



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences

Department of Peace Studies

**POLITICAL MARGINALIZATION OF YOUTH AS A
DRIVER FOR VIOLENT EXTREMISM – EXAMINING
THE CASE OF JORDAN**


Fadi Bashir Ahmad SAID

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2019

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
Ankara, 2019

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The jury finds that Fadi Bashir Ahmad Said has on the date of 28th of January 2019 successfully passed the defense examination and approves his Master's Thesis titled "Political Marginalization of Youth As a Driver For Violent Etremism-Examining the Case of Jordan".



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ETİK BEYAN

Bu çalışmadaki bütün bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar çerçevesinde elde ettiğimi, görsel, işitsel ve yazılı tüm bilgi ve sonuçları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduğumu, kullandığım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadığımı, yararlandığım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduğumu, tezimin kaynak gösterilen durumlar dışında özgün olduğunu, Doç.Dr.Çetin Türkyılmaz danışmanlığında tarafımdan üretildiğini ve Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Yazım Yönergesine göre yazıldığını beyan ederim.



Öğrencinin Ünvanı (varsa). Adı SOYADI

Fadi Bashir

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

First of All I would like to express my gratitude to my advisor Doç.Dr.Çetin Türkyılmaz for his insightful comments and patience, without his guidance writing this thesis would have been impossible, and I couldn't have asked for a better advisor to guide me through this process.

And second, my sincere thanks go to my family and friends, who supported me through this journey, and were there for me in ups and downs of my thesis writing,

Thank you,

Fadi Bashir

ABSTRACT

SAID, Fadi Bashir. *Political marginalization of youth as a driver for violent extremism – examining the case of Jordan* Master's Thesis, Ankara, 2019

Jordan, wedged amid political unrest and conflict, has found itself a hub for extremism both domestically, and across its neighboring borders. Jordanian youth are at the forefront, engaging with radical and extremist groups. This case-study determines factors that motivate youth to join violent extremist groups, focusing on low-levels of civic engagement and youth participation in political life. Moreover, the study outlines the interventions needed to reduce the level of youth participation in violent and extremist groups. Finding that extremism is a multi-dimensional issue, the researcher draws on political, sociological, and psychological theories to explain the drivers and factors that may motivate youth to join violent and extremist groups in Jordan. This study found that a combination of factors led to increased radicalization in Jordan including external political unrest and instability due to conflicts in neighboring Syria and Iraq which lead to a spill-over effect influencing radicalization and the activity of extremist groups in Jordan. Domestically, the influence of Salafis increased, this coupled with high levels of corruption and increasing unemployment rate among youth has increased the vulnerability of youth to ideological and psychosocial radicalization. While these have been found to largely make the country more vulnerable to radicalization, the study found that governance and democracy are key in minimizing extremism, and in the prevention of violent groups in Jordan. To counter-extremists efforts Jordan needs to create programs that integrate social education aimed at the economic and social development of youth to minimize and rid of existing groups

Keywords: Violent Extremism, Rational Choice Theory, Jordan, Political Participation, Youth.

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DEFINITIONS

Youth - There is a lack of consensus in the international community over the exact definition of youth. The UN Secretariat refers to the youth and young people as those of age 15-24. (UNDESA, 2014). Social science considers youth to be a transitional age and to be part of the developmental stage of “emerging adulthood” age 18-25, a fragment of life that is “theoretically and empirically distinct” from adolescence and adulthood (Arnett, 200, p.469) and (Almasraweh, 2003. P.g. 43), what distinct this period from others is that “little about the future has been decided for certain” and “many different directions remain possible” (p.469). Arnett also proposed giving categories for this developmental period to capture all the uncertainties it holds by giving a five-theme categorization; “identity exploration, Instability, self-focus, feeling in between, and possibilities/ optimism” (p.158).

According to the National Youth Strategy of Jordan youth are those aged 12-30 years of age. Youth is further defined as the period of moving from childhood to adult hood, from dependence to independence. This key document driving youth policy in Jordan further breaks down youth four age brackets to, 12 – 15, 16 – 18, 19 – 22 and 23 – 30 years of age. (National Youth Strategy, 2004)

For the purpose of this thesis, to study the dynamics of youth political participation and to

unfold the impact that has on youth joining violent extremism groups I have settled upon a broad definition of youth to include those within the second or third decade of their life.

Civic engagement – It is broadly to define civic management in reference to the citizen's active participation in his community, aiming to progress circumstances for his partners. (Adler and Goggin 2005). What is the meaning of civic engagement? Civic engagement is a communal or an individual action in order to achieve progress in the community, establishing the act as a “form of community services” (Diller, 2001). Discussing the term theoretically while considering countless attempts to define it will lead to associate it with the accompanying practices rather than the labeled definition; the countless definitions of the term meet with countless researchers and active communal individuals on the case. (Jacoby 2009). Other definitions emphasize on the importance of a political aspect in the civic engagement as the communal act in progressing the circumstances through the political process that is based on channeling the individual efforts, while the individual ethic of service is based on moral regulations that are consistent with a certain community. (Diller, 2001). A broader definition was given by Ehrlich which states that civic engagement is defined by making a difference in the lives of the members of the society.

Civic engagement among youth in MENA is essentially lower than the rest of the world, even though youth in MENA comprise a larger segment of the population. In Jordan only a very small percentage of youth are members of civic groups 5.8%, respectively. (Mercy Corps, 2016)

Political participation – The definition of political participation is limited, especially compared to the many definitions civic engagement has. For instance, E. Amna and J. Ekman consider recycling as a civic engagement act, but not as an act of political participation. (Ekman & Amna, 2012) It almost exclusively refers to actions that aim to affect or back certain policy; governments or its agencies, or influence society, or systemically attempting to change social behavior. (Milbrath and Goel 1977) (Norris 2001) All the present definitions try to encompass the essence of political participation, which is that it is an act, not a thought or a belief practiced by a citizen and not by an employee or a politician, and that it is voluntary.

According to the Political Parties Law 2015, to qualify as a candidate and be eligible to run for elections as a founder of a political party, the conditions are as follows; must be a minimum of 18 years old and in addition hold the Jordanian nationality for a minimum of 10 years in order. Furthermore, the founder of any political party should be no less than 150 members. (Law of Political Parties, 2015) According to the new Law of Election in Jordan of 2016, a candidate for election must be a minimum of 30 years old and have obtained the Jordanian citizen for no less than 10 years with no other passport or nationality. (Law of Election, 2016)

Violent Extremism – Violent Extremism refers to violent actions and violent principles adopted by individuals who aim to attain ideological, religious or political goals. That applies to terrorism, political violence and certain patterns of community violence. In fact, if we disregard the drivers towards violent extremism then violent extremism can be viewed as a form of terrorism against constructive processes. Other definitions assert that even the “willingness to use or support the use of violence to further beliefs may include acts of terrorism”. (Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011).

In Jordan, there is no clear and concise definition or consensus the “extremism” or “violent extremism” however, there is a law on anti-terrorism which clearly defines and states the act of terrorism in which refers to intentional acts which are entirely intolerant towards others. (Anti-Terrorism Law No. 55, 2006) This law was passed in 2006 Jordan and defines terrorism as “every intentional act which is committed by any means and causing death or physical harm to a person or damage to public or private properties, or to means of transport, infrastructure, international facilities or diplomatic missions which are intended to disturb public order, endanger public safety and security, and involve the disturbance of national security by means of threat, intimidation or violence.” (Anti-Terrorism Law No. 55, 2006)

Later in 2014, this law was amended to expand the definition to reflect a bigger percentage of the Jordanian population to the possibility of being prosecuted under it. This is due to the insignificance of the acts listed within in the law that was passed in 2006. In addition, it “expands the scope of spaces through which acts of terrorism can be convicted” (Tiber 2014). The amended law has been revised to the “use of information systems, information

network, publishing or media tool, or websites to conduct terrorist acts or support terrorist groups, organizations or a charity that performs acts of terrorism or conduct any acts that subject Jordanians or their property to acts of hostility or reprisals.” (Anti-Terrorism Law, 2014). When considering the timing of the passing of this law, one can derive that the high number of Jordanian fighters in Syria and Iraq was a driver influencing the expansion of this definition in order to prosecute not only fighters, but recruiters targeting Jordanian youth via online platforms and media outlets.

Radicalization – Radicalization can be differentiated from extremism, it is a distinct transformational process aiming to change the individuals’ ideology over time. Many reports and articles outline different radicalization processes and recruitment methods, such as Radicalization – A guide for the perplexed (Smith 2009), FBI 2006, Silber and Bhatt’s models, Taanrnby’s eight-stage recruitment process (2005). Silber and Bhatt (2007) suggest that radicalization is the process that consists of four steps: pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination and Jihadisation. Also, it can be noted that those who go through all the stages are more ready to adopt ideologies of violent extremism and may be involved in planning and performing terrorism in the future. In the case of Jordan, radicalization is defined under anti-terror legislation as it is encompassed in the aforementioned section on violent extremism, and not distinctly referred or defined on its own.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. OVERVIEW

Looking at terrorism throughout the history of human being we can see that it is not a new phenomenon and it has taken various forms and shapes. The most recent of its forms has risen to the international level after the events of the 11th of September 2001 at New York City. Since that time the international community has focused on ‘Islamic terrorism’ and extremist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, Taliban, ISIS, Alshabab etc. Since 2014 one of the most known extremist organizations has been the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), later referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) after declaring itself an Islamic State on the 29th of June 2014. ISIS did not get much attention prior 2014, as the spotlight was taken by Al-Qaeda organization at that time, but it also claimed the responsibility for several terrorist attacks on the West since September 11th. Despite seeming to appear out of nowhere, the organization in fact illustrated to have long roots in Iraq.

According to a report by the Soufan Group in December 2015, entitled “*Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq*”, there are vast numbers of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, fighting with ISIS. The report published by the Soufan Group in June 2014 states approximately 12,000 foreign fighters from 81 countries had been identified to be fighting in Syria. The December 2015 report estimates that the number of people which traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State

and other violent extremist groups is estimated to be between 27,000 to 31,000 persons, from at least 86 different countries. This illustrates means that the number of foreign fighters nearly doubled from 2014 to 2015. The increase in foreign fighters is not uniform throughout the world; certain regions and countries have seen more significant rises than others. Recruitment within the United States for example has been mostly reliant on social media, particularly in the initial phases of the process. In the countries with the largest flows, recruitment to the Islamic State has become more focused and localized, with fewer people just leaving on their own; family and friends also play a great role.

Table 1.1 - Composition & Break-down of ISIS fighters by Region

Approximate Number of fighters December 2015	
Western Europe	5000
former Soviet Republics	4700
North America	280
Balkans	875
Maghreb	8000
Tunisia	6000
Saudi Arabia	2500
Middle east	8240
Southeast Asia	900
United Kingdom	760
Belgium	470
Denmark	125
France	1700

The majority of those recruited from Arab states in descending order are Tunisians, Saudis, and Jordanians. One of ISIS's objectives is to "hold" the territory it appropriated to assure the Caliphate's preservation and expansion success (Carmon 2014). To this end, ISIS used

the notion of “Hijira” defined in Islam as the “migration for the cause of Allah” as justification for people of all backgrounds (e.g. physicians, engineers, military experts, clerics, and administrators) loyal to ISIS populate the Caliphate (Brown 2014, Carmon 2014). The invitation to participate in the founding of the Caliphate appeals to individuals who feel excluded from Western society, and who are restricted in their religious practices, these individuals have also a desire to make a new start (Brown 2014). Participating in the jihad and founding of the Caliphate may provide individuals with employment, basic needs, or political and religious goals that align with an individual’s expectations (Brown 2014). According to the Mercy Corps report “From Jordan to Jihad: The Lure of Syria’s Violent Extremist Groups, which was published in September 2015 the reason for joining violent extremist groups is not poverty; but rather deeper factors related to marginalization, lack of political and social participation to social order. Other organizations such as Search for Common Ground consistently support such arguments for all countries, including Jordan (2017).

Though most of the people who joined ISIS from Middle East came from Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, Jordan is the country from which the highest rates of people join ISIS (Soufan, 2016). With respect to the size of its population, Jordan is the country in the Middle East with the highest number of civilians joining extremist groups such as ISIS, with official numbers reaching 2000+ in Iraq and Syria (Soufan, 2015), which makes Jordan the country with the highest rate of fighters per capita, estimated to be 303 fighters (Citylab 2016) .

This fact makes Jordan an important case to study given the severity of the issue of Jordanians taking part in radical and extremist activities outside its borders. Given Jordan's political context and low-civic engagement rates, it is particularly interesting to understand as the research questions of this thesis pose, *is there a correlation between political participation and extremism? Particularly, is there a correlation between youth's lack of participation in politics and civic engagement with their likelihood to join or participate in extremist groups?* This work seeks to address and understand the relationship between political participation and participation in extremist groups. If the drivers are not addressed then youth participation in extremist groups will not be reduced, and the risks associated with their participation in such groups will continue to pose a danger to the youth themselves as well as impact domestic stability and safety.

A systematic review will be conducted to determine how youth marginalization have led to violent extremism in Jordan in the past while comparing the same with the current trend to give imperative evidence on current situation. To effectively solve this problem, this research will explore major factors that have contributed to youth marginalization in contemporary Jordan societies and how these have influenced violent extremism in the country.

1.2.Context of Jordan: The Socio-political and Economic

Jordan, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan located in middle east and sharing the border with Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Saudi Arabia Peace agreement with Israel, Jordan was along with Egypt the only 2 countries which signed this peace accord. Jordan is a unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy. According to the Department of statistic in Jordan in 2018, the population reached over 10 million. In Amman which is the capital of Jordan has around 4 million individuals (Department of Statistic. 2018). This size includes non-Jordanian citizens, asylum seekers, workers, refugees, and Palestinian citizen who do not hold a Jordanian National ID numbers.

1.2.1. Political-Parties

1.2.1.1.The Muslim Brotherhood

This has been the oldest political movement in Jordan hat is pegged upon Muslimism and the implementation of Sharia laws in the country with a slogan “Islam is the solution”. The Muslim brotherhood as a political movement was observed to be non-violent even though it was known to support Palestine Violence against Israel. This has not only caused political tension between the two countries but has also contributed to domestic political tension within Jordan. For instance, an Israel security guard shot and killed a Jordanian construction worker at the Embassy when the construction worker stabbed him with a screw driver. The guard also went ahead and shot another Jordan citizen which brought series of protests

against Israel security measures in Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem which was largely attended by Jordanian believers. In other occasion, it has also been documented that four gunmen carried out a series of attack at the city of Karak while police officers were responding to a fire outbreak in the town of Qatraneh. In this case, the gunmen started firing at the police officers from inside the house. These attacks are said to have left more than ten individuals dead including seven Jordanian security officers, two tourists and two civilians (Karadsheh, 2016. Pg. 11). Further, thirty-four other civilians were also reported to be injured in the attack. ISIS, a radical group in Jordan claimed responsibility for the attack. This gives a postulated impact of youth involvement in radical groups in the country as motivated by growing tension between Palestine and Israel. It is due to this tension and the resultant radicalization that King Hussein took to himself to ban political movements that had political ties with foreign countries. Despite the illegalization of political movements with foreign ties, the Muslim Brotherhood still continued to have majority parliamentary seats as was observed in 1989 when the movement acquired 22 out of 80 parliamentary seats. Besides, the leader of the movement echoed that high number of Jordan population still have support for the movement and therefore, they sought to establish another wing of the movement called Islam Action Front.

With determination to resolve political parties with foreign ties, King Hussein did not have much left but to implement policies that would see such political parties become inadequate in the country. It is in this line that Muslim Brotherhood suffered a major decline in 2007 as its policies largely ignored domestic Jordan issues in support of Palestine violence against Israel. It is in this period that the movement only managed to save six parliamentary seats.

In subsequence to the spring of Arabs in early 2011, the movement wing, Islam Action Front, radically participated in pretests that called for the dissolution of parliament and countenance free election of the prime minister. Despite the radical nature of the protest, the King dismissed the call and instead instituted a prime minister that would see the implementation of political reforms. To this case, the King tried to implement reforms that would see the abolition of religious organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islam Action. This made radical protests more prominent in the country with the movement head calling for the government to listen to people's demands. Besides, this led to the Muslim Brotherhood movement and the Islam Action Front Boycott parliamentary election of 2013.

1.2.1.2. Salafist Movement

The Salafist movement in Jordan has been known for their advocacy in the implementation of Sharia law and abidance by the latter. Despite the movement being banned in the country, Salafist movement have been known to attract new followers. In the period of 1990s, the movement's head was attributed to have militarized the group there by giving them more chances of being even more radical in their operation. The movement leader Mohammad al-Chalabi expounded that interest for the movement among Jordan population rose after the rise of Arab spring. According to recent analysts, it is articulated that Salafist jihadist preachers attract more followers and worshipers than other preachers. To add on this, it has also been articulated that preachers that are pro-government as well as those from the

Brotherhood also attract more followers and worshipers. Blames have been placed on the economic disparity and lack of youth involvement in government operations as the major contributing factors to pro-government ideology in the country. Similarly, Syrian civil war has also been attributed to the increased Salafist followers as well as pro-government ideology in the country. It is in records that the head of Salafist group Mohammad al-Chalabi was jailed for seven years as a result of a failed plot against United States in 2003. Additionally, Chalabi was also charged with plot to harm western diplomatic missions in Jordan during this period. These plots were registered by the radical movement as a way of expression their grievance against Western marginalization of Muslim countries through their intervention into Muslim activates. This is also associated with the Boston Marathon bombing that happened in 2013. Mohammad al-Chalabi even went further to illustrate his contentment after the bombing when he alleged that he was “happy to see the horror in America,” he also added that “American blood isn’t more precious than Muslim blood.” In his contentment Chalabi also argued that it is only Salafist movement that practice Jihad but not the government.


Political activities and establishment of political parties as well as participating in one is monitored by the authorities and set by the law of the constitution, Jordanian youth do practice the right to meet and initiate parties, but within the law no. 33. (EuroMed, N.D, p. 14). “The Ministry of Social Affairs may monitor the meetings and activities of associations and has a right to dissolve them upon a reason” (Harmsen 2008, 154). Despite such tight regulation Jordanians seem to be enjoying much better conditions of civic engagement and political participation than their surrounding neighboring countries. Jordan

scored 5 points out of 12 in organizational rights in Freedom House survey in 2007 (EuroMed, N.D, p. 14) But the ability to form and be a part of political parties and even have as much as 45 registered ones doesn't necessarily come with the ability to change and influence policies and political decisions, making the role of such parties vague and of no specific purpose. 17% of the parliament in the last election consist of political parties' members, while the rest are businessmen and tribal figures. (Al Sharif, 2016), (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 120) the mentioned lack of representation is only a reflection of the lack of influence those parties hold.

1.2.2. The Economy

Jordan has been classified to be highly dependent on foreign money, with little national production, and limited natural and national resources. (World Bank, 2019). In terms of employment, Jordan is burdened by high levels of educational attainment with high rates of unemployment. As illustrated in the figure 1.3, youth aged 15-24 have the highest rates of unemployment. To add to the dire economic situation, Amman, the capital of Jordan ranked in 2018 as one of the most expensive cities in Middle East (The guardian, June 2018)

Figure 1.1 Unemployment Rate (2016-2018)




Source: Department of Statistics (DOS)

Figure 1.2 Unemployment Rate 2018 – Gender-Break down

Unemployment rate	
Gender	
Female	Male
27.80%	16%
Education levels	
High school/University graduates	Secondary school education and below
54.60%	45.40%
Regional disparity	
Region with highest unemployment	Region with lowest unemployment
21.9% Ma'an	15.9% Karak

Source: DOS 2018

Figure 1.3 – Youth Unemployment by Age



From the above graph, it is evident that youth between the ages of 20 to 24 are the most affected in the employment sector as they have the largest number of individuals who are not employed. This gives an indication that they are most likely idle and are likely to join radical groups as a way of meeting their ends need. They are followed by youth between the age group of 15 to 24 years. This figure gives a cumulative of 76% showing that the most economically marginalized youth are between the ages of 15 to 24 years. Looking at the gender characteristic in the employment sector, females are highly marginalized as the number of employed females are lower than those of males as shown in the graph below.




Figure 1.4 – Youth Unemployment by Gender

According to the Jordan Higher Council for Youth, working males between 20 – 24 years old are 54%, and between 15 – 20 years old are 4.6%, while 40% of bachelor's holders are unemployed. (Jordan Higher Council for Youth, 2004, p. 5). The problem of unemployment is made worse by the distribution of the job market, 65% of employment is in the central region, and 63% of the employed work in the private sector, and 37% in the public sector as illustrated in the figure below. (Jordan Higher Council for Youth, 2004, p. 5) where only 25% of the youth reside in the middle region of Jordan, and the difficult labor market is made even more difficult with these demographic differences. (Jordan Higher Council for Youth, 2004).

The Jordanian government has made efforts to minimize political radicalization in the country. In 2014, the National Policies council and other specialized committees launched an extensive campaign to create a comprehensive counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) strategy that involved all levels of government; including ministries of

the Interior, Culture, Awqaf, Social Development, Foreign Affairs, and Education. This campaign resulted in the 2014 National Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism which was published in newspapers in 2016. This strategy laid out procedures to increase monitoring of political activities, as well as religious freedoms, and the activities of civil society organizations (CSO's). The latter is crucially important given the fact that CSOs in Jordan provides youth with a voice and act as an outlet and medium for social, political, and economic, and civic activities for Jordanian society.

For those fighters those who do return, the most radical are sent to high-security prisons in Jordan. On January 1st, 2015, government established the Community Peace Centre “to de-radicalize returned fighters who are less of a security risk.” hosting a total of 69 prisoners when it opened (BBC News,2015). This research will evaluate these measures while examining existing gaps in these measures. Consequently, more development measures will be recommended as a strategy of preventing radicalization in the country.

1.3.RESEARCH OUTLINE

Problem statement

Despite being one of the most stable countries in the region Jordan is the country from which one of the highest rates of people joined ISIS, and other extremist groups per capita in the Middle East.

Research Questions

1. **What are the main drivers influencing Jordanian youth to join violent extremist groups?** What is the relationship between religious extremist and radical groups and political participation? Do low-levels of political participation increase the level of youth participation in violent extremist groups?
2. **Does marginalized status of individuals increase likelihood to participate in violent extremist groups?**

Hypothesis

This research argues that the lack of political participation amongst youth in Jordan increases the likelihood of youth joining violent extremist groups.

Methodology

An exploratory design was used to gather information in line with this topic of concern. Due to the national security implications and confidentiality and security issues, interviews were not conducted with former fighters. This research depended on secondary sources such as international and Jordanian academic literature and reports by international organizations, together with examining relevant statistics.

The literature review conducted aimed to understand and unravel the meanings of this work's key terms. Firstly, identifying the search terms that captured the key dimensions of research filed, which included youth, civic engagement, political participation, violent extremism, and radicalization. Second, the electronic search was conducted on several databases, including Google scholar, Google books, as well as the databases of the main development agencies. The criteria for the selection of studies reviewed was based on references to youth, political participation, radicalization and extremism amongst youth, the political dynamics of Jordanian youth, and the quality of the research. Further, social and political theories have also been used to explain concepts and factors which motivate youth to join violent and extremist groups in Jordan.

Main Findings

Various external factors such as instability and radicalization occurring neighboring countries such as the war in Iraq and the Syrian conflict all combine to contribute to radicalization in Jordan. Additionally, internal factors such as the influence of Salafists and challenges in governance mainly the political climate and restraints on citizens to practice political free will and participate in political life make the country more vulnerable to ideological and psychosocial radicalization of its youth. On a social and economic level, high levels of corruption and increasing unemployment rate among youth contribute to the dissociation of youth and act as push-factors for youth to join extremist groups.

While these have been found to largely make the country more vulnerable to radicalization, democracy was found to be more important in minimizing extremism and formation of violent groups in the country. Further, the country needs to create programs that integrate social education and economic developments for the youth as a way of minimizing chances of joining violent groups in the country and countering violent extremism.



CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review is on the topic of political participation of youth, it's based on a topic that I find interesting, and of valid importance, but also a personal issue that I have struggled with from my younger years. It aims to provide insights into the role that the youthful part of our society takes in the political movements, and the dynamics of the youth political participation. In particular, it focuses on how the youth in Jordan have been attempting to a better political future, and how that can be enhanced. The author is hoping that his findings reach a wide audience that includes researchers, professionals, and simply those who are interested.

The methodology for searching of relevant literature was underpinned by clarifying the meaning of our key terms to ensure transparency and coherence. In the search of relevant literature I followed the systematic review methods. First, I identified the search terms that captured the key dimensions of research field, which included the youth, civic engagement, political participation, violent extremism, and radicalization. Second, the electronic search was conducted on several databases, including Google scholar, Google books, as well as the databases of the main development agencies. The criteria for the selection of studies that I reviewed consists in their references to the youth, their reference to political participation, their reference to radicalization and extremism amongst the youth, their reference to the political dynamics of Jordanian youth, and the quality of the research.

2.1. Youth, Political Participation and Civic Engagement

2.1.1. Democracy and Political Participation

Aristotle made a point of describing man as a political animal and claimed that the political community exists of the sake of a better life. As democracy can be defined as a “system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives” y people, Many scholars stress on democracy as implying equality between citizens, and yet, as Held (1996) puts it, the very classic example of democracy in ancient Greece was highly exclusive, while other scholars questioned whether the concept of real democracy exists at all. As it is mentioned Held also believes that without citizen involvement democracy can’t exist. (Van Tatenhove & Leroy, 2003, pg. 63). Where most scholars meet on the intertwined relationship between political participation and democracy, some of them assert that political participation is about powering the participants in order to improve their situations, which leads, eventually to hold their political powers to account, and, according to other scholars, “current social divisions” should be maintained and kept in check, or it can be considered as a form of citizen agency regulating the political system. (Verba et al., 1993; Kleppner, 1982; Croft & Beresford, 1993).

Understanding the meaning of political participation must take into account undergoing changes in the world, and this concept is surrounded with domains kept rising over time

(van Deth, 2001). Parry said, by considering the conventional political processes, that “by ‘political participation’ I stipulate: sharing in the framing and/or execution of public policies” (Parry 1972, p.39). For Nagel, however, the scope of participation can be widened beyond the conventional political acts thereby giving opportunity for adjusted political participation in a more unconventional approach.

Speaking of political participation academically, van Deth states that the field has shifted the focus of political research, growing from a limited focus on the matter of mere voting in the mid of the last century to include traditional, and later nontraditional participation. (Van Deth, 2001, Verba et al., 1971; Verba et al., 1993; Axford et al., 1997). According to the latter suggestion, questions have risen concerning the identification of the participants and their goals in relation to voting as a form political participation (Butler, 1969; Berelson et al., 1954). As a result of noticing the abstention of voting, and therefore the active voters don’t necessarily represent the wider population demographically (Prior et al.1995; Pitkin, 1967). Conventional participation can be dated back to the 50s, while also realizing, on the other hand, that voting is not only the political act of casting a ballot, but it also includes processes outside election such as socio-economic status and education (Osborne, 1985). For this reason, literature defines the importance of processes beyond the electoral and voting process as it influences the tendency of people to vote in an election process. (Bienen & Morell, 1975).

Going back to discussing individual and collective participation, we can say that voting is an individual, not collective, act of political participation. All this helps to shift the focus to

political acts that take place prior to or thereafter elections, and the recognition that political participation constitutes other actions such as being a member of a political party, participate in demonstrations, join professional and labour unions, and one of the most important being taking part in civic initiatives and civic engagement in general. Education levels and age are consistently found to be good predictors and indicators of political participation of individuals, with those with higher education attainment levels having higher numbers in political participation than lower-level counterparts (Potgieter, 2018). And even though the socioeconomic status is mostly used as the standard approach (Verba et al., 1995; Lane, 1959) it has been demonstrated that many components affect the political participation.

The aforementioned factors are aligned as determinants of youth political participation in a country. For instance, when looking at the education factor, it holds importance as individuals whom are more educated hold higher awareness with regard to the importance of voting. It is through the voting process that they select leaders with economic, social and political capacity to represent them. Paradoxically it is imperative to note that this would be difficult to achieve especially when a country, such as Jordan does not have a *real* democracy. Autocratic governments, such as Jordan do not allow for election of head of state, or an opportunity for fair voting and selection as is illustrated in the municipal elections laws in the segmentation of constituencies in accordance to population size etc. This increases the likelihood for radical acts. Of the reviewed literature, there is a limitation in the scope of research when it comes to autocratic governments and conventional vs. unconventional political behavior. For instance, most of these studies did not address the unconventional political behavior which can take the shape of political violence and direct

action (Parry et al., 1992). Such behavior is considered to be political participation because of their goal and perceived as an extension of analyses of conventional political participation. Protest movements and new social movements are clear actions of citizens' interests, and therefore cannot be excluded from political participation (Barnes & Kaase et al., 1979; van Deth, 1997; Urwin & Patterson, 1990). Most pro-government ideologists see these movements as the best platform to address their socio-economic and political grievances. While this is proclaimed to be true, the distinction between unconventional and conventional political participation varies amongst the literature. This is particularly true for youth who are sometimes perceived as participating apathetically as they do not participate on conventional ways such as voting, they do however participate in unconventional ways such in civic initiatives. (EU, 2015). In many cases the two forms overlap, but in order to understand the expansion of what is studied in political participation, this term is important to the highlight.

2.1.2. Political Attitude and Civic Engagement of Young People

In order to describe the civic engagement literature, the most important step for us is to identify the main questions moving this field. What are the problems, obstacles or abnormalities that light an interest in the civic engagement? A big part of the current civic engagement literature talks about the drastic demise in American civic participation since the 60s.

According to Putnam and other authors, a decline in civic life in America is a direct sign of corroded social capital; he defines it as an element of social organization that includes some standards according to which the coordination for mutual benefit can be achieved. (Putnam 1995). It is basically what allows communities and individuals to follow and achieve mutual goals and enhance social trust bonds. According to Robert Putnam, civic engagement is suffering from multi factorial waning; factors including citing decreased organizational membership, weaker religiosities, political apathy, declining volunteerism, and plummeting levels of social trust and neighborliness (Putnam 1995). The research on civic decline is especially interesting regarding youth. Scholars stress on evidence supporting that older people are more civically oriented than the young, not just because of the age difference, but because of independent generational differences in attitudes and patterns of civic participation (Putnam 1996; Soule 2001).

Even though many scholars given evidence of older generations being more civically active and engaged, they haven't pinpointed the exact causes of that decline in the civic action in the young. Suggested causes include the increased social isolation, government frustration, social and political distrust, youth violence, economic inequalities, dissolution of marriage and family, media saturation, etc. (Flanagan and Sherrod 1998, Putnam 1996, Soule 2001).

2.2. Violent Extremism: Concepts and Theories

Many concepts and theories have tried to use the hypothesis to be an explanation of violent extremism and radicalization. Nevertheless, none of these theories surpass with stronger basis than the other. In essence, they are based on types of thinking and debates rather than formal propositions. (Schmid & Jongman, 1988).

2.2.1. Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory states that the individual bases the decision of participation or lack of it in violent extremism or terrorism on a “cost benefit analysis; benefits are weighed to the costs, and if greater; the individual takes the decision to participate”. (Eager, 2008). The benefits of the success of participation can take two forms, the form of personal goods that can only be gained by participation in the act or movement, and the form of collective benefit which the entire group can gain (Eager, 2008).

That benefit gives rise to a flaw when comparing group behavior to an individual decision called a “free rider”, since theoretically, the collective goods can be available for the interested, and individual participation isn’t a pre-requisite for that; and that leads to a possible individual recognition of possible gains and benefits without the necessity to participate, and, therefore leads to avoiding participation and becoming a “free rider”. Another flaw of this theory is that if the movement succeeded in reaching its goal it would

be hard for interested individuals not to receive some sort of benefit, even if not participating (Eager, 2008).

2.2.2. Social Movement Theory

The widely mentioned theory among scholars is the social movement theory or the ultimately social movement theory which is one of the most promising theories to help explain violent extremism. It indicates that the deep generator of radicalization is frustration. This has its roots in a psychological model known as the frustration-aggression theory, which suggests that when humans are frustrated, they use aggressive means to negotiate the frustration (Rinehart, 2009). Or as Zald and McCarthy define it "A set of opinions and beliefs in a population, which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society." This theory arose in the 40s and at that time stated that violent extremism was a result of irrational social group behavior due to social discontent, but contemporary researchers revealed that it is a result of rational and strategic processes, where social bonds and relationships play an integral part.

2.2.3.. The Theory of De-pluralization

This theory asserts the ideology of 'praised future vision' as outlined in (Koehler, 2017 pg. 75). This theory indicates that people gradually get involved in radical movements and acts as a way of increasing their worldview. This concept outlines that as individuals engage in radicalization as a strategy to increase their popularity, their political understanding starts

to change from being objective to subjective. This has been the main concept underpinning extremists' engagement in radicalization as they believe that engagement in these violent acts makes them more popular politically and socially. This theory asserts that extremists believe that their acts will remain to be remembered in the world's history, rewritten, redefined and restructured. This theory conceptualizes that violent act is the best way of solving psychological tensions especially in the political facet. In essence, the intuitive psychological tension of being popular politically triggers the need to perform horrific acts as a way of solving such tensions. To perform this, individuals decide to join radical groups as they know it is the best platform to undertake the negative political acts. This is also triggered by the gradual psychological changes (from objective to subjective).

2.2.4. Theory of Radicalization

This theory asserts that individuals follow a four-stage path from being “ordinary” and “remarkable” individuals in a society to violent and extremists in a society. Many scholars and think tanks have defined radicalization as a funnel process which takes different stages and steps, individuals follow these stages with the first step being adoption of a set of belief systems from a pool that schemes individuals' mentality and psychological process of becoming extremists at the end process. According to the Barcelona Center for International Affairs, what occurs first is “ideological engagement” then “radicalization”, then a “Catalyst Event” ending in “Violent extremism or terrorism”. The catalyst event has been described by Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004; 2005) as a “cognitive opening” which makes a person more

receptive to the possibility of new ideas and world views. This event or personal crisis shakes an individual's certitude in previously held beliefs, prompts them to re-assess their entire life and become open to a radical change of values and behavior and can take the shape of social, personal, or even political event. According to the NYPD, it is acknowledged that not all individuals who enter the funnel may emerge as extremists. However, it is warned that once in the funnel, there is likelihood that the person has high potential of influencing others into the "funnel" and pool of these belief systems and thus still pose security threats with regard to recruiting future radicals. In essence, once in the funnel, there is high potential of becoming influential agent in recruiting more people who become future extremists in a society. This theory was echoed by Economist Ronald Wintrobe, when he noted that even though extremists may have different ideology, they share a common characteristic with similar objective that is natured through a set of belief. In his articulation, Wintrobe mentioned a set of belief systems that accelerate ones decision to become violent and radical in a community. These include; the need to advocate and at times use violence to achieve political ends, extremists are utterly sure of their political position and are willing to use violence in protecting their position, the feeling of antagonizing any action that compromise their belief systems and the feeling of demonizing individuals from the other side of the belief system.

2.2.5. Concept of Structural Violence by Johan Galtung (1969)

Johan Galtung is popular for his massive contributions towards peace and conflict resolution globally. His theories and concepts have been largely used in contemporary conflict resolution approaches which have supportive in limiting violence and extremism in most countries. He introduced the concept of “structural violence” in his article of “Violence, Peace and Peace Research” (1969) when he noted the existed of some social structures or institutions that operate to harm others by limiting their chances of acquiring their basic needs. Some of the identified social structures by Galtung included institutionalized adultism, ethnocentrism, racism, ageism, sexism, speciesism, elitism, nationalism, and classism. His ideology directly corroborates with the concerns of this study “youth engagement in radicalization and extremism groups.” to this end, the institutionalized ageism and elitism as outlined by Galtung points youth potential to be the target for radical groups while channeling this demography into the radical system through the “funnel” as mentioned in the theory of radicalization.

As posited by Galtung, structural violence is an “avoidable impairment of fundamental human needs”. Despite structural violence being unavoidable, Galtung noted that the latter have become the leading cause of premature death and unnecessary disability in the contemporary societies. Further, Galtung also indicated that structural violence is closely linked to social injustice as it affects individuals at different social structures. In his

assertion, structural violence and direct violence are highly interconnected and they include family violence, hate crimes, racial violence, gender violence, state violence as well as terrorism and war. In this case therefore, the concept of social violence can be linked to this subject of concerns in the facets of terrorism, racial violence, state violence, hate crimes and war as is conspicuous in the case of tension between Israel and Palestine which have resulted to state war (including violent protests and formation of groups that support Palestine against Israel). An example of this is black September which is a conflict which occurred in Jordan between the Jordanian armed forces (JAF) which were under the lead of King Hussein ben Talal and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) under Yasser Arafat leadership in September 1970 which is classified as a civil war following the international criteria of civil war (Nevo, J. 2008)

On the other hand, it is imperative to consider the theory of positive peace as conceptualized by Galtung which postulate “victory for all” as a means of conflict resolution. In his assertion, Galtung recommends in-depth analysis of violent behaviors as well as structural mechanisms attending violence. The approach of positive peace enables governments and peace builders identify processes that led to human conditions which catalyzed extremism and radicalization. Galtung encourages that it is only through understanding these processes and factors that led to human conditions that cases of extremism can be prevented in a society.

2.3. Roots and Drivers to Violence Extremism

Attempting to approach the case of violent extremism, an understanding of how individuals choose this way must be taking into consideration. It's important to understand that these reasons are not fixed, but rather in a change all the time. (Sinai, 2007). As noted, there is a spontaneous relationship between terrorist activity relationships and demographic, fundamental social, economic, political and conditions (E. Newman, 2006). These conditions have internal causes, which makes them difficult to recognize scientifically for that every condition has its certain outcome. And according to this argument, examining certain conditions help clarifying the roots of the matter of terrorism as Mani puts it "Many of the scholars referred to below go as far as arguing that ignoring this relationship [of the conditions] may contribute to the exacerbation of the underlying conditions that give rise to terrorism and in turn intensify the terrorist threat" (Starr, 2012. Pg. 55).

While other governmental researchers are unwilling to accept the fact of these causes because they refuse to take into consideration the probability to have legitimate causes behind terrorism. (Mani, 2004; E. Newman, 2006).

2.3.1. Political-Sociological Causes of Violence Extremism

The western world view extremism and political violence as an immoral and corrupt civilization that impacts Islamic civilization negatively. The solution in their view is therefore the avoidance and encounter of extremists' acts in order to improve development in Islamic states through the laws of the land. (Monroe & Kredie, 1997. Pg. 33) and (De Graaff, 2010. Pg. 41). Terrorism can be linked to the use of authority and power. Theorists believe that these corrupt political agencies were behind several unrests all over history. In the case of terrorism, extremists accuse their governments of being used and manipulated by enemies of the religion, and claim that these governments do not apply true Islamic laws (Astin et al. 1998. Pg. 101). Many scholars assert that suppression and marginalization of Islamic political parties and groups by governments play an important role in radicalization of these groups. (Astin et al. 1999. Pg. 82). In Iraq, according to Tripp, the failure to include Sunni Arabs in the post-2003 political settlement is frequently identified as a cause of the 2006-07 civil war and the later rise of ISIL (Tripp, 2007; Weiss and Hassan, 2015).

According to the literature, the decline of the Islamic civilization into a marginalized civilization now is playing an important role in the radicalization process. (Harvey, Sullivan, & Groves, 2005; Kepel, 2002; J. M. Post, et al., 2009; Vaillancourt & Boyd, 2007). In addition, West's colonialist and imperialist involvement in the Islamic countries, and the "ongoing political interference" can be regarded as the reasons increased radicalization in

the Islamic states leading to the rise of political Islam. (J. Bartlett; Braun & Clarke, 2006; Cronin, 2002/03; Hassan, 2008; Jones & Smith, 2010; M. M. Khan & Azam, 2008; Mullins, 2009; Pape, 2003; Wilhelmsen, 2009; Winkates, 2006; Wintrobe, 2006). Other reasons for the rise of political Islam are argued in this work to be unemployment, poverty, and lack of political participation. These reasons have led youth to feel no sense of belonging, and thus they are more likely to turn to religious groups which can fill this void and offer, at times economic gains, and allow them to feel a sense of family and belonging to a greater cause. Another important role is the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially after the 1967 defeat. The humiliation led to peace agreements between Israel and Egypt in 1979, then a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan 1994, which then was a result of the failure of Pan-Arabism. These agreements are considered to be ‘political agreements’ in the face of the popular refusal. (Mobasher, 2006). Governments also used Islamic extremism to combat political enemies. (Ameen, 1993; Ghadbian, 2000; Moghadam, 2006; Richmond, 2003). That climate led the governments to fund Islamic movements (Stern, 2003), such as the financing of the Saudi movement of religious centers and schools in the west. (Husain, 2005; Kanany-Minesot, 1995).

As mentioned, unemployment is considered a major driving factor for political extremism following different examples throughout the extremist’s movements. Studies show that many recruited individuals during the Second Intifada and those in Hezbollah in Lebanon are unemployed. (Sageman, 2004). As aforementioned youth aged 15-24 are most affected by unemployment, furthermore more than 3,000 Jordanian fighters are said to have fought in Syria and Iraq. Statistics also support this adding the fact that between the

beginning of 2013 and the end of 2014 69% of those fighting with ISIL have completed high school, and that 25% of fighters are university graduates, those that have not finished high school are less than 15% of fighters (QPost, 2018).

2.3.2. Socio-Economic Causes of Violence Extremism

Social and economic causes have been also considered as factors in Islamic extremism. The major factor would be poverty; the failure of governments in providing fair life qualities will lead to “cultural isolation and sense of being marginalized from the society and feeling hopeless and ineffective”. (Ahmed, 1993; Ameen, 1993; Ardila, 2002; Orbach, 2001). (Feeney, 2002; Orbach, 2001). This is where the extremists take advantage of these conditions to spread their views and to develop support bases by focusing on the social-economic aspects of the grass root levels. (Ahmed, 1993; Ameen, 1993; Stern, 2003). These groups would challenge the failure of governments by providing their members with salaries, economical privileges and benefits.

In some cases, poverty is another marginal factor that may be linked to radicalization and terrorism in Islamic countries. For instance, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (Gurr, 2006) or the case of Kashmir (Stern, 2003) which erupted as a result of economic disparity linked to poverty among marginalized youth. It is necessarily the case for the Palestinians, Egyptians and other Arabs even though a big compensation was offered to the families of the martyrs (R. Hassan, 2009).

Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) research implies that the lack of political freedom can be an explanation of terrorism, and claims that those countries that provide more level of political freedom are less prone to terrorism than those with less political freedoms, (Abadie 2006:50) also suggests that a lot of today's terrorism is a result of grievances against the more rich countries. In contrast to that; in Krueger and Laitins' research (2003, cited by de Mesquita, 2005) it is suggested that poor countries don't produce more terrorism than those that are richer. This controversial information proves that there is no significant evidence in the relationship between economic capability and radicalization in Islamic countries. This creates a gap that motivate further studies in line with economic parity and extremism actions in Islamic countries. Besides, other studies have also revealed that rich countries have become targets for terrorist attacks by violent groups.

Vaillancourt and Boyd (2007) state that the link between poverty and extremism is invalid, since we don't have as much terrorists or terrorist acts as we have poor people. Studies that are exclusive to terrorism such as the one by Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010 also state that terrorists are not poor or suffering from deprivation of any form. But David Keen suggests that there is an indirect link between poverty and its contribution to terrorism and violence, (Gurr, 2006). Research of (Gurr, 2006) also states that historical review shows that socioeconomic inequality and marginalization are platforms linking youth participation in radical groups. Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers are examples of that. Other researchers also argue that neither economy nor poverty per say are dominating factors for youth participation in radicalization. Meanwhile, education, or socioeconomic status should be considered the

important factors and determinants of terrorism. (Krueger 2007, cited by de Mesquita, 2008) (Sarwono, 2008)

Various studies have explored the role of education in extremism and terrorism acts. For instance, a study by Nwafor and Nwogu, (2015) observed that recruits from the west are mostly from middle class families and have completed their high school education. This shows that elites also have high potential of joining radical groups just as other population despite their awareness on the consequences of the violent actions. Study by Sageman (2004) showed that over 60% of terrorists have some form of a higher education, and it also showed that holders of the more leading positions in terrorist groups were mostly college graduates, and some even had a doctorate degree. Krueger and Maleckova 2003 also suggest that holders of higher level of education are more likely to hold leading positions in organized violence groups and might be actually preferred candidates by such organizations having more abilities and skills to offer. Benmelech and Berrebi (2006, cited by de Mesquita, 2008) also show evidence that participants of terrorist groups who are better educated are better, more effective and more suitable for carrying out more difficult tasks. Therefore, when considering the level of education as a base for categorizing extremism we can't overlook the fact that participants of violent extremist groups vary greatly in their age, socioeconomic status, literacy levels, occupation and past criminal records (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 805).

While studying the role of education in violent extremism, some came across the fact that the expansion and the evolution of education and universities clashed down barriers and

raised the national consciousness of the youth who then adopted acts of violent extremism like suicide bombing in Palestine in the 80s and the civil uprising in Tunisia in 2011 (Gunning 2008). And others referred to lack of empowerment and training in ‘conflict-free interaction’ and not the lack of good education is what plays a role in youth vulnerability to join violent extremist groups (Davydov 2015).

What can be concluded is that the gap created when dignified life isn’t provided, and basic services and needs of the individuals exceed the government’s capacity, is the vulnerable gap that extremist groups exploit. In 2011, protesters in Jordan held demonstrations over increasing prices regarding food and unemployment. As a result, re-elections to assign new prime ministers and financial aid for both food and fuel were implemented. Furthermore, King Abdullah acknowledged the demonstrations through communicating with leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and made a \$500 million increase in salaries for government employees (SA Tobin, 2012). Another example is the inflation on general cost of living in Jordan due to an increase of taxes resulted in Jordanians protesting the decision and moreover demonstrators throughout the Kingdom called on the cabinet to reside. (Aljazeera 2017).

2.3.3. Psychological Causes of Violence Extremism

It was accepted that personality disorders are linked with terrorism. Nowadays, scholars are divided, some suggest that terrorists in fact do suffer of psychological disorders. Some suggest that terrorists have issues with identity and emotions (Thackrah, 2004), others refer

it to an inferiority complex, as well as lack of independence, low self-esteem, lack of empathy and empowerment and narcissism (Orbach 2001, Ardila 2002, Bell 2005, Piven 2002, Goertzel 2002, Hudson 1999) To understand the role of psychological factors in joining violent extremism we will examine those factors a little bit deeper.

2.3.3.1. Personal Traits of Extremists

Many researchers denied the relationship between violent extremists and specific unusual personal traits (Crenshaw, 1981; Hudson, 1999; Ibrahim, 1980; Merari, 2000; Sageman, 2004). Borum (2014) argues that terrorists are normal in most psychological aspects, and that their maladaptive behavior stems from the human need and search for identity, putting youth who are in search of their identity and a strong sense of grievance at more risk to choose the path of violent extremism than those individuals who has formed identity already. (Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler, 2006) Referred the choice to join violent extremism groups to rational choice theory, where individuals follow their spiritual incentives and chose violent extremism as a path for eternal salvation and see it as the only way to fulfill their obligations to God.

Researchers are inclined to explain the acts of terrorism as acts chosen by young men rationally to achieve self-realization and direction, as well as fulfillment and status (Sageman 2004, Schwind 2005), putting those at the transitional time of youth in their lives, yet to form and find their identities at most risk and vulnerability of choosing terrorism and violence in pursuit of their high ideals (Baumeister, 1991). On the other hand, some authors

labeled terrorists as mentally ill, describing them as psychopaths, narcissists, sociopaths, borderline mentally defected and paranoid (Piven, 2002; Pearlstein, 1991, Taylor, 1988; Thackrah, 2004, Juergensmeyer, 2000).

2.3.3.2. Thinking of Extremists

Literature describes the thinking of terrorists and extremists as extreme, rigid and utopian, and individuals adopting this thinking tend to over-simplify matters and have primitive and no development of analytic thinking, with a subjective rather than an objective interpretation of reality (Loza 2007, Thackrah 2004, Ahmed 1993, Ibraheem 1993).

2.3.3.4. Feelings/ Emotions of Extremists

Researchers described many negative feeling and emotions of extremists including fear and anger, disappointment and frustration, as well as hatred for others, in the case of Muslim violent extremists, these feelings stem from the perceived alienation and discrimination against their faith, rejection and hatred towards the Western culture and values, feelings of being victimized, insulted and attacked. (Goertzel, 2002; Hudson, 1999; Ibrahim, 1988; Piven, 2002; Sageman, 2004; Thackrah, 2004; Tanveer, 2005).

2.3.3.5. Belief System of Extremists

It is controversial how much and to what extent does ideology push people to violent extremism, but it is obvious that faith and ethnicity are of the most powerful expressions of identity. Juergensmeyer (2003) describes faith and religion to be a medium through which grievances and roots of negative emotions are articulated, therefore religious identity is used as an instrument for radicalization and recruitment, and it is especially easy to instrumentalize the religious identity in weak and failing states and governments, Iraq is a powerful example of that.

2.3.3.6. Conformity and/or Belonging

Many researchers state that important factors for participants to remain in violent extremist groups include group solidarity and dynamics, peer pressure, a sense of accomplishment within a community, the need for social approval, and therefore show that those who have extremists amongst their peer groups are more likely to become violent extremists themselves (Hudson, 1999; Stern, 2003; Malik, 2005; Sageman 2004, 2007; Bakker 2006)

2.3.3.7. Media and Communications

Media is suggested to play multiple roles in the path towards extremism and violence. The importance of media is that it dictates how the public perceives terrorism and any political development for that fact (Jongman, 2007). A major role that the media played was igniting

the anger and frustration amongst the Muslim and Arab community because of the negative light they are presented in and the assumed link of Islam and terrorism by the mainstream media, since media assumes the role of providing the public with a compass of what is right and what is wrong (Campain 2006, Pickering, et al., 2007 Dreher, 2007).

Another huge role the media played was becoming a crucial method of communication, radicalization and recruitment of future violent extremists, with the growing number of terrorist related websites becoming a growing concern (Jongman, 2007).



CHAPTER 3: DISCUSSION

This section covers discussion of the main objectives as was established in this research. As the main aim was to explore youth marginalization as drivers for extremism and violence in Jordan, there have been significant findings pointing at social, economic and political factors contributing to youth marginalization in this country of interest. Consequently, it is evident that these factors have contributed to youth radicalization in the country that are worth discussing. Discussion in this section have therefore described these factors as the main thematic areas of concern for this study. Similarly, this section has also briefly outlined the significance of the results in relation to its response to the literature gaps.

3.1. Economic Marginalization as a Driver

Even though Jordan is praised for its relative stability compared to the surrounding regions, it is also at risk of the effects of the violent extremism in the region, and its youth are at risk of radicalization due to the obstacle of unemployment. The consequences of unemployment among the youth is only one of the many drivers that can push the Jordanian youth to join violent extremism groups, such dynamics are well reported in the findings, including how such feelings are exploited in the process of recruitment into violent extremist groups. Moreover, the theory of deprivation as was discussed in the literature section states “when the individual believes that he/ she is deprived of something compared to others, whether that is on an economic, political or social level, this individual becomes frustrated and therefore at risk of radicalization or violence.” This corroborates with the findings of this study as the majority of youth in Jordan believe that they are economically deprived.

Additionally, the government seemed to do less in promoting youth empowerment thereby making majority of this demography more vulnerable to joining radical forces in the country. Through this study, it is evident that the theory of ‘relative deprivation’ holds and therefore the approach of ‘positive peace’ by Galtung needs to be taken solemn in order to minimize cases of youth radicalization in the country. Interestingly, the increasing unemployment rates among the youth leaves them jobless and thus the inability to cater for their families. This makes them a ‘prey’ to radical groups for them being recruited in violent groups within Jordan. Unemployment has an adverse effect on poverty level and livelihood. The poor quality of employment system coupled with low wages proves to be a catalyzing factor for youth involvement in radicalization as they feel the government is not sensitive to their economic parity. Furthermore, it was identified that the government provides less job opportunity as compared to other private institutions in the country. This is an indicator of an inadequate labor system by the government which has left a number of youths marginalized, and thus the opportunity to accept recruitments in violent groups.

3.2. Social Marginalization as a Driver

A second issue is that Jordanians are not battling for water, housing, or employment with their compatriots, but rather against the “other.” As one participant put it, the different groups in the Kingdom (for example, Jordanians, Syrians, and Jordanians of Palestinian

origin) are fighting the same fight, just separately, with little hope of uniting. “Theorization, particularly when coupled with marginalization, is a recognized driver of radicalization.” (Africa, n.d., p. 47). Radicalization among youth in the country were can be attributed to social drivers such as; influence of peers, identity confusion and search of purpose, as well as the lack of active social inclusion, the focus of this thesis. Being a part of a society doesn’t only carry objective indicators in its meaning, but subjective indicators as well, like civic engagement and political participation, feeling of security and well-being; these are all important indicators for the youth to have a more fulfilling life and help them play a bigger role in contributing to the development of their country. This finding corroborates with the ‘social movement theory’ as the latter suggests that ‘when humans are frustrated, they use aggressive means to negotiate the frustration. Besides this theory have been echoed by Rinehart, Zald and McCarthy when they observed that a set of opinions and beliefs in a population represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society. Those factors can be negatively affected by the limitations and struggles the youthful society of Jordan is facing; such as the unemployment issue discussed above, the growing population especially with the flooding refugees after the Syrian crisis, and the violence and instability of the surrounding countries in general, limited outlets for active engagement and many more. As a result, youth participation in political system was limited due to poor electoral system, poverty, unemployment, lack of democracy and fear of participating within political parties which are congruent to deprivation as seen in the relative deprivation theory. (Africa, n.d., p. 49). Although that university students are politically active, they are often skeptic towards political parties and leadership. (UNDESA, 2012, p.1) it’s worth mentioning that this same society can form an obstacle in the face of

active participation of the youth for example they try to avoid political participation due to family and society restrictions. (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 120).

Schools in Jordan do a poor job when it comes to civic education and empowerment of the youth, they attempt to build into the youth the moral and values of proper citizens, yet they omit political issues and don't facilitate youth participation and engagement in activities such as the student's parliament or volunteering. Interestingly this verifies the theory of relative deprivation since majority of the youth believe that they are deprived of the educational chances as their counterparts in democratic countries such as Denmark. though a huge amount of change and evolution is due in the curricular aspect; some steps towards reform were taken, to better engage the Jordanian youth and provide them with the opportunity to influence decisions and policies (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 114). Universities are to be considered the biggest opportunity for active political participation and civic engagement of the Jordanian youth, since despite of the restrictions on political activities universities are still centric for youth activism. (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 114) Universities provide the youth with the unique chance to network on a much bigger and diverse field, especially that having a student union per university is mandatory by the Law of Universities (EuroMed, N.D., p. 26).

3.3. Political Drivers

Even though the Jordanian youth have shown re-ignited eagerness to be more politically active, they were faced with the lack of opportunities, lack of organization, and generally frowned upon. Since Arab Spring, many young people are still active through movements rather than parties. (UNDESA, 2012, p. 1), “Prior to the 2011 Arab Uprisings, the participation rate in any form of civic grouping was under 4 per cent; membership in political parties and participation in volunteerism were even lower, both at 1 per cent” (Africa, n.d., p. 136) but as the events of the Arab spring were motivational for some it was not approved by others. “Respondents are convinced that the events were started by youth but then hijacked by others (54 per cent), in particular by external / international actors such as the United States (41 to 47 per cent). Moreover, youth hold these events responsible for widespread violence (53 per cent). Thus, for the majority of Jordanian youth, the Arab Spring has more negative than positive connotations.” (Kreitmeyr, 2018, p. 11). This finding is consistent with the radicalization theory suggested by Wintrobe which asserts the need to advocate for political positions and at times use violence to achieve their ends. The low rates of formal active participation amongst the Jordanian youth are striking and worrisome, political actions considered / used are participating in elections and boycotting certain goods – both 6 to 16 per cent, so also rather low. Other political actions – such as participating in demonstrations / strikes or joining a political party (0 to 3 per cent) – are hardly considered or done. Even the Jordanian youthful population isn’t interested in the act of voting and joining the process of elections, which is one of the primary forms of political participation

as much as older age group citizens. According to a poll, only 67% of young Jordanians said that they are planning to vote in 2007 elections comparing with 76% of people over 40. (EuroMed, N. D, p. 8), and one of the main reasons for such low interest was how the rural and marginal areas were out of proportion as represented in the parliament, and how elections were reflecting the tribal identities of the citizens instead of focusing on presented policies and suggestions. (National Dialogue Committee, 2016).

3.4. History of Civic Engagement and Violent Political Participation in Jordan

The kingdom of Jordan went through major changes quite quickly with regard to population, composition and size. This off course has had an effect on citizen identity and citizen loyalty and worries. Over twenty years, Jordan witnessed protests either by economic or political conditions. The first wave of change and a stepping stone in shaping today's morphology of the Jordanian population is the evens of West Bank annexation and Palestinian immigration which followed shortly afterwards. After independence, Jordan took over the west bank in 1950, which resulted in a crucial shift in population. (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 102). The issue of identity stems from the fact that those immigrants have become Jordanian by law, but their heritage and origins were major parts of their identities, which prevented creating a united nation by all aspects, "King Abdullah I described this unity as a 'nationalist and factual reality'. (Massad, 2001)." (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 102). Active political participation was thriving in Jordan in the 1950-1960, the highlight of that was the 1957 win of the political opposition in the parliament, but the authorities quickly regained control over the situation by placing a criminalizing law on

active political participation and the dismantling of the parliament. (El-Said and Harrigan, 2008; Tell, 2013), which was followed by an expansion of the army by five times in 1967, and a twice in the 1970-71 Black September conflict. (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 102).

Another wave of change hit the Jordanian political scene after the April uprising in 1989, where protests and riots touching socioeconomic matters like price hikes on food staples and fuel, and unemployment evolved into the citizens demanding a more active and vocal role in decision making and better representation, this wave of liberalization eventually helped in removing the law that was criminalizing active political participation and activism. As a result of one person-one vote rule, political parties emerged, and political participation in general spread across the population. (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 102). Opposition parties and individuals were allowed to be part of the election process, which resulted in increasing in seats won by the Islamic Action Front. Jordan also witnessed protests during the second Intifada in 2000, specifically at the beginning where 203 marches and 73 demonstrations took place in one week. Demonstrations were not likely to be met with governmental response. When the bigger wave of demonstrations started in 2011 during Arab Spring, the government was not able to respond to economical demands due to the country's limited resources. (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011,).

It's important to highlight that even if those movements and protests didn't achieve efficient results, what they sure accomplished was raising the citizen's awareness, and gifting them with a sense of empowerment, as this phase brought back the discussion of national identity

and political participation. These discussions were led by independent initiatives and NGO's. (UNFPA, 2015) (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 104) that was reflected in the 2016 general elections, where we can notice the motivation of the youth and their eagerness and hunger for change and reform by comparing the numbers with the previous general elections. Numbers show above average participation among the youth voters, where 37.9% of them voted compared to the average of 36.1%. In addition, young voters less than 25 years old formed 25% of the voters. (IEC, 2017) (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 104).

3.5. The Impact of Public and Private Organizations

The official institution responsible for youth development in Jordan used to be the Ministry of Youth, which was replaced in 2001 by the Higher Council for Youth, in order to overcome the struggles and failures of that ministry, to help develop a youth policy for Jordan, as well as licensing, youth clubs and organizations, and forming youth centers to care for all youth categories. A UNICEF report saw the ministry failure in long term planning, which led to incompetent policies. (EuroMed, N.D., p. 11) The lack of strategies that deal with youth participation leads to a gap in policies concerning the youth's participation. (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 18) "The lack of a unifying vision for social and political transformation among civil society actors prevents alliance-building, collaborative strengthening, and progressive influence" (Africa, N.D., p. 137)

Many events and programs were launched to promote for political participation in the Jordanian public. To mention a few: Children Parliament in 1997, The Children Municipal Council of Greater Amman, New Jordan Center's national youth meetings, Jordan Youth Forum, the National Campaign for Student Rights, the Jordanian Democratic Youth Union.

It is worth mentioning that the widest and most inclusive opportunities and activities to practice active engagement in Jordan are provided by NGOs rather governmental institutions and programs provide much more valid physical change and development. "Government initiatives to foster youth participation are also limited, prompting NGOs and international actors to step in and implement programs that enable youth to engage in their communities through volunteerism, life skills training, grants, technical support and information tools." (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 18), but that doesn't mean they don't face their share of the obstacle, volunteerism in its formal forms is delayed by restricted framework and bureaucracy. (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 44) and their efforts don't necessarily always go hand in hand with the needs of the society to grow and develop "The dominant development paradigm strongly favors nationally led strategizing, prioritization, and implementation. The mandate of organizations such as UNDP dictates that the government is their principal interlocutor." (Africa, N.D., p. 137). Another important point is that the methods used by the NGOs must be adapted and tailored to the needs of the society that is governed by Islamic culture and heritage and have different values and priorities that the west "We need to let go of the assumption that a Western-style, people-powered civil society is the best solution. As donors have repeatedly discovered, attempts to use foreign constructs as development solutions are rarely effective. The version

of civil society will need to be palatable to current ruling bargains. This is not a sell-out: it is pragmatism and prudence” (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 138)



CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS

This section outlines the main findings of the study. As was evident in the previous sections of this research, the main aim was to explore youth marginalization as a driving factor to extremism and violence in the case of Jordan. The study mainly focused on previous publications and studies that sought to understand youth political participation and how their marginalization have led them in joining radical groups as a way of airing their political grievances. It is also important to note that inclusion method was considered while reaching conclusion for this study. The inclusion approach meant that the researcher accepted papers and publications that focused on youth political participation in Jordan as well as factors that may lead to their marginalization. Key themes relating to youth recruitment in radical groups, political participation and political democracy have been considered during this analysis so as to understand systems that may accelerate youth participation in radical groups in Jordan. While exploring drivers to youth participation in radical actions, the researcher also focused on economic and social development systems in Jordan as some of the driving factors to youth radicalization.

4.1. Economic Situation/Drivers to Youth Marginalization

“An estimated 31 per cent of youth aged 15-30 years old are unemployed, and an even greater percentage of youth are disengaged and not in education, employment or training.” (Unicef, 2017, p. 2), In 2016, 34% of youth aged 15-24 in Jordan were unemployed (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 34) and even holders of a higher education degrees struggle to find a job, and suffer from mismatch between the jobs offered and their respective

qualifications, leading to frustration and anger amongst youth as outlined in the National Youth Strategy (2005) the policy show that 31% of youth in Jordan are unemployed and youth age 20-24 years who are unemployed rates at 41%; and only 54% of males and 11% of female are working. The figure below illustrates youth unemployment rate per age group.

The issue of unemployment grew even bigger after the Syrian crisis, where, on one hand, with the already busy market it is even harder for the Syrian refugees to find a job and support themselves, and it's worth mentioning that most of these refugees reside within the host communities and not within refugee camps "Access to opportunities for Syrian refugee youth living in Jordan is even more limited (Wagemakers, 2017. Pg. 17). An estimated 84 per cent of Syrian refugee youth are unemployed and at risk of harmful or exploitative labor or negative coping mechanisms." (Unicef, 2017, p. 1) on the other hand, the Jordanian youth are now struggling even more with the job market being taken up by the arriving refugees, who can be more skilled and less demanding for wage rates.

Another problem of unemployment in Jordan is the low quality of the jobs offered, especially, if it's compared with the qualifications of the job seekers, and the low wages offered, which puts a great strain on the government to provide a job market to take up the growing youth population, and to prevent the illegal and non-formal employment, and also to prevent the youth from turning their backs on education and training, which can eventually negatively affect the development and the economy of the country. (Dimova, Elder, & Africa, 2016) (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 36).

4.2. Social Drivers to Youth Marginalization

4.2.1. Religious and Family Affiliation

In order to understand what drives the Jordanian youth we must try to comprehend the values and priorities they socially hold important. The Jordanian youth recognize family bonds and religion to be their most important pillars in life and refer to both of them as providers of stability and serenity, with a show of increase in religiosity over recent years, and specifically in Jordan. In this study it states that “83 per cent of Jordanian youth state that their personal faith in religion is a (rather) stable field of personal life”. This refers to religion as a comfort, and a backbone for youth’s belief systems and way of life. “The tendency towards more religiosity and the importance of religion in the personal life of youth is a regional phenomenon” (Kreitmeyr, 2018, p. 4) and they find that showing religious orientation is an important practice that can enrich one’s life, and they believe religion should take a more leading stance in their daily lives. The research finds that most common social priorities for youth living in Jordan included the headscarf (32 per cent) and the prayer bump (17 per cent) are the most common social priorities in youth life within Jordan. While religion affiliation is considered the most important social facet of youth in Jordan, 66% of men as well as 20% of women were realized to show reluctance in displaying religious orientation. Similarly, 49% of individuals with low education level as well as 50% of individuals living in small cities of Jordan were also realized to show marginal religious orientation (Kreitmeyr, 2018. Pg. 36). This is presented in the table below;

Table 2 Demography of youth religious orientation in Jordan

Demographic	% of Religious Orientation
Women	20%
Men	66%
Percentage living in small cities	50%
Low education level	49%

Despite religion plays an important role in shaping moral values of individuals within a society, it is evident that a significant demography in Jordan shows no sign of religious orientation. This implies that extremism and radical operations cannot be entirely be blamed on Muslimism but rather other social factors. However, it is also imperative to denote that religious marginalization by the western countries also have a significant contribution to marginalization and formation of violent groups in Muslim countries such as Jordan as aforementioned in the Literature section. According to this finding, it can be deduced that the tabulated population are the most targeted youth for recruitment in radical groups within Jordan. With no religious orientation, the probability of manipulating their psychology to change towards doing well for a particular religion is high even when the acts are ‘evil’. For instance, despite the fact that western culture has become global, the Jordanian youth sees the west as a threat, and their Islamic culture to be more humane and righteous, as 87% of them sees the cultural invasion of the west as very serious (Gelfand et al. 2013. Pg. 12). “Of all the age groups young people (16-24) show least favorable attitudes toward Western countries” (EuroMed, N. D). Even though most of the Jordanian youth show pride and trust

in their culture and heritage, others also suffer from identity confusion. And if it is to identify the lost identity or to help the righteous religion to prevail, these points of view are openings for the extremists to attract the Jordanian youth, who lack the tools and insight into what positive political participation can be, and haven't been offered to participate in other forms of political participation that don't include violence and destruction (Johnson, 2001. Pg. 27).

Another social factor realized to have an impact in youth recruitment to radical groups is the familial ties. Even though family bonds are a source of support and stability, they don't necessarily have a positive effect on the level of active participation in democratic politics amongst the youth. A case study showed that families in Jordan societies has the tendency to degrade political participation, which have eventually lowered youth interest in general elections as well as the democratic processes (OECD Development Centre, 2018). This shows that families may also take an option of sending their youth to involve in radical operations such as violent protests and terrorism acts as a way of expressing their governmental grievances. Besides, literature findings indicated that families from poor societies have the tendency of motivating their youth to join these groups based on economic and political grounds such as poverty and lack of government encouraging community participating in their activities.

4.2.2. Internet/media and Youth Radicalization

The Jordanian youth have a lot of free time to spare, and most of this time is filled with watching T.V. or using the internet "Every third young Jordanian spends more than 3 hours watching TV and over 80% watches it every day (Almasarweh 2003, 4). Every second

young Jordanian uses Internet, but there are only 5 computers for every 100 persons and 11.2 Internet users per 10 thousand inhabitants” (EuroMed, N. D) especially the female youthful population suffers lack of participation in different activities due to their restricted mobility.

4.3. Political Drivers to Youth Marginalization

4.3.1. Youth Awareness in Civic Engagement and Political Participation

One of the most important reasons of the low active engagement of the Jordanian youth and their lack of interest is low political literacy and knowledge, which asserts on the case of political participation restrictions brought by tribalism. “In 2011 and 2013, only 6.2% and 5.2% of surveyed Jordanian youth aged 15-29 attended a meeting to discuss a political subject, signed a petition or participated in protests, marches or sit-ins” (Arab Barometer, 2013), (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 120) and, only a small fraction of the Jordanian youth are fully aware of the various methods of political participation and civic engagement, and realize how those methods executed methodically can lead to change, help impactful decisions to be made, and influence policies “92 per cent of respondents were found to be apolitical. The Internet (67 per cent) and TV (62 per cent) are the main sources of information for civic participation. Only 16 per cent of respondents who inform themselves about politics use face-to-face conversations to do so” (Kreitmeyr, 2018).

Jordanian youth also seems to be disturbed by the tight relationship between democracy and tribalism in Jordan, when they find these two concepts to contradict one another, where democracy dictates the freedom of opinion and speech, the tribal and ethnic culture of the region impose their ideas and values as set rules that are not open for personal interpretation and criticism. However, young people believe that these matters oppose their vision of “active citizenship, demonstrating their knowledge of the processes, practices and functioning of Jordan’s political system”. (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 109). Reports show that 7.6% of youth belong to a tribal association, and 2.7% of them belong to charitable societies. Tribalism takes views of citizenship away from being part of a shared nation. (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 108). In the case of Jordan tribal affiliations often pressure citizens to vote only for their tribe rather than for the candidate they choose to represent them. “Lack of interest in participatory politics is an extension of protracted authoritarian governance” (Africa, N. D, p. 136), and this lack of active support from the society has formed political apathy amongst the confused and misguided youth, as well as other personal reasons for lack of non-engagement “45 per cent state that they are themselves already struggling to make ends meet; the same proportion have the feeling that none or few initiatives exist in their neighborhood. In terms of structural reasons, others argue that social projects are not professionally managed 37%, it remains unclear where the money goes 37% (Kreitmeyr, 2018, p. 10). Reasons such as lack of extra time and financial abilities prohibited them from volunteering. (OECD Development Centre, 2018).

It is important to note that the areas available for the Jordanian youth to actively participate and engage aren't exactly political and can't be called controversial. "The main areas youth frequently support are the interests of the young people (14%), helping the poor / vulnerable (12%), improving the community life in their area of residence (12%), a better / cleaner environment (11%), and improving the situation of disabled people (11%)" (Kreitmeyr, 2018, p. 11). The same can be on a grander level where places providing opportunities for active engagement are few in number and barely touch political matters "Most youth participate in a group at school or university (15 per cent) or in a youth organization (9 per cent). Only 6 per cent support social goals as members of a religious institution" (Kreitmeyr, 2018, p. 10) Young people consider student councils as a tool to make their voices heard and a way to communicate with the school bodies. At the same time, they point that they need to be activated (UNICEF 2007, 3-4). (EuroMed, N. D, p. 25). As for political engagement, not many of the youth are interested in it, those who are interested are mainly males, those of higher education, and those who live in smaller cities "87 per cent of respondents' state that they have little or no interest in politics. Youth with high educational level and residents of small cities are slightly more interested in politics, they express high interest in politics (17 and 20 per cent) respectively (Van Tatenhove, et al. 2003. Pg. 15). According to UNICEF, half of Jordanian youth think that they lack the impact on changing laws (UNICEF 2002), and many of them lack the trust in the elections. (IRI 2003) (EuroMed, N. D, p. 8). Such lack of trust can be called worrying to say the least, for besides the risk of consequential upheaval, this is also an obvious driver that can push young people to join violent extremism groups to have their voice to be heard.

The lack of political freedom and participation is reflected in various universal rates; Freedom House rated Jordan as “Not Free” giving it a 5.5 freedom rating, and a 6 on political rights with 7 being the worst. The CATO Institute also rated Jordan poorly on their Human Freedom Index at 91 out of 159 (Of, Into, Extremism, & Jordan, n.d., p. 49) and this lack of political freedom, the limitations and obstacles are facts the Jordanian youth face, if they attempt to make a change, or voice disagreement or criticism, this can lead youth to feelings of frustration, resentment and anger. Besides, these factors can cause deep damage in different aspects of their lives, and help the youth become easy targets for violent extremist groups to recruit, feeding them illusions about the ability to finally make their voices heard loud and clear.

4.3.2. Cases of Youth Political Participation in Jordan

Youth political participation can be traced in an array of approaches even though participation have been considered marginal in the country. Participation of youth in political parties has also been in the form of community groupings and social organizations. Mainly this participation has been motivated by the Muslim brotherhood party, the Salafist movement as well as tension rise between Palestine and Israel. A number of extremism cases have also been observed as a means of political participation by the youth. These have been condensed in the following subsections.

A challenge that eager and motivated youth in Jordan face is that the opportunities available for active civic and political participation, whether in the form of institutions and organizations, or in the form of local community activities and programs are limited.

Moreover, such opportunities provide the youth with a chance to participate in a role of a follower and not a role of a leader, a decision maker or a game changer. Available opportunities don't do much to empower them. Youth's participation is usually a planned role, and rarely has the tools to change these plans. (OECD Development Centre, 2018, p. 120)

The way protest movements and protest attempts has been treated in Jordan example Tahrir square in Amman, and the way they have been deliberately ignored and not organized properly is proof of the authoritarian regime to be dominating and over ruling democracy in some respects. The main parties to form protest demonstrations against the socioeconomic factors are the leftist parties of Jordan, a bright example of that is the Jordanian Communist party and the Jordan Social Leftist Movement that planned protests to protest against poverty and prices and governmental corruption. (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011, p. 10) other important movements of socioeconomic protestors in Jordan are some Islamist Parties, and the example of that is the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood that retreated from the mentioned protests for they feared that the government would reject the demonstrations. However, the Brotherhood took part and conducted many other demonstrations. (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011, p. 10).

4.3.3. Syrian Refugees and Youth Recruitment in Radical Groups

Youth recruitment and radicalization have also been attributed to Syrian refugees in the urban areas of Jordan especially Amman. Since the sprout of Syrian civil war in 2011, Jordan have become a home for over 657,000 Syrians who enter the country to seek Asylum.

This has brought major concerns to the government especially in consideration to the country's scarce resources such as land, water, and healthcare services as well as job markets. Of great alarm is the projection that violent Syrians may take advantage of the porous border of Jordan and cross into the country while smuggling weapons. Besides, it has also been in concern that the increased resource pressure that would leave more young Jordanians vulnerable to join violent groups in the country. This can be triangulated with the contributing factor of unemployment and poor resource availability to youth joining extreme groups. One of the violent cases observed in line with Syrian refugees entering the country is the vigorous riot that took place at Zaatari camp of Jordan – which is the largest refugee camp in the country – which took place in 2014. It was believed that Syrian opposition that illegally entered the country facilitated the riots that took place in the camp. Besides, there were traces of young Jordanians who participated in the riot as it was believed that they were recruited by extremists Syrians who illegally entered the country. Following this conception, the Jordan military had to fire a convoy of trucks that were crossing the border from Syria as they believed that the trucks were smuggling weapons into the country.

The latest survey report observed that most Syrian refugees living in Jordan reside outside the camps but within the urban settlements. Interestingly, landlords in these urban areas are known to crowd these refugees in small apartments with increased rent rates. Additionally, it has been noted that Syrian refugees are not legally allowed to work in the country thereby leaving vast majority of these refugees to take dangerous and low paying jobs. This has been coupled with the high standard of living within the urban areas where refugees live such as the Amman city. For example, it has been realized that food and rent prices have skyrocketed

in these towns while economic income for these demographics remain to be low. The resultant consequence is the recruitment of the refugee Syrian youth into radical groups as they receive a considerable payment for the Katter. Besides, their involvement in the radical operation has been known to be more subjective than objective and therefore there is a degree of support provided to the young refugees to join radical groups by their families. This is a case that have been debated with a need to hamper Syrian migration into the country. It is postulated that the main target for youth recruitment into radical groups are not only Jordanians by birth but also the refugees who have been marginalized by resource scarcity in the country. It is in this line that Jordan's Planning Ministry held a press conference that sought to determine strategies for restricting Syrian refugees into the country as the latter have become a threat to the country's stability both socially, economically and politically.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

This study focused on exploring youth marginalization as a factor contributing to violence extremism in Jordan. Following in-depth analysis, it is evident that youth in Jordan have been economically, socially and politically marginalized; factors which have driven youth engagement in radicalization in the country. Economic marginalization among the youth is evident through poor employment systems in the country which have left an estimated of 37% for the age of 15-24 and 20.5% for the age of 25-34 of youth jobless (DOS, 2017). This has in turn lead youth to seek dangerous and extreme means as a way of improving their standards of living. Turning to extremism is one of the main dangerous path's youth follow as they see compensation in this area more rewarding. This may be the reason why even the educated elite still involve in extremism and radicalization in the country. Besides, it is evident that the government provide low quality jobs coupled with poor wages and compensations which present as drivers to youth involvement in radical and extremism groups. Poor housing systems, water shortages, poor education quality, influence from neighborhood countries as well as religious marginalization by the west also presents as social drivers to youth involvement in radicalization within the country. On the other hand, lack of democracy corrupt nature of the government compounded with issues of nepotism and failure to address youth problems have been the major political drivers to youth extremism and radicalization in Jordan.

Democracy in its own is a significant factor that drives equal political participation among youth and other demographics in a country. Even though democracy have been

credited with opportunity to political participation (Boix, 1996. Pg. 52). Negative economic factors such as unemployment, unequal distribution of resources, poor housing system are some of the factors that have led to youth marginalization thus leaving them vulnerable to joining radical groups as a way of expressing their needs to the government. This have been coupled with influences from neighboring countries such as Syria, Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. In essence, the youth explore what other youth in the neighboring countries do to solve their political problems and adopt the same in their political systems. It can be attributed that these factors were the major drivers to the formation of radical groups such as ISIS and Salafist movement. This has been the major problem that this study sought to address.

Following the above findings, this research was able to determine how youth marginalization have led to violence extremism in Jordan with the resultant effect of social, economic and political marginalization in the country. For instant, violent perpetration have leads limited commercial and business operation in prime areas of the country. This is largely as a result of violent protests, fear and anxiety within the state. Furthermore, foreign interest for investing in the country becomes limited thus the country's economic growth becomes more vulnerable. As noted in Galtung's concept of structural violence, it is evident that institutionalized violence puts a country at a low development index due to premature deaths and unnecessary instability. With increased state violence, development institutions such as education, businesses and industries become standstill with business owners looking out for foreign investments. To this end therefore, it is imperative for the government to take more actions as a means of preventing youth recruitment into radical groups. Besides,

preventing youth participation in extremist groups will be supportive in limiting extremism within the country thereby improving economic development. In this case therefore, this study makes the following suggestions.

Recommendations

1. The government need to ratify reforms that would enable democratic participation of youth in the country's political affairs. Moreover, as a measure to mitigate radical approach in solving political problem, the government need to introduce education and awareness creation programs on democracy and demarcating ways of airing political problems faced by the youth
2. The state in collaboration with potential non-state actors should develop more social economic and political programs to ensure that youth are at least engaged in an economic activity rather than remaining idle most of the time. This can be reached through provision of incentives to the youth and promoting business ideas among the youth.
3. Policies should be implemented to support youth employment and those that encourage civic participation among the youth as a way of minimizing recruitment of this demography in radical groups. In this case therefore, the government need to implement programs such as political civic education among the youth as well as political participation awareness.
4. Lastly the government need to create social and economic opportunities for the youth in terms of employment and sports. In this way, the government will have not only to curb

the problem of youth joining radical groups but also development of the country's economy. In recommending these programs, this research was able to answer question two of the study that sought to determine interventions that may assist in curbing youth engagement in violent groups.

5. Youth participation in political system was limited due to poor electoral system, poverty, unemployment, lack of democracy and fear of participating within political parties which are congruent to deprivation as seen in the relative deprivation theory. (Africa, n.d., p. 49). Although that university students are politically active, they are often skeptic towards political parties and leadership.

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APPENDIX 1 ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM



HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORM FOR THESIS WORK

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
.....Peace studies..... TO THE DEPARTMENT PRESIDENCY

Date: 27/3/2019

Thesis Title / Topic:Political Marginalization of Youth as a Driver for Violent Extremism – Examining the Case of Jordan.....

My thesis work related to the title/topic above:

- ☒ 1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people.
- ☒ 2. Does not necessitate the use of biological material (blood, urine, biological fluids and samples, etc.).
- ☒ 3. Does not involve any interference of the body's integrity.
- ☒ 4. Is not based on observational and descriptive research (survey, measures/scales, data scanning, system-model development).

I declare, I have carefully read Hacettepe University's Ethics Regulations and the Commission's Guidelines, and in order to proceed with my thesis according to these regulations I do not have to get permission from the Ethics Board for anything; in any infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility and I declare that all the information I have provided is true.

I respectfully submit this for approval.

27/3/2019 Fadi
Date and Signature

Name Surname: Fadi Bashir Ahmad Said

Student No: N 13120680

Department: Department of peace studies

Program: Peace and Conflict Studies




Status: ☒ Masters ☐ Ph.D. ☐ Integrated Ph.D.

ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL

Approved.

(Doç.Dr.Çetin Türkyılmaz)

APPENDIX 2 THESIS ORIGINALITY REPORT

	HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF POPULATION STUDIES THESIS/DISSERTATION ORIGINALITY REPORT
HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF POPULATION STUDIES TO THE DEPARTMENT OF <u>Peace Studies</u>	
Date: <u>27/3/2019</u>	
Thesis Title / Topic: <u>Political Marginalization of Youth As a Driver</u> <u>For Violent Extremism - Examining the Case of Jordan</u>	
According to the originality report obtained by myself/my thesis advisor by using the <u>Turnitin</u> plagiarism detection software and by applying the filtering options stated below on <u>25/3/2019</u> for the total of <u>92</u> pages including the a) Title Page, b) Introduction, c) Main Chapters, and d) Conclusion sections of my thesis entitled as above, the similarity index of my thesis is <u>9</u> %.	
Filtering options applied: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Bibliography/Works Cited excluded 2. Quotes excluded 3. Match size up to 5 words excluded 	
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Name Surname: <u>Fadi Bashir Ahmad Said</u> Student No: <u>N13120680</u> Department: <u>Peace Studies</u> Program: <u>Peace & Conflict Studies</u> Status: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Masters <input type="checkbox"/> Ph.D. <input type="checkbox"/> Integrated Ph.D.	
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APPROVED.  Dog. Dr. Getin Tarkeyilmaz (Title, Name Surname, Signature)	