


**T.R.
POLICE ACADEMY
INSTITUTE OF SECURITY SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY**



**Narco-terrorism in Colombia: Exploring the Links
Between Organized Crime and Terrorism (2000-2012)**

**MASTER'S THESIS
Cristian-Mihai COSTENAR**

**Supervisor
Assist. Prof. Dr. Muhammet Faruk ÇAKIR**

ANKARA- 2018

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
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
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
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
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Cristian-Mihai COSTENAR

Signature



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As I lay these words down, I must also thank you, dear reader. You may find some answers to your questions, but please remember: The quest for truth is never-ending.

ÖZET

T.C.

Polis Akademisi

Güvenlik Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Uluslararası Güvenlik Anabilim Dalı

Kolombiya’da Narko-terörizm: Organize Suç ile Terörizm Arasındaki Bağların Araştırılması (2000-2012)

Hazırlayan: Cristian-Mihai COSTENAR

Yüksek Lisans

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Muhammet Faruk ÇAKIR

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Bu yüksek lisans tezinin amacı, organize suç örgütleri ile terörist örgütler arasında işbirliği olabileceğini belirlemek için aralarındaki finansal nedenlerle oluşan bağlantıları incelemektir. Daha detaylı belirtmek gerekirse, bu tez Kolombiya Devrimci Silahlı Kuvvetleri (FARC) adlı terör örgütü ile Latin Amerikalı sınır-ötesi organize suç örgütleri arasındaki bağları incelemektedir. Kolombiya içinde FARC örgütünün her bir bölgesinin ne ölçüde organize suç örgütleri gibi davrandığını ölçmek için bu tezde davranışsal model olarak adlandırabileceğimiz bir model kullanılmaktadır. Davranışsal model, Kolombiya’da yerlerinden edilen insan sayısı ve koka bitkisinin ekildiği alan değişkenleri esas alınarak geliştirilmiştir. FARC’ın yabancı organize suç örgütleri ile bağlantısını anlamak için bu tezde yurt dışında ve Kolombiya’nın etrafındaki ülkelerdeki göçmenlerin sayısı esas alınmıştır. Bu nedenle tezde “varış ülkesi” ve “geçiş ülkesi” kavramları, kokain trafiği ve yabancı organize suç örgütleri ile işbirliğinin alakasını anlatmak için kullanılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Organize Suç Örgütü, Terörist Örgüt, Koka Ekimi, FARC, Yerinden Edilmiş Kişiler, Göçmenler.

ABSTRACT

T.R.

Police Academy

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Department of International Security

**Narco-terrorism in Colombia: Exploring the Links Between Organized
Crime and Terrorism (2000-2012)**

Cristian-Mihai COSTENAR

Master's Thesis

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Muhammet Faruk ÇAKIR

2018 – 73 pages (Excluding appendices)

The aim of this master's thesis is to examine the connection between terrorism and narcotics in order to determine the possibility of terrorist groups engaging in drug related activities. More specifically, the thesis examines the involvement of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in narcoterrorism. The thesis focuses its analyses on FARC's seven blocs rather than its dozens of fronts, due to the large size of FARC fronts. For the internal Colombian landscape, the thesis utilizes what can be called a behavioural model to identify which FARC's blocs behave more like narco-terrorist group and which blocs concentrate more on attaining political objectives. The behavioural model is based upon the number of displaced persons in Colombia and the area of coca crops within Colombia. The blocs which have a narco-terrorist behavioural pattern are more likely to establish links with organized crime in the protection, production and distribution of cocaine inside Colombia. FARC's involvement in narco-terrorism also includes the trafficking of cocaine abroad. In order to understand the degree of FARC's need to cooperate with organized crime for the delivery cocaine to international markets, the importance of ethnic and national ties is emphasised in this study.

Key Words: Organized crime group, terrorist group, FARC, narco-terrorism, cocaine, displaced persons.

NARCO-TERRORISM IN COLOMBIA: EXPLORING THE LINKS BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM (2000-2012)

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AUC	: United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia
BACRIM	: Criminal groups
CC	: Coca cultivation
DEA	: Drug Enforcement Administration
DP	: Displaced persons
ELN	: National Liberation Army
EU	: European Union
FARC	: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
IDP	: Internally displaced persons
NTG	: Narco-terrorist group
OCG	: Organized crime group
PIRA	: Provisional Irish Republican Army
TCO	: Transnational criminal organizations
TG	: Terrorist group
UN	: United Nations
UNODC	: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRIC	: United Nations Regional Information Centre

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INTRODUCTION

As the name implies, the term narco-terrorism is related to drug trafficking and terrorism. However, the groups that have been described as narco-terrorist can range from organized crime groups to terrorist groups. Narco-terrorism initially referred to drug traffickers using terrorist methods in order to reduce government interference in their criminal activities (Björnehed, 2004:306). However, the term can be used to refer to terrorist groups who engage primarily in drug trafficking while conducting terrorist activities in order to protect their drug revenue. This thesis is focused on the second part of narco-terrorism, namely the terrorist groups classified as narco-terrorist. The thesis's purpose is to analyse the Revolutionary Armed of Colombia (FARC)'s behaviour in order to determine the factors that motivated some of its factions to behave as a narco-terrorist group. In the paragraphs below, the thesis would argue the importance of FARC as well as discuss terrorist and organized crime groups that were present in the Colombian landscape.

The dissertation acknowledges that besides FARC, other Colombian terrorist groups were either active in Colombia in the past or are still active nowadays. According Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations list by the U.S. Department of State, the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) were also listed as terrorist organizations. The first group was delisted in 2001 and it ceased activities in 2005 while the other group continues to be active within the Colombian landscape (U.S. Department of State, 2017).

While the other two groups were also responsible for organized violence against the civilian population, they will be considered, from a methodological point of view, less important than FARC. The origins and ideology AUC and ELN, their relationship with the Colombian government and with FARC will be emphasized below in order to explain the small role they play in this research.

The AUC originated as a paramilitary group as opposed to left-wing guerrilla groups, including FARC (UNRIC, 2010). AUC had been active since the mid1990s until

2006, the date of its demobilisation. Unlike the other terrorist groups mentioned in this thesis, AUC did not conduct attacks against the Colombian government, but rather directed its activities against FARC and ELN members and their “sympathisers” (Stanford University, 2015). It is important to notice that AUC and the Colombian government had the same common enemies: FARC and ELN. In the light of these facts, the dissertation would assume that AUC acted as a proxy of the state.

The ELN has its origin as a Marxist guerrilla movement in Colombia during the advent of Cold War. Like FARC, the ELN has also received assistance from Cuba. It is important to note that ELN had been in competition with FARC at the peak of its power in the 1990s (Uppsala University, 2016), and in mid-2000s it allied with FARC (Stanford University, 2015). ELN has been classified as a terrorist organization by United States in 1997¹ (U.S. Department of State, 2017). While ELN is an interesting case to study in order to see its patterns of violence, as well as its evolution in comparison with other criminal groups, the dissertation argues that the alliance with FARC puts constraints on their ability to initiate attacks. Although alliance exists between FARC and ELN, ELN’s power relative to FARC is considerably lower. Therefore, the research argues that ELN should not be considered as a separate actor from FARC, but rather a subordinate, may be even a proxy. Given that there is an alliance relationship between ELN and FARC and that ELN is the weaker part in the alliance, it would be safe to assume that attacks might be only coordinated with the approval of FARC in order to mitigate risk of repercussions on both organizations.

The thesis will clarify between organized crime groups (OCGs) and terrorist groups (TGs). In order to accomplish this, the thesis will emphasize two definitions which are based on the motivational factors behind each group.

Organized crime group would be classified as an association of people, bound by ethnic ties, who conspire to commit crimes for financial gains and use intimidation as well as blackmail to continue their illegal criminal activities without repercussions (Berg,

¹ This is not to imply that before 1997 ELN was not behaving like a terrorist group. However, the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organization starts from 1997.

2008). This definition is adequate for the purpose of this dissertation as well for understanding how it differs from a terrorist group. It explains not only the organizational pattern of OCGs, but also its main motivations and the type of activities it would be willing to commit.

On the other hand, a terrorist group would be defined as an association of people, bound by ideological ties, who conspire to commit terrorist acts, which are violent tactics of exploiting fear with the purpose of creating political change (Hoffman, 2006:41). The thesis is focused on FARC, thus considering FARC as being a group that uses terrorist tactics to fulfil its ideological based objectives² (Stanford University, 2016).

The dissertation will use the term “drug cartel”, “mafia” and “BACRIM”³ to refer to “criminal organizations which engage in the illegal distribution and supply of illegal drugs”. The distinction between these groups lies within the structure and the leadership of these two organizations, which differ from each other. The study of the structural differences is not a particular concern of this study, but rather the term emphasizes the background of these criminal organizations. Additionally, the terms are commonly used in the media. In order to avoid any potential confusion, the term “drug cartel” will be used in in this study in the following context: Mexican drug cartels, drug cartels which originated from Mexico. The term mafia will be used to refer to Italian⁴ mafia, mafia which originated from Italy.⁵ The term “BACRIM” would be used to refer to Colombian organized crime groups as well as Colombian drug cartels, if not otherwise mentioned.

² The thesis does not go into a debate of whether ideology plays an important part of FARC’s activity anymore, but highlights that it is nevertheless present within official communications.

³ *Bandas criminales* from Spanish (In English criminal groups).

⁴ The whole territory of present-day Italy.

⁵ The term “mafia” is overused, to refer to groups originating from other countries as well. In some aspects, it has become synonymous with organized crime. Out of approximate 150 definitions collected by Klaus von Lampe (2018), only 10% include the term mafia, suggesting that is a term mostly used by society and not by academia.

The reason for examining FARC is due to the reputation it has gained across the decades, not only in Colombia, but also on the international stage. The Revolutionary Armed of Colombia (FARC) is an example of a terrorist group that has survived and fought the Colombian government for more than five decades across multiple fronts. This in turn has resulted in several incidents, which influenced Colombian's foreign affairs with its neighbouring countries, most notably as seen in 2008 Andean crisis. Keeping these ideas in mind, the thesis would be organized in three chapters.

The first chapter explains the research dilemma that lies at the core of this thesis, the timeline of the research as well as its research methodology, where various variables would be introduced to the reader. With this in mind, the thesis produces a model, which would explain FARC's tendency towards narco-terrorism based on two factors: the number of displaced persons and coca cultivation.

The second chapter deals with the literature review available on the issues of terrorism, narco-terrorism and organized crime. It is better to make a clear distinction between organized crime groups and terrorist groups. Therefore, this chapter analyses the activities of these groups, the tactics and strategy employed as well as the motivations that lie underneath terrorist and organized crime groups. In regards to FARC, the thesis also gives an explanation to the importance of analysing FARC before analysing any other Colombian criminal group. In other words, due to the multitude of actors involved in the Colombian landscape, the chapter explains why FARC is being prioritized as a key actor.

Unlike the second chapter, which presents a general approach to understanding the terrorist phenomena as well as the importance of FARC in Colombian politics, the third chapter delves extensively into FARC itself. Therefore, the history of this terrorist group, as well as its finances are analysed. Additionally, the FARC's structure is thoroughly investigated and various FARC factions and their *modus operandi* are highlighted. In line with the first chapter, the narco-terrorist behaviour within FARC is brought forward, in order to highlight the factions which behave more like a narco-terrorist group. Various interpretations are brought forward in order to explain the possible motivations behind the behaviour of a particular FARC faction. Furthermore, it will highlight the external aspect

of cocaine trade that FARC is involved in. The chapter argues that in order to analyse FARC and other organized crime groups for that matter, an analysis into the drug routes is required. As will argued later, cocaine plays an important role in the self-financing of criminal organizations in Colombia, which is the reason the thesis considers important the dichotomy of transit-destination country. In other words, the influence Colombian criminal organizations possess abroad is crucial for understanding the limitations as well as the expansion abilities they may possess. Is it therefore hoped that this chapter would give insight into the factors that encourage or discourage terrorist and organized crime organizations to expand outside their original area of operations.

FIRST CHAPTER

RESEARCH APPROACH

1.1. RESEARCH PROBLEM

The focus of this research is to examine the conditions that determined FARC blocs to engage in narco-terrorism or just collaborate with organized crime groups. One of the objectives of this thesis is to distinguish between organized crime groups and terrorist groups. In order to accomplish this, the thesis will emphasize the different goals each group strikes to attain and how they might be related to each other's goals. FARC has been designated as a terrorist organization both by US (U.S. Department of State, 2017) and well as EU (Council of the European Union, 2017,). If an OCG engages in terrorism, the following dilemma appears: OCG is actually a TG? In order to avoid the dilemma, the dissertation will use the official designated lists of terrorist groups of US and EU. The rationale is mostly on the pragmatic aspect that a TG may also be considered an OCG based on particular illegal activities it conducts. Makarenko's theory of crime-terror nexus holds sway when discussing the activities of OCGs, in the sense that besides engaging in criminal activities they may also engage in political assassinations and blackmail, in order to maintain their revenue. For the case of FARC, Makarenko's theory is certainly useful in explaining how terrorism becomes commercial in practice, but remains politically motivated as well (Makarenko, 2004). Is useful as a theoretical concept, because it creates the two polar opposites to explain the phenomenon of OCGs adopting TGs and vice-versa. Certainly, there is not a "pure" TG or OCG, however it is important to note that by placing both of them at the end of spectrum, we could understand better the preferences of OCGs and TGs. While not particularly important for this thesis, the "*black hole syndrome*" as exposed by Makarenko has relevance when talking about various Colombian paramilitary groups that became more in line with organized crime groups. Makarenko's principle is useful for explaining what could happen in the future, for example how a TG may transform into an OCG identity. The academic literature on the connection between TG and OGC will explored below in more detail.

1.2. TIMELINE OF RESEARCH

The purpose of this research is to analyse the period of 2000 and 2012 in order to determine the factors that particular blocs of FARC to collaborate with organized crime elements. The dissertation considers the year 2000 to be of significance, mainly because the coca cultivation reached its maximum point (UNODC, 2002). Additionally, level of violence has increased during the peace negotiations. Of particular importance is also of the presidency of Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) is considered important mainly because the peace talks were aborted during his presidency. This research considers the final year of that period as important due to the official declaration of peace negotiations in this year. The peace negotiations which started in 2012 were later accompanied by periods of ceasefire, in order to show gestures of good-will, which means that data for the year after 2012 may be irrelevant in analysing FARC. Therefore, the dissertation has decided against prolonging the research into the years after 2012. New developments may occur if the research span is further expanded.

1.3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In order to understand the relationship between FARC and other OCGs (both between Colombian ones and external ones), the thesis would emphasize a few particular factors that might be of relevance. The concept of territoriality and influence would be important in order to distinguish between FARC and other OCGs. This aspect would be explained further down below. Secondly, the level of political violence in a country (in our case in Columbia) shows that a terrorist organization (in our case FARC) is concentrated on attaining its political objectives. The main indicator of the level of violence is the number of civilian casualties. However, data for civilian casualties caused by FARC and various criminal groups are not available. Therefore, the number of displaced persons in Colombia is introduced in order to determine the level of violence. Thirdly, in the absence of viable information on the amount of income that FARC obtained from domestic production of cocaine, the area of coca cultivation in a particular FARC bloc's territory and area of

influence will be used in order to make an assumption on a particular FARC bloc's income from cocaine production. It is therefore supposed that the second and third factor would be able to give insight into the different approaches within FARC. Additionally, comparative methods would be used to analyse the level of cooperation of FARC's factions with OCGs. The second factor and the third factor are discussed in the chapter regarding FARC's structure. Lastly but not least, the thesis would dwell into demographic data related to countries where cocaine is exported. This would help understand the external influence FARC had, and the way it interacts with foreign OCGs.

Keeping all the factors in mind, the dissertation would inquire into the conditions under which FARC's blocs tended to behave like OCGs not only from an internal point of view, which is represented by Colombian landscape, but also from an external aspect, by focusing mainly on the Latin-American landscape.

1.3.1. Territory and influence

The research would distinguish between the concepts of territoriality and influence. Territoriality would be defined as presence of an armed force in an area which would act as a deterrent for the opposing side. Influence on the other hand would be defined as ability of an armed force to operate in areas where it does not necessarily have presence. In other words, influence is the result of territorial control, and by that logic influence increases as more territories are acquired. Unfortunately, there is not an accurate measurement for influence, but the territories where FARC has established fronts is known (see Appendix 1). The significance of these regions for FARC would be discussed more in the third chapter.

On another note, the maps which represents FARC's territory are not necessarily an accurate representation of the scale of their territory, but rather it represents the presence of FARC territories within those departments⁶ (see Appendix 2). A valid point might be made that territory automatically increases influence in the particular area FARC

⁶ Department is the equivalent of an administrative county.

is present. This would mean that FARC might also have influence in neighbouring departments if it is close to the borders of a particular department. Additionally, FARC's influence might also extend to neighbouring countries based on territories where it is present. In Appendix 2, they are presented at a departmental level. However, it should be kept in mind that the map within Appendix 2 represents the blocs in terms of influence rather than territory.

The concept of territory and influence are of a particular concern of this thesis, and the thesis would emphasize that FARC in particular has managed to attain *de facto* control of some Colombian as well as Panamanian territories (Buschschluter, 2015). The main problem of identifying the area that they control (from a territorial perspective) would inevitably lead the research to argue that the influence is more important in assessing the potential power capacity a particular group possesses.

While it cannot be denied that FARC has managed to acquire and control territory, it does not necessarily imply that FARC operates as a static front, but rather as mobile front. Nevertheless, the thesis would argue that particular factors would still demand FARC to conduct actions within the same departments where fronts are present. The nature of the conflict in Colombia is asymmetric, which would indicate that FARC would avoid conventional warfare. Therefore, FARC would be able to engage in elastic defence while Colombian troops would only be able to engage in static defence.

1.3.2. Assumptions regarding displaced persons

The research has decided using the term displaced persons to refer to persons who have been forced to leave their home based on a credible threat that may harm their lives. Accordingly, persons may have been displaced not only by an ongoing conflict, but also from natural disasters. Fortunately, the Colombian statistics differentiate between the victims of natural disasters and the victims of conflict. The term internally displaced person (IDPs) as well as the term refugee would be avoided in this research due to the available statistics provided by the Colombian government, which only counts the number of displaced persons. The data does not reveal the number of people who became either

IDPs or refugees. Furthermore, the statistics does not track the destination of displaced persons (Government of Colombia, 2018). Therefore, the statistics also fail to reveal the areas where displaced persons might have arrived from, which might be an interesting point in order to track migration flows.⁷

However, if the number of displaced persons from a conflict increases, it would mean that the conflict has escalated. If the number of displaced persons has decreased, it would mean that the intensity of the conflict has decreased. If the number of displaced persons remains constant, it would mean that the conflict is still ongoing or there is a military stalemate between the groups involved. The number of casualties being reported differently by various sources; therefore, the dissertation considers the number of displaced persons to be a viable option for gauging the political violence caused by activities of FARC.

By comparing regions and areas of Colombia, a measurement may be created in order to estimate the level of violence within a particular region, which would indicate the intensity of a conflict. On the other hand, if the thesis were to analyse the number of displaced persons after the period of 2012, it would yield no results, as the number would be low. In order words, the lack of motivation in continuing the conflict would inevitably lead to results which may not be analysed from a methodological standpoint.

1.3.3. Civilian casualties as a factor?

As far as Colombia is concerned, civilian casualties are not a viable indicator of the level of violence. Police, military casualties and FARC casualties are also not adequate for the purpose of measuring a long-lasting conflict which spans multiple regions. A different measurement is needed in order to gauge the activities of FARC as well as examine government involvement in the conflict. The numbers of casualties might be exaggerated or hidden for the purpose of advancing a political agenda. Due to the large number of actors involved in this conflict, the research has decided against using casualty numbers

⁷ The data provided by the Colombian government tracks people who have been taken hostage, or have been injured/killed by land mines, etcetera. However, they are not relevant for this research.

to measure the level of violence caused by FARC. It is not uncommon for terrorist organizations to withdraw forces and shift their operations to other areas.

The main trap a researcher may fall into is to analyse the number of homicides alone attributed to OCGs in comparison with FARC or, to be more specific, the number of homicides committed by a Colombian cartel in comparison with FARC. This would theoretically determine the level of violence and highlight the differences between OCGs and TGs. However, in practice the activities undertaken by organized crime groups would be kept hidden in order to avoid media attention and implicitly negative coverage. While the level of violence cannot be understood by number alone, the reported numbers would be able to reveal a certain *modus operandi*.

According to statistics of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program of Uppsala University, between 1989 and 1994, the number of deaths in Columbia attributed to FARC was approximately 2,630.⁸ For the Medellín cartel⁹ within the same time period the number of inflicted casualties was approximately 260 (Uppsala University, 2017). Because the exact number of deaths attributed to the cartels is low, the dissertation makes the following statement: OCGs would rather keep their activities in secrecy, which would hinder the possibility of cooperation with TGs. This is not to say that TGs do not act as clandestine organizations, however the responsibility for an attack would be declared publicly by TGs. Uppsala University recommends looking at the homicide rate of each country where an OCG is present, however the national statistics would not reveal the number of crimes attributed to OCGs.

1.3.4. Number of people abroad

In order to identify the actors that facilitate the transport of cocaine to destination countries, the research would consider important to point out the actors which might

⁸ FARC and Medellín cartel have been active for longer than that, however the limitations of the database as well as the common timeframe would be considered important for the purpose of this study.

⁹ The dissertation considers these two organizations as the most powerful TG and OCG groups during that timeframe.

collaborate with FARC. For the case of United States, the Mexican drug cartels play an important role in the transportation and distribution of cocaine (U.S. Department of Justice DEA, 2016). However, for other countries the influence of Mexican drug cartels is limited. Therefore, it is important to understand the transit routes that go from Colombia to other countries and which OCGs have an influence. It is crucial therefore to point out that in transit countries, local OCGs might act out as the dominant players in facilitating the transport of cocaine to neighbouring countries and to destination countries. In order to gain insight into this issue, the research considers that the number of migrants within a country would determine the expansion of a narco-terrorist group.

1.3.5. Cocaine

The main issue of conceptualizing FARC and its relationship with cocaine, is the issue of whether FARC is trafficking cocaine or just charging “gramaje”¹⁰. While the issue is contentious, and the thesis would discuss the issue in further detail, the main idea is that cocaine is relevant for FARC’s financing and well as for maintaining its support base. Assuming that FARC only imposes “gramaje”, the research would argue that the loss of coca crops would inevitably lead to lower profits for FARC.

The research would like to find factors that might reveal the reasons why a FARC front may be inclined to engage in manufacturing and distributing cocaine by comparing with other fronts which do not engage in this activity. Naturally, a TG may be divided in various cliques and factions, and if the length of a conflict increases, the chances are that more factions and cliques may form. Therefore, the research would like to conduct a comparative analysis between the various FARC factions in order to determine which ones may behave like an OCG, or at the very least the level of cooperation between FARC and local and transnational OCGs.

¹⁰ Gramaje is a type of taxing drugs by the amount of kilograms through an area FARC has influence.

1.3.6. The problem of density

First of all, FARC is present within low-density and high-density areas, which would arguably point out that each bloc behaves differently than the other. Terrain and human factor would encourage conflicting sides to utilize different tactics in order to adapt to the environment. Resources would also play an important role in the behaviour of actors. Besides different tactics, blocs would differ in strength according to the government's level of involvement in the conflict.


In sparsely populated areas, criminal organizations may find advantageous to encourage farmers to plant more coca crops. These areas could also provide a safe-haven from government raids on coca farms. Furthermore, the government's capacity to gather human intelligence would be severely limited by the absence of a human factor as well as by a lack of infrastructure.¹¹ However, the narco-terrorism of FARC is not necessarily dependent on the density factor, as the research would argue in later chapters. There is only one particular aspect of density that may be relevant to the research, and that is its strategic importance. For example, cities have strategic importance in any type of conflict. Because cities are high-density areas, they would theoretically entail more resources, but also more responsibilities for FARC. Therefore, the strategic and tactical importance of cities is relevant in every conflict. In any case, FARC is a group with political and social oriented goals, thus it emphasizes the importance of acquiring high-density areas in order to be successful.

1.3.7. Research focus

As mentioned above, other terrorist groups were/are present in Colombia, and while they may have engaged in political violence, the thesis considers FARC to be the most relevant actor in understanding the Colombian landscape. In order to simplify matters, the following model is considered relevant for the purpose of this research:

¹¹ There might be also geographical factors which will impede any tactical advantages

Figure 1.1: The result of interactions between FARC and Colombian government



While the Colombian landscape is inevitably filled with a multitude of non-state actors, such as various BACRIMs, the thesis finds that their lifespan is considerable lower when compared to the above-mentioned terrorist groups. In some regards, their existence may even be questionable, when considering that the result of alliances between OCGs may be their merger in larger groups or intra-group conflicts that may result in their disappearance.

1.4. BEHAVIOURAL RESEARCH MODEL

As mentioned in the research problem, a dilemma may appear in researching the links between OCG and TG. In order to solve that dilemma, however, the dissertation would rather look into the behavioural patterns of each FARC faction. By doing that an answer would be provided at the very least to the question how the way each FARC faction behaves, whether they are behaving like an OCG by engaging in more cocaine production or behaving more like an TG by engaging more in attacks against government targets. Therefore, the following model is considered crucial for resolving this dilemma:

Figure 1.2: Type of behaviour as highlighted by the ratio between displaced persons and coca cultivations

$$\frac{\text{Average number of displaced persons (in bloc's territory and area of influence)}}{\text{Average area (hectares) of coca cultivation (in bloc's territory and area of influence)}}$$

As mentioned before, the number of displaced persons is an indicator of the level of violence in a particular department. While the maps in the appendices (5 to 17) accurately describe the departments where the violence has reached its highest point, they do not display the number of displaced persons generated by each front in their territory and sphere of influence. Therefore, the thesis considers important the departments under the FARC's influence. It is important to note that while FARC may not have territories in all the departments, it nevertheless conducts attacks outside the departments where it has territories, which is why influence is inherently dependent on the concept of territoriality.

On the other hand, the number of displaced persons alone may not accurately achieve the objective of conceptualizing FARC in relationship with its revenues. While numbers exist regarding FARC's income (see Figure 2), they are only available for specific years, but not for the timeline of this research. Therefore, the area of coca cultivation is introduced in order to establish the link between FARC's revenue and activities. This is not to say that all the coca cultivations are controlled by FARC, but rather that it represents a source of income from which FARC can profit. But this is to say that in the long run the level of influence of FARC in Colombia as terrorist group is tied to the amount of coca cultivations.

Taking all into consideration, the statistics regarding the number of displaced persons and the statistics regarding the coca plantation are sufficient for the purpose of determining FARC's behavioural patterns. Therefore, the dissertation brings the following model to the table:

Figure 1.3: Narco-terrorist behavioural pattern of a FARC bloc

$$\frac{\text{Average number of displaced persons (in bloc's territory and area of influence)}}{\text{Average area (hectares) of coca cultivation (in bloc's territory and area of influence)}} < 4$$

Figure 1.4: Terrorist behavioural patterns of a FARC bloc

$$\frac{\text{Average number of displaced persons (in bloc's territory and area of influence)}}{\text{Average area (hectares) of coca cultivation (in bloc's territory and area of influence)}} > 4$$

The value 4 is the threshold value used to identify the behavioural pattern adopted by each FARC bloc. Based on the values for each year within the period of 2000 and 2012, it was observed that the value of 4 significantly reduces the number of exceptions for each group. Each year within the period of 2000 and 2012 is defined as case. For each of the seven blocs there are 13 cases, therefore the total amount of cases for this thesis is 91. As the thesis shows, out of 91 cases only two exceptions apply, which show a divergence from the normal behaviour the bloc engages in (please refer to Appendix 21). The bloc in question shows a criminal behaviour in 11 out of 13 cases; however, for the year 2001 and 2012 the bloc exhibits patterns which are related to terrorist behavioural patterns. In 6 blocs out of 7, the threshold value signifies the behavioural pattern of each bloc and it is applicable for the period of 2000-2012. Overall, by applying the threshold value of 4 to all FARC blocs, it has been observed that four blocs follow a terrorist behavioural pattern, while the other three blocs follow a narco-terrorist behavioural pattern.

Geographically, the four FARC blocs that follow a terrorist behavioural pattern are concentrated in the northern and central part of the country where coca cultivation is less, while the other three blocs operate in eastern and southern parts of the country, the main areas of coca cultivation. For the years 2004-2013 of coca cultivation in Colombia see Appendix 24.

SECOND CHAPTER

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. THE POSSIBILITY OF TERRORIST GROUPS ENGAGING IN NARCO-TERRORISM

This chapter will explore the academic literature in order to understand the differences between OCGs and TGs and determine FARC's behavioural patterns. While FARC has been classified as a TG by the U.S. Department of State (U.S. Department of State, 2017), various factions of FARC have also exhibited characteristics of OCGs. FARC's structure will be discussed in the following chapter. However, the thesis argues that each type of group emulates tactics from each other, which would explain the main issue in defining the differences between OCGs and TGs. A mind-set is necessary in order to understand the tendencies of OCGs and TGs to imitate each other. Therefore, the dissertation will look into several characteristics of OCGs and TGs in terms of rationality, structure, aims, behaviour and other aspects. After each group's characteristics have been explored, the thesis will examine the conditions required for cooperation between TGs and OCGs. As explained in the introduction chapter, the special focus of this thesis would be towards FARC.

Both TGs and OCGs exhibit traits which are tied to a rational behaviour (Enders and Sandler, 1993:830; Sanderson, 2004:53). Because the members of these groups share a common objective, there is a need for a rational structure to achieve their operational goals. In order to maximize efficiency and to reduce risks, the structure needs to be hierarchical and have the ability to instruct members to take rational decisions. However, it cannot be expected for TGs and OCGs to engage completely in rational decision-making, as the lack of information would limit their rationality. The concept of bounded rationality (Simon, 1990:19) is useful in understanding different types of acts which may differ from usual categories OCGs and TGs are placed in. To give more details, bounded rationality perfectly explains that various unknown factors constrain criminal groups to behave in a certain manner, even if the solution is not the most optimal one. Nevertheless,

patterns may be seen in TGs and OCGs, as the dissertation will argue latter, which will disapprove the idea that these criminal organizations are irrational.

In terms of structure, both types of groups are apparently organized in a hierarchical structure. In the case of FARC, although it started as a hierarchical structure (Molano, 2000), it later allowed greater autonomy within its ranks (Insight Crime, 2017). This autonomy may have been given due to its rapid expansion as well as concerns of efficiency within the region the blocs were active. Naturally, there are advantages and disadvantages of increasing or decreasing the autonomy within an organization. Unfortunately, is it not clear to what extent a FARC bloc operate independently from the Secretariat's directive. However, there are FARC dissidents who opposed the recent peace process. FARC's dissidents are numbered around 5%-7% (Defence Minister, 2017) by conservative estimates, going as high as 15% (Albaladejo) of the number of pre-negotiations FARC members. Due to the multitude of OCGs groups in Colombia, the thesis would go deep into analysing the structural difference between TGs and OCGs.

Both types of groups are illegal¹² in their respective countries and both groups are engaged in criminal activities. This is not to say that FARC did not try to achieve their objectives through legal procedures. It even went as far as registering Patriotic Union as a political party in the 1980s (Molano, 2000), and recently forming the Common Alternative Revolutionary Force¹³ as a political party in 2017 the peace agreements (Asmann, 2017).

In terms of behavioural patterns, TGs and OCGs also differ from each other. By behaviour it is meant the way the groups interact with other actors and the tactics they employ. Therefore, the thesis considers that TGs would rather display their power by sending a message within the area they are active¹⁴ (Richardson, 1999:210), while organized crime groups would desire very little public attention in order to engage in their

¹² By illegal, the dissertation refers to the fact that they are not registered as legal organizations. Therefore, they lack legitimacy.

¹³ The party's acronym is also FARC (*Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común*).

¹⁴ Naturally TGs may want to keep their secrecy regarding the targets and methods of attacks in order to increase the possibility of success. However, their claims of responsibility may serve to also attract unwanted attention to their cause.

activities without being hindered (Martin, 2010). As mentioned in the previous paragraph, this is not to say that criminal groups would not adopt tactics from each other, however their characteristics must be observed in order to gauge their affiliation to a particular category. To give an example, the Medellín Cartel has been engaged in acts of terrorism against the government, with various sources going as far as classifying them as “*narco-terrorists*” (Björnehed, 2004:306). However, the thesis considers them more affiliated with OCGs because of their lack of political agenda, as well as the fact that OCGs are interested in maintaining the status quo rather than implementing political change (Toros and Mavelli, 2013:77).

Terrorist groups would engage in actions that are categorized as violent¹⁵, however the focus of their actions would be to highlight their objectives, ideology and power to the public. This would attract more resources (both material and non-material) which would enable them to achieve their agenda easier. In the case of FARC, its main support comes from the farmers (Cook, 2011:22).

Naturally, a highly organised terrorist attack would also mean that a terrorist group has managed to secure enough funds and resources by receiving foreign aid or worse by being engaged in drug trafficking activities. All organizations are dependent on funding, which would imply that their agenda would be tied to the group finances them. State-sponsorship has declined since the end of the Cold War, which would serve to explain why the rise of transnational criminal groups and TGs started to use criminal tactics (Roth and Sever, 2007:902). In the case of criminal organizations, resources gained through criminal activities would mean that their dependence on backers/supporters would be lower. Therefore, the external pressure on the group would inevitably limit the activities as well as the tactics that criminal organizations may be able to deploy. In the absence of any external financial dependence, a group may concentrate on pursuing its objectives unrestricted. Furthermore, it can turn its attention into solidifying its internal structure,

¹⁵ In the academic literature, the issue to what degree an action is violent is debated. The adage “*One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter*” is interesting, but Ganor (2002:294) argues the use of violence and civilians as targets are key elements to identifying a terrorist group. The thesis notes that for the case of FARC, the use of violence against civilian targets constitutes a terrorist act.

which would theoretically eliminate any possibility of splinter groups. The longevity of any TGs is "...highly contingent upon the amount of popular support or social tolerance mobilized among its population of reference" (Bjørngo, 2004:127).

The *foco* theory which bases itself upon the support of the peasants (Guevara, 1961), was abandoned by the FARC, the moment when FARC decided to engage in drug trafficking.¹⁶ Since OCGs activities are viewed with suspicion by the local population and because of the nature of the illegal activities they conduct (e.g. racketeering, extortion and intimidation) for profit, they are not a suitable ally for TGs from a reputation standpoint. However, the dissertation argues that since drug trafficking is the most profitable illegal activity which involves an illegal product¹⁷. Keeping in mind also that FARC enjoyed limited financial support from foreign sponsors, finally motivated them to engage in drug-related activities.

It can be observed that when an OCG engages in violence outside the criminal underworld, it has managed to gain access to funds and resources. This is the case for Medellín which managed to conduct several attacks against government officials (Dishman, 2001:45). The attacks may be carried out in order to reduce external interference with their criminal activities. However, an OCG may find more attractive the prospects of investing in legal business in order to gain access to otherwise illegitimate funds. This aspect is not only limited to OCGs, as FARC's declaration of assets has revealed its involvement in purchasing real estate (DW News, 2017). Nevertheless, the FARC's claim has been criticized on the basis of its low-declared income by the Colombian government (Semana, 2017). However, while FARC's declaration of assets might be opened to questioning, it may particularly reveal to what extent one front is more powerful than the other.

¹⁶ Che Guevara argues that a guerrilla fighter is not only a warrior, but also a teacher of revolution. Therefore, he needs to appear as a larger than life figure and be morally just.

¹⁷ There is a difference between illegal product and unlicensed product. The thesis considers mined gold in the black market to be an unlicensed good, since gold is legal on the market.

Keeping all these aspects in mind, the thesis considers unwise to characterise criminal groups as irrational. Their structure and the nature of their activity demands a rational mind-set.

In terms of acquiring skills, there might be instances where a TG may seek assistance from an OCG, however to what extent cooperation is possible, remains for the most part an unresolved question. A terrorist group may find it more likely to cooperate with similar-minded organizations. In the case of FARC, reports have surfaced on possible cooperation links between PIRA, as well as arrests of PIRA members in Colombia (Murphy Jr, 2005). Furthermore, PIRA's declaration of friendships with FARC may establish the basis for further cooperation.

The thesis argues that the organizations engaged in cocaine trafficking would want to have large profits by cutting costs as much as possible. In a normal business scenario, the main way to reduce costs is to reduce the chain of people involved in a business. In regards to gaining revenue, this may be done by expanding operations not only in the country of origins, but also in other countries as well. The territory of FARC has reduced significantly since the failed peace negotiations of 2000s (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2017), which would mean that in the absence of control, FARC would have to cooperate with other criminal groups in order to ensure the supply of cocaine abroad remains stable. BACRIM¹⁸ could act as brokers in Columbia and while they certainly have the same motivations as any organizations, which is to reduce costs by taking over FARC's drug trafficking, this would be difficult due to the strength of FARC. Furthermore, BACRIM act as loose organizations, which would suggest that conflicts of interest may arise between the groups that form BACRIM.

Both groups are in need of funds and political influence, which would explain the conundrum of organized crime groups' engagement in occasional political and societal violence. This would certainly explain the characteristics of Mexican drug cartels and Italian mafia which engage in the assassination of rivals, political leaders as well as police

¹⁸ Bandas criminales from Spanish (In English criminal groups).

personnel in order to strengthen their power. However, the lack of an ideology illustrates the differences between TGs and OCGs, as well as the lack of a political party that may claim association with OCGs. In Mexico, the increase in political plurality has given the cartels the opportunity to enlarge their criminal operations (Ríos, 2015). In the case of FARC, it has been argued that poor governance coupled with a lack of political representation inevitably enabled FARC to expand in rural areas (Idler, 2016:2).

If terrorist groups engage in criminal activities their lifespan would increase rather than decrease (Omelicheva and Lawrence, 2018:16). This would be a practical reason why FARC would engage in drug trafficking. Drug activities are relatively low-risk activities with a high pecuniary value, unlike kidnappings which are high-risk activities. In the case of the latter, in response to FARC's kidnappings, paramilitary right-wing groups had been formed. In any case, in states plagued by conflict, the chances of a terrorist group engaging in drug trafficking is more as compared to a stable state (Omelicheva and Lawrence, 2018:2).

FARC has managed to control the main areas where the drugs are shipped as well as to improve their relationship with farmers. It is therefore necessary for terrorist groups to not only tax the farmers for each kg of coca-derivate product, but also ensure the safe delivery of drugs. FARC's capacity to deliver drugs into neighbouring countries may be limited. However, it may be able to tax the distribution chain. This idea is based on the resource dependency, which is able to analyse the inter-organizational behaviour between organized crime groups and terrorist groups. As any organization needs funds, initially terrorist groups need the expertise of organized crime groups in engaging in drug trafficking. Naturally, organized crime group would demand a fee for their service, which would motivate terrorist group to "cut the middle-man". However, this logic may be purely anecdotal (Wu and Knoke, 2017:478), which is why the academic literature is divided on the crime-terror nexus.

Countries which have hinterland geographies are at a higher risk of experiencing civil unrest, mainly because guerrilla groups are harder to detect by government forces

(McDougall, 2009:341). The conflict in Colombia has lasted for a period as a result, which might also explain the reason why FARC became a narco-terrorist group.

According to Hutchinson and O'Malley there are three key determinants for why cells might engage in crime activities. The details, materials and the availability of resources need to be considered when planning an attack. These key determinants are part of the planning phase, but the authors emphasize the planning as the most important factor in understanding the behavioural shifts within an organization (Hutchinson and O'Malley, 2007:1099). The operational patterns of a terrorist organization might differ from its cell, but nevertheless it is important to understand that FARC fronts have a high level of autonomy from its Secretariat. Therefore, some fronts might engage in drug trafficking while others may not.

According to Weinstein, terrorist organizations give economic incentives in order to attract "opportunistic joiners" who would be able to engage in drug trafficking partly independent from the main organization. However, this may leave the main organization open to "corruption" (Cited by Jonsson and Brennan , 2013).

On the opposite spectrum, Findlay argued that collaboration between terrorist groups and organized crime groups could only happen at a "level of enterprise" (Findlay, 2008: 76–77). This notion is grounded on the basis that an OCG and a TG share too little common elements that might enable them to work together. Furthermore, Leong argued that distinguishing between terrorism and organized crime might not be as easy as previously thought. The most important of all, terrorist groups' use of organized crime's methods and organized crime's use of terrorist tactics would make any classification unclear (Leong, 2005).

Terrorist and criminal groups are strategic actors which are affected by "socioeconomic, political and topographic characteristic of space" (Omelicheva and Lawrence, 2018:3). In their research, Omelicheva and Lawrence correlate the number of seizures as well as the quantity of seized drugs with the number of terrorist incidents. Furthermore, they argue that the correlation can be direct or indirect. In a direct way, an alliance exists between criminal groups and terrorist groups, which would mean that drug

seizures would directly motivate terrorist groups to organize more attacks. In an indirect scenario, however, the drug trade may flourish in failed states, which would link drug trade directly to social and political conditions which may foster terrorist attacks (Omelicheva and Lawrence, 2018:4). Their research is only limited to Central Asia, but it could possibly apply to Latin America as well. This is because there are instances of collaboration between organized crime groups and terrorist groups, as well as a multitude of failed states in South and Central America.

Asal argues that ethnopolitical terrorist groups are more likely to engage in drug trafficking as compared with religious-motivated terrorist groups. FARC, however, does not have an ethnopolitical ideology, so Asal argues that a terrorist group holding territory would be more likely to engage in drug trafficking than a group that does not hold territory. Furthermore, he argues that a high number of network connections to terrorist or organized crime groups determines a higher likelihood of engaging in drug trafficking (Asal and others, 2015:121).

Ridley argues that terrorist organization and organized crime exhibit characteristics from each other. According to the author, both rely on diaspora communities to finance their operations. Furthermore, they also rely on diaspora to as take part in any transnational activity they might engage in. (Ridley, 2007)

It is argued that terrorist groups are very cohesive, therefore the loyalty of the members is higher than the members of an organized crime group. (Hutchinson and O'Malley, 2007:1101). This is mainly because members of an organized crime group are solely motivated by profit, while members of a terrorist group might be motivated by an ideological cause.

The available resources a terrorist organization possess is certainly important for understanding the attack capabilities it may possess. While this thesis has discussed the importance of financing, as well as the availability of manpower, it has not discussed the importance of weapons. Jonsson and Brennan argue that an insurgent group that acquired man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) would be more effective at deterring government intervention (Jonsson and Brennan, 2014:). FARC has not managed to

acquire MANPADS, which is one of the reasons it may have lost the battle in Colombia. Terrorist organizations could be helped by organized crime groups in acquiring MANPADS, which is a vital resource from denying government forces air superiority. Furthermore, the authors argue that the United Wa State Army in Myanmar has successfully managed to reduce the number of government attacks because they own MANPADS (Jonsson and Brennan, 2014).

The trend of coca production has declined in Colombia since 2000 from its peak in that year, which was 163,000 hectares, to around 43,000 hectares in 2012 (UNODC, 2015). This decrease has been achieved due to initiation of aerial fumigation and manual eradication of coca bushes (Landel, 2010). With the loss of coca production, the thesis would argue that losing in terms of finance has led to a decline in FARC's power.

At the end of 1970s the coca boom began, which meant that the price and demand of cocaine increased. FARC and Colombian drug cartels acquired land in order to plant coca. They also began refining coca paste into cocaine (Colombia Journal, 1999). Due to the profits involved, FARC rebels started battling Colombian drug cartels, which resulted in many casualties and the formation of paramilitary groups to battle FARC. With the decline of power of the Colombian cartels, FARC has managed to establish control over areas where the Colombian OCGs used to operate (Otis, J. 2014:4).

The main production of cocaine has been located within the Andean Region. According to the World Drug Report commissioned by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the majority of it is coming from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. The dissertation considers Colombia as the most important country in analysing the effects of cocaine, not only because of its particular history of struggle with terrorist groups, but also because Colombia has been classified as the country with the largest production of cocaine (UNODC, 2016).

In the period of 2000 and 2012, the price for cocaine in United States has fluctuated between 130 dollars and 200 dollars (White House National Drug Control Strategy, 2016: 83). If the price of cocaine would increase by 100 dollars, it would generate more terrorist attacks (Piazza, 2011:307) in a given year. The number of terrorist attacks in Colombia is

not a concern for this thesis, however the number of displaced persons is relevant for this thesis. In the case of Colombia, for the period of 2000 and 2012, the annual number of displaced persons due to violence has dropped from approximately 750,000 to approximately 250,000 in 2012 (Government of Colombia, 2018). The main motivation for not taking into account the number of terrorist attacks is for the reason that complex terrorist attacks can cost as little as 10,000 dollars¹⁹.

Furthermore, the 2016 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary commissioned by DEA highlights the importance of Colombian transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) in the production and exportation of cocaine (U.S. Department of Justice DEA, 2016:10). Therefore, it is understood that Colombian TCOs control the production of cocaine and export cocaine from Columbia, while other organized crime groups (OCG) of different origins facilitate the transportation of the product to other countries. In the case of US, the Mexican cartels help the spread of cocaine from Colombia to US states, and in the case of Western Europe, Italian mafia plays an important role, although it is not understood to what extent they control the flow of cocaine in comparison with other transnational criminal organizations (Rodriguez, C, 2011).

However, the terms “short-term” and “long-term” could be used to identify different behavioural patterns. According to Meierrieks and Schneider, in a short-term scenario, terrorist groups would shift their terrorist activities towards criminal activities. In other words, TGs would be more occupied with developing their drug activities in order to take advantages of the higher drug prices. However, in a long-term scenario higher drug prices would lead to more terrorism, as the income would have increased significantly since terrorist groups managed to gain funds (Meierrieks and Schneider, 2016). Nevertheless, the price of cocaine has remained relatively constant for the period of 2000 and 2012, therefore the thesis would not take into account the drug prices.

Taking all into account, the policy of drug-liberalization would be ill-advised as the demand for cocaine would increase. This would help terrorist groups legitimize their

¹⁹ As seen in the 2004 Madrid bombings (Clarke, 2016:7).

business and make their product more accessible on an international scale as well. However, an aggressive policy of counter-narcotics would not only lead to a sudden spike in price, but also would serve to encourage farmers to give more support to FARC. It is the opinion of Meierrieks and Schneider that policies which reduce the demand for cocaine would prove more effective in tackling terrorist groups. Piazza on the other hand, recommends interdiction strategies as well as using tactics, which would deprive terrorist groups of territory and popular support (Piazza, 2011:311). In the long-run, an eradication of coca bushes might entail a loss in FARC's grip on power.



THIRD CHAPTER

FARC: ITS INVOLVEMENT IN NARCO-TERRORISM INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF COLOMBIA

3.1. IMPORTANCE OF DRUG RELATED ACTIVITIES FOR FARC'S FINANCING

FARC started as a leftist guerrilla group in Colombia in 1964, growing to become one of the biggest threats to Colombian security. While initially it was not involved in the drug trafficking, at the end of 70s it started to engage itself in drug trafficking. Although partially funded by Cuba, due to the ideological ties (Otis, 2014:3), it managed to attain self-sufficiency later.

FARC later started to depend less and less on foreign funding by engaging in extortion, drug trafficking and kidnapping (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2017). To what extent each brings more profit than the other for FARC remains a contentious issue, nevertheless they have remained to a degree important for FARC's financial operations.

Other main sources of FARC's finance than drug related activities and kidnapping have been illegal gold and rare minerals mining (McDermott, 2017). While gold mining and the taxing of the machinery used for digging gold have been activities that brings profits, there is no connection between transnational crime and FARC in the delivery of gold. In addition, there is no illegal international gold trade since the price of gold is the same worldwide as it is in Colombia (ICE Benchmark Administration, 2017). A cost-benefit and risk analysis would reveal that gold may be sold to the local market instead of delivering it abroad.²⁰ Furthermore, while FARC has engaged in kidnapping of people for ransom, it has abandoned that tactic (Murphy, 2012). The dissertation considers other non-mentioned FARC criminal activities not be of relevance for the analysis of the OCG-TG

²⁰ FARC can charge mining companies a tax for gold mining. Nevertheless, in the area of FARC's control they may operate without official government license.

connection. Therefore, the motivation of this dissertation is to connect the organized crime groups that collaborate with FARC through the analysis of drug trafficking operations.

The FARC's central command has denied the allegations of drug trafficking (Público, 2011), instead pointing out that they enforce "*gramaje*" for the drugs that are produced and moved through their area (McDermott, 2017). While the statement may be dismissed as irrelevant given multiple sightings of FARC engaging in drug trafficking, the statement may reveal a few particular points. Hypothetically, if the claim by the FARC central command is taken as a true statement, it would mean that FARC is only engaged in "*gramaje*" and not in the production and distribution of cocaine. Secondly, the statement may reveal that at the higher chain of command there is an official policy to ban the production and distribution of cocaine by FARC members. On the other hand, if reports of FARC manufacturing drugs are proven to be true, it would mean that the leaders of various blocs and fronts disobey the official directives. This would point out that FARC is becoming less like a terrorist organization and more like a criminal organization. Given the length of the conflict, the thesis finds that FARC is not acting as a completely centralized organization. This would imply either that there are various factions within FARC's structure or that FARC's various fronts are acting independently. It is relevant to point out that dissident factions started to be active after the 2016 peace deal between the Colombian government and FARC. Furthermore, some members of FARC have joined ELN (Reuters, 2018).

On another note, FARC has been associated with facilitating the delivery of cocaine in different parts of Columbia and to neighbouring countries. To this extent, FARC fronts have been established or drug corridors have been established in Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama and possibly Costa Rica (Martín, 2018). After the failed negotiations at the beginning of 2000s, FARC became more involved with the drug trade, either through direct production or *gramaje* (Bargent, 2015). This was in part thanks to the new area of control they have managed to gain during the peace negotiations of 2000s (Steiner and Vallejo, 2010:190).

3.2. THE PRODUCTION OF COCAINE AND FARC'S RELATIONSHIP WITH FARMERS

In terms of support, farmers might find more advantageous to plant coca leaves when compared to vegetables or fruits, as they will get paid more for producing coca paste (Miroff, 2015). At the very least, FARC has been involved in “gramaje” and facilitating safe passage for drug traffickers. Therefore, FARC sees cocaine production as a necessary evil in order to accomplish their agenda. According to Molano (2000:27): *“Guerrilla leaders realized that banning coca would mean losing peasant support. This marked the birth of the coca-trade tax”*.

It can be observed that because of a lack of manpower and due to the risk of being caught, FARC would find it more useful to involve itself as part of the delivery chain, rather than being involved in the entire level of production. There are three major stages in the production of cocaine: harvesting of coca plants, transforming coca plants into coca paste and finally refining coca paste into cocaine. In order to accomplish this, FARC may offer incentives to farmers to plant coca plants instead of other types of crops. This is not to say that BACRIM do not offer incentives, however FARC would still benefit from the growth of coca crops. Because cocaine paste requires a big amount of chopped leaves as well as other ingredients, FARC would furthermore give incentives to farmers for converting coca leaves into coca paste (McDermott, 2017). However, this is not to say that FARC would not be involved in the cocaine manufacturing process, but due to the tedious process, most likely they are involved only in the refining of coca paste into cocaine.²¹ A business relationship is then established, between FARC and farmers, where FARC purchases coca paste from the farmers themselves (Cook, 2011:23).

While the international cocaine routes are known to government authorities, the internal routes of Colombia are less known. The only information available, is the countries where the cocaine is exported to. Unfortunately, cocaine is exported to all neighbouring countries of Colombia. What is known, however, is that the most attractive

²¹ In order to obtain 1kg of coca paste, a farmer would have to harvest between 500 kg and 1ton of coca leaves.

market is Europe and North America (UNODC, 2011). Therefore, it is sent towards north, either through Central America or through the Caribbean Islands.

FARC would be interested in imposing “gramaje” along its territory and the parts where it enjoys influence. Therefore, its strategic objectives would be to control territories along the routes where cocaine is transported. While the power of FARC has declined significantly since 2008, which would inevitably lead to the conclusion that territorial control and “gramaje” would be harder to maintain, their territories have remained close to the borders of the neighbouring countries. This would mean that at the very least, FARC would be able to enforce “gramaje” in the cocaine which exits Colombia. In terms of financial gains, FARC might have an interest in prioritizing control over departments which are close to borders, in order to impose “gramaje” or to manufacture cocaine themselves and reduce the cost of transportation by exporting it themselves.

3.3. AN ANALYSIS OF THE BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS OF FARC BLOCS

The thesis would assume that FARC’s decentralized nature would mean that each front is different in the way violence is carried. However, due to the large number of fronts, the lack of data on each individual front, the shift of power, as well as possible reorganization, the dissertation considers important to categorize fronts into units of analysis, in this case blocs. Accordingly, FARC is divided into seven blocs which vary in terms of numerical strength (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001:28), which would imply that the tactics also vary among them. For the purpose of highlighting differences, the thesis would use the number of displaced for each region where FARC has territories in order to determine which bloc retains more of a terrorist network’s tactics and which bloc operates more as a narco-terrorist group. By narrowing the blocs which operate more like an OCG, the dissertation would hope to find the factors which determine a possible cooperation between OCGs and TGs.

In order to differentiate the tactics of each front, the dissertation will assign a unit of analysis to each bloc where FARC front had been holding territory. Currently, there are


five blocs and two joint commands (Gentry, 2010:457) present within Colombian territory, however their territory might also extent to neighbouring countries as well. This is based on the 2008 Andean diplomatic crisis, which resulted from a Colombian military incursion into Ecuadorian territory. Furthermore, there is a possibility of FARC expanding territory with the countries of Panama and Venezuela (Insight Crime, 2016).

At the beginning of 2000s, FARC was comprised of seven blocs, each one would include several fronts under their control. The fronts themselves would range approximately 100 fighters to 300 fighters (Alsema, 2012). The blocs as well as the fronts were delimited by geographical concerns as well as strategic considerations. Particularly interesting is that the Eastern bloc and the Southern Bloc operate on the eastern sides of the Andes Mountains. For a geographical representation of each department please refer to Appendix 4.

In order to measure the level of FARC's involvement within Colombian national departments, national statistics of displaced persons are used to highlight Colombian departments which have been affected by FARC's activities. It is the assumption of this research that the state of conflict within a region would force people to move to another area. But it is possible that terrorist attacks would generate a low number of displaced persons. In that case, we can say that FARC has displayed characteristics not only of a guerrilla group, but also a *de facto* authority in territories controlled by the organization. This would inevitably lead to conflict with the government and the people in FARC's area of influence. Naturally there are people who may support FARC, and therefore they may choose not to move from the area they reside in. This is a perfectly normal response, however this does not mean that they would not be affected by conflict, which would force them to relocate. While in the academic literature it is argued that displaced persons are generated by paramilitary groups (Ibáñez and Vélez, 2005:667) as well as fumigation of coca (Dion and Russler, 2008:401), it is important to note that civilians have also been targets of attacks, not only from criminal organizations, but also from the Colombian military.

In all 32²² departments of Colombia, the number of displaced persons for the period of 2000 and 2012 was approximately 5.7 million²³ (Colombian Government, 2018). In other words, if these numbers were divided by 13, which represents the number of years which span this research period, the national average would be approximately 440,000 of displaced persons. If this number would be further divided by the number of departments, it would result in the average of 14,000 displaced persons. Accordingly, the thesis has decided that the presence of a conflict might be reflected by a high number of displaced persons. For the purpose of this research, the number has been set to 15,000, which is an approximate number close to the annual average number of displaced persons in the period of 2000 and 2012.

Figure 3.1: Number of annual displaced persons in Colombia for 2000-2012 Period



Source: Government of Colombia (2018)

²² Technically speaking there are 33 departments. However, the department of Archipelago of San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina are a group of islands and FARC does not have territory there. Therefore, 32 departments would be considered relevant for the purpose of this study.

²³ The number has been calculated based on the registry provided by the Colombian government. The exact number is 5.653.641.

In Figure 3.1., the most interesting year is 2017, as FARC started to disarm itself under the agreed peace terms in the previous years. Furthermore, FARC started to have political representation as of September 2017. These events led to a sudden decline in the number of displaced persons, reaching approximately 55,000. It is therefore the assumption of this paper is that the conflict between FARC and the Colombian government caused the largest amount of displaced persons.


3.3.1. Caribbean Bloc

The Caribbean Bloc operates in the northern part of Colombia and it is close to the border of Venezuela and even within Venezuela. In 2000, it had territories in the following five regions: La Guajira, Cesar, Bolivar, Magdalena and Sucre. Their influence might have extended also to Atlantico, even though fronts were not present in the area in 2000 (See Appendix 1). However, in Atlantico the number of displaced persons was very low, which would indicate that FARC did not conduct large-scale operations in the area.

In terms of displaced persons overall, the number was more than 1.5 million in the 6 departments it had control. In the number of displaced persons alone, this bloc stands behind the Medio Magdalena Bloc. However, the number of displaced persons has dropped in the period of 2009-2012 which would lead us to conclude that the power to conduct terrorist activities within this bloc has weakened significantly (See Appendices 4 to 16). The declared income was under 1 million dollars in 2015 (Appendix 2), which would further prove the point that this bloc has been weakened. In economic terms, this bloc is very weak, and in military terms the Caribbean Bloc reaches 300 fighters. However, the bloc has political importance, as the leaders of this bloc have been present at the peace negotiating table in Havana (McDermott, 2013:23).

Interestingly, one front of the Caribbean Bloc shares territory with another front from the Magdalena Medio Bloc in the Bolivar department. (Appendix 1). Therefore, the Bolivar department needs to be considered as a case where FARC's territorially is hard to differentiate. The number of displaced persons is therefore assigned to both of them, as both blocs could have been responsible for forced displacement.

Figure 3.2: Caribbean Bloc's behavioural patterns




Source: Please refer to Appendix 17.

3.3.2. Magdalena Medio Bloc

Magdalena Medio Bloc conducted activities between the northern part of Colombia and the eastern part of Colombia. In other words, it is surrounded by the Caribbean Bloc, North-western Bloc, Central Bloc and lastly Eastern Bloc. It had active fronts within the following departments: Antioquia, Bolivar, Boyaca, Norte de Santander, Santander. As mentioned before, in terms of common fronts, it shared departments with the Caribbean Bloc in Bolivar. However, it also shared territory with the North-western bloc in Antioquia and territory with the Eastern bloc in Boyaca. Their influence might have also extended to Cesar department, even though fronts were not present in that area (Appendix 1). As is with the case of the Caribbean bloc, the cases of Antioquia and Boyaca needs further inquiry in order to determine which bloc has been more active in that department. However, the number of displaced has surpassed the national average for 8 years, which would suggest that it had operations in Cesar. The number of displaced persons for this bloc is also past the 1.5 million mark in 5 departments it had territories, which would mean that this bloc engaged in a large number of attacks. Like the Caribbean Bloc, the Magdalena Medio Bloc has also been present in Venezuela.

The peak of bloc's involvement was in the beginning of 2000s, however this bloc has been mostly involved in the department of Norte de Santander. The number of displaced persons has dropped in the period of 2007 and 2012 which would indicate that the power of this bloc has also been eroded by the government (See Appendices 4 to 16). The declared income was 5 million dollars in 2015 (Appendix 2), which would indicate that this group is stronger in financial terms than the Caribbean Bloc. The Magdalena Medio Bloc is important due to its strategic position next to the drug routes.

Figure 3.3: Medio Magdalena Bloc’s behavioural patterns




Source: Please refer to Appendix 18.

3.3.3. Eastern Bloc

As the name would imply, this bloc operates in the eastern area of Colombia and possibly near the border of Venezuela and Brazil. The bloc is by far the strongest bloc in terms of the number of departments. In 2000, they had fronts in the following territories: Vichada, Guaviare, Meta, Casanare, Arauca, Cundinamarca, Boyaca. Their influence might have further extended to Vaupes and Guainia, which are located near the borders Venezuela and Brazil respectively (Appendix 1). However, since the population density of Vaupes and Guainia is extremely low when compared with the other regions of Colombia, the number of displaced persons would also be low (DANE, 2007). Therefore, the level of FARC involvement in these two regions is unknown.

On the other hand, the Eastern Bloc has been mostly involved in Meta and Cundinamarca departments, with occasional outbursts in Arauca and Meta. It does share a common department with the Magdalena Medio Bloc in Boyaca. The number of displaced persons was the highest during the period of 2000-2008. The number of displaced persons from this bloc has been only over 550.000, which is particularly interesting considering the financial power this bloc possesses. In terms of declared income, the Eastern Bloc boasted 121 million dollars in 2015 (Appendix 2), which means this bloc was the most powerful of all FARC blocs in financial terms. The Eastern Bloc is inclined towards a narco-terrorist behaviour, which would suggest that peace negotiations would be hindered. It is more likely that the bloc would be interested in controlling their areas of influence for the benefit of revenues. Therefore, peace negotiations would be stalled if FARC bloc are narco-terrorist (Otis, 2014). Furthermore, at the peace negotiations in Havana, there were no representatives of this bloc (McDermott, 2013:24).

Figure 3.4: Eastern Bloc’s behavioural patterns




Source: Please refer to Appendix 19.

3.3.4. Southern Bloc

The Southern Bloc has fronts in the southern region of Colombia near the borders of Ecuador, Peru and Brazil, more specifically in the following departments: Caqueta and Putumayo. It may also have influence in the department of Amazonas, but the number of displaced persons is extremely low (Appendix 1). In that sense, their military operations were only conducted in the departments of Caqueta and Putumayo. However, in Putumayo the number of displaced persons remained high for the period of 2000 and 2009, unlike Caqueta where the number of displaced persons remained high for 13 years (Appendix 4 to 16). In other words, the number of displaced persons for the Southern Bloc was over 550.000 people, just a little over the Eastern Bloc. In terms of income, the Southern Bloc is the second richest bloc, reaching an income of 30 million dollars in 2015 (Appendix 2).

It does share Huila department with the Central Bloc. As with the Eastern Bloc, there were no representatives within the Havana peace talks. Similar to the Eastern Bloc, the Southern Bloc was inclined towards a narco-terrorist behaviour.

Figure 3.5: Southern Bloc’s behavioural patterns



Source: Please refer to Appendix 20.


3.3.5. South-western Bloc

The South-western Bloc has front in the following departments Cauca, Narino, Valle del Cauca. It is possible that the front has influence in Choco, however it has no fronts active within Choco. The thesis cannot differentiate whether the North-western bloc is more active within the department of Choco or the South-Western bloc (Appendix 1). For the most part, this front was active in Cauca and Narino. The number of displaced persons in

its three departments was approximately 850.000. In terms of income, the South-western bloc made 7 million dollars in 2015 (Appendix 2). Like the previous two blocs, the South-western Bloc was also exhibiting narco-terrorist group behaviour. The thesis considers particularly important the Eastern Bloc, the Southern Bloc and the North-Western Bloc for the main reason that they exhibit a narco-terrorist behavioural pattern.



Figure 3.6: South-Western Bloc's behavioural patterns



Source: Please refer to Appendix 21.

3.3.6. Central Bloc


The central bloc had territory in the departments of Caldas, Risaralda, Tolima and Quindio. As mentioned before, it shares territory in the department of Huila with the Southern Bloc. Central bloc operates in the central area of Colombia, close to the capital city of Colombia (Appendix 1). Unfortunately, it is not clear however if this bloc either merged with neighbouring blocs or was weakened because of various government actions. Additionally, no financial data is available on this bloc, and it seems the bloc no longer operates in the central area of Colombia. Due to the lack of clear data, the thesis would rather avoid going deep into this bloc. Nevertheless, please refer to Appendix 22. The Central Bloc is extremely weak when compared to other blocs, as the number of fighters it can muster barely reaches 400 fighters (McDermott, 2013:27). However, the number of

displaced persons had gone past 500.000, which would seem to indicate that the bloc was engaged in a large conflict.

3.3.7. North-western Bloc

This bloc operates in the area close to Panama between the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean. It has territories in the following departments: Antioquia, Choco, Cordoba. As mentioned before, the North-western bloc shares the department of Antioquia with the Caribbean Bloc (Appendix 1). Furthermore, the 57th Front active in Panama may be included in the central command of this Bloc (Insight Crime, 2016). Taking into account the number of displaced persons, the bloc displaced more than 1.2 million people. In terms of income, the North-Western Bloc made 4 million dollars in 2015 (Appendix 2). Strategically able to control the drug routes, not only towards United States, but also towards Europe, the Bloc is not inclined towards a narco-terrorist behaviour. Furthermore, the Bloc was present during the Havana peace talks, which would seem to indicate that demobilisation would be easier to achieve when compared to the narco-terrorist blocs.

Figure 3.7: North-Western Bloc's behavioural patterns



Source: Please refer to Appendix 23.

Particularly interesting is the fact that the two largest fronts of FARC in terms of income, namely the Eastern Bloc and the Southern Bloc have territories which are located in low-density areas. This would indicate that government control is particularly weak in those areas. To some extent, density may be associated with a lack of power, as low-density areas may be used by FARC to establish territories without government interference.

3.4. TRANSNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING AND FARC

Drug trafficking through transnational drug routes, including cocaine trafficking,²⁴ is an activity that has been carried out by both TGs and OCGs. For this reason, this study considers that an aspect of FARC's involvement in narco-terrorism is the delivery of Colombian cocaine to international markets.

By maintaining a large presence within Columbia as well as being close to the borders of other countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru, FARC would theoretically be able to smuggle cocaine into the neighbouring countries without relying on third parties. Alternatively, the *gramaje* system could be also in place, meaning that in places where FARC is in control, BACRIM may transport drugs as long as they pay money to FARC (Molano, 2000). FARC is mostly concentrated along the borders of Colombia with neighbouring countries, which would indicate its ability to impose *gramaje* on the products exiting Colombia. However, as will be explained below, FARC also has some shortcomings that lead it to cooperate with Colombian as well as international OCGs in trafficking cocaine abroad.

The dissertation finds that FARC became fragmented as a result of its overextension as well as its conflict with government and various paramilitary groups. In addition to the declining power of FARC, it is a fact that the cocaine is transported from Colombia via a route that passed through many Central American countries or at the very least through the Caribbean Islands. However, the influence of FARC is particularly low in Brazil and Peru, mainly due to the low Colombian demographics within these two countries.²⁵ For this reason, the transportation of cocaine into Peru and Brazil and later possibly to North America (by sea from Peru) and Western Europe (by sea from Brazil) creates the possibility cooperation between FARC and OCGS. Taking all things into consideration, it can be said that FARC may need cooperation with OCSs depending on

²⁴ Cocaine has become a global product. Other routes may be relevant for the purpose of researching the cocaine "business", such as the routes that move towards Australia and South-East Asia. However, the thesis would rather emphasize the importance of main routes as well as the routes upon which information is readily available.

²⁵ Nevertheless, FARC may find profitable to hold territory near the borders of these two countries, due to their strategic location for drug routes.

influence FARC has in the countries along the drug trafficking routes (below, the number of Colombians living in the related countries will be introduced in order to assess the possibility of FARC's influence there).

Before examining the issue of FARC's influence two other issues are dealt with. The first one is the nature of cooperation between TGs and OCGs in transnational drug trafficking. Undoubtedly, every actor has particular interests which may require them to approach the cocaine business from a monopolistic point of view or a cooperative point of view. In the case of the first one, resources are needed in order to take over a rival criminal organization. The dissertation considers manpower the most important resource to be used by criminal organizations, whether they are TG or OCGs. The dissertation assumes the second option is used when a criminal organization is having problems with recruiting people from their own ethnic background. Therefore, the need for cooperation is prevalent especially in countries without a large migrant population. This is particularly important because direct transport routes from drug producing countries to destination countries are rare, especially if the country where cocaine is produced is far away. This aspect would be discussed further down below.

The second one is the possible partners of FARC in transnational drug trafficking. They are namely Italian mafia, the Mexican drug cartels and local OCGs.

3.4.1 Partners of FARC in Transnational Drug Trafficking

3.4.1.1. Italian Mafia

Italian mafia is particularly interesting due to its longevity as well as the branches it has managed to establish worldwide. There are four main mafia groups which operate in Europe: Sicilian Mafia, Calabrian 'Ndrangheta, Neapolitan Camorra, Apulian OC and with the exception of the latter one, all of them are present within Latin America (Europol, 2013). Furthermore, all of them are engaged in drug trafficking²⁶ and other sorts of illegal activities. The main issue a researcher may encounter when analysing the network of

²⁶ Cocaine, heroin and cannabis trafficking

Italian mafia is with the concept of alliance, due to the fact that the importance of clan and family ties is significant within the Italian mafia. Alliances may switch constantly, which is why the dissertation groups the Italian OCGs within a single unit: Italian mafia.

3.4.1.2. Mexican drug cartels

While the Mexican drug cartels are not as old as the Italian mafia, they have nevertheless managed to expand in the Americas, effectively becoming transnational OCGs. There is a large number of OCGs in Mexico, most notably being: Sinaloa Cartel, Tijuana Cartel²⁷, Familia Michoacana, Juarez Cartel, Beltran Leyva Organization, Los Zetas, Gulf Cartel, Knights Templar and lastly but not least Jalisco Cartel – New Generation (CJNG) (NotimexPR, 2017). The Mexican transnational OCGs are classified as the “greatest criminal drug threat to the United States” by U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which reveals the predominance of these groups in the drug trade with United States (U.S. Department of Justice DEA, 2016). It is argued that due to the departure of Institutional Revolutionary Party from power in the year of 2000, as well the developing pluralism within Mexico enabled drug cartels to upscale the level of violence (Ríos, 2015). Due to the similarities between the system of alliances between Mexican drug cartels and Italian mafia, the dissertation also considers Mexican OCGs as a single unit: Mexican drug cartels.

3.4.1.3 Local OCGs

Other groups are active within the Americas, however to mention all of them would not be useful to the research for two main reasons. First of all, their size is hard to determine and secondly the lifespan of several groups is short. Instead, the research will point out a particular group, only if this group has managed to achieve a transnational status.

²⁷ Also known as Arellano-Félix Cartel

3.5. COCAINE TRAFFICKING ACROSS AMERICAS

The main type of drug produced and exported from South America is cocaine and other cocaine related products. The United States, the countries part of European Union and European Free Trade Association accounted for more than 80% of the world cocaine consumption in 2008 (UNDOC, 2010). In no small part, due to their economy and large population, it makes them an attractive market for cocaine producers to ship drugs. In order to understand how the drugs are delivered we must understand the transit area between Columbia and the destination countries. In large part due to the geographical distance between Colombia Europe and the United States, the risks with distributing cocaine in these regions remains essentially high. However, the prices of cocaine, which can range from 10,000-50,000 dollars depending on the purity as well as the region itself, make them attractive locations to sell drugs (Wells, 2013). The price of cocaine increases if the location is further away from FARC, due to the risk associated with the transport of drugs, as well as other taxes an organization might charge for the safe transport of cocaine.²⁸ The estimates of gross profits made by cocaine traffickers is 10 times higher in Europe or North America compared to South America (UNDOC, 2011).

In the past, the Colombian cartels were dominant in the production, distribution and supplying of drugs to the United States (U.S. Department of Justice DEA, 2016). Due to the decline of the Colombian drug cartels, the power vacuum was filled by Mexican drug cartels, who act as distributors and suppliers in collaboration with American OCGs as well.

In the first scenario, the route of Columbia-United States, two main ways of delivering drugs need to be mentioned:²⁹

- 1) Land and maritime route between Colombia-United States. The thesis will mostly focus on this route in understanding the relationship between FARC and Mexican

²⁸ In areas where FARC or Mexican drug cartels have no control, local OCGs might charge a tax in order to assure the safe delivery of the drugs. Alternatively, they could buy the product and sell or transport it themselves.

²⁹ Both of them pass through Mexico first.

drug cartels. The route goes from Colombia-Panama-Costa Rica- Nicaragua-Honduras-El Salvador or Guatemala –Mexico (UNDOC, 2010).

- 2) Maritime route between Colombia-Caribbean Sea-United States. The thesis will focus less on this route due to lack of information on the OCGs in the Caribbean Sea (UNDOC, 2010).

The second scenario, the route of Colombia-Europe.

- 1) Maritime route Colombia-Venezuela or Panama³⁰ towards Spain/Portugal Italy/Netherlands/UK³¹ (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2016). Schengen Area is considered as an attractive destination point for the distribution of cocaine.

3.6. ASSUMPTIONS

The thesis finds that geographical proximity as well as a high demand for cocaine (Caulkins, 2015) would have been factors which directed FARC to collaborate with local OCGs or even with Mexican drug cartels. In the case of shorter distances, FARC would have been determined to implicate itself directly, in the case of longer distances FARC would rather rely on contractors who belong to various terrorist or organized crime groups (Molano, 2000). There is no evidence to suggest that the Italian Mafia is active in the distribution of drugs to the United States from Mexico-and that Mexican drug cartels are actively involved in the drug distribution and supply within Western Europe.

In the academic literature, it is pointed out that the cultural ties strengthen the cohesion of the internal structure of clandestine organizations (O'Reilly and Chatman, 1996). The cultural ties might be anything related to customs, language, history, norms and nationality. Additionally, common cultural ties lead to a capacity of building trust,

³⁰ Countries where FARC has been sighted.

³¹ UK is a final destination country. The other countries could be destination countries or transit countries for other European countries.

which is essential in any commercial activity. Trust become the main factor which determines criminal organizations to cooperate with each other. Since, there cannot be any legally binding contract between clandestine organizations enforceable by a transnational authority³², a higher authority that can exercise powers over the criminal organizations involved, the issue of trust arises.

According to academic literature, foreign OCGs can bring drugs into a different country if they have international connections (Caulkins, 2015:8). The dissertation considers that the influence of a particular ethnic group or a foreign community could have in their host country in expanding the activities of a criminal organization is important. This is because they would have cultural and personal ties with their host country and the country of their origin. Such ties may help when a group is engaged in transnational criminal activities.

The thesis finds that each criminal group has influence in a particular area or country. While the concept of territorial control can be applied to FARC, based on several instances where rebels have sighted, the areas where they impose *gramaje*, as well the villages or cities where government control is weak, the same case cannot be said about OCGs. OCGs would rather refrain from obtaining and administrating territory as it would draw unwanted attention.

Furthermore, the debate to what extent a foreign OCG is present within a country also comes forth. The thesis assumes that a small percentage of a community would partake in illegal activities, especially with OCGs of the same ethnicity, if the community is large enough and entrenched in the local culture. Geographical proximity would inevitably play an important role as well, meaning that countries that are closer to the base of operations of Mexican cartels, Italian mafia and FARC would most likely be under the influence of these organizations. However, for the Americas, the dissertation assumes that the Italian mafia operates mostly in illegal activities related to Europe, due to the

³² There have been so called Commissions which regulated mafia activities and acted as peace-brokers in Italian and Italian-American mafia. However, they have been on a national scale, not on international scale.

geographical distance between Europe and American continent³³. To further highlight the point, the Italian community is relatively small when compared with the Colombian and Mexican migrants in the American continents.



³³ The issue of which condition is more important for the development of transnational organized crime is debatable. Geographical proximity or cultural ties? Certainly they are both crucial for understanding criminal organizations, but the dissertation would choose the second one as priority factor.

Table 3.1: Approximate number of migrant flows in each country during the period of 1990-2015

Countries/International Organizations	Columbians abroad	Mexicans abroad
Brazil	8,200	3,200
Bolivia	3,000	9,500
Costa Rica	22,000	3,200
Ecuador	195,000	2,300
El Salvador	600	1,700
Guatemala	1,200	18,000
Honduras	650	1,200
Nicaragua	450	850
Panama	55,000	5,000
Peru	6,000	1,500
United States	700,000	12,000,000
Venezuela	975,000	3,800
Western Europe ³⁴	100,000	45,000
Caribbean Islands ³⁵	9,500	5,300

Source: International Organization for Migration-United Nations Agency, 2015.³⁶

³⁴ By Western Europe, the dissertation refers only to the following countries: United Kingdom, Spain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Italy.


³⁵ By Caribbean Islands, the dissertation refers only to the following countries: Haiti, Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Jamaica.

³⁶ The number does not deal with ethnic affiliation, but rather the country of origins for each migrant. Other cultural ties can also be found be identified (e.g. language, religion, etc.).

The dissertation considers a large community to be present within a country when the number of migrants from a particular nationality has reached 20,000. This number is based on the physical representation of a community provided by the International Organization for Migration-United Nations Agency (2015). While the statistics of each country through which major drug routes are present, they would not reveal the crime rate among foreigners. Furthermore, they are complicated by the different views on nationality and ethnicity, as well as the number of undocumented immigrants. Nevertheless, the dissertation acknowledges that they can play an important role in understanding the reach of OCGs and TGs may have. Besides the sources which report the presence of Mexican drug cartels, Italian mafia and lastly but not least FARC, the dissertation examines the demographics of countries involved within the aforementioned land and maritime routes. Unfortunately, the statistics of later generations of migrants are not readily available due to a difference in methodology and classification between countries.

It is necessary to understand that an ethnic group engaged in criminal activities may also include members outside their ethnic group depending on the task at hand. In many aspects, the organizational structure differs within each criminal organization. However, the number of members of each criminal organization is extremely hard to gauge, which is why the focus of this thesis is to focus on the expansion ability each criminal organization could wield. By this assumption, the thesis is right in discerning that there is little to no presence of FARC, Mexican or European OCGs presence within Central America.

Figure 3.8: Map of Latin-America's OCG and FARC presence in the Americas



Source: Map created using International Organization for Migration-United Nations Agency's data as well as Insight Crime's reports on FARC's presence

3.7. CENTRAL AMERICA

The thesis argues that the expansion of criminal organizations into Central America is due to the necessity of controlling the drug route and eliminating intermediaries in order to gain more profits. Accordingly, it is argued that Central America is divided into particular sphere of influences, which are first determined by the community present within the country and secondly based on the geographical proximity to the origin country of the criminal organization.³⁷ The dissertation concludes that particular arrests of members part of criminal organizations would not disclose the presence or influence of a criminal organization, but rather show that the organization in question is interested in that area.

With the exception of Panama, where 57th Front of FARC managed to establish a presence and the exception of Guatemala where Sinaloa drug cartel has established a foothold (Insight Crime, Guatemala, 2017), the criminal underground of each Central American country have been represented by local OCGs. Last but not least, Costa Rica could be theoretically influenced by FARC due to its geographical proximity to Panama as well as the fact that a large Colombian community is present within the country.

In Guatemala, the Mexican numbers barely reaches the thesis's criteria for a large community, however its geographical proximity with Mexico would justify Mexican cartels' presence within Guatemala. However, the influence of local OCGs as well as Colombian cartels would require the Mexican cartels to cooperate in the smuggling of cocaine into Mexico.

In the case of Panama, the large Colombian community present and its geographical proximity with Colombia would justify FARC's presence within the country. The location of the country for the international trade would reveal the strategic necessity of conducting drug trafficking from there. As the Panamanian OCGs are not powerful enough to challenge the 57th Front in Panama, the thesis assumes that FARC does not need to collaborate with local OCGs (Insight Crime, Panama, 2018). The drugs

³⁷ The thesis considers more important the factor of community, than the one of geographical proximity.

come from Colombia either by land or sea, nevertheless it is very likely that the cocaine passes through FARC's hand, because FARC had territory in Colombia and Panama.

In Costa Rica, a Colombian community is present, however it is small in size in comparison with its neighbour Panama. This would imply that Colombian criminal organizations has some sort of influence in the region, but they are required to cooperate with the local OCGs. However, FARC has no territory in the area, and it would seem that in Central America its only territory is in Panama. Sea and land drug routes are present within this country and with the exception of its land route which comes from Panama, the cocaine that comes from a sea routes, either ~~comes~~ directly from Colombia, or from Panama.

Interestingly local OCGs still play a role, as the majority percentage of people arrested for cocaine trafficking in 2010 were Costa Rican. The cocaine is further delivered to Nicaragua, if Costa Rica has not been designated as a final destination by the Colombian BACRIM (UNODC, 2012).

Unlike its neighbour Costa Rica, there are not enough migrants from any neighbouring country to qualify as a community relevant to this research. As a result, local OCGs are employed to transport cocaine to neighbouring countries. Air routes as well as sea and land routes are employed to transport cocaine from Costa Rica, Colombia and Venezuela to Honduras (UNODC, 2012).

3.7.1 The cases of Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala

For the cases of El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, the Mexican drug cartels or FARC are barely visible if we consider the population as a reference, however Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Bario-18 are present within the country. Bario-18 and MS-13 are also transnational OCGs, however their origins are tied to the communities of Salvadorians, Guatemalans, Hondurans and Nicaraguans (UNODC, 2012). These groups have been established in United States by refugees who came from El Salvador, Honduras,

Guatemala and Nicaragua. While their criminal origins may have started from the United States, they have also expanded their “franchise”³⁸ back into their previous countries.

Like El Salvador, there is not a single large foreign community that can facilitate the infiltration of transnational OCGs in Honduras, which means that cooperation with local OCGs are vital for Colombian or Mexican drug cartels. There are several routes that enter Honduras: by land and sea it only comes from Nicaragua, however by air it comes from Venezuela. This may be due to practical considerations, as the infrastructure in Honduras is poorly maintained, which would reduce the practicality of transporting cocaine by land routes. If the cocaine manages to reach Honduras, its next possible destination is Guatemala or El Salvador (UNODC, 2012).

Unlike the several countries in South America, the Colombian community present within El Salvador is not large enough according to the assumption of this research, which would mean that the influence of Colombian criminal organizations is not extending to this country. Furthermore, there is not a single community large enough to fulfil the criteria of this dissertation, which would suggest that local OCGs have more influence than foreign OCGs. Cocaine may come from Honduras, either by land or sea or come from Nicaragua by sea. If the cocaine passes through El Salvador, naturally its next destination would be Guatemala (UNODC, 2012).

Guatemala’s case is particularly interesting because there is a sizable Mexican community, even if it is barely meeting the criteria of this dissertation. While this may be dismissed by the research, it is important to note that Mexican drug cartels have managed to acquire territory and influence within Guatemala. The most prominent ones are Los Zetas and the Sinaloa Cartel (Insight Crime, Guatemala, 2017). Cocaine comes from its southern neighbours, either by land or by maritime routes and the only possible destination for cocaine is Mexico, via air, land or maritime routes (UNODC, 2012).

Mexico’s situation is particularly complicated when talking about its relationship with drug cartels and other type of OCGs. It would not do justice to talk about it in a short

³⁸ The dissertation uses the term to refer to franchise in the context of expansion and replication of methods for illegal activities.

paragraph, however the most important thing related to Mexico for this research is its status as a transit country to the United States. Cocaine would come from Guatemala (CHECK) via various routes and later cross the border to the United States.

3.8. SOUTH AMERICA AND EUROPE

Unlike the other two criminal organizations, Italian Mafia does not have the privilege of benefiting from geographical proximity in South America. A large Italian community is present only in Venezuela and Brazil. For the Caribbean Islands, which may be used as a transit area, the Italian presence is low. The thesis assumes that Colombian criminal organizations may seek alliances only in Venezuela and possibly Brazil, because of the large Italian community present within those countries.

In Western Europe there are large Italian communities who may serve to solidify mafia's presence within the area. The case of Spain is particularly interesting for the fact that there are large Italian, Mexican and Colombian communities, which may indicate that there is particular interest in the region for all the criminal organizations. However, for the case of cocaine trafficking, Mexican drug cartels would likely be less interested due to the geographical distance between Mexico and Spain. Because the Mexican drug cartels are not the producers of cocaine, the option of distributing and supplying the U.S. market seems more viable. The Western European countries seem an attractive market for FARC and Italian mafia due to the cultural ties they share.

Because of the expansion of Schengen Area, the potential for Italian mafia to expand into other parts of Europe could be dramatically increased. The same could be said about the abolishment of Schengen visa requirements for Colombians and Mexicans. However, the difference consists the fact that Italian mafia members could reside within any Schengen area country, while Colombians and Mexicans would first have to obtain residence visa. Based on geographical proximity it can also be assumed that the power of Italian mafia in Western Europe is greater than the other American criminal organizations.

In Brazil, the Colombian community does not allow for rapid expansion such as in the case of Venezuela, due to its small size. Therefore, the dissertation assumes that FARC or any Colombian BACRIM would have low influence in the area. It is important to note, however, that the Eastern and the South-Eastern bloc have the capacity to deliver shipments through this country. However, they would inevitably have to rely on the Brazilian OCGs to achieve that. On that note, FARC may have possible links to the Red Command group, but it is not clear to what extent the cocaine is delivered from Brazil to Europe. The logistical challenge of transporting cocaine across Brazil also needs to be noted. While drug routes coming from Colombia are present within Brazil, it is important to note that FARC may prefer to deliver its drugs to Europe through Venezuela. This assumption is based on several key facts: the reduced delivery costs and the risk of getting caught, which is higher in Brazil than it is in Venezuela.

In Ecuador, a large Colombian community is present, which would imply that FARC has influence in this particular country. Furthermore, FARC may also have territory in this country as revealed by the 2008 Andean Crisis. Ecuador is important for the drug trade, because cocaine shipments may be delivered from Ecuador to other countries, however it is not as important as the Colombia's northern neighbours.

In Peru, there is not a large community to justify the expansion of FARC or Colombian OCGs. However, Peru is interesting mainly due to the Shining Path, a terrorist group that had similar ideology as FARC. Peru is cultivating coca plant and producing cocaine which would justify the absence of a drug route coming from Colombia. Furthermore, Peru is not in a strategic position for the delivery of cocaine, which would mean that alliances between criminal organizations would be only concerned with delivering cocaine into Ecuador or Colombia, to be further sold in destination countries.

Venezuela is an interesting case, due to the fact that it hosts the largest community of Colombian migrants. Furthermore, FARC and ELN have managed to establish territorial control in Venezuela, which would mean that the research would not only talk in terms of influence in this particular case. Venezuela is used as a route for shipping drugs

directly to Europe or shipping drugs to United States, possibly through the Caribbean Islands.

Bolivia is a top producer of cocaine, coming just behind Colombia and Peru. The influence of Mexican or Colombian drug cartels are less present, as there is a lack of community presence. This would enforce the assumption that the local OCGs play an important role in exporting cocaine abroad. Notably, there is a large Brazilian community, which would explain the ability to ship cocaine towards Brazil.

By Caribbean Islands, the dissertation refers to the following countries: Haiti, Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Jamaica. It is important to note that most of the cocaine flows towards the Dominican Republic rather the other mentioned countries. The cocaine flows towards Jamaica have decreased and Cuba has been safe from drug-trafficking incidents (UNODC, 2012). In 2000, the number of primary cocaine movements was in the same amount in Haiti and Dominican Republic. However, that number has decreased in Haiti while in the Dominican Republic it has increased (UNODC, 2012). In Caribbean Islands, there is not a large Colombian or Mexican community, which would imply that Colombian or Mexican criminal organizations would need to collaborate with the local OCGs in order to ensure the safe delivery of cocaine to Europe or United States.

As mentioned before, there are two main drug routes that pass into the United States, which would emphasize that the U.S. would need to carefully monitor its land routes coming from Mexico as well as its maritime routes coming from the Caribbean Islands. There is a large Colombian community within the U.S. However, it needs to be emphasized that Mexican drug cartels have a larger role in the delivery of cocaine. Therefore, Colombian criminal groups would need to collaborate with Mexican drug cartels in order to ensure the transport of cocaine in the U.S. If the cocaine is not transported to Canada, the U.S. represents the final stop for cocaine delivery.

Lastly but not least, Europe is worth mentioning due to the large market it provides for criminal organizations. The most used drug routes are either flowing from Venezuela directly to Europe or flowing from the Caribbean Islands to Europe. The thesis considers Western Europe the most important consumer market for criminal organizations, due to

the large European demand coupled with its strong economy. Most of the drugs come through Spain, nearly half of the drugs coming towards Europe were seized in Spain (UNODC, 2011:1). There are two factors that determine the Colombian criminal organizations to ship drugs to Spain: geographical proximity and cultural links (UNODC, 2011:13)



CONCLUSIONS

One of the most important objectives of this dissertation was highlighting the FARC blocs which are more inclined towards collaborating with organized crime elements and adopting narco-terrorist tactics. As shown by the thesis, there were three FARC blocs which maintained a low-profile by engaging less in political violence as revealed by lower number of displaced persons in comparison with the other FARC blocs. Furthermore, they had a larger amount of revenue when compared with the other blocs, which would mean that the capacity to carry attacks was possible. The thesis considers that whole drug business requires complete secrecy, and therefore it may be a possible explanation for the low-level FARC operations conducted by these blocs in their area of influence.

One may argue that all FARC blocs are involved in drug trafficking to a degree, which is a fair assumption based on news reports and various intelligence sources. This assumption ignores the fundamental aspect that many terrorist organizations are also engaged in tactics which are common in organized crime groups. The assumption would theoretically eliminate the idea that FARC blocs which engage in drug trafficking do not conduct terrorist attacks. The purpose of this thesis is not to completely differentiate between terrorist groups and organized crime groups, but rather highlight the tactics and mentality that generally are present within criminal organizations. Therefore, the thesis argues instead that the concept of terrorist groups or organized crime adopting different tactics is a far more interesting subject to research.

Keeping these ideas in mind, the thesis argued that two of the three criminalized FARC blocs, namely the Eastern Bloc and the Southern Bloc have the advantage of having influence in low density areas. This in turn facilitates the growth of coca plantations and subsequently the growth in the revenue. However, one of the side effects of low density areas is the limited access to new recruits as well as the lack of strategic targets. This in turn is a setback to conducting operations in their respective areas. However, for the third criminalized bloc, the South-Western Bloc, the density factor does not explain their narco-terrorist behaviour. While the density factor cannot be neglected, the thesis rather argues

that the common traits all these three criminalized blocs share is the distance from the main drug routes. In other words, the main cocaine routes move north of Colombia, while the blocs are present within the southern part of Colombia. It is more viable for coca cultivators, as well as drug traffickers to have their operations in the northern part of the country, because it minimizes risks and costs. Therefore, the blocs that operate in the north would have the ability to impose “*gramaje*”, and would be less likely to be concerned with the growth of coca cultivations as drugs will continue to pass through their area. Naturally, the Colombia government would give priority to eradicating the coca cultivations which are closer to the main drug routes, which would give incentive to the criminal groups in the South to increase their cocaine yield in order to satisfy the European and American markets.

Taking into account the global demand for cocaine, the thesis then examined the influence Colombian criminal organizations have in transit countries. While in some countries FARC had not only influence but also territorial presence, the dissertation argued which countries the criminal organizations need to collaborate with local OCGs, and in which countries Colombian criminal organizations could expand with the help of local organized crime groups. As stated in chapter three, the thesis gave importance to the manpower as a resource, and therefore analysed the demographical data available for each country of interest. In other words, a large community would help organized crime groups, since many organized crime groups rely on ethnic and national ties in order to expand their influence abroad.

The findings of this study are limited only to the case of FARC and only analyses two of its main cocaine routes. FARC has also been involved in other parts of South America, the focus of this thesis was to analyse its relationship with organized crime groups. Therefore, the dissertation may not be generalizable to any other terrorist or organized crime group.

The data used to calculate the level of violence within a particular region as well as the criminalization of FARC was based on the Colombian government’s statistics as well as the statistics provided by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Due to the nature of

cocaine business, the numbers may not be accurate enough to represent the reality of this situation, however in the lack of better evidence, the research considers the data relevant.

The data used for identifying the number of migrants within each country was based on the data provided by the International Organization for Migration – UN Migration Agency. It is the opinion of the author that the number of migrants may be even higher in some countries, however the national census of each country differs from each other, which means the data is hard to verify. Furthermore, the data does not reveal the number of ethnic communities. The author's assumptions are based on various political speeches and media reports.

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
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
Appendices

Appendix 1: Geographical representation of FARC fronts and blocs in 2000



Source: Rabasa and Chalk (2001: 28).

Appendix 2: FARC's presence and coca crops in 2017




Source: Insight Crime, McDermott (2017).

Appendix 3: Geopolitical representation for each department in Colombia



Appendix 4: Colombian departments with high number of displaced persons in 2000




Source: Map created using data provided by Government of Colombia (2018) for each department.

Appendix 5: Colombian departments with high number of displaced persons in 2001




Source: Map created using data provided by Government of Colombia (2018) for each department.

Appendix 6: Colombian departments with high number of displaced persons in 2002




Source: Map created using data provided by Government of Colombia (2018) for each department.

Appendix 7: Colombian departments with high number of displaced persons in 2003




Source: Map created using data provided by Government of Colombia (2018) for each department.

Appendix 8: Colombian departments with high number of displaced persons in 2004




Source: Map created using data provided by Government of Colombia (2018) for each department.

Appendix 9: Colombian departments with high number of displaced persons in 2005




Source: Map created using data provided by Government of Colombia (2018) for each department.

Appendix 10: Colombian departments with high number of displaced persons in 2006




Source: Map created using data provided by Government of Colombia (2018) for each department.

Appendix 11: Colombian departments with high number of displaced persons in 2007




Source: Map created using data provided by Government of Colombia (2018) for each department.

Appendix 12: Colombian departments with high number of displaced persons in 2008




Source: Map created using data provided by Government of Colombia (2018) for each department.

Appendix 13: Colombian departments with high number of displaced persons in 2009




Source: Map created using data provided by Government of Colombia (2018) for each department.

Appendix 14: Colombian departments with high number of displaced persons in 2010




Source: Map created using data provided by Government of Colombia (2018) for each department.

Appendix 15: Colombian departments with high number of displaced persons in 2011



Source: Map created using data provided by Government of Colombia (2018) for each department.

Appendix 16: Colombian departments with high number of displaced persons in 2012



Source: Map created using data provided by Government of Colombia (2018) for each department.

Appendix 17: The division factor between the average number of displaced persons and the average number of coca cultivation in the case of the Caribbean Bloc for the period of 2000-2012

Year	Total number of displaced persons ^a	Coca cultivations (hectares) ^b	Annual average(DP/CC)
2000	240,952	6,481	37.17
2001	216,510	5,689	38.05
2002	247,351	3,733	66.26
2003	141,617	5,229	27.08
2004	139,671	4,664	29.94
2005	158,634	4,212	37.66
2006	128,475	2,819	45.57
2007	113,733	5,997	18.96
2008	83,000	6,403	12.96
2009	30,064	5,697	5.27
2010	19,459	3,579	5.43
2011	13,711	2,269	6.04
2012	14,779	2,028	7.28
Average (2000-2012)	119,074	4,523	
Average DP/ Average CC	26.32		

Sources: a) Government of Colombia (2018).

b) UNODC and Government of Colombia (2003); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2005, June); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2009, June); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2015, July).

Appendix 18: The division factor between the average number of displaced persons and the average number of coca cultivation in the case of the Medio Magdalena Bloc for the period of 2000-2012

Year	Total number of displaced persons ^a	Coca cultivations (hectares) ^b	Annual average(DP/CC)
2000	276,790	17,935	15.43
2001	137,006	17,800	7.69
2002	235,214	14,387	16.34
2003	129,536	14,440	8.97
2004	117,769	13,108	8.98
2005	133,826	12,251	10.92
2006	122,403	10,334	11.84
2007	109,612	18,908	5.79
2008	91,169	16,817	5.42
2009	57,712	14,425	4.00
2010	47,452	11,341	4.18
2011	55,781	9,489	5.87
2012	50,291	9,330	5.39
Average (2000-2012)	120,351	13,890	
Average DP/ Average CC	8.66		

Sources: a) Government of Colombia (2018).

b) UNODC and Government of Colombia (2003); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2005, June); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2009, June); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2015, July).

Appendix 19: The division factor between the average number of displaced persons and the average number of coca cultivation in the case of the Eastern Bloc for the period of 2000-2012

Year	Total number of displaced persons ^a	Coca cultivations (hectares) ^b	Annual average(DP/CC)
2000	30,550	37,389	0.81
2001	36,969	52,396	0.70
2002	73,690	46,136	1.59
2003	62,267	35,868	1.73
2004	52,321	36,988	1.41
2005	56,006	37,493	1.49
2006	58,778	29,143	2.01
2007	59,321	30,159	1.96
2008	53,390	17,166	3.11
2009	28,766	17,992	1.59
2010	19,031	13,003	1.46
2011	14,236	12,981	1.09
2012	15,740	8,438	1.86
Average (2000-2012)	43,159	28,858	
Average DP/Average CC	1.49		

Sources: a) Government of Colombia (2018).

b) UNODC and Government of Colombia (2003); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2005, June); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2009, June); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2015, July).

Appendix 20: The division factor between the average number of displaced persons and the average number of coca cultivation in the case of the Southern Bloc for the period of 2000-2012

Year	Total number of displaced persons ^a	Coca cultivations (hectares) ^b	Annual average(DP/CC)
2000	30,464	92,625	0.32
2001	45,913	62,168	0.73
2002	75,644	22,921	3.3
2003	44,628	15,414	2.89
2004	35,878	11,669	3.07
2005	45,143	14,848	3.04
2006	53,328	17,913	2.97
2007	56,854	21,672	2.62
2008	51,791	14,797	3.5
2009	35,551	9,930	3.58
2010	29,600	7,701	3.84
2011	28,795	13,400	2.14
2012	30,479	9,941	3.06
Average (2000-2012)	43,390	24,231	
Average DP/Average CC	1.79		

Sources: a) Government of Colombia (2018).

b) UNODC and Government of Colombia (2003); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2005, June); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2009, June); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2015, July).

Appendix 21: The division factor between the average number of displaced persons and the average number of coca cultivation in the case of the South-Western Bloc for the period of 2000-2012

Year	Total number of displaced persons ^a	Coca cultivations (hectares) ^b	Annual average(DP/CC)
2000	36,217	13,995	2.58
2001	66,794	10,817	6.17
2002	58,977	17,362	3.39
2003	50,022	19,108	2.61
2004	28,279	15,465	1.82
2005	53,774	16,608	3.23
2006	68,930	17,991	3.83
2007	98,660	24,880	3.96
2008	96,040	27,123	3.54
2009	61,917	25,233	2.45
2010	51,678	22,524	2.29
2011	87,591	24,278	3.6
2012	89,531	15,540	5.76
Average (2000-2012)	65,262	19,302	
Average DP/Average CC	3.381143294		

Sources: a) Government of Colombia (2018).

b) UNODC and Government of Colombia (2003); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2005, June); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2009, June); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2015, July).

Appendix 22: The division factor between the average number of displaced persons and the average number of coca cultivation in the case of the Central Bloc for the period of 2000-2012

Year	Total number of displaced persons ^a	Coca cultivations (hectares) ^b	Annual average(DP/CC)
2000	25,716	N/A	N/A
2001	44,019	N/A	N/A
2002	72,914	N/A	N/A
2003	46,416	54	859.55
2004	42,468	358	118.62
2005	46,372	189	245.35
2006	48,015	461	104.15
2007	53,254	56	950.96
2008	47,300	187	252.94
2009	30,181	186	162.26
2010	20,062	46	436.13
2011	19,187	46	417.10
2012	20,987	16	1311.68
Average (2003-2012)	37,424	160	/
Average DP/Average CC	234,65		

Sources: a) Government of Colombia (2018).

b) UNODC and Government of Colombia (2003); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2005, June); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2009, June); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2015, July).


Appendix 23: The division factor between the average number of displaced persons and the average number of coca cultivation in the case of the North-Western Bloc for the period of 2000-2012

Year	Total number of displaced persons ^a	Coca cultivations (hectares) ^b	Annual average(DP/CC)
2000	194,038	2,914	66.58
2001	76,483	4,177	18.31
2002	181,382	3,415	53.11
2003	89,777	5,564	16.13
2004	88,684	7,027	12.62
2005	96,432	10,575	9.11
2006	82,254	8,189	10.04
2007	84,417	12,864	6.56
2008	87,593	10,600	8.26
2009	62,280	9,998	6.22
2010	55,929	12,397	4.51
2011	70,213	6,703	10.47
2012	61,148	7,200	8.49
Average (2000-2012)	94,664	7,817	
Average DP/Average CC	12.1		

Sources: a) Government of Colombia (2018).

b) UNODC and Government of Colombia (2003); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2005, June); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2009, June); UNODC and Government of Colombia (2015, July).

Appendix 244: Regional coca cultivation in Colombia (2004-2013)



Source: Colombian Government – National Monitoring system supported by UNODC

CURRICULUM VITAE

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Doğum Yeri : Timișoara

Mesleği : Öğrenci

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Yabancı Dil Puan ve Türü : CAE (64), TOEFL (100), TÖMER (72)

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Kitap Özeti. “Investigating Terrorism: Current Political, Legal and Psychological Issues by J. Pearse”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 19 / No. 2 / 2017, s. 254.

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