



KADIR HAS UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES
PROGRAM OF PSYCHOLOGY

**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTACHMENT
PATTERNS, MORAL FOUNDATIONS AND THE ROLE OF
COGNITIVE STYLE**

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ASSOC. PROF. MEHMET HARMA

MASTER'S THESIS

ISTANBUL, JULY, 2021

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PUBLISHING METHODS

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ABSTRACT

This study focuses on how attachment orientations (i.e., avoidance and anxiety) shaped by early experiences could play a role in individuals' worldviews, specifically moral foundations and political orientations. Both attachment theory and moral foundations are highly studied, well-established fields of psychology which thrived in the last 50 years. A significant number of studies have been conducted for both disciplines, and in the last three decades, however, limited studies have examined the relationship between attachment and morality. In two preregistered studies, we collected data from 1567 participants (Turkey: N=781, USA: N= 786) and tested the relationships between attachment dimensions, moral foundations, and political ideology. In addition, we also examined the role of cognitive style in attachment/morality relationships. Results showed different attachment dimensions (i.e., anxiety and avoidance) divergently predicted binding and individualizing moral foundations. This relationship was moderated by cognitive style only in the Turkish sample. Attachment orientations and political ideology were also significantly related to each other.

Keywords: attachment, moral foundations, cognitive style, political ideology

ÖZET

Bu araştırma, erken yaşta şekillenen bağlanma örüntülerinin (i.e., kaçınan ve kaygılı) dünya görüşü, özellikle ahlaki temeller ve politik yönelimler üzerindeki etkilerine odaklanmıştır. Bağlanma ve ahlaki temeller teorisi, psikolojinin son 50 yılda çok çalışılmış ve güçlenmiş konularındandır. Özellikle son 30 yılda her iki çalışma alanı üzerinde de yüksek miktarda çalışma yapılmış olsa da bağlanma ve ahlak arasındaki ilişkiyi inceleyen çalışma miktarı sayılıdır. Bu çalışmada iki ön kayıtlı çalışma ile toplam 1567 katılımcıdan (Türkiye: N=781, ABD: N= 786) veri toplanmış ve bağlanma örüntüleri, ahlaki temeller ve politik ideoloji arasındaki ilişki incelenmiştir. Ayrıca bilişsel düşünme stiline bağlanma ve ahlaki temeller arası ilişkideki rolüne bakılmıştır. Sonuçlar, bağlanma örüntülerinin ahlaki temelleri otonomi ve gruba bağlayıcı olmak üzere iki ayrı alt dalda farklı olarak öngördüğünü göstermektedir. Bu ilişki, Türkiye örneğinde bilişsel düşünme stili tarafından modere edilmiştir. Bağlanma örüntüleri ve politik ideoloji arasında da kuvvetli bir ilişki bulunmuştur.

Anahtar kelimeler: bağlanma, ahlaki temeller, bilişsel düşünme stili, politik ideoloji

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To My Grandfather...

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Previous work has yielded that political attitudes and behaviours predict and have been predicted by countless variables from age to how you like your steak (not to mention the fact that whether you eat a steak or not also tells something to them). It is not just psychologists, but also social scientists have worked intensively about how and why people politically behave, feel, and think in certain ways. There are various reasons that fuel their ambition concerning why they want to know these preferences about people, especially if they are studying some core concepts like attachment or morality. Today, we know that these concepts relate to almost every psychological variable (if not all of them). It is about governing people, what they want in their daily life, how they cope with tough situations, what are their reactions to distress, how they approach concepts such as love, loyalty, freedom, morals, rights. This study primarily aims to investigate the relationship between moral foundations and attachment patterns meanwhile, examining the role of a concept that is highly related to attachment and moral foundations: political attitudes (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Graham, Haith, & Nosek, 2009; Koleva et al., 2014). Although the relationship between attachment patterns (i.e., attachment anxiety and avoidance) and political and moral stands are understudied, testing these associations could be promising to understand the roots of moral judgments by showing how early experiences with caregiver(s) may have a role on such kind of processes. Findings from such kinds of studies also would help to understand how attachment orientations could contribute to other life domains in the life rather than romantic contexts. To do so, first, we provided a brief background about the moral foundations, political orientations, and attachment patterns. Then, we gave the rationale behind the question of how they relate to each other.

John Bowlby, when he was a young physician, probably did not know what he started when he took his first steps to design what is later called attachment theory while he was

working at the London Child Guidance clinic during the first six months of the Second World War. This was the clinic where he began studying on his first published work in which he examined 44 children in the clinic who had a history of theft compared to children who had records of other offences except theft. In his study, he realized the importance of the caregiver in children's development. He especially focused on the separation between the child and his/her caregiver (mainly children who were separated from their parents due to war). This enlightenment led Bowlby to focus on maladapted and delinquent children after the Second World War, specifically on issues concerning a child's separation from his/her caregiver and its relationship with children's general affection. In time, the relationships Bowlby established with several researchers, especially Mary Ainsworth, who made fundamental contributions, unveiled a major branch in psychology literature which today we call Attachment Theory.

Just like attachment, morality is also considered one of the core concepts for human personality (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Coincidentally, both theories' first major work was published in 1969 (Bowlby, 1969; Kohlberg, 1969), and both are conceived as developmental theories. Deriving from Kohlberg's studies, today, morality is mostly studied under Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004), in which human morality was anthropologically and evolutionarily studied to come up with a set of foundations that represent the key elements of human morality. Each foundation taps into a different aspect of human morality, and even though it is rather scarce, the literature suggests a relationship between morality and attachment (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2012; Koleva et al., 2014).

But what would be the relationship between attachment theory and political attitudes? Do really early experiences with caregivers shape our later life, even nonromantic domains? In the simplest terms, political psychology tries to find relationships between political beliefs and the behaviour of an individual or a group with almost any concept and variable. The foundations of political psychology rely on various variables from genetic parameters to the

upbringing of an individual (Block & Block 2006; Jost et al., 2003; Kanai, Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 2011). In a nutshell, all the experiences influence how a person perceives and interprets the outer world, and political orientation derives from that. In theory, every thought and behaviour are political, and to think a core concept such as attachment or morality is not related to one's political beliefs and behaviour would be great negligence. One's political beliefs and behaviours nourish from attachment which inherently weaves itself in childhood and ultimately positions itself as one of the core concepts of one's personality. Simply, it could be suggested that templates about ourselves (e.g., am I loveable?) and others (do others trustworthy) could have implications regarding evaluations of the outer world reflected by political and moral stands.

Attachment and moral patterns are predispositions that, generally, people are prone to. They predict our perceptions, how we interpret situations, whom we vote to or with whom we are going to marry. Both attachment orientations and moral foundations provided a template that we follow when we think about something; essentially, it affects how our minds work. How do these templates play a role in life? One of the potential concepts that influence how our mind works is basically our thinking style. In other words, our predispositions in our way of thinking. According to The Dual Process Model of Mind, we have two types when we think which are Type-1 and Type-2 (Evans, 2003; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Type-1 is responsible for automatic, intuitive responses; meanwhile, Type-2 is analytical thinking. People have different tendencies on the ratio of their usage of these types. Literature suggests robust relationships between cognitive style, political ideology (Saribay & Yilmaz, 2017; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2016, 2017a, 2017b), and morality (Capcaro, Everett, & Earp, 2019; Paxton, Ungar, & Greene, 2012; Royzman, Landy, & Leeman, 2014; Baron, Scott, Fincher & Metz, 2015). Limited studies investigating the relationship between political ideology and morality suggest that cognitive style has a role in this relationship.

After the attachment theory, moral foundations, cognitive style, and political psychology established themselves as major concepts throughout the years. All of them were also studied interdisciplinary with each other, but studies that specifically focused on these concepts together are scarce (except political ideology and moral foundations / cognitive style), and other findings are mainly exploratory (Koleva & Rip, 2009; Gaziano, 2017). In addition, findings are contradicting with each other. The purpose of this study is to contribute to the clarification of the contradictions in the literature by approaching these concepts together. Specifically, we examined how attachment orientations (i.e., avoidance and anxiety) are associated with moral foundations, political ideology in both Turkish and American samples with preregistered studies. We also tested how cognitive styles moderate the link between attachment and moral foundations. We also had no expectations in terms of cultural difference, and we hypothesized that attachment dimensions would universally predict moral foundations and political orientations. Thus, we tried to replicate our preregistered hypotheses in diverse samples.

1.1 Attachment Theory

Attachment theory is a widely studied topic in psychology that originates from the works of John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth (Bretherton, 1992). According to Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980), behavioural systems shape experiences from the cradle to the grave. These behavioural systems, including behavioural repertoire dedicated to satisfying the needs of the system, are adaptive. For example, the attachment behavioural system motivates one to seek proximity to its caregiver (attachment figure). The proximity-seeking component is adaptive, especially in threatening circumstances, and it also allows an individual to regulate his emotions with its caregiver caused by the threatening circumstance. Infants use their attachment figure as a secure base to explore the environment so that when they face a threatening situation, the secure base is ready as their safe haven (Ainsworth, 1991). Well-

documented literature suggested that an infant's attachment behavioural system is shaped by the attachment figure's responsiveness and availability, and this attachment model is carried to adulthood as a core concept that can be projected to romantic partners, friends, other attachment figures and even surpass one-on-one relationships and project itself to other aspects of life (Hazan, & Shaver, 1987). Moreover, these repeated interactions with attachment figure(s) become a sort of template to explain the external world. The template could lead the person to evaluate what is risky, what is acceptable (e.g., rightness or wrongness), and how to interact with others.

Attachment theory could be described as both normative and individual differences theory. The normative aspect of the theory explains the formation and function of attachment bonds. Attachment bonds are formed by the early interactions with caregiver(s) and satisfy the attachment behavioural system. Individual differences in caregiving behaviours (how caregiver responds to baby's needs) are also associated with the development of different attachment patterns (also called attachment styles).

The normative aspect of attachment theory focuses on the universal characteristics of attachment processes. Attachment bonds have been established to increase the survival rate in the environment. A newborn is ready to accomplish several tasks, including granting proximity to the caregiver, signalling distress (due to the separation), exploring around under the caregiver's protection, and relieving distress with the caregiver. The quality of attachment bonds is also influenced by the caregiver's sensitivity to newborns' needs. More specifically, caregiving to an offspring is evolutionarily adaptive as it increases the infant's chance of survival and equips the offspring with adaptive behavioural assets such as teaching an offspring how to hide from predators or how to gather food and so forth, which then increases the offspring's chance in same factors. The more socially sophisticated the species become the more formed attachment's complexity increases. This can be observed through animals as the

more they become socially sophisticated, the more they tend to their offspring in detail. For example, compared to a Mexican free-tailed bat, West African chimpanzees have so much more sophisticated relationship with their offspring (Tomasello, 2014; Buss, 2005). The normative aspect of the theory highlights two parameters which are attachment figure's (caregiver) responsiveness and availability. These parameters derive from the obvious fact that infants are not capable of tending most of their needs (e.g., nutrition, protection, warmth), so when they need something, they want their caregiver to be available and accurately respond to these needs.

Early interactions with caregivers help the infant to regulate him/herself as a response to demanding environments. Infant attachment behaviours can be observed when the caregiver and the infant separate from each other (this can be seen as a part of the availability parameter of the caregiver). As an evolutionarily adaptive strategy, the infant immediately protests the situation as it needs the protection normally provided by its caregiver. If the infant's protests fail to accomplish the presence and attention of the caregiver, the infant enters another stage which is to shut down all attempts to communicate with the caregiver. This strategy is also an evolutionarily adaptive behaviour as if the caregiver cannot respond to the infant either because they are busy or they abandoned the infant, the infant's calls for the nonresponsive caregiver will eventually attract predators that can harm the infant. If this strategy also fails to bring the caregiver, the infant enters the third stage, which is detaching from the caregiver. This is also an evolutionarily adaptive behaviour as at that point, it is obvious that – whatever the reason why the caregiver cannot unite with the infant - the caregiver is not coming back to the infant. So, the infant must tend to its needs on its own and find a new caregiver. According to Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980), to form new bonds with a new caregiver, the infant must abolish its previous bonds with the other caregiver. To avoid getting to a position where the infant must experience any of these stages, the infant has behavioural patterns that help it to be in the proximity of the caregiver, such as trying to communicate with the caregiver aside from its

needs like smiling or following the caregiver or clinging. These adaptive behavioural patterns work both ways between strengthening attachment bonds and staying in the proximity of the caregiver. Before getting to the individual differences, it is worth mentioning that the experiences an infant goes through have a huge effect on the way it forms its attachment style, which is the aspect of the individual differences of the attachment theory. The normative patterns which the infant obtains in the early stages of development affect how he perceives the world in adulthood, such as evaluating threats, how to cope with them, emotions derived from a threat-bearing situation (can be physically or socially).

In addition to the normative aspect of attachment theory, previous work on attachment processes has also focused on the individual differences and their associations with stress regulation strategies. According to previous work (e.g., Weinfield et al., 2008; Waters & Deane, 1995), individual differences in attachment could be a result of the content of the early interaction with the primary caregiver(s), and it could be classified into two basic dimensions: secure and insecure attachment. Insecure attachment patterns also consist of anxious-ambivalent and avoidant attachment styles (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978; Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998; Griffin, & Bartholomew, 1994). These attachment patterns have different mental and behavioural patterns to various circumstances (Hazan, & Shaver, 1987). Secure individuals are comfortable with intimacy in relationships, and they are not worried about abandonment by their partner. Insecure individuals are also classified into two different categories depending on the interaction patterns with their primary caregivers. Specifically, avoidant individuals are not comfortable with intimacy in their relationships and show difficulties in trusting and depending on and are depended upon by their partners. Unlike avoidantly attached people, anxious individuals want to be vigilantly close and intimate but concerned and worried about their relationships as they feel that others are not as willing as they are to be close and intimate.

Differences in attachment patterns are thought to be associated with the interpretation of the outer world. In their integrative model of the activation and dynamics of the attachment system, Mikulincer and Shaver (2002; 2007) suggested that secure people use primary strategies to deal with stress. Primary attachment strategies allow people to behave in some ways, such as experiencing and expressing both positive and negative emotions that they are going through comfortably. However, people characterized with attachment insecurities prefer secondary strategies to cope with stress. Both primary (i.e., secure strategies) and secondary attachment strategies (i.e., hyperactivation and deactivation) are not only related to stress regulation but also associated with how to interpret what is dangerous, what is reasonable, and what is acceptable (Cassidy & Kobak, 1988; Mikulincer & Orbach, 1995; Mikulincer & Nachshon, 1991; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a).

These secondary attachment strategies could be seen as a template to give a reaction to the outer world and occur by hyperactivating or by deactivating one's attachment system. Previous work suggests that people who are anxiously attached tend to rely on hyperactivation strategies which are to cling towards proximity and support from attachment figures, whereas people who are avoidantly attached tend to rely on deactivation strategies which are to avoid proximity, closeness, and neglecting attachment needs. Hyperactivation strategies make people more sensitive to other peoples' opinions, and thus, this is associated with more desire to be accepted by other people. There are limited studies showing that attachment-related strategies could also be associated with cognition and behaviour during group interactions (Rom & Mikulincer, 2003). Similarly, deactivation strategies are also linked with decision and behaviour in a group context, and people using deactivation strategies (especially under distress) showed fewer conformity behaviours (Monteoliva et al., 2018). These indirect shreds of evidence regarding the link between attachment orientations and moral and political stands

suggest that attachment orientations could be associated with moral foundations and political orientations.

As mentioned before, because of being a core concept, attachment orientations do not just reflect themselves on the relationships with one's attachment figures, but at the same time, illustrates itself in an individual's life in various aspects from cognition to social preferences (Mikulincer, & Shaver, 2007a; Koleva, & Rip, 2009). So, it could be suggested that attachment orientations are not just a concept that models one's behavioural patterns towards attachment figures in romantic relationships context but also relevant to one's lifestyle from its core. The dissemination of the effects of attachment orientations on various aspects can be seen on various attitudes, which brings us to the other correlated concepts in this research: political ideology and moral foundations. How is it possible that attachment orientations could be associated with individuals' political orientations and their moral foundations? This question is the core idea behind this study. To provide rationale regarding this link, we first summarized previous work on political ideology and moral foundations. Then, we explained the background idea behind the link between attachment and political/moral stance.

1.2 Political Ideology

Political psychologists have focused on the relationship between political ideology and various other concepts to identify related variables and produce a better understanding of the relationship for the last two decades (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). This work mainly divides political orientation as a spectrum with two poles as *conservatism* and *liberalism*. So first, one needs to understand how liberalism and conservatism are defined in political psychology literature. In dictionaries, *conservatism* is defined as the tendency to preserve traditional values and opposition to change. It is a preference to preserve the status quo over change. On the contrary, liberalism, by its definition, is the opposite (Jost, 2006; Gutmann, 2001).

A major issue about this spectrum is that one cannot simply form a political spectrum with just one dimension. Studies have argued that political orientation dimensions should be approached on two levels (Everett, 2013): *economic* and *social*. So, when political orientation is under discussion, it is better to separately measure an individual's political orientation on economic and social levels. But what do these two levels represent? First, economic conservatism (or liberalism for that matter) is an individual's political stance on economic issues. For example, how government's practise should be on economic matters such as welfare benefits, healthcare system, how businesses should be regulated by the government (heavily or mildly) or whether fiscal responsibility should be heavily leaned on individual or government, etc. can be said as some factors on economic conservatism.

Meanwhile, social conservatism is an individual's stance on social matters - which are predominantly affected by society's position depending on the matter - that mainly concerns themselves personally, such as religion, traditional values, patriotism, military, and national security. Not to mention, some of these variables are culture-dependent. So, one variable in a culture may not correspond to a variable in another culture. For instance, in the USA, gun ownership is a much-debated issue for decades that meshed itself into people's political stance as a civil right (The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution) that takes its roots from freedom. Meanwhile, this matter does not have correspondence in Turkey.

Another problem on how to examine political conservatism is about measuring it. This takes its roots from the meta-analysis done by Jost et al. (2003) in which, they found that political conservatism can be measured under two variables: *resistance to change* and *opposition to equality*. They also suggest that, unlike economic and social division, these two dimensions are not culture-dependent, meaning they can measure political conservatism on different cultures and systems (Aspelund, Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2013, Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan & Shrout, 2007).

However, the differences between conservatives and liberals are not just consisted of political preferences. Studies show that psychological and biological factors underlie the differences between two (political) ideological spectrums (Jost, 2006; Jost, Stern, Rule, & Sterling, 2017; Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014). The differences between conservatives and liberals are not only explicit but also perceptual and cognitive as well. These perceptual and cognitive differences are a significant factor in why people lean towards a political ideology (Berkel, Crandall, Eidelman & Blanchar, 2015). For example, Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar (2012) asserted analytical thinking ability as an important factor. Yilmaz and Saribay (2016) found a relationship between cognitive style and political orientation, as in their study, the analytic cognitive style was negatively correlated with conservatism. One significant contribution to the literature concerning the underlying factors that affect people's political orientation was made by Jost et al. (2003), which showed that while conservatism was associated with death anxiety, system instability, intolerance of ambiguity, and cognitive closure, liberalism was associated with openness to experience, uncertainty tolerance, and integrative complexity. Taking things further, findings of Block & Block (2006) suggest innate predispositions that affect one's political orientation in later life. Other accounts, such as Hibbing et al. (2014), suggest negativity bias as a significant concept that differentiates conservatives and liberals from another in cognitive and perceptual ways. In short, literature is filled with studies showing the effect of cognitive and perceptual differences on people's political beliefs and behaviours. This brings us to a concept that works with perception, cognition, and the mind.

1.3 The Dual-Process Model of Mind

Political psychology literature is highly intertwined with the dual-process model of the mind (Evans, 2003; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). According to the dual-process model, humans have two thinking types for mental operations: Type 1 and Type 2. Type 1 is responsible for

automatic responses. It is thinking intuitively, and it is evolutionarily older processing compared to Type 2. It comes from our primate ancestors and is an essential system to reduce the overload on our mental bandwidth. We use Type 1 thinking in our basic tasks that can be achieved with low effortful thinking, such as walking, riding a bicycle, or driving a car. Type 2 is a system unique to us and basically what makes us extraordinary compared to other species. Type 2 is responsible for complex mental operations (analytical thinking). It is evolutionarily newer, and from the discovery of fire to sending rockets to space, from cumulative culture to mental simulation, Type 2 thinking was a crucial factor in our history, and without a doubt, it still is (Evans, 2003).

The difference between Type 1 and Type 2 thinking is not clear. It is not like an automobile transmission that has gears, and one can shift between them. One matter about the shifting issue is cognitive overload. Like computers, humans have a mental (cognitive) bandwidth. Load fluctuations in this bandwidth affect perception, decision making, and other mental operations. If an individual is under too much cognitive load, he/she shifts to Type 1 thinking to ease the overload in mental bandwidth. This mental regulation occurs because Type 2 thinking requires high effort and has low capacity. Studies show that one's analytical thinking is affected by various variables that preoccupy the mind, which reduces the mental bandwidth that is channelled towards tasks in front and eventually leads the individual to Type-1 thinking style (Trémolière, De Neys, & Bonnefon, 2012, 2014). With this shift to Type 1, various features of Type 1 occur, such as intuitive thinking. Because the bandwidth is overloaded, participants shift their thinking to a basic, straightforward manner that is more intuitive, and the volume of mental load correlates with intuitive thinking.

These thinking dispositions also influence our everyday beliefs and attitudes, from religiosity to politics (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015). For instance, Jost (2006) states a relationship between analytical thinking and political orientation in relation to the dual-

process model of the mind. Other studies suggest that politically conservative people think more intuitively than politically liberal people (Saribay & Yilmaz, 2017; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2016, 2017a, 2017b).

As mentioned above, attachment and moral patterns are core concepts that can be considered as predispositions of an individual. Mikulincer and Shaver (2002; 2007) suggested that people, through their development, form these behavioural templates which they follow when they are in necessity. Similar observations also can be made with moral patterns (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Literature shows that these concepts can be affected by various which are also affected by mental processes (Koleva et al., 2014; Jakubiak & Feeney, 2016; Stanton, Campbell, & Pink, 2017), which suggests that these concepts can be affected by mental operation availability. In other words, people positioned in a particular area of attachment and moral foundations spectrum can act differently (according to their position in the spectrum) under different circumstances concerning their mental availability, which constitutes one of the hypotheses this study brought forward mentioned below.

1.4 Morality

Literature shows that attachment theory and political studies are intertwined with morality (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Graham et al., 2009; Yilmaz, Harma, Bahcekapili, & Cesur, 2016). Before explaining the relationships between attachment and morality, we provided background information about morality. A proper introduction to moral psychology should probably start with Lawrence Kohlberg (1969). Kohlberg studied moral development with children and proposed that children are developing their moral skills as they are role-taking and simulating others' perspectives, which helps them put themselves into someone else's shoes to see the difference between what is fair or unfair. He divided this development into stages, and at each stage, the child adds another tool to his/her inventory

which builds his/her moral model. He concluded that the foundation of morality is the concept of fairness.

Then came Carol Gilligan (1982) criticized Kohlberg's theory and proposed care as an additional moral foundation. Gilligan also pointed out some gender differences between males and females on morality (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987). Even though Kohlberg and Gilligan argued about which foundation was more important, there was a consensus that fairness and care are two different foundations. In 1983, Elliot Turiel codified these converged perspectives. In his work, any value other than justice, rights, or welfare was not considered an element of morality (Turiel, Hildebrandt, & Wainryb, 1991). Kohlberg was also thinking similarly. He came across some other morality concepts that affect moral judgments, which are very similar to what we call *binding foundations* today (Graham et al., 2009). Kohlberg's reasoning was that these concepts are immature, which he attributed to stage 4 in his moral development theory. For him, morality was about protecting individuals, and concepts other than fairness and care did not provide that. This means that these other concepts were some individual differences.

His perspective was later criticized on several issues. One area of criticism directly concerns the issue this research is conducted upon. As Graham et al. (2011) put it, "Kohlberg's post-conventional morality enshrined politically liberal ideals as developmental endpoints" (Hogan, Johnson, & Emler, 1978; Shweder, 1982; Sullivan, 1977). For Kohlberg, moral domains that conservative people tend to hold were not moral but a stage to move beyond, and if you were a conservative with moral domains other than fairness and care, you could not pass stage 4 properly.

Kohlberg's perspective leaves a massive gap in the understanding of human morality. To put it short, conservative people also exist. They are living, breathing, and trying to make morally correct decisions just like liberal people do. So, it would not be fair to think that these

liberal preferences solely construct the actual moral domain. After the criticisms, psychologists realized that they needed a bigger, broader, and inclusionary model for morality.

To fill this huge gap, Richard Shweder (1990) proposed a model that included Kohlberg's and Turiel's model but probed into areas overlooked by previous theories (Schweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). For Shweder, human morality consists of 3 moral ethics: *a) ethic of autonomy, b) ethic of community, and c) ethic of divinity.*

In the ethic of autonomy, the only consideration is the protection of individual autonomy as every individual can do whatever they want within their limits of freedom. Concepts such as fairness, justice, rights, or freedom ensure the protection of said individual autonomy. On the other hand, the ethic of a community relies on other moral grounds. Whereas the ethic of autonomy separates everybody as particular individuals, the ethic of community, as the name suggests, separates the world by communities (e.g., families, parties, unions, nations, clans, and tribes). These communities have their own identity. Every member assumes this identity and makes it a part of their own identity. Unlike the ethic of autonomy, instead of protecting every individual by their autonomy, the main objective is to protect the community. Aside from the ethic of autonomy, virtues in the ethic of the community are duty, respect, and solidarity. The third and last ethic is the ethic of divinity which starts from the assumption that God(s) exists, and every human being contains a soul. This ethic demands the protection of divine elements related to divine figures, such as the soul or the spirit. In this ethic, each soul is formed by a piece of God, and so it is one's duty to keep it clean and untainted, for their body and their souls are, after all, possessions of God.

From Shweder's perspective, it can be spotted easily that fairness and justice pretty much correspond to the ethic of autonomy. Ethics of community and divinity tap into areas of morality that are usually assumed and accepted by conservative ideologies (Haidt & Graham, 2007). After it was solidified that human morality is not only consisted of fairness and justice,

Haidt and Joseph (2004) researched the psychological and evolutionary roots to come up with a better understanding of human morality. They concluded their research with five moral foundations, which are *a) harm/care, b) fairness/reciprocity, c) ingroup/loyalty, d) authority/respect, and d) purity/sanctity.*

a) Harm/care

Evolutionary roots of harm/care foundation are pretty straightforward. Every animal care for their offspring and tries to preserve them from harm. This evolution of mind gave rise to sensitivity for seeing other individuals in suffering, which paved a way to appreciate those who relieve harm, provide care and compassion, meanwhile condemning those who cause harm as cruel and relentless.

Koleva et al. (2014) found that, compared to secure people, while avoidant people had less moral concerns, anxious people had stronger moral concerns on harm/care foundation. Besides, studies show that people from both political ideologies put similar weight on this foundation (Haidt & Shaver, 2007; Graham et al., 2009; Although the relationship between moral foundations, attachment, and political ideology will be addressed deeply in further sections while going through each moral foundation, it would be beneficial to include a - at least - superficial take on the relationships).

b) Fairness/reciprocity

Throughout the evolution, primates, especially humans, showed considerable improvements in their social structure (Tomasello, 2014). These improvements increased the cooperation between unrelated group members (no kinship), which paved the way for reciprocal altruism where a member spends its resources (this can be food, water, or an action in any shape or form) on another member's behalf

with the expectation that aided member will reciprocate when the time comes. This led humans to form emotions that motivate reciprocal altruism, such as gratitude and appreciation when they receive aid, or guilt when they fail to reciprocate, or anger when they feel cheated.

Similar to the harm/care foundation, avoidant and anxious people showed the same patterns as avoidant people showed less concerns while anxious people showed greater concerns on the fairness/reciprocity foundation (Koleva et al., 2014). Likewise, studies show that the same pattern was also present with political ideologies as both parties put similar weight on it (Haidt & Shaver, 2007; Graham et al., 2009).

c) Loyalty/ingroup

A considerable percentage of animals live in kin-based groups at some point in their lives. Kin-based groups are the first group to form in an animal's life. This period increases with humanoids, and with humans, tribes, and other types of groups were formed with kin-based groups coming together. Even though they were forming a bigger group and reciprocating with each other, they were primarily in subgroups based on kinship. These circumstances allowed humans to develop emotions, social and cognitive abilities, and perceptions to recognizing, trusting, and cooperating with members of the kin-based group meanwhile not showing the same attitudes towards other individuals (Buss, 2005). They valued their kin-based group, which led to cherish members who were sacrificing for the group and scorn members who betray or fail to contribute to the group. Loyalty to the ingroup was expected and failing that was punishable. These circumstances produced concepts such as patriotism, heroism, betrayal, and treason. These groups also cherished

members and acts that strengthen the group's solidarity and condemned members and acts that cause disorder among the group.

Studies show that one of the three foundations differentiating between conservatives and liberals is the loyalty/ingroup foundation. Compared to liberals, conservatives show more moral concerns about this foundation (Haidt & Shaver, 2007; Graham et al., 2009). Koleva et al. (2014) also found that anxious people had more moral concerns about loyalty/ingroup foundation compared to avoidant people, but this relationship disappeared after controlling the other four foundations.

d) *Authority/respect*

A significant proportion of mammals live in groups which makes sense because it is evolutionarily adaptive as a group's chance of survival is higher than one individual. However, the development of ingroup interactions differs from species to species. Generally, primates show the most complex ingroup social structure as there is an ingroup hierarchy, and every member places itself in a position, whether by their own choice or not. In a traditional hierarchical group, every member strives to get into a better position in the group hierarchy because of the benefits of that position, such as privileges in food distribution and mating (Buss, 2005). However, in human societies, usually, *with great power comes great responsibility*. Dominant males and females receive these privileges, and in return, they are expected to provide services to the group, such as protection. They are being monitored by their ingroup, and if they fail to provide these expected services, the group might overthrow them or even banish them from the group. These hierarchical structures shaped the human mind in a way to help them operate in their communities. Other group members respect and admire these dominant members because of the particular services they provide. Many virtues can be seen that are attached to

respective, legitimate authorities like generousness, magnanimity, noble, and this perception may even expand to their kin as their kin might be considered as royalty.

Meanwhile, dominant members who fail to provide expected services are considered incompetent, exploitative, or tyrannical. The community also encourages ingroup and outgroup members to have respect for the authority. Virtues like obedience, duty, devotion, or adherence are cherished; meanwhile, members who do not behave in this manner are considered rebellious, adversarious, impudent, or even considered public enemies or enemies of the state.

Another one of the three foundations that differentiate between conservatives and liberals is the authority/respect foundation, as conservatives showed stronger moral concern than liberals (Haidt & Shaver, 2007; Graham et al., 2009). Similar patterns were present with attachment patterns as Koleva et al. (2014) found that anxious people had more moral concerns about authority/respect foundation compared to avoidant people, but yet again, this relationship disappeared after controlling the other four foundations.

e) *Purity/sanctity*

Like many mammals, primates, especially humans, scavenged and gathered food. Unlike other primates, humans developed their skills on how to scavenge, gather, and also process their food to prevent poisoning or contracting various diseases. Considering the eating habits of our primate ancestors, the addition of meat into our diet is recent (Leakey. 1994). There was no modern medicine or medical knowledge back then, so humans needed to find ways to avoid getting sick by food poisoning. This was also the time where our frontal cortex increased its development. It is thought that this convergence may be why the disgust emotion came into existence (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1999; 2000; Haidt, & Graham,

2007). Disgust is an evolutionarily adaptive emotion from various perspectives, including diet, sex, and almost all social contexts. It takes its roots from the material, physical circumstances such as seeing vomit, faeces, rotting corpses, visible diseases, and animals with behaviours associated with these matters. Feeling disgusted towards these are adaptive as these things are unhealthy, and disgust builds a cognitive barrier so that the beware individual keeps his/her distance to stay healthy. However, disgust as an emotion does not only reside in such material, primitive states. It made its way to become a social emotion. Today, humans feel disgusted towards various social things according to their personal differences like religion, ideology, beliefs, culture, and so on. Some cultures and religions prohibit some diets (e.g., in Islam and Judaism, pork is prohibited while it is consumable in various other cultures), or in some cultures, casual sex is generally condemned and disgusted while it does not have the same impact in other societies.

Nevertheless, one thing is certain that disgust is an emotion that is felt in various social circumstances, which works as an agent of aversion. It is injected into our social life and shapes our way of living. The community, overall, expects members to conform to these social norms and values (e.g., chastity, piety, dignity). These norms and values are sanctified, and they believed that they would lead the member to spiritual purity. Community members cherish members who partake in these practices. Actions that do not coincide with a community's social disgust tendencies may be perceived as sins, lust, gluttony, heresy, perversion, and lecherousness. Members who gave into these carnal passions are condemned and even banished from the group.

The last one of the three foundations differentiating between conservatives and liberals is the purity/sanctity foundation. Unlike two previous foundations

(loyalty/ingroup and authority/respect), Koleva et al. (2014) found a relationship between purity/sanctity and insecure attachment patterns even when controlling for other foundations. Specifically, the anxious attachment was related to the purity/sanctity foundation before and after controlling for other foundations, while avoidant attachment was not related. Like the two previous foundations, conservative people had more moral concerns towards the purity/sanctity foundation than liberal people (Haidt & Shaver, 2007; Graham et al., 2009).

It can be easily seen that Shweder's ethics and Haidt and Joseph's moral foundations coincide almost perfectly. Harm/care and fairness/reciprocity foundations, together, correspond to the ethic of autonomy. Likewise, ingroup/loyalty and authority/respect, together, corresponds to the ethic of community. Finally, purity/sanctity corresponds to the ethic of divinity. According to Haidt and Joseph (2004), Moral Foundations Theory extends Schweder's ethics and allows it to be seen in detail, distilling each element so that they can be examined separately.

One issue with these models and theories is the fact that most of these studies mentioned above were conducted in Western societies, mainly in the United States of America (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), which leaves an unfilled gap concerning other cultures and the implementation of models of morality. Even though Graham, Nosek, and Haidt (2011) studied with a huge sample ($N = 34,476$), 94.7% of participants were from Western societies, mainly from the U.S.A., Canada, United Kingdom, and Australia, which still leaves the majority of the world uncharted. One study focused on this issue by gathering data from 27 countries, including Turkey (Iurino & Saucier, 2020). Although their measurement lacked some basic applications, they suggested that the 5-factor model for measuring and categorizing morality

may not be a suitable approach to model moral foundations. Meanwhile, other accounts (Dogruyol, Alper & Yilmaz, 2019) suggest otherwise.

In their study, Yilmaz et al. (2016) tested Moral Foundations Theory in a Non-Western, Turkish sample to see if the morality model proposed by Haidt and Joseph (2004) fits into a Turkish sample or not. Results showed that the model was a good fit, and they suggested that it is currently the best model to be used in Turkey.

1.5 Morality and Political Ideology

As mentioned before, moral and political psychology, by their nature, coincide both theoretically and in practice. Even the early studies of moral psychology included elements of political ideology (Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1983; Turiel, Hildebrandt, & Wainryb, 1991). By definition, political beliefs also contain moral stands. One topic studied a lot is basically how people differ on their moral stands based on their political ideology. In other words, what are the differences between people that are at the opposite end of the political spectrum moral-wise?

Various studies showed differences in moral judgment depending on people's political ideology (Jensen, 1998; Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Yilmaz, Harma, Bahcekapili, & Cesur, 2016). Haidt and Graham (2007) showed that liberals, compared to conservatives, showed significantly more concern on harm/care and fairness/reciprocity foundations. Meanwhile, conservatives, compared to liberals, showed significantly more concerns on ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity foundations. Later, Graham et al. (2009) grouped these foundations. Harm/care and fairness/reciprocity foundations were categorized as individualizing foundations, whereas ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity were categorized as binding foundations. Now, findings Haidt and Graham (2007) showed do not mean that if one is conservative, (s)he will disregard individualizing foundations and just live the rest of his/her days morally judging

things with binding foundations or vice versa liberals. It should not be confused as conservative people do not consider harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, or liberals not considering ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity as moral factors. What this basically means is that, overall, conservative people (compared to liberal people) rely more on binding foundations, meanwhile also relying on individualizing foundations as well.

What also happens is that conservative people can bypass (not intentionally) moral judgments that rely more on individualizing moral foundations with binding moral foundations. For example, killing someone is wrong. Nevertheless, killing someone for the sake of one's motherland is acceptable, even cherished, and respected. Alternatively, correcting someone's mistake sounds like a morally correct thing to do, but correcting an authority figure (one's superior in the military) in a specific context (with other privates at present) can be disrespectful. Haidt and Graham (2007) emphasize that just because liberals do not necessarily rely more on binding foundations or conservatives relying more on them makes neither party morally wrong nor immature. It just means that they measure morality with different standards. However, when asked, both parties usually find the counterpart morally wrong or lacking some components. For some, Vietnam veterans are war heroes meanwhile others see them as baby killers.

One another thing that was also shown by Haidt and Graham (2007) was the difference between people who are the polar opposites in the political spectrum. Specifically, they found that people who rated themselves at the end on a 7-point Likert scale on political ideology differ on how they rely on moral foundations. They found that extreme conservatives showed relatively equal reliance on all moral foundations, whereas extreme liberals showed more reliance on individualizing foundations and less reliance on binding foundations than conservatives. These findings further strengthen the suggestion that conservatives and liberals put different weights on their reliance in the case of moral foundations.

1.6 Morality and Attachment

Attachment theory and morality was not a popular interdisciplinary research area before last decade, which is, to put it mildly, insane since both disciplines started and thrived as a developmental theory (Kohlberg, 1969; Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980; Ainsworth, 1991; Ainsworth et al., 1978). Since morality researchers started their interdisciplinary pursuits, the relationship between attachment theory and morality is found to be a promising research area (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2012; Koleva et al., 2014). Gilliath, Sesko, Shaver, and Chun (2010) took some of the first steps on this issue and found a relationship between attachment theory and morality. In their study, attachment security priming increased state authenticity and reduced dishonesty and cheating. Specifically, they found a relationship between attachment insecurity and dishonesty (lying and cheating) and that security priming reduces the tendency to lie or cheat. In 2012, Shaver and Mikulincer showed that not just the correlates but attachment theory and morality, as concepts, are related to each other. The same researchers (Mikulincer & Shaver 2001, 2007a) also found that insecure attachments were related to outgroup prejudice and bias. They also found that promoting attachment security attenuated these effects. Now, these findings might sound like stating the obvious. Morality as its core is social. It is about how people should interact with others. It answers questions like what would be right or wrong to do while interacting with other people. The attachment also is involved in people's perceptions of their relationships and how they behave towards them. So, it is pretty evident that these two concepts, by their definitions, are connected.

Diving into this question, Koleva et al. (2014) examined the relationship between attachment models, conceptions of morality, and emotions. Their research showed that people with high avoidance showed weaker moral concerns on harm/care and fairness/reciprocity dimensions, whereas people with high anxiety showed stronger moral concerns on harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, and purity/sanctity dimensions. They also found that two distinct emotions

were mediating three moral foundations. Specifically, harm/care and fairness/reciprocity were mediated by empathic concern, and purity/sanctity was mediated by disgust sensitivity. More specifically, people who reported higher attachment anxiety and avoidance showed increased moral concerns on harm/care and fairness/reciprocity dimensions when their empathic concern increased. Furthermore, people who reported higher attachment anxiety showed increased moral concerns on the purity/sanctity dimension when disgust sensitivity increased.

Even though the relationship between attachment and moral foundations theory is evident both theoretically and practically, research on the subject is relatively scarce (Koleva et al., 2014) and has a huge gap to fill with a perspective that introduces other variables into the equation as well.

1.7 Attachment and Political Ideology

Previous work suggested that political ideology is related to attachment, though the findings are contradictory on some issues (Koleva, & Rip, 2009). However, most importantly, there is a limited number of studies concentrated specifically on these two variables. Although generally, studies show a link between secure attachment style and covariates of liberalism and a link between anxious-ambivalent attachment style with conservatism (Jost et al., 2003; Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2017; Weise et al., 2008; Mikulincer, 1997; Mikulincer, & Shaver, 2001; Magai, Distel, & Liker, 1995; Mikulincer, & Florian, 2000). Weber & Federico (2007) found that avoidant and anxious-ambivalent attachment styles were associated with right-wing authoritarianism (Altmeyer, 1996) and social dominance orientation. Gillath & Hart (2010) used mortality and security priming and found that while mortality priming increased concepts associated with conservatism, security priming did the exact opposite effect. In their experimental research, Itzhakov & Reis (2020) studied the relationship perceived responsiveness has with tolerance towards attitude ambivalence and open-mindedness, which are variables that have strong connections with political attitudes. In other words, feelings of

security (i.e., temporary security feeling in this context) seem to spare room to tolerate the external world's demands. In addition to the link between attachment security and political attitudes, previous work suggests that compared to liberals, conservative people have an intolerance towards ambiguity, system instability, opposing views, and a proneness towards cognitive closure, which is simply the opposite of open-mindedness (Jost et al., 2003). They found that open-mindedness increased as they experimentally increased perceived responsiveness. Furthermore, they found that perceived responsiveness was also affecting opposing evaluation on a subject in which increasing perceived responsiveness resulted by increased tolerance towards opposing evaluations. Perceived responsiveness also affected one's perception as when perceived responsiveness increased, the perception that one's initial attitude of it being correct and valid was reduced.

Longitudinal studies have also supported the idea that attachment styles may have a role in political orientation. These studies yielded a relationship between early childhood experiences, especially attachment styles and political orientation in future life. Specifically, Block & Block (2006) collected data from participants when they were children in nursery school (rated independently by their teachers) and 20 years later about how their political orientation shaped after 20 years in relation with their personal differences. Results showed that preschool children who were relatively liberal 20 years later were rated as more self-reliant, energetic, resilient, under-controlled and dominating, and prone to develop close relationships. Preschool children who were relatively conservative 20 years later were rated as easily victimized and offended, indecisive, fearful, rigid, inhibited, vulnerable, and relatively over-controlled. In another longitudinal study by Fraley, Griffin, Belsky & Roisman (2012), they collected data from 1-month infants and followed up those infants 18 years later. They found that children rated high on temperament items (e.g., a child was afraid of the dark or gets upset by sad films) when they were one month old positively correlated with conservative political

beliefs after 18 years later. Liberals were rated high on activity and restlessness dimensions of temperament on their 1-month-old. Also, Fraley and his colleagues (2012) assessed parents' authoritarian attitudes towards the child when the child was one month old and found that high authoritarian attitudes from parents towards one-month-old infants predicted conservative attitudes in those children when they were at age 18. Consistently, a recent study done by Wegemer & Vandell (2020) used longitudinal data from early childhood to age 26 and found that beliefs and parenting of mothers and children's temperament and attachment security in early childhood were in a relationship with political ideology when they were at age 26. Specifically, children with fearful temperament, anxious attachment style, and mothers with high authoritarian beliefs reported more politically conservative attitudes when they were at age 26. They also found that children's abilities with focusing their attention and avoidant attachment style showed more politically liberal attitudes. Overall, this evidence suggests that attachment insecurities (i.e., anxiety and avoidance) could be associated with a more conservative worldview.

The results of this work, however, are not consistent. For example, Thornhill & Fincher (2007) showed that low avoidance and high secure attachment were associated with conservatism, while high avoidance and low secure attachment were associated with liberalism. Anxious-ambivalent attachment style was associated with covariates of conservatism, but avoidant attachment style was linked with some covariates of liberalism and some covariate of conservatism (Mikulincer, 1997; Mikulincer & Florian, 2000; Brennan, & Shaver, 1995; Mikulincer, & Shaver, 2001, 2007a).

One variable that is associated with both political ideology and attachment style is information processing and its covariates. Previous work suggests a coherent pattern between political ideology and attachment style on information processing, analytic thinking, cognitive closure, and need for cognition (Jost et al., 2003; Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2017; Koleva & Rip,

2009; Mikulincer, 1997; Saribay, & Yilmaz, 2017; Yilmaz, & Saribay, 2016, 2017a, 2017b).

Literature also suggests that attachment styles can be situationally activated (Baldwin, Keelan, Fehr, Enns, and Koh-Rangarajoo, 1996). This suggests that, aside from the fact that attachment style is a core knowledge, people can exhibit behaviours that are characteristic of different attachment styles that various circumstances can activate and stimuli (Jakubiak, & Feeney, 2016; Stanton, Campbell, & Pink, 2017) which suggests that attachment style can both affect and be affected by other concepts.



CHAPTER 2

The Present Research

Overall, previous work suggests associations between moral foundations, political ideology, and attachment patterns. Even though the relationship between moral foundations and political ideology has been studied well, the role of each concept, especially attachment patterns, in this equation was not clear. The role of attachment patterns (i.e., anxiety and avoidance) was studied with morality and political ideology only a handful of times (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2012; Koleva & Rip, 2009; Koleva et al. 2014) which leaves a large gap to fill. This study aims to fill this gap by focusing on the associations among three concepts together.

In the light of the findings mentioned above, the preregistered hypotheses for both samples are as follows (for Turkey: <https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=ww4wh4>; for the USA: <https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=8mv48g>):

1. Attachment security would correlate with political ideology. Specifically, participants who report lower levels of attachment anxiety and avoidance [(measured by the Turkish version of Experiences in Close Relationships - Revised scale (ECR-R)] would also report less conservative attitudes (measured by Conservatism Scale) toward societal issues.
2. We conceptually replicated Koleva et al.'s (2014) Study 1 finding that attachment dimensions (i.e., attachment-anxiety and avoidance) predict moral foundations. Specifically, attachment avoidance would negatively predict harm/care and fairness/reciprocity foundations, whereas attachment anxiety would be positively associated with harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, and purity/sanctity dimensions.
3. Considering previous work (Yilmaz, & Saribay, 2017) showing that analytical thinking enhances individualizing moral foundations (i.e., harm/care and

fairness/reciprocity), an exploratory analysis was run with the purpose to reveal the patterns between attachment dimensions and moral foundations. Cognitive style (measured by Cognitive Reflection Task) was examined to see if the link between attachment dimensions and individualizing moral foundations (i.e., harm/care and fairness/reciprocity) disappeared.



2.1 Method

The present research is a correlational study to examine and explore the patterns between attachment, moral foundations, political orientation and cognitive style in two different samples (Turkish and American).

2.1.1 Participants

We conducted a power analysis for the Pearson correlation using G*Power to determine a sufficient sample size with an alpha of 0.05, a power of 0.80, a small effect size ($\rho = .1$), and a two-tail test (Faul et al., 2013). Thus, the priori sample size was 779. Initially, 945 responses from Turkey and 831 responses from the USA were collected. Participants who failed the attention check questions in Moral Foundations Questionnaire, who took a too long or a short time to finish the survey (participants who took more than 30 minutes and less than 3 minutes were excluded), and who did not complete at least two scales were excluded from the study. Therefore, the data consists of 781 Turkish (mean age = 29.52, $SD = 13.432$, 556 females, 145 males, 3 others, 76 unknown) and 786 American participants (mean age = 38.08, $SD = 11.61$, 314 females, 457 males, 13 other). Turkish participants were provided one course credit as an incentive, and American participants were recruited from Prolific and participated in the study in exchange for money.

2.1.2 Materials

Four scales were used in this study (on both Turkish and American samples) to measure conservatism, cognitive style, attachment, and moral foundations. Specifically, we used the Conservatism Scale (Saribay, Okten, & Yilmaz, 2017), Cognitive Reflection Test - 2 (CRT-2; Thomson, & Oppenheimer, 2016; for Turkey see Yilmaz, & Saribay, 218), Experiences In Close Relationships-Revised (ECR-R) Questionnaire (Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000; for

Turkey see Selcuk, Gunaydin, Sumer, & Uysal, 2005) and Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011; for Turkey see Yilmaz, Harma, Bahcekapili, & Cesur, 2016).

2.1.2.1 Conservatism Scale

The conservatism Scale was used to measure participants' conservative attitudes. It was developed by Saribay, Okten, & Yilmaz (2017) to measure people's conservatism levels on two dimensions: resistance to change and opposition to equality. These dimensions both have two categories which are personal attitudes and societal attitudes. In this study, only societal attitudes on resistance to change and opposition to equality were used.

To devise this scale, Saribay et al. (2017) formed an item pool. This item pool has consisted of items that are taken from The Resistance to Change Scale (Oreg, 2003), Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), Personal Need for Structure Scale (Neuberg, & Newsom, 1993), Social Dominance Orientation Scale (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (Altemeyer, & Hunsberger, 1992), Fascism Scale (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), Social and Cultural Attitudes Scale (Küçükler, 2007), and Egalitarianism Scale (Kluegel, & Smith, 1983). Researchers added 13 items written by themselves after reviewing the relevant literature. They optimized the measure in their study and concluded the measure with 18 items on *personal resistance to change* part, 11 items on *personal opposition to equality* part, 9 items on *societal resistance to change* part, and 17 items on *societal opposition to equality* part. Higher scores on this scale refers to higher conservatism levels.

2.1.2.2 Cognitive Reflection Test – 2 (CRT-2)

CRT-2 was used to measure cognitive style. The scale was developed by Thomson & Oppenheimer (2016) as an alternative test for the first Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005), just like the original test. The CRT-2 consists of 4 short questions that have an inciter

nature to lead the reader to an intuitive and wrong answer. These questions do not need high degrees of knowledge in any particular area. The four questions are as written below:

1. If you're running a race and you pass the person in second place, what place are you in? (intuitive answer: first; correct answer: second)
2. A farmer had 15 sheep, and all but 8 died. How many are left? (intuitive answer: 7; correct answer: 8)
3. Ayşe/Emily's father has three daughters. The first two are named Eylül/April and Ekim/May. What is the third daughter's name? (intuitive answer: Kasım/June; correct answer: Ayşe/Emily)
4. How many cubic feet of dirt are there in a hole that is 3' deep x 3' wide x 3' long? (intuitive answer: 27; correct answer: none)

2.1.2.3 Experiences In Close Relationships-Revised (ECR-R) Questionnaire

Attachment style was measured by the ECR-R (Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000; for the Turkish version, see Selcuk, Gunaydin, Sumer, & Uysal, 2005), which measures adult attachment anxiety and avoidance dimensions. The avoidance subscale consists of 18 items (for Turkish version: $\alpha = .90$) which measure participant's discomfort with closeness, dependence, and self-disclosure (i.e., "I am very comfortable being close to romantic partners"). The anxiety subscale also consists of 18 items (for Turkish version: $\alpha = .86$) which assess the need for closeness, fear of abandonment, and rejection (i.e., "I often worry that my partner will not want to stay with me"). Higher scores on each subscale refer to higher anxiety or avoidance.

2.1.2.4 The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ)

Participants' moral orientation was measured by The Moral Foundation Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011; for the Turkish version, see Yilmaz, Harma, Bahcekapili, & Cesur, 2016). The questionnaire contains 32, 6-step Likert-type items (2 items are attention checks), which are measuring five moral dimensions, and it asks participants to rate whether they agree or

disagree with each statement. The questionnaire consists of 2 parts which are judgments and relevance. In the judgment part, participants are asked to rate to what extent the criteria said in the item is relevant in their moral judgments (e.g., "Whether or not someone suffered emotionally"). In the relevance part, participants are asked to rate to what extent they agree or disagree with moral judgments said in the item (e.g., "Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue"). Every moral dimension is measured with three items, both from the judgment and the relevance part of the questionnaire, and a composite score is formed for every moral dimension by adding up the scores of their respective six items.

2.1.3 Procedure

After the informed consent form was signed, participants were given Conservatism Scale, CRT-2, ECR-R, and MFQ in a random order to eliminate any effect that might influence the participant. Lastly, the demographic form was presented, and participants received a briefing about the objective of the study.

2.2 Results


2.2.1 Turkish Sample

Firstly, A zero-order correlation was conducted to test the hypothesis in which attachment patterns (i.e., anxiety and avoidance) correlate with political ideology. Specifically, it was hypothesized that lower levels of attachment anxiety and avoidance would positively correlate with less conservative attitudes, whereas higher levels of attachment anxiety would positively correlate with higher levels of conservative attitudes towards societal issues. Results showed that attachment anxiety positively correlated with both subscales of societal conservatism [resistance to change: $r(779) = .213, p < .001$; opposition to equality: $r(779) = .181, p < .001$]. Similar patterns were also found between attachment avoidance and both subscales of societal conservatism [resistance to change: $r(779) = .124, p < .002$; opposition to

equality: $r(779) = .119, p < .001$]. Overall, attachment insecurities were positively correlated with both resistance to change and opposition to equality.

Secondly, we tested if attachment anxiety and avoidance predict moral foundations in which we ran a path analysis to consider shared variance between moral foundations using MPlus 7.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). In this way, we were able to control each moral foundation against other foundations in the single model. Results revealed that attachment anxiety only predicted loyalty/ingroup ($\beta = .076, p < .048$), authority/respect ($\beta = .121, p < .001$) and purity/sanctity ($\beta = .095, p < .012$) foundations. These three dimensions are also categorized as binding foundations by Graham et al. (2009). Attachment avoidance predicted harm/care ($\beta = -.106, p < .005$) and fairness/reciprocity ($\beta = -.127, p < .001$) foundations and these dimensions also categorized as individualizing foundations (Graham et al., 2009; see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Path Analysis Results for Turkish Sample: Attachment Patterns & Moral Foundations



Thirdly, we run multiple moderated regressions (one for each moral foundation) to see if the link between attachment patterns and moral foundations is moderated by cognitive styles (i.e., CRT levels). To do this, at the first step, we entered centred attachment and CRT scores. Then at the second step, we entered interaction terms between attachment anxiety and CRT scores and attachment avoidance and CRT scores simultaneously. The outcome variables were five moral foundations on separate moderated regression analyses.

Results revealed that the interaction between attachment dimensions (i.e., anxiety and avoidance) and moral foundations was significantly moderated by CRT levels. Specifically, harm/care [$F(5,744) = 3.890, p < .002; \beta = -.120, p < .002; R^2 = .025$] and fairness/reciprocity [$F(5,744) = 5.149, p < .001; \beta = -.100, p < .01; R^2 = .033$] foundations were significantly predicted by the interaction between attachment avoidance and CRT (see Figure 2), whereas loyalty/ingroup [$F(5,744) = 7.192, p < .001; \beta = .083, p < .031; R^2 = .046$], authority/respect [$F(5,744) = 8.768, p < .001; \beta = .089, p < .021; R^2 = .056$], and purity/sanctity [$F(5,744) = 9.637, p < .001; \beta = .089, p < .021; R^2 = .061$] were predicted by the interaction between attachment anxiety and CRT (see Figure 3).

Figure 2. Predicting Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity Dimensions by Attachment Avoidance and CRT interaction





Figure 3. Predicting Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity Dimensions by Attachment Anxiety and CRT interaction




Simple slope analyses revealed that participants who scored low CRT and higher levels of attachment avoidance also reported the lowest levels of harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, whereas those who scored low CRT scores and higher attachment anxiety reported the highest levels of ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity dimensions on MFQ scale. As seen in Figure 2 and Figure 3, if participants graded with higher levels of CRT, their scores on five moral foundations did not change as their attachment avoidance and anxiety scores changed. In addition to these results, it should be noted that CRT did not predict five moral

foundation dimensions uniquely at the first step in moderated regression analyses. These results suggest that CRT may have a role on moral foundations only if they interact with attachment dimensions in our sample.

Outside of our preregistered hypotheses, as an exploratory analysis regarding our first hypothesis, a path analysis was conducted to see if attachment patterns predicted societal conservatism. Results revealed that attachment anxiety significantly positively predicted societal opposition to equality ($\beta = .194, p < .001$) and societal resistance to change ($\beta = .159, p < .001$), meanwhile attachment avoidance was not significantly associated any other variable (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Path Analysis Results for Turkish Sample: Attachment Patterns & Societal Conservatism




Our second exploratory analysis focused on the relationship between moral foundations and political conservatism. A path analysis was conducted to examine if moral foundations predicted political conservatism. Results revealed that societal opposition to equality was

significantly negatively predicted by harm/care ($\beta = -.169, p < .001$), fairness/ingroup ($\beta = -.360, p < .001$), and positively predicted by loyalty/ingroup ($\beta = .082, p < .043$) and authority/respect ($\beta = .300, p < .001$). Meanwhile, societal resistance to change was significantly negatively predicted by harm/care ($\beta = -.108, p < .002$), fairness/reciprocity ($\beta = -.144, p < .001$), and positively predicted by loyalty/ingroup ($\beta = .188, p < .001$), authority/respect ($\beta = .340, p < .001$) and purity/sanctity ($\beta = .249, p < .001$; Figure 5).

Figure 5. Path Analysis Results for Turkish Sample: Societal Conservatism & Moral

Foundations






2.2.2 American Sample

A zero-order correlation was conducted to test the first hypothesis in which attachment patterns (i.e., anxiety and avoidance) correlate with political ideology. Specifically, it was hypothesized that lower levels of attachment anxiety and avoidance would positively correlate with less conservative attitudes, whereas higher levels of attachment anxiety will positively correlate with higher levels of conservative attitudes towards societal issues. Results showed

that, unlike Study 1a, attachment dimensions and conservatism on societal attitudes were not correlated, except for attachment anxiety and societal resistance to change correlation [$r(784) = .126, p < .001$].

To address our second hypothesis, we tested if attachment anxiety and avoidance predict five moral foundations. We ran a path analysis in which five moral foundations were estimated as outcome variables and attachment anxiety and avoidance were predictors (see Figure 6). Attachment anxiety positively predicted all foundations [harm/care ($\beta = .080, p < .047$), fairness/reciprocity ($\beta = .122, p < .003$), loyalty/ingroup ($\beta = .218, p < .001$), authority/respect ($\beta = .141, p < .001$), and purity/sanctity ($\beta = .183, p < .001$)], whereas attachment avoidance negatively predicted all foundations [harm/care ($\beta = -.218, p < .001$), fairness/reciprocity ($\beta = -.128, p < .001$), loyalty/ingroup ($\beta = -.203, p < .001$), authority/respect ($\beta = -.227, p < .001$) and purity/sanctity ($\beta = -.189, p < .001$)].

Figure 6. Path Analysis Results for the USA Sample: Attachment Patterns & Moral Foundations




Thirdly, we run multiple moderated regressions (one for each moral foundation) to see if there is a significant interaction between attachment patterns and CRT in predicting moral foundations. To do this, at the first step, we entered centred attachment dimensions and CRT scores. Then at the second step, we entered interaction terms between attachment anxiety and CRT scores and attachment avoidance and CRT scores. We predicted five moral foundations on separate moderated regression analyses. Different from Study 1a (Turkish sample), results

showed that CRT did not significantly moderate the relationship between attachment patterns and moral foundations on any attachment pattern or moral foundation.

Identical to what we did with our Turkish sample, a path analysis was conducted as an exploratory analysis to see if attachment patterns predicted societal conservatism. Results revealed that societal resistance to change was significantly negatively predicted by attachment avoidance ($\beta = -.166, p < .001$) and significantly positively predicted by attachment anxiety ($\beta = .211, p < .001$), meanwhile societal opposition to equality was not significantly predicted by neither attachment pattern (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Path Analysis Results for the USA Sample: Attachment Patterns & Societal Conservatism




Finally, our last exploratory analysis focused on the relationship between moral foundations and political conservatism. A path analysis was conducted to examine if moral foundations predicted political conservatism. Results revealed that societal opposition to equality was significantly negatively predicted by harm/care ($\beta = -.116, p < .001$),

fairness/reciprocity ($\beta = -.381, p < .001$), and positively predicted by loyalty/ingroup ($\beta = .183, p < .001$), authority/respect ($\beta = .285, p < .001$) and purity/sanctity ($\beta = .130, p < .007$) foundations. Similarly, societal resistance to change was significantly negatively predicted by harm/care ($\beta = -.116, p < .001$), fairness/reciprocity ($\beta = -.073, p < .007$), and positively predicted by loyalty/ingroup ($\beta = .441, p < .001$), authority/respect ($\beta = .216, p < .001$) and purity/sanctity ($\beta = .183, p < .007$) foundations (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Path Analysis Results for the USA Sample: Societal Conservatism & Moral Foundations





2.3 Discussion

The purpose of this study was to examine the link between attachment, morality, political ideology, and the moderator role of cognitive style on the relationship between attachment (i.e., anxiety and avoidance) and moral foundations (i.e., harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity). Results were consistent with current literature (Koleva & Rip, 2009; Gaziano, 2017; Koleva et al., 2014;

Yilmaz & Saribay, 2017) and opened new areas to explore. Specifically, the relationship between attachment, morality, and cognitive style, and also the relationship between attachment patterns and political ideology.

The Turkish sample revealed that political ideology was significantly correlated with attachment dimensions as hypothesized, which supports Koleva and Rip's (2009) account on attachment patterns being a significant factor in political attitudes and ideologies. Specifically, the insecure attachment (characterized by higher levels of attachment anxiety or avoidance) was positively correlated with both subcomponents of the Conservatism Scale (societal resistance to change and opposition to equality). The pattern is also coherent with the current literature when examined deeper, in which attachment anxiety had a higher correlation with both subcomponents of conservatism compared to attachment avoidance (Koleva & Rip, 2009). Meanwhile, the only strong correlation between attachment patterns and political conservatism in the American sample was between attachment anxiety and societal resistance to change. This result may suggest a cultural difference that should be studied in detail.

Our second hypothesis was also supported, as we conceptually replicated Koleva et al.'s (2014) first study in which they found attachment dimensions predicting moral foundations. Specifically, Koleva et al. (2014) found that attachment avoidance negatively predicted harm/care and fairness/reciprocity dimensions, whereas attachment anxiety positively predicted harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, and purity/sanctity dimensions. Coherent with these findings, in our Turkish sample, attachment avoidance negatively predicted harm/care and fairness/reciprocity foundations, meanwhile attachment anxiety positively predicted loyalty/ingroup, authority/respect and purity/sanctity foundations. Similarly, in our American sample, attachment avoidance negatively predicted all foundations. Meanwhile, attachment anxiety positively predicted all foundations. These results support the findings of Koleva et al. (2014) but moreover, it also suggests a relationship between the categorization of moral

foundations (individualizing and binding; Graham et al., 2011) and attachment patterns. Attachment patterns particularly predicted different moral foundation categories. In other words, while attachment avoidance negatively predicted both subcomponents of individualizing foundations, attachment anxiety positively predicted all three subcomponents of binding foundations. These patterns are similar with the relationship between moral foundations and political ideology, as liberals generally have moral concerns about individualizing foundations, whereas political conservatives have moral concerns on all foundations (Graham et al., 2011).

Compared to the Turkish sample, the American sample showed a more clear-cut pattern. Specifically, attachment anxiety did not significantly predict harm/care and fairness/reciprocity foundations in the Turkish sample. Similarly, attachment avoidance did not significantly predict loyalty/ingroup, authority/respect and purity/sanctity foundations. Meanwhile, in the American sample, attachment anxiety positively predicted all foundations, attachment avoidance negatively predicted all foundations, and there were differences between the beta scores of attachment anxiety. In other words, while attachment anxiety positively predicted all foundations significantly, it predicted loyalty/ingroup, authority/respect and purity/sanctity foundations stronger compared to harm/care and fairness/reciprocity foundations. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, these findings also support the arguments of Graham et al. (2011) about categorizing the foundations as individualizing and binding foundations. Also, just like the Turkish sample, results of the American sample suggest a similarity between the patterns of *attachment/moral foundations* and *political ideology/moral foundations*. However, the resemblance is way more apparent with the American sample as attachment anxiety correlates with all foundations, just like political conservatism.

Cognitive style was introduced to the equation to probe the relationship between attachment patterns and moral foundations. Our Turkish sample showed that cognitive style

significantly moderated the interaction between attachment patterns and moral foundations. Specifically, low CRT strengthened the interaction between attachment patterns and moral foundations, whereas, in high CRT, the interaction disappeared. This moderation was examined in every single foundation. Specifically, CRT moderated the interaction between attachment avoidance and harm/care and fairness/reciprocity foundations (individualizing foundations). Likewise, CRT also moderated the interaction between attachment anxiety and loyalty/ingroup, authority/respect and purity/sanctity foundations (binding foundations). These results suggest that participants were relying more on their intuitive, core concepts (attachment patterns) when thinking about moral issues, whereas if they were thinking more analytically, they bypass their attachment patterns that shape their moral judgments, which leads them to judge differently. Specifically, anxious participants were found to be relying more on loyalty/ingroup, authority/respect and purity/sanctity foundations when they were thinking more intuitively, but this reliance disappeared when they think more analytically. A similar phenomenon could be observed for avoidant participants. They were negatively associated with harm/care and fairness/reciprocity foundations when they were in an intuitive thinking state, and like anxious participants, their patterns changed when they think more analytically.

Unlike the Turkish sample, cognitive style did not have a significant moderator role in any interaction in the American sample. There can be many reasons why CRT had a moderator role on one sample and not on the other. First, it should be considered that American participants were gathered from an online crowdsourcing platform (Prolific), which means that the participants were most likely more experienced with filling surveys or maybe filled the survey sloppily compared to Turkish participants who can be considered more “organic” as it was gathered mainly from college students. Also, the rewards were different as in the Turkish sample, participants received one course credit, but in the American sample, they received money. Aside from the sampling differences, there can be cultural differences as well.

Regarding CRT scores, we run an independent sample t-test as an exploratory analysis to see if two groups significantly differ from each other on CRT scores. Results showed that Turkish participants had higher CRT scores compared to American participants [$t(1534) = -11.335, p < .001$], which suggests that sampling of two cultures might play a role.

Aside from our preregistered hypotheses, we also did exploratory analyses to deeper examine the relationship between attachment patterns and political conservatism. To do so, we used the same analytical methods as we did with attachment patterns and moral foundations. In our Turkish sample, results showed that attachment anxiety positively predicted both subcomponents of our conservatism scale. Meanwhile, attachment avoidance did not have a significant relationship with either subcomponent. This supports our first hypothesis and develops our understanding of the relationship between attachment patterns and political conservatism to a new level. This also supports the previously discussed notion about the three-way relationship of attachment patterns, moral foundations and political conservatism. In our American sample, attachment anxiety and avoidance predicted the same subcomponent of conservatism (societal resistance to change). These results also support the notion of the relationship between attachment patterns and political ideology. The patterns of attachment avoidance are also coherent with current literature as attachment avoidance does not show clear patterns on political conservatism like attachment anxiety does (Koleva & Rip, 2009; Gaziano, 2017).

As our last exploratory analysis, we examined the relationship between moral foundations and political conservatism. In our Turkish sample, results showed that both subcomponents of individualizing foundations (harm/care and fairness reciprocity) negatively predicted both subcomponents of societal conservatism (societal opposition to equality and societal resistance to change), meanwhile, all subcomponents of binding foundations (loyalty/ingroup, authority/respect and purity/sanctity) positively predicted both

subcomponents of societal conservatism except the relationship between purity/sanctity and societal opposition to equality. Similarly, in our American sample, both subcomponents of individualizing foundations negatively predicted both subcomponents of societal conservatism, whereas all subcomponents of binding foundations positively predicted both subcomponents of societal conservatism. These results are also coherent with literature as conservative people rely more on binding foundations (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Graham et al., 2009, Graham et al., 2011; Yilmaz et al., 2016).

2.4 Limitations

Concepts such as morality and political ideology, which are susceptible to cultural variables, should be examined using representative data, which we could not obtain for this study. Also, even though this study included non-Western participants, it may not be a non-WEIRD sample. Thus, the generalizability of such findings should be tested with different subsamples and settings as well. Another thing about the sampling is that, compared to the Turkish sample, the sampling could be more “organic” with the American sample. Turkish sample mainly consists of college students who received one course credit for their participation, meanwhile American sample was collected from a crowdsourcing platform in which participants received money for their participation. These differences in participant profiles can play a significant role in examined relationships.

One of the major things about the study is that the data was collected under the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic. The circumstances of participants can very well be affected by these conditions. Literature suggests that extreme conditions concerning one’s well-being can alter one’s perception and attitude towards moral (Trémolière et al., 2012) and political issues (Burke, Kosloff, & Landau; 2013), and can even alter one’s cognitive style (Trémolière et al., 2014). This suggests that these relationships should also be tested in a more “normal” setup.

Apart from that, the relationships in this study should be studied experimentally as this was a correlational study. Even though the analytical strategies were competent, an experimental design to complement the findings in this research would be healthier and significant. The relationship between attachment patterns, moral foundations, and cognitive style should be studied with different aspects, such as manipulating cognitive style (Yilmaz, & Saribay, 2017), revealing more about the relationships.



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APPENDICES A

A.1 Turkish Informed Consent Form

Araştırmayı destekleyen kurum: Kadir Has Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü

Araştırmanın konusu: Kişilerin Sosyal Olaylara Karşı Tutumları

Araştırmacının adı: Metin Ege Salter

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Bu araştırma kişilerin sosyal olgulara karşı tutumunu incelemektedir. Çalışmada doğru veya yanlış cevap yoktur. Sizden istediğimiz kendinize en yakın hissettiğiniz cevapları işaretlemenizdir.

Bu çalışma bilimsel amaçlarla yapılmaktadır. Çalışma süresince toplanan veriler anonim olarak değerlendirilecek ve araştırmanın hiçbir aşamasında isimler kullanılmayacaktır. Sonuçlar kişisel bilgileriniz ile eşleştirilmeyecek, araştırma sonucunda herhangi bir kişisel değerlendirme yapılmayacaktır.

Çalışma yaklaşık on dakika sürecektir. Bu araştırmaya katılımınız karşılığında bölüm derslerinizin birinden 1 kredi alabilirsiniz. Çalışmaya katılmanız tamamen isteğe bağlıdır. Bu formu onaylamama ve çalışmaya katılmama hakkınız her zaman geçerlidir. Formu onaylarsanız dahi kendinizi rahat hissetmediğiniz an çalışmayı bırakabilirsiniz. Bu durumda, kredi alma hakkınızı kaybetmeyeceksiniz ve sizden almış olduğumuz veri yok edilecektir.

A.2 Turkish Conservatism Scale

A.2.1 Societal Opposition to Equality

Aşağıda, çeşitli **toplumsal** olaylara dair tepkilerinizle ilgili ifadeler bulunmaktadır.


















Lütfen dikkatlice okuyunuz ve her ifadeye ne kadar katıldığınızı 1'den 7'ye kadar olan ölçekte işaretleyiniz.

Kesinlikle Ne katılıyorum Kesinlikle
katılmıyorum ne katılmıyorum katılıyorum

1 2 3 4 5 6 7



Running head: ATTACHMENT, MORAL FOUNDATIONS, AND THE COGNITIVE STYLE

1. Gelir dağılımı eşit hale getirilmemelidir çünkü insanların kabiliyetleri eşit değildir	
2. Gelir dağılımı daha eşit olmalıdır çünkü herkesin topluma katkısı eşit derecede önemlidir	
3. İnsanlar iki sınıfa ayrılabilir: güçlü ve zayıf	
4. Eğer insanlara daha eşit bir şekilde davransaydık daha az sorun yaşayan bir toplum olurduk	
5. Aşağı seviyedeki gruplar yerlerini bilmelidirler	
6. Bazı grupların tepede diğerlerinin aşağıda olması muhtemelen iyi bir şeydir	
7. Gelir dağılımı daha eşit olmalıdır çünkü her ailenin yemek, barınak gibi temel ihtiyaçları aynıdır	
8. Eğer gelir dağılımı daha eşit olsaydı insanları daha çok çalışmaya motive eden bir sebep kalmayacaktı	
9. Toplumsal grupların eşit olması iyi bir şey olurdu	
10. Hiçbir grup toplumda baskın olmamalıdır	
11. Toplumsal grupların eşitliği amacımız olmalıdır	
12. Bazı gruplar diğer gruplardan daha fazla yaşam hakkına sahip olabilir	
13. Tüm gruplara hayatta eşit şans tanınmalıdır	
14. Bir sürü insan ekmek bile bulamazken beş yıldızlı otellerde tatil yapmak bir insana yakışmaz	
15. Gelirleri eşitlemek için gayret etmeliyiz	
16. Gelir dağılımının daha eşit hale getirilmesi sosyalizm demektir ve bu kişisel özgürlükleri engeller	
17. Devlet gücü azınlıkta bile olsalar insanların sesini kısmak için kullanılmalıdır	

A.2.2 Societal Resistance to Change

Aşağıda, çeşitli **toplumsal** olaylara dair tepkilerinizle ilgili ifadeler bulunmaktadır. Lütfen dikkatlice okuyunuz ve her ifadeye ne kadar katıldığınızı 1'den 7'ye kadar olan ölçekte işaretleyiniz.

	Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum	Kesinlikle katılıyorum				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Devletin istikrarının korunması için yeni partilerin kurulmasına sınırlandırmalar getirilmelidir.							
2. Eğer bazı gruplar yerlerini korusalardı daha az sorunumuz olurdu. ()							
3. Toprak bütünlüğümüzün korunması kişisel çıkarlardan daha önemlidir. ()							
4. Bu belalı zamanlarda kanunların kimsenin gözyaşına bakılmadan uygulanması lazım, özellikle işleri karıştıran devrimci ve provokatörlere karşı. ()							
5. Batılılaşma sevdası kültürümüzün ve kimliğimizin asimile olmasına yol açacak. ()							
6. Ülkemizin ihtiyacı daha çok medeni haktan ziyade daha katı bir hukuk ve düzendir. ()							
7. Toplumsal ahlakımıza ve geleneksel inançlarımıza zarar veren unsurlardan mutlaka kaçınmalıyız. ()							
8. Toplumda örf ve adetlerimizin korunması değişen dünya düzenine uyum sağlamaktan daha önemlidir. ()							
9. Ülkenin durumu giderek ciddileşmektedir, sorun çıkaranların temizlenmesi bizi yeniden doğru yola ulaştırmak için en güçlü çözüm olacaktır. ()							

A.3 Turkish Cognitive Reflection Test

1. Siz bir kořu yarışındasınız ve ikinci olan kişiyi geçtiniz kaçınca sıraya yükselirsiniz?

2. Bir çiftlikte 15 tane koyun var. 8 tanesi hariç hepsi öldü, geriye kaç tane kaldı?

3. Ayşe'nin babasının 3 tane çocuęu var. İlk iki çocuęunun adı Eylül ve Ekim ise üçüncü çocuęunun adı nedir?

4. 3 metre derinliğinde, 3 metre uzunluęunda, 3 metre genişliğinde (boş) bir çukurun içinde kaç metreküp toprak vardır?

A.4 Turkish Experiences in Close Relationships- Revise (ECR-R)

Aşağıdaki maddeler romantik ilişkilerinizde hissettiğiniz duygularla ilgilidir. Bu araştırmada sizin ilişkinizde yalnızca şu anda değil, genel olarak neler olduğuyla ya da neler yaşadığınızla ilgilenmekteyiz. Maddelerde sözü geçen "birlikte olduğum kişi" ifadesi ile romantik ilişkide bulunduğunuz kişi kastedilmektedir. Eğer halihazırda bir romantik ilişki içerisinde değilseniz, aşağıdaki maddeleri bir ilişki içinde olduğunuzu varsayarak cevaplandırınız. Her bir maddenin ilişkilerinizdeki duygu ve düşüncelerinizi ne oranda yansıttığını, karşılardaki 7 aralıklı ölçek üzerinde, ilgili rakamın altına işaret koyarak gösteriniz.

Running head: ATTACHMENT, MORAL FOUNDATIONS, AND THE COGNITIVE STYLE

	Kesinlikle atılmıyorum		Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum			Kesinlikle katılıyorum	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Birlikte olduğum kişinin sevgisini kaybetmekten korkarım.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Gerçekte ne hissettiğimi birlikte olduğum kişiye göstermemeyi tercih ederim.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Sıklıkla, birlikte olduğum kişinin artık benimle olmak istemeyeceği korkusuna kapılırım.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Özel duygu ve düşüncelerimi birlikte olduğum kişiyle paylaşmak konusunda kendimi rahat hissedirim.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Sıklıkla, birlikte olduğum kişinin beni gerçekten sevmediği kaygısına kapılırım.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Romantik ilişkide olduğum kişilere güvenip dayanmak konusunda kendimi rahat bırakmakta zorlanırım.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Romantik ilişkide olduğum kişilerin beni, benim onları önemsemiğim kadar önemsemeyeceklerinden endişe duyarım.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Romantik ilişkide olduğum kişilere yakın olma konusunda çok rahatımdır.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Sıklıkla, birlikte olduğum kişinin bana duyduğu hislerin benim ona duyduğum hisler kadar güçlü olmasını isterim.

Romantik ilişkide olduğum kişilere açılma konusunda kendimi rahat hissetmem.

İlişkilerimi kafama çok takarım.

Romantik ilişkide olduğum kişilere fazla yakın olmamayı tercih ederim.

Benden uzakta olduğunda, birlikte olduğum kişinin başka birine ilgi duyabileceği korkusuna kapılırım.

Romantik ilişkide olduğum kişi benimle çok yakın olmak istediğinde rahatsızlık duyarım.

Romantik ilişkide olduğum kişilere duygularımı gösterdiğimde, onların benim için aynı şeyleri hissetmeyeceğinden korkarım.

Birlikte olduğum kişiyle kolayca yakınlaşabilirim.

Birlikte olduğum kişinin beni terkeceğinden pek endişe duymam.

Birlikte olduğum kişiyle yakınlaşmak bana zor gelmez.

Romantik ilişkide olduğum kişi kendimden şüphe etmeme neden olur.

Genellikle, birlikte olduğum kişiyle sorunlarımı ve kaygılarımı tartışırım.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Terk edilmekten pek korkmam.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Zor zamanlarımda, romantik ilişkide olduğum kişiden yardım istemek bana iyi gelir.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Birlikte olduğum kişinin, bana benim istediğim kadar yaklaşmak istemediğini düşünürüm.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Birlikte olduğum kişiye hemen hemen her şeyi anlatırım.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Romantik ilişkide olduğum kişiler bazen bana olan duygularını sebepsiz yere değiştirirler.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Başımdan geçenleri birlikte olduğum kişiyle konuşurum.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Çok yakın olma arzumu bazen insanları korkutup uzaklaştırır.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Birlikte olduğum kişiler benimle çok yaklaştığında gergin hissederim.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Romantik ilişkide olduğum bir kişi beni yakından tanıdıktan sonra, "gerçek ben"den hoşlanmayacağından korkarım.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Romantik ilişkide olduğum kişilere güvenip dayanma konusunda rahatımdır.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Birlikte olduğum kişiden ihtiyaç duyduğum şefkat ve desteği göremem beni öfkelenendir.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Romantik ilişkide olduğum kişiye güvenip dayanmak benim için kolaydır.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Başka insanlara denk olamamaktan endişe duyarım.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Birlikte olduğum kişiye şefkat göstermek benim için kolaydır.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Birlikte olduğum kişi beni sadece kızgın olduğumda önemser.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Birlikte olduğum kişi beni ve ihtiyaçlarımı gerçekten anlar.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

A.5 Turkish Moral Foundations Questionnaire

Bir şeyin doğru veya yanlış olup olmadığına karar vermenizde aşağıda verilen düşünceler ne derecede etkilidir? Lütfen cevaplarınızı aşağıdaki skalayı kullanarak derecelendiriniz.[0] = hiç bir şekilde alakalı değildir (Bu düşünce doğru ve yanlış yargılarımla hiçbir şekilde alakalı değildir).[1] = pek alakalı değildir[2] =biraz alakalıdır[3] = orta derecede alakalıdır[4] = çok alakalıdır [5] = kesinlikle alakalıdır (Bu düşünce bir şeyin doğru veya yanlış olduğuna karar verirken dikkat ettiğim en önemli faktörlerden biridir.)



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	Hiç bir şekilde alakalı değildir (1)	Pek alakalı değildir (2)	Biraz alakalıdır (3)	Orta derecede alakalıdır (4)	Çok alakalıdır (5)	Kesinlikle alakalıdır (6)
1. Birisinin duygusal olarak acı çekip çekmediği	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2. Birilerinin diğerlerine göre farklı muamele görüp görmediği	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3. Birisinin eyleminin ülkesi için sevgi göstergesi olup olmadığı	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4. Birisinin otoriteye saygısızlık edip etmediği	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
5. Birisinin namus ve edep konusundaki normları ihlal edip etmediği	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
6. Birisinin matematiğinin iyi olup olmadığı	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
7. Birisinin güçsüz ve incinebilir olan birini koruyup korumadığı	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
8. Birisinin adaletsiz davranıp davranmadığı	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

9. Birisinin grubuna ihanet edecek bir şey yapıp yapmadığı	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
10. Birisinin toplumun geleneklerine uyup uymadığı	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
11. Birisinin iğrenç bir şey yapıp yapmadığı	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
12. Birisinin zalim olup olmadığı	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
13. Birinin haklarının elinden alınmış olup olmadığı	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
14. Birisinin sadakatsizlik gösterip göstermediği	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
15. Bir eylemin kaosa da düzensizliğe neden olup olmadığı	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
16. Birisinin Tanrı'nın onaylayacağı bir şekilde davranıp davranmadığı	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Lütfen aşağıdaki cümleleri okuyunuz ve bunlara katılıp katılmadığınızı belirtiniz. [0]

= kesinlikle katılmıyorum[1] = katılmıyorum[2] =pek katılmıyorum[3] = biraz katılıyorum[4]

= katılıyorum[5] = kesinlikle katılıyorum



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	Kesinlikle katılmıyorum (1)	Katılmıyorum (2)	Pek katılmıyorum (3)	Biraz katılıyorum (4)	Katılıyorum (5)	Kesinlikle katılıyorum (6)
1. Acı çekenlere şefkat duyabilmek en önemli erdemdir.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2. Hükümet kanun yaparken teminat altına alınması gereken ilk kural herkese adil davranılmasıdır.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3. Ülkemin tarihiyle gurur duyuyorum.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4. Otoriteye saygı bütün çocukların öğrenmesi gereken bir şeydir	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
5. Hiç kimseye zarar vermese de insanlar iğrenç şeyler yapmamalıdır.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
6. İyi olanı yapmak kötü olanı yapmaktan daha iyidir.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
7. Birisinin yapabileceği en kötü şeylerden biri savunmasız bir hayvana zarar vermektir.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

8. Adalet bir toplum için en önemli gereksinimdir.

9. İnsanlar, aile üyeleri yanlış bir şey yapmış olsa dahi onlara karşı sadık olmalıdırlar.

10. Erkeklerin ve kadınların toplum içinde farklı rolleri vardır.

11. Bazı hareketleri doğal olmadıkları için yanlış olarak nitelendiririm

12. Bir insanı öldürmek hiçbir zaman haklı bir hareket olamaz.

13. Bence fakir çocuklar miras olarak hiçbir şey alamazken zengin çocukların miras olarak çok para almaları ahlaki olarak yanlıştır.

14. Bir takım oyuncusu olmak birisinin kendisini bireysel olarak ifade etmesinden daha önemlidir.

15. Eğer bir asker olsaydım ve komutanımın emirleriyle aynı fikirde olmasaydım, yine de itaat ederdim çünkü bu benim görevimdir

16. İffet çok önemli ve değerli bir erdemdir.



A.6 Turkish Demographics

1. Cinsiyetiniz:

- Erkek
- Kadın
- Dięer _____

2. Yaşınız



3. Çocukluğunuzdaki gelir seviyenizi tanımlar mısınız?

- Çok iyi
- İyi
- Fena Değil
- Kötü
- Çok Kötü

4. Aşağıdakilerden hangisi sizin dini/inanç sisteminizi en iyi ifade etmektedir?

- Tanrı'ya inanmam (Ateistim)
- Tanrı'ya inanıyor ama bir dini tercih etmiyorum
- Hıristiyan
- Yahudi
- Müslümanım
- Diğer
- Cevap vermek istemiyorum

5. Seçtiğiniz politik görüşünüzü nerede konumlandırırsınız?

Aşırı sol Orta Aşırı sağ

1 2 3 4 5 6 7



6. Őu an romantik bir iliŐkiniz var mı?

Evet

Hayır

7. Hangi okulda okuyorsunuz?

8. Lütfen bonus almak istediđiniz dersin kodunu ve adını yazınız (örn., PSY223- Sosyal Psikoloji gibi)

9. Lütfen öğrenci Numaranızı Yazınız (bonus puan alabilmek için)

APPENDICES B

B.1 Informed Consent Form

PRINCIPLE INVESTIGATOR: Metin Ege Salter

SUPERVISOR: Associate Professor Mehmet Harma

INSTITUTION: Kadir Has University

INFORMATION

You are invited to participate in a research study. Your participation is completely voluntary, and if at any point you wish to withdraw from the study, you are free to do so without penalty. Participation in this study involves completing a series of questionnaires and choice tasks.

RISKS

There are no significant risks involved in participating in this study.

BENEFITS

You will have the opportunity to observe the methods researchers use to study psychological constructs, thus enhancing your understanding of psychological research methods.

CONFIDENTIALITY

Your responses and scores will be kept completely confidential: Confidentiality of your research records will be strictly maintained by assigning all the data you provide a code number. The list connecting your name and this number will be kept in a locked office in the psychology department that can be accessed only by the principal investigator and the research supervisor and will be destroyed seven years after completing this study, in accordance with American Psychological Association guidelines. Electronic data will be stored in an online repository but will have all identifying information removed (gender, age, and race). The results of this study may be reported in conference presentations and journal

articles. Note, however, that the responses of individual participants will not be identified in any reports of this research; only aggregated data will be reported.

COMPENSATION

You will receive **£1.09** for your participation in this study. Participants who begin the study but choose to withdraw prior to its completion or ask to have their data excluded from the analysis will still receive compensation. Simply write “WITHDRAW” in the text box for the survey completion code on the link. Of course, once you have completed the study and have agreed to include your responses, they cannot be withdrawn because it is anonymous.

CONTACT

If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, you may contact the principal researcher, Metin Ege Salter, at the Psychology Department, Kadir Has University, email 20180928002@stu.khas.edu.tr. Alternatively, you can contact Assoc. Prof. Mehmet Harma via email: mehmet.harma@khas.edu.tr. This project has been reviewed and approved by the University Research Ethics Board. If you feel you have not been treated according to the descriptions in this form, or your rights as a participant in research have been violated during the course of this project, you may contact the Kadir Has University Research Ethics Board via danisma@khas.edu.tr

PARTICIPATION

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled. To receive your compensation please enter “WITHDRAW” in the survey completion code text box and

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submit your HIT for approval. Furthermore, if there are any questions that you are not comfortable answering you are free to skip those questions.

- I understand what was written above and participating in this study totally on my own will. I give my consent for the use of the information I provide for scientific purposes.
- I do not give my consent.



B.2 Conservatism Scale

B.2.1 Societal Opposition to Equality


















The statements below concern how you feel towards societal issues. Please read carefully and mark how you feel about each statement from 1 to 7.

Strongly disagree Neither agree nor disagree Strongly agree

1 2 3 4 5 6 7











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1. Income distribution should not be made more equal because people's skills are not equal	
2. Income distribution should be more equal because everyone's contribution to society is equally important	
3. People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong	
4. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally	
5. Inferior groups should stay in their place	
6. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom	
7. Income distribution should be more equal because every family's basic needs, such as food and shelter, are the same	
8. If income distribution was more equal, there would be no reasons left to motivate people to work harder	
9. It would be a good thing for societal groups to be equal	
10. No one group should dominate in society	
11. Group equality should be our ideal	
12. It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others	
13. All groups should be given an equal chance in life	
14. It's not nice to go on vacation in a five-star hotel when so many people cannot find even bread	
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible	
16. Making income distribution more equal means socialism and this prohibits personal freedom	
17. State authority should not be used to silence people even if they are in the minority	

B.2.2 Societal Resistance to Change

The statements below concern how you feel towards societal issues. Please read carefully and mark how you feel about each statement from 1 to 7.

	Strongly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree			Strongly agree		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. There should be a limitation on the founding of new political parties in order to protect the stability of the state. ()							
2. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. ()							
3. Protection of our country's land is more important than personal profit. ()							
4. In these troubled times laws have to be enforced without mercy, especially when dealing with the agitators and revolutionaries who are stirring things up. ()							
5. The love of Westernization will lead to the assimilation of our culture and identity. ()							
6. What our country really needs, instead of more "civil rights," is a good stiff dose of law and order. ()							
7. We must avoid elements that harm our societal morality and traditional beliefs. ()							
8. It is more important for our society's customs and traditions to be protected than to adapt to the changing world order. ()							
9. The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path. ()							

B.3 Cognitive Reflection Test

1. If you're running a race and you pass the person in second place, what place are you in?

2. A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How many are left?

3. Emily's father has three daughters. The first two are named April and May. What is the third daughter's name?

4. How many cubic feet of dirt are there in a hole that is 3' deep x 3' wide x 3' long?

B.4 Experiences in Close Relationships- Revise (ECR-R)

The statements below concern how you feel in emotionally intimate relationships. We are interested in how you generally experience relationships, not just in what is happening in current relationship. Respond to each statement by circling a number to indicate how much you agree or disagree with the statement.



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	Strongly disagree					Strongly agree	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I'm afraid that I will lose my partner's love.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I often worry that my partner will not want to stay with me.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I often worry that my partner doesn't really love me.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I worry that romantic partners won't care about me as much as I care about them.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I often wish that my partner's feelings for me were as strong as my feelings for him or her	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I worry a lot about my relationships.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When my partner is out of sight, I worry that he or she might become interested in someone else.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

When I show my feelings for romantic partners, I'm afraid they will not feel the same about me.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I rarely worry about my partner leaving me.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My romantic partner makes me doubt myself.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I do not often worry about being abandoned.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I find that my partner(s) don't want to get as close as I would like.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Sometimes romantic partners change their feelings about me for no apparent reason.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
My desire to be very close sometimes scares people away.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I'm afraid that once a romantic partner gets to know me, he or she won't like who I really am.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

It makes me mad that I don't get the affection and support I need from my partner.

I worry that I won't measure up to other people.

My partner only seems to notice me when I'm angry.

I prefer not to show a partner how I feel deep down.

I feel comfortable sharing my private thoughts and feelings with my partner.

I find it difficult to allow myself to depend on romantic partners.

I am very comfortable being close to romantic partners.

I don't feel comfortable opening up to romantic partners.

I prefer not to be too close to romantic partners.

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I get uncomfortable when a romantic partner wants to be very close.

I find it relatively easy to get close to my partner.

It's not difficult for me to get close to my partner.

I usually discuss my problems and concerns with my partner.

It helps to turn to my romantic partner in times of need.

I tell my partner just about everything.

I talk things over with my partner.

I am nervous when partners get too close to me.

I feel comfortable depending on romantic partners.

I find it easy to depend on romantic partners.

It's easy for me to be affectionate with my partner.

My partner really understands me and my needs.



B.5 Moral Foundations Questionnaire

When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?



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	Not at all relevant	Not very relevant	Slightly relevant	Somewhat relevant	Very relevant	Extremely relevant
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Whether or not someone suffered emotionally	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not some people were treated differently than others	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone's action showed love for his or her country	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone violated standards of purity and decency	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone was good at math	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

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Whether or not someone acted unfairly	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone did something disgusting	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone was cruel	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Whether or
not
someone
acted in a
way that
God would
approve of



Please read the following sentences and indicate your agreement or disagreement.



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	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am proud of my country's history.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Respect for authority is something all children need to learn.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
It is better to do good than to do bad.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless animal.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Justice is the most important requirement for a society.

People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong.

Men and women each have different roles to play in society.

I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural.

It can never be right to kill a human being.

I think it's morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children inherit nothing.

It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself.

If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer's orders, I would obey anyway because that is my duty.

Chastity is an important and valuable virtue.



B.6 Demographics

1. Gender:

- Male (1)
- Female (2)
- Other (3) _____

2. Age:


3. How would you define your household income in childhood?

- Very good
- Somewhat good
- Neither good nor bad
- Somewhat bad
- Very bad

4. Which one identifies your religious belief?

- I do not believe in God (Atheist)
- I believe in God but do not prefer a religious belief
- Christian
- Judaist
- Muslim
- Other _____

5. Where would you position your political standing?



6. Do you currently have a romantic relationship?

Yes

No