

THE THEORY OF CAPITALISM AND ITS ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MARX AND DELEUZE&GUATTARI

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VOLKAN KOCAGÜL

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

(Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata)
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

(Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam)
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

(Dr. Barış Parkan)
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Dr. Barış Parkan (METU,PHIL) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Halil Turan (METU,PHIL) _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Cem Deveci (METU, ADM) _____

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Name, Last name: Volkan Kocagül

Signature :

ABSTRACT

THE THEORY OF CAPITALISM AND ITS ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MARX AND DELEUZE&GUATTARI

Kocagül, Volkan

Msc., Department of Philosophy

Supervisor : Dr. Barış Parkan

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The main objective of this thesis is to examine the theory of capitalism and its ontological foundations through the major works of Marx and Deleuze&Guattari. In his monumental book called *Capital*, Karl Marx develops an account of capitalism based on his understanding of philosophy of which takes its roots from Hegel and Feuerbach. Additionally, English political economy and French socialism serve as reliable grounds for Marx's analysis. In light of the writings of these historical precursors, Marx constitutes a profound critique of capitalist mode of production. On the other hand, Deleuze and Guattari, as the representatives of contemporary French philosophy, develop a different account of capitalism in their influential book called *Anti-Oedipus*. By relying upon Nietzsche, in *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari examine capitalism in a non-dialectical manner. Despite the fact that they reject the major aspects of Marxian mode of thinking, they concentrate on the similar questions shared by Marx. The question of capitalism and its conception as an immanent system which reproduces itself by means of capital appears as the common problem that directs them to think analogously. In this respect, this thesis is an attempt to discover the points of ruptures and the points of continuities in two different account of capitalism.

Keywords: Use-Value, Exchange-Value, Value, Surplus-Value, Ideology, Commodity Fetishism, Desiring-Machines, Desiring-Production, Body Without Organs, Socius, Deterritorialization, Reterritorialization.

ÖZ

KAPİTALİZM TEORİSİ VE ONUN ONTOLOJİK TEMELLERİ: MARX VE DELEUZE&GUATTARİ ÜZERİNE KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ÇALIŞMA

Kocagül, Volkan

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Bu tezin temel amacı kapitalizm teorisini ve onun ontolojik temellerini Marx ve Deleuze&Guattari'nin başlıca eserleri üzerinden incelemektir. *Kapital* olarak bilinen anıtsal kitabında Marx, kökenlerini Hegel ve Feuerbach'tan alan felsefî geleneğe dayanan bir kapitalizm anlayışı geliştirir. Ayrıca, İngiliz politik ekonomisi ve Fransız sosyalist geleneği de Marx'ın analizi için sağlam bir zemin görevi görürler. Bu tarihsel öncülerin yapıtları ışığında, Marx kapitalist üretim tarzının derin bir eleştirisini inşa eder. Öte yandan, çağdaş Fransız felsefesinin temsilcileri olarak Deleuze ve Guattari *Anti-Oedipus* olarak bilinen kitaplarında farklı bir kapitalizm anlayışı geliştirirler. *Anti-Oedipus*'ta, Nietzsche'den temellerini alan diyalektik olmayan bir anlayışla kapitalizmi analiz ederler. Marx'çı düşünme tarzının başlıca veçhelerini reddetmelerine rağmen, Marx'ın ele aldığı benzer sorunlar üzerinde odaklanırlar. Kapitalizmin sermaye sayesinde sürekli kendini yeniden üreten içkin bir sistem olduğu anlayışı Marx ile paylaştıkları ve onları benzer şekilde düşünmeye iten ortak bir problem olarak ortaya çıkar. Bundan dolayı bu tez bu iki farklı kapitalizm anlayışındaki devamlılıkları ve kesintileri ortaya çıkarmak amacındadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Kullanım-değeri, Değişim-Değeri, Değer, Artı-Değer, İdeoloji, Meta Fetişizmi, Arzulayan-Makinalar, Arzulayan-Üretim, Organsız Bedenler, Socius, Yersizyurtsuzlaşma, Yeniden Yurtlanma.

To My Mother and My Fiancée

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I. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Capitalism has always been a problematic subject for philosophers who deal with the political and social dimensions of philosophy. On this subject different understandings and theories have been developed by philosophers. In this thesis, the theory of capitalism and its ontological foundations will be discussed through the major works of Marx and Deleuze. Their basic axioms, categories and concepts will be elaborated throughout the thesis.

Karl Marx (1818-1883) is one of the major figures in contemporary philosophy and politics. His writings on social, political and economic issues did not only inspire modern political thought but were also widely accepted by many revolutionary movements. In his works, Marx presents a comprehensive account of a materialistic conception of history and human life. From his early writings such as *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* to his monumental work *Capital*, Marx always attempts to understand the human being in relation to its social existence and collective activities. Such an attempt, as mentioned above, is possible only within a systematic projection of history. To understand the emergent conditions, one must develop an account of history which constitutes a proper ground for a systematic analysis. Here, a historical materialism developed by Marx allows examining the existing relations of social being. From the primitive societies to capitalist relations of production, historical materialism presents Marx with a theoretical framework in which dialectical change is the primary law of motion. Historical materialism divides history into stages. Each stage has its peculiar character. But, the common thing to all the stages is the development of productive forces. Each stage represents a set of productive forces that determine the mode of production. In addition to this, each stage in the development of the productive forces corresponds to a certain set of

production relations. At this point, capitalism appears as one of the stages in the progress of history.

According to Marx, capitalism is the historical stage in which the wage-labor, that is to say, the working class appears as the productive force. All the production in capitalist society depends upon the labor of this class. However, despite the fact that the working class is the source of all production, the property of means of production does not belong to it. In capitalist societies, relations of production basically depend on capital itself. This means that workers sell their labor to capitalists and capitalists use this labor in order to increase their profit. Therefore, all relations in capitalist societies are determined according to capital. In his major work called *Capital*, Marx attempts to analyze these relations of production and develops a profound critique. In examining such relations of production, Marx employs many categories such as *commodity*, *use-value*, *exchange-value*, *value*, *surplus-value* and etc. All these categories are the ontological units that express a statement about the reality. They all represent various states of affairs peculiar to capitalist mode of production. But today, do these categories have the capacity to explain the existing system of relations? Do they correspond to emergent dynamics of capitalism? Such questions reflect the essence of contemporary political philosophy and seek to capture new forms of relations of production. At this point, the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze presents a new mode of thinking. In light of the questions which are mentioned above, Deleuze constructs a different account of capitalism based on his understanding of philosophy.

French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) is one of the major representatives of contemporary continental philosophy. His early writings are mainly concerned with the critique of metaphysics in western thought. In these writings, Deleuze exhibits a profound critique of the image of thought presented by western thinking the roots of can be traced back to Plato. In his book called *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze attempts to overturn the basic categories of western metaphysics and tries to develop a form of

thought without an image. In his early writings, Deleuze also wrote on Nietzsche, Hume, Bergson and Spinoza. After collaboration with Felix Guattari, Deleuze's primary interests in philosophy shifted to political and social dimensions and *Anti-Oedipus* is the first product of this collaboration.

Anti-Oedipus subsumes Marx and Freud within a Nietzschean framework, which serves as the basis, not only for a critique of psychoanalysis and traditional Marxism, but also for the development of a history and a politics of social-libidinal activity (Bogue, 1989: p.83). In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari attempt to develop a political ontology which harmonizes the abovementioned writers. Unlike Marx, they try to construct a non-dialectical approach to history, arguing that historical stages are not successive but contingent and each stage is defined in terms of its social machine. For instance, there is a barbarian-despotic machine that codes the social relationships in feudal societies. Here, the mode of production is not the primary condition that determines the characteristics of this stage but there is a coding machine that arranges the economic activities in this stage. Society is taken into consideration as a whole with its all aspects. Similarly, in capitalist societies, there is a civilized capitalist machine that directs all the activities. Deleuze and Guattari presuppose machinic arrangements prior to all modes of production in particular societies. In light of this presupposition, in *Anti-Oedipus*, capitalist societies are examined with new categories such as *machines*, *body without organs*, *socius*, *deterritorialization*, *reterritorialization*, etc. In this respect, this thesis is an attempt to compare Marxist categories that explain the nature of capitalism to the Deleuzian concepts and investigate the possibility of Deleuzian Marxism through their major works.

Chapter I elaborates Marx's basic ontological principles in order to constitute a proper ground for his analysis of capitalism. This chapter explains the intellectual evolution of Marx by emphasizing his historical precursors and outlines the fundamental points of his theory of history. Firstly, Adam Smith and David Ricardo as the representatives of English political economy and

their contribution to Marx's theory of labor value are examined. Secondly, the tradition of French socialism and their impact on Marx are reviewed. Finally, Hegel with his dialectical method and Feuerbach with his understanding of materialism are examined in the intellectual evolution of Marx.

Chapter II consists of the explanation of the categories employed by Marx to describe the fundamental aspects of the capitalist mode of production. *Commodity*, *use-value*, *exchange-value* and *value* are investigated through their relations with each other. *Surplus-value* is also examined as the source of wealth and the primary means of exploitation in capitalist societies. The concept of *ideology* and its legitimate successor *commodity fetishism* are outlined in this chapter in order to explain the illusory aspect of capitalism.

Chapter III outlines Deleuze's understanding of philosophy in order to clarify the idiosyncratic concepts employed in *Anti-Oedipus*. His criticism of western philosophy is elaborated through his conception of philosophy outlined in *Difference and Repetition*. Chapter III also examines the new image of thought presented by Deleuze and Guattari in *What is Philosophy?*

Chapter IV discusses concepts offered by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus*. These concepts such as *machines*, *production*, *body without organs*, *desire* and *socius* are examined in relation to their conception of philosophy and to their account of capitalism.

Chapter V elaborates Deleuze's account of capitalism. His projection of universal history and its stages are examined in a comparison with Marx's historical materialism. And his concepts such as deterritorialization and reterritorialization are investigated in relation to Marxist categories. Chapter V also outlines the major differences between two accounts of capitalism.

II. CHAPTER 2: MARX'S BASIC ONTOLOGICAL PREMISES

2.1. The Three Sources

Before analyzing the concepts of *Capital*, first, the intellectual evolution of Marx has to be examined, since his method in *Capital*, his concepts, and his intentions were thoroughly determined by his intellectual development.

Lenin, in his essay called *The Three Sources and Three Components of Marxism*, outlines three fundamental components that influenced the theory of Marx. These are German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism. These three have influenced Marx in different ways. For instance, Hegel as a representative of classical German philosophy influenced the methodology of Marx by his dialectical method. Feuerbach, a young Hegelian, has a great impact on Marx's materialism. Adam Smith and David Ricardo as the founders of English political economy are cornerstones for Marx's theory of labor value. Lastly, French socialists such as Saint-Simon and Fourier influenced Marx with their idea of socialism. According to Lenin, Marxist doctrine is the legitimate successor to the best that man produced in the nineteenth century, as represented by German philosophy, English political economy and French socialism. On this continuation, Lenin states that "his [Marx] doctrine emerged as the direct and immediate continuation of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, political economy, and socialism." (Lenin, 1964: 3)

The first component is English political economy. Adam Smith is the writer of *The Wealth of Nations* –the book attempts to understand the source of wealth in modern societies- and is one of the major figures in the intellectual development of Marx. What Marx found in Smith is the ground on which his labor theory of value and his critique of capitalist production process emerge.

According to Smith, the wealth of a nation is determined by the division of labor and free markets. Any barrier to free market must be overturned in favor of a free competitive market. Obstacles such as feudal relations or monopolistic formations must be expelled from the basis on which free trade develops. Then, the productivity of labor would be increased and the capitalist development of market would be the dominant mode of production. For Smith, the development of the division of labor is crucial in this development. The wealth of a society is increased by expanding the division of labor. It seems that the expectations of Smith and his method of analysis are far from what is pursued in *Capital* by Marx. However, in Smith, there is something very crucial for Marx. First of all, Marx adapts Smith's connection between production and surplus. (Pilling, 1980: 14)

Smith states that the source of surplus is not exchange but production. The real measurement of commodities is only possible with the analysis of labor in the production process. Before Smith, it was widely accepted that surplus comes from the exchange of goods or money. According to French 'physiocrats', agricultural production is the only source of surplus or wealth. (Pilling, 1980: 15) Adopting Smith's ideas, Marx shows that the source of surplus or wealth is only the human labor in production processes. Labor, here, is conceived of as social labor in the sense that it is exercised within the division of labor in which it is distributed through the society. Therefore, Smith thinks that surplus is not produced through trade or accumulation of valuable metals such as gold and silver, in fact, it comes into being only by social labor. This idea allowed Marx to develop his own labor theory of value which locates labor as the source of capitalist production process. Here, Marx concludes that trade or exchange are the apparent aspects of wealth and these activities conceal the real process in which production and labor are essential factors in the creation of value.

While adapting the ideas of Smith, Marx never treated them as stable and unchangeable ideas. He employed them in accordance with his own dialectical method.

Ricardo, as one of the important figures in Marx's intellectual development, developed a more detailed labor theory of value than the one suggested by Smith. It is acknowledged by some writers that Marx's entire writings on political economy were determined by his reading of Ricardo. This claim is partially true but Marx's approach is more comprehensive and systematic than Ricardo.

Ricardo's main concern was to understand the exchange value of commodities. Here, he refers to a commodity as a 'reproducible entity'; that is to say, commodities which are produced in large numbers.

According to Ricardo, the value of any commodity which is exchanged through the market is precisely determined by the labor which is exercised in the production of this commodity. Ricardo divides the embodied labor in commodity into two. The first one is the past labor and the second one is the current labor. (Pilling, 1980: 19) Producer, in the process of commodity production, first encounter with the past labor that is already exercised by the previous producers, and then adds his own current labor in order to give the commodity to its final shape. For Ricardo, the emergence of profit is at the heart of this process. The combination of invested capital which can be called past labor and living current labor presents us the source of profit. Ricardo argues that profit is exactly the result of the production process. Unlike Marx, Ricardo does not distinguish value into two as Marx does. Ricardo deals with the exchange aspect of value. He does not take use-value into consideration. (Pilling, 1980: 22)

The adoption of Ricardo's labor theory of value allowed Marx to constitute the law of motion in capitalist society. By means of dialectical method, the nature of commodities is revealed through the labor theory of value which has been originally constituted by Ricardo.

The second component is French socialism. In Marxist literature, the term French socialism refers to the writings of utopian socialist writers such as Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier and Robert Owen. In *Communist Manifesto*,

Marx and Engels develop a critique of utopian socialist ideas and reject them in favor of a communist thinking. According to them, utopian socialist thought is the product of the stage in which the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie has not matured yet. Utopian socialists argue that a social transformation in which private property, exploitation, and competition are removed is possible without depending on class struggle and the revolutionary role of the proletariat. Marx and Engels put it as follows:

The Socialist and Communist systems properly so-called, those of St. Simon, Fourier, Owen and others, springs into existence in the early undeveloped period of struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie. (Marx and Engels, 1945: 43)

According to Marx and Engels, utopian socialists were aware of the developing class antagonisms but they were not able to direct them into a revolutionary manner. They could not develop a systematic thinking on economical relations among classes because of historical conditions. Although Marx and Engels state the deficiencies of the utopian socialist thought, they also agree with their conclusions. The existing exploitation must be overturned in favor of the working class. The conditions of every member of society must be improved. However, the utopian socialist method is not the proper way to reach such an idea because the utopian socialists do not accept all political and revolutionary action, preferring to attain their ends by peaceful means. (Marx and Engels, 1945: 43)

The third component is classical German philosophy which begins with Kant, Fichte, Schelling and reaches its peak with Hegel and Feuerbach in the 18th and 19th centuries. In this tradition, Marx was influenced especially by Hegel and Feuerbach. With his influential book, *The Essence of Christianity*, Feuerbach had a great impact on Marx and the other young Hegelians. The basic argument of Feuerbach is that something which is divine is an illusory product of real life and our thoughts proceed from being, not being from thought. From this argument, it can be derived that God is an illusory creature of human beings which is constituted and posited outside the inward nature of human. God is the symptom of alienation.

Feuerbach's rejection of idealism and his formulation of materialism are the key aspects that determine the intellectual adventure of Marx. Feuerbach's materialism, despite its deficiencies, serves as reliable ground for Marx's conception of history. Marx used the materialism of Feuerbach along with the historical and dialectical approach of Hegel.

The impact of Hegel on Marx is beyond question. Although some writers claim that Marx was not a successor of Hegel and was an opposite instead, it is obvious that the logical connection between each other's thought is considerable. Hegel influenced Marx mainly in two ways: First, with his dialectical method and second, with his conception of history.

According to Hegel, 'dialectics' refers to the movement of thought and deals with coupling of concepts, their emergence and their connections with each other. The transition from one concept to the other and the relationship between contradictory concepts are examined in the framework of Absolute Spirit. In this framework, contradiction appears as the source of every form of movement. This way of thought is clearly seen in his major work called *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

In *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel shows us the structure of consciousness. Instead of explaining a stable structure, he tries to indicate the stages in which consciousness takes different forms. By means of its moments, consciousness is understood in terms of a developmental sketch. Here, change and movement are crucial elements that allow consciousness to develop. Then, we can ask under what conditions change is possible. On this question, Hegel presents us a tripartite movement of consciousness. This tripartite movement also summarizes the form of dialectical way of thought. Hegel, first, puts a stage in which consciousness remains as pure and undifferentiated. In this stage, consciousness asserts nothing but itself and appears as consciousness-in-itself. Objects have no meanings yet. Consciousness entitles nothing except itself. This is the stage of thesis. In the second stage, consciousness becomes something different than it was in the

first stage. It is no longer pure and undifferentiated. It encounters the object outside itself. It negates its first condition insofar as separates itself from its pure being. Consciousness becomes consciousness-for-itself. This is the stage of anti-thesis. The third stage negates the second one and it can be called as the negation of negation. In this stage, consciousness recognizes itself within its own activities. Consciousness becomes consciousness-in-and-for itself. This stage also implies the inclusion of all previous stages. This is the stage of synthesis. (Marx, 1975: 11-13)

This schema shows us the process in which consciousness develops. Dialectical way of thought, here, expresses the law of motion by which consciousness takes its different forms. This way of thinking is inscribed in the methodology of *Capital*. For instance, the analysis of commodities in capitalist market obviously depends on this way of thinking. However, Marx can not be considered a direct successor of Hegel, since Hegel employs dialectics in an idealistic way. But Marx's relation with his dialectics depends strictly on Feuerbach's materialism. Marx describes his relation to Hegel as follows:

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea', he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea'. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought. (Marx, 1967: 19)

Although Marx criticizes Hegel on mystifying dialectics, he also accepts the dialectical method as providing the only dynamic active account of human reality. In the *Economic Philosophical Manuscripts in 1844*, he praises Hegel for being the first to conceive of the "self genesis of man as process." (Tucker, 1978: 112) Here Marx follows the young Hegelian tradition, and especially Feuerbach. According to the young Hegelians, Hegelian philosophy contains a lot of important insights but its basic ontological structure needs to be reconsidered in order to "discover the rational kernel

within the mystical shell” (Marx, 1967: 19). Marx adopts Feuerbach’s method of transforming Hegel’s philosophy by inverting its subject-predicate structure. To put it another way, they accuse Hegel of *hypostatization*. Hypostatization is treating a property of an entity as if it is an independent entity itself. Hegel, according to Marx, takes Consciousness (ultimately Absolute Spirit) to be the subject and actual historical individuals to be manifestations of Spirit’s activities in other words as the predicates. According to Marx, on the other hand, the real subjects are actual historical individuals and Consciousness, Spirit etc, are their predicates. Thus, as Marx states, with Hegel, dialectics is standing on its head and needs to be turned right side up again.

The impact of Hegel on Marx cannot only be restricted to his dialectical method. Hegel, with his conception of history, also influenced Marx profoundly. Hegel argues that each historical era is characteristic and society has a structure which is based upon progress. Hegel employs the term Spirit and asserts that our history is the story of the gradual historical realization or manifestation of reason or spirit in the world.

According to Hegel, history consists of different epochs and the spirits of each epoch is distinct from the other. Spirit, as the set of ideas, develops in a dialectical way, and then, as a result of this process, the next step which follows the former is determined by the contradictions inherent in the previous one. For Hegel, the generating principle of this dialectical change is consciousness. In this respect, Hegel’s philosophy constitutes a historical idealism that relies upon the development of spirit and its dialectical movement.

It is this conception of history that Marx criticizes. As a result of the hypostatization which Marx accuses Hegel of, “the condition is postulated as the conditioned, the determinant as the determined, the producing factor as the product of its product of its product.” (Tucker, 1978: 17) For Hegel, ideas or consciousness appear to be the driving force of history. This inversion

causes the active character of human actions and institutions to become invisible. Therefore, the idea that spirit is the main principle of progress is rejected by Marx in favor of an idea which locates material conditions at the heart of historical progress. According to Marx, the source of progress is the material factors such as actual living individuals, their conditions of production and their class struggle. Thus, unlike Hegel's historical idealism, Marx develops a materialistic conception of history.

2.2. Historical Materialism

Historical materialism can be conceived of as an application of Marx's works to the development processes of history and life. Unlike its Hegelian origin, Marx distinguishes historical development from consciousness and its progress and connects it to material conditions such as means of production, exchange of things and labor.

According to the materialist conception of history, the production and exchange of things produced are the basis of all social structure, and this basis determines the distribution of wealth and division of the society into classes. These relations of production in turn define what in Marxist literature is called "the superstructure"—i.e., ideas, law, morality, etc. Therefore, the cause of historical events and social change should be sought, not in ideology (in men's convictions about truth and justice), but in changes in the modes of production and exchange. (Engels, 1999: 4)

In the preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* Marx also defines the standpoint of historical materialism stating that "[i]t is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness." (Marx, 1970: 12)

According to Marx's materialistic conception of history (as developed in the *German Ideology*), the starting point of history is the production process or

the production of goods that allows human being to survive. In this respect, historical materialism is mainly concerned with identifying “the productive forces” of a particular form of society. Every form of society has its peculiar mode of production, such as hunting and gathering, agriculture, or industry. The term ‘productive forces’ refers to this mode of production as well as the means of production used in that particular mode of production. ‘Relations of production’ in turn are determined on the basis of how and by whom the means of production are appropriated (i.e., property relations), and explain the existence of different classes in a society. According to Marx, there are basically two classes: those who own the means of production and those who don’t. However, the conditions of production themselves are constantly evolving because production itself is a dynamic process. This constant change in the conditions of production “constitutes the dynamic, the changing element in history”. (Socialist Party of Great Britain, Executive Committee, 1975: www.worldsocialism.org) Any change or development in productive forces implies a change in the relations of production which is dominant in a given society. Even though the property owners control the base as well as the superstructure of a society on the basis of their ownership of means of production, they cannot control the dynamics of the productive forces themselves and when the evolution of productive forces reaches a certain breaking point, they can no longer stabilize themselves on the productive forces and are overthrown. There thus arises a new mode of society with a different economic basis and new class divisions. This dynamics explains the law of motion in history. In Marx’s words, all history is “the history of class struggles”. (Marx and Engels, 1945: 8)

By means of these criteria, historical materialism divides history mainly into four stages, these are; primitive communism, slavery societies, feudalism and capitalism. In addition to this classification, The Asiatic mode of production which defines the production relation of eastern despotic societies is also considered as the fifth component. These stages will be described in greater detail in the next section (2.2).

Historical materialism defines primitive communism as the earliest stage of societies. The essential characteristic of this stage is the fact that it strictly depends on kinship systems and collective property. In primitive communism, the main activity of people was gathering and hunting. There were no productive arrangements that organize the division of labor. There was no hierarchy which depends upon classes. The only division that was seen was between men and women. Men were responsible for gathering and hunting in order to maintain the needs of tribe. Women were mainly responsible for raising children. Here, we can easily see that the main difference among human beings is their biological difference. Natural abilities influence the division of labor. Primitive societies are tribal societies. Therefore, there was no state which overcodes the social relations. All the problems among people were solved in the system of tribal rules. All these characteristics show that there was no organized relations of production that relies upon productive forces peculiar to primitive societies. But something has changed through the years. The first great revolution has happened in history. This was the agricultural revolution. People learned ploughing. They learned how to use land. Henceforth, grains were cultivated to satisfy basic human needs. By means of agricultural activity, people met with the concept of surplus. They learned to keep the surplus which corresponds to the exceeding part of the product. However, under primitive societies, there was no enslavement of people. There was no private property in the modern sense. Productive activities were implemented collectively and property was assigned to tribe as a whole. (Cohen, 2000: 28)

The second stage of history is slavery societies. In this stage, the mode of production depends primarily on slavery, that is to say, the direct possession of individual human beings. Society, in this stage, according to people's position to labor, is mainly divided into two. The first is citizens and the second one is slaves. Ancient Greek cities were a typical example of this kind of society. In Ancient Greece, citizens were responsible for the task of ruling. They did not get directly involved with the production process. On the other hand, slaves, in other words, non-citizens were the essential part of

production process. They provided citizens with unpaid labor. In this mode of production, agriculture was at the center of economical activities. Citizens held the property of means of production and possession of slaves' labor power. Surplus product which is the result of production process was owned by citizens. States in slavery societies were the states of ruling classes or citizens. Slaves did not have any political rights. (Cohen, 2000: 34)

The feudal mode of production constitutes the third stage of historical materialism. This stage is typically represented by Western Europe. In this stage, productive forces were under the authority of aristocrats. Aristocrats also had the possession of people as peasants and serfs. Agriculture was still the substantial economic activity. However, it's more developed and complex form was carried out. The relationship between the peasants and aristocrats was the main source of exploitation. While peasants were working on their own land for their subsistence, meanwhile, they also worked for the lords to satisfy their needs.

The fourth and last stage is capitalist mode of production. This mode of production refers to modern industrial societies in which property and production are held in different hands. In capitalist societies, production primarily depends on wage workers, means of production and capital owners. As in all previous stages, production is also the primary category in this stage. However, the distinctive point is that workers produce commodities which belong to the employer. In this respect, the capitalist mode of production depends on the monopoly of means of production in the hands of the ruling class and depends on the exploitation of the working class. This exploitation is performed through the concept of surplus-value. The origin of the profit held by capitalists is found in the formulation of surplus-value in production process. (Cohen, 2000: 41)

In sum, historical materialism consists of four major modes of production which are mentioned above. With historical materialism, Marx presents us a dialectical and materialist conception of history in which modes of production

are the primary source of change. In light of this conceptual framework, the categories employed by Marx in the analysis of the capitalist mode of production, will be examined in the next chapter.

III. CHAPTER 3: THE ONTOLOGY IN CAPITAL

Before embarking on an exposition of Marx's analysis of capitalism, let me begin by justifying the claim implicit in the title of this chapter, that the concepts used by Marx in *Capital* are ontological units. Traditionally, economic concepts such as labor, commodity, capital, and surplus value are not treated as ontological units. However, as Etienne Balibar states in *The Philosophy of Marx*, these concepts in fact represent individuals and social connections, which influence historical developments, and it was Marx's insight to trace these concepts back to their ontological roots and identify their historical importance.

The most technical arguments in *Capital* are also those in which the categories of logic and ontology, the representations of the individual and the social bond, were wrested from their traditional definitions and re-thought in terms of necessities of historical analysis." (Balibar, 1993: p.5)

For this reason, these concepts are treated as ontological units throughout the thesis. In doing so, I intend to compare Marxian account of capitalism to Deleuzian one with reference to their understandings of philosophy.

3.1. Commodity, Use-Value, Exchange-Value, Value

In the Preface to the first German edition of *Capital*, Marx states that "the ultimate aim of this work [*Capital*] is to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society." (Marx, 1967: 10) Here, 'modern society' refers to capitalist bourgeois societies. In the first volume of *Capital*, Marx presents a detailed analysis of the relations of production which is appropriate to these societies. Modern societies are bourgeois societies in which capitalist relations of production are dominant. To make a detailed analysis of these societies, Marx determines a focal point that is suitable for the analysis of the broader

forms of capitalism. In capitalist societies this focal point is the commodity. Although the major axis of volume one is simple commodity production, the implications of this analysis never be reduced to an analysis of a simple economical variable. Commodity, from its first appearance to its detailed analysis, bears the essence of capitalist relations of production.

Marx states that the most important characteristic of capitalist societies shows itself in the accumulation of commodities. According to him, then, the investigation must begin from the profound analysis of this accumulation. He puts it as follows:

The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as "an immense accumulation of commodities," its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity. (Marx, 1967: 35)

The analysis of commodities shows that commodity itself becomes the framework through which the structure of capitalism can be understood. He starts his critique of capitalism by defining a 'commodity' in terms of its three main characteristics. First, a commodity is something that has a 'use-value'. Second, a commodity has an 'exchange-value'. Third, according to Marx, "only such products can become commodities with regard to each other as result from different kinds of labor, each being carried on independently and for the account of private individuals." (Marx, 1967: 71)

For Marx, 'use-value' refers to the utility of a thing. It is the property a commodity has of satisfying a certain human want. The first function of a commodity as an object outside of us is satisfying a need. For instance, by means of a pair of shoes, we protect our feet from cold. But as Marx states, the "want" a commodity satisfies does not have to be may be a luxury; for his analysis it makes no difference whether it is a basic need or a luxury. In addition, a commodity may serve as a use-value either by directly satisfying a want or indirectly as a means of production. (Marx, 1967: 35)

Use-value constitutes the material aspect of commodity. It is not something indefinite, but is defined by the physical properties of the commodity. In short, a commodity, as a material thing, is a use-value, something useful. (Marx, 1967: 36)

Since a commodity is an object that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another, it at first sight may appear merely as a use-value. However, Marx argues that “every useful thing, as iron, paper, &c., may be looked at from the two points of view of quality and quantity.” (Marx, 1967: 35) The use-value corresponds to the qualitative aspect and the material side of a commodity which is incommensurable. By pointing out that the use-value is incommensurable, Marx intends to draw attention to the fact that, in terms of the material qualitative aspects of commodities, there is no common denominator by which to compare the products and measure them up against each other.

However, a commodity must be subject to exchange. Thus, there must also be a quantitative aspect of a commodity, which is commensurable. Here, we encounter the second dimension of a commodity, which is quantitative and immaterial. This is the exchange-value of commodities. According to Marx, exchange-value is a quantitative relation, “as the proportion in which values in use of one sort are exchanged for those of another sort, a relation constantly changing with time and place.” (Marx, 1967: 36)

In addition, there is also a third characteristic of commodities. According to Marx, “only such products can become commodities with regard to each other as result from different kinds of labor, each being carried on independently and for the account of private individuals.” (Marx, 1967: 71-72)

Only by means of this triple character, can an object be assessed as commodity. These are the inseparable parts by which an object takes the form of commodity. In other words, use-value of a commodity cannot be fully evaluated until the object itself has entered into a system of exchange. Use-

value and exchange-value cannot be completely defined into either quality or quantity, but instead must be defined in terms of co-existing parts. After distinguishing between the use-value and exchange-value, Marx asks what the common thing is among commodities. If commodities are comparable things, therefore, there must be something which is inherent to all commodities, that is to say, something which is common to all of them. Then, Marx investigates this quantitative correlation and pursues it in the following way.

While the exchange-value of a commodity implies that there is something it holds in common with other commodities, exchange-value itself does not constitute this common property; it merely expresses it; it is “the phenomenal form, of something contained in it, yet distinguishable from it...” (Marx, 1967: 37) On the other hand, as mentioned above, this “something in common” that a commodity has with other commodities cannot be its use-value, since use-values are qualitatively different. Thus, when we say “1 coat is exchangeable for 2 pairs of boots”, for instance, here the equality/commensurability lies neither between the coat and boots nor between the numbers 1 and 2. So Marx presses the question: “What then is it?”

The result of this questioning process brings us to the meaning of value. According to Marx, value is the common essence that makes commodities comparable with each other. The concept of value presents the quantitative correlation among commodities. Marx argues that the “crystals of this social substance,” common to all commodities, are ‘values’. (Marx, 1967: 38)

From this concept of value, Marx deepens his analysis and investigates the content of value. Here, Marx appeals again to the distinction between use-value and exchange-value. According to Marx, commodities having different qualities are as use-values. But as exchange-values they are solely different quantities without any use-value. Hence, if the use-value of commodities is left out of consideration, being products of labor becomes the only common property of commodities. (Marx, 1967: 37-38)

After determining 'value' as labor, Marx proceeds to discuss the magnitude of this labor. The analysis of magnitude explains the measurability of value among commodities. According to Marx, a use-value, or useful article, has value only because human labor in the abstract has been embodied or materialized in it. Then, he asks how the magnitude of this value is to be measured and immediately states that the quantity of the value-creating substance, the labor, measures the value, and "the quantity of labor is measured by its duration, and labor-time in its turn finds its standard in weeks, days, and hours." (Marx, 1967: p.38) Then, one can ask what kind of labor is contained in a commodity. On this question, Marx argues that the homogeneous human labor, expenditure of one uniform labor-power, gives the substance of value. (Marx, 1967: 39) Marx defines this homogeneous labor with the concept of 'socially necessary labor'. According to him, the sum total of the values of all commodities produced by the society gives the homogeneous mass of human labor-power.

Here the qualification "socially necessary" in the expression "socially necessary labor time" needs to be explained. It could be objected that the labor time required to produce a particular commodity is also not commensurable since the production of the same commodity may require different amounts of time depending on the tools and methods used in its production (e.g., sewing by hand, sewing by a machine). This objection can be countered by the term "socially necessary" which refers to the average time required for the production of a commodity with the tools and technology (or more generally given the mode of production) prevalent in a particular society. In Marx's words, "[t]he labor-time socially necessary is that required to produce an article under the normal conditions of production, and with the average degree of skill and intensity prevalent at the time." (Marx, 1967: 39)

All these definitions indicate that the magnitude of value is determined by the amount of labor socially necessary or the labor-time socially necessary for its production.

To sum up, Marx begins his analysis of capitalist mode of production with the commodities which are the economic cell-forms of this mode of production. By means of his dialectical method, he, first, divides commodities into two. These are use-values and exchange-values of commodities. In addition to this division, Marx asserts that a commodity can be entitled as a commodity only in relation to other commodities. After distinguishing these three aspects, he seeks to find out the common essence inherent in all commodities in order to determine the homogeneous component common to all commodities, that is, value as labor. And, he states that socially necessary labor is the source of value of all commodities. The first part of *Capital (Volume 1)* presents us the categories mentioned above. These categories serve as a conceptual basis on which production and exchange can be examined. But these categories are not sufficient to analyze the law of motion which is peculiar to capitalist mode of production. There must be something that explains the accumulation of profit and progress in capitalist societies. The third part of *Capital* supplies us with the concept that explains the source of such an accumulation. In this part, the concept of the surplus-value appears as the source of such an accumulation.

3.3. Surplus-Value

All the categories which are mentioned above present us a system of concepts in order to analyze production and exchange processes. The key aspects of the capitalist mode of production can be evaluated in light of this conceptual framework. However, by employing these categories alone, something remains lacking in the process of production. The question of what the source of wealth in capitalist societies is still remains unanswered. On this subject, Marx develops the concept of surplus-value.

Capitalist mode of production, at first sight, appears as the systematic production of commodities. However, the reproduction of commodities can only be dependent upon the production of surplus-value. In this respect,

Surplus-value has a dual character. First, it is the compulsory component of commodity production because only by creation of surplus, is it possible to maintain capitalist relations of production. Second, surplus-value is also the source of the wealth of the ruling class and it constitutes the main part of their income and their capital which is the essential element of their power in society. Then, one can question by which conditions surplus is produced? To understand the production process of surplus-value, it will be appropriate to glance at the pre-capitalist processes of surplus production.

In pre-capitalist societies, surplus-value appears in the circulation of goods and services. The products which are mainly produced in agricultural activities enter into circulation only by means of markets driven by merchants. Surplus can only be obtained in trade operations and surplus-value corresponds to the quantity that results from transferring activities. Therefore, the aggregate wealth of a society does not grow in terms of productive value. There is only replacement of surplus-value. In these societies, speculative operations are the main factors that influence the quantity of surplus.

But, with the emergence of capitalist relations of production, the form of surplus-value has changed. In these societies, surplus is no longer derived from speculative operations, transferring activities or circulation of goods. From now on, surplus appears in the process of production.

The third and the fourth parts of *Capital* (Volume 1) describe the production process of surplus-value in capitalist societies. Marx begins his analysis by defining labor-process and the process of labor power. According to Marx, labor-power, bought by the capitalist, in use is labor itself. The capitalist consumes labor-power “by setting the seller of it to work. By working, the latter becomes actually, what before he only was potentially, labor-power in action, a laborer.” (Marx, 1967: 177) Labor-power is expended on something useful, on something capable of satisfying a want of some sort. In this respect, labor-process is a productive activity that produces use-values. Marx

defines the labor-process in terms of three components. First, the personal activity of man or in other words, work itself, second, the subject of that work and finally the instruments. The personal activity of man consists of man's potential ability to transform the nature and social environment. The second component implies that all the raw materials are subjected to labor and the third component indicates the means of production by which subjects of labor are transformed. In the framework of these three components, Marx explains the conditions for producing surplus-value.

The primary and the apparent function of labor process are to produce use-values. At the end of the process, something which satisfies a human need is produced. Marx put it as follows.

In the labor-process, therefore, man's activity, with the help of the instruments of labor, effects an alteration, designed from the commencement, in the material worked upon. The process disappears in the product; the latter is a use-value, Nature's material adapted by a change of form to the wants of man. (Marx, 1967: 180)

On the other hand, the other function of the labor process is to create values. Capitalist, at the end of the process, aims at producing values. According to Marx, as mentioned above, this labor-process implies the use of productive elements such as means of production. But, it must include something live only by which this process may emerge. This element is the labor-power. Capitalist, in order to combine the components and transform these into a commodity, must employ labor-power. Therefore, potential labor owners are employed in the process of production. The capitalist mode of production treats labor as a commodity. In this respect, labor-power as commodity is divided into two aspects:

Firstly, labor-power has an exchange-value. The exchange-value of labor-power is determined by the amount of socially necessary labor embodied in it. In a free market, capitalists and workers encounter each other and come together to implement production process. In this market, workers sell their labor-power in order to cover their expenditures. The basic needs of him and

his family is included in the price of his labor-power. According to capitalist, this means the reproduction cost of the worker's labor-power.

Secondly, labor-power has a use-value. Use-value of labor-power corresponds to its capacity to create new values. Capitalist pays workers to reproduce their labor-power and, with this payment, also possesses his labor-power as a whole. Therefore, the creative aspect of labor is dominated by capitalists without paying any money. This unpaid free labor is the core of capitalist mode of production and progression.

The difference between new value, that is produced by workers and remains unpaid, and the exchange value of labor-power, which is paid to workers, constitutes the source of surplus-value. On surplus, Marx states that,

The value of labor-power, and the value which that labor-power creates in the labor-process, are two entirely different magnitudes; and this difference of the two values was what the capitalist had in view, when he was purchasing the labor-power. (Marx, 1967: 193)

When the capitalist buys the means of production, he pays for their exchange-value and gains the right to their use-value. Among these means of production purchased by capitalist is a very special one: labor-power. By paying the exchange-value of labor-power, the capitalist gains the right its use-value, i.e., labor itself. Like the other means of production, labor-power is also slowly consumed when it is being used and has to be replenished. The exchange-value of labor-power is determined by the exchange-value of commodities required for this replenishment, i.e., the laborer's subsistence. However unlike other commodities, labor-power when it is being-used, as actual labor itself, creates value, more value than is required for its replenishment. This is what is called surplus-value. The capitalist, by gaining the right to the use-value of labor power and by paying only for its exchange-value gets to appropriate the surplus-value.

After describing the process of surplus-value production, Marx redefines it in terms of constant capital and variable capital. In the eighth chapter of the third part of *Capital*, Marx separates constant capital from variable capital according to their role in the production of value and surplus-value. Marx argues that the various factors of the labor process play different parts in the forming of the value of a product. As described above, in the free market, capitalists combine mainly the two elements of the labor process in order to produce a commodity. First, there must be possession of means of production and the second they must employ workers. The creation of value of commodities is possible only through this process. But, how is value produced? What is the origin of value? What component is able to produce the added value? On this point, Marx states that during the production process, the value of means of production is transferred to the final product. Means of production add new value to a product insofar as they are consumed in the process of production.

Therefore, the new product preserves the transferred value of means of production. Means of production, when they are taken into consideration alone, do not reproduce a new value. In this respect, the first aspect of capital appears as something which is stable and Marx calls this as constant capital. (Marx, 1967: 207)

Then, what constitutes the reproduced value or the surplus-value of a commodity? According to Marx, there is a productive aspect of capital that creates new value. This is the labor-power. In the process of production, labor power produces a value which is equivalent to its value. Moreover, it produces an excess that corresponds to the surplus-value of a product. Unlike means of production, it has a capacity to produce new value. This constitutes the second aspect of capital which is called by Marx as variable capital.

In short, the key to surplus-value is the distinction between labor-power and labor. Labor power is not a fixed or frozen component of the production process. It has a capacity to produce added value and it is the primary source of

capitalist profit and accumulation. The surplus is the property of the capitalist. Workers do not have any right to claim the opposite, since they sold their labor-power in a 'free' market.

3.4. Ideology and Commodity Fetishism

Marx's theory of ideology is a problematic concept. What Marx thought on this subject is very cloudy. Different interpretations of the concept, which are drawn from the works of Marx, present enormous variety. As in the concept of ideology in general, in the Marxist tradition and even in Marx's own works, there are several distinct, in some respect contradictory, uses of the concept. (Barret, 1991: 4) However, in *German Ideology* Marx develops an account of ideology which has a critical core.

The seeds of this critical usage were actually planted in Marx's critique of religion and his critique of Hegel's political philosophy. In this respect, the background of ideology was established through these critiques. In *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, religion is conceived of as a product of man. Marx states that, "Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet won through to himself, or has already lost himself again." (Marx, 1994: 244) This passage shows that Marx develops a critical point of view on the problem of religion. No doubt, Marx wrote this passage under the influence of Feuerbach. As a matter of fact, according to Feuerbach, religion is an illusion involving an inversion of reality. Here, illusion and inversion are the key points for Marx. The illusory nature of religion and its capacity to invert reality play a central role in Marx's formulation of the concept of ideology. In *Marxism and Ideology*, Jorge Larraín puts it as follows:

...here Marx anticipates one of the crucial elements of his concept of ideology, namely that religion compensates in the mind for a deficient reality; it reconstitutes in the imagination a coherent solution which goes beyond the real world in an attempt to resolve the contradictions of the real world. (Larraín, 1983: 13)

Thus, it can be said that the concept of ideology, the roots of which can be traced back to the critique of religion and of Hegel had been implicitly articulated before *The German Ideology* was written.

The *German Ideology*, originally written in 1845-1846, presents the most explicit definition of ideology among the works of Marx. Ideology is discussed and criticized in numerous passages in this book. The first definition is as follows:

Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious being and the being of men is their actual life process. If in all ideology, men and their relations appear upside down in a *camera obscura*, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the immersion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process. (Marx, 1995: 42)

Here Marx employs the *camera obscura* metaphor in order to support his conception of ideology as an inversion of reality. In ideology, the relation between men and material conditions in which they live is distorted. Ideology masks real conceptions and ideas of men and refracts them. Ideology becomes an illusion of the presupposed reality. As Barret puts it, although material conditions specify real or true interests, in ideology these are mystified and “people see their interests as the opposite of what they really are. False consciousness is thus the mirror-image of what political consciousness should be.” (Barret, 1991: 5)

The base-superstructure metaphor is employed by Marx and Engels in order to explicate how the economic structure of society determines and shapes the social institutions such as state, law, etc. The economic structure (base) conditions the superstructure. This formulation is central to the theory of historical materialism developed by Marx and Engels. As described in the previous chapter, historical materialism, in the context of the base-

superstructure metaphor, puts economic structure in the center of society and history in general. Mode of production becomes a progressive factor and relations of production provide a critical base for the investigation of society as a whole. According to this perspective, elements in the superstructure (such as law, state, morality) are determined by the relations of productions—i.e., property relations. To put it more explicitly, the class which owns property controls and manipulates the production of ideas as well as the state and law to secure and stabilize the existing relations of productions.

Marx, in order to explicate ideology as distortion of reality, emphasizes the material conditions and their capability to determine superstructure. The *German Ideology* presents another formulation concerning this insight. According to Marx's formulation, what men say, imagine or conceive only arises from real, active men, and their real life processes. All the 'phantoms in their brains' (such as religion, morality, etc.) are sublimations of certain facts about their material life-processes. All the forms of ideology such as morality, religion, metaphysics, etc. cannot be considered as independent. For example, following Feuerbach, Marx asserts that the need for religion is the sign of a certain lack in the lives of individuals who feel that need.

While Marx takes morality, religion and metaphysics as the elements of ideology and the products of consciousness, he also insists that the material production as the determining factor shapes the products of consciousness. Morality, religion and metaphysics cannot exist by themselves but they exist only by means of material conditions. Therefore, ideology must be explained on the basis of material practice. According to Marx, the change of the economic foundation eventually transforms the entire immense superstructure. However, there is a distinction between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production and the ideological forms such as law, politics, religion etc. The material transformation can be determined with the precision of natural sciences. However, the consciousness fails to judge of such a period of transformation as it directly

belongs to this period. Therefore, “this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life.” (Marx, 1973: 182)

These arguments clarify the base-superstructure metaphor. Here, Marx argues that any transformation in the infrastructure more or less affects the superstructure and material transformation of the economic conditions as base is different from the ideological forms.

In *Capital*, Marx maintains the main theme which is at the heart of the concept of ideology. This time, however, he grafts it onto the production process, in particular, onto commodities. According to Marx, capitalist societies are also characterized by an intense and widespread dissemination of ideology and mystification. This mystification manifests itself most prominently in what Marx calls “fetishism of the commodities” where, according to Marx, commodities acquire a mystic character. Marx’s analysis of the commodity form is first of all intended to discover the source of this mystification.

As described in the first part of this chapter, a commodity, first, is a thing that satisfies a definite human need. On this idea, Marx states that “so far as it is a value in use, there is nothing mysterious about it.” whether we consider it from the point of view that by its properties it is capable of satisfying human wants, or from the point of view that or from the point that those properties are the product of human labor.” (Marx, 1967: 71) Thus when use-value is taken into consideration alone, it cannot explain the mysterious character of commodities. As Marx states, altering the form of wood, for instance, by making a table out of it does not make the table anything else than wood. Therefore, the mystical character of commodities does not originate in their use-value. (Marx, 1967: 71)

But, as a commodity, the table, for instance, becomes something transcendent. In relation to all other commodities, it “evolves out of its

wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than table turning ever was" (Marx, 1967: 71)

This is because satisfying a need is not the unique aspect of a commodity. As explained in the second section of this chapter (3.2), there are two other aspects of a commodity: exchange value and the private ownership of the means of production in the form of production in which these commodities are produced. According to Marx, "only such products can become commodities with regard to each other as result from different kinds of labor, each being carried on independently and for the account of private individuals." (Marx, 1967: 72)

Recall that according to Marx, the value of a commodity is determined by socially necessary labor. The production process in which value is produced does not rely only on some concrete labor exercised by a private producer. But, commodities, after having being produced, seem as products which were produced privately. Further, the value relation between commodities which in fact relies on socially necessary labor is in the market expressed in terms of a general equivalent, money, which obscures the social labor relation. Marx put it as follows:

The equality of all sorts of human labor is expressed objectively by their products all being equally values; the measure of the expenditure of labor power by the duration of that expenditure, takes the form of the quantity of value of products of labor; and finally, the mutual relations of the producers, within which the social character of their labor affirms itself, take the form of a social relation between products. (Marx, 1967: 72)

Here, Marx identifies the mystification process in two steps. First, exchange-value allows for value to be expressed as a money-relation, and second, the private character of capitalist production allows for the social character of the value relation to become invisible. In other words, Marx reveals the social character of production and shows how the social character of commodities dissolves when commodities enter into relation with each other in the

capitalist market, where the hidden social character of value appears as the money relation between commodities.

Further even though it is labor that creates value, in the capitalist market, value appears as if it is a property of commodity itself. Marx puts it as follows:

A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men's labor appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labor; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labor is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labor. (Marx, 1967: 72)

With the introduction of commodity as the unification of three abovementioned characteristic, then a mysterious thing adheres to commodities.

Thus, speculative movements of supply and demand in the capitalist market and the role the invisible hand plays in these movements represent such a relationship that conceals the fundamental connection between the producer and the product. Price, according to liberal economy, is determined at the equilibrium point in which supply curve intersects with the demand curve. So then, the price of a commodity primarily depends on the movements of the market. Price is seen as the only source of values of commodities. But in fact, Marx has demonstrated that a value of a commodity can be determined and measured only by means of abstract labor.

Marx argues that the mystification involved here is quite similar to the mystifications involved in Hegelian philosophy, German Ideology and religion. It is because human beings do not correctly identify the real ontological basis of the production process and human labor and social relations of production as active principle the true basis of value creation that they lose sight of the true meaning and nature of their activities and are controlled by their own products instead of controlling them.

In sum, the misidentification of social relationship as money relationship and loss of sight of labor as the true source of value lead to commodities' appearing to be independent bearers of value. This misperception is called "fetishism of commodities" by Marx and the tripartite division including use-value, exchange-value, and the so-called private dimension of commodities explains what leads to a fetishism of commodities.

IV. CHAPTER 4: DELEUZE'S UNDERSTANDING OF PHILOSOPHY

As we saw in the previous chapters, Marx defines capitalist relations of production in terms of his own categories. In relation to his understanding of philosophy and historical precursors, Marx develops a profound critique of capitalist mode of production. In this chapter, I will try to analyze Deleuze's understanding of philosophy that determines the basic principles of his account of capitalism in *Anti-Oedipus*. To pursue this aim, first, I try to elaborate his understanding of philosophy through his influential book called *Difference and Repetition*. Then, in the second part of the chapter, I relate the arguments of *Difference and Repetition* to his understanding of philosophy outlined in his collaborative work with Felix Guattari called *What is Philosophy?*

The categories employed by Marx for his analysis (discussed in the previous chapter) are the ontological units that express a statement about reality. They all represent various states of affairs peculiar to the capitalistic mode of production. Unlike Marx, Deleuze constructs a different account of capitalism based on his understanding of philosophy. His philosophical precursors give rise him to develop a different account of capitalism. In this respect, his concepts, presented in order to analyze capitalist societies in *Anti-Oedipus*, are determined in light of his understanding of philosophy and critique of western philosophy. On this idea, I agree with Ronald Bogue who states that in *Anti-Oedipus* Deleuze and Guattari re-work many of the concepts and themes developed in *Difference and Repetition* and transpose them into a political context. (Bogue, 1986: 83) What I hope to accomplish in this thesis is to compare Marx and Deleuze's understandings of philosophy by tracing their political accounts to their ontological roots and discovering the real basis of the differences and similarities in their ontologies. Thus, clarifying the

ontological presuppositions before the political explanations is the more substantial way to proceed

4.1 Dogmatic Image of Thought

In his book called *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze attempts to overturn the basic categories of western metaphysics and tries to develop a form of thought without an image. Chapter three of *Difference and Repetition* represents a profound critique of dogmatic image of thought the roots of which can be traced back to the writings of Plato, Descartes, Kant and Hegel. Deleuze, through his critique, tries to expose how the concepts of thought and thinking are perceived by dogmatic image of thought. In this respect, the forms of concepts employed in *Anti-Oedipus* that explain the dynamics of capitalism are actually planted in *Difference and Repetition*.

In chapter three of *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze exposes eight postulates that belongs to traditional western philosophy. According to Deleuze, these postulates determine the basic principles of traditional philosophy.

The first postulate of Deleuze is the *principle* ("*Cogitatio natura universalis*") . Namely, it is the 'good will of the thinker' and 'good nature of thought'. This postulate expresses the subjective or implicit presupposition of the dogmatic image of thought. According to Deleuze, Descartes, in presenting the Cogito, presupposes that everyone already knows how thought is to be defined and knows what it means to think pre-philosophically. When anyone says 'I think therefore I am', then, it is assumed that everyone understands what is meant by 'I think'. This also means that no one can deny that to doubt is to think, and to think is to be. This implicit presupposition provides a trustworthy ground to Descartes in formulating the Cogito and guarantees the universality of the premises.

The universality is derived from the idea of Common Sense. That is to say, there is a natural capacity for thought endowed with a talent for truth or an affinity with the true in man's mind and there is also a desire to know. The dogmatic image of thought assumes that there is an innate idea of truth inscribed to man's mind. By 'the image' Deleuze means a double aspect of a good will on the part of a thinker and an upright nature on the part of thought. According to this image, between thought and true there is an affinity; thought formally possesses the true and materially wants the true. In terms of this image "everybody knows and is presumed to know what it means to think." (Deleuze, 1994a: 131)

Deleuze states that Nietzsche defines the same problem in a different way. Nietzsche conceives of implicit presuppositions as moral presuppositions. Deleuze puts it as follows:

When Nietzsche questions the most general presuppositions of philosophy, he says that these are essentially moral, since Morality alone is capable of persuading us that thought has a good nature and the thinker a good will, and that only the good can ground the supposed affinity between thought and the True. (Deleuze, 1994a: 132)

Against the first postulate, Deleuze argues that the subjective or implicit presuppositions operate similarly to the objective presuppositions that Descartes tries to escape. There is no innate idea of thought which works in accordance with the true. Furthermore, there are no individuals endowed with good will. Philosophy, according to Deleuze, must not rely upon such presuppositions. Rather, it must firstly develop a radical critique of dogmatic image of thought and then, repetition and difference must be revealed through this radical critique. This also means the liberation of thought from the chains by which it is imprisoned.

The second postulate is the postulate of ideal or common sense (common sense as the *concordia facultatum* and good sense as the distribution which guarantees this concord). This postulate takes its roots from the famous

phrase of Descartes: “good sense is of all things in the world the most equally distributed.” (Deleuze, 1994a: 167) Descartes, in presenting Cogito, implicitly assumes that there is a good nature of thought which has an affinity with the true; that is, there is a natural exercise of thought filled by truth and, this good nature is immanent to all men’s minds. Here, the distribution assures the universality of good nature of thought. It provides a secure ground to claim the Cogito.

The third postulate is the postulate of recognition. The recognition model consists of the harmonious exercise of the different faculties (imagination, memory, perception, and understanding) on a supposed single object. The recognition model, from Plato to Kant, operates with the assumption that each faculty collaborates with each other. Dogmatic image of thought links the first two postulates to the third. (Deleuze, 1994a: 133)

According to Deleuze, recognition of an object is determined by the sameness of the object. In dogmatic image of thought, by means of common sense, it is presupposed that recognition is inscribed in man’s mind as a natural and innate faculty. However, such a claim requires a ground on which the harmony among faculties is established. This ground is defined by the unity of a thinking subject. Descartes established the unity of a thinking subject by means of Cogito. When Descartes says ‘I think, therefore, I am’, he implicitly presupposes that there is a unity in the thinking subject. Deleuze put it as:

As Descartes says of the piece of wax: ‘It is of course the same wax which I see, which I touch, which I picture in my imagination, in short the same wax which I thought it to be from the start. (Deleuze, 1994a: 134)

Deleuze states that there are three dangerous faults in the recognition model. Firstly, he argues that recognition model occupies a large part of our daily life. However, to recognize objects only through the recognition model destroys the creativity of thought. Thought, according to him, is not destined

only to recognize but to create. Secondly, the recognition model derives its presuppositions from certain facts. Deleuze claims that to extrapolate presuppositions from certain empirical facts peters out the transcendental characteristics of thought. According to him, among all philosophers, Kant is the one who discovers the realm of the transcendental but he traces the transcendental structures from the empirical acts of psychological consciousness. Thirdly, the recognition model conceives of the concept of error as a consequent, emerging from the one faculty which confuses its object with different object of another faculty. That is to say, the recognition model traces error from empirical correspondence of faculties. In this respect, the concept of error appears as a characteristic of the recognition model. However, Kant treated error as an illusion of reason, illusion interior to reason. Therefore, by means of locating error into the realm of reason, Kant appears equipped to overturn the dogmatic image of thought. But, according to Deleuze, he fails to prevent his system from empirical extrapolations. (Deleuze, 1994a: 134)

The fourth postulate is the postulate of representation. Deleuze argues that representation can appropriately subordinate the concept of difference to the Same and the Similar, the Analogous and the Opposed. This means that representation is defined by the identity with regard to concepts, opposition with regard to determination of concepts, analogy with regard to judgment and resemblance with regard to objects.

Deleuze argues that dogmatic image of thought, with its components or elements, considers difference as an object of representation. The 'I think' provides a source for the elements of representation. In this Image, difference can only be defined among elements of representation such as difference between opposition and resemblance and etc. According to Deleuze, difference is crucified by dogmatic image of thought. Image is unable to grasp the nature of difference and replaces difference in itself with difference among the elements of representation.

Deleuze, by exposing the postulates of dogmatic image of thought, tries to develop the conditions of a true critique. The task of a true critique is to destroy the image of thought and to prepare the conditions of the act of thinking in thought itself. In this respect, Deleuze employs the distinction of Plato. Plato, in *The Republic*, distinguishes two forms of thinking: “those which do not disturb thought and those which force us to think. The first are objects of recognition: thought and all its faculties may be fully employed therein, thought may busy itself thereby, but such employment and such activity have nothing to do with thinking.” (Deleuze, 1994a: 138)

The fifth postulate is the postulate of error. That is to say, error which occurs in thinking is caused by external rather than internal mechanisms. In dogmatic image of thought, error functions as a possible misadventure of thought. Image defines error as the ‘negative’ which develops naturally and considers stupidity, malevolence, madness as the other misadventures of thought. Dogmatic image recognizes that all misadventures result from external factors. For instance, Deleuze puts it as follows:

Who says ‘Good morning Theodorus’ when Theaetetus passes, ‘it is three o’clock’ when it is thirty three, and that $7+5=13$? Answer: the myopic, the distracted and the young child at school. (Deleuze, 1994a: 150)

In contrast to dogmatic image, Deleuze argues that error could belong to the realm of thought and must be treated as internal to it. Therefore, the exercise of thought can not be measured according to the external factors.

The sixth postulate is the postulate of designation or of the proposition. Namely, the truth of a proposition is only determined by what is designated by the proposition. Deleuze states that dogmatic image takes designation as the locus of truth and forms designation as the logical form of the recognition model. Image traces truth from the form of designation. According to Deleuze, propositions have two dimensions. That is to say, both expression and designation constitute truth by their distinct operation in the unity of

proposition. However, there must be an extra something that conditions the truth. There must be a transcendental unit that provides a ground for the production of truth. (Deleuze, 1994a: 154)

Deleuze argues that truth is a matter of production not of adequation. The real condition of truth is genitility, not of innateness or reminiscence. In this connection, Deleuze employs the concept of sense. Sense establishes the relation between the proposition and what it designates. Sense gives the unity of the former and the latter. Apart from the truth and falsity, as an extra third, sense, appears as the condition of the true. Deleuze defines sense as:

Sense is the genesis or the production of the true, and truth is only the empirical result of sense...Sense is what is expressed by a proposition...Sense so defined is only a vapor which plays at the limit of things and words. (Deleuze, 1994a: 154)

Deleuze gives no exact definition of sense but shows the way which sense can be grasped. The main characteristic of sense is its transcendental employment. There is no empirical fact or state of affair that corresponds to what the term indicates. Only by means of transcendental operation, sense can be revealed. (Deleuze, 1994a: 155)

The seventh postulate is the postulate of modality. This postulate implies that problems are defined only by their solutions. In other words, problems are explained by the possibility of their being solved and constituted in terms of external conditions. Deleuze argues that the dogmatic image of thought involves tracing problems from propositions and constitutes the test of truth according to the possibility that it receives a solution. For this reason, dogmatic image cannot grasp the productive characteristic of thought. According to him, it is not a matter of propositions but a genesis of truth in thought. For this reason, Image misses the productive aspect of thought and its differential elements. He puts the position of the Image as:

...the natural illusion which involves tracing problems from supposedly pre-existent propositions, logical opinions, geometrical theorems,

algebraic equations, physical hypothesis or transcendental judgments; and the philosophical illusion which involves evaluating problems according to their solvability- in other words, according to the extrinsic and the variable form of possibility of finding a solution. (Deleuze, 1994a: 161)

Contrary to dogmatic image, Deleuze maintains that problems are transcendent and immanent in relation to their solutions. Problems take their transcendent characteristic from their system which consists of differential genetic elements and take their immanence from their incarnation in actual relations.

The eighth postulate is the postulate of knowledge. Namely, learning is seen only as means of obtaining knowledge. Image, according to Deleuze, subordinates learning to knowledge and culture to method. In contrast, according to Deleuze, learning is prior to knowledge. In a connection with this priority, the concept of apprenticeship is sublimated in Deleuze. (Deleuze, 1994a: 165)

Chapter three of *Difference and Repetition* consists of the analysis of these eight postulates. Deleuze investigates them as the components of Image. When they are taken into consideration together, they form the dogmatic image of thought. According to him, by means of postulates, dogmatic image of thought betrays 'what it means to think'. For him, thought must be engendered in thought without considering the postulates and concepts such as innateness or reminiscence cannot be attributed to the act of thinking.

In sum, by investigating the eight postulates of Image, Deleuze presents a profound critique of the mode of thinking which has been developed by Plato, Descartes and Kant. However, Deleuze does not offer a new image of thought which defines 'what it means to think'. Rather, he proposes a thought without image.

4.2 Plane of Immanence and Concepts

Deleuze and Guattari present their account of the dynamics of social relations in general and capitalism in particular in *Anti-Oedipus*; but the philosophical concepts used in *Anti-Oedipus* will best be understood if we look at their understanding of “the creation of concepts” elaborated in *What is Philosophy?* It may seem anachronistic to continue by *What is Philosophy?* since it was written about eighteen years after *Anti-Oedipus*, but the highly idiosyncratic concepts used in *Anti-Oedipus* can only be appreciated in light of the key role that the creation of new concepts plays in Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of philosophy. It is evident that Deleuze and Guattari were already operating with the understanding of philosophy elaborated in *What is Philosophy?* but postponed providing an account of this more fundamental philosophical question. My methodology, in addition being more convenient in terms of clarity, is also motivated by a more systematic concern.

In *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish philosophy, science and art in terms of their respective position in relation to Chaos. (It seems that Deleuze and Guattari use the word “chaos” in its ordinary sense of “lack of organization or order”) According to them, philosophy deals with creation of concepts. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 118) They employ the term ‘concept’ as a technical term which serves to distinguish philosophy from science and art. They argue that science operates with referential states of affairs which determine the representation of mathematical and propositional functions. Science, according to its position to chaos, constructs a different plane which consists in the system of references. However, science operates with functions, while philosophy operates with concepts. In this respect, Art has a similarity to philosophy. Like philosophical concepts, works of art do not refer to objects or states of affairs outside themselves. However, works of art and philosophical concepts differ from each other according to their position to Chaos. Unlike philosophical concepts, art aims at capturing and expressing

of particular perceptions and affections. For this reason, art employs percepts and affects in order to define its plane. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 165)

After distinguishing the original positions of philosophy, science and art according to their realms occupied in relation to chaos, Deleuze and Guattari elaborate the plane of philosophy in terms of their philosophy of becoming. Analysis of concepts and the construction of a plane of immanence are the central points to their work

Deleuze and Guattari define philosophy as “the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994b: 2). Concepts consist of their components. For this reason, there are no simple concepts which consist of only one component. Concepts can be defined as a multiplicity and combination of their components. They unify all their components in terms of their “irregular contour”. The expression “irregular contour” is intended to indicate that the components comprising the concept are not tightly bound, but they nevertheless present a consistent whole—in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, “a fragmentary whole”. Only by means of this fragmentary wholeness, are concepts able to shape chaos. There may be more than one concept on the same plane. The relationship among concepts on the same plane is arranged according to their becoming. Therefore, they may intersect or link up with each other. In spite of the fact that they have different histories or speak of different problems, they belong to the same plane. The connections among concept are bridges which constitute the possibility of constructing of a plane.

There are three original characteristics of concepts. First, concepts are created and extend to infinity. Because of being created, they are not ready-made units which can be found pre-philosophically. Second, the peculiar characteristic of concepts is the inseparability of their components from themselves. Components stand distinct and heterogeneous to their concepts but they are inseparable from them. According to Deleuze and Guattari, these inseparable and heterogeneous qualities determine the

“endoconsistency” of concepts. Deleuze and Guattari define ‘endoconsistency’ as follows:

Components remain distinct, but something passes from one to the other, something that is undecidable between them. There is an area ‘*ab*’ that belongs to both *a* and *b*, where *a* and *b* become indiscernible. These zones, thresholds or becomings, this inseparability define the internal consistency of the concept. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994b: 19-20)

Third, concepts can be considered as the points of coincidence, condensation and accumulation of their components. Deleuze and Guattari state that concepts cross their components on the plane with an infinite speed. In this respect, each component is a singularity which is traversed by concepts. Deleuze and Guattari define components as the intensive ordinates and insist that ordinate relationship among components cannot be reduced to the relationship among variables and constants. According to them, science and philosophy differ from each other in respect to their attitude towards the status of variables and constants. In this respect, components cannot be considered as variables but as variations ordered according to their neighborhood. About the relation between the concept and its components, Deleuze and Guattari write as follows:

The concept is in a state of survey [*survol*] in relation to its components, endlessly traversing them according to an order without distance. It is immediately co-present to all its components or variations, at no distance from them, passing back and forth through them: it is a refrain, an opus with its numbers [*chiffre*]. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994b: 20-21)

According to Deleuze and Guattari, the concept is incorporeal in that it has no actual reference (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994b: 21) The concept, according to Deleuze and Guattari, has no reference. When it is created, the concept posits its object at the same time. In this sense, the concept is self-referential and does not have any factual correspondence. This self-referential quality of the concept also determines the condition of its consistency. Deleuze and Guattari argue that concepts are not discursive

and reject the confusion of propositions and concepts. The main difference between them is the problem of reference. Propositions refer to states of affairs or empirical facts. But concepts are self-referential. Deleuze and Guattari put it as:

The concept is not a proposition at all; it is not propositional, and the proposition is never an intension. Propositions are defined by their reference, which concerns not the Event but rather a relationship with a state of affairs or body and with the conditions of relationship. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994b: 21)

Concepts which present a fragmentary whole, reside in a same plane in which they are interrelated to and differentiated from each other. Deleuze and Guattari define this wholeness as “plane of immanence”. Plane of immanence is the plane of consistency which keeps all concepts in the same plane. In this respect, plane is different from concepts. Deleuze and Guattari state that concepts and plane are strictly correlative, but nevertheless the two should not be confused. “The plane of immanence is neither a concept nor the concept of all concepts.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994b: 35)

Plane of immanence serves as a “horizontal reserve” by which concepts retain their consistencies. The plane encircles the concept as an envelope. Only by means of plane, do concepts constitute a coherent form. Deleuze and Guattari put the relation between concepts and the plane as follows:

Concepts are the archipelago or skeletal frame, a spinal column rather than a skull, whereas the plane is the breath that suffuses the separate parts. Concepts are the absolute surfaces or volumes, formless and fragmentary, whereas the plane is the formless, unlimited absolute, neither surface nor volume but always fractal. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994b: 36)

When concepts speak of the event, the plane constitutes the horizon of events. Concepts fill in the plane by their continuity. Deleuze and Guattari do not bestow any realm for the subject in the plane. Instead, they employ the expression ‘to orientate oneself in thought’. This means that movement belongs only to the horizon not to any subject or object. A subject and an

object can only be concepts. As movement takes in everything, there is no place for them. The horizon itself is in movement: “the relative horizon recedes when the subjects advance, but on the plane of immanence we are always and already on the absolute horizon.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994b: 37-38)

According to Deleuze and Guattari, the plane of immanence is pre-philosophical. They compare it with Heidegger’s pre-ontological understanding of being. In this respect, they demonstrate the fact that in any event, philosophy must posit the pre-philosophical. It must not be constituted prior to philosophy but must be considered with it. The task of philosophy is creation of concepts but only by means of instituting a plane.

By formulating the plane of immanence, Deleuze and Guattari lay out a new image of thought which gives itself of ‘what it means to think’. Plane of immanence appears as the new image of thought and draws a line from Chaos by preparing. Plane of immanence is the condition of the possibility of any attempt to create concepts. The plane of immanence is the image of thought, not a concept that is or can be thought, “the image thought gives itself of ‘what it means to think’, to make use of thought, to find one’s bearings in thought. It is not a method, since every method is concerned with concepts and presupposes such an image.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994b: 37)

Gilles Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition* introduces the importance of a philosophy of difference by describing how difference is subordinated to the difference among concepts of dogmatic image of thought. Deleuze explains that difference and repetition have a reality which is independent of the concepts of sameness, identity, resemblance, similarity, or equivalence which are presupposed by dogmatic image of thought.

At the end of chapter three of *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze presents a critique of the dogmatic image of thought. By investigating its postulates, he

tries to dismantle the presuppositions of the Image. However, Deleuze does not offer a new image of thought. There are only clues for the new image of thought such as productivity of thought, the Idea and the concept of genesis. Deleuze insists on emancipating difference from the conception of dogmatic image of thought and offers a thought without an image

However, *What is philosophy?*, the collaborative work of Deleuze and Guattari, presents a new image of thought which is called plane of immanence. Unlike *Difference and Repetition*, this book concentrates on creation of concepts and instituting plane of immanence.

In sum, in *What is philosophy?*, by formulating the plane of immanence, Deleuze and Guattari offer a different mode of thinking which breaks off all its ties from traditional image of thought.

V. CHAPTER 5: THE POLITICAL ONTOLOGY IN ANTI-OEDIPUS

5.1. Machines and Production

In connection with their conception of philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari analyze society in terms of new concepts such as 'desire', 'machines', 'production', 'socius', 'body without organs', 'deterritorialization', and 'reterritorialization'.

Anti-Oedipus begins with a claim that everything is composed of machines, machines which are functioning with permanent interruptions and recommencements. Machines should be here considered ontological units that constitute reality and treated as a component providing us with a key to understanding the nature of reality. They put it as follows:

Everywhere it is machines –real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 1)

Machines are not things which correspond to any fixed state of affairs. In connection with their philosophy of becoming the roots of which can be traced back to Nietzsche, they define machines as processes, in other words, machines are flows of becoming. To define machines as flows provides an adequate base for Deleuze and Guattari for deconstructing the subject-object dichotomy, which will be important in understanding their account of capitalism.

Deleuze and Guattari argue that machines are asubjective and unnatural, that is, machines are different from the human subject and from nature and

also there is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces the one within the one within the other and couples the machines together. “Producing-machines, desiring machines everywhere, schizophrenic machines, all of species life: the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 2) Machinic process does not consist of acts of human subject and its relation to nature. They insist that there is no distinction between man and nature. Man and nature cannot be conceived as two opposite terms confronting each other. They are not bipolar opposites within a relationship of causation, ideation, or expression, “they are one and the same essential reality, the producer-product.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 4) Here, the man-nature dichotomy is dismantled by constituting an identity (of the producer and the product). According to Deleuze and Guattari,

...the human essence of nature and the natural essence of man become one within nature in the form of production or industry, just as they do within the life of man as a species. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 4)

The concept of production plays a key role in the argumentation of Deleuze and Guattari. Machinic process as becoming or flow means ‘process of production’. Production is pre-subjective and pre-natural. Deleuze and Guattari argue that production is the act of producing but there is no human subject or any intelligence that stands behind the production process and control this process in accordance with a system of rules. What Deleuze and Guattari mean by ‘production’ is different from Marx’s usage of the term. In Marx, ‘production’ refers to something more specific and concrete, such as the commodity in capitalist production. Even though Marx also speaks of the reproduction of labor-power, his usage of the term ‘production’ is nevertheless never as pervasive as Deleuze and Guattari’s. With Deleuze and Guattari, what is produced is not only commodities, but also concepts, individuals, social relations, in short, everything.

Then, what does it mean to say that everything is production? Production is the form of what is going on. As mentioned above, by means of the recognition of the unity of producer and product, the subject-object dichotomy is broken, and all the idealistic categories that allow sublimation of human-subject and guarantee the certainty of *ration* are overthrown. According to this formulation, human subjects and nature arise as products or effects of processes of production. They no longer have a privileged status over the world of things. The essential thing is the production of production which covers up machinic process.

What Deleuze and Guattari say about schizophrenia can shed light on this idea of production. The schizophrenic, according to them, dismantles the subject-object dichotomy and considers nature or world of things as a process of production without sublimating any aspect of it. Additionally, by means of such recognition, the schizophrenic deviates from the fixation of being and overtakes the flows of becoming. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 3)

5.2. Desire and Desiring-Production

In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari present the concept of desire in relation to machinic process and production of production. In fact, desire is the unique concept among others which has an independent ontological status. Although desire has its autonomous existence over all concepts presented in *Anti-Oedipus*, we can say that there is no such thing as desire. Deleuze and Guattari always present desire along with another concept such as desiring-machines, desiring-production, etc.

Desire is the manner in which we are able to understand the whole of becoming. It is the pivot that serves as a point of reference, because, machines are desiring-machines and productions are desiring-productions. Desire is the driving-force that covers up machinic processes and production processes. Desire activates machines toward other machines. They operate

on other machines. Desire is the concept that surveys all machines and productions.

As the productive-force it may be appropriate to compare desire to labor in Marx's theory. But just as production is a more pervasive concept in Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy than it is in Marx's, desire is also a more diffused ontological entity than the labor that Marx speaks of. The main reason behind this difference is that Marx and Deleuze have different ontologies. Marx is influenced by Hegel, who also tried to overcome the subject-object dualism in a way that focuses on the active relation between subject and object. This focus on activity led Marx and Hegel to identify human labor as a key ontological concept. Further, in his criticism of Hegel's idealism as well as his critique of ideology, Marx has made it clear that for him, the human subject and its productive activity is the true starting point ontologically, and what is real is the finite empirical individual material person. Thus, in Marx's ontology, the human subject remains "intact."

Deleuze and Guattari, in contrast, go further in deconstructing the subject so that desire, unlike labor, is a pre-subjective concept. The influence behind this "deconstruction of the subject" in Deleuze and Guattari can be traced back to two important figures in Deleuze's intellectual development. If we glance at the theoretical background of the concept of desire, we encounter two main sources that affect its constitution. The first one is Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche which has a positive effect. The other one is the psychoanalytic conception of desire which serves in a negative manner.

Before his collaboration with Guattari, Deleuze has worked on Nietzsche systematically. In his book *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze treats Nietzsche not as "a mere rhapsodic aphorist," but as "an intellectually consistent philosopher." (Bogue, 1989:15) First of all, Deleuze finds in Nietzsche's critique of traditional philosophers such as Plato, Hegel, and Kant not only an attack on traditional morality and religion, but also a thoroughgoing articulation of the most basic problems of traditional

metaphysics and epistemology. Indeed, Deleuze's delineation of the eight postulates of dogmatic thought discussed in Chapter three seems to be directly influenced by Nietzsche's critique. Further, in overturning Platonism, Nietzsche's philosophy does not remain only a critique. According to Deleuze's reading, Nietzsche also develops his own philosophy of becoming based on a physics of force, which in turn, becomes a key influence on Deleuze's concept of desire. (Bogue, 1989: 15)

What is essential for Deleuze in Nietzsche is the formulation of active and reactive forces and will to power as the immanent criterion. These forces give Deleuze a profound ontological approach on which the other concepts are able to move. First, these forces are virtual capacities to affect and be affected by other forces which are actualized in determinate form in a given material. As Deleuze puts it,

[F]orces are essentially related to the other forces and the will to power must be understood as the inner principle of the relation between forces. Chance brings particular forces into relation with one another, but will to power determines the character and the outcome of the relations between forces. (Patton, 2000: p. 52)

Forces can be active or reactive. Deleuze argues that the relative strength of forces gives the first dimension of this distinction. The superior force, which dominates another force in a given encounter, is active and the inferior one which is dominated. These two kinds of force have different manners of action. Forces the activities of which are conditioned or constrained by superior forces are reactive forces. (Patton, 2000: 60)

In this respect, desire must be understood as the primary active force which constitutes reality. What Deleuze found in Nietzsche is the affirmation of active forces, that is, the affirmation of desire as the constitutive element of life. For Deleuze, Nietzsche puts an ontologically positive foundation for his concept of desire.

The other source for Deleuze in his formulation of desire is the psychoanalytic approach. By means of the Oedipus complex, Freud confines desire into a family triangle (daddy-mommy-me) and defines it as a lack, that is, in a negative manner. In this respect, The Oedipus Complex works as a device which ensures the individualization of desire in the structure of family. Freud, by means of Oedipus complex, treats desire as a lack and imprisons the relation between the social field and desiring-production into a family structure. According to Deleuze and Guattari, Oedipal family is one of the major aspects of capitalism which restricts desire in capitalist societies. (Bogue, 1989: 88)

These two main sources (Nietzsche and Freud) on the basis of whose influence Deleuze and Guattari develop their ontology provides the key to the main difference between Deleuze and Marx's accounts of capitalism. After locating desire at the center of their analysis Deleuze and Guattari transfer it to the social field, a move that allows them to overwrite Marx's base-superstructure distinction.

5.3. Body without Organs and Socius

In *Anti-Oedipus*, the concept of desiring production is also defined with its function, that is, production is immediately consumption and a recording process. Everything that is produced is recorded as a system of references on a surface which serves as a web of coordinates. All the actions, passions, pains, that is to say, all that is consumed through the production processes are recorded on this surface. This recording surface is what Deleuze and Guattari call the 'body without organs'.

The 'body without organs' is an entity produced by desiring-machines. But, what kind of a body are Deleuze and Guattari speaking of? We can formulate the body as: "made up of various desiring machines, parts unrelated to any whole, which are connected to other desiring-machines, some within the body, some in the natural world." (Bogue, 1989: 91) However, the body

without organs is not the whole of which the desiring-machines are the parts, but an extra part produced alongside the desiring-machines. (Bogue, 1989:93) In other words, while desiring-machines are active, the body without organs is passive.

The body without organs, the unproductive, the unconsumable, serves as a surface for the recording of the entire process of production of desire, so that desiring-machines seem to emanate from it in the apparent objective movement that establishes a relationship between the machines and the body without organs. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 11)

As can be seen from this passage, there is a parallel between the relation between desiring machines and the body without organs and the relation that Marx sees between capital and labor. As seen in the chapter on Fetishism of Commodities, according to Marx, it is human labor that creates value and thus capital, but then human labor appears as if it is produced by capital. Similarly, the body without organs is produced by desiring machines

The body without organs can be defined as the zero state of intensity and there is a conflict between desiring-production and the body without organs. The former always tries to penetrate the latter. "The desiring machines attempt to break into the body without organs and the body without organs repels them as an over-all persecution apparatus" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 9). Deleuze and Guattari state that the birth of machine strictly depends upon this conflict. The genesis of the machine lies "in the opposition of the process of production of the desiring machines and the nonproductive stasis of the body without organs." (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 9) Additionally, they emphasize the emergence of the subject through the body without organs and machinic processes. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 20)

The full body without organs is the unproductive, the sterile, the unengendered, and the unconsumable, but at a certain place and a certain

time in the connective synthesis it is produced as the identity of producing and the product. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 8)

Deleuze and Guattari define a different recording surface for social production, that is, *socius*. 'Socius' can be defined as the nonproductive element of social production in which desire is coded or it is a focal point or support for the social investment of desire (Holland, 1999: 60).

It falls back on all production constituting a surface over which the forces and agents of production are distributed, thereby appropriating for itself all surplus production and arrogating to itself both the whole and the parts of the process which now seem to emanate from it as a quasi cause. Forces and agents come to represent a miraculous form of its own power: they appear to be miraculated by it. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 10)

On this point, in order to clarify the status of *socius*, we can compare it to the Marxist notion of capital. According to Marx, capital, in the first place, is the form of accumulation of money. Nobody denies this statement. But, in fact, what constitutes capital is not money at all. Marx points that not money but labor constitutes the real shape of capital. Marx states that, money mystifies the real process in which capital takes its form. Using the concepts of Deleuze and Guattari, we can say that, here, the miraculated capital functions as a recording surface, as an element of anti-production which provides a basis for capitalist activities.

Having applied their own conceptual framework to Marx's notion of capital, Deleuze and Guattari proceed to provide the following account of capitalism. Once capital presents itself as the source of all process in capitalism, the real processes which are invested by desire are attached to the body of capital, in other words, to capital as *socius*. For instance, when the source of wealth in capitalist society is examined and investigated, we can easily see that capital –the accumulated money- appears as the source of wealth. But, in fact, it is labor, as Marx shown, which produces capital. In the beginning stages of

capitalism, the opposition between capital and labor is obvious. But because capital functions as a recording surface, the socius, when capital reproduces itself, it reproduces all of society. From a Marxist point of view, the fetishism of commodities manifests a state of false consciousness where individuals are under the influence of ideology and alienated from the true nature of their real life-activities. This implies that there is a reality shrouded by the false consciousness. Deleuze and Guattari differ from Marx on this point in that there is no reality other than the existing social relations. All the forces inherent in society then are defined in terms of capital as “socius.” Further, as Deleuze and Guattari state, this state of “bewitchment” is not unique to capitalism.

What is specifically capitalist here is the role of money and use of capital as a full body to constitute the recording or inscribing surface. But some kind of full body, that of the earth or the despot, a recording surface, an apparent objective movement, a fetishistic, perverted, bewitched world are characteristic of all types of society as a constant social reproduction. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 11)

What is essential here is the process of miraculation. Capital transforms the relationships between capital and labor. Labor is no longer the labor in the beginning of capitalism. Something has changed through the capitalist production. Production is not recorded in the same way it is produced, however. Or rather, it is not reproduced within the apparent objective movement in the same way in which it is produced within the process of constitution (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 12). This is what Marx called commodity fetishism.

Throughout their conception of history, Deleuze and Guattari describe three different aspects of socius inherent in societies; in primitive territorial era, socius is the body of earth, in imperial era, socius is the body of despot and lastly in capitalist era socius is the body of capital. These stages will be discussed in relation to their account of capitalism

VI. CHAPTER 6: DELEUZE AND GUATTARI'S ACCOUNT OF CAPITALISM AND ITS RELATION TO MARX: POINTS OF RUPTURE AND POINTS OF CONTINUITY

Deleuze and Guattari examine capitalism in *Anti-Oedipus* in terms of their new terminology which does not resemble to older explanations presented in western political thought. They discuss political, economical, and social relations in terms of desiring-production, desiring-machines, body without organs, and socius. Desire, throughout their work, operates as an immanent criterion that floats over these concepts. Their account of capitalism is not only defined by the introduction of new concepts, they also ask new questions about the dynamics of capitalism.

As mentioned before, desiring-production has the same essence with social-production but they differ in regimes or in the manner in which they operate. Desiring-production comes into being with syntheses. These were the connective synthesis of production, the disjunctive synthesis of recording, and the conjunctive synthesis of consumption-consummation. As such, in the relation between desiring-production and social-production, body without organs and socius also have the same essence but they differ in the way they operate. Two recording surfaces work similarly but their contents are different from each other. This distinction allows Deleuze and Guattari to investigate social being, in particular capitalism, by means of the same syntheses but in a different manner.

Syntheses show us how desire is invested in production, recording and consumption. Deleuze and Guattari, in chapter three of *Anti-Oedipus*, grafts syntheses of desiring-production onto social-production and show us how

desire is invested through three syntheses in the social realm. On this point Bogue states that:

Theirs rather an immediately physical and social model of desire and in the longest section of *Anti-Oedipus* they offer a universal history of social desiring-production which focuses on the relationship between the *socius* and its related network of desiring-machines. (Bogue, 1989: 95-96)

In this respect, Deleuze and Guattari examine three types of society. The first one is primitive societies, the second one is despotic societies, and the third one is capitalist societies. This analysis resembles to Marx's historical materialism. But, we must always bear in mind that these types are not examined in continuity or in a dialectical way. Deleuze and Guattari argue that 'universal history is the history of contingencies and not the history of necessity'. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 140) For this reason, societies are treated as assemblages according to their investments and syntheses of desire. In accordance with their three types of syntheses, they discuss societies in terms of their concept of *socius* that serves as a recording surface or as a unit of anti-production and of machines which operate on this *socius*.

The first social type is primitive societies. In these societies, the *socius* is the body of the earth. The body of the earth works here as an immanent unity from which rules are derived. In primitive societies, in addition to *socius*, there is a social machine which is the first form of *socius*. This is the territorial machine. Territorial machine functions as 'declining' the lineages on the body of the earth. Alliances (marriage relations) and filiation (blood relations) are the forms of territorial machine. In primitive societies, kinship system is the major factor that determines social relations. It organizes and regulates social becoming. Productive activities and behaviors of individuals are coded according to rules of this system. (Bogue, 1989: 97) Alliance and filiation are two forms through which codes flow in primitive societies. Social becoming is defined under the effect of alliance and filiation.

In this formulation, if we ask where desire is, we can easily see that desire is acting on the flows. Desire as the element of field of forces, desire as the driving force that constitutes reality, is not yet captured. Desire is coded through the social machine.

The second social type is despotic societies. In these societies, socius becomes the body of despot. The body of the earth loses its function with the introduction of this new socius. However, all the flows presented by the former socius are preserved or maintained by the body of despot. What is new in this stage is the type of synthesis of desire and the functions fulfilled by the socius. Despotic societies are covered up by the barbarian despotic machine.

This new social machine operates in accordance with the rules of second synthesis, that is, the disjunctive synthesis of recording. In this stage things are not only coded but also overcoded by the body of the despot.

The founding of the despotic machine or the barbarian socius can be summarized in the following way: a new alliance and direct filiation. The despot challenges the lateral alliances and the extended filiations of the old community. He imposes a new alliance system and places himself in direct filiation with the deity: the people must follow. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 192)

The territorial alliances and territorial filiations which belong to the former type of society are not replaced, but redefined in terms of new social type. Moreover, while redefining the old codes, the body of despot constitutes new forms of alliances in which it locates itself at the center of social organization and regulation.

In these societies, desire is invested by disjunctive synthesis as in the form of "...or...or...". In contrast to primitive societies, in the despotic stage, desire is captured under the authority of the despot. The absence of a higher authority in the territorial machine has given desire an ability to move through the

flows. But in the despotic stage, desire is being trapped by the barbarian machine. The transcendent despot permanently codes and overcodes desire.

The third social type is capitalist societies. A capitalist machine dominates and determines the whole relations in society. Under the capitalist machine, the conjunctive synthesis is primary. The body of capital is the socius of the capitalist machine. Capitalist machine acts as an axiomatic which decodes previous codes and re-codes them through his systematic. (Bogue, 1983: 101) In this sense, capitalist machine is strictly an axiomatic. Deleuze and Guattari define as follows:

The true axiomatic is that of the social machine itself, which takes place of the old codings and organizes all the decoded flows, including the flows of scientific and technical code, for the benefit of the capitalist system and in the service of its end. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 233)

According to Deleuze and Guattari, capitalist machine differs from previous social machines by its axiomatic structure. At this point, they introduce two new concepts in order to explain the difference between the capitalist and the former societies. These are deterritorialization and reterritorialization. These concepts are the logical units of capitalist axiomatic. What capitalism does is always to deterritorialize social codes and always to reterritorialize them in a different state. This is the core function of capitalist axiomatic. In order to explain the functions of these new concepts, Deleuze and Guattari draw a parallelism between Marx and themselves. Marx's account of primitive accumulation is employed to clarify the status of these new concepts.

According to Marx, the accumulation of capital presupposes the existence of surplus-value and its capitalist production. Only by means of the accumulation of surplus, is capital able to increase itself. However, the concept of surplus-value remains insufficient to explain the primitive origin of capitalist accumulation, since; it belongs strictly to the capitalist mode of production. Marx put it as follows:

The accumulation of capital pre-supposes surplus-value; surplus-value pre-supposes capitalistic production; capitalistic production presupposes the pre-existence of considerable masses of capital and of labor-power in the hands of producers of commodities. The whole movement, therefore, seems to turn in a vicious circle, out of which we can only get by supposing a primitive accumulation (previous accumulation of Adam Smith) preceding capitalistic accumulation; an accumulation not the result of the capitalistic mode of production, but its starting point. (Marx, 1967: 713)

Therefore, there must be a process that provides the conditions for capital accumulation. This is the primitive accumulation. Marx elaborates this accumulation in the eighth part of *Capital (Volume 1)*. Marx argues that primitive accumulation, which is the origin of capital accumulation, refers to a historical process that separates producers from their means of production. This corresponds to the era in which labor-power owners become 'free' from their means of production and they appear only as potential workers. There is a double operation which transforms laborer to a worker. The laborer first detaches himself from existing mode of production and means of production which belongs to it, and then, becomes a free worker who is able to sell his labor-power.

This double operation corresponds to what Deleuze and Guattari called as the movement of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. However, they do not restrict this double operation only into the primitive accumulation of capital. They apply this to social surface as a whole.

According to them, unlike the early stages, capitalism always involve with deterritorialization of social codes and their reterritorialization in a different manner. It decodes the former relationships and recodes them in new frameworks. However, Deleuze and Guattari argue that social transformation based on decoding and recoding movements can be found in many aspects in history. But, they argue that what is peculiar to capitalism is the double operation of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. For instance, the major characteristics of capitalism such as private property, commodity production and monetary operations can be seen in feudal societies. (Deleuze and

Guattari, 1983: 223) But such characteristics did not result in capitalism. Only through the conjunction of deterritorialization, could capitalism emerge. On this idea Deleuze and Guattari state that:

Decoded desires and desires for decoding have always existed, history is full of them. But we have just seen that only through their encounter in a place, and their conjunction in a space that takes time, do decoded flows constitute desire –a desire that, instead of dreaming and lacking it, actually produces a desiring-machine that is at the same time social and technical. That is why capitalism and its break are flows, the new massive deterritorialization, the conjunction of deterritorialized flows. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 224)

The conjunction that determines the conditions for the emergence of capitalism, according to Deleuze and Guattari, can only appear in the framework of a machinic arrangement. This is the capitalist machine that separates the forms of transformation in social being from the former stages. The position of merchant and his commercial activities in feudal societies expresses the peculiarity of capitalism. Deleuze and Guattari state that capitalism or its break, the conjunction of all the decoded and deterritorialized flows, cannot be defined by commercial or financial capital –these being merely flows among other flows and elements among other elements- but rather by industrial capital. Doubtless the merchant was very early an active factor in production, either by turning into an industrialist himself in occupations based on commerce, or by making artisans into his own intermediaries, or employees (the struggles against the guilds and monopolies). But capitalism doesn't begin, the capitalist machine is not assembled, until capital directly appropriates production, and until financial capital and merchant capital are no longer anything but specific functions corresponding to a division of labor in the capitalist mode of production in general (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 224).

Industrial capital simultaneously accompanies this machinic arrangement. And it is key factor in making capital the full social body. In the agrarian societies which constitute the old social body, capital floats according to the activities of merchant and fixes itself within these activities. Merchant

combines capital with non-capitalist mode of production. There is a relationship of alliance with capital and production. But, Deleuze and Guattari argue that “the capitalist machine begins when capital ceases to be a capital of alliance to become a filiative capital.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 227) Here, the word ‘filiative’ refers to the parental aspect of capital and means to a process in which capital is able to increase itself by only relying on itself. From now on, capital becomes the major component of making capital. Capital becomes ‘filiative’ when money begets money or a value a surplus value.

Deleuze and Guattari state that Marx’s main concern in the definition of general formula for capital is its quantitative aspect. As mentioned above, a quantity becomes another quantity by means of creating surplus. However, they argue that the problem is not only the problem of quantities but ‘differential relations’ which constitute capitalist machine. Deleuze and Guattari put it as:

We are no longer in the domain of the quantum or quantitas, but in that of the differential relation as a conjunction that defines an immanent social field particular to capitalism, and confers on the abstraction as such its effectively concrete value, its tendency to concretization. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 227)

Differential relations refer to concretization of concepts and connection of them with each other and also assume a virtual surface on which they may emerge. In this respect, for example, the law of tendency to falling profit rates cannot be restricted to the relation between surplus-value and total capital. When analyzing this tendency, we must consider the whole capitalist field and the analysis must be open to all other variables. Therefore, the question such as why tendency has no end, but always reproduces itself can only be answered on this surface. According to Deleuze and Guattari, tendency is not falling because of payments to workers and credits to capital. The system reproduces itself by using these instruments. And, only by considering differential relations, can this reproduction be seen. From this standpoint, one can encounter a problem that concerns the limits of capitalism. Is there any

limit that prevents capitalism from increasing? Deleuze and Guattari do not answer this question clearly, but state that the only limit to capital is capital itself. Therefore, how is capital able to reproduce itself without removing itself?

Deleuze and Guattari explain this reproduction in terms of their formulation of capitalism. According to them, the reproduction of capitalist relations of production develops around two major axis. These are machinic surplus value and the role of state.

Firstly, in order to clarify the status of machinic surplus value, we must recall Marx's distinction of capital in terms of constant capital and variable capital presented in chapter two (2.2). According to Marx, capital divides in two as constant and variable. Constant capital refers to means of production and raw materials that used in production process. The main characteristic of constant capital is the fact that it directly transfers its value to the product. Constant capital does not reproduce its value through the production process. The second part of the distinction of capital is variable capital. Variable capital refers to the productive aspect of capital, that is, labor-power. It reproduces a value which is equivalent to its own value. Moreover, it produces an excess that corresponds to surplus-value of product. In this respect, Marx argues that it is labor-power that produces surplus. Therefore, by subordinating means of production as constant capital, Marx privileges the variable capital in 'value-creation' process.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, the definition of surplus value must be modified in terms of the machinic surplus value of constant capital. Machinic surplus value refers to a reconsideration of Marx's definition of constant capital. Deleuze and Guattari admit the distinction of capital into two as constant and variable, but combine them within a new framework in which they are transformed.

Marx thinks that surplus-value comes only from exploited labor. The difference between the exploited labor and constant labor is the only source of surplus value. He also treats technical machines as they are dead labor. On the other hand, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the origin of surplus-value is not only the exploited labor but machinic surplus value which is the conceptual framework of emergent properties of technical machines. In their conception, machines are no longer conceived as the elements of constant capital, but they treat them as the component of machinic surplus value. Machines are the embodiment of the technical and scientific developments. In other words, they are the bearers of decoded and recoded flows in capitalist machine. For this reason, they are productive elements in the production of surplus-value. The mechanization of human-labor process in industrial production indicates the new source of surplus in capitalist production. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 234)

The second major axis around which capitalist relations of production develops is the role of state in capitalist societies. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the role of state, within the capitalist axiomatic, is the more manifest in that what it absorbs. State is the absorption unit of surplus-value. Therefore, the falling profit rate is stopped by the intervention of state. Here, state functions in this absorption by means of its apparatuses. For instance, military expenditures, while increasing the surplus-value in the defense sector, it also keeps and fixes the surplus. However, the function of state is not only keeping surplus by means of its apparatuses, it is also responsible for guaranteeing the human surplus-value to the capitalist machine. In this respect, state is the element of anti-production. It constitutes a full body on which relations of production are coded. Here, state functions as the body without organs. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 235)

Capitalism, on the one hand, tries to realize its supreme goal, that is, to produce lack in large aggregate and permanently introduces this lack to sustain its presence, on the other hand, with its element of antiproduction,

that is, the State, always controls and arranges flux of surplus by absorbing and re-directing it.

In sum, Deleuze and Guattari develop an account of capitalism based on their understanding of philosophy and their conception of history. They distinguish three social machines corresponding to three different societies. The first is the underlying territorial machine, which consists in coding the flows on the full body of the earth. The second is transcendent imperial machine which consists in overcoding the flows on the full body of despot or his apparatuses, the Urstaat: it effects the first great movement of deterritorialization, but does so by adding its eminent unity to the territorial communes that it conserves by bringing them together, overcoding them and appropriating their surplus labor. The third is the modern immanent machine, which consists in decoding the flows on the full body of capital-money: it has realized the immanence; it has rendered concrete the abstract as such and has naturalized the artificial, replacing the territorial codes and the despotic overcoding with an axiomatic of decoded flows, and a regulation of these flows (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 261). The last social machine constitutes the capitalist machine which is also an axiomatic that determines the processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization of desire in capitalist societies.

So far, I have investigated Deleuze and Guattari's account of capitalism presented in *Anti-Oedipus*. As Deleuze has stated in an interview with Antonio Negri, what their account shares with Marx's analysis is that the capitalism is taken as an immanent system of which limit is merely capital itself. (Deleuze, 1995: 171) Nevertheless, there are some points from which they go beyond Marx's conception of capitalism. Their differences do not only stem from the idiosyncratic concepts which are unusual to ordinary Marx reader but also from their understandings of philosophy and methodology. On which they differ with Marx can be summarized in three major points.

Firstly, their conceptions of history differ from each other in some respects. On this point, let me recall the materialist conception of history outlined in chapter two of the thesis. According to Marx's materialistic conception of history, the starting point of history is the production process or the production of goods that allows human being to survive. In this respect, historical materialism is mainly concerned with identifying "the productive forces" of a particular form of society. Every form of society has its peculiar mode of production, such as hunting and gathering, agriculture, or industry.

Deleuze and Guattari propose a universal history in which three types of society are examined. These are primitive, despotic, and capitalist societies. In place of Marxian 'mode of production', Deleuze and Guattari employ their idiosyncratic term 'socius', which is explained in the third chapter of the thesis, in order to show us the main characteristics of such societies. According to Deleuze and Guattari, every type of society has its peculiar socius that organizes and coordinates social, economic and political fields. For instance, capital, at the age of capitalism, appears as the 'socius' of capitalist societies that seems to regulate and determine the relation among individuals and between man and his products. Socius works as a quasi-cause of all productive and social activities. At this point, Marx confines his analysis to economically determined capital. Capital, as the product of labor, fulfills the same function that Deleuze and Guattari explained in the definition of socius.

Secondly, according to Marx, it is labor that creates wealth in capitalist societies. Labor is the source of all wealth. In this respect, Labor works as a constitutive element. At this point, we should remind the definition of labor which is presented through the analysis of values of commodities in the second chapter of the thesis. In this definition labor appears as the productive force that creates the value of a single commodity. However, Marx also indicates that, in capitalist societies, there is an inversion in the perception of real forces that characterizes major aspects of society. There is a mystifying aspect of capitalism that hides real processes of production. This

can be called the state of 'ideology' or 'commodity fetishism' as described in the second chapter of thesis. In ideology or by means of commodity fetishism, labor is subordinated to capital and capital seems as the source of all wealth in capitalist societies. The main productive force is hidden through the production process in favor of a so-called productive capital.

At this point, Deleuze and Guattari share Marx's opinions but modify them in terms of their categories. According to Deleuze and Guattari, it is desire which can be called as the productive force in a society. Desire is the constitutive element. All political, social and economical activities are determined through the acts of desire. In this respect, Marxian definition of labor is one of the variations of desire in the social field. In Deleuze and Guattari, as in Marx, there is a mystifying aspect that distorts the productive aspects of life. According to them, there is a miraculating-machine which conceals the constitutive dimensions of desire. Here, the term 'miraculation' refers to a deceiving characteristic of the 'socius'. The concept of 'socius' fulfills this function by subordinating desire acts in the social field. For instance, capital as the socius of capitalist societies on which production is recorded and coded manipulates the real processes by simultaneously producing them while absorbing them. According to Marx, in capitalist societies, it is labor that produces capital but it seems that capital is produced by capital itself. Deleuze and Guattari expand this miraculative aspect to social field as a whole. Unlike Marx, they do not restrict it in an economic determinism which presents itself as the source of all development in capitalist societies. They open it up to all dimensions of social field.

Thirdly, the most important differences between Marx and Deleuze's analyses of capitalism stem from the differences in their methodology. From the historical stages which are defined in terms of the materialistic conception of history to the specificity of capitalism, Marx employs the dialectical method through his works. Hegelian dialectics functions as an immanent criterion in the analysis of subject matters. As described in the first chapter, the impact of Hegel on Marx is beyond question. The essence of the proceeding

followed by Marx in *Capital* is primarily determined by Hegelian dialectics. Although Marx has changed the idealistic implications of such a way of thought, dialectical thinking can easily be seen in the argumentation of Marx in *Capital*. For instance, his analysis of commodities basically depends on the dialectical way of thought. The division of commodities into two aspects as use-value and exchange-value exemplifies this dialectical method. The contradictory nature of capitalistic production is revealed when these two conflicting aspects of a commodity are “synthesized” in the peculiarity of the third characteristic of commodities: despite requiring high degrees of cooperation and division of labor (revealed by the commensurability of commodities falsely expressed as exchange-value in capitalism), capitalistic production is carried on by and for the account of private individuals, without a social decision process about what is to be produced and how it is to be produced (the social relevance of use-value is neglected). More generally, the distinction between capitalists and the workers as the bearers of contradictory class interests in capitalist societies and their class struggle present the other examples of this dialectical method. In light of dialectics, Marx locates contradiction at the heart of capitalist movement. According to Marx, contradiction reflects the form of movement and logic of capitalism.

On the other hand, Deleuze and Guattari are very critical on dialectics. Their account of capitalism never presupposes a dialectical change or movement. Thus, they reject any explanation that describes capitalist societies in a dialectical way. Instead, they establish a Nietzschean ground for their account. They try to constitute a mode of thinking which depends upon Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche. Deleuze, as mentioned in the second chapter, derives the concepts of active and reactive forces from Nietzsche and defines society as a field of forces. For instance, capital as ‘socius’ in capitalist society is also an active force that dominates the other forces. In capitalist societies, every aspect of life is determined in terms of capital.

Deleuze and Guattari reject the idea of contradiction in favor of their concepts: ‘deterritorialization’ and ‘reterritorialization’. According to Deleuze

and Guattari, these two concepts constitute the logic of capitalist movement. Capitalism always deterritorializes social codes and reterritorializes them in a different manner. For instance, in Marx, the development of capitalism strictly depends on the dialectical movement of productive forces. The contradiction between capitalists and workers is the core of capitalist development. But, according to Deleuze and Guattari, the principle of capital's movement is no longer the contradiction between capitalists and workers, but deterritorialization and reterritorialization, a movement that capitalist and worker alike both participate in. Instead of seeing human subjects and their class interests as the determiners of the dynamics of capitalism, Deleuze and Guattari see the human subject as determined by the capitalistic machine. This re-conceptualization result from their ontological premises described in the fourth chapter of this thesis: when Deleuze and Guattari overcome the subject/object dualism, they end up defining the subject as a residue of machinic activity.

VII. CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

In *Capital*, Marx presents a profound critique of capitalism. According to Marx, capitalism represents a historical stage in which the working class appears as the productive force and all the production in this society depends upon the labor of this class. In the first volume of *Capital*, Marx presents a detailed analysis of relations of production which is appropriate to capitalist societies. Capitalist societies are bourgeois societies in which capitalist relations of production is dominant. To make a detailed analysis of these societies, Marx determines commodities as a focal point. Marx argues that the most important characteristic of capitalist societies shows itself in the accumulation of commodities. According to him, then, this accumulation must be investigated.

Marx asserts that a commodity appears as a thing which satisfies one of our needs or wants. This indicates the use-value of commodities. The first definition of commodity implies the conception of use-value. Qualitative aspect is the material side and corresponds to use-value of a commodity which is incommensurable. However, there is a quantitative aspect of a commodity. Something which is useful has also an immaterial side. Saying that an object satisfies human needs is not a sufficient condition for entitling an object as a commodity. A commodity must be subject to an exchange. Here, we encounter with the second dimension of a commodity. This is the exchange-value of commodities. Exchange-value constitutes the quantitative side of a commodity. It is the commensurable aspect. Marx asserts that there is a third characteristic that determines an object as a commodity. The fact that commodities are produced in relation to other commodities as the products of private individual implies this third characteristic. Only by means of this triple character, can an object be assessed as commodity. After distinguishing the use-value and exchange-value, Marx asks what is common

among commodities. If commodities are comparable things, there must be something inherent to all commodities, that is to say, something common for all them. His analysis results in the concept of value. According to Marx, value is the common essence that makes commodities comparable with each other. The concept of value presents the quantitative correlation among commodities. These categories serve as a conceptual basis on which production and exchange can be examined. But these are not sufficient to analyze the law of motion peculiar to capitalist mode of production. There must be something that explains the accumulation of profit and progression in capitalist societies. The third part of *Capital (Volume 1)* presents us the conceptual source of such an accumulation. In this part, the concept of the surplus-value appears as the source of such an accumulation. Marx argues that unpaid free labor is the core of capitalist mode of production and progression. The difference between new value, produced by workers and remains unpaid, and the exchange value of labor-power which is paid to workers constitutes the source of surplus-value. Marx attempts to analyze these relations of production and develops a profound critique. In examining such relations of production, Marx employs many categories such as *commodity*, *use-value*, *exchange-value*, *value*, *surplus-value* and etc. All these categories are the ontological units that express statements about the reality. All these represent states of affairs appropriate to capitalist mode of production. By examining these categories, Marx demonstrates the law of motion in capitalist societies. However, today, capitalism operates in a more complex way than Marx explained in *Capital*. The categories employed in *Capital* still refer to basic forms of relations but they must be modified in terms of new dynamics that determines the characteristic of capitalist mode of production. At this point, the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze presents a new mode of thinking. In his collaborative work with Felix Guattari called *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze attempts to develop an account of capitalism through their conception of philosophy.

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze presents a profound critique of the mode of thinking which is retained and developed by Plato, Descartes and

Kant. However, Deleuze does not offer a new image of thought which defines 'what it means to think'. Rather, he proposes a thought without image. In addition to *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze maintains his critical attitude to western philosophy in *What is Philosophy?*, the collaborative work of Deleuze with Felix Guattari. In *What is Philosophy?*, they present a new image of thought which is called plane of immanence. Unlike *Difference and Repetition*, this book concentrates on the creation of concepts and instituting plane of immanence. Deleuze and Guattari, by means of *What is philosophy?*, offer a different mode of thinking which breaks off all its ties from traditional image of thought by formulating the plane of immanence. Their conception of philosophy which is constituted through these two works shapes their understanding on the correlation between politics and philosophy.

In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari analyze society in terms of their new concepts such as desire, machines, production, socius, body without organs, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization. In addition to these, they examine three types of society. The first one is primitive societies, the second one is despotic societies, and the third one is capitalist societies. These categories resemble Marx's historical materialism. But, we must always bear in mind that these types are not examined in continuity or a dialectical way. Deleuze and Guattari argue that universal history depends upon contingencies not necessities. For this reason, societies are treated as assemblages according to their investments and syntheses of desire. In accordance with their three types of syntheses, they discuss societies in terms of their concept of socius that serves as a recording surface or as a unit of anti-production and of machines which operate on this socius.

The first social type is primitive societies. In these societies, "the socius is the body of the earth. The body of the earth works here as an immanent unity from which investments or rules derived. The second social type is despotic societies. In these societies, socius becomes the body of despot. The body of the earth loses its function with the introduction of new socius. However, all

the flows presented by the former socius are preserved or maintained by the body of despot. What is new in this stage is the type of synthesis of desire and the functions fulfilled by the socius. Despotic societies are covered up by the barbarian despotic machine. The third social type is the capitalist societies. A capitalist machine dominates and determines the whole relations in society. The socius of the capitalist machine is the capital itself. Capital, in capitalist societies, works as a quasi-cause. Capitalist machine acts as an axiomatic which decodes previous codes and re-codes them through his systematic. In this sense, capitalist machine is strictly an axiomatic process. According to Deleuze and Guattari, capitalist machine differs from previous social machines by its axiomatic structure. At this point, they introduce two new concepts in order to explain the difference between the capitalist and the former societies. These are deterritorialization and reterritorialization. These concepts are the logical units of capitalist axiomatic. What capitalism does is always to deterritorialize social codes and always to reterritorialize them in a different state. This is the core function of capitalist axiomatic. According to them, capitalism is an immanent system that regulates and controls social field with an axiomatic structure that consists of the processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization

Although Deleuze and Guattari share the same base with Marx in their account of capitalism, in some respects, they offer new perspectives which are unusual to Marxian tradition. For instance, they argue that the Marxian concept of surplus-value must be reconsidered in terms of machinic surplus value. They expand the concept of surplus-value to machinic surplus-value and modify Marx's definition of the concept to include all the forces that affect production process.

More generally, they differ in their methodology. Deleuze and Guattari reject dialectical way of thought in favor of Nietzschean active and reactive forces. For Marx, Hegelian dialectics functions as an immanent criterion in the analysis of subject matters. The essence of the proceeding followed by Marx in *Capital* is primarily determined by Hegelian dialectics. On the other hand,

Deleuze and Guattari, in their account of capitalism, reject any explanation that describes capitalist societies in a dialectical way. They try to constitute a mode of thinking which depends upon Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche which allows defining social being as field of forces. Deleuze and Guattari also reject the idea that contradiction is the driving force of capitalism. Rather, they employ their concepts of deterritorialization and reterritorialization.

Despite their fundamental differences, Deleuze and Guattari seek to explain the possibility of a renewal of historical materialism in the light of new dimensions of capitalistic development. When rejecting Marxian mode of thinking, Deleuze and Guattari concentrate on the similar questions shared by Marx. The question of capitalism and its conception as an immanent system which reproduces itself by means of capital appears as the common problem that directs them to think analogously. Therefore, Deleuzian understanding of capitalism should be considered as a contemporary interpretation of Marx's account. By emphasizing the emergent dynamics, Deleuze constructs an understanding of capitalism based on Marx's analysis.

VIII. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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