

**AN INNOVATIVE STEP TOWARDS RESOLVING TURKEY’S “HEADSCARF
CONFLICT”: ASSESSING THE APPLICABILITY OF “INTERACTIVE
CONFLICT RESOLUTION” AT THE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS
LEVEL**

by

AYLİN AYDIN

**Submitted to the Graduate School of Arts and Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts**

Sabancı University

September, 2005

**AN INNOVATIVE STEP TOWARDS RESOLVING TURKEY’S “HEADSCARF
CONFLICT”: ASSESSING THE APPLICABILITY OF “INTERACTIVE
CONFLICT RESOLUTION” AT THE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS
LEVEL**

APPROVED BY:

Dr. Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak
(Dissertation Supervisor)

Dr. Ayşe Gül Altınay

Dr. Ayşe Betül Çelik

DATE OF APPROVAL: September 16, 2005

*In the memory of Basri Akmanov,
and*

*for my grand parents Remzi Aydın, Fevziye Aydın,
and
Lamiha Akmanova*

© Aylin Aydın 2005
All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT

AN INNOVATIVE STEP TOWARDS RESOLVING TURKEY’S “HEADSCARF CONFLICT”: ASSESSING THE APPLICABILITY OF “INTERACTIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION” AT THE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS LEVEL

AYLİN AYDIN

Program of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, M.A. Thesis, 2005

Supervisor: Dr. Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak

Key Words: Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR), protracted social conflicts (PSCs), headscarf, Civil Society Organizations

Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR) approaches are non-official methods suggesting that through sustained contact and interaction, negative perceptions and attitudes of the parties towards each other can be exchanged so that empathy can be built paving the way to the resolution of protracted conflicts. Accordingly, the objective of this study is to conduct an assessment of Turkey’s “headscarf conflict” in the context of Islamist and Kemalist CSOs. Following the findings of this assessment, conditions that should be taken into consideration for a successful ICR intervention are indicated and the applicability of the ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict is evaluated. The purpose of this endeavour is to identify the most appropriate ICR approaches for this case.

Given the assessment of the headscarf conflict, the Islamist CSOs appear to strongly emphasize their needs for identity, recognition and justice, while the Kemalist CSOs indicate their needs for identity and security. Moreover, it is discovered that while certain concepts such as human rights, democracy, secularism, and women rights are shared by the adversarial parties, different values are attributed to them.

The evaluation of the ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict suggests that human needs; identity; and transformation-oriented approaches appear to be the most appropriate ones in addressing the underlying causes of the conflict. Concerning the resolution of the headscarf conflict, transformation-oriented approaches appear to be the most appropriate ones for an initial ICR intervention, while communal relations and communication based approaches seem to be appropriate for a subsequent intervention.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE’NİN BAŞÖRTÜSÜ SORUNU’NUN ÇÖZÜMÜNE YÖNELİK YENİ BİR BAKIŞ AÇISI: “SORUNLARIN ETKİLEŞİMLİ ÇÖZÜMÜ” MODELİNİN SİVİL TOPLUM ÖRGÜTLERİ ALANINDA UYGULANABİLİRLİLİĞİNİN İNCELENMESİ

AYLİN AYDIN

Uyuşmazlıkların Analizi ve Çözümü Programı, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2005

Danışman: Dr. Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sorunların Etkileşimli Çözümü (SEÇ), çıkmaza giren toplumsal uyuşmazlıklar, başörtüsü, Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları

Gayri resmi metodlar olan ve üçüncü kişiler tarafından uygulanan “Sorunların Etkileşimli Çözümü” (SEÇ) yöntemleri, taraflar arasındaki işbirliği ve iletişimin artırılması, ve olumsuz düşünce ve tutumların açıkça ifade edilebilmesi ile sorunun çözümüne yönelik önemli bir adımın atılabileceğini savunurlar. Karşı tarafın korkularının, ihtiyaçlarının, değerlerinin ve önyargılarının anlaşılması suretiyle çatışan gruplar arasındaki uzlaşma yolunun açılacağını vurgulayan bu yöntemler genellikle çatışan kimlikler ve değerler üzerine kurulu, ve çıkmaza giren toplumsal ya da gruplar arası sorunlara uygulanır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye’nin başörtüsü sorununu İslamcı ve Kemalist STKlar çerçevesinde değerlendirerek SEÇ’in başörtüsü sorununa uygulanıp uygulanamayacağını belirlemektir. Bu doğrultuda, hangi yöntem(ler) daha uygun olacaktır ve başarılı bir SEÇ müdahalesi için hangi durumlar göz önüne alınmalıdır gibi sorulara yanıt aranmaktadır.

Başörtüsü sorununu STK’lar bazında değerlendirdiğimizde İslamcı STK’ların kimlik, tanınma ve adalet ihtiyaçlarına, Kemalist STK’ların ise güvenlik ve kimlik ihtiyaçlarına vurgu yaptıkları sonucuna varırız. Bunun dışında her iki taraf demokrasi, laiklik, kadın hakları ve insan hakları gibi kavramları eşdeğer biçimde vurgularken onlara yükledikleri değerler ve anlamlar önemli ölçüde farklılaşmaktadır.

SEÇ yöntemlerinin başörtüsü sorununa uygulanabilirliğine baktığımızda ise bireysel ihtiyaçlar, kimlik ve dönüşüm odaklı yöntemlerin, uyuşmazlığın altında yatan temel nedenleri daha kapsamlı gösterebildikleri için daha uygun metodlar olarak ortaya çıkmaktadırlar. Başörtüsü uyuşmazlığının çözümü ile ilgili olarak ise, dönüşüm odaklı yöntemler, herhangi bir SEÇ müdahalesinin ilk aşamasında uygulanabilecek en uygun metod olarak gibi görünmektedir. Bu ilk aşamayı takiben ise, iletişim ve ilişki bazlı yöntemlerin uygulanması daha uygun olacaktır. Tüm bu SEÇ yöntemleri olası bir müdahalenin ilk aşamalarında uygulanmadıkları takdirde insani ihtiyaçlar, kimlik, psikolojik ya da müzakere bazlı metodlar istenen yapıcı sonuçları veremeyecek gibi görünmektedir.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Scope and Aim of the Study.....	1
1.2 Research Questions.....	4
1.3 Research Methodology	5
1.3.1 Level of Analysis.....	5
1.3.2 Methods Used.....	8
1.3.3 Types of Sampling	9
1.3.4 Methodological Caveats	9
1.4 Design of the Study.....	10
 CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY.....	 13
2.1 Overview of Protracted Social Conflicts: Basic Definitions, Theoretical Background and Characteristics	13
2.1.1 Basic Definitions of Protracted Social Conflicts (PSCs).....	14
2.1.2 The Theoretical Framework of Protracted Social Conflicts.....	15
2.1.2.1 Basic human needs.....	16
2.1.2.2 Identity frames.....	18
2.1.2.3 Value frames.....	19
2.1.3 Characteristics of Protracted Social Conflicts.....	21
2.1.3.1 Issues.....	22
2.1.3.2 Relationship between adversaries.....	23
2.1.3.3 Context.....	24
2.1.3.4 Processes.....	24
2.1.3.5 Outcomes.....	25
2.2 Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR) Approaches as Alternative Methods for the Resolution of Protracted Social Conflicts (PSCs).....	26
2.2.1 Definitions of Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR).....	26
2.2.2 General Similarities and Differences between the ICR Approaches.....	28
2.3. Categorization of ICR Approaches: Seven Theories of Practice of ICR.....	32
2.3.1 Human Needs Approaches.....	33

2.3.2	Identity Approaches.....	35
2.3.3	Psychoanalytic Approaches.....	37
2.3.4	Intercultural Communication.....	40
2.3.5	Communal Relations.....	42
2.3.6	Principled Negotiation.....	44
2.3.7	Transformation-Oriented Approaches	46
2.4	Theories of Practice of ICR and the Headscarf Conflict.....	48

CHAPTER 3: THE GENERAL OVERVIEW OF TURKEY’S HEADSCARF CONFLICT.....51

3.1	The Chronology of the Headscarf Conflict.....	51
3.2	The Context of the Headscarf Conflict.....	54
3.3	The Escalatory Dynamics of the Headscarf Conflict	57
3.4	The Current Stage of the Headscarf Conflict.....	59
3.5	The Headscarf Conflict as Protracted Inter-Group Conflict with Identity and Value Aspects at the Centre.....	60
3.6	Propositions for the Resolution of the Headscarf Conflict.....	62

CHAPTER 4: ASSESSMENT OF THE HEADSCARF CONFLICT.....64

4.1	Parties to the Headscarf Conflict.....	65
4.1.1	Primary Parties.....	65
4.1.2	Secondary Parties.....	67
4.1.3	Interested Third Party.....	67
4.2	Choosing the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs as Primary Stakeholders.....	68
4.3	Islamist Civil Society Organizations	70
4.3.1	Identity of the Islamist CSOs.....	71
4.3.2	Islamist CSOs’ Identification of the Headscarf Conflict.....	73
4.3.3	Issues emphasized by the Islamist CSOs.....	75
4.3.3.1	Need based issues	75
4.3.3.1.1	Need for identity and recognition.....	75
4.3.3.1.2	Need for justice.....	77
4.3.3.2	Value based issues	78
4.3.3.2.1	Human rights and liberty.....	79
4.3.3.2.2	Values concerning women’s status.....	80

	4.3.3.2.3	Democracy and citizenship.....	80
	4.3.3.2.4	Social peace.....	81
	4.3.3.2.5	Public sphere.....	82
4.3.3.3		Other issues.....	82
	4.3.3.3.1	Politicization of the conflict.....	82
	4.3.3.3.2	Legal issue.....	82
	4.3.3.3.3	Giving service-taking service issue.....	83
4.3.4		Relation with the Kemalist CSOs.....	84
	4.3.4.1	Networks and other groups that Islamist CSOs belong to.....	84
	4.3.4.2	Interaction and communication with the Kemalist CSOs.....	85
	4.3.4.3	Perceptions and stereotypes.....	87
4.3.5		Objectives.....	89
4.3.6		Visions and Proposed Solutions for Dealing with the Headscarf Conflict.....	90
4.3.7		Relations with the State.....	92
4.4		Kemalist Civil Society Organizations	94
	4.4.1	Identity of the Organizations.....	94
	4.4.2	Kemalist CSOs' Identification of the Headscarf Conflict	96
	4.4.3	Issues Emphasized by the Kemalist CSOs.....	99
	4.4.3.1	Need based issues.....	99
		4.4.3.1.1	Need for identity.....99
		4.4.3.1.2	Need for security.....101
	4.4.3.2	Value based issues.....	103
		4.4.3.2.1	Values concerning the status of women.103
		4.4.3.2.2	Public sphere.....104
		4.4.3.2.3	Secular education.....105
		4.4.3.2.4	Democracy.....105
		4.4.3.2.5	Turban-headscarf differentiation 106
		4.4.3.2.6	Human rights and liberties.....106
	4.4.3.3	Other issues.....	107
		4.4.3.3.1	Giving service-taking service.....107
4.4.4		Relations with the Islamist CSOs.....	107
	4.4.4.1	Networks and other groups that Kemalist CSOs belong to.....	107

4.4.4.2	Interaction and communication with the Islamist CSOs.....	109
4.4.4.3	Perceptions and stereotypes.....	108
4.4.5	Objectives.....	111
4.4.6	Visions and Proposed Solutions for Dealing with the Headscarf Conflict.....	115
4.4.7	Relations with the State.....	117

CHAPTER 5: BUILDING STRATEGY FOR CHOOSING THE APPROPRIATE ICR APPROACH(ES).....119

5.1	The Islamist and Kemalist CSOs' Visions towards the ICR Approaches.....	119
5.1.1	The Islamist CSOs.....	120
5.1.2	The Kemalist CSOs.....	123
5.2	Strategic Opportunities and Constrains for the Applicability of the ICR Method.....	125
5.2.1	Strategic Opportunities.....	125
5.2.2	Strategic Constraints.....	130
5.3	Strategic Resources.....	133
5.3.1	Women Organizations as Strategic Resource.....	134
5.3.1.1	Uçan Süpürge (Flying Broom).....	134
5.3.1.2	Başkent Kadın Platformu (Başkent Women's Platform).....	136
5.3.1.3	KA-DER (Association for the Support and Training of Women Candidates).....	138
5.3.2	Human Rights Organizations as Strategic Resource.....	140
5.3.2.1	İHD (Human Rights Association).....	141
5.4	Strategic Objectives.....	144

CHAPTER 6: APPROPRIATE ICR APPROACH(ES) FOR TURKEY'S HEADSCARF CONFLICT 149

6.1	How to Envision the Causes of the Headscarf Conflict?.....	149
6.2	How to Envision the Resolution of the Headscarf Conflict?.....	150
6.2.1	Indicating the Factors that Nurture Intractability of the Conflict	151
6.2.2	Dealing with Unrecognized Options	152

6.2.3	Empowering the Parties to Understand the Most Important Aspects of the Conflict	152
6.2.4	Empowering the Parties to Decide on Their own Future.....	153
6.2.5	Empowering the Parties to Reframe the Conflict.....	153
6.2.6	Using the Women Organizations as Strategic Resource	155
6.2.7	Addressing Negative Perceptions	156
6.2.8	Generating a Common Goal and a Common Task.....	157
6.2.9	Dealing with Power Asymmetry.....	158
6.2.10	Training the Participants	158
6.3	Evaluating the Applicability of the ICR Approaches.....	161
6.3.1	Suitability to Address the Causes of the Headscarf Conflict.....	161
6.3.2	Suitability to Address the Resolution of the Headscarf Conflict.....	165
6.3.2.1	Human needs approaches.....	165
6.3.2.2	Identity and psychoanalytic approaches.....	166
6.3.2.3	Principled negotiation.....	167
6.3.2.4	Communal relations.....	168
6.3.2.5	Intercultural Communication.....	170
6.3.2.6	Transformation-oriented approaches.....	171
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION.....		174
CHAPTER 8: APPENDIX		179
CHAPTER 9: REFERENCES.....		181

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Figure 2.1 Protracted, intractable conflict system.....	20
Table: 2.2 Major theories of practice of interactive conflict resolution.....	47-48
Figure 5.1 A framework for understanding inter-group conflict.....	141
Figure 6.1 The progression of conflict.....	154

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADD	Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (The Association of Atatürkist Thought)
AK-DER	Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları Derneği (Women's Rights Organization against Discrimination)
BKP	Başkent Kadın Platformu (Başkent Women's Platform)
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
ÇYDD	Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği (The Association of Support for Modern Life)
ICR	Interactive Conflict Resolution
İHD	İnsan Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Association)
KA-DER	Kadın Adaylarını Destekleme ve Eğitim Derneği (Association for the Support and Training of Women Candidates)
MAZLUM-DER	İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği (Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People)
ÖZGÜR-DER	Özgür Düşünce ve Eğitim Hakları Derneği (Association of Free Thought and Educational Rights)
PSCs	Protracted Social Conflicts
TKB	Türk Kadınlar Birliği (The Association of Turkish Women's Union)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Scope and Aim of the Study

Being on the agenda since the beginning of the 1980s, the debate on wearing headscarf in public places has intensified and become a source of polarization in the political life in Turkey since the mid 1990s. What has triggered this conflict was the demand coming from university students to attend the classes with their headscarves, in accordance with Islamic precepts.¹ Later on, a category of the professional women (especially doctors and lawyers) also began to raise their demands to be able to perform their jobs with that particular dressing style. They have stated their major demands in terms of “identity”, claiming that the right to wear headscarf in public realm is a requisite of civil rights, freedom and that forbidding its usage is anti-democratic and authoritarian. However, these demands were not found acceptable by the authorities, on the grounds that they were against the Dress Code. Accordingly, those who have been against these demands have been claiming that such demands constitute a threat to the basic principle of Kemalist regime, which is “laicism”. On the other hand for the secularists, turban is not allowed in public space because it, as an Islamic symbol, cannot be reconciled with the “secular identity” of the state. Consequently, the way in which the events and discussions around wearing headscarf in public places was articulated led to an opposition between secularists and religious oriented people and groups; or between Kemalists and Islamists. The headscarf issue continued to escalate with the polarization of the public opinion leading the way to new debates on human

¹ According to the common Islamic interpretation, women have to cover the parts of their bodies particularly their hair and shoulders to preserve their virtue and not lead to disorder. That Islamic principle is called “hicab”.

rights, political liberties, and identity politics. That debate can be mainly defined as a continuation of traditional tension between the secular democratic regime and Islam in Turkey. (Arat, 2001:1)

Related to the abovementioned characteristics of the “headscarf conflict”, in this study I take this conflict as a “protracted conflict”² since it is deeply important to a large group of Turkish people; based on a complex set of historical, religious, cultural and political issues among which the irreconcilable moral differences including fundamental moral, religious and personal values are always emphasized; and it has remained unresolved for a long period of time. Moreover, the headscarf conflict has escalated, transformed and resurfaced repeatedly; and eventually has become stuck at a high level of intensity and destructiveness that is claimed to threaten the basic human needs and values of a large group of people.

For the resolution of “protracted social conflicts”, starting to analyze them by a “subjectivist approach”³ has great importance, since the outbreak of these types of conflicts are dependent on the appearance of certain perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and motivations that need to change for conflict resolution to occur. (Azar 1990; Kriesberg 1998) As Reimann (2002:4) claims, analyzing intractable conflicts from a pure objectivist approach in terms of seeking the origins of these types of conflicts only in the social and political structure by ignoring the perceptions of the parties involved, leads to conservative and status quo oriented approach to conflict resolution. Therefore, in this study, by focusing on these perceptual factors I conduct the assessment of Turkey’s “headscarf conflict” in the context of Islamist and Kemalist Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).

For the resolution of intractable conflicts, changing the conflicting parties’ beliefs regarding their own and the other group’s goals, as well as changing the adversaries’ undersanding of the conditions of political environment and the situation of their own group (Burton 1990; Fisher 1997; Kelman 1997; Kriesberg 1992) has great importance.

² I also interchangeably use it with the term “intractable inter-group conflict”.

³ The subjectivist approach to conflict focuses primarily on the perceived incompatibility of goals. The essential implication of this approach is that many goals are subjectively perceived as incompatible, whereas from an objective point of view they can be thoroughly compatible. This may be due to misinformation, cultural misunderstanding, or misperceptions such as stereotypes, mistrust and emotional stress. (Reimann, 2002)

The Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR) approaches that are non-official conflict resolution methods, are based on this assumption and see the perceived incompatibility of goals due to misinformation, cultural misunderstanding, or misperceptions (such as stereotypes, mistrust and emotional stress) among the conflicting parties as critical aspects of conflicts. Moreover, the theoretical groundwork of ICR indicates that through increased cooperation and improved communication between parties, common interests and shared needs can be revealed out so that in the long-run a successful resolution of the conflict can be reached. All ICR theorists claim that it is only through parties' interaction and communication that perceptions and attitudes may be expressed and changed and reconciliation can be achieved. Building personal, intellectual and even political ties among the groups in conflict are often justified on the basis that such contacts alter hostile stereotypes, increase understanding of the other side's fears, and help pave the way for inter-group peacemaking efforts. (Saunders, 1999:20) In other words, ICR methods are defined as those used in efforts to create a conflict-resolving environment in which the parties engage in carefully structured dialogue to gain insight about their specific conflict and conflict processes in general through which they discover new means of creatively resolving their conflict. (Rothman, 1997:6)

Concerning all these aspects of ICR, one of the objectives of this study is to conduct an assessment of Turkey's "headscarf conflict" in the context of Islamist and Kemalist CSOs which will be called "stakeholder analysis"⁴ in this research. The purpose of the stakeholder analysis is to identify whether the ICR can be used in the headscarf conflict, if yes which approach is more suitable and what conditions should be taken into consideration for a successful ICR intervention. In accordance with these broad objectives, I have two supplementary objectives. First, through the "stakeholder analysis" I aim to give a general picture of the relationships among Islamist and Kemalist CSOs (in terms of interaction and communication); the potential of improving their communication; their awareness of the conflict; their identification of the conflict; the issues emphasized by them; their needs, values and concerns; their proposed

⁴ "Stakeholder analysis" can be defined as an approach for understanding a system by identifying the key actors or stakeholders in the system, and assessing their respective interest in that system" (Grimble et al. 1995 cf. Ramirez, 1999). In other words, the "stakeholder analysis" refers to the identification and description of stakeholders on the basis of their characteristics, interrelationships, positions and interests related to a given conflict. Stakeholder analysis can help to discover existing patterns of interaction, analytically to improve interventions, to assess their capacities towards the resolution of the conflict. (Engel, 1997) In this study the stakeholder refers to the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs.

solutions for dealing with the conflict; their visions related to the limitations towards the desired change; their willingness in terms of acting together for the resolution of the conflict; and their perceptions of the ICR field. However, this examination should not be interpreted as a sociological analysis of these CSOs, but rather as a preliminary study with a limited objective that aims at building an analytical framework through which the applicability of the ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict can be evaluated.

To sum up, initially this thesis reviews the literature on “protracted social conflicts” and categorizes “Interactive Conflict Resolution” approaches in order to systematically be able to evaluate their applicability to the headscarf conflict. Subsequently, it gives a general overview of Turkey’s “headscarf conflict” to indicate that this conflict is protracted in nature and conducts an assessment of the conflict in the context of Kemalist and Islamist CSOs. Afterwards, it discusses the findings of this analysis and indicates the conditions that should be taken into consideration in a successful ICR intervention. Finally it evaluates the applicability of the ICR approaches in the headscarf conflict in order to find out the most appropriate ICR approach(es) that can be applied on this conflict.

1.2 Research Questions

The broad research question of this research is: In the context of civil society organizations, can the ICR approaches successfully address the “headscarf conflict” in order to initiate a “reconciliation process” among the organizations; and help them come up with a common ground? To find out the most appropriate ICR approach(es) for this specific conflict, I try to explore the factors that should be taken into consideration while designing an ICR process addressing the “headscarf conflict”.

While assessing the headscarf conflict in the context of Islamist and Kemalist CSOs that provides important findings for my broad research question, I answer these sub-questions:

- How do the stakeholders of the “headscarf conflict” identify themselves?
- What are the networks and other groups that the stakeholders belong to?

- What are the interests that each stakeholder has towards the “headscarf conflict”?
- What is the level of interaction and communication between the stakeholders?
- How do the stakeholders perceive each other?
- How do the stakeholders define the conflict?
- What are the issues (of the “headscarf conflict”) emphasized by the stakeholders?
- How do the parties identify the desired change related to the “headscarf conflict”?
- What is the parties’ awareness of the “headscarf conflict” ?
- What kind of solutions do the stakeholders propose for the resolution of the conflict?
- What kind of limitations do the stakeholders emphasize towards the desired change?
- Are the stakeholders willing in terms of acting together to deal with the headscarf conflict?
- How do the stakeholders perceive the ICR and its applicability in the headscarf conflict?

1.3 Research Methodology

1.3.1 Level of Analysis

Most of the ICR approaches can be defined as “small-group processes” in which the key actors (participants of the problem-solving workshops) or “middle-range leaders” participate in problem-solving discussions facilitated by an impartial third-party. (Fisher, 1997; Lederach, 1997) “Middle-range leaders” that are also called as “mid-level leaders” or “opinion-leaders” (Mitchell, 1993) are people who function in leadership position within protracted conflict but they are not necessarily controlled or connected by the authority or the structure of the government. So, these people are less constrained and freer in their interactions, but at the same time maximize the transfer of new learning and knowledge into the political process (ex: academics, intellectuals, ethnic/religious leaders, NGO leaders or other people that are well known and respected by the top-leaders) (ibid.) Looking from the ICR perspective, I believe that for the official resolution of protracted conflicts, reconciliation among opinion leaders (mid-

level leaders) is crucial since in the long run this will provide a transfer⁵ affect. In other words unofficial approaches have value as pre-negotiation and peace-building mechanisms that lay the groundwork for official negotiations especially when the conflict is highly polarized. (Keashly and Fisher 1996: 245 cf. Çuhadar- Gürkaynak, 2004:9)

In the context of Turkey's headscarf conflict, my rationale for choosing CSOs as the level of analysis can be based on the CSOs' ability to affect the public opinion and grass roots through the writings and other activities of their representatives who work in academia, media, private sector, education or jurisprudence and through the campaigns with which the CSOs form close relations with the grassroots. However, for the resolution of Turkey's headscarf conflict what should be influenced is the decision making process or state since this conflict is not a communal one but a politicized conflict that can be resolved only by political applications or by reconciliation at the political level.

However, concerning Turkey's CSOs' capacity in affecting the decision-making process two important limitations come to the fore. First of all it should be kept in mind that the CSOs in Turkey cannot form strong pressure groups who can directly affect the decision making process. (XI. STK Sempozyumu, 2002:136-139) Secondly, the "state"⁶ that is one of the primary parties to the headscarf conflict does not have a homogeneous structure so that the question "How can the CSOs generate spillover affect on this heterogeneous actor?" comes to the fore. Given these limitations, it should be stated that in the context of the headscarf conflict the characteristics of the Kemalist CSOs form an important opportunity in terms of influencing the decision making process. Considering the character of the Kemalist CSOs who strongly identify themselves with official ideology and as protectors of the Atatürkist principles and have good relations with Kemalist bureaucratic elite a possible reconciliation among the CSOs will at least draw

⁵ ICR scholars generally claim that once the relations between the participants of the workshops improve and their perceptions of the conflict change as a result of the contact and dialogue between the adversaries, it will spill over or "transfer" to a wider circle. Thus, in time, this will contribute to a de-escalation of that conflict. How this wider circle is defined changes from one conflict resolution initiative to another.(Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, 2004)

⁶ By the word "state" what is meant is not only the government or the political parties in power, but also the military-bureaucratic elites and the representatives of this mentality who situate themselves at the "centre". This heterogeneous structure of the state reflects itself in the heterogeneous position of the state towards the headscarf conflict.

the attention of the “pro-headscarf ban institutions”⁷ and these conservative Kemalist institutions of the state will inevitably have to take this transformation in the civil society into consideration.

Another characteristic of the CSOs in Turkey is their structure, which is not completely independent of politics.(Mardin, 1995; Toprak, 1996; Göle, 1994) However this specific characteristic of the CSOs in Turkey would bring an important opportunity to an ICR intervention. First of all since there is not an actual tension in the society (grass-roots level) and since the headscarf conflict is highly constrained in political aspects, this characteristic of the middle-range leaders would automatically prevent elimination of the political aspects from the ICR process. Another reason for choosing the CSO as my level of analysis is closely related with their flexible structure. Although the CSOs in Turkey do not appear to be completely independent from the government structure or political concerns, still the executives would not be formally constrained by the authority so that they would be freer in their interactions and be more flexible than formal officials.

Although the objective of this study is to identify the appropriate ICR approach(es) for the headscarf conflict; the fundamental aim is to underline the existence of promising intervention models that can be applied towards the resolution of the headscarf conflict. Approaching the headscarf conflict from a Conflict Resolution perspective, analyzing the level of the society that has the capacity and strategic ability towards the resolution of the conflict is an important starting point. The applicability of the ICR approaches will be based on this analysis which I hope will provide the groundwork for the implementation of the selected ICR process(es). To sum up, how and from which perspective one approaches the conflict shapes the process one recommends towards its resolution. This study focuses on the CSOs that can serve as “mid-level leaders” in Turkey’s “headscarf conflict”. These organizations not only represent the conflicting parties to the “headscarf conflict” but also have strategic capacity towards affecting the resolution of the conflict.

⁷ Concerning the heterogonous structure of the state and its position, the conservative Kemalist institutions including the Turkish Military Forces who have pro-headscarf ban stance should be the target since they have the tendency to ignore the headscarf conflict and perceive it in zero-sum terms that blocks the resolution of the conflict.

1.3.2 Methods Used

The present study is not a rigorous sociologic analysis of the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs. Rather it is a preliminary study having the limited purpose of giving a general picture of the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs' identities in order to assess the applicability of ICR in this conflict. Since the main purpose is to evaluate the applicability of the ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict and to indicate the conditions that should be addressed in an appropriate ICR process, this general analysis of the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs will be used only as an analytical framework to evaluate the ICR approaches.

The bulk of data for the assessment of the headscarf conflict in the context of CSOs comes from three main sources. These sources include bibliography available related to the headscarf conflict in general as well as the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs; publications, web pages, press releases, bulletins, monthly journals of the organizations and semi-structured interviews⁸ (see Appendix A) conducted with the representatives of the following Islamist CSOs (Women's Rights Organization Against Discrimination (*Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları Derneği*) [AK-DER]; Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People (*İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği*) [MAZLUM-DER]; Association of Free Thought and Educational Rights (*Özgür Düşünce ve Eğitim Hakları Derneği*) [ÖZGÜR-DER]) and from the following Kemalist CSOs (The Association of Atatürkist Thought (*Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği*) [ADD]; The Association of Support for Modern Life (*Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği*) [ÇYDD]; The Association of Turkish Women's Union (*Türk Kadınlar Birliği*) [TKB]) These interviews constitute an additional source of information for the analysis of attitudes, perceptions, and relations of the stakeholders. The numbers of interviewees for each organization are not selected with the concern of methodological representation⁹ but rather with the purpose of identifying potential participants for the ICR workshop.

⁸ For the interview questions look at Appendix A.

⁹ The number of interviewees for each organization is as the following: Ak-Der (1); Özgür-Der (1); Mazlum-Der (2); ÇYDD (3), ADD (3) and Turkish Women's Union (2).

1.3.3 Types of Sampling

To represent the polarization of the “headscarf conflict”, I have conducted the assessment of the conflict in the context of Kemalist and Islamist CSOs. In the selection process the most important point was to include the civil society organizations that obviously have conflictual identities, perceptions, interests and positions related to the “headscarf conflict”. This was very important since the relation between the selected CSOs had to represent Turkey’s “headscarf conflict” in general. Taking into consideration all of these aspects, during the selection of the organizations I have used some academic works, articles (from the journals and newspapers); web sites, statutes and some publications of the civil society organizations as well as my previous knowledge in order to identify the key actors. Moreover, I have consulted and talked to some scholars who are knowledgeable about the organizations that have clear position and interest in the “headscarf conflict”. In order to capture the “gender” issue of the “headscarf conflict”, I have also included women organizations from both the Kemalist and Islamist rank.

1.3.4 Methodological Caveats

Emphasizing that the assessment of the headscarf conflict that is conducted in this study is not a rigorous sociologic analysis, a thorough sociologic analysis of these CSOs would have further improved my “stakeholder analysis”. Including the other CSOs that can be grouped under Islamist and Kemalist identity; selecting all their headquarters and branches that are situated in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir as the domain of the research; conducting unstructured interviews with their executives as well as their members and conducting survey research through which I could have reached larger number of respondents would have provided me more valuable data. Through such a comprehensive sociologic research I could have more precisely indicate the differences among the CSOs that have the same position towards the headscarf conflict; consistency of the arguments stated by the executives with the other members of the organization; or other strategically important aspects concerning the relationship among the organizations, perceptions to each other, visions towards the conflict and each other as well as propositions towards the resolution of the conflict. However, for such a research

a long time and considerable funding should be devoted. For further studies on the “stakeholder analysis” of the headscarf conflict in the context of CSOs, it could be suggested that conducting such comprehensive sociologic research would be useful for the methodological and epistemological structure for a study of this kind and for the sake of the consistency of the “stakeholder analysis”.

Moreover, conducting interviews with the executives of the CSOs that have relatively moderate and neutral stance in the headscarf conflict would have provided me additional valuable data to indicate the strategic resources in Turkey’s civil society for a successful third-party intervention in the headscarf conflict. Although, Flying Broom (Uçan Süpürge), Başkent Women’s Platform (Başkent Kadın Platformu), Ka-Der (the Association for the Support and Training of Women Candidates) [Kadın Adaylarını Destekleme ve Eğitim Derneği] and İHD (Human Rights Association) [İnsan Hakları Derneği] are included in the study as potential “bridge-builders” due to their moderate position to the headscarf conflict, they were reviewed from their publications, bulletins, web pages and executives’ declarations. Because of time restriction, not incorporating these CSOs in the field research reveals another caveat of this study.

1.3 Design of the Study

Within the aforementioned context, the following chapter provides an introduction to the theory underlying the thesis and the terms used throughout. It specifically focuses on the “Protracted Social Conflicts” and “Interactive Conflict Resolution” (ICR). By giving the basic definitions, theoretical background and characteristics of the “protracted social conflicts” I aim to draw the theoretical basis for my definition of Turkey’s “headscarf conflict” as a “protracted conflict”. By presenting ICR as an alternative method for the resolution of “protracted conflicts” and indicating its general characteristics and theoretical background, I categorize the ICR approaches into “seven theories of practice” having the aim to provide the theoretical basis through which I can evaluate the applicability of ICR in the “headscarf conflict”.

Chapter Three gives a general overview of Turkey’s headscarf conflict by indicating the chronology, context and escalatory dynamics of the conflict.

Subsequently, by signifying the current stage of the conflict and the resolution attempts and propositions for the resolution of the conflict the protracted character of the headscarf conflict is evaluated. The main objectives of this chapter are to construct a general picture of the conflict; to provide the ground that will help to pinpoint the positions and interests of the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs within the larger conflict; and to authenticate that the headscarf conflict is a “protracted inter-group conflict with identity and value aspects at the centre”.

In Chapter Four, by using the data from the interviews conducted with the executives as well as the publications and web sites of the CSOs an assessment of the headscarf conflict (in the context of the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs) is presented to the reader. This analysis focuses on the stakeholders’ identity and characteristics; their visions of the headscarf conflict; their relations with each other; societal context in which the stakeholders operate, and their attitudes towards the resolution of the conflict. The contribution of this chapter is that it forms the “analytical framework” of the “headscarf conflict” through which the applicability of the ICR approaches will be evaluated and the conditions that should be addressed in an appropriate ICR approach will be stated.

In Chapter Five based on the general assessment of the headscarf conflict conducted in the previous chapter, a strategy for indicating the fundamental principles of an appropriate ICR process and for choosing the appropriate ICR approach(es) will be built. Strategy building will be based on the perceptions of the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs’ interviewees towards the applicability of the ICR approaches in Turkey’s headscarf conflict; identifying strategic opportunities and constraints for the applicability of the ICR processes; identifying the strategic resources; and identifying strategic objectives that should be taken into consideration in an appropriate ICR approach. ,

In Chapter Six, taking into consideration the theoretical features of ICR approaches and the “analytic” and “strategic” insights of the headscarf conflict, the applicability of the ICR approaches (seven theories of practice according to which the ICR approaches are categorized) in Turkey’s headscarf conflict will be evaluated. However, preceding this evaluation the conditions that should be addressed and taken into consideration in an appropriate ICR process will be indicated. Stating these

conditions will provide an important reference point through which the applicability of the ICR approaches can be evaluated and construct the case specific framework of the ICR process design that can be implemented in the future specifically in the headscarf conflict.

Chapter Seven is the conclusion, which focuses on the implications of this study for theory, practice and future research.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The main objective of this chapter is to construct the theoretical background of this study and to introduce the terms used throughout. In the first part by focusing on the “Protracted Social Conflicts” (PSCs) and stating their definitions, theoretical explanations and characteristics, I will try to provide the theoretical ground for specifying the theoretical characteristics of Turkey’s headscarf conflict as a “protracted” conflict. In the following chapters this theoretical ground would be used as the reference point for identifying the appropriate ICR approach that would be proposed as an intervention tool. Accordingly, in the second part of this chapter the general principles of Interactive Conflict Resolution approaches are introduced and categorized according to their visions towards the nature of protracted conflicts; their macro-goals; micro-objectives; their mechanisms for achieving these objectives; and suggested impact on the wider conflict. Concerning this categorization, the main objective is to provide the theoretical ground through which the applicability of ICR on the “headscarf conflict” would be evaluated and the appropriate ICR approach for the headscarf conflict would be designated.

2.1 Overview of Protracted Social Conflicts: Basic Definitions, Theoretical Background and Characteristics

In the present study, Turkey’s “headscarf conflict” is defined as a “protracted” conflict since it is based on a complex set of historical, religious, cultural, identity and political issues. Furthermore, there seem to be irreconcilable differences involving fundamental cultural, religious, political and personal values emphasized by the

Islamists and Kemalists. Moreover, the headscarf conflict has remained unresolved for long periods of time, escalated and eventually has become stuck at a high level of intensity that appears to threaten the basic human needs and values of a large group of people. The following literature on PSCs forms the theoretical ground for the definition of the “headscarf conflict” as a “protracted” conflict by revealing out how this actual conflict shares many characteristics of the PSCs stated in the literature.

2.1.1 Basic Definitions of Protracted Social Conflicts (PSCs)

Soon after the Cold War ended, many conflict resolution theorists and practitioners began to depict a new group of conflict. Naming those type of conflicts as ethnic conflicts (Horowitz, 1985), they have tried to provide an explanation for the violent post-Cold War environment. However, in time it has become clear that this new class of conflicts often involved identities not strictly associated with ethnicity. Hence to illustrate the phenomena that these conflicts are difficult to manage, intense, stuck, and extremely difficult to resolve (Coleman, 2000) other classifications emerged as well including “protracted social conflicts”(Azar, 1990); “deep-rooted conflicts” (Burton, 1990); “enduring rivalry” (Goetz and Diehl, 1993 Cf. Sandole, 2003); “intractable conflicts” (Kriesberg, 1998) “moral conflicts” (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997) “communal conflicts” (Gurr and Davies, 2003) and recently the common term “identity-based conflicts” (Rothman, 1997)

At first, Azar stated the term “protracted social conflict” (PSC) in order to refer to the ongoing and apparently irresolvable nature of disputes in locations such as the Middle East, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, the Horn of Africa, Cambodia and Africa. (Azar, Jureidini and McLaurin 1978 Cf. Fisher 1997) Azar defines “protracted social conflict” as:

“Mutually incompatible goals among parties, amidst a lack of resolution mechanism cause communal cleavages to become petrified and the prospects for cooperative interaction progressively more poor.” (Azar, 2002: 16)

Likewise, Burton defines deep-rooted conflicts as those:

“...which involve deep feelings, values and needs (that) cannot be settled by an order of from outside authority such as court, an arbitrator or a more powerful nation. These are conflicts which appear to be endless, erupting into emotional displays and even violent from time to time.” (Burton, 1990:3)

Naming these types of conflicts as identity-based conflicts Rothman defines them as:

“... deeply rooted in the underlying individual human needs and values that together constitute people’s social identities, particularly in the context of group affiliations, loyalties and solidarity.... They are rooted in the articulation of and the threats of frustrations to people’s collective need for dignity, recognition, safety, control, purpose, and efficacy”(Rothman, 1997:7)

Similarly, by using the phrase “protracted, intractable conflict”, Coleman emphasizes the enduring and intransigent structure of these conflicts that is resistant for resolution. (Coleman, 2000)

2.1.2 The Theoretical Framework of Protracted Social Conflicts

Most of the conflict resolution theorists and scholar/practitioners claim that understanding the theoretical and idiosyncratic causes that led to the emergence of PSCs is very crucial. Emphasizing the importance of this aspect Azar (1990) and Burton (1990) suggest that if people’s psychological responses to their unfulfilled needs can be understood and addressed, the surface issues that seem to preoccupy conflict loose their significance. Similarly, Druckman (1997) and Kelman (1997) propose that examination of the way in which group attitudes and perspectives feed, escalate and perpetuate inter-group conflict can provide conceptual tools to overcome psychological barriers to peacefully resolving conflict. In the same way as his colleagues, Sandole (2003) also suggests that there is something generic about the psychological processes of conflict, and that an understanding of these processes - the ability to ‘map’ conflict in general - is key to any intervention.

Believing that identifying the sources, preconditions and the theoretical basis of intractable conflicts is very important for identifying appropriate conflict resolution methods, I will indicate to the main theoretical explanations concerning PSCs. In the conflict resolution field, there are many different theories that explain the emergence of

PSCs. Basing their explanations on social-psychological, political, developmental, structural and psychoanalytic theories, the conflict theorists have tried to find out the preconditions and sources of prolonged struggles. In Turkey's "headscarf conflict" the "needs", "values" and "identity" of the Islamists and Kemalists appear to be at the crossroads of the conflict as well. Thus, in this part, I will focus only on the protracted conflicts whose emergence can be theoretically explained with the following theoretical frames: "basic human needs"; "identity" and "values". Although these three aspects are closely related with each other, to denote the effect of each frame on the characterization of protracted conflicts, elaborating on them separately becomes an important undertaking.

2.1.2.1 Basic human needs

Azar, who for the first time has coined the term "protracted social conflict", identifies four groups of variables as a precondition for PSCs: communal content of a society, human needs, the state's role and international linkages. (2002) Indicating all these as preconditions for the emergence of PSCs, Azar puts special emphasis on the concept of "human needs" by stating:

"We are led to the hypothesis that the source of protracted social conflicts is the denial of those elements required in the development of all people and societies, and whose pursuit is compelling need in all. These are security, distinctive identity, social recognition of identity and effective participation in the processes that determine conditions of security and identity and other such developmental requirements." (Azar 1985:60 Cf. Fisher, 1997:83)

As well as Azar, Burton also explains the genesis of "deep-rooted conflicts" with unfulfilled needs by developing his own "basic human needs" theory that takes its origin from Maslow's (1954) work. (Cf. Kimmel, 2000: 12).¹⁰ Developing Maslow's notion of "hierarchy of needs" Burton expands "basic human needs" to include material and nonmaterial needs as: recognition, valued relations, distributive justice, identity, security, autonomy, dignity, belonging, physical needs and personal development needs. (Burton, 1990) At the end, Burton comes up with a unique theory by distinguishing between *needs* which are universal human motivations conditioned by biology; *values*, which are ideas, habits, customs and beliefs characteristic of particular social

¹⁰ In his work Maslow claims that human motivation is based upon a "hierarchy of needs", moving from basic physical requirements up to psychological requirements such as recognition, attainment and fulfillment that are claimed to be biologically innate. (Kimmel, 2000)

communities; and *interests* which are the aspirations of individuals or identity groups within a social system (Burton 1990: 36–38). According to him, only interests can be negotiated, while ‘needs will be pursued by all means possible’ (Burton 1990: 36) that in turn leads to the intractability of all types of conflicts where human relations are at the center.

Although Burton’s theory has found many supporters in the conflict resolution field, it has also been criticized for its emphasis upon genetic determinism and its subsequent failure to take culture and social institutions into consideration. (Scimecca, 1998: 45) For instance, Avruch and Black who are cultural anthropologists ask which specific needs are universal and what is the theoretical basis of their origin. (Avruch and Black, 1993). Christopher Mitchell also (1993) raises the question of whether some needs are more important than others. Although Burton originally saw these needs as genetically based, in a response to Avruch and Black, he modified his position. (Cf. Lumsden et. al. 1996: 39) Burton accepts that humans have a “dual inheritance system”, one cultural and one genetic but he continued to advocate that what is important is the “existence of universal patterns of behavior” (Burton and Sandole, 1987 Cf. Sweeney et. al. 1996).

Burton’s “basic human needs” theory that is used to understand deep-rooted conflicts, has also been criticized for its focus upon "the self" that reflects a Western perspective. (Avruch, 1998) Avruch and Black argue that non-Western societies and cultures are far more group-oriented, and suggest that rather than the individual per se, the need for social attachment may be more dominant in other cultures. (1993) Although the critics of “basic human needs” theory do not call for abandoning the human needs theory, they call for testing the premises in the context of other cultures. Since it is claimed that even for some who support basic human needs as a gateway to conflict resolution and prevention, there is an inherent contradiction between some culturally specific norms such as human rights and human needs. (Scimecca, 1998:43) However, although equating the origin of all protracted conflicts with unfulfilled human needs may seem too simplistic, many conflict resolution scholar/practitioners perceive the satisfaction of these needs as a crucial step for the resolution of PSCs.

2.1.2.2 Identity frames

As an important aspect of “basic human needs”, an important number of theorists have put the identity frame at the center of the fundamental drivers of intractable conflicts. First of all it should be underlined that an identity group generally is defined in ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic or cultural terms. Taking the identity group as a unit of analysis of the PSCs, many theorists of the field argue that through identity groups, human needs are expressed. (Fisher, 1997; Azar, 1990) Supporting this argument Rothman points out:

“When people’s essential identities, as expressed and maintained by their primary group affiliations are threatened or frustrated intransigent conflict almost inevitably follows” (Rothman, 1997:14)

Through this statement it becomes obvious that Rothman emphasizes the identity group as the analytical unit of PSCs and furthermore he labels the PSCs as “identity-based conflicts”. In the same manner as Rothman, Burgess and Burgess also underline that all the causes of intractability are combined in the identity conflicts, arguing that identity conflicts involve conflicts over social status, privilege and the distribution of scarce resources, along with a moral component, since each group tends to believe in its own moral superiority. (Burgess and Burgess, 1996)

Explaining inter-group protracted conflicts with reference to “identity” is a social-psychological and psychoanalytical phenomenon. As a social-psychological concept, “identity” as a source of inter-group conflicts finds its roots in “social identity theory”. Tajfel who is one of the architects of ‘social identity theory’ defines it as:

“ [social identity is] part of an individual’s self concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.” (Tajfel 1978:63 Cf. Brown, 2000: 210)

To put it in another way, social identity is claimed to consist of an individual’s self-image that derive from the social categories to which the individual perceives him- or herself to belong in; and to the value and emotional significance ascribed to that membership. Going further social psychologists even suggest that people satisfy their needs for positive self-identification, status, or reduction of uncertainty by identifying with a group (Hogg & Abrams, 1993 Cf. Maoz, 2000) This in turn leads to favorable

comparisons of the “in-group” vis-à-vis the “out-groups” (Turner, 1987 Cf. Brown, 2000) This leads to differentiation; and stereotyping of other groups generally in hostile terms constructing the basis for the emergence of inter-group conflict. (Tajfel, 1981 Cf. Jackson, 2002) Taking the origin of his arguments from cognitive-social psychological identity theory, Fisher argues that typical competitive orientation taken by conflicting parties fuels the perception of threat and the development of intense ethnocentrism, mistrust which feed ineffective communication and interaction. (Fisher, 2000)

On the other hand psychoanalytically informed identity theory emphasizes how threatened identity rooted in unresolved past loss and suffering launches and perpetuates inter-group conflict. (Ross, 2001) In psychoanalysis, it is claimed that the existence of ‘psychological gap’ between ‘good’ self and ‘bad’ leads to “dehumanization” of the enemy furthering the intractability of the conflict. (Wedge, 1986; Kriesberg *et al*, 1989; Volkan *et al*, 1990 Cf. Gillard, 2000) As Volkan claims, high emotional salience is attached to group differences that are reinforced through symbolic and ritual behaviors binding individuals to their own groups. He also points out that the stories of loss, suffering and historical grievances exacerbate the conflicts and facilitate their intractability. (Cf. Bar-Tal, 2000) To sum up, taking some specific identity theories from the fields of cognitive and social-psychology, and psychoanalysis, several conflict resolution theorists provide a diagnostic mapping of the conflict.

2.1.2.3 Value frames

Differentiating “values” from “needs” Burton identifies values as ideas, habits, customs and beliefs that are characteristic of particular social communities. (Burton, 1990:36-38) Concerning “values” Pearce and Littlejohn argue that culture has a powerful influence on the moral order since systems of meaning and ways of thinking differ from one culture to another so that people from different cultures typically develop different ideas about morality and the best way to live. (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997:49) Similarly Ross argues that by means of culture people locate “self” and “other” through which they interpret the “other”’s behaviours, develop varying degrees of biased inter-group perceptions that involve ethnocentric evaluations and stereotypic lenses causing emotional frustration in the “other” and triggering the emergence of conflicts. (Ross, 2001) However, at this point it should be underlined that not only people’s perceptions, but the policies of the states are shaped by culture. (Rabie, 1994)

In this sense “values” should not be understood in pure cultural domains but also in political and ideological domains.

Relating “values” to “identity”, Pearce and Littlejohn claim that people understand their experience and make judgments about what is important or not through their values and in turn these patterns of meaning shape the way individuals understand facts and issues and help them to develop a sense of identity. (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997:51) In other words acting as a common frame of reference, values strengthen the structure of group and individual identity, providing a shared normative foundation that makes harmonious in-group interaction possible as well as meaningful. Similarly Kimmel argues that as people are socialized, group members learn to centre their judgments on values fundamental to their group identity so that people sharing the similar values have more or less equivalent realities and mindsets. (Kimmel, 2000: 456)

In this sense value based conflicts are claimed to revolve around incompatible preferences, principles or practices that people believe in and are invested in with reference to their group identity. (Fisher, 1989:34) According to Fisher, it is difficult to compromise or accommodate value conflicts because they lie at the center of people’s identities. Therefore, Fisher argues that peaceful coexistence may be the most likely solution for these types of conflicts, involving adherence to some super-ordinate values that allow for differences among subordinate values. Going further he claims that in successful multicultural societies, respect for differences and a valuing of basic human rights must take precedent over the value preferences of any particular group. (Fisher, 1989:34) Similarly Bartos and Wehr argue that value conflicts occur when groups with different world-views, different assumptions about the best way to live or different standards of rightness and goodness stress the importance of different things and develop radically different or incompatible goals. (Bartos and Wehr, 2002: 41)

Defining “value conflicts” as “moral conflicts” Pearce and Littlejohn claim that these types of conflicts involve intractable issues from which the parties are unwilling to compromise. (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997: 50) Subsequently, they assert that because struggles over values often involve claims to status and power, parties may have a great stake in neutralizing, injuring or eliminating their rivals so that any compromise about their values are claimed to be perceived as a threat to their very identity. (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997: 70) Going further they claim that moral conflicts often stem from a

desire to safeguard basic human needs such as security and social recognition of identity so that on some occasions, the continuation of a conflict becomes preferable to what would have to be given up. (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997: 73)

2.1.3 Characteristics of Protracted Social Conflicts

In the literature, many different terms are used to capture the intense, inescapable, complex, traumatic and resistant to resolution characteristics of PSCs. Some of these terms are: “protracted” “destructive”, “deep-rooted”, “resolution-resistant”, “intransigent”, “grid locked”, “intractable”, “identity-based”, “needs based”, “complex”, “extremely difficult to resolve”, “malignant”, “enduring”, “deadlocked” (Burgess & Burgess, 1996; Coleman, 2000; Lederach, 1997) The phenomenon of PSCs is also defined and characterized as: bitter, hostile interaction among groups, where hatred, political and economic oppression and other forms of victimization (perceived or actual) running along identity-based lines and periodically flaring up in acts of extreme violence (Rasmussen, 1997). Yet, there are some scholars who claim that intractability is a “perception”, not a firm characteristic, which can be perceived differently by different people or groups.(Burgess & Burgess, 2003) Meaning that if a conflict is perceived to be intractable, its disputants are likely to engage in desperate measures that in turn increases the intractability of the conflict.(ibid.)

Being inspired from Coleman’s (2003) organization of the distinguishing characteristics of PSCs into highly interactive five categories (see Figure1) , in this part I will review the literature in order to further elaborate on these five categories.




Figure 2.1 Protracted, intractable conflict system

Taken from: Coleman, Peter T. (2003). "Characteristics of Protracted, Intractable Conflict: Toward the Development of a Metaframework–I, *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 9(1), 1–37

2.1.3.1 Issues

Related to the central issues in PSCs, Coleman claims that intractable conflicts tend to involve needs or values that disputants experience as critical to their own or their groups' survival and that as conflict escalates the issues are often transformed and take a threatening character. (Coleman, 2003:4) More specifically, PSCs involve deeply symbolic issues, ideologies, and processes of meaning-construction. (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998) For instance, the tangible issues (land, money, water rights, etc.) that may trigger hostilities in these settings become very important because of the symbolic meaning assigned to them. (Bar-Tal, 2000; Kelman, 1999) In the same way, Lederach and Rothman claim that intractable dimensions of conflicts are often embedded within a larger set of values, beliefs, identities, and cultures (such as the parties' religious beliefs, ethical principles, philosophical worldviews, or cultural traditions) (Lederach, 1997; Rothman, 1997)

Conceptualising conflicts as “a mixture of objective and subjective elements that escalate and de-escalate over time”, Fisher and Keashly propose that “the subjective elements increase and take on greater importance as conflict escalates”. (1991:234) They have described how as conflict escalates the issues tend to shift from “substantive interests and positions to concerns regarding the relationship, to basic needs and values, and ultimately to the very survival of the parties”(Fisher & Keashly, 1991:236) From all these arguments it becomes obvious that although most PSCs involve both resource and identity types of issues, identity-based issues tend to be dominant in intractable situations as it is the case for the “headscarf conflict” in Turkey.

2.1.3.2 Relationship between adversaries

As far as the relations between the adversaries involved in PSCs are concerned, it is argued that as the conflict escalates, the opposing groups become increasingly polarized through in-group discourse and out-group hostilities, resulting in the development of polarized collective identities constructed around a negation of the out-group (Druckman, 1997; Kelman, 1997). Similarly Volkan argues that the anxieties that lie beneath PSCs can act to “blur realistic considerations, lead to irrational actions, and create resistances to change and progress toward adaptive negotiations” (Volkan, 1997: 343).

Coleman differentiates the nature of the relationships that distinguish tractable from intractable conflicts along four dimensions. The first aspect is based on the fact that with intractable conflicts, the relations between the parties develop in situations where exclusive social structures limit intergroup contact. Lack of contact facilitates the development of abstract, stereotypical images of the other, autistic hostilities and intergroup violence. (Coleman, 2003: 20) Secondly, in intractable conflicts, the relationships are claimed to be perceived as inescapable and the parties “see no way of extricating themselves without becoming vulnerable to an unacceptable loss” (Deutsch, 2000: 44). The third character of the nature of the interdependent relationship of the parties in intractable conflicts is claimed to be an intense, often inescapable combination of cooperative and competitive goals, which at their core concern issues are irreconcilable or nonnegotiable. (Coleman, 2003: 21) Finally, Coleman asserts that intractable conflicts that escalate and de-escalate, but persist over time, tend to damage

or destroy the trust, faith, and cooperative potential necessary for constructive or tolerant relations. (Coleman, 2003: 23)

2.1.3.3 Context

Concerning the context in which PSCs are embedded, Azar indicates that many PSCs are rooted in a history of colonialism, ethnocentrism, racism, sexism, or human rights abuses which causes a large power imbalance. (Azar, 1990) Coleman also argues that PSCs regularly occur in situations where a severe power imbalance between the parties exists and where the more powerful party exploits, controls, or abuses the less powerful one. (Coleman, 2000) Azar defines this context of PSCs as “structural victimization” where the identity, security, and right for effective political participation of members of low power groups are denied (Azar, 2002). Complementarily, under “social injustice”, Deutsch claims poverty, environmental degradation or poor access to health care and other forms of structural injustices jeopardize the physical safety and security of people. (Deutsch, 2000) Because of its dangerous effects on marginalized communities, Galtung (1969) labels this pattern of oppression as “structural violence” and claims that the pattern of deprivation–insulation –violence–repression largely accounts for the long-term, cyclical nature of many intractable conflicts.(Cf. Kriesberg, 2003)

2.1.3.4 Processes

In general all types of conflicts are shaped and characterized by idiosyncratic processes that are named as “dynamics” of the conflict, in terms of “interaction” between adversary parties. Tamra Pearson d’Estrée states this general characteristic of the conflicts as:

“Conflict requires “three legs of a stool”: 1- real difference in interests, resources, power, and so on between the two parties, 2-stereotypes, or more general negative schemas or expectations and 3-perceived injustice. Let us add an essential fourth element to this: interaction between the parties. It is this interaction between the parties, the dynamics of the conflict that takes predisposing conditions and turns them into actual conflict.” (d’Estrée, 2003:69)

In that case, it can be argued that in order to understand how the issues and context of conflicts make them “intractable”, a special emphasis should be given to the inner

processes of PSCs. Many scholars in the field claim that over time, a variety of cognitive, moral, and behavioral processes combine to bring PSCs to a level of high intensity and perceived intractability (Fisher & Keashly, 1991; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994). For instance, it is claimed that the cognitive processes that are based on misperception, selective perception, self-fulfilling prophecies, over commitment and entrapment negatively affect the interpersonal, inter-group functioning, their communications, relations, interactions and perceptions. (Fisher & Keashly, 1991; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994) Fisher and Keashly argue that all of these cognitive processes can cause the other side to be viewed as non-human, the relations to be seen as hopeless, the conflict to be framed in terms of survival needs, and the outcomes to be seen as lose – lose. (Fisher & Keashly, 1991) Moreover, as the PSCs that are deeply important to people remain unresolved for long periods of time, they tend to escalate, transform and resurface repeatedly, eventually becoming stuck at a high level of intensity and destructiveness.(Coleman, 1997) Related to this, in the conflict literature there is a widespread thought asserting that intractable conflicts are self-perpetuating. Meaning that the enemy is not the other side, but rather the process of escalation, that takes conflicts out of the disputants' control, and pushes them to act in increasingly extreme ways that would not be considered acceptable.(Burgess & Burgess, 2003) From all these statements related to the inner dynamics of the PSCs, the formation of intractable cycle becomes understandable.

2.1.3.5 Outcomes

Coming to the outcomes of PSCs, it is extensively agreed that their consequences are detrimental, including high loss of life, damage to property, economic costs, division of families and communities, extreme violence and dislocation. (Coleman, 2000; Kriesberg, 1997; Lederach, 1997). In addition to these physical costs, the social and psychological costs are immense too including fear, hatred, anger and guilt that are difficult to deal with while the conflict is ongoing, and that are equally difficult to remedy after the conflict has been resolved. (Kriesberg, 1998) These conflicts tear apart relationships, lead to protracted state of trauma for individuals and communities and challenge institutions which spend most of their time dealing with these issues rather than focusing on their primary goals. (Coleman,2003). At times, these conflicts may subside and appear to be resolved, but if their root causes are not addressed they tend to

resurface and intensify again when external circumstances permit or encourage their expression. If the outcomes do not begin to satisfy the basic human needs, they will lead to the existence of latent conflicts which may cause further cycles of manifest conflicts, often spilling over into new issues and actors. This statement supports Azar's argument claiming that PSCs result in negative-sum that is loose-loose outcomes where there are no winners since all parties to these conflicts tend to be victimized in the process. (Azar, 2002)

2.2 Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR) Approaches as a Method for Resolving Protracted Social Conflicts (PSCs)

In this part of the chapter, definitions of ICR and general similarities and differences between various ICR approaches will be stated. In the last part, I provide a categorization of the ICR approaches under seven "theories of practice" and construct a theoretical reference point through which I will evaluate the applicability of ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict and identify the appropriate approach for the headscarf conflict in the following chapters. Additionally, this categorization of the ICR approaches will be my contribution to the ICR literature.

2.2.1 Definitions of Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR)

Recently, the term 'interactive conflict-resolution' has become widely established to denote:

"small group, problem-solving discussions between unofficial representatives of identity groups or states engaged in complex, destructive intercommunal or international conflicts that are facilitated by [an] impartial third party of social scientist-practitioners" (Fisher, 1997:8).

In a broad manner Fisher defines ICR as:

"facilitated, face-to-face activities in communication, training, education or consultation that promote collaborative conflict analysis and problem-solving

among the parties engaged in PSC in a manner that addresses basic human needs and promotes the building of peace, justice and equality. (Fisher, 1997:8)

Fisher equates ICR with the implementation of conflict analysis or problem-solving discussions in a workshop format that are directed toward mutual understanding of the conflict and the development of collaborative actions to de-escalate and eventually resolve it. (Fisher, 2001) Similarly, Rothman identifies ICR approaches as those used in efforts to create a conflict-resolving environment through problem-solving workshops in which influentials meet with each other; are guided by a panel of third party facilitators; and engage in carefully structured dialogue to gain insight about their specific conflict and conflict processes in general through which they discover new means of creatively resolving their conflict. (Rothman, 1997)

As yet, there is no unified terminology for ICR approach, its representatives have interchangeably used the following terms: “controlled communication”, “problem-solving workshops”, “third-party consultation”, “conflict resolution and prevention” (Ropers, 1995) and “analytical problem solving workshops”, “interactive problem solving”, “human relations workshops”, “inter-communal dialogue”, “sustained dialogue”, “track-two diplomacy”¹¹, “unofficial diplomacy” and “multi-track diplomacy”¹². (Fast, 2002) In the literature, frequently we come across with their interchangeable use, whereas they are not equivalent in their philosophies and methodologies and this complicates the definite position of ICR within the conflict resolution field.

2.2.2 General Similarities and Differences between the ICR Approaches

¹¹ Joseph Montville coined the term “track-two diplomacy” and identified it as unofficial, non-structured interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations directed toward conflict resolution by addressing psychological factors. (Montville,1993) He characterizes track-two diplomacy as complementary to official/track-one diplomacy opening up opportunities for communication, cross-cultural understanding and joint efforts to explore how the needs of the parties might be addressed when official dialogue is blocked or constrained. (Montville,1987 Cf. Fisher, 2002) The methods used under “track- two” diplomacy range from problem-solving workshops to fact-finding missions; from training measures, consultation and organizational development for the new NGOs in the societies undergoing transformation to public relations work in favor of conflict-regulation strategies. (Montville, 1993)

¹² John McDonald and Louise Diamond invented the term “multi-track diplomacy”(1996 Cf. McDonald, 2002) proposing nine tracks of peacemaking and peacebuilding, starting with tracks I and II as proposed by Montville. To these they add several further tracks that work within various sectors of global society to promote peace. These are: track III (private-sector business involvement in peace process), track IV (citizen-to-citizen exchange programs), track V (media), track VI (education and training) track VII (peace activism), track VIII (religion), track IX (funding). (McDonald, 2002)

To provide a well-grounded categorization of the ICR approaches that would be presented in the following part, emphasizing the general similarities and differences among the ICR approaches is crucial. In this sense, the common points of the ICR approaches can be summarized as the follows:

a. “Contact Hypothesis” is the general theoretical basis of the ICR approaches: Building personal, intellectual and even political ties among the groups in conflict are often justified on the basis that such contacts alter hostile stereotypes; increase understanding of the other side’s fears, and help pave the way for inter-group peacemaking efforts. (Saunders, 1999) This common argument in ICR, takes its origin from “inter-group contact hypothesis” that is introduced by social psychologists Gordon Allport in 1954 and is furthered by Pettigrew. Allport (1954 Cf. Dovidio et. al. 2001) argued that bringing members of different groups into contact with one another in various ways is the best way of reducing any tension or hostility, improving inter-group relations, and reducing prejudice.

In Allport’s view however, it is not enough for groups just to see more of each other since he advocates that contact alone would not guarantee inter-group harmony. According to this hypothesis, positive effects of contact occur only when certain essential conditions are met. Allport mentions these conditions as: *equal group status* (it is regarded as important since the groups in face-to-face interaction all expect and perceive equal status in the contact situation); *the support of authority, law, or custom* (local governments, founders, the media and intermediary organizations can function as instrumentals in promoting and facilitating constructive efforts to strengthen inter-group relations); *common goals and inter-group cooperation* (inter-group relations can be improved if there is contact and cooperative interdependence between groups in the pursuit of common and *superordinate* goals).(Cf. Maoz, 2000) For the success of contact theory in reducing inter-group conflict and prejudice, some theorists also mention supplementary conditions. One of these conditions is ‘*contact over time*’ claiming that frequent and sustained contact and cooperation among groups is critical for fostering inter-group relations, overcoming their anger/prejudice and develop trust.(Brewer, 1999) This argument can be indicated as the theoretical basis for the ICR’ s sequential workshop series.

The process of perceptual and attitudinal change through inter-group contact provides a theoretical setting for ICR's notion of "Resolution". Through inter-group contact, in social-psychology literature, four processes of change have been stated. These are: learning about the other group; changing behavior; generating affective ties and in-group reassessment.(Pettigrew, 1998 Cf. Maoz, 2000) New learning is claimed to correct one's negative and incorrect view toward out-group members and discover that in-group norms and customs are not the only ways to manage the social world. Hubbard (1999b) argues that extended contact and communication make people perceive similarities with the other group's members that lead to the reduction of uncertainty and anxiety. Although inter-group contact has important effects on the conflicting parties and on their relationships, there are multiple factors that work to constrain positive outcomes of contact and many criticisms have been raised against its effectiveness. Nevertheless communication and contact with the adversary is supposed to play an important role in interactive conflict resolution field.

b. *The ICR approaches share the common goal* that is based on generating options and alternatives for resolving deep-rooted conflicts through deep understanding, mutual recognition and respect; rather than settling disputes or suppressing differences. (Fisher,1997; Burton, 1990)

c. *All ICR approaches give importance to transfer effect* asserting institutionalization of the group's activities within the environment of conflict leading to changes in public opinion as well as changes in the opinions of governmental decision-makers (Ross and Rothman 1999) that is defined by Kelman as "transfer into political process".(Kelman, 2000) However, this transfer is not only confined to including key participants or influential who have close relations with the decision makers or the capability to affect the decision making process. The transfer affect of the ICR approaches can be also maintained by institutionalizing these approaches by multiplying the number of the participants who go through the workshop experience. (Anderson, 1996)

d. *In all ICR approaches the general character of the third-parties* is based on their "neutrality"; capability of building a trusting relationship with the parties to the conflict (Ropers, 1995); having considerable knowledge about the conflict and the parties in question; knowledge and expertise in conflict analysis, human relations skills,

interpersonal and cross-cultural communication and in small-group processes. (Fisher, 2002)

After stating the commonalities of the ICR approaches, below is the discussion of the main differentiating points of the ICR approaches to be used as a reference point in my ICR typology.

- a.** *The theoretical framework on which each ICR approach is based* on ranges from basic human needs theory, identity theory, and psychodynamic theory to intercultural communication theory.
- b.** *Their general approach to the nature of protracted conflicts and how they can be resolved:* while some approaches emphasize unmet human needs or threatened identity as the source of protracted conflicts; others emphasize cultural differences as well as lack of knowledge and skills (concerning the conflict, its resolution options and the adversary party) as factors increasing the intractability of the conflicts.
- c.** *Methodological tools used during the intervention of each ICR approach* range from reflexive dialogue, analytical dialogue, transcend discourse, relational empathy, communication skills and problem-solving trainings, mourning of past losses, sustained dialogue to other interactive activities including sports, arts and other professional activities.
- d.** *The participants involved in the ICR approaches* range from influentials, middle-range leaders, grass-roots leaders to participants coming directly from the grassroots. However, in general people who are not officials, but who can have an impact on the thinking of decision-makers and society at large are chosen as participants for ICR workshops. Due to this characteristic, ICR is defined also as a “middle-range approach” (Lederach, 1997) where participants are typically invited because of their knowledge of the conflict and their proximity to key decision makers. Mitchell (1993) defines such participants as “opinion-leaders”¹³ – those who are in a position to influence public opinion and similarly Lederach defines these types of participants as “middle-range leaders”. (Lederach 1997)

¹³ Those opinion leaders could be academics, intellectuals, ethnic/religious leaders, humanitarian leaders(NGOs) who have to be known by top-leaders and have connections to the constituency that top-leaders represent.(Lederach, 1999)

- e. *The role of third-party* changes according to his/her type and degree of intervention in ICR workshop. These interventions can be classified under three headings: “content observation”; “process observations” and “theoretical inputs”. (Kelman, 2002) In “content observations” the third-party suggests interpretations and implications of what is being said and point to divergences between the parties and to issues of clarification. In “process observations” the third-party has the opportunity to observe the interactions between the parties at the inter-group level. Yet, this intervention type has great importance for the success of the workshop since interactions between the parties may reflect dynamics of the conflict between their communities. The other intervention type of the third-party where it provides “theoretical inputs”, help participants distance themselves from their own conflict by providing them conceptual tools for analysis of their conflict and offering them relevant illustrations from previous research.(Kelman, 2002:92) In some ICR approaches these three types of interventions are used systematically and simultaneously, whereas in other ICR approaches only one or two of these interventions are used by the third-party. Moreover, parallel to their objectives, the emphasis given to each type of intervention and other roles of the third-party change from one approach to another.
- f. *The micro-objectives/internal objectives*¹⁴ (refer to changes that take place during the actual workshop, and normally include changes at the individual level (Ross and Rothman, 1999)) of ICR approaches change across each type of intervention.
- g. *The macro-goals/external goals* (refer to the “transfer/spillover effect”¹⁵ of the changes occurred in the group process to the wider conflict) of ICR approaches change across each type of intervention.

2.3 Categorization of ICR Approaches: Seven Theories of Practice of ICR

¹⁴ Rouhana classifies the micro-objectives in four categories: “ psychological, such as forgiving the other and achieving psychological healing; interpersonal, such as reducing mutual stereotypes, attitudinal changes, improving interpersonal relationships, and establishing personal relationships across the divide of the conflict; political, such as changing participants’ views about the conflict through mutual learning about the other side’s political needs and political constraints and having participants create new ideas for solving particular problems between the two sides; and educational, such as training participants in conflict resolution logic and tools or integrative negotiation strategies.”(Rouhana, 2001:297)

¹⁵ ICR scholars generally claim that once the relations between the participants of the workshops improve and their perceptions of the conflict change as a result of the contact and dialogue between the adversaries, it will spill over or “transfer” to a wider circle. Thus, in time, this will contribute to a de-escalation of that conflict. How this wider circle is defined changes from one conflict resolution initiative to another.(Çuhadar-Gürkaynak, 2004)

In this part I will differentiate and categorize the ICR approaches under seven theories of practice that have the common concern in providing a step towards the resolution of protracted conflict. While formulating this categorization, I will take each approach's idiosyncratic theoretical framework and their take on each aspect of ICR as a guide. In other words, besides their theoretical frameworks coming from distinct fields, the ICR approaches will be classified according to their visions towards the nature of protracted conflicts and the factors that increase intractability of these types of conflicts ("Conflict"); their visions towards how protracted conflicts can be resolved concerning their specific activities and methodological orientations ("Interaction"); and their objectives that are aimed to be reached at the end of intervention ("Resolution").

Although this "ICR approaches" categorization is inspired by Marc Howard Ross's "Six Theories of Practice in Ethnic Conflict Resolution" (Ross, 2000), the seven theories of practice that will be presented in this study focus not only on ethnic, but all types of protracted conflicts and they are confined to the interactive conflict resolution field.¹⁶ For example, while Ross includes "identity theory" inspired by social-psychology and Saunders' "communal dialogue" process under "psychoanalytically informed identity theory", I categorize these theories of practice under three separate headings: "identity approaches", "psychodynamic approaches" and "communal relations".

In this study, the seven theories of practice under which the ICR approaches will be classified are: human needs approaches; identity approaches; psychoanalytic approaches; intercultural communication; communal relations; principled negotiation; and transformation-oriented elicitive approaches. I will compare the core assumptions of these seven theories of practice concerning their theoretical orientation from which their understanding of protracted conflicts and their resolution emanates from; how each views the nature of protracted conflicts or the fundamental aspects increasing the intractability; the general pathways that they propose to change protracted conflicts; their methodological orientations (best method to transform the conflict); the specific

¹⁶ Ross defines these theories of practice as "less formal procedures that are sometimes called as track-2".(Ross, 2000:1003) However, in this study I differentiate track-2 diplomacy from ICR, since in track-2 fact-finding missions, institution building and organizational development for the NGOs are also included. Nevertheless, with the term ICR I refer to the problem-solving workshops, training groups, consultation and other measures that can be characterized with small-group dialogue process.

effects that are expected on participants and how each practice is supposed to impact the course of a wider conflict beyond its direct effects on the participants. (transfer/spillover effect)

Although while classifying the ICR approaches their concrete theoretical framework will be taken into consideration, since some of the ICR approaches appear not to have a specific theoretical framework or do not denote explicit problematic aspects of protracted conflicts on which they focus, in their categorization I will take into consideration their particular and limited objectives that obviously differentiate from the other approaches in the classification. Concerning all these categorization points it should be underlined that at some levels these theories of practice share considerable commonalities because of the previously mentioned general ICR principles on which they are based. Moreover, some approaches seem to integrate multiple theoretical frameworks or methodological orientations and at that point how they generally approach the nature of protracted conflicts and their resolution will act as a reference point for their classification. (ex. Kelman's Interactive Problem Solving approach that is inspired both from human needs theory, identity theory and psychodynamic theory)

2.3.1 Human Needs Approaches

The ICR processes that are based on "human needs theory" perceive protracted conflicts as deep-rooted conflicts in which "there are frustrations and concerns under the surface that are not negotiable and cannot be repressed, adjudicated by the courts, or negotiated". (Burton, 1990: 13) Putting the unmet, or frustrated, core human needs at the centre of the causes of deeply-rooted (protracted) conflicts, the philosophical orientation of these ICR approaches is to surface, fully analyze and address these needs before any kind of bargaining or negotiation succeeds. (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1990; Fisher, 1997; Mitchell and Banks, 1996) In other words concerning the resolution of protracted conflicts, the supporters of human needs approaches claim that deep-rooted conflicts can be resolved only by the satisfaction of the basic needs through constructive conflict-regulation.

The methodological orientation of this theory of practice is based on analytical problem-solving workshops and analytic dialogues wherein the causes of conflict and the suppressed human needs of each group can be analytically understood and a traditional power bargaining does not take place. (Burton, 1990; Azar, 1990)

Central to analytical problem-solving notion is the hypothesis:

“once the relationships between the parties have been analyzed [*sic*] satisfactorily, once each side is accurately informed of the perceptions of the other, of alternative means of attaining values and goals, and of costs of pursuing present policies, possible outcomes are revealed that might be acceptable to all parties” (Burton, 1990: 205).

Concerning the goals of these approaches Burton states that building a non-threatening atmosphere in which the high-level representatives of the adversaries can discover shared goals and objectives; recognize the common needs; analyze perceptions towards the conflict and each other and explore avenues for resolving are the fundamental goals. (Burton, 1993) Similarly according to Azar the workshop format allows the participants to discuss their grievances with the immediate goal of assessing what is at issue; to differentiate needs from interests; analyse their identity- related needs through effective communication, leading to mutual discovery of and consensus on compatibility of competing goals. (Azar, 2002) Thus Azar also calls “problem-solving workshops” as “citizens’ diplomacy” for their usefulness in initiating contact between parties or for bringing to light possible new solutions. (ibid.) Parallel to Burton and Azar, Mitchell and Banks state that a successful workshop does not resolve a bitter conflict by itself but clarifies options towards which the parties might work. (Mitchell and Banks, 1996) According to Mitchell and Banks the most important success may not be the specific understandings the parties achieve but:

“a sense of reassurance about the possibility of reaching some mutually acceptable solution in the future; a deeper appreciation of the goals, constraints and obstacles faced by the other side; and an awareness of a range of mutually acceptable parameters within which a future solution might be sought. (Mitchell and Banks, 1996:146)

From all these it becomes obvious that in human needs approaches the key is to translate the interests (and positions) of the conflict parties into their underlying needs for collective identity, security, and participation and make them recognize the shared and nonnegotiable character of those needs and how they are central to the

dispute(Burton, 1990) However, these approaches go beyond simple “process-promoting” techniques for achieving greater trust at the interpersonal level whose primary aims are to influence the conflict in the long term and to work to improve relationships at the grassroots level.(Burton, 1993) Thus it should be stated that, human needs approaches attempt to influence leaders and representatives of the conflicting parties in the near or medium term by working with “influentials” to address conflict issues.

2.3.2 Identity Approaches

Although almost all ICR approaches take “threatened identity” as the central aspect for explaining the emergence and persistence of protracted conflicts, the theoretical framework of identity approaches and how they address the identity frame during an intervention processes is my differentiating point. For instance, in human needs approaches “identity” is treated as one of the fundamental human needs through which the participants could reframe their interests and the whole conflict. On the other hand, in the psychoanalytic approaches past atrocities, threats and fears that are incorporated in to the group identity are the focal points and mourning past losses as well as the fears appear as the fundamental tool through which the perceived threat directed to the identity of the parties is addressed. However, under the identity approaches whose theoretical framework depends on “identity theory” coming from social-psychology¹⁷ I categorize the processes that are highly inspired from social-psychology and that put identity frame at the center of their approaches focusing not only on mourning but also on generating options for collective action and focusing on improving inter-group relationship instead of interpersonal one. To sum up, the most prominent character of these ICR approaches that differentiates them from psychoanalytic approaches is their cognitive focused and rationality based character that aim at changing the hostile thinking towards the other group.

¹⁷ Theories of cognitive social-psychology assume that the individual finds psychological security and self-esteem through identifying self with positively valued groups, in comparison to perceiving self as not-like certain negatively valued groups. Thus during intense, damaging conflict, as much psychological distance as possible has to be maintained between in- and outgroups (Turner, 1987). All potential outgroup members are stereotyped (Tajfel, 1981) in the most hostile terms while the self is closely identified with an ingroup whose actions are necessarily just and honourable. Alternative identification of self and outgroup members as in any way similar is therefore threatening to that sense of self, and any sources of such identification are psychologically and bodily rejected (Hewstone, 1989).

Identity approaches define the causes of protracted conflicts in terms of threatened or frustrated identities that are expressed and maintained by group affiliations. (Rothman, 1997; Kelman, 1990) In this sense the satisfaction of basic human needs articulated through identity groups is perceived as the ultimate point for satisfactory resolution. For the resolution of identity-based conflicts Rothman, Chataway&Kelman indicate the importance of articulating and mutually engaging the fundamental identity issues as a precondition for interest-based bargaining. (Rothman and Olson, 2001; Chataway and Kelman forthcoming Cf. Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998)

Concerning the methodological orientation of identity approaches, “reflexive dialogue” where needs and values are voiced and reconciled in the presence of adversaries and where roots of the conflict are dealt with can be given as an example. (Rothman, 1997) Having first expressed themselves and heard each other in this way, parties are encouraged to collaborate in setting new goals and restructuring their relationship through generating positive perceptions to each other. (Rothman et. al.2001) This suggestion of Rothman introduces us with the four phased ARIA model.¹⁸

The macro-goals of identity approaches are based on transforming identity conflicts in order to create a ripe ground base for the implementation of traditional conflict resolution methods including negotiation, mediation and other problem-solving methods; and to produce change in larger social systems, in national policy and in the conflict system at large through participants’ writings, lecturing, political activities and advising of political decision-making. (Rothman 1997; Kelman, 2002)

Accordingly the micro-objectives of the workshops conducted under identity oriented ICR processes (inspired from social-psychology) are confined to produce shifts in how participants view each other; help participants develop problem-solving skills so that common needs can be identified, and proposals that meet the basic needs and many common interests of all parties may be developed (Ross, 1993); produce change through

¹⁸ Antagonism (digging out underlying values, needs through which parties articulate their animosity), Resonance (disputants reflexively articulate their core concerns sought, threatened, or frustrated within the conflict, first to themselves and then interactively. Having truly reframed the conflict in this way allows parties then to turn their attention to a functional focus), leading to Invention (of creative solutions by exploring collaboratively how the tangible issues – or ‘interests’ and objectives – of the conflict can be resolved without threatening the identity of the other.), and Action (to implement them, including negotiation planning or functional problem-solving). (Rothman, 2001: 297-99)

new learning, in the form of new understanding, new insights, new ideas for resolving conflict in particular individuals who participate in the workshop. (Kelman, 2000: 280)

Different from ARIA process, in Interactive Problem Solving (IPS) process there is relatively little effort to have the parties develop specific solutions to the conflict and little interest in the development of interpersonal bonds among the workshop participants. Thus, by engaging politically-active members of each society in compelling positive interactions with the other side, Kelman claims that their pro-peace attitudes and behaviours will be further developed, and through the activities of these participants, the discussion within each society will become more pro-peace (Kelman, 2002). Concerning Kelman's IPS approach it should be also underlined that it is highly inspired from Burton's human needs theory and Doob's training groups. However, since emphasis is given to identity needs and since education effect is integrated as one of the objectives but not as the main objective of the approach, IPS is classified under identity approaches.

2.3.3 Psychoanalytic Approaches

Similar to identity approaches, psychoanalytic approaches explain the emergence of PSCs with threatened identity rooted in unresolved past loss and suffering, putting identity issues at the center. (Northrup, 1989; Volkan, 1988 cf. Tidwell, 1998) However, different from identity approaches their theoretical framework depends on psychodynamic theory ¹⁹ that identifies the "threatened identity" in different terms. Moreover, psychoanalytic approaches can be identified as more "affect focused" or emotion based approaches while identity approaches are more cognitive oriented. The fundamental principle of psychoanalytic approaches is based on the claim asserting that

¹⁹ Similar to the theories of social-psychology, psychodynamic theory describes a 'psychological gap' between 'good' self and 'bad' other, founded on a developmental projection of good and bad images of self into suitable group targets. Thus, during conflict, any perception of self in the 'enemy' other, or of the other in the self, threatens that gap and a regressive crisis of identity follows. Consequently the enemy is 'dehumanized' in order to both account for the enemy's hostility, and to justifying the worst excesses of the in-group's behavior towards that enemy. However, that the in-group and out-group are somehow alike in the way they behave towards each other - that the self and inhuman other are similar - cannot be escaped, and this continual threat to the self drives a dynamic of enmity. (Wedge, 1986; Kriesberg *et. al.*, 1989; Volkan *et. al.*, 1990).

disputants should engage in interactions which first evoke mutual threats to identity and then should offer mutual assurances which communicate an acceptance of each other's core identity and right to exist. (Ross, 2000) The underlying reason lying beneath this proposition is best described by Scimecca:

“Threat challenges identity, which produce defense, which becomes integrated into identity. The end result is that conflict becomes profoundly embedded into the very essence of those engaged in it. Attempt at resolution, then, certainly must cut far more deeply into the collective psyche of the feuding parties than may originally be anticipated.” (Cf. Tidwell, 1998:136)

Psychoanalytic approaches can be traced to the hypothesis of Volkan and Montville who claim that members of opposing communities might ‘walk through history’ and people from conflicting communities explain (and comes to understand) the other's interpretations of emotionally meaningful historical events. (Montville, 1993) To put it in another way, as Volkan claims, until significant loss can be mourned, groups are unable to alter their positions and develop new relationships with former enemies (Volkan, 1988 Cf. Ross, 2000). By identifying four concepts from psychoanalytic psychotherapy, Volkan and Harris summarize the core assumptions of their approach as the following:

[1-] the awareness that events have more than one meaning, and that sometimes a hidden meaning is more important than a surface one; [2-] that all interactions whether they take the form of overt or concealed actions, verbal or non-verbal statements, formal or informal gatherings are meaningful and analyzable; [3-] that the initiation of a process in which problems become the “shared problems” of opposing parties is more essential than the formulation of “logical” or “quick” answers. ; and [4-] that the creation of an atmosphere in which the expression of emotions is acceptable can lead to the recognition of underlying resistances to change. (1992:24 Cf. Tidwell 1998:99)

Taking their notions from these assumptions, the supporters of psychoanalytic approaches claim that if the disputants engage in interactions through which mutual threats to identity are evoked and then communicate each other's core identity and right to exist, a constructive resolution initiative for the resolution of protracted identity conflicts will be formed. (Ross, 1993) The theoretical base of this argument rests on the psychoanalytic defence mechanisms including externalisation, projection and identification, that individuals are seen as using to protect themselves from perceived psychological danger while exercising prejudice, discrimination or conflict. (Volkan 1990 cf. Fisher 1997) Thus, in psychodynamic theory, encouraging the mutual

expression of emotion like sorrow for loss that allows each party to fully mourn them, becomes a necessary step for establishing new relationships.(Montville, 1993) Similarly, according to Ross some modification of hostile psychocultural interpretations of severe disputes must precede efforts to negotiate conflicts of interest since he claims that changes in psychocultural interpretations are sufficient to produce constructive management of most conflicts. (Ross, 2001) Moreover, Ross and Rothman suggest that psychocultural interpretations should be a prerequisite to joint-problem solving. (Ross and Rothman, 1999)

By using ICR workshops as intervention techniques, the supporters of psychoanalysis aim to lower the emotional barriers that originate due to past loss or threats to identity. Since according to psychological perspective, outbreaks of conflict are claimed to be dependent on the appearance of particular perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and motivations, the change of those aspects is indicated as crucial for conflict resolution to occur.(Bar-Tal, 2000) The models based on psychoanalysis also try to change relations between the parties through mutual recognition, encouragement of a sense that agreement is possible, and lowering the parties' fears so that they are able to explore alternatives to continuing confrontation.

Related to the objectives of his psychodynamic problem-solving workshops, Volkan and Harris write:

“... it is not designed to resolve the conflict, but to create an environment in which the psychological barriers that so often impede official diplomacy can rise to the surface, be discussed openly, and then be taken into account in the negotiations of “real world” political issues. (Volkan & Harris, 1992: Cf. Tidwell, 1998: 97)

Similarly Ross also claim that some modification of hostile psychocultural interpretations of severe disputes must precede efforts to negotiate conflicts of interest since changes in psychocultural interpretations are sufficient to produce constructive management of most conflicts. (Ross, 2001)

2.3.4 Intercultural Communication

The framework on which this theory of practice is based emphasizes that it is when the parties are not especially aware of their differences, or of how members of a different community understand particular behaviours, tensions begin to mount. (Hall, 1959 cf. Ross, 2001: 1018) Intercultural communication approaches base the causes of protracted conflicts to the inability of groups with very different cultural beliefs and practices to communicate effectively. (ibid.) In other words, intercultural communication treats cultural differences in communication styles as central in protracted inter-group conflicts. (Cohen, 1991)

One of the intercultural communication approaches is the relational approach introduced by Benjamin Broome. The fundamental objective in this process is the creation of new, shared meaning through relational empathy. (1991) Broome argues that almost all protracted conflicts revolve around dissimilarity in attitudes, perceptions, cultural values, communication style, needs or goals. In order to promote successful conflict resolution, he claims that these differences must be addressed constructively by the participants and he proposes “relational empathy” as a means for understanding how to effectively manage differences in conflict situations. Broome also claims that empathy is associated with many important aspects of communication behaviour, including formulating communicative intentions and goals, devising strategies to accomplish communicative purposes and constructing messages consistent with communicative strategies. (Broome, 1993:98) De-emphasizing similarities, Broome’s relational approach focuses on the creation of third culture between communicators that would provide bases for shared meaning in intercultural situation. Accordingly, the micro-objectives of this approach comprise improving common understanding; increasing participants’ understanding about how their own prejudices influence the development of understanding in the encounter; providing ground for participants to learn to work at merging their views with those of the others and adopt a set of “dialogic attitude” for use in conflict interaction.

The other scholar/practitioner who perceives the cultural differences in beliefs and behaviours as barriers to effective inter-group communication and sources of misperception and distrust, is Cohen (1991). Cohen indicates the cultural differences in communication styles as central in inter-group conflict, and claims that the conflict is exacerbated by the fact that each side has significant trouble in understanding what the

other is saying and as a result is unable to respond effectively on a number of occasions. According to Cohen intercultural miscommunication readily occurs when symbols and rituals which mark and celebrate identity for one group generates threat and fear for another. The basic principle of his approach involves third parties in the peacemaking process who can 'translate' between the parties even when they are apparently speaking the same language so that the third-party would contribute to intercultural communication. (Cohen, 1991)

Another approach that is based on communication theory is presented by Pearce and Littlejohn who focus on moral conflicts and claim that moral conflicts arise from moral differences that stem from different cultures, moral worldviews or social realities.(Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997) Concerning moral conflicts, Pearce and Littlejohn seek to develop new, more productive ways of expressing moral difference and managing moral conflicts. By drawing on the basic principles of communication, the fundamental objective of their approach is to transform moral conflicts and develop new communication patterns which may improve the quality of moral conflicts.(ibid.)

In this sense Pearce and Littlejohn propose "transcendent discourse" to approach the differences. "Transcendent discourse" aims to create a new shared language through which the parties can coordinate their differing world views. They assert that transcendent discourse will require a form of eloquence which bridges the communities. Pearce and Littlejohn argue that transcendent eloquence must be philosophical, comparative, dialogic, critical, and transformative. (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997:157) In other words, they claim that as a methodological orientation "transcend eloquence" must uncover the communities' basic assumptions, develop categories to compare differences, seek to explore rather than convince, assess the strengths and weakness of both worldviews, and seek to reframe the conflict into more productive terms.

All these examples that are based on intercultural communication theory of practice aim to enhance effective communication by increasing the parties' knowledge of each other and by weakening negative stereotypes. More specifically, they try to improve intergroup communication through increasing mutual awareness of barriers to effective communication, emphasizing knowledge of each other's culture, and developing new shared historical accounts. Accordingly, these approaches build their practice around increasing awareness of cultural barriers to effective communication,

such as increasing knowledge of other cultures, and developing less threatening metaphors and images of opponents. Concerning the vision of intercultural communication about the impact of these types of interventions on wider conflict, this theory of practice focuses on developing more effective communication between negotiators (and other group representatives) so that they stay on task and are able to arrive at good agreements, and asserts that if publics understood each other better, leaders would have greater support for peacemaking. (Ross, 2000: 1027)

2.3.5 Communal Relations

Regarding the vision of community relations theory towards root causes of protracted conflicts, it can be claimed that it does not especially concern itself with the root cause of any specific conflict; rather it begins with the reality of intergroup conflict characterized by hostility, polarization, distrust, an absence of cooperation, and that there are continuing incidents which perpetuate the conflict. (Ross, 2000: 1021) The core principle of these approaches asserts that effective conflict resolution requires significant changes in how people from different communities interact with each other at the local level. Fitzduff describes the overall aim of community relations as increasing ‘...understanding, respect, and cooperation between communities...in the belief that such development can assist communities in working together to develop a solution to...conflict that is both just and sustainable’ (Fitzduff; 1993:34 cf. Ross, 2000:1010) Similarly, putting the conflictual relationships among the citizens at the centre, Saunders claims that communal dialogues aim to change relationships between adversaries as the core aspect for long term success in bringing peace even in the most intractable conflicts (Saunders, 1999)

As the leading figure of communal relations approaches, Saunders indicates the methodological orientation in terms of “sustained dialogue” that is used by the citizens in reducing racial, ethnic and other deep-rooted tensions in their countries, communities and organizations. Saunders articulates a “five-stage model”²⁰ that he believes is helpful

²⁰ 1-*Deciding to engage*: identifying individuals willing to risk interacting with enemy, gaining official approval for initiative and creating safe public space

2- *Mapping the relationship together*: participants need to learn to talk analytically about the relationship in underlying interests and emotions

in capturing the unofficial dialogue between conflicting parties. Moreover, Saunders advocates that these stages guide the work through a series of sessions over several years and in practice are not linear and sequential, but having a tendency to jump back and forth (Saunders, 1994 cf. Hubbard, 1999).

Alternatively, Frazer and Fitzduff propose a two-stage theory of action which asserts that community development projects are needed to increase the control of the groups on decisions affecting their own lives, and then the resulting self-esteem will leave them less fearful and threatened, and therefore enable them to meet with representatives from other communities to pursue matters of common interest (Frazer and Fitzduff, 1994: 31 cf. Ross, 2000:1010). In this sense, the starting point for community relations work in this two-stage theory is the development of local organizations which will articulate the needs and concerns of their community in such a way that they can be addressed through institutional channels. The second phase of community relations work is developing constructive local-level interaction and cooperative relationships between people from different groups. The core assumption is that functional cooperation around substantive matters can contribute to the breakdown of negative images and diminish intergroup hostility. (Ross, 2000:1011)

Concerning the objectives of communal dialogues it can be said that they aim to provide an experience (learning) in changing relationships and understanding underlying factors of the conflict within the dialogue group; changing relationships in the larger community; producing a shared sense of what kind of community or country current antagonists would like to build together to serve the interests of each other and designing together a scenario of interactive steps to be taken in the political arena to change perceptions and to increase the possibilities of working together toward objectives that meet shared needs.(Saunders, 1999) Similarly, Frazer and Fitzduff (1994: 25 cf. Ross, 2000:1010) emphasize three key aspects of community relations approaches in protracted conflict resolution including improving communications and understanding between communities; promoting a tolerant acceptance of the existence

3- *Probing the dynamics of the relationship*: participants need to listen with greater sensitivity to the other side's hopes and fears to understand how the other's mind works.

4- *Experiencing the relationship by thinking together (Building scenario)*: the challenge is to have the group experience how to generate change in the relationships by thinking together about how to deal with a particular problem

5- *Acting together*: the purpose is to develop practical ways to implement scenarios so as to have concrete impact on the relationships (Saunders, 1999:97-135)

of a diversity of traditions and cultures; and encouraging structures which safeguard the rights of all members of society.²¹

Concerning the transfer of the changes reached in communal dialogues to the wider conflict, Saunders asserts that involving parties who are not yet ready for negotiation but do not want a destructive relationship to continue is important. (Saunders, 1999) In order to indicate the relation of communal dialogues with formal peace process, he also writes:

“Dialogue, mediation, and negotiation may each play appropriate, even simultaneous, roles in a larger political process for the resolution of deep-rooted human conflicts. The dialogue approach is potentially complementary to the other methods, not exclusive.”(Saunders, 1999:86)

From this argument it becomes obvious that communal dialogues make both intangible and substantive contributions to the pre-negotiation stage. Similarly, Knox and Hughes (1995: 57–59 cf. Ross, 2000:1012) suggest a number of ways in which communal dialogues have been successful, including the establishment of contact in a favourable social climate, the placement of community relations on to local policy agendas and in increasing power-sharing at the local level. It is claimed that the effect of these approaches are twofold including the direct effects they might have in local communities, and their potential impact on the ability to tackle the underlying divisions in the region. At the core of this approach is the hypothesis that ‘as community relations work operates to develop more inclusive communal relationships that will facilitate politics in working out more inclusive political settlements’. (Bloomfield, 1997: 185)

2.3.6 Principled Negotiation

Principled negotiation can be identified as an interest-based approach to negotiation and focuses on the incompatible positions into which groups are locked and altering their inability to devise solutions for mutual benefit. At the core of this theory of practice is the hypothesis claiming that once each side can articulate its core interests and understands those of the other parties, a creative solution to bridging differences

²¹ One interesting way community relations work in Northern Ireland has tried to develop a tolerance of diversity among the different groups is by providing contexts in which contested identities could be affirmed, as Protestants and Catholics learn more about each other’s beliefs and traditions (Fitzduff 1996:36–43,cf. Ross, 2000:1012).

can be generated (Fisher, Kopelman and Schneider 1994 cf. Ross, 2000:1012) Since the central points of principled negotiation (especially the notion of focusing on the interests which underlie seemingly incompatible positions) are widely seen as helpful in the ICR approaches that emphasize needs and motivations over interests. (e.g. Rothman, 1997) Therefore, I include this approach under ICR categorization. Although, principled negotiation has been applied in many PSCs and in many problem-solving workshops, different from the general characteristics of ICR approaches, principled negotiation is relevant in distributional disputes – those which are about the allocation of resources – rather than value based disputes which focus on constitutional or legal rights. (Susskind&Cruikshank, 1987:17 cf. Ross, 2000:1013) Moreover, while principled negotiation seeks agreement which involves all stakeholders and addresses their key concerns, other ICR approaches in general do not always intend to achieve an agreement among the adversaries.

The methodological orientation of the principled negotiation can be categorized under four parts including separating the persons from the problem; focusing on interests, not positions; inventing options for mutual gain; and insisting on objective criteria. (Fisher and Ury, 1991:22) Separating people from the problem means separating relationship issues (or “people problems”) from substantive issues, and dealing with them independently. According to Fisher and Ury, “people problems” tend to involve problems of perception, emotion, and communication²². The second methodological principle is based on concentrating on interests and not on positions. Fisher and Ury differentiate interests and positions by stating that interests are things that people really want and need, whereas positions are what they say that want or need.

²² Perceptions are stated to be important because they define the problem and the solution. While there is an "objective reality," that reality is interpreted differently by different people in different situations. When different parties have different understandings of their dispute effective negotiation may be very difficult to achieve. (This is what we have been calling framing problems.) People problems also often involve difficult emotions — fear, anger, distrust and anxiety for example. These emotions get intertwined with the substantive issues in the dispute and make both harder to deal with. Fisher, Ury and Patton consider communication problems to be "people problems" as well. They list three types of communication problems. First, disputants may not be talking to each other. While their comments are formally addressed to the opponent, they are actually addressing some outside audience. A second communication problem arises when parties are not listening to each other. Rather than listening attentively to the opponent, parties may instead be planning their own response, or listening to their own constituency. Finally, even when parties are both listening and talking to each other, misunderstandings and misinterpretations may occur. (Fisher and Ury, 1991:22-36)

Fisher and Ury claim that if participants are asked about why they are taking those positions, interests may arise and it can be found that both parties' interests are actually compatible but not mutually exclusive so that an important step will be generated towards the resolution of the conflict. (1991) The third methodological principle of principled negotiation is based on inventing options for mutual gain so that negotiators should create new solutions to the problem that will allow both sides to win (win-win approach). The fourth principle focuses on parties' search for objective criteria. Concerning this principle, Fisher and Ury present BATNA as Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. They assert that if the parties do not know their BATNA before getting into negotiations, they may accept an agreement that is far worse than the one they may have gotten, or reject one that is far better than they may otherwise achieve. Being aware of BATNA is claimed also to create alternatives to the negotiation, which in turn increase your power at the table.

Concerning its vision towards spillover affect, principled negotiation theory believes that the skills needed to achieve mutual gains are transferable to others, and that when leaders of contending groups can reach agreements, they are building models for future intergroup cooperation. (Ross, 2000: 1026)

2.3.7 Transformation-Oriented Approaches

Transformation-oriented approaches see problems of injustice and inequality as the main causes of conflict to be understood through competing socially and culturally constructed meanings and attempts to change relationships among the parties through moral empowerment, justice, forgiveness, reconciliation and recognition. (Ross, 2000: 1027) Thus, recognizing the existence of irresolvable conflicts, these approaches suggest replacing the term conflict resolution with the term conflict transformation. John Paul Lederach developed the most comprehensive transformation-oriented approach asserting that a solution cannot be "...pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or minimize the conflicting groups' affiliations..." because "...relationship is both the basis of the conflict and of its long term solution..." (Lederach, 1997: 26) Thus, Lederach asserts that opportunity must be given for people to look forward and envision their shared future..." (Lederach, 1997: 26) In this sense, his recommended approach involves a complex process of reconciliation so that more complex but above all more

accurate images of “the enemy” can be developed. Together with relationship building, capacity building forms one of the major parts of Lederach’s transformational approach to conflict and peace building.

Similarly, Bush and Folger (1994) argue that through transformative conflict resolution the parties are able to change their relationship into one which allows for moral growth ‘by helping them wrestle with difficult circumstances and bridge human differences, in the very midst of conflict’ (Bush and Folger, 1994: 2) They also designate that in the transformation –oriented approaches, the aim is not to solve the conflict but to help transform the individuals involved in the conflict, in terms of moral growth. (Bush and Folger, 1994: 82) Bush and Folger focus not only on the transformation of individuals, but also on the transformation of social institutions in a way that eliminates or reduces differences in power and class privilege (Bush and Folger, 1994: 24) Although Bush and Folger’s transformative approach is presented in the context of mediation practices, since it is generated as a critique towards mediation; it is relevant to a wide range of intergroup conflicts; and aims inter-group empathy that many ICR scholars see as necessary to settling protracted conflicts I categorize this process under an ICR theory of practice.

Concerning the methodological orientation of transformation oriented approaches, Lederach articulates an elicitive, as opposed to prescriptive (one in which the trainer is the expert), approach in which ‘the participants and their knowledge are seen as the primary resource for the training’. (Lederach, 1995: 56) The prescriptive approach is based on the intervener’s understanding of the conflict, whereas in elicitive approaches participants develop their own understanding of conflict and are encouraged to develop local approaches to their problems. In this sense it can be argued that culture is at the core of elicitive practice because culture is treated as a critical resource, not as a barrier, to conflict transformation. According to Lederach, elicitive training requires particular attention to language and metaphors which reveal both how conflicts are understood and possibilities for their transformation. (Lederach, 1995: 73–83) Having participants recounting proverbs and engaging in storytelling helps them to understand how a conflict is framed and to identify possibilities for its resolution.

Central to transformation is not just empowerment, but also ‘seeking resource and root in the cultural context itself’ (Lederach, 1995: 55). In other words, the ultimate goal

of such elicitive approaches is empowerment and ‘the development of appropriate models of conflict resolution in local cultural contexts’. (Lederach, 1995: 63) Moreover, transformation oriented approaches imply a process of changes in a conflict’s manifestation at the personal, relational, structural and cultural levels. (Lederach, 1997) At the personal level a transformational approach focuses on changes in perceptions and attitudes toward the conflict. This suggests an intervention strategy designed to lessen immediate suffering and other psychologically destructive effects of the conflict. At the relational level improvements in interaction and communication can increase mutual understanding and reduce fear and stereotyping.(ibid.) Transformation concerns not only psychological aspects of group relations but social, economic, political and military relations as well. The structural transformation focuses on the social environment necessary to fulfill basic human needs; access to religious, economic, political and administrative resources and opportunities to participate in decision-making procedures. (Rasmussen, 1997) Transformation at the cultural level is about identifying and reshaping the patterns that contribute to increased incidents of violent conflict and promoting indigenous resources and mechanisms that are effective in responding constructively to conflicts. (Lederach, 1995: 55)

2.4 Theories of Practice of ICR and the Headscarf Conflict

After stating the basic differences among the ICR approaches by classifying them under six theories of practice, the reference point for evaluating the applicability of these approaches to the headscarf conflict is formed. In the following chapters by analyzing the headscarf conflict in the context of CSOs, concerning the needs, identity and value aspects of the conflict; positions, interests and needs of the stakeholders; their interactions, relations and capability to act together as well as the strategic opportunities and limitations that have to be addressed for successful intervention the applicability of each theory of practice would be evaluated with the purpose of designating the most appropriate ICR approach(es).

Figure 2.2 Major theories of practice of interactive conflict resolution

	Theoretical Orientation	Nature of Protracted Conflicts	General Pathways to Change Protracted Conflicts	Methodological Orientation	Effects on Participants in Intervention	Transfer: Impact on Wider Conflict
Human Needs Approaches	Basic Human Needs Theory	Unmet/frustrated, core human needs at the centre of deep-rooted conflicts	Surface, analyze, address and satisfy BHN; explore ways to meet them through joint action	Analytic dialogues, analytical problem-solving workshops	Discovery of shared goals and objectives; recognition of the common needs; analysis of perceptions towards the conflict and exploration of avenues for resolving the fundamental goals	Transfer of new perspectives from influentials affect decision-making process and improve relationships at the grassroots level;
Identity Approaches	Social-Psychology Oriented Identity Theory	Threatened/frustrated identities that are expressed and maintained by group affiliations	Satisfaction of identity needs that are articulated through identity groups; jointly act towards creating proposals that meet identity needs ;	“Reflexive dialogue” where needs and values are voiced and reconciled in the presence of adversaries and where roots of the conflict are dealt with	Shifts in how participants view each other; develop problem-solving skills so that common needs can be identified, attitudinal change, new learning	Produce change in larger social systems, in national policy and in the conflict system at large through participants’ writings, lecturing, political activities
Psychoanalytic Approaches	Psychodynamic Theory	Threatened identity rooted in unresolved past loss and suffering,	Lowering fears to allow exploring options; to alter their positions and develop new relationships with former enemies	Mourning of past losses, evoking mutual threats to identity, communicating each other’s core identity and right to exist	Lower the emotional barriers, mutual recognition, explore alternatives to continuing confrontation	New understanding of conflict through changes in discourse and symbolic actions which feed new understanding into the policy process

Intercultural Communication	Dialogic perspective on communication	Conflicts revolve around dissimilarity, attitudes, perceptions, cultural values, communication style, needs or goals; cultural differences in communication styles, beliefs and behaviours is central in inter-group conflict,	Dialogical interaction improves relations; weaken negative stereotypes; improved communication	“Transcendent discourse”; “dialogic attitude” to approach the differences; Relational empathy; Use of third party “translators”	Creation of new, shared meaning, create a new shared language through which the parties can coordinate their differing world views, compare differences, improving common understanding;	Increased communication makes it easier to reach agreements and increased public support for communication
Communal Relations		Social and psychological elements as distrust, hostility, polarization are important factors in generating intractable, deep-rooted conflicts	Changing relationships between adversaries; reducing racial, ethnic and other deep-rooted tensions in their communities, focusing on dialogue within identity groups	‘Sustained dialogue’ used by the citizens; reinforcement from prior successes through local institution building	Increase learning in changing relationships and understanding underlying factors of the conflict; change perceptions and increase the willingness of working together, build community self-esteem	Changing relationships in the larger community; complementary to official methods, increased community capability
Principled Negotiation	Interest-based bargaining	Incompatible positions and zero-sum view of conflict	Once each side can articulate its core interests and understand those of the other parties, a creative solution to bridging differences can be generated	Separating people from the problem; focusing on interests, not positions; inventing options for mutual gain; and insisting on objective criteria	Build analytical ability to identify mutual interests and generate solutions that devise mutual gain	Spread of skills to others; increased sense that agreement is possible
Transformation-Oriented Approaches	Conflict Transformation	Real problems of inequality and injustice expressed through socially and culturally constructed meanings	Through complex process of reconciliation more accurate images of “the enemy” can be developed; relationship and capacity building are crucial for transforming protracted conflicts and to peace building.	Elicitive training which develops culturally relevant models of conflict resolution	More complex but above all more accurate images of “the enemy” can be developed	Improvement of interpersonal or local-level relationships offers a culturally appropriate model which can lead to system-wide change

CHAPTER 3

THE GENERAL OVERVIEW OF TURKEY’S HEADSCARF CONFLICT

Before presenting the assessment of the headscarf conflict in the context of civil society organizations that have definite positions to the conflict, the general overview of the conflict will be presented in this chapter. While presenting the general picture of the conflict the aim is to discuss the context of the headscarf conflict including the chronology, context and escalatory dynamics of the conflict. Subsequently, after indicating the current stage of the conflict and the resolution attempts and propositions for the resolution of the conflict, the protracted character of the headscarf conflict will be evaluated. The main objectives of this chapter are to construct the general picture of the conflict; to provide the ground that will help to pinpoint the positions and interests of the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs within the larger conflict; and to authenticate that the headscarf conflict is “protracted inter-group conflict with identity and value aspects at the centre”.

3.1 The Chronology of the Headscarf Conflict

■ **Tanzimat (Reformation) Period (1839-76):** The dress codes of women start to be debated with the modernization efforts. However; at that time the issue turns around wearing “çarşaf”. (Aktaş, 1990:26)

■ **Republican Period:** In 1925, the first legalization on the dress code requires civil servants to dress like in the civilized nations of the world. In the early years of the Republic there was no legal regulation on woman dress codes in particular.

■ **1968²³:** The first veiling controversy happens. A student of Ankara University Theology Faculty, Hatice Babacan, is dismissed from the school since she is attending

²³ Until the 1960s the constitutional principle related to secularism, together with the laws on dressing was interpreted in such a way that religious covering was banned in public offices including schools.

the school with her headscarf. This is the first event on the headscarf debated in the press. (Aktaş, 1990:27)

■**1980**²⁴: The military regime prohibits the use of head cover for civil servants, with a notice on the proper dress codes stating that headscarf is a symbol of certain ideology.

■**1981**: The Ministry of Education puts into force the regulation that prohibits head covering of students and teachers at secondary educational institutions. (Arat, 2000:4)

■**1982**: The Council of Higher Education (YÖK) forbids female university students to cover their heads while attending classes. (Özdalga, 1998; Arat, 2000) Large scale of protests follows the decision.

■**1984**: As a result of the increasing protests, YÖK allows *türban*, a kind of headscarf covering the head but neither neck nor shoulders, as an intermediary solution. Turban is introduced as “contemporary clothing”. (Özdalga, 1998: 40)

■**1986**: The president Kenan Evren initiates a new sharpening of the regulations by sending a warning to YÖK in which he calls attention to the increasing influence of “reactionary tendencies” (irtica) in society in general and in the universities in particular.

■**1987**: YÖK prohibits any clothing other than modern ones. Since the wording of regulation is not clear the term “modern” is interpreted differently by the universities. Thus the use of scarf is allowed at some universities and strictly supervised at others. (Aktaş, 1990:32)

■**1987**: The Prime Minister Turgut Özal tries to pass a law to relax the dress codes in the universities. The proposal is vetoed by President Evren.

■**1988**: Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) passes a law permitting to cover head and body on the basis of religious faith. (Human Rights Watch Report on Turkey, 2004:24)

■**1989**: This law is annulled by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that it is a breach of principle of secularism threatening the unity of the state, security, and public order. (Abadan-Unat, 1998; Özdalga, 1998).

■**1989**: The right to decide on the issue is left to the individual universities that provide temporary solution while keeping the problem intact. (Özdalga, 1998:42)

■**1990**: The Motherland government passes Law 3670 that provides that “dress is not subject to any prohibition in institutions of higher education, provided that it is not forbidden by law.” (Human Rights Watch Report on Turkey, 2004:25)

When this unwritten consensus was challenged, the authorities needed to formalize prohibitions legally. (Özdalga, 1998) No governmental regulation prohibiting the headscarf at universities in pre-1980 period.

²⁴ The main controversies emerged with the 1980s when a considerable mushrooming in the number of veiled students attending universities, ‘the castles of modernity’. (Göle, 1996)

■**1991:** The Constitutional Court states that covering head with turban or headscarf cannot be allowed since it is against the laws in force.

■**1993:** The headscarf issue is taken to European Human Rights Commission by the application of two university students whose pictures are refused by the university administration to be used in diplomas. The Commission rejects the case on the grounds that a secular university can limit the freedom of performing religious beliefs in order to keep the public order and collaboration of the students who have different religious beliefs.(Özkan, 2005:37)

■**1995:** The politicization of the headscarf issue and the accompanying polarization increases with the Islamist Welfare Party's (WP) coming to power in the general elections.

■**1997:** The WP claims that they would soon lift the ban on turban both for the university students and for the civil servants.

■**February 28, 1997:** The National Security Council, with the initiative of the generals, declares that Islamic fundamentalism is the biggest threat to the security of the country and initiates a process to contain fundamentalist Islam. The process is called "post-modern coup d'état." (Arat, 2000:6) Stricter implementations of the headscarf ban follow.

■**1997:** The closure of WP and the forced resignation of the then Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan

■**1998:** The headscarf is also forbidden in classes, except Koran courses, in Prayer Leader-Precacher High Schools (IHLs) and YÖK stiffens the ban. This leads condition leads to more than 1.000 legal cases in Turkish courts awaiting results. (Human Rights Watch Report on Turkey, 2004:24)

■ **1998:** Three million people perform the greatest massive civil disobedience act in Turkish history, human chain, all throughout Turkey, demanding freedom for education with headscarf. (Ak-Der, 1999)

■**1999:** The turban issue politically escalates by Merve Kavakçı affair. In the general elections, Kavakçı as a veiled woman is elected as a deputy from VP that is also stated as a reason for closing her party by the Constitutional Court. After Kavakçı Affair the regulations against head covering are tightened more in universities as well as high schools. (Göcek, 2000)

■**2002:** The headscarf ban is brought to European Human Rights Court with the application of Leyla Şahin who was a student in Medical Faculty of İstanbul University and had to leave the university because of her headscarf.(Özkan, 2005:48)

■**2003:** With the triumph of Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the general elections, the headscarf conflict spreads to other areas. Since the wives of the deputies, the prime minister and of the assembly chairman are veiled, Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer does not invite their wives to the receptions and official invitations. The concept "public sphere" once more begins to be questioned. (Özkan, 2005: 46)

■**2004:** The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) gives decision on Leyla Şahin case by stating that the headscarf ban in Turkey is not violation of human rights and that the state has the right to make prohibitions in order to protect public order, the pluralism in universities, gender equality and the respect to others.(Özkan, 2005: 49)

3.2 The Context of the Headscarf Conflict

Revealing deep cultural, social, political, and identity cleavages between Islamists and secularists, the headscarf appears as a politicized emblem reconstructing the “otherness”. The identity of women in Turkey has always been shaped through the conflict between Islam and Kemalism which has been the “project of civilization by which the local patterns and the traditional values are dismissed and devalorized” (Göle, 1997:46) to homogenize the society for the sake of the development of the nation-state. In this context, the headscarf began to highlight the tension within the core values of society ranging from secularism of the public space, the place of religion in education, and individual rights to multiculturalism. This controversy has historical origins going back to late nineteenth century when modernization reforms of the Ottoman state created reactions among the Islamic groups. (İlyasoğlu, 1998; Özdalga, 1998)

The aim of the Republican founders was to create a homogeneous secular nation state in the Western forms and a public composed of secular minded, rational, modernized, Westernized, civilized citizen. In this sense the demands of different social groups that can be defined as “other” identities within the society were not taken into consideration. Islamic identity as one of these “others” was perceived as a threat to the secular, republican regime. Accordingly, although a considerable group of secular-minded people have been created and secularized national identity dominated the public space, the tension within the “other” identities to protect themselves has kept alive. (Alankuş-Kural, 1995:79; Göle, 2000:116)

Secularism as a modernist ideology in Turkey is linked to the state’s control of the public sphere. (Göle, 1997: 48) “Turkish secularism has meant the banning of religious orders, dress codes for the public servants and the imposition of certain types of audio-visual programming at state radio stations and television channels”(ibid.: 49) The purpose was to teach and impose a modern way of life and thereby exclude and

marginalize the Islamic identity. The secularism understanding of Kemalism had two dimensions. First to keep religion away from politics and state mechanism; second as to put all the religious organizations and the religion out of the society, both as a cultural-educational policy and as a political-ideological attitude. (Parla, 1993: 200) As a result the Kemalist reform movements, whose main target was the replacement of Islamic-Ottoman culture with modern Western culture, tried to remove both the symbolic and the institutional structure of Islam. (Toprak, 1988: 122)

To indicate the idiosyncratic context of the headscarf conflict, at this point the difference between Turkish secularism (laicism) and the Anglo-Saxon notion of “laïcité” should be further indicated. The new Republic’s secularism was not based upon the separation of the state and religion. Rather, Islam as a religion had been “nationalized” and “secularized” by the state. In other words, the state not only refused any public manifestation of religiosity, but it also monopolized the right to organize religious life and to define the context of what a proper understanding of religion was. (Yılmaz, 2005: 387) Any interpretation outside the official definitions and any religious formation outside state control would therefore be seen as deviant and threatening. However, laïcité that is redefined along more Anglo-Saxon lines forms a more neutral relationship between religion and the state arguing that the state should be neutral on the beliefs, faith, and philosophical orientation of society. (Yavuz, 2000:36)

In this context, it can be said that the struggle between Republican elites and Islamist has taken place in the realm of cultural codes and life styles. It is not therefore surprising that women’s headdress was always and continues to be a major concern for both the Republican secular elites and Islamists since the dissemination of secularism into the daily lives of people is best illustrated by women’s visibility. For the initiators of the reforms unveiling of women was the symbol of women’s emancipation from religious bonds. In this sense woman issue symbolized the cleavage between the Western-oriented rulers and Islamists since dress codes and physical appearance, especially of women, have been significant indicators of the Republican reforms and the project of modernity. (Saktanber, 1994: 102; Arat, 2000: 3; Ilyasoğlu, 1991: 50)

From the viewpoint of the modernity project the headscarf has been regarded as either backward or religious and the women were tried to be freed from religious practices such as veiling and sexual discrimination. Women in urban areas were

gradually adapted to Western types of clothing and left the headscarf in the public realm; but ones in rural areas were keeping on tying their heads with loose scarves under their chin as their traditional wearing. Since 1980s, some women in urban areas began to challenge the concept of secularism and demanded to participate to public realm with their heads covered. However, their style of head covering was distinctly different from the headscarves of rural women. This new type of covering over head, neck and shoulders were called “turban”.²⁵ The demand that occurred among the university students spread out and the turban affair was turned to be the symbol of politicization of Islam in the 1990s. Emergence of these women in the metropolitan centers which are the most modernized parts of the country and at the most prestigious universities makes their protest even more significant. (Acar,1991: 285) In this sense Acar states that “For the first time in Turkish Republic history the conventional view which equated Islam with women’s imprisonment at home was being challenged by the appearance of these women demanding an Islamic way of life through open political struggle in which they used the weapons and tactics of modern democracy” (Acar, 1991: 287)

However, the politicization and turning of the headscarf debate to one of the major issues of Turkish politics is not independent from the political climate in relevant times. In spite of constitutional regulations against using religion for political purposes, Islam gradually integrated to the political system. In the 1990s, the veiling controversy erupted as a significant front within the confrontation between Islamists and military, guardians of the Turkish Republic who perceive headscarf as the ideological uniform of fundamentalism. (Çemrek, 2004:52) The veiled women became more and more visible through their sit-ins in demonstrations and even death-fasts. They were also the invisible hands behind the electoral victories of the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) in the 1995 general elections. (Arat, 1999)

²⁵ As Kadioğlu points out the distinction between “headscarf” and “turban” stems not only from the various styles of head-dress representing different currents but also from the different background education, public participation, and the militancy of the women who cover their hair. (Kadioğlu, 1994: 655) A headscarf is a smaller piece of cloth covering only the head and not the neck. It is worn by the women who follow traditional customs and behavior and whose activities are confined in the private realm usually without an active role in the public realm. Women who wear headscarf mostly reside in small towns and on the outskirts of large cities in squatter settlements that were formed as a result of internal migration. As Kadioğlu observes, women who wear headscarf include elderly women who were youngsters during the modernization reforms of the 1920s and 1930s and who never internalized the new dress codes initiated by Kemalists. To use Kadioğlu’s terms their perceptions are “pre-Kemalist” rather than “anti-Kemalist”. (Kadioğlu, 1994:648)

In 1998, the National Security Council, with the initiative of the generals, declared that Islamic fundamentalism is the biggest threat to the security of the country and initiated a process to contain fundamentalist Islam. (Arat, 2000:6) So called “the 28 February Process” proved the invisible legitimacy of military interference on civilian authority and escalated arbitrary attitudes towards veiled women in the name of national security priority. Beside the ban on headscarf in the universities and the state offices, a further development deepened the conflict following the renewal of the Turkish Parliament after the 1999 elections when Merve Kavakçı attempted to take her oath of office with her headscarf.

Consequently, it can be said that what is at stake about the headscarf conflict in Turkey is the clash between the secular nationalist identity as the bearer of cultural homogenization and the claims of difference in terms of Muslim identity. The female body in this context has been over politicized so that while the Kemalists evaluate the headscarf as the flag of fundamentalism rather than as a religious value of Muslim women, the Islamist political parties appear to use this aspect for generating questions in the minds’ of Kemalists.

3.3 The Escalatory Dynamics²⁶ of the Headscarf Conflict

Concerning the conflictual relationship between the Islamists and secularists, the origins of the headscarf conflict can be traced back to the modernization project of THE early Republican period. In that period the dynamics between the parties can be identified in terms of discussion or debate. Before the revivalism of the Islamic movements in 1980s, covering head was practiced by rural and lower-class women and was perceived as symbol of illiteracy and lower social status. However, in 1980s, when the university students began to cover their heads as a symbol of their identification with the religious movement, the conflict among secularists and Islamist has become eminent. (İlyasoğlu, 1998) In this respect the revivalism of political Islam and subsequently the headscarf ban can be taken as important stages of the conflict,

²⁶ In this part the analysis of the escalatory dynamics of the headscarf conflict would be based on Fisher and Keashly’s (1991) four staged conflict escalation model: discussion, polarization, segregation and destruction. The analysis would be conducted on the basis of the chronology of the conflict stated in the first part.

escalating the polarization among the parties, intensifying their relations and opening a new chapter in the debate over women's headscarf.

Inconsistent policies of the state authorities that kept changing between having a flexible standpoint and exerting strict control turned women's headscarf into a controversial political conflict. In the mid 1990s when the Islamists have begun to shape their demands concerning fundamental human rights, some veiled girls applied to the European Human Rights Commission and in 2002 to the ECHR. At this stage the escalation of the conflict became visible since the issues began to shift from value based to needs based and with the involvement of ECHR as an external actor, the number of parties increased.

The Welfare Party's election in 1995, its policies and 28 February "post-modern coup d'état" have further politicized and escalated the conflict. Over politicization of the conflict by Islamist political parties has even caused polarization among the Islamists since the wrong policies of WP ended in intensification of ban policies and increased the negative perception of the secularists towards the Islamists. Subsequently, the massive demonstrations organized by the Islamists to protest the ban and Women's March against Sharia protest that was organized by the secularists visualized the polarization stage of the conflict. In 1990s, assassinations of the Kemalist intellectuals including Muammer Aksoy, Bahriye Üçok, Uğur Mumcu and Ahmet Taner Kısıralı by radical Islamists constructed another escalatory dynamic. In 1999, election of Merve Kavakcı as a deputy has further escalated the headscarf conflict since the fear and concern of the secularists increased claiming that Islamism began to penetrate the whole society, state and the political mechanisms. These events generated negative attitudes, perceptions, stereotypes, intolerance and "enemy" discourse among the parties towards each other.

Concerning the general characteristics of dynamics/processes of "protracted conflicts" in terms of increased sensitivity to differences and threats (Deutsch, 2000); increased negative attitudes, perceptions, stereotypes and de-individuation (d'Estrée, 2003); negatively affecting inter-group functioning, communications, relations, and interactions (Fisher & Keashly, 1991; Rubin et. al. 1994), it can be argued that the escalatory dynamics of the headscarf conflict definitely fit this characterization. Moreover, the whole process of the headscarf conflict can be defined in terms of a

“Conflict Spiral Model” where each party’s actions influence other party’s responses provoking another round of responses. (Rubin et. al. 1994) This model obviously proves that the enemy is not the other side, but rather the process of escalation that takes conflicts out of disputants’ control, and pushes them to intensify extremism of their actions and sometimes this has been the case for the headscarf conflict. (Burgess & Burgess, 2003)

3.4 The Current Stage of the Headscarf Conflict

Today, veiled girls/women are still deprived of their rights for education and work and this condition appears to create important psychological and economic problems. (Ak-Der, 1999) There are still some daily incidences and debates that keep the headscarf conflict on the agenda. As another outcome of the conflict it can be claimed that the relationship between the Islamists and Kemalists is torn apart still including fear, hatred, anger and antipathy. Additionally, because of the headscarf controversy the state, political parties and even universities had to spend much of their time dealing with the issues of the conflict instead of focusing on their primary goals. All these aspects affect development of the state and the civil society so that a social cohesiveness to work in unity cannot be fully generated.

Although a serious polarization, clash or tension is not observed in the community and although majority of the society supports lifting the ban (TESEV, 1999; IMV-SAM, 1997; TUSES; 1994-2004; AKART, 2002; LDT, 2003) the headscarf conflict is still in deadlock. Negative perceptions of the Kemalists towards the Islamists that can be defined in terms of fear, suspicion and de-individuation prevents emergence of communication channels and makes the secularists ignore existence of the headscarf conflict. Likewise, civilian governments’ hesitance to face military confrontation limits the action area and resolution attempt of current AKP government who opposes the headscarf ban. (Arat, 2000) However, the international pressure, especially the European Union (EU), triggers Turkey in promoting human rights standards and this prevents further escalation of the conflict. Nevertheless, Turkey still continues to struggle with problems in terms of finding some social and political formulas for having both religious people and a secular state.

Taking all these aspects into consideration, concretely indicating the current stage of the headscarf conflict would not be a very precise designation. The conflict seems not to escalate; the Kemalists and the state seem to take unilateral advantage of the current situation and ignore the existence of the headscarf conflict. In this sense, the current stage can be defined rather as a “stalemate”²⁷ (but not a hurting stalemate) in which the Islamists come to regard the conflict as intolerable and entered in a deadlock, generating high level of psychological costs for the veiled women. Obviously, this stage affects many aspects of interpersonal and inter-group functioning so that communication between the Islamist and Kemalists is almost nonexistent, relations are seen as hopeless, the conflict is framed by the Islamists in terms of survival needs, and the outcomes are seen as win–lose. Moreover, it can be claimed that the psychological costs for the two parties are undeniable. The Islamists feel as oppressed, deprived from their fundamental rights, excluded from the society and reduced to second class citizen. On the other hand, the Kemalists have great concerns and fears related to the future in terms of being psychologically oppressed and that their liberties, identities, values and securities would be threatened. However, from the continuation of the headscarf ban that prevents the veiled girls/women to continue their education or work, it can be argued that the costs of the conflict are one sided.

3.5 The Headscarf Conflict as a Protracted Inter-Group Conflict with Identity and Value Aspects at the Centre

In this part, to relate the literature on PSCs with the general characteristics of the headscarf conflict, how the theoretical characteristics of PSCs epitomize themselves in the framework of Turkey’s headscarf conflict will be further elaborated. Concerning the general characteristics of the headscarf conflict, in this study I define it as a “protracted inter-group conflict with identity and value aspects at the centre”. With this definition, I try to denote the intractable cycle of the conflict; the intermingled and incompatible character of the issues that have value and need based importance for each party; and the negative perceptions and stereotypes that dominate the relation between the Islamists and Kemalists damaging the trust and cooperative potential for constructive ways of dealing with the conflict.

²⁷ The reference definition of the “stalemate” is taken from Rubin et. al. (1994)

As it is the case in most protracted conflicts, Turkey's headscarf conflict does not represent a pure type, but involve a mixture of conflict generating aspects combined with misperception and miscommunication. Therefore defining the headscarf conflict as pure "identity based", "value based", "needs based" or "power conflict"²⁸ would not be an appropriate designation. Not to ignore or oversimplify the political, structural, historical and legal aspects of the headscarf conflict I define it as "protracted inter-group conflict with identity and value aspects at the centre".

Concerning the identity and value aspects of the conflict, it can be asserted that they are emphasized not only by the Islamists but also by the secularists, although the secularists seem to focus on political and legal aspects of the conflict more. On the one hand, the Islamists closely identify themselves with their strong religious beliefs so that they demand to enter the public places with headscarf that is claimed to be an indispensable part of their identities. For this reason it can be claimed that with the headscarf ban Islamists' primary group affiliations are frustrated. In other words their identity needs in terms of "freedom for religious expression" and "respect for their religious identity" are violated. The other needs of the Islamists that are at stake include the need for recognition (not accepted in the public places as how they are) political participation (Merve Kavakçı case) and distributive justice (not able to enter the universities and public institutions with headscarf).

On the other hand, if we define the social identity as something that:

"...consist of an individual's self-image that derive from the social categories to which the individual perceives him- or herself to belong in; and to the value and emotional significance ascribed to that membership (Tajfel 1978:63 Cf. Brown, 2000: 210)

it can be easily stated that the secularists closely identify themselves with secularist identity of the state and Atatürkist principles. So that perceiving the visibility of the headscarf in public sphere as a threat to the secular identity of the state, makes the secularists internalize the threat as if endangering their future identity in terms of freedom, recognition and security.

²⁸ Fisher defines the power conflict as a condition when each party wants to maximize its influence over the other. The central issue in power conflict is not scarcity or incompatibility, but question of control and related items such as pride, recognition or other aspects that power may bring. (Fisher, 1989:34) In this sense Turkey's headscarf conflict is highly epitomized by a power struggle comprising political Islam, state and the Turkish Military Forces as the protectors of the secularist regime.

Concerning all these aspects, it can be argued that Turkey's headscarf conflict is not only about wearing the headscarf or not in public places. Comprising identity, value and needs based aspects, the "headscarf" is at the crossroads of the power based relationship between "modernity-tradition"; "civilization-backwardness"; "particularism-homogenization"; "secularism-religion"; "Islam-West"; "Kemalism-Islamism"; "men-women"; "citizenship-pluralism"; "secular national identity-religious and cultural identity"; "political Islam-Islamic way of life"; "public sphere-private sphere" as well as "elitism-populism". Not having a pure character but being generated by complex set of aspects causes an important challenge in theoretically defining the headscarf conflict and in approaching it with a view to develop ameliorative interventions.

Looking at the characteristics of PSCs mentioned in the literature, it becomes obvious that it is difficult to resolve them in terms of breaking the intractable cycle of problematic issues. However, no matter how deep-rooted, widespread, and seemingly "endless" intractable conflicts are, they do end and even more are transformed.(Burgess, 1996) The widespread opinion in the conflict resolution field, related to the constructive resolution of PSCs focuses on the need for a different, multi-faceted, more prolonged, interdisciplinary, innovative, creative means of analysis and resolution including different channels (e.g. using extended dialogue sessions, truth commissions, town-meetings or individual psychotherapy) for transforming intractable conflicts into tractable ones, for re-framing and de-escalating intractable conflicts.(Burgess & Burgess, 1996; Lederach, 1997; Kriesberg; 2003; Burton, 1990; Fisher, 1997; Rothman 1997) This was the notion that led to the emergence of the ICR field and the same notion would provide us with the vision in articulating an appropriate ICR approach(es) through which Turkey's headscarf conflict can constructively addressed.

3.6 Propositions for the Resolution of the Headscarf Conflict

Concerning the resolution of Turkey's headscarf conflict, it cannot be mentioned of a real resolution attempt coming from the state or another internal or external party. "Avoidance" is the main strategy of the state as well as the secularists so that they prefer to ignore the negative affects of the headscarf ban on veiled girls/women arguing

that there is not a conflict within the society. Since the secularists interpret the headscarf issue as a problematic mentality, for a permanent resolution they propose expansion of scientific and secular education. (Behramoğlu, 1998) Having this objective in mind, the state reorganized the status of Quran courses and religious high schools and compulsory education has been increased to eight years. Moreover, some secularist civil society organizations began to organize many education campaigns (e.g. ÇYDD).

On the other hand, a group of Islamists propose holding a referendum to resolve the conflict since the nationwide surveys conducted in recent years conclude that the majority would vote for lifting the headscarf ban. (TESEV 1999; LDT, 2003; TUSES; 1994-2004; IMV-SAM, 1997; AKART; 2002) Similarly, some liberals also support the referendum option claiming that the demand to wear headscarf is democratic right. (Altan, 2005) However, some Islamists and liberals reject the referendum asserting that the right to wear headscarf in public places is a fundamental human right not a democratic right. (Bulaç, 2005; Coskun, 2005) Despite all these insufficient propositions for the resolution of the conflict, the reality illustrates that individuals and groups having different identities and values need to live together politically. In this sense, resolving headscarf conflict by fulfilling the needs of both parties becomes inevitable.

Concerning all characteristics of the headscarf conflict stated in this chapter, the intractable character of the conflict becomes obvious revealing how difficult it is to resolve it in terms of breaking incompatible cycle of the problematic issues. However, as Burgess argues no matter how deep-rooted, widespread, and seemingly “endless” intractable conflicts are, they do end and even more are transformed. (Burgess, 1996) At this point for the constructive resolution of the headscarf conflict the need for different, multi-faceted, more prolonged, interdisciplinary and innovative means of analysis and resolution comes to the fore. Evaluating the applicability of the ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict in the following chapters I will try to denote the appropriate ICR approach(es) that would provide promising step towards transforming this intractable conflict into tractable one in terms of empowering parties to re-frame and re-define the incompatible issues; generate a common language; eliminate the negative stereotypes and perceptions towards each other and the conflict; and to create alternative options and common ground for approaching the conflict.

CHAPTER 4

ASSESSMENT OF THE HEADSCARF CONFLICT

Analyzing “protracted social conflicts” with “subjectivist approach”²⁹ has great importance, since the escalation of these types of conflicts involve particular perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and motivations all of which need to be addressed for conflict resolution to occur. (Azar 1990; Kriesberg 1998) As Reimann (2002:4) claims, analyzing intractable conflicts from a pure objectivist approach, by seeking the origins of these types of conflicts only in the social and political structure rather than in the perceptions of the parties involved, leads to conservative and status quo oriented approach to conflict resolution. Therefore, in this chapter taking the civil society organizations as the crucial stakeholders in this study representing the parties of the “headscarf conflict” in Turkey, I analyze the conflict focusing on the perceptions, attitudes, identities, interests and unmet needs of the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs.

The aim of this chapter is not to conduct a sociological or qualitative analysis of the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs but to conduct a preliminary assessment of the conflict in terms of providing a general introduction to the stakeholders of the headscarf conflict from which the ICR workshop will draw from while selecting participants. In this sense, classification and categorization of the CSOs in terms of their “pro” and “anti” positions towards the headscarf ban is indispensable. Through this dichotomous grouping the main difference between the adversary organizations will be easily revealed out. However, this dichotomous representation should not be seen as an attempt to underestimate the similarities that exist between these organizations. The ultimate

²⁹ The subjectivist approach to conflict focuses primarily on the perceived incompatibility of goals. The essential implication of this approach is that many goals are subjectively perceived as incompatible, whereas from an objective point of view they can be thoroughly compatible. This may be due to misinformation, cultural misunderstanding, or misperceptions such as stereotypes, mistrust and emotional stress. (Reimann, 2002)

objective of this stakeholder analysis³⁰ is to provide the framework through which the applicability of the ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict can be evaluated in the following chapter.

For this stakeholder analysis³¹ three main sources will be used. These sources include secondary sources related to the headscarf conflict and to the concerned Kemalist and Islamist CSOs; publications, web pages, press releases, bulletins, monthly journals of the organizations, and semi-structured interviews with representatives from Islamist CSOs (Ak-Der, Mazlum-Der, Özgür-Der selected as Islamist CSOs) and Kemalist CSOs (ADD, ÇYDD, Turkish Women's Union selected as Kemalist CSOs). These interviews constitute an additional source of information for the analysis of attitudes, perceptions, and relations of the stakeholders. The numbers of interviewees for each organization are not selected with the concern of methodological representation but rather with the purpose of identifying potential participants for the ICR workshop. The terms interviewee and representative are used interchangeably and denote the executives or executive committee members of the organizations.

4.1 Parties to the Headscarf Conflict

4.1.1 Primary Parties

Taking into consideration the headscarf conflict beginning from the early Republican era the primary parties can be collected under three groups. The first primary party is the state that is involved in the headscarf conflict through the decisions and prohibitions of the Council of State, Constitutional Court and the Council of Higher Education; the Turkish Military Forces that act as the ultimate arbiter of the Republican

³⁰ The "Stakeholder analysis" can be defined as an approach for understanding a system by identifying the key actors or stakeholders in the system, and assessing their respective interest in that system" (Grimble et al. 1995 cf. Ramirez, 1999). In other words, the "stakeholder analysis" refers to the identification and description of stakeholders on the basis of their characteristics, interrelationships, positions and interests related to a given conflict. Stakeholder analysis can help to discover existing patterns of interaction, analytically to improve interventions, to assess their capacities towards the resolution of the conflict. (Engel, 1997)

³¹ The number of interviewees for each organization is as the following: Ak-Der (1); Özgür-Der (1); Mazlum-Der (2); ÇYDD (3), ADD (3) and Turkish Women's Union (2).

regime; and the government³². The other parties in this camp can be identified as the Kemalists, (conservative) secularists³³, modernizing and western-oriented elites who can be also defined as the supporters of the headscarf ban. On the other hand, the traditional and reactionary conservatives that can be grouped under the term Islamists³⁴ construct the oppositionist primary party to the headscarf conflict.

At this point it should be stated that neither Kemalists nor Islamists are homogeneous since they are comprised of moderate and extremist groups. For instance, Kemalists include a group that can be called as liberal-secularists who oppose the headscarf ban claiming that wearing it in public places is a democratic right. On the other hand, the Kemalist group that can be identified as “nationalist-conservative” oppose the democratic essence of such a right. (Kozat, 2003) Concerning these aspects, in this study using the term “Kemalists” I refer to the conservative secularists. On the other hand, although as a group the Islamists collectively oppose the headscarf ban, concerning their characteristics and goals the Islamists should also be differentiated among themselves. Among the Islamists there is a group that criticizes the state’s discriminatory regulation of the Islamic practices and suggests a political-legal resolution through non-violent means. The members of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) can be given as an example for this group. On the other hand, there are radical Islamist groups such as Hizbullah whose goals can be defined in terms of violent struggle; or there are followers and believers of some religious sects as Fethullah Gülen sect or some other political and intellectual groups. (Tugal, 2002,) However, in this study without differentiating the Islamists among themselves or emphasizing the Islamist-Islamic differentiation, I will use the term Islamists to indicate their homogeneous position to the headscarf ban.

³² Although “government” (hükümet) can be identified as an important institution of the state, not all the governments have political vision or ideology parallel to the official one. Especially concerning the headscarf conflict when political parties with Islamic tendency come to power considerable controversies have occurred among the government and the other institutions of the state.

³³ Using the term “secularists”, I refer to those who do not consider Islam to be a major frame of reference in their social interactions. This is not to say that they do not believe in or practise Islam. Nevertheless, they find such practices to be cultural rather than political and argue that religion is a private affair, they always oppose to the public manifestations of religious symbols and practices.

³⁴ The words “Islamic” and “Islamists” are different. Islamic, from the perspective of secularist groups, denotes religious devotion and thus has a limited compatibility with secularism. The term Islamist implies a politicized and fundamentalist form of Islam that makes use of religion and has a strong opposition to the secular foundations of the Republic. To avoid such negative attributions, Turkey’s Islamists assert on every occasion that they are Islamic or Muslim people (İslami Müslüman kesim).

4.1.2 Secondary Parties

One of the secondary parties to the conflict can be identified as “liberals” since they have the potential to affect the conflictual relationship between the adversary parties. This group consists of intellectuals, scholars, journalists, some liberal and human rights CSOs that argue that state does not hold any right to intervene in the private life of individuals and that everybody is free to dress in the way s/he wishes. They underline the “tolerant” attitudes, which are necessary to avoid exaggerating the question. Furthermore, although it has a very heterogeneous structure some of the feminist³⁵ groups can also be taken as a secondary party. Emphasizing the discrimination against women because of their dress codes and indicating that men with same religious beliefs are not deprived of their rights, some of the feminist groups support the women rights concerning the headscarf ban. In the mid-1980s with introduction of human rights, democracy, liberalism and feminism concepts in Turkey, the secondary parties and their positions in the headscarf conflict began to crystallize. (Çakır, 2000)

4.1.3 Interested Third Party

The application of two veiled university students to the European Human Rights Commission in 1993 and Leyla Şahin’s application to the European Court of Human Rights in 2002 identified these foreign legal institutions as external third parties to the headscarf conflict. Moreover, the European Union that requires Turkey to promote universal human rights standards can be indicated as another external party. The international human rights organizations as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are also interested in the headscarf conflict concerning the violation of human rights issue of the conflict.

³⁵ The feminists do not have a homogeneous structure. Kemalist feminists, socialist feminists, radical feminists and civil activist feminists can be defined as some of the subgroups of the feminist movement in Turkey. In this study, with the concept “feminist” I refer to the feminist intellectuals of 1990s and the socialist feminists of late 1980s who were gathered around the journal *Kaktüs*. I do not categorize the Kemalist feminists as secondary party but classify them in the secularist group as a primary party.

4.2 Choosing the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs as Primary Stakeholders³⁶

From the abovementioned characterization of the primary parties to the headscarf conflict it becomes obvious that they are not homogeneous but composed of different sections organized under different institutions. All of these actors are important stakeholders to the headscarf conflict. However, my intention in choosing the CSOs as the level of analysis in this study is closely related to the ICR perspective that defines the executives of the organizations as important opinion leaders. (Lederach, 1997) It is claimed that once the relations between the participants (that would be the representatives of CSOs in our case) of the ICR process improve and their perceptions of the conflict change as a result of the contact and dialogue, it will spill over or “transfer” to a wider circle affecting the decision-making process. (Keashly and Fisher 1996: 245) Another reason for choosing the CSOs as the stakeholders in this study is their capacity to form affective pressure group. Besides their ability to affect the macro-process (official-decision making), the CSOs have the ability to affect public opinion through the writings and other activities of their representatives who work in academia, media, private sector, education or jurisprudence. Furthermore, through their campaigns the CSOs have the capacity to form close relations with the grassroots and this increases their efficiency in transferring the successful changes in the ICR approaches to the society.

In this study the word “stakeholder” stands for the Kemalist and Islamist civil society organizations that have clear interests and positions in the context of Turkey’s headscarf conflict. Since our aim is to conduct a stakeholder analysis categorizing the CSOs according to their “pro” and “anti” positions towards the headscarf ban, not each CSO but the group that they form along the headscarf conflict will be analysed. The organizations that are chosen to represent these groups will illustrate also the “in-group” differences that will construct important strategic insights for choosing the appropriate ICR process.

³⁶ The definition of the word “stakeholder” is “a person with an interest or concern in something” (Ramirez, 1999) However, “stakeholder” does not only refer to individuals, social entities as groups or organizations that have an interest or are active players in a system can also be defined as stakeholders. In the conflict resolution field, “stakeholders” can be defined as the groups that share a common interest towards the conflict or are affected by it in a similar way. Moreover, the stakeholders are also the central actors for the resolution of the conflict.

The stakeholder analysis will be conducted under four main parts including: identity and characteristics of the organizations; structure of the conflict; relationship among the stakeholders; societal context in which the stakeholders operate, and attitudes of the stakeholders for the resolution of the conflict.

In the “identity of the organizations” the general group identity that the Islamists CSOs form around the headscarf conflict and in-group variations will be analysed. Concerning their in-group variations, the general characteristics of the organizations will be stated including their demographic structures, founding principles, objectives and activities. The aim of this part is to provide the framework through which the emphasized issues, needs, values, fears, concerns, objectives, perceptions and desired changes of the stakeholders towards the conflict and stakeholders’ relations with the adversary party can be easily understood.

In the “structure of the conflict” part, stakeholders’ perceptions towards the conflict; and of the critical issues pertaining to the conflict will be analysed. Related to the issues emphasized by the organizations it should be underlined that the aim is not to analyze all of the mentioned issues by each CSO. Therefore although some issues are not mentioned by some of the organizations or if only mentioned during the interviews, but not in their publications or web sites, these issues will still be presented to illustrate a general stance on the issues important for the CSOs. Categorizing these issues according to the needs and values of the organizations concerning the headscarf conflict has strategic importance for two reasons. The first reason is to identify if there are any compatible issues among the adversary organizations. The second reason is to identify the most important issues for each party that should be addressed in an ICR workshop process. However, being aware of the fact that a third party’s prioritization of the conflicting issues is risky undertaking, I will categorize the issues according to the emphasis given to them by the CSOs and their needs based and value-based character. Since for the resolution of protracted conflicts the fulfilment of basic needs has great importance, the need-based issues will be prior in this categorization.

In the “relationship among the stakeholders” part, the networks and other groups that the stakeholders belong to; interaction and communication between the stakeholders; the stakeholders’ perceptions towards each other and variation in their groups will be analysed. The relationship between the stakeholders have indisputable

strategic importance since it reveals information about the dynamics of the conflict; provides significant insight for the constraints and opportunities for the resolution or transformation of the conflict; and gives a hint for the vital aspects that should be addressed in an ICR process.

In the “attitudes of the parties for the resolution of the conflict” part, the visions and proposed solutions of the stakeholders for dealing with the conflict will be analysed.

In the “societal context in which the stakeholders operate” part, the relation between the civil society organizations and the state will be analysed. At this point it should be clarified that the term “state” will be continually used and it does not refer to the government or political parties in power, whereas it refers to the military-bureaucratic elites and the representatives of this mentality. For instance, although the Islamist CSOs are sometimes very close to the political parties in power since they do not have a close stance to the official ideology they would be claimed not to have close relations with the state. The objective of analysing the CSOs-state relationship is to understand if the civil society organizations can be successful in affecting the decision-making process. This analysis will be a central aspect in designating the capacity of the CSOs to produce spillover affect in terms of transferring the outcomes of the appropriate ICR process to the decision-making process.

4.3 Islamist Civil Society Organizations

I collect the CSOs that oppose the headscarf ban under the name of “Islamist CSOs”. Throughout the study, the word “Islamist” is used to denote the Islamic tendency of the organizations and the strong Muslim identity of their founders, executives and members. By using the concept “Islamist” I *do not* try to construct a relationship with political Islam or fundamentalism. Although, in the study the two concepts are interchangeably used, the difference between the terms Islamic (*İslami*) and Islamist (*İslamcı*) should be clearly stated since it denotes an important restructuring in Turkey. From the perspective of Kemalist groups, the term “Islamic” denotes religiosity and devotion and thus is claimed to be more compatible with secularism and Kemalism. On the other hand, the term Islamist implies a politicized and

fundamentalist form of Islam that is claimed to make use of the religious sources and oppose to the secular characteristics of the Republic. To avoid such negative attributions, Turkey's Islamists as well as the representatives of the CSOs with which I have conducted the interviews assert that they are Islamic or Muslim people (*İslami Müslüman Kesim*) not "Islamist" as Kemalist groups perceive.

4.3.1 Identity of the Islamist CSOs

The Islamist CSOs appear to form a group identity manifested by the strong value attributed to the headscarf and their strong religious beliefs. This identity formation can be traced back to the early Republican Period since the Islamist CSOs mentioned the modernization project starting in that period as the breaking point. Emphasizing how the secular ruling elites tried to externalize the visibility of Islam from the public places, the threatened identity of the Islamists comes to the fore. Accordingly, the identity of the Islamists appears to be shaped around strong religious values and the threat (perceived and actual) of being discriminated and excluded by the secular elites.

After stating the positions of the Islamist CSOs towards the headscarf conflict their group norms become eminent. However, analysing the founding principles, demographic structure, objectives and activities of each organization will obviously reveal the variations among them. These structural variations among the organizations will provide the framework through which we can better understand their relations with the Kemalist CSOs and the state; their perceptions towards the Kemalists and the headscarf conflict; and their objectives and desired changes concerning the conflict. Although the objectives and interests of these Islamist organizations seem to be similar, they do not have the same identities. As Akşit et. al. indicate the variation among the identities of the Islamist CSOs can be epitomized by the demographic or gender aspects as well as the difference in their ideologies. (Aksit et. al., 2004: 664)

Ak-Der: Ak-Der that was founded in 1999 is defined as a human rights organization founded by students who lost their education rights and lawyer, doctor, teacher, lecturer, other officials who were dismissed from their job just because of their headscarves. (AK-DER-Regulation Section 3, n.d.) Likewise, the executive of Ak-Der identifies the organization as a civil initiative formed by people who take the

responsibility to struggle towards the headscarf ban and against every kind of women discrimination. (26.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)

Although Ak-Der is founded by women; all of its members are women and has some common projects with other women organizations in the context of gender based problems, it does not appear to define itself in gender based aspects.³⁷ However, looking at the character of its members/founders as well as its area of interests that is confined to discrimination against women, child education, education of women and improving the women status in Turkey it can be presented as a women organization. Nevertheless, as Plagemann asserts, Ak-Der is an exception among the Islamist women organizations because of its activities concerning human rights violations. (Plagemann, 2002:384)

Özgür-Der: Like Ak-Der, Özgür-Der was also founded in 1999, when the headscarf conflict was in escalation; by a group of students who have suffered from the headscarf ban as well as journalists, lawyers, authors and representatives of some civil society organizations.(Pusch, 2002: 467) Although Özgür-Der can be identified as a women organization since most of its founders and members are women, in its sociological analysis of the Islamist CSOs Akşit et al. define Özgür-Der as a “human rights organization” characterized by strong Islamic identity. (Akşit et. al., 2004: 670) Even though the organization is founded to take an action for equal rights to education, in terms of the headscarf conflict, Özgür-Der’s area of interest is not only confined to the headscarf conflict but includes various other fields of interests as F type prisons, Iraqi invasion, Palestinian conflict etc. (17.05.2005, interview, İstanbul) Moreover, concerning their demonstrations, activities, projects and press releases as well as the interview with its representative it becomes obvious that except for its actions with Ak-Der, Özgür-Der does not work with any other women organization. All these factors confirm that Özgür-Der cannot be characterized on gender basis. Furthermore, Özgür-Der’s strong relation with the journal Hak-Söz reveals another dimension of its identity.

³⁷ Identifying itself as a “human rights organization” and the executive’s clear rejection to define Ak-Der as a feminist women organization reveals that Ak-Der does not emphasize its gender based character. Although, the representative rejected to define Ak-Der as a feminist women organization, concerning the headscarf conflict during the interview she indicated how women are affected from the headscarf ban while the men with strong religious beliefs were not affected at all. A similar argument is made by the previous executive of the organization. (“Tuba Akyuz ile Gorusme”, 2004) These statements have an implicit stance blaming men with strong religious beliefs and these kinds of statements are generally expressed by women who are defined as Islamic feminists.

In Ankara the organization is represented in the office of Hak-Söz and Hak-Söz is the monthly journal of the organization. The most important thing is that Hak-Söz can be identified as a Radical Islamist journal (Erkilet, 2004: 683) and this condition clarifies the identity of Özgür-Der; explicates its firm, conservative and pessimistic vision towards the headscarf conflict; and its highly critical attitude towards the state.

Mazlum-Der: Mazlum-Der was founded in 1991 by lawyers, authors, publishers and businessmen with various Islamic tendencies. (Plagemann, 2002: 377) The representative of Mazlum-Der defines the organization as a civil institution that deals with human rights and indicates that regardless by whom and towards whom; any violation of human rights is placed on the agenda of Mazlum-Der. (02.05.2005, interview, Ankara) Consistently, in its web site Mazlum-Der is defined as an organization defending freedom of expression for all kinds of political views and thoughts; supporting all activities organized by anyone as long as they respect human rights; opposing all kinds of human right violations committed by anyone and struggling against the abuse of universal human rights for the sake of political benefits. (“Mazlum-Der’in Amacı”, n.d.)

From the abovementioned aspects it becomes obvious that although Mazlum-Der is known as an Islamic-human rights organization, the Islamic characteristic of the organization is not so much emphasized. As Plagemann (2002: 382-384) argues it can be stated that Mazlum-Der has been experiencing a transition in recent years from an Islamist orientation to one which pays attention to human rights defined on a universal basis. This differentiates Mazlum-Der from the other Islamist human rights organizations including Özgür-Der. The effort for such a transition can be explicitly seen at the central office of the organization. While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is hung on one wall of the room; the veiled secretary and the Quran in the library of the chairman symbolize the characterization of Mazlum-Der which locates itself between Western and Islamic values.

4.3.2 Islamist CSOs’ Identification of the Headscarf Conflict

Ak-Der identifies the headscarf conflict as a political conflict claiming that it originates from a political, ideological, elitist mentality that generates discrimination against women. (Ak-Der, 1999: 210) Accordingly, the representative of the organization

asserts that the headscarf conflict should not be defined as a social problem since there is not an actual clash between covered and uncovered people who live together peacefully. (26.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) Designating the application of wrong policies as the source of the headscarf conflict, the organization rejects the definition of the headscarf conflict in terms of a religious problem since headscarf is stated to be worn not because of the misinterpretation of Islam but because of religious beliefs and religious necessities. (ibid.) Although the founding principle of Ak-Der is presented in terms of “struggling against every kind of discrimination against women” (Ak-Der, 1999:5), its previous executive rejects to identify the headscarf conflict as a gender based conflict. Instead the ban is evaluated as a party line process directed towards all the people having strong religious beliefs. (“Tuba Akyuz ile Soylesi”, 2004)

Similarly, Özgür-Der defines the headscarf conflict as a political conflict that has no legal basis and that originates from double standard state policies and problematic mentality of the state that violates the fundamental human rights. (“Double Standards”, n.d.; Şekerci, 2005) To denote the origins of the conflict, Özgür-Der also calls attention to the modernization project of the Turkish Republic as a process rejecting the old traditional values, creating new nation, changing the traditional clothing styles of women and perceiving the headscarf as a threat. (17.05. 2005, interview, İstanbul) Likewise, stating that the headscarf is not a new phenomenon for the Turkish society and that it goes back, in belief and traditions, as far as fourteen centuries, Mazlum-Der maintains that when the headscarf began to irritate the partisans of the state ideology, the propagation claiming that the regime is under threat has come to the fore. (Ensaroglu, 2004) Similarly, defining the headscarf ban as the continuation of the modernization project that started in the latest periods of the Ottoman Empire, Ak-Der also asserts how Islam has been evaluated as an obstacle to the modernization of the society and as the main reason for the backwardness of the society. (Ak-Der bulletin1/2, 2004: 2-5)

Concerning the headscarf conflict, Mazlum-Der defines it as a problem of freedom and a matter of human rights. (Mazlum-Der bulletin 63, 2004: 20) Accordingly, the representative of the organization argues that the headscarf conflict should be defined in terms of discrimination against women which brings restrictions to their work and

education rights; and intolerance against different dress codes. Going further, the interviewee also defines the headscarf conflict as an identity conflict stating:

“I think that there is an aggression towards more than one identity. People’s beliefs, preferences and the way they choose to live are inseparable parts of their identity. Doubtlessly, there is intolerance towards this fact.”(02. 05. 2005, interview, Ankara)

Consistently, in its web site stating that the headscarf conflict is not a legal conflict since it has no legal basis, it is affirmed that the students wearing headscarf confronted with an obligatory choice in terms of giving up either their beliefs that are part of their identities or their educational rights. (Yılmazoglu, 2004)

To sum up, Islamist CSOs perceive the headscarf conflict as one of the most important problems of Turkey that should be immediately resolved. Strangely, although Özgür-Der that is an Islamist CSO is built to struggle with the headscarf conflict, it appeared not to give an immense importance to the headscarf conflict claiming that the problematic mentality of the state is the real problem generating all other problems in Turkey. This reveals an important faultline among the Islamist CSOs. While Ak-Der and Mazlum-Der seem to separate the headscarf issue from the state regime, the main concern of Özgür-Der appears not to be the headscarf or its freedom but changing the regime. However, since these are some inferences deduced from the statements of the representatives, in a face-to-face dialogue with the Kemalist CSOs, Özgür-Der would have the chance to correct if there are some misinterpretations or obviously explicate what is meant by changing the problematic mentality of the state.

4.3.3 Issues emphasized by the Islamist CSOs

4.3.3.1 Need based issues

4.3.3.1.1 Need for identity and recognition

- *Respect for and recognition of religious identity; freedom of religious expression:* Veiled women’s demands to freely express their religious beliefs and their resistance against the headscarf ban as well as their withdrawal from education, career, and jobs

reveal the strong identity aspect within the headscarf conflict. Islamist women as well as a number of academicians document how covering their heads and leading Islamic lives allow veiled women to exercise autonomy and express their identities, at times in opposition to their parents who disapprove of their headscarves, at times against the state or social pressure (Arat, 1991; Göle, 1996; Özdalga, 1998). Taking into consideration sociological research on veiled women, it becomes obvious that they belong to recently urbanized and educated social groups who have broken away from traditional popular interpretations and practices. (ibid.) In this sense, the demand of these girls to cover their heads can be interpreted as an identity need rather than a cultural or traditional one and protecting their identities appears to be the central issue for them since the headscarf ban experience is perceived as a threat to their group's survival.

Accordingly, living according to the Islamic precepts, religious beliefs, preferences and wearing headscarf are defined by the Islamist CSOs as inseparable parts of the Islamists' identity. To put it more specifically, concerning identity needs of the veiled women, Ak-Der argues that the headscarf is an indispensable part of the veiled women's identity and claims that prohibiting their entrance to the public places threatens their survival in the social life. (Ak-Der, 1999:120) To indicate that wearing headscarf is a strong identity and religious need from which no concession can be given, the representative from Ak-Der stated:

“By taking off our headscarves we could have continued our education and had job today. However, thousands of girls did not accept this because this is our life style, our religious belief and part of our identity. I was not forced to wear this headscarf and no one can force me to take it off.”(26. 05. 2005, interview, Istanbul)

Similarly, underlining the need for identity in the conflict, Mazlum-Der argues that people's beliefs, preferences and the way they choose to live are inseparable parts of their identity. (Yılmazoglu, 2004) As a continuation of this statement, Mazlum-Der asserts that creating the “other” nourishes the stereotypes that are used to legitimize the state's pressures on the “other”, generating hatred within the civil society towards the “other”. (02. 05. 2005, interview, Ankara) Although in this assertion the “other” is used by the organization to refer to all oppressed groups of the society, in terms of the

headscarf conflict the “otherness” is used to refer to the people with strong religious beliefs. Accordingly, another interviewee from Mazlum-Der adds:

“In Turkey a religious person is equated with the internal enemy, looking for an opportunity to rebel, making plans to take the state control, taking money from Iran to cover her head, traitor. Consequently, the victims of this identification will damage our own society. The growing hate and rage will harm the society” (12, 06, 2005, Istanbul)

These words obviously reveal the threatened identity aspect and its potential in creating social conflict.

To sum up, in the context of the headscarf conflict the Islamist organizations argue that with the headscarf ban the religious identity is not tolerated, respected and recognized whereas it is attacked. The headscarf ban is defined by the Islamist CSOs as an attempt to eliminate the visibility of Islam in public places and freedom for religious expression is identified in the context of liberties and human rights. In this sense to be recognized as how they are, without trying to change them is specified as the main demand of the veiled women by the Islamist organizations.

- *Freedom to control her/his own way of life*: The headscarf ban is evaluated by the three Islamist CSOs as the state’s control on people’s dress preferences. For instance, Mazlum-Der identifies the headscarf ban as disrespect to dressing preferences asserting the needless, meaningless and ridiculous character of this application and claiming that the decision of a state about how the individuals should dress seems unreasonable and illegitimate. (Selamet, 2000) Accordingly, Ak-Der defines the way of dressing as a personal choice into which the state may not intervene even if it originates from religion, fashion or personal preferences. (26.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)

4.3.3.1.2 Need for justice

- *Economic well-being in terms of education and work opportunity*: Since the headscarf ban prohibits entrance into public places (including the universities and the public institutions) with headscarf, the veiled women are claimed to be deprived of their rights to have education and work. Related to the field of education, Özgür-Der indicates that everybody has the right to take education service and because of a dressing code, depriving a girl of going to school or work is a real discrimination and violation that lies at the heart of the headscarf conflict. (Sekerici, 2005) Similar statements are also found

in the press releases, web sites and publications of Mazlum-der and Ak-Der. This need is presented by the Islamist CSOs in terms of violation of the human rights claiming that because of his/her wearing style, nobody can be deprived of the right to have education.

- *Equity*: Generally the Islamist organizations appear to emphasize that the headscarf ban is a double standard policy discriminating against the veiled women. In Galtung's term this can be stated as a "structural inequality" (2002) so that "discrimination against women" issue appears as a need based issue where the need for justice is at stake. In the context of the headscarf conflict, the central issue emphasized by Ak-Der is the discrimination that women have to live with. In its bulletins, web site and during the interview it has always been emphasized how women are discriminated and have to give up their jobs and educations as well as their social and insurance rights just because of their wearing styles. Defining the headscarf ban as a political, ideological and elitist mentality discriminating against women and by emphasizing the fundamental human rights, democracy and the citizenship rights, Ak-Der indicates that they oppose the discrimination against women due to their dressing styles and claims that the headscarf conflict should be immediately resolved by lifting the headscarf ban. (Ak-Der, 1999) Similarly, related to the discrimination against women Mazlum-Der argues that women and especially girls are the most affected group from the applications of the headscarf ban. It has been claimed that either the girls who continued their works or educations by taking off their headscarves or the girls who went on wearing the headscarf at the price of quitting their work or studies at the university are not happy and comfortable with their choices and have psychological problems caused by disassociated personality. (Ensaroğlu, 2004) In the context of the headscarf ban rather than indicating discrimination against veiled women aspect, Özgür-Der indicates the headscarf ban as an attack against the Islamic beliefs and all the people with strong religious beliefs.³⁸

4.3.3.2 Value based issues

The abovementioned need based issues are indicated as common needs by the Islamist CSOs. In this part, value based issues mentioned by the Islamist CSOs in their web sites, publications as well as in the personal interviews with the representatives will

³⁸ For more information about Özgür-Der's position to the headscarf ban look at : http://www.ozgurder.net/cgi-bin/index.pl?mod=news;op=news_list;id=11

be listed. These are values pertaining to human rights and liberty; democracy and citizenship Rights; values concerning women's status; social peace; public sphere.

4.3.3.2.1 Human rights and liberty

In a general sense the Islamists claim that wearing headscarf as a basic right and liberty can neither be removed by legislative organs, nor can be subjected to referendum, since head covering of a religious woman or her request to take part in public life with her headscarf is not a democratic right but an essential right. (Bulaç, 1998) Indicating the headscarf ban as a violation of fundamental human rights, the Islamists also claim that people covering their heads as a necessity of their religious beliefs are becoming deprived of their educational rights and public services that limits their essential rights and liberties. (Koru, 1987) Emphasizing human rights aspect, some of the Islamists do even reject the proposition of referendum as a resolution for the headscarf conflict.

Similarly, the Islamist CSOs perceive head covering of a religious woman and her request to take part in public life with her head cover as her essential human right. In this sense the headscarf ban is identified as the violation of fundamental human rights by the Islamist CSOs in particular. (Şekerci, 2005; Ak-Der, 1999; Ensaroglu, 2004) To put it more specifically, emphasizing the educational rights in the context of human rights, the headscarf ban in high schools, colleges, universities or in any educational settings is defined by the Islamist CSOs as a violation of educational rights. Likewise, Mazlum-Der asserts that everyone, without discrimination, has the right to have education and because of her/his clothing, nobody can be deprived of education. (Mazlum-Der Bulletin-63, 2004)

Besides human rights issue the aspect of liberty is also strongly emphasized by the Islamists who argue that wearing headscarf is a requirement of their religious faith which in turn is an inseparable aspect of their identity and that in secular states everybody should have right for religious freedom. (Bulaç, 1998) Accordingly, Mazlum-Der presents the freedom to believe or not to believe; to practice, profess, learn, search and teach their fate in the context of liberty and appear to have an important value for the Islamists. In this sense the interviewee identifies the ban as violation against the freedom for thought, religion, and conscience. (12. 06. 2005,

interview, Istanbul) By giving the argument of Kemalist CSOs that is: “headscarf is not a religious duty since it is not mentioned in Quran as a duty (farz)” as an example, according to Mazlum-Der discussing if wearing headscarf is a religious duty or not, is the attempt of the ban supporters to legitimize one of the interpretations of Quran leaving the other interpretations aside that is a complete violation of individual freedom. (02.05.2005, interview, Ankara)

4.3.3.2.2 Values concerning women’s status

Although this issue is generally presented in the context of violation of human rights and liberties, since the woman is at the centre of this conflict and her veil is perceived as a battleground by the adversary parties, value related to women’s status is especially important to mention for both the Islamists and Kemalists in this conflict. For the Islamists in general and veiled women in particular, women’s status has an important role in the conflict since the headscarf ban discriminates “only” against women, deprives them of their fundamental rights, and forces them to give up their identities. (Barbarosoğlu, 2000) According to the Islamists, the veiled women define their headscarves as a symbol of their devotion to God not as an acceptance of the imprisonment of men and assert covering their heads as their personal choice not an external enforcement. (Ramazanoglu, 2001)

The necessity for recognizing the veiled women without trying to change them and giving them equal rights is another value mentioned by the Islamists. Especially the Islamist women organization Ak-Der strongly emphasizes the women’s status issue by asserting that men with strong religious beliefs are not deprived of their rights. (Kaplan, 2004) Taking into consideration the headscarf ban, the Islamist women maintain that because of their wearing styles many veiled women lost their rights to work and be educated, whereas men with strong religious beliefs are not deprived of their rights for education or other liberties. (Ak-Der, 1999)

4.3.3.2.3 Democracy and citizenship

For the Islamists, this issue has an important value since they claim to be deprived of their democratic rights in terms of political participation, freedom for education and work. Islamists define democracy as a regime in which different

ideologies are freely expressed and where there is no authority, order or principle above the preferences of people. (Bulaç, 1998) Freedom of speech, press, walk, association, dress and belief are stated as the main aspects of democracy. At this point it becomes obvious that Islamists closely relate democracy with the human rights and this relationship reveals the relative importance of human rights for Islamists compared to democracy. The liberty to wear headscarf is indicated as a democratic and citizenship right claiming that a person who gives taxes and completes his/her citizenship duty has the right to benefit from the services provided by the state. (Selamet, 2000)

4.3.3.2.4 Social peace

Social peace is raised as another central value by the Islamist CSOs who fear that if the headscarf conflict cannot be resolved in the future, the social peace might be threatened generating polarization in the society. It is claimed that prejudices, generalizations, accusations and the “enemy” discourse directed towards the Islamists would damage the society since it would lead to growing hate and rage.

Criticizing the double-standards, prejudices, stereotypes and generalizations of the state towards people having different life styles, the representative of Mazlum-Der says:

“Of course among the veiled women and their supporters there may be some people who desire to impose their own beliefs to others as soon as they gain power. But the solution for this problem is not restriction of the beliefs. It is not right to regard all women who wear headscarf as a backyard of a certain political thought.”(02. 05. 2005, interview, Ankara)

Concerning this situation, the organization asserts that an approach that accuses and charges all individuals of a group, harms the social peace and that it is not reasonable to block a group of people from living freely just because of the fear for future. (Ensaroğlu, 2004)

To sum up, the Islamists point out the continuation of the headscarf conflict and the prejudices generated towards the Islamists as the fundamental aspects challenging their value related to the continuation of the social peace. Contrarily, the Kemalists indicate the over-politicization of the headscarf and the exploitation of religion as the main factors threatening their core values related to the social peace.

4.3.3.2.5 Public sphere

Although many controversial arguments have been stated about where the public sphere begins and ends, the absolute truth is that the public sphere is a battleground representing the power relations between the parties to the headscarf conflict. As an indicator of the characteristics of the state and the society; and the power relationship between Islamism-Kemalism; modernity-traditionalism and homogenization-pluralism, both parties have very different values regarding the definition and use of public sphere.

Raising the public-private sphere issue; the organizations underline that the religious beliefs of veiled women order them to expose their identities not only in the private but also in the public places so that women with strong Islamic beliefs do not have the chance of not wearing headscarf in the public sphere.(Özgür-Der, 1999) Maintaining that not wearing headscarf in the public sphere is unacceptable for the veiled women it is claimed that Islam orders them to cover their heads especially in public place.(Şekerci, 2005) Besides the necessity of the religious orders, the Islamists also argue that the right to wear headscarf in public realm is a requisite of citizenship, civil rights, liberty and fundamental human rights and forbidding its usage is anti-democratic and authoritarian.(Yılmazoglu, 2004)

4.3.3.3 Other issues

4.3.3.3.1 Politicization of the conflict

The Islamist CSOs also indicate the historical context of the conflict in terms of the modernization project through which Islam has been evaluated as an obstacle for the modernization of the society and as the main reason for the backwardness. (Aksoy, 2004) This mentality is presented as the political aspect that has initiated the conflict.

4.3.3.3.2 Legal issue

The Islamists who demand freedom for the headscarf, reveal their legal interests by referring to the “freedom of religious expression”; “discrimination before law due to religious belief”; “right to education” and “right to political participation” articles that are guaranteed and protected with 1982 Constitution. (Arat, 2000) Accordingly,

emphasizing the legal part of the conflict the organizations emphasize that the headscarf conflict is not a legal conflict since it has no legal basis and that the headscarf ban has been enforced de facto and based on decrees. In this sense the conflict is defined by the terms of “practical implication” and “despotism” affirming that the students wearing headscarf confronted with an obligatory choice in terms of giving up either their beliefs or their educational rights. (Ak-Der, 1999; Özgür-Der, 1999; “Meselenin Hukuki Boyutu”, n.d.) In this sense, it can be stated that the Islamists raise women’s right to veil themselves concerning the principles of liberty, while the state and the secularists refer to the principle of secularism when justifying the headscarf ban. In other words, it can be argued that although the legal principles through which the adversary parties express their interests are not necessarily contradictory, in the headscarf conflict they have come to clash.

4.3.3.3.3 Giving service-taking service issue

Although this issue can be grouped under the public sphere issue, it appears to be the only issue on which consensus can be reached among the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs. Concerning this issue the executive of Mazlum-Der stated:

“Although we support the freedom in every sense, at least the conflicting parties may reconcile on lifting the ban at the “taking service” level. People who argue that a police or a judge (people who give service) cannot wear headscarf may accept that the student can take education service or a patient can take health service regardless of her dressing style.” (02.05.2005, interview, Ankara)

From this issue it can be inferred that even though the Islamist representatives supported the “complete freedom” for the headscarf, they indicated that in the short term the veiled women can be given the freedom to take service in terms of taking education or health service, whereas the ban may continue on those who are in the giving service field which prohibits the veiled women to become public officials as judge, police, teacher or doctor.³⁹ Apparently, consensus on this issue would not solve the conflict since it is proposed by the Islamists as the initial step for the complete lifting of the ban.

³⁹ 12.05.2005, interview with representative from Mazlum-Der, Istanbul;
17.05.2005, interview with representative from Özgür-Der, Istanbul

4.3.4 Relation with the Kemalist CSOs

4.3.4.1 Networks and other groups that Islamist CSOs belong to

The networks of the Islamist CSOs and their relations with the other civil society organizations reveal the potentials and obstacles for improving their relations with the Kemalist CSOs.

Analysing the demonstrations, joint press releases and activities of Ak-Der it becomes obvious that, they work with Mazlum-Der and Özgür-Der among the Islamist organizations and with İHD as a non-Islamist organization.⁴⁰ However, the common point of these organizations is their work in the field of human rights and their emphasis on the violation of human rights and educational rights. (Plagemann; 2002: 384-385) As it can be inferred from this network, having similar attitudes and positions towards the headscarf ban is the main reference point used by Ak-Der in choosing its partner organizations.

Similarly the organizations with which Özgür-Der works in terms of organizing meetings, demonstration and joint actions can be stated as Mazlum-Der, Ak-Der, Hukukçular Derneği as well as İHD and TAYAD.⁴¹ Concerning Özgür-Der's difference from Mazlum-Der, the representative of Özgür-Der states that Mazlum-Der has a more universal character fighting with all types of human rights violations not only with the ones directed towards Muslims. (17.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) This is also stated by Plagemann in his analysis of the Islamist CSOs. (Plagemann, 2002:370-378) TAYAD and İHD (Human Rights Organization) are leftist organizations with which Özgür-Der works not only in the context of the headscarf conflict but also in some other political issues.

⁴⁰ For more information about the CSOs with which Ak-Der works look at <http://www.ak-der.com/>; Ak-Der bulletins 1(2)- 2004, 1(4)-2004, 2(5)-2004; Plagemann (2002)pp: 384-385; interview with the representative of Ak-Der on 20.04.2005, Istanbul

⁴¹ For more information about the CSOs with which Özgür-Der works look at Akşit; Serdar &Tabakaoğlu . (2004: 664-670); <http://www.ozgurder.net/> ; <http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/>; <http://www.mazlumder.org/>; <http://www.haksoz.net/>; interview with the representative of Özgür-Der on 20.04.2005, Istanbul

Taking into consideration the relations of Mazlum-Der with the other CSOs, Ak-Der, Özgür-Der, Başkent Women's Platform and İlk-Der can be listed as the women organizations with which Mazlum-Der has some joint activities.⁴² Since these organizations are founded by women suffering from the headscarf ban, their work with Mazlum-Der is based on organizing meetings, demonstrations and press conferences in which the headscarf ban is protested, its negative affects are expressed and an immediate resolution is demanded from the state.

Besides these women organizations, İHD (Human Rights Organization) is the primary leftist organization with which Mazlum-Der cooperatively works in the context of the headscarf conflict as well as in other human rights violations issues. (Plagemann, 2002: 387) The representative of Mazlum-Der states that İHD's definition of the headscarf ban in terms of "human rights violation" provides the ground for their cooperative work in relation to the headscarf conflict. (02.05.2005, interview, Ankara) Both of these organizations are working on the issue of human rights, and shelter people from different social groups who suffer from mistreatment of the state. (Plagemann, 2002: 370) In this sense, it can be stated that discourse of suffering brings together these two CSOs despite their different political tendencies.

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are the international partner organizations of Mazlum-Der. (20.05.2005, interview, Ankara) In its web site it is also indicated that these organizations strongly underline the "violation of educational rights" and the "discrimination of women" issues in the context of the headscarf ban. ("İnsan Hakları Örgütleriyle İlişkiler Komisyonu", n.d.)

4.3.4.2 Interaction and communication with the Kemalist CSOs

Concerning the relationship of the Islamist CSOs with the Kemalist CSOs, it can be stated that there is very poor interaction and communication between them. For instance, some of the Kemalist women organizations including Turkish Women's Union are even not known by the executive of Ak-Der. (26.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) The well known Kemalist organization among the members of Ak-Der is ÇYDD since the founder of this Kemalist organization has been one of the most active supporters of the

⁴² For more information about the joint activities of Mazlum-Der with women organizations look at http://www.basortusuneozgurluk.com/detay_03.asp?id=22; "Barış İçin Sürekli Kadın Platformu" Retrieved from: www.ihd.org.tr/kadin/cagri.html; <http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/>; www.ihd.org.tr/ana.

headscarf ban. (Ak-Der, 1999: 156-157) Although the representative of Ak-Der states that she does not have sympathy towards ÇYDD, in 2004 Ak-Der organized a picnic inviting many different CSOs, including ÇYDD and the representative indicates that no problem occurred during the picnic. (26.05.2005, interview, Istanbul; Ak-Der Bulletin(2), 2004)

As an active member of Turkish Directorate General on the Status and Problems of Women (DGSPW), Ak-Der also had the chance to work and have meetings with other women organizations including ÇYDD, TKB and Ka-Der on gender based problems without experiencing any conflicts while working together.⁴³ However, the general attitude of Ak-Der in terms of improving its relations with the Kemalist CSOs can be easily inferred from the statement below:

“The Kemalists think that when we begin to look like them and think like them, we will be on the right way. They do not recognize and accept me as how I am. Since this is the case I do not think that we can meet on a common ground. I recognize them as how they are; therefore I want to be recognized as how I am. If they would accept us only by changing us, we have nothing to do with them.”(26.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)

From this statement it becomes obvious that for Ak-Der working together or organizing a common project with a Kemalist CSO seems impractical and difficult.

Concerning their relations with the Kemalist organizations, Özgür-Der emphasizes that neither Özgür-Der nor the Kemalist CSOs have had a demand for coming together, trying to solve the headscarf conflict or to find a common ground in other issues. (17.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) Looking at the bulletins, joint demonstrations, activities and press releases supports the claims of the representative who says that they had never had a joint action, project or meeting with the CSOs that have very opposite and contradictory positions and interests.⁴⁴

The representative of Mazlum-Der spells out their relationship with the Kemalist CSOs with the following words:

⁴³ For more information look at: <http://www.kssgm.gov.tr/liste.html>

⁴⁴ Look at <http://www.ozgurder.net>

“We are not against for coming together with these Kemalist CSOs, we do not have any prejudices like we will never come together, talk or discuss with them. We sent invitations for our meetings and conferences to all CSOs but these organizations never came.”(02.05.2005, interview, Ankara)

Mazlum-Der has worked together with ÇYDD in the Turkish Human Rights Consultative Committee although their joint work in the committee is based only on expressing their own thoughts.⁴⁵

4.3.4.3 Perceptions and stereotypes

In general the Islamists claim that by prohibiting some types of wearing styles neither a religious nor a modern and secular society can be constructed. (Aktaş, 1990) Resisting to be defined as backward, the veiled women also reject to define modernization in terms of Western clothes, life styles and tastes. (ibid.) Sharing the same classes, educations, and professions but asserting at the same time their aspirations for an Islamic identity the veiled girls are claimed to produce their own modernity that is different from traditional Islam. (İlyasoğlu, 1998; Gole, 1996)

Accordingly, Ak-Der, Özgür-Der and Mazlum-der are completely against the mentality of the Kemalists who are claimed to perceive the enlightenment of the society and the modernization of the state in terms of wearing hat, listening to classic music or banning the headscarf.⁴⁶ For instance, Ak-Der argues that the Kemalists try to externalize all religious aspects from the society, in order to modernize the state since they take the uncovered women as a symbol of modernity. (Ak-Der, 1999: 158) Consistently, highlighting the abovementioned arguments, the interviewee from Ak-Der perceives the education projects and campaigns of the Kemalist women organizations as the practical aspect of their attitudes towards women with strong religious beliefs.⁴⁷ Similarly, Özgür-Der underlines that modernizing Turkey in terms of banning the

⁴⁵ "Türkiye'de İnsan Hakları, Güncel Gelişmeler, Sorunlar ve Çözüm Önerileri Paneli" Retrieved from: <http://www.ozgurpolitika.org/2002/12/12/hab01b.html>; interview with the executive from Mazlum-Der on 02.05.2005, Ankara

⁴⁶ (Ak-Der). *"Near history of scarf ban by photographs: With pleasure"* (1999) İstanbul: Değirmen Yayınları; (Mazlum-Der) *"Bütün Yönleriyle Başörtüsü Sorunu"* .(2001). İstanbul:Ekin Yayınları; (Özgür-Der) *"Şahitlik: 28 Şubat Sürecinde Başörtüsü Direnişi"*, (1999) İstanbul: Özgür-Der Yayınları.

⁴⁷ "They perceive us as a big problem and claim that we are in the wrong way. The Kemalist CSOs believe in the positive correlation between education and not wearing headscarf. In this context the main goal of their educational campaigns is to cure the young girls or to protect them from illness."(26.05.2005, interview, İstanbul)

headscarf and leaving aside the people having different life styles, beliefs, attitudes and thoughts, is the ultimate goal of the Kemalist CSOs. (Özgür-Der, 1999:56-63)

Another perception of the Islamist CSOs towards the Kemalist CSOs reveals itself in the Islamists' questioning of the civil structure of the Kemalist CSOs. Concerning this aspect Özgür-Der prefers not to define the Kemalist CSOs as real civil initiatives and claims that they have been founded and funded by the state in order to legitimize the headscarf ban among the civil society. (17.05.2005, interview with the executive of Özgür-Der, Istanbul) In other words, it can be stated that Özgür-Der perceives the Kemalist organizations as dependent structures that do not work for the benefit of the society but for the state. Similarly, Mazlum-Der states that the Kemalist CSOs cannot be defined as civil initiatives since they identify and perceive the "others" by identifying themselves with the state.⁴⁸

Another aspect revealing the perceptions of the Islamist CSOs towards the Kemalist CSOs is their "out-group generalization". For instance, when the representative of Ak-Der was asked about the Turkish Women's Union, after saying that she is not aware of the studies and founding principles of Turkish Women's Union she generalized its activities in the context of the notion of Kemalism by closely relating it to ADD and ÇYDD. (25.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) This example explicitly illustrates the tendency of the Islamist CSOs to generalize the Kemalist CSOs. On the other hand, during the interviews the representatives of Özgür-Der and Mazlum-Der made a clear differentiation among the supporters of the headscarf ban.⁴⁹

Evaluating the attitudes of the ban supporters in terms of prejudices and double standards, Özgür-Der emphasizes that the mentality of perceiving the veiled women who have high educational level as a threat, is a paranoiac mentality that should be immediately changed. (Özgür-Der, 1999: 85) Accordingly, Mazlum-Der also defines the ban supporters' fear that is based on perceiving the visibility of the headscarf in

⁴⁸ "Turkey has a serious problem in terms of "civil thinking". For instance if a person has Sunni-Muslim identity and while he tries to identify Alaouites as the "other", this is done by identifying himself with the state and the "other" as "enemy of the state". (02.05.2005, Interview, Ankara)

⁴⁹ In this sense the group who claims that the girls/women with headscarves can take service but they cannot give service are defined by these Islamist CSOs as "half freedom" supporters. On the other hand, the position of the other Kemalist group is defined as "a bull that has seen the red and is preparing to attack immediately"(17.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)

public places as an uprising against the state regime, or threat towards the Republic as unreasonable and unjustified. (Ensaroglu, 2004) Moreover, the interviewee from Mazlum-Der claims that through this groundless fear, the supporters of the ban are actually restricting their future freedom by perceiving a threat to their own security. (02.05.2005, interview, Ankara)

To sum up it should be stated that most of the Islamist CSOs' representatives make generalizations about the Kemalist CSOs in particular and the Kemalists in general. Especially ADD and ÇYDD appear not to be differentiated by the Islamist organizations and they were generalized under their anti-headscarf positions although they have some important differences. Moreover, most of the Islamist CSOs representatives perceive the Kemalist CSOs not as civil initiatives but as dependent structures that do not work for the benefit of the society but for the state. It is also claimed that the Kemalist organizations are founded and funded by the state to denote that the civil society is also supporting the headscarf ban. Likewise, it is also asserted that the Kemalist organizations disturb the civil thinking since they identify themselves with the state and perceive all the differences in the society as a threat to the secular state.

4.3.5 Objectives

Considering that the headscarf problem mostly centre around women who want to attend public life, the main objectives of Ak-Der are based on struggling with the headscarf ban in every field; preventing every kind of discrimination against human rights; improving social consciousness in this matter, particularly about women rights in terms of education, work and career; educating its members; increasing solidarity among them and helping all the people suffering from discrimination. ("Gayemiz", n.d.) In other words Ak-Der aims to solve the problems that prevent women to attend political, social, economical, and cultural areas; to decrease the obstacles resulting in problems in women's career; and to provide work places that are useful and suitable for women. In this sense it can be claimed that Ak-Der has important commonalities with the other women organizations whose objectives also centre on pursuing women's social and political integration as well as on women's rights.

While identifying the objectives of Özgür-Der related to the headscarf conflict, the representative highlights the Islamic identity of the organization and states that Islam orders people to resist against injustice and oppression. (17.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) This motto appears as the main principle of Özgür-Der. In this sense, the objective of Özgür-Der is stated to be based on supporting works in the field of education, culture and thought; initiating a legal fight against the violations of the rights of Muslims in terms of free thought, and individual values; and working cooperatively with the human rights organizations in this struggle. (“Amacımız”, n.d.)

Similarly, objectives of Mazlum-Der can be indicated as to struggle against every kind of human rights violation no matter what is the religious, ethnic, cultural or gender based identity of the oppressed people. (“Mazlum-Der’in Amacı”, n.d.) The organization seeks to realize this objective through dialogue with other international human rights organizations and defenders all around the world. The aim of this dialogue is claimed to give an end to the human rights violations and expand freedom and human rights. (02.05.2005, interview, Ankara)

4.3.6 Visions and Proposed Solutions for Dealing with the Headscarf Conflict

Concerning the resolution of the headscarf conflict, Ak-Der stresses the importance of self-criticism and indicates that instead of solving the problem everybody is looking for a criminal. The organization also argues that as long as the state continues to avoid self-criticism, it will always find an inner or external enemy as a scapegoat for the situation of Turkey. (Ak-Der, 1999:234-237) Concerning these aspects the desired change of Ak-Der includes environment where all the basic rights are equal for ethnic groups, religions and sexes; where everybody has equal right for education and work and where people are not discriminated just because of their wearing styles. (Benli, 2004) Likewise, Mazlum-Der emphasizes its aspiration for a free environment where everybody can express his/her thoughts without having fear. The platforms in which people can freely express their thoughts, demands and opinions are also stated as necessary aspects from which the whole Turkish society would benefit. (Ensaroğlu, 2004)

Concerning the change related to the headscarf conflict, Özgür-Der indicates that resolving the headscarf conflict does not mean very much since the mentality of the state is claimed to be the main source of all problems in Turkey that should be changed. (17.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) This hardline statement of the organization appears to create an important divide line among the Islamist CSOs. While Ak-Der and Mazlum-Der seem to separate the headscarf ban issue from the state regime, the main concern of Özgür-Der appears not to be the headscarf or its freedom but changing the regime.

In terms of the practical resolution for the conflict, Ak-Der indicates the necessity of recognizing the veiled women without trying to change them. Respecting the differences among the people is also underlined as a crucial point for the resolution of the headscarf conflict. (“Tuba Akayüz ile Gorusme”, 2004) In addition, as the urgent resolution for the discrimination towards women in social, economic and political arenas, the representative of Ak-Der underlines the need for giving women equal rights for education and work by lifting the ban. (26.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)

Indicating that the headscarf conflict cannot be resolved only by consensus among the CSOs, Özgür-Der also argues that the CSOs should increase their effectiveness by taking the support of the grassroots. (Şekerci, 2005) Stressing the role of the CSOs in terms of motivating the society for action, the organization claims that for the resolution of the headscarf conflict the grassroots, the community itself and the pressure coming from it is indispensable. (“Double Standards”, 2004) Moreover, strengthening the relationship between different CSOs is indicated as another important factor by the representative, although what is meant by “different” is the leftist organizations not the Kemalist CSOs. (17.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)

“Mutual confidence among different parts of the society” and “the social compromise” is indicated by Mazlum-Der as the main approach that would lead to absolute resolution of the conflict.⁵⁰ In other words Mazlum-Der spells out the “respectful” manner as the necessity for mutual confidence and co-existence. However, the interviewee underlines “empathy” as the starting point for mutual respect and claims

⁵⁰ “I believe that this compromise does already exist, though it is not expressed explicitly. The uncovered people should not be afraid of the ones who wear headscarf. Similarly, the veiled women should not judge the unveiled ones in the frame of concepts like morality or integrity. The two parts should respect each other’s way of dressing and beliefs.” (02.05.2005, interview, Ankara)

that if the supporters of the ban could have put themselves in the place of the veiled women, they would have certainly seen how they exaggerate their fear.

Going further, Mazlum-Der also asserts that contradictions originating from differences in belief and opinion, should be prevented through a dialogue process that need to be based on tolerance before turning into a destructive conflict which might threaten the social peace. In this respect the representative argues that in order to overcome the impasse that has occurred because of lack of communication and prejudices, the European and especially the Turkish human rights organizations have great responsibility.⁵¹ In this context, Mazlum-Der perceives the resolution of the headscarf conflict not only taking into consideration the top level leadership but all societal levels.

To sum up, it can be claimed that the fundamental desired change of the Islamist CSOs concerning the headscarf conflict is based on the change in the mentality of the state and the supporters of the headscarf ban. For the Islamist CSOs the desired social structure is where people freely express their thoughts, beliefs and demands without having fear, where all the basic rights are equal for ethnic groups, religions and sexes and where the state does not interfere in people's dressing preferences. Related to the realization of all these visions it was also claimed that the unity and synergy among the Turkish citizens would be strengthened leading to the maturity of the state. High level of education and equal education opportunities for everybody is another future desire of the Islamist representatives which seems compatible with the one emphasized by the Kemalist CSOs, especially ÇYDD, who dreams of high level of education leading to social enlightenment.

4.3.7 Relations with the State

In order to find out if reconciliation is possible among the CSOs related to the headscarf conflict and if this reconciliation can be affective in shaping the decision making process, indicating the character of the relationship between the decision

⁵¹ "As much as targeting political powers, a human rights organization has to stand against oppression and violations committed by non-governmental organizations, groups, or persons. Human rights struggle must not contain only forcing political powers to justice and protection of rights but it should also pressure all layers of society to respect human rights."(02.05.2005, interview, Ankara)

makers and the CSOs gets importance. Moreover, in their sociological analysis of the Islamist CSOs Akşit et. al. (2004:678) indicates that the relationship of the CSOs with the state is very important in denoting their antagonistic or reconcilable identities. More specifically Akşit et. al. point out that Özgür-Der and Mazlum-Der define the function of the civil society in terms of forming a pressure group towards the state and perceive the state as a constraint. On the other hand he claims that Ak-Der defines the civil society with non-political terms and defines the function of the civil society in terms of sharing the burden of the state. In terms of these aspects Akşit et. al. assert that while Mazlum-Der and Özgür-Der have adversary identities, Ak-der has a reconcilable identity. (Akşit et. al. 2004: 668-675)

Parallel to the arguments of Akşit et. al. (2004), the representative of Ak-Der emphasized how the state is willing to work cooperatively with the CSOs and give importance to the civil society projects by giving the example of women organizations. The interviewee stated that the women organizations have been very active during the Turkish Penal Code (TPC) campaign by forming a successful pressure group through which they have managed to change some articles in TPC. (26.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) From these aspects it can be asserted that compared to Özgür-Der and Mazlum-Der, Ak-Der has relatively better relations with the state and previously worked to influence the policy making in issues related to women.

Similar to the findings of Akşit et. al. (2004) the representative from Özgür-Der claimed that the state does not have good relationship with the civil society organizations in general and human rights organizations in particular indicating that she does not believe in the capability of the CSOs in affecting the decision making processes. (17.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) Accordingly the representative of Mazlum-Der said that there are some issues including human rights, religious rights, ethnic rights, cultural rights and political rights in which CSOs cannot be so effective on the decision-making process. In terms of these issues the state is claimed to be closed to civil pressure since accepting the demands of cultural, religious or identity groups is perceived as giving concession to them or being defeated. Relating this argument to the headscarf conflict, Mazlum-Der claims that as long as the people supporting the headscarf continue to be perceived as insurgents and fundamentalists, the state would not be eager to bargain with these people. (02.05.2005, interview, Ankara)

4.4 Kemalist Civil Society Organizations

I collect the CSOs that support the headscarf ban under the name “Kemalist CSOs”. In general terms, I characterize these organizations as “Kemalist” for two reasons. The first reason is to denote their founding principles and objectives that depend on Kemalist ideology, Atatürkist principles and reformations. The second reason for classifying these organizations under the name “Kemalist” is to indicate the general attitude of their executives and members who do not consider Islam to be a major frame of reference in their social interactions. This is not to say that they do not believe in or practise Islam. However, they find such practices to be Islamic and “cultural” rather than Islamist and “political”. Arguing that religion is a private affair, they always oppose the public manifestations of religious symbols and practices.

4.4.1 Identity of the Organizations

Concerning the identities of the Kemalist CSOs it can be said that they are founded on the themes of secularism, modernization and nationalism as the reflections of the Kemalist project. (Erdoğan, 2002:235) In this sense the Kemalist CSOs appear to closely identify themselves with the secular identity of the state and Atatürkist principles by indicating complete loyalty and gratitude to these aspects. In this sense, perceiving the visibility of the headscarf in public sphere as a threat directed to the secular identity of the state, most of the Kemalist CSOs representatives’ implicit identification of the Islamists as their enemies becomes meaningful. This enemy discourse and negation seems to be an important aspect for the formation of identity and it is theoretically stated by Mouffe as “definition of the social identity with its diametrical opposite”. (Mouffe, 1999:754) Indicating their founding principles in terms of fighting with political Islam, reactionary movements, fundamentalism and backwardness the Kemalist CSOs appear to identify themselves with their “diametrical opposite” that seems to be the Islamists.

If we take the organizations’ activities, objectives and demographic structures as part of their identity, it can be argued that the differentiation among Kemalist CSOs is

not only confined to gender based characterization (TKB-woman organization) but also to their areas of work (ADD-wide area of interest including politics vs. ÇYDD-limited area of interest that is based on cultural activities including educational campaigns). Most importantly, this differentiation highly affects their relations with the Islamist CSOs and their positions towards the headscarf conflict. For instance as a women organization TKB had the chance to work with some Islamist women organizations, whereas strongly emphasizing the political aspect of the headscarf conflict ADD has almost no interaction with the Islamist CSOs.

ÇYDD: Emphasizing its loyalty to Atatürkist principles and reforms, ÇYDD was founded in 1989 by Türkan Saylan who has been an active supporter of the headscarf ban. Since most of its members are women it has been defined as a women organization. (Saktanber, 2002; Simel and Cindoğlu, 1999) However, the interviewees from ÇYDD did not appear to identify ÇYDD on gender based characteristics. ÇYDD identifies its realm of actions as cultural not political and locates them in Kemalist boundaries. (ÇYDD Tanıtım Brosuru, 1999) Moreover, in the context of civil society, the organization defines itself as a civil initiative having the responsibility of supporting the state in terms of providing education opportunities to the young generation and by this way supporting the modernization, civilization and the development of the society. (CYDD Regulation: article 3-4, 1999) In this sense the mission of ÇYDD is stated to enlighten and lead the public with a motivation to reach the level of “contemporary civilization”. (Cumhuriyet, 13 Mayıs, 1998 cf. Erdogan, 2002: 249) Concerning the internal structure of ÇYDD it can be stated that in recent years some signs of polarization have begun to appear since the chairman of the organization has been accused of controlling the organization in her own by even dispelling the opponent members. (Uçan News, 12 March 2004) However, the interviewees did not criticize the hierarchical structure of the organization, whereas they emphasize their loyalty and respect to their chairman.

ADD: Parallel to ÇYDD, ADD was also founded in 1989 under the leadership of M. Aksoy and by the Kemalist intellectuals as H.V. Velidedeoğlu, B. Uçok, S. Gürsoytrak and Özer Ozankaya. (Erdogan, 2002: 248) ADD defines itself as a Kemalist CSO that has brought all people who believe in Atatürk and Atatürkism together to protect the Turkish society from the backward-looking attempts, support and protect the

independence, freedom, national solidarity and the secular Republic with Atatürkist attitude and thought.(Özden, 1999:3-4) In addition to the Kemalist principles and legal ideology on which the organization is founded, it is also argued that ADD defines itself in relation to the threat that is perceived to be posed by the supporters of the headscarf. (Erdogan, 2002:250) In other words self-identification of the group in relation to the adversary group becomes obvious.⁵² Similar to ÇYDD, the self-definition of ADD reveals that the organization perceives the civil society to be the monopoly of the enlightened people whose mission is to enlighten the rest of the society with their actions that are limited to the context of Kemalism. (Tabakoglu, 2002)

Turkish Women's Union: The foundation of Turkish Women's Union goes back to 1924 when its founder Nezihe Muhittin founded the organization with the order of Atatürk. TKB is identified by its executive as a Kemalist women organization whose members are Kemalist-secular-modern-Republican-Turkish women and whose objective is to support the development of Turkey in accordance with Atatürkist principles and reforms. (02.06.2005, interview, Ankara) The "Kemalist women" identity is the main attribute emphasized by the organization and is based on a deep feeling of "gratitude" and "loyalty" to Atatürkist principles and reforms that is a common aspect for all Kemalist CSOs. (13.06.2005, interview, Istanbul)

4.4.2 Kemalist CSOs' Identification of the Headscarf Conflict

Taking into consideration the Kemalist CSOs' definitions of the headscarf conflict it should be primarily emphasized that they do not agree on the term "headscarf conflict". For these organizations the problematic issue is not the "headscarf" since they claim that headscarf is a cultural head cover worn by village women, housewives and old women. However, the Kemalist organizations prefer to name the problematic head cover as "turban" since it is claimed to symbolize series of systematic politics opposing Kemalism and the Islamist fight for founding a state governed by Sharia rules.

⁵² This enemy discourse and negation seems to be an important aspect of the identity formation and it is theoretically stated by Mouffe as "definition of the social identity with its diametrical opposite". (Mouffe, 1999:754) In other words the identity of the Kemalist CSOs appears to be closely related with their "diametrical opposite" that seems to be the Islamists. Similarly most of the Islamist organizations also identify their founding principles and objectives in terms of fighting with the headscarf ban and the human rights violations so that implicitly putting the secularists and the state on the adversary side.

(Gürsoyatrak, 1997) The second tendency of the Kemalist organizations is to avoid defining the “headscarf conflict” as a “conflict” since Turkey is claimed to have more important problems than a “scarf”. This argument is generally used by the Kemalist CSOs as a justification for their unwillingness for participating in a dialogue with the Islamist CSOs.

Defining the headscarf conflict as “turban issue” or “turban affair”, ÇYDD tries to indicate that there are some groups who try to problematize the issue in order to make use of it as a political mechanism. Accordingly, ÇYDD strongly indicates that the unity of the state, its full independence, unique education, equality between genders and peace are the main principles from which no concession can be given. (15.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) Thus, the organization’s main interest in the headscarf conflict is to protect these principles from “regressive” political movements that the headscarf is claimed to symbolize.⁵³

Likewise, ADD defines the headscarf conflict as politicization and use of religion by the groups who try to motivate the illiterate masses to take action threatening the regime. (Kışlalı, 1999:16) In other words, the headscarf conflict is defined as a chaos generating demand threatening the unity of the society.(Ozankaya, 2002: 8-11) Going further, ADD defines the headscarf conflict as a legal problem since wearing turban in public places is indicated as a violation of the principle of secularism stated in the constitution. (Gürsoyatrak, 1997) Consistently, the interviewee from ADD perceives the headscarf conflict as power struggle between secularism and Islamism; and defines the visibility of the headscarf in the public sphere as the defeat of secularism.⁵⁴ In this

⁵³ During the interviews with the three representatives from ÇYDD, I observed an important variation among the representatives and the formal position of the organization. Although the interviewees were trying not to oppose the policies of the state explicitly, by giving examples most of them indicated that prohibiting the headscarf did not work and that not giving the veiled girls the right to have education will not solve the problem. Even though the underlying assumption of this position appears to depend on supporting deep-rooted and long-term policies to fight with visibility of the headscarf, it can be still claimed that ÇYDD in the “rights for education” issue has a relatively moderate position. However, since this observation is relatively different from the analysis of the web site, bulletins and publications of ÇYDD this variation among the members of the organization can be constructively used in the ICR process.

⁵⁴ “The problem is not the subject of turban. The problem is whether Turkey is going to choose the model of republic and democracy to live or is going to convert to Iran, Saudi Arabia or Ottoman model. Is the public going to be ruled with the laws of its own making or is it going to be dictated by a group who claims to be the practitioners of religious laws on earth. The essence of argument lies here.” (29.06.2005, interview, Istanbul)

context, the general attitude of ADD appears to be based on protecting the secular character of the Turkish Republic and to prevent the coercion of religions over each other the state has the right to intervene actively even if it is limiting the liberties or democracy. (Ozankaya, 2000)

Looking at the conflict from a gender perspective, TKB defines the struggle for wearing turban in the public sphere as a consequence of coercion applied to women by men whose doctrine is political Islam.⁵⁵ Opposing the definition of the headscarf conflict as a struggle for individual liberty or women's rights, concerning the problematic mentality that is claimed to lie beneath the turban issue, the representative from TKB states:

“The Taliban mentality that wants to make women invisible by putting them in sacks is similar to the mentality of people who want to make women invisible by putting them in turban.” (02.06.2005, interview, Istanbul)

. Accordingly, TKB rejects to identify the headscarf conflict as women's right question since it includes other aspects like politics and presents the Kemalist woman as a model claiming that “Turkish” women had realized her dress reform and emancipated herself. (“Öncelikli Hedef İlkokullar”, 2000) In this context, calling themselves enlightened, modern, dutiful and progressive, the Kemalist women in general appear to reject the existence of multiple womanhoods that has always been the reality of the country. As Saktanber says ‘Kemalist women’ who defined themselves in terms of being against the Islamist women speak from a pro-Western, pro-state, secular-nationalist and gender egalitarian position. (Saktanber, 1994: 99)

Taking all these aspects into consideration it can be concluded that although the Kemalist CSOs have common points while defining the headscarf conflict, there are differences in their perceptions towards the headscarf conflict parallel to the identity and structure of the organization. For, instance while the representatives from ADD emphasize the political aspect of the conflict, TKB prioritizes the woman aspect of the conflict, and ÇYDD underlines the education aspect.

⁵⁵ Sancar, S., Ü. “Otoriter Türk Modernleşmesinin Cinsiyet Rejimi Retrieved on 20.08.2005 from: http://kasaum.ankara.edu.tr/gorsel/dosya/1097132326otoriter_turk_modernlesmesinin_cinsiyet_reji_mi.doc

4.4.3 Issues Emphasized by the Kemalist CSOs

Although the headscarf conflict does not frustrate the actual needs of the Kemalists, by indicating their fears and concerns about the headscarf conflict, the Kemalist CSOs appear to internalize the threat that is perceived to come from the headscarf and mentality lying beneath. In this sense, the Kemalists' future needs in terms of identity, freedom and security are indicated to be endangered. Therefore, modern character of the state, secularism, unity of the state, endangered freedom and psychological pressure as well as revivalism of political Islam will be listed as need based issues emphasized by the Kemalist CSOs. Going further the values from which the Kemalists claim that no concession can be given are classified as: values concerning the status of women, public sphere, secular education and democracy.

4.4.3.1 Need based issues

4.4.3.1.1 Need for identity

- *Modern character of the state*: Taking into consideration the historical context, it can be argued that Westernization, presuming the possibility of a civilization shift was perceived by the Kemalists as abandonment of Islam. (Mardin, 1971 Cf. Dağı, 2005) In this sense, the Islamists' rejection of the West and westernization appears as an objection to the Kemalist design aiming to reform the society and politics along a secularist and modernist line, eroding the influence of Islam in society and politics. In this sense, modernization appears as an important need for the Kemalists since it is closely related with the identity of the state. Defining the headscarf as backward; uncivilized; representing shame and inferiority in relation to the West and damaging the modern character of Turkey, the Kemalists oppose the visibility of the headscarf in public sphere. (Arat, 1997) Thus, the Kemalists construct strong relation between education and not wearing headscarf thinking that secular, scientific education would make tradition and religion disappear while advancing the modernity. (Gole, 1996)

Accordingly, in the context of the headscarf conflict, one of the central issues emphasized by the Kemalist CSOs is the civilized and modern character of Turkey. In this sense, the Kemalist organizations claim that the headscarf is challenging and threatening the modern and civilized character of the state since it symbolizes political

Islam, inferior worldview and opposition to reason and science.(02.06.2005, interview TKB, Ankara; Denk, 1996; “Ertugrul Kazancı ile Röportaj”, n. d.)

- *Secularism*⁵⁶: For the Kemalist elite, the process and eventual success of secularism became a matter of political survival in the face of the challenges put up by the Islamist periphery. (Dağı, 2005) In this sense secularism can be identified as need for identity since it is internalized by the Kemalists as one of the most important characteristics of the Turkish state and their self-identity. Thus, the disagreement on secularism is part of an inter elite fight for political power in which the Kemalists look to the Turkish Armed Forces as the ultimate arbiter that has assumed a guardian role in maintaining secularism, not only as a constitutional order but also as a political/ideological discourse against the Islamic periphery. (Dağı, 2005)

Accordingly, secularism can be identified as a need based issue for the Kemalist CSOs since they appear to closely identify themselves with the secular identity of the state. (Erdoğan, 2002: 244) They perceive “secularism” principle to have indispensable importance for the survival of the Republic, and any threat directed towards this principle is interpreted as engendering the survival, security and recognition of a Kemalist person and the whole identity group. (Gürsoyatrak, 1997:1)

For instance, defining themselves as strong supporters of the secular character of the state, ÇYDD indicates that turban threatens “secularism”, since it symbolizes the use of religion for political or personal interests. (Saylan, 2004) Similarly, the central issue emphasized by ADD is “secularism” and the organization obviously claims that wearing turban in public places violates secularism and represents a reactionary movement that has the aim to alter the secular regime with religious one. (Serim, 1996) Although the concept of secularism is differently interpreted by the supporters of the headscarf, ADD gives special attention to highlight the “right” identification and meaning of secularism. In its annual journal “Atatürkçü Düşünce”, Özer Ozankaya who is one of the founders of ADD clarifies the meaning of secularism with the words:

⁵⁶ The Kemalist CSOs closely identify themselves with the official ideology, Atatürkist principles and reforms and Republican regime and define themselves by emphasizing their loyalty and gratitude to these aspects. (Erdoğan, 2002:237-260) Thus, in addition to secularism all of these aspects are raised as need based issues (identity needs) claiming that visibility of the headscarf in public places poses threat to all these aspects.

“Secularism does not only mean ‘I would not interfere in people’s beliefs and thoughts so that nobody should interfere in mine.’ In addition secularism means ‘I would not live my life in accordance to religion.’ The secular person prefers modern life. The secular individual cannot interfere with, try to affect or demand secular attitudes from the non-secular people.”(Ozankaya, 2002:9)

Accordingly, one of the representatives of ÇYDD underlines the misinterpretation of the concept by the words:

“It is not enough for the state to separate worldly and religious affairs and direct the public life in accordance with the rule of science and civil laws in order to become secular; also the state has to interfere actively to inhibit the beliefs applying force over each other from dominance.” (11.05.2005, interview, Ankara)

From these assertions of the Kemalist representatives it can be concluded that for them, secularism has two meanings. The first is to separate the religion from politics and state mechanism (passive meaning) and the second is to put all the religious organizations and the religion out of the society, both as a cultural-educational policy and as a political-ideological attitude (active meaning). However, stating that the headscarf conflict should be resolved not through prohibitions but through constructive means, a representative from ÇYDD reveals the difference within the Kemalist CSOs. (15.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)

4.4.3.1.2 Need for security

-Unity of the state: Revealing the Kemalists’ need for security, “unity of the state” issue can be identified as need based since the ban supporters explicitly assert that they view the turban as an effort to divide the country and as a sign of separatism. (Kışlalı, 1999) Claiming that the visibility of the headscarf psychologically oppresses uncovered people and reveals the religion, sects and groups that people belong to, the Kemalists indicate that by this way the communication, unity between people and harmony in the public places is threatened that in turns would lead to mutual enforcement and threatening of the brotherhood among the people. (Ozankaya, 2002)

- Endangered freedom and psychological pressure: The greatest concern of the Kemalist CSOs is related to the threat that is supposed to be directed towards uncovered women in case the headscarf becomes free. This concern turns into an important need based issue since the Kemalists’ need for security is stated to be at stake. Parallel to this issue the representative of ÇYDD states:

“If the headscarf becomes free in public places and if the number of the veiled women increases, would the supporters of the headscarf tolerate uncovered women? I think that they would insert a great psychological pressure on the women who do not cover their heads.”(15.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)

As this statement illustrates, especially the women representatives of the Kemalist CSOs perceive the headscarf as a future threat endangering their freedom. However, they do not mention that they fear of being forced to wear headscarf but they fear of psychological pressure. (02. 06.2005, interview with the representative from TKB, Ankara). This differentiation is very important since it reveals out the Kemalists’ perception towards the Islamists and their objectives.

The Kemalists’ concern about their future security and freedom also comes to the surface while they claim that the main target of turban is to order all fields of life with a totalitarian perspective and achieving this by interfering in all these fields using an authority above. Related to this aspect the representative from ADD states:

“Today turban, tomorrow mosques and in the future efforts aiming to change our lifestyle. Turban is dangerous. Turban is the symbol, and the target is to enslave the society and regime step by step.”(29.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)

From this statement, it can be inferred that in general the Kemalist CSOs think that if the students with turban are allowed for their actions in the universities, the events would not stop.

- *Revivalism of political Islam:* In general the Kemalists state the headscarf to be a vehicle for veiling political Islam that has the aim of building a “religious state” and to loosen the rules of the state to jeopardize its effectiveness. (Adem, 2002:22-24) In this context although the threat that is perceived to be posed by political Islam can be indicted as a need based issue for the Kemalists since it challenges their secular group identity, it mainly reveals the Kemalists’ need for security. Merve Kavakçı affair is one of the examples that have been used by the Kemalist CSOs to indicate their concern about the rise of political Islam. In this sense Ahmet Taner Kışlalı who was one of the founders of ADD states:

“Ms. Kavakçı is made deputy intentionally. In other words they have found a woman with head cover in order to use her to loosen the rules of the state. (Kışlalı, A. T., 1999:6)

Not giving importance to the Islamists' emphasis on political, citizenship or democratic rights, the secularists state that the headscarf is a political symbol of Islamists who fight for founding a religious state by using aspects of freedom and human rights as vehicle. (Toker, 1998; Sirmen; 1997)

4.4.3.2 Value based issues

4.4.3.2.1 Values concerning the status of women

The woman question has an important value for the secularists since as Kandiyoti states the “new woman” of the early years of the Turkish Republic became the symbol of a break with the past. (Kandiyoti, 1991) In this sense the women in Western clothes has been remarked by the Republican elites as well as by today's secularists as the symbol of Turkey's modernity. (Saktanber, 1994; Arat, 1997) The Kemalists and the Kemalist women in particular, oppose the visibility of the headscarf in the public places, since they perceive the headscarf as backward; a sexist religious tradition that denies women full access to the public sphere and as a symbol that makes woman accept she is a second class person who has to obey her man. (Saylan, 2001) In this sense the Kemalist feminists perceive the headscarf as a symbol of sexism and imprisonment blurring the clear-cut oppositions between religion and modernity and as an offence to contemporary notions of “gender emancipation” and “universal progress”. (ex. Özsoyeller, 1995)

Likewise, underlining the women question of the headscarf conflict, the Kemalist CSOs claim that turban has a humiliating character. For instance one of the interviewees from ÇYDD defines the headscarf as a symbol of women's acceptance of being inferior to men and second class “creature” and says:

“Turban is the symbol of the perspective which suggests that woman does not conceive her as an equivalent of man, that she attributes holiness to this imbalance and she supposes herself as provoking man sexually and forcing him to commit sins.” (15.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)

Similarly, the executive of Turkish Women's Union claims that covering women is gender discrimination and violation to human rights and that wearing headscarf cannot be supported in terms of freedom of belief. In this framework, the organization argues

that women have been exploited by the supporters of Sharia since women are less educated and already have many problems. (“İnançların Hukuka Etkisi”, n. d.) The main concern and fear of Turkish Women’s Union is that some anti-secularist political approaches that are symbolized with “turban” are getting stronger threatening the women’s rights. Related to this aspect, one of the interviewees maintains:

“For gender equality and for the liberation of women, Sharia mentality cannot be tolerated. Otherwise it would be betrayal for the women.” (02.06.2005, interview, Ankara)

Equally, the executive of ÇYDD states that she does not blame the girls who wear headscarves but rather the Muslim men who use the girls and their head covers as a political mechanism for their political interests and who try to draw these girls into the darkness of the backwardness. (Saylan, 2001)

From these statements it can be concluded that the Kemalists in general perceive the veiled women as passive people who can be easily deceived. Moreover, it can be inferred that the Kemalists do not perceive the headscarf struggle as an identity struggle taken by veiled women but rather as a political mechanism that is used by some interest groups.

4.4.3.2.2 Public sphere

Concerning the public sphere issue, in general the Kemalists maintain that religious beliefs should be confined to the private life and should not be visualized publicly. They closely relate allowing head covering in public places with allowing religion to influence the secular and democratic public space of the Republic. (Arat, 1997) For Kemalists the public sphere has an important value since the image of the public sphere represents modernity, civilization and the secular character of the society.(ibid.) It can be also claimed that although many controversial arguments have been stated about where the public sphere begins and ends, the public sphere occurs is a battle ground representing the power relations between the parties to the headscarf conflict. As an indicator of the characteristics of the state and the society; and the power relationship between Islamism-Kemalism; modernity-traditionalism and homogenization-pluralism, the public sphere is an issue that the two sides have very strong and dichotomous values.

4.4.3.2.3 Secular education

The Kemalist CSOs assert that the headscarf is contradictory to the secular education where reason and ration prevails. (Saylan, 2004) Likewise, they argue that the only way to completely solve the headscarf conflict is to increase the knowledge and awareness of the people, improving education and eliminating the unscientific education that is given in Quran courses and religious high schools. (“Oncelikli Hedef Ilkokullar”, 2000) Related to this argument Ozankaya says:

“If the human beings have reason and mind, then the aspects as religion and belief should be analyzed and recognized from the filter of reason. The real freedom of religion and conscience should be in accordance with mind. This ability of the human beings can be nurtured by scientific education.” (Ozankaya, 2002:10)

In this sense the Kemalist CSOs assert that only through education social enlightenment can be reached, girls can be saved from becoming voluntary servants so that positive correlation is perceived between education and not wearing headscarf.⁵⁷

4.4.3.2.4 Democracy

Kemalists put considerable value on democracy and even claim that sometimes prohibitions and restrictions are needed for the protection of democracy. Concerning democracy principle, the main fear of the Kemalists is that if headscarf is permitted, some anti-democratic forms and actions would follow so that democracy might be replaced with Sharia order. (Akbal, 1998) Perceiving the headscarf as a threat towards the Republic and democracy and as a symbol of regressive action, the secularists also state that for the protection of democracy from the takeover of possible repressive state regimes, the ban has to be implemented. Related to this issue ÇYDD indicates that democracy does not mean that everybody can do whatever he wants. (Saylan, 2004)

Likewise, rejecting the Islamists’ arguments claiming that the headscarf ban is a “violation of freedom and democracy”, ADD argues that freedom and democracy have some boundaries. (“Ertuğrul Kazancı ile Roportaj”, n.d.) Parallel to this statement one of the interviewees from ADD maintains:

⁵⁷ 14.05.2005, interview with a representative from ADD, Istanbul;
11.05.2005, interview with a representative from ÇYDD, Ankara;
02.06.2005, interview with a representative from TKB, Ankara

“We do not agree that democracy includes the freedom of pulling down the democracy. Democracy cannot be pulled down by using the aspects of democracy. If we provide all the conditions to the people who want to abolish secularism and imprison our country into a dark theocratic regime, this cannot be defined as providing democracy but as betrayal to democracy.” (09.06.2005, interview, Istanbul)

Not giving importance to the Islamists’ emphasis on human rights, the secularists state that the headscarf is a political symbol of Islamists who fight for founding a religious state by using aspects of freedom, human rights and democracy as vehicle. (Toker, 1998; Sirmen; 1997)

4.4.3.2.5 Turban-headscarf differentiation

The Kemalists define the headscarf worn by the girls and women living in villages and squatter areas as traditional and innocent cover, whereas they define turban that is worn by university students as “flag of Sharia” threatening the secular character of the state. (Denk, 2002) Likewise, the representatives of ADD, ÇYDD and Turkish Women’s Union denote that they are not against the “headscarf” since it is a traditional covering. However, they identify the turban worn by young girls as a political uniform not a traditional headscarf.⁵⁸ During the interviews an example from the Turkish Independence War was also given by the women representative from ÇYDD claiming that during the war women used their headscarves to protect the guns from rain. By giving this example, the sacred and dear meaning given by the Kemalist women to the headscarf can be stressed. However, this example also reveals the creation of the adversary concept of the “headscarf” that is “turban”.

4.4.3.2.6 Human rights and liberties

Not giving importance to the Islamists’ emphasis on human rights, in general the Kemalists state that the headscarf is a political symbol of Islamists who fight for founding a religious state by using aspects of freedom and human rights as vehicle. (Toker, 1998; Sirmen; 1997) Accordingly, some scholars claim that, although the Kemalists who could be identified as hard-line Westernizers, came to see western

⁵⁸ 10.05.2005, interview with a representative from ADD, Ankara;
15.05.2005, interview with a representative from ÇYDD, Istanbul;
02.06.2005, interview with a representative from TKB, Ankara

political values of democracy, human rights and rule of law as ill-fitting the “realities” of Turkey and threatening its integrity. (Dağı, 2005)

4.4.3.3 Other issues

4.4.3.3.1 Giving service-taking service

Although the Kemalist CSOs do not appear to support veiled women’s taking service aspect, during the interviews, some moderate representatives ⁵⁹ implicitly criticized the headscarf ban in universities and this gave the impression that they are prone to support the freedom of the veiled women to take public service in terms of education or health service. To denote this important in-group variation this limitedly emphasized issue has great importance since this tendency of some of the Kemalist CSOs representatives can be used as an opportunity during the ICR process through which the relationship of the adversary parties may be reconstructed.

4.4.4 Relation with the Islamist CSOs

4.4.4.1 Networks and other groups that Kemalist CSOs belong to

Concerning the relationship between ÇYDD and ADD, Erdoğan states in his work that the two organizations have very close relationship.⁶⁰(Erdoğan, 2002: 236) However, from the interviews it seems that this aspect is not valid for today. During the interviews, almost all ÇYDD representatives criticized ADD for being too conservative and for dealing only with political issues while they differentiated themselves for not interfering in or make declarations related to politics. Moreover, rejecting the criticisms that are directed towards ÇYDD, the representatives criticize ADD for not organizing any campaigns and activities but only criticizing the constructive activities. Going further one of the interviewees stated that as she has lost her enthusiasm in religion

⁵⁹ These moderate representatives were from ÇYDD and they asserted that their thoughts on taking service issue do not represent the official policy of the organization.

03.07.2005, interview with a representative from ÇYDD, Istanbul;

15.05.2005, interview with a representative from ÇYDD, Istanbul;

⁶⁰ campaigns for increasing the compulsory education to eight years; demonstrations against the REFAHYOL government and the Susurluk Affair; common membership to the Civil Society Union (CSU) together with other 189 CSOs ; signing a common declaration against anti-democratic, anti-secular policies of REFAHYOL government and against the reactionary movements towards the principles and revolutions of the Turkish Republic; “friendship and brotherhood” plaque given by ÇYDD to the chairmen of ADD. (Erdoğan, 2002:239)

because of the Islamists, she has lost her enthusiasm in Kemalism because of ADD. (15.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) Similarly, ADD raises some criticism against ÇYDD claiming that ÇYDD takes money from private and foreign organizations for the educational campaigns and that this is contrary to the Atatürkist principles. (02.06.2005, interview, Ankara) Going further ADD criticizes the chairman of ÇYDD for signing the minority rights declaration prepared by the Prime Ministry Human Rights Consultation Board since it was supporting the language rights of the Kurds. (11.06.2005, interview, Istanbul) This specific criticism stated by the interview from ADD is also very important since it reveals the conservative and nationalist character of the organization that opposes religious, linguistic, cultural or identity demands claiming that they threaten the unity of the state. Concerning all these statements the recent polarization among these two Kemalist CSOs becomes obvious.

While ÇYDD has improved relations with the other CSOs including the women organizations and the organizations interested in educational and cultural activities, from the interviews and publications of ADD it seems to have closed structure not having many common activities with the other CSOs. Its poor interaction with other CSOs that generally work related to social and cultural issues can be explained with the conservative character of ADD as well as its strong attention on political issues.

The relations of TKB with the other Kemalist CSOs as ÇYDD and ADD, appears to be based on supporting each other's campaigns, making collective demonstrations that ranges from visiting Atatürk Mausoleum to show their solidarity; to symbolically complaint to Atatürk the politicians who do not protect the women rights from Islamist movements. (TKB Bulletin, 15-22 March, 1998). The headscarf conflict, the Sharia threat directed towards the contemporary life and rise in political Islam are the main issues that bring the Kemalist CSOs together. (Erdoğan, 2002: 240)

In terms of TKB's relations with other women organizations it can be said that Turkish Women's Union has an enhanced network. The organization is member of many civil platforms and groups including the committee of preparing reports for CEDAW committee (the United Nations' Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women); "For Ever Peace Forever Woman Platform" (Barış İçin Sürekli Kadın Platformu); "Turkish Penal Code-Ankara Platform" (TCK-Ankara Platformu); and "Turkish Directorate General on the Status and Problems of Women"

(Başbakanlık Kadının Statüsü ve Sorunları Genel Müdürlüğü) provides an important potential for TKB to work cooperatively and build relations with different women organizations.⁶¹ The cooperative action in these networks is based on working against the violation of women's rights, honour killings, blood feuds and all other aspects leading to the discrimination of women.

4.4.4.2 Interaction and communication with the Islamist CSOs

Because of their opposing ideologies, it can be easily concluded that the Kemalist CSOs do not have close relations or attempt to work with any Islamist CSO on the headscarf conflict. From the interviews with the Kemalist CSOs it became obvious that some of the representatives are even not aware of the activities, objectives and founding principles of the Islamist CSOs that they were asked.⁶²

However, the only field that brings the Kemalist CSOs together with some Islamist organizations is the platforms that deal with women problems in Turkey. For instance ÇYDD has some joint activities with different women organizations including Islamist women organizations, in the Turkish Penal Code Platform (TCK Platformu).⁶³ Although this joint work can be defined as “issue specific”, the member organizations of the platform have succeeded to form a civil pressure changing some of the articles in the Turkish Penal Code. However, an interviewee from ÇYDD asserts that during the platform meetings, when the discrimination of women issue has been raised by the Islamist women organizations, many divergences have occurred. (18.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) Likewise, the central office of TKB that works with the abovementioned platforms and groups had the chance to improve its solidarity, cooperation and friendship and work with many different women organizations that are also active members of the same groups.

⁶¹ For more information look at: “CEDAW Gölge Raporu” (2005), Retrieved on 28.07.2005 from:

<http://www.ucansupurge.org/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=1344>

“TCK için Mucadeleye Devam!”, 2005 Retrieved on 28.07.2005 from:

http://www.ucansupurge.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2392&Itemid=87

“Fatih Altaylı'yı Şiddetle Protesto Ediyoruz!” 20-04-2002 Retrieved on 21.07.2005 from:

<http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=9&ArsivAnaID=6837>

⁶² 15.05.2005; 18.05. 2005 interviews with representatives from ÇYDD , Istanbul-Ankara

20.06.2005, interview with the representative from TKB, Istanbul

10.05.2005, interview with a representative from ADD, Ankara;

⁶³ “TCK için Mucadeleye devam!”, 2005 Retrieved on 28.07.2005 from:

http://www.ucansupurge.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2392&Itemid=87

In this sense, the interaction among the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs can be defined in terms of limited communication that is confined to specific issues. In other words, both the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs unintentionally come together as members of the same groups or platforms and their temporary interaction in these groups is only confined to the expression of their own opinions on a specific issue. However, this limited communication does not appear to be valid for all organizations. Concerning ADD and its relations with the Islamist CSOs it can be claimed there is no communication and this situation appears to nurture the stereotypes and negative perceptions further destructing the relations. At this point it should be underlined that the women organizations of the two adversary groups appear to be the only exception for the poor interaction between the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs.

To sum up, the capacity of the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs to act together in a great extent depends on the prejudices that they have towards each other, their characteristics (close identification with the state and differences in area of works), their unwillingness and the structure of the civil society in Turkey⁶⁴. All these factors construct important obstacles on their capacities to act together and they should be carefully taken into consideration while designing the ICR process. However, among the CSOs in Turkey there are some organizations and platforms that may act as a capacity generating resource in terms of building bridges among the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs.

⁶⁴ Taking into consideration the argument of Habermas who defines the public sphere as a communication structure which has been rooted in the realm of personal relationships, and at its best “communicative action” through the associational network of civil society, Tabakoğlu claims that the CSOs in Turkey cannot be considered to be a participant of such a network of communication of Habermasian sense. (Tabakoğlu, 2002) Although there are series of CSOs Symposiums organized for nearly ten years by Tarih Vakfı, several e-mail groups including various CSOs trying to form a communication network among civil actors and important platforms that bring many different CSOs together. However, at this point the relation of the member organizations of these platforms should be questioned. As it has been stated previously in our study, not all the offices of a member organization correctly know the other members of these platforms. Additionally, most of these platforms are constructed for specific issues and when their task is finished the platforms dissolve. (XI. STK Sempozyumu-Tarih Vakfı, 2002) Going further it can be argued that, even the CSOs having the same ideology do not have structured and permanent relationships. (ibid.) For instance ÇYDD and ADD representatives maintained that they do not regularly organize joint campaigns or projects and even some representatives harshly criticized the other Kemalist CSOs. Likewise, the Islamist CSOs declared that they only come together for joint press declarations or demonstrations in the context of the issues on which they share similar opinions. Therefore, it is very difficult to claim that the civil society in Turkey has a communication structure within a Habermasian perspective.

4.4.4.3 Perceptions and stereotypes

Although most of the representatives of the Kemalist CSOs are not familiar with the Islamist CSOs, from the interviews it became obvious that they have a tendency to attribute negative perceptions they have towards the Islamists to these organizations as well. In other words, overgeneralization and prejudice is observed among the Kemalist organizations. The most important thing is that the representatives (ex. one from TKB and one from ÇYDD) who have previous experience with Islamist organizations or a chance to work with them on other issues tried to avoid making generalizations.⁶⁵ From this aspect it can be concluded that interaction with the adversary party has an impact in transforming the attitudes and perceptions towards the adversary group.

The most notable negative perception of the Kemalist CSO's towards the Islamists reveals itself in Kemalists' differentiation between the "headscarf" and "turban". Most of the Kemalist representatives defined the "headscarf" as traditional, innocent head cover, whereas the "turban" as political uniform, symbol of ideology and flag of Sharia. However, even within a single organization there are different visions towards headscarf and turban differentiation. For instance one of the representative from ADD states that he does not blame the girls wearing turban but the groups that make use of them by exploiting religion.⁶⁶ On the other hand, another interviewee with a firmer position states that she perceives women wearing ideological turban as "enemies of Atatürk and the Republic"; "counter revolutionaries", "fundamentalists" and who try to reach their aims by problematizing a piece of cloth.⁶⁷ This differentiation among the representatives from the same organization reveals that there are different levels of

⁶⁵ Although both of the representatives from TKB have similar perceptions towards the Islamist CSOs in general and Islamist women organizations in particular, the representative that had the chance to work with Başkent Women's Platform that is an Islamist women organization was trying to avoid making overgeneralizations. Although she was criticizing some of the Islamist women organizations for being founded with the intention to simplify the turban issue by presenting it only in terms of discrimination against women, she also underlined that some of these organizations are aware of the women's exploitation by the people who use the religion for their benefits. (02.05.2005, interview, Ankara)

⁶⁶ "There are many girls who wear turban since they are forced to. These girls did not have economic opportunities and had to use the dormitory, scholarship and education opportunities provided by the groups that forced them to cover their heads. I do not blame the girls who economically need the help of these groups." (14.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)

⁶⁷ "The people who wear turban that has ideological meaning are country traitors. Covering head but at the same time having a make up and wearing some fashionable clothes has nothing to do with religious dress codes." (10.05.2005, interview, Ankara)

empathy among the Kemalists towards the “other”. Thus, this theme would construct a key aspect in selecting the participants for the appropriate ICR process.

From all these negative perceptions it can be concluded that most of the Kemalist representatives identify the Islamists as a threat against the secular character of the state and as “enemies”. Past losses in terms of the assassinations of some Kemalist intellectuals by radical Islamist groups can be indicated as one of the reasons for such “enemy” discourse.⁶⁸ (Erdoğan, 2002:244-250) Another reason might be close identification of the Kemalist CSOs with the state since identifying with the official ideology and the secular character of the state, every group of the society that threatens these aspects is defined as “enemy”. (“Ege Bolge Toplantısı”, 1998:31) At this point it can be argued that most of the Kemalists do not perceive the Islamists as “adversary” but as “enemy”. The vital difference between “adversary” and “enemy” is precisely denoted by Chantal Mouffe (1999) as:

“ [adversary is]... somebody with whose ideas we are going to struggle but whose right to defend those ideas we will not put into question....Adversary is legitimate enemy, with whom we have in common “shared adhesion to the principles of democracy”.... [Whereas enemy is]... somebody who is tried to be destroyed and eliminated.... (Mouffe, 1999:755)

Making a differentiation between “adversary” and “enemy” brings the necessity to differentiate the relationship between the conflicting parties who perceive each other as “enemy” but not as “adversary”. The identification of these two different types of relations again comes from Mouffe who entitles them as “antagonistic relations” that is between enemies and “agonistic relations” that is between the adversaries. (Mouffe, 1999) She defines these relations as:

“In “agonistic relations” the sides see each other as adversary and both the conflict and the differences are legitimized and recognized by the adversary parties...[In “antagonistic relations”]...the parties see each other as enemy trying to eliminate, destroy and suppress the “other” by imposing authoritative order.” (Mouffe, 1999: 756)

⁶⁸ During the interviews, in the bulletins and monthly journal of ADD, the assassination of its founders and some of its members including Muammer Aksoy, Bahriye Üçok, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı and Uğur Mumcu is always emphasized by ADD condemning the radical Islamist groups that have committed these assassinations. (see also Erdoğan, 2002:267) In this sense, ADD declares a complete struggle with regressive movements, Sharia supporters and political Islam. It becomes obvious that ADD has generated the “enemy” discourse and by making overgeneralization it seems to perceive all supporters of political Islam to be responsible for these assassinations.

In the context of the headscarf conflict, particularly the Kemalist and Islamist women identities appear as another important factor blocking the relations since polarized womanhoods delineate a category crystallizing the relationship between the adversary parties. Especially TKB and the other women representatives of the Kemalist CSOs identified themselves as enlightened, modern, dutiful and progressive, whereas the Islamist women were implicitly identified as backward, imprisoned and as the supporters of Sharia.

4.4.5 Objectives

Perceiving the headscarf as a symbol of political Islam that threatens the official ideology of the state, Atatürkist principles and reforms, the main objective of ÇYDD is stated to protect, broaden and improve the rights that have been given and provided by the Atatürkist principles and reformations; and to support Turkey's modern character through contemporary education. (ÇYDD, Regulation-3, 1999) In this context, ÇYDD can be defined as a civil resistance aiming to strengthen and reactivate Kemalism to prevent the religious movements which have come to the scene with the "turban affair".

ÇYDD organizes many activities by opening schools, courses, dormitories, youth and children clubs, camps, competitions, awards, festivals, concerts; making some suggestions related to the legislations; and initiating state wide education campaigns. From all these activities it can be concluded that ÇYDD figures out all of its works as a "reaction" and "defence" plan towards the Islamic threat that has been visualized with the headscarf in public places. (Erdoğan, 2002: 236-237)

Likewise, the objective of ADD is to fight with these approaches that threaten secularism, the Atatürkist principles and reformations in the context of legal rules, to protect the Turkish nation from the backward-looking attempts and initiatives by "providing service in terms of enlightenment and awakening to the society and by creating synergy among the people who believe in Atatürk and Atatürkism." (Erdogan, 2002:236-237) Claiming that these anti-modern movements nourish from the illiteracy of the people, the representatives of ADD indicate their objectives in terms of supporting the enlightenment of the society however they do not give a specific method for this. (Cumhuriyet, 13 Mayıs, 1998)

Fighting with the headscarf and supporting the spread of modern dress code can be indicated as the main objective of the Kemalist women organizations from the beginning. (Saktanber, 2001) Accordingly, Turkish Women's Union perceives fighting with the headscarf problem as the necessity of progress, reformation and Atatürkism and as ÇYDD, TKB sees the resolution of the conflict in educating girls so that they would be saved from becoming "voluntary servants". (02.06.2005, interview, Ankara; Esim and Cindoglu, 1999) As Esim and Cindoglu assert, like the other Kemalist women organizations TKB and ÇYDD try to build up their own alternative "help networks", signifying that they perceive secular political regime and life style as the indispensable prerequisite for the freedom of women; and the contemporary education as the only approach for the protection of that freedom. (Esim and Cindoğlu, 1999: 185)

To sum up, taking into consideration the objectives of the Kemalist CSOs in the context of the headscarf conflict, their main objective appears to be confined to struggle with the wrong mentality lying beneath the headscarf and in the long run to eliminate that mentality. In this sense the general objectives stated by the Kemalist CSOs representatives can be summarized as "protective" and "reactive". Since the headscarf is perceived as a threat the protective objectives include: protecting, broadening and improving the rights that have been given and provided by the Atatürkist principles and reformations; protecting the Turkish society from the backward-looking attempts; supporting and protecting the independence, freedom, national solidarity and the secular Republic with Atatürkist attitude and thought. On the other hand the "reactive" objectives of the Kemalist CSOs can be defined with their alternative networks in terms of providing education opportunities to the students in need; giving some seminars on topics such as legal and political rights of women, birth control and courses in sewing and carpeting that would increase the welfare and independence of women living in the squatter areas. Although the civil activities of both Islamist and Kemalist CSOs seem to have compatible objectives they appear not as "complementary" but as "alternative" revealing out the competitive relationship between the adversary parties.⁶⁹ The only exception related to the incompatibility of the parties' objectives can be found among the Islamist and Kemalist women organizations that focus on improving the status of women in Turkey.

⁶⁹ The most important issue that was underlined by the Kemalists is that the Islamists choose the grassroots population as target and for that reason all the Kemalist CSOs representatives indicated the importance of reaching the grassroots and providing them educational, financial and health service.

4.4.6 Visions and Proposed Solutions for Dealing with the Headscarf Conflict

In general terms, the Kemalist CSOs see the resolution of the headscarf conflict in changing the “problematic” mentality of the supporters of the headscarf. In this sense the Kemalist organizations emphasize the importance in increasing the knowledge and political awareness of the people as well as improving education and eliminating the unscientific education that is given in Quran courses and religious high schools.

Parallel to this emphasis, ÇYDD underlines that a permanent solution to the turban issue and for the problematic mentality lying beneath is secular education. (Saylan, 2001) This argument reveals out that ÇYDD makes a positive correlation between education and not wearing headscarf so that all activities and campaigns of ÇYDD are closely related to this argument having the aim to increase the literacy rate of the girls and help them to have education that is supposed to prevent them from wearing headscarf in the future. (“Gençlerimizi Tarikatların Kucağına Biz Atıyoruz”, 1997) Accordingly, ADD also emphasizes the importance of “social enlightenment” as the only approach that would lead to contemporary civilization level through which backward-looking mentality would be eliminated from the Turkish society. (Şengül, 1997) Social enlightenment aspect is indicated by ADD as “...the domination of the suspicious and curious mentality that is based on observation and evaluation and open to research and discussion.”(Ozankaya, 2002:9) Similarly, the representative from TKB supports the notion of secular education as an approach towards the resolution of the headscarf conflict by the words:

“Only by spreading the secular education, we can fight with the problematic mentality lying beneath the headscarf issue. Uneducated society cannot be civilized. For the equality and freedom of the women, civilized society in other words secular and democratic environment is the main precondition. And this can be achieved only by secular education.”(02.06.2005, interview, Ankara)

In addition to improving the educational level of the girls, in terms of the headscarf conflict the Turkish Women’s Union also stresses some other networks that can be adopted by the civil society organizations. According to TKB the mission of civil actors is to enlighten and lead the public. (13.06.2005, interview, Istanbul) As a Kemalist woman organization TKB claims that women are the productive members of the society and believes that by enlightening women with Kemalist ideals, the secular

nature of the state will be secured. (Esim and Cindoğlu, 1999: 180) This can be stated as the main approach of the organization to fight with the mentality lying beneath wearing turban and the exploitation of women.

The other argument raised by the Kemalist CSOs concerning the resolution of the headscarf conflict is related to reconciliation of the conflict by reasonable interpretations. Accordingly, ADD emphasizes that taking the conflict from the “secularist” perception stated in the constitution and from the “religious rules” perception stated in Quran, would help to transform the controversy into diversity and multiplicity. (Denk, 2002: 33-35) Similarly one representative from ÇYDD says:

“For the resolution of this conflict the two parties should be ready and mature enough to discuss their beliefs. The women wearing headscarves and their supporters claim that religious beliefs cannot be discussed and questioned whereas we claim that no matter what kind of beliefs they are they should be questioned.” (15.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)

However, these propositions implicitly suggest that in the context of wearing headscarf, Quran is misinterpreted by the Islamists. Concerning this proposition, the Islamists CSOs strongly emphasize that religious rules cannot be interpreted, questioned or discussed claiming that the objective of Kemalist CSOs in proposing this resolution method is to open the religious rules in Quran into discussion. (Akşit et. al., 2004: 667)

Another desired change stated by the Kemalist CSOs is about the environment where the headscarf is not questioned and discussed anymore and where other problems of Turkey can be addressed claiming that the headscarf polemics and its politicization prevent Turkey’s concentration on its other social, cultural, political and economic problems (Adem, 2002:23; Şengül, 1997:41-42) Concerning this specific desired change of the Kemalists as well as their desire for high level of education it can be claimed that these desired changes are compatible with the ones stated by the Islamists.⁷⁰ However, the implicit assumptions and values that the parties have for these similar desires are completely different.⁷¹

⁷⁰ High level of education and equal education opportunities for everybody is one of the fundamental future desires of the Islamists.

⁷¹ While the Islamists desire for high educational level and equal opportunity for everybody, they implicitly demand the allowance of the veiled girls to go to universities. On the other hand the underlying assumption of the Kemalists’ desire for high level of education is their beliefs asserting that through increased secular, scientific education and high level of literacy the society would be enlightened and this in turn would eliminate the problematic and backward-looking mentality of the headscarf supporters.

4.4.7 Relations with the State

According to Yaresimos, the CSOs in Turkey that have a pro-modernization attitude have closer relationship with the state, whereas the conservative organizations that try to lessen the state control on the civil society have adversarial position towards the state. In this categorization the former group obviously comprises the Kemalist CSOs while the latter includes the Islamist CSOs. (Yerasimos, 2001:20)

Accordingly, since the founding principles of ÇYDD are closely related with the official ideology, ÇYDD appears to have close relationship with the state. Identifying itself as a civil actor who shares the burden of the state ÇYDD performs its activities in order to support the state. (ÇYDD tanıtım broşuru) Despite these positive aspects of ÇYDD-state relationship, when the state and its devices appear to be weak in their actions to maintain the Kemalist political project, the state may turn into an opposition for ÇYDD as well as for the other Kemalist CSOs. (Erdoğan, 2002: 244-255) From the demonstrations of ÇYDD to drop the REFAHYOL government and to protest the Susurluk Affair by supporting the “The One Minute Darkness for Permanent Enlightenment Action”, it can be concluded that the opposition of ÇYDD to the state and the necessity to affect the political administration come into view as a reaction to the Kemalist insufficiencies of the state. (ibid.) Similarly since ADD has conservative ideological position and its area of interests focus on political issues sometimes it has important problems with the governments. (Tabakoğlu, 2002)

As a Kemalist organization that supports the legal ideology of the state and defines itself as a civil actor working for the benefit of the state and of the nation, TKB also has unproblematic relation with the state. Moreover as a women organization, the activities of TKB are confined to the gender problems and discriminations against women so that its field of activity is not threatening its relations with the governments. Concerning the CSO's capacity in affecting the decision-making process, the representative of TKB indicates that in recent years the most successful CSOs in terms

Concerning “the environment where the headscarf is not questioned and discussed anymore” seemingly compatible future desire the underlying assumptions are again controversial. In their visions, the Islamist CSOs actually want to indicate the immediate need for the resolution of the conflict that would create suitable social and political environment for the successful resolution of the other problems. Contrarily, by the same vision the Kemalists tend to ignore the importance of the conflict or to indicate that the headscarf issue is finished and that it should not be raised anymore.

of affecting decision-making process are the women organizations and their joint activities. (02.06.2005, interview, Ankara) Turkish Women's Union is member of many civil platforms and groups as: "Turkish Penal Code-Ankara Platform" (TCK-Ankara platformu); "Turkish Directorate General on the Status and Problems of Women" (Başbakanlık Kadının Statüsü ve Sorunları Genel Müdürlüğü) and "the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women" (CEDAW committee) (Birleşmiş Milletler Kadınlara Karşı Her Türlü Ayrımcılığın Önlenmesi Komitesi). Being member of these networks, TKB constructs close relation with the state in terms of providing observations and propositions to the government concerning the status of women in Turkey.

To sum up, it should be stated that the Kemalist CSOs' founding principles that are very close to the legal ideology; the organizations' close identification with the state and their campaigns that are defined in terms of "sharing the burden of the state", form the essential basis for their good relation with the state that in turn shapes their relation with the Islamist CSOs.

CHAPTER 5

BUILDING STRATEGY FOR CHOOSING THE APPROPRIATE ICR APPROACH(ES)

After evaluating the assessment of the headscarf conflict in the context of the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs, based on this assessment, in this chapter the strategy for designing an appropriate ICR process will be discussed. Strategy building will be based on the general perceptions of the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs' interviewees towards the applicability of the ICR approaches in Turkey's headscarf conflict; identifying strategic opportunities and constraints for the applicability of the ICR processes in general; identifying the strategic resources; and identifying strategic objectives that should be taken into consideration in an appropriate ICR approach. The results of each step will give an important insight for evaluating the applicability of the ICR approaches in the headscarf conflict which will be the topic of the following chapter.

5.1 The Islamist and Kemalist CSOs' Visions towards the ICR Approaches

The aim of this part is to illustrate the general vision of the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs towards the ICR method if applied to the headscarf conflict. The ultimate aim of this part is to provide information for indicating the strategic constraints and opportunities towards the applicability of the ICR method rather than conducting a thorough sociologic analysis of the CSOs.

Although neither in the literature nor in the publications, bulletins and web sites of the organizations there is information about their visions towards the ICR processes, organizations' perceptions towards solving the headscarf conflict through dialogue can

be analysed as part of their visions towards the ICR processes. Thus, besides the interviews⁷² conducted with the representatives of Ak-Der, Özgür-Der, Mazlum-Der (Islamist CSOs) and ÇYDD, ADD, Turkish Women's Union (Kemalist CSOs), the publications and web sites of the CSOs are used as information source.

5.1.1 The Islamist CSOs

As an Islamist CSO, Ak-Der supports the resolution of the conflict through dialogue and claims that the two parties of the headscarf conflict can better understand each other only through dialogue. (Ak-Der, 1999: 280) However, the main obstacle for the dialogue process is stated to be the attitude of the Kemalist CSOs who do not want to listen and understand, but only try to change the thoughts opposite to theirs. (Ak-Der, 1999: 221) It is also claimed that as long as the Kemalist CSOs do not change their objectives, attitudes and perceptions towards the people having strong religious beliefs, the dialogue platform will enter into impasse so that ICR is likely to fail. (26.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)

According to the interviewee, another limitation for a possible ICR process is the tendency of some Kemalist organizations to give suggestions and advice to the veiled women in terms of wearing hat or wig instead of headscarf. Although such advice can be evaluated as attempts to find a resolution to the problem, Ak-Der perceives them as a total disrespect. Likewise, claiming that the ICR process should not be based on negotiation since some issues like religious beliefs and necessities cannot be negotiated and that in the headscarf conflict there is not an issue open for negotiation, Özgür-Der also underlines the Kemalists' willingness to propose solutions that only suits their interests as a limitation for the dialogue process. Claiming that the principles shape the dialogue, the representative from Özgür-Der also points out that respecting the beliefs and thoughts of the other party is crucial aspect for the initiation and successful implementation of an ICR process. (17.05.2005, interview, Istanbul)

⁷² During the interviews after briefly introducing to the representatives of the adversary organizations, the main principles and goals of the ICR in general, they were asked about their thoughts on the applicability of ICR on Turkey's headscarf conflict as well as their perceptions, objections, recommendations and concerns related to this conflict resolution method.

Another potential obstacle emphasized by the representatives is the unwillingness of the Kemalist CSOs in entering a dialogue with the Islamist organizations. In this context Ak-Der claims that the designers of the ICR process should study very hard in order to persuade the Kemalists for attending a dialogue effort. (26.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) Similarly, the representative from Mazlum-Der signified the unwillingness of the parties to come together as a possible practical obstacle on the dialogue process. In this sense he asserted that because of their prejudices the parties who never came together may think that a dialogue would not be effective, or that it would escalate the conflict polarizing the society. (11. 06.2005, interview, Istanbul)

Additionally, the “use of words” is also indicated as a potential obstacle by the organization saying:

“For long years everybody was complaining that people do not talk and discuss. Today everybody has begun to talk. However this dialogue is like a dialogue between deaf people. Everybody has different words. The words sound the same however their meanings are completely different. Islam, democracy, secularism, freedom, human rights, public space...there are many other concepts that are being discussed in media and press. However, there is not a result yet because everybody talks behind his own wall. Intellectuals cannot provide common terms and concepts that will lead all these discussions to resolution. Turkey now suffers from not finding a common dictionary.”(Ak-Der, 1999: 210)

In this respect Ak-Der emphasizes that coming to a mutual agreement on the meanings of certain concepts is a crucial step for a successful dialogue process.

On the other hand, Özgür-Der has a very pessimistic vision towards the ICR processes and asserts that both the initiation and the success of a dialogue process between the organizations having adversarial positions towards the headscarf conflict would be very difficult due to the sharp mentality lying beneath the conflict. (17.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) Although the representative states that as an organization they are not so compassionate for a dialogue with the adversary organizations, she makes a list of preconditions for a future dialogue including:

“... the supporters of the headscarf ban should admit their mistakes and say that girls with headscarves can go to the universities and all other public places with their headscarves. I know that we are on the right way so they have to come to this point.” (ibid.)

Going further, the executive of Özgür-Der argues that before participating in such a dialogue, she would investigate the aim of the dialogue process as well as the objectives and identity of the process designers. Concerning the concessions that can be given in a future ICR process, Özgür-Der strongly identifies itself with the Quran principles and claims that no concession can be given from this. (Özgür-Der, 1999) From all these aspects it becomes obvious that Özgür-Der has a very strong position that would threaten the dialogue process before it even starts.

Contrary to Özgür-Der, Mazlum-Der remarks the initiation of a dialogue process between the adversary parties as a possible intervention method that should be implemented as soon as possible. However, some limitations and conditions are positioned also by the interviewee from Mazlum-Der. (02.05.2005, interview, Ankara) The first condition for such an ICR process is claimed to be “empathizing with the other” and “be able to look in the mirror”. In this sense it can be claimed that for Mazlum-Der “empathy” is the vital condition for a successful dialogue. Taking into consideration, the possible limitations that may threaten the successful implementation of ICR methods; Mazlum-Der highlights the lack of knowledge, prejudices, stereotypes and fears of the parties. (02.05.2005, interview, Ankara) Complementarily, the language that would be used is also defined as an important aspect and it is claimed that antagonistic, polemical, and offensive language should not be used in the ICR processes.

In terms of the perceived conclusion of the ICR processes, the representative argues that the parties do not have to reach a common decision since some differences would inevitably prolong. (ibid.) Concerning reconciliation among the parties and the limits of the concessions that can be given, Mazlum-Der also signifies that the communal relations should depend on mutual respect to have minimal tolerance for co-existence, although people do not have to love each other. (Ensaroglu, 2004) This example reveals that Mazlum-Der is ready to respect the adversary party and has a cooperative attitude in finding a common ground.

To sum up, although they indicate some limitations that may threaten the dialogue process with the Kemalists, in general sense the Islamist CSOs strongly support the initiation of a dialogue process.

5.1.2 The Kemalist CSOs

Concerning the Kemalist CSOs' perceptions towards ICR processes and dialogue with the adversary Islamic organizations, it can be said that they have a very similar stance in terms of unwillingness to participate in a dialogue, avoiding the existence of the conflict and perceiving entering into a dialogue with the adversary as giving concessions from their core values.

Accordingly, on the one hand the interviewees from ÇYDD agree that talking, discussing and holding a dialogue for resolving a problem are very important mechanisms. On the other hand they indicate that ÇYDD has nothing to negotiate, debate or talk with the Islamists since the objectives of Islamist CSOs are claimed to threaten the Turkish society. Moreover, one of the representatives states that for her there is not a headscarf conflict that should be resolved. (14.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) Similarly, the representatives from ADD reveal out their unwillingness to participate in a dialogue with these types of organizations stating that they have nothing in common and nothing to talk. (10.05.2005, interview, Ankara)

The interviewee from ÇYDD suggests that the ICR process should be designed as a scientific discussion platform where the necessity of wearing headscarf could be scientifically discussed and the purpose and the context of the beliefs questioned. Related to this the representative says:

“If some religions and religious precepts order the women to cover their heads, I would question this. You have to ask what are you protecting the woman from and what is the right, necessary and needed amount of covering and protecting her.”(11.05.2005, interview, Ankara)

Indicating that the Turkish society is not mature enough for discussing and questioning these kinds of aspects, the best solution in making people discuss and question everything is claimed to be the education of the society. (Saylan, 2001) To sum up, emphasizing the need for outlining the endurable and tolerable aspects in a dialogue, ÇYDD claims that rejecting to discuss an aspect since it has been perceived as an unquestionable religious belief would harden every dialogue process. (ibid.) Moreover, the organization asserts that in the context of the headscarf conflict, the ICR process should be carefully investigated in terms of its aim; objectives of the designers;

and the financial supporters of the dialogue process claiming that such a dialogue process may serve the interests of the groups that make use of the headscarf and exploit religion. The representatives also emphasized their concerns indicating that such a dialogue may create monologue instead of dialogue or sharpen the positions of the parties and polarize the society. (11.05.2005, interview, Ankara)

The representatives from ADD mainly perceive the ICR methods as processes trying to find a common, satisfactory agreement for both of the parties. In this sense one of the interviewees claimed that a common agreement cannot be reached by saying:

“It is impossible to rule half of the state with Sharia and half of the state with Republican regime. People cannot cover half of their heads and the other half staying bare. We would either prepare our *çarşafs* ⁷³ for the Sharia order or be Republican women.”(10.05.2005, interview, Ankara)

From the abovementioned statement it becomes evident that the organization perceives common agreement as one in which the parties have to give some concessions and where compromises dominate. However, in the ICR processes an integrative agreement in which the needs of the primary parties are fulfilled can be the ultimate outcome. Taking into consideration the organization’s perception towards ICR methods and its unwillingness to enter into a dialogue with Islamist CSOs, it can be argued that ADD perceives participating in a dialogue with the adversary group as giving concession from its interests. Similarly, Turkish Women’s Union perceives the dialogue process as a method where negotiation and bargaining would prevail and where the parties would try to impose their objectives in order to reach compromise. For that reason the representative of TKB asserts that when some important issues are at stake bargaining cannot be acceptable. (13.06.2005, interview, Istanbul)

Related to implementing the ICR methods on the headscarf conflict, one of the interviewees from ADD also claimed that without evaluating the conflict in its own reality, the resolution cannot be found in foreign systems or in the resolution methods proposed by scholars having different social and religious backgrounds. (14.05.2005, interview, Istanbul) He states that without comprising analysis of the turban question

⁷³ *çarşaf* is a type of veil that completely covers the body and sometimes the face with the exception of the eyes.

within its historical and sociological realities Western resolution methods may lead not to constructive resolution but to a destruction or even disaster.

5.2 Strategic Opportunities and Constraints for the Applicability of the ICR Method

In this part the aspects that provide opportunity and limitation for the successful implementation of Interactive Conflict Resolution method to the headscarf conflict will be elaborated. To define it more precisely, the “strategic opportunities” refer to the aspects that have promising character for the successful implementation of an ICR process. Contrarily, the “strategic constraints” refer to the aspects that challenge the success of an ICR process. The opportunity and constraint generating aspects are identified by the contributions coming from the assessment of the conflict in the context of Kemalist and Islamist CSOs as well as from the literature concerning the general context of the headscarf conflict. These aspects provide an important insight for indicating the conditions that should be addressed in the appropriate ICR process and for evaluating the applicability of the ICR approaches in the headscarf conflict.

5.2.1 Strategic Opportunities

- 1) In some platforms and groups the Kemalist and Islamist women organizations had the chance to work together. The representatives who participated in these work groups appeared to have a tendency to avoid “out-group” generalization. This condition poses a promising reference point for the success of ICR processes where the adversary parties would have the chance to know each other and build a more complex perception of the other group rather than a stereotyped and simplistic one.
- 2) The assessment has identified that there are moderates in both parties who can act as bridge builders in an ICR processes. Among the Islamist CSOs, Mazlum-Der appears to have a more moderate position since it has the capacity to make “in-group” criticism; identify itself both with Islamic and Western discourses and has a cooperative attitude to find a common ground with the adversary. Likewise, Ak-Der does not have conflictual relations with the official ideology and has previous work

experience with some of the Kemalist women organizations. Among the Kemalist CSOs, ÇYDD appears to have more moderate positions on the freedom for education issues.

- 3) In each group there are different levels of “empathy” towards the “other”. For instance while some Kemalist representatives perceive the veiled women as enemy, others perceive not the veiled women but the groups who make use of them as a threat. On the other hand while some Islamists generalize all the Kemalists claiming that they are against the headscarf regardless of where it is worn, some Islamist representatives differentiate the Kemalists as “half freedom supporters” and “the ones who completely rejects the visibility of the headscarf”. All these aspects have strategic importance in selecting the participants for an appropriate ICR workshop. In other words, participants with a range of differences do exist and can be included in an ICR process.
- 4) Although both parties agree that in the context of the headscarf conflict there is not an actual tension in the society, both of them have common concerns and fears about the further polarization of the society threatening the communal peace, in case the headscarf conflict does not come to an end. Despite the means envisioned by the parties to end the conflict are different, this shared vision provides an important ground and common goal for the parties to work together in an ICR process.
- 5) The attitudes of Islamist representatives provide another opportunity since they are all willing to have a dialogue with the Kemalist CSOs and believe that conflicts and problems can be resolved only through dialogue. (Özgür-Der appears to be more sceptical about ICR and its effectiveness) In general this aspect reveals that the Islamist CSOs renounce violence.
- 6) Some of the representatives from both Islamist and Kemalist CSOs indicated that during the ICR process the parties do not have to reach a common agreement claiming that some differences would inevitably prolong. In this sense, the stakeholders who have this kind of mentality would not perceive “understanding of the adversary’s demands or needs” as giving concessions so that the dialogue process would not be endangered. Since the headscarf conflict is a value and need based conflict and people cannot compromise on their values, the parties will have the chance to understand each others’ needs, values, fears and concerns.
- 7) The Islamist representatives indicated the “giving service-taking service” issue as an issue on which the parties may come to an agreement. Among the Kemalist

representatives especially the ones who implicitly criticize the headscarf ban in universities are defined as “half freedom” supporters by the Islamists and addressing this issue in the ICR process may be an initial step for the resolution of the conflict. This issue might construct a zone of possible agreement in an ICR workshop.

- 8) Concerning the transfer of the ICR results to the decision making process, the close relations of the Kemalist CSOs with the state may provide an important opportunity for the long-term success of an ICR process.
- 9) During the research it became clear that both the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs talk referring to the same concepts such as democracy, secularism, freedom, human rights, Islam and public space. However, these concepts were defined differently by the representatives and they attached different values to them. Lack of common language would be an important point of entry since it provides a convenient base for the application of a communication based ICR process. Trying to form a common language and generating common definitions to these concepts can be used as an important activity during an ICR process. However, this opportunity may turn into a serious obstacle in case the parties cannot manage to generate a common language.
- 10) Most of the Kemalist CSOs’ unwillingness to participate in a dialogue with the Islamist CSOs appears to be because of their perception of the ICR processes as a method where negotiation and bargaining prevail; mutual agreement is seen as ultimate objective; and where the parties try to impose their views on each other. Moreover, having strong prejudices, the parties who never come together appear to think that a dialogue would not be effective, or that it would escalate the conflict further polarizing the society. Since the CSOs in Turkey are not familiar with the ICR processes they should be well informed about its aims, principles and methodologies before a workshop. In this sense, preceding the dialogue process, private meetings with each participant and with the adversary parties should be organized. In these pre-workshop activities their unwillingness will probably be reduced and this seemingly restrained condition may turn into an opportunity.
- 11) The internal tensions and differences among the organizations that have similar position on the headscarf conflict (ex: ADD and ÇYDD or Mazlum-Der and Özgür-Der) may come to the surface during an ICR process and this can lead to the parties’ differentiation of in-group variation and thus, decrease the generalizations and stereotypes towards the out-group. This aspect appears as an important opportunity

since the participants will gain a more complex view of the conflict and of the other side that is necessary for cross-conflict alliances.

- 12) The common identity of the representatives of the adversarial CSOs is another opportunity since the stakeholders can realize the similarities with the adversary party and generate complex perceptions towards and relations with the “other”. The commonality between the representatives cannot only be stated in terms of their organizations’ civil agent role but also in terms of their Turkish citizenship, common history, common sex, common culture and tradition and even common future. Moreover, being representatives of the CSOs would give them a similar status in an ICR process that would form another opportunity to build relationships.
- 13) Concerning the status of women in Turkey, objectives of the women organizations from the adversary parties appear to be compatible. These objectives inevitably seem to provide a common ground among all types of women organizations, although they differ along the means through which these objectives can be achieved and the values attributed to these means. This compatibility forms an important opportunity for an ICR process since it can be used as a “superordinate goal”⁷⁴ helping to create a joint action among the women organizations including Kemalists, Islamists and feminists. However, past experiences among the women organizations should be clearly stated at this point since they prove that only acting jointly towards a superordinate goal do not lead to reconciliation among the Kemalist and Islamist women.⁷⁵ These experiences reveal that without addressing deep fears, concerns and negative perceptions of the parties, only working towards a superordinate goal does not seem enough to improve the understanding of the parties towards each other. In this respect it can be concluded that “improving the women’s status in Turkey” or another common goal can be used as a “superordinate goal” in an ICR process to improve the capacity of the parties to act together. However, the preceding activities in which the psychological aspects of the conflict

⁷⁴ Superordinate goal can be defined as a common goal. In the literature it is claimed that if there is contact and cooperative interdependence between groups in the pursuit of common and superordinate goal, inter-group relations can be improved. (Cf. Maoz, 2000)

⁷⁵ The joint works of women organizations in CEDAW that have the aim to improve the status of women and indicate the violations of women’s rights, is one of these experiences Related to the experience, the representative from TKB who worked with an Islamist women organization in CEDAW committee stated: “In our joint works related to the status of women in Turkey the Islamist women organizations try to raise the headscarf issue in every occasion. Bringing this issue to the agenda really jeopardize the other issues that we have to work on.” (02.06.2005, interview, Ankara)

(needs, values, prejudices, fears of the parties) should be addressed and precisely chosen not to put the joint work in deadlock. In other words for contact to result in favorable outcomes, it needs to fulfill the four essential conditions including equality in status; cooperation towards common goals; interdependence between the parties; and a social climate that supports the inter-group contact. (Pettigrew, 1998 cf. Maoz, 2000) Since all the participants will be from the CSOs, they will have equal status.

- 14) During the stakeholder analysis, concerning desired changes of the parties about the social structure in which the headscarf conflict is situated, some compatibility is identified. For instance, high level of education and equal education opportunities for everybody is emphasized both by the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs (especially by ÇYDD, who dreams of high level of education leading to social enlightenment). However, the implicit assumptions and values that the parties have for these similar desires are completely different.⁷⁶ Another seemingly compatible desired change among the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs appears to be the environment where the headscarf is not questioned and discussed anymore and where other problems of Turkey can be addressed. So, there is a sense being worn out, a kind of “hurting stalemate” which is important to make the parties to the table. Both parties assert that the headscarf polemics and its politicization prevent Turkey’s concentration on its other social, cultural, political and economic problems. Nevertheless, the underlying assumption in this desire is again controversial.⁷⁷ In this sense although these desires seem compatible, the underlying values and assumptions are different so that they cannot be used directly in an ICR approach. However, after addressing the underlying assumptions, these desires may provide a ripe ground for joint work.

⁷⁶ While the Islamists desire for high educational level and equal opportunity for everybody, they implicitly demand the allowance of the veiled girls to go to universities. On the other hand the underlying assumption of the Kemalists’ desire for high level of education is their beliefs asserting that through increased secular, scientific education and high level of literacy the society would be enlightened and this in turn would eliminate the problematic and backward-looking mentality of the headscarf supporters. In other words for the Kemalists high level of education represent a society where everything can be discussed and questioned including religious beliefs and where modern looking women (uncovered women) dominate the public places.

⁷⁷ In their visions, the Islamist CSOs actually want to indicate the immediate need for the resolution of the conflict that would create suitable social and political environment for the successful resolution of the other problems. Contrarily, by the same vision the Kemalists tend to ignore the importance of the conflict or to indicate that the headscarf issue is finished and that it should not be raised anymore.

5.2.2 Strategic Constraints

- 1) The intractable and complex character of the headscarf conflict that is centred on identity and deep-seated values that oppose each other forms a serious limitation for the resolution of the conflict. All issues emphasized by the stakeholders involve needs or values that both the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs representatives perceive as critical to their groups' survival that cannot be negotiated. Although the public sphere and women issues seem to be related with identity and values, they also appear to be closely related with power since the parties have a zero-sum perspective of these issues. For instance, the visibility of Islam in the public sphere appears to be perceived by the Kemalist representatives as the defeat of secularism; and the head cover is accepted as embarrassment for modernization and civilization. From these aspects it becomes obvious that the issues emphasized in the context of the conflict have a complex and intermingled character that justifies our identification of the headscarf conflict as a "protracted conflict". In this sense, the need for an ICR process that has to address all these need and value based issues comes to the fore.
- 2) Poor interaction and broken relationships; high level of negative perceptions, stereotypes and essentializing the other provide another constraint for the resolution of the conflict. Apparently, all these aspects will challenge the success of an ICR process. However, taking all these aspects into consideration an ICR approach appears as the most appropriate intervention strategy for the headscarf case in comparison to other traditional methods as mediation, arbitration, or formal negotiation.
- 3) The power asymmetry between the Kemalists and Islamists poses another limitation towards the resolution of the headscarf conflict. Holding the key institutions of the state in their hands including the military, the Kemalists benefit from the current situation. Although the Islamists with strong religious beliefs are not minority and are able to come to political power, from the continuation of the headscarf ban it becomes obvious that the state⁷⁸ and so that the secularist elites are dominant in terms of political power. In other words, the state apparatus assigns more power and

⁷⁸ By the word "state" what is meant is not the government or the political parties in power, whereas it refers to the military-bureaucratic elites and the representatives of this mentality who situate themselves at the "centre".

privilege to the Kemalist group. In this sense, the notion of power asymmetry has considerable impact on the dynamics of conflict; on the parties' views on strategies concerning the conflict and its resolution. To put it more specifically as a high-power group the Kemalists have interest in maintaining statusquo and preserving their own power and see any significant change in power relations as contrary to their interests. In this context, the unwillingness of the Kemalist CSOs to participate in a dialogue with the Islamists; the Kemalists' preference to avoid/ignore the headscarf conflict; and the incompatibility of the stakeholders' objectives become meaningful. Therefore, in an ICR approach addressing the power asymmetry among the parties appears as an important undertaking since overriding this strategic constraint is crucial for providing a forum for examining alternative perspectives on conflict and strategies for its resolution. (Rouhana and Korper, 1997: 4)

- 4) The unwillingness of most of the Kemalist CSOs to come together with the Islamist CSOs is another practical obstacle on the dialogue process. Stating that they have nothing to negotiate, debate or talk with the Islamists, most of the Kemalist CSOs representatives appear to block the implementation of an ICR approach in the headscarf conflict. However, by indicating that ICR is not about negotiation, debate or coming up with an agreement this constraint can be partially eliminated.
- 5) Some of the Kemalist representatives perceive the Islamists as insincere and claim that in complex conflicts where the interests and objectives of one of the parties are not clearly stated, dialogue is not an appropriate method for resolution. In this sense during an ICR process approaching the Islamists' demands and their needs with suspicion would to a great extent challenge the process and this condition should be successfully addressed. Organizing informal pre-workshop activities especially designed to build trust will give the participants a chance to construct interpersonal relations with the adversary and will make trust-building as an important part of the ICR process.
- 6) Another important obstacle for the success of the ICR process is the tendency of most of the Kemalists who try to discount the existence of the headscarf conflict in Turkey claiming that Turkey has more important problems than "a piece of cloth". This aspect reveals Kemalists' low awareness of the conflict that can be closely related to their willingness to protect the status quo. Stating that they have not a problem to resolve, this condition leads to representatives' unwillingness to participate. Since the stalemate is to their advantage, how should they be convinced

to engage in talks with the other side has great importance. This situation can be defined as establishing experience of ripeness among disputants where the parties make a commitment to change the direction of the normative social processes of the relations towards de-escalation. (Coleman,1997)

- 7) The tension that was observed to exist between ADD and ÇYDD may prevent the representatives of these organizations to adopt a flexible attitude during the dialogue. Since ÇYDD is criticized by ADD for giving up some of the Atatürkist principles, ÇYDD may adopt a rigid attitude not to appear as if giving concessions from its Kemalist character in order not to lose face.
- 8) Almost all the Kemalist and some of the Islamist representatives approach the ICR processes with suspicion claiming that it should be carefully investigated in terms of its aims; objectives of the designers and the financial supporters. In this sense, a very clear, detailed and explanatory document should be prepared and sent to the participants as well as private meetings should be held with each party separately before the dialogue process begins. Otherwise, the neutrality of the designers, the objectives and characteristics of the dialogue may begin to be questioned during the process endangering all dialogue.
- 9) The proposition of some Kemalist CSOs to design the ICR process as a scientific discussion platform where the necessity of wearing headscarf, the purpose and context of the beliefs could be scientifically discussed reveals out the probable attitude of the Kemalists that may come to the surface in the dialogue. This kind of attitude would really harden the process since the Islamists explicitly reject discussing and questioning their religious beliefs.
- 10) Most of the Kemalists and Islamists appear to perceive the headscarf conflict as a power struggle, but not as a conflict that should be resolved in a mutually satisfactory way. This poses an important obstacle that should be carefully addressed during an ICR process. However, since Mazlum-Der does not conceive the resolution as a power struggle and bases it on mutual empathy and consensus it can act as a facilitator from the inside.
- 11) In the context of the headscarf conflict, neither the Kemalist CSOs nor the Islamist CSOs locate “improving their mutual relationship” among their objectives or desired changes related to the future. This reluctance appears to be an important obstacle for the dialogue process since it affects their willingness to participate and to understand the adversary party.

- 12) Most of the Kemalist CSOs' perception of the Islamists as "enemy" and their "antagonistic relationship" pose another constraint since in antagonistic relations the parties try to eliminate, destroy and suppress the "other" by imposing authoritative order. (Mouffe, 1999: 756)
- 13) Taking into consideration the objectives of both parties in terms of the headscarf conflict, it should be underlined that neither of the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs indicated their objectives in terms of reconstructing their relations with each other. In other words neither of the parties sees the resolution of the conflict or the elimination of threat posed by the adversary in improving its relations with the adversary party. This forms an important constraint to an ICR approach since the desire to reconcile the conflictual relationships and to solve the conflict is a vital aspect to bring the parties together and for the success of an ICR approach.

5.3 Strategic Resources

"Strategic resources" can be identified in terms of organizations or people who have the capacity, and ability, and who already have the vision to play a role of "bridge builders". Identifying these actors as "moderates", Lederach strongly emphasizes the importance of working with moderates in resolving conflicts by suggesting that moderate individuals and groups within society have the capability in maintaining peaceful relations and can be the strongest allies for conflict resolvers. (1997: 94-97) Likewise, focusing on the weak relationships among the adversarial parties Ury (2000) argues that the bridge-builders can prevent the escalation of the conflict through creating cross cutting ties and forging relations across lines of conflict via joint projects and genuine dialogues. According to him such cross-cutting ties can build trust and establish natural avenues for communication where mutual understanding is promoted and relationships are build that can prevent escalation into violence.(Ury, 2000: 132-138) Accordingly, we argue that moderate groups who are potential bridge builders can reveal the shared identity of the adversary parties; create a common ground within the context of the headscarf conflict and be strategically important in generating consensual norms that would minimize hostile attitudes between the primary parties. In this sense,

including these moderate organizations would provide an important strategic resource for the appropriate ICR approach.

Concerning the abovementioned assumption in choosing the moderate organizations, the most important thing related to these bridge builders is the necessity for their existence in the conflict setting that is the “civil society in Turkey” in our study. In the context of the headscarf conflict the civil society appears to be polarized and due to the limited contacts between the organizations this situation seems very desperate. Nevertheless, the women organizations that have a relatively neutral stance towards the headscarf conflict and have contact with organizations from either side generate an important resource rooted in the civil society. Although the following three women organizations have different characteristics, their potential capacity for being “bridge builders” during an ICR process is undeniable. On the other hand, human rights organizations also appear as an important strategic resource although their capability in acting as bridge builders is a problematic issue and this will be discussed in the following part.

5.3.1 Women Organizations as Strategic Resource

5.3.1.1 Uçan Süpürge (Flying Broom)⁷⁹

Flying Broom was founded in 1996 by a group of women coming from the feminist movement whose aim was to provide communication and network between women’s CSOs and to function as an information and documentation centre. By promoting women’s empowerment, the organization defines its long term goal as to contribute to the process of democratization and development of civil society in Turkey, in accordance with the international gender equality norms.

The main objective of the organization is identified by its representative as to build a network between the women organizations and by this way to provide common ground to know each other and to have joint works. (Sivil Toplum, 2004) Defining the Flying Broom as a communication centre, it is even stated that the organization does not only try to provide communication with women organizations but also with other different CSOs. Believing that by sharing experiences, the CSOs can create a synergy,

⁷⁹ Most of the information about the Flying Broom are taken from its web page: www.ucansupurge.org

improve their relations and strengthen the civil society in Turkey, the role of the organization is stated to be “mediator” among the CSOs to open up their knowledge to share. (ibid.)

In this sense Flying Broom organizes many projects in order to realize these objectives. For instance, the “Database of Women’s Organizations in Turkey” project aims to establish an efficient, easily accessible database for national and international women NGOs, groups and initiatives to meet the pressing need to access the information of these organizations and to intensify the interaction and communication between them. On the other hand the National Meetings of Women CSOs that were organized by Flying Broom managed to bring the Islamist and Kemalist women organizations together and gave them the chance to work together for the improvement of the women’s status in Turkey. As it has been previously stated, these meetings were arranged for the preparation of “Shadow Reports”⁸⁰ to be handed in to the United Nations CEDAW Committee.

Moreover, the political neutrality of the organization reveals itself in the representative’s statement claiming that the organization is not a member of a political party or a political group. In other words staying neutral and with equal distance to every political opinion and being objective is defined as the fundamental principles of Flying Broom.(Sivil Toplum, 2004) However, the neutrality of the organization is claimed to be abandoned only in the issues related to the discrimination and violation of women’s rights. It is also claimed that in the social movements that have been realized through civil initiatives the women organizations have unifying and bridging role.(ibid.) In this sense, the representative of the organization claims that the women organizations are candidates to change and reconstruct all the politics related to women and assert the importance and necessity for close interaction between women. Concerning the stance of Flying Broom on the headscarf conflict, it can be said that its commitment to secularism illustrate its closeness to the Kemalist women organizations. However, their strategies for dealing with Islamist groups differ considerably from those of the Kemalist CSOs. While Kemalist women organizations like TKB have an exclusionary attitude with respect to Islamist women organizations, as a feminist women organization

⁸⁰ The Shadow Reports was a supplement to the official Country Report, giving a voice to the women of the country and reporting important shortcomings in the government policy.

Flying Broom looks for common platforms on which to discuss issues and reach a better understanding with Islamic women's groups.

Taking all these aspects into consideration, it can be argued that the capacity of Flying Broom to build bridges between the secularists and the Islamists in an ICR approach lies in its actual projects, founding principles and organizational objectives. In this sense, it can be concluded that with its practical capacity the organization can really play a facilitative role among the adversary Islamist and Kemalist organizations.

5.3.1.2 Başkent Kadın Platformu [BKP] (Başkent Women's Platform)⁸¹

Although Baskent Women's Platform can be defined as an Islamist women organization, its self identification; criticisms towards Islam from the inside; wide networks with different groups; closeness to feminism; structure that is criticized by most of the Islamist women organizations and work experiences with the Kemalist women organizations gives the platform an important strategic potential in building bridges among the Kemalists and Islamists in the context of the headscarf conflict. BKP was built in 1995 as a union of civil institutions comprising many women branches of civil society organizations and women groups. Generating solutions for the problems of the religious women and detecting the barriers on the progression of the religious women by organizing conferences, meetings and education activities are the main objectives of the platform. (Çubukçu, 2004:115) Like other feminist organizations they also act against domestic violence, "honour" killings and other problems of women through joint actions with other women organizations. The most important point related to BKP is that unlike the other Islamist women organizations they accept to be defined as "feminist" and claim that they have many common points with liberal feminists. (Pusch, 2004:484)

The platform also tries to form a bridge between "secular" and "religious" women organizations and to improve the relations between the two parties. In terms of the headscarf conflict they aim to transform (for the two poles) the status of women from a

⁸¹ Most of the informations related to the platform are taken from the chairman's speech in the conference organized by TESEV: "Muslim Woman in Western Societies" ("Batı Toplumlarında Müslüman Kadın", 11 June, 2004, İstanbul). Retrived from: http://www.tesev.org.tr/etkinlik/basortusu_kitap_tanitim_konusmalar.php

docile to an active actor of of resolution. (Çubukçu, 2004:120) According to the representative of the platform the activities like HABITAT, Pekin+5 that are organized by the United Nations are affective in improving the dialogue between different women organizations. BKP participated in all these activities and even in the preparation of the “Shadow Report” that was handed in to the United Nations CEDAW Committee and organized by the Flying Broom.

The self identification of the platform is a very important aspect to denote its difference from the other Islamist women organizations. The representative of BKP opposes the identification “Islamist women” or “women wearing turban” and defining Islamism as an ideology. She asserts that they are not Islamists. Furthermore, emphasizing the concept of “Muslim woman”, the representative argues that the majority of the uncovered women in Turkey are also Muslim so that she prefers to define herself as a “religious woman”. The representative also rejects the definition “women wearing headscarf” claiming that they also worship, have a world view, life style, obey the rules of religion and internalize the philosophy of religion.

Making a very similar argument to the Kemalist CSOs representatives, the chairman of BKP claims that the society is not mature and ready enough to discuss everything calmly and asserts that for a healthy discussion people should wait for the problems in which deep-rooted values are at stake to calm dawn. She points out that in the headscarf conflict people do not discuss to find a solution but rather to sharpen and make a position. Indicating that if a person feels herself/himself to belong to a group, inevitably the person will take a side in a discussion and discuss some aspects and issues from that side. Related to the headscarf controversy the main issue is emphasized to be this type of discussion among the adversary parties. All these statements reveal the equal and impartial stance of the representative to the whole headscarf debate since she does not blame one of the parties but criticizes both of them.

On the one hand, with the statement indicating that without providing people the appropriate ground for discussion but by only trying to impose something on them would not lead to success, the platform criticizes the Kemalist elites and the state. Unlike the other Islamist organizations the representative of the platform does not find the Turkish modernization project as a complete product of problematic mentalities and indicates some of its successful concepts. However, at the same time she criticizes its

method and claims that if the modernization project was realized by taking into consideration the needs and values of all identity and cultural groups of the society, it could have been more successful, not problematic, not generating today's problems in Turkey and convey more liberal context.

On the other hand the representative strongly criticizes the interpretations of religion that originate from the traditional and masculine structure of Islam. In the context of the headscarf conflict, the Islamist men are also criticized by the platform because of their unwillingness in solving the headscarf conflict for their own political and economic interests. Strongly criticizing the religious communities and their leaders for using the veiled girls without taking care of their psychologies, the platform appears to have a very different character than the other Islamist women organizations. Indicating that the Islamists should make self evaluations, self-criticisms and questioning, the chairman of the platform also indicates that without taking into consideration religious knowledge, the religious groups produce religiosity with their feelings, adherence and religious communitarianism (*cemaatcilik*). In this sense, like the Kemalists, the platform maintains that not questioning these religious types is the most important handicap of the Islamists so that they have many problems related to the liberty and pluralism. However, at the same time she criticizes the secularists by stating that since they are in power they have to first perform their own duties and then to question the others.

From all these aspects it can be concluded that Baskent Women's Platform can be a potential strategic resource for an ICR process and its strategic value depends on its ability to criticize the Islamists from the inside.

5.3.1.3 KA-DER (Association for the Support and Training of Women Candidates) **[*Kadın Adaylarını Destekleme ve Eğitim Derneği*]**

Ka-Der is a civil society organization that was founded in 1997 to promote the equal representation of women by election or appointment at all levels of the decision-making process in Turkey. Berktaş identifies Ka-Der as a secular feminist organization that has the aim to increase the number of women deputies in the parliament, regardless of their ideologies or political opinions. (Berktaş, 2004:28) In other words, maintaining an equal distance from all political parties, Ka-Der's main attempt is to raise the presence of women in Turkish politics. The main objective of Ka-Der is stated as to

develop gender awareness in the society so to combat the domination of men in Turkey's social and political culture and the organization pursues this goal by preparing women to participate in political parties and by working to get political parties to accept and welcome women in their decision-making processes. ("Ka-Der'in Amacı", n.d.) The overall mission of Ka-Der can be defined as to contribute to the quality of democracy in Turkey and to enhance women's rights.

The perception of Ka-Der towards the tension among the Islamists and secularists reveals out the neutral and reconciliatory position of the organization. Ka-Der criticizes the perception of the Muslim women as "passive", "backward" and "obedient" and the Western women as "progressive", "independent" and "contender". (Ka-Der, 2004:10) According to the organization relating the backwardness of the people to Islam means to define their culture as problematic. In this sense, the organization opposes the homogenization of the out-group without differentiating the attitudes and thoughts of its members and claims that this kind of attitude would build a wall between the groups and cultures. (ibid.) By stating that this type of attitude may increase the strength of the conservative Islamists, the organization also reveals out its secular character.

The organization proposes building bridges in order to better know and understand the "other" party instead of building walls that cannot be passed over. (Berktaş, 2004:30) Likewise, the main argument of Ka-Der is based on building bridges between all women, passing over their ideological and political differences. Indicating that solidarity is not possible without a genuine effort to understand each other, and that understanding can only begin when each party is informed about the "other", Ka-Der strongly emphasizes the importance of preparing the groundwork for sharing knowledge and experience to facilitate mutual understanding, empathy and improvement of relations. (Ka-Der, 2004:8)

Concerning the stance of Ka-Der in the headscarf conflict it can be said that they do not have a clear position. Yet, Ka-Der's stand on the issue of veiled members in the organization is ambiguous. For instance, its members publicly avoid the question of whether they will accept veiled women's membership or participation in the association's activities. (Kozat, 2003:210) Moreover, the association did not take a public stand on the case of Merve Kavakçı and from her research about Ka-Der, Kozat states that she was told during her interviews with the staff in Ka-Der's Istanbul branch

that there was a serious divide among the members on the issue of supporting Merve Kavakçı, and that the association finally decided not to make a general press statement.(Kozat, 2003: 210) Nevertheless, Ka-Der asserts that the individual members are permitted to express their opinion in the press. (ibid.)

Taking all these aspects into consideration it becomes obvious that Ka-Der has an important potential in building bridges between the Islamist and secularist women. Although the underlying assumption of the organization is to increase the solidarity of women for the formation of strong women movement, the position, attitude and its style in approaching differences would really provide an important contribution to an ICR approach to be implemented on the headscarf conflict. Furthermore, since the activities of Ka-Der aim to raise the presence of women in Turkish politics and to support the women's participation in politics, it can be claimed that the organization has or at least in the long run will have the capability to affect the decision making process. In this sense, the other strategic opportunity that the presence of Ka-Der could provide to an ICR process is its potential capability in transferring the change in the process to the decision making process.

5.3.2 Human Rights Organizations as Strategic Resource

Although for the Kemalist CSOs in general, human rights issue does not appear to be included in their areas of interest, ÇYDD can be indicated as an exception among the three Kemalist CSOs analysed in this study. ÇYDD's vice executive is also the head of the Prime Ministry Human Rights Consultation Board (İnsan Hakları Danışma Kurulu-İHDK)⁸² and signed the minority rights declaration prepared by the Board generating many debates among the Kemalists⁸³. Still, the membership of Mazlum-Der in this

⁸² The vice executive of ÇYDD who is the head of İHDK defines the aims of İHDK in terms of improving human rights notion in Turkey and acting as bridge among the CSOs and public institutions. (ÇYDD 2. Başkanı Prof. Dr. İbrahim Kaboğlu'ndan mesaj", 2004) In this context the mission of ÇYDD is stated to be confined to creating a society that is respectful to human rights by undertaking the mission of secular education by saying that in an uneducated society human rights cannot go beyond a "discourse".

⁸³ Two interviewees from ADD who criticized the chairman of ÇYDD for signing the minority rights declaration. (11.06.2005, interview, Istanbul and 10.05.2005, interview, Ankara) can be given as examples.

Board⁸⁴ and the Islamist CSOs' (that are analysed in this study) identification of themselves as supporters of human rights, makes the human rights field appear as a potential common ground generating aspect between the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs. However, since during the interview with the executive of Mazlum-Der it was stated that their work with ÇYDD in Human Rights Consultation Board is limited and did not have positive affects on their relationships; and since the Board was criticized by the Islamists for not accepting the headscarf ban as a violation of human rights ("Özgürlük isteyen kurul başörtüsünü görmedi", 2004) limits the use of human rights as a common ground generating field. However, at this point it should also be asked: "Do the human rights organizations that do not belong to any of the adversary parties to the headscarf conflict, have the capacity to act as bridge builders among the adversaries in an ICR approach or further sharpen the division between the two sides?" Identification of human rights organizations as strategic resource is a debatable issue that will partially find its answer after analysing İHD as the most prominent one among the human rights organizations that do not belong to either of the camps in the conflict.

5.3.2.1 İHD (Human Rights Association) [*İnsan Hakları Derneği*]

İHD was founded in 1986 as a civil reaction and solidarity movement by some intellectuals, academicians, lawyers and journalists with leftist tendencies in order to support the people who were imprisoned because of their political thoughts and to react against violations of human rights and liberties. İHD defines itself as a non-governmental and voluntary organization that is not a body of a political party or of a single political tendency. ("Principles of HRA", n. d.) However, the initial political tendency of the organization was stated to be "Marxist-laicist". (Plagemann, 2002: 364) Accordingly, in late 1980s İHD had close relations with "Cumhuriyet" that is one of the most prestigious newspapers in Turkey known for its conservative Kemalist identity. (Plagemann, 2002:367) However, in 1990s this situation began to change with İHD's activities concerning the violation of human rights in the Kurdish region since the organization began to support the Kurdish rights, thus, breaking down an important taboo of Kemalist-laicist order. (ibid.) In this sense, İHD clearly began to distance itself

⁸⁴ For the other members of the Board you can look at: "İnsan Hakları Danışma Kurulu'nun tam listesi/23.11.2004" Retrieved on 27.07.2005 from: <http://www.ortakpayda.org/makale.asp?foo=read&feox=108>

from Jacobin laicism even though its secular identity still prevails. (ibid. 368) Consequently, İHD identifies itself as a non-governmental organization:

“...upholding the principle that the human rights are universal and indivisible; opposing the death penalty at regardless of geographical location and circumstance; opposing torture regardless of the individual, the geographical location and circumstance; defending the right to fair trial everywhere, for everyone and in any circumstances; strongly supporting the idea that the right of nations to self determination is a human right; defending unconditionally and without any restriction the right to freedom of expression; and defending the right to freedom of religion”. (“Principles of HRA”, n. d.)

Parallel to the transformation in the position, principles, areas of interest, policies and activities of İHD, its relations with the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs also changed. Opposing the headscarf ban, its relationship with Mazlum-Der that is an Islamist CSO began to improve in terms of sharing knowledge, joining each other’s meetings or making joint press releases. Concerning this aspect, Plagemann says that the close relation between Mazlum-Der and İHD cuts across the polarization lines since each organization represents the political polarization in Turkey. (Plagemann, 2002: 394) On the other hand, supporting Kurdish rights, freedom to the headscarf in public places and struggling against other human rights violations criticizing the policies of the state, İHD appears to have poor relations with the Kemalist CSOs that can be identified as the supporters of the Atatürkist principles including “secularism” and “nationalism”. In this context, the harsh criticisms of Kemalists towards the executive İHD⁸⁵ (Akın Birdal) get internal coherence. Taking into consideration this problematic relationship between İHD and the Kemalist CSOs it would be challenging to claim that İHD can act as a bridge builder in an ICR approach since the organization has a clear “anti-headscarf ban” position and is harshly criticized by the Kemalists.

The position of İHD towards the headscarf conflict reveals itself in the statements of its executive who harshly criticizes the policies of the state concerning the Kavakçı case:

⁸⁵ In a conference organized by ADD and ÇYDD, Vural Savaş indicated that the word “democrat” is used as camouflage of the enmity against Atatürk and the Republic. He claims that under the name of democratization, Atatürkist principles are violated and Atatürkist principles would be eliminated, the way towards regressive movements would be opened and the Turkish republic would be divided. In this sense among many other names, Birdal is also defined as a democrat having all these aims. For more information look at: “Apo da Birdal da Demokrat” Retrieved on 01.08.2005 from: <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2000/05/20/haber/hab03.html>

“The political actors who restrict freedoms in all walks of life and who force a deep and authoritarian political and legal structure upon the people of Turkey have now moved onto attack a female Fazilet (Virtue) Party MP, supposedly in the name of women’s freedoms, modernity and civilization. Regimes where the majority in the Parliament abolishes the freedoms of others are dictatorial regimes, though they may be parliamentary. This isn’t a stance adopted for modernity and civilization.”(Öndül, 1999)

Going further the executive states that just as the male political Islamists have the right to work, to have education and being prime minister according to democratic tolerance, without discriminating between the sexes, female Islamists also have the same right. (Öndül, 1999) İHD also clearly asserts that they do not consider the claims about modernity and civilization, which are based upon symbols, clothes and formalities as valid and asserts that in Turkey’s institutions only one-way of thinking dominates and only one way of life is imposed. (ibid.)

However, İHD also criticizes the Islamist groups and political parties that take advantage of women and see them and their headscarf as the focal point of their political agenda. Rather than positive discrimination to provide opportunities for women, İHD criticizes them for seeing the woman as a tool for their own ends and for reproducing the authoritarian system quoting “human rights” only when the issue of headscarf arises. In this sense it becomes obvious that İHD does not have a pro-Islamist stance.

İHD explicitly states that they view the headscarf issue from the “individual’s freedom” point of view and that they do not see the headscarf as an attempt to divide a country, to take the regime back to the middle ages, or as a threat of losing the gained rights of women. (Human Rights Bulletin, 1999:15) Likewise, the previous executive of the organization claims that healthy and democratic solutions cannot be produced under the influence of historical paranoia. (Öndül, 1999) According to İHD, the prohibition of wearing headscarf or constraints in dressing in general is in opposition to abolition of discrimination and interference in people’s private lives. The headscarf ban is regarded as practices discriminating against women to prevent them from having equal roles in the society and from attending in social life equally. (Tr: “Headscarf ban is discriminatory towards women”, 2005) In this sense the state is claimed not to have the authority to intervene in personal preferences of the people about their appearance in private life or public life or to force the people to change their preferences. (Keskin,

2005) Going further İHD also claims that the right of education and work; privacy of the individual life and the right to engage in public life must be protected without exception. The organization also appears to have a concern stating that increasing polarization and tension in the society resulting from such practices are worrisome. (Öndül, 1999)


Consequently, if İHD's run-down relations with the Kemalist CSOs and relatively close relations with the Islamist CSOs; as well as its clear anti-headscarf position are taken into consideration, İHD does not appear to be a potential, appropriate, and neutral bridge builder in an ICR approach.

5.4 Strategic Objectives

After assessing the headscarf conflict in the context of Islamist and Kemalist CSOs; indicating stakeholders' visions towards the ICR approaches; strategic opportunities and limitations as well as the strategic resources, with this final part the strategic framework towards evaluating the applicability of the ICR approaches in Turkey's headscarf conflict will be completed

In order to find the appropriate ICR process(es) for the headscarf conflict just stating the issues, fears, concerns, prejudices, relationships, objectives and desired changes of the parties is not enough. These themes have to be approached by taking into consideration the strategies adopted by the parties towards the conflict at the moment and for this *Figure 5.1* gives an important insight.

In this inter-group conflict framework, first of all it is illustrated that when the parties assume that disagreement is inevitable and permanent, and agreement is impossible the conflict is claimed to be resolved totally in favor of one party or the other. The figure states that if the stakes are high the parties will engage in win-loose power struggle till one party yields; if the stakes are moderate the parties may turn to a third-party for judgment; and when stakes are low they may decide not to determine the outcome but simply wait for fate to intervene.



* **Win-Loose Power Struggle** : When the conflict was highly escalated especially in 1997-1998 adopted by both parties and still adopted by some Kemalist and Islamist CSOs;

* ***Indifference or Ignorance; Fate***: the Kemalist CSOs;

* **Problem-Solving**: most of the Islamist CSOs;

Figure 5.1 A framework for understanding inter-group conflict

Taken from: Blake, Shepard and Mouton (1964 Cf. Fisher, 1989)

On the other hand, if the parties assume that disagreement is not inevitable, they perceive that conflict can be avoided because interdependence is not necessary. Thus, depending on the stakes one or both parties may withdraw, maintain indifference or isolate itself from the relationship. Finally, it is suggested that if the parties assume that agreement is possible and therefore interdependence is necessary then with low stakes the parties are prone to smooth differences or make reference to broad common goals. If the stakes are moderate the parties are likely to enter into bargaining to reach compromise that meets both parties' needs to an acceptable degree. However, with high stakes compromise will not be acceptable and the parties will be prone to engage in problem solving to find a creative resolution. As it is seen all these approaches vary on an active-passive dimension.

Relating this inter-group conflict framework to Turkey's headscarf conflict, it can be stated that especially in 1997 and 1998 when the headscarf conflict was highly escalated; both for the Islamists and the Kemalists the stakes were very high in terms of

their needs and values at the centre, they were in consensus that the conflict is inevitable but agreement is impossible. At this time, both parties were in a win-loose power struggle. Taking into consideration the declarations made by the political parties (especially the Welfare Party), National Security Council (MGK), the Constitutional Court, media and university rectors, this strategy can easily be observed during this period.

However, today the situation seems more complex concerning the strategies adopted by the parties. From the assessment of the Kemalist CSOs, it became obvious that some of them still perceive the conflict as a win-loose power struggle. Nevertheless, the majority appear to avoid/ignore the headscarf conflict and isolate themselves from the relationship with Islamists since they see agreement as impossible; do not assume the conflict as inevitable and do not perceive interdependence as necessary. Moreover, since the headscarf ban continues, the actual needs and values of the Kemalists are not perceived as endangered so that their stakes in resolving the conflict appear to be low. It can be also claimed that there are some Kemalist CSOs' representatives who perceive the headscarf tension as permanent and inevitable because of the clashing values and identities among the parties and, thus, perceive an agreement as impossible. Accordingly, these Kemalists prefer to wait for fate to intervene rather than deciding to determine a resolution. On the other hand, from the stakeholder analysis it became obvious that such as the Kemalists, the Islamist CSOs also do not adopt unique strategy towards the conflict. For instance, most of the Islamist CSOs' representatives point out that there is an actual conflict and perceive an agreement with the Kemalists as possible. By emphasizing their basic needs and values (high stakes), these representatives appear to adopt a problem solving strategy or smoothing the difference and maintain interdependence. On the other hand, some radical Islamist CSOs such as Özgür-Der in our case see the headscarf controversy as power-struggle by indicating the wrong mentality lying beneath the politics of the Turkish state. This argument can be interpreted as an opposition towards the regime.

For a successful ICR process the fundamental strategic objective would be to bring the Kemalists to the problem solving level. Therefore, an appropriate ICR approach should focus on strategy transformation, but how? The answer to this question

will illustrate the strategic objectives towards which an appropriate ICR approach should work. These objectives can be listed as the following:

a- To increase parties' awareness about the conflict, the costs of continuing the present strategies they adopted, and to generate an awareness of mutually acceptable parameters within which a future solution might be sought. In other words, to create ground rules through which the stakeholders can work jointly towards a superordinate goal. Given the findings of the conflict assessment, especially the Kemalist CSOs appear not to be ready to generate a mutually agreeable solution to the headscarf conflict. Thus, generating common orientation or deciding on the aspects that should be addressed for the resolution in the long-run can be in the agenda of an ICR approach.

b- Creating interpersonal changes such as reduction in mutual stereotypes, attitudinal changes, improving interpersonal relationships and trust, and establishing personal relationships across the divide of the conflict; to make the disputants perceive each other as adversaries not enemies or generate more complex perception towards the adversary that is not based on stereotypes; to change the parties' attitudes from adversarial attitude to cooperative or problem-solving one; to empower the parties to jointly decide on their shared future and future relationships;

c- To make the parties stop perceiving the conflict in "win-loose" terms; as a power struggle or as a political and interest-based conflict, but rather as a joint problem that should be cooperatively resolved or as a protracted conflict where the parties' needs, values and identities are threatened or thought to be threatened in the future;

d- Increase parties' belief that reconciliation with the adversary is possible and there are other options for approaching the headscarf conflict; to make the participants recognize that they do have a choice to constructively change the problematic aspects that are perceived as threat; in other words to make them realize that they can take control of their own future and that there are some other options except waiting for the resolution of the headscarf conflict with official methods, fate or just ignoring it;

e- To create a group process through which the participants would be able to discuss the conflict, communicate their feelings, learn about each others' differences and similarities, interests, needs, values, objectives, fears and concerns related to the

headscarf conflict (either in terms of political or psychological aspects) and observe their self-identifications in connection with the “other” so that they can become acquainted with each other; find the opportunity to evaluate in-group perceptions; recognize commonalities and compatibilities with the adversary party without ignoring the differences;

f- Increase parties’ awareness that working cooperatively and improving relationships with each other is necessary; to provide the ground work and tools for the participants through which they would be able to redefine the conflict, reassess the costs of their objectives, create new ideas for solving the particular problems about the headscarf conflict, and visualize new policy options towards which the parties should jointly work.

Moving along these strategic objectives an ICR approach will successfully address the current strategies of the adversarial parties that may ripen the parties in terms of achieving a consensus towards acting together or adopting problem-solving strategy towards the resolution of the headscarf conflict.

CHAPTER 6

APPROPRIATE ICR APPROACH(ES) FOR TURKEY’S HEADSCARF CONFLICT

After assessing the headscarf conflict concerning the Kemalist and Islamist CSOs and building the strategy towards the appropriate ICR process, in this chapter the appropriate ICR approach(es) for Turkey’s headscarf conflict will be designated. Indicating the conditions that should be provided and taken into consideration prior to an intervention process has an important value for choosing the appropriate ICR approach(es). In this sense, prior to evaluating the applicability of the ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict in the first part of this chapter the following questions will be answered: “How to envision the causes of the headscarf conflict?”; “How to envision the resolution of the headscarf conflict?” The answers given to these questions will not only provide the framework through which the applicability of the ICR approaches can be evaluated, but also they will construct the case specific framework of the ICR process design that can be implemented in the future specifically to the headscarf conflict.

In the second part of the chapter, taking into consideration the assessment of the headscarf conflict; the strategic aspects indicated in the previous chapter and the conditions that will be mentioned in the first part of this chapter, the applicability of the seven theories of practice (ICR approaches that were categorized in the literature review) to the headscarf conflict will be evaluated.

6.1 How to Envision the Causes of the Headscarf Conflict?

Although the headscarf conflict keeps its intensity because of the headscarf ban and it appears to be about wearing or not wearing headscarf in public sphere, the causes

of this conflict are not that simple and straightforward. Almost all studies about the headscarf controversy try to explain its causes with some paradigms. Modernization project starting in the early Republican Period; revivalism of political Islam in 1980s; globalization paradigm that has brought the tension between universalism and particularism and emergence of “the crisis of identity” are some of these paradigms. Although, these explanations are well-located and provide simple explanations for the complex structure of the headscarf conflict, they appear to neglect the influence of other factors and the validity of alternative explanations.

The roots of Turkey’s headscarf conflict are multiple and complex. In such a protracted conflict it has become very difficult to distinguish between causes and effects. Nevertheless, it is essential to understand and highlight all the factors of the conflict before trying to propose a solution. Although the headscarf conflict in Turkey is unique in many aspects, it shares essential characteristics with other inter-group protracted conflicts where the values, identities, and needs of the parties are at stake. In this context, it can be claimed that the characteristics and dynamics of the headscarf conflict are created by the parties’ needs, values, perceptions, attitudes, concerns, fears, goals and relations with each other.

In this thesis I chose to assess the roots and causes of the headscarf conflict from a subjective perspective focusing on the unmet human needs (need for identity, need for justice, need for recognition, need for security, need for freedom), threatened values (religious values and values given to other aspects as the visibility of women, public sphere, democracy, human rights), threatened identity aspects, problems of injustice and inequality (being deprived of the right to have education, work or political participation) power struggle (visibility of public space and women appear to be battle grounds among the Islamists and Kemalists) and parties’ perception of the conflict in zero-sum terms (especially the Kemalists’ thought that perceives understanding the adversary as giving concessions).

6.2 How to Envision the Resolution of the Headscarf Conflict?

For a successful intervention in the headscarf conflict, one of the fundamental principles that should be taken into consideration is based on not perceiving the conflict

as hopeless and stuck despite its complex, intractable, and deep-rooted character. Although for the headscarf conflict it seems as if there is not a near-term solution that will completely resolve it, the parties to the conflict (Islamist and Kemalist CSOs) can be empowered to work together with less distrust; make their interactions more constructive; be aware of their common identities and concerns; learn to co-exist without having exclusive fears and concerns towards each other; stop to see each other as enemies and understand the reason for their differences while accepting that these differences will most likely not wither away.

In other words, the conflict should be seen as a necessary and potentially valuable dynamic that will lead to a shift in institutions, norms, relationships and even in social and political structure. Accordingly, the goal of the appropriate ICR approach for the headscarf conflict should not aim to direct the parties towards eliminating or ignoring the headscarf conflict, but to understand it and to suggest ways in which the conflict can be approached constructively. In this sense redefining Turkey's "headscarf conflict" as a tremendous opportunity for constructive change and growth in the social and political context would ease the tension between the Islamists and Kemalists and constructive resolution process can be initiated instead of ignoring it or trying to resolve it with authoritative means.

For constructive resolution of the headscarf conflict and for choosing or designing the appropriate ICR approach, addressing the case specific conditions has great importance. Given the stakeholder analysis, the conditions and aspects that should be addressed or taken into consideration in the appropriate ICR approach are listed in the next section under ten headings.

6.2.1 Indicating the Factors that Nurture Intractability of the Conflict

The first condition that should be taken into consideration by the appropriate ICR approach is to address the factors that need to be changed for the conflict to be transformed from an intractable to a tractable one. These factors can be summarized as:

- 1) The poor communication and lack of interaction between the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs;

- 2) Conflict avoidance strategy mostly used by the Kemalists (ignoring the existence of the headscarf conflict);
- 3) High level of negative perceptions, misperceptions and stereotypes that the parties have towards each other;
- 4) Parties' (most of the Kemalists) perception that "reconciliation with the adversary" is impossible;
- 5) Parties' perception of the headscarf conflict as a "power struggle" or in "zero-sum" terms;
- 6) Parties' unwillingness to improve their relations and to act together;
- 7) Parties' (mostly the Kemalists) perception of the "adversary" as "enemy";
- 8) Parties' use of the same words with different interpretations, (none existence of a common language) or problem of redefining the conflict;
- 9) Adversarial attitudes among the parties.

6.2.2 Dealing with Unrecognized Options

The most important aspect that should be approached by the appropriate ICR approach is the Kemalists' strategy that is based on ignoring the conflict. As Deutsch states, in order to generate a cooperative orientation towards resolving a conflict, "reframing the conflict as a mutual problem to be resolved through joint cooperative efforts" is very important.(2000:52) In this sense, for the emergence of a constructive change, teaching the parties that avoiding a conflict is not a good option, that there are other alternative methods for approaching the problematic characters of the conflict, and that ignoring it may create destructive results, should be prior to the undertaking of the appropriate ICR process.

6.2.3 Empowering the Parties to Understand the Most Important Aspects of the Conflict

Concerning the resolution of the headscarf conflict, if we take the protracted and complex nature of the conflict into consideration, it can be concluded that resolving it is a difficult task. The stakeholders generally indicate what is important for them in the context of the headscarf controversy but they are not aware of the underlying needs

lying beneath their interests. However, the identities, needs, values, prejudices, and fears of the parties give the enduring character to the conflict. In this sense for a successful ICR intervention into the headscarf conflict all these subjective aspects should be taken into consideration so that the participants should be given the opportunity to share their needs, values and fears with the other party and be acquainted with the perceptual aspects emphasized by the other party. Accordingly, they will be able to reframe the headscarf conflict through these aspects or to denote which of these aspects appear to be more important for the intractability as well as for the transformation of the headscarf conflict.

6.2.4 Empowering the Parties to Decide on Their Own Future

In a general sense the implementation of problem-solving or relationship oriented ICR approaches require parties' awareness of the conflict, their demands for its resolution and their willingness to improve their relations believing that it would constructively transform the conflict. However, for the headscarf conflict this is not the case. As it has been stated in the previous chapter most of the Kemalist CSOs representatives did not even identify the headscarf conflict as a "conflict" and both of the parties appeared not to have the willingness to improve their relationships. Underlining these aspects it can be argued that implementation of the ICR approaches that are based on analytical or problem-solving dialogue, would not generate productive results for the headscarf conflict. Giving the parties the opportunity to question what kind of relationship and shared future they want, parties' awareness towards the conflict and hurting stalemate situation, their beliefs about the possibility of reconciliation and the necessity for improved relationships should be addressed prior to any intervention strategy. In other words, establishing or fostering a valid experience of ripeness among the Islamists and Kemalists in terms of developing a motivation to escape the conflict is the fundamental initial step for intervening in the headscarf conflict.

6.2.5 Empowering the Parties to Reframe the Conflict

Providing the stakeholders with the appropriate resolution approach for the headscarf conflict appears as an important condition for the resolution of the headscarf conflict. In this sense redefining and reframing the conflict has great importance.

Concerning the fact that some of the Kemalists do not even indicate the headscarf controversy as a conflict, in one of the stages the participants should be encouraged to acknowledge the conflict. This exercise can be defined as “*Adversarial Conflict Framing*” where the conflict is defined in terms of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, the resources at stake, and the opposing solutions sought. (Rothman, 1997) In this type of framing, the parties have to state what they think about the headscarf issue and what is important for them. The aim of this exercise is to increase the stakeholders’ awareness towards the headscarf conflict and towards each other’s positions since it is crucial before the parties’ adoption of problem-solving or cooperative attitude.

In another stage the participants should engage in “reflexive dialogue” through which they would be able to articulate their needs, values, fears, concerns and threatened identities related to the headscarf conflict and evaluate the previous adversarial stage. This type of reframing of the conflict is defined as “*Integrative framing*”⁸⁶ and the aim is to indicate what the parties care about and why do they care about, who they are, and, given their self definitions as well as why the conflict matters to them so much. Although the stakeholders in the headscarf conflict appear to be familiar with each other’s needs, demands, fears and values through media or other communication channels, because of poor communication and lack of interaction they have never come to articulate these aspects in a face to face analytical dialogue platform so that some of their perceptions are distorted and they are not aware of the underlying needs of the “other”. In this sense as Rothman argues reflexive dialogue would encourage the parties to collaborate in setting new goals and restructuring their relationship through generating positive perceptions towards each other. (Rothman et. al. 2001)

In the following stage, to avoid not addressing the political and power concepts of the headscarf conflict (that is a common deficiency of the ICR processes), the participants should be encouraged to reframe the conflict by using the central, conflictual concepts on which the whole headscarf conflict is situated. From the

⁸⁶ This dialogue is defined by Rothman as a form of guided ‘interactive introspection’ by which disputants speak about themselves in the presence of their adversaries and about their needs and values as viewed interactively through the constructivist prism of the conflict situation (Rothman, 1997). According to Rothman having first expressed themselves and heard each other in this way, disputants may then become allies in determining an agenda for future resolution approaches – further meetings, interest-based problem-solving, functional cooperation, even traditional negotiation, and so forth (Rothman, 1996).

stakeholder analysis, it became explicit that the stakeholders reveal the psychological and power aspects of the conflict through the concepts such as democracy, secularism, human rights, Islamism, headscarf, turban, public space, private space, modernization and citizenship. Although these concepts are used by the stakeholders to justify their needs, values, fears and identities, they appear to be interpreted differently because of the higher political aspects of the headscarf conflict. In order to identify all these concepts in a joint manner, the participants should concretely assess their own and each other's psychological as well as political concerns that would in turn give participants the opportunity to redefine the larger conflict. Since all these concepts lie at the heart of the headscarf conflict, reframing these concepts and identifying the shared meanings would open the way towards the resolution of the conflict. Working on these concrete terms which are loaded with political concerns, would make the disputants concretely realize and evaluate the sincerity of the previously mentioned psychological concepts. By providing the stakeholders with a common language, in the long-run these redefined concepts can be used as a political tool through which the parties can actually go to reconciliation or agreement about the formal resolution of the conflict.

6.2.6 Using the Women Organizations as Strategic Resource

From the stakeholder analysis and from the brief overview of the three women organizations (Flying Broom, Başkent Women's Platform and Ka-Der) it became evident that these women organizations have capacity to act as bridge builders in an ICR process. In this sense, these organizations should be included in order to generate a successful intervention. These women organizations may arrange some civil society projects in which both the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs can be brought together and common tasks with the aim to act together towards a common goal.

Moreover, in an ICR workshop the representatives of these women organizations can be included as participants who would have a key role in terms of building bridges among the adversaries and possibly serving as facilitators. With this purpose, "Reframing the Headscarf Conflict from the Women Issue Perspective"⁸⁷ exercise can be used in an idiosyncratic ICR workshop. This exercise has the purpose to grasp the power struggle theme of the headscarf conflict so that in one of the stages a

⁸⁷ This exercise is designed specifically to be implemented in headscarf conflict specific ICR workshop that would be conducted among the representatives of CSOs.

confrontation can be initiated around the question “Do you think that the visibility of woman is used as a battle ground by both of the parties?” This confrontation would probably act as a breaking point since both the Islamist and Kemalist women organizations would begin to question their own groups, find themselves with the women from the adversary party in the same position and the “neutral” women organizations who are highly inspired by the feminist approach would act as bridge builders presenting a different insight and orientation. The whole confrontation would make disputants realize to what extent the headscarf conflict revolves around needs, values and identity and the role of power struggle and politics in this conflict. Since the disputants (except the women organizations) would not probably accept that the woman and her visibility in the public sphere is used as a battle ground, they would have to partially overcome the power struggle mentality of the conflict that would provide a ripe ground for the following important stage. However, the important aspect of this exercise is based on the role of the women organization who could act as bridge builders.

6.2.7 Addressing Negative Perceptions

Since in the headscarf conflict some of the Kemalists perceive the Islamists as “enemy”, but not as “adversary” the necessity to reduce prejudices and stereotypes gets immense importance. From the stakeholder analysis it became obvious that although most of the Kemalists are aware of the needs and values of the Islamists, they do not find these aspects sincere but as means that are used to reach some destructive political objectives. In this sense from the Islamists point of view only revealing out needs, past sufferings and values would not be sufficient for the reduction of the Kemalists’ concerns, prejudices and fears. In order for their needs for security to be addressed, during the appropriate ICR process the commonalities or the shared identities between the adversaries should be emphasized without making the participants ignore the differences. Empathy generating exercises in which the parties would have to wear adversary’s shoes also need to be used to make the parties move from adversarial to collaborative, problem-solving attitude and generate a working relationship.

6.2.8 Generating a Common Goal and a Common Task

Another important aspect that is observed in the conflict assessment is that for both parties, polarization that may threaten the communal peace and unity of the state is something to be avoided. This finding can be strategically used in the appropriate ICR process as a catalyst for inducing the parties to work jointly towards this shared vision. For instance, the participants may be introduced with a worse case-future-scenario concerning the headscarf conflict on which they would have to work jointly to find out the most appropriate resolution method and to analyze how it could be prevented. Alternatively, by using analogies the participants may be introduced with other similar cases in the world or with cases that are worse than their case. (e.g. Iranian women, Afghanistan, abortion conflict in the U.S.) (Kaufman, 2002:218) These activities would make disputants realize the costs of the continuing confrontation or avoidance policies; that they have the capacity to work together; that there should be other options except the present strategies and that, they have to improve their relations or at least recognize each others' differences. Besides the abovementioned activities, given the stakeholder analysis it can be claimed that the parties' shared vision towards the women's status in Turkey can be used as another common goal in an ICR process. Taking into consideration the recent stage of the headscarf conflict, in the final part of this exercise, the participants may try to generate a creative option about how to approach the headscarf conflict, what should be done in social or political level, which level of the society has the capacity for applying these new options for action and as civil society organizations what kind of actions they can do. In this sense, creating a new relational structure or another option which would make it possible for the basic needs and other concerns of all those involved to be satisfied may be the final outcome of the appropriate ICR process.

6.2.9 Dealing with Power Asymmetry

The power asymmetry between the Kemalists and Islamists is an important aspect that should be carefully addressed in an ICR process. Given our conflict assessment, the power asymmetry among the parties reflects itself in their incompatible goals and strategies adopted towards the headscarf controversy. In this context, how power would

be addressed during the intervention is very important since power relations between the parties should be overridden for successful intervention. Accordingly, in an ICR workshop by providing each of the parties equal time; including the same number of participants of each party who have comparable status in terms of profession and gender and equal legitimacy; including a balanced third party who are familiar with and sensitive to the concerns of each of conflicting parties can be indicated as some examples through which the power asymmetry should be addressed during an ICR process. (Rouhana and Kelman, 1994)

6.2.10 Training the Participants

Educating the parties who ignore the conflict they are involved in, and who are not aware of the alternative conflict resolution methods has great importance in creating peaceful relations. Figure 6.1 where the progression of a conflict is illustrated successfully visualizes the importance of education strategy within the conflict process. In this figure, the stages of a conflict are indicated in relation to the power asymmetry and relations among the adversarial parties, as well as their awareness of the conflict. The figure indicates that when there is power asymmetry and unpeaceful relations among the conflicting parties, and when they have low awareness of the conflict, the conflict is in its latent stage. Thus, at this stage the parties should be educated to increase the awareness of the parties about the conflict and its resolution. Subsequently, it is illustrated that when the parties are aware of the conflict, and have unstable relations characterized by power asymmetry, they engage in confrontation that is followed by negotiation strategy requiring the power asymmetry to be balanced. The final stage of the conflict progression figure refers to sustainable peace where the parties reach peaceful relations.




Figure 6.1 The progression of conflict

Original Source: Adam Curle, *Making Peace* (London: Tavistock Press, 1971)

Taken From: John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace* (Washington: USIPP, 1997)

Applying this figure to Turkey's headscarf conflict, it becomes obvious that power asymmetry, conflict awareness and relations aspects indicated in the figure completely suit the conditions that characterize the headscarf conflict. Thus, given the power asymmetry; poor relations between the adversarial parties and the Kemalists' low awareness of the conflict⁸⁸, it becomes obvious that in order to transform the headscarf conflict from an intractable to a tractable one where negotiation can be implemented, using education as an initial strategy has great importance.

What is meant by education or training is introducing the participants to communication and problem-solving skills, empathy building, prejudice decreasing, stereotype breaking exercises with the assumption that misunderstanding and lack of human compassion are among the primary causes of conflict. In this sense "compassionate listening" becomes important and as Abu-Nimer indicates, it requires:

"questions which are non-adversarial and listening which is not judgemental. Listeners seek to humanise the enemy. They do not defend themselves but accept

⁸⁸ The Kemalists' low awareness of the headscarf conflict can be closely related to their willingness to protect the status quo.

whatever others say as their perceptions and validate the right to their own perception.”(Abu-Nimer, 2002: 141)

Abu-Nimer also argues that for the adversaries who meet for the first time and have a great deal of fear and know little about each other, compassionate listening is perfectly suitable since it introduces them to each other’s perspectives. (Abu-Nimer, 2002) In other words, listening should be taught to the people who are paralysed by high level of prejudices and stereotypes. In other words these skills are necessary for a constructive dialogue and will empower the participants to look at their conflict from an outside perspective so that they will not be locked in unproductive or destructive traps that would threaten the success of the dialogue.

Moreover, introducing participants with theoretical definitions and types of inter-group or communal conflicts; conflict assessment tools and other mechanisms of conflict resolution such as negotiation, mediation and arbitration are other important parts of the education strategy. With these skills, the participants will be able to analytically analyze the conflict and realize that there are other options for the resolution of the headscarf conflict. As Babbitt notes “Conflict resolution training provides both analytical and behavioral instruction, enabling participants to expand their range of both assessments of the conflict and actions aimed at resolving or transforming it”. (Babbitt, 1997:370) Moreover, she states that “Joint training allows both parties to engage in a mutual learning process, with the crucial assumptions that these new skills will form the basis for interaction between parties when they do meet for...negotiation on the conflict”. (Babbitt, 1997:367) Combining this theoretical knowledge with their experiences in the civil society, the CSOs’ representatives will be able to design appropriate ICR approaches to all types of organizational or communal conflicts. The long-term affect of the education approach used in an ICR process will be the introduction of the ICR field to the participants and provide them with the theoretical and practical capacity to institutionalize the ICR method in Turkey.

The other reason for using the education strategy in the appropriate ICR process is to prevent the confrontations from entering in deadlock as well as to help disputants be effective and not violate moral aspects. Since in the “interactive” conflict resolution processes confrontation between the adversary parties is inevitable but at the same time necessary, at every stage using training tools and some exercises, the education strategy

will also give the participants the opportunity to re-evaluate and consider their in-group perceptions. Another reason for using the education strategy so frequently is highly related to the interviewees' concern towards the ICR methods in general and their claims suggesting that a simple dialogue cannot solve the headscarf conflict. In this sense, to break the parties' prejudices related to the ICR's efficiency, systematic and repeated training in conflict resolution mechanisms will make them familiar with the conflict resolution field helping them to understand that there are some other alternative options for resolving protracted conflicts.

6.3 Evaluating the Applicability of the ICR Approaches

The seven theories of practice categorized in this study differ in how they define the roots of protracted conflicts and this in turn shapes the intervention strategies they propose in protracted conflicts. In this part, the applicability of the ICR approaches will be analyzed according to their suitability to address the roots of the headscarf conflict and the compatibility of their conflict resolution orientation with the orientation with which the headscarf conflict should be approached. In the first section taking into consideration the assessment of the headscarf conflict as well as how the roots of the headscarf conflict should be envisioned, the ICR approaches will be analyzed to find out which one(s) are most proper to address the causes of the headscarf conflict. Subsequently, taking into consideration the assessment of the headscarf conflict; strategic opportunities, limitations and objectives; conditions for its resolution; and the ICR approaches' methodological orientations as well as their general orientation towards the resolution of protracted conflicts, the applicability of the ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict will be evaluated.

6.3.1 Suitability to Address the Causes of the Headscarf Conflict

First of all it should be stated that all theories of practice stated in this study approach protracted conflicts in constructive terms since they do not aim to direct the parties towards eliminating or ignoring the conflicts they are involved in. Rather all these approaches aim to make the parties understand the conflict and suggest ways in which the conflicts can be approached constructively instead of ignoring them or trying

to resolve them with authoritative means. In this sense, all ICR approaches appear as proper processes to envision the headscarf conflict in constructive terms; and provide an opportunity for constructive change and growth in the social and political context. Moreover, grasping the subjective aspects of the protracted conflicts, these ICR approaches completely suit the vision through which the headscarf conflict is analyzed in this study.

Concerning the assessment of Turkey's headscarf conflict, it became obvious that for the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs fundamental needs such as identity, recognition, security and justice are at stake. In this sense, human needs approaches that see unmet human needs as the sources of deeply rooted conflicts can be appropriately used to address the underlying causes of the headscarf controversy.

On the other hand, more specifically identity and psychoanalytic approaches put threatened or frustrated identities at the centre of the conflicts, in addition, psychoanalytic approaches emphasize how threatened identity rooted in unresolved past loss and suffering launches and perpetuates inter-group conflicts. In this sense it can be claimed that since human needs approaches focus on wider area of needs while identity and psychoanalytic approaches focus only on identity needs, human needs approaches are more appropriate in explaining the complex nature of the headscarf conflict. However, focusing on the psychological aspects of the conflict and threatened identity aspects, identity and psychoanalytic approaches can provide a greater understanding of the prejudices, stereotypes, enemy discourses and negative attitudes of the stakeholders so that their relationship can be further elucidated.

On the other hand, communal relations that do not especially concern themselves with the root causes of any specific conflict, begin with the reality of intergroup conflict characterized by hostility, polarization, distrust, absence of cooperation, and that there are continuing incidents which perpetuate the conflict. This relationship oriented assumption is highly appropriate for the headscarf conflict since what has escalated the conflict and has brought it to the current stage is the dynamic interaction of the abovementioned aspects. From the assessment of the headscarf conflict it is also apparent that the unwillingness of the parties to participate in a dialogue with the adversary and especially the Kemalist CSOs' win-loose strategy that has to be urgently approached for the resolution of the conflict are closely related with the poor

relationship among the parties shaped with distrust, negative perceptions, stereotypes and enmity. These aspects emphasized by communal relations cannot be indicated as the root causes of the headscarf conflict but rather as affects that nurture the escalatory dynamic of the conflict. In this context, this type of understanding of protracted conflicts can be appropriate for designing constructive intervention strategies that would provide the framework through which deeper causes of the headscarf conflict can be addressed.

Intercultural communication approaches perceive the cultural differences in beliefs and behaviours as barriers to effective inter-group communication and sources of misperception and distrust that is central in inter-group conflict. The scholars of these approaches claim that the conflict is exacerbated by the fact that each side has significant trouble in understanding what the other is saying and as a result is unable to respond effectively on a number of occasions. Moreover, it is asserted that intercultural miscommunication readily occurs when symbols and rituals which mark and celebrate identity for one group generates threat and fear for another. Concerning these arguments of intercultural communication approaches, it becomes obvious that they grasp an important escalatory aspect of the headscarf conflict. Although the Kemalists and Islamists share a common culture, history and even the same religion, their interpretations of some central aspects to the headscarf conflict such as secularism, democracy, public sphere and citizenship are completely different and this appears to be an important factor that prevents the parties to communicate effectively further exacerbating the tensions. As it is the case in communal relations, these aspects also appear not to explain the roots of the headscarf conflict but the poor communication that blocks the resolution of the conflict through dialogue. However, intercultural communication's emphasis on value differences among the parties that is claimed to originate from different world views, grasp the nature of the headscarf conflict where both the Islamists and Kemalists' values come to clash.

Besides these approaches, transformation-oriented approaches that see problems of injustice and inequality as causes of protracted conflicts also provide an appropriate vision for explaining the headscarf conflict that is shaped with discrimination against veiled women who are deprived of their rights for education, work and political participation. Moreover, concerning not only psychological aspects of group relations

but also social, economic, political and military relations as well, transformation approaches appear as the most appropriate ones that have the capacity to take into consideration almost all underlying causes of the headscarf conflict. From the analysis of the headscarf conflict it became apparent that focusing only on subjective elements or oversimplifying the conflict by eliminating political or other structural aspects would not generate constructive changes. However, since this is the general case in ICR approaches, transformation oriented approaches appear as an exception with their comprising and not oversimplifying understanding of protracted conflicts. Moreover, characterizing protracted conflicts as complex, dynamic, nonlinear systems with a core set of interrelated and mutually influential variables, these approaches appear to comprisingly grasp the nature of the headscarf conflict.

Finally, principled negotiation sees the zero-sum view as the causes of conflicts and focuses on the incompatible positions into which groups are locked claiming that this zero-sum nature of the conflict can be altered and the parties can become able to devise solutions for mutual benefit. In this context, principled negotiation does not seem to recommend an appropriate vision to grasp the nature of the headscarf conflict. First of all, I agree that zero-sum vision towards a conflict prevents its resolution and going further this vision can be indicated among the aspects generating and escalating the headscarf conflict. Moreover, I agree that this kind of vision should be addressed in an intervention process. However, believing that some conflicts are inherently zero-sum, not the nature of the conflict but the visions of the parties towards the conflict can be changed. Concerning the headscarf conflict it is obvious that holding the key state institutions, such as the military, at their hands the Kemalists are the powerful party and they benefit from the statusquo perceiving the headscarf case in zero-sum terms. However, as long as one of the parties holds the power, the nature of the conflict will going to have zero-sum character. Thus, in the early stages of these types of conflicts directing the parties to work jointly towards a win-win agreement is not an appropriate strtaegy. Nevertheless, to address the zero-sum vision of the parties the most important thing is to make the parties reconcile along what kind of relationship and shared future they want. Moreover, since principled negotiation is claimed to be more relevant in distributional disputes – those which are about the allocation of resources – it does not appear as an appropriate approach to grasp the main causes of the headscarf conflict that

can be indicated in terms of subjective, non-divisive, non-negotiable value and need based aspects.

Evaluating the ICR approaches' understanding of the roots of protracted conflicts, it can be concluded that although they emphasize different aspects of the causes of protracted conflicts for the most part they do not directly disagree with each other and do not claim that the causes of conflict identified by the others' theories are irrelevant. Thus, concerning the protracted, complex structure of the headscarf conflict they all appear to successfully address specific aspects of the headscarf conflict. However, from the assessment of the headscarf conflict conducted in this study it can be claimed that especially transformation oriented approaches as well as the human needs and identity approaches provide the most proper theoretical explanation for the causes of the headscarf conflict.

6.3.2 Suitability to Address the Resolution of the Headscarf Conflict

Taking the assessment of the headscarf conflict; the strategic limitations, opportunities, sources and objectives; as well as the previously mentioned conditions for approaching the headscarf conflict into consideration, in this part the seven theories of practice will be evaluated having the purpose to designate the most appropriate ICR orientation(s) towards the headscarf conflict. Although each of these theories of practice aim to resolve protracted conflicts, there are significant differences among them in what exactly they aim.

6.3.2.1 Human needs approaches

The ICR processes that are based on "human needs theory" claim that unmet, frustrated, core human needs should be surfaced, fully analyzed, and addressed before any kind of bargaining or negotiation succeeds. In other words concerning the resolution of protracted conflicts, the supporters of human needs approaches claim that deep-rooted conflicts can be resolved only by the satisfaction of the basic needs through constructive conflict-regulation. To sum up, in human needs approaches the key is to translate the interests (and positions) of the adversary parties into their underlying needs

for collective identity, security, and participation and make them recognize the shared and nonnegotiable character of those needs and how they are central to the dispute.

In this context, the methodological orientation of human needs approaches that is based on analytical problem-solving workshops and analytic dialogues wherein the causes of conflict can be analytically understood appears to propose a promising, constructive step towards the resolution of Turkey's headscarf conflict. The Kemalist and Islamist participants involved in such workshops would find the opportunity to self-analyze the conflict; see their own and other group's frustrated needs; and analyze their relationships. They would also be informed of each others' perceptions, alternative means of attaining values and goals, and of costs of pursuing present policies. However, given the findings of stakeholder analysis, it can be claimed that high level of distrust, negative perceptions and stereotypes shape the relationship between the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs; most of the Kemalist CSOs representatives are even not willing to participate in a dialogue with the Islamists; and the underlying needs, values or causes of the conflicts are indicated by the parties via using same concepts but with different meanings. These aspects indicate that these stakeholders are not ready yet for analytical problem-solving workshop. In this sense, using the human needs approach and its techniques in the early stages of an ICR intervention would probably not produce constructive outcomes but rather exacerbate the conflict.

6.3.2.2 Identity and psychoanalytic approaches

Identity approaches claim that articulating and mutually engaging the fundamental identity issues is the ultimate point for satisfactory resolution and that disputants should engage in interactions which first evoke mutual threats to identity and then should offer mutual assurances which communicate an acceptance of each other's core identity and right to exist. In this sense, identity approaches seem to be applicable to Turkey's headscarf conflict. Similarly, psychoanalytic approaches that encourage the mutual expression of sorrow for losses, appears to be applicable to the headscarf case since in both the Kemalists' and Islamists' undertsandings of the headscarf controversy psychological aspects have significant importance. For instance, the Kemalists' enemy discourse can be related to the assassinations of some Kemalist intellectuals by the fundamentalist Islamists. Likewise, because of the headscarf ban thousands of veiled girls had to leave their educations and jobs and had to cope with psychological

problems. All these factors indicate the psychological aspects of the conflict that nurture its intractable character so that they should be constructively addressed in the appropriate ICR process.

However, as it is the case for the application of human needs approaches, before addressing threatened identities or mourning past losses the parties to the headscarf conflict have to be ready for entering in such an analytical dialogue. In this sense, first of all the stakeholders should be empowered and taught that there are other options besides following their current strategies. Subsequently, they should be provided with communication based approaches in order to break the cycle that prevents adversaries enter into a dialogue so that the space where the parties can mutually mourn their losses or where they can mutually analyze each others' needs, concerns and fears can be analyzed.

Nevertheless, some techniques used under identity approaches (especially “antagonistic reframing” of the conflict and “reflexive dialogue”) that are mentioned in the first part of this chapter can be constructively used in the middle stages of an appropriate ICR process. Moreover, education strategy that is adopted by some of the identity approaches (ex: in Interactive Problem Solving; Kelman, 1999) is compatible with the appropriate methodological orientation through which the headscarf conflict should be approached.

6.3.2.3 Principled negotiation

Principled negotiation whose methodological orientation can be categorized under four parts including separating the people from the problem; focusing on interests, not positions; inventing options for mutual gain; and insisting on objective criteria do not appear to recommend an appropriate vision for the resolution of the headscarf conflict. Although principled negotiation theorists argue that almost all disputes can be resolved using these principles, the intractable conflicts such as the headscarf conflict in Turkey seem to need something more than the mere application of these principles. Through the mere articulation of the parties' positions in terms of their interests a creative solution that would bridge the differences between the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs cannot be generated. Given that there is an extreme level of mistrust, stereotypes and negative perceptions among the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs, the use of principled negotiation in

the early stages can even be counter-productive. It is also important to note that principled negotiation is based on rational cost-benefit analysis that cannot be implemented in protracted conflicts where values, human needs and other psychological aspects epitomize the positions of the parties.

Accordingly, since the fundamental objective of the principled negotiation is an agreement among the parties and since in the highly escalated headscarf conflict the parties appear not to be ready for reaching an agreement inapplicability of this approach once again comes to the fore. Moreover, separating people from issues is not such an easy undertaking for value-based conflicts and cannot be implemented at the initial stage of the intervention process. Thus, only articulating positions in terms of interests would automatically eliminate the needs, values, concerns and fears of the parties that are at the centre of the headscarf conflict. In this sense, all these aspects need to be systematically addressed throughout the whole process rather than trying to separate the substantive issues from relational issues only at the initial stage. Although principled negotiation is a useful tool for conflict resolution and its principles provide guidance to the practitioners, the value and identity centered characteristics of the headscarf conflict require the use of different approaches for its resolution.

Going further, Fisher and Ury (1991) claim that if participants are asked about why they are taking their positions, interests may arise and it can be found that both parties' interests are actually compatible. However, in Turkey's headscarf conflict this is not the case since among the issues, values, needs or objectives emphasized by the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs no compatibility could be analyzed. Besides, the objective criteria principle that is defined as an important factor leading the parties to reach an integrative agreement does not appear to suit the context of the headscarf conflict. Since the Kemalist CSOs appear to be satisfied with the current situation and have no intention in changing the status quo their BATNA will be the continuation of the headscarf ban that will not produce constructive change and block the resolution process.

6.3.2.4 Communal relations

The core principle of these approaches asserts that effective conflict resolution requires significant changes in how people from different communities interact with

each other at the local level. In this sense, the conflictual communal relationships are put at the centre of these approaches claiming that communal dialogues aim to change relationships between adversaries so that in the long run peace would be brought even in the most intractable conflicts. Parallel to this theoretical framework, community relations do not use solely small-group dialogue processes as intervention tools, but they also focus on community development projects to increase the control of the groups on decisions affecting their own lives. Accordingly, the development of local organizations which will articulate the needs and concerns of their community are emphasized as the initial tools to be used in these approaches. The second phase of community relations work is based on developing constructive local-level interaction and cooperative relationships between people from different groups. While specific interactions can vary widely – from sporting encounters, to school and cultural exchanges, or discussions of joint concerns such as children’s safety or clean water – the core assumption is that functional cooperation around substantive matters can contribute to the breakdown of negative images and diminish intergroup hostility.

Since the headscarf conflict is not a communal conflict and there is not a tension at the grassroots level, these approaches cannot be applied directly to this conflict. However, taking the theoretical framework of the communal relations works, they can be modified to suit the context of the headscarf conflict in Turkey. Analyzing the headscarf conflict in the context of CSOs, it appears that the CSOs in Turkey cannot act as moderators or bridge builders since most of them are not politically neutral but rather polarized along the headscarf controversy. However, as this study states there are some strategic resources in the civil society that can act as potential bridge builders among the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs. Thus, while in communal relations the community relations are set at the centre, in the modified communal relations works the relationship among the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs can be defined as the focal point.⁸⁹ So that with the activities of potential bridge builders (from the stakeholder analysis the women organizations appear to have the greatest capacity) the relations between the Islamist

⁸⁹ From the stakeholder analysis it became obvious that in an ICR process that would be implemented among the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs their relations should be placed at the centre.

and Kemalist CSOs can be improved that in the long-run would affect decision-making process.⁹⁰

6.3.2.5 Intercultural communication

Intercultural communication aims to improve inter-group communication through increasing mutual awareness of barriers to effective communication, weakening negative stereotypes, emphasizing knowledge of each other's culture, and developing new shared historical accounts. Accordingly, these approaches build their practice around increasing knowledge of other cultures, developing less threatening metaphors and images of opponents, addressing the differences that revolve around dissimilarity in attitudes, perceptions, cultural values, communication style, needs or goals and creating new, shared meaning .

Concerning high level of prejudice, stereotypes, poor relationship and limited interaction among the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs it becomes obvious that before applying analytical, cognitive or emotion based approaches as human needs, identity and psychoanalytical approaches in the context of CSOs, communication based approaches appear as more appropriate. The stakeholder analysis conducted in this study reveals that the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs indicate their needs, perceptions, values or fears by using same concepts but attributing different meanings to them. Thus, this condition appears to form an important strategic obstacle to a potential analytical dialogue process among the parties. In this sense preceding such intervention process, communication based approaches should be implemented in the context of the headscarf conflict. In this way, value based aspects can be redefined and new communication patterns can be developed through which the whole conflict can be reframed.

⁹⁰ The rationale for choosing CSOs as the target level of the society whose relationship will be improved can be based on the CSOs' ability to affect the public opinion and grass roots through the writings and other activities of their representatives who work in academia, media, private sector, education or jurisprudence and through their organizational activities. However, for the resolution of Turkey's headscarf conflict what should be influenced is the decision making process or state since Turkey's headscarf conflict is not a communal but politicized conflict that can be resolved only by political applications. In this sense, if highly politicized CSOs come to reconciliation about the headscarf conflict this would inevitably draw the attention of the decision-makers. Although the state has a heterogeneous structure, what should be constructively influenced within this structure are the conservative-Kemalist institutions. Sharing similar identities, needs, fears and values with these institutions, the Kemalist CSOs would be affective in spillover affect.

Analyzing the methodological orientation of these approaches, it becomes evident that they provide wide range of strategically valuable tools that can be implemented to the headscarf conflict. For instance, as a specific tool “transcendent discourse” that is designed to approach the differences and that aims to create a new shared language through which the parties can coordinate their differing world views can be constructively implemented to generate common definitions to the concepts that have central importance in the headscarf conflict. Involving third parties in the peacemaking process who can ‘translate’ between the parties even when they are apparently speaking the same language is another technique recommended by intercultural communication approaches and that can be used in an ICR approach designed to be implemented in the context of the headscarf conflict. The other technique that is presented in the context of these approaches is “relational empathy”. With the use of this tool in an ICR process the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs can find the opportunity to improve the common understanding about how their own prejudices influence the development of understanding in the encounter and learn to work at merging their views with those of the others and adopt a set of “dialogic attitude” for use in conflict interaction. Like “transcendent discourse”, this tool also provides the parties with the opportunity to create new, shared meanings.

6.3.2.6 Transformation-oriented approaches

Transformation oriented approaches imply a process of change in a conflict’s manifestation at personal, relational, structural and cultural levels. These approaches focus on changes in perceptions and attitudes toward the conflict; on improvements in interaction and communication; not only on psychological aspects of group relations but on social, economic, political and military relations as well; on social environment necessary to fulfil basic human needs; on access to religious, economic, political and administrative resources and opportunities to participate in decision-making procedures; and on identifying and reshaping the patterns that contribute to promoting indigenous resources and mechanisms that are effective in responding constructively to conflicts. In this sense, transformation approaches are long term intervention processes generally implemented as peace building strategies in the communities divided along armed conflicts.

Although in the context of the headscarf conflict Turkey's society is not divided along violence and peace building does not emerge as a necessary intervention strategy, the theoretical principles of transformation approaches give a valuable insight for a successful intervention in the headscarf conflict. First of all, not focusing in resolving the conflicting issues but in rebuilding relations among the polarized institutions including CSOs should be adopted as the primary intervention principle for the headscarf conflict. Rebuilding the relationship among the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs may even provide an important step towards improving the relationship between the institutions of the state that have controversial positions towards the headscarf conflict.

From the stakeholder analysis it is found out that the CSOs are not ready to enter into analytical problem solving dialogue or to reach an agreement on certain issues. In this sense using "empowerment" strategy that is also the methodological orientation of the transformation approaches can give the CSOs the opportunity to decide on what kind of relations and shared future they want. This would be the first step taken in the complex process of reconciliation so that the parties can generate more complex but above all more accurate images of the "adversary".

In the long run, this process may even transform the Islamist and Kemalist CSOs into strategic resource that can jointly organize some projects towards the shared future that they envision. In other words, "empowerment" strategy can be used as the initial intervention strategy in the context of CSOs so that the parties can be ready to take further steps in terms of entering in a dialogue where communication based approaches can be successfully implemented and new shared meanings or shared language can be created. In this sense, the ripe ground would be constructed for the application of problem solving and negotiation based approaches.

Elicitive training that is another strategy recommended by these approaches highly suits the training strategy that should be implemented in an appropriate ICR process. With the elicitive training the parties can generate their own indigenous methods towards the resolution of the headscarf conflict. In fact from the stakeholder analysis it became obvious that the stakeholders give greater credibility to power based resolution methods such as the ones imposed by the state or the ones based on arbitration and adjudication. Moreover, since facilitative dialogue groups, communal dialogue projects or other ICR approaches are not familiar to the Turkish society, the stakeholders appear

to have a considerable concern related to these resolution methods. Accordingly, using “elicitive”⁹¹ and “prescriptive”⁹² training the participants can find out the most appropriate approach for addressing the headscarf conflict.

From all these evaluations of the applicability of the ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict, it can be concluded that the strategies used by some approaches need case specific modifications and some of them are not proper to be used at the initial stages of an intervention to the headscarf conflict. However, despite these drawbacks, in general sense all ICR approaches recommend promising intervention strategies and proper visions to approach the roots and resolution of the headscarf conflict. The most important principle on which all these ICR approaches are based is the importance of involving the parties in the resolution process. This principle that also epitomizes the aim of this study suggests that authoritative third parties or unilateral action by the parties is not likely to produce good solutions and that constructive conflict resolution requires exploration and innovation by the parties themselves. Moreover, all these approaches view conflict resolution as a long-term process involving both pre- and post-settlement tasks, not just reaching a signed agreement.

⁹¹ According to Lederach, elicitive training requires particular attention to language and metaphors which reveal both how conflicts are understood and possibilities for their transformation. (Lederach, 1995: 73–83) Having participants recounting proverbs and engaging in storytelling helps them to understand how a conflict is framed and to identify possibilities for its resolution. In elicitive trainings the participants develop their own understanding of conflict and are encouraged to develop local approaches to their problems. In this sense it can be argued that culture treated as a critical resource, not as a barrier, to conflict transformation.

⁹² Prescriptive training refers to the conflict assessment tools, conflict resolution methods, communication or problem-solving skills trainings that are theoretically generated by the U.S or European scholar/practitioners and that form the basis of the Conflict Resolution field. In these trainings the trainer is the expert.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The main aspiration of this study was to find out the appropriate ICR approaches towards the headscarf conflict. Arguing that conflict assessment is crucial before intervening in a conflict, in this study the headscarf conflict was approached from a “conflict resolution perspective” and concerning the civil society organizations the “stakeholder analysis” of the conflict was conducted. Analyzing the empirical findings of the stakeholder analysis, a case specific strategy was formulated towards the appropriate ICR process.

From the general findings of the “stakeholder analysis” it can be concluded that the headscarf conflict is a protracted inter-group conflict based on complex set of historical, religious, cultural and political issues among which the identity and value aspects are at the center. The lack of interaction and poor interaction between the stakeholders; perception of the veiled women as a battleground; and stakeholders’ negative perceptions and stereotypes towards each other appeared to increase the intractable character of the conflict. In this sense, the headscarf appears at the cross-roads of the power relationship between modernity-tradition; civilization-backwardness; secularism-religion; Kemalism-Islamism; citizenship-pluralism; secular national identity-religious/cultural identity as well as the power relationship between different womanhoods in Turkey. Although the current stage of the headscarf conflict appears to be a stalemate threatening the actual and future needs and values of the primary parties, from the assessment some strategically promising points for the entry of a third party were found. Concerning these strategic opportunities as well as the possible limitations the applicability of the ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict was evaluated.

Concerning the general findings from the conflict assessment and case specific ICR process the major implications of this study for the Conflict Resolution field in general; Interactive Conflict Resolution field and Turkey's "headscarf conflict" in particular can be summarized as the following:

- *Moving beyond just "waiting for the resolution of the headscarf conflict with official methods" or just "ignoring it"*: This study explored the applicability of an alternative, non-official, long-term method for the resolution of the headscarf conflict. One of the most crucial assumptions on which it is based, indicates that for the official resolution of protracted communal conflicts, reconciliation among the opinion leaders (mid-level leaders) is a very important step since in the long run this will provide a ripe pre-negotiation process or a common voice representing a common ground and the minimum consensus to the society. In relation to Turkey's headscarf conflict, the institutionalized application of appropriate ICR approaches among civil society organizations, intellectuals, women organizations, political parties' youth branches, academicians etc. will form the most important step towards the official resolution of the conflict although it may take a long-time. Going further through some modifications the appropriate ICR approaches can even be applied at the grassroots level including people involved in local communities or members of CSOs.

- *Conducting a thorough assessment of the conflict is crucial before intervening*: This study emphasizes the importance of conducting an assessment of the conflict before applying some conflict resolution methods. This is very crucial for the correct match of the conflict assessment and the conflict resolution method that will be implemented. In the ICR field, many scholar/practitioners directly intervene in the conflict without conducting a deep analysis of the conflict and this situation sometimes leads to unsuccessful intervention.

- *Institutionalization of ICR in Turkey*: By introducing the general theoretical basis of ICR approaches and by evaluating its applicability to Turkey's cultural context (although it is limited to CSOs and the headscarf conflict), this study proposes an alternative framework for the resolution of "protracted" communal, organizational, environmental, cultural and other types of inter-group conflicts. The third party role may be adopted by some neutral civil society organizations in terms of conducting problem-solving workshops in relation to these types of conflicts. When the ICR

approaches become institutionalized by some civil society organizations, positive impact on Turkish government's decision-making process might be created. Presenting the ICR approaches to the CSOs would open a new insight in terms of not waiting for the authoritative resolution to the problems or leaving them to fate, but taking a more active and constructive approach. By increasing the awareness of the CSOs that they are politically effective and can make difference to the structural sources of the communal conflicts, the ICR approaches would empower the CSOs as social agents who can actively engage in decision-making process and work outside the government to change the conflictual relationships. In this particular study, such third party role was found to be suitable for the bridge-builder CSOs.

- *Conflict can be embraced, not just avoided or extinguished.* Conflict should be seen as a necessary and potentially valuable dynamic that will lead to a shift rather than just identifying and eliminating existing conflict. So the goal of this research project was not to eliminate or ignore the intractable conflict, but to understand it and to suggest ways in which that conflict can be resolved constructively. My own conjecture is that intractable conflicts offer a tremendous opportunity for constructive change and growth in a social and political context. I believe that identifying Turkey's "headscarf conflict" in these terms would ease the tension between conflicting groups and constructive resolution process can be initiated instead of ignoring it or trying to resolve it with aggressive means. Bringing together the CSOs' representatives with adversary perspectives, experiences, and values in ways that realize their differences and enable them to build consensus about how to resolve common problems should be the significant aspiration of an ICR process that would be implemented in the context of CSOs. However, if participation could be further expanded across social divisions, the process would be an important mechanism within civil society to facilitate a social change.

- *The social justice implications of research and practice can't be ignored:* As a future implication, the present study suggests that the researchers need to not just analyze and propose solutions for a conflict, but must also consider the role of a practitioner and apply the proposed resolution approaches. Consequently, based on the findings of this study, my future plan is to design and conduct an idiosyncratic ICR process with the participation of the examined sample of the civil society organizations.

- *Bridging theory, research and practice*: Concerning the conflict resolution field in general this study underlines the importance of bridging theory, research, and practice. Taking into consideration the “theoretical” aspect of the study, it can be stated that the nature and underlying causes of the headscarf conflict and its capacity to generate change were analysed by approaching the conflict as a “protracted” one and by focusing on stakeholders’ perceptions, needs, values and interests rather than focusing on the structural aspects of the conflict. This was the role of theory that was effective in determining the mechanisms to deal with the conflict. Taking into consideration the role of “research” in this study, it can be asserted that the unit of analysis was the interaction between the stakeholders as well as their perceptions towards each other, the conflict and the ICR approaches. Finally, concerning the “practice” oriented character of this study, it should be stressed that, the aim of evaluating the applicability of the ICR processes was to provide the theoretical mentality, methodological orientation and tools that appear to propose constructive change in inter-personal perceptions, stereotypes, attitudes and relationships.

- *Need for interactively elaborating on identities*: Since identities cannot be taken as predetermined or unchanging categories but as categories that change in close relation with the “other”, another contribution of the ICR approaches to the headscarf conflict would be providing parties the opportunity to elaborate upon their identities through active interaction with the adversary party. In other words, providing relational setting as well as ground for constructive communication, all needs, values, concerns and historical grievances can be expressed and questioned through interaction with the adversary. This could be the only process to transform the perceptions, or stereotypes that become an important part of the identities and can be stated as the most appropriate intervention point in protracted conflicts in which identity is at stake.

- *Need for transforming “antagonistic” relations into “agonistic” ones in the headscarf conflict*: Despite the considerable difference in their values, identities and needs the Islamists and Kemalists need to live together politically. In this sense the ICR principles would provide the parties with the notion of a common ground to realize that there are other options for approaching the conflicts and live together. As Göle states there exists a possibility for recognition of difference only when one finds similitude with the other. (Göle, 2003:17) Accordingly, one has to discern the ‘concrete other’, single individuals

with life histories, in order to be able to tolerate difference as making part of a social bond (Benhabib, 1992 cf. Göle, 2003:20). Although in the context of the headscarf conflict, there are over-politicized definitions of identity and conspiracy arguments hardening the possibility of finding similarity with the adversary, participating in an ICR process where constructive dialogue prevail the possibility for a social bond, communication and public debate would be generated. This would be the fundamental step towards transforming the antagonistic relations between the parties into agonistic relations where the sides would see each other as adversary rather than enemy; the differences would be legitimized and recognized by the adversary parties. (Mouffe, 1999:756) Concerning the headscarf conflict, it can be argued that with the transformation of antagonistic relations it would be possible to mobilize the needs and concerns of the parties in the realm of politics instead of eliminating or imprisoning them to private sphere. At this point the ICR approaches appear as the most appropriate methods for initiating this long, communal and political process.

- *Need for empowerment*: In the protracted conflicts such as Turkey's headscarf conflict, where one of the parties is not ready to reach an agreement on substantial issues; is not willing to enter into a problem-solving dialogue; and even does not accept the existence of the conflict, the need for empowerment comes as a crucial strategy. Through this strategy they would be given the opportunity to decide on what kind of relations do they want and what kind of shared future do they want according to which they can jointly decide on how to approach the conflict and its resolution and state joint objectives towards that end. This intervention strategy would be the first step taken in the complex process of reconciliation.

CHAPTER 8

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

- 1) How do you identify yourself? Where do you position yourself in Turkey's political spectrum?
- 2) How do you identify the headscarf conflict? Is it a political, communal, cultural, identity based, religious or gender based conflict?
- 3) What do you think about this conflict, what is your attitude and where do you see yourself in the context of this conflict?
- 4) How do you identify your organization? Concerning the headscarf conflict, what is the attitude and position of your organization?
- 5) How do you evaluate the attitudes and positions of the ones who oppose/support the headscarf ban? What are their interests and demands?
- 6) Which groups of the society or which institutions are most affected by the headscarf conflict or will be affected in case the conflict is not resolved?
- 7) According to you, in the context of the headscarf conflict, what is the most important issue?

- 8) What kind of change do you envision about the headscarf conflict? Concerning this conflict, what kind of society and political environment do you dream of? How can the headscarf conflict be resolved?
- 9) What are the other CSOs that are concerned with the headscarf conflict? Among these CSOs, which are the ones you work with?
- 10) Concerning the headscarf conflict, was there any activity where the CSOs having different visions and positions shared their needs, values, fears, concerns, interests related to the conflict? Did you participate in such an activity? How was it, what was the outcome? What do you think?
- 11) Among Turkey's problems, what is the place of the headscarf conflict? What is the importance of this conflict?
- 12) Is it possible to initiate a dialogue process among the adversary parties? If yes, how this dialogue should be initiated? If no, why? What will be the limiting factors?
- 13) If a successful dialogue process is initiated among the CSOs do you think that it can be successful in the long-run? How? What kind of change can this kind of dialogue generate? Will you participate in such a dialogue process?

CHAPTER 9

REFERENCES

- Abadan-Unat, N. (1998). Türkiye’de kadın hareketleri ve küresellesme. In N. Arat (Ed.) *Aydınlanmanın kadınları* ,pp: 288–302. İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Yayınları.
- Abu-Nimer, (2002).Israeli-Palestinian dialogue in the second intifada: Between despair and hope. *Global Dialogue*, 4 (3): 130-1143.
- Academic Survey Centre (AKART). (2002). *Report of Turkey research*. İstanbul: AKART.
- Acar, F., (1991). Women in the ideology of Islamic revivalism in Turkey: Three Islamic women’s journals. In R. L. Tapper (Ed.) , *Islam in modern Turkey: Religion, politics and literature in a secular state*, pp: 280-303. London: Tauris.
- , (1995). Women and Islam in Turkey. In Ş. Tekeli (Ed.), *Women in modern Turkish society*. London, New Jersey: Zed Books.
- Adem, M. (2002). Politikacılarca sömürülen “Türban”. *Atatürkçü Düşünce*, 9(96): 22-24
- AİHM kararları ışığında inanç özgürlüğü ve dini sembollerin kullanımı*. (2004). Retrieved on 21 March, 2005 from: <http://www.mazlumder.org/turkce/diger.html?sy=253&cst=makale>
- Akbal, H. (1998, June 16). Kavga kızışıyor. *Milliyet*. p.13
- AK-DER-Regulation Section 3*. (n.d.). Retrieved on 11 June, 2005 from: <http://www.ak-der.com/>
- Aksoy, M. (2004). *Türban versus hukuk: Yasallık-meşruluk, kamusal alan-özel alan üzerine birkaç söz....*Retrieved on 21 March, 2005 from: <http://www.mazlumder.org/turkce/diger.html?sy=182&cst=makale>
- Akşit, B. , Serdar, A. & Tabakoğlu, B. (2004). İslami eğilimli sivil toplum kuruluşları. In Y. Aktay (Ed.) *Modern Türkiye’de siyasi düşünce:İslamcılık*, pp:664-681. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

- Aktaş, C. (1990). *Kılık, kıyafet ve iktidar II*. İstanbul: Nehir Yayınlar.
- Altan, M. (2005, April 30). Referandum en sağlıklı çözüm, *Sabah*, p.15
- Anderson, M. B. (1996). *Do no harm, supporting local capacities for peace through aid*, Cambridge. Mass.: Collaborative for Development Action.
- Arat, Y. (1997). The project of modernity and women in Turkey. In S. Bozdoğan & R. Kasaba (Eds.), *Rethinking modernity and national identity in Turkey*, pp: 95-112.. Seattle & London: University of Washington Press.
- (1999). *Political Islam in Turkey and women's organizations*. İstanbul: Tesev Yayınları.
- (1999). *Politik İslam ve kadın organizasyonları*. İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları
- Amacımız. (n.d.). Retrieved on 12 May, 2005 from:
http://www.ozgurder.net/cgi-bin/index.pl?mod=news;op=news_list;id=11
- (2000). *Islamist women, their headscarves and democracy in Turkey*. Department of Political Science and International Relations. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University.
- Association for Liberal Thinking (LTD). (2003). Report of research on freedom of speech with regards to the legal and social aspects in Turkey. İstanbul: LTD.
- Avruch, K. & Black, P. (1993). Conflict resolution in intercultural settings: Problems and prospects. In J. D. Sandole & H. van der Merwe (Eds.), *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*. New York: Manchester University Press.
- Avruch, K. (1998). Introduction: Culture and conflict resolution. In K. Avruch, P. W. Black & J. A. Scimecca. (Eds.), *Conflict resolution: Cross-cultural perspectives*. Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger.
- Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları Derneği (AK-DER). (1999). *Near history of scarf ban by photographs: With pleasure*. İstanbul: Değirmen Yayınları.
- Azar, E. (1990). Protracted international conflicts: Ten propositions. In J. Burton & F. Dukes (Eds.), *Conflict: Readings in management and resolution*. London: The Macmillan Press.
- (2002). Protracted social conflicts and second track diplomacy. In J. Davies & E. Kaufman (Eds.), *Second track/citizen diplomacy: Concepts and techniques for conflict transformation*. U.S.A: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.
- Babbitt, E. F. (1997). Contributions of training. In I. W. Zartman & L. J. Rasmussen (Eds.), *Peacemaking in international conflict*, pp: 381-382. Washington DC: United States Institution of Peace.

- Bartos, O. J. & Wehr, P. (2002). *Using conflict theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Başörtüsü Zulmü Zirvede (2002). Retrieved on 21 March, 2005 from:
<http://www.vahdet.com.tr/isdunya/dosya1/0053.html>
- Bar-Tal, D. (2000). From intractable conflict through conflict resolution to reconciliation: Psychological analysis. *Political Psychology*, 21(2), 351–366.
- Barbarosoğlu-Karabıyık, F. (2000, March 10) ‘Kendisi olmaktan vazgeçmiş İslamcı kadınlar. *Yeni Safak*, p.8
- Behramoğlu, A. (1998, November 3). Tayyip Erdoğan, türban, demokrasi ve bazı aydınlar üzerine. *Cumhuriyet*. p.14
- Benli, F. (2004). *Türkiye’de başörtüsü sorunu ve İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi’nin bakış açısı*. Retrieved on 18 May, 2005 from:
<http://www.hukukcularder.org/makaleler/fatmabenli.htm>
- Berkan, M. (2001, August 23). Demokrasiye yeni yeni sınırlar. *Radikal* p. 12
- Berkovitch, J. (1997). Mediation in international conflict: An overview of theory, a review of practice. In W. Zartman & L. Rasmussen (Eds.), *Peacemaking in international conflict: Methods and techniques*. Washington D.C: USIP Press.
- Berktaş, F. (2004). Karşılıklı anlayış ve işbirliği için köprüler kurmak. In *Türkiye’de ve Avrupa Birliği’nde kadının konumu: Kazanımlar, sorunlar, umutlar*, pp: 23-37. İstanbul: KA- DER Yayınları.
- Bildirici, A. (2005). *Ankara’da 28 Şubat Zorbalığı ve başörtüsü yasağı protesto edildi*, Retrieved on 20, May, 2005 from:
<http://www.ozgurder.net/index.shtml?o01103r01m01>
- Bloomfield, D. (1997). *Peacemaking strategies in Northern Ireland: Building complementarity in Conflict management theory*. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan.
- Boudreau, Thomas (2003). Intergroup conflict reduction through identity affirmation: Overcoming the image of the ethnic or enemy “other”. *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 10(1)
- Broome, B. (1991). Building shared meaning: Implications of relational approach to empathy for teaching intercultural communication. *Communication Education*, 40, 235-249.
- (1993). Managing differences in conflict resolution: The role of relational empathy. In D. J. D. Sandole & H. van der Merwe (Eds.), *Conflict resolution theory and practice*. New York: Manchester United Press.

- Brewer, M. (1999). The psychology of prejudice: Ingroup love or outgroup hate. *Journal of Social Issues*, 55(3), 429-444
- Brown, R. (2000). *Group processes: Dynamics within and between groups* (2nd ed.). Oxford, England: Blackwell.
- Bulaç, A. (1998, May 12). Kadın, başörtüsü, kamusalılık. *Zaman*. p.8
- (1998, June 23). Başörtüsü ve referendum. *Zaman*. p.9
- Burgess, H & Burgess, G. (1996). Constructive confrontation: A transformative approach to intractable conflicts. *Mediation Quarterly*, 13, 305-322
- (2003). *What are intractable conflicts?*. Retrieved on 29 January, 2005 from: http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/meaning_intractability.jsp
- Burton, J. (1990). *Conflict: Resolution and prevention*. London: Macmillan.
- (1993). Conflict resolution as a political philosophy. In J.D. Sandole & H. van der Merwe (Eds.), *Conflict resolution theory and practice: Integration and Application*. New York: Manchester United Press.
- Bush, R. A. & Folger, J. (1994). *The promise of mediation: Responding to conflict through empowerment and recognition*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Cohen, R. (1991). *Negotiating across cultures: Communication obstacles in international diplomacy*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Coleman, P. T. (2000). Fostering ripeness in seemingly intractable conflict: An experimental study. *International Journal of Conflict Management*, 11(4), 300-318
- (2000). Intractable conflict. In M. Deutsch & P. T. Coleman (Eds.), *The handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice*, pp: 428–450. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- (2003). Characteristics of protracted, intractable conflict: Toward the development of a metaframework. Retrieved on 02 February , 2005 from: http://www.leaonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1207/S15327949PAC0901_01
- Çakır, R. (2000). *Direnış ve itaat: İki iktidar arasında İslamcı kadın*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.
- Çemrek, M. (2004). How could the rights to education and representation challenge national security? The headscarf conflict in Turkey. *Human Security Perspectives*. 1 (2)
- ÇYDD Tüzük, (1999). madde:3
- ÇYDD Central Office. 1998 Bulletin, p.3

- Çubukçu, S. U. (2004). Demokrasiye önemli bir katkı: Kadın sivil örgütleri. In *Türkiye’de ve Avrupa Birliği’nde kadının konumu: Kazanımlar, sorunlar, umutlar*. İstanbul: KA-DER Yayınları.
- Çuhadar-Gurkaynak, Esra. (2004). Evaluating track two diplomacy in pre-negotiation: A comparative assessment of Israeli-Palestinian track two initiatives on water and Jerusalem. Ph.D. Dissertation. Syracuse University.
- Dağı, İ. (2005). Transformation of islamic political identity in Turkey: Rethinking the west and westernization”. in *Turkish Studies*, 6(1), 21–37
- Davies, J. & Kaufman, E. (2002). Second track/citizen diplomacy : An overview. In J. Davies & E. Kaufman (Eds.), *Second track/citizen diplomacy: Concepts and techniques for conflict transformation*. U.S.A: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.
- Deniz, Z. A. (2005) . *Başörtüsüne özgürlük grubu basın açıklaması*. Retrieved on 12 June, 2005 from: <http://www.yeniasya.com.tr/2005/04/24/haber/h15.htm>
- Denk, C. (2002). “Türban” ayırt edilme işaretidir. *Atatürkçü Düşünce*, 9(96): 33-35
- Dedring, J. (2001). On peace times of war: Resolving violent conflicts by peaceful means. *The International Journal of Peace Studies*. Retrieved on 10 January, 2005 from: http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol4_2/dedring.htm
- d’Estrée, T. P., Larissa, A. F., Weiss, J. N. & Jakobsen, M. S. (2001). In theory: Changing the debate about “success” in conflict resolution efforts. *Negotiation Journal*. April: 101-113
- (2003). Dynamics. In S. Chandelling, D. Druckman & L. Fast (Eds.), *Conflict*. London: Continuum.
- Deutsch, M. (2000). Justice and conflict. In M. Deutsch & P. T. Coleman (Eds.), *The handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice*, pp: 41–64. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Druckman, D. (1997). Negotiating in the international context. In I. W. Zartman & J. L. Rasmussen (Eds.), *Peacemaking in international conflict : methods and techniques*, pp:25-42. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Double standards*. (n.d.). Retrieved on 12 May, 2005 from: <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/5FD78EC7-EFF1-445F-B090-256E5B0AC627.htm>
- Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L. & Kawakami, K. (2003). Intergroup contact: The past, present, and the future. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 6(1), 5–21
- Durakbaşı, A. .(1998). Kemalism as identity politics in Turkey. In Z. Arat (Ed.), *Deconstructing Images of the Turkish Women*, pp: 139-155. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

- Dünü, bugün ve yarınıyla başörtüsü sempozyumu sonuç bildirgesi.* (2004). Retrieved on 29 June, 2005 from:
http://www.basortusuneozgurluk.com/detay_03.asp?id=22
- Engel, P. (1997). *The social organization of innovation: a focus on stakeholder interaction*. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Royal Tropical Institute.
- Ensaroğlu, Y. (2004). *Din özgürlüğü ve "bize özgü" laiklik*. Retrieved on 08 June, 2005 from: <http://www.mazlumder.org/turkce/diger.html?sy=209&cst=makale>
- Erdoğan, N. (2002). Kalpaksız kuvvacılar: Kemalist sivil toplum kuruluşları. In S. Yerasimos, K. Vorhoff & G. Seufert (Eds.), *Türkiye’de sivil toplum ve milliyetçilik*, pp: 235-264. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Erkilet, A. (2004). 1990’larda Türkiye’de radikal islamcılık. In Y. Aktay (Ed.) *Modern Türkiye’de siyasi düşünce: İslamcılık*, pp: 493-503. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Ertuğrul Kazancı ile röportaj. (n.d.). Retrieved on 07 May, 2005 from:
<http://www.aydinlanma1923.org/>
- Esim, S. & Cindoglu, D. (1999). Women’s organizations in 1990s Turkey: Predicaments and prospects. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 35(1), 178-188
- Fast, L. A. (2002). Frayed edges: Exploring the boundaries of conflict resolution. *Peace and Change*, 27(4): 56-97
- Fisher, R. and Ury, W. (1991). *Getting to yes: Negotiating agreements without giving in*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Fisher, R. J. & Keashly, L. (1991). The potential complementarity of mediation and consultation within a contingency model of third party intervention. *Journal of Peace Research* 28 (1): 29-42.
- Fisher, R. J. (1997). *Interactive conflict resolution*. New York: Syracuse University Press.
- (2000). Intergroup conflict. In M. Deutsch & P.T. Coleman (Eds.), *Handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice*, pp: 63-89. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- (2001). Methods of third-party intervention. In *Berghof handbook for conflict transformation*, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin, Germany.
- (2002). Historical mapping of the field of interactive conflict resolution. In J. Davies & E. Kaufman (Eds.), *Second track/citizen diplomacy: Concepts and techniques for conflict transformation*. U.S.A: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.

- Fowler, A., Gamble, N. N., Hogan, F. X., Kogut, M., McComish, M., & Thorp, B. (2001). Talking with the enemy. *The Boston Sunday Globe*. Retrieved on 28 January, 2005, from: <http://www.boston.com/globe/Sunday>
- Gayemiz. (n.d.). Retrieved on 12 May, 2005 from: <http://www.ak-der.com/>
- General Erol Özkasnak, then general secretary of the general staff. (2001, January 16). *Milliyet*.
- Gillard, Steve (October, 2000). *Psychological 'conflict mapping' in Bosnia & Hercegovina: Case study, critique and the renegotiation of theory*. Working paper-6: University of Bradford –Department of Peace Studies
- Göçek, F.M. (2000). To veil or not to veil? The contested location of gender in contemporary Turkey. *Interventions* 1(4): 521–35.
- Göle, N. (1994). Toward and automatization of politics and civil society in Turkey. In A. Evlin & M. Heper (Eds.), *Politics in the the Third Turkish Republic*. Boulder, Co: Westview Press.
- (1996). *Forbidden modern: Civilization and veiling*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- (1997). Secularism and islamism in Turkey: The making of elites and counter-elites. *Middle East Journal*, 51(1):46–58.
- (2003). Contemporary Islamist movements and new sources for religious tolerance. *Journal of Human Rights*, 2(1):17-30
- Gurr, T. R. & Davies, J. (2002). Dynamics and management of ethnopolitical conflicts. In J. Davies & E. Kaufman (Eds.) *Second track/citizen diplomacy: Concepts and techniques for conflict transformation*. U.S.A: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.
- Gürsoyatrak, S. (1997). Ayın yorumu. *Atatürkçü Düşünce*, 3(35):1
- Headscarf ban is discriminatory towards women*. (2005). Retrieved on 29 June, 2005 from: <http://www.cascfen.org/news.php?nid=1314&cid=15>
- Hewstone, M. & Greenland, K. (2000). Intergroup Conflict. *International Journal of Psychology*, 35(2): 136-144
- Hubbard, A. S. (1999). Grass-roots conflict resolution exercises and constituent commitment. *Peace and Change* 24(2): 197-219
- (1999). Cultural and status differences in intergroup conflict resolution: A longitudinal study of a Middle East dialogue group in the United States human relations. *Human Relations*, 52(3): 303-324
- Human Rights Watch Report. (2004). *Memorandum to the Turkish government on human rights watch's concerns with regard to academic freedom in higher*

education and access to higher education for women who wear the headscarf.
Retrieved on June 18, 2005 from:
<http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/turkey/2004>

Human Rights Bulletin. (1999).22 (10)

İlyasoğlu, A. (1998). *Örtülü kimlik*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları

İnan, A. (1999). Özgürlüğün yeri ve önemi. *Atatürkçü Düşünce*. 73(2): 6-7

İnsan hakları örgütleriyle ilişkiler komisyonu. (n.d.). Retrieved on 29 May, 2005 from:
<http://www.mazlumder.org.tr/tanimim.htm>

Interview with Selen Doğan (Uçan Süpürge Yerel Kadın Muhabirler Ağı Projesi Editörü) (2004). In *Sivil Toplum*, 2 (8): 16-20

Jackson, J. W. (2002). Intergroup attitudes as a function of different dimensions of group identification and perceived intergroup conflict. *Self and Identity*, 1: 11- 33.

Kabaoğlu, İ. (2004). *ÇYDD 2. Başkanı Prof. Dr. İbrahim Kaboğlu'ndan mesaj*. Retrieved on 21 June, 2005 from: <http://www.cydd.org.tr/?sayfa=haberac&id=220>

Ka-Der'in Amacı. (n.d.), Retrieved on 29 May, 2005 from:
<http://www.ka-der.org.tr/index.html>

Kadioğlu, A. (1994). Women's subordination in Turkey: Is Islam really the villain?," *Middle East Journal* 48(4): 645-660.

Kandiyoti, D. (1988). "Bargaining with patriarchy," *Gender and Society* 2(3): 274-289.

----- (1991). End of empire: Islam, nationalism and women in Turkey. In D. Kandiyoti (Ed.), *Women, Islam and the state*, pp: 22-48. Hampshire: Macmillan Press.

Kaplan, H. (2004). Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları Derneği (AK-DER). *Sivil Toplum*, 2(8)

Kaufman, E. (2002). Sharing the experience of citizens' diplomacy with partners in conflict. In J. Davies & E. Kaufman (Eds.), *Second track/citizen diplomacy: Concepts and techniques for conflict transformation*. U.S.A: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.

Kelman, H. (1997). Social-psychological dimensions of international conflict. In W. I. Zartman & L. Rasmussen (Eds.), *Peacemaking in international conflict: Methods and techniques*. Washington D.C.: USIP Press.

----- (1999). Interactive problem solving as a metaphor for international conflict resolution: Lessons for the policy process. *Peace & Conflict*, 5(3): 201-219.

-----. (2002). Interactive problem solving as a tool for second track diplomacy. In J. Davies & E. Kaufman (Eds.), *Second track/citizen diplomacy: Concepts and*

- techniques for conflict transformation*. U.S.A: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.
- (2000). The role of scholar practitioner in interactive conflict resolution. *International Studies Perspective*, 1: 273-288.
- Kendirici, S. (n.d.). *İnançların hukuka etkisi ve töre cinayetleri*. Retrieved on 12 May, 2005 from: http://www.kultur.gov.tr/portal/turizm_tr.asp?belgeno=20091
- Keskin-Kozat, B. (2003). Entangled in secular nationalism, feminism and islamism: The life of Gonca Kuriş. *Cultural Dynamics* 15(2): 183–211
- Keskin, E. (2005). *Türban, devletin yarattığı simge*. Retrieved on 29 June, 2005 from: <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/diziler/basortusu/basortusu03.html>
- Keyman, F. (1995). On the relation between global modernity and nationalism: The crisis of the hegemony and the rise of (Islamic) identity in Turkey. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 13(3): 93-120.
- Kışlalı, A. T. (1999). Amaç bekçi dövmek mi?. *Cumhuriyet*. p.16
- Kimmel, P. R. (2000). Culture and conflict. In M. Deutsch & P. T. Coleman (Eds.), *The handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
- Koru, F. (1987, January, 9). Anlamli ve anlamsız ouurlar. *Zaman*. p.8
- (1998, November 11). Kadın milletvekili olursa, *Zaman*. p.8
- Kriesberg, L. (1997). The development of the conflict resolution field. In I. W. Zartman & J. L. Rasmussen (Eds.), *Peacemaking in international conflict : Methods and techniques*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press
- (1998). Constructive conflicts: From escalation to resolution. In D. A. Lake, & D. S. Rothchild (Eds.), *The international spread of ethnic conflict: Fear, diffusion and escalation*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- (2003). Identity issues. *Intractable Conflict Knowledge Base Project Conflict Research Consortium University of Colorado*. Retrieved on 14 January, 2005, from: http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/identity_issues.jsp
- Lederach, J. P. (1995). *Preparing for peace: Conflict transformation across cultures*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- (1997). Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. Washington: USIP.
- (1999). Identifying key actors in conflict situation: Levels of leadership. In L. Reyhler & T. Paffenholz (Eds.), *Peace- building: A field guide*. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

- Lumsden, M. & Wolfe, R. (1996). Evolution of the problem-solving workshops: An introduction to social-psychological approaches to conflict resolution. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 2(1): 37-67.
- Mahcupyan, E. (1999, May 9). Basiretsizlikten tefessühe. *Radikal*. p.13
- (1998, April 22). Gazetecilik zor, Müslümanlık daha da. *Radikal*. p.14
- Maoz, I. (2000). Multiple conflicts and competing agendas: A framework for conceptualizing structured encounters between groups in conflict- The case of a coexistence project of Jews and Palestinians in Israel. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 6(2):135–156.
- Mardin, Ş. (1995). Civil society and Islam. In J. Hall (Ed.), *Civil society: Theory, history, Comparison*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Mazlum-Der'in amacı. (n.d.). Retrieved on 12 May, 2005 from:
<http://www.mazlumder.org.tr/tanitim.htm>
- McDonald, J. (1990). Managing complexity through small group dynamics. In J. Burton & F. Dukes (Eds.), *Conflict: Readings in management and resolution*. London: The Macmillan Press.
- (2002). The needs for multi-track diplomacy. In J. Davies & E. Kaufman (Eds.), *Second track/citizen diplomacy: Concepts and techniques for conflict transformation*. U.S.A: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.
- Mert, N. (2001, February, 8). Avrupalı “militan demokratlar. *Radikal*. p.13
- (2001, June 19). İmam hatipli kızlar. *Radikal*, p. 10.
- Meselenin hukuki boyutu. (n.d.). Retrieved on 13 May, 2005 from:
<http://www.simurg.4t.com/hukukiboyut.htm>
- Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O. & Woodhouse, T. (1999). *Contemporary conflict resolution*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Midilli, Z. (1997, February, 8). Medyaya iğne. *Milliyet*. p.12
- Mitchell, C. (2002). Beyond resolution: What does conflict transformation actually transform? *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 9(1): 37-59
- (1993). Problem solving exercises and theories of conflict resolution. In D. J.D.Sandole, & H. van der Merwe, eds. *Conflict resolution theory and practice: Integration and application*, pp: 78–94 .Manchester: Manchester UP.
- Mitchell, C. & Banks, M. (1996). *Handbook of conflict Resolution: The analytical problem-solving approach*. London: Pinter.

- Montville, J. (1993). The healing function in political conflict resolution. In D. J. D. Sandole & H. van der Merwe (Eds.), *Conflict resolution theory and practice: Integration and application*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
- Mouffe, C. (1999). Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism? *Social Research*, 66(3): 745-758
- Ozankaya, Ö. (2002). Bilim Özgürlüğünü Kaldırmak İçin Mi “Giyim Özgürlüğü”? *Atatürkçü Düşünce*, 96(3): 8-11
- Öncelikli hedef ilkokullar. (2000). Retrieved on 07 May, 2005 from: <http://www.radikal.com.tr/2000/05/14/spor/sid.shtml>
- Öndül, H. (1999). *Upon headscarf and superficial crises that are sought to be created*. Retrieved on 07 May, 2005 from: <http://www.ihd.org.tr/basin/bas990503.html>
- (2002). *Headscarf issue and principle attitudes*. Retrieved on 07 May, 2005 from: <http://www.ihd.org.tr/basin/bas20020415.html>
- Özden, Y. (1999). Atatürkçü düşünce derneği ve siyaset. *Atatürkçü Düşünce*, 59:3-4
- Özdalga, E. (1998). The veiling issue, official secularism and popular Islam in modern Turkey. Richmond: Curzon Press.
- Özgür-Der (1999). *Şahitlik: 28 şubat sürecinde başörtüsü direnişi*, İstanbul: Özgür-Der Yayınları.
- Özgürlük isteyen kurul başörtüsünü görmedi. (2004). Retrieved on 13 May, 2005 from: <http://www.yeniasya.com.tr/2004/10/23/haber/h2.htm>
- Özkan, F. (2005). *Yemenimde hare var: Düünden yarına başörtüsü*. İstanbul: Elest Yayınları
- Özsoyeller, G. (1995). *Türkiye’de iki kadın dinamiği: şeriatçı-çağdaş*. İstanbul: Ortam Yayıncılık.
- Özturanlı, İ. (1994). Laiklik, insan hakları ve Atatürk. *Atatürkçü Düşünce*, 1(3-4): 39-40
- Parla, T. (1993). *Türkiye’nin siyasal rejimi (1980-1989)*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Pearce, W. B. & Littlejohn, S. W. (1997). *Moral conflict: When social worlds collide*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Inc.
- Plagemann, G. (2002). Türkiye’de insan hakları örgütleri: Farklı kültürel çevreler farklı örgütler. In S. Yerasimos & K. Vorhoff & G. Seufert (Eds.), *Türkiye’de sivil toplum ve milliyetçilik*, pp:361-396. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

- Principles of HRA*. (2005). Retrieved on 28 July, 2005 from: www.ihd.org.tr
- Pruitt, D. G., Kim, S. H. & Rubin, J. Z. (Eds.). (1994). Problem solving. In *Social conflict: escalation, stalemate, and settlement*, pp: 170-190. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Pusch, B. (2002). Kamusalığa doğru: Türkiye’de islamcı ve sünni-muhafazakar kadın sivil toplum kuruluşlarının yükselişi. In S. Yerasimos&Günter Seufert &K. Vorhoff (Eds.), *Türkiye’de sivil toplum ve milliyetçilik*, pp: 461-487. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Rabie, M. (1994). *Roots of conflict, conflict resolution and ethnicity*. Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger.
- Ramazanoglu, Y. (2004). Cumhuriyetin dindar kadınlar. In T. Bora & M. Gültekingil (Eds.) *Modern Türkiye’de siyasi düşünce: İslamcılık*, pp:804-812. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Ramirez, R. (1999). Stakeholder analysis and conflict management. In D. Buckles (Ed.) *Cultivating peace: Conflict and collaboration in natural resource management*. IDRC: World Bank.
- Rasmussen, J. L. (1997). Peacemaking in the twenty-first century: New rules, new roles, new actors. In I. W. Zartman & J. L. Rasmussen (Eds.), *Peacemaking in international conflict: Methods and techniques*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Reimann, C. (2002). *Assessing the state-of-art in conflict transformation: Reflections from a theoretical perspective*. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Retrieved on 08 February, 2005 from: <http://www.berghof-handbook.net>
- (2004). *Gender in problem-solving workshops: A wolf in sheep’s clothing?*. Working Paper 3. Swisspeace Publications.
- Ropers, N. (1995). *Peaceful intervention: Structures, processes, and strategies for the constructive regulation of ethno political conflicts*. Report on Approaches to the constructive regulation of ethno political conflicts in the realm of states and the realm of societies. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.
- (2000). *From resolution to transformation: Assessing the role and impact of dialogue projects*. Paper presented at the conference on Facing Ethnic Conflicts, at Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.
- Rothman, J. (1997). *Resolving identity-based conflict: In nations, organizations and communities*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publication.

- (1997). Action evaluation and conflict resolution training: Theory, method and case study. *International Negotiation* 2(3): 451-470.
- Rothman, J. & Olson, M. L. (2001). From interests to identities: Towards a new emphasis in interactive conflict resolution. *Journal of Peace and Research*, 38(3): 289-305.
- Rothman, J., Rothman, R. L. & Schwoebel, M. H. (2001). Creative marginality: Exploring the links between conflict resolution and social work. *Peace and Conflict Studies Journal*, 8(1)
- Rouhana, N. (1995). Unofficial third-party intervention in international conflict: Between legitimacy and disarray. *Negotiation Journal*, 11: 225-270
- Rouhana, N., & Bar-Tal, D. (1998). Psychological dynamics of intractable conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian case. *American Psychologist*, 53: 761-770.
- Rouhana, N. (2001). Interactive conflict resolution: Methodological and conceptual issues in conducting research and evaluation. In P. Stern & D. Druckman (Eds.), *International conflict resolution after the Cold War* (294-337). Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- Ross, M. H. (1993). *The management of conflict: Interpretations and interests in comparative perspectives*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- (2000). Creating the conditions for peacemaking: Theories of practice in ethnic conflict resolution. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 23(6): 1002-1034.
- (2000). Culture and identity in comparative political analysis. In L. Crothers & C. Lockhart (Eds.), *Culture and politics*. New York: St. Martin's Press
- (2001). The relevance of culture for the study of political psychology and ethnic conflict. In P. K. Chew (Ed.), *The conflict and culture reader*. New York and London: NYU Press.
- Rubin J., Pruitt D. & Kim S. (Eds.). (1994). *Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate and settlement*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Saktanber, A. (1994). Becoming the 'other' as a Muslim in Turkey: Turkish women vs. Islamist women. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 11: 99-134
- (2001). Kemalist kadın hakları söylemi. In A. İnsel (Ed.) *Modern Türkiye'de siyasi düşünce: Kemalizm*, pp: 324-334. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Sancar, S. Ü. (2004). *Otoriter Türk modernleşmesinin cinsiyet rejimi*. Retrieved on 12 June, 2005 from:
http://kasaum.ankara.edu.tr/gorsel/dosya/1097132326otoriter_turk_modernlesmesi_nin_cinsiyet_rejimi.doc

- Sandole, J. D. D. (1993). Paradigms theories and practice in conflict resolution: Coherence or confusion? In D. J. D. Sandole & H. van der Merwe (Eds.), *Conflict resolution theory and practice*. New York: Manchester United Press.
- (2003). Virulent ethnocentrism and conflict intractability: Puzzles and challenges for third party interveners. *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 10(1): 72-85
- (2003). Typology. In S. Chandelling, D. Druckman & L. Fast (Eds.), *Conflict*. London: Continuum.
- Saunders, H. H. (1999). *A public peace process: Sustained dialogue to transform racial and ethnic conflicts*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Saylan, T. (1997). *Gençlerimizi tarikatların kucağına biz atıyoruz!*. Retrieved on 07 May, 2005 from: <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1997/01/20/t/egitim/pazar.html>
- (2001). *Cumhuriyetin bireyi olmak*. İstanbul:Cumhuriyet Yayınları.
- Scimecca, J. A. (1998). Conflict resolution in the United States: The emergence of a profession. In K. Avruch, P. W. Black & J. A. Scimecca (Eds.), *Conflict resolution: cross-cultural perspectives*. Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger.
- Selamet, A. (2000). *Bir yılı daha geride bırakırken*. Retrieved on 29 May, 2005 from: <http://www.mazlumder.org/turkce/diger.html?sy=189&cst=makale>
- Serim,B. (1996). Laiklik ilkesi ve bireyin durumu. *Atatürkçü Düşünce*, 3(28-29): 29-35
- Sirmen, A. (1997, January 27). Türban gösterileri. *Milliyet*. p.13
- Social Research Centre of Social Studies Faculty Graduates Foundation (IMV-SAM). (1997). *Report of the research on political and social trends*. İstanbul: IVM-SAM.
- Sönmez, G. (n.d.). *Karanlığa sürükleniyoruz*. Retrieved on 21 March, 2005 from: <http://www.mazlumder.org/turkce/makale.html?sb>
- Steinberg, S. (2004). Discourse categories in encounters between Palestinians and Israelis. *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 17 (3): 471-490
- Sweeney, B., Ruthers, C. & William, L. (1996). Conflict resolution: History, philosophy, theory, and educational applications. *School Counselor*, 43(5): 326-345.
- Şekerci, H. (2005). *Ankara'da 28 şubat zorbalığı ve başörtüsü yasağı protesto edildi*. Retrieved on 12 May, 2005 from: <http://www.ozgurder.net/index.shtml?o01103r01m01>
- Şengül, M. (1997). Atatürkçü düşünce ışığında: Toplumsal aydınlanmanın sağlanmasında aydınlar ve sivil toplum örgütleri. *Atatürkçü Düşünce*, 3(35): 41-42

- Tabakoğlu, B. (2002). *Civil society in Turkey: The experience of civil society organizations*. Unpublished Master's Thesis. Ankara, Middle East Technical University.
- Tidwell, A. (1998). *Conflict resolved? : A critical assessment of conflict resolution*. London: Pinter
- Toker, M. (1998, March 4). Makulü normalde aramak. *Milliyet*. p.7
- Toprak, B. (1996). Civil society in Turkey. In A.R. Norton (Ed.), *Civil society in the Middle East Vol.2*.pp: 87-118. Leiden: E.J. Brill
- (1988). The state, politics and religion in Turkey. In M. Heper & A. Evin (Eds.), *State, democracy, and the military in Turkey in the 1980s*. New York: de Gruyter.
- Toprak, B. & Çarkoglu, A. (1999). *Report of research on religion, society and politics in Turkey*. İstanbul: The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV).
- Tugal, C. (2002). Islamism in Turkey: Beyond instrument and meaning, *Economy and Society* 31(1): 85–111.
- Turkey Socio-Economic Political Research Association (TÜSES). (1994-2004). *Report of the research on ethnic/religious identities and political tendencies of Turkish political party adherents and voters*. İstanbul: TÜSES.
- Türk Kadınlar Birliği Bulletin.(1998, March 15-22).
- Türkiyede insan hakları: 1999 yılı analizi* (2000). Ankara: Mazlum-Der Yayınları.
- Uçan News, (2004, 12 March). *Başörtüsü varsa burs yok*. Retrieved 20 June, 2005 from:
http://www.ucansupurge.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=432&Itemid=69
- Ury, W. (2000). *The third side*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Volkan, V. (1997) *Blood lines: From ethnic pride to ethnic terrorism*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Walter, G. S. (1999). The role of empathy in improving inter-group relations, *Journal of Social Issues*, 16(4): 46-63
- Yılmazoğlu, Y. (2004). *Mazlumder: Örtüye yasak hızla yayılıyor!*. Retrieved on 01 July, 2005 from:
<http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=5&ArsivAnaID=25359>
- Zartman, I. W. (1997). Toward the resolution of international conflicts. In I. W. Zartman & J. L. Rasmussen (Eds.), *Peacemaking in international conflict: Methods and techniques*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.