ISTANBUL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY ★ GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL HYPOCRISY: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

M.A. THESIS

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SİYASAL İKİYÜZLÜLÜĞÜN ELEŞTİRİSİ: BİR KAVRAM ANALİZİ

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Anneme ve Babama,

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SUMMARY

This thesis aims to define the status and function of hypocrisy in the realm of democratic politics, and try to find an answer to the question; "Are there any circumstances in which political hypocrisy can be justified in a democracy?" The argument of the thesis is that the structural opposition between the ones in favour of hypocrisy and the strict anti-hypocrites is an inevitable starting point in evaluating the moral status of political hypocrisy, yet both perspectives have their problems as they are apt to be taken to extremes, and create a vicious circle of denouncing each other. However, taking democracy in the minimal sense as the self-government of the people, and transparency, accountability and trust as its essential features, it is not difficult to infer that hypocrisy, by its properties, is inmical to democratic polity. Thus any attempt to justify it appealing to reasons like the nature of politics, adversarial political competition or noble intentions are excuses, rather than justifications. In this sense, if an instance of political hypocrisy is to be accepted as benign or justifiable, it needs to be put in certain restrictions, evaluated carefully, and be able to be checked by informed citizens and other institutions; it can only be an exception, and the exception proves the rule.

In order to accomplish this goal, after examples to show the importance of the issue at hand are given, firstly "hypocrisy" as an elusive concept is analyzed conceptually in order to assert its distinctive properties, in terms of descriptive and normative thinking. Secondly, as hypocrisy implies a moral category, its moral status is evaluated from the perspectives of different ethical theories to understand why hypocrisy is seen to be morally culpable and what, if anything, is inherent in it that brings the negativity it carries upon itself. Thirdly, the relationship between hypocrisy and politics as a set of actions is examined and the definition of political hypocrisy is introduced alongside with the arguments of both its advocates and opponents. Finally, an assesment of these two camps is done about their problematic aspects, and the implications of political hypocrisy on a democracy is discussed, concluding with remarks on the institutions that may serve as possible checks for political hypocrisy.

SİYASAL İKİYÜZLÜLÜĞÜN ELEŞTİRİSİ: BİR KAVRAM ANALİZİ

ÖZET

Bu çalışma ikiyüzlülüğün demokratik siyaset alanındaki rolünü ve işlevini tanımlamayı amaçlar ve "bir demokraside siyasal ikiyüzlülüğün meşru görülebileceği durumlar var mıdır?" sorusuna bir cevap bulmaya çalışır. Tezin argümanı, ikiyüzlülük yanlıları ile katı bir şekilde buna karşı çıkanlar arasındaki yapısal zıtlaşmanın, ikiyüzlülüğün ahlaki statüsünü değerlendirmek açısından kaçınılmaz bir başlangıç noktası teşkil etmesine karşın, iki tarafın da aşırı yönlere çekilmeye ve birbirlerini tamamen reddederek bir kısır döngüye dönüşmeye yatkınlıkları nedeniyle sorunlu olduklarıdır. Ancak, demokrasiyi asgari düzeyde halkın kendi kendini yönetmesi, şeffaflık, hesap verebilirlik ve güveni onun asli özellikleri olarak ele aldığımızda, ikiyüzlülüğün tabiatı itibariyle demokratik siyasete zararlı olduğu sonucuna varmak zor değildir. Dolayısıyla, siyasetin doğası, mücadeleci siyasal yarış ya da soylu niyetlere vurgu yapmak suretiyle ikiyüzlülüğü meşru göstermeye çalışan her yaklaşım haklı sebeplerden ziyade bahaneler sunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, eğer bir siyasal ikiyüzlülük vakası iyicil ya da meşru olarak kabul edilecekse, bunun sınırlarının net bir biçimde belirlenmesi, dikkatli bir şekilde değerlendirilmesi ve bilgilendirilmiş vatandaşlar ve başka kurumlar aracılığıyla kontrol edilebilir olması gerekmektedir; çünkü bu durum yalnızca bir istisna olabilir ve istisnalar kaideyi bozmaz.

Bu hedefe ulaşmak adına, öncelikle konunun öneminin gösterilmesi açısından örnekler verildikten sonra, ilk olarak tarif edilmesi zor bir kavram olan ikiyüzlülük, kendine has özelliklerinin açıklanması adına tanımlayıcı düşünüş yoluyla kavram analizine tabi tutulmuştur. İkinci olarak, ikiyüzlülük ahlaki bir değer ima ettiğinden, kavramın neden ahlaki olarak kusurlu görüldüğünü ve taşıdığı negatif anlamın kavramın kendisine içkin hangi özelliğinden kaynaklandığını anlamak adına, ahlaki statüsü farklı etik teorilerinin perspektiflerinden değerlendirilmiştir. Üçüncü olarak, ikiyüzlülük ve bir eylem türü olarak siyaset arasındaki ilişki incelenmiş ve siyasal ikiyüzlülük kavramı onu savunanların ve karşı çıkanların argümanları ile birlikte tanıtılmıştır. Son olarak, bu iki grubun argümanlarının sorunlu yönlerinin bir değerlendirmesi yapılmış, siyasal ikiyüzlülüğün demokrasi için ne ima ettiği tartışılmış ve siyasal ikiyüzlülüğü kontrol altında tutabilecek olası kurumlar hakkında yorumlarla çalışma sonlandırılmıştır.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Methodology

Hypocrisy is a subjective concept with disagreements on its properties, which makes it difficult to define with a single definition. Thus, the conceptual analysis of hypocrisy is done by acknowledging this difficulty. In this regard, different definitions of hypocrisy given by the Oxford English Dictionary, and by various thinkers like Hegel, Eva Kittay, Dan Turner, Bela Szabados and so on are all taken into account, in order to determine the necessary conditions of the concept inherent in all these definitions. Through conceptual analysis, the concept will be seperated into four properties; hypocrisy as intentional deception, hypocrisy as a self-interested affair, hypocrisy as inconsistency, and hypocrisy as secrecy. Afterwards, as hypocrisy implies a moral category, with respect to its conceptualization and properties, the moral status of hypocrisy will be evaluated from the perspectives of ethical egoism, utilitarianism, virtue ethics, deontology, natural law theory, and contractualism with a comperative approach, and the outcomes of the evaluations from every single theory will be critically analyzed. Later on, as the main subject of this research is political hypocrisy, firstly, two conceptions of politics is will be given, one being end-oriented, and the other being principle-based and intrinsically valuable, based on Hannah Arendt's (1958) concepts of "acting in concert" and "plurality". These conceptions will be given by virtue of their effect on how hypocrisy in politics is conceived by the public, intellectuals and the political agents. In this regard, a definiton of political hypocrisy will be made, in accordance with the properties of the core concept. With the definition given, two oppositional perspectives -similar to the opposition between consequentialism and deontology on the moral status of hypocrisy- on the status of political hypocrisy will be given with a comperative approach. The philosophical sources of the justifications given by the advocates of political hypocrisy will be based upon "common good" and "self-interest", as the former is apparent in Plato's Noble Lie, while the latter is derived from the realism of Niccolo Machiavelli. On the other hand, the arguments of the

anti-hypocrites will be derived from Kant, and his strict moral principles. Correspondingly, a critical analysis and assesment of both perspectives will be made, and the justifications given for political hypocrisy will be scrutinized. In order to see if they can really pass as justifications, the difference between a justification and an excuse will be introduced, by means of J.L. Austin's approach in A Plea for Excuses (1956) and Michael Walzer's in Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands (1973). Finally, as the purpose of this research is to find out whether there are any circumstances in which political hypocrisy can be justified in a democracy, a minimal concept of democracy which consists of the principles of self-government, participation, political equality and public discussion will be introduced based on Thomas Christiano's The Rule of the Many (1996). These principles will be paired with the detrimental results of political hypocrisy, and thus be used in order to show the discrepancy between democracy and hypocrisy. As a result, referring to this discrepancy on the one hand, and the deficiencies of the arguments of both the advocates and opponents of political hypocrisy on the other, it will be argued that political hypocrisy has to be objected principally in a democratic setup, and any instance of it which can be seen as benign or justifiable can only be an exception, and needs to be restricted, evaluated and checked very carefully.

1.2 The Framework and Outline of The Thesis

Hypocrisy has been a matter of interest for a wide range of disciplines from philosophy to psychology, theology to political science and so on. It must be said that, in accordance with this diversity, there is no agreement on the concept with regards to its definition, how it is to be conceived or what to do about it, thus it remains and ambiguous concept; the only thing that seems certain about it is the negativity it carries upon itself and the discontent it creates. However, no matter how ambiguous it is, it can be seen in any social relation and entity from micro scale to macro, and politics, in this regard, is not an exception. In the minds of the people around the world, hypocrisy and politics have almost become identified with each other, and seen as bedfellows, and thus, even in our modern democracies that cherish the right of the people to rule themselves as its core principle and openness, transparency and accountability as its central values, politics is still thought to be nothing more than a "self-serving, two-faced and unprincipled activity" (Heywood,

2013, p. 4). In this regard, to show the importance and the relevancy of the research subject at hand, in the first chapter of this research, a superficial evaluation of the problem of political hypocrisy will be given by way of an introduction, and then significant examples of political hypocrisy and deception from recent past until today –from Watergate Scandal to WikiLeaks- will be introduced, to acknowledge the dissatisfaction and discontent of the people with political agents and with politics itself, is not without a reason after all.

As mentioned above, hypocrisy is an ambiguous and slippery concept, yet it is so ubiquitous that it is hard to avoid encountering it or falling into it in one's life. In this regard, for the purposes of this study –as political hypocrisy is its main subject- a comprehensive analysis of the concept is of crucial importance to base the rest of the study on solid ground. Therefore, the second chapter will dwell on what hypocrisy is. To that end, firstly, two definitions of hypocrisy will be introduced; internal, and external. The internal definition of hypocrisy refers to the word's Greek origins – hypocrisis- where it meant acting on a stage, and takes hypocrisy as "pretending to virtue or goodness" or in other words, "pretending to be better than one actually is" (Kittay, 1982, p. 278). On the other hand, the exterior definition of hypocrisy takes it as , "saying one thing in public and doing another in private" (Barden, Rucker and Petty, 2005, p. 1463), or simply, not practicing what you preach. Both these definitions taken into account together, secondly, the necessary conditions of hypocrisy will be examined. It will be argued that, there are four necessary conditions for hypocrisy; at first, hypocrisy involves intentional deception of others; second, it is a self-interested affair; third, it always involves an inconsistency; and finally, fourth, it needs an element of secrecy.

No matter what we understand from hypocrisy, one thing is for sure; we never use it as a compliment or take it as a praiseworthy act. Our common-sense morality makes us think that hypocrisy is morally culpable intuitively. But, if it is a vice, why is it so ordinary to see in every relation? And if it is not morally wrong, why do we feel such discontent about it? As these questions are also closely connected to the problem of political hypocrisy, the third chapter will be evaluating the moral status of hypocrisy from the perspectives of different ethical theories, in order to see what is morally wrong with it. In accordance with this purpose, consequentialist theories and deontology will be positioned against each other and what they have to say about

hypocrisy will be compared primarily, for after all, hypocrisy is an end-oriented affair. After that, to understand the matter on a larger scope, natural law theory and contractualism will also be introduced and used for evaluating the moral status of hypocrisy. At the end of this chapter, a final assessment of all these theories and what they say about the moral status hypocrisy will be made to conclude the topic.

The fourth chapter will finally be touching upon the realm of politics, as the main purpose of this research is to define the status and function of hypocrisy in the realm of democratic politics, and try to find an answer to the question; "Are there any circumstances in which political hypocrisy can be justified in a democracy?". In this regard, above all, politics as a concept and a realm will be introduced briefly with two different perspectives; one that conceives politics as an end-oriented or instrumental affair, and the other that conceives it as a right based or intrinsicly valuable one. Later on, the concept of political hypocrisy will be introduced and defined, and in a similar manner to the opposition between consequentialism and deontology on the moral status of hypocrisy, two main camps on the permissibility of political hypocrisy, namely its advocates and opponents, will be introduced comperatively. Through the end of the chapter, the reasons given for why politics and hypocrisy are so tangled will be scrutinized, and the "justifications" that the defenders of political hypocrisy gives and their philosophical backgrounds will be introduced.

Carrying on from this point, in the beginning of the final chapter, an assessment of the "justifications" and counter arguments given by the defenders and opponenets of political hypocrisy will be done. Later on, in order to find out if political hypocrisy can be justified in a democracy, at first, what justificiation is and its difference with excuse will be briefly discussed. Then, in accordance with the purpose of the research, the concept of democracy as the "self-government" and self-legislation of the people through the "participation" as "equal" citizens in "open and fair discussions" (Christiano, 1996, p. 3) with its basic elements will be introduced with a proceduralist approach, and the implications of political hypocrisy for democracy and democratic ideals will be set forth. In the light of this examination, it will be concluded that democracy and hypocrisy are at odds with each other, thus political hypocrisy needs to be rejected as a matter of principle in a democratic setup. Although the possibility of an instance of a benign or "justifiable" kind of political

hypocrisy is not completely rejected, it is considered to be only an exception which proves the rule, and it needs to be put in certain restrictions, evaluated by citizens with regards to specified criteria, and needs to be checked by institutions other than the public itself. In this regard, the chapter will be concluded by discussing the rights and institutions that are necessary for keeping political agents accountable and political hypocrisy under control.

2. POLITICAL HYPOCRISY: WHY DOES IT MATTER?

"He who doesn't know how to dissimulate doesn't know how to rule". This very maxim from Louis XI of France gives a perfect glance to the relationship between deception and politics -and thus to the problem of political hypocrisy-, an issue that goes a long way back in time, maybe even to the beginning of the recorded history (Arendt, 1972, p.4). It must be stated that, even though political systems and the ways of "ruling" have changed a lot since the time Louis told his famous maxim, the issue of political deception –political hypocrisy, mendacity, and secrecy- hasn't lost its importance, centrality, and relevancy a bit for philosophers, political scientists and, of course, citizens of our modern day democratic politics which rely on the principles of self-governing and self-legislation of the people, for "there is a lot of hypocrisy at work in contemporary politics" (Runciman, 2008, p.1).

What makes political hypocrisy an intriguing problem today as it was before, in both theory and practical facts is that; firstly, although the very concept of hypocrisy is intuitively repulsive and inherently unattractive, it is really easy to find examples of it all around us, yet it's hard to know what to do about it; and secondly, it is almost inevitable in any political settings, and especially in liberal democratic societies it is essentially ubiquitous, which makes it hard for one to criticise hypocrisy without falling into the trap of the very thing she is criticising (Ibid, p.1). This complexity of the problem has made a vast range of thinkers from different fields –psychology to political science- to contemplate on it and come up with their own "solutions". As the role of hypocrisy in the realm of politics is commonly a means in order to achieve political goals and gain -in other words power- through dissimulation and duplicity, the charge of hypocrisy for politicians has become an "ordinary" accusation. It can be said that, in the eyes of the "demos", hypocrisy –and other kinds of deception such as mendacity and secrecy- and politics are "bedfellows". Yet, it is hard to say that the kind of remarks like "truthfulness has never counted among the political virtues" and "lies have always been regarded as necessary and justifiable

tools of the politician's" (Arendt, 2000, p.545) applies only to the public, for there is a significant number of thinkers who espouse these views.

Politics and "the political" are concepts/realms that are hard to put in certain boundaries and separate them from other realms –such as law, economy, and philosophy and so on. In this sense, the debates around political hypocrisy have their roots in morality as much as they have in the political realm, for the concept of hypocrisy is a morally loaded term –mostly in a negative way, and politics and morality are interwoven. The axis of the arguments about the role and the moral status of hypocrisy in politics is in almost all cases around the structural opposition between the ones in favour of hypocrisy and the anti-hypocrites. The defenders of political hypocrisy claim that it is a "lesser evil" and a "necessary feature" of political life and liberal democracies (Quill, 2010, p.197), for it is fostered by the political relations, which are "relations of dependency" (Grant, 1997). According to this stance, whose champion is Machiavelli who graded hypocrisy as a political virtue, even in democracies, power and success are still goals to be sought, and achieving those ends justifies duplicity, for what matters are the outcomes and effects, not abstract moral principles. In the service of goals, which would otherwise be unattainable, leadership sometimes involves –maybe even require- to "know one thing and say another" (Jay, 2010, p.17). Whereas the latter, the anti-hypocrites, take a "moralist" stance against political hypocrisy and want to apply the moral standards that should be followed in private life to politics and hold out for a liberal democratic polity ideally based on transparency, accountability and trust, purging hypocrisy and mendacity from public life as much as possible (Ibid, p.16).

This research finds both accounts problematic; on one hand, considering the perspective of the advocates of hypocrisy, it is hard to deny that politics is a "grey area" where political agents are dependent on too many different variables –like party mechanisms, funds for their campaigns, and above all, votes- to fulfil their interest and pursue their version of the "public good", thus they might need to resort to deception, manipulation, and concealment along the long path ahead of them. In addition, as ever-changing conditions and sudden changes are essential features of daily political life, politicians need to make instant decisions and "prudently" tackle every single problem in each particular situation, while trying to adjust their principles, hence making strict moral choices might become difficult. However,

defining politics or the political as a concept in terms of "a routine of cheating and lying" or as "mere manipulation" is first of all meaningless for it ignores the existence of rules of the game without which terms like "cheating", "bending the rules" or "deceiving" are empty (Ibid, p.132; Heller, 1991, p.338), and secondly, discredits politics and thus democracy as a whole, transforming the society into a "culture of bullshit" where no one believes anything anyone says any more (Quill, 2010, p.201)

On the other hand, the anti-hypocrites have sound claims as well on where hypocrisy might become a problem for democratic politics, for it is true that deception of this kind is at odds with transparency, which is one of the essential properties of democracy. Deceiving people either for "their own good" like in Plato's famous Noble Lie or for the politicians' own self-interests in the Machiavellian sense seem to be contradictory to the principles of democracy. Too much deception and secrecy in a democracy means bypassing the consent of the governed and when it comes to light, immensely damages the trusts of citizens to democratic institutions and to politics, make them feel "marginalized" and reduced to "mere residents" (Gup, 2007, p.21), and this feeling can lead them to depolitization, therefore becoming a threat to politics itself. For instance, a survey conducted in 1976 –a few years after the Watergate Scandal, shows that 69 percent of the American public that time believed that their leaders were consistent liars and that many refuse to vote under such circumstances (Bok, 1979, p.184). However, a complete transparency –which is almost impossible reach-, would possibly undermine the effective functioning of the government. In addition, in a morally pluralistic world like ours, even the concept of truth itself is questionable. Finally, the search and demand for complete transparency is likely to turn into a source of oppression, as the hunt for hypocrites is boundless and a never ending fight, and "every effort to make- goodness manifest in public ends with the appearance of crime and criminality on the political scene" (Arendt, 2006, p.88), the Reign of Terror being one of the most horrific examples.

Another problem is that, since hypocrisy is ubiquitous in politics, charges of hypocrisy has become a frequently used weapon between political opponents. Politicians employ charges of hypocrisy against their opponents while ignoring to see the similar or worst behaviour by themselves or by their allies. In this never-ending game of "mutual unmasking", where each side tries to destroy the credibility of her

rivals, politics becomes a "treadmill of dissimulation and unmasking" (Shklar, 1984, p.67). This leads, according to McDonough (2009), a sense of disgust in the public with politicians who seem to be more interested in destroying their enemies at any cost rather than trying to solve problems (p.298-299).

If both unlimited hypocrisy and complete transparency are problematic and thus to be rejected, is there a way to strike a balance between this two perspectives? In other words, acknowledging "transparency" and "accountability" as essential features of a democracy, are there any circumstances where political hypocrisy –as a concept with negative moral evaluation- can be justified? As political actions are by definition strategic acts, can hypocrisy be understood as situations of independent choice, in the democratic decision making processes? Do we really need to be concerned with the personal hypocrisies of political agents, or should they be kept away from the public sight, with regard to the agents' "privacy"? All these questions are of importance, for the reasons mentioned above. In order to answer them, questions of what hypocrisy is, what –if anything- is inherently wrong about it, what are its moral implications, and what is the relationship between hypocrisy and politics need to be dwelled on primarily, as it will be done in the following chapters.

The citizens of democratic states tend to feel that politicians are betraying their moral expectations, and this loss of trust is spread all over the democratic world, from the United States to Western Europe and post-communist East Central Europe (Kis, 2008, p.2). However, the public opinion that "today's politicians are more corrupt and hypocritical than their predecessors from a century ago" is not necessarily true; the reason why our politicians –especially in the past few decades- seem to be more dishonest is that politics have become way more transparent than it used to be, thanks to the technological advances, free press and academia, a fact which makes "the vices of politicians more visible too", as the public receives "more frequent, more detailed and more explicit reports of their misdeeds" –and WikiLeaks might well be the peak of this process of revelations- (Ibid, p.2). Although there is not a decisive agreement on the concept of hypocrisy, the central role it plays in politics can clearly explain why it is so ubiquitous and why it still arouses a big amount of interest –and eventually unease- both factually and theoretically. Therefore, in order to show better the significance of the questions asked above and the matter in the eyes of the public all around the world, and see why the distrust and the dissatisfaction of the people

towards politicians and maybe even politics itself seem to be reasonable from their perspective, it will be useful to refer to some important examples of political hypocrisy and mendacity from the recent past until today, which have occupied the attention of the world, especially the cases of "Bushspeak" (Kellner, 2007) before and through the invasion of Iraq, and the Wikileaks, which the citizen government relations have changed fundamentally.

2.1 From Watergate to Clinton Affair

In the recent decades, the world has witnessed a series of political scandals involving hypocrisy and mendacity, which mostly took place in and around American politics, and they contributed to the negative feelings of the public towards politics and politicians in a respectable amount. The cynical perspective they caused in the public can be overtly seen in an example given by Eric Alterman, where a TV advertisement shows presidents from Nixon to Clinton and their famous moments of lying one after the other, and ending with the advertiser claiming "Talk is cheap" (Alterman, 2004, p.1).

In the morning of June 17, 1972, before President Richard Nixon's successful re-election to a second term, five burglars were caught inside the Democratic National Committee headquarters, located in the Watergate Hotel in Washington D.C. Soon it became clear that this was not an ordinary robbery attempt, as the details started to emerge the following year and reveal that burglars were connected to Nixon's re-election campaign and taking orders from the officials close to him, and that they broke into the office in order to wiretap phones and steal secret documents. In the light of this information, soon the questions of whether Nixon ordered, covered up or at least knew of the burglary arose. He denied the accusations, claiming that he knew nothing about the break-in, and as a response, in front of 400 Associated Press editors, he used his famous statement; "I am not a crook". This very quote came to represent his entire political career and, eventually, this lie came back to haunt him, as private White House conversations about the matter were recorded, and the investigation committee subpoenaed the tapes of those conversations. Nixon refused to share the tapes relying on executive privilege, and this refusal took the matter to the Supreme Court, which ruled that the tapes had to be handed over. The findings in the tapes were enough to implicate that Nixon knew more about the matter than he

claimed, and he was actually trying to cover-up the scandal. Finally, because of these latest findings, Nixon resigned from presidency, while proceedings for impeachment were about to take place. The Watergate Scandal left a lasting scar in American politics, making the Americans to think more critically about their leaders and presidency (Perlstein, 2015).

A decade after the Watergate Scandal, another scandal came to the fore, where the president of the United States in that period, Ronald Reagan, "repeatedly and deliberately misled the American people" (Alterman, 2004, p.240); the Iran-Contra Scandal. The scandal consisted of three interconnected parts; "The Reagan administration sold arms to Iran, a country desperate for materiel during its lengthy war with Iraq; in exchange for the arms, Iran was to use its influence to help gain the release of Americans held hostage in Lebanon; and the arms were purchased at high prices, with the excess profits diverted to fund the Reagan-favoured "contras" fighting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua" (Sabato, 1998). This "grand scheme" was violating the American law and policy in many aspects as "arm sales to Iran were prohibited", the government had "forbidden any ransom for hostages", and it was illegal to do "any funding above the limits set by the Congress" (Ibid, 1998). The first revelations about these affairs in the press started emerge in November 1986, and right after on November 13th, President Reagan made his Address to the Nation concerning the issue, saying that the government was working with the Iranian government. However, on a press conference on 19th, Reagan admitted that they were working with a "particular group" –with terrorist organizations- and that they "did not condone and do not condone the shipment of arms from other countries". However, the president said this after his Chief of Staff had already admitted that the government condoned Israeli weapons to Iran in September 1985. These revelations were followed by three investigations, "conducted by a presidentially appointed commission headed by former Texas U.S. senator John Tower, by Congress and finally by a special federal prosecutor", and resulted in the convictions of several members of the Reagan administration (Ibid, 1998). Although Reagan was never charged with anything, he later backed away from his own earlier statements, leaving the public again with questions and suspicions about the trustworthiness of their leaders and governments.

In the following decade, a scandal took the entire world's attention to the White House once more. However, this one was different from the previous two, as at stake was the private life of a president, "something that had happened to no previous president during the nearly 220-year course of the American republic" (Alterman, 2004, p.12). In January 1998, a sensational story –which came out to be true- came to the fore, claiming that the President of the U.S. Bill Clinton had a sexual affair with a White House intern named Monica Lewinsky. As the story broke, the public suspicion mounted and Lewinsky was questioned by FBI agents and U.S. attorneys, which led Clinton to publicly deny the allegations, waving his finger at a television camera and sternly proclaiming that he "did not have sexual relations with that woman, Ms. Lewinsky" (Ibid, p.1). As Paula Jones already sued the president about sexual harassment, Jones' lawyers subpoenaed Lewinsky, and she filled an affidavit where she denied having any sexual relationship with the president, while Clinton himself denied the affair under oath. On August 17, Clinton testified to the grand jury and this time he admitted the relationship, and his regret in misleading the public and his family. After this admission, the House of Representatives voted to impeach Clinton for perjury and obstruction of justice. In 1999, Clinton was acquitted of the charges, yet still his legacy is tarnished in the eyes of the world and Americans ever since.

Clinton, unlike Nixon and Reagan, lied about his adultery, to spare his family and himself from public humiliation, as he was pursued by political rivals and ideologues who sought to "make his private life public" (Ibid, p.12), leaving complicated moral dilemmas behind about a president who lied about something that most people would consider to be private. His successor George W. Bush, however, brought the traditional political deception back, "relating to key matters of state, particularly those of war and peace", as a candidate who claimed that he would "tell the American people the truth," but as president who deceived whenever it suited his purpose (Ibid, p.296).

2.2 The Invasion of Iraq and "Bushspeak"

After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, George W. Bush administration practiced a "systematic politics of mass deception" based on hypocrisy and lies, to create policies and promote their agenda (Kellner, 2007, p.643). By early 2002, Bush was

facing difficulties, which would threaten his re-election, as the success of the war in Afghanistan was limited and the economy was failing. Thus the administration needed something dramatic that would guarantee re-election and that's where the discourses of the "axis of evil" and "war on terrorism" morphed into "an era of perpetual war against terrorism and the countries that support terror, a situation in which media spectacle was used to promote policies of unilateral aggression", and Saddam Hussein provided a viable symbol for these (Ibid, p. 632). On January 29 2002, in his State of Union address, Bush promised "epoch of Terror War" and expanded the doctrine of "war on terrorism" not only to terrorists and the countries who harbour them, but also to the countries which are making "weapons of mass destruction", a term that is pretty deceptive and misleading. The great hypocrisy of the Bush administration in here was that, the U.S. "has done more to develop and spread weapons of mass destruction than any other country and the Bush administration has systematically blocked all global efforts to limit, restrict, and cut back on existing weapons of all sorts" (Ibid, p. 632). On March 2003, Bush claimed in his address to the nation that the intelligence by the U.S. and several other governments –as the British Prime Minister of that time, Tony Blair, was no less involved in this scheme- "leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised", making it evident that the war against Iraq was at hand, as he was also repeatedly using "Saddam Hussein", "terrorism", "threat" for some time back in order to link Iraq with terrorism and 9/11 (Ibid, p. 635). As the rest is known, Iraq got invaded by the coalition forces led by the United States with the intend of "disarming Iraq of weapons of mass destruction", "freeing the people of Iraq" and "ending the Hussein's support for terrorism"; Bush got re-elected in 2004; the "non-existent" weapons of mass destruction were never found, more than a million Iraqis lost their lives due to the chaos resultant of the invasion, and the world came up against maybe one of the most blatant example of political hypocrisy and mendacity.

The hidden agenda of the Bush administration all along that process was to create a "major victory and symbolic triumph over terrorism in order to deflect attention from the failings of his regime both domestically and in the realm of foreign policy", for being re-elected (Ibid, p. 634). From the beginning, they created a "Big Lie" –that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, the invasion was a part of the war on terrorism

and was connected to 9/11- and kept telling it in the face of facts and counterevidence, "assuming that if you repeated a slogan or idea enough times the public would come to believe it, that words would become reality", just like the Nazis did (Ibid, p. 639). The Bush cabal had some elaborate support from outside with philosophical and theological justifications, where the German philosopher Leo Strauss who legitimated Plato's "Noble Lie" as a useful means to rule "ignorant masses" and who was also a supporter of Machiavelli and his understanding of power politics, has been frequently cited (Ibid, p. 641). These philosophical issues will be further scrutinised in the fourth chapter of this research.

2.3 WikiLeaks

Secrets –or state secrets- have been an integral part of the state apparatus and political manipulation, which can be traced back to the "Arcana Imperii" of the Roman Empire. Moreover, as it has such a central role, leaks and revelations have happened many times during history, like the incident of the "Pentagon Papers" in 70's. Governments also, contrary to a search for truth, often "engage in strategic leaking to rubbish political opponents, prepare the public for a change of policy, or take credit for events in which they actually played little part" (Quill, 2014, p. 125), like the Bush administration's disclosure of some selectively picked classified information to the press on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, in order to advance their hidden agendas. In this sense, WikiLeaks was something brand new and groundbreaking. It differed from previous leaks in the past, as firstly, it was the product of the new network age and technology, "one that, admittedly, poses distinct challenges to governments who wish to maintain control over their epistemic space" (Ibid, p.11); secondly, although it was novel, WikiLeaks still relied upon the "traditional organs of dissent" –the mainstream press, in other words- for circulation and the interpretation of the data which they possessed (Ibid, p.11). The leaks was an example of "stateless journalism" as they operated beyond legal restrictions and jurisdictions, by using "Internet Service Providers" that offered anonymity to the users.

WikiLeaks web site first hit the internet in December 2006, and released documents of that year concerning the planned assassination of Somali government officials. During 2008 elections in the U.S, the site published the vice presidential candidate

"Sarah Palin's address book, pictures, and screenshots of her e-mail inbox"; in October 2009, it posted "a list of names and addresses of people it claimed belonged to the British National Party" (Fildes, 2010), files about corruption in Peru's oil industry, financial corruption in Iceland's banking sector, and a narrowly averted nuclear accident in Iran (Quill, 2014, p.127), and again in that year, it was awarded an Amnesty International New Media Award; in 2010, this time "WikiLeaks leaked a report on itself that had been conducted by the Pentagon" which characterized the organization as "an information security threat", along with four other major leaks, with "an edited video of footage from a US Apache helicopter attacking and killing civilians, including two Reuters' journalists in Baghdad in July 2007" as being the most sensational one (Ibid, p.128). The site also hosted other controversial documents, such as "a copy of the Standard Operating Procedures for Camp Delta, a document that detailed restrictions placed on prisoners at Guantanamo Bay" (Fildes, 2010).

The key objectives of WikiLeaks can be summarised as using technology to empower ordinary citizens, leading a war on secrecy in order to promote transparency against "unaccountable governments who abuse their authority and engage in unjust wars" (Quill, 2014, p.126). In this sense, WikiLeaks can be seen as crucial to the functioning of a real democracy, as it stands for the public's "right to know", and aims to give the information necessary for an "enlightened citizenry", even if it means embarrassing governments and politicians.

What the leaks did was "unmasking the hypocrisy of governments", nevertheless, its success on influencing the public was limited, despite the shocking facts the site revealed. According to Quill, the reason for this was that "liberal democracy and hypocrisy are also fundamentally connected" and "liberal democracies exercise a form of hypocrisy that sustains government at the level of appearance and maintains legitimacy", thus the main achievement of Wikileaks is that it revealed hypocrisy "on a collective level" (Ibid, p.124-6). But, no matter how successful or not it was, it is for sure that WikiLeaks has opened a door to the age of transparency, which is being followed since then, as we can see in the case of Edward Snowden, where a former CIA employee revealed classified information from the United States National Security Agency in 2013; in Hillary Clinton's shared personal e-mails; and finally the National Intelligence (MIT) scandal in Turkey in 2015 which revealed that MIT

trucks were supplying weapons to Syria during the Syrian Civil War, resulted in the arrest of two Cumhuriyet newspaper editors and journalists Can Dündar and Erdem Gül, who were tried with "spying" and "divulging state secrets". Especially Snowden and MIT cases can be considered successors of WikiLeaks, as they all were "designed to upset the political order, threatening the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the demos" (Ibid, p.125) by revealing and returning the information, in other words truth, to the ones who really deserve it.

2.4 Conclusion

Throughout this chapter, it has been mentioned that politics and hypocrisy has always been seen interconnected throughout history in the eyes of the rulers, thinkers and public, and that this issue is still of importance in contemporary democratic politics both theoretically and factually. There are two opposite approaches on whether political hypocrisy can be justified; the advocates of hypocrisy claim that it is unavoidable due to the nature of politics and political relations, and it may even be necessary; whereas the anti-hypocrites claim that hypocrisy and any other kind of deception is at odds with transparency and inimical to democratic ideals, thus they need to be avoided at any costs. Although both these approaches have some rightful points, they are still problematic as they are viable to be taken to extremes, a lesson that is already taught in the examples of totalitarianism and the Reign of Terror. Besides, as they position themselves exactly against each other, cynicism and absolutism becomes a vicious circle, without being able to provide proper justifications.

 In order to show the relevancy and the significance of the issue at hand, prominent examples of political deception from recent past until today have been addressed, as citizens of modern democracies are disappointed –maybe even disgusted- by the untrustworthy politicians, and the feeling of distrust is wide spread in almost all the of democratic states around the world. This distrust and disappointment, unfortunately, is not an idle prejudice, but rather experiences acquired over time, for as it is seen, even a rather short period of time like few decades are filled with scandals and examples of barefaced political hypocrisy and mendacity, as it has been mentioned in the examples including the affairs from Watergate to Lewinsky. The process leading to the Invasion of Iraq, and the ground-breaking revelations of

WikiLeaks constitute the two most important cases of our decade, as the former is one of the most explicit and large scaled examples of blatant political deception after the "Big Lie" of the Nazis, while the latter consisted of the biggest global leaks of all times of the dirty secrets of governments all around the world, revealing their hypocrisies and lies to the citizens all around the world, opening the way to the search for truth, which is still being followed today.

3. HYPOCRISY: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

In the previous chapter, it has been mentioned that the role of hypocrisy in politics has been a long lasting matter of questions, one that draws interest both theoretically and factually, for citizens as much as thinkers. In order to build ideas on solid basis further in this research, it is of primary importance to define hypocrisy as a concept. What then, is hypocrisy? Our linguistic intuitions directly tell us that hypocrisy is morally condemned. But in order to see what makes hypocrisy morally wrong, or should it always be morally wrong needs a detailed analysis of the concept, for in order to distinguish salient features of actions and make moral judgments, concepts must be defined independently of controversial moral assumptions (Carson, 2010, p. 19). Thus, in this chapter, the term *hypocrisy* and its necessary conditions will be examined through conceptual analysis.

3.1 Hypocrisy

Hypocrisy is a ubiquitous concept which carries a strong negativity upon itself. Although it is ubiquitous, it is a difficult concept to put in certain boundaries and give a clear formula of it. The word hypocrisy implies a moral category, but its origins actually had nothing to do with morality. The roots of the word hypocrisy can be traced back to Ancient Greek word *hypokrisis*, which meant acting on a stage. Thus the word did not have any moral implications as it has today. Yet, this morally neutral Greek usage has an interesting link to our modern understanding of the notion, as the language of the theatre –namely, acting or pretending- still has its place in our discourse about hypocrisy (Szabados and Soifer, 2004, p. 1).

The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines hypocrisy as "the assuming of a false appearance of virtue or goodness, with dissimulation of real character or inclinations, especially in religious life or beliefs..." and hypocrite as "one who falsely professes to be virtuously or religiously inclined; one who pretends to have feelings or beliefs of a higher order than his real ones. . ." These definitions lead us to the "interior" (Furia, 2009, p. 115) account of hypocrisy, which is the most frequently used one by

a few philosophers who tried to analyse the concept. According to this account, hypocrisy always entails a deception of some kind (Runciman, 2008, p. 8). As there are different varieties of deception, the hypocritical deception may include "claims to knowledge that one lacks, claims to an identity that one does not hold, claims to a loyalty that one does not possess, or claims to a consistency that one cannot sustain" (Ibid, p. 8). The hypocrite is like an actor who pretends to be what she is not, saying things she does not mean, acting out parts to which she has only immediate allegiance (Szabados and Soifer, 2004, p. 1).

According to Hegel (2008) hypocrisy contained; a knowledge of the true universal, whether knowledge in the form merely of a feeling for right and duty; a volition of the particular which conflicts with this universal; a conscious comparison of both these moments, so that the conscious subject is aware in willing that his particular volition is evil in character. Yet these are not alone sufficient for characterizing a case of hypocrisy, but rather acting with a bad conscience. In hypocrisy there is also the formal aspect of untruth which holds up evil in the first place as good in the eyes of others, of setting oneself up to all appearance as good, virtuous, pious and so on, and the conduct in these circumstances is only to deceive others (p. 139-140).

Hypocrisy is also described as an individual's public statements of principle that do not coincide with her own "private" practices, where the duplicity lies in the attempt to separate off one's personal behaviour from the standards that hold for everyone else (Runciman, 2008, p.8). This "exterior" account of hypocrisy, "saying one thing in public and doing another in private" (Barden, Rucker and Petty, 2005, 1463) meaning of hypocrisy can also be called as "not practicing what you preach". This refers to the widespread gap between "political rhetoric and action, between personal profession and action, and between what people "pass" as and what they genuinely are" (Szabados and Soifer, 2004, p. xiv). In this sense, the hypocrite is the one who either explicitly or implicitly advocates principles that their behaviour contradicts, and who tries to advance her self-interest through this inconsistency.

It is not wrong to say that deception can never be completely absent from human life and practices, for it is a natural property of human capacity –along with secrecy and concealment, as much as it is a significant feature of the biosphere, which can be seen in the never-ending contest of "camouflage", "mimicry" and other forms of hiding the truth between predator and prey (Jay, 2010, p. 20). As humans evolved

into being both individual and communal at the same time, they needed contrary skills that allows both telling the truth and the ability to subvert it, and deceit persisted in spite of the disapproval against it (Ibid, p. 25). But there are huge differences between societies in the kinds of deceit that exist and the extent to which they are practiced (Bok, 1979, p. 179), thus it is hard to define hypocrisy by a single definition and this is the reason why it is a subjective concept and there is no agreement on its definition. Hypocrisy can also take different forms, depending on the deception it uses and the sphere it operates in. For example social hypocrisy arises in our everyday social life where manners and politeness are of importance and are subjected to social and moral rewards and penalties (Davidson, 2004, p. 8), whereas in the realm of politics, it takes the form of political hypocrisy to obtain power, as mentioned above.

According to these definitions of hypocrisy, the concept has at least four properties. First, hypocrisy entails *intentional* pretence and deception; second, hypocrisy is a *self-interested* affair; third, hypocrisy involves an element of *inconsistency*, which can be between one's words and deeds, pretended motives and real motives and so on; and finally, it contains *secrecy*, as it is a form of deception.

3.1.1 Hypocrisy and Deception

As mentioned above, the internal/pretence account of hypocrisy puts intentional deception at the centre of the concept, which makes sense, for questions about "truthfulness" and "deception" belong to the moral domain of intention. If someone intends to deceive, she says something that she believes to be false –or not true, with the intention to make someone else believe it to be true (Cliffe, Ramsay and Bartlett, 2000, p. 3). According to this, as hypocrisy always involves pretence or deception, we can say that all forms of hypocrisy are a kind of lie (Runciman, 2008, p. 9). But of course, it would be a mistake to assert that all lies are therefore hypocritical –lying about my grades to my parents is simply not hypocrisy.

Lies are false statements in the simplest form. But not all false statements are lies, such as the ones that occur when our memory makes an error or when we make a joke (Carson, 2010, p. 17). When we lie, we make false statements in order to deceive others and make them believe what we ourselves do not believe (Bok, 1979,

p. 14; Fallis, 2010, p. 1). Lying, then, is one of the many other parts of deception and in this sense, deception is a larger category.

Deception must be intentional, for one cannot deceive someone unintentionally. There is an important distinction between causing someone to have a false belief intentionally or unintentionally, and to mark this distinction, the term "mislead" can be useful. For the word "deceive" implies a stronger negative evaluation –namely, moral condemnation- than the word "mislead", for one can mislead someone without the intention to do so (Carson, 2010, p. 47). If an agent predicts the consequences or the effects of her act and still do it, we can talk about a case of "intention". In intentional deception, the agent -the deceiver or sender- predicts that another party -the deceived or receiver- is going to misperceive, not perceive, mispredict or not predict the consequences of her deceptive act (Mechner, 2010, p. 3). Also, when we deceive someone, we intentionally make her to believe or persist in believing something we believe to be false – or do not believe to be true (Carson, 2010, p. 50).

In this sense, deception differs from lying in two important respects; first, for lying one must make a false statement, however, deception does not require to make a false statement, or sometimes any statement at all. Second, the word deception implies success, unlike lying. If an act is going to be count as deception, it must cause someone to have false beliefs. Although some lies are deceptive, successfully deceiving someone is not the condition of lying (Ibid, p. 55).

In his short essay "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense", Nietzsche gives us an interesting point of view –just like he does in almost all of his works- on truth, lies and deception. According to him, "the art of dissimulation reaches its peak in man" and "deception, flattering, lying, deluding, talking behind the back, putting up a false front, living in borrowed splendour, wearing a mask, hiding behind convention, playing a role for others" and so on are the "rule and law among men", so much that it is almost unthinkable "how an honest and pure drive for truth could have arisen among them" (Nietzsche, 1979, p. 80). A liar, he claims, "is a person who uses the valid designations, the words, in order to make something which is unreal appear to be real". According to Nietzche Ibid),as the individual wants to keep herself against other individuals, she will naturally employ her intellect mainly for dissimulation, but also, she will feel the need to "exist socially and with the herd", and this is the first step for "the drive for truth"; "that is to say, a uniformly valid and binding

designation is invented for things, and this legislation of language likewise establishes the first laws of truth" (p. 80-81). But then, the question of "what truth is" needs to be answered. Nietzsche claims that, truth is "a movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms", "it is a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding". Therefore, they are "illusions which we have forgotten are illusions" (Ibid, p.84). In this sense, "truth" is nothing more than a "eudaemonic" invention of of fixed conventions for practical purposes such as "repose, security and consistency", and "for the maintenance of the human species" (Ibid, p. 86-93). Based on this, "truth" is actually grounded on deception and self-deception –about forgetting its origins, and thus "even our truth drives rest upon a foundation of lies" (Ibid, p. 96).

According to Eva Kittay (1982), hypocrisy is a "self-referential" deception, in which "one pretends to be better than she is, or pretends to hold beliefs, have feelings, motives or attitudes other than those one truly has or adheres to" (p. 278). The hypocrite is an "imposter", who feigns conformity to some positively valued norms, ideals or expectations in domains of life where sincerity really matters -e.g. piety, virtue, love and friendship (Ibid, p. 282). Thus, broadly speaking, hypocrisy entails the construction of a persona, which generates a false impression in the eyes of the deceived ones. In this sense, hypocrisy can be thought of as "the wearing of masks" (Runciman, 2008, p. 9). Arendt claims, that the duplicity of the hypocrite is different than the duplicities of the liar and the cheater, as the hypocrite, just like the ancient Greek play actor mentioned above, has to play her role –falsely pretending to virtue- as consistently as she can for the sake of play-acting (Arendt, 2006, p. 93).

This account shows hypocrite as a cynical and evil character, who intentionally deceives others around her by seemingly endorsing religious, moral, political ideals of their society, and yet she violates these by her own actions or beliefs. But the motives of the hypocrite need not always be out of her malice. Many people conceal aspects of their true natures simply because it is the easy option, and one that may even be required by basic standards of social conformity (Ibid, p. 11). In some cases hypocrisy might even be a necessary response to unjust situations, where individuals try to "pass" as something they are actually not, out of the intolerance around them – like homosexuals trying to pass as heterosexuals (Szabados and Soifer, 2004, p. xvi).

Although this kind of hypocrisy benign and excusable, this does not change the fact that it is still hypocrisy. This moral dimension of hypocrisy will be touched upon further in the upcoming chapter.

We saw that, in the standard account, the act of hypocrisy is based on fully conscious and intentional other-deception. But is it possible for the hypocrite to be self-deceived? Does hypocrisy involve self-deception as well as other-deception?

Self-deception is a situation in which a subject is motivated to believe p in spite of strong evidence to the contrary (Statman, 1997, p. 58). According to Statman (Ibid), the standard account of hypocrisy, which he calls the "dichotomous view", puts hypocrisy and self-deception in an opposite relation, for the hypocrite consciously constructs a mask and put it on whenever they interact with those people whose approbation they seek. Thus awareness is essential for hypocrisy (p. 60). But Statman rejects this view by claiming both self-deception and hypocrisy lead to each other. He claims self-deception leads to hypocrisy, for deceiving oneself is closely connected to deceiving others, and since the deception of others is essential to hypocrisy, hypocrisy and self-deception are much close than the dichotomous view assumes. Secondly, since the hypocrite is committed to egoism and aims to get benefits by pretending to hold values, she tries to get what she wants from the easy way, without putting so much effort. According to Statman (Ibid), calculating your every move to deceive others and being fully aware all the time is exhausting, therefore self-defeating to the hypocrite's fundamental purpose. In this case, the best thing to do for the hypocrite to "forget their real beliefs and values, and take the moral or religious game seriously", thus the hypocrite needs self-deception, to get into the character she portrays and persuade us (p. 62).

Although both Szabados and McKinnon give intentional deception a crucial role in their analyses, they also leave some possibility the hypocrite to be self-deceived, and like Statman they take the self-deception of the hypocrite to be the part of the strategy to deceive others. Szabados and Soifer use self-deception to explain the cases "in which people are genuinely surprised to learn that they have been hypocritical, without thereby conceding that there can be cases of hypocrisy that do not involve deception" (Szabados and Soifer, 2004, p. 256). In a similar vein, McKinnon claims that some hypocrites might be "quite unself-conscious about the

extent to which they misrepresent their real reasons for acting" (McKinnon, 2002, p. 719).

However, if we are to take deception as a necessary condition of hypocrisy, the self-deception accounts seem problematic. For as Carson stated above, one cannot deceive someone else unintentionally. We can mislead someone by causing them to have false beliefs, but this need not be intentional or hypocritical (Carson, 2010, p. 49). If the hypocrite herself is unconscious about their real reasons for acting as McKinnon claims, to what extend then she is a hypocrite? Or if the hypocrite deceives herself about the moral values and reasons she holds, to make her hypocrisy perfect, can we still talk about a case of hypocrisy, since the hypocrite will lose her orientation about her real motives. Not necessarily. As Runciman states; "the least one can say for the nastier kind of hypocrites is that they are not self-deceived" (Runciman, 2008, p. 11). As the main purpose of this thesis is to scrutinize the relationship between hypocrisy and politics which is a considerably rational realm of power struggles, strategic actions, and improvisations according to the ever-changing circumstances and so on, hypocrisy is taken to be an intentional and self-conscious act. Self-deception might be involved in some cases of hypocrisy, but it is not a necessary condition. In other words, as Hegel states; "When self-consciousness pretends, to others only, that its action is good, this form is that of hypocrisy" (Hegel, 2008, p. 150).

3.1.2 Hypocrisy and Self-Interest

Taking hypocrisy to be a deceptive affair and the hypocrite to be someone who wears a "mask" in order to dissimulate, the question "why the hypocrite wants to deceive us?" should be asked. Self-interest can be defined basically as the satisfaction of one's "self-regarding" desires. In this sense, by deceiving people with her false appearance of being trustworthy or virtuous, the hypocrite aims to promote her own advantage at the expense of others. Therefore, someone who deceives others for their own good and well-being is not a hypocrite. For example, we cannot call a doctor hypocrite when she gives a fake pill to her patient to make her feel better. In this sense, the use of deception to gain an unmerited self-interested reward is crucial for hypocrisy (Szabados and Soifer, 2004, p. 166). As the hypocrite is insincere in just those domains where sincerity really matters, deceiving us by being insincere, the

hypocrite aims to gain unmerited self-reward. Thus hypocrisy is a self-interested affair (Ibid, p. 166). What all hypocrites share is the pretence of virtue, idealism, or sympathetic concern used to further selfish ends (Grant, 1997, p. 1). It must be stated that the hypocrite need not be a single person. The agent might as well be a group, for example a ruling elite, which deceives the people they rule for its own interest.

But the hypocrite need not always be a ruthless egoist and pursue her own self-interest. For example; a father who tries to have a good friendship with his son's coach to ensure his son's place in the team is a hypocrite, but he is not pursuing his own benefit in an egoistic way. Yet even in this case, in trying to be a good father and making his son happy, there is still an element of an internal satisfaction, even if it is not purely egoistic, which still makes hypocrisy a self-interested affair. This example shows us that the unmerited gain the hypocrite tries to obtain might be external benefits like good jobs in public offices, as well as internal benefits like the joy of being accepted, cared, loved and so on (Statman, 1997, p. 62). Yet these benefits seem harder to detect in the cases of hypocrisy compared to the external benefits. The difficulty of the notion of self-interest –both theoretically and practically- is that it is usually quite subjective as the needs and desires of every individual are different from each other. On the other hand, short-term interests and long-term interests are mostly at odds with each other and unpredictable –especially in politics-, a controversy which makes an objective evaluation and definition quite difficult.

An important point to make here is that "in order to get unmerited glory or escape some deserved reproaches", the hypocrite uses "the standards and judgments that compromise our system of morality. Thus, the hypocrite "is the one who desires to be judged more favourably than she deserves to be, according to the prevailing standards" (McKinnon, 1991, p. 322-323). This means the hypocrite needs the existence of a social context and a moral system to operate in. As Statman states; "Robinson Crusoe could not have been a hypocrite because he did not operate within a social context: there was no-one around to deceive" (Statman, 1997, p. 58).

3.1.3 Hypocrisy and Inconsistency

Consistency is an essential element of any moral theory or argument, for if they cannot produce consistent judgments about whether an action is right or wrong –as it

cannot be both at the same time- they simply fail and lose their cogency. If a theory of "right conduct" implies inconsistent claims about the morality of a particular action, it cannot give us a correct account of the nature of morality (Timmons, 2013, p. 12). The same goes for individuals as moral agents; we are expected to be consistent with our thoughts and actions in both of our public and private lives, if we are to participate in healthy relations, be judged and evaluated morally and be found trustworthy.

As mentioned above, the exterior definition of hypocrisy is, to put simply, not practicing what you preach. The two components that make up this kind of hypocrisy are the public saying element and the private doing element. While the "saying element" is the public communication of a personal standard, the "doing" element of hypocrisy is a behaviour that is inconsistent with the personal standard established in the statement and is hidden from the public eye (Barden, Rucker & Petty, 2005, p. 1463). According to Shklar (1984), the gap between word and deed constitutes the essence of hypocrisy, especially in political arena, where people have no shared commitments to debate their positions, and motivated only by attacking their opponents' moral and political prestige. The contempt for hypocrisy becomes their only common ground that remains (p. 79-81).

Dan Turner, also becomes distant to the deception account of hypocrisy by making the feature of disparity or conflict the essential core of the concept. According to Turner (1990), every disparity or conflict requires opposing sides. Thus "words vs. deeds, pretended beliefs vs. genuine beliefs, beliefs vs. desires" seem appropriate forms to generate hypocrisy. Turner calls such pairs as "disparity pairs" (p. 265). But any disparities will not do; firstly, the disparity pair involved in hypocrisy must express values. Secondly, the disparity must be attributable to a single individual, for "only conflicts and disparities between the words and deeds (e.g.) of the same person" (Ibid, p. 265). Contrary to Kittay, Turner claims that, the wrongness of hypocrisy cannot be located in insincerity, for some hypocrisies do not involve insincerity. The only thing wrong with hypocrisy is the disparity in it. But contrary to Turner who claims the inconsistency account of hypocrisy need not entail deception, therefore deception is not a necessary condition of hypocrisy, I think inconsistency between one's for example pretended beliefs and genuine beliefs does indeed entail

deception, for otherwise she would not need to hide her real beliefs if she didn't have the intention to deceive, even in cases of self-protection.

Either we take hypocrisy as the OED definition which characterizes it as "dissimulation, pretence or sham", or "not practicing what you preach", there is the element of inconsistency in both cases. In the standard definition, the inconsistency can be between the hypocrite's real motives and internal motives, the values she pretends to hold and the values she really holds, or in not practicing what you preach, the inconsistency can be between one's words or and deeds etc. Inconsistency also leads to another kind of hypocrisy that is regularly seen in the realm of democratic politics, which is blame, where one blames another of being a hypocrite because of the inconsistency between one's words and deeds, where the critic herself is worse than the criticized (Crisp and Cowton, 1994, p. 344).

3.1.3.1 Hypocrisy and Weakness of Will

Until now, following the analyses above, the concept of hypocrisy is understood roughly as the pretending to be better than one really is, by falsely endorsing moral, religious or political ideals to deliberately deceive others in order to gain undeserved rewards. According to some, hypocritical action also involves a mismatch between what someone does and what she advocates. But as McKinnon states, weak willed actions also involve a similar kind of inconsistency (McKinnon, 2005, p. 400). What is then, the difference between hypocrisy and weakness of will?

According to McKinnon (Ibid), "a weak-willed action is preceded by an "internal struggle" before and agent succumbs to temptation and finds herself acting for reasons she does not endorse". Weak-willed action involves neither a lack of character nor vicious dispositions. It is a failure of the practical reason to engage the agent's will (p. 400). For example, the father who tells his son not to smoke because it is unhealthy, but still continues to smoke is not a hypocrite, but rather seems to suffer a weakness of his will. This element of failing to resist the temptation is the reason, according to McKinnon, that while hypocrites are the objects of condemnation, weak-willed agents are often the objects of "pity". However, although it doesn't have any demonic dimension, McKinnon warns us that weakness of will is still aberrant, and a weak- willed action "may be followed by a hypocritical attempt on the part of an agent to cover it up or to justify it". If the agent fails to resist the

temptation too frequently, the honesty of her commitments will become questionable (Ibid, p. 401).

3.1.3.2 Hypocrisy and Changes of Mind

Another kind of inconsistency that needs to be distinguished from hypocrisy is changes of mind. As a result of their experiences, agents can realize that their prior assessments need reconsideration and modification. Thus after this process of reconsideration and motivation, they can change their minds and act in ways contrary to they used to before, and there is nothing hypocritical in doing so. But as in weakness of will, there is a possibility of shifting to hypocrisy in changes of mind. As McKinnon states, "if an agent's concern remains with protecting or enhancing her moral reputation instead of with seriously trying to understand what dispositions to inculcate to lead a good human life, then it would seem we have a case of hypocrisy" (Ibid, p. 404).

Béla Szabados too, distinguishes changes of mind from hypocrisy, while admitting "that there can be changes of mind without hypocrisy, hypocrisy without changes of mind, and also cases in which there is both a change of mind and hypocrisy". According to Szabados and Soifer (1999), there are two structural differences between the concepts; first, "changes of mind require an inconsistency involving different times, whereas hypocrisy seems able to exist at a single time", and "hypocrisy seems to require the presence of an audience whose esteem is desired, in a way changes of the mind does not" (p. 66).

3.1.4 Hypocrisy and Secrecy

As mentioned in section (2.1.1) hypocrisy is a form of deception, in the broad sense that saying something that one believes to be false –or not true, with the intention to make someone else believe it to be true. The hypocrite is an imposter who puts on a mask –in accordance with the Greek origins of the term- and constructs a persona through it in order to create a false appearance in the eyes of the deceived. And the mask she wears always "conceals" something behind it such as the real self, real motives, real beliefs and emotions and so on. Thus, an act of hypocrisy needs to have a certain amount of secrecy, either about the deceiver's ulterior motives or the principles –moral, social, political- she believes in privately while pretending to endorse others publicly. As Sissela Bok puts it, "all deception involve keeping

something secret" about which one wishes to deceive others, however, "while all deception requires secrecy, all secrecy is not meant to deceive" (Bok, 1983, p. 7), for example someone might keep a secret of a friend or something about her life that no other needs to or supposed to know –which is privacy- without having the intention deceive at all. This need for concealment is one of the points which differentiates hypocrisy from lying as well, as lies may involve saying something false in the face of facts and evidences –which is called blatant lie- while without concealment and duplicity, hypocrisy cannot take place; Secrecy is exactly the reason why hypocrisy cannot be detected until the mask of the hypocrite slips off accidentally or intentionally.

3.1.5 Conclusion

In the beginning of this chapter, two definitions of hypocrisy have been given; the first one is the interior account which is simply pretending to have virtues or goodness which we don't have and hiding our real motives to show ourselves better than we really are, and the second is the exterior account which is saying one thing in public and doing another in private, or not practicing what we preach. These definitions lead us to at least four necessary conditions of hypocrisy.

First of all, hypocrisy entails deception. Either from her malice or because it is an easier way to reach what she desires, the hypocrite puts on a mask and creates a persona by falsely attending to virtue and goodness to deceive others, and thereby hides her real motives. Therefore the hypocrite needs the existence of a social context, for hypocrisy is a matter of interrelations. And as hypocrisy takes place in the realms where honesty, sincerity and integrity matters, such as morality, interpersonal relationships, religion and politics, it needs a moral system to operate in. Secondly, hypocrisy is a self-interested or, to put it in another way, interest oriented affair. The hypocrite intends to gain unmerited gain or avoid deserved sanctions. As mentioned above, even if the hypocrite is not a cynical and ruthless egoist, her hypocrisy is still a means to reach some ends, or so to say some benefits. These benefits need not directly be about the hypocrite's self-interest, nor need they always be external and tangible. Thirdly, hypocrisy always involves an element of inconsistency. The inconsistency can be between one's words and deeds, actions and thoughts, pretended beliefs and genuine beliefs and so on. But we cannot call all

inconsistencies of this kind as hypocrisy, since one always can change her mind or have a weak will to do what she knows to be the right thing to do. And finally, hypocrisy has to involve secrecy, for in order to be able to dissimulate or pretend, the hypocrite needs to conceal her real self or beliefs and so on behind her mask. Given these definitions and properties of moral hypocrisy, it can be said that it is not the only type of hypocrisy, as there other types which appear in different realms –yet transitive between each other- such as "social hypocrisy" also appearing in the social realm in the form of "politeness and manners", and political hypocrisy, the main subject of this research, which will be scrutinized in the following chapters.

4. HYPOCRISY AND MORALITY

Since antiquity, hypocrisy –not the word we use today, but the act itself- has been subjected to questions of morality and a strong negative evaluation. In Plato's Republic Book II, through a long discussion about what justice is, Glaucon challenges Socrates by claiming "people act justly unwillingly" and the only reason they act justly and conform with the laws of morality is because "they will gain good reputation" as a result, and they are right to do so (358c-361d). What Glaucon favours for challenging Socrates has strong resemblances to the internal definition of hypocrisy as it implies a false appearance and the dissimulation of real motives. Hypocrisy is seen as a clear manifestation of a "corrupt" character, for a hypocrite is generally regarded as morally corrupt (Statman, 1997, p. 57). As Shklar (1984) puts it, for those who put hypocrisy first, it is the only unforgivable sin, it is inexcusable even for the ones who can justify any other vice (p. 45). It was the hypocrites, who accommodated the deepest circle of hell in Dante's *Inferno*, seen as "painted people" sentenced to wear golden gilded robes lined with lead inside, referring to their duplicity (Canto XXIII). When we consider the play-acting link attached to the concept, coming from Ancient Greek, we think of the hypocrite as someone who wears a mask and plays a role to deceive others. Interestingly, however, we praise the real actor as her acting gets more compelling, whereas we condemn the unmasked hypocrite as her hypocrisy gets more convincing. What then brings hypocrisy its moral condemnation? Why it cannot be neglected and why the ones who put hypocrisy first, tend to see it everywhere?

Hypocrisy is understood to be a moral failing. Hypocrites try to appear moral or virtuous, while trying to avoid the cost of actually being moral or virtuous, if possible. Therefore, as mentioned in the previous chapter (3.1.1), hypocrisy is a deceptive act. It is understood as "a form of deception in service of one's own selfish interests" (Szabados and Soifer, 2004, p. xii). As the hypocrite knows that her moral character is not as she publicly presents it to be, if she takes pleasure either from her own vice or others' false beliefs about it, or both, her hypocrisy is a "pure vice"

(Hurka, 2001, p. 96). In this sense, the morally blameworthiness of hypocrisy in our common-sense morality firstly lies in insincerity, as "the hypocrite is insincere in just those domains where sincerity really matters"-like religion, interpersonal relations, politics and so on- and as she injures the deceived by her "violation of trust" (Kittay, 1982, p. 282-6). By undermining trust, hypocrisy questions an important element of our social well-being on one hand, and damages our ability to make moral judgments about other people on the other (Szabados and Soifer, 2004, p. xii). According to Szabados and Soifer (Ibid), the hypocrite exploits the gap between appearing and being by manipulating the evidence to their own advantage and to others' disadvantage, and thus sabotage the reliability of the evidence on which we base our judgments (p. 8).

Another reason for the morally blameworthiness of hypocrisy is that by being insincere and deceiving us, the hypocrite aims to gain unmerited self-reward. Thus, hypocrisy is also a self-interested act. This is the second point where in our common sense, hypocrisy clashes with morality, and thus, condemned. For morality, imposes some restraints upon self-interest, sometimes even require people to sacrifice their own advantage in order to exercise a virtue or a moral rule (Szabados and Soifer, 2004, p. 203-205). Finally, the hypocrite uses our society's accepted moral norms to construct a persona that generates a false impression (Runciman, 2008, p. 9), and by dissimulating in this moral domain and deceiving, she abuses the core of inter-action and communality, plays us for a fool and "mocks" both us and our moral system (Statman, 1997, p. 60). Our moral tradition condemns hypocrisy and sees it harmful not only towards its victims, but towards the very moral fabric itself. Prophets like Jesus or Mohammad, the divines like Dante, or the strict absolutists like Kant looked on it as a source of moral corruption (Soifer and Szabados, 1998, p. 175).

Although, for the reasons stated above, the act of hypocrisy carries a strong moral condemnation upon itself in our common-sense understanding, the relation between hypocrisy and morality, and should hypocrisy always be seen as morally culpable under any circumstances needs further philosophical and ethical investigation. For despite the fact that it is ranked high on the list of objectionable human behaviors or characteristics, it still can be quite innocuous or even desirable in some circumstances (Alicke, Gordon and Rose, 2013, p.675). Therefore the rest of this chapter is going to be dealing with the conceptions about the necessity of moral

principles –generalism vs. particularism- and different moral camps –principles- and their implications on the moral status of hypocrisy.

4.1 Moral Generalism and Particularism

The moral theories which will be intoduced and surveyed in this chapter in accordance with their perspectives on hypocrisy all feature moral principles that indicate the rightness or wrongness of the features of actions subjected to their evaluation. All these theories are considered to be versions of what is called "moral generalism" in the sense that they give general moral principles "an ineliminable role in understanding morality, particularly when it comes to explaining why particular actions have the deontic status they do" (Timmons, 2013, p. 305). In this regard, they rely on two fundamental kinds of moral principles; decisive principles and defeasible principles.

Decisive principles are the ones that include "all-encompassing" generalizations, like the utility principle in utilitarianism or the categorical imperatives in deontology, which are to be discussed in the upcoming sections. The reason they are called decisive principles is that they "set forth conditions that provide considerations which, when present, decide the deontic status of an action", and the are all-encompassing for they "refer to actions generally and purport to explain what makes any action right or wrong" (Ibid, p. 306). In contrast to decisive principles are the "defeasible principles", which are the principles of "prima facie duty" –featured in W. D. Ross' moral theory- that "specify some action type that provides a moral reason either for or against a course of action, but one that may be overridden by competing moral reasons" (Ibid, p. 306). Hence, the main difference between decisive and defeasible principles is that the latter, by allowing the moral reasons of the principles can be overridden by other moral reasons, is allowing "exceptions" – while still acknowledging "principle guidance as a method of moral deliberation, choice, and action" (Ibid, p. 319).

Moral particularism, on the other hand, challenges and rejects the basic assumption of moral generalism –and traditional moral theories- which has been mentioned above, namely, the need to appeal to moral principles in order to explain the deontic status of particular actions properly. Moral particularists also claim that it is not possible "to specify once and for all those features that are always going to be

relevant in determining the rightness or wrongness of an action" (Ibid, p. 305). In accordance with these claims, particularism asserts two prominent theses opposed to the central place that moral generalism gives to moral principles, called as "principle eliminativism" and "principle abstinence". Principle eliminativism claims that "there are no correct or true moral principles that represent moral criteria and are needed to explain the deontic status of particular actions", while principle abstinence claims that "a morally committed agent who wants to come to correct verdicts about particular cases and act accordingly should not rely on moral principles for guidance" (Ibid, p. 306-307). It must be stated that particularists, just like generalists, accept the genuine difference between good or bad and right and wrong. Their crucial difference is, however, that they reject the need for subsuming an action under a moral principle, in order to explain its deontic status. They also claim that, relying on "absolute" and general moral principles is liable to distort our thinking about the particular cases that actions take place and thus "mislead us in our efforts to arrive at correct moral verdicts about right and wrong, good and bad" (Ibid, p.307). Moral knowledge, in this regard, can be derived from a moral sensitivity, namely, a developed capacity for "discernment", which "allows one to respond to morally relevant details of particular cases without reliance on moral principles or rules" (Ibid, p. 307).

Throughout this chapter and this thesis in general, moral generalism –and thus classic moral theories- will be preferred to moral particularism, due to various reasons. First of all, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, morality means imposing contraints on our desires and choices, and in order to have constraints, there is a need for moral rules or principles, for which we might even need to abandon our self-interests. Secondly, as mentioned in the previous chapter (3.1.3), consistency is an essential element of moral thinking and judgment, and as an action cannot be right and wrong at the same time due to this need for consistency, the same features in those acts need to be the same reasons wherever they occur –which is one of the basic assumptions of generalism called "the universal relevance thesis"- (Ibid, p. 309). Thirdly, the particularist thesis of principle abstinence is more prone to "special pleading" –when a person makes moral exceptions for herself in her own favour- than the principle guidance, for "a principled person is more likely to resist engaging in special pleading compared to a person who recognizes that procedural fairness

may be morally relevant and count against some course of action as a mere rule of thumb" (Ibid, p. 324). Finally, moral principles cannot be left aside so easily, for they do not only come to our minds consciously when thinking about a moral choice, but unconsciously as well as we internalize them throughout our development as individuals and moral agents. In this regard, one cannot completely escape from the domain of moral principles, even when she claims that she is not bound to any particular moral theory or principle.

It must be acknowledged, however, that even if generalism overcomes particularism both theoretically and practically for the reasons stated above, moral particularism does point out an important issue in generalism, that is "the perils of a kind of overly rigid principle-guidance that can blind one to the subtleties of our moral lives". For in our complex modern societies based on plurality in their almost every aspect and especially in politics, too much motivation for following moral principles so strictly and strongly in order to resist special pleading –and being corrupted, in a way- which might result in distortion of our moral judgments when we are confronted with good reasons for "modifying our princples" can become a serious predicament for the agent. As it will be seen in the following sections, although hypocrisy is a morally condemned act, absolutist approaches will find it difficult to deal with benign examples of hypocrisy as exceptions, like in the case of "victim hypocrisy". In this regard, being open to the possibilities of exceptions while still being committed to certain principles –namely, defeasiblle principles- is important, especially when dealing with slippery acts like hypocrisy.

4.2 Consequentialist Perspectives on Hypocrisy

Similar to lying, two opposing moral camps can be positioned on hypocrisy; on the one side, harsh absolutists or deontologists, who condemns all kinds of lies and deception as an intrinsic evil to be avoided under any circumstances, and consequentialists, who are concerned with the practical results of these acts, either good or bad (Jay, 2010, p. 48). Henceforward, the relation between different consequentialist perspectives such as ethical egoism, utilitarianism, virtue ethics and their probable evaluations of hypocrisy will be examined, and then, will move to the opposing camp and examine the relation between deontology –absolutism- and hypocrisy.

4.2.1 Ethical Egoism and Hypocrisy

As stated above, we think of morality as something which sometimes requires individuals to sacrifice their own interests for the benefit of others. Thus, morality clashes with our selfish self-interests. We have a tendency to praise altruists and condemn egoists, for egoists, unlike altruists, are primarily concerned with their well-being and interests. Sometimes, they might take their selfishness up to a point that, just like the hypocrite, they might use and take advantage of others for their own ends. To put it simply, descriptive egoism, which is also called "psychological egoism", holds that people are basically selfish, and primarily pursue their own self-interest. It is a descriptive assertion how people behave and why they do what they do (MacKinnon, 2014, p. 67-68).

Keeping this argument in mind, we are, then, confronted with a question; "should we be motivated by self-interest or should we be concerned with the well-being of others"? According to ethical egoism, as a normative theory, it is sufficient for an action to be morally right, if it maximizes one's own self-interest. Thus, ethical egoism claims that it is good for people to pursue their own self-interests (Ibid, p. 69). In this sense, ethical egoism differs from both other consequentialist moral theories and deontology in content. For utilitarianism, deontology, or our common-sense morality requires us to give importance to the interests of others, sometimes even to sacrifice our own interests if the gain of others is too great, or in other words, for the greater good (Shaver, 2015).

Ethical egoists claim that, however, egoism generates many of the same duties to others, for in order to achieve our self-interested ends, we need the cooperation of others. Thus, differing from psychological egoism, ethical egoism claims that acting selfishly and acting in our own interest are not the same. Self-interest has to be understood more broadly and more concerned with the long-term outcomes. If one wants to attain her long-term interests such as a satisfactory career, self-respect, good health, good friends and family, she eventually would need to avoid short-sighted selfishness (MacKinnon, 2014, p. 70). As MacKinnon states, the idea is not that people sometimes or always act in their own self-interests, rather, the only thing that ultimately motivates people is their self-interests (Ibid, p. 71). In other words, just like in the saying "I'll scratch your back, if you scratch mine", to achieve our ends

which we cannot get by ourselves, we need to give something to others in order to get their cooperation in return.

In this sense, caring for others and doing good to them would not be for their sake, but rather for our sake, thus we would be able to call on them, when they are needed. This is the exact point where hypocrisy gets into the picture, for we would not actually need to be concerned about others, but only to appear to be concerned (Ibid, p. 70). And as mentioned above, the hypocrite is the one who wants to achieve her selfish ends by deceiving us through her pretence and insincerity. Therefore, if we take an egoist moral stand point, which recommends us to pursue our self-interests, then it would be difficult to find hypocrisy morally culpable, even though it is against our common-sense morality.

Although the egoist, self-serving hypocrite is condemned by our common-sense morality, another question arises; are all hypocrites ruthless deceivers and egoists, who put their self-interest above anything else and use morality as a means to their selfish ends? What if the morality in the society we live is corrupt -for example Nazi Germany? Or what if our life is in danger, if we do not submit to certain religious or moral codes of our community -for example an atheist in a radically religious community? Can the hypocrite still be condemned? In these kind of cases, referring to Kittay, we can speak of "victim hypocrisy". Here hypocrisy appears to be yet another form of self-protection in a hostile environment, and whatever the moral condemnation attached to hypocrisy is, it is greatly diminished (Kittay, 1982, p. 288). Still, it must be stated that even in the instances of self-protection and self-preservation, these are still exceptional and according to Kittay (Ibid), if the victim hypocrite continues to conform with the present moral and social system, when there is a possibility of a change arises, then her hypocrisy again will be morally culpable (p. 288). And again, we see a conflict between egoism and altruism, when the victim prefers to conform, rather than sacrificing herself for the greater good.

4.2.2 Utilitarianism and Hypocrisy

Like egoism, utilitarianism is also a form of consequentialism. It focuses on the consequences of our actions. But while egoism focuses on an action's consequences for its agent, utilitarianism focuses on the consequences for all people effected by that action. Utilitarians take into account the general happiness of everyone, with the

goal of maximizing the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Utilitarians do not consider actions or policies as good or bad in themselves, for them, the goodness or badness of an action is rather a function of its consequences (MacKinnon, 2014, p. 92-93).

What then, makes an action good or bad? Or, does a good end justify an objectionable means, as it is in the classic Machiavellian sense? According to utilitarianism, an action is good as they tend to promote happiness, and bad as they tend to produce pain. For according to the father of the utilitarian tradition, Jeremy Bentham, pleasure and pain are the two masters of mankind, and it was in our nature to seek pleasure and try to avoid pain, and that this "happiness principle" applies equally to all individuals and their actions (Shapiro, 2003, p. 18). From the utilitarian perspective, to determine if an action or means is morally acceptable, we need to compare the benefits and costs of each alternative, and try to seek the cumulative happiness of the number of people who are going to be effected by that action, rather than our own pleasures or pains. Whichever has the greater net happiness or pleasure is the best alternative. If the consequences of the action is good, then the end justifies the means. For as mentioned above, utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory and holds that it is the consequences of our actions that determine whether particular means to them are justified (MacKinnon, 2014, p. 95-99). Shapiro claims that, classical utilitarianism is actually a radically consequentialist doctrine; even if an act or policy involves grave harm for some, perhaps even death, it is not a reason to object if the net effect maximizes total utility (Shapiro, 2003, p. 26).

Following these premises, what utilitarianism would say about the moral status of hypocrisy? In the case of hypocrisy, the problem for consequentialism is that the hypocrite tries to conceal her true beliefs, and often does so by doing things which have good consequences (Soifer and Szabados, 1998, p. 169). Kittay, for example, gives the example of the sexist employer, who believes by heart that women are inferior to men, but still hires a woman instead for a vacancy which is traditionally a man's position. He does this to impress a woman with his "open-mindedness" (Kittay, 1982, p. 277). And what is morally wrong about his hypocrisy, if it produces good consequences? If the end justifies the means, then hypocrisy, lying, or any other kind of deception seem to be justifiable, or so to say, morally acceptable, as long as they maximize the overall happiness of the ones who are effected by the

particular case. In other words, sometimes acting hypocritically can be moral, if it results in the best consequences of any available alternative. As it is seen, from a utilitarian perspective, hypocrisy is not a moral problem, let alone being an unforgivable sin or a vice, so long as it results in a greater amount of pleasure over pain. Therefore utilitarianism may approve hypocrisy, and this does not match with the moral condemnation attached to hypocrisy by our common-sense morality.

This problem of doing morally questionable things such as acting hypocritically, lying, manipulating, breaking promises and so on, has always been a topic under consideration from a political perspective as well, from Plato's "noble lie" to Machiavelli's ruthless realism, and to the controversy about the problem of "dirty hands", which can be centralized over the question of "can it be right to do wrong?" (De Wijze, 2007, p. 3). Against the criticisms raised to the justification of morally questionable acts, contemporary utilitarians generally focus of rule utilitarianism, which states that an act's consequences should be considered as if that is performed as a general practice. Act utilitarianism, on the other hand, states that the consequences of every act ought to be considered separately (MacKinnon, 2014, p. 101).

4.2.3 Virtue Ethics and Hypocrisy

Contrary to egoism and utilitarianism, virtue ethics asks how we ought to be, rather than how we ought to act or what we ought to do. It is concerned with the traits of character which make us a good person. According to virtue ethics, if we focus on virtues and base our morality on them, it will encourage us to develop good traits and dispose the bad ones, in other words, to develop virtues and eliminate vices (MacKinnon, 2014, p. 150). Unlike utilitarianism, virtue ethics holds happiness and pleasure as different things. According the Aristotle, who is the founder of virtue ethics, happiness –eudaimonia- was achieved throughout a virtuous and purposeful life, thus it was something different than the ordinary pleasure we obtain in our everyday activities.

From the perspective of virtue ethics, the moral life is about developing a good character, determining the ideals for human life, and trying to apply these ideals in our own lives. And the virtues are the ways in which we embody this ideals (Ibid, p. 151). These virtues –such as honesty, generosity, courage etc. - conduct us to act

well, and they are learned by repetition. If we practice honesty and generosity, we become even more honest and generous. Thus, it becomes easier to become virtuous, as we repeat our virtuous acts, just like training for a sport or practicing a musical instrument to become better at them. But the same system applies to the opposite of the virtues too, which are vices. A person who lies again and again will eventually find it easy to lie after a while, rather than being honest and telling the truth. This is the first point where hypocrisy will be condemned, from a virtue ethics perspective. For as the hypocrite dissimulates and deceives people to achieve her selfish ends, her character becomes more corrupt, and it will become more and more difficult for her to do what is right every time as she gets used to get what she wants from a short way without making a real effort, sacrifices or going through pain –just like the saying; no pain no gain.

Secondly, according to Aristotle, doing the correct thing is truly virtuous only if it is done for "the right reason" or for the sake of "what is noble" (Szabados and Soifer, 1998, p. 563). But, as we stated before, hypocrite is the one who is motivated by her selfish self-interests. She deceives us by looking moral or virtuous while she is not, thus try to "look better than she really is" (Kittay, 1982, p. 281), in order to gain unmerited rewards. Therefore the hypocrite is, then, someone who does the right thing, but for the wrong reasons, for she is in a pursuit for her self-interest. In this sense, it can be said that hypocrisy is morally condemnable from the virtue ethics perspective. The hypocrite uses the appearance of morality to promote self-serving ends, whereas for the moral person being moral is the ultimate end at the end of the day (Szabados and Soifer, 1998, p. 564).

4.3 Deontological Perspective on Hypocrisy

In the first section, we have seen egoism, utilitarianism and virtue ethics as different versions of consequentialism, and their possible perspectives on the moral status of hypocrisy. Even though they have differences among each other, they were all concerned about the consequences of actions, either for the agent herself -egoism and virtue ethics- or the entire people who are effected by that act -utilitarianism. In contrast to consequentialism, absolutism or deontological ethics focuses on duties or, in other words, obligations, things we ought to do under any circumstances and regardless of consequences. For according to absolutists like Kant, whose name is

almost identified with deontological ethics, morality consists of a set of exception less rules. Kant claimed that the commands of ethics were certain, clear and without any exception. While utilitarianism focuses on creating the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, deontology focuses on what makes us worthy of happiness (MacKinnon, 2014, p. 111-112).

According to Kant, there were no guarantee that acting in order to get a particular result would actually cause the intended consequence (Jay, 2010, p. 70). Thus, an act has moral worth only if it is done with the right motive, which he called a "good will". He claimed that the only unconditionally good thing is a good will, and everything else needs a good will to make it good. Contrary to virtue ethics, Kant claimed further that, without a good will, virtues such as intelligence, courage and so on can be used for evil purposes. What mattered for Kant was to "act out of duty", out of a concern for the moral law, and only is morally permissible only if it is motivated by a concern for the moral law (MacKinnon, 2010, p. 114). But acting with the right motivation alone is not enough to make our actions moral, we also need to do the right thing. In Kant's words; we must act not only "out of duty" but also "as duty requires", in other words, do what is right (Ibid, p .114).

How then, are we going to know that we are doing the right thing? Kant separates between two imperatives; hypothetical and categorical. In the simplest sense, imperatives are forms of statements that tell us to do something. Hypothetical imperatives take the form of "I ought to do x in order to y" and, according to Kant, these kind of oughts are not moral oughts, for they are contingent and individual. They depend on our desires and wishes, and thus these are not moral imperatives (Ibid, p. 115). But moral obligation, on the other hand, is really demanding; if we ought to do something morally, no matter what we desire or wish to happen, of if the act is approved by our society or not, we have to do it –or, if we reverse our angle, we have to avoid doing it under any circumstances. Kant calls them categorical imperatives for they are unconditional and universally apply to everyone. And tell us what to do under all conditions, or categorically (Ibid, p. 115).

Going back to the question above, Kant had different formulations for categorical imperatives, but for the connection to the moral status of hypocrisy, only two of them will be mentioned here. The first formulation is; "Act only on that maxim that you can will as a universal law". In other words, the thing we are going to do has to be

something that we can will or accept for others to do. But how can we know what we can or cannot will as a universal practice? As an example, Kant wants us to consider if it is morally permissible to lie to get ourselves out from a difficult position (Ibid, p. 116). If we apply this situation to his formulation as a "universality test", can we will or accept everyone to lie when they are in a difficult situation? The answer is obviously no, for if lying when in a difficult situation becomes a universal law and we all know about it, then nobody would believe the word of the person in the difficult situation, and this rule would be a self-destructive rule and would be impossible to apply. Therefore, lying is morally impermissible.

The second formulation is as follows; "Always treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of another, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end" (Ibid, p. 117). Kant believed that as rational beings, people deserve respect. They are valuable regardless of whether they are useful or valued or loved, and we have to treat them with respect, not as a means with an instrumental value, but people as an end in themselves. Thus we simply should not use others, while not letting ourselves be used.

In the light of such information, the moral status of hypocrisy from a deontological perspective can be generated now. Considering Kant's emphasis on the "good will" and categorical imperative, hypocrisy clearly seems condemnable in three different points. First of all, the hypocrite does not have a good will –at least most of the time. As Kittay states, we give sincerity a crucial importance in both our everyday relations and morality. By the presumption of sincerity, we take virtuous actions to be the indicator of a good will, and our moral judgments are not only concerned with the consequences those actions, but with their intent as well (Kittay, 1982, p. 280). The hypocrite does the right thing and appear moral or virtuous, but for the wrong reason. She seems to endorse a norm and hide her true intentions and thus deceives us in order to gain merit and rewards. Therefore, hypocrisy is morally impermissible.

Secondly, the act of hypocrisy is clearly a violation of the first categorical imperative. Just like the instances of lying, we cannot make acting hypocritically into a universal law, which we want to apply to us as well as to the others. If we try to imagine a situation in which everyone seems to endorse moral norms and act virtuously, but having ulterior motives or violating those norms in their private lives. Everyone would know that the others have been acting hypocritically, and not

sincere at all when they endorse a moral norm. Therefore, this contradiction shows that the very act of hypocrisy would become impossible, and the universal law of acting hypocritically for self-interests would become a self-destructive law. Again then, hypocrisy is morally impermissible.

Finally, hypocrisy is also a violation of the second categorical imperative mentioned above. The hypocrite pretends to treat us as an end, but actually merely uses us as a means to achieve her selfish self-interests. Thus, again, hypocrisy is morally impermissible. Kant's strict rejection against lying is well known, especially from his famous example in which a murderer who asks you where your friend lives in order to kill her, and your "duty" to tell him the truth, no matter what. For according to Kant, moral obligation binds us as moral subjects, and it is also a duty to ourselves as rational beings and as ends in ourselves (Jay, 2010, p. 70). Therefore, if hypocrisy is akin to lying, a Kantian could claim that the deception involved in hypocrisy makes it morally wrong independent from any further consequences, and that it is a duty to abstain from hypocrisy under any circumstances.

But is it really possible to rule out all instances of hypocrisy as bad and condemnable, which makes it the greatest –modern- vice ever, according to many people. On this point, there are some criticisms to the deontological perspective. First of them is that; although we want and expect people to act according to the highest standards in both public and private lives-including politics-, it must be admitted that it is hard to remain constantly faithful to moral and personal principles is tough, and even the best of us can fall short to these ideals sometimes (Alicke, Gordon and Rose, 2013, p. 673). And here, it must be stated that the strict anti-hypocritical behaviour –like Moliere's fictional character Alceste or Robespierre who is both the architect and also the victim of the Reign of Terror- is as much problematic as the hypocritical behaviour as well. For first of all, imposing expectations of high moral standards on people is more likely to backlash and increase the chances for hypocrisy.

The second point of criticism is that, as mentioned in the previous chapter, most cases of hypocrisy involve intentional deception of others, and as making moral judgments is a matter of intentions, and we actually can never know the intentions of others a hundred percent, making certain moral judgments might become a problem. When we make moral judgments about something we don't know, we do it either for

some "self-serving purpose" or at least we are "pretending to be able to do something which we actually cannot". And either way, we become vulnerable to accusations of hypocrisy (Szabados and Soifer, 2004, p. 9-10). Besides, in cases of negative moral judgments, the accusation of hypocrisy might as well be driven by the desire to achieve ascendance over others. Thus the anti-hypocrites might fall into hypocrisy themselves as their hearts may not be any purer than the hypocrites they despise (Ibid, p. 9).

A final criticism is that, the moral status of even the clearest cases of hypocrisy may not be as straightforward as often assumed. Some forms of hypocrisy –in other words social hypocrisy- can actually facilitate the very human interactions, like politeness and manners, without which it would be impossible to create the social fabric and hold it together. Hypocrisy can also serve as a tool for individuals or minority groups in unjust situations such as political or social pressure or repression (Ibid, p. 14-15). These "victims" coming from a threatened sexual, racial or political minority would not have needed to act hypocritically in order to get equal treatment, were it not for intolerance. Then maybe, as Szabados and Soifer put it, the reason why hypocrisy is on the rise and being seen the ultimate moral failing of our time is related to another serious failing of our age; intolerance (Ibid, p. xvi). All these criticisms have some fair concerns about adopting a rigorous moral stance, and as the examples they give are reasonable and may even be acceptable, it must be stated that they are not more than exceptional, hence do not change the fact that hypocrisy is a morally culpable behaviour.

Although, as mentioned above, the controversy on the moral status of hypocrisy is mostly fitted on the centreline of consequentialism versus absolutism conflict, for the sake of scrutinizing the subject in every aspect, two more no less important ethical theories need to be brought forward; Natural law tradition and Contractualism.

4.4 Natural Law Theory and Contractualism on Hypocrisy

4.4.1 Natural Law Theory and Hypocrisy

The natural law theory holds that there are moral laws that which can be found in nature and are observable by the use of reason. In this sense, the natural law is the moral law written into nature itself (Mackinnon, 2014, p. 135). According to the

theory, what we ought to do can be determined through a consideration of the certain aspects of nature; particularly, as human beings, we ought to examine our nature in order to see what is fundamental for us to function well "as members of our species". The laws of our societies vary and change over time, whereas "the natural law is supposed to be universal and stable" (Ibid, p. 135), and our duty is to obey to the universal laws of nature.

Although, it was Aristotle who was the first to claim that certain actions are right or wrong because they are suitable to or against human nature, and develop an ethical philosophy on this claim (Ibid, p. 136), the moral theory of Thomas Aquinas plays the central role in the natural law tradition. His objective was to find a way to incorporate reason and faith, in order to connect the insights of reason with the commands of faith. Despite the fact that natural law tradition is often connected to religion, since it gives equal importance to reason and holds that reason can discover the moral law independent of scripture, it cannot be considered to be merely a version of the divine command theory (Ibid, p. 136). According to Aquinas, the specific capacities of knowing and choosing freely were unique to humans, therefore we ought to treat both ourselves and others as beings capable of understanding and making free choices. The things that help us pursue and discover truth –like education- are good, while things that prevent it are bad. In this sense, "deception", "lack of access to the sources of knowledge", and "limiting people's possibilities of choosing freely" are morally wrong and objectionable as they simply "prevent us from fulfilling our innate natural drive or orientation to know the way things are" (Ibid, p. 137). The natural law theory also argues that "we are social creatures by nature", thus "we ought to find ways to live well together", for we are interconnected as human beings. Thus the essence of natural law theory is that "that we ought to further the inherent ends of human nature and not do what frustrates human fulfillment or flourishing" (Ibid, p. 137).

From this point forth, what can be said about the moral status of hypocrisy from the natural law perspective? As mentioned above, the main arguments of this theory are that, as human beings we ought to observe and process nature through our reason to "function" well, and as Aquinas states, knowing, understanding and making free choices are essential for our well-functioning, and as we are naturally social creatures, we need to find ways to live together properly in order to fulfil what is

inherent in our nature. In this sense, firstly, hypocrisy seems to be prima facie impermissible, as it involves intentional deception of others, which undermines their capacity to know and limits their possibility to make free choices, thus preventing them from understanding and fulfilling their natural ends where they were supposed to reach. Also, hypocrisy and lying might as well be dangerous to our natural inclination towards living together as social beings, as it involves deceiving in order to further one's own self-interest. However, this argument is disputable if thought vice versa, for as it is stated earlier in this chapter, that social hypocrisy in the form of manners and politeness can actually serve quite efficiently to create and hold together the whole social fabric as a glue. If the need to live together is an essential feature of our nature, then hypocrisy in this sense might be permissible.

According to Aquinas, "lying is always to be excluded as to some extent wrong" as he defines it as "one's assertion of what one believes to be false" (Finnis, 2014). For Aquinas, the essential wrongfulness of lying –and in this sense hypocrisy as well- in the intentional inconsistency between one's "presented self" and one's "real self", in other words a "duplicitas" (Ibid, 2014). Finnis claims that, Aquinas acknowledged that "it is often reasonable and even morally necessary to hide one's beliefs", which he called as "prudent dissimulatio", and he thought that it was justifiable in appropriate contexts (Ibid, 2014). Thus, secondly, there might be circumstances where one's life can be at stake in times of political pressure or social repression, and as procreation and the right to life is of primary importance for both Aquinas and natural law theory, since the instinct to survive is essential to the nature of any living being including humans, hypocrisy and lying seems permissible to protect one's life, in accordance with the laws of nature.

4.4.2 Contractualism and Hypocrisy

The social contract theory is a field which has branches in both political theory and ethics –Contractarianism and Contractualism- and its prominent advocates from the history of political thought include Hobbes, Locke, Kant and Rousseau, while the most important contemporary social contract theorist is John Rawls. Contractarianism as a political theory of authority and legitimacy claims that "legitimate authority of government must derive from the consent of the governed, where the form and content of this consent derives from the idea of contract or

mutual agreement", and in this sense, "moral norms derive their normative force from the idea of contract or mutual agreement" (Cudd, 2013) which is "reached through a process of self-interested bargaining, among all those to whom they apply" (Kumar, 2010, p. 490). As is seen, Contractarianism which comes from the Hobbesian line of social contract thought has self-interest as its central element, claiming "that a rational assessment of the best strategy for attaining the maximization of their self-interest will lead people to act morally" (Cudd, 2013), while contractualism's roots lie in the social contract tradition of Rousseau and Kant –and then Rawls- claiming that "what motivates the parties to the hypothetical agreement is the appeal of living in community with others on a basis of mutual respect for one another", in other words, what Kant calls "a kingdom of ends" (Kumar, 2010, p. 490). In this sense, Contractualism is a non-consequentialist theory with deontological properties.

Stemming from a Kantian line of thought, Contractualism holds that "rationality requires that we respect persons, which in turn requires that moral principles be such that they can be justified to each person" (Cudd, 2013). According to Scanlon, who can be considered as the founder of Contractualism, his theory is "an account of the basis of those norms that constitute one important aspect of morality, those having to do with 'what we owe to each other', and that the value of moral behaviour lies in "mutual recognition" (Ashford and Mulgan, 2012). The main argument of Contractualism, then, is that a person who takes complying with morality's requirements to be important should attach importance to her conduct being justifiable to any other on grounds that that person cannot reasonably reject (Kumar, 2010, p. 493). Thus, Contractualism is not only concerned with determining right and wrong acts, but also with what forms of reasoning and which reasons are justifiable. At this point, Contractualism takes a different route both from Kant and Rawls, as firstly, it does not seek to find principles "to which all rational agents would agree" – like Kant does-in order to form the "contract", but rather seeks principles that "no one can reasonably reject". Secondly, it does not give self-interest a central place and thus doesn't invoke a veil of ignorance in order to represent a commitment to justice –like Rawls does (Ashford and Mulgan, 2012).

As Contractualism is not a consequentialist theory, it surely will not consider the moral status of hypocrisy according to its results. Also, as the theory is focused on

the standpoint of individual persons, contrary to utilitarianism, it does not aggregate. Finally, as Scanlon himself puts it, Contractarianism covers only the realm of what we owe to one another, and that does not the whole of morality (Ashford and Mulgan, 2012) thus the theory is partial. As mentioned above, according to Contractualism, the moral value of an act lies in mutual recognition and respect for one another. From this perspective, it can be said that hypocrisy is morally culpable, as the hypocrite deceives people in order to achieve her aims or gain merits she doesn't deserve, hence using people as means to her ends, violating their dignity as rational beings. However, according to Scanlon, respect for the value of others "requires that individuals be sensitive, in their practical thinking, to others' reasons for wanting, caring about, and pursuing certain things" (Kumar, 2010, p. 492), thus one wrongs another, "or fails to comply with the requirements of respect for her value as a human being", when one fails to give her interests the kind of consideration in one's practical thinking for the regulation of the situation requires (Ibid, 493). In this sense, deciding on the moral status of an action whether it is permissible or impermissible under certain circumstances, is a matter of assessing if there is a decisive reason to do or not to do it, from the evaluative perspective of relevant principle. Hence hypocrisy, not the one that is caused by the hypocrite's selfish self-interests, but like the ones in the cases of "victim hypocrisy", aimed to protect oneself in the face of injustice or even threat to one's life, mentioned in the previous sections in this chapter, might be permissible from a Contractualist perspective as it can be justified in such circumstances in the eyes of others.

4.5 Conclusion

Throughout this chapter, firstly, a comperative analysis of moral generalism and particularism is made in order to locate the role of moral principles in evaluating the rightness or wrongness of particular actions, and thus to introduce the framework in which the classical moral theories operate. Thereafter, different moral camps have been examined vis-à-vis their perspectives on the moral status of hypocrisy. Two main moral camps were positioned against each other; consequentialism -egoism, utilitarianism and virtue ethics- on the one side, and deontology –absolutism- on the other. Our common-sense morality condemns hypocrisy for it involves insincerity, deception, inconsistency, and pursuit of self-interest, whereas we think that morality

imposes some restraints upon it. But as we have seen in the case of "victim hypocrisy", there are instances of hypocrisy that our common-sense morality too seems to find it hard to consider as morally culpable. Looking from the perspectives of consequentialist theories; virtue ethics condemns hypocrisy as a vice and renders it morally impermissible, for a moral life is about developing a good character and hypocrisy hinders this development and corrupts one's character instead. Whereas egoism and utilitarianism, based on the consequences of an act for a single agent's utility or the aggregated utility of a majority, justify hypocrisy as long as it is able to produce "good" outcomes. Both egoism and utilitarianism are able to show us why hypocrisy can be morally acceptable sometimes, but apparently they are having troubles when trying to explain what is morally wrong with it, even if there are a few instances where it produces good consequences. On the other hand, from the perspective of deontology, hypocrisy is strictly impermissible, for firstly it involves intentional deception of others which cannot be made into a universal law, and secondly the deception of others is aimed at fulfilling the hypocrites self-interest and thus using people as a means to that end, which is against respecting others basically as rational moral agents. Deontology –contrary to egoism and utilitarianism- is able to explain what is morally wrong with hypocrisy, yet having troubles when it comes to examples of hypocrisy that seems morally acceptable, where the agent tries to protect her privacy, liberties or even her life, like in victim hypocrisy.

Apart from the central conflict between these two moral camps mentioned above, in order to give a broader scope on the subject, two more important moral theories have been examined; the natural law theory and contractualism. It has been showed through the perspective of natural law theory –especially of Aquinas- that hypocrisy is against the function of speech and our capacity to know and understand in order to fulfil our natural function, and for this reason, it is morally impermissible. However, there can be "prudent dissimulations" in justifiable proper and "exceptional" contexts –such as trying to protect our own lives in accordance with our nature. And as for Contractualism, hypocrisy seem to violate the respect we ought to have for each other as rational agents, and the principle that we ought not to use others as means to our ends. But then again, as we need to consider other's –and our- reasons for acting in a certain way to judge if they can be justifiable in the eyes of others, certain kinds of hypocrisy might be seem as benign under certain circumstances where the

outcomes and reasons are so sound that one cannot reasonably reject. To conclude, it can be said that apart from egoism and utilitarianism, all the other ethical theories, including our common-sense morality, evaluates hypocrisy as morally impermissible one way or another. Although there might be some instances where hypocrisy might be seen as benign, but they are exceptional cases, which do not change the overall status of hypocrisy.

5. POLITICAL HYPOCRISY

In the previous chapters, firstly, a short overview of the research subject at hand has been given with significant examples of political deception, in order to show the importance and the relevancy of the subject; secondly, a conceptual analysis of the term "hypocrisy" has been made; and finally, as hypocrisy implies a moral category, the moral status of hypocrisy has been examined through the perspectives of various ethical theories in order to see whether it is "the unforgivable vice", simply a bad trait or an exaggerated behaviour compared to other acts in the catalogue of bad behaviours. As the main research object of this thesis is the relationship between hypocrisy and democratic politics and whether some instances of political hypocrisy can be justified, from this point on the investigation shall be furthered into the relationship between hypocrisy and politics.

As mentioned before, although hypocrisy is considered to be repugnant and a problem inherent to both our private lives and to politics, it is ubiquitous in almost any societies and it seems almost inevitable in most political settings. But however ubiquitous and recurrent hypocrisy may seem to be, it still brings out massive disturbance, especially for those who "hold out hope for liberal democratic polity ideally based on transparency, trust and accountability in the public sphere" (Jay, 2010, p. 16). It is said to be difficult not to mind about it and no one likes it, for firstly, as it contains intentional deception of others, nobody enjoys being played for a fool; and secondly, it is very easy to find wherever we look just like in everyday social relations, in economics, in education and of course, in politics (Runciman, 2008, p. 1-2). As Judith Shklar (1984) puts it, the horror of hypocrisy for those who put hypocrisy first –the ones who think it is the worst of the vices- is enhanced "precisely because they see it everywhere" (p. 47). However, our approach to hypocrisy in our everyday life is ambiguous; for on the one hand, we condemn hypocrisy as morally wrong and use the term hypocrite almost as an insult, yet on the other hand, we commonly accept and endorse social hypocrisy in the form of "manners", "politeness" and "civility" (Jay, 2010, p. 30), considering them virtues of

their own which enable "healthy" social relations. This ambiguity shows itself also in our approach to political hypocrisy, as it will be seen through this chapter.

Trust, is one of the basic features of communication, and it is essential to our lives. We praise truthfulness and honest people, while condemn hypocrites and liars, as they betray our trust, usually for pursuing their self-interests, debasing "the currency of language and undermine to some extent the ease of communal interactions" (Coady, 2008, p. 110). Still, conversely, we also teach our children to be polite and avoid "unvarnished candor" if possible, knowing that complete and immoderate honesty can be brutal, for socialization involves learning "to be sensitive to context and audience", which relativizes the imperative to always tell the truth and making private beliefs and feelings public (Jay, 2010, p. 30-31). Manners, as "social constraints that check the dictates of individual desire", and politeness, in this sense serve as a "subtle but pervasive hypocrisy" –in other words, social hypocrisy- that promises "social and moral rewards" (Davidson, 2004, p. 8). Thus, social hypocrisy in the form of manners and politeness, is seem to be a justifiable compromise in the eyes of the public. But if we read this situation backwards, it shows us that hypocrisy is not just a personal failing of the moral agent, but it is a "socially learned behaviour", whatever its function is (Shklar, 1984, p. 56). Thereby, it can be said that, different types of hypocrisy like moral, political and social are interconnected, and they feed on each other.

5.1 Politics and Political Hypocrisy

It was strange, according to Arendt (2006), that hypocrisy –one of the minor vices we are inclined to think- has become hated more than all other vices taken together, as it was supposed to be the vice that pays it's reverence to virtue, "almost the vice to undo the vices, at least to prevent them from appearing and to shame them into hiding" (p. 91). This modern confusion over hypocrisy, she claimed, occured at the confluence of the theoretical traditions of the Ancient Greek and the Christian, on the relationship between "being and appereance", which caused reflection at least from Socrates to Machiavelli. Socrates took his stand in the unquestioned belief in the truth of "appereance" as the perspective of Greek tradition of thought, and taught; "Be as you wish to appear to others", meaning that one should appear to herself as she wishes to appear to others. Whereas Machiavelli, from the standpoint of the

Christian tradition of thought which "took for granted the existence of a transcendent Being behind and beyond the world of appearances", taught contrary to Socrates; "Appear as you may wish to be", meaning that one shouldn't mind how she is, for it has no relevance in the world and in "politics", where only appearances count (Ibid, p. 91). The Socratic agent carried a witness within herself, from whom she cannot escape wherever she goes and whatever she does, and being judged by that "audience" like a court of justice, which have been called "conscience" in the later ages. The crime of the hypocrite in this sense is that she bears false witness against herself, and the reason why it might be considered as the vice of vices is that integrity cannot exist only under this one (Ibid, p. 92-94). On the other hand, for Machiavelli, the virtues an agent displays were meaningful only when displayed in public. No matter how she would be judged by the God –for who one is as true being can only appear before God, her virtues would improve the world while her vices remain hidden, and she would hide them because she would feel that they were not fit to be seen (Ibid, p. 94).

Any attempt to resolve this state of affairs in the name of "absolute truth", "complete transparency", "the love of country" and so on leads to a futile and a boundless pursuit of "unmasking", along with paranoia, suspicion, and political madness (Quill, 2010, p. 199), for every deed has its motives and these motives remain hidden in the dark, sometimes even from the agent herself. Hence "the search for motives" and the demand that "everybody display in public her innermost motivation" demands the impossible, and transforms all actors into hypocrites (Arendt, 2006, p. 88). Every effort, Arendt claims, to "make goodness manifest in public ends with the appearance of crime and criminality in the political scene" –as seen in the war upon hypocrisy which lead to Robespierre's self-purging Reign of Terror. In politics, like in the other human affairs, there is no possibility of distinguishing between being and appearance, they are indeed one and the same (Ibid, p. 88).

What then, is politics? Politics in the broadest sense "is the activity through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live" (Heywood, 2013, p. 2). In this sense, it always includes "conflict" and "cooperation" at the same time; on the one hand, opposing opinions, different needs and desires, and conflicting interests creates deep disagreement about the rules under which people live. On the other hand, they perceive that in order to have an influence on

these rules and make sure that their version of them are upheld, they need to work with others. Thus, the need to "act in concert", in order to bring about their political power (Ibid, p. 2; Arendt, 1958, p. 162). In our everyday language, politics is a "loaded" concept. It is usually thought to be a "dirty" entity as it brings images of "trouble, disruption, violence, and above all, deception, manipulation and lies" to mind. This discontent with the concept of politics or political is mostly due to its conception as "the art of government"; in this sense, the definition of politics is taken as "what concerns the state", and people are thought to be "in politics" when they hold a public office (Ibid, p. 3). Defining the concept in this way restricts the political as a realm to the agents and inner machinations of government; associating it to "polity" as allocating benefits, rewards and penalties; thus, making it an "end-oriented" activity. This definition gets even narrower, when it is reduced to party politics and its political actors who are motivated by ideological beliefs and self-interest, which explains the negative image of politics in the eyes of the people. In the popular mind, politics is identified with the activities of politicians who are seen as "power-seeking hypocrites who conceal personal ambition behind the rhetoric of public service and ideology", and thus it is a "self-serving, two-faced and unprincipled activity" (Ibid, p. 4). Such an image of politics and the political can be traced back to Niccolo Machiavelli who developed a "realist" account of politics based on self-interested power relations and the hypocrisy of political agents – namely, princes- in order to obtain and keep that power. Machiavelli's remarks on the issue of political hypocrisy will be brought out further in this chapter.

Another broad conception of politics takes it not as an end-oriented or instrumental affair, but rather, dating back to Aristotle, an "essentially public" activity that is noble and enlightened by virtue of its "public" character (Ibid, p. 6). It is essential to the social existence, and it is "based on the fact of human plurality" (Arendt and Kohn, 2005, p. 93). Politics is the most important human activity for it springs through interaction among free and equal citizens. Through politics, human life becomes meaningful as it affirms the "uniqueness" of every single individual (Heywood, 2013, p. 7; Arendt, 1958). Men, according to Arendt (2005), exists in politics only through the equal rights that "those who are most different guarantee for each other", which is a "voluntary" guarantee for a claim of legal equality that protects their plurality (p. 94). For Rousseau and Mill, political participation was a

"good in itself", and that only through a continuous participation of all citizens into the political life could lead to a "common good", while also promoting their moral and intellectual development (Heywood, 2013, p. 7). Considering the former conception of politics as an end oriented affair and the latter as right or principle based, it will not be surprising to say that the former is more open and suitable to instances of hypocrisy and its justifications.

In the simplest term, political hypocrisy is commonly defined as the inconsistency between a political agent's public statements and her actions. However, this definition is too broad and brings two problems with it. First, a disparity between a political actor's words and deeds may occur from various reasons such as her genuine changes of mind, weakness of her will −as explained in the second chapter (2.1.3.1-2), or just out of a need for "political compromise" which is innate to political relations, and none of these should need to be call as hypocritical. In the second chapter of this research (2.1), it has been mentioned that hypocrisy involves a pretence to morality, apart from inconsistency, in order for the hypocrite to show herself better than she actually is. Hence, mere inconsistency is not sufficient for locating political hypocrisy; the political actor intentionally exaggerates her moral commitments, while presenting herself in the public (Dovi, 2001, p. 11). Second, there is a tendency to call a politician a hypocrite, due to the discrepancy between what she said in public and what she did in her private life. Yet, it is open to question that what a political actor does or says in her private life should be a matter of public concern, instead of focusing on what she does on behalf of the office she holds, and her performance in there, needs to be made clear.

With the elimination of traditional foundations of political legitimacy such as "ancestral worshipping" or a "divine providence", modern liberal democracy seeks to establish its legitimacy on rhetoric and moral superiority over other systems, the only capital that can sustain it, and this generates political exigency and the interplay of hypocrisy and anti-hypocrisy, for the rhetoric of morality inflates the expectations of the public, encouraging political actors to present themselves better than they actually are (Shklar, 1984, p. 70; Dovi, 2001, p. 5-6). In this sense, as morality is an indispensible part of democratic politics, and showing one's rigorous commitment to morality and how others undermine it constitutes an important part of political competition and manifacturing the consent of the voters. This much appeal to

morality, as might be expected, makes private lives of the political actors the Achilles' heel, like in the example of Lewinsky Scandal (1.2), and thus, sex scandals, extra-marital misdemeanors, and many other private affairs and matters became perennial feature of charges of hypocrisy and political life (Quill, 2010, p. 197). But, is a failing in a political actor's personal life an indicator of failings in the office? It does not seem so, for as Thompson (2005) states, there are enough examples of politicians who had "impeccable" private lives but performed poorly in the office, and politicians who were objects of public scandals because of their private lives but did exellent job in the office –Bill Clinton might be the best example to this category (p. 236).

The general discourse in favour of making private lives of the political agents' public is that what those agents think, say, or do in private life is an important measurement for the citizens before they vote. But Some commentatiors argue that, preoccupation with the personal affairs of political agents can distract us from important issues of policy and other serious matters which are proper objects of political regulation and deliberation, and thereby detracting them with unnecessary disputes. The "public-private boundary" keeps the "disruptive material" out of the public realm (Mokrosinska, 2015, p. 183; Nagel, 1998, p. 20), as there are already a lot of issues to be disccussed in the public realm like issues of justice, economics, security, rights and other public goods. It must be said that, trying to expose one's private life in order to damage them in a political race is a violation of one's liberty, one's right to do as she wants without "the interference of others" (Wilson, 2016). And this interference on privacy is likely to push a political agent towards hypocrisy, for on the one hand she will try to protect her private space, and on the other hand, she will try to restore her image by appealing to morality more than before, and make statements that she cannot possibly live up to. In this sense, as one's personal failings or inclinations are not certain indicators of her performance in the office, political actors need to be evaluated by their political actions in the name of the office they hold, the people and the state they represent. However, this does mot mean that whatever a political actor does in her private life needs to be kept hidden from the eyes of the public. Remembering J. S. Mill's "harm principle", one's privacy should not be interfered with as long as there is no harm to others or a violation of their rights. However, if political agents engage in practices which involve harm or

discrimination in their private lives, then these matters can no longer be classified as private and becomes a matter of public concern. For example, in a case where a deputy or cabinet member is involved with a foundation which turned out to be abusing children under their care, an attention to her political performance and an appeal to privacy obviously will not do (Mokrosinska, 2015, p. 196). Thus, personal endeavors involving harm, violation of rights and discrimination cannot be protected by the veil of privacy, and need to be interfered and revealed to the public. In short, in the case of political hypocrisy, what we need to be concerned about primarily is not the discrepancy between what a political agent endorsed publicly and did or said in her private life, but rather what she endorsed in the public realm and did or said while she is on duty or in the office, unless what she does in her private life harms others. The revelation of these harmful acts in a democracy requires a strong, impartial and free press, which can support the citizens' "right to know" and thus become a check for political hypocrisy. This issue will be further discussed in the final chapter of this research.

 Therefore, it seems more convenient to define political hypocrisy as; a political actor's intentional "exaggeration" of her commitment to morality and to political ideals, while acting contrary to them on behalf of the office they hold and their state. This version of political hypocrisy, as is seen, is based on the activities of political actors, however, political hypocrisy might as well happen on an institutional level; institutional hypocrisy "involves a disparity between the publicly avowed purposes of an institution and its actual performance or function", and this disparity generally develops when an institution "comes to serve purposes other than those for which it was established" (Thompson, 2005, p. 212). This disparity and its results can be deeply deceptive, especially in the areas like national security. The Iran-Contra Affair, given in the first chapter, is a good example of an injurious type of institutional political hypocrisy, as the National Security Council became a tool for evading the congress, instead of "providing the president with an independent source of advice and control over the conduct of foreign policy" (Ibid, p. 212) and thus deviating from its official purpose in order to deceive, bringing out serious consequences for democratic process, and for the trust of the public.

5.2 Justifications and Oppositions for Political Hypocrisy

The "consequentialism-moralism" or "hypocrisy – anti-hypocrisy" duality on the moral status of hypocrisy mentioned in the previous chapter is apparent likewise in the issue of political hypocrisy, and it must be stated that this issue is not only peculiar to the modern liberal democracies, as the theoretical background on this issue goes a long way back to antiquity. The reason why the scope of this research is limited to hypocrisy in democratic politics, considering various other political regimes/systems is that, what pressures political actors towards hypocrisy is mainly their dependency on other political actors and of course on votes –either for their selfish pursuit for power or for pursuing their version of the "public good"- which means the approval and consent of the voters. The character of the government has much to do with the incidence of hypocrisy (Shklar, 1984, p. 52), thus, hypocrisy and mendacity in dictatorial regimes or tyrannies, where there are no free elections, no dependency on public support for making policies, no concern for being accountable, is not much of an important issue, as they are not concerned much about the public reaction to their acts. Whereas, "in a state that claims to be democratic, governments want people to believe they are acting in the best interests of their people". From this point of view, the citizens of authoritarian states often react with a "cynical disbelief" to pronouncements of their governments (Cliffe, Ramsay and Bartlett, 2000, p. x), which is reasonable. However, when this cynical disbelief arises in a liberal democracy, a regime that claims to be morally superior and represent the interests of the people the best, it sure is of importance.

As mentioned before in the first chapter, the arguments concerning the role and the moral status of political hypocrisy in democratic politics is gathered around the structural opposition between the ones in favour of hypocrisy –or at least the ones who accept it as a regrettable but nevertheless an essential feature of liberal democracy- and the anti-hypocrites. The former group, claims that hypocrisy is inevitable because of the inner mechanisms and the nature of politics, and for power and personal success are still goals to be sought even in democracies. Being a leader sometimes involves saying something and doing another, in order to achieve goals which would otherwise be unattainable, and these ends, either the "greater good" of the people being ruled or obtaining and preserving power necessitates and thus "justifies" duplicity; what matters are the outcomes, not abstract moral principles

(Jay, 2010, p. 17). From this point of view, democracy and hypocrisy only have "instrumental value" as long as they produce the desired consequences.

On the other hand, the latter group, sees democratic politics as "intrinsically" more ethical and valuable than any other alternative and claims that trust, transparency and accountability are irreplaceable properties of democratic polity and, of course, the public realm. Public life must be subjected to the same high moral standards which should be followed in the private life, and be purged from hypocrisy and any other kind of deception as much as possible, for the consequences of deception are "ultimately and invariably self-destructive" (Alterman, 2004, p. 22). Thus "open society must be based on the truth-telling of those entrusted with the power to rule" (Jay, 2010, p. 16-17). This perspective, contrary to the one in defence of hypocrisy, sees politics and democracy as an end in itself, and for this reason try to cleanse them from any kind of entity of "corruption".

Both these conventional terms and perspectives are hard to avoid, and they serve as an inevitable starting point when the question of political hypocrisy is at hand. For, "railing against one's opponents while privately granting oneself the right to commit one's own in the name of a higher cause that truth-telling" has been in play ever since Plato (Jay, 2010, p. 3), while oppositional ideas that simply and strictly advocates that "one ought not lie under any circumstances" are around since St. Augustine. Although commentators appeal to various different traditions and philosophers in order to build up a structure of the ideas on political hypocrisy and deception, Plato and Machiavelli will be focused on specifically in this research, for there is a particular line of thought starting from Plato and continuing with Machiavelli up to the present, containing arguments about the necessity of political hypocrisy, which has been and still is used to "justify" political deception. The argument which comes from Plato is the "Noble lie", the idea that it is "justified" to deceive the ruled for their own good, or in other words, for a "greater good" or "common good"; and the latter is "Machiavellianism", which claims that power and glory are primary goals to seek in the political arena and any means you use in order to gain them is "justified", as long as you succeed, thus giving a justification based on self-interest. While these two arguments serve as the waterway to the defenders of political hypocrisy, the ideas about the "impermissibility" of lying –and any other kind of deception- mentioned in the previous chapter (3.2) provide the basis for the

perspective of the ones in discontent with hypocrisy, which claims that there is no way to justify any kind of deception either in morality or politics. As the philosophical sources for the rejection points of the opponents of hypocrisy are mentioned before, the sources of its advocates will be mentioned briefly at the end of this chapter.

It was mentioned, in the beginning of this chapter, that people despise hypocrisy and see it everywhere. In this sense, "negative advertising" became a useful tool for politicians who knows that disposing of an opponent's character by exposing her hypocrisy is easier than showing that her political convictions are wrong (Shklar, 1984, p. 48). In line with the pursuit of power and votes, democratic politicans seek to expose the duplicity of their opponents and "paint" them as hypocrites by highlighting the gap between their "honeyed words and the underlying reality", between "the mask and the person behind the mask", between "what they say now and what they once did" (Runciman, 2008, p. 2-3), in order to do the maximum possible damage to their rivals. But this adversarial aspect –and actually nature- of election based democratic politics unquestionably contributes the displeasure of the citizens, especially when politicians consistently accuse each other of the "misdeeds of which they are all suspected" (Lowell, 2007, p. 189). The reason of this suspicion is that, hypocrisy and politics has always been seen as "bedfellows". Just like Hannah Arendt (2000) puts it; "truthfulness has never counted among the political virtues" and lies have always been regarded as necessary and justifiable tools of the politician's (p. 545).

The reason why hypocrisy, mendacity and politics are so tangled depends on various facts. First of all, what makes the relationship between politics and morality so thorny is that; politicians claim to act for others but also serve themselves, they rule over others and make decisions on their behalf, and use violence against them when "necessary" (Walzer, 1973, p. 174). Secondly, political relations are relations of power and therefore they can be conceived as "relations of dependence" (Grant, 1997, p. 2-3). They are dependencies among people, in accordance with the nature of politics, who requires others' voluntary cooperation but at the same time, their interests are in conflict. In such circumstances, trust between these parties is required but also is really difficult to attain, "and to enlist the support of the other party requires flattery, manipulation, and a pretence of concern for her needs", thus

pressures towards hypocrisy is immense. As political relationships are dependencies of this sort, hypocrisy becomes a "regular feature of political life" (Ibid, p. 3-13). Party politics and party mechanisms, for example, force politicians to vote accordingly with the leaders of their party, and places them in a conflict between their own integrity and their loyalty to the party. The stakes are too high to undermine this loyalty, for voting or doing something against the party's will might well mean losing their office, their chances of being preferred, or even exclusion from the party. Thus, by using "carrot and stick" party mechanisms are trying to "reinforce" the loyalty of the members, forcing them into doing things they don't actually believe in, namely, to act hypocritically (Hinde, 2007, p. 152). What this means for the political actor is that hypocrisy is inevitable, "which means the public proclamation of shared values and interests combined with a private acknowledgment of their hollowness" (Jay, 2010, p. 171). Moreover, the political actor, in seeking election, has to "tailor her own beliefs" to some extend to the inclinations and priorities of the electorate (Hinde, 2007, p. 151). As Grant (1997) puts it, "hypocrisy requires moral pretence, and that pretence is necessary because politics cannot be conducted solely through bargaining among competing particular interests" (p. 14), for moral values are hard to either decisively abandon or rigorously apply, and this is exactly the sense of which La Rochefoucauld's famous remark comes to mind; "Hypocrisy is the homage vice pays to virtue".

Thirdly, although many political thinkers tried to separate "the political" as a concept and "the realm of politics" as a space from other concepts and realms such as "the social", "law", "economics", "religion", "science" and of course "morality" – which maybe is the most challenging one among the others, as mentioned above- the boundary between them is porous, even when politics seems to be most autonomous. Therefore, there always has been a transitivity between politics and morality, which makes political actions and decisions to be judged by their moral status, as well as their outcomes and efficiency. When we take politics to be a realm where "improvisation" and "ever-changing conditions" are the essential features and where agents are highly dependent on various other factors, dilemmas involving both practical issues and moral principles become intrinsic to the life of politicians (Hinde, 2007, p. 149). And as there is a high expectation towards politicians to be to be honest, sincere, truthful and so on, a wide gap appears between "the standards that

apply to persons who act in the name of the citizenry and their actual conduct" (Kis, 2008, p. 2-3). This expectation of high moral standards coming from citizens again creates pressures towards hypocrisy, and paradoxically, causes the widening of the gap between, remembering Machiavelli, how one should be –or act- and how one really is in the realm of politics. Another paradox is that, as politicians occupy public offices and the expectations against the ones who hold public offices are more demanding compared to the ones against ordinary people, their faults are judged more harshly and strictly (Ibid, p. 3). For example, we praise an aunt when she helps her niece with her education expenses or when she arranges a job to her, but we condemn her when she arranges her niece a governmental job. It is clear that we have an expectance of higher integrity from the ones who act in the political realm and govern us.

On the other hand interestingly, as politicians have to engage in electoral competition in order to get elected and to gain a public office, we are reluctant to vote for a really virtuous candidate whom we do not expect to find his way in the mess of political struggle, as we would not like to see our candidate lose because of his praiseworthy moral character (Ibid, p. 3). We are not pleased if our candidates are always defeated because they, unlike their rivals, are unwilling to adapt themselves to the game of politics and bend the rules of morality to do what needs to be done. We are, as the electorate, more interested in the here and now, while having less interest in the long term, and expect quick and certain returns (Hinde, 2007, p. 164). Therefore, it can be said that, party politics and representative democracy somehow became a source of political hypocrisy, and the public reaction against it is again ambiguous –even ironically hypocritical- just like in the case of social hypocrisy, and this ambiguous attitude itself is feeding the "vicious" circle that it claims they condemn.

5.2.1 Political Hypocrisy for The Common Good

As mentioned in the beginning of the previous chapter, an argument about the moral status of hypocrisy takes place in the *Republic* Book II, along the story known as "the ring of Gyges". The main question of the discussion focuses on what sort of motivations people have when acting morally and what should be expected from those who "seem" to act morally with regard to their motivations. Through the discussion (358a-360d), Glaucon claims, in opposition to Socrates, that people act

justly not because they think being just is good in itself, but rather they "unwillingly" do so because they want to have a good reputation and the honour, respect and trust that comes along with it and also to make others act justly toward them (Darwall, 2010, p. 539), and they are right to do so, therefore praising hypocrisy. Plato answers Glaucon's challenge through Socrates, saying that "ethical conduct benefits the just person not simply through its consequences, but in itself" (Ibid, p. 539).

Although Plato claims that being just and acting justly is intrinsically good, later in 414b-c, he introduces the idea of "the noble lie" after discussing the myth of medals, in which the whole society is divided into three kinds of metal which also show their function and place in the polis; the ones who have gold in them were meant to be rulers and rule, the ones who have silver in them were meant to be soldiers and finally the ones who have bronze in them were meant to be workers. Plato has Socrates wonder;

Now, can we devise one of those lies -the kind which crop up as the occasion demands, which we were talking about not long ago- so that with a single *noble lie* we can indoctrinate the rulers themselves, preferably, but at least the rest of the community?

Here, for the sake of political stability based on "natural" hierarchies based on talent and function, Plato allows telling a lie, for the city's own good (Jay, 2010, p. 148). The justification of this benign deception is that, as the populace, with their imperfect reasoning, is not always able to tell the difference between true and false or their true interests, they need their leaders/rulers whom they trust the virtue and rationality of hers, to take on a "tutelary role" and guide them (Ibid, p. 149-151). Later again in the *Republic*, Plato reaffirms his point that rulers "might have to rely a lot on lies and deceit" for the well-being of the ruled, as lies and deceits of this sort "are useful as a type of medicine" and "there is nothing wrong with using them like that" (459c-d). Thus Plato accepted the necessity of the political deception as a useful means in order to secure the just and harmonious city. Here, as Annas (1981) states, "Plato's readiness to legitimize the telling of lies in the interests of some higher end" needs to be noticed, something according to her which "is an early sign of what will become more prominent: his readiness to revise the content of morality in the interests of establishing morality" (p. 107-108). According to Schofield (2006), the reason why Plato has no unease with lying in such circumstances and thinks it to be Noble where

the citizens of the polis is concerned is that "devotion to one's city was a widely accepted and frequently hymned Greek ideal, familiar from Homer -particularly in the figure of Hector in the Iliad- to the Athenian funeral oration". Therefore, a deception to promote such devotion to a good city might well be regarded as something noble for Plato (p. 285-7).

This approach to the "justification" of political deception by a wise or elite ruler – either a philosopher or a politician- has, as mentioned above, never lost its attractiveness and usefulness until today, as it found remarkable support by Leo Strauss and his neo-conservative followers, especially after they were held responsible for the hypocrisy of Bush administration's Iraq policy (Jay, 2010, p. 151).

5.2.2 Political Hypocrisy for Self-Interest

The other canonical figure on political hypocrisy, is Niccolo Machiavelli, whose name has actually been identified with it ever since. For some, Machiavelli is the devilish advocate of immorality, referring to his reluctance to impose abstract moral principles on politics, whereas for some, for the same reason he is the first one to really understand the necessities and the autonomy of the politics. Anyhow, "the stigma of being a wicked immoralist interested only in power" sticked to his name, and considering the question of political hypocrisy, one can still see it claimed that all justifications of hypocrisy and lying in politics are still one way or another connected to Machiavelli (Ibid, p. 6).

According to Grant (1997), the distinctive feature of Machiavelli was that he understood that political relationships are relationships of dependency and that hypocrisy is inevitably associated to them (p. 13). As mentioned before, "politics is characterized by relationships of mutual need among parties with conflicting interests" and to obtain the support of other party "requires flattery, manipulation, and pretence" to either their needs or to some commonly held moral norms that one doesn't actually endorse, and therefore seek to ensure that she is the "manipulator" but not the "manipulated", by "acquiring enough power to secure her autonomy" (Ibid, p. 13). The reason why the political agent –the prince- needs to appeal to these tact is that the other actors in the political realm might not be –and most likely will not be- so virtuous and honest;

Many writers have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen nor known to exist in reality. For there is such a distance between how one lives and how one ought to live, that anyone who abandons what is done for what ought to be done achieves his downfall rather than his preservation. A man who wishes to profess goodness at all times will come to ruin among so many who are not good. Therefore, it is necessary for a prince who wishes to maintain himself to learn how not to be good, and to use this knowledge or not to use it according to necessity (The Prince, Chapter XV).

As it is seen, Machiavelli generates his case of hypocrisy out of the more general case for the necessity of deception in political life. "His defence of deception of all kinds", as Grant states, "is part of his still more general case for the necessity of abandoning conventional moral constraints in politics and learning not to be good according to- necessity" (Ibid, p. 18-19). However, some commentators claim that, this own brand of Machiavelli's "political realism" is one that allows the moral assessments to apply to political agents, but they are overridden by political necessities. Thus his view differs "from the view in political theory that moral assessment simply fails to apply to political action" (Cullity, 2007, p. 54). Machiavelli also admitted that, political relations cannot be reduced to mere calculations of interest, as they also include strong drives like vanity, pride and ambition. If these political objectives are worth pursuing, then they must be pursued effectively, and that requires "a level of unscrupulousness at least equal to that of your competitors" or otherwise it is "self-sacrificial" (Ibid, p. 57).

Similarly, according to Grant (1997), Machiavelli knew that the pressures toward evil are not only present in the political passions mentioned above, but in the very structure of political relationships. But the same time, morality is also embedded in political relationships, even if it is just rhetorical, as political discourses always have a moral component, and this is the reason why hypocrisy is the homage paid to virtue. As he appreciated political hypocrisy, he also appreciated the public moral principles and thus the importance of appeals –meaning the pretense- to them. This also shows –ironically in a way- that " the frequency of hypocrisy testifies to the strenght of the moral impulse in public life" (p. 14).

5.3 Conclusion

Throughout this chapter, the relationship between hypocrisy and politics as a set of actions has been examined in order to find why these two are so tangled, and then the concept of political hypocrisy has been introduced alongside with the arguments of both its advocates and opponents. The former group claims that the adversarial nature of politics and political relations as relations of dependency make political hypocrisy an inevitable and even necessary feature of politcal life, and thus, justified. The latter group, on the other hand, claims that hypocrisy and any other kind of deception is destructive to both politics and society, thus it needs to be purged from it at any cost and complete truthfulness has to prevail instead; thus political hypocrisy can never be justified.

The advocates of hypocrisy draw their arguments and justification points from Plato and Machiavelli, and its opponents draw theirs from Kant. As the implications of Kant's moral philosophy for hypocrisy has been mentioned in the previous chapter, the philosophical backgrounds of the defenders of political hypocrisy has been introduced in the rest of this chapter. Both Plato's elitist noble lie which prescribes the ruler to deceive the ignorant masses for their own good and Machiavelli's political realism which endorses the necessity of hypocrisy in the realm of politics and advocates the political actor to be cunning and duplicitous like a "fox" in order to survive the political struggle for power with her ruthless opponents, have strong impacts on our understanding of political hypocrisy and the relationship between politics and morality, with our current political problems. They serve as sources of justifications, wherever there is a reaction either from public or other political actors about the deceptive acts that have been done. And this brings us to another question about the moral status of political hypocrisy; is it ever justified or are these reasons given by politicians –and philosophers- are just excuses? In accordance with this question, the following chapter will deal with the moral status of political hypocrisy in democracies.

6. POLITICAL HYPOCRISY: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY

6.1 Justifications and Oppositions: An Assesment

The lasting conflict between the advocates of hypocrisy and its strict opponents on the moral status of political hypocrisy is, as mentioned in the previous chapter, hard to avoid as a starting point, however, it is not without problems. According to the strict opponents of hypocrisy, deception is ultimately destructive to social relations and democracy, for trust, transparency and accountability are irreplaceable properties of democratic polity and, of course, the public life. In this sense, it needs to be purged from any kind of deception, and the high moral standards that need to be followed in our private lives must apply to public as well. The idea that governments have to deceive people in order to lead them is directly a threat to democracy itself, for deception of this kind strikes the very essence of government (Bok, 1978, p. 182). The foundation of democracy is trust, and political deception undermines the bond of trust between goverments and the citizens over time, which is the essential feature of a functioning democracy (Alterman, 2004, p. 14). Politicians know that deceiving their constituents is wrong, but they do it nevertheless for they believe that their lies serve their narrow political interests. Whatever the anticipated outcomes of political hypocrisy may be, in the long term, the hypocritical acts and lies create uncontrollable effects like a chain that extends over time and many areas, which are "almost always negative"; deception, even for the most altrusitic and "unselfish" motive, "corrupts and spreads". Political hypocrisy, generally assumed to be trivial by its advocates and the ones who deceive, is in fact rarely is, for it affects so many people, and spreads from few to many, and takes the power from the public who is the real owner. Thus, deceiving the public is ultimately and invariably self-destructive, and it should be avoided at all costs (Bok, 1978, p. 178-185; Ibid, p. 21-22); in other words, from a deontological perspective, one should not, under any circumstances, lie!

Idealism always seems more appealing and to be nobler than cynicism, but sometimes it can also have counterproductive results (Jay, 2010, p. 17). Firstly, the charges of hypocrisy against political agents can be vague and unfair, for political acts which seem to be hypocriticial might include instances of "changing their minds on issues", breaking well-intentioned promises in the face of a change in circumstances which makes the result of keeping that promise worse than breaking it, or keeping secrets, as secrecy is also an element of democratic government especially in issues like intelligence or national security/defence (Lowell, 2007, p. 205). Political actions are very contextual, and political agents are humans too like all of us, thus they can fall short of expectations or make mistakes, without having evil intentions or a hypocritical conduct; after all, "to profess principles that one has no intention of following is hypocrisy; to be unable to live up to our best expectations of ourselves is human nature" (Grant, 1997, p. 26). Likewise, overemphasizing the dangers of hypocrisy and a demand for complete transparency can produce political paralysis (Dovi, 2001, p. 5). Finally, the motives for a deed can never be completely known, as they "remain hidden in the dark". The search for the motives behind the acts and demanding everyone to display their deepest motivations in public is a futile and a never ending endeavor, for it demands something impossible. And at the end of the day, this search for complete transparency and absolute truth is likely to backfire, as it can turn into a mechanism of opression, transforming everybody who want to keep their privacy and inner selves from the eyes of others into hypocrites; "the moment the display of motives begins, hypocrisy begins to poison all human relations" (Arendt, 2006, p. 88).

The other side of the structural conflict on the moral status of political hypocrisy is its advocates, who draw their arguments from the Noble Lie and Machiavellianism, see political hypocrisy as a "lesser" and a "necessary" evil. They build their arguments on the difficulty and slipperiness of political action and politics as a grey area, where actors are dependent on too many various factors in the competiton for power. Democratic politics puts political actors on spotlight publicly, and there is a very strong temptation to lie and deceive their way out of trouble, into advantageous positions, namely, enhancing their "vote-getting capacities" (Coady, 2009, p. 118). In this sense, following the Machiavellian way of thinking, the defenders of hypocrisy claim that if political goals and gains are worth pursuing, they have to be pursued

effectively, and this requires a level of ruthlessness, at least equal to one's competitors. Anything less than that for a political representative, would not be only self-sacrificial, but also other-sacrificial (Cullity, 2007, p. 57) as they represent a group of people, who expect her to further their interests. Indeed, the pursuit of power is so attached to "befuddling, deceiving, and conning the electorate", various forms of dishonesty like hypocrisy or blatant lying have almost become standard elements of democracy (Coady, 2009, p. 118). And this is exactly first problematic point with this perspective, for many of them see such actions as the essential part of the political game. They argue that, morality and politics simply don't go together, for deception is an indispensable tool of the politician's trade, and while everyday moral principles are elaborated in order to ease the relations between individuals, politicians, as their vocation requires, have to make decisions about far more comprehensive issues. Thus the ones who raise moral concerns for politics are ignorant of political realities (Hinde, 2007, p. 158; Bok, 1978, p. 179). Yet, it must be stated that not all of them deny the presence of morality in politics. They do not reject the possibility of moral judgment in democratic politics, but still they are convinced that hypocrisy is a "regrettable but necessary" component of modern democratic politics, claiming that hypocrisy is a structural feature of liberal democracies and more "truth" is not an antidote; "there is no way of breaking out from it", and "all attempts to find such an escape route are delusions" (Quill, 2010, p. 198; Runciman, 2008, p. 196).

However, basing this "political game" on a routine of cheating and lying or on mere manipulation is self-destructive and meaningless, for it is simply ignoring the fact that without the existence of the rules of the game, bending the rules, deceiving or cheating are empty (Heller, 1991, p. 338). Besides, in a system where everybody – according to so called rules- deceives others in order to get what they want, politics and any other social entity of that kind becomes pointless, and turns the society into a "culture of bullshit" where no one believes anything anyone says anymore (Quill, 2010, p. 201). It is true, that negotiating and a capacity to make compromises is essential to political life in democracies. But when everything, including one's own character becomes a subject of negotiation, then "the craft of politics" becomes just "crafty", which stirs contempt as a proper response (Coady, 2009, p. 119). Also, basing democratic politics on sheer representation of the interests of a set of

individuals or major groups undermines the very foundations of democracy and its ideals; "a culture based on material wealth is inimical to true democracy" (Hinde, 2007, p. 152).

Another point of view is that, it is "justified" to deceive the people for their own good or for a greater good, which goes back to Plato's Noble Lie as a source of justification, to a passage –mentioned in (4.1.3) – where Plato advocates to tell fanciful –and untrue- stories to people in order to make them accept class distinctions, and thus protect social harmony. The way of thinking here is quite paternalistic, for the reason why the citizens are being deceived is due to the fact that they are not capable of understanding what they need for their own good and what is at stake, that they are likely to respond truthful information in the wrong way with their inadequate judgment, thus the wise ruler, "who is trained to discern this purposes" needs to deceive the citizens for "their own good", or a few for "the benefit of the community at large" (Bok, 1978, p. 176-177). Even if the deception was to be revealed, when the benefits of this deception comes to the light and its benefits are understood, the citizens would not be complaining, but on the contrary, they would be grateful (Ibid, p. 177).

This elitist and "alturistic" –for the ruler damages her own integrity for the sake of the citizens- justification for political deception too, as one can easily realise, carries many problems along with it. First of all, this "justification" relies on the asymmetry between the citizens and the ruler, as the citizens are considered as ignorant masses while the ruler is the wise one who not only needs to deceive, but also has the "right" to do so considering her education and superiority. However, in a democracy, the political agent who holds an office and represents people is not someone superior to the ones who are being represented, but on the contrary, equal to them. Thus, the key political relationship in a democracy is no longer a relationship of deference between unequals, but a relationship of respect and trust between equals. This equality between the representative and the citizen, which is introduced by democracy undermines this elitist justification of political deception/hypocrisy (Lowell, 2007, p. 196).

Secondly, deceiving people for the sake of people –an ironic resemblance to Lincoln's famous definition of democracy as "government of the people, by the people, for the people"- in a democracy is a "self-contradictory notion" (Bok, 1978,

p. 182). Besides, in the context of the Noble Lie, Plato's presupposed that the ruler was going to be a wise philosopher king, who would be the best eligible person to tell right from wrong and foresee what needs to be done for the best of the political communtiy, namely the Polis, and in this sense, it was safe for such a "virtuous" ruler to adhere to slippery means like deception. Whereas in our modern democracies, even though there are certain conditions and qualifications to be able to run for an office or become a representative, it still cannot be said that the ones who are in the position to make important decisions are that well educated and wise as what Plato had in mind, and thus it is troublesome and "unrealistic" rather than realistic to believe that they can always make the right calculations. For even if there is a possibility for some deception to bring out a "public good", when the idea that deception is genuinely "necessary" to achieve an important public end, the judgments of those who make this decisions are susceptible, as there is a high possibility that the benefits of such deception will be overestimated and the chances of harm will be underestimated (Ibid, p. 182). Finally, as the example of "Bushspeak" –in (1.3)- before and during the Invasion of Iraq in the first years of 2000's manifested, deceiving the public with "noble" thoughts or "good intentions" (Runciman, 2006) can easily work as a masquarade to cover up the private gain behind what is going on in the political stage. Thus, political actors must be judged by their actions both morally and legally; dubious "good intentions" do not suffice (Hinde, 2007, p. 161). In short, considering all these justifications for political hypocrsiy and their problems, underemphasizing the troubles of political hypocrisy, accepting it unconditionally as a consequence of the realities of politcs and democracy is likely to promote cynicism (Dovi, 2001, p. 3-4), putting the very intitutions of democracy and politics at stake. These remarks about the necesstiy of hypocrisy in democratic politics raise important theoretical questions about "justification" such as what it is, can deceptive acts ever be justified, are there reasons for political hypocrisy any valid and so on.

The structural opposition between hypocrites and anti-hypocrites and their remarks on the issue are, as is seen, not really fruitful considering the question of "are there any circumstances in which political hypocrisy can be justified in a democracy?", for the former tends to consider it justified in almost all cases, whereas the latter utterly rejects that it can be justified at all, no matter what, and also they are apt to be taken

to the extremes as ruthless cynicism or as eccentric –and dangerous- idealism. It is apperant that the problem of political hypocrisy has been solidified into these two positions which have been battling each other, forming a "discreet system", with no clear victory for either sides since the issue was first raised (Shklar, 1979, p. 10; Jay, 2010, p. 17). Yet the problem still endures, and an answer needs to be found about the question if there are any justifiable instances of political hypocrisy in a democracy. For this reason, in order to find an answer to that, what justification is and what it is not should be made clear.

Justifications and excuses generally appear side by side, when we are "accused" of having done or said something which is "bad, wrong, inept, unwelcome, or in some other of the numerous possible ways untoward" and we or someone in our behalf try to defend our "conduct" (Austin, 1956, p. 2). We might not be using the terms as carefully as we should, for we are inclined to confuse them to one other, despite the fact that they are conceptually distinct. When we try to justify an act of ours, we admit doing it, but argue that "it was a good thing, or the right or sensible thing, or a permissible thing to do, either in general or at least in the special circumstances of the occasion"; whereas when we try to find an excuse, we admit that "it was not a good thing to have done" but argue that it is not "quite fair" to say that we simply did it, for we were doing something different and what happened in the end was "accidental" or "unintentonal". In short, "an excuse is typically an admission of fault; a justification is typically a denial of fault and an assertion of innocence." (Ibid, p. 2; Walzer, 1973, p. 170).

However, when it comes to political actions –and deceptions- the matter is not that simple, for the results of these acts have impacts on so many people, either beneficial or detrimental. Thus, considering the issue of political hypocrisy, the important practical question is; whether any reasons pertaining to the well being of the political actor are sufficient to justify her doing which is detrimental to others? If this question is tried to be answered –or more accurately avoided- by talking about one's own point of view, like the defenders of hypocrisy does, then what is being resorted is not a justification at all, it is a mere excuse (Cullity, 2007, p. 64). As to justify is to defend something as just, proper or right; and the justification process of a norm or an act always involves more than one person, since "it is a question of one person making the norm acceptable to another", it must involve more than just untested

personal steps of reasoning, for moral justification cannot be hidden or exclusive (Bok, 1978, p. 96-97; Finlayson, 2005, p. 79). In this regard, as Habermas claims through his "discourse ethics", justification of a moral discourse –and act- is inherently "dialogical". Thus, contrary to Kant's "monological" test of the universalizability of maxims, individual reasoning is not sufficient to carry our moral discourses (Ibid, p. 85). How the question of justification needs to be asked then, is that "whether there is a justification that a reasonable person affected by my action would have to accept as adequate" (Cullity, 2007, p. 70). This account of what justification really is clearly shows us that, the reasons given by the advocates of political hypocrisy in order to defend it such as the nature of politics, competing interests and power struggles, the dependency between the political agents and so on are not justifications, but they are mere excuses, and therefore they do not remove or clean the morally blameworthiness of the hypocritical acts in our modern democracies. In this regard, from this point on it is necessary to dwell upon democracy, and what hypocrisy implies for it, in order to see if political hypocrisy can be justified in a democracy.

6.2 Democracy and Discontent with Political Hypocrisy

6.2.1 Democracy as Proceduralism

Mostly, the conceptions of democracy are based on the principle of "government by the people", which means that by participating in decision-making processes about the crucial decisions that will structure their lives and determine the future of their society, the people govern themselves (Heywood, 2013, p. 91). Democracy in its minimal conception, in this sense, can be defined as the "self-government" and self-legislation of the people through the "participation" as "equal" citizens in "open and fair discussions" (Christiano, 1996, p. 3). These basic principles and ideals of democracy, especially popular sovereignty, suggest that citizens need to play a very significant role in the governance of their society, coming together to discuss and make decisions about the policies and laws which are going to regulate their lives all together. Taking on democracy from a "proceduralist" perspective, the legitimacy of democratic decisions and acts comes from being the result of "an appropriately constrained process of democratic decision-making" (Fabienne, 2014). Without participation, discussion and deliberation, the decisions that are taken cannot be

considered legitimate for each citizen who is going to live according to them. Thus, as long as the decisions are taken by and in accordance with these conditions, they are legitimate, whatever the result is; the results are legitimate by being the results of a democratic procedure (Christiano, 1996, p. 35). In this way, participation and the "consent" of the people is given a central importance.

The proceduralist account of democracy insists that equal political liberty and rights are the most important goods for a democracy and they need to be flourished, for what characterizes democracy as a distinct form of government, since its classic Athenian origins, is the pursuit of equal liberty, defined as the participation of all citizens in the process of making the laws they obey and live under through their equal contribution (Saffon and Urbinati, 2013, p. 442). As politics is characterised by pluralism and disagreement, the equal opportunity for expressing one's voice and the equal weight given to that voice in decision-making becomes foundational for democracy. Liberty of the citizens is only possible through political rights and a basic equality of opportunities, where the former enables people to participate through voicing their opinions and organising them in order to be effective in public deliberations, and the latter makes the participation matter evenly. People, in a democracy, should participate to the decision-making processes and deliberations not because they are always capable of making the right decisions under any circumstances, but because their participation is crucial in order to minimize the risk of power abuses, and their consent is essential for the legitimacy of any democratic decision, act, or policy. As Karl Popper (1947) states, in a democracy "we hold the keys to the control of the demons". Once we realize this learn how to establish the control of the political power –namely, constructing institutions for the democratic control of power- "we can tame them" (p. 120-121). In this regard, general elections and voting becomes the first and maybe the most effective ways of participation which permit the public to control of the rulers, considering its direct results on the political system, for competitive elections give voting its democratic character as it "empowers the public to kick the rascals out and thus makes politicians publicly accountable" (Heywood, 2013, p. 91; Ibid, p. 140). However, participation in a procedural democracy cannot be reduced to voting only, since there are many other ways to participate to a democratic system through different institutions, public discussions and deliberation, and electoral participation is only one of those ways,

but not sufficient to indicate meaningful participation; "the existence of institutions that allow dissent to be voiced must exist too" (Saffon and Urbinati, 2013, p. 461).

6.2.2 Democracy and Political Hypocrisy

The important question about democracy as a regime is; "who has the right to rule" (Christiano, 1996, p. 2)? It is believed, in the democratic idea, that the answer is the people; that they have a right to rule, and that the decisions about the government and laws that they will live under has to be made by them, or at least by the individuals they have chosen. Each citizen has her right to participate as an equal, and political equality and the ideal of rational deliberation strongly requires citizens to have more equal resources to develop their understanding of their society and interests, and be equal over the control and exercise of the decision-making processes on all issues of public interest (Ibid, p. 2-4). In this regard, when citizens ignore their "duties" and leave all the discussion and decisionmaking to experts and special interests, it results into a society where "a few rule and the rest obey" (Ibid, p. 3-6). It is obvious, in a society or a system like that, political hypocrisy thrives, for closed elites or self-interested political agents all rely on some "myths and deceptions" about how the government is conducted (Crick, 2002, p. 98). They will argue that, as we saw in the arguments of the advocates of political hypocrisy, a measure of deception is crucial for tackling obstacles in the way of achieving national interests; that political negotiations and bargains must be hidden from from the public view, for "a politically unsophisticated electorate" cannot comprehend what is at stake; that in order to be effective, political agents need "a certain amount of illusion". In short, every government needs to deceive the citizens to some extent, in order to rule them properly (Bok, 1978, p. 178). Habermas saw this danger for Western democracies, and claimed that when the "input" coming from civil society to the political and legislative processes is reduced or denied, the sources of "communication" and "discourse" which function as the foundations of political institutions will dry up, leading to political decisions being more prone to "ideological distortion" and to self-interest. In manifacturing the popular consent as the last step of beurocratic decisions, politicians' tendency is not to appeal to and promote open and transparent decision-making institutions, but rather to bypass the procedures of communication and discourse from the political process altogether "for the sake of expediency, moral clarity or some other supposed benefit". Under such circumstances, as the policy

making bodies diminish, the role of citizens is reduced entirely to that of "passive consumers", and the policies and laws the citizens live under are "likely to appear indifferent or hostile to them" and "their feelings of marginalization, alienation, and cynicism will grow", becoming a threat to the social order itself (Finlayson, 2005, p. 120-121).

Political hypocrsiy, then, simply do not go together with the ideals of democracy; for any kind of act or defense of political hypocrisy contains some sort of a consequentialist approach within itself, and an approach of this sort to politics and democracy relegates them into "instruments", makes them good as long as they produce the desired results. However, democracy does include values that make it "intrinsically worthwhile", such as the "liberty" and "equality" of the citizens. Otherwise, a "benevolent monarchy" would do just good as democracy does, if it could reliably produce good outcomes like good legislation and so on (Christiano, 1996, p. 16)

Of course, a need for secrecy in certain situations is real, especially when there is a risk of compromise about the safety of the citizens, and in such exceptional cases, citizens understand that states cannot reveal everything to everyone. However, there is a certain line and difference bewteen refusing to divulge information and deliberate deception (Alterman, 2005, p. 15). In a democracy, the policies, plans and acts of the government or political agents are -in accordance with the essential democratic principles of transparency and accountability- open and known, so that they can be discussed and criticized by the public in order to evaluate them, and give their consent, rectify, or abandon them, if necessary; governments or political representatives can be called into question and can "even be thrown out of office" (Crick, 2002, p. 99). When transparency and accountability is undermined; when political actors resort to hypocrisy in order to "cover up their past mistakes", their "vindictiveness" and their "desire to stay in power", while trying to pass these self-serving ends in the disguise of acting out of necessities and good intentions in accord with the nondescript "public good" (Bok, 1978, p. 182-183), the political system becomes distorted. This private/self-interest aspect of political hypocrisy makes it a type of political corruption. What counts as political corruption can be variable and relative, but it is generally tend to be understood as a distortion or subversion that attacks the "basic nature or function of politics", which is seen to be a "sphere of

allocation and exchange" –in accordance with the instrumental definition of politics mentioned in (5.1)- with a structure and order (Philp, 2014, p. 21). In this regard, when we try to define political corruption in the simplest manner, we take this structure and order of politics –and thus the political system- to be subverted by a political agent who "fails to conform to the norms and expectations of that structure in their societies", and this failure to conform is intentional since the agent does so in order to pursue advantages for herself or the her group –just like most cases of hypocrisy- (Ibid, p. 21). Another point is that, as the term "corruption" can be applied to various other realms such as economy, public service, education and so on, they all have the same conceptual structure, especially on the need for "a recognition of certain formal responsibilities attached to an idea of office or a position of trust" and "the violation of rules and norms concerning the exercise of that office or trust" in order to achieve self-interested benefits –with a strong resemblance with the definition of political hypocrisy described in (5.1)- and thereby "the subversion of the legitimated ends of the office" (Ibid, p. 22). In this regard, political corruption is not only not only a problem of material ends, for it also means the decay or destruction of politics and political itself.

Under the circumstances mentioned above, self-government, equality, participation, deliberation and thus the rule of people become only an illusion, as citizens are relegated to nothing than being mere spectators, hence we can no longer mention a proper democracy. But political hypocrisy, on the other hand, does not only threaten to undermine democratic ideals. When the hypocrisy is exposed, it also damages something even more crucial; trust. Trust is the essential component of any kind of social interaction and cooperation from interpersonal relations to government, and when it is eroded, the existence and sustainability of all institutions are imperiled. Without a certain amount of trust about the "truthfulness" of others, there is no way for us to assess if they are to be fair with us, if they have our interests at their hearts, or if they would do us any harm. It was Habermas, who claimed that the primary "practical" function of language was to coordinate the actions of social agents toward "reaching understanding" –and consensus- which according to him was the "inherent telos of speech" (Habermas, 1984, p. 287). When social agents address each other with this kind of "pragmatic" attitude, they engage in what he calls "communicative action". Whenever they use speech to coordinate their actions, they enter into certain

commitments to justify their actions on the basis of good reasons, commitments which Habermas calls "validity claims", by which he means "the internal connection with reasons and grounds" (Ibid, p. 301). The social order is possible only through these actions guided by speech and the mutual recognition their validity claims. Any "sincere" speech acts, he claims, makes three different validity claims as of a validity claim to truth; a validity claim to truthfulness; and a validity claim to rightness (Habermas, 1995, p. 3). The goal of the communicative action through the validity claims, in this regard, is to generate an agreement of "intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding", "shared knowledge", and most important of all, "mutual trust" in the realm of social interactions (Ibid, p. 3). When social agents appeal to "intentional untruthfulness" –as in the case of hypocritical acts, the mutual understanding and the "consensus" is shaken, and the communicative action cannot continue as it becomes a distorted communication. Thus, when trust is damaged, "the community as a whole suffers" (Bok, 1978, p. 28). The same goes for democratic politics; political hypocrisy is not a problem of individual political agents alone, but rather, it is a problem for democratic and political culture. Considering hypocrisy is an essential and even necessary feature of democracy does not only undermine trust, but transfroms politics and society into a state where no one believes anything others say anymore (Quill, 2010, p. 201). When the public loses faith in democracy and the public opinion believes that all politicians, maybe even the very activity of politics is "corrupt" and "self-serving", legitimacy of the governments and the system as a whole is threatened (Crick, 2002, p. 99).

Finally, the fundamental democratic liberties and rights of the citizens are also undermined by political hypocrisy. As mentioned above, every citizen in a democratic society has the right to participate to decision-making processes –public discourse and discussions- as equals, and make free choices about the government, policies and laws which are going to regulate their lives. It is true, of course, that they might give up on choosing and participating to democratic processes, or they might let others such as "guardians", "financial advisors" or "political representatives" decide for them. However, these alternatives has to be chosen personally and freely by the citizens, not "surreptitiously" imposed by hypocrisy and other kinds of manipulation, without their actual "consent" (Bok, 1978, p. 22). Any attempt as such is an assult on citizens' right to be the "authors" of their own lives,

shaping their lives and personalities by their own choices and actions, in other words, their "freedom as self-development" (Christiano, 1996, p. 18). Habermas (1990) claims that, in a democratic discourse –namely, in an "ideal speech situation"- there must be some rules in order to achieve a reasonably acceptable consensus, such as; every subject with the ability to speak and act should be allowed to take part in the discourse; everyone should be allowed to question any assertion and introduce any assertion to the discourse; everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs; and finally speakers cannot be prevented from exercising their rights mentioned in the previous lines by any internal or external coercion –including deception, and thus hypocrisy- (p. 89). What Habermas recommends, in this regard, is that in a –public, democratic- discourse speakers should "incur a commitment to be sincere, to justify one's utterances, not to contradict oneself, not to exclude other participants, and so on" (Finlayson, 2005, p. 44). For only through a process of discussion and deliberation with sincere participants, a proper and rational consensus and democratic decision is possible. Although in real life discourses, where speakers are prone to error and the time for making decisions is limited, these ideals seem to be approximated to a lesser degree. Yet they still can guide us and have a regulative effect of "ensuring inclusiveness, comprehensiveness", and concerning political hypocrisy, "the absence of deception and coercion" (Ibid, p. 44). Thus, in the light of all these information, it is clear that the effort to question political hypocrisy cannot be ruled out so simply with appeals to "excuses" like the nature of politics, adversarial aspect of electorial campaigns, with good intentions aimed at a greater good and so on. There is simply an apparent incompatibility between the moral status, objectives and outcomes of political hypocrisy and the properties and ideals of democracy. Disparaging or evading any inquiries about political hypocrisy necessarliy leads to defending unwarranted power; a power which bypasses the consent of the citizens (Bok, 1978, p. 179).

These remarks leads us to conclude that political hypocrisy in a democracy is, as a matter of principle, unjustified. However, in this current chapter and the previous ones in this research, it has been claimed that completely rejecting hypocrisy under any circumstances can be as much problematic as completely affirming it. Thus, does concluding that hypocrisy is principally unjustified contradict with criticising the strict anti-hypocritical perspective, as the main purpose of this research was to find if

there are any circumstances that might justify political hypocrisy? Not necessarily. Rejecting political hypocrisy in principle does not mean that we need to adopt an absolutist perspective and claim that we ought to tell the truth even to a murderer who asks the whereabouts of our friend. It rather makes us be cautious about trivial reasons and excuses given to us about the necessity or permissibility of political hypocrisy; it makes us to hold that openness, transparency and accountability as essential features of a literal democracy with intrinsically valuable properties like freedom and equality, and if an instance of political hypocrisy is going to be considered as acceptable, it can only be an exception and a last resort, as the exception proves the rule.

It is true, that hypocrisy and other kinds of deception are not always used in order to gain power, unmerited rewards or avoiding deserved punishments, but as we have seen in the case of "victim hypocrisy" (3.1.1) they can be used also for self-defence, trying to protect one's privacy from interferences, even for survival. Another "benign" type of hypocrisy shows itself in our everyday lives in the form of manners and politeness. As we seem to find all these instances of hypocrisy somewhat acceptable or at least excusable, what then, can be said about similar instances of political hypocrisy? What if a particular hypocritical act of government or a political agent is "the right thing to do on utilitarian terms", as it gives an opportunity to achieve a morally good end (Walzer, 1973, p. 161; Alexandra, 2007, p. 76-77)? Or what if, the political agent faces a dilemma, where she has to choose between her publicly avowed principles and ideals that she both believes in, where choosing one of them means defying the other, and thus make her a hypocrite? At first, it must be said that, these kind of cases are not very likely to happen during the lifetime of a political agent, thus taking political hypocrisy to be principally impermissible, even if they can be considered as benign or justifiable, they can only be exceptions as it is mentioned above. Secondly, the restrictions and boundaries of such exceptions need to be defined clearly and carefully, and be approached case-by-case. In such cases, citizens can appeal to some criteria in order to see if the case of political hypocrisy at hand can be justified like; (i) what moral reasons is the political actor giving for abusing her publicly avowed principles; (ii) in what context did this violation took place; (iii) where there any non-hypocritical alternatives available; (iv) what are the effects of these actions both to the public and agent herself –e.g did she derive

personal benefits to the detriment of the one's being deceived (Dovi, 2001, p. 16; Bok, 1978, p. 109). In this regard, turning back to the examples given in the second chapter, it is clear, for instance, that the examples of Clinton and Bush cannot be evaluated as the same; for the former was trying to protect his and his family's privacy and even dignity as their private life was was tried to be made public –and as mentioned in (5.1), too much interference on anyone's privacy is likely to push them towards hypocrisy in order to try to protect it- while the latter used hypocrisy and blatant lying in order to fulfill an agenda which was meant to hide the failures in the economy, domestic and international policies to be re-elected, or in other words, fulfill his very self-interests. Thus, appealing to the criteria mentioned above, the deception in the Clinton case clearly looks benign in its own circumstances, when compared to the Bush case.

Given these criteria and restrictions, citizens might give their consent and consider the case of political hypocrisy justifiable. But of course, this kind of an evalution and consent needs to be based on adequate information available to the citizens. Apart from this, in case that public reasoning fails –for its reliability can as well be questionable- the acts of the political agent needs to be checked by a third party, namely other legal and political institutions –e.g a supreme court, for political hypocrisy can adversely effect the rule of law as well (Dovi, 2001, p. 8). As Popper (1947) states, the most fundamental problem of all politics –either in the cases of political hypocrisy or in any other uses of political power- is "the control of the controller", in other words, the control of the government. In this regard, democracy and democratic institutions, he further claimed, "are the only known means to achieve this control" (p. 121-122). What we must learn in the long run, according to Popper, is that "all political problems are institional problems" and "problems of the legal framework", rather than personal ones, and the only guarantee against exploitation and power abuses is the "establishment of institutions for the democratic control of the rulers" (Ibid, p. 128-151). Thus, the final part of this chapter will reflect on the entities and institutions which might have significant role in holding political hypocrisy in check.

6.3 Keeping Political Hypocrisy Under Control

As mentioned above, in accordance with the princinple of self-government, the citizens need to participate as much they can to the public discussions and deliberations. Citizens who do not participate in decision-making processes which has a powerful impact on the direction of their lives lose their control over shaping them, becoming passive subjects (Christiano, 1996, p. 20). When they just vote as a routine and leave everything else to the representatives and experts, the political system and the government starts to become enclosed and centered around a single individual or a group of people working behind a veil, creating fertile grounds for political hypocrisy and other kinds of deception and thus transforming the citizens from rulers into merely the ruled. In such cases, we might talk about an autocracy or maybe even a dictatorship, but clearly, not a properly functioning democracy. In a democratic setup, the participation of the people has crucial importance for checking the excesses of political hypocrisy and opposing it, however, it is not enough, for this participation will not be effective if the citizens are not well informed on all sides of the issues at hand which they are going to express their views (Singh, 2014, p. 96). Open, transparent government and the freedom of information, with its availability and circulation is as important as participation, and in this sense, "right to information acts" have a crucial rule in modern democracies (Crick, 2002, p. 99). The "right to truth" is the precondition of freedom and democracy, and a fundamental human right, which was expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations. In a democratic society and state, every single citizen has the right to "true, verified, understandable, accurate, relevant, pertinent, timely, available and practically accessible information", and any attempt to deceive, dissimulate or disseminate information that does not fulfil these criteria, "violate the citizens' right to information and the human right to truth" (Olenski, 2003, p. 34). Therefore, an "informed citizenry" and "transparency of information" is crucial for a functioning democracy, as well as for containing political hypocrisy and corruption, thus holding governments and their instruments accountable to the citizens. A democracy is not meaningful when the citizens cannot audit the acts and performances of their governments, bureaucrats and representatives, the ones who act on behalf of them, and in order to the be able to audit all these, they have to be well informed. In short, an informed citizenry is the precondition for a participatory

democracy (Singh, 2014, p. 96); and the better the right to information laws are obeyed and employed, the more restriction it means for the acts of goverments and political agents –thus for political hypocrisy- and the more democracy the citizens enjoy (Olenski, 2003, p. 34).

In accordance with the citizens' right to information, another crucial institution which supports the people in checking the hypocrisy of their leaders and representatives and holding them accountable by providing information, is a free press. A strong and impartial free press can uncover the truths hidden or denied by governments and politicians, deliver evidences that can "undercut deliberate obfuscations of the facts", revealing secrets to the citizens which were actually intended for the "eyes of the few", whose intentions may not be so good and pure as they claim, after all (Jay, 2010, p. 177). In this sense, "muckraking" has been especially effective in exposing political hypocrisy. It must be said that, of course, while searching for valuable information that need public attention, the press should not violate the privacy of public figures as long as there are valid reasons, as mentioned above. The important role of the free press in exposing duplicity has sometimes been criticised by saying that it is not immune to corruption either, as journalism itself can perpetuate lies and publish false stories. But still, "the fourth estate" provides a vital service for the public as a check on "spins, dissimulations, deliberate ambiguities, and outright falsehoods of political rhetoric", matters that the public could not have known or heard about any other way. (Ibid, p. 178). That being said, along with the free press, an open academic culture is another important public institution that supports public in checking political hypocrisy by providing information and professional judgment based on "openness, transparency, and especially in the case of science, on experimental data" (Ibid, p. 179). The importance of a free academia in protecting the democratic ideals can be understood from it being one of the first entities to be suppressed, when a government starts to become authoritarian or corrupt.

As mentioned before, apart from participation and public deliberation of citizens, a third party is necessary for holding political hypocrisy in check; legal institutions. In this sense, an "independent judiciary dedicated to fair and impartial implementation of laws" –such as the right to information acts- is crucial in order to align the acts of governments and political agents with laws (Ibid, p. 178). An independent judiciary

with strong legal institutions like constitutional courts and supreme courts, is an essential feature of a properly functioning democracy, as its main objective is to prevent abuses of power, and political hypocrisy might as well be considered as an abuse of power. Political hypocrisy does not only undermine the rights of the citizens and democratic ideals, but it can also effect the rule of law adversely, for most of the time it accompanies different froms of wrongdoing like bending the laws or bypassing them, and illegal acts like bribery, tax fraud, collusive tendering and so on. In this sense, independent judiciary and a strong legal system have a significant role in checking political hypocrisy and other kinds of abuse of power by the governments and political agents. That said, they are important not only for checking political hypocrisy, but also in protecting the fundamental democratic rights of the citizens, which also serve as control mechanisms. Finally independent judiciary and legal institutions also serve as a loadstar, when the public reason fails, and actually checks it too, if necessary.

6.4 Conclusion

Starting from the previous chapter, the main opposition between the advocates and the opponents of political hypocrisy has been introduced. From the assessment of both perspectives, it can be seen that although they both have points that can be considered as sound, they are not without defects. The arguments given by the anti-hypocrites seems to forget that not every single inconsistency of a government or political agent is hypocrisy and that politicians are humans too and thus can fall short of expectations. Imposing strict moral principles on people and to demand a complete transparency from them is likely to be counterproductive and prone to turn into oppression. Besides, some secrecy and concealment is inherent to politics, even in democracies, especially in issues of national security, and a complete transparency is not feasible. On the other hand, the "justifications" given by the advocates of political hypocrisy are so trivial, and in fact inimical to the institution of politics itself as they accept deception as a necessary condition of all political relations and inherent to the nature of politics. An approach like this renders politics into a mere instrument, nothing than a means to achieve power and fulfil self-regarded desires. The banality of these so-called "justifications" required an inquiry into what

justification and what it is not, which has shown that they are not justifications but mere excuses from the narrow perspective of the one's who benefit from them.

As the main purpose of this research was to define the status and function of hypocrisy in the realm of democratic politics, and see if there could be any circumstances under which political hypocrisy can be justified, in accordance with that goal, firstly a procedural account of democracy has been introduced and then the implications of political hypocrisy for the democratic ideals have been discussed. It has been clearly seen that, political hypocrisy simply disaccords with democracy, and as a principle, it needs to be objected. Objecting it principally, however, does not mean turning a blind eye to the political realities or adopting an extremely idealist stance, which has been criticized beforehand. It rather means canonizing transparency and accountability as indispensable democratic ideals and political honesty as a virtue, and not being satisfied with the crafty "excuses" given for political hypocrisy. It also does not mean that there can never be an example of benign political hypocrisy, but means that even if there might be, it can be only an exception that proves the principle, and it needs to be put in certain restrictions, evaluated carefully, and be able to be checked by informed citizens and other institutions. In this regard, in the final section of this chapter, the institutions that are crucial for holding political agents accountable and keep political hypocrisy under control have been indicated and discussed.

7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the conceptual analysis of hypocrisy, at first, two definitions of the concept has been given as the interior and the exterior ones. The interior definition of hypocrisy is the assuming of a false appearance of virtue or goodness, with dissimulation of real character or inclinations, thus referring to one or more of an individual's psychological attributes (Furia, 2009, p. 115), while the exterior definition of hypocrisy is simply, not practicing what you preach. Taking these two definitions together, it has been argued that the concept of hypocrisy consists of four distinct properties being the intentional deception of others, a self-interested affair, an element of inconsistency, and secrecy. Hypocrisy involves the intentional deception of others in the sense that the hypocrite pretends to be better then she actually is, constructing a "persona" that generates a false impression in the eyes of of the deceived (Runciman, 2008, p. 9) –in accordance with the word's Greek origins that comes from theatre; it is a self interested affair, for by pretending to a false appearance in or to look trustworhy and virtuous, the hypocrite aims to gain unmerited rewards and fulfill her self-regarding desires; it involves an element of inconsistency as the hypocrite pretends to virtues and goodness she does not have, thus there will always be a disparity between her pretended beliefs and genuine beliefs, between her actions and thoughts, between her words and deeds. However, it has been argued that not all kinds of personal inconsistencies can be called hypocrisy, thus the differences between hypocrisy, weakness of will and changes of mind have been presented. Finally, as hypocrisy is a form of deception through one's construction of a false image in the eyes of others, it requires the concealment of one's real self and all its components behind the fabricated one, thus always needs a certain amount of secrecy, in order to be successful.

Hypocrisy has always drawn attention because of its ubiquity in any kind of relations and social entities, including politics, but this attention has been a rather negative one. Stemming from the duplicity and the pursuit of self-interest inherent in it, our common-sense morality condemns it, for morality imposes the restriction of self-

interest for the sake of others, if necessary. Hence hypocrisy has been seen as a moral failing, the manifestation of a corrupt character, an unforgivable sin, or a pure vice. In this regard, in order to see what is morally wrong about hypocrisy with the intention of understanding the concept to the core, its moral status have been evaluated through the perspectives of various ethical theories in the third chapter. For this purpose, at first, as hypocrisy is an end oriented act, consequentialist theories and deontology as a principle/duty based theory have been positioned against each other. It has been argued that, from the perspective of ethical egoism and utilitarianism, hypocrisy is morally permissible as long as it produced good consequences either for the agent herself, or a group of people based on their aggregated utility; while for virtue ethics, it is a vice, due to the fact that it renders the development of a good character which is the condition of happiness – eudamonia- which could only be achieved through a virtuous and purposeful life. From the deontological perspective, contrary to egoism and utilitarianism, it has been argued that hypocrisy is morally impermissible, based on two categorical imperatives introduced by Kant; the first reason for its impermissibility is that, just like in the example of lying, acting hypocritically cannot be made into a universal law, for it would be self-destructive; secondly, the hypocrite pretends to treat people as ends, but actually uses them merely as a means to fulfill her self-interests, thus violates the second categorical imperative by not treating people with the respect they deserve as rational beings. Although we intuitively know that hypocrisy is morally culpable, there might be instances where it would we difficult to consider it as blameworthy. In this regard, the concept of "victim hypocrisy" (Kittay, 1982) has been introduced. In such cases, hypocrisy appears to be a means for self-protection in a hostile or oppressive environment, where one tries to protect her privacy, her freedom, or perhaps even her life. The example of victim hypocrisy, it has been argued, shows the deficiencies of both consequentialism and deontology, for the former is able to show why hypocrisy might not always ne morally culpable, while having problems to show what is morally wrong with it; whereas the latter is able to explain what is morally wrong with hypocrisy, but has problems in explaining the examples where the moral condemnation attached to hypocrisy is greatly diminished. In order to get a broader understanding of the subject, and step out of the central conflict between consequentialism and deontology, natural law theory and contractualism have also been introduced and examined. It has been argued that, from the perspectives of both

theories, hypocrisy was morally wrong. According to natural law theory, the function of speech and our capactiy to know and understand were crucial in order to fulfill our natural function and hypocrisy or any other kind of deception simply detains us from that. For Contractualism on the other hand, hypocrisy seemed to violate the respect we ought to have for each other as rational agents, and the principle that we ought not to use others as means to our ends. But it has been argued that, these two theories were not completely closed to the possibility of a benign example of hypocrisy, after all.

After analysing the the concept of hypocrisy conceptually and evaluating its moral status from different perspectives, it was necessary to continue to the realm of politics, as the main the issue at hand in this research is political hypocrisy. Hence, in the fourth chapter, the relationship between hypocrisy and politics as a set of actions has been examined in order to understand why these two are thought to be so intertwined. In our everday language, politics has become a negatively loaded concept and endeavor. It has been argued that, this discontent with politics is due to its conception as the "art of government" or "what concerns the state", incarcerating it to allocating benefits, rewards, penalties and to party politics, thus relegating it to an "end-oriented" activity in service of power-seeking and self-interested politicians, rather than an activity inherent to our social existence with its public character, "based on the fact of human plurality", rights and the equality of citizens (Arendt and Kohn, 2005, p. 93). Afterwards, in order to further the aim of the chapter, the definition of political hypocrisy has been given. It has been stated that, political hypocrsiy is the inconsistency between a political agent's public statements and her actions. However, as exposing what one's political opponent does in her private life in order to defame and paint her as a hypocrite in the electoral race has become regular, the relationship between political hypocrisy and privacy and what should stay private and what should be served to public attention needed to be discussed. In this regard, it has been argued that the private lifes of political actors need to be uninterfered, as long as what they do in their privacy does not harm anyone or violate their rights. Hence, in accordance with this approach, the term political hypocrisy has been redefined as a political actor's intentional "exaggeration" of her commitment to morality and to political ideals (Dovi, 2001, p. 11), while acting contrary to them on behalf of the office they hold and their state. As the definition of political hypocrisy

has been set, two opposing approaches on the moral status of political hypocrisy has been introduced, similar to the consequentialism-deontology controversy on the moral status of hypocrisy. It has been argued that, the advocates of political hypocrisy see it as an indispensable and necessary feature of politics, for political relations are relations of dependency (Grant, 1997) and for power and personal success are still goals to be sought even in democracies, thus obtaining these requires hypocrisy. According to this perspective, hypocrisy might also be necessary for bringing out a public good, which the public could not be able to foresee. On the other side, the opponents of political hypocrisy –namely, the anti-hypocrites- argue that deception is ultimately destructive to society and social relations, thus public life has to be subjected to the same high moral standards which should be followed in one's private life, and be purged from hypocrisy and any other kind of deception as much as possible. In this regard, it has been argued that the "justifications" given by the advocates of political hypocrisy have their roots in Plato's Noble Lie, and Machiavellianism, while the counter-arguments of the opponents of political hypocrisy resides in deontology. Thus, as the deontological perspective on political hypocrisy has been evaluated beforehand in the third chapter, the Noble Lie and Machiavellianism have been introduced as the justification sources of the advocates of political hypocrisy, as the former emphasises the common good that comes from political deception, while the latter emphasises the necessity of political hypocrisy in order gain power and fulfill one's self-interests.

As the final chapter went on from where the previous one left, firstly an overall assesment of the arguments of both the defenders and opponents of political hypocrisy has been done critically. It has been argued that, just like the consequentialism – deontology controversy, both sides have deficiencies and are not very fruitful for the question "Are there any circumstances in which political hypocrisy can be justified in a democracy?", for the former justifies political hypocrisy too comfortably in any context –and apt to create ruthless opportunism and cynicism, while the latter claims it cannot be justified under any circumstances –and thus apt to evolve into an extreme idealism or absolutism. In this regard, in order to scrutinise the status and relationship of hypocrisy with democracy, a definition of democracy has been given. It has been argued that, democracy in the minimal sense is the "self-government" and self-legislation of the people through the "participation"

as "equal" citizens in "open and fair discussions" (Christiano, 1996, p. 3). As there are many different forms and definitions of democracy, a procedural account of it has been preferred for this study, as it bases the legitimacy of the regime on the democratic processes, and gives central importance to the participation and the consent of the citizens. Taking the participation of the people to decision-making processes and and public deliberations about the laws and policies that will shape their lives as the core of democracy, it has been claimed that when citizens leave these processes to experts and special interests, it results in their relegation from self-governing agents into mere spectators. Correspondingly, such circumstances also provides fertile grounds for political hypocrisy to thrive. For as the citizens abandon the public matters, closed elites or self-interested politicians start to create "myths and deceptions" about the conduct of the government and resort to political hypocrisy whenever it suits their interests. In this regard, when they try to pass their self-serving ends in the disguise of good intentions or a common good, self-government, equality, participation, deliberation and thus the rule of people become only an illusion, hence a proper democracy can no longer be mentioned. Furthermore, political hypocrisy does not only undermine democratic ideals, but its effects can be even more detrimental when it is exposed, as it damages the feeling of trust in the society. Finally, it has been argued that political hypocrisy undermines the the fundamental democratic liberties and rights of the citizens, for it is an assult on their right to be the "authors" of their own lives, shaping their lives and personalities by their own choices and actions, in other words, their "freedom as self-development" (Christiano, 1996, p. 18), in the sense that their choices are surreptitioulsy manipulated, thus their consent is bypassed. In accordance with these remarks, it has been claimed that political hypocrisy and democracy explicity do not go together, and political hypocrisy is unjustified as a matter of princple. However, it has been argued that taking political hypocrisy princpally unjustified does not mean to take an absolutist stance, which has been criticised before. It rather means that, being cautious about trivial reasons and excuses given in the guise of justifications about the necessity or permissibility of political hypocrisy, and holding openness, transparency and accountability as essential features of a democracy, while acknowledging that if an instance of political hypocrisy is going to be considered as acceptable, it can only be an exception –which proves the rule- and a last resort, which needs be put in certain restrictions, evaluated by citizens with regards to

specified criteria, and be able to be checked by institutions other than the public itself. In this regard, to conclude the research, the criteria that can be used to evaluate the status of the case of political hypocrisy at hand, and the institutions which can hold it under control such as a free press, free academia, right to know acts, and an independent judiciary with strong legal institutions have been discussed.

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