

left and its press, the last of which were dissolved under Martial Law conditions by December 1946.¹⁶¹

Increasingly tense atmosphere between Peker and Bayar required President İnönü's intervention with the promise to stay on equal footing to both parties on July 12, 1947. The approach was also interpreted as İnönü's preference of moderates over extremists and a more liberal view of the opposition.¹⁶² While this caused dichotomy in RPP, it made matters difficult for DP, whose main policy had been to oppose RPP (which extended to the breakup of a group from DP to form the extremist Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*) in early 1948). Nevertheless, the exhausted RPP under H. Saka was losing ground and continuation of economic hardship in the country gave way to his replacement with Ş. Günaltay as prime minister. Finally with the reform of the electoral law to a democratic one, the election date of the first democratic elections was set as May 14, 1950.¹⁶³

Finally, the elections opened the door for DP to form the government through peaceful means placing Bayar as the President and Menderes as the PM. DP's legitimacy was derived from its success at the polls as DP secured 408 seats of the total 487 seats in Parliament while RPP had only secured 69 seats. Political parties now competed for popular support to rule the country which gave way to a new group of elite that was pragmatic and depended on persuasion, manipulation and mobilization of the masses.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Cumhuriyet, December 17, 1946; Harris, G. S., *Troubled Alliance, Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, AEI Hoover Policy Studies, Washington, 1972, pp. 23-4; Karpas, K. H., (1966), "Left Wing Intellectuals between the Wars", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 1, No. 2, SAGE Publications, p. 176. Socialist elements had long been the key opponent of mono-party system and seemed to be getting stronger as the USSR was one of the victors of the war in 1945. Hence as the end of the war approached, Western attitude towards the USSR (with the aura that she was one of the winners) was also very friendly. Nevertheless, the fear in Turkey that socialist elements could dominate the opposition was strong and violent student demonstrations against the left in December 1945 (which may have been to a degree tolerated by the government) occurred. However the left was cursed from the start because at the same time Stalin was exerting pressure on Turkey.

¹⁶² Ahmad, *the Making*, pp. 106-7.

¹⁶³ Eroğul, pp. 37-52.

¹⁶⁴ Sunar, İ., *State, Society and Democracy in Turkey* (Ed.) Mastny, V. and Nation, R. C., *Turkey between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power*, Westview Press, US, 1997, pp. 141-8; Eroğul, pp. 53, 61-2.

DP was mainly supported by large landowners and rising bourgeoisie, who were not pleased with surprises such as the land law, arbitrary taxes and growing state sector. Hence, the internal demands for the setting up of a new political set up as the old alliance was under strains as insecurity from RPP policies increased. Now, they aimed to have a say at the top decision making, which had hastened the formation of an opposition party to protect their interests. Other supporters included businessmen, intellectuals, urban consumers and villagers who wanted better economic conditions and those who resented laicism that RPP¹⁶⁵ had put in place.¹⁶⁶ With the overwhelming victory that Democrats secured in the municipality elections in September 1951, the internal demands from the lower levels of the party, to settle the account with the past RPP rule increased. This revenge taking atmosphere in fact continued for most of the DP decade.¹⁶⁷

Meanwhile, DP had taken the decision to send Turkish troops to Korea and was aligning more and more with the West. RPP was basically in the same frame of mind with DP in this matter, but did not approve the economic laws with such large concessions to foreigners. This led DP to open the past deeds of RPP and to confiscate the valuables of the party gained during the mono-party rule. While the deed could be understood to correct the wrongs done in the past, the methods of DP to demolish RPP were not correct and could not be justified. More and more, ruling elite of DP took repressive measures towards their own party members only to show they were not as “democratic” as they had claimed, which over time led to resignations from the party.¹⁶⁸ The repression towards RPP soon showed its face as penal code amendment made offensive criticism of cabinet members a punishable crime in June 1953, outlawed the political activities of professors in July 1953 and further law that confiscated some properties of RPP in December 1953. Hence, Democrats were tightening their grip on politics towards both intra and inter party politics. On the other hand, good harvests, foreign credits and the government’s

¹⁶⁵ However, soon to cope with the dangerous incidents that extremely religious elements gave way to, DP adopted a law to protect the memory of Atatürk (his statutes were under attack) in 1951 and aimed to curb the strong Islamic movement.

¹⁶⁶ Ahmad, *the Turkish*, p. 8; Eroğul, pp. 58-9.

¹⁶⁷ Eroğul, pp. 75-6.

¹⁶⁸ *ibid*, pp. 70-4.

investment in public works were good signs for the electorate.¹⁶⁹ Democrat victory arrived in May 1954 elections where DP secured 502 seats, leaving RPP won only 31 seats out of the 541 seat Parliament.

4.1.2 Economic factors

Many years of war and departure of Greek and Armenian populations had led to considerable losses of qualified and non-qualified workforce and capital in the early years of the Republic. A provision in a protocol in the Lausanne Treaty had also required Turkey to maintain the Ottoman customs tariffs at the existing low levels until 1929 and hence, much required revenues could not be generated. Moreover, the economy was burdened with the pay back of a large portion of the Ottoman Empire's foreign debt and the infrastructure of Anatolia was in ruins. On the other hand, when in 1929, the import tariffs were drastically raised; Turkish firms were more drastically hit than foreign producers. The largest sector of the economy, the agricultural sector, was not helped by the drought in 1927-1928. Turkey was running a balance of trade deficit as her exports consisted of raw materials and agricultural products (whose price deteriorated considerably between 1929 and 1934) and her imports were finished goods. The failure of the liberal policies coupled with the Great Depression of 1929 led to a disbelief in liberal economic measures in Turkey and intensified pressures for state intervention into the economy. Hence etatism principle of Kemalism was born, where the government established State Owned Enterprises (SOE) in certain sectors since the private sector did not have the required funds or the entrepreneurial skills. This also served to strengthen the mono-party regime. The first five year plan was drawn in 1933 where concentration was in textiles, iron and steel, paper, cement, glass and chemicals while it was declared that agriculture would not be affected by etatism.¹⁷⁰

However, what the limits of state intervention were was a controversial point, where İnönü believed it should continue while Bayar believed that it was a transitory method. When

¹⁶⁹ Ahmad, the Turkish, p. 49.

¹⁷⁰ Ahmad, the Turkish, pp. 3, 5-6; Zürcher, E. J., Turkey, A Modern History, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1998, pp. 204-6.

Bayar became the PM, a liberal approach was to start but as İnönü became President in 1939 and contingencies of war prevailed, statism continued to lead the economy. In the run up to the Second World War, the political change in Europe of course had profound effects on Turkey's economy as covered in Section 4.2. In fact by the end of the Second World War, etatism and the power of SOEs were so significant in Turkey that they could crowd out private investment.¹⁷¹

Finally, the Land Reform Law of 1946 was the last straw which led to the formation of DP to protect the interests of landlords and bourgeoisie of Anatolia at the top echelons of power. With the end of the war, there occurred great changes in the international system, which will be considered in the next section. The new world order was bipolar and Turkey with its geostrategic importance aimed to exploit the advantages of this.

During the Pentagon Talks of 1947, it was highlighted that Turkey needed

“sounder integration of the nation's economic potentialities with emphasis on the basic necessities upon which a sound national economy must rest, rather than on spectacular undertakings in imitation of the most modern achievements of the more mature Western economies. Singled out as fundamental to national economic advancement was an efficient road system.”¹⁷²

In the ideal of exploiting her geographical importance, Turkey was helped by the fact that her traditional rival, the USSR was making some encroachments towards her as Turkey called out effectively to the West for protection against facing the challenge of the USSR. Initially, Turkey was not included in the Marshall Aid as it was not war struck. Pointing to her defense burden in the negotiations in Paris in July 1947 coupled with effective lobbying convinced Washington, Turkey received aid as part of the Marshall Plan on July 4, 1948. In the Marshall Plan negotiations, the Americans aimed for the Turkish

¹⁷¹ Ahmad, *the Turkish*, pp. 5-6; Zürcher, p. 206.

¹⁷² FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, the Pentagon Talks of 1947 between the US and the UK concerning the ME and the Eastern Mediterranean, Memorandum Prepared in the State Department, p. 548.

government to halt practices that restricted competition and demanded the end of monopolistic power. There was also emphasis on developing the agriculture sector.

While the share of agriculture in national income was 37% and rural workforce accounted for around 80% of the population¹⁷³, DP was to put full concentration into economic development. The means to this end was identified as large injections from the US in line with the political direction of the country. As the economic well-being became a key consideration in the ballot box with populist policies, DP was ready to utilize and publicize American aid as much as possible. Laws to encourage foreign investment and more laws to ease the environment for foreign oil enterprises to enter Turkey were passed in January and March, 1954 respectively. In opening speech of the tenth session of the TGNA in November 1954, Bayar pointed out that since 1950, Turkey's agricultural production increased by 200%, industrial production increased by 100% while tractors have increased sevenfold in number. There was also impressive surge in road and bridge building. Boosted by the beneficent weather conditions and mechanization of the farmers (imports of agricultural equipment) and of course the foreign loans, in the first five years of DP rule, Turkish national income grew 45%.¹⁷⁴ However, this impressive growth would soon run into obstacles.

4.2 External Dynamics

4.2.1 Republican Turkey's improving relations with the West

Despite the British expectation for the Greek army to bring Turks to their knees, the Turkish War of Independence between 1919 and 1922, under the aegis of Mustafa Kemal, allowed the Turks to carve out a country in Asia-Minor, where Muslim Turkish majority dominated. The Lausanne Treaty signed on July 24, 1923 established the borders and status of an independent Turkish state making the earlier Sevres Treaty void. While the country had been reduced to the status of small nation in comparison to the Ottoman Empire, it was relatively stronger and more homogenous in comparison to the Empire esp.

¹⁷³ Bromley, Rethinking, p. 127.

¹⁷⁴ Lenczowski, the Middle East, p. 143.

in its last days. Being a realist, Mustafa Kemal pursued a non-adventurous and careful foreign policy in the highly turbulent decade of the 30s, with full recognition of the limits of his country.¹⁷⁵ Nevertheless, the historical conditioning since the Ottoman days had not changed as Turkey desired to be admitted as a partner of the West.

The foreign policy of the Turkish Republic was based on “living in peace with all nations and maintaining friendly relations with all powers”. But having fought against imperialist powers in the War of Independence, Turkey would never allow an encroachment over her territorial sovereignty and political independence. Because the international system was considered to be anarchic and rested on unequal distribution of power, power politics was the controlling dynamic of the international society; those who possess power were the ones who could claim humane and just treatment. Hence, while Turkish leaders were committed to peace and the maintenance of the status quo, as realists in power politics, they believed it to be important to be prepared for war and to be prepared to resort to force against those who opposed Turkey’s twin goals of national security and modernization.¹⁷⁶ Throughout the 1930s when Atatürk was the President, Turkey aimed to draw close to democracies, which led the foreign policy to be pragmatic and principled.¹⁷⁷

“The fundamental objective of the Turkish warrior diplomats was...to bring Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization and to make her an equal partner of the Western community of nations and to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of Turkey against any aggression.”¹⁷⁸

Before considering the evolution of Turkey’s relations with the West, it is important to note that the young Republic attempted to avoid any confrontation with the USSR and settle once and for all the problems with her historic rival.¹⁷⁹ As a result of Turkey’s promise to end former irredentist pan-Turanist ideas and the close cooperation with

¹⁷⁵ Lenczowski, *the Middle East*, p. 121.

¹⁷⁶ Tamkoç, *the Warrior*, pp. 301-3; Ataöv T., *Turkish Foreign Policy*, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1965, p. 1.

¹⁷⁷ Ahmad, *the Historical Background*, pp. 20-1.

¹⁷⁸ Tamkoç, *the Warrior*, p. 298.

¹⁷⁹ Carley, *Turkey’s Place in the World*, pp. 6-7.

Bolsheviks during the Turkish War of Independence, Turkey signed a Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality with the USSR in December 1925. The treaty required Turkey to stay neutral in the face of military action against the USSR, abstain from aggression against the USSR and not to participate in an alliance directed against this country. Despite the initial honeymoon between the two revolutionary regimes, they could not nurture each other. While Turkey's movement was nationalistic, Soviet ideology promoted socialism with emphasis on the proletariat. Moreover, Kemalist reforms visualized Western Europe as a model for Turkey, not the USSR.¹⁸⁰

In the early years of the Republic the international system was rather sceptic of Turkey¹⁸¹ and it is not surprising that there was some resentment with Britain in the early Republican period when we remember the British support for Greeks in the Independence War and for the Kurds in Sevres Treaty as well as the resurfacing of the Kurdish rebellion in 1925 during the Mosul discussions.¹⁸² Following the Independence War, the first incident when Turkish foreign policy was constrained by systemic factors was in Lausanne when Turkey had to reach a compromise with great powers to start her internal transformation. Two territorial issues remained from Lausanne, namely Mosul and Alexandretta (Hatay). While Mosul will be discussed here, Alexandretta will be covered in Section 5.1.4. Lausanne had ended without a decision on Mosul, which both the Turks and the British did not want to relinquish. Great statemencraft was required to settle the Mosul problem where there was a significant Turkish minority as well as vast oil resources.¹⁸³ Assessing realistically that Britain was superior to Turkey both diplomatically and militarily (as well as the worry that the Kurdish population would almost certainly cause problems for the Republic at the later stages¹⁸⁴), Turks yielded in Mosul question and abandoned the claim to the province in compensation for 10% of the oil produced in the region for the following 25 years¹⁸⁵ (with no mention of Kurdish autonomy) in June, 1926. Turkey hoped to secure British political

¹⁸⁰ Lenczowski, *Soviet*, p. 38.

¹⁸¹ Robins, P., *the Foreign Policy of Turkey* (Ed.) Hinnebusch, R. and Ehteshami, A., *the Foreign Policies of Middle East States*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2002, p. 312.

¹⁸² Okyar, p. 74; Lenczowski, *the Middle East*, pp. 122-3.

¹⁸³ Lenczowski, *Soviet*, p. 37.

¹⁸⁴ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 71-2.

¹⁸⁵ Sluglett, p. 72-3, 84-5.

acceptance as well as her participation in the Turkish economy and from then on friendly relations followed.¹⁸⁶

Turkey's admission to the League of Nations in 1932 symbolized the end of her isolation from international community and the start of new initiatives in foreign affairs¹⁸⁷ and was an "ardent supporter of the principle of collective security".¹⁸⁸ Turkey took the lead in forming the Balkan Pact (1934) which included Greece (as former hostile sentiment pending from the Independence War was overcome by wisdom), Yugoslavia and Rumania, guaranteeing each other's territorial integrity and independence as well as settlement of disputes through peaceful means. It was actually a pact designed against revisionist Bulgaria, who had unfulfilled desires in Macedonia, Western Thrace and Dobruca.¹⁸⁹ Turkey was alarmed about the recent threats from Italy, such as the illegal militarization of the Dodecanese Islands, Mussolini calling the Mediterranean Sea as "Italian Lake" and Italy's occupation of Ethiopia (then known as Abyssinia 1935-1936) as well as invasion of Albania in 1939. Moreover, German rearmament in 1935 and the remilitarization of the Rhineland demonstrated the rise of totalitarian and revisionist intentions in Europe. As a result, Turkey asked for the revision of the Lausanne Straits Convention, which was not sufficient in protecting her in the face rising danger in Europe. The legal nature of the Turkish demand and her willingness to undertake peaceful measures for revision received support from Britain and France (the pending problem of Alexandretta was settled with France simultaneously as will be seen in Section 5.1.4). This was because the European powers were also in search of allies against Germany and Italy and felt that their interests in the EM were challenged.¹⁹⁰ The USSR was also supportive of Turkey's demand for reasons of self-interest since she hoped to have the straits closed to the navies of non-Black

¹⁸⁶ Shaw, S. J. and Shaw, E. K., *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977, p. 376; Robins, *the Foreign Policy*, p. 313; Lenczowski, *the Middle East*, p. 123.

¹⁸⁷ Okyar, p. 63.

¹⁸⁸ Ahmad, *the Historical Background*, p. 20.

¹⁸⁹ Shaw, pp. 377; Lenczowski, *the Middle East*, p. 124; Ataöv, *Turkish*, p. 7.

¹⁹⁰ Lenczowski, *the Middle East*, pp. 124-5; Ataöv, *Turkish*, pp. 3-4; Ahmad, *the Making*, pp. 67-8.

Sea powers (from which she suffered in the First World War) and secure freedom of transit to the navies of Black Sea powers.¹⁹¹

With the signing of the Montreux Convention in 1936 by Lausanne signatories, Turkey gained sovereignty over the straits, gained the ability to militarize them and limited the tonnage of warships passing from the Straits. In time of peace, all merchant vessels could freely pass from the Straits. In a war, where Turkey was not a belligerent, merchant vessels could also pass. In peace all minor war vessels had freedom to pass with some tonnage restrictions. In time of war she now had the right to control the passage of belligerent warships as well as exercise jurisdiction over all warships in times of peace if under threat of war or if she were a belligerent.¹⁹² However the final arrangement was not one desired by Italy or the USSR, despite their subsequent acceptance. Nevertheless, these developments point to building up of mutual confidence between Turkey and Britain, hoping to secure each other's friendship at the face of a rising revisionist camp in Europe.¹⁹³ On the other hand in 1937, there was diplomatic cooling with Germany as Turkey was in an effort to press for diplomacy in the Balkans and in Europe.

Turkey also signed the Sadabad Pact (1937) with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan which was welcomed by the West as an effort to maintain stability in the East. The member countries were to "refrain from acts of aggression against each other and from provocation of each other's ethnic groups (especially as a result of Kurdish resurrections in the border areas)".¹⁹⁴ The USSR's acceptance of Balkan and Sadabad Pacts of the inter-war years stretching from the Balkans to the Himalayas can only be explained by the fact that the treaty included relatively weak states and was narrow in scope with no common defense.

¹⁹¹ Ataöv, Turkish, p. 4.

¹⁹² *ibid*, pp. 4-5.

¹⁹³ Lenczowski, Soviet, p. 38.

¹⁹⁴ Tschanguiz, H. P., Turkish-Iranian Relations, An Iranian View (Ed.) Barkey, H. J., Reluctant Neighbor, Turkey's Role in the Middle East, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 2005, pp. 71-3; Soysal, İ., Between East and West, Studies on Turkish Foreign Relations, The Isis Press, Istanbul, 2001, p. 249; Mango, A., "Turkey in the Middle East", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 229.

4.2.2 Turkish foreign policy during the Second World War

In 1937, Turkey needed machinery for her newly launched second Five Year Plan, and received this from Germany (which had already economically penetrated into the Balkans). On the other hand, the scare in Turkey was that increasing foreign trade with this country could translate into increased German political control over Turkey. This was very important considering the delicate situation where revisionist states alarmed all of Europe.¹⁹⁵ Moving into 1939, there was a decline in Turkish-German trade as Turkey attempted to decrease her armament dependency from Germany and started buying some aircraft material from Britain. Developments in Europe (such as in Czechoslovakia and the fate of Albania) worried the Turks. With the announcement of joint declaration as of May 1939 of the Pact between Turkey and England, Germany was displeased and introduced some restrictions on economic transactions with Turkey. Chrome ore was an item that Germany required in manufacturing of steel for armaments and was not under restrictions. Due to the restrictions that Germany put on existing contracts for war materials, in early phases of the war, Turkey aimed to compensate this with trade from Britain, France and the US.¹⁹⁶ Moreover, despite non-belligerency, Turkey had to keep two million men under arms during the war and since the ME was London's area of interest, it was Britain that supplied Turkey with military material. Turkey was granted lend and lease assistance by the US in December 1941. However, as Germany made advances in Europe, Berlin exerted pressure on Ankara for more chrome sales to Germany. Turkey by then had formed a chrome sale agreement with Britain, also. Nevertheless, pressurized by Germany, Turkey concluded a pact with Berlin in exchange for war equipment that lasted until March 1943. While Germany was concerned whether Turkey would side with the allies, Turkey confirmed friendly ties with the USSR in June 1943 and lend-lease help to Turkey followed. With the change in the outlook of the war, Turkey stopped sending chrome to Germany in April 1944 and ended diplomatic relations in August 1944.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁵ Ataöv, Turkish, p. 8.

¹⁹⁶ *ibid*, pp. 39-40, 48.

¹⁹⁷ Lenczowski, *the Middle East*, pp. 131-3; Howard, pp. 176-7.

Against growing German influence and pressure in the Balkans, England was in search of allies and approached Turkey in March 1939 on the question of Rumania becoming a victim of aggression from Germany. Poland was moving towards being in danger and Italian aggression in Albania increased fears. Turkey, which had been feeling threatened by Italian aggression, started negotiations with England and France while aiming not to provoke Germany. A bipartite agreement was achieved on May 1939 that said “in the event of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area, they would cooperate effectively and lend each other aid and assistance”. The move was officially declared as an effort of saving Turkey from War by uniting for peace but not shying away from war when required by R. Saydam, the Turkish PM.¹⁹⁸

Germany on the other hand was upset about the deal as German ambassador in Ankara Von Papen noted that Turkey had abandoned her earlier line of strict neutrality and allied with Britain. The Germans believed that Turkey had to be reverted back to her earlier position and had to be pressurized not to complete an eventual agreement with the West. Securing an agreement in the Alexandretta issue, Turkey signed a Franco-Turkish Declaration in June 1939, identical to the one with Britain.¹⁹⁹ Overall, Turkey successfully exploited the systemic dynamics as she secured Alexandretta from France in July 1939.²⁰⁰

Turkey had a bilateral Turco-Soviet Agreement of Mutual Assistance prolonged since 1925. The USSR on the other hand was working towards an arrangement with Western Europe against the Nazis. However, attaining no results, the USSR devised a pact with Germany on 23 August 1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (or Nazi-Soviet Pact)²⁰¹, which came as a complete surprise to Turks. Turkey had aimed to keep both sides at equal distance (and had believed that British opposition against Germany could lead to Soviet

¹⁹⁸ Ataöv, Turkish, pp. 20-5; Aydın, İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye, p. 417.

¹⁹⁹ *ibid*, pp. 27-30.

²⁰⁰ Robins, the Foreign Policy, p. 313.

²⁰¹ Campbell, Defense, pp. 20-3.

participation in the war effort) but now the whole balance was upset. Turkey had aimed to converge two impossible aims, stay pro-West and pro-Soviet.²⁰²

Turkish Foreign Minister Ş. Saraçoğlu had been invited to Moscow in the same month, but arrived only in late September after the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed and invasion of Poland was underway. With the alignment of Nazis and Soviets, the USSR had to resist any Turkish initiatives that might cause the encirclement of Germany from the Balkans and the Black Sea. The dialogue for the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the USSR and Turkey continued with the Soviet aim of securing permanent neutrality from Turkey. Since Western aid to Romania would come from the Straits, they aimed to keep the Straits closed. Hence, to avoid Turkish cooperation with the West became the most important policy of Germany regarding Turkey.²⁰³ The Soviets proposed Saraçoğlu two unacceptable clauses; first, to close the Straits to foreign warships and second, to conclude a mutual assistance pact with the USSR (to win Turkey away from the West). The first one was immediately rejected and for the second, views of Britain and France with whom Turkey's negotiations had reached the final stage had to be taken. After the rejection of both proposals, as Saraçoğlu left Moscow, the Turkish Government made public the Mutual Assistance Treaty with Britain and France on October 19, 1939, greatly disapproved by Russia. France and Britain promised to protect Turkey if it were attacked by any power. In exchange Turkey was to side with them if Italy were to declare war or if fighting broke out in Romania and Greece. This was however conditional on Turkey receiving aid from Britain and France.²⁰⁴ Turkey secured two clauses in the pact which were; Turkey's duties as an ally would not be operative unless the war spread to Eastern Mediterranean and in undertaking her obligations, Turkey would not be compelled to enter into an armed conflict with the USSR.²⁰⁵

In the 1939-1941 period, the Soviet leadership tried to set a bargaining position to limit the German advance in the Balkans, to establish Soviet predominance in Turkey and also

²⁰² Aydın, İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye, p. 416.

²⁰³ Ataöv, Turkish, pp. 52-7; Lenczowski, the Middle East, pp. 126-7.

²⁰⁴ Brown, pp. 98-9.

²⁰⁵ Lenczowski, Soviet, pp. 38-40.

to prevent the West from using their ME position to attack the USSR. Turkish foreign policy aimed to avoid being attacked by Germany or the Soviets. The Nazi victories of 1940 (securing France) removed the danger and posed more pressure on the Soviets. With the entry of Italy, the War had spread to the Mediterranean and Turkey could enter into the War. However, fall of France in June 1940 had drastically changed the conditions and it would be suicidal for Turkey to jump into the War. While attaining a sphere of influence in the direction of the Indian Ocean was a favorable possibility for Stalin, German control of the Balkans made him dependent on Germany. In November 1940, Molotov negotiating with the Germans, proposed to have Soviet bases at the Straits, an alliance between the USSR and Bulgaria (providing to guarantee Bulgaria an outlet on the Aegean)²⁰⁶ and to secure the area south of Batum and Baku towards the Persian Gulf as Soviet spheres of influence.²⁰⁷ An eastward German move was frightening for Turkey in 1940 and Turkey promoted unity in the Balkans, but Rumania and Bulgaria were under German control. In 1941, Turkey was even more alarmed with German victories in Yugoslavia, Greece, Aegean Islands, anti-British rebellion in Iraq and Vichy controlled Syria coming under German rule.²⁰⁸

Soviet plans to pressurize Turkey to make territorial and strategic concessions with the German scare were to subside with the start of Nazi initiation of Operation Barbarossa on the USSR in June 1941.²⁰⁹ While before the German attack, Soviet policy was to detach Turkey from her alliance with Britain and France, now having aligned with the West, the USSR was the most enthusiastic of the allies to see Turkey in war against Germany in 1941-1942. Nevertheless, İnönü government continued to uphold non-belligerency in the War (with the belief that Germany will win the war in 1942)²¹⁰ but this was not liked by the USSR who preferred the opening up of another front in Europe against Germany²¹¹ and

²⁰⁶ Kuniholm, *the Origins*, p. 69.

²⁰⁷ Campbell, *Defense*, pp. 20-3.

²⁰⁸ Lenczowski, *the Middle East*, pp. 129-30.

²⁰⁹ Lenczowski, *Soviet*, p. 42; Aydın, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye*, p. 445.

²¹⁰ Feroz, *the Historical Background*, p. 23.

²¹¹ Lenczowski, *Soviet*, p. 42.

opening up the Straits to the Allied ships.²¹² Turkey was harshly criticized for her claimed pro-Axis standing.²¹³

On the other hand, Turkey was excessively worried by a possible Nazi invasion and had signed a non-aggression pact with Germany on 18 June 1941, four days before the Nazi offensive on the USSR started, where the two countries pled to respect each other's territorial integrity.²¹⁴ The German invasion of the USSR had relieved Turkey of anxiety about possible aggression from both Germany and the USSR, the Polish case. However, now it was the Germans turn to threaten Turkey. Aiming to win over Turkey, Von Papen attempted to attract her by a special incentive, Pan-Turanism, which was a First World War ideal when Turkey mainland joined together with the Turkish speaking elements of Caucasus and Central Asia. It was a divisive and dangerous ideology for the USSR.²¹⁵ Now in 1942, with the advance of German armies towards the interior of the USSR, Germans saw an opportunity in reviving it, yet attained no results against Turkey's insistence on neutrality.²¹⁶ However, inside Turkey there was a rise in Pan-Turanism ideals, which could also provoke the Soviets. In an effort to decrease Soviet irritation with Turkey about not joining the war and the rise of Pan-Turanism, the Turkish government banned Pan-Turanian 'Grey Wolf Society' and put its leaders in jail in the second half of 1944.²¹⁷

In December 1942, Britain aimed to bring Turkey under the Allied camp. In February meeting of Churchill and İnönü in Adana, it was agreed that proper material was to be supplied to Turkey and was followed by the entry of British personnel to Turkey. However, with the threat of Germany in the Balkans, the Turkish government refused to abandon non-belligerency. In the Quebec Conference in August 1943, it was agreed that Turkey should keep German ships away from the Straits, stop chrome sales to Germany

²¹² Aydın, İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye, pp. 446-7.

²¹³ Kuniholm, the Origins, p. 69, Lenczowski, the Middle East, pp. 134-5.

²¹⁴ <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/turger41.asp>.

²¹⁵ Carley, Turkey's place in the World, p. 5. Being a realist, Mustafa Kemal had rejected such adventurism in the early 1920s when the Turkish War of Independence was being fought, a time when Soviet support was crucial; Aydın, İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye, p. 449.

²¹⁶ Lenczowski, the Middle East, pp. 132-4.

²¹⁷ Lenczowski, Soviet, pp. 43-5.

and prepare her facilities for war. While Churchill was willing to persuade Turkey to join the war on the allied side or make the Turkish airfields available, American military planners did not agree to new commitments in the Eastern Mediterranean. With Italy's surrender in September 1943, in Moscow Conference, it was decided that Turkey should enter War while Eden believed that "Turkey was militarily very backward and would be a liability than an asset."²¹⁸

Towards the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, as German military threat decreased, there was increasing anxiety in Turkey about what Soviets demands would be after the war.²¹⁹ Turkey was worried that if she declared war against the Axis following the Soviet pressure and propaganda, this would give the USSR the right to enter into Turkish territory²²⁰ as part of the war effort against Germany similar to Poland. Simultaneously Moscow was nesting a Union of Polish Patriots (a puppet Polish army to entre Poland with the Red Army to liberate the country) as well as disregarding Polish government in exile in London.²²¹ A Cairo Conference was held in December 1943 between Roosevelt, Churchill and İnönü where the former two stressed the importance and advantages of Turkey's entry into war and if Turkey missed the opportunity she might find herself alone. İnönü on the other hand did not want to be dragged into war blindly and wanted to know his part exactly. It was agreed that a general plan of entry was to be made by experts as İnönü insisted on war materials and requested a few days. Churchill demanded the availability of Turkish air fields by February 15, 1944. Otherwise Turkey would fail to reap the advantages that the entry into war would provide to her.²²²

Late in 1943, the USSR reversed her policy to coerce Turkey into entering the war. She either hoped to create a situation that would make the occupation of Turkey possible or legitimize Soviet claims over the Turkish Straits. Simultaneously, Turks were worried about after war settlement in the Balkan and Iranian events which pointed to malevolence

²¹⁸ Lenczowski, *the Middle East*, p. 133; Aydın, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye*, pp. 451-464; Howard, p. 172-88.

²¹⁹ Kinross, p. 21.

²²⁰ Kuniholm, *the Origins*, p. 69.

²²¹ Lenczowski, *Soviet*, pp. 43-5.

²²² Howard, pp. 188-92.

of Soviet intentions. The worry was that an Anglo-Soviet deal had been struck to share the Balkans and the march of Russian troops into Bulgaria on September 8 was part of this plan. Soon it was obvious that Soviets wanted full control over Bulgaria and the Balkans.²²³ Now, anti-German articles were seen in the press as Turkey was aligning itself with the Allied camp in late 1944. She severed economic and political relations with Germany and opened the Straits for supply of material to the USSR in January 1945. This was followed by declaration of war in February 1945 to go to San Francisco Conference. Still, anxiety over Soviet fears remained.²²⁴

4.2.3 Turkish-Soviet relations and the US response

Soviet government's denouncement of the Soviet-Turkish Pact of Friendship and Non-aggression in March 1945 alarmed Turkey even more and pushed her to look for backing from the West (Section 2.2.3). The alignment was formalized with Truman Doctrine and was eventually sealed with NATO (Section 5.1).

4.3 Truman Doctrine and Implications for Turkey

The Foreign Ministers Conferences after the War had shown that Soviets were ambitious to secure their southern flank and acquire a springboard to the ME. Similar to Russia's traditional goals, which led to the British incentive to meet them, the USSR was pursuing the same goals in 1945 and this time was to find similar responses from the US. Anglo-American interest in the Near East converged and the necessity of confronting Soviet pressures along the Northern Tier followed as seen in Section 2.2. Although the US did not want to get involved in a military commitment in the ME, March 1946 crisis in Iran forced her to understand that UN had some shortcomings and that bilateral negotiation between the USSR and Northern Tier countries would only give way to Soviet encroachments over their neighbors. Washington now recognized the need to deal firmly with the Soviets, which led to sharp responses to Soviet encroachments over Iran and Turkey.

²²³ Kuniholm, *the Origins*, pp. 60-5, 69-70.

²²⁴ Lenczowski, *the Middle East*, p. 135.

Now that policy was established, the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) was to translate it into actual concrete policy responses. The Turkish army, which remained mobilized, due to the Soviet scare was draining the Turkish economy and did not allow any new investment to be undertaken. On the other hand the situation in Greece did not improve as the civil war continued at full speed.

A critical memorandum prepared by the Division of Near Eastern Affairs as early as October 21, 1946, imparted that the events of 1945-1946 have pointed out the vital importance of Turkey. The memo drew attention to three main points. First Turkey was one of the few nations that lay in the periphery of the USSR but was not controlled by the USSR although there were signs²²⁵ that pointed to the fact that the Soviets aimed to see Turkey in her sphere of influence. Like this, the US aimed to use her both “as a defense against possible outside attack from the Mediterranean and as a springboard for political and military expansion into the Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East.” Through her geographical position Turkey was “the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence could most effectively flow into the Eastern Mediterranean and ME”, making possible a Soviet advance into Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula, which were at the time quite free from direct Russian pressure. Turkey’s loss to the Soviets would also expose Greece and Iran, two countries that were already going through difficulty in standing up to the USSR and her agents. Secondly, Turkey was a blessing for the US’ plans because there were not effective Soviet supporters similar to those existing in Greece, Iran and China. None of the states in the region were as stable or united as Turkey against pressures from the USSR.²²⁶

“In the first years after World War II, as the only Islamic country with a secular democratic government and was seen as a bulwark against Soviet designs in the

²²⁵ Such as organized radio attacks on Turkish Government, Soviet assertion that some portions of Eastern Turkey must be incorporated into the USSR, denunciation of the Turco-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1925, Soviet insistence on the arrangement for joint defense of the Black Sea Straits based on the diplomatic notes of August 7 and September 24, 1946 insisting on a joint Turco-Soviet defense of the Black Sea Straits.

²²⁶ FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, the Near East and Africa, Turkey, Memorandum on Turkey prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, October 21, 1946, pp. 894-6.

ME. Along with Iran, it provided a massive land barrier to Moscow's ambitions in the oil-rich Persian Gulf.”²²⁷

Moreover, Turkey was ready and determined to cope with the Soviet pressure as Turkish Foreign Minister N. Sadak opined that Turkey was worried that the USSR could turn her into a satellite similar to Eastern European countries,

“Armed with the control of Straits, the USSR would demand a Communist government at Ankara and would impose one on Turkey.”²²⁸

If Soviets even partially attained their objectives in Turkey, this would lead other nations to give in to the USSR and abandon the effort to support upholding the UN principles, inevitably weakening the security of the US. The third point that the memo highlighted was that Turkey would not be able to stand against Soviet pressures if she was completely left to her own devices. While the country had to retain a large military due to the persistence of the Soviet threat, this simultaneously consumed the Turkish economy. The US government hence decided to support Turkey in four ways, 1) diplomatic (the support given to Turkey in the Straits issue to be repeated), 2) moral (the upholding of UN principles should be explained to the Turkish and American people), 3) economic (an Export-Import Bank credit of \$25 mn was authorized) and 4) military.²²⁹ Suggesting the geostrategic importance of Turkey and Greece in the politico-military defense of the ME.

“They are the natural bastions of the ME to the North and West. It was when the West lost command of the Mediterranean during the last war that the Italians and Germans could were able to attack the ME overland from North Africa. British

²²⁷ Kuniholm B. R., (March, 1991), “Turkey and the West”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, Is. 2, p. 34.

²²⁸ Sadak, N., (1949), “Turkey Faces the Soviets”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 27, pp. 458-60.

²²⁹ FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, the Near East and Africa, Turkey, Memorandum on Turkey prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, 21 October 1946, pp. 894-6.

control of the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea by sea and of the Sudan by land has acted as a shield to the whole area from the East and South.”²³⁰

As of February 1947, Britain admitted that she was in no position to extend further financial or military aid to Greece and Turkey and asked for American assistance to supplant British aid.²³¹ The war had demolished the British economy which had lost two-third of her exports, half of its overseas investments and a significant portion of its financial reserves necessitating a reduction in overseas commitments.²³² In a matter of weeks (signaling that the move was not a sudden, drastic departure in American foreign policy) on 12 March 1947, the first of the containment moves, namely the Truman Doctrine emerged.²³³ President Truman appealed to the Congress asking for \$400 mn aid for Greece (\$300 mn) and Turkey (\$100 mn). To convince the Congress, Acheson asserted the importance of decisiveness in “getting tough with Russia” to secure approval to the doctrine.

“In the past eighteen months, Soviet pressure on the Straits, on Iran and on northern Greece had brought the Balkans to the point where a highly possible Soviet breakthrough might open their continents to Soviet penetration. Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran all to the East. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt and to Europe through Italy and France, already threatened by the strongest domestic Communist parties in Western Europe.”²³⁴

²³⁰ FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, the Pentagon Talks of 1947 between the US and the UK concerning the ME and the Eastern Mediterranean, A memorandum prepared in the Department of State, pp. 569-70.

²³¹ Lenczowski, Soviet, p. 46; (Ed.) Hanhimeaki, J. M. and Westad, O. A., The Cold War, A History in Documents and Eye Witness Accounts, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 107; Brands, p. 14.

²³² Kuniholm, the Origins, pp. 406-7.

²³³ LaFeber, p. 52; Paterson, p. 193; Kuniholm, the Origins, pp. 211-13.

²³⁴ Acheson, D., Present at the Creation, W.W. Norton & Co, New York, 1969, p. 219. Acheson meant that in the Northern Tier, there were quite a few ethnic groups who would be open to Soviet manipulation.

Truman made a very original speech to attain the support of the Republican dominated stingy Congress²³⁵ and the American people despite opposition of some officials in the State Department. He used the ideological rivalry between the two superpowers and exaggerated the Soviet challenge for world leadership. In fact, the President did all he could to “scare the hell out of the country” as the Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg had advised during the draft preparations.²³⁶ The speech portrayed that US’ support for Greece and Turkey was part of the global struggle between democracy and dictatorship.²³⁷ The rhetoric may be likened to the idealism of Wilson principles²³⁸ as Truman imparted the world must now “choose between alternative ways of life.” The Americans were asked to commit to help free peoples against totalitarian regimes and

“It must be the policy of the US to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.... If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East. Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war.”²³⁹

²³⁵ In the Congressional elections of November 1946, the Republicans under the leadership of Senator Robert Taft had defeated the Democrats (President Roosevelt and President Truman were Democrats) for the first time since 1932. War was over and Taft and a large portion of the Republicans were in support of isolationism in US foreign policy. Hence, there was extensive domestic pressure on the Truman administration to detach the US from the problems of Europe. Nevertheless, throughout 1946, during the Foreign Ministers Meetings held in Paris and New York, where US officials were getting more in line with containment strategy, the State Department carefully accumulated bipartisan support through the presence of Republican Senators A. Vandenberg and T. Connally in their meetings.

²³⁶ Gardner, L. C., *Imperial America, American Foreign Policy Since 1898*, Rutgers University, New York, 1985, p. 184.

²³⁷ Kissinger, p. 453. He argues that criticism of the Congress on Truman Doctrine was based on two main reasons. Firstly, Greece and Turkey were not really examples of democratic rule so it was claimed that the US was committing herself to the defense of countries that were not morally worth it. Secondly, these countries were not regarded as vital to American security

²³⁸ *ibid*, pp. 451-452.

²³⁹ President Truman’s, Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey, March 12, 1947. available on site: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12846>

While the speech had overdone its mission, it nevertheless allowed the President to rally support behind him and attained the support of the Congress as well as the people. It also signaled to the Soviets that the US would not sit back but would aim for US primacy in the ME.²⁴⁰

In the events that followed, Truman was able to secure the presidential election of November 1948 but he would have a difficult time with the seeds of anti-communism that he had planted because the “overstated and misleading” rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine bounced back to his administration through McCarthyism.²⁴¹ As Chiang Kai-shek lost power in China in 1949, the US regarded China “lost to the Soviets”. The China first lobby in the US which had gained momentum after 1948 constantly accused Truman administration with accelerated doses of McCarthyism for being soft on communists. As communist hunt accelerated in the US²⁴² and failed to take the opportunity to talk to Mao despite evidence of considerable disagreement among the Chinese and Soviet communists. Further communist scare hastened as information on the fact that the USSR had enhanced atomic weapons (first test was held in August 1949) reached Washington and the expectation was that Soviets might achieve full atomic capability in the early 1950s, probably in 1952. The USSR was expected to exert more influence in Asia as well as in Western Europe.²⁴³

As the Truman Doctrine became law on 22 May 1947, Turkish-American defense relationship for containing Soviet expansion started. The military assistance agreement signed on 12 July 1947 was the first military contract between the two countries. The US was to furnish Turkey²⁴⁴ with military and naval equipment, US Army-Navy-Air personnel

²⁴⁰ Kuniholm, *the Origins*, pp. 413, 415.

²⁴¹ *ibid*, pp. 416-7.

²⁴² President transformed the defense system of the country by passing the National Security Act through the Congress in July 1947 establishing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a National Security Council (NSC) to advise the president and a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

²⁴³ Campbell, *Defense*, pp. 39-40.

²⁴⁴ FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, *the Near East and Africa*, US Economic and Military Aid to Greece and Turkey: the Truman Doctrine, Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of War (Patterson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal), March 13, 1947, pp. 111-4 and the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey, p. 173. This memorandum reviewed the Truman Doctrine and explained why the US must give support Turkey. The withdrawal of UK, at least temporarily from her long-lasting role as the stabilizing power of the ME through the eventual evacuation of the Suez base and relinquishment of Palestine were to affect Turkish security adversely. Moreover, discontinuance of British economic and financial aid to Greece

to assist the use of the new equipment as well as financial aid and technical advice for road, harbor and strategic buildings' construction.²⁴⁵ The aid was welcomed by everyone, especially the government since Turkey would now be able to modernize her obsolete military establishment. The criticisms of some like M. A. Aybar, F. Köprülü and independent İstanbul Deputy H. Bayur on the granting of unrestricted freedom to US journalists (no such right existing for Turkish counterparts) and US officials to supervise the aid were unheard.²⁴⁶

Concurrently, the fragility of European economy required American involvement.²⁴⁷ The main worry was that economic problems were the reason why alternatives to democracy were devised and that poverty would breed communism through hunger, desperation and chaos.²⁴⁸ The Marshall Plan invited Europeans (including the Russians) to devise a long-term program to get the Europe back on its feet and most importantly to rebuild Germany. However, this was not in line with the Soviet aim of keeping the enemy weak. Relations

was detrimental for Turkish security as the US predicted that if Greece was not secured effectively from the control of communists, the fear of ultimate Soviet domination might induce the Turks to compromise with the Soviets. Hence, the US believed that positive assurances and improvements in Turkish military would strengthen Turkish posture against Soviet pressure. In the unlikely case of war (US officials also declared that the USSR currently possessed neither the desire nor the resources for a major war. In fact she knew that such event will result in war with the West, which now had the atomic monopoly.) Turks could resist and undertake a holding and delaying action against Soviets. In a potential war, Turkey was a natural barrier to an advance by the USSR to the EM and ME countries, esp. Palestine. A Soviet dominated Turkey would mean a Soviet dominated ME because the West would not be able to effectively defend the region. Also, in peace Turkey held the key position with respect to the ME. Her determination to stand up to Russian pressure and her democracy set an example to her neighbors.

²⁴⁵ FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, the Pentagon Talks of 1947 between the US and the UK concerning the ME and the Eastern Mediterranean, Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State, pp. 525-6; FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, the Near East and Africa, Truman Doctrine, the Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, August 17, 1947, pp. 298-309 and the British Embassy to the Department of State, pp. 351-3. The relationship exceeded only military aid as for example, Turkey was concerned to get Western advice and approval for military decisions. Turkish Foreign Minister Saka in 1947 approached Ambassador Wilson on American (as well as British) advice in downsizing Turkish armed forces from 485,000 men to 330,000 for comforting the budget. Saka declared that while the Turkish General Staff was worried about the possibility of revitalized Russian pressure, the government made considerations on the economic burden of the large military which represented 60% of the Turkish budget. The US and British supported the reduction and reorganization of the Turkish military.

²⁴⁶ Harris, pp. 26-9.

²⁴⁷ Gaddis, the US, p. 317.

²⁴⁸ Marshall, G. "European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery," Address at Commencement Exercises at Harvard University, June 5, 1947, available on site: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/index.php?pagenumber=1&documentdate=1947-06-05&documentid=8-7

with the USSR during the Marshall Plan quickly broke down and subsequently, the USSR devised the Molotov Plan for EE in July 1947 and set up COMECON for promoting the development of the Eastern bloc.²⁴⁹ Simultaneously, priorities in other parts of the world required American attention and resources to be drawn away from the ME while Arab-Israel war started. In June 1948, the Soviet blockade of Berlin started elections in France and Italy threatened to bring communists to power. As Mao Zedong's Communists beat Chiang Kai-shek's nationalists, Washington concentrated on Japan as the stabilizing force against China in the Pacific.²⁵⁰

Nevertheless by 1948, Truman Doctrine seemed successful in the ME to which it was addressed as Greece avoided a communist takeover²⁵¹, Turkey maintained her sovereignty and territorial integrity and Iran managed to get rid of Soviet sponsored secessionist republics in the north.²⁵²

²⁴⁹ LaFeber, pp. 68-9.

²⁵⁰ Brands, pp. 31-2.

²⁵¹ As Yugoslavia left the Communist Bloc in early 1948, Tito ended giving help to the Greek left effectively leading to their end.

²⁵² Lenczowski, Soviet, p. 55.

5. THE ME ON THE WAY TO THE BAGHDAD PACT: US STARTS TO TAKE OVER FROM BRITAIN

Although there were some disputes such as oil concessions, influence on Saudi Arabia and Jewish immigration into Palestine²⁵³, the basic principles of cooperation in ME policy was established during the “Pentagon Talks” between British and US officials in 1947.²⁵⁴ Both sides believed in the vitality of the region for Western purposes and drew attention to the recent Soviet expansionist aspirations over the Northern Tier.

It was emphasized that Soviet aims in the region would not only destroy Western interests in the area but also harm the global position of the free world vis-à-vis the USSR as Acheson summarizes,

“When we refer to the Near and Middle East, we have in mind the territory lying between the Mediterranean and India. When the USSR has once obtained full mastery of this territory, which is strategically important from the point of view of resources including oil and from the point of communications, it will be in a much stronger position to obtain its objectives in India and China.”²⁵⁵

Given the extent of US commitments in other parts of the world and Britain’s already established position in the region, the US believed that Britain should maintain primary responsibility for military security in the ME.²⁵⁶ Hence, the US followed the British lead in the ME in the attempt to form a collective defense pact, namely MEC and MEDO with the newly sovereign states of the region to contain the communist aggression during 1951 and 1952. Hence, this section will include an account of the British standing in the ME

²⁵³ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. V, the Pentagon Talks of 1947 between the US and the UK concerning the ME and the Eastern Mediterranean, A memorandum prepared in the Department of State, p. 498. During 1947 Pentagon talks, Bevin explained that in 1946 and 1947, there had been considerable bloodshed and loss of property in Palestine as well as decline in British prestige. He also claimed that the US had the blame in this regard through the statement of admitting additional Jews into Palestine at a critical time. He also claimed that terrorists in Palestine received the bulk of their financial and moral support for illegal immigration from America.

²⁵⁴ Campbell, Defense, pp. 29-30.

²⁵⁵ FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, August 15, 1946, pp. 840-1.

²⁵⁶ FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, “the Pentagon Talks of 1947” between the US and the UK concerning the ME and the Eastern Mediterranean, Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State, pp. 513-4.

after the Second World War. Basically, two basic sources of conflict prevailed in the region. First was the rivalry between Arab nationalism and Western imperialism and second was Arab-Israel hostility, both of which was exacerbated with the East-West rivalry.

Although it was not often clear whether the local Arabs had an allegiance to one nation such as Egypt or Iraq or to a greater Arab ideal, the rising Arab nationalist leaders were agitated by the remains of imperial (British) rule in the form of bilateral treaties imposed on their countries. Dramatic changes occurred in the societies as the tide of nationalism created evolutionary movements and forced national wars of liberation to expel Western colonial powers. The new leaders accused traditional elites in their societies for being in collaboration with the imperialists for decades and for aiming to prolong the earlier established ties with the West. In the end, as will be shown, Western attempts to divert third-world nationalism into anti-Communist directions were not successful as these countries did not perceive the same set of dangers from Soviets that the West did. The ME countries in fact believed that the West exaggerated the Soviet threat to draw attention away from the more pressing issues of full emancipation of their nations (anti-imperialism) and the Palestine dispute. Hence, British initiatives in early 1950s failed as well as similar attempts that followed.²⁵⁷

Especially after Stalin's death in 1953, the USSR had a revitalized approach towards the ME with the new Soviet leaders. The USSR was ready to court these countries with her anti-imperialist credentials and managed to successfully exploit the Arab struggle for liberation for her own purposes.²⁵⁸ The Arab nationalists in turn did not hesitate to accept the backing of the USSR. In the meantime, the US was taking over Britain's traditional responsibility in the ME. As conflicting interests intersected and superpower rivalry reached a peak, what followed was a series of crisis in the region after 1955.

²⁵⁷ Sanjian, A., *Turkey and her Arab Neighbours, 1953-58*, Archive Editions, UK, 2001, p. 22.

²⁵⁸ Soviet Strategy and Intentions in the Mediterranean Basin, National Intelligence Estimate Number 11-6-67, CIA, June 1, 1967, p. 10, available on site: http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000278481.pdf

“For most of the 20th century two ideas, both of European origin, dominated political thought and action in the ME - socialism and nationalism.”²⁵⁹

5.1 Turkey: Incorporation Into the West is Complete

5.1.1 NATO and Turkey

While the ME was still critical for the Americans, it seemed that the region would assume second priority as the US could not devote any substantial resources there. Higher priorities in other parts of the world, especially in Europe (after the Czech coup and tighter Soviet grip of EE) led the US to concentrate on the Old Continent with Marshall Aid and NATO during the turbulent period of 1948-1949.

In spring 1948, as the US Congress approved the Marshall Plan, Britain, France and the Benelux formed the Brussels's Pact in April 1948. This was a defensive pact designed to repel any attempt to topple democratic governments in Europe after witnessing the “brutal Czech coup”²⁶⁰ which reawakened fears that the Soviets might sponsor other coups”. However, Western Europe simply lacked the sufficient strength to stand against a Soviet attack and some sort of American involvement had to be considered. Undersecretary of State R. Lovett and Senator A. Vandenberg together drew up a congressional resolution for US entry into this new institution, called NATO. After the Senate approval on May 11, 1948, Lovett left for Europe to draft the treaty, which took its final form in April 1949. For Britain, participation in a regional defense system, namely NATO, would relieve her from urgent defense expenses. Much more importantly, the US would be responsible to

²⁵⁹ Lewis B., *the Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, Schocken Books, New York, 1998, p. 131.

²⁶⁰ (Ed.) Hanhimeaki and Westad, p. 38, FRUS, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Vol. IV, the Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, February 27, 1948, pp. 741-2. While Czechoslovakia had signed a treaty with the USSR in 1943 making her part of the Eastern bloc, President E. Benes and Foreign Minister J. Masaryk resisted full communist control. After the Marshall Plan, Stalin decided to increase his grip of Eastern Europe. In February 1948, with Red Army troops assembled at the Czech border, the communists staged a coup d'état in the country. Since no Western help was forthcoming, the President failed to take advantage of obvious popular anti-Communist sentiment and Communists gained full control. From then on the USSR pressed for orthodoxy within EE demonstrated in the purges and show trials between 1948-1952 during which a number of EE leaders who were accused of being sympathetic to the West or having 'national deviation' were killed (such as Rajk in Hungary, Kostov in Bulgaria and Slansky in Czechoslovakia) or removed from office (Gomulka in Poland, Răscănu in Romania).

finance Europe's rearmament allowing Europe to carry on with recovery.²⁶¹ It was during this time that the Berlin Blockade (between June 1948 and May 1949) erupted. On 24 June, all highway and railway traffic between Berlin²⁶² and the Western zones was restricted. As a US official noted,

“Presence in Berlin of western occupants became a symbol of resistance to eastern expansionism. It is unquestionably an idea of our prestige in Central and Eastern Europe. As far as Germany is concerned, it is a test case of US ability in Europe. If we docilely withdraw now, Germans and other Europeans would conclude that our retreat from western Germany is just a question of time.”²⁶³

Washington responded by following a firm policy of supporting West Berlin by sending supplies through an airlift that lasted 324 days.²⁶⁴ This act was also to be a demonstration of superior US technology, economy and humanitarianism in comparison to Soviet brutality. As the Berlin Blockade ended in April 1949, the idea of a US guarantee to protect Europe was complete. French fears over German rearmament were answered with a US promise to finance French expenditure in Vietnam²⁶⁵ as well as in Europe.

Although containment was essentially passive in terms of diplomacy with the USSR, it enabled creativity in what the Truman administration called “building positions of strength” in military and economic domains. Acheson was particularly interested in this

²⁶¹ FRUS, 1948, Vol. III, Western Europe, the UK, Report by the Office of Intelligence Research, Britain's Rearmament Policy: Political and Economic Implications, pp. 1122-4.

²⁶² The USSR was already upset that the economic reconstruction of Western Europe had started with a federal form of government uniting the three Western zones as well as a currency reform. Stalin naturally was alarmed of an idea of revitalized West Berlin inside East Germany.

²⁶³ FRUS, 1948, Vol. II, Germany and Austria, the United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State, June 26, 1948, pp. 919-21.

²⁶⁴ LaFeber, pp. 74-6. Simultaneously, the three Western zones of Germany were merged under the Federal Republic of Germany.

²⁶⁵ After the Second World War, the US supported the continuation of French dominance (since the late 19th century) in Indochina instead of passing power to the Vietnamese communist leader Ho Chi Minh. Hence, the US was committed to the French cause as of February 1950, four months before the Korean War and had promised financial aid. LaFeber states that the importance of Indochina is due to the fact that it was available for Japanese exploitation, which was the most important American position in the Pacific.

because it would also serve to avoid negotiations between East-West.²⁶⁶ Hence, he had aimed to tighten the American military alliance with Western Europe because he believed that Europe's political problems could be solved by the use of military alliances.²⁶⁷ The Americans aimed to "thwart any attempt by the Kremlin to seize Western Europe in wartime, intimidate it in peacetime, or lure West Germany into its orbit anytime."²⁶⁸

When NATO was formed in April 1949, Turkey (then lead by RPP) was immediately interested in becoming a member. Turkey aimed to join NATO because

"Turks saw themselves as being more threatened than NATO countries (by the USSR) and less able to protect themselves. Because they were not protected by a treaty they were concerned that the Soviets might be tempted to once more display their previous pressures."²⁶⁹

To counter the Soviet threat that might resurrect in the future, Turkey was now asking for guarantee, mainly from the US as the leader of the free world. On top of this security concern explained above, what weighed as much in the mind of Turkish politicians was probably that NATO membership would systemize the Western aid, which could be utilized for Turkey's economic development and modernization of her army. The great scare in the country was that her exclusion from NATO could lead to a reduction in US interest in Turkey, which could translate to the loss of aid altogether. Lastly, NATO membership symbolized Turkey's acceptance into the family of European nations which had been the guiding principle of the nation since 1923 (and even during the Ottoman Empire) and a refusal would in fact be exploited by the opposition.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁶ Leffler, *A Preponderance*, p. 390. Faced with the possibility of a rearmed Western-oriented Germany entering into NATO and in an effort to win her away, USSR proposed to three Western powers a peace treaty that would unify an independent Germany (with an army not tied to any power) but was not picked up by Acheson whether it was genuine or not.

²⁶⁷ LaFeber, pp. 128-130.

²⁶⁸ Leffler, *the Specter*, p. 114

²⁶⁹ Kuniholm, B. R., *Turkey and the West since World War II* (Ed.) Mastny, V. and Nation, R. C., *Turkey between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power*, Westview Press, US, 1997, p. 48.

²⁷⁰ Vali, F. A., *Bridge across the Bosphorus: the Foreign Policy of Turkey*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1971, pp. 125-6, 115.

RPP's initial calls for membership were not heard by NATO members despite Turkish statesmen's reasoning that European security could not be complete without Turkey.²⁷¹ Brown asserts that the reason why the US left Turkey (and Greece) out of NATO was that the US and her allies did not want to spread their scarce resources to further regions from the North Atlantic and concentrated on protecting the core, Europe. Besides if Turkey and Greece were accepted, it would set a precedent for other countries.²⁷² Turkey on the other hand believed that the US' unwillingness to extend a formal guarantee to Turkey could mislead the Soviets to the belief that the West would not react to an increase in Soviet pressure on Turkey. During his visit to the US, Foreign Minister Sadak asked for a formal guarantee and raised the issue of an Eastern Mediterranean Pact. While this offer was not picked up, Truman's letter to İnönü (delivered through Sadak) dated 17 April 1949, still it comforted the Turks by confirming that there was no decrease in the country's importance.²⁷³

Turkey's acceptance to the Council of Europe in August 1949, (which would not provide any economic or military resources) was no substitute for NATO²⁷⁴ but was still regarded by the government as Turkey being part of Europe.²⁷⁵

5.1.2 Korean War and Turkey

As bipolarity between the superpowers accelerated, the US was at the point of re-evaluating American Cold War Policies, which led to NSC 68 in April 1950.

“...The USSR is developing the military capacity to support its design for world domination...As for the policy of containment, it is one which seeks by all means short of war...Our position as the center of power in the free world places heavy

²⁷¹ Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak's Interview with Agence France Presse on February 17, 1949 in *Ayın Tarihi*, February 1949; *Ulus*, February 18, 1949.

²⁷² Brown, pp. 100-1. Egypt and Iran had also applied for membership.

²⁷³ FRUS, 1949, Vol. VI, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, April 2, 1949, p. 1650, Letter from President Truman to Turkish President İnönü, April 26, 1949, pp. 1656-7; Gönlübol, M., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1995)*, Siyasal Kitapevi, Ankara, 1996, p. 225.

²⁷⁴ Harris, pp. 37-8.

²⁷⁵ Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla*, p. 227.

responsibility upon the US for leadership. We must organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in positive program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust...The whole success of this program hangs ultimately on recondition by this government, the American people and all free peoples that the Cold War was in fact a real war in which survival of the free world is at stake.”²⁷⁶

NSC 68 drew attention to the sharp difference in the defense expenditure between the East and the West as illustrated in Table 5.1 below.

Table 5.1 Percentages (%) of Gross Available Resources Allocated to Investment, National Defense and Consumption (Source: A Report to the “National Security Council – NSC 68”, April 12, 1950, the President’s Secretary’s File, Truman Papers, pp. 25-6, available in http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf)

%	Gross Investment	Defense	Consumption
USSR	25,4	13,8	60,8
Soviet Orbit	22	4	74
US	13,6	6,5	79,9
W Europe	20,4	4,8	74,8

Hence, the NSC 68 requested a giant increase of the US defense budget from \$13 bn to \$50 bn²⁷⁷ which would allow a rapid building up of strength and improvement of political and economic conditions for the West throughout the world.

As the NSC 68 was formulated, the US needed an opportunity to carry this policy into real life. As hopes to “build positions of strength” seemed to deteriorate, the start of the

²⁷⁶ Report to the “National Security Council – NSC 68”, April 12, 1950, the President’s Secretary’s File, Truman Papers, pp. 25-6, available on site: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf

²⁷⁷ Kuniholm, Turkey and the West since World War II, p. 45-7.

Korean War on June 25, 1950 seemed to provide the proper opening.²⁷⁸ As North Korea attacked South Korea, Truman believed that Soviets were on the march with the aim of world domination and the lesson of history was that aggression had to be met firmly since appeasement only led to eventual war. The Americans believed that the Southeast Asian nations had to be protected from the communists and had to be pulled to the Western orbit. The ME governments also had to be protected from the same virus and be convinced of leaving neutralist ambitions and offer their bases and oil to the Western allies.²⁷⁹

With these considerations, MacArthur (based in Japan) was ordered to provide supplies to South Korea.²⁸⁰ On June 30, Truman decided to send ground units despite the Soviet argument that this was a civil war among Koreans.²⁸¹ But, the War was important in demonstrating the attachment of US policy-makers to create a military shield to protect the allies from Soviet counterthrusts. This was the pretext for increasing defense expenditure even beyond the duration of the Korean conflict and hence increased the importance of the NSC 68 of April 1950. Truman believed that Korea was the Greece of the Far East and if the US was tough enough, the Soviets would back down. While the US had atomic and

²⁷⁸ LaFeber, p. 98.

²⁷⁹ Leffler, *A Preponderance*, p. 361.

²⁸⁰ LaFeber, pp. 99-102. In 1905, after stopping a Russian thrust, Japan had established a protectorate over Korea and in 1910 annexed it. In 1945, Soviets disarmed the Japanese armies north of the 38th parallel and the US disarmed those south of the parallel. But Korea could not be unified after lengthy conferences as both superpowers were worried that a united Korea could join the other camp. A bloody civil war had begun in 1946 between left-wing Koreans (communist and non-communist led by Kim-II Sung, but also tied to Mao's Chinese communist and later moved closer to Stalin to keep the balance) and right-wing Koreans. The US backed the rightist groups under Rhee, who only accepted elections in South Korea but Rhee's heavy handed methods upset the US. When the US wanted to pull out from Korea, Soviet side also decided to leave but the civil war evolved into conventional battles between the two sides. The Korean War started as North attacked South end of June 1950. While Kennan saw it as very dangerous, Dulles, Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East D. Rusk and Acheson believed that the US could force the Koreans to unite and there were rumors that MacArthur would cross the 38th parallel. On September 15, MacArthur armed with NSC decision, made a landing at Inchon and continued northward (to move beyond the 38th parallel). China however was displeased saying that the Americans would not be allowed to come to the border. In November 21, MacArthur continued his drive to Yalu but was pushed back with significant casualties. After the President's remark about US using all its power to contain the Chinese (which implied nuclear weapons), British Prime Minister Attlee visited the US to change his mind. The agreement was that an all-out war must be reverted but differences emerged at the details.

²⁸¹ LaFeber, pp. 102-7; Aron, p. 120. The UN had given its support to the American commitment in Korea because Soviet delegation was not present to veto it. The Soviet delegation at the time was boycotting the exclusion of Communist China from the UNSC. In autumn Acheson pushed through the UN General Assembly a Uniting for Peace proposal giving the Assembly the right to make collective security recommendations, if the veto stopped the UNSC from acting.

military superiority at the moment, it was expected that the USSR would develop their weapons by 1952 and NSC 68 had to be followed to boost US military capability as soon as possible.²⁸² While the US did not expect Soviets to enter the fight in Korea, the fear was that they would take advantage of US preoccupation in Korea and attempt a move on Berlin or ME.²⁸³

In May 1950, the first democratic elections had taken place in Turkey and RPP had peacefully handed over responsibility to DP. This meant a radical change for Turkey from mono-party rule in the last twenty seven years. Within a month, Korean War had started. The new Foreign Minister Köprülü told the US Ambassador that Turkey agreed with the US conduct at the UN and would support the US.²⁸⁴ Soon, DP took the opportunity to distinguish itself from other countries by the decision to send a brigade of 5,000 troops (of the 21 countries only the US, the UK and Canada had sent more troops than Turkey)²⁸⁵ to Korea as a reply to the UN resolution to request military aid to South Korea against North's aggression.

What was the motive for Turkey to take part in the UN force in the Korean conflict? While the formal answer that the government provided was that Turkey would uphold collective security even in the defense of a remote country such as South Korea, the real answer is that Turkey aimed to prove her value to the West and be admitted to NATO.²⁸⁶ The second formal request of Turkish government to join NATO was made only a week after the decision to send troops to Korea and demonstrates Turkey's expectation in this regard.²⁸⁷ The security that NATO would provide was regarded as the answer to the Soviet threats that had terrorized Turkey in the immediate post-War period. While the Soviet

²⁸² Leffler, *A Preponderance*, pp. 363, 367-71.

²⁸³ Brands, p. 35.

²⁸⁴ FRUS, 1950, Vol. V, the Near East, South Asia and Africa, Memorandum of Conversation by the Chief of the Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, pp. 1275-6.

²⁸⁵ Brown, p. 95.

²⁸⁶ *ibid*, p. 97.

²⁸⁷ Brown, p. 103; Eroğul, pp. 72-3. After sending troops, DP also increased efforts to initiate foreign investors into Turkey. Laws passed in 1950 to facilitate foreign investment were elaborated further in August 1951 to include foreign capital into industry, energy, mining, transportation and tourism (but failed to attract the expected capital into Turkey). This is why in 1954, new laws that laxed the entry of foreign enterprises into Turkey were taken.

threat had subsided by 1950, still the contraction in the Turkish army coupled with the expansionist fervor of Stalin scared Turkey.²⁸⁸ As a result, Turkey aimed to ally with the stronger power that could match the Soviets.²⁸⁹ DP government made the issue a life and death matter as PM Menderes stated that any criticism on sending Turkish forces to Korea is a punishable crime.²⁹⁰ Due to the delicacy of the matter, RPP could only criticize how the decision was taken (without discussing the issue in the Parliament and taken without a parliamentary approval) rather than the decision itself.²⁹¹

Earlier Kennan had defined that there were only five meaningful centers of power in the world- the industrial complexes of the US, Great Britain, the Rhine valley, the USSR and Japan.²⁹² If more than one was under hostile control, international equilibrium would not be preserved. NSC 68 took a much broader approach, “changes in balance of power could occur not only as a result of military action” but also from “intangible sources like intimidation, humiliation or even loss of credibility.” Now with NSC 68, “the simple existence of a Soviet threat made all interests endangered vital as US interests became a function of threats” and “could in fact expand or contract as threats did.”²⁹³

²⁸⁸ FRUS, 1950, Vol. V, the Near East, South Asia and Africa, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews), August 28, 1950, p. 1289.

²⁸⁹ Brown, p. 99.

²⁹⁰ Zafer, August 25, 1950.

²⁹¹ Ataöv, Amerika, p. 205; Eroğul, p. 69-71, Soon objections in the Turkish Parliament were dropped due to the heroism displayed by the Turkish troops in Korea and as calls for national unity took priority. In December 1950, DP passed a Parliamentary resolution to regularize the Cabinet’s decision. For opposition’s view; Gülek K. imparted RPP’s official position by a press release on July 26, 1950, Erim N., Hükümetin Son Kararı, Ulus, July 27, 1950, Sadak N., Kore Savaşı ve Türkiye, Akşam, July 16, 1950.

²⁹² Leffler, the Specter, p. 117. He argues that while the limited war continued in Korea, the periphery became important for the global strategy of Truman in its last year in power. With NATO, German and Japan agreements industrial Eurasian core was secured while political turbulence and revolutionary movements prevailed in the periphery. The scare was that the communists could exploit these to increase hold of these centers or weaken the power of America’s allies in the core. The US decided that US should replace British influence and prevent Iran from falling into the hands of Soviets.

²⁹³ Gaddis, J. L. and Nitze, P., (Spring 1980), “NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered”, International Security, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 165-8. Kennan on the other hand believed in a neutralization plan for Central Europe, but NATO and armed Germany could be an obstacle to this. In 1950, Kennan left the State Department.

In summer 1951, negotiations to end a stalemated war in Korea had begun (armistice was to come in July 1953), as the military buildup of Europe was also under way. Although the war was limited to Korea,

“Truman and Acheson used the war as the opportunity to develop new American policies around the globe...the Korean War gave them an opportunity to shut up their critics at home and to take advantage of new openings abroad...the offensive would also allow the administration to put plans into motion including the NSC 68 blueprint and the revitalization of American military alliances around the world.”²⁹⁴

5.1.3 Quid pro quo: Turkey enters NATO in exchange for MEC membership

With UN forces barring communist expansion in Korea and Franco-American effort barring communists in Indochina²⁹⁵, a power vacuum in the ME was becoming more and more obvious as a result of the decline in British prestige in the region. While Egypt was the key for British plans, the prolonged negotiations and the deadlocks between Egypt and Britain were not encouraging. In the effort to keep Western primacy in the ME, Britain devised a new approach to secure the treaty rights through “internationalizing the troops in Suez” through a ME defense arrangement (Section 5.2.1). For this local partners were needed and Arab regimes would be approached after Egypt’s answer was heard. Iran was very important for the security of the ME especially in case Turkey was flanked from the east and south²⁹⁶ but at the time was very hostile to Britain as a result of the embargo on Iranian oil after the nationalization of the Abadan oil refinery (Section 5.2.2). Hence, Iran’s adherence to a British led defense scheme could not be expected. Israel, which had the most organized modern army in the region, could surely be useful against a communist invasion from the north but any cooperation between Israel and Arabs was not realistic. Turkey seemed to be an ideal candidate. The main reason was the clear communist danger that Turkey experienced from the Soviets overlapped with the concerns of the West in the immediate post-War (as well as historical) period. Her geographical proximity to the

²⁹⁴ LaFeber, p. 105.

²⁹⁵ Brands, p. 50.

²⁹⁶ Campbell, Defense, pp. 47-8.

USSR was an advantage also. Besides her Moslem character in a ME Pact could be expected to reduce the opposition of Arabs and could save the arrangement from being labeled “Western”.

Britain aimed to include Turkey in a ME defense scheme with the worry that if Turkey got involved in NATO, she would be less committed to such a pact for the ME.²⁹⁷ The US on the other hand was getting closer to the idea of utilizing Turkey (and Greece) in NATO since she would prove useful in meeting the US’ objectives for the ME which were to deter Soviet armed aggression against the region, to secure NATO’s southern flank and ensure stability and maintain western access of ME oil.

On top of the Soviet threats and the relative reluctance of the West to include Turkey in NATO, G. Avcı claims that “Turkish policy makers created an atmosphere that made Turkey appear indispensable to the West’s security needs” and played the neutrality card.²⁹⁸ After the meetings of US Chiefs of Mission with Turkish officials in İstanbul in February 1951, George McGhee, the US Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East, South Asia and Africa urged the State Department to consider the admittance of Greece and Turkey into NATO.²⁹⁹ Turkey’s frustration was evident as President Bayar stated that Turkey could reconsider her standing in the Cold War. This meant that Turkey could drift to neutrality (similar to Iran under Prime Minister M. Mossadeq).³⁰⁰

At this early stage of the Cold War, Turkey’s importance for the US derived from; 1) Turkey’s strategic position geographically as the southern flank of NATO³⁰¹, 2) the fact

²⁹⁷ Ataöv, Amerika, p. 207.

²⁹⁸ Avcı, G., (2005), “the Postwar Incorporation of Turkey into the Western Alliance”, 1947-1952, European Review, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 421-2.

²⁹⁹ In 1951, Western Foreign Ministers had worked out some rough issues, such as Italy was to be released from the restriction on its military, ties were to develop with Franco’s Spain, who granted the use of military bases in exchange for economic and military aid to Spain and US proposal for the entry of Greece and Turkey into NATO. NATO countries gathered in Lisbon in 1952 to set the ground rules.

³⁰⁰ Leffler, A Preponderance, pp. 420-4; Gönlübol et al., Olaylarla, p. 229; Tamkoç, the Warrior, pp. 230-1, Brown, p. 102.

³⁰¹ If Turkey entered NATO, she would constitute the second largest land force in NATO. With the Turkish army, NATO was stronger in the Eastern Mediterranean against the Soviet land forces. Soviet forces that were initially allocated to EE would have to be moved south against Turkey.

that the West could utilize the Turkish bases and the straits³⁰² close to the SU and “lying at the water passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, commanding the most direct land route from the USSR to the Suez, Turkey was within striking distance of important communist targets.”³⁰³ After the Second World War, as air force and navy took precedence over land power, control of the Straits gained primacy.³⁰⁴ 3) Turkey’s role in protecting the ME as a bulwark against a possible Soviet attack. Turkey would constitute a barrier between the USSR and the region by forcing the USSR to commit large forces to protect its southern flank and the vital oil fields around Baku.”³⁰⁵ US Secretary of State Dean Acheson believed the same by March 1951.

“As the threat of Soviet expansionism seemed to fix on Europe and US policy shifted from containment in the ME (under Truman Doctrine) to containment in Europe (under the Marshall Plan and NATO), Turkey’s main strategic role was increasingly seen in a European context; as potentially bottling up the Soviet navy in the Black Sea, tying up Warsaw Pact forces along NATO’s southern flank and serving as a staging ground for a counterthrust against the Soviet Union.”³⁰⁶

Hence it was not only sending of troops to Korea that paved the way for eventual Turkish entry into NATO.³⁰⁷ The US policy makers were getting increasingly convinced to include

³⁰² Vali, Bridge, pp. 42-50; McGhee G., the US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey’s NATO Entry Contained the Soviets, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1990, p. 170. Montreaux Convention of 1936 facilitated Turkish control over the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus Straits. Through the arrangement, Turkey was entitled to close the Straits to the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and hence could block its main route to the Mediterranean, North Africa and the ME (through the Suez Canal, could reach the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean). Likewise, it could cut off all Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean from the Soviet ports in the Black Sea. In peacetime, all countries were to acknowledge the transit of their warships and submarines in the straits, which would allow for Western intelligence gathering. If Soviets gained advantage over Turkey, Soviet naval vessels would enjoy freedom to pass to the Mediterranean in times of crises and war and NATO would face a greater Soviet power in the Mediterranean.

³⁰³ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIV, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey, Statement of Policy on Turkey, February 28, 1955, pp. 620-46.

³⁰⁴ Harris, pp. 39-42 and Gönlübol et al., Olaylarla, p. 230.

³⁰⁵ Kuniholm, Turkey and the West since World War II, p. 47.

³⁰⁶ Kuniholm, Turkey and the West, p. 34.

³⁰⁷ Brown, pp. 104-5.

Turkey (and Greece) into NATO³⁰⁸ as the Korean War had brought into daylight her strategic importance.

The real opposition to Turkish membership to NATO came from Britain, who as mentioned above aimed to include Turkey in a ME Pact (that aimed to somehow include Egypt and Iraq) rather than being consumed in NATO.³⁰⁹ After complex bargaining, the US and the UK reached an agreement to a British led Middle East Command (MEC) as well as admitting Greece and Turkey to NATO at the Ottawa meeting of the NATO Council (September 14-20, 1951).³¹⁰ Finally, the bravery and success of the Turkish troops in Korea as well as proactive Turkish diplomacy secured Menderes NATO membership, on the condition that Turkey promised to join into a Western Middle Eastern defense scheme.³¹¹ As Köprülü had imparted to his British counterpart Herbert Morrison, “Turkey was willing to enter any project that would enhance her role to the West.”³¹² As promised, Turkey would effectively perform the role expected of her in the ME and was ready to enter into negotiations with the interested parties as Turkish Foreign Minister Köprülü stated that defense of the ME is absolutely necessary for the economic and strategic defense of the free world.³¹³

However, disputes arose in the discussions about which command Turkish (and Greek) forces would be assigned to in NATO. Britain insisted that they perform under a British general and be part of a MEC. Turkey on the other hand, wanted to be part of a NATO

³⁰⁸ Meeting of General Eisenhower with the President and the Cabinet, January 31, 1951, p. 11-2 available on site: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nato/large/documents/pdfs/1-4.pdf. In January 1951, General Eisenhower had explained to President Truman that Europe was a long bottleneck, with Russia as the wide part of the bottle at one end, Western Europe the narrow neck and Spain at the Western end. If the Western power controlled both sides of the bottle (that is the North Sea and the Mediterranean) then they could prevent a Soviet advance in the center, by hitting Soviet forces hard on both flanks. On the southern flank, arms and support of Western forces should be directed to Turkey and Yugoslavia. However, Turkey whose help in the Balkans was detrimental could choose not to help if she was not given a firm security commitment by the West.

³⁰⁹ Gönübol et al, *Olaylarla*, pp. 230-1, 251.

³¹⁰ *ibid*, p. 234. The formal enlargement of NATO was approved at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon in February 1952.

³¹¹ Campbell, *Defense*, pp. 40-1.

³¹² *Cumhuriyet*, July 21, 1951.

³¹³ TGNA Parliamentary Discussions, Term. IX, Vol. 9, Gathering. 102, July 20, 1951, pp. 232-3; Karpas, *Turkish and Arab-Israeli*, p. 116.

European army and report to a US General. Even after Egypt's refusal of a MEC (Section 5.2.1) it was not easy to agree on the command structure. The British insisted on a British general and a compromise was reached with the creation of South European command under an American general.³¹⁴

The Turkish government rejoiced after being accepted into NATO that was won hard-fought. The Parliament approved the membership by a recordable 404 to 0 (with one abstention) vote. The acceptance was interpreted as Turkey was now part of the European family of nations. Moreover, DP's newspaper, *Zafer* was delighted that Turkey would be automatically protected if attacked by the USSR. Having attained the Western commitment that Turkey sought desperately, she interpreted the alliance at the broadest terms and aimed to get closely acquainted with the US in foreign and economic affairs because great confidence was placed in her as the protector of small states. Köprülü declared in Parliament in December 1951,

“Our national interest is identical with the joint interests of NATO and with its geographic and military requirements.”³¹⁵

NATO and American goals in Turkey overlapped: to resist Soviet attack as a part of a concerted allied defense, to withstand an assault by satellite forces, to protect the vitally important Straits, to protect NATO's southern flank as well as to maintain internal security.³¹⁶ Hence, in military terms, NATO membership meant that US officials were to coordinate Turkey's defense plans with that of NATO and train, equip and organize Turkish armed forces under the American model to increase its efficiency. This required US military advisors to work with the Turkish army to adjust Turkey's plans with other NATO members.³¹⁷ Under the NATO Treaty and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement of June 1951, Turkey and the US entered into a wide range of bilateral military agreements. They were followed by new agreements. Some of these were made public

³¹⁴ Harris, pp. 42-4; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla*, pp. 234-5.

³¹⁵ *Ayın Tarihi*, No. 215, October 1951, p. 18.

³¹⁶ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIV, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey, National Security Council Report, June 29, 1957, p. 723.

³¹⁷ Harris, pp. 53-4; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla*, p. 235.

and ratified by the Turkish Parliament such as the Status of Forces Agreement of June 1954, which ensured that the US non-diplomatic personnel in Turkey had privileges and immunities (for example, not being subject to Turkish tax and law). There were also public and secret exchanges of notes and agreements between officials of the two countries not ratified by the Turkish Parliament, such as the Military Facilities Agreement of June 1954. A third group of informal or verbal understandings that aimed to fill in gaps of former agreements to solve immediate problems or overcome bureaucratic difficulties, were also conducted. However, such practices not recorded by either Turkish or US personnel led to a very complex and incompetent system as the personnel changed or left Turkey.³¹⁸ NATO was highly praised with the claim that no Turkish defense could exist without it, especially in the early stages. Hence, Turkish statesmen did not feel the need to introduce it to the public since there was no negative reaction against it practically until early 1960s.³¹⁹

Hence, in light of territorial threats from the USSR in the immediate post war period and in an effort to insert political independence from the USSR, newly elected DP government³²⁰ urged to attain military guarantees from the US and NATO. Turkey in response to increasing bipolarity now moved away from Atatürk's earlier foreign policy of non-alignment with any major power to a dynamic policy of active participation of the defense

³¹⁸ Harris, p. 55; Gönlübol, NATO, US and Turkey (Ed.) Karpas, K. H., Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974 (Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East), Brill Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 1975, pp. 35-6; Uslu, N., the Turkish American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003, The History of a Distinctive Alliance, Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 2003, pp. 70-1.

³¹⁹ Kemal K. H., NATO and Turkey (Ed.) Karpas, K. H., Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974 (Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East), Brill Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 1975, p.14; Ataöv, Amerika, p. 217; Hale, Turkey, pp. 256-7; Uslu, p. 71. Turkey and the US concluded 3 bilateral agreements before 1950, 31 between 1950 and 1960 and 20 between 1960 and 1965. The initial agreements, some of them secret granted the US armed forces extensive facilities in Turkey. The most significant was the İncirlik air-base near Adana, with other bases at Karamürsel, Çiğli and Diyarbakır, intelligence gathering facilities at Karamürsel, Sinop, Samsun, Belbaşı and Diyarbakır, and naval and storage centers at İskenderun and Yumurtalık. US military assistance to Turkey reached \$2,445.3 mn between 1948 and 1964 as well as another \$1,380 m in project economic aid between 1950 and 1962. In the 1960s, as importance of public opinion increased and Cyprus issue gained primacy for Turkey, both US and NATO were subject to harsh criticism.

³²⁰ While RPP had applied for NATO in 1949, the aim was pursued much vigorously by Menderes government in an effort to prove RPP did not work hard enough for the membership.

of the Free World.³²¹ Turkey's entry into NATO was not approved by the Soviets seen in the two notes sent attacking Turkey that this was not a defensive pact but allowed US bases on Turkish soil.³²²

Some alliance theories may shed light to Turkey's entry into the NATO. Brandt's theory which depicted that budget was the reason why alliances are made may be a partial explanation when considering that DP was also very interested in the aid that would contribute immensely to the government's ambitious industrialization plans. A second explanation may be Barnett's theory of identity politics, where Turkey aimed to achieve admission to the European family of nations. However, Waltz's Balance of Threat approach seems to provide a fuller explanation where the crucial factor was to balance the threat received from USSR's geographic proximity and aggressiveness towards Turkey.³²³

The research also supports F. Ahmad's argument that "a country's foreign affairs are merely an extension of its domestic policy" for Turkey. In the early years of the Republic, the country concentrated on nation-building. In line with this, peaceful, cordial and rather distant relations were to be kept with all nations. As the threat from revisionist states such as Italy increased, rapprochement with Britain and France occurred as Turkey sided with collective security. With İnönü's presidency "Turkey's foreign policy became more cautious and opportunistic."³²⁴ During the Second World War, Turkey managed to remain neutral and upheld her own national interest. As the war drew to a close, Turkey was faced with rising pressure from her historical rival, the USSR. This security deficit pushed her to look for some backing from the countries that could stand up to Russia, namely Britain and the US. Turkey was hesitant. While she had signed an Alliance Pact with Britain and France in 1939, she was not drawn into the War until the later stages. Simultaneously, as

³²¹ Tamkoç M., A Bibliography on the Foreign Relations of the Republic of Turkey 1919-1967 And Brief Biographies of Turkish Statesmen, Faculty of Administrative Sciences, Ankara, 1968, Publication No. 11, p. 13. However, in terms of living standards as well as most other criteria, Turkey was not in line with Europe. While Turkey had before been sensitive about Ottoman capitulations that had pushed the Empire to its demise, the country was not shy in terms of pursuing economic relationship with the US. What weighed probably more heavily in the minds of Turks was that membership guaranteed economic and military aid.

³²² TGNA Parliamentary Discussions, Term. IX, Vol. 11, Gathering. 15, December 10, 1951, pp. 89-90.

³²³ Brown, p. 107.

³²⁴ Ahmad, the Historical Background, p. 22.

the War ended there were internal demands in Turkey to end the mono-party rule and uphold liberal economic policies, which was parallel to asking support from the West against the Soviet encroachments. Hence, Turkey's domestic and foreign policies converged with the initiation of an opposition party. With DP's rise to power in 1949 and the subsequent NATO membership, Turkey's close integration with the West was well under way. Moreover, foreign aid from the US under NATO alliance was regarded as the means to elevated growth and was welcomed by all.³²⁵ Since the threat perceived from SU was very real, the result of adhering to a Western defense did not create much internal opposition.³²⁶

5.1.4 Turks and Arabs

At the outset of Republican Turkey, the new elite undertook secularist reforms to reach the ultimate aim of Westernization. There was no interest in maintaining ties with the Islamic world. The abolition of Sultanate and Caliphate in September 1922 and November 1924, respectively, were two of the most prominent reforms to cut the link with the religious past. Sharia courts were replaced by a civil code in 1925 making religious clergy redundant. This was followed with replacing of the Arabic alphabet by a Latin one as well as the removal of the "the religion of the state is Islam" clause from the constitution in 1928. In 1937, laicism, enhanced as the ideological cornerstone of the Republic and was inserted into the constitution. All these changes unquestionably had negative connotations for Arabs, who believed that Turks abandoned Islam and denied their Islamic heritage.³²⁷

In terms of territory, Turkish-Arab relations were beclouded by two territorial issues, not settled in Lausanne, namely, Mosul and Alexandretta. While Mosul (Section 4.2.1) was seen as a problem between Turkey and Britain (as the mandate holder of Iraq in 1926), Alexandretta became a direct point of hostility between Turkey and Syria. Turkey had accepted Alexandretta's autonomy under the French mandated Syria with the promise that cultural development of the Turkish community would be protected. However, as France

³²⁵ Ahmad, *The Making*, pp. 223-4.

³²⁶ The small existing communist tilt had already been crushed.

³²⁷ Karpas, *Turkish and Arab-Israeli*, pp. 110-1; Kürkcüoğlu, *Development of Turkish-Arab Relations*, p. 11.

declared the decision to grant independence to a unified Syria in September 1936, Turkey was discontent with the city coming under Syrian rule and raised objections. The matter was taken to the League of Nations in December 1936, resulting in a special arrangement that would grant the city her autonomy in internal affairs. Its foreign and economic relations were to be tied to Syria. A French Council Delegate would reside in the city and France and Turkey would be able to enforce the Council's decisions. The new rule, which would start in November 1939, in effect separated the city from Syria and recognized its Turkish character. Hence, it led to vigorous protest in Syria, which refused Alexandretta's special status. As a result of French favoring Turks over the Arabs (as well as freezing the ratification of treaties with Syria and Lebanon that would grant their independence in the wake of War), France and Turkey concluded a joint garrisoning of the *sanjak* by both countries. This was actually the price that France (also pressurized by Britain to agree to the union³²⁸) paid to attract Turkish cooperation to the getting closer war effort as the next day Franco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship was signed in Ankara. The elections in Alexandretta in September 1938 had produced a Turkish dominated Parliament. The city, now called Hatay, united with Turkey in June, 1939.³²⁹ The incorporation of Alexandretta into Turkey has always been resented by Syria who saw the act as appeasement of Turkey and relations between the two neighbors have always been sour. Hatay issue did get in the way between Turkey and Syria, especially when Turkey aimed for a pro-active policy in the ME in the 1950 decade when Arabs accused Turkey of having a hidden agenda with the West.³³⁰

Turks on the other hand in the early years of the Republic, viewed the ME was as an unattractive neighborhood that needed to be dealt with if security concerns required it. The Sadabat Pact of July 8, 1937, a non-aggression treaty of limited character, may be an

³²⁸ Shaw, p. 377.

³²⁹ Lenczowski, the Middle East, pp. 125, 319-20; Akşin, A., Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara, 1991, pp. 308-9.

³³⁰ Aykan, M. B., (February, 1993), The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy From the 1950s to the 1990s, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1, Cambridge University Press, pp. 91-2.

example. The Turkish approach towards the Arabs included a deep-rooted suspicion, conspiracy and betrayal of “being stabbed in the back” during the First World War.³³¹

Nevertheless, in the initial years of Arab-Israel hostility, Turkey voted with the Arabs in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in November 1947 opposing the partition of Palestine. The fact that the USSR was in favor of a Jewish state in the ME was a sufficient reason for Turkey to vote against Israel since the worry was that she could come under Soviet influence.³³² However, Turkey was drawn to the center of international politics as a result of the perceived Soviet threat. Soon there was a change in Turkish voting behavior as Turkey aligned with the West (initiated formally with Truman Doctrine and Marshall Aid and culminated with NATO). She voted for first time in favor of establishing a Palestine Reconciliation Commission (PRC), which the Arabs did not want and in fact took part in RPC to settle the hostilities after the Arab-Israeli War in December 1948.³³³ The differences in perceived threats between Turkey and the Arab world peaked with Turkey’s recognition of Israel on 28 March 1949, the first Muslim country to do so. The rationale for the Turkish decision was to be in amiable terms with the influential Jewish community in the US since it would help in Turkey’s entry into NATO and for the flow of the much-required aid into the country.³³⁴ Hence, it was a byproduct of Turkey’s full identification with Western interests in Cold War terms. From then on, Turkey’s ME policy became an extension of her (pro-Western) foreign policy, whose main aim was to create an effective defense system against the USSR. The immediate and related objectives (national security, economic aid and expanding her influence in the area) of Turkish foreign policy in the ME were subordinated to commitment to US ideals of

³³¹ Jung, D., (January 2007), “Turkey and the Arab World: Historical Narratives and New Political Realities”, Danish Institute for International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 6.

³³² Cumhuriyet, December 2, 1947, Jan 2, June 2 and June 27, 1948.

³³³ The UNGA assigned US, France and Turkey to the PRC. The Commission attempted to bring together Israel and her four Arab neighbors in Lausanne in April to discuss three critical issues; the future of Arab refugees, international status to be given to Jerusalem and drawing of boundaries between Israel and Arabs. However, negotiations were cut without achieving any substantial results.

³³⁴ Aykan, the Palestinian, p. 92; Kürkçüoğlu, Ö., Türkiye’nin Arap Orta Doğusu’na Karşı Politikası (1945-1970), Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları No. 340, Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara, 1972, pp. 31-3.

containing the Soviets.³³⁵ Turkey followed the US lead without giving too much thought or understanding to changing trends in the Arab world. In fact, it may be said that Turkey viewed her relations with the Arabs as a continuation of mandate years where France and England rather than Arabs were in charge. The Turkish decision to recognize Israel was greatly abhorred by the Arabs.³³⁶

Turkish assumption that Arab states (newly gaining independence from the West) would automatically follow pro-Western policies and lend a hand to the effort to oppose Soviet expansion was to prove wrong. Arab analysis of threat was very different from the Turkish one since the West had troops in Arab countries in comparison to a Soviet danger³³⁷ that was articulated by Western analysts. Nasser's words below depict what threatens his country:

“Soviets are thousands of miles away from us. We have never had any quarrel with them. I would be the laughing stock of my people if I told them they now had an entirely new enemy, many thousands of miles away and that they must forget about the British enemy occupying their territory.”³³⁸

DP's allegations that Arabs were distracted from the real threat in the region (Soviet threat) because of the Israel menace (Turkish administration advised that Arabs should recognize Israel and negotiate a peace treaty and concentrate on the critical problem of the region) only goes to show how far apart the interpretation of the two were.³³⁹ The Turkish view was strictly in Cold war terms while the Arab view was in terms of perceived immediate threats and protection of sovereignty. It is no wonder that Egypt's *Al-Dawa* newspaper of the Muslim Brotherhood labeled Turkey as “Second Israel”.³⁴⁰

³³⁵ McGhee, pp. 189-200.

³³⁶ Karpas, Turkish and Arab-Israeli, pp. 114-5.

³³⁷ *ibid*, p. 115.

³³⁸ Brands, p. 49.

³³⁹ Aykan, the Palestinian, p. 92.

³⁴⁰ Karpas, Turkish and Arab-Israeli, p. 116.

5.2 Rise of Nationalism and Domestic Instability in the Arab World

Carl Brown asserts that “the ME is a penetrated system, which is subject to exceptional levels of external intervention and control yet, by virtue of its cultural distinctiveness, stubbornly resistant to subordination.”³⁴¹ The Western imperial legacy and its continuous involvement in the region coupled with the addition of superpower rivalry led to regional conflicts, civil wars and external interventions into the ME in the mid-twentieth century.

Having assured the importance of the ME in British defense plans³⁴² in 1945-1946, the Labor Foreign Secretary Bevin decided to open a new page through a regional approach on an economic level that was based on partnership with ME countries instead of domination. With the hope of reducing inequality in the different ranks of people, Britain set up Middle East Office in Cairo and ME Secretariat in London as successors of the MESC with advisory capacity on economic, cultural and social issues. Britain was to assume the role of a senior partner in developing the ME and the expectation was to prevent the increase of nationalism hostile to Britain. However, financial difficulties that Britain faced made it impossible to provide the resources to fund the area. Again, with respect to financial realities, Britain could not guarantee aid to Greece, Turkey and Palestine as of early 1947. The loss of Greece to the USSR would weaken Britain’s entire strategy and she formally

³⁴¹ Hinnebusch, Introduction, p. 2.

³⁴² Zametica, J. and Aldrich, R. J., *The Rise and Decline of A Strategic Concept: The Middle East, 1945-51* (Ed.) Aldrich, R. J., *British Intelligence Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-1951*, Routledge, London, 1992, pp. 243-4. While Churchill government that fought the War against the Axis was fully committed to the ME, incoming Labour Prime Minister Attlee was against the idea of imperial defense that was based on naval power (which was now obsolete and replaced by the more determinant air power) and the heavy defense burden it generated in July 1945. Being a fierce internationalist, Attlee supported to withdraw from her imperial position in the ME and put all power and determination into the UN (he was aware of closeness of India’s independence and a possible return of the US to isolationism) to smash any aggressor by every means including atomic bomb (although President Truman had the intention to continue the monopoly of his atom bomb) and advocated granting self-government to British colonies. Hence, in February 1946, Attlee’s view was the abandonment of defense of the ME, signifying a radical break from earlier British governments. British Chiefs of Staff (CoS) on the other hand, held a contrary view to that of Atlee, attempting to justify Britain’s continued hold on the ME, having witnessed the importance of the Suez base during the War. By 1946 spring, Russia was identified as the adversary and her vulnerable flank was the oil producing and industrial centrals of the Urals and West Siberia. It was only from the ME that effective air strikes can be taken against this southeastern flank. This argument raised the importance of the ME to the highest level by linking it directly with the defense of homeland UK.

requested American assistance for Greece and Turkey. This resulted in the formulation of the Truman Doctrine symbolizing formal US backing to the British strategy.³⁴³

During the subsequent Pentagon Talks on the ME on October 16, 1947, the British draft outlined to the Americans that the British Chiefs of Staff informs that in a war (as in the last two world wars), the ME would be a strategic theater second only in importance, or perhaps equal in importance to the UK. The reasons for this was not only because ME was a “vital theatre for communication of the Commonwealth, or that it was the supplier of oil”, but because in “answering a future aggression, the West had to have counter offensive capability, not only defensive capability. The ME was perhaps the only area from which offensive action could be taken, both to relieve the pressure of attack on the UK and from which to strike at the aggressor where he was vulnerable.” However, even in 1947, Britain was not hopeful about being able to retain her strategic facilities in Egypt or Palestine, without which the defense of the ME was not possible.³⁴⁴ Also, oil was a major element for the reconstruction and the development of war struck Europe and needed to be tightly controlled for any future war.³⁴⁵

For these strategic considerations and economic realities of the post-War world, Britain could not relinquish the ME easily despite the mounting nationalism in the region. The newly rising nationalists understood that the bilateral treaties and their revisions by the regimes in power were an undercover for Britain’s continued colonial rule. Claiming that colonialism was the reason for the backwardness of the ME, the first duty of the post-colonial governments was to get rid of the barriers to national development i.e. to get rid of foreign ownership of petroleum industry. Economic independence was the most essential prerequisite for political independence. There was the need to scrap any attempt to prolong or renew the earlier colonial type of dependency on the West. Hence, nationalist leaders were sceptic of the international economy and aimed to protect their countries from

³⁴³ Zametica, pp. 243-4.

³⁴⁴ FRUS, 1947, Vol. 5, “the Pentagon Talks of 1947” between the US and the UK concerning the ME and the Eastern Mediterranean, Draft Notes for Remarks by the United Kingdom at the Opening of the US-UK Talks on the Middle East, October 16, 1947, pp. 566-7.

³⁴⁵ Campbell, pp. 39-40.

foreign control. Most regimes aimed to put in place import substitution and barriers to foreign investment as constantly new definitions of threat were formed.³⁴⁶ On the other hand, in attaining her goal to keep the ME under her grasp, London aimed to collaborate with the oligarchic Arab rulers. They were also suspicious of former leaders' intention to rally behind pan-Arabism claims or the Palestine issue. Nationalists believed

“Britain was the spearhead of the problems in the region and cooperation with the West was treachery.”³⁴⁷

Stalin on the other hand considered “the developing world too far from home and too unstable, its leaders too difficult to control”. In 1947 Andrei Zhdanov described the ME “as an area dominated by American and British imperialists competing with each other.”³⁴⁸ Soviet rhetoric to the Arab audience was not different from ones to other parts of the world and preached the advantages of communism over capitalism. In 1947, the USSR had advocated to partitioning of Palestine and was one of the first countries to recognize Israel.³⁴⁹ In time, Soviet approach to the ME would acquire a completely different color with the new leaders after Stalin's death in 1953, making its presence felt after arm sales to Egypt in 1955.

5.2.1 Egypt: Failure of British led MEC&MEDO

Having correlated her ME policy with the US during the Pentagon talks of 1947, Britain hoped to preserve her rights granted by bilateral treaties. The British decision to let go of Palestine in 1947, led to the hope that an understanding could be worked with Egypt to keep the Suez Base. The 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty which was to expire in 1956 was critical because it preserved British primacy in the area. Any attempt to defend the Eastern Mediterranean and guarantee the Canal was conditional on holding Suez Base.

³⁴⁶ Owen, R., the Economic Component of Middle East Security: Twenty-First Century Options (Ed.) Martin, L. G., New Frontiers in Middle East Security, Palgrave, New York, 2001, pp. 170-1.

³⁴⁷ Sanjian, Turkey, pp. 20-1.

³⁴⁸ Kissinger, p. 523.

³⁴⁹ Campbell, Defense, pp. 208-11; Sanjian, Turkey, p. 8. Israel on the other hand had initially chosen neutrality between the superpowers but turned increasingly towards the US.

Britain and Egypt³⁵⁰ entered into repeated negotiations for prolonging her rights to the Suez Canal Base and the Sudan. Nevertheless, negotiations entered a deadlock as they could not agree. It was then devised that a new approach, setting up an international defense organization could help to remedy the British position. A Middle East Command (MEC) could be an instrument by which Britain and Egypt could resolve their differences. It was expected that an allied organization instead of one with a solely British label would be subject to less criticism by the Arabs. Egypt's partnership in a ME organization was crucial for two reasons. First, Suez was necessary for the defense of the region and second Egypt's membership could enable further Arab adherence³⁵¹ due to her leadership role. Hence, it was decided that smaller Arab countries were to be approached after receiving Egypt's reaction to MEC proposal.³⁵² Britain's main aim was to pursue a regional pact in the ME and make it seem like there was egalitarian cooperation with regional states while the underlying aim was to maintain her leadership through keeping the base rights.³⁵³ Hence, MEC aimed to devise a possible solution to the Anglo-Egyptian problem.³⁵⁴ Following the announcement of Turkey's acceptance into NATO in exchange for taking part in Western Defense Projects in the ME, on October 15, 1951, Britain, US, France and Turkey approached Egypt and proposed her equal partnership in MEC. However, Egypt quickly refused the offer imparting that MEC was a disguise for the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian

³⁵⁰ Bayly, pp. 198-211. Britain regularized her position only through the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty against surging nationalism in Egypt. The Treaty was crucial to British interests since it allowed her to maintain British troops in the strategic Canal Zone and check the ME. The importance of the Canal was seen once more during the Second World War. While Hitler was making plans to start Operation Barbarossa on the Soviet Russia in June 1941, Mussolini aimed for North Africa. In August 1940, Italy had conquered British Somaliland and in September invaded Egypt. The British were forced to retreat in Egypt when the Italians were fortified by German divisions under General Rommel. King Farouk of Egypt was given the choice to either abdicate the throne or to accept a pro-British government. He preferred the latter and Cairo became the military capital of the Britain during the War. Rommel's attack was halted at El Alamein in August 1942. General Montgomery then chased the Germans and linked up with Anglo-American forces in Tunisia in May 1943. The North African campaign had provided the Allies a base to invade Italy and it was once more seen that in a world war the ME was to be held. However, brutal British means used in Egypt were not to be easily forgotten by the Egyptians.

³⁵¹ These countries were also to be members since their crucial oil reserves were required and their land was to be used as bases for the allied defense effort.

³⁵² Campbell, Defense, pp. 39-42.

³⁵³ Zametica, p. 257.

³⁵⁴ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. IX, P. I, the Near and Middle East (in two parts), Military and Economic Policies with Respect to the Near and Middle East, January 4, 1952, p. 168.

Treaty with “the four powers” replacing the British. Moreover, Egypt unilaterally abrogated the 1936 Treaty and demanded all British personnel to leave.³⁵⁵

With Egypt’s refusal, a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) with seven sponsoring powers (Britain³⁵⁶, US, France, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Turkey) was proposed as of 1951 year-end. The organization was to be termed a “defense organization” this time rather than a “command organization” so that it would sound more acceptable to the Arabs. In the first phase, it would be a planning and coordination mechanism while in the second phase it would evolve into a fully-fledged defense organization. In 1952, the UK had increased hopes of attaining a pro-Western position as a result of some government change in Egypt due to internal instability. However, as of July 1952, deadlock remained as the feature of the negotiations. There were worries that the present situation would lead to more riots and disorders, which Egyptian authorities could not handle.³⁵⁷

Signaling the more direct involvement of the USSR into the ME, she gave diplomatic warnings to US, Britain, France and Turkey stating that the USSR cannot close her eyes to an aggressive pact (MEC) so close to her borders. In fact, the four powers were accused of planning the MEC to bring to life the aggressive policies of NATO.³⁵⁸

Quite shortly, on 23 July 1952, Egyptian army seized power through a bloodless coup known as the Free Officers’ Coup. King Farouk’s corrupt monarchy ended and a republic was proclaimed bringing General Naguib and Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) to power.³⁵⁹ The new regime drew incredible support from inside the country to undertake

³⁵⁵ FRUS, 1951, Vol. V, the Near East and Africa, Egypt, Editorial Note, p. 371; the Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State, pp. 391-2.

³⁵⁶ With October 1951 elections Conservative Party came to power in Britain placing Churchill as Prime Minister and Eden as Foreign Secretary.

³⁵⁷ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. IX, P. II the Near and Middle East, Egypt, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern South Asian and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State, pp. 1838-41.

³⁵⁸ Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye’nin Arap, pp. 50-1.

³⁵⁹ Colonel Abdel Nasser was among the Free Officers that organized the coup but in the first two years he remained on the side. After Nasser become President in September 1953, Naguib disappeared from Egyptian politics.

revolutionary reforms to solve Egypt's problems as well as to strengthen the army after the humiliation of 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Head of government Naguib declared that Egypt could allow a minimum number of technicians in the Canal Zone to keep the installations ready in case of war. As of 1952 year end, Britain had stationed 81,000 troops despite the fact that the 1936 Treaty allowed 10,000. Egypt viewed this as an infringement on her sovereignty. Regarding the future of the Suez Canal base, the British had defined three cases to act as a medium of discussion in the negotiations (which was also shared with the US). In Case A, the Canal Zone would be handed over to Egypt and base area would be under Egyptian control while depots and installations would be under British control with no more than 5,000 personnel and 2,000 RAF (Royal Air Force) members to run the installations. This implied that the West would have a base that would be operational in war. In Case B, the base would still remain in Egypt but Egyptians would take over depots and installations and make sure that the base was ready in wartime. Smaller number of British personnel would help assist the base. This would be a worse scenario for the British since the base could be reactivated within 60 days. Case C, which was the worst case scenario for London and would not be enhanced in any case. Under this, the base would remain under Egyptian control with almost no British personnel and it would take at least 90 days to reactivate at a time of war.³⁶⁰

Generally, British and American views were in line with each other on broad principles. It was agreed that Britain's aim was to strive to achieve Case A in the negotiations (but the US officials did not believe this was realistic). Both agreed that MEDO should not be established until negotiations with Egypt were finalized. Once MEDO talks with Egypt matured then other Arabs would be approached. However, disputes between British and US positions existed on 1) when Egypt's participation to MEDO would be required, before or after the British evacuation and 2) US military and economic aid to Egypt. In early 1953, British officials had convinced Americans that they would be prepared to withdraw their forces from Suez Base by the end of 1954 if Egypt entered into a ME defense organization and if the base installations were made available to the West immediately

³⁶⁰ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. IX, P. II, the Near and Middle East, Egypt, Attachment on Egypt, pp. 1929-33.

after a war. There was an Anglo-American difference in opinion here. London insisted on not evacuating the Canal Base without securing Egyptian participation in MEDO because if Egypt refused the common defense then a vacuum would be created. On the other hand, the State Department believed that first the base issue had to be sorted out and then Egypt's entry into MEDO could be discussed. Moreover, Britain aimed to make sure that any Western (US) aid to Egypt should be tied to her role in MEDO since otherwise would reduce Britain's bargaining power. The US had earlier urged Egypt to look for arms from her traditional supplier but believed that Egypt should not be excluded from an arms deal with the US. After careful convincing of the British, Western proposal for the Suez Base negotiations was:

- 1) "A phased withdrawal of British armed forces from Egypt,
- 2) The maintenance of the Canal zone base in peace with a view to its immediate reactivation in the event of war
- 3) Air defense of Egypt
- 4) Participation of Egypt in a MEDO
- 5) Military and economic assistance to Egypt." ³⁶¹

Just as a coordinated strategy was developed between the US and British governments, in January 1953, Eisenhower's Republican administration replaced Truman. Eden's visit to the US in early March outlined that development of MEDO was important in providing a bulwark against possible deterioration of the situation in Iran and a peace proposal was to be delivered to Egypt and Israel to make MEDO meaningful. Churchill's letter to Eisenhower of March 18, claimed that although the US was not giving support to the UK in the ME, Britain would not abandon the UN effort in Korea. Eisenhower was however "puzzled" as the US had agreed to the British plans during Eden's visit while he informed Churchill that the US did not want to project the image of teaming up (with the UK)

³⁶¹ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. IX, P. II, the Near and Middle East, Egypt, the Ambassador in the UK (Gifford) to the Department of State, January 3, 1953, pp. 1940-1, 1949-51.

against the Egyptians. Hence, the US preferred to stay out of the negotiations without proper invitation from Egypt.³⁶²

In any case, as expected, negotiations broke down since Britain insisted on Case A as well as Egyptian participation in a MEDO before she evacuated British personnel from the Base. On the other hand, Egypt demanded immediate evacuation to be able to discuss the project as equals. No one believed that British standing in Egypt was sustainable anymore and maintaining a base under such hostility was not plausible. Eisenhower and Dulles' believed that Egypt was the key to the ME and expecting cooperation from the Arabs against the Soviets without the settlement of Canal negotiations, was not realistic since Arab distrust of British overrode any fear of Soviets. For the Americans, MEDO was dead as Dulles commenced a trip to the ME to evaluate the situation in the region (Section: 5.4).

5.2.2 Iran: Nationalization of Abadan oil refinery

Faced with Soviet post-War designs on her sovereignty, Iran had successfully countered the Soviet threat with the support of the US in 1947. Britain was the dominant Western power in Iran through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in Abadan. However, there was growing consciousness in Iran of how little (Iran demanded a 50-50 profit sharing, which was US offer to the host countries where she had deals)³⁶³ she was getting from her petrol placing nationalization of oil in the center of politics. In the end, the powerful Prime Minister Mossadeq nationalized Iranian oil in May 1951 and Soviet radio bombarded Iran with propaganda giving support to anti-Shah elements.³⁶⁴

Britain was in no state to set up a military effort against Iran so she devised a strategy to place an embargo on Iranian oil. British staff was withdrawn from the refinery and demanded payment for the confiscated holdings, which Iran could not pay.³⁶⁵ The embargo lasted for three years and put increasing pressure on the Mossadeq government.

³⁶² FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. IX, P. II, the Near and Middle East, Memory of Conversation by the Secretary of State, March 4, 1953, pp. 2008-9; Prime Minister Churchill to President Eisenhower, pp. 2026-28.

³⁶³ Keohane, p. 167.

³⁶⁴ Mansfield, pp. 249-5.

³⁶⁵ Brands, pp. 39-40.

The USSR exploited the situation by placing herself as the “protector” of underdeveloped countries against former imperialists and was the beneficiary of the Iranian crisis since Iran’s attention was fixed on imperialist Britain. The Shah worried about the worsening Iranian-Western relations as well as the resurfacing of the Tudeh party after four years of suppression.

With Nasser’s final rejection of the MEDO proposal, Mossadeq was doomed as the West needed to secure Iran for the defense of the ME (there were rumors that Iran was moving into the Soviet orbit³⁶⁶) and to keep the petrol under Western dominance. Hence, the CIA coup for getting rid of Mossadeq was under way.³⁶⁷ The coup in August 1953 restored the Shah to power as the US replaced Britain as the chief country to block Soviet expansion to the south in the ME. The vitality of Iran’s security and oil to American interests was evident.³⁶⁸ With initiative of the Shah, America increased her share in Iranian oil concessions from 0 to 40% thus gaining an important edge in ME petrol³⁶⁹ while opening up the country to new defense projects under US tutelage.³⁷⁰

The Soviet response to the rapprochement between Iran and the US was to create hostility through her widely used methods of subversion, propaganda and diplomacy. The Soviets aimed to create an influence in the Iranian army through establishing an espionage network, which was crushed by the Shah’s Security Organization, SAVAK, in 1954. The propaganda consisted of radio broadcastings that imparted that the Shah was a tool of American imperialism which placed the British one.³⁷¹ However, Iran’s alliance with the West continued at full speed.

³⁶⁶ LaFeber, p. 157.

³⁶⁷ Brands, pp. 51-3.

³⁶⁸ Lenczowski, Soviet, p. 29.

³⁶⁹ Keahone, p. 167-8; LaFeber, p. 157. After the 1953 coup, Iran’s oil was placed under a new consortium where the British retained their 40% while five American oil firms (Gulf, Socony-Vacuum, Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Texaco) got 40%, and Dutch Shell and French Petroleum received the remaining 20% of Iran’s oil. Profits were to be equally shared between the consortium and Iran.

³⁷⁰ Mansfield, pp. 250-1; Bayly, pp. 230-1.

³⁷¹ Lenczowski, Soviet, pp. 30-2.

5.2.3 Iraq: Rising nationalism

Given that Britain left Palestine and was close to give up the Suez Base due to Egyptian hostility, the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was becoming increasingly crucial in maintaining whatever remained of British positions in the ME. Although Iraq³⁷² was entitled to the oil royalties of the British owned Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), she would not be able to finance a development program and concurrently maintain a modern army. Hence, the goal of the traditional Iraqi leaders and the monarchy was to keep close relations with Britain under the 1930 Treaty. It was hoped that in time the Treaty could be replaced with one that was more acceptable to the nationalists, who were gradually consolidating their power (but hoped to abrogate the Treaty altogether).

The tug of war between the traditionalist and the nationalist leaders of Iraq had resulted in the Portsmouth Treaty of January 1948, which brought only minor alterations to the original one, retaining minimum British troops in Iraq while returning the British bases to Iraqi ownership with the right to overtake them at war or threat of war. The Treaty however led to internal rioting and was disowned by the government that signed it as well as causing it to fall from power. Still the subsequent Iraqi governments hoped to sign a revised agreement with Britain to keep stability in the country.

5.2.4 Jordan: In line with Britain

While being heavily dependent on the British, King Abdullah of Jordan³⁷³ had pan-Arab aspirations to greater Syria and Palestine. He had secretly hoped for partition of Palestine

³⁷² Mansfield, pp. 197-9; Sanjian, Turkey, p. 21. Britain assigned Faisal (who was rejected by the French as the King of Syria) as King of Iraq in 1921 and the subsequent 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (which was to expire in 1957) enhanced close cooperation between the two countries on foreign and defense policies (placing petrol under British control). Britain was entitled to keep two bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba as well as the right to place or transit troops in Iraq. During the Second World War, in 1941, Rashid Ali, a German sympathizer ascended to power disposing the Prince. German planes in Crete and Rodeos used the Vichy French mandate of Syria (which hoped that if Germany won the war, the French mandate would be terminated) as a base to help the Rashid Ali rebellion. In May 1941 British initiated a campaign against Rashid Ali restoring power back to the Hashemites. However, the backing that the Hashemite dynasty received from the West arose suspicion and their prestige was eroded in Iraq. On the other hand, Rashid Ali rebellion led the British to undertake heavy handed methods fuelled the nationalist sentiment in Iraq.

³⁷³ Mansfield, pp. 208-10. British set up the Emirate of Transjordan in the lands to the east of the Jordan River over the British mandated Palestine and designed Abdullah, brother of Iraq's Faisal as the ruler in

(while he looked as if he opposed partition as the Arab world was against it) which would allow his expansionist dream come true. He had also realistically assessed the power of Israel and was ready to negotiate with her. During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, he increased his territory. Among the Arab countries where Britain had bilateral treaties, only Jordan, had agreed to renew the original 1946 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty in 1948. The new treaty allowed Britain to retain the right to maintain and move her troops in Jordan in case of war or threat of war as well as keeping two airbases at Amman and Mafraq. It also envisioned the creation of a permanent Anglo-Jordanian council of defense.³⁷⁴

5.2.5 Syria and Lebanon: End of French mandate

Britain had helped the Free French based on the understanding that France would agree to the independence of Syria and Lebanon after the Second World War. When the Lebanese government was against the Free French towards the end of 1943 and France responded with force, Britain was on the Lebanese side. France aimed to retain the Levant in a similar fashion to the British bilateral agreements with regional countries. However, Syria rejected the idea of an agreement as nationalists gained power. While the French aimed to display force, they were faced with the British ultimatum which eventually led to the termination of French rule in Syria in 1945.³⁷⁵ Hence, France was forced to leave the ME after granting full independence for her two mandates without any treaty concessions that Britain had with her former mandates. This made France believe that Britain and the US aimed to scrap any French influence in the region. In turn, Britain and the US suspected that France could block any Anglo-American defense arrangement despite its anti-Communist structure. Britain and France also differed in their approach to Arab unity. London supported Arab political unity as long as it served Western interests. However, France would not support any Arab plan which would lead to further loss of influence in

1923. Emir Abdullah undertook expansionist policies especially towards Palestine and militarily he relied on Jordan's Arab Legion (established in early 1920s) administered by John Glubb (Pasha), to keep the desert in order. Replacing the 1928 Treaty, the 1946 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty granted Transjordan her independence (close cooperation with Britain in foreign and defense policies remained) in exchange for allowing Britain to keep two airbases and her troops in Transjordan.

³⁷⁴ Bogle, E. C., *The Modern Middle East, From Imperialism to Freedom, 1800-1958*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1996, pp. 353-5.

³⁷⁵ Mansfield, pp. 224-5.

the Levant as she faced problems with her North African colonies. In 1946, both Syria and Lebanon joined the UN.³⁷⁶

5.3 Arab-Israel Hostility

Arab-Israel hostility over Palestine was the second source of major hostility in the ME after the Second World War. The deterioration of the situation³⁷⁷ became the bitterest problem in the early Cold War contributing to the hate towards the West, whom the local Arabs blamed for the existence of Israel.³⁷⁸ As the Second World War drew to an end, Jewish immigrants were pouring into Palestine and the issue took priority over all others in the ME. Since, the difficult situation could not be resolved; in February 1947 Britain announced her intention to terminate her mandate for Palestine. In April, she took the matter to the UN for recommendations. UNGA recommended the partition of Palestine Resolution 181 with a vote of (with 33 to 13 votes (with 10 abstentions and 1 absent)) on November 29, 1947.³⁷⁹

Following the expiry of the British Mandate on May 14, 1948, the State of Israel was proclaimed. The next day armies of Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon and Iraq attacked Israel and 1948 Arab–Israeli War started. Faced with the War, the US retreated and

³⁷⁶ Sanjian, Turkey, p. 4.

³⁷⁷ Before the Second World War, the British government chose to favor the Arab side considering that Arabs constituted the majority in Palestine. Regarding the Arabs as more crucial for British interests, Britain abandoned the Peel Commission Plan of 1937, which had recommended partition of Palestine. This was followed by the Palestine Round Table Conference of 1939, but with could attain no results. Britain then formulated a policy known as the McDonalds White Paper of 1939 (British policy in Palestine until the end of the war) that limited Jewish immigration into Palestine.

³⁷⁸ Fry, G. C. and King, J. Roy, the Middle East: Crossroads of Civilization, Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., Ohio, 1973, p. 243.

³⁷⁹ Mansfield, pp. 234-5. Being the world chief, the US led the Palestine issue in the UN. After this stage, the problem was internationalized with the involvement of Soviets and disproportionate pressure exerted by smaller non-aligned nations through their standing in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). On 15 May 1947, the UN appointed the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), with eleven states, in which none of the Great Powers were present. Three months later in August the UNSCOP released its report. The only unanimous recommendation was that the UK should terminate her mandate and independence was to be granted as soon as possible. A majority report (including Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay) recommended the creation of independent Arab and Jewish states, with Jerusalem to be placed under an international administration. A minority report (including India, Iran and Yugoslavia) supported the creation of a federal union (composed of two states, Jewish and Arab).

declared her opposition to “imposed” partition. The fighting went on for a year and was followed by a ceasefire. In the end, Palestine was divided between Israel and Jordan after Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank of the river Jordan and East Jerusalem³⁸⁰ while Egypt gained control of the Gaza Strip. The resulting state of Israel was much larger than in the UN Partition Plan. What was probably even more dangerous was that the Arab world bitterly resented not only Israel but also the West for the results. The humiliating defeat of Arab armies during the 1948 War exacerbated Arab’s nationalistic desires. Simultaneously, Arab monarchies and governments that had close links with London such as Egypt, Iraq and Jordan lost credibility in the eyes of their local people as well as among fellow Arabs.³⁸¹ The arrangement was far from settling the problems of the region permanently. Israel was constantly worried about her borders. Arabs on the other hand, were upset about Israel’s military superiority and Palestinian case became the central issue of Arab governments in their relations with the West. They expected some basic conciliation from the West to exert pressure on Israel to evacuate the territories occupied in 1948 and allow the return Palestinian refugees to their homeland.³⁸²

As the Palestine dispute reached a peak with the Arab-Israeli War in 1948, the Cold War also climaxed with the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the expulsion of Tito from the communist camp and the Berlin blockade, pushing the West to devise new instruments such as NATO. The expected communist aggression did not come in Europe but in Korea.³⁸³

The irreconcilable demands of both sides in Palestine led to the infiltration of Arab refugees to Israel usually in the form of suicide bombers. Israel retaliated in return. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was not very successful in stopping the incidents. Since the UN could not cope with the intensifying situation, the

³⁸⁰ Sanjian, Turkey, p. 19.

³⁸¹ Campbell, Defense, p. 37.

³⁸² Mansfield, pp. 235-8; Sanjian, Turkey, pp. 19-20.

³⁸³ Campbell, Defense, p. 38.

US, England and France in May 25, 1950 issued the Tripartite Declaration.³⁸⁴ The Declaration stated that as provider of arms/weapons to the ME, the Three Powers would maintain the balance and supply of arms to both sides. They would not allow any imbalance in the quantity of arms since this would endanger “peace and stability” in the area.³⁸⁵ The declaration recognized the fact that a minimum level of arms was required for international security and self-defense while adding that the purchases were not to lead to an aggression against another state. If aggression was undertaken, the Three Powers promised to “take action” against the aggressor with or without the UN.³⁸⁶

5.4 Rise of the “Northern Tier” with Dulles

The problems that Britain encountered in the negotiations for extending the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and in the futile attempts to form defense schemes showed the US that Britain’s ability to lead in the ME was seriously weakened. Deep distrust and hostility for British policies in the region led to mass upheavals in Egypt and Iraq in the first half of 1950s.³⁸⁷ The US administration prioritized that she did not want to be associated with Britain’s colonial past in the ME, which could not be sustained in the twentieth century. Hence, the progressive decline in Britain’s standing led the US to assume leadership of the Western effort. As of January 1953, a National Intelligence Estimate stated that, “in addition to its objective of contributing to stability in the in the ME, the West has a specific and basic concern with the extensive oil resources and strategic location of the area. Denial of these assets to the West would constitute a serious setback in the struggle with the Soviets, even if the area did not come under direct Communist control.”³⁸⁸

³⁸⁴ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/mid001.asp, American Foreign Policy 1950-1955
 Basic Documents Volumes I and II
 Department of State Publication 6446
 General Foreign Policy Series 117
 Washington, DC : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957. It was issued one month before the Korean War.

³⁸⁵ Campbell, Defense, pp. 80-7.

³⁸⁶ Divine, R. A., Eisenhower and the Cold War, Oxford University Press, USA, 1981, p. 70-1.

³⁸⁷ Sanjian, Turkey, pp. 8-9; Hurewitz, J. C., Origins of the Rivalry (Ed.) Hurewitz J. C., Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East, pp. 3-5.

³⁸⁸ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. IX, P. I, the Near and Middle East, Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Near and Middle East, National Intelligence Estimate, January 15, 1953, p. 334.

The incoming Secretary of State Dulles set on a tour of the Middle East to determine a new US approach for the region. He had understood the impossibility of Egypt's acceptance of a MEDO type of initiative, esp. when the future of the Suez Canal Base was bleak. Now, the US had a double sided plan to enter the ME. The first aim was to put forward a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict called Operation Alpha as will be seen in Section 5.5. The second aim was to employ Egypt as a possible member in a regional alliance of a new gathering of states against Soviet expansion, this time under US leadership.³⁸⁹ Between 9 and 29 May, Dulles visited Israel, India, Pakistan, Greece as well as six Arab countries. Turkey, as a NATO member was not initially included in the travel plan but at the request of Prime Minister Menderes, Dulles also visited Turkey between 23-27 May.

In Egypt, General Neguib and Foreign Minister Fawzi imparted to Dulles that Egypt had priorities on social and economic advancement while British occupation hindered Egypt's advance. The resentment in the country towards the British was also colossal due to the master-slave connotations of the treaties imposed, which was shown as the reason for the Egyptian refusal of MEDO. Arabs had always seen the US as upholding nationalist aspirations but Israel had weakened the US' position in the region and increased bitterness. It was also said that once liberty is achieved, Egypt would have confidence in everybody-even the UK. Hence, Egypt did not rule out possibility of participation in a defense arrangement or the problem of Israel to be handled if Egypt has full sovereignty with the evacuated of the Suez Canal. He also made the point that Arab governments cannot act against the will of the people who hate the British and are bitter against the US, for supporting Britain. Dulles reply was that the US and the UK agree on the broad principles and have no colonial ambitions. He also added that the US believed in phased withdrawal of British troops with the right to return instantly if a problem aroused. With the clearance of this issue, Dulles said that he was interested in talking about collective security (MEDO

³⁸⁹ Brands, pp. 44-5.

was dead and a new initiative was to be found) and peace with Israel (which Egyptian officials were ready to discuss informally).³⁹⁰

In Syria, Dulles met Head of State General Shishakli who explained to him that Arabs could not accept a MEDO without the settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute and the Arab-Israeli dispute. Here, Dulles witnessed that Arab priority was to ensure the safety of the ME itself before inserting a defense system against a Soviet attack. In Iraq, Dulles received the message that Iraq was more threatened by the communist danger in comparison to other Arabs and was exposed to Soviet threats, similar to Turkey (yet Turkey was militarily stronger). Identifying that the problems between India and Pakistan, affected the region, Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed Ali informed Dulles that his country was willing to take part in the defense of the ME.³⁹¹ In Israel, American officials met Foreign Minister M. Sharett, who talked about Israel's fear of eventual convergence of Arabs against Israel while Prime Minister D. Ben-Gurion drew attention to Soviet's fundamental desire of world domination and the aim to divide the free world.³⁹²

In Turkey, Dulles inquired Prime Minister Menderes on his views on Turkish interpretation of what was going on in the USSR and how greater unity might be achieved within the ME. Menderes argued that Turkey did not believe that the Suez Canal issue was exclusively confined to Egypt and the UK. Turkey interpreted the issue in Cold War terms and believed that "the UK is acting as the guardian of an outpost of one of the key positions the free world." He also declared that Egyptian struggle for independence should be of secondary importance in comparison to the strategic importance of the Canal for the entire free world. The Turkish side believed that Britain should not vacate the Canal until

³⁹⁰ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. IX, P. II, the Near and Middle East, From Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State, pp. 2065-9,

³⁹¹ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. IX, P. I, the Near and Middle East, The visit of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Mutual Security Administrator Harold Stassen to the Near and Middle East, May 9-29, 1955, Memorandum of Conversation in Syria, pp. 56-63; Memorandum of Conversation in Iraq, May 18, 1953, pp. 90-9; Memorandum of Conversation in Pakistan, May 23, 1953, pp. 22-36.

³⁹² FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. IX, P. I, the Near and Middle East, The Visit of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Mutual Security Administrator Harold Stassen to the Near and Middle East, May 9-29, 1955, National Intelligence Estimate, January 15, 1953, p. 334 and Memorandum of Conversation in Israel, May 13, 1953, pp. 29-37.

the expiry date (another 2 years). Turkey understood by then that the MEDO idea was abandoned due to Arab disinterest to join. The Prime Minister said that a new leaf could be turned and a new enterprise undertaken, where “Turkey could be the backbone” considering her social and political unity and determined attitude against the Soviet threat. Turkey hoped to be the primary agent in the area. Menderes suggested NATO Council to be involved in Anglo-Egyptian and France-North African disputes to create forceful decisions where essential interests needed to be maintained. Menderes also referred to recent reports that showed a four power conference with the USSR. He believed that no result would come out of the meetings and on the contrary may have the effect of dividing the Western front and create suspicion about appeasement.³⁹³ American aid was also discussed where Menderes claimed that it was necessary to cover the economic and military requirement (that was the result of proximity to the USSR). In response the Turkish point that Turkey could be the backbone of a defense organization, Dulles drew attention that “while backbone is important, there should be flesh around it.” While MEDO was not currently possible, Arabs could not be wholly ignored in a plan for the arena. He concluded by saying that of all the allies, he believed that Turkey had the most awareness of the fundamental problem that confronted the free world. Menderes then clarified the point that Turkey did not wish to disregard the Arab countries, but requested to take action since the defense of the ME was an urgent matter. Hence his suggestion was to proceed with a defense plan and then expect Arab cooperation.³⁹⁴

The trip enabled Dulles to deduce that Arab priorities were on the colonial status of Britain (embedded in the bilateral treaties such as Egypt’s case or the controversy on the nationalization of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) and Arab-Israeli dispute over Palestine. His finding was that because of these preoccupations, most regional members failed to see the larger problem related to the USSR. The Arabs were not going to accept preconceived

³⁹³ This refers to the 1955 Geneva Summit of the Big Four. Menderes’ attachment to the basics of the Cold War may be seen here.

³⁹⁴ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. IX, P. I, the Near and Middle East, The visit of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Mutual Security Administrator Harold Stassen to the Near and Middle East, May 9-29, 1955, Memorandum of Conversation by the Counselor of Embassy in Turkey (Rountree), May 26, 1953, pp. 137-54.

defense arrangement such as MEDO, at least not in the short term. This was already labelled as a Western initiative because the proposal included too many countries, most of which had no relevance to the region.

The idea of MEDO had evolved into a sound regional defense organization which was to stem from regional governments who felt genuine danger from the USSR, namely the Northern Tier (Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq)³⁹⁵ shifting away from the inner crescent, where Egypt was the key. The idea was to be promoted in such a way that it would seem as if it was initiated in the Northern Tier. Western powers were not to mix in the initial stages of the pact but could get involved later. It would also automatically be free from inter-Arab problems and Palestine dispute. Nevertheless, Dulles believed that Arab participation was necessary for the Pact to be meaningful.³⁹⁶ The plan was in fact easier to develop than earlier schemes as it did not include problem areas like Suez or Palestine. Moreover, step by step approach meant that planning did not have to be made immediately but over time.

5.5 Operation Alpha

Finally after years of difficult negotiations, in October 1954, a compromise was reached between Egypt and Britain on Suez Base. Britain agreed to evacuate her bases in the Canal Zone within 20 months in exchange for the right to re-enter if there was an attack on an Arab country or on Turkey by a power other than Israel.³⁹⁷ The agreement gave way to a US grant of \$40 mn in economic aid to Egypt.³⁹⁸ From then on, London had to be content with Egyptian promises to enter the Suez Base as opposed to holding it in her own hands. Nevertheless, Britain retained her dominance in the autonomous Suez Canal Company

³⁹⁵ Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Arap, pp. 52-3; Campbell, Defense, p. 48.

³⁹⁶ Sanjian, the Formulation, pp. 226-7.

³⁹⁷ Jalal, A., (August 1989), "Towards the Baghdad Pact: South Asia and Middle East Defense in the Cold War, 1947-1955", Taylor&Francis, the International History Review, Vol. 11, No. 3, p. 431.

³⁹⁸ Bowie R. R., Suez 1956, International Crisis and the Role of Law, Oxford University Press, New York, 1974, pp. 7-13.

through the 1888 Convention of Constantinople, which had established the status of the Canal as an international waterway.³⁹⁹

With the finalization of the prolonged Canal Base problem, the US had now identified the Arab-Israeli hostility as the most critical problem in the region. As well as providing an excuse for Arabs for not cooperating with the West, it was also an issue that Soviets had started to exploit in the UN in an effort to nullify Western influence.⁴⁰⁰ When Ben-Gurion was temporarily retired for a year in 1954, Sharett, a moderate hoping to reduce hostility had become the Prime Minister. This was the opportunity that the West could use to conduct Operation Alpha, a joint US-UK effort to encourage a peace settlement between Israel and the Arab States.

The West believed that the country to be first confronted was Egypt. The inducements that could be extended to Egypt were, “1) help RCC to stay in power 2) support Egypt as a focal point of power in the ME to enable her to play the rightful role in the area and the world and 3) extend assistance towards the high Aswan Dam.”⁴⁰¹ Hence, the US saw Nasser very central to the ME and believed that Turkish attacks on Egypt especially efforts to undermine RCC did not help the Western stance. The US had correctly identified that Nasser felt betrayed and isolated by the West which may push him to take extreme neutralist line at Bandung Conference making future cooperation even more impossible.⁴⁰² It was made known to Nasser that if Egypt took the lead in solving the critical Palestine problem, this would strengthen her position in the ME and attain a central role in cooperation with the West. The scheme would end the suffering of Arab refugees, remove

³⁹⁹ Rodman, P. W., *More Precious than Peace, the Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1994, p. 75.

⁴⁰⁰ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. IX, P. I, the Near and Middle East, Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Near and Middle East, Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board, July 29, 1954, p. 538.

⁴⁰¹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, Memorandum of a Conversation, January 27, 1955, p. 24.

⁴⁰² FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran; Iraq, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, March 26, 1955, pp. 43-4.

the obstacle for cooperation with the West and eliminate the opportunity for Soviet designs on Arab society opening Arab eyes to the real danger of communist infiltration.⁴⁰³

On the other hand, the US offered Israel a security guarantee, elimination of tension with neighbors, removal of Suez Canal restrictions and continued commitment to her future. In turn, Israel had to make some territorial concessions (partially symbolic), accept the return of some refugees and make some conciliation on Jerusalem. Arabs in return were expected to remove restrictions on Israel in the Suez Canal and end economic boycott to Israel.⁴⁰⁴

The process of peace negotiation (which took place separately with Egyptians and Israelis, since the Arab side did not want confrontation) was short lived while the main issues to be discussed were the frontiers, the future of Palestine refugees and the special status of Jerusalem. While an “honorable peace” could put an end to the agony in the region, the sides did not commit to the required concessions and a deadlock was inevitable.⁴⁰⁵

In February 1955, Ben-Gurion had returned to power with the aim to break the Egyptian blockade on Gulf of Aqaba. Some sort of an outcome could come out of Operation Alpha negotiations if Israel’s Gaza raid in February 1955 resulting with 69 casualties had not taken place. This was retaliated by Egypt’s fedayeen type of counterstrokes. The Gaza raid once more drew attention to the weakness of Egypt’s military and revealed the fact that it had to be strengthened.⁴⁰⁶ The army was of course key to Nasser’s position and had to be kept content if Nasser wanted to hold onto his position. As Nasser was refused by the West, he was induced to look for alternatives sources of arms as will be discovered in Section 6.3.1.

⁴⁰³ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, Brief for Secretary of State’s Visit to Cairo, January 27, 1955, p. 60.

⁴⁰⁴ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XIV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, Points of Agreement in Discussion on Arab-Israel Settlement, pp. 36-40.

⁴⁰⁵ Kissinger, pp. 527-8.

⁴⁰⁶ Bowie, pp. 7-13.

6. THE BAGHDAD PACT (25 FEBRUARY 1955)

Courting with Pakistan since 1951 for the defense of the ME (in exchange of arms which would strengthen her position against India), the State Department had instructed its embassies to use every appropriate occasion/subject (including religion) to draw her closer to the ME. Pakistan going through a deep financial crisis in the fall of 1953, had secured substantial aid from Washington through cooperating in establishment of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 while Northern Tier was at the birth stage.⁴⁰⁷

As of end of 1953, the US had been encouraging Turkey to draw close to Pakistan. A few months later, on 2 April 1954, the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation for Security, which did not involve a joint defense planning but was rather a political maneuver to awaken the two states to the dangers of communism. In return, Pakistan was awarded with military equipment and training on the condition that she would not undertake any aggression against another nation.⁴⁰⁸ The American officials at the time stated that,

“Turkey’s strategic position, her determination to resist communist aggression, the social and political ability of the country and her willingness to contribute forces to the common defense...the dollars spent in Turkey will buy more for defense than those expended in any other country.”⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁷ Jalal, pp. 419-30. Despite warnings from the Soviets and the Chinese about not accepting US bases on her soil, Pakistan continued negotiations with the US and it was well known that she had pledged to commit herself in the war against communism, not export strategic materials to USSR and allow US bases in the country. London was shocked to see how the US was inserting itself into spheres where British used to have unchallenged authority. Pakistan, which used to use British military equipment and was responsible for securing Commonwealth interests in South Asia, was now given military aid by the US and was ready to join a US sponsored Northern Tier to protect the ME and Iran, a duty that traditionally belonged to British-Indian troops. US had assigned Pakistan the role that India had played in Britain’s imperial days. The British case was that this would offend India whose PM Jawaharlal Nehru, was one of the leaders of the non-aligned movement and would drag India in East and West conflict but was not successful in convincing the US. Avoiding an open breach with the Americans, British believed that strained relations with India could endanger the military facilities that were required for Western defense of South East Asia.

⁴⁰⁸ Sanjian, the Formulation, p. 231.

⁴⁰⁹ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. IX, P. I, the Near and Middle East, The visit of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Mutual Security Administrator Harold Stassen to the Near and Middle East, May 9-29, 1955, Memorandum of Conversation by the Counselor of Embassy in Turkey (Rountree), May 26, 1953, p. 141.

After the issue of the joint communiqué of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Turkey and Pakistan, the USSR gave warnings to both countries on March 18, arguing that since there was no aggression in the region, the Pact could not be defensive and regarded the act as part of an Atlantic Bloc maneuver. She also claimed that it would endanger the situation in the ME as well as the relations of these two countries with the Soviets.⁴¹⁰ The Soviet reaction may be seen as the first precipitation of Cold War into the ME. *El Tahrir*, the newspaper of the Egyptian RCC wrote that this Pact was a threat and would increase the insecurity in the region as the US would impose its terms on the region and aim to include other ME states into the Pact.⁴¹¹

6.1 Formation

For the Turkish-Pakistan Pact to be meaningful, the territorial gap between the two countries had to be filled. Iraq was a clear option because her political orientation was conservative, pro-British and anti-Communist. The dominance of the US in the ME was rising and Iraq's Jamali government was forming increasingly better relations with the US and requested military equipment.⁴¹² The US responded by providing a military assistance agreement (of \$10 mn annual) to Iraq as of April 1954, with a warning from Dulles that if Iraq's first move was against Israel (by accomplishing a political union with Syria) rather than working towards the Northern Tier, the US could revoke the agreement. Later in the year, the appointment of Nuri Said as Prime Minister of Iraq revived hopes of Iraq's adherence to the Turkish-Pakistani Pact. Being an anti-communist and conservative leader, Nuri Said was aware that Iraq's rich oil sites could attract Soviet appetite. The USSR could penetrate into Iraq through the members of the banned Communist Party or through the manipulation of Kurds⁴¹³ of the North. He was genuinely scared of the spread of communism in the ME. Hence, Nuri Said believed in keeping the established firm links

⁴¹⁰ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. IX, P. I, the Near and Middle East, Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Near and Middle East, Editorial Note, pp. 490-1.

⁴¹¹ Soysal, p. 208.

⁴¹² Until then all military equipment of Iraq was provided by Britain, who now realized that Iraq was playing US off UK.

⁴¹³ The Iraqi Kurds were allowed to stay in the USSR for 13 years between 1945-59 only to return to Iraq after Qasim coup.

with the West to protect the monarchy and exploit American willingness to provide arms for cooperation against the Soviets in the ME.

Because Nuri Said did not believe that small powers could not remain neutral between East and West since then their voices would not be heard in the international arena, he hoped to pursue a regional pact rather than a bilateral pact with Britain, which would receive a lot of criticism from the nationalists. Hence, the US believed that he could be used for Western purposes in a Northern Tier project.⁴¹⁴ However, weighing the pros and cons, Nuri Said believed that such a project would not provide Iraq the opportunity to lead an Arab dominated pact since he did not expect other Arabs to adhere to it. After this point, he held discussions with Egyptians in Sarsank (Iraq) as in August 1954 to strengthen the Arab League Collective Security Pact (ALCSP).⁴¹⁵

Nuri Said believed that Egyptian opposition against Iraq would soften with the aura of the initiation of the solving of the Anglo-Egyptian problem in July (to be effective as of October) and cooperation with the West could now start. With such Pact, Nuri Said did not mean abandoning the Turkish-Pakistani Treaty but to keep it on the sidelines while developing the ALCSP into a much complete scheme (to permit the entry of non-Arab states like Turkey, Britain, Iran, Pakistan and the US). When the US received intelligence that Nuri Said was developing relations with Egypt and was moving away from Turkish-Pakistan Pact, Dulles was most disturbed by this idea because a pact that included Iraq, Syria and Lebanon would lead to problems with Israel. He insisted that Iraq should tie up with the Northern Tier countries in the Turkish-Pakistani Pact and this was the reason why military aid was provided to Iraq. Soon, having difficulty in negotiating with Egyptians, Nuri Said abandoned the idea of strengthening the Arab Defense Pact.⁴¹⁶ Although Turkey

⁴¹⁴ Bogle, pp. 353; Gerges, p. 26.

⁴¹⁵ Seale, P., *The Struggle for Syria, A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945-1948*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1987, p. 201.

⁴¹⁶ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. IX, P. I, the Near and Middle East, Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Near and Middle East, pp. 541-7; Sanjian, the Formulation, pp. 236-40; Soysal, pp. 213-7; Seale, pp. 206-7. The meeting took place between Nuri Said and Nasser on 14 September in Cairo, did not produce any concrete plan for the ME. Nasser objected asking for advice from the UK and the US for the strengthening of the ALCSP. Nuri Said had understood from Nasser's talk that while Egypt could not join a ME defense for domestic reasons at the moment, it could consider joining later. Nasser on the other hand in a radio

was not Iraq's first choice (he hoped to form a separate pact with Pakistan and UK (instead of joining the Turkish-Pakistan Pact)⁴¹⁷, both enthusiastic to form a deal, were drawn to each other through diplomatic visits.

In September 1954, young King Faisal and Nuri Said were in London to discuss a potential pact and expected a softening in Egypt's stance against a pact that Iraq initiated for the defense of the ME. Returning from London, Nuri Said stayed in Istanbul between October 9-18 where he met Menderes, Deputy Prime Minister F. R. Zorlu and Foreign Minister F. Köprülü and Foreign Affairs General Secretary N. Birgi and exchanges on a possible pact took place. In the negotiations, Iraq put the communist threat, the Israeli problem and the Canal issue on the table and also wanted Turkey to accept the Arab view on the Arab-Israeli dispute. Menderes advocated that since the Canal controversy was solved, Egypt was expected to have a more conciliatory tone to a ME Defense Project. He further believed that with the optimism in the ME, some form of rapprochement between Arabs and Israel would materialize. The joint communiqué issued declared that a joint defense of the ME was a necessity and the sides would start working for this. Following extensive discussions during Menderes, Köprülü and Birgi's meeting in Baghdad, the Baghdad Communiqué was published on January 13, 1955 which announced the necessity of cooperation for the stability and security of the ME. It was a shock for all including Britain and the US that did not expect such fast progress. In this optimistic atmosphere Menderes announced in *al-Akhbar* newspaper that he wished to visit Nasser (though it never took place).⁴¹⁸

The Turkish delegation then continued on to Damascus and Beirut (to invite Syria and Lebanon to join the Pact as will be discussed in Section 6.3.2 and 6.3.3.) Iraq and Turkey both started negotiations on a military assistance agreement with the US in early 1955. After the January communiqué, Egypt was quick to display her antipathy to the proposed

program said that Egypt would not support such a move to enter into a defense pact with the West but would raise no objection to Iraq incentive.

⁴¹⁷ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. IX, P. I, the Near and Middle East, Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Near and Middle East, the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey, p. 549.

⁴¹⁸ Sanjian, the Formulation, pp. 240-3, 246; Soysal, pp. 213-9.

pact and called a meeting of Arab states in the same month in Cairo. Attaining no real result, a second conference was held in Baghdad to bridge differences among Arabs. With the eventual failure of both conferences, the signing of the Baghdad Pact (Treaty of Mutual Cooperation) was accelerated and concluded on February 24, 1955.⁴¹⁹ Pointing to the complementary nature of the two pacts, Menderes drew attention to the Soviet threat

“The Baghdad Pact was established for the exact reasons that NATO was established in the West.”⁴²⁰

6.2 Covenant of the Pact

The introduction of the Baghdad Pact⁴²¹ stressed the desire to continue brotherly relations between Iraq and Turkey, complementing the earlier 1946 Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborhood. It was also mentioned that being in conformity with the UN Charter, the Pact was also in compliance with Article 11 of the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation between the Arab League States.

Both states realized their duty to maintain peace and security in the ME. Article 1 of the Pact said that signatories would cooperate for their security and defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. The parties could agree to special agreements for cooperation.⁴²² Article 2 noted that to give way to realization and application of cooperation under Article 1, parties will determine the measures to be taken and would be put into force by respective governments, hence no need for Parliamentary ratification. The Pact did not include an obligation on any member to take immediate action against an aggression on one of the members. It included a Military Committee for planning work but did not include a Joint Command like NATO. The provision dealing with the extent of

⁴¹⁹ Gerges, pp. 27-8.

⁴²⁰ Cumhuriyet, November 22, 1955.

⁴²¹ For a copy of the Baghdad Pact, see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/baghdad.asp; or Hurewitz, J. C., *Diplomacy In the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record: 1914-1956*, Van Nostrand Company, Princeton, 1958, pp. 309-10 as may be found in Appendix B.

⁴²² No other agreements were concluded except for the Iraqi-British agreement that was signed as Britain adhered to the Pact in April 1955 and bilateral agreements that were concluded between three local members and the US after Iraq's withdrawal in 1959.

cooperation was rather vague as the countries were to cooperate through joint measures or special agreements, which never materialized except in the cases mentioned in footnote 422. Article 3 said the sides will refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs. Article 4 declared that the Pact is not in contradiction with any international obligation of the sides. Article 5 imparted that the Pact is open to any state recognized by both countries which has an interest in this region (leaving Israel out since she was not recognized by Iraq). Article 6 said that a Permanent Council at Ministerial level will be set up when the number of signatories reach four.⁴²³ Annexed to the Treaty, the document of the Pact also included letters (valid only for Iraq and Turkey) saying that the Pact members would "work in close cooperation for the implementation of the UN resolutions concerning Palestine to make the Pact more appealing to Arab states in the region". It was an attempt to show the Arab audience that Iraq cared about the Palestine issue.⁴²⁴

Two days after the signing of the Pact on January 26, it was ratified by the TGNA with a unanimous vote (the letters on Palestine were not submitted to the Parliament so it was binding only as a pledge given by the Turkish government). While RPP declared that the Pact was not clear in what a member was supposed to do against an aggression on a fellow member, the PM assured that it gave no addition obligation to Turkey beyond frontiers.⁴²⁵

The Pact was the political expression of the US led Northern Tier strategy. London understood that this was part of a wider plan that the US was conducting in the ME that involved crushing British dominance. Having lost Suez Base, Whitehall was worried that 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty could come under review and be lost with the nationalist tide in Iraq. In an attempt to at least secure whatever influence Britain had left in the region, London followed the lead of the US and finally accepted a design that excluded Egypt.⁴²⁶ Having lost Suez, now London wanted to hold onto Iraq and form a new arrangement that kept the spirit of the Portsmouth Treaty alive and at the same time be acceptable to the

⁴²³ Sever, A., *Soğuk Savaş Kuşatmasında Türkiye, Batı ve Ortadoğu*, Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul, 1997, pp. 131-2; Soysal, pp. 220-1.

⁴²⁴ Kürkçüoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Arap*, pp. 56-7; Soysal, p. 221.

⁴²⁵ Soysal, p. 222.

⁴²⁶ Jalal, pp. 429-432.

nationalists.⁴²⁷ Eden (who was to take over the post of Premier from Churchill on April 7, 1955) declared the termination of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty stressing the “cooperation between equal partners” theme in his House of Commons speech on March 30.⁴²⁸ The day that Britain joined the Baghdad Pact on April 5, 1955, Britain and Iraq negotiated a new military cooperation agreement (Iraq now was to take care of her own defense, gain the control of her two bases while British were to leave personnel to help maintain bases, train and equip the Iraqi air force envisioning close defense cooperation between the two).⁴²⁹ She hence accepted that “if the US filled the critical vacuums of power that she was forced to vacate, this would lead to no overall loss of Western positions.”⁴³⁰

Further enlargement of the Pact came with Pakistan’s entry in September 1955, which was expected since Turkey had initially signed a Cooperation Pact with the country before the Baghdad Pact. This was followed by Iran’s adherence in October 1955, which culminated her alliance with the US. The first meeting of Baghdad Pact members took place in Baghdad in November 1955 where the five members set up a Council of Ministers and special committees for military planning, economic planning and counter subversion. A permanent headquarters was set up in Baghdad.

6.3 International Repercussions

6.3.1 Egypt: Disdained the Pact

In 1954 a power struggle had emerged between President Naguib and Nasser, two prominent figures of the Free Officers’ Coup. Following Naguib’s resignation in November 1954, Nasser, the father of Egyptian nationalism, became the President of Egypt.⁴³¹ Nasser identified imperialism as the main enemy, which he believed could take more than one form, such as British forces in Suez, Israel or Arab governments which all served Western aims. His rhetoric to the Arab world was of Arab unity accompanied by

⁴²⁷ Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye’nin Arap, pp. 56-7.

⁴²⁸ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran, Iraq, General United State Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Middle East, Editorial Note, p. 46.

⁴²⁹ Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye’nin Arap, p. 68.

⁴³⁰ Campbell, Defense, pp. 15-6.

⁴³¹ Bogle, p. 347; Butt, Gerald, The Arab World, The Dorsey Press, Chicago, 1988, pp. 38-9.

challenging the West, especially Britain. In fact, he was successful in channeling all the discontent in Egypt to the West. In his book “the Philosophy of the Revolution”, Nasser explained his revolutionary ideas through his own experience.

“...One region, the same factors and circumstance even the same forces opposing them all. It was clear that imperialism was the most prominent of these forces; even Israel itself was but one of the outcomes of imperialism. If it had not fallen under British mandate Zionism could not have found the necessary support to realize the idea of a national home in Palestine.”⁴³²

The US and to some extent Britain did not view the Egyptian revolution as completely negative, at least initially. King Farouk’s monarchy had long been incapable and it was hence expected that the new military elite could be utilized effectively as a reliable bulwark against the USSR. The new military leadership could also be a negotiation partner for a peace settlement with Israel. However, the Free Officers’ aim was to get rid of British dominance, eliminate the power of the landlords, the Wafd Party, Muslim Brotherhood and corruption in the country.⁴³³ Americans still valued Nasser’s influence and cooperation highly and declared their will to extend political, economic aid to Egypt to increase her standing. While the US declared that she would not seek for adherence of ME states in the Turco-Pakistan Pact and accept the grouping of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and UK, she expected Egypt to participate in Turkish-Pakistani Pact, which was looser than Baghdad, and hence could be more acceptable as well as initiate steps to Operation Alpha.⁴³⁴ In this way, the US is giving signals that it is not willing to cast off Egypt to the side (towards the Soviets).

Despite these incentives from the West, Nasser was furious at the Baghdad Pact and became its bitterest enemy. The fundamentals of Nasser’s rhetoric about his enmity to imperialism explain this hostility to the Pact. He was already moving towards a policy of

⁴³² Abdel-Nasser, G., the Philosophy of the Revolution, Book 1, Mondiale Press, Cairo, 1955, p. 62.

⁴³³ Mansfield, pp. 243-5.

⁴³⁴ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran, Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Middle East, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt, March 31, 1955, p. 47.

neutrality and signaled his will to attain better relations with the USSR to counterweight Western influence.⁴³⁵ We can identify three main reasons for Nasser's strong antipathy to the Pact. First, he saw it as a neo-colonial threat to Arab independence, another scheme that the West tried to insert itself onto the ME⁴³⁶ and would lead to "subordination" of the ME to the West. It would be practically impossible for him to remain silent to a Western defense scheme that included Britain, his country's former colonizer whose troops had left Egypt only a few months ago. Moreover, the Pact included Turkey, which was by then regarded as a tool of Western imperialism with her recognition of Israel, her assertive behavior in MEC and MEDO, all pro-West attitudes.

Second, Nasser condemned Iraqi government for betraying the ALCSP⁴³⁷ and for creating a crack in its uniformity.⁴³⁸ Egypt's accusation was that The Pact ignored the interests of the ME and aimed at frustrating and destroying the solidarity of the Arab League. It would only serve to weaken it through decreasing Egypt's bargaining power against the West.⁴³⁹ He also condemned the West for attempting to divide the League as the real threat to the Arab world originated from imperialists.

Third, he did not see the USSR as a significant threat for the core states of the ME since historically or recently she had not threatened them. It was impossible for Nasser to identify with the Western reasons for Soviet scare when the real danger in the region was perceived as Western imperialism as well as Arab-Israel hostility, which was also a Western doing.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁵ Schoenberger, E. and Reich, S., (July 1975), "Soviet Policy in the ME", MERIP Reports, No. 39, pp. 3-28, p. 10. In January 1954, Nasser signed a petroleum agreement with the SU and in March diplomatic relations were raised to embassy level.

⁴³⁶ Walt, p. 58

⁴³⁷ ALCSP was hoped to lead to cooperation against Israel militarily. Against an aggression, the members were to coordinate armed forces for collective defense. By the time it was ratified in October 1953, all independent Arab countries had joined it except for Libya. However, fragmentation among the Arab elite did not allow the Arab Pact to evolve into an efficient one.

⁴³⁸ Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Arap, pp. 66-7.

⁴³⁹ Hurewitz, Diplomacy, p. 390; Sanjian, the Formulation, p. 246; Seale, p. 196.

⁴⁴⁰ Walt, p. 59.

Last but not least, Nasser saw the Pact as an Anglo-American plot to promote Iraq's Hashemite monarchy (or Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Said) as a rival leader to himself. Now, the issue concentrated on which of the two would attract more Arab allies.⁴⁴¹ It was for these reasons that after the signing of the initial communiqué between Iraq and Turkey in January 1955, Nasser immediately called an Arab conference in Cairo in which Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon attended. Iraq sent former PM Jamali to defend her position. Since the meeting generated no real result, a group of representatives were dispatched to Iraq to discourage Nuri Said from joining but this also failed⁴⁴² and the Pact was signed in February.

In April 1955, in the Bandung Conference, the leaders of the Third World (Nasser together with India's Nehru and Yugoslavia's Tito⁴⁴³) had defined the basics of non-alignment. While Dulles seemed to own Zhdanov's two camp theory and did not display much accommodation to nations that undertook neutralism, Moscow had given support to the main points of peaceful co-existence as set out in the Conference; 1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, 2) non-interference in domestic affairs and 3) peaceful coexistence.⁴⁴⁴ Nasser hence pursued a policy of non-alignment, which was a guarantee of sovereignty and means to escape from being involved in one of the power blocs. He of course wanted to make this the policy of the Arab world through his leadership role. While his popularity in the Arab and third world increased, his standing in the West deteriorated.⁴⁴⁵ Iraq's adherence in the Baghdad Pact was a challenge to Nasser's non-alignment policy. For Iraq, Russian threat was real and Britain's importance still mattered for her defense. In fact Iraqi leaders were not pleased with the Egyptian interference in Arab affairs where Iraq could dominate.⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴¹ Seale, p. 186; Walt, p. 59.

⁴⁴² Soysal, p. 219.

⁴⁴³ Mansfield, p. 248.

⁴⁴⁴ LaFeber, p. 174.

⁴⁴⁵ Bowie, pp. 7-13.

⁴⁴⁶ Seale, pp. 199-200. It was seen in Section 6.1 that Iraq tried some formulation to agree with Egypt on strengthening the ALCSP as of August and September 1954 but could not agree. With US insistence, Iraq went ahead with the Baghdad Pact option.

Concurrently, the US and Britain placed high priority on Operation Alpha (Section 5.5) which was now under strains. Relations between Egypt and Israel deteriorated as Egypt and Syria performed guerrilla attacks on Israel, followed by Israeli retaliation. It was believed that Egypt was setting up a supply center for Arabs with Saudi financial backing while also draw Arab support for bilateral defense pacts with Syria and Saudi Arabia.⁴⁴⁷

Following Israeli attack on Gaza in February 1955, Nasser turned to the West⁴⁴⁸ in search of arms. The US was willing to provide arms but there was disagreement on how the payment would be made and the type of weapons to be sold (Nasser did not accept a US military assistance mission). Although Nasser aimed to free himself from the West, he nevertheless did not consider an alignment with the Soviets (since he disliked communism immensely). However, remaining empty handed, Soviet friendliness (with no strings attached) to nations that did not want to be drawn into a Western alliance⁴⁴⁹, led to the finalization of a deal with Czechoslovakia, an undercover for the USSR in September 1955, for large amount of arms, including aircraft and tanks in exchange for rice and cotton.⁴⁵⁰ Still, the American administration did not believe that these were clear indications that Nasser had turned his back to the West completely and joined the Soviet bloc.⁴⁵¹

The arms deal was a significant step for the SU in neutralizing the threat posed by the Baghdad Pact and an evidence of independence of action for Egypt.

6.3.2 Syria and Saudi Arabia: In line with Egypt

There was a parallel between the rise of pan-Arabism and Syria's domestic policy. After securing its independence from France, Syria had a constitutional parliamentary system

⁴⁴⁷ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran, Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Middle East, National Intelligence Estimate, the Outlook for US Interests in the ME, November 8, 1955, p. 186.

⁴⁴⁸ Bowie, p. 104; Campbell, Defense, p. 102. Israel also had established close relations with France due to sale of arms and planes since 1954.

⁴⁴⁹ Schoenberger and Reich, p. 11.

⁴⁵⁰ Mansfield, p. 255.

⁴⁵¹ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran; Iraq, Memorandum of Discussion at the 267th Meeting of the NSC, November 21, 1955, pp. 202-3.

with ambitiously led multi-parties. The defeat of Arab armies in the Arab-Israel war of 1948 effected politics and undermined the power of non-military politicians. This resulted in a military coup in 1949 followed by a number of subsequent coups with changing military dictators. After the fall of Colonel Shishakli in 1954, there was disarray in the country. By mid-1950s, four major lines had developed; pan-Arab Socialist, Greater Syrian, Islamic and Communist⁴⁵², out of which pan-Arab Baathists (lead by M. Aflaq and S. Al-Bitar) found fertile ground to grow. The Party aimed to reach Arab unity and socialism.⁴⁵³ By 1956, Baath enhanced support from all layers of the population, exploiting popular dissatisfaction. While Baath's ideology differed from Syrian communism (led by K. Bakdash), the two often collaborated (against Western influence) which disguised their distinction. However, Baath was nationalist while Syrian Communist Party was internationalist and Moscow oriented.⁴⁵⁴

The day after Iraq and Turkey published the initial communiqué of the Baghdad Pact, on January 14, 1955, Menderes's visited Damascus to persuade Syria to join it. Before the visit, many anti-Turkish demonstrations had taken place in Damascus and Aleppo. While Menderes could not secure commitment, his impression was that Syria would be at an equal distance to Baghdad and Cairo.⁴⁵⁵ However, Nasser had understood the importance of Syria in the battle of the Baghdad Pact and aimed to win her over.⁴⁵⁶ Despite Nasser's ferocious attitude to the Pact, the Turkish government was more critical of Syria, which had not been so hostile to it in the earlier stages. In fact, Syria's negative response to the Pact may be attributed to a combination of a few factors; such as pan-Arab sentiment in post-colonial Syria, the worry that (Turkey and) Iraq had territorial ambitions as well as the weight that Egyptian propaganda had in the country.⁴⁵⁷ Now, Turkey's attempts to create friendly ties with Syria backfired as the former government was dissolved and replaced

⁴⁵² Lenczowski, Soviet, p. 101.

⁴⁵³ Şen, pp. 153-64.

⁴⁵⁴ Lenczowski, Soviet, pp. 102-4.

⁴⁵⁵ Sosyal, pp. 226-7.

⁴⁵⁶ Seale, p. 220.

⁴⁵⁷ Walt, p. 60.

with one that was more determined to sign an alternative pact with Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Tripartite Pact) as of early 1955.

Due to the neutralist coloring of the new Syrian government and difficulty of bringing Syria closer to the Iraqi-Turkish Pact, Turkey decided that the first step was to take was to prevent Syrian adherence to the Tripartite Pact. Deputy Premier Zorlu proposed that Turkey, Britain and the US should exert pressure on Damascus and frustrate the Tripartite Pact. On March 13, 1955, Turkish charge d'affaires in Syria delivered a message to Syrian government that signing of a Pact between Syria and Egypt would aim to isolate Iraq and Turkey from the Arab world and hence would mean hostility towards Turkey. If this happened Turkey could not remain indifferent and could revise relations with Syria. From then on, Turkey advocated a very firm attitude to Syria and even threatened that relations could be broken if Syria continued to dig up Hatay issue. Iraq on the other hand had a much quieter tone on the issue because of pan-Arab concerns.⁴⁵⁸

The pressure Turkey exerted on Syria against the Tripartite Pact did lead Syria to handle her relations with Egypt with delicacy as well as leading to protests in the Arab world. American and British embassies in the Arab countries (including Iraq) warned their governments that further Turkish pressure and toughness on Syria could lead to unpleasant consequences and that attitude had to be softened. The West decided that the efforts of Menderes government had been counterproductive and aggravated the already existing anti-Turkish sentiment in the Arab world and asked for Turkey to stop attacks.⁴⁵⁹ Turkey however, believed that unless strong pressure was exercised on Syria, the Tripartite Pact would be signed, which would be a hindrance to the development of the Turkish-Iraqi Pact. However, the new Turkish Ambassador in Damascus urged Köprülü to moderate PM's anti-Syria tone and Ankara's line subsided. In any case, the Turkish-Syria crisis enabled the Soviet government an opportunity to impress Syria and develop friendly relations. The

⁴⁵⁸ Sanjian, Turkey, pp. 95-102.

⁴⁵⁹ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran, Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Middle East, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt, March 30, 1955, p. 45.

Soviet Union had become a champion through their statement on April 17 that defended the sovereignty of states in the region.⁴⁶⁰

As of end of April 1955, Turkey still believed that a Tripartite Pact would adversely affect the West's position in the ME. The Turkish government suggested that the US, Britain, Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan should take joint and coordinated action to strengthen the Baghdad Pact and discourage the Tripartite Pact. Turkey believed that the US actions in the ME such as not supporting the Turco-Pakistani or Turco-Iraqi Pacts may prolong the life of a hostile Syrian government, encourage the Egyptians in a neutralist line (if not a pro-Soviet one) and finally postpone the formation of a ME barrier to Soviet aims (if not give Russia the opportunity to form a bridgehead in the region).⁴⁶¹ However Washington did not exactly agree. Currently, the US had a few sensitive aims regarding the region. Firstly, she aimed to keep the Palestine issue and the Northern Tier apart. Not frustrating Israel, essential for Operation Alpha was a priority for the US. Secondly, to maintain the relationship with Egypt, who was also a key component of Operation Alpha was important.⁴⁶²

In the end, Tripartite Pact was signed in the last months of 1955 and in a way Syria handed over her foreign policy to Egypt.⁴⁶³ While the military significance of this Pact did not amount to much, its political weight was important as it rejected an alignment with former masters and was a manifestation that a unified Arab policy against the West was to prevail.⁴⁶⁴ Luckily for the West, the problems faced during the creation of the Tripartite Pact had frustrated the signatories reducing its appeal to the Arabs. Shortly, the rising communist threat in Syria would attract more attention. The reason why Saudi Arabia sided with Egypt in opposing the Baghdad Pact was not only for security and uniformity of the Arab League. Tense Anglo-Saudi relations in early 1950s contributed to the result as

⁴⁶⁰ Sanjian, Turkey, pp. 101-2.

⁴⁶¹ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIV, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey, Telegram dated from the US Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, April 1, 1955, p. 630.

⁴⁶² Sever, pp. 140-3.

⁴⁶³ Seale, p. 254.

⁴⁶⁴ Walt, p. 59.

Britain supported the Hashemites as opposed to Saudis (a traditional rivalry in the region) in the border disputes, such as the Buraimi issue.⁴⁶⁵

6.3.3 Jordan and Lebanon: Reluctant to join

Menderes government believed that Baghdad Pact could be interpreted effective only if it had sufficient members. The aim was 1) to make the pact more acceptable for Iraq (inside the country, there was criticism about distancing itself from the Arab League⁴⁶⁶ while Voice of Cairo radio encouraged Iraqis to get rid of Nuri Said⁴⁶⁷), 2) to frustrate Egypt from isolating Iraq and 3) to isolate Nasser from other Arabs.

Turkey was committed to enlarging the Baghdad Pact, which would prove and enhance Turkey's value to the West as a detrimental ally. It was hoped that this would entitle Turkey to more economic and military assistance from the US.⁴⁶⁸ In this endeavor, Turkey aimed to draw Jordan and Lebanon (both looking pro-Western) into the Pact. Both countries had not condemned the Baghdad Pact publicly and Lebanon was expected to follow Jordan's decision. In this respect, Zorlu approached Dulles in Geneva in October 26, 1955, saying that President Bayar was to visit Jordan in early November. The opposition of the US centered on two points. Firstly the move would antagonize Egypt, (which was important for Operation Alpha) and could be counter-productive and push her towards the Soviets. Secondly, adherence of countries bordering with Israel would label the Pact as "anti-Israel" (thereby endanger the support US could otherwise provide to the Pact). If Jordan joined the Pact before the Arab-Israeli dispute was settled, Israel would certainly feel encircled and believe that the US favored Arabs over herself. Zorlu then

⁴⁶⁵ Gergers, p. 25; Lenczowski, *the Middle East*, pp. 590-2.

⁴⁶⁶ Kürkçüoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Arap*, pp. 62, 74-5.

⁴⁶⁷ Campbell, *Defense*, p. 55.

⁴⁶⁸ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIV, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, May 21, 1955, pp. 637. Concurrently, Zorlu was in the US in May 1955 to discuss the possibility of a \$300 mn loan to Turkey (but was refused by the US).

advanced the idea of giving US security guarantee to Israel as well as US adherence to the Pact to strengthen the position of Western oriented Iraq and Iran.⁴⁶⁹

On the other hand, the US did not want her unwillingness to draw Jordan into the Pact to be interpreted as a change in the US attitude towards the Baghdad Pact since this would be a victory for Egypt over Iraq and would certainly cause resentment in Turkey and Iraq. In fact, both Turkey and Iraq were perplexed about the attitude of the US. Moreover, Iraq did not want to be the only Arab country in a defense pact with West while the challenge that she created for Egypt in terms of Arab leadership intensified.⁴⁷⁰

During his visit to Jordan on 3-4 November 1955, Turkish President Bayar and Zorlu imparted that Jordan would be eligible for arms and aid if she entered the Baghdad Pact. Bayar went as far as using the Israeli threat (waiting at Jordan's doorstep to seize the any opportunity to secure the west bank of the River Jordan) to secure the adherence of Jordan to the Pact. Bayar declared that

“If the people of Jordan were victims of aggression from any quarter⁴⁷¹, they would not be surprised to see Turkish army fighting shoulder to shoulder with them.”⁴⁷²

While Jordan was not completely against the Pact, the country was in a delicate situation and had no intention of joining neither the Baghdad Pact nor the Tripartite Pact. On the other hand, King Hussein⁴⁷³ was under pressure to nullify the 1946 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty as two-thirds of the Jordanian people were now Palestinians. The King was caught in a tug of war between his ties to Iraq through the Hashemite dynasty and the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia opposition.

⁴⁶⁹ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran, Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Middle East, Telegram from the Office of the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State, October 26, 1955, pp. 176-7.

⁴⁷⁰ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran, Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Middle East, Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs to the Secretary of State, April 1, 1955, pp. 48-9.

⁴⁷¹ Here, the aggressor was Israel.

⁴⁷² Karpas, Turkish and Arab-Israeli, p. 119.

⁴⁷³ After Abdullah's assassination in 1951, his grandson Hussein took office in 1953 at the age of 18 and ruled until 1999.

Simultaneously, Turks and other members of the Pact brought the issue of Jordan's membership to Britain. British Foreign Secretary Macmillan believed that time was right for drawing Arabs away from Nasser and the Soviets. The UK was interested in strengthening the Pact, especially after the negative effect of Egyptian arms deal with the Soviet bloc and sent General Templer, Chief of British Imperial General Staff to Jordan between December 6 and 14, 1955 to discuss the substantial arms aid to the country.⁴⁷⁴ As a result of hostile Egyptian propaganda strengthened by Saudi finance, ministers resigned and Palestinian refugees initiated pro-Egyptian riots in the country. Further resignations in the new Cabinet led King Hussein to dissolve the Parliament and call general elections. Moreover, to tone down the revolts induced by continuing anti-Western propaganda, the King dismissed the British Commander of Jordan's Arab Legion, J. Glubb in March 1956 whose thirty-five year presence in the country had been a symbol of British predominance.⁴⁷⁵

There was a sharp contrast in US unwillingness to draw Jordan into the Pact and the vigorous support UK displayed in drawing her in. Although, the US had warned Turkey and Britain against any attempt to draw any Arab country that bordered with Israel, they went ahead. However, Turkish and British push for Jordan's inclusion to the Pact completely backfired for Western interests as Jordan terminated the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty before expiry date. Britain then decided not to make further effort to bring other Arab countries into the Pact. Moreover, with the rejection of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan of the Baghdad Pact, "Iraq was effectively isolated by the beginning of 1956 and Egypt was now the leader of a broad Arab coalition".⁴⁷⁶

6.3.4 Israel: Increased perception of threat

Israel was already feeling threatened by several developments in the ME. First of all, British decision to withdraw from Suez as of 1954 left Israel exposed to the Arabs. Secondly, Nasser was imposing greater pressure on the country to show his commitment to

⁴⁷⁴ Sever, pp. 151-2; Lloyd S., Suez 1956, Mayflower, New York, 1978, pp. 29-30.

⁴⁷⁵ Campbell, Defense, pp. 58-9; Lloyd, pp. 30-1.

⁴⁷⁶ Walt, p. 60.

Palestine and used it to show off to his Arab audience. After the Second World War, while Britain still dominated the Canal, Egypt aimed to assert some influence as seen during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War when she closed the Canal to Israeli ships. In 1951, Egypt had rejected UNSC call to reopen the Canal to Israeli shipping. The issue was raised in the Security Council in 1954 by Israel again, only to face a Soviet veto, on which she had abstained before. (Gradually, Egypt unilaterally relaxed the restrictions on Israel.)⁴⁷⁷ Thirdly, the formation of the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabia alignment increased Israel's fears of Arab encirclement.⁴⁷⁸ Hence, Baghdad Pact increased the likelihood of open Arab-Israeli hostility⁴⁷⁹ as we will see in the Suez Crisis. As the anti-Pact countries moved towards the USSR, the US had to give additional support to the Pact and as of 1956 spring announced her decision to join the econ and anti-subversion committees.

After the signing of the initial communiqué between Turkey and Iraq, on January 13, 1955, Israel was upset about the wording "...against aggression from inside (meaning Israel) or outside". Israeli Ambassador A. Eban declared that while the Israeli government did not in principle oppose a security system such as Baghdad Pact, it was anxious when such arrangements deliberately excluded Israel. He believed that possible adherence of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan that were not really concerned about a Soviet threat but were obsessed with Israel, could give an anti-Israel coloring to the Pact. In time if more Arabs adhered to the Pact, they would gain a disproportionate advantage in weapons over Israel. Israel was also worried that the Arabs could influence Turkey away from cordial relations with Israel.⁴⁸⁰ The letters attached to the Baghdad Pact indicated a change in Turkish attitude. Dulles attempted to comfort Eban that the Pact would benefit Israel as it would weaken the solidarity of the Arab League and Egypt's sharp adverse reaction was a sign of this.⁴⁸¹

⁴⁷⁷ Bowie, pp. 1-5.

⁴⁷⁸ Walt, p. 61, Bowie, p. 104; Campbell, Defense, p. 102. Israel had already established close relations with France due to arms and planes sale since 1954.

⁴⁷⁹ Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Arap, p. 66.

⁴⁸⁰ Sanjian, the Formulation, p. 254.

⁴⁸¹ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran, Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Middle East, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel, January 19, 1955, pp. 9-10.

Nevertheless, the US was well aware that Israel was not pleased about the Pact. In fact sensitivities regarding Israel were the crucial reason why the US did not adhere to the Pact.

However, while Operation Alpha did not reach the desired results, plans regarding the Baghdad Pact did not work out as intended either. The expectation for Jordan, Lebanon and to a lesser degree Syria to join the Pact failed to materialize and in fact, the West was almost going to lose the Arab world completely as all Arabs circled around Nasser to demonstrate their hostility to the Pact.

6.4 The Baghdad Pact and Turkey's Expectations

It is evident that Turkey's security deficit from the USSR had been its curse and excuse in the post-War world. Acting on self-interest, this problem was taken care of with Turkey's NATO membership in 1952. After this point, A. Sanjian states that

“Policies of successive post-War Turkish governments were generally aimed at increasing Turkey's strategic value in the eyes of the Western alliance, esp. the US, both in order to have the latter remain committed to Turkey's defense and to extract from her as much military and economic aid as possible.”⁴⁸²

After 1948, Turkey started to identify herself fully with the Western cause and conditioned herself to act strictly in Cold War terms. Her NATO membership was conditional on buttressing Western defense schemes for the ME. However, not only out of necessity but also willingly, Turkey backed the British led incentives of setting up defense pacts in the ME, such as, MEC and MEDO during 1951-1952.

As seen in Section 5.1.4, matters of the Arab world had largely been neglected after the foundation of the Turkish Republic with a view of Westernization. Following the initial initiative with Pakistan, there was a reversal in Turkey's foreign policy towards the Arabs since it was understood that Arab cooperation was necessary for the development of the Turco-Pakistani Pact. Hence as a kind of rapprochement with the Arab world, Menderes

⁴⁸² Sanjian, Turkey, p. 118.

and Bayar held a conference in Ankara between July 12 and 17, 1954, which included the Turkish diplomats and heads of missions in Arab countries and may be seen as an effort to understand the characteristics of the region better. The conference resulted in the decision to send friendly gestures to the Arab world such as creating cultural contacts, invitations and diplomatic visits. Turkey also decided that goodwill must be displayed towards Egypt (as the leader of Arab states) without undermining relations with Israel.”⁴⁸³

The fact that Turkey had committed a large portion of her army to NATO was enough for Arabs to believe that Turkey was controlled by the West and followed policy dictated from Washington. Baghdad Pact of 1955 only served to confirm the staunch Turkish standing in line with the West in the eyes of the Arabs. The threat of imperialism was much more real and immediate than any threat that the USSR projected to the region. However, Turkey assessed the realities of the Arab world only in Cold War terms, led and pursued a foreign policy detached from their realities. In this respect, Turkey gave support for the continued existence of British forces in the Suez Canal in the Suez Base negotiations. The issue was extremely sensitive for the Arabs who aimed to break free from Western control and hence evaluated it in terms of Egyptian sovereignty. In the UN, Turkey had consistently voted in line with the Western bloc on issues such as Egypt’s refusal to let Israeli ships pass through the Suez Canal and on the future of France’s North African protectorates.⁴⁸⁴ These fuelled the negative Arab sentiment towards Turkey and led to accusations that she is a lackey of the West.⁴⁸⁵ While the US aimed to encourage Turkish government to undertake relations with Nasser during Bandung Conference⁴⁸⁶, Turkey managed to intimidate the Third World with her attacks on non-alignment.⁴⁸⁷ Political realities of mid-1950s made any rapprochement between Turkey and the Arabs very hard.

⁴⁸³ Sanjian, *the Formulation*, pp. 231-2; Soysal, pp. 211.

⁴⁸⁴ Kürkçüoğlu, *Türkiye’nin Arap*, p. 72-8.

⁴⁸⁵ Deringil, S., *Turkish Foreign Policy Since Atatürk* (Ed.) Dodd, C. H., *Turkish Foreign Policy*, New Prospects, SOAS, the Eothen Press, England, 1992, p. 4

⁴⁸⁶ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran, Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Middle East, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt, March, 30, 1955, p. 44.

⁴⁸⁷ Ahmad, *the Turkish*, p. 396.

There was one area where Turkish attitude seemed to be reformed and that was the Arab-Israeli dispute. As Baghdad Pact was signed, Iraq was in an effort to display to the Arab world that she was drawing Turkey closer to the Arab position in the Palestine controversy. Actually, Turkey had accepted the letters that were added to the document of the Baghdad Pact out of the necessity to secure the signing of the Pact as smooth and as quick as possible. She was however cautious, not to alarm Israel or the West. In fact, Turkey had assured Israel that there would be no change in Turkish policy towards her and aimed to justify the letters as part of the larger project of collective security. Over time however, enthusiastic to promote the Pact, it is seen that Menderes declared that Turkey would consider an Israeli aggression against an Arab state as an aggression against Turkey. Foreign Minister Köprülü declared that letters similar in content could be exchanged with Jordan if she adhered to the Pact. Menderes also in public gave support to the Arab cause (also aided by US's more conciliatory tone to the Arabs).⁴⁸⁸ Relations with Israel were in a progressive deterioration after Bayar's assurance to Jordan against Israeli aggression. However, Turkey was not really concerned as all emphasis was on enlarging the Pact.⁴⁸⁹

Despite the efforts to decrease Syrian opposition to the Baghdad Pact and the unsuccessful attempt to bring Jordan into it, the Tripartite Pact (the counter Baghdad Pact) led by Egypt was signed towards the end of 1955. While Turkey had hoped that an Arab adherence would decrease the opposition from rival states, such as Egypt, the Baghdad Pact had not been valuable to attract new regional states. Even worse, the effort to promote the Pact was counterproductive as Jordan had gone through a change in government since it could not cope with internal pressures against the Pact. Moreover, Egypt seemed to have tightened her grip over the smaller Arab countries. In fact now in 1956, Turkey was worried that if the Pact failed to deliver benefits (in form of aid) as was promised, it would never attract the Arabs. Hence, Turkey strived to make Western aid available to regional members, who had been brave enough to stand by the West at this difficult time. Turkey

⁴⁸⁸ Sanjian, *the Formulation*, pp. 254-5; Sanjian, *Turkey*, pp. 108-9. On the other hand, Washington and London were worried that Nuri Said's insistence on supporting UN resolutions on Palestine would strain Operation Alpha since the West promoted the armistice regime established in 1948-1949 in the final settlement.

⁴⁸⁹ Sever, p. 151.

placing herself as the leader of the members tried to form a common policy and facilitated each government to send a memorandum to the US and Britain in explaining the importance of Western aid.⁴⁹⁰

The Summit held in Washington between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden on January 30-February 2, 1956 was a disappointment in this respect for Turkey because the communiqué only held moral support for the Pact with no real actions against Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria.⁴⁹¹ As of March 1956, Nasser wanted the membership of the Pact to be frozen at least to Arab members while British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd argued that it would be “intolerable” to withdraw invitations extended. In response, the Egyptian propaganda against the UK, the Baghdad Pact, Iraq and allies of the West continued. He also stressed the Western view that while immediate aims of the Pact was to fortify military defense planning, as the Pact developed over time its economic aspects would be the main source of attraction for new members. Nuri Said’s view was that success of the Baghdad Pact was conditional on halting the Saudi financing of Nasser’s ambitions. While King Saud was an anti-Communist, Nuri Said believed that he created more difficulty for the Pact than Communists because he financed Syria and Jordan (effectively nullifying the aid given to regional members).⁴⁹²

The Iraqi expectation had been that the Pact would evolve into a predominantly Arab one. However, in reality, Egypt had managed to isolate Iraq as she remained as the only Arab member of the Pact. Let alone, bring any concrete benefits to Iraq, the Pact had accelerated the anti-British sentiment in the country and Nuri Said’s policies were under severe criticism. In comparison to Nasser, Nuri Said was not perceived as a pan-Arab nationalist by his people and fellow Arabs. Moreover, the Pact achieved very little in terms of Palestine dispute.

⁴⁹⁰ Sanjian, Turkey, pp. 117-9.

⁴⁹¹ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran, Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Middle East, Memorandum of Conversation, White House, Washington, January 30, 1956, pp. 243-4.

⁴⁹² FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran, Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Middle East, Telegram from the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, March 10, 1956, pp. 254-5.

Concurrently, Syria was under the influence of Nasser and Soviets were approaching her in establishing trade. Soon, Syria was to conclude her own arms deal with Czechoslovakia. As a result of rising Communist influence in Syria in early 1956, Nuri Said told Lloyd that Iraq was ready to take action in response to an appeal from rightist elements in Syria to make sure that Communists do not come to power. He also insisted that Turkey and Israel should stay out of operation. On the other hand, when Menderes was notified, he declared that Turkey did not want Syria to be a communist satellite but to be on the side of the West. While Turkey was not involved in the planning and implementation stage of the (never carried forward) Syrian coup, in September 1956 she complained about not being told of the developments.⁴⁹³

Meanwhile, the second meeting of Baghdad Pact members took place in Tehran between April 16 and 19, 1956 at Prime Ministerial level. The British were concerned about the specific contribution that the US could provide to strengthen the Pact. Regional members were concerned about the future of the ME where Nuri Said stressed the importance of greater US commitment. All regional members shared the common “frustration” and “puzzlement”, especially about the possibility of the US negotiating some kind of rapprochement with the USSR behind their backs. Turkey was particularly upset that while Nasser was entitled to significant assistance for the Aswan Dam while Turkey, a committed ally of the US since the Cold War began was in economic dire straits. Turks and Iraqis especially pointed at Soviet overtures and subversion activities in their countries. While regional countries did not expect stability in the ME without solving the Palestine problem, Nuri Said believed that Nasser exploited the controversy to advance his nationalist aspirations.⁴⁹⁴

In fact, it was true that Nasser was pursuing an accelerated policy of pan-Arabism in the region. But the Western allies were not ready to attack Nasser so openly. Nevertheless, to

⁴⁹³ Sanjian, Turkey, pp. 122-7. As will be seen in Chapter 8, this plot never took place as it coincided with the Suez Crisis.

⁴⁹⁴ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran, Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Middle East, Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, April 18, 1956, pp. 286-92; Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, May 23, 1956, pp. 299-302.

the comfort of the Turks, the US representative Under Secretary of State Henderson announced that the US would participate in the economics and counter subversion committees of the Pact as well as continue to provide military and economic assistance in bilateral agreements to member states.⁴⁹⁵ Turkish hopes in the Pact were revived through US membership in the committees but eventually anything short of expanding the Pact was seen as a failure for Turks.⁴⁹⁶

Meanwhile, in the gap between the government and opposition in Turkey had widened so much that the Republicans did not run in the municipal elections of 1955. Simultaneously, the right wing (religious) and liberal elements in DP began to oppose the larger group headed by Menderes. Extremely religious ones had separated as early as 1948 from the Party to establish the Nation Party. Especially, after the September 6-7 1955 incidents, the liberal opposition towards Menderes also mounted. The response was the resignations from DP and establishment of a new party named Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi*) later in the year. Its number of MPs reached 29 and acted with RPP against DP.⁴⁹⁷ Hence, while DP was weakening internally, Menderes attempted to increase his hold of the party but his standing was also shaky. Nevertheless, he concentrated his attack on the opposition. He refused to accept the economic problems that became more and more obvious. While ideologically DP claimed to promote liberal economy, in June 1956 a law which the government the right to intervene in prices was passed. This was also the year, Freedom Party and RPP started to voice increasing opposition in the Parliament.

While repressive politics intimidated the liberals in the country, there was increasing economic discontent from the common people. While the US aid enabled Turkey to maintain the high economic growth experienced in the initial years of DP rule, it also led the authorities to dismiss economic realities (economic growth cannot be possible without compromising from standard of living). The economy was in dire straits in the latter part of the DP decade. The inflationary spiral did not allow the continuation of economic

⁴⁹⁵ Kürkçüoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Arap*, pp. 68-9; Soysal, p. 235.

⁴⁹⁶ Sanjian, *Turkey*, pp. 127-30.

⁴⁹⁷ Lenczowski, *the Middle East*, pp. 139-42.

stability and also upset the balance of the society as wage earners income melted. The need for a new injection of funds was critical as Turkey asked for a \$300 mn loan from the US under the Mutual Security or Technical Assistance Aid in 1955 but was refused. In the political realm, American insistence to grant economic aid conditional on economic criteria or achievements led to disputes between the two countries.⁴⁹⁸

6.5 The Reasons for US Non-Entry to the Pact

It was Dulles that had come up with the Northern Tier idea during his ME tour and encouraged the regional countries to form the Baghdad Pact. Now, Ambassador Warren declared that Turks were frustrated by the indifferent attitude of the US towards the Pact. The discouragement came from US's non-participation in the Pact and non-use of her influence on others in comparison to the development stage of the Pact likening it to "disowning own child" (reminding that Northern Tier was a US idea in the first place). Moreover, the rival Tripartite Pact also increased the frustration.⁴⁹⁹

By 1956, Turkey's main goal was to facilitate the entry of the US (as well as other regional countries) into the Pact. US entry would provide the muscle and encourage Arab adherence. However, the US had her own reasons for not entering the Pact. Hence, despite repeated pleas by the regional member governments and the US embassies in those states, the US official documents point to the assessment on joining the Pact or not as below.⁵⁰⁰ The reasons for a possible adherence were outlined as,

- 1) "strengthen the general ability of Pact members which are staunch allies of the US,
- 2) warn the USSR that US attaches great importance to the area and deter her from putting pressures on members,

⁴⁹⁸ Harris, pp. 31-3; Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 123; Lenczowski, the Middle East, p. 143.

⁴⁹⁹ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran, Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Middle East, Telegram from Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, May 21, 1955, pp. 55-6.

⁵⁰⁰ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran, Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Middle East, Position Paper on the Baghdad Pact, pp. 332-8.

- 3) strengthen US leadership and lessen the harm done by Western plot to attack Egypt during the Suez War,
- 4) strengthen the Pact and give it some vigor,
- 5) close the territorial gap in security arrangements south of USSR.”

On the other hand, the reasons for non-adherence were,

- 1) “the USSR has firmly declared her opposition to the Pact and US insistence to join may aggravate Soviet desire to confront the US and provoke open hostility between the members,
- 2) the Pact does not seem to be effective to prevent Soviet penetration into the area and the USSR seems to exploit every opportunity such as psychological, economic and covert military means to get a foothold in the region rather than open confrontations,
- 3) the nations that are not members are hostile to the Pact and are instigated by the USSR,
- 4) adherence would raise Israeli demands for US security guarantee,
- 5) adherence would be opposed by Saudi Arabia, where US has significant interests,
- 6) The congress can create difficulties of accepting and ME policy would be debated in domestic policy.”

Hence, the US consideration was that while a decision to enter the Pact could open the way to the adherence of other Arabs, it also would simultaneously offend other vital countries in the region, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel.⁵⁰¹ The US hoped to secure Egypt and Israel’s cooperation in Operation Alpha to settle the Palestine dispute. The aim was to keep this separate from the Northern Tier concept. The US also expected to be in collaboration with Egypt and Saudi Arabia on defense and economic matters.

While the US was interested in supporting regional pacts to contain Soviet expansionism, she was sensitive not to aggravate relations with the Soviets, who had declared that she

⁵⁰¹ Campbell, Defense, p. 56; Sanjian, Turkey, p. 116.

was against the Pact from the start. Hence, Turkey's attempts for US entry into the Pact remained void. In time, Washington defined several alternatives to full adherence to the Baghdad Pact. The solution that prevailed was that the US would also join the Military Committee and display the required leadership.

7. THE USSR AND VIEW OF THE BAGHDAD PACT

As the Cold War was taking shape, in September 1947, Second Secretary of the USSR, Andrei Zhdanov delivered a speech with the aim of ending the ideological compromise of wartime at Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) meeting. He drew out a world polarized between imperialism under Washington and socialism under Moscow outlining that there was no possibility of compromise. Going over the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the setting up of American bases in Eastern Mediterranean, he imparted that the US was to wage an imperialist war to combat socialism and democracy. In this setting of rigid bipolarity, Stalin-Zhdanov Doctrine⁵⁰² was not going to allow any country to remain uncommitted to either one of the camps. In January 1951, K. Bakdash, the Syrian Communist leader attacked Arab socialists for adherence to neutralism.

“...We must work constantly to unmask groups and parties claiming to be socialist, such as the Arab Socialist Party, the Islamic Socialist Front and Baath Party in Syria and the Socialist Progressive Party in Lebanon... for through their seductive propaganda they constitute a danger to the growing democratic national movement against war and imperialism, feudalism and exploitation.”⁵⁰³

The Great Bolshevik Encyclopedia described Islam as “a vestige of the society of exploiters in the USSR and abroad it is a weapon in the hand of the local reactionaries and of foreign imperialism.”⁵⁰⁴ In the 1950s, Soviet leadership and press had started to promote oriental and Islamic studies, which had long been neglected (since all attention had concentrated on Europe and the Far East). Scholars and experts took increasing interest in Arab and African nations with a view to support their detachment from imperialism and the Western world. The underlying attempt was to train the diplomats, experts, negotiators and secret agents who would be the executors of the new and more

⁵⁰² Embracing the dichotomy between the two systems (if you are not one of us, you are our enemy).

⁵⁰³ K. Bakdash's “For the Successful Struggle for Peace, National Independence and Democracy We Must Resolutely Turn Toward the Workers and the Peasants” report delivered at the plenary session of the Central Command of the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon, January 1951 in Lenczowski, Soviet, p. 206.

⁵⁰⁴ Bennigsen, A., Henze, P. B., Tanham, G. K., Wimbush, S. E., Soviet Strategy & Islam, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1989, p. 27.

assertive Soviet approach for the ME.⁵⁰⁵ In short, while Stalin regarded the ME as a Western area of dominance and did not challenge the West, the new Soviet leaders initiated a reorientation in strategy towards the developing world. The most effective step would be to provide Arab states with an alternative source of arms.⁵⁰⁶

7.1 Reorientation in Soviet Policy After 1953

When discussing the post-1953 world, Lenczowski identifies that the USSR was aided by three sets of factors to diffuse into the ME.

First, Soviet policies were flexible and correct in exploiting the fertile environment in the ME for their own purposes as well as pointing out to the errors of the Western powers. From the Soviet point of view, the power to deny oil to Western Europe could dictate the course of history and if the USSR could outflank and neutralize NATO, it would gain an incredible advantage over the Free World.

Borders of ME states were drawn by Europeans at the end of the First World War in order to enhance European grasp of the region. For Arab nationalists, these frontiers were the very reason for non-development of Arab unity and Arab culture. They believed that getting rid of the borders would not lead to domination of one over another but would only unite the Arab nation, like how Bismarck had untied various German states.⁵⁰⁷ Moreover, the legacy of mandate rule and existing bilateral agreements with their imperialistic spirit, the exploitation of Arab oil and the agony that the Palestinian conflict contributed to the bitter relations between the West and Arabs.

Second, Moscow was successful in using the neutralist (non-aligned) stand of Third World countries to its advantage. In the bipolar world of 1950s, nationalist leaders of the Arab

⁵⁰⁵ Campbell, *Defense*, p. 210.

⁵⁰⁶ Gerges, pp. 23-4.

⁵⁰⁷ Kissinger, p. 531.

world became advocates of non-alignment because this would provide them some freedom and power which they would otherwise not have as Kissinger argues.⁵⁰⁸

“Populist rulers like Nasser saw no future in being identified with the West; they wanted their volatile publics to perceive them as having wrested not only independence but freedom of maneuver from the democracies. Non-alignment was for them as much a domestic necessity as a foreign policy choice.”⁵⁰⁹

The Soviet support given to the three basic principles of Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian Countries, non-alignment in the cold war, peaceful coexistence and anti-imperialism, increased the prestige of the USSR in the third world.⁵¹⁰ Khrushchev promoted neutralism with the aim of taking advantage of the anti-Western connotation inherent in it and in saw it as an opportunity for Moscow. Now, adherence to neutralism was sufficient for Soviet purposes and the scope of Soviet diplomacy widened as the USSR could now sell goods and arms to all non-aligned world rather than to a small number of communist regimes. In stark contrast, Americans evaluated the third way as immoral.⁵¹¹

In fact, Khrushchev⁵¹² elaborated the Communist doctrine through the 20th Congress of the Communist Party in February 1956⁵¹³ and the 21st Congress in 1959. The basic feature of his design was peaceful co-existence, which promoted a reformulation of foreign policy based on co-existence of countries with different social systems, rejecting the former

⁵⁰⁸ Lenczowski, Soviet, p. 57.

⁵⁰⁹ Kissinger, p. 525.

⁵¹⁰ Lenczowski, Soviet, pp. 1-3.

⁵¹¹ Hurewitz, Origins of the Rivalry, pp. 7-10.

⁵¹² LaFeber, p. 172. While Malenkov had taken the office of Soviet Premier after Stalin's death, the power game between Malenkov and Khrushchev resulted with the resignation of the former. Khrushchev had established his control by February 1955 as the Secretary of the Communist Party as Bulganin assumed the post of Premier.

⁵¹³ *ibid*, p. 183. During the Party Congress, Khrushchev surprised everybody by outlining Stalin's crimes against the Communist party. There was emphasis that Stalin not the Communist Party was at fault. Khrushchev was aiming to increase his own personal power, loosen Stalinist restrictions so that the economy could bloom, yet he aimed to keep the society under full control. Eastern Europe was shocked as the doctrine of capitalist encirclement seemed over. The barriers imposed by Stalin had been torn down by Khrushchev in the aim to reach the Third World. Riots erupted in Georgia, Poland and Hungary as people demanded more autonomy, which in fact coincided with the Suez Crisis of October 29, 1956.

Stalin-Zhdanov Doctrine. Hence, to attain cordial relations with the Third World was the aim as formalized in the Bandung Conference.⁵¹⁴

It was recognized that while revolutionary national liberation wars may be necessary, it was also acceptable for a country to gain independence from imperialism through peaceful means and follow a non-revolutionary path to socialism. The new interpretations also advocated that alliances between working classes, peasantry, intellectuals and middle class urban bourgeoisie for the purpose of independence from imperialism were possible.⁵¹⁵ This move promoted the prestige of the USSR among Arabs, expanded Moscow's sphere of influence and at the same time weakened Western standing in the ME. The USSR increasingly associated herself with newly independent and nationalist movements and offered support on the basis of a shared interest in "anti-imperialist" policies. Having correctly assessed the hostility to British imperialism in core Arab states, Khrushchev evaluated that saving their respective countries from the hands of the colonial West was the priority of the newly emerging Arab nationalists such as Egypt's Nasser.⁵¹⁶ Also, realizing the tension that Israel created in Arab-Western relations, the USSR also extended diplomatic support to the Arab cause in the UN in 1954. This added to her prestige, giving the image of a friendly country that favored the Arabs over Israel.

Third, the progressive regimes of the ME at the time were revolutionary and usually ascended to power through military coups. As nationalism became a determining factor in ME politics, the new rulers resented Western imperialism. The Soviets were at an advantage in comparison to the Western world because core Arab states had never been exposed to Russian imperialism (while the Northern Tier states had). Moreover, the progressive regimes aimed to find a parallel between Communist ideology and Arab socialism in the economic development of the Arab world. Hoping to undertake industrialization, Arab leaders reckoned that Soviet aids with no strings attached (Western aid was conditional on political and economic requirements) would serve their purposes

⁵¹⁴ Schoenberger and Reich, pp. 10, 12.

⁵¹⁵ Lenczowski, Soviet, pp. 13-8.

⁵¹⁶ Soviet Strategy and Intentions in the Mediterranean Basin, p. 3; Mansfield, pp. 253-4.

the best.⁵¹⁷ Hence, the power balance in the ME was not at the mercy of the great powers anymore but also depended on the local governments empowered by Arab nationalists. These new leaders saw the USSR as a balancing force against Western domination or as an instrument to use against the West to receive concessions.⁵¹⁸ In this respect, we have witnessed how the relationship between Egypt and Soviets evolved. The Soviets initiated support to Egypt in the Suez Base negotiations with the British as well as providing backing to the Arab cause against Israel in the UN in 1954. The “friendship” peaked at Suez, where USSR was titled as the advocate of Arabs. The ties strengthen further after 1956, reflected in economics through technical assistance, oil exploration, production as the United Arab Republic (UAR) became increasingly dependent on Soviet arms. Arab nationalism was beyond US’ influence and the best that the US could do was to mitigate nationalism by supporting conservative states like Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq.⁵¹⁹

While Khrushchev prompted a reconsolidation with the communist world, he also embarked on an economic-political offensive to North Vietnam and Indonesia in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran⁵²⁰ and Egypt in the ME.⁵²¹ Through promoting peaceful coexistence, he aimed to convey to the Northern Tier states that military ties with the West were not required and in fact were dangerous as they kept the tension elevated. By 1952, Turkey had already joined NATO and in the eyes of Soviets, would serve Western interests by promoting and taking an active stance in Western sponsored defense schemes in the ME. Nevertheless, in May 1953, three months after Stalin’s death, a friendlier USSR announced that Armenian and Georgian governments had renounced their

⁵¹⁷ Lenczowski, *Soviet*, pp. 160-161.

⁵¹⁸ Campbell, J. C., *American Search for Partners* (Ed.) Hurewitz J. C., *Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East*, the Academy of Political Science, Vol. XXIX, No. 3, Capital City Press, New York, 1969, p. 200.

⁵¹⁹ Brands, pp. 74-5.

⁵²⁰ Campbell, *Defense*, pp. 208-9. To attain better relations with Iran after the CIA sponsored coup that ended Mosaddeq’s power and placed Shah back to power in 1953 (which the Soviets were not happy with), the USSR settled the issue of Soviet-Iranian border and released the long-held Iranian gold in Moscow. However, Iran came increasingly under US influence through arm sales in exchange for concessions to American petroleum companies and finally adhered to the Baghdad Pact in 1955.

⁵²¹ LaFeber, pp. 173-4. Khrushchev visited Mao and returned Port Arthur and Chinese Eastern Railway, long controlled by Russia as well as signing some capital goods delivery agreement with the hope to bring China under Moscow’s line.

post-War territorial claims on Turkey although Turkish ears were not receptive to the rapprochement.⁵²² While tensions always existed with Soviets, the USSR had continuous interest in Turkey to win her away from the West. The conversation between President Bayar and Admiral Fechteler as of 1956 is illustrative in this respect. The President informs the Admiral that leaflets printed in Lebanon are smuggled into Turkey through Syria are distributed to undermine Menderes as the reason for economic deprivation in Turkey. Simultaneously, Soviets offered aid in terms of goods and loans “with no strings attached” to comfort Turkey. President also draws attention to the fact that WB refused minor credits to Turkey but committed large sums to Egypt for the Dam project.⁵²³

Also noting that by 1955, the Soviets had stabilized their economics and politics. Internationally, their unfavorable situation had ended by attaining nuclear weapons. Moreover in the Geneva summit, some relaxation of tensions had been reached with the West.⁵²⁴ Hence, especially after 1955, the USSR “became actively engaged in the ME, looking for clients and subordinates exploiting military, economic, trade and cultural relations.”⁵²⁵ In the period that followed, the main aim of the USSR was to block Western attempts to forge defense schemes in the region and utilize Nasser to serve Soviet aims. Early rhetoric calling Nasser a fascist dictator was forgotten. The mutual benefit from cooperation between the two was obvious and readily exploited. Moreover, the desire for social change in the ME was a catalyst that brought militarist Arab regimes closer to communism and the USSR lent support to these progressive regimes.⁵²⁶

⁵²² Hale, *Turkish*, pp. 120-1; Karpas, *Turkish Soviet*, p. 85, Ataöv, *Amerika*, p. 191-2; Vali, F. A., *The Turkish Straits and NATO*, Hoover Institution Studies, US, 1972, p. 78; Halliday, F., *The Middle East in International Relations, Power, Politics and Ideology*, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2005, p. 109.

⁵²³ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIV, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, January 17, 1956, pp. 666-7.

⁵²⁴ Schoenberger and Reich, p. 10, 12.

⁵²⁵ Campbell, *American Search for Partners*, pp. 199-200.

⁵²⁶ Receiving power through coups and mostly being socialists, these Arab rulers however did not attain much social or economic success.

7.2 The USSR and Reactions to the Pact

The USSR displayed her discontent with the Pakistani-Turkish Pact and then later with the Baghdad Pact as well as SEATO. Khrushchev and Bulganin toured India, Burma and Afghanistan to emphasize the growing importance of Asia for the Soviets. Now, the two camps approach remained as a thing of the past as neutralism was embraced by the Soviet leaders⁵²⁷ and peaceful transition to communism was accepted.

The US Administration perceived that

“The objectives of the post-Stalin regime remain the same as those of its predecessor- to increase the power and improve the security of the Communist Bloc, to prevent the marshaling of the Free World's power against the Bloc, and to expand the Communist sphere. The present regime has developed policies designed to achieve these objectives by means which are less obviously aggressive than before...From the Soviet point of view, the progress made by the Northern Tier concept since the spring of 1955 has been a stimulus to Soviet intervention.”⁵²⁸

Whether Russian retreat from the ME in 1946 was a tactical response to Western pressure or a policy choice, still her absence brought its benefits in the 1950s. The propaganda of Cairo's Voice of Arabs Radio was forceful in exploiting the contrast between Moscow's hands off approach in the ME against the Western attempts to reorganize the area through MEC and MEDO. The signing of the Baghdad Pact however showed to the Soviets that prestige alone would not be enough to promote Soviet interests and actual policies are in fact needed.⁵²⁹

In 1955, Egyptian hostility to the Baghdad Pact was paying back as Iraq was now isolated in the Arab world, other Arabs did not consider joining the Pact and the Tripartite Pact was

⁵²⁷ Schoenberger and Reich, p. 10.

⁵²⁸ Review of Soviet Foreign Policy in the light of the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference, National Intelligence Estimate Number 11-13-55, CIA, December 6, 1955, pp. 4, 2, available on site: <http://www.cia.gov>

⁵²⁹ Laqueur, W. Z., *Communism and Nationalism in the ME*, Routledge&Kegan Paul, London, 1961, pp. 260-2.

complete. Nasser's arms deal with the Eastern Bloc in September 1955 (Section 6.3.1), which ended the long Russian absence from the ME, had soured his popularity in the ME.⁵³⁰ Now, through the arms transaction, the door of the ME was opened for Soviet penetration, effectively ending Western monopoly of arms shipments to the area.

This led to an increase in the anti-Western resentment and Arabs perceived the Soviet danger as an invention of the Western imperialists to perpetuate Western dominance in the region. Hence, Soviet prestige among the Arabs increased further. However as a result of the arms purchases, Israel was increasingly less secure because no organization had scrutiny over the deals. Soon, the aim for bringing a permanent settlement to the disputes on Palestine was replaced with the aim to prevent the outbreak of a new Arab-Israel War since soon the ME was to become an arms depot.

By 1955 year-end, the situation in the ME was more severe than it had ever been since 1948. The incursions by both sides continued and kept the tension high as things were getting out of control as Macmillan and Dulles correspondence on November 25, 1955 after the former came back from Baghdad shows. Dulles explained that the Russians were exploiting every means to win the support of Arabs which were not committed to the West through propaganda, exploitation of nationalist, xenophobia and anti-Israel sentiment.⁵³¹

⁵³⁰ Kedourie, E., *Britain, France and the Last Phase of the Eastern Question* (Ed.) Hurewitz, J. C., *Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East*, the Academy of Political Science, Vol. XXIX, No. 3, Capital City Press, New York, 1969, p. 194.

⁵³¹ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran, Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Middle East, Letter from Foreign Secretary Macmillan to Secretary of State Dulles, November 25, 1955, p. 205-6. Macmillan also added that on top of the Russians who were conducting anti-Western activity in the ME, Saudi Arabia (through immense subsidies) was also adding to the same sentiment.

8. SUEZ CRISIS: FIRST TEST OF THE BAGHDAD PACT

It will be seen from now on that two variables affected the regional ME states in their relationship with the superpowers. These were the superpower rivalry (which enabled them to manipulate the highly polarized international system) and the cohesive regional order that was the result of Nasser's effective pan-Arab strategy, which took shape especially after 1955.⁵³²

In mid-1950s, Nasser's commitment and appeal to "higher values such as Arab nationalism and unity, political independence, third World solidarity and neutralism and socialism" made him the leader of the Arab world. Parallel to his rhetoric, the challenge he created for colonialist West in the ME led him to determine and dominate the agenda of the region. His charisma overwhelmed other Arabs⁵³³ as his prestige went further through his non-aligned world leadership initiating contact with Africa and Southeast Asia.⁵³⁴

"Great Britain and America's best riposte would have been to isolate Nasser until it had become obvious that Soviet arms had gained him nothing and then if Nasser abandoned his Soviet ties-or better still, if he was replaced by a more moderate leader-to follow up with a generous diplomatic initiative. That was the American strategy toward Anwar Sadat twenty years later. In 1955, the democracies chose the opposite tactic: they tried to conciliate Nasser by meeting many of his demands."⁵³⁵

While Nasser's Arab-unity and leadership dream pushed him to undertake a fierce rhetoric towards the West, he understood the urgency of cooperating with the West for his Egypt's development and gave impressions of co-operation to Western officials. While he promoted neutrality, he was also a pragmatic who was willing to cooperate with the West so long as it was on his terms.⁵³⁶ Making use of this, in an effort not to permit Egypt to fall

⁵³² Gerges, pp. 245-251.

⁵³³ *ibid*, pp. 21-2.

⁵³⁴ Butt, pp. 38-9.

⁵³⁵ Kissinger, pp. 525-6.

⁵³⁶ Podeh E., (January 1996), "the Drift towards Neutrality, Egyptian Foreign Policy during the Early Nasserist Era, 1952-55", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 159.

irrevocably into the Soviet orbit after the arms deal with the Soviet Bloc, the West (the US, Britain and the IBRD) made an offer to Egypt to finance the Aswan Dam – a great hydroelectric and irrigation project on the Nile River in December 1955. This was a \$1,3 bn project to be completed in 12-15 years. It was based on the hope that some pressure could be exerted on Egypt through the offer and the ME would not be lost to the Soviets altogether.⁵³⁷ On the other hand, Turkey (who had recently been refused a loan of \$300 mn by the US)⁵³⁸ and pro-West Arab states resented the loan claiming that they were being penalized for not playing both sides.

Although Egypt had accepted the Western offer, he did not moderate his criticism against the West. Now, British policy was being realigned towards countering Nasser rather than appeasing him. London's aim was to increase support for the Baghdad Pact and its members as well as securing the membership of the US to the Pact. Iraq and Jordan could be drawn closer. A Syrian government friendly the West and Libya and Gulf not under Nasser's influence were also targeted. While US support was crucial for Britain, Dulles did not want to seem as teaming up with the British, old imperialists.⁵³⁹ Egyptian transactions with Soviets intensified through more arm deals. However this raised questions on whether Egypt can repay the loans granted for the Dam because the gains from her main export, cotton was to flow exclusively to the Soviet bloc in exchange for arms.⁵⁴⁰

In 1956 spring, Nasser objected international supervision of the Egyptian economy that was in the financial package of the Dam. It appeared that Egypt was not willing to take the West's offer and could in fact be negotiating a separate deal with the Soviets for the financing of the Dam.⁵⁴¹ In May 1956, Nasser withdrew recognition from Chiang Kai-

⁵³⁷ Bowie, pp. 28-30; Mansfield, p. 256.

⁵³⁸ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran, Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Middle East, Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, May 23, 1955, p. 300.

⁵³⁹ Lloyd, pp. 60-1.

⁵⁴⁰ There was also criticism in the US Congress, which did not want to aid Israel's biggest foe.

⁵⁴¹ Lenczowski, Soviet, pp. 93-4.

shek⁵⁴² and initiated diplomatic relations with Peoples' Republic of China, which led to icing of relations between the West and Egypt.⁵⁴³

This was followed by the conclusion of bilateral defense arrangements between Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, which increased Nasser's standing in the Arab world as his antagonism to the Baghdad Pact increased. By March 1956, it was clear that Operation Alpha had failed. By mid-1956, it was also being understood that Nasser's relationship with the Soviets was closer than expected. Dulles' response to Nasser's condescending attitude was rescinding the Aswan Dam loan on July 19, 1956. The former policy of helping/appeasing Egypt and expecting cooperation was over.

In retrospect, not receiving a positive response from the West for arms purchases coupled with Western reactions of withdrawing the offer on financing of the Aswan Dam and nationalization of the Suez Canal pushed Nasser towards the Soviets.

8.1 Nationalization of the Canal

Nasser took the withdrawal of the loan seriously. As a respected regional leader and a champion of non-alignment he had to perform a dramatic showdown as he hastily nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956. He aimed to maximize the effect of the decision by making an impressive speech on the fourth anniversary of the Free Officers' Coup. He acted politically in his decision and his proactive speech served more than one purpose.⁵⁴⁴

In his speech, imperialistic efforts to "thwart Egyptian independence" were outlined, condemning the past British actions and US refusal to finance the Aswan Dam. He stated that instead of benefiting the Egyptian nation, the Canal had been used as an instrument of

⁵⁴² LaFeber, pp. 184-5. This led to China first lobby in the US to openly oppose any deal with Nasser. They were joined by southern Congressmen at the Capitol Hill, who did not wish to finance a dam which would make Egyptian cotton more competitive to American cotton.

⁵⁴³ Rodman, p. 77; Robertson, T., *Crisis, the Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy*, New York, 1965, p. 58. The official reason for the recognition was because Peking would provide the arms that Arabs needed without the restrictions and conditions that the West would place.

⁵⁴⁴ Bowie, pp. 14-8.

exploitation by the imperialists and the IBRD conditions for the financing of the Aswan Dam were no different from the earlier methods of imperialism. Nasser fully exploited the nationalistic sentiment in the country imparting that this was a declaration of independence from imperialism and an assertion of national sovereignty. He marked that with nationalization and recovery of the Canal's full revenues by Egypt, there would be no need for Western aid.⁵⁴⁵

8.1.1 European view

British were shocked at the nationalization. In practice, British government was the largest shareholder of the Suez Company (with a 44% stake) and her ships dominated the traffic and carried 60-70% of the oil Britain required for her industry as well as to other nations of Europe.⁵⁴⁶ As a result, effective management of the Canal was critical for Britain. It was to be understood whether the revenue from the Canal would be used in expanding it to tackle the increasing traffic or diverted to building the Aswan Dam as Nasser imparted. Britain claimed that Egypt had expropriated a foreign-owned company which was managing an international waterway and the existence of that very company had been the institutional guarantee of freedom of navigation through the waterway. Hence, she accused Egypt for breaching the Constantinople Convention of 1888 granting that "the Canal and its ports shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war without distinction crossing from one sea to the other."⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴⁵ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, Editorial Note, pp. 1-2.

⁵⁴⁶ Bowie, pp. 1-5. The 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty allowed Britain to keep her troops in Suez and protect it until Egypt could do it herself. During the two world wars, the British did not allow the passage of German ships and defended Suez practically on her own. After the Second World War, while Britain still dominated the Canal, Egypt aimed to assert some influence as seen during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War when she closed the Canal to Israeli ships. In 1951, Egypt rejected UNSC call to reopen the Canal to Israeli shipping. The issue was raised in the Security Council in 1954 by Israel again, only to face a Soviet veto. Gradually, Egypt unilaterally relaxed the restrictions on Israel. In October 1954, the Suez dispute with Britain was settled as Britain agreed to withdraw her troops by June 1956 in exchange for the right to return to the and last British forces were to leave Egypt in June 1956.

⁵⁴⁷ Campbell, Defense, p. 101.

Egypt's purchase of arms from the Soviet bloc had been a "psychological threshold for Britain because Egypt had been the most crucial legacy of Britain's imperial past."⁵⁴⁸ As suspicion between Britain and Egypt had been accelerating, further compromising attitude towards Nasser was becoming increasingly unacceptable. Antony Eden, as Foreign Secretary after 1952 and as prime minister after April 1955 believed that Nasser was the reason for Britain's troubles in the region; the never-ending Suez base negotiations, the deep hostility towards the Baghdad Pact, worsening in the Arab-Israel situation through the Soviet arms deal, the break-down of Western imposed control of arms in the region, dismissal of Glubb in Jordan and now the problems related to the Aswan Dam. Hence, the list of Britain's frustrations with Nasser was exploited by the press and Eden's opponents and the issue was likened to Munich events and to the appeasement of Hitler.⁵⁴⁹

Eden and his colleagues believed that the whole British-Western position in the ME was in jeopardy through the nationalization as Nasser could manipulate the Canal to put pressure on Europe through disrupting the flow of oil. Accepting the withdrawal of troops from the Canal was one thing but to allow the Canal to pass into the hands of an Egyptian whose next move no one could not predict was yet another thing. Eden vowed not to appease Nasser.⁵⁵⁰ The British would risk a world war than "sink to the level of a third-rate power with a depleted economy". British Foreign Office also received intelligence of Egyptian plots to overthrow other Arab regimes in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria and Iraq through coups similar to Free Officers. Once this happened, Nasser would be in full control of oil and Suez. Then, his alliance with Soviets would be detrimental for Western interests.⁵⁵¹

Similar to Britain, the real hostility in France was also directed towards Nasser's personality due to the accusations that Nasser supported the Algerian rebellion that had been going on since 1954 by supplying arms to the rebels.⁵⁵² Similar to Eden⁵⁵³, the

⁵⁴⁸ Kissinger, p. 523.

⁵⁴⁹ Bowie, pp. 18-25.

⁵⁵⁰ Nye, p. 169.

⁵⁵¹ Robertson, p. 81, 89.

⁵⁵² Rodman, p. 78; Mansfield, p. 255. Despite Nasser's promises that Algerians were not trained in Egyptian camps, in the following weeks there was evidence that this was so

⁵⁵³ Eden, A., *The Suez Crisis of 1956*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1960, p. 117-9.

French Premier G. Mollet and his Cabinet applied Hitler analogy to Nasser, whom they would not appease. Moreover, France was humiliated by defeats in Indochina, Morocco and Tunisia and needed a victory to boost self-esteem.⁵⁵⁴ France argued that Nasser violated international law by nationalizing an international utility protected by an international treaty and had discriminated against Israel in the Canal. He was a threat to peace.

As noted earlier, Israel was upset about the withdrawal of British forces from Palestine and Suez since this gave a free hand to Egypt. She was dissatisfied with the UN because 1951 resolution of the Security Council calling Egypt to end the Suez and Gulf of Aqaba blockades of Israel did not amount to much. Moreover, siding with Egypt, the USSR had vetoed a second resolution in 1954. Egypt's fedayeen raids had also been frustrating Israel and finally, the arms deal with the Soviets would give a disproportionate advantage to Egypt against Israel. She was ready to claim the right to self-defense under Article 51.⁵⁵⁵

8.1.2 US view

While London and Paris had made their positions clear declaring that force could be used as a last resort, President Eisenhower believed that as long as the Canal was in operation, force was not to be applied without exhausting all that the UN charter offered. If this was not done, the whole developing world would be against the West. It would be an act of continued imperialism and the US did not want to be stamped as colonialist.⁵⁵⁶

Hence, the US administration⁵⁵⁷ believed that if Egypt could run the Canal smoothly, she should be allowed and aimed to resolve the Crisis peacefully through commitment to the

⁵⁵⁴ Bowie, p. 104; Campbell, Defense, p. 102.

⁵⁵⁵ *ibid*, p. 104.

⁵⁵⁶ Rodman, pp. 80-1.

⁵⁵⁷ Eisenhower handled the first few days of the crisis alone when Dulles was in Latin America and the critical UN phase after November 3 when Dulles was in the hospital for operation.

UN Charter. Unlike the Europeans, Eisenhower opposed the use of force on moral, legal and political grounds.⁵⁵⁸

Throughout the crisis, Eisenhower repeatedly ruled out a military solution which would lead to a negative sentiment in world opinion against the West and would also scare away the Arabs into the arms of the USSR. Unlike the British and the French, Eisenhower was not willing to overthrow Nasser. His concern was with the global implications of Suez, especially with the loss of Middle Eastern oil during a war and “the opportunity this would supply to the Russians.”⁵⁵⁹ The President genuinely believed that the situation required skillful diplomacy not to alienate the people of the Near East and North Africa since world public opinion sided with Nasser.⁵⁶⁰ By having a decisive role in ending the aggression in Suez, the US hoped to preserve or enhance its moral standing in the Third World as well as minimize the effects of Soviet propaganda.

8.1.3 The Baghdad Pact and Turkey during nationalization

Baghdad Pact members were frustrated with Nasser due his earlier attacks at both the Pact and its members’ pro-West standing. They would have preferred to see him toppled. However, during the political crisis of the nationalization until the start of the European plot, the regional Pact members made an effort to keep the Pact out of the crisis and preferred to act on their own since it would be impossible to come up with a common policy since all countries had different priorities regarding the crisis.

Turkey had no important traffic in the Suez Canal. Nevertheless the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian agreement, which said if an Arab state or Turkey was attacked, the UK could come to their aid by using the Canal, had an important connotation for Turkey’s defense. Hence, Turkey

⁵⁵⁸ Bowie, pp. 33-4. However, the US had difficulty to put forward a theory against Nasser’s nationalization. A claim that could be developed was that User Dependence on the Canal made it an international public utility that the international community was entitled to regulate. But the US did not want to take up this approach as she was not prepared to accept an international operation in the Panama Canal. Dulles lectured Britain and France against colonialism while not touching on the Panama Canal. Not using the issue of global interest, the US based the Suez Case on the fact that Convention of 1888 had completed its time.

⁵⁵⁹ Divine, pp. 80-3.

⁵⁶⁰ Bayly, p. 231.

claimed that the confiscation of the Canal reduced her security.⁵⁶¹ Egypt probably expected Turkey to side with her as far as the judicial aspects of the matter were concerned since Turkey had full control over her Straits. In fact, Turkey was one of the countries that Nasser approached to mediate between Egypt and the West in July 1956.⁵⁶² However, the hostility that Nasser had displayed to the Baghdad Pact was beyond Turkey's limits and now nationalization was the last straw. Turkey did not interpret the issue as an attempt to gain sovereignty but again as a Cold War dispute where Nasser was the shadow the USSR. The Soviets would attain power in the ME through defeating the US, Turkey's ally and creditor.⁵⁶³ Hence, Turkey evaluated the issue politically and neither the government nor the public were interested supporting Nasser.

Dulles proposed a 24-nation conference in London between August 16-23 to devise a peaceful solution and simultaneously buy time. Menderes government supported this and Turkey was represented by Nuri Birgi, the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry who during the meetings tried to stay at equal distance to Egypt's sovereignty concerns over Suez and the European position. Turkey also supported the Dulles Plan (on the whole 18 countries supported it out of the 22 participating), that emerged out of the meeting which suggested the setting up of an international board of control with members coming from user nations whose aim would be to supervise the operation and development of the Canal. The outcome was Australian Prime Minister Menzies (together with Iran's Foreign Minister) going to Egypt to explain the plan to Nasser. Turkey was satisfied that Baghdad Pact members contributed to the London settlement and demonstrated that the Pact was valuable.⁵⁶⁴ However, Nasser rejected the proposal since it would mean undoing what he had done. He stamped the attempt as "collective colonialism" and sent a letter that justified nationalization of the Company under international law and the UN Charter. Traffic in the Canal continued without disturbance.⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶¹ Cumhuriyet, July 28, 1956.

⁵⁶² Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Politikası, pp. 91-3.

⁵⁶³ Ayın Tarihi, No. 273, August 1956, p. 145; Ulus, August 8, 1956.

⁵⁶⁴ Sanjian, Turkey, pp. 137-8.

⁵⁶⁵ Bowie, pp. 14-8.

There were frictions between the Americans, British and the French on what the next step would be. British aimed to carry the crisis to the UNSC as soon as possible before the possibility of resorting to force slipped from grasp. This time, Dulles devised a second conference in London between September 18-21, among the formation of a Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA) in September where the Users would get together to form a body to exercise their rights under the 1888 Convention.⁵⁶⁶ Turkey believed that she performed effective cooperation to both conferences believing that Egypt's sovereignty was not in any danger⁵⁶⁷, but she thought that she did not receive the praising he deserved from the West. While the Turkish government hoped that Nasser would be punished by the West, public statements issued said that the problem should be handled without resorting to force. With the ultimate failure of SCUA, Turkish Foreign Ministry became pessimistic believing that Nasser was there to stay. Turkey's security would not be enhanced thereafter if Nasser was to survive this crisis.⁵⁶⁸

The Iraqi statesmen had learned about the nationalization of the Suez Canal on an official trip to Britain. Lloyd in his personal account of this incident declares that Nuri Said's attitude towards Nasser was similar to the British and wanted Nasser to be "hit hard and quick."⁵⁶⁹ However, Nuri Said could not make his real feelings known in public since there was genuine affection towards Nasser in his country, which the Westerners sympathized with. Hence, an Iraqi communiqué dated August 5 declared that nationalization was Egypt's right and Egypt's sovereignty and independence were to be respected. On the other hand, attention was drawn to the fact that as a consequence of Nasser's actions, Israel could try to exploit the dispute for her own ends. It was claimed that this would endanger the Arab world. The Iraqi expectation was that Egypt would retreat and agree to international control of the Canal, which would damage Nasser's prestige and undercut his influence in the region. But when this turned void Nuri Said hoped that an international operation (including the US, excluding Israel) to topple Nasser

⁵⁶⁶ *Ayn Tarihi*, No. 274, September 1956, p. 225.

⁵⁶⁷ *Ayn Tarihi*, No. 273, August 1956, pp. 140-3.

⁵⁶⁸ Sanjian, Turkey, pp. 139-40.

⁵⁶⁹ Lloyd, p. 74.

should be carried with Britain's lead. In the end, nationalization of the Canal had left Nuri Said in a vulnerable position in Iraq because there was incredible support for Nasser in the country. In stark contrast to the governments of Iraq and Turkey, Syria fully endorsed Egypt's nationalization and lobbied among Arabs for diplomatic support.⁵⁷⁰

8.2 Suez War

8.2.1 The Israeli attack on the Canal and the European plot

The failure of SCUA had convinced the Europeans that they would have to go ahead with their own solution to the crisis without further consultation of the US.⁵⁷¹ On September 12, Britain and France brought the issue to the UNSC and requested action. By then, Nasser was under increasing pressure to negotiate a solution from the international community including some Arab oil-rich states and the USSR (experiencing problems in Poland and Hungary). Moreover, the possibility of a military threat from the British and French was real and Nasser did agree to the negotiations. However, the Western appeal to the UN was the last step to show the international community that peace was tried and British⁵⁷² and French plot in collusion with Israel was well under way. The Soviets meanwhile publicly championed the Egyptian case and vetoed a UN resolution in October that would have pressed Egypt to accept some version of a users' organization.⁵⁷³ The negotiations were cut abruptly by provocation of the British to exhaust any attempt of negotiation. Moreover, in the last two weeks of October, communication between London and Washington broke down since the relationship between Eden and Dulles was unfavorable.⁵⁷⁴

The plot started with an Israeli attack on the Sinai Peninsula on October 29 when Eisenhower was in the middle of his presidential campaign. Following the Israeli attack,

⁵⁷⁰ Sanjian, Turkey, pp. 140-2.

⁵⁷¹ Divine, p. 84.

⁵⁷² Britain was however hesitant because while the Arabs could accept a British-French attack, they would not accept a plot with Israel. Eden was also under pressure from the Labor Party and the Americans both of whom favored a peaceful solution. Israel on the other hand wanted the British to be involved because they suspected that the French could back out.

⁵⁷³ Rodman, p. 79.

⁵⁷⁴ LaFeber, p. 187.

British and French gave an ultimatum to Israel and Egypt to keep their forces ten miles from the Suez Canal (the Israeli army on the east and the Egyptian army on the West) and threatened to otherwise occupy the Canal Zone. When the ultimatum expired, Britain started to bomb Egyptian bases. Britain believed that she was entitled to act because “Nasser was an enemy in a state of war with Israel and inciting people throughout the ME and East Africa to murder and insurrection.”⁵⁷⁵ The US had not been informed of the plot since the expectation was that she would oppose it. With the start of the attack, the Europeans believed that the US would exercise benevolent neutrality⁵⁷⁶ due to the “hope that the President would keep quiet not to upset the Jewish voters for his reelection.”⁵⁷⁷

On October 19, 1956, the USSR was occupied with Gomulka coming to power in Poland. The news of Gomulka’s success spread to Hungary as students, joined by workers, demand Stalinist leader to be replaced by I. Nagy. Huge protests, demanded removal of Russian troops and formation of an opposition party. As Nagy, now in power, announced the withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw pact, Soviets changed position and on November, 4 and 5, Russian tanks crushed the Hungarian uprising. US watched as Nagy was captured to meet his end in Russia.⁵⁷⁸ The American administration was upset that the British-French attack on Egypt had taken the limelight away from the Soviet’s brutal repression of the Hungarian uprising.⁵⁷⁹ In amidst of the two crisis, Hungary and Suez, Eisenhower was re-elected to presidency.

8.2.2 US response

The President was furious and his immediate response was to seek a cease-fire in the UN for Israel to withdraw forces behind armistice lines on October 30. However, it was refused as a result of British and French veto. The danger was that the plot would transform the ME conflict into a Western attack on Egypt.⁵⁸⁰ The US was alarmed since

⁵⁷⁵ Lloyd, p. 193.

⁵⁷⁶ Campbell, Defense, pp. 108-9.

⁵⁷⁷ Kissinger, p. 541.

⁵⁷⁸ LaFeber, p. 188.

⁵⁷⁹ Rodman, p. 81.

⁵⁸⁰ Campbell, Defense, p. 110.

hesitation would alienate those Asian and African nations and draw them into the arms of Moscow, where bonds had already been formed. To support or excuse the Europeans would mean losing the Afro-Asian people and in effect could undermine the whole UN system. As expected, the world opinion was extremely hostile to the invasion.⁵⁸¹ On the other hand, condemning the invasion could jeopardize the Atlantic Alliance and perhaps result in a Soviet hold on the Near East.⁵⁸²

On the next day, the British and French launched their air attacks against Egypt. The US called on an emergency special session of the UNGA (as provided in the 1950 Uniting for Peace resolution of Acheson) where an immediate ceasefire and opening of the now blocked Canal was asked. With the uninvited support of the USSR, the US secured a call to stop the invasion on November 2. Striking effectively, Israel had attained control of the Gaza Strip and lifted the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. She halted operations as an answer to the UN. However, the British and the French continued to bomb Egyptian bases and brought in troops and paratroopers on November 5. Nasser's forces put up stiff resistance at Port Said and denied the British a quick victory. On the same day, Soviet Premier Bulganin sent messages to Eden, Mollet and Ben-Gurion condemning the attack and threatening to undertake rocket attacks if the invasion continued. He also sent a note to the US proposing joint intervention, which the US rejected after denouncing Soviet cruelty in Hungary.⁵⁸³ The invasion had placed intense pressure on the sterling. The need for a US loan was immense and was made conditional on the ceasefire of the British and French. On November 6, Eden halted the invasion.⁵⁸⁴

8.2.3 The Baghdad Pact and Turkey during the Suez war

When the Tripartite plot started, both Turkish and Iraqi statesmen were supportive of the British, but had to do this behind closed doors not to outrage the Arab public and add to the enmity against them in the region. At the UN, Turkey voted in line with the US, on the

⁵⁸¹ Mansfield, p. 257.

⁵⁸² Aron, pp. 474-5.

⁵⁸³ Rodman, p. 83.

⁵⁸⁴ Brands, pp. 65-7; Robertson, pp. 61-77; Rodman, p. 81.

majority side but at times found it difficult to take sides between the US and Britain. The Times sums up Turkey's relative silence during the hostilities,

“Turkey was torn between her friendship with Britain and her indebtedness to the US for economic and military aid. Moreover, the position taken by two members of the Baghdad Pact, Iraq and Pakistan against the Anglo-French action in the canal zone forces Turkey to adapt her policy to theirs if the Baghdad Pact is to be saved from disintegration.”⁵⁸⁵

Four regional Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact organized an extraordinary meeting in Tehran at the height of the crisis on November 7, 1956. The need to strengthen the Pact was obvious when in fact one of the members of the Pact, Britain, collaborated with Israel against a leading Arab country, Egypt. Nuri Said, under heavy domestic pressure, arrived in Tehran on November 4 demanding the restoration of Egypt's independence/sovereignty and withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the 1949 demarcation line. Moreover, he suggested that members work towards a final settlement of the Palestine issue to show to the Arab public that Baghdad Pact was contributing to the peace process. Menderes arrived on November 7, allegedly recovering from an illness. However, it was claimed that he had waited until the reactions of parties had cooled and the final declaration would not be so harsh on Britain since fighting had ended by then. The resulting communiqué named the British and French intervention “regrettable” and asked to pull forces from Egypt and respect Egypt's sovereignty. US's rapid move in the UN was very much appreciated.⁵⁸⁶ Hence, Turkey saw the Tehran meeting as a victory for the Pact⁵⁸⁷ (stating once more that time was right for US entry into the Pact) although the communiqué contained only a limited criticism of the UK and France (and were not denounced) while

⁵⁸⁵ The Times, November 5, 1956.

⁵⁸⁶ Ayn Tarihi, No. 276, November 1956, pp. 168-9; Cumhuriyet, November 9, 1956; Gönübol et al., Olaylarla, pp. 282-4.

⁵⁸⁷ Ayn Tarihi, No. 276, November 1956, pp. 171-2; Ayn Tarihi, No. 277, December 1956, p. 158; Zafer, November 11, 1956.

the US was praised. It was also said that for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, the 1947 UN partition plan was to be taken as a starting point.⁵⁸⁸

Another meeting of the same group was to be held, this time in Baghdad between November 19 and 23. However pressure in Iraq was great and the provisions of the Tehran communiqué were not sufficient to alleviate public strains. So the Baghdad communiqué endorsed the provisions of the first communiqué as well as the communiqué accepted by the Arab Heads of State conference held in Beirut (November 13-15) which advocated “the implementation of the UN General Assembly recommendations and the disassociation of the Suez Canal question from the circumstances of the aggression against Egypt.” Again, during his Baghdad visit, Menderes also took an active conduct of policy to inform the Prince Abdul-illah that Nuri Said’s Cabinet members should not be changed. He also met members of opposition and warned them against the delicacy of the situation. The Baghdad Pact members also decided to send President Mizra (of Pakistan) to Saudi Arabia and Lebanon for further lobbying for the Pact. It was also decided in this meeting to send urgent request for US adherence to the Pact through the American ambassador in Baghdad and propose a visit of Prince Abdul-illah to Washington.⁵⁸⁹ Menderes encouraged Nuri Said to proceed with the same supporting attitude towards the West. In this respect, the planned visit of Iraq’s Prince to Washington could be significant. It was hoped that this would please the Iraqi public and ease pressure on Nuri Said.

Menderes had a meeting with the US Ambassador in Iraq on November 21, 1956. While the final communiqué was not completed yet, Menderes hoped the wording to contribute towards easing popular pressure on Nuri Said’s government and had asked for a reinforcing statement from the US. The Ambassador replied that this would depend on the wording of the communiqué (where the US demanded that a US entry to the Baghdad Pact should not be mentioned).⁵⁹⁰ All regional pact members hoped to see a favorable reaction

⁵⁸⁸ Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye’nin Arap, p. 97.

⁵⁸⁹ Sanjian, Turkey, pp. 160-1, 164.

⁵⁹⁰ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran; Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies toward the Middle East, Telegram from the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, November 23, 1956, pp. 353-4.

to the communiqué from Washington. The press release from the Department of State on November 29, answered the expectation of regional states praising them for meeting twice in the last weeks to reach a peaceful settlement to the problems of the ME. The US reinforced support for the Baghdad Pact and declared that

“A threat to the territorial integrity of political independence of the members of the Pact would be viewed by the US with utmost gravity.”⁵⁹¹

This was an effort to buttress the Pact and was especially important for Iran and Iraq, since the US did not have formal treaties of alliance with them. Hence, the US military officials believed that while this statement would bolster the morale of the region and end the queries about US hesitation to join.⁵⁹² On the other hand, it alarmed Israel.⁵⁹³

While the US statement was encouraging, Turkey was still disappointed that US did not become a full member of the Pact. As of December 1956, the Ambassadors of regional countries declared their views that half measures were not comparable to formal adherence of the US to the Pact (while it was decided that invitations to the US to adhere to the Pact should not be made public because it signaled to the weakness of the Pact as the US did not join). Dulles explained that the more important concern was the heavy pressure from Congress to give a security grant to Israel if the US joined the Pact. On the other hand, the Arabs and other regional countries, who witnessed the Israeli aggression in Suez, would not like this. If the Pact however collapsed, the Iraqi government would fall from power enabling the communists to pursue their goals in the ME. The Iranian Ambassador also

⁵⁹¹ Department of State Press Release No. 604, November 29, 1956 printed in Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXXV, No. 911 (December 10, 1956), p. 918.

⁵⁹² FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, the Near East; Iran; Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies toward the Middle East, Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), November 30, 1956, p. 362.

⁵⁹³ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, the Near East; Iran; Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies toward the Middle East, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation between Israeli Ambassador (Eban) and Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Roundtree), November 30, 1956, pp. 363-4.

declared his hope of some link between NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact to provide greater strength to all these arrangements.⁵⁹⁴

As to the value and effectiveness of the Baghdad Pact in establishing peace and security in the region, Turkey believed that the recommendations that Baghdad Pact had made to Britain to pull out their troops from Egypt rather than to be forced out had worked as British decision to withdraw forces came on December 3, 1956.⁵⁹⁵

Turkey was starting to take a more openly Arab oriented approach to the matters in the ME. In the rapprochement with the Arab world, Turkey denounced Israel during the two meetings of the Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact as the greatest threat to peace in the ME. She also withdrew her ambassador from Israel in November 1956⁵⁹⁶ (though there was not mention of Israel's attack on Egypt and the excuse of the situation in Palestine was preferred to be used).⁵⁹⁷ In an effort not to strain relations with Israel so much, Turkey declared that the act was not against Israel but was a move to save the prestige of the Baghdad Pact. This was not exactly the best conduct of foreign relations and did not lead to the sympathy of Arabs. Although diplomatic relations were later renewed at charge d'affairs level, Israel was displeased about the Pact being used as an anti-Israel medium.⁵⁹⁸

In terms of Turkish politics, the RPP did not agree with DP's policies, esp. endorsement of the Beirut communiqué in the Baghdad Pact meeting and the withdrawal of the Turkish Ambassador from Tel Aviv. There was harsh criticism for conducting aggressive policy without consulting the Parliament and DP was accused for adding to regional instability in the region.⁵⁹⁹ In fact a pro-opposition newspaper criticized the West not being able to

⁵⁹⁴ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, the Near East; Iran; Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies toward the Middle East, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, December 4, 1956, pp. 369-72.

⁵⁹⁵ Sanjian, Turkey, p. 158.

⁵⁹⁶ *Ayın Tarihi*, No. 276, November 1956, pp. 39-40.

⁵⁹⁷ Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Arap, p. 99.

⁵⁹⁸ Karpas, Turkish and Arab-Israeli, p. 119; Aykan, the Palestinian, pp. 93-4.

⁵⁹⁹ Sanjian, Turkey, p. 163.

make good use of the Pact in providing defense against the communist threat also claiming that the West used the Pact to solve regional problems.⁶⁰⁰

After the end of the hostilities, Nasser continued his propaganda to antagonize the West or pro-West governments, namely Turkey and Iraq. Menderes on the other hand, accused Egypt in his speech on December 28, 1956 regarding Suez,

“Egypt’s administration has shown the issue as part of a sovereignty issue and anyone who attempts to look at it in a different perspective is accused of betraying Egypt.”⁶⁰¹

Since US adherence to the Pact could not be attained, Turkey believed in US commitment to give additional help to Pact members was necessary. Confidence in the Pact had been badly shaken. Only promises of more aid could keep some regional governments, like Iraq, in power. The result of Suez from the Turkish point of view was;

“The influence of Soviets in this part of the world increased while the effect of West including the US declined.”⁶⁰²

8.3 Consequences of the Suez War

Before and during the Suez Crisis, there were vast differences in European and American views. The Europeans were concerned with the destruction of Nasser in order to get rid of further difficulties he could cause and did not want him to get away with his deeds this time. The US on the other hand believed that resorting to force would enlarge Soviet positions in the ME, exactly the opposite of Western efforts to contain the Soviet expansion and would also antagonize the Third World. Moreover, condemning Soviet aggression in the EE made it necessary to oppose the use of force in Egypt. Hence, the US

⁶⁰⁰ Yeni Ulus, November 13, 1956.

⁶⁰¹ Ayın Tarihi, No. 277, December 1956, p. 162.

⁶⁰² Ayın Tarihi, No. 276, November 1956.

declared that the plot remained from the imperial days of the nineteenth century and could not be justified in the twentieth.⁶⁰³

The plot failed to bring down Nasser or put the Canal under international supervision as the Europeans had hoped. Not only was Suez lost, but Britain's remaining influence in Jordan and Iraq were also demolished. Almost at one strike, Britain's claim to be a great power in the ME had collapsed. In the end, Britain turned away from European unity but chose subordination to American policy⁶⁰⁴ and essentially accepted decisions made in the US in international politics.⁶⁰⁵ A reshuffle in Britain's Conservative government took place as Eden stepped down in January 1957 and Macmillan assumed the post of Prime Minister. The operation also discredited France, which was left with diplomatic contact only in Lebanon, Libya and Sudan as of November 1956. Europeans now understood that the rhetoric that Europe did not need nuclear weapons and could always count on American support (the main idea behind NATO) to defend their interests was only partially valid. The French came to grips with the idea of building a united Europe with their historical enemy, the Germans, and initiated steps to that end. Moreover, the French (and the Israeli's) initiated their independent nuclear weapons programs to be self-sufficient. In fact, Suez Crisis almost had the effect of dividing and straining NATO⁶⁰⁶, a definite success for Nasser. Germany was content that it was not her who used force this time.⁶⁰⁷

While both superpowers condemned the Suez invasion, the USSR gained more prestige. In fact, the European aggression on Suez provided the perfect opportunity for the USSR to highlight herself as the defender of the Arabs parallel to the policies that she had formalized by now. Simultaneously, she had effectively diverted attention from her suppression of Hungary. When the Suez crisis was at its peak, Khrushchev proposed joint US-Soviet military aid to Egypt but was rejected by the US, recalled his Ambassador to Israel and requested approval to move warships through the Straits. In the letters to the

⁶⁰³ Divine, pp. 83-8.

⁶⁰⁴ Finer, H., Dulles over Suez, the Theory and Practice of His Diplomacy, Heinemann, London, 1964, pp. 491-2.

⁶⁰⁵ Kissinger, p. 548, 527-528.

⁶⁰⁶ Campbell, Defense, p. 111.

⁶⁰⁷ Finer, p. 507.

prime ministers of Britain and France, the USSR had made known that she would use force to crush the aggressor and restore peace. It was also stated (but only after the ceasefire) that Soviet volunteers would fight side by side with Egypt.⁶⁰⁸

Despite simultaneously crushing the Hungarian uprising with tanks, the USSR was promoted as the defender of Egyptian and pan-Arab interests against the colonialists and Israel. A Soviet loan for the Aswan Dam was secured in 1958 and learning from the Egyptian experience, developing nations saw that they can turn to Moscow in order to increase their bargaining power with the US. Khrushchev related American actions during Suez to weakness rather than high principle. By accepting Soviet weapons, Nasser had brought the Soviets into the ME and the arms deals that followed, turned into means of accelerating Moscow's influence in the ME. Khrushchev's actions led from one confrontation to another, from 1958 Berlin ultimatum to Cuba in 1962.⁶⁰⁹

Despite the military defeat against the tripartite invasion, Nasser had secured an undisputed diplomatic victory.⁶¹⁰ While he was saved by American pressures on the Europeans, the US officials distrusted Nasser more than ever and would soon be opposed to him altogether.⁶¹¹ Despite the obvious role of the US in saving Egypt, Pan-Arab nationalists did not show any appreciation of the US. This could be because the US had before been too involved with Britain and French policies and was already labelled as the friend of colonialism.⁶¹²

The plot had turned Nasser into a mythical figure in the Muslim world⁶¹³ and the period in between 1956 and 1959 would prove to be his most powerful years as he accelerated the dose of pressure on pro-Western governments of the region. In Jordan, 1948 Anglo-

⁶⁰⁸ Schoenberger and Reich, pp. 10, 12.

⁶⁰⁹ Kissinger, p. 548.

⁶¹⁰ Mansfield, p. 257.

⁶¹¹ Brands, pp. 66-8.

⁶¹² Sanjian, Turkey, p. 147. Moreover, the US did not unfreeze the Egyptian assets held in American banks after the hostilities which led the Egyptians to look up to Soviets, once again

⁶¹³ Karpas, Turkish and Arab-Israeli, p. 121. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo was organized between December 26, 1957 and Jan 1, 1958, where Muslim representatives from the USSR participated but Turkey and Pakistan did not. This conference placed Nasser as the leader of Muslims.

Jordanian Treaty was abrogated and replaced by the Arab Solidarity Agreement of January 13, 1957 where the signatories of the Tripartite Pact would compensate Jordan for the loss of British subsidy in the next ten years. Iraq was also asked to put her forces in Jordan under Egyptian command and when they refused, they were asked to leave the country.⁶¹⁴ Egyptian troops were to enter Yemen in five years to overthrow the existing regime. Nasser's biggest rival, Nuri Said was left in an especially difficult position after Suez. Although Nuri Said had tried to sympathize with Egypt during Suez Crisis, Iraq was nevertheless an ally of Britain, the very country that displayed aggression against Egypt through the Baghdad Pact. Opposition against Nuri Said climbed.

8.3.1 Eisenhower Doctrine

Basic objectives of the US in the region remained as Free World's access to the oil reserves, the right of passage from the Canal, preservation of Israel and independent Arab states and exclusion of Soviet military power or political control of the region.⁶¹⁵

The short term goal was the withdrawal of British⁶¹⁶, French and Israeli troops from Egyptian territory they captured. After intense bargaining, a compromise was reached with Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories.⁶¹⁷ Finally, Suez Canal was reopened in March 1957. The British and French were to pay compensation to Egypt. The Canal was cleared of Egyptian blockade and by May 1957, Britain and France ended their boycott of

⁶¹⁴ Sanjian, Turkey, p. 146.

⁶¹⁵ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran; Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies toward the Middle East, An Outline of Short-Term and Long-Term US Plans in the ME, p. 344.

⁶¹⁶ Keohane, p. 170; Kedourie, E., Politics in the Middle East, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992, p. 90. With UN handling the case thereon through the Canadian proposal for the creation of a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to supervise the ceasefire, the initial target was hasty withdrawal of British, French and Israelis from Egypt. From then on UNEF would replace them. Egyptian blockade of the Canal, the disruption of oil shipments (Syria cut the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) oil pipeline carrying Iraq's oil to the Mediterranean to be sent to Europe and Saudi Arabia's restriction of oil sales to the West) had created an oil shortage in Western Europe. The President used this against the Europeans and induced them to withdraw from Suez. Then, America started oil shipment to Europe on November 30. Last European ship left the Canal on December 22.

⁶¹⁷ Campbell, Defense, p. 111-9. Israel had a military victory and did not want to lose her achievements (controlling Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh) and go back to the insecure position before Suez. In November 1956, Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had withdrawn most of his troops from Sinai but he remained in control of Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh to make sure terrorism did not occur and control access to the Gulf of Aqaba and the port of Elath.

the Canal. By July 1957, Egypt enacted a law that forbade her Canal Authority to discriminate against the passage of any ship, except Israel's.⁶¹⁸

The longer term goal was to prevent the Soviets from using the British and French defeat to expand influence in the ME. There was a need to disassociate the US, from the legacy of the imperialists⁶¹⁹, which would require a fresh approach to American policy to the region.⁶²⁰ Hence, Suez marked the start of America rising to power in the world. Cutting links with the Europeans, who were interested in realpolitik and “flawed” devotion to balance of power, the US got acquainted with realities of power and that vacuums get filled. The question here was by whom the vacuum in the ME would be filled and the answer was the US.⁶²¹ If the US hesitated, the Soviets would fill the vacuum. Now the President was keen in keeping them away from the region.⁶²² Hence, Seale argues that the Eisenhower Doctrine was an expression of how the US saw the world and had to mirror the US determination without any compromise. In fact, by demanding alignment against the Soviets under the Doctrine, an Arab state would not only be standing against the Soviets, but also against an Arab neighbor.⁶²³

In the meantime, the US administration received hints that the Soviet threat was exaggerated by Turkey, Iraq and Lebanon. It was believed that especially Turkey, which favored deeper US involvement in the ME, was interested in proving her importance for the West and exploits the Pact for her own ends, such as further loans.⁶²⁴ By then, Turkey was falling deeper into a financial crisis.⁶²⁵

⁶¹⁸ Finer, pp. 496-9.

⁶¹⁹ During the NATO meeting in December 1956, Dulles made clear it was no longer appropriate for the Europeans to behave as global powers in defense of extra-regional interests. He claimed essentially that no member of NATO could be excused for using force as an instrument of national policy – “except possibly the United States, which had global commitments and an acknowledged responsibility for preserving world peace and order”.

⁶²⁰ Divine, pp. 88-96; Kedourie, Politics, pp. 89-90.

⁶²¹ Kissinger, p. 548; Seale, p. 285.

⁶²² LaFeber, p. 188; Kedourie, Politics, p. 90.

⁶²³ Seale, p. 286.

⁶²⁴ Sanjian, Turkey, p. 164.

⁶²⁵ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIV, the Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey, Statement of US Policy on Turkey, pp. 722-3.

Eisenhower made a formal request to the Congress on January 5, 1957 for a three part grant of authority for the ME as may be seen in Appendix C. First, the President asked for \$200 mn in economic assistance to preserve the independence of any nation or group of nations in the ME; second he requested military assistance for the same countries; and finally he asked for the Congress to permit him to use the armed forces to protect ME nations, that requested such aid against “overt armed aggression from any nation dominated by international communism.”⁶²⁶ The interesting detail in the Doctrine was that America’s own national interest was justified by an American intervention in the ME. Hence, it is important in pointing the importance of the region for the US.⁶²⁷ The Doctrine committed the US to the defense of the Middle East against communism and was America’s effort to shape the region unilaterally and side-step the European allies. Now the US was making a direct commitment to the Middle East, which Hurewitz interprets as “imposing a pox-Americana on the region overriding the earlier Tripartite Declaration where Britain, France and the US had collective responsibility to defend Western interests.”⁶²⁸

However, there were some problems with Eisenhower Doctrine. First of all Soviet penetration was most likely in Egypt and Syria, nations that were unlikely to request aid from the US. Second, the main threat to the independence of pro-Western countries such as Jordan and Lebanon came from radicalized Arab nationalism, “personified in Nasser and not really from international communism”. The doctrine also failed to take account of regional considerations in the ME, such as rising Arab sentiment and xenophobia. Moreover, the UN was not to be consulted by the US that would be using force geographically so far away from the US itself. Washington could now take unilateral action, exactly what she forbade London only a few months ago.⁶²⁹ Britain and France now claimed that the moral values that Dulles applied in the Suez affair were

⁶²⁶ Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East," January 5, 1957. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, the American Presidency Project, available on site: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11007>; Kedourie, Politics, p. 91.

⁶²⁷ Finer, p. 499; Gönlübol et al., Olaylarla, p. 288.

⁶²⁸ Agman, M., (July, 1986), “Defending the Upper Gulf: Turkey's Forgotten Partnership”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 85-86; Kedourie, Politics, pp. 93-4.

⁶²⁹ Campbell, Defense, p. 126.

hypocritical.⁶³⁰ Nevertheless, as expected the Congress voted in favor of the doctrine by 355 to 61. The resolution blundered in the Senate as there was criticism on extending aid to Arab nations (which troubled Israel's supporters) but with a change in wording and the help of Majority Leader L. Johnson, it passed and became law.⁶³¹

The four Muslim members of the Pact confirmed their positive response to the Doctrine in their meeting in Ankara on January 19-20, 1957. They were pleased with the information that the US would join the Military Committee of the Pact, if she was invited. This was the closest the US had ever gotten to full membership.⁶³² In fact, Ankara meeting was right before Prince Abdul-illah's visit to the US in February (it had been postponed with US's request) and it was decided that the Prince would represent the views of regional states of the Pact. The issues to be discussed were Palestine, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and North Africa.

In the meetings in the US, the Prince made known that the members were interested in implementing the 1947-1948 UN resolutions in the Palestine conflict. It was reminded that "Nasser had turned to the Soviets because of the disillusionment over the Western attitude on Palestine". Dulles replied that this administration has taken an impartial view than its predecessors and reminded that it was the Arabs who rejected the UN resolutions. The issue was delicate because it offered an excuse for Soviet entry into the region. Regarding Syria, Iraq was worried for the economic loss due to the stoppage of oil as a result of the destruction of the pipeline by Syria during the Suez crisis. Both sides discussed Turkish concerns over Syria. Egypt was identified as the main source of propaganda against both Iraq and the Baghdad Pact while the Iraqis also added their regret for the Israel aggression. Iraqi delegation also said "Saudi Arabian money, Egyptian propaganda and Soviet influence have all joined to bring about the serious situation in Jordan." In terms of Saudi Arabia, the sides agreed that King Saud would not join the Baghdad Pact but could be persuaded to take a more tolerant view of the Pact. Although, there was not much time to

⁶³⁰ Finer, p. 499; Kedourie, Politics, p. 91.

⁶³¹ Divine, pp. 80-92; Gaddis, Strategies, p. 180; Kedourie, Politics, p. 93.

⁶³² Sanjian, Turkey, p. 168.

discuss the Baghdad Pact, Dulles made clear that while the US saw the Pact as a key, relations with Saudi Arabia were a priority. He hoped to see some softening on the King's view of the Pact. The US was to offer increasing support to the Pact. While the Prince's visit was not successful in terms of achievements, it in fact coincided with King Saud's visit to the US. There had been some rapprochement between the two rival monarchies since Suez and this continued when the two met in the US. The Prince had informed the King about the anti-communist stance of the Baghdad Pact and hoped to continue favorable relations.⁶³³ King Saud would grow increasingly hostile to communists. Not sympathizing with Nasser's eventual aims, he would continue some rapprochement with Iraq and Pakistan.

In March 1957, Eisenhower sent J. P. Richards, Special Assistant for ME Affairs to the ME (except Syria, Egypt and Jordan) to establish a common front against subversion, socialism and communism, all related to Nasserism in Western thinking and explain the Eisenhower Doctrine. The aim of the Richards' mission was to put across that the US was ready to maintain the independence of ME states with US armed forces (while respecting political independence and territorial integrity). A second aim was to determine which countries in the region would accept to participate in the program and make commitments for economic and military programs. It was to be put across that the Doctrine did not aim to replace the Baghdad Pact but to work together with members as well as those outside the Pact. Richards also conveyed the message of US readiness to enter the Military Committee of the Pact.⁶³⁴ The Arab countries that accepted the Doctrine were Iraq, Libya and Lebanon while the rest, under Egyptian dominance were hostile to it. Nasser declared to the US Ambassador in Egypt that after the favorable US involvement in Suez, he hoped to turn a new page with the US but the proclamation of Eisenhower Doctrine showed otherwise. In fact Nasser believed that Richards tour was resulting in an alliance that would reform a ME alliance hostile to Egypt and Syria, which aimed to weaken both

⁶³³ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran; Iraq, Memorandum of a Conversation, February 5, 1957, pp. 1029-35.

⁶³⁴ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, the Near East; Iran; Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies toward the Middle East, Letter from the Secretary of State to the President's Special Assistant (Richards), pp. 454-8.

domestically and internationally.⁶³⁵ The USSR on the other hand was running a propaganda campaign that American imperialism was replacing the European one.

In the meantime, there were some unfavorable developments for the West such as the communists getting stronger in Syria and Nasserist elements getting stronger in Jordan as we will see in Chapter 9.

8.3.2 Deeper penetration of the USSR into the ME

Campbell argues that by siding with the popular cause of progressive governments, Khrushchev managed to earn a more favorable environment and got closer to dominating the ME than Stalin or the Tsars ever had.⁶³⁶ Having identified Nasser and his influence over fellow Arabs, Egypt was a primary target for the USSR in utilizing the Arab hatred for Western imperialism and Israel. Soviet propaganda by Cairo's Voice of Arabs radio was useful in convincing the masses that America aimed to supplant British imperialism.

The Soviet exploitation of the Arab-Israel dispute in the region was culminated with the sale of Soviet arms to Egypt in 1955⁶³⁷ undercutting Western monopoly over arms deliveries to the ME.⁶³⁸ Arms transactions were the most important method of Soviet penetration into the region as it boosted Soviet prestige psychologically, politically and strategically. Psychologically, the USSR gained prestige in the region as the supporter of the Arab cause in the Arab-Israel dispute. Politically and strategically, the USSR readily used the sales to extend influence and control over local governments which allowed her to gain an important edge in the global balance of power of the Cold War. Evaluating the arms deal from the Egyptian perspective, the nightmare had ended; Egypt did not have to look up to the West for arms while having the contradicting aim of attempting to erase Western dominance in the region. Nasser declared a month after the arms deal that

⁶³⁵ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Syria, Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, September 1, 1957, pp. 668; Seale, p. 289.

⁶³⁶ Campbell, *Defense*, pp. 214-5. On the way, the Soviets had let go of some former friends to attain the friendship of some others, such as alienating Iraq, Israel and Pakistan to enhance the support of Egypt as well as some other Arab states and India and Afghanistan.

⁶³⁷ Of course, heavy arming of Israel had also led the Arabs to look for a balance.

⁶³⁸ Lenczowski, *Soviet*, p. 60.

“The greatest thing the arms deal has done is to give our people a feeling of pride in themselves and pride in their country.”⁶³⁹

Realizing the Egyptian drift to the Soviet orbit, Britain and the US devised plans to show Egypt advantages of adhering to the Western camp such as increasing security in the ME through promoting peace by conducting Operation Alpha. A second attempt in this direction was the Western decision to provide finance to build the Aswan Dam.⁶⁴⁰ However, collapse of this deal followed by Suez debacle strained West’s relations with Egypt altogether. It also facilitated Nasser’s independence and leadership position not only in the ME but in the non-aligned world.

Having secured cooperation with Egypt, USSR began to also court Syria. After the end of Shishakli regime, the Communist Party’s role (headed by the respected and powerful leader K. Bakdash) in the anti-Western coalition government may be shown as an example of the role that communists performed in the emancipation movement against imperialism. As governmental exchanges took place, Soviets provided economic help to Syria.⁶⁴¹ Finally, in January 1956, an arms deal that alarmed the US was signed.⁶⁴² While secular pan-Arab Baath was gaining support, Syria was being radicalized under Nasser’s influence at the time. Iraq (with the backing of the West) had considered an operation to invade Syria and insert right wing elements to topple the communists. However, coinciding with the Suez incident, the coup never materialized since anyone attempting it would be labelled as an agent of Israel.⁶⁴³ After this point, Syria was in Nasser’s orbit, undertaking arms deals with the Soviets and recognizing China.⁶⁴⁴

In short, Soviet rapprochement with Arab revolutionary regimes was the result of anti-colonial rhetoric, neutralism and preference of state planned economy called Arab socialism. However, trade was not always complementary. Egypt’s cotton could be used

⁶³⁹ Bayly, p. 231

⁶⁴⁰ Kissinger, p. 527.

⁶⁴¹ Schoenberger and Reich, “Soviet Policy in the ME”, p. 12.

⁶⁴² Lenczowski, Soviet, pp. 102-4.

⁶⁴³ Seale, pp. 263-79; Sanjian, Turkey, pp. 147-8

⁶⁴⁴ Mansfield, p. 260.

in the Soviets but Iraq's oil was to be sold to the West since the Arabs needed the industrial Western goods in comparison to lower-grade Soviet goods. Still, the USSR was ready to provide assistance on long term infrastructure projects, such as Aswan Dam constructed with Soviet aid between 1960 and 1970. Scholarships for Arab students in the USSR and EE and use of skilled personnel in technical, military, cultural and diplomatic fields⁶⁴⁵ were other ways for Soviet penetration into the area.⁶⁴⁶

⁶⁴⁵ Soviet cultural center and trade mission were opened in Cairo in 1956. Nuclear cooperation agreement was also signed in January 1956.

⁶⁴⁶ Lenczowski, *Soviet*, pp. 58-67.

9. REGIONAL CRISES AND DECLINE OF THE BAGHDAD PACT

9.1 Jordan-Syria Crisis

Jordan was being absorbed into the Egyptian-Syrian camp as she had signed the Tripartite Pact and joined a military command accepting Syrian and Saudi troops on her soil. With the termination of British subsidy, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia were to subsidize the country. However, Eisenhower Doctrine led to a crack in the Tripartite Pact as Syria and Egypt refused it immediately whereas Saudi Arabia⁶⁴⁷ and Jordan did not.

For Jordan, the Tripartite Pact had fallen short of replacing the British subsidy. Moreover, King Hussain was not in line with the policies of Jordan's politicians which were following extremely pro-Egyptian line esp. after the victory of the nationalists (and leftists) in the October 1956 election. The new Jordanian government announced the decision to terminate the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1946 (which would formally expire in March 1957). Sensing that the increasing Egyptian assertiveness could lead to his own demise, King Hussein asked for the resignation of the prime minister, banned political parties and initiated martial law. Increased tension also led the King to indirectly request help against international communism in April 1957. This was a test for the Eisenhower Doctrine as Dulles and Eisenhower declared that Jordan's independence was vital to the US and independence and integrity of the nations of the ME was to be preserved.⁶⁴⁸ Meanwhile, a plot against Hussein was recovered and pro-Nasser and pro-left elements in the country had to flee to Syria. Colonel Bizri's appointment as Chief of Staff of the Syrian army compelled King Faisal and King Hussein to meet in Ankara to discuss the developments and how to respond to a possible Syria initiated coup. Deputy Undersecretary of State L. Henderson was dispatched to the ME to get information on the situation in Syria that frustrated the Americans. He also joined the Kings' talks in Turkey.⁶⁴⁹

⁶⁴⁷ There was a reversal in King Saud's commitment to the Tripartite Pact after his trip to the US in February 1957.

⁶⁴⁸ LaFeber, p. 192.

⁶⁴⁹ Campbell, *Defense*, pp. 127-30; Sanjian, *Turkey*, p. 173; Karpas, *Turkish and Arab-Israeli*, p. 120; Seale, pp. 290-7.

After Henderson's return, the US attitude stiffened and Syria was to be warned for aiming to act beyond her borders. The defenses of pro-Western countries were to be strengthened. In September an immediate airlift of military material arrived in Jordan.⁶⁵⁰ The Sixth Fleet was ordered to the EM as Jordan's independence was under strains from international communism. The President employed the Eisenhower Doctrine to buttress King Hussein and in a few days, an emergency grant of \$10 mn was extended (the first of many to come) as US replaced Great Britain as Jordan's chief subsidizer.⁶⁵¹ King Saud allocated his forces in Jordan under Hussein's command and extended financial aid. Since Egypt and Syria did not send troops to Jordan, Hussein defeated his enemies and pro-Western policies were restarted. Soon, Syria was asked to evacuate her troops from Jordan.⁶⁵²

A resolution giving the President military powers to wage war against international communism was transformed with Jordan Crisis into a presidential power to intervene in any ME situation which threatened the independence and integrity of any nation in the area.⁶⁵³ Turkey had also amassed troops at her Syrian border during the crisis. The events in Jordan was merely a start of the critical struggle between pro-Western elements in the ME and pan-Arab nationalists.

9.2 Turkey-Syria Crisis

As of November 1956, there were allegations that the USSR was strengthening the Syrian army for a future attack on the pro-Western countries in the ME, Syria against Lebanon, Israel, Iraq and Turkey. The issue was taken to the agenda of the NATO ministerial meeting of December 1956, it was decided that the issue would be studied in the NATO Council. Turkey was most enthusiastic to the developments, because if the situation got worse, she could pursue her harbored dream of establishing a link between NATO and the Baghdad Pact. In the meantime, both Turkey and Syria accused each other of violations of

⁶⁵⁰ Seale, p. 297.

⁶⁵¹ Finer, p. 500; Brands, pp. 72-73.

⁶⁵² Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Arap, p. 101; Karpat, Turkish and Arab-Israeli, p. 120.

⁶⁵³ LaFeber, p. 192.

airspace and amassment of troops. The Iranian government was worried about the escalating tension and sent messages that Turkey should not intervene in Syria.⁶⁵⁴

The fleeing to Syria of Jordan's top military personnel and the declarations they made on the radio led to increasing volatility in Jordan as was seen in Section 9.1. The Syrian Defense Minister had completed a significant military deal with the Soviets in Moscow. Simultaneously the US entered the equation as Syria deported three US diplomats accused with the attempt to topple the Syrian regime. Again as we saw above, communist sympathizer Bizri, had replaced the moderate Chief of Staff of the Army. These developments in Syria strained relations with her neighbors as well as with the US. The world believed that Moscow gained a bridgehead in the ME through Syria. For Turks, Syria was an armed center of subversion aiming to overthrow existing regimes in the area.⁶⁵⁵ Hence, a Syrian-Russian attack on Turkey seemed like a possibility and for similar or different reasons, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Israel were also frightened.⁶⁵⁶ It appeared as though the West was losing ground in the ME and the USSR was accumulating gains.⁶⁵⁷ The loss of oil pipelines to the Soviets would be frightening for Western Europe and Japan.

As of August, both Iraq and Turkey were worried that Syria could undertake subversive activities into their countries. Menderes believed that little remained before Syria became a Soviet satellite. Menderes also declared that "we are awaiting solid decision in order to be able to take appropriate measures."⁶⁵⁸ He effectively meant that he would prefer to see the Syrian government toppled by an Arab regime, such as Iraq or Saudi Arabia. He also suggested that he was waiting for a response from Washington to take action. Simultaneously King Hussain and King Faisal discussed the Syrian situation in Istanbul. Discussions between Turkish and US officials showed that it was agreed that any military

⁶⁵⁴ Sanjian, Turkey, pp. 171-2.

⁶⁵⁵ Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Arap, pp. 102-3.

⁶⁵⁶ Finer, p. 501.

⁶⁵⁷ The New York Times, August 18, 1957.

⁶⁵⁸ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Syria, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, August 21, 1957, pp. 642-4.

action against Syria was to be carried by Arabs.⁶⁵⁹ Eisenhower had sent Deputy Under-Secretary Loy Henderson on a ten day fact finding mission to the ME in August 1957. Having met top Turkish, Iraqi, Jordanese and Lebanese statesmen, his findings in September suggested that there was great anxiety in the region and that the Soviets may be able to topple the regimes in these countries through their dominance over Syria. He also drew attention to the animosity between the royalties of Jordan and Iraq and that they should move closer. Iraq was cautious in dealing with Syria because Syria held the pipelines that carried oil which accounted for half of Iraq's revenues. Moreover, while the Prince was strong, the new PM was weak with no backing from the people. So, Prince believed that Nuri Said could come back as vice premier.⁶⁶⁰

In Iraq, Prime Minister Nuri Said had been replaced by A. Jawdat (as well as some ministers) during the Jordan crisis in April 1957. The new Prime Minister was a nationalist as well as a pro-West politician. However, he also aimed to improve ties with fellow Arabs. Hence, he turned down all proposals for Iraq's military endeavor in Syria, esp. due to the possible cut of oil pipelines by Syrians. Hence, Iraq was careful throughout the Turkish-Syria Crisis not to have military personnel close to the Syrian border. However, Jawdat's stance sympathetic to Syria, was not shared by Nuri Said and the Prince. This deviation of the new Iraqi government soured relations between Iraq and Turkey. Reminding the Prince and the King their informal discussions in Istanbul, the response Menderes got was that the decision of the Palace had not changed but the Syrian movements were not interpreted as hostile and hence did not require action (the dependency of Iraq on Syria for the pipeline). To the relief of Turks, Jawdat was replaced by a pro-Nuri Said politician but anti-Baghdad Pact stance in Iraq remained alarming.⁶⁶¹

The President then ordered arms deliveries to Jordan and other countries in the area to strengthen their defenses. These speeded up deliveries coupled with Henderson's meeting

⁶⁵⁹ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Syria, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, August 23, 1957, p. 650; Telegram from the Consulate General in Istanbul to the Department of State, August 26, 1957, 1957, pp. 656-9.

⁶⁶⁰ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Syria, Memorandum of a Conversation with the President, September 7, 1957, pp. 685.

⁶⁶¹ Sanjian, Turkey, pp. 193-5.

with King Faisal and Hussein in Istanbul created suspicion that US was planning to overthrow the Syrian regime.⁶⁶² When Syria asked the Arab regimes what they thought the situation was Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Jordan demonstrated support for the fellow Syrian regime alarmed by domestic opponents in their countries.⁶⁶³

On September 2, Menderes had imparted to Prince Abdul-illah that the existence of a communist controlled Syria was so critical for Turkey that if the Arabs could not take action themselves against Syrian aggression, Turkey would consult the US on what to do.⁶⁶⁴ A US National Intelligence Estimate on the next day stated that unless there was forceful intervention from outside Syria, the extremist elements would acquire control. Hence there may be hope for some outside interference into the country. Nevertheless, Syrian would not accept a coup under Turkish auspices and this would lead to a rally against the coup. So, the US believed that an intervention under the leadership of an Arab country was more suitable.⁶⁶⁵ Dulles' telegram to Turkey conveys that the US cannot dictate Turkey how to act but merely give information on what the US conclusion to the problem is. Dulles stated that Syria was or was about to become a base for military and subversive activities that aimed to destroy independence of ME countries and make them subordinates of the Soviets. Hence, the US accepted the case for individual and collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, the US believed that Turkey should not act unless requested by Arabs. The US was ready to send economic assistance and military supplies if Syria's Moslem neighbors acted. Dulles also stated that if Turkey chose to act and Sino-Soviet bloc attacked Turkey, US would come to Turkey's assistance with armed force.⁶⁶⁶ The verbal assaults between Turkey and Syria continued with military and diplomatic maneuvers. On September 21, two Soviet warships visited Syrian

⁶⁶² Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla*, p. 291.

⁶⁶³ Still, most Arab leaders did not believe that control of Syria had passed to the communists but that power was vested in the army and a few key Baath Party politicians and were supported by the local communists.

⁶⁶⁴ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Syria, Telegram From the Consulate General in İstanbul to the Department of State, September 2/3, 1957, p. 672.

⁶⁶⁵ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Syria, Special National Intelligence Estimate, Development in the Syrian Situation, September 3, 1957, pp. 678-79.

⁶⁶⁶ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Syria, Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey, September 10, 1957, pp. 691-3.

port Lattakia and on October 5, US sent the Sixth Fleet to Izmir. On October 13, Cairo and Damascus also sent troops to Lattakia to support Syria.⁶⁶⁷

On October 9, Khrushchev in an interview with New York Times, accused Dulles of provoking Turkey to attack Syria but reminded the geographic proximity of USSR to Turkey.⁶⁶⁸ On October 16, Dulles said that if the USSR attacked Turkey, the US would not confine herself to a “purely defensive operation.”⁶⁶⁹

The UN General Assembly in New York corresponded to the same time as the Turkish-Syrian Crisis and on October 15, the Syrian Foreign Minister took the matter to the UN to place the issue on General Assembly’s agenda. It was claimed that concentration of Turkish troops at the border had created military threat to Syria. In a letter to the President of the General Assembly, Soviet delegation claimed that Turkish General Staff together with American military advisors worked out plans to attack Syria after the Turkish elections on October 27, 1957. Soviet delegations said that Syria would not be left alone to face struggle or provocations so close to their borders. While the Turkish side declared that the allegations were fictive, the Syrian delegation stated that the Turkish military preparations and deployment of Sixth Fleet were instruments to pressure Syria.⁶⁷⁰

The USSR had managed to create a war scare and gave assurances that if Turkey, Israel and other states would attack Syria, USSR would respond. In an effort to put a showdown before the Arabs, the USSR had played the role of being the champion of their freedom against American imperialism. Simultaneously, Turks denied the accusations and answered that the Turkish concern was that Syria would be converted into a weapons depot by the USSR to be used against her.⁶⁷¹ After discussions between October 22 and 30 as well as King Saud’s mediation efforts, Indonesian representative urged both Syria and

⁶⁶⁷ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIV, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey, Editorial Note, September 10, 1957, pp. 734.

⁶⁶⁸ The New York Times, October 9, 1957.

⁶⁶⁹ Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye’nin Arap, p. 107.

⁶⁷⁰ Yearbook of the United Nations, 1957, pp. 54-5, available on site: www.unyearbook.un.org

⁶⁷¹ Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye’nin Arap, p 106.

Turkey to resolve differences with mutual goodwill and refrain from aggression. The Assembly agreed to take no further action.⁶⁷²

The whole debate was right in the middle of Turkish elections which took place on October 27, 1957.⁶⁷³ Thanks to the rural votes⁶⁷⁴, DP managed to secure an electoral victory, receiving 424 seats against RPP's 178 seats out of the total 610 in TGNA. However DP's share in the number of votes was less than 50% this time as opposed to more than 50% in the earlier two elections.

The climax settled down as Khrushchev and Bulganin attended the celebrations of the 34th anniversary of the Turkish Republic on October 29, 1957 in Turkish Embassy in Moscow, declaring that the whole thing was a misunderstanding. While tensions eased, Egypt and Syria seemed ever closer to the Soviets. Soviet propaganda and the nationalism in the ME led to the assertion that Eisenhower Doctrine was an imperialist devise to divide and to penetrate into the Arab world.⁶⁷⁵ The crisis of 1957 autumn strengthened the Syrian communists and made the West believe that Syria was undertaking Soviet orders.

In retrospect, the question whether Turkey or Syria expected a direct military action from the other side or both simply aimed to distract public attention from domestic problems is not certain. Turkey's deployment of troops at the Syrian border, short of giving way to a war, was expected to increase the attention given to Turkey and force the US to be warmer to her financial demands in the face of rising economic crisis in the country. While the Soviets suggested a committee to detect Turkish amassment in Turkish-Syrian border, the US suggested a committee to detect the Bulgarian amassment in Turkish-Bulgarian border. It has also been claimed by various writers that during the critical early elections of

⁶⁷² Yearbook of the United Nations, 1957, p. 55-6.

⁶⁷³ Although a general election was expected; it was not made public until the last minute. It was announced in September that a general election was to be held in October 27.

⁶⁷⁴ Ahmad, *the Turkish*, pp. 52-7.

⁶⁷⁵ Campbell, *Defense*, p. 134.

October 1957, Menderes desperately needed to distract the attention to external affairs due to increasing financial problems in Turkey.⁶⁷⁶

Saudi Arabia and Iraq at different points suggested that a ME state like Turkey should break relations with Israel. Hence, in time it could be that Menderes believed that the question of Palestine (through instigating to a Communist infiltration to the area) was the key problem in the ME and hindered the formation of a larger security pact that included Arabs. There is some evidence to suggest that Menderes thought of breaking relations with Israel to gain the adherence of Saudi Arabia to a Western defense initiative in summer 1957.⁶⁷⁷ On the other hand, during the meeting with Eisenhower on December 18, 1957 in Paris, Menderes again brought up the issue of formal US adherence to the Pact where Eisenhower replied that US was a member in all but name. In the meeting held the next day, Dulles declared his wish to strengthen the Pact but formal adherence would require giving a security guarantee for Israel. Dulles suggested that if Turkey could convince Israel not to press for a security arrangement from the US if US joined the Pact, Dulles could reconsider entering it. Menderes (who had recently been considering breaking relations with Israel altogether to enhance support for the Pact) replied he was going to do this. Menderes stated once more that only US membership could secure the adherence of more Arabs, such as Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia (Dulles did not think Saudi Arabia would join but the King's attitude to the communists hardened). If Saudi Arabia entered the Pact and no Israeli guarantee was required, the US would enter the Pact.⁶⁷⁸

At the same time, Turkey was upset with Iraq for another reason. Turkey expected support from her allies on Cyprus issue and reacted strongly to those who supported the Greeks. Greece had introduced a new resolution in the UNGA, calling for the renewal of negotiations with a view to apply self-determination to the Cyprus case, which was strongly opposed by Turkey and Britain. Turkey on the other hand saw "partition" as the

⁶⁷⁶ Ahmad, *Experiment*, p. 397.

⁶⁷⁷ Sanjian, *Turkey*, p. 200.

⁶⁷⁸ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran, Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Middle East, Memorandum of a Conversation, Paris, December 18 and 19, 1957, pp. 673-5.

only feasible solution to the Cyprus issue and countered the countries that supported the Greek position. The resolution was approved by a majority in the Political Committee and Turkey reacted harshly to the allied countries of Iraq and Lebanon for their positive votes. In the end, the resolution failed to reach a two thirds vote in the General Assembly (where the US abstained on both votes) and was defeated. Nevertheless, the Turkish government's powerful reaction led to the Iraqi abstention in the vote in the Assembly. In Lebanon's case, the TGNA withdrew a bill that proposed to send a small quantity of arms and ammunition to the country.⁶⁷⁹

During the Turkish-Syria crisis, it is important to note that Soviet morale increased with the launch of Sputnik the world's first artificial satellite in October 1957 (which in turn led to a change in NATO strategy).⁶⁸⁰ The NATO Conference of December 1957 enhanced the decision to deploy missiles and nuclear warheads in Europe. While most countries did not accept the missiles, Turkey was ready for the challenge despite USSR's strong opposition. In October 1959, the US and Turkey reached an agreement to deploy Jupiter missiles in Turkey.⁶⁸¹ While installation did not take place until fall 1961 when they became operational in 1962 spring, the technology had become obsolete.

9.3 Formation of the United Arab Republic and Arab Union

The eventual union of Egypt and Syria, named the United Arab Republic (UAR) came to life as of February 1958. While pan-Arabism was the most important ideological doctrine of Syria's Baath party, the timing and the pressure for the union of Syria in 1958 points to the scare of Baath leaders to be consumed by communists or conservatives. The

⁶⁷⁹ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. X, P. II, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Operations Coordinating Board Report, January 29, 1958, pp. 741-4.

⁶⁸⁰ LaFeber, p. 195. NATO's initial strategy called "massive retaliation" was about giving nuclear response to any Soviet aggression against a NATO member. This was believed to deter the USSR from attacking members. The strategy seemed plausible as the Soviets had a much larger conventional army in Europe and neither the Soviets nor the Americans had advantage of long-range missiles to hit the other from their home country. In this respect, Turkey was useful in massive retaliation as her bases could be utilized to hit Soviet land. However, massive retaliation strategy was shaken with Soviet's launch of Sputnik in October 1957. While pointing to the development of the Soviet science, it also pointed to the capability of the USSR to send weapons at very high speeds to distant targets. This reduced the morale of the West camp.

⁶⁸¹ Hurewitz, Origins of the Rivalry, p. 14.

conservative parties were fragmented and were weak in comparison to the decisive Syrian army. The appointment of Communist General A. Bizri, as Chief of Staff in August 1957 was interpreted as the army getting ready for a communist takeover of the country and Baath leaders and conservative elements were scared of this. The emerging Turkish-Syria Crisis also paved the way for increased demands in Syria to merge with the more stable Egypt. Nasser had to accept the offer because Arab-unity had been a dream that he had been promoting since he came to power. It would also make him more commending in the Arab world than any other leader as well as end Syria's extreme radicalization.⁶⁸²

Nasser had accepted the Syrian offer to unite on two conditions. The first condition was that all Syrian political parties (Nationalists, Populist, Communists and Muslim Brotherhood) were to be dissolved and the second condition was that unification of Syria and Egypt gave way to a unitary (not federal) state. Nasser was to be the head of the centralized authority.⁶⁸³ The decision was not particularly welcomed in USSR as Baathists in Syria called for the union to neutralize the ascending strength of the communists. Now the merger made the communist party go underground and in January 1958, communist leader Bakdash declared his opposition and left for Moscow (only to return in 1966). Cairo on the other hand had started to distance itself from Moscow. Soon Qasim's coup was to arrive in Iraq to complicate matters further in the region.⁶⁸⁴

The Baghdad Pact meeting was to be held in Ankara on January 28, 1958 and did not contain the UAR on its agenda. Instead, the agenda of the meetings was as; full membership of the US, US' acceptance of the Arab line in the Palestine issue and increased economic and military support to the Pact members from the US. Before the meeting, Menderes went to Baghdad personally to request the presence of Prince Abdullah in Ankara in the Pact meeting to put pressure on the US to be more receptive of the Pact's demands. He also touched on the issue of establishing a link between the Pact and NATO. However, the Iraqis believed that this would be difficult for them considering the

⁶⁸² Seale, pp. 311-4.

⁶⁸³ Lenczowski, Soviet, pp. 106-9.

⁶⁸⁴ Schoenberger and Reich, pp. 13-4.

favorable relations between France, a NATO member and Israel since it would provide opponents great material to exploit. However, Iraq would utilize any military or economic aid from a NATO relationship but would keep it a secret. Menderes also believed that the situation in Iraq was deteriorating and that Nuri Said should again be prime minister.⁶⁸⁵

The West had not been very enthusiastic about a possible union between Syria and Egypt before because the new state could prove to be a hardline Soviet satellite. In fact, the West had not paid attention to the merger talks, which advanced quite rapidly and was taken by surprise. As the events unfolded, the cracks in Syria between Baathist and communist elements would surface.⁶⁸⁶

In his meeting with Dulles on January 26, 1958, Menderes declared his view on the proposed Union of Syria and Egypt imparting that “the main pressure came from Syria that the USSR and Syrian Communists were behind that pressure”. The willingness of the Egyptian regime to go along with the idea demonstrated that Egypt was collaborating with the Communists. “The plan was pushed by Syria and Egypt to topple the Baghdad Pact”. In turn the US view was that the decision seemed to be the free will of the peoples.⁶⁸⁷

With the decision of the union made public on January 27, Ankara meeting of the Baghdad Pact concentrated on the UAR while regional members’ aid requests remained on the sidelines. Dulles explicitly told that Arab nations had to lead if anything had to be done. Iraqi officials declared that some time had to pass before deciding their position and see if other Arab states would oppose or support the union. If Iraq was the only one opposing, it would be accused of being influenced by the non-Arab members of the Baghdad Pact. Hence, Iraq did not want to be pressed until she worked towards a common position with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon. Dulles also believed that the Pact should not condemn the union until finding out Arab position on the issue and give support to anti-union

⁶⁸⁵ Sanjian, Turkey, pp. 209-10.

⁶⁸⁶ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XIII, Arab-Israeli dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Memorandum from the Acting Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Berry) to the Acting Secretary of State, January 25, 1958, pp. 409-10.

⁶⁸⁷ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. X, P. II, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Memorandum of Conversation, January 26, 1958, pp. 737-8.

elements inside Syria later. However, the Baghdad Pact members refrained from doing anything hasty since it could have the counter effect of strengthening the union.⁶⁸⁸

On February 7, Kign Saud has informed that the Union did not harm any other Arab state hence no action should be taken towards the country. Dulles' message to Iraq reminded that the US would invoke Eisenhower Doctrine if after Syrian provocations on Iraq that could be justifiable under Article 51 of UN Charter or if the Soviet block intervened into the situation. While the Arab states were concerned about the implications of the Union, they did not seem prepared to take any action.⁶⁸⁹ Although the union resulting in the dissolution of the Syrian Communist Party led to a discomfort in the USSR, Soviet authorities recognized the regime on February 22. The US did so on February 25. Iraq was in a difficult situation because on the one hand she could not come into conflict with pan-Arabism, desired by the Arab masses while on the other hand, there was the scare that the merger had brought the Egyptian revolution closer to Iraq and would export it to nearby Arab regimes. Hence she asked Baghdad Pact members not to extend recognition to UAR as long as they could hold. In line with Iraq's requests, Turkey postponed extending recognition and finally gave it on March 11, 1958.⁶⁹⁰

Turkey's official belief outlined by the Foreign Minister Zorlu was that Turkey would be happy to see Arabs cooperate. If the union meant that Syria was going to get out of the Soviet orbit, Turkey would be pleased.⁶⁹¹ However, the Turkish worry (similar to Nuri Said's view) was that if Syria became the center of Soviet arsenal and subversion and aimed to promote leftist coups in the area⁶⁹², Turkey would be faced with the danger of Soviet encirclement and would like Syria to be detached from the USSR.⁶⁹³ (Turkey had been conducting a rapprochement with Egypt as reflected in Nasser's words that he had

⁶⁸⁸ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XIII, Arab-Israeli dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Telegram from the Delegation at the Baghdad Pact Council Meeting to the Department of State, January 29, 1958, pp. 412-3.

⁶⁸⁹ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XIII, Arab-Israeli dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq, February 8, 1958, pp. 419-22.

⁶⁹⁰ Sanjian, Turkey, p. 216.

⁶⁹¹ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. X, P. II, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Memorandum of Conversation, January 26, 1958, pp. 737-8.

⁶⁹² Karpas, Turkish and Arab-Israeli, pp. 120-1.

⁶⁹³ Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Arap, pp. 113-4.

been keeping US and Turkey out of his speeches that attacked imperialism.⁶⁹⁴) The problems between Turkey and Syria did not end as Syria accused Turkey with amassing troops at the border as well as other charges and Turkey accused Syria of smuggling.

While the UAR was interpreted as a victory of the advocates of Arab nationalism, other countries in the region which were pro-West felt threatened. In response, the Hashemite dynasties of King Faisal of Iraq and King Hussein of Jordan set up a (short-lived) federation to form an Arab Union (AU) on February 14, 1958 (and also extended an invitation to Saudi Arabia). Faisal II was to be the head of the Union while Nuri Said would be the head of the first government. Both countries would be committed to the pacts that they had signed earlier. Saudi Arabia was sympathetic to this union but could not consider entry due to Egyptian objection. In March 1958, Lloyd had informed the Americans that the Iraqi leaders very disturbed since the belief was that Iraq would have to finance Jordan. Hence, Iraq needed support and funds to boost spirits. Moreover, US Embassy in Iraq warned that there was no demonstration hailing the union with Jordan.⁶⁹⁵

An important matter of dispute between the UAR and the AU was the crisis that had arisen in Lebanon, which in effect is related to the Iraqi revolution in Section 9.4 and will be covered in Section 9.5. Lebanon had emerged from French rule after World War II as a predominantly Arab country with a population nearly evenly divided between Maronite Christians and Sunni Moslems. A carefully engineered National Pact had divided political control between these two religious groups with Christians controlling the presidency and foreign ministry and Moslems controlling the Parliament. Although Arab nationalism was gaining momentum in the country, Lebanon had managed to pursue a neutralist foreign policy until the Suez crisis. However tensions rose as influential Muslim leaders were opposing President C. Chamoun's initiation to amend the constitution to secure himself a new six-year Presidency. With Chamoun's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the

⁶⁹⁴ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Telegram from the Embassy in UAR to the Department of State, March 20, 1958, p. 435.

⁶⁹⁵ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XII, Near East region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Telegram from Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State, March 11, 1958; Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, February 21, 1958, pp. 293-5.

country seemed to be moving towards the Western camp. This in turn angered the Muslims of the country, who were excited about the formation of UAR and Nasser's Presidency (supported by constant Egyptian propaganda).⁶⁹⁶ Chamoun had secured support from Iraq, Iran, Sudan and Turkey and possibly from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Greece and Italy. His success was to be understood not only in terms of international politics but Western success to support him and respond to the demands of a Western ally in the ME. He symbolized the forces of resistance against Nasser. If Iraq and Jordan were to introduce forces to stabilize Lebanon, America could help by moving the Sixth Fleet off the coast of Lebanon as a direct warning and Turkey could mass troops on the Syrian border to present a challenge to Syria, who was accused of aggravating the situation in Lebanon. These moves could stabilize the situation in Lebanon without the landing of non-Arab forces in the country.⁶⁹⁷ The US believed that Jordan and Iraq would welcome US intervention as they would see it as a blow against Nasser and as a demonstration of US' support for friends. However, people of these countries would not support the operation. Others such as Libya and Sudan, which were more vulnerable to Nasser, would welcome the US move but would be even more reluctant to demonstrate public support. Turkey, Iran and Pakistan would support the move while Saudi Arabia would not want to get involved.⁶⁹⁸

The American government was concerned that if Lebanon was lost, the rest of the Arab world could follow suit and Northern Tier countries would be in trouble. As the situation in the next two weeks deteriorated and turned into a civil war in Lebanon, similar to the methods used in Jordan and Syria crisis, US speeded up arm deliveries to the country and the Sixth Fleet was ordered to be ready for maneuver. However, the US was not willing to go further and the dispute was taken to the UN. In the UNSC, Lebanon and Iraq stated their case for help against massive, illegal and unprovoked intervention by the UAR. The Security Council could not decide on the matter as the UAR was backed the USSR and

⁶⁹⁶ Kedourie, *Politics*, pp. 97-8.

⁶⁹⁷ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Telegram from the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, May 4, 1958, p. 29; Memorandum of a Conversation, June 15, 1958, p. 132.

⁶⁹⁸ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Memorandum of a Conversation, June 15, 1958, June 15, 1958, p. 97.

Lebanon was backed by the US. The decision was to send UN observers to Lebanon, who found little evidence of direct Egyptian and Syrian involvement in the unrest.⁶⁹⁹ However as the fighting continued, the Lebanese government was getting closer to asking for actual assistance from the US.

9.4 Iraq Crisis (Qasim Coup)

As King Hussein of Jordan asked for Iraqi help against anti-Western demonstrations and upheavals in his country, the Iraqi force under General Abdul Karim Qasim that was supposed to help Jordan entered Baghdad instead. A coup took place and brought the end of Hashemite rule in Iraq by brutally murdering King Faisal II and Prince Abdul-illah as well as the Prime Minister Nuri Said on July 14, 1958. As the regime declared its adherence to neutralism, Baghdad Pact headquarters were closed.⁷⁰⁰ The coup received affirmative reaction from Egypt, who hastily recognized the new regime hoping to make arrangements to include Iraq in UAR. The same was true of USSR as diplomatic relations between Baghdad and Moscow that were cut in 1955, were initiated. The Iraqi coup in fact was promising for the USSR who was now experiencing a cooling in relations with Egypt. Qasim had come to power with the strong support of the anti-Nasser left including the strong Communist Party and the Kurdish Democratic Party (also tilted to the left by the backing received from the Soviets) and would pressurize Nasserist groups in the coming years.⁷⁰¹

On the other hand, the West and pro-West regimes in the region were shocked at the bloody overthrow of fellow politicians in Iraq when they were expected to attend a meeting of the regional members of the Pact in Istanbul on that very day. The news of violent toppling of a friendly government and the loss of a key member of the Baghdad Pact created a deep sense of crisis for the others and was a harsh blow to the Pact.⁷⁰² Now, the worry was that the coup would start a chain reaction in the pro-Western elements of the

⁶⁹⁹ Campbell, *Defense*, pp. 139-142.

⁷⁰⁰ Sanjian, *Turkey*, p. 229.

⁷⁰¹ Schoenberger and Reich, p. 14.

⁷⁰² Campbell, *Defense*, p. 146.

ME, such as Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and cause dismal problems in Turkey and Iran. The expectation that the USSR could react strongly to a military action by Turkey or Iran but the reaction would fall short of initiating a general war.⁷⁰³

9.5 Lebanon Crisis

The US believed that “if they did nothing Nasser would take over the whole area, the US would lose influence in the ME and the dependability of US commitments in the event of need would be questionable.”⁷⁰⁴ Hence, as the situation in Lebanon climaxed on 14 July 1958, with the coup in Iraq, Eisenhower took up Chamoun’s urgent appeal for help and US alerted the Sixth Fleet and sent 15,000 US marines to Lebanon without asking for UN approval.⁷⁰⁵

In a televised speech to the nation on July 15, the President resorted to the Cold War rationale, making a parallel with the situation in Lebanon (which would be a victim of indirect Communist aggression) to Communist threat to Greece in 1947, Czechoslovakia in 1948, China in 1949, Korea in 1950 and Indochina in 1954. Yet, there was no Soviet activity in Lebanon and the problem seemed internal and as Kedourie put it, “It was Arab nationalism not Soviet communism that was the source of danger to American hopes for a stable ME.”⁷⁰⁶ Eisenhower wanted to convince the Arab nations that the US was prepared to defend her allies and their interests in the ME. Securing political influence and protection of oil interests was the desired goal, not military victory. Worried about a possible Iraqi move against Kuwait, he also transferred a marine regimental combat team from Okinawa to the Persian Gulf and moved tactical air strike force from Europe to Turkey.⁷⁰⁷ Eisenhower estimated that the costs of non-intervention weighed more than intervention. If Lebanon was allowed to be led by radicals, he evaluated that “the impact

⁷⁰³ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XII, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Telegram from Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State, March 11, 1958; Briefing Notes by Director of Central Intelligence Agency Dulles, July 14, 1958, p. 311.

⁷⁰⁴ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, Department of State, July 14, 1958, pp. 209-10.

⁷⁰⁵ *Finer*, pp. 500-2; *Kedourie, Politics*, pp. 99-100.

⁷⁰⁶ *Kedourie, Politics*, p. 101.

⁷⁰⁷ *Campbell, Defense*, p. 146.

from Morocco to Indochina would be harmful. Turkey, Iran and Pakistan would feel that the US was afraid of the USSR. Loss of confidence in the Western world could induce a move toward neutralism". The intervention was a "symbol to demonstrate to the conservative regimes in the ME that the US cared for their survival and to Nasser that Washington would not retreat in the face of this anti-Western agitation."⁷⁰⁸

On July 16, King Hussein invited US and British troops into Jordan to be used if there was external aggression from Lebanon. This resulted in Britain sending 2,500 paratroops from Cyprus to Jordan the next day. Turkey again welcomed the news as Zorlu declared that Turkey believed that the head of the Iraqi-Jordanian Federation was King Hussein.⁷⁰⁹

The US exploited the opportunity to use limited force in Lebanon to restore Western influence and prestige in the region. No shots were fired in Lebanon and a regime change was not expected.⁷¹⁰ On the other hand, no troops were sent to Iraq to topple the revolution government (Qasim government) despite Jordan's request to do so on July 18.⁷¹¹

⁷⁰⁸ Brands, p. 77.

⁷⁰⁹ Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Arap, p. 133.

⁷¹⁰ Divine, pp. 98-104.

⁷¹¹ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan, July 19, 1958, pp. 344-5.

10. TURKEY IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1950 DECADE

10.1 Turkey in Iraq and Lebanon Crises

A memo prepared by the Foreign Relations of the US declared that Turkey's alignment with the West was close and effective, especially as the Syrian government entered a pro-Soviet position. As Russian propaganda pressures on Turkey increased, Turkish dependence on Western support was more visible. The receipt of two Soviet notes with threats concerning Turkish attitude towards Syria during the Turkey-Syria Crisis did not weaken the Turkish stance as she continued to give unconditional support to NATO and the Baghdad Pact.⁷¹²

Despite the coup in Iraq, the meeting of the regional pact members in Istanbul (the location was changed to Ankara) was held and the subsequent US move in Lebanon was welcomed. Turkey has demonstrated her will to side with the West in the Lebanon Crisis also, as she allowed the US military to use İncirlik Air Base, a NATO facility (as well as suggesting the use of Turkish Air Force despite opposition's criticism). The note sent to President Eisenhower with the views of heads of non-Arab Baghdad Pact states stated that they believed that the coup is the result of revolting army and foreign powers, i.e. Egypt and Communist world, which undermined the security of the whole free world. They believed that King Hussein was the head of state of the AU. Through the instigation of Egypt of Kurds, Nasser and the USSR were clearly aiming to create common frontiers and place the ME under Soviet domination. Turkey, Iran and Pakistan urged the US to put Eisenhower Doctrine into action to support the Iraqi-Jordan federation and asked for US interventions in Iraq, Syria and Jordan.⁷¹³ The heads of Baghdad Pact members also demanded to hold an emergency meeting of the Pact and requested the participation of Dulles, to demonstrate that the Pact was alive.⁷¹⁴ On July 17, the US answered the call of Baghdad Pact members

⁷¹² FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. X, P. II, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Operations Coordinating Board Report, January 29, 1958, pp. 741-4.

⁷¹³ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Lebanon and Jordan, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, July 16, 1958, pp. 306-8; Karpat, Turkey and Arab-Israeli, p. 121-2.

⁷¹⁴ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XII, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Near East Region, Telegram From the Consulate General at Istanbul to the Department of State, July 17, 1958, pp. 78.

that she would take all measures to safeguard the independence of the small states in the ME. The President intended to maximize support to Turkey and Iran by increasing aid and setting up radio stations to topple Egyptian propaganda.⁷¹⁵

A top level meeting in Washington on July 18 was convened by the US and UK officials to discuss the urgent situation of the ME including the Turkish proposal to undertake military action in Iraq. First of all, the act would be condemned by the world public as an act of aggression and would alienate Third World that was newly attaining their very precious sovereignty. Second, the move would almost certainly involve the Soviets as they would take their place by Iraq and the two superpowers would be driven into confrontation. (Iraq was not as important as to lead to a war risk for any of the superpowers but it also seemed that the USSR backed the Iraqi regime and would answer to any attempt against it since there were manoeuvres of 24 Soviet Army divisions on the Bulgarian-Turkish border, in an attempt to keep the Turks under control.) Third, a Turkish invasion (that Dulles informed the President could take place as he was giving the details of Qasim coup on July 14)⁷¹⁶ could unite the Iraqis in support of a new regime as there has always been historical hostility towards the Turkey, seen as irredentist.

Hence, the common belief was that an armed involvement in the ME would bring the Soviets into the ME and could also lead to uniting the whole Arab world against the West under the leadership of Iraq (Qasim regime) or Egypt (Nasser). This possibility was dreadful for the West. Hence, the decision was to strongly dissuade Turks from maneuvering against the Qasim regime in Iraq. Dulles also declared that the US administration had not told the Turks that they should not take action in the Syrian Crisis that occurred a year ago since the US did not want to hold the blame for the developments. However, doing the same at the onset of the Iraqi revolution would be too risky. Hence, Turks were to be discouraged from taking any action against the new regime in Iraq but without giving the impression that fear of a Soviet response made the US reach this

⁷¹⁵ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XII, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Near East Region, Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower, July 16, 1958, pp. 72-3.

⁷¹⁶ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XII, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Near East Region, Editorial Note, July 14, 1958, p. 307.

decision. Hence, this time in the Iraq Crisis of 1958, Ankara was told by the US exactly, not to interfere (unlike last year's Syria Crisis). The best option was to watch Iraq carefully to see if a potential for a favorable environment for the West arose in the country.

Throughout the Iraqi crisis, Turkey was very concerned for the future of pro-Western regimes in the ME and strived for a Western concerted military action. However, there are contradictory views on whether Turkey, was prepared to overtake a military intervention in Iraq alone. Turkey once more reacted to the Iraq crisis in a similar way to the one year earlier Syrian crisis and interpreted it as a sign of increasing Soviet influence in the ME, asserting that the coup was inspired by Nasser and the communists. Turkey was worried that whole of the Western position in the ME was under threat and would give support to any Western initiative, which they believed had to performed as soon as possible. Moreover, as during the Turkish-Syria crisis, Turkey was undergoing a severe economic crisis due to mismanagement of the economy. This probably has pushed Menderes to exaggerate the threat perceived from the coup. There were other fears over the possibility of Egyptian-new Iraqi government collaboration in encouraging cooperation between the Kurds of the region. Turkey was also worried about the future of relations with Iraq as well as the delicate state of affairs with Syria.⁷¹⁷

The idea of military intervention taking place in Turkey had always been present in Menderes's mind since DP came to power in 1950 and the respect for İnönü in the military circles had always raised suspicion in DP. This is why Menderes undertook a change in army commanders in the first months when he came to power in 1950.⁷¹⁸ In the later years with the continuation of DP's Parliamentary majority, this threat somewhat subsided. However the example of the brutal Iraqi revolution in July 1958 again brought up the possibility of a military intervention. Just recently in January 1958, the Nine-Officer's incident had taken place in Turkey, where nine officers were charged with staging a coup

⁷¹⁷ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. X, P. II, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Operations Coordinating Board Report, November 19, 1958, pp. 772-4.

⁷¹⁸ Eroğul, pp. 66-7.

against the government.⁷¹⁹ Now, the Iraqi Crisis showed that a military intervention supported by popular uprising could threaten the ruling elite. This only added to the “revolution phobia” that DP had since its foundation.⁷²⁰ Even before any possibility of revolution existed in 1956, Menderes declared that it was the intention of RPP to come to power by a military coup. It is this fear that initiated the rule of terror in DP and the vicious circle of fear of revolution leading to pressure, pressure leading to the possibility of revolution and so on.⁷²¹ The Iraqi revolution tempered a new wave of crisis in Turkey’s internal politics. As, the events after the Iraqi crisis unfolded and brought Turkey to the edge of war, RPP which had kept relative silence aimed to be included in the decision-making. The extraordinary Parliamentary took place on July 26, 1958 with the speech of only one MP from DP and the opposition was not allowed to voice its view. In response, RPP gave a 148 signatory signed proposal that required the Parliament to reconvene, where the government was criticized for their adventurous policies. On the other hand, the dedication in RPP led to the birth of the idea of getting rid of the opposition in government circles. The communiqué undertaken in August, 11 1958 would eventually lead to the formation of the Investigation Committee that would trigger the actual coup of May 27, 1960.

Eroğul states that against the Iraqi coup and the economic erosion, Menderes’ ideology was that “people who are hostile to me (opposition and pressure groups) are against the people and aim to exploit the temporary economic problems in the country. Common people will agree to getting rid of these centers of hostility. However, this minority group will try to undertake revolutionary methods to overtake DP rule and therefore it is all right for the government to use any means not to allow this to happen.”⁷²²

The Iraqi Revolt demolished DP’s dream of forming a regional pact, being its leader and eventually make Turkey a respectable member of the West. On the contrary, Turkey’s unpopularity in the region increased due to her position as a servant of the West coupled

⁷¹⁹ Eroğul, pp. 159.

⁷²⁰ Ahmad, the Turkish, p. 60, Eroğul, p. 161.

⁷²¹ Eroğul, p. 147.

⁷²² *ibid*, pp. 160-2, 172.

with her insensitiveness to liberation movement of Arabs. For the region, it seemed Turkey was in alignment with the West to crush any awakening movement of the Arabs.⁷²³

The US was not really sure about how much international involvement there was in the Iraqi coup. While there had always been negative propaganda from Cairo, Damascus and Moscow against the Iraqi monarchy and Nuri Said, simultaneously there was also considerable internally dissatisfaction seen in rising Arab nationalism and discontent in the distribution of oil revenues in the country and the economy in general. Hence, the US believed that Iraqi revolution seemed to derive roots from within the country as there seemed to be no intention to unite with the UAR (despite the Egyptian suggestion). Besides Qasim was in control and he had made no declarations against the West. In fact, through a radio announcement he ensured the West that oil would flow as usual on July 18⁷²⁴ as well as declaring that Iraq would remain a member of the Baghdad Pact.

The Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council Meeting was held in London between July 28 and 29. The agenda was to review the recent developments in the ME and consider recognizing the new Iraqi regime or not. Iraq had not sent a delegation to London and since her membership was problematic, the members agreed to move the Headquarters to Ankara. Zorlu once again appealed to Dulles, the head of the US observer delegation that the US should join the Pact to give it “new life” as Dulles commented that the Pact was a very loose organization and he proposed to increase military aid and make special agreements with the regional members.⁷²⁵ The joint communiqué published at the end of the meeting signed a declaration that the US would sign bilateral agreements with regional members of the Pact; Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. The Pact members recognized the Iraqi regime on July 31 while the UK and the US did so on August 1 and 2, respectively.⁷²⁶

⁷²³ Eroğul, p. 186.

⁷²⁴ Campbell, Defense, p. 146.

⁷²⁵ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XII, Near East region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Near East Region, Editorial Note, Baghdad Pact Meeting in London, July 27-28, 1958, pp. 111.

⁷²⁶ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. X, P. II, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Operations Coordinating Board, p. 778.

10.2 General Instability

10.2.1 Economics

The Western aid that began flowing into Turkey after Truman Doctrine was expected to bring an initial push to the economy. The 1950 elections had also brought the first democratically elected government into power in Turkey. DP government now in power believed that the Western aid would inject the dynamism needed into the economy. Hence, foreign aid started to flow into the country. Of the \$300 mn aid between 1948 and 1952, 60% was invested in the agricultural sector. It is no wonder that DP preferred the agricultural sector that made up more than 70% of the population. Priority was also given to projects that would benefit DP's electorate. An ambitious economic growth program with new roads, harbors, power plants and factories were made. These were to be financed through foreign payments of the US. However, four consecutive years of draught coupled with the fall in prices of Turkish agricultural products led Turkey to establish a large external debt. By 1954, such large and fast growth rates would prove to be inflationary as well as adding to the large foreign trade deficits. There were no funds to buy oil, spare parts and raw materials as a result of lack of foreign exchange. Some investment had been misdirected and there was a large flight of capital from the country. The economy entered a vicious circle with prices rising making exports uncompetitive and credit outlook deteriorating. Bankruptcy had become a reality by 1955. Although Turkey had eased provisions for transfer of foreign capital and expected large direct foreign investment to enter the country, the amount fell short of expectations.

On top of these, the US refused to provide a \$300 mn loan to Turkey in 1955 that would be used to stabilize the economy stating that Turkey must first undertake credible economic policies and tightening measures. In line with the directives of IMF in 1956, the Turkish government undertook some contraction measures but did not pursue them. The situation was bleak as of June 1957. The US aimed to impose some conditions and economic reform on the economy but Turkish government seemed not to agree due to concerns on

Turkish sovereignty.⁷²⁷ Economic stability could only be reached by cutting back the military and economic programs accompanied by effective fiscal and monetary measures. However, Turkey did not adopt effective financial measures such as a more realistic exchange rate. Before the October 1957 elections the government had forgotten all economic stability and undertook spending that fueled inflation, believing that Turkey was indispensable for the US. The fact that the US had always provided help when required to the DP government created the expectation that it would always hold. Annual American aid to Turkey during the period 1953-1959 had doubled to \$96 mn in comparison to 1948-1953 period.⁷²⁸

By 1958, Turkish economy had stopped growing and was close to bankruptcy more than ever and pressurized by the West on December 4 1957, Menderes was forced to introduce a stabilization program and devalued the lira, under pressure from the US where the objectives were to keep inflation and bank credit under control as well as make SOEs self-sustaining.⁷²⁹

Still, the US regarded Turkish membership in NATO very crucial (especially considering Turkey's will and ability to resist communist invasion or subversion) and attached importance to Turkey's internal stability. Hence, a stabilization program⁷³⁰ and a \$359 mn credit from the IMF and OEEC was secured after President Bayar's personal request of aid from Dulles (who responded by saying that "no country, people or government reacted more firmly and effectively the Soviet Communist menace than Turks and considered Turkey an important American ally.")⁷³¹ However, as the economic crisis subsided, Turkish administration seemed to ease the restrictions on the economy.⁷³² Simultaneously,

⁷²⁷ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIV, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey, Statement of US Policy on Turkey, June 29, 1957, pp. 722-3.

⁷²⁸ Harris, pp. 71-4.

⁷²⁹ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. X, P. II, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Operations Coordinating Board Report, January 29, 1958, pp. 741-4; Ahmad, the Turkish, pp. 59-60.

⁷³⁰ The program aimed to also establish a sustainable exchange rate, including a devaluation of the TL to TL9 to \$1) firm credit ceilings on central and commercial banks, control of State enterprises and efficient investment allocations while making sure that the government commits to its promises.

⁷³¹ FRUS, 1958-1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Vol. X, P. II, Memorandum of Conversation, January 26, 1958, p. 740 and Operations Coordinating Board, November 19, 1958, pp. 772-3.

⁷³² Harris, pp. 74-6.

as the intensity of the Cold War decreased, there was less need by the US to relieve Turkey from her burdens.⁷³³

10.2.2 Foreign and domestic policies

As the hostility between the opposition and the government was getting stronger over economy and the government's political repressions, DP's foreign policy was also increasingly under fierce attack by the opposition. The quote below summarizes the critical view of the situation in retrospect of the DP decade,

“After joining NATO and being an ally of America, we have signed numerous agreements and left everything in US's hands. Our military is under the command of NATO, our bases are in the hands of the Americans, our security is dependent on America and our economy is dependent on American aid. We saw it as our duty to support France, America and Britain in their dealing with the Algerian, Vietnam and Suez problems. We also felt it our responsibility to defend Western colonialism in the Bandung Conference. In the UN voting, we look at the arm of American representative. We do not have the initiative in foreign policy.”⁷³⁴

Turkey's foreign policy had been totally dependent on US policy makers starting with the Truman Doctrine. In the subsequent years of 1950s, Turkey conducted a foreign policy fully parallel to that of her Western allies' and was even accused for taking orders from Washington. She tied herself to the US through the bilateral agreements and felt that the policies with the US should not and could not be questioned. Extensive military facilities and bases were given to US use, which allowed full scrutiny of the USSR. At the expense of being labelled a US satellite, Turkey's ruling elite genuinely believed that the country could have no foreign policy interest outside the alliance with the West.⁷³⁵ During Dulles' trip in 1955 to the ME, Menderes declared that North Africa and Canal problems were to be studied from the same angles, the Cold War. He believed that the West had to secure a

⁷³³ Harris, p. 173.

⁷³⁴ Milliyet, December 24, 1965.

⁷³⁵ Ahmad, the Turkish, p. 395.

foothold in the ME, which was vital to the defense the free world and asserted that these problems could not be simplified as colonial problems or independence moves. In fact, Menderes opined that the UK and France did not receive enough support in Suez base and North African disputes.⁷³⁶ Yet the relationship with the West was not only strategic and military but was also economic making Turkey dependent on US aid.

The ME policy was a main topic of controversy between the government and the opposition towards the end of 1950s. RPP claimed that Turkey had failed in her ME policies and urged the government not to take sides in the internal rivalries of ME powers (especially after the Iraqi Crisis where RPP disapproved Western intervention in Lebanon and Jordan). The Baghdad Pact was also accused of failing and not reaching its aims. It was now perceived as an organization to allocate loans and aid to the regional members from the wealthier ones in exchange for subordination to the greater powers in foreign policy terms. It was also attempted to be used as a medium to promote the Arab view in the Palestinian debate. The opposition regarded this as a divergence in the aims of the Pact and not necessarily in Turkey's best interest. Opposition's request for holding GNA meetings on July 17-18 at the height of Lebanon and Jordan Crises were not answered by the government. İnönü in turn, declared that Turkey should have stayed neutral to the Western interventions to these countries. He also criticized the high tensions with Iraq after the coup and claimed that Iraq should have been utilized as a friendly neighbor for the future.⁷³⁷

In line with their view of non-involvement in what they regarded as Arab countries internal affairs, RPP believed that the use of İncirlik base by US troops for landing in Lebanon in 1958 was abuse of Turkish sovereignty since Turkey was only notified by the US but not consulted. Moreover, Turkish journalists were not allowed to enter the facilities while foreign correspondents did and Turkish media received coverage from foreign

⁷³⁶ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. IX, P. I, the visit of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Mutual Security Administrator Harold Stassen to the Near and Middle East, May 9-29, 1955, Memorandum of Conversation, May 23, 1955, p. 140.

⁷³⁷ Sanjian, Turkey, pp. 239-43.

journalists.⁷³⁸ Hence, hostility between the government and RPP in TGNA throughout August 1958 was high. The government accused the RPP by provoking an internal revolution like in Iraq and accused the opposition for being sympathetic to Iraqi revolution for overthrowing the authoritarian rule of Nuri Said and claimed that it was even hinted as a warning for Menderes.⁷³⁹

After a considerable delay, the Cooperation Agreement (signed on March 5, 1959) with the US was brought to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Turkish Parliament in February 1960. This increased anxiety among the leaders of the opposition who argued that this was not in line with Turkish sovereignty. The opposition's scare was that the US could be positioned to rescue the increasingly authoritarian DP from falling from power (RPP claimed that the stabilization loan of 1958 had saved the government from stumbling because it was used for political purposes not what it was intended for) and demanded the term "indirect aggression" to be clarified. B. Ecevit, was especially critical of this wording which made intervention into Turkey possible against an internal opposition (similar to Lebanese President Chamoun's call in 1958).⁷⁴⁰ He asked for assurance that it would not be exercised against RPP for a political opposition to DP. Nevertheless, despite the boycott of the opposition, it was ratified on May 9, 1960.⁷⁴¹

While internal situation in Turkey was highly tense and incidents between opposition and government became an everyday event, Menderes took a trip to the US to join the CENTO meeting in October 4, 1959. However, the real reason was to give concessions to the US to draw support for the government. Shortly, after this trip on October 30, 1959, it was declared that Jupiter missiles would be placed in Turkey. In December, Eisenhower visited Turkey and saw an exceptional welcome⁷⁴² that raised anxiety in opposition that bonds between the government and US was deep rooted.⁷⁴³ Hence, İnönü speaking in the

⁷³⁸ Harris, p. 67.

⁷³⁹ Karpat, Turkish and Arab-Israeli, p. 122.

⁷⁴⁰ Cumhuriyet, February 6, 1960; Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 123.

⁷⁴¹ Ulus, February 26, 1960; Harris, pp. 67-69, 81-83; Gönlübol et al., Olaylarla, pp. 308-9.

⁷⁴² Eroğul, p. 169.

⁷⁴³ Harris, p. 81-2 points out that there was over exploitation of cooperation between DP and the US government to underline that DP was indispensable for the continuation of relations with the US. The trips

Parliament declared his hope that relations between Turkey and the US were beyond governments and were genuine “from nation to nation.”⁷⁴⁴ The US evidence on the other hand, displays that both parties used American presence in Turkey for partisan ends. While DP alleged that only it can receive US aid and was therefore critical for Turkish economy, RPP argued that although DP weighs high in the alliance with the US, the misuse of DP’s power cannot be forgiven. Both parties seemed to make political capital out of Turco-American relations. DP hoped that while charging RPP with anti-Americanism, it would gain US’ sympathy. The US declared that it has no involvement in either side of this controversy viewing the whole issue as an internal political affair.⁷⁴⁵

On April 15, DP accused RPP of attempting to demolish Turco-American friendship by attacking bilateral agreements and by offenses committed by US personnel in Turkey. The next day, RPP Parliamentary group retaliated by issuing a proposal for GNA investigatory motion to impeach Menderes before High Court Justice for totalitarian violations of the constitution and laws to keep him in power and destroy all opposition. DP was also accused of using its parliamentary majority to legalize her objectives. Following İnönü’s meeting with some generals and admirals in his house on April 17 (telling them that it was up to them to protect Turkey), DP announced that it would investigate the alleged subversive activities of RPP “to secretly involve the army in politics and make armed forces to disobey order and law”. On April 18, there was a proposal to set up an Investigation Committee to investigate the activities of RPP and a section of the press.⁷⁴⁶ The 15-person committee suspended all political activity for three months and banned all publicity regarding activities of committee. RPP displayed passive resistance, not resorting to violence. The scare was that the government could close down RPP. Fighting

of government officials were manipulated to show that the US preferred to work with DP in Turkey rather than opposition. This led to early criticisms of the US claiming that priority of the US was “its own interests to control without noise and complications, certain geo-political and strategic advantages in this key point of the ME” and in time it was justified that global trend for the US was to favor working with powerful governments. These examples then justified why the US administration would favor the authoritarian DP in Turkey and not really worry about democracy or being fair to the opposition.

⁷⁴⁴ TGNA Parliamentary Discussions, Term. XI, Vol. 12, February 25, 1960, p. 498.

⁷⁴⁵ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. X, P. II, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Telegram from Embassy in Turkey to Department of State, April 19, 1960, pp. 830-4.

⁷⁴⁶ Hale, W., *Turkish Politics and the Military*, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, London, 1993, pp. 106-10.

spread to the streets and turned into violent demonstrations against the government. On April 29, Martial Law was established in Istanbul and Ankara.⁷⁴⁷

As the situation worsened, DP government was overthrown by a military coup on May 27, 1960. The President and most government members were arrested. The National Union Committee (NUC) of 38 members who organized the coup assured that Turkish Armed Forces desired to fulfill all of Turkey's international commitments especially NATO and CENTO showing no evidence of anti-Americanism.⁷⁴⁸

Despite following a foreign policy in line with the West during the DP decade, Turkey was not perceived as an ally that mattered for the US because even a threat to move towards neutrality was not possible for Turkey, whose borders were guaranteed under NATO. Hence, Turkey was taken for granted by the West as her stern commitment would not allow playing off the superpowers against each other. Still, Turkey aimed to utilize her position by extracting economic aid from the US. Despite the fact that Turkish economy was becoming a burden for the US and a request for a further loan of \$300 mn was turned down in 1955⁷⁴⁹, the US still bailed Turkey out of economic crisis in 1958. This had led Menderes to deceive himself by placing too much value on Turkey's importance as an ally for the US. He attempted more than once to increase the alarm level in the Middle East to secure more aid from the US such as during Syria Crisis in August 1957 and Iraq Crisis in 1958. In each case Turkey seemed ready to undertake a military intervention in these countries and was pressurized to be cautious by the US.⁷⁵⁰ In fact in the second crisis, Turkey was told exactly not to intervene into Iraq. With the disintegration of the Pact, Turkey's aggressive foreign policy to promote the interests of the West in the ME ended. The policy had failed because Turkey and her "Western mentors" did not understand the true nature of the change taking place in the ME.⁷⁵¹

⁷⁴⁷ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. X, P. II, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Telegram from Embassy in Turkey to Department of State, April 19, 1960, pp. 830-4.

⁷⁴⁸ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. X, P. II, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Editorial Note, p. 844.

⁷⁴⁹ Sever, p. 89.

⁷⁵⁰ Zürcher, p. 248.

⁷⁵¹ Karpas, Turkish and Arab-Israeli, p. 122.

11. DEMISE OF THE BAGHDAD PACT

11.1 Middle East State System until 1960

As the international system polarized along East-West ideology, both superpowers were in a so-called competition with each other to win allies and develop alliances among the newly independent nations. Baghdad Pact was a Western attempt in this race to contain the entry of the Soviets into the ME and enhance its own dominance in the region. However the Pact failed in achieving this basic goal. On the contrary, by opening the ME to superpower competition, it became an instrument of its own destruction. The Soviets were successful in the 1950s in taking advantage of the anti-Western sentiment in the ME through their flexible ideology as well as correct policies targeting the Arab ME.

Baghdad Pact was not successful in its goal of increasing the security and the stability of the ME. To analyze this, it may be useful to divide the regional system of the ME into two phases for the time under investigation: “1) Birth of the State System and Quasi Independence Under Oligarchic Multi-Polarity and 2) Rise and Fall of the Egypt-Centric pan-Arab System.”⁷⁵²

The first phase between 1945 and 1955, may be identified as the region’s attempt to end colonization of the West in the region. Right after the Second World War, periphery states of the ME; Turkey Iran and Israel were more advanced in nation building and faced a fragmented Arab core that aimed to curb Western dominance. The Arab states were ruled by monarchies or oligarchies and compradors in each state had extensive ties with the West, especially Britain. The main threat to the system was the instability and elusive politics of the regional states themselves; the people lacked loyalty to the imposed boundaries that were often artificial to the region’s masses. There was gross uneven distribution of wealth as well as pains of decolonization. The birth of Israel in 1948 and her success in the 1948 War furthered the problems for the Arab ruling elite. They seemed

⁷⁵² Hinnebusch R., *The Middle East Regional System* (Ed.) Hinnebusch, R. and Ehteshami, A., *the Foreign Policies of Middle East States*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2002, p. 34.

to lose legitimization as it was believed that the Arab world had lost Palestine to the Jews. There was also great instability in Arab-Israel demarcation lines.

Foreign policies of the Arab regimes were not stable. They either used Western backing to protect themselves from domestic opposition or they exploited anti-imperialist rhetoric to gain support for the regime. On the other hand, the Hashemite regimes of Iraq and Jordan were ambitious to expand. The power elite in Iraq aimed to consolidate its monarchy through ties with Britain. Jordan, heavily dependent on Britain for funds and protection, aimed for Greater Syria through accumulation of Palestine's land and people. The system moved towards growing acceptance of a multipolar system, where no state would be allowed to be more powerful than others.⁷⁵³

The second phase between 1956 and 1970 may be called the rise and decline of the pan-Arab System under Nasser. Coming to power after the 1952 Free Officers Coup with the elimination of the Egyptian monarchy and gaining popular support (and internationalizing it through effective propaganda techniques), Nasser was able to exploit pan-Arabism. The beginning of this phase corresponds with the Baghdad Pact of 1955. Initially the West hoped that Egypt seen as the leader of the Arabs would join this seemingly Northern Tier initiative that was made to believe stemmed from the region, led to a dichotomy that precipitated the Middle East's own Cold War. On the one hand, there were countries that strongly opposed the Pact led by Egypt, who denounced it as a continuation of Western imperialism. Through his own charisma and anti-imperialist rhetoric, Nasser became the self-appointed defender of the Arab cause against the Baghdad Pact. He hastily accused Iraq⁷⁵⁴ for breaking the integrity of the Arab League through her membership of the Pact. Iraq as a founding member of the Pact represented the other side of the fragmentation of the Arabs aiming to counter the expansionist fervor of the USSR (as well as being entitled to economic and military benefits from the West).⁷⁵⁵ Hence, the Pact turned into a rivalry

⁷⁵³ Hinnebusch, *The Middle East Regional System*, pp. 34-5.

⁷⁵⁴ Nasser was also furious as he claimed that through the Pact, Washington favored Nuri Said for Arab leadership.

⁷⁵⁵ (Ed.) Cohen, M. J. and Kolinsky, M., *Demise of the British Empire in the Middle East: Britain's Responses to Nationalist Movements 1943-55*, Frank Cass, London, 1998, p. 217.

between Iraq and Egypt to attract support for Western enhanced alliance and maintain a unified Arab League.⁷⁵⁶

The superior military power of Israel only aggravated tensions giving way to the 1955 Egyptian arms deal with the Soviet bloc. The Suez War, where the Europeans hoped to remove Nasser from power served to strengthen Nasser's confidence and the Arabs' faith in him. While Suez destroyed whatever was left of British influence in the region, it promoted the Soviets as the guardian of Arab interests. The US attempt to fill the vacuum and contain Syrian radicalism under Eisenhower Doctrine led to strengthening the ties between Egypt and Syria (also aided by the domestic pressures in the country against getting stronger communists). The penetration of the USSR into the ME was used by Egypt to keep the US power and Baghdad Pact in check, limiting the use of superior Turkish and Iranian military power in comparison to regional countries. Moreover, the structural bipolarity of the international system made Nasser a beneficiary of aid from both superpowers as both expected collaboration from him to exclude the other from the region.⁷⁵⁷ Both sides increased assistance to prevent him to bandwagon with the rival. Especially, after 1955, regional countries

“Thought of Moscow as a useful lever to extract concessions from the West rather than as a threat to their independence. Many of the new nations managed to convey the impression that their takeover by the communists would hold more danger for the US than it did for them.”⁷⁵⁸

Soon, Egypt had succeeded as demonstrated in the emergence of a counter-Baghdad Pact Tripartite Pact between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria (and later Yemen). As the pan-Arab tide grew to topple governments in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and other countries, it also pushed pro-Western regimes to bring their policies in line with pan-Arab policies.⁷⁵⁹ British and Turkish efforts to pressurize Lebanon and Jordan to join the Pact had backfired.

⁷⁵⁶ Hinnebusch, *the Middle East Regional System*, pp. 35-8.

⁷⁵⁷ Seale, pp. 283-5.

⁷⁵⁸ Kissinger, p. 525.

⁷⁵⁹ Kerr, M., *the Arab Cold War: Jamal Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970*, Oxford University Press, London, 1972, pp. 60-75.

This eventually led to a bandwagoning with Egypt seen in the unilateral abrogation of bilateral treaties, evacuation of British personnel and the dismissal of Glubb in Jordan. Other examples may be the unified face displayed after Arab League conferences. What scared the pro-Western regimes was the response of nationalistic masses would be, if a betrayal of the pan-Arab ideal or Palestine issue was detected.⁷⁶⁰

Kremlin, of course, saw the destruction of the Baghdad Pact in her interest and joined hands with Egypt. Soon the conflict over the Pact spilled over into the Arab-Israeli confrontation. Israel scared of an Arab encirclement increased raids into the Arab world, which in turn intensified Egypt's search for weapons. Not being able to secure an agreement from the US, Nasser cut an arms deal with the Soviets, increasing suspicion that Nasser was under Soviet influence. With Soviet sale of arms to Egypt in September 1955, first of many to follow, the arms race in the region intensified, making the ME less secure than ever.

By then, Nasser became a hero for Arabs and the USSR became Arabs' best friend.⁷⁶¹ The withdrawal of Aswan Dam offer triggered a plot by Nasser's enemies (Britain, France and Israel) against him. However, due to US position against armed intervention, the three powers had to leave the Canal Zone and the plot failed to topple Nasser.⁷⁶² Soviets had sided with Egypt during the dispute and continued to supply arms. Increased calls for anti-imperialism with the Suez War pushed Jordan into aligning with Nasser in 1956 as the new elections had resulted in a pro-Nasser Cabinet and moved towards a defense treaty with Egypt and Syria in October. This was the highest point for Nasser. Iraq's attempt at leadership had ended, Western influence reduced, Egypt and Syria had become Soviet clients. Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen were in a formal alignment with Egypt. Nasser was helped here by superpower competition. The more the superpowers tried to balance each other, the greater was Egypt's freedom of action. Nasser's ability to oppose the Baghdad Pact was also the result of Syrian and Saudi Arabian fear of Iraq and the

⁷⁶⁰ Walt, pp. 60-2; Hinnebusch, *the Middle East Regional System*, pp. 37-8.

⁷⁶¹ Spanier, J. W. and Hook, S. W., *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, Congressional Quarterly Inc, Washington, 1998, pp. 130-131.

⁷⁶² Walt, pp. 62-4.

popularity of Egypt. This also allowed him to put political pressure on the pro-Western regimes in the region.⁷⁶³ The USSR undertook political, economic and cultural policies to establish close relations with Egypt and other Arabs in the mid-1950s and did not interfere in the problems of each country with their local communists.⁷⁶⁴

As Egypt got closer to the SU, the US interest in containing him increased and he emerged as a more significant threat than Iraq in the Arab world. The US worry that Soviet influence in Egypt and Syria increased led to the birth of Eisenhower Doctrine, which was embraced by the pro-West regimes but strongly denounced by USSR and Egypt.

After Syrian crisis with Turkey, Syrian communists seemed to be acceding to power, which led Baath rulers to look for a merger with Egypt with the hope that the realization of the pan-Arab dream could halt this. Egypt and Syria merged to form the UAR.⁷⁶⁵ Even at this high point of pan-Arabism, Arab states aimed to balance against each other, specifically against the threat from Egypt. This was true for the conservative monarchies in the region, such as Iraq who formed the Arab Union with Jordan. The US also managed to draw Saudi Arabia and Jordan towards itself through the visits of their heads of state to the US, which were both suspicious of Nasser's increasing power. Hence it was Nasser's successes after 1955 which caused the erosion of his power. Jordan was also to leave pro-Nasser camp as King Hussein detected a coup to oust him. While the US sent help, Iraq and Saudi Arabia supported Hussein. These balancing acts preserved the state system against pan-Arabism ideology.

The worsening crisis atmosphere may be seen in anti-Western demonstrations in almost all regional countries as well as in the brutal Iraqi coup of 1958. While ending the AU between the Hashemite dynasties, the coup seemed to have secured Nasser another ally; Iraq. Saudi Arabia also moved to appease Egypt.

⁷⁶³ Walt, pp. 64-6.

⁷⁶⁴ Lenczowski, Soviet, pp. 86-8.

⁷⁶⁵ Walt, pp. 67-8.

However, Nasser's insistence to push his own terms as a result of the rise of Egypt centric system provoked a counter reaction from other Arabs. It was soon evident that Qasim would challenge Nasser by not joining the UAR. While pan-Arabists in Iraq wanted to join the UAR, communists were interested in strengthening their own position to consolidate power. Qasim on the other hand believed that if (oil rich) Iraq joined the UAR, she would have to subsidize the deprived Egypt and Syria. Hence, the Iraqi Communist Party, which quickly had re-established itself was in alliance with Qasim against Nasser. This conflict in Iraq meant that the American intervention assumption (into Lebanon and Jordan right after the coup) that Nasserites were taking over Iraq, proved false since Qasim was not going to subordinate Iraq to Egypt and would keep his own freedom of action despite Nasser's pressures.⁷⁶⁶

With the entry of US troops into Lebanon⁷⁶⁷, the war-scare in ME was high again as the Soviet government accused the US of open aggression. This led to greater communist and anti-Western propaganda. On the other hand, Nasser was cautious and asked the Soviets not to intervene in the ME unless the Western forces invaded Iraq or the UAR. The Soviets vetoed any proposal for transfer of the American and British role in Lebanon and Jordan to the UN. Through an initiative among the Arab states, a compromise was reached in Lebanon on who the next president would be as Western forces left.⁷⁶⁸ Qasim regime in Iraq was recognized by the USSR two days later and by China the next day, which opened the way for Iraq to establish aid and trade agreements, cultural pacts as well as arms deliveries with the USSR.

11.2 Weaknesses of the Baghdad Pact

Cold War was a time in history when the US and the USSR were engaged in a rivalry that was political, economic, physiological and cultural. Aron argues that the world witnessed

⁷⁶⁶ Brands, pp. 77-90.

⁷⁶⁷ In fact, the entry of the US into Arab territory two years after US had condemned the UK and France was only upsetting in the eyes of the Europeans.

⁷⁶⁸ Campbell, Defense, pp. 143-5.

peace by terror between the two superpowers during the Cold War.⁷⁶⁹ The creation of the Baghdad Pact was an attempt to fill global and regional contingency planning of the West between NATO (1949) and SEATO (1954) against the Soviet threat. However, it was soon clear that with Mossadeq's rise to power in Iran in 1950 and Free Officers coup in Egypt in 1952, nationalist forces would not be easily shaped by the Cold War policies of the West. Under these circumstances, London (and Washington) sought to maintain vital interests in the ME through supporting pro-West monarchies such as Jordan and Iraq as well as reverting Iran back to the pro-West axis through a coup in 1953. What emerged as the Baghdad Pact in 1955 aimed to contain the USSR in the ME. However, it may be said that the Pact has failed and it is the weaknesses inherent in the Pact that has accounted for its subsequent collapse.

First of all, despite high expectations of member states from the Pact as a Containment policy tool, it remained as a political pact with little military and economic depth as the member states failed to evolve it into a complex multilateral defense pact. On the whole, it did not amount to more than a pledge of mutual assistance in the event of aggression by the USSR against one of the members. The geographical distance between the members restricted the ability of the Pact to be an effective instrument to contain the Soviets in the ME as well as the non-development of a centralized military command like that in NATO. The military forces of the member states were not designed to assist neighbors in the event of an aggression by the USSR, for example three quarters of Turkish land forces were under NATO command which left very limited resources to be used against a Soviet attack on Iran. In any event, the pact was too divided to be effective in undertaking measures to counter Soviet influence. Far from strengthening the members' external defenses, it exposed them to hostility from all directions, the USSR, the Arab League and Israel as well as the non-aligned group.

Although it was made believe that the grouping springed from the Northern Tier by the very countries that recognized a threat from the USSR, the idea was a consequence of US'

⁷⁶⁹ Aron, p. 162.

Northern Tier project and had materialized quickly lacking comprehensive political and military strategies for the defense of the ME. The regional countries were not aware of what was required of them.⁷⁷⁰ In reality, the Pact was a Western design to continue to have a say in the oil rich region where great potential was at stake. The West needed to maintain some control of the region no matter what.

Secondly, the members of the Pact did not share a common purpose. While in name the goal was to fight communism, this was not a genuinely shared by the members or the members that the Pact aimed to attract in the future.

“For an alliance to be effective, it must reflect some sense of common purpose, a perception of common danger and the capacity to pool strengths. None of these elements applied to the Baghdad Pact.”⁷⁷¹

While the West could form a common interest in fighting communism in Europe, which made the establishment of NATO logical, there was no Arab interest to form alliances against the Soviets. The threat perceptions in the Middle East differed greatly from one state to another. As the main target country Egypt denied cooperation with the West in MEC and MEDO, the Western defense project evolved to include the Northern Tier countries under the Baghdad Pact in 1955. The Northern Tier countries were Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, which had reasons to develop a more effective defense position against the USSR. Still, these countries also had other considerations, such as access to modern warfare and economic aid that would increase protection from neighbors as will be seen shortly.

⁷⁷⁰ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XII, Near East; Iran, Iraq, General United States Military and Economic Policies with respect to the Middle East, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, May 21, 1955, pp. 51-2. The US was not even certain of her own role or the effectiveness of the military aid that she supplied to the regional members. Politics and military details overlapped to a certain extent. The best defense was hinged on the Zagros Mountains of Iran. If this was to be held, Iran had to accept temporary Soviet occupation in the north. Another problem would be the difficulty in stationing Turkish military troops in Iraq, which would not be welcomed due to earlier problems between the two.

⁷⁷¹ Kissinger, p. 527.

The Arab countries had more prominent reasons not to cooperate with the West, their former imperialist lords. In fact, it was Britain and her very troops that posed the real threat to the Arabs, not the USSR. Unequal treatment of the regional countries by the West for decades had erupted into fire in two interlocked problems in the 1950 decade; pan-Arab nationalism rising against Western imperialism and Arab-Israel hostility. Arabs blamed Western imperialism for the establishment and the backing of the Israel menace.⁷⁷² In short, Arabs believed that imperialism (exploitation of their territory and oil) and Zionism were the main dangers to which Arabs were exposed. Below is an account of what members expected from the Pact.

The Iraqi monarchy and Prime Minister Nuri Said was more preoccupied about halting Arab nationalism in the country and protecting the monarchy than Soviet aggressiveness. For this end, the ruling elite sided with the West and secured a new version of the 1930 Treaty with London. However, fellow Arabs both in Iraq and in the region were not pleased when they recognized the parallel between the Anglo-Iraqi special agreement and the previous unequal military treaties which only showed the real interest of Britain regarding the Arabs. This in fact made future Arab adherence to the pact extremely unlikely.⁷⁷³ Nuri Said was severely criticized by Nasser for being a part of the Baghdad Pact and for creating a crack in the unity of the Arab League and for undermining its bargaining power against the West. Nuri Said's position became extremely critical after Suez, which led to Iraq's alienated completely from the Arabs. In an effort to rally support for the Pact, Nuri Said emphasized different priorities to different audiences. In making the Pact more acceptable for Arabs, Nuri Said aimed to utilize the Palestine issue and aimed to show the change in Turkish perceptions as a success of the Pact and lobbied for acceptance of the Arab side of the Palestine issue by the Western states. Nuri Said hoped that if he could secure this support, then internal and external criticism on the Pact would subside.⁷⁷⁴ However, this aim backfired as it gave the Pact an anti-Israel coloring and increased hostility from Israel. It also did not gain Nuri Said a leadership position among

⁷⁷² Campbell, *Defense*, p. 48.

⁷⁷³ Sanjian, *Turkey*, p. 241.

⁷⁷⁴ Lenczowski, *the Middle East*, pp. 283-4.

the Arabs. Aggravated by Egyptian propaganda, pan-Arabist tensions overwhelmed Iraq, which paved the way for the Qasım coup.

Covering the high plateau of Asia Minor, Turkey was at the junction of roads from the Balkans to the ME and from the Caucuses to the Persian Gulf. It directed land, sea and air communications in much of the Balkans to the Persian Gulf, across the Turkish Straits. Moreover, Turkey lying at the ideal Soviet route to Persian Gulf would be a powerful deterrence to any Soviet aggression directed towards the south. The US believed that Turkey was a natural ally through her anti-Soviet stand, which was the result of traditional confrontation between the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia that had resurrected once more in the immediate post-War period. In fact, this threat coupled with the Republican mission to reach the Western standards had pushed first RPP, then DP to align with the West. Menderes government fully endorsed Western ideals such as democracy and capitalism, at least in name as Turkey entered NATO in early 1952. From then on, warm relations with the US prevailed which showed itself in the flow of significant economic and military aid into Turkey. Moreover, in exchange for NATO membership, Turkey willingly accepted to take part in Western initiated defense schemes regarding the ME. The goal of the West here was to protect ME oil from the USSR as well as having access to bases close to the Soviets.

In terms of foreign policy, Turkey fully cooperated with her Western Allies not only in military but also in foreign policy terms and took a pro-active role in the formation of the Pact and in the attempt to promote it. At the expense of being labelled a tool of the West by the Third World, Turkey stood by the West in almost all policy decisions in the 1950s. Voting against Algeria's independence in the UN, maintained relations with Israel and intimidating the non-aligned countries at Bandung Conference (1955) through backing the West are only a few examples.⁷⁷⁵

⁷⁷⁵ Sever, p. 89. In the final stages of the Pact, Turkey attempted to attract support from her Pact allies in her dispute with Greece over Cyprus.

While Turkey was successful in building a bridge between some of the ME powers and the West, this bridge proved to be unsafe and unreliable.⁷⁷⁶

Yet, as a NATO member, Turkey did not expect the Baghdad Pact to bring any additional protection. The Turkish reasons for establishing the Pact may be the promise to protect Western interests in the ME as was admitted to NATO. More and more Turkey aimed to draw financial backing from the US through using the medium of Baghdad Pact and enhancing her strategic importance and commitment to Cold War ideals.

Pakistan's main concerns were to use every opportunity to enlarge its military through the US aid, receive diplomatic support against India and attain a stronger bargaining position over Kashmir. Yet the Americans at least initially believed that bringing Pakistan into the Pact could drag Egypt in. However, it only "confused an already confused situation". Moreover, Pakistan had little to offer to the pact in military terms (relied on her SEATO membership) and had been more of a "liability" than an asset through her extravagant demands.⁷⁷⁷ The weapons agreement with the US created worries in India that they could be used against India.⁷⁷⁸ Pakistan's accession to the Pact led the Soviets to deepen their influence in Afghanistan as well intensifying relations with New Delhi.⁷⁷⁹

A third weakness of the Pact is that it brought into daylight the Anglo-American rivalry for leadership in the ME. While both Washington and London agreed on the general terms of defending the ME against Communist expansion, they differed on the means. Having lost her once dominant position in the Canal Zone and in the ME in general, Britain aimed to secure as much as possible from her imperial days in terms of the treaty rights and military facilities under a regional defense pact including some key Arab membership, such as Egypt. This contrasted with the ME defense that the US had in mind which included the non-Arab states of the Northern Tier. The Americans would of course like to see the Arabs join, which was the plan in MEC. But policies diverged during the Suez Canal

⁷⁷⁶ Tamkoç, *the Warrior*, pp. 238-9.

⁷⁷⁷ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XII, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Memorandum of Conversation, Macmillan Talks, June 9, 1958, pp. 301; Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, p. 127; Jalal, pp. 425-6.

⁷⁷⁸ Brands, p. 53.

⁷⁷⁹ (Ed.) Cohen and Kolinsky, p. 217.

negotiations in 1952-1954 where Britain pressed for a settlement that would be conditional on Egypt's acceptance of adhering to the Pact. While the Arab states were not up for joining a defense against the USSR, the Northern Tier was closer to the danger. "This was a judgement in favor of a forward defense strategy and against a system in depth in Arab territory" coming to life with the Baghdad Pact. Initially, Britain resisted in this American incursion in a part of the world where she believed was her primary responsibility (such as Iraq and Pakistan) but was forced to join out of the necessity to reassure control of the Iraqi bases (otherwise after the expiry of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 in 1957, with Iraq in a Pact with the US, there would be no justification to renew the Treaty).⁷⁸⁰ After the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement in October 1954, Britain was more available to regain the initiative in the ME. Later in November 1956, British invasion of Egypt, in collusion with France and Israel detrimentally shattered whatever was left of UK's position⁷⁸¹ in the ME.

After the Second World War, the US had mediated between her imperial allies and Arab nationalists and US' eagerness and willingness to play a subsidiary role had kept the Anglo-French system alive.⁷⁸² In the last years of the Truman administration and beginning of Eisenhower administration, the US was coming to grips with the decline of British positions in the region which culminated with the decision to evacuate the Suez Base in 1954. Understanding that British involvement only created anxiety in the region as exemplified in the futile attempts of MEC and MEDO proposals, the US took the matters into hand and devised the Baghdad Pact, which was to serve US interests both politically and ideologically by helping to preserve the rule of pro-Western ruling elite in the member countries.

Lastly, the US aimed to contain the Soviets without offending either Nasser or Israel, both of whom had strong objections to the Pact. For Nasser, it meant his rivals would be strengthened and for Israel it meant Arabs would be entitled to more arms. In an effort not

⁷⁸⁰ Seale, p. 186-91; Karpas, Turkish and Arab-Israeli, p. 118.

⁷⁸¹ (Ed.) Cohen and Kolinsky, p. 217.

⁷⁸² Hurewitz, Origins of the Rivalry, pp. 7-10.

to offend these two states which were needed for Operation Alpha, the US hesitation to become a full member of the Pact casted shadows on the Pact's intentions and may be said to undermine it from the start.⁷⁸³ Ambassador Warren drew attention that the Northern Tier may be a sound concept, but would not add great material strength to the free world military capabilities if the US did not own it.⁷⁸⁴

11.3 Demise of the Pact and New Initiatives

The eventual withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact on March 24, 1959 (after the Qasim coup) symbolized the end of Arab participation in the Western initiated defense pact. With the termination of the 1955 Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement, British military presence in Iraq's Habbaniya and Shahiba bases was also eliminated. The Pact was renamed as CENTO to remind the fact that it stood between NATO and SEATO while headquarters were moved to Ankara. While regional members urged the US to adhere to CENTO, US continued her status as an observer but present in all the committees.

In March 1959, Turkey drew attention to a proposed non-aggression pact between Iran and the USSR, which would weaken the Pact through opening the way for ultimate domination of Iran by the Soviets and could lead to Pakistan and probably Afghanistan's following of suit. Turkey aimed to encourage the US to aid the Shah regime to make sure Iran's Baghdad Pact membership continued. Menderes declared that if Iran was under Soviet rule, Turkey would be vulnerable to threats from all directions, Iran, Iraq and Syria and this would create an increase in Turkish military requirements.⁷⁸⁵

On March 5 1959, US signed three identical bilateral letters in the respective capitals of the regional members providing military and economic aid to these countries to give "new life" to the Pact. In Turkey's case, it was stated that "in case of an aggression against Turkey" the US "will take such appropriate actions, including the use of armed forces to

⁷⁸³ Mango, "Turkey in the Middle East", p. 232; Gerges, p. 27.

⁷⁸⁴ FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIV, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, April 1, 1955, pp. 629-30.

⁷⁸⁵ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. X, P. II, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Memorandum for the Record, pp. 791-2.

assist Turkey.”⁷⁸⁶ In effect, the countries were guaranteed by the US against aggression. However, the third article of the agreement said that this defense will not be against open aggression only but also covert aggression, which could be without arms. It was then for the US to decide to help the government if help was requested against an alleged communist uprising.⁷⁸⁷

Regarding the future of pan-Arabism, there were problems between Syria and Egypt. Syrian Baath leaders who had led the merger were discontent since the new land reform had not brought the expected results. Polarization among the Arab regimes was visible, esp. after the breakup of UAR in 1961. Nasser joined with Jordan and Saudi Arabia in sending troops to protect Kuwait⁷⁸⁸ (after Kuwait got her independence in 1961) from Qasim’s expansionism.⁷⁸⁹

The US policy of blocking Soviet penetration of the ME by opposing the nationalists had collapsed with the Iraqi revolution. Now the conservative elements in the area that the Americans and Europeans relied on were to a large extent destroyed. This required a reorientation in Western policy based on some form of accommodation of the nationalists, who were now in charge.⁷⁹⁰ Nasser on the other hand, was dissatisfied with increasing Soviet dominance and was following a policy favoring Chinese over the Soviets.⁷⁹¹ Despite the drastic steps towards ending communism in Syria, some verbal combat took place between Khrushchev and Nasser in the first half of 1959. To strengthen his position, Nasser was also in need of some rapprochement with the West. In effect, the unthinkable was in motion in Britain since mid-1959 when Lloyd had initiated relations with Nasser in

⁷⁸⁶ Harris, pp. 221-3; Hurewitz, *Origins of the Rivalry*, pp. 3-5; (Ed.) Cohen and Kolinsky, p. 217.

⁷⁸⁷ Eroğul, pp. 186-7.

⁷⁸⁸ In 1961, Kuwait was the third largest oil producer and the largest in the ME.

⁷⁸⁹ Hinnebusch, *the Middle East Regional System*, pp. 37-8.

⁷⁹⁰ Brands, pp. 79-80.

⁷⁹¹ Campbell, *Defense*, pp. 149-50.

an effort to use Cairo to limit the ambitions of Baghdad-Qasim.⁷⁹² He also established better relations with the US in the last years of Eisenhower's presidency.⁷⁹³

The rivalry between Qasim and Nasser caused problems for the USSR. Despite the fact that they recognized the UAR, the Soviets were not pleased about the merger because Syria's powerful Communist Party was to be eliminated. Besides an Arab state at the south could be threatening but simultaneously, the USSR aimed to maintain cordial relations with Egypt. Iraq's revolution (where the communist party was prominent) on the other hand was welcomed by the USSR. The rift between Nasser and Qasim, made it difficult for the USSR to sustain good relations with both. With excessive restrictions Nasser brought to communists inside the UAR, the USSR was tilted towards Iraq. Still economic partnership with Egypt continued. Soviet enthusiasm for Qasim did not last long either since he also aimed to crush the growing strength of the communists in the fall of 1959 after silencing the pan-Arabists. Nevertheless, the USSR maintained economic ties with Iraq and relations with Qasim continued as he was still preferable to any other possible government in Iraq. In 1961, Qasim moved to repress the Kurds, who the Soviets had supported for a long time. Relations with Baghdad soured and Soviets were not upset with the fall of Qasim in 1963.⁷⁹⁴

Following the Qasim coup, Kurdish leader M. Barzani was allowed to return to Iraq from the USSR, which increased the recognition of the Kurds. Moscow on the other hand aimed to achieve an Iraq under her command with the manipulation of Kurds and communists. This would naturally bring an advantage to the Soviets as they would control an important source of oil in the ME as well as outflanking Turkey and Iran. However, it would conflict with the support given to Arab nationalism, a useful friendship that had served Soviet interest all through the 1950s.⁷⁹⁵

⁷⁹² Ashton, N. J., (December 1997) "A Microcosm of Decline: British Loss of Nerve and Military Intervention in Jordan and Kuwait, 1958 and 1961", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 1072-3.

⁷⁹³ Brands, pp. 79-80; Walt, p. 74-6. The US responded positively after detecting Nasser's anti-Communist stand with the hope to entice Egypt from the SU.

⁷⁹⁴ Schoenberger and Reich, p. 14.

⁷⁹⁵ Campbell, *Defense*, pp. 153-5.

Khrushchev was in a difficult situation internally as his international policies did not seem to be successful. There was open conflict with China, no solution was devised to the problem of Germany and the Cuban Missile crisis had eroded his power in 1962. He continued to promote a non-capitalist path to communism in the Third World without communist leadership exemplified in the UAR and Algeria. Furthermore, the nationalization decrees, agrarian reforms in Egypt in 1961 (extended further in 1963) and the completion of the first stage of the Aswan Dam showed that Egypt seemed to be on the path of Soviet rule. Nevertheless Nasser continued his anti-communist policies domestically which did frustrate the Kremlin. He also did not hesitate to promote non-aligned stance in the Third World, which now stood at a distance not only to the US but also to the USSR.⁷⁹⁶

Syria withdrew from the UAR in September 1961 and a Baathist coup followed in March 1963 and the rule became more and more hostile towards communists in the country. Hopes for a pan-Arab bloc revived but fears of Nasser's domination led to its collapse. Syria and Iraq soon aligned against Nasser and were pushed towards aligning with conservative regimes. Qasim coup led to increased entry of Soviet weapons into Iraq, Algeria and Yemen reforming Pan-Arab states (UAR, Syria, Iraq, Algeria and Yemen) into Soviet arms clients.⁷⁹⁷

This in fact created a sense of overconfidence in the Arab world prompting the 1967 War.⁷⁹⁸ The total of arms deliveries to the UAR was a stunning \$1,5 bn by the short war of 1967⁷⁹⁹ as shown by Table 11.1 below. However, almost the entire Arab arsenal was destroyed by the Israel (only replaced by a new wave of arms deliveries by the USSR).

⁷⁹⁶ Schoenberger and Reich, p. 14.

⁷⁹⁷ Hinnebusch, the Middle East Regional System, pp. 37-8.

⁷⁹⁸ Lenczowski, Soviet, pp. 128-38, 145.

⁷⁹⁹ The 1967 Arab-Israel war was to eventually lead to a major impairment of the pan-Arab system.

Table 11.1 Soviet arms to the UAR before the 1967 War (Source: Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East, p. 14)

Year	mn of Dollars
1955	250
1957	150
1959	120
1961	170
1963	500
1965	310
Total until the June 1967 War	1500

Communist Bloc's long term aid to the ME in the form of grants and loans was higher than from the US's by about 50% as Table 11.2 shows below:

Table 11.2 Long term external aid to Egypt (Source: Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East, p. 93)

Source	mn of Dollars
US Economic Aid (1945-64)	943
World Bank and I.D.A. as of June 30, 1965	45
Communist Bloc Aid (Inc. China) (1954-65)	1441
Kuwait, as of June 30, 1965	209

By 1957 Turkey understood that she had been trying to swim against the tide in the ME since the USSR was gaining ground as the West was losing. Her policy then became erratic as some rapprochement with Nasser was under way while Turkey considered breaking relations with Israel (to include Saudi Arabia into the Pact). Simultaneously, Turkey still aimed to promote the Pact by attempting to draw the US into the Pact by working to soften Israel's opposition to US adherence and a contrasting promise to extend

a Turkish security guarantee to Jordan in return for Jordan's accession. Nevertheless, Turkey furthered relations with Israel by secret meetings over cooperation over Syria.⁸⁰⁰

Soviet peace offensive towards Turkey had started in 1953 and continued with some breaks during Syrian and Iraqi crises. The rapprochement was not conditional on breaking relations with NATO or the Baghdad Pact. The Soviets accused the US of opposing the rapprochement between the two countries.⁸⁰¹ As of August 1957, Menderes had softened his policy toward the USSR, esp. economically. The Russians provided some effective solution to immediate problems at the election time of October 1957 when the US refused to grant aid for a glass factory, the USSR supplied \$10 mn in June 1957 with repayment to be made in goods. The Americans evaluated this as a tactical shift to increase Turkey's bargaining power with the US, rather than any serious change.⁸⁰² Persistent Soviet effort to improve relations with Turkey through small programs of economic assistance coincided with exploiting the growing Turkish distaste for the large US military presence in the country. The Soviet support given to Greek Cypriots in the form of arms interfered with the effort to improve relations with Turkey and late in the 1960s when the USSR chose to follow a balanced policy toward Greeks and Turkish interests in the island.⁸⁰³

⁸⁰⁰ Sanjian, *Turkey*, p. 244.

⁸⁰¹ Karpas, *Turkish-Soviet*, pp. 85-7. The dialogue was to continue with Menderes' planned visit to Russia in 1960, which never materialized due to the coup.

⁸⁰² FRUS, 1955-1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Memorandum From the Secretary's Special Assistant for Intelligence (Cumming) to the Secretary of State, August 7, 1957, p. 733.

⁸⁰³ *Soviet Strategy and Intentions in the Mediterranean Basin*, p. 7.

12. CONCLUSION

In this final chapter, the reader will be presented with the findings of this research, which will be submitted in conjunction with historical evidence.

While Western European states shared a common perception of the Soviet threat (with the existence of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe) after the Second World War, they were able to stand united and form the NATO. The Arab states that the Baghdad Pact hoped to eventually attract did not however share the common perception of threat from the Soviets that Europeans or even the Northern Tier countries did. Hence, the first finding of this dissertation is that Baghdad Pact failed as a result of the difficulty of containing Soviet expansion by drawing lines outside of Europe where threat perceptions differed from those of Europe. These differences in perception made the West misjudge the Arab expectations as they tended to view the ME as another Cold War theater rather than an area with its own dynamics. The West also aimed to superimpose its own defense plans on top of complex Arab politics.⁸⁰⁴

Drawing attention to the hypothesis explained in the Introduction, the Arabs saw the preponderance and further assertion of the West into the ME as a greater danger than any “alleged” Soviet threat that was intangible. In fact, the revolutionary regimes claimed that Soviet threat was put forward by the West to shadow the importance of crucial problems in the region such as emancipation of Arabs from colonialism and Palestine issue, both of which targeted Britain. There was open hatred against the British due to the bilateral treaties that had confirmed her dominance over the locals through exploiting the land and resources of the region. This was exactly the time when the West was considering plans to include the ME in the containment of the USSR in the 1950 decade. The Arabs who had not been allowed self-determination after the First World War (placed under mandate rule of Britain and France), now prioritized ending Western preponderance in the region. The author believes that “Aiming to protect those who do not feel the threat” may be the essence of the failure of the Baghdad Pact.

⁸⁰⁴ Seale, pp. 100-1.

E. Podeh points out for example that Egypt actually was not opposed to regional arrangements directed at the USSR but was opposed to any scheme that would perpetuate British occupation.⁸⁰⁵ This is why Egypt wanted to first see the evacuation of British troops from Egypt and then would negotiate a defense arrangement. However, with the prolonging of the negotiations and hoping to amalgamate their position, it was not possible for Egypt to even accept the Baghdad Pact although it arrived after the evacuation of British troops.⁸⁰⁶ Arab nationalism had gained momentum.

The second threat to pursuing Western aims in the ME was the existence of Israel, which had caused the emergence of a deep mistrust toward the West as the Arabs believed that both its creation and protection was a Western deed. Parallel to the hypothesis suggested in the Introduction, not just the timing but also the instruments selected by the West were not appropriate. The extent of anti-Western feeling that the establishment of a Jewish state in the heart of the Arab ME would create was miscalculated. In the attempt to contain the problem, the US, Britain and France had signed the Tripartite Agreement in 1950 in the hope to stabilize the arms balance between Arabs and Israel. In the second phase, a grand scheme called Operation Alpha was devised to reach peace between Arabs and Israel. While this Western attempt also failed, it was followed by the many more futile attempts to achieve peace in the Arab-Israel problem.

Following from this, another very important result that this dissertation deduced is that the Baghdad Pact was only embraced by the top rank politicians in the member countries which had worked for its existence, such as Menderes in Turkey and Nuri Said in Iraq but not by the bureaucracy or the people at large. Realizing that this was true for Nuri Said, Menderes did all he could to prolong Nuri Said's influence and even courted to bring him back as prime minister after 1957. Unlike Western democracies, members of the Baghdad Pact did not form foreign policies based on long-term goals that lasted over time and whose main frames remain unchanged by new governments. Instead their policies were

⁸⁰⁵ Podeh, p. 160.

⁸⁰⁶ Roberson, B. A., *The Impact of the International System on the Middle East* (Ed.) Hinnebusch, R. and Ehteshami, A., the Foreign Policies of Middle East States, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2002, pp. 57-8.

based on short term goals such as securing acceptance or aid from the West conditional on playing their part in establishing a defense scheme that served to protect Western interests. Seen as puppets, pro-West governments did not really stand a chance of ruling their own countries let alone protecting Western interests. The parallel in the futures of the signatory governments of all regional members enhances this point; July 1958 military coup in Iraq, October 1958 coup in Pakistan and May 1960 coup in Turkey. The revolution in Iran followed in 1979, with a lag of two decades.

The governments of these regimes had grown alien to their people which enhanced the fact that the Pact was not embraced by their people. The lack of acceptance of the Pact by the peoples coupled with the volatile politics in the region (that was prone to propaganda attacks from the Soviets and Egypt) may be an explanation for the short life span of the Baghdad Pact. For the common Arab, the rise of nationalism, the unstable internal politics of regional states, worsening of the Israeli-Arab dispute and economic difficulties proved to be more vital than other concerns.

For the US, the ME was not only important as the southern flank of NATO but also as the source of abundant petrol reserves that the free world required at all times, peace or war. For the USSR, it was the strategic backdoor which her rival aimed to dominate. Nevertheless, since balancing was the norm, none of the two superpowers were able to dominate the region in the 1950 decade. US support for conservative regimes was matched by Soviet support for new radical regimes. The opposition of the US to European empires did not turn into support for nationalist movements due to the need to maintain imperialist influence in the region in the strict bipolarity of the Cold War.⁸⁰⁷

Although superpowers were very forceful, they both found themselves able to affect the course of events to only a limited extent in the ME as they could translate their preponderant military and economic power into direct political influence as the region gained its own momentum. As superpowers focused their attention primarily on each other, the ME states were more concerned with threats from geographically closer ones

⁸⁰⁷ Bromley, *American*, p. 110.

rather than strong powers in the international system and tended to balance. For example, Iraq's position in the Baghdad Pact led to Syria and Saudi Arabia to align with Egypt. However, when Nasser's growing prestige and ambitions made him more dangerous than Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan joined hands against him.⁸⁰⁸ Projecting the "Gestaltig" approach, one could presume that differences in threat and interest perceptions pushed the ME countries to generate a third way that is the emergence of non-alignment policy against strict bipolarity. This stand gave them strength which they would otherwise not have and led them to formulate their own foreign policies. The West on the other hand rebuked the Arabs for not sharing the Western sensitivity to the Soviet threat. The West's approach to the ME was governed by cold war rivalries at a time of strict bipolarity. The geographical gap between NATO and SEATO was vital. Secretary of State Dulles was in a "pact-mania", which meant firming containment of the USSR through pacts⁸⁰⁹ as Western planners believed that they had to be prepared to attack anywhere in the periphery of the Communist bloc. Hence, an area as important as the ME mattered dearly to the West.

Another finding of this thesis is that Western pressure to fortify supremacy in the region have in fact backfired easing the door to Soviet penetration in the 1950 decade. The Egyptian arms deal with the Eastern Bloc in 1955 marked the beginning of relations between the Soviets and Arabs. The US however did not protest against the arms deal loudly with the hope of keeping the sale as a one-off affair, not sold counter arms to Israel and continued the negotiations for financing Egypt's Aswan Dam.⁸¹⁰ However, by March 1956, both London and Washington were considering possibilities of covert action to overthrow Nasser or exert influence on him through economic and political pressures. Still, the US was more careful in not displaying an open break with him since this could lead Egypt to lean towards the Soviets more.⁸¹¹ Soviet penetration in the ME with Soviet arms grew over time and it had the repelling result of destabilizing the arms balance

⁸⁰⁸ Walt, p. 157-9.

⁸⁰⁹ LaFeber, pp. 154-5.

⁸¹⁰ Bowie, pp. 28-30.

⁸¹¹ Rodman, pp. 75-6.

between Arabs and Israel. This made the region less stable and prone to crisis than any time before.

Having established the tenets of Cold War and Arab ME, attention should also be given to the striking contrast between Turkish and Arab approaches towards the West and towards shaping of priorities regarding the Cold War. Turkey, which had never been under formal imperialism, had fought her way towards independence and formed a republic in 1923 from the remains of the Ottoman Empire. However, standing at the crossroads of East and West, North and South and in control of one of the most crucial water canals of the region, Turkey was threatened by Soviet covets as the Second World War drew to a close. Choices were very limited and in search for security from an expansionist USSR, Turkey became a part of wider US strategy with Truman Doctrine in 1947 ending her traditional neutralist policy towards larger powers. After this point, Turkey aligned her foreign policy with the West and aimed to keep her relations with the USSR at the lowest level.⁸¹² This was to prove that “Turkey was the staunchest of US’ allies”. Abandonment of one party rule in the early post-War period was to demonstrate the country’s motivation as was the sending of Turkish troops to Korea to display commitment to Western ideals (in line with Turkey’s basic Western orientation).⁸¹³ Moreover, almost all groups in society had agreed to align with the West to undercut Soviet ambitions. Hence, the policy was not regarded to pose a threat for the government in power unlike in the Arab countries.

Regarded as the “linchpin” between Europe and the ME, two areas that were interdependent in peace and war (through the indispensable importance of oil and the geostrategic significance of airfields and troops to prevent the Soviets from securing the Persian Gulf and the Suez Base), Turkey was seen important in containing Soviet submarines in the Black sea as well as enable NATO control of the Eastern Mediterranean. Although it did not seem likely (Turks only looked very enthusiastic to cooperate with the West), a neutralist Turkey would make Western control of the ME impossible. In the meantime, the possible loss of Iran to the Communist camp (after the nationalization of the

⁸¹² Despite some Soviet attempts to initiate relations especially after 1953.

⁸¹³ Kuniholm, *Turkey and the West since World War II*, p. 47.

Abadan oil refinery) would “expose all of the ME to Soviet inroads, endanger lines of communication, damage US prestige and deny the West essential supplies of petroleum (producing one third of ME output daily).” The volatilities in Egypt and Iran as well as the decline of British power in the ME induced the US to include Turkey and Greece into NATO.⁸¹⁴

It is also the finding of this analysis that Turkish foreign policy was conducted with a short sighted vision, failing to see approaching change with Khruchev era and easing of relations with Geneva Summit in 1955. Turkish government believed that the deadly rivalry between the Free World and the USSR where the latter was keen to penetrate into the former and launch an assault on the gaps would continue. In fact, it may be argued that Turkey has added to the acceleration of tension as seen in Syria crisis or after Iraqi coup. Turkey hoped to keep her strategic importance which also was her insurance for continued US aid. Hence, Turkey’s alignment with the West was not purely a result of security considerations but was the solution to keep the economy running in exchange for the security she provided to the West by being a key for the security of the Free World. Hence, supporting her to uphold Western interests was crucial.

“Economic aid at this time is necessary to help Turkey to carry out her duty as guardian of civilization and an element of security in this part of the world, here Turkey constitutes a bridge between the West and the undeveloped countries of the Near East. Without Turkey, the question of ME defense would merely lie in theory.”⁸¹⁵

Similarly, Turkey viewed the ME entirely in Cold War terms and had a “More-Dullesian-than-Dulles” phobia about the danger of communist penetration in the ME.”⁸¹⁶ She was ready to play a willing part in any Western effort to defend the region to enhance her importance to the developed world and her NATO entry was made conditional on her

⁸¹⁴ Leffler, *A Preponderance*, pp. 420-4.

⁸¹⁵ FRUS, 1952-1954, the Near and Middle East, The visit of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Mutual Security Administrator Harold Stassen to the Near and Middle East, May 9-29, 1955, p. 142.

⁸¹⁶ Hale, *Turkey*, p. 272.

participation in a Western defense scheme in the ME. In undertaking cooperation with the West, it was seen fit for Turkey to act as a bridge between the ME and the West. Her ties to the Arab world (though miscalculated), her democratic regime and her loyalty were to be melted in the so-called Baghdad Pact to protect the Western interests in the area and to make sure that Moscow did not prevail. Turkey also genuinely believed that it was in her interest to get into contact with regional states in the ME that were pro-West and cooperate with them to decrease the Soviet threat at her borders. She would be more than happy to see similar regimes around her. However, Turkey had neglected the ME since the proclamation of the republic and the legacy of the Ottoman past did not help in forcing relations.

Once the Baghdad Pact was formed, Turkey concentrated on increasing the number of members because it was believed that the Pact would be meaningful if it succeeded to achieve a large membership. The member that would matter the most was of course the US because she would provide the required leadership for the Pact and help to pull pro-Western regimes to the Pact. Hence, Turkey (as well as other members) repeatedly pled for US adherence but remained empty handed. The US had her reasons for non-adherence. First of all, she did not want to increase tensions with the USSR and did not want to lose the collaboration that she expected from antagonists of the pact, such as Egypt and Israel in Operation Alpha, a project to settle the Palestine dispute. Even when it was understood that Operation Alpha failed, the US did not give up relations with Egypt and proposed to sponsor the Aswan Dam, with the aim of not losing Egypt to the Soviets. Nevertheless, US' strange position as financer but not a member (functioning in the committees) of the Pact undermined its credibility and failed to provide the leadership to deal with the repetitive crises in the region.

To boost the importance of the Baghdad Pact for the West, Menderes believed that it should expand to include more regional states. Other pro-West states, such as Lebanon and Jordan were possible members and Turkish statesmen embarked on diplomatic visits to these countries. However, they failed to receive positive responses because leader of the Arab states, Egypt was wildly furious at the Pact. Nasser's claim was that the Pact was an attempt to continue Western domination of the region by dividing the Arab League through the inclusion of Iraq. Turkish and British insistence in Jordan's membership counter fired

as the King was forced to dissolve the Parliament and remove Glubb to decrease anti-British tensions. Syria's negativity to the Pact drew criticism as Turkish statesmen believed that she was under Nasser's control. The Tripartite Pact envisaged between Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia in response to the Baghdad Pact was frustrating for Turks since it could generate enough momentum to scare off other smaller potential members (Lebanon and Jordan) against the Pact. It was soon apparent that Egypt, the dominant state with an assertive leader like Nasser, was able to put enough resistance on the Pact making it impossible to secure new members.

Another point that this research has shown that in the aim to expand the membership of the Pact, Turkey did not rule out using non-democratic means to reach the desired result. For example Turkey supported the given-up coup attempt in Syria in 1956 that was plotted by the West to bring the conservative elements to power. Turkey aimed to promote Nuri Said at all times, esp. when he was increasingly alienated and became the scapegoat of Egypt after the Suez Crisis. Turkey also took a tough stance towards Syria during Turkey-Syria crisis and allowed Incirlik base to be used despite harsh domestic criticism from RPP when the US sent troops to Lebanon. During the Iraq coup in 1958, Menderes was told by Washington not to undertake unilateral military action. Turkey also did not hesitate to reduce relations with Israel during the Suez dispute. This was however a political maneuver and none of the Arab regimes believed in Turkey's sincerity since Turkey had not condemned Britain and France in their aggression against Egypt.

While initially Turkey and Iraq were "pushed" towards each other by the US, in time genuine relationship developed between Nuri Said and Menderes. Menderes knew that Iraq's membership of the Pact was dependent on Nuri Said so Menderes even discussed with the King to have Nuri Said back as AU's Prime Minister in 1957 year-end and early 1958. In the hope to maintain Iraq's ties to the Baghdad Pact, which was dependent on the assertiveness of Nuri Said (or a PM under his influence), Menderes delayed the recognition of UAR as much as possible. However, Iraq was increasingly alienated in the Arab world. Neglect of the masses coupled with pan-Arabist propaganda of Egypt, eventually led to the bloody coup of 1958 in Iraq. After this, Turkey strived to bring back the monarchy in Iraq and it even seemed that she could undertake military action for this purpose (was discouraged by US).

The dissertation also shows that there was one policy issue where Turkey moved towards the Arab side; the Palestine issue. By and by, in promoting Nuri Said's stance as well as upholding the Baghdad Pact against progressive Arabs, Turkey increasingly favored the Arab view in Palestine dispute. This in turn upset Israel despite Menderes' assurances that these precautions were to keep the Baghdad Pact alive and did not mean Turkey distancing herself from Israel. Nevertheless, Israel already believed that the Pact was to encircle her and also that Turkey was dragging away. After the Suez Crisis, Turkey had withdrawn her Ambassador from Tel-Aviv to show that she did not support Israel's aggressive behavior, but failed to satisfy Arabs about her earnestness. Within a year, Turkey was ready to break relations with Israel after the Iraq and Lebanon Crisis to prolong the lifespan of the Baghdad Pact.

With the entry of Soviets into the ME, by 1958 it was seen that Turkey had accomplished very little in her proactive ME policy. In fact, Turkey's promotion of Western policies in the region wholeheartedly led her to be labelled as an instrument of Western interests. For example, during Bandung Conference (1955) Turkey harshly criticized non-alignment and intimidated the Third World.⁸¹⁷ In the UN, Turkey voted repeatedly in line with the West against Algeria's independence.

Unquestionable loyalty to the US and lack of long term vision was going to cost a lot to Turkey when she was isolated in the UN at the eve of Cyprus conflict. Even the West did not extend support in the issue. In 1960, for the first time, Turkey voted in line with the Afro-Asian block in the UN in favor of Algerian independence. When Cyprus issue was at its height, Arab countries systematically extended backing to Greek Cypriots in the UN. It would take many years and continued effort on Turkey's side to get rid of her image as a tool of the West that was formed in the 1950 decade. The disappointment in the West created through the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) and Johnson Letter (1964), and the realization of the need to find backing in international arena led the Turkish government to undertake progressive foreign policies. In the March 1965 Bulletin of the Turkish Foreign

⁸¹⁷ Karpat, Turkey and Arab-Israeli, p. 118.

Affairs Ministry, a new policy was set out by H. Batu, a senior officer. The article said that while Turkey was still deeply attached to the Western Alliance, the Soviet threat seemed to have subsided (thanks to the detent period) and Turkey would develop ties with the Arab countries. Since Turkey could not be represented in the Conference of Non-Aligned countries, she sent missions to more than seventy states to gather support in the Cyprus issue from the third world. The policy was to gradually pick up as in December 1965, in UN Resolution 2077 on Cyprus as Turkey received some support from Arab states.⁸¹⁸

Parallel to the failure of the Baghdad Pact, Menderes' dream of Turkey being proactive in the construction of balances in the ME in the early years of the Cold War had ended in disappointment. Despite great expectations, Turkish foreign as well as domestic policy during the DP rule had been based on a short term vision without careful consideration of policy options and on political show offs for the public (as public opinion started to matter). While she failed to include new members into the Pact (esp. the non-adherence of the US) which was a reason for frustration, she could not escape being isolated from the Arab world, completed with the Iraqi coup. Turkey was seen as an instrument of the West and not quite "as Muslim as the other Middle Eastern" countries. DP policies were doomed to failure in Arabs' eyes with enhancement of the Eisenhower Doctrine, aggressive Syrian Policy (1957), Iraq Crisis (1958) and the granting permission to the US to station troops at İncirlik base during Lebanon Crisis.

Meanwhile Turkey's economic difficulties (that resulted from a set of complex factors such as investment ambitions that exceed domestic savings, subsidization the current output to the economy, accumulation of large foreign short and medium term debts, which required repayments much larger than the country's repayment capacity⁸¹⁹) led to mounting opposition against DP and exacerbated by failures and alienation in foreign

⁸¹⁸ Aykan, the Palestinian, pp. 93-4.

⁸¹⁹ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. X, P. II, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Memorandum of Conversation, May 6, 1958 and Operations Coordinating Board Special Report June 18, 1958, pp. 746-7; 754-5.


policies that received fierce opposition from liberals and RPP, gave way to the May 1960 coup.

Empirical evidence also showed that the non-ending crisis in the member and non-member countries made it all too difficult for the Pact to survive, let alone be successful. In fact, the unstable internal policies and regime changes through military coups displays the elusive and tough nature of ME politics.

While foreign policy is about making the most of a country's resources and capabilities, the regional members of the Pact had no real resources or capabilities that they could capitalize on. The Pact was a gathering of countries with different resources and capabilities that the West deemed necessary. While they had differed from core Arab states in the sense they had been subject to some Russian scare⁸²⁰ in the recent past due to their geographic proximity to the Soviets, in their national consciousness, the members nourished historical rivalry coupled with lack of confidence toward each other which made any harmony between them very difficult. As a result, regional members aimed to exploit their geostrategic importance to attain their own goals, such as extracting more economic and military aid from the US.

⁸²⁰ Campbell, Defense, p. 49.

APPENDIX A: MAP OF THE MIDDLE EAST⁸²¹



821

<http://www.pluralistnation.com/content/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/middle-east-and-north-africa->

APPENDIX B: TEXT OF THE BAGHDAD PACT (FEBRUARY 24, 1955)

(Pact of Mutual Cooperation Between the Kingdom of Iraq, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom, the Dominion of Pakistan, and the Kingdom of Iran (Baghdad Pact), February 24, 1955)⁸²²

Whereas the friendly and brotherly relations existing between Iraq and Turkey are in constant progress, and in order to complement the contents of the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborhood concluded between His Majesty the King of Iraq and his Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic signed in Ankara on March 29, 1946, which recognized the fact that peace and security between the two countries is an integral part of the peace and security of all the nations of the world and in particular the nations of the Middle East, and that it is the basis for their foreign policies;

Whereas article 11 of the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Co-operation between the Arab League States provides that no provision of that treaty shall in any way affect, or is designed to affect, any of the rights and obligations accruing to the Contracting Parties from the United Nations Charter;

And having realized the great responsibilities borne by them in their capacity as members of the United Nations concerned with the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region which necessitate taking the required measures in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter;

They have been fully convinced of the necessity of concluding a pact fulfilling these aims, and for that purpose have appointed as their plenipotentiaries . . . who having communicated their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

political-map.png

⁸²² Text of Baghdad Pact available on site: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/baghdad.asp

Consistent with article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High Contracting Parties will co-operate for their security and defense. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements with each other.

ARTICLE 2

In order to ensure the realization and effect application of the co-operation provided for in article 1 above, the competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 3

The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any interference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs. They will settle any dispute between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

ARTICLE 4

The High Contracting Parties declare that the dispositions of the present pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them with any third State or States. They do not derogate from and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any international obligation incompatible with the present pact.

ARTICLE 5

This pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both of the High Contracting Parties. Accession shall come into force from the date of which the instrument of accession of the State concerned is deposited with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

Any acceding State party to the present pact may conclude special agreements, in accordance with article 1, with one or more States parties to the present pact. The competent authority of any acceding State may determine measures in accordance with article 2. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the parties concerned.

ARTICLE 6

A Permanent Council at ministerial level will be set up to function within the framework of the purposes of this pact when at least four Powers become parties to the pact.

The Council will draw up its own rules of procedure.

ARTICLE 7

This pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for other five-year periods. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from the pact by notifying the other parties in writing of its desire to do so six months before the expiration of any of the above-mentioned periods, in which case the pact remains valid for the other parties.

ARTICLE 8

This pact shall be ratified by the contracting parties and ratifications shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

In witness whereof, the said plenipotentiaries have signed the present pact in Arabic, Turkish and English, all three texts being equally authentic except in the case of doubt when the English text shall prevail.

Done in duplicate at Bagdad this second day of Rajab 1374 Hijri corresponding to the twenty-fourth day of February 1955.

APPENDIX C: THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE (JANUARY 5, 1957)

The Eisenhower Doctrine⁸²³ on the Middle East, A Message to Congress

I

The Middle East has abruptly reached a new and critical stage in its long and important history. In past decades many of the countries in that area were not fully self-governing. Other nations exercised considerable authority in the area and the security of the region was largely built around their power. But since the First World War there has been a steady evolution toward self-government and independence. This development the United States has welcomed and has encouraged. Our country supports without reservation the full sovereignty and independence of each and every nation of the Middle East.

The evolution to independence has in the main been a peaceful process. But the area has been often troubled. Persistent cross-currents of distrust and fear with raids back and forth across national boundaries have brought about a high degree of instability in much of the Mid East. just recently there have been hostilities involving Western European nations that once exercised much influence in the area. Also the relatively large attack by Israel in October has intensified the basic differences between that nation and its Arab neighbors. All this instability has been heightened and, at times, manipulated by International Communism.

II

Russia's rulers have long sought to dominate the Middle East. That was true of the Czars and it is true of the Bolsheviks. The reasons are not hard to find. They do not affect Russia's security, for no one plans to use the Middle East as a base for aggression against Russia. Never for a moment has the United States entertained such a thought.

⁸²³ Eisenhower Doctrine, available on site:
<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1957eisenhowerdoctrine.html>

The Soviet Union has nothing whatsoever to fear from the United States in the Middle East, or anywhere else in the world, so long as its rulers do not themselves first resort to aggression.

That statement I make solemnly and emphatically. . . .

The reason for Russia's interest in the Middle East is solely that of power politics. Considering her announced purpose of Communizing the world, it is easy to understand her hope of dominating the Middle East. . . .

International Communism, of course, seeks to mask its purposes of domination by expressions of good will and by superficially attractive offers of political, economic and military aid. But any free nation, which is the subject of Soviet enticement, ought, in elementary wisdom, to look behind the mask.

Remember Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In 1939 the Soviet Union entered into mutual assistance pacts with these then independent countries; and the Soviet Foreign Minister, addressing the Extraordinary Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet in October 1939, solemnly and publicly declared that "we stand for the scrupulous and punctilious observance of the pacts on the basis of complete reciprocity, and we declare that all the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization of the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs." Yet in 1940, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union.

Soviet control of the satellite nations of Eastern Europe has been forcibly maintained in spite of solemn promises of a contrary intent, made during World War II.

III.

Stalin's death brought hope that this pattern would change. And we read the pledge of the Warsaw Treaty of 1955 that the Soviet Union would follow in satellite countries "the principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs." But we have just seen the subjugation of Hungary by naked armed force. In the aftermath of this Hungarian tragedy, world respect for and belief in Soviet promises

have sunk to a new low. International Communism needs and seeks a recognizable Success.

Thus, we have these simple and indisputable facts:

The Middle East, which has always been coveted by Russia, would today be prized more than ever by International Communism.

The Soviet rulers continue to show that they do not scruple to use any means to gain their ends.

The free nations of the Mid East need, and for the most part want, added strength to assure their continued independence.

IV

Under all the circumstances I have laid before you, a greater responsibility now devolves upon the United States. We have shown, so that none can doubt, our dedication to the principle that force shall not be used internationally for any aggressive purpose and that the integrity and independence of the nations of the Middle East should be inviolate. Seldom in history has a nation's dedication to principle been tested as severely as ours during recent weeks.

There is general recognition in the Middle East, as elsewhere, that the United States does not seek either political or economic domination over any other people. Our desire is a world environment of freedom, not servitude. On the other hand many, if not all, of the nations of the Middle East are aware of the danger that stems from International Communism and welcome closer cooperation with the United States to realize for themselves the United Nations goals of independence, economic well-being and spiritual growth. . . .

V

Under these circumstances I deem it necessary to seek the cooperation of the Congress. Only with that cooperation can we give the reassurance needed to deter aggression, to give

courage and confidence to those who are dedicated to freedom and thus prevent a chain of events which would gravely endanger all of the free world. . . .

VI

The action which I propose would have the following features.

It would, first of all, authorize the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.

It would, in the second place, authorize the Executive to undertake in the same region programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations which desires such aid.

It would, in the third place, authorize such assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism.

These measures would have to be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States, including the Charter of the United Nations and with any action or recommendations of the United Nations. They would also, if armed attack occurs, be subject to the overriding authority of the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter.

The present proposal would, in the fourth place, authorize the President to employ, for economic and defensive military purposes, sums available under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, without regard to existing limitations. . . .

VII

The proposed legislation is primarily designed to deal with the possibility of Communist aggression, direct and indirect. There is imperative need that any lack of power in the area

should be made good, not by external or alien force, but by the increased vigor and security of the independent nations of the area.

Experience shows that indirect aggression rarely if ever succeeds where there is reasonable security against direct aggression; where the government possesses loyal security forces, and where economic conditions are such as not to make Communism seem an attractive alternative. The program I suggest deals with all three aspects of this matter and thus with the problem of indirect aggression. . . .

And as I have indicated, it will also be necessary for us to contribute economically to strengthen those countries, or groups of countries, which have governments manifestly dedicated to the preservation of independence and resistance to subversion. Such measures will provide the greatest insurance against Communist inroads. Words alone are not enough.

VIII

Let me refer again to the requested authority to employ the armed forces of the United States to assist to defend the territorial integrity and the political independence of any nation in the area against Communist armed aggression. Such authority would not be exercised except at the desire of the nation attacked. Beyond this it is my profound hope that this authority would never have to be exercised at all.

In the situation now existing, the greatest risk, as is often the case, is that ambitious despots may miscalculate. If power-hungry Communists should either falsely or correctly estimate that the Middle East is inadequately defended, they might be tempted to use open measures of armed attack. If so, that would start a chain of circumstances which would almost surely involve the United States in military action. I am convinced that the best insurance against this dangerous contingency is to make clear now our readiness to cooperate fully and freely with our friends of the Middle East in ways consonant with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. I intend promptly to send a special mission to the Middle East to explain the cooperation we are prepared to give.

IX

The policy which I outline involves certain burdens and indeed risks for the United States. Those who covet the area will not like what is proposed.

Already, they are grossly distorting our purpose. However, before this Americans have seen our nation's vital interests and human freedom in jeopardy, and their fortitude and resolution have been equal to the crisis, regardless of hostile distortion of our words, motives and actions. . . .

In those momentous periods of the past, the President and the Congress have united, without partisanship, to serve the vital interests of the United States and of the free world.

The occasion has come for us to manifest again our national unity in support of freedom and to show our deep respect for the rights and independence of every nation - however great, however small. We seek, not violence, but peace. To this purpose we must now devote our energies, our determination, ourselves.

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