

**THE EU AS A SECURITY ACTOR IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA:
A CIVILIAN AND/OR MILITARY (STRATEGIC) ACTOR IN CRISIS
MANAGEMENT?**

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TUĞBA SEVİNÇ

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Assist. Prof. Dr. Galip Yalman
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı (METU, IR) _____

Prof. Dr. Ramazan Gözen (Ç.U., PS&IR) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sevilay Kahraman (METU, IR) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these thesis rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Tuğba Sevinç

Signature :

ABSTRACT

THE EU AS A SECURITY ACTOR IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: A CIVILIAN AND/OR MILITARY (STRATEGIC) ACTOR IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT?

Sevinç, Tuğba

M.Sc., Department of European Studies

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı

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The objective of this thesis is to analyze whether the EU can be considered as a ‘limited’ military/strategic actor or as a civilian actor in the Post-Cold War international security architecture. In this framework, the impacts of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the US-led war in Iraq on the EU crisis management capabilities are analyzed more specifically. In this framework, firstly, the historical dynamics of European foreign and security policy from the Post-World War II period to the Post-September 11 period are analyzed. Secondly, the EU’s changing role in the international arena together with its crisis management capability is evaluated. Thirdly, the EU’s international actorness in the Post-September 11 era is discussed with a special reference to the US-led war in Iraq. In this general framework,

following a brief analysis on reactions of the US and the EU against global terrorism, crisis management strategy of the EU during and after US-led war in Iraq is analyzed in detail. The last part allocated to, a critical analysis of the security actorness of the EU is made in order to conceptualize it and to draw a more theoretical framework. Moreover, it is mentioned in this thesis that while having triggering effect on the CFSP and ESDP, the 9/11 events and the US-led war in Iraq provides the emergence of new methods for crisis management and the European Security Strategy. Accordingly, considering the new international security context beginning with the end of Cold War period and transforming to another dimension by means of September 11 attacks, the main argument of this thesis is that the EU still tends to be a civilian actor as it was before and it is envisaged to be so in the foreseeable future despite its latest attempts to develop its common security and defence policies.

Keywords: European Union, Post-World War II, Post-Cold War, European Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP, ESDP, Civilian Actor, EU Crisis Management, Military Actor, September 11th Terrorist Attacks, US-led war in Iraq, Global Terrorism, International Security Actor, European Security Strategy.

ÖZ

SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI DÖNEMDE BİR GÜVENLİK AKTÖRÜ OLARAK AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ: KRİZ YÖNETİMİNDE SİVİL VE/VEYA ASKERİ (STRATEJİK) BİR AKTÖR MÜ?

Sevinç, Tuğba

Yüksek Lisans, Avrupa Çalışmaları Bölümü

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Bu tezin amacı, soğuk savaş ile değişen uluslararası güvenlik ortamında Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) kriz yönetiminde 'sınırlı' bir askeri/stratejik aktör olarak mı yoksa etkin bir sivil aktör olarak mı algılanabileceğinin değerlendirilmesidir. Bu çerçevede, 11 Eylül terörist saldırısı ve Irak'taki (ABD kaynaklı) savaşın AB'nin kriz yönetimi kabiliyeti üzerindeki etkisi incelenmiştir. Bu çerçevede, ilk olarak, II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönemden 11 Eylül sonrası döneme kadar olan süreçte Avrupa Dış ve Güvenlik Politikasının tarihsel dinamikleri incelenmiştir. İkinci olarak, AB'nin uluslararası ortamdaki değişen rolü kriz yönetimi kabiliyeti ile birlikte değerlendirilmiştir. Üçüncü bölümde, Irak'taki (ABD kaynaklı) savaşa referans verilerek AB'nin 11 Eylül sonrası dönemdeki aktör rolü tartışılmıştır. Bu genel çerçeve içinde, AB ve ABD'nin 11 Eylül sonrası dönemde uluslararası terörizme

karşı tepkilerinin kısaca değeriendirilmesinin ardından, Irak'taki savaşta AB'nin kriz yönetimi stratejisi detaylı olarak incelenmiştir. Sonuç bölümü ise, AB'nin güvenlik aktörlüğünü kavramsallaştırmak ve teorik bir çerçeve oluşturmak için kritik analize ayrılmıştır. Bu tezde, ayrıca, 11 Eylül saldırıları ve Irak'taki savaşın AB'nin Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası (ODGP) ve Ortak Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası (OAGSP) üzerinde tetikleyici bir etki yaparak, Avrupa Güvenlik Stratejisinin oluşturulmasına ve kriz yönetiminde yeni oluşumlar yarattığı iddiası yer almaktadır. Buna göre, bu tezin temel argümanı, soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde başlayıp 11 Eylül sonrası dönemde uluslararası terörizm ile yeni bir boyuta geçen uluslararası güvenlik ortamında ortak güvenlik ve savunma politikalarını geliştirmek için attığı önemli adımlara rağmen, AB'nin hala sivil bir aktör olma eğiliminde olduğu ve bu eğilimin gelecekte de devam edeceğinin öngörülmesidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönem, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönem, Avrupa Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası, ODGP, OAGSP, Sivil Aktör, AB Kriz Yönetimi, Askeri/Stratejik Aktör, 11 Eylül Terrorist Saldırıları, Irak'taki (ABD kaynaklı) Savaş, Uluslararası Terörizm, Uluslararası Güvenlik Aktörü, Avrupa Güvenlik Stratejisi.

To my family and my dear husband

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CEES	Central and Eastern European Countries
CESDP	Common European Security and Defence Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
EC	European Community
ECAP	European Capability Action Plan
EDC	European Defence Community
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ERRF	European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
FYROM	Former Republic of Macedonia
HFC	Helsinki Force Catalogue
HHC	Helsinki Headline Catalogue
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
KFOR	Kosovo Force

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PSC	Political and Security Committee
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
SFOR	Stabilization Force
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product, The European Union (EU) is inevitably a global player...it should be ready to share the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.¹

Western Europe's status and impact within the contemporary international arena is a matter of conflict especially after the end of the Cold War. The European Union (EU) is an important focus of study in international relations because through the gradual development of foreign policy cooperation and 'common' foreign and security policy, it increasingly appears as an actor in the world politics though this actorness capability is still in the middle of the discussions.

The discussions on developing a 'common' foreign and security policy raised to the top the EU's agenda at the end of the Cold War. The fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 and consequently the disintegration of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War as well as the end of the bipolar international system. Afterwards, the September 11th events, considered as one of the turning points for the international relations, have been accepted as a test case for effectiveness and credibility of the EU's security actorness as well as that of the U.S. The events in international system have created a new security environment where the definition of security including threats and principles has changed as well as the actors of the international system.

¹ Javier Solana, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', *European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003. <http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf>

On the other hand, it has to be revealed that today's European foreign and security policy namely the CFSP did not emerged suddenly with the end of Cold War but its basis goes back to the Post World War II and then the Cold War periods. The successive attempts including the European Defence Community (EDC), the West European Union (WEU) and the European Political Community (EPC) can be considered as the initial steps for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) even if they are known as failing attempts of the EC in terms of its constructing a common foreign and security policy. While the European States were trying to find the failures in these projects and also a way for developing a common foreign and security policies, the September 11 events accelerated the process.

The EU has realized such transformation of security issues from "high politics" including traditional security and defense emerging from ideological confrontations to "low politics" i.e. soft security issues like international terrorism, international crime, illegal flow of money, goods and people, environmental hazards and so on. Taking into consideration these new threats or challenges and restructuring of NATO, which has been the most important security organization of Western World since its establishment, the EC/EU has decided to create a 'common' foreign and security policy. By means of this policy, the EU would be able to more active and credible international actor in the international security environment.

The Gulf War and crisis in former Yugoslavia are in general accepted as the catalyst for the development of the EU's crisis response capability, therefore a new structure for first military and then civilian crisis management was established within the CFSP in Maastricht Treaty.

After this new initiative, the successive crisis situations in Balkans and the Middle East regions triggered the new attempts of the EU to form more coherent, consistent and effective foreign and security policy in order to be a real actor in international security environment. By means of its experiences no matter positive or negative, the EU has tried to realize the transformation of the CFSP in terms of both its internal mechanisms and instruments and also of its external missions and image. In accordance with this transformation, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was accepted in the Saint Malo Summit, which is known as a ‘turning point’ in evolution of the EU’s security actorness. After the launch of ESDP, the EU has begun to take more concrete steps for more effective crisis management like the introduction of Petersberg Tasks as a basis for humanitarian and rescue tasks and tasks for peacemaking and peacekeeping. Moreover, the Helsinki Headline Goals has brought a military dimension to the crisis management capabilities, by which the EU could be able to act as a real security actor firstly within the European borders and out of its borders.

While the EU has been taking important steps towards a common foreign and security and even defence policies by means of successive summits, the September 11 attacks and the following global war against terror has had indisputable effects on the EU’s security actorness comparing the previous developments.

In this context, the focus in this thesis is whether the EU can be considered as a ‘limited’ security actor because of lack of its autonomous military power or as a civilian actor in the international security arena while analyzing the EU’s international actorness including crisis management capability in the context of the September 11 attacks and recent US-led war in Iraq.

In order to clarify my arguments, there are some fundamental questions to be answered in different parts of the thesis: Does the EU, which is now the largest provider of humanitarian aid in the world, have to remain as a civilian/economic power in the future? Or does it have to struggle with changing international security agenda or with other world powers in order to be an international power? In the post-cold war arena, what will the EU play a role in the crisis management aspect whether being a real “crisis manager” or a sole “crisis financier”? While considering the US-led war in Iraq, what has changed for the EU or has there been a change the actorness position of the EU? Does the EU need a foreign policy? If it does, how does the EU deal with the ever increasing “capability-expectation gap” within the member states and also between the EU and other countries outside the EU? In such a complex and changeable international environment, finding exact and indisputable answers is not easy but the experiences of the EU in successive crisis situations occurred within European borders and out of these borders give scholars and researchers important opportunity to analyze the EU’s international actorness as well as possible.

This thesis is composed of six chapters. After a general overview of the introduction, in the second chapter, the historical background of the dynamics underlying a more assertive European foreign and security policy from the post-World War II to the post-Cold War era is discussed. This long period of evolution is divided into two main periods: First one is the period from 1950s to 1990s including the initial attempts for today’s European foreign and security policy and the second period, which is the period known as Post-Cold War era, including the major steps for the EU in order to be an effective international actor in global politics. The second period mainly concentrates on how the CFSP emerged and then developed

during the successive summits and Treaties. This part will begin with Maastricht Treaty, which is accepted as the first turning point for the creation of CFSP and that end with the recent changes brought by the European Convention.

The third chapter examines the EU's changing role in the international arena together with its crisis management capability covering the time period until the recent Iraq case. For the purpose of this thesis, the EU crisis management is dealt with in terms of its military and civilian aspects as well as the EU's financing capacity of its crisis management instruments. Analyzing the EU's crisis management capability and its initial attempts, this chapter underlines its non-military crisis management instruments; most notably economic measures and humanitarian aid backed by diplomacy. In the last part, however, the problems of civilian crisis management of the EU in the CFSP framework are mentioned.

The forth chapter examines the EU's international actorness including crisis management capability in the US-led war in Iraq in order to make the issue more concrete and specific. Before a detailed discussion on the EU's security actorness in recent US-led war in Iraq and the future of the CFSP, global war against international terrorism after the September 11 events in general and more specifically the responses of both the EU and the US towards these terrorist attacks are examined. The following part discusses the underlying reasons for the EU's failure to act as a coherent and consistent actor in Iraqi case by touching on the internal divisions and the US influence on this division, which are known as "*Old Europe vs. New Europe*" and "*Atlanticists vs. Europeanists*" and then focusing on the EU's role in crisis management in Iraqi case. This chapter also covers the following improvements in the CFSP and the EU's crisis management capabilities including the *Battle Groups*

project, EU-Just Lex Program and also Headline Goal 2010 and the European Security Strategy, which covers the common strategic objectives of the EU Member States.

At the fifth chapter, a critical analysis of the security actorness of the EU will be made in accordance with the major concepts of *Presence and Actorness, Civilian and/or Military Actorness or Power, Civilian and Military Actorness/Power and Capability-Expectation Gap*, which are frequently used to conceptualize the European Foreign Policy.

During the conduct of this study, qualitative research method has been used with a comprehensive literature review. In this study, books, articles, working papers of research centers, the EU Fact Sheets and Chaillot Papers dealing with this subject, Founding Treaties of the European Union, Formal Declarations of the European Union and Presidency Conclusions of the European Union are used to support the argument of this study. Moreover, the Internet has become very helpful in order to search for the recent official and unofficial documents of the EU, many articles and many think tank sites on European security.

CHAPTER-2

DYNAMICS UNDERLYING A MORE ASSERTIVE EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

In order to analyze the EU's actor position in the global security environment, historical evolution of the EU should be analyzed carefully because changes in world politics and security environment have affected and also directed the security actorness of the EU in a broad sense. In this sense, this chapter aims to analyze the evolution of the European foreign and security policy from the post-World War II period to the post-September 11 period. In other words, the historical background of the CFSP and so of the ESDP will be evaluated in order to understand the present position of the EU in security issues better.

2.1. The Roots of the European Foreign Policy in the Post-World War II Era

Efforts of the today's EU countries to attain an independent presence in the security and defense field is not a matter confined to the last decade or so. These efforts started after the World War II and continued throughout the Cold War Period. Creation of the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1952 based on Pleven Plan and then emergence of the Foucet Plan; establishment of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1954 through a process initiated by the Brussels Treaty of 1948,

and finally the European Political Cooperation (EPC) have become the initial steps for present security policies and institutions. These initiatives of European States in the areas of foreign and security policy were seen as precursors of the CFSP.²

At the end of the World War II, the main driving force behind the attempts for security and defence arrangements was the threat coming from the Soviet Union (the SU) and fear of Germany's rearmament. The Brussels Treaty, which was signed among France, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in 1948, was accepted as a step for creation of a regional defence organization in Europe. However, there were some drawbacks for the further improvement of the organization such that there were the differences in opinions of the member countries, military weakness and economic conditions of them. Afterwards, the signing of Washington Treaty in 1949 and the establishment of NATO were the major steps in European security.

In 1950s, Korean War and nuclear threat from Soviet Union led to the need to increase European security and defense capacities, which would only be achieved German military power. However, the rearmament of Germany raised a major dilemma for the Europeans, especially for French politicians. The EDC treaty, which was signed on 27 May 1952, by the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, was designed to integrate the militaries of its respective members by creating a supranational security institution with common armed forces and a common budget.³

² Özgür T. Kaya, "The Common Foreign and Security Policy: The EU's Quest for Being a Coherent and Effective Actor in Global Politics", (Unpublished M.Sc. Thesis) Ankara: Department of International Relations, METU, 2004. p. 29

³ Jones, Seth G., "The European Union and the Security Dilemma", *Security Studies*, Published by Frank Cass, (London Vol 12, no. 3, Spring 2003), p. 13

The EDC was designed to allow Germany to rearm by binding it into a regional institution. In August 1954, however, the French National Assembly rejected the EDC. West Germany was admitted into NATO following the October 1954 Paris accords. Establishment of the EDC, which was the proposal of France, could be considered as the first initiative for solving the dilemma. The EDC was an important step in the evolution of European States' efforts to cooperate in the areas of foreign and security policy. However, this first initiative became unfruitful due to the rejection of the French parliament. The lessons learned from the EDC were used in further efforts to cooperate in the areas foreign and security policy. Failure of the EDC revealed that it was not yet the appropriate time to cooperate in areas of foreign and security policy.⁴

After that unsuccessful attempt, as a result of British effort, the ECSC member states and the UK signed a modified version of the Brussels Treaty of 1948 in September 1954 by including Germany as a member. This treaty created the Western European Union (WEU), an advisory body aimed to coordinate security policies of member countries. On the other side, NATO, which was established in April 1949 following the original Brussels Treaty (1948), was more powerful day-by-day because of its increasing number of member states. For example, Germany became NATO state in 1955 and with its inclusion the WEU played a very limited role because NATO was fulfilling the functions, which had been originally conceived for the WEU.

⁴ Kaya, op.cit., p. 36

Thus, WEU became a political platform, leaving security and collective defense in Europe to NATO.⁵ In fact, the WEU would attempt to regain its position by constructing a new security understanding for Western Europe in the end of the 1980s.

Following attempt was the European Political Cooperation (EPC), which was initiated by Davignon Report, achieved limited success in maintaining cooperation among the European Community (EC) states in foreign policy. Despite having played a concrete role in European foreign policy, the Davignon Report of 1970 recommended regular meetings among EEC foreign ministers, liaison among EEC ambassadors in foreign capitals and so on. In this sense, the EPC's main success was that EC states have gained the habit of cooperation in the areas of foreign and security policy by the EPC. EPC also facilitated the adoption of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by the European Union (EU) states and EPC became the predecessor of the CFSP, because most of practices and rules of the EPC was adopted by the CFSP.

On the other hand, it has to be noted that the EPC did not aim to replace NATO or American predominance in world affairs with a strictly European foreign policy but was a cooperative entity, which set the promotion of peace, democracy and human rights as the common ground between members of the EC.

⁵ Ali Yıldız, "Turkey and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): Anatomy of a Problematic Relationship", (Unpublished M.Sc. Thesis) Ankara: Department of International Relations, METU, 2002. pp. 6-8

In conclusion, European states' efforts to become a coherent and effective foreign and security policy actor in global politics have continued since the 1950s. However, during the Cold War, these efforts in the areas of foreign and security policy did not succeed because of many internal dynamics of Europe and also external dynamics.

- Firstly, their varying interests and approaches towards any form of cooperation whether supranational or intergovernmental.⁶ For example, Britain favored the US to remain the linchpin of the defense of Europe whereas others, especially France, were skeptical about the long-term reliability of the US.
- Secondly, military weakness of the members of the EDC undermined the effectiveness of the organization comparing the military forces of the US in the west and the USSR in the east.
- Thirdly, economic shortages of European countries forced them to make cutbacks in their defense expenditures.
- Finally, signing of the Washington Treaty in April 1949 and the establishment of NATO marked a milestone in European security

Although Cold War years marked the dominance of the two superpowers in the European security environment through respective institutions like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for Western Europe; the second half of the 1980s witnessed the efforts of Europeans to revitalize the WEU as a platform to discuss and raise issues in European security.

⁶ European countries have regarded their foreign and security policy as an indivisible part of their national sovereignty, they have refrained from forming such cooperation.

Some authors believe that revitalization of the WEU was largely due to the questions on the growing unilateral power statute of the US in the European security. However, the other authors like Gülnur Aybet stated that the primary goal of the Europeans in the revitalization of the WEU throughout the second half of the 1980s was not the replacement of the trans-Atlantic Alliance or an anti-NATO project but rather to address the concerns over the trans-Atlantic burden-sharing.⁷ The major motives behind the revitalization of the WEU can be considered as:⁸

- To remedy the weakness of the European countries within the Atlantic alliance that will also constitute a response to continuous US demands for burden sharing.
- The questioning of the relations with the US due to the growing concerns on the part of the Europeans over the reliability of the US guarantee arising from the renewed Cold War hostility and the reluctance of the US to consult with Europeans on certain foreign policy initiatives such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).⁹

As a result, although there were expectations on the WEU having become a more effective instrument for building a European security policy, the WEU, which was very limited instrument, has been a secondary organization as far as the management of the European security affairs is concerned, when compared to the NATO.

⁷ Yıldız, op.cit., p. 8. See also Gülnur Aybet, A European Security Architecture after the Cold War: Questions of Legitimacy, (London: MacMillan Press, 2000), pp.81-85

⁸ Ibid., pp. 9-10

⁹ G. Wyn Rees, the Western European at the Crossroads (Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), pp.23-24

Efforts within the European Community to develop a foreign and security policy also continued in the second half of the 1980s with the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987, which obliged member states to compose and apply a European foreign policy. Nevertheless, ‘security’ was referred as only limited to the political and economic dimensions, considering the scope of the SEA.¹⁰

2.2. Evolution of the EU’s Position in the Post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War has initiated a new process in Europe as far as security and defense is concerned because of radical changes in security perceptions and security environment in Europe. The concept of “enemy” has totally changed. Security has not been regarded as confined to the military security but focus shifted to more ‘low’ security issues, such as international crime, ethnic and nationalist conflicts, massive immigration, organized crime, and spread of nuclear weapons and massive violation of human rights as well as environmental crisis.¹¹

The conceptual transformation in European security has made the institutional transformation inevitable, which led to the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within the EU. This led to increase in European States’ efforts to act as a coherent actor in their foreign and security policy.

In the Post Cold War period, two important events convinced EC Member States to further their cooperation in the areas of foreign and security policy and the launch of the CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty. These events were Yugoslavian Crisis in the early 1990s and the Gulf War in 1991.

¹⁰ Brian White, Understanding European Foreign Policy, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2000, p.146

¹¹ Yıldız, op.cit., p.10. See also, Helene Sjursen, “The Common Foreign and Security Policy: An Emerging New Voice in International Politics?”, *Arena Working Papers* (WP 99/34), pp.3-4

The first event that shocked the Europeans was the ethnic violence that broke up in former Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia disintegrated when its constituent republics broke up from the Yugoslav Federation in 1991 and almost immediately fighting broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina between Bosnians, Serbs and Croats because of the deep-rooted antagonisms between the different ethnicities.

In addition to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the internal hostilities among the newly emerging states, the division among the EC Member states regarding the recognition process of Slovenia and Croatia escalated the crisis in Europe.¹² On the one side, Germany, as a result of her persuasion Denmark, Belgium and Italy supported the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. However, on the opposite side, France, the UK and the Netherlands believed that an early recognition without safeguards for minorities living within the borders of Yugoslavia would damage the peace making attempts of the EC.

Therefore, France underlined that the before recognition, agreed frontiers and respect for minority rights should be guaranteed and the EC should adopt a joint decision based on these principles. While discussions on the date for recognition were carrying on, Germany's unilateral recognition undermined the unity and credibility of the EC in the eyes of international community.¹³ After this recognition, the other EC member states were recognizing Slovenia and Croatia even if they thought it was an early action.

¹² Trevor J. Salmon, "Testing Times for European Political Cooperation: the Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990-1992", *International Affairs* (Vol. 68, No. 2, 1992), p. 244.

¹³ Simon J. Nuttall, European Foreign Policy (United States: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 222

On the other side, there was another important internal crisis within the EC countries. Such that; EC Member States were also divided on the issue of military intervention in the Yugoslavian Conflict. While France was willing to send a peacekeeping force under the WEU, the UK, Denmark, Germany and Portugal took opposite position. The UK thought that a military intervention in Yugoslavian crisis, which required important military force, would be difficult and dangerous.¹⁴

As a result, during the Yugoslavian Conflict, EC Member States could not agree on a common position both on military intervention and recognition of the sepetated countries, so EC Member States were not able to solve the Yugoslavian crisis but the US solved it. Their lack of coherence during the crisis undermined their effectiveness and credibility.

As Roy Ginsberg suggested that the EC was “baptized by fire” by Yugoslavian Crisis and this changed the course of post-war European Integration, EC Member States realized that civilian diplomacy not backed by hard power -capability of military action- would not be successful in preventing and stopping the conflict.¹⁵

The Gulf Crisis and the following war in Iraq in 1990-1991 period was accepted as the second event, which had important influence on the EC Member States’ taking concrete steps for a common security and foreign policy for the future crisis.

¹⁴ Salmon, op.cit., p. 232

¹⁵ Roy H. Ginsberg, “Ten Years of European Union Foreign Policy, Baptism, Confirmation, Validation”, *Heinrich Böll Foundation*, (Washington Office, 2002), p. 6.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Gulf Crisis was directed by the United States and the Europeans could mainly employ diplomatic and economic means and their military contribution was symbolic in the sense that it did not go beyond individual acts of the UK and France. Although the EC Member States responded to the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait rapidly and a unified position initially; during the Gulf Crisis and War, the EC Member States failed to maintain a common position on the crisis due to the varying domestic political considerations and varying national interests of EC Member States. Especially, on the issue of European hostages in Iraq and Kuwait, some of EC Member States' unilateralist initiatives, France, the UK and Germany undermined coherence of EC Member States.

On the other hand, there was an attempt of the EC taking a military role in the period between the invasion of the Kuwait by Iraq and the beginning of the Gulf War. The EC Member States decided to cooperate militarily through the WEU. The WEU played a role in the naval embargo during the Gulf Crisis and War, but EC Member States made their own arrangements with the US when it came to fight the war. The WEU forces were not under an integrated political command structure but they were under national command due to the political differences among member states. This was another example that domestic politics played a determining role in EC States' reactions during the Gulf Case.

Before the war, the EC's foreign policy laid on peaceful lines. The trend of history toward disarmament and dismantling of military alliances and it was accepted that the EC's contribution to the new security environment in Europe was through non-military means as a civilian power.¹⁶

¹⁶ Kaya, *op.cit.*, pp. 65-67. See details also in Nuttall, *op.cit.*, p. 147

However, Gulf War obliged the Member States to confront their global responsibilities in the post-Cold War world, and the security and defence dimensions of the CFSP gained much more importance.¹⁷ For example, after the end of the Gulf War, the EC Member States' protective policies towards Kurdish refugees and its economic aids to the neighboring countries of Iraq and humanitarian aids to region was considered, as 'European foreign policy was capable of acting as well as talking.'¹⁸

On the other side, since fighting stopped with American diplomatic and military intervention, it was realized that in the new unipolar world order, where the US was going to be the hegemon of international affairs, Europe was still away from having the necessary mechanisms to pursue objective in line with its interests.

The EC's position was defined by Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens as such 'The Gulf War demonstrated that even though the EC was an "economic giant", it also a "political dwarf", but worst of all, a "military worm".¹⁹ Therefore, it can be concluded that the Gulf War has changed the course of discussion on 'common' foreign and security policy in Europe in order to achieve a recognized international role. Christopher Hill expressed that both Yugoslavian Crisis and Gulf War showed the EC was not an effective international actor in terms of both its capacity to produce collective decisions and impact on events and he called it as "capability and expectations gap" for the EC.²⁰

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 129- 130

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 146

¹⁹ Statement made by Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens in New York Times, January 25, 1991

²⁰ Christopher Hill, "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role", *Journal of Common Market Studies* (Vol. 31, No.3, September 1993), p. 306

As a result of these two experiences and the changing international security environment in the Post-Cold War era, including new threats like political and economic instability in the ex-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, ethnic and nationalist conflict, cross-border terrorism, massive immigration, destruction of environment, organized crime, spread of nuclear weapons and massive violation of human rights, it was both externally and internally expected and demanded from the EC to play an active and effective role in global politics.

Therefore, these two events forced European States to accelerate their efforts to make the EU a coherent and effective security actor in global politics and eventually the Maastricht Treaty introduced the CFSP in 1993. The establishment of the CFSP became necessary and it became evident that the EPC process was insufficient to meet requirements of a politically strengthened EU in 1990s.

2.2.1. Maastricht Treaty: Treaty of European Union

At Maastricht Treaty, i.e. the Treaty on the European Union (the TEU) of 1991 established the CFSP as the EU's second pillar on all EU security issues and proclaimed that the Union shall "assert its identity on the international scene in particular through the implementation of a CFSP which shall include the eventual framing of a common defense policy".²¹

²¹ Yıldız, op.cit., p.11 Treaty on the EU, 1992, Title I, Common Provisions, Article B quoted in Meltem Müftüler-Bac, "Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies", Security Dialogue (Vol.31, Iss. 4, 2000), p. 491

In the framework of the TEU, a distinction was drawn between security and defense issues; while security was considered in the second pillar; the defense was kept within the WEU concept. In this respect, Maastricht Treaty of 1993 has been a turning point by its identification of the WEU as the defense arm of the European Union (EU).²²

The EU introduced the CFSP to respond to the challenges facing it on the international level, and to provide new means of taking action in areas of foreign relations. Conflict prevention and conflict management occupy the prime seat on the CFSP agenda, along with its central objective of projection of stability to Central and Eastern Europe. These conflict prevention and management tasks cover humanitarian aid, election monitoring, and police deployment and training, border controls, institution-building, mine clearance, arms control and counter terrorism initiatives.²³

Geoffrey Edwards and Simon Nuttall underlined that the EC Member States had different views about *substance of the CFSP* during the IGC and these differences were reflected in the CFSP provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. First of all, a group of EC Member States including the UK, Denmark, Greece and Portugal advocated a reform in EPC on existing lines and opposed any further dilution of the intergovernmental procedure by bringing EPC closer to the EC.²⁴

²² Ibid

²³ Hüseyin Bağcı, "Turkey and Europe: Security Issues" in Dangerous Neighborhood: Contemporary Issues in Turkey's Foreign Relations, edited by Radu, Michael S., (Transaction Publishers, London, 2002)

²⁴ Geoffrey Edwards and Simon Nuttall, "Common Foreign and Security Policy", in Andrew Duff (ed), Maastricht and Beyond, Building the European Union (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 88.

Another group of EC Member States including France, Germany, Benelux countries, Italy and the Commission advocated the establishment of a strong common policy aligned with EC mechanisms and procedures.²⁵ France also advocated establishment of strong common policy focused on the European Council.

There was another division among the EC Member States on the issue of *security and defence provisions of the CFSP*. According to Gülnur Aybet, France, Italy, Spain and Belgium advocated the establishment of a European defence system, which could be based upon the integration of the WEU in European Integration process by making the WEU subject to directives of European Council. Therefore, these states favored the EC as main forum for European Security in 1990s and wanted to make the WEU as defence and security arm of the EC.²⁶ On the other side, the UK, the Netherlands and Portugal, so called Atlanticists, favored NATO as the main security and defence forum for Europe and they advocated the making of the WEU as European pillar of NATO.²⁷

Atlanticists believed that considering the EU as main forum for European Security would provide a threat to transatlantic solidarity and the functioning of NATO. Germany favored maintaining NATO and the US presence in Europe and advocated the strengthening of the EC by including a defence and security dimension into it with the ultimate goal of leading a pan-European security structure based on the CSCE.²⁸

²⁵ Ibid. and Nuttall, op.cit., p. 150.

²⁶ Aybet, op.cit., p. 82.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

This showed that Germany adopted a middle way i.e. giving a security and defence dimension to the EC without sacrificing NATO and US security and defence commitment in Europe. In addition, Denmark, Greece and Ireland adopted distinctive national policies.²⁹ This internal division has been still remained as a main shortage of the EU's actorness in security and defence issues. This shortage, for example, would be seen in latest US-led war in Iraq.

CFSP, however, has not been successful in meeting the expectations of the EU circles in its initial times. Three factors can be identified regarding the weakness and the failure of the CFSP to become a reliable foreign and security tool for the EU. First, national interests of the main EU players diverge. CFSP has not been instrumental in reconciling the different national interests and concerns over sovereignty. Second, there is a lack of strategic clarity. The scope of the CFSP and possible instruments at its disposal has either not been identified or done in an improper manner. Third factor is institutional weakness. There has been a lack of relevant institutional bodies that will realize the goals of the CFSP.³⁰

Failure of the CFSP project became apparent after the lack of an initiative on the part of the Europeans to take a lead in the efforts to find a solution to the war in the territories of former Yugoslavia. In this case, the solution was not able to find by the EU. Therefore, in 1994, NATO endorsed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces and of "separable but not separate forces" that could be made available for European-led crisis response operations other than collective defense.

²⁹ Nuttal, op.cit., p. 150

³⁰ Yıldız, op.cit., p.12. See also Stelios Stravridis, "The Common Foreign and Security Policy: Why Institutional Arrangements Are not Enough" in Howard Machin et al. (eds), New Challenges to the EU: Policies and Policy Making (Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, 1997), p.113.

This process was channeled into the NATO framework under the name of the European Security and Defense Identity/Initiative (ESDI). The main objectives of the ESDI were,³¹

- to enable the European allies to share more of the burden of providing European security,
- to reinforce the transatlantic partnership,
- to allow the allies to conduct EU-led operations within the framework of Petersberg tasks.

Moreover, in the ESDI framework, necessary arrangements were made between NATO and the WEU to allow the latter to make use of NATO assets and capabilities in any operations under NATO's political control and strategic direction.³² In this sense, the ESDI can be considered as a tool giving the Europeans within the NATO structure an independent presence in security and defense matters in the post-Cold War security environment.

2.2.2. Amsterdam Treaty

The whole Balkan experience has put forward the need to reform of the CFSP emerged, because these years showed the inability of the CFSP to develop a coherent and effective foreign and security policy. Following many discussions within the EU institutions about the need for reform on CFSP, the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed by fifteen EU States on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999 after the ratification of the Treaty by all Member States.

³¹ Bağcı, op.cit., in note 24, p. 56.

³² Ibid.

The Treaty of Amsterdam aimed at the completion of the unfinished business of the Maastricht Treaty that was to improve the coherence and effectiveness of the EU in the areas of foreign and security policy.³³ In Article C of the Treaty of Amsterdam, it was stated “the Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency and shall cooperate to this end. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its respective powers.”³⁴ The Treaty of Amsterdam brought several innovations such as the introduction of a new policy instruments called as ‘Common Strategy’, ‘Joint Actions’ and ‘Common Positions’, introduction of post of High Representative for the CFSP (“Mr. CFSP”), introduction of Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. Common strategies have to be adopted by the European Council “in areas where the Member States have important interests in common” and that are also regarded as a means to ensure consistency of EU external policies as a whole. Recently, the EU adopted Common Strategies on Russia, Ukraine, the Mediterranean and the Western Balkans.³⁵ Joint Actions have been defined previously as “legally binding operational actions with fixed aims and financial means” and that have covered the first Stability Pact including Central and Eastern Europe, numerous operations in the Balkans and the appointment of special representatives. Common Positions, on the other side, has been introduced in order to “define the EU’s approach towards particular geographic

³³ Kaya, op.cit., p.101

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Fraser Cameron, “The European Union’s Growing International Role: Closing Capability-Expectations Gap?”, *Paper Presented to Conference on the European Union in International Affairs*, (National Europe Center Paper No. 15, 3-4 July 2002), p.12

or thematic issues” covering special regions like the Caucasian region as well as arms control issues.

Moreover, one of the most significant changes in CFSP after Amsterdam was the improvement of its operating machinery. While the political oversight via the European Council and the General Affairs Council remains unchanged, for Fraser Cameron, the motor sunning the CFSP has been greatly enhanced by the establishment of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which monitors international affairs, guides the work of Military Committee and all CFSP working groups; prepares and oversees the implementation of CFSP decisions; leads the political dialogues at official level and maintains links to NATO.³⁶

Another critical contribution of the Treaty of Amsterdam Treaty was the establishment of the post of High Representative for CFSP, which was considered as an intention for replying Henry Kissinger’s classical question “who speaks for Europe”. The underlying reason for establishing this new post was to strengthen the cohesion in EU’s external representation and give EU a single visible voice in international system. According to Article J.16 of the Treaty;

The Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties.³⁷

Javier Solana, former Secretary General of NATO was appointed as High Representative for the CFSP for five years by European Council on 18 October 1999 and started his new occupation in November 1999.

³⁶ Ibid., p.8

³⁷ Kaya, op.cit., p. 104

The basis of a true security and defense role for the EU can be noticed in the Amsterdam Treaty, which brought the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks³⁸ of the WEU into the EU framework. By this way, a strong relationship between EU and WEU was formed through the establishment of an organic link between the two organizations and naming the WEU as the defense arm of the EU. Therefore, it can be said that the Amsterdam Treaty provided important ground for acceleration of establishment of sufficient European Mechanism for Crisis Management.³⁹

The new process beginning with the Amsterdam Treaty can be regarded as a continuation of the past efforts towards the development of a security and defence role for the EU. However, these improvements were not sufficient to ensure the coherence and effectiveness of the CFSP. According to Fraser Cameron, the past experiences showed that appropriate structures and procedures alone will not be enough to ensure the coherent and effective foreign and security policy and the political will to use these structures and procedures was necessary for a real CFSP. This necessitates a deeper awareness among Member States that they would no longer pursue only their national interests and also pursue their external interests together rather than separately while shaping a genuine European foreign and security policy.⁴⁰

³⁸ Petersberg tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking.

³⁹ Hüseyin Bağcı, "Turkey and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): Anatomy of a problematic relationship" in Spezifika einer Südost-Erweiterung der EU: Die Türkei und die EU-Türkei-Beziehungen, (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden, 21-23 January 2002), pp.9-10

⁴⁰ Fraser Cameron, "Building a Common Foreign Policy: Do institutions matter", in Kjell A. Eliassen (ed.), Foreign and Security Policy in European Union (London: SAGE Publications, 1998), p.76.

2.2.3. Saint Malo Declaration: Turning Point for CESDP

After the Kosovo War, at Franco-British Saint Malo Summit in December 1998, Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) was launched in order to strengthen the CFSP by adding it a defense dimension. In Saint-Malo Declaration, it was clearly stated that;

The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage...This includes the responsibility of the European council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defense policy in the framework of CFSP...To this end, the Union must have the *capacity for autonomous action*, backed up by credible military forces, the *means to decide to use them*, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis.... In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means – European capabilities pre-designed within NATO's European Pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework.⁴¹

The St. Malo Declaration has had important contribution on the security actorness of the EU while mentioning, for the first time, the necessity of “an autonomous capacity for conducting its (EU's) objective of a common foreign and security policy” and also the possibility of European military action taken outside the NATO framework and without NATO assets.⁴² Therefore, it is generally defined as the “the real turning point for the initiation of a true security and defence policy for the EU” in the literature.⁴³

By means of this new arrangement, the European defense capabilities would be transferred from the WEU into the EU framework itself, the ESDI has been replaced by the ESDP and therefore discussions regarding the European security and defence have begun to be channeled into the EU framework.

⁴¹ Joint Declaration Issued At The British- French Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998, See Kori Schake, Amaya Laine Bloch and Charles Grant, ‘Building a European Defence Capability’, *Survival* (Vol.42, No.1, Spring 1999), pp. 23-24 for the full text of the Declaration.

⁴² Bağcı, op.cit. in note 24, p. 57

⁴³ Bağcı, op.cit. in note 41, p. 10

The St. Malo Declaration was, actually, an outcome of a historical process. The whole Balkan experience, and particularly Kosovo War in 1998, demonstrated EU Member States' inability to respond a security challenge in their own backyard, the Balkans, and also showed their reliance on the United States' military capabilities for crisis management and major shortfalls in European defence capabilities. In this sense, the Kosovo experience can be accepted as both a 'catalyst' for a new transatlantic bargain and a more autonomous European role.⁴⁴ Another key factor was the policy change of Britain because of the New Labor Government's coming to power and British Prime Minister Tony Blair's ambition to become more influential member inside the EU.⁴⁵

Mathiopoulos and Gyarmati stated that there were three additional factors for the change in attitudes towards autonomous European defence. First of them was the arrival of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and it made the Europeans more receptive and willing to the idea of common defence. Second additional factor was the industrial imperative to consolidate the European defence and create an important incentive for defence cooperation. The last one was the lack of 'strategic vision' or determination of most of European nations to respond to the new threats that would emerge in the 21st century.⁴⁶

⁴⁴Yıldız, op.cit., p.14.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 24

⁴⁶ Margarita Mathiopoulos and Istvan Gyarnati, "Saint Malo and Beyond: Toward European Defense", Washington Quarterly, (Vol. 22, Iss.4, 1999), pp. 67-68

According to them, it is not coincidental that France and the UK took the lead on the St. Malo initiative, since they are the only two countries in Europe with some degree of strategic vision and doctrine, and also with national interests beyond Europe's borders and military capabilities to support these interests.⁴⁷

At the **EU Summit in Cologne in June 1999**, the European Council decided about establishment of autonomous capacity for performance of the Petersberg tasks, and stated “the Union must have the *capacity for autonomous action*, backed by *credible military forces*, the means to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO”.⁴⁸ Thus, the EU Member States agreed on utilization of resources and skills of all member states disregarding whether they are non-aligned or members of NATO. The terms as “conflict prevention” and “crisis management” were first articulated in official EU documents as linked to the Petersberg Tasks.⁴⁹

In this sense, Cologne Summit has initiated the institutionalization stage of the ESDP by identifying four main bodies to be set up within the EU. These bodies will form the core of the decision-making mechanism of the future ESDP:⁵⁰

- At the Ministerial level the *General Affairs Council (GAC)*, composed of foreign-affairs ministers would be in charge.
- The *Political and Security Committee (PSC)* would be the key body to prepare ministers' decisions.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Quoted in, “EU Crisis Response Capabilities An Update”, ICG Group Issues Briefing, (29 April 2002), p. 6, available online at www.crisisweb.org

⁴⁹ Antonio Missiorili, “Background of ESDP (1954-1999)”, the EU Institute for Security Studies, <http://www.iss-eu.org> accessed on 01.01.2006

⁵⁰ Bağcı, op.cit. in note 41, p. 59

- A *Military Committee (MC)* would formulate advice on military matters.
- A *EU Military Staff (MS)* of more than 100 officers will inform and prepare the deliberations of the Military Committee and PSC on defence-related issues.

These bodies correspond to the respective institutional mechanism of NATO, which was conceived to be an influential factor in facilitating the effective functioning of the bilateral cooperation between NATO and the EU.⁵¹ On the other hand, the Cologne European Council Declaration put an emphasis on the development of necessary arrangements that allow non-EU European NATO Members to ensure their fullest possible involvement in EU-led operations.

One of the most significant aspects of the Cologne Summit is the decision of the full integration of WEU into the EU. In accordance with this decision, WEU has fulfilled its mission and put an end to its functionality in May 2000.⁵²

The Institutional features of the ESDP have been developed through an evolutionary process within the scope of the successive EU summit meetings in Helsinki, Feira, Nice and Laeken.

ESDP progressed rapidly and went one step further in the **Helsinki Summit in December 1999** and has defined a ‘Headline Goal’ for ‘Rapid Reaction Force’ for improving necessary military assets to carry out full range of Petersberg operations.

The Headline Goal can be regarded as the reflection of the EU ambition of improving military and civil capacities to take effective action as an international

⁵¹Bağcı, op.cit. in note 41, p. 11

⁵²Ibid

actor.⁵³ In other words, it can be accepted as a key document for military and civilian crisis management of the EU.

The European Headline Goal gave member states the task of achieving, *by 2003, the capability to deploy force of up to 50.000-60.000 persons, capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks, will be deployable within 60 days and sustainable for at least 1 year.*⁵⁴ This new EU force is named as Rapid Reaction Force. It is established for carrying out Petersberg tasks, which can be either in or outside the Europe. Therefore, Rapid Reaction Force is able to operate areas other than Europe like Africa and Middle East.

The Article 28 of the Helsinki Presidency Conclusion stated also that new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework; and modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States. Regarding the position of non-EU European NATO members, it was concluded that “...while respecting the Union’s decision-making autonomy, appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow non-EU European NATO members and other interested states to contribute to the EU military crisis management.”⁵⁵

At the Helsinki Summit in 1999, EU member states agreed on cooperation voluntarily in EU-led operations and establishment of new political and military

⁵³ “Effective Crisis Management A Challenge for the EU”, EU Info, (No. 8, July 2000), available online at www.utrikes.regeringen.se/eu

⁵⁴ See Helsinki EU Presidency Conclusions, www.europe.eu.int, particularly Art. 28

⁵⁵ Ibid

bodies and structures to ensure necessary political guidance and strategic action. However, the phrase ‘without prejudice to actions by NATO’ stated in the Cologne Summit was replaced by the phrase ‘where NATO as a whole isn’t engaged’.⁵⁶ According to Hagman, this wording ensures autonomous action of the EU since the EU can conduct operations without resorting to NATO assets.⁵⁷

Towards the end of 1999, the European states conducted an audit of assets and capabilities available for Petersberg tasks. As a result of this audit, weakness of the European forces was identified. In this sense, it was observed that military strategic lift, limited capabilities in intelligence provision at strategic and military levels, air mobility and deficiencies in the military civil coordination as the main point of weakness.⁵⁸ Thus it was recognized that while European forces were able to conduct ‘a small, high intensity operation and any lower intensity conventional military operations.’⁵⁹ Later, the EU reaffirmed its decisiveness to fulfill Headline Goal at the Santa Maria de Feira European Council.

At the **Feira European Council of June 2000**, the European Heads of State and Government decided that in times of crisis management and humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, and in the case of recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, the decision-making capacity would be within the EU’s authority.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Ibid. Art. 27.

⁵⁷ Hans-Christian Hagman, “European Crisis Management and Defence: The Search for Capabilities”, *Adelphi Paper*, (Oxford: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 353, 2002) p. 20

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.18-19

⁵⁹ Ibid. p.20

⁶⁰ Bağcı, op.cit. in note 41, p. 59

Regarding the non-EU European NATO members' position, the Feira Summit has been instrumental in its attempt to respond to the demands of them towards a greater degree of participation in the ESDP mechanisms by taking steps to streamline decision-making procedures and introducing guidelines for the management of military operations.

On the other hand, before this summit, the European states had conducted an audit of assets and capabilities available for Petersberg tasks. As a result of this audit, weakness of the European forces was identified. In this sense, it was observed that military strategic lift, limited capabilities in intelligence provision at strategic and military levels, air mobility and deficiencies in the military civil coordination as the main point of weakness.⁶¹ Thus it was recognized that while European forces were able to conduct 'a small, high intensity operation and any lower intensity conventional military operations.'⁶²

In November 2001, the EU Foreign and Defense Ministers arranged the Capabilities Improvement Conference to review the gap between actual capabilities and required capabilities for crisis management. In this conference, member states pointed out that they met around two thirds of the 144 capability requirement and 20 of them were remained unsolved. In terms of military capabilities, the EU members reaffirmed existence of a pool of more than 100,000 troops, 400 combat aircraft and 100 ships. Despite the current capability shortfalls, the conference concluded the need for improvement in commitment capability, logistics, operational mobility and flexibility of forces. Moreover, the member states agreed on strengthening the

⁶¹ Ibid., p.18-19

⁶² Ibid., p.20

qualitative aspect of European armed forces. This conference gave rise to the Helsinki Force Catalogue (HFC) that outlined the current sum of national commitments. The HFC involved only part of the EU's 1.8 million soldiers, 160 destroyers and frigates, 75 tactical submarines and 3300 plus combat aircraft in 2000.⁶³

On the other side, EU member states adopted a voluntary European Capability Action Plan, which had the purpose of 'incorporation of all investment, development and coordination measures for improving existing resources and developing capabilities for the EU's activities.'⁶⁴ The Plan was proposed by Netherlands. It isn't a detailed plan; it sets up guiding principles and mechanisms. The main principles of the Action Plan are as follows:

- Increasing military cooperation between member states and enhancing effectiveness and efficiency of European military capability efforts
- A bottom up approach to European defense cooperation, voluntary contribution of member states resting on national decisions
- Coordination within the EU and cooperation with NATO to avoid duplication
- Providing the public with a clear vision to gain broad public support.

The Action Plan can be regarded as an impetus for the achievement of Helsinki Headline Goal by inducing them to make more contribution to the EU forces, increasing effectiveness of current capabilities.⁶⁵

⁶³ Hagman, op.cit., p. 21

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.24

⁶⁵ *European Security Review*, Number 1, p.2 available at www.isis-eu.org

Despite the fact that European Capability Action Plan provided important platform for the assessment of requirements and increasing coordination, member states tended to concern with projects which they have an explicit interest.⁶⁶

In addition to improvement of military capabilities, the institutional framework for the EU crisis management was arranged and new political and military structures have been established in March 2000 and made permanent in January 2001. In this sense, the main structures of the EU crisis management are Political and Security Committee (PSC), EU Military Committee, EU Military Staff. These new political and military structures work in close cooperation and subordinate to existing structures like the European Council, General Affairs and COREPER Political and Security Committee. EU Military Committee makes recommendations to the Political and Security Committee and provides coordination of the EU military staff. EU military staff is responsible for providing military expertise and conducting EU-led military crisis management operations.⁶⁷

2.2.4. Nice Treaty

The Nice Treaty was signed on 26 February 2001 by fifteen Member States and entered into force on 1 February 2003 after ratification of the Treaty by all Member States. The Nice Treaty made a few arrangements concerning the CFSP and therefore, it was argued that the Nice Treaty attempted to address much of unfinished business of Amsterdam.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Hagman, op.cit., pp. 24-25

⁶⁷ See Ibid., p. 24- 25 and “EU Crisis Management Capabilities: An Update”, op.cit., p. 7

⁶⁸ Kaya, op.cit., p. 124

At Nice, the Member States agreed that NATO should maintain control of military planning while new Rapid Reaction Force would be guaranteed access to NATO assets for 'peacekeeping' and 'peacemaking' missions.

Firstly, provisions defining relations between the WEU and the EU have been removed from the TEU and the EU itself arranges the defence aspects of the CFSP.

Secondly, with the Article 25 of the Nice Treaty, Political Committee was replaced by Political and Security Committee and tasked with exercising under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations.

Thirdly, the use of QMV was extended to two more CFSP areas in addition to areas agreed at Amsterdam; in appointment of a special representative with a mandate for particular foreign policy issues and in concluding an agreement with non-member states or international organizations when implementing a joint action or common position. Finally, the most important innovation brought by the Nice Treaty was the extension of enhanced cooperation, which was previously established in the area of JHA, to the CFSP.

In short, the main contribution of Nice Treaty to the CFSP was simplification of existing arrangements especially rules on enhanced cooperation and clarification of new obligations in more detail.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 126. See also, Missiroli op.cit., p. 192

Since the launch of the CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty, there have become successive developments in the CFSP. From the Maastricht Treaty to the Nice Treaty, European foreign policy evolved step by step and transformed from ‘foreign and security policy’ to the ‘security and defence policy’. However, the CFSP process has been continuing and the EU Member States have been furthering their efforts in reforming the CFSP and making the EU an effective actor in ever-changing international security agenda.

2.3. The European Convention framework

The Laeken Declaration of the European Council in December 2001 became the catalyst for the European Convention. The Declaration pointed out that the EU faced with new security environment where religious fanaticism, ethnic nationalism, racism and terrorism were the new threats. Thus, the EU must play a significant role in searching for ways for providing stability and promoting democracy, the respect for human rights. The Laeken Declaration gave the mandate for the Convention on the Future of Europe.

Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the former French President, became the President of the Convention and Jean-Luc Dehaene and Giuliano Amato, the former Italian Prime Minister were the two Vice Presidents. Convention involved 109 members who were the representatives of national governments, national parliaments, the European Parliament, the European Commission and a small number of observers and representatives of candidate states. These members worked for a draft Constitution for the Union through the working groups and plenary sessions.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ Fraser Cameron, “The Convention and Common Foreign and Security Policy” *EPC Working Paper*, 2003, pp.7-9

The Convention of the Future of Europe was formed in 2002 for dealing with the problems of coherence, effectiveness and legitimacy that would emerge with the accession of ten new members to the EU in 2004.

The Convention ended its work in June 2003 and produced a 'Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe'. In its essence, the convention is a kind of exercise for self-definition and institutional reform of the EU. It has focused on the purpose of the EU, the allocation of power within the EU and EU decision-making structure.⁷¹ Moreover, the Convention was an instrument for the achievement of more democratic, more transparent and more efficient Union through the simplification and rearrangement of the existing treaties. Additionally, the problems of enlargement of the Union were also held.

In order to enhance effectiveness of the ESDP, France and Germany jointly proposed the transformation of the ESDP into 'European Security and Defence Union' in November 2002. Afterwards, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg prepared a proposal to make contribution to the reform debate on the CFSP and the ESDP with emphasize on flexibility. As a result of the Convention on the Future of Europe, Working Groups drafted reform proposals in their fields. The final report of the Working group on defence stressed on the 'flexibility'. Flexibility covers the flexible forms of decision-making and participation in operations and so it can be considered a solution to the tension between keeping unanimity, and ensuring effectiveness.

⁷¹ Steven Everts & Daniel Keohane, "The European Convention and EU Foreign Policy: Learning From Failure", *Survival* (Vol. 45, No. 3, Autumn 2003), p.167-168.

In the draft Constitutional Treaty the elements of flexibility in ESDP has been stated as follows: According to Article I-40(3), EU member states may make their multinational forces available to the CFSP. Article I-40(5), Article III-211 and Article I-40(1) stated that the Council may give responsibility to the conduction of tasks like crisis management operations to a group of countries. Article I-40 (5) and Article III-211 regulated the establishment of a European Armaments and Strategic Research Agency that would be open to the participation of all member states.⁷²

Moreover, the Article I-41(6) and Article III-312 of the Constitution initiated a new formation within the ESDP, which is called as “Permanent Structured Cooperation”. According to these articles, member states must have an adequate level of defence expenditure, take concrete measure to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of their armed forces, and commit resources to address shortfalls identified by the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) mechanism. The real purposes are to encourage coordination of the identification of military needs, to specialize national defence and to pool capabilities. Therefore, if implemented, permanent structured cooperation could offer a precious framework in which to change the dynamics of European defence.⁷³

Another initiative, which relates to the permanent structured cooperation, is the European Defence Agency (EDA). Its main objective is to support the member states in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management. The Agency is to promote equipment collaboration, research and technology projects and procurement.

⁷² Udo Diedrichs and Mathias Jopp, “ Flexible Modes of Governance: Making CFSP and ESDP Work”, *International Spectator*, (Vol.XXXVIII, No.3, 2003), pp.20-24

⁷³ Jean-Yves Haine, “Military Matters- ESDP Transformed?” available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/english/military.html> accessed on 16.12.2006

During the work of the European Convention in 2002-2003, new proposals intended to “push ESDP closer to a ‘real’ defence going beyond *ad hoc* cooperation in crisis management”. Among the proposals, the development of a ‘solidarity’ principle, which can be invoked to provide collective assistance against a terrorist attack, gained support. The concept of solidarity seemed appropriate due to the fact that it could involve actions in all dimensions of human and functional security.⁷⁴

In this sense, the Convention made a distinction between the ‘solidarity clause’ and ‘mutual defence’. While the former applies to terrorist attacks, natural or man-made disasters, the latter refers to traditional territorial defence against armed aggression.

During the Convention, the divergence of views became apparent among the Atlanticists, neutral and non-aligned states and Europeanists. The ‘Atlanticist’ group composed of the United Kingdom, Portugal, the Netherlands and Spain aimed at prevention of undermining the role of NATO. As a result, the statement that foresees ‘a common defence *in* the EU and a mutual defence among a group of member states’ included. The neutral and non-aligned countries were wary of the extension of the EU’s defence role due to the likelihood of negative knock-on effects for the EU support in these countries. The Europeanists advocated an assertive role for the EU in the security and defence realm and supported the further development of European autonomy in these areas.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Alyson J.K. Bailes, “The Institutional Reform of ESDP and Post Prague”, *International Spectator*, (Vol.XXXVIII, No.3, 2003), pp.33-35

⁷⁵ Simon Duke, “The Convention, the Draft Constitution and External Relations: Effects and Implications for the EU and Its International Role”, *Working Paper* (European Institute of Public Administration, 2003/2). pp. 21-26

The draft constitution viewed the CSDP as an integral part of the CFSP. Concerned to CSDP, the Petersberg tasks were expanded to involve ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization’. [Article III 210] Thus, the scope of Petersberg tasks reflected employment of both civilian and military means. In this sense, the EU’s military operations of Concordia in the former Republic of Macedonia and Artemis in Congo took place within the broadened scope of the Petersberg tasks. As a result of these experiences, the EU endorsed the “Battle Group” concept, which is based on a “quick-in, quick out” capability to restore order in any crisis situations. This concept can also be accepted as an indirect outcome of flexibility principle.

CHAPTER-3

THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE EU IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA: THE EU'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY

Military security crises in international politics have occurred from the earlier times, but definition and perception of crisis has changed in time. While crisis as a concept was defined narrowly in the Cold War period, it has depicted more generally in the Post Cold War period. Because, rather than political or ideological hostilities and confrontations, local and regional crises and broad scale violence has taken place in international politics in the Post Cold War era.⁷⁶ Thus, response of military-security crisis has gained importance. In this respect, while the EC, then the EU, pursued reactionary policy and took the side of more powerful states during 1980s, it has began to improve its crisis management capabilities beginning from the 1990s. Particularly, international crises of Gulf and Yugoslavia became catalyst for the development of EU crisis response capability.

For the purpose of this thesis, this chapter deals with the EU Crisis Management with a view to both military and civilian aspect. In this chapter, after mentioning the definition of crisis management in general, the military and civilian crises management capabilities will be analyzed.

⁷⁶ Joakko Blomberg, "Non –Military Crisis Management as a Security Means in the EU' in The EU Civilian Crisis Management, Graeme P. Herd and Jouko Huru eds (Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst 2001

Since the EU's international actorness and crisis management capabilities during Iraqi crisis and the following war in Iraq will be analyzed in the following chapter, this chapter covers the crisis management until the period of Iraqi crisis.

3.1. Definition of Crisis Management

Crisis, which may escalate to war, are seen in international system frequently, but emergence of crisis management in the field of International Relations does not go back earlier. Generally speaking, crisis management came into the agenda of International Relations after the Second World War. In other words, close linkage between crisis and war led scholars to study the phenomenon of crisis. Having seen the devastating effects of the two world wars, scholars began to deal with means of avoidance of war. Later on, Cuban missile crisis⁷⁷ in 1962 was highly influential in the development of literature on this issue.⁷⁸

Before the definition of crisis management, we must shed light on what crisis is. Although crisis is associated with conflict or war, the turmoil in politics, international disputes, incidents or rebellions can be regarded as crisis. Broadly speaking, crisis is a general term for denoting disruption and disorder. However, the essence of international crisis is the change or increase in intensity of disruptive interactions, which involves probability of military hostilities. The change or increase in intensity can be stem from a threatening statement, an economic act, a trade embargo, nonviolent military act such as movement of troops etc. Therefore,

⁷⁷ Cuban missile crisis emerged with Soviet installation of medium range nuclear missile in Cuba. President Kennedy gave an ultimatum to Khrushchev for removal of Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba. In return for this removal Kennedy promised that America wouldn't invade the island. During 13 days of Cuban crises, the confrontation between Kennedy and Khrushchev brought the world edge of nuclear war. For details see Kissinger Henry, Diplomacy, (New York: TouchStone), 1994 p.612

⁷⁸ Gilbert Winham, "Introduction" in New Issues in International Crisis Management, Winham R. Gilbert. (ed), (London: Westview Press, 1998), p.ix

disruptive interaction can lead to violence, high tension and disruption.⁷⁹ While international crisis includes conflict situation, every conflict does not involve crisis. International crises may take place both within and outside conflicts.⁸⁰ It is also seen that crisis take place due to minor or serious clashes without violence. For instance, the crisis emerged with Iraq's threat to Kuwait's territorial integrity in 1961 after Kuwait attained independence was without violence.⁸¹

On the other side, international crises are generally associated with acts, events or changes that take place before the outbreak of military hostilities. In line with this, Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing defined international crises as a 'a sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of a high probability of war.'⁸² The recent Iraq crisis lasted until the US-led war in Iraq can be accepted as a latest example for this definition because the US administration had treated Iraqi administration basing on its unproven arguments like that Al-Qaeda and Iraq had a common interest in wanting to damage the US as much as possible; Saddam had collaborated with Al-Qaeda, and he may have given his weapons of mass destruction to terrorists.

Within this context, crisis management is identified with measures, precautions for the prevention of outbreak of war. As Hanspeter Neuhold puts: 'a crisis can be regarded as managed if its intensity has so far been reduced that major

⁷⁹Michael Brecher, Crisis in World Politics, (Britain: Pergamon Press, 1993) p.3

⁸⁰ Ibid. p.4

⁸¹ Ibid. p.5

⁸² James Richardson, "Crisis Management –A Critical Appraisal" in New Issues in International Crisis Management, Winham R. Gilbert. (ed), (London: Westview Press,1998), p.14

armed hostilities can reasonably be ruled out'.⁸³ According to Ali Dessouki, crisis management research should not assume that crisis avoidance or de-escalation is necessarily a desirable goal of all participants and it does not necessarily mean the avoidance of the use of force or managing a crisis does not always mean deescalating it but the concept 'management' refers to "a way of handling or success in accomplishing one's objectives".⁸⁴

Considering the above definitions in the EU's context, we face with European Union crisis management, which is mostly regarded with EU's efforts of conflict prevention. Broadly speaking, conflict prevention is concerned with identification and determination of the sources of disputes and trouble. However, it does not mean that intervention to an intra state or interstate conflict. There are internationally recognized rules for dealing with these situations.⁸⁵ From European point of view, Hans-Christian Hagman described the conflict prevention as the use of non-military or civilian instruments 'for stabilizing a state or region in the pre-crisis phase'. For him, the main instruments of conflict prevention are as follows: "preventive diplomacy, defense diplomacy, observer missions, intelligence sharing promotion of Human Rights and democracy."⁸⁶

Moreover, Hanna Ojanen argued that development of EU's crisis management had mainly two objectives; increasing international role of the EU and giving a foothold for particular interests or countries. With regard to first purpose, crisis management is a stepping-stone for the EU to become an effective actor in

⁸³ Ibid., p. 15

⁸⁴ Cited in Ibid., p.16-17

⁸⁵ Blomberg, op.cit., p. 12

⁸⁶ Hagman, op.cit., p.116

international foreign and security realm. Therefore, EU's crisis management can be seen as the initial stage for further integration in foreign policy and concrete manifestation of the EU as a security actor. In terms of second purpose, crisis management has allowed the UK has a foot inside the EU.⁸⁷

In accordance with the main argument of this thesis, it will be helpful to analyze the EU's crisis management into two parts; military and civilian crisis management. According to Hagman, while military crisis management refers to traditional peace support operations, from preventive deployment and peace keeping to armed intervention and peace enforcement, humanitarian and evacuation operations and civil protections tasks, civilian crisis management is concerned with four areas: police, the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection.⁸⁸

3.2. Military Aspect of the EU's Crisis Management

Although the EU's engagement with crisis management does not go back earlier, EU has made a good progress to improve itself for reacting crisis more quickly. Nonetheless, crisis management is a longer undertaking and it can be realized if it is supported by credible military capabilities.

With regard to military capabilities, EU's ambition of Rapid Reaction Force that was deployable in 60 days and sustainable for up to a year was intended to prevent and manage military crisis. In this sense, EU would be able to carry out small scale Petersberg missions involving a few thousand troops. As EU declared at Laeken Summit:

⁸⁷ Hanna Ojanen, "The Future of European Crisis Management –A Critical Perspective' in the EU Civilian Crisis Management", Graeme P. Herd and Jouko Huru (eds) (Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst 2001) p.58

⁸⁸ Hagman op.cit., p. 116

...Through the continuing development of the ESDP, the strengthening of capabilities, both civil and military, and the creation of appropriate structures within it and following the military and police Capability Improvement Conferences held in Brussels on 19 November 2001, the Union is now capable of conducting some crisis management operations. The Union is determined to finalize swiftly arrangements with NATO. These will enhance the EU's capabilities to carry out crisis management operations over the whole range of Petersberg tasks...⁸⁹

For the foreseeable future, it is expected that the EU's military operational capabilities would increase dramatically. In this connection, France and most probably Germany would have completed their military crisis management. So it is high likely that the 2003 Headline Goal will be fulfilled by 2010 and the EU Member States will essentially be capable of performing all the military tasks that fall explicitly within the Petersberg spectrum, including peace enforcement. However there is a need for development of existing capabilities, the military capability is not up to desirable level. Decisiveness of the UK, France, Germany and the other EU member states to improve and better coordinate their efforts to produce enhanced capabilities and achieve an increase in the substantial level of European contributions.⁹⁰

In terms of military capabilities, logistic shortages such as lack of sufficient airlift and sealift, transportable docks, communications, equipment and headquarters, intelligence gathering satellites, aircraft constitute main deficiencies.⁹¹

As it is seen, military capabilities are not sufficient for sustained long-term operations. The obstacle for development of necessary military capabilities is the budgetary allocations for defense. The Western European Defense budget still does

⁸⁹ Cited in ICG Issues Briefing, op.cit., p.8

⁹⁰ Hagman. op.cit., p.101

⁹¹ Charles Grant, 'A European View of ESDP' in The EU's Rapid Reaction Capability, (Brussels: ESF Working Paper, 2001) p. 7-8

not match with the US. According to the ISS's strategic survey 2000-2001, members of the EU reduced their defense spending from \$178 billion in 1997 to estimate \$ 147 billion in 2001. However, the figures of NATO that relied on constant countries increased marginally from \$184 billion to \$190 billion.⁹² Moreover, data of the Military Balance 2003/2004 reports on defence budgets reveals that European defence spending remains far behind that of the US. In 2003, the US spent more than twice as much on defence as the 25 EU Member States combined. While the US defence budget increased from \$362,10 billion in 2002 to \$382,60 billion, the EU defence budget became \$173,46 billion in 2002.⁹³ It shows that the transatlantic gap is likely to widen even more in military aspects.

The other dimension of military capabilities of the EU's crisis management is the reconciliation of different interests of member states. In a crisis situation, it is high likely that member states have different interests. For example, EU played a marginal military role in recent Afghanistan crisis. At the Laeken Summit, the EU member states were not able to reach a consensus about sending EU army to the Afghanistan. Thus there was no joint EU crisis management presence in Afghanistan. EU states contributed to International Security Force (ISAF) on an individually.⁹⁴ More interesting than the Afghanistan case, recent Iraq operation of the US created disunity in the EU. The EU did not develop a common stance against Iraq crisis because five member states-Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Spain and UK – acted with the side of the US.

⁹² Ibid., p.8-9

⁹³ Burkard Schmitt, "Defence Expenditure", *The EU Institute for Security Studies*, (July 2004), pp. 1-5

⁹⁴ See ICG Issue Briefing, op.cit., p. 3

In the light of these points, we can conclude that although EU's quest for improving its crisis management indicates EU's desire for being an internationally active and responsible actor, capability–expectation gap exist in terms of military capabilities. Present capabilities of the EU do not meet growing expectations of environment. In this respect, the EU still has along way to go for increasing its crisis response capability.

Since the military aspect of the EU's crisis management is mostly linked with the realization of Headline Goal, the initial problems of the military aspect of the EU's Crisis Management can be seen in the framework of the first Headline Goal Project.

The Headline Goal is a political project that based on compromise between Britain and France and aimed to build up of a Rapid Reaction Force composed of 60.000 troops by the end of 2003. Particularly, the lessons drawn from Kosovo crisis of 1999 were influential in setting up this goal. However, most of the EU member states have their own domestic interpretation of the Headline Goal.⁹⁵ The major problems of the first Headline Goal can be seen as *sustainability, readiness, combat intensity and complexity* and *self-sustainability*.

With regard to *sustainability*, main challenge to the Headline Goal stems from the availability and rotation of troops. Because, containment of 60.000 soldiers for one year necessitates at least 120.000 troops on the group in addition to air and navy constituents. Moreover, this number can rise up to 180.000-240.000 in relation with the specific mission and minimum 240.000 soldiers would be employed in operations lasts more than one year. As it is seen, the realization of the Headline

⁹⁵ Ibid. p. 38-39

Goal means employment of substantial part of Europe's assets and military capabilities.⁹⁶ In this sense, main obstacle for containment of the new European Force is the national priorities. It seems that other than the UK and France are not able to contribute rapid reaction force substantially.⁹⁷ The Deployment of 60.000 troops within 60 days is another challenging issue because even the NATO was not able to deploy a corps-sized formation to Albania and Macedonia despite the full support of US strategic lift. In this sense, EU member states will likely face with problems for deployment of effective and coordinated multinational force in a 60-day period.⁹⁸

Another problematic area with regard to Headline Goal is *self-sustainability* of Rapid Reaction Force with all the intelligence, transport and command and control capabilities. In this sense, it is not expected that the EU will have credible intelligence input or output for strategic decision-making, operational assessment or operational command for the near future. Therefore, EU Member States seems to be depended on US intelligence capabilities.⁹⁹

Scarcity of EU's assets and capabilities for autonomous strategic decision making planning and intelligence is the other problem. In this sense, decision-making capability for intergovernmental crisis management is not very effective. The decision-making capability is in a 'work in a progress' stage. Coordinating the ESDP

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 30

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 36

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.51

structures and member states decision-making units are very crucial for the success of EU crisis management.¹⁰⁰

3.3. Civilian Crisis Management

In Europe of today, security in the traditional, narrow sense is not threatened, except for some ethnic conflicts in the certain regional and local contexts. Therefore, instead of absence of war, peace and security can be defined now as ‘a web of interaction and co-operation, as the fulfillment of common and positive goals and prevention of fundamental conflicts of interest’.¹⁰¹ In the ever-changing security environment, nowadays focus is increasingly on fighting against ‘low’ security problems including terrorism, regional conflicts, international crime, trans-border criminality, drug trafficking, illegal flow of money, goods and people, communicable diseases, environmental hazards and so on.

The European Union has realized the transformation of the crisis issues from the traditional military sense emerging from ideological confrontations to the regional ethnic-based conflicts and other more specific threats mentioned above. These new issues have also become the bases of the civilian crisis management of the EU while it has a complementary characteristic to the military crisis management. Then, the EU vested interest in preserving peace and security in its neighborhood and beyond, it is by nature interested in peace and security in the comprehensive sense. In its vocabulary, ‘stability’ is a key word and closely connected with political, social and economic transition. It can be said that the Union

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p.50

¹⁰¹ Blomberg, op.cit., p.11

aims at spreading its own image, which is based on democracy, peace, freedom and justice.

Taking into consideration these new threats or challenges, civilian crisis management came into agenda of the EU within the CFSP. In Helsinki Summit, non-military or civilian instruments of crisis management and conflict prevention were mentioned, though they were not directly linked to the Headline Goal. In recognition of the EU's comparative advantage in this area, member states agreed that "A non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the member states."¹⁰² After determining basic idea regarding the civilian crisis management, at the EU Summit at Santa Maria da Faria in June 2000, the EU decided to focus on four aspects of civilian crisis management: Police, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection.¹⁰³

POLICE:

The EU policing is the most developed of the four civilian crisis management areas and it has been still developing since the Feira Summit. In Feira Summit, EU members made it their goal to provide up to 5,000 police officers for international missions by 2003, with 1,400 available at 30 days' notice.¹⁰⁴

The Police Action Plan (PAP) agreed at the Göteborg Summit in June 2001 called for the establishment of operational headquarters, interoperability criteria,

¹⁰² Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Helsinki, 10 –11 December 1999

¹⁰³ Following the successive experiences, a Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference was held on 22 November 2004 and in this conference, the quantitative targets set in Feira in June 2000 had been exceeded. Voluntary member state commitments of personnel number 5761 in the area of police, 631 for the rule of Law, 565 for civilian administration and 4988 in the area of civil protection.

¹⁰⁴ Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Santa Maria da Faria, 19 –20 June 2000

training programs, the development of interfaces with military and other civilian components of crisis management and the development of a legal framework for the police operations. Since then, the development of common concepts, command-and-control arrangements, selection and training criteria, compatible equipment lists and guidelines has made significant progress. This development of common European standards and training will eventually enhance internal police and civil-emergency cooperation within the EU. On the other hand, the development of *gendarmerie*-type heavy police has made little progress on the European Level, but the value of such capabilities is likely to increase for counter-terrorist operations where traditional police forces are too weak and military combat forces too provocative or expensive.

By the EU Seville Summit in June 2002, further progress was made in implementing the Police Action Plan and in civil protection/emergency relief. The non-military aspects of ESDP became more prominent, and the link between civilian and military crisis management capabilities was reinforced. Guidelines for the command and control structure in EU police operations, an EU concept for police planning, and concepts for police substitution missions and for missions to strengthen local police have been developed and submitted to the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Further work has been carried out regarding selection and training criteria in member states, as well as on equipment criteria, for police missions. Regarding these issues, a seminar on “the Role of European Police in Civil Crisis Management” took place in La Toja on 11-13 March 2002.

As a concrete example, the EU was able to offer the UN help in improving its guidelines and, on 1st January 2003, the EU took over the UN police missions in Bosnia, with almost 500 officers from more than thirty countries (the 15 EU Member

States as well as 18 countries) make up the mission. This is called as the European Union Police Mission (EUPM), which was established for a duration of three years, sought to establish sustainable policing arrangements in accordance with best European and international practice. It does so in particular through monitoring, monitoring and inspection activities.¹⁰⁵

RULE OF LAW:

During the first half of 2001, civilian crisis management overshadowed the military elements of the ESDP, and the scope of EU crisis management and conflict prevention was significantly broadened. Members committed themselves to an additional pool of 200 officials for crisis-management operations (judges, prosecutors and correction officers) to supplement the police and to assist the establishment of the rule of law in crises situations. In 16 May 2002, the Rule of Law Capabilities Commitment Conference was held and it confirmed that the concrete targets set at Göteborg for member states to develop their capacity to deploy officials for public prosecution; courts and detention activities have been met. Member states have pledged a combined total of 282 ‘Rule of Law’ officials for crisis management operations. Of these 60 officials will be deployable within 30 days and 43 will be provided for the purposes of fact-finding missions. These contributions include 72 judges, 48 prosecutors, 38 administration services, 72 penitentiary system officials and 34 others.¹⁰⁶ At present these figures remain paper commitments. The capabilities development process and modalities for their deployment are yet to be worked through.

¹⁰⁵ <http://ue.eu.int/pesc>

¹⁰⁶ Hagman, *op.cit.*, pp. 26-27. Quoted in “Progress in Building ESDP Capabilities”, ICG Group Issues Briefing, (No 13, July 2002), pp.5-6 available online at www.crisisweb.org

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION:

The area of civil administration is the least developed of the EU's four priority areas in civilian crisis management. EU members agreed to create a pool of experts in civil administration, ranging from elections and taxation to health services and waste management. A set of basic guidelines for transitional administration in the context of crisis management has been developed and considered by the Political and Security Committee (PSC). EU member states decided at Göteborg and Seville summits to develop common standards and modules for training, and common exercises. Since Seville summit, national training centers have been developing training modules and pilot courses for civilian administration and rule of law experts.¹⁰⁷

CIVIL PROTECTION:

Civil protection is a third-pillar issue and involves adapting EU-internal civil protection mechanisms for crisis management. The main procedural development in this field was the agreement that the Community Mechanism to facilitate reinforced co-operation in Civil Protection assistance interventions by member states could be utilized for crisis management operations. This mechanism was established by a Council decision of 23 October 2001. It can be activated by EU Presidency to request civil protection assistance from member states regarding an emergency taking place outside the borders of the EU within the context of a crisis management operation. However, the practical coordination of such assistance with other EU activities and civil-military capabilities, and other international organizations and humanitarian actors on the ground remains to be worked through. After Göteborg and Seville

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

summit, concrete targets were established in this area; for example, it has been aimed to issue a call for contributions, aiming to reach the 2,000- people civil protection intervention teams target by 2003. However, the questions remain about the willingness of contributing countries to offer civil protection capabilities for use in high-risk security environments.¹⁰⁸ The Ministerial Civilian Crisis Management Capability Conference held on 19 November 2002 confirmed that the concrete targets in the priority areas had been exceeded through Member States' voluntary commitments. This was a major step forward in line with the Laeken declaration on operationality enabling the EU to take on a wide range of crisis management operations.¹⁰⁹

The TEU had asserted a role for the EU in the management of complex humanitarian crises by incorporating in its language the so-called 'Petersberg Tasks'. In order to meet these broader responsibilities, the two still evolving capabilities are proposed to develop: The Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), which is the military policy of the ESDP, and The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), which is the civilian policy. Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) is a relatively recent addition to the EU's crisis management toolbox. On 26 February 2001, the General Affairs Council (EU Foreign Ministers) adopted a Commission proposal for establishment of the RRM using existing Community instruments, including election monitoring, human rights initiatives, media support, institution building, border management, police training and provision of police equipment. The main purpose of the RRM is to deliver these and other instruments as short-term stabilizers. Moreover, RRM specifically include

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ <http://ue.eu.int/pesc>

‘humanitarian missions’, ‘emergency assistance, rehabilitation, and reconstruction RRM will be financed through a separate budget line of 40 million Euros per year.¹¹⁰ In the light of these missions and capability, the RRM was used five times in 2001: twice in Macedonia, once in Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and once to finance a mission to decide how to program conflict prevention action in Indonesia, Nepal and the Pacific. In 2002, the RRM focused on Afghanistan and some African countries’ peace process. It was stated that Commission officials has seen great potential for the RRM to become one of the EU’s principal crisis management tools by means of assessing its initial success.¹¹¹

3.4. Coordination Civilian and Military Crisis Management

Since the attacks in the US in September 2001, ESDP institutions have also fed into assessments of the terrorist threat and have begun to take some precautions against it. In this sense, ESDP processes, procedures and structures were tested in early 2002 in a crisis management exercise involving Brussels and all the EU member states¹¹². One of the main lessons of the exercise was need for stronger civil-military coordination. As it was mentioned previous part, the EU has faced the challenge of linking non-military (civilian) and military crisis management, and developing joint capabilities in order to broaden the range of tools for managing crisis.

¹¹⁰ Quoted in “The European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO): Crisis Management Response in the Grey Line” ICG Group Issues Briefing, (26 June 2002), p. 11, available online at www.crisisweb.org

¹¹¹ “EU Crisis Management Capabilities: An Update”, ICG Issue Briefing, (29 April 2002), p. 11

¹¹² The first EU crisis management exercise aimed at testing the decision-making procedures for ESDP and the co-ordination of the full range of its civilian and military instruments in the pre-decisional phase.

The relation between civilian method and the military method is crucial factor, but it will have to be determined according to the character and needs of the crisis at hand. In this sense, the crucial question is not whether civilian or military crisis management is preferred or not but it is how to ensure the coordination and cooperation among both way of crisis management in order to resolve a crisis and ensure stability and peace. In other words, there is a common idea that non-military methods are to be preferred as they are less expensive than military methods.¹¹³ The relative significance of the military and non-military instruments of crisis management depends on the nature of the situation. For example, if the crisis becomes violent, military means may be needed and if the crisis is originated from the ethnic kind or similar reason, non-military methods are needed. When the today's multi-dimensional crisis and their mostly negative results are taken to consideration, civilian methods will be a better option.¹¹⁴

On the other side, achieving crisis management in a proper sense, many of the instruments of the EU are still to be developed. As it is mentioned before, there are important instruments being developed in order to improve civilian and military crisis management within the CESDP. Therefore, it can be said that the EU will have a rich "tool box" when the CESDP is completed.¹¹⁵

Of course, there has to be efficient cooperation and coordination among the components of this toolbox. In this sense, the Political and Security Council must coordinate all elements of crisis management, including non-military components. The two elements should be inseparable in conceptual work, planning and operational

¹¹³ Blomberg, op.cit., p.13

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

command-and-control. However, currently, the EU lacks any kind of common-and-control arrangement for non-military operations and the division of labor between the Directorate-General for External Affairs, which has responsibility for police operations, and the Military Staff, which focused on operational military crisis management is not satisfactory.

As a conclusion, one can stress that a pointed distinction between the military and the civilian in crisis management is not useful. Close cooperation between the elements of crisis management would further enhance Europe's ability to employ its wide-defined power to the benefit of international peace and security. As it incorporated in the TEU as "Petersberg Tasks", "humanitarian and rescue tasks" and "peace-keeping tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making" have had to be coordinated under suitable institutions.

3.5. Debates on Financing Crisis Management

Crisis management financing has remained for a long time as one of the major institutional questions the agenda of EU. It will not be wrong to say that this debatable issue has not been solved yet despite the concrete steps at Seville European Council. Member states were negotiating which operational costs should have been common and collectively financed according to the established GNP scale¹¹⁶ and which should "lie where they fall".¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ According to GNP scale principle, each Member State pays a percentage of its GNP into the Community Budget.

¹¹⁷ Quoted in "Fixing EU Crisis Management Financing", ICG Group Issues Briefing, (No 8, October 2001), p.3-5, available online at www.crisisweb.org

Member states also considered new proposals to create a fund to fill in the gaps existing first and second pillar funding arrangements in order not to face financial obstacles in crisis management operations at the Göteborg European Council.

The Maastricht Treaty is the legal foundation for the CFSP and it established the Community budget is the primary source of CFSP funds. However, under Title V of the TEU draws a clear distinction with regard to the administrative costs and operational expenditure of the CFSP. The only military or defense related cost incurred during an operation that can be charged to the EU budget are the institutional administrative expenses.¹¹⁸ Hence, with the exception of civilian aspects such as policing, EU crisis management operations must be charged to the Member States. In fact, this has been problematic since the CFSP budget is not sufficient pay for large CFSP operations and member states have been reluctant to pay GNP-based contributions. Regarding the financing of joint action or other implementing measures, a unanimous decision by the Council will be necessary each time operational costs occur. In one example, budgetary disagreements between the EC and member states had emerged in the Joint Action on the administration of Mostar in the Balkans for years.

The Treaty of Amsterdam helped clarify some details of CFSP financing. This Treaty mentioned that the CFSP budget line could be used for financing actions such as the development of EU envoys, support for democratic transition processes, conflict prevention processes and disarmament assistance. The funds allocated to CFSP actions were, however, very limited compare with those that the Community

¹¹⁸ see Article J.11 (2) of the TEU.

had at its disposal for foreign relations. CFSP actions have often been accompanied by Community action implemented by the Commission. The Amsterdam Treaty also introduced two important qualifications to the rule of Community financing for CFSP. The first is that any expenditure arising from operation with military or defense implications can not be charged to the Community budget but must be financed by member states, through GNP-based contributions or voluntary contributions by participating states. Secondly, any member states that wished to obtain from a military action would not be required to finance it. It was mentioned as “constructive abstention in Article 28”¹¹⁹. However, this system of financing was seemed to have same weaknesses when applied to crisis management operations:

- The distinction between military and civilian operations was difficult to draw in crisis management operations. In those circumstances different arrangements for financing different aspects of an operation would be complicated and impractical.
- Member states have often interpreted differently what should be financed by the CFSP budget, by the member states and by the Community.
- The constructive abstention mechanism was seen to undermine solidarity and ultimately hinder the development of the ESDP.
- The proposal of creation of a fund for crisis management operations would break the Commission monopoly on budgetary matters and might damage the civilian crisis management.

¹¹⁹ **Constructive abstention** means that when a decision is adopted, a member state may couple its abstention with a formal declaration. In such case, it is not required to apply the decision but acknowledges that the decision is binding on the Union. For example, Denmark negotiated a specific protocol, which excludes its participation from all operations having defense and security implications.

After Amsterdam Treaty, there occurred important developments in ESDP funding at the Seville European Council. At this Council, an agreement on how to fund EU crisis management operations with military implications was presented. Before mentioning this agreement, it has to be known that there was a division among the member states on this issue. Such that; the Benelux countries, France and Greece were pushing for an expanded definition of “common costs” arguing that ESDP requires maximum solidarity with regard to the expenditure to be successful. On the other side, Germany, Britain and the neutral member states favored a broad application of the “costs lie where they fall” principle, so as to retain maximum national control over their contributions. After these disagreements, all member states agreed that certain operational costs such as administrative and infrastructure expenditure should be common. According to this agreement, common funding should apply to the incremental costs for headquarters and for force support costs.

In addition, the Council stated that whether the costs for ‘the transportation of the forces, the barracks and the lodging for the forces’ would be funded in common would be decided on a case-by-case basis. All other costs from those outlined would be considered as individual costs and financed on a “cost lie where they fall” basis.

When we look at funding civilian capabilities, it has been seen easily that funding civilian crisis management remained less developed and are complicated by the fact that the Commission has traditionally had a monopoly on funding civilian actions. Some member states argued that the military and civilian aspects of a crisis management operation should be handled and funded in an integrated manner through the 2nd pillar, and in accordance with the procedures for military operations.

Others maintained that civilian crisis management financing should be channeled through the Community budget.

Since the EU aims at creating its global role primarily within a broad regional framework, the Balkan wars of 1990s demonstrated the need to create independent crisis management capabilities for the EU. For example, the Kosovo crisis and its handling by the EU may be considered as a turning point in efforts to develop a security actorness of the EU.¹²⁰ The Kosovo peace process has firstly indicated that the EU could find an international role as only a partner of the US in military terms though the case occurred in Europe because the EU had a less influential role in building peace in the region by means of allocating economic assistance. Secondly, the case has become an evident that the EU will play a more important role in promoting social dimension of the process of economic globalization and it has to play a more decisive role within the framework of global trade. Finally, it was argued that the EU has to better define its security interests and to develop the CFSP, which contains the necessary defense capabilities for crisis management.¹²¹

The successive crisis events in Balkans during 1990s, Gulf crisis and Northern Iraq crisis in 1990-91 and resent Afghanistan crisis became the major examples that the EU's crisis management capability has remained insufficient especially in military terms. However, the EU's economic presence in these examples and even in the latest US-led war in Iraq cannot be ignored. The EU, being a global economic power, contributed to other countries and regions in terms of development cooperation, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction aid. Indeed, the

¹²⁰ Alpo M. Rusi, 'Europe's Changing Security Role' in *New Issues in International Crisis Management*, Winham R. Gilbert. (ed), (London: Westview Press,1998), p. 118

¹²¹ Ibid., pp. 119-120

EU and its member states today provide more than half the funds for international development aid and more than 50% of world aid to the Middle East (50% for the Palestinian Territories), almost 60% to Russia and the Republics arising out of the former Soviet Union, and 40% of the reconstruction effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this sense, it is necessary to explain briefly the EU's humanitarian aid authority, namely the European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)¹²², which is important for the civilian crisis management.

ECHO is the agency the Commission established in 6 November 1991 aftermaths of the Kurdish refugee crisis that followed the Gulf War and with the Yugoslav crisis beginning to appear. It was established to advise on and administer grant allocation for EU Humanitarian aid. The office operates under the overall administrative and policy supervision of the Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Poul Nielson. ECHO is based on a Commission regulation, which provides for expenditure through direct grants to NGOs, member states and international organizations.¹²³

Since its establishment, the two primary objectives of ECHO have been to improve internal coordination and efficiency in the delivery of emergence humanitarian aid and to improve external perceptions of the EU as an actor in the field of humanitarian assistance. In this sense, there are many possible objectives of EU humanitarian aid in addition to its core functions, which are relief, rehabilitation or protection operations. Some of them are providing aid and relief to people

¹²² The acronym ECHO derives from the earlier name of the European Community Humanitarian Office. Usage now varies but its most commonly used formal name is European Humanitarian Aid Office.

¹²³ Quoted in "The European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO): Crisis Management Response in the Grey Line", *op.cit.*, pp. 2-3

suffering from long lasting crisis, especially those arising from violent conflict, transporting of aid and (non-military) protection of humanitarian aid and workers, providing short-term rehabilitation and reconstruction, supporting of civil operations to protect victims of violence and so on.¹²⁴

3.6. Major Challenges of the EU's Civilian Crisis Management

Although the EU's military and non-military or civilian measures are still considered very important and efficient together with the measures of the US or NATO in order to protect stability in globalize international system, there are also five principal challenges facing EU civilian crises management¹²⁵:

1. Structural challenges: It is related to the internal rivalry between the European Council, the Secretary General of the Council of the EU/High Representative for CFSP (SG/HR).
2. Functional coordination challenges: It concerns the functional coordination of the vast array of CFSP/ESDP components across the three EU pillars and the various directorates, secretariats and power protection, are equally relevant for internal and external security, this could complicate coordination. In addition, decision-making procedures and the respective roles of member states and EU organs differ between the EU's various pillars.
3. Diversified interests within the EU: It means few member states have a deep-seated interest in multinational civilian crisis management and few have a defined policy in this area. The reason for this situation is that its success is

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Hagman, op.cit., pp. 57-58

difficult to measure and a conflict prevented is essentially a non-event in the eyes of the media and general public. Above all, there is little domestic support for sending scarce resources such as police officers, doctors, judges, prosecutors, engineers and money elsewhere. The other challenging position of national coordination is the fact that the assets belong to different ministries, individual federal states, counties and cities. Moreover, the financing of civilian crisis management would be challenging for most of the member states.

4. Difficulties in military-civilian coordination: In general, there is a reluctance to link military and civilian assets. Although the WEU made some improvements on this point, many European armed forces fear that professionalism and war-fighting expertise are threatened by further civilian cooperation.
5. Lack of culture of EU preventive engagement and the function will remain embryonic for some time.

CHAPTER-4

THE EU'S INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ACTORNESS INCLUDING CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY AFTER US-LED WAR IN IRAQ: IS IT A TURNING POINT FOR THE EU IN TERMS OF ITS SECURITY POLICIES?

4.1. Global War Against International Terrorism after 9/11

After the end of the Cold War, it is widely-known that the attention of both sides of Atlantic, namely the European countries and the US, has been drawn to different kind of threats. In such a changed international environment, the September 11 attacks¹²⁶ in the US have become a turning point in international security discussions of transatlantic communities in the sense that the international security has began to be analyzed as before and after 9/11 events. The fight against international terrorism and the proliferation of mass destruction became the dominant issues in the post-September 11 era.

In the Forth Global Strategic Meeting of International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), which took place in Geneva on Sept.8-10, 2006, titled as “New Thinking on Conflict and Peace”, it was stated, “the conflicts in classical understanding are transforming into a new term and level, such that neither the nation-state nor international organizations can cope with them.”¹²⁷ In the fifth

¹²⁶ In the text, the statement of “the September 11 attacks” will also be written as “9/11 events”, which has the same meaning with the former one.

¹²⁷ Hüseyin Bağcı, “The Start of a long war?”, The New Anatolian, 18.09.2006. <http://www.newanatolian.com/opinion-14827.html> accessed on 20.10.2006.

anniversary of the 9/11 events, the meeting stressed that the terrorism is still the biggest enemy against which the free societies, especially the Western countries, have to combat. Since the new kind of terrorism is rooted with religious fundamentalism and also with cultural and economic differences between Western and Eastern societies, the main questions are how Western societies can combat terrorism without losing the basic rights of citizens and what kind of instruments – civilian, military or both- would be used in this struggle. In this sense, Hüseyin Bağcı underlined Sir Michael Howard’s critical words on “long war” against terrorism in this article and stated that

It is not a military one only, but a war of values and policies. Everyone is responsible now for heading off a new totalitarian ideology. However, reality leads to a very pessimistic point: The global system, which was established in 1945 with the UN, cannot face the challenges of the future.¹²⁸

Although both the European countries and the US spoke in ‘one voice’ about the global war against terrorism just after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it seems to have done more to split than to unite the world’s leading powers. There have been deep divisions among Europeans, between the US and Europe as a whole, and between the US and other important nations. These disagreements, moreover, are not limited to specific aspects of antiterrorism and counter-proliferation policy – or to specific cases for action like Afghanistan and Iraq. They also extend to other important dimensions of global governance such as the rule of law, the legitimacy of military action, equal answerability (e.g. for war crimes), the meaning of strategic stability and associated restraints.¹²⁹

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Alyson J.K. Bailes, “The Iraq War: Impact on International Security”, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Policy Paper, Geneva, August 2003, pp.1-2

The EU was particularly criticized during the various phases of the crisis for failing either to maintain its own unity, or to come up with any coherent alternative to US policy on terrorism Iraq or Afghanistan. According to Bailes, it is reasonable to attribute this to the EU's total lack of a coherent philosophy and mechanisms of its own for tackling problems outside the wider Europe, as well as rivalries among its own larger members.¹³⁰

In this chapter, the EU's international security actorness and the new attempts on crisis management following the recent US-led war in Iraq will be evaluated. However since the US-led war in Iraq is one of the outcomes of global reactive policies against international terrorism after 9/11 events, a general and short overview towards the changes of European and American position in the new international conjuncture will be examined. Also, Turkey's position, as a non-EU European NATO member, will be mentioned briefly because of its ever-increasing role in fighting against international terrorism and of her influence on the ESDP

4.1.1. American Response to International Terrorism

The 9/11 terrorist attacks have created an unimpaired atmosphere in all around the world and of course in American society and political circles. Many analysts agree on that after 9/11 events, especially from the US perspective, the security paradigms of the 1990s has replaced with the new paradigm known as "global war on terror" (GWOT) in which, as President Bush argued, democratic and other "freedom loving" states struggle against an "axis of evil" (Iran Iraq, North Korea), and global terror networks and transnational terrorist groups, such as Al-

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 6

Qa'idah.¹³¹ Therefore, from merely being reaffirmed when the Bush administration came into office, the traditional 'neo-con' concepts of national sovereignty, national interest and the balance of power became the cornerstones of US policy after '9/11'

Following the so-called attacks, the declarations of the President George W. Bush gave the American point of view against international terrorism and also the main points of future actions.

"...We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them..."¹³² (*September 11, 2001*)

...They have attacked America, because we are freedom's home and defender. And the commitment of our fathers now the calling of our time... as we have been assured, neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities nor powers, nor things present nor things to come, nor height nor depth, can separate us from God's love...¹³³ (*September 14, 2001*)

...We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime...¹³⁴ (*September 20, 2001*)

"...America would emerge stronger; with a renewed spirit of pride and patriotism...we are a nation awakened to danger..."¹³⁵ (*November 8, 2001*)

...The civilized world faces unprecedented dangers...In a single instant, we realize that this will be a decisive decade in the history of liberty, that we've been called to a unique role in human events...to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace...Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet since September the 11th, but we know their true nature...North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens...Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's

¹³¹ Anne Aldis & Graeme Herd, "Managing Soft Security Threats: Current Progress and Future Prospects", *European Security*, (Frank Cass: Taylor & Francis Inc., 2004), p. 179

¹³² Quoted from declaration of President George W. Bush in *September 11, 2001*. It was addressed to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks. <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govdocs/docs/iraq/091101.pdf> accessed on 26.11.2004

¹³³ Jiri Sedivy & Marcin Zaborowski, "Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Relations", *European Security*, (Frank Cass: Taylor & Francis Inc., 2004) p. 200

¹³⁴ Quoted from declaration of President George W. Bush in *September 20, 2001*. <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govdocs/docs/iraq/092001.pdf> accessed on 26.11.2004

¹³⁵ Sedivy & Zaborowski, *op.cit.*, p. 200

hope for freedom...Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror...States like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world...¹³⁶ (January 29, 2002)

...From containment to preemption...And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives...Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent...¹³⁷ (June 1, 2002)

In accordance with these declarations, President George W. Bush laid out his administration's conceptual framework for dealing with the post-September 11 world. This conceptual framework took place in greater detail in administration's National Security Strategy (NSS) issued three months later. The NSS document can be accepted as the major US response to international terrorism and the other threats that emerged in post-Cold War and intensified in the post-September 11 events. The aim of this strategy is "to help make the world not just safer but better" and the main goals of US administration are stated as "political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity"¹³⁸

The NSS document has also underlined the theme of America's military hegemony, developing it more fully and explicitly.¹³⁹ It has underlined the three critical features of this hegemony: aggressive, unilateral and global. In other words,

¹³⁶ Quoted from declaration of President George W. Bush in January 29, 2002. <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govdocs/docs/iraq/012902.pdf> accessed on 26.11.2004

¹³⁷ Quoted from declaration of President George W. Bush in June 1, 2002. It was addressed at the US Military Academy in West Point. <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govdocs/docs/iraq/060102.pdf> accessed on 26.11.2004

¹³⁸ The National Security Strategy of the US, September 2002, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html> p. 1

¹³⁹ Edward Rhodes, "the Imperial Logic of Bush's Liberal Agenda", *Survival*, (Vol 45, no 1, Spring 2003) p.133

NSS makes clear that Bush administration proposes to use American military hegemony not simply *aggressively and pro-actively* –“the best defence is a good offence”- and *unilaterally* – “consensus is desirable but it is not necessary” but *globally*.¹⁴⁰ In the last part of the document, the need for transforming America’s National Security Institution -whether civilian and military- to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century is mentioned.¹⁴¹ According to Jonathan Kirshner, the document “represents a fundamental shift from foundations upon which US foreign policy has been based since World War II” and can be summarized in terms of three words: “supremacy, ambition and prevention”.¹⁴² He argues that *supremacy* is related to the unparalleled military strength of the US; *ambition* is the aggressive promotion of American values, such as free trade, democracy and etc. and *prevention* is an outcome of a doctrine of preventive war.

Considered this document as a whole, it is argued to declare the ideological underpinnings of the US foreign policy for the future. Therefore, Kirshner even argued that the NSS document provided the strategic and philosophical justification for the US invasion of Iraq.¹⁴³ US President George W. Bush’s words on the Iraqi War seem to confirm this argument. He said that the Iraqi War was legitimate and added that “*the US has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own*

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 134-136

¹⁴¹ “The National Security Strategy of the US”, *op.cit.*, pp. 29-31

¹⁴² Jonathan Kirshner, Barry Strauss, Maria Fanis & Matthew Evangelista, “Iraq and Beyond: The New US National Security Strategy”, *Cornell University Peace Studies Program*, (Occasional Paper #27, January 2003), p.1

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

*national security...when it comes to our security we really don't need anyone's permission".*¹⁴⁴

Moreover, in the wake of these attacks, the Department of Homeland Security was established, with broader powers of enforcement. Homeland Security, as set forth in the US National Strategy for Homeland Security, has four objectives: to prevent terrorist attacks within the US; to reduce the vulnerability of the US to terrorism; to minimize damage from those terrorist attacks that do occur; and to recover from such attacks. The emphasis on terrorism is thus clear, and other considerations are subordinate to this focus.¹⁴⁵ In addition to setting up the Department of Homeland Security, there have been other developments in the US side including passing the Patriot Act; stepping up security in specific ways such as at airports and ports; shaking up intelligence agencies and appointing a supervising Director; and setting up a National Counter-terrorism Center.

4.1.2 EU's Response to International Terrorism

After September 11 terrorist attacks, as it is mentioned before, a new security environment, security perceptions and security threats emerged. Since there is a generally accepted 'burden sharing' position of the transatlantic allies in especially international crisis, an analysis on the EU's position in the fight against international terrorism would have important contribution to an analysis on the EU's security actorness during the Iraq crisis in early 2003 and in US-led war in Iraq.

¹⁴⁴ Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance, (New York, Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, 2003), p.33

¹⁴⁵ Jack Clarke, "The United States, Europe, and Homeland Security: Seeing Soft Security Concerns Through a Counterterrorist Lens", *European Security*, (Frank Cass, Vol. 13, 2004), pp. 117-119

EU Member States declared their solidarity with the US in its fight against terrorism immediately after September 11 terrorist attacks. Christopher Hill defined EU's immediate reaction to the attacks as effective solidarity.¹⁴⁶ Immediately after the September 11 attacks in order to express European solidarity with the US, Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission said that "In the darkest hours of European history, the Americans stood by the US. We stand by them now". Moreover, European leaders immediately convened to release a joint declaration as an expression of unity with American people, as well as condemnation of the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the terrorist attacks.¹⁴⁷ This was an immediate and bold commitment and also High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana immediately said, "The European Union stands firmly and fully behind the US."¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, Charles Grant claimed that in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on New York and Washington and during war in Afghanistan, EU Member States were united among themselves and in support for the US. He also stated that Europeans offered great deal of help to the US-led campaign against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, including diplomatic and military support, the sharing of intelligence and new initiatives to help track down terrorists and their funding.¹⁴⁹

UK Prime Minister Tony Blair underlined the EU's response to and role in the formation of a new coalition of world powers in today's international

¹⁴⁶ Christopher Hill, "EU Foreign Policy since 11 September 2001: Renationalizing or Regrouping?", *First Annual Guest Lecture in the Europe in the World Center Series*, (University of Liverpool, 24.10.2002), <http://www.liv.ac.uk/ewc> accessed on 30.10.2003, p. 4.

¹⁴⁷ Deniz Altınbaş Akgül, "The European Union Response to September 11: Relations with the US and the Failure to Maintain a CFSP", *The Review of International Affairs* (Vol. 1, Iss. 1.4, Autumn 2002), p. 2.

¹⁴⁸ Hill, op.cit., in note 21, p. 5.

¹⁴⁹ Charles Grant, "The European Union and September 11th", CER.

environment and said in his speech in a Labour Party conference of October 2001, “...the kaleidoscope has been shaken, the pieces are in flux and soon they will settle again. Before they do, let us re-order this world around us...”¹⁵⁰

According to Michael E. Smith, in their initial response to September 11 attacks, EU Member States were extremely quick to speak with a common voice; they expressed their support for the US and offered troops to the effort, but on a bilateral and national basis rather than collectively on behalf of the EU.¹⁵¹ Although most of operational support for the US was provided by the UK, in December 2001 Belgian EU Presidency at Laeken Summit announced that the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was operational and that the EU would provide up to 4000 troops for the peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. This could have been first deployment of new Rapid Reaction Force, but three big, France, Germany and the UK refused the announcement and decided to deploy troops on their own not under institutional umbrella of the EU.¹⁵²

Jolyon Howorth put forward that European response to September 11 was ‘renationalization of security and defence reflexes’. National leaders all expressed their solidarity with the US on behalf of their respective countries. In this sense, France, the UK and Germany- three major EU Member States- offered national military assets to the US and national leaders were keen to engaging in “bilateralism”

¹⁵⁰ Charles Grant, “Introduction: A Coalition for Global Security”, in The European Union and September 11th eds. Edward bannerman, Steven Everts, hether Grabbe, Charles Grant and Alasdair Murray, (London: CER, December 2001), p. 1

¹⁵¹ Michael E. Smith, “Institutional Moments, Policy Performance, and the Future of EU Security/Defence Policy”, *EUSA Review* (Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 2003).

¹⁵² Ibid.

with the US administration.¹⁵³ It is argued that although the leaders of three EU Member states seemed to be representing the EU, they did not make any effort to speak for the EU.¹⁵⁴ The smaller member states complained that by acting alone particularly in dealings with the US, the bigger countries undermined EU institutions and solidarity.¹⁵⁵

Deniz Altınbaş Akgül agreed with these views and asserted that the competition among the individual EU Member States to obtain more influential position in the international arena, by becoming a good ally of the US, creates further difficulties for the establishment of a CFSP. She quoted from Brezinski that “we cannot talk about a Europe in this war, we can only talk about European states” and also quoted from the deputy director of the Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Dominique Moisi, that “there is a renationalization of foreign policy, because it is a matter of different capabilities and feelings of interests.”¹⁵⁶

According to Charles Grant, September 11 attacks highlighted and increased tensions between the EU’s bigger and smaller states and he named this as ‘Big against Small’.¹⁵⁷ Since September 11, with the British, the French and the German leading the EU’s response, the big-small divide has deepened; the leaders of EU’s big three, French President Jacques Chirac, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, twice met as a group and these summits were

¹⁵³ Jolyon Howorth, “CESDP After 11 September: From Short-term Confusion to Long-term Cohesion?”, *EUSA Review Essay* (Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 2002).

¹⁵⁴ Charles Grant, “The Eleventh September and Beyond: The Impact on the European Union” (Oxford: Political Quarterly Publishing, 2002).

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Akgül, op.cit., p. 18

¹⁵⁷ Grant, op.cit., in note 147

called as mini-summits and these mini-summits provoked the smaller states to complain that these meetings undermine the EU's solidarity.¹⁵⁸

In one these mini-summits, President Chirac, Prime Minister Blair and Chancellor Schröder discussed the Afghanistan operation, the fight against international terrorism and their positions on the international scene. As a result, these mini-summits led to divisions among EU Member States especially between bigger and smaller states and undermined the solidarity and coherence among EU Member States. Thus, the mini-summits clearly undermined one of the most important purposes of the EU; to speak with one voice.¹⁵⁹

EU Member States' failure to speak with one voice also undermined their international credibility. Charles Grant claimed that the fact that bigger EU Member States required to hold these mini-summits indicated that when there is a crisis and especially one with a military dimension, the EU's existing institutions are ill-suited to coordinate a quick response or represent the EU forcefully to the rest of the world., so the need to reform the institutions of the CFSP and especially the EU's rotating presidency – the system in which every six months a different member takes over the presidency – increased in order to strengthen effectiveness and international security actorness and credibility of the EU¹⁶⁰

Furthermore, after September 11, in order to increase the coherence and effectiveness of the EU's foreign policy, there will be a pressure for the two sides of EU foreign policy, diplomacy under Solana and economic assistance under Chris Patten, the commissioner for external relations, to be integrated closely. It was

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Akgül, op.cit., pp. 17-18

¹⁶⁰ Grant, op.cit., in note 147

widely thought that in order to strengthen Europe's voice in global politics these two sides should be managed fused.¹⁶¹ Moreover, Charles Grant claimed that "solo diplomacy" pursued by any EU Member State is not necessarily harmful to the EU as long as bigger Member States present a common European view and work for the unity of the anti-terrorism coalition rather than try to undermine each other.¹⁶² Therefore, Member States with a huge diplomatic and military power must consult the High Representative for the CFSP and the Commission and inform them of their action in order to increase the credibility of the EU institutions.¹⁶³

September 11 attacks was therefore not a turning point for the EU's external policy. Rather it served to confirm the view that a policy that focuses exclusively on military means cannot achieve long-term stability or ensure national security. 'September 11 attacks and the events that followed, notably the declaration of a war on terrorism and the invasion of Iraq, did nonetheless highlight the major differences between the EU's and the Bush administration's views on how to achieve security. Undoubtedly, 9/11 events and Iraq case influenced Member States' willingness to consider an exercise in strategic thinking, though the various States may have had differing motivations: defining a distinctive 'European way' for some, aligning priorities with those of the US for others, or a combination of both, reconciling the drafting of the EU agenda with the need for continued transatlantic partnership. The important point is that it enabled the decisive step to launch a strategic debate in the Union.

¹⁶¹ Grant, op.cit., in note 147

¹⁶² Charles Grant, "A Stronger European Foreign and Defence Policy", in The European Union and September 11th eds. Edward Bannerman, Steven Everts, Hether Grabbe, Charles Grant and Alasdair Murray, (London: CER, December 2001), p. 42.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

The EU has become more decisive in order to fight international terrorism but of course within the limitations of ‘European way’. In this sense, a consortium called as ESSTRT consortium¹⁶⁴, which consists of Thales, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and Crisis Management Initiative, has been established. The consortium analyzed threats to European security, and in particular the threat from international terrorism. It examined actual and potential responses to terrorist threats; and technologies that are and could be deployed in support of these responses; and ethical and legislative issues raised by these responses and technologies. Finally, the consortium drew up a set of recommendations for the Commission and for the European governments. The Commission’s clear demand was to focus on internal security issues not the excluded military threats. Therefore, the Study has considered civilian and dual-use security technologies, but no purely military technologies.

The final report of the ESSTRT consortium, titled as “*New European Approaches to Counter Terrorism*” can be considered as a detailed plan including both possible threats and the preventing methods and tools. According to the report, European Countries can substantially reduce the threat from international terrorism if they adopt a comprehensive security approach. In this sense, the report includes important recommendations and conclusions regarding measures against the ever-increasing threats:¹⁶⁵

All European countries should have a crisis management structure that would follow crisis situations in Europe and also the neighboring regions. Also the national

¹⁶⁴ The ESSTRT is an acronym for “**European Security: High Level Study on Threats, Responses and Relevant Technologies**”. The study has been carried out for the European Commission as a Supporting Activity, part of the Preparatory Action for Security Research (PASR) 2004 program.

¹⁶⁵ “*New European Approaches to Counter Terrorism*”, ESSTRT Deliverable D&-I Final Report, ESSTRT Consortium, 21st March, 2006, pp. 3-4 (This report is an outcome of a 16-months- research work of the ESSTRT consortium)

actions should be backed by a set of enabling capabilities including intelligence information, a strong policy of public communication, and robust relationships with international partners. This set of actions is called as ‘The Four Plus Three Package’ The European Union as a whole should develop a comprehensive strategy as well as stronger operational and tactical structure. In order to concretize that strategy, the EU should establish a Crisis Management Center in Brussels that would be supported by secure communications between the crisis management structures of Member States.

The EU should work with important partner countries to develop links between terrorism analysis centers and share analysis of risks and counter-measures. All these actions should be supported by the development of international standards for security measures.

Technology should be developed and used as a powerful counter measure against terrorism. For example, if advanced and improved, scanners or other methods of detecting weapons or hazardous substances for airports; “smart containers” for sea transport and large vehicles; area surveillance for public spaces and border protection; personal identification devices including biometrics; fast detection of chemical, biological and radiological substances; high assurance software development methodologies for networked data system will be beneficial. As well as making recommendations on measures to counter-terrorism, this study identified four sets of threats to European internal security: terrorism; weapons of mass effect and the risk of their proliferation; unstable situations and organized crime. However, the main focus of the study was terrorism in Europe.

In this study, the underlying reasons, means and the results of the major terrorist attacks have been analyzed like September 11 attacks and bombing attacks in

Spain and in the UK. For instance, the radicalization of individuals among local Muslim communities in European countries has been mentioned as a real danger for them and this reality is said to force many governments to reevaluate not only their approaches to security, but also their policies in foreign affairs, education and other social issues.¹⁶⁶ In this sense, it was concluded in the study that the level of responses to terrorist threats has varied among countries.¹⁶⁷

France adopted a “zero tolerance” policy that was focused on “intentions, not actions” according to the Interior Ministry. There is close and continues cooperation between police, intelligence agencies and the judicial system.

Germany has since 9/11 attacks implemented numerous reforms, including the creation of a Common Center for Counter-terrorism under the authority of the Interior Ministry, increased the power and funding for intelligence agencies, removed immunity of groups from investigation on religious groups and improved aviation security, barred membership of terrorist organizations.

In Italy, an anti-terrorism law, the Pisanu package enacted in 2005, which made conspiracy for the purposes of international terrorism a criminal offence, allowed for rapid expulsion of foreigners deemed dangerous, prohibited diffusion of terrorist know-how, extended police powers...etc.

Spain has a well-developed counter-terrorist infrastructure with elite police forces and specialized judges with far-reaching powers. In addition to them, a National Antiterrorism Center after the Madrid bombings to coordinate intelligence work between the National Police, Civil Guard and National Intelligence Center have been created.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 15-16

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 17-18

In the UK, The Joint Terrorism Analysis Center was created in 2003 to co-ordinate government departments and agencies. Also, a counter-terrorist legislation has been prepared. The UK developed the Four P (Prevent, pursue, Protect, Prepare) framework for counter-terrorist strategy that is now being adopted across Europe. These kinds of measures are less extended in other EU countries.

It can be concluded that, in the initial phase of post-September 11 attacks and the US operation in Afghanistan, the EU Member States declared their solidarity with the US and adopted a common position on fight against terrorism. In later phases, however, bigger Member States by excluding smaller ones had supported the US in its war against terrorism on bilateral basis not through the EU and this led to divisions among the EU and frustrations among excluded smaller Member States. These events showed that the EU still has deficiencies in building an effective and coherent CFSP and the need to reform CFSP institutions has come on the agenda of the EU.

4.1.3. Dividing Alliances: ‘high politics’ vs ‘low politics’

In the post-Cold War era, the security concerns of America and Europe, which are in literature called as ‘transatlantic allies’, have significantly changed. The two side of the Atlantic has tended to agree on what threats are, but disagreed as to their priority, characteristics, and the most appropriate methods and instruments to deploy when responding to these threats. This divergence of methods and approaches has become obvious during the US-led war in Iraq.¹⁶⁸

The foreign policy agendas of the European states and the US have differed from each other though both side are based on liberal political cultures and have

¹⁶⁸ Aldis & Herd, op.cit., p. 180

common interests and goals including global justice, democratization and stability. While today Europe is most concerned with creating peaceful and democratic Europe with secure borders, concentrating on EU enlargement, internal security issues, immigration and the maintenance of stability in the Balkans, and proceeding with overall European integration, the US, on the contrary, concentrates on the global security issues, especially on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, on the threat of terrorism and ‘rogue states’ that are considered to be the possible source of threat against the US.¹⁶⁹ In other words, it can be said that especially after 9/11 events, while the US, who has been perceiving international relations by placing anti-terrorism at its center, continues to look at foreign policy issues with an understanding of ‘high politics’ whereas the EU has a ‘low politics’ mentality.

Not only the foreign policy agendas but also the methodologies of the allies are divergent. It is not a new attitude but the US defines security in terms of military means. For the defence and promotion of its national interests the US is ready to use armed force whenever it believes necessary, as the recent Iraqi case demonstrated us. In other words, the US gives little attention to international organizations, international law and multilateral diplomacy or she takes into consideration them in terms of legitimizing American foreign policy. In short, the US prefers ‘*unilateralism*’ as a method in general whereas the EU prefers the ‘*multilateralism*’ in external relations. In the European understanding, in the crisis situations, the politic, diplomatic and economic means are and should be used within the limitations of international law and with related international organizations. On the other hand, the usage of military powers would be as the last resort.

¹⁶⁹ Erdal Onat, “Tension and Cooperation in Transatlantic Relations With Regard to Iraq”, (Unpublished M.Sc. Thesis) Ankara: Department of International Relations, METU, 2005. pp. 2-3.

From the realists' point of view, this divergence can be interpreted as the continuation of the power struggle over power structures within transatlantic relations. As Strange mentions that the possessor of the power is able to change the range of choices open to others, without apparently putting pressure on them to take one decision or to make choice rather than others.¹⁷⁰ In this sense, the US led war in Iraq has demonstrated that she wants to reshape her Middle Eastern policy by having a direct possession over the power structures. So far, the US has been trying to maintain her global dominance by controlling or influencing the power structures. Therefore, the Iraqi case displayed the US policy has been re-shaped as to continue controlling the power structures and getting possession on them at the same time.¹⁷¹

On the other side, Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski has brought this discussion into another dimension and added the impact of different 'strategic culture' on diverging approaches of the two side of the Atlantic.¹⁷² According to them, for example, the transatlantic disagreements over Iraq cannot be adequately explained without reference to the past experiences of the two sides. It has been argued that the material factors like economic interests of the EU and the US and the recent threats emerging from the Middle East region provide only partial explanations for the diverging approaches of them. The primary factor of this divergence in US-led war in Iraq is the different past experiences and strategic cultures of the two sides and also the European split between those who supported

¹⁷⁰ Onat, op.cit., pp.24-29. See also Susan Strange, States And Markets: An International Political Economy, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1998), p. 59

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Kerry Longhurst & Marcin Zaborowski, "The Future of European Security", *European Security*, (Frank Cass: Taylor & Francis Inc., 2004) p. 381

and those who objected to the US's Iraq policy- can be accepted as another sign of the European countries' having different past experiences and strategic cultures.¹⁷³

Regarding the transatlantic divergences in ends and means in security issues, the analysis of Robert Kagan has to be mentioned. In his well-known analysis, it is stated that, "*the Americans comes from Mars and Europeans comes from Venus.*"¹⁷⁴ It means that the Europeans and Americans do not share a common view about the world politics; instead on almost all-important issues of power they have different perspectives. Moreover, Kagan characterizes Europe living in a "Kantian self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation", whereas the US is an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable."¹⁷⁵ The two different perspectives that Kagan outlines can be witnessed today over the case of Iraq in general. However, the Kagan's generalization on European side and considering it as "homogenous" actor in the transatlantic relations are questionable for some authors.¹⁷⁶ Indeed, the European side also divided inside. In the sense that some of European countries, the UK, Spain and Italy declared their support to the US position on Iraq, while others, especially France and Germany, opposed to the US and preferred to work through the rules of law, negotiations and cooperation.

On the other hand, at the CSIS-Wilton Park Conference on "US-European Policy After Iraq: Redefining The Transatlantic Partnership", organized in October 2003, the present transatlantic divergence was evaluated and that was came to

¹⁷³ The old and the new Europe will be discussed in part 4.2.2. in detailed.

¹⁷⁴ Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), p. 3

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Longhurst and Zaborowski, op.cit., p.381

important conclusions regarding future of the transatlantic relations. In the document of conference, it was summarized that:¹⁷⁷

The transatlantic relationship is at a critical juncture so there may be an opportunity to take advantage of the situation to rebuild the transatlantic relationship politically and institutionally and to generate a common agenda of issues to be tackled together.

While NATO remains important to the transatlantic relationship, the EU-US relationship is even more crucial and needs to be greatly strengthened. In a new structured EU-US relationship there is every reason to think that, since neither the EU nor NATO is a “full-service organization”, their respective strengths and weaknesses can be drawn on in a synergetic way according to the circumstances (e.g. NATO: war-fighting, Rapid Response Force, US involvement; EU: smaller scale peace-keeping/intervention without US involvement, a range of civilian/police/economic post-conflict instruments).

The EU must also get its act together and speak with a single voice in the foreign as well as the trade policy fields. The EU and the US has to find a common way in diverging issues like the military interventions like the Iraq case as well as the operations in the Balkans and over terrorism, including financial flows and judicial affairs/extradition.

Effectiveness and success in dealing with these (including remedying the Non Proliferation Treaty, which allows any state legally to have its own fuel cycle all the way to producing the raw material for a nuclear device) could be the key to future success or failure for the international system as well as the transatlantic relationship.

¹⁷⁷ “US-European Policy After Iraq: Redefining The Transatlantic Partnership”, CSIS-Wilton Park Conference (WP724), (20 – 22 October 2003) Page 1 of 6

Other issues such as post-conflict Afghanistan and Iraq, as well (despite US reluctance) as the Arab-Israel dispute must also be tackled jointly.

In line with the thesis argument, it can be said that there are different foreign policy perceptions between the EU and US as well as within the EU. These are based on economic considerations, high/low politics mentalities, militaristic capabilities and also their different strategic cultures. However, even if there are such divisions between the EU and US, it seems as if the superiority of US as an actor in world affairs will continue for the foreseeable time period. and EU's foreign policy seems not to not create serious tensions with US. Iraqi crisis and the following war have also showed that, EU will only be a partial and majorly a civilian actor in world affairs. It could possibly be only in the very long run that the EU's foreign policy considerations will be able to limit US.

4.1.4. Turkey's position between NATO and the ESDP

The end of Cold War and the globalization brought about weakened borders, world-wide problems so the borders of the European security architecture does not end at the borders of the EU countries but it encompasses the surrounding regions. Therefore, European security need a real cooperation and partnership of the EU and NATO in order to ensure the security and stability for not only European regions but also some other regions like Caucasian region, Middle East Region and so on. Especially after the September 11 attacks, European countries recognized new threats that were arising from more or less unstable, undemocratic and underdeveloped regions. In this sense, both EU and NATO have began to find a suitable platform that make a true division of labour possible in order to find durable and viable solutions

for both hard security and low security problems and to pursue effective and coherent policies in crisis situations. In order to be successful in such a division of labour, the contributions of the regional powers having long-lasting relations with both organizations can not be ignored. In this security platform, Turkey's role has to be analyzed considering her geo-strategic, military and political power in her region.

After the Cold War, Turkey found itself in an unstable and difficult international security environment stretching from the Balkans to Mediterranean, Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Since being close to these problematic areas, Turkey's security position changed fundamentally from being at the southeastern flank of NATO to the heart of the new security architecture due to her multi-dimensional security agenda. Ramazan Gözen categorized Turkey's agenda into four groups: "*multi-directional*", "*multi-functional*", "*multi-levelled*" and "*multi-institutionalization*".¹⁷⁸

Considering the thesis subject, Turkey's position in the "multi-institutionalization" of the international security architecture in Europe will be analyzed. Although NATO was the only security institution for Turkey as it was for the European countries during the cold war years, there emerged new security organizations with the ever-changing security environment. It can be argued that Turkey has a rather critical and in Gözen's words a "delicate position" within the emerging security architecture. This resulted from the fact that Turkey's connection to the new security architecture has been multiplexed at various levels and degrees. In this sense, Ramazan Gözen underlines that Turkey has three levels/types of positions within the new security architecture in Europe: It is located,

¹⁷⁸ Ramazan Gözen, "Turkey's Delicate Position Between NATO and the ESDP", Center for Strategic Research (SAM), March 2003. p.15

simultaneously, ‘at the center’ through NATO”, ‘at the midway’ through the EU/WEU and ‘at the margin’ through the ESDP.¹⁷⁹

Considering the scope of the thesis, after mentioning Turkey’s position within NATO and WEU briefly, her critical position within the ESDP will be analyzed in this part of the thesis. This analysis is prominent because Turkey, as one of the non-EU NATO members and having a long-lasting historical tie with Europe, continues to play a vital role in EU’s security actorness at present and probably so it does in the future.

Turkey strengthened her position in the European security system by means of becoming a full member of NATO in 1952 and while Turkey has become a vital and active member for NATO since her membership, NATO has become the main international security organization for Turkey’s security, defence and foreign policy. Ramazan Gözen touches on some critical points regarding the mutual contributions of Turkey and NATO to each other. For him, from the Turkey’s side, it can be firstly said that NATO contributes to her stability and security by means of construction of new security architecture through the establishment of partnership and dialogue with about 50 countries, which closely concerns Turkey’s security perspective and interests in the post-Cold war era as it was before.¹⁸⁰ Moreover, NATO is an international platform for Turkey to express its views and interests about international developments being in a rather critical and unstable region. In NATO’s intergovernmental decision-making structure in which each member has a ‘veto’ power in North Atlantic Council and other organs, Turkey has a strong voice on issues of European security. On the other hand, NATO provides Turkey with a

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. p.16

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. pp. 17-18

transatlantic connection.¹⁸¹ It means that under the NATO umbrella, Turkey and the US improved their relations especially in security terms by sharing similar perspectives on European security and by playing active role in unstable regions.

On the other side, because of its proximity to the critical regions like the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and Mediterranean and its historical and cultural links with these regions, Turkey is considered as a major asset in NATO before and after the Cold War. From NATO side, Turkey's major contribution to European security is her acts as a 'mediator' and 'model' for the adoption of the CEE states and many other states in the regions mentioned above into the Western World.

However as it was stated before, NATO is very major but no longer the only security actor in the new European security architecture after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, the WEU-Turkey and EU-Turkey in the ESDP framework has to be analyzed.

Turkey participated in the construction of the EU's security and defence identity within the framework of the WEU as the second pillar of the EU in the Maastricht Treaty. The WEU, as the European pillar of NATO, was implementing Petersberg tasks and developing the ESDI. However, Turkey can not be a full member of the WEU but becomes an 'associate member' since she is not a full member of the EU. This membership provided Turkey with a place and some institutional rights in the WEU's decision-making processes as well as in the WEU's non-Article 5 operations. In this sense, Turkey's status in the WEU granted Turkey the right to become closely involved in the European security architecture. However,

¹⁸¹ Ibid. p.18

Turkey as other associate members has no right to block a decision that was accepted by the full member states. On the other side, although Greek attempts to block Turkey's full participation to the WEU, in April 1997, French government's proposal aimed to make the associate members part of WEU decision making process.¹⁸²

Although NATO members reached a historic agreement on the evolution of the security and defence mechanisms in NATO and underlined the Turkey's associate membership in Washington Summit document of April 1999; on the other side, the Saint-Malo Declaration and following EU summits –especially Helsinki Summit- brought about another historic development: That is, Turkey's associate membership position in the WEU was ended as a result of the EU's decision to terminate the WEU's role in the ESDI and also to transform the European security and defence into the EU framework under the name of the ESDP. As a result of these developments, Turkey-EU relations have experienced rather strange ups and downs as a result of the development of the ESDP and it can be said that Turkey's position moved from “the midway” to “the margin” due to the termination of Turkey's participation in the WEU decision-making mechanism and of exclusion from the ESDP's decision-making process.¹⁸³ Such an exclusion from the ESDP has resulted in not only tensions in Turkey-EU relations in general but also created some complications within the EU-NATO cooperation and operationalization of the ESDP.

Firstly, the underlying reasons for the tensions in the Turkey-EU relations regarding the security issues will be evaluated from the each side's perspectives. As it was mentioned previous parts, the ESDP was developed by means of the

¹⁸² Ibid., p.27

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 29

successive Council declarations in Cologne (June 1999), Helsinki (December 1999), Feira (June 2000), Nice (December 2000) and Laeken (December 2001). While these declarations built up a new institutional, political and military structure for the EU, they had important implications for those countries that were not members of the EU, the so-called non-EU European NATO Allies¹⁸⁴, particularly Turkey. As a result of these successive declarations, Turkey, as other non-EU European NATO members were connected to the ESDP with a “consultative function” in decision-making procedures and in military operations.¹⁸⁵ In this sense, even when a EU-led operations uses NATO assets and capabilities (in Turkey), the EU does not provide Turkey with the right to participate in the strategic control and political direction of the operations.¹⁸⁶ However, considering the Turkey’s geo-strategic position and her playing a very important role in the heart of a very unstable region as a member of NATO, Turkey has been negatively affected from these developments. Therefore, Turkey mainly demands to participate in the ESDP’s formation and decision-making process as well as its crisis management operations. Turkey is highly sensitive and interested in the EU’s Petersberg-task-type operations in her surrounding region so Turkey wants to take role these operations. It is obvious that Turkey has important contributions to the Bosnia and Kosovo crisis and in the re-construction of Afghanistan after September 11 attacks under the control of NATO. In this sense, it can be said that the EU can also benefit from Turkey’s contributions on managing such military or civilian crisis.

¹⁸⁴ The so-called non-EU European NATO Allies includes Turkey, Norway, Iceland, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary before the last EU enlargement in 2004.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 30-37

¹⁸⁶ Turkish General Staff, “The Turkish General Staff View on ESDI”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol.3, No.2, April-June 2001, p. 88

On the other side, when and if EU has autonomous operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities but using EU Headline Goal forces, Turkey might be totally excluded from such operations as a result of a 'veto' of a EU Member State. More clearly, among the member states, Greece and the Greek Cypriot government might veto Turkey's participation in such operations whether it is related to Turkish-Greek problems or not. Since there are still unsolved problems between Turkey and Greece, like Cyprus problem, Greece is able to use its 'veto' power in ESDP in order to put pressure on Turkey. As a reaction, Turkish officials declared that Turkey would be hesitant to allow use of Turkish military assets and capabilities by European allies in future crisis around Turkey and in addition to this, Turkey would not permit the use of NATO assets and capabilities by using her veto. It reveals that Turkey's marginalization from the ESDP process creates serious setbacks for improvement of European security architecture.

However, the September 11 attacks has become a turning point for realization of Turkey's critical importance and position in the fight against terrorism in the area where Turkey has influence and involvement due to its geo-strategic, geopolitical and geo-cultural connections by the US and the EU members. Turkey, as a NATO member, provided logistical and political support; allowed the use of Turkish assets and capabilities to the US, German and British aircrafts and also involved the reconstruction process of Afghanistan. Taking the Turkey's support and contricution for fighting against terror in the region, the attempts, which had started before September 11, were accelerated in order to satisfy Turkey's expectations in order to remove Turkey's veto on EU's demand for using NATO assets and capabilities while conducting ESDP operations. Ramazan Gözen summarized Turkey's expectations

from the ESDP as such: “having the WEU *acquis* back again”; “The EU and non-EU NATO members should have daily consultations on a permanent basis, providing Turkey with a role in decision taken by the EU”; “Full participation in the decision-making process of the operations with NATO assets and operations”; “Respect to Turkey’s national interests and security concerns in such operations in Turkey’s geographic proximity and areas of national interests such as the Aegean Sea, the Cyprus problems so on”; “Insurance that the ESDP is not to be involved in the disputes among the Allies”.¹⁸⁷

The diplomatic negotiations among the US, the UK and Turkey produced the so-called Ankara Document to find a solution to Turkey’s veto on the EU-NATO cooperation. It was accepted in the year 2001 but finalized in 2002. This document is generally accepted as a mid-way solution to the problem. In this document, it was stated that Turkey would remove its veto on the EU-NATO co-operation under the following conditions:¹⁸⁸

Firstly, the non-EU European NATO members can participate in the EU-led operations for Petersberg tasks without NATO assets only after an invitation by the EU Council for consultations. However, the EU, in any case, would assure Turkey, by giving security guarantees on the following points:

- The EU will give special attention to Turkey’s serious concerns and supreme national interests primarily in the areas of proximity to Turkey like the Balkans, the Aegean Sea, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. As far as a EU-led operation is concerned in

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p, 62

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp- 63-64

these regions, the EU will invite Turkey to preparation stage of the operation and also will take into consideration Turkey's views during decision-making process.

- The ESDP will not involve in such cases where a NATO country has vital interests; therefore, the ESDP will not involve in the disputes between Turkey and Greece and also Greek Cypriot Government and also Greece will not use the ESDP as a leverage on Turkey in their relations.

Secondly, in the EU-led operation with NATO assets and capabilities, the EU-led operations will be able to use NATO assets and capabilities in two cases: In the case of use of "non-strategic assets", the EU will have guaranteed access to NATO assets and capabilities and also Turkey will be able to participate in the operations. However, in the case of use of "strategic assets", NATO Council will decide on the EU demands case-by-case basis. In this sense, Turkey will be able to participate in final decision-making about the EU-led operations. Therefore, it can be said that Ankara Document is an important step in fulfillment of the EU-NATO co-operation and also it provides an important progress to meet Turkey's fundamental concerns relating her position in the new European security architecture.

On the other hand, its implementation area seems to remain very limited in terms of Turkey unless the institutional arrangements are established. The most critical problem, which is Turkey's participation into the ESDP decision-making process, remains to be unresolved. Therefore, Turkey's demands for being a full member of the EU in order to get full integration into the ESDP and also into the first and third pillars will continue in the future. In addition to lack of concrete institutional arrangements, there is also another setback for Turkey within the EU

members. It is the Greek factor. Although NATO and the EU member states supported the Ankara document, Greece, a EU member, vetoed this document because of fearing that Turkey might be given rights to have influence in the ESDP decision-making and also of being topped to be in Turkish-Greek problems. Finally, it can be argue that this veto not only damages Turkey's position but also prevents the operationalization of the ESDP and ceases the NATO-EU co-operation.

Since September 11 attacks, Turkey's position has become more valuable for the EU and NATO members. Turkey's contributions to the reconstruction of Afghanistan strengthen the arguments that Turkey can be accepted as a "security provider" role in her region and contribute to the European security by means of its geo-strategic and military power. Moreover, Turkey is accepted as a "model" country for the Muslim world because of its modern, democratic and secular and market economy country. These features make Turkey's position more critical and also 'delicate' in terms of the security of Europe. However, Western allies, particularly the EU should take into consideration Turkey's positive contribution to the creation of a peaceful, stable and secure environment around the EU. It makes the EU's crisis management operations, especially the civilian crisis management operations more successful and more coherent. As a conclusion, Turkey's position is very crucial for the future of the broader European security architecture. The more Turkey is integrated into the EU security arrangements, especially the ESDP, the more secure and stable environment will be provided for Turkey, NATO and the EU.

4.2. Security Actorness of the EU in the Recent US-led War in Iraq

During the Iraq Crisis in early 2003, EU Member States were not able to develop a common policy over Iraq. Some of European Governments supported the US Administration's cause in Iraq Crisis and this led to divisions among them. Therefore, Charles Grant called US-led war in Iraq as "Achilles heel of EU foreign policy".¹⁸⁹

While the US was preparing for a new war against Iraq, France and Germany took their strong positions against a new US intervention the Iraq and in accordance with Schröder and Chirac declared that Germany would not vote in the UN Security Council and stated that "we agree completely to harmonize our positions as closely as possible to find a peaceful solution."¹⁹⁰

On 27 January 2003, at the General Affairs and External Relations Council, Ministers reaffirmed that "the EU's goal remains the effective and complete disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The Council fully supports the UN to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq with all relevant resolutions of the Security Council" and they emphasized the importance of the UN Security Council in maintaining international peace and security must be respected.¹⁹¹

The real problem of EU's security actorness in the recent US-led war in Iraq is not rooted from the bureaucratic or institutional structure of the EU but that is an outcome of the other internal dynamics, which limit the EU's room to maneuver in its

¹⁸⁹ Ibid. p.152.

¹⁹⁰ M. Dittrich, "Europe in the World, EU-Iraq: A Brief Chronology", *Working Papers*, 02.04.2003, <http://www.theepc.net>.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

international actorness. The dynamics or more correctly the debates are mainly called as “Europeanists vs. Atlanticists” and “old Europe vs. new Europe”.

4.2.1. Intra-EU Discussion on the Crisis: Atlanticists vs. Europeanists

The US invasion to Iraq brought to the division between the so-called Atlanticist and Europeanist camps within the Europe, which eventually led to the transatlantic debate between the Franco-German axis and the US. While the countries of the Atlanticist camp were supporting the US position in Iraq, the countries of the Europeanist camp opposed to it.

The UK, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Denmark constitutes so-called Atlanticist camp of Europe because of their support the position the US’s position against Iraq. Indeed, the most active supporters of military action against Iraq have been Spain and the UK, who is a long lasting security partner of the US. On January and February 2003, the US and the UK worked together on a new resolution that would cover a “short-term ultimatum to Iraq” and that also would try to get the maximum possible support on the Security Council for “military action”.¹⁹² In accordance with this attempts, the US, the UK and Spain asked the UN Security Council to declare that “Iraq had missed its last chance to disarm to avoid a war.”¹⁹³

By contrast to the position of the Atlanticist camp, France and Germany constitute the leading countries of the Europeanist camp. It is observed that since the formation of CFSP, France and Germany act by consulting each other, Germany's

¹⁹² Onat, op.cit., pp.33-34

¹⁹³ Ibid., p.34.

and France's consulting each other before deciding on a position has brought out the concept of so-called "Franco-German initiatives and positions".

During the Iraqi crisis and US-led war in Iraq, France and Germany followed a policy that is against the war. This situation gave birth to the questioning of the legitimacy of the war around the world paving the way for the countries, which are against the war, to loud their voices by standing such a guarantee of France and Germany. Franco-German axis opposed the war against Iraq and that insisted on the need for a diplomatic and peaceful solution to the Iraqi crisis. In this sense, France, Germany and Russia released an informal memorandum in which they demanded that weapons inspections in Iraq should continue at least four more months and argued that the conditions for using force against Iraq are not fulfilled.¹⁹⁴ The main *raison d'être* behind the opposition of the Franco-German axis Europeanists is generally argued to prevent the establishment of the US structural dominance in the Middle East.

The division between the Europeanists and Atlanticists continued on the question whether the UN or a US-UK military administration would play a key role in Iraq's postwar future. In the NATO meeting in Brussels between the foreign ministers of the US and the 23 European countries, the Europeanists argued that with the end of the Iraqi War the UN should have the responsibility in terms of establishing peace in Iraq and restructuring it. On the other hand the Atlanticists stated that this responsibility should be in the hands of the coalition forces, i.e. of the US and the UK.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 36. See also, Elaine Sciolino, "France and Germany Call for Long Inspections", *the New York Times*, (25 February 2003).

Considering the US-led war in Iraq, it is generally argued that CFSP would be effective policy and than the EU could be a coherent security actor if the EU Member States act together and speak in one voice. However, the division between the Europeanists and Atlanticists has delayed and even impeded the development of both CFSP and CESDP. As it can be seen in the following parts regarding the EU's position in US-led war in Iraq, these dividing parts will come together with respect to the reconstruction of Iraq.

4.2.2. A New EU Division: 'Old Europe vs. New Europe'

The new intra-EU division, known as 'Old Europe vs. New Europe', came to the fore with US-led war in Iraq.¹⁹⁵ Regarding the opposite behavior of Franco-German axis over the US-led Iraq crisis, in a press conference on 22 January 2003, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld declared, "That's old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today the center of gravity is shifting to the east"¹⁹⁶ On 7 February 2003, A group of 10 Central and Eastern countries, which are Slovakia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Romania, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Latvia and Macedonia, called as 'Vilnius 10', issued a joint letter to support the US position on Iraq.¹⁹⁷ In this letter, it was stated that:

"...Our countries understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend our shared values. The trans-Atlantic community, of which we are a part, must stand together to face the threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and dictators with weapons of mass destruction..."¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵ The 'US-led Iraq War' might be used just as the 'Iraq War' in the thesis.

¹⁹⁶ Sedivy J. and Zaborowski M., op.cit. p. 188.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Mustafa Türkeş, "New vs Old Europe: Contested Hegemonies and the EEC's Dual-Guarantee Strategy", in *International Problems*, (No.3, in September 2005), p. 7

Especially France criticized this attitude of the CEE states. French President Chirac even described the attitudes of the CEE states as ‘childish’ and also ‘dangerous’ because for him, this kind of behaviors would damage the EU’s position in the international arena. Also, he warned all in general and Romania and Bulgaria in particular in that they would loose their chances of joining the EU.¹⁹⁹ The pro-US stance of CEE states were also explained in the paper of Juergen Habermas and Jacques Derrida as these states “immaturity” and their somehow “infantile” attachment to national security, which would likely change with the process of EU enlargement.²⁰⁰

On the other side, on 30 January 2003, eight European leaders including Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the UK, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and called as ‘The Gang of Eight’ signed an open letter of solidarity backing US policy towards Iraq without consulting France or Germany or the Greek Presidency.²⁰¹

As a result, the US-led war in Iraq led to divisions between EU Member States, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld called this as a division between ‘Old Europe’ including France and Germany who opposed US-led war against Iraq and ‘New Europe’ including the Member States and Candidate States supporting US-led war against Iraq. Since they support the US position in Iraq case, the eight of the

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p.8

²⁰⁰ Longhurst & Zaborowski, op.cit., p. 384. This definition was quoted by them from Habermas, J. & Derrida J., “Unsere Erneuerung”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31.05.2003

²⁰¹ Kaya, op.cit., p.138

ten new EU Member States (CEEs) are even called as “Trojan Horses” that seem to be used by the US.²⁰²

According to Longhurst and Zaborowski, it is clear that the support of CEE states for the US policy on Iraq boosted the US’s position and undermined the Franco-German claim to speak on behalf of the whole Europe. Moreover, the CEE states are contributing to the stabilization in Iraq such as Poland had the third largest military contingent in Iraq apart from the US and the UK.²⁰³ In this sense, the CEEs should not be remained absent from the discussions on the future of the transatlantic relations and also the EU’s security actorness. Indeed, it was believed that in the post-Cold War era, relations with the near abroad, especially the Eastern Europe, would represent both a challenge and an opportunity for the EU either as a security actor or not.

In terms of security issues, the recent Iraq crisis demonstrate us the possible division within the EU on foreign policy matters in the wake of the inclusion of new members. Therefore, one can argue that the EU will be confronted with many difficulties after the enlargement process in terms of formulating the CFSP.

Longhurst and Zaborowski also added this issue another dimension and argued that the pro-US positions of the CEE states during the US-led war in Iraq have demonstrated that Western European countries had misunderstood the CEE politics and identities from the very beginning. For example, ‘Old Europeans’ is argued to fail to see pro-US positions of the CEE states as consistent with the general line of their foreign policies since 1989. Indeed, there were deep historical and

²⁰² Simon Serfaty, “EU-U.S. Relations Beyond Iraq: Setting the Terms of Complementarity”, CSIS Europe Program: EURO-FOCUS (Vol 9, No. 3, April 11, 2003), available at www.csis.org/europe, p.3

²⁰³ Longhurst & Zaborowski, *op.cit.*, p. 381

cultural tenets underlying behind the Atlanticism of CEE states. Therefore, it can be safely said that most of these states will exhibit pro-US tendencies in the EU and will certainly support the continuation of the US's involvement in European security.²⁰⁴

On the other side, according to Türkeş, there are several reasons behind the tension between the 'Old' and 'New' Europe:

- The CEE states do not want to be merely dependent on the Franco-German axis with regard to the military technology and security policies.
- The Franco-German axis is reluctant to share their military technology and their political leadership within the EU with the CEE states.
- The CEE states do not want to be dependent again on a single power because of their past experiences. Türkeş states that the CEE states would like to balance the Franco-German axis with the US in the context of the US-led war against Iraq. The policy pursued by the CEE states is labeled as 'dual guarantee strategy', which has two pillars. In this sense, is argued that the CEE states wish the EU to provide soft security guarantee on the one hand and the NATO/US to provide hard defence guarantee on the other side.²⁰⁵

It can be easily said that the division between the European powers has created negative effects in terms of that process. Since there was not a common European position on Iraq, the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy initiative had not become successful so far during the crisis.

Thus, Iraq Crisis once again showed that, in order to be an effective actor in global politics, the EU should develop a coherent foreign and security policy. The

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 12

division among EU Member States during the Iraq Crisis prevented them to adopt a common position and also, this prevented them to influence US foreign policy and affect the course of events. Therefore, lack of coherence among them toward the Iraq Crisis undermined their effectiveness.

Although many authors argue that the US-led war in Iraq results in death of the EU's security policy ambitions because of the divisions among EU Member States, there are also arguments about it's having a positive impact. Anand Menon, asserted that the undeniable divisions between EU Member States during the Iraq Crisis led to renewal of efforts to improve the ESDP.²⁰⁶ For him, developments following the US-led war in Iraq provide grounds for optimism about the potential future effectiveness of the ESDP. He mentioned that there were three main contributions. Firstly, the recent Iraq case served to make explicit the various competing agendas and ambitions of the member states. Secondly, the balance between the EU's military and non-military components and the extent of EU military ambitions has been clarified. Finally the Iraq crisis underlined the need for consensus among the larger member states if the EU external policies were to function effectively.²⁰⁷

In line with these arguments, Steven Everts, Daniel Keohane and Fraser Cameron argues that Iraq Crisis has been a wake up call for Europeans and they thought that the EU's handling of Iraq was an terrible failure and there are signs that Europeans are learning from that fiasco and are moving ahead, the Convention on the Future of Europe, European Security Strategy and latest developments in ESDP were

²⁰⁶ Anand Menon, "From Crisis to Catharsis: ESDP After Iraq", *International Affairs*, (Vol. 80, No. 4, 2004), pp. 631-632.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

signs of European's efforts to regroup and analyze what is wrong and adjust accordingly after failure in Iraq Crisis.²⁰⁸

4.2.3. The EU Crisis Management in the Recent Iraq Case

The US-led war in Iraq of 2003 is increasingly seen by as a real watershed for the EU as a foreign and security actor. The EU has been involved in almost all aspects of the effort to bring stability, democracy and prosperity to Iraq as it is mentioned below.²⁰⁹

Military and police: A number of EU Member States are participating in the Multi-National Force in Iraq. Some are conducting police and security personnel training operations outside Iraq. (See details in part 4.2.4)

Coordination and outreach: The EU has worked with the other international actors in mobilizing additional contributions to reconstruction and in coordinating international efforts to support Iraq. The EU hosted the first donors' conference in Madrid in October 2003 and promoted the establishment of the *International Reconstruction Facility for Iraq* (IRFFI), which has been crucial in generating international contributions for reconstruction of the country.²¹⁰

Funds pledged and delivered: At the Madrid Conference the EU collectively pledged €1.2 billion. The European Community (EC) pledge amounted to €200

²⁰⁸ Fraser Cameron, "Repairing the Damage: European Disunity and Global Crisis: The New Challenges To EU External Policy After Iraq, After Iraq- Can there really be a Future for CFSP?", *Issue Paper 9*, 18.03.2003, <http://www.theepc.net/en/default.asp>

²⁰⁹ For more detailed information on the EU's contributions in Iraq, it can be offered to see EU-Iraq relations website: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iraq/intro/index.htm and EU-Iraq humanitarian aid website: http://europa.eu.int/comm/echo/field/iraq/index_en.htm

²¹⁰ The Council Secretariat Factsheet, "EU Support For Iraq", June 2005. <http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom> accessed n 12.05.2006

million for 2003-2004 for reconstruction and €100 million for humanitarian needs. It has since then deployed €320 million with a view to restoring key public services, boosting employment and reducing poverty as well as strengthening governance, civil society and human rights. EC reconstruction assistance for 2003-2004 has primarily been channeled via the IRFFI, the multi-donor trust fund managed by the UN and the World Bank.²¹¹

Medium-term strategy: The EU adopted a medium-term strategy for Iraq put forward by EU High Representative Solana and the European Commission in June 2004, based on the European Commission's communication "The European Union and Iraq – a Framework for Engagement".

Building ties with the new Iraq: The EU has developed good relations with the Iraqi authorities, demonstrated by the participation of interim Prime Minister Allawi at the European Council in November 2004. On this occasion Member States endorsed a package of support including measures ranging from the perspective of a EU-Iraq agreement to continued reconstruction assistance.

Trade and cooperation: The EU supports Iraq's candidacy for WTO membership as part of the process of integrating Iraq into the region and the international community. As our political dialogue develops, a Trade and Co-operation Agreement could be the framework of future EU-Iraq relations.

Electoral support: The European Commission worked closely with the UN and the Iraqi Independent Electoral Commission in the preparations for the January 2005 parliamentary elections and provided a specific package of support for an amount of €31.5 million.

²¹¹ Ibid.

Supporting the UN in Iraq: As part of the EU's commitment to underline the UN's central role in the long-term reconstruction and stabilization of Iraq, the EU is providing funding for the UN Protection Force.

Assistance program for 2005:²¹² The European Commission adopted a new Assistance Programme for Iraq for 2005 in March with a budget of €200 million, supporting the following needs.

Provision of essential services and jobs (€130million): The funds, also to be channeled through the IRFFI, will continue supporting activities to restore and strengthen delivery of education and health services, increasing employment opportunities, and developing administrative capacity in the Iraqi administration. This support will be important in helping the new government meet the needs and expectations of the Iraqi population.

Capacity-building in energy and trade (€15million): The EU will offer its genuine expertise and know-how to public and private actors in form of bilateral technical assistance in key sectors for growth such as energy, trade and investment with the aim to increase the capacity of Iraqi institutions.

Support for the political process (€10million): Funds have been earmarked to continue supporting the political process, the development of civil society and respect of human rights. In this area, the EU stands ready to assist and provide experts, for example, to:

- The Constitutional process, in co-operation with the UN;
- Future elections, including a possible EU observation mission on the ground if invited by the Iraqi government and if security circumstances permit;

²¹² Full text of the program is available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iraq/doc/c_2005_718.pdf

- In addition €45million have been set aside allowing for a flexible response to changing circumstances on the ground and responding to the needs identified by the newly elected Iraqi government.
- Primary focus will be on strengthening the Iraqi institutions.²¹³

4.2.4. The EU Rule of Law Mission for Iraq: EUJUST LEX

The European Union is committed to a secure, stable, unified, prosperous and democratic Iraq that will make a positive contribution to the stability of the region. It supports the country in its efforts towards economic, social and political reconstruction in the framework of the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1546 of 8 June 2004.²¹⁴

In this framework, the EU Council has decided on February 21, 2005 to launch an integrated **rule-of-law mission for Iraq- “EUJUST LEX”** –which would be operational by 1 July 2005, for a period of 12 months. The mission has been launched in the scope of the ESDP.

The mission consists of integrated training in the fields of management and criminal investigation and whereby nearly 800 Iraqi cadres, judges, police officers, high-level personnel would be trained in the rule of law. An amount of €10 Million from the EU budget is intended to cover the common costs of the mission.

²¹³ *European Union Factsheet*, June 2005, op.cit., p. 3

²¹⁴ Ibid., p. 1

In March 2005, the EU Member States agreed formally on the EUJUST LEX mission²¹⁵ and Mr. Stephen White, a senior police officer, was appointed to lead it. The training program, then, started on July 2005. Number of 21 Member States have been involved in the project, which is known as the largest the EU has ever organized to strengthen the rule of law in a third country. The major objective is to make the Iraqi familiar with the standards of police work and law enforcement within the EU.²¹⁶

Javier Solana has stressed on the importance of this new civilian mission and stated “EUJUST LEX demonstrates the EU’s commitment to a secure, stable, unified, prosperous and democratic Iraq that will make a positive contribution to the stability of the region.”²¹⁷

4.3. Future Prospects on the EU’s security actorness

4.3.1. European Security Strategy

The US-led war in Iraq of 2003 is increasingly seen as a real watershed for the EU as a foreign and security actor. In the first half of 2003, the EU and, in particular, the UK, France and Germany seemed to be so deeply divided on the question of use of military force. However, by the end of 2003, the momentum of European integration in security and defense appeared to have rapidly improved in an unprecedented way.

²¹⁵ The details can be seen in EU official document titled as “Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP of 7 March 2005 on the EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq” in *Official Journal of the EU*, 09.03.2005

²¹⁶ “Rule of Law Mission: the EUJUST LEX Mission for Iraq”, *ESDP Newsletter*, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Issue 1, December 2005, pp.26-27.

In December 2003, the EU member states agreed on a European Security Strategy that conveyed an image of Europe as a responsible and ethical power – *a force for good* – seeking to strengthen justice (human rights) and order (effective multilateralism) in international society.²¹⁸

The European Security Strategy (ESS) was partly a response to the Union's disorder over Iraq and partly a response to the assertive US national security strategy of September 2002 with its emphasis on "pre-emptive strikes." The Member States gave Javier Solana, the High Representative for CFSP, a mandate to address the issue of where the Union stands as a global actor and how it sees its evolving security instruments meeting that vision.²¹⁹

A security strategy is a policy-making tool which, on the basis of given values and interests, outlines long-term overall objectives to be achieved and the basic categories of instruments to be applied to that end. It serves as a reference framework for day-to-day policy-making in a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex international environment.

Member States hold widely divergent views as to the ambitions of the Union as a player on the international stage, the desirable degree of EU autonomy and the instruments and capabilities the Union should develop. There is no common strategic vision behind the existing – but incomplete – consensus on the need to develop more effective military capabilities for the EU. As a consequence, EU external policy lacks direction, determination and consistency. Faced with the initiatives of a dominant global player, the US that is both very determined and very powerful and does

²¹⁸ Lisbeth Aggestam, "The 'Big Three' and the European Foreign Policy: A Force for Good?", Paper for presentation at NUPI, Oslo, 29 May 2005

²¹⁹ Fraser Cameron & Gerrard Quille, "The Future of CFSP", EPC Working Paper N-11, September 2004

possess an explicit strategy – the National Security Strategy adopted in September 2002 –, the EU is necessarily restricted to a reactive role. Without a clear security strategy of its own, the EU cannot escape the American framework of thought and promote its own policy priorities in terms of both objectives and instruments.

In this sense, a security strategy would not only provide the reference framework that is needed for day to day policy-making – and that should determine the instruments and capabilities that are being developed, rather than the other way around – but would also bring political benefits.²²⁰ If consensus can be found on the Union's general approach to security and on what it will and will not do, those Member States that are now reluctant about the Union's security dimension, might be persuaded to fully support converting the Union into an effective international player.

The issue of the EU's being a player in international security arena was finally welcomed by the European Council in the document submitted by Solana, titled as 'A Secure Europe in a Better World'.²²¹ This document was first proposed as a draft at the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 and then submitted at the December 2004 European Council in Brussels. In this document, Solana basically argued that 'Security is a precondition of development'. And then he has mentioned today's major threats for the world security as well as the European security and policy instruments and methods fighting against these threats like terrorism, proliferation weapons of mass destruction (PWMD), regional conflicts, organized

²²⁰ Sven Biscop, 'In Search of a Strategic Concept for the ESDP'. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, (Vol. 7, No. 4, 2002), pp. 473-490.

²²¹ Solana, J., "European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World", December 2003, ISS-EU, Paris at : <http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf>

crime and bad governance of some countries...etc. As it is an outline that needs to be fleshed out, the document naturally sums up the principles and broad objectives for EU policies without going into extensive detail.²²²

In their article, Biscop & Coolsaet have analyzed motives behind this document.²²³ According to them, the EU initiative to define a security strategy is not the first attempt at recasting the concept of security. In response to the changing security environment and new assessment of security threats, a number of States and international organizations have sought new ways to deal with security. The use of politico-military instruments can deal effectively with immediate security threats, by ending violence or preventing its eruption, but underlying causes of instability, conflict and terrorism demand a much broader, long-term and permanent policy of conflict prevention. 9/11 event has demonstrated that possession of the greatest military might on earth, including the most advanced technology, cannot by itself guarantee security.”²²⁴

In the ESS, while describing change of international security environment, Solana has pointed out that *“The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own”* and added that *“As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product*

²²² *Ibid.*, p.19

²²³ Sven Biscop & Rik Coolsaet, “The World is the Stage-A Global Security Strategy for the European Union”, *Policy papers N-8*, (December 2003)

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9

(GNP), the European Union is inevitably a global player...it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.”²²⁵

In the ESS, the new security challenges, which are defined as *more diverse, less visible and less predictable*, have been stated as;

- Terrorism: (The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism like attacks of Al Qaeda)
- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (PWMD) (Prevention of Biological, chemical or radiological weapons and spread of missile technology)
- Regional Conflicts, (Problems such as in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region, the Korean Peninsula, Bosnia, Congo, KKTC)
- State Failure,: (Bad governance-corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability)
- Organized Crime: (Cross-border trafficking in drugs, women,, ,illegal migrants and weapons.²²⁶

The ESS suggests that the EU has three key strategic objectives in applying its external instruments to meet contemporary security challenges:²²⁷

- extending the zone of security on Europe’s periphery;
- supporting the emergence of a stable and equitable international order, particularly an effective multilateral system;
- seeking effective countermeasures to new and old threats.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.1

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-5

²²⁷ Cameron & Quille, *op.cit.*, p.8

First of all, the document points out that the EU must extend the zone of security around Europe, for ‘even in an era of globalization, geography is still important’ and conflicts, weak States, etc., on EU borders produce spill-over effects for the EU. Therefore ‘a ring of well-governed countries’ must be established. In this sense, the EU is assumed to have responsibility and take the lead in ensuring a stable neighborhood. The most suitable instrument to that end would be the comprehensive Neighborhood Policy proposed by the Commission. The concrete benefits offered in that framework are not only promotion of economic and political reforms via conditional assistance but also is the substantial politico-military cooperation, in order to establish joint mechanisms for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. The Neighborhood Policy’s overall objectives would thus be:²²⁸

- preventing conflicts in EU neighborhood & acts of aggression against the EU;
- settling ongoing disputes and conflicts;
- establishing close economic and political partnerships based on shared values,
- prosperity and security;
- controlling migration and all forms of illegal trafficking into the EU;
- protecting the security of EU citizens living abroad.

Secondly, the ESS clearly stress that the European security and prosperity increasingly depend on an “effective multilateralism”. In this sense, development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order constitute the main bases of a ‘true’ multilateral international system. According to ESS, the UN has to be placed at the center and

²²⁸ Biscop & Coolsaet, op.cit., p.20

also it has to fulfill its responsibility. Other key institutions for global governance are the WTO, the international institutions, the ICC and regional organizations such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union. On the other hand, the quality of international security depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation.

Solana states in this document, *“The best protection for European security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.”*²²⁹ It means that the EU has to pursue a well-planned neighbourhood policy that includes trade and development policies, assistance programs and funds for better governance, for better education and for better socio-economic structures in countries outside the EU zone. As the world’s largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the European Union and its Member States should be ready to pursue this policy to make the some outsider and/or isolated countries rejoin the international community.

As a third objective, Solana has mentioned in the ESS that the EU should develop instruments to respond to cases in which states do not live up to their commitments while seeking effective countermeasures to new and old threats. Permanent monitoring of potentially destabilizing events must provide the basis for early warning and conflict prevention, using whole range of instruments available to the EU, including sanctions and non-coercive use of military instruments (e.g. observer and peacekeeping missions and interventions at the request of State

²²⁹ Solana, op.cit., p.10

authorities). Moreover, whether applied to new or old threats, these countermeasures have certain common elements; recognizing that the first line of defense lies beyond EU frontiers; acknowledging that inaction is not an option; understanding that a military response is not always appropriate but might form one element of a combined response. In this way, the EU can engage in the systematic political engagement of “prevention.”²³⁰

In European approach to security, the coercive use of military power is considered as a last resort but it does not mean that the military power will never be used. As it is stressed in the ESS, the coercive use of military power should be considered only if all other means have clearly failed and the authorization of the UN Security Council regarding the case is taken prior to action being taken. Since the Article 51 of the UN Charter allows military action by way of self defence only after an armed attack occurs, the Security Council is the only body that can legally - and legitimately- decide on any other form of coercive military action. Any deviation from this rule would pave the way for a complete dismantling of the Charter and the multilateral system.

In the final part of the ESS document, the implications of this proposed strategic orientation are identified in terms of instruments and means. In the document, Solana underlines that the EU, as a global actor, ‘has the potential to make an impact on an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.’

In order to realize that potential, it is argued that the EU needs to be,

²³⁰Fraser Cameron, “The European Union’s Growing International Role: Closing Capability-Expectations Gap?”, *Paper Presented to Conference on the European Union in International Affairs*, (National Europe Center Paper No. 15, 3-4 July 2002), p.9

- ‘more active’ in using all instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities;
- ‘more coherent’, in order to use its instruments under a unity of command;
- ‘more capable’, by means of combining not only the political and economic resources but also the military and civilian resources of the Member States.

On the other hand, the ESS underlines the necessity of ‘working with partners’, i.e. international organizations and key actors and regions. Among these, the transatlantic relationship is defined as ‘irreplaceable’. By means of acting together, ‘the EU and the US can be a formidable force for good in the world.’²³¹ The position of the EU in this relationship is defined as ‘effective and balanced partnership with the US’. Furthermore, the EU has to develop links with every part of the world since the EU’s historical background, geography and cultural ties with many countries. In particular, Russia, Japan, China, Canada and India can be counted as other ‘strategic partners.’ As international organizations, the EU has to be closer relations with NATO in politico-military field and with the UN in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management.

In the final part, the document highlights the EU’s lack of military capabilities or in a better sense EU’s reluctance to develop its military capabilities until the US-led war in Iraq. In the global environment, politico-military power does play a more prominent role than the European continent, so there is no escaping the fact that projection of military power, within the bounds of the UN Charter, seems to be necessary to ensure peace and stability. In order to constitute a more active,

²³¹ Solana, op.cit., pp.13-14. See also Cameron, op.cit., in note 221, pp. 24-26

capable and coherent security and defense policies, Solana mentions also his future prospects regarding to a new institution titled as the European Defence Agency.

In conclusion, the ESS that can be considered as the last preparatory step before a fully-fledged security strategy clearly builds on the “European way” in international relations. On the other side, the European comprehensive security strategy contrasts with the US National Security Strategy (USNSS)²³² and certainly with recent US policies. Although the ESS and the USNSS share an emphasis on threats, threats are the dominant theme throughout in the NSS document. Such that, all policy areas are considered in the light of the fight against proliferation of WMDs and ‘rogue states’ and particularly of the ‘war’ against terrorism – a struggle that ‘will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over a long period of time’ -, referred to as the US strategic priority’. On the contrary, the ESS document advocates a much more positive and comprehensive approach. When the both documents are compared in terms of their general arguments, the European and American ways of understanding on global security issues can be seen easily. For example, according to the NSS, the world is dangerous and therefore the emphasis is on defense policy and the use of military means, including pre-emptively.²³³ The US document also stresses unilateralism though it uses the words of ‘allies, partners or friends’ in the text frequently and it is implied that US can act apart when her interests and unique responsibilities require as it can be seen in the Iraq case.

²³²“The National Security Strategy of the US”, (September 2002), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>

²³³ The NSS has a wider interpretation of Article 51 such that it allows ‘anticipatory action to defend us, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack’. In fact, this is not pre-emptive action, but preventive war.

On the other hand, one of the most important concept in the ESS is the multilateralism and the cooperation and partnership with other international institutions and states are mentioned as the basis of the ‘European way’ of fighting against all kind of threats, of coping with the problematic issues and that of ensuring peace, stability and prosperity in the world.

4.3.2. Improving Capabilities: The Headline Goal 2010

There has not been consensus on what level of force Europeans envisage and under what circumstances force should be used, yet. Furthermore, it has long been argued that the Petersberg Tasks have become an unhelpfully empty concept.²³⁴ This was finally recognized in the ESS and the Thessaloniki European Council acknowledged that the EU operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks was still limited. Afterwards the new 2010 Headline Goal was adopted at the Brussels European Council in June 2004.²³⁵ The essence of new Headline Goal takes place in the following statement:

Building on the Helsinki Headline and capability goals and recognizing that existing shortfalls still need to be addressed, Member States have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond to with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union. This includes humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping task, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including operations, the support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The EU must be able to act before a crisis occurs and preventive engagement can avoid that a situation deteriorates. The EU must retain the ability to conduct concurrent operations thus sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement.²³⁶

²³⁴ Cameron & Quille op.cit.. in note 213, p.11. See also, Clarke, M., Garden, T., & Quille, G., “Achieving The Helsinki Headline Goal,” *Centre for Defence Studies*, (King’s College London, November 2001)

²³⁵ Council of the European Union, ESDP Presidency Report, Brussels 15 June 2004.

²³⁶ Ibid.

The new 2010 Headline Goal states that today's security threats and challenges are multifaceted and require both civilian and military responses and it recognized that existing shortfalls still need to be addressed following a review under three categories; the Headline Goal Catalogue, the Headline Force Catalogue and the Headline Progress Catalogue. It outlines a process for achieving these objectives with some specific milestones:²³⁷

- to establish during the second half of 2004 a civil-military cell within the EU Member States as well as the capacity to rapidly set-up an operation center should the need arise for certain operations;
- to establish the Agency in the field of defence capability development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency) during 2004.
- to implement by 2005 the creation of an EU strategic lift joint coordination as a step towards achieving full capacity and efficiency by 2010 in strategic lift;
- to transform (in particular for airlift) the EACC into the EAC by 2004 and to develop (between some Member States) a European Airlift command by 2010;
- to complete by 2007 the establishment of the Battle Groups including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and debarkation assets;
- to acquire the availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and escort by 2008;

²³⁷ Cameron & Quille op.cit., in note 213, p.13

- to improve the communications at the levels of EU operations by developing appropriate compatibility and network linkage of all communications equipment and assets by 2010; to develop quantitative benchmarks and criteria for national forces declared to the Headline Goal in the field of deployability and in the field of multinational training.

These objectives do not seem to be unrealistic targets. However, having been failed to reach the targets of previous Headline Goal brings about question marks in minds. In this sense, it remains to be seen whether the Member States will have greater success in achieving the 2010 goals.

4.3.3. A New Instrument of the EU: The Battle Groups

The EU defense ambition was disappointed in the mid-nineties following the frustrating lack of European activity in face of the first Balkan war. After the US-led war in Iraq, the EU realized again its weakness in its defense dimension.

Although “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces,” was taken into consideration as the need for the EU in Saint Malo Summit, the first concrete step was taken in 1999 Helsinki Summit under the title of ‘Headline Goal’. By means of this document, it was aimed that deploy up to 60.000 persons with air and naval elements within the space of 60 days, by 2003. However, difficulties in building up operational forces of that size lead to a more rapid European response option to crisis situations in the shape of ***battle groups***.²³⁸

²³⁸ A battle group is the smallest self-sufficient military-operational formation that can be deployed and sustained in a theatre of operations; The concept draws upon standard NATO doctrine, for instance the NATO Response Force (NRF) ‘land component is a land brigade tactically configured with 5 Battle Groups.

The idea of developing such a concept was mentioned at the Franco-British Summit at the Le Touquet in 4 February 2003. At that meeting the two countries referred to the need for joint tactical groups to be created so as to strengthen the EU rapid reaction capability to support United Nations operations. The experience of Operation Artemis in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)- the first EU-led military operation launched in June 2003 at the request of the UN Security Council- is a typical scenario for which the battle groups may be deployed.²³⁹

The Franco-British proposal- referred to as ‘Battle Groups’ by the British or ‘Tactical Groups’ by the French- was endorsed by Germany in February 2004. Within the space of two months EU defence ministers approved it and then it was formally launched by the 22 November 2004 Military Capabilities Commitment Conference. According to this Conference’s Declaration on European Military Capabilities: “Battle groups will be employable across the full range of tasks listed in the TEU Art. 17.2, and those identified in the European Security Strategy, in particular in tasks of combat forces in crisis management, bearing in mind their size”. In this sense, according to Gerrard Quille, the “Battle Group” concept forms an important link between the previous ‘quantitative’ approach to improving European defence capabilities and the new ‘qualitative’ emphasis of the Headline Goal 2010.²⁴⁰ The Battle Group concept is seen as a key “mobilizing” element in pursuing the Headline Goal 2010.²⁴¹ A Battle Group consists of highly trained units (1.500 soldiers each) – including all combat and service support as well as deployability and

²³⁹ Gerrard Quille, “‘Battle Groups’ to Strengthen EU Military Crisis Management?”, *European Security Review*, (April 2003) available at <http://www.isis-europe.org>

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Cameron & Quille op.cit., in note 213, p.13

sustainability assets. These should be available within 15 days notice and sustainable for at least 30 days (extendable to 120 days by rotation). They should be flexible enough to promptly undertake operations in distant crises areas (i.e. rogue states), under, but not exclusively, a UN mandate, and to conduct combat missions in an extremely hostile environment (mountains, desert, jungle, etc).²⁴² As such, they should prepare the ground for larger, more traditional peacekeeping forces, ideally provided by the UN or the Member States. Moreover, European NATO countries, which are candidates for accession to the EU can also participate in a EU Battle Group. They should also be compatible with NATO Response Force (NRF).

“Battle Group” concept, which has been generated as a new instrument of the EU, has been accepted as a positive development within the EU Member States. Despite the unconditional support of the EU Member States regarding the Battle Groups, there are also question marks in many circles’ mind whether it will be turned into a reality or not. For example; Center for Strategic and International Studies has produced the report “European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap between Strategy and Capabilities” and pointed to several problems: “While many in and outside of Europe are hopeful that the Battlegroups will spur EU members to develop the expeditionary capability, doubts have been raised about the viability of the overall concept.”²⁴³

First, it is unclear whether EU member states will acquire the strategic lift needed to deploy the Battle groups in a timely fashion. Second, questions remain about the Battle groups’ relationship with the NATO Response Force and the extent

²⁴² *Ibid.*, p.14

²⁴³ “EU Battle Groups”, published on 30 November 2005 and updated on 6 December 2005, available at <http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/eu-battlegroups> accessed on 03.02.2006

to which their development might distract from the EU's 2010 Headline Goals. Third, there are competing views on how and when the Battle groups will be used, with some countries envisioning a full spectrum of future missions and others suggesting that the Battlegroups only be used for low-intensity missions. Finally, details on how the Battlegroups might work with or under UN authority have yet to be sketched out.

4.4. A new proposal for the EU's Crisis Management

In the post-Cold War era, the 'crisis' definitions as the definition of 'security and peace' has changed dramatically in West and this shows that the traditional aspects of security and defense will play a minor role in the future as it recently does. In this sense, it will not be wrong to argue that the NATO-centric view, which has been dominant security argument in the post-Cold war era, is no longer relevant because of today's broader and multi-faceted security environment including the ESDP, CFSP and other European Security arrangements.

When we look at the phases of development in European crisis management within the CESDP and that how the idea of civilian and military crisis management emerged and concreted in successive EU summits after 1992, it can be argued that the future of European crisis management looks promising indeed because many concrete steps has been taken until now and it seems to be continued in the future. Moreover, EU's commitments on its crisis management capability like the Battle Groups under the Headline Goal 2010 and the crisis management operations within and out of European borders, some of which were successfully completed have lead to increase in expectations.

While developing crisis management instruments, a coherent and consistent internal body within the EU is also important for success in future prospects. The discrepancies among the big three –the UK, France and Germany- are frequently seen in the area of foreign and security and recently in defence policies because of their diverging political interests and their ongoing leadership competition. However, history proves that a stronger and more influential European voice can only be based on consensus among all participating countries.

The role of “Big Three” in the post-September 11 attacks and during the Iraqi crisis was not so positive. For example, while these states organized mini-summits in order to develop future steps of the EU fighting against terrorism and managing the other internal and external crisis, these mini-summits on the other hand led to divisions among EU Member States especially between bigger and smaller states and undermined the solidarity and coherence among EU Member States.

There is no doubt that the EU wants to play a bigger role in the international political arena. Regarding the EU’s desire to be a more effective international actor, it was proposed that a new posture would be necessary so during the debates on draft EU Constitution, “The EU Foreign Minister” post has come to the EU agenda.

Steven Everts and Antonio Missiroli, in their article published in *International Herald Tribune* on 10 March 2004, went a step further and argued that if the EU wants to enhance its international role, one solution could be the establishment of an EU Security Council, which would operate as a steering board between the EU Council and the EU Foreign Minister, a post proposed in the draft constitution.²⁴⁴

²⁴⁴ Steven Everts and Antonio Missiroli, “Beyond the ‘Big Three’: To Claim a Global Role, the EU Needs its Own Security Council”, *International Herald Tribune*, (10 March 2004), available at <http://www.cer.org.uk>

They also underlined that the EU Security Council would be an effective body if only it has some fundamental characteristics.²⁴⁵

Firstly, a EU Security Council should be small, with no more than 10 seats, in order to prevent constant deadlock because it would be impossible to discuss or manage an international crisis in a body that has 25 seats, as the Council of Ministers will have after the EU's enlargement on May 1.

Secondly, France, Germany and Britain should have permanent seats. This would give them the status and visibility they deserve.

Thirdly, other member states would sit on the EU Security Council on the basis of a rotation system that would take into account their size, population, economic, diplomatic and military capabilities. In this way, countries like Italy, Spain and Poland, but also the Netherlands and Sweden, could all get an appropriate role and standing. Moreover, the smaller EU member states could also take part from time to time in the EU Security Council on a similar but less frequent rotation basis. In any case, all member states would always have a seat in the broader EU Council. Finally, the European Commission should also have a permanent seat on the EU Security Council, because of its substantial resources and policy-making role. In other words, the composition of the EU Security Council would combine elements of the UN Security Council, where some countries are recognized as "more equal" than others, and of the U.S. National Security Council, where all relevant agencies of the executive are represented.

A EU Security Council, as a new proposal for the improvement of EU's crisis management capabilities, could act as a permanent advisory body for the future EU

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

Foreign Minister, helping with decisions and initiatives.²⁴⁶ It could help to build a consensus inside the EU, thus speeding up formal decision-making, which would remain the preserve of the broader EU Council of Ministers. A EU Security Council could also help in crisis situations by executing guidelines and implementing decisions that had been adopted by all 25 members. In that case, representatives of the countries on the EU Security Council must act as EU emissaries, not as national officials. According to Evers and Missiroli, the main goal of a EU Security Council would be to give the whole EU all the relevant capabilities and ambitions to act effectively on the global stage. Without a EU Security Council - which could be established in the Constitution –, for them, the risk is that political energy and momentum will go outside the EU framework.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

CHAPTER 5

THE CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EU AS A SECURITY ACTOR

5.1. Actorness and Presence

There has been during the past twenty years an almost continuous debate about the nature of an international actor. The primary questions are, how do we recognize the actors in the system; are they merely states or can other entities also fall within the category of actor like the EU. The EU, generally defined as a *sui-generis* entity, has stayed in the middle of the theoretical debates regarding its international actorness. In International Relations literature, the question of 'actorness' has always been a fundamental one because the term actor is used as the unit that constitute political systems on the largest scale.

These debates range from realist conception of actorness, which takes *the states* at the center of the system and refuse to accept the EU as an actor, to the opposite ones, which argues that not the states but may be partially EU which deserves to be identified as an actor. On the other hand, there is a common denominator in the discussions of the EU's actorness, that is the issue of "autonomy". The concept of autonomy overlaps with EU's "actor capacity" which is perfectly defined by Gunnar Sjöstedt as the "capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system".²⁴⁷ Therefore, behavioral criteria of actorness are focusing mainly on internal dynamics and resources. In accordance with the

²⁴⁷ Charlotte Bretherton & John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 23

definition of actorness, Gunnar Sjostedt firstly assured that the EU meets two basic prerequisites for actorness, which are “being discernible from its environment” and “enjoying a minimal degree of internal cohesion”. Therefore, for him, the EU had a degree of autonomy necessary for it to be considered as international actor.²⁴⁸

Christopher Hill, following Gunnar Sjostedt, elaborated the features of an international actor, which are,²⁴⁹

- being delimited from others and from its environment,
- being autonomous in the sense of making its own laws and decisions,
- possessing certain structural prerequisites for action on international level, such as legal personality, a set of diplomatic agents and the capability to conduct negotiations with third parties.

Apart from Sjostedt and Hill, Bretherton and Vogler elaborated five basic requirements for actorness:²⁵⁰

- Shared commitment to a set of overarching values and principles.
- The ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies.
- The ability effectively to negotiate with other actors in the international system.
- The availability of and capacity to utilize policy instruments.
- Domestic legitimization of decision process and priorities, relating to external policy.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 37

²⁴⁹ Hill, *op.cit.*, in note 21, p. 309.

²⁵⁰ Bretherton and Vogler, *op.cit.*, p. 38.

Considering these prerequisites and the ever-changing international arena, Bretherton and Vogler conclude that the EU is an actor *sui-generis*. It is conceived as a “*multi-perspectival polity*” whose construction reflects both the experimentation of policy entrepreneurs and the opportunities afforded by the changing structures of international system. Essentially, it is problematic considering the EU as a single actor.²⁵¹

According to John Vogler, actorness implies “*volition*”. It is a measure of unit’s capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system. Over the past decade, the EU showed an aspiration to enhance its status as a distinct actor. Declarations to this effects are numerous- from the stated objective of the EU to assert its identity on the international scene (Art. 2, Treaty on European Union (TEU)) to the Commission’s ambitions, as articulated in Agenda 2000 – The Union must increase its influence on world affairs, promote values such as peace and security, democracy and human rights, provide aid for the least developed countries, defend its social model and establish its presence on world markets, prevent major damage to the environment and ensure sustainable growth with an optimum use of world resources. Collective action by the EU is an ever-increasing necessity.²⁵² The EU’s present position and actor role after the US-led war in Iraq and its future position are also well explained in the European Security Strategy approved in Brussels Summit in 2003.²⁵³

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 44

²⁵² John Vogler, “In the Absence of the Hegemon: EU Actorness and the Global Climate Change Regime”, *National Europe Center Paper*, No. 20.(3-4 July 2002)

²⁵³ See details in Chapter 4, part 4.3.1.

Bretherton and Vogler also claimed that the development of actorness might be regarded as a process, involving the interconnections between them – presence, opportunity and capability.

- *Presence* conceptualizes the relationship between the internal development of the EU and third party perceptions and expectations of the EU's role in world politics.
- *Opportunity* refers to factors in the external environment that enable or constrain purposive action.
- *Capability* refers to the capacity to formulate and implement external policy, both in developing a proactive policy agenda and in order to respond effectively to external expectations, demands and opportunities.²⁵⁴

'Presence' has been as a new concept firstly introduced by David Allen and Michael Smith. Allen and Smith's main argument is that Western Europe was neither a fully-fledged state-like actor nor a purely dependent phenomenon in the international arena; rather it was a variable and multidimensional presence playing an active role in some areas of international interaction and a less active one in others.²⁵⁵

On the other side, in the analysis of Allen and Smith, it is evident that presence serves as a substitute for, and extension of, the concept of actorness. In this sense, they argue that "a particular presence is defined by a combination of factors:

²⁵⁴ Bretherton and Vogler, op.cit., pp. 5-6 and p. 33

²⁵⁵ David Allen and Michael Smith, "The European Union's Security Presence: Barrier, Facilitator, or Manager?", in Carolyn Rhodes (ed.), The European Union in the World Community (Boulder-Cororado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 48

credentials and legitimacy, the capacity to act and mobilize resources, the place it occupies in the perceptions and expectations of policy makers.”²⁵⁶

According to Bretherton and Vogler, actorness relates to the capacity to act and presence is a function of being rather than action; presence manifests itself through subtle forms of influence, but it also produces tangible impacts.²⁵⁷ They also claimed that there is a relationship between actorness and presence, in that actorness logically presupposes presence, which is thus a precondition for actorness and thus presence may generate an active response from third parties, which in turn produces demands for action by the EU.²⁵⁸

In this sense, Bretherton and Vogler define the concept of presence as the ability to exert influence and then shaping the perceptions and expectations of other. Presence is a consequence of internal policies and processes. Various aspects of the EU’s evolution, in terms of deepening and widening have contributed to its international presence such as CAP, Single Market Program, EMU and especially enlargement have added to EU’s presence.²⁵⁹

On the other hand, of course, the presence can realize in a negative term. If the EU is perceived to internally divided and potentially incoherent and ineffective actions it shows the diminishing the presence of the Community. The EU’s internal division on whether taking place or not in the US-led war in Iraq can be seen as the latest example for diminishing presence in the international arena. However, the EU

²⁵⁶ Bretherton and Vogler, op.cit., p.33

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 6

aims to overcome its position by means of humanitarian aid and other civilian projects in this region.

Karen E. Smith asserted that the EU has a considerable presence in the international affairs and its internal policies affect other international actors, but the EU could not always translate its presence into actorness, or the ability to function actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system.²⁶⁰ Smith elaborated two reasons behind EU's inability to translate its presence into actorness: one of them is the complexity of the EU's decision-making machinery with three different pillars for making foreign policy decisions: the supranational EC pillar for decisions on trade and aid policy, the intergovernmental CFSP pillar for political decisions and the intergovernmental Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar for decisions on fighting international crime. The second one is that EU Member States should all agree that the EU should act in a given instance of international relations, but Member States do not always share common interests and this logic of diversity prevents the agreement on creating more supranational foreign policymaking machinery, as well as the making of common foreign policies within the current framework and this will prevent the EU to act coherently and effectively on the world stage.²⁶¹

Helene Sjursen asserted that building on the concepts of Presence and Actorness, both Brian White and Christopher Hill have suggested that the EU is best seen as a system of external relations.²⁶²

²⁶⁰ Karen E. Smith, "The European Union: A Distinctive Actor in International Relations", *The Brown Journal of International Affairs* (Vol. IX, Iss. 2, Winter/Spring 2003), p. 105.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Helene Sjursen, "Understanding The Common Foreign and Security Policy: Analytical Building

Brian White applied a model of Foreign Policy Analysis which he identifies as a European foreign policy system composed of three different types of European foreign policy; Community foreign policy which refers to the foreign economic policy dimension of European foreign policy and includes Common Commercial Policy, trade and development relations with third countries; Union foreign policy which refers to political dimensions of European foreign policy and the CFSP; national foreign policy which refers to the separate foreign policies of Member States that have continued to exist and indeed to flourish in 1990s.²⁶³

Christopher Hill regarded the EU as a system of external relations. According to this, the European countries represent a subsystem of the international system as a whole and that they are a system which generates international relations - collectively, individually, economically, politically rather than a clear-cut European foreign policy as such.²⁶⁴

According to Michael Smith, the EU can be accepted as having a performed foreign policy and he further argued that the CFSP/CESDP is a central element of this part-formed foreign policy in which a major part is also played by the economic diplomacy and foreign economic policy encapsulated in the activities of the EC as strictly defined.²⁶⁵ He also emphasized the significance of interplay of member state

Blocs”, *ARENA Working Papers*, (WP 03/9). <http://www.arena.uio.no>, p. 10.

²⁶³ Brian White, *Understanding European Foreign Policy*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp.40-41.

²⁶⁴ Hill, *op.cit.*, in note 21, p. 322.

²⁶⁵ Michael Smith, “The Framing of European Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Post-modern Policy Framework?”, *Journal of European Public Policy* (Vol. 10, No. 4, August 2003), p. 569.

interests and the demands of the European or global environments in explaining the shape of EU foreign policy.²⁶⁶

Michael Smith also conceptualized the EU's external policy-making as an evolving negotiated order. He also argued that within the administrative, institutional and political structures established over the life of the EU, there is a constant, rule governed process of negotiation between actors, which produces policy positions and international policy outcomes.²⁶⁷ Moreover, Smith claimed that this negotiated order that rests upon a rule-governed process of governance is very sensitive to external demands deriving from an increasingly globalized world.²⁶⁸ Smith put forward that European foreign policy cannot be assumed as a recognizable form of a quasi-state foreign policy, which might be identified by the modernist, or statist terms rather European foreign policy is a kind of post-modern or post-sovereign or extra-national foreign policy in which the multi-perspectival nature of the European project combines with the complexities of a globalized world to render fruitless the quest for a real foreign policy based on modernist assumptions of territoriality, of central government control and of the deployment of hard policy instruments.

Most analysts conclude that the EU has established a collective *presence* in international affairs. Presence refers to the capability of the EU to exert influence on non-members and therefore it is a result of internal processes and policies. As Smith and Allen points out, the EU has considerable structure, salience and legitimacy in

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Sjursen, op.cit., pp. 10-11.

²⁶⁸ Ben Tonra, "The European Union's Global Role", *FORNET Working Paper*, (FORNET Working Group 1: Theories and Approaches to the CFSP London School of Economics, 7/8 November 2003)

international politics. However, although the EU has a tangible presence in the economic sphere, in military sphere it has no tangible presence.

In Iraqi situation, EU had certain external constraints. In this respect we can say that there was no *opportunity* that enable or strengthen EU's actorness. The initiatives of Germany and France were failed with Britain and newcomer's engagement with US. Moreover, the divisions among the EU members have risked external perceptions of common foreign and security policy. Despite the presidency's efforts, it is a fact that CFSP have had very hard times during the Iraqi crisis.

Similarly, the EU's *capacity* to respond effectively to external expectations and opportunities also failed in Iraq situation. In this respect we can say that, EU's external political impact has also been failed. Ginsberg argues that, external political impact refers to the "effects of EFP activity on non members such that, the non members modify or change the direction or substance of a domestic or foreign policy that would not likely have occurred in the absence of the EU stimulus or EU stimulus accompanied by stimuli from other international actors". Moreover that, "non-member's interests are beneficially or adversely affected by EFP action or inaction".

In Iraqi situation, US had not changed its direction or substance of its domestic foreign policy by the decisions taken with the efforts of Council Presidency that there was a need for a UN resolution for an operation on Iraq. Moreover, with this decision neither of the non-members was beneficially or adversely affected. Therefore Iraqi situation could be put into the category of "nil political impact" in Ginsberg's article.

5.2. Civilian and/or Military Actorness of the EU

The EU, a distinctive, sui generis actorness and presence in international arena, has arguably a 'civilian power' role as a traditional projection. Despite the general assumption that the EU's being a civilian power, the definitions on the capability of an international actor in security and defense is still problematic. This part will mainly analyze the argument that the EU has not been a *classical* international actor in security issues, especially in the military terms (hard security) but has been a 'civilian power' in the international system.

Debates on whether the EU is a 'civilian' power or a 'military' power has started since 1970s and that continued during the 1980s and 90s. Today this debate is still on the agenda of many scholars because of recent developments in the European Security and Defence Policy- including notably the intention to set up the *Battle Groups*.

On the other hand there were some scholars who were suspicious about the EU's gaining a security and defense mission like NATO or other similar organizations because of its traditional projection of a 'civilian power' role. However, notion of 'civilian power' is still a controversial issue for many scholars.

At the beginning of the 1970s, Duchene introduced the term "civilian power" to characterize (western) Europe's position in the world and argued mainly that the EC is and ought to be a civilian power and; as such, could serve as a non-military model of international power and influence that might help to transform international relations.²⁶⁹ Duchene also underlines that a united and 'civilian' Europe may be well

²⁶⁹ White, *op.cit.*, p.152

placed to play a stabilizing role on the world scene by means of using non-military means so Europe does not need to become a military superpower.²⁷⁰

However, in 1980s, *the Europe puissance* conceptualization has become dominant and alternative conceptions such as ‘civilian power’ have been criticized. According to this conceptualization, “Europe is not only (becoming) an economic giant, but also a politico-military power.”²⁷¹ Hedley Bull, from a realist perspective, argued Duchene’s notion of a ‘civilian power’ is a contradiction in terms and he underlined that “to be a real power and therefore to be an effective actor in world politics requires the acquisition of military powers.”²⁷² Contrary to the pluralist and structuralist approaches, in realist terms, the autonomous value of the economic, diplomatic and ideological spheres are accepted as secondary to the ultimate source of power, namely the military power.²⁷³

Although many scholars repeated such realist arguments at the end of the 1990s, the EU’s ‘civilian power’ arguments did not end. Taken into consideration the ever-changing security environment and ‘civilian power’ arguments, it has been argued “important dimensions of the EU’s evolving security role are missed if the focus on actorness is too narrowly restricted to defense in a traditional sense.”²⁷⁴ Considering the importance of soft security as well as hard security in the post-Cold

²⁷⁰ Duchene, F., ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’, in Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, Mayne ed. (London: Fontana, 1972)

²⁷¹ Jan Orbie, “Everything but Arms: a Civilian Power Europe at Work?”, a draft paper submitted in European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Workshop no 7: New Roles for the EU in International Politics?, (Uppsala, 13th-18th April 2004), pp. 2-3

²⁷² White, op.cit., p.152. See also, Hedley Bull, Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? (1982)

²⁷³ Orbie, J. op.cit., p. 4

²⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 153

War era, many scholars thought that when the emergence of soft security-based international environment and the EU's facing some regional challenges rather than serious military threats are combined, the forms of civilian power deployed by the EU are very useful element of 'actorness' and that the EU has made continues to make significant contributions to security by helping to provide stability and peace in Europe and beyond. In this sense, enlargement policy towards the CEECs can be considered as a mechanism affecting the European security and stability.

In Europe of today, (in 1990s and later) security in the traditional, narrow sense is not threatened, except for some ethnic conflicts in the certain regional and local contexts. Therefore, instead of a sense of war, peace and security can be defined now as "a web of interaction and cooperation, as the fulfillment of common and positive goals and prevention of fundamental conflict of interest."²⁷⁵ In the ever changing security environment, nowadays focus is increasingly on fighting against common problems including counter terrorism, international crime, trans-border criminality, drug trafficking, illegal flow of money, goods and people, environmental hazards and so on. This shows the transformation of security issues/concerns from "high politics" including traditional security, territorial defense...etc. to "low politics" looking at the role of diplomacy, as well as trade, environmental and development policies for solutions of the issues mentioned above. The EU has realized the transformation and has begun to develop not only by crisis management instruments but also some external policies like extensive enlargement process, the inclusion of countries in the European network of preferential trade agreements,

²⁷⁵Blomberg, J., 'Non-Military Crisis Management as a Security Means' in the EU Civilian Crisis Management, Graeme, P. H. and Huru, J. eds. (Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, 2001) p. 11

political pressure in public statements and on international conferences, assistance with the observation of elections and so on.

The EU has also been called as “economic superpower” and it can be said that this powerful situation make the EU as an important international actor. With the economy larger than of the U.S., the EU is the world’s largest, richest, and most powerful trade block. It is one of the two largest monetary unions. Also, in international environmental diplomacy the EU plays a leading role in such issue areas as sustainable development, climate change, and fisheries etc. Moreover, the EU has enormous influence on European states that have applied for membership and the economic level is one of the important conditions mentioned in Copenhagen criteria. The other important character that contributes the EU’s economic presence in the international system is that the EU is the largest donor of humanitarian and development aid in the world.²⁷⁶

At this point, it will be useful to clarify what the definition of and the conditions to be a “civilian actor/power” are. Karen Smith uses the term as “civilian power” and analyzes the term by means of two subtitles like “(exercising) civilian power” and “(being) a civilian power”.²⁷⁷ According to Smith, although there is a clear agreement on the difference between civilian and military means, there is, however, considerable fuzziness in the literature over where to draw the line between civilian and military power; for example, peacekeeping forces are frequently considered to be a ‘civilian foreign policy instrument’. For Smith, however, the peacekeeping is not civilian because of its using military forces. On the other hand,

²⁷⁶ Ginsberg, op.cit., p.1

²⁷⁷ Smith, Karen E. “Still ‘civilian power EU?’”, available at <http://www.arena.uio.no/cidel/WorkshopOsloSecurity/Smith.pdf> accessed on 09.11.2005, p. 1

she added that there are four elements to being a civilian power: *means; ends; use of persuasion; and civilian control over foreign (and defence) policymaking.*²⁷⁸

The most classic definition of civilian power refers really to only two of the four critical elements. Hans Maull defines the (being) a civilian power as:²⁷⁹

- a) The acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives;
- b) The concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and
- c) A willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management.

Regarding the debate on EU's actorness, some scholars even argue that the EU is and 'political dwarf' and 'security pigme', which is unable to influence international politics comparing its economic weight.²⁸⁰ On the other hand, when a general assessment made with the concrete actions and policies are taken into consideration, it will be unfair to say that the EU is a "political dwarf" because it would mean the EU has no international influence. Such a clear-cut definition will not be useful considering the today's world. However, the security issue is still challenging though there are ever-increasing attempts towards being a security actor like developing "Battle Groups" project, peacekeeping and recovering instruments like "Rule-of-law missions" under the CESDP.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 1-2

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.* See details in Hans Maull, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers", *Foreign Affairs*, (Vol. 69, no.5, 1990), pp. 92-3

²⁸⁰ Roy Ginsberg, *The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire*, (Boulder, Rowman and Little Publishers, 2001), pp. 1-10

On the other hand, Lisbeth Aggestam has brought the debate regarding the civilian/military actorness into a different dimension by analyzing the changes in the role conception of the three main actors within the EU: the UK, France and Germany. In Aggestam's conceptualization, in 1990s, the EU was defined as "power for good" in British perspective, was defined as "Europe as a power" in French perspective and "Europe as an agent for peace" in German perspective. However, the developments in Europe during the 1990s have also changed the content of these titles, which were in general implied the civilian role of the EU. For example, the main change in the content of British, French and German role conceptions of the EU is the 'legitimacy of the EU to selectively use military force for humanitarian purposes'.²⁸¹ She defined the recent role conception of the EU as 'ethical power', which contains a number of distinctive characteristics. Firstly, it is intended to signify Europe as a 'reasonable power', willing to defend universal values, such as human rights, democracy and the fundamental freedoms of other nations faced with aggression. Secondly, it expressed a 'civilizing' view of international relations that is closely associated with the qualities of a civilian power. Thirdly, the conception of Europe as an ethical power involves the careful use of military force when needed. This dimension makes the 'ethical power' concept different from the classic conception of Europe as 'civilian power', which is mentioned above.²⁸² As a result, Aggestam argues that the lessons taken from the previous Balkan experiences can be considered as manifestation of a common role of Europe as an ethical power- a role

²⁸¹ Aggestam, op.cit., p.35

²⁸² Ibid., p.36

based, in the first instance, on soft power, but with the instruments of hard power as a last resort.²⁸³

In conclusion, in the light of the historical background and especially in the post-Cold War environment, it can be said that the EU can be considered as a limited ‘security actor’ because of the lack of autonomous military power, but can be and ought to be considered as a ‘civilian power’. For example, in Iraqi crisis and war from the beginning to the end, since there is a American superiority in military terms and decisiveness and on the other side the EU’s lack of military power and internal division on “to be or not to be” in US-led war in Iraq, then the EU had no chance to be an effective decision maker in the situation. However, the EU took part in the Iraq case with its civilian instruments like “Rule of Law Mission” and humanitarian aids for reconstruction and sustainability of post-war situation in Iraq. This case reveals both the EU’s remaining as a civilian actor and who uses the military power (the US in this case) taking the main role in overcoming the crisis situation.

5.3. Capability-Expectations Gap

Christopher Hill introduced the concept of *Capability-Expectations Gap*. Capability-Expectations Gap is a significant approach to the study of the EU as an international actor. According to Christopher Hill, the capabilities of the EU are not only conventional instruments of foreign policy. They are the use and threat of force, diplomacy, economic carrots and sticks, cultural influence and also the underlying resources of population, wealth, technology, human capital and political stability together with cohesiveness or the capacity to reach a collective decision and to stick

²⁸³ Ibid.

to it. Expectations are those ambitions or demands of the EU's international behavior, which derive from both inside and outside the EU.²⁸⁴

Hill divided his analysis into two parts. In the first part, he elaborated on the functions that the EC has performed until 1993 in the international system. These are the stabilizing of Western Europe, managing world trade, and principal voice of the developed world in relations with the South and providing a second western voice in international diplomacy. In the second part, he elaborated the conceivable future functions of the EC which are the replacement for the USSR in the global balance of power, a regional pacifier, a global intervener, mediator of conflicts, bridge between rich and poor and joint supervisor of the world economy.²⁸⁵

In his article 'Closing Capabilities-Expectations Gap?' Hill elaborated on some of the expectations such as political pressures to grant membership of the EU to applicant states or to provide solutions to the problems of third countries; pressures for economic assistance in the form of aid, trade preferences or even access to the Single Market. The intellectual expectations are that the EU can resolve the problem of the nation-state; provide a new framework for European order or an alternative identity for the non-American West.²⁸⁶

According to Christopher Hill, these expectations pose a serious challenge to the actual capabilities of the EC in terms of its ability to agree its resources and the instruments at its disposal. Furthermore, he claimed that the EC does not have the resources or the political instruments that can respond these demands and he called

²⁸⁴ Christopher Hill, "Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap?", in John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (eds.), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?, Competing Visions of the CFSP (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 23.

²⁸⁵ Hill, op.cit., in note 21, pp. 310-311-312-313-314..

²⁸⁶ Hill, op.cit., in note 142, p. 23.

this as ‘the Capability-Expectations Gap’. In his article, ‘The Capabilities-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role’, Hill by looking at EC’s performance in the Gulf War, the Uruguay Round and Yugoslavia, asserted that the EC is not an effective international actor, in terms of both its capacity to produce collective decisions and its impact on events.²⁸⁷

Hill also put forward that even after improvements brought by the Maastricht Treaty, there was still a large Capability-Expectations Gap, because a coherent system and full actorness are still far from realization. Brussels and demander states have ignored this fact. The EC not only in terms of substantive resources – money, arms, room for immigrants – but in terms of the ability to take decisions and hold to them, is still far from being able to fulfill the demands of those who want to see the EC in great power terms.²⁸⁸

In his article ‘Closing Capabilities-Expectations Gap?’ Hill evaluated the EU’s success in performing Conceivable Future Functions for the EC. He stated that five years were not sufficient to be sure whether any of the functions is being persistently fulfilled. He quoted from Patrick Keating’s case study of Somalia, that three of these functions are relevant to assessing the EU’s role in global security. He also added that only the bridge between rich and poor function was being performed with any real effectiveness.²⁸⁹ Hill further claimed that the EU in conjunction with the UN is only performing the function of conflict mediator,

²⁸⁷ Hill, op.cit., in note 21, p. 306.

²⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 318.

²⁸⁹ Hill, op.cit., in note 142, p. 34.

Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and particularly the US, like in events in various parts of the Balkans. However, the function of global intervener, along the lines, which many called for in Bosnia, is still far out of reach. On the function of replacement for the USSR in the global balance of power, the EU is no equivalent to the USSR globally, but it has started to be the major presence in the old Warsaw Pact area, through the net of Europe Agreements and the positive encouragement it has given to the accession of the Central European States. Lastly on the function of joint supervisor of the world economy, the EU consolidates its position as an important player in the making of international trade agreements, with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the World Trade Organization.²⁹⁰

In his article, 'The Capabilities-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role', Hill claimed that the idea of Capability-Expectations Gap is a useful starting point. It enables Europeans to see that if the gap is to be closed, dangerous tension can be relieved in European foreign policy. In order to achieve this, either capabilities should be increased or expectations decreased. If capabilities are to be increased significantly, then an important political and constitutional leap will probably be necessary and lowering expectations means both lowering one's own ambitions in foreign policy and communicating the fact to outsiders. Furthermore, in his article "Closing Capabilities-Expectations Gap?", Hill concluded that Capability-Expectations Gap is narrower than it was before even if capabilities have not significantly advanced, because if the EU could not meet the

²⁹⁰ Hill, op.cit., in note 142, pp. 34-35-36.

expectations, the expectations would be lowered back into line with capabilities.²⁹¹ Fraser Cameron, after evaluating the EU's success in performing the functions enumerated by Hill, asserted that the EU has made substantial progress towards its aim of becoming a major, credible international actor and he further asserted that the EU has played significant global and regional role in areas such as trade , environment and development policy whereas in the area of foreign and security policy, although the EU has played a more assertive global and regional role, the expectations of the EU citizens remain high and the EU's capabilities have only gradually improved. ²⁹²Thus, Fraser Cameron concluded that ten years since the Maastricht Treaty, the capability-expectations gap has been narrowed but not closed and it will be some time before it is closed.

According to Asle Toje, a decade after the Hill's arguments regarding the CEG, the EU possesses the necessary capabilities and institutions, but is still unable to deliver – due to a lack of consensus on foreign policy goals and the means by which they are to be attained.²⁹³ However, Toje asserts that, at the beginning of 2005, the Capability-Expectation Gap has narrowed considerably. Since the launch of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) in 1998, the EU has assembled a security toolbox with economic, diplomatic and military assets.²⁹⁴

Although this important step for taking more action in international arena, the role of the EU in crisis situations would be different than the US and other security

²⁹¹ Hill, op.cit., in note 142, p. 36.

²⁹² Cameron, op.cit., p. 2

²⁹³ Asle Toje, "Europe's Consensus-Expectation Gap", A Research Note Presented in 'Europe in Crisis' seminar at the Center for Applied Policy Research in Munich, (17-20 November 2004), p. 1

²⁹⁴ Ibid. p. 2

organizations. The CESDP can be considered as a new crisis management initiative by which the member states have agreed on ‘common strategies’. Looking at the EU’s present crisis management activities, the Union is active in police missions in the Balkans (EUPM and Proxima) and rule of law missions in Georgia and finally in Iraq. So far the EU has taken on three military missions in Macedonia, Congo and most recently in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Though they are important steps, one must, however keep in mind, that these are all “low-intensity military missions” that could just as well have been handled by NATO or the US.²⁹⁵

On the other hand, the recent US-led war in Iraq and the humanitarian crisis in Sudan’s Darfur region exposed the fragility of the member states commitment to the CESDP. According to many scholars - like Toje -, why the EU is persistently fail to reach complete agreement on such security issues is accepted as “sovereignty” problem. In this sense, the EU can not be expected to generate a meaningful common positions on great questions of the day as long as the right of initiative remain in the hands of member states and decisions are made by consensus. Therefore, at the beginning of 2005 the primary obstacle to an effective European security policy has been reduced from an overall Capabilities- Expectation Gap to a “Consensus-Expectation Gap”.²⁹⁶

The European Security Strategy (ESS) document, which is approved in 2003 Brussels Summit, can be accepted as a remarkable step for narrowing this gap. The latest intra-European and transatlantic disputes with the US-led war in Iraq increased the need for this document. Despite having some deficiencies, this document has

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 3

been accepted as the “most accessible EU keynote document ever written”. Previous CESDP documents, such as the 1992 Petersberg Declaration, the 1998 Saint Malo agreement, the 1999 Helsinki headline Goals, the 2000 Nice Treaty, and the 2001 Laeken declaration have all indicated the scope of the initiative but the ESS put the previous arguments into a single document.

Toje has finally asked whether the Consensus-Expectation Gap be closed or not and stated that in order not to close but narrow the gap:²⁹⁷

- The EU has to ensure the popular support for itself and its foreign and security policies.
- There has to be clear ‘common strategies’ which are accepted by all Member States
- There has to be a consensus on the EU’s position and actions regarding the internal and external crisis situations.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 8-9

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, basically, the debate on security actorness of the European Union - a limited military/strategic actor or an effective civilian actor- in the changing security environment of post-Cold War era has been evaluated. In evaluating the security actorness of the EU, the influence of the September 11 terrorist attacks and the US-led war in Iraq on the EU crisis management capabilities and its international actorness has been analyzed in order to be able to identify the present position of the EU and to make future prospects on security actorness of the EU.

Since debates on EU's security actorness in the international security environment did not emerge post-Cold War era, the early roots of this debate in the post-World War II and Cold War periods have been also evaluated since the roots of debates on whether the EU is a civilian actor or a would-be-military/strategic actor date back to the post-World War II period. One should reveal that the most important motive of the evolution of security policies and institutions within Europe was change in international security agenda and also the attitudes of the other actors like the US and of international security organizations like NATO.

In this sense, a general evaluation on the European foreign and security policies from the establishment of European Defense Community (EDC) in 1950 to the establishment of the CFSP in 1993 helps us to understand the basis of recent discussions and enable us to make future prospects on the EU's actorness. The EU's evolution process from being a sole economic power and a civilian power in security terms towards a more effective and strategic power in global politics has continued until the post-Cold War.

In the post-Cold War era, the definition of both 'enemy' and of 'security and peace' has changed dramatically in West and this shows that the traditional aspects of security and defense will play a minor role in the future security agenda of European states and the US. The security concerns that were relevant in the post-World War II and Cold War era have no longer been relevant with the end of the Cold War era. The end of Cold War have created many new realities, alerted us to many new dangers, and opened us to many new tensions like global terrorism, trans-border criminality, drug trafficking, illegal flow of money, goods and people as well as regional ethnic-based conflicts and domestic wars occurred especially under-developed and developing countries. This change in international security concerns is called as the transformation of 'high' security issues to 'low' security issues.

In the post-Cold War period, especially the regional ethnic-base conflicts like Yugoslavian Crisis in the early 1990s and the Gulf War in 1991 convinced the EC Member States to further their cooperation in the areas of foreign and security policy and the launch of the CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore, these two events can be considered as the initial crisis cases that made the European States more determined in searching for a more effective actor in world politics.

However, since having a traditional civilian image and accepted as an economic power, the EU has not been able to effective international actor so far because of both its incapacity to produce collective decisions and inability to take deliberate actions in crisis cases. This dilemma can be seen as one side of “capability-expectation gap” for the EU.

As a successive attempt for narrowing the capability-expectation gap, Amsterdam Treaty brought the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks which include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking. In this sense, Amsterdam Treaty provided important ground for acceleration of establishment of sufficient European Mechanism for Crisis Management.

Moreover, continuous crisis within the European borders, especially the latest Kosovo Crisis in 1998, demonstrated EU States’ inability to respond a security challenge in their own backyard and also showed their reliance on the United States’s military capabilities for crisis management and major shortfalls in European defence capabilities.

In this sense, the Kosovo experience and the following Saint-Malo Summit is generally defined as the real turning point for the initiation of a true security and defence policy for the EU because possibility of the EU’s being an autonomous military actor – being outside the NATO framework and without NATO assets- in addition to its civilian actorness came to the agenda. As a result, the ESDP was launched and developed by introducing a Headline Goal and Capability Action Plan, which were critical attempts for the EU being more effective actor in international security environment.

On the other side, Turkey's role as a non-EU European NATO member has become effective on the ESDP's weakness in conducting EU-led crisis management operations. Turkey's veto on using NATO assets and capabilities in EU-led operations and the following the Ankara Document, which aimed to remove this veto, and also Greece's veto on this document has led to a serious setback before the operationalization of the ESDP as well as a disruption in NATO-EU cooperation.

As a result of these two experiences and the changing international security environment in the Post-Cold War Era, including new threats like political and economic instability in the ex-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, ethnic and nationalist conflict, cross-border terrorism, massive immigration, destruction of environment, organized crime, spread of nuclear weapons and massive violation of human rights, it was both externally and internally expected and demanded from the EU to play an active and effective role in global politics.

Discussions on the EU being a military or civilian actor or both and what will/should be its role have been continuing for a long time but an event marked a new epoch in these discussions. It was September 11 terrorist attacks against the US. It has put an undeniable mark on both international security discussions and the position of the EU in the new security arena.

The September 11 events The EU has realized the changes in the crisis issues and then has vested interest in preserving peace and security in its neighborhood and beyond by means of civilian and military crisis management instruments. The underlying reason is that 'stability' is a key word in its vocabulary and it is closely connected with political, social and economic transition. It can be said that the Union aims at spreading its own image, which is based on democracy, peace, freedom and

justice. In this sense, the EU's most influential tools for affecting international stability are seen as non-military (civilian) crisis management instruments, most notably economic measures and humanitarian aid backed by diplomacy. It can be seen in Afghanistan and recent Iraq cases, the EU became the biggest donor for providing humanitarian aid and reconstruction policies.

Considering discussions on the limits and capabilities of the CFSP comparing with NATO in terms of military capabilities and effectiveness of both of them, it can be said that crisis management institutions of the EU and their capabilities has to be reevaluated and strengthened. In the light of these, as the recent events shows the EU's non-military instruments are much more effective though there are some problems including mainly political, technical and financial obstacles that have to be overcome.

On the other hand, as it is still being seen in recent operations in Western Balkans, South Caucasus, Middle East including US-led war in Iraq, Africa and Europe, it can be argue that the EU still tends to remain as civilian power providing humanitarian aid, police missions, border assistance, rule of law missions and election monitoring missions, reconstruction service in a crisis region and peacekeeping service rather than a military power like the US. It means the EU will continue being a more effective civilian and economic power instead of a military power as an alternative of the US.

The US-led war in Iraq has also important outcomes for the EU future security actorness. The Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, European Security Strategy submitted by Javier Solana and latest developments in CESDP

were the signs of European States's efforts to analyze what is wrong and adjust accordingly after US-led war in Iraq.

The issue of the EU's being a player in international security arena was finally welcomed by the European Council in the document submitted by Solana, titled as 'A Secure Europe in a Better World'. This document, which was submitted at the Brussels Summit (December 2003), is generally called as "European Security Strategy Document" can be seen as a mission statement document of the EU.

In this thesis, it will be argued that the problem is not backing by a short historical background of the CFSP and lack of technical and military capabilities but the main problem is lack of will and aspiration to ensure the cooperation and coordination to mediate the international conflicts. However, as it is mentioned in Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, 'consistency of the EU's external actions has to be related to political will, which is a determining factor in the proper use of instruments.' Instead, it is well-known characteristic of the CFSP that the member states are not willing to give up their own foreign policies based on long historical background and diverging national interests in special cases.

Considering post-September 11th and post-US-led war in Iraq security concept, the overall argument of this thesis is that the EU has a powerful tendency to be a civilian power that has failed to adopt significant defence and international security responsibilities because of internal divisions of the EU Member States. Also, it continues to be viewed as a soft-security actor for whom inclusion is the primary instrument to ensure peace and security. Moreover, although EU's recent attempts to generate a more coherent and consistent foreign and security policy and to be more effective international political actor by introducing new policy instruments to ensure

peace and security have raised expectations of member states and even the outside world, in the foreseeable future, however, the EU's quest for being an effective security actor is still a subject of debate.

In conclusion, as is generally seen in many recent crises, the EU seems to remain as only a civilian power providing humanitarian aid and peacekeeping and reconstruction service in a crisis region. In this sense, the main argument of this thesis is that the EU's most influential tools for affecting international stability can be seen as non-military crisis management instruments, most notably economic measures and humanitarian aid backed by diplomacy.

APPENDIX- I

THE EUROPEAN UNION ESDP MISSIONS, 2003-2006

1. European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina: EUPM

Dates	January 1, 2003 – present
Goals	In line with the general objectives of the Paris/Dayton Agreement, EUPM seeks to establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with best European and international practice
Composition	Approximately 500 police officers from more than thirty countries
Cost of Operation	€ 14 million for start-up costs (including equipment and the planning team) for 2002, to be financed out of the EC budget; up to € 38 million for yearly running costs for the years 2003 to 2005; the final budget for the years 2003 to 2005 shall be decided by the Council of EU on an annual basis
Chain of Command	Mission Chief reports to Secretary-General / High Representative for CPSP through special representative for BiH.

2. EUFOR mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Concordia

Dates	March 11 – December 15, 2003
Goals	Contribute to the establishment of a stable and secure environment in Macedonia, leading to a situation in which an international security presence is no longer needed
Composition	400 persons from 26 countries
Cost of Operation	The common cost of the operation are € 6.2 million; personnel and other items are on a “costs lie where they fall” basis, i.e. member states pay from their own budgets for their own forces and for their support in the field.
Chain of Command	Operation commander: DSCEUR; chief of the staff of the EU command element: EUFOR; force commander: UFOR. EU operation headquarters will be located at the Supreme Headquarters Allies Powers in Europe.

3. EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo: DRC/Artemis

Dates	June 5 – September 1, 2003
Goals	Contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia; ensure the protection of the airport, internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia; and, if the situation requires it, contribute to the safety of the civilian population
Composition	1,800 mostly French soldiers
Cost of Operation	Approximately € 7 million
Chain of Command	France acted as a “framework nation” for the operation. EU operational commander: French Major General; EU force commander: French Brigadier General. Headquarters of the military force was installed in Entebbe, Uganda, with an outpost in Bunia, DRC.

4. EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: EUPOL Proxima

Dates	December 15, 2003 – present
Goals	Consolidation of law and order, including the fight against organized crime; practical implementation of Ministry of Interior reforms, including the police; operational transition toward, and creation of border police, as a part of the wider EU effort to promote integrated border management; the local police in building confidence within the population; enhanced co-operation with neighboring States in the field of policing.
Composition	170 personnel from EU member states and other countries, both uniformed police personnel and civilian internationals; additionally, the mission employs about 150 local staff in support functions
Cost of Operation	A maximum amount of €7.3 million for start-up costs of the mission; a maximum of €650,000 for running costs for 2003; a maximum of €7.06 million for running costs for 2004, not including per diems, all to be financed out of the European Community budget
Chain of Command	Head of the EU mission and police commissioner closely cooperates with the EU special representative in Skopje and reports to the EU Secretary-General/High Representative for CFSP through the EU special representative.

5. EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia: EUJUST Themis

Dates	July 16, 2004 – July 16, 2005
Goals	To provide urgent guidance for the new criminal justice reform strategy; to support the overall coordinating role of the relevant Georgian authorities in the field of judicial reform and anticorruption; to support the planning for new legislation as necessary, e.g. Criminal Procedure Code; to support the development of international as well as regional cooperation in the area of criminal justice.
Composition	Approximately 10 international civilian experts, plus local staff
Cost of Operation	€4.65 million
Chain of Command	Head of mission reports to Secretary-General/High Representative for CFSP through the EU Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus.

6. EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: EUFOR Althea

Dates	December 2, 2004 – present
Goals	Provide deterrence, continued compliance with the responsibility to fulfill the role specified in Annexes 1A and 2 of the Dayton/Paris Agreement (General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina); contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH, in line with its mandate, required to achieve core tasks in the OHR's Mission Implementation Plan and the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP)
Composition	The EU deployed a robust force (EUFOR) - at the same force levels as SFOR (7,000 troops); in addition to 22 EU member states, the following countries are participating in the Althea Operation: Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Switzerland, and Turkey
Cost of Operation	Common costs of the operation are €71.7 million; personnel and other items are on a "costs lie where they fall" basis
Chain of Command	EU operation commander (OpCdr): DSACEUR, with the EU operation headquarters located at Supreme Headquarters for the Allied forces in Europe; EU force commander: EUFOR. The basic decisions on the operation are taken by the Council of the European Union. The EU's Political and Security Committee will exercise the political control and strategic decision of the operation. EU operations commander will direct Althea through the EU Command Element in Naples and EUFOR HQ in Sarajevo.

7. European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC): EUPOL Kinshasa

Dates	January 2005 – present
Goals	Monitor, mentor, and advise the setting up and the initial running of the Integrated Police Unit in order to ensure that the IPU acts follow the training received in the Academy Centre and are in accordance with international best practices in this field
Composition	The mission will consist of approximately 30 staff members who form a headquarters (HQ) located in the IPU operational base; the HQ will consist of the office of the head of the mission, a monitor, mentor and advisor branch, an administration support branch and liaison officers to the most relevant actors regarding the IPU
Cost of Operation	A maximum amount of €4.37 million to cover the costs during the planning phase and the year 2005
Chain of Command	Head of the mission/police commissioner reports to the Secretary-General/High Representative for CFSP through EU special representative. All police officers remain under full command of appropriate national authorities.

8. Integrated rule-of-law mission for Iraq: EUJUST LEX

Dates	February 2005 – present
Goals	Training of some 520 judges, investigating magistrates, senior police and penitentiary officers in senior management and of some 250 investigating magistrates and senior police in criminal investigation
Composition	TBA
Cost of Operation	€10 million from the EU budget is intended to cover the common costs of the mission; member states will contribute training courses and trainers.
Chain of Command	As a crisis management operation, the structure of EUJUST LEX has a unified chain of command. The Political and Security Committee provides the political control and strategic direction. The head of mission assumes coordination and day-to-day management. The head of mission reports to the Secretary-General/High Representative for CFSP.

9. EU Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC DR Congo)

Dates	May 2005 – present
Goals	Provide practical support for the integration of the Congolese army and good governance in the field of security, as set out in the general concept; identify and contribute to the development of various projects and options that the European Union and/or its member states may decide to support in this area
Composition	Mission experts shall be seconded by member states and by the EU institutions; international civilian staff and local staff shall be recruited on a contractual basis by the mission as required
Cost of Operation	€1.6 million
Chain of Command	Head of mission leads the advice and assistance team, assumes day-to-day management and reports to the Secretary-General/High Representative for CFSP through the EU special representative. EU special representative reports to the Political and Security Committee and to the Council through the Secretary-General/High Representative for CFSP.

10. EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories: EU BAM Rafah

Dates	November 2005 – November 2006
Goals	The European Union is to monitor the operations at the Rafah border crossing point.
Composition	The mission will be composed of 70 personnel seconded from EU member states.
Cost of Operation	Unspecified
Chain of Command	The EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) will exercise the political control and the strategic guidance of the mission under the responsibility of the Council of the EU. The Head of the mission is Major General Pietro Pistolese.

11. Aceh Monitoring Mission: AMM

Dates	September 2005 – March 2006
Goals	This mission is designed to monitor the implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement set out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement on 15 August 2005.
Composition	The AMM numbers some 226 international unarmed personnel, of which 130 are from EU Member States as well as Norway and Switzerland, and 96 from the five participating ASEAN countries (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand).
Cost of Operation	€9 million from the EU budget is intended to cover the common costs of the mission; €6 million will come from member states.
Chain of Command	The EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) will exercise the political control and the strategic guidance of the AMM under the responsibility of the Council of the EU. The Head of the mission, Pieter Feith, seconded from the EU Council Secretariat, is supported by three deputies, two EU and one from ASEAN.

12. EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories: EUPOL COPPS

Dates	January 2006 – January 2009
Goals	Assist in the implementation of the Palestinian Civil Police Development Plan, advise and mentor senior members of the Civil Police and criminal justice system and co-ordinate EU and, where requested, international assistance.
Composition	It will include approximately 33 unarmed personnel mainly seconded from EU Member States
Cost of Operation	The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related until the end of 2006 will be 6.1 million euros (common costs).
Chain of Command	It will build on the work of the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support. The EU's Political and Security Committee will exercise political control and strategic direction. High Representative Javier Solana will give guidance to the Head of Mission.

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