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THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

DURING AK PARTY ERA

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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the foreign economic relations of Turkey which is an instrument of Turkish foreign policy and the contribution of Turkish foreign policy to Turkish economy by benefiting both from the statistics and indices. In this context, the economy foreign policy relationship will be scrutinized. Our study is focused on the change of Turkish economy during the period of 2002 – 2012 of Ak Party that came into power after the crisis of year 2001 and the new approaches in the foreign policy within this period. In this study the basic findings are: Firstly, the performance of the Turkish economy in the 1990s is compared with its performance between the years 2002 – 2012 with different parameters and it was seen that there was a relative improvement. Second, in this period the scale is enlarged with new approaches in global and regional areas in the Turkish foreign policy and as a result of this the quests of regional economic integration has been shown by benefiting from statistics. Thirdly, depending on the growth of the scale in Turkish Foreign Policy; by removing visas within the frames of new approaches, it has been facilitated the opening of diplomatic embassies, the signing of free trade agreements, the Non-governmental organizations, to be able to cooperate and conducting trade of the business world with the global and regional world rapidly. In this context, Turkish Foreign Policy has increased the global and regional cooperation and its quests for conducting trade in becoming a “Trading State”.

Keywords: Ak Party, Foreign Policy, Soft Power, Economy, Trading State

ÖZET

Bu tez, istatistiklerden ve endeklerden faydanılarak, Türk dış politikasının bir enstürmanı olan dış ekonomik ilişkilerin Türk ekonomisine katkısını incelemektedir. Bu bağlamda ekonomi dış politika ilişkisi irdelenecektir. Çalışmamız, 2001 krizi sonrası iktidara gelen AK partinin 2002-2012 dönemde Türk ekonomisindeki değişimi ve bu dönemdeki dış politikadaki yeni yaklaşımları merkeze almaktadır. Bu çalışmadaki temel bulgular: Birincisi, Türk ekonomisinin 1990'lı yıllardaki perfonması ile 2002-2012 yılları arasındaki performansı farklı paremetlerle kıyaslanmış, göreceli bir iyileşme olduğu görülmüştür. İkincisi, Bu dönemde Türk dış politikasında yeni yaklaşımlarla küresel ve bölgesel alanda ölçek büyötmüş, bunun sonucu olarak bölgesel ekonomik entegrasyon arayışları istatistiklerden faydalınılarak gösterilmiştir. Üçüncüsü, Türk dış politikasındaki ölçek büyötmeye bağlı olarak; yeni yaklaşımlar çerçevesinde vizeleri kaldırarak, diplomatik elçilikler açılması, serbest ticaret anlaşmaları imzalanması ile Sivil toplum kuruluşları ve iş dünyasının hızlı bir şekilde küresel ve bölgesel dünyayla işbirliği ve ticaret yapmasını kolaylaştırmıştır. Bu bağlamda. Türk dış politikası 'Trading State' olma yolunda küresel ve bölgesel işbirliğini ve ticaret arayışlarını artırmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AK Parti, Dış Politika, Yumusak Güç, Ekonomi, Ticaret Devleti,

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Abbreviations used in this study are presented below together with declinations.

Abbreviation	Declination
AFAD	Disaster and Emergency Management Agency
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AKP	AK Party
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BRSA	Banking Regulations and Supervision Agency
BSEC	Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DBP	Democratic Regions Party
DEIK	Foreign Economic Relations Board
DPT	State Planning Organization
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
ECOWA	Economy Community of West African States
EEC	Europe Economic Community
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FP	Foreign Policy
FRA	Foreign Policy Analysis
FTA	Free Trade Agency
GB	Governing Body

GEGP	Gold Entertainment Group
GNP	Gross National Product
IHH	Humanitarian Relief Foundation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
KDK	Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy
MENA	The Middle East and North Africa Region
MUSIAD	Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
ORSAM	Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies
PCO	Polycystic Ovary Syndrome
PJAK	Party Of Free Life Of Kurdistan
PKK	The Kurdistan Workers' Party
PR	Public Relations
R&D	Research and Development
SETA	Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research
SME	Society of Manufacturing Engineers
TCMB	Central Bank of the Turkish Republic

TFP	Total Factor Productivity
THY	Turkish Air Ways
TIKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
TIM	Turkish Exporters Assembly
TL	Turkish Liras
TUIK	Turkish Statistical Institute
TUSIAD	Turkish Industry and Business Association
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
US	United States
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWII	World War II

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CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

There have been significant changes in Turkish Foreign Policy with the beginning of AK Party rule in Turkey since the elections of November 2002. This transformation which has been experienced in Turkish Foreign Policy since 2002 is a product of new approaches in foreign policy making while preserving the traditional aspects of Turkish foreign policy such as “status quo” and “westernism”. However, while preserving the traditional aspects, there had been changes in the vision, principles and tools of Turkish foreign policy.

During 1990s, Turkey made effort to be a significant regional actor and to be more effective in world politics. In this period, Turkey has carried out Western oriented, status quoits, passive and security oriented foreign policy. AK Party government brought new approaches in foreign policy making in Turkey.

The new foreign policy approach in Turkey has been facilitated by several domestic and international affairs. Turkey’s new position within the post-Cold War period, global and regional transformations and their impact on the global politics and the global economy, the beginning of accession negotiations with the European Union, AKP government and change in the vision, quest new global markets of Turkish economy, the unsuccessful coalition governments in 1990s and severe economic recession and crisis in 2001 were among the most significant factors.

In this context, a pragmatic change has taken place in Turkish foreign policy, and the new actors and tools have been emerged which shape country’s foreign policy perspective. Especially in the first period of AKP rule, Turkey implemented a policy of “moving EU affairs to the center”. Also, Turkish foreign policy displays a foreign policy approach that prioritizes the economy. Turkey, during Ak Party period, pritorized political

and economic stability in the Middle East and the neighboring countries by implementing “zero problem with neighbors” policy and initiated new foreign policy understanding that aims to construct high-level economic, political, and cultural cooperation within the region.¹

The new approaches initiated by Davutoglu who ensured paradigmatic change in Turkish foreign policy with ‘Strategic Depth’ perspective paved the way for a vision to strengthen global and regional relations by focusing economy, culture and politics.² The new approaches conceptualized by Davutoglu as; ‘zero problem with neighbors’, ‘Rhythmic and proactive foreign policy’, ‘Central state’, ‘Multi-dimensional foreign policy’, ‘freedom security balance’ became the most important instruments in Turkish foreign policy.

Davutoglu summarized the transformation in Turkish foreign policy in the post-cold war era as follows; “the transition to the dynamic condition of the period led many global and regional actors to seek alternative foreign policy approaches”. This situation also created a change in foreign policy preferences and processes of Turkey. According to Davutoglu, *“As a result, Turkey has been seeking new political and economic alliances beyond her region and quested new initiatives for the last ten years”* Davutoglu also emphasizes the new approach of Turkish foreign policy by stating that Turkish diplomacy should be effective not only in the region but throughout the world (*Davutoğlu, 2007, p. 221-437*).

¹ It is a policy that is initiated by Ahmet Davutoglu which aims Turkey to eliminate all the problems with her neighbors or at least to minimize them as much as possible.

² “Strategic Depth” is the name of the book written by Ahmet Davutoğlu in 2001 and can be considered as a summary of vision of new Turkish foreign policy. In his book, Davutoğlu states that Turkey should combine its cultural, historical depth and potential dynamics with strategic policies.

This vision and approach contain political economy perspective. This policy aims a multidimensional, economy oriented Turkish foreign policy by establishing global and regional relations. Turkey opens diplomatic missions in Latin America, Africa and signs free trade agreements and high level cooperation and trade agreements, and lifts visa requirements as a result of this economy- oriented foreign policy.

Political economy of Turkey refers to the political economy realities of foreign policy preferences of Turkey and economic factors within the country and their impact on foreign policy. States while determining their foreign policies should also take economy into account. On the other hand, for the countries that aim development, capital is one of the most prominent considerations. Developing countries such as Turkey should give priority to foreign investment and foreign capital. In this context, in order to receive foreign capital and investment Turkey should construct cooperation in her foreign relations. In other words, Turkey's foreign policy should be in line with economic needs, programs and demands within the country in order to have investment and capital. (Ateş, 2014, p. 130-31).

In terms of foreign economic relations and in order to become a “trading state” a state should realize foreign capital mobilization, develop business relations and investments on a global scale. In a global liberal economic order, states perform in order to take share from the global market as a trading state. Thus, foreign policy has a significant impact in this competitive world order. The age we live in led global and local actors to perform within the same markets. In the context of global power and prosperity relations and in this competitive environment, foreign policy becomes the most significant tool of economies.

In the last decade, Turkey's priority has been the development of Turkish economy. Foreign capital investments are the most prominent sources of developing economies and

the countries. Hence, Turkish foreign policy played significant role in attracting foreign capital and investment. In addition to this, civil society initiatives and business world have been effective in developing cooperation with the global and regional centers through foreign policy. While Turkish foreign policy during AK Party era is evaluated, it can be stated that economy has been the major tool.

1.1 Subject of This Study

The subject of this study is the evaluation of the transformation in Turkish foreign policy after 2002 with AK Party government and its impact on Turkish economy and Turkey's foreign economic relations.

In order to explain the subject, in Chapter 2 the main focus will be given to the theoretical and conceptual framework by focusing on the concepts of foreign policy and economy in the context of international relations. Liberal approach of international relations which focuses on the economic dimension will be the framework in the course of this study.

This theoretical framework will be used in order to explain multidimensional Turkish foreign policy in 2000s, the developments in political economy, the rapid globalization of business world, and state-business relations. However, liberal approach can not applicable to the entire course of Turkish foreign policy.

In Chapter 3, new vision, approaches and perspectives in Turkish foreign policy during the AK Party government will be evaluated. In this period, economy became a major tool of foreign policy making. The quest for globalization, regionalization led Turkey to scale up her foreign policy and Turkey attempted to be a trading state by using soft power, public diplomacy, and the new vision and mission initiated by Davutoğlu.

In Chapter 4, the emphasis will be given to the economic situation of Turkey in 1990s. Also, in order to understand the current economic conditions, economic indicators between 2002-2012 will be used. In this context, growth rates, Turkey's economic situation within the global system and her economic relations within the region will be analyzed. Turkish foreign policy and its impact on foreign economic relations will also be mentioned.

In Chapter 5, Turkey's direct or indirect relations with non-state actors as a result of scaling up in foreign policy will be discussed. Also, as mentioned in previous chapter, impact of Turkish foreign policy on business world and civil society will be mentioned. The role of non state actors in quest of new markets and regional integrations will be analyzed. It can be stated that the foreign investments have been increased since 2002 together with the growth in Turkish economy.

In this study, Turkish foreign policy will be presented in chronological order. While, using periodization as a method of study, major global turning points will be taken into consideration.

1.2 The Purpose and Importance of the Study

It can be stated that the significance of economy has been increased in domestic politics and foreign policy during the AK Party rule in Turkey. Although there are many studies that focus on Turkish foreign policy, only few studies address foreign policy with an economic perspective. Therefore, the main purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the economic growth in Turkey with a liberal theoretical framework by focusing on the transformation of Turkish foreign policy.

When the literature on Turkish foreign policy is examined, it can be stated that majority of the studies focus on issues of high politics in Turkish foreign policy. There are only few studies that focus on Turkish foreign policy during AKP rule with an economy perspective. Mehmet Şahin wrote a master thesis in 2011 on Turkish political economy at Gazi University, Ankara which aims to present the economic perspective of Turkish foreign policy. (Şahin, 2011, p. 1-30)

This study focuses on economy as a tool of foreign policy making and analyzes the political economy of Turkey in the post cold-war era by considering international trends such as regionalization and globalization. (Şahin, 2011, p. 1-30) Also, Haluk Gerger wrote a book on “political economy of Turkey in the post-cold war era” which focuses international and domestic factors that shape foreign policy in Turkey. In his book “Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politiği”, Gerger discusses Turkish foreign policy with a historical perspective and points out the breaking points and transformation periods by considering the economic conditions of each period. (Gerger, 1998)

Özdemir at al. recently wrote a book on Turkish foreign policy and its economic dimension which is called “Türk Dış Politikası’nin Ekonomi Politiği”. In this book, the main focus was given to the international political economy and Turkey’s position within the changing international economic environment. (Özdemir, 2016, p. 1-153)

Mustafa Kutlay wrote an article on economic dimension of Turkish foreign policy which was published in “Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi” in 2012. His study focuses on the importance of the transformation of Turkish political economy into a “proactive state” structure in order to operationalize economy as a sustainable vehicle in foreign policy. (Kutlay, 2012)

In 2009, a special issue on Turkish foreign policy was published “New Perspectives Publishing”. There, Kemal Kirişçi wrote an article about political economy of Turkey by

paying adequate attention to the role of economic factors shaping Turkish foreign policy. Also it offers a preliminary conceptual framework based on Richard Rosecrance's notion of the "trading state" and Robert Putnam's idea of "two-level diplomatic games" to explore the impact of economic considerations on Turkish foreign policy. (Kirişçi, 2009)

There are numerous books and articles on Turkish foreign policy. However, as already mentioned, there are few studies focusing on the economic dimension of Turkish foreign policy. This study aims to fill a gap in the literature, by presenting an approach on foreign policy –economy relations in Turkey and distinguish itself from the previous works on several points. This study will focus on the role of civil society, business world, newly initiated free trade agreements and visa liberalization as a result of multidimensional foreign policy making in Turkey. This study points out the shift in Turkish economy by creating market diversity. During the AK Party rule, Turkey became very active in the Middle East market while preserving trade relations with the European countries. Foreign investments and cash inflow has been increased in this period because of the economy oriented foreign policy.

Economy has tremendous impact on developing countries. Foreign capital inflow, regional integration, civil society and expansion of business activities throughout the world make Turkish political economy more prominent.

This study also aims to suggest new approaches to economy oriented foreign policy. In this context, this thesis has two main contributions: First, it attempts to describe Turkish Foreign Policy under AK Party rule as a "change in continuity" rather than a "disengagement from the traditional approach". The second contribution is the evaluation of the relation between economy oriented Turkish foreign policy and growth in Turkish economy.

1.3 Methodology

This thesis can be regarded as a qualitative research, which requires collecting consistent knowledge about a certain phenomenon and interpreting this information. In order to support the hypothesis, this study also will provide statistical information regarding Turkish economy. The primary data will be collected from TUIK (Turkish Statistical Institute). Also, data collection method will include the review of the current and historical literature related to Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish political economy.

Turkish foreign policy will be analyzed with a chronological order. In this work, periodization will be used as a method of the study. Thus, dividing it into the periods will provide a better understanding of the conditions in each period.

CHAPTER 2

2. FOREIGN POLICY AND THEORY

A phenomenon, a data in Foreign policy are in need of understanding and explanation within the context of cause and effect relationship. In this context theory is needed. We can say that, theory is a set of propositions that is connected to each other's with cause and effect relationship, in order to understand and explain a certain phenomenon. A generalizable knowledge generation claim of the theory and to do so by means of abstractions can be able to offer an opportunity for future predictions. In fact, the theories that can be able to resist to time and space differentiation and sustain the explanation claim, can also estimate the results, reasons of the events and facts that may occur at different times and places and the relationship between both of them. This case saves us from the speculative and ideological discourses and it allows us to solve the concrete problems that may be encountered with a rational approach, instead of an unconditional faith.

The theoretical approaches in the foreign policy discipline are in favor of pluralism and they are accepted by everyone and they are not a theory of a single country or a policy of a continent, they are worldwide theoretical approaches. In particular, "power" will be assessed on foreign policy axis within this context. The theoretical approaches which are accepted by everyone and which have considerations and predictions within the context of cause and effect relationship are taken into account. In this study, the theoretical approaches that are accepted by the majority in the foreign policy are addressed; as Turkish foreign policy will be analyzed as economy-oriented, in particular the liberal theoretical approaches are anticipated in the thesis.

2.1 International Relations Theories and Foreign Policy

While foreign policy implementations are related to IR paradigms and theories, the process of foreign policy has come to be understood as a different discipline of study. Therefore, there is a disconnectedness between IR paradigms and theories, and foreign policy approaches. We encounter leadership, decision making and implementation mechanism, bureaucratic processes and the experiences in these processes as fundamental issues of the field we know as foreign policy analysis (FPA) (Hudson et al., 2008, p. 1-30). These issues have been evaluated with empirical data and rather in the framework of the approaches of the behavioralist school. IR paradigms on the other hand, generally develop theoretical perspectives regarding the workings of the international system. Most IR theories are far from being actor-oriented and they do not present approaches related to processes of foreign policy. IR have developed in a way that is disconnected from the included development of the field of FPA. This study, which focuses especially on the economic dimension of foreign policy, discusses foreign policy in scope of the main discipline of IR and in conjunction with its paradigms. While foreign policy is generally seen as an output and there is a close relationship among Actors---Processes---Results, IR paradigms are not directly concerned with this relationship and FPA approaches discuss it in rather technical ways that are disconnected from the general context. This study that focuses rather on the economic dimension of foreign policy, aims to overcome this disconnectedness, and discusses the effects of IR paradigms on the processes of foreign policy in a comparative way.

There are small differences between IR and foreign policy. These are rather about their scopes. In this sense, they differ from each other in that the former is used in a broader sense that covers the latter. To evaluate them one by one, foreign policy views international political issues in the perspective of the purposes, goals and behaviors of a

state or states in general, and investigates the attitude of a state towards the international system or other states. IR has a wider focus and it is concerned with the entire international system. Thus, IR is not the sum of all foreign policies one by one, but it is also concerned with non-state overseas institutions and their effects (Ari, 1999, p. 11-2).

The economic connections among countries within globalization after the Cold War led to an improvement of relationships and development of interdependence. States that are connected to international markets were affected by globalization more, and economic relations among states affected foreign policy decisions. New issues that arise in the cycle of today's international system based on these developments (such as energy policies, environmental issues, terrorism, etc.) affect states' foreign policy decision making mechanisms directly (Kardaş, 2014, p. 246). Problems that arise in connection to globalization made foreign policy an inseparable part of international relations.

2.1.2 Foreign Policy Definition

It is not possible to see a universal definition of foreign policy in the IR literature. The most important reason for this is that foreign policy is not a theoretical paradigm, but an approach based on practice and tangible outputs. There exist different approaches that all explain foreign policy. Valerie M. Hudson (p. 14) defines foreign policy as “the strategy or approach chosen by the national government to achieve its goals in its relations with external entities.” According to Hudson, doing nothing may also be policy. Hudson's definition emphasized the approach to reach the goals in “external places”.

Charles Hermann's definition of foreign policy is an outcome oriented one, rather than based on the approach or the foreign/domestic difference. Hermann defines foreign policy as “the discrete purposeful action that results from the political level decision of an

individual or group of individuals. It is not the decision, but a product of the decision” what really matters for Hermann. (Hermann, 1978, p. 25). Global, domestic factors and even the personal characteristics of leaders may affect the foreign policy decisions, therefore what we need to do is to focus on the outcome according to this approach.

According to Campell, while foreign policy that can be defined as state identity shapes international politics, it is also affected by international politics of any given moment. It is reestablished and strengthened by it. To give an example, Cyprus, which had been one of the most important foreign policy issues after the intervention of 1974, was not only shaped within the lines of state identity, but it also shaped, reestablished and strengthened state identity. State identity became the thing that turned Cyprus into a national security issue, and Cyprus becoming a national security issue shaped state identity (Balci, 2007, p. 72-3).

While discussing foreign policy, we may talk about three different situations. The first is the foreign policy as a concept that describes the point of view of the political power towards the collection of relations that it defines as external. FR in this sense may be defined as an orientation. In the second situation, foreign policy may be understood as a prediction related to other centers of power and of how other states will form their relations related to their sovereignty by the political power. If understood like this, foreign policy may be seen as a design. Thirdly, foreign policy may be understood as a concept related to the attitudes of the political power towards the area they define as external (Balta, 2014, p. 327).

Is foreign policy different from ordinary political activities? Is it possible to define a separate form of political activity as foreign policy? If yes, approaches that consider a national foreign policy, and say it is national, has fundamental principles and goals, therefore it should stay as it is, have lost their validity in a great amount. It is not possible

to see foreign policy issues separate from political discussion processes any more. When it is seen as the outcome of the power grabbing strategies of the political power, the IR field defined as foreign policy, becomes no longer a field that is outside political life, that is technical, special, and managed by non-political, supra-political tools. In this sense, foreign policy is no different from any other policy the political power follows to grab power, use its power, strengthen its position and prevent its opponents from getting strong (Balta, 2014, p. 329) Instead of defining foreign policy in abstract terms, focusing on the properties of foreign policy would be a more comprehensive approach.

Unlike the contenting theoretical approaches or paradigms in IR theories, there are no grand theories about foreign policy. There are mid-range theories that characterized the general logic and the flow of foreign policy. One of the founders of the FPA field James Rosenau argues that foreign policy lacks general theory (Rosenau, 1966, p. 98-9) and called for a “middle range theory that mediated between the grand principles and the complexity of reality” in the FPA field (These theories are often related to or connected to the theoretical paradigms in the discipline). By definition, differentiation between domestic and foreign is emphasized in discussions of foreign policy. Different IR paradigms present different approaches regarding this separation. This study, rather than emphasizing this separation, focuses on the interaction of domestic and foreign. The meaning of this interaction makes the definition of the word “foreign” increasingly vague. Another element of foreign policy is that it relies on practice and tangible interactions instead of the focus on theoretical discussion in IR. These practices are compatible with certain theoretical assumptions and more comprehensive strategic constructs; however, the foreign policy is based on practice, tangible reflections and policies.

Another defining element of foreign policy is the emphasis of actors. Tangible foreign policy steps are taken by certain tangible actor or actors. foreign policy covers the

relations of these actors with each other, their decision making processes and compliance with a wider scope of foreign policy constructs, and cooperation and conflicts among these. Practice of interaction among actors from differing levels in any case is a subject of foreign policy. The general idea of foreign policy may be decided upon certain abstract strategies and theoretical approaches, but theory-practice interactions are more central for foreign policy to be studied as an academic field. From this point of view, it may be seen that the emphasis on practice in the foreign policy literature is prominent. This may be one of the most important thing that separates it from IR theories.

In her famous book “New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking in Globalized Era” (2008) Laura Neck Characterizes foreign policy with several features:

- Foreign policy is made and conducted in complex domestic and international environments.
- Foreign policy results from the work of coalitions of interested domestic and international actors and groups.
- Foreign policy issues are often linked and delinked, reflecting then strength of various parties and their particular concerns.
- The “stuff” of foreign policy derives from issues of domestic politics as well as foreign relations.
- Foreign policy analysis needs to be multilevel and multifaceted in order (Neck, 2008, p. 7)

Neck’s characterization reflects the developing trends in the fields and in the practice. Complexity of the foreign policy in a globalized and interconnected world needs to highlighted. As Neck highlights, foreign policy practice is multilevel and multifaceted, therefore the analysis of foreign policy should also work with the same logic. Especially

when dealing with the global trade, production or complex emergencies and crises, all those artificial boundaries and fragmented way of thinking and acting lose their importance.

Today, it is not that easy to separate foreign policy and domestic policy. While it is possible to think of them separately in theory, we must establish that these fields are more intertwined and in interaction with each other in practice. One of the leading factors that require this interaction is that policy making issues such as environment and climate, immigration and population mobility and commerce can no longer be regulated as “domestic” parameters and by domestic decision making methods. A less and less complicated decision making mechanism for decision makers shows itself in the global arena. Therefore, while defining foreign policy, instead of basing our definition on the differences between the domestic and the foreign, we should focus on the domestic-foreign interaction.

Decisions to be taken in various fields including agriculture, commerce, environmental standards, media, education, etc. cannot be viewed only from the point of view of domestic politics. Besides this, NATO determining security policies, WTO regulating and inspecting trade activities, or the EU working on various fields such as education, human rights and administrative issues has implications on the political structure. All these factors appear in all stages of decision making and implementation processes. Kaarbo (2013), while categorically defining foreign policy, defines an approach with foreign goals whilst having domestic consequences in the end (Beasley *et al.*, 2013).

Almost everyone may agree that roughly two main elements affect states’ foreign policy. These are strategic-military elements and economic elements. For example, according to Stanley Hoffman, the world of IR may be placed into two dimensions: diplomatic-political game and modern world economy. Susan Strange, who agrees with this analysis, accepts that the same game is always being played in these two worlds

although the name of the game may change. While one takes border and territory control as a basis, the other one is based on control of market share. Richard Rosecrance also mentioned a similar differentiation. According to Rosecrance, foreign policy has two dimensions: military-political world and trade world. The famous philosopher also categorizes states as power states and trading states, or mercantile-militaristic powers and liberal powers (İşyar, 2013, p. 98). In the process of foreign policy making, states use military or trade elements based on their needs and geographical statuses.

Foreign policy in summary, is a field with goals in the foreign area, while concerning the domestic area in terms of its results and outputs, while being defined and shaped by practice. Foreign policy making occurs as a result of interactions among various actors. While foreign policy is not a meta-theoretical field, paradigmatic approaches about IR determine and shape the understanding of foreign policy. This is why we should investigate the interactions between these paradigms and foreign policy practices more closely. Foreign policy analysis, which has become a sub-field of international relations, investigates the policies considered outputs by the field of foreign policy with all of their dimensions (Hudson, 2007).

2.2 International Relations Paradigms and Foreign Policy

The worldviews or paradigms in the discipline of IR present alternative insight into the processes of the international system, main motives of the actors in these processes, and their goals and working practices. Those practicing foreign policy are of course not limited by these worldviews, nor they are in effort of making policies based on these. However, considering systematic decision making and foreign policy implementations are shaped around certain fundamentals, there will be some consistencies in the practices. Different

main worldviews in the discipline of IR like Realist, Liberal, Marxist and Constructivist views are all different in terms of their approaches to foreign policy. These main worldviews also have different versions and they have evolved through time. Additionally, these worldviews approach IR differently in terms of perception and understanding. As mentioned above, this separation is a separation that occurs rather in academics and discourse. Tangible foreign policy practice on the other hand, is usually pragmatic and output-oriented, which is why it cannot be fully restricted into worldviews.

This study focuses mainly on the economic dimension of FR. Economics-oriented foreign policy is mainly a fundamental issue of liberal and neo-liberal IR paradigms, while economics is still meaningful for other paradigms. While realist and neo-realist approaches consider foreign policy an important element of power by thinking of it in a state-based way, liberals and neo-liberals consider economic interactions, trade and financial operations as more central issues. Constructivists are interested more in the norm-building aspect of economic exchanges. I will now discuss how different paradigms within the IR discipline approach Foreign Policy and how they position economic exchanges within the overall foreign policy approach.

2.2.1 Realism and Foreign Policy

Realism is a state centered approach to international relations. Realists have a pessimistic angle of approach to human nature and attitudes of states towards each other. Attitudes of actors in this relationship are selfish and based on competition. According to realism, the international order is anarchical and all states aim to survive in this anarchy. The main way of surviving is increasing one's power and maximizing security. What really matters for realism is the relative distribution of power. Practices based on mutual trust and

cooperation, according to realists, cannot be priority issues in the anarchical environment. IR is confrontational by nature and main actors see the situation in a zero sum logic in this confrontational environment. Realists categorize the states according to their power within the system such as super powers, great powers, regional powers or medium powers. Practical foreign policy instruments and practices are very competitive and often times confrontational.

Realist worldview and paradigm focus on issues such as security, military competition and macro strategy. They have a certain approach towards the definition of IR, and the priority at this point is on actors such as states, actors in the security sector and political decision makers. Realism differentiates between domestic and foreign policy; however, especially neo-realism does not focus much on domestic factors in terms of the workings of the system (Waltz, 1979). Structural realism, in this sense, does not provide a specific explanation or suggestion towards countries' individual foreign policies. According to the main theorist of neo-realism, Kenneth Waltz "A systems theory of international politics deals with the forces that are in play at the international and not at the national level. An international political theory does not imply or require a theory of foreign policy any more than a market theory implies or requires a theory of the firm.... Such theories tell us about the forces the units are subject to" (Waltz, 1979, p. 71-2).

This approach of Waltz is shaped by the statuses, places and positions of powers held by the actors in the system. So, studies on individual countries' foreign policies and theoretical conceptualizations become meaningless. For Waltz foreign policy at the national level categorically stands outside of the international relations theory. "Systems theories explain why different units behave similarly despite their variations, produce outcome that fall within expected ranges... A theory of foreign policy is a theory at the national level or unit level. It leads to expectations about the responses that dissimilar

policies will make to external pressures. A theory of international politics bears on the foreign policies of nations while claiming to explain only certain aspects of them” (Waltz, 1979, p. 71-2).

Within the realist paradigm the closest approach that takes the foreign policy and the domestic dynamics more centrally. Neoclassical realism challenges the systemic view of structural realism on the foreign policy. Neo-classical school tries to incorporate both external and internal dimensions and tries to overcome the limitations of classical and structural realism in the foreign policy (Rose, 1998, p. 146). According to Gideon Rose the adherents of neoclassical realism argue that “the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities.” The pressures and influences that are posed at the systemic level are translated and turned into action at the domestic level. Neoclassical realists argue that relative material power establishes the basic parameters of a country's foreign policy. Systemic level influences are crucial in terms of their limitations and capabilities but those capabilities and limitations are interpreted by elites and translated into policies. Therefore, we cannot completely deny the agency of the domestic actors and leaders.

Capabilities and the constraints of a particular country are translated into policy through its leaders. While the systemic influences are more dominant in this frame, there are not completely decisive on policies. In the other hand the smaller actors may also have some influence on the great powers. Especially Waltz's theory is extensively focused on great powers' orientations. For instance, by looking at the Cold War system not as a stable unipolar system but a dynamic interaction, neo-classical theorists William Wohlforth explained the relative power shifts and policy changes of US and Soviets during the Cold

War (Wohlforth, 1993). It is therefore not sufficient to predict the foreign policy of great Powers at the systemic level.

One of the important features of the realist or neo-realist thinkers is their focus either on the universal characteristics of the selfish states in an anarchical environment or the generic characteristic of the system. All states are similarly motivated and therefore their behavior and policies may be expected (Neck, 15). In order to survive they can resort to the use of armed violence against each other. State's behavior may be predictable according to this logic, what is really more important and policy relevant is to understand relative powers of the states. According to Wolhford, neo-classical realism goes on a factor and specific features of the situation and takes the context into consideration (Wolhford, 2012, p. 41). The fundamental limitation of realist theories when conceptualizing the role of economic policies is the state centric stance with regard to foreign policy. The economic statecraft is conceptualized within the margins of state interests, thus promoting relative gains and power accumulation.

Overall realism promotes a selfish, state centric and survival oriented approach to IR. foreign policy orientations of the realist scholars vary along different theoretical approaches such as offensive/ defensive; structuralist/ classical/ neo-classical; balance of power theorists and balance of threat realism. Each of these approaches give varying degree of agency to individual states in terms of their foreign policy approaches. None of these theoretical approaches, with the exception of Neo-classical realism, offer a consistent foreign policy theory. However, foreign policy approaches can be formulated along the principles of these approaches. Economy is an important item in realist theories, to the extent that it promotes state power or relative power configuration within the system.

2.2.2 Marxism and Constructivism

IR approaches such as Marxism and constructivism are more reluctant about working towards making foreign policy directly in a state system. As foreign policy is a field that is understood rather as process and output, especially Marxism, which is based on structural economic logic is not directly in scope of foreign policy. Issues such as the financial architecture of the global system, international economic system and trade inequalities are among the foreign policy interests of Marxism. Center-periphery distinction (Wallerstein, 1984) and the reading of the processes and division of labor in world politics in this perspective are results of the Marxist approach. North-South distinction, political-economical segmentation of the world in blocks, and reading world politics in context of this relationalism also present a foreign policy approach in this sense (Rothstein, 1984, p. 155-81; Rothstein, 1988, p. 725-48). Especially in 1970s, dependency theories considered the global economic system within a division of labor perspective (Frank, 1967). A comprehensive political system of this relationship was also established and its results were discussed. These approaches have recently focused on neo-liberalism and its criticism (Harvey, 2005; Duménil and Dominique, 2001, p. 578-607). Especially after the global economic crisis of 2008, the amount of research conducted on world politics in terms of classes and criticism of neo-liberal institutions has increased; however, these approaches did not manage to take part in the general frame of the mainstream debate in foreign policy. Moreover, they were not able to provide policy makers with tangible foreign policy tools. Critical approach set forth by Marxism was more popular in consideration especially in the political environment of the Cold War Period. While it had been pushed under the rug for about 20 years, it became popular again after the global economic crisis of 2008.

While Marxism is not determinant of tangible politics on level of actors as states, it should be taken into consideration in terms of foreign policy.

2.2.3 A New Pluralist Mainstream in Foreign Policy

When foreign policy is restricted to the survival paradigm only, the expectations of results and instruments to be used to reach these goals will be bland and limited. In cases like this, the power needed for survival should be defined in a more tangible, physical way. For today, survival still continues to be a priority goal for states; however, further goals and issues have become priority subjects of foreign policy. In the case described also by Laura Neck as new foreign policy, we may talk about a situation where more pluralistic actors are in place and foreign policy making is turned into an internal challenge and debate among these actors. Besides these actors being plural, there are more complicated interactions in place in the global system. These interactions take place among individuals, corporations, celebrities, institutions, NGOs, religious groups and cyber networks. Foreign policy is focused on more pluralistic goals. This complicated actor configuration may only be managed by pluralistic interactions.

At this point, almost all foreign policy analysts outside neo-realist and Marxist approaches that tend to see IR in a structural way, agree that this pluralistic structure exists. Structuralist approaches have not even felt the need to develop theories on foreign policy and establish tools of analysis on such theories. However, in this environment in the real context where there is such complexity, it is not realistic to deny the existence of what is obvious. While liberals and constructivists see this general environment as a positive thing, it may be said that realists are not very pleased with this complexity. While liberals claim that foreign policy implementations will serve the goals of a majority with the correct institutions, regimes and healthy interactions, constructivists believe in the possibilities of

norm diffusion and human potential to redraw the World in a more constructive way.

While the pluralist paradigm accepts that states are important actors of international politics, it supports the idea that states' control over foreign policy was undermined by the emergence of other effective actors, and such non-state actors should not be ignored in foreign policy analyses. It fundamentally rejects the idea that military security issue control foreign policy, and it is concerned with social and economic issues such as information, communication and prosperity. This is why the agenda of foreign policy is highly broad for pluralists, who see it as a complicated process where various public and private actors on local, national and international levels interact with each other. Many pluralists claim that increasing speed and scope of human interactions and increasing complexity of the network of interdependence will decrease the amount of international conflict (Aydın).

In a case foreign policy is made in such a pluralistic environment, it can be argued that commercial and economic interactions become more central. It may be seen that economic interactions affect many portions of the society in terms of employment, investment, finance, advertising or distribution. In terms of Turkish foreign policy, especially after the end of the security-oriented environment in the Cold War period, the importance of the role of economics in foreign policy became more central. Especially in the Özel period, making economics central in foreign policy was a priority. This approach was maintained in the following periods, but it especially became a fundamental element of foreign policy after the economic crises of 2001. One of the most important findings about Turkish foreign policy is that it has become increasingly multi-actor and multi-subject. Especially the activities of private entrepreneurs abroad diversified the economic and cultural dimension of foreign policy. As the number of actors that benefited from these interactions increased, the number of people who support economic policy and positive interactions with countries such as Russia, Iran and Germany increased. Number of public

sector actors has increased in Turkish foreign policy. As well as institutions like Yunus Emre Institute, Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities, TİKA and DEİK, companies, Turkish Airlines, cinema and television sector and tourism companies have become actors that affect foreign policy in various ways. Even in periods where Turkey's security priorities became significant, these actors provided different processes of foreign policy. It is important to make the point that non-state actors and non-security issues became prominent in addition to diversification in Turkish foreign policy.

2.2.4 Liberal Paradigms and Foreign Policy

Liberalism focuses more on the market, international organizations and international economic actors, and civil society in the establishment and working of the international system. It has defined the approach on the nature of IR as open to more cooperation. It defines human nature and actors who practice foreign policy in a more optimistic way. The emphasis of liberalism on foreign policy approaches and logic may display different factions within itself, but certain characteristics are common among all factions. Liberal approaches are not state centered, but they prioritize the individual and basic rights of the individual. Liberalism focuses on social and economic rights, as well as democratic participation. Actors in IR are focused on their own interest, but they do not necessarily rely on destructive competition. As well as states, companies and individuals may participate in cooperation with each other in order to further and optimize their interests. International organizations or certain rules and regimes help eliminate the obstacles towards such cooperation.

Liberal approaches to international relations do not just focus on the distribution of power within the international system. Their definition of power also does not fit with the

realist definition of power. Soft power, economic capacity and cultural influence are also considered as elements of power. They emphasize the role of agency and their understanding of the state foreign policy is not based on unified state interests. Private citizens, companies, intellectuals and NGO's can also promote the power of a country. Humans exist in a multiple interconnected webs and networks of relations. Foreign policy is a complicated internal negotiation of plurality of actors and processes. Various ideas, interests and institutions interact within a framework and this interaction brings more efficient and peaceful outcomes.

International politics, do not deny the possibility of the harmony among international Actors (Neck, 2008, p. 16). Interdependence of multiplicity of actors, possibility and efficiency of cooperation and optimistic view on the human nature are the key assumptions of the liberal foreign policy. Trade and economic interactions constitute the backbone of a cooperation oriented foreign policy in which all the actors benefit from such an interaction. All states will benefit from a cooperation oriented interactions according to liberals. There is a more optimistic view about international institutions and organizations. Regional integration in the case of EU or formation of trade and cooperation institutions such as NAFTA and ECOWAS are considered to demonstrate the constructive foreign policy.

In liberal foreign policy making, contributions of soft power, commercial and humanitarian interactions, and approaches to support peaceful solutions to problems are important. In the liberal theory of IR, instead of survival and self-help, human rights and democracy are prominent, and these are based on cooperation and absolute gains. Creating interdependence and setting the relations into a rational perspective based on support of each other's mutual interests constitute the basis of the liberal approach. These interactions and interdependence of institutions may be run via trade and democratic and participatory

decision making mechanisms. Individuals are considered in decision making processes in any case. Moreover, the essence of liberal foreign policy is the belief that each of the actors with different interests can increasingly benefit from the system without the need for harming each other. Institutions and established norms make this interaction easier.

In foreign policy implementations resulting as reflections of the liberal IR theory, a few particular focuses are prominent. “Democratic Peace Theory” (Doyle, 1983, p. 205, 207-8) which claims that democratization and human rights will make peace stronger, presents spread of democracies for global peace and stability, and approaches that support democratic processes as preferable foreign policy tools. Similarly, the approach that prioritizes soft power within liberal theory (Nye, 2004), places the public at the top in IR, while not completely rejecting hard power. Effectively using non-coercive methods like establishment of consent and public diplomacy in foreign policy has recently become a more popular choice.

Another approach that reflects the liberal IR theory on foreign policy is commercial liberalism (Gatzke and Li, 2003, p. 561-86; Barbieri and Schneider, 1999, p. 387-404). It is claimed that creating mutual interests over commercial interactions and establishing interdependence may play a role to prevent or postpone conflicts as a tool of foreign policy. Different interdependence forms may be created by trade, such as (i) trade interdependence, (ii) monetary interdependence, and (iii) capital interdependence (Özşahin, 2013, p. 98). As creating interdependence will create a mass that benefits from peace and cooperation, it will help protect peace and stability. The most genuine side of liberal foreign policy is that it shows cooperation and collaboration is a reasonable choice to maximize own interest for selfish actors. Liberal foreign policy approaches present tangible tools to prevent wars; however, when conflicts arise, it becomes highly difficult to sustain these approaches. The issue liberal foreign policy finds the most difficult is what

can be done after conflicts and wars arise.

2.2.5 Liberalism in Turkish Foreign Policy

Every theoretical approach aims to explain a phenomenon. Theory also aims to generalize the abstract. The validity of the theory is based on its persuasiveness and continuity. Fundamental property of all theories is that they are understandable, usable and valid. It was aimed to explain the causality relationship between different theories and foreign policy above. Theoretical approaches in foreign policy are generalizations to understand abstract concepts better. It is possible to explain Turkish foreign policy with various theoretical approaches. However, each theory provides one perspective of Turkish foreign policy.

Liberalism is the most discussed approach with realism theoretically, in foreign policy axis. The faith concerning the sanctity of the individual and the general welfare of the society will be increased as a result of the removal of the obstacles in front of the free enterprise is the main feature of liberalism. The liberalism that is having a beneficiary point of view proposes that single enrichments of individuals will increase the overall wealth of the society and in the relationship between the market and the state, the market gives priority to the state. Therefore, liberalism predicts not the intervention of the state to the economy but the regulation of the market.

The fundamental explanation of the market is, the increase in the economic productivity, maximizing the economic growth and thus increasing the human welfare. Liberals believe that, the economic activities improve the government's power and security. In other saying, the Liberals believe that trade and economic connections between the countries are the source of peace, because the mutual benefits of trade and the expanding dependencies of the national economies will nurture their relationship.

According to liberalism, the emphasis of the common interest in the foreign policy is important. As long as the common interests of the State's, the anarchic and chaotic structure of the system cannot prevent their cooperation. The prominence of the soft power elements such as the importance given to economic interests, the values attributed to the efforts of regional and global integration, common identity emphasis, diplomacy and the power of persuasion bring to the fore the economy-oriented approach in the liberal foreign policy understanding.

The liberal foreign policy approach will ensure the stability of the mutual cooperation and peace environment and will provide the development of trade between states and thereupon, the welfare of the nations will be increased in the mutual dependence axis. Charles Rouley lists the liberal point of view of Ak Party as follows:

- Strengthening of the Law
- The protection of property right
- The protection of the Law against internal opposition
- To ensure the control of the money supply
- The balance of the budget
- The market economy.

Ak Party that reveals the liberal values as a vision of its economy and foreign policy, has entered into the global and regional cooperation and integration with the perspective of “Multi-dimensional foreign policy” and with the approach of “Zero Problem with Neighbors”.

From the moment of the establishment of the Ak Party government their foreign policy cooperation and integration are as follows: They made an extraordinary effort for the

membership of EU and as a result of their many legal and economic reforms, in a short period of three years, they provided the starting of the negotiations on November 3, 2005 for the full EU membership of Turkey. By making free trade agreements with many countries, they have expanded the global and regional domain of Turkish foreign policy within the context of “Trading State”

In line with the predictions of the liberal theory, in recent years Turkey began to make more use of the soft power elements, to implement the foreign political activities within the frame of economic motivations in parallel with the trading state approach, to improve the problems with the neighbors by trying to create a relationships of mutual dependence, to enhance the efforts in the direction of integration in their region and to provide more contribution to the solution of chronicle safety problems by increasing the diplomatic mediation style activities. All of these foreign political strategies, the economy based new approaches of Ak Party Foreign policy is the quest of expanding the global and regional domain of the Turkish economy.

CHAPTER 3

3. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

One of the most basic characteristics taken on by a country in terms of its foreign policy, is the conflict between continuity and change. Continuity that fixes a country's foreign policy to certain parameters gives that country an identity. If continuity, because of internal or external reasons, can no longer satisfy the needs of foreign policy, change will be a necessity for the foreign policy interests of the country. Therefore, choosing change in foreign policy is not only a choice, but also a must. In summary, the stronger internal and external dynamics that force a country's foreign policy to change are, the more making a change becomes a necessity.

The purpose of comparative foreign policy analyses is, contributing to the formation of a comprehensive foreign policy theory, by determining the differences and similarities among foreign policies of states. Differences and similarities seen in states' foreign policies subject us to questions such as why a state keeps holding a policy for a long time and not abandon it, or why it abandons it when it sees the need to do so. Because a state is exposed to the need to abandon a policy it has been following for a long time, continuity and change in states' foreign policies resemble a conflict. As a matter of fact, continuity and change presents a conflict between the stability coming from continuity, and novelty and uncertainty coming from change. The winner of this conflict is determined by the national sources of power that shape the state's foreign policy, as well as foreign policy variables (Sümer, 2010, p. 73).

Continuity seen in a state's foreign policy, comes from the control of dynamics that are not affected by a simple government change over the state's foreign policy. The stronger these dynamics are, the costlier and more irrational making a change becomes. A

policy can gain a continuity characteristic because of internal or external dynamics. Continuity stemming from internal dynamics is rooted in the lack of sufficient resources relevant to foreign policy. In this sense, it should be noted that this type of continuity is usually a necessity rather than a choice. Lack of sufficient economic resources that shape a state's foreign policy, prevents that state from crossing the lines it has defined.

“The meaning and importance of economic limits and opportunities for a country's foreign policy” (Sander, 119) is a concept known and accepted by everyone who follows international relations closely. The resourcing problems Turkish economy has been experiencing since its foundation, have become one of the most important dynamics that pushed Turkey to cooperate with the West (71-99) Thus, “1930s' economic crisis is only one of the factors that led Turkey to get closer to the West” (119). When a country has a population potential without the necessary scale of economic resources, this prevents the country from heightening its foreign policy goals. If a country with a high per capita income does not have a sufficient population potential, it is highly difficult for that country to make a significant change in its foreign policy.

Academics in many studies suggest that “foreign policy usually depends on some basic principles and needs such a geo-political status, historical facts, national characteristics, and these basic principles carry a form of continuity” (Sönmezoğlu, 2004, p. 1045). For example, as Russia has the largest geographical area in the world, continuity is emphasized in its foreign policy. Similarly, as Turkey serves as a bridge between Asia and Europe, the historical depth that comes from its geographical location emphasizes Turkey's geo-political and geostrategic status. Thus, in his book ‘Strategic Depth’, one of the architects of the continuous change in foreign policy and one of the most effective figures in recent Turkish foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoğlu, supports the idea that Turkish

foreign policy should be placed on a new geo-political and economic frame. Davutoğlu, in this sense, especially emphasizes Turkey's historical and geographical depth. According to this, *“for a country that experiences continuous conflicts with its close neighbors, it is impossible to pursue regional and global policies that go beyond its borders”* (Davutoğlu, 2009, p. 144). In this sense, *“for a relatively young country like Turkey, which emerged on the most central lands of a multinational empire, based on fundamentals of a nation state by the initiative of the ruling Turkish national element, which separates it from its predecessor, this continuity/change conflict becomes even more important as a tool to establish”* (Sönmezoğlu, 2004, p. 1045).

The government of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), by successfully providing answers to ideological criticisms during the last decade, has ensured the continuity of a significant change in Turkey's foreign policy. AK Party's “team of leaders and foreign policy specialists who achieved the most important revisions in Turkey's history, not only provided structural solutions to a set of chronic problems in the country's politics, but also became pioneers of a radical change in the international visibility of Turkey” (Yeşiltaş, 2011, p. 1). In this scope, an insight will be provided into the change and continuity in Turkish foreign policy especially after 2002.

Many were surprised that a political party, which has seen a thunder of ideological criticism like no other in the history of democracy in Turkey, came into power with a majority as a result of getting 34% of the votes. The socio-psychological reasons behind this much voter support have become significant subjects for many researchers. The nationwide spread of the effects of the economic crisis in 2001 was pointed as the most obvious reason for this support, because according to many academics and other researchers, the crisis was turned into a field where AK Party leaders could express

themselves effectively. On every occasion, AK Party emphasized that it can collect the fruits of globalization, and will do its best to take part in it. It is with this reason that AK Party, promised that it will achieve social justice and individual rights and freedoms simultaneously with economic prosperity. The expectation that the promise would be kept and action would be carried out was the thing that Turkish society wanted to hear being already in despair about the crisis. Additionally, when the relative success in local governments and hopes about the country's economic future were combined, the voters' choice turned out to be AK Party. In short, AK Party, as a party whose legitimacy has been questioned in many regards, was viewing foreign policy as a field to emphasize its legitimacy almost everywhere.

Justice and Development Party (AK Party), just as the previous governments it is succeeding, focused on Turkey's geo-political status and have always emphasized "the country's potential to be a place of attraction which has the possibility of collaboration in many fields" (Efegil, 2011, p. 424). The content of AK Party's manifesto under the title of foreign policy seems to confirm this thesis:

"Turkey's geo-political status has a potential to make it a place of attraction for collaboration in many fields. The ability to turn this potential into regional and global effectiveness, depends on the smart usage of geo-politics in international political and economic relations. On the other hand, the dynamic conjuncture brought by the time period after the cold war provided a suitable environment for developing a foreign policy with many alternatives. The property of military alliances and establishments to be a determining element in international relations diminished significantly and collaborative projects are becoming a wide-spread tool in inter-state relations. In this new environment,

Turkey should re-establish and reform its relations with centers of power in a flexible, multiaxial way that provides alternatives” (AK Party).

In case this geo-political status is used masterfully in the international arena of foreign policy, security, and political and economic relations, “it is considered that this potential may be turned into a global effect, which is why AK Party emphasized that especially the time period after the cold war provides a suitable environment for developing a multidimensional foreign policy” (Koçer, 2008, p. 920-26). Naturally the course of the shaping of this process and the establishment of a suitable environment did not happen easily. AK Party, who used the frame of foreign policy approach it established in its manifesto as a guide, valued foreign policy at least as much as domestic policy. In other words, AK Party, a party whose legitimacy was questioned in many regards, considered foreign policy as a field that can emphasize its legitimacy. One should take a quick look at the historical context that has provided and emphasized AK Party’s legitimacy in both domestic and foreign politics.

As a result of factors such as the emergence of a conservative bourgeois class, the spread of communication technologies and religious education, and economic liberalization beginning with the end of 1970s, “it is a reality that the elite agents of the Republican political regime went into a transformation and a new layer of elites was formed” (Yavuz, 2001, p. 47). It is possible to look for the roots of the activism in foreign policy here. Turkey’s economic opening to foreign countries and growth by liberalization starting with 1980s, went on in parallel with the activism in foreign policy. Therefore, the market needs of the new conservative bourgeois emerging and developing in Anatolia, started to go hand in hand with the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy orientation of the new Turk-Islamist political elite.

Nineties, along with the emergence of the new political elite class, witnessed a new era where political Islam started rising and being seen as a threat by the political regime, and critical voices were significantly loud. In a time period where fundamentalism was considered one of the most important threats there were, the rise and accession of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), which was known with its anti-secularist vision, was seen as a serious threat against Turkey's political regime in the document defining Turkey's security policy, the National Security Policy Document. The armed forces, thinking that the principle of secularism was being breached, took initiative and started an era known as the 28 February process, therefore increasing the prominence of the armed forces in both domestic and foreign policy.

AK Party, coming from among the ranks of the National Vision Movement, did not take long to be considered a threat to the secular republican regime and find serious opposition from the traditional political elite (Erol and Ozan, 2011, p. 34). Meanwhile, AK Party, thinking that military alliances are no longer as effective as before, started expressing its vision regarding the importance of being more active and effective in foreign policy. In such an environment, AK Party, to prevent its legitimacy from being questioned further, decided to pursue serious collaboration and integration with global structures without compromising its traditions and values. It should be especially emphasized that AK Party took on "a foreign policy in peace with its traditions and values, while reiterating foreign policy principles of the previous governments such as active foreign policy, contribution to international and regional peace, improving good relations with neighbors, an understanding of balance with powerful countries that emphasizes the national interests of Turkey" (Efegil, 2011, p. 245).

It should be especially noted that AK Party used the European Union (EU) as a legitimizing tool in its efforts to show that it defied its National Vision past and it had changed. Therefore, for AK Party, which gained a lot of attention in foreign policy during Turkey's process of getting closer with the EU between 2002 and 2005, the EU discourse was a great source of motivation. AK Party's usage of the EU as a tool to show that it defied its National Vision past and legitimize its existence in the regime, is another indicator of the continuity in Turkish foreign policy provided by the Turkish political regime. Now that AK Party had proven to all fractions that "it kept itself separate from the National Vision Movement, which was one of the strongest pieces of the opposition to the EU, considered by Turkey as a 'club of Christians' since 1970s, and Turkey's accession to the EU, as well as parties representing this movement and harboring Eurosceptic views" (Tezcan and Aras, 2015, p. 5). Especially after the 28 February process, the moderation on the Eurosceptic views coming from the National Vision movement became visibly stronger, "democracy and the EU gained a place among the most prominent subjects of discourse in the era of AK Party" (Usul, 2006, p. 206). The EU policy of AK Party, which needed international support to gain political legitimacy more than other political parties since 2002, served as a strategic tool used in domestic policy" (Balci, 2013, p. 10). With this reason, "especially between 19 February 2002 and 14 July 2004, eight Harmonization Packages were approved in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and 218 clauses in 53 laws were changed accordingly. As a gain from the Harmonization Packages, the positive approach on Turkey's reformation process in the Brussels Summit held on 17 December 2004 was a strategic reflection of AK Party's pro-EU policies" (Tuncay, 2011, p. 133-34).

The rapid change in relations with the EU, the removal of obstacles on the way to Turkey's accession to the EU, and abandoning the insolubility policies especially about Cyprus, were made possible by the term's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's

proactive politics and win-win foreign policy. This situation indicated the start of a radical change in Turkey's routine foreign policy views with the government of AK Party. The most fundamental reason behind this great success of AK Party in both domestic and foreign politics, was its inclusion of academics and bureaucrats who could bring a brand new international relations perspective and strategy to the table. Without a doubt, one of the most important reasons for this successful foreign policy was the inclusion of a scholar like Ahmet Davutoğlu, who had great knowledge and qualifications in this field (Özipek, 2009, p. 666-7).

In AK Party's foreign policy, which was rather aligned with the West in its first years, by the prominence of Davutoğlu's vision later, a more multi-dimensional foreign policy vision started. While the foreign policy goals that extended from the Middle East to Caucasus, from Africa to Asia appeared to make the discourse on the EU no longer indispensable, Ahmet Davutoğlu suggested that "Turkey's policy was based on soft power and the improving relations with the Middle East did not mean Turkey is turning its back to the EU" (Erkul, 2013, p. 35-6).

Ahmet Davutoğlu, the implementer of the concept of Strategic Depth and the policy of Zero Problems with Neighbors in the discussions of new lines and decision making processes on foreign policy with the government of AK Party, "in his work named *Strategic Depth* where he approached the Ottoman-Turkish heritage regarding international relations and foreign policy in its entirety and continuity, said that '*there is a need for a strategic frame of analysis that will bring alternate points of view on the country's future*' and indicated that he wanted to contribute in this direction" (Güler, 2008, p. 7). The reason for this lack of strategy was "the inconsistency of the approaches on fixed data (history, geography, culture and population) and variable data (economic, technological and

military capacity) and the lack of in-depth analysis on these data. Historical heritage, for example, is seen as an impediment by some, while others consider it an important frame of reference. Therefore, lack of strategic theory was a problem that needed to be fixed, and this depended on the realignment of the harmony between the nation's political culture and foreign policy making" (Tuncay, 2011, p. 94). The new discourse of foreign policy conceptualized by Ahmet Davutoğlu brought a new perspective to Turkish foreign policy.

Ahmet Davutoğlu developed five foreign policy tools while making policies. The first one of these was the gathering of all foreign policy areas in one picture. The second one was the emphasis on the need to pursue a proactive foreign policy, which relied on the focus on rhythmic diplomacy. The third was the consideration of borders as a whole, and maximum collaboration with neighbors was emphasized. The fourth was the preparation of Turkey as a central country in its region that wants to play an active role in solution of problems. The final tool was following up on all the steps mentioned above. "The developed foreign policy tools are ordered as follows 'pursuing a comprehensive and active foreign policy, appropriate interventions in times of crises, establishing and implementing policies that keep equal distance from both incidents and parties of incidents, considering all civil society groups, especially capital groups, as new actors'" (Tuncay, 2011, p. 94). In summary, "the plan developed with regards to strategies produced in this, was to economically and culturally increase human mobility in relations with the neighbors, and to pursue a policy that will lead the value and relations created around Turkey to flow into Turkey" (Uslu, 2010, p. 149-50).

Ahmet Davutoğlu (2007) argued that "the reason Turkey had not developed a strategic mindset so far, was that it was subjected to the corrosive processes of internal conflicts with the idea of a dynamic Turkey with an understanding of historical and

geographical depth” (Davutoğlu, 2007, p. 63) and laid emphasis on Turkey’s need to abandon its one-dimensional foreign policy and become a center. In this sense, “Turkey, having various geographical traits, is capable of making simultaneous maneuvers in several regions. Because of both its history and its central geographical location, Turkey should become a central country in its region as a reflection of the shared historical and cultural heritage. Turkey, because of both its history and its geography, is simultaneously a Balkan, Caucasus, Caspian, Central Asian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea country. Thus, Turkey should abandon its old peripheral role and make an effort to become a country that can provide and guarantee stability and security for itself and its neighbors by taking up a more active, constructive, systematizing role” (Köseoğlu, 2011, p. 27-8).

If Turkey has a certain power and effect in the region today, it is because of its image as a democratic, secular, even moderate Muslim but Western-minded country. Although Turkey’s internal ‘democracy’ implementations from past to now are open to questioning, democratic steps are still in the process of development, especially depending on the EU reformation process. Based on its own internal dynamics and the socio-cultural and economic codes of its members, it is because AK Party has the capability to mobilize both its internal dynamics and the dynamics genuine to the Middle East, establish communication with the countries in the region and operate the process, that it has managed this process successfully since the day it came to power in scope of sociological factors. However, the implemented policies and if needed, the pursued methodologies, the ways and manners in foreign policy, should be constantly reviewed by keeping an open mind about change. Internal and external dynamics, even the conjuncture are not always sufficient to become fortunate in the political arena.

Therefore, the Davutoğlu vision that added a new perspective on Turkish foreign policy, put many instruments in practice for making foreign policy. Economic developments and discourse were centralized based on scaling up the foreign policy, while on the other hand the element of soft power was implemented. The EU vision as a criterion of the continuity in foreign policy, especially the final EU-TR declaration of 2004, became a lever for improvement of Turkish democracy, broadening of foreign policy, and economic performance. Additionally, in order to disseminate discourse and implementation in Turkish foreign policy, publicity was achieved by public diplomacy, as well as TİKA and other institutions. The clues for all these new practices may be seen in the doctrine Davutoğlu conceptualized. The following section elaborate on these new practices.

3.1 The Economy as a Foreign Policy Tool During the AK Party Period

Foreign policy may be defined as all political, military and economic strategies a state implements against other states and international organizations with security and economics purposes. While determining their foreign policy, states are expected to act as regards to their greatness, namely their economic and military power, and their potential to affect regional or global equilibria. States that have sufficient geographical area, economic power, high population and military power, and are able to affect world politics with their foreign policy are defined as ‘great powers’. Otherwise, that is, when they are affected by the international system and they have limited or no power to create an effect, they are defined as ‘small powers’ (Alptekin, 2006, p. 18). States that reside in the category between the two categories above are called ‘regional powers’, and they may be effective regionally, though not universally. Regional powers may affect small powers and resist the effects of great powers to some extent (Şakar, 2006, p. 5).

Foreign policy is defined as a collection of decisions, behaviors and goals strategically designed with regards to external environments that are outside the internal dynamics of states but effective on such dynamics; it is "a strategy or a method of planned maneuvers decision makers of a state develop towards other states or international elements"(Plano and Olton, 1988, p. 6). Christopher Hill (2003), on the other hand, defines it as "the sum of the official external relations carried out by a sovereign actor in international relations" (3). These relations that are international, are formed of the complexity of the sum of internal and external conditions a state is in. The nature of international relations that changed especially after 1950, made it more difficult to strictly differentiate between the effects of internal and external environments on foreign policy. Therefore, it may be argued that foreign policy decisions are made in a wide framework containing different factors on national and international levels (Aydın, 1996, p. 97).

Foreign policy may also be defined as the management of a country's relations of all sorts, especially social, political and economic relations. In this scope, external economic relations have always become inseparable and important parts of foreign policy arguments, especially in the West. European history is not only the history of political hegemony wars, but also the history of establishing commercial relations and gaining economic power. While "first efforts of public diplomacy are indicated in most research to have happened in the 17th century (Akçadağ, 2009, p. 4)," in classical diplomacy eras of 18th and 19th century, imperialist powers, particularly the colonialist British Empire, owed their expansion to the capabilities of their tradesmen, bankers and entrepreneurs, besides their military power. In our modern world, international politics and international economic relations are even more intertwined. Moreover, the weight of economic relations within foreign policy, depends on various factors such as the country's place in the world,

its historical development, its relative economic dependency on external economic conditions, and even its political regime (Temel, 2016).

One of the priorities of foreign policy is to ensure national independence and security, and maximize national interests. Besides, diplomacy is “one of the most important tools that serve to protect peace, and are used in times of crises before resorting to threats or brute force” (Yılmaz, 42). However, as the concept of national interest is an ambiguous, flexible, questionable one and it depends on the world views of individuals, there is no consensus on it. Marxist theory defines national interest as the interest of the dominant classes in the country. Even people who do not agree with this view accept that national interest cannot be held separate from the interests of the dominant classes. National independence and national security are less controversial concepts. There is a wider agreement on their definitions. Foreign policies of countries are considered along with their state capacity, their political, economic, military, socio-cultural power, their geopolitical status, security and defense priorities, and their energy needs. Whether the country has ‘soft power’ or ‘smart power’ is another issue to be considered. Soft power is a collection of power elements other than military power, and it is defined as the capability of a state to make another state do what it wants. Foreign policy makers consider all these elements and evaluate them together. Likewise, energy security and national security, or political independence and economic independence are directly related. There is a direct relationship between a state’s economic, social, scientific, cultural power and its capability to get consent from another state, ensure that it gives consent, or construct consent in that state without using military intervention in order to ensure it behaves accordingly. A country’s dependency on imports, for example, especially in a strategic area such as energy, brings consequences in not only economics, but also areas like defense, security, foreign policy. Accordingly, after the assessment of all these power elements, capabilities

and goals, a decision may be made about classifying a country as a great, middle, or small power. Considering that one of the definitions of a great power is a “state that cannot do everything it wants, but does not allow anything it does not want to happen,” the answer to the question “who is a great power” is provided based on multiple factors (Doster, 2012, p. 19).

The idea that traditionally interstate relations are rather based on politics and defense and economics comes later is no longer valid today as a result of globalization. Accordingly, it is natural that global economic crises affect how states behave, shape their foreign policy and reflect on their international relations outlook (Ateş, 2012, p. 915-6). Our world has taken a new step with the notion of globalization that is leading to a new millennium (Aydın, 2008, p. 1). The main characteristics of the international economics that resulted from recent rapid changes are multinational production and the vast scale of trade volume. Therefore, the conflict between the ever-increasing economic integration, globalization and the resulting increase in prosperity, and national independence along with the desire to keep the political control in hand, is the main concern of the global economy. Differing views among individuals, classes, other social groups and states make way for political disagreements (Altan, 2013, p. 7). In a world economic and political factors are so intertwined, it is needed to consider interactions among several factors in analyses on international political economy.

The concept of political economy which brings a set of economic, social, political and cultural reforms, is showing improvements that will force the existing institutions and rules to change. In the globalizing economic order of the world, developments within a country affect not only that particular country, but also all economies via the countries that are connected to the economic network of the country, which intensifies the concerns of international organizations over how well countries are run (Aydın, 2008, p. 1). A

successful foreign policy is run alongside a successful economic policy and cannot be considered independent from it, because these two things are deeply intertwined. These two areas are the extensions, complements, cultivators and supporters of each other. They strengthen each other. Foreign policy has reflections on political economic consequences, military extents, outputs about national defense and security, and other issues regarding energy security. Economic interests in foreign policy are in relation and interaction with national security (Doster, 2012, p. 27).

New world conditions emerge as a result of quests towards solutions for global economy and global security problems. The quests to find solutions for both economic and security-related problems, especially as a result of the U.S. approach, are mostly focused on security. The continuation and power of political and military existence are strategically directly related to economics. It is not right to think countries are kept safe only by armies around the borders. In the newly emerged conditions, the most important issue that will affect country's status and decisions is whether the country is adequate in terms of security and economics. This adequacy issue takes us to the concepts 'economics of security' and 'security of economics' (Aydın, 2008, p. 1).

Defining security of economics based solely on the concept of economics would be a short sighted attempt. The state of being secure in an economic sense which needs to be defined, is in interactions with various political, military, social, cultural and environmental phenomena. The situations that require things such as political security, military security and social security, are eventually about economic status (Alkan, 2014, p. 1).

National security has not one but many dimensions, and military security along with economic security are two of the most important characteristics of a country's

security. Especially in the process of globalization, these two concepts gain even more importance as a result of economic effects. The economics of security starts with the security of the individual's environment, later extending to the security of the public space and eventually to national security at the top. For the economics of security, the security of economics must be ensured (Aydın, 2008, p. 1).

The security of economics has three stages. Firstly, the economic structure must have the potential of production, competition and quality on global scales. Secondly, the economic structure must be ensured to have leadership that is capable of providing and sustaining these potentials. Thirdly, physical and strategic security of the economic structure must be ensured institutionally and sectorally. In the future of modern security approach, the relationship between the economics of security and the security of economics will sustain its priority status, and economic threats will be the most significant threats of security. Main purposes of economic policies are to ensure macroeconomic stability, and providing suitable environmental conditions for sustainable economic growth and balanced distribution of income. Positive and negative developments in a country's per capita GNP, budget deficits, borrowing requirements, debt management, inflation, imports and exports directly affect its economic security. Therefore, the economy must be structured and managed based on strong foundations to prevent or minimize the effects of negative economic developments in other countries, and implementations must be made to avoid threatening economic security or causing crises. Economic policies must be created and put into practice in a way that will keep the indicator of economic security within limits accepted by international economic organizations (Aydın, 2008, p. 1).

3.1.1 Soft Power in the Foreign Policy of the AK Party Period

The world is experiencing a rapid process of change and improvement. The changes and developments in the last quarter of a century are almost like a summary the last thousand years. Thus, “the most important phenomenon of the world in our time has been globalization” (Balay, 61). Globalization, defined as “economic, political and cultural integration on a global scale; global usage of ideas, views, practices, technologies; universalization of movement of capital, emergence of new relationship and interaction types that surpass the borders of the nation-state, shortening of distances, the world becoming a smaller place, unlimited competition, free movement, markets growing in a global scale and exceeding borders; shortly, the world becoming a single market” (Kaçmazoğlu, 49), has taken its place among the most talked about concepts in our time.

The fundamental need of survival, the phenomenon of power which started with the birth of humanity, has also become a survival need states and international actors that consist of societies. “The history of international relations, in a way, is the history of establishment, development, struggle and relationships of powers. Despite the concept being the most important one referred to in international relations theories and international analyses, there is not a clear consensus on the content of power and how it can be measured” (Sandıklı, 186). Because “power is like the weather; it is a phenomenon everyone talks about, but not many understand how it works” (Nye, 1990).

"Existence as a primary concern, security and essential needs, interest and prestige needs, and the national interest as the combination of these” (Sönmezoğlu, 2005, p. 48) all depend on the existence of power. With globalization and the changing balances of power in our time, international politics changed shape and traditional channels of diplomacy were replaced by modern channels of diplomacy. This new shape of diplomacy, consists of

intergovernmental communication, as well as the communication between states and other countries' publics, and the communication among different publics. Thus, new diplomacy is more concerned about soft power, public diplomacy, culture and cultural elements and civil society (Bayraktar, 2012, p. 184).

The power struggle that has been going on since the ancient times has been carried on by different methods in different times. Wars fought with swords and shields at first, were replaced by gunpowder, and later modern conventional weapons. Like the ones in the past, the hegemons of our time are also determining and implementing new strategies to keep their power. While the instruments used for world domination keep changing, the aim is to achieve it with minimum costs. It is not a coincidence that ones who wanted to pursue global hegemony after WWII preferred soft power (Altun, 2013, p. 22).

Until the 19th century (Can, 2009, p. 6) the power called 'soft power' or 'smart power' which includes power elements except military power and designates the capability of a state to make other states do what it wants" (Doster, 2012, p. 19) did not appear significantly in the literature. Or at least, such an activity was not seen frequently then. Actually, "while not clearly named in those times, soft power was being used as propaganda activities to demotivate the people of the lands to be invaded, or applications that are intended to ensure the public's peace and comfort in order to sustain loyalty and stability in the invaded regions" (Yılmaz, 2011, p. 32).

The fundamental approaches behind these views and activities were nothing but purely economic goals. In the Ottoman Empire's time, an unnamed soft power policy was already being used via merchant activities. Merchants carrying new developments and some ideals to places they visit, acted as propaganda agents for their country. For example, the Ottoman Empire would send merchants to places it wanted to conquer, and those

merchants would propagate about how good an Ottoman rule would be. The Ottoman Empire would not interfere much with religions and freedoms of the people in the conquered lands, and precautions would be taken to ensure peaceful coexistence. People of the lands where the Ottoman Empire ruled for about four centuries, are still express their gratitude for the compassion and good treatment of the Ottoman Empire” (Yılmaz, 2011, p. 32).

The international prominence of public diplomacy as an academic area of study was achieved after Joseph S. Nye coined the term ‘soft power’. “While the term public diplomacy have been used since 1960s, the concept of ‘soft power’ Nye discussed in *Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of the American Power* in 1990 and detailed in *Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics* in 2004, has been the source of the recent popularity of public diplomacy” (Kurtuluş, 2014, p. 26) and “put it into use by assigning strategic meaning, as well as formulating the importance of soft power created by using cultural industries, against hard power that diminishes by usage” (Günay, 2006, p. 105).

As much as the accuracy and effectivity of a country’s domestic and international policies in addition to the military and economic power it has, soft power potential is among main elements that determine the success of public diplomacy. Soft power also indicates how attractive and exemplary a country seems to others. According to Joseph Nye who coined the term, while soft power indicates the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideas and policies, by saying “I do not have to force you to do what I want, if I can make you want what I want” (Nye, 2003, p. 10-1), he wanted to emphasize “a country’s capacity to present the national interests in a way that would align with the interests of the other countries it is leading” (Sandıklı, 186). Legitimacy of a country’s policies in others’ eyes increases that country’s soft power capacity.

The world in the 21st century, which turned into a global village with the globalization of communication and commerce, has had to face the undesired consequences of the rapidly advancing technology. In these times where terrorism and terrorist networks are able to go beyond the regions via these technologies and become ‘transnational’, governments are driven to conduct deeper security implementations. The common solution found on both the academic level and the level of governments was the implementation soft power, leaving hard power aside, in order to make the world a safer place at time we are lacking security (Öztürk, 1).

While a state’s power used to be measured by a state’s activity and durability during wars in older times, number of troops and the power connected to it start to lose importance and effect in our modern world. Concepts like economic development, technology, education have now been added into the definition of the notion of power in international relations. If we take one step further, today’s power is aligned more with information richness rather than economic richness. In this sense, as the value attributed to information and communication tools has increased, the importance assigned to soft power has also increased in this conjuncture. Soft power in this context, is the ability to attract people and get a desired result instead of manipulating their desires, in other words, “collaborating with people instead of forcing them” (Nye, 2003, p. 11).

In our world today, “hard power, which means using the carrot and stick of the military and economic means in order to get desired response from others” (Gardels, 2005: 36), “despite losing effectiveness and ease against usage of soft power which seems more logical, the importance of using military power in the anarchy of the international environment has not yet disappeared completely. Therefore, one must not forget that military power is still important while discussing soft power’s advantages, and alternate

strategies must be developed based on co-dependencies of these concepts in order to logically assess them and fix their inadequate aspects” (Özdemir, 136).

As the soft power policy is “strategically important especially for regional powers, it has become one of the key concepts of the new Turkish foreign policy” (Kanaş, 2014, p. 113). Turkey, with the democratic experience, traditional heritage and modern aspects it has had in its long-standing history, is a country which has a soft power perspective that may become the center of attraction in its region” (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 80).

We have mentioned that the purpose of states resorting to soft power “is to lead other actors to the desired positions without forcing them” (Yagubzade). “Turkey has pursued foreign policies where, with its peaceful approaches, it placed other actors onto a desired course of politics with their consent, by the usage of soft power” (Çamır, 2009, p. 4-23). The Montreux Convention where Turkey gained control over the Çanakkale Strait and the Bosphorus may be shown as an example of these. “This convention, which is one of the additional protocols of the Treaty of Lausanne, took the place of the Lausanne Treaty of Straits that regulated the regime of the region of these two straits and Turkish control over the straits gained a legal status. When the process leading to the Montreux convention is examined, it may be seen that Turkey managed to convince the parties of the Treaty of Straits that the treaty was not sufficient to eliminate the threats and risks of the international environment of the 30s. This way, on 20 July 1936, Turkey managed to get the Montreux Convention signed by all parties of the previous Treaty of the Straits by their consent, which in turn reestablished Turkish control over the straits. Turkey, instead of utilizing the complicated nature of 1930s and making a *fait accompli*, preferred to convince other actors, acting peacefully and according to diplomatic traditions, which was a step exemplary for the usage of soft power” (Bal, 2006, p. 862). As it can be understood

from the example above, “in addition to the convention, Turkey’s peaceful ordeals contribute to its soft power, too. Activities of Turkey in its region to resolve and prevent conflicts, help construct an image of Turkey that is peaceful, and therefore contribute to its soft power” (Çamır, 2009, p. 4-23).

The likes of the political steps Turkey had taken before which contributed to its soft power are still continuing today in a more professional manner. Today, states pursue international relations, paying more attention to the importance of soft power elements. In parallel to the tendencies in the world, Turkey aims to increase its activities in its region by using its soft power. As it can be seen in the example related to Turkey’s soft power policies above and many examples that are the subjects of academic research though were not cited here, “although Turkey does not have the popularity advantages it used to have, it holds undeniable potential and opportunities in terms of soft power elements. Especially because Turkey is connected to the geographical region it resides in by strong bonds in terms of history, culture and sentiment, it is able to develop bilateral and multilateral region-wide relations. As it supports all kinds of initiatives that will contribute to stability in its region, in both regional and global conflicts, it is a state whose collaboration is sought after by regional and global actors. Additionally, factors such as prioritizing development support for collaboration with developing countries” (Karagül, 2013, p. 84) are the most obvious indicators that it harbors the elements of soft power.

The changes and improvements Turkey “has shown since 1980s in every field have made it possible for new opportunities of effective soft power usage to emerge” (Altınay, 2008, p. 58). The soft power perspective of the USA that includes effective power usage, has become a well-emphasized approach taken into consideration in terms of idea planning by academics, intellectuals and implementers of Turkish foreign policy. At the same time

“the idea that the multiplier effect of a foreign policy implemented by Turkey considering soft power and public diplomacy will be higher, has gained more legitimacy” (Sanberk and Altınay, 2008). At the top of the developments supporting this approach is the indirect multiplier effect of the considerable increase in international humanitarian aid activities of Turkey. The following are considered some of the developments that increase soft power in foreign policy; that Turkey is one of the countries contributing most to the solution of hunger in Africa among all in the United Nations World Food Program; that it hosts various aid conferences; and that it continues to support education, water and agriculture in various parts of the world (Bayer and Keyman, 2010, p. 7).

In addition to the mentioned examples, elements that emphasize Turkey’s soft power in foreign policy may be summarized as “its multiculturalism, its vibrant experience in democratization and plurality despite the still existing problems, its devotion to a democratic political system, its economic dynamism, its sustainable success in humanitarian development despite the problems in the economy, its proactive stance in solution creation, its dialogue-based good neighbor relations despite the deficiencies of making foreign policy in a realist and effective way” (Keyman, 2010, p. 2-3).

Turkish foreign policy in the first decade of the 21st century, gained a more active character when compared to previous periods, and got the increased amount of attention from experts and the international media. Soft power, which has an increased importance for the Republic of Turkey as a regional power, has become one of the key concepts of the new Turkish foreign policy. In studies working on Turkish foreign policy, there are frequent comments about the serious changes in foreign policy during 2000s. One of these changes is that the country switched from hard power to soft power in its behavior in the region. “Turkey’s soft power refers to its soft power elements considering its strategies and

goals, which came into attention in 2000s and increased in importance in the AK Party era” (Çavuş, 2012, p. 63). In the time of the AK Party government “which came into power in 2002 and is still in power, Turkish foreign policy experienced a considerable change-transformation process. This process witnessed debates on many key terms such as assertive foreign policy, multi-dimensionality, facing the east, mediation, proactive foreign policy, axis shift, neo-ottomanism, soft power, and no problems with neighbors” (Kanaş, 2014, p. 98).

New Turkish foreign policy, framed by the book by Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Strategic Depth*, and implemented in person by Ahmet Davutoğlu himself as the foreign minister since March 2009, in the last decade, has become an expression of Turkey as a mediator in various regional problems and a solution finder in the surrounding regions. It may be argued that the new Turkish foreign policy, with the given constraints of the Cold War period, “instead of a philosophy based on security and focused on hard power elements, in other words, high level politics, is rather based on low level politics which is defined on economic and cultural elements based on geo-strategic and geo-cultural goals implying soft power (Kardaş, 2011, p. 19-42). In this sense, Turkey’s behavior in foreign policy presents itself in the emphasis on its soft power. Accordingly, Turkey, taking an approach alternative to a paradox of freedom and security, contributes to every kind of behavior that will support transformation in the region in a creative way (Yalçın, 2011, p. 49).

After the coining of the term soft power by Joseph Nye after 1990s, and the emphasis of the AK Party government on soft power, Turkey’s soft power became an element of debate. While discussions are mostly on the reasons that increase or decrease Turkey’s soft powers and they focus on Turkey’s soft power in the Middle East, soft power is used to describe Turkey’s effects on the shaping of policies in the Middle East and

surrounding regions (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 86). Turkish leaders, focusing on the need for rational leaders and societies to create these leaders in order to make the stability sustainable especially in the Middle East, has been a part of transformative activities such as democratization, human rights, mutual security, collaboration of civilizations, and the Greater Middle East Initiative from the beginning (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 84).

The concept of soft power, constructed on three pillars as historical and cultural connections with countries of the region, democratic traditions and institutions, and the developing free market economy, has been seen as a diplomatic method that requires undermining of military power that used to be frequently emphasized in the past (Yeşiltaş and Balcı, 2011, p. 14). The concept as it is used in international relations is defined as “persuading addressee to get the desired results”, and is defined by Turkey’s foreign policy approach as persuading other countries by following just, smart and persuasive policies (Gürevin, 2014, p. 93).

AK Party, knowing the importance of the existence of a diplomatic structure that will support economic and military capacity and complement the deficiencies of these for effectiveness of foreign policy, by implementing a policy based on diplomacy and soft power, is trying to improve its capacity and opportunity in this field. One of the most important steps in this discussions has been to expand Turkey’s scope of soft power by increasing the number of representatives abroad, and supporting the exporters and investors that constitute Turkey’s engine of economic development outside Turkey. As it may be seen on the table below, the number of embassies were increased to 124 in 2012 from 91 in 2000, while general consulates increased to 74 in 2012 from 59 in 2000 (İnat, 2014, p. 16).

It has been seen that while increasing the opportunities of the foreign ministry abroad, Turkey also intensified its cultural activities toward the international communities as a component of soft power. Turkey gained an increasing number of friends abroad with the increasing number of branches of the Yunus Emre Institute abroad, activities of the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, with the help of the “Turkish Scholarships” program that educate thousands of international students in Turkey, and activities of TİKA (Yunus Emre Institution). These centers which gain intensive attention in countries they operate play important roles in dissemination of Turkish culture in these regions and increasing sympathy towards Turkey (Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı, Türkiye-AB İlişkileri Kronolojisi).

3.1.2 Turkey’s European Union Perspective During the AK Party Period

The idea of the European Union (EU) took place in some philosophers’ minds as a theoretical structure before it came into existence. Europe reached the ideal of EU after a long and difficult journey. These days came about after hundreds of battles, death of tens of thousands of people, and transformation of countries and borders. There was a need for peace among these people who share the same geography, same religion and even the same language. The only solution for this was the gathering of countries under an economic and political roof.

The Republic of Turkey, established as a result of long and formidable wars, had to position itself and enter into a process where peace prospered. Ottoman traditions on one side, and the new political regime of the young republic on the other side. Turkey, in order to integrate into the West and utilize the fruits of this civilization, chose to join international organizations such as OECD and NATO. In order to strengthen the country

that just came out of a long war and get the public to a certain prosperity level, strong experiences had to be utilized. The West had overcome this process and established the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959. Turkey did not ignore this establishment and applied for full membership in July 1959; however, the conditions for full membership were not entirely satisfied and an agreement was signed on 12 September 1963 until full membership conditions are satisfied. According to this agreement called Ankara Agreement, the full membership to the EEC was provisioned in three stages as the “preparatory”, “transitional” and “final” stages.

Turkey, though not in the sharp sense outlined by Abdullah Cevdet as “there is no second civilization; civilization is the European civilization, and it should be important with its roses and thorns” (Baç, 2001, p. 25), saw the solution to crises, economic and political underdevelopments in the Ottoman Era as integration to the West. One of the important reasons for Turkey to apply for an EU membership is the economy. After the wars, countries that thought combining economic powers will be profitable, started joining powers and establishing alliances of interest. Turkey wanted to join the EU, which it thought to be more effective in this process. Turkey, already having economic relations with European countries, resembles those countries with its secular and democratic nature. Utilizing the EU’s economic funds and the provided economic privileges has great importance for Turkey. This is why it is inevitable that economic relations will be more abundant (Uslu, 2006, p. 122). Turkey’s fear of being left alone is one of the motivations about the EU. Being neighbors with countries that it fought for centuries, and the necessity to be a party with its strategic and geographical structure, in addition to the alliances becoming popular around the world, pushed Turkey towards Europe. Additionally, Greece’s membership to the EU disadvantages Turkey in terms of regional decisions. In order for Turkey to be effective in regional decisions, it needs to participate in this process.

Undeniably, the social and political environment in Turkey that comes from its history is different from that of Europe. There have been conflicts between Turkey's historical experience and its regime, and these brought crises of freedom of politics and speech. This is why different social structures demand Turkey to have freedoms of the West. Especially in terms of individual freedoms, the EU is considered as a life saver for many intellectuals (Uslu, 2006, p. 127). It is evident that different opinions were formed about the EU accession process since 1959. While the EU is known as a "Christian Western Club" by conservative religious masses, liberal and libertarian approach of the West in terms of freedom of thought and belief gained support of these masses (Çomak, 2010, p. 316).

The preparation stage of Turkey's EU adventure was completed in 1973 by signing of the Additional Protocol that determined the conditions, observances, orders and processes of the implementation of the transitional stage. The transitional stage started with the Additional Protocol. This stage moved slowly because of the political and social crises and the coup in 1980. The last stage started by signing the Customs Union Agreement on 1 January 1996. Entrance in to this level is one of the most important stages of Turkey's EU adventure. With this agreement, the process gained an important dimension (Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı, Gümrük Birliği).

According to the Customs Union Agreement, a liability was issued to comply with free movement of goods, competition policy, intellectual and industrial property rights, agricultural products, customs provisions, adoption of laws, and corporate provisions (Customs Union). With the signing of the agreement, Turkey has become the first and only country to enter the customs union without being a full member (Uysal, 2001, p. 140-53).

Customs union means making trade among countries without tariffs or taxes, applying a common external tariff for third countries and implementing common trade

policies (İlgin, 2014, p. 8). In other words, customs union is a process shaped by the agreement in 1969 towards Turkey's accession to the EU, and regulated by the implementation of the methods and principles of the Additional Protocol dated 1973, as well as the Association Council Decision (ACD) no. 1/95 (Yergin, 7). With customs union, Turkey has become a more open country with increased industrialization and improved economy (Aksoy, 2014, p. 41).

In the Summit held in Helsinki on 10-11 December 1999, our candidacy for full membership was registered, which started a new era for our relations with the EU. Additionally, Turkey was given a specific road map first time in this process. Turkey would be accepted into the EU if it satisfied some conditions (Uslu, 2010, p. 132).

The European Council gathered in Helsinki (Finland) on 17 December 2004. In the meeting, it was established that Turkey had satisfied political criteria sufficiently and negotiations were decided to start on 3 October 2005 (Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı, Türkiye-AB İlişkileri). With the Intergovernmental Conference held on 3 October 2005 in Luxembourg, Turkey officially started negotiations to join the EU. In the same day, a press conference was held and a 'Negotiations Framework' for Turkey was published. This way, the up-and-down relationship between Turkey and the EU has passed a significant milestone and started a brand new process (Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı, Avrupa Birliği Kronolojisi)

Starting from 3 October 2005, the level it has reached to comply with the acquis of the EU would be established. From 2005 to 2015, only 14 of the 35 negotiation items have been opened. As a natural result of the process, the negotiations in this decade are moving on slower than they did in previous years. Cyprus issue, PKK operations, Turkey providing different opinions than EU politics are factors considered to be affecting the process

negatively. While the support for the EU in Turkey was around 85% in 1999, this support fell up to 48% because of the EU's stance about the Cyprus issue. Simultaneously, Turkey's economic development, and growth of Turkish economy despite the crises in the EU and the US, led Turkey to act confidently as a decision maker in its foreign policy. This was seen by the EU as Turkey turning towards the East (Duran, 2016)

As opposed to this perception, the government prepared the 'National Action Plan for EU Accession' and tried to make this plan towards sustainability and the strengthening of the current socio-economic transformation in Turkey and to present it as a road map to express the planned steps. The first stage of the Action Plan to include operations between November 2014 and June 2015 was published on 30 October 2014, while the second stage to include operations between June 2015 and June 2019 was published on 1 December 2014 (Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Türkiye-AB İlişkileri)

AK Party, which came to power in 2002, three years after the official candidacy of Turkey, has shown a surprising performance in its management of EU relations. The National Vision movement, which constitutes the roots of AK Party, was a fraction that was the most anti-West in Turkey and had actively oppose especially the idea of the EU accession for years. However, the situation was different for AK Party, which came from the same traditions. "AK Party, has separated itself from the National Vision movement which had opposed EU accession since the 70s, and the political parties that followed this movement" (Uğur and Yankaya, 2008, p. 592). The existing anti-European views "were replaced by the idea that EU membership will be economically and politically benefiting for Turkey, the requirements of the accession process will make Turkey a more democratic country, and the army's influence in Turkish politics and its anti-democratic stance will change" (Usul, 2008, p. 179).

In the first term of AK Party, after gaining a candidate status and as a result of the start of negotiations on 2 October 2005, relations with the EU intensified. This historical development, replaced Washington, which had been in the center of Turkish foreign policy for so long, with Brussels (İnat & Duran, 2006, p. 49). Improving relations in the first term was “welcomed by Republicans, and they even spent efforts to speed up the accession process” (Çınar, 2011, p. 15). Again, in this term, academics suggested that “the most realistic and accessible, and economically-politically profitable option was the EU” (Acar, 85) and Turkey had no alternative in the existing conjuncture. On the other hand, the second term of AK Party was criticized by Second Republicans as it did not focus on the EU sufficiently in foreign policy. Mehmet Altan (2016), in the petition he started, used the following words regarding relations with the EU:

“The only way to overcome the internal and external perception that Turkey is isolating itself from the West and world, and wipe out certain concerns is anchoring ourselves to the EU. The EU accession is the assurance of secular democracy, economic and political stability, and social prosperity in Turkey. This is why it has existed for 50 years as a state policy. However, the dominant idea today is that this anchor is weakened, and Turkey is slipping away to other courses”.

In this sense Republicans transmit the opinions of the liberal Western class in Turkey and express their concerns. Especially the pressure coming from the intellectual liberal class, forced Turkey to be more active in the EU accession process. The pressure to by Second Republicans to establish a civil constitution in scope of the EU process is still going on. These opinions are important in the sense that they show the effects of liberalism on AK Party’s domestic and foreign policy. These developments in Turkey’s foreign policy were perceived as first indicators of normalization by some academics. So, the

relations with the EU and the US transformed into strategic steps based on profit-loss, instead of emotionality. According to these thinkers, the EU was no longer an obsession now, and it was turned into a tool for a stronger and wealthier Turkey (Oğuzlu, 2006, p. 396).

Especially “the referendum on the Annan Plan held in 2004 in Cyprus caused a diffraction” (Şimşir, 2003, p. 86) and this led to the biggest transformation in Turkish politics. In this sense, as Turkey’s aim was “to add momentum to the EU accession process and get a date for negotiations,” its support for the Annan Plan shows its willingness to find a solution to the problem in the island. “An initiative was taken to find a solution in scope of the Annan Plan despite the opposition in Turkey and from TRNC President Rauf Denktaş” (Bulunç, 2006, p. 37). In other words, although negotiations with the EU, the representative of the liberal world started, eight items were not opened because of the problem in Cyprus, and this bring the liability of Turkey to take some steps about Cyprus, as well as sustain these steps in the future. This shows us that Turkey does not want to break away from the liberal world, and this is why it can create different solutions in issues that are the redlines of the country. In this sense, AK Party period shows that Turkey will not be on the side that does not want a solution for the Cyprus issue, and collaborative action is taken as seen in the case of the Annan Plan. In this sense not only the Annan Plan foresees Cyprus’ membership to the EU as a whole, but also it is aimed here to counteract the Greek part which has been the biggest obstacle on the way to the EU.

It is an undeniable fact the Turkey has been pro-EU since the establishment of AK Party. Additionally, no other political party in Turkish politics has been or seemed more pro-EU than AK Party. The performance AK Party government has shown, besides the compliments and criticisms, created shock for a great segment of the population. The main

point separating AK Party, which defines itself as conservative democrat, from its predecessors, “was that it started close relations with the EU in the first years of its establishment” (Eylemer and Taş, 2007, p. 571). AK Party governments, besides the point arrived today, showed a historical performance as the most pro-EU one among all governments of the republic (Koçer, 2009, p. 46-7). Additionally, “entirely accepting the EU goals in 2002, it would not be incorrect to say that as a post-Islamist party, AK Party served its aim to legitimize itself in Turkey and abroad, and show the international community that it quit its Islamist past” (Kaygusuz, 2010, p. 437).

As AK Party has needed “the international community’s support in order to gain political legitimacy more than any other party since the day it came to power, the party’s EU policy has become a strategy it used and implemented for success in domestic policy” (Balci, 2013, p. 10). In other words, AK Party aimed to gain support from Europe to prevent the army from intervening with politics, and wanted to emphasize that it has confidence in Europe to strengthen the freedom of religion held in control of the secular class in Turkey. In summary, “AK Party is continuing to be the main decision making party in EU relations by receiving 34.3%, 46.6% and 49.8% of the votes in 2002, 2007 and 2011 elections respectively. Turkey, which gained the candidate status in 1999 Helsinki Summit, was in relations with the EU as a candidate country when AK Party came into power. During AK Party governments, acts like the start of the negotiation processes, opening of stages and establishment of the EU ministry are nothing but the indicators of the importance given to the EU” (Tezcan and Aras, 2015, p. 2)

For Turkey, the EU has always been seen as a goal to be reached. The EU adventure lasting for more than half a century reached today after all its up-and-downs. This process gained acceleration especially with the AK Party government and a great

distance was covered. The problems the founding ideology of AK Party experienced especially in terms of freedom of religion and thought have been a motivating power for accession to the EU. Turkey, with the EU harmonization laws, will be a freer and more liberal country, and it will gain significant economic power in terms of integrating in to the West and the global economy. This will simultaneously strengthen the democratic and secular structure and bring a political stance in compliance with the West.

3.1.3 Turkey's Public Diplomacy

3.1.3.1 Definition of Public Diplomacy

The concept Public Diplomacy was introduced into the literature for the first time in 1965 after being used by the dean of 'Tufts University Fletcher School of Law' (Akçadağ, 2), Edmund Gullion (Çomak and Sancaktar, 2013, p. 60). Different debates were held on the concept later. Almost every time period has genuine set of methods to keep the power in hand and manage economies and societies. While sometimes diplomatic language was used, sometimes societies went into wars for various reasons. The increased levels of science, technology and communication tools increased the importance of diplomacy day by day. A good diplomatic language usually provided benefits for countries and societies. As much as the concept of public diplomacy is a modern concept, we encounter cases from our own culture that express the importance of diplomatic attitude.

As attributed to Yunus Emre;

Words can take someone's head

Words can put an end to war

Words can poison food

Or become butter and honey

Though this poem may be read in an individual sense, its depth may be understood when it is assessed in terms of politics. It implies that words expresses in correct place and time can be benefiting.

While Hans Tuch describes public diplomacy as “a government communication process to communicate own nation’s thoughts and ideals, own institutions and culture, as well as national goals and current policies to foreign nations;” Gifford Malone describes it as “we must learn about the culture, history, psychology and especially the language of the nation that we want to communicate with, if we want to tell them about our own society and policies” (Akçadağ, 1). According to Jim Riggins, public diplomacy is “the initiative to disseminate correct information structured to openly create foreign public opinion, and reach national goals, interests and aims” (Akçadağ, 2). In addition to these, Peter Krause and Staphen van Evera define it as “the sum of all activities to understand, inform and influence public opinion” as a strategic communication tool (Kalin). As it can be understood from all these definitions, it may be argued that public diplomacy is collecting information in order to understand countries and their people, and establishing a positive perception about own country with the collected information. As a natural result of collecting information and establishing a positive image, the amount of economic and political relations will increase and there will be mutual effects.

As much as public diplomacy seems similar to propaganda, the source of the information must be correct and certain in public policy. The situation is not the same for propaganda. Public diplomacy involves communication by dialogue, while propaganda is one-way communication (Çomak and Sancaktar, 2013, p. 61). Recent developments

require states to be publicized like private companies. Just as in trade, correct alignments in hard times bring great success and profits in public diplomacy (Arıboğan, 2014, p. 28).

In frame of all these definitions explained in the field of public diplomacy, the notion of “soft power” should also be mentioned. As explained by Nye, a state’s soft power depends on three main sources (Kurtuluş, 2014, p. 28):

- its culture (as long as it is attractive to others),
- political values (as long as it complies with these at home and abroad),
- its foreign policies (as long as these are found legitimate and ethical).

According to Nye, the universality of a culture, as well as its ability to establish suitable rules and institutions that help international legitimization are significant sources of power. The values that are frequently emphasized in the American popular culture such as democracy, freedom, high prosperity and transparency, contributes to the power of the US in many aspects. Ability to determine choices depends on abstract sources of power such as an attractive culture, ideology and institutions (Kurtuluş, 2014, p. 28-9).

Public policy is an important element of soft power. As indicated by Seib, public diplomacy is “the essence of soft power and the mechanism to implement this type of effect. While Hayden describes public policy as the lever of soft power, Sun suggests that soft power is a political product just like national image and it may be constructed and improved by public diplomacy. However, soft power is delicate, and it may be damaged by extreme one-sidedness and pride (Kurtuluş, 2014, p. 32).

3.1.3.2 Main Components of Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy gained importance especially with WW I. The US and the Soviet Union promoted their own countries by radio broadcasts in other languages (Çomak and Sancaktar, 2013, p. 62). Many things have changed from WW I up to our times. Cinema, television and newspapers have become important factors that affect societies. Integration of technology into our lives and interactive communication by mobile phones are affecting societies in an increasing amount. Concepts of geography and distance start to disappear with the help of social media, and every individual is becoming not only passive, but also active parties. Thus the interactive and effective role of social media in the processes of Arab Spring and Gezi Park Process is undeniable. These processes brought some political outcomes as well as economic results in scale of billions of dollars.

It has been reported that the main components of public diplomacy are; Listening, Advocacy, Cultural Diplomacy, Exchange Diplomacy and International Broadcasting (Kurtuluş, 2014, p. 49). These five components are used to influence the international public opinion.

Let us look into these concepts in summary (Kurtuluş, 2014, p. 49-50):

Monitoring: this implies an actor collecting and organizing information about communities and public opinions in a foreign country, and considering this information while creating own policies, of establishing a wider public diplomacy.

Advocacy: this implies an actor participating in an international communication operation to promote a policy, idea, or its interests.

Cultural Diplomacy: this component is an actor providing publicity of its cultural resources and successes in foreign countries and facilitating cultural communication outside the borders.

Exchange Diplomacy: Exchange diplomacy is sending of own citizens to other countries for a certain time and receiving other countries' citizens in return. The main idea here is the reciprocity principle that provides a learning experience that benefits and transforms both sides.

International Broadcasting: This implies affecting foreign publics using radio, television, cinema and the internet.

Public diplomacy has been used effectively by many countries and has been effective on publics. This effect became more apparent after televisions started to appear in every home. This is because television, movies and programs have been used as tools to transmit all kinds of messages. Language learning, which can be understood in scope of cultural diplomacy, implies direct transmission of a country's culture to individuals, as language comes with its own cultural elements. Movie industry that can be considered in scope of international broadcasting also plays an important role in cultural transmissions and influencing societies. A movie is not only a movie for the viewers. With the clothing of actors and actresses who may be viewed as role models, eating and drinking cultures, behavior models or state-citizen dialogues in scope of the movie's genre, movies can meet citizens as elements of propaganda. These interactions are not only political and cultural, but they also transform into economic power among countries.

3.1.3.3 Public Diplomacy Practices in the AK Party Period

The importance of public diplomacy in international relations increased with globalization. In international politics evolving from hard power to soft power, public diplomacy has become the most effective and essential element. It would be out of question for Turkey to

ignore public diplomacy as an essential tool in terms of foreign policy strategies (Öztürk, 12).

Public diplomacy, with its functions such as advocating countries' interests, providing legitimacy for countries and establishing foreign public opinion, is one of the most important practices that can be carried on by Turkey, which has a strategy to be a "central power".

Traditional Turkish foreign policy is set up on a realist perspective that considers Turkey's geo-political status in international relations, embraces 'Atatürk nationalism' and is nourished by the pragmatic nature of this nationalism (Akgün, 2009, p. 4). While the two most significant concepts of Turkish foreign policy in the years following the establishment of the Republic were independence and hegemony, Turkey turned towards the West during the Cold War Era in order to be protected from Soviet communism, and followed a pro-West policy. Turkey also tried to adapt to the rapid global transformation emerging in the beginning of the 90s, and Turkish foreign policy started to follow a path that may be described as 'multi-dimensional'. In this period, issues such as democratization in international relations, pluralism, sustainable development, mutual understanding, harmony and tolerance between cultures gained importance and prominence ("Ministry of Foreign Affairs"); and Turkish foreign policy took on a pursuit to create and implement multi-dimensional strategies in this context.

In the international environment where distances started to disappear with the revolutionary changes in communication, and economies were integrated with globalization, collaborations inevitable flourished; collaboration that presented itself firstly in field of security, gained more prominence in fields of social and cultural life after the increased importance of these field in the international environment (Ari, 2006, p. 82).

Important foreign policy practices were taken on after AK Party came to power in the year 2002. It may be argued that foreign policy was shaped over the book named ‘Strategic Depth’ written by Ahmet Davutoğlu (Köksoy, 2013, p. 167). With this new process, instead of a Turkey closed to outside, establishment of a Turkey interacting with all countries around the world started. The most solid example of this theoretical frame is that Turkish Airlines (THY) became the airline that has the highest number of countries to travel in the world, with its destinations in 108 different countries (TC Başbakanlık KDK: 2016 a)

The biggest and most important step taken in this context is the establishment and operation of the Office of Public Diplomacy. The Office of Public Diplomacy was established by the Prime Ministry Public Mandate No: 2010/3 published on the Official Gazette Issue: 27478 on 30 January 2010. The Public Mandate was signed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Başbakanlık Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü: 2016 b)

In our time, international relations have become more complicated as a result of globalization, and besides official diplomacy among states, “Public Diplomacy” gained an additional importance as a tool to influence and direct the international community. In order to succeed in practices to prove the rightfulness of our country against problems and accusations we face internationally, the international community should be provided with accurate information with methods and tools of public diplomacy.

Duties to improve strategies towards increasing our country’s respectability in the eyes of the international public, and facilitate our country’s external publicity operations, have been assigned to various public institutions and organizations based on the relevant legislation. However, in our time where national and regional problems gain global

dimensions easily, especially developments in information and communication technologies, opportunities and threats occurring in the international environment, necessitated a more effective coordination among institutions bearing public diplomacy duties as well as close cooperation and fast decision making processes.

With this purpose, in order to facilitate cooperation and coordination of public institutions and organizations with non-governmental organizations via public diplomacy practices, it was decided that an Office of Public Diplomacy will be founded under the responsibility of a Prime Ministry Principal Consultant. Secretariat services of the Office of Public Diplomacy will be conducted by the Directorate General of Press and Information.

All public institutions and organizations will help facilitate the operations of the Office of Public Diplomacy with the personnel, financial resources, establishments abroad, and technical and scientific capacity they have. In scope of the annual operation plans to be prepared in order to facilitate our country's public diplomacy practices, funding will be supplied onto the budgets of relevant institutions.

3.1.3.4 The Office of Public Diplomacy

The operations in this area were speeded up with the establishment of the Office of Public Diplomacy. Practices were initiated in numerous fields that carry PR value. The following are the units of this Office.

Media Studies Unit: In scope of the media studies of the Office, programs towards journalists and programs to inform international press were organized.

Political Communication Unit: Country meetings, wise-people conferences, European meetings, panels and international congresses were organized.

Cultural Studies Unit: Besides Kardeş Eli, Turkey's Friends, Somali, Nizam Mosque and Doğuyorum Korosu documentaries, I-list Turkey Program was organized with cooperation of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the Office of Public Diplomacy and this program was broadcast simultaneously on CNN International and CNN US. This program informed the viewers about Turkey's economic and cultural aspects.

Institutional Studies Unit: Studies are being conducted towards structuring the Office.

Project Development Unit: Projects are being prepared in the field of public diplomacy (Başbakanlık Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü: 2016 c).

Besides the Office of Public Diplomacy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, TİKA, and the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities play a great role in promotion of Turkey politically, socially and economically.

In scope of the PR operations, private sector also plays an important role in the country's promotion. Especially consumer good bring great economic vibrancy. Tourism has one of the important role in promotion. Correct moves, promotions, public diplomacy in this area will bring great economic power. Rather than sea-sand-sun tourism, prominence of culture tourism will be effective in this matter.

Using the instrument of public policy, Turkish foreign policy will have taken important steps in increasing the brand value, and the regional and global activities of Turkey. This process will also expand the cultural and economic connections to geographic regions we have historical connections to, and interrupted political, economic and social friendships will be reconstructed. This process will also provide Turkey to be a country that is effective in different regions and in a decision-making position, instead of a country restricted in its own bubble.

3.1.4 Davutoğlu's Doctrine

In the foreign policy discourse of the AK Party government that is deemed to be new, Turkey historical past and the responsibilities brought by this past were emphasized, and an impact area was aimed to be described based on this frame. This area or geography, primarily consists of Turkey's neighbors and the surrounding regions. In this context, it can be seen that a more aggressive and proactive diplomatic approach named as "rhythmic diplomacy" is followed where the "zero problems with neighbors" idea is embraced, discourses such as balance of security and freedom, regional foreign policy, integration with neighbors and win-win are made prominent. The main axis is emphasized as following a multi-dimensional foreign policy, and transition to a solution-oriented approach from a problem-oriented approach (Çelikpala, 2010, p. 101).

When we look at the historical course of Turkish foreign policy, we will see that foreign policy has been conceptualized by different actors in different periods. While it would not be accurate to argue that these concepts were invented by AK Party, it may be suggested that they were settled in the period of AK Party. Additionally, the foreign policy concepts introduced in the AK Party period were formulated by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (Balcı and Yeşiltaş, 2011, p. 9-34). There is a system that has long been implemented in Western countries: Foreign ministers gather ambassadors periodically, express their foreign policy goals to them, provide them with duties, and ask for their opinions and suggestions. Such statements and orders are dependent on foreign ministers' philosophical approaches and visions, and the foreign policy goals they determine based on these. This way, the countries are able to disseminate the main lines of the doctrine. The foreign policy concepts introduced in the AK Party period were formulated by Ahmet Davutoğlu in his times as the Foreign Minister.

It is known that terms such as “historical dimension”, “vision deficiency”, “good relations with neighbors”, “cooperation among civilizations” and “initiative” used by Ahmet Davutoğlu who constructed the intellectual and theoretical basis of Turkish foreign policy, were used before the AK Party government by the prominent actor of foreign policy at his time, İsmail Cem (Balci & Yeşiltaş, 2011, p. 9-34).

The concept of strategic depth used as a title by Ahmet Davutoğlu for his book published in 2001 reflects the transformation of Turkish foreign policy in 2000s. Strategic depth depends on the assumption that Turkey’s geo-political, geo-cultural and geo-economic status has an important place in transforming world politics and the international political system, and it argues that Kemalist foreign policy is not able to use the advantages provided by Turkey’s rich historical and geographical depth (Uzgel, 2010, p. 357).

Main ideas provided by Davutoğlu with impressive statement and the goals he determined may be summarized as the following (Kohen):

- The world –and Turkey- has changed after the Cold War, Turkish diplomacy must comply with new conditions.
- Turkey is in the center of the need for a new order. With its geography, history and experience, Turkey has a lot to say in the establishment of new conditions in the world.
- Turkey is one of the few countries that resides many regions and basins simultaneously. It is in a status to play a role and become effective in the establishment of global order. Now, for Turkey, “there is no such thing as a line of diplomacy, there is a surface of diplomacy,” and that surface is the world.
- The crises around should be considered opportunities to pursue the vision of Turkish diplomacy. Turkey is in a position to make itself visible not only with its military, but also with its “soft power”.

- The biggest strength of Turkey is its democracy. Freedom and security cannot be put into opposite corners.

- The vision of Turkey in the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the Republic, in 2023, is like the following: “A strong, respected Turkey which has become a member of the EU, integrated with neighboring countries in terms of security and economics, took up the role of establishing order in its region, active in the global arena, playing a decision-making rule in international organizations, which is among the 10 largest economies in the world.

The foreign policy supported by Davutoğlu is based on a spatial and geographical dimension. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey has the potential to be a “central” power not only in its region but also globally with its historical, geographical and cultural resources. It is stated here that in scope of the proactive foreign policy defined as neo-ottomanism or soft power and considered to have been founded by Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey will be a regional power in the Middle East. With Davutoğlu, concepts “neo-ottomanism” and “soft-power” began to be used to describe Turkish foreign policy. However, neo-ottomanism, just as the concept of proactive foreign policy, was mentioned in the 90s by Özal first, and went out of the agenda after Özal’s death. Neo-ottomanism approach made Turkish foreign policy depend on the Kurdish Issue. According to this approach, Kemalist foreign policy separated Turkey from the Middle East, brought the Kurdish issue to a bottleneck, and failed to use its historical heritage by seeing its neighbors as enemies through a perspective of threats. Additionally, traditional foreign policy had a hesitant nature depending on the status quo, and behaved on defensive reflexes instead of acting proactive and taking initiatives (Uzgel, 2010, p. 357).

Davutoğlu, by making extraordinary decisions while determining Turkey's foreign relations strategies, aimed stronger relationships with its neighbors and surrounding regions. This way, he aimed to gain a leading position in the Middle East and have a stronger hand in EU negotiations. This is called "Strategic Depth" in foreign policy. It can be seen that an understanding of politics based on history and geography is prominent in the foreign policy approach of Ahmet Davutoğlu, who said "a society's strategic mindset is a product of the determination of that society's perception about its place in the world by the historical experience also containing cultural, religious and social values, and a conscience that is the product the living area where this experience is established and reflected. In this perspective, the relationship between mindset and strategy occurs in the intersection of the perception of space based on geographical data and perception of time based on historical awareness" (Davutoğlu, 2012, p. 29).

Davutoğlu foresees that Turkey will make peace with its historical past and use its geography and history more effectively. This is why Turkey's position as a bridge between the East and the West has become more important than ever. Moving from this approach, Turkey chose to broaden its choices as a European, Asian, Caucasus, Middle Eastern, and Balkan country. Additionally, it found opportunities to be active in many regions simultaneously by establishing regional connections. In the AK Party period, Turkey embrace a policy of zero problems with neighbors. This principle is a process that started with the "Neighborhood Forum" by former Foreign Minister İsmail Cem (2011) in the Ecevit government." The idea of Neighborhood Forum which aimed to gather the countries in the region under an economic and security umbrella was proposed by Cem in 1998; however, as Turkey's relations with Israel were good at the time, the idea was not favored by the Arab states. The formerly unsuccessful idea came up again, after the increasing possibility of the US attacking Iraq in 2002.

Davutoğlu developed various methods while establishing its foreign policy. One of these is the integrated foreign policy approach. This is not only one of the main principles in the AK Party period, but also the most visible discourse in the paradigm of foreign policy (Yeşiltaş and Balcı, 2011, p. 16). As a requirement of this approach, it is impossible for Turkey to remain impartial to the problems in the Middle East. Integrated foreign policy initiative is found necessary for the establishment of peace in the Middle East and stability in Caucasus. Davutoğlu's thesis reduces foreign policy directly to diplomacy. However, foreign policy does not solely consist of limited diplomatic meetings, inspection tours and hosting committees. It is also the creation of positive diplomatic relationships with constructive policies. This is why it is important to adjust relations with Arab states, Israel, the US and countries of the EU based on sensitive balances. Another issue Davutoğlu focuses on is the need of Turkey to be active everywhere in scope of its interests in times of international crises. Turkey must be effective on Middle Eastern, Caucasus and EU countries in terms of its interest and approach all countries from the same distance. Davutoğlu, saying that Turkey as a middle power country requires the strategic weight of a continental super power (that is, the US) in the parameters of power balances of Africa and Eurasia, emphasizes that one cannot keep the same distance from every country and power balances are effective (Uzgel, 2010, p. 364). Additionally, it is emphasized here that becoming a regional power will only be possible with the support of the US. The basis of the foreign policy approach of Davutoğlu depends on the philosophy that a permanent and comprehensive strategic approach will occur in the intersection of a historical depth analysis that is able to make a past-conjuncture-future connection and a geographical depth analysis that is able to establish trans-nationality on domestic-regional-international parameters (Uzgel, 2010, p. 552).

Ahmet Davutoğlu, after his visit to Baghdad in August 2009 when he was the foreign minister, said “We see Iraq not only as a friend and a neighbor, but also as a great ally to integrate shape a common future.” These statements are indicative of future policies by Ankara that will be dramatically different from the previous ones in terms of style and methods. While Turkey preferred to be a country in the region that only reacts to the developments around it during the Cold War years, Ankara recently started to surpass this and follow an active and multi-dimensional foreign policy to prevent instability and promote democratization. Initiatives to facilitate economic integration with Iraq and Syria, and relations that aim the unification of the peoples may be given as examples for Turkey’s multi-dimensional policy (Turkish Journal, 2009).

Ahmet Davutoğlu, in his book *Strategic Depth*, criticizes the previous periods in numerous aspects, almost categorically. These criticisms may be listed as facing the West without reservations while turning back to the East, scaling down, alienation to one’s own region, becoming an extension of the West (or the US – Israel) and following passive policies, and lack of self-esteem. As the criticism of alienation from own region and turning back against the East brought about a principle like ‘zero problems with neighbors’, the criticisms on passive foreign policy and axis politics facilitated the establishment of a foreign policy principle that is multi-dimensional and multi-platform (Kanaş, 2014, p. 108).

Turkey’s geopolitical importance is often described as a bridge between the West and the East. Davutoğlu, not denying this approach all together, asserts in *Strategic Depth* that there are two ways, one strong and one weak, to build a bridge, and adds that the first choice depends on a strong identity and self-esteem, while the second results in identity crises followed by internal conflicts. This discourse of a strong bridge in his theoretical

work, led to the association of a multi-dimensional and multi-platform foreign policy with the discourse of ‘central power’ in his term as Prime Minister.

One of the goals of the foreign policy doctrine set forth in the book *Strategic Depth* is to hold as many alternatives as possible and not lose elasticity in political alignments. While the principle of ‘multi-dimensional and multi-platform foreign policy’ Davutoğlu explained in his term as the head consultant of Erdoğan works in parallel with this theoretical direction, it attracts axis shift criticisms frequently in practice. Keeping many alternatives does not require choosing permanent friendships and enmities, but prioritizing own national interests. Ahmet Davutoğlu, in his article in *Foreign Policy* entitled “Zero Problem Policy in the New Period” in his terms as Foreign Minister, assessed the zero problems with neighbors policy in the context of democratic changes in the MENA region and stated the following: “(...) I suggested that our foreign policy depended on six fundamental principles: balance of security and freedom, zero problems with neighbors, multi-dimensional foreign policy, pro-active regional policy, a brand new diplomatic style and rhythmic diplomacy” (Davutoğlu, 2016).

This flexible policy brings maximum contact and dialogue. In his book *Strategic Depth*, Davutoğlu supported the idea above by emphasizing that dynamic international conditions necessitate continuous contact with all actors, and opposing these actors is important in understanding the intentions of the actors. The reflection of this approach on the five principles determined/explained by Davutoğlu in *Strategic Depth* has brought the result described as rhythmic diplomacy. Ahmet Davutoğlu, who feels the need to mention that world conditions act dynamically after the Cold War years, argues that foreign policy cannot handle static conditions in such a conjuncture and rhythmic diplomacy must be followed. He explained how such a principle was put into action during a television

program he attended in 2004 as: "...the number of countries visited by the Prime Minister and Ministers last year is higher than 60. In exchange for these visits, Turkey hosted 9 presidents, 14 prime ministers, and 25 foreign ministers" (Davutoğlu, 2011, p. 117). During his term, Davutoğlu emphasized that rhythmic diplomacy is in practice by frequently utilizing such statistics. Although the quantitative but not qualitative nature of these data receives criticism, it is evident that a rhythm was gained in diplomacy as advocated.

Rousseau, in the Social Contract: "humans are born free, however, they are chained everywhere" (Rousseau, 2010, p. 4). This great philosopher, if he wrote his book now, would probably say "humans are born free, however, they are monitored everywhere." That is, humanity is forced into living in a small fish tank in the name of security (Dinler). In the light of this context, the balance of freedom and security is one of the most important principle in terms of the emphasis on the difficulty of coexistence of the two of the five principles Ahmet Davutoğlu stated after his appointment as the head consultant, being a democratic country and being a powerful country in the region. In scope of the democracy and human rights standards in our era, individuals demand states to both provide security, and not restrict freedoms (Kanaş, 2014, p. 102). As described by Ahmet Davutoğlu's own words, balance of freedom and security is a foreign policy principle that argues that Turkey's security can be ensured only by the expansion of freedoms at home and abroad (Yeşiltaş and Balcı, 2011, p. 14).

The discourse on freedom-security dilemma is investigated thoroughly in the statement, and it is explained as the balance of democracy-rights and freedoms-rule of law with security. Firstly, the value and essential importance of this discourse are emphasized. Accordingly, the concept of security should be debated on a national level, as well as along

with the issue of improving rule of law and human rights standards on an international level (Yokuş, 52-453).

The issue of a relationship between freedom and security is one of the oldest discourses in the literature of law and politics. Undoubtedly, freedom is among the most fundamental human values, both in the individual and in the social-political sense. Freedom is an indispensable element of a civilized social-political existence. Freedom and the attached human rights are fundamental human values, because with freedom, people can express themselves, increase their potential, and live a life they value. In this context, individual freedom is defined as individuals' ability to make decisions and act in the way they choose within a pre-defined space. Similarly, security also has great importance in social life. Of course, people can only feel and act free in a safe environment, and this gives security a fundamental importance for a free society. According to an opinion, freedom and security are in a symbiotic relationship. Thus they complete each other in most cases. Instead of being each other's opponent, they are prerequisites of each other (Erdoğan, 2013, p. 23).

When the freedom-security relationship is considered in a democratic state with rule of law, instead of trying to set a balance between these two concepts, they are to be assumed complementary concepts, and an approach prioritizing freedom should be taken on, as freedom is the rule (Çelik, 237). Thus freedom and security are not conflicting terms. One cannot be sacrificed for the other either (Pınar, 452). In the contrary case, the idea that freedom and security are enemies will emerge, and the responsibility to ensure security will push political governments and states to act in a psychology of restricting freedom, consequently making freedoms easy to sacrifice for the sake of security (Arslan, 2006, p. 123-4). However, the primary and the most important aim in a democratic state of law

based on human rights is the protection of freedoms. Indispensability of fundamental rights to freedom constitutes the essence of a free state of law (Erdoğan, 2013, p. 26).

The concept of balancing security and freedom is a vicious cycle. Security in every case does and must absolutely serve the people and their most fundamental, most obvious right, their freedom. Security that does not protect, allow or serve freedom loses its fundamental property to serve, and it becomes a weapon turned into a threat itself with the reflex to protect its own existence. Freedom is the thing to be protected in every case, as well as the basis and the essence. The concept of security should never be used as a curtain, a screen, a Trojan horse to eradicate or weaken freedom (Pinar, 452-3).

Establishing ideal standard for freedom and security demands that turn out to be in the opposite direction is a difficult task. This is because the conditions of such a balance depend on the geographical location of the country, its relations with its environment, the conditions of the conjuncture it is in, and its perception of internal threat. Thus stability is expected to contribute to freedoms, while concepts like terrorism shift the focus towards security (Kanaş, 2014, p. 103).

Ahmet Davutoğlu defines Turkey as a central power. As it is mentioned in the importance he pays to the concept of civilization, Davutoğlu's goal of union of civilizations includes the interactions of Western civilization and civilization of Islam. For this to happen, Turkey, the successor of the Ottoman Empire, which he sees as the extension of the civilization of Islam, should make peace with the Middle East. Davutoğlu's naming Turkey as a central power implies the necessity to expand towards both directions. After all, he describes this idea with an analogy of bow and arrow. Accordingly, the distance Turkey's arrow travels towards the West depends on how far to the East we stretch our bow (Kanaş, 2014, p. 76).

The concept of “strategic depth” has been used in the foreign policy making practice in terms of Turkey being a “central” country in the international system in terms of history, geography, culture on a scale of both regional and global politics. According to Ahmet Davutoğlu (2001), “close land, sea and continent basins surrounding Turkey contain the center of the world geographically, and the areas where the main arteries of humanity were shaped historically. “This concept has been used by Ahmet Davutoğlu to describe Turkey’s ability of movement in the international system. This definition implies two main planes of the concept of central power. The first one is a criticism of the “bridge” analogy for Turkey in terms of the country’s position as a bridge for both materials and culture. According to this criticism, this bridge analogy does not make Turkey seem like an “independently existing actor” in the international system, “embracing this definition has led us to be perceived as a Westerner enforcing Western ideas in our relations with the East, while on the other hand be perceived as an Easterner carrying disliked traits of the East while dealing with the West.” In the light of this fundamental criticism, the second plane of the discourse on central power, takes as a starting point the global and structural realignment of the international system, in other words, the nonexistence of “order” after the Cold War. It implies that Turkey, by the means of its geo-cultural, geo-political and geo-economic statuses, is not an “object of transmission” between the East and the West, but an enforcing, regulating and order-establishing country with its ability to move in different directions. Therefore, the concept of central power/country is not only a geographical definition, but at the same time a geo-political perspective on the effects of Turkish foreign policy towards the transformation of the international system and the establishment of a new order on a regional-global level, which contains aspects like history, culture and religion (Yeşiltaş and Balcı, 2011, p. 13).

We have mentioned that Turkish foreign policy in the period of AK Party which is frequently associated with Ahmet Davutoğlu as its architect since his appointment, has five principles. These are balance of freedom-security, zero problems with neighbor countries, multi-dimensional and multi-platform foreign policy, new diplomatic style and method, and rhythmic diplomacy. Davutoğlu, asserting that these are the most fundamental principles for those who want to investigate or criticize the foreign policy under his management, emphasizes the importance he attaches to these principles. According to these principle, Turkey will increase freedoms and security in a balanced way based on democratic standards, and will repair its relations with its neighbors by changing the perception that it is surrounded by enemies. Hence, Davutoğlu's academic views and the policies of AK Party between 2002 and 2009 are parallel in most parts. Umbrella concepts that are expected to be unifying such as common identity, common culture, Ottoman Empire and Islam and the normative unity aimed to be shaped around these, constitute the soft hegemony strategy. Davutoğlu describes self-understanding as the identity creating value of the culture, explains this with Islam, and sees Turkey as an element of civilization of Islam. His emphasis on Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East with concepts such as history, culture and close land basins symbolizes his ottomanism. Additionally, goals of unification with Central Asian Turks carries traces of Turkism. Therefore, Davutoğlu produced and implemented policies based on geo-politics and pragmatic constructivism.

CHAPTER 4

4. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND NEW APPROACHES IN THE TURKISH ECONOMY

Under the umbrella of NATO throughout the Cold War, Turkey entered a new period after the dismantlement of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s in terms of its foreign policy, both regionally and globally. Established under American hegemony and named the new world order (Gerger, 1998, p. 176), also referred to as the Age of Globalization, this new period saw Turkey making new openings one after the other, and leaning towards the Balkans, the Middle East, Eurasia, and Africa with Europe in a central place in order to diversify its relations. However, because these openings lacked a visionary basis (Gözen, 2006, p. 4) and a holistic approach, the desired results were not attained.

According to some, Turkey's importance declined during this period (Oran, 1996, p. 360). Due to communism no longer being regarded as a threat by Western Europe, the presence of a buffer zone between itself and Russia, and with the establishment of the easy flow of oil due to the relative peace in the Middle East under American hegemony, Europe's need for Turkey was lessened. In terms of the US, with the USSR no longer a threat and without a competitor, as well as due to its need for Russia for stability in Eurasia, America's interest in Turkey, as an outpost of NATO, had declined.

That this declining interest was not only caused by outside factors but also due to inner ones has been expressed. Due to Turkey's weak economy and its continually increasing external debt throughout the 1990s, it was emphasized that Turkey would not be very influential in foreign policy. In addition, the economic costs of the Kurdish problem feeding off of the cycle of violence in the Southeast (Gerger, 1998, p. 167) was causing even greater problems for the economy and was tying Turkey's hands in the world on the

topic of human rights. Thus, attention to foreign policy was never paid to the extent it was supposed to and a focus on new areas and markets was never developed.

However, again in this period, Turkey's importance increased (Oran, 1996, p. 359). Because while borders changed one by one in areas of close proximity to it, Turkey managed to remain as an island of stability (Çiftçi, 2010, p. 309). The Soviets, as the competitor of America in the aftermath of WWII and as representative of the other pole of the world, had collapsed and left its place to the Russian Federation with an as yet undetermined direction. Yugoslavia had collapsed in the Balkans and various troubles had made themselves felt, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a civil war had begun. At the same time, non-democratic and non-secular countries in the Middle East continued to protect their borders without being fully articulated within the context of the global system. Due to the presence of weak neighbors, some sectors have stated that there was a need for Turkey within the region.

Due to the nature of coalition governments, as a characteristic of the period (Adaklı, 2010, p. 559), long-standing administrations were not established and this situation made itself felt very much in foreign policy. Unable to bring a holistic approach to its foreign policy throughout the 1990s, Turkey essentially entered a phase of identity crisis. Attempting to expand to the Turkic Republics that broke off from the Soviet Union at the beginning of the period based on shared Turkish identity, Turkey then attempted to generate an opening towards the Middle East during the more conservative Refah Party period through an Islamic identity in the middle, and then further changed course to Europe towards the end through the Western identity idea suggested by the Foreign Minister of the time, Ismail Cem (Babiş, 2011).

Parallel to what has been mentioned above of Turkey's foreign policy, the country's economy did not experience a particularly bright time either. What had been

import substitution policies before the 1980s experienced a transformation after the decisions taken on 24 January 1980, and a liberal economy focused more on exports began to be adopted. *This program, rather than being focused on actualizing short-term goals, is more of an economic development program aimed at ensuring a more permanent and structural change in the economy* (Karluk, 2014, p. 521). Prepared through a neoliberal approach, this program *aimed to open Turkey's economy to the world and to integrate it with the global economy* (Karluk, 2014, p. 522).

The precautions taken while the country's economy entered a phase of structural transformation due to the program turned out not to be effective enough and a new economic crisis occurred in 1988 (Kepenek, 2014, p. 215). The price hike placed on government business enterprises due to growing inflation in the aftermath of the crisis caused domestic demand to decrease and for exports to increase. The raised interest had increased costs and public investments which had been reduced in order to decrease public gaps caused a negative effect on private sector production and investments. When this situation negatively affected the financial markets, the escape from the TL caused the demand for foreign currency to exponentially rise and interests which had been left to run free rose speedily. Gaining too much value, the Turkish Lira expedited the entrance period of short term capital (hot money) into the country as a result of the movements of liberalizing capital (Kepenek, 2014, p. 191).

Through a decision taken in 1989, *all supervision and restrictions on the comings and goings of financial capital movements on the Turkish economy were removed* (Kepenek, 2014, p. 213). In this way, the now completely liberalized capital movements caused currency reserves to act up which ultimately unbalanced the economy by arbitrarily having the currency increase or decrease unexpectedly. On top of all this, *unemployment*

continued at a high rate, budget deficits increased, and parallel to this, price increases sped up (Çoban, 2015, p. 144).

With the liberalized capital movements, the volume of domestic and foreign debt increased even more. The freely moving international financial capital within the country made the current deficit of the transforming industry sector chronic while also increasing the domestic and foreign debt incurred due to the credit attempts made towards the ever more indebted as an attempt to save the oft-in-crisis economy. At this point, the Turkish economy entered a debt spiral that would eventually become a vicious cycle due to debt above the levels of current and fiscal deficit (Kepenek, 2014, p. 214).

With a borrowing policy based on short term capital in an environment of high interest-overvalued rate that was set up after 1989, there was possibility of sustaining the financing of high public deficits. ...In fact, because the limits of this borrowing policy had been reached in 5 April 1993, Decisions were taken in 1994 (DPT, 1994).

Despite the stability program's aim being to rapidly decrease inflation, increase exports, and encourage economic development, the populist precautions taken by the prime minister of the time, Tansu Çiller, *were unable to establish stability for the economy and were unable to fully succeed because it could not accomplish structural change* (Karluk, 2014: 533). The national economy had shrunk to 6.1% in 1994, inflation had continued to increase and found itself at 150%, GNP had regressed from 173 billion dollars to 132 billion dollars, and devaluation had occurred. Additionally, this crisis had forced Turkey into entering another deal with the IMF due to its need for resources (Çoban, 2015, p. 155).

As a result of the 1994 agreement with the IMF and various measures taken following it, the national economy grew at a high rate of 7-8% in the following three years; however, the continually high inflation meant a continuation of the lack of a steady and stable economic structure. The steps taken after 6-7 September 1995 as a way of

eliminating these problems had the aim of controlling the demand for money by lowering public and private sector spendings and reducing domestic demand; this control, however, meant a constriction on the real economy and there was an attempt to increase exports in order to surpass this.

Aside from the domestic factors listed above, the 1997 Asia Crisis and the 1998 Russia Crisis (Çoban, 2015, p. 156) spread like a wave and caused the lowering of the national economy's growth to 3.9% in 1998, followed by another economic crisis in the country in 1999 which reduced the economy to -6.1%. Afterwards, it had to sign the 17th Stand-by Agreement with the IMF. While the precautions of this agreement began to be set in 2000, crises occurred in November 2000 and February 2001, and the national economy shrunk by -9.5%. These values are shown in the below table

Table:4.1: Growth Rate, Current Account Balance, Wholesale Price Index and Consumer Price Index in Turkey between 1994-2001

Years	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Growth Rate (%) (GDP)	-6.0	7,2	7,0	7,5	3,1	-4,7	7,4	-7,5
Growth Rate (%) (GNP)	-6,1	8,1	7,1	8.3	3,9	-6.1	6,3	-9,5
Current Account Balance (Billion dollars)	2,6	-2,3	-2,4	-2.6	2,0	-1,4	-9.8	3,3
Wholesale Price Index (Annual Average %)	120,7	86,0	76,0	81,8	74,0	62,9	32,7	88,6
Consumer Price Index (Annual Average %)	-	88,0	80,4	85,7	86,7	68,8	39,0	68.5

Source: (TÜİK; DPB)

As can be seen in the graphic above, the structural crises of the 1990s had become chronic and created instabilities in growth. With a growth rate of -6 in 1994 which reached -4,7 in 1999, the negative (-) growth numbers caused rapid deterioration in Turkey's current accounts balance.

The 1999 crisis was regarded as the finalization of the structural change that had been ongoing since the 1980s by economy circles and the November 2000 crisis caused by liquidity and the February 2001 crisis which occurred due to the disruption of the foreign exchange market were to become the start of a new period wherein extensive reforms would begin during the first years of Turkey under the AK Party (Öniş, 2010, p. 267).

4.1. Turkey and the World Economy During the AK Party Period

4.1.1. General View of the World Economy

Throughout the 1990s, dozens of crises occurred in developing countries in the world economy caused by the rising global financial system. These crises, through the contribution of the maturing global finance, were able to spread to the entire world in a short time. At the base of the crisis lay the requirement of international finance institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, of especially developing countries to be outward-oriented market economies which caused the lack of a connection between the global finance entering these countries and production, which thus paved the way for speculative movements (Ongun, 2012, p. 39). In this period, the external debt of world economies became heavier and instability increased in country economies.

The first place where a crisis occurred in this period was in 1992 in England, the birthplace of Capitalism; during this period, while nearly 27 billion pounds left the country, speculative attacks were observed to be the cause of the crisis. Arriving at 1994, the crisis, which began in Mexico and which would later be named the Tequila Crisis, would create a domino effect on world economies and cause a serious quake. The *unanswered inflation expectation in Mexico, growing current deficit, and the reversal of capital flows whereby the entry of capital left its place to a sudden and big capital outflow caused the crisis* (Ongun, 2012, p. 56).

The biggest regional crisis that occurred in the 1990s was the 1997 Asia Crisis. This crisis began due to the backlash of certain precautions taken by a dozen Asian countries in order to strengthen the competitive capacity of their economies—their national money lost value, which caused mass capital outflows (Çoban, 2015, p. 268). The cost of the first year of the crisis was around 260 billion dollars. The most devastating result of

this crisis was that at the end of the crisis, financial capital removed itself from developing markets and gravitated towards developed markets. The movement of capital after the Asia Crisis and falling oil prices caused the Russia Crisis. Brazil, with a similar economic structure, also experienced a crisis.

The years 1998-2007 are made up of cycles of descent/slowdown and revival. The descent stage covers 1998-2001, while the revival occurred between 2002-2007 (Boratav, 2015, p. 463). The effects of the shrinking experienced by the world economy between 1998-2001 would dominate the world economy in 2002 and make itself felt especially on unemployment and real wages.

Among the reasons for the lull observed in the world economy at the very beginning of the 2000s were the monetary tightening used in the US economy in order to reduce domestic demand, the further weighting of the protectionist structure on foreign trade, and the devaluation of the dollar as compared to the euro and the following interest rate drops. Right after the tightening, an effective revival was observed in the world economies and an enlargement occurred. *The growth rate that had been at a little bit over 2% in 2001 had risen to 4.8% in 2006, while inflation dropped from 3.7% to 3.3% during the same period. This drop in the inflation rate is better observed in advanced capitalist countries. In this period, the average inflation rate remained between 1-2% in these countries (Durmuş, 2011, p. 111).*

It must be stated that the most determinant factor in the transition from constriction to revival was the monetary policy pursued in the US economy. Economic decision makers in the US lowered interest rates and allowed for the enlargement of liquidity in order to surpass the languish being experienced and to create an expansion. *In the aftermath of the internal loan volume, widening liquidity and low interest rates, total debt in the US had grown twice as much between 2001-2006 and this growth was shared amongst the*

financial sector, households, non-financial sectors, and the public respectively (Ongun, 2012, p. 66).

Parallel to the US economy, the world economy also demonstrated a revival in the same trajectory and expanded. *Economically, the international system entered a period of swift growth following 2001, with world trade and capital movements demonstrating extraordinary growth until 2008, when the global financial crisis came to be felt* (Kutlay, 2012, p. 105).

The lowering of inflation disposition has been shown as the main characteristic of this revival period. The main reason for this disposition has been the decisions taken by economic decision-makers who considered ways of protecting themselves from the damages of capital movements that caused global crises throughout the 1990s. Another main reason for the decrease in the inflation disposition was that South Asian countries, China foremost among them, flooded the world markets with cheap goods as concrete evidence of rising competition in world markets (Üngör, 2009, p. 35).

While before the 1990s Japan, among the three biggest economic powers of the world, had a growth rate greater than that of the EU and the US, this situation was reversed in the 1990s. The main reasons for this were the speedy rise of domestic demand in the US economy, the lack of a mirror situation in Japan, and the role of high investment disposition and new technologies allowing for labor productivity in the US' growth performance in the second half of the 1990s. The table below shows the growth numbers.

Table 4.2: Global Output in the Period between 1990-2000 (Annual Average Percentage Change)

Region/Country	1990-1995	1995-2000	1990-2000
World	2.0	3.1	2.6
US	2.4	4.3	3.4
Japan	1.4	1.1	1.3
EU	1.5	2.5	2.0

Source: (UNCTAD)

Another important situation that is observed in the revival period between 2002-2007 is the degeneration of the current account balance of developed or industrialized countries. But in response to this, the amelioration of developing countries' current account balances is of note. The most fundamental reason for this is China's foreign trade extras which grew exponentially in response to the current account deficits given by the US economy at the head of all developed countries. In addition to this, it must be expressed that the main source of the current surplus observed in Middle Eastern countries came from the increase in oil prices. The table below clearly sets out this situation.

Table 4.3: Current Account Balance / GDP (In Percentages)

Regions/Countries	1990	1995	2000	2005	2006	2007
Developed Countries	-0.5	0.1	-1.0	-1.1	-1.3	-0.9
Developing Asia	-1.2	-2.1	1.7	4.0	5.9	7.0
Middle East	1.3	1.0	11.3	20.0	21.1	18.4

Source: (IMF World Economic Outlook, Issues in 2008)

Within this framework, *one of the most important realities of the 21st century was the entrance of East Asia into the most powerful centers of the world economy as well as China and India together beginning to shape global economic performance. China's real income per person increased by 5 after the 1990s and 390 million citizens were raised from the poverty line* (Chen and Ravallion, 2008; UNCTAD). In the same way, *India garnered attention to itself by demonstrating a growth of 8-9% between 2003-2007, its success in producing and exporting high technology in the 2000s and creating a middle class of 200-250 million persons with high income* (Kazgan, 2005, p. 42). The other two members of BRIC countries, Brazil and Russia, had bright economies in the 2000s like in China and India. That these countries were in a much better place in terms of foreign debt as compared to developing countries prior to the 2007 global crisis can be clearly seen from the table below.

Table 4.4: Foreign Debt Indicators in 2007 (In Percentages)

Country	Total Foreign Debt/GDP	Short Term Debts/Total Reserves
Brazil	25	21,8
Russian F.	39	16,6
India	20	15,8
China	13	13,2
Poland	53	91,8
Argentina	63	82,5
Indonesia	43	61,4
Turkey	47	54,6

Source: (World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2009)

In the last decade coinciding with the economic expansion stage in the global system, there has also been a relaxation in the system's control mechanisms in terms of international politics (Kutlay, 2012, p. 107). As Kutlay states, this period prior to the 2007 global crisis was one of less supervision and regulation. Especially the expectation of *abundant liquidity and interest rates continuing at a low level caused homeowners to buy other homes and thus led to a price inflation in the real estate sector and created a second balloon in the US housing market* (Ongun, 2012, p. 66). Exploding with the US-sourced fund and credit collapse, the crisis affected Asian and European finance centers within a

few weeks and the destruction of the Lehman Brothers bank, an American financial giant, caused the crisis to be felt throughout the world.

Table 4.5: Growth Rates (Between 2007-2013)

YEAR	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
World Production	%5.3	%2,7	%,-0,4	%5.2	%3.9	%3,2
Developed Country Economies	%2,7	%0.1	%-3.4	%3,0	%1.7	%1.4
Developing Countries Economies	%8.7	%5.9	%3,1	%7,5	%6.3	%5,0
Developing Asian Economies	%11,5	%7.3	%7,7	%9,7	%7.9	%6,7

Source: (IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2013)

As can be seen from the table, global production began to shrink after 2007 and decreased quite seriously in 2009. After a sudden spurt in 2010, global production once again saw a decreased growth until 2012. During this period, the 3% growth rate in developed markets that was attained in 2010 after the 2009 crisis steadily decreased until it hit 1.4% in 2012. Conversely, developing markets saw a decrease in growth speed from 7.5% in 2010 to 5% in 2012. The ability of developing countries to have reached such high numbers must be attributed to the high growth in Asian markets, with China and India foremost among them.

Again during these years, the drought and high oil prices experienced in 2007 and 2008 caused the Global Food Crisis, which led to political and economic instabilities in

certain countries. The global crisis of 2009 saw a -3.4% contraction in developed countries while there was a growth of 3.1% in developing countries. The total trade volume in the world decreased by 0.4%. In connection with this, while world production decreased, unemployment increased. After various diminutions were experienced by the 2009 global crisis, nearly all countries experienced a swift recuperation in 2010 and 2011 and the growth momentum continued.

4.1.2. General View of Turkey's Economy

4.1.2.1. Factors Leading to the AK Party Becoming the Administration

This chapter will begin by considering how the AK Party, forming the administration by itself after the 2002 snap election, benefitted from the crisis environment; it will later continue with an evaluation of Turkey's economic performance under the AK Party administration between the years of 2002 and 2012. The continually short term coalition governments that had occurred since the 1990s and the oft-encountered economic crises during these years caused voters to lean towards the AK Party as a new party. *No matter how incredible the promises of AKP [...] might have been, they nevertheless signaled the masses that they would change the status quo and adopt more caring policies for the masses* (Çarkoğlu, 2002, p. 36).

None of the three coalition parties who had been sharing the administration after the 1999 general election were able to surpass the election threshold in the November 2002 snap election. Arriving as the sole party of the administration with 34.3% of votes, the keys that brought this victory to the AK Party can be listed as follows: the destructive effect of the 2001 economic crisis on center-right and -left parties; expected to be the AK Party's most formidable adversary, the CHP's being withdrawn and its understanding of

tradition and secularism causing the party to remain passive and thus unable to surpass the 20% vote rate (Öniş, 2010, p. 262-63).

Another key was the AK Party learning lessons from its predecessors, the Refah and Fazilet Parties, and staying away from their separatist language and discourse, meaning radical Islamist, and rather opting to demonstrate a more moderate and centrist image. At the same time, using the power of its predecessors and gathering the support of the middle and small scale enterprises that had risen up in Anatolian cities in the 1990s which had congregated under the umbrella of MUSIAD, as well as succeeding in using the success of its predecessor parties in local governments (Öniş, 2010, p. 263-64).

4.1.2.2. AK Party's 10 Year Balance Sheet

Before starting on the practices of the AK Party during its ten years of tenure, it will be useful to concisely demonstrate the reflection of this ten year long administration through economic indicators as in the below table. These economic indicators are important for being a comparative accounting of the years 2002 and 2012.

Table 4.6: Turkey's Economy (2002/2012)

Order	Economic Indicator	2002	2012
1	Total National Income	230 Billion Dollars	786 Billion Dollars
2	National Income Per Person	3.500 Dollars	10.504 Dollars
3	Inflation	30%	6.16%
4	Central Bank Overnight Borrowing Rate	44%	5%
5	IMF Debts	23.5 Billion Dollars	900 Million Dollars (2012 December)*
6	Central Bank Foreign Exchange Reserves	26.7 Billion Dollars	100.3 Billion Dollars
7	Export Figures	36 Billion Dollars	152 Billion Dollars

*(As of May 14, 2013, the credit debt to the IMF has been finished)

As observed in the above table, economic indicators in 2002 are filled with negative ratios due to the 2001 crisis. While national income per person was at 3500 dollars, inflation around 30%, and the Central Bank's overnight borrowing rate was around 44%, these economic parameters vastly improved by 2012. In 2012, the national income per person had risen to 10504 dollars, inflation gone down to 6%, and the Central Bank overnight borrowing rate was down to around 5%.

We will consider the economy of Turkey under the AK Party between the years of 2002-2012 by separating it into two as accepted by economic circles; we will touch on the years 2002-2007 first and then 2007-2012.

4.1.2.3. Turkey's Economy Between 2002-2007

Essentially taking over a wreck after the 2002 elections, the success of the AK Party in managing to improve the course of the economy in a short period of time was not only due to its own success or for the political reasons listed above as detailed by Öniş.

The neoliberal reforms of the 1990s gained momentum after the signing of the Customs Union Treaty with the European Union in 1996 as well as Turkey reaching candidate country status for the EU in December 1999, and extensive reforms were enacted. Prepared under the supervision of Kemal Derviş by the coalition government after the February 2001 crisis and operationalized in May 2001, the ***“Transition Program to a Strong Economy”***³ was applied during the first years of the AK Party as well.

From the important headings of the package, topics such as the establishment of macro-economic stability, sustainable growth, structural reforms, ensuring fiscal discipline, and the increased role of the private sector in the economy were among those that were emphasized by the AK Party government as well (Çoban, 2015, p. 173-77). Corrections were made to banking and thus the financial sector was placed on a solid base;

³ The Turkish economy dealt with chronic crises throughout the 1990s. In 1999, the transition program to a strong economy was enacted. ([http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/fc5a4a1a-63d9-4de3-bb8bd56a61409df6/program+\(1\).pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=ROOTWORKSPACEfc5a4a1a-63d9-4de3-bb8b-d5](http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/fc5a4a1a-63d9-4de3-bb8bd56a61409df6/program+(1).pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=ROOTWORKSPACEfc5a4a1a-63d9-4de3-bb8b-d5)) With the Transition Program to a Strong Economy announced on April 15, 2001, the goals of public finance were reset. According to it—within the aims of tax policy—the principles of increasing tax revenues, Fuel Consumption Tax be set at the lowest aimed inflation rate and FCT returns being 2.8% of GNP, widening the use of taxpayer identification numbers in order to widen the tax base, increasing tax auditing in order to minimize tax loss and tax evasion, and getting tax late fees and penalties to be compatible with inflation in order to increase tax collection were adopted. The AK Party administrations consistently applied the Transition Program to a Stronger Economy.

the measures taken during this time would have the 2008-2009 global crisis only tangentially affect Turkey.

As a result of the 18th Stand-by Agreement signed with the IMF in February 2002 after the 2000 and 2001 economic crises, the precautions taken—with the GEGP done in May 2001 foremost among them—and the AK Party's rational policies, the country's economy speedily began to recuperate and GNP rose by about 5% between 2000-2006. All of this was achieved despite the -5.7% reduction experienced in the country due to the 2001 crisis. Solutions were found to chronic problems during this period, privatization was done, and structural reforms were placed.

Table 4.7: Growth Rates (Between 2000-2006)

Year	Agriculture (%)	Industry (%)	Services (%)	GNP (%)	GNP (Million Dollars)*
2000	3,9	6.0	7.2	6,3	200.002
2001	-6.5	-7.5	-5.9	-9.5	145.693
2002	6.9	9.4	6.0	7,9	180.892
2003	-2.5	7.8	5.2	5,9	239.235
2004	2.0	9.4	8.4	9.9	299.475
2005	5.6	6.5	7.6	7,6	360.876
2006	1.4	8.3	7.1	6,9	526.429

Source: (TÜİK)

Table: GNP inflexible pricing (1987 prices) - * Ruling Prices (Million Dollars)

When the growth proportions of the growth rates of the above sectors are closely observed, all sectors demonstrated negative (-) growth in 2001 as a result of the 2001 crisis. With the AK Party administration, the growth rates became positive. In fact, during this period, historical records were set. For example, in 2004, the growth rate in terms of GNP was 9.9%. On a sectoral basis, the fastest growth rate was in the industry sector.

Remaining firm about the reforms, while the AK Party administration was able to use the economic crises that occurred prior to its arrival to its advantage, this environment of crisis and the reforms that came to be enacted prior to the 2002 snap election paradoxically caused the collapse of the coalition governments of the time.

The tripartite coalition government was forced to leave through a very different insistence than that of the economic crisis' conditions; the increasing poverty and dependency that came about as a result of the 2000/2001-2002 period's stand-by policy caused the coalition party to suffer an immense defeat at the hands of the decidedness of the people and... the AKP became the administration by itself. While the economic circumstances in the period up to the 2002 snap election were a great disadvantage for the tripartite coalition government, they essentially became an advantage for the six-year AKP administration (Ekzen, 2010, p. 474).

Within the framework of the agreement signed with the IMF, the Emergency Action Plan was presented in January 2003. The public administration reform and economic transformation program was prepared accordingly (Çoban, 2015, p. 177). Reaching an independent status, the Central Bank was made transparent and more accountable. There was a transition to an inflation-targeting regime and while an implicit inflation target was set for the period between 2002-2005, there was a segue to an open economy inflation target set from 2006 on (Çoban, 2015: 179). Inflation was reduced to

single digits in 2004 and national income per person rose above 5000 dollars for the first time.

As the joint result of meetings with the EU and IMF, it is observed that the agricultural sector shrank, while the industrial and service sectors grew parallel to the growth in GNP during this period. However, because payroll data in agriculture was around 30-35% total, the situation created the impression that the country still had not been saved from undeveloped country status. On the other hand, the public deficits, which were brought under control by the balanced budget application heading of the GEGP package, increased the entry of foreign capital and *increasing private sector investments created new areas of employment* (Çoban, 2015, p. 183).

The AK Party continued its reforms non-stop between its first period of 2002-2007 and in order to reduce the increasing zeros in the Turkish lira due to the oft-experienced devaluations throughout the 1990s, six zeros were removed from the Turkish lira with a regulation brought in 2004 and through a law executed in January 2005. It is observed that this procedure caused great convenience for the operations of banks (T.C. Başbakanlık Kamu Düzeni ve Güvenliği Müsteşarlığı, 2013, p. 120). By signing the 19th Stand-by agreement with the IMF in May 2005, the allocation of 100 billion dollars of source money for the period between May 2005 and May 2008 was ensured. Providing a critical view of this period, Ekzen states, *multiple clashing preferences occurred between the economic policies formed by the IMF-World Bank duo which would cause Turkey to be foreign-dependent and create a flimsy, weak, and reassembled economy, and assumed the role of being the continuation of these policies* (Ekzen, 2010, p. 474), allowing for a different approach to this topic.

Unfortunately, because the inflation targeting regime destabilized the money demand function, the Central Bank used short term interest rates—overnight interest

rates—in order to control inflation which then caused the hot money competing for the country to pressurize and lower rates. This situation then created an economic growth dependent on imports. In this period, *that the main goods being imported were made up of intermediate and investment goods and that an important part of the growth source being dependent on imports strengthened the connection between imports and growth* (Çoban, 2015, p. 182). Thus, the deficit in foreign trade and the current deficit continued on a path of persistent growth. The table below shows the coverage ratio of exports to imports; it is observed that this ratio decreased from 2001 to 2007.

**Table 4.8: Export to Import Coverage Ratio
According to Year**

2001	75,7
2002	69,9
2003	68,1
2004	64,8
2005	62,9
2006	61,3
2007	63,1

Source: (TÜİK)

For Turkey, the balance of foreign trade is of vital importance. This balance is that between exports and imports. This ratio shows how much of the currency required for imports is met through the foreign currency obtained by way of exports and how much is

met through other means. The table above shows that the ratio of exports meeting imports as a result of the 2001 crisis to be 75.5%. This situation bettered in connection to the improvement of the economy. When 2007 came around, the ratio of exports to imports had decreased to 63.1%.

The increasing flow of hot money during this period is an important point. It has been observed that the rising entry of hot money between the years of 2002-2005 decreased between 2006-2007 parallel to the global crisis. According to Boratav, hot money's rapid increase as a result of the exponential rise in foreign capital entry helped to close off the current deficit. The majority of foreign capital entry being done by direct foreign investment plays an important role as a crisis preventive mechanism during times of crisis (Boratav K., 2010: 463-72). Close to 10 billion dollars in 2005, and 20 billion dollars and 22 billion dollars in 2006 and 2007 respectively, direct foreign capital formed 40% of total foreign capital which occurred.

On the other hand, the faster rise of current account deficit compared to national income after 2001 showed the fragility of the economy. There are two reasons for this according to Boratav: the Customs Union Agreement and the valuation of the Turkish Lira. That the effect of the Customs Union was seen not in 1994 but in 2001 Boratav connects to the temporary defense provided by the real devaluation in 1994; Boratav expresses that the Customs Union's late influence increased the dependency of the manufacturing industry on imports and caused the current account deficit to exponentially grow (Boratav, 2010: 463-72). In the aftermath of the 2001 devaluation, the removal of the exchange rate from among the Central Bank's priorities and the high tempo capital entries made the Turkish lira more valuable as compared to the situation pre-crisis, which braked imports and thus made an important contribution to the current account deficit.

4.1.2.4. Turkey's Economy Between 2007-2012

While in the period between 2002-2007 Turkey's economy was taken out of the crisis situation and placed on solid ground, the world economy enlarged parallel with the Turkish economy, and this revivalist trend continued until the 2007 Global Crisis. With the 2007 Mortgage Crisis based in the US shaking up the world market and the uncertainties surrounding the 2007 general election slowed the growth rate in Turkey and the lowest growth rates were observed compared to the previous six years. The Turkish economy, uninterruptedly growing since 2002, began to shrink in the last quarter of 2008 and continued shrinking until the last quarter of 2009. The extent of this shrink reached 4.8% in 2009. The table below shows the growth rates in the Turkish economy between 2007-2012.

Table 4.9: Growth Rates (between 2007-2013)

Year	Agriculture (%)	Industry (%)	Services (%)	GNP (%)	GNP (Million Dollars)*
2007	-6.7	5,8	6,4	4.7	648.754
2008	4.3	0.3	2,3	0.7	742.094
2009	3.6	-6.9	-1,8	-4.8	616.703
2010	2.4	12.8	7,7	9.2	731.608
2011	6.1	9.7	8.8	8.8	773.980
2012	3,5	2.0	2.6	2.2	786.293
<i>Table: GDP at fixed prices</i>					

Source: (TÜİK)

As can be seen from the table, Turkey, shaking off the effects of the 2009 crisis quite quickly and growing by 9.2% in 2010, was second only to China in the world and the quickest growing economy in Europe. Turkey continued this rapid growth in 2011 with 8.8% growth.

The point that draws attention in the 2009 global crisis is that the crisis was most felt on the financial sector in developed markets, and in developing countries, including Turkey, it showed itself through the finance sector as well. The cause of this was that although the precautions taken in the aftermath of the 2000-2001 crises in the banking sector obstructed the financial crisis, it was unable to stop the real market from entering the crisis. The reason for this was the shrinking volume of foreign trade (Çoban, 2015, p. 185-7).

In order to get over this and to increase domestic demand, the AK Party instituted revival packages. The administration prepared Medium Term Programs in 2010 in order to reduce the effects of the crisis, establish growth once again, increase employment, and decrease inflation; it also passed the '*Fiscal Rule*' resolution in the parliament in order to close budget deficits.

Between 2007-2013, the average growth rate of Turkey's economy was near 3.5%. Throughout this period, there was an attempt to keep the inflation at single digits and budget deficits were decreased due to lessened imports during the 2009 global crisis and steady budgetary discipline. Except for between 2008-2009, there were high rates of increase in foreign trade. Employment records show an improvement after 2011 again due to the precautions taken. Rising to 14% in 2009, the unemployment rate was brought down to 10% in 2011 after the crisis was passed in Turkey. The table below shows employment rates according to sectors between the years 2007-2012.

Table 4.10: Employment Rates (Between 2007-2013)

Year	Agriculture (%)*	Industry (%)*	Services (%)*	Unemploy ment (%)	Labor Participation (%)
2007	23,5	26,7	49,8	10,3	46,2
2008	23,7	26,8	49,5	11,0	46,9
2009	24,6	25,3	50,1	14,0	47,9
2010	25,2	26,2	48,6	11,9	48,8
2011	25,5	26,5	48,1	9,8	49,9
2012	24,6	26,0	49,4	9,2	50,0

Source: (TÜİK)

Table 4.11: Export to Import Ratio Between 2007-2012

2007	63,1
2008	65,4
2009	72,5
2010	61,4
2011	56
2012	64,5

Source: (TÜİK)

There are two important factors about Turkey's economy from the years between 2007-2012 in the ratio of exports to imports as observed from the above table: the first is that as a result of the 2008-2009 crises, while the import amount fell, Turkey's exports showed a relative increase. The second is that in contrast to the static economies of developed countries, Turkey's economy continuing its growth trend relatively increased the ratio of its exports to imports once again.

Table 4.12: Ranking of Top 20 Economies According to Size (2003-2012)

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1	US	US	US	US	US	US	US	US	US	US
2	Japan	Japan	Japan	Japan	Japan	Japan	Japan	China	China	China
3	Germany	Germany	Germany	Germany	China	China	China	Japan	Japan	Japan
4	UK	UK	UK	China	Germany	Germany	Germany	Germany	Germany	Germany
5	France	France	China	UK	UK	France	France	France	France	France
6	China	China	France	France	France	UK	UK	UK	Brazil	UK
7	Italy	Italy	Italy	Italy	Italy	Italy	Italy	Brazil	UK	Brazil
8	Canada	Spain	Canada	Canada	Canada	Russia	Brazil	Italy	Italy	Russia
9	Spain	Canada	Spain	Spain	Spain	Brazil	Spain	India	Russia	Italy
10	Mexico	Mexico	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Spain	Canada	Canada	India	India
11	Korea	Korea	Mexico	Russia	Russia	Canada	India	Russia	Canada	Canada
12	India	India	Korea	Mexico	India	India	Russia	Spain	Australia	Australia
13	Brazil	Brazil	India	Korea	Korea	Mexico	Australia	Australia	Spain	Spain
14	Netherlands	Australia	Russia	India	Mexico	Australia	Mexico	Mexico	Mexico	Mexico
15	Australia	Netherlands	Australia	Australia	Australia	Korea	Korea	Korea	Korea	Korea
16	Russia	Russia	Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands	Netherlands	Indonesia	Indonesia
17	Swiss	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Turkey	Netherlands	Turkey
18	Sweden	Swiss	Swiss	Swiss	Sweden	Poland	Indonesia	Indonesia	Turkey	Netherlands
19	Belgium	Belgium	Belgium	Belgium	Belgium	Swiss	Swiss	Swiss	S.Arabia	S.Arabia

Source: (IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2013)

As can be seen from the above table, Turkey was among the world's biggest 20 economies in 2003, and rose to 17th rank in 2004 after a large leap as a result of its economic performance. Succeeding in remaining at the same spot until 2010, although Turkey fell to 18th place in 2011, it once again rose to 17th place, leaving Holland behind in 2012. Also, the performance of the BRIC⁴ countries as the rising economies of the world draws attention in the table. Possessing the 6th biggest economy in the world in 2003, China was the second biggest economy in 2012 in the world, after the US. While Russia was in 16th place in 2003, it became the world's 8th biggest economy in the world in a decade. Brazil rose from being the 13th to 7th biggest economy in the world in ten years.

⁴ The phrase of BRIC or BRIC countries is an economic term taking the first letters of Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, and China, whose economies have shown a high rate of growth in recent years. Some analysts call this group of 4 BRICS by adding South Africa, while others say BRIMC by adding Mexico. In fact, during one period when Turkey's economy was growing at a steady rate of 10% caused some economists (for example the RBS Developing Markets Head Economist Tim Ash in 2011) to use the term T-BRIC, meaning Turkey. The BRIC countries beginning to demonstrate an intense affect—to the extent of upsetting the global balance—is being interpreted, especially in political circles, as the transition to a multi-polar world after the period ending the Cold War with the US' victory. <http://politikaakademisi.org/2013/03/27/bric-ulkeleri/>.

Table 4.13: Average Annual GDP Growth Rates, BRICS, The US, The UK And Turkey (2002-2012)

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Average
Brazil	2,7	1,1	5,7	3,2	4	6,1	5,2	-0,3	7,5	2,7	0,9	3,5
China	9,1	10	10,1	11,3	12,7	14,2	9,6	9,2	10,4	9,3	7,7	10,3
Germany	0	-0,4	0,7	0,8	3,9	3,4	0,8	-5,1	3,9	3,4	0,9	1,1
India	3,8	8,4	7,9	9,3	9,3	9,8	3,9	8,5	10,5	6,3	3,2	7,4
Russia	4,7	7,3	7,2	6,4	8,2	8,5	5,2	-7,8	4,5	4,3	3,4	4,7
Turkey	6,2	3,3	9,4	8,4	6,9	4,7	0,7	-4,8	9,2	8,8	2,2	5
UK	2,3	3,9	3,2	3,2	2,8	3,4	-0,8	-5,2	1,7	1,1	0,2	1,4
US	1,8	2,8	3,8	3,4	2,7	1,8	-0,3	-2,8	2,5	1,8	2,8	1,8

Source: (IMF, World Economic Outlook, 2013)

The above table shows the growth rates among developing and developed countries between 2002-2012. In this period, while developing countries showed high growth rates, developed countries show a more stagnant side in their economy. Turkey, as a country with a developing economy, showed high growth rates and, growing on an annual average of 5% within 10 years, became the fastest growing economy within Europe.

4.2 Trading State and Turkish Foreign Policy

In connection with globalization, economic liberalism came to the fore in the world and states became more dependent on each other in the global system. This obligation caused

states to use the economy as an important instrument in the formation of foreign policy and strategies.

Trade becoming a tool of foreign policy can occur in three ways: the first is through rewarding or punishing a state by using their need of various products. The second is through creating “economic satellites” on the outside dependent on the state or to create areas of influence by establishing relationships of economic dependency. The third is to increase the state’s economic possibilities or to shut the enemy state off from economic potentials (Gönlübol, 1978, p. 141). The liberalization wind blowing through the world since the 1980s enlivened economic life. States began to change their securitizing foreign policy reflexes from the Cold War period into trade-focused foreign policies and thus essentially transformed their states into trading states.

For nearly forty years, being a side force of NATO has obstructed Turkey from developing multi-dimensional relations in political, economic, military, and social areas (Köse, 2014: 624); alongside this, the introverted Kemalist foreign policy understanding severed Turkey from the Middle East, brought the Kurdish problem to a complete standstill, and caused Turkey to be unable to use the historical heritage left to it by seeing its regional neighbors from a prism of threats and as enemies (Uzgel, 2010, p. 359).

Arriving as the sole party in the administration after the November 2002 election, the AK Party cadres, with the leadership of then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and then advisor in the Foreign Ministry Ahmet Davutoglu led a proactive policy in Turkey’s foreign policy after breaking out of its shell. *The AK Party administration began to change Turkey’s status with a new understanding parallel to the power distribution within the global political system and the changing face of the international political system. Turkey now separated itself from securitizing policies in its foreign policies and took up an identity as a Trading State (Aslan and Aslan, 2015, p. 115). It can be claimed*

that the new Turkish foreign policy, rather than following what is termed high level politics left over from the Cold War period's systemic constraints dependent on hard power and based on a philosophy of security, changed instead to a geostrategic and geocultural based strategy aimed at the substitution of soft power by following low level politics focused on economic and cultural factors (Kutlay, 2012, p. 102).

In the beginning of the 2000s, the world began to transform from the unipolar system under the hegemony of the US after the dismantlement of the Soviets in the beginning of the 1990s to a multipolar one with the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) (Karaosmanoğlu, 2008, p. 16). While in the east, China, India, and other East Asian countries attempted to take control of the manufacturing industry, Russia and Brazil succeeded in placing their economies among the world giants through their exports of natural resources and ended the world economy being focused solely around the trans-Atlantic.

While this was the situation in the global economic balance, *first the Iraq War and the Afghanistan crises, followed by the global financial crisis which brought a more introverted approach to American policy making, and a parallel increase in the influence of rising powers such as China caused a power vacuum in the geopolitical basin where Turkey is located* (Kutlay, 2012, p. 107). The ongoing crises and the power vacuum in its region presented new opportunities to the administrative party attempting to change its foreign policy. According to some, Turkey has also undertaken to benefit from the Greater Middle East Initiative the US has been attempting to prepare.

Not wanting to remain an observer of all that has been going on regionally and globally, the Turkish administration began to intervene through diplomatic means by way of the foreign policy theorized by Davutoglu in various regional and global events. In his book *Strategic Depth*, Davutoglu pulls away from the thesis that Turkey is neither eastern

nor western and expresses that it should become both eastern and western more comprehensively; thus saying he places Turkey in the position of *central country*.

While the central country provides political and cultural unity between the east and west, it deepens economic relations between north and south. By using its position as central country it will intervene in regional events; Turkey will become a regional power and eventually become a global actor by using its regional power in global events. A Turkey that can intervene in the position of global actor will then become a global power in short order.

The mentality Davutoglu foresees for the Turkey that is to evolve from central country to global power will go through the following phases: the first is the presence of a state that gives its citizens trust and provides an environment where they can live freely. The second is zero problems with neighbors and effectiveness in neighboring areas. *It is impossible for a country experiencing constant crises with its neighbors to create regional and global policies surpassing these borders* (Davutoglu, 2001, p. 144). What must be paid attention to here is that when Davutoglu writes of neighboring areas, he is speaking of the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. Meaning he is expressing that in foreign policy, West Asia should not be the sole index.

The third is multi-dimensional and multi-track democracy. Needing to follow a dynamic foreign policy, Turkey needs to enact a foreign policy that can get rid of clamp of east and west poles that has dominated the country throughout its history and can take initiatives while also being able to meet with all global actors. According to Davutoglu, this situation should not be read as an axis shift. The fourth will be a new style and tone of diplomacy. This approach, expressing that Turkey should play a position setting role in foreign policy, needs to contain more than one identity and be believable. At the last stage expressing rhythmic diplomacy and opening towards new basins, this mentality has formed

the basis of Turkey's coalescent foreign policy between 2002-2012 under the leadership of the AK Party. There are also limitations that Turkey will have to face while enacting its foreign policy during its transition through these stages into becoming a global power. Köse makes the following observations about Turkish Foreign Policy's (TFP) limitations prior to the AK Party:

The reasons for why TFP has been unable to put into practice its holistic foreign policy with all its potential can be summarized under the following headings: (I) the deficiencies in background knowledge, people with the necessary education, and experience in political coordination that Turkey needs to manage this assertive policy; (II) the lack of agreement by Turkey's other regional interlocutors of this policy and the inability to establish multilateral partnerships at the necessary level; (III) the lack of hard power instruments that would support and when necessary substitute for Turkey's diplomatic initiatives; (IV) Turkey's own domestic problems and conflicts; (V) the suspicious regard given to Turkey's comprehensive relations with the West that have been going on for many years by Turkey's other interlocutors (Köse, 2014, p. 210).

Attempting to get rid of the securitizing foreign policy imposed by the Cold War, Turkey, through the liberalizing international trade by way of the GATT and the World Trade Organization and the Customs Union signed with the EU has made an attempt to establish the same deepened political and economic relations with the West with the rest of the regions in the World and has begun to take in a bigger piece of the international trade pie. The high level visits that have been made to foreign countries, by Erdogan and Davutoglu foremost among them, has brought an increased foreign policy with it (Civan *et al.*, 2013, p. 107).

Alongside this, after becoming a candidate country in the EU, the direct foreign capital making its way into the country greatly increased and allowed for Gulf countries to

regard Turkey as a country with a democratic structure and a stable economy. By acting as a negotiator between Iran and Western countries on nuclear negotiations and being the pioneer for the peace meetings between Israel and Syria, Turkey became a leader in the region by intervening in regional problems and showed that it had become a regional power. Turkey succeeded in reflecting its increasing influence in politics with its stable structure through economic indicators and increased absolutely its exports to the near region while intensifying its relative rate (Aslan and Aslan, 2015, p. 116).

Two important structural problems draw attention to Turkey's rising foreign trade numbers during this period: finance and energy. The rising foreign trade deficit with the increase in imports could be threatening to political stability due to inadequate national savings causing dependency on foreign-sourced finance leading to sudden capital outflows in the case of a global or regional crisis. On the other hand, the dependency on foreign energy increases the dependency of the country on imports. Also, Turkey's manufacturing of low-value-added products as a part of industry and its dependency on imports for its intermediate goods, machines, and outfits are among the fundamental problems that are encountered in the economy.

Turkey, desiring to increase its exports, needs to produce advanced technology, meaning products that cannot be easily replaced. That in the arena of advanced technological products Turkey's share is at 2% while countries that can be counted as its competitors this rate is somewhere between 10% to 25% (Aslan and Aslan, 2015, p. 126) shows that Turkey has a long way to go in this area. Increasing its research and development spending during the AK Party period, Turkey has still been unable to reach the desired levels. R&D rates must be raised alongside a lasting reform in education. The expectation from the education reform is the creation of an education system that can

commercialize the high quality information that it will produce. The table below shows the R&D spendings in Turkey since 2000.

Table 4.14: R&D Spendings (TL) (Annual)

2002	1.843.288.038
2003	2.197.090.032
2004	2.897.516.250
2005	3.835.441.076
2006	4.399.880.662
2007	6.091.178.492
2008	6.893.048.199
2009	8.087.452.600
2010	9.267.589.617
2011	11.154.149.797
2012	13.062.263.394

Source: (TÜİK)

4.3 Turkey's Foreign Economic Relations During the AK Party

Operating as a buffer country for Western allies during the Cold War, Turkey became a neighbor to all regions with economic and political areas of influence due to its geographic position in the aftermath of the Cold War. This situation means that Turkey's area of

influence is spread over a very a large area. With this in mind, setting out Turkey's historical area of influence will help in determining its area of trade propagation. In our day, however, Turkey's geopolitical area of influence spreads covers the following wide territories (Davutoğlu, 2001, p. 118):

Near land basin: Balkans-Middle East-Caucasus

Near sea basin: Black Sea-Adriatic-Eastern Mediterranean-Red Sea-Gulf-Caspian sea

Near continental basin: Europe, Middle and East Asia, North Europe, and South Asia (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 316).

The reflection of the Turkish Foreign Policy which transformed from a securitizing line to being concentrated on trade will be examined here under two main headings. The first of these is in the context of the pre-AK Party period and then the AK Party period. The principal trade partner of the country would be the EU while others will be the near regions that will be detailed under sub-headings. These near areas are Asia, Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, continental America respectively. The Asian continent will be divided into headings within itself.

In the parts below, Turkey's changing foreign policy will be taken in comparison with various country groupings and especially both its absolute and comparative increase in foreign policy with the Middle East will be taken up and reasons for it will be detailed.

Prior to the AK Party, Turkey's trade volume with its biggest trading partner the EU was a little over 37 billion dollars in 2001, the year before the AK Party arrived at the administration. Despite accounting for 51% of its trade total, this number showed a sharp decrease after ten years of AK Party rule. Although rising to 147 billion dollars in 2012, this number made up 38% of Turkey's foreign trade volume. As will be understood from this, within a 10 year period, the AK Party both increased the country's total foreign trade while at the same time diversifying this foreign trade in order to lessen the dependency on

the EU. *During the last ten years when foreign policy activism has been the hegemonic paradigm, while the EU's share as Turkey's traditional trade partner has lessened, the role of the Middle East and Asia has rapidly increased* (Kutlay, 2012, p. 116).

The interest that had increased during the Ozal period towards the Turkic Republics after their independence with the breakup of the Soviets was interrupted during the period of coalition governments (Türk, 2013, p. 2). The coalition governments of this period leaned only towards the EU market. With the AK Party coming to power, Turkey once again started to show an interest in Asia Minor and Central Asian countries and going beyond the big brother role that had been expected of it in the 1990s, began to consolidate its unilateral relationship with them. In connection with this, it attempted to increase its trade potential. It has been observed that the AK Party tried to increase Turkey's economic effectiveness in East and Southeast Asia. In 2012, it was accepted into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, to which it had applied in order to deepen its political and economic relations while continuing a proactive foreign policy, as a Dialogue Partner.

Trade relations with Russia, Turkey's second-biggest trading partner after Germany, increase to nearly 38 billion dollars in 2008. Decreasing to 22 billion dollars after the effect of the 2009 global crisis, the total foreign trade increased again in 2012 to 33 billion dollars. While the view that the Turkish and Russian economies were complimentary to each other gained strength, the lack of an alternative to Russian gas has increased Turkey's dependence on Russia. At the same time, Turkey has been trying to carve a niche for itself in the Russian market through its construction firms.

Unable to develop political and trade relations with its eastern neighbors due to various problems throughout the 1990s, Turkey intensified its high-level relations not just with these countries but with Middle East and North African countries (Türk, 2013, p. 201) and thus established a great increase in its foreign trade under the AK Party administration.

Showing a deep interest in the African continent during the AK Party period, Turkey has invested in the development and better life conditions of the region through both state and private sectors. Developing its bilateral relations with sub-Saharan countries, it has attempted to set up bilateral foreign trade councils. As evidence of the approval of Turkey's support to Africa by Africans, the most concrete evidence can be shown as the observer status Turkey had received in 2005 in the African Union being transformed to a strategic partner in 2008 (Mansfield, 2009, p. 3).

Turkey's foreign trade with the American continent was at 7.5 billion dollars in 2001, around 10% of its total foreign trade. After 10 years with the AK Party, while the trade with America increased to 30 billion dollars, the decrease of its share in Turkey's foreign trade to 8% shows that—as with other regions—its volume of trade increased and diversified.

Table 4.15: The Change in Trade Structure of Turkey between 2001 and 2012

	2001				2012			
Country Groups	Export (Mil \$)	Import (Mil \$)	Trade (Mil \$)	Total Trade (%)	Export (Mil \$)	Import (Mil S)	Trade (Mil \$)	Total Trade (%)
EU (27 Countries)	17.546	19.823	37.369	51	59.201	87.447	146.648	38
Other Europe	2.095	5.738	7.833	11	14.368	37.416	51.784	13
Africa	1.521	2.819	4.340	6	10.357	5.922	16.379	4
North America	3.297	3.390	6.688	9	6.662	15.084	21.746	6
Central America	201	41	242	0	769	1.069	1.838	0
South America	186	410	596	1	2.191	4.079	6.270	2
Near and M. East	3.261	3.016	6.278	9	42.452	21.410	63.862	18
Other Asia	1.331	4.884	6.216	9	10.375	49.601	60.176	15
OECD	21.307	26.886	48.193	66	66.393	113.723	18.016	46
BSEC	2.932	5.553	8.486	12	18.793	41.509	60.302	16
Commonwealth of Independent States	1.978	4.630	6.608	9	15.075	35.248	50.323	13
Organization of the Islamic Conference	4.197	5.540	9.736	13	55.220	31.690	86.910	22
Total	31.334	41.399	72.733	1	152.469	236.545	333.991	1

Source: (TÜİK)

As can be seen from the above table, in connection to the widening of Turkish foreign policy's area of influence, there were transformation in market structures. While in 2001

51% of Turkey's foreign trade was being done with European country, this rate had fallen to 38% in 2012, and trade had increased with other areas.

4.3.1. EU Economic Relations with Turkey During the AK Party Period

Oft-emphasized during the AK Party period and at the same time becoming the most important matter of the day, the negotiations with the EU moved forward rapidly through the visits of then AK Party head Erdogan, before he had even become Prime Minister, and a date was set by the European Council in Copenhagen for a day in December 2004 for Turkey's full membership. Putting full membership on the agenda in October 2005 after intense meetings and deciding to negotiate the various parts, Turkey's relations with the EU have actually been going on for over 50 years.

As is known, the six European countries which formed the European Coal and Steel Community under the leadership of Germany and France in 1953, formed the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958. Not wanting to ignore the increasing economic power of this organization, Turkey applied to the EEC in 1959 with the purpose of uniting further with the liberal economies the West had which Turkey had turned towards, and signed the Ankara Agreement in 1963. *"Turkey,... by signing the Ankara Agreement, has established a partner relationship aiming for full membership based on the economic development the EU and Turkey will succeed in achieving"* (Morgil, 2003: 103).

It will be beneficial to concentrate on two important points about this agreement. The first is achieving full membership with the EEC, and the second is, as Morgil writes, that the establishment of this membership being dependent on Turkey's economic performance. In this sense, it was foreseen that financial support would be provided from Europe to Turkey within the context of the Ankara Agreement in order to both better Turkey's economic performance and thus also to speed up its membership process.

Between the years 1964-1972, known as the *preparation period* between Turkey and the EU, Turkey's economy was able to rapidly grow with this financial support.

On the other hand, when considering the financial support the EU gives to other candidate countries from a larger perspective, Bilici expresses that the union did not show the same sensitivity towards Turkey which it showed towards other candidate countries whose total population barely comes close to Turkey by itself, and that there was an obvious unfairness in the following manner:

The financial support total that it gave to Turkey up until the Helsinki Accords (December 1999) wherein Turkey was accepted as a candidate country remained at 914 million euros. After bestowing the title of candidate country status, 177 million euros were given as grant aid from 2000 on. This number was raised to 250 million euros in 2004 and to 300 million euros in 2005. In 2006, it was decided to raise it to 500 million euros. These amounts set aside for Turkey are shown to be extremely low when compared with that given to other candidate countries. The amount set aside for 10 new members who were made official members in 2004 was 10 billion euros, 12.5 billion euros in 2005, and 15 billion euros in 2006 (Bilici, 2006, p. 44).

In accordance with the Ankara Agreement with the European Community, Turkey signed the Additional Protocol in 1975, which *foresaw the removal of customs on manufacturing products coming from the EEC in a gradual manner over 12 years, and increased this time to 22 years for sensitive manufacturing products that must be protected* (Uysal, 2001, p. 141). The EEC, in turn, immediately removed all restrictions and customs taxes on Turkish manufacturing products. Signed in 1995 by the Partnership Council in 1995 and entering into force in 1996, the Customs Union Agreement, as the continuation of the Ankara Agreement, allowed Turkey to enter the European market without customs and without becoming a member of the EU. *Forced into competition and thus to make*

better quality and cheaper products through the customs union, Turkish producers also had the opportunity to become better acquainted with their competitors (Bilici, 2006, p. 44). According to the framework of the agreement, laws and regulations on the protection of competition, protection of the consumer, protection of manufacturing and intellectual property rights were removed and adapted to the system of incentives (Morgil, 2003, p. 108). Additionally, a joint application of standards began between the EU and Turkey in order for manufacturing products to be tested and for them to not meet with technical obstacles (Doğan, 2015: 309); for this, Turkey set up the Accreditation Body in 1999.

Wanting a market functioning according to the economic criteria of the 1993 Copenhagen Summit and with competitive power in the EU market (Güney and Akbay, 2008, p. 160), Turkey made arrangements in money markets and competition boards, made the free market economy better functioning through private boards, made the Central Bank independent and gave the work of inspecting banks to the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA), encouraged SMEs by revitalizing investments for the development of manufacturing, and, in order to make its economic structure better suited to the EU, put quotas on certain agricultural products while also providing support contributions to farmers (Doğan, 2015, p. 310).

Despite relations with the EEC being suspended due to the 1980 coup, momentum rose under the leadership of Ozal in order for the liberal openings it would make in the Turkish economy as well as for the full membership application that would be made to the EEC (Demirel, 2003). Entering the Customs Union in January 1996 and whetting its appetite on the matter of becoming a full member, Turkey *“reacted harshly to not being given candidate status to full membership at the EU Luxembourg Summit held on 12-13 December 1997 and suspended political dialogue with the EU. Turkey then embarked on a search to strengthen its partnerships with big economies such as the US, Russia, China,*

Canada, and India against the EU...Relations with the US would begin by qualifying them as a strategic partnership. Wanting to unite with the West, Turkey would balance the obstacles to its EU membership with the support it found from the US. At the Helsinki Summit of 10-11 December 1999, through US support and with the arrival of more pro-Turkey parties to administrative positions in various EU countries as well as due to other factors, Turkey was given candidate status” (Çiftçi, 2010, p. 313).

The Customs Union’s dynamic and static influences on the Turkish economy were watched and these effects were clearly observed with the increase in imports and exports during the AK Party period. In terms of dynamic effects, the fact of being able to enter the EU market without customs meant a positive expectation formed of Turkish companies, which caused an increase in company investments as well as increasing the quality and productivity of companies who began to adopt outside competition more. This effect came to the fore especially in the automobile and iron-and-steel sectors. As another dynamic effect, the expectation of an increase in foreign investments, meaning technology transfers and the acquisition of other outside markets, was not actualized due to the period’s unstable political conditions, economic crises, and the full membership process not beginning. However, during the period between 2002-2012 when political stability was established, it was observed that foreign investments increased in a manner unseen before throughout the Republic’s history. This topic will be touched on in the following parts.

On the other hand, as a static effect, the year Turkey was accepted into the Customs Union within the context of its economic relations with the EU, the small increase in exports compared to imports caused a negative outlook on the union’s static effect; however, the crises in Asia and Russia in the following years causing a slowdown and constriction in exports without being reflected on the exports being made to the EU

specifically, and a continual increase—with the exception of the period after the 2008 global crisis—in exports was observed (Doğan, 2015, p. 312).

With the AK Party coming to the administration in November 2002, the reforms that were being made by coalition governments as a candidate country to the EU were sped up. Through Erdogan’s political visits between the EU and the US, a rhythmic diplomacy (Yeşiltaş and Balcı, 2011, p. 16) was established and through the decision taken on 17 December 2004, negotiations began on 3 October 2005.

“In the Intergovernmental Conference dated 3 October 2005, the “Negotiation Framework” document arranging the methods and fundamental framework of how the negotiations would be held was also accepted. When the document in question is examined, it is seen that the negotiations are being held over three essential factors: the application without exception of the Copenhagen political criteria, the deepening and internalization of political reforms, the assumptions and application of EU acquis, the strengthening of civil society dialogue, and the conduction of a communication strategy with the publics of both EU countries and of Turkey within this framework” (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığı, 2015). The open-ended negotiations with unpredictable results were made up of 35 chapters, some of them were opened and shut through completion, some were opened but left incomplete, and some were left unopened because they were blocked by the EU or France or Greek Cyprus (EurActiv).

While reforms were rapidly ongoing in Turkey, the draft constitutional treaty in Europe were tied to Turkey’s membership, with discourses being brought down to the level of insurmountable cultural differences, leading to rising anti-Turkey feelings in Europe, causing the rejection of the treaty. In addition, the lack of a resolution to the Cyprus issue, the lack of legislation of the foundations law in connection with the freedom of religion for minorities, and the dead-end about the status of the Heybeliada Halki

Seminary (Kaygusuz, 2010, p. 415-24) resulted in the suspension of negotiations in December 2007.

After this date, the AK Party still tried to show that in its relations with the Middle East, it was still holding to the EU's line; in this context, the conservative parties who arrived at the head of the EU in 2008 supported Turkey in the Middle East and emphasized Turkey's army, its moderate Muslim identity, and Turkey as a model democratic country.

The experience of political tensions after the suspension of negotiations with the EU with the AK Party administration would be observed later on during the Israel issue, but this was not reflected on to economic relations and on the contrary, the foreign trade between the union and Turkey increased year by year with no slowdown being observed except for the period of the 2008 global crisis. Increasing its trade relations with all of Europe, Turkey continued to increase its exports and imports with Europe's principal countries, with Germany at the fore.

Table 4. 16: EU(28) - Turkey Foreign Trade

Year	Export	Import	Total
2002	20.457.907	25.698.221	46.156.127
2003	27.479.360	35.156.836	62.636.195
2004	36 698 919	48.130. 900	84.829.819
2005	41.532.953	52.781.362	94.314.315
2006	48.148.628	59.447.587	107.596.215
2007	60.754.022	68.472.309	129.226.331
2008	63.719.097	74.513.444	138.232.541
2009	47.228.119	56.616.302	103.844.421
2010	52.934.452	72.391.053	125.325.505
2011	62.589.257	91.439.406	154.028.664
2012	59.398.377	87.657.462	147.055.839

Source: (TÜİK)

As can be seen in the above table, our trade with the EU increased steadily from 2002. While our total foreign trade was 46,156,127 dollars in 2002, it was 147,055,839 dollars in 2012. It's ratio within the total foreign trade had decreased.

Table 4.17: Turkey - Germany Foreign Trade

Year	Export	Import	Total
2002	5.868.813	7.041.532	12.910.345
2012	13.124.375	21.400.614	21.400.614

Source: (TÜİK)

While our trade with the EU from 2002 on showed a steady increase, our trade with Germany also demonstrated a parallel increase. Our increasing trade with Germany forms the biggest share in our trade with the EU. This situation is the indicator of a strategic partnership.

4.3.2. Close Continents

4.3.2.1. Asia

4.3.2.1.1. Asia Minor (Caucasus)

Established after the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1990 and recognized later on, the grand aims of diplomatic developments and widening economic relations during the Ozal period with the Caucasus countries (Asia Minor) were interrupted in the 1990s due to unstable coalition governments and because the country's face was turned only towards the West. Because this area is both in Turkey's close proximity and being at the crossroads of the East and West in terms of its location and the power vacuum within, the transformed foreign policy under the AK Party proactively moved towards this area. Unfortunately,

despite diplomatic contacts and the following increased economic relations, relations with the area's country were unable to be brought to desired levels.

“Russia using the economic relations of Asia Minor countries with it as a tool of repression, creating instability in the region by creating artificial problems, and the ease with which [Russia] can communicate with the managers [in these countries] who have a Soviet/Russian cultural background has made it hard for Turkey to lead a principal policy in the Caucasus in the face of Russia” (Hasanov, 2013, p. 387).

Unable to withstand Russia's military presence in the region, just as Turkey did not respond to Russia's interventions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 (Ertaş, 2009), it also was unable to help Georgia as a balancing actor against Russia in the region. Regarded as one nation, two states, despite the continually rising diplomatic relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan and the increase in economic relations focused on energy, relations have still not reached expected levels (Yılmaz, 2010, p. 32). While there was an attempt through Soccer Diplomacy (Kantarıcı, 2009) to mend relations with Armenia, which were unable to improve due to the so-called genocide, these efforts were frozen by the Armenian Parliament.

Central Asia

Attaining their independence by breaking away from the Soviet Union after the Cold War, the interest shown towards Central Asian Turkic Republics in Özal's time and unrealistic expectations remained dim because of the unstable coalition governments of the 1990s, the domestic security and foreign policy doctrines focused on domestic threats, and the unpreparedness of the tendency and bureaucracy with the EU (Kanat, 2013, p. 411-12). As a result of the AK Party's new foreign policy vision, while interest grew in Central Asia, it

has been observed that this interest still remained minor when compared with the interest shown in MENA countries (Kanat, 2013, p. 412).

Yalçınkaya relates the inability of the relations to deepen and to remain only at the level of energy-based trade on the following problems: Russian being the dominant language in the region, the competition between the Turkic countries, the border problems between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and the problem of sharing the natural gas sources in the Caspian Sea between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan (Yalçınkaya, 2013, p. 38).

Turkey, desiring to progress its relations with the region's countries as part of its proactive foreign policy and attempting to compete with Russia and China as the two regional powers in the region, tried to attempt participation actively in the region by joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization it applied to in 2012 as a Dialogue Partner. This participation brought with it the debate that Shanghai would become an alternative to the EU (Yardımcıoğlu and Koçarslan, 2012, p. 169). *“This political convergence with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the actualization of the Asia dimension that was thought to be disregarded of Turkey's foreign policy understanding that has been going on for the past decade in a multifaceted and multi-dimensional manner”* (Kanat, 2013: 416). In addition, Turkey and regional countries wanted to proceed with further integration by forming supra-governmental organizations such as the Turkic Council and Turksoy.

Table 4.18: Turkey - Turkish Republics Foreign Trade

Year	Exports	Imports	Total
2002	61.9345	467.790	1.087.135
2003	899.114	623.295	1.522.409
2004	1.194.307	945.581	2.139.888
2005	1.409.257	1.203.548	2.612.804
2006	1.981.603	1.923.529	3.905.132
2007	2.874.467	2.525.102	5.399.569
2008	3.749.451	3.242.055	6.991.506
2009	3.399.485	1.872.138	5.271.623
2010	3.921.072	2.923.668	6.844.740
2011	5.039.884	3.642.096	8.681.979
2012	5.840.703	3.558.042	9.398.745

Source: (TÜİK)

Coming to the administration in 2002, the AK Party formed close political and economic relations with the Turkic Republics. The above table demonstrates this best. From 2002 on, foreign trade steadily increased between Turkey and the Turkic Republics.

East and Southeast Asia

Turkish foreign policy, wanting to be active in the Caucasus because of its close proximity and the presence of the Turkic Republics in Central Asia, was unable to show the economic successes—no matter how small—it was able to achieve here in what is referred to as Far Asia, namely, East and Southeast Asia. While foreign trade with the region continued to increase between 2002-2012, continually rising external deficits with the principal economies of the region and of the world, China, India, and Japan, are observed in bilateral trade.

Table 4.19: Turkey - India Foreign Trade

Year	Exports	Imports	Total
2002	72.724	564.463	637.187
2012	791.720	5.843.638	6.635.358

Source: (TÜİK)

Russia

Political relations with Turkey's competitor Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia, economic relations which gained speed after the breakup of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the Russian-Chechen War and the planned placement of Russian missiles in South Cyprus have been highly charged. Upon reaching an understanding by the sides that this competition would be harmful to bilateral relations in the 2000s, convergence between the two began and as a result of this, the foreign trade that was 5.8 billion dollars in 2002 rose to a record level of 38 billion dollars in 2008.

Underlying the intensified bilateral relations between the countries lies the following, established through the multidimensional foreign policy of leaders such as Erdogan and Putin who think outside of the West: the political stability established in both countries, Turkey showing that it could take decision without the US through the March 1st Memorandum in 2003 and this new behavior being met with admiration by Russia, the development of tourism between the two nations, and the social and cultural interaction stimulated by the visa-free travel which began in 2011 (Imanov, 2011, p. 335-36). The convergence with Russia rose to the most advanced level with the joining of the Shanghai Five in 2012.

“When considering one side of the coin, we can state that the trade-economic relations, energy relations, tourism relations, cultural relations, similar or close policies followed in regional and global problems, the reciprocal removal of visas, partnership in the Black Sea, the establishment of a higher-up partnership council between the two countries and the increase in political dialogue have never been better. When considering the other side of the coin, however, we see that with the difference of opinion on Cyprus, Armenia, the PKK, Nagorno-Karabakh, Kosovo, the Arab Spring, and the Syria crisis, and the unending competition in southern Caucasus, there remain problematic areas” (Özbay, 2013, p. 352).

While the continually increasing foreign trade between the two countries from 2002 until 2008 suffered a decrease parallel to the global crisis of 2008, it once again surpassed 30 billion dollars in 2012. Energy being the spine of the trade (Imanov, 2012, p. 459) caused a continual and increasing external deficit being entered into with Russia. There was an attempt to diversify this partnership on the matter of energy through the Akkuyu Nuclear Plant Project. In return, the external deficit was attempted to be covered through

tourism revenue, the exports of fruits-vegetables and textiles (Erşen, 2015, p. 356) and the investments of Turkish firms in Russia especially in the areas of infrastructure.

Table 4.20: Turkey - Russia Foreign Trade (\$)

Year	Exports	Imports	Total
2002	1.172.039	3.891.721	1.172.039
2003	1.367.591	5.451.315	6.818.906
2004	1.859.187	9.033.138	10.892.325
2005	2.377.050	12.905.620	12.905.620
2006	3.237.611	17.806.239	17.806.239
2007	4.726.853	23.508.494	23.508.494
2008	6.483.004	31.364.477	31.364.477
2009	3.189.607	19.450.086	19.450.086
2010	4.628.153	21.600.641	21.600.641
2011	5.992.633	23.952.914	23.952.914
2012	6.680.777	26.625.286	26.625.286

Source: (TÜİK)

Throughout the 1990s, Turkish-Russian relations were unable to be developed due to the Asia Minor Turkic Republics getting close to Turkey as well as the Caucasus-Russian wars occurring in the Caucasus. With the AK Party administration in 2002, high level strategic agreements were signed. In this period, it became the second biggest economic partner in

Turkey's foreign trade after the European Union. The 1,172,039 dollars in Turkey's foreign trade rose to 26,625,286 dollars in 2012, making Russia Turkey's second-biggest economic partner after the EU.

4.3.2.2. Turkey's Economic Relations with MENA

Having turned its face to the West throughout the Republican period, Turkey did not pay much attention to the Middle East until the 2000s. Due in part to regime differences and in part to the blame it placed on its neighbors for the support they gave to the separatist Kurdish movement, Turkey only established relations with them from a security perspective and did not deepen its economic relations. In connection with these, the foreign trade portion with this area was not even 10% of total foreign trade at the beginning of the 2000s. During the AK Party period, both trade numbers and the reflections of these on the total foreign trade have observably increased due to Turkey's economic integration with MENA countries. Focusing on capitals and energy on MENA countries, Turkey regarded the region as a newly discovered big market (Okur *et al.*, 2013, p. 135).

With Iran, another neighboring country, issues related to the Iranian arm of the PKK PJAK supporting its activities against Turkey (Inat, 2013), Iran's targeting of democracy due to its Islamist regime, its red lines in relations to formations in northern Iraq (Uzgel, 2010, p. 374), and the UN embargo affecting bilateral relations negatively and with Syria, continuing problems about Hatay and the Euphrates (Yeşilyurt and Akdevelioğlu, 2010: 385) have made Turkey unable to remove itself from a perspective of security. On the other hand, during the 1990s, there are issues which created a chasm between Arab countries and Turkey: the first was the increasing relations between Israel and Turkey and the disinterest shown towards the Palestine issue (Türk, 2013, p. 203) and

the second is the regard for Islam as reactionism as in the 28 February period (Çiftçi, 2010, p. 312).

At the very beginning of the 2000s, when the AK Party had not yet arrived at the administration and the world was transitioning from a uni-polar world to a multi-polar one, the most obvious factor of which were the BRIC countries, regional relations were also quickly changing. This change probably showed itself most in the Middle East. With the deaths of Hafez Assad and King Hussain, the Middle East became younger through young leaders; the Iraq war brought civil war with it and an autonomous Kurdish area was being set up in northern Iraq under the guidance of the US; Hamas was on the rise in Palestine. Alongside this, peace talks between Israel and Palestine continued to remain futile. What's more, the Arab Spring was binding about the entire Middle East and North Africa region ranging from Syria to Algeria (Kanat, 2014, p. 20-1).

While all of this was going on in the region, it has been observed that the AK Party increased the interest shown the Middle East with its inclusionary vision through its rise in Turkey and the reflection of this was seen in the speedily increasing foreign trade. Distancing itself from the status quo approach of Kemalist mentality, the AK Party's leaning towards the region has been named by some as the birth of political Islam and an active participatory movement as a reflection of a new diplomacy (Fattah, 2014, p. 125-26).

The understanding that the AK Party drew for Turkey in the Middle East as a leading country, a country that can give directions, the aim of being the country that opens the door to the West (Baş, 2014) and zero problems with neighbors (Kösebalaban, 2012, p. 144) would give results in the 2000s with Iran, Iraq, and Syria with whom Turkey had been having problems, and this would be reflected in the trade relations with these

countries. The response found in Middle Eastern societies by this transformation in Turkey are explained through three images by Yeşilyurt and Akdevelioğlu:

“The first of these is an image of Turkey with relatively advanced democratic institutions that can allow a party rooted in Islam to come to power. The second is an image of Turkey as a country that has been able to pull through a serious economic crisis, secure high growth numbers, and a country with increasing self-confidence through foreign direct investment and prevalent export products. The third is the image of Turkey that has taken an important step in debunking the discourse of clash of civilizations by beginning EU membership negotiations and with the potential to represent the Islamic world in the eyes of the West” (Yeşilyurt and Akdevelioğlu, 2010, p. 407).

Table 4.21: Turkey - MENA Foreign Trade (\$)

Year	Exports	Imports	Total
2002	4.706.385	5.741.821	10.448.206
2003	7.041.784	4.399.617	11.441.401
2004	10.124.640	5.438.715	15.563.355
2005	12.728.628	7.650.617	20.379.245
2006	14.412.416	10.317.556	24.729.972
2007	19.111.005	12.434.194	31.545.199
2008	31.280.657	16.681.154	47.961.811
2009	26.608.583	9.371.678	35.980.262
2010	30.320.041	16.108.919	46.428.960
2011	34.635.577	23.781.467	58.417.044
2012	51.894.757	24.718.351	76.613.108

With the AK Party arriving at the administration, unilateral relations with all Middle Eastern countries improved despite some problems between 2002-2012. In general, it deepened economic relations in the areas of energy and security (Akbay, 2013, p. 92). While Turkey's total foreign trade in the MENA region was 10.448.206 dollars in 2002, this rose to 76.613.108 dollars in 2012. In this period, our total foreign trade with the MENA region multiplied seven times. This can also be regarded as the economic reflection of Turkey's zero-problems with neighbors foreign policy and its becoming close to the Arab geography. On the other hand, the Iran regime was taken out of the context of being a threat and through gold exports and gas imports, foreign trade was greatly increased and a joint struggle was initiated towards the problem of PJAK. In this period, Turkey worked in the UN to reinstate Iran, which had been isolated from global trade because of its regime and nuclear attempts (Akbay, 2013, p. 95), into world trade and for the embargoes on it to be removed. However, with the missile shield problem that began in 2010 (Inat and Telci, 2012, p. 213) and the re-ignition of the PKK/PJAK problem served to increase tensions once again.

Table 4.22: Turkey - Iran Trade (Million \$)

Year	Imports	Exports	Total
2002	334	921	1.255
2003	534	1.861	2.394
2004	813	1.962	2.775
2005	913	3.470	4.383
2006	1.067	5.627	6.694
2007	1.441	6.615	8.057
2008	2.030	8.200	10.229
2009	2.025	3.406	5.431
2010	3.044	7.645	10.689
2011	3.590	12.462	16.051
2012	9.922	11.965	21.886

Source: (Gümrük ve Ticaret Bakanlığı; TÜİK)

Table 4.23: Turkey's Gold Exports to Iran (Million \$)

2011	54
2012	6.528

Source: (Gümrük ve Ticaret Bakanlığı; TÜİK)

Iraq became the country to which Turkey gave the most foreign trade surplus with the US' export of democracy to it (Okur *et al.*, 2013, p. 134) and with the removal of the UN embargo in 2003. Increasing its relations with the autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq, Turkey began to increase its exports at a previously unseen rate while also importing oil from the region in an effort to diversify energy. Also, Turkey saw a strategic function to Kurdish oil opening up.

“When the exit points of the PUK’s oil is considered, it is observed that the Basra Port is not preferred due to tensions with the central Iraqi regime and that the use of the Latakia Port is impossible due to the Syrian civil war and the costs. The Strait of Hormuz in its turn loses its attractiveness for the PUK due to Iran being isolated from the international community as well as Iran having similar political worries as the central Iraqi regime” (Baykal, 2015, p. 39-64).

Table 4.24: Turkey - Iraq Trade (Million Dollars)

Year	Exports	Imports	Total
2003	829	113	942
2004	1.821	468	2.289
2005	2.750	459	3.209
2006	2.589	376	2.965
2007	2.845	645	3.490
2008	3.917	1.321	5.238
2009	5.126	952	6.078
2010	6.043	1.355	7.398
2011	8.314	2.505	10.819

Source: (Gümrük ve Ticaret Bakanlığı; TÜİK)

By means of the 1998 Adana Protocols signed with Syria in 1998 before the AK Party came to power, Syria's support to the PKK would end and even if not official, Syria would eliminate the issues about the Euphrates and Hatay from its agenda (Yeşilyurt and Akdevelioğlu, 2010, p. 385). During the AK Party period, despite the US protesting the Syria-Turkey convergence, relations between the two deepened politically and economically. During the 2006 Lebanon Crisis and Israel-Syria relations, Turkey played a negotiator role appropriate for US policies and thus increased its influence in Syria, and this increasing environment of trust was reflected in economic data as well. With the Free

Trade Agreement signed in December 2004 with Syria (Maden, 2012, p. 91) and the reciprocal removal of visas (Türkmen, 2014, p. 31) caused the volume of trade of the two countries between 2002-2012 to exponentially increase. However, *while the wind of rebellion spreading throughout the entire North Africa and Middle Eastern starting in Tunisia came with demands for democratization on one hand but the potentials for instability and violence on the other* (Arıboğan, 2013, p. 139), the rise of this would be reflected on the economic relations with Syria as well.

Table 4.25: Turkey-Syria Trade Until the Arab Spring (Million \$)

Year	Exports	Imports	Total
2000	184	545	729
2004	395	248	643
2005	552	143	695
2006	609	187	796
2007	798	259	1.057
2008	1.115	324	1.439
2009	1.422	221	1.643
2010	1.845	452	2.297
2011	1.610	337	1.947

Source: (Gümrük ve Ticaret Bakanlığı; TÜİK)

Remaining in the shadow of Israel throughout the 1990s, relations between Turkey and Gulf countries gained a new face through the great importance the AK Party gave between 2002-2012. It is possible to see this increased importance from the increased advanced level visits conducted to the region's countries by (at the time) prime minister Erdogan and president Gul (Türk, 2013, p. 203) and from the rising economic relations that followed. The value given to Turkey in the region was crowned with the position of the general secretary of the Organization of the Islamic Conference being given to Turkey between 2005-2014 (Turkish Republic Foreign Ministry). Capital and energy was brought into Turkey from the region's countries. In return, the region began to become an important market for Turkish import goods.

“In 2005 and 2006, no significant increase in investments from Gulf countries were noticed and no extraordinary increase happened in Turkey's trade with the Gulf. In 2005, Turkey signed a trade and investment agreement as the first step in free trade with the GCC and a memorandum of understanding aiming for free trade on October 3, 2008. During an official visit to Qatar in April 2008, President Gul expressed Turkey's wish to import natural gas from Qatar in 2011. After this, the investment of Gulf banks in many Turkish banks came to the agenda and important Kuwaiti companies began to make shopping and residential investments in Istanbul” (Ataman and Uçgan, 2011, p. 194).

Table 4.26: Turkey-Organization of Islamic Conference Foreign Trade (\$)

Year	Exports	Imports	Total
2002	4.725.287	3.749.777	8.475.065
2003	7.204.574	5.422.493	12.627.067
2004	10.214.345	7.098.998	17.313.342
2005	13.061.019	9.741.049	22.802.068
2006	15.007.499	13.689.148	28.696.646
2007	20.310.574	17.354.351	37.664.925
2008	32.596.965	22.051.265	54.648.230
2009	28.626.586	13.357.101	41.983.687
2010	32.46. 556	22.200.530	54.670.085
2011	37.325.434	31.417.773	68.743.207
2012	55.218.487	31.690.284	86.908.771

Source: (Gümrük ve Ticaret Bakanlığı; TÜİK)

On the other hand, relations between Turkey and Israel were always good ever since Israel's establishment in 1948 and these bilateral relations were reflected in the economic data. Developing particularly intense relations with Israel on the military arena, Turkey was unable to keep these relations from remaining insensitive to the Palestine issue and from damaging its relations with Arab countries.

In the period coinciding with the AK Party's first years in administration, Turkey fixing its relations with its neighbors, Israel's harsh policies towards Palestine, and Israel's mobility throughout northern Iraq (Yeşilyurt and Akdevelioğlu, 2010, p. 392-93) would cause a stagnation in relations with Israel. While Israel's Gaza operations in 2006 and 2008, the Davos Crisis in 2009, and lastly the Mavi Marmara attack in May 2011 (Institute of Strategic Thinking International Relations Coordinatorship, 2011: 18) caused a decrease in diplomatic relations with Israel, economic relations between 2002-2012 drew an increasing graph.

Table 4.27: Turkey - Israel Trade (Million \$)

Year	Exports	Imports	Total
2009	1.075	1.522	2.597
2010	1.360	2.080	3.440
2011	2.057	2.391	4.448
2012	1.710	2.330	4.040

Source: (TÜİK)

4.3.2.3. Sub-Saharan Africa

Remaining completely uninterested in sub-Saharan Africa throughout the Republican period, Turkey took its first serious step towards Africa with its 1998 expansion to Africa plan. This plan brought concrete suggestions with it: the establishment of new embassies, increase of high-level visits, removal of double taxation, invitation of African Ministers of

agriculture and trade to Turkey, and the giving of humanitarian and economic aid to Africa through the UN.

Although this plan was very encompassing, it was unable to be instituted due to the unstable coalition governments and the consecutive economic crises between 2000-2001 until the AK Party's arrival in November 2002. Gaining speed in 2005, the image of sub-Saharan Africa as a place of hunger and disease and known for its instability due to its geographic distance was changed through African-Turkey relations (Özkan, 2011, p. 574) and began to be regarded as an area with which economic partnerships could be made.

Attempting to develop its relations with the continent through the African Union organization, Turkey gained observer status in 2005 in this organization and Erdogan was the guest of honor to the organization's 2007 summit. Deepening these relations even more in 2008, Turkey joined the African Development Bank as a strategic partner to the Union and asked for support to become a non-permanent member of the UN after holding the Turkey-Africa Summit (Mansfield, 2009, p. 3). The deepened relations with the Union are reflected on economic data. Contracting only with the 2008 global crisis, foreign trade quickly regained traction.

With limited resources compared to other regional actors—US, EU, Russia, China, and India—Turkey used its soft power in continental Africa with its untouched natural sources with a win-win approach and focused on health, telecommunications, construction, and education (Karagül and Arslan, 2013, p. 40) and actualized both these and humanitarian aid. The most concrete examples of the humanitarian aid are the pharmacy operationalized in Chad's biggest public hospital in 2008 as well as the services done in Somalia.

“What any country or aid organization had been doing for 21 years, Turkey succeeded in doing more in just a few months. The Turkish Embassy became the first stop

of those looking for advice on Somalia. Alongside the Turkish government's donation of 49 million dollars, greater than any European country with the exception of the UK, the donation made by the Turkish private sector in 2011 to Somalia is greater than 365 million dollars. Thank you for this intense campaign. Turkey is the most liked country by the Somali government and its people" (Karagül, 2013, p. 42).

Table 4.28: Turkey - sub-Saharan Africa Foreign Trade

Year	Exports	Imports	Total
2002	430.060	380.669	810.729
2003	554.243	616.185	1.170.427
2004	764.791	1.428.470	2.193.261
2005	1.086.849	1.632.270	2.719.119
2006	1.469 127	2.233.388	3.702.514
2007	1.946.661	2.821.104	4.767.764
2008	3.212.341	2.060.486	5.272.827
2009	2.738.866	1.700.198	4.439.064
2010	2.257.898	1.725.916	3.983.813
2011	3.633.016	3.424.658	7.057.675
2012	3.913.246	2.613.447	6.526.694

Source: (Gümrük ve Ticaret Bakanlığı; TÜİK)

4.3.2.4. America

As with Far Asia, attempting to incrementally increase its presence in the American continent, Turkey has been intensifying both its political and economic activities in the American continent. Constantly keeping its bilateral relations with North America, and the US and Canada in the context of the NATO alliance, at a high level, Turkey has also increased its relations with Middle and Latin America to an important degree during the AK Party period. Negotiating with regional countries to sign STAs, Turkey intensified its relations with Brazil especially and signed a Strategic Partnership Action Plan (Yetim, 2013: 464), and also engaged in joint initiatives for Iran in the UN. The nearly 8 billion dollars of foreign trade in 2002 with the entire continent rose to 30 billion dollars in 2012.

Table 4.29: Turkey – America (Continent) Foreign Trade (\$)

Year	Exports	Imports	Total
2002	3.913.833	4.064.890	7.978.723
2003	4.269.431	4.922.458	9.191.889
2004	5.733.174	6.594.660	12.327.834
2005	5.960.234	7.857.382	13.817.615
2006	6.328.447	9.401.273	15.729.720
2007	5.603.154	12.152.396	17.755.550
2008	6.531.624	17.224.222	23.755.846
2009	4.878.254	12.275.086	17.153.340
2010	6.077.766	16.799.161	22.876.927
2011	7.925.943	22.749.493	30.675.436
2012	9.623.267	20.232.975	29.856.242

Source: (Gümrük ve Ticaret Bakanlığı; TÜİK)

CHAPTER 5

5. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

In the AK Party period, Turkish foreign policy used tools other than security focused foreign policy structures. One of these was the formation of a foreign policy focused on becoming a trading state, which placed the economy in the center of Turkish foreign policy. In this period, economic instrumentalism came to the fore in the making of foreign policy. In terms of discourse and action, Turkish foreign policy entered a political economic view and had many functions in many economic-political areas. In this context, Turkish foreign policy played an important role in foreign capital investments, regional integration, market diversification, and the opening of the private sector to the world. The removal of obstructions to non-governmental actors also opened the way for non-governmental actors who were part of the Turkish foreign policy decision-makers in the context of a larger piece of the market pie and global and regional integration.

5.1 Foreign Capital Investments

Foreign capital can be defined as the carrying over of investable resources by people or institutions to another country. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) are investments outside of portfolio investments, which mean the taking of securities, done either individually by foreign investors or through establishing partnerships with local investors (Karagöz). Rising trends of globalization and liberalism after the end of the Cold War allowed for the flow of foreign capital going to developed countries to also go to developing countries. Decision-making actors searching to liberalize the economy and legal arrangements played an important role in the entry of foreign capital into the country during the AK Party period.

Again, as a result of the socio-economic and political stability established in the country, foreign capital investments' interest in Turkey increased in this period. Relative to previous periods, this had a more lasting effect that contributed to the production, employment, technology and finance transfers, and in connection with all this, opened the path for a rise in the national income. It can be qualified as a driving force for Turkey as well as for the world.

The foreign direct investments form the driving force behind the fact of globalization in the world economy (Karluk, 2014, p. 731). Koyuncu explains what is meant by foreign direct investments in the following way: *Foreign direct investments are the investments made by firms in the investing country to the firms in another country in order buy a firm in the country, or to give the founding capital of a newly established firm, or to increase the investment made to an already existent firm* (Turan Koyuncu, 2010, p. 56). The investments made by foreign firms and investors in the hopes of gaining high profits to other countries become the sources of finance first and foremost but also a source of new technology transfer, employment, production, and consumption for those countries who pull in this foreign investment. Therefore, this affects development.

While foreign capital closes the savings gap on the one hand, it increases product variety by allowing for competition and the opening up of new markets for these products. The economic integration experienced in the world throughout the 1990s brought globalization with it and this caused countries to become dependent even more on each other. In the 1990s, when self-enclosed economic policies became impossible and where outward-oriented economic policies became a must for growth, economic development, and reaching the level of welfare, foreign investment did not only transfer finance sources but also technology, management knowledge and trade secret (Erkaçar and Karagöl, 2011, p. 6) and began to play the principal role in the development of these countries.

In order for adequate development to occur in less developed countries, an important part of the national income must be set aside for investments. Because the source of investments are from savings, the provision of investments is dependent on the increase of savings. However, because in less developed countries the national income is lower, enough savings cannot be made and thus in connection with this, enough of an increase in investments cannot be accomplished, and production cannot be increased. Less developed countries can attempt to compensate for this through foreign borrowing. However, because foreign borrowing also has a limit, development is also possible through the more rational method of pulling in direct capital investments to the country (Turan Koyuncu, 2010, p. 57).

Considering Turkey's place in this framework, it is possible to see these views.

One of the most important economic problems facing Turkey today is the deficiency of capital and technology. In addition, because the lowness of income causes savings to be insufficient, the capital need cannot be procured from internal sources. For this reason, in developing countries [as in the example of Turkey], in order for economic growth and development to happen, there is a need for foreign investments (Turan Koyuncu, 2010, p. 55).

Looking at Turkey within the framework of this approach, because a large part of public sources throughout the 1990s were set aside for recurring expenditures and external debt interest, there was a lessening of investments.

Although the need for foreign capital was so high in Turkey, it was unable to benefit from the foreign capital flow throughout the 1990s because of internal factors, be it political or economic conditions (Oksay, 1998, p. 9). Additionally as external factors, because China, Far Asia and Latin America pulled in a large part of the funds from developed countries, the foreign capital coming to Turkey remained very limited as

compared to that going to other developing countries. The reasons for this situation have been summarized as follows in a SETA 2011 Analysis:

“...high costs of entry and operation for foreign investors, chronically high inflation, increasing economic instability, inward-oriented structure that went on until the 1980s, deficiencies in protection of copyright, inflation calculations and the lack of accepted international accounting standards, failures in privatization, inadequate legal structure, and unfavorable infrastructure caused by the impression of excessive bureaucracy and widespread corruption (Erçakar and Karagöl, 2011, p. 18).”



Table 5.1: Foreign Capital in the World (Million \$)

	1989-94 Avg.	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
World	200.145	331.068	384.910	477.918	692.544	1.075.049	1.270.764	817.574	678.751	559.576
Developed Countries	137.124	203.462	219.688	271.378	483.165	829.818	1.005.178	571.483	489.907	366.573
Developing Countries	59.578	113.338	152.493	187.352	188.371	222.010	240.167	219.721	157.612	172.033
Central and Eastern Europe	3.444	14.268	12.730	19.188	21.008	23.222	25.419	26.371	31.232	20.970
Turkey	708	885	722	805	940	783	982	3.266	1.038	575
As Percentages (%)										
Developed Countries/World	68,51	61,46	57,08	56,78	69,77	77,19	79,10	69,89	72,17	65,50
Developing Countries/World	29,77	34,23	39,62	39,20	27,20	20,65	18,90	26,87	23,22	30,76
Central and Eastern Eu./World	1,72	4,31	3,31	4,01	3,03	2,16	2,00	3,22	4,60	3,74
Turkey/World	0,35	0,27	0,19	0,17	0,14	0,07	0,08	0,39	0,15	0,10
Turkey/Developing Countries	1,19	0,78	0,47	0,43	0,50	0,35	0,41	1,48	0,66	0,33

Source: (UNCTAD)

In order to get a bigger slice of the foreign investment pie, developing countries are speeding up their infrastructure works by organizing their legal legislations. Preparing encouragement programs and offering arrangements such as long-term tax exceptions, discounts, and exemptions, developing countries are offering market priorities and monopoly rights to foreign investors. At the same time, these countries are ensuring the advantages gained by these direct international investments. Developing countries are removing the administrative impediments to investments—shortening the period of approval, transparent and fair management, less bureaucracy—and supporting local firms in order to help them globalize. It is necessary for all of these regulations to be put into practice as well. In the period between 2002-2012, Turkey also actualized the aforementioned regulations in order to encourage and attract foreign capital investments. In connection with this, a fast foreign capital flow occurred.

Despite all of these, a greater portion of investments continued to flow into developed countries and the rest is being shared amongst developing countries. Countries that used to regard foreign capital with suspicion because of mistrust are now viciously competing over it. The prepared infrastructure and developed legal legislations as well as the economic and political stability make developed countries a more attractive endpoint for investments.

The reason why foreign capital is so desired by the countries described above is not just to gain a source of finance but also the potential to change old technology with new in these countries, to develop management knowledge, gaining trade secrets from transferring countries, and gaining new foreign market opportunities. Additionally, due to the non-volatile nature of foreign direct international direct investments, they are not risky for country economies. This situation causes developing countries to lean towards foreign capital as opposed to high cost and limited foreign borrowing.

In order to better the investment environment and lessen bureaucracy, the 6224 numbered Foreign Investment Incentive Law of 1924 was replaced by the 4875 numbered Foreign Investment Law in 2003, playing a guide role in showing the path for foreign investments. The changes brought have removed the permissions required of foreign investments and instead has them being tracked, *while also ending the application of bringing in at least 50,000 dollars in the case of establishing companies, joining a partnership, or opening a branch* (Erçakar and Karagöl, 2011, p. 18).

Although the environment of economic and political stability afforded by the AK Party, advancing to membership negotiations with the EU, joining the Customs Union before that and the reforms being done parallel to it raised the foreign capital investments at a much higher rate compared to the Republican period, it is observed that Turkey has been unable to benefit from the foreign capital pie being shared amongst developing countries. Table 5.2 below shows the situation clearly by comparing Turkey with the BRIC countries. On top of that, we see that the foreign capital coming into Turkey is concentrating more on the service sector sourced by tourism rather than the high value-added sector of manufacturing. Additionally, when the economic power, market and population size, and geo-strategic position of Turkey is considered (Oksay, 1998: 9), it is even better understood that Turkey is not getting enough of the foreign capital and shows that Turkey remains unsuccessful in attracting foreign capital. The inability to attract foreign capital will affect growth rates negatively. *It is not possible for Turkey to reach developing countries at its current growth rate and reach its 2023 goals* [2 trillion dollars GDP, 25,000 dollars/person wages, and 500 billion dollars in exports] (Karluk, 2014, p. 747). The author expresses that it is impossible for the goals to be attained in the framework he has drawn; nonetheless, the AK Party administrations continue to engage in various legal arrangements, projects, and works in order to attain these goals. If economic

and political stability can be made to continue and in the case of international relations developing advantageously for the country, the actualization of these goals could be possible.

Table 5.2: Direct Investment Net Inflows (BOPCurrent \$)

	Brazil	China	India	Russia	Turkey
2002	16.590.204.193	49.307.976.629	5.626.039.508	3.461.131.800	1.082.000.000
2003	10.143.524.671	49.456.847.102	4.322.747.673	7.958.120.200	1.702.000.000
2004	18.165.693.855	62.108.043.001	5.771.297.153	15.444.370.800	2.785.000.000
2005	15.459.981.604	104.108.693.867	7.269.407.226	15.508.061.500	10.031.000.000
2006	19.378.093.068	133.272.548.472	20.029.119.267	37.594.764.000	20.185.000.000
2007	44.579.492.464	156.249.335.203	25.227.740.887	55.873.680.300	22.047.000.000
2008	50.716.402.711	171.534.650.312	43.406.277.076	74.782.907.000	19.851.000.000
2009	31.480.932.200	131.057.052.870	35.581.372.930	36.583.098.400	8.585.000.000
2010	53.344.632.547	243.703.434.558	27.396.885.034	43.167.769.100	9.099.000.000
2011	71.538.657.409	280.072.219.150	36.498.654.598	55.083.632.500	16.176.000.000
2012	76.110.663.189	241.213.868.161	23.995.685.014	50.587.554.700	13.282.000.000
Total	407.508.277.911	1.622.084.669.325	235.125.226.366	396.045.090.300	124.825.000.000

Source: (World Bank)

The biggest foreign capital coming into the Turkey is from the EU. The reasons for this are that the EU is Turkey's traditional trade partner, the geographic proximity of EU countries to Turkey, and the presence of Turkish citizens living in the EU. On the other hand, the Gulf capital that had begun to show interest in Turkey during the AK Party period has started to lessen its investments. It is observed that the zero-problem with neighbors policy was not used in a functional enough manner in attracting Gulf capital. This situation is shown in table 4.3. While able to pull in important capital flows from Saudi Arabia, a Gulf country, only in 2008 and 2012, EU countries made serious investments in Turkey between 2002-2012.

Table 5.3: FDI Flows In Turkey, by Geographical Origin (Millions \$)

Region / economy	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
World	571	696	1.190	8.535	17.639	19.137	14.747	6.252	6.238	16.055	10.559
Developed economies	540	692	1.136	5.195	15.762	17.213	12.282	5.580	5.654	13.445	8.278
Europe	468	576	1.033	5.047	14.567	12.864	11.278	5.209	4.915	11.779	7.695
European Union	455	565	1.027	5.006	14.489	12.601	11.076	4.928	4.719	11.456	7.103
Other developed Europe	13	11	6	41	78	263	202	281	196	323	592
North America	9	58	97	114	969	4.223	891	312	378	1 422	471
Other developed countries	63	58	6	34	226	126	113	59	361	244	112
Developing economies	7	1	50	1.689	1.862	1.181	2.357	558	560	571	1.912
Africa	-	-	-	3	21	5	82	2	-	-	-
North Africa	-	-	-	3	13	-	82	1	-	-	-
OtherAfrica	-	-	-	-	8	5	-	1	-	-	-

Asia	7	1	50	1.678	1.813	682	2.215	537	553	509	1.892
East Asia	2	1	-	3	7	110	90	172	43	215	106
South-East Asia	-	-	-	-	9	57	9	45	29	35	527
South Asia	-	-	-	-	12	18	75	102	64	15	4
West Asia	5	-	50	1.675	1.785	497	2.041	218	417	244	1.255
Saudi Arabia	-	-	5	2	22	10	1.312	34	39	8	439
Latin America and the Caribbean	-	-	-	8	28	494	60	19	7	62	20
South America	-	-	-	-	1	467	52	7	7	5	4
South-East Europe	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	4	3	8	11
CIS	-	1	4	1.650	8	731	90	101	21	2.031	350
Russian Federation	-	-	-	1.605	7	108	71	12	2	762	11

Source: (UNCTAD FDI/TNC database, based on data from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.)

**Table 5.4: Order of Countries who Invested the Most in Turkey
Between 2003-2012 (Million \$)**

Order	Country	Capital	Percentage (%)
1	Netherlands	16.667	16,6
2	Austria	8.586	8,5
3	USA	8.527	8,5
4	Belgium	7.315	7,3
5	Greece	6.659	6,6
6	Luxembourg	6.614	6,6
7	UK	6.602	6,6
8	France	6.091	6,1
9	Germany	5.465	5,4
10	Spain	4.314	4,3
11	Other	23.775	23,6
Total		100.625	100

Source: (TCMB)

Turkey beginning membership negotiations with the EU and continuing with reforms in tandem with it—even though not at the desired level—attracted foreign capital to Turkey, which has been reflected in fundamental economic indicators. In the years between 2002-

2012, Turkey's GNP multiplied by three times from 230 billion dollars to 780 billion dollars, the national income per person rose from 3500 dollars to 10504 dollars, exports went up from 36 billion dollars to 152 billion dollars, and inflation decreased from 29.7% to 6.2%. Additionally, Turkey, growing uninterruptedly over the course of 27 quarters until the 2009 global crisis, became the 6th biggest economy in Europe and the 16th in the world according to OECD data (T.C. Başbakanlık Kamu Düzeni ve Güvenliği Müsteşarlığı, 2013, p. 119-23).

As can be seen in the above table, most foreign capital came to Turkey from EU countries. This situation is also an indicator of Turkey being a part of western economies.

Table 5.5: CPI Inflation/Year

Rates (1993-2012)	
1993-2002 Avg.	70,4
2002	29,7
2003	18,4
2004	9,3
2005	7,7
2006	9,7
2007	8,4
2008	10,1
2009	6,5
2010	6,4
2011	10,5
2012	6,2

Source:(TÜİK)

Dealing with chronic crises since the 1990s, Turkey also presents the view of a country whose inflation is high. The CPI inflation between 1993-2002 is 70.4%. With the

Transition Program to a Strong Economy, financial discipline, and tight monetary policy in the aftermath of 2002, the inflation rate of 29.7% in 2002 fell to 6.2% in 2012.

The cut separated for Rand D, which will afford the innovation needed for Turkey, must be increased in order to get a bigger slice of the foreign capital that plays a big role in developing countries' economies. These works need to be increased quickly not just in the public but in the private sector as well. It is necessary to lessen bureaucratic processes (Oksay, 1998, p. 10), observe the primacy of law without fail, and carry out tax reform. In order to lessen labor inputs and key input costs, it is understood that taxes such as the value-added-tax and special consumption tax must be reduced.

Table 5.6: Product Ratio of High Technology in the Export of Industrial Goods (%)

Turkey	2
India	10
Brazil	14
China	31
South Korea	32

Source: (World Bank)

While work must be done to pull in technology concentrated investments, education reforms must also be enacted in order to meet the demand for an educated and qualified workforce. Investments being given legal guarantees is another way to improve. The

preparation of the necessary regulations and the establishing of infrastructure to pull in more Gulf capital which has been left untapped so far is an important topic. Alongside this, economic policies must be led with decisiveness and political stability must be maintained.

Table 5.7: Time to Establish a Company (Days)

China	33
Poland	32
Spain	28
India	27
Japan	23
Czech Republic	20
Switzerland	18
Russia	18
Germany	15
UK	13
Turkey	6

Source: (KDK, 2015)

The fastest recovering economy in the world after the 2009 global financial crisis, Turkey sped up its economic structural reforms. Carrying the title of fastest growing economy amongst the OECD countries, Turkey became a secure investment hub for multinational

investors due to its public sector, finance sector, social security, and tax reforms. Through the opening to competition of key markets to increase the role of the private sector in the economy, the acceleration of privatization, and the new support laws for Rand D and innovation, the enhancement of the investment environment was delivered. Through the new Commercial Code that came into force in 2012 and the improvement of transparency, responsibility, investment, and environment of commerce and the diversification of possibilities legal procedures being conducted in the electronic environment, foreign investors' interest in Turkey is gradually increasing. According to the 2010 data of World Trade Indicators, Turkey is the world's fifth country with the most liberal trade policies. In the Turkey of today, guaranteeing the equal treatment of domestic and global investors, it is possible to establish a company in Turkey in 6 days [as shown in the table above]. Compared to previous years, for example in 2003, a company could only be formed in 38 days. The average amount of days needed to establish a company in OECD countries is 12 days (KDK, 2015).

Table 5.8: Number of Companies with Foreign Capital in Turkey (thousand)

2002	5,6
2003	6,7
2004	8,8
2005	11,7
2006	15
2007	18,7
2008	21
2009	23,7
2010	25,5
2011	29,4
2012	33,8

Source: (Ekonomi Bakanlığı; TCMB)

Table 5.9: GDP per Person (\$)

2002	3.492
2012	10.504
2023 (Target)	25.000

Source: (KDK, 2015)

5.2 Regional Integration and Market Diversification

In the period after the crumbling of American hegemony in the aftermath of the unipolar global structure and where state-controlled economic system in the aftermath of the 2008 global crisis made the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) rising global powers, Turkey became a rising medium-scaled power in its region (Öniş and Kutlay, 2015, p. 35). Turkey succeeded in this transformation by its visionary change in foreign policy. Evaluating this change in Turkey's foreign policy from five different viewpoints, Kirişçi orders them in the following manner: europeanization, constructivism, impact of domestic political developments, geopolitical factors and end of the Cold War, and finally, the concept of soft power (Kirişçi, 2009, p. 34-7).

According to Kirişçi, this transformation, instead of following a foreign policy focused on security, took Turkey on a path toward becoming a trading state through a foreign policy focused on trade. As a result of the trading state policy, by way of dialogue and partnerships, states increase economic dependency and lessen tensions. Due to the needs of becoming a trade state, Turkey deepened its relations with the EU on the one hand while on the other it increased its economic dependency on the Middle East, Asia, and Africa and widened its relations. Economic dependency became a tool for the solution of problems and also created market opportunities for Turkish exports and businessmen

(Kirişçi, 2009, p. 42). In this sense, *the inability of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to handle today's demands and the inadequacy of multilateral trade order in opening new markets made countries follow the path of signing bilateral and regional trade agreements. Free Trade Agreements (FTA), be it among developed countries, or north-south and south-south commercial and economic relations, have spread* (General Information with Regards to Free Trade Agreements). For this reason, in order to widen its economic relations with markets other than the EU, Turkey signed FTAs with many countries in order to arrange strategic partnerships with them as the first step in economic integration.

Acting with the consciousness of active responsibility in both the region and the world between 2002-2012, Turkey was in the status of problem-solving country and, rather than regarding neighboring countries as threats, it has attempted to show that it is a center country by leading these countries through partnerships with them (Özbudun and Hale, 2010, p. 195). Actually, during the Gulf Crisis, Turkey's name coming up frequently brought with it the speeding up of its relations with the West. *Especially after the break up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, Turkey, now in the very middle of the new Eurasian geography, began to see itself as an island of stability in the middle of centers of instability in the Middle East, Balkans, and the Caucasus* (Çiftçi, 2010, p. 309).

The zero-problems policy with neighbors foreign policy made Turkey follow a strategy wherein it legitimized the relations it established with Iran and Syria by placing itself in the position of mediator in bringing to a resolution the tensions these countries have with the West. In this sense, Turkey continued for a long time its role as a mediator between Israel and Syria and the West and Iran, and took up a leading role in surpassing the problems by arranging an exchange in Iranian nuclear problem (Kösebalaban, 2012, p. 144). While managing this web of relations, Turkey, developing an original understanding of humanitarian diplomacy, began to create an important awareness in this area through the

unilateral, regional, and global initiatives it actualized with border countries and its near geography (Pirinççi and Demirtaş, 2015, p. 12). In this sense, Turkey attempted to demonstrate that it was not just a bridge country between East and West, and that on the contrary it was a central country in its mission in terms of being an order-establishing force in the region. In fact, it is possible to state that the Ottoman Empire was formed under similar circumstances of becoming a great state and great power in the same geography.

Attempting to reinforce its policy of central country, although Turkey took up active roles in organization such as the UN, NATO, OIC—where it was a member before the 1990s—and international organization such as the ECO, BSEC, D8, G20 and the successful variety of foreign policy demonstrated by all of these institutions, there are problems with their operations according to Davutoglu. Turkey tried to campaign for a change in the Security Council's structure of giving 5 countries the veto on important matters through Erdogan's statement of 'the world is bigger than 5'. The presence of an inconsistency between ECO's member countries' individual strategies and the joint strategy of the organization due to countries not being able to utilize the advantage they have from being a member, and the EU countries' in-area trading volume being 65% compared to the ECO's 7% was regarded as a failure and thus it placed the ECO Trading Agreement into effect in 2010. The BSEC was re-evaluated as a regional strategic tool that was not used to avoid polarization among blocks in the region, and thus it was determined to be used leading force in deepening relations with Russia. Additionally, formed out of the G7 and now currently the G20, it was determined that rather than going with a membership based on security, it would be regarded as an important opportunity whereby it would be able to have a voice in global economic-political and cultural problems (Aysan and Genç, 2014, p. 254-60).

Elevation of the G20 to summit level represents Turkey with major strategic opportunity. Turkey is a “middle power” in more than one sense: It straddles the European and Asian continents geographically, economically and culturally, it is Islamic with a secular and Western orientation, it is middle income and middle size. The challenge for Turkey is to develop multi-vector approaches to manage its international relations that help it achieve the kind of international influence, recognition and representation of its national interests that it needs for long-term development, stability and security (Colin I. Bradford and Linn, , p. 63).

According to some writers, Turkey has become a mid-level power within its region through this fast and strong transformation in its foreign policy. According to Öniş and Kutlay, as long as a rising mid-level power country can establish these four principles, it will then also show that it has the potential to influence the regional and global system: first, it must become a role model for the countries around it through economic growth and democratization. Secondly, it is necessary to establish overarching and rationalist coalitions who can form a well-managed challenge and revisionist demands towards the present construction in the system. Thirdly, it must carefully observe the balance of expectation-capability in terms of its military, economic, and diplomatic capacity. Lastly, it must ready a niche diplomacy that will ensure supremacy in competition and which will contribute to regional and global governance by way of this supremacy (Öniş, 2010, p. 36-7). Within this framework, Turkey having a presence in the G20 and in NATO as well as joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization under the label of observer are important.

In the period between 2002-2012, while Turkey consolidated its position politically on the one hand, it changed the structure of the products it exported in order to both continue competitiveness and to increase its export potential. Thus, be it getting involved

in GB from before, or with the increased trust felt for the country after the start of negotiations with the EU from both Europe and the Gulf meant an increased foreign capital flow, which brought with it technology transfer as well. While this situation caused a lessening in labor-intensive production, it allowed for the increase of capital-intensive production. For instance, while clothing and textiles had a lessened piece of the export pie, the ratio of exports of the automotive sector increased. An important reason for this change was the rising economies of Asia.

In the last years, through the integration of countries like China and India with cheap labor forces, it has become difficult to continue competition based on basic industrial products. In Turkey, production in traditional sectors such as textiles, clothing, and leather has decreased after 2002. In return, after joining the customs union, the slice of the middle and high technology manufacturing industry sectors increased in the ensuing exports and production. The high export increases in automotive, machine, electronic, and appliances have been influential in the continuation of this trend (Karluk, 2014, p. 290).

Table 5.10: Manufacturing Industry Production and Exports Structure (2003-2012)

Technology Density	TURKEY					
	Production			Exports		
	2003	2007	2012	2002	2007	2012
High	5.7	3,4	3.5	6.2	4.5	3.7
Above Average	21,9	23.2	24,1	24.3	32,8	31,4
Below Average	25,5	34.8	33,2	22,8	29,7	31,5
Low	47.0	38.7	39.1	46.8	33.0	33,5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: (TÜİK), (OECD.Stat)

While the speeding up of membership talks with the EU under the AK Party period and setting a date for negotiations to become a full member increased trade with European countries, the technology and capital transferred from the EU created an environment of competition in Turkey which allowed for Turkish exports to be sought after in both the EU market and others. Despite the opening to the outside which began in the 1980s and becoming an addition to the global economy getting interrupted by the internal complications and unstable coalition governments which also corroded Turkey's relations with the EU in the 1990s, these relations once again began to rise in the 2000s with the AK Party.

According to Öniş and Kutlay, the privileged partnership that the EU had been considering for Turkey should be changed to flexible membership in light of the open-ended negotiations and the Euro Crisis experienced after 2008. Flexible membership would bring a functional aspect to Turkey by increasing economic partnership between the EU and Turkey and by heading off Turkey becoming isolated in foreign policy. *EU integration shaped along a flexible construction will quell, economically speaking, Turkey being the single member of a competitive and high-technology capacity market and politically, the political autonomy that would come from being a regional actor in foreign policy as well as the material and ideological dilemmas that would come from acting alone* (Öniş and Kutlay, 2012, p. 17-8). This situation would both deepen relations with the EU and would strengthen Turkey's hand in moving towards non-EU markets while also lessen dependency on the EU and aid in diversifying markets.

Because the environment of financial crisis in the EU led Turkey to search for new markets, the increased economic, political, and cultural relations with the Middle East, Asia, and Africa also contributed to the diversification of foreign trade. Within this framework, strategic partnership agreements were made with regional countries and FTAs were signed. Through visa exemption agreements, the aim was to increase both cultural and economic relations. Turkish Airlines began direct flights to many new places within the region's countries. Established in 1994, TİKA began to intensify its works for the development of the geography as the changing face of foreign policy during the AK Party period. All of this had a positive impact on the economy and helped in the increase of trade volume.

Table 5.11: Exports to countries with FTAs signed (Million \$)

Countries (FTA year)

	Bosnia Herze govina (2003)	Tunisia (2005)	Morocco (2006)	Palestine (2005)	Syria (2007)	Egypt (2007)	Albania (2008)	Georgia (2008)
2002	43	121	138	5	267	326	80	103
2003	63	220	181	6	411	346	114	155
2004	100	256	330	9	395	473	161	200
2005	128	295	371	9	552	687	191	272
2006	151	325	551	21	609	709	214	408
2007	445	530	722	21	798	903	295	646
2008	572	778	958	21	1.115	1.426	306	998
2009	227	647	600	30	1.425	2.618	273	766
2010	224	714	624	40	1.845	2.251	241	769
2011	269	802	921	49	1.610	2.759	271	1.092
2012	252	797	797	63	498	3.679	256	1.253

Source: (Köse, Okumuş, and Duran, 2014: 272)

The table above shows the reflections of some FTAs signed between 2002-2012 on Turkey's exports. After the FTA signed with Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2003, exports to this country increased by 400% in the next ten years from 63 million dollars to 252 million dollars. The FTA signed with Syria in 2007 doubled Turkey's exports to this country, from 798 million dollars to 1845 million dollars. The reason behind the negative trend in the aftermath of the FTA signed with Albania and Georgia in 2008 is the 2008 global economic crisis restricting these countries' imports.

Table 5.12: Free Trade Agreements that went into effect between 2002-2012

Country	Year
Bosnia-Herzegovina	2003
Tunisia	2005
Morocco	2006
Palestine	2005
Syria	2007
Egypt	2007
Albania	2008
Georgia	2008
Serbia	2010
Jordan	2011
Chile	2011
Montenegro	2010

Source: (Köse, Okumuş, and Duran, 2014: 271)

While commercial relations with the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia increased between 2002-2012 alongside the FTAs, it is observed that the construction sector added speed to the relations. *The construction project rate that was 2570 million dollars in 2002 multiplied by 10 to reach 26610 million dollars in 2012. The number of projects increased from 131 to 441 within these ten years. 2012 was the year when a historical record was set in terms of new projects taken on and construction services. In addition, average project prices rose from 16 million dollars in 2003 to 60 million dollars in 2012* (Aysan and Genç, 2014, p. 264-65).

Table 5.13: Work Load of Construction Abroad in 2012

Countries	Million (\$)	Share (%)
Turkmenistan	4.886	19
Iraq	4.384	17
Russia	3.641	14
Saudi Arabia	2.246	9
Iran	1.886	7
Ethiopia	1.670	7
United Arab Emirates	1.289	5
Qatar	892	3
Morocco	861	3
Other	4.342	17
TOTAL	26.096	100

Source: (Köse, Okumuş, and Duran, 2014: 271)

Davutoglu had suggested the idea that in bilateral relations with the Middle East, mutual economic dependency would decrease the tension as a reflection of the transformation in Turkish foreign policy during his tenure as advisor to the AK Party and later on, during his ministry, he turned this view from theory into practice. According to Davutoglu, the Middle East should not be seen as just a transfer route for commercial and natural sources, it is also a natural resource stock and place of competition. Other than the balance over oil, it is important for Turkey due to its agricultural basins and the transfer of energy sources. In these ancient lands, there began a diversification of relations between 2002-2012 with the Arab world and polarization was headed off by creating mutual areas of interest. According to Aysan and Genç, Turkey, by using its soft power in the Middle East, *the enlargement of access facilities, border commerce becoming more widespread, increasing mutual cultural exchange, and the easing of employment, labor, and capital transfer aiming to decrease the possibility of tensions should be used as tools of foreign policy* (Aysan and Genç, 2014, p. 243). Additionally, the bilateral removal of visas with Middle East countries and the establishment of direct flights to many new places increased both acculturation and also contributed to an increase in trade volume.

Another market focused on in order to lessen economic dependency on the EU and to diversify the market was that of Asia. According to Yıldırım, Turkey's foreign should be renewed through a new strategic orientation and transformation policy considering its commercial potential in logistical and agricultural products, its supremacy in the services sector, and by using its connections with the EU. Ultimately, with the economic power it can establish in its life space, Turkey can take its place among the big economies of the world and can establish opportunities for itself towards the future (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 335). Accordingly, it increased political, cultural, and commercial relations with the Caucasus in

its close land basin as well as the Turkic Republics and Russia. Attempting to increase its relations with this area of low population but high natural resource reserves, Turkey tried to apply its foreign policy in this area by way of BSEC and ECO and succeeded in using its soft power. Wanting to use its geographic advantages with the continent, Turkey contributed to the revitalization of the Silk Road (Yıldırım, 2010, p. 319) and opened the Bolu-Tbilisi-Kars rail line. In addition, in order to both use the natural gas coming from the Caucasus within the country and to become the transit country whereby the natural gas would reach Europe, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipelines were built throughout 2006 and 2007. Establishing High Level Strategic Partnership Councils in order to increase its trade volume with countries of the Asian continent, while Turkey began to import more and more natural gas from the continent, increased its export of manufactured goods and made many advancements in the construction sector in especially the Turkic Republics and in Russia. The increased interest in the Russian and East European markets through suitcase trading and the strategic perspective on economic sources in Central Asia are typical indicators of Turkey's attempt at a new geo-economic specification (Davutoglu, 2001, p. 205).

From a political and economic point of view, the continent that Turkey disregarded the most during its Republican period has been Africa. For the establishment of regional integration and the increase in market diversification, Africa was regarded as one of the key regions and Davutoglu's critical view of Turkey due to this disregard was taken as the basis. *To be completely ignorant of developments in Africa or to belittle this continent as a backwards community of countries with its still virgin resources despite all of the colonial background forms an inexcusable weakness for a regional country such as Turkey with its historical and geographic factors* (Davutoglu, 2001, p. 208). During Ismail Cem's

ministry, after the acceptance of the Opening Plan to Africa in 1998, re-entering Africa with the economic, cultural, and humanitarian policies especially after 2005, while Turkey attempted to develop its relations with African countries, it also gave importance to strengthening the institutional infrastructure of the cooperation it formed with the African Union based on strategic partnership (Karagül and Arslan, 2013, p. 22). Increasing the number of embassies throughout the continent within this framework, Turkey provided direct flights to many places in the region by way of Turkish Airlines. For the increase of mutual economic dependency and the enhancement of commercial volume, bilateral work councils started to be established with regional countries.

The economic growth procured as a result of becoming a trade-focused state by way of the transformation in foreign policy between 2002-2012 strengthened Turkey's central country status and gave the impression of an arbiter country in the G-20 as a medium level power; increased economic integration and market diversification were observed with Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Kutlay evaluates this situation as follows:

In the last decade, Turkish foreign trade diversified parallel to economic growth and foreign policy activism; alongside Turkey's traditional markets, new commercial basins began to be opened up. In principle, market diversification, which can be regarded as both the propellant force and practical result of foreign policy activism, became a development strengthening Turkey's hand. Because market diversification lessened dependence and changed into a factor strengthening the bargaining power of foreign policy makers. In the last decade wherein Turkish foreign policy activism formed the dominant paradigm, while the EU's share as Turkey's traditional trade partner decreased, the roles of the Middle East and Asia greatly increased (Kutlay, 2012, p. 116).

Table 5.14: Ratio of regional to total exports (%)

	Eu	Near and Central East	North Africa	Other Africa	Turkic Republics
2002	56,6	9,5	3,5	1,2	1,7
2003	57,9	11,6	3,3	1,2	1,9
2004	57,9	12,5	3,5	1,2	1,9
2005	56,3	13,8	3,5	1,2	1,9
2006	56,0	13,2	3,6	1,7	2,3
2007	56,3	14,1	3,8	1,8	2,7
2008	48,0	19,3	4,4	2,4	2,8
2009	46,0	18,7	7,3	2,7	3,3
2010	46,3	20,4	6,2	2,0	3,4
2011	46,2	20,7	5,0	2,7	3,7
2012	38,8	28,1	6,1	2,5	3,8

Source: (Köse, Okumuş, and Duran, 2014: 273)

As can be seen in the table above, the EU's share in Turkey's exports was 56.6% in 2002, but fell to 48% after the transformation of the 2008 global crisis into the Euro Crisis, and finally reached 38.8% in 2012 while continuing its fall. During this period, exports to Middle Eastern countries—in the framework of intense high level political meetings and

commerce-focused partnerships—began to steadily increase and the export ratio that was 9.5% in 2002 rose to 20.7% in 2011, followed by an exponential increase in 2012 to 28.1%. Strengthening its market diversification even more throughout the decade, Turkey raised its export ratio to North Africa from 3.5% to 6.1%; with sub-Saharan Africa it nearly doubled its exports from 1.2% to 2.5%; the exports to the Turkic Republics who gained their independence from the Soviet Union went up from 1.7% to 3.8%.

5.3 Opening the Private Sector to the World

5.3.1. Removal of Visas

As is known, it was only possible to travel to other countries by getting a visa prior to the removal of visas. This was both a costly situation and had taken on a rather humiliating and shameful state. From a commercial and touristic perspective, it also had an obstructive, limiting, frightening, exclusionary, and separatist character. With the removal of visas, the citizens of Turkey and those who joined the agreement who traveled for whatever reason began to be met with humane treatment. They began to be seen as guests and visitors. They began to contribute to country economies as factories without chimneys. They played a big role in closing foreign deficits. With the policy of visa removal that Turkey began applying in this period, relations developed with many countries in the areas of tourism, trade, investment, and culture. In this sense, as explained by our source:

“...one of the fundamental pillars of Turkish foreign policy, which is considered under debates of “axial shift” by the international public, is the free travel of people. Reconstructing the isolationist, military power-focused, and based on an understanding of outside threats foreign policy understanding into one that is built on diplomacy, mutual

economic dependency, good neighborly relations and socio-cultural dialogue with the region's societies, Turkey, moving from the importance of integration for economies and societies on the path to regional prosperity and stability, signed visa exemption/ease agreements with many close neighbors” (Mutuş, 2010, p. 4).

Approaching foreign policy in a holistic manner, the AK Party leadership, foreseeing the dynamism that would be created by free travel throughout the region which would be reflected in the political, economic, and social areas and that Turkey's desire to follow a more active foreign policy would become stronger in its own geography, began to remove visas with regional countries and Russia and also started to engage in visa meetings with the EU in order to get exemptions from the Schengen.

Continually delaying the exemption Turkey wanted on the issue of visa and placing the Readmission Agreement as an obstruction to Turkey, the EU regarded *Turkey giving visa exemptions to countries that were blacklisted by the EU after its compliance with the EU's visa legislations in 2004* (Mercan, 2015) as an axial shift in Turkey. In its stead, Turkey regarded the removal of visas as a soft power aiding in free travel that would lessen dependency on the EU and would lead to regional integration by way of market diversification. Despite the economic constriction in the world after the 2008 global crisis, Turkey's trade with regional countries increased. At the same time, visa-free travel increased the tourism and trade potential between Turkey and the Russian Federation (Turkish Republic Foreign Ministry, Ahmet Davutoglu, 2013, p. 14). In this framework, while free travel would quickly increase the number of tourists coming to the country and would increase acculturation, it would also change the demographic structure of tourists and thus help in increasing the revenues coming from tourism. *The middle class European tourists who spent little money and either came individually or as couples began to be*

replaced by crowded and rich Arab families who regarded Turkey as a heaven of shopping and vacation (Nuroğlu, 2013, p. 10). As a result of this new tourist profile and the foreign currency it left behind, production, employment, and technological development in many sectors alongside tourism increased as well as a rise in acculturation.

Table 5.15: Number of Tourists Coming to Turkey and Revenue from Tourism Between 2003-2012

YEARS	TOURISM REVENUE (1000 \$)	NUMBER OF VISITORS
2003	13.854.866	16.302.053
2004	17.076.606	20.262.640
2005	20.322.112	24.124.501
2006	18.593.951	23.148.669
2007	20.942.500	27.214.988
2008	25.415.067	30.979.979
2009	25.064.482	32.006.149
2010	24.930.997	33.027.943
2011	28.115.692	36.151.328
2012	29.007.003	36.463.921

Source : (TÜİK) , (TCMB)

5.3.2. Opening of Embassies

Another transformation observed in Turkey's foreign policy in the 2000s is the importance given to embassies. In order to better know the sub-Saharan Africa that had been ignored during the years of the Republic, embassies and consulates were opened in countries there in order to intensify political, cultural, and commercial relations. With decisions taken in October 2008 and July 2009, consulates in Tanzania, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Ghana, Mali, Uganda, Angola, Madagascar, Zambia, Mozambique, Mauritania, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Gambia, South Sudan, Niger, Namibia, Burkina Faso, and Gabon were established; with these, the total number of embassies on the African continent rose to 31 (Karagül and Arslan, 2013, p. 33). In response to the interest shown by Turkey towards the African continent, the consulates including the aforementioned countries became 21 in Ankara in 2012. Additionally, 14 more countries came to the decision to open embassies in Turkey and with this, it is expected for the number of embassies to reach 35 (Özkan, 2013, p. 486). Alongside diplomatic, political, economic, commercial, and touristic relations, cultural relations have also developed between Turkey and the countries establishing embassies.

5.3.3. Relations with the IMF

In order to fence off the effects of the economic crisis experienced at the beginning of the 2000s, *Turkey signed the 17th stand-by agreement (1999-2002), 18th (2002-2005), and 19th (2005-2008) with the IMF. Established after 2002, the AK Party administration, after the signing of the 18th and 19th stand-by agreements, signed off on very important structural reforms in Turkey and many long-standing problems were thus removed. In the period wherein the AK Party applied the stand-by agreements, the international foreign*

capital amount increased and a reassuring environment was created for investors (Karagöl and Bingöl, 2013, p. 27).

These developments caused an increase in the foreign capital entering the country as well as economic growth, while also decreasing the ongoing high inflation since the 1990s to a single digit. In order to protect these gains, the AK Party administration gave great importance to the independence of the central bank for its aim of tight fiscal policy and price stability and managed to reach EU standards in economic indicators.

Despite the global crisis of 2008, a new stand-by agreement with the IMF was not signed, and dependency on the IMF was removed; however, fiscal discipline was not left behind. It is beneficial to mention the following: the lack of a new stand-by agreement with the IMF does not mean an end to relations. It is foreseen that with a strengthened Turkish economy and due to Turkey's global rise, relations will most likely increase in the coming periods. Additionally, the IMF provides consultancy services to Turkey on technical matters. During non-IMF periods, increases in the grade the Turkish economy received from credit rating agencies were observed and Fitch raised the country's grade to investible. With a decision taken in G-20 in 2010, in order for rising economies to be represented better in the IMF, member countries' quota portions were greatly increased and through the enactment of quote and management reforms, Turkey's quota rose to 0.98%. In this way, through its strong economic structure, Turkey became one of the 20 biggest actors of this institution and its voice rose as well. With the decision taken in June 2012 at the G-20 summit, Turkey committed 5 billion dollars to the IMF and thus changed its role in this institution and transferred from a country receiving loans to one giving loans. Thus, Turkey showed that it had become a regional and global actor under the umbrella of this institution as well (Karagöl and Bingöl, 2013, p. 28-30).

Table 5.16: Debts to IMF Per Year (Billion SDR)

2003	16,2
2004	13,8
2005	10,2
2006	7,2
2007	4,5
2008	5,5
2009	5,1
2010	3,6
2011	1,9
2012	0,5

Source: (Karagöl and Bingöl, 2013: 28)

With Turkey at the head, in order to give more voice to rising economies and make the IMF a better functional institution, criticisms of this institution intensified. With the IMF essentially working at the US' behest, the ineffectiveness of the country population criteria but with the quota being determined over the capital paid which meant that Belgium had more of a say than Bangladesh are some of the irregularities that draw the attention. The election of solely European or American presidents loudly proclaimed the idea that this institution is only a trans-Atlantic institution. In almost all crises, the IMF preparing similar packets and offers and thus worsening countries' already bad macro-economic situations and changing slowdowns to recessions and recessions to depressions is worthy

of attention. These applications increased the IMF's infamousness throughout the world. Due to the deviation of the aim of its high interest prescription for economic stability during and after periods of crisis and its resulting in the failure of businesses and banks has come to be seen as the cause of the weakening of the present financial system and deepening the crisis. Through its insistence on raising the tax rate in order to close budget deficits but suggesting devaluation in order to close current deficits, calamities such as economic stagnation becoming worse rather than being surpassed have been experienced. Additionally, that it gives suggestions attached to conditions and the potential threat of cutting off what it gives at any moment and causing reforms to be interrupted has been experienced as an added problem. The expectation that aid can be received from the institution no matter the circumstances has caused administrations and the private sector to repeat the same mistakes and increased financial indiscipline. As in the Asia crisis, mistakes such as its failure in predicting crises and causing economic and financial crises by leading economies in the wrong way are striking. Its unfairness towards countries with the potential to experience economic crises causes a deepening of the crisis. The lack of independence in the institution and the overwhelming influence of developed countries, and its lack of support for developing countries, shows its lack of impartiality and written structure (Karagöl and Bingöl, 2013, p. 31-3).

5.3.4. Foreign Aid

In the last decade, a period wherein developed countries' foreign aid has become less, Turkey has been active in foreign aid in over 100 countries on five continents and has increased its foreign aid amount and development activities 30 times and become an example of humanitarian diplomacy. Turkey raised its foreign aid to 3.4 billion dollars in

2012. While international foreign aid supports inter-country partnerships and convergence, it is also accepted as a factor of soft power. Parallel to its growing economy and its increase in international activities, Turkey caught on to a high rate of increase in terms of its development aid to countries it provides foreign aid. As the country who has most increased its foreign aid in the world, Turkey has been conducting more of its aid activities in Asian and Middle Eastern countries. While the Balkans and East European countries follow these, African countries come in at third place.

Qualified as a “rising donor” by the World Food Program, Turkey will host the World Humanitarian Summit organized by the UN for the first time in 2016. According to the Global Humanitarian Aid Report, in just 2012 alone, Turkey provided 1.04 billion dollars in Emergency Humanitarian Assistance (EHA) alone. While in the same year the rate of EHAs decreased by 5.9% throughout the world, Turkey’s emergency aid showed an increase. With its more than 1 billion dollars of aid, Turkey rose to 4th place in EHA ranking, following the US, the EU, and UK. Taking up 0.13% of GNP, Turkey also became the 3rd country providing aid by comparison to its GNP, coming after Luxembourg and Sweden (Anadolu Ajansı, 2013).

Table 5.17: Turkey’s Official Development Assistance 2003-2012 (Million US Dollars)

2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
76	339	601	712	602	780	707	967	1273	2533	8590

Source: (TC KDK, 2013)

As can be seen in the above table, according to the Official Development Assistance (ODA) numbers, Turkey multiplied its foreign aid in the last decade by 30. Between 2003-2012, Turkey gave a total of 8.590 billion dollars in ODA. Providing 76 million dollars in ODA in 2003, Turkey increased this ODA amount to 2 billion 533 million dollars in 2012. With a 38% increase in 2011 compared to the previous year, Turkey, in providing 1 billion 273 million dollars in ODA, became first among OECD countries in the quickness with which its foreign aid increased. With its more than 2.5 billion dollars in aid in 2012, demonstrating a growth of nearly 100% compared to the previous year, Turkey set a new record in increases while also maintaining its title as the most rapid riser two years in a row. This rise, accomplished within a decade, has made Turkey a country regarded with interest in the area of humanitarian diplomacy.

Table 5.18: Turkey's Bilateral Official Development Assistance (Million \$)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
Asia	195.46	422.49	535.02	430.60	575.54	509.59	730.35	876.87	1582.72	5.859.65
Europe	30.19	95.59	83.10	83.94	133.5	126.37	139.84	77,18	87,83	858.54
Africa	3.84	11.75	24.78	30.96	51.73	46.96	38.08	269.47	249.47	727,37
USA	0.18	0.04	0.14	1.11	7,63	2.90	11.20	1.87	2.42	27.50
Oceania	0	1.59	0	1.38	3.60	0.12	0.66	0.51	0.06	7.92

Source: (TC KDK, 2013)

Between the years of 2004-2012, Turkey provided 7.5 billion dollars in bilateral ODA in total. When considering the places to which this aid has been provided, it is observed that a majority of this aid, comprising 5 billion 859 million dollars, went to Middle Eastern and Asian countries. The aid provided to the Balkans and Europe came in at second place with 858 million dollars. African countries were in third place at 727 million dollars of Turkey's ODA. It is observed that Turkey took its aid to the American and Oceanic continents in this last decade. In 2012, a nearly 100% increase is observed in the ODA provided to the Asian continent, where this number rose from 876 million dollars to 1582 million dollars.

Table 5.19: ODA and NGO Aid Amounts for Assistance made from Turkey

	Total Assistance	Total ODA	NGO Assistance
2012	3,436,480	2,533,300	111,65
2011	2,363,450	1,273,010	199,52
2010	1,718,180	967,42	105,68
2009	1,519,650	707,170	109

Source:(TC KDK, 2013)

Turkey's foreign aid is not limited with just ODAs. Through direct investments and assistance provided by NGOs, Turkey maintains its position as an important factor in the agenda of international aid. Turkey's total foreign aid in 2012 was well over 3.4 billion dollars, showing rapid increase compared to the previous year. While this number was 1.5

billion dollars in 2009, it rose to 1.7 billion dollars in 2010, and surpassed 2.3 billion dollars in 2011 with a major increase. While a majority of this aid was in the form of ODAs, this number increased from 0.7 billion dollars in 2009 to 0.96 billion dollars in 2010. While ODA rose to 1.27 billion dollars in 2011, it grew more than 100% in 2012 compared to the previous year to reach 2.5 billion dollars. Turkish NGOs aid in 2011 realized an amount of 200 million dollars. Additionally, after ODAs, direct investments form the greatest share in total aid, but have not been detailed as they are not part of the focus of this study.

5.3.4.1. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA)

The executor and contractor of the policies aimed for by the Foreign Ministry through its embassies, TIKA was established in 1992 in order to facilitate the restructuring and patronage of Turkic Republics after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Remaining ineffective due to a passive foreign policy and unstable administration throughout the 1990s, TIKA was made more visible by shedding the policy of wait-and-see between 2002-2012. Actualizing an average of 256 projects between 1992-2002 (Kardaş and Erdağ, 2012: 171), TIKA's project number rose to 11,447 in total between 2003-2012 and by actualizing a yearly average of 1140 projects in 110 countries over 5 continents (TC Başbakanlık KDK), it allowed for this foreign policy to be applied more actively. With this increase in projects and TIKA's progress, *Turkey's transition from a country receiving help in general and technical help within the world's countries to one giving technical assistance was clearly observed* (Kardaş and Erdağ, 2012, p. 171).

With the transformation experienced in Turkish foreign policy, the importance given to TIKA increased from 2004 on and through its institutionalization by way of TIKA's Program Coordination Offices (PCO), its assigned positions spread throughout the

world parallel to Turkish foreign policy. *Focusing mostly on the Caucasus and Central Asia in its first years, TİKA spread to Balkan countries from 2002 on and then enlarged its geography of activities to encompass all developing countries, with Middle Eastern and sub-Saharan African countries at the lead* (Gür, et al., 2008, p. 13). As of the end of 2012, intensifying its activities in the Caucasus-Asia, Middle East-Africa, and Balkans-Eastern Europe with more than 30 physically sound and newly equipped PCOs (Strateji Geliştirme Dairesi, 2012, p. 15), TİKA is acting as a facilitator in Turkey's international introduction and increasing its respectability.

By going towards a vision change in TİKA's project applications, [in developing countries] instead of foreign aid being given as financial aid, it began to be provided on a project basis, with visibility and answering people's basic needs taken as priority in the applications of these projects, and a transition from project understanding to program understanding was undertaken (Strateji Geliştirme Dairesi Başkanlığı, 2012, p. 15). Intensifying its projects on social infrastructure and services, the institution began to be active in the sectors of education, health, social infrastructure and services, administrative infrastructure, water, and hygiene. Within this framework, the number of those who joined specialist training programs and benefited from consultancy services reached 42866 between 2002-2012 (Strateji Geliştirme Dairesi Başkanlığı, 2012, p. 15).

Table 5.20: Countries Receiving the Most Aid According to Size of Expenditure (%)	
Somalia	30,46
Palestine	19,35
Afghanistan	11,9
Bosnia-Herzegovina	7,94
Kyrgyzstan	7,65
Macedonia	6,82
Georgia	4,23
Kazakhstan	4,13
Ukrania	3,8
Serbia	3,72

Source: (Strategy Development Agency Reporting and Coordination Unit 2012)

5.3.4.2. Kızılay

Turkey did not just confine itself to simply increasing its visibility in the political and economic arenas in the world throughout the 2000s but also reinforced its changing image through the topic of humanitarian aid. This aid, done through the medium of Kızılay, opened a new canal for Turkish foreign policy and allowed for the socialization of our citizens and those from countries to which aid was being given. Successfully using this

new foreign policy tool called cultural diplomacy, the AK Party was able to increase Turkey's bilateral relations with countries Kızılay reached in the cultural, economic, and political arenas. *Reaching the needy in every corner of the world in as short a time period as possible, effectively meeting their basic humanitarian needs* (TC Başbakanlık KDK, 2013), it demonstrated the Turkish person's sensitive approach to places ranging from Latin America to Oceania, from Africa to the Balkans. Some of the works of the Turkish Kızılay can be listed as follows: clean water project in villages after the 2004 tsunami disaster in Indonesia; humanitarian assistance to Lebanon in 2006 and the construction of 37 prefabricated schools; establishing a pharmacy of international standards in Chad in 2008; setting up 10 tent cities in Pakistan after the earthquake; sending humanitarian aid to Gaza with medicine and food at the head in 2009.

5.3.4.3. AFAD

Established in 2009 to respond to natural disasters both in Turkey and in the world in a fast and efficient manner, the Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (AFAD) demonstrated success in a short time period. AFAD has been carrying out both domestic and international activities simultaneously. While succeeding in being one of the first international institutions to reach the Philippines after the typhoon disaster there, AFAD is also carrying out a coordinator role for Turkey's aid to Syrians. Syrians who have taken shelter in Turkey have benefited from the sheltering, food, health, and educational services given under AFAD coordination, in addition to tens of thousands of Syrian benefitting from educational services. While nearly 1.5 million Syrian refugees received treatment in field hospitals until the end of 2012, many Syrian were also treated in hospitals throughout Turkey (Başbakanlık Kamu Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü: 2016 d).

The Disaster and Emergency Management Agency is an institution established for the prevention of disasters and reducing their harms, intervening in disaster situations and planning, managing, supporting, and coordinating the necessary activities in order to better the situation in the aftermath of a disaster, and establishing cooperation with all institutions and foundations of the country in order to facilitate effective application of these plans; it is a versatile, multi-actor institution looking out for the rational use of resources in this area and taking an inter-disciplinary approach to its activities, focused on the work it does and shaped in a flexible and dynamic manner (AFAD, 2015).

Moving from the reality that disasters are unavoidable and aiming to lessen the damages of disasters, taking precautions against them, and lessen their effect, AFAD has explained its mission as shaping a society that is resistant to disasters. Within its mission framework of helping people, the environment, and the economy overcome the devastating effects of disasters and to facilitate their speedy recovery, and increasing their resilience in order to be able to do so, and to lower the effects and damages of disasters as much as possible and to minimize the period within which a society gets back on its feet, AFAD's slogan has been determined as "We are prepared for the unexpected". AFAD's vision has been determined as becoming a leader and coordinator institution in cases of disasters and emergency situations that can present risk-focused, active, effective, and safe services that puts sustainable development at the center of its work and which can be regarded as a model on the international level. Through its vision, AFAD is an institution that is focused on risk management and aware of sustainable development, presenting effective services and taking care of reliability, and strong at an international level and one that coordinates with other institutions in disaster management. AFAD's aim has been set as creating a disaster-resistant society within the framework of its mission (AFAD, 2015).

Established in 2009, AFAD's organizational structure and aims grew rapidly; in order to have the institution reach its 2011 and 2012 aims, the total allowance set aside for the organization was 2.949.569.941 TL (AFAD, 2012, p. 52) and 3.303.427.000 TL (AFAD, 2013, p. 42). Although AFAD is active both domestically and internationally, only its international activities will be considered in this study. In 2012, it was active in such activities as building-repairing mosques, carrying those wounded in bombings to Turkey, delivery of medicine and medical equipment, the transition of emergency equipment in the aftermath of an earthquake, and sending fire extinguishing vehicles. AFAD carried out these activities from Gaza to Somalia, Irak to Iran, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina to Myanmar (AFAD, 2013, p. 73-6) and increased Turkey's visibility in these areas.

Table 5.21: Basic Data on Shelter Center for Syrian Refugees in Turkey

Name of Camp	Place	Date of Establishment	Number of Refugees
Adıyaman Center Tent City	Adıyaman	22 September 2012	9.851
İslahiye Tent City	Gaziantep	24 March 2012	9.392
Karkamış Tent City	Gaziantep	08 August 2012	7.366
Nizip - 1 Tent City	Gaziantep	02 October 2012	11.196
Altınözü 1 Tent City	Hatay	09 June 2011	1.563
Altınözü 2 Tent City	Hatay	10 June 2011	2.737
Yayladağı 1 Tent City	Hatay	01 May 2011	2.768
Yayladağı 2 Tent City	Hatay	12 July 2011	2.912
Apaydın Konteynerkenti	Hatay	09 October 2011	5.019
Kahramanmaraş Tent City	K.Maraş	01 September 2012	15.052
Öncüpınar Konteynerkenti	Kilis	17 March 2012	14.067
Cevdetiye Tent City	Osmaniye	09 September 2012	9.098
Ceylanpınar Tent City	Şanlıurfa	26 April 2012	20.496
Akçakale Tent City	Şanlıurfa	06 August 2012	25.271
Total:			136.788

Source: (ORSAM, 2014)

The table above shows the locations and capacities of tent and container cities established in coordination with AFAD in Turkey after the ignition of the Syrian civil war after April 2011 until the end of 2012. There are nearly a total of 140,000 registered refugees in these cities. All kinds of food, shelter, health, and educational needs of the refugees are provided through the camps coordinated by AFAD.

5.3.4.4. IHH

IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) became an important supporter of the administration's openings in foreign policy through the projects it implemented in the 2000s as well as a civil society organization that encouraged these openings. Occupying an important place in the public eye with the Marmara Vessel raid that had been carrying aid to break the siege of Gaza by Israel, the IHH has been leading many activities in Africa. *Among Turkey's foremost humanitarian aid institutes, the IHH, alongside the development-related activities it has been leading in 43 countries in Africa, has also provided sight to thousands of people through the Cataract Project it has been carrying out through the hospitals it established in Sudan. Additionally, the IHH has contributed directly to setting up wells and projects aimed to support technical and vocational education alongside providing direct support to establishing schools and hospitals in many African countries (Özkan, 2011, p. 124).*

Conveying Turkey's helping hand to neighboring countries, the IHH is facilitating the speedy success of the administration's foreign policy opening. *Conservative business associations which are ideologically and politically close to the ruling AKP, such as ...and international aid organisations like the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and HumanitarianRelief (IHH), have paved the way for the acceleration of Turkey–Africa relations, exemplifying the converging interests between state and civil society (Özkan and*

Akgün, 2010, p. 539). With Turkey becoming involved in crises experienced in different parts of the world, the IHH, as a global aid institution, has been actualizing its projects parallel to the administration's work in foreign policy and is pursuing its activities in nearly 120 countries throughout the world (Can, 2011, p. 124).

Active in Africa on issues ranging from hunger to AIDS, drinking water wells to cataract operations, the IHH is encouraging civil society and aid organizations to become more active in the region while also presenting the administration's opening in a more tangible manner to the region's countries. *By June 2008, the IHH reached forty-one countries in Africa through various projects such as clinics, wells, schools or computer laboratories, to mention a few. The IHH African campaigns broke new ground in Turkey–Africa relations, and facilitated the activities of many organisations in the region. They have created social awareness and brought Africa to Turkey's attention. The IHH projects have been included in the agenda of meetings between Turkish and African leaders, thus becoming a foreign policy subject themselves* (Özkan and Akgün, 2010, p. 542).

5.3.5. Business World

The speedily increasing globalization in the aftermath of the Cold War has tied world economies together through the integration it allowed for while also creating a system wherein world politics is also going through a change showing that it is not only states that are arbiters of politics and that NGOs at both the international and domestic levels as well as the business world are also active as new actors. The aim of new actors is to make the state's decision-making stages more democratic and to bring its service to domestic interests to a better level. The aim of this new approach is as follows: *to conduct works*

that will contribute to creating options that will shed light on the state's strategic choices, its security needs, and its middle- and long-term policies; ...to conduct studies in order to provide foresight on foreign policy, and to share these studies with society, the public, and the state management (Ayman, 2009, p. 48). One of the most distinct traits of this new system is steering of these new actors who receive policies of the state's foreign policy, be it directly or indirectly done (Cicioğlu, p. 77). In this system, where the decision-making body is taken away from being held in just one place, the best way to reach domestic interests came to be regarded as reaching a joint decision and with this, by limiting the state, its solitary movement was obstructed. This increasing importance of NGOs has clinched its place in the AK Party's foreign policy vision. Giving up the idea of regarding neighboring countries as enemies but rather considering them in light of the zero-problems perspective and seeing them as countries with which economic partnerships can be made and the economic openings actualized have caused the business world to gain importance in foreign policy (Duran, 2011, p. 27). In this framework, while the business world provided full support for some of the administration's openings throughout its ideological accumulation and perspective, in some it has remained passive. TUSIAD, with the pro-EU policies it has followed, provided full support for the full membership negotiations with the EU and worked to transport Western norms and democratic system to the country and to be internalized by the state and society. Known for its conservative structure, MUSIAD provided full support for the administration's cultural, economic, and political openings in the Middle East and North Africa and invested in these countries; it also informed the public through both individual activities as well through foundations and tried to steer the state in this sense.

Businessmen are not people who conduct only their own business in the countries they go to, they also have the status of representing the country they are from. They play important roles in the presentations of their country from a cultural, social, political, and economic perspective. Many openings were actualized in Turkey's economy in the past years and it has become a country that invests in many different parts of the world—the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia foremost among them—that develops business relations, and which seriously helps the development of these countries (Özkan A.). As a result of the new economic and political behavior brought about by this new perspective, businessmen carry the potential to serve the public diplomacy vision for Turkey. However, instead of them acting by themselves, it is necessary to steer them in a previously determined political framework, for the vision of public diplomacy to be explained by way of trade bodies and foundations of the business world and for them to set forth expectations (Özkan A.).

5.3.5.1. TIM

With a very important place in the growth of Turkey's economy and established for the purpose of resolving the problems that might occur in imports and exports, the Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM) has been active in many important works of the Turkish economy in both the domestic and foreign market. TIM lists its missions in the following manner on its corporate website: *as the highest organization in the private sector portion of Turkey's exports, to represent both domestically and internationally the exporters and to facilitate coordination and solidarity among export unions. To be present in studies to determine export targets and policies; to work to reach the determined export target, to contribute to the ongoing work in other institutions and foundations, to conduct*

coordinated work with public institutions and foundations as well as civil society organizations whether directly or indirectly involved in foreign trade, and to contribute to ongoing works (TIM's Missions, 2011). The reports and statistics published by TIM on Turkey's and the world's economy, the consultations it has with country economy representatives from nearly every corner of the world and the projects it leads abroad brings it forth as one of the attention-grabbing products of the transformation in Turkey's foreign policy, and, in a sense, it represents Turkey's soft power.

5.3.5.2. Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK)

DEIK, half governmental organization, half civil society organization, is an institution that has been formed with the aim of creating strategies to open the way for Turkish businessmen in the global market and to provide them with logistical support.

It is tasked with carrying out foreign economic relations of Turkey's private sector, with foreign trade, international investments, services, construction, and logistics foremost among them, and in this context to research both domestic and foreign investment opportunities, to aid in increasing Turkey's exports, and to coordinate similar work development efforts. Established in 1986 with this purpose, DEIK has completely taken on the role of "carrying out the foreign economic relations of the Turkish private sector. As of December 2015, there are 103 establishment institutions, 130 works council, and more than 1000 member firms who make up these councils, and nearly 2000 representatives from these firms within the body of DEIK (Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu, 2016)

Taking the holistic approach to foreign economic relations, DEIK is working on areas encompassing foreign trade, foreign investments to Turkey, foreign investments of

the Turkish private sector, foreign construction, energy, banking, finance, and logistics sectors. In order to reach these aims, DEIK has been engaged in the following activities: delivering opinions to public institutions and establishments when necessary, helping companies to deepen in their present markets and to reach new markets, organize international activities, create and apply strategies on foreign economic relations, procuring the knowledge required by the business world, engaging in activities to pull more foreign direct investments into Turkey, helping the private sector to increase its interactive web, whether domestically, regionally, or globally, organizing educational programs in order to increase firms' institutional capacities with the aim of becoming global players, supporting public diplomacy and to be an intermediary for bilateral and multilateral social relations, with cultural and art activities foremost among them, representing the Turkish business world at international and multinational institutions, and to lobby in Turkey's name on international platforms (Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu, 2016).

In the words of Cihat Vardan, the head of DEIK: “DEIK will help in the increase through diversification of both exports as well as the investments that will come to our country, and will support our firms in making investments in global markets, and thus in increasing the brand value of our country.” In another statement, he says, “DEIK is carrying out its work congruent to the priorities of foreign policy and the economic aims of our country.” (Grant Thornton)

These statements by the head of DEIK demonstrate the following: in Turkey's future perspective, DEIK, as a business world institution, plays a compatible role with our foreign policy as part of the influential policies of the business world. DEIK is contributing to Turkey's economic policies within the framework of our foreign policy's priorities.

5.3.5.3. TUSIAD

Established in 1971, the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) is an institution comprised of Turkey's most rooted and biggest economy environment. Supporting all of the pro-west projects to become a member of the EU prior to joining the Customs Union, the association is known for its works aimed towards democratic openings and for the acceptance and internalization of EU norms and pressuring decision-makers in Turkey in this vein. Continually defending that Turkey's identity be built over western values and that its direction be continually affixed to the west, this institution has supported all of the administration's works towards the EU and been engaged in many activities to get the administration to focus even more on the EU. TUSIAD presents its own mission and approach in this sense in the following way: in a Turkey with the presence of a state that is tied to the universal principles of democracy and human rights, initiative, respectful of the freedoms of belief and thought, and focused solely on its fundamental duties, it will help in the development of a societal structure loyal to Atatürk's contemporary civilizations aims and principles and the settling of an understanding of democratic civil society and secular state of law (TUSIAD, 2000).

TUSIAD, by best evaluating the regional and sectoral potentials in the economic-social development of our country, aids in the formation of national economic policies. They contribute to the introduction of Turkey at the global competitive level. It works for the development of international political, economic, social, and cultural relations, communications, representations, and partnership networks in order to support the membership process in the EU. It conducts research in order to speed up international integration and interaction, and regional and local development, forms opinions, develops projects, and organizes events within this context (Emeni, 2013, p. 47). In this context, it

has shown intense support to the EU membership process through its activities and reports during the AK Party period.

5.3.5.4. MUSIAD

The concept of Anatolian bourgeois was constructed in contrast to the Istanbul bourgeois which sprouted and developed from the first years of the establishment of the Turkish Republic and which were on a bigger scale, in the format of holdings. In 1990, the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (MUSIAD) became the biggest umbrella under which the Anatolian bourgeois grouped together. Its membership profile does not just include the first 500 but smaller owners as well. It is grouped not just in Istanbul, but in Denizli, Gaziantep, Kayseri, and other places that are rapidly growing in Anatolia, in industrial centers where political Islam is stronger.

Due to its conservative nature, the MUSIAD has openly supported the AK Party from its formation to its becoming the administration due to it coming from a conservative political Islam origin and also steered the administration's path towards Middle Eastern countries for political and economic openings. With the increasing business volume with MENA countries with which Turkey has a shared past and geographic togetherness, the association, through the businessmen's works and its own devotion has helped Turkey to be felt even more in the region through its activities with states and the public. The Turkish export products sent to the area and the increasing investments have brought Turkey to a leader country status in the region and has also contributed to the regard for Erdogan as the most liked leader parallel to Turkish foreign policy.

Table 5.22: TIM, DEİK, TUSIAD, and MUSIAD number of members and the change in total export numbers between 2002-2012

	EXPORTS Million \$	EXPORTS Million \$	TİM MEMBERS	TÜSİAD MEMBERS	MÜSİAD MEMBERS	DEİK MEMBERS
2002	36.059	51.553	31.719	469	1000	481
2007	107.271	170.062	48.265	576	2100	564
2012	152.469	236.545	54.400	595	4175	830

Source: TIM, TUSIAD, MUSIAD, DEİK websites

All firms conducting exports in Turkey must be TIM members. Therefore, firms doing exports are TIM's natural members. In 2002, there were 31,719 exports firms as members of TIM. In the same period, there were 469 firms who were members of TUSIAD. DEİK membership was formed of 481 firms, in 2002, these firms were also exporting firms. MUSIAD membership in this period was 1000; there is no clear information on whether these firms conducted exports. Therefore, it is not possible to link their membership with exporting firms.

When it comes to 2012, the number of firms doing exports had risen to 54,400, and all of these were natural members of TIM. 595 of these firms were members of TUSIAD and 830 of DEİK. The data is not clear on how many of the MUSIAD firms were exporting ones.

That there has been serious economic growth in Turkey in the years between 2002-2012 is clearly demonstrated by the number of exports and the number of exporting firms.

While exports were 36.059 billion dollars in 2002, it rose to 152.459 billion dollars in 2012; the number of exporting firms rose from 31,719 to 54,400.

5.3.5.5. THY

In order for Turkey's foreign policy's changing face and its feature as a trade state to become clearer, and in order for the businessmen with it to make earlier commercial and economic investments in regions and areas wherein no such investments have been priorly made, Turkish Airlines' growing structure presented an important opportunity for them to show an economic presence. Due to the demands of foreign policy and businessmen coinciding, the President and Prime Minister have been accompanied by several businessmen on their trips (Kutlay, 2011, p. 23). Additionally, with the mutual removal of visas with many countries between 2002-2012, the rise of Turkish exports and the approval shown towards local Turkish television shows throughout the world, the number of tourists who visit Turkey have increased exponentially every year, parallel to which Turkish Airlines has also grown. *The stability reached since 2003 and with the precautions as well as the liberalization policy taken, there was an average growth of 10% per year; this growth caused it to become an important actor in our country's economic development and richness* (TC Ulaştırma, Denizcilik ve Haberleşme Bakanlığı, 2014, p. 244). At the same time, this growth was reflected on to Turkish Airlines' position in European and Global markets.

Table 5.23: Turkish Airlines' Market Share in the World and Europe

	2003	2012
Europe	3,2	7,8
World	0,8	2,2

Source: (TC Ulaştırma, Denizcilik ve Haberleşme Bakanlığı, 2014)

With flight rights to 162 countries on the world and already flying to 107 countries, Turkish Airlines was successful in raising its 2.2 billion dollars turnover in 2003 to 21.4 billion dollars in 2012. The reduction in travel costs, the physical improvement of airports and their modernization, the construction of airports with qualities able to compete with its global counterparts have caused a speed-up in Turkish civil aviation. Additionally, this speedy development of Turkish Airlines' is a result of its geo-strategic status. Just as Turkey bridges the Northern and Southern economic worlds, it also acts as a cultural passage between East and West. Especially Istanbul, at the heart of Turkey's economy, affords non-layover flights to countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa lying within a 3000 km radius (TC Ulaştırma, Denizcilik ve Haberleşme Bakanlığı, 2014, p. 249). In this sense, the third airport project which will be built in Istanbul in order to meet rising demand and need, will be the biggest airport project in Europe.

Table 5.24: Exports to Countries to which Turkish Airlines Does or Does not Fly (Billion \$)

	Flights	No Flights
2003	43.836	
2004	58.539	
2005	67.973	2.531
2006	79.656	2.91
2007	100.478	3.85
2008	123.615	5.403
2009	96.422	3.765
2010	107.875	3.925
2011	127.479	4.884
2012	144.947	5.22

Source: (THY, 2015)

As a result of the improvement of aviation conditions in Turkey, while Turkish Airlines increased its revenue in the past decade quickly, its rise is also reflected in Turkish exports. The total exports made to countries to which Turkish Airlines flies demonstrated an increase of more than 100 billion dollars from 2003 to 2012 and rose from 43.833 billion

dollars to 144.947 billion dollars. However, in countries to which Turkish Airlines does not fly, exports remained at 5.22 billion dollars in 2012.

5.4. Economic Diplomacy

During the AK Party years, Turkish foreign policy has experienced serious change. The security-focused line has given its place to a trade-focused state. In truth, this experienced transformation is Turkey keeping pace—albeit late—with the change appearing in the world since the 1980s, and expresses that this conjecture was passed into with the AK Party. This transformative movement, mentioned by Ozal but unable to be carried out in the 1990s due to the short-term coalition governments, became highly operational in the time of AK Party administrations. Prior to this transformation throughout the world, economy and politics were regarded as being completely separate spheres; economy's aim was the maximization of individuals' welfare and it was used to serve the purposes of foreign policy. The exact opposite came forward after the transformation. In this transformation, where politics becomes shaped by economic interests, developmental aid, official/commercial credits, intelligence services, and cultural diplomacy are all put to the service of economic/commercial profit (TUSIAD, 1998: 84-91).

By changing the traditional understanding of diplomacy, this transformation allowed for the appearance of economic diplomacy as a form and application space of diplomacy. New roles were written for diplomats in the global economic governance, and diplomats afforded more roles for the integration of economies and economic arrangements. *The study of economic diplomacy is concerned not only with the broader diplomatic agendas as they emerge from the processes of market integration such as high*

carbon economy negotiations, intellectual property rights bargaining, e-commerce agreements, transnational finance negotiations, but also with changes in diplomacy and especially with the emergence of new modes of diplomacy, new diplomatic actors and new formal and informal structures of diplomacy (Lee, Donna, and Hocking, 2010).

Throughout the 2000s, when the mutual dependence of country economies speedily grew on a global level, economic diplomacy was regarded by some as a tool of traditional diplomacy; others regarded it as ‘economic state craft’ encompassing grants or embargoes. (For better information on this, David Allen Baldwin’s 1985 book “Economic Statecraft” from Princeton University Press can be checked). But the joint attitude emphasized by both sides is that economic and political activities cannot be considered separately from each other, due to this being practically impossible. Economic diplomacy is necessary for states’ to develop an integrated and coordinated diplomacy (Lee, Donna, and Hocking, 2010).

With the transformation of traditional diplomacy, actors in economic diplomacy have diversified as well. The system where the state is the sole actor in states focused only on security was replaced in trade-focused systems by both states and business groups as well as NGOs, comprising ‘non-state actors’. These actors put pressure both domestically and internationally on states through lobbying and work in tandem with states for economic interests. Globalization and economic coalitions are the main themes of economic diplomacy for these new actors. *It is necessary for us to accept that traditional nation-state functions have changed, that domestic and foreign policy have become intermingled, that the concrete borders among states have conceptually become abstract and that nation-states can no longer control policy by itself (Acar, 2006, p. 427).*

Economic diplomacy is the use of all of the state’s economic tools for the establishment of national interests. Economic diplomacy is one that includes all economic

activities such as exports, imports, investments, foreign aid, FTAs, while also not limiting itself to them. Related to economy policies, economic diplomacy necessitates diplomats to report their observations from foreign countries and to make recommendations while also searching for ways to impress these countries in the best possible way. In this sense, focusing on increasing our commercial activities with all the countries with which we have diplomatic relations, the AK Party has focused on carrying the topics wherein these countries have good background and technology to Turkey, to benefit from them, and to be involved in diplomatic initiatives by way of its embassies in Ankara in order to reach 2023 goals. For instance, the Turkish administration's initiatives have been evaluated in the following manner by the Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade:

The Turkish economy seeks to grow its resource industries, invest in new mining technology and lift productivity as cost pressures intensify. Turkey's ambitions of becoming the world's 10th largest economy by 2023 are contingent on achieving a significant reduction in dependence on its neighbouring region for energy and resources. The reforms to the industry include a heightened emphasis on sustainability in work practices, safety and the environment to bring Turkey to the levels of world's best practice (Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2016).

Increasing trade, encouraging growth, pulling in investments, and supporting business partnerships, economic diplomacy aims for the peace emphasized by traditional diplomacy alongside economic richness. Economic welfare, connected to this, is directly related to the developments in economies whose dependence on each other have risen. For this reason, the AK Party has taken joint decisions with both the business world and with civil society organizations to use foreign policy in the service of economic interests. With this transformation, Turkey's visibility has increased both regionally and

internationally between 2002-2012; while gaining speed in foreign trade, it has also become a game-setting actor that can serve economic interests and produced solutions for problems among the region's countries.



CHAPTER 6

6. CONCLUSION

Forming the administration after the 2001 economic crises, the AK Party was a leader of transformation in myriad areas ranging from the economy to foreign policy. There were deep-seated paradigmatic shifts and transformations experienced in Turkish foreign policy. These shifts and transformations also profoundly affected external economic relations as well as the Turkish economy.

The paradigmatic shift experienced during the AK Party period in Turkish foreign policy (TFP) gave it the opportunity to move towards the East and other geographies due to Turkey's geopolitical position; it also allowed for the use of new instruments in the formation process of foreign policies. This situation was wondered about by many sides, bringing to mind the question 'Is there a shift in TFP?' Another question that came up was whether TFP had abandoned traditional foreign policy codes. In truth, the answer to both of these questions can be found in the makings of Turkey's foreign policy.

First, through a multi-dimensional foreign policy perspective, the TFP re-shaped itself by shifting its direction from the West to the East and North to South through political and economic partnerships. While continuing EU negotiations for membership on one hand and maintaining its place in the Atlantic alliance, TFP also entered into close political and economic relations with other geographies. Thus, there was more a transformation to a multi-dimensional approach to foreign policy rather than a sharp shift in direction.

Secondly, the traditionally fundamental foreign policy principles of the Turkish Republic that remain constant are those of being West-oriented, keeping to the status quo, and garnering legitimacy. Its participation in the Atlantic alliance is a result of this Western orientation, while keeping to the status quo comes from the desire to protect its borders due to Turkey's geopolitical status at the same time that it maintains a balance in the international system. Legitimacy comes in through its conformance to international law as a medium-size country. In this context, while the AK Party period has put forward new approaches to TFP, it is not possible to say that there has been a fundamental change in the principles of foreign policy. A continuity is present in the fundamental foreign policy reflexes, while there have been differing attitudes demonstrated due to Turkey's geopolitical position.

Although focused on the West in its foreign policy, it is not possible for Turkey to turn a blind eye to the goings-on in its neighboring geography and to remain outside economic relations. The zero-problems policy and regional integration by establishing good relations with regional countries contributed positively to Turkey's economy. To give a summary statement of the new tendency in Turkish foreign policy during the AK Party policy, it would suffice to say 'continuity in transformation'.

The AK Party came to the administration in the aftermath of the political and economic crises experienced in the world and in Turkey after 1990. In this period, all of the macro economic indicators were extremely bad in the Turkish economy. Enlarging the scale and the presentation of different approaches through the AK Party administration positively effected the Turkish economy. In this context, proactive convergences such as economic and political partnerships as well as free trade agreements and others in

connection with the expansion of the area of influence of TFP caused the intertwining of economy and foreign policy. As a result of this, the weight of economy increased in foreign policy. The zero-problems with neighbors policy and the multi-dimensional and regional integration perspectives of foreign policy improved relations with neighbors, which in turn brought economic relations to higher levels. In this way, Turkey began to create a foreign policy planned around the economy rather than security. Moreover, Turkish foreign policy was able to benefit from the opportunity provided by the overarching theme of the current period, where foreign policy and economy have become inseparable in connection with globalization. Just as external economic relations are supported through each foreign policy process, foreign policy is supported in every external economic relation. For example, in the high-level agreements being made with Iraq, economic interests were kept in mind while making sure to harmonize every stage of the foreign trade being conducted with Iraq with foreign policy.

Another point is that while during the Cold War states considered national security to be a military matter, in our current situation, economic security has become the most important aspect of a state's security. In this context, while Turkey has been attempting to keep its economy stable and secure in the Western alliance, it has also aimed at strengthening Turkey's economic structure by signing bilateral agreements on a global and regional scale.

One of the new approaches put forward by the AK Party in foreign policy is Turkey's soft power. The historical and cultural ties Turkey has with countries in its close basin formed solid ground for it to enter effective relations with these countries. Turkey tried to be more influential in the area by using its soft power in geographies with which it

has historical and cultural ties through the instruments of civil society, cinema, tourism, and others. During this period, interactions with close land basins, especially the Middle East, increased. The Middle East was enchanted by Turkish movies and TV shows concerned with historical topics and watched them in great numbers, Turkey became a central location for tourism from the Middle East. By using soft power, economic relations were developed with the Middle East and close continental basins.

Turkey's relations with the EU began in 1959, after its application to become a member of the European Economic Community, and the adventure continued with the Ankara Agreement that came into effect in 1963, which remained as such until the AK Party formed the administration. After the arrival of the AK Party in the administration, the membership process sped up and, following the Brussels Summit in 2004, EU membership negotiations began in earnest on October 3, 2005. The start of membership negotiations with the EU was an important step for foreign policy just as it brought about important results for Turkey's economy. The membership period with the EU gave the Turkish economy an image of stability for external economies. The EU acted as a vitalizer for Turkey's economy. The laws that were to be enacted in the context of membership negotiations were important for the modernization and qualitative change of Turkey's economy.

In this global age where the periods of local, regional, and global transformations are very rapid, public diplomacy has increased in importance for states. Defending state's interests is no longer feasible solely through the use of diplomacy and hard power. States must appeal not only to international organizations and other states, but also to foreign public opinions. Today, many states must conduct public diplomacy in order to create a

positive image in the eyes of foreign public opinion, states, and international organizations. As a result, Turkey also has not remained indifferent to public diplomacy.

With the AK Party's arrival at the administration in 2002, public diplomacy became one of the best used instruments in foreign policy. In this period, PR work was done; media works were conducted in the context of political communication by organizing country meetings; as cultural works, 'Turkey's Friends Programs' were arranged; 'wise people commission' meetings were organized; and finally, A-list Turkey programs were organized through the efforts of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and Public Diplomacy Coordination Office.

Other important institutions which should be mentioned in the context of public diplomacy are TIKA and the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities. These institutions develop projects in social, cultural, and economic educational areas in countries where Turkish is spoken or to which there are historical ties and support these countries' development.

The public diplomacy institution—begun during AK Party tenure—is still new. Turkey is wrestling with the problems and misperceptions in foreign public opinion brought about by not conducting enough PR in the context of public diplomacy in the EU and abroad. Despite the lateness in these works, Turkey has nonetheless been able to advance its brand value. This process has supported the revitalization of our cultural and economic ties with geographies in the proximate continental basin to which we have historical and cultural ties.

Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoglu was a key advisor to the AK Party administration which came to power after the November 3, 2002 general election. Stamping his name on the AK Party's foreign policy during his presence as an advisor, Davutoglu caused paradigmatic shifts in Turkey's foreign policy through the new approaches he had theorized about in his book, *Strategic Depth*, as well as through the discourses he brought forward later on. In this period, Prof. Dr. Davutoglu was both the theoretician and practitioner of the new foreign policy Turkey had begun to follow. Searching for these new approaches and the depth of Turkey's strategic vision in its historical and cultural amplitude, Davutoglu built the new foreign policy based on fundamental principles such as central country, zero-problems with neighbors, multi-dimensional foreign policy, rhythmic diplomacy, balance between freedom and security, and others.

Enlarging the scale of foreign policy after putting in central status Turkey's historical accumulation, cultural depth, and geographic situation, Davutoglu aimed for the creation of a stable economic basin by developing Turkey's political and economic relations with its neighbors through the zero-problems with neighbors approach. Parallel to this, Turkey arranging partnerships not just with the West but with countries such as Russia, China, Iran, Brazil, Japan, and Egypt and external economic relations rapidly improving with these countries was observed.

Davutoglu's foreign policy vision was not focused solely on the establishment of political and cultural relations but global and regional relations in economy as well. During Davutoglu's period, the growing scale of TFP increased Turkey's recognizability while also giving it the image of a secure and stable country. This situation has eased the entry of foreign capital into Turkey. The establishment of embassies in order to rejuvenate trade

relations with Africa, holding the African Conference, the visa exemptions enacted with Latin America and East Asia in order to vitalize trade, and signing free trade agreements have been influential in the growth of Turkey's economy.

Throughout the same period, Turkey beginning EU negotiations, being elected as a member of the UN Security Council, and its mediation efforts between Iran and the West as well as between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia all increased Turkey's recognizability in terms of public diplomacy while also showing that Turkey was a politically and economically stable country in global markets.

Throughout the 1990s, crises of financial systems were experienced in world economies, and especially in developing countries. These crises made the World Bank and IMF push developing countries to be open to the outside and become market economies, which exposed developing countries to speculative movements. Turkey, during this period, was one of the developing countries who experienced chronic crises due to its current account deficits and inability in administering fiscal discipline. Concerning the 1994 and 2001 crises, a part of their dimension is global. Coming to the administration after the 2001 crisis, the AK Party centralized liberal principles in the economy while also creating a politically stable and secure environment, thus allowing for a positive performance in the economy.

Determinedly following through on the reforms, the AK Party did not leave behind financial discipline and applied tight monetary policy. Through its Transition Program to a Strong Economy, it aimed for the establishment of macro economic stability. These efforts brought with it an amelioration in macro economic data.

As the 20th biggest economy in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis, Turkey was able to rise in the GNP rankings, even if a little bit. Rising to the 17th spot in 2012, Turkey moved ahead of countries like Sweden, the Netherlands, and Saudi Arabia. The Turkish economy's growth rate of -9.5 during the 2001 crisis rose by 7.9 in 2002, and grew by 6.9 in 2012. In terms of growth rates, Turkey demonstrated a successful growth performance in this period when compared with other developed countries.

While the situation in 2002 was rather bleak, with GNP at 230 billion dollars, national income per person at 3500 dollars, an inflation of 30%, overnight borrowing rate at 44%, IMF debts at 23.5 billion dollars, and exports of 36 billion dollars, there was definitive turnaround in 2012, where GNP was now 786 billion dollars, national income per person had reached 10.504 dollars, inflation was 6.6%, overnight borrowing rate was 5%, IMF debts at 900 million dollars, and exports of 152 billion dollars.

The fundamental aim of developed and developing countries is the growth of their economy. The condition for economic growth is to conduct foreign trade and for this trade to be export-based. In this context, the AK Party developed a growth model in its economic policy perspective dependent on exports. Through structural reforms after 2002 and the administrative decisions and applications, it aimed to open the way of exports. The Turkish economy began a phase of searching for alternative markets during the AK Party period. The administration's leaning towards Middle Eastern, African, Asian, and Latin American markets increased our 2002 36 billion dollar exports to 152 billion dollars in 2012.

In light of this data, it is obvious that there was substantial improvement in Turkey's economy. Through the applied policies and reforms between 2002-2012 and in connection with the enlargement of Turkish foreign policy, the Turkish economy was positively affected by market diversification and the general warm weather and cash abundance throughout the world. In this context, it is possible to say that there was some success in the Turkish economy's macroeconomic indicators. However, when considering the fact that the 2008 global crisis affected developing countries deeply, the Turkish economy continues to be rather fragile.

The AK Party's economic policies were in line with Western values and, as part of its search to be integrated with the global economic system, was a party program based on the rules and laws of the market economy and domestically dependent on exports—through these policies, the AK Party came to form the administration. The AK Party presented a government program where the market economy and its less state in the economy idea was prioritized, pure competition conditions were attempted to be arranged, and the private sector's way was cleared in the global and local markets through privatization. In this context, the AK Party built a foreign policy perspective was one that prioritized foreign trade, that opened the way for the private sector, that contributed to market diversification, and which took on an important role in the entrance of foreign capital.

The EU membership negotiations that began on December 15, 2004 took on the role of a lever in the Turkish economy's opening to the global world; we can observe from this period a rapid increase in exports and equally rapid entry of foreign capital into Turkey. Turkey beginning its full membership negotiations with the EU showed not only

the Turkish economy's desire to be added to the Western and global world, but also the trust placed in the Turkish economy by the West and the rest of the world. If Turkey wants to enlarge its global and regional areas of influence, it must continue its relations with the EU alongside the opportunities afforded to it by its geography, and put forward the need for it to be present in the global liberal economic system. However, with the temporary suspension of membership negotiations in 2009, contractions in the Turkish economy can be clearly seen. From this period on, the entry of foreign capital demonstrated a serious decrease while growth rates also showed serious falls.

It is important for the growth of Turkey's economy for it to develop economic relations with its close continental basin as well as other geographies while maintaining its EU perspective and abiding by the Western liberal economic policies.

Another condition to being competitive in the global market is to produce high-value goods; to do so, R&D must be prioritized. Showing gradual improvement from 2002 on, R&D investments are still low when compared with developed countries.

With its 150 years of democracy, EU perspective, and liberal economic values, its geo-economic and geopolitical positioning in an age where globalization and regional actors come forth rapidly, Turkey has been able to greatly improve in the past decade in improving its trade and economic relations.

Another factor in the formation of foreign policy during the AK Party period has been civil society organizations (CSOs) and Turkish businessmen. In this period, our

diplomacy entered into interactive relations with the Turkish public, private sector, and CSOs and paved the way for them in order to increase trade.

For the management of economic relations established with Western countries, the continual entry of foreign capital, and partnerships with international capital, the AK Party shared the same vision with TUSIAD in its foreign policy. On another front, MUSIAD took on important missions in regional integration and market diversification. Global markets expended efforts to become part of MUSIAD and TUSIAD as the dynamos of the private sector. According to TIM data, while there were 31719 firms conducting exports in 2002, this number had risen to 54400 in 2012; this shows the search of the Turkish private sector to be present in global markets.

Again in this same period and in the context of paving the way for the private sector in foreign trade, Erdogan taking businessmen on trips abroad and these businessmen being engaged in many international trade agreements is a result of this new foreign policy approach.

The need for foreign capital is a mandatory condition for the growth of all countries. Turkey needs a financial source for the investments it will make. During the 1990s, the political and economic instabilities were the biggest obstructions to the entrance of foreign capital. With the coming of the AK Party to the administration in 2002 and its gradual stabilization of politics and economy, the growth trend of the Turkish economy parallel with the enlargement of the world economy, memberships negotiations with the EU and the domestic legal regulations with the purpose of inducing foreign capital, the entry of foreign capital showed great increase. Foreign capital is the main factor of growth.

The multi-dimensional foreign policy approach eased foreign investments and the entry of foreign capital into Turkey. The foreign capital entry which was 1.082.000.000 dollars in 2001 rose to 22.047.000.000 dollars in 2007, and reached 13.282.000.000 dollars in 2012. Despite this, the entry of foreign capital to Turkey is still low when compared with other developing countries. Additionally, despite Turkey's attempts to diversify its markets since 2002, it continues to get the biggest share of foreign capital from the EU.

The new approaches brought to foreign policy beginning with the AK Party arriving at the administration, and especially with Ahmet Davutoglu's 'central country', 'rhythmic diplomacy', 'zero problems with neighbors', 'multi-dimensional foreign policy', 'balance of freedom and security' concepts, there was a search for regional integration with the neighboring areas. There was an attempt to establish an economic basin among Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Turkey. Turkish foreign policy enlarging through its multi-dimensional and zero-problems with neighbors discourse increasing its economic partnerships with close areas and allowed Turkey to reach new markets. Again in the same period, the Free Trade Agreements prepared bases for Turkish businessmen to reach new markets. While in 2002 Turkey was conducting 56.6% of its exports with the EU, this had lowered to 38.8% by 2012. On the other hand, the 9.5% exports to Near and Middle Eastern countries in 2002 had risen to 28.1% by 2012. We can see that Turkey aimed for market diversification during this period in order to increase its competitiveness in world markets and to not be dependent on just one market. Also, the 2008 global economic crisis deeply affecting Western countries but only marginally touching on Turkey's economy was due in large part to the diversification of Turkey's economic relations as well as markets.

Globalization had decreased the effect of nation-state while in the capitalist global system businessmen and CSOs had become active actors in economic development. Under the AK Party administration, CSOs and businessmen took on important operational roles in the world and the region politically, economically, and culturally. In this period, CSOs and businessmen worked together with foreign policy makers in order to create added value for the Turkish economy in both global and regional markets.

Signing visa exemption agreements in order to enlarge the activity areas of Turkish businessmen and CSOs and to allow them comfortably engage in their economic activities, Turkey also established embassies in order to widen the area of influence of Turkish foreign policy, setting up more than 30 embassies in Africa alone. The removal of visas and establishing embassies is a new approach of Turkish foreign policy, and the economy is the most important dimension within this. Increasing trade in the regional and global areas, easing the works of our businessmen, and obtaining the necessary conditions to increase tourism to Turkey has also helped in the entry of foreign currency into Turkey.

Working in tandem with Turkish foreign policy makers, Turkish businessmen engaged in many free trade agreements in order to facilitate the Turkish economy. These agreements, alongside the removal of visas and establishment of embassies helped Turkish businessmen to take on roles in the global market. The number of TIM members which had been 31719 in 2002 reached 54400 in 2012.

Alongside this, business world organizations such as TIM, TUSIAD, MUSIAD, and DEIK—as the life-blood of the Turkish economy—took on important operational roles throughout the AK Party’s structural economic reforms in order to increase Turkey’s

competitiveness in the regional and global markets while also reaching these world standards. Parallel to the economy-oriented foreign policy approach, businessmen accompanied the President and Prime Minister on their trips. This situation prepared bases for many bilateral trade agreements. Additionally, Turkish Airlines flying to many points in the world eased the work of Turkish businessmen.

In other respects, Turkey is continuing its foreign aid to countries in Asia, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Africa by way of CSOs. While in the 1990s Turkey was the object of foreign aid, in 2012 its foreign aid amount had reached 3.4 billion dollars. Through CSOs such as AFAD, TIKA, Kizilay, IHH, and others, Turkey is engaged in foreign aid. The foreign aid conducted by Turkey not only helps in building its image as a strong state, but also prepares a base for regional and global economic partnerships.

At this point, the thesis of this study has been that the new approaches in Turkish foreign policy have made important contributions to external economic relations and to the Turkish economy. The result of this study shows that the new approaches in TFP not only helped in market diversification and regional effectiveness, it also laid the groundwork for the entry of foreign capital; to augment this, businessmen and CSOs were active in opening the way for the expansion of relations at regional and global levels.

The theoretical contribution of this thesis is that there has been an intertwining of foreign policy and economy as a result of the transformation experienced in Turkish foreign policy during the AK Party period and each changed to become the instrument of the other. In this context, Turkish foreign policy and the Turkish economy are in constant interaction with each other. Thus, just as the new instruments of Turkish foreign policy

laid the groundwork for the economy's market search in local and global markets, the removal of visas, establishment of embassies, and free trade agreements also prepared a base for regional and global integration. In this framework, it is necessary to read the regional and global opening of Turkish foreign policy and economy through a liberal economic approach and Turkey's search for becoming a trading state.

In conclusion, the new approaches in Turkish foreign policy during the AK Party period ended up with positive results in Turkey's economic relations. TFP took on an important mission in the Turkish economy's search for new regional and global markets without having it lose its EU perspective and liberal values. The proactive approaches and scope enlargement of TFP showed that Turkey in general and the Turkish economy in particular was a trust-worthy market. Due to this trust, in the Turkey where macroeconomic indicators had been extremely disrupted after the 2001 crisis, there was rapid foreign capital entry. Until the AK Party administration, Turkey's traditional market had been Europe. Under the AK Party administration, new markets were discovered, with the Arab geography and Russia coming up as new market spaces. In this period, the Turkish economy leaned towards market diversification, the traditional market share of the EU decreased, and economic shares in other markets increased. Part of the reason why the 2008 economic crisis did not reflect as seriously in Turkey is due to this market diversification. Nonetheless, our biggest economic market continues to be EU countries. The most important actors in market diversification are CSOs and businessmen. In this context, Turkish foreign policy makers laid the groundwork for these actors and thus took important steps in transforming Turkey into a trading state. In this sense, the 'continuity in transformation' of Turkish foreign policy presented new opportunities for Turkey as a

trading state; the most important anchor for the Turkish economy remains the EU and liberal values.



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