

ANTI-IMMIGRANT ATTITUDES AND THE DUAL COST OF LABOR  
PRECARITY FOR IMMIGRANTS: THE CASES OF GERMANY,  
FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

MEHMET FUAT KINA

İSTANBUL ŞEHİR ÜNİVERSİTESİ

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YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

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TEMMUZ 2018

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Sociology.

Examining Committee Members:

	DECISION	SIGNATURE
Assist. Prof. Zübeyir Nişancı (Thesis Advisor)	<u>Accepted</u>	
Assist. Prof. Alim Arlı	<u>Accepted</u>	
Assist. Prof. Alpkın Birelma	<u>Accepted</u>	

This is to confirm that this thesis complies with all the standards set by the Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences of İstanbul Şehir University.

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## ÖZ

### GÖÇMEN KARŞITI TUTUM VE EMEK PREKARİTESİNİN GÖÇMENLERE ÇİFTE MALİYETİ: ALMANYA, FRANSA VE İNGİLTERE VAKALARI

Kına, Mehmet Fuat

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Bu çalışma, Avrupa Değerler Araştırması'nın sonucu ve dördüncü dalgasından istifade ederek, bireysel değişkenlere bakarak, her bir ülke için ayrı ayrı kurulan ve en küçük kareler yöntemine (EKK) dayanan nicel modellerle, Almanya, İngiltere ve Fransa'da çalışan kesimin göçmen karşıtı tutumunu (bağımsız değişken) analiz etmektedir. Ampirik analize teorik bir derinlik kazandırmak amacıyla, göçmen karşıtı tutum, öznel iş güvencesizliği ve emek prekaritesi literatürlerinden faydalanır. Ayrıca, post-modern dönemde güvensizlik ve bir sınıf olarak "prekarya" meselelerini tartışır. Bulgular, göçmen karşıtlığını belirlemede öznel iş güvencesizliğinin bu üç ülke için de en önemli faktörlerden biri olduğunu göstermektedir. Sonuçlarla delillendirilen ana argüman, emek prekaritesinin göçmenler üzerinde ikili bir maliyet yarattığı fikrine dayanmaktadır. Bu onların hem daha güvencesiz çalışmalarından, hem de yerlilerin güvencesizliğinin sorumlusu olarak görülmelerinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Esnek emek piyasası, yerlilerin olumsuz tutumları yoluyla göçmenleri daha da güvensiz bir hale itmektedir. Çalışma ayrıca ülkelerin sahip oldukları emek piyasası politikaları, milliyetçilik biçimleri ve politik kültürlerindeki çeşitlilikten yola çıkarak modeller arasındaki farklılıkları açıklamaya dair bir tartışma yürütür.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** göçmen karşıtı tutum, çifte maliyet, güvensizlik, prekarite, emek, esneklik

## ABSTRACT

### ANTI-IMMIGRANT ATTITUDES AND THE DUAL COST OF LABOR PRECARITY FOR IMMIGRANTS: THE CASES OF GERMANY, FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

Kına, Mehmet Fuat

MA in Sociology

Thesis Advisor: Dr. Zübeyir Nişancı

This study analyzes anti-immigrant attitudes of workers (as the dependent variable) in Germany, France and the United Kingdom through separate OLS models with individual variables in each country and finalize a multi-linear analysis by using the fourth and last wave of European Value Survey. In order to construct a theoretical depth for the empirical analysis, it utilizes three separate literatures on anti-immigrant attitudes, subjective job insecurity and labor precarity. Discussions on post-modern insecurity and the precariat as a class are also included. Findings reveal that subjective job insecurity in all three countries is one of the most remarkable predictors of negative attitudes towards immigrants. The main argument, as proven by the results is that, there is a dual cost of labor precarity for immigrants since they are also scapegoated as the cause of insecurity, in addition to be suffering from their own precariousness. Flexible labor-markets put immigrants in a more unsecured position in the society by way of the attitudes of native workers. The research also points out differences of the countries on matters of political culture, nationhood and labor-market policy while explaining differences among models.

**Keywords:** anti-immigrant attitudes, dual cost, insecurity, precarity, labor, flexibility

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## 1. Introduction

Attitudes towards immigrants have remained on the agenda of academic world over the past several decades as the number of migrants has risen all around the world. The increasing mobility of people due to growing transnational networks, advances in transportation technology, economic and democratic interregional global inequalities, and instability caused by civil wars in the Middle East (especially in Iraq and Syria) have made immigrants more visible in Western societies. The rise of anti-immigrant attitudes is another side of the same coin. The number of anti-immigrant crimes in Germany, for example, doubled from 2011 to 2015 (Kempf, 2016). Scholars have discussed the rise of anti-immigrant violence mostly from the perspective of the rise of anti-immigrant right-wing political parties in Europe (Boomgaarden & Vliegthart, 2007; Rydgren, 2008; Mudde, 2013; Hockenos, 2013).

The reflection of anti-immigrant attitudes in (electoral) politics is also noticeable. Right-wing leader Donald Trump, in one of his public speeches before the 2014 elections, called on his voters to be careful about immigrants: "They are taking our jobs. You better be careful! You better be careful!"<sup>1</sup> Before the French election in 2017, Marine Le Pen promised that he would protect the French from immigrants: "Your neighbors, your village, your children's school, your life, your wages will be inevitably impacted by immigration. I, as president, will put back our borders in place the next day in office!"<sup>2</sup> The rise of the Alternative for Germany Party (AfD) and the success of Theresa May in the United Kingdom are other examples of similar trends in Europe.

Independently of the discussions on the rise of rightism, academics still have not adequately explored specific-structural effects of the culture of new capitalism (Sennett, 2007) on the attitudes of natives. Although efforts in the social sciences to understand the fundamental predictors of anti-immigrant attitudes (AIA) have a long history (Blumer, 1958; Neol & Pinkney, 1964; Blalock, 1967), there is not a dominant theory in the literature (Price and Oshagan, 1995; Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Rustenbach, 2010). Stable yet fragmented efforts of academics, and socio-economic

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C9kHJ6cRzdE> in 25.10.2017

<sup>2</sup> [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m6IHqxsE\\_pU](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m6IHqxsE_pU) in 3.11.2017

aspects of migration imply that the emphasis on migrant studies (and specifically for studies on AIA) does not only stem from recent rise of rightism in Europe. Migrant studies are also very important to understand the social solidarity, that is evidently under the pressure of labor-market.

As the rhetoric of right-wing political leaders suggests, anti-immigrant attitudes seem to have some form of an association with fear of job loss. Nevertheless, the individual fear of natives (in the US and in Europe) for the loss of their jobs has not been sociologically investigated before as the main trigger of negative attitudes and behaviors against immigrants despite unemployment rates at regional and national level have been mostly covered (Hjerm, 2009; Schneider, 2008). Unemployment rate is a structural variable which could not help scholars to see the variation of feelings of security individuals are having. It is possible to do research on the negative attitude of natives towards immigrants in many ways. However, such efforts would be misleading without building a sociological perspective focusing on the pressure of today's work life on individuals.

For every social group, work life experienced a transformation in 1980s (Harvey, 2005). The labor side of the transformation of "work" has a rooted relationship with immigrants. It is widely accepted that during the last 30-40 years, labor-market has started to be reformed with much more flexibility resulting in higher risks of unemployment for individual workers than the previous welfare period. This has been perceived as the counter attack of capitalist classes against vested rights of working classes in the welfare period (Sennett, 2007). For both migrant and native laborers, neoliberal labor-market flexibility means job insecurity. However, precarity, as a social and economic condition of the individuals who suffer from individual socio-economic instability, has systematically increased in the case of immigrants (Standing, 2011). Regarding the precarity as not just an economic deprivation, but more likely, the deprivation of security, even of stable social network or legal rights, the migration itself gives rise to precariousness (Goldring & Joly, 2014). Although in the last few decades labor researchers have engaged with the precarity of marginalized and mostly oppressed groups, immigrants are still not sufficiently analyzed in the academic discourse.

Scholars mostly take job security in a subjective manner when they conceptualize it as “perceived job security” and describe it as “a psychological state in which workers vary in their expectations of future job continuity within an organization” (Kraimer, Wayne, Liden, & Sparrowe, 2005, p. 390). It is often considered as the self-perceived probability of job loss (Mohr, 2000). In this research, I take job security as the particular responses of native working classes in the concept of workers’ individual fears towards the loss of jobs in the country (in other words, fears of job loss at a national level) and use the term “subjective job insecurity” (SJI) because of methodological concerns.

Concentrating on empirical and theoretical relationships between the widening SJI of native working classes and their attitudes toward immigrants, I will explore the determinants of Anti-Immigrant Attitudes (AIA) in Europe. What are the determinants of AIA? How are they affected by individual SJI? What might be the social roots behind the AIA of European native workers’ in today’s work life? How can one understand the social exclusion of immigrants? What is the cost of neoliberal flexibility for immigrants? Through an individual-level analysis (by Ordinary Least Square / OLS regression) for three countries (Germany, the United Kingdom and France), this paper aims to create a bridge between migrant studies and critical labor discussions. These are the first three countries at harboring the biggest numbers of immigrants in Europe. While analyzing AIA, in order to be able to deepen my analysis regarding differentiation of labor-market policies and difference of nationhood, I apply separate models for each country. On the one hand, focusing on individual level variables helps to analyze the relationship between individual precarity (related to the macro level transformations) and the attitudes towards immigrants. On the other hand, examining country specific regressions would help us to see and reveal specificities of each country and compare them. In this sense, both of the contextual and individual factors are methodologically considered. I used the last wave of the European Value Survey (2008-2010), by modeling a large-scale index for the dependent variable (AIA).

With the contribution of empirical evidence, this research investigates if and how the precariousness of neoliberal working conditions affect AIA among native workers.

The debate over the attitudes of native workers against deprived newcomers, who are either more precarious or blamed for the wealth loss, constitutes the main focus. They are precarious since being more vulnerable and they are “guilty” since taking native jobs. I suggest a new concept to understand the costs of atypical employment forms over immigrants: the “dual cost”. This dual cost arises from the combination of a direct cost (economic vulnerability due to their labor-market position) and an indirect (social) cost of labor flexibility, instituting a hostility for immigrants. More hostility (or more negative attitudes) also gives some clues on labor solidarity among natives and immigrants. This study assumes solidarity is more than the participation of workers in formal-manifested cooperation mechanisms like trade unions. It hence suggests taking labor solidarity as in the contexture of social solidarity, which is vital for the case of immigrants.

## **2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

The literature focusing on the core issues of this study can be explored in three separate but related areas: AIA, SJI, and the precarity of labor. While discussions on AIA concentrate on the main predictors of negative attitudes toward immigrants, SJI literature often tends to focus on the consequences of workers’ SJI. Labor precarity is mostly associated with the transformation of labor in today’s work life in the sense of growing risk, insecurity and flexibility, rather than decreasing solidarity of workers. In this chapter, I will elaborate on two theoretical debates by deepening in precarity discussions, contributed to by Richard Sennett and Guy Standing, related to the overall characteristics of flexible times; they are respectively “age of insecurity” and “precariat, as a class”. The theoretical significance of immigrants and anti-immigrant attitudes in the light of these fields, and the hypothesis and assumptions of this study are given at the end of this chapter.

### **A. Anti-immigrant Attitude (AIA)**

In migrant studies, there is a growing literature on the attitudes of natives (Anderson, 2010; Gorodzeisky, 2011; Hainmueller, Hiscox & Margalit, 2015; Berg, 2015; Nagayoshi & Hjerm, 2015). While some texts focus on social-psychological or political factors, others emphasize rational-choice-related economic factors such as job

scarcity, competition, and fear of possible welfare loss (Markaki & Longhi, 2012). The fundamental question I focus on in the AIA literature is what determines negative attitudes. The explanations of AIA are many. Rustenbach (2010) sorts eight prominent explanations (cultural marginality theory, human capital theory, political affiliation, societal integration, neighborhood safety, contact theory, foreign investment, and economic competition) and exemplifies all in one analysis with fitting specific predictors for each. She finds no significant correlation for cultural marginality and contact explanations, but strong effects for -from strongest to weakest- interpersonal trust (societal integration), educational level (human capital theory), left versus right political leaning (political affinity), income per capita (economic competition). Berg (2015) divides the theories in the previous literature into five categories: "personal social identity, self and group interest, cultural values and beliefs, social interaction and multilevel theories". He favors multilevel theories and intersectional approaches addressing class, race and gender because these theories are more convenient to understand the fluid boundaries of racial identities in ethnically more diverse societies of today.

Pettigrew (1998) reformulated the intergroup contact theory of Allport (1954) in a more dynamic pattern by taking into consideration both social norms and individual differences and including different stages of contact. The scope of the contact theory is historically not limited just in the case of immigrants. Rather it is first discussed through overall prejudice and perceived threat of individuals in a psychosocial manner. Some other scholars then criticized the lack of individual-level variables in the literature and applied the problematic of contact - whether it is a theory or not - to the issue of AIA at an individual level (McLaren, 2003; Quillian, 1995). It basically assumed that the level of racial prejudice is mostly determined by the degree of interaction between native and immigrant individuals or groups. Accordingly, natives, who come into contact with more immigrants in everyday life (e.g. at school or work, or as neighbors) tend to have more positive view of them. They found psychological conditions, like negative correlation between perceived threat and feeling of familiarity, as the most significant determinants, mainly in comparison to economic hardship and competition.

Political views are also linked to the formation of attitudes towards minority groups (Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). Cosmopolitanism, holding more liberal values, rejecting ethnocentrism, and being less nationalist are associated with pro-immigrant sentiments (Haubert & Fussell, 2006; O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006). Factors effecting pro-immigrant sentiments may not be effective for anti-immigrant sentiments (Wilkes, Guppy & Farris, 2008). Effective predictors of pro and anti-immigrant sentiments are not always the same. Wilkes, Guppy and Farris found that only "ideology" was effective for both.

Increasing educational levels among workers also consistently predict lower levels of prejudice and higher levels of openness toward immigrants regardless of workers' skill levels. Low skilled native workers are more likely to be inhospitable towards the immigrants because they view them as sources of competition (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). The positive effect of education appears to stem from predictable capacity for empathy of well-educated natives. Being more educated might foster more tolerance for "others" (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007). However, scholars who use labor-market competition arguments to explain anti-immigrant attitudes present another reason for the positive effect of education. They argue that immigrants are more likely to complement rather than replace natives with higher educational levels since immigrants mainly compete for low skilled jobs (Markaki & Longhi, 2012; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010).

Another assumption of competition theory was that every skill group would have a negative approach to the immigration of potential competitors of the same skill level. Yet, empirical analyses have shown that immigrants with high skill levels are perceived as more acceptable by all natives regardless of skill level (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010). High-skilled natives, however, are less opposed to immigration in comparison to the low skilled (O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006). Considering the significance of relative skill of natives to immigrants, which is positively correlated with openness to immigration, Mayda (2006) found empirical evidence for greater significance of economic factors in comparison to noneconomic ones.

Economic competition is usually calculated by GDP, unemployment rate, income, or skill or occupational level (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001; Hainmueller, Hiscox & Margalit,

2015). Some divide the unemployment rate effect of natives and immigrants with upper-level analyses and reach the conclusion that independently of the unemployment rate of natives at a regional level, more unemployed immigrants increase feelings of threat from immigrants (Markaki & Longhi, 2012). The fundamental argument of labor-market-competition theory is similar to one of the implications of this research: natives are looking for someone to blame in times of recession (Hempstead & Espenshade, 1996). Group-conflict theory also considers the competition between immigrants and natives for scarce material resources. In line with the implications of this theory, scholars have recently found that socio-economic insecurity significantly effects on perceived ethnic threat (Billiet, Meuleman & de Witte, 2014). They also found significant effect of job insecurity.

In a more recent study, Nagayoshi and Hjerm (2015) found promising evidence for the effects of labor-market policies across different welfare regimes as they endeavored to discuss the significant implications for anti-immigration to develop an institutional framework. The study highlights active labor-market policies - "which complement job losses through improving the employability of the unemployed" (2015, p. 2) - associates with lower levels of negative attitudes. In doing so, the authors also pointed out that institutions matter, especially for the most vulnerable.

Gender is often found to be statistically insignificant, albeit a weaker, predictor of AIA. When it is found to be significant, the AIA among women tends to be stronger than men (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Gorodzeisky, 2011). Age, like gender, mostly does not yield a significant impact, controlling for other factors. However, when age holds a significant effect, it is always negative. Older people have more negative attitudes towards newcomers (Hempstead & Espenshade, 1996).

Although a limited number of studies have found that both socio-economic factors and political preferences matter (Hempstead & Espenshade, 1996; Mayda, 2006; Wilkes, Guppy & Farris, 2008), there are some gaps in these studies. Literature is widely dominated by psychological arguments, which are often plagued by the lack of well-defined direction of causality. In the example of intergroup contact theory, people who are more positive towards immigrants might be more exposed to connections and interactions with immigrants. It is not hard to claim that daily

“interpersonal trust” is influenced by anti-immigrant attitudes, which might also be affected by entirely different social and economic determinants.

Even though a significant proportion of the previous research take economic aspects into account, socio-economical aspect of insecurity still needs to be analyzed in-depth since it is so open to feed and to be fed by individual fears on job insecurity for both immigrants and native workers. In addition, these studies do not pay due attention to the theoretical discussion of the structural downsizing of labor and they rarely discuss psychological aspects and economic conditions together. This thesis argues that their insufficient theoretical implications in sociological concepts and unconcern with overall labor flexibility are misleading. The social sphere is often reduced to the number of contact and size of groups (Quillian, 1995; Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010). Operationalization has always been needed, but not by sacrificing theory. “Sociological imagination”, so to speak, is essential to be able to visualize psychological and economic aspects together. With the contribution of consideration of “class”, for example, one can understand and combine economic “exploitation” and psychological “alienation” by the social theory. In this sense, sociology should be invited to connect psychological and economic discussions. The connection between attitudes against immigrants and labor discussions would bring better-directed points and arguments for this sociological lack.

## **B. Subjective Job Insecurity (SJI)**

One of the crucial points of negative approaches towards immigrants is the impacts of SJI. The rising negative consequences of non-standard employment all around the world brings job security in question in view of widening labor flexibility discussions (Valverde, Tregaskis & Brewster, 2000). Quinlan (2015), in his recent study, reviews studies of precariousness by focusing on the effect of non-standard employment on the health status' of workers. In this context, non-standard employment varies in the number of types of work such as temporary, subcontracted, part-time, fixed-term, on-call, casual, and home-based employment as well as dependent self-employment, and informal sector work which have become more common over the last couple of decades (Quinlan, 2015).

While the idea of flexibility was discussed in academic discourse mostly through the pursuit of “efficiency” during 1980s and early 1990s, in the last two to three decades scholars have started to focus on its negative impacts on workers’ psychological well-being (Ferrie, Shipley, Stansfeld & Marmot, 2002; Loi, Ngo, Zhang & Lau, 2011; Sverke, Hellgren & Näswall, 2002). Flexible labor results in withdrawal of prediction regarding the future and strategic planning for workers.


Flexibility was a functional step for the sake of efficiency, despite the stability loss. This means stability lost its popularity with rising attention on efficiency. One fundamental argument of scholars who support more flexible employment relations is related to the correlation between (inflexible) job security regulations and high unemployment (Lazear, 1990; Pagés & Heckmann, 2000). They claimed that if governments offered more job security provisions (like severance-pay requirements) that would increase hiring costs of permanent workers. Their efforts had an active role in increasing flexibility during 1980s. Additionally, technological advancements also forced firms to be more flexible so that they may compete against leading firms (Gustafsson, 1984).

Scholars in 1980s began to promote principles of flexibility extensively (Buzacott, 1982; Slack, 1983; Atkinson, 1984; Atkinson, 1987; Browne, Dubois, Rathmill, Sethi & Stecke, 1984; Gerwin, 1987). An early model of flexible firms described by Atkinson is shown in Figure 1. The focus of his description was on the division of employed workers in the firm with wide range of flexibilities at varying degrees.

However, in 2000s, even in mainstream economics, scholars have started to mention the necessity of abstaining from the dark side of flexibility with respect to damages on mental health status of workers in the sense of decreasing the feeling of security at work. Consequently, while some of them did not give up flexibility, they proposed flexible but secure employment, “flexicurity” (Wilthagen & Tros, 2004), meanwhile, others harshly judged flexibility (Standing, 1999).

SJI is sometimes used as a broader description of perceived job insecurity (PJI) and frequently as a synonym for it. Scholars have understood SJI and treated it as a worker’s fear of losing his/her job, and have not focused much on its broader (country

Figure 1: Structure of Flexible Firms



Source: Atkinson (1984)

or regional-level) implications. Alongside showing the negative impacts of SJI on the psychological well-being (Ashford, Lee & Bobko 1989; De Witte 1999) and physical health of workers (Crandall & Perrewe, 1995; Quick & Tetrick, 2003), convincing evidence has also been presented to show that job insecurity decreases work performance and productivity of firms (Sverke, Hellgren & Näswall, 2002; Cheng & Chan, 2008; Erlinghagen, 2007). A high level of SJI is strongly associated with, lower levels of job satisfaction and work engagement in addition to high levels of job burnout and psychosomatic complaints. Strong empirical evidence for long-term causality between SJI and health problems have been recently found by scholars (De Witte, Pienaar & De Cuype, 2016).

Not only SJI, but also negative outcomes of objective job insecurity (OJI), as the complement of SJI, or objective threat of unemployment, which is often measured by the form and duration of contracts and being informed about dismissal for an individual worker, are discussed in the literature (De Witte & Näswall, 2003). Although it is widely known today that there is a strong correlation between objective threat of unemployment and SJI (De Cuyper, De Witte, Vander Elst & Handaja, 2009), the former is not found to be as harmful as the latter (Mauno, Kinnunen, Mäkikangas & Nätti, 2005).

Previous studies emphasize the psychological and economic costs of SJI, and scholars have started to discuss the shadowy aspects of flexibility. On the one hand, they

explored crucial sociological topics such as; how people from lower social classes and immigrants work with higher levels of job insecurity and as a result have a higher risk of mental and physical health problems (Landsbergis, Grzywacz & LaMontagne, 2014; Quinlan & Sokas, 2009). On the other hand, there are theoretical gaps in the literature between flexible work life and related parameters in the society. How does the social relations associate with labor flexibility? What might be social costs of this? Without building a systemic understanding over more societal dimensions through social consequences, it is not possible to probe insecurity troubles, other than the health status of individuals, which are deeply rooted in every corner of the social sphere.

### **C. Labor Precarity and the Dismantling of Solidarity**

Since the 1980s, European countries have applied labor law reforms with more flexibility and fewer minimum standards (via deregulation), which has had large-scale negative effects on fundamental social rights and workers' protection (Clauwaert and Schomann, 2012). Kalleberg (2009) does not take flexibility as one-off phenomenon in the history and rather see the welfare period of 1940-1970 as an exceptional interregnum with relative certainty. Hence, "flexibility" is just one of the characteristics of long-term capitalism and largely dominant over "security". With great success of neoliberalism, flexibility has just defeated security one more time in the history and the pendulum was reversed to the normal.

For popular Marxist thinker Harvey (2005), the primary goal of neoliberal ideas and policies has been focusing on making the labor-markets more flexible in order to create a more profitable market system. He points to neo-conservatism which is vital for the sustainability of the inherently unstable and flexible neoliberalism, as an inevitable glue which bonds the neoliberal project and nationalism. For Harvey (2005, p.85):

“... the neoliberal state needs nationalism of a certain sort to survive. Forced to operate as a competitive agent in the world market and seeking to establish the best possible business climate, it mobilizes nationalism in its effort to succeed.”

The regime of informality/precarity is related to systematically changing employment relationships (Breman & Linden, 2014). However, broadly implying both a condition of precarious workers and a possibility for resistance, precarity refers to uncertainty, instability and insecurity, which are frequently invoked alongside the concepts like risk and vulnerability (Waite, 2009). The usage of the concept in reference to social devastation of precariousness has been increasing among academics, especially in the last decade.

Some scholars think of precarity as, an idiosyncratic consequence of employment relations in terms of the labor-market positions of precarious workers, where it stands for longer hours with lower wages, a bigger risk of unemployment, less job satisfaction, and limited upward mobility and union coverage. This understanding of precarity often relates to OJI and is more likely to highlight the economic costs of precarity (Noack & Vosko, 2011; Kalleberg, 2009). However, Neilson and Rossiter (2005) argue that precarity is more than the positions of precarious workers in the labor-market. They look at flexibility in the sense of societal malaise concerning “ontological insecurity” (Butler, 2006). According to Sennett (2007), workers have started to lose touch with their self-reality in flexible management and the results have been “the loss of narrative” and the dismantling of long-term planning. This social and psychosocial understanding of precarity aims to reveal the sociological and philosophical aspects of precarity, which are very relevant to economic conditions. I will use the terms “economic precarity” and “social precarity”<sup>3</sup> by utilizing these two interrelated approaches.

Likewise, Barbieri (2009) in his investigation of employment flexibility, reviewed various studies on the transformation of the European labor-market, and found that new entrants and women face the highest levels of risk for experiencing labor-market precarity and therefore social exclusion. However, in the last a few years, labor precarity has also been interpreted as an “action framework”, “discursive practice” and “political toolbox” (Schram, 2013; Casas-Cortés, 2014). Scholars started to think that precarity provides a new kind of labor solidarity. This is a hope on the capacity

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<sup>3</sup> Social precarity is associated with higher risks of social exclusion and discussed in view of people’s attitudes (Gallie & Paugam, 2003).

of this uniting character of today's oppressed classes to contribute universal mobilization. Some scholars have even attempted to redefine "class" anew in terms of precariousness (Standing, 2011, 2014). Although some street protests indicate limited level of mobilization among precarious workers even at the international level, it still seems like a tragic optimism to take precarity as resistance and solidarity provider. As Burawoy implied (2010), before celebrating internationalism, scholars need to develop a more realistic analysis of marketization and of the culture of new capitalism. While neoliberal flexibility imposes precarity, for Layton (2010), social traumas created by neoliberal subjectivity induce social perversion with the perversion of truth, followed by the disavowal and paradoxical denial of precarity through "the lie of self-sufficiency." This perspective works for exclusive solidarity confronting an expanding "other" by the ideology of competitive individualism (Neilson, 2015). Whereas for neoliberalism, the success or failure of individual workers depends on "entrepreneurial virtues or personal failings (such as not investing significantly enough in one's own human capital through education) rather than being attributed to any systemic property (such as the class exclusions usually attributed to capitalism)" (Harvey, 2005, p.65-6). Either for the individual or for the firm, the duality that appears between permanently and temporarily employed workers working together is also reflected in the downsizing of class-consciousness and resistance power (Pialoux & Beaud, 1999). For Wield (2014), responsibility for this downsizing belongs to the fissured (fragmented) workplace at the global and local levels. Some others have argued that automation, robotization, and computerization were the main factors behind the power loss of the working class. That is why, directly and indirectly, Castells (1997) and Sennett (2007) regarded technological transformations responsible for the decreasing ability of workers to act and reproduce themselves as a class.

Labor scholars strongly emphasize migrants in their discussion of precarity because of their structural vulnerability. They provide "hyperflexible labor" and are regarded as "available when required, undemanding when not" (Anderson, 2010, p. 300). Considering the inability of immigrants to reject forms of exploitation that impose just one labor-market option and their deprivation of the same legal status with

natives, it makes sense to name the hyper-precarious lives of migrants as “modern slavery” (Lewis, Dwyer, Hodkinson & Waite, 2015). The precariousness of immigrants is not limited to the work; it is also strongly related to their legal rights (Goldring & Joly, 2014). Accordingly, immigration detentions and deportations are other specific factors that directly increase migrant precarity (Martin, 2015). That is why precarity exceeds the limits of workplace and expands on all parts of social life.

Although analyses on precarious labor of immigrants are important, they could not present the whole picture of social exclusion of immigrants and their social precarity without analysis of attitudes of natives. Labor scholars have not sufficiently expanded the discussion to the social precarity. What about their position in the mindset of native workers? Might they be channeling their own fears onto immigrants, who are being scapegoated as the cause of insecurity (Robinson & Barrera, 2012)?

#### **E. Age of Insecurity**

Sennett (2007, 2011) attributes such a Weberian origin for the welfare period, in which each member of the bureaucratic pyramid has a specific position and a static but specialized task with great contribution of “rationalized time”. On the one hand, the iron cage of welfare regimes implies strong control over the life of workers. On the other, it ensures that the workers are able to imagine developing long-term strategies for their progression and to keep on progressing by experience.

However, when it comes to the flexible times, the centrality of experience at work dissolved and rising common value of potential ability gained more importance. Stability left its popularity to efficiency and came to evoke a static, old fashioned culture of work, since technological advancement (“the new page”) requires dynamic, fluid, present-oriented and task-oriented models rather than institutionalized, predefined, inefficient hierarchies. The structural change of work has been associated with three social deficits: lower loyalty to the firm, diminishing informal trust among workers, and the weakening of institutional knowledge (2007, p. 63). The idealized self of the new working man/woman carries no fear of failure, does not feel much attachment, and is highly motivated with possibilities. Nevertheless, practical consequences of this change call forth a new trouble: anxiety.

“Anxiety attaches to what might happen; dread attaches to what one knows will happen. Anxiety arises in ill-defined conditions, dread when pain or ill-fortune is well defined. Failure in the old pyramid was grounded in dread; failure in the new institution is shaped by anxiety.” (Sennett, 2007, p.53)

The pressure of new structure of work over anxious workers has increased social distances among them (p.56). Therefore, one significant domain of insecurity, in this framework, is the relationships. Not only in workplace, but also in their daily social spheres, the new structure affects people’s psychosocial well-being.

Beck (1992), Bauman (2013), Giddens (1990), and Castells (1997) also read modern society under the shadow of the risks surrounding everyday life and the rising insecurity. Fevre (2007) and Doogan (2001) criticize this understanding, by claiming that Sennett’s arguments lack empirical evidences to generalize. Fevre also argue that, the power of the sociological theories of Sennett and his colleagues - based on rising risks - comes from their courage to exaggerate or the capacity of nightmares in social theory, hence, in reality the whole picture of workers is better than in the theories of pessimistic sociologists. The sociology of Sennett has been also criticized for being overly nostalgic for the past (Strangleman, 2007) and for ignoring the potential new age for human freedoms (Joas, 2004). Some other researchers support his fundamental focus on the transformation of the “individual experiences” of workers, which is under the attack of new culture of capitalism as Sennett describes (Tweedie, 2013).

#### **F. New Class Definition: “Precariat”**

For Standing, who takes anxiety as one of four detrimental effects of flexibility on individual workers, alongside anger, alienation, and anomie (2011, p. 19), this process was not a simple deregulation, but a re-regulation of the labor-market to break the resistance mechanisms and to dismantle workers’ solidarity (1997), as Polanyi (1944) argued much earlier. Insecurity, in Standing’s perspective, institutionalizes market regulation. Another implication is that even though the fragmental structure of the new oppressed class brings in “idleness,” it is still “class” in the making, and the neoliberal trend would never make them happy since it is built on their sufferings.

Standing defines three subgroups in the precariat: “overqualified unemployed youth,” “undocumented migrant labor” and “workers detached from the proletariat.” He explicitly differentiates the protected, long-term employed, secure working class (proletariat) from the creative precariat of the globalized world. He argues that the precariat lacks seven labor securities which the proletariat historically enjoyed: labor-market security, employment security, the security of working conditions, the security to gain and employ new skills, income security and representation security (the right to a collective voice in the labor-market) (2011, p. 10).

The main contribution of Standing to the ongoing discussion was establishing precariousness as a class-making and uniting characteristic. This has sparked a debate on class, around the question of whether neoliberal flexibility induces continuity or disengagement for the working class. Some labor scholars, rejecting the “precariat” of Standing, argue that the traditional working class shares all weaknesses of the precariat (Wright, 2016; Breman, 2013). Considering the tiny range of common interests of the three separate groups counted in the precariat, critics think that Standing exaggerates and they question how the material interests of the precariat differ from those of the proletariat. Another problem with the concept of precariat is the negative character of its definition. Class should be pertinent to the economic role and interests of its members, which was formulated neutrally (or sometimes positively) in previous theories (Seymour, 2012). The last criticism of precariat which can be observed in the literature is about the geographical bias of the term. Munk (2013) criticizes its eurocentrism, claiming that Standing’s evidence is mainly from the “North.” He criticizes inadequate concentration on the experience of the “South”, where the labor force seems obviously more “precarious”. In addition to all definitional troubles, some takes precarity as a condition of the proletariat rather than a class (Fraser, 2013). There seems to be great doubt over its class-making capacity and the debate over the conceptualization continues.

### **G. Looking for Immigrants and Anti-Immigrants**

Migrant issue and anti-immigrant attitudes are the two sides of the same coin. Negative attitudes towards immigrants are one of the most obvious aspects of social

exclusion. In fact, the effect of social exclusion of immigrants spreads all over the social space, even over labor movements irrespective of class-consciousness of the native workers. The comparative study of Lamont (2009) on French and American workers matters considering one of its crucial findings: with respect to the latter, French native workers, who had greater political consciousness against the ruling class, were paradoxically more anti-immigrant and even racist to some extent. Standing (2011) criticizes the secure proletariat in the same manner.

This exclusion can be investigated in the critical viewpoint of the “new left” to the unequal struggle of the “old labor movements”. The new left scholars concentrate on how existing trade unions and socialist parties exclude women, racial/ethnic minorities and immigrants (Wood, 1995). Moreover, the “labor aristocracy” conceptualization of Lenin often has helped them in order to imply elite (white, aristocratic) labor (Hobsbawm, 2012). Another recently formulated criticism within the theoretical intersectionality debates focuses on the condition of people in the society who are located at the intersecting points of different oppressed identities, like being an immigrant and belonging to a lower social class (Walby, 2007). It seems that the exclusive “whiteness” (Fraser, 2000) in the firing line of the new left remains, and is still getting discussed in terms of today’s organization of work, working conditions, employment relations, and their social extensions. The hostility of individual native workers towards immigrants appears as the most crucial social extension of employment relations for immigrants.

In this sense, this paper offers to prioritize individual-level analysis and sociological perspective to understand the relationship between SJI and AIA. While AIA scholars lack sociological imagination in their theories, SJI scholars empirically do not attribute sufficient importance to social hazards (increasing hostility) as consequences of high levels of insecurity. On the one hand, AIA scholars have not extensively utilized theories of subjective responses against labor-market transformations. On the other hand, though the concept of SJI is somewhat broader than PJI in the literature, it has been always applied within the same empirical context. I re-conceptualize it in the sense of the subjective responses of workers against the overall precarization at higher levels. It is still the individual fear towards the loss of jobs but on a countrywide

rather than a personal basis. In order to capture contextual differentiations, and not to sacrifice individual level for the details, my study contains separate models for Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, I propose to analyze AIA at the individual level because of one of my main arguments: the bridge between AIA and SJI can better be built on the reflection of systemic matters on the attitudes. In addition to enhancing empirically wide range of individual determinants for anti-immigrant attitudes, comparing major factors related to different theories, this study theoretically binds AIA and SJI and constructs a link between increasing labor precarity and decreasing inner solidarity among today's working-classes<sup>4</sup>, especially for the most suffering ones.

Accordingly, I developed two theoretical arguments. Firstly, in addition to economic (and direct) cost of neoliberal flexibility over immigrants, native facet of social pressure produced by insecurity of non-standard employment relations is another (and indirect) cost for these "blameworthy" agents. It is namely the "dual cost." More explicitly, precarity negatively affects immigrants in two forms. The first one comes from their position at the margin of the labor-market like women, youth and ethnic minorities and derived from economic precarity. The second one is that being the supposed cause of all worsening conditions in labor-market (job scarcity, low wages, long work hours etc.), which, triggered by neoliberal project, pushes AIA of native workers and feeds the social precarity.

My second argument is that the connection between AIA and SJI presents evidence of the downsizing labor solidarity and class-consciousness in the "age of insecurity." The flexible labor-market keeps workers continuously insecure which leads to less solidarity among native and immigrant labor.

## **H. Assumptions and Hypothesis**


The interrelations between the three bodies of the literature in the theoretical framework of my analysis are in Figure 2, which also specifies where my empirical findings are located. In this framework, flexibility stands for economic precarity in

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<sup>4</sup> Plural form of class is preferred while attributing subjects in order to avoid tautologies, regarding the diversity of working classes in the new age of capitalism (Wright, 1985).

connection to the theoretical literature on labor precarity (C) and SJI (B), and dismantling solidarity does the same for social precarity between labor (C) and AIA (A). AIA and SJI respectively represent the social precarity of immigrants and the economic precarity of natives. Hence, I investigate the social precarity of immigrants through the economic precarity of native workers. Social precarity of immigrant workers is assumed as a reflection of economic precarity of native workers. The analysis is expected to reveal that economically insecure native labor, in social sphere, is becoming the reason of a social cost over immigrants.

Figure 2: Theoretical Framework



While the focus is on the SJI of native workers for the empirical analysis which establishes the connection between (A) and (B) literatures, my theoretical focus is on understanding one of the crucial elements of the social precarity of today's working classes.<sup>5</sup>

In the light of all these theoretical implications, I expect to find SJI as the most effective factor on the attitudes of natives (H1). With its symbolic attribution to the "old left" and "old labor movements," belonging to a trade union is expected to be insignificant (H2) since unions no longer provide social solidarity. OJI is expected to be insignificant since it is dominated by the feelings of individuals on SJI (H3). Interpersonal trust as a proxy of social integration theory (which is widely issued in

<sup>5</sup>This does not mean that social and economic precarity are reduced respectively to dismantling solidarity and flexibility. Rather, this differentiation is done to imply the foci and the limitations in this study. One may think social precarity of flexibility as "ontological insecurity" (Neilson & Rossiter, 2005) and economic precarity of dismantling solidarity as "falling wage shares" (Bengtsson & Ryner, 2015).

the literature) is expected to be weakly significant (H4) since its effect is also thought to be explained by SJI. Education is expected to decrease AIA (H5).

The variables of “concern about Europeans” and leftism (as a political view) are expected to positively affect attitudes towards immigrants (H6, H7) such that those who support the interests of all Europeans or have left-wing disposition is politically opposed to nationalist approaches, and vice versa. Therefore, they are expected to have lower levels of AIA. Most right-wing political parties in European countries, for instance, support leaving the European Union. Openness to other Europeans seems as strongly related to positive attitudes towards immigrants.

### **3. Methods**

The main schema of the analysis is based on three hierarchical models for each one of the three countries (Germany, the United Kingdom, and France) that vary historically and have different origins for immigrants. I build a hierarchical multi-linear analysis with individual variables in order to comment on the overall explanatory powers of three separate groups of variables (which are control, attitude and job variables). One of the reasons I chose these countries is to broaden my discussion about if, how, and why the relationship between my major predictors and AIA varies for different migrant destinations in Europe. Comparing R-square changes by models and their significance, I will follow the question of which one of the attitude and the job variables have greater ability to predict the dependent variable: AIA index. The main independent variable of this research is SJI. In order to acknowledge the most commonly applied predictors of negative attitudes from a wider perspective and to compare their explanatory powers with respect to SJI, eighteen independent variables are included.

#### **A. Data**

In this research, I use the European Value Survey (2008-2010). Tilburg University and GESIS (Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) have carried out the survey in four waves in the years 1981, 1990, 1999, and 2008. The dataset of this research is the last wave of the survey. For most of the countries, the data was collected in 2008, but

for a few in 2009 and 2010. It was in 2008 for France, in 2008/2009 for Germany and in 2009/2010 for the United Kingdom. The publishers described the survey's area of interest as the "moral, religious, societal, political, work, and family values of Europeans" - I covered all of these fields while selecting the independent variables in the study. There are various characteristics of respondents from 47 countries in the dataset. The sample size is 66,281, with 477 variables extracted from interviews, which consisted of about 250 questions.

## **B. Analytical Approach**

My empirical model uses a multivariate analysis based on the OLS regression. Since the index (AIA) is a normally distributed numeric variable, I chose to apply a linear model. The empirical model is as follows:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_i + z_i + e_i$$

*y*: AIA

*x*: SJI

*z*: All other control variables

*e*: Error term

In order to exclude immigrant people's attitudes against immigrants from my calculations, I carried out the analysis only for individuals who were born in the country where the data was collected. Generations of immigrants after the first one, are treated as native workers because they are also expected to have a fear about the loss of jobs in that country that might be caused by new comers. I preferred a recoded version of the age variable, for which the lowest category starts from 15, since the focus of my analysis is "working" classes. In addition, the study disregards unemployed people due to methodological limitations. Variables like income or job-related occupational status are naturally unavailable for the unemployed, since these variables are proper only for employed respondents. After these exclusions, the sample sizes came down to 583 for Germany, 224 for the United Kingdom, and 639, for France.

I recoded the values of all variables from smallest to largest and coded categorical ones as dummies. I apply three hierarchical models for each country. In the first

model, only socio-economic factors and general descriptive conditions are included. They are gender, age, income, education, marital status, number of children, health status, size of town and life satisfaction. In the second model, I use four more variables to cover the effect of some critical attitudes: the importance of God for people, political leaning, concern about Europeans and interpersonal trust. Finally, in the third model, I added up outstanding variables related to the job: occupational status, job satisfaction, belonging to a trade union, experience of unemployment, and SJI as the major independent variable.

### **C. Variables**

#### *i. Dependent Variable: Anti-Immigrant Attitude Index*

What I mean by AIA is the combination of some specific negative approaches to immigrants. The components of the dependent variable are formed by twelve questions. As descriptions of the component variables imply, native people's AIA in this study do not have to consist of "hate" or unmediated "violent behavior". Rather, I investigate "the negative attitude", which smoothly promotes to dislike immigrants. Short descriptions of the component variables are as follows:

- 1- Immigrants take away jobs from [nationality].
- 2- Immigrants undermine country's cultural life.
- 3- Immigrants increase crime problems.
- 4- Immigrants are a strain on welfare system.
- 5- Immigrants will become a threat to society.
- 6- Immigrants living in your country: feels like a stranger.
- 7- Immigrants living in your country: there are too many.
- 8- Important: to have been born in [country].
- 9- Important: to respect [country nationality] political institutions and laws.
- 10- Important: to have [country nationality] ancestry.
- 11- Important: to be able to speak [country language].
- 12- Important: to have lived in [country] for a long time.

The range of first five variables were from 1 to 10 in the dataset with decreasing affirmation, and of the sixth and seventh were from 1 to 5, from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The range of other five variables were from 1 to 4, from very important to not important at all. Each one of these twelve variables is standardized

before the combination. The Cronbach Alfa value is reliable to combine them all in one index. The number is 0.83. I summed standardized variables, initialized the range with the minimum point of zero, and divided the sum of the component variables by twelve. The resulting range of the index was 6.27 (from 0 to 6.27) for the three countries.

*ii. Independent Variable: Subjective Job Insecurity*

I re-conceptualized subjective job insecurity (SJI) as country-level fear of individuals towards the loss of jobs. Rather than PJI, conceptually the umbrella of SJI is more likely to be interpretable in the sense of working environment from broader perspective. Respondents were asked about their fear towards the loss of jobs in their country as part of a broader set of questions related to the European Union. In the questionnaire, it is like this:

*Some people may have fears about the building of the European Union. I am going to read a number of things which people say they are afraid of. For each tell me if you - personally - are currently afraid of:*

*The loss of jobs in [COUNTRY]*

SJI is mostly discussed in the form of perceived threat of unemployment as I described above in the literature chapter. However, this research treats it as individual fear towards the loss of jobs at a country level. A worker might have a secure job with no fear of loss of her/his current job, but still have a feeling of insecurity on her/his job maintenance in the long-run due to the possibility of countrywide crises. Here the wider level of the question helps us to cover deeper feelings of workers about loss of job, in a country-based context. What is more, since my focus is country-based contexts among the three European countries in this research, the fears of respondents about the building of the European Union are assumed as not violating the main argumentation. Even though the fear is about the European Union, it derives from the individual fear for loss of jobs in the country. Thus, while the fear is personal, the focus of the fear is national and the conveyer of the focus of the fear is Europeans.

Workers with more fear of losing their jobs on a country basis have greater SJI. Its range is from 1 to 10, the lowest to the highest.

### iii. *Control Variables*

The categorical variables in the analysis are gender, marital status, belonging to trade unions, trust and having experienced unemployment. Being male, being married (with respect to the categories of registered partnership, widowed, divorced, separated and never married or never registered partnership), belonging to a union, having experienced unemployment, and having a positive disposition to trust others are coded as “1”, and the other values of the variables are left as control groups (“0”). Positive / negative dispositions to trust are represented in the dataset with the expressions of “most people can be trusted” or “you can’t be too careful in dealing with people”. For the experience of unemployment, respondents are asked whether they have experienced unemployment of more than three months in the last five years. The variable is a proxy for OJI.

The recoded age variable has six groups, as commonly used in previous literature (15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 65+). From rural to urban, with respect to the population, size of town where the interview was conducted is also recoded as one of eight separate categories (under 2,000, 2,000 – 5,000, 5,000 – 10,000, 10,000 – 20,000, 20,000 – 50,000, 50,000 – 100,000, 100,000 – 500,000, and 500,000 and more). Monthly household income has been divided into twelve hierarchical categories and occupational status, nine. The lowest category of occupational status is taken as the “routine workers” and the highest one is “larger employers”. The variable for education is formed as the highest educational level respondent attained within eight categories from “inadequately completed elementary school” to “university graduation with high degree.” Health status description and concern about Europeans (through the question of: “Do you feel concerned about the living conditions of Europeans?”) are represented in the scale from 1 to 5. The values of the health status variable is increasing as unhealthiness, from “very good” to “very poor”. Life satisfaction, job satisfaction, the importance of God or the religiosity (increasingly) of the respondents, political leaning (from “left” to “right”) are on a scale from 1 to 10. The number of children is included just as it is.

## 4. Results

In this chapter, I will present the migrant statistics and descriptive, bivariate, and multivariate results of my empirical analyses for three countries.

Germany, the United Kingdom and France are typical immigrant destinations in Western Europe. The migrant share of their total population has been increasing since the 1990s for the three countries, and the number of immigrants since the 1980s. In 2010, 14.4 percent of the German, 12.1 percent of the British, and 11.4 percent of the French populations were comprised of immigrants (Table 1). Immigrants in Germany come mostly from Eastern European countries (like Romania and Poland), Turkey, Russia, and Kazakhstan. For the United Kingdom and France, immigrants come from geographically diverse range of places though many hail from their historical colonies. Since the colonies of the United Kingdom were distributed more widely over different continents, from sub-Saharan Africa to South Asia, one observe a more diverse range of immigrants than one does in France, where, Algeria and Morocco are two biggest sources of immigration.<sup>6</sup> The three countries are actually not very different in terms of immigration at first glance. However, previous studies and my bivariate analysis both show crucial differences.

*Table 1: Descriptive Data*

	AIA	SJI	Political View	Concern about Europeans	GDP per Capita	Unemployment Rate %	Migrant Share % in 2010
<b>Germany</b>	5.18	7.89	4.81	3.15	31,750	7,4 (2008)	14,4
<b>France</b>	4.84	7.04	4.98	2.46	31,000	7,4 (2008)	11,4
<b>The United Kingdom</b>	5.33	8.09	5.33	2.2	27,600	7,6 (2009)	12,1

AIA, SJI, political view, and concern about Europeans are variables in EVS (2008). I listed their means for each country in the table. I applied the T-test for each couple of countries for each variable. Except for SJI difference in Germany and the UK and political view difference in Germany and France, which are weakly significant, differences are strongly significant (with p-value less than 0.001). I extracted the GDP and unemployment rate of the three countries from Eurostat, and migrant share from MPI. For the UK, since the EVS was conducted in 2009, I used the unemployment rate and GDP from 2009. For the migrant share, I used data from 2010, the closest year for which information was available.

When it comes to the AIA of native working classes, the United Kingdom, the second most preferred destination of the three countries, rises to first place with the highest average of AIA. Germany follows the United Kingdom, and France comes third with

<sup>6</sup>Migration Policy Institute (MPI): <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/> at 15.11.2017.

the least negative attitudes. The order of the SJI means of the countries is similar again, with the United Kingdom with the highest to France with the lowest. The close means of both SJI and AIA to their maximum levels demonstrate once again the importance of these two phenomena separately. For each country, negative attitudes and subjective job insecurities are substantial facts.

Moreover, the GDP and unemployment rates of the countries seem to be close to one another. The means of political view and concern about Europeans fall into the same order, but in opposite directions. Considering that the value of the political view variable is increasing from “left” to “right”, leftist political views and concern about Europeans appear to be parallel for country ranks. Although the means of political view do not differentiate greatly by country, the difference between the highest (Germany) and the lowest (the United Kingdom) means of concern about Europeans seems remarkable for its small range.

I have listed the descriptive statistics of all variables in Table 2. Another noteworthy difference between countries, in addition to concern about Europeans is about the trust variable. France has the smallest proportion for trust. In France, almost three-fourths of respondents see people as not very trustable, while this proportion in Germany and the United Kingdom was similar at around three-fifths. As well as the difference between countries, the overall high level of mistrust is also worth mentioning. Like SJI, in France, the proportion of people experiencing unemployment (OJI) is also lower than it is in Germany and the United Kingdom, for which OJI levels are very close to each other. French native workers seem to suffer less from job insecurity and to have less negative attitudes towards newcomers. The ratio of trade union membership for native workers in the three countries is similar, at about 6 percent. The descriptive results show that the number of workers in these countries, who experience unemployment for more than three months (OJI) is approximately three times that of people belonging to a trade union. The biggest variance among the variables in the three countries belongs to religiosity. This means that religiosity is the variable that varies the most in each country. The second biggest variance was, not surprisingly, occupational status.

I added separate correlation tables (Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5) for the three countries in order to broaden on bivariate results. I present correlation results by highlighting significant ones. Strength of a correlation (strong or weak) stands for the interval of the p-value. Subjective and objective job insecurities, both significantly correlate with lower levels of income and lower levels of occupational status in all three countries. The situation of people who work for lower wages is more precarious, like that of workers who are assigned an inferior job status. I found SJI and OJI to be gender indifferent. However, age is negatively correlated with OJI, but not significantly correlated with SJI except for in Germany. For Germany, both OJI and SJI have negative correlations with age. This means that younger natives have less objective security than older ones in all three countries and they also have more fear of losing jobs in Germany.

Furthermore, education is another variable negatively correlated with SJI in the three countries. Higher educational levels correspond to a lower SJI, not surprisingly. Significant correlation also exists for OJI, but in opposite directions for countries. In Germany and the United Kingdom, OJI is negatively correlated with education, just like SJI, but for France the correlation is positive, unexpectedly. As I described before, the SJI of respondents is defined in sense of their fears about European Union. This explains its strong negative correlation in the three countries with concern about Europeans. More fear about European Union (via loss of jobs in that country) is associated with less concern about Europeans. However, it is very beyond the risky level which sometimes brings multi-collinearity trouble. The correlation between having concern about Europeans and OJI is only significant in Germany and less OJI is associated with higher concern.

Table 2: Descriptive Results

	Germany							France							The United Kingdom						
	N	Range	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Var.	N	Range	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Var.	N	Range	Min.	Max.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Var.
age	1916	5	1	6	3.97	1.569	2.462	1383	5	1	6	3.9	1.641	2.692	1388	5	1	6	4.13	1.651	2.724
income	1702	10	1	11	6.23	1.806	3.262	1256	9	3	12	6.83	1.955	3.821	962	11	1	12	6.57	2.428	5.895
education	1929	6	2	8	5.32	1.354	1.833	1381	7	1	8	5.02	2.13	4.538	1330	7	1	8	4.31	1.885	3.553
number of children	1917	11	0	11	1.4	1.221	1.49	1383	12	0	12	1.74	1.516	2.299	1396	8	0	8	1.75	1.394	1.945
health status	1929	4	1	5	3.69	0.928	0.861	1382	4	1	5	3.87	0.925	0.855	1399	4	1	5	3.9	1.012	1.025
size of town	1932	4	1	5	2.76	1.303	1.697	1383	4	1	5	2.7	1.569	2.463	869	4	1	5	2.82	1.196	1.432
life satisfaction	1928	9	1	10	6.77	2.134	4.554	1382	9	1	10	7.07	2.076	4.311	1396	9	1	10	7.58	2.007	4.026
reigiosity	1873	9	1	10	3.98	3.178	10.1	1377	9	1	10	4.15	3.016	9.096	1376	9	1	10	4.68	3.196	10.22
political view	1681	9	1	10	4.81	1.719	2.957	1279	9	1	10	4.98	2.28	5.199	1119	9	1	10	5.33	1.814	3.291
concern about Europeans	1889	4	1	5	3.15	0.884	0.781	1379	4	1	5	2.46	1.02	1.041	1359	4	1	5	2.2	1.015	1.03
occupational status	1701	8	1	9	4.65	2.847	8.104	1317	8	1	9	5.37	2.871	8.24	1309	8	1	9	5.28	3.004	9.025
job satisfaction	983	9	1	10	7.56	1.727	2.983	741	9	1	10	7.3	1.88	3.533	630	9	1	10	7.51	2.023	4.091
subjective job insecurity	1900	9	1	10	7.89	2.456	6.033	1377	9	1	10	7.04	2.784	7.751	1356	9	1	10	8.09	2.571	6.612
AIA	1636	3.03	3.24	6.27	5.185	0.5691	0.324	1337	3.06	3.21	6.27	4.844	0.67074	0.45	1237	3.34	2.92	6.27	5.331	0.59764	0.357
Valid N (listwise)	583							639						224							

	Germany		France		The United Kingdom	
	1	0	1	0	1	0
gender (male)	52.6	47.4	45.4	54.6	42.2	57.8
marital status (married)	49.9	50.1	44.5	55.5	44.5	55.5
trust	38.5	61.5	26.3	73.7	40.6	59.4
belonging to a trade union	6.4	93.6	5.7	94.3	6.9	93.1
objective job insecurity (experience of unemployment)	22.5	77.5	15	85	21.9	78.1

All values in the lower section of the table are in terms of percentage.

Table 3: Correlations for Germany

Correlations for Germany																		
	gender	age	inc.	educ.	MS	NoC	HS	SoT	LS	relig.	PV	CE	trust	OS	BTU	JS	OJI	SJI
<b>age</b>	-0.007																	
<b>inc.</b>	0.072**	-0.048*																
<b>educ.</b>	0.147***	0.072**	0.316***															
<b>MS</b>	0.057*	0.238***	0.422***	0.127***														
<b>NoC</b>	-0.113***	0.405***	0.081***	0.043	0.31***													
<b>HS</b>	0.048*	-0.424***	0.268***	0.055*	0.042	-0.157***												
<b>SoT</b>	-0.032	-0.062**	0.023	0.106***	-0.135***	-0.098***	0.007											
<b>LS</b>	-0.009	-0.022	0.381***	0.187***	0.189***	0.031	0.39***	0.014										
<b>relig.</b>	-0.141***	0.138***	0.148***	-0.055*	0.101***	0.135***	0.003	-0.088***	0.244***									
<b>PV</b>	0.111***	-0.025	0.077**	-0.101***	0.011	-0.008	0.042	-0.095***	0.027	0.21***								
<b>CE</b>	-0.045*	0.08***	0.043	0.122***	0.037	0.018	0.08***	0.046*	0.162***	0.14***	-0.091***							
<b>trust</b>	-0.007	-0.013	0.14***	0.123***	0.048*	-0.005	0.149***	-0.053*	0.262***	0.153***	-0.038	0.177***						
<b>OS</b>	-0.05*	0.041	0.346***	0.564***	0.105***	0.032	0.104***	0.116***	0.219***	0.082***	-0.045	0.117***	0.16***					
<b>BTU</b>	0.096***	0.014	0.066**	0.054*	0.049*	0.023	-0.014	0.002	0.042	-0.04	0.001	-0.019	-0.008	0.033				
<b>JS</b>	0.016	0.04	0.22***	0.179***	0.087**	0.028	0.269***	-0.017	0.516***	0.152***	-0.004	0.12***	0.145***	0.159***	-0.037			
<b>OJI</b>	0.015	-0.162***	-0.331***	-0.175***	-0.129***	-0.034	-0.114***	-0.032	-0.368***	-0.222***	-0.061*	-0.148***	-0.17***	-0.241***	-0.069**	-0.14***		
<b>SJI</b>	-0.025	-0.073**	-0.104***	-0.163***	0.002	-0.018	0.015	-0.025	-0.113***	0.021	0.073**	-0.09***	-0.139***	-0.167***	-0.033	-0.094**	0.133***	
<b>AIA</b>	0.023	0.1***	-0.115***	-0.251***	-0.032	-0.026	-0.038	-0.096***	-0.161***	0.031	0.288***	-0.147***	-0.176***	-0.275***	-0.035	-0.078*	0.059*	0.367***

\*P value ≤ 0.05, \*\*P value ≤ 0.01, \*\*\*P value ≤ 0.001.

In order to fit the table onto the page, I shortened variables as: income (inc.), education (educ.), marital status (MS), number of children (NoC), health status (HS), size of town (SoT), life satisfaction (LS), religiosity (relig.), political view (PV), concern about Europeans (CE), occupational status (OS), belonging to unions (BTU), and job satisfaction (JS).

Table 4: Correlations for France

Correlations for France																		
	gender	age	inc.	educ.	MS	NoC	HS	SoT	LS	relig.	PV	CE	trust	OS	BTU	JS	OJI	SJI
<b>age</b>	-0,043																	
<b>inc.</b>	0.133***	-0.055*																
<b>educ.</b>	0,027	-0.41***	0.4***															
<b>MS</b>	0.064*	0.243***	0.334***	-0,016														
<b>NoC</b>	-0.107***	0.471***	-0,003	-0.255***	0.344***													
<b>HS</b>	0,041	-0.324***	0.229***	0.261***	0.053*	-0.15***												
<b>SoT</b>	-0,017	-0.096***	0.093***	0.185***	-0.163***	-0.148***	-0,015											
<b>LS</b>	0,02	-0.071**	0.19***	0.073**	0.141***	-0,04	0.32***	-0,025										
<b>relig.</b>	-0,153	0.234***	-0.1***	-0.137***	0,05	0.172***	-0.126***	0,045	0,011									
<b>PV</b>	0,027	0.111***	0.073*	-0,042	0.066*	0.058*	0,014	-0.071*	0,01	0.212***								
<b>CE</b>	0,02	0.058*	0.107***	0.173***	0,008	-0.052	0,047	0.132***	0.063*	0.064*	-0.09***							
<b>trust</b>	-0,029	0,025	0.147***	0.203***	0,028	0,021	0.102***	0.107***	0.089***	-0,041	-0.112***	0.207***						
<b>OS</b>	0,02	0.07*	0.419***	0.481***	0.126***	-0,04	0.11***	0.191***	0.084**	0,007	0,051	0.22***	0.241***					
<b>BTU</b>	0,048	0,024	0.12***	0.068*	0,034	-0,027	-0,012	0.068*	0,042	-0.056*	-0.156***	0,046	0.125***	0.075**				
<b>JS</b>	-0,002	0.025	0.142***	-0,011	0.11**	0,05	0.116**	-0.073*	0.374***	0,043	0.124***	-0,027	-0,007	0.087*	-0.093*			
<b>OJI</b>	-0,061	-0.243***	-0.156***	0.092***	-0.127***	-0.146***	0,025	0.075**	-0.085**	-0,021	-0.08**	0,001	-0.057*	-0.085**	-0.068*	-0,063		
<b>SJI</b>	-0,069	-0,006	-0.22***	-0.246***	-0,031	0,038	-0.097***	-0.092***	-0.055*	0,023	-0,004	-0.186***	-0.193***	-0.292***	-0.063*	-0,014	0,049	
<b>AIA</b>	0,01	0.212***	-0.214***	-0.375***	0,043	0.138***	-0.182***	-0.161***	-0.112***	0.122***	0.367***	-0.237***	-0.363***	-0.274***	-0.169***	0,023	-0.056*	0.335***

\*P value ≤ 0.05, \*\*P value ≤ 0.01, \*\*\*P value ≤ 0.001.

In order to fit the table onto the page, I shortened variables as: income (inc.), education (educ.), marital status (MS), number of children (NoC), health status (HS), size of town (SoT), life satisfaction (LS), religiosity (relig.), political view (PV), concern about Europeans (CE), occupational status (OS), belonging to unions (BTU), and job satisfaction (JS).

Table 5: Correlations for the United Kingdom

Correlations for the United Kingdom																		
	gender	age	inc.	educ.	MS	NoC	HS	SoT	LS	relig.	PV	CE	trust	OS	BTU	JS	OJI	SJI
<b>age</b>	0.037																	
<b>inc.</b>	0.101**	-0.147***																
<b>educ.</b>	0.059*	-0.173***	0.452***															
<b>MS</b>	0.076**	0.148***	0.458***	0.107***														
<b>NoC</b>	-0.081**	0.314***	0.006	-0.124***	0.221***													
<b>HS</b>	-0.01	-0.28***	0.292***	0.184***	0.095***	-0.104***												
<b>SoT</b>	-0.01	-0.087*	-0.062	0.033	-0.153***	-0.026	-0.044											
<b>LS</b>	-0.064*	0.071**	0.179***	0.068*	0.145***	0.068*	0.288***	-0.08*										
<b>relig.</b>	-0.139***	0.315***	-0.112***	-0.015	0.041	0.145***	-0.117***	-0.016	0.062*									
<b>PV</b>	-0.004	0.105***	0.04	-0.084**	0.094**	0.075*	0.063*	-0.073*	0.082**	0.109***								
<b>CE</b>	0	0.02	-0.018	0.093***	0.017	-0.019	0.042	-0.051	0.045	0.148***	-0.018							
<b>trust</b>	0.037	0.031	0.18***	0.184***	0.095***	0.004	0.086***	-0.033	0.12***	0.001	-0.063*	0.065*						
<b>OS</b>	-0.014	0.045	0.442***	0.501***	0.136***	-0.034	0.121***	-0.008	0.078**	0.054	0.065*	0.092***	0.138***					
<b>BTU</b>	0.077**	-0.016	0.17***	0.12***	0.036	-0.04	0.055*	0.065	0.029	-0.025	-0.072*	0.018	0.063*	0.039				
<b>JS</b>	-0.075	0.023	0.124**	0.112**	0.029	0.006	0.224***	-0.032	0.398***	0.144***	-0.004	0.06	0.046	0.185***	0.001			
<b>OJI</b>	-0.032	-0.262***	-0.321***	-0.105***	-0.189***	-0.049	-0.153***	0.089**	-0.222***	-0.085**	-0.04	-0.011	-0.064*	-0.18***	-0.097***	-0.084*		
<b>SJI</b>	-0.038	0.022	-0.153***	-0.261***	-0.046	0.026	-0.117***	-0.045	-0.105***	0.022	0.176***	-0.106***	-0.126***	-0.136***	-0.094***	-0.097*	0.022	
<b>AIA</b>	0.022	0.189***	-0.217***	-0.385***	-0.02	0.115***	-0.12***	-0.053	-0.103***	0.054	0.231***	-0.201***	-0.226***	-0.22***	-0.118***	-0.057	-0.001	0.475***

\*P value ≤ 0.05, \*\*P value ≤ 0.01, \*\*\*P value ≤ 0.001.

In order to fit the table onto the page, I shortened variables as: income (inc.), education (educ.), marital status (MS), number of children (NoC), health status (HS), size of town (SoT), life satisfaction (LS), religiosity (relig.), political view (PV), concern about Europeans (CE), occupational status (OS), belonging to unions (BTU), and job satisfaction (JS).

Moreover, the trust variable in the three countries is similar and negatively correlated with SJI, within the highest significance levels. More trust of others is related to less SJI. Again, except for Germany, OJI and trust correlation is insignificant. Experiencing unemployment is negatively associated with trust in Germany. Therefore, one might argue that precarity in people's jobs creates social mistrust. What is more, OJI and SJI strongly correlate to each other only for Germany. The correlations in the United Kingdom and France are insignificant. On the other hand, occupational status and education variables powerfully correlate with OJI and SJI in the three countries. Higher levels of education predictably indicate higher occupational status.

For AIA, the significance levels of correlations are generally high. Gender does not have significant correlations with AIA in any of the countries. Age positively correlates with AIA in all three countries, and the correlations are strongly significant. Older people have higher levels of negative attitudes against newcomers. Income negatively correlates with AIA. Individuals at higher income levels seem more positive towards immigrants. Education has strongly significant (negative) correlations with AIA, with one of the greatest coefficients in each country, especially for the United Kingdom and France. Not for Germany but for France and the United Kingdom, having more children, unhealthiness and not belonging to a trade union are significantly associated with more negative attitudes. They are insignificant in Germany. While smaller town size is related to more negative attitudes in Germany, it is insignificant for the other two countries. Higher levels of life satisfaction seem to bring more openness to newcomers for all three countries. The correlation of religiosity with AIA is only significant in France, and there, it is strongly significant. The correlations of political view, concern about Europeans, and trust with AIA are strongly significant in the three countries. Especially for France, however, the coefficients of political view and trust variables are very high. People from the upper levels of occupational status seems to have less negative attitudes in the three countries. Interestingly, belonging to trade unions in France and the United Kingdom is significantly associated with high levels of AIA. OJI is weakly correlated with more AIA in Germany, less so in France and not at all in the United Kingdom. SJI for all three

countries, on the other hand, positively and strongly correlates with AIA as one of the highest coefficients in each.

In sense of multi-collinearity problem, correlation values are proper to go through multivariate analysis. They are all beyond 0.7, which is widely accepted threshold. Bivariate analysis works for understanding binary relations, but without controlling for all variables in one analysis, it is misleading. As the final step of result chapter, I added the OLS regression table (Table 6) in order to control the variables and to present the comparative explanatory power of each factor for each country. All R-Square values (including R-Square changes of additional steps) are strongly significant and much bigger than sufficient levels.

Among the control variables, education seems to be the most remarkable factor. For the three countries, in the first and the second models, its effect on AIA is strongly significant. However, in the third model, with the contribution of the job variables, the power of education seems to be explained out in Germany and France. In the United Kingdom, education still maintains its significance in the third model, but at lower levels. The number of children is insignificant in each model in this research. Gender is significant only in Germany and only in the first model with small levels. Income is insignificant in each country in the third model, while in the first and the second ones it is just significant for France. The same is true of town size. It is just significant for the first model in France. For the life satisfaction, the same thing occurs for Germany. The explanatory power (or coefficients) of age and income variables in three countries and health status in the United Kingdom display unexpected increases in additional models, namely suppression effect. This means that the power of these variables are suppressed in initial models. However, further investigation is needed to understand its background, which is beyond the scope of this research.

When it comes to the attitude variables, which are added in the second model, the overall R-Square change in France is the greatest. The R-Square value increases more than three times. Its rise is more than two times in Germany and around two times in the United Kingdom. Religiosity is insignificant for the countries. Considering the huge significance for the religiosity variable in France in the correlations, one may argue that its correlation with AIA is corresponded by other variables.

Table 6: Results of Multivariate Analysis

	Germany						France						The United Kingdom					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Beta	Std. Beta	Beta	Std. Beta	Beta	Std. Beta	Beta	Std. Beta	Beta	Std. Beta	Beta	Std. Beta	Beta	Std. Beta	Beta	Std. Beta	Beta	Std. Beta
<b>control variables</b>																		
(constant)	5.61	-	5.03	-	4.33	-	5.83	-	5.39	-	4.55	-	5.66	-	5.31	-	4.17	-
gender (male)	0.09	(0.08)*	0.02	(0.02)	0.02	(0.01)	0.05	(0.03)	0.02	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.09	(0.07)	0.12	(0.09)	0.05	(0.04)
age	0.04	(0.09)*	0.05	(0.11)**	0.04	(0.09)*	-0.0	(-0.00)	0.04	(0.07)*	0.06	(0.10)**	0.03	(0.06)	0.03	(0.06)	0.07	(0.13)*
income	0.01	(0.03)	-0.0	(-0.0)	0.01	(0.04)	-0.0	(-0.08)*	-0.04	(-0.10)**	-0.01	(-0.04)	-0.00	(-0.00)	-0.00	(-0.00)	0.02	(0.07)
education	-0.09	(-0.21)***	-0.08	(-0.18)***	-0.03	(-0.07)	-0.09	(-0.22)***	-0.06	(-0.16)***	-0.02	(-0.07)	-0.14	(-0.41)***	-0.11	(-0.32)***	-0.05	(-0.16)**
marital status (married)	-0.02	(-0.01)	-0.03	(-0.03)	-0.07	(-0.06)	0.07	(0.05)	0.05	(0.03)	0.03	(0.02)	-0.17	(-0.13)	-0.17	(-0.13)*	-0.18	(-0.14)*
number of children	-0.03	(-0.07)	-0.03	(-0.07)	-0.02	(-0.05)	0	(0.00)	-0.01	(-0.02)	-0.01	(-0.03)	0.01	(0.01)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)
health status	0.05	(0.08)	0.04	(0.06)	0.03	(0.04)	-0.02	(-0.03)	-0.02	(-0.03)	-0.02	(-0.02)	0.09	(0.09)	0.10	(0.11)*	0.09	(0.10)*
size of town	-0.03	(-0.07)	-0.01	(-0.03)	-0.02	(-0.05)	-0.04	(-0.11)**	-0.02	(-0.05)	-0.00	(-0.01)	-0.06	(-0.11)	-0.04	(-0.08)	-0.02	(-0.04)
life satisfaction	-0.03	(-0.12)**	-0.02	(-0.07)	-0.01	(-0.05)	-0.02	(-0.07)	-0.02	(-0.05)	-0.02	(-0.06)	-0.01	(-0.03)	-0.01	(-0.04)	-0.01	(-0.05)
<b>attitude variables</b>																		
reigiosity			-0.00	(-0.00)	-0.00	(-0.02)			0.00	(0.02)	0.00	(0.01)			0.01	(0.07)	0.02	(0.09)
political view (from right to left)			0.11	(0.34)***	0.10	(0.30)***			0.10	(0.34)***	0.10	(0.33)***			0.10	(0.26)***	0.07	(0.19)***
concern about Europeans			-0.00	(-0.00)	-0.00	(-0.00)			-0.10	(-0.14)***	-0.06	(-0.09)**			-0.18	(-0.25)***	-0.15	(-0.21)***
trust			-0.14	(-0.12)***	-0.09	(-0.08)*			-0.38	(-0.26)***	-0.30	(-0.21)***			-0.18	(-0.13)*	-0.12	(-0.09)
<b>job variables</b>																		
occupational status					-0.01	(-0.09)*					-0.02	(-0.10)**					-0.03	(-0.13)*
belonging to unions					-0.04	(-0.02)					-0.10	(-0.04)					-0.06	(-0.03)
job satisfaction					-0.00	(-0.00)					-0.00	(-0.00)					0.00	(0.01)
objective job insecurity (OJI)					-0.02	(-0.01)					-0.09	(-0.05)					0.00	(0.00)
subjective job insecurity (SJI)					0.07	(0.31)***					0.06	(0.28)***					0.10	(0.42)***
<b>R Square</b>	0.08***		0.21***		0.31***		0.11***		0.36***		0.44***		0.22***		0.40***		0.57***	
<b>R Square Change</b>	-		0.13***		0.09***		-		0.25***		0.08***		-		0.18***		0.16***	

\*P value ≤ 0.05, \*\*P value ≤ 0.01, \*\*\*P value ≤ 0.001.

Political view has high levels of significance in the three countries in both the second and the third model. Even though the explanatory power of political view decreases somewhat in the third model in each country, it is one of the variables with the highest overall coefficients. While in France it is the most powerful variable, it is the second most influential variable in Germany and the third in the United Kingdom. The strength of concern about Europeans and trust variables change from country to country. Concern about Europeans is insignificant for Germany, very significant for the United Kingdom (as the second most influential variable), and moderately significant for France in the final model. Trust, on the other hand, is significant with the highest levels as the third powerful factor in France, but does not sustain its significance in the last model in the United Kingdom and Germany. In the final model, its significance is weak in Germany and it is insignificant in the United Kingdom.

For the job variables, the R-Squares in the three countries again significantly increase. While the biggest contribution of the job variables is in the United Kingdom, the smallest is in France. Belonging to a trade union, job satisfaction, and OJI are insignificant in all three countries. Regarding the significant correlations between belonging to trade unions and AIA in the United Kingdom and France, other factors like religiosity seem to match its effect. Occupational status in each country is consistently but weakly associated with AIA. SJI, however, strongly and significantly predict AIA in each. It is the most powerful variable in Germany and the United Kingdom and the second in France, after political view.

All in all, both political disposition to the right and the SJI in the country strongly explain individual negative attitudes towards immigrants for all three countries. While interpersonal trust does the same strongly in France but weakly in Germany, having more concern about Europeans does so strongly in the United Kingdom and moderately in France. The order of the variables with respect to their explanatory powers in each country is given in Table 7.

Table 7: Order of Major Variables

Order of Major Variables*	Germany	France	The United Kingdom
1 <sup>st</sup>	<i>Subjective Job Insecurity</i>	<i>Political view</i>	<i>Subjective Job Insecurity</i>
2 <sup>nd</sup>	<i>Political view</i>	<i>Subjective Job Insecurity</i>	<i>Concern about Europeans</i>
3 <sup>rd</sup>	Age	<i>Trust</i>	<i>Political view</i>
4 <sup>th</sup>	Occupational Status	Age	Education
5 <sup>th</sup>	Trust	Occupational Status	Marital Status
6 <sup>th</sup>	-	Concern about Europeans	Age
7 <sup>th</sup>	-	-	Occupational Status
8 <sup>th</sup>	-	-	Health Status

\*I only covered major variables that I found to be significant in each country, and have ordered them with respect to their explanatory powers.

Those in italics are strongly significant (with p-values less than 0.001).

The age and occupational status variables interestingly have equal coefficients in three countries. To show them all in order, I put age above.

In view of R-Square changings in additional models, attitudes give the impression that they are more important for France in prediction of AIA, than they are in the United Kingdom and Germany. In Germany, the job and the attitude factors appear to explain AIA equally well. For the United Kingdom, the overall explanatory power of the job variables seems bigger than that of the attitudes variables.

## 5. Discussion

While results in Germany and the United Kingdom verify the first hypothesis that SJI is the most prominent factor in terms of AIA of natives, this is not the case in France. The variable with the biggest explanatory power is political view for France. Nevertheless, the (standardized) coefficients of SJI in France also seems high. Although for the United Kingdom the dominance of SJI over all other variables is obvious, a second powerful variable (political view) comes just behind SJI in Germany.

The results confirm the second hypothesis, which assumed belonging to a trade union is no longer an important factor in the determination of attitudes of working classes, for the attitudes of native workers towards immigrants in the three countries examined here. While the United Kingdom has the highest union density percentage

with 27%, it is 18.8% and 7.9% for Germany and France<sup>7</sup>, respectively. The United Kingdom with the highest AIA mean has the highest union density. This is another indicator of ineffectiveness of unions in terms of solidarity, since the union membership seemingly does not rise solidarity among native and immigrant workers.

The third hypothesis assumed that OJI would be insignificant, which held for all three countries. This implies that negative approaches against immigrants are not limited to material conditions, instead they are most likely connected to how workers perceive the potential risks behind those material conditions. However, the statistical operationalization for OJI (due to data restrictions) is insufficient to claim that the effect of SJI dominated that of OJI. Objective insecurity needs to be covered beyond the experience of unemployment with a wider range of variables.

When it comes to the fourth hypothesis, which expects weak explanatory power for the trust variable, this is only verified in Germany. While it is one of the most prominent factors for France, its weak significance in the second model disappears after adding the job variables for the United Kingdom. Therefore, one has sufficient evidence to claim that, the power of trust diverges greatly for these countries and it seems not convincing to generate the overall explanation of AIA through interpersonal trust.

The fifth hypothesis, my expectation for a positive effect of education on the openness of natives, which is also one of the widely accepted findings of previous literature, seems not to be the case in France and Germany. Until the second model, one could claim that education has greatly decreases AIA. However, the job variables evidently attenuated the effect of education. Though significance levels of education decrease in all countries, for the United Kingdom it still matters in the third model. Hence, the outcome validates the fifth hypothesis only for the United Kingdom and the educational levels of workers do not perform as I had expected and as earlier studies had suggested they would.

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<sup>7</sup> "Trade union density" data is extracted from the OECD website for 2009.

The sixth and the seventh hypotheses, which supposed that there would be a positive impact of concern about Europeans and political leaning from the right to the left on openness towards immigrants, are verified in France and the United Kingdom. However, for Germany, surprisingly, political view and concern about Europeans do not synchronously performed. Only the seventh one is true but the sixth one is rejected. The openness to other Europeans is not relevant to AIA in Germany. In order to understand the reason behind the differentiating tendency of Germany's distinctiveness on these points, utilizing further investigations and literature is needed. Nonetheless, this is beyond the scope of this research.

Analyzing the nationhood of Germany and France comparatively, Brubaker (1990) coded French nationality as based on political institutions. French type nationhood and the French nation-state have been built up under the shadow of French political history, which is vital for the prominent political values of all Western societies. In terms of the first hypothesis on SJI, which seems not valid for France, the theory of Brubaker might help to understand the dominance of French political attitudes. France, for Brubaker (1990), appears as the hometown of the modern democratic and bureaucratic revolutions. He offers two diverging typologies in his book, representing two types of nationalism for all Europe: Germany and France. His theory rests on the traditional interpretations of citizenship and relevant immigration policies. He explains immigration policies with respect to the political history and cultural legacy of those countries. Political institutions and the state are at the center of "assimilationist" French nationhood versus "differentialist" Germany, for which ethnic-cultural attachment is more important. Their state-centered and volk-centered nationhood has brought different tolerance levels for their legal openness towards citizenship seekers. In this regard, by utilizing the theories of Lepsius (1985) and Anderson (1983) on nationalism, Brubaker (1990, p.4) says: "In Germany the 'conceived order' or 'imagined community' of nationhood and the institutional realities of statehood were sharply distinct; in France they were fused. In Germany nationhood was an ethnocultural fact; in France it was a political fact."

Even though many legal reforms have been carried out in Europe since the book of Brubaker was published, especially on the differentialist immigration policy of

Germany from 2000s such as the development of birthright citizenship, Brubaker's theory still helps to understand the significance of political attitudes in France regarding politics-based historical development of French nationhood. In this respect, his theoretical tolerance for France and the structure of the book reveals his more positive interest on France regarding that it contributes an opportunity to accept immigrants as equal citizens by the blessing of assimilation. While writing on French nationhood he says "... institutionally it went much further than its British or German counterparts in the legal and political assimilation of metropolitan and overseas regimes, aiming at the construction of '*la plus grande France*.'" (1990, p.11). In the sociological projection of this framework, then, political triggers exist more significantly than all other factors in the historical shaping of French nationality and, therefore, of the attitudes towards immigrants waiting for that purposeful assimilation. Assimilation becomes a blessing rather than a curse here. Another evidence supporting this thesis is that France also has the lowest mean for AIA (Table 1) among the three countries.

In addition to the dominance of political view in France, R-square changes specifically signify the significance of one group of variables, which are related to the attitudes, including political view. One can follow the traces of significances of both attitude variables against job variables and political view against SJI in France by historical strength of left and labor movements in there, and French Republicanism. Although lower classes of France have experienced a reduction of their benefits and political power during Neoliberal regime like the ones of other European countries, France still seems to make difference in terms of remaining capacity of workers in building political mobilization (Lamont, 2009). While interviewing workers in United States and France comparatively, Lamont finds that French workers extremely attach importance to labor solidarity. Solidarity for them, "is often a form of resistance that coworkers develop" (2009, p.166), and they perceive it as a struggle for the benefit of others and against injustice. On the one hand, they feel more responsible toward society than their American counterparts do. Attitudes towards immigrants, on the other hand, were definitely more complicated and equivocal in France. Lamont never defines French type approach towards immigrants as having more tolerance, unlike

Brubaker. In this study, I utilize from her emphasis on politically motivated French workers and her explanations for French anti-immigrants in terms of Republicanism.

In French Republicanism, which is a condition for anti-immigrant boundaries, the state is a neutral agent above particular interests of individuals, which is “embodying universal reason and acting for the benefit of an undifferentiated mass of equal citizens” (p.186). Citizens are individuals here, not group members, and “individuals are considered to be equal citizens, independently of their cultural, natural, or social characteristics” (p.186).

This has an intrinsic relationship with the understanding of appointing France with the role of civilizing humanity as the superior culture. Lamont mentions on the difference between British colonial project, giving cultural autonomy of its subjects, and French colonial motivation to make barbarians part of humanity by assimilating (p.185). In contrast with Brubaker, who remarks culture-free but politically unified French nationhood, She claims there is only one cultural identity is allowed in France. Republicanism is taken as a powerful warranty against discriminations and the French do really care about defining themselves as anti-racist (p.194-9). However, Lamont argues it is just another kind of racism, for which she appreciates ethnicity-free structure, by the decoupling of the skin color and racism. It is possible to name this racism as “color-blind political racism”. Veil ban in 2010, which was not even discussed in the United Kingdom and Germany, can be understood in this sense. In Lamont’s research, the significance of ideological origins of immigrants creates a sharp distinction between the non-assimilability of North African Muslim immigrants and assimilability of European immigrants (p.183-6). The pursuit of ideological-political homogeneity in France definitely covers religiosity, which was also one of the attitude variables of my study.

Self-identification of politically motivated French workers also might have created somewhat exceptionality. Lamont (2009, p.216) says only few of them identified with the middle class. “They are less likely to blame minority group members” (p.198) because of their powerful socialist tradition in France, and have more structural way of explanations for the migrant issue. They share an “antimarket position”, which

highlights “the importance of recognizing the dignity of people regardless of their labor-market positions” (p.196-7). Neither money one earn nor power one have is sufficient to make her/him French, but the common values do. These characters of overall political culture of the working classes in France seem to decrease AIA a little bit and operate a different kind of AIA.

Contrasting the distinguishing characters of French society, the study of Soysal (1994), as being not in opposition to Brubaker, but as being examination of the core concepts in his book, argued citizenships and nationalisms are more likely to be converging in Europe. One recent evidence from the most preferred migrant destination countries in Europe that supports her argument is that since 1 September 2008<sup>8</sup>, in order to gain citizenship, immigrants have to pass various exams on the language and, the legal and societal system of the country.<sup>9</sup> However, the findings of my research on French case provide evidence that points to the remaining uniqueness of France.

When it comes the case of Germany, some scholars take German identity as having not only nationalistic aspects but also patriotic dimensions, which do not trigger negative attitudes towards immigrants and are more powerful than the former in the country (Blank & Schmidt, 2003). The historical experience of colonization and having many immigrants from previously colonized territories might result in European identity acting as a sanctuary for British and French societies, in the shadow of the un-wanted history. Not having this historical background as much as other two, German nationhood seems not to contain that reflexive correlation between national hostility and European sanctuary. Results show that sharing European identity (concern about Europeans) does not say anything about anti-immigration in Germany, in contrast with France and the United Kingdom. It is the case in Germany since the great mean of the variable implies that the concern about Europeans is

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
<sup>8</sup> Like France and United Kingdom, Germany also started to apply these tests. (Algan, Dustmann, Glitz & Manning, 2010).

<sup>9</sup> For deeper and more recent discussions on nationalism, immigrants and citizenship, see Shachar (2009) and Joppke (2010).

more likely a common sense (Table 1). Nevertheless, the uniqueness of Germany seems to exceed the interest of this study and definitely needs to be deeply analysed.

Comparing R-Square changes among the three countries, the attitude variables have their strongest contribution in France, as discussed above. While Germany displays a moderate position, the contribution of the job variables in the United Kingdom is the most remarkable out of the groups of variables (even seems greater than the explanatory contribution of the attitude variables considering exponential rise of R-Squares from one model to the next one). Most of the power of the job variables is obviously coming from the SJI. The standardized coefficient of the variable is double that of the second most powerful variable in the country. In order to appreciate the dissimilarity of the United Kingdom reflecting in the supremacy of job insecurity, one should examine the variation of labor-market policies for the three countries. In terms of labor-market deregulations, the labor-market policies of the United Kingdom presents have notable differences from those of France and Germany. Public expenditures on labor-market policies, as shown in Figure 3, shows how much less the United Kingdom spends compared to the other European countries.

Figure 3: Public Expenditures



Source: Eurostat (2018)

The activeness of labor-market policy often implies greater regulation and active support for more vulnerable workers or unemployed people. The British labor-market has been widely known as having one of the less active programs among European countries (Kluve, 2010). There are different types of active and passive

programs, like training or out-of-work income, with varying level of activeness. More than half<sup>10</sup> of all labor-market policy expenditures in the United Kingdom go to job-search programs, which are some of the most passive types of worker support programs (Kluve, 2010, p.906). The shares for France and Germany are respectively 9.3 and 10.6 percent. Furthermore, in 2009, social spending, which comprises benefits for “low-income households, the elderly, disabled, sick, unemployed, or young persons,” was also the lowest<sup>11</sup> for the United Kingdom among the three countries (OECD, 2018).

The United Kingdom is one of the few relatively unregulated labor-markets in Europe (Kalleberg, 2003), and it had one of the fastest deregulation processes during the 1980s (Atkinson, 1987). In the famous classification of Esping-Andersen (1990) on different types of welfare states, while Germany and France belong to the conservative regime family (with medium level of decommodification), the United Kingdom is defined as having one of the liberal welfare markets. Since the early times of neoliberal flexibility in the labor-market policy of the United Kingdom, there has been not much constraint on the expansion of temporary (non-standard and less regulated forms of) work; in contrast with France and Germany (Hakim, 1990, p.161).

Therefore, the prominence of job insecurity in predicting negative attitudes towards immigrants in the United Kingdom is not surprising and very much consistent with the major argument of this thesis. The market pressure on the native labor force prompts anti-immigrant approaches in a psychosocial reflection of more structural socio-economic conditions. The victory of deregulation capital-labor relationship in the 1980s is not a new trend in history, but the history of their relationship was cut off by an interregnum within welfare period (Kalleberg, 2009). However, the real victory of capitalism, which is also attaining its historical peak, is that the neoliberal virtues enfeebled the capacity of working classes to attribute both social and personal failures to the systemic property (Harvey, 2005). The peak corresponding to the widening perception of “self-employed” brings out continuous feeling of failure during all segments of an individual worker’s career and the problematic of anxiety

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
<sup>10</sup> It is 55.1%.

<sup>11</sup> It is 23% of GDP for United Kingdom, 26.7% for Germany and 30% for France.

(Sennett, 2007). In this sense, the economic precarity of native workers tends to lead towards antagonism against more challengeable competitors: immigrants. In addition to the lack of labor solidarity and the downsizing of class-consciousness among workers coming from securitization, this mechanism is making the misery of immigrants double layered.

The main finding of this research is that the cost of neoliberal insecurity for immigrant workers has increased in untold ways. As in Figure 4, they suffer more both due to their marginal position in the labor-market (especially in the case of women, and young workers) and due to the indirect cost of flexibility in the attitudes of native workers. Scholars agree that the first arrow-cost (1) is greater than the second one (2), which implies that the direct price of flexibility is bigger for immigrants (Landsbergis, Grzywacz & LaMontagne, 2014). However, while each worker is increasingly exposed to economic precarity, migrants also pay the social price of economic precarity of native labor. The third/indirect effect (3) of non-standard employment relations is almost invisible in the previous literature. Since this indirect effect of flexibility transforms economic precarity into aggression, unfriendliness, hostility, and anti-immigration, it might be called social precarity. The dual cost for immigrants comes into being by the combination of the first and the third arrows in Figure 4.

Figure 4: The Dual Cost



- 1: Direct cost of flexibility over immigrant workers.
- 2: Cost of flexibility over native workers.
- 3: Indirect cost of flexibility over immigrant workers, AIA

Standing (2011, p.103) emphasized a similar framework, attributing precarity as the decisive characteristic of today's precarious workers: "Capital welcomes migration because it brings low-cost malleable labour. The groups most vehemently opposed

to migration are the old (white) working class and lower middle class, squeezed by globalisation and falling into the precariat.” On the other hand, although his thesis so functional to attract notice for precarious work, results could not legitimize the “precariat” in terms of class making incapacity. If it is not yet class for itself, but class in the making, one might hope its upsurge is not as far as it seems. Marx once described class through the major tensions in capitalism, which is obliged to utilize labor in order to sustain itself. This was the “power” of labor in the production process, which also makes it a class (Wright, 2005). Contrarily, Standing comes up with his definition for precarity deriving from conjectural weakness of workers. That is why it seems quite complicated to scholars. Nevertheless, ineffectiveness of unions in contributing solidarity makes the precariat thesis of Standing significant, considering the fact that the nature of labor solidarity exceeds workplace. That is also why one should take solidarity in a broad sense including immigrants while insecurity of work has expanded onto every corner of social sphere.

In addition, the findings of my study validate a phenomenon already known by most labor scholars. The age of insecurity and rising precarity has weakened class-consciousness. Regarding the deeply engraved troubles of workers in today’s work life, by proving Sennett right, results contribute an empirical depth for his arguments. Through interrelated specific discussions in separate literatures, this study also contributes a theoretical depth to Sennett’s and his colleagues’ reading of post-modern societies within surrounding insecurity.

As I presented in the second chapter, AIA literature has a multi-part structure. This stems from the complicated structure of anti-immigration itself, which has taken over each corner of the social sphere. Therefore, scholars need to deal with dynamic theoretical implications and intersectional perspectives. Empirical progress in the last two decades has been very eye-ful, but one cannot observe that much theoretical renewal in the literature. Scholars studying anti-immigration have been suggesting similar arguments to those of their predecessors, just with new statistical methods. Even though my empirical results legitimate some interests of the AIA literature on economic determinants (with the general effectiveness of the SJI and occupational-status variables in the three countries), the theoretical discovery in this paper reveals

that “competition” as an explanation is insufficient to formulate the factual misery and position of immigrants in this framework.

On the other basis, while education has been estimated as one of the main predictors of AIA in the previous literature, my findings show that its significance has been overstated. The effect of education seems to be explained with the contribution of occupational status, which is powerfully related to the work-life of an individual worker (Table 6). Moreover, a lack of interpersonal trust is another factor that has frequently cited as a cause of AIA, especially in early studies. It is easy to form a mental/philosophical bridge from lack of trust to the “negativeness” of an attitude in many cases. In societies where workers feel less pressure from the labor-market, levels of interpersonal trust might be higher. One may evaluate French society as the closest one to that among the three examined here. Nevertheless, under the supremacy of precarity and the political preferences of people, the potential of trust is largely reduced. From another perspective, even rising mistrust, where it exists, might spring from working life variables and, therefore, be discussed in connection to labor precarity. In this sense, the social consequences of labor-market flexibility bring out the unescapable tensions into the relationship of the capital and the labor therefore, this matter requires more interdisciplinary approaches.

## **6. Conclusion**

In this paper, I have argued that anti-immigrant attitudes among native workers in Europe are strongly associated with the individual effect of flexible employment. In other words, I propose that such negative attitudes are best understood as the reflection of the unmaking of workers’ class-consciousness under the umbrella of insecurity. The precarity is transforming immigrants into easy scapegoats in the eyes of natives, who are also precariously moving away from secure and continuous jobs. The theoretical literatures on which my thesis has drawn, include the explanations of anti-immigrant attitudes, the consequences of job insecurity, and increasing labor precarity. Furthermore, in order to specify in-depth discussions this thesis has utilized literature on post-modern insecurity in work life and the class-making capacity of precarity.

Through a three-layered OLS regression, I empirically analyzed the relationship between AIA and the SJI of individual native workers in Germany, the United Kingdom and France by applying a proper operationalization of the fourth and last wave of the European Value Survey (2008). SJI increases AIA in the three countries at varying levels with respect to contextual characteristics of these countries. The results of this validated my major theoretical argument, which accepts the charge of labor-market flexibility over immigrants as a dual cost with one more untold (indirect) effect of flexibility in the form of hostility from the native working classes. Additionally, in order to understand how these varied by country I analyzed the varying nature of nationhood and political cultures in, and the different labor-market policies of the three countries.

French Republicanism, historical progress of strong left wing in France and its political-based nationhood helped to figure out French type AIA, for which the effect of the political view of workers is found as greater than SJI. The overall contribution of the attitude variables over the job variables (while checking R-square changes) is the biggest for the French AIA, which also has the smallest mean among the three countries. Furthermore, the model works better in the United Kingdom than other two countries with the great coefficient of SJI and the R-Square level in the final model. It also has the biggest mean of AIA. What might be the reason behind these results is, the United Kingdom has experienced the most salient deregulation since 1980s, and nowadays has the most flexible labor-market with the lowest labor-market expenditure ratio among the three countries. When it comes to Germany, it displays a moderate position. The insignificance of the concern about Europeans variable needs more attention but this study puts a question mark for this complication.

By selecting three heading countries in Europe, which harbors immigrants the most, and by applying separate models in each country, which enables an opportunity for comparison, I carried out individual level analyses without disregarding contextual differentiations. My theoretical contribution and empirical findings indicate, on the one hand, that researchers studying AIA should keep in mind the adventure of labor

in the last few decades which has become highly insecure and structurally downsized. On the other hand, it is a good idea for labor researchers to be open to benefiting from and contributing to related fields of study, both empirical and theoretical. Intersectional perspectives always help shed light on the condition of the most vulnerable people in society. Bridging different literatures is very eye-opening and useful in this sense.

There are some limitations within this study. First, like most previous research, it focused only on actively working individuals because of methodological constraints. Because employed and unemployed workers are both suffering from a crisis of job insecurity, one might think of SJI as something beyond the perceived threat of the loss of an active job. Researchers should consider that unemployed workers are in the specific process of the highest level of insecurity and deserve to be encompassed as a crucial component of labor insecurity discussions, since the limits between unemployed and employed workers are disappearing in terms of the overall precarization of labor force. Second, regional or country-level variables are lacking in this study due to the structure of the data. With the contribution of the form of SJI variable in the questionnaire, I tried to cover upper levels by selecting different countries, and applying separate regressions for each. Yet a multilevel analysis is needed. Third, the topic requires more recent versions of datum. Fourth, I could not include further variables for labor solidarity because of data limitation. Findings are insufficient to broaden, since the only proxy belongs to a trade union.

In terms of precarity discussions, despite of some deficiencies, it is encouraging to see remarkable efforts in the literature on global labor movement perspectives (Chun & Agarwala, 2016). Labor solidarity among immigrants and natives can be realized or sustained by appreciating what precarious work is, what it provides, and what it costs. My contribution is in last three of these points. For workers suffering from precarity to be able to imagine themselves as a “class” once again, passing “from denial to resistance” through “inclusive solidarity” appears as the only way (Neilson, 2015). Without delivering the dark but real picture of working classes, it is very difficult to handle contemporary troubles of capitalism.

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## Appendix

### Reliability Statistics:

Table 6: Cronbach Alpha

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
,832	12

It is given for all the database.

### France

Table 7: ANOVA for France

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	32.343	9	3.594	8.641	,000 <sup>b</sup>
Residual	261.590	629	0.416		
Total	293.933	638			
2 Regression	107.795	13	8.292	27.842	,000 <sup>c</sup>
Residual	186.138	625	0.298		
Total	293.933	638			
3 Regression	131.210	18	7.289	27.774	,000 <sup>d</sup>
Residual	162.723	620	0.262		
Total	293.933	638			

Figure 5: Histogram for Standardized Residuals for France




Figure 6: P-P Plot for Standardized Residuals for France





Figure 7: Scatterplot for Standardized Residuals for France



## The United Kingdom

Table 8: ANOVA for the United Kingdom

Model	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1 Regression	22.168	9	2.463	6.936	,000 <sup>b</sup>
Residual	75.992	214	0.355		
Total	98.160	223			
2 Regression	40.178	13	3.091	11.194	,000 <sup>c</sup>
Residual	57.983	210	0.276		
Total	98.160	223			
3 Regression	56.206	18	3.123	15.258	,000 <sup>d</sup>
Residual	41.954	205	0.205		
Total	98.160	223			

Figure 8: Histogram for Standardized Residuals for the United Kingdom




Figure 9: P-P Plot for Standardized Residuals for the United Kingdom





Figure 10: Scatterplot for Standardized Residuals for the United Kingdom



## Germany

Table 9: ANOVA for Germany

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	14.792	9	1.644	5.667	,000 <sup>b</sup>
	Residual	166.182	573	0.290		
	Total	180.974	582			
2	Regression	38.249	13	2.942	11.730	,000 <sup>c</sup>
	Residual	142.725	569	0.251		
	Total	180.974	582			
3	Regression	56.032	18	3.113	14.052	,000 <sup>d</sup>
	Residual	124.942	564	0.222		
	Total	180.974	582			

Figure 11: Histogram for Standardized Residuals for Germany




Figure 12: P-P Plot for Standardized Residuals for Germany




Figure 13: Scatterplot for Standardized Residuals for Germany

