


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
**THE EUROPEAN UNION- MOROCCO COOPERATION
BETWEEN PEACE AND SECURITY**

Mariam BENSAOUD

Supervisor
Prof. Dr. Zehra Nilüfer KARACASULU

İZMİR- 2023

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APPROVAL PAGE

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this doctoral thesis titled as “The European Union-Morocco Cooperation: between Peace and Security” has been written by myself in accordance with the academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials benefited in this thesis consist of the mentioned resources in the reference list. I verify all these with my honor.

Date

23/05/2023

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ABSTRACT
Doctoral Thesis
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
The European Union-Morocco Cooperation: Between Peace and Security
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Department of International Relations
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Contemporary international relations have become characterized by unconventional security issues related to the irregular movement of people from the global South to the global North. In light of the last decade's geopolitical changes at the international and regional levels, global powers such as the US and the EU have shifted from liberal interventionism to political realism and pragmatism. Seeking global power, regional stability and domestic unity, the EU has adopted a pragmatic approach toward migration management under the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) which is studied in this thesis through; securitization, externalization and de-politicization.

Adopting a poststructuralist perspective through critical constructivism, this thesis provides a critical assessment of the EU's pragmatic approach through the case study of the EU-Morocco relations. This study defines irregular migration as a form of resistance to patterns of domination. It highlights the paradoxical effects of the EU' approach in exacerbating forms of resistance ranging from everyday life forms of resistance to irregular migration and radicalization by empowering the forces of domination rather than the microphysical actors of power. Studying the interaction between the forces of colonialism and authoritarianism, this study takes to its center the political variable by focusing on the effects of the nature of political power on state society relations that manifest in everyday life behaviors directly affecting the EU in the form of resistance manifested as unconventional security. Adopting a triangular research methodology combining qualitative and quantitative research methods for depth and precision, this analysis is conducted through

a three level of analysis; epistemological, bilateral and domestic level. The study focuses on the following actors; the EU, the oligarchic elite, the Moroccan population with a focus on the youth.

Keywords: EU-Morocco Cooperation, Irregular Migration, Unconventional Security, Political Realism, EU Global Strategy.



ÖZET
Doktora Tezi
Fas-Avrupa Birliđi İşbirliđi: Barış ve Güvenlik Arasında
Mariam BENSAOUD

Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi
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Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı
Uluslararası İlişkiler Programı

Çağdaş uluslararası ilişkiler, insanların küresel Güney'den küresel Kuzey'e düzensiz hareketleriyle ilgili geleneksel olmayan güvenlik sorunlarıyla karakterize edilir hale geldi. Son on yılın uluslararası ve bölgesel düzeylerdeki jeopolitik değişimlerinin ışığında, ABD ve AB gibi küresel güçler liberal müdahalecilikten siyasi gerçekçilik ve pragmatizme kaydı. Küresel güç, bölgesel istikrar ve iç birlik amaçlayan AB, Avrupa Birliđi Küresel Stratejisi (ABGS) kapsamında göç yönetimine yönelik pragmatik bir yaklaşım benimsemiştir; bu tezde şu kavramlar çerçevesinde incelenmektedir: güvenlikleştirme, dışsallaştırma ve apolitikleştirme.

Eleştirel inşacılık yoluyla postyapısalcı bir bakış açısı benimseyen bu tez, AB-Fas ilişkileri vaka çalışması aracılığıyla, AB'nin pragmatik yaklaşımının eleştirel bir değerlendirmesini sunmaktadır. Bu çalışma, düzensiz göçü tahakküm kalıplarına karşı bir direniş biçimi olarak tanımlamaktadır. İktidarın mikrofiziksel aktörleri yerine tahakküm güçlerini güçlendirerek, AB'nin gündelik hayattaki direniş biçimlerinden düzensiz göçe ve radikalleşmeye kadar uzanan direniş biçimlerini şiddetlendirme yaklaşımının paradoksal etkilerini vurgulamaktadır. Sömürgecilik ve otoriter güçler arasındaki etkileşimi inceleyen bu çalışma, siyasi gücün doğasının, geleneksel olmayan güvenlik olarak, günlük yaşamda AB'ni direniş şeklinde doğrudan etkileyen davranışlarda ortaya çıkan devlet toplum ilişkileri üzerindeki etkilerine odaklanarak siyasi değişkeni merkezine alıyor. Derinlik ve kesinlik için nitel ve nicel araştırma yöntemlerini birleştiren üçgen bir araştırma metodolojisini benimseyen bu analiz, üç analiz düzeyi aracılığıyla gerçekleştirilir; epistemolojik, ikili ve yerel düzeyde. Çalışma şu aktörlere odaklanmaktadır: AB, oligarşik seçkinler, gençliğe odaklı Fas halkı.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AB-Fas İşbirliđi, Düzensiz Göç, Geleneksel Olmayan Güvenlik, Siyasi Gerçekçilik, AB Küresel Stratejisi.



**THE EUROPEAN UNION-MOROCCO COOPERATION:
BETWEEN PEACE AND SECURITY**

CONTENTS

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	ii
DECLARATION	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZET	vi
CONTENTS	viii
ABBREVIATIONS	xiv
LIST OF TABLES	xviii
LIST OF FIGURES	xix

INTRODUCTION	1

CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL, CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. CRITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM	18
1.1.1. Critical Constructivism: The Importance of the Marginalized	23
1.1.1.1. Context as a Variable	24
1.1.1.2. Power as a Variable	26
1.1.2. Critical Constructivism: Knowledge Production and The Creation of Borders and Boundaries	28
1.2. CRITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS	32
1.2.1. Discourse Analysis and Resistance to Domination in Knowledge Production	34
1.2.2. The Importance of Discourse in Foreign Policy Analysis	37
1.2.3. Triangular Research Methodology	38
1.3. THE EUROPEAN UNION GLOBAL STRATEGY: A GEOPOLITICAL TURN	39
1.3.1. Global Power, Domestic Unity and Regional Strategic Interests	40
1.3.2. Assessment of the EUGS: Practical and Theoretical Issues	47
1.3.3. Major Concepts and Principles of the EUGS-The Management of Irregular Migration from Root Causes	52
1.3.3.1. Relational Power and the EU' Search for Credibility through the EUGS: A Shift from Political Influence to Social Relations	52

1.3.3.2. Principled Pragmatism	56
1.3.3.3. Resilience	59
1.3.3.4. The Internal-External Nexus and the Security of the EU: Irregular Migration	65
1.3.3.5. Selective Engagement under the EUGS	66
1.4. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK	68
1.4.1. Literature Review about Resistance and Irregular Migration	68
1.4.1.1. Irregular Migration as a Form of Resistance to Patterns of Domination	68
1.4.1.2. Patterns of Domination and Resistance in the EU-Morocco Migration Management Approach and Cooperation: A Three Level Analytical Framework	71
1.4.1.3. The EUGS: A Reading Through James C. Scott Everyday Life Forms of Domination and Resistance	74
1.4.1.4. The EUGS: A Reading Through Putnam' "Making Democracy Work" and Others	79
1.4.2. Conceptual Deconstruction	84
1.4.2.1. Deconstruction of Mobility Between Peace and Security	84
1.4.2.2. Binary Oppositions and Irregular Migration Between Peace and Security	86
1.5. EVALUATION OF THE CHAPTER	878

CHAPTER TWO

THE EU-MOROCCO RELATIONS: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2.1. THE EU-MOROCCO RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLONIAL ERA	90
2.1.1. The EU as a Normative Power	92
2.1.2. Morocco' Overall Relations with the EU	93
2.1.2.1. The Problems	95
2.1.2.2. The Advantages	96
2.1.2.3. Morocco Seeking the US Help to Deal with the EU as a Trade Partner	98
2.1.3. Morocco' Independence and Relations With The EC/EU	100
2.1.3.1. Mohamed V Era (1956-1962)	100
2.1.3.2. Era of Hassan II (1963-1999)	100

2.1.3.3. Mohamed VI and Relations with the EU (1999-Date)	103
2.2. THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP (EMP) AS A TOOL FOR DEMOCRACY	108
2.3. THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY (ENP) AND MOROCCO	112
2.4. AGREEMENTS BETWEEN MOROCCO AND THE EU/EC	124
2.4.1. The EU-Morocco Association Council's Seventeenth Meeting	125
2.4.1.1. The Political Cooperation	125
2.4.1.1.1. The Euro-Mediterranean Agreement /Association Agreement	126
2.4.1.1.2. The EU-Morocco Trade Agreements	128
2.4.2. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)	129
2.4.3. The MEDA Programs	131
2.4.4. The Morocco's Advanced Status	134
2.4.5. The EU Aids and Initiatives for Morocco	135
2.5. LEARNING LEVERAGES	136
2.5.1. The ECJ Clashes and Relationship Renewal	137
2.5.2. The EU-Morocco Interests in the Relationship and Future Aspects	138
2.6. EVALUATION OF THE CHAPTER	139

CHAPTER THREE

THE EU-MOROCCO RELATIONS ON IRREGULAR MIGRATION

3.1. THE EU-MOROCCO RELATIONS AFTER THE ARAB SPRING	144
3.1.1. The Arab Spring, Europe, Africa and the Migration Issue	144
3.1.2. The EU Policy Context	150
3.2. THE EU-MOROCCO COOPERATION OVER IRREGULAR MIGRATION	151
3.3. PHASES OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION FROM MOROCCO TO THE EU	154
3.4. THE EU' POLICY ON SUB-SAHARAN TRANSIT MIGRATION	161
3.4.1. The External Internal Nexus, Terrorism, Irregular Migration and Securitization	162
3.4.2. Transit Migration towards the EU	165
3.4.3. Migration Management through Externalization in the EU: Focus Areas	166
3.4.4. The EU' Burden Sharing or Shifting Through Externalization of Immigration Policy with Third Countries	169

3.4.5. The Agenda of Migration in the EU, Morocco and African Countries	171
3.5. AGREEMENTS BETWEEN MOROCCO AND THE EU ON IRREGULAR MIGRATION	172
3.5.1. The EU Readmission Agreements	174
3.5.2. The EU Funding for Border Security in Morocco	175
3.5.2.1. Border Security Development Phase 1: 2001-10	176
3.5.2.2. Border Security Development Phase 2: 2013-18	178
3.5.2.3. Border Security Development Phase 3: 2018-Present	180
3.5.2.4. Consequences of the EU-Morocco Border Security Measures	182
3.6. MOROCCO' POLICIES ON IRREGULAR MIGRATION	183
3.7. FACTORS BEHIND IRREGULAR MIGRATION FROM MOROCCO TO THE EU	189
3.8. EVALUATION OF THE CHAPTER	196

CHAPTER FOUR

ASSESSMENT OF DATA AND ANALYSIS

4.1. EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANALYSIS	203
4.1.1. Epistemological Patterns of Domination	204
4.1.1.1. Sovereignty and National Security	207
4.1.1.2. Societal Security	209
4.1.2. Epistemological Patterns of Domination and Irregular Migration in the EU' Policy	211
4.1.2.1. Epistemological Securitization and the Externalization Policy	213
4.1.3. Assessment of the Epistemological Analysis	214
4.2. BILATERAL LEVEL ANALYSIS	215
4.2.1. Bilateral Patterns of Domination	218
4.2.1.1. Unfounded Eurocentric Myths and Stereotypes	218
4.2.1.2. Horizontal Asymmetry: Security Versus Development	222
4.2.1.3. Vertical Asymmetry: Equality in the Externalization Policy	226
4.2.1.4. France, Spain, Italy' Unilateral Choices against Morocco's Interests	229
4.2.2. Resistance to the EU' Border Domination: Humanitarian Crises and Trafficking Activities	231

4.2.3. Morocco's Alternative Royal Vision for the Management of Migration	235
4.2.4. Morocco's Expectations from the EU-Morocco Cooperation	242
4.2.5. Morocco' Expectations on the Migration Management	243
4.2.6. Assessment of the Bilateral Level of Analysis	246
4.3. DOMESTIC LEVEL ANALYSIS	247
4.3.1. The EU' Bottom-Up Approach in Morocco: The EU Programs Assessment	248
4.3.1.1. Socioeconomic Development and the Youth Integration	250
4.3.1.2. Good Governance and the Fight against the Informal Institution of Corruption	255
4.3.1.3. Human Rights and Democracy	257
4.3.1.4. Penitentiary Reform	260
4.3.1.5. Support to Civil Society and Local actors of Change	261
4.3.1.6. Support to Women Rights and Gender Equality	264
4.3.1.7. Limitations of the EU Programs of Support	264
4.3.2. Domestic Patterns of Domination	270
4.3.2.1. The Consolidation of Authoritarianism through Democratization	270
4.3.2.2. Post-Arab Spring Centralization of Power in the hands of Monarchy	273
4.3.2.3. Control and Co-optation of the Civil Society Actors	276
4.3.2.4. The De-legitimization and Co-optation of Political Parties and the Political Elite	277
4.3.2.5. Business and Political Elite Co-optation and Convergence	280
4.3.2.6. Neoliberalism and indirect French Colonialism: Offshore Economy	282
4.3.2.7. Post-Colonial Nation-State Building Issues of Morocco	284
4.3.2.8. Privatization of Education	287
4.3.2.9. The Informal Institution: Corruption	289
4.3.2.10. The Informal State/ Makhzen: The Monarchy' Security Apparatus	290
4.3.2.11. Human Rights and Individual Freedoms	293
4.3.3. Everyday Life Forms of Resistance to Patterns of Domination	295
4.3.3.1. Inequalities and the Youth Socioeconomic Issues	295

4.3.3.2. Low Range Forms of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts and Informal Economy of the Youth.	302
4.3.3.3. Middle Range Resistance: Political Abstention, Lack of Trust and Informal politics	300
4.3.3.4. High Range Forms of Resistance: Irregular Migration and Radicalization	305
4.4. EVALUATION OF THE CHAPTER: THE PARADOXICAL OEFFECTS OF THE EU'S APPROACH	316
CONCLUSION	323
REFERENCES	347



ABBREVIATIONS

AAM	African Agenda for Migration
ADFM	Democratic Association of Moroccan Women
AECID	Spanish Agency for International Cooperation
AENEAS	Advanced European Network of E-Infrastructure
AMDH	Administrative Association for Human Rights
AMO	African Observatory for Migration
ANAPEC	National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Skills
ANCLA	National Agency for Alphabetization
ARMCDH	Association of Mediterranean Meetings of Cinema and Human Rights
AU	African Union
BMP-Maghreb	Maghreb Border Management Program
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CCDH	Consultative Council for Human Rights
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CESE	Social and Environmental Council
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CGE	Computable General Equilibrium
CGEM	General Confederation for Enterprises in Morocco
CIP	Competitiveness and Innovation Program
CNDH	National Council of Human Rights
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
CSF	Neighborhood Civil Society Facility
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DG-DEVCO	Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development
DGSN	General Directorate of National Security
DGST	General Directorate of Territorial Surveillance
EAM	European Agenda for Migration
EASA	European Union Aviation Safety Agency
EC	European Communities
EC	European Community

ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECLCC	European Criminal Law Convention against Corruption
ECOWAS	Economic Community of Western African States
EEA	European Economic Area
EEC	European Economic Communities
EEC	European Economic Community
EED	European Endowment for Democracy
EFP	European Foreign Policy
EFSD	European Fund for Sustainable Development
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EMAA	Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement
EMCDDA	European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Trafficking
EMP	European Mediterranean Policy
EMPI	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative
EMSA	European Maritime Safety Agency
ENI	European Neighborhood Instrument
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighborhood Partnership Initiative
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
EUISS	European Union Institute for Security Studies
EURA	European Readmission Agreement
EURODAC	European Dactyloscope System
EUROSUR	European Border Surveillance System
EUTF	EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FHI	Freedom House Index
FIIAPP	La Fundacion Internacional de Administracion y Politicas Publicas
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GADEM	Galileo Atmospheric Data Enhancement Mission
GAM	Global Approach to Migration

GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GED-GPG	Fundacion Policia Espanola
GREGO	State Group against Corruption
HDI	Human Development Index
ICPS	International Centre for Prison Studies Institute
ICT4D	Information and Communication Technologies for Development
IDM	International Dialogue on Migration
IER	Equity and Reconciliation Commission
IFPRA	International Food Policy Research Institute
IME	Investment Management Exhibition
INDH	National Human Development Initiative
INPPLC	National Authority for Probity Prevention and Fighting Corruption
IOCSO	Instrument Organizations of Civil Society Organizations
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IOSC-AL	Instrument Organizations of Civil Society and Local Actors
IR	International Relations
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
MEAs	Multilateral Environmental Agreements
MEDA	Adjustment Measures
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MENFP	Ministry for National Education and Professional Formation
MMC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MNI	Moroccan National Identity
MP	Mobility Partnership
NAP	Neighborhood Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDI	National Development Institute
NEET	Young Persons No Longer Engaged in Education, Employment or Training
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIP	National Indicative Programs
NIP	Neighborhood Investment Platform
NSIA	National Strategy for Immigration and Asylum
OAU	Organization of African Unity

ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFPPT	Office of Vocational Training and Employment Promotion
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OMP	Moroccan Observatory of Prisons
PESCO	Permanent Structural Cooperation
PJD	Justice and Development Party
PNR	Passenger Name Record
PPP	Purchasing Power Per Person
PPS	Party of Progress and Socialism
RASFF	Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed
RNI	National Rally of Independents
SAF	Structural Adjustment Facility
SEM	South Eastern Mediterranean
SESAR	Single European Sky
SIGMA	Support for Improvement in Governance and Management
SME	Small Medium-Sized Enterprises
SNFP	System for Professional Formation
SPRING	Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Development
TACIS	Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
TAIEX	Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
TFEU	Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union
TPMA	Strategic Program on Asylum and Migration
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFP	National Union of Popular Forces
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNNM	United Nations Network on Migration
UNTP	United Nations Human Trafficking Protocol
US	United States of America
USFA	Socialist Union for Populist Parties
WTO	World Trade Organization

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Deconstruction of The Concepts Of Societal And State Resilience In Line With The Peace And Security Framework	p. 65
Table 2: Binary Oppositions around the issue of Irregular Migration	p. 87
Table 3: A Comparison of Morocco's Progress on FHI, Political rights, Civil Liberties, HDI between 2011-2022.	p. 269



LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: The Process of Mainstream Knowledge Production Based on the Variables of Power and Hierarchy	19
Figure 2: The Process of ‘Critical Knowledge’ Produced by Alternative Approaches to IR Based on the Variables of Context and Text/Discourse	19
Figure 3: Triangular Methodological Framework	39
Figure 4: The Importance of the EU’s Regional Influence for its Domestic Stability and global power Objective	43
Figure 5: Areas of Strategic Interests for the EU Global Strategy 2019-2030	44
Figure 6: The EU’ Traditional Normative Power versus the EUGS Bottom-up Approach based on Relational Power	55
Figure 7: The Process of Tackling the Root Causes Behind the Issue of Irregular Migration under the EUGS’	68
Figure 8: The Democratization Circle and the Centrality of Political Relations	82
Figure 9: Epistemological Domination and Related Policy	214
Figure 10: Illegal Border Crossings on the Western Mediterranean Route 2008-2021	232
Figure 11: Bilateral Level Domination and Resistance: Externalization Policy	245
Figure 12: The Moroccan Political System Between Traditional and Modern Political Structures	272
Figure 13: Freedom Index in Morocco (2011-2022)	295
Figure 14: Unemployment Levels in Morocco (2011-2021)	297
Figure 15: Human Development Rank in Morocco (2011-2022)	297
Figure 16: Irregular Migration as an Act of Resistance	306
Figure 17: Increase in the Irregular Migration Flows to the EU from the Western Mediterranean after 2017.	307
Figure 18: Domestic Analysis	313
Figure 19: The EUGS Paradoxical Circle (Part I)	314
Figure 20: The EUGS Paradoxical Effect (Part II)	315
Figure 21: The EUGS Paradoxical Effect (Part III)	315

INTRODUCTION

Adopting a poststructuralist perspective, this study provides a critical assessment of the European Union (EU) approach to managing irregular migration based on political realism and principled pragmatism under the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS). It highlights the paradoxical effects of the EU's approach through an in-depth analysis of the EU-Morocco cooperation on the management of migration.

Western and European foreign policies toward the global South have for long been guided by notions of European and American exceptionalism. These strategies fed by ideas such as the 'City upon a Hill', manifest destiny or 'Mission Civilizatrice', have generally been guided by the 'global power' objectives of the Western nation states. Fed by notions of racial supremacy based on binary oppositions such as superior/inferior, colonizer/colonized, more human/less human, master/student, Western policies toward the global South have resulted into a variety of foreign policies that have generally failed to bring about their civilizational objectives. These foreign policies have served the interests of the Western nation states while leaving off the common good of the states and populations of the South.

Having legitimized colonization, this supremacy guided policies have resulted into justified and unjustified forms of interventions, foreign policies and actions generally based on the interests of the Westerner that compromise the contextual needs and the complexities of the countries of the South.

In the 21st century, American and European notions of exceptionalism and superiority have guided the United States (US) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military forces to bring about the fall of two key regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA); namely Libya's Qaddafi and Iraq's Saddam Hussein. These interventions were a turning point for the MENA making it a region of failed states and regimes, insurgency, terrorism and insecurities. The subsequent fall of the regimes of Egypt's Housni Mubarak and Tunisia's Ben Ali as well as the Syrian crisis further enlarged the circle of insecurity around the EU.

The failure of the Arab spring revolutions has not only affected the populations of the South who sought migration mainly to the EU to escape insecurity, violence or search for better life opportunities, it also affected the public opinion of the populations of the US and the EU raising domestic opposition and criticism toward the Western foreign interventionism. Migration flows from the MENA has intensified this criticism

voicing opposition to what is described as an 'invasion' from the MENA and Africa of Europe.

This has resulted into the rise of the concept of principled pragmatism during the Obama administration designing a new way for US foreign policy that replaces democracy by resilience. Having faced its first crisis as a result of the rising flows of migration and the correlating rise in political far right, creating divide within the Union and member states, the EU like the US has taken a turn in its foreign policy shifting from the Kantian liberalism to political realism designed through the EUGS adopted in 2016.

The realist turn in EU foreign policy is focused on geopolitical and structural challenges at the global, regional and domestic levels. Adopting the concept of principled pragmatism, the EU replaced democracy by the concept of state and societal resilience. Resilience is under the strategy sought for both within the Union as well as the neighborhood.

Under the EUGS, the EU has changed its role and identity as a regional and global actor from normative power to relational power. Unlike the normative power, the relational power does not target the government and does not target political influence. Regime change is no longer an objective to seek under EU foreign policy. Instead, focusing on the everyday life of citizens, the EU seeks to have a relational influence that is defined as a societal influence on the local actors of change, defined as microphysical actors of power.

Through relational power, the EU aims to build the capacity of local actors of change that is expected to bring about a bottom up approach to building democracy, considered to be more lasting and solid and avoids the security shocks and crises related to regime change. This approach besides maintaining stability and bringing in about the necessary change, is also expected to serve the EUGS' two primary objectives; the aim for global power in a time of a changing international political system keeping the EU behind, avoiding domestic crisis and restoring institutional legitimacy. Both of these objectives rest upon the EU' credibility and solidarity, that means they are resting upon its success in handling the challenges of its own neighborhood.

Structural challenges to the East and the South of the EU questioned the Union's capability to securing the European member states and citizens' interests and security ranging from issues related to sovereignty, to security, socioeconomic inclusion and identity. Russia, migration and terrorism are the EUGS primary focus

areas. While the Union's member states were able to coordinate on the issues related to Russia, migration from the South remains the most divisive and contentious policy area for the EU. Given its complexity and close interlinkage with sovereignty related issues, migration management has exacerbated the old/new European divide around responsibility sharing and the Western European colonial past in the South. For this reason, the EU has opted for outsourcing and externalization policy to avoid further divide, especially considering the politicization of the issue of migration by the political far right raising opposition against the Union.

Migration is a complicated issue involving both foreign policy and domestic affairs. The issue of migration also encompasses a range of political, socioeconomic, and institutional concerns. Interconnected with terrorism and radicalism, migration also encompasses a variety of unconventional security issues such as trafficking and smuggling activities. Migration is also attached to sovereignty rights and has important demographic consequences that affect the domestic coherence and stability of populations. Irregular migration also raises the dilemma between peace and security, security and development, security and human rights, the interests of the nation-states versus those of the migrants. Most importantly, the migration issue is characterized by an internal-external nexus of bringing the outside in which transfers domestic instabilities to other nation-states further linking security to democracy, development and peace.

Analyzing migration issue through an internal-external nexus, the EUGS argued for dealing with migration issue through an approach that goes beyond security and border control to tackling the root causes. For the sake of mutual peace and security, the EU claims to open a new chapter in the relations with the South by building partnerships based on equality and shared responsibility.

Migration related root causes in the MENA and Africa are defined to be related to the youth bulges, socioeconomic integration issues, political and civil instabilities and environmental changes that are expected to increase in the coming decade exposing the Union to potential increase in irregular movement of people and related challenges. These root causes under the EUGS are to be tackled through a bottom up approach that target the sector areas related to the youth issues such as socioeconomic development, governance, corruption, democracy, human rights and others.

The EUGS also claims to adopt a case by case study approach based on the concept of selective engagement that designs EU foreign policy based on a strategic

assessment of the EU' priorities. This approach shall ensure EU foreign policy effectiveness and will target areas that serve its interests. It also infers that the EU' involvement for democratic change is to be conducted in partner states that have the potential context for it and show the will for democratization. In cases of entrenched authoritarianism, the EU shall suffice by targeting resilience building through capacity building of local actors. Accordingly, the EUGS has replaced Morocco and Ukraine as potential success stories, which have become of key strategic value for the EU' migration and Russia objectives, by Tunisia and Georgia.

Through the case study of Morocco, this study provides an in-depth assessment of the EUGS, political realism based on principled pragmatism to effectively tackle migration issue from its root causes for mutual peace and security. In the mainstream literature, irregular migration has mainly been studied in relation to security issues such as national security, societal security, sovereignty, unconventional security issues such as trafficking and smuggling activities as well as terrorism. By adopting a post structural perspective based on critical constructivism, this thesis studies irregular migration as a form of resistance. Referring to the works of James C. Scott and Robert Putnam, the study assesses irregular migration as a form of resistance to patterns of domination. This approach to the study of irregular migration focuses on the everyday life practices; and it analyzes effectiveness of the EU' approach in promoting state and societal resilience. The study defines irregular migration as a form of resistance to patterns of economic, political and security forces of domination that rest on coercive power.

Bringing it to literature the perspectives and knowledge on irregular migration from the South through the case of Morocco, this study uncovers the epistemological, bilateral and domestic level patterns of domination at the root cause of irregular migration issue. Accordingly, this study shows the paradoxical effect of the EU policy choice toward the issue matter through principled pragmatism that is studied as securitization, externalization policy' frontier approach and the EUGS' de-politicized bottom up approach. Based on its findings, the study argues that the EU approach exacerbates the underlying patterns of domination leading to an increase in forms of resistance rather than to resilience.

This study uncovers the interactions between the forces of colonialism and authoritarianism based on an oligarchic rule, the interactions between the forces of domination and the resulting forms of resistance. It argues that inequalities at the epistemological and bilateral levels feed inequalities at the domestic level at the origin

of the rise of the issue of irregular migration and connected unconventional security issues. The domestic level analysis studies the patterns of domination through the oligarchic rule and the related indirect colonization of France, the post-colonial development and nation-state building issues of Morocco resulting from the Spanish and French colonialism. The paradoxical effect of the EU approach leads to consolidation of authoritarianism through the manipulation of the democratic means of the 2011 reforms. It uncovers the consequences of this consolidation through the study of centralization of power, formation of the oligarchic elite against the mass, delegitimization of political parties, control and limitation of civil actors and impacts on state society relations. State society relations are studied through the indicators of political participation and level of trust. Persistence of the informal institution of corruption, judiciary and informal state of the Makhzen' are studied in relation to the coercive power of regime against population. As a result, the population forms of resistance with a focus on the youth are studied through informal economy, informal politics, irregular migration and radicalization.

This study is primarily based on the concepts of domination and resistance. Assessing the EU choice of principled pragmatism in its foreign policy toward its neighborhood, based on the case study of Morocco, this study operationalizes the concept of pragmatism as: securitization, externalization and de-politicization. Each of these concepts is studied at a different level of analysis. Epistemological analysis focuses on securitization in the knowledge production and its impacts on the related policy making of the EU. Bilateral level analysis, studies the impacts of securitization and externalization from the perspective of Morocco and its paradoxical effect of reproducing security issues such as trafficking, smuggling and humanitarian crises. De-politicization, which is defined through relational power, and includes the EUGS' objectives of state-societal resilience, is studied at the domestic level of analysis. The domestic level of analysis focuses on the oligarchic patterns of domination, the resulting state-society relations and forms of resistance. It highlights the post-Arab spring consolidation of authoritarianism through the manipulation of reform and democratic means and its effects on domestic peace and security; extending to the EU through migration. Issues related to socioeconomic inequalities, educational system, corruption, institutional performance, separation of power, political parties and civil actors, individual and political freedoms are highlighted. As a result of the domination of the traditional political system of the monarchy and its attached oligarchic rule converging the political and economic elite, the Moroccan population,

especially the youth, forms of resistance through the everyday life are studied through: informal economy, informal politics, irregular movement and radicalization. Patterns of domination are analyzed through: the forces of power on knowledge production, colonialism, authoritarianism, oligarchy, neoliberalism and coercive force of the security apparatus of the EU and Morocco.

Forms of resistance are studied through low range, middle range and high range forms of resistance. Low range forms of resistance are studied through everyday life hidden transcripts such as informal economy and related use and trafficking of drugs. This analysis also highlights the related forms of violence and youth malaise resulting from political and socioeconomic exclusion by the forces of the Moroccan regime and those of the EU and member states. Middle range forms of resistance analyze the forms of voiced resistance and demonstration in the public space directly or indirectly. It analyzes Moroccan youth informal politics against the formal political system, the ballot system and institutions controlled and co-opted by the monarch and his oligarchic coterie. High range analyzes the forms of resistance resulting from the regimes security apparatus: the Makhzen' coercive power against the Moroccan population, and also youth formal and informal dissent. High range forms of resistance are studied through irregular migration through the death boats and the related potential radicalization.

Resistance is also applied to study the EU approach at the bilateral level through the frontier approach, based on the externalization policy in reducing and preventing irregular crossing.

This study focuses on the following actors: the EU, the Moroccan oligarchy composed of the Moroccan monarchy, the political and economic elite, local actors of change and institutions of the modern political system and the population.

Framing the issue in terms of peace and security stems from the fact that irregular migration is a problem with security-related repercussions for the host and transit states, whose root causes stem from a lack of peace, development, and prosperity. In relation to irregular migration, the term security approach refers to traditional security concepts such as border control, sovereignty, national security, the frontier, and societal security. However, the concept of peace is used in reference to horizontal and vertical equality, that is, domestic societal equality as well as equality in the partnership between the EU and partner states from the South, as illustrated by the Morocco case study. With a focus on the youth population, the concept of peace is also applied to development, prosperity, equal opportunity, and emancipation.

While addressing the security concerns associated with irregular migration flows is a necessity for both the EU and transit states such as Morocco, achieving long-term, sustainable peace and security on the European and African continents requires a successful approach to the root causes of youth migration.

The Significance of The Study

Located at the crossroads of Europe and Africa, Morocco, an exceptional partner of the EU in its region, has become an important target for the Union's strategic interests in the wake of the Arab Spring, particularly in terms of security concerns such as terrorism, trafficking, and irregular migration. However, the EU-Morocco partnership continues to face challenges on a number of fronts, most notably in the management of migration issue, both of transit and of origin nature. The recurring conflict between the EU and Morocco over this issue stems from the partners' different perspectives and priorities on the matter, which are rooted in their respective contexts. The EU's approach to outsourcing sub-Saharan African transit migrants to Morocco for the sake of national and societal security conflicts with Morocco's desire to outsource its own youth bulge through regularized mobility and migration for the sake of development and prosperity.

Morocco is very important for the security of the EU due to its geopolitical position. Morocco provides an important case study for the evaluation of the EUGS in terms of achieving state and societal resilience, mutual peace and security as well as the EU' selective engagement. Unlike the majority of its neighbors, Morocco has managed to maintain stability while initiating the process of democratic reform and change. The EU-Morocco has the most advanced and deepened partnership in the region with high and interlinked stakes from both the sides of the Union and Morocco mainly related to security and trade. Morocco is also the country where the EU' has the highest soft power and relational influence on the population and local civil actors. Morocco's youth attraction to the European principles of modernity, as well as the civil actors' adoption of the Union's principles of democracy, have provided a favorable context for the EU' positive influence. The Moroccan regime also has high stakes in the relations with the EU in relation to trade. Morocco remains the country which makes the highest level of trade with the Union at the global level. The Moroccan regime has since the foundation of the European community (EC) showed a high level of will to build strong relations with the EU. Despite the high potential of the EU-

Morocco, the partnership remains short of achieving the most of its potential in relation to issues related to peace and security such as democracy, development, effective management of security issues such as irregular migration and related unconventional security issues.

Studying the EU-Morocco cooperation on the migration issue from the post structural perspective and an assessment based on the context of Morocco, this thesis aims to understand the underlying reasons behind the EU limited effectiveness in the case of Morocco through a three level analysis and a triangular research methodology.

Aim of The Study

The objectives of this study are as follows; first, the contribution to the production of representative, democratic and comprehensive knowledge production on the issue of migration: the emancipation of knowledge production on the migration issue and the overcoming of epistemological patterns of domination in mainstream knowledge through the study of the knowledge of the marginalized 'other'. This is done through the adoption of Hermeneutics methodology in the study of local knowledge, the evaluation of the local context, texts and needs. This analysis is conducted through the adoption of critical constructivist methodologies mainly of Foucault' deconstruction method and Derrida' binary opposition. Accordingly, an analysis of the local text and discourses of the state apparatus is conducted to have an understanding of the local perceptions through the study of the Moroccan political discourse on the irregular migration partnership with the EU.

Second, with the aim of achieving mutual peace and security, this study bringing knowledge about the context of Morocco aims to inform effective policy making on the migration issue in the EU-Morocco cooperation based on a comprehensive and post structural analysis. Combining qualitative and quantitative research methods and a three level analysis, focusing on the actors of the EU, Moroccan oligarchy, Moroccan local actors and political institutions as well as the population, this study aims to provide an objective and scientific analysis characterized by depth and precision.

Third, by focusing on the domestic level of analysis, this research seeks to have a deep understanding of the issue, to voice the silenced and project the hidden

patterns of domination controlling the issue of migration at the different levels of analysis.

By so doing, this thesis aims to offer a different perspective on irregular migration that is as a resistance reaction to patterns of domination. For the purpose of achieving mutual peace and security, there is a need for overcoming the underlying patterns of domination behind the migration issue. Unfortunately, based on the findings of this study, this study also shows the paradoxical effect of the EU' policy choices in reproducing and exacerbating the issue through the adoption of securitization and principled pragmatism which reinforce and exacerbate the patterns of domination leading to resistance through irregular migration as a last resort after low range and middle range forms of resistance.

Putting to test the EUGS approach to dealing with the root causes of irregular migration through the case study of Morocco, this thesis argues that the EUGS remains short of coping with the issue of irregular migration because of the prioritization of security oriented approach over long-term sustainable security and peace. Although the EUGS argues otherwise, the approach designed to deal with irregular migration is designed to cope with the number of migrants entering the EU rather than the qualitative solution of the underlying issues. Furthermore, the EU' adoption of the externalization policy based on a securitization approach and on outsourcing unwanted migrants to Morocco runs counter to the EUGS' objectives of tackling the issue of irregular migration from its root causes. The reason for this is that this policy not only neglects the context, needs and perceptions of the Moroccan side and youth but further exacerbates the already existing issues in the country, specifically in relation to the Moroccan youth population. In relation to the bottom up approach and relational approach, referring to Robert Putnam, this research argues that siding the political element from the EU' agenda of interference in the neighborhood limits the Union' effective capacity to bring about change. This approach disregards the importance of the state apparatus and political will and power in enabling or limiting the activity of the microphysical actors of power through legal and financial constraints.

This study argues that inequalities at the epistemological and bilateral levels feed inequalities at the domestic level resulting into forms of instabilities and resistances that take the form of unconventional security directly affecting the Union. The three levels of analysis patterns of domination are characterized by forces of colonialism, superiority, authoritarianism and elitism.

While a regime change is linked to instabilities and insecurity, consolidated authoritarianism for the sake of stability produces the same rent seeking instabilities. Instead of relational power, this thesis argues in favor of organizational power of the EU and an informed engagement that is guided by economic power, normative and relational power to influence Morocco democratization and turn toward constitutional monarchy.

Taking into consideration Morocco's postcolonial development and nation-state building related to French and Spanish colonialism, overcoming continuing colonial patterns in the bilateral relations and myths toward the southerner and African migration fed by notions of European exceptionalism and supremacy are important steps for the EU' long term security. The EU' global power objective and domestic unity resides in the EU' successful role in the region which necessitates in-depth and context informed policy making. Instead of studying and designing policy toward migration from the European structural context, through the European knowledge and language, this study advocates for the representation and understanding of the South issues and the South from the South perspectives and contexts for the sake of the EU's geopolitical and structural long term objectives.

Achieving peace and security within and between the European and African shores cannot be done without the emancipation of the knowledge production on migration and the related policy making. It is the purpose of this study, to advocate for and contribute to achieving peace and security in the Mediterranean through the emancipation of the knowledge production and policy making on the issue of irregular migration through the EU-Morocco case study, with a focus on the youth population.

Research Method and Structure

There remain contradictions between the EUGS designed objectives to handling mutual interests with partner countries of the South and the EU' practical foreign policy. Despite the EU' approach of equality and shared prosperity for bilateral relations with countries of the South under the EUGS currently guiding the EU-Morocco partnership, the EU' approach toward Morocco in contested and contentious issues such as migration remain characterized by inequality and self-interest primarily focused on the security of the EU rather than the mutual peace and security of the EU and Morocco. Considering that Morocco is an important source of irregular migration related to the youth, the EU's migration policy of outsourcing and externalization to

Morocco as a transit state despite the country's limited socioeconomic infrastructure contradicts the Union's objective of tackling the migration issue from its root causes.

Furthermore, the EU' intensified border control approach and increased barbed wires have not been able to reduce or prevent the migrants irregular crossing of the borders. The migration flows have increased and their attached security issues as well. Despite the EU' intensified security measures, security issues related to migration have also proliferated including humanitarian crises, smuggling and trafficking activities.

Since 2012 under the framework of the advanced status, the EU has tailored and funded a variety of support programs in programs targeted toward dealing away with domestic root causes behind youth migration ranging from socioeconomic integration, employment, good governance and corruption, civil society actors, parliament support, penitentiary reform, human rights and democracy, women rights amongst others. These programs directed toward a bottom up approach for capacity building of microphysical local actors of change remain inefficient and of limited results.

Despite the EU-Morocco effective policy convergence on the migration issue, migration toward the EU both from Morocco and through Morocco has significantly increased in the post-Arab spring period. Moroccan youth irregular migration in the recent years, especially in the post-2015 period has increased in unprecedented ways. Morocco's development and democracy related indicators have in the post-Arab spring become worse despite Morocco' GDP increase and the ambitious reforms adopted in 2011 seeking separation of power, democratization, freedoms of expression and assembly and overall reforms for the political and socioeconomic sectors.

This study aims to answer the following questions:

- What are the epistemological patterns of domination around the issue of migration?
- To what extent do they correlate with the EU' policy making on migration management?
- What are the patterns of domination around migration management at the bilateral level of the EU-Morocco cooperation?
- What are the paradoxical effects of the EU' externalization policy? The resulting forms of resistance?
- What are the patterns of domination at the domestic level?

- To what extent has the EU' approach of principled pragmatism/bottom approach been effective in tackling the root causes behind the Moroccan youth migration?

- What are the paradoxical effects of the EU' approach of pragmatism and bottom up approach?

- To what extent has the EU' approach of principled pragmatism and relational power resulted into empowering or disempowering the microphysical actors of power?

- To what extent has the EU' approach opened further space for the domination of central and informal state at the expense of the microphysical actors of power?

- What are the everyday forms of resistance against the patterns of domination?

This study is based on a three level of analysis: epistemological, bilateral and domestic. The concept of pragmatism is operationalized and evaluated at the three levels accordingly as: securitization, externalization and de-politicization.

The study adopts a triangular research methodology that combines between qualitative and quantitative research methods with the aim to achieve an analysis that is characterized by depth and precision to guide better informed policy making on the issue in relation to the EU-Morocco partnership. Based on the case study of Morocco, this study conducts a qualitative study of the mainstream literature on the issue of irregular migration for its epistemological analysis. It also conducts a qualitative analysis of the EUGS' documents collected from the official websites of the EU. The analysis of the EUGS is conducted for the period of 2016-2021. It comprises of the primary documents of the global strategy, yearly reports as well as the analysis of interviews, articles and books by Nathalie Tocci on the EUGS. The analysis of the primary documents of the EUGS is also supplemented by a literature review for the assessment of the concepts of the global strategy. The bilateral level analysis is conducted through a discourse analysis of the Moroccan state apparatus and political elite is conducted on official discourses given by the king, ministers, head of governments, think tanks directors on the EU-Morocco relations on migration management, data is also provided on the EU' border approach paradoxical effects. At the domestic level an analysis of the EU's programs and action plans report in Morocco for the period between 2012 and 2020 is conducted. For the analysis of the EU' pragmatic approach through bottom up approach, the study provides qualitative and quantitative data about the patterns of domination and the forms of resistance.

This research uses critical constructivism. It focuses on the approach of the EU about irregular migration from its Southern neighborhood based on the EUGS, by focusing on the case study of Morocco. Case study is defined by social science scholars as an “in-depth, qualitative study of one or a few illustrative cases”.¹ It is also defined as a method involving systematically gathering enough information about a particular event or subject to permit the researcher to effectively understand how the subject operate or function.² Being both a tool for in-depth analysis and of meaningfully organizing data gathering segments through a line of action, case study contributes to the application of theory as well as precision especially in qualitative research. In the words of Geertz, using case study helps to achieve a “Thick Description” of the issue in hand.³ It is a research tool that allows for uncovering the processes, patterns involved in the sense-making around the subject or issue that is under study. As described by Bruce L. Berg and Howard Lune;

Sense-making is the manner by which people, groups, organizations make sense of stimuli with which they are confronted, how they frame what they see and hear, how they perceive and interpret the information and how they interpret their own actions and go about this problem-solving process which can help reveal both the shared and the unique sense-making decisions .⁴

Discourse analysis which is an important qualitative research method in the social sciences consists of the study of text and the meaning in use through the analysis of the use of language. Discourse analysis constitutes an important part of Michel Foucault' approach and is considered an academic field of research in its own right. According to Foucault, discourse analysis is a concept that denotes a historically contingent social system that produces meaning and knowledge. It is a tool of organizing knowledge which determines the constitution of social and global relations through the acceptance of discourse as a social fact. It is through discourse that similarities and differences are created and forms of knowledge are created and organized. According to Foucault, the logic produced by discourses is related to the structure of knowledge of the historical period and the context in which it happens.⁵ The production of discourses and the related knowledge is closely linked to power

¹ Bruce Berg and Howard L. Lune, **Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences**, Eight Edition, Pearson Education, 2012.

² Berg and Lune, p. 326.

³ Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture” in **The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays by Clifford Geertz**, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers: New York, 1973, pp. 311-323.

⁴ Berg and Lune, p. 328.

⁵ Rachel Adams, “Michel Foucault: Discourse”, **Critical Legal Thinking**, 17.11.2017, <https://criticallegalthinking.com/2017/11/17/michel-foucault-discourse/>, (05.06.2022).

structures which legitimate, define and produce facts or truths. As stated by Young, “discursive rules are strongly attached to power. Discourse itself is both constituted by and ensure the reproduction of social system through forms of selection, exclusion and domination”.⁶ In other words, while power structures are themselves a result of the effects of discourse they exist before the discourses themselves and are the main element in the discourse, thereby knowledge production. As a result, capacity and construction between discourse and power structures goes in a two ways and mutual process. According to Foucault; “in every society, the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by certain procedures.”⁷ Political rationality is produced by discourse and maintains itself through the production of discourse.

The legitimation of political actions and meanings is dependent on the legitimation of their attached discourses which highlights the importance of studying discourses. Discourse and text is an essential element of political exercise and action whether at the political party level, the national, bilateral or in global platforms and among the international society. It is through discourse that different political actors compete for power through argumentation and inscription. This is especially significant in foreign policy making whereby states can have competing interests over common interests. For this reason, the significance of the legitimate definition, the framing of the issue is critical for the involved partners as it determines the dominating side which gets to set the rules versus the one which gets to be ascribed and assigned rules and roles. This construction and framing of issues is done through discursive practices which exemplifies the significance of the linguistic construction of reality and the productive role of language⁸ especially in foreign relations and bilateral relations. According to Fairclough, discourses are “selective representations of economically, politically, socially, culturally complex phenomenon that may be understood in more than a single way”.⁹

As stated by Stephen Gill, discourse in Foucault’s terms refers to “a set of ideas, practices with particular conditions of existence which are more or less

⁶ Robert Young (Ed.), **Untying the Text: A Post Structural Anthology**, Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.

⁷ Michel Foucault, The Order of Discourse, In Robert Young (Ed.), **Untying the Text: A Poststructuralist Anthology**, Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981, pp. 48-78.

⁸ Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S Counterinsurgency in Philippines”, **International Studies Quarterly**, No. 37, 1993, p. 297-320.

⁹ Andrea Teti, “The EU’s First Response to the ‘Arab Spring’: A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity”, **Mediterranean Politics**, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2012, pp. 266-284.

institutionalized but which may only be partially understood by those that they encompass".¹⁰ Discourse which is also defined as meaning in use is critical in the process of fixing meanings through text production which includes the disqualification of certain meanings and the inclusion of others, thereby legitimating a certain meaning and eliminating differences.¹¹ For this reason, statements and texts that are related to the discourse are important in reaffirming the meanings that were enacted by the discourse. As a result, discourses not only legitimate power or certain political practices they also "fix meanings of texts, pre-determine categories of reason by which statements are accepted as knowledge. Discourses create an epistemic reality and become an instrument of control and discipline."¹² Against hegemonic or dominant versions of reality, thereby power, discourses are also important in problematizing these and being used as an instrument of critique and resistance. In this case, as described in Foucault "The Will to Knowledge", discourse analysis' main important task is to destabilize hegemonic or accepted meanings by shedding the light on the critical discourse of the marginalized side of the 'reality'.¹³

The first chapter of the thesis describes its theoretical, conceptual and analytic framework. It provides an analytical review of the EUGS approach to the issue of irregular migration based on a study and analysis of EUGS documents, key concepts in relation to the migration issue, particularly principled pragmatism, resilience, bottom-up approach, and the internal-external nexus. This chapter examines irregular migration through the lens of the study's theoretical framework, which is critical constructivism. It then analyzes the concept of irregular migration from the perspectives of resistance and domination. Therefore, the chapter provides an overview of the works of Robert Putnam and James C. Scott chosen for analysis.

The second chapter provides a historical context for EU-Morocco relations since the formation of the EC. It discusses the complication, interdependence, and challenges of the bilateral relations between the Union and Morocco, both in terms of the EU's asymmetric approach and Morocco's domestic reform challenges. The chapter highlighting Morocco's political and social issues in relation to its bilateral relations with the Union throughout the various monarchical systems since the

¹⁰ Stephen Gill, "Globalization, Market Civilization and Disciplinary Neoliberalism", **Millennium – Journal of International Studies**, Vol. 24, 1995, pp. 399, 402.

¹¹ Anna Holszcheiter, "Between Communicative Interaction and Structures of Signification: Discourse Theory and Analysis in IR", **International Studies Perspectives**, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2013, pp. 1-21.

¹² Graham Burchell, **Michel Foucault on the Government of the Living: Lectures at the College de France 1979-1980**, Palgrave MacMillan, 2014.

¹³ Derek Hook, "Discourse, Knowledge, Materiality, History: Foucault and Discourse Analysis", **Theory and Psychology: Sage Publication**, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2001, pp. 521-547.

inception of the EC also provides insight into the primary causes of irregular migration from Morocco and the primary obstacles to a successful partnership between the Union and Morocco.

The third chapter of the thesis provides context for the EU and Morocco's cooperation on the issue of migration. The chapter provides an overview of the issues surrounding irregular migration from Morocco, both in terms of transit and origin. Consequently, it evaluates the causes of irregular migration from Morocco to Europe and the signed agreements between the Union and Morocco on the subject. In addition, the chapter highlights the effects of the Arab Spring and ties structural issues to the rise in migration between the EU and Africa via Morocco. In addition, the chapter emphasizes the EU's preferred policies and strategy for addressing the migration issue via the border/security approach. In addition, it highlights the effects of this policy on Morocco's domestic migration management policies.

The fourth chapter provides an evaluation and analysis of the study's findings using the three-level analysis approach adopted for the study of forms of resistance and dominance surrounding the issue of irregular migration in EU-Moroccan relations to answer the study's research questions.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL, CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Security perspectives dominate the study of International Relations (IR), despite the unconventional nature of post-Cold War security issues. Mainstream theories like realism focus on state behavior and variables to explain security, while interpretive and post-structural approaches emphasize understanding the ideational aspects of the state and security. Critical constructivism, a post-structural framework, emphasizes moving away from conventional knowledge production based on scientificity and power dynamics in IR. Instead, it prioritizes understanding the text and context to produce objective, comprehensive, and inclusive knowledge that considers marginalized perspectives in policy-making.

The hierarchy in IR raises concerns about who has the authority to define and shape reality.¹⁴ Whose perceptions are accepted as reflecting the material world and structure? Poststructuralist scholars, influenced by Michel Foucault, explore the power imbalance between the Global North and Global South. Key issues dominating 21st-century political and economic debates include security, insecurity, and the relationship between liberty and security. However, knowledge production on these matters continues to be dominated by the interests of Global North countries.¹⁵

Reality construction and knowledge production regarding the Global South and North have been framed through binary oppositions, such as democracy versus authoritarianism, freedom versus restraint, security versus insecurity, peace versus threat, and stability versus instability. These dichotomies gained prominence in security studies and policy-making agendas after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, subsequent political transformations in the Middle East, and the Arab Spring.

Liberal globalization, along with increased terrorist attacks and migration from the Global South to the North, has posed challenges to sovereignty, border control, and national security. These developments have led to a surge in security studies and

¹⁴ As stated by Roxane Lynn Doty (1993), “mainstream theories in IR accept hierarchy as a decisive conception that is characteristic of international relations and they all exhibit an unspoken agreement not to problematize the construction of subjects that constitute the world and the categories through which these categories are constructed. The issue of hierarchy in international relations has been a background condition from which analysis proceeds rather than something which is itself in need of examination.”

¹⁵ As stated by Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit; both conventional and critical constructivists have their roots in Critical Social Theory and they both adopt a sociological perspective towards global politics which emphasizes the importance of both normative and material components of reality. Intellectual roots of constructivism go back to scholars of the 3rd debate such as Jürgen Habermas, Anthony Giddens, Michel Foucault and their philosophical predecessors.

the exploration of unconventional security issues in IR theory. Despite highlighting the interdependence between the security of the South and North, prevailing practices continue to be influenced by traditional security paradigms that hinder peace rather than promote it. This is largely due to the framing of issues based on the concerns and perspectives of dominant actors.


The dominant focus on the security perspectives in Western countries when studying and approaching to migration, limits the comprehensive understanding of the issue. This narrow lens hinders the development of effective, contextually grounded, and sustainable policies regarding migration. By prioritizing security over peace, the nuanced complexities of the issue are often overlooked, leading to inadequate responses and solutions. A more holistic and inclusive approach is necessary to address the multifaceted nature of migration and to formulate policies that are responsive to the needs of all stakeholders involved.

1.1. CRITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

Critical constructivism is an approach to understand the 'already-constructed' process by looking at what was marginalized in the process of construction. It is interlinked with other theoretical approaches such as post-structuralism and post-modernism. The marginalized knowledge studied through critical constructivism also termed as 'Blue knowledge' by Kincheleo serves to bring to the mainstream knowledge alternative realities and variables marginalized by power and their prioritized contexts.¹⁶

¹⁶ Joe L. Kincheleo, **Critical Constructivism: A Primer**, Peter Lang INC, International Academic Publishers, New Edition: New York, United States, 2005, p.143.

Figure 1: The Process of Mainstream Knowledge Production Based on the Variables of Power and Hierarchy



Source: Created by the author.

Figure 2: The Process of 'Critical Knowledge' Produced by Alternative Approaches to IR Based on the Variables of Context and Text/Discourse



Source: Created by the author.

Through deconstruction, critical constructivism exposes the 'power' relations in knowledge production that are influenced by hierarchy in IR (Figure 1). Deconstruction of knowledge creation focuses on the knowledge that was marginalized by mainstream knowledge rather than the mainstream knowledge itself (Figure 2). This is done by replacing the mainstream knowledge production process variables of power and hierarchy by text and context to bring local knowledge of the marginalized to the mainstream one.

Through the representation of local knowledge that is obtained through local language and discourse analysis, the hegemony of universalized, "verified" information that results from a network of power relations is counterbalanced. This is typically done in relation to topics that are deemed to be contentious and where the

interests of the dominant actors are assumed to influence the generation of information.

The irregular movement of people and irregular warfare are amongst the most contested issues in contemporary IR between security and peace, global North and Global South. In contemporary security studies and IR, the concept of 'security' itself has become increasingly contested between old and new security, western and southern needs, state control versus population emancipation.

Based on Foucault's concept of the nexus between knowledge and power in IR, critical constructivism credits the importance of language as an important medium to understanding and in de-coding reality and knowledge.¹⁷ Material reality and resources cannot exist independently from the language that translates them, thereby the importance of the text, the written and the discourse in making and reflecting reality.¹⁸ In Derrida, the world exists through language and texts and this does not only imply the social reality but also other structures such as economic, socio or juridico-institutional structures like the 'state' itself.¹⁹

In the relations between the Global South and North, particularly between the EU and the Southern neighborhood, achieving security is heavily reliant on establishing the foundations of peace. True peace cannot be attained if the interests, perspectives, and contexts of the concerned "other" are marginalized in defining concepts, producing knowledge, making policies, and implementing them. Considering the unconventional security issues in the post-Cold War era, achieving peace in Western countries is largely contingent on achieving peace in Southern countries. From a critical constructivist perspective, both insecurity and security should not be treated as explanatory variables alone; their inherent nature and context need to be thoroughly explained and understood.

Western dominated approaches to non-western subjects have failed to be relevant and reflective of the concerns, needs and interests of the non-west itself independent from the dominance and omnipresence of the western concerns as argued by Pinar Bilgin. Non-western subjects are generally studied and framed as source of trouble if not as trouble makers. On the other hand, they are assigned the role of junior partners according to an already established paradigm in 'an already set power game' where they only get assigned roles and functions that meet the needs

¹⁷ Philippe Fournier, "Michel Foucault's Considerable Sway on International Relations Theory", **Bridges: Conversations in Global Politics**, Vol. 1, Issue. 1, Article 3, 2012, pp.18-43.

¹⁸ Catherina Carta, "A Rose by any Other Name: On Ways of Approaching Discourse Analysis", **International Studies Review**, Vol. 21, 2019, pp. 81-106.

¹⁹ Jacques Derrida, p. 148.

of western powers. IR theorizing has resulted in adopting radical non-west position whereby the focus is totally excluded to representing the non-western states. This approach contributes to drawing a line between the already existing oppositions and asymmetries between the Global North and South. In comparison, western states are not approached as an issue as long as they meet the requirements of Western security interests.²⁰

In other words, the study of the unconventional security issues such as migration is based on the context and needs of the countries of the west rather than the context of the countries of South from where the issue emerges. As a result of this approach, global powers such as the EU and the US have been unable to effectively tackle the migration flows from their Southern neighbors because of their inability to have an in-depth understanding of the issue of migration and its underlying causes. In fact, as this study argues, the EU's approach to tackling the migration issue through pragmatism has had the paradoxical effect of exacerbating its underlying causes leading to an increase in the migration flows, related security and humanitarian crises.

Given their interconnection, human demands for security and politics in both regions of the world would benefit more from a critical constructivist approach to knowledge production. For this reason, pluralizing variables and knowledge creation as proposed by critical constructivists should be taken into consideration rather than exclusive non-west or west-focused knowledge production. This would allow for a thicker and more complex understanding of global affairs to guide effective policy making. This is done for the purpose of neutralizing the role power has in the knowledge production and validation process which to a large extent results into the marginalization of the weaker.²¹ By imposing an intricate system of restrictions and boundaries on the production of knowledge, western/European thinking of universalizing power is opposed to Foucault's idea of pluralizing knowledge. The difference between the secular and the religious, the scientific and the cultural or spiritual, is seen in international politics.²² Universalization as adopted and advanced by western states in the management and production of knowledge refers to:

²⁰ Pinar Bilgin, "Thinking Past Western IR", **Third World Quarterly**, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008, pp. 5-23.

²¹ Kincheleo, p. 3.

²² Julien Pomarede, "Review: Foucault and the Modern International: Pluralizing IR, Power, Domination and Foucault", **European Review of International Studies**, Vol. 5, No.1, 2018, pp. 80-85.

“A social process in which a particular idea, norm or concept is incarnated by a nodal point and elevated to a general principle or norm that symbolizes the overarching identity of a discourse”.²³

Shapiro, Connolly, Walker, and Der Derian are instances of how Foucault's theory of knowledge has been applied to international relations and the ongoing construction of the state. Instead of the unity often promoted by the "scientific" standard of knowledge production, Foucault favored a plurality of knowledge. An investigation of the connections between the state, sovereignty, diplomacy, foreign policy, and most importantly security has emerged as a radical new approach to the theory of IR in recent decades. These critical academics have used a pluralist ontology in their writings to promote diversity rather than unity.²⁴

The idea of power, which typically has a determining role in security, determines the emergence of notions like space, conflict, the border, or even freedom. Given the word power's centrality in the study of politics and international relations, it continues to be a key idea in IR theory.

In traditional IR, security has generally been defined through the collection of power or resistance to danger through survival. In doing so, this perspective has generally prioritized the concerns, interests and security of the dominant ones against the rest of the world. The dominance of Eurocentric, American and elite class inscription on validated knowledge is countered by hermeneutics.²⁵

Critical constructivism is argued to be a unifying theory or a 'weltanschauung' that represents a synergic worldview and creates meaning on the nature of human existence by representing 'counter-hegemonic' concepts.²⁶ The subjugation and marginalization of certain knowledge leads to a 'hegemonistic' knowledge production that goes against 'scientific' standards of knowledge production.²⁷ Critical constructivism, besides serving the purpose of a unifying theory, also serves the

²³ Tomas Martilla, **Post-Foundational Discourse Analysis: From Political Difference to Empirical Research**, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp. 19-34.

²⁴ Philip Bonditti, **Foucault and the Modern International: Silences and Legacies for the Study of World Politics**, The Science Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy, 2017, pp.1-300.

²⁵ Hermeneutics is defined by Keller as “the understanding of understanding and a qualitative research methodology which reflects upon the position of the researcher and develops strategies of data interpretation that focuses on the comprehensibility and social objectification of the steps of interpretation” (Keller, p. 61). Hermeneutics as a research Methodology seeks to free knowledge production from asymmetric, non-representative and authoritative processes by rejecting and resisting unilateral representation and processes. Hermeneutics as a methodology adopts dialectics and interpretation methods, it also prioritizes the variable of the context in the process knowing in the representation of marginalized knowledge.

²⁶ Kincheleo, p. 14-16

²⁷ According to Tomas Martilla, both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic practices are not independent of the social contexts in which they take place.

purpose of liberating and democratizing knowledge production by representing knowledge of the 'other' many that are weaker in power.

Critical constructivism aims to give a voice to the voiceless and represent the suppressed in the knowledge production, in this case the populations of the South, especially the youth, seeking life opportunities and emancipation through irregular migration as a form of resistance to patterns of domination.

1.1.1. Critical Constructivism: The Importance of the Marginalized

The EU's foreign policy documents not only reflect the EU' interests but also determine changes in its identity defining new interests for itself and for partner states. Changes in international relations at the regional, global and multilateral level have resulted in increasing the connectedness and contested nature of the issues of the 21st century. It has also resulted in increasing the connectedness between the stability and peace of the Union and that of its neighborhood.

The EU' practical approach in dealing with irregular migration remains narrow toward the EU' immediate interests and preferences which prioritize a security oriented approach instead of stability, equality and peace. The EUGS, however, promises dealing with the migration issue from a sustainable security point of view prioritizing partners' interests and long term sustainable approach. A sustainable solution to irregular migration, however, implies a reliance on the shared engagement of both partners' interests.

According to critical constructivism, events are constructed as crises or not as crises depending on the contexts and the discursively constituted identities of states. Wedes argues that insecurity itself is the production of processes of identity construction in which the self and the difference is produced and constituted.²⁸ Critical constructivism offers a postmodern insight of intertextuality, representation discourse and power knowledge in producing different modes of reality. Discourse practices such as foreign policy documents become crucial in understanding and explaining changes in states' foreign policy especially in relation to representation of danger and insecurity.²⁹

²⁸ Runa Das, "Critical Social Constructivism: "Culturing Identity", (IN) Security and the State in International Relations Theory", **Indian Journal of Political Science**, Vol. 70, No. 4, 2009, pp. 961-982.

²⁹ Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism", **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1998, pp. 259-294.

In other words, the meanings attached to irregular migration today depend not only on the structural changes in international relations but also on the collective meanings that constitute nation-states' perceptions of the issue.

1.1.1.1. Context as a Variable

Critical constructivism aims at bringing under focus the impact of the context on human perception by adopting analytical methods that expose this process. This is mainly represented by Derrida's statement of "nothing exist out of context" "Il n'y a pas de hors context".³⁰ Although the text is an important field of research, the study of its context remains important given the interlinkage between the two.³¹

Critical constructivism is an approach to knowledge building that seeks to connect the object of inquiry to the context in which it is embedded.³² It emphasizes a connection between meaning making and human experience as well as the use of textual forms of analysis. The importance of the context of the text has mainly been highlighted by Derrida who adopted the approaches of deconstruction, binary opposition and metanarratives to illustrate how they affect the everyday living. According to Derrida, meanings are never simple and pure, instead, they are the result of the interaction between text and context.³³ Derrida calls into question the supposed "neutrality" of the prevalent meanings, definitions, and interpretations embedded in texts of "verified knowledge". He adopts the examination of the text by observation of language methods and the use of figurative knowledge. The investigation of knowledge or deconstruction through careful reading is influenced by Freud, Nietzsche, and Heidegger.³⁴ Derrida contends that truth is:

*merely a mobile army of metaphors "that can be accessed through analysis of knowledge, which is also characterized by having infinite standpoints to be viewed. He rejects the existence of centers around which knowledge is produced, which he considers to be" the greatest illusion of Western philosophy.*³⁵

The reading and definition of key issues and concepts in the field of IR - including border, sovereignty and territory - is dependent on the context within which

³⁰ Clare Gorman, **The Undecidable: Jacques Derrida and Paul Howard**, The Cambridge Scholars Publishing: Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle: UK, 2015, pp.1-17.

³¹ Senem, Duzgit Aydin, "Discourse Analysis: Strengths and Shortcomings", **All Azimuth**, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2019, pp. 285-305.

³² Kincheleo, p. 21.

³³ Gorman, p. 4-7.

³⁴ Gorman, p. 7.

³⁵ Gorman, p. 9.

they are produced and interpreted.³⁶ This idea is mainly based on the assumption that systems of meanings have a major role in the definition of the material world.³⁷ Critical constructivism is founded on both conventional constructivism and critical theory, thereby, bridges between relativism and rationalism.³⁸ For this purpose, critical constructivism emphasizes the importance of the socio-linguistic construction of subjects and objects in world politics as well as the relationship between power and knowledge.³⁹

Resistance to foundationalism as well as to emancipation of knowledge production and the practice of world politics are two important concepts for the theoretical framework of this study. Consensually based ethical principles, that bridge between the extreme or foundationalism perspectives, carry greater emancipatory effects than others as argued by Linklater.⁴⁰ By examining objects, subjects, and views that have been marginalized, a hermeneutics-based, critical constructivist approach to international relations calls into question understandings and 'taken for granted' definitions, conceptions, and perspectives.

This study approaches the theory of critical constructivism mainly through the core concepts of resistance and domination.⁴¹ Critical constructivism is an approach to knowledge production which places emphasis on the 'resistance' of the marginalized side by bringing its definitions, concerns or simply its meanings as determined by its contexts to mainstream knowledge. This is carried through the study of discursive and locally based linguistic practices of the 'subverted' side. 'Resistance to 'domination' by critical constructivism is done on topics and issues contested between the 'dominant' and the marginalized side. Issues of security and foreign affairs in the binary of 'dominance and resistance' are particularly peculiar given their importance in international relations.

Foreign policy is the field of framing, argumentation, persuasion, negotiation and that generally takes place between actors of 'domination' and those of 'resistance'. Foreign policy conducted mainly through texts and discourse is an act of contestation and exchange around domination and resistance. Domination and

³⁶ Fournier, p. 22.

³⁷ Price and Smit, p. 266.

³⁸ Price and Smit, 278-279.

³⁹ Price and Smit, 268.

⁴⁰ Price and Smit, 262.

⁴¹ In this research, critical constructivism is adopted in a general term that includes elements of both critical social constructivism as well as post-structuralism.

resistance can vary depending on the extent of contestation around common interests and related issues and the issue's precedence in the defined agenda.

1.1.1.2. Power as a Variable

In critical theory, power determines knowledge, material resources, and reality. Power, according to Foucault, creates and produces things, knowledge, and discourses. According to critical constructivist analysis, power is not just the ability to use material resources to impose one's view on others, but also the power to define the state's identities, interests, and practices. According to Foucault, power is defined as a creative and productive force that traverses and produces things, forms of knowledge as well as discourses.⁴²

Power, whether domestic or international, comes from the ability to set the rules and decide what is right and wrong. Power in international relations is mostly about getting others to follow rules that may be based on the actors' interests or identities. The subtlest form of power is closely linked to knowledge and its production. Knowledge is rarely neutral. Knowledge is created and reproduced in a way that benefits some over others. Power determines the creation of social facts through objectification, which Foucault says is determined by "conditions of Truth" that are rigidly selected, organized, and produced through power-determined processes. Critical constructivism in IR studies how issues are framed and how certain framings dominate, especially in security. Critical constructivists challenge dominant perspectives by studying marginalized or unrepresented perspectives, denaturalizing, deconstructing, and analyzing how the subject was constructed rather than what it is.

According to Ashley, western political philosophy and theory's notions of rationality, freedom, sovereignty, and legitimacy have been constructed through exclusion and coercion that have varied by historical context.⁴³ According to critical constructivist scholars, sovereignty, the foundational concept in IR, reinforces the idea of identities as mutually exclusive forces that oppose each other.⁴⁴ Ashley, Walker, Der Derian, and Shapiro study IR concepts that are "taken for granted". Power and knowledge in IR are resisted and marginalized, according to Jennifer Milliken's study.⁴⁵ Power-dependent discourses establish "mainstream or taken for granted"

⁴² Bonditti, p. 8.

⁴³ Fournier, p. 22.

⁴⁴ Fournier, 22.

⁴⁵ Jennifer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods", **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1999, pp. 225-254.

understandings at the expense of others. Thus, sovereign power institutionalizes and legitimizes discursive definitions of "threat" to the nation state.⁴⁶

Poststructuralist writers have focused on Global North-Global South relations through domination and discipline as key forms of power,⁴⁷ especially in relation to irregular migration, terrorism, and global powers like the EU and the US. Campbell claims that the US foreign policy practices define self and other through hegemonic discourses of identity, creating state identity.⁴⁸ Foreign policy is interlinked with political identity in the sense that it reflects and defends it as well as creates it.⁴⁹ Discourse in foreign policy serves to create boundaries, it serves the: "representation and constitution of the real and provides a managed space in which some statements and depictions come to have greater value than others."⁵⁰

Thus, for critical constructivists, language is both a reflection and a constituent of reality. Shapiro calls language as a set of signs that are part of a system which is set to generate subjects, objects and worlds. Discourses represent and constitute, elevating some perspectives over others. Diez noted that discourses set limits by framing issues and enabling the legitimation and procedure of knowledge that would form the basis of social reality, roles, and relationships between self and others in international relations.⁵¹ Discourses also limit what can be said and known and give certain lines of reasoning power and legitimacy.⁵²

Critical constructivists and poststructuralists generally study elite discourses. The elite's discourses are chosen to study because the state-apparatus has the power to allow or disallow and turn discourses into actions of meaning for itself and others. Texts/discourses are seen as sites of struggle, contestation, and resistance. Wodak defines texts as: "sites of struggle that show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance."⁵³

⁴⁶ Fournier, p. 32.

⁴⁷ Fournier, p. 37.

⁴⁸ David Campbell, **Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity**, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998, pp.15-169.

⁴⁹ Young Chu, Cho, "Conventional and Critical Constructivist Approaches to National Security: An Analytical Survey", **The Korean Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2009, pp.76-98.

⁵⁰ Senem Aydin-Duzgit, "De-Europeanization through Discourse: A Critical Discourse Analysis of AKP' Election Speeches", **South European Society and Politics**, Vol. 21, No:1, 2016, pp. 45-58.

⁵¹ Thomas Diez, "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'", **Millennium**, Vol. 33, No.3, 2005, pp. 613-636.

⁵² Jane Briant Carant, "Unheard Voices: A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Millennium Development Goals' Evolution into the Sustainable Development Goals", **Third World Quarterly**, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2017, pp.16-41.

⁵³ Ruth Wodak, **The Discourse of Politics in Action**, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2011, pp. 28-56, 187-207.

This method is preferred because studying subjects' ideas helps explain their actions. Political psychologists like Robert Jervis use "Vestehen" to highlight semantic instability and multiplicity by unmasking dominance and de-naturalizing the "scientific" to achieve poststructuralist emancipation.⁵⁴

1.1.2. Critical Constructivism: Knowledge Production and The Creation of Borders and Boundaries

Joel S. Migdal defines boundaries as more than borders. Unlike borders that can be mapped out, boundaries remain invisible. The physical borders of the state mark the point where 'something becomes something else' or 'something is done differently than it is done elsewhere'. 'We' becomes 'them' here. Borders have social and complex aspects. These boundaries are based on lifestyle and what makes a society or a nation unique. Boundaries are a group's customs and locations, while borders are protected by checkpoints and metal maps. Language, dress, and identity are all boundaries. Joel Migdal says mental maps and practices shape what is familiar and unfamiliar.⁵⁵

Besides the border related issues of migration and territorial sovereignty and security such as trafficking and smuggling, migration is more contentious because of its attached impacts on the invisible boundaries of the nation-state. Bringing the outside in, migration has important demographic impacts that affect the nation-state coherence, identity and stability. Mainstream knowledge and policy making by the global powers on the matter, however, only focus on the binary oppositions characterizing the global south and global north in the study of the boundaries related issues neglecting the demographic impacts of the migration issue on the countries of the South as is the case with the externalization policy of the EU.

Migration especially in relation to the EU' identity formation and foreign relations has been approached by several poststructuralist scholars such as Jeff Huymans in "Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU". Based on the assumption that the EU is a territorial and cultural entity to a great effect, Huymans argues that there exist: "differences and overlaps between a juridical territorial

⁵⁴ Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics", **European Journal of International Relations: Sage Publication**, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1997, pp. 319-363.

⁵⁵ Joel S. Migdal, **Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities in Local Practices**, Cambridge University Press: United States of America, New York, 2004, pp. 3-24.

reordering of the EU with its in-built definition of legal and illegal movements and the bio-political technique that maintains the European population".⁵⁶

Migration, poverty, and transnational crimes are increasingly seen as borderless interventions and transcriptions.⁵⁷ Post-structuralism views migration as the main issue, that nation-state's foundation, sovereignty, and territorial security are manifested. Migration is mostly about binary oppositions such as self-other, chaos-stability, and difference. According to Derrida, the construction of reality as an effect of self-representation creates the concept of difference in the construction of the self and others stemming from acts of deferring inherent in the identity construction system.⁵⁸ Violence and brutality against irregular migrants define legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate.

According to Paltrieni; "The individual who is incapable of engaging in the mechanism of competition is considered as a potential danger to the social body as well as to other nation-states."⁵⁹

State security apparatus is growing to repress and contain non-productive populations who migrate irregularly in search of opportunities, justice, and freedom. Thus, many see migration and mobility as a form of freedom, a place of possibilities and emancipation.⁶⁰ The regime that governs mobility either values freedom and liberty and sets mobility limits or is based on traditional security concepts that justify the use of force.⁶¹

National security, border security, and brutality are used to securitize migration. In international relations, the building of walls is used to set limits around a territory.⁶² Foucault believed that the territorial "dot" and its associated security could

⁵⁶ Jeff Huysmans, **The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU**, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 3-159.

⁵⁷ Fournier, p. 35.

⁵⁸ Carta, p. 97.

⁵⁹ Pomarede, p. 83.

Kennedy Deveraux, "Michel Foucault: The Archaeology and Sociology of Knowledge", **Theory and Society**, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1979, pp. 269-290.

⁶⁰ Didier Bigo, "Michel Foucault and International Relations: Canibal Relations", in **Foucault and the Modern International: Silence and Legacies for the Study of World Politics**, Eds. Philippe Bonditti et al., 2017, p. 33-56, (CRLTS).

⁶¹ Bigo, CRLTS, p. 47

⁶² Border security is according to Zuhail Karakoc Dora (2020) generally dealt with under the "umbrella of national security while public and societal security are discussed as dimensions of internal security. It generally refers to issues of irregular warfare, that is terrorism, and irregular migration. National security also extracts its origins from a course of modernist political and sociological ideas ranging from Thomas Hobbes to Max Weber insisting on the exclusive and unconditional monopoly of the state over the legal use of coercion. Accordingly, national security is not only the responsibility of the state but also its *raison d'être*"

never be fully achieved.⁶³ However, peace and freedom based on the Benthamian dream of utilitarianism can increase security. Peacebuilding expands opportunities rather than coercion and exclusion.⁶⁴ While border control and security are necessary, this concept of security is based on a positive relationship between surveillance and freedom. It emphasizes freedom and possibility in concerned societies rather than threat and danger.

According to Foucault's concept construction, migration is framed and handled through power relations rather than emancipation.⁶⁵ These power relations serve dominant interests, which prefer the "dot" security concept over the positive relationship between freedom and limitation. The power-knowledge nexus prioritizes certain interests through self-representations against others.

While concepts are considered the building blocks of knowledge, as argued by Kant, concept definition guiding policy making can be subjective and influenced by the dominant actors in international relations.⁶⁶ The process of objectification adopted by mainstream theories tends to prioritize the perspectives, interests and needs of the dominant nation-states tending toward a superficial and simplified approach to complex and contested issues such as migration.⁶⁷ Unconventional threats like irregular warfare or irregular migration challenge state security and surveillance. To effectively address these issues, knowledge production must pluralize at the methodological, epistemological, ontological, and dominant interest levels.

William Walters called the Mediterranean as the jaw of migration in reference to the drowning of irregular migrants in the Mediterranean border line between the zone prosperity, the EU and that of poverty, its neighborhood. This is a result of the EU' choice of securitization of migration, the adoption of the frontier approach and its ineffective engagement in tackling the root causes of migration in the countries of the South. According to Walters, this jaw is conserved by using pain to achieve compliance, resulting in a negative security concept based on the "dot" that focuses

⁶³ Zuhail Karakoc Dora, "International Migrants as a Matter of Security: Open Door Policy and Syrians in Turkey", *Güvenlik Bilimleri Dergisi*, Vol. 9. No. 2, 2020, p. 501-524.

⁶⁴ Bigo, CRLTS, p. 51, 52

⁶⁵ Marta Fernandez, Paula Esteves, "Silencing the Colonial: Foucault and the International" in **Foucault and the Modern International**, Philippe Bonditti et al. (eds.), The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy, 2017, pp. 137-154.

⁶⁶ Bonditti, p. 158.

⁶⁷ From the perspective of critical social constructivism and poststructuralists in general, the objective itself is a result of the process of creation of reality which is both dependent on the identity and interests of the one creating as well as networks of power relations.

on building the limit rather than balancing freedom and surveillance.⁶⁸ The power-knowledge framework of state-enforced migration justifies violent controls. These border control mechanisms are based on territory and state sovereignty, which are both geographical and juridical-political concepts.

The nation-state in IR has a security "dispositif" that emphasizes police, war, military, and diplomacy.⁶⁹ Contemporary security issues, however, require emancipation through the provision of possibilities, freedoms, peace, and moving beyond traditional limits and bridges between the zones of prosperity and poverty, instability and stability, security and peace to achieve holistic security in both zones. This requires going beyond exclusion and violence to pluralizing concepts and knowledge.

The EU's southern border has become a site of human death, exclusion, and coercion, making it the primary example for this issue. Studies on the EU security and identity focus on construction and dissemination. In these studies, foreign policy discourses are the main unit of analysis because the EU identity construction centers on foreign policy. These studies do not illuminate the EU's construction of others' identities and roles while constructing its own to shape others' interests and policies to serve the EU's. This includes shaping partner states' internal policies on irregular migration and externalization policy without a balance of interests between the EU and its Southern partners. Political far-right politicization of migration discourse has shown that the EU identity, credibility, and reputation depend on its relations with the South. The EU self-representation and foreign policy reform redefine partners' identities and roles. This is done by defining concepts like irregular warfare, irregular migration, and security from the EU's perspective and in line with the EU interests, disregarding the others', and by subjugating the other to accepting ready-made roles assigned by the EU and believed to serve mutual interests.

The Arab Spring events showed the importance of stability, peace, and security in North Africa for the Union's domestic and long-term stability goals, especially given the two regions' geographical proximity, historical colonial relations, linguistic, and economic dependence. Although the EU security definition and conception seeks to increase knowledge and consideration of local needs, the EU

⁶⁸ William Walters, "The Mycro-physics of Power Rydux", Chapter 4, **Foucault and the Modern International**, Philippe Bonditti, The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy, 2017, pp. 57-76.

⁶⁹ Pomarede, p. 81.

practice remains overwhelmed by rationalist, Eurocentric, short-term security calculations.

To achieve mutual interests and long-term peace, the EU and its foreign policy shall have inclusive, comprehensive approaches that are aware of the local perspectives of the other side, which is the terrain for resolution. Although the EU is dominant in capabilities and in its ability to define mutual interests through its own foreign policy that includes others in having assigned interests, roles, and objectives by the Union, it cannot achieve its goals without including and understanding the other, who is an important part of peace and security. This study aims to contribute to this field of research by studying the "other" side, Morocco, which has become a significant partner state for the EU security and geopolitical interests, especially in Africa, migration, and terrorism, in the last decade.

The research methodology of this study is based on primary data collected through a discourse analysis of the Moroccan political elite, a qualitative review of the literature on the migration issue, a qualitative study of the EUGS and the EU programs and action plans documents and reports collected from the official websites of the EU. It is also based on quantitative data in relation to migration flows and Morocco's domestic issues collected from official websites of international organizations as well as secondary data from previously conducted studies. Adopting a triangular research methodology, this study aims to achieve both depth and precision in understanding and explaining the issue of migration in the EU Morocco cooperation.

1.2. CRITICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Qualitative research focuses on meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, and descriptions, unlike quantitative research, which examines quantity. Quantitative research methods focus on distribution and quantity, which can obscure the quality of issues and concepts. Qualitative research seeks to "understand" reality by studying subjective elements like meanings and motivations, unlike quantitative research, which only "explains" through positive science and verifiable data. Meanings can be collected and measured to study meanings and qualities using metaphors or other conceptual and theoretical frameworks. Qualities are invisible, unlike quantities or elemental amounts. Studying them requires specialized tools and methods.

D.T. Campbell said; "All research ultimately has a qualitative grounding."⁷⁰ Quantitative research is considered to be more 'scientific' than qualitative research, comprehensive research, however, requires both. In the study of contested or imprecise subjects, qualitative research helps explain reality that quantitative research cannot. Given the widespread assumption of the "scientificity" of quantitative research, important elements of reality can be ignored, left out, or ignored in the scientific representation of reality. Quantitative and qualitative methods are complementary, despite social science scholars' views. Quantitative research provides precision, while qualitative research provides depth, both essential criteria for any research field. Qualitative research is better at revealing social complexity, which is crucial to social sciences. Qualitative research needs precision in tool selection, concept definition, and meanings to be productive.⁷¹

Social sciences lack certainty and occurrence. Studying social reality is about pattern regularity, not certainty. The phenomenon's meaning is measured by these patterns' regularity. Social sciences study, test, and apply theories to decipher the meanings behind these patterns. Hagan defines theory as propositions that describe a phenomenon. Social scientists define theory as a set of logical statements that explain the relationship between two or more variables—objects, concepts, phenomena, or human traits.⁷² The theory's theoretical propositions create coherent reality narratives. The most important building blocks of theories are concepts as defined by Jonathan Turner. Concepts are the means by which scientists explain generalizations. They build and distribute knowledge. Conceptualization helps make sense of multiple patterns, relations, and processes related to a subject, unlike information sharing or producing without conceptual frameworks. The symbolic element, or term, and the definitional element make up concepts. Theories differ in definition and application.⁷³ Qualitative social science research requires theory, operationalization, and definition of concepts, as well as precise methodological tools.

⁷⁰ Michael Huberman and Mathew Miles, **Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook**, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994, pp. 5-10, 40-45, 90-100.

⁷¹ Berg and Lune, p. 325-328.

⁷² Berg and Lune, p. 20.

⁷³ Berg and Lune, p. 19-22.

1.2.1. Discourse Analysis and Resistance to Domination in Knowledge Production

Discourses are an important tool in building power, criticizing and resisting it. According to Foucault, all truths are equal depending on their contexts. Discourse analysis's main goal is to raise awareness of how marginalization creates the normalized or naturalized truth. Discourse analysis disrupts and destabilizes the boundaries between the legitimate, illegitimate, rational, and irrational in knowledge production. Post-structuralism and Foucauldian discourse analysis does not substitute one truth for another because of their ethical and philosophical belief that there is no universal, absolute, or single truth.⁷⁴ Power-influenced knowledge production prioritizes certain social facts, realities, and truths over others. Thus, social science investigates existing truths, their contexts, and conditions. Language as a tool for building truth or reality is more embedded in material resources that build power through language.⁷⁵ Texts and discourses cannot independently establish meaning or truth.

Resistance, however, challenges the disciplining power. In IR, where power dominates knowledge production and practice, Michel Foucault emphasizes the importance of analyzing, rethinking, and investigating underlying assumptions. IR is centered around the "concept of power," its distribution, implementation, transition, and study, whether through dominant "rationalist" perspectives that focus on the evident side of truth or resistant perspectives that seek to bring up the subjugated voices and versions of reality by that power through alternative critical theoretical framework. IR has prioritized and avoided investigating positivist and universalist power and their disciplining instruments. Scholars have called for critical inquiry to show the limits of realism in contemporary international relations as global powers and society prioritize unconventional security issues.

Post-positivist approaches to theorizing IR and security go beyond the 3rd debate of IR to study power and re-design it as a category of analysis. The EU's move from normative or civilian power to relational power, based on equality and mutual interests with partner states, shows the importance of doing this. This reflects global shifts and challenges like terrorism and irregular migration, where traditional power and its instruments have limited effects. To maintain these priorities for power holders

⁷⁴ Berg and Lune, p. 525.

⁷⁵ Berg and Lune, p. 530.

in international relations, alternative approaches to power, security, and IR are needed. Without understanding alternative perspectives, voices, and the "resistant," the dominant is threatened.

In fact, Foucault's genealogy and archaeology method recovers subjugated voices and strengthens potentially subversive knowledge.⁷⁶ This genealogical work does not trace discursive forms of power and control but organizes historical knowledge to oppose the hegemonic discourse's dominance and coercion. Foucault believed that discourse as a text is only an effect of power, but studying its context reveals its power as an instrument. Discourses legitimize what is rational and irrational, possible and impossible, and assign identities and roles in Foucauldian discourse analysis.⁷⁷ Discourses are social actions and interactions, and Fairclough emphasizes text and context in discourse analysis. Fairclough also distinguishes three domains of social life that are constituted by discourse: 1-the representations of the world, which depend on the speaker's perspective, 2-relations between people, which focus on hierarchy's role in the role ascribed to each participant in the representation process, and 3-social and personal identities, which focus on identity construction and how it affects discourse production.⁷⁸ Edward Said believes discourse analysis should relate discourses to power relations.⁷⁹

However, Foucault emphasizes the need to reexamine knowledge production in specific historical and cultural contexts.⁸⁰ International actors defend their reality through text production. Scholars influenced by Foucault's discourse analysis theory study how actors' strategies play out in international politics and which versions of reality get to dominate.⁸¹ Discourse analysis also examines representation politics, which can create social facts to serve its desired material reality. Thus, facts represent social reality. Knowledge, interpretations, and language are interdependent.

Scholars have distinguished between types of discourse analysis because pluralism presents discourse as an open field of research with a variety of conceptual frameworks and analytical tools. Some studies categorized discourse analysis as

⁷⁶ Hook, p. 537.

⁷⁷ Bahar Rumelili, & Senem Aydin -Duzgit, "Discourse Analysis: Strengths and Shortcomings", **All Azimuth**, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2019, pp. 285-305.

⁷⁸ Nieto & Helena, p. 39.

⁷⁹ Hook, p. 522.

⁸⁰ Holzscheiter, p. 8.

⁸¹ Michel Foucault, **The Order of Things**, London: Tavistock, 1970, p. xxii, (ORDER).

Michel Foucault, **The Archeology of Knowledge & the Discourse on Language**, London: Tavistock, 1972, pp.152-153, (ARCHEOLOGY).

Michel Foucault, **The History of Sexuality: An Introduction**, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981, pp. 88-95, (HISST).

micro-interactional or macro-structural, while others distinguished mainstream and critical discourse analysis. Macro-structural discourse analysis emphasizes discourse as signification structures, while micro-interactional discourse analysis emphasizes communicative pragmatics.⁸²

According to Foucault in the 'Order of Discourse'; "In every society, the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a number of procedures."⁸³

The most studied discourse analysis methods are critical discourse analysis, Foucauldian discourse analysis, and sociology of knowledge discourse analysis. These methods differ in how they gather and analyze empirical material against their conceptions of social agency, reality structure, and origins. Foucault defined discourses in the "Riviera Case, 1982" as: "Battlefields, power struggles around the legitimate definition of a phenomenon."⁸⁴

Thus, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's discourse theory of political struggles for hegemony.⁸⁵ Foucauldian discourse analysis studies statements' constitutive and political effects rather than their content. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) studies foreign policy discourse using Derrida and Foucault's binary opposition, deconstruction, and genealogy methods. Critical discourse analysis focuses on language in power relations, exclusion, inequality, and identity construction.

Critical discourse analysis emphasizes power, ideologies, and how discourse creates IR realities like "nation-state," "territory," and "frontier". Critical discourse analysis incorporates power concepts from Habermas, Gramsci, Bourdieu, and Foucault. Critical discourse analysis views society as a result of discursive practices. Fairclough defines discourses as three social domains. Hierarchies, social and personal identities shape worldviews and relationships.⁸⁶ Gramsci defined hegemony as the exertion of power with the partial consent of the dominated, which is most exacerbated in discursive space. Bourdieu uses "Habitus" to study practice production schemes. Bourdieu's habitus helps one understand one's place and others' practices. The agency's social environment's cultural capital determines its linguistic habitus.⁸⁷ State power institutionalizes this personalized language habitus.

⁸² Holzscheiter, p. 12.

⁸³ Hook, p. 522.

⁸⁴ Reiner Keller, "The Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse (SKAD)", **Human Studies**, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2011, pp. 43-65.

⁸⁵ Keller, p. 47.

⁸⁶ Norman Fairclough, **Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language**, Longman Publishing: New York, 1995, pp. 85-100, 183-185.

⁸⁷ Helena and Nieto, p. 45.

Thus, the state controls language. A network of political, economic, and institutional power relations at the domestic and international levels governs the a-priori standardization of knowledge, which precedes language production.⁸⁸ Thus, international standardization or universalization imposes one view that is considered shared, recognized, and representative of everyone.

Thus, critical discourse analysis encompasses the practices of individuals or institutions that make the "legitimate" or "possible" through the collection of data from samples of written or oral language/texts.⁸⁹ Empirical discourse analysis uses conversation analysis to study broad themes and language functions. Structured text analysis reveals general linguistic and communicative rules of recurrent patterns, talk in interaction, and genre analysis.⁹⁰

1.2.2. The Importance of Discourse in Foreign Policy Analysis

Foreign policy plays a crucial role in defending and defining national interests, relying heavily on discourse, negotiation, framing, and persuasion. By studying and analyzing foreign policy discourses, we can gain insights into a state's principles, beliefs, and perceptions on contested issues within their specific context. As states have conflicting interests on common issues, foreign and bilateral negotiations become arenas of "winning" struggles. These struggles take place through discursive practices that employ linguistic tools for argumentation and persuasion, focusing on meanings, definitions, and framing. These meaning-defining battles shape international relations and global politics, particularly in International Organization platforms, influencing trade, climate, security, sovereignty, and burden sharing. The conflict between a state's primary interests, like "sovereignty" or "societal coherence," and those of other states has increased due to irregular migration and the EU's externalization or burden sharing policy. Discursive practices in negotiations over contested issues reveal dynamics of dominance and resistance, especially in bilateral relations or foreign policy interactions between powerful countries of the Global North and countries of the South.

The topic of 'Migration' has become a central concern on the international Agenda for global affairs and Security, as well as on the agendas of global powers for

⁸⁸ Michel Foucault, **Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language (1969)**, Trans. AM Sheridan Smith, 1972, pp. 135-140.

⁸⁹ Brian David Hodges, Ayetel Kuper and Reeves Scott, "Qualitative Research: Discourse Analysis", **BMJ: British Medical Journal**, Vol. 337, No. 7669, 2008, pp. 570-572.

⁹⁰ Hodges et al., p. 570.


their foreign policy. The unity, security, and continuity of the EU have become of utmost importance with the advent of the terrorist issue and, in particular, the Arab Spring-related influx of migrants, making irregular migration a top priority. This is mostly due to the politics of migration and the resulting fragmentation of the EU member states and the population.

1.2.3. Triangular Research Methodology

Triangular methodology while primarily focused on qualitative discourse analysis, it attempts to combine this research with a qualitative evaluation of the EU' initiatives and action plans in Morocco through the study of the EU reports, a qualitative study of the EU' new foreign policy guided by geopolitical concerns under the EUGS documents and a quantitative assessment of the domestic context of Morocco. The study is conducted through a three level of analysis; that is the epistemological, bilateral and domestic level. Combining between qualitative and quantitative research methods and different levels of analysis, this study aims to achieve both depth and precision on understanding the issue of migration.

The goal is to examine and comprehend the challenges to an effective resolution of the contentious problem of irregular migration between Morocco and the EU, where border control, sovereignty, and security are at stake for all parties. Each method will expose a different aspect of the situation. This will also clarify this issue's intricacies. A precise study of the topic requires understanding the EU objectives and aspirations through the EUGS, Morocco's concerns, interests, and viewpoints through discourse analysis, and domestic obstacles related to the EU preferred approach and challenges related to Morocco' context. This methodological approach considers irregular migration's intricacy and contestation as well as the EU-Morocco relations' patterns of dominance and resistance. Method:

Figure 3: Triangular Methodological Framework



Source: Created by the author.

1.3. THE EUROPEAN UNION GLOBAL STRATEGY: A GEOPOLITICAL TURN

“Europe will not be made all at once or according to a single design. Concrete results will first build de facto solidarity,” ⁹¹said Robert Schuman during the opening of the European Integration project.

Seventy-two years later, as Robert Schuman stated, the EU faced geopolitical and structural difficulties that shook its unity and solidarity. The EUGS, developed by the High Representative Mogherini, was adopted after major structural and geostrategic shifts at the regional and global levels that affected the Union's domestic affairs. Most notably, the EUGS was designed to address a sovereignty issue in defense, borders, and currency.⁹² The EUGS guides the EU foreign policy in a complex and contentious structural environment. Despite connection, global issues are difficult and debated, leading to greater divide than collaboration. The EUGS provides policy coherence for the EU foreign policy across policy areas, topics, and

⁹¹ The European Union, **Schuman Declaration May 1950**, European Commission Directorate-General for Communication.

⁹² Jose Antonio Sanahuja, “The EU Global Strategy: Security, Narratives, Legitimacy and Identity of an Actor in Crisis”, in **The Routledge Handbook of European Security Law and Policy**, Edited by E. Conde with Zhaklin V. Yaneva and Marzia Scopelliti, Routledge: Taylor and Francis, 2019, pp. 395-414.

regions.⁹³ Most notably, the EUGS is expected to resolve the EU foreign policy conundrum between interests and values and overcome the harmful effects of western interventionism in the Global South. The EUGS was designed to advance policy direction, political unity, and external action.⁹⁴ The EUGS may help the EU become a global leader in diplomacy and security. In the past decade, the EU has faced internal, regional, and global challenges. Most importantly, the EU has struggled due to the interconnection of these three strategic levels. The EU citizens question its agency due to structural changes. This included the Union's effectiveness abroad, especially in the MENA region, but most critically protecting the European citizens and territory. The Arab Spring also eroded the EU's normative character and strength, which has been its hallmark internationally. The Arab Spring, viewed as Europe's 30 years' war, exposed the EU's foreign policy failures and presented the Union with unprecedented theoretical and practical challenges. The Arab Spring's major consequence for the Union besides the security and instability issues was bringing under question the EU's political and "normative" position in the neighborhood and its institutional purpose for the European continent.

As a non-traditional state, the EU has had a unique place in the international system, adopting rules and liberal principles as foreign policy priorities. This contrasted with the US blunt interventionism or pragmatism. Following the EU's first major crisis, the EUGS was designed by the High Commissioner Mogherini and Nathalie Tocci to create a strategic foreign policy. The EUGS sought to resolve the EU foreign policy conflicts between interests and liberal principles and major powers' liberal roles and involvements in the MENA. Find a medium ground between traditional *realpolitik* and the EU's classical normative identity based on liberal idealism.

1.3.1. Global Power, Domestic Unity and Regional Strategic Interests

Resilience, principled pragmatism, and relational strength underpin the EUGS. The EUGS recognizes the Union's need to strengthen its authority amid global power shifts and embraces the Union's normative identity. Power in the EUGS's is based on societal influence designed through an agent and agency equilibrium. Under the

⁹³ The European Union Global Strategy, **The European Union Global Strategy: Three Years On, Looking Forward**, European Union External Action, 2019, pp. 4-54, (TYO).

⁹⁴ Nathalie Tocci, "Interview with Nathalie Tocci on the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy", **The International Spectator**, Vol. 51, No. 3, 2016, pp. 1-8, (INTERVIEW).

EUGS, the EU claims responsibility for its own security, its neighborhood's security, and the multilateral system while simultaneously strengthening partners' agency in effecting their own transformation with the help of the EU.

The EUGS' bottom-up approach to pragmatism changes the focus from governments to microphysical power actors through increasing people' and civil actors' capability. This strategy aims to modify persons' daily habits to bring about change from within. The EUGS protects a rule-based global order and democratic transformation in the neighborhood through responsible but selective engagement and participation during power rivalry and geopolitics. The EU's new identity and function emphasize state and society resilience, principled pragmatism, and relational power.⁹⁵

Terrorism's emergence as a direct threat, related to irregular migration from the MENA, and populist parties' use of this to oppose the EU, are the EU's main obstacles. Due to the international system's move from unipolar or hegemony to poly-nodal, where other powers are growing, the Union's global strategy has likewise become more strategic and pragmatic. The Union's global power is endangered by structural developments that impair internal coherence. The EU's international influence and normative authority have been shaped by Kantian Liberalism for decades.

China's economic and military expansion into Asia and Eastern Europe is expected to grow its GDP share to 20%, overtaking the US and the EU. The Silk Road Project in Eastern Europe affects the EU business interests. Russia's hybrid threats, military attacks on Ukraine, political infiltration against democratic elections in the Union and Eastern Europe, and rising populism against the Union pose a strategic threat to the Union. The EU's Common Security and Defense concerns have resurfaced with China's rise and the US geopolitical shift towards Asia. Due to geostrategic developments, the EU cannot rely on the US or NATO for defense. In this evolving geostrategic setting, the EU and member states must be more strategic, improving their security and defense capacities notwithstanding the security split among member states.⁹⁶

The EUGS's principal foreign policy goal is to maintain the EU's global power status amid global power shifts.⁹⁷ The EUGS defines its global power position and

⁹⁵ Nathalie Tocci, "The Making of the EU Global Strategy", **Contemporary Security Policy**, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2016, pp. 461-472, (MEUGS).

⁹⁶ Tocci, MEUGS, p. 462.

⁹⁷ Florence Gaub, **Global Trends to 2030: Challenges and Choices for Europe**, European Strategy and Policy Analysis, 2019, pp. 2-42.


identity as "relational power" in a time of liberal norm regression and strategic interests at all levels. The EU's global power role to protect the multilateral system depends on two interdependent variables: the EU's ability to sustain domestic unity and strength and its ability to have relational influence and power on the neighborhood, with the former relying on the latter. This highlights the EU's effective foreign policy in the neighborhood, which damages its credibility in the international system and threatens its institutional unity and continuity.

The EU's main concern is neighborhood stability and dealing with the connectivity between regional instabilities and its own internal stability created by irregular migratory flows. Thus, the EU global power objectives require a cohesive, coherent, and resilient EU that can influence its Southern zone. Irregular migration and populist use of it divide the Union's citizenry and member states politically.⁹⁸ Irregular migration is linked to terrorism and radicalism. Populist parties have used right-wing and left-wing terrorism to criticize Islamic terrorism.⁹⁹ The Union's cohesiveness, decision-making, and international strength are affected by this division. This is why irregular migration management, along with terrorism and the Russian threat, are the most divisive issues for the Union.

⁹⁸ Gaub, p. 27, 30, 31.

⁹⁹ Gaub, p. 27.

Figure 4: The Importance of the EU's Regional Influence for its Domestic Stability and global power Objective



Source: Created by the author.


The Union's challenge is connecting and interdependent structural challenges and levels. Given the political nature of the MENA challenges, addressing them requires pragmatic, strategic, and normative approaches. The British Referendum and the threat of a repeat experience with other member states have created an unprecedented crisis in the Union. Given the UK's role in military expansion and foreign intervention through peace-building, Brexit further weakened the Union's defense capabilities. The British referendum forced the Union to rethink its principles, role, and identity, especially in regional and international foreign policy.¹⁰⁰ The EUGS addressed strategic challenges from strategic regions at the global, multilateral, and domestic levels. Most importantly, the EU wanted to secure the European citizens and territory. This implied greater EU involvement in regional and global foreign affairs.¹⁰¹ The Union needed to protect the international multilateral system due to the

¹⁰⁰ Nathalie Tocci, "Towards a European Security and Defense Union: Was 2017 a Watershed?", *JCMS*, Vol. 56, Annual Review, 2018, pp. 131-141, (ESDU).

¹⁰¹ The European Council, **A New Strategic Agenda: 2019-2024**, The EU Council, Brussels, 2019, pp. 1-8, (NSA).

US support decline and the rise of competition and geostrategic goals.¹⁰² The EU had to balance pragmatism and normativity in its "selective engagement" in strategic regions.

Figure 5: Areas of Strategic Interests for the EU Global Strategy 2019-2030



Source: Gaub, 2019, p. 26.

Given the security, normative, socioeconomic, and political challenges expected to persist or worsen in the MENA and Africa' strategic regional interests of the EUGS, the EU foreign policy faces a unique challenge. The EU is challenged by neighborhood political changes and conflicts, the youth bulge with high unemployment and low education levels, and the threat of radicalism and terrorism. History and geography link the EU to MENA and Africa, influencing its development. Most importantly, instabilities cause people to flee these two strategic areas, affecting the EU.¹⁰³ According to "Global Trends to 2030: Challenges and Choices for Europe," the EU's challenges from the past decade, particularly irregular migration and Islamic and populist terrorism, will persist and grow.¹⁰⁴ The EUGS was prompted by multiple crises that required geo-strategic thinking in foreign policy. The EUGS was designed to strengthen the Union security globally and thematically.

¹⁰² Caroline Bouchard, John Peterson, and Nathalie Tocci, 2014 Review by Ebru Dalğakıran, "Multilateralism in the 21st Century: Europe' Quest for Effectiveness", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2017, pp. 245-247.

¹⁰³ Gaub, p. 12, 13, 14, 25, 26, 41.

¹⁰⁴ Gaub, p. 27.

The EU security is the most contested and desired goal. Security and defense are contested because member states have different interests and interpret threats differently. The Eastern European states prioritize Russia, while South and Western European states prioritize terrorism and irregular migration.¹⁰⁵ Due to the complex crises facing the Union that pose security and political threats, security is also the most desired goal.¹⁰⁶ The Union is also concerned about anti-systemic Europhobia movements that use divisive and emotional language to exploit terrorism and migration. Terrorism, linked to Southern conflicts, instabilities, poverty, and youth bulge, also threatens the Union's security. Terrorism is linked to irregular migration and the EU's inability to secure its borders. However, Southern issues are expected to persist and even worsen in the coming decade. Youth bulge, unemployment, poverty, socioeconomic issues, and rising repression and intrastate conflicts drive southern irregular migration. According to the report "Global Trends to 2030: Challenges and Choices for Europe", the South neighborhood population will reach 282 million by 2030, while poverty rates will rise.¹⁰⁷ North Africa, the Middle East, and Africa are particularly affected by repression, democracy decline, and conflict which are expected to persist if not rise.¹⁰⁸ The Union is expected to face ideological, political, and security issues related to the issue of terrorism. Radicalism persists, especially among Syrian and Iraqi returnees and released prisoners. Given radical groups' "enemy" view of Europe, IS continues to threaten terrorist attacks in Europe. European Muslim terrorism continues to fuel the Union terrorist attacks.¹⁰⁹ The EU is monitoring 50.000–100.000 people for radicalism. Warlordism, terror groups, and insurgencies have flourished in Somalia, Libya, Egypt's Sinai, and other ungoverned spaces in the South, especially Africa, due to state failure.¹¹⁰ For this reason, the rising security and political conflicts in the South and the EU's expected increased connectivity to the region directly affect the Union.

¹⁰⁵ Tocci, INTERVIEW, p. 3.

¹⁰⁶ According to Tocci, ESDU, p.132, the European public opinion is mostly concerned about security and a more involved EU in foreign policy and at the global level. majority of the European public expects the EU' future to depend on its ability to assume more responsibility toward and effectiveness in the field of security.

¹⁰⁷ Gaub, p. 10.

¹⁰⁸ Gaub, p. 25-26.

The Institute for Economics and Peace, **Global Peace Index 2018: Measuring Peace in a Complex World**, Sydney, June 2018, pp. 4-73.

¹⁰⁹ Gaub, p. 27.

¹¹⁰ Gaub, p. 27.

The Institute for Economics and Peace, p. 39.

The EU faces Right- and Left-wing radicalism, as well as Islamic terrorism, due to migration.¹¹¹ Populism and the EU border security fuel anti-systemic terrorism. Thus, it is mostly related to the EU foreign policy credibility and effectiveness in the Southern Neighborhood and its ability to handle irregular migration and address its root causes. Migration, a symptom of many megatrends, is expected to rise. Economic, political, religious, and climate change megatrends drive irregular migration.¹¹² Climate change and environmental issues causing water and food security issues have driven population movement, especially from Africa. Climate change causes local and intercontinental migration, but poverty, youth bulge, and unemployment are driving irregular migration from the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa to the EU.¹¹³ Bilateral and global cooperation, especially the Partnership with Morocco and Turkey, has helped the EU control movement intensity. Given the ongoing issues, this has not stopped the flow of people.

Populist movements use irregular migration to oppose the Union on three grounds: 1-a threatened identity, 2-economic crises and rising European unemployment, 3-an unresponsive political system. Populism's appeal to violence and emotional language makes it both a cause and an effect of the Union's many crises.¹¹⁴ Because of this, the EU must protect its democracy, resilience, and stability as well as its region. In the coming decade, intra-state conflicts will dominate in the Horn of Africa, Sahel, and Central Africa, the EU's neighbors.¹¹⁵ Intrastate conflicts are contentious because international law does not apply. Sovereignty and human rights prevent the international community from intervening. Intrastate conflict causes the most damage because of this. Thus, intrastate conflicts lead to unprecedented migration, especially to the EU, a symbol of peace, democracy, and justice.

The EU faces unpredictable, connected, and complex threats from terrorism and irregular migration. For the next decade, the EU must be able to handle rising violence. Radicals and Russia, which has launched a hybrid war against the Union, are expected to launch cyber-attacks.¹¹⁶ Terrorism and irregular migration are dividing the EU like never before, but other threats are also threatening its security.

¹¹¹ Gaub, p. 27, 31.

¹¹² Gaub, p. 30.

¹¹³ Gaub, p. 30-34.

¹¹⁴ Gaub, p. 31.

Barry Eichengreen, **The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 1-13.

¹¹⁵ The United Nation; World Bank; Pathways for Peace, **Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflicts**, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2018, pp. 1-65.

¹¹⁶ Giray Sadik, **Europe's Hybrid Threats: What Kind of Power Does the EU Need in 21st Century**, Cambridge Scholars Publishing: UK, 2017, p. 2-123.

The security order in Eastern Europe threatens the Union from Russia and China. Russia's military and political infiltration and China's Silk Road Project economic infiltration of Eastern Europe threaten the EU unity and strategic interests. The rule-based global order and multilateralism face challenges as the international system shifts, favoring rivalry, competition, and self-interest over cooperation and international law.¹¹⁷ China's strategic advancement in Asia, especially Southeast Asia, has shifted the US strategic interests from Europe to Asia.

Although the US is increasing its military presence in Europe, Washington will neither have the will nor the capacity to look after Europe nor in fact be the global policeman in the years ahead, Peña said.¹¹⁸

Thus, the EU, which is being weakened from within and challenged from its South and East, is also being challenged transatlantically and globally. Multilevel geopolitical changes are making the EU's security and defense more contentious and vulnerable.

Grevi stated,

*The US security umbrella provided through NATO cannot be indefinitely taken for granted... An assertive Russia despite the cold war ending three decades ago while global power has shifted to multiple centers and between them.*¹¹⁹

The EU security and defense, which has relied on NATO and the US, now faces complex realpolitik and unconventional challenges.

1.3.2. Assessment of the EUGS: Practical and Theoretical Issues

The EUGS was designed to help the Union navigate these difficult times due to the complexity of its structural environment at all levels. Thus, the EUGS addresses China's economic challenges, Russia's military and hybrid war, the US's withdrawal from Europe and the global multilateral system, the South's terrorism and irregular migration. Populist movements have also risen due to global shifts in the international system and the EU's weakness in security and defense, exacerbated by the Brexit. The EUGS was created to align the EU foreign policy with structural changes and prioritize security. According to the EUGS, The EU must engage abroad with

¹¹⁷ In this topic, see the work of John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War", *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1. 1990, pp. 5-56.

¹¹⁸ Charles V. Peña, "Should America be the World's Policeman?", *The American Conservative*, 6.02.2017. <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/should-america-be-the-worlds-policeman/> (15.5.2018).

¹¹⁹ Giovanni Grevi, "The Interpolar World: A New Scenario", *The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)*, Occasional Papers, 2009, No. 79, pp. 7-44.

pragmatism, resilience, and selective engagement. In other words, the EU must be pragmatic in its foreign policy, more focused on its own security and self-interests. The EU must strengthen its security and defense community and act normatively and autonomously while cooperating with the NATO, the UN, and others.

Migration requires bilateral partnerships more than international cooperation. The EU seeks to strengthen its global role by acting autonomously, cooperatively, and pragmatically. Under the EUGS, the EU activated the Permanent Structural Cooperation (PESCO) to allow member states to make more binding commitments to each other for the most difficult missions to improve security and defense.¹²⁰ Article 42.7 of TEU and Article 222 of TFEU promote mutual assistance and solidarity in Common Security and Defense. A united Union will also integrate security and defense. By strengthening its defense, the EU hopes to contribute to global peace, security, and development.¹²¹ The EU believes post-WWII multilateralism is more important than ever to meet the century's challenges. In a time of rivalry and geopolitics, the EUGS frames multilateralism as a responsibility for the EU to promote democracy and global values through principled multilateralism.

Not only does Europe need Europe, but the World needs Europe, according to the The Global Trends Report.¹²²

Political reform in the neighborhood is a strategic and difficult goal for the EU. Democratization and regime change are no longer part of the EU foreign policy priorities.¹²³ Instead, local and microphysical agents of power —mainly civil society and citizens—are targeted for capacity development. The EUGS is implemented using the CFSP, CSDP, Development and Humanitarian Aid, Energy Security Strategy, and Revised ENP.¹²⁴ Regional cooperative orders aim to create 'A peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa' in the EUGS. Solving the South issues is crucial to addressing terrorism, migration, climate change, and demography. The EU's goal of equality and shared prosperity through bilateral

¹²⁰ Tocci, ESDU, p. 135

The Council of Ministers of the European Union, **Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**, Official Journal of the European Union, Brussels, 2017, p. 1-13, (PESCO).

¹²¹ The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; Vice President of the European Commission; and Head of the European Defence Agency, **Implementation Plan on Security and Defense, Annex 14392/16**, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 2016, p. 1-31.

¹²² Gaub, p. 3.

¹²³ Tocci, INTERVIEW, p. 5.

¹²⁴ Michael E. Smith, "Implementing the Global Strategy Where It Matters Most: The EU's Credibility Deficit and the European Neighborhood", **Contemporary Security Policy**, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2016, pp. 446-460.

partnerships with the South is unclear. Institutional cooperation with ECOWAS and the African Union (AU) addresses the EU and South African challenges.¹²⁵

The EUGS is divided into five main categories: state and society resilience, geostrategic environment, integrated conflict management, cooperative regional orders, rules-based global governance, and more credible defense.¹²⁶

The EUGS offers a limited diagnosis of the EU's shortcomings in terms of determining its strategic goals. Besides its contradictions in relation to resilience and principled pragmatism, the EUGS has had little impact on the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) even though it was designed to do so.¹²⁷ Additionally, the EU's ability to achieve its strategic goals including its global power aims, the security of the European territory and citizen, the efficiency and credibility of the EU Foreign policy in the South depend to a large extent on the successful implementation of the EUGS.¹²⁸

The EUGS resilience and principled pragmatism have theoretical and practical challenges, specifically regarding "selective engagement" and "bottom-up approach." The EU foreign policy is limited by the EUGS' requirement that partner nation potential determines the EU success. Only identifying Tunisia and Georgia as potential successes precludes the EUGS success. While local actors progress democratization and the rule of law, the EU's impact on state apparatus will "determine" its relational power and influence.

The bottom-up method's focus on civil society has limited effectiveness, which tries to move 'influence' from power holders to civil society actors and eliminate the political element of the EU's intervention approach, because civil society relies on the state. Thus, civil society needs central government space and funding to properly realize its potential. Limits on activity, assembly, or funding can hinder the EU's "capacity-development," as seen in Morocco, where civil society is both promoted and

¹²⁵ Erwan Lannon, "The Mediterranean in the EU's 2016 Global Strategy: Connecting the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa", **IEMed: European Institute of the Mediterranean**, 2017, pp. 213-216.

¹²⁶ The European Union Global Strategy, **From Shared Vision to Common Action: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy: Implementation Report Year 2**, The European Union External Action Service, Brussels, 2018, pp. 3-44, (IRY2).

¹²⁷ Smith, p. 447

¹²⁸ As stated by Nathalie Tocci in "Framing the EU Global Strategy: A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World" p. 61; stability in the surrounding regions of the EU, especially in the South is of crucial importance for EU's credibility at the international level which is an important element in the identity of the EU as an international actor which has so far been defined by the Union's 'normative role'. The situation in the surrounding regions are also important in determining the Union's effective approach in coping with migration flows given the dependence of the Union's domestic stability and peace on the effective management of migration. This comes as a direct result of the politicization of the issue of migration by Far right posing direct threat to the stability, coherence and continuity of the EU.

constrained by such limits. Civil society requires assembly, expression, and individual freedoms.

Given that the South region is dominated by varying degrees of authoritarianism, the EU's selective engagement where the state has already engaged in change and emphasis on a bottom-up approach is a passive foreign policy choice that is more about distancing the EU from the structural environment and political reality of its neighbourhood than the opposite, which is closer to a US-driven pragmatic foreign policy towards the MENA. This is surprising given that the EUGS is founded on the EU's relational power, which is assessed by its sociocultural influence on citizens rather than normative influence on government.¹²⁹

The EU's ability to address important security challenges like irregular migration and terrorism is limited by its attempt to change its foreign policy from normative power to relational power. North Africa's youth bulge and socioeconomic challenges induced by international liberalisation and a lack of democracy drive the steady flow of migrants, especially minors and youth, to the EU's shore. Thus, the EUGS supports strategic aims rather than balancing normative and strategic values through "selective engagement." Before the Arab Spring, the EU had little influence in MENA, which contributed to its current issues. Changing this tendency is essential for the EU's long-term peace and security, internal unity, legitimacy, and worldwide credibility.

In the EUGS, the issue of migration as an internal-external nexus has been argued to be the primary foreign policy objective necessitating the effective implementation of the EUGS foreign policy instruments. As stated in the "New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024", ensuring the integrity of the territory and effective control of the EU's external borders is an important prerequisite for ensuring security, upholding law and order, and ensuring the proper functioning of the EU policies. By ensuring the smooth operation of the Schengen system, the EU hopes to strengthen its fight against terrorism, which is inextricably linked to border control.¹³⁰ Migration is also the area in which the most contestation and disagreements in member states' interests are manifested. It is also the issue in which the internal-external link is most visible.¹³¹ In other words, according to the EUGS, managing migration requires a

¹²⁹ As mentioned by Florence Gaub in the Global Trends Report (2019), power in the coming decade based on the nature of the security challenges, the structural and geopolitical changes happening in the world:

The power of states will be determined by their –relational influence, p. 19.

¹³⁰ The European Council, NSA, p. 3.

¹³¹ Tocci, MEUGS, p. 469.

collaborative approach supported by the EU efforts to promote resilience in neighboring countries dealing with the issue at its root causes. Resilience and principled pragmatism are framed as the ideal approach to fostering the Union's long-term peace and security, which has become inextricably linked with the peace and security of the neighborhood due to migration.

Migration is the EUGS' main challenge, showing its growing and reversed dependency on its neighbours. While the EU adopts security measures to deal with migration, resilience-based peace would secure the EU's long-term goal of regulated and managed migration according to need and supply.

Under the EUGS, migration management is expected to go beyond border management and securitization to address root causes. Promoting peace and sustainable security through a bottom-up approach based on resilience and principled pragmatism, coordinated with an internal-external nexus focus is the EUGS objectives related to migration management. As part of the EU's new identity, relational power emphasizes the impact relationship between agency and agent, and the EUGS has stressed the need of equality in partnerships.¹³² Due to the increased significance of neighbors and neighbors of neighbors for the Union's peace and security, the EU's EUGS also acknowledges the significance of promoting prosperous partnerships based on shared prosperity. This is primarily in reference to Africa and the MENA, whose security, prosperity, and peace levels directly reflect on those of the EU. Adopting an African strategy to increase the EU's positive engagement on the continent, the EUGS has aligned the Union's interests with those of its partner states, imagining a less asymmetrical and more inclusive approach.¹³³

The EUGS manages irregular migration with resilience and coherence. The EUGS's five priorities will be implemented coherently. Addressing irregular migration requires internal and external coherence. The EU promotes cooperation with origin and transit nations externally. Resilience means working with origin nations to curb irregular migratory flows and combat trans-border crime by increasing monitoring and control. Fostering civil society partnerships to avoid irregular migration is crucial. State and society resilience aim to improve state institutional performance and civil society capabilities. Societal and state resilience address the root reasons of migration in the countries of origin. The EU also wants to help transit nations improve asylum and

¹³² The European Union Global Strategy, **From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1: A Global Strategy for the European Union' Foreign and Security Policy**, The European Union External Action, Brussels, 2017, pp. 1-56, (IRY1).

¹³³ Nathalie Tocci, **Framing the EU Global Strategy: A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World**, Palgrave Macmillan Cham, London: U.K, 2017, pp. 1-161, (FREUGS).

reception. The EU works with transit nations to increase returns and ensure regular human mobility by strengthening legal channels. The EU should promote conflict prevention and cooperative regional orders in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa, focused on security and development.¹³⁴

1.3.3. Major Concepts and Principles of the EUGS-The Management of Irregular Migration from Root Causes

In this section the policy of the EU about the management of irregular migration will be reviewed.

1.3.3.1. Relational Power and the EU' Search for Credibility through the EUGS: A Shift from Political Influence to Social Relations

The concept of power has been central to the study and practice of international relations. Definitions of power in international relations include hard power, market power, and soft power. In international relations, the distribution of resources has played a particularly decisive role in the allocation of power: the acquisition of military capabilities and resources, as well as Joseph Nye's concept of soft power, which focuses on cultural relations and influences among the world's civilizations.¹³⁵ The EU's *raison d'être* is based on common cultural values, social arrangements, and political principles, which can be summed up as the European "civilization" united by an institutional organism. The EU was created to preserve:

*The Great Republic of Voltaire, which was divided into several nation states but united under an institutional flag, a common religion, culture, language, and manners that produce the most beneficial results for human liberty.*¹³⁶

The EU's foreign policy, which has been defined as normative for decades, aimed to promote the political, normative, and conceptual influence of its 'civilization' in its neighborhood, which represents its opposite 'other' but is connected to it by borders and history. The EU, despite having succeeded in bringing together the EU's

¹³⁴ Karolina Podstawa, Veronika Haasz, and Chiara Altafin, "The New Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign Policy at a Time of Human Rights Crises", **Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights**, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2017, pp. 122-143.

¹³⁵ Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power: The Evolution of a Concept", **Journal of Political Power**, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2021, pp. 198-206.

¹³⁶ Jonathan Power, "Power's World-Europe: The Great Republic?", **Prospect**, 16.06.2009. <https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/arts-and-books/powers-world-europe-the-great-republic>, (15.08.2018).

nation-states, has been ineffective in resolving the division of interests, especially on security and defense, which remained dominated by self-interests over common ones, and in promoting its 'civilization' through the foreign policy instruments of the ENP toward the South. The persistence of authoritarianism, lack of freedoms, human rights, prosperity, and opportunities for the population and youth has been the driving force behind irregular migration and terrorism-related security issues facing the European continent from its southern region.

The EU's normative power policy toward its neighborhood, based on Kantian liberalism, enhanced its value as an institution and global actor.¹³⁷ The EU has been the only actor to pursue a comprehensive Southern neighborhood policy for decades, based on partnership, reward, issue interlinkage, and mutual interests rather than crude interventionism and political breach of sovereignty. Although these partnerships have been dominated by asymmetry and proved ineffective in bringing about effective political change compared to the US-driven foreign policy, the EU has succeeded in achieving a positive influence among the countries population and appeal to the MENA youth, who generally view it positively.¹³⁸

This positive influence and appeal of the European culture on MENA youth against the unsatisfactory reality in their countries drives them to seek the "European dream" via death boats. The EU foreign policy has struggled between self-interest and normative values. Scholars have criticized the EU for using normative discourse to pursue self-interest. This has damaged the EU credibility at the bilateral, international, and most importantly, domestic public levels. The EU's first and unprecedented crisis after the Arab Spring questioned its normative power and foreign policy. In order to balance interests and values in this context, the EUGS introduced the concept of relational power to balance interests and values, face structural challenges while maintaining the EU agency role in the region.

The EUGS defines power as the ability to: *"have effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate,"* as defined by Michael Barnett and Robert Duval.¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Richard Youngs, **The EU' Role in World Politics: A Retreat from Liberal Internationalism**, Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group, London and New York, 2010, pp. 177, (EUWP).

¹³⁸ 70% of Moroccans have a positive view of the EU and it is the most positively perceived international actor in the country The European Union External Action, "Opinion Poll 2020: Moroccans and the European Union", **The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, The EU Neighbors: South**, 06.01.2021, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/opinion-poll-2020-moroccans-and-european-union_en, (07.06.2021).

¹³⁹ Michael Barnett, Duvall Raymond, "Power in International Politics", **International Organization**, Vol, 59, No. 1, 2005, pp. 39-75.

Relational power examines the EU's global power preconditions through social relations to power.¹⁴⁰ Relational power impacts context. Relational power, as defined by Dahl, is based on social relations rather than realism's control over resources and the will to use them for military purposes.¹⁴¹ Thus, relational power relies on "influence" and "interests" rather than coercion.


Liberal institutionalist scholarship, constructivist and critical theory brought agenda setting to IR. The "relational power" and "realist power" of resource acquisition and agenda setting are crucial to international relations. However, the actor's "normative" profile and power affect agenda setting, as in the EU's or the US's role in setting international norms. Gramsci's definition of power in governmentality literature is critical. The EUGS defines relational power as all of the above. The EU's strategic power and influence on nation-states through capacity development and social relations with civil society also involves governmentality. Foreign intervention shifts relational power from the sovereign power model to the "microphysics" of power including; the civil society, everyday life practices of citizens, human rights promotion, and democracy assistance. Practice theory defines power as influencing citizens' "everyday practices" and "everyday life." Critical and poststructuralist theory takes a Foucault-inspired critical approach to power.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ Barnett and Raymond, p. 42.

¹⁴¹ Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power", **Behavioural Science**, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1957, pp. 201-215.

¹⁴² Niklas Bremberg, Stefan Borg, "Ambiguous Power? A Relational Approach to how the EU Exercises Power in Morocco and Tunisia", **Journal of International Relations and Development**, Vol. 24, 2020, pp. 128-148.

Figure 6: The EU' Traditional Normative Power versus the EUGS Bottom-up Approach based on Relational Power



Source: Created by the author.

According to David Chandler, resilience "highlights the role of local action and local accountability, but it also bears the potential of depoliticizing issues and serving as a "empire in denial". This shows the EU's relational power controversies and ambiguities, especially in Morocco. Morocco's EUGS uncertainty and dispute stem from the EU's strategic goals dominating the partnership.

The EU promoted democracy in Morocco but not Tunisia until 2016. The EUGS does not include Morocco, but Tunisia and Georgia are cited as potential success models that will inspire their regions. Morocco and the EU have the strongest relationship among neighboring countries. After the Arab Spring, Morocco and the EU must cooperate due to their common strategic interests. Security challenges and collaboration, such as irregular migration and terrorist management, border control, and the African Strategy, have enhanced EU-Morocco interdependence. The EU's uncertainty between normative and strategic aims in its Morocco engagement is concerning.

The bottom-up approach and state apparatus influence should be complementary and essential to reform. The power to allow freedom, legalize individual rights, monitor fair elections, and democracy requires state will and

commitment, while central government reforms require citizen adoption and implementation.¹⁴³

According to Joseph, the EU's turn to pragmatic sociology is based on the idea that:

*The more uncertain we are of the "bigger" picture/ global picture, the more we must rely on the small detail of the picture... Resilience is a new governance through denial that shifts the responsibility onto the governed says Joseph.*¹⁴⁴

The resilience concept's focus on citizens as change agents drives the EU's "bottom-up" approach to everyday life. The relational power concept's social component emphasizes the EU's social and relational influence on local actors. As indicated, the EUGS does not explain how the EU proposes to balance state and societal resilience, which are more likely to conflict than to coexist. State resilience can be hard to distinguish between stability of the state institution and status quo, centralization of power, and dominance at the expense of societal resilience.

The pragmatic sociology-based EU intervention is meant to empower partner country citizens. Liberal foreign intervention sought regime and governance transformation. The EU builds local practices and the governed' ability through social and state resilience, guided principled pragmatism.

1.3.3.2. Principled Pragmatism

With the rise of pragmatism in international politics, the focus of European scholarship on international affairs shifted to geopolitics.¹⁴⁵ Consequently, the EUGS is primarily valued for its adoption of the principled pragmatism approach, which combines values and interests. It is believed that principled pragmatism combines both idealism and pragmatism and serves as the EUGS's operational philosophy.¹⁴⁶ Obama applied principled pragmatism during his presidency to reduce international

¹⁴³ There are several reforms in the case of Morocco such as elections and transparency or anti-corruption law introduced by the state that remain breached by the citizens themselves as a result of a lack of political awareness. Despite the Moroccan state and international organizations such as International Transparency campaigns of awareness on corruption, it still remains a common practice although it has reduced. This practice is conducted and promoted by citizens will and it inhibits the full potential execution of several reforms. This is an example of the importance of the complementarity between both Top-Down and Bottom-Up approach to reform and democratization.

¹⁴⁴ Jonathan Joseph, "Governing through Failure and Denial: The New Resilience Agenda", **Millennium – Journal of International Studies**, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2016, pp. 370–390.

¹⁴⁵ Youngs, EUWP, p.131.

¹⁴⁶ Silvia Colombo, "Principled Pragmatism Reset: For a Recalibration of the EU's Diplomatic Engagement in the MENA", **Istituto Affari Internazionali**, IAI Papers, Vol. 21, No. 39, 2021, p. 1-26.

tension in a long-term perspective without resorting to a military solution. The concept was first introduced in American foreign policy and politics to evaluate the performance of US presidents. This was primarily due to the American approach to human rights, the rise of China and Russia.¹⁴⁷ In addition to the traditional normative approach, the EUGS intends to integrate more geopolitical thinking into the EU's strategy through the use of principled pragmatism. Respect for democratic values within the EU institutions and member states serves as the foundation for principled pragmatism, which combines a realistic assessment of the strategic environment surrounding the EU with idealistic aspirations for a better world. This indicates that respect for the rule of law and human rights were to remain pillars of the EU foreign policy. In contrast to the ENP and ESS, the EUGS remains more modest in terms of its idealistic and normative goals. Originally rooted in the concept of Realpolitik as coined by Rochau in opposition to utopianism and which is intended to serve as a:

"Guiding light of political action that does not move in a hazy future but in the present field of vision," its task is not the realization of ideals but the attainment of concrete goals. As a result, it is able to settle for partial results if total achievement is not possible.¹⁴⁸

Principled pragmatism offered vision and flexibility to unite the EU member states divided between those who wanted a more pragmatic, even armed Union and those who wanted to preserve the Union's normative identity. The EU security and development communities saw issues differently.¹⁴⁹ Principled pragmatism could unite the EU member states and communities while adapting to change and preserving its identity.

Principled pragmatism brings political realism to the EU foreign policy by making sensible decisions that match the EU's circumstances and the structural changes' need to move beyond ideals and theories. Several researchers say principled pragmatism is ambiguous and doesn't explain the EU's reaction to issues. The EU interests come first in migrant accords. Ana E. Juncos believes the EU's pragmatic approach entails case-by-case democratization, distinguishing principled from pragmatic. Juncos thinks that one cannot be principled and pragmatic. In a period of geopolitics and strategic power rivalries, the EU pledges to uphold universal

¹⁴⁷ Neil Winn, Stefan Gänzle, "Recalibrating The EU Foreign Policy Vis-à-vis Central Asia: Towards Principled Pragmatism and Resilience", **Routledge Taylor & Francis Online: Geopolitics**, 2022, pp. 1-24.

¹⁴⁸ Giusti Serena, "The European Union Global Strategy and the EU' Maieutic Role", **JMC**, Vol. 58, No. 6, 2020, pp. 1452-1468.

¹⁴⁹ Tocci, FREUGS, p. 70.

ideals and promote democracy worldwide. The EU values cannot be pragmatic. Juncos' pragmatism denies liberal internationalism, universal principles, and morality. The EUGS contrasts "resilience" to "principled pragmatism," but this tension undermines the new foreign policy's "resilience-building" idea.¹⁵⁰

In response to structural changes that are challenging the EU at multiple levels, the principled pragmatism approach to interventionism focuses on human agency rather than central government. This also removes the negative connotation of western interventionism in the MENA, which has been blamed for current issues in the region. This refers to the US' crude interventionism and the EU's relative passivity. Both failed in the MENA. Schmidt argues that resilience under philosophical pragmatism: *"points us to appropriate, realistic and much more source of empowerment which is: the ability to shift from causal forces to consequences."*¹⁵¹

Principled pragmatism emphasizes human agency and long-term effects over immediate causes. Chandler claims that principled pragmatism: *"starts neither from universalist nor cultural relativism in regard to formal institutional frameworks, instead it deals with the effects of their application in particular circumstances."*¹⁵²

The EUGS's principled pragmatism, based on a pragmatic sociological approach, prioritizes a case-by-case approach that tailor foreign policy to targeted contexts. John Dewey and William James developed pragmatism with epistemological complexity and truth uncertainty in mind before the US and the EU adopted it. Pragmatic philosophy rejects "Cartesian" truth and emphasizes practical consequences to determine truth.¹⁵³ Accepting the difference in the contexts and their needs, pragmatism embeds flexibility in its notion of truth. Pragmatist philosophy has been covered by scholars including (Richard Rorty 1982, Hilary Putnam 1994 and Brandon 2011).¹⁵⁴ Local actors are supported to learn from ontological complexity and adapt their daily lives to make constant inner life changes. Principled pragmatism requires responsibility, flexibility, and completeness. The EU relinquishes responsibility to local actors and develops flexibility to account for uncertainty, complexity, and the need to change and take new approaches to issues. The joined-up approach, based on connectivity and complexity, ensures comprehensiveness

¹⁵⁰ Ana E. Juncos, "Resilience as the New EU Foreign Policy Paradigm: A Pragmatist Turn?", **European Security**, Vol. 26, No.1, 2017, pp. 1-18.

¹⁵¹ Jessica Schmidt, "Intuitively Neoliberal? Towards a Critical Understanding of Resilience Governance", **European Journal of International Relations**, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2015, pp. 402–426.

¹⁵² Chandler, p. 29.

¹⁵³ Juncos, p. 5.

¹⁵⁴ Hilary Putnam, **Pragmatism: An Open Question**, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, pp. 120.

mainly in relation to the interconnectedness of local, regional, and global issues. Pragmatism's practicality also acknowledges the importance of power in the promotion of norms. Thus, pragmatic norms can only be promoted when supported with an overall configuration.

The EU's pragmatic move toward the MENA is more US-driven than European. This approach prioritizes strategic and self-interests and realistically assesses the strategic environment without utopian liberal ideology. Realistic strategic assessments determine the EU's international involvement. Pragmatism has theoretical and practical implications. Pragmatism with universal liberal values is principled pragmatism. First, how the EU balances interests and principles while interfering is unclear. Second, the EUGS's selective involvement philosophy and switch from Morocco-Ukraine to Tunisia-Georgia models show that strategic goals trump values. Instead of pragmatism, the EU's "relatively passive" foreign policy will continue. Some scholars have also criticized principled pragmatism as a new western method to remove free market barriers without neo-colonialism.¹⁵⁵ If strategic objectives dominate the EU foreign policy, resistance may increase rather than resilience.

1.3.3.3. Resilience

Resilience was used in the EU environmental policies to promote environmental stability and recovery from environmental crises. The Council Conclusions on the EU approach to resilience (2013) and the Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries for 2013–2020 introduced resilience to the EU foreign policy.¹⁵⁶ According to the Council of the EU 2013, resilience helps citizens, especially children, reach their potential.¹⁵⁷ Under the resilience concept adopted in the EUGS as part of principled pragmatism, the EU and local actors share responsibility because they believe that knowledge transfer without local capacity development and involvement will not bring about change. With a shift toward pragmatism in social sciences, foreign policy, and international relations, resilience has moved from environmental literature to global politics. Resilience, which means

¹⁵⁵ Jonathan Joseph, "Resilience as Embedded Neoliberalism: A Governmentality Approach", **Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses**, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2013, pp. 38–52.

¹⁵⁶ The Council of the European Union, **Council Conclusions on The EU Approach to Resilience 3241st Foreign Affairs Council meeting**, The Council of The EU, Brussels, 2013, p. 1-5, (CCEAR).

¹⁵⁷ The Council of the European Union, CCEAR, p. 4.

"springing back," helps fragile states adapt to crises.¹⁵⁸ Based on complexity and uncertainty, resilience targets societies' internal capacity rather than dependence on external aid and resources.¹⁵⁹ Designed to apply independently to state and society, the EUGS defines resilience as the capacity of states and societies to adapt and reform in response to crises.¹⁶⁰ However, the purpose of maintaining stability through state resiliency is not to foster authoritarianism at the expense of democratization. Societal resilience requires political participation, protection of human rights, robust civil societies, and sustainable development. State resilience, on the other hand, refers to the stability and efficacy of state institutions.¹⁶¹ Given that state resilience is based on stability while societal resilience is based on change and reform, and considering the contemporary need for stability for the EU strategic needs as pointed out by Nathalie Tocci, the concept of resilience risks being used in favor of stability rather than change and reform, which tends more toward realpolitik than resilience.¹⁶² However, the EU High Representative chose resilience for its flexibility to balance reform and stability by emphasizing the need for the former. Resilience would help secure states without securitizing issues.

"This does not mean supporting stability by condoning authoritarianism. State and social resilience are interdependent. We've been clear with our partners publicly and privately," states the EUGS.¹⁶³

Resilience targets societal and state resilience by developing locally based, flexible, and adaptable solutions to problems. Resilience would avoid securitization by focusing on self-development rather than external threats. The EUGS targets state resilience through the rule of law and civil society support. Resilience targets the rule of law, civil society, and economic inequality. Resilience also assumes local actors drive long-term change.¹⁶⁴

This resilience-based approach requires anticipation and preparation, which takes time but yields more lasting results. Resilience builds a culture of preparedness and anticipation that shapes the future. A stable, self-reforming nation is secure. Thus,

¹⁵⁸ Nathalie Tocci, "Resilience and the Role of the European Union in the World", **Contemporary Security Policy**, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2020, pp. 176-194, (RREUW).

¹⁵⁹ David Chandler, "Resilience and the 'Everyday': Beyond the Paradox of 'Liberal Peace'", **Review of international studies**, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2015, pp. 27-48.

¹⁶⁰ The European Union Global Strategy, IRY1, p. 27.

¹⁶¹ Tocci, RREUW, p. 185.

¹⁶² Tocci, RREUW, p. 186.

¹⁶³ EUGS, IRYI, p. 23.

¹⁶⁴ Tocci, INTERVIEW, p. 5.

a resilient state can adapt. Thus, a resilient democracy is secure. Authoritarian states, however, are unchangeable and insecure.

Resilience is an emancipatory form of governance that promotes democracy and security. Resilience includes flexibility, uncertainty, and preparedness for the unknown. Resilience governance prepares states for shocks and potential crises and prevents them by addressing their root causes in a coordinated, comprehensive, and flexible manner.¹⁶⁵

Resilience shifts in-state building discourses and practices from liberal peace's top-down institution building to a bottom-up approach. This bottom-up approach focuses on citizen, community, society, and state resilience. Thus, resilience as a foreign policy approach is expected to limit western actors by emphasizing the ineffectiveness and limitations of the conditionality or coercion approach long used by liberal/universal theology to promote democracy.¹⁶⁶ Resilience promotes sustainable development through social and state governance. Development and security integrate state and society resilience.¹⁶⁷ Resilience emphasizes crisis management flexibility and innovation. The EUGS defines resilience as investing in fragile states to prevent crises.¹⁶⁸ As stated by the-then High Representative/ Vice President Federica Mogherini,

*One fourth of the world's population lives in fragile States or societies. We want to prevent these fragile situations from turning into new wars, new humanitarian catastrophes, or new refugee crises. This is what we call resilience. While repressive states are inherently fragile in the long term, there are many ways to build inclusive, prosperous and secure societies. For this reason, the EU will pursue tailor-made policies to support inclusive and accountable governance critical for the fight against terrorism, corruption and organized crime and for the protection of human rights...through the long term engagement we will persistently seek to advance human rights-based approaches to the reform of justice, security and defense sectors and support fragile states in building capacities.*¹⁶⁹

Political, developmental, and humanitarian aid will support capacity development. Resilience balances liberal peacebuilding and stability. Resilience is adopted to complement and concretize the EU normative agenda.¹⁷⁰ Resilience's

¹⁶⁵ Melinda Cooper, Jeremy Walker, "Genealogies of Resilience: From Systems Ecology to the Political Economy of Crisis Adaptation", **Security Dialogue**, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2011, pp. 143–160.

¹⁶⁶ Juncos, p. 4.

¹⁶⁷ EUGS, IRY1, p. 23.

¹⁶⁸ The European Commission, "The EU Presents its Strategy for more Resilient States and Societies around the World, The European Commission", **The Official Website of the European Union**, 07.06.2017, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_1554 , (10.11.2020), (SRSS).

¹⁶⁹ The European Union Global Strategy, IRY1, p. 26.

¹⁷⁰ Tocci, RREUW, p. 180.

dynamic nature should allow the EU to design policies based on partner countries' contexts.

The EU's resilience approach, inspired by the Arab Spring and the subsequent migration flows, emphasizes anticipation, preparation, and slow but lasting change to avoid unpredictable crises. Thus, resilience emphasizes the capacity to build, maintain, or restore core functions and the cohesion and ability of societies to manage opportunities peacefully and sustainably. Resilience encourages context-based reorganization and renewal, unlike democratization, which is linear.¹⁷¹ The EU's resilience strategy for entrenched authoritarianism involves strengthening the rule of law in governance, supporting civil society, and reducing economic inequality. The EUGS links state resilience to societal resilience. State resilience depends on improving governance, accountability, civil society spaces, pluralism, coexistence, youth, culture, and civil actors. Corruption, judiciary and defense reform, and civil society strategic communication support. To prevent social unrest, radicalism, and irregular migration, resilience must fight poverty and inequality. The EUGS' bottom-up approach to democratization emphasizes domestic actors' role in state resilience. The EU relational power also influences partner countries' progress.¹⁷² The EUGS details resilience strategies for Eastern Europe and the Southern neighborhood, unlike principle pragmatism.

Georgia and Tunisia are designated as key countries for the EU's resilience project, and it is believed that they will not only be successful but also serve as a model for their respective regions. According to the EUGS, the development, democratization, and prosperity of Georgia and Tunisia would reverberate throughout their respective regions.¹⁷³ Resilience, on the other hand, has garnered scholarly interest and criticism for its emphasis on stable state institutions and structures over democratization. Additionally, resilience is criticized for being vague. According to scholars, the relationship between state and societal resilience is antagonistic. Thus, state resilience may conflict with societal resilience.¹⁷⁴ For instance, the promotion and emphasis on the stability of state institutions may go hand-in-hand with restrictions on civil society actors whose effectiveness remains under state control. In

¹⁷¹ Tocci, RREUW, p. 181.

¹⁷² Tocci, RREUW, p. 186.

¹⁷³ The EUGS, IRY1, p. 25.

The EUGS, IRY2, p. 16.

The EUGS, IRY2, p. 22.

¹⁷⁴ Pol Bagues, "From Resilience to Strategic Autonomy: A Shift in the Implementation of the Global Strategy?", **EU-LISTCO: Policy Papers Series**, No. 9, 2021, pp. 3-16.

other words, the EU's approach, which aims to promote a bottom-up approach to democratization and change, may be counterproductive given the importance of state stability to the security of the Union. Uncertainty surrounds the Union's strategy to strike a balance between state and societal resilience, as well as its ability to influence partner states through what is known as relational power in order to facilitate societal resilience. This is particularly difficult in the context of the MENA region, where authoritarianism rather than democratization is the predominant trend. Resilience also stems from the US National Security Strategy released in 2015 with an emphasis on border control and externalization.¹⁷⁵ Extending resilience to normative change remains ambiguous, and compared to the democratization approach, it is not only less transformative but also creates additional room for ambiguity in measuring change and transformation in instances of authoritarianism.¹⁷⁶ Despite the EUGS prioritizing resilience over democratization, democratization remains distinct from resilience, and it establishes clear standards and criteria for the EU credibility and the state in the reform process. The degree to which a state is resilient is distinct from its degree of democratization, primarily because resilience cannot be operationalized and, as a result, is difficult to measure. This carries the risk of being less aspirational in the name of realism. In addition, the list of objectives and the EU's capabilities to achieve them are deemed incoherent. Some academics have interpreted resilience's origins in the US national security as a shift toward "realpolitik." It also carries the risk of a restrictive interpretation that prioritizes security over normative reform. The shift to realpolitik stems from the assumption that the EU will "turn a blind eye" to political reform failures. Others, however, have linked resilience with democratization as a result of the bottom-up strategy.¹⁷⁷ Given that it is unclear how the EU could simultaneously be committed to international liberal values and maintains a pragmatic foreign policy, the bottom-up approach itself has been viewed as controversial.

Resilience is also perceived to be both ambiguous and a tool for securitization.¹⁷⁸ Critical scholars of the concepts argue that the resilience approach can turn non-security issues into security issues. Over the past decade, resilience has become a quasi-universal solution to governance issues like climate change,

¹⁷⁵ The White House Washington, **National Security Strategy**, The White House, Washington: DC, 2015, pp. 1-48.

Nathan J. Lucas, Kathleen J. McInnis, "The 2015 National Security Strategy: Authorities, Changes", **The Congressional Research Service Issues for Congress**, CRS Report, 2016, pp.1-26.

¹⁷⁶ Sanahuja, p. 406.

¹⁷⁷ Tobias Adolfson, **The Rise of Resilience in EU Foreign Policy: A Shift of Paradigm or Parlance?** (Master' Thesis), Uppsala University, Uppsala: Sweden, 2018, pp. 2-55.

¹⁷⁸ Tocci, RREUW, p. 185.

education, indigenous history, development, and terrorism. Thus, resilience has linked democratization, governance, and security. The concept is also part of the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development and several American National Security documents since 2015.¹⁷⁹

Although Morocco is not mentioned in the EUGS, the partnership with Morocco is crucial for evaluating the Union's global strategy toward the South for a number of reasons. In addition to the country's geopolitical significance for the EU's core interests, including the African Strategy and border control, the EU-Morocco partnership has assumed a privileged position relative to other partnerships. Morocco's strong desire to strengthen ties with the EU and adapt to the EU reforms, as well as the Union's security interests in the partnership, make it a crucial case study for evaluating the EUGS. As the only neighboring country with direct borders with the EU via Gibraltar and only 14 kilometers from Spain, Morocco has become crucial for the EU irregular migration goals. Morocco, a source of irregular migrants to the Union, has also become a transit point and host country for Sub-Saharan migrants en route to the Union. Increased security interests between the EU and Morocco in the aftermath of the Arab Spring have given a new impetus to the partnership with Morocco's growing agency. Nevertheless, despite the high stakes that both partners have in a successful cooperation, the EU-Morocco partnership continues to be hampered by traditional patterns of obstruction. The EU-Morocco partnership is also the most advanced and most complex in the region of the South, encompassing relations of trade, security and political influence. Morocco also remains an important case study in terms of assessing the EU' approach and foreign policy in relation to the dilemma of change versus status quo especially in the post-Arab Spring under the EUGS.

¹⁷⁹ Sven Biscop, "The EU Global Strategy: Realpolitik with European Characteristics", **Egmont Institute**, Security Policy Brief, No. 75, 2016, pp. 1-6.

Table 1: Deconstruction of The Concepts Of Societal And State Resilience In Line With The Peace And Security Framework

Societal Resilience- PEACE	STATE RESILIENCE: SECURITY/STABILITY
Social Stability	Sovereignty
Socio-Economic Development	Border Control And Boundaries (Non-Physical Borders)
Education And Health	National Integrity
State-Society Relations	Defense And Security
Political Pluralism, Elections, Freedoms And Justice	
	Good Governance
Everyday life behaviors of resilience/ Solved collective action problem	
Trust in State institutions	
Trust in Civil society	
Effective civil associations, civic culture and a solved collective action problem	

Source: Created by the author.

1.3.3.4. The Internal-External Nexus and the Security of the EU: Irregular Migration

The EUGS prioritized EU security. Due to irregular migration, an internal-external nexus links the Union's security to its neighbors". Thus, the Union's neighborhood success and domestic stability are linked. The EUGS believes irregular migration management requires more than a security plan. The EUGS states that irregular migration incorporates the global strategy's goals and requires the Union's ability to effect deep change in neighboring countries. Due to the increasing movement of people from places that are unable to be resilient, in the sense of reforming while maintaining stability, and the associated consequences for the Union's domestic and political resilience, peace and security in the neighborhood are seen as a prerequisite for the Union's.

The Union and its neighbors must be resilient to reform and adapt while sustaining stability. The EUGS considers irregular migration a security risk that

requires further precautions. Long-term irregular migration management involves peace and development in neighboring countries. The global strategy links the Union's long-term security, peace, and prosperity to its neighbors'. A rich, stable Union surrounded by a ring of fire rather than friends can use contextual obstacles to grow itself and its partners.¹⁸⁰

The EUGS priorities are first and foremost the security of the Union, establishing state and societal resilience to the South and East neighborhood, an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, supporting and expanding the role of regional cooperative regional orders, and the preservation of global order.

The EUGS addresses defense and security, multilateralism, fragility and conflict, migration, political change and democratization, climate change, terrorism, and global and regional collaboration. EUGS targets security-critical regions geographically. The EU has promoted Eastern partnerships and worked with Turkey to address common issues like migration, terrorism, energy, trade, and multilateralism through the EUGS. The EUGS sought unprecedented partnership-based engagement with African states. Given the region's political insecurity, the EU's African strategy is crucial to its worldwide strategic goals. Morocco, a paradigm for democratization and transformation in most EU foreign policy publications, is absent from the global plan. Instead, Morocco's strategic importance to the EU's African Strategy and irregular migration is underlined.¹⁸¹

1.3.3.5. Selective Engagement under the EUGS

The EUGS's decision to replace Morocco and Ukraine with Tunisia and Georgia and to list only two potential success stories among sixteen partner countries has prompted criticism that the strategy is inconsistent with its optimistic aspirations and is primarily a strategic, interest-based, and security-focused approach. The selective approach has raised questions about the Union's ability to implement the EUGS as intended. Implementing state and societal resilience and seeking a holistic approach to the issue of irregular migration that addresses its root causes remains a source of uncertainty given the Union's pragmatic approach and the inconsistencies in the global strategy, which highlight the dominance of security and strategic

¹⁸⁰ Charlemagne, "Europe's Ring of Fire", **The Economist**, 20.09.2014, <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21618846-european-Unions-neighbourhood-more-troubled-ever-europes-ring-fire> (13.04.2019).

¹⁸¹ Luis Barroso, Marc Cruise, "The European Union' Global Strategy: Complementarity and Specialization", **Portuguese Journal of Social Sciences**, Vol. 18. No. 3, 2019, pp. 359-383.

interests. The strategy is also criticized for the ambiguity of the concepts of resilience and principled pragmatism, as well as its failure to specify the tools necessary to achieve its broad objectives.¹⁸²

The EUGS aims to develop partnerships to address the root causes of irregular migration, promote legal migration and mobility, protect asylum seekers, combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and facilitate returns, readmission, and reintegration. The EU's greatest investment plan for Africa and the EU's neighborhood aims to create jobs, promote sustainable growth in vulnerable regions, and focus on youth and women. The EU also supported African cooperation institutions to find African solutions to African problems and create an equal collaboration with African partners. The EU increased civil society support in education, culture, and youth to build social resilience on the continent.

In contrast to its progeny, the ESS, in which irregular migration did not figure as a threat or risk, migration is the most frequently cited issue in the EUGS.¹⁸³ Even though it is not explicitly listed as a security threat, it is regarded as a major security concern.

*We live in a time of an existential crisis, and the European project is being questioned. The EUGS describes the state of the union and its incapacity to deal with the massive influx of migrants as never before has our unity been so threatened.*¹⁸⁴

Migration is incorporated into the EUGS through the publication of two complementary agendas that lay the groundwork for the future incorporation of the issue into the global strategy: the Agenda on Security and the Agenda on migration.¹⁸⁵ In the EUGS, the internal and global security of the EU, are highly interconnected and interdependent. Border control is cited as the keyword and linchpin of EU internal security and peace.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸² Bargues, p. 4-7.


¹⁸³ Maria Mälksoo, "From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy: External Policy, Internal Purpose", **Contemporary Security Policy**, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2016, p. 374-388.

¹⁸⁴ Tocci, INTERVIEW, p. 6-8.

¹⁸⁵ The European Commission, "The European Agenda on Security: Legislative Documents", **The Official Website of the European Union**, Brussels, 30.10.2019, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/european-agenda-security-legislative-documents_en, (08.07.2020), (EAS).
The European Commission, **Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council: Twentieth Progress Report Toward an Effective and Genuine Security Union**, The European Commission, COM (2019) 552 Final, Brussel, 2019, pp. 1-17, (TEGSU).

¹⁸⁶ The European Commission, "The European Agenda on Migration four years on: Marked Progress Needs Consolidation in the Face of Volatile Situation", **The Official Website of the European Union**, 16.10.2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_6075, (06.05.2020), (EAM).

Figure 7: The Process of Tackling the Root Causes Behind the Issue of Irregular Migration under the EUGS'



Source: Created by the author.

Other related objectives include shared prosperity and equality which the EUGS does not operationalize nor specify how it will be achieved.

1.4. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

1.4.1. Literature Review about Resistance and Irregular Migration

Below there will be literature review about resistance and irregular migration.

1.4.1.1. Irregular Migration as a Form of Resistance to Patterns of Domination

The EUGS has adopted the concept of resilience and pragmatism based on a bottom up approach that emphasizes the local agency, the citizen and civil actors' responsibility in bringing about change and growing self-government defined as the 'microphysical actors of power'.

Political realism eliminates the political aspect of the EU foreign interventionism and emphasizes social interactions and institutionalism based on the EU's relational control over local actors through knowledge transfer and capacity building. This approach also focuses on citizens' everyday life patterns and behaviors influenced by the EU's societal and relational power to build resilience in the long term and bring about a bottom-up change to secure the Union's long-term resilience considering the internal-external nexus between the Union's stability and that of its neighborhood due to irregular migration.

This research adopts the concepts of resistance and domination and focuses on citizens' daily lives to argue that the EU's "de-politicized" but securitized approach

both through the externalization policy and the EUGS instead of promoting resilience creates a paradox of strengthening patterns of dominance, which leads to resistance rather than resilience and irregular migration.

This study uses critical constructivism to characterize irregular migration as resistance against dominance. It examines dominance in knowledge production, policymaking, and migration management in the EU-Morocco relations at the bilateral and domestic levels of the EU intervention. This paper also examines Morocco's resistance to the EU's pragmatic approach. Critical constructivism, which resists epistemological, ontological, and practical dominance through knowledge production, emphasizes marginalized representation in scientific production for emancipation. The mainstream theoretical frameworks that have dominated knowledge production at the expense of the 'other' have represented and supported the 'power holders' and dominants. Critical constructivism and post-structuralism study power as a method for creating alternative realities through marginalization of the global powerless. Critical constructivism and post-structuralism have used hermeneutics, text analysis, and linguistic tools to represent marginalized people and realities by elevating local knowledge to mainstream knowledge. In modern international relations, irregular warfare and migration have intensified resistance to dominance.

This study is based on critical constructivism and post-structuralism in general, and on deconstruction as adopted by Foucault, binary opposition by Derrida, and works such as "Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance" and "Domination and the Art of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts" by Scott, applied to study the issue of irregular migration as a form of resistance to domination and related everyday life forms of resistance by the Moroccan population and the migrants at the border. This study also refers to Putnam's work to explain the ineffectiveness and limitations of the EU's bottom up approach and principled pragmatism in the context of Morocco.

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the relationship between peace and security has assumed a prominent position in the production of IR knowledge and in the formulation of policy. Critical approaches emphasize the significance of emancipation for the purpose of long-term peace and security, whereas security-oriented foreign policies have maintained furthering forms of dominance in addressing contemporary security issues.

This thesis argues that irregular migration is a form of resistance to three forms of domination. 1- The EU's 'security' perspective dominates the definition of irregular

migration, marginalizing Morocco's (state and population) needs, perspectives, and interests. This epistemological domination informs policy making lacking depth and consequently ineffective. 2- The domination of the EU's Eurocentric approach toward the migration issue based on its own context guides its approach at the bilateral level that is dominated by border control and the frontier leading to patterns of resistance from the migrants. Consequently, this has led to further security and humanitarian crises. This approach based on outsourcing marginalizes Morocco' context needs and exacerbates the already existing issues related to the youth given the country socioeconomic infrastructural limitations. This approach also makes strategic interests in the bilateral cooperation more dominant reducing the EU' potential of influence on the Moroccan state to bring about needed genuine political reform to handle the issues related to the Moroccan youth. 3- Increase in domestic patterns of domination resulting from the EU's pragmatism and the elimination of the political element to the EU interference leading to unprecedented increase in Moroccan youth irregular migration flows toward the Union.

Moroccan irregular migration's 'symptomatic' root causes are being exacerbated by the EU's selective and pragmatic engagement, which targeted Morocco for strategic interests at the expense of normative ones and in relation to migration management as a Buffer zone rather than an equal partner. The EU' s choice of following a pragmatic turn in its foreign policy deviates the attention from the original root cause, that is the nature of the political power and the consolidation of oligarchic rule which results into inequalities and societal malaise. These forms of dominance are based on and legitimized by power determined knowledge production that overwhelmingly emphasizes the security side of the migration issue and the interests of the dominant/western countries over the peace related issues and the interests of the marginalized South populations. The literature review shows a domination of approaches that study the migration issue through a security approach in marginalization of the peace-related elements to the issue. Mainstream literature mainly approaches migration through concepts of national security, societal security, border, sovereignty, and the priorities of the Global North rather than a peace approach based on development, peace, equality, positive mobility, exchange, and human rights, which better reflects the needs and interests of the Global South.

The EU must be able to address domestic forms of dominance that lead to youth resistance through irregular migration, which is an act of resistance through a "exit" of borders and boundaries that requires political as well as social influence to

achieve the EUGS's state and societal resilience goals. The EU must be able to balance its own interests and perspectives with those of "others" at the bilateral level to be resilient to irregular migration. This requires an epistemological representation of non-western nation-states' concerns, perspectives, and contexts on migration. The EU's bilateral dominance exacerbates domestic forms of dominance underpinning irregular migration by framing the issue from its own perspective and according to its own security and strategic needs. The EU's externalization policy and passive approach to Morocco's democratization by prioritizing strategic/pragmatic interests in irregular migration and African strategy go against Morocco's population needs of political liberalization and socioeconomic development.

Referring to Putnam's case study, this study argues that the political element is crucial to changing other fields because of its impact on state-society relations, society's trust in state and political institutions, and other indicators. This study examines Morocco's ongoing issues, including informal corruption, informal economy, informal politics, irregular migration, and potential radicalization, using Scott's model of resistance and dominance. The domestic level analysis of Morocco covers three layers of resistance: low-level/everyday life hidden transcripts, middle-level resistance, and high-level resistance (i.e., irregular migration, irregular warfare, terrorism). The study uses Putnam's notion of informal institutions from "Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy" to analyze Moroccan household milieu.

1.4.1.2. Patterns of Domination and Resistance in the EU-Morocco Migration Management Approach and Cooperation: A Three Level Analytical Framework

This study examines irregular migration as a form of resistance to forms of domination at the bilateral, domestic, and knowledge production levels. Migration irregularities are caused by inequality, asymmetries, and power relations. This study evaluates the EUGS bottom-up approach and pragmatism in the case of irregular migration with Morocco using Foucault's "Knowledge and Power," Derrida's deconstruction, James C. Scott's work on dominance and resistance, and Robert D. Putnam's work on social capital in "Making Democracy Work."

The reason for choosing to focus on microphysical actors of power and analyzing everyday life practices, forms of resistance and dominations stems from

the EU' argument that the EUGS pragmatic approach/bottom up approach seeks to strengthen the resilience of the microphysical actors of power, citizens and civil actors, by developing their capacity while eliminating the political element directed toward the central government and making change from above. This study argues that while the bottom up approach is an important part of the democratization process, eliminating the political element to the EU' interference and solely focusing on the local actors results in the further centralization of power, the exacerbation of existing patterns of domination and the weakening of those same local actors including the citizens and civil actors.

This as a result, shows that the EU' approach also fails in achieving state and societal resilience given that it strengthens state patterns of domination further weakening state-society relations, causing more collective action problems and exacerbating the root causes behind the irregular migration issue. As a result, this study argues that the EU' approach leads to resistance rather than to resilience. Accordingly, this study examines the patterns of the domination attached to the EU' approach and the forms of resistance of citizens in the case of Morocco including the act of irregular migration.

Knowledge Production Around Irregular Migration and Patterns of Domination; This study initially examines epistemic dominance over irregular migration through knowledge creation. In this chapter, western countries, particularly the EU, dominate irregular migration knowledge creation. Non-western states' concerns, views, and interests are ignored despite their equal involvement in the EU foreign policy and irregular migration management. Western definitions, policymaking, and agenda setting on irregular migration exclude other nations from the knowledge level and compensate for their representation at the policy level, which is impacted by power relations.

Bilateral Level Forms of Domination: The Frontier Approach through the Externalization Policy and EUGS pragmatism ; The second level of dominance is bilateral. In the externalisation policy, the EU interests dominate bilaterally. The EU continues to dominate irregular migration relations with Morocco. This is done using an epistemological, ontological, and methodological approach to irregular migration that prioritises the EU interests over those of Morocco. The EU's choice to outsource sub-Saharan African migration control to Morocco shows its dominance. Morocco's interests and context are ignored in the EU's irregular migration management.

Domestic Level Patterns of Domination: Inequalities and Root Causes Behind Irregular Migration-Assessing the EUGS' Principled pragmatism to Fostering resilience; At the third level of analysis is domestic dominance underlying youth irregular migration. Domestic dominance and power relations are the "root" of irregular migration. However, the EU's selection of principled pragmatism, which is characterised by selective engagement, and the bottom-up approach targeting state-societal resilience through relational power is theoretically and practically at odds with the EUGS goal of addressing irregular migration's root causes. In truth, the EU-dominated response to irregular migration at the ontological and epistemological levels of knowledge generation, bilateral, and policymaking levels exacerbates domestic dominance tendencies underlying irregular migration. Strategic interests based on an EU-dominated perspective limit the EU's efficacy and ability to address irregular migration's core causes. Most crucially, the EU strategy strengthens Morocco's informal state, the monarchy, and the corporate and political elite, creating an oligarchy. This is also linked to a decrease in human rights, young political liberalisation, state-society interactions, corruption, and the EU programmes to address these issues from inside and below. As will be shown in the research, democratisation measures implemented after the 2011 demonstrations have strengthened authoritarianism rather than political liberalisation in Morocco. The EU's political realism, which eliminates political interventions and prioritises strategic goals over population and youth needs, has exacerbated this pattern.

According to Robert Putnam and James C. Scott, in a cooperative setting, the EUGS's bottom-up method would work. Political dominance and power relations must be addressed for societal and state-society cooperation and confidence. Resistance is more common than resilience in situations of established domination and inequality, a collective action dilemma. Dominance breeds opposition. These include breaking the law and destroying property to fight inequities. Irregular migration is a crucial form of resistance since it shows a loss of faith in one's nation-state and in citizens' agency and power to change. This is especially true if other forms of resistance are present or if they are confronted with strength and violence, such demonstrations. Morocco is relevant to EU irregular migration policy. The EU dominates bilateral relations with Morocco and irregular migration knowledge production. These two types of dominance, established and supported by the EU even through the EUGS, hinder the management of the root reasons and domestic dominance patterns that caused the record surge in irregular flows from Morocco.

1.4.1.3. The EUGS: A Reading Through James C. Scott *Everyday Life* Forms of Domination and Resistance

James C. Scott, drawing on George Eliot and George Orwell, studies how dominance generates counterhegemonic behavior and discourse among peasants in hidden spaces and undeclared forms. The study of domination, which embeds forms of superiority and inferiority and implies the use of power to maintain the domination of the powerful or elite, on Malay peasants is argued to function similarly in other settings where domination is exercised. Infra-politics, or hidden transcripts, are behaviors or discourses that occur outside the public space to resist public space dominance. Peasants in Malay and Southeast Asia show patterns of dominance and resistance that can be studied at other levels of society. As argued by James C. Scott:

“Structurally similar forms of domination will bear a family resemblance to one another”, similarly “equally functioning forms of domination will also, other things, equal elicit reactions and patterns of resistance that are broadly comparable”.¹⁸⁷

The subordinated or dominated groups usually create settings outside the one dominated to share critique of domination and perform “hidden” acts of resistance.¹⁸⁸ The dominated groups fear openly challenging their dominance.¹⁸⁹ Thus, they create offstage dissent to the official transcript.¹⁹⁰ Dissent can range from creating and defending a subculture and religion to the dominant one in the country to opposing the official transcript maintained and dominated by the dominant power.¹⁹¹ These groups protest material and dignity exploitation. Subordinate groups can rebel in many ways, from creating a new culture or religion to breaking laws like “not respecting road lights” and others. These daily acts of resistance create an order that opposes the power holders without voicing dissent. Between the powerful’s public transcript and the “hidden” transcript, dominants and subordinates struggle to resist through deference.¹⁹² In this case, domination generates deference, that is where there is domination there exist deference which can take different forms based on the level of domination.

¹⁸⁷ James C. Scott, **Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts**, Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 1990, pp. 10-250, (DOMINATION).

¹⁸⁸ Scott, DOMINATION, p. 11.

¹⁸⁹ Scott, DOMINATION, p. 11.

¹⁹⁰ Scott, DOMINATION, p. 13, 21, 198.

¹⁹¹ Scott, DOMINATION, p. 108.

¹⁹² Scott, DOMINATION, p. 184.

Scott claims, referring to Nietzsche's "Ressentiment", that where there is dominance, there is resistance.¹⁹³ While the public transcript usually cannot tell the whole story about power relations in the "domination-resistance" pattern, studying infra-politics of the powerless through off-stage or hidden transcripts reflects the forms of relations between and levels of domination and resistance.¹⁹⁴ This is so because the study of everyday forms of deference shows the daily impact of power. According to Scott, forms of stratification provide:

*fairly reliable guide to who gives orders and who receives them ... the hidden transcript represents a discourse or an act that is ordinarily excluded from the public transcript of subordinated by the exercise of power.*¹⁹⁵

Power subjugates and controls the dominated. By doing so, the dominant power maintains public space control and legitimacy, subordinating the subjugated and their networks of power.¹⁹⁶ Because of this, power and dominance networks cannot be studied or seen on the public or official stage, which is controlled by the dominant and power holder. Infra-politics¹⁹⁷ can be used to study this dominance, which consists of off-stage resistance acts that range from silent acts of breaking the rules to middle range ones where demonstration and resistance to the domination is voiced in public to high range ones that can take the form of insurgency, irregular warfare, or irregular movement that resists borders and boundaries. Barrington Moore outlined the oppressed's tasks as follows;

*Range from the main task of undermining the justification by which the dominant justifies its stratum to the least radical step of criticizing the stratum for violating norms by which they rule to accusing them of failing to observe the principles of their rule ... all the way to repudiating the very principles by which they dominate which consists of the most radical step*¹⁹⁸

Coercive dominance is more likely to provoke opposition. The classical aggression theory of social psychology states that the natural desire for freedom and autonomy shared by all humans triggers acts of opposition when limited by force.¹⁹⁹ In the face of overt threats like punishment for public dissent or acts of opposition in patterns of dominance, subordinated actors may choose to appear compliant while

¹⁹³ Scott, DOMINATION, p. 38.

¹⁹⁴ Scott, DOMINATION, p. 2.

¹⁹⁵ Scott, DOMINATION, p. 23.

¹⁹⁶ Scott, DOMINATION, p. 45.

¹⁹⁷ Infra-politics is defined by James C. Scott as all forms of resistance that are below the 'line'.

See, Scott, Chapter Seven "The Infra-politics of Subordinate Groups", p. 183.

¹⁹⁸ Scott, DOMINATION, p. 91.

Barrington Moore Jr., **Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt**, White Plains, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Eds. 1987, pp. 3-109, (REVOLT).

¹⁹⁹ Scott, DOMINATION, p. 109.

secretly resisting.²⁰⁰ In Scott's study, dignity's private and public nature causes resistance. Publicly humiliated people are least likely to follow the rules of the dominant power.²⁰¹

The power-resistance cycle is also important. Power tends to increase surveillance and control as resistance grows, which can actually increase resistance. As stated by Foucault as well in the History of Sexuality "*where there is power, there is resistance and yet or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.*"²⁰²

On Michel Foucault's Knowledge and Power nexus, Colin Gordon stated that,

*the binary division between resistance and non-resistance is an unreal one. The existence of those who seem to rebel is a warren of minute, individual, autonomous tactics and strategies which counter and inflect the visible facts of overall domination and whose purposes and calculations, desires and choices resist any simple division into the political and apolitical... the schema of a strategy of resistance as vanguard of politicization needs to be subjected to re-examination and account must be taken of resistance whose strategy is one of evasion.*²⁰³

In "Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Resistance," Scott describes various types of resistance. According to Scott, resistance can vary based on the level of dominance; this can primarily take two forms: passive resistance and active resistance. 1- everyday defiance that is typically concealed and unstated, and 2- public defiance that is voiced and declared in public spaces.²⁰⁴

Resistance to slavery in the US has dominated the literature on resistance. Resistance includes sabotage, theft, cultural resistance, and false compliance.²⁰⁵ The dominant's public sanctions also affect public resistance. Scott says chosen forms of resistance reflect their conditions and challenges.²⁰⁶ According to Barrington Moore, "Flight" or "EXIT" has historically been man's most common and effective response to dominance, especially under the Mogul System, their oppressive agrarian systems, and the peasants' "avoidance" of this system through flight.²⁰⁷

In Southeast Asia, Scott's research on peasant resistance and dominance shows the same trend. As Scott argues, Southeast Asia's Malay communities have

²⁰⁰ Scott, DOMINATION, p. 109.

²⁰¹ Scott, DOMINATION, p. 113.

²⁰² Scott, DOMINATION, p. 111.

²⁰³ James C. Scott, **Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance**, Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 1985, pp. 9-389, (WWEAK).

²⁰⁴ Scott, WWEAK, p. 32.

²⁰⁵ Scott, WWEAK, p. 34.

²⁰⁶ Scott, WWEAK, p. 14.

²⁰⁷ Barrington Moore, **Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World**, Penguin University Books: U.K, 1996, pp. 3-484, (SORIGINS).

developed a trend of "movement" as a form of resistance to indigenous leaders and colonial rulers domination.²⁰⁸ In Malay society, "exiting" has been the preferred form of resistance to dominance and oppression.

In the words of Barrington Moore,

*So long as there was land frontier and so long as control over man power rather than land was the basis of surplus extraction ... the possibility of what one writer called 'avoidance protest' has proved more attractive than the risk of open confrontation.*²⁰⁹

"Avoidance," "exit," and "flight" have long been used to resist dominance networks. In addition to "exit", Scott studied other routine resistance acts against wages, tenancy, rents, and resource distribution in Malay Sedaka and other stratified societies.²¹⁰ Theft and violence during protests are common forms of resistance to inequality, stratification, and dominance. In the context of entrenched inequality, those at the margin struggle to gain benefit by stealing or other illegal acts. Theft is one of these routine resistance acts by which the subordinated class exerts pressure and regains what it believes is taken by the dominant through "self-help".²¹¹

Acts of resistance have revolutionary goals and oppose the dominant. Organized resistance tends to be cooperative, principled, and revolutionary, embodies intentions against dominance itself.²¹² Formal or informal resistance can be declared or hidden, individual or collective, public or anonymous.

Based on this work, irregular migration of Moroccan youth in unprecedented ways has increased due to domestic patterns of dominance that do not respond to routine acts of resistance like social malaise, youth theft, and unprecedented drug and crime use. These are mostly done by unemployed youth who have given up on education to secure a good future. Since 2015, stated resistance has been violent and imprisoned. Morocco's GDP and social capital metrics like unemployment, poverty, and socioeconomic development are lower than Middle Eastern war-torn countries like Palestine. Morocco's governmental authority is dividing its economy and society. Youth malaise and a poor image of politicians and political institutions are generated by political-business elite embedding and social class inequalities. Youth distrust political institutions and their ability to change. Inequalities and hidden dominance, which the government claims to reform but cannot, leave youth

²⁰⁸ Scott, WWEAK, p. 245.

²⁰⁹ Scott, WWEAK, p. 245.

²¹⁰ Scott, WWEAK, p. 281, 291.

²¹¹ Scott, WWEAK, p. 291.

²¹² Scott, WWEAK, p. 292.

despairing. The youth's hopelessness in changing dominant patterns that generate societal cleavages drives them to the "high range" of resistance through "fish boats," where death is more likely than peace, justice, and liberty.

For the purpose of the analysis of this research, this study adopts three forms of resistance at the domestic level of analysis that are based on the level of the domination patterns.

I—Hidden Resistance—Low range: Despite state and NGO efforts, informal corruption in Morocco remains high. Corruption also hinders state-led reforms and good governance. Drug use by "hopeless" youth increased in the last decade, leading to theft and social unrest. These acts of theft and violence by youth under the "drugs effect" are mostly committed by unemployed youth who have no future and dropped out of school. Privatization has also led to low-quality public schools that are only accessible to those who cannot afford private schools.

II- Declared Resistance-Middle Range: Protests, petitions, demonstrations. Morocco has seen more protests and demonstrations since 2015 than the 2011 February Movement. The post-2015 protests over the Trash track fisherman's death rekindled the conflict between Rabat, Morocco's central state, and the Rif region, which has a history of protesting the monarchy and expressing its non-Arab Amazigh identity. The region without state representation or services has a high unemployment rate and no universities or factories. In this case, Rif population irregular migration to Europe is high. Most Moroccan emigrants to Europe are from the Rif region. Unemployed teachers and doctors protested across Morocco after the state used force and imprisoned journalists. Despite its development, Morocco has striking regional inequalities, with Rabat and Casablanca heavily invested in while other regions remain marginalized. Youth unemployment is lowest in Casablanca and Rabat. However, civil society's work in women's rights and defending imprisoned journalists has increased in the past decade. Since 2011, the state has promoted civil society, but financial and bureaucratic constraints limit its potential.

III—Resistance through Death Boats' irregular "exit" of borders—High Range: In this study and in the context of irregular migration, I characterize irregular border crossing as a high range of resistance for two reasons. Barrington Moore and James C. Scott characterize it as the avoidance protest for Malay peasants. First, irregular migration of Moroccan youth is a last resort after theft, social unrest, drug addiction, and civil society, protests, and demonstrations. Moroccan youth choose sea death to find dignity and life because the state uses power and force instead of decreasing

dominance and power, causing youth malaise. The second reason for categorizing irregular youth migration as a high level of resistance to domestic patterns of dominance in Morocco is the high risk and "uncertainty" of the journey, where migrants willingly choose death over staying in the country with no future. Most people who migrate through the "pateras" and "hrig" (Moroccan term for "irregular breaching") have more chances of dying than of reaching the zone of peace. Walters describes the Western Mediterranean as a migration jaw due to human atrocities on the dangerous journey to the EU. Even if migrants reach the EU border, their "irregular status" and the potential use of force against them as "threats" make for another painful journey. In this case, irregular migration with its "sufferings" and death potential is a high level form of resistance that represents a final stage of hopelessness from one's country rather than avoidance of the preference for confrontation with the domination power. This form of resistance comes after having tried middle range form of resistance directed at the forms of dominance, it also comes as a result of knowledge of the context and the certainty about the inability to make a change to the existing conditions.

1.4.1.4. The EUGS: A Reading Through Putnam' "Making Democracy Work" and Others

Robert D. Putnam compared the North and South regions of Italy in his book "Making Democracy Work" to determine why some governments succeed while others fail, even within the same country, given the significant differences between the North and South of Italy. This work by Putnam has contributed to the prominence of the variable of social capital in the social sciences and studies of democracy. Numerous works on social capital and institutional effectiveness have emphasized the significance of state-society relations, civic culture, and the effectiveness of institutions in the functioning of a democracy and the process of democratization. Robert A. Dahl, for instance, has highlighted the significance of the socioeconomic factor as a significant variable in the functioning of democracy. According to Robert Dahl's "Equality versus Inequality":

*The extent to which political equality and democracy are attainable depends, among other things, on the distribution of access to political resources and the willingness to employ them to achieve one's goals.*²¹³

²¹³ Robert A. Dahl, "Equality Versus Inequality", **American Political Sciences Association: Political Sciences and Politics**, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1996, pp. 639-648.

Institutions and social and economic equality are essential to democracy. Social and economic equality, based on political and power relations, facilitates state-society collaboration. A nation-state with balanced social and economic equality is more likely to have a civic culture and successful civic life that encourages beneficial state-level development. Institutional functions demand state reform and social participation. Social and economic equality fosters cooperation and civic life, which impacts top-down change. Cooperation between state and society, civic culture, and effective civil life would be difficult without equality and significant inequality. Because of entrenched inequality, excluded social groups are more likely to defect and oppose than cooperate.

However, Putnam's work does not explain inequality in general by eliminating the political variable. This study emphasises the centrality of the political variable to other variables including socioeconomic equality, civic culture effectiveness, and state-society connections, which affect resilience or resistance in daily life. Resisting established political inequality and other inequalities is more important than social capital. Equality promotes cooperation, social capital, and resilience. Inequality—dominance—leads to rule-breaking, crime, protests, and irregular migration. According to Robert A. Dahl, this is primarily due to:

Just as we all, again with rare exceptions, are endowed as members of the human species with capacities for breathing, eating, walking upright, and speaking, so too we are endowed by nature with capacities for acting as social and moral beings, for sympathy, empathy, and trust, for creating and adopting norms and rules to guide our behavior toward others. ²¹⁴

Thus, fulfilling and concretizing one's role as a citizen and social being is not a luxury but a natural requirement for human well-being and society's overall well-being. A society that lacks education, jobs, social rights, political rights, and citizenship rights cannot fortify and achieve peace. Unemployment, especially among youth, leads to social abnormalities like violence, theft, crimes, and radicalization.

Based on this logic, which combines Putnam's and James C. Scott's theories, the EU's focus on bottom-up change and social relations without political involvement would be ineffective in a context of dominance, inequality and centralisation of power. In fact, it carries the risk to exacerbate these domination patterns further. Civic culture, civil society's rule, as shown by research dating back to Tocqueville, is critical to democracy's promotion, but focusing on civil society alone in a context of

²¹⁴ Dahl, p. 642.

socioeconomic inequalities and political dominance will not yield effective results. In a context of dominance and resistance, promoting a culture of civic life and cooperation among the population is impossible.

Studies on institutionalism and state-society relations have stressed the importance of civil actors, citing Alexis Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, which links "habits of the heart" to stable and effective democratic institutions.²¹⁵ Civic culture promotes prosperity and development, as shown in the North and South of Italy by Putnam. South Italy lagged behind the North in socio-economic, political, and institutional modernization. However, civic culture, argues this study, is dependent on the pre-existing political conditions.

Putnam identified civic cultures and collaboration in North Italy but not in the South. North Italy had a vibrant civic life and reform-minded regional governments, while the South was more defiant. Decentralisation weakened Southern regional governments due to lesser civic engagement. Northerners' egalitarian social relations fostered trust, reciprocity, and collaboration. North overcome collective action issues. Social issues required social capital. Associational living fostered horizontal social links, boosting regional development and government efficiency. Southern Italy was vertical. North-South civic community vibrancy is Putnam's explanation. Social capital improved bureaucratic efficiency in Northern competitive democracy. Well-informed, willing citizens could vote out underperforming politicians. Good governance allowed the community to prioritise its interests. Enforcement, compliance, and state-society cooperation were achieved. To develop political institutions, the North built social capital by bridging social class divides. Social capital depends on cooperation. South associational life was weaker than in the North, hampering cooperation, law enforcement, regulatory compliance, and bureaucratic efficiency. Defecting to rule was more common in the South than cooperating.²¹⁶ Unlike the North, the Mezzogoriono had uncivil, unhappy familism.²¹⁷ Southern inequality and social hierarchies were entrenched. In such a context, civic culture and associational life cooperation is difficult.

²¹⁵ James March, Johan Olsen, "New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life", **American Political Science Review**, Vol. 78, No. 3, 1984, pp. 734-749.

²¹⁶ Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, Raffaella Y. Nanetti, **Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy**, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey: U.S, 1994, pp. 17-205.

²¹⁷ Charles Boix, Daniel N. Posner, "Making Social Capital Work: A Review of Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*", **The Weatherhead Center for International Affairs**, paper No. 96-4, Harvard University, 1996, pp.1-22.

“The rich can easily abandon any arrangement with low costs to themselves to maintain their political and economic privileges”, Carles Boix and Daniel N. Posner argue.²¹⁸

Thus, the rich are expected to divide the poor.²¹⁹ According to this view, associational life and civic culture are heavily influenced by the political context and relations, which shape inequality, polarization, and societal issues.²²⁰ Political relations create the conditions for cooperation or defection in the social and associational life. Boix and Posner argue that: “pre-existing political relations in the community, the inequalities, polarization and the conflict suffered by society-issues determine social cooperation”.²²¹

Robert Putnam's research does not address political context or relations, leaving the question of why associational life succeeded in the North but not the South unresolved. Like Putnam, the EUGS argues that associational life, civic culture, and civil actors for change will promote long-term change from the bottom, even if it takes longer. Associational life reflects politics and economics. In an unequal society, organisations and bureaucracy cannot collaborate. Political liberalisation determines civil society's existence, activity, and ability to advocate social change. In a situation of domination and limited civil society, bottom-up political transformation is difficult. Trust, cooperation, and effective governance affect economic and associational growth. Civil society would support these variables if they already provide such results. To attain equality and representation, social and political cleavages have been overcome.

Putnam also noted that externally promoted local civic associations are likely to fail in a context where social cleavages persist.²²² Civic association's circular relationship with social capital and political relations makes it dependent on both while both civic association and the social capital are dependent on the nature of the political relations in that context.

Figure 8: The Democratization Circle and the Centrality of Political Relations


²¹⁸ Boix and Posner, p. 14.

²¹⁹ Boix and Posner, p.12.

²²⁰ Boix and Posner, p. 14.

²²¹ Boix and Posner, p. 14.

²²² Putnam, p. 91.



Source: Created by the author.

In parallel with Robert Putnam's civic life model for democratization, the EUGS's bottom-up approach places associational life, civic culture, and civil actors at the center of efforts to alter political relations and social capital.

As illustrated in Figure 10, this study argues for the centrality of the political relations, that is the political variable on determining the social capital and the effectiveness of associational life which are necessary for maintaining the democratization circle. A review of Putnam's study of Italy's South and Scott's work reveal that associational life and cooperation are highly dependent on and reflective of the broader social, economic, and political relationships. As previously mentioned, the work of Putnam leaves the question of why civic culture and associational life works in some cases but not in others, as is the case with South and North Italy, unanswered.

Through the case study of Morocco, this study answers this question by arguing in favor of the centrality of the political variable which sets the prerequisite context and conditions for the civic and institutional variable including the social capital and good governance. By so doing, it criticizes the EUGS pragmatic/ bottom up approach and explains the so-far ineffective involvement of the EU in Morocco and its limited potential to cope with the root causes behind irregular migration in Morocco. Without political liberalization, a state of dominance characterized by power relations at the political level, entrenched social inequality and cleavages, and economic

inequalities would result in a state of defection, which is non-commitment to rules and regulations and acts of resistance against the existing distribution of resources and power at the state and societal levels. In such conditions, civic culture and associational life would have limited capacity in being able to solve the collective action problem as will be detailed in the domestic level analysis of Morocco.

Investing in bottom-up actors and social relations while prioritising strategic interests is not a promising approach because irregular migration is a last resort and loss of hope from other forms of resistance, including protests. Instead of addressing domination, border control and outsourcing dominate the EU strategy. As in Morocco, addressing irregular migration, which is a resistance through "exit," needs lowering political, social, and economic disparities and cleavages. The EU's use of Morocco as a "potential buffer zone" for transit migrants is encouraging these inequities by burdening Morocco with increased socio-economic duties and prioritising strategic objectives over normative ones. This would delay EU domination over domestic power. Pragmatism, selective involvement, and a bottom-up strategy won't fix EU irregular migration.

1.4.2. Conceptual Deconstruction

Below deconstruction literature will be reviewed.

1.4.2.1. Deconstruction of Mobility Between Peace and Security

Survival, power, borders, and sovereignty underpin IR security. The "dot" border concept blocks security's expansion, promoting compulsion, exclusivity, and freedom restriction. Mobility and international security are increasingly interwoven. Emancipation was a security building block in critical international relations. Because of this, security is now related to domestic affairs and governance as well as border control. In the 21st century, citizen emancipation through rights, freedoms, and democracy is as vital to security as army growth. This is predominantly about the Global South and MENA and the security difficulties caused by political and socioeconomic issues influencing security elsewhere, like migration, insurgency, and terrorism. Lack of emancipatory security has fuelled irregular migration between the Global South and North to seek freedom and security. However, a threat-and-limitation security architecture cannot address this mobility. Irregular migration seeks

freedom from domestic oppression. Security tools should be disseminated as a domestic art of governance that promotes individual liberation through rights, equality, and democracy to avoid "other" difficulties. Relational power is the EUGS's theoretical approach.

Mobility as free movement emerges from state-based security doctrine. Mobility is freedom to pursue opportunities not offered by the nation-state. Mobility as a security threat or emancipation deed is more about the regime's understanding of freedom and its bounds than people's movement. Foucault's dot implies that security comes from expanding freedoms and possibilities rather than limiting them. Sustainable security prioritizes peace and long-term aims over short-term ones. Connected international interactions make people movement difficult to manage. Mobility and connection strengthen regional peace and security interdependence. Walters' metaphor of 'the Jaw of Migration' to describe the boundary zones between poverty and prosperity underlines the EU's perspective of mobility as a security danger and migrants from the South's view as a source of emancipation, peace, and freedom. Peace, prosperity, and security seekers on the Mediterranean coast face murder and suffering due to the regime's security-focused policy. Until now, the EU focused on walls, borders, and dots. People still cross its borders. Instead, irregular migration has soared. Morocco is a source of irregular migrants, especially teenagers and minors, and a transit route for Sub-Saharan Africans, making its case study relevant. After creating the EUGS to better address the Union's concerns, the Union's goal of sustainable security and resolving migration's core causes will promote security as the art of governance that promotes individual emancipation in one's own country without having to hunt for it in the EU. However, the EU's geopolitical priorities, such as externalization and utilizing Morocco as a "buffer zone," are hampering its capacity to resolve the situation in Morocco. The EU perceives security as coercion, constraint, and border, not governance, freedom, shared wealth, and equality. Considering the geopolitical connectivity and proximity between the EU as a zone of peace, freedom, and prosperity and the South as a zone of poverty, inequality, and instabilities, approaching mobility through a regime based on security as the promotion of emancipation through the art of governance rather than coercion and limitation would ensure long-term peace and security for the EU.

1.4.2.2. Binary Oppositions and Irregular Migration Between Peace and Security

Binary opposition, developed by Derrida, involves a deep reading of the text or concepts to trace the oppositional, resistant, or marginalized element of reality from the validated and mainstream one. The issue of irregular migration combines several binary oppositions, including self-versus other, control versus chaos, sovereignty versus anarchy, surveillance versus freedom, prosperity and poverty, dominance and resistance, equality and asymmetry. For decades, the EU-Southern relations have been characterized by binary oppositions that reflect their different "self", histories, and interests. The South's instability, lack of democracy, freedom, and justice contrasts with the EU's peace, justice, and freedom. The EU concerns and interests have dominated the EU-South relations. In recent decades, this pattern has become more prominent in their relations, including security and border control. The EU-Southern partner relations have often been tense over migration, as is the case with Morocco. The EU and its partner states' opposing views on the issue have caused this. While the EU has tried to keep the "Southern other" out of its zone of peace and freedom, the South, including its nation states and citizens, has instead sought to enter the EU. While the South is mainly a zone of insecurity and instability for the EU, bringing political and securitization conflicts to its borders, the EU is a source of opportunity, freedom, and hope for migrating youth.

To combat the significant flows, particularly from North Africa, the EU has adopted a policy of encouraging the growth and development of these nations in order to provide the opportunities that their youth seek on its shores. The EU also made significant efforts to provide and promote justice, democracy, and freedom, which is a significant factor in the migration of young North Africans to the EU. In the region, human rights, democracy, justice, and development are not fully concretized.

Considering the political events and changes in the Middle East and North Africa, instability and insecurity have become a definite characteristic of the region, increasing the opposite "characters" of the EU and the South. The rise in irregular migration and far right activists' "Europe for Europeans" approach heightened alertness against the "threatening other" from the other shore. Contemporary international relations and security suggest that a dependence on security in its traditional sense leads to a low performance of peace. Due to socioeconomic, political, and ideological factors, the EU security issues and their causes are

unconventional. In modern international relations, a security-focused migration policy undermines peace. Dealing with irregular migration, which combines key IR concepts like border, security, frontier, identity issues, peace and security, dominance and resistance, requires a holistic approach that balances peace and security.

The following table shows how irregular migration's binary opposition affects the EU-Southern Neighbor partnerships. "Characteristic" represents the EU and member states, while "Opposite" represents "irregular migration" from the South.

Table 2: Binary Oppositions around the issue of Irregular Migration

Characteristic	Opposite
Self	Other
Sovereignty	Anarchy
Control	Chaos
Freedom	Limitation (Border)
Prosperity	Poverty
Inequality	Equality (Desired)
Dominance	Resistance

Source: Created by the author.

1.5. EVALUATION OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter has overviewed the theoretical, conceptual and analytical framework of this thesis. Against the power determined mainstream theoretical frameworks to the study of unconventional security issues of the 21st century, based on 'realpolitik' and realism, this study adopts critical constructivism from a general post-structural perspective. It argues for an inclusive epistemological and ontological approach to knowledge production on security that includes the contexts and population needs of countries of the South to guide effective context grounded policy making for short term security needs and long term peace objectives. It adopts the core concepts of domination and resistance and identifies irregular migration as a form of resistance to patterns of domination. The study is based on a triangular research methodology and refers to the works of James C. Scott, Robert Putnam and others for the study and analysis of patterns of domination and related forms of resistance.

This chapter also provided a critical overview of the EUGS concepts, strategic objectives and issues. It highlighted the EU' strategic goals and strategies, the potential of the success of the EU' foreign policy based on pragmatism and political realism in relation to the MENA through relational power and bottom up approach. The review of the strategy highlighted the main objectives of the EU which are global power, domestic unity and regional stability. In addition, it underlined the interdependence between these objectives and the centrality of the EU success in its neighborhood for both domestic unity and global power objectives. The EU' global power has traditionally been based on its normative power toward the neighborhood. Global power changes, regional insecurities and their political repercussions on the Union's domestic stability guide the EUGS. Migration, terrorism and the Russian threat are the EUGS prior objectives. Migration and terrorism remain the most divisive for the Union. The study of the EUGS shows practical and theoretical issues with the EU approach based on principled pragmatism, selective engagement, relational power and bottom up approach. It remains unclear how would the EU would balance between state and societal resilience in a context of entrenched authoritarianism in the MENA. Prioritizing strategic objectives and a bottom up approach through a US pragmatic based and passive foreign policy raises several questions around the potential of the EUGS effectiveness.

This study puts to test the EUGS approach for effectively dealing away with irregular migration issue from its root causes through the case study of Morocco. Arguing for the centrality of the political variable for the social and economic inequalities behind irregular migration, this study criticizes the EU's principled pragmatism under the EUGS for achieving state-societal resilience, peace and security. The approach based on the EU' structural and geopolitical needs and own context has the potential to have the paradoxical effect of exacerbating patterns of domination leading to patterns of resistance in the form of 'unconventional security'. As a result, it is reproducing, importing and outsourcing insecurities rather than achieving mutual peace and security. Studying the everyday life forms of resistance and patterns of domination, this study aims to highlight the EUGS paradoxical effects of exacerbating resistance in the form of unconventional security rather than achieving state and societal resilience.

CHAPTER TWO

THE EU-MOROCCO RELATIONS: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

To name a country like Morocco and counting its richness of nature and history is in itself a tedious task. However, the most important asset Morocco possesses concerning its dogmatic reputé is its geographical location where it is the hub to join one of two versatile regions (precincts) filled with countless potential. On one side, just 14-Km away from it on sea-side is the neighbor from the EU Spain, whereas on another side it is a country, which provides a gateway to and from Africa other than serving as a junction for Scandinavian countries and their trade with years of history. This makes Morocco a geostrategic “diamond hub”.

Given its position, Morocco has always been a very important country for the neighbors especially Europe and both have influences over each other on regular basis. Morocco and Europe dealings go a long way in history and have relations that include French and Spanish colonization of Morocco. Soon after its decolonization from France in 1956, Morocco has developed strong relations with its neighbors and had its friends and enemies without borders just like any other nation.

The aim of this chapter is to overview the historical development of the entrenched and complex partnership between the EU and Morocco since the establishment of the EC to present post Arab Spring Era marked by the signature of the 2019 partnership for equality and shared prosperity under the auspices of the EUGS with the aim to overcome the partnership’ traditional challenges.

The EU-Morocco partnership encompasses a range of areas ranging from trade, culture, socioeconomic development, democratization to security issues such as terrorism, border control and migration management. While the partnership remains inevitable for both partners, it remains challenged by path-dependent issues such as asymmetry, post-colonialism, inequality and domestic challenges to reform on the part of Morocco, such as the persistence in the informal institution of corruption, limited implementation of law and political reforms. Despite this, however, the EU-Morocco partnership remains the most advanced and deepened of its kind in the Southern Neighborhood. Understanding and analyzing the development and potential of this partnership, which is important for understanding the EU- foreign policy in the post-Arab spring era whereby the Union was faced by multiple structural challenges, necessitates understanding the historical development of their partnership throughout the different eras.

2.1. THE EU-MOROCCO RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLONIAL ERA

Before going into the depth of the relations between the two bodies i.e. Morocco and the EU (European Communities before the EU), it is important to provide some background about Morocco as well as the EU and its general functioning.

Following its independence in 1956, Morocco went through some tough times under the leadership of Sultan Mohamed V the Monarch. In Particular, Morocco and Tunisia were highly interested to have easy access to goods and labor markets in the EC. However, these countries had to put some effort and it was not until 1969 when the EC based on article 238 of the Treaty of Rome signed the agreement with them. Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria signed cooperation agreements with the EC in 1976. Morocco' interest to join the European Economic Community (EEC) was high from the beginning and many efforts were put throughout the history of the country where it has even been claimed that Morocco is more European than few countries existing in Europe. In 1969, Morocco signed agreement with European communities and showed great interest in being the permanent part of the European communities. It was for this reason that in 1987 Morocco officially applied to be the part of the EEC. Aside the link to Europe, Morocco claims to be connected with Islamic, Arab and African states. Morocco's foreign policy also reflects the relationship with all of these states. The concern for Islamic states can be observed through the role of Morocco in Middle Eastern issues. The support provided to sub-Saharan African nations during 1950s about their movement for independence and assistance in establishing the Organization of African Unity (OAU) clearly depicts the core concerns of Morocco for African economies. Therefore, since independence, Morocco formulated its foreign policy concerning different dimensions for obtaining the equilibrium among all these relationships along with stabilizing its own domestic economy.²²³

The domestic economy of Morocco also plays a significant part in determining the foreign policy. However, such a role is complex due to the dichotomy within the state residents that many identified themselves as Berber, although, it did not pose a direct impact on the foreign policy decision making. Considering the domestic factors, the foreign policy is usually developed in palace due to the decision making power of monarchy. Decision making process in Morocco remained different and complex from the other liberal Western democratic states due to difference in the functioning of

²²³ Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment", **World Politics**, Vol. LXIII, No. 2, 1991, pp. 233–56.

institutions. Mainly, the foreign policy is formulated through power rather than balance as an approach to try and take benefits from the monarch decisions rather than daring to oppose it. The dominance of monarch decision making can easily be understood by analyzing the role of Morocco in supporting Arab and Middle-East, strengthening relation with Europe and providing assistance in resolving Western Sahara issues. This monarchy decision-making strength has not build overnight rather it took centuries.

Morocco observed stable political structure in the decade of 1990s when the Kingdom encouraged political liberalization. The 1992 and 1996 reforms in the constitution build foundations of political institutions and electoral colanders. It also enhanced the power of government and parliament. In addition, the human rights policy was also modified. This political liberalization was reflected in several acts during mid-90s including freedom of expression, closing Tazmamart infamous prison and releasing ample 'prisoners of conscience'. A diverse press was willing to display the Morocco history underlying assumptions and structures in a critical analysis that would have been impossible at earlier decades and the new degree of liberalization could be imagined with it. These liberalizations were not only implemented to ease the political climate but they also had other strong reasons behind. One of the major reasons was to smoothen the royal succession that happened during 1999 where Mohammed VI succeeded Hassan II. Avoiding the disastrous path of Algeria and implementing the Europe suggestions to establish democracy were between other two reasons. Beside these, reforms had ended the reasons for which major opposition parties Istiqlal and the Socialist Union for Populist Forces (USFP) criticized the Monarchy. Radicals were opposing until 1970s but resolving Western Sahara issue seized it. Islamists in Morocco did not emerge as a radical group as in the other states because of monarchy' religious dimensions where the king is called "Amir Al-Moumineen" and diversity in the structure and role of Islamist organizations of Kingdom that did not allow a mass movement elsewhere. However, one of Islamist groups entered the politics and became national parliament's third largest party. The political movements permission process from authorities included the respect of monarchy and the present political structure in order to control future disruptions. After the Arab Spring, aside strengthening parliament and prime minister' role along with all other socio-political reforms, still all the major decisions were taken by royalty in the palace.

2.1.1. The EU as a Normative Power

The EU is known as a great influencer, which plays a leading role in global politics. The engagements may include cooperation, negotiations, and conflict resolution schemes with a large number of bodies through its variety of tools. Encompassing unique nature, the EU possesses a versatile power. This power in itself carries such values that it is often taken as great power. However, the success of this great power often depends on the nature of the issue-area and the strength of the other actor as well as how that particular event is observed and influenced by others at the international level.

Although the present face of the EU was established in 1993 in the Netherlands, it has been around the scene much earlier in the form of the EC.

The EU has been recognized as a normative power and is synonymous to Peace process, conflict resolution, human rights and democracy promotion at the international level. A normative great power is the one, which has the ability to influence the ideas of other actors in an international environment rather than being coercive to achieve its goals and the EU encompasses those characteristics solidly.²²⁴ This concept for the EU has been linked to its Mediterranean and neighborhood policy through which the EU has claimed and aimed to spread the European model of democracy, human rights and freedom. This peculiar EU project which targets both Northern neighboring countries which have historically been under communist colonialism who presented a threat to European liberal model and the Southern neighborhood that consists of a majority of North African, Arab and Muslim countries. The Southern neighborhood countries which have been under the European colonialism have been going through several political, socio-economic and cultural changes. Stability in the Southern neighborhood has been set as one of the EU's objectives given the direct effects any chaotic events in these countries can have on the European continent not just related to migration flows but also terrorism and identity related challenges in European countries. The possible rise of Islamism has though been considered one of the major concerns for European countries and the EU which it seeks to inhibit through cooperation with state actors as is the case in the cooperation with Morocco. The EU's normative power which takes the European historical experience as the standard and model for the rest of the countries to follow

²²⁴ Rikard Bengtsson, *The EU and the European Security Order: Interfacing Security Actors*, Routledge: New York, 2010, pp. 5-190.

to reach its light, sets the EU as a special actor in international politics. As an intergovernmental organization composed of nation-state actors, the EU claims to go beyond the standard of serving its members national interests to serving the interests of the people of neighboring countries who are yearning for freedom, democracy and political liberalization. This sets a new pattern for foreign policy analysis both from the liberal and realism model for foreign policy analysis in two ways. First, unlike what the liberalism model for foreign policy expects from liberal countries in their approach towards illiberal countries which is supposed to be one of mistrust and can extend to even the use of force given the threat liberal countries feel from countries that do not share their values. The EU not only build relations of trust and interdependence but also sets mutual goals to achieve and extends its hand to those illiberal countries to lift them to the liberal standards. Second, unlike what the realism theory claims that foreign policy actors, nation-states, seek only their survival, self-interests and power through foreign policy, the EU's foreign policy includes objectives that go beyond national interests to include the interests not only of other nation states but of the people of those nation states by funding and supporting development, democracy, freedom and human rights.²²⁵ To what extent is this really the case remains questionable and it is the objective of this study to help answer this question through the analysis of the EU foreign policy towards Morocco in the post-Arab Spring context that has brought several changes to the region with both opportunities and challenges for the EU normative power.

2.1.2. Morocco' Overall Relations with the EU

Talking about the geographical and historical aspects of Morocco, back in 1956, Morocco got independence from colonial control of Spain and France and since then Europe has taken a central place in the foreign policy of Morocco.²²⁶ For Morocco, the relationship is also important with Europe given that high volume of trade that happens with it along with a lot of Moroccans seeking career opportunities in the EU which in figures is about two third of trade volume and nearly two million Moroccans. This makes a huge number and signifies the importance of the EU for Morocco.

²²⁵ Isabelle Lloyd-Pugh, **The Moroccan Perception of the European Union**, (Master's Thesis), Lund University, Department of Political Science-Student Case Study, Lund: Sweden, 2015, pp.1-35.

²²⁶ Michael Willis, Nizar Messari, "Analyzing Moroccan Foreign Policy and Relations with Europe", **The Review of International Affairs**, Vol. 3 No. 2, 2003, pp. 152-172.

Other than the significant trade relations which make the EU the major trade partner of Morocco and also the continent where the majority of its diaspora resides, Moroccan leaders have always lined the destiny and the vision of Morocco with the European one. Europe was more than a partner for Morocco for trade, it was part of its history and identity as well as its visions for the future of the country. This was best symbolized by the king Hassan the II application for membership in the EC and which he supported by the argument that although Morocco was not geographically in Europe but it was a European country in soul and path which could not be ignored by the European nation states. The dominantly French speaking country with its Spanish Speaking Northern part has not aligned itself with Europe as state but also as people. The Moroccan population while deeply rooted in its own identity has, to a great extent, adopted the European model of thinking, living and imagining their own future and that of their country. While a good number of Moroccans see Europe as their second home, most Moroccans envisage a Europe at home not just in economic, cultural terms but also politically. While Morocco as a state has easily adopted the European identity and way of life in the political embodiment of the European being has not been that smooth and it has required decades of struggle between the people dreaming of politically more liberal Morocco and the regime. This has noticed an important progress with the coming to throne of the king Mohammad the VI whose academic interests while a crown prince has focused on the EU Maghreb countries and who has set as an objective for his rule the deepening of European Moroccan as well as Moroccan African relations. The new king's initiatives in human rights liberation, notably women's rights and political prisoners, freedom and political liberalization especially with the Arab spring uprisal did set Morocco in a distinct position and path of relations with its European partners. Morocco's 'change through continuity' approach was just a perfectly suiting one for the interests of European countries worried about the spread of the chaotic events to their southern borders. This has made Morocco an especially important partner for the EU since then and has opened Morocco many new opportunities based on its geostrategic position to deepen relations with the EU and increase its asymmetrical importance in the negotiation process of cooperation to serve its foreign policy interests.

Although there are challenges in foreign policy making but aside them, Morocco observed several advantages due to its geographical location combined with regional and international environment. Such expanded relationship served Morocco in the way that it did not influence much due to the events of the Middle East

comparing to Jordan or any other Arab regional country. Morocco somehow reflect and follow the European economies whereas on the other end it remained loyal and connected to its own Muslim heritage at the same time. Morocco provided importance to European economies so much that Europe affect both regional and international matters of Morocco.

2.1.2.1. The Problems

Morocco is clearly connected to the European region geographically. Besides, it being colonized by France and Spain between 1912 and 1956, establish the roots of relationship with Europe. Morocco signed the Treaty of Rome after the first year of independence in 1957 and therefore the relationships with the European continent is smoothened the relations with the EC and later the EU membership expanded its integration. The nature of this relationship was largely commercial that is highlighted through trade volume where 74 percent of exports and 66 percent of imports of Morocco happened with the EU economies during 1999.²²⁷ The EU commercial links assisted Morocco to obtain trading concessions from the EC attached with the Association Agreement of 1969 and later 1976 with Cooperation Agreement. This agreement succeeded and paved way towards a new Association Agreement signing in 1995 that was a part of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative (EMPI) or shortly called the Barcelona process. It seemed a success, but on the contrary, commercial concessions of these agreements could not make Morocco happy. One of the reasons was the set of restrictions on exporting agricultural products that were among the major exporting items of Morocco to Europe. It was due to the EC Mediterranean members' reservations about cheap agricultural products from Morocco with the argument that it could reduce their native farmers selling ability within nation.²²⁸ Morocco had no choice but to accept these imposed restrictions on trade from Europe primarily due to either lack of other opportunities available for trading, or in order to raise trading relationship with the EU. Although Moroccan trade' large share came from the EU but the rank of Morocco in the EU trading partners' list was thirty-four with less than one percentage of the total EU's trade in 2001 according to the report of the European Commission. Morocco continued with the hope that the EU's imposed

²²⁷ The Economist Group, "Country Profile: Morocco:2001", **The Economist Intelligence Unit**, 2001, <https://country.eiu.com/morocco>, (10.11.2019).

²²⁸ John Damis, "Morocco's 1995 Association Agreement with the European Union", **The Journal of North African Studies**, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1998, pp. 91-112.

restrictions on trade of agricultural products would alter with the expansion of Eastern Europe member countries but in 2002 Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) of the EU member states endorsed the restrictions that decreased this hope of Morocco to come true.

2.1.2.2. The Advantages

The Moroccan palace was highly concerned about the relationship with Europe as the Crown Prince that later became King: Mohamed VI worked personally in the European Commission President office Jacques Delors. This clearly indicated that in the Monarchy' thought Morocco' future would be attached to Europe. Although there were disadvantages for Morocco in the trade agreements of Europe but there were certain advantages that Morocco enjoyed due to preserving the European relationship. Besides, Europe provided Morocco with bilateral and commercial loans and a huge chunk of external finance and aid. The development needs and the external debt of about \$20.7 billion in 1998 along with about 20 percent of debt servicing ratio made Morocco very much dependent on Europe.²²⁹ The EU direct aid had observed rising trend with time, specifically within the European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) framework about \$576 million aid was provided under the Adjustment Measures (MEDA) program in order to enhance the economic and social development and assisting the transition process of Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Further, the European Investment Bank (EIB) showed willingness to provide \$705 million loan that could initiate development in Morocco.²³⁰ Aside these direct benefits, many Moroccans were working in the EU countries and foreign exchange earned through remittances from Europe reached worth of \$2 billion in 1999.²³¹ Though Europe provided a lot of employment opportunities that strengthened the relationship of these countries but there remained a political pressure of a native unemployment along with the Islamism spread from Moroccan that exerted another potential pressure of any attempt to reduce the working and living Moroccan in European economies.

Although Morocco had forced to consider the EU collective as an organization but it remained firm on strengthening the bilateral relationships with several EU states individually and it succeeded to properly maintain them as well. The primary relationship was developed with France: the former colonial power of Morocco, where

²²⁹ The Economist Group, p. 14.

²³⁰ Damis, p.12.

²³¹ The Economist Group, p.19.

France remained a major exporter and importer for Moroccan products. Specifically, during 1999, France bought about 36 percent of Moroccan exports and sold 26 percent of imports to Morocco, one of the major trading relationship among other states individually and that's not all as more than half the remittances of Morocco came from France. Because of its dominance over trading relationship, France has been given an impressive role in the diplomacy of Morocco. This dominance of France in Morocco had also been recognized by several EU states. Moreover, foreign bilateral relationships with France established colonial and commercial links as well, specifically providing French language permission over Moroccan political, business and educational life. Further, business elites and politicians followed French events and send their children frequently to either metropolitan France or French run institutions. France also emphasized on placing Europe relationship as the major focus in the Moroccan diplomacy.

Morocco' relationships with Spain could be one possible challenge to the France's privilege. Spain strengthened its economic ties with neighboring nations during 1980s. After joining the EC in 1986, economic development enhanced in Spain by which the exchange with Morocco raised to the level that Spain emerged as the second largest in trading partnership during late 1990s. However, both states had conflicts due to which in October 2001 the ambassador of Morocco was withdrawn, Spain followed the act later in same year, and a war of words was ignited. Spain was disappointed at Morocco' disagreement over the EU' new fishing agreement since the old one expired during 1999 and affected a lot of Spanish fishermen that benefitted earlier over the Moroccan water territories. Spain also claimed the drug trafficking in its urban areas due to Morocco. Further, Spain accused Morocco for growing emigration illegally from Morocco towards Spain. Morocco on the other end, blamed Spain for not supporting the United Nations (UN) submitted proposal of Western Sahara and further Spanish media put forth sanctions over Morocco that were considered as Madrid government perception which provoked anger in Moroccan government. Therefore, Morocco complained persistently in the form of ideas for Spain's attitude. Somehow, the behavior of Spain for Morocco appeared discriminating between European and traditional elites and it seemed as the Spanish leadership take Morocco as a partner state and look forward to the Moroccan as a potential threat. "The Leila dispute" in July 2002 was not a cause rather the symptom of broadening differences and tensions between these nations.

2.1.2.3. Morocco Seeking the US Help to Deal with the EU as a Trade Partner

Morocco highly depended upon the EU links for its economic, trade and financial matters and therefore its foreign policy remained focused towards the EU. However, Morocco raised negotiations with the US in order to create a free trade zone between the two. It would be far-fetched for both the US and the EU to consider that Morocco could replace America for Europe, rather it could be a part of diplomatic policy Morocco looked forward to play with the EU. However, the French minister of foreign trade warned Morocco that it could not be possible to enjoy strong relationships with the EU and free trade agreement of the US simultaneously.²³² The relationship with France had assisted Morocco to deal with the conflicts of Spain. The Seville European summit was the initiative of Spain taken in June 2002 with agenda to penalize countries by reducing financial assistance of the EU on those that did not put a check on European immigration flux. In this regard, the precise target was Morocco and France' timely intervention played significant role of stopping summit' approval. Besides, the EU cannot be neglected and dealt well without France' assistance and one possible attempt could be using balanced relationship with the US. The relationship of the US could possibly put a pressure on the EU through the World Trade Organization (WTO) to reform its agricultural policy and further suggestions could be taken from the EU members in order to reform immigration policy. These could be possible opportunities for Morocco to establish a balanced relationship with the EU. However, negotiations with the EU would be crucial and the only possibility would be creating free trade zone with the US that could unbalance Morocco' position in the EU along with deteriorating relationship with France.

²³² Bichara Khader, « 2006: A Controversial Agreement between Morocco and the United States Came to Effect », **IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook**, 2007, pp. 207-216.

2.1.3. Morocco' Independence and Relations With The EC/EU

In the following section, the relations between Morocco and the EU will be reviewed from the independence of Morocco until the recent decade, that is post Arab Spring and the 2019 partnership of equality and shared prosperity signed under the auspices of the EUGS with the hope to overcome mutual challenges, past obstacles and give a new impetus to the bilateral relations.

2.1.3.1. Mohamed V Era (1956-1962)

The Moroccan identity has been established due to its history over centuries and perhaps over a millennium. The role of a national monarchy in Moroccan politics linked back to about eight hundred years. Moreover, the existing Alawite dynasty has been ruling over Moroccan territories from the mid seventeenth century. Such a range in history along with political structures and geography distinguished Morocco from other neighboring states. Although after independence from colonial rule of Europe, the Kingdom' domestic policies looked counter balancing the state in first two decades but later these affects turned into stabilizing inheritance in both historical and territorial perspectives. The turbulence period provided the important lessons on the basis of which the present political structure of Morocco has developed. The Alawite Monarchy and Istiqlal party were the core leaders in the independence campaign of Morocco from colonial rule of France and Spain. Therefore, the initial political structure was developed in the era of Sultan Mohammed V with the joint coordination of Istiqlal party and monarchy. Both of them were partners in the movement of independence and Istiqlal party was legend of people so monarch provided them the place in the kingdom' political institutions rather than eliminating their role in decision making process at once. Decision making process continued this way till the death of Sultan Mohammed V in 1961 after which Hassan II became king.

2.1.3.2. Era of Hassan II (1963-1999)

The demise of his father king Mohamed V brought into power Hassan II as the new ruler of the country. Unlike his father, Hassan II was more of an active ruler with lots of critical decisions such as change in the constitution of 1962 and termination of parliament.

The kingship of Hassan II broke the ice and almost got rid of Istiqlal and its allied parties from the decision making process in the favour of almost absolute ruling power of monarchy in 1960s. Before his kingship, Hassan II was Chief-of-Staff. Using links from Kingdom's military with the suspension of parliament and Moroccan constitutions in 1965 was an attempt to provide absolute political power to the king Hassan II. Later military powers were also used in 1971 and 1972 to obtain the absolute control but these attempts were narrowly unsuccessful and had consequences for both economy and monarchy. Further, in 1973 an attempt to use power to eliminate political opposition of the party of the National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP) affected more the existing reputation of Monarchy. Then in 1976 initiating integrating campaign of former Spanish Sahara, gathered the support with excitement from military and oppositions at the same time that granted strength to monarchy and their foreign policy played the role of Omni balancing in the domestic political structure of Morocco. Hassan II led the Saharan campaign in politically and also symbolically whereby his ruling and institutions worked side by side during late 1970s. The oppositions claimed Western Sahara which Algeria and Libya backed initially but all this strengthened the Moroccan resolve and concluded in obtaining legal control of the territory. This political unity of Morocco in the Sahara matter was due to the efforts done at the domestic level in Morocco to take control of the territory. The Sahara issue was given highest priority over any domestic or foreign matter in Morocco since mid-1970s. The importance of this matter was reiterated by Hassan II time and again placing it after territorial integrity. Beside the popularity of the Sahara matter among Moroccan residents and its significance towards the state, it was extremely important for the monarchy as they attached their prestige with it. The Monarchy gave much attention to Western Sahara issue due to the fear that any failure in this matter or delaying it so long that people may forget it could potentially create the same political environment of early 1970s and possess a hidden threat over the monarchy ruling power over Morocco.

After signing agreements with the EC in 1976, the king of Morocco Hassan II desired to join the EEC along with its neighboring countries Spain and Portugal with whom Morocco has very good relations with since independence.²³³

The king Hassan was highly interested in the Europeanness of Morocco which was prominent according to the article 237 of the Treaty of Rome in 1987. The

²³³ Stanislaw Parzymies, "Mohamed ben el Hassan Alaoui : La Cooperation Entre l'Union Europeenne et Les Pays du Maghreb", **Polish Quarterly of International Affairs**, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1996, pp. 145-147.

approach of Hassan II towards 'European Morocco' was admired by both actors and non-actors inside Morocco as well as the European Commission bureaucrats.

In his approach towards the European Morocco, Hassan II changed his title from Sultan to king, deeply impressed by the Christian and European Status of the king. The king's interest and approach to consider Morocco as a part of Europe was described in his speech where he used a metaphor to describe where Morocco belongs. He said Morocco can be taken as a tree whose roots are in Africa and whose leaves and branches are in Europe and described Moroccans as both Orientals and Occidental.²³⁴

In an attempt to recognize the significance of France in Europe and its closeness to Morocco, king Hassan II said, those who think and write that France turned Morocco into an underdeveloped country between 1908 to 1945 are truly mendacious. Further, he appreciated the French approach towards Moroccan Islam and further accepted that he copied French Industrialism for his Moroccan agricultural development.

In an interview on 9th April 1980, king Hassan II accepted that his culture is coming from French and there is some Frenchness in his lifestyle. In another place, king also commented that Morocco is a Euro-African state.

King Hassan II on November 9th 1984 announced that Gibraltar strait will be constructed that will work as a bridge between Morocco and Europe giving an air once again to the admiration and theme of Europe emphasizing again that Morocco is more European than some of the far countries of Europe such as Greece.

The king Hassan II repeated the influence of French culture over Moroccan culture during a meeting with French President in 1984 at the Fontaine bleu Summit of the European communities where he asked for a support over Morocco's right to be an EEC member. Morocco's request to join the EC through the EEC saw its support when the ECs enlargement officer told the press that Morocco and the EEC relations will be based just like the relations with Portugal and Spain stamping on king's comments that Moroccan culture is similar to some European countries. Further, another official from Portuguese parliament emphasized over the common history between Morocco and Portugal, which may benefit for future cooperation between the two nations.

²³⁴ Volkan Ipek, **The King's European Morocco: A Postcolonial Approach to Morocco's Quest to Become a European Community Member**, (PhD Thesis), İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, Ankara, 2015, pp.1-271.

The first solid step taken by the king to make Morocco part of Europe or in other words European Morocco, was at the 38th session of the European Federation of Zootechnics. Here the federation in the opening session, declared that it has formally admitted Morocco as a member of the organization which encouraged the king and he officially submitted his membership application to be the part of the EEC on 8th July 1987. The king provided justification that how Morocco corresponds to the Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome and emphasized the common history and culture with Europe.

The letter, which was sent to Mr. Jansen, presented a true theme of postcolonial nationalism theory where reflection of hybridity in the postcolonial period was prominent. An argument was visible that how Morocco integrates with European nations through hybridity of the European culture with that of the France.

A blend of reactions came from the king's proposal. These reactions are enlisted as below.

Moroccan National Identity (MNI) was instrumentalized by king Hassan II at the time of application to explain the Europeanness of Morocco by portraying the hybridity of Morocco' cultural links to France'. The Europeanness of Morocco was justified on the bases of colonial history of Morocco with France. The claim was made wisely by the king who used colonial connections of France to justify that there was no mistake in requesting to be part of Europe. The decision was appreciated given an inevitable wave of development at all fronts may follow if Morocco becomes part of the EEC.

Some criticism also followed after the application to be the part of EEC. The criticism was based on two main grounds which were economic and national identity. Criticism based on economic grounds claimed that the EEC as a part of the EC may impact the Moroccan economy negatively. The claim, however, lacked solid justification and mere argument focused on colonialist and Christian side of the EC. The criticism which incorporated Islamic bases came from "Yassine" a member of the movement called "Al-Adal Wal Ihsan". He commented that Morocco cannot be called Islamic and European at the same time. Further, he commented that secularism is un-islamic and these are Western ideas. Another criticism came from Istiqlali paper named Al-Alam which complained about colonial invasion and named it a secret war against the language of Quran which is Arabic and emphasized that our identity is not French identity, our language is not French language and our culture is not French culture. The comical part of the criticism was all these writings were declared in

French language. King Hassan II immediately rejected such ideas and responded that such minds are nothing but suffering from complex.

As soon as the application was submitted, it got good response and interest from Europeans side. Morocco's application to be member of the EEC and to be called a European state under the Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome was welcomed at diplomatic levels.

The response also followed quickly and the European commission responded within three months when the EEC board members decided not to accept the Morocco's proposal to be a full EC member. Instead the board offered a privileged partnership to Morocco which it finally accepted although king Hassan showed great displeasure at the decision.²³⁵

2.1.3.3. Mohamed VI and Relations with the EU (1999-Date)

On the demise of his revolutionary father, Hassan II, Mohamed VI took over the responsibilities from being Crown Prince to the new king in a fast changing time period. His tenure also includes some landmark progress in the history of Morocco.

King Hassan II had established the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER) for dealing with human rights' past abuses. Later, its upgraded and more liberal form was instigated by king Mohammed VI in the form of the National Human Development Initiative (INDH). Both of these acts brought popularity to Morocco over the world as a model for its region. The Justice and Development Party (PJD) failure of elections in 2007 was also reported as an excellent example of Islamist party integration into political process. Although the level of liberalization in Morocco appeared reasonable, it was not realistic according to the European model of democracy. Aside these liberalization attempts, king Mohammed VI authority remained unchallengeable in all matters including political and religious dimensions. The elections of Morocco held in September 2007 were monitored by the EU funded NGOs and its results were failure of PJD to participate in the government while Istiqlal, USFP, the National Rally of Independents (RNI) and Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS) remained on the political participation in Moroccan government.

Reactions over Morocco' elections in 2007 were positive among the EU nations. Portugal considered the democratic condition of Morocco during elections as

²³⁵ İpek, p. 247.

the test of commitment for reforms.²³⁶ France' President wrote to king Mohammed VI a letter for admiring the representation of the robustness of democracy in the nation.²³⁷ Major EU members admired Morocco for transparency and approval of international delegation for monitoring the elections for the first time in its history. The French President Nicolas Sarkozy during his first visit to Morocco, managed many large contracts for companies of France with estimation of approximately 3 billion € and he was warmly welcomed back to France.²³⁸ Morocco' importance for the EU increased further due to the rise in need of energy supplies specifically for gas obtained from Algeria. In another attempt to manage the need of energy supply, the EU and Morocco signed a declaration on July 2007.

Along with such respites, Morocco also had some disputes with the EU nations as well. The Spanish periodical rumpuses with Morocco about Parsley Island and enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta of Spain caused the temporary ambassadors' withdrawals. Public prosecutor from Spain filed cases for genocide within Western Sahara against several Moroccan officials.²³⁹ However, the impact of such conflicts remained short term and progress was not halted in the long run. Aside these, Morocco had observed several conflicts that were reported several times in the EU documents which included migration, violation over human rights, restrictions over freedom and unequal distribution of authority.

The opinion of the EU Commissioner about the relationships between Morocco and the EU were successful and a referential for other relevant regions.²⁴⁰ This relationship grew enormous with king Mohamed VI kingship era soon after he took over the reign from his father after July 1999. An important point to consider is the impact of structural changes that were brought in by the EU towards Morocco's convergence in social, economic and standards of living with the other EU states. Analyzing GDP with respect to the purchasing power per person criterion (PPP), it

²³⁶ The European Parliament, **Resolution of 6 September 2007 on the Functioning of the Human Rights Dialogues and Consultations on Human Rights with Third Countries**, (2007/2001 (INI), Committee on Foreign Affairs, Strasbourg, 2007, pp. 1-19, (CONSULTATIONS).

²³⁷ French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, « Elections Législatives au Maroc : Lettre du Président de la République, M. Nicolas Sarkozy, adressée au Roi du Maroc, Sa Majesté Mohammed VI », **French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris**, 09.09. 2007, <https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/167656-lettre-de-m-nicolas-sarkozy-president-de-la-republique-adressee-au-ro> , (02.03.2018).

²³⁸ Stephanie Plass, "Nicolas Sarkozy, Mohammed VI : Une Amitié Economique", **Afrik.com**, 25.10.2007, <https://www.afrik.com/nicolas-sarkozy-mohammed-vi-une-amitie-economique>, (09.10.2018).

²³⁹ MEE Staff, "Spanish judge upholds Western Sahara Genocide Charges against Moroccan Officials", **Middle East Eye**, 13.04.2015, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/spanish-judge-upholds-western-sahara-genocide-charges-against-moroccan-officials>, (09.10.2018).

²⁴⁰ Ivan Martin, "EU-Morocco Relations Between "Success Story" and Hamster's Wheel", **Centro de Estudios Documentación Internacionales de Barcelona**, Working Paper, No. 267, 2014, pp. 1-3, (WHEEL).

was 10.6 percent compared to the EU area in 1995 that raised to 18.8 percent by 2013. With such speed of convergence, Morocco would take more than half a century to converge the half of living standards enjoyed in the average EU territories. However, rapid activities of 2013 regarding bilateral relations became slower afterwards as if it would require constant efforts as of hamster's wheel to maintain such relations.

The modernization policies of the ENP seem like taking over through Khatibi's rationalism in which the willingness of power affects the decisions.²⁴¹ The ENP would employ domestic agents to create or sometimes enhance the violence such as political Islam that raise many "silent questions" in the residents. These disruptions by proponents of the ENP and the EU could help in spreading their agenda of homogenizing and codifying neighboring economies into self-managed working units, in the manner that would have more chances of universal acceptance. The ENP norms were firstly admired by the MENA societies administration but contradicting with the culture and traditions of Islam creating rebellious attitude of Islamists that prefer their past colonial system to these new reforms. The effectiveness of the EU policies in the countries remained a question because the attempts to develop socio-economic structure of neighboring economies looked far behind from the promising results. These economies still suffer from rising unemployment, larger social inequalities, lack of literacy, provision of fewer necessities and persisting poverty. The roadmap of the EU policy reforms foundations is self-disciplined rationality, entrepreneurship in analyzing effectiveness, profit making and productivity. Taking these footsteps and considering the World Bank and IMF initiatives of financial assistances and training packages, the major beneficiaries were elites from government and non-government sectors. Although many attempts were made but the EU expectations from the countries were not met. The implementation of the EU's reforms provides a little benefit to the average person living in Morocco. The major causes of unsuccessful EU reforms could be corruption, poor governance, clientalism and the MENA's lack of social capital. Aside, critique over the EU argues that it did not take the responsibility of failure on its own as a player rather it steps aside as a judge of the situation.²⁴² The enormous complexities in the reforms process of the EU may have made it difficult

²⁴¹ Bohdana Dimitrova, Olivier Thomas Kramsch, "Decolonizing the Spaces of European Foreign Policy: Views from the Maghreb", *Interventions*, Vol. 19, No. 6, 2017, pp. 797-817.

²⁴² Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, University of California Press: Berkley, 1991, pp. 5-240.

to implement rather than simply blaming its actions.²⁴³ Besides economic reasons, the socioeconomic roadmap of the EU faced the ideological differences according to Islamists. The PJD in Morocco was in the favor of privatization and foreign investment in some specific sectors of the economy, whereas the EU reforms promoted overall liberalisation and eliminating almost all obligations on the foreign investors. The EU recommendations re-emphasize the economic liberalization that was also prescribed by the World Bank.²⁴⁴ The well-known importance of liberalization and market driving forces faced problems due to the Arab Spring. However, the risk remained that Arab Spring effects could end after which Arab governments may return to the same liberalization principles and policy reforms adopted earlier.

The EU claimed to provide free advises due to its goodwill representations as the neutral agent that gave technical assistances. Moroccan PJD deliver their motive in 2009 on Islamic banking and described the legislations and principles of Islam that were replaced by “development banking”. The term development is often considered as the West’s monopoly. Zakat and secular taxes on the capital were often compared but this does not conclude that Islam contradicts capitalism rather many Moroccan scholars admit that Islam promotes commerce, goods circulation and private property.²⁴⁵ The attempts to acquire economic development in Morocco, the postcolonial differences were untamed due to the nature of the procedure of assessment criterion of the ENP that included human rights, justice, good-governance and liberalization. Zakat on the other end could be used as an alternative to the EU and the ENP’s open economy. Although it seemed an easy task but it needed a long way to resolve the effectiveness of Zakat and Islamic banking system in Morocco and among other Islamic nations. Regarding the failures of previous implementations, it seemed rational to do something different than repeating the old prescription of liberalization for development. Morocco and the EU relation specified the ENP foreign policy reforms were not much effective due to the fact that the policy makers were not familiar with the core traits, traditions and instruments of Islam and

²⁴³ Sandra Ponzanesi, “The Point of Europe: Postcolonial Entanglements”, **Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies**, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2016, pp. 159–164.

²⁴⁴ Ahmed Musabeh, Mehdi Zouaoui, “Policies and Variables Affecting FDI: A Panel Data Analysis of North African Countries”, **The Journal of Economic Policy Researches**, 2020, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 1-20.

²⁴⁵ Charles Tripp, **Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, pp.5-239.

hence their decision-making framework created hindrance in Morocco's economic development.

Taking an overview of history, the Council of Europe provided authorization to the European Commission to initiate the discussion with pioneer countries about participating in community agency programs and actions.²⁴⁶ Morocco decided to join gradually other fields and initially joined the CFSP that incorporate justice, security and freedom as the working agenda areas. Morocco hold the desire for joining the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), the European Economic Area (EEA) and the European Maritime Safety and Agency (EMSA). Some most attracted programs were the Single European Sky (SESAR), Competitiveness and Innovation Program (CIP), Customs 2013 (2008-2013) and the Marco Polo Programme. The financial assistance of the EU could be helpful for participating in these programmes and agencies. However, the EU had its own criterion and needed to agree for bearing some cost requirements. Although financial constraints could be an important hindrance but the more basic rule for participating in the EU agencies and other programs required compatibility of economy in order to implement laws and policies provided in the aims of some particular agency. Acquiring participation in the desired community program of the EU by Morocco therefore, required negotiations to establish the agreement framework. The ENP partnership provided an open opportunity for Morocco in order to enhance integration with European nations by participating more in the EU markets and performing an active role in the EU organized events with political cooperation. The EU-Morocco Association' seventh meeting formed a group that would be responsible for preparing feasible short term proposals in the next session but in the form of instructions to groups for specific technical measures without providing any deadlines.

Given the discussion and the policies of the EU towards it collaborate nations, there are many areas in which Morocco needed to improve if it still wanted to be a regular member of the EU. Some of the main potential areas have been discussed below.

One of the most significant areas in which Morocco has been struggling is the proper implementation of its law particularly over corruption. On the list of

²⁴⁶ Larbi Jaidi, "The Morocco/EU Advanced Status: What Value Does It Add to the European Neighborhood Policy?", *Panorama*, 2009, pp. 149-154.

transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for least corrupted countries, Morocco ranks at 80 out of 180 countries with a score of 41/100. Among the EU members, the country with the worst performance is Bulgaria with a score of 43 and a rank of 74.²⁴⁷ The difference may not seem a lot but being a non-EU member who is willing to join the EU may make it a big difference given the strict policies adopted by the EU towards its partner countries. Recent developments in the anti-corruption legal work has seen the criminalization of corruption offences and a comparison of Morocco with two other advanced developing countries namely Azerbaijan and Moldova shows astonishing results. Out of the 25 standard anticorruption provisions under the UN and the European Criminal Law Convention against Corruption (ECLCC), Morocco has only implemented 6 of those provisions while the result is 10 and 22 for Azerbaijan and Moldova respectively.²⁴⁸ This creates a huge gap in the standards set by the EU and the UN against corruption and Morocco's performance towards it.

2.2. THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP (EMP) AS A TOOL FOR DEMOCRACY

The EMP was established in 1995 by twelve Mediterranean and fifteen EU states. The objective was to create an area of stability, prosperity and peace. The agreements major dimensions included cooperation in economic, political and cultural matters.²⁴⁹ The existing instability, mass migration, terrorism and economic issues within states, held potentially harmful impact on the EMP. The EMP states are heterogeneous, they possess different characteristics with respect to population, GDP per capita, region, civil freedom and political rights. As an example, Morocco' population was about 31.7 million with per capita income of 1,725\$ per year while Israel population remained 7.2 million with 17,800\$ per capita income in 2005. However, the EMP recognized Morocco with Constitutional monarchy and the score of providing residents with civil liberties and political rights, the Moroccan score

²⁴⁷ Valentine Evstatiev, "Bulgaria is EU' Worst Performing Member in Implementing Circular Economy, NGO says", **Bulgarian News Agency**, 29.09. 2022, <https://www.bta.bg/en/news/economy/335528-bulgaria-is-eu-s-worst-performing-member-in-implementing-circular-economy-ngo-s>, (01.11.2022).

²⁴⁸ Bryan Michael, Abdelaziz Nouaydi, "When EU Law Meets Arabic Law: Assessment of Anti-Corruption Law in Morocco and Some Proposed Amendments", **Arab Law Quarterly**, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2009, pp. 353-388.

²⁴⁹ The Commission of the European Communities, **Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership**, (COM94)/427 Final, European Commission, Brussels, 1994, pp. 2-33, (MEDPART).

remained average.²⁵⁰ The Barcelona Declaration was considered a fundamental bridge instrument in the foreign policy of Europe to emphasize the common grounds in all of the south and North Mediterranean state. The fundamental chapters of the declaration included economic and financial, political and security, cultural and social, and human partnership affairs. Due to these highlights, it was accorded as three baskets of the EMP. The Barcelona Declaration officials advised to the participating states that the better understanding for each other would be necessary in the Mediterranean region states at cultural, traditional, scientific, technological and economic domains which could be enhanced using dialogue. For making shared prosperity, the provided suggestions included balanced and sustainable growth both at economic and social levels.²⁵¹

Back in 1992, the establishment of Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and CFSP at Maastricht Treaty became the foundation of the EU. Later, the Barcelona Declaration (1995) declared that member states promote peace, security and stability considering it as the common asset of the Mediterranean region which do the needful in all of these matters according to their strengths. The economic and social matters were dealt as inter government and so the member states follow their own national foreign policies made by following the instructions of the EMP. Trade policy remained the fundamental interest of the Commission and suggestions were continuous in this matter to the member.²⁵² In 1992, the European Council focused on the general relationship with the Mediterranean economies.²⁵³ A particular communication bridge was fabricated by the Commission in 1994 for strengthening the EU Mediterranean policy. However, the critiques on the EU depict the distinction of states between partnership and commonalities as the difference in the official policy announcement and its implementation remained the main focus of criticism. For example, security, economic prosperity and stability were the goals to be achieved under the Barcelona Declaration but these would follow as by-products. The EU promoted the values beyond any national boundary that it could settle as a normative

²⁵⁰ The Freedom House, **The Worst of the Worst: The World's Most Repressive Societies 2007**, Freedom House, 2007, pp.1-36.

²⁵¹ The European Commission, **Barcelona Declaration: Adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference**, The European External Action Service, MEMO98/02, Brussels, 1995, pp. 1-17, (BARCELONA).

²⁵² The European Commission, **European Union, Trade in goods with Morocco- Units A4 / G2**, Directorate-General for Trade, Brussels, 2018, pp. 1-10, (TRADE).

²⁵³ The European Council in Lisbon, **Conclusions of the Presidency**, SN 3321/2/92, EU Council, Lisbon, 1992, pp. 1-72, (LISBON92).

power in the social constructivism.²⁵⁴ The idealization behind the normative power of the EU was the inauguration of first area of existing world in which war and violence could be altered by civilized politics of the twentieth century.²⁵⁵ To realize such aim, five core values set up by the EU were peace, democracy, liberty, rule of law and the provision of human rights.²⁵⁶ The EMP attempted to promote partnership-building, recognizing common values, increasing trust and sharing identity. At a glance, the European Foreign Policy (EFP) remained focused on its papers and official statements but the inside inspection on the EU relations looked like supporting the legitimacy and effectiveness of external policies. Some named it the normative cloak of the EU.²⁵⁷

Europe promoted democracy and considered it the legitimate political regime. Democracy remained among the core five values of the EU due to its importance in the post war history of pluralist societies.²⁵⁸ According to the EU, stability, peace and economic growth could be obtained through democracy. The EMP acted as the instrument to promote democracy through the aid provision and development assistances. At first, the EC promoted democracy using articles and treaties, later in 1999, the need for establishing a legal base for dealing with democracy and human rights was realized for which regulation settings were adopted Council Regulation (EC) No. 976/1999).²⁵⁹ From 1996 to 2006, the goals of Barcelona processes were dealt financially under MEDA regulations (Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 (MEDA I); Council Regulation (EC) No 2698/2000 (MEDA II)).²⁶⁰ MEDA' basic focus remained as the economic restructuring of the member states and a major share of assistance consumed on this effort which left a scanty portion to be spent on the

²⁵⁴ Thomas Diez, "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'", *Millennium*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2005, pp. 613–636.

²⁵⁵ Francois Duchêne, "Europe's Role in World Peace", in: Richard J. Mayne (ed.), *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead*, Fontana, London, 1972, pp. 32-47.

²⁵⁶ Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2002, pp. 235-258.

²⁵⁷ Richard Youngs, "Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External Identity", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2004, pp. 415-435, (NDSI).

²⁵⁸ Philippe Schmitter, Imco Brouwer, "Conceptualizing, Researching and Evaluating Democracy Promotion and Protection", EUI Working Paper SPS, No. 99/9, *European University Institute SPS*, 1999, pp. 1-44.

²⁵⁹ The Council of the European Union, **The Council Regulation (EC) No. 976/1999**, Official Journal of the European Communities, Brussels, 1999, Updated 2005, pp. 1-11, (Regulation99).

²⁶⁰ The Council of the European Union, **Council Regulation (EC) No. 1488/96**, Official Journal of the European Communities, Brussels, 1996, pp. 1-9, (Regulation96).

The Council of the European Union, **Council Regulation (EC) No. 2698/2000 of 27 November 2000: Amending Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 on Financial and Technical Measures to Accompany (MEDA) the Reform of Economic and Social Structures in the Frameworks of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership**, Official Journal of the European Communities, Brussels, 2000, pp. 1-8, (MEDA).

democracy development of nations.²⁶¹ Further, Human Rights and Democracy Committee was established and its important initiative was renamed in 2007 as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) (Council Regulation (EC) No. 1889/2006).²⁶² The EIDHR remained the instrument for promoting democracy by providing financial assistances to the members of the EMP from 2007 onwards. In Morocco EIDHR is involved in funding of several projects, which were either directly linked to international organizations or Moroccan NGOs.

The micro-projects funding of EIDHR remained around 2 million € between 2003 to 2006. Although the EIDHR funding increased every year, it remained only as 2 percent of the EC's funding to Morocco. Moreover, the EIDHR funding on micro-projects was worth about 100,000 € with NGOs being the main beneficiaries. EIDHR assisted Morocco for the elections held in 2007 through a training of 3000 facilitators for the reporting and monitoring of elections and providing institutional support. This project report by Moroccan NGOs linked the lower voting rate with the irregularities in the process of elections that identified the structural political reforms.²⁶³

According to the National Indicative Programs for Morocco the MEDA/EMPI funds for Morocco remained 426, 275 and 654 million € during 2002-04, 2005-06 and 2007-10 respectively but only 5 and 28 million € were provided for the promotion of human rights and governance during 2005-06 and 2007-10 respectively. During 2005-06, human rights supporting projects were provided with 2 million € while 3 million € were donated for victims of violation of human rights through the government-controlled NGOs of Morocco. During 2007-10, Morocco received the highest funds in the EU region out of which, 20 million € were allocated for supporting the ministry of justice and 8 million € were provided for creating public archives. Although the total funding to Morocco remained high but the specific funding for democracy and human rights promotion remained relatively low i.e. just 2 percent in 2005-06 and 4.28 percent of total funding in 2007-10. France' aid allocation remained highest to Morocco in their bilateral relationship and total financial assistance from France on average remained nearly about 188 million € per year till 2008 but hardly any of it was

²⁶¹ Richard Youngs, "The European Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: A New or Disingenuous Strategy?", **Democratization**, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2002, pp. 40-62, (DPM).

Elena Baracani, "From the EMP to the ENP: New European Pressure for Democratization?", **Journal of Contemporary European Research**, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2005, pp. 54-66.

²⁶² The Council of the European Union, **Regulation (EC) No. 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Official Journal of the European Communities**, Official Journal of the European Union, Brussels, 2006, pp. 1-11, (Reg06).

²⁶³ Richard Youngs, "Is European Democracy Promotion on the Wane?", **CEPS working paper**, No. 292, Brussels, 2008, pp. 1-14, (Wane).

provided for democracy as if it were not the area eligible for aid provision. French aid allocation remained focused on the production sector, infrastructure, education, water management and transversal sectors (democracy included). Spain provided 30 million € to Morocco in 2003 and 70 million € in 2006. Here the share for democracy development was 2 percent. Other EU member states also remained reluctant in providing financial assistance for promoting democracy in the region.

For critics, the Barcelona Process was a failure as the EU did not manage to promote the rule of law and democracy in the Southern Mediterranean.²⁶⁴ North African and Middle Eastern economies lacked the economic prosperity that was supposed to come due to free trade agreement by 2010.²⁶⁵

Article 3 in the regulations of MEDA with regards to democracy principles highlighted that violating these principles would justify appropriate measure's adoption which clearly depicted the negative conditionality presence in official manners of the EU but the EU had never implemented them on the members like suspension of association agreements or terminating financial assistances.²⁶⁶ The EU promoted democracy by setting certain goals and fulfilment of those would bring rewards. However, inability to achieve the targets would not penalize its members.²⁶⁷

2.3. THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY (ENP) AND MOROCCO

Morocco was among the foremost countries signing the ENP Action Plan of the EU with priority over many objectives including democracy, fundamental freedom, decentralization, justice, modernization of courts and legal processes, cultural and linguistic rights, etc. However, most of these objectives were not fulfilled due to difficulties in their implementation as they were focusing on modernization, capacity building, equipment and experiences.²⁶⁸ The more serious flaw of the Action Plan revealed absence of timeframes, implementation body and evaluation mechanism

²⁶⁴ Richard Youngs, "European Approaches to Security in the Mediterranean", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 57, No. 3, 2005, pp. 414-431, (SECURITY).

²⁶⁵ Andreas Stahn, Van Hüllen Vera, "Different Actors, Different Tools? Approaching EU and US Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean and the Newly Independent States", **Prepared for the Bi-Annual Conference of the European Union Studies Association (EUSA)**, Montreal, Canada, May 17-19, 2007, pp.1-31.

²⁶⁶ The European Council, "Council Regulation EC No 1488/96 of 23 July 1996 on Financial and Technical Measures to Accompany MEDA the Reform of Economic and Social Structures in the Framework of the EuroMediterranean Partnership", *The Official Journal of the EU*, L189, 30.07.1996, <https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:31996R1488&from=LT>, (09.19.2019), (MEDA96).

²⁶⁷ Youngs, DPM, p. 47

²⁶⁸ The Association Between the European Union and Morocco, **Neighborhood Action Plan: UE-MA 2702/1/05 REV 1**, 27, The Association Council, Brussels, 2005, pp. 1-41.

that were highly criticized in the European Parliament and further by Moroccan NGOs that were consulted by the EC in 2007 for evaluating the Action Plan.²⁶⁹ The ENP resolution improvised the aim in 2006 that the EU would provide political freedom to the residents of neighboring countries.

The EU' role to enhance human rights and democracy with consideration of several policy instruments and reforms are elaborated.²⁷⁰ It can be reflected as a particular part of the ENP. The EU had developed bilateral assistance programs for supporting its members and also established Governance Facilities in order to monitor their progress towards democracy where better ones would be rewarded. Previously, there was blame over the EU for not providing the optimum support for either democracy or human rights to its members in qualitative or quantitative manner as an international institution. Due to such developments, many uncertainties raised over the ENP institutional design and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The existing state of human rights became solid in Morocco with the Makhzen as the reforms' guardian. On the other side, Morocco's modernization could not reflect the democracy in its absolute form. Following the EU policy, Morocco remained a stabilizing agent for encountering terrorism during the conflict of Palestine and Israel. The EU further developed a comprehensive analysis of democracy within Morocco and issued its report in April 2008. The improvements were communicated through meetings and in the form of sub-committee dialogues to promote the existing situation of human rights, good governance and democracy in Morocco. The ENP Governance Facility admired the Moroccan decision of controlling the expected PJD entrance to ruling in its 2007 elections and refrain other members to criticize over it. Additionally, Morocco had greater security and military assistance from member states along with the reward of aid from the ENP.

The EU remained focused on promoting the democratic norms in its states by broadening cultural links and educational support. The ENP attempted to innovate Moroccan economy by providing some initiatives in its security and foreign policy but it remained difficult to specify the effects of those policy initiatives on democratic norms. The EU analyzed the funding on human rights and democracy in the reflection of other developing organizations (like the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)) and the individual economies and revealed that funding was distributed mostly under the categories of administrative and judiciary matters and therefore was

²⁶⁹ The European Parliament, CONSULTATIONS, p. 15-17.

²⁷⁰ Youngs, SECURITY, p.17.

extremely limited. Morocco had allocated only four percent of funding from the European Neighborhood Partnership Initiative (ENPI) to promote human rights and democracy within the nation. Generally, the promotion of budget supports had admiration over the investment on democracy and human rights. Morocco also utilized a smaller fraction of the bilateral aid from France and Spain on the provision of human rights and democracy in the economy. Although the EU member countries were in partnership with rising challenges from many years, they paid a little attention towards upbringing democracy within their nation even after suffering from its consequences.

Morocco performed relatively better in both human rights and in enhancing liberalization, yet it could not become a model MENA country. Being an active member of the EU, the effects of policies regarding migration, terrorism and trade could impact huge on member states but Morocco handled all such matters effectively under the ENP. The Action Plan of the ENP had suggested few reforms to Morocco that could enhance modernization at one hand while avoiding power distribution on the other. These conditions were not focused on traditional partnership promotion and admiring incentives or achievements because the EU Commission and member states were uncertain for pressurizing Morocco to the extent that it could be agreed on structural political reforms, for which criticism was put on the EU' bilateral committees. Although there was a raise in the funding of the EU to Morocco, but it was considerably lower in proportion to the Official Development Assistance (ODA). The exiting funding from the projects of the EIDHR were short to support the political reforms Moroccan regime were taking to implement the ENP policy suggestions. Morocco' efforts were recognized by the Governing Facility of the ENP and it was among the two foremost beneficiaries from the program in 2007. Although, the funded amount was way lower than the incentives required, yet the possibility remained of obtaining more rewards linked to other achievements. The commission later promised 28M€ assistance for Morocco for implementing agendas in an effective way.

Although the actions did not seem to provide political freedom or democracy genuinely in Morocco, but the EU documents assured the commitments of Morocco to fulfil these constitutions within time. The EU kept praising reforms of Morocco regularly due to its reluctance for criticizing the guards of reforms. However, the EU revealed the realities about shortcomings in Moroccan human rights and democratic policies in 2008, although both the document on sectoral progress and the press

release of Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner portrayed the ENP initiative as a success story omitting either human rights or democracy from the discussion.²⁷¹

Even though the EU facilitated its states by using closed bilateral meetings for providing suggestions, it attached no strict conditionality against the assistance provided for key agendas of the Action Plan to its member countries. The EU was blamed for discriminating North and South Mediterranean regions as Arab exceptionalism and the critics were of the view that Morocco was asking for advanced status while on the other end the EU could impose restrictions of democracy over it in effective manner.

The focus of the subcommittee meeting in November 2007 was on judicial cooperation and it invited all member states representatives while the attendees were states of Mediterranean EU and the UK. The Moroccan Consultative Council for Human Rights (CCDH) representatives attended the meeting for which Morocco was criticized later to send NGO in meeting but it was another indication of the importance of the commitment towards democracy in Morocco although some member states in the EU saw it as controversial. Further, Morocco had forwarded steps to promote integration with the EU by making proposal on case wise discussion with its CFSP that became a bridge for negotiations for advanced status. Later in 2008, the EU realized the need for improving the ENP's Action Plan keeping the objectives same with providing better implementation plans.

Morocco joined hands with the EU to eradicate international terrorism. Morocco takes terrorism as a diversion while the real challenges of the region include peace establishment, development in social and economic perspectives, democratic consolidation and preserving cultures and human traditions. The judicial cooperation agreed on promoting human rights and further agenda would be made to harmonize and update the traditional framework along with establishing institutions and border controlling mechanisms.

Besides the strategic value that Morocco encompasses, it has another positive advantage or control that has often extravagant and even sometimes tainted the relationships with the EU is its number of irregular migrants. Morocco has been in great tensions with the EU concerning the flow of illegal migrants that include Moroccans as well as huge influx from other parts of Africa, which takes Morocco as a transit route to enter Europe. Among the EU member states, the main concerned

²⁷¹ The Commission of the European Communities, **Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2007: Sectoral Progress Report, SEC (2008) 403**, Access to European Union Law, Brussels, 2008, pp. 1-10, (SECREPORT).

country is Spain as being 14-Km away from Morocco, it becomes the major entry point for the irregular migrants. Not only that, the relations have further been stained due to the disputes relating to the Western Sahara as well as claims over drugs trafficking. Spain blames Morocco for being lenient in controlling the flow of illegal migrants, which to some extent may not come as a surprise. Such emigration provides a chance to the people who see no future or are victim of the unemployment situation in Morocco, once they cross the border and start earning, they become a real source of foreign remittances as most of those migrants have families back home. Such remittances help profoundly and the annual foreign exchange earnings may go beyond 3 billion dollars. Therefore, under current scenario, if any attempt or action is taken against such illegal migration without addressing the issues in local economy, it may run against the country where not only it affects on foreign exchange earnings but may also add extra burden over the economy and the political system given the number of unemployed will multiply.

Although such problems exist between Morocco and the EU, Morocco is still better placed where it can bring development by achieving strong economic position if Morocco is assisted properly. Thus, this situation provides an upper hand to Morocco where Morocco can present its case on the same lines and may enforce the strong negotiating powers and arguments to attain higher developmental aid.²⁷²

Morocco joined the Mobility Partnership (MP) with the EU as the foremost Southern Mediterranean agent. The basis was to promote the migration of workers within the region. However, such dream remained converted with improving the status of existing Moroccans living in the EU states, although €5 million assistance is provided to Morocco for enhancing the capacity and technology to implement the Mobility Partnership.²⁷³

The Commission in 2002-2004 provided 50m€ to enhance vocational training while 8m€ initially and 8m€ for the year 2005-2006 for the participation of Morocco in the TEMPUS program.

Morocco negotiated extensive association agreement with the EU between 1995 and 1996 that also included Free Trade Agreement (FTA) spanning over 12 years i.e. 1998-2010. However, the period actually began in 2000 due to some ratification issues and thus ended in 2012. The agreement was indeed an effort by the EU towards the promotion of economic stability and prosperity in the MENA

²⁷² Carl Dawson, **EU Integration with North Africa: Trade Negotiations and Democracy Deficits in Morocco**, London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2009, pp. 3-224.

²⁷³ Martin, WHEEL, p. 23.

region. The highlight for Morocco from this agreement was the exclusion of its agriculture as well as service sector from where Morocco would have benefited from this trade liberalization thus proving it to be a poor deal for Morocco. Even the FTA was at stake during early stages of the agreement which shook the Moroccan business community. Further, the ambiguity in the performance of the firms and the amount of aid which Morocco may expect from the EU in order to make an upgrade to its industry, were all uncalculated. This raised a concern over the cost and benefits of FTA given that short and long-term negative impacts may appear as well as the performance of SMEs and Medium enterprises may get a compromise. The accord showed that the funding the EU provided to Morocco for its company upgrading came only a fraction of what Morocco had expected it to be. Not only that, many of those allocated funds did not manage to reach due to multiple constraints. Such scenario saw little to no change in progress of Morocco towards its trade liberalization. The in-depth analysis revealed the situation visibly that what interest such disadvantageous FTA served and who were the beneficiaries of such a misbalanced agreement.²⁷⁴ The answer lies in the deal of agreement where out of the 15 members' states at that time only participants from the EU economies included France, Spain and Italy which ensured that international lobbies are protected but this time at the cost of Morocco. The minimum partnership of Morocco and significant but scanty participation by the EU resulted in an agreement that favored the interests of narrow European member states at the expense of nullifying and damaging the broader vision of the Mediterranean-Euro partnership.

The FTA signed by Morocco with the EU was clearly a case of influential sectoral bodies serving their interests by keeping Morocco at clear disadvantage. This, however, did not happen at the EU end only, as Morocco accepted this visibly disadvantageous agreement where service and agriculture sector was left out to serve the interest of other nations, it was actually influenced to serve some within state bodies that included elite businessmen who had complete influence over decision making. Even the consequences of short and medium term shocks were willingly ignored based on the idea that Morocco should not be excluded from trade liberalization in the long run.²⁷⁵

Aside enhancing the mobility of labors promoting free trade in the region in 2014, the ratification towards four years Fisheries Agreement 2007 was also made.

²⁷⁴ Dawson, p. 23.

²⁷⁵ Dawson, p. 133.

According to this agreement, Moroccan water territories remained open for the EU member ships to cultivate the available resources. In order to compensate such services, €30 million were provided by the EU to Morocco on a yearly basis. Although the fishing agreement was established in 1995, it remained disputed and was terminated in December 2011 on political grounds by Rabat. Modifying the previous agreements Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) was negotiated in March 2013 to replace the Free Trade Agreement of 1998. The agenda was to liberalize all the trade on industrial goods, which was signed in March 2012 but it shifted to unclear incentives for the Moroccan economy. Later in October 2012, when bilateral trade liberalization took place, still quotas and price restrictions were practiced on agricultural exports of Morocco. Further, in April 2014, the EU developed a unilateral calculation method for the market deal with fruits and vegetables. Such trade relationship generated a dispute in the authorities as Morocco observed a decrease in its export items in 2014. On the contrary, the EU members enjoyed continuous trade surplus from 2008 of above €6 billion per year; particularly in 2013 the worth of exported items of the EU to Morocco was exceeding €17 billion while the exports of Morocco to the EU remained €10 billion giving a surplus of €7 billion to the EU members. The rationale behind such remarkable difference lies in that the EU exports to Morocco consist of machinery, chemicals and transportation tools, whereas Morocco' export items were clothing and agricultural products, which produce less value addition. The EU-implemented structural reforms to promote "Europeanisation" in Morocco are not enough to reach a benchmark required to bring structural transformation that would make the country meet the ENP standards.

The need of finalizing free trade agreement could terminate the barriers in free movements of goods, services, capital and purposeful professional people on temporary basis.²⁷⁶ Although these conditions of goods liberalization could include the agricultural products, during discussion, Morocco reiterated the controlled and gradual opening of the market that could be aligned with the socioeconomic situation of the country. The EU and Morocco negotiations shed light on the speed and ways to regulate the agricultural products whereas taking aside the challenges and limitations that could have occurred due to sudden opening of the EU markets on Morocco's economy. The market issues significance was different in both the EU and the Moroccan perspectives. These issues had a potential to pose a direct impact

²⁷⁶ Jaidi, p. 32.

on the social and economic situation of Morocco while it remained an agenda of market regulating and managing the competition among the Mediterranean economies for the EU. The liberalization look simple task but the complications remained not only in goods movement but a more dynamic challenge to liberalize services. Services bring in the challenge of dealing suppliers with clients and passing across residents on borders for this purpose produces the real challenge. The services are heterogeneous and without their classification it would be ambiguous to implement a common framework and opening services across borders therefore would need a sector wise plan of action that could implement specific restrictions and conditions in an effective manner. Morocco also emphasized on “package” readmission agreement in order to facilitate the visa facilitation and promote legal migration along with financial and technical assistance to implement the agreement. Although it is submitted, the EU did not provide the details of either accepting it or rejecting it due to which Morocco decided to watch for negotiations at this particular stage as it was not in position to provide further concessions.

The Moroccan GDP growth rate remained high during 1995 to 2004 yet the freedom scores remained 57.4 percent in 2007 and it ranked 96th among the 161 countries.²⁷⁷ It indicated a need to promote economic freedom in Morocco that could possibly enhance the GDP per capita as well.²⁷⁸ Morocco was part of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement since 2000 to gradually establish the free trade area. The agreement reached to terminate tariff and non-tariff barriers on manufactured goods till 2012. Article 18(2) of this agreement stressed on the sensitivity of agriculture products and therefore relied on gradual implementation for increasing the liberalization of trade in fishery and agriculture products. The suggested framework was discussion on product by product concessions but no understanding was developed between the EU and Morocco.²⁷⁹ Agriculture in Morocco consisted 13 percent in total GDP that remained 71.5 percent of Moroccan trade with the EU.²⁸⁰ There existed a clear distinction point that Moroccan exports to

²⁷⁷ The International Monetary Fund, “Morocco: Preliminary Findings of the 2008 Article IV Consultation”, **IMF Press Center**, 25.06.2008, <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/52/mcs053008a> , (20.11.2019).

²⁷⁸ Tim Kane, Kim R. Holmes, Mary Anastasia O’ Grady, **2007 Index of Economic Freedom: The Link between Economic Opportunity and Prosperity**, 13th Edition, The Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C, 2007, pp. 5-408.

²⁷⁹ The European Commission, **EC-Morocco Association Agreement L 70, Article 6**, Official Journal of the European Communities, Brussels, 2000, pp. 1-189, (AAgreement L70).

²⁸⁰ The US Department of Commerce, “Morocco: Country Commercial Guide: Agricultural Sector”, Official Website of the International Trade Administration, 29.11.2022, <https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/morocco-agricultural-sector> , (11.12.2022).

the EU would be facing both tariff and non-tariff barriers while its imports from the EU remained free from all barriers that would be causing tariff loss to Morocco. Further, the Article 38 of the EU-Morocco agreement regulated on Morocco that no such measure would be adopted or maintained by Morocco that could possibly disturb the trade between Morocco and the European Community.

The Agreement between Morocco and the EU remained the same from 1996, which was awarded with the advanced status in 2008 having few real commitments.²⁸¹ The relationship however lost its footings when this status was extended to Jordan in 2010 and later in 2011 the privileged partnership was granted to Tunisia. There was not any clarity between the roles or value addition it could provide to Morocco. However, the rise in the volume of aid received to Morocco by the EU was clearly visible. The Average aid per person during 1995-2006 raised from €4.7 to €5.45 by 2007-2010 that further publicized to €6.2 in 2011-2013 and even exceeded €8 per person for the period of 2014-2020. The surge in aid, however, was exposed and real indication appeared where if Morocco were to consider being part of the EU, it would be entitled up to €98 per person as structural funds for a year. This plan of action for 2005-2010 was replaced with a mutually agreed new Neighborhood Action Plan (NAP) of 2013-2017. This plan supposed to provide the priorities in the bilateral relation for the future four years but contrary to the EU transparency policy its report was not published.

Detailed insights to roadmap for Morocco's economy and its economic integration in the EU market are explained in detail.²⁸² In order to achieve this goal, four crucial areas included aligning Morocco' legal framework with the EU requirements, concluding comprehensive free trade agreement, economic and social development cooperation, specific sector cooperative schemes and Morocco participation in the Trans-European Network. The reverting of Morocco' legal system would require environment, job security and health investments along with many sectors' modernization. The sensitive areas in community development like border control and consumer protection could require excellent administration and trained personnel. Such difficulties in legislation, political hurdles, administration and financial constraints were the major reasons that Morocco asked for technical assistance.

Free trade agreement as a principal was agreed in the EU and Southern Eastern Mediterranean (SEM) economies in 1995. The FTA at this stage would be

²⁸¹ Martin, WHEEL, p. 23.

²⁸² Jaidi, p.12.

liberalizing the EU' industrial goods access in the SEM economies while SEM' access remained short towards the EU markets. The EU economies mainly exported the industrial goods while the SEM economies including Morocco who possessed the comparative advantage in the field of agricultural products that were omitted from the free trade agreement. It puts SEM in a comparative disadvantage from the beginning although some positives were also expected from this agreement though it was highly criticized later on. Morocco was among the first economies that implemented the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative (EMPI) in the years 1995 and 1996.²⁸³ The possible effects of joining free trade agreement on Moroccan economy could spill-over at the existing employment level.²⁸⁴ The free trade provided consumer and producer gains and tariff loss to the government. Import taxes average in Morocco was 18.9 percent in 1993²⁸⁵ whereas 55.4 percent imports and 62.5 percent exports origin remained in the EU and the Euro-FTA states. While Morocco manufactured imports consisted equipment, finished consumer goods and semi-finished goods in early 1990s remained in percentages of 75, 80 and 75 respectively.²⁸⁶ Such remarkable share of the EU in the exports and imports of Morocco could affect the whole economy as the cheaper imports would be coming in the economy that will affect the demand and supply mechanism. Morocco collected about 40 percent of GDP from tax and tariff revenues but later in 1996 this proportion had reduced to 24 percent due to the implementation of free trade agreement.²⁸⁷ Further, a loss of 3 percent in the GDP was expected for Morocco during that time.²⁸⁸ Such a significant loss in the GDP required an equally significant value addition by factor reallocation. The output expansion by free trade agreement highly depended on the sensitivity of price and demand elasticity for domestic goods after considering the aspects like the devaluation of currency.

Aside the possible devaluation due to free trade agreement, the SEM economies were highly favorable for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) due to comparatively cheaper labor than that of in the other EU markets. However, there

²⁸³ Amoroso Bruno, Andrea Gallina, "The impact of the Euro-Mediterranean Free-Trade Area on the EU Social Cohesion and Economic Co-operation in the Wider Europe", **Paper Presented at the First Femise Conference**, Marseilles, 17-18 February, 2000, pp. 3-25.

²⁸⁴ Diana Hunt, "Employment Implication of the Euro-Med Free Trade Agreements", **Journal of North African Studies**, Vol., 7, No. 1, 2002, pp. 71-98.

²⁸⁵ Isabelle Bensidoun, Agnès Chevallier, **Europe-Méditerranée : Le Pari de L'Ouverture**, Paris : Editions Economica, 1996, pp. 104.

²⁸⁶ The Kingdom of Morocco Ministère Chargée de la Population Rabat, **Annuaire Statistique 1993**, Direction de la Statistique, Rabat, Morocco, 1993, p. 75, 373, 473.

²⁸⁷ The World Bank, **World Development Report 1998/9**, World Bank Group E-Library, 1999, pp. 16-181, (WDR98/9).

²⁸⁸ Bruno & Gallina, p.11.

were few hurdles in investing SEM and few of those include poor infrastructure, complexities in bureaucratic institutions and the lack of transparency.²⁸⁹ The absence of agriculture from free trade agreement between the EU and SEM reduced the benefits from FDI. Moreover, these restrictions lowered the domestic price of agricultural goods and reduced the wages in that sector. Tariff removal also decreased return on capital on few productive activities therefore capital flows were also reversed.²⁹⁰ However, the impact of free trade agreement on employment was projected in few studies through predictions on Moroccan economy using Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modelling. The model results projected about 1.5 to 2 percent of GDP welfare gains considering free trade agreement and assuming liberalization in the agriculture sector, a slight negative occurred.²⁹¹ The GDP affect were projected negative in the medium term for Morocco that could not be ignored considering the assumptions utilized in the CGE modelling. Comparative static CGE model analysis for Morocco included the liberalization from both the EU and Morocco, provided projection of unemployment in four branches of agriculture: about 11 percent in cereals; nearly 67 percent in meat and dairies; in sugar production about 82.5 percent. The unemployment rate was least projected for manufacturing; the most affected factors were processed food, cement, textiles, chemical and electro-mechanical that were ranging about 3.1 to 6.1 percent shares of GDP. The depreciation in real exchange rate projected surge of 58 to 93 percent for the phosphates sector and nearly 22 percent rise in fruits and vegetables as Morocco hold comparative advantage over it but the EU barriers of agriculture did not allow to bring benefits to Morocco. In all these circumstances, the model predicted that at least 3.2 percent of labor force had to be reallocated. Considering the omission of liberalization, the agriculture benefits would be eliminated, and the benefits incurred through phosphates would be enhanced.²⁹² Another study considered the devaluation of 1 percent annually impact on primary exports, labor intensive industry, capital intensive industry, formal and informal sector non-tradable remained negative for Moroccan employment. The only sector which showed positive stats was agriculture

²⁸⁹ Riadh Zghal, "Globalisation, Culture and Management Systems", **Journal of North African Studies**, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1999, pp. 20-105.

²⁹⁰ Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardoff, Robert M. Stern, "Some Economic Effects of the Free Trade Agreement between Tunisia and the European Union", **Regional Partners in Global Markets: Limits and Possibilities of the Euro-Med Agreements**, (eds. Ahmed Galal, and Bernard Hoekman), London: Centre for Economic Policy, 1997, pp. 85-89.

²⁹¹ Thomas Rutherford, Elisabet Ruström, David Tarr, "Morocco's Free Trade Agreement with the European Union: A Quantitative Assessment", **World Bank Policy Research Working Paper**, WPS No. 1173, 1993, pp. 237-269.

²⁹² The Kingdom of Morocco Ministère Chargée de la Population Rabat, p. 373.

that also after assuming 8 percent gain in productivity of labor intensive manufacturing was nullified and no factor remained positive on Moroccan employment. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) models were developed to check the impact of agriculture liberalization on poverty and welfare of rural residents. Those models allowed liberalization from Moroccan side only. The results predicted a loss of rural semi-commercial and small-scale farmers by Moroccan agriculture trade liberalization. The losses spilled over to non-farm rural sectors and the rural to urban migration increased.²⁹³ However, the results revealed welfare gain over the liberalization for the whole economy by decreasing food prices. Excluding administrative cost, the prediction indicated absorption of 0.8 percent of GDP in the adjustment process for the program of decreasing 25 percent tariff and non-tariff barriers on Moroccan agriculture sector. The implementation of free trade agreement, non-tariff barriers would also be eliminated, and tariff barriers would be reduced to 10 percent. The compensatory cost for the farmers that observed loss peaked to 3.75 percent of GDP then it gradually starts declining.

While talking about SEM states, the existing rate of unemployment in SEM states remained high along with rapidly growing labor force. In 1992, Moroccan unemployment rate was 15.7 percent²⁹⁴ implementing free trade agreement with 22 percent of urban labor employed in manufacturing in which 30 percent decrease in employment would lead to 3.5 percent labor force that would give rise to 23 percent unemployment rate in urban labor force. The manufacturing unemployment would be consisting skilled labors.²⁹⁵ During 1999, the influx of 300,000 unemployed graduates caused great danger to weaken the public sector efficiency.²⁹⁶ The transition time for the implementation of free trade agreement could raise labor force by 1.6 million that could generate extra pressure on existing jobs.²⁹⁷ Agriculture trade liberalization could accelerate unemployment in urban sector through rural to urban migration and the free trade agreement implementation generated unemployment in SEM economies and its impact may continue for decades. Along with the domestic migration, the emigration pressure could also increase that would be controversial in the EU and

²⁹³ Hans Löfgren, "Trade Reform and the Poor in Morocco: A Rural-Urban General Equilibrium Analysis of Reduced Protection", **Earnings Inequality, Unemployment, and Poverty in the Middle East and North Africa**, eds. Wassim Shahin, Ghassan Dibeh, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000, pp. 69.

²⁹⁴ The Kingdom of Morocco Ministère Chargée de la Population Rabat, p.394.

²⁹⁵ Denis Cogneau, George Tapinos, "Libre-Echange, Repartition du Revenu et Migrations au Maroc", **Revue d'Economie du Développement**, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1995, pp. 29, 33.

²⁹⁶ The Economist Group, p.12.

²⁹⁷ The Kingdom of Morocco Ministère Chargée de la Population Rabat, 1993, p. 389.

SEM economies. Therefore, unemployment has to be absorbed within the domestic sectors of economy. The unemployed labor must be displaced, and it depends highly on the positions available at factor or product market. The factor market observed two types of constraints. At first political that could be easy to encounter comparing to market imperfections, and that were rooted in the system as the second constraint. One case of market imperfection that was observed in many countries that the individual work over family farm having more absorption capacity than commercial due to the comparative cost is less at those farms.²⁹⁸ However, many of Moroccan farms are too small and dependent on rainwater and for this very reason, applying more labor from family would cause diminishing returns unless they could be supported through some technological innovations. There existed a general trend in Morocco to support middle and large farms (5-20 hectares). In 1980s, the large 4 percent farms (over 20 hectares) consisted of 33.6 percent of land used for cultivation. Absorption of labors into Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME) would be beneficial when demand for their product also increased, otherwise it could result in wage decrease and underemployment. Similar phenomena for the 1990-92 recession in Morocco was also reported.²⁹⁹ Besides, unemployment appeared as the most complained phenomena in North Africa.³⁰⁰ Existing high unemployment rate and growing poverty in unskilled labourers could be a challenge for SEM economies. Negotiations for liberalizing agriculture trade in the EU and at the World Trade Organization (WTO) could be an option after considering domestic agriculture sector. To deal with the consequences of free trade and stabilizing economic growth, potential solutions could be the improvement of manufacturing sector in labor intensive techniques and promoting small family farms.

2.4. AGREEMENTS BETWEEN MOROCCO AND THE EU/EC

Although these agreements have been discussed above within the conversation, a complete detail encompassing discussion of these agreements is a

²⁹⁸ Frank Ellis, **Peasant Economics: Farm Households in Agrarian Development**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: CUP, 1992, pp. 328.

Giovanni A. Cornia, "Farm Size, Land Yields and the Agricultural Production Function", **World Development**, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1985, pp. 413-434.

²⁹⁹ Francois Bourguignon, Jaime de Melo, Akiko Suwa, "Modelling the Effects of Adjustment Programs on Income Distribution", **World Development**, Vol. 19, No. 11, 1991, pp. 1527-1544.

³⁰⁰ Mark Tessler, Carrie Konold, Megan Reif, "Political Generations and in developing Countries: Evidence and Insights from Algeria", **The Public Opinion Quarterly**, Vol. 68, No. 2, 2004, pp. 184-216.

must for the study. Thus, these agreements along with their main objectives, points are discussed below.

2.4.1. The EU-Morocco Association Council's Seventeenth Meeting

The EU-Morocco Association Council's seventeenth meeting was held in October 2008 in which Morocco requested for the advanced status in the ENP. The advanced status of Morocco also came up with negotiations that provided two basic benefits to it within the EU framework. First negotiation involved visa free travel after implementing readmission agreements while under mobility partnership, the EU supposed to create employment opportunities in its job market and to facilitate migration process for the partner economies residents. The second benefit could be that the EU would be supporting the regional development based on its policy. Such funding would come from the EU pilot regional program to provide the support to small enterprises, human capital and infrastructure. The Commission ensures direct cooperation and extension of border across the EU partner countries with financial assistance from the ENP mechanism. Both the EU and Morocco emphasized on strengthening their relationship by re-examining the framework of the partnership and enhancing it through generating new opportunities in the ENP, promoting openness, prosperity and progress.

The request for having an advanced status was not for obtaining exclusive rights over the other nations but it was a contribution in establishing governance forms necessary for the Euro-Mediterranean space. Implementing strategic changes and addressing the rising security issues in the economy, Morocco and the EU attempted to forge foreign neighborhood. Additionally, they would be trying to encounter threats and issues raised due to globalization and capitalization of assets. The document further pointed out that both the EU and Morocco would be focusing on political, financial, human and economic fields in order to facilitate Morocco's inclusion in particular community agencies and programs.

2.4.1.1. The Political Cooperation

The political cooperation may strengthen by focusing on each other strategic priorities and through appropriate financial support that gradually may make Morocco

the interior market of the EU.³⁰¹ The political commitments for rising bilateral coordination were followed by a series of actions, such as establishing the EU-Morocco Summit. The Moroccan Foreign affairs and officials of the Kingdom meeting with representatives of European Ministers and the EU CFSP and other working group meetings took place. These meetings status were ad hoc and were not included in the regular framework of the UN or the EU Council meetings. Further, Morocco and the European Parliament would be establishing a joint inter-parliamentary committee that has permission to observe the Council of European Parliamentary Assembly. Morocco and the EU secretary general meetings on some particular themes were also scheduled with expected themes of democracy, collective security and human rights. Negotiations over Morocco support in crisis over military and civil management would be perhaps joining the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). With such agreement, Morocco would be a supporter to statements of CFSP over case by case.

2.4.1.1.1. The Euro-Mediterranean Agreement /Association Agreement

The Association Agreement between Morocco and the EU came into force in 2000. It was introduced as the partnership development framework for the nations, which promised to promote growth friendly environment, investment, liberalisation of trade, economic restructuring, integration and technological modernisation. The main objective of this agreement was to facilitate the two-way trade between the EU and Morocco. Given that Morocco lies in the South Mediterranean region; the EU had established free trade agreements with Morocco in order to promote the trade among regional countries. Some rules for trading were established by the EU in order to enhance trade. The bilateral negotiations were settled for dealing over services, dispute settlement, establishment, industrial and agricultural standards. The base of negotiations was built around creating new investment opportunities and an EU-Morocco market integration. The DCFTA aimed at assisting the process of economic reforms in Morocco and ensuring the EU legislations regarding trade. These negotiations were successful, and these negotiations later were merged under the DCFTA negotiations. The EU provided authority to Commission for opening bilateral negotiations among Jordan, Egypt and Morocco for creating DCFTA on 14th December 2011.

Some of the major objectives of the agreement are listed below:

³⁰¹ Jaidi, p. 21.

Political Dialogue: Political dialogues within member-parties in order to build solidarity of partner states along with contributing to the prosperity, security and stability ensuring peace and regional development of the Mediterranean region.

Free Movement of Goods: Free trade in 12 years from implementation in an effort to eliminate tariff with the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Economic Provisions: Including balance of payment, investment and capital movements. Several suggestions and guidelines to both Morocco and member states for enhancing investment opportunities, to maintain the balance of payment account and the commitment to the Association Agreement.

Economic Cooperation: To attain sustainable growth of economy and society. Cooperation would be focusing on the areas that faced internal difficulties like the process of liberalisation in Morocco; particularly liberalising the trade of Morocco and the member states.

Cooperation in Social and Cultural Matters: No discrimination based on nationality. Member states would treat Moroccans with the similar rights they were providing to their own residents i.e. the working conditions, remuneration and dismissal conditions. Morocco will follow the same procedure for migrants. Further, Morocco and member states would respect each other's culture for cooperation in the society, enhancing mutual understanding, knowledge and promote other cultural activities without a social unrest in the economy.

Financial Assistance: In order to achieve the goals, Morocco would be provided with the financial assistance and the knowledge about the procedures and resources for obtaining more finance.

Association Council as a Power: Situations where issues arise in the bilateral and multilateral agreements within states and Morocco, this council would be authorised to take the decisions or provide recommendations on the matters presented to them. Where, Association Committee would ensure the implementation of the decisions taken by the council. The Association Council had three major set of decisions for amendments in the Association Agreements between the EU and Morocco which were announced in 2005, 2010 and 2014.

2.4.1.1.2. The EU-Morocco Trade Agreements

The EU-Morocco trade relationship consists of both goods and services. The trade of goods indicates Morocco's imports of €23.4 billion and exports of €16.3 billion were traded with the EU in 2019. Back in 2018, the Moroccan imports from the EU were €22.5 billion and exports were €15.4 billion. The EU remained the greatest trading partner to Morocco where approximately 59.4% of trade relationships settled in 2017. For Morocco, 64.6% of its exports served the EU while 56.5% imports were from the EU. On the other end though, Morocco was placed on 22nd place among the trading partners of the EU where 1% of total EU trade came from Morocco. Going down the years, the EU and Morocco partnership exports and imports were worth about €37.4 billion in 2017. The major imports of the EU to Morocco consist of about €6 billion (40.4%) on transport and machinery while agriculture remained €3.4 billion (23.0%), clothing and textiles cost about €2.9 billion (19.3%). The exports of the EU to Morocco remained equipment for machinery and transport about €8.4 billion (37.7%), metals, minerals and fuel worth about €5.2 billion (23.4%), clothing and textiles consist of €1.8 billion (8.1%) while agriculture products remained €1.6 billion (7.3%). The trade of services between Morocco and the EU depicts Morocco exports stayed €5.6 billion and imports were about €4 billion in 2018. The services trade with the EU generated about €8.8 billion in 2016 out of which Morocco's exports were €5.2 billion while imports remained €3.6 billion. To sum up the figures, it is visible that Morocco is facing trade deficit when it comes to trading goods with the EU while its asset which generates surplus is its trading of services with the EU.

The Association Agreement between Morocco and the EU was officially signed on February 1996 and it was completely implemented by March 2000.³⁰² This association agreement took Community and Member States on one part and Morocco on the other part. Later, the negotiations and dispute settlement mechanism was operational in November 2012 and another agreement on trade liberalising of agriculture was incorporated in October 2012. Further, in March 2013, Morocco and the EU jointly launched negotiations on DCFTA as an independent contractor and the trading negotiations have been conferred under that forum thereafter. The most recent round of negotiations had happened in April 2014 where the plan of Morocco required further improvements before further negotiations or implementation. The

³⁰² Claire Brunel, "Morocco-EU Trade Relations", **Peterson Institute for International Economics**, Series No. 88, 2009, pp. 221-236.

Association Council recalled for relaunching DCFTA in June 2019, but it did not happen until February 2020.

2.4.2. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

The relationship between Morocco and the EU is based upon the necessity of solving the common difficulties that exist in economic development, climate change, innovation, security, justice, migration, good governance, mobility and grabbing the new opportunities. Legally, the Association Agreement which came into force in 2000 became the basis of this partnership. The ENP was launched in 2004 which later received an overhaul in 2015.

With time, Morocco and the EU partnership strengthened in the area of trade, development, technical, economic and political cooperation. Further, the Association Council provided the framework of political dialogues and cooperation of the EU-Morocco relationship. The ENP's last meeting was held on 27th June 2019 that enhanced multidimensional, privileged and strategic partnership.

Few of the major points in the agreement are enlisted.

The ENI remained the important financial instrument for promoting the EU and Morocco cooperation during 2014 to 2020. Bilateral assistance consists about €1,323 million to €1,617 million for Morocco. The assistance priorities remained as equitable access to social services, rule of law and mobility, democratic governance, inclusive and sustainable growth and employment. Morocco obtained several financial assistances under different instruments and programs of the ENP. Among those some major are as follows:

First is the EU grants and loans. Such grants and loans are concessional in nature to lower the economic and political risks of the partner states. Since 2011, Morocco had accessed €6 billion loans for sustainable energy, transport, water management, private sector and skill development. Aside these sectors, the support to promote civil society and capacity building were also given to Morocco. The EU specifically provided assistance for youth, gender equality, environment, art and cultural programs. Morocco also got funding benefits from the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) worth € 1 billion with specific objective of controlling irregular migration and providing respect to the migrants along with creating awareness in the public regarding the risks of irregular migration.

Morocco participates in initiatives available for Southern Neighbourhood economies including Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX) and Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) and Neighbourhood Investment Platform (NIP). TAIEX is an instrument of the EC to support public administration according to the EU legislation; it is a need based approach and it facilitates the issues using expert missions, workshops and study visits within the EU states. The assistance provided to member states civil servants, parliament members, social representatives, law enforcing authorities and judiciary. TAIEX is assisting Morocco for transportation of dangerous goods like chemicals and gas through roads from November 2017 to date. The major objective of SIGMA is to assist ENP countries for making progress in public governance reforms by increasing capacity of public administration. It also involves the expertise of the EU economies and acts as a transfer of knowledge through practices.³⁰³ The Neighbourhood Investment Platform (NIP) provides investment in infrastructure that are capital-intensive projects of ENP in the EU member countries from the sectors of energy, environment, transport and social development. In September 2017, NIP joined the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD). Morocco obtained an investment of €221.35 million from NIP between 2008 to 2016, where €10.30 million worth projects were approved in 2016. Currently NIP grants to Morocco have approved for few projects in 2018.³⁰⁴

Second is the regional cooperation and Other funding. The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) also provides funding in the regional programs focusing on the different sectors such as education, research and training, business environment, media and culture, justice, security and freedom, climate change, environment and energy. Aside the ENI cooperation programs, Morocco obtains funding under other thematic instruments and programs like the EIDHR and Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI).

³⁰³ The European Commission, **Commission Implementing Decision on the Neighborhood Investment Platform (NIP) and the Programme in Support to the Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA), Part of the European Neighborhood Wide Action Programme for 2018, 2018C**, Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Brussels, 2018, pp. 1-54, (SIGMA).

³⁰⁴ Johannes Hahn, Neven Mimica, "External Investment Plan", **The European Fund for Sustainable Development: Neighborhood Investment Platform Report**, 11.07.2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4385 , (08.10.2020).

2.4.3. The MEDA Programs

The MEDA program was adopted as the fundamental financial instrument of the EU to flourish the EMP in 1996. Morocco was considered the major beneficiary of MEDA as it was allocated with €1,472 million distributed in two phases; €660 million in MEDA I for the period of 1995-1999 and €812 million in MEDA II for 2000-2006. The programs touched both social and economic spheres including structural reform programs on taxation, education, water, health, transport, enterprise development, sanitation programs, human rights, freedom, migratory issues, etc. During the whole period from 1996 to 2006, the total budget for democracy, institutional reforms, environment, drug addiction, assistance to NGO's and to combat with severe diseases remained €15 million which was less than 2 percent for the programs. Therefore, it was not enough to finance the whole program, rather it brought in the challenge for Morocco to participate and facilitate these programs along with managing the rest of finances on its own. Though MEDA provided support to the reforms process of the EU, rather focusing on the needs of the Moroccan economy, the reforms were not met to the extent that could satisfy the EU. Moreover, since MEDA was dispersed in both NGO's and partly the government facilitation, so the assistance was not much for the Moroccan monarchy.³⁰⁵ The MEDA programs were both bilateral and regional in nature. Technical assistance of MEDA projects was provided to services, supplies, works and donations for civil society institution's small projects. The MEDA funds served both public and private entities for medium and small enterprises, institutions, infrastructure, training and micro-enterprise investment.

Although MEDA was an academic instrument of the EMP, it remained absent from the disputes and scholarly debates in the EU. The MEDA program analysis suffered from two major obstacles. First was the lack of reliable and transparent data and the gaps in the implementations of projects was the other reason.

The issues faced by the MEDA program include first low level of determinacy. MEDA I and MEDA II basic objectives were defined differently which showed low level of determinacy in MEDA regulations. These amendments were made in 2000 in accordance with guidance of Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) that both defined MEDA assistance programs in the countries. It

³⁰⁵ Michal Natorky, "The Meda Programme in Morocco 12 Years On: Results, Experiences and Trends", **Documentos CIDOB Mediterráneo**, N°11, 2008, pp. 5-54.

was basically defined due to the previous unclear definitions with regards to its indicator's implementation and evaluation of the countries.³⁰⁶ The low level of determinacy was realized in Morocco during operational period of MEDA I when earlier, to implement the guidelines provided for indicative program, National Indicative Programme granted approval in 1996. Hence, in many cases the programming process was not applied in Morocco, rather the identification of true programming was realized at the execution phase of the project and then actions were taken with the involvement of different personnel in MEDA cooperation.³⁰⁷

Second there is slower implementation. The MEDA I payments were averagely between 20 to 36 percent of allocation. Later in MEDA II the payments expanded. In 2004, the ratio of accumulated allocation and accumulated payments increased from 26 to 54 percent during 1999 to 2004. This clearly pointed out the slower implementation of MEDA projects. The disbursement of MEDA II funding rose by just 15 percent from what it was in MEDA I on the general level projects. While in the case of Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) 89 percent of allocation was done after 5 years and in the case of project support, only 29 percent allocation was done after 5 years.

Third is the lack of MEDA project's prioritization. The MEDA I period was operated somehow in learning by doing mechanism of the EU with lack of clarity in its instruments, priorities, planning measures, etc. Philippart resembled MEDA with the Christmas tree that offered almost something for everybody with greater gifts at the bottom and small boxes for different governments. Later, in MEDA II the decision-making process had improved much along with programming and planning of the projects. The MEDA I had initiated many projects in Morocco which made it difficult to identify the priorities according to their budget allocation. MEDA I was split into 14 areas and types of intervention. Among these, five were infrastructure programs with the allocation of €127 million. Roughly, by the number of projects MEDA I focus remained on the economic activities in accordance to the Association Agreement. Out of them, six projects were on economic institutional support, three were infrastructural and one was with private sector development. However, MEDA II chose the different approach where projects related to justice, police, immigration, human rights and civil society were supported, ignoring cultural, agricultural and environment related

³⁰⁶ The European Commission, MEDA, p. 12.

³⁰⁷ Luis Tejada Chacon, "La Cooperación MEDA En El Período 1995 – 1999", **Boletín Económico de Información Comercial Española**, No. 2655, 2000, pp. 8-24.

programs. Hence, transparency level had increased during MEDA II with the cost of lowering other EU assistance objectives.

Fourth is the reforms costs and rewards. The MEDA program rewards were attached to change the cost-benefit analysis of Mediterranean countries' structure undertaking the EMP reforms. Morocco was attached with both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU economic reforms at the same time. The most demanding agenda was establishing Free Trade Area by 2012 with the EU. Applying the process of liberalisation in the economy was a challenge at one hand, while many structural problems were observed on the other. One of the largest impacts was on social welfare.

Fifth are the MEDA financial constraints. Though Morocco was leading beneficiary by obtaining €1.6 billion for the period 1995 to 2006 but the average assistance per person remained €4.66 in Morocco that was fourth from last in MEDA I. MEDA funding distributed over 59 projects in 1995 to 2006. The EU allocated around €659 million with averagely €132 million allocated per year. This allocation further rose to around €950 million for seven years with around €136 million per year. Although it seemed a lot, but it had serious aid supplying issues. The EU claimed to do the allocation of funds over 4 years, but this promise never fulfilled. Morocco obtained the disbursement of only €566 million from all MEDA funds for the period 1995 to 2004 that was lower than 42.4 percent of MEDA allocations. Specifically, the disbursements till 2004 were around 53 percent of allocation from MEDA I and 32 percent from MEDA II. The projects under SAF and EIB were accomplished while the technical assistance projects could not benefit Morocco with its implementation.

The last is the conditionality. The conditional ties attached with the provision of MEDA funds were political and economic. The regulations attached political conditionality with Mediterranean countries, violating human rights could suspend the budgetary support. Morocco was an interesting case where no clear indication was levied, in fact, the democratisation of Morocco was not even asked as the political conditionality. The EC first tried to achieve democratisation of Morocco through a spill-over of reforms and economic adjustments.³⁰⁸ In MEDA I initially, the population of the country was considered the base of fund distribution, but it was replaced in the progress of economic reforms and the funds which were not allocated to the countries till 1999, were declared lost. Morocco scored higher in this performance conditionality

³⁰⁸ Vivien A. Schmidt, "Re-Envisioning the European Union: Identity, Democracy, Economy", **Journal of Common Market Studies-JMC**, Volume 47, 2009, pp. 17-42.

due to which under MEDA I, NIP initially secured €455.5 million for any single country for 1996 to 1998 but in 1998, the EC approved 10 projects that provided Morocco with €76 million more than planned. MEDA II budget also provided average annual increase of around €4 million that came in the favour of Morocco.

2.4.4. The Morocco's Advanced Status

The EU and Morocco relationship is among the most advanced trading relationship outside Europe for the EU. It is also an advanced relationship in the framework of Southern Neighbourhood of the ENP. Morocco' binding with the EU is far stronger than the EU bonding with any other country of the Southern neighbourhood and realizing that Morocco also emphasizes on promoting political relationship with African countries and others.³⁰⁹ That is what made Morocco gain advanced status with the EU. The value added to Morocco in the form of advanced status was unclear in the joint document and it seems like a general view rather any specifications. The negotiations in altering text of joint document were continued even after publishing that document.

The request for having an advanced status was not for obtaining exclusive rights over the other nations but to build cooperation between the EU and Morocco where focus could be on the development of political, financial, human rights and economic divisions. Morocco had good expectations attached to it such as visa free negotiations under mobility partnership and providing job opportunities to Moroccan residents whereas the development aid for small enterprises, human capital and infrastructure was also projected. The political commitments for rising bilateral coordination were followed by a series of actions such as joining the EU CFSP and the inter-parliamentary committee of the EU and Europe was promised by the EU. Democracy, collective security, institutions establishment, and human rights could also be important along with negotiations over Morocco to support the EU in crisis over military, anti-terrorism and civil management by joining the ESDP. Yet the EU funding was not enough in these areas to meet the expectations of Morocco. One of the reasons was that in the early years, Morocco was not provided with the permission to join the different programs and agencies similar to the EU member states.

³⁰⁹ Chloe Teevan, "EU-Morocco: A Win-Win partnership?", **Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis (MIPA)**, Working Paper, 2019, pp.1-14.

Comprehensive free trade agreement, economic and social development cooperation, specific sector cooperative schemes and Morocco' participation in Trans-European Network could be the pillar of Morocco's economic reform from the EU. The reverting of Morocco's legal system would require environment, job security and health investments along with many sector's modernizations in which the EU assistance was projected. Yet the job creation abroad within the EU states dream end up with the migratory negotiations between the EU member states and Morocco. Morocco was looking forward to a free trade agreement, which could terminate the barriers in the free movements of goods, services, capital and purposeful professional people on temporary basis especially on Moroccan exports. Although, these conditions of goods liberalisation could include the agricultural products, the major exports of Morocco, but the EU never approved it, rather negotiations remained busy to regulate agricultural products of Morocco by quota system. The later years followed by round on negotiations again and again, but Morocco was never provided with the agriculture trade full liberalization similar to which the EU asked for the industrial goods later in the form of the DCFTA. Morocco had a vision of economic convergence to the EU member states development which was never realized and the EU always discriminated in Morocco and European states, therefore convergence became a mere dream.³¹⁰

2.4.5. The EU Aids and Initiatives for Morocco

The Association agreement between Morocco and the EU signed in 1996 remained the same and assigning the advanced status in October 2008 acted as the general political framework with the absence of any strong commitments in key fields of bilateral relations. Although the advanced status came up with promising discussions for expansion in Morocco's structural funds methodology from the EU, it was never materialized. Aside that fact, the volume of aid received by Morocco from the EU expanded to a considerable extent. During 1995 to 2006, aid per person raised from €4.7 average of €5.45. Just at the period of signing and soon after having the advanced status this aid boosted to €6.2 per person during 2007 to 2010. Later in 2011-2013 the aid per person even exceeded €8 between 2014-2020. That sounds respectable yet Morocco was eligible to have up to €98 per person on the basis of

³¹⁰ Ivan Martin, "EU–Morocco relations: how advanced is the 'advanced status?', **Mediterranean Politics**, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2009, pp. 239-245.

4.25 GDP percent as ceiling limit of 2005, only if it was treated as the EU member state in the form of annual structural fund.³¹¹

The most important part played in the EU and Morocco relationship was the initiatives Morocco had availed due to the advanced status. Such initiatives include advanced trading as in DCFTA negotiations in 2013, parliamentary exchange, migration and security cooperation and the ENI assistance that was approximately €200 million annually during 2014 to 2017. The dispute settlement mechanism in the form of Association Council is also a huge step to promote the EU-Morocco relationship. The DCFTA became the reason for the enhancement in the trading and security assistance as well. Although the DCFTA negotiations started in 2013, Morocco suspended these negotiations in 2014 with the argument to study its possible impact on several sectors of the economy.

The EU constantly promotes Morocco's integration into the European Market. Morocco also assists in security and anti-terrorism issues. Despite the fact that the Moroccan residents flow towards the EU member states is small in comparison to global perspectives but still the EU agenda is led by the migratory issues from Morocco to the EU migrations in the present years. Spain is on the front in these issues and tries to minimize the inflow of migrants in its country. The EU takes this dealing of migration management to Morocco and its neighbours, so it remained apparently silent on Moroccan claim of bad treatment to the migrants and rising initiatives in this regard.

Democracy and human rights promotion seemed a large agenda in the ENP documentation. The parliamentary exchange of Morocco-EU, technical consultations on bilateral basis, and NGOs support system were some of the tools adopted to assist democracy and human rights in Morocco. However, its application is limited to technical and symbolic support in Morocco similar to the EU Southern neighbourhood. The EU remained silent soon after 2011 constitution with Morocco and did not provide satisfactory answers of the questions put on in this regard.

2.5. LEARNING LEVERAGES

The EU have strong ties with Morocco in the economic field where Morocco's 59.4 percent trade and 64.6 percent exports flow to the EU in 2017, over 70 percent of FDI in Morocco also came from the EU countries. Moreover, European economies

³¹¹ Martin, WHEEL, p. 22.

are a major source of remittances to Morocco due to the large Moroccan diaspora in Europe. Although Morocco' relationship with the EU is a partnership from decades but Morocco also look forward to wider foreign policy since 2008. The European crisis and policies drive Morocco to follow multilateral policies where it is promoting its relationship with regions like Africa and with economic powers like China and Russia. Due to this sense of leverage, the behaviour of Morocco is much demanding in the field of economic assistance from the EU while it is less willing to change its political structure demands of the EU. This behaviour is vivid in the speeches of king Mohammed VI.

In 2010 on the Grenada Summit, after signing the advance status agreement, Mohamed VI was looking forward for the cooperation of the EU in developing trade, social and political relationship as well as education. He also emphasised the struggles attached to bringing democracy in Morocco. Later in 2019, at the summit of the EU-Arab League, the king emphasized on the sovereignty and un-interrupted domestic decisions. He also focused on economic inequalities between Southern neighbours and the states of the EU and as a reference, he quoted trade imbalance that always favour Europe. The comparison of these speeches provides that in 2010 the king's intention was to bring the cooperation of Europe to development but in 2019 he stated that it was the responsibility of Europe to assist the development in the Arab region. Further, the king promoted an integrated approach towards the solution of terrorism and migration issues, which also proved effective at domestic level where the government promised job provision, healthcare, education, investment decentralization, etc.

2.5.1. The ECJ Clashes and Relationship Renewal

The Association Council obtained the ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on 10 December, 2015 and later on 27 February, 2018 where Morocco claimed sovereignty over the Western Sahara and the decision of the court supported the argument that Association, Fisheries and Liberalization Agreements would be effective with Morocco but were not applicable to the adjacent waters of the Western Sahara. The effect of such a step of Morocco seems the suspension of the EU Delegation in Rabat that caused unease in the relationship until January 2019 when the EU amended the liberalization agreement including the Western Sahara along with the amended fisheries agreement that was considered as the success of

Morocco. Though the EU had provided Morocco the advanced status and the EU member states emphasis on the importance of the relationship with Morocco but still the EU' structural funds to Europe Eastern Neighbourhood were far more than the Southern neighbours. The liberalization of visa process was also slower in the Southern Neighbourhood excluding Israel. The behaviour of Morocco against the ECJ ruling showed that Morocco' willingness to cooperate with the EU is limited unless the issues at hand are not solved according to the national perspectives of Morocco.

2.5.2. The EU-Morocco Interests in the Relationship and Future Aspects

Morocco' interest seemed to develop partnership of wide range with the EU similar to that was mentioned in the joint statement, which mentions shared prosperity partnership with equality and structured around economic convergence, shared knowledge, political and security cooperation alongside dealing with environment and migration. The EU played its part well by providing aid and flexibility in trading and assistance in diplomacy, technology, knowledge and climate change. Through working on the environment, Morocco could emerge as the green leader in the region. The European concerns on migration from the Western Mediterranean in 2018 brought the opportunity to Morocco in having more negotiations to enhance developmental aid and trade along with migration cooperation. Europe migration concerns could possibly enhance budgetary and technical support to Morocco with the new strategic framework looking forward in 2020. The major concern of the EU about the youth was the visa provision on which the EU desired to reopen the Mobility Partnership negotiations that were called off by Morocco in 2015. Morocco did not accept it in the past due to disagreements with the EU request to accept the return of nationals from third-country into Morocco. These negotiations if happen, could provide easy visa facilitation to Moroccan residents but at what cost remains a question.

Morocco is a key partner of the EU due to its implications on reforms and political stability. There are no solid initiatives regarding democratization, the rule of law and human rights but regional security challenges were the most highlighted ones. The emphasis was convincing Morocco for providing favours while dealing criminal networks and work on Sahel and other peace and security issues. The security commitments and assistance in anti-terrorism activities were preferred over the political values where there might be a possibility that Morocco would be joining CSDP missions with the EU. The Joint Statement highlighted the need to revive DCFTA

negotiations for enhancing Moroccan market integration into the EU market. Since Morocco suspended the DCFTA negotiations earlier, now the EU is counting on visa liberalisation along with this agreement to make the offer attractive for Morocco. In addition, the EU is looking forward to DCFTA as an essential part of liberalising services. The EU further attached the DCFTA as the key to job creation and development in the Southern neighbourhood. However, in the case of accepting the DCFTA, there is a possibility of opposition renewal in Morocco, while on the other end, development and economic governance cooperation is attached with the DCFTA in the Joint Statement of the EU-Morocco partnership.

The newly concluded Partnership for Equality and Prosperity under the auspices of the EUGS between the EU and Morocco in 2019 stands as a new chapter of relations between the two partners based on equality and promises to respond to Morocco's demands to be treated as an equal partner rather than a post-colony to serve the EU's demands and interests especially in matters of trade and immigration. It promises to take the relationship between the partners from a vertical bottom up European –pre-colonial neighbour to a horizontal relation between two equal partners whose both interests matter for the cooperation to be taking place.

The bilateral level analysis of this study will contribute to understanding whether the EU-Morocco relations under the auspices of the EUGS have been able to overcome the traditional issues of equality and postcolonial patterns asymmetry or whether it is characterized by the path dependence of asymmetry and patterns of domination.

2.6. EVALUATION OF THE CHAPTER

The aim of this chapter was to overview the development of the relations between Morocco and the EU through the different historical stages since Morocco's decolonization and the EC foundation. As can be seen through this historical background, the EU-Morocco partnership is very important for both partners mainly in terms of trade and security. It is also a very advanced partnership which is characterised by a good performance of Morocco under the ENP especially on security issues such as terrorism and migration management. However, this partnership remains challenged by postcolonial issues of asymmetry.

The EU' asymmetry approach preference prioritizing its own interests over those of Morocco, the EU' lack of clarity toward its objectives from the partnership

with Morocco, issues in relation to the EU' institutional limitations in the face of member states' sovereign preferences especially France and Spain remain challenging to achieving an effective cooperation.

Trade relations between the EU and Morocco remain dominated by the interests of Morocco's pre-colonists France and Spain to the disadvantage of Morocco's local economic needs. The Moroccan agricultural sector remains limited by the EU member states protectionist policies and inequality in trade policies.

Moroccan development and nation-state building process also remains affected by the French and Spain colonialist experience in Morocco in relation to the Western Sahara, Ceuta Melilla and the Rif region. France interests still dominate the EU' trade relations with Morocco. Spain interests disregarding Morocco's primary national interests and national integrity through the support of Polisario insurgency also stand in the way of developing win-win cooperation between the EU and Morocco based on equality and partnership. Morocco's complain from the EU' postcolonial approach to the country both in terms of security as well as trade inequality and the EU' disregard of Morocco' main national interest; that of post-colonial national integrity in relation to the Western Sahara specifically in addition to Ceuta and Mellila, have repeatedly caused rifts in the cooperation.

On the side of Morocco issues with concretising and implementing reforms and laws mainly on the issue of corruption, political liberalization and overall domestic obstacles to the EU' initiatives efficacy are related to; power centralization in the hands of the king and the monarchy's divide and rule strategies that handicap the Moroccan modern democratic system and its institutions. The Moroccan regime segmentation politics has handicapped the political process in Morocco by delegitimizing and dividing political parties with a potential to present strong opposition or leadership that would challenge the monarchy' power centralization e.g. the USFPA and the PJD. Pro-monarchic political parties such as the RNI remain supported by the regime which maintains an oligarchic rule composed through a convergence and co-optation of the political and economic elite through neoliberal policies. As a result, Morocco's economic and democratization initiatives, generally initiated to serve as a façade of democratization result into contrasting results such as in relation to macroeconomic policies and corruption.

Morocco and the EU have under the 2019 partnership for equality and mutually shared prosperity agreed to give an impetus to their cooperation and overcome the past challenges in a post-Arab Spring period with multiplied structural challenges

especially in relation to terrorism and migration. The African strategy also holds an important position in the new partnership between the EU and Morocco giving Morocco' post 2017 pioneering role in the AU making it an ideal bridge to heal the long rifted Europe-Africa relations. Morocco has also become a primary destination for sub-Saharan African migrants seeking entry to Europe which the EU outsources to Morocco as a 'transit state'. The issue of migration thus remains as a subject of contention between the Union and Morocco, which persists on its rejection to serve the role of a post-colony border policeman for the EU.

Overcoming the challenges in the cooperation of the EU-Morocco would benefit both partners' security and peace objectives. It is for this reason, that understanding the historical development of the partnership between the EU and Morocco on the migration management issue will help understand the contemporary issues and challenges surrounding the developments on the issue of irregular migration.

The following chapter will focus on reviewing the historical background of the EU-Morocco partnership on the issue of irregular migration.

CHAPTER THREE

THE EU-MOROCCO RELATIONS ON IRREGULAR MIGRATION

The Kingdom of Morocco, a 'constitutional' monarchy with a total population of over 33 million, has seen significant out-migration to European countries, in addition to illegal transit movement from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa, especially migrants bound for Europe, for many years now. Since Morocco's colonial history and proximity to Europe have made it a popular emigration route and destination for African migrants, the country has always been an important emigration hub.

The EU and other major players in international politics have substantial policy interests in a region of critical geopolitical and economic importance i.e. MENA in particular the African economies. Although it is frequently undermined by a greater dominant stability and security discourse, as well as a 'economic realism', on the part of the involved EU policymakers, it serves to uphold a hegemonic approach based on the EU's self-perception as a normative power.

Since the EU was formed, Morocco has shown a keen interest in developing strong ties with it and the country has made a commitment to upholding and advancing those ties even as regional conflict has escalated. This commitment began with domestic reform and stability, and has since been extended to the Union. When faced with the protests and the rise of the Islamist party to power, Morocco took a different approach than its neighbors in order to ensure continuity, stability, and future prosperity.

Since early days of its inception, Morocco has been a preferred partner for the EU.³¹² The country has been seen as strong and relatively democratic, making it much easier for the EU to collaborate with it.

The acknowledgment of Morocco as the very first state to have acquired what was called "advanced status" in its dealings with the EU is an example of this, however, the significance of this recognition lies primarily in its symbolic nature.

The southern EU coastlines face a massive flood of migrants attempting to enter the EU territory illegally by water through four routes: from West Africa to the Canary Islands, via the Strait of Gibraltar, from Libya to Malta or Sicily, and finally from Turkey to Greece. Morocco is the major destination for the influx of migrants

³¹² Frederic Volpi, "Normative and Technical Power at the EU-Moroccan Interface: The Islamization of the North as a Response to the Democratization of the South", **European Foreign Affairs Review**, Vol.15, No. 5, 2010, pp. 681–696.

from all of North Africa who want to enter Europe especially because geographically Spain is just 14 Km away from Morocco via sea as the nearest EU country.³¹³

The EU-Moroccan relationship has long been a source of contention for a variety of reasons, the most important of which are political in nature. The Arab Spring uprisings were crucial in establishing the EU's credibility, setting the agenda, and redesigning its foreign policy. North African revolutions, echoing the EU goals of promoting democracy in the region, were also a source of criticism of the EU foreign policy in the Southern neighbors. For quite some time, Morocco has had strengthened relationship with the EU, and its unique status highlights the variance in the EU's treatment of the ENP nations.

It is the aim of this chapter to provide an overview of the historical background of the EU-Morocco relations on the issue of migration management which remains one of the most contentious topics in the partnership, especially in the post-Arab Spring period.

Being primarily a structural and geopolitical concern, the migration issue encompasses several issue areas ranging from political to socioeconomic, to human rights, sovereignty, border control and security related issues such as terrorism, the fight against trafficking and smuggling. Having become a security concern with the rise of the issue of terrorism and with the results of the Arab Spring, in specific, the migration management has once again become an issue of contention between the EU and its Southern neighbor Morocco. Morocco and the EU, however, although remain short of fully converging their interests in relation to the issue have managed to converge their policies which is mainly thanks to Morocco's commitment and efforts of converging its policy and law making on the issue with the EU despite not being an EU member state. This, however, remains a non-linear path and Morocco – EU relations on the migration management remains characterized by contention due to the EU's outsourcing approach through the externalization policy and the conflicting perspectives that both partners attach to the migration issue.

While the EU perceives African migration as a security concern to its peace and stability which it prefers to tackle by outsourcing to the gate state Morocco, for Morocco, mobility and migration while having security consequences that can be dealt with through cooperation cannot be approached as a security approach, cannot be securitized, nor can it be effectively dealt with through externalization. Mobility and

³¹³ Thomas Demmelhuber, "The European Union and Illegal Migration in the Southern Mediterranean: The Trap of Competing Policy Concepts", *The International Journal of Human Rights*, Vol. 15, No. 6, 2011, pp. 813-826.

migration remains for Morocco attached to objectives of development, equality, partnership and mutual prosperity underlined by the EUGS.

The chapter will also review the factors and origins behind migration from Morocco, the EU border approach toward Morocco, its advantages and shortcomings as well as the EU-Morocco agreements and policies on the migration issue.

3.1. THE EU-MOROCCO RELATIONS AFTER THE ARAB SPRING

In this section, the EU-Morocco relations after the Arab Spring will be examined under several headings.

3.1.1. The Arab Spring, Europe, Africa and the Migration Issue

In the post-Arab Spring period, the EU faced numerous challenges, including deep authoritarian control, a lack of economic opportunity for young people, and a conflict between Islamist parties and post-revolutionary ruling regimes. The immediate effects of these events put pressure on the EU's internal stability, security, and cohesion, as well as the Union's goals in the region. Domestic and regional challenges also put at stake the EU's survival as a global power in a changing international system leaving the EU behind.

In the wake of the uprisings, it has been clear that internal developments in Morocco affected their approach to the EU and the EU's reaction to them. Therefore, there is a virtuous circle that makes connections more complicated and personalized than previously imagined.³¹⁴

The EU saw the Arab Spring as a window of opportunity to advance its political dialogue goals related to controlling irregular migration. Regional protests around Morocco put pressure on the administration to take unprecedented steps toward liberalization and democratization in line with the EU's goals and objectives, prompting the EU to offer Morocco an upgraded status in 2008 and include political dialogue for the first time in the delegation meetings.

Post the Arab Spring, security issues like the fight against terrorism, border management in relation to irregular migration, and related security issues were

³¹⁴ Fredereica Zardo, Franco Cavatorta, "Friends will be Friends? External–Domestic Interactions in EU-Tunisia and EU-Morocco Security Cooperation after the Uprisings", *International Politics*, Vol. 56, No. 5, 2019, pp. 678–696.

prioritized by both the EU and Morocco in their respective unilateral foreign policy objectives and in their bilateral cooperation.

After years of relatively quiet migration flows (2008-2015), Morocco implemented a new policy to regulate migration within its borders in the fall of 2013. This policy utilized a humanitarian approach aiming at the execution of a strategic plan to incorporate migrants into the Moroccan population. The economies of the Mediterranean and perhaps Africa as a whole looked to this new policy as the most progressive option.

The EU's security concerns, however, dominated its cooperation with African countries, as evidenced by a stepped-up southern border control policy, especially in the wake of the Arab Spring. The EU consistently acknowledged Morocco as a good influencer of democratic reforms and financial interdependence into the free trade zone which the EU fostered since the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.³¹⁵ The performativity of this process was on full display in the need to come up with ever more magnificent sounding names for such engagements; the EU also declared a "Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement" with Morocco, obviously needing to improve upon the previous "Free Trade Agreement," which actually omitted a lot of agricultural produce.³¹⁶

The commitment in the Mobility Partnership declaration to move towards fully visa-free entry among Morocco and the Schengen zone for any and all Moroccan nationals, was an example of an area where collaboration was more likely to offer satisfactory response to neighboring countries.

Among the MENA region states which has set an exception to the Arab Spring experience is Morocco which leadership represented in the monarchy preferred approaching the context as an opportunity rather than a security threat. Morocco has not witnessed revolutions in the same intensity as its neighboring countries rather moderated and peaceful protests organized by the 20th February movement calling for several changes ranging from socioeconomic to gender equality, ethnic representation of the country's Amazigh identity as well as political reforms and youth issues. Still, the events taking place in neighboring states were enough for the leadership to take the revolutions seriously and express openly a will for change by designing an approach called change within continuity. This approach which actively

³¹⁵ Graciet Catherine and Eric Laurent, **Le Roi Prédateur**, Seuil, Paris, 2000, pp. 224.

³¹⁶ Michael Collyer, "Geopolitics as a Migration Governance Strategy: European Union Bilateral Relations with Southern Mediterranean Countries", **Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies**, Vol. 42, No. 4, 2016, pp. 606-624.

involved the EU as a major partner take the partnership goals with the EU as the main guidelines for progress and reform at several levels including the political, administrative and socioeconomic. This came as an alternative to the extreme options faced by the Arab Spring cases as it promised stability through continuity of the leadership while bringing changes at various levels to respond to the population's needs starting with the monarchical institution role, the constitution as well as the political system in general.

Theoretically, this solves the dilemma between security and democratization witnessed in the other countries of the region where the fall of regimes was the trend either through forced foreign intervention, a military takeover or a willful withdrawal of presidents. It also assures the leadership that is the monarchy, continuity by reinforcing the population's trust on the institution.

Since it joined the AU in 2017, Morocco has taken a holistic approach to addressing the issues in its neighborhood, including those spawned by the Arab Spring, and it has taken a leadership role in addressing and resolving political instabilities on the African continent. This strategy has been widely praised by the EU.

Following the Arab Spring, Morocco not only conducted reforms at the domestic level but also re-oriented its foreign policy towards the African continent for two critical objectives. First is the economic investment and second and prime national objective, the Western Sahara. Directing its foreign policy efforts towards the African continent while serving these two objectives has also earned it an important position and leadership in the fight against terrorism and the management of the migration issue at the regional and international institutional levels. Morocco has in a very short period of time, since its rejoining of the AU in 2017, earned a critical institutional role in the decision making of the AU and its relations with the EU. The Moroccan king' initiation of the South-South cooperation under the motive of African solutions for African problems has boosted cooperation among African countries and was met by an international appraisal and welcoming at the multilateral level including by the UN and the EU

Morocco has also ascribed itself a leadership role in the fight against terrorism through the eradication of radicalism by spreading its version of Islam in the continent through teaching as well as through the prevention of terrorist attacks using both intelligence and specialized police power. The reorientation of economy towards the African market and positioning itself as an investment door to the continent has served investment progress in Africa and boosted the country's economic importance for

foreign investors and African partners. Given its natural strategic position as a bridge point between Europe and Africa, this foreign policy choice has made of it an important player for the EU' designed African strategy as well as a critical partner for meeting some of the EU' strategic security goals related to terrorism and irregular migration from the Sahel.

Reforms which have been implemented have been hailed as a success for the EU's partnership with Morocco and have paved the way for a new era of cooperation. However, the obstacles still stand in the way of progress in both the social and political spheres in Morocco and the hoped-for relations with the EU.

The Moroccan king' African vision has earned the country a leadership role in the continent at several sectors that are key for African and EU interests. Promoting development, stability, conflict resolution, fighting extremism and planting seeds for peace has positioned Morocco which is a physical transit point between the two continents as an important bridge between them at other levels. Morocco became not just the unique and inevitable pole of peace in the region for the EU or the inevitable gate point of its borders security but also a strategic partner for concretizing positive change in the African continent through an African voice with European aspirations and commitments.

While Morocco has made significant strides in comparison to other Southern countries, the EU's asymmetric approach and predominance of self-interest in crucial areas of trade and security, especially with regards to irregular migration, continue to be persistent obstacles.

There was tremendous opportunity for the EU and Morocco, in the wake of the Arab Spring, to work together for mutual benefit, particularly on the issues of regional security. Despite this, progress towards a closer alliance has not been without difficulty. Not much is known about the efforts made to remove the historical roadblocks that prevent the partnership from reaching its full potential.

Positioned at the bordering line between the EU, the African continent and the MENA states and siding both with the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Sea, Morocco was able to prosper strategically through a proactive African presence and an intelligent, promising and comprehensive approach towards the Arab Spring's contextual challenges. This helped Morocco to become an inevitable strategic partner for the EU in the Mediterranean both as a pole of stability and a bridge with Africa where it has gained important influence. Achieving what other MENA states failed through the initiation of change and democratization while conserving its stability and

leadership continuity, served both requirements for a successful Arab Spring experience that is democratization and security. The promises to fulfil the EU normative objectives which have been driving the cooperation even before the Arab Spring, offered the EU an important partner to deal with the structural challenges raised by the Arab Spring consequences such as terrorism, extremism and border control.

This also offered the EU a model to follow to inspire other Southern neighbors to process change. Morocco has also proved to be an important partner in conflict resolution in the Maghreb region as was the case in the recent Libyan conflict in which it initiated negotiation and dialogue between the parties with the potential of turning the country into more chaos and armed conflicts as tensions increased.

In short, despite the Arab Spring' several challenges, the choice of reforms both at the domestic and foreign policy levels have turned the context to one of opportunity and opened room for a more enlarged cooperation with the EU' shared interests and goals in the African continent. This also extends in security matters related to climate change, terrorism, radicalism and irregular migration as these were the sources of boosting Morocco' advantage in the cooperation while also serving the EU's key foreign policy objectives. Nevertheless, the cooperation between the EU and Morocco after the Arab Spring has witnessed ups and downs and challenges related to achieving effective results and conserving Morocco' interests in the cooperation.

In October 2016, the death of Mohsen Fikri, a poor 31 years old fishermen in the port city of Al Hoceima, sparked a large-scale protest movement known as the Hirak. The Rif area of Morocco has the biggest quota of migration to Europe, hence the Hirak was able to organize the Rifi diaspora in Europe to a much higher extent than the Arab Spring. It showed how migration flows across the Mediterranean create intricate social, economic, and political webs. On the other hand, it highlighted the dynamics of collective consciousness and historical imaginaries that are tied to the persistent material and political repercussions of Spanish and French colonial control.

Despite heavy central government persecution and the arrest of numerous movement leaders, protests continued throughout 2017. Members of the Hirak leadership were given prison terms of up to 20 years in the summer of 2018. The attorneys filed an appeal, but the Moroccan courts upheld the original decision in the spring of 2019 which gave rise to another debate of returning to old dark times.

Soon after, Hirak support groups sprang up in a number of European cities with a sizeable Moroccan diaspora, including Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, Madrid, and Berlin.

However, Hirak supporters provided an interesting example of transnational European citizenship in an era when the EU is experiencing an existential crisis, as evidenced by Brexit and an increase in mostly right-wing EU-skepticism. These activists are adopting, exercising, and shaping European citizenship in a way that does not conflict with their identity as Moroccans.³¹⁷ It was this movement which had a role in the EU parliament adoption of amendments to the EU Morocco association and Fisheries Agreement.³¹⁸ Addressing the dispute on the inclusion of Western Sahara to the trade agreement on fisheries paved the way for a relaunch of relations and dialogue.

For the EU, reducing the flow of economically disadvantaged migrants and asylum seekers into the EU is an aim of the resilience approach. To achieve this goal, policymakers should selectively engage with countries of origin in order to address root causes of migration, strengthen their administrative capacities to handle returning citizens, and ultimately reduce the outflow of foreign nationals. Meanwhile, the EU plans to improve access to education and economic prospects in nations used as a passageway. If implemented successfully, it has the potential to positively affect third world countries by improving their standard of living over time. However, this approach also requires shifting the bulk of migration management responsibilities to these nations.

A new momentum has been added in recent years to the process of negotiating readmission accords with native countries, especially in Africa. At the Valletta Summit in November 2015, European and African partners agreed to establish an Emergency Trust Fund for Stability to address the fundamental causes of irregular migration and political refugees in Africa." This was a step in the right

³¹⁷ Christoph H. Schwarz, "Trans Mediterranean Political Socialization: The Hirak Movement, the Moroccan Diaspora and Europe as a Political Imaginary", *Quaderns de la Mediterrània*, Vol. 28-29, 2019, pp. 101-110.

³¹⁸ The European Commission, **International Agreements: Commission Proposal for a Council Decision Regarding the Signature, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement in the Form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco on the Amendment of Protocols 1 and 4 to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States**, Official Journal of the European Union, Brussels, 2019, pp.1-3, (AMENDMENT).

direction toward "retailoring some of the EU's support with the aim of prominently improving citizens' wellbeing."³¹⁹

The security situation and humanitarian crisis in Syria created severe migratory crises. This crisis was precipitated by the humanitarian catastrophe and security upheaval in Syria that began in 2011 and continued until mid-2016. This means that the Mediterranean was once again experiencing the same level of migration from Africa in 2018 as was seen between 2000 and 2005, especially in the area surrounding the Strait of Gibraltar.³²⁰

3.1.2. The EU Policy Context

In the event of refugees' crisis throughout 2015, the EU implemented a variety of policies to deal with the growing of such refugee crisis. In accordance with the European Agenda on Migration, collaborative efforts with third countries should be a top priority for all of the Union's thematic policy pillars moving forward.

On the migrants' issues, to guarantee third-party cooperation on the resettlement of illegal migrants, the EU has stated its intention to employ the more-for-more principle and a fine balance of incentives and pressure to its ally states which are mostly developing African countries. The European funding and tailored pathways for formally accepted into the Union are being used to woo them. The European Commission has pledged €1.8 billion to an Emergency Trust Fund for stabilization and tackling the fundamental causes of irregular migration and political refugees in Africa. Although all such incentives are not new and such sort of promises have been assumed in the past. Morocco is an instructive example in this regard because of its longstanding relationship with the EU and its substantial receipt of the EU funding.

If the same economic and political structures on the African continent are maintained, guarding the coastline, including the boundaries in the Mediterranean from Morocco to Libya, will not be effective in halting migration trends towards Europe.³²¹

³¹⁹ Michella Ceccorulli, Sonia Lucarelli, "Migration and the EU Global Strategy: Narratives and Dilemmas", **The International Spectator**, Vol. 52, No. 3, 2017, pp. 83-102.

³²⁰ Mehdi Lahlou, "Migration Dynamics in Play in Morocco: Trafficking and Political Relationships and their Implications at the Regional Level", **Menara Working Papers**, No. 26, 2018, pp. 2-17, (TRAFFICKING).

³²¹ Mehdi Lahlou, "Regional Migration Dynamics and Implications for Innovation and Development in North Africa", **Handbook of Migration and Globalisation**, (eds. Anna Triandafyllidou), Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham/Northampton, 2018, pp. 247-261, (DEVELOPMENT).

On the grounds of irregular migration, to stop irregular migration to the north coast of the Mediterranean, it is not enough for Morocco, on the EU's perimeter, to do everything feasible and actively engage with European migration management, as it has been mainly done since 2014.

The most likely solution is to come up with a novel strategy for improving the political, economic, and social climates of countries of origin and transit, in which the EU provides full support and Morocco is treated as an equal partner by the EU.

3.2. THE EU-MOROCCO COOPERATION OVER IRREGULAR MIGRATION

The border monitoring and policing partnership between Spain and Morocco, partially funded by the EU funds, is held up as an example of successful international cooperation. On these lines, Morocco launched a new policy in 2013. As part of this strategy, new laws and institutional frameworks were implemented regarding migration, asylum, anti-trafficking, and integration.

When placed in the historical context, it becomes vague why the EU has made readmission, border controls, and the acceptance of asylum-seekers a top priority in its cooperation with the Kingdom of Morocco.

Concerning the EU readmission agreement negotiations, despite additional offers of funding and mobility, no consensus has been made with Morocco as of yet. Several projects funded by the EU and its member states are also in the works as part of the Mobility Partnership, though they were likely in the works before the initiative was launched. In addition, parallel negotiations on a readmission agreement with the EU were offered to Morocco in the form of visa facilitation dialogues.

As a matter of foreign policy, Morocco opposed the EU's readmission agreement. Within the strategy of its *politique africaine*, which the Kingdom has revived over the past decade, the country aims to restore economic and political ties with countries in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly those in West Africa.³²²

Morocco rightfully protects its economic interests considering the region's high growth rates as an alternative to Europe's stagnating rates, and also considering the tense relationship between Morocco and the AU over the Western Sahara. To protect its Western Sahara policies, Morocco requires the backing of other sub-Saharan nations, particularly those in West Africa. As a result, Morocco has no choice but to

³²² Nora El-Qadim, « Le Gouvernement Asymétrique des Migrations : Maroc/Union Européenne », *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, Vol. 34, No.1, 2015, pp. 265-267.

refuse Europe's request for help in expelling citizens of African countries. Not only does this hurt those countries' bottom lines, but it also creates a crisis of public relations for Morocco owing to stories of forced deportations and makeshift camps.

Overall, given the regional security context, the increase in common interests between the EU and Morocco which were mainly related to the migration crisis but given the general positive convergence of Morocco with the EU in different sectors, both parties had significant stakes at rebuilding stronger cooperation. Morocco has demonstrated strong leadership in key security areas such as the green energy, counter-extremism and curbing irregular migration and its related security issues. Also, Morocco's reemergence as key player in Africa presents the EU with an important opportunity. The EU's commission representative emphasized on the shared destiny between Morocco and the EU in relation to common regional issues and interests, both on the side of MENA and Africa.

The EU decision to build new relations with Morocco in line with the EUGS and to launch a new phase based on prosperity and equality stemmed from the common challenges and opportunities resulting from the Post-Arab Spring contextual conditions as well as Morocco's domestic and foreign policy choices. The EU parliament adoption of amendments to the EU Morocco Association and Fisheries Agreement³²³ addressing the dispute on inclusion of Western Sahara to the trade agreement on fisheries paved the way for a relaunch of relations and dialogue.

For the partnership, human rights and democracy remained to be the bone of contention despite the advancements made on boosting common interests in economic and security sector on the issue of migration and terrorism. The EU representatives, however, also highlighted the importance to overcome Morocco's issue of implementation which remained a challenge to the EU reforms in most areas of the cooperation.

However, despite the broadening of the cooperation and common interests, the EU's ascribed task to Morocco as the border policeman to outsource migrants and keep its borders 'clean and safe' remain a point of disputation for Moroccan decision makers.

³²³ The European Parliament, (RESP8), p. 1-8.

The Council of the European Union, **Council Decision (EU) 2019/441 of 4 March 2019: On the Conclusion of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco, the Implementation thereto and the Exchange of Letters accompanying the Agreement (CD-2019/441)**, Official Journal of the European Union, Brussels, 2019, p. 4-55, (LETTERS).

From Morocco' side, the ideal platform necessary to push restructuring that combined stability, openness, and the will to change was secured by integrating the PJD party into the system while overhauling the political structure and institutions to have more autonomy from the monarchy's rule.

As a result, relations between the EU and Morocco are now headed in a new direction, one that prioritizes addressing shared interests and challenges through expanded cooperation that is firmly rooted in geopolitical and structural considerations while also aiming for political and liberal reform.

The study of international migration and migrants is greatly aided by taking into consideration the nature, form, and content of the interactions that exist among Europe's borders. The EU external policy has been institutionalized and led by the EU immigration policy with the objectives and the concerns regarding migration. This policy highlights the drastic need of cooperation from the third countries, indicated by several EU Commission communications. The externalization policy of the EU has been limited, in its effectiveness, by the competing internal issues and priorities of the member states. The migration policy of the EU has developed as Eurocentric and assists in perusing the interest of the EU member states on the cost of providing negative externalities to the third countries. For this reason, the famous rhetoric of the EU burden sharing has been widely questioned by the scholars and states and indicated as the burden shifting upon the third countries.

The Kingdom of Morocco contains the population of about 33 million governed through a constitutional monarchy. The country observed enormous emigrants from Morocco to the EU along with the high irregular transit migration as a pathway for both the North and sub-Saharan Africa towards the border of Europe. Morocco has drawn much attention of the European countries due to two reasons: one of the largest diaspora of emigrants (about 2.9 million) in Europe and an important transit border location for the irregular migrants.³²⁴ The migration is an essential and dominating article of external and internal level of policy making in Morocco. In fact, the instability brought in the region by the Arab Spring and the disturbance in the North African region in the current decade has made the direct impact on the migratory movement towards and from Morocco. Further, the immigration policy of the EU with Morocco is highly important after the advanced status of Morocco in 2008. Morocco has been holding the position in the world's largest emigrant countries from mid-twentieth

³²⁴ The European Commission, "Migration and Mobility Partnership Signed between the EU and Morocco", Press Release, **The EU Spokesperson Service, Brussels**, 07.06.2013, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_13_513 , (12.04.2022), (MMP).

century. In addition, the Moroccan community of migrants is most disperse in the Western part of Europe.³²⁵ The Eurostat has indicated over forty-seven thousand newly arrived Morocco residents in the EU in 2013, followed by the approximately forty-one thousand Chinese and twenty-seven thousand Russians in the same year.³²⁶ Similarly, Moroccan leads in holding the nationality of the Europe as during 2013 only, more than eighty-six thousand nationalities were granted to the Moroccans in the Europe.³²⁷

3.3. PHASES OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION FROM MOROCCO TO THE EU

The irregular migration has its roots in the emigration that started in the colonial era. The emigration patterns of Morocco have been carved in both colonial and post-colonial periods. For centuries, the movements of population in Morocco remained mostly circular and seasonal, creating routes for people moving from rural areas to urban centres or other rural places. In many ways, the European colonization of the Maghreb is connected to the current migration trends of Moroccans to Europe. Between 1912 and 1956, the formation of the Franco-Spanish dominion over Morocco also had a significant impact on the development of migration patterns. During this time, the Spanish had little sway outside of the northern Rif mountain zone and southern Western Sahara, while the French consolidated their hold over the country's central regions.³²⁸ Since Morocco was under the French control, the French language had been introduced into the administration and education of Morocco. France had the huge labour demand, due to its colonial expansion its resources expanded exponentially during that period. In these circumstances, the subordinated position of Morocco to France and the introduction of French language had reduced language barrier that ultimately converted Morocco into the supplier country of low-skilled workers.

³²⁵ Hein de Haas, « Morocco's Migration Transition: Trends, Determinants and Future Scenarios», **Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM)**, No. 28, 2005, pp. 1-44, (MMT).

³²⁶ Eurostat, **People in the EU: Who are We and How Do We live**, Eurostat Statistical Books, Luxembourg, 2015, pp. 3-175.

³²⁷ Eurostat, p. 9.

³²⁸ Hein de Haas, "Morocco: From Emigration Country to Africa's Migration Passage to Europe", **Migration Policy Institute**, 01.10.2005, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/morocco-emigration-country-africas-migration-passage-europe>, (20.09.2021), (FECAMPE).

There are five major phases of Moroccan emigration.³²⁹ The first phase started with 1830s when the French colonise Algeria. The French colons had established farms there. With the expansion of coastal cities of Algeria, demand for less-skilled labour was enhancing. This rise in demand was taken as an opportunity by the Moroccans and they responded it through migration towards Algeria. However, the nature of these migration practices was seasonal or circular. The second phase of migration was signalled in 1912 through the enforcement of the Franco-Spanish protectorate that decreased the flow of migratory workers to France, and also the inclusion of Moroccan soldiers, providing services, in the French army. The second wave of the Moroccan emigration started during the World War I, as a result of joining the French army by more than forty thousand Moroccan.³³⁰ Similarly, in World War II nearly one hundred twenty-six thousand Moroccan joined the French Army that became a source of emigration for Moroccan. In addition to these wars, the Algerian War of Independence (1954 - 1962) also promoted emigration from Morocco, due to the fact that French has stopped recruiting the Algerian people. Further, the migration from Morocco to France has been increased from 1949 to 1962 particularly due to workers of factories and mines.

In 1956, Morocco got independence from the French colonial era but the migration patterns persisted in the same way. During this period, internal migration, between rural and urban areas, also accelerated due to urban development and growth of infrastructure.³³¹ The third era began in the midst of the 1960s and continued until the oil crisis of 1973. During this time period, there was a massive influx of labourers into the economy as a result of the burgeoning industrial sector in Europe's economies. During this time period, immigrants began to look beyond France for their new homes. Due to the economic upswing, everyone in Europe now has a secure job, and the informal migration patterns in Europe have been formally codified. Bilateral recruitment agreements were signed with France and West Germany in 1963, Belgium in 1964, and the Netherlands in 1967, guaranteeing the formalization.

The fourth wave of Moroccan emigration coincided with the economic downturn brought on by the 1973 oil crisis. Amidst of the crisis, started the period of economic stagnation accompanied by the restructuring that ultimately resulted in the

³²⁹ Hein de Haas, Simona Vezzoli, "Migration and Development on the South–North Frontier: A Comparison of the Mexico–US and Morocco–EU Cases", **Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies**, Vol. 39, No. 7, 2013, pp. 1041-1065.

³³⁰ Hein de Haas, "Morocco's Migration Experience : A Transitional Perspective", **International Migration**, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2007, pp. 39–70, (MME).

³³¹ De Haas, MMT, p. 7

lower demand for unskilled workers and rising unemployment. To respond to the need of their own nationals, Europe closed its borders for the new labour migrants. In this phase, Moroccans observed freeze of labour recruitment in the European countries, even the existing jobs held by them were on the threat of termination under the economic downturns. This economic crisis did not lead to mass return, but instead had created the significant disruption in the circular migration patterns. However, the migrants existed in Europe at that time, most of them, had chosen to reside in Europe permanently. These global economic downturns were hard hitting to both African countries and Morocco. In these countries, the economic downturn has been translated to the political instability. This political instability in the African countries had become the reason for even more irregular flow of migrants, but the political instability in Morocco made the country handicapped to support the existing economic oil crisis at hand let alone the flow of irregular migrants. Moreover, Morocco was already dealing with the political problems as there were two *coups d'état*, in 1971 and 1972, that were failed against the king Hassan II. This Oil Crisis has added an insult to the injury for already existing in the political system of Morocco and resulted in the era of repression and political instability.

The stagnant economic situation and political instability in Morocco have resulted in the staying decisions of Moroccans living in Europe over coming back to their country. Similarly, the closed employment opportunities in Europe stimulated the existing residents to stay there rather leaving for their country largely in case of Morocco, while the other countries' residents made the different choices.³³² Transnational marriages, in which migrants' partners remained in Morocco, served as the policy that allowed them to establish roots in Europe after making the decision to permanently relocate.³³³ To complicate it further, the migratory limits have led to an increase in the number of Moroccans entering France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands to reunite with relatives. In 1975, more than 400,000 Moroccans, predominantly from Morocco, were living in Europe, most of them in France.³³⁴

Family reunification, which began in the 1960s and continued unabated until the late 1980s, was a major factor in the acceleration of these migration movements. In the era of global economic and political crisis, along with the national crisis of the

³³² De Haas, MMT, p. 16.

³³³ Paolo De-Mas, « Regroupement Familial Marocain aux Pays-Bas 1968-1987 : un Aperçu Quantitatif », **Le Maroc et La Hollande : Actes de La Deuxieme Rencontre Universitaire, Etudes Sur les L'Histoire, La Langue et la Culture**, (eds. H. Obdeijn, E. Engelen, and M. Haji), Publications de La Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines, Rabat, 1990, pp.147-170.

³³⁴ De Haas, MME, p. 46.

same nature, which had become the reason for many Moroccan to choose Europe as their permanent settlement, this family reunification further accelerated the migration in the form of family formation during 1990s.

Beginning in the mid-1980s, a new wave of Moroccans began migrating to the EU, marking the beginning of the country's fifth migration phase. With the rise in the migrant population came a corresponding rise in the variety of destinations. A rising number of migrant women, perhaps in search of domestic work jobs in Southern Europe, are heading in the direction of Spain and Italy. One other significant shift in migratory patterns was the increasing number of highly educated Moroccans relocating not just to Europe but also to the US and Canada.

As the demand for labour in the informal sectors expanded during this time, the EU tightened its border controls and implemented measures to restrict immigration.

Until 1991, Moroccans could enter Spain and Italy as tourists without the visa requirements. This concession was overused by the Moroccans when many of them entered but overstayed there and become migrants without documentation (overstay). The visa requirements imposed in the northwest Europe has also become the reason for relying upon the irregular migration, in which the long coastline of Italy and Spain were the attractive paths to enter into Europe illegally. On the other hand, there was a large demand of unskilled workers in Europe, specifically in informal sector of Italy and southern European countries. To grab these employment opportunities, during the 1980s, Moroccan low-skilled workers started the irregular migration to Spain and Italy. On several occasions the governments of Italy and Spain had been compelled to provide legal status to almost 200,000 undocumented migrants from Morocco since the late 1980s, by successive campaigns for legalisation.³³⁵ These movements of migrants have resulted in skyrocketing the Moroccan diaspora in both Italy and Spain, combining both countries the Moroccan residents have increased from 20,000 to 550,000 between 1980 and 2004. It brought Italy and Spain as the preferred countries of destinations in Europe for Moroccans.

The world observed the economic growth in the era of 1990s. This growth has caused an increase in the demand for unskilled workers, in industry, agriculture and services sector, in the EU countries that is followed by large irregular migration. However, the destination of irregular migrants from Morocco was not largely Spain

³³⁵ Rickard Sandell, "Spain's Immigration Experience: Lessons to be Learned from Looking at the Statistics", **Real Institute Elcano**, Working Paper, 2006, pp. 1-21.

and Italy this time but the other countries of the EU as well. This period is also important in diversifying the migrants from Morocco. When Moroccans faced unemployment of the highly educated skilled labours, these labours were turned to seek migration in the US and Canada. The similar trend of emigration still persists in the Moroccan people. From 2009–2010, 86,000 Moroccans left the nation legally or illegally,³³⁶ proving that the country's socioeconomic problems and population age distribution continue to foster instability and further flight.³³⁷

From the 1990s until the early 2003, however, there was a surge in irregular migration from Morocco to Europe. As a result, Morocco and the EU have settled their migratory security cooperation. From 2006 to 2010, the number of irregular migrants utilizing Morocco as a transit nation dropped thanks to this cooperation.³³⁸ Since the mid-1990s, when emigration began in earnest, Morocco has served both destination as well as transit country for people from sub-Saharan Africa trying to reach Europe via Spain's borders. There were two major factors that contributed in large inflow of African migrants in the Morocco. The first was the Pan-African anti-immigration policy provided by Muammar Qaddafi. Prior to this policy Libya was a major destination for the migrants of the sub-Saharan Africa, but these policies converted this friendly land into hostile land for the African migrants; therefore, the migrants then diverted to the Maghreb countries in 2000s.³³⁹ These policies in Libya brought instability in it and caused migration stemming from the life threatening situation; hence, increased the asylum seekers, saving their lives from persecution, that want to go to Europe using the grounds of Morocco as the transit country. The migrants who remained unsuccessful in entering Europe chose to live in Morocco by taking it as a better choice than returning to their country of origin. Morocco received few skilled migrants and students from sub-Saharan African countries. The mass irregular migration flow of sub-Saharan African towards Morocco as a transit country, in the mid1990s, was the result of civil war and political turmoil that affected many West African countries. In addition, the existing migratory destinations for the African countries like Côte d'Ivoire were facing the economic downturns. Therefore, second cause was the rising

³³⁶ Françoise de Bel-Air, "Migration Profile: Morocco", **Migration Policy Center European University Institute**, Policy Brief, Issue 5, 2016, pp.1-16.

³³⁷ Switzerland: State Secretariat for Migration (SEM), **The Development in Morocco in the Shade of the Arabic Spring and its Consequences on Migration: Report from a Swedish-Swiss Fact Finding Mission to Morocco**, Migrationsverket, Switzerland, 2011, pp. 2-24.

³³⁸ Mehdi Lahlou, "Morocco's Experience of Migration as a Sending, Transit, and Receiving Country", **Istituto Affari Internazionali**, Working paper, No. 15, 2015, pp. 1-19, (MSTRC).

³³⁹ Hein De Haas, "Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends", **Migration Information Source**, 1.11.2006, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/trans-saharan-migration-north-africa-and-eu-historical-roots-and-current-trends> , (11.10.2021), (HRCT).

political instability, unrest, conflicts, civil wars and economic crisis from which the sub-Saharan African people seek refuge through migration to get the better opportunities to spend their lives. All the details highlight that Morocco acted as the new best attraction for sub-Saharan African for transit migration to Europe. The sub-Saharan African migrants who choose Morocco as their final destination were far more than those who used Morocco as the transit country to reach to Europe.³⁴⁰ The sub-Saharan African living in Morocco without a legal status remained vulnerable to marginalization, they had to accept the informal sector low paid jobs to ensure their survival. The era of 2000s has highlighted that Morocco is not only important for the sub-Saharan African irregular migrants as the transit country but also many sub-Saharan African migrate there for study and work, even sometimes they seek to settle permanently in Morocco. In 2005, approximately 25,000 African were legally residing in Morocco and the number rose even further.³⁴¹ This pointed out Morocco as the new best attraction, for sub-Saharan African, for both the step for transit migration to Europe and the permanent settling place.

Transit migration to Spain and other EU countries increased dramatically between the 1990s and 2003. Therefore, the pressure on Morocco to guard its borders from irregular migrants had increased. In its response, Morocco introduced the new immigration principles that exert severe punishments to all those people who are participating or assisting the irregular migrants or human smugglers. Although these laws were formed in line with the international convention, application of these laws remained limited in practice. These laws faced critics of criminalizing the irregular migration indicating that Morocco is bowing to the policies of the EU.³⁴² Morocco was also pressurized to make its visa and immigration rules tougher for the sub-Saharan African. As a result, the Moroccan side used to conduct raids against the irregular migrants and left them to their fate at the borders of Algeria. The migratory flows to the EU through Morocco were further controlled by providing this goal as a conditionality along with the avenues for development. In 1996, European Mediterranean Association Agreement (EMAA) was signed between the EU and Morocco declaring the establishment of free trade area in 2010. The MEDA (Mésures

³⁴⁰ Mehdi Alioua, "La Migration Transnationale des Africains Subsahariens au Maghreb : L'Exemple de l'Etape Marocaine", **Maghreb-Machrek**, Vol.185, 2005, pp. 37-57.

³⁴¹ Philippe Fargues, "Mediterranean Migration - 2005 Report", **European University Institute: Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies**, 2005, pp. 6-405, (Report).
 Johara Berriane, « Les Étudiants Subsahariens Au Maroc : Des Migrants Parmi d'autres ? », **Méditerranée**, Vol. 113, 2009, pp. 147-150.

³⁴² Abdelkrim Belguendouz, **Politique Européenne de Voisinage, Barrage aux Sudistes : De Schengen au Barcelone**, Beni Snassen, Salé, 2005, pp. 167.

d'Accompagnement or Accompanying Measures) was focused on providing the economic transition. Immense funds under MEDA were allocated for the reduction of immigration.

Between 2002 and 2005, Morocco and the EU began working together on security issues related to migration. Because of this, between 2006 and 2010 there was a decline in the number of people crossing through Morocco illegally. In 2010, the Arab Spring became the reason for a large scale of migration movements towards the EU. During the Arab Spring, Morocco remained one of the region's few safe havens, making it more appealing to migrants seeking to cross the Mediterranean Sea or the East African coasts into Europe than the other routes. After the Arab Spring, the number of people migrating illegally to Europe again began to rise. Migration from Morocco was affected by the economic and political unrest in the Middle East and North Africa that began with the Arab Spring upheavals a few years ago. Morocco is also dear to the European retirement migrants, approximately 28,000 EU migrants were living in Morocco in 2005. Among these people the number of French migrants is increasing. This fact can be taken as the returning back of the migrants who settled in the EU earlier at the time of turmoil in Morocco.

Morocco being a transit point for a diverse range of nationalities, including labour migrants, asylum seekers, and primarily undocumented migrants, those from Algeria, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, DG Congo, France, Guinea, Italy, the Gambia, Senegal, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Mali, and Yemen make up the bulk.³⁴³ This irregular migration from Africa to Europe via Morocco has been increased since 2000. Due to the ongoing nature of transit migration, accurate population estimates are elusive but a rough estimate identify that the irregular migrants passing from Morocco on yearly basis ranges between 8000 and 15000.³⁴⁴ However, Moroccan irregular migrants consist only 9 percent, where African were nearly 87 percent of the migrants, to Europe in 2004 from its border.³⁴⁵ Although many policies were introduced to control the irregular migration in the EU from the path on Morocco, none of the policies have been able to eradicate the irregular migrants. Rather the number of irregular migrants has been increasing since 2000. The FRONTEX

³⁴³ Bel-Air, p.13

³⁴⁴ Mehdi Lahlou, « L'Année Migratoire 2006 : Vue à Partir du Maroc », **In Migrations : Droits de l'Homme et Développement**, (eds., L'Institut National de Statistiques et d'Economie Appliquée et la Chaire de Recherche du Canada en Droit International des Migrations Université de Montréal), **INSEA : Rabat**, 2007, pp. 9-33, (Migrations).

³⁴⁵ Lorenzo Coslovi, "Brevi Note Sull'Immigrazione Via Mare in Italia e in Spagna », **CESPI : Centro Studi Di Politika Internazionale-Rome**, 2007, pp. 2-13.

reported that approximately 200,000 people were the irregular migrants in the Europe during 2021, it is the highest figure reported after 2017. The report further illustrates that this rise in illegal migration was 57 percent and 36 percent more while comparing to 2020 and 2019 figure for irregular migration respectively. It indicates clearly that the irregular migration, taking Morocco as the transit country, is still increasing on yearly basis. It is because Europe is paying more attention to its own development and the development of its borders through controlling the immigrants as the conditionality against the financial aid programs. The sub-Saharan African nations are still facing the economic downturns, political instability and massive poverty. In this case it is very attractive for the sub-Saharan African people to cross the border of Morocco to enter Europe or if unsuccessful it could better stay in Morocco. It is because death by famine is worse than getting caught where the latter has less dreadful end. Keeping this in mind the sub-Saharan African people like to live as the irregular migrants in European region or its neighbourhood developed under several economic programs like Morocco. The same reason has become the cause of persistent flow of irregular migrants on the Moroccan border. The only way to solve this is the development of these poor regions whose miserable citizens are forced to take refuge away from their homeland.

3.4. THE EU' POLICY ON SUB-SAHARAN TRANSIT MIGRATION

The EU economic difficulties and the nature of security considerations both within Europe and in its neighbourhood are the primary causes for the establishment of the EU's external immigration policy and asylum. In the context of global migration and mobility, these issues are seen as crucial to the long-term security, freedom, and justice in Europe. Therefore, both economic and security concerns are determining factors of different migration policies of Europe. The changing geopolitical environment has created the interdependencies in economic and security matters among the countries. On the other hand, the financial crisis, changes in demography, political instability and the crisis in the neighbouring countries has ultimately led a large diaspora from the neighbouring countries towards Europe. The massive migration challenges around Europe is considered a serious threat as it constrains the further holding of migrants, the sustainability of the European countries and invoke their internal security concerns. Hence, the external immigration policy of Europe primarily is an attempt to ensure the internal security, freedom of movement in the

European region and justice provision across the Europe. One way to solve this problem was presented in the Global Approach to Migration (GAM) in 2005 where the legal migration between Europe and the third countries were legalized to fulfil the needs of the labour market. Through cooperation with third countries, the GAM paves the way for a unified and worldwide strategy to be implemented in support of legal migration and the suppression of irregular immigration.³⁴⁶ The legal migration is promoted because the migrants from third countries contribute in the labour market that ultimately leads to the economic growth of the Europe. It is because the European countries are facing the declining population caused by low birth rates, and hence the declining labour force. According to the World Bank³⁴⁷ thirty-three percent population of the EU would be over sixty-five years old, it implies a worker would bear a burden of two retirees. Hence, the focus of GAM is tilted towards the economic development of Europe through promoting the legal migration and not the elimination of root causes of the irregular migration from the third countries. This policy stimulates the economic stability of both the Europe and the third countries in the long run where the legal migration replaces the illegal trespassing and only the required labour force would be allowed to travel across borders. In this way the legal migration has- become a way of economic development of the European countries.

3.4.1. The External Internal Nexus, Terrorism, Irregular Migration and Securitization

Traditionally, the internal and external security concerns were dealt with differently. The external migration was considered as an escape from economic misery. The migrants were not considered as a threat to security. However, this distinction of external and internal security concerns has been losing its importance due to the nature of emerging security concerns in the recent era.³⁴⁸ The rise of terrorism has led to relate the external migration with the organized crimes that in turn has become the threat to both external and internal security.³⁴⁹ Hence, the countries

³⁴⁶ The Council of the European Union, **Global Approach to Migration**, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 2005, pp. 1-25, (GAM).

³⁴⁷ The World Bank, **Shaping the Future, a Long-Term Perspective of People and Job Mobility in the Middle East and North Africa**, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009, pp. 13-88, (LTPPJM).

³⁴⁸ Florian Trauner, "The Internal-External Security Nexus More Coherence under Lisbon?", **The European Union Institute for Security Studies**, Occasional paper, No. 89, 2011, pp. 7-35.

³⁴⁹ Didier Bigo, "The Möbius Ribbon of Internal and External Security(ies)", **Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory**, eds. Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, Yosef Lapid, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2001, pp. 91-116, (MOBIUS).

have developed their migration policies along with their security policies. The EU realizes that migration is an important factor for their economic growth as well but the unbridled and irregular migration has taken the position of a threat to internal security of the European countries. This debate of external and internal security concerns has become the origin of the external immigration policies. Due to the enforcement of human rights, irregular migration, uncontrolled borders, organized crime, and terrorism have been characterized as non-traditional security challenges which cannot be dealt with militarily. Therefore, modern security threats are multifaceted and difficult to pinpoint.³⁵⁰

Security risks related to various types of migration have been discussed at length in the available research.³⁵¹ The literature claims that migration leads to different threats. Migration gives birth to ethnic functionalism.³⁵² The other threat their study indicated is the migratory pressure that put a social strain on the existing infrastructure: migration as the threat to societal sector security.³⁵³ That research argued that the influx of migrants possesses a pressure upon the existing scarce resources of the country and also altered the composition of the host population: the host population is threatened by linguistic composition, ethnic, religious and communal identities. However, there has been an extensive literature that debates around whether the external migration is a challenge to the security or only a threat. Further, the dispute centres that if migration is the problem or the particular type of migration, that is irregular and uncontrolled migration, is the security challenge. Then, the migration security nexus is formed that considers the impact of migration on demographic security, social stability, cultural identity, welfare state philosophy, internal security and the social security.³⁵⁴

The EU migration was mingled with the securitization in 1986 with the conclusion of the Single European Act that initially emphasized upon the internal mobility. Further, the Schengen Agreement abolished the internal control on the

³⁵⁰ Florian Trauner & Imke Kruse, "EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: Implementing a New Security Approach in the Neighborhood", **Center for European Policy Studies**, CEPS working document, No. 290, 2008, pp. 2-31.

³⁵¹ Maggie Ibrahim, "The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse", **International Migration**, Vol. 43, No. 5, 2005, pp. 163–187.
Huymans, pp. 10-155.

³⁵² Emil J. Kirschner, James Sperling, "The New Security Threats in Europe: Theory and Evidence", **European Foreign Affairs Review**, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2002, pp. 423–452.

³⁵³ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, **Security: A New Framework for Analysis**, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1998, pp. 21-163.

³⁵⁴ Anna Kicing, "International Migration as a Non-traditional Security Threat and the EU Responses to this Phenomenon", **Central European Forum for Migration Research: Warsaw**, Working paper No. 2, 2004, pp.1-10.

member European borders and also increased the external border controls, of the EU and non-member countries. In the earlier periods, the literature has indicated that the irregular migration is a threat to security and urges the measures to control it through management discourse.³⁵⁵ The Maastricht Treaty addressed the issue by placing migration to the same inter - governmental pillar as organized crime and terrorism. The EU's external relations were later explicitly addressed in the Tampere Presidency Conclusions³⁵⁶ as the instrument to achieve the EU's internal security objectives.³⁵⁷

Following discussions in Tampere, the term "migrant flow" has taken on a pejorative meaning in the EU discourses requiring administration and supervision.³⁵⁸ Taking unlawful migration and terrorist threats as a single issue to battle and oppose, the European Council in Seville emphasized the necessity for prompt political action.³⁵⁹

Article 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007 recognizes the importance of the interplay between internal and external security, highlighting a trend that emerged after the year 2000. According to this section, the EU is obligated to provide its members with a "region of justice, freedom, and security" regardless of national boundaries. Article 2 goes on to say that the mobility of citizens is ensured in the EU region, together with necessary measures for outer border security, immigration, asylum, and the prevention and fighting of crime. The European Security Plan recognizes the inextricable link between external and internal security, arguing that the latter; "Could not exist without the former, as then the internal depends heavily upon exterior security".³⁶⁰

There were three major developments that were mainly the reason for the EU securitization of migration: the terrorist attack on the US on 11 September, 2001, the enlargement of the EU in 2004, and the massive irregular migration after Arab Spring in 2010 coupled with refugee and migrant crisis in 2015. This irregular migration,

³⁵⁵ Diana Babayan, **Balancing Security and Development in Migration Policy-EU Mobility Partnerships** (Natolin Best Master thesis), College of Europe: Department of European Interdisciplinary Studies, Natolin, 2010, pp. 14-54.

³⁵⁶ The Council of the European Union, **Presidency Conclusions: Tampere European Council**, The European Union, Tampere, Finland, 1999, pp. 2-13, (TAMPERE).

³⁵⁷ Sarah Wolff, Nicole Wichmann, and Gregory Mounier, "The External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs: A Different Security Agenda for the EU", **Journal of European Integration**, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2009, pp. 9-23.

³⁵⁸ Babayan, p. 11.

³⁵⁹ The Council of the European Union, "Presidency Conclusion: Seville European Council", **The Official Website of the European Union**, Bruxelles, 22.06.2002, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/DOC_02_13 , (03.05.2022), (SEVILLE).

³⁶⁰ The Council of the European Union, **Internal Security Strategy for the European Union towards a European Security Model**, General Secretariat of the Council Publication: Office of the European Union, Brussel, 2010, pp. 2-30, (ISS).

illegal entry or overstay, is taken as the severe threat to the sustainability of the Eurozone justice and security.³⁶¹ The European Strategy on Migrants emphasizes working with other nations to combat human trafficking, smuggling, and organized crime³⁶². However, the analysis has shown that the rising irregular migration flows are primarily framed by the increased border securitization.³⁶³ In addition, the internal security concerns are so important to the European countries that they are willing to suspend the Schengen Agreement that symbolizes the EU unification. However, as long as the policies for development are failing in the origin and transit countries, these mechanisms for controlling the irregular migration are only increasing the number of irregular migrants and create only diversification in the routes. Therefore, in the European Agenda on Migration³⁶⁴, the EU aims to reduce uncontrolled migration towards Europe and eliminates the factors behind such migration.

3.4.2. Transit Migration towards the EU

The EU cooperation on migration takes the issue of migration with third countries in the framework for external relations that consider transit migration of core importance. However, the literature has debated in defining the transit migration. It is usually considered as migration from an origin country to the destination country using another country in the way. The transit migration took its place in the migration policy in the 1990s when it came into attention by the United Nation Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). The transit migration as the labour migration in core and peripheral countries.³⁶⁵ The International Organization for Migration (IOM)'s definition of a "transit migrant" is the most thorough and widely acknowledged one: an alien who temporarily resides in the country while looking for a way to permanently relocate to another nation.³⁶⁶ It made the transit migrant a complicated phenomenon in which defining space, time and intention are not enough to explain it properly. However, the

³⁶¹ Kicinger, p. 7.

³⁶² The European Commission, **Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European Agenda on Migration, COM2015/240 final**, Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs, Brussels, 2015, pp. 1–22, (COM2015/240).

³⁶³ Hein de Haas, Mathias Czaika, "Measuring Migration Policy: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections", **American Political Science Association**, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2013, pp. 40-47.

³⁶⁴ The European Commission, (COM2015/240), p. 13.

³⁶⁵ Elizabeth McLean Petras, "The Global Labor Market in the World Economy", **International Migration Review**, Vol. 15, No.1, 1981, pp. 44-63.

³⁶⁶ Franck Düvell, Bastian Vollmer, "Irregular Migration in and from the Neighborhood of the EU: A Comparison of Morocco, Turkey and Ukraine", **Clandestino: Undocumented Migration**, Vol. 7, 2009, pp. 1-45, (IRMI).

concept of transit migration is also debated as the people question whether it is a category of migration or it is the political construct. The migrants consider transit country as their destination, others sometimes take it as the second best option to stay if they failed to reach their destination country.³⁶⁷

The issue of transit migration genuinely highlights the transit countries as well. These countries are geographically located in the destination and the source countries. Almost all countries neighbouring the Eurozone are stigmatized to be associated with the transit migration: The Baltic States, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Turkey, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Balkan and Caucasus countries.³⁶⁸ Both Morocco and Turkey played important roles as transit countries during the Arab Spring and Syrian conflict, respectively. Therefore, these two countries are considered as the safe haven for the transit migrants. However, Morocco is the only country which possesses both sea and land route to Europe and is part of both the West Africa Route and the West Mediterranean Route.

3.4.3. Migration Management through Externalization in the EU: Focus Areas

With regard to migration management with third countries, the EU places a premium on five key areas: border migration, mobility partnership, asylum policy, readmission, and visa policy. The blurred lines between the EU member states mean that they can all benefit from the European-wide databases that have enabled the development of cutting-edge technologies.³⁶⁹

To be considered external borders, as opposed to internal boundaries between European states, are all air, land, sea, river, and lake borders, as stated in Article 2 of the Schengen Borders Code of 2006. This creates a huge area numerically covering the external border of over 50,000 km consisting of 80 percent of the sea and 20 percent of the land borders.³⁷⁰ The EU' large border management also accompany challenges and the policy making and implementation weaknesses. The foremost problem is that the policy is originated from two different yet closely

³⁶⁷ Hein De Haas, **Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends**, Migration Policy Institute: Migration Information Source, 2006, (TSMNA).

³⁶⁸ Franck Düvell, "Transit migration: A Blurred and Politicized Concept", **Population, Space and Place**, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2012, pp. 415-427, (TRANSIT).

³⁶⁹ Sergio Carrera, "Building a Common Policy in Labour Immigration. Towards a Comprehensive and Global Approach in the EU?", **CEPS**, Working Document, 2007, No. 256, pp. 1-16.

³⁷⁰ The Council of the European Union, **The Schengen area**, The EU Publications Office, Brussels, 2015, pp.1-19, (SCHENGEN).

associated approaches of border management: the one is the common territorial borders and the other is the global approach to migration. The increased securitization of the EU external borders depicts the concern to protect the borders on priority basis than the lives of irregular migrants. These security measures are the cause of over 22,000 deaths of migrants trying to reach Europe between 2000 to 2014.³⁷¹

The legal migration between the third countries and the EU was promoted by the Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships. It then became a tool for the EU policy. These agreements provide specific commitments like the readmitting nationals from own and third countries, initiating efforts to decrease the irregular migration, enhancing the border control for improving the legal migration opportunities, assistance to third countries for managing migration, addressing the risks attached with the brain drain and promoting circular migration, making the visa process better for the third countries. However, the conditionality occupies the dominating role in the EU partnership for mobility with the third countries, for example the legal migration is conditioned with the commitments to control the irregular migration by the third country.

Further, the mobility partnerships remained feeble in promoting the legal migration between the third countries and the EU for several reasons. The first is the sensitivity of the legal migration for the member states for which it is very difficult to reach at the mutual agreement among them.³⁷² The member states want to continue their internal control over the issue of the legal migration, so they prefer national policy of migration over the control policy of illegal migration. These nations are supported by the Article 79 (5) of the TFEU that indicates that the nations are free to determine the volume of the migrants coming from the third countries for finding work. The mobility partnerships failed as these lack the schemes for labour mobility³⁷³ and provide no framework for enhancing the legal migration for the partner country citizens. In the absence of such framework, the independence of the member states in making policy for the migration leads to failure because the freedom in policy making make the policy competence questionable. The issue of competence act as the constraints during the negotiations in the Commission for partnerships and hinders the legal migration opportunity deliverance by the EU. Another issue in the mobility

³⁷¹ Tara Brian, Frank Laczko, **Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost During Migration**, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Geneva, 2014, pp. 15-199.

³⁷² Carrera, p.13.

³⁷³ Natasja Reslow, "The New Politics of EU Migration Policy: The Case of the Mobility Partnerships", **Paper prepared for the fifth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics**, Portugal, Porto, 23-26 June 2010, pp.1-25.

partnership is that it is lacking the legally binding character, it is confined to only voluntary participation by the member states.³⁷⁴ Moreover, the third countries remain at the mercy of the EU to make a policy for the partnership mobility and they were unable to influence the policies determined by the EU. In a nutshell, the mobility partnerships have not proven successful in fulfilling its objectives rather it has become a wishful thought. In the future, the EU needs to provide better legal migration opportunities through the money, mobility and the market access to the third countries.

If the partnership mobility fails, one solution to irregular migration is to make visas easier to get for citizens of third countries in order to encourage legal immigration; in exchange, these nations may help police the EU borders.³⁷⁵ The current rigorous visa requirements, however, are driven mostly by the need to secure the EU borders. It seems to be the instrument for managing undocumented immigration. The visa policies of the EU are used as a securitization tool against the freedom of the third country citizens through the proliferation of mechanisms like the European Dactyloscopy System (EURODAC), the Passenger Name Record Data (PNR) and the Europol-USA agreements.³⁷⁶ The data systems like Schengen system maintain the negative visa list for all the citizen of the third countries which need visa to enter the EU. For this reason, these individuals face additional discrimination and are viewed as a potential threat. In general, nationals from the countries on the adverse on the visa list are treated with mistrust, fear, and suspicion because of the reputations those countries have earned themselves.³⁷⁷ These policies present the negative image of the EU countries in its neighbourhood and described as the 'Fortress Europe' among the third countries. Europe's security and justice system faces a serious threat from illegal immigration and overstays, which are both forms of irregular migration.³⁷⁸

³⁷⁴ The Commission of the European Communities, **Commission Staff Working Document: Mobility Partnerships as a Tool of the Global Approach to Migration**, SEC (2009)/1240, EC Brussels, 2009, pp. 2-30, (MTTG).

³⁷⁵ Didier Bigo, Elspeth Guild, **Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and within Europe**, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, pp. 2-233.

³⁷⁶ Thierry Balzacq, "The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs: Tools, Processes, Outcomes", **Center for European Policy Studies**, Working Document, No. 303, 2008.

³⁷⁷ Bigo and Guild, p. 11.

³⁷⁸ Kicingier, p. 3.

3.4.4. The EU' Burden Sharing or Shifting Through Externalization of Immigration Policy with Third Countries

Delegating authority is central to the ENP goal of creating a safe and secure area—a rhetorical term for a network of close allies.³⁷⁹

According to the ENP, neighbours should help one another out by taking on more work and more responsibility in order to keep their communities safe. It has been argued that the EU policy of delegation constitutes a shifting of responsibility, while others have argued that it merely constitutes a shifting of the burden.³⁸⁰ As a result of these discussions, the EU's claim of collective security with a third country has been reframed as the responsibility transferring on those third countries. As a result, the EU may be able to extra-territorially extend its management of security threats to its neighbours without compromising the EU interests, all thanks to the type of cooperation it is seeking.³⁸¹ As a result, the externalization strategy is highly authoritarian because it requires non-member countries to assume responsibility for migration management and to construct infrastructure to accommodate asylum seekers and police their borders.

The existing readmission agreement also portrays the example of the burden shifting upon the third countries in case of irregular migrants and asylum seekers: the readmission of all those migrants at the borders of the EU who are unable to present a valid argument except that they are trespassing from the transit countries. They are all sent back to the transit countries instead of their country of origin. This policy secures the borders of the EU at the cost of putting the administrative, financial and social pressure on the transit countries. On the other hand, when it comes to facilitating the legal migration, the EU does not share the burden as it tends towards the independent policy of their countries hindering the chances of earning better livelihoods for the citizens of the transit countries.

Moreover, the EU is transferring its responsibility of processing the applications for asylum to the third countries which is another delegation of burden by the EU to its neighbours. Rather than sharing the burden and enhancing development, the initiatives and programs launched by the EU within its agenda on European Migration (2015) were mere instruments that outsource the asylum claims upon the

³⁷⁹ The Commission of the European Communities, MTTG, p.12.

³⁸⁰ Düvell and Vollmer, p. 10.

³⁸¹ Bigo and Guild, p. 11.

Balzaq, p.7.

Wolf et al. p. 13.

third countries. It appears that the EU wanted these third countries to absorb the unwanted migrants from their borders, and these third countries are becoming the dumping ground or buffer zones.³⁸² These asymmetries in the relationship of the EU and the third countries upon the bearing of responsibility are the sources feeding into the ambiguity of sharing or shifting the burden by the EU policies.

The EU presents itself as the superior power holding resources such as money, normative framing, knowledge, and considers its neighbouring states inferior needing the assistance of the EU for development and prosperity.³⁸³ However, such powers do not enable the EU to mend the policies of the neighbouring countries in its own benefit. The arguments followed to the overestimation of the EU power are the meagre progress in the ENP Action Plans, Syrian refugee crisis, Arab Spring upheavals, and inability to influence the recent initiatives in the Middle East and Mediterranean. The EU sets itself as the norm setter for the management of migration, but its policies are highly dependent upon the third countries to control the migration that the EU countries take as the security threat. The problems and opportunities posed by the EU's neighbours considerably affect the EU directly whenever the Union's frontiers shift towards the east, the burden of the EU's borders falls upon the neighbours.³⁸⁴ In addition, the ENP declares that if Europe fails to manage stability then it will have to import instability and hence migration will not just be a political imperative. Therefore, it can be stated that the EU consider its neighbourhood as the cause of potential insecurity, and then the EU tends to alter the direction of movement for its own sake.³⁸⁵ With the aim of controlling the mobility of the migrants, the conditionality is used as the instrument whereas the notion that the EU states it concerns with the consent of both sides and not imposing its will. While the EU pursues its own interest through rational behaviour, ignorance of the domestic needs and factors related to the third countries largely constrained the effectiveness of policy

³⁸² Sarah Collinson, "Visa Requirements, Carrier Sanctions, 'Safe Third Countries' and 'Readmission': The Development of an Asylum 'Buffer Zone' in Europe", **Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers**, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1996, pp. 76-90.

³⁸³ Rickard Bengtsson, **The EU and the European Security Order: Interfacing Security Actors**, Routledge, New York, 2010, pp. 597-616.

³⁸⁴ The Council of the European Union, **Joint letter on Wider Europe by Commissioner Chris Patten and High Representative Solana: Strengthening Relations with the Arab World**, the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 15945/03, PESC 791, Brussels, 2002, pp. 2-12, (PESC).

³⁸⁵ Bengtsson, p. 609.

measures of the EU. The EU's policies are seen as too invasive by its neighbours, who reject the bloc's inclusion in the overall framework of cooperation.³⁸⁶

3.4.5. The Agenda of Migration in the EU, Morocco and African Countries

Unlike Morocco, sub-Saharan African countries have shown little to no interest in enforcing immigration laws or cooperating with any readmission strategy that requires them to assume responsibility for non-nationals.³⁸⁷ The EU is not seen the same way in all African countries. From the EU 's point of view, a major incentive for the third countries to adhere with the readmission agreement is the EU's policy of granting visas on a more streamlined basis for specific groups of persons including businessmen, students, and academics. On the other hand, the third countries believe that this agreement is more demanding as the EU claims; because, their interest lies in the access to the labour markets of the EU and their development agendas, while the EU is not providing these facilities to them. The mismatch of priorities in the African countries and the EU is translating in the lack of policy support. The transit countries fear that the burden of readmission is far more than the facilities provided against these agreements. Moreover, such agreements have limited actions on the ground as they are scrutinized by the vague calls for action like exchanging views and establishing the constructive dialogues. Perhaps, the EU needs to offer more amenities besides the visa facilitation, including the development aid, access to the markets and increased external trade.

The EU sees the growing influx of undocumented African migrants as a serious threat to national security. Given that political violence and poverty are generally accepted as primary drivers of irregular migration, the EU's external policies should centre on preserving Africa's political and economic stability. The EU's measures, it is alleged, externalize its restrictive immigration policy by pressing North African states to adopt tight immigration regulations and laws and reinforce their border controls. In truth, the EU views the number of arrested irregular migrants as a proxy for the degree to which its partner nations are cooperating with it, rather than

³⁸⁶ Bernhard Zeilinger, "Governing 'Wider Europe' in an Interdependent World: EU's External Policy towards Eastern Europe on Migration Management", **ECPR Conference Fifth Pan- European Conference on EU politics**, Porto, 2010, pp. 1–36.

³⁸⁷ Agnieszka Weinar, "The EU Cooperation Challenges in External Migration Policy: Technical Report- EU-US Immigration systems", **Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute**, 2011, pp. 1-25.

the partner countries' development, the elimination of the reasons of migration, or their benefit from legal migration. Given its proximity to Europe, Morocco is a popular choice as a transit nation for people heading to the EU. The EU recognizes the need of allowing regular migration from Morocco, since this country is the main source of substantial remittances. In exchange, the EU requires the Moroccan government to close its border for the irregular migration and absorb the irregular migrants coming from its border through readmission agreement. Although the EU's immigration policy impact could be noticed at border controls in Morocco which have been militarized, but the EU maintains that it is still conducting a "preventative operation" to keep illegal immigrants out of Europe.

Although it seems the nature of migration agenda is similar in the EU, Morocco and the African countries, it is not the same when it comes to the agreements between the countries. The North African states, under the agreement of the ENP, are agreed for curbing the irregular migration through their borders and are signatory of the readmission agreements. These countries agreed to these proposals due to the financial support in the form of aid and the work permits.³⁸⁸ It seems valid reason for these countries because the irregular migrants mostly belong to the African economies. On the other hand, the transit migration from Morocco has less than 10 percent their residents crossing borders of the EU illegally while the majority of population attempting irregular migration have origins of African countries. In this case, the Moroccan government is not willing to take the readmission agreement for taking care of irregular migration against the cooperation in legal migration provided by the EU. The demographic pressure on Morocco could be worse if it admits to these difficult agreements as the large number of people use Morocco as the transit route. It appears that the EU is attempting to secure its border and not solving the causes of migration, economic and political crisis, from African countries and Morocco.

3.5. AGREEMENTS BETWEEN MOROCCO AND THE EU ON IRREGULAR MIGRATION

One of the main regional recipients of the EU financial aid is Morocco. Numerous EU financial aid initiatives, including as Technical Assistance of the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS), MEDA, the ENPI and the Advanced European Network of E-Infrastructure (AENEAS), the European Return Fund, and the

³⁸⁸ De Haas, MMT, p. 10

European Border Fund, have benefited the country. The political and economic ties between Europe and Morocco saw a dramatic transformation in the year 2000, compared to both preceding and subsequent years. Since king Hassan II's death in 1999 and the subsequent ascension of king Mohammed VI. According to the available literature, the EU's relationship with Morocco pre-dating the year 2000 was characterized by a focus on trade, democratic advancement, good governance, and the protection of human rights. However, in the period followed by 2000 the focus of relationship between Morocco and the EU emphasised upon migration, energy, environment, defence cooperation and terrorism. It is also driven by the fact that the EU also prioritized the external actions cooperation with the third countries after 2000, due to massive irregular migration which is considered as the security threat by the EU. The EU and Morocco have had formal connections since the signing of the Association Agreement in 2000.

Its goal was to encourage regional collaboration to boost economic growth and ensure political stability. Combined with the mandate to resume negotiations with the EU on the readmission accord, the trade benefits of this approach are substantial. This proves that the EU's envisaged partnership with Morocco is not unconditional. In addition, in 2005, Morocco was granted advanced status, which gives it access to the EU's commodities and labour markets in exchange for cooperation on critical European interests in migration, counterterrorism, and organized crime. However, the high tariffs were imposed in Europe upon the goods in which the Moroccan had speciality of exports, and the EU members were also granted access to the markets of Morocco.³⁸⁹ Therefore, it can be stated that the desire for political and economic development of Morocco has been provided by the EU through advance status, giving aids and grants. The same status has also made Morocco comply the EU border control policy, resisting irregular migration and harmony in the migration issues. Morocco has majorly obliged to the ENP policy by protecting its borders, through strong surveillance and control, after 2000s. Well over eighteen million euros were granted through the AENEAS Program between 2004 and 2008 to improve Morocco's capability in the areas of joint migration policy, resending of migrants to their home countries, asylum and safeguarding of refugees, and border controls.³⁹⁰

³⁸⁹ Kristina Kausch, "Morocco's 'Advanced Status': Model or Muddle?", Policy brief, **FRIDE: A European Think Thank for Global Action**, No. 43, 2010, pp.1-5.

³⁹⁰ Emil J. Kirschner, James Sperling, "The New Security Threats in Europe: Theory and Evidence", **European Foreign Affairs Review**, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2002, pp. 423–452.

A rise in the number of unlawful border crossings from Morocco into Spain prompted the EU to enhance its collaboration with Morocco on migration management during the summer of 2018. In conjunction with this diplomatic and geopolitical manoeuvre, which was mostly led by Spain, the EU handed Morocco €140 million out of its development expenditure for initiatives relating to border security.

Given the human rights violations committed by security personnel, development funding for Morocco's security apparatus raised questions about whether the EU's decision to support the country's capacity for migration control is consistent with its broader efforts to promote "democratization" and "stability" in Morocco.³⁹¹

3.5.1. The EU Readmission Agreements

The EU Readmission Agreements (EURAs) are the indispensable instruments for decreasing the irregular migration. Under these agreements, the third country allows the migrants to re-enter in its territory who were irregular migrants or were unable to get asylum facilities. The third country, in these agreements without formalization, agrees upon taking care of all its citizens that have entered in the EU territory illegally from its border irrespective of the fact that they are its citizen, the citizen of non-contracting states or the stateless persons. The Amsterdam Treaty shifted to negotiate the readmission agreements with the third countries with the reciprocity principle, the contracting countries must take responsibility of all the readmission persons irrespective of the nationality of the irregular migrants. However, taking responsibility of the other country nationals has not been mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 Article 13. The Article states that each country must take back its citizens, but it states nothing about the country would take responsibility of the nationals of another state.

Similarly, the particular dynamics of the third country like organizational and domestic factors impacts upon the instrumentation of the EURAs. For the same reason both Morocco and Turkey denied to sign the EURAs over a decade.³⁹² The major hindrance in accepting these EURAs, by the third countries, are not the acceptability of the nationals of the third country but the acceptability of the citizens of

³⁹¹ The Council of the European Union, **Draft Action File on Libya**, Operational Coordination Mechanism for the External Dimension of Migration, Brussel, 2023, p.1-9, (LIBYA).

³⁹² Sarah Wolff, "The Politics of Negotiating EU Readmission Agreements: Insights from Morocco and Turkey", **European Journal of Migration and Law**, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2014, pp. 69-95.

the other countries trespassing the transit country via any route. On the other hand, the European Commission provides two primary causes of such difficulty: few incentives and shrinking flexibility given by the member countries of the EU due to technical issues.³⁹³ Although the readmission agreement was presented to Morocco in April, 2003, it neither got consent by negotiations, nor did it acquire the implementation. Despite the financial support from the EU, Morocco remained reluctant to accept the agreement of readmission of the EU. The major reason behind this policy is the large proportion of non-nationals in the transit migration. The nation is prepared to take in its own citizens, but it will not accept people who are citizens of other countries; it is because these people could be sent to their country of origin only after making a readmission agreement prior to their dispatch. These readmission agreements are not in place between the sub-Saharan African countries and Morocco, because the sub-Saharan African countries are mostly not willing to welcome back their irregular migrants. Although, there are several African countries that are signatories to readmission agreements with the EU countries, it is still difficult to put these agreements into practice due to the complexity involved.³⁹⁴ In these kinds of circumstances, the readmission agreements might bring an enormous number of undocumented migrants from Africa into Morocco, despite the fact that the country does not have the administrative, technical, or financial ability to accommodate them. For this reason, Morocco demanded a well-rounded package, as well as concrete pledges from Europe about the provision of future financial aid, visa simplification, and improved mobility, in exchange for signing the readmission agreement.

3.5.2. The EU Funding for Border Security in Morocco

The EU externalization policy needs the support of the neighbouring countries, for which it provides financial assistance. The financial support provided to Morocco by the EU was mostly presented in the form of development aid for migration control through developing border security. It is possible to classify various phases, dependent upon time, of the funding provided to Morocco under different initiatives by the EU, in the area of enhancing border control. There are three major phases: 2001-2010, 2013-2018, 2018 to present.

³⁹³ The European Commission, **Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Evaluation of EU readmission agreements COM (2011), 76 Final**, Official Journal of the European Union, Brussels, 2011, pp. 2-15, (ERA).

³⁹⁴ Collyer, p. 613.

3.5.2.1. Border Security Development Phase 1: 2001-10

During 2001-10, a border infrastructure was formed and put in work. During this time period, the EU committed at least €74.6 million across six separate projects to improve border security in Morocco. Three of these initiatives were carried out in Morocco alone. Morocco was one of four countries involved in the other three initiatives. Each country's allocation of the program's funds was contingent on the area in question, and the same was true of the program itself. 2001/HLWR/118 - The War on Illegal Immigration was the working title for the first project. A grant of €370,682 was provided by the EU to make this project possible. The Fundación Policía Española (GED-DPG) oversaw the project's execution. The project's primary goal was to provide Moroccans with tools and education to spot fake documents. However, the Moroccan government never followed through on this plan, and it appears that their lack of interest was the main reason why the project never came to fruition.³⁹⁵

The second project, of the first phase, was about Operational Communication Centres, and its implementation responsibility was granted to the French Ministry of Interior. This project initially possessed the budget of €1,139,680, while contribution of the EU in it was €665,980. The project goal was to provide infrastructure required for the effective and rapid checking of travelling documents through equipping and constructing the border posts. Statewatch³⁹⁶ analysed the document that provides an overview of the project. According to the document, the project's principal goal was to build a command and control hub in Rabat for coordinating the activities of six individual border outposts. Using a safe online connection, the established network structure would enable the rapid exchange of identity, travel permits, and accompanying images between the various border stations. The long-term goal of the project is to establish a trustworthy database for cross-checking identity documents, which may be used to aid in the battle against illegal immigration and, potentially, reduce the amount of time needed to respond to individual questions.

³⁹⁵ Statewatch, "Aid, Border Security and EU-Morocco Cooperation on Migration Control", **Statewatch.org**, London, 24.11.2019, <https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/aid-border-security-and-eu-morocco-cooperation-on-migration-control/>, (12.01.2022), (EUCMC).

³⁹⁶ Jane Kilpatrick, "Migration Control, Not Rescue: Squeezing Search and Rescue in the Mediterranean", **Statewatch: Monitoring the State and Civil Liberties in Europe**, 03.09.2019, <https://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/sep/es-mo-sar.htm>, (12.01.2022).

The Moroccan border patrol was also given top-notch training on the new system as part of this initiative. However, the primary goals shifted during the project's execution phase. The Moroccan authorities remained resistant to build the operational centres for communication, that were the heart of the project; on the other end, the SCTIP had supplied all the material and deliverables required for training. Instead, Morocco implemented cost-efficient and much larger project by creating a link among all border posts; this project had potential to give the opportunity to create identity cards for all residents of Morocco.³⁹⁷

The AENEAS program supported the third initiative, known as "Project Seahorse" (for providing technical and financial assistance to third countries in asylum and migration). Between 2005 and 2008, the Guardia Civil of Spain applied it in Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, and Cape Verde. The EU's initial investment in the program was valued at €2,507,968, while the total expenditure for the project was €2 million. AENEAS also supported the Seahorse Network, the fourth initiative. Between 2006 and 2008, the Guardia Civil carried out this initiative in the African countries of Morocco, Senegal, and Cape Verde-Mauritania. The total initial budget was €2,502,578, with the EU's share coming in at €1,999,043. The goal of this initiative was to set up universal border and pre-border monitoring between the EU and the rest of the world. This project implementation has established an information network (that is now known as Seahorse Atlantic) which, further, has provided the basis of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR).³⁹⁸ The fifth project initially came as the assistance in the budget for border management. The EU allocated €67,625,000 from 2007 to 2010, in this project, under the supervision of the Moroccan Ministry of Interior. This was by far the huge support, but its utilisation report has not been publically available and not even provided to the team of Statewatch even after demand. It appeared that the information on this project is limited even to the official sources.

DCI-MIGR/2008/152-794 - Seahorse Cooperation Centres was the sixth and final project in the first phase. Spain initiated this program in the countries of Morocco, Senegal, Mauritania, The Cape Verde, Gambia, and Guinea Bissau. From 2009 to 2010, the project was carried out. The original budget for the project was €2,503,465, of which the EU contributed €2 million through its Strategic Program on Migration and

³⁹⁷ Kilpatrick, p. 24.

³⁹⁸ Statewatch, "Minor Interpellation Tabled by Member Andrej Hunko et. Al, and the Parliamentary Group of the Left Party: Launch of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)", **Bundestag printed paper**, No.18/76, 2014, pp.1-18.

Asylum (TPMA). Prior to 2007-2008, the primary purpose of such a program was to provide a high-level overview of the projects that received funding during that period. Focus areas for the project included a training program on coastal, land, and ports surveillance; a network of liaison officers; the formation of cooperation centres in Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, and Cape Verde; an international police conference between Europe and Africa; and training courses for the maritime services of Senegal, Mauritania, and Gambia.³⁹⁹ To sum up, between 2001 and 2010, the EU allocated a minimum of €68.6 million to border security initiatives in Morocco alone, and a minimum of €6 million to border security initiatives in the handful of countries from which Morocco benefited.

However, the evaluation of these projects was hardly given public access, and only one of these projects was made public, and the public had generally no idea where the funding of these projects has been allocated and consumed. The lack of public access to data is defended by the commission with few traditional arguments. The first argument was about issues like irregular migration, and specifically, the struggle to control human trafficking, are highly complex. Therefore, if the information is disclosed publically then the nature of cooperation between the countries would be affected by it. Another argument in the favour of hiding the information from public was claimed as the disclosure of this information would undermine the public interest in the area of public security. Moreover, disclosing information publically related to the projects hold the threat of decreasing the effectiveness of the plans against irregular migration and human trafficking. The commission further argued that the public information regarding the policy of controlling illegal migration would be similar to giving the roadmap of plan of authorities, all operational details, to eradicate the channels of irregular migration. Therefore, the masses may gather against the government policies as a result the policies might fail to provide the desirable results.⁴⁰⁰

3.5.2.2. Border Security Development Phase 2: 2013-18

The second phase of the EU border control policies was between 2013 and 2018. In this era, the attention to border security exclusively declined, whereas the

³⁹⁹ The Commission of the European Communities, **Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament: Thematic Programme for the Cooperation with Third Countries in the Areas of Migration and Asylum - Overview of projects funded 2007-2008**, Official Journal of the European Union, Brussel, 2008-updated, p. 3-13, (TPCTC).

⁴⁰⁰ The Commission of the European Communities, (TPCTC), p. 4.

attention was increased towards the new migration policy of Morocco. The focus of this period was integration. Further, this period witnessed no exclusive aid financed border security projects for Morocco. The primary focus of this era, by the EU, was the implementation of all the policy reforms of migration on supporting Morocco during the first phase of 2001 to 2010, specifically for the integration among migrants and refugees. Initiated and signed in 2013, the EU-Morocco Mobility Partnership has been awaiting an allocation of funds to bring it into effect.⁴⁰¹

Afterwards, the two main shows began. The first of these partnerships was established in 2015 between the EU and Morocco under the broader 'Support for Partnership, Reforms, and Inclusive Development (SPRING)' banner, with the goal of facilitating migrant integration.

Morocco received €10 million from the EU's second programme, which was overseen by the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), to help advance this collaboration. The EU gave €35 million to Morocco's budget in 2016 to help with the country's migration policy.

In the years 2016–2018, the EU Trust Fund for Africa allocated a total of €16.58 million to Morocco across three separate schemes. The first programme among them was of €5.5 million with the aim to fight against xenophobia.⁴⁰² Another program was about the judicial empowerment of the people migrated, it was with €4.58 million assistance⁴⁰³. These programs were managed by the Spanish Development Cooperation Agency, the Fundacion Internacional de Administracion Y Politicas Publicas (FIIAPP) and the Belgian Development Agency.⁴⁰⁴ The third programme was, with €6.5 million finances, focused on providing assistance to vulnerable migratory people; it was managed by the EU.

However, the implementation phase of this new migration policy of Morocco was not straightforward. The policy implemented two campaigns for regularising the people without documents; but, the parliament of Morocco only turned the reforms which dealt with human trafficking into law. The parliament did not provide the legal status to the reforms written in the law on asylum and new migration act; instead,

⁴⁰¹ The European Union External Action, « Promouvoir L'intégration Des Migrants Au Maroc (Programme D'appui Au Partenariat Pour La Mobilité UE-Maroc) », The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, 10.08.2018, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/52235_en, (09.07.2022), (PLMM).

⁴⁰² The European Commission, **Annexe IV à l'Accord Instituant le Fond Fiduciaire 'European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa**, Official Journal of the EU, Brussel, 2016, p. 2-23, (Annex IV).

⁴⁰³ The European Commission, **Empowerment Juridique des Personnes Migrantes**, The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, Brussel, 2020, pp. 1-31, (EJPM).

⁴⁰⁴ Statewatch, EUCMC.

these acts were stuck in the legislative pipeline. It was highlighted that the migrants were facing difficulty in integration because they were not provided access to the public services against which they were entitled. According to the Galileo Atmospheric Data Enhancement Mission (GADEM) 's research, donors like the EU and the Swiss Development Agency are helping migrants in Morocco in order to make up for the fact that the Moroccan government hasn't done anything to create and implement a genuine integration policy. The NGO said that the National Strategy for Immigration and Asylum (NSIA) will be weakly implemented at the local level because of the weakening effect that the defined financial rules from 2013 to the present have had on NSIA. The NGO further, highlighted that the NSIA is majorly implemented through international organisations by using the funding coming from the EU.

3.5.2.3. Border Security Development Phase 3: 2018-Present

This era was initiated by the massive mass arrival of 30,000 at the EU borders, higher than 2017, which clearly indicated crisis in the Western Mediterranean. In response, the EU looked back to its measures defined for border security at the border between the EU and Morocco in 2018. The European leaders justified this large inflow of irregular migrants, on the Western Mediterranean route, as impetus for enhancing cooperation to for border security at the EU-Moroccan border. The data compiled by Frontex indicated that, in 2018, there were 57,034 attempts of irregular border crossings on the Western Mediterranean route. It was an alarming increase in the attempts of crossing the border illegally as the figure was 23,063 between January and December 2017.⁴⁰⁵ On the other hand, Moroccan authorities were publicly claiming to disrupt 76,000 attempts, approximately, of irregular emigration, but the reliability of this claim have been questioned.⁴⁰⁶ Although the border crossings in 2018 were publicly declared as a 'crisis', the border crossings measured through the arrivals to Spain from Morocco through coast reported a remarkable decrease. In a note released in February 2019, the Romanian Presidency of the Council of the EU stated that the number of irregular migrants reported at the EU borders fell to around 150,000 in 2018, a fall of 25% from the previous year and the lowest level recorded

⁴⁰⁵ Frontex, "Risk Analysis for 2018", **Frontex: A Body of the European Union**, Warsaw, 2018, pp. 6-54, (REPORT).

⁴⁰⁶ Hassan Bentaleb, « De gros Chiffres mais pas Plus : La Lutte Contre la Migration Irrégulière Enveloppée dans une Curieuse Opacité », **Libération**, 29.11.2018, https://www.libe.ma/De-gros-chiffres-mais-pas-plus-La-lutte-contre-la-migration-irreguliere-enveloppee-dans-une-curieuse-opacite_a103659.html, (03.02.2022)

between 2015 and 2019.⁴⁰⁷ A new tranche of funds has been made available despite the fact that it is difficult to fathom how an increase of 30,000 irregular migrants over the Strait of Gibraltar could possibly justify the expanded deployment of both security and diplomatic resources. The EU provided funding of €140 million to Morocco in the years following 2018 to bolster the country's capability for border management. Three distinct initiatives contributed to this funding total. The first was the Maghreb Border Management Programme (BMP-Maghreb). This program, funded by the EU's Trust Fund for Africa, is intended to help both Morocco and Tunisia put into practice their border control strategies. In this programme €30 million was exclusively allocated for Morocco, with declaring its Ministry of Interior as the major beneficiary. The core objective of this programme was upgrading the capacity of state on integrated border management through developing IT infrastructure. This upgraded IT system would help in biometric collection, archival and identification of the migrants. In addition, it would improve border control by the acquisition of aerial, naval and terrestrial control equipment, for instance buying drones for the police guarding the Moroccan border.

The second project was about providing support to the integrated management of migration and borders in Morocco, by €40 million funding from Trust Fund for Africa by the EU. This project funding management was granted to FIIAPP of Spain. This programme was aimed to implement many activities including enhancement of the capacity of authorities of Morocco to disrupt irregular migration and search operations, providing helpful equipment for the surveillance of borders at both sea and land, as well as, to provide instruments for rescuing operations at sea and reinforce cooperation among authorities of Morocco – the EU agencies and its members.⁴⁰⁸ Another programme, worth €70 million, was designed to eradicate migration led smuggling and human trafficking by reinforcing border management in Morocco.⁴⁰⁹ However, the details for these programmes were kept hidden from the public against the rhetoric of protection of international relation, decision-making process and public interest. Although there is lack of information on these projects, it is evident that such funding from the EU could strengthen the political assistance and ensure the provision of material resources. These border security initiatives have

⁴⁰⁷ Statewatch, EUCMC.

⁴⁰⁸ Statewatch, EUCMC.

⁴⁰⁹ The European Commission, "Western Mediterranean Route: EU Reinforces Support to Morocco", Official Journal of the European Union, Press Release, 14.12.2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_6705, (02.04.2022), (WMDR). Yasha Maccanico, "Morocco: Wherever EU Immigration Policy Rears its Ugly Head, Violence and Abuses Follow", **Statewatch**, 23.10.2018, <https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2018/wherever-eu-immigration-policy-rears-its-ugly-head-violence-and-abuses-follow/>, (03.02.2022).

ultimately resulted in enormous violations of human rights through actions of security forces of Morocco against migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees.⁴¹⁰

3.5.2.4. Consequences of the EU-Morocco Border Security Measures

The border control agreements have made Morocco the guardian of the European borders. However, the use of Morocco as the transit country is becoming difficult. Consequently, more and more people are getting stuck on the transit routes of Morocco and the EU that poses a huge impact upon the lives of migrants in particular and the Moroccan society as a whole.⁴¹¹ On the other hand, the number of irregular migrants is increasing from sub-Saharan Africa because of critical political situation, economic downturns and the closure of European border for them. These irregular migrants, stuck in the transit area, are socially and economically vulnerable as they lack the legal status, and can be marginalised.⁴¹² The high unemployment rate in Morocco adds to the injury when these irregular migrants find it difficult to integrate into labour markets.⁴¹³ However, Morocco has been left alone to deal with these situations and the assistance of the EU is not up to the mark in the settlement of these irregular migrants. The externalization of the EU border, through strict border control in Morocco, has created the risk of threatening rights and security of migrants that include asylum seekers and the refugees.⁴¹⁴ The human rights record of Morocco is not sufficient which makes the strict border control into unintentional violation of several human rights of migrants⁴¹⁵, many migrants were shot dead by the border police when they were attempting to climb the fence. Hundreds of irregular migrants, from North and sub-Saharan Africa, have died due to thirst or drowning in the effort to reach Europe by boat.⁴¹⁶ Therefore, Morocco has been highly criticized to police the borders of Europe in its regional neighbourhood; the African Muslim states accused Morocco of killing its own Muslim brothers and it is also perceived as the watchdog of the EU.

⁴¹⁰ The European Commission, WMDR.

⁴¹¹ Joris Schapendonk, "Stuck between the Desert and the Sea: The Immobility of Sub-Saharan African 'Transit Migrants' in Morocco", **Rethinking Global Migration: Practices, Policies and Discourses in the European Neighborhood**, (Eds. Helga Rittersberger, Aykan Erdemir, Ayca Ergun, & Hayriye Kahveci), Zeplin Iletisim Hizmetleri Ltd, Cankaya, 2008, pp. 129–143.

⁴¹² Haas, MMT, p. 33

⁴¹³ Lahlou, TRAFFICKING, p. 10.

⁴¹⁴ Yıldız, p. 82.

⁴¹⁵ Hein de Haas, "The Myth of Invasion: Irregular Migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union", IMI Research Report, **International Migration Institute: James Martin 21st Century School, University of Oxford**, 2007, pp. 1-64, (MOI).

⁴¹⁶ Lahlou, TRAFFICKING, p. 12

3.6. MOROCCO' POLICIES ON IRREGULAR MIGRATION

It is estimated that between three to five million Moroccan resides in Europe making it one of the largest emigrant populations in Europe. Morocco has also become a major transit state for the irregular migration to the EU.⁴¹⁷ Morocco's foreign and domestic policies are intertwined and dependent on migration. When it comes to migration policy, Morocco's immigration policy is primarily a matter of security, as the country is not only a transit country, but also a de facto destination. Morocco's geographical location, an African frontline near Europe, is crucial for its use as transit country making it as one of the most significant country in the world with respect to migratory flows.⁴¹⁸ Spain is just at 14 km distance from Morocco making it attractive to African immigrants to pass to the Schengen area. Further, the Ceuta and Melilla, the Spanish enclaves, on the North African coast are circled by Morocco that roughly represents the Europe in Africa.⁴¹⁹ However, in the noise for the EU migration policy it is often forgotten that Morocco is also the attractive state for its own sake by the North and sub-Saharan African citizens. The attraction of Morocco as the destination state for immigrants lies in its geographical location, French colonial history, alterations in the economic and political macro level context in the region. Hence, the migration experience to Morocco lies in both the external and internal fields. Due to the dramatic rise in the number of undocumented migrants in Europe in the 1990s, Spain put pressure on Morocco to restrict the movement of its own residents as well as those of other countries who attempted to enter Europe through Morocco.

While border security in Morocco has been a concern for decades, it was not until the 2000s that a coherent strategy emerged. The Moroccan Ministry of the Interior implemented a border monitoring program in 2002 with the goals of improving border security, halting illegal migration, and eliminating trafficking organizations. In 2003, the parliament of Morocco adopted law 02-03. The law was broadly passed on 'Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Morocco, Irregular Emigration and Immigration'. This law provided the governing rules for all types of migration. The law also provided conditions to regulate irregular migration by defining penalties and expulsion for the

⁴¹⁷ The Eurostat, "Citizenship Granted to 827000 People in 2021", The Official Website of the European Union", 01.03.2023, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20230301-1?language=fr>, (05.04.2023).

⁴¹⁸ Michael Collyer, Myriem Cherti, Thomas Lacroix, Anja V. Heelsum, "Migration and Development: The Euro-Moroccan Experience", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 10, 2009, pp. 1555–1570.

⁴¹⁹ Haas, MME, p. 51.

people found involved in facilitating the irregular exit or entry from the country. Overall, the purpose of this new migration legislation was to criminalize irregular emigration and immigration, as well as the facilitation of these illegal activities, by imposing new penalties such as fines and detention on traffickers and irregular migrants. Morocco has not taken any legal steps toward declaring irregular migration to be a terrorist act or for the detention of illegal migrants in the framework of terrorism. However, the events in Ceuta and Melilla have shown the consequences of the law based border repression in this decade. For instance, during 2005, at least 11 people died from the group of people who were attempting to cross the fences dividing Morocco from Spain.⁴²⁰ Moreover, Moroccan authorities also conducted raids to locate the irregular migrants in the forests surrounding the border areas and forcibly displaced many people found there to the desert between Morocco and Algeria. They made no exceptions in these raids; they did the same to the people indicated in the categories identified under protection by law 02-03. For this critical application of the law, this law has faced the criticism from the scholars. Haas⁴²¹ accused this law has turned Morocco into the Europe's policeman.

Later, some major changes in law through Law No. 02/2003 on the entry and stay of foreigners went into effect on November 2003, making irregular immigration and emigration illegal. The institutional framework was also developed to deal with the migration. There was extension in the retention of foreign nationals stay awaiting for deportation to the origin country or the readmission to the transit country by 25 days from the 10 days. The law applied in 2003 has granted the right to appeal in the court to the asylum seekers before the implementation of deportation of asylum seekers and the refugees. However, in practice the state of Morocco considered all the immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa as the economic migrants using Morocco as the transit, for their way to Europe. Therefore, the asylum seekers were rejected at the border most of the time or deported later as illegal economic migrants. Morocco is a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention and has developed the formal system for the evaluation of applications of asylum seekers, but this system was hardly functional. As a result, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) kept Morocco as a low profile country in which the asylum seekers and refugees were

⁴²⁰ Blanchard Emmanuel, Anne Sophie-Wender, Aminata Traore, Helene Flautre, **Guerre aux Migrants : Le Livre Noir de Ceuta et Melilla**, Migreurop, 2007, pp. 7-103.

⁴²¹ Hein de Haas, "Morocco: Setting the Stage for Becoming a Migration Transition Country?", **Migration Policy Institute**, 19.03.2014, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/morocco-setting-stage-becoming-migration-transition-country>, (05.06.2022), (SSBMTC).

not granted protection.⁴²² The EU, in the hope to externalize the border controls, seek help of the neighbouring countries including Morocco to deport the refugees and asylum seekers from Africa, but there is no guarantee of their protection over there.⁴²³ Later, in 2007, the UNHCR signed an accord with Morocco which granted the organization full representation in Morocco. It was with the hope of increasing the rights provided to the refugees and asylum seekers on the grounds of Morocco. During the assessment, in 2007 the UNHCR reported that 786 refugees were residing in Morocco and 671 people were asylum seekers with their cases pending at UNHCR. However, the state of Morocco did not provide residency status to the refugee. In April 2011, Morocco acceded to the additional protocol to the UN Convention against transnational, organised crimes, with primary goal to punish, suppress and prevent the human trafficking. In short, human trafficking of migrants was made illegal and punishments were defined to control such practices. Despite the statements in law, the events reporting the disappearance or death of migrants kept happening, with no regular pattern, in the first two decades of 2000s, with an alarming escalation during 2012⁴²⁴ and rising again in 2018.⁴²⁵

On 10 September 2013, then king of Morocco Mohamed VI held an important meeting with human rights representatives for initiating a new “migration and asylum policy”. Its purpose was to provide policy reforms for foreign residents living in Morocco and illegal migrants. As a result of this policy announcement, Morocco has taken a more human rights-oriented approach to dealing with irregular immigrants, the vast majority of whom are people from sub-Saharan Africa, specifically Senegal, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea, as well as refugees from Syria and Libya. There were three main components to the new migration policy. To begin, in 2014, an unusual regularization process was implemented for immigrants. The second major law was about extending power of the UNHCR in the territory of Morocco to provide the right of asylum to a large number of asylum seekers. The third part of new laws agreed to give better integration opportunities to migrants and asylum-seekers into the society of Morocco, this was also accompanied by increasing focus upon the fight against human traffickers and trafficking.

⁴²² Channe Lindstrom, “Report on the Situation of Refugees in Morocco: Findings of an Exploratory Study”, **Forced Migration and Refugee Studies, American University of Cairo**, Cairo, 2014, pp. 3-19.

⁴²³ De Haas, SSBMTC.

⁴²⁴ Conseil des Migrants Sub-Sahariens du Maroc, **Recrudescence de La Répression Envers Les Migrants Au Maroc Une Violence Qu'on Croyait Révolu**, CMSM and GADEM, Rabat, 2012, pp. 1-21.

⁴²⁵ Maccanico, p. 14.

Till the end of 2014, the implementation of the first phase of exceptional regularization had achieved 17,916 validated requests out of a total of 27,332 requests. The first phase was followed by the second phase that involved approximately 24,000 irregular migrants during 2016 and 2017. However, the UNHCR acknowledged relatively few refugees in terms of asylum in Morocco. According to the UNHCR, Morocco had only 853 UNHCR-recognized refugees, while the cases of 2,178 asylum seekers were pending during that time.⁴²⁶ The Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Migration has developed a National Strategy of Immigration and Asylum to help achieve the other two aims of the new effort. With this policy, the Government Council hopes to better regulate migration flows and facilitate the social integration of newcomers within a framework that is comprehensive, humane, and responsible. It was enacted in December 2014.⁴²⁷ The strategic vision, developed through this council, possessed three major goals. The first objective was providing to facilitation for the integration of the newly regularized immigrants. The second goal was establishing a regulation and institutional framework for migration. The last objective of the strategy was managing migration flows in such a way that the human rights of migrants can be maintained. This new policy prioritizes the rights of migrants in which at first the protection of migrants from the several kinds of trafficking is ensured, those types of trafficking to which migrants can be vulnerable. However, the implementation of this policy on grassroots remained limited to the few migrants while the others might still fall as a victim of trafficking.⁴²⁸ Lahlou conducted a research upon the implementation of these policies by going, in the field, to the migrants of Morocco. The people from Rabat and in Dakhla reported, in the interviews conducted that domestic migration within Morocco has become relatively easy since 2014 in southern part. Contrary to that, the southern part faced massive attacks on or near the security fences, and migration became possible only by taking the help of national communities, around Melilla and Ceuta, as happened during the summer of 2018. This lead to the custom of traffickers for obtaining support in the illegal border crossings by Moroccans who are willing to migrate as irregular migrants, specifically to migrate towards Libya and beyond. The traffickers could be Morocco national citizens, acting independently or could also belong to some criminal organizations

⁴²⁶ Human Rights Watch-HRW, **Abused and Expelled. III-Treatment of Sub-Saharan African Migrants in Morocco**, HRW, New York, 2014, pp. 18-67.

⁴²⁷ The Kingdom of Morocco Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Living Abroad, **Stratégie Nationale d'Immigration et d'Asile**, Royaume Du Maroc Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Rabat, 2014, p. 2-12.

⁴²⁸ Lahlou, **TRAFFICKING**, p. 23.

comprising Moroccans, Nigerians or Côte d'Ivoire migrants. In the fight against the irregular migration, a Moroccan official reported that the border security services in Morocco had failed and more than 54,000 irregular immigration attempts were made in 2018. The authorities however, destroyed 74 criminal networks that were actively involved in human trafficking and irregular immigration and further seized 1,900 boats.

429

Such announcements, initially put an end to the violence of state against migrants within the cities of Morocco, but the situation on the border areas did not change through such reforms. Six years later, approximately 50,000 migrants received legal papers as part of these two regularisation campaigns. However, the parliament adopted only the law on human trafficking. Further, migrants and refugees in Morocco mostly continued to be assisted by charities of donors and related international organisations (including the IOM and the UNHCR). Adopting this new policy, nearly eighteen thousand migrants were regularized, the asylum rights were promoted under the UNHCR perspectives by adopting 'National Strategy on Immigration and Asylum' in 2014 for improving the integration of migrants and asylum seekers. This policy did the announcement of a regularisation campaign (another such campaign followed in 2016). Despite the advance status in the ENP framework, Morocco did not make the progress in legislating and management system for asylum seekers. Although the cooperation between UNHCR and Morocco enhanced, Morocco did not recognize the refugee as indicated by the UNHCR. Further, in the summer of 2018, a massive crackdown was carried in the urban centres against migrants by the Moroccan police.⁴³⁰ This lacking legislation hinder the asylum seekers social access and rights for the labour markets. It could only emphasize that Morocco' asylum policy has slightly turned through the EU influence.

The IOM in this regard, highlighted some very important aspects of migration policy of Morocco. The report underlined that the country offers a relatively favourable framework to migrants for acquiring resident permits over a longer period of time. Its laws specify that the foreign residents need to renew permits yearly for the first three years, after three years, the foreigners can opt the ten-year permit.⁴³¹ Further, the laws pointed out that if the stay of foreigners in Morocco has been regularized then

⁴²⁹ Agence Marocaine de Presse-MAP, "Immigration Clandestine : Le Maroc Refuse de Jouer au Gendarme", *Le Matin*, 07.09.2018, <https://lematin.ma/express/2018/el-khalfi-maroc-refuse-jouer-gendarme/300240.html>, (12.03.2022), (MRJG).

⁴³⁰ Maccanico, p. 17.

⁴³¹ Global Migration Data Analysis Center, **Migration Governance Profile: Kingdom of Morocco**, Migration Data Profile-IOM, Berlin, 2017, pp. 1-6.

after one year the duration of resident permit could be extended to three years, this would remain valid unless the permit holder has not involved in any punishable offence. In addition, after spending five years in Morocco, the foreigners could also apply for citizenship, provided that they possess good health, can speak in Arabic and can ensure their economic holdings or ability to have sufficient means of sustenance. Moreover, the draft has also been presented to the parliament to amend the law in favour of naturalizing the marriage of Moroccan women to the foreign men. The right to education has been provided to the migrants by giving them access to government primary, secondary and post-secondary institutions. Moreover, migrants who are holding a resident permit enjoy similar status as the Moroccan citizens. The ministerial circular, since 2013, has authorized every migrant child, irrespective of his administrative situation, to enrol in Moroccan national education system. Further, Morocco also welcomes international students. The country does not limit the international students through any quota, and approximately contained 20,121 students (from 108 countries) in 2016–2017. Moreover, the international students from many sub-Saharan Africa are provided with scholarships financed by the Government of Morocco. These sub-Saharan students comprise 54 percent of residents living in university dormitories.

The IOM further highlighted that in Morocco the migrant workers have been granted access to public jobs in regulated occupations similar to Moroccans, the restriction lies in sensitive official authorities for safeguarding the state interests. In addition, regularized migrants have no need to acquire the work certificate through the National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Skills (ANAPEC in French) to obtain the work, since 2014. Moreover, the “Taechir” platform has been introduced in 2017 to provide assistance in the process of getting work visas. In the perspective of civic participation, by the Law No. 57-11 Articles 40 and 41 and the Constitution of Morocco’s Article 30, allow migrants to participate in the electorates that are legally established in municipal elections in Morocco. Although the Section 17 of the 2011 Constitution ensures that Moroccan diaspora is entitled to both vote and contest the elections, the practical and logistical problems denied the right of participation of Moroccan diaspora in the 2016 elections. Morocco is an active member of the discussion about migratory issues at international level, it has also co-chaired, with Germany, the Global Forum on Migration and Development for the period 2017–2018. The country is also a member of IOM. Further, Morocco launched a platform in 2006, named the Rabat Process, which brings nearly sixty European and African partner

countries to increase the political cooperation regarding migration policies and routes between the countries. Morocco is playing a prominent part in deriving regional migration governance as it is concerned with migration issues of the AU and has engaged in negotiations, consultations and discussions on migration with the EU. Further, the country is signatory of a joint declaration with the EU by which the country is attempting to manage regular migration and fight the irregular migration from its borders.

3.7. FACTORS BEHIND IRREGULAR MIGRATION FROM MOROCCO TO THE EU

In present context, irregular migration is equivalent to risking one's life in a fading hope of crossing alive the border of the EU without documents, when Spanish naval boats, according to reports, often circle the drowning migrants and refuse to provide aid to them, it is their desire to avoid dealing with the issues at hand.⁴³² The evidence of these drowning migrants is reflected in the fact that 3,285 dead bodies were retrieved to the shores of the Straits of Gibraltar between 1997 to 2001.⁴³³ Migration attempts are there throughout the history of Morocco. Since 1956, after getting the independence from France, Moroccan migration has shaped largely by movements of labour migrants and students. Migration intrinsically influences the development of countries and help in improving the livelihoods of the migrants along with their families. The reasons for migration are both country and individual level.

In terms of the emigration policy, since 1968, Morocco has been the only country with a consistent policy of encouraging emigration to manage unemployment levels. Morocco maintained its policy of encouraging emigration, even after the 1974 oil crisis and the closing of European labour markets to immigration. Despite the opposition of this integration, Morocco kept receiving a large amount of remittances from its Moroccan diaspora.⁴³⁴ This led to an increase in the number of Moroccans to Europe given most of the Moroccans did not return. The number of Moroccans which were 400000 by 1970 rose to a massive 1.6 million by 1996 and the influx continued

⁴³² Alexandra Djaha, "Motivations to Migrate: Migration from Morocco and the 'Failure' of Rural Development During the Eurozone Financial Crisis", **Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection**, 2013, p. 4-24.

⁴³³ Liza Schuster, "The Realities of a New Asylum Paradigm", **Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford**, Working Paper, No. 20, 2005, pp. 1-21.

⁴³⁴ Philippe Fargues, "Arab Migration to Europe: Trends and Policies", **International Migration Review**, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2004, pp. 1348-1371, (AME).

to Europe due to better opportunities and encouraging government policies. Many Moroccans were given the European nationalities despite the opposition of the Moroccan state. The numbers however continued and by 2004, a massive 10% of the Moroccan population (3 millions) was living abroad with majority in Europe.⁴³⁵ The government of Morocco launched an investment aid programme in 2009 to provide subsidies for establishing projects by Moroccans living abroad. Remittances received by the country also toned the attitude of the country towards its migration policy. Morocco is a signatory of legal bilateral agreements for various labour contracts with Germany, Netherlands and Belgium in 1960s; with France, Qatar, Jordan, Libya and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1980s and with Italy, Netherlands, and Spain after 2000. In addition, Morocco with the assistance of IOM, published a handbook for guidelines of foreign wage-earners about recruitment, integration and cultural diversity along with corporate practices in Morocco. Further, the government conducted awareness sessions regarding labour inspectors, to ensure the ethical recruitment of foreign migrants in Morocco. National development strategy considers emigration as an important part and actively encourages international out-migration for both political and economic reasons. The political reasons include decrease in the existing political tensions which is often misused as a tool specifically for the Berber areas working rebelliously towards the central state. Promotion of migration from these areas assist the Moroccan government to maintain these people' loyalty to the authority of the state through presenting such opportunities as essential for the economic development of the Berber community. Further, it facilitates the transfer of remittances, promote bilateral agreements to increase economic emigration, and support action plans for the socioeconomic, cultural, and political integration of Moroccans abroad. From 2010 to 2014, remittances to the country totalled 7.3 billion dollars, with an average annual impact on GDP of 8.7 percent.⁴³⁶ Such remittances have proven to be a significant impact on reducing poverty by acting as a migration–development nexus. As a result, the Moroccan government is always on the lookout for ways to better manage remittances and prevent them from declining. Persuading this policy, the Moroccan government sent over eighty-six thousand emigrants in 2009 to 2010.⁴³⁷ In addition to these initiatives, the government strived to change the

⁴³⁵ Fatima Sadiqi, "Morocco: The Political and Social Dimension of Migration", **CARIM: Mediterranean Migration Report**, 2007, p. 177-192.

⁴³⁶ Olga Marzovilla, Marco Mele, "Remittances, Economic Growth, Exchange Rate Regime: The Case of Morocco", **European Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Sciences**, Issue 71, 2015, pp. 106–123.

⁴³⁷ Bel-Air, p. 13.

mentality of the people towards the migration, to promote it further, by rephrasing the term 'Moroccan labour abroad' by 'Moroccan residents abroad'.⁴³⁸ It is because of perusing such policies, the remittances received by Morocco as percentage of the GDP remained highest from 2005 to 2010 (Between 8.3 - 8.5 %) and the figure for 2020 is 6.5% which is very significant number.⁴³⁹

The country level reasons for migration include demographic shifts. These shifts clearly play a role in the socioeconomic pressures that drive people to migrate. With regards to the concerns about population growth and density, Afolayan discuss economic vulnerability, debt, social and cultural issues as well as natural disasters and the internet's role in nurturing community and migrations. On the other hand, neither migration nor socioeconomic growth is simple or one-way affairs. Low-income countries have a lower emigration rate than high-income countries because of their large income disparities. There are many background reasons for migration. Government policies on migration management are also geared toward supporting successful Moroccan migration, as the flow of hard currency from remittances represents the second largest source of hard currency after tourism for the Moroccan economy.⁴⁴⁰

Further, there are four major causes of migration from Morocco taking shape of the long term patterns. The first cause is the colonial history of the country, where the strong migratory networks exist in it that have made Morocco observe a large scale migration from its borders to the borders of the Western Europe. The second cause was the demographic transition, declining population in the 1970s and 1980s in Morocco, but an increase in the labour force, the population of the working age, which resulted in high unemployment. This labour force seeks the work abroad through migration; a net emigration of 86,000 Moroccans. A country's socioeconomic conditions and population's age distribution are still a breeding ground for unrest and further migration.⁴⁴¹ The third reason for migration is the political and economic trends, at both external and internal level. The root factors in this migration increase included rising demand for unskilled labour in the European market in the 1960s, the differences in the opportunities available both economic and social in Europe and

⁴³⁸ Collyer, p. 615.

⁴³⁹ The World Bank, "Personal Remittances, received (% of GDP) – Morocco", **The World Bank Group**, 2021, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=MA>, (02.07.2022), (PRRM).

⁴⁴⁰ Adejumo A. Afolayan, "Issues and Challenges of Emigration Dynamics in Developing Countries", **International Migration**, Vol. 39, No. 4, 200, pp. 5-38.

⁴⁴¹ Switzerland: State Secretariat for Migration, p. 3.

Morocco and the emigration supporting policies of the Moroccan government to lower the economic and political crisis. The fourth cause indicated by de Haas was the development of policies of Europe for migration between Morocco and the Europe: Schengen visa regulations, measures by ANEAS border control, FRONTEX operations, development in the ENP and the EU return policy.⁴⁴²

Moreover, the transit migration through Morocco to Europe is basically attempted by the resident of sub-Saharan African countries. There are several factors fuelling such irregular migration. The foremost reason is the Pan-African anti-immigration policies adopted by Libya which was a major destination country for the migrants of the sub-Saharan Africa. These policies converted this previous destination hostile, even life threatening situation, for living of African migrants; therefore, the irregular migrants then went to Maghreb countries. Hence, the sub-Saharan African asylum seekers increased, to save their lives from persecution, those want to go to Europe using the ground of Morocco as the transit country. The ones unsuccessful in entering Europe chose to live in Morocco by taking it as a better choice than returning to their country of origin. Another reason for a large scale irregular migration remained the result of civil war and political turmoil that affected many West African countries. The rising political instability, unrest, conflicts and civil wars were the primary reasons for which the sub-Saharan African people seek refuge through migration to get the better opportunities to spend their lives. As a result, the refugees, asylum seekers and the irregular migrants from sub-Saharan Africa continuously used Morocco as the transit country to reach Europe.

Further reason for massive migration, at the country level, is the relative deprivation. The regions of sub-Saharan Africa are not developed as compared to the EU countries and Morocco. It made the EU and Morocco stable and wealthy states for the people of sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the irregular migrants towards these states wanted to enjoy the living standards of the people of these developed regions. For example, the GDP per capita (purchasing power parity) of Morocco was 3.7 times higher than that of Mali and 2.5 times greater than that of Senegal. The legal migration is difficult to peruse for the unskilled workers and its process needs the assistance and finance that may not be available to the people. The other way of irregular migration then becomes a motivation for reaching the destination country. The EU border is fenced and the transit sometimes result in deaths, as the people who were caught in the process and raids were deported and left at their own fate, the sub-

⁴⁴² Collyer et al., p. 1561.

Saharan African migrants who choose Morocco as their final destination were far more than those who used Morocco as the transit country to reach the Europe. Morocco is pivotal for sub-Saharan African emigrants and irregular migrants for their study and work, sometimes they seek to settle permanently in Morocco. The relative deprivation, among the countries, which is causing the irregular migration has been carved by the policies of the ENP. Europe is paying more attention to its own development and the development of its borders through controlling the irregular immigrants as the conditionality against the financial aid programs. The EU neighbouring countries like Morocco are willing to opt the financial aid and development programs and therefore the border control are rising. However, the sub-Saharan African nations are still facing the economic downturns, political instability and massive poverty. In this case, the sub-Saharan African people like to live as the irregular migrants in European region or its neighbourhood developed under several economic programs like Morocco.

Moreover, the global economic downturns have also provided reasons for irregular migration among countries. The global crisis of 2008 was hard hitting to African countries and Morocco. The economic downturns, in these countries, have been translated to the political instability. For instance, 1973 Oil Crisis started the period of economic stagnation accompanied by the restructuring that ultimately resulted in the lower demand for unskilled workers and rising unemployment, making it an economic downturn. It created the unemployment in both the skilled and unskilled labour force in Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa. The existing migratory destinations for the African countries like Côte d'Ivoire were facing the economic downturns. On the other hand, there was large demand of unskilled workers in Europe, specifically in the informal sector of Italy and southern European countries. To grab these employment opportunities, Moroccan low-skilled workers started the irregular migration to the EU countries. Similarly, Europe provided better employment opportunities than the sub-Saharan African countries could attain, because of their tattered economic situation in these countries, famine, and economic downturns, the sub-Saharan African tried to enter illegally into the EU countries.

Similar to economic downturns, the economic growth also leads to increased migration. For instance, the world observed the economic growth in the era of 1990s. This growth caused an increase in the demand for unskilled workers, in industry, agriculture and services sector, in the EU countries which resulted in large scale irregular migration. That economic growth period was important in diversifying the

migrants from Morocco. The highly skilled Moroccan who were unemployed, turned to seek migration in the US and Canada. The similar trend of emigration still persists among the Moroccan population.

Focusing on the individual reasons for migration, there are four major groups of Moroccan migrant. First, there are those who make a conscious decision to travel to Morocco because they believe it to be a "safe haven". The second group sees Morocco as a sub-station on the way to Europe, as well as a place with better economic prospects than the rest of North Africa. Instead of their intended destination of Europe, the third group of migrants end up in Morocco because smugglers misled them into believing that they would be taken to Europe. Rather than return to their poor, unstable, or deadly home countries, irregular migrants who were denied entry to Europe settled in Morocco as a "second best" alternative. The EU's rigorous border restrictions and immigration rules are likely also contributing factors in this group's decision to leave for Morocco.⁴⁴³

The individual reasons for irregular migration can be classified into economic and non-economic factors.⁴⁴⁴ These factors basically become the motivation behind the irregular migration from Morocco to the EU. The major economic factors leading to migration includes attraction of high wages, easy availability of work, higher living standards, desire to have money, escape from poverty, providing for family needs and lack of job opportunities in Morocco. The work for wages is basically the inherent idea that the people migrate to the EU for earning their family livelihood. They do this because the wages in Europe are far better than the wages in Morocco. Moreover, the job market of Morocco is limited as compared to the EU market. It is easier to find the work in the EU countries, though in informal sector. These people usually migrate towards the EU countries and work there for some months and collect the money, then they return with their saved wages and spend some months in their home in Morocco. Afterwards, when their savings reaches a certain minimum they again travel towards the EU. Such movements of irregular migrants form the circular pattern, which are termed as the 'long term project' for improving livelihood of Moroccan.⁴⁴⁵ The irregular migrants strive for the better standards of living as enjoyed by the residents of the EU countries. The urge for earning money derives the people to move illegally across the borders. The better earning opportunities help the people to move

⁴⁴³ De Haas, MME, p. 51.

⁴⁴⁴ Djaha, p. 26.

⁴⁴⁵ Flore Gubert, Christophe J. Nordman, "Return Migration and Small Enterprise Development in the Maghreb", **Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: European University Institute**, Technical Report, MIREM-AR, 2008, pp. 3-23.

out from poverty. Further, the lack of employment opportunities in Morocco forced the people to choose between the ruthless effort to find work within the country or taking risk of crossing border illegally, to which the irregular migrants mostly preferred. This choice is even more difficult for the bread earners of the families. These people have to earn for fulfilling the needs of their children and run the house.

The non-economic motivations leading to migration from Morocco to the EU include the appealing qualities of the host country and the status gained after returning to the home country. One of these aspects is the nature of living in the EU countries, the people observe freedom there. The people living in the EU territories enjoy the freedom of speech and working upon which nobody questions such freedom. Similar sort of freedom is lacking in Morocco. In addition, the social norms play a pivotal role in leading the irregular migration. The social pressure and expectations may lead to migration of young Moroccans. It is because, the people who have attempted the irregular migration successfully earn the respect in society, and often called as the hero. They are considered the successful man in providing for their families and their story provides courage to the new migrants.⁴⁴⁶ Further, the women also prefer the migrant husband over the villager husband of Morocco, for their money holdings.⁴⁴⁷ Moreover, during the interviews conducted from the women, none of the women mentioned their missing sons or husbands, they just mentioned the money sending to home and successes they got in abroad. This social structure indicates the high prestige to the irregular migrants which promotes the irregular migration.

Belonging from the same social structure, the young students idealise the successful migrants who returned from Europe, regardless of the goal of education or employment. They are attracted to Europe. These students from Morocco wait to go abroad, because in their neighbourhoods they see students leave their studies to join irregular migration towards Europe for 3-4 years and later return with massive money to Morocco. The students completing their education would also want to move to the EU countries to earn and come back as the successful man. It made the education in Morocco less attractive for the students, as the ultimate fact remained that they have to earn from Europe. The students attempted to opt studying opportunities in Europe and wanted to prolong their stay in Europe. This attraction in Europe cause brain drain and hindered the way of modernity and development in Morocco. According to CSP⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁶ Djaha, p. 14.

⁴⁴⁷ Djaha, p. 22.

⁴⁴⁸ Commission Supérieure de la Population (CSP), **Rapport National sur la Politique de la Population et la Jeunesse 2004, Genre et Configuration de la Société Marocaine**, Eds. Rahma Bourqia, Centre Jacques Berque, 2004, pp. 293-314.

lack of opportunities and required incentives cause the brain drain from Morocco. In addition, the people of Morocco favour democracy and take it as the true symbol of modernity and freedom and this concept in search of freedom leads to the irregular migration.⁴⁴⁹ Further, the non-economic aspirations to live under democracy are closely related with economic opportunities, as the so called idea is that democracy provides prosperity in most of the cases.⁴⁵⁰ This non-economic reason for migration is closely related to the economic reason for migration. The irregular migration might slow down if the earning opportunities in Morocco would increase. However, it cannot stop people in attempting illegal migration as they have many more incentives and ideas beyond earnings. Therefore, it can be concluded that the economic and non-economic reasons for migration would persist in the near future, unless all the factors leading to migration are not observed, minimised or completely eliminated.

3.8. EVALUATION OF THE CHAPTER

Issues related to European colonization and related postcolonial patterns of domination reflect on the migration flows from Morocco to the EU and the EU' and member states adopted policies for migration management. Migration from Morocco toward the EU has developed based on colonial policies of France and Spain and their policies to meet army or labour needs. Spain' colonization of the Moroccan Rif and Western Sahara had sparked migration movement from the regions toward Spain. Also, France's domination over central Morocco has been accompanied by France's introduction of French into Moroccan educational system and administration to meet France' labour needs. Today, the issues related to the Rif region and Western Sahara persist and have considerable effects on Morocco' national integration, development and migration flows.

The Rif region issues remain the major factor behind irregular migration toward the Union from Morocco. The Western Sahara conflict resulting from the Spanish colonization also costs considerable financial and state efforts for Morocco delaying the equal development of Moroccan regions. French language domination over the job market and the educational system as well as French' companies' dominance over the Moroccan market in the form of an indirect colonization is one of the main factors behind the unemployment and socioeconomic integration issues related to the youth.

⁴⁴⁹ Djaha, p. 20.

⁴⁵⁰ Djaha, p. 22.

Migration policy, designed based on the contexts and preferences of the EU and Western Mediterranean states not only ignores these issues behind migration from Morocco but also primarily positions Morocco as a border policeman for the EU security in relation to transit migrants. The EU policy choices on the issue of migration toward Morocco maintain Morocco's position as a post-colony rather than an equal partner. Morocco is targeted by the EU' policy as a buffer zone and a border policeman with disregard for Morocco's own security interests and context needs. The securitization of the migration issue by the EU results into policies characterized by postcolonial patterns of domination prioritizing the Union' security and needs over the peace and development of Morocco as well as mutual peace and security.

Thanks to Morocco' advanced cooperation and strong will for building consensus on the issue as an ENP countries, an attitude that has not been shown by other African countries, the EU and Morocco have been able to successfully converge policy on migration management. The EU approach, however, remains oriented toward securitization, outsourcing and on its own interests. Policies such as the Readmission accords, the more for more approach, conditionality characterizing mobility partnership requiring the commitment to the border control in exchange for legal migration remain contentious issues between Morocco and the EU. The EU' policy approaches based on the frontier approach has had several consequences on Morocco's own peace and security. Besides increasing the pressure on Morocco, the EU' approach has resulted into making the EU-Morocco border a site for violence, security crises, trafficking activities and humanitarian issues. This approach, neglecting Morocco's own postcolonial development issues has created further burdens for the already limited socioeconomic infrastructure of Morocco unable to integrate own youth. This approach has also created issues for Morocco's African strategy objectives and national integrity by positing Morocco at the front of negotiating contentious returns with sub-Saharan African countries which have shown unwillingness to cooperate or negotiate with the EU returns of own citizens. Besides all, this approach ignores Morocco's own domestic issues in relation to the youth considering that it remains itself an important source of irregular migration. The burdens attached to transit migration, as considered by transit countries, overwhelm the grants and financial supports offered by the EU for border control. The demographic burden and attached issues have increased on Morocco as the EU and member states choose to outsource the migration control to Morocco. The EU's readmission policies and securitization are also considered to be too invasive of the

transit countries sovereignty rights. If anything, the EU' preferred policies based on a securitization of the migration issue have only resulted into making the EU-Morocco border a site for security and humanitarian crises and creating further burdens for Morocco's socioeconomic infrastructure to solve its own development and socioeconomic issues related to the youth. The peace and security of the EU is bound on that of its neighbourhood and mutual security can only be achieved through mutual consensus, understanding and effective cooperation based on principles of shared responsibility and equality.



CHAPTER FOUR

ASSESSMENT OF DATA AND ANALYSIS

Contemporary international relations are characterized by complexity and interdependence. This complexity reflects in the connectedness between issues of security, development and democracy. It is also reflected in the interdependence between the different structural levels; that is the global, regional and domestic. This complexity and connectedness mainly results from and is manifested through the movement of people which brings the outside in.

The EU under the EUGS has adopted political realism based on principled pragmatism to deal with regional challenges to the Union's peace and security namely Russia, irregular migration and terrorism. Pragmatism in the EU' foreign policy to dealing with irregular migration in the case study of Morocco is operationalized and analyzed as: securitization, externalization and de-politicization. Securitization is studied at the epistemological level, externalization is studied at the bilateral level of the cooperation with Morocco, and de-politicization is studied in relation to the EU' involvement in the domestic level of Morocco.

Against the political realism approach toward irregular migration adopted by the EU, this study adopts a post-structural approach through critical constructivism. Post-structuralism is adopted to both understand and explain the issue of irregular migration through a three level of analysis that is based on a triangular research methodology. Combining qualitative and quantitative research methods, the study is based on a qualitative study of the available literature on the migration issue to assess patterns of epistemological domination. The study involves a qualitative analysis of the EU policy on the issue by analyzing the EUGS primary documents as well as the EU programs and action plan in Morocco. This allows us to understand the effects of the epistemological patterns of domination around the migration issue on the EU policy making and its effectiveness in the ground. A qualitative study of the Moroccan local knowledge on the issue through a discourse analysis of the Moroccan political elite translated from French to English by the author. A quantitative/qualitative study of the Moroccan context in relation to issues related to migration to have a deeper understanding of the patterns of domination and the forms of resistance.

In line with critical constructivism approach, this study aims to understand the patterns of domination surrounding the issue of irregular migration at the epistemological, bilateral and domestic level.

It argues that the EU's approach empowers the forces of domination centered around colonialism, authoritarianism and related elitism. The concept of irregular migration has been examined using Foucault's deconstruction and Derrida's binary opposition method.

This in-depth understanding helps explain the issue of irregular migration which is defined as a form of resistance amongst others resulting from the patterns of domination. This study, then, provides an antithesis to the EU' approach arguing that the EU' policy choice based on horizontal and vertical patterns of domination, marginalizing the Moroccan population and Moroccan context needs and knowledge leads to the paradoxical effect of exacerbating the patterns of domination behind irregular migration and related unconventional security issues. In line with critical constructivism approach, this analysis is conducted through access to the local knowledge, local text and context.

The findings of this study support the hypothesis that the EU approach to tackling migration under the EUGS through principled pragmatism and political realism based on: securitization, externalization and de-politicization of the EU' intervention in domestic democratic processes is counterproductive to the long term peace and security aspirations. Considering that this analysis is based on a three level of analysis, a triangular methodological approach, this chapter of data analysis and assessment is longer than the previous ones.

Adopting the conceptual frameworks of James C. Scott "resistance and domination" and "everyday life", as well as Robert Putnam' concepts of state society relations based on "deference or cooperation", this study defines irregular migration as a form of resistance to patterns of domination. This form of resistance through 'exit' of borders and breach of sovereign borders of the EU defined as 'high range resistance' comes after low and middle range forms of resistance studied through the analysis of the everyday life forms of societal deference in Morocco. The low and middle range forms of resistance to the political and economic domestic patterns of domination faced by oppression through the use of force, security apparatus leads to the resistance through 'exit' of borders as a result of loss of hope from the ability to make a change. Epistemological patterns of domination solely studying the migration issue from the Western/European perspective and the security perspective informs the EU policy making that consolidate the domestic patterns of domination through de-politicization of the EU domestic intervention as well as externalization and securitization of the migration management at the bilateral level.

This study argues, based on the collected data and analysis that the EU's approach to dealing with irregular migration as a security issue and to addressing its root causes in the case of Morocco serves to exacerbate the dominance patterns exacerbating the rise of youth irregular migration as a form of resistance.

The neglect of the Moroccan context and needs by the externalization policy which results from the securitization of the issue leads to the continuity of colonial patterns of domination in the relations between Morocco and the EU and member states characterized by notions of inferiority and superiority and the dominance of Eurocentric stereotypes on African migration reflecting it as a crisis and an invasion. Delegating Morocco the role of border policeman and a buffer zone for the EU transit migrants, this approach has been ineffective in solving the migration issue. In fact, it has had the paradoxical effect of creating further security crises and issues such as trafficking activities and humanitarian issues. This approach also ignores Morocco's own postcolonial development issues behind the migration issue such as issues related to the Rif region, Western Sahara and Morocco's limited socioeconomic infrastructure and youth bulge unemployment.

At the domestic level, this pattern is further strengthened by the EUGS' removing the political element from its interference and the adoption of the bottom-up strategy with an emphasis on civil society and local actors for change with a shift from normative power to relational power based on societal relations. Without a constructive political change and reform, the EU's support and interference remain of a limited nature, as evidenced by the case of Morocco. In fact, the Moroccan case study shows that the EU' approach leads to the paradoxical effect of increasing the patterns of domination behind irregular migration. The domestic level analysis focuses on three main concepts mainly domination, state-society relations and resistance. Domination is studied through oligarchy, clientalism, informal/deep state, informal institution of corruption, centralization of power/consolidation of authoritarianism, co-optation and convergence of political and economic elite, co-optation of political parties and civil actors. State society relations are studied through indicators such as political participation, level of trust and engagement in political parties and civil society. Resistance is studied through everyday life practices directed against the status quo that consist of informal politics, informal economy, irregular migration and radicalization.

Based on the analysis of the Moroccan everyday life in the post-Arab spring, this study argues for the centrality of the political variable to dealing away with

everyday life consequences of patterns of domination ranging from inequality, informal economy and informal politics, to informal state and institution (the Makhzen and corruption), irregular migration and radicalization. By so doing, this study presents an antithesis to the EU' pragmatic approach based on relational power and bottom up approach for sustainable security designed under the framework of the EUGS.

Having adopted as its central analytical variable the nature of the political power in Morocco that is based on oligarchic rule composed of the monarchy, the political and economic elite sustained through the use of coercive power, neoliberalism and domination of the judiciary, this study argues for the EU' organizational power with reference to Levitsky and Way.⁴⁵¹

In this study, the concept of organizational power is used to refer to the economic, normative and relational power of the EU. While a regime change has been eliminated from the EUGS' list of objectives considering the post-Arab spring state failure challenges, the EU' geopolitical approach toward the region based on political realism and pragmatism would not serve its objective of state-societal resilience. Considering the favorable relational power between the EU and Moroccan local actors, the EU high soft power on the Moroccan youth and the Moroccan state's high stakes in the trade and strategic relations with the EU, the Moroccan context overall provides the EU with a favorable case for positive and successful influence to trigger the regime' change from a consolidated executive monarchy and oligarchic rule to a constitutional one. The EU is Morocco's major trade partner with which the country makes the most trade than the rest of the world. The EU-Morocco cooperation is the oldest and most advanced in the region and it has a high cooperation and issue linkage level as a result of the geopolitical, historical and economic relations. The important presence of the Moroccan diaspora in Europe is another important linkage. Applying an organizational power that combines the EU' economic power targeting a political influence on the regime while maintaining its capacity building and relational power on the local actors would bring about better results. In the current context, the EU is the only actor with the highest potential to influence peace and security in Morocco which is critical for that of Europe. This, however, would necessitate

⁴⁵¹ Levitsky and Way have used the concept of organizational power to measure coercive power of authoritarian regimes in the Maghreb region ranging from low to medium to high. In this study, the concept of organizational power is used to refer to the EU' economic, normative and relational power. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "Organizational Power and the Fate of Competitive Authoritarianism in Sub-Saharan Africa 1990-2010", **APSA 2010**, Annual Meeting Paper, 2010, p. 1-88.

overviewing the EU' securitization and externalization policy toward Morocco that is fed by the Western dominated epistemological approach to the migration issue.

This study focuses on the following actors: the EU, the Moroccan oligarchy composed of the monarchy, the political and economic elite, the population with a focus on the youth.

4.1. EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

The concept of irregular migration in the literature serves as an umbrella for several categories and types of irregular migration. These include refugees, asylum seekers, people being trafficked or smuggled in, people in search for survival due to political conflicts and wars, others migrating due to environmental issues or those coming from stable countries in search of better living standards than their own home countries.⁴⁵² In other words, as defined by William Peterson, irregular migration is divided into voluntary and involuntary migration with the latter being in a collective form and with seasonal flows resulting from conditions that range from wars, conflicts to famine. The impacts of irregular migration are also divided into macro-level that covers the political, economic and cultural levels, the medium or (Meso) level relations that include the collective and social bonds or relations and the micro level focusing on the individual freedoms and rights.⁴⁵³ Under the UN Human Trafficking Protocol (UNTP), the debate on distinguishing between those who are trying to access nation-state borders and those who have been subject to trafficking was started.⁴⁵⁴

A review of the relevant literature reveals that the topic of migration is mainly studied through the concepts of sovereignty, nation state, national and societal security. Migration by unauthorized means is considered to be a serious violation of the Westphalian treaty's principle of sovereignty. The unique right of nation-states to determine who may enter their territory and who may become citizen is regarded to be breached by irregular migrants, particularly in the case of Western countries. The presence of irregular migrants and the violation of boundaries are viewed as a violation of the state's territorial sovereignty as well as other forms of spaces⁴⁵⁵ such

⁴⁵² Peterson William, "A General Typology of Migration", **American Sociological Review**, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1958, pp. 256-266.

⁴⁵³ Yazan, p. 49-50.

⁴⁵⁴ Raimo Vayrynen, "Illegal Migration, Human Trafficking and Organized Crime", **World Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations University**, Working Paper, 2003, Vol. 72, pp. 3-5.

⁴⁵⁵ Khalid Koser, "Irregular Migration, State Security and Human Security", **Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM)**, 2005, pp. 2-28.

as belonging.⁴⁵⁶ Therefore, a nation-state that has lost control of its boundaries has also lost its national and territorial integrity and sovereignty. The sovereignty and security approach to the migration issue, however, is mainly focused on the priority interests of the western states which comes at the expense of the sovereignty and security interest of the countries of the South.

The epistemological patterns of domination explained at this level of analysis will lay the ground for understanding the relationship between power and knowledge production on the issue of migration, its effects on foreign policy making of the EU and its effectiveness in coping with the complex issue of migration. The epistemological analysis shows that the mainstream knowledge on the migration issue is dominated by a horizontal and a vertical asymmetry prioritizing the perspectives and needs of the Western/European actors over those of the South.

4.1.1. Epistemological Patterns of Domination

The concept of horizontal and vertical asymmetry is utilized to arrange the investigation of patterns of dominance at the epistemological and bilateral levels. Horizontal asymmetry examines the patterns of the dominance of 'realist'-based conceptions to the study of migration over "human" concerns pertaining to peace and development. This analysis focuses on the conceptual predominance of security over peace in the study of migration, i.e. the interests of nation-states over those of migrants. At the expense of peace, development, and human rights, national security, social security, and sovereignty dominate knowledge production and policymaking. Vertical asymmetry examines patterns of asymmetry in the analysis and policy formulation of the migration issue between the global North and global South, i.e. the west and the rest of the world.

At the horizontal level of asymmetry, security-related concerns and notions such as sovereignty, border control, and the boundary predominate over issues of peace and development. This is due to the dominance of western interests and perspectives, which has resulted in a realist approach to the study of migration. This pragmatic approach to the study of migration is exemplified by the prevalence of national and social security notions in mainstream literature. In the mainstream

⁴⁵⁶ As referred through the work of Joel Migdal in the theoretical framework chapter, sovereignty is composed of visible and invisible borders. Physical borders refer to territorial sovereignty while non-physical borders refer to belonging, national identity, demographic integrity of the nation-state.

literature, sovereignty, border control, and national and societal security are the primary analytical themes.

Migration, a problem with security implications, is a consequence of the absence of peace and development. Adopting a realist approach to the study and management of migration narrowly focuses on migration's effects as opposed to its causes. This restricts the academic understanding of the core reasons of migration by focusing on the settings and demands of the Western players as opposed to those of the countries of origin. This horizontal disparity results in ill-informed policymaking that is less likely to produce effective and lasting solutions to the problem.

At the vertical level, the analysis of the migration issue within a dominant, realistic, security framework concentrates mainly on western nations while marginalizing the security and sovereignty requirements of southern nation-states. As evidenced by the externalization policy resulting from the epistemological securitization of the issue of migration, the sovereignty and security interests of the South are not only sidelined, but also expected to be sacrificed and compromised for the benefit of the West. This originates from the notion that western nation states are "complete" nation states whose national stability, integrity and identities must be maintained. This also infers that countries of the South have the capacity to accommodate multiple identities, religions, and languages. However, the majority of Southern nations are more prone to ethnic and religious conflicts than European nations. Countries of the South are also more susceptible to political instability and have fewer infrastructures to absorb transit migrants than European nations. It goes without saying that irregular migration from nations of the South, such as Morocco, is primarily the result of their inability to socially and economically integrate their youth bulges.

The demographic, sovereignty and national/societal security consequences of migration on the "other nation-states" are marginalized for the sake of those of the west. This approach not only limits the effectiveness of the Western actors' policies to efficiently manage the migration issue it also carries the risk to have the paradoxical effect of reproducing the issues behind irregular migration in the beginning.

More importantly, critical scholars have contradicted the 'mainstreamed' reality of irregular migration that is projected by the western scholars and policy makers by data on South and African migration proving that unlike what the West is projecting, South migration remains by majority intracontinental, minimally intercontinental. Also, not all migration toward the West is of negative connotation as is projected through

the mainstream knowledge that is a result of war, conflict and instability and involuntary. In many cases, it is voluntary and related to the search for opportunity, jobs or education. The Western dominated perspective on knowledge production on the migration issue that is more related to the stereotype toward the southerner and the fear of a so-called 'invasion' has resulted into linking migration exclusively to the notions of threat and crisis. This shows the mainstream knowledge dominance by the Western fear of the other resulting into further othering of the southern nation states and populations from scholarly perspective and related policy.

The mainstream literature's depiction of the migration issue reflects the Western perspective on the migration issue rather than the reality of the migration issue. The securitization of migration was primarily criticized in relation to the US/EU foreign policy toward transit countries such as Mexico, Morocco, and Turkey.⁴⁵⁷

Critical scholars (De Haas, Flahaux, Weiner, Adamson, and Dannreuther) have condemned migration literature's restricted perspective. Flahaux and De Haas suggest that 86% of intra-continental movement occurs in Africa and is not necessarily caused by war, contrary to the literature's main focus on migration and terrorism from the global South.⁴⁵⁸ Critical perspectives also highlight refugee issues in emerging nations and the significant risk of invasion from impoverished nations to developing nations with limited resources. Unless migration threatens wealthy countries' national security, IR scholars do not study its political effects in the South. However, most migration occurs in the South, affecting security, society, politics, and economics. While the literature mostly focuses on the hazards and threats that migration poses to the security of industrialized countries, practical reality demonstrates that irregular migration would actually offer higher risks, burdens, and perils to developing countries falling behind at all levels.

While inhibiting an in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the migration issue, the realist and pragmatic approach to the study of migration approach also leads to misinformed and ineffective policy making. In fact, as will be discussed at the bilateral and domestic levels of analysis, the securitization of the migration issues leads to increasing the patterns of domination at the origin of irregular migration, the exacerbation of migration and migration related security issues such as trafficking, smuggling even terrorism.

⁴⁵⁸ Marie-Laurence Flahaux, Hein De Haas, "African Migration: Trends, Patterns, Drivers", **Comparative Migration Studies**, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2016, pp. 1-25.

To do so, epistemologically understanding the migration issue from and through the context, texts and languages of the countries of the South rather than the contexts, languages of European countries would better serve the understanding and policy making around the issue of migration; thereby mutual peace and security.

4.1.1.1. Sovereignty and National Security

According to Weber and international relations principles since the Westphalian Treaty, the state's legitimacy is based on its monopoly of power and authority over its territory.⁴⁵⁹ The state decides who enters its territory and who can be a citizen with rights and duties. State legitimacy depends on border control. Border control is crucial to sovereignty; the most precious ideal in international relations. Many scholars have studied migratory securitization (Bigo 2001, Ceyhan Tsoykala 2002, Faist 2004, Huynam 2006, Ibrahim 2005, Koser 2005, Dennis Broeders and Godfried Engbersen 2007).

International migration, specifically irregular migration in IR, revolves around space investigations and definitions. Spaces that have been prioritized and defined, such as through Europeanization principles of spatiality, are more sensitive to migratory difficulties.⁴⁶⁰ These transnational players have strong national interests in protecting and organizing their welfare, citizenship, and identities around territorial borders.

Since the emergence of the terrorism issue in the field of international relations, population migration, international politics, and security have been intricately connected. According to Georgios Kartyotis, the 9/11 attacks on American territory, which resulted in a direct correlation between terrorism and irregular migration, were the most significant event influencing the EU policies on migration in general and irregular migration in particular. While globalization was liberalizing international mobility, the September 11 attacks hindered this trend by associating the movement of people with potential security problems.⁴⁶¹ As a result of the attack, the

⁴⁵⁹ Karl Duszca, "Max Weber' Conception of the State", **International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society**, Vol. 3, No. 1. 1989, pp. 71-105.

⁴⁶⁰ Collyer, p. 607.

⁴⁶¹ Georgios Karyotis, "European Migration Policy in the Aftermath of September 11", **Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research**, Vol. 20, No.1, 2007, pp. 1-17.

EU used the term "war on illegal migration" for the first time in the 2002 Seville Convention.⁴⁶²

Based on the Westphalian notions of state sovereignty, irregular migration is a modern form of state invasion of another's territory, encompassing physical and societal frontiers.⁴⁶³ In the same way, a state that lets another state select who enters its territory has its sovereignty broken and cedes some of its social and border control, because of this, irregular migration has become a major threat to the EU' unity. The EU, historically regarded as a normative, liberal, or civic actor, has seen its foreign policy and role in protecting the European borders and citizens questioned in a geopolitical turn in international relations at regional and global levels.⁴⁶⁴ Increasing tension has arisen among member states on the topic of burden sharing, with states of new Europe refusing to take the burden of irregular migration, which they blame on western European countries colonial past.

This new and old European divide especially on the issue of migration has led to the rise of Europhobia, separatist movements and notably the EU' first major crisis manifested through the British Referendum. The issue of irregular migration has shown the growing connection between the EU's peace and security and those of its neighbors. Both the EU and its partner states struggle to address this issue. The lack of an international regime on irregular migration, its interlinkage with sovereignty, human rights, and security challenges that affect both host nations and states, make irregular migration a complicated issue that requires mutual collaboration and strategic peace and security building.

With the emergence of migration in domestic politics of industrialized countries, migration in the literature is mostly analyzed from a threat perspective linked to unconventional security threats such as smuggling and trafficking activities as well as terrorism putting the western-states national security at stake. Migration research is focused on migration as a potential result of conflict or other crises with negative externalities. Involuntary migration is perceived as an undesirable, irregular, and unpleasant worldwide issue that could threaten peace and security.⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁶² Yeliz Yazan Koç, **Avrupa Birliğinin Yasadışı Göç Politikası: Türkiye Örneği Çerçevesinde İnsan Hakları Sorunsalı**, Milenyum Yayınları, İstanbul, 2020, pp. 10-223.

⁴⁶³ Matthew L. Michelle, "Migration, Sons of the Soil Conflict and International Relations", **International Area Studies Review**, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2018, pp. 51-67.

⁴⁶⁴ James Roger, "from a "Civilian Power to Global Power", Explicating the European Union' Grand Strategy Through the Articulation of Discourse Theory", **JCMS**, Vol. 47. No. 4. 2009, pp. 831-868.

⁴⁶⁵ Mitchelle, p. 56.

The general literature focuses on the Western nations' concerns and viewpoints on irregular migration, as the topic rises in the security agenda of major powers. The literature on migration mostly focuses on national security, national interest, forced migration, developed countries, and societal security, indicating a dominance of a realist approach to the topic. Western ideas and concerns on irregular migration dominate the broader literature.

Internal conflicts, South-South movement, voluntary or regular migration, development, and developing countries are marginalized in the mainstream migration literature. The literature analyzes how migration threatens industrialized countries' national security at the state level.

With the dominance of the realist approach to the study of migration comes its securitization. The securitization of migration in the literature of industrialized governments originates from the exclusive focus on the frontier assumptions. Western states exclusively worry about migration related security threats and terrorism. This has caused a concentration on border security, especially the external frontier. This position dominates major international actors' studies and foreign policy due to the realism approach to IR based on boundaries, the necessity of border management, and the state actor's exclusive legitimacy of it.

4.1.1.2. Societal Security

The concept of societal security seems to dominate the migrant issue, linking it to internal conflict. Waever defines societal security as the preservation of traditional language, culture, affiliation, faith, national identity, and practices under acceptable conditions.⁴⁶⁶ Thus, migration destabilizing effects on societal security can severely destabilize state security.

Societal security in IR literature and international relations has become central to migration rhetoric and national security.⁴⁶⁷ This view holds that societal security—cohesion and resistance to "others"—is crucial to national security. However, in the literature this only applies to industrialized countries with "stable" identities in the literature. In contrast, developing countries' identities are considered to have the flexibility to host multiple identities even though that can increase societal, religious, and ethnic problems.

⁴⁶⁶ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Le Maitre, **Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe**, Pinter Publishers: London, 1993, pp. 3-210.

⁴⁶⁷ Mitchell, p. 53.

The migration threat to societal security stems from its effects on demographics and politics, making it a unique security challenge. By sending a chunk of one's land to another society, migration brings the outside in.⁴⁶⁸ Migration, thus, can undermine national identity depending on volume and pattern.

Also, migration increases competition for scarce resources, according to Buzan et al., threatening societal security. According to Buzan, migration changes the host community's ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic makeup, threatening communal identity and culture. In addition to border invasions, irregular migration also invades non-physical regions like justice and freedom, which makes it more sensitive for international actors like the EU.⁴⁶⁹ Due to its impacts and challenges to the EU's democratic standards, irregular migration remains a problematic issue for the EU, leading to charges of double standards and casting doubt on its foreign policy.

The choice of the EU' externalization of its border control to neighboring countries reflects the epistemological securitization of the issue of migration resulting from horizontal and vertical patterns of asymmetry. The externalization policy based on the notion of threat to the societal and national security and resulting from the EU institutional limitations that is member states sovereignty chooses to adopt the frontier approach by outsourcing irregular migrants and related threats to transit states. This approach not only breach the third countries own sovereignty by having the access to their territory decided by the EU and member states it also carries the potential of exacerbating existing domestic issues behind irregular movement toward the EU. Also makes it breach other states' sovereignty by deciding who shall enter their territories. While this policy choice might be serving the EU' immediate need of border security, even though it has been inefficient in so doing, it does put at stake long term peace and security. This approach also designed to meet the EU' domestic credibility crisis risks to put its long term institutional credibility and efficiency at stake by reproducing a circle of insecurity and its attached consequences against its declared principles of human rights, democracy, shared prosperity, peace and security.

⁴⁶⁸ Christopher Rudolph, "Globalization and Security: Migration and Evolving Conceptions of Security in Statecraft and Scholarship", *Security Studies*, Vol.13, No. 1, 2003, pp. 1–32.

⁴⁶⁹ Ayselin Gözde Yildiz, *The European Union Immigration Policy: Managing Migration in Turkey and Morocco*, Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2016, pp. 5-213.

4.1.2. Epistemological Patterns of Domination and Irregular Migration in the EU' Policy

Irregular migration in the form of illegal entry or overstay has in the last decade become a major concern for the EU' policy makers considered a breach of the Union' area of security and justice, a threat to the Union' coherence and stability.⁴⁷⁰ Migration policy has become standardized after the 2015 refugee crisis. The Maastricht Treaty underlined the relationship between migration, security, and terrorism. The Lisbon Treaty's Article 2 states that the Union shall "provide its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice," emphasizing the issue's importance.⁴⁷¹ The EU's enlargement program, 9/11 and the ensuing attacks on European capitals, Muslim radicalism in Europe, the Arab spring, and migrant flows contributed to the securitization of migration in the EU policymaking. The EU response to increased irregular migration has mostly centered on border control and security, which has failed to address the issue.

Member states disagree on how and to what degree the migration crisis of Mediterranean European states should be shifted to other member states to preserve solidarity and the European principle of coherence and unity. Migration is seen as a foreign intrusion into member states' unique realm of national identity building, blurring the lines between within and outside. In 2017, the migrant issue became extremely politicized and the core of political elections that would define both national and Union beliefs. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland oppose moving asylum seekers from Greece to Italy.⁴⁷² Migration also dominated national elections, with anti-immigration parties performing well in Austria, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, threatening a repeat of the British referendum.

Thus, migration became a strategic priority that the Union must handle through foreign policy, according to council conclusions. Since 1990-2000, security concerns have dictated the EU migration policies, establishing a route dependency that is hard to reverse. The EU's first global migration strategy addressed labor market demands and curbed irregular migration in 2005.⁴⁷³

⁴⁷⁰ Anna Kicingier, "International Migration as a Non-traditional Security Threat and the EU Responses to this Phenomenon", **Warsaw: Central European Forum for Migration Research**, CEMFR working paper, No. 2, 2004, pp. 1-8.

⁴⁷¹ Yildiz, p. 44.

⁴⁷² The Edinburgh Law Review, "The European Union Migration Crisis", **EdinLR**, Vol. 20, 2016, pp. 230-235.

⁴⁷³ The European Commission, **Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)**, Migration and Home Affairs, Brussel, 2005, pp. 2-25, (GAMM).

The EU has outsourced this load and obligation to foreign policy and neighbor relations to avoid new crises that could jeopardize the EU project. The Externalization policy and more-for-more tactics were used. The EU rewarded partner country compliance by signing mobility partnerships.

The Union has worked with non-EU governments to curb migration via the Mediterranean Sea route. The 2015 European Agenda for Migration (EAM) and the 2015 European Agenda on Security steer the Union's migration policy in the lack of a single policy. The EAM recognizes the relevance of legal migration to EU economic development in light of demographic issues and stresses cooperation with third countries through Mobility partnerships and externalization policy. The EAM includes four primary pillars: lowering incentives for irregular migration, addressing core problems in non-European countries, improving return policies, and dismantling smuggling and trafficking.⁴⁷⁴ Second, the EAM promotes solidarity with Greece and Italy to improve border management. Due to demographic decrease, a new legal migration policy to meet the EU economic needs was designed. The blue card was introduced to encourage high-skilled migration.

Mobility partnerships in line with the EAM include readmission of own and 3rd country nationals, development of initiatives to deter irregular migration, and mutually enhancing border control. Third countries are guided by the EU to build their own measures to address irregular migration to the EU from their borders. Mobility partnerships, however, remain non-legally binding political agreements with limited effectiveness.⁴⁷⁵

Besides conditionality, Mobility partnership agreements prioritize member states' own concerns and interests over those of partners by prioritizing member states' national policies designed according to Article 79/5 of the TFEU, which gives member states the exclusive right to decide on the volumes of 3rd country nationals seeking entry. Mobility partnerships are voluntary political collaborations. Mobility partnerships also struggle to manage irregular migration between the EU member states and non-EU partners.

Externalization makes the EU migration policy more divisive. Boswell said:

Externalization of migration control refers to measures that change the place where the control of travelers take place from the border of the state into the

⁴⁷⁴ Fabien Willermain, "The European Agenda on Migration, One Year On. The EU Response to the Crisis Has Produced Some Results, But Will Hardly Pass Another Solidarity Test", **IEMeD Mediterranean**, 2016, pp. 133-140.

⁴⁷⁵ Yildiz, p. 183.

individual is seeking to within the countries of origin which also referred to as 'policing at distance'.⁴⁷⁶

However, Collier believes the EU's externalization program holds third countries accountable for holding European assets.⁴⁷⁷ The internal-external nexus of the migration crisis has made border control a priority for foreign policy and intertwined domestic and international policy.

The externalization policy, mostly implemented through the EU-Turkey accord and African compacts, has been challenged for its ethics, effectiveness, and legality. The externalization strategy violates European and international law and defies the EU democracy and normative goals, especially in the EUGS. Scholars have questioned the externalization policy for favoring the EU member states over partner countries.

4.1.2.1. Epistemological Securitization and the Externalization Policy

The externalization policy restricts third-country nationals' freedom of movement, violates their human rights, and unfairly shifts the EU member states' migratory responsibilities to unprepared neighboring countries.⁴⁷⁸ This is done without considering the effects on 3rd countries' quality of life, peace, and stability, as well as the mistreatment of their inhabitants.

Scholars view the EAM's externalization policy as an EU tool to outsource asylum claims to third countries rather than help migrants or partner governments. The EAM and externalization policy have rendered surrounding countries buffer zones for the EU's undesirable duties. This underscores the EU's longstanding asymmetric approach to partners, which began with the ENP's premise of shared responsibility. According to Yildiz, the Union prioritizes its own migration policy goals since it views the area as insecure. Scholars and 3rd nations themselves have questioned the EU discourse on migration sharing. The EU's asymmetric approach to the neighborhood has also highlighted its incapacity to foster stability in the region, as shown by the Arab Spring results.


⁴⁷⁶ Christina Boswell, "The External Dimension of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy", **International Affairs**, Vol. 79, No. 3, 2003, pp. 619–638.

⁴⁷⁷ Paul Collier, "Meeting the Migration Challenge and Reforming Capitalism Through Mutual Solidarity", **Social Europe**, 25.07.2018, <https://www.socialeurope.eu/the-migration-challenge-and-reform-capitalism-through-mutual-solidarity>, (11.05.2021).

⁴⁷⁸ Mehdi Lahlou, "Morocco's Experience of Migration as a Sending, Transit, and Receiving Country", **Istituto Affari Internazionali**, Working papers, No. 15, 2015, pp. 2-18, (MMSTR).

The externalization policy cannot solve migration in the long-term. Instead, it risks hindering the EUGS goals for sustainable security. This indicates that the union will import instabilities from adjacent countries and export them to third countries of transit to address its immediate security concerns, producing a circular process of instability.

Figure 9: Epistemological Domination and Related Policy



Source: Created by the author

4.1.3. Assessment of the Epistemological Analysis

Mainstream knowledge production on the issue of migration is characterized by horizontal and vertical asymmetry prioritizing the perspectives and needs of western European nation states over those of the South, also the interests of the western nation states and populations over those of the populations and the migrants of the South. Horizontal asymmetry is characterized by the dominance of security

related issues such as national and societal security over development and peace concerns. This reflects the domination of the realist perspective to understanding and tackling the migration issue. Vertical asymmetry is characterized by the dominance of the interests of the nation-states of the West over those of the populations of the South and the migrants; also, by the dominance of the sovereignty and security interests of nation-states of the West over those of the South.

This realist based approach to the study of migration issue has resulted into the securitization of the migration issue shaping the EU policy making narrowly linking migration to security leading to the domination of the frontier approach as manifested through the externalization policy. This approach is mainly based on the notion of the 'dot' and building limits rather than an in-depth and comprehensive tackling of the issue based on notions of Benthamian peace.

To put it differently, patterns of colonialism still guide the knowledge production on issues related to the South that are guided by notions of superiority and inferiority and dominated by notions of European and Western exceptionalism and superiority. The South and issues related to the South are studied from the perspective, the context and through the language of the European and the Westerner. More importantly, policies affecting the sovereignty of the South such as externalization, are produced by the West based on the West' sovereignty needs.

4.2. BILATERAL LEVEL ANALYSIS

This part of the analysis, studies the patterns of domination around the issue of irregular migration at the bilateral level of the cooperation between Morocco and the EU. Analyzing the bilateral level of cooperation from the Moroccan perspective through discourse analysis would allow to assess the correlation between the patterns of epistemological and policy making and the domination patterns on the bilateral level of relations.

Through the discourse analysis, this level of analysis seeks to understand the Moroccan perceptions on the issue of irregular migration, Morocco's domestic, regional and bilateral priorities related to the management of the migration in the cooperation with the EU. This analysis will also allow us to understand the challenges to a successful EU-Morocco cooperation for an effective management of the migration issue.

The analysis of the Moroccan state apparatus discourse on the migration issue has allowed to operationalize the Moroccan perspective to the following themes: Eurocentric stereotypes and myths around the issue of migration, migration between securitization, peace and development, Inequality and asymmetry in responsibility sharing: the externalization policy, western European states unilateral migration choices and cooperation with Morocco, Morocco' alternative approach to migration management under the king' royal vision to migration, Morocco' expectations about the EU-Morocco "privileged partnership", Morocco' expectations about migration management under the EU-Morocco cooperation.

The collected discourses mainly consist of speeches given by the King Mohammed VI who has been appointed by the AU as 'the Leader for the Migration issue'⁴⁷⁹, speeches given on behalf of the King Mohammed VI by representatives of the political will such as the head of governments of Morocco, ministers or the king' brother the Prince Moulay Rachid. Second, after the King Mohammed the VI' discourses come the discourses, interviews and press meetings given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates Nasser Bourita on the relations between the EU and Morocco in relation to irregular migration. Interviews given by a regional representative on the issue of migration and the director of the Strategic Center for Migration are also included. The discourses cover the period range from 2015-2022 where irregular migration flows turned into a crisis especially in the year 2015 and 2018 with unprecedented flows to the EU through the western Mediterranean route.

The discourses are collected from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cooperation and African Relations and Moroccans Resident abroad, the Moroccan National Agency of News (L'Agence Marocaine de Presse-MAP) as well as Moroccan and French newspapers such as Le Matin, Le Monde, Telquel and Al Jazeera. The collected discourses are translated from French to English by the author. The total number of the collected discourses is twenty-eight and the analysis is conducted through the theme categories mentioned above.

Migration management has emerged as a precarious issue in the EU-Morocco cooperation that is more characterized by contention and lack of understanding than

⁴⁷⁹ The Kingdom of Morocco Ministry of Foreign Affairs African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, « M. Nasser Bourita : La Réussite de l'Approche Nationale a Conduit les Pays Africains à Confier à Sa Majeste le Roi, le Mandate de 'Leader sur la Question Migratoire », **Ministry of Foreign Affairs**, Rabat, 02.03.2020, <https://www.diplomatie.ma/8%C3%A8me-conf%C3%A9rence-minist%C3%A9rielle-du-dialogue-55-sur-la-migration-et-le-d%C3%A9veloppement-0> , (12.01.2019), (MLQM).

by consensus and collaboration. The migration issue' complexity and close interlinkage to sensitive and strategic priorities such as sovereignty, national and territorial integrity, security, human rights and development needs has made it especially challenging in the global South global North cooperation.

The different perceptions and needs attached to the issue stemming from the differences in contexts and histories has made it a source of increasing clashes between the worlds' two axes as is reflected by the EU-Morocco, US-Mexico frontier, EU-Turkey frontier contentions. The lack of an international regime for the management of cooperation on migration has made it subject to bilateral cooperation which is dominated by the prioritization of the needs, perceptions and interests of the more powerful than of building consensus taking into consideration the different contexts of the two sides of the shore. Increasing pressure on the EU as an institutional body from member states' prioritization of sovereignty rights and lack of understanding on responsibility sharing has reflected on the increasing pressure on the Moroccan border and western Mediterranean.

Located 14 km from Spain and linking the African and European continent, Morocco has in the last decade become subject to important pressure from both the African and European sides. While increasing flows from Sub-Saharan Africa are targeting Morocco as a transit state to reach Europe, the EU and member states are increasing pressure on Morocco by choosing the frontier approach and outsourcing the responsibility to Morocco as a transit state. This approach based on securitization and externalization has not only failed to efficiently cope with the flows but it also compromised Morocco's own sovereignty needs, security and context which is characterized, like other developing post-colonial African states, by limited infrastructure and unintegrated youth bulge.

Balancing between the needs of the Western states and those of the South, the needs of states and of migrants, security needs and peace needs such as development are according to the Moroccan state apparatus the inevitable way to achieving a long term solution to the long term challenge of migration which is to persist in the century of mobility than to reduce. This, however, cannot be achieved without overcoming the EU' unfounded Eurocentric and xenophobic perceptions toward migration that reflect the EU' own perception of the African than the reality of the South-North migration.

4.2.1. Bilateral Patterns of Domination

Through the study of the Moroccan political elite discourses, this level of analysis aims to trace the patterns of domination and resulting forms of resistance in the EU-Morocco cooperation on irregular migration management. The patterns of domination in the cooperation can be summarized as: the domination of unfounded Eurocentric myths and stereotypes toward African migration, the persistence of inequality in the responsibility sharing between the EU and Morocco through the externalization policy, the domination of the approach of security over that of peace resulting from the domination of the Western states interests, the domination of the western European member states' unilateral choices and decision to the detriment of the bilateral cooperation and Morocco's interests. As a result of these patterns of domination, forms of resistance by the migrants to the EU' frontier approach resulted into humanitarian crises and increase in security issues in the western Mediterranean. Morocco has also resisted this EU approach which it voices as ineffective and counterproductive. Arguing that the main challenge to a successful approach of migration management was the predominance of the Eurocentric stereotypes and myths over knowledge production and policy making around irregular migration, the Moroccan sovereign King Mohammed VI, designed an alternative approach to the EU' securitization/externalization one under the royal vision to migration. Instead of ostracism, bias and fences Morocco argues for bi-continental cooperation, consensus, promotion of inclusive knowledge production around migration through the African Migration Observatory (AMO). Morocco also argues for the importance of multilateralism, regional and international cooperation through the Marrakesh Pact and the Global Pact. Balancing between the interests of the West and the South, the interests of the nation states and the migrants, is Morocco' priority to a more humanized migration management to avoid the humanitarian crises and rise in insecurities resulting from the EU' Eurocentric based externalization policy.

4.2.1.1. Unfounded Eurocentric Myths and Stereotypes

According to the Moroccan political elite, unfounded Eurocentric myths and stereotypes characterize the EU migration management with Morocco through externalization and securitization. The politicization of the migration issue by the political far right, paralleling the rise in populism and anti-Europeanism is based on a

collective Eurocentric fear of Africans and southerners in general. The EU' Eurocentric approach is linked to binary notions of superiority and inferiority, colonizer and colonized that feed the relations between Europe and its opposite other, the South. The notion of 'existential crisis' that is linked to an 'African invasion' of the European continent represents the European perception of the phenomenon rather than its practical reality.

Speaking at the EU-AU summit, King Mohammed VI appointed as "the leader of African migration" argued that unlike what is promoted through the European existential crisis and fear, African migration is far from being any close to an 'invasion'. This reality created by the EU and member states reflects the dominating Eurocentric myths around the creation of 'mainstreamed reality' of migration rather than the actual reality. The securitization and outsourcing of the migrants is based on the following unfounded myths; 1-South migration is by majority intracontinental not intercontinental. According to the king, the majority of the South migration is intracontinental. 4 out of 5 African migrants move within Africa. The minister for foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccans residing abroad M. Bourita in relation to the same myth argued that there are 256 million migrants worldwide, which represents 3% of the global population. 36 million of these are African, 80% of them remain in Africa and 7 million African leaves Africa for the rest of the world, among which 1.5% move irregularly. The minister also added that only 0.5% of global migration was irregular African migration. Listening to European political discourses and media footage, it is instead portrayed as an 'African invasion' of the European continent. 2- Irregular migration does not constitute the majority of South-North migration; it accounts for only 20% of it. 3- Migration is not an economic threat. 85% of migrants' income remains in the receiving countries. 4- Migration is South-North. According to the king, the xenophobic European discourse on migration narrowly focuses on it as a flow from South to North. Besides being primarily South-South, migration is also characterized by an increasing North-South flow. The last decade has witnessed an increase in North South migration. There is a growing number of Europeans who choose to settle in Morocco in search of investment opportunities in Morocco and Africa.⁴⁸⁰

⁴⁸⁰ Aboubacar Yacouba Barma, "Sommet UA-UE : Le Plaidoyer Engagé de Mohammed VI pour un agenda Africain sur la migration », **La Tribune**, 30.11.2017, <https://afrique.latribune.fr/politique/leadership/2017-11-30/sommet-ua-ue-le-plaidoyer-engage-de-mohammed-vi-pour-un-agenda-africain-sur-la-migration-759870.html>, (04.10.2022).

As a result of these Eurocentric myths behind the European perceptions of African migration, migration in the collective imaginary has become linked to poverty, precarity, instability, violence and the loss of life. Incapable and rather unwilling to comprehend the root causes that generalize the issue of movement of people, European leaders have generalized the issue of movement of people through the image of migrants as resource poor with dubious profiles. King Mohammed VI also expressed that unfortunately Europeans are right to feel concerned about the security imperatives of the migration issue but this generalized image is not the complete reality of migration. Reminding the European leaders of the contribution of African migrants to the post-war construction of Europe, King Mohammed VI argued that the EU approach to handling migration in the last decade has generally focused on the challenges that migration presents while ignoring its positive aspects.⁴⁸¹

The discourse on migration according to the king in a century characterized by movement of people shall not take an ideological, emotional or xenophobic turn as is being done by the EU and member states. Instead it should become a topic of peaceful debate and constructive change. The movement of people has always connected Europe and Africa which are connected by a colonial past, language, history and geography despite the EU' preference for ostracism toward the African. This connection and mobility is supposed to increase in the coming decades. Morocco, according to the king, has as a result of its geographical position was forced to become an immigration hotspot between Africa and Europe. In such a context, there is no longer a distinction between the countries of migration, transit and emigration.⁴⁸²

The migration crisis, according to the Moroccan sovereign and political elite, is more a consequence of the EU response that is based on its perception of migration than of migration itself. The likelihood of a 'migration crisis' increased as the EU' approach of the frontier, building fences and outsourcing persists. Adopting a strategy of regulated and organized movement taking into account the needs of both the African and European continents while taking into account the root causes of migration would be more conducive to achieving mutual peace and security.

While migration has important security imperatives, migration according to King Mohammed VI is not a standalone issue, not a security issue and cannot be dealt with as one. Migration is a natural phenomenon that has existed for centuries.

⁴⁸¹ Barma.

⁴⁸² Barma.

Migration became a security concern when it was given a xenophobic and passionate turn by the EU. The EU stereotypical approach to migration demonstrates an unwillingness to comprehend its root causes thereby limiting the EU' and its partners' ability to effectively address those causes.

The dominating Eurocentric myths and bias toward African migration is a continuation of the European and Western superiority feeding the colonial past of the West toward the South. The West's approach toward the migration issue through the mainstream of these myths and related policies of transfer supports the continuations of post-colonial binary oppositions between global South-North such as colonizer, colonized, superior, inferior, master, student.

This superiority and inferiority notion is most visible in the vertical pattern in the promotion of knowledge between Africa and Europe. While the majority of the African population knows and speak European languages and has strong affinities with Europe, the European, who have been present in Africa for decades lack knowledge of Africa' indigenous languages and cultures. This pattern continues to define the postcolonial relations between Africa and Europe and is one of the reasons behind the xenophobic fear shown toward the Southerner. Instead of establishing this fear and truth as a reality through knowledge and mainstream discourse, the EU and member states shall make an effort to know more about the African, the context and its needs. Lack of knowledge about the African other is preferred because of the lack of the will to do so.

The African is defined through what Europe is and what Europe fears. It is defined and studied through European language, identity and context. It is this domination of the European knowledge of the African neglecting the African itself, giving an epistemological continuity of colonialism that is characterizing the migration issue as a crisis, an invasion and a security matter. This bias shaping the EU policy toward migration based on the notions of securitization, the frontier and othering does not serve long term mutual peace and security.

For this reason, the King Mohammed VI argued that in order to benefit from migration as a concentration of opportunities rather than a concentration of threats and difficulties, his primary concern is to dispel misunderstanding around migration. The EU' preferred erroneous assumptions around migration are according to the King Mohammed VI the primary reason for the failure of the security framework's failure to in a time of increasing mobility. Neither Africa nor Europe, argues the king, can handle

migration alone. Migration is a shared responsibility, a shared interest for mutual peace and security.⁴⁸³

4.2.1.2. Horizontal Asymmetry: Security Versus Development

Noting the historical patterns of colonialism and the postcolonial development process, the Moroccan political elite emphasized the controversies surrounding the concept of the 'Frontier' adopted by the EU to tackle migration. The notion of the frontier according to the Moroccan sovereign was only recently introduced to the African continent by colonial powers and has had important effects on the continent's security, political development and political stability manifested today through migration. In other words, the frontier is a European construct that stems from the European context but which is a foreign notion to the African being and context. Several contemporary African conflicts, including the rise of insurgencies and terrorist organizations, are negative relics of European colonialism in Africa. Representatives of the Moroccan political will criticize the EU's preference for building "Frontiers" against Africa rather than bridging the borders between Europe and Africa to achieve mutual peace and sustainable security.

The Moroccan sovereign and the political elite while do acknowledge that migration has important security consequences and is linked to an African context of insecurity they oppose the EU' approach toward migration that is narrowly focused on security to the neglect of peace and development.

According to the foreign affairs minister M. Bourita, the situation of security in the Sahel and Sahara region keeps worsening and Morocco has become an ideal destination for African migrants seeking entry to Europe.⁴⁸⁴ The resurgence of coup d'états in several African states has been framed by M. Bourita to have become a special concern for African security behind Sub-Saharan African migration. Terrorism and the emergence of insurgency groups as well as the convergence between them

⁴⁸³ Agence Marocaine de Presse, "Discours Royal Adresse au 6eme Sommet Union-Europeene-Union Africaine", **The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccans Resident Abroad**, 18.02.2022, <https://www.mapnews.ma/fr/activites-royales/sm-le-roi-adresse-un-discours-au-6%C3%A8me-sommet-union-europ%C3%A9enne-union-africaine#:~:text=Excellences%2C%20Mesdames%20et%20Messieurs%2C,Africaine%20et%20l'Union%20Europ%C3%A9enne> , (05.03.2022), (SUEUA).

⁴⁸⁴ Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, de la Coopération Africaine et des Marocains Résidant à L'Etranger, « M. Nasser Bourita : L'Action du Maroc Au Sein de L'UA Guidée par un Cadre Référentiel Fixe par SM Le Roi », **The Ministry of Foreign Affairs :Kingdom of Morocco- Rabat**, 05.02.2022, <https://www.diplomatie.ma/fr/m-nasser-bourita-laction-du-maroc-au-sein-de-l%E2%80%99ua-guid%C3%A9e-par-un-cadre-r%C3%A9f%C3%A9rentiel-fix%C3%A9-par-sm-le-roi> , (01.03.2022), (AMSUA).

is according to M. Bourita another important security issue putting at stake the stability and security of African citizens. A quarter of terrorist attacks according to M. Bourita take place in Africa.⁴⁸⁵

The securitization of the migration issue, according to the King Mohammed VI, only serves to divert the migration dynamics but does not stop them. Instead of building defensive polemics the time is for constructive dialogue engaging African and European perspectives, contexts and needs. Highlighting the commonalities and differences between Europe and Africa, King Mohammed VI argued that most African nation states are on an ongoing post-colonial development process in which national integrity is still ongoing. The European introduced concept of the “frontier” has had an important effect on the political and ideological stability, the security and development of the African continent.⁴⁸⁶

Migration management according to the King necessitates a balance between the needs of the nation states and the migrants, countries of the West and those of the South. Security matters shall not overlook the rights of the migrants. As stated the King Mohammed VI;

*A migrant is not less or more human based on the side of the border in which he stands. Security concerns should be addressed concurrently with socioeconomic development that addresses the root causes of risky migration.*⁴⁸⁷

Even though there are important security issues related to migration, they cannot overlook the rights of the migrants. Security issues can also no longer spare socioeconomic needs and development policies geared toward resolving the root causes of the precarious migration. Issues of security also cannot deny the right of mobility. Mobility is approached through cooperation, shared responsibility and solidarity can become a lever for sustainable development at a time when the international community is working to implement the 2030 Agenda.⁴⁸⁸

Speaking at 29th African Union Summit in Addis Ababa on behalf of the King Mohammed VI, Prince Moulay Rachid highlighted the interconnection between peace

⁴⁸⁵ Le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la Coopération Africaine et des Marocains Résidents à L'Etranger, AMSUA.

⁴⁸⁶ The Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco in Vietnam, “His Majesty King Mohammed VI Sent a Message to the Intergovernmental Conference on Migration, Marrakesh 10 -11 December 2018”, **The Embassy of Morocco: Vietnam**, 29.03.2018, <https://moroccoembassy.vn/en/news/his-majesty--king-mohammed-vi-sent-a-message-to-the-intergovernmental-conference-on-migration-marrakech-10-11th-december-2018.html>, (11.03.2022).

⁴⁸⁷ Benjamin Fox, “Minister: EU-Morocco Pact is about Having Relationship We Both Deserve”, **EURACTIV**, 10.07.2019, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/interview/morocco-doesnt-seek-eu-privilege-it-is-about-having-the-relationship-we-both-deserve-minister/>, (08.09.2021).

⁴⁸⁸ The Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco in Vietnam.

and security for the solution of irregular migration. Migration argues the Prince cannot be solved without tackling security and development issues related to the youth equally. The underlying socioeconomic development issues and youth bulge unemployment levels if left untackled do increase the existing unconventional security threats related to the African context. The security context in Africa is characterized by the rise in insurgent groups, the rise of ungoverned areas, threats related to transnational extremism and global warming issues. Highlighting the limitations of the global North-Global South cooperation, Prince Moulay Rachid argued for Africa's need to utilize its intracontinental cooperation. The growth and prosperity of Africa, argued the prince would be hindered if African youth bulge is left untapped. 70% of African youth argued the Prince lives on 3\$ per day, 60% of the unemployed in Africa are young adults. These unemployed youth, argued the Prince speaking on behalf of the King Mohammed VI, become fragile and susceptible to potential radicalization. About 40% of unemployed youth in Africa are recruited by rebellious movements, extremist groups and terrorist organizations active across the continent. Africa stated the Prince, continues to lose its youth through both legal and illegal ways. In reaction to the EU' frontier approach, the Prince also interrogated that whether the future of the African youth was destined to be in the Mediterranean waters? Must their mobility necessarily be a bleed?⁴⁸⁹

The EU' securitization approach toward migration inhibits understanding the full image of the African migration. M. Nasser Bourita, who participated in the first session of the IOM International Dialogue on Migration (IDM), emphasized the significance of climate change in the context of forced migration. According to Mr. Bourita, natural disasters and global warming have become important factors behind local displacements around the globe. Morocco, argued the Minister, is paying important attention to the category of climate change migration given its potential increase to 200-250 million by 2050 and also to its complexity. Climate change migration is difficult to handle considering the challenges of quantifying it. The reason behind this is that it bridges the gap between forced and voluntary migration. Climate change intertwines with other factors such as economic, social and political factors

⁴⁸⁹ Le Ministère de la Jeunesse, de la Culture et de la Communication du Royaume du Maroc, « Sa Majesté le Roi Adresse un Message à la Conférence Intergouvernementale sur la Migration à Marrakech », **Le Département de la Communication / Les Discours du Roi : Rabat**, 10.12.2017, [https://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/sm-le-roi-adresse-un-message-la-conference-intergouvernementale-sur-la-migration#:~:text=Sa%20Majest%C3%A9%20le%20Roi%20Mohammed,ses%20travaux%20lundi%20%C3%A0%20Marrakech,\(10.12.2022\),\(MRAMCI\).](https://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/sm-le-roi-adresse-un-message-la-conference-intergouvernementale-sur-la-migration#:~:text=Sa%20Majest%C3%A9%20le%20Roi%20Mohammed,ses%20travaux%20lundi%20%C3%A0%20Marrakech,(10.12.2022),(MRAMCI).)

contributing to climate related migration. Africa remains disproportionately impacted by the phenomenon of climate and environmental migration and climate change issues. This is especially true for the Sahel region, which is among the most affected regions in the world. The Sahel has become one of the epicenter of the displacement crises with the highest growth rate in the world including 1.6 million internal displaced persons and 365,000 fleeing violence, including 640,000 in 2020 alone. Climate change has become an inextricable part of peace and security in Africa.⁴⁹⁰

The risk of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, added the Minister has increased by 11% since 1980 due to global warming. In 2030, this rate is expected to grow to 54% claiming the lives of 394 thousand people due to lack of water and the loss of agricultural land. Climate change related conflicts and migration challenges shall be taken into consideration, tackled through cooperation based on three complementary axes: the protection of the displaced persons, facilitation of preventive displacement to move away from danger and the prevention of success and massive displacements. Forced and irregular migration, as a result, cannot be viewed solely through the lenses of political instability, economic needs and 'refugee' argued Mr. Bourita. There is according to Mr. Bourita, a growing new category of migrants that is the one related to climate change.⁴⁹¹

The Moroccan sovereign King Mohammed VI expressed that in its perception toward migration, related challenges and opportunities, Morocco prioritizes both Africa to which it belongs as well as Europe, its immediate partner and neighbor, in light of their shared history and destiny. Considering that the migration issue is mainly related to the youth; education, culture, professional mobility and migration are Morocco's top action priorities in both Africa and Europe. The youth, stated the King, is Africa' human capital and its mobility in the search for development do not have to be manifested in the search for death in the sea. The youth mobility, according to the King Mohammed VI, does not pose a threat to economic development. If managed and planned, it can actually help to solve the challenges to the peace and security of

⁴⁹⁰ The Kingdom of Morocco Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Resident Abroad, "M. Nasser Bourita 1st Session of the International Dialogue on Migration (IDM)", **Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rabat**, 25.05.2021, <https://www.diplomatie.ma/m-nasser-bourita-sous-le-leadership-de-sm-le-roi-lengagement-du-royaume-se-situe-%C3%A0-l%E2%80%99intersection-de-la-migration-de-l%E2%80%99environnement-et-des-changements-climatiques> , (12.12.2022), (SIDM).

Agence de Presse Marocaine, Chef du Gouvernement, « les Relations entre le Maroc et l'Espagne Sont Meilleures Plus Que Jamais », **Ministère de la Jeunesse, de la Culture et de la Communication, Département de la Communication, Rabat**, 03.06.2015, <https://www.maroc.ma/fr/actualites/chef-du-gouvernement-les-relations-entre-le-maroc-et-lEspagne-sont-meilleures-plus-que> , (08.12.2022), (RME).

⁴⁹¹ The Kingdom of Morocco Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SIDM.

both continents, Africa and Europe. Migration if not approached as a threat by the EU, it would be a concentration of opportunities.⁴⁹²

4.2.1.3. Vertical Asymmetry: Equality in the Externalization Policy

The EU' postcolonial myths toward the South reflect in its bilateral relation with Morocco and related policy for the management of migration which remains dominated by the EU' externalization and securitization approach. This approach, besides neglecting the context of Morocco and its capacity it also inhibits an effective solution to the issue. The minister for foreign affairs Mr. Bourita has expressed in an interview with the French Newspaper *Le Monde*, that the only coherent policy that the EU managed to achieve on migration is to exert pressure on transit countries. In response to the criticism directed at Morocco' detention of millions of Sub-Saharan African migrants, the minister argued that while European governments throw balls at each other saying; "I took 100, you shall 300. Morocco, a developing nation, has processed 50,000 requests for regularization, of which 90% of the applicants are satisfied".⁴⁹³

The EU' colonial notions toward the South guide its expectations of Morocco serving it the role of border police guard and a buffer zone. Morocco, having its independent and consistent migration policy would not accept to engage in a blackmail stating: I am your border patrolman; how much you pay?⁴⁹⁴ This expectation, stemming from the EU' perception of superiority maintains the notions of master/pupil, colonizer/colonized, superior/inferior notion in the bilateral cooperation. This approach inhibits achieving equality in the partnership where both partners are perceived as independent nation-states with own sovereign needs. The EU' unequal treatment of partners of the South underlies its choice of externalizing its responsibilities to transit states. Transit countries, added the minister Mr. Bourita, should not be at the center of the issue of migration control. Instead, all involved parties including those of origin, transit and destination must assume their responsibilities on an equal footing. The logic of constructing EU funded centers also

⁴⁹² Agence Marocaine de Presse, SUEUA.

⁴⁹³ Charlotte Bozonnet, "Maroc : La seule politique migratoire cohérente de l'Europe, c'est de mettre la pression sur les pays de transit », *Le Monde*, 2.11.2018, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/11/02/maroc-la-seule-politique-migratoire-coherente-de-l-europe-c-est-mettre-la-pression-sur-les-pays-de-transit_5377982_3212.html, (09.10.2022).

⁴⁹⁴ Bozonnet.

applies the logic of provision of funds. All of these solutions sought by the EU are flawed, they create more problems than they solve.⁴⁹⁵

The Minister M. Bourita in a 2018 speech expressed that it was important for the EU' to reconsider its partnership with Morocco based on the notion of 'equal/to equal-Egal-a-egal' in the area of migration management given the growing surge and pressure toward Morocco. Mr. Bourita also added that the EU cannot expect assistance from Morocco on the matter of migration management and terrorism while treating it as an object. Since the progressive close of the East Mediterranean migration route between Turkey and Greece, the Central one between Libya or Tunisia and Italy, the migration pressure on Morocco has intensified. Trafficking networks are increasing their activities in the Moroccan border with Spain. This situation is stemming from the EU choice of frontier and externalization approach toward Morocco. Transit countries added the minister do not have the authority nor the responsibility to act as a policeman or a frontier guard. The EU cannot simply get rid of its responsibility by transferring it. This not only discard the Union' own responsibility, it also bridges the logic and substance of cooperation that is based on equality.⁴⁹⁶

A partnership added the minister entails egalitarian association not scapegoating. This EU' preferred choice of action is also instrumentalizing the migrants. The EU' emotional blackmail and binary conceptions are breaching not only the rights of its partners but also those of the migrants. Instead of choosing cynicism in developing migration policies by focusing on border control, the EU shall build more inclusive policies taking into account regular channels of migration.⁴⁹⁷

The minister responsible for the Relations with the Parliament, Civil Society and the Government, Mr. Mustapha El Khalfi, expressed in a press conference that the EU' approach of treating Morocco as the EU' border policeman goes against the principles of partnership and cooperation. Morocco shall never serve as the EU's border patrol. Mutual and equal coordination argued the minister was essential for an effective management of irregular migration and the fight against related smuggling

⁴⁹⁵ Bozonnet.

⁴⁹⁶ La Vérité, "M. Nasser Bourita : Le Maroc veut un Partenariat d'égal à égal avec L'Europe », **La Vérité-AFP**, 4.10.2018, <https://www.laverite.ma/migrations-le-maroc-veut-un-partenariat-degal-a-egal-avec-leurope/>, (13.10.2022).

⁴⁹⁷ The Kingdom of Morocco Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, "MFA Bourita: Under HM the King 'Leadership, Kingdom's Commitment Lies at the Intersection of Migration, Environment and Climate Change", **Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Kingdom of Morocco-Rabat**, 25.09.2021, <https://www.diplomatie.ma/en/mfa-nasser-bourita-under-leadership-his-majesty-king-morocco-has-always-been-inventive-tackling-energy-issue> , (02.12.2022), (IMECC).

and human trafficking activities. The Minister reminded that unlike the EU, Morocco in the framework of the principles of partnership has been making important efforts to meet mutual interests which have been successful. Morocco, stated the Minister has unilaterally repatriated 1,400 people in 2018. 22,000 individuals have benefited from the same process in collaboration with the IOM. In addition to involving public administrations in the process, the Moroccan National Council for Human Rights will also intervene in the event of a violation of human rights during the process, thereby ensuring the adherence to its humanitarian policy while respecting mutual state interests.⁴⁹⁸

The previous head of government Mr. Abdelilah Benkirane in an interview about Morocco-Spain relations in 2015 during the 11th High Level Meeting between Spain and Morocco in Madrid, argued that the EU cannot expect Morocco to police irregular migration. Morocco is not and should not be expected to become the EU' policeman. Proximity, added Mr. Benkirane compels Morocco to contribute to the mitigation of this phenomenon. This commitment, however, is not exclusive to Morocco but it entails the partnership between two independent but equal actors in meeting their partnership requirements for common challenges. Morocco having played an important role in the mitigation of issues related to terrorism and irregular migration has contributed to the security of Moroccans, French and Spanish citizens on equal footing. While Morocco would never accept or permit the development of physical or ideological terrorism on its borders, Morocco would not accept to be treated as a policeman by the EU. Morocco, stated the head of government, has its own macroeconomic issues and inequalities which Morocco has been putting efforts to overcome with the aim to integrate its youth bulges. The EU' choice of transferring responsibilities disregards its partner's context and limitations putting at the risk of potential societal and security instabilities as long as the humans are kept away from its borders.⁴⁹⁹

Mr. Bourita, the minister for foreign affairs has also highlighted the inequalities in the relations between Morocco and the EU on trade which compromises Morocco's competitive advantage and its youth employment needs especially in the sector of Agriculture. The EU' choice of turning toward the Asian market has affected Morocco' reminding once again of the EU choice of policy making based on unilateral interest

⁴⁹⁸ Jassim Ahdani, "Mustapha El Khalfi: Le Maroc refuse d'être le gendarme de l'immigration clandestine », **Telquel**, N.1016, 28-3.11.2022, https://telquel.ma/2018/09/07/mustapha-el-khalfi-le-maroc-refuse-detre-le-gendarme-de-limmigration-clandestine_1609841, (15.10.2022).

⁴⁹⁹ Agence de Presse Marocaine, RME.

and need to the neglect of those of the partner states. This inequality reflects directly on the Moroccan job sector considering the importance of agriculture sector and the issue of youth bulge professional integration.⁵⁰⁰

Calling for the reconsideration of the debt conditionality, the King argued that the Western nations, ignoring the histories and development process of African states have been waiting half a century for certain African nation states to achieve political and economic success that is comparable to their own and also impose conditions that are impossible to achieve.⁵⁰¹

4.2.1.4. France, Spain, Italy' Unilateral Choices against Morocco's Interests

The domination of the European interest over that of Morocco does not only reflect in the EU' policy choices but also in the policy choices of western European member states breaching the mutual interests of the EU-Morocco cooperation and Morocco's critical national interests. Moroccan power holders have criticized at several occasions the western European states' choice of taking unilateral actions that go against the mutual interests of the EU-Morocco partnership. Policy choices by France, Spain and Italy have made it more difficult to achieve the EU-Morocco cooperation objectives. Besides the border management related policy choices, Western European countries have also acted against some of Morocco' critical national and security interests such as Spain's protection and hosting of a member of the Algeria funded Polisario targeting Morocco' Western Sahara.

In reaction to France's decision to restrict visa policies for Moroccan nationals, the minister for foreign affairs Mr. Bourita expressed in a press conference that France's decision was unjustifiable and was against the common interest of consular cooperation in the fight against irregular migration. Morocco, added the minister;

*has always approached the issue of migration with a sense of responsibility, the need for a balance between the facilitation of the movement of people (students, businessmen, etc.), the fight against irregular migration and the firm treatment reserved for those in an irregular situation. Morocco has in line of the cooperation interests issued 400 Laissez-passer in just one year.*⁵⁰²

⁵⁰⁰ Fox, p. 4.

⁵⁰¹ Barma.

⁵⁰² Agence de Presse Marocaine, « M. Bourita Juge 'Injustifiée' la Decision de la France de Durcir les Conditions d'Octroi de Visas aux Marocains », **Maghreb Arab Press**, Rabat, 28.09.2021, <https://www.mapnews.ma/fr/actualites/politique/m-bourita-juge-injustifi%C3%A9e-la-d%C3%A9cision-de-la-france-de-durcir-les-conditions> , (03.12.2022), (FVISA).

France's choice to act unilaterally on taking such a decision, breaching the interests of the framework of the EU-Morocco cooperation that guides the migration management does not reflect the reality of consular cooperation between France and Morocco.

In an interview with the French Newspaper Le Monde, the minister for foreign affairs Mr. Bourita, criticized Italy's choice to close its borders with Libya. According to Mr. Bourita, this decision disregarding the consequences of this action has redirected migration flows and trafficking networks toward Morocco-Spain border. By so doing, Italy has exerted further pressure on the western Mediterranean border and on Morocco as a transit country which is already witnessing important flows and has become the primary target for irregular migrants. The massive flows, stated the king, have become a major security and humanitarian issue.⁵⁰³

Western European states lack of will to cooperate at the level of the consulates and at border levels added to the EU' border approach has turned the whole responsibility, pressures and security issues to Morocco to deal with. The fact that these approaches have not resulted into reducing the flows and their intensity is witnessed through the migrants finding alternative ways such as using the sea that leads to human atrocities related to the drowning of migrants in the Mediterranean. In addition to this, these EU and western member states self-interested unilateral choices have presented Morocco with an important challenge for dealing with trafficking and smuggling networks which as a result of these policies have saw an unprecedented increase in Morocco's border.

Another similar issue related to Western European states lack of cooperation and respect for the partnership's mutual interests and Morocco's security and national objectives is Spain's support to the Polisario guerilla group leading to a diplomatic crisis with Morocco followed by a migration crisis. The Algeria funded Polisario which targets Morocco's Western Sahara region has been accused of multiple crimes, including terror attacks and terrorism. Upon Spain' hosting of one of their member, Brahim Ghali, who was searched for by the authorities, Mr. Bourita upon Morocco's cutting relations with Spain and also letting migrants cross the borders expressed that Morocco does not have a problem with the EU rather with Spain over a crisis that was willingly sparked by Spain. Morocco's national integrity and the western Sahara is one of Morocco' primary national interests which Spain irresponsibly chose to breach

⁵⁰³ Bozonnet.

disrespecting the bilateral relations with Morocco and the common interests with Morocco and the common partnership under the EU-Morocco partnership.⁵⁰⁴

The minister added that Morocco has no obligation to defend any borders other than its own. Morocco has no inclination to serve as Europe's policeman or concierge. The efforts made by Morocco to protect borders for which European member states have not even been grateful for were done in the context of a well-established partnership between Morocco and Spain and Morocco and Europe. In case the fundamental principles of this partnership are not respected by the EU member states, one shall ask Spain whether they consulted with Europe before acting against and violating a partner's primary interest. The EU-Morocco partnership added the minister is not one sided. Mr. Bourita also added that if Europe has never had to worry about its western border, it is not because it is not targeted by trafficking networks and criminal gangs, rather because a partner nation state has deployed 20,000 of its own security forces to protect it. In only three years, Morocco has prevented 14,000 irregular migration attempts, dismantled over 8,000 trafficking cells and foiled 80 assault attempts on the city of Ceuta. The minister also added that although Morocco had no issue with the EU and was overall satisfied with the partnership, it remains of paramount importance that the EU member states respect the national interests of Morocco and the cooperation framework and principles before acting unilaterally and knowingly against Morocco's national interests.⁵⁰⁵

4.2.2. Resistance to the EU' Border Domination: Humanitarian Crises and Trafficking Activities


The EU' choice of securitization and externalization of migration through the frontier approach has had the paradoxical effect of increasing patterns of "crises" rather than preventing them and effectively handling the issue. The EU and Western member states choice of increasing fences against the migrants and transferring to neighbor countries have led to patterns of resistance from the migrants leading to migration turning further into "irregular" one and the increase of related trafficking and smuggling activities. The EU and member states' patterns of domination to

⁵⁰⁴ Agence de Presse Marocaine, « Mr. Bourita : Le Maroc n'a pas de problème avec l'Union Européenne, mais avec l'Espagne qui Doit Trouver une Solution », **Ministère de La Jeunesse, de la Culture et de la Communication, Département de la Communication, Rabat**, 24.05.2021, <https://www.maroc.ma/fr/actualites/mrbouritale-maroc-na-pas-de-probleme-avec-lue-mais-avec-lespagne-qui-doit-trouver-une> , (02.01.2022), (MPE).

⁵⁰⁵ Agence de Presse Marocaine, MPE.

responding to the challenge of migration have resulted into increasing the pressure on Morocco to unilaterally manage the migrants and the related smuggling activities. Morocco's border has become a site for unconventional security issues related to the migrants and trafficking networks as a result of the EU's choice of increasing fences which has not been effective in effectively tackling the issue. The EU securitization approach has had the paradoxical effect of the creation of further security and humanitarian crises rather than maintaining peace and stability. The western Mediterranean Sea has become a complex area of unresolved nation-states versus migrants' interests characterized by human loss and a vicious circle of insecurity.

Figure 10: Illegal Border Crossings on the Western Mediterranean Route 2008-2021



Source: Frontex, **Migratory routes: Annual Risk Analysis Report**, Frontex: A Body of the European Union, Warsaw, 2021, pp. 3-64, (MGR).

As can be seen through the above figure, the EU securitization approach toward the migration issue has not been successful in decreasing irregular migrants crossing toward the Union. This migration crisis is more a consequence of the EU's response to migration than of migration itself. In other words, the likelihood of a "migration crisis" increases as the EU's outsourcing policy and the number of its borders and barriers increase

Despite Morocco's efforts to tackle the security issues, regularize the situation of sub-Saharan African migrants and negotiate with African partner states repatriation, this approach has been ineffective in reducing or solving the migration issue. Migrants have showed a persistence and insistence on crossing the fences

despite the related human dangers as well as finding alternative ways to the EU' border approach.

As a result of the EU' bias toward African migration that stems from lack of knowledge about the African context and being, the lack of will to know, ideological and xenophobic perceptions based on colonial superiority are guiding the EU' policy choice toward migration management. Instead of finding solutions to a shared problem, the EU according to the foreign minister Bourita has chosen the approach of naming and shaming.⁵⁰⁶ The EU' approach choosing securitization over consensus, shared responsibility and mutual solidarity consists of erroneously blaming transit countries, identifying perpetrators rather than solutions. This approach has led to prioritizing securitization, the frontier approach, building fences and outsourcing to transit states that is only leading to further security crises rather than mutual peace and development.

As stated by the Moroccan minister for foreign affairs, Mr. Bourita, although Morocco has made significant contributions to the protection of common security by improving legal pathways and regularizing the status of over 50,000 African migrants, the shift to the western Mediterranean has had a significant impact on Morocco.⁵⁰⁷

In 2022, a confrontation between the Moroccan border police, the migrants and migrants' traffickers in the Ceuta-Melilla border led to the death of more than 35 migrants. In the incident, asylum seekers and migrants mainly from Sudan and South Sudan trying to cross the fence separating Morocco' Nador from the Spanish enclave Ceuta resulted into the death of as high as 37 persons and the injury of dozens of migrants. Injuries were recorded on the line of the Moroccan security officers also in their clash with the migrants' smugglers. This violence has been described to have been accepted by the EU as part of their migration control toolbox according to Judith Sunderland, the associate director for Human Rights Watch Europe and Central Asia Director.⁵⁰⁸

Mentioning the Cassiago forest violent events, close to the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, and in Nador, close to Spanish enclave of Melilla, Morocco stated the Minister would not tolerate to serve as a platform for illegal activities related to the

⁵⁰⁶ Malika EL Kettani, "Nasser Bourita : Le Phénomène Migratoire est Exagéré », **Le Courrier de L'Atlas**, 27.02.2021, <https://www.lecourrierdelatlas.com/nasserbouritalephenomenemigratoireestexagere/>, (12.10.2022).

⁵⁰⁷ Bozonnet.

⁵⁰⁸ Emma Smith, "What is Behind the Death at Morocco' Land Border with the EU?", **The New Humanitarian**, 8.09.2022, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2022/09/08/Migrant-crisis-Morocco-Spain-border>, (08.10.2022).

migrants that refuse to remain in Morocco. The security situation in the Northern region has become intolerable. Morocco has approached migration management as a priority issue and has adopted concerted efforts to meet the responsibilities to its citizens and migrants, as well as balancing between its own security needs and interests, those of its European partners and African neighbors. These efforts, however, remain taken for granted by the EU member states who adopt an approach of inequality prioritizing their own immediate needs over the security and peace needs of Morocco that is becoming a target of trafficking and smuggling networks as a result of the EU migration policy choices.⁵⁰⁹

Smuggling and human trafficking have in the recent decades increasingly targeted Morocco. According to the Wali Director of Migration and Border Surveillance for the Moroccan Ministry of Interior Mr. Khalid Zerouali, a growing number of transnational criminal specialists is increasingly targeting Morocco via Algeria, leading to a growing number of migrants residing there seeking to cross the iron fence encircling Ceuta-Melilla. Accordingly, 145 assaults by irregular migrants have been repelled by Morocco from the region of Ceuta since 2016. Mr. Zerouali explained that Morocco has established order forces that have responded to these assaults with professionalism and respect for law and order. According to Mr. Zerouali, more than 360.000 irregular migration attempts have failed since 2017 (63.000 in 2021 and 26,000 through May 2022). The director also stated that Morocco has been able to dismantle over 1300 trafficking networks in the last five years (256 in 2021 and 100 by May 2022) without receiving any recognition from the EU.⁵¹⁰

The director of the Strategic Center for Africa and the Sahara, Mr. Abdelattif Fatifi also pointed out to the role that Algeria plays by pointing to its role in the recent violent events of Ceuta involving irregular migrants and resulting from smugglers attacks on Moroccan border forces. According to Mr. Fatihi, Algeria plays the irregular migration card to settle its political accounts with Morocco. Mr. Fatihi stated that the attempts to cross the border separating Ceuta and Melilla are a constant challenge. As a result of the political, security and climatic reversals in sub-Saharan Africa, these intrusion episodes continue to recur.⁵¹¹

⁵⁰⁹ Bozonnet.

⁵¹⁰ Faras Ghani, « Q&A: Morocco' Border Chief Hits Back at Criticism over Migrants », **AL Jazeera**, 18.11.2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/18/qa-moroccos-border-chief-hits-back-at-criticism-over-migrants>, (14.09.2022).

⁵¹¹ Groupe Le Matin, "Immigration Clandestine : Pourquoi L'Union Européenne Doit Soutenir Davantage le Maroc », **Le Matin**, 3.07.2022, <https://lematin.ma/express/2022/lutte-contre-limmigration-irreguliere-lue-soutenir-efforts-maroc/377981.html>, (05.10.2022).

According to Mr. Fatihi, Morocco has employed important efforts to secure its borders and those of European neighbor states from irregular migration. In so doing, Moroccan police officers are often forced to clash with smuggling and trafficking networks resulting into injury even death of migrants. The director, thus, argued against the EU approach that is based on wire building, securitization and border control.⁵¹²

A stampede and a fall over the barbed wire contributed to the increased death rate among migrants during the last incursion, according to the director. Morocco opposes the narrow focus on border control, wire building, and securitization approach to the issue of migration for this reason. According to Mr. Fatihi, these policy decisions have been ineffective in reducing or addressing the problem of irregular migration. This approach has been ineffective in reducing and solving the migration issue. In fact, it has only led to increase in related security crises, mostly left on the Morocco's shoulders and responsibility.⁵¹³

4.2.3. Morocco's Alternative Royal Vision for the Management of Migration

*Between unacceptable laxity, intolerable full securitization is the third path of solidary sovereignty versus exclusive nationalism, multilateralism versus ostracism, shared responsibility versus institutional indifference.*⁵¹⁴

The royal vision to migration is the Moroccan alternative approach to the EU approach of frontier and securitization. Framed by the King Mohammed VI who was appointed as the "leader of African Migration", the royal vision highlight Morocco's approach that is characterized by humanism, volunteerism and pragmatism. This vision is based on an approach that highlights three important pillars to the effective management of migration: shared responsibility, mutual solidarity and cooperation. The Moroccan royal vision consists of: a bi-continental cooperation between the EU and AU on migration, the African Agenda for Migration (AAM), the 5+5 axes and the Marrakesh Pact.

Speaking at the Intergovernmental Conference on Migration in Marrakesh, the King Mohammed VI argued that Morocco's policy interests related to the royal vision stem from Morocco's historical interest in the issue, Morocco's geopolitical position

⁵¹² Groupe Le Matin.

⁵¹³ Groupe Le Matin.

⁵¹⁴ Le Ministère de la Jeunesse, de la Culture et de la Communication du Royaume du Maroc, MRAMCI.

and its own leadership will. Morocco unlike the EU chooses to adopt humanism over securitization. The royal vision is voluntarist in its philosophy, global in its content pragmatic in its method and responsible in its action between the legitimate interests of states and the protection of the human rights of the migrants. The royal vision, anticipates the future in order to establish regulated mobility, it balances between realism and voluntarism as well as the interests of states and the human rights of the migrants.⁵¹⁵

Speaking at the 29th African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, the Moroccan Prince Moulay Rachid expressed that considering the heavy consequences of the EU' securitization on African youth and its ineffectiveness, Morocco is submitting an African Agenda on Migration that focuses on the African perspectives on migration, its stakes and challenges.⁵¹⁶

To build consensus between the European and African member states, their needs and different perceptions, the royal vision was articulated in the African Agenda for Migration, which anticipates the importance and significance of knowledge regarding the dynamic of migration. The African Agenda for Migration adopted by the Conference of the African Union in January 2018, highlights the principles of the royal vision alternative approach to the migration management. These principles are; border management and the protection of the human rights of migrants, migration and development objectives to promote the positive impacts of the migrants on the host states, emphasis on collective accountability, responsible sovereignty and humanist pragmatism. The securitization of migration is considered both repressive and discouraging. The royal vision emphasizes the importance of the youth integration and the provision of opportunity which is a crucial component of a successful migration management strategy. At every stage of migratory routes, there shall be a degree of integration and complementarity between development and migration, the African youth voices shall be heard.⁵¹⁷

Acknowledging the importance of the knowledge production on the topic of migration, the King Mohammed VI under the framework of the African Agenda for Migration initiated the creation of the AMO. The observatory serves as a regional mechanism for the collection, analysis, management and exchange of data on migration. Knowledge production by the observatory would help overcome the unfounded myths around migration guiding European and global policy making on

⁵¹⁵ The Embassy of Morocco in Vietnam.

⁵¹⁶ Le Ministère de la Jeunesse, de la Culture et de la Communication, MRAMCI.

⁵¹⁷ The Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco in Vietnam.

migration toward the South. It will also facilitate decision making coordination and growth in Morocco, between Morocco, the EU and the AU.⁵¹⁸

The observatory shall promote coordination between African states, African and European member states through the engagement of the regional organizations of the EU and the AU. While promoting a positive migration dynamic, the observatory would also promote consensus, understanding and pragmatism over fear. Created at the initiative of the King Mohammed VI, the observatory, expressed Mr. Bourita, was a significant step towards advancing cooperation on the subject of migration at the African level. The observatory will serve the purpose of comprehension, anticipation and proposal. The first of its kind is that with the purpose of advancing migration governance.⁵¹⁹ The previous head of government El Othmani, also argued that the observatory would highlight the positive aspects of migration by encouraging regular migration, protecting the rights of migrants and promoting new investment in development.⁵²⁰

Mr. Bourita also expressed that considering the growing geopolitical importance and complexity of the Western Mediterranean area, Morocco's contemporary politics' major objective is the establishment of a model partnership between Morocco the EU and its Southern neighbors. To do so, Morocco under the royal vision for migration seeks to build a bi-continental cooperation between the EU and the AU for migration management and related issues.⁵²¹

Having the primary aim to demystify the migration issue from unfounded stereotypes, the Moroccan alternative approach seeks achieving a bi-continental cooperation between the EU and AU through the medium of Morocco that shall bring all concerned parties together and ensure an equitable sharing of responsibility. This

⁵¹⁸ The Kingdom of Morocco Ministry of Foreign Affairs African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, "Mr. Nasser Bourita, and the Commissioner for Social Affairs of the African Union, Ms. Amira El Fadil Inaugurated on December 18, 2020, the African Migration Observatory in Rabat", **Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Rabat**, 18.12.2020, <https://www.diplomatie.ma/en/inauguration-rabat-african-migration-observatory> , (13.01.2021), (AMO).

⁵¹⁹ Susanna Spurgeon, "King Mohammed VI gives Report to AU on Migration Observatory in Rabat", **Morocco World News**, 10.02.2020, <https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2020/02/293343/king-mohammed-vi-gives-report-to-au-on-migration-observatory-in-rabat>, (07.06.2021).

⁵²⁰ Yassine Toumi, "Le discours royal lu par El Othmani : L'Afrique sera un acteur central du pacte de Marrakech », **Telquel**, No. 1016, 28.11.2022, https://telquel.ma/2018/12/10/lafrique-sera-un-acteur-central-du-pacte-de-marrakech-le-discours-royal-lu-par-el-othmani_1621404, (09.01.2023).

⁵²¹ The Kingdom of Morocco Ministry of Foreign Affairs African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, « En Méditerranée, l'Action du Maroc est Guidée par une 'Vision Royale volontariste', a Déclaré, jeudi, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, de la Coopération Africaine et des Marocains Résidant à l'Etranger M. Nasser Bourita, dans une Allocution Prononcée à l'Occasion du la 16 Eme Réunion des Ministres des Affaires Etrangères du Dialogue en Méditerranée occidentale 5+5 », **Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Rabat**, 22.10.2020, <https://www.diplomatie.ma/en/node/2035> , (11.12.2021), (RDMO).

partnership, however, stated the minister being more necessary than before cannot be achieved without overcoming the traditional obstacles to it.⁵²²

The bi-continental cooperation seeking to balance the interests of the nation states of the South and those of the west, the interests of the citizens and those of the nation-states, security and development needs would serve achieving an effective solution to migration management than the EU' approach of outsourcing and securitizing.

Mr. Bourita, Morocco's foreign affairs minister, speaking at the 8th conference for dialogue 5+5 Migration and Development expressed that Morocco's migration management was guided by the royal vision. The royal vision is primarily focused on overcoming the myths around the migration issue which has become a global norm.

Mr. Bourita, the minister for foreign affairs has during the 8th Ministerial Conference for Dialogue on Migration and Development highlighted the five axes that support the bi-continental cooperation designed by the King Mohammed VI. First is the need for clear and precise objectives to facilitate action, cooperation and optimal practical outcomes. Second, rapprochement between the policies of partner countries, and the facilitation of regular migration for the benefit of the sending and the receiving states, third, information exchange in the field if the fight against migration and trafficking activities, fourth, achieving a sustainable solution to the migration issue and finally, the need to utilize and implement the required measures and mechanism. During the Barcelona Process, Mr. Bourita also expressed that the Moroccan leadership had the conviction that the thematic leadership of the 5+5 at the Mediterranean level and beyond could serve as a precursor to the bi-continental consensus that Morocco seeks.⁵²³

During a meeting with the Danish foreign minister, the minister Mr. Bourita expressed that migration is a complex issue that requires collaboration of all partners at the regional and global level. Migration, stated the minister requires a global perspective that takes into consideration the needs, interests and contexts of all concerned parties.⁵²⁴ Morocco, stated Mr. Bourita during the visual Session of the

⁵²² Barma.

⁵²³ The Kingdom of Morocco Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, "Mr. Bourita: Declaration of 8th 5+5 Dialogue Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, Consensual Document with Practical Provisions", **Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Rabat**, 02.03.2020, <https://www.diplomatie.ma/en/mrbourita-declaration-8th-55-dialogue-ministerial-conference-migration-and-development-consensual-document-practical-provisions> , (03.11.2022), (MCMDC).

⁵²⁴ Chakir Alaoui, Mohammed Boukouyane, "Nasser Bourita : La lutte contre l'immigration clandestine necessite 'une cooperation collective' », **Le 360**, 30.06.2021, <https://fr.le360.ma/politique/video-la-lutte-contre-limmigration-clandestine-necessite-une-cooperation-collective-affirme-nasser-241264>, (09.11.2022).

General Assembly of the United Nations, has played a pioneering role for the maintenance of peace in the Mediterranean. Working with the EU and the AU, Morocco also engages EU member states such as France and international community through the UN whereby it has participated in several peacekeeping operations such as those in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Central Africa, South Sudan.⁵²⁵

Morocco's alternative approach to securitization and externalization adopted by the EU and Western states advocates the importance of multilateralism, international cooperation and the commitment to the implementation of the Global Pact and the Marrakesh Pact. During a speech given at the Intergovernmental Conference on Migration in Marrakesh, the King Mohammed VI argued that there are five important issues pertaining to migration: security and development, human rights and stereotypes, sovereignty rights and multilateralism. Morocco's international engagement in the area of migration, stated the King, aligns with Morocco's international engagement through the global pact. Morocco's constant pursuit of novel understandings is framed around the principles of collective accountability, responsible sovereignty and humanist pragmatism. The King also emphasized on the importance of the implementation of the global pact by the signatory nations. The global pact, according to the King Mohammed VI, remains a promise that will be judged by history.⁵²⁶

The Marrakesh Pact was framed by the minister Mr. Bourita to have become a significant standard that aligns migration policies as closely as possible with the strictest requirements. The Marrakesh Pact argued the minister shall remain the "mantra" of the migration management partnership to preserve the credibility of multilateralism and the efficacy of international cooperation. The United Nations Network on Migration (UNNM) is according to Mr. Bourita a manifestation of the transnational nature of the migration issue as envisioned by the Marrakesh Pact. The Marrakesh Pact argued the minister is not an end in itself but only makes sense when is implemented. The minister also added that Morocco' interest in finding a collective solution to the migration issue stems from Morocco being a land of emigration,

⁵²⁵ The Kingdom of Morocco Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, « Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, de la Coopération Africaine et des Marocains Résidant à l'Etranger, M. Nasser Bourita a Mis en Avant le Rôle Pionnier du Maroc en Matière d'Immigration, de Lutte Antiterroriste, de Maintien de la Paix et d'Action Climatique », **Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rabat**, 27.09.2021, <https://www.diplomatie.ma/fr/ag-de-lonu-m-nasser-bourita-met-en-exergue-le-r%C3%B4le-pionnier-du-maroc-en-mati%C3%A8re-d%E2%80%99immigration-de-lutte-antiterroriste-et-de-maintien-de-la-paix> , (22.06.2022), (RPMITPC).

⁵²⁶ The Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco in Vietnam.

immigration and transit making migration an ingrained part of the Moroccan culture. Under the leadership of Morocco, the majority of the Marrakesh pact signatories were located in Africa in addition to the UN Network on Migration Data Centers, one of which is based in Morocco's Rabat city.⁵²⁷

The previous head of the government, Saadedine El Othmani, stated on behalf of the King Mohammed VI that the greatest obstacle facing the Marrakesh pact was the international community's lack of responsible solidarity. The success of the Marrakesh pact argued the then-head of government lies in the commitment of the partner states. Mr. El Othmani also argued that; "The international community shall demonstrate that multilateralism is not the party of empty chair, desertion and apathy".⁵²⁸

As a result, it was important to unite against isolationism to bring about structural responses that would be characterized by dialogue and international cooperation in the face of one of the century's major challenges. Cooperation and multilateralism argued the minister is the only path to solving the migration issue which cannot be dealt with unilaterally by any single nation-state.⁵²⁹

Mr. Othmani also defined Morocco's alternative approach, to be framed through the Marrakesh Pact which converges Morocco's national and continental vision around migration. Mr. Othmani, speaking on behalf of the King Mohammed VI, also argued that it was time to incorporate humanity in the process of preserving structural order.⁵³⁰

The page of history being written today in Marrakesh brings the international community closer to a more just and humane international migration order, added Mr. Othmani.⁵³¹

Moroccan King Mohammed VI advocating Morocco's alternative approach to the Western states' securitization approach argued that the management of migration

⁵²⁷ The Kingdom of Morocco Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, « M. Nasser Bourita : Le Maroc ne Ménage Aucun Effort pour Contribuer à la Mise En Oeuvre Les Objectifs du Pacte Mondial pour des Migrations Ordonnées, et Régulières (Pacte de Marrakech) a Affirmé, Mardi, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, de la Coopération Africaine et des Marocains Résidant à l'Etranger », **Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Rabat**, 01.12.2020, <https://www.diplomatie.ma/fr/m-nasser-bourita-le-maroc-ne-m%C3%A9nage-aucun-effort-pour-contribuer-%C3%A0-la-mise-en-%C5%93uvre-des-objectifs-du-pacte-de-marrakech> , (12.09.2022), (MPM).

The Kingdom of Morocco Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, "MFA Nasser Bourita: Champion Countries Meeting Confirms Morocco's Leadership", **Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Rabat**, 25.03.2022, <https://www.diplomatie.ma/en/mfa-nasser-bourita-champion-countries-meeting-confirms-moroccos-leadership> , (04.07.2022), (CCMML).

⁵²⁸ Toumi.

⁵²⁹ Toumi.

⁵³⁰ Toumi.

⁵³¹ Toumi.

is a delicate matter which calls for rethinking the European partners' traditional approaches to common issues and interests that is excessively tilted in favor of one side without the other. Although the EU' approach met the European member states' immediate needs, added the King, it could not effectively and permanently solve the issue.⁵³²

The growing geopolitical importance and complexity of the Western Mediterranean region was highlighted by the minister for foreign Affairs, Mr. Bourita, who argued that regional and global developments have contributed to the growth of the Mediterranean region's complexity and its development. The challenges related to the peace and security of the area could not be solved through eurocentrism, securitization and ostracism. Instead, it was time to engage in collective responsibility, building consensus and shared solidarity. For this reason, Morocco has engaged in a number of actions with both European and African partner states for the maintenance of peace in the Mediterranean.⁵³³

In relation to the Western Mediterranean rising peace and security challenges, Mr. Bourita argued that there was a new challenge to modern nation states in relation to the migration management which is maritime sovereignty and responsibility related to the rise of overlapping areas. The sea argued the minister is more than a border, it is a space for connection, security, resource sharing and cooperation in terms of relations with neighboring nations and the rest of the world. Under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, Morocco adopts a maritime vision that guarantees its maritime sovereignty while enhancing these areas for connectivity, cooperation and development opportunities. The EU' choice of policy, however, has led to this common area become one of disagreements, human atrocities and security matters.⁵³⁴

In a nutshell, as pointed out by the director of the Strategic Center for Africa and Sahara Mr. Abdelfatah Fatihi, Morocco's alternative approach lies on uniting the perspectives of Africans and Europeans around a new vision that views migration as a tool for development that must be managed in accordance with the needs of the sending and receiving nation-states. In order to accomplish this, it is important to

⁵³² Toumi.

⁵³³ The Kingdom of Morocco' Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates, MPM.

⁵³⁴ Aymeric Chauprade, "Interview with Mr. Nasser Bourita: Minister of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates", **Marine & Oceans**, 25.08.2021, <https://marine-oceans.com/en/interview-with-mr-nasser-bourita-minister-of-foreign-affairs-african-cooperation-and-moroccan-expatriates/>, (10.11.2022).

transcend the narrow security approach adopted by the European nation states in favor of a global approach to development.⁵³⁵

Morocco's alternative approach is based on advancing bilateral, regional and international cooperation that is characterized by equitable responsibility sharing, collective commitment, solidarity and building consensus.

Equality and cooperation would not, however, according to the Moroccan leaders be achieved in the context of the domination of the European perceptions and western interests over the topic narrowed around security and securitization. This domination, according to the Moroccan sovereign, is maintained through the dominance over the knowledge production over migration and the use of coercive power through the border and frontier approach. The major tools advanced by Morocco under the royal vision for migration consist of the AAM, the AMO, the Bi-continental cooperation and the Marrakesh and Global Pact. Through the observatory knowledge production from the African perspective the Moroccan sovereign aims to overcome the EU' and Western domination over the creation of reality on the migration topic through unfounded myths and stereotypes toward the African and the Southerner in general. Bringing the nation states of the South and those of the West through the EU-AU bi-continental cooperation, Morocco aims to build mutual understanding and equitable sharing of responsibility between the sending, transit and receiving nation-states. Under the EU-preferred transit approach, Morocco like other transit states remains at the front of managing all responsibilities related to migration which is ineffective, unrealistic and unfair. Commitment through international cooperation is also essential to a peaceful and effective management to the long term and complex challenge of migration.

4.2.4. Morocco's Expectations from the EU-Morocco Cooperation

Having signed the 2019 Partnership for Equality and Shared Prosperity under the framework of the EUGS, Morocco and the EU promised to give a new impetus to their partnership and overcome the traditional challenges to a successful mutual cooperation. Whether the EU-Morocco partnership could become a privileged partnership could be answered through the persistence of the traditional challenges to the partnership under the new partnership, mainly that of equality and the consideration of mutual prosperity. During an interview with EURACTIV, the

⁵³⁵ Groupe Le Matin.

Moroccan minister for foreign affairs asked whether Morocco was seeking a 'privileged partnership' with the EU, the minister Mr. Bourita argued that it was not about achieving a 'privileged partnership', instead about achieving a cooperation of equals deserved by both the EU and Morocco. Morocco's expectation from the cooperation is, thus, equality and not privilege. While Morocco's ambitions toward the cooperation with the EU remain very high, Morocco is also highly pragmatic. The EU-Morocco partnership, according to Mr. Bourita has been tested and challenged but has over the time showed resilience resulting to the development of strong ties considering the level of common interests. Morocco, added the minister, has always been a driving force in the EU relations with its Southern neighbors. The new partnership signed by the partners has paved the way for a new chapter in the bilateral relations implying a paradigm shift toward equality. Equality in the partnership does not only fulfill Morocco's expectations, it would also serve the interests of the EU. Morocco, as a result does not seek exclusivity and privilege, instead co-development, growth and complementarity. Equality remains a challenge in the EU-Morocco partnership especially in the critical areas of traded and migration.⁵³⁶

The EU-Morocco partnership argued the minister is a long term achievement that is driven by sustainable dynamics but which remains challenged by issues of equality and lack of consensus on strategic issues. Morocco, however, remains optimistic and demanding on this subject. The bilateral relation between the EU-Morocco is positive because it is the first of its kind in Morocco's southern neighborhood and it is demanding because Morocco aspires to maximize its potential within the context of a win-win cooperation that is based on mutual respect and trust. The challenges to achieving the cooperation's full potential are several and range from the issue of socioeconomic development and climate change to fisheries agreement, trade, youth employment and the Western Sahara.⁵³⁷

4.2.5. Morocco' Expectations on the Migration Management

Considering the expectations of Morocco on the management of irregular migration between the EU-Morocco, Mr. Bourita argued that migration was the most critical topic between the EU and Morocco. Mr. Bourita also added that the EU needs North African partners not only on the matter of migration management but also on

⁵³⁶ EURACTIV.

⁵³⁷ EURACTIV.

other strategic issues of shared interest. Migration, argued the minister is not a standalone topic and is not a matter of control. For this reason, Morocco rejects the EU-funded center in Morocco because it views them as ineffective. Detention centers, argued Mr. Bourita, do not prevent the migration flows. In fact, they would be counterproductive as they would increase the risk of human smuggling and trafficking. These EU preferred courses of actions lack a long term perspective. Migration routes are likely to change and these tools do not protect the human rights of the migrants.⁵³⁸


On the other hand, migration, argued Mr. Bourita, from the perspective of Morocco is a matter of shared responsibility and it can be a potent tool for development. The EU-Morocco cooperation on migration shall have a human dimension that is centered around promoting the well-being of the migrants. Mr. Bourita also emphasizes the importance of the EU's reconsideration of the concept of mobility to include a two process that establishes the rights and responsibilities of the migrants and the host communities. Morocco, argues the minister, unlike the EU seeks a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach. The EU' approach of increasing financial reward shall be viewed in the context of the increasing pressure on the western Mediterranean route. Financial support by the EU shall also not be viewed as a reward, instead a proportional response to the pressure Morocco endures as a result of the EU and member states policy choices.

Additionally, in rethinking the concept of mobility and its approach to it, the EU, argued the minister shall also increase its goals toward Morocco. Morocco argues the minister expects the EU to have a consistent migration policy. According to Mr. Bourita, there are currently more migration policies than nation states as is exemplified by the European Council. The EU' passive approach of maintaining coherence through outsourcing and applying pressure on transit states is not a viable solution. Approaching the issue of migration in its true light, a securitized natural phenomenon will lead to more peaceful and productive solutions.⁵³⁹

⁵³⁸ Fox, p. 5.

⁵³⁹ Bozonnet.

Figure 11: Bilateral Level Domination and Resistance: Externalization Policy



Source: Created by the author

4.2.6. Assessment of the Bilateral Level of Analysis

The EU-Morocco partnership on the issue of migration is characterized by patterns and forces of domination based on notions related to colonialism such as superiority, inferiority, less sovereign, more sovereign that are guided by Eurocentric fear of the other, lack of will to know and disregard of the security and peace interests and needs of the Moroccan partner states. The priority of the interests of western European nation' states guides the EU' frontier approach which disregards the border security as well as the national and societal security of Morocco. Besides disregarding the Moroccan postcolonial development process related to its own youth bulge issue, the EU' securitized approach has posited Morocco between the European intense border control and Sub-Saharan African states lack of will to cooperate on returns and border control leading to an unfair responsibility share putting pressure on Morocco. This approach has made Morocco's frontier a cite of security crises and activities such as trafficking, violence as a result from crashes between border guards and the migrants as well as humanitarian crises related to the migrants' resistance to the EU' barbed wires. The EU' on the migration management has the expectation from Morocco to serve as a border policeman and buffer zone from transit migrants disregarding Morocco's context, peace and security and emphasizing traditional colonialist patterns of relations rather than a partnership based on equality and shared prosperity as promised under the EUGS partnership. This approach has had the paradoxical effect of leading to increased insecurity issues and has not been effective in reducing nor in coping with migration. Morocco under the royal vision advocates an alternative approach that is guided by bi-continental cooperation between Africa and Europe, consensus, demystification of migration, shared responsibility, solidary cooperation and inclusive knowledge production on the migration issue that represents the African context and side of reality. Morocco' major adopted policies are the Agenda for Migration, the bi-continental cooperation between the EU and AU as the creation of the AMO for research on African migration. Morocco emphasized the role of the Marrakesh pact, the global pact, regional and international cooperation guided by the principles of multilateralism that balance between peace and security, the needs of the states and the population, the interests of the South and the North. Most importantly, the Moroccan political elite perceive that migration is a natural phenomenon that could become a concentration of opportunities for both Europe and Africa if demystified from Eurocentric myths, ostracism, xenophobic ideologies.

Reality based pragmatism that treats migration for what is can help deal with its security issues while benefiting both continents from its potential advantages. Migration became a security issue as a result of the EU' securitization, it also became a crisis due to the EU approach to it. African migration is also far from being an invasion, a perspective reflecting the European colonialist stereotype of the African based on fear and othering. A migrant, thus, does not have to be characterized as less or more human based on the side of the border on which he stands. Security, peace and sovereignty of the nation-states of the South are not expected to be compromised for those of the global North. This approach reproduces the underlying issues, such as those related to postcolonial development process and the European introduced notion of the frontier affecting the African political, ideological stability, security and development; thereby reproducing migration flows that are more irregular and violent.

4.3. DOMESTIC LEVEL ANALYSIS

This section of the analysis evaluates the efficacy of the EUGS's bottom-up, principled pragmatism-based approach to addressing the underlying causes of irregular migration in Morocco. In light of the structural changes facing the EU in the post-Arab Spring at the international, regional and domestic level, the EU decided to take a geopolitical turn in its foreign policy to guarantee its unity, continuity, global position and credibility through the EUGS. Under the EUGS, the EU asserts that it will concentrate on the local agents of change, also known as the microphysical agents of power. This approach is based on the social relationships between the EU and the local actors framed as relational power, as opposed to normative power that targets the government. Under the EUGS approach to foreign intervention, the EU's principled pragmatism shifts from influencing and pressuring the government to influencing and building the capacity of local actors, such as civil associations.

This pragmatic and relational approach is predicated on the notion that, in light of the results of the Arab Spring, regime change can be detrimental to the peace and security of the Union and the region. This study defines this approach as a de-politicization of the EU's foreign policy. This level of analysis studies how this pragmatic approach of the EU consolidates domestic patterns of domination related to both colonialism and authoritarianism and leads to the exacerbation of everyday life forms of resistance leading to irregular migration rather than everyday life forms

of resilience. The reason for this is that it results into patterns of state domination and population resistance rather than state and societal resilience as claimed by the EUGS.

4.3.1. The EU' Bottom-Up Approach in Morocco: The EU Programs Assessment

The EU' bottom up approach consists of tackling the root causes behind the issue of irregular migration that target the population and youth needs as well as civil actors. These so-defined root causes, however, such as socioeconomic issues, the persistence of corruption, unemployment and poverty level are according to this study not themselves the original root causes rather the consequences of the political root cause of the centralization of power in the hands of monarchy and oligarchy leading to failing reforms, deepened inequalities, lack of coordination policy and institutional effectiveness. As will be discussed below, the EU' programs in general studied for the period of 2012-2020 show a persistence of limited results and inefficiency; if anything speaks of the lack of the political will to make a genuine change which affects amongst other things the EU' programs.

In 2014, the EU and Morocco signed a new program to bolster reforms initiated in 2008 and 2011 through an action plan designed for the period of 2014-2017, later extended to 2018-2020, in order to achieve the advanced status objectives. The program addressed a variety of issues identified as the root causes of the migration issue related to governance and socioeconomic development. The programs support categories are as follows: Professional formation and development, socioeconomic development and economic reform, alphabetization and illiteracy, the youth socioeconomic inclusion and work, governance and the performance of public administration, political participation and civil society and gender equality. Under the framework of this support program, the EU-Morocco partnership became the most active one in the region. The programs, however, remained inefficient and had limited results due to bureaucratic challenges and the persistence of the informal institution of corruption. This study argues that the areas targeted by the EU support programs as 'root causes' for the migration issue are symptomatic consequences of the nature of the political power and relations that is characterized by an oligarchic rule. The consolidated authoritarianism in Morocco and power centralization is the main factor

behind the social instabilities, the persistence of the informal institution of corruption and the EU programs' ineffectiveness.

The European parliament and Council ruling 236/2014 and Eurotom No. 966/2012 based on article 84, paragraph 2, adopted a unique program for Morocco to concretize the advanced status' goals and objectives. The program's primary objectives included establishing equitable access to social needs, strengthening democratic governance and the rule of law, promoting sustainable development, and creating jobs. Access to health services and a reform of the judicial system were implemented to ensure that the different social classes of the population have efficient and independent access to basic services with a budget of 150 million euros.⁵⁴⁰ The 2014 program for the advanced status was extended and included yearly programs and action plans that targeted different policy sectors in Morocco.⁵⁴¹

However, the 2015 ECJ ruling on the Fisheries Agreement not including the territory of Western Sahara caused a rift between the EU and Morocco, despite the fact that the action plan continued until 2018 and targeted reforming in various sectors and areas.⁵⁴² Given the implications that this decision had on Morocco's claims of jurisdiction over the Western Sahara, which is a priority national interest on Morocco's foreign policy agenda, Morocco announced publicly in 2016 that it was terminating diplomatic discussions with the EU and suspended the EU commission and the partnership dialogue. This action, however, has resulted in a significant setback for the country's cooperation with the EU in terms of individual rights, freedom, and political liberalization objectives.⁵⁴³

Following the outbreak of Hoceima in 2017 which was followed by a massive migration flow of the youth from Morocco to the EU, a sectoral study conducted by

⁵⁴⁰ The European Commission, **Décision D'exécution de La Commission : Relative au Programme D'Action Annuel 2014 En Faveur du Maroc à Financer sur Le Budget General de L'Union Européenne**, Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Brussel, 2014, pp. 1-4, (PAA).

⁵⁴¹ The European Commission, **Décision D'Exécution de la Commission : Modifiant la Décision de la Commission C (2014) 7204 Final Approuvant le Programme d'Action Annuel en Faveur du Maroc à Financer sur le Budget General de L'Union Européenne**, The Directorate General for the Neighborhood and Enlargement, Brussels, 2015, pp. 1-3, (PAABDG).

⁵⁴² The European Union General Court, **Judgement of the General Court (Eighth Chamber): Agreement in the Form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and Morocco, Reciprocal Liberalization of Agricultural Products, Processed Agricultural Foods, Application to the Agreement of the Western Sahara, the Polisario Front, Action Annulment and the Right to Defense**, InfoCuria: Case-Law, Luxembourg, 2015, pp.1-36.

The Court of Justice of the European Union, **Press Release No 21/18: Judgement in Case C-266/16 - The Queen on the Application of Western Sahara UK v Commissioners for her Majesty's Revenue and Customs and Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs**, InfoCuria: Case Law, Luxembourg, 2018, pp. 1-3.

⁵⁴³ The European Court of Auditors, **Special Report- The EU Support to Morocco: Limited Results So Far**, The Publications Office of the European Union, No. 09, Luxembourg, 2019, pp.4-20.

the EU delegation in Morocco revealed that macro-economically, the economic strategies initiated by Morocco were insufficient to create employment opportunities. Lack of coordination among the involved parties and issues with the efficiency of the Ministry of Youth and Sports, which is paradoxically dominated by employees over the age of 50 and does not include youth, also impede the effective implementation of strategies for youth integration initiated by the Moroccan government. The Ministry relaunched a ministerial strategy for the youth, which serves as the foundation for the European Union's action plan on the youth situation and provides support for the government's "National Policy for the Youth". According to the same study, instability in the case of Morocco is primarily related to the situation of the youth. The youth issue not only hinders the nation's ability to mobilize its youth capital for the purpose of economic growth and development, but it also jeopardizes its social peace, which impacts its relations with the EU via the issue of irregular immigration.⁵⁴⁴

4.3.1.1. Socioeconomic Development and the Youth Integration

In cooperation with the IOM, the EU put in place mechanisms for the prevention of irregular migration of youth and adolescents from Morocco. Besides the actions taken to prevent migrants from crossing to the European border, the program designed in cooperation with the IOM is also put into synergy with other programs directed toward improving the situation of the youth in Morocco in general.

These include programs against illiteracy, educational programs through the opening of youth houses that offer support course after school to both college and high school students. A program for professional training directed and executed by the Ministry for Youth and Sports through the National Strategy of Professional Traineeship. Also, a program of territorial development that seeks to include youth in local decision making to promote a holistic understanding of citizenship and boost

⁵⁴⁴ The European Union Commission, **Decision D'exécution de la Commission Relative au Programme d'Action Annuel en Faveur du Maroc pour 2018, (Partie 1), (2018/8196) Final**, The Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Bruxelles, 2018, p. 1-119, (PDAM).

The European Commission, **Annex: Fiche D'Action pour le Programme Reussir le Statut Avance II, Maroc RSA II, CRIS: 2013/024+875-2018/041696**, The Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement, Brussels, 2018, p. 1-21, (FAPRSA).

The European Commission, **Decision D' Execution de la Commission Modifiant la Decision d'Execution C (2013)7666 Relative au Programme D'Action Annuel 2013 (Partie 2) en Faveur du Maroc a Financer sur le Budget General de L'Union Europeene**, The Directorate General for the Neighborhood and Enlargement, Brussels, 2018, pp. 1-31, (MDERPA).

The European Commission, **Annex I: Programme D'Appui au Développement Territorial au Maroc, CRIS, ENI/2018/041398**, The Directorate General for the Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Bruxelles, 2018, pp. 5-34, (DEVTER).

youth role in understanding and performing their citizenship rights and responsibilities.⁵⁴⁵ In conjunction with the civil society programs, programs were launched to create and boost the performance of existing youth associations in four regions of Morocco.

To solve the lying cause behind unrest in Morocco and flow of youth to Europe through the 'death boats', the EU' program for socioeconomic development consists of both financial and technical support through a sectorial budgetary support. Professional formation program goes in parallel with the 2011 constitution Article 31 which previews: "Mobilization of all possible measures to ensure the equitable access of citizens, men and women to professional formation".⁵⁴⁶ This program also envisions equitable results throughout the territory of Morocco to ensure both social and territorial inclusion.

In light of the challenges facing the Moroccan agricultural sector and in support of the Moroccan socioeconomic development, the EU conducted an audit study in 2017 that was followed by a recruitment program in 2019 aimed at integrating rural youth into modern agricultural sectors. In addition to the actions taken for the youth, the Erasmus program "Youth's non-formal education" was designed. This program financed the mobility of youth workers between Morocco and Europe for training and exchanges, allowing 1,380 Moroccan youth to participate in projects in Europe.⁵⁴⁷ Other youth-focused activities involving volunteer work, Erasmus exchanges, and intercultural cooperative projects between Morocco and Europe were also outlined.

In 2018 and in support of the youth of Morocco, an action plan guided by ten Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) objectives to reduce inequalities, provide equitable access to basic services, and achieve the autonomy of all people regardless of age, race, ethnicity, gender, or religion was implemented. This program included United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) as participants.⁵⁴⁸ It also aimed to promote gender equality and women's rights and

⁵⁴⁵ The European Commission, DEVTER, p. 22.

⁵⁴⁶ The European Commission, **Programme D'Appui à la Formation Professionnelle : Développement du Capital Humain au Maroc**, CRIS : ENI/2015/37-372, Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Brussels, 2015, pp. 1-23, (PROFL).
The European Commission, **Décision d'Exécution de La Commission : Relative au Programme d'Action Annuel 2015 et au Programme d'Action Annuel 2016 (Partie I) en Faveur du Maroc à Financer sur le Budget General de L'Union Européenne**, The Directorate General for the Neighborhood and Enlargement, Brussels, 2015, p. 1-5, (FBG).

⁵⁴⁷ The European Commission, PROFL, p. 22.

⁵⁴⁸ The European Commission, **Annex III : Document Relatif à L'Action pour le Programme d'Appui a la Jeunesse au Maroc**, CRIS : ENI/2018/041-151 Final, The Directorate General for the Neighborhood and Enlargement, Brussels, 2018, p. 43-83, (YOUTH).

autonomy by contributing to the adoption of policies and laws favorable to gender equality and autonomy, as well as strengthening and facilitating their correct implementation. Actors involved by the EU for this action plan are the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Ministry of National Education, professional formation, superior education and research, the Economic, Social and Environmental Council (CESE) and the Ministry in Charge of General Affairs and Human Rights. Following the Paris Summit, Morocco also put into place an inter-ministerial delegation to study and assess the developments and needs of the market. Based on the study's findings, there was a critical gap between the Moroccan Youth reality and the market emphasizing the need to reinforce means of intermediation and proximity through civil society actors and youth houses.⁵⁴⁹ The 2018 program for the youth inclusion has also offered support for small projects and entrepreneurship for young people. In collaboration with the UNESCO, the EU financed the Net-Med Youth program which was executed by UNESCO and brought about effective and successful results. Members of the Net-Med program are also subsequently made as observant and consultative committee of youth for UNESCO.

In order to help build the human capital of Morocco, the action plan especially targets the youth population and women. Youth, women and children especially minors represent the most vulnerable group of the Moroccan population that is mostly affected by the socioeconomic issues. The rise of irregular migration among the youth and minors through dangerous ways across the sea and young girls' refuge to marriage at a very young age under 18 is proof that Morocco' inability to meet its population needs in terms of employment, education and socio-economic rights is bringing the country into regression in terms of security, stability and social peace in the long run. Despite the Moroccan population being composed of 30% of youth, the highest level of unemployment and inactivity is recorded amongst Morocco's youth population. It is especially interesting to note that Morocco despite its impressive economic progress also has the highest levels in poverty and social gaps between classes in the region. Almost 8 million of the population of which 3.5% is of the youth does not have any qualifications. 45% of the youth, though educated are unemployed or inactive. Educational leaves among the youth remain striking high and almost only half of the population participates in the economic life of the country. An inadequate

The European Commission, DEVTER, p. 24.

⁵⁴⁹ The European Commission, DEVTER, p. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.

Le Conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental (CESE) Royaume du Maroc, **Rapport : Statut et Dynamisation de la Vie Associative**, Conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental, Rabat, Auto Saisie, No. 28, 2016, pp. 1-110.

adaptation of professional formation to the market needs and the limited access of workers to continuous formation make the country's social issues hard to solve despite the several initiatives to achieve youth inclusion in society.⁵⁵⁰

A capacity building and skills teaching programs for the youth was also designed to cover four regions of the kingdom that would be chosen based on the following criteria; the level of education, the unemployment scale, territorial coverage of establishments of proximity of Ministry of Youth and Sports. The target population of the program is young people aged between 24 and 34 years' old which make up about 11.000.000 of the general population. Priority would be given to Young Persons No Longer Engaged in Education, Employment or Training (NEETs) which are estimated to be about 2.700.000 people among which 2.160.000 are girls.⁵⁵¹ Basic skills like calculation and numeric skills, illiteracy, soft skills such as language learning, computer skills, financial education, career planning and job search, social entrepreneurship will also be acquired in programs in cooperation with the ANAPEC. For recruitment, personal orientation through coaching on the development projects of personal life and entrepreneurship skills as well as a follow up of projects of managers and founders would be conducted. Development of hobbies, personal entertainment and open spaces for socialization are also among the project's objectives with the aim to have an ecosystem around the youth that is more professionalized and dynamic.

The EU program on Morocco's socioeconomic situation seeks the formation of 10 million citizens and to increase the level of insertion and professional integration of graduates to 75% by 2021.⁵⁵² In addition to Moroccan governmental institutions, ANAPEC and the Office of Vocational Training and the Promotion of Employment (OFPPT) civil society actors, and private sector actors such as the General Confederation for Enterprises of Morocco (CGEM), the Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), the Ministry for National Education and Professional Formation

⁵⁵⁰ The European Commission, PROFL, p. 20.

⁵⁵¹ The European Commission, DEVTER, p. 25.

⁵⁵² The European Commission, **Relative au Programme d'Action Annuel 2016, (Partie 2), en Faveur du Maroc a Financer sur le Budget General de L'Union C (2016)**, The Directorate General for European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Brussels, 2016, p. 3, (PAAFF).

The European Commission, **Relative au Programme d'Action Annuel 2016, Partie 2, en Faveur du Maroc à Financer sur le Budget General de L'Union C (2016)**, The Directorate General for the Neighborhood and Enlargement, Brussels, 2016, p. 1-4, (PAAMBG).

The European Commission, **Relative au Programme d'Action Annuel 2016, Partie 3 en Faveur du Maroc a Financer sur le Budget General de L'Union, C (2016)8836 Final**, The Directorate General for the Neighborhood and Enlargement, Brussels, 2016, p. 1-5, (PAAFM).

The European Commission, **Annual Action Plan 2016 in Favour of Morocco-Part 2, To be Financed from the General Budget of the European Union-Regulation (EU No. 232/201)**, The Directorate General for the Neighborhood and Enlargement, Brussels, 2016, p. 1-4, (TDBEU).

(MENFP), and the System for Professional Formation (SNFP) were also involved by the EU. The Union also included a number of key sector actors in the program's implementation, such as CGEM, MEAS, MENFP, and SNFP.⁵⁵³ At the international level, the program also includes the IMF's plan to support sustainable growth via a macroeconomic policy that balances internal and external sectors through transparent and balanced management of public finances.⁵⁵⁴

Within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, an industrial cooperation aimed at promoting small businesses through the Small Business Act, in which Morocco participated through the National Agency for the Promotion of Small-Medium Enterprises, is also carried out.⁵⁵⁵ In addition to the EU's initiatives to boost Morocco's socioeconomic development, member states such as France, Belgium, Spain, and the British Council have independently contributed to the development of professional development in rural areas. In Morocco, Spain has been working to educate the uneducated, whereas the British Council has been promoting skills through its "Skills for employability" initiative.⁵⁵⁶

Due to the stark contrasts in the country's macroeconomic indicators, namely the gross domestic product, the level of poverty, and the unemployment rate, the human capital in Morocco remains particularly challenging. The strengthening of youth organizations was also prioritized through a stimulation of a culture of coordination between the youth and youth associations. The organization of educational programs equips youth organizations with institutional and political skills and engages them in dialogue with state institutions. In parallel, programs funded by the World Bank and an initiative by the African Bank of Development also accompany the EU action plan for solving the employment issue of the youth. The African Bank of Development gave special attention to the recruitment of non-educated citizens and to small entrepreneurship projects development.

The EU's support program for the youth socioeconomic integration also targeted the educational sector. The support program for education is framed under 17 objectives of the 2030 Agenda. It targets educational policy and related administrative management, primary educational, basic life skills for youth and adults,

⁵⁵³ The European Commission, PROFL, p. 4, p.7.

⁵⁵⁴ The European Commission, PROFL, p. 12.

⁵⁵⁵ The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, The European Commission, the European Training Foundation, **Politiques en Faveur des PME Afrique du Nord et Moyen-Orient 2014: Évaluation sur la Base du Small Business Act pour l' Europe**, OCDE Editions, 2014, p. 3-406.

⁵⁵⁶ The European Commission, PDAM8, p. 1-33.

secondary education and vocational training. The program is inscribed in the “European Consensus for Development” which defines education as an important element for sustainable development. The program is also inscribed in Morocco’s ‘Executive Plan of the Government for the Period 2017-2021’. The program’s objectives are as follows; mastering basic knowledge and foreign language skills notably French, the generalization of preschool education, improving the governance of the educational system, the moralization of school according to universal citizenship values. The program also targeted the integration between the job market and educational system, enlarging the social financial support to respond to problems related to school leaves especially in the rural areas. The programs’ mainly aims for reducing the impacts of social disparities on the educational opportunities of the Moroccan population, improving the integration between the educational system and the job market and improving the efficiency of the educational system as a whole. The program involved local and international actors including: The Ministry of education, the ministry of finance, the National Agency for Alphabetization (ANCLA), OFPPT, the UNESCO, the UNICEF, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MMC), the World Bank, the European Bank for Investment and the European Training Foundation.⁵⁵⁷

Nevertheless, according to the 2019 report of the European Court of Auditors, which evaluated the effectiveness of the EU budget support in Morocco across multiple sectors from 2014 to 2018, the EU budget support remained weak in terms of value, capacity, and effectiveness. According to the study, although the EU budget support was substantial (“totaling about 0.37 percent of Morocco’s total budgetary expenditures”), it had a limited capacity to advance Morocco’s reform implementation process, primarily due to sub-optimal focus and uneven coordination of donors across the respective sectors.⁵⁵⁸

4.3.1.2. Good Governance and the Fight against the Informal Institution of Corruption

Good governance has since the initiation of the 2011 Constitution become a priority objective for the government with an important place given to the Ministry of General Affairs and Governance in terms of sectorial coordination. Morocco has also

⁵⁵⁷ The European Commission, **Annex I: Programme Intégré d’Appui au Secteur de l’Education et la Formation au Maroc, (PIAFE), CRIS: ENI/2019/041-950**, The Directorate General for the Neighborhood and Enlargement, Brussels, 2019, p. 1-35, (PIAFE).

⁵⁵⁸ The European Court of Auditors, p. 14-20.

in cooperation with international actors such as Transparency International which became actively engaged in the fight against corruption and money laundering. To boost Morocco's efforts in the field, the EU created the State Group against Corruption (GREGO) and organized a committee of experts on evaluation of measures against capital laundering and the financing of terrorism.⁵⁵⁹ Nevertheless, despite the efforts made by both the EU and Morocco in the field of corruption, Morocco still ranks significantly high despite making significant progress in terms of social, political and economic reforms as well as public governance and fundamental rights.

To support Morocco' rule of law and good governance reform, the EU adopted a two phased program called the "Hakama/governance program" and consist of two phases. The Hakama project I financed under the scope of the European Neighborhood instrument for Morocco aims to support democratic governance, rule of law and mobility as well as the recruitment of youth and an inclusive and sustainable growth. The Hakama II program is directed toward the reinforcement of public governance with the objective to put into execution the principle of good governance initiated through the 2011 constitution in terms of public finances. The Hakama II program designed to complement the Hakama I program aims to improve the efficiency and efficacy of administrations to achieve quality public service that is accessible to all citizens.⁵⁶⁰ Public administration development has for years remained subject of citizen distrust and dissatisfaction in Morocco and improving their functioning remains critical for the implementation of key reforms including the rule of law and democratization. Optimizing the utilization of political resources and improving the services given to citizens through public resources mobilization is targeted by the action plan for governance. The provision of a service that is "available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable"⁵⁶¹ in ministries and establishments is taken as a guiding principle for reforming the Moroccan administration in line with a human rights approach, a gender approach and territorial equality that is both vertical and horizontal; that is between rural and urban areas as well as amongst the different regions of the kingdom. These targets at a territorial scope marginalized

⁵⁵⁹ The European Commission, PDAM8, p. 15.

⁵⁶⁰ The European Commission, **Financement du Programme d'Action Pluriannuel en Faveur du Maroc pour les Années 2019-2020 Partie I**, The Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Brussel, 2019, pp.1-19, (PLURAN).
The European Commission, **Annex III : Document Relatif à L'Action pour le Programme « Hakama II » pour le Renforcement de la Gouvernance Publique**, CRIS : ENI/2018/041-229, The Directorate General for the Neighborhood and Enlargement, Brussels, 2018, p. 84-119, (HAKAMA).

⁵⁶¹ The European Commission, PDAM8, p. 13.

vulnerable regions. It also envisions the inclusion of girls and women as well as vulnerable categories to fulfil their potential to participate in the “citizenship” life.⁵⁶² Accordingly, sets a strong ground for a more stable and productive political progress in line with the 2030 Agenda which targets the autonomy of individuals and the integration of citizens at the social, political and economic level independent of their age, gender, religion, ethnic or social class belonging.⁵⁶³

A framework for the development of the justice sector was also developed in collaboration with the Ministry of Youth and Sports and UNICEF through the 'Himaya' program, which aims to improve the services provided to orphaned children in child protection centers. In collaboration with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCDE), a project of support for the improvement of governance was also established to aid in the improvement of governance.

Policy coordination issues and corruption related issues persist in Morocco as a result of the consolidation of the patterns of oligarchic domination and authoritarianism.

4.3.1.3. Human Rights and Democracy

To advance human rights and democracy in the European neighborhood in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the EU has created different instruments that target different policy areas and objectives including the EIDHR, the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) and the Neighborhood Civil Society Facility (CSF). This was mainly crafted to handle the political issues and contentious developments of the region based on the concept of ‘deep and sustainable democracy’⁵⁶⁴ which envisioned a comprehensive and proactive involvement of the EU and prioritizes non-state actors such as activists, NGOs and civil society members. The EIDHR is the most notable EU instrument created to deal with human right issues in non-EU countries. EIDHR funds’ recipients are non-state actors including individuals and organizations and it

⁵⁶² The European Commission, PDAM8, p. 23.

⁵⁶³ The European Commission, PDAM8, p. 14.

⁵⁶⁴ Teti Andrea, Darcy Thompson and Noble Christopher, “The EU Democracy Assistance Discourse in Its New Response to a Changing Neighborhood”, **Democracy and Security**, Vol. 9, No. 1/2, 2013, pp. 61-79.

Catherine Ashton The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Vice Presidency of the European Commission, **Speech of Catherine Ashton the EU High Representative and the Vice President of the European Commission on the Annual Human Rights Report Strasbourg, Speech /11/885**, the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 2011, pp.1-3.

differs from the ENI and ENPI instruments in the fact that the funds management is allocated to the recipient state.⁵⁶⁵

For the same purpose, the EED created in 2013 mainly as a result of the Arab Spring revolts has deployed efforts in numerous projects on democracy and human rights in Morocco by engaging with non-state actors and individuals that seek to advance the state of human rights in the Kingdom. Among these projects are; the “Adala Project for Justice and Justice Reform”, the Information and Communication Technology for Development (ICT4D) which organizes law disclosure activities. Additionally, support to the right to education was provided through funding to popular university and the plural Moroccans project for election organization awareness and participation as well as the Simsim project which works on parliamentary and constituency relations.⁵⁶⁶ For the promotion of ‘deep and sustainable’ human rights, the EU also adopts a constructive approach that tackles the spread of awareness and understanding of human rights, the spread of a discourse of human rights amongst the population in the belief that this will in the long term contribute to a popular belief and interest in human rights. For this purpose, the EED deployed efforts to support several human rights projects including state initiated actions, civil society groups and human rights projects in general funded by local or international actors. The EED also created the Association for Mediterranean Meetings of Cinema for Human Rights (ARMCDH) which promotes human rights awareness through films. Last but not least, the EED created the Euro-Mediterranean Federation to fight against enforced disappearances. Other initiatives have also been introduced for the promotion of human rights and the protection of economic, social and cultural rights of citizens.⁵⁶⁷

In line with the EU’ foreign policy objectives and Morocco’ constitutional reforms, Morocco took the action of changing the status of the Human Rights Council from the Consultative Council of Human Rights to the National Council of Human Rights (CNDH). This gave the council autonomy and independence and a larger role to play in the development and promotion of human rights, good governance and the rule of law.

In the framework of reforming the judicial system in line with the objectives of democratic governance and the rule of law and to ensure the access of fair and equitable justice treatment of citizens, the action plan also adopted a program of

⁵⁶⁵ Isa Felip Gomez, Munos Nogal Ester, “The EU Promotion of Deep Democracy in the Southern Mediterranean: A Missed Opportunity?”, **Frame**, Work Package No. 12., Deliverable. No. D.12.4, 2016, pp.1-109.

⁵⁶⁶ Gomez and Ester, p. 80.

⁵⁶⁷ Gomez and Ester, p. 80.

support to penitentiary reform. Other targeted areas of the action plan include equitable access to health system and reform of justice sector to improve the system of preventive detention through development of alternative sanctioning to imprisoning and building a system that guarantees the protection of human rights of women and children.⁵⁶⁸ As will be discussed in the domestic analysis part, the judiciary reform remains inefficient considering that in the post-Arab spring period the judiciary has become further linked to the interests of the deep state, the Makhzen, and the oligarchic regime. The Judiciary has become an important tool for the maintenance of authoritarianism serving to punish citizens and to curb individual and political freedoms.

The EU' program for democracy promotion also includes support to the parliament. Improving the efficiency of the parliament, its transparency and relations with the citizens is one of the major objectives of this program. Under the framework of the objectives of sustainable development, notable peace, justice and democracy, the EU' support program for the parliament aims for supporting democratic governance. The program framed under the 2015-2019 action plan for human rights and democracy targets both the house of representatives and the house of counsellors both administrative and elected. For the house of the representatives, the EU aims to improve the capacity of research, follow up and evaluation, improving the administrative jobs of the parliament, improving the quality of legislative production, control of the executive, the follow up of the application of the law, mainly the law of finance and parliamentary diplomacy. As for the house of counsellors, the programs objectives include institutional development including, strategic planning, logistical needs, structuration and administrative management, communication tool and equipment and coordination between the two houses. Actors involved include the Ministry in Charge of the Relations between the Parliament and the Civil Society, the Ministry of Finance, local Authorities, non-governmental actors such as political parties, political groups, syndicates and civil society. The program aims for improving the transparency and efficiency of the parliament, that is increasing the professionalization of the administration of the parliament as well as the parliament's openness to the citizens. Attached to this is the objective of improving the relationship between the parliament and the citizens, and the citizens' trust on the parliamentary institution and electoral process. The lack of information and transparency on the work

⁵⁶⁸ The European Commission, **Programme D'Appui à La Reforme Pénitentiaire au Maroc, CRIS: ENI/2015/37-752**, Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Brussel, 2015, pp. 1-32, (PENT).

of the parliament has reflected on the lowering levels of trust of the Moroccan population on the parliamentary institution. According to the EU report, the access to information on the parliament remains as a challenge for the EU action plan efficiency. Also, the increasingly decreasing levels of political participation amongst the Moroccan population especially following the results of the 2021 elections has further opened the gap between the Moroccan population and the political system institutions.⁵⁶⁹ This issue is more related to the issues of the Moroccan political system and nature of power characterized by the centralization of power in the hands of the monarchy and oligarchic elite that handicaps the functioning and efficiency of the modern political system institutions, its transparency and the population's level of trust in it.

Overall, the situation of human rights and democracy has witnessed a decline in Morocco in the post-Arab spring with a consolidation of the forces of authoritarianism.

4.3.1.4. Penitentiary Reform

Targeting the penitentiary sector' reform, the program aimed at reinforcing the institutional capacity and includes human rights in the system by making the integration of the prisoners a priority objective. The reform includes objectives at the different phases and processes from pre-detainment to representation right during the process, rights to equal and just treatment of the prisoners. The judicial cooperation between Morocco and the EU resulted in important modifications of the penal code and the penal code of procedure that introduced alternative sanctioning ways to detention and prevention from individual liberty. It also seeks securing the rights and needs of women while in prison and designs programs to build skills, training and formation for professional integration with the aim to help integrate the prisoners in the society after being liberated. Actors such as the Moroccan Observatory of Prisons (OMP), civil society members were included and financed through EIDHR which also organized formative seminars and programs for lawyers and activists.⁵⁷⁰

Despite the EU' reform program, Morocco's prison situation remains unfavorable with a high number of prisoners that overcomes the prison's capacity.

⁵⁶⁹ The European Commission, **Annex VI: Document d'Action Concernant l'Appui au Parlement Marocain », CRIS: ENI/2019/041-847**, The Directorate General for the Neighborhood and Enlargement, Brussels, 2019, p. 1-26, (PARLMT).

⁵⁷⁰ The European Commission, PENT, p. 11.

This stems from the youth social and psychological malaise resulting from their political, economic and social malaise that has led to everyday life practices of resistance including violence, discrimination and the use of drugs.

4.3.1.5. Support to Civil Society and Local actors of Change

Given the importance of civil society in the democratic rule and the special attention accorded to it by the European Council Conclusions (2012), the activity of civil society in several domains including political and socioeconomic development was highlighted by the Moroccan constitution and accorded a priority importance in the EU-Morocco action plans. The 2016 Action plan sought to boost the civil society potential and activity in the political progress in Morocco by improving the institutional and legal context in which it functions and reinforcing the capacity of their institutional partners at the local and national level. The participation of civil society in the making of public policy and the implementation processes of socioeconomic services along with improving their inclusion in mechanisms of participative democracy and monitoring of public policies is framed as the dominant objective of the action plan.

Civil society in Morocco including women associations, human rights groups and others have been active in the country since the independence era where it played a major role. Civil society in Morocco, however, remained lacking in potential and efficiency mainly due to limited capacities, skills and state restrictions on their activity in the political life. Following the 2011 constitution, the development and activity of civil society in the country's political progress has been highlighted both by Morocco as well as the EU in accordance with the advanced status objectives. The creation of a Ministry in Charge of relations with the parliament and Civil Society in the aftermath of the 2011 constitution was an important step to facilitate dialogue and coordinate relations between the executive power and the organizations of the civil society. The Ministry was also designed the task to manage the Council of Human Rights, local collectives, NGOs and actors involved in the sector of development.⁵⁷¹

In addition, Morocco undertook a significant reform of the legal framework governing the activity of civil society by making it a key actor in the law on "advanced regionalization" and the "integrated national strategy for youth 2015-2030" in

⁵⁷¹ The European Commission, **Annex I: Action Annuelle: Programme d'Appui à la Société Civile du Maroc, Part II**, CRIS: ENI/2016/39793, Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Brussel, 2016, pp.1-37, (CIVSOC).

conjunction with the newly established Ministry of Youth and Sports.⁵⁷² Regarding the Council's conclusions on the significance of civil society in promoting democracy and representation, defending and guaranteeing the needs of vulnerable citizens, and based on the 2011 constitution's article on the freedom of association and assembly, a roadmap for the EU's engagement with civil society in Morocco for the period 2015-2017 has been developed. This action plan also included European member states that were already active in the country, as well as other local actors such as relevant ministries and the CNDH.⁵⁷³

In contribution to the promotion of Morocco' social stability and progress, civil society is given the task to mediate between the state actors and the youth by listening to the youth needs and engaging them in the cultural, social, political and economic development of the country. However, civil society actors are unable to perform this role to the fullest due to the limited financial support they have access to and the amount of administrative procedures and financial restrictions imposed on NGOs and associations in Morocco. According to the EU report, only few associations that are supported by international NGOs and able to access international funds are able to meet their financial needs.⁵⁷⁴ The capacity of civil society associations in Morocco is also limited by factors such as weak qualification of members, issues and weaknesses in governance and internal governance. The lack of specialization and proper professional training of the personal combined with a lack of strategy and coherence results in inactivity and inefficiency.⁵⁷⁵ Involving civil society representatives in the dialogue process between Morocco and the EU would help trace a better road for the development of civil society actors in the country's political progress and the required financial, professional and technical support.

For the purpose of achieving the goals of the EU action plan on democracy, governance, and the rule of civil society, the EU has also employed thematic instruments such as the IEDDH, the Instrument Organizations of Civil Society Organizations (IOCSO), and the Instrument Organizations of Civil Society and Local Authority (OSC-AL).⁵⁷⁶ In addition, geographic programs such as those for integrated rural development in the North, the promotion of gender equality, and the National Initiative for Human Development were created.

⁵⁷² The European Commission, CICSOC, p. 4.

⁵⁷³ The European Commission, CIVSOC, p.5.

⁵⁷⁴ The European Commission, CIVSOC, p. 6.

⁵⁷⁵ The European Commission, CIVSOC, p. 8.

⁵⁷⁶ The European Commission, CIVSOC, p. 14.

To improve political participation in Morocco, the EU under the framework of the program of the support to civil society included a support to national reform. The program seeks to improve the capacity and professionalism of civil society and improving the engagement and participation of the civil society in public policy and local development. Civil actors benefitting from the EU financial support are expected to develop professional skills and policy coordination for project structuration and relations with the population. The program targets the capacity building of the local actors through capacity building programs and providing funding opportunities for civil society in the different regions of the kingdom. The program aims to improve the visibility of the civil actors' initiative by developing good practices and innovative actions including follow up on results of the projects and evaluation. The program also aimed at providing coordination of donors for civil society work including the French FISCA, the French agency for development, the German GIZ and Belgian SolSocas well as international donors such as the World Bank.⁵⁷⁷

As will detailed in the domestic analysis part, the civil actors' performance and efficiency remains limited due to the monarchy's strategy of co-opting and controlling civil actors and political parties. As a result, the population's trust on civil actors remains limited and their impact on the citizens' political participation is also limited considering that political participation is more related to the nature of the political power and its concentration on the hand of the king making the political process useless in the eyes of the population, especially the youth. In reaction to the political domination of the Moroccan regime, the youth and a large segment of the population has resorted to informal politics and various acts of resistance including boycotting the formal political process through non-participation.

The EU adopted a program of support for Morocco's campaign against illiteracy in 2017 under the framework of the action plan for the period of 2014-2017. The program aims to foster equitable access to education, the promotion of better educational services for increasing the chances of disadvantaged citizens to be better integrated socioeconomically and for professional formation. This program also aimed at supporting the EU and Morocco's governance programs and efforts considering that illiteracy levels especially in the rural areas remain an important obstacle to

⁵⁷⁷ The European Commission, **Programme D'Appui à la Participation Citoyenne au Maroc, CRIS: ENII/2020/042-676**, The Directorate General for the Neighborhood and Enlargement, Brussels, 2020, p. 6-14, (PATCIT).

democratization and good governance. The program like in other areas included international and local actors such as the UNESCO and local civil society actors.⁵⁷⁸

4.3.1.6. Support to Women Rights and Gender Equality

The issue of women rights and women socioeconomic, political progress and inclusion has occupied an important part in the Moroccan constitutional reforms and an area in which Morocco' efforts and initiatives have set it as an exceptional model in the region. The 2017 Executive ruling by the EU Commission in line with the unique strategic program designed for Morocco' advanced status implementation, has put in place a "Mousawat /Equality" program to achieve women autonomy and gender equality. The program seeks fighting violence against women, achieving their integration in sectorial public policy making and local governance as well as increasing women and girls' presence in higher education, political and public sectors. Under the auspices of the EIDHR, the Democratic Association of Moroccan Women (Association Democratique des Femmes du Maroc-ADFM) was created to organize capacity building activities for elected female representatives.⁵⁷⁹

4.3.1.7. Limitations of the EU Programs of Support

Despite the support programs by the EU, Morocco remains way behind in the targeted sector from achieving the expectations. In fact, Morocco can be said to be performing worse than before 2011 especially in the areas of political liberties and individual freedoms. These action plans and supportive programs deviate the attention from the original root causes behind the country' socioeconomic, governance and youth issues which is the political power centralization and the

⁵⁷⁸ The European Commission, **Action Annuel 2017 En Faveur du Maroc Partie I: Programme d'Appui a la Strategie d'Alphabetisation du Maroc-3eme Phase**, Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Brussel, 2016, pp.1-35, (ALPH).

The European Commission, **Implementing Decision on the Seventh Complementary Financing Decision of the Neighborhood Investment Facility to be Financed from the General Budget of the European Union, C (2017) 7174 Final**, The Directorate General for the Neighborhood and Enlargement, Brussels, 2017, p. 1-53, (SCFD).

⁵⁷⁹ The European Commission, **Programme d'Action Annuel 2017 En Faveur du Maroc Partie II: Programme D'Egalite et Moussawat**, Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Brussel, 2017, pp.1-35, (GNDR).

The European Commission, **Décision d'Exécution de la Commission : Programme EGALITE/Moussawat Appui à la Mise en Œuvre du Plan Gouvernemental pour L'Egalite II (PGEII), Initiative Concentrée pour le Renforcement les Acquis des Marocaines (ICRAM2), CRIS : ENI/2017/40-260**, Directorate General for the Neighborhood and Enlargement, Brussels, 2017, p. 1-49, (GNDREQ).

domination of the oligarchy composed of the monarchy, the economic and political elite taking over the political and economic resources and sustained by the coercive power of the Makhzen, Morocco' security apparatus. This political domination leaves Morocco behind at several levels and also predetermine the EU' programs to failure. If anything, the EU programs only serve to deviate the attention from the authentic problem while further supporting and legitimating the patterns of domination through a 'financial and normative support'.

Targeting the influence of the regime through an organizational power that combines the EU' trade and normative power paralleled by a bottom up, relational approach for local actors would be more promising for achieving mutual peace and security and reducing the irregular migration flows which has become Moroccan youth only 'Exit' choice in the search of life through death boats.

The human development index in Morocco stands at 0.667 ranking the country 123 among other nations.⁵⁸⁰ Also, while Morocco' GDP has nearly tripled in the last 20 years, its Gini coefficient which is a measure of income inequality shows that Morocco' inequality rate is the highest in the region of North Africa.⁵⁸¹ The failure of Morocco to harness its youth bulge and human capital not only threatens its social and political stability but also reflects negatively in its economic indicators.⁵⁸² The lack of economic opportunity for the youth is the major factor behind minors and young people attempts to migrate to Europe through illegal ways. The human capital in Morocco especially remained challenged and challenging due to the striking contrasts in the country's macroeconomic indicators mainly GDP, the level of poverty and unemployment levels. According to a state funded study by the economic, social and environmental council of Morocco, a deep malaise is especially spreading among the youth segment of the Moroccan society which directly reflects on the youth' lack of interest in political participation with only 1% of the population belonging to political parties. According to the same study, 20% of the youth of Morocco are unemployed, 50% of which have a low pay, 75% of them have no social security coverage and 20% have psychological disorders.⁵⁸³

⁵⁸⁰ The United Nations, **The Human Development Report 2020: The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene**, The United Nations Development Programme, New York, 2020, pp.1-370.

⁵⁸¹ The European Commission, DEVTER, p. 14-34.

⁵⁸² The Legatum Institute, "The Legatum Prosperity Index 2018: Report Prosperity Index", **The Legatum Institute**, Twelfth Edition, Bristol: U.K, 2018, pp. 3-69.

⁵⁸³ Le Conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental du Royaume du Maroc, **Une Nouvelle Initiative Nationale Intégrée pour La Jeunesse Marocaine : Saisine n 23/2018**, Conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental, Rabat, 2018, pp. 1-72.

As a result of this, immigration of Moroccan youth both through illegal and legal ways has become an issue causing the country a serious brain drain and conflict with European member states especially Spain on irregular migration given the important amount of migrants are from Moroccan origins.

In the majority of commission reports, the Moroccan regime's rhetorical commitments to democratization and judicial independence did not translate into actual results. In reality, a growing trend of entwinement between politics and business, as well as a tighter grip on power by the monarchy and business elite, is more indicative of the situation. The king's hard intervention into politics in 2017 by removing the charismatic leader of the Islamist party PJD, Benkiran, who had popular support, and replacing him with a less popular figure was a clear indication that constitutional reforms on separation of power have remained on paper. In the case of Morocco, systemic obstinacy in the areas of administrative reform, the educational system, the training and inclusion of youth, as well as political ones, impedes the achievement of substantial results and change. Normalizing relations with the monarchy hampered the PJD's ability to realize any of its pre-election goals and impeded the party's ability to govern.

Many of the legal reforms remain ink in paper either due to corruption practices, limitations in administrative capacities or sometimes socioeconomic issues as in relation to the law against girls' marriage under the age of 18 among others. For this reason, despite the remarkable efforts and progress at several levels, Morocco is still categorized as a 'semi-authoritarian/partly free' country. According to the Freedom House, "Morocco holds regular multiparty elections for the parliament, and reforms in 2011 shifted some authority over government from the monarchy to the elected legislature. Nevertheless, king Mohammed VI maintains dominance through a combination of substantial formal powers and informal lines of influence in the state and society. Many civil liberties are constrained in practice".⁵⁸⁴ The incomplete political and democratic reform added to the overall economic inequalities especially touching the youth stand on the way to Moroccan sustainable peace and security. For this reason, migration in all its forms, legal or illegal especially to Europe has become an inevitable option for the country' youth looking for a better future by crossing the sea through 'Pateras'.⁵⁸⁵

⁵⁸⁴ The Freedom House Organization, "Freedom in the World, 2021: Morocco", **The Freedom House**, 2021, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/morocco/freedom-world/2021> , (02.01.2022).

⁵⁸⁵ The Spanish name given to the small fish boats used by illegal migrants to cross the sea borders across the Mediterranean to European borders and which carry heavy dangers to human life.

Issues of development especially socioeconomic development have come to carry critical importance for the stability of both Morocco and the EU. Having a large youth population, Morocco has been unable to efficiently coordinate between professional training, educational system and the market needs. The amount of inactive and unemployed youth causes heavy burden on managing the sea borders with Europe which remains heavily crossed despite the works done on preventing the transits and the smuggling networks. 89,000 attempts of illegal migration has been prevented by Morocco in a single year which is also proof of the critical role Morocco has and the efforts it employs in the service of the EU border security objective.⁵⁸⁶ Prevention of these attempts and the smuggling networks, however, does not suffice. Ensuring the stability and well-being of Moroccan interest resides in solving its development and macroeconomic issues especially those related to the youth in the different regions of the country. This, however, cannot be achieved without genuine political reform.

According to the EU report, policies and actions carried out by Morocco under the framework of "advanced regionalization", which aims to reduce the disparity between the country's regions, continue to focus primarily on youth inclusion in the region of Casablanca-Settat, which is already the most active and is considered the economic capital of the country. Regions such as the North, mountainous regions, and others inhabited primarily by Berber-Amazigh communities continue to be severely marginalized in terms of education, training, employment, and participation in the nation's economic activity. According to the program findings, 2.700.000 persons in Morocco are unemployed, do not go to school and does not follow any professional training. In certain regions 1 out of 2 persons is a NEETS.⁵⁸⁷ Despite its important regional progress and the integration of its economy to the global one, Morocco has the highest proportion of NEETS in the Maghreb region ahead of Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria.⁵⁸⁸

⁵⁸⁶ Ahmed EL Jachtemi, "Morocco foils 89,000 illegal migration attempts in 2018: interior ministry", **Reuters**, 18.01.2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-morocco-idUSKCN1PB2P5>, (02.08.2022).

⁵⁸⁷ L'Economiste, "Un Jeune sur Trois est Sans Occupation », **L'Economiste**, 28.03.2018, <http://www.leconomiste.com/flash-infos/1-jeune-sur-3-est-sans-occupation>, (03.02.2023).

Le Haut-Commissariat au Plan du Royaume du Maroc, « Principaux Enseignements sur la Qualité de L'Emploie en 2016 », **Haut-Commissariat au Plan**, 07.02.2017, https://www.hcp.ma/Principaux-enseignements-sur-la-qualite-de-l-emploi-en-2016_a1879.html, (03.10.2021).

⁵⁸⁸ Pamela Abbot, Andrea Teti, "A Generation Waiting for Jobs and Justice: Young People in North Africa Not in Employment, Education or Training", **Arab Transformations Project**, Policy Brief 9, 2017, pp. 2-39.

According to reports on the first phase of the country's anti-corruption strategy for 2015-2025, 30 out of 89 projects completed in cooperation with the EU delegation in Morocco remain behind schedule.⁵⁸⁹ However, it remains unclear whether the persistence of these practices is due to social practices, the ineffectiveness of the legal system and framework on the subject, or problems with the development of public administrations. Another possibility could be related to the dissatisfaction of public employees with their salaries or the general state of accountability in the country's political, judicial, and administrative system, which remained related to the correct implementation of the constitution of 2011. Nevertheless, despite the efforts made by both the EU and Morocco in the field of corruption, Morocco still ranks significantly high despite making significant progress in terms of social, political, and economic reforms as well as public governance and fundamental rights. According to International Transparency, Morocco still ranks 87 out of 180 countries.⁵⁹⁰ This demonstrates the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the efforts made thus far to combat the "informal institution" of corruption in Morocco.⁵⁹¹ As a result, the country's numerous legal and other initiatives for progress in areas such as women's rights and others remain unfinished.

The following tables, highlight the political liberalization degradation in the case of Morocco based on the following indicators: Human Development Index (HDI), Freedom House Index (FHI), political rights and civil liberties from 2011 to 2022.

⁵⁸⁹ Transparency International, **The Corruption Perception Index 2021: Morocco**, Transparency International, Casablanca, 2021, pp. 1-17.

⁵⁹⁰ Transparency International, 2021.

⁵⁹¹ **Informal Institutions** have been defined by Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky (2004) as "Socially shared rules, usually unwritten that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels. Informal institutions are different from other forms of institutions in that they act as a substitutive or competing to the formal ones ... informal institutions are also not organizations" informal institutions have become important in the study of good governance and democratization given that they mark the political and institutional development in different regions of the world including Latin America, Asia, Middle East and Africa. Informal institutions shape the outcomes of the formal institutions by determining their effectiveness and outcomes and strengthening or weakening incentives for compliance with their rules. In this sense, they can either enable or constrain the development of good governance. The term informal institution has been used to refer to an array of issues such as corruption, clientalism, judicial and bureaucratic norm, civil society and traditional culture.

Gretchen Helmke, Steven Levitsky, "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda, Perspectives on Politics", **American Political Science Association**, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2004, p. 725-740.

Table 3: A Comparison of Morocco's Progress on FHI, Political rights, Civil Liberties, HDI between 2011-2022.

No.	Year	FHI	Political Rights	Civil Liberties	HDI	HDI rank
1	2011	62	28	34	0.614	131
2	2012	62	28	34	0.624	130
3	2013	62	28	34	0.635	125
4	2014	62	28	34	0.644	125
5	2015	62	28	34	0.654	125
6	2016	41	15	26	0.661	124
7	2017	41	15	26	0.67	124
8	2018	39	14	25	0.676	124
9	2019	39	14	25	0.679	122
10	2020	37	13	24	0.682	124
11	2021	37	13	24	0.683	123
12	2022	37	13	24	0.681	123

Source: Freedom House, **Freedom in the World 2021: Morocco**, Freedom House, Washington, D.C, 2021, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/morocco/freedom-world/2021> , (01.11.2022).

As can be seen through the graphs, although Morocco' Human Development Index has relatively increased between 2011 and 2022, Morocco has witnessed an important decline in civil liberties, freedom index and political rights as of 2016. This turning point in the political liberalization in Morocco marked by the Rif demonstrations and the return of the informal Makhzen state correlates with the peak in irregular flows of Moroccan youth toward Europe by 2016-2017. This period was marked by Morocco' securitization approach toward the demonstrations and the subsequent youth irregular migration flows.⁵⁹² It is also important to note that the 2016-2017 demonstrations sparked by the Rif protests and echoed throughout the country were mainly related to the situation of youth unemployment, the public educational system, social inequalities, regional inequalities, bureaucratic and institutional corruption especially in the Rif. The Moroccan state' reaction through securitization and the

⁵⁹² Bel Trew, "Woman Dies After Moroccan Navy Shoots at Migrants Boat in the Mediterranean", **The Independent**, 26.09.2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/migrant-boat-morocco-navy-woman-killed-fire-shooting-mediterranean-crossing-a8556411.html>, (14.03.2022).

Makhzen state unmasked the hidden reality of the political reality in Morocco and sparked the beginning of an important decline in civil and political rights.

4.3.2. Domestic Patterns of Domination

The section overviews the domestic patterns of domination in Morocco that are related to the EU' approach toward Morocco which strengthens the forces of authoritarianism and indirect colonialism linked to the strengthening of oligarchic rule. It examines the consequences of these patterns of domination on the everyday life of the Moroccan citizens and youth population. This level of analysis also sheds the light on the impacts of French and Spanish colonialism on Morocco's postcolonial development and integrity linked to inequalities and migration. The population, especially the youth, political and socioeconomic segregation results into everyday forms of resistance ranging from low to middle and high range that is irregular migration with the potential of terrorism. The EU' choice of pragmatism has opened space for the strengthening of the patterns of domination leading to unprecedented consolidation of authoritarianism and related oligarchic rule. This has not only left the Moroccan population vulnerable to the regime's coercive power but also local actors of change such as civil society.

4.3.2.1. The Consolidation of Authoritarianism through Democratization

During the Arab Spring, Morocco made "unprecedented" constitutional reforms to separate powers and become a constitutional monarchy. Western officials labeled this reform process the third way because regional pressure and western intervention drove the monarchy to peacefully resolve Morocco's twentieth movement protests unlike neighboring nations.⁵⁹³ This maintains Morocco's monarchy's legitimacy. The 20th movement, led by a young, activist population, has kept its demands clear, its protests organized and peaceful, and most importantly, unlike protests in neighboring countries, has not called for the overthrow of the regime/monarchy but for a transition to a constitutional monarchy based on the Dutch


⁵⁹³ Jonathan Hill, "Authoritarian Resilience and Regime Cohesion in Morocco after the Arab Spring", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 55, No.2, 2019, pp. 275-288.

model.⁵⁹⁴ King Mohammed VI's constitution review commission terminated the youth's nonviolent protests.

Traditional monarchical institutions and modern democratic institutions coexist in the political system of Morocco. The current democratic political system of Morocco, including the parliament and house of representatives, electoral system, and public space, has been dominated and controlled by the monarchical institution, which rests its authority and legitimacy on inheritance, historical longevity, and religion. This control has been primarily exercised through a dominant executive power over the legislative, executive, and judicial institutions, control over the political and business elite, ministries of sovereignty, and the divide-and-conquer strategy of political parties to prevent the rise of a powerful opposition party. The control and employment of control and surveillance measures, the security apparatus, and, most crucially, the informal state of the Makhzen has secured the silence of any possible dissent within the populace, particularly among the youth.

⁵⁹⁴ Amina Drhimeur, "Politics and Policy Making in the MENA after the Arab Spring in Morocco: A Power Struggle or a Reluctant Elite?", **4th International Conference on Public Policy**, 26-28 June, Montreal, 2019, pp. 1-24, (POLS).

Figure 12: The Moroccan Political System Between Traditional and Modern Political Structures



Source: Created by the author

The monarchical institution led by the reformist King Mohammed VI initiated an ambitious constitution that promised reform in several key sectors, including the distribution of executive power between the monarchy and democratic institutions, after the Arab Spring. The reform process promised free elections, freedom of

expression, demonstration, and individual liberties by linking the government to the electoral process rather than the king's appointment, as demanded by the 20th movement protestors. This democratization process has enabled Morocco's unprecedented authoritarianism in the name of stability and resiliency.

These top-down induced reforms by the monarchy, including the constitution,⁵⁹⁵ have, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and especially after 2015, further consolidated the monarchy's power in unprecedented ways. Post-Arab Spring political developments in Morocco involving the PJD and the monarchy showed that the monarchy had no desire or intention to negotiate or compromise its powers; rather, the reform process was a strategy to quell unrest and lay the foundation for a more consolidated executive monarchy with absolute powers and legitimacy without accountability.

With the French-introduced constitution of 1962 declaring the Moroccan monarchy to be sacred, the monarchy has adopted various strategies to discredit the Moroccan modern political system, co-opt opposition parties, control youth civil and leftist student associations.⁵⁹⁶ This so-called divide-and-rule strategy, along with the centralization of power and the co-optation of political and economic elites through neoliberal policies, has been maintained through the use of the security apparatus and coercive measures of the Makhzen, which silenced and punished Moroccan dissent through enforced disappearances, defamation, and torture. In addition to these mechanisms, the judiciary has come to play a significant role in this process under the current, post-Arab Spring-reformed system.

4.3.2.2. Post-Arab Spring Centralization of Power in the hands of Monarchy

Post-Arab Spring Morocco sets an important case whereby democratic tools and means have been employed to delegitimize the democratic system, strengthen and consolidate the power of an authoritarian traditional system. The top-down

⁵⁹⁵ According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Morocco represents an extreme case of top-down reforms that are exclusively under the power of the king without involvement of the opposition. National actors of democracy are selectively engaged and chosen by the monarch. Reforms are also under the power of the Royal court.

Carnegie Endowment for Peace, "Morocco from Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition?", **Carnegie Politika**, 01.11.2016, <https://carnegiemoscow.org/2006/11/01/morocco-from-top-down-reform-to-democratic-transition-event-931> , (01.12.2022).

⁵⁹⁶ Mahmoud El Aallaoui, "How is the Political Elite Produced in Morocco", **La Nouvelle Chronique**, 21.06.2021, <https://lanouvellechronique.com/2021/06/21/how-is-the-political-elite-produced-in-morocco/> , (02.02.2023).

induced constitutional reforms have proved to be far from genuine and instead to serve the purpose of protection and consolidation of the absolute power of the 'executive monarchy' instead of shifting toward 'constitutional monarchy'.

The 2011 constitution, which promised to reduce the king's powers and increase those of the head of government and parliament at the executive, legislative, and judicial levels, actually enshrined his dominance. The king retains his pre-2011 powers under Article 41-59 section 3. The king protects the nation, religion, and faithful and leads the military. The constitution granted the king immunity and supremacy over the law, political system, and use of force. The constitution guaranteed his veto power, unaccountability, and executive power over strategic issues, preserving his privileges.⁵⁹⁷ The constitution also gave the king executive powers and made him an arbiter in opposition to the ruling government, advocating for Moroccans' rights. The Moroccan king's new role as arbiter, considering that the government and parliament have remained deprived of executive power and only executed the king's decisions, has further legitimized his power as the only genuine leader interested in Moroccan well-being against the government's failures, which he scolds in speeches.

Post-Arab Spring and under the 2011 constitution, the king has absolute power over Moroccan state sovereignty, including power institutions, security and surveillance mechanisms, ministries of sovereignty, regional administrations, and strategic government positions that he appoints without consultation or interference from the head of government. The king's advisers, the royal cabinet, have more power than elected government officials and intervene in politics without accountability.⁵⁹⁸

The Moroccan king rules by royal decrees, known as the Dahir, which are above the law and part of his veto power. He can dissolve parliament and change the government.⁵⁹⁹ The king appoints five independent members to the Supreme Council of the Judiciary which is responsible for judge appointment and holds executive power of the judiciary.⁶⁰⁰ The king appoints ambassadors without government input.⁶⁰¹ He

⁵⁹⁷ Francesco Cavatorta & Fabio Merone, "Never Ending Reformism from Above and Dissatisfaction from Below: The Paradox of Moroccan Post Arab Spring Politics", Working Paper, **German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)**, Bonn, 2022, pp.1-31.

Saloua Zerhouni, "'Smartness' Without Vision: The Moroccan Vision in the Face of Acquiescent Elites and Weak Social Mobilization", **Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik**, Vol. 11, 2014, pp.1-8.

⁵⁹⁸ Bertelsmann Stiftung, **BTI 2022 Country Report-Morocco**, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2022, pp. 1-43.

⁵⁹⁹ Mohammed Daadaoui, "A Symbol Kind of Monarch", **Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center**, 14.06.2012, <https://carnegie-mec.org/sada/48534>, (11.03.2023).

⁶⁰⁰ Bertelsmann Stiftung, p. 12.

⁶⁰¹ Mohammed Hashas, "Moroccan Exceptionalism Examined: Constitutional Insights pre-and post-2011", IAI Working Papers, **Istituto Affari Internazionali**, Vol. 13, No. 34, 2013, p.1-18.

has full control over the ministries of interior affairs, foreign affairs and the judiciary, known as the sovereignty ministries. These ministries are king-controlled and not subject to elections.⁶⁰² The king controls the other ministries by appointing pro-monarchy officials and technocrats to strategic positions in each ministry⁶⁰³, ensuring his control over the state despite a modern political system that barely serves to give the king local and international legitimacy while shielding him from accountability.

Despite the elected government, the king intervenes in government affairs and remains the only "legitimate and unaccountable" political/executive actor in Morocco. The king controls the reform process which is only accessible through the royal court.⁶⁰⁴ This keeps the reform process controlled by the king, top-down induced, and generally held to manoeuvre around crises by initiating "hopeful" reforms for change and calling on commissions for political or developmental crises to silence international criticism and local unrest while enhancing the king's role as protector from "failed/corrupt" politicians. The king sets the elected government's political framework. Royal committees allowed the monarchy to maintain its power and decision-making mechanisms in Morocco. The king maintains his absolute power by controlling the judiciary and Makhzen.⁶⁰⁵

The king is the commander-in-chief and chairs the newly established supreme security council, which gives him control over the military and security apparatus, including the Makhzen state.⁶⁰⁶ This power, supplemented by the judiciary, has helped the king control and silence dissent through authoritarian means of force against democratic principles and ethics, including beating, violence, defamation, torture, and the criminalization of protestors demanding socioeconomic rights or criticizing the king's political monopoly.

By co-opting the political elite, discrediting, delegitimizing, and dividing political parties, and controlling civil society actors through legal and financial restrictions, the king has maintained political control. In addition, as the most important capitalist actor in Morocco, the king initiated neoliberal policies and brought his capitalist elite into politics, creating a powerful, loyal elite with common interests with the monarchy and which benefits from authoritarianism to get richer. Investing in the convergence and

⁶⁰² Bertelsmann Stiftung, p. 36.

⁶⁰³ Drhimeur, (POLS), p. 11.

⁶⁰⁴ Khalid Mouna, "The Role of Civil Society in Morocco: Toward a Democracy or an Autocracy", Working Papers, **Medreset**, No. 13, 2018, pp. 2-22.

⁶⁰⁵ Lalla Amine Drhimeur, "Moroccan Political System: Literature Review", **ERC AdG Prime Youth ISLAM-OPHOB-ISM-785934**, 2020, pp. 2-16, (POLSYS).

⁶⁰⁶ Amin Alsaden, "Averting a Moroccan Revolution: The Monarchy's Pre-emptive Spatial Tactics and the Quest for Stability", **Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Comment**, No. 30, 2012, p.1-8.

co-optation of the political and business elite protects the king and allows him to ignore protests from the powerless.

4.3.2.3. Control and Co-optation of the Civil Society Actors

The 2011 constitution recognized civil society's role in democratization. Article 29 guarantees freedom of public space, civil action, assembly, demonstration, and expression without discrimination.⁶⁰⁷ However, the post-Arab Spring period showed that civil society was also part of the monarchy's co-optation strategy, which was controlled by the constitution, law, monitoring strategies, and strategic control of change forces like political parties and civil associations.

Civil society funding is limited and monitored. Moroccan state used the National Human Development Initiative to monitor civil society through funding.⁶⁰⁸ The 1958 decree mandated civil association registration and penalized lawbreakers.⁶⁰⁹ The decree requires civil association protesters to register, inform, and follow peaceful protest rules. This clause restricts freedom of expression, public space, and assembly and protests the meaning of protest. Moroccan authorities dissolve and punish non-state actors under the 1958 decree. After 2011, the "Racines" association was dissolved, the Administrative Association for Human Rights (AMDH) was banned from opening local branches, and the association's venues were closed.⁶¹⁰ The regime also created NGOs to marginalize "independent" civil actors. Pro-regime NGOs are funded while pro-dissent ones are prosecuted. Financial and legal constraints limit civil society's decision-making capacity.⁶¹¹ This monarchic carrot stick strategy has reduced civic engagement by reducing civil actor efficiency and legitimacy. The regime also controls civil society by appointing pro-regime directors of associations and NGOs.⁶¹² The authority can align civic actions and discourses with the political regime. The monarchy also created NGOs and associations in the name of the king or family members to promote the image of the king and monarchy as "good" figures who help Morocco's population and youth overcome poverty and inequality, such as the Mohammed VI association.⁶¹³

⁶⁰⁷ Bertelsmann Stiftung, p. 10.

⁶⁰⁸ Mouna, p. 7.

⁶⁰⁹ Bertelsmann Stiftung, p. 11.

⁶¹⁰ Bertelsmann Stiftung, p. 39.

⁶¹¹ Bertelsmann Stiftung, p. 31.

⁶¹² El Aallaoui, 2021.

⁶¹³ Bertelsmann Stiftung, p. 31.

Civil society in Morocco faces other challenges, including a lack of trust, legitimacy, and appeal among youth due to regime legal and financial restrictions. Due to the political decision-making process's inefficiency, youth and literate people are unwilling to participate. Civil actors as well as political parties in Morocco can barely show good intentions and serve as tools for legitimizing the regime and power while becoming illegitimate in the eyes of the population.

4.3.2.4. The De-legitimization and Co-optation of Political Parties and the Political Elite

Political parties organize public opinion, link power mechanisms to the people, and most importantly, represent the public will through a "majority" system in modern democracies. Political parties ensure equal power, resource sharing, and accountability-based legitimacy. Political parties in Morocco have been used to discredit opposition parties, discredit modern governance, and consolidate the monarchy's rule through co-optation of the political elite, divide and rule⁶¹⁴, and segment politics. Political parties in Morocco became an important tool for preventing the rise of a real modern "political system" with political parties that compete for the population's enchantment rather than the monarchy's favor or loyalty to gain personal advantage and ensure continuity. After Morocco's first free elections in 2011, the PJD overthrew Morocco's loyalist, royalist political system. The PJD's unwillingness to challenge the monarchy's long-standing political dominance by asking for democracy and acknowledging the king's leadership has allowed the monarchy to discredit and delegitimize anti-systemic political parties by bringing them to power.⁶¹⁵ This strategy has strengthened the monarchy by undermining the modern Moroccan political system, actors and the 2011 initiated reform process.⁶¹⁶ Delegitimizing and discrediting political parties has always kept the monarchy in power. This strategy has prevented a strong oppositional party and maintained loyal political elite that does not challenge the king. Political parties also absorbed social unrest and dissent that would have been directed against the monarchy had they not existed, as Moroccan protests

⁶¹⁴ The Moroccan monarchy is known for its post-independence strategy of playing the political parties against each other to weaken potential strong opposition and the political parties in general.

⁶¹⁵ Armin Arefi, "Maroc : Les Islamistes de Sa Majesté », **Le Point**, 29.11.2011, https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/maroc-les-islamistes-de-sa-majeste-28-11-2011-1401535_24.php, (09.03.2023).

⁶¹⁶ Driss Maghraoui, "Constitutional Reform in Morocco: Between Consensus and Subaltern Politics", **The Journal of North African Studies**, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2011, pp. 679-699.

have repeatedly targeted government officials while calling for the king's intervention.⁶¹⁷ Popular mistrust and frustration has generally targeted the political elite. Political parties in Morocco, it can be argued, serve the primary function of delegitimizing and discrediting the modern political system in favor of the monarchy's traditional political system based on heritage, religious, and historical symbolism.

Without executive or legislative power, Moroccan political parties can only make empty promises and serve to reshuffle the government through the king's intervention upon popular dissatisfaction. Moroccan political parties lack an ideological foundation⁶¹⁸ and the ability to persuade voters, especially young people who are more aware than older generations of the monarchic dominance over the political system. Winning parties serve to execute the king's orders, do not govern. Given Morocco's weak parliament, political parties are thought to have less power than the king's councilors. Due to the king's political dominance, political actors, including oppositional parties like the PJD, must submit to the king's power and will as soon as they are elected,⁶¹⁹ which often compromises their principles, ethos, and public legitimacy. The PJD's coalition with the monarchy alienated its voters and tarnished its reputation in Morocco. After the elections, the PJD endorsed the monarchy's discourse and expressed "allegiance" to the king's supreme power. The popular head of government Abdelilah Benkirane has stated several times that Morocco's real governor is the king and that they will follow his will.⁶²⁰ The PJD was the first political party with the potential to challenge the monarchy's power which it failed by choosing to align itself with the monarchy failing the population's expectation and allowing the monarchy to initiate an unprecedented process of power consolidation. Maintaining the PJD in place, the Moroccan king has appointed pro-monarchy technocrats and royalist political party members to ministries other than than the sovereign ministries that are under his full control.⁶²¹ The king has, thus, maintained full control over the decision making keeping the governing 'allegiant' PJD at the margin. The PJD's inability to form a government due to parliamentary opposition and pressure from monarchist and loyalist parties led by the king's close allies forced the king to dismiss the popular Abdelilah Benkirane and replace him with

⁶¹⁷ 2011 protests including the February movement called for changing the monarchic system into constitutional while keeping their call for reforms directed toward the political elite, technocrats and government officials.

⁶¹⁸ Berterlsmann Stiftung, p. 15.

⁶¹⁹ Drhimeur, 2019, p. 2.

⁶²⁰ Mohammed Daadaoui, "Of Monarchs and Islamists: The 'Refo-lutionary Promise of the PJD Islamists and Regime Control in Morocco", *Middle East Critique*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2017, pp. 355-371.

⁶²¹ Arefi, 2011.

a less popular party member. After the 2016 elections, the PJD coalition government led by vice president El Othmani had to make and sign decisions against the party's Islamist ethos. The legalization of medical cannabis and the Abraham accords normalizing relations with Israel were most significant.⁶²² This has led to an internal divide within the political party, the end of its ethical legitimacy from its "conservative" supporters, and the return of a Moroccan political system led by pure loyalist political parties composed of the co-opted converged political and business elite forming the closest coterie of the king.

The Moroccan multiparty system, with almost 36 political parties,⁶²³ maintains monarchic political dominance by giving the appearance of democracy. The variety of political parties has eliminated real political competition, ideological parties, and strong leading parties. This political variety diffuses "political power" and public attention, promoting democracy. This also gave the impression that political parties are useless because they are many, ideology-free, disconnected from the public, and rarely make a difference. The monarchy's strategy of government rotation keeps the checks and balances mechanism directed toward elected officials that are easy to rotate without shifting power from the king, rather than having fewer and stronger political parties that can draw attention to the real political actor, the king.

In Morocco, political parties seek personalist advantage by cultivating close political and economic ties with the monarchy.⁶²⁴ After 2011 and 2016 protests, the king has intervened several times to make 'reforms' by forming commissions and changing the government officials. Top-down reforms, praised by international, media, and civil actors, serve to calm unrest and legitimize the king while delegitimizing the modern political system as inefficient. These reforms rarely hide the real issues that deprive Moroccans, especially youth, of a good quality of life. Aziz Akhenouch, Morocco's most powerful capitalist after the monarchy, rules after the PJD through the RNI political party. The 2015 Moroccan 2nd Arab Spring saw youth boycotts and social media protests against Akhenouch, a close friend of the king. After 100 days in office, Akhenouch has failed to fulfill election promises and caused a deep social crisis in Morocco with uncontrolled price increases, but parliament and

⁶²² Berterlsmann Stiftung, p. 36.

Mohammed Masbah, "How Morocco's Islamist Party Fell from Grace", **Chatham House**, 14.09.2021, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/how-moroccos-islamist-party-fell-grace>, (10.03.2023).

⁶²³ According to the Berterlsmann Stiftung Report, the multiparty system in Morocco has generated disorientation and disaffection within the electorate.

Berterlsmann Stiftung, p. 15.

⁶²⁴ Andrew Barwig, "'The New Palace Guards': Elections and Elites in Morocco and Jordan", **Middle East Journal**, Vol. 66, No. 3, 2012, pp. 425-433.

the king, who has remained silent during several demonstrations, keep silent.⁶²⁵ Aziz Akhennouch repealed some of the 2011 constitution's most important legislative reforms, including the one fighting corruption and requiring government officials to declare their assets at the start and end of public office to prevent "unexplained accumulation of wealth." To maintain power, the monarchy co-opts business and political elites.⁶²⁶

4.3.2.5. Business and Political Elite Co-optation and Convergence

The elites are a select group of society that controls capital or political power. The elites, usually the few members of a society, are used to analyze groups that control or are at the top.⁶²⁷ It is a powerful minority. The monarchy has relied on the convergence of the political and business elite to maintain its absolute power and prevent real democratization by creating an oligarchy.⁶²⁸ Neoliberal policies were used to align the monarchy and business elite. The business elite's political involvement has further consolidated the oligarchy's interests and formed a strong alliance against the rest of the population.

The king is Morocco's biggest capitalist and power holder. Converging the business and political elite has further consolidated the king's power over the economic and political domains by merging the monarchy's and elite interests⁶²⁹ while facing popular dissent through the security apparatus. This oligarchy consists of public technocrats, businessmen who are also politicians, and the king's closest loyalists.

The monarchy created new elite that is more supportive and dependent on it by incorporating a rising class of political and economic elite. The monarchy, business politicians, and technocrats formed a clientalistic network that controls decision-making, economic sectors, security, and administrative privileges. This oligarchic elite, which operates under a neoliberal economic system, benefits more from a non-democratic regime than one with checks and balances.⁶³⁰ To maintain its neoliberal

⁶²⁵ Mohamed Taifouri, "Morocco's Billionaire PM: Business Elite Stifles Politics", **Qantara**, 15.03.2022, <https://en.qantara.de/content/moroccos-billionaire-pm-business-elite-stifles-politics>, (20.03.2023).

⁶²⁶ Taifouri, 2022.

⁶²⁷ El Aallaoui, 2021.

⁶²⁸ Youssef Boudhal, "Beyond the Model Reform Image: Morocco's Politics of Elite Co-optation", **German Institute for Global and Area Studies**, No. 3, 2018, pp. 1-11.

⁶²⁹ Susi Dennison, Nicu Popesco, Jose Ignacio Torreblanca, "A Chance to Reform: How the EU can Support Democratic Evolution in Morocco", **European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief**, No. 33, 2011, pp. 1-15.

⁶³⁰ Koenraad Bogaert, "Globalized Authoritarianism and the New Moroccan City", **Middle East Report**, No. 287, 2018, p. 6-10.

advantage, the converged business and political elite is more concerned with producing loyalty to the monarchy than with society's instabilities and everyday resistances that are silenced by security and violence.

The monarchy has made the economic, political, and cultural elite dependent on it through elite co-optation and convergence. Thus, the elites trade loyalty for economic, political, and administrative privilege. Elites benefit from: access to state rent distribution channels, state resources mobilized to protect commercial enterprises under "impressive" neoliberal projects combining state and public actors, fiscal and administrative exceptions.⁶³¹ These elites are exempt from judicial accountability for corruption and maintain a clientalist regime that benefits from and maintains informal corruption. Elites maintain power by owning and controlling institutions and organizations. Elite-owned companies operate unsupervised and only 8 out of every 1000 pay taxes.⁶³²

This oligarchic regime benefits the monarchy, state, and converged business and political elite. As Morocco's biggest capitalist, the monarchy can ignore the masses and even oppress them by aligning the elite's interests with its own.⁶³³ The oligarchic regime serving authoritarian resilience allows security forces to use force against dissenters to maintain the undemocratic system that benefits them more than a democratic one. In addition to its strong elitist power over the masses, the state benefits from reduced public responsibility and delivery.⁶³⁴ Having adopted neoliberal privatization, the Moroccan state has sold several state assets at bargain prices,⁶³⁵ transferring state responsibility for public interest or service provision to private actors, strengthening the oligarchic circle and shifting the burden of societal needs to citizens in a market economy.

This economic structure has marginalized lower and average Moroccans politically, economically, linguistically, and socioeconomically, especially in education and employment. This oligarchic regime has also increased corruption, inequality, and economic and political contempt, which the oligarchic circle applauds.

This oligarchic regime also strengthened the French companies, especially offshore ones, which exploited the Moroccan market and labor. French multinationals

⁶³¹ Boudhal, 2018.

⁶³² Berterlsmann Stiftung, p. 35.

⁶³³ Boudhal, 2018.

⁶³⁴ Myriam Catusse, « Maroc : Un État Social Fragile Dans La Réforme Néolibérale », **Alternatives Sud**, Vol.16, 2009, pp. 59–83.

⁶³⁵ Bogaert, 2018.

dominated the Moroccan economy thanks to their close ties to Moroccan elites examples include Bouygues and Alstom multinationals.⁶³⁶

French market dominance has hurt Moroccan citizen integration, domestic production, and competitiveness, resulting in indirect colonization. French language dominance over the job market and elite-supported privatization of education are linked. Moroccan elite-supported indirect French colonialism marginalizes the average citizen, who is already marginalized by neoliberalism, oligarchism, and authoritarianism.

4.3.2.6. Neoliberalism and Indirect French Colonialism: Offshore Economy

As early as the middle of the 19th Century, French colonialism had begun to make its mark on the North African Country of Morocco. Having become a dominant force in Morocco, France has dominated its power in Morocco through a variety of strategies one of which is offshore economy as well as a variety of political, cultural and socioeconomic patterns of domination. The continuous domination of France of Morocco will be assessed in this section as a form of indirect colonialization.

Despite Morocco's decolonization in 1956, Morocco is still struggling to overcome the repercussions of this colonial experience that is continuing through other forms. Offshore business is one of them. French corporations having a significant political weight in Morocco exert influence over the offshore economy in Morocco. Making use of the Moroccan labor, Morocco's natural and mineral resources, these companies maintain the economic dependence of Morocco on France. Morocco's economic policies have also been adjusted to facilitate French' companies' domination by setting shops in tax havens, taking advantage of double taxation treaties and lowering their corporate tax rates. Policies initiated by the Moroccan leadership in favor of the French companies have contributed to the marginalization of the Moroccan population needs. Examples of these policies include, the introduction of financial incentives, government subsidies and infrastructural investments funded by the French government, bringing in workers from outside Morocco to work in sectors of the economy closely tied to France. Also, there has been building a French speaking educational infrastructure in Morocco to

⁶³⁶ Bogaert, 2018.

prepare locals to work for French-funded businesses and initiatives as well as favorable trade pact negotiations.

Morocco's offshore economy provides France with low wages, laxer labor regulations and lower corporate tax rates than France's domestic economy. French companies also take advantage of Morocco's lower labor costs and service rates to make products for the French market at a lower cost. France also takes advantage of the relaxed regulatory environment and relocating labor-intensive operations there where wages are significantly lower than in France. The garment industry is a prime example whereby French design houses send manufacturing to Morocco where employees are paid cheaper salaries. This gives France and French enterprises an important economic advantage which is also a type of colonization⁶³⁷. Offshore businesses and labour in increasingly growing in Morocco as a means of enforcing French indirect rule. As a result of this dominance, France not only maintains control over Morocco's population and labour, it also maintains control over the Moroccan state.

Besides the labor and economic advantage, French companies have an inappropriate amount of political influence in Morocco as a result of their dominance over the offshore economy of the country. This dominance as stated by Moha Ennaji⁶³⁸ extends back to the era of French colonialism of Morocco. French businesses maintain an advantageous standing in Morocco's current economic system. corporations such as Renault and Total have made significant investments in Morocco and have utilized their political weight to maintain their dominant position in the Moroccan market.

Even though the offshore business has contributed to the prosperity of Morocco, it remains dominated by patterns of inequality and indirect colonialism to the advantage of France against Morocco's domestic competitiveness and population prosperity. Additionally, although French offshore business is not the only one present in Morocco, it remains especially important and distinct from others considering the overall continuing patterns of French colonialism on Morocco especially in terms of the economy and the education.

Morocco's economy remains highly dependent on France, the country's lingua franca remains dominant on the job market and the educational system as well as the

⁶³⁷ Samir Amin, **Capitalism in the Age of Globalization: The Management of Contemporary Society**, Zed Books: London, 2000, pp.10-192.

⁶³⁸ Moha Ennaji, Offshore economy and political influence of France in Morocco, **Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences**, Vol. 5, No. 10, 2014, pp. 162-168.

daily life of Moroccan citizens. Besides creating a segregation in the country, this makes Morocco culturally and socioeconomically dependent on France' economic advantage and monopoly over Morocco.⁶³⁹ The resulting cultural hierarchy in the Moroccan context as a result of the French domination patterns is also reinforced by Morocco's favorable treatment of French organizations like the Alliance Francaise. The hegemony of French over the educational system and the job market contributes to the continuation of French hegemony and enhances the asymmetric cultural ties between Morocco and France as a result of the colonial experience.

Moroccan economy is also structured in favor of businesses based in France, thereby strengthening France's position in the country's economy. French companies have a disproportionate role in Morocco's economy and are a major source of FDI.⁶⁴⁰ The sale of agricultural goods to France is also a major contributor to the Moroccan economy, maintaining the pattern of economic dependency dating back to the colonial times. French colonialism over Morocco and its population is maintained by French corporations, the dominance of the French language, French culture, all of which contribute to the continued legacy of French colonialism over Morocco.

4.3.2.7. Post-Colonial Nation-State Building Issues of Morocco

The consequences of the Spanish and French colonialism of Morocco still affect the country's post-colonial development process and play an important role behind irregular migration of the Moroccan youth. Issues related to the Rif, the Western Sahara, the youth integration in the job market, the segregation in the educational system and the integration between the job market and educational system are direct consequences of the French and Spanish colonialism which repercussions are still shaping Morocco's everyday life.

Spanish colonialism of the North of Morocco has resulted into the region being disconnected from the center of Morocco which was colonized by France and which is still dominated by the French language unlike the Spanish language speaking North cities. The North, mainly the Rif region has since the colonial time remained disconnected from the country's development process both as a result of the colonial power divide and rule policies as well as the postcolonial approach of the monarchy

⁶³⁹ Najat Rochdi, The Educational System in Morocco: A Legacy of French Colonialism, **Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences**, Vol. 5, No. 10, 2014 pp. 227-233.

⁶⁴⁰ The World Bank, The World Bank in Morocco, **World Bank**, 20.10.2022, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/morocco/overview> , (02.11.2022).

to marginalize it as a result of their criticism of its regime. The majority of the Moroccan diaspora living in Europe and migrating toward Europe originates from the Rif.

The Western Sahara issue originating from the Spanish colonialism of the region is today Morocco's primary national interest that consumes a considerable financial cost and public involvement of the state for national integrity. Morocco has spent decades investing in the Western Sahara to gain support against the Polisario and using foreign policy to gain regional and international support for its autonomy plan. To gain the support of the local population, Morocco has prioritized the region's development over other regions of the country such as the Rif. Morocco expends significant resources fighting the Algeria-funded Polisario insurgency in the Western Sahara. Spain, however, still provides support to the guerilla movement causing crises in the EU-Morocco cooperation.

Morocco's post-colonial independence, national, and territorial integrity is still ongoing. Ceuta and Melilla, are still colonized by Spain, the Western Sahara' autonomy plan of Morocco remains as unresolved.

French colonialism which is still continuing through other means, notably the dominance of French on the Moroccan context and job market, is also a main factor behind the youth socioeconomic integration issues. French colonialism continued in an indirect form affects Morocco's development issues by creating issues of identity and national integrity. This issue was further empowered by high interlinkage between the economic and political forces of Morocco and France, that is benefitting the elites against the population's needs. The French domination on the Moroccan economic and social domain mainly affects populations of the rural areas, the Spanish speaking populations of the North as well as the Moroccan Amazigh/Berber populations. It also, in a general sense, leads to the segregation of average and middle class Moroccan that cannot afford education in private schools.

Morocco has a mosaic identity with many local languages and cultural colors, generally grouped under the historical reference of "Moorish" race and culture due to its geopolitical position linking it to several continents. Estimates about the Amazigh/Berber population in Morocco range between at least 45% to 70%.⁶⁴¹ Official Arabic, French, and Spanish are taught in schools and used in administration and jobs, marginalizing the Amazigh language and identity. Language and dominance keep a large margin the population out of the socioeconomic system that is dictated

⁶⁴¹ Amina Ambarech, "The Indigenous World 2022: Morocco", **IWGIA**, 01.04.2022, <https://www.iwgia.org/en/morocco/4639-iw-2022-morocco.html>, (06.04.2023).

by the persistent high level of illiteracy dooming Morocco's marginalized classes to poverty due to illiteracy. This linguistic dominance creates a gap in citizens' opportunities, discrimination, and a first indicator of the "haves" and "have-nots," with French speakers privileged and Moroccan speakers or poor French marginalized in daily life. This situation has led the Amazigh population to create their own economic system which consists of 'small shops' in cities while they prefer to maintain their tribal and family living in Amazigh populated rural areas.

Foreign language skills and openness can aid development, but in Morocco's centralized political, economic, and territorial integrity, foreign language dominance became a barrier to development and a tool for discrimination. While some of Morocco's development issues are related to post-colonial territorial independence issues, the main issue is incomplete national integrity at the demographic and linguistic level, coordination between the educational and job markets, and ensuring equal integrity chances and opportunity for Moroccans in all regions and ethnic groups. However, the predominance of oligarchic interests selectively engages the state in areas of interest and maintains French language dominance over local language despite the state's withdrawal from public service and the worsening public educational system, resulting in systemic stratification between social groups, rural urban areas, and urban areas. Thus, Morocco has two realities: that chosen by the elite, which is modernized and developed, and that considered useless by the elite, which is left behind. This has created macroeconomic and microeconomic contrasts where the rich are getting richer and the average Moroccan is marginalized from life. This asymmetry also limits superficial responses to unrest to elite interests. These issues are also symptoms, not causes. Political power and dominance also threaten Morocco's postcolonial national and linguistic integrity.

Related to the power consolidation in the oligarchic elite, Morocco also has issues related to the urban-rural divide and the divide between the central Morocco and the rest of Morocco. The 2011 reforms addressed the rural-urban divide and inequalities between urbanized regions by introducing advanced regionalization, a decentralization process that gives regions their own governors or *walis*. This policy, like many others, is limited by the centralization of power and the king-dominated political system. Governors are appointed by the king, not elected, and are under his executive power as part of his control over the ministry of Interior Affairs.⁶⁴² Another issue is that regionalization development plans prioritize developed center cities like

⁶⁴² Berterlsmann Stiftung, p. 14.

Casablanca and Rabat. Due to elite centralization and interest in these regions, unemployment programs focus on them. Rabat-Casablanca has lower unemployment than the rest of Morocco and a concentration of doctors, schools, companies, etc. Casablanca has 56% of doctors.⁶⁴³ This has created a bridge and gap between what Moroccans call "Beneficial Morocco"—the Morocco chosen and benefiting the oligarchic group—and "Useless/Marginalized Morocco," where the state withdraws from investing in all public sectors, including infrastructure, unemployment, etc. The Northern Rif region, due to its history of open criticism of the monarchy, represents the extreme of this Moroccan state regional selective engagement, where it has "punished" the region and its population for decades through absence and deprivation from services, leading to massive migration and high cannabis economy engagement.

Social and political unrest such as the 2016 Hirak movement is a direct result of the Moroccan nation-state building issues which is characterized by the lack of democratic governance and the centralization of power in the hands of monarchy and coterie.

4.3.2.8. Privatization of Education

Morocco's neoliberal and privatization policies have hurt the education sector the most, deepening the average Moroccan's economic and political marginalization. Morocco's rural-urban literacy gap is large despite its macroeconomic development. A 2020 Education International and World Bank study found that the oligarchic system's neoliberal market economy's privatization of education has deepened youth marginalization and created a double-speed polarized society with degradation and development.⁶⁴⁴ Public schools, which most Moroccans attend, lack infrastructure, teaching materials, and space due to privatization. In addition, the education quality, especially in linguistic skills, is lower than private education for the wealthy. Thus, while average and lower classes must use the public education system, they are denied the benefits of quality education that could help them rise in society. Middle-class families must take out loans to send their children to private schools to ensure quality education and linguistic skills for the French-dominated job market. In 2018, Moroccan students performed below the OECD average in reading, math, and

⁶⁴³ Berterlsmann Stiftung, p. 8.

⁶⁴⁴ Education International, Morocco: A Report Highlights Inequalities Caused by Increased Privatization of Education, **Education International**, 6.02.2020, <https://www.ei-ie.org/en/item/23207:morocco-report-highlights-inequities-caused-by-increased-privatisation-of-education>, (03.02.2023).

science.⁶⁴⁵ Morocco spends 5.7% of its GDP on education and 0.7% on Research and Development.⁶⁴⁶ Morocco's inequalities between urban and rural areas with the persistence affects civil society engagement, political awareness, and the ability to reform soft issues like women's rights, but the educational system's privatization mainly affects youth socioeconomic integration. The main reason for youth non-integration is the gap between the job market, which is based on foreign markets, especially the French one, requirements, and language, and the educational system, which is more theoretical and disconnected from the job market. Thus, privatization of education has maintained the gap between urban classes and peripheral urban classes with high poverty rates. 19% of Moroccans live on less than \$4 a day, a growing problem. According to the World Bank report, the unexploited youth bulge in the MENA region has become a major problem due to marginalizing political and socioeconomic systems that keep youth potential untapped. Youth socioeconomic issues and unemployment drove the Arab spring. According to the World Bank report on Morocco's youth, most unemployed youth have no or little education. Moroccan public education returns are low. Morocco has private and public education due to privatization. Private schools teach Arabic as a language and Islamic religion in French, while public schools teach Arabic and French as foreign languages. The private educational system and its quality vary in cost and quality, with French system schools at the top, which are linked to France and teach in French, American system schools, which are linked to the US and teach in English, and Moroccan system private schools, which also teach in French and other foreign languages well. However, these schools are inaccessible to most Moroccans who must use the state-run public system, which is marginalized from quality education. This creates a systemic stratification of Moroccan society, with the majority marginalized by the privatization of education, which ensured that the public system would not promote socioeconomic integration. Moroccan labor market requires French, which automatically excludes "public school system" students whose education is based on official Arabic with weak foreign language skills and overall low quality. This situation contributed to the "majority of Moroccan youth" being marginalized in the job market

⁶⁴⁵ OECD, **Morocco-Country Notes: PISA 2018**, OECD Publishing, Vol. I-III, 2019, pp.1-8.

⁶⁴⁶ The World Bank, "Research and Development Expenditure (% of GDP): Morocco", **The World Bank**, 24.10.2022, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS?locations=MA>, (09.02.2022).

The World Bank, "Government Expenditure on Education, total (%GDP): Morocco", **The World Bank**, 24.10.2022, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS?locations=MA>, (09.02.2022).

and a high rate of school dropouts and young students seeing education as pointless. This led to youth poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment, as well as social instability, public space discrimination, theft, acts of aggression, drug use and trafficking, overcrowded prisons, and empty seats in school and university roofs.

In the face of demonstrations and calls for socioeconomic integration, the king has initiated the 'smokescreen' initiative of professional vocational training to guarantee the youth future.

4.3.2.9. The Informal Institution: Corruption

Morocco's informal institution of corruption persists. Morocco remains corrupt despite the EU reforms and program support. Economic and political clientalism explains why corruption persists in the country. The oligarchic regime perpetuates corruption in these ways. First, the lack of political will sustains corruption. Corruption serves clientalist power, reducing political will. Morocco's institutions are opaque. Public spending, allocation, and execution information is unavailable or selectively released.⁶⁴⁷ Policy coordination on the tackling of the corruption issue is limited the monarchy and its coterie hold all power, which hinders the EU and transparency international anti-corruption programs.⁶⁴⁸ Nepotism in public administration still favors family and political connections over merit.⁶⁴⁹ The regime's protection of its elite and interests and the judiciary's dependence on it also prevent legal mechanisms from preventing the corruption trend since cases of monarchy entourage corruption are dropped.

In Morocco, corruption is a major informal institution that shapes and hinders youth socioeconomic integration, political and economic transparency, social justice, and equity. As mentioned, most elite-owned companies do not pay taxes, it is estimated that corruption costs the Moroccan economy 7% of its GDP.⁶⁵⁰ According to transparency international secretary general and economist Fouad Abdelmoumni, Morocco's corruption affects all sectors, "*deliberate choice to encourage criminality in Morocco*".⁶⁵¹

Morocco's parliament has been plagued by corruption for decades, according to International Transparency. Arab Barometer found 71% of Moroccans believe state

⁶⁴⁷ Bertelsmann Stiftung, p. 35, 36.

⁶⁴⁸ Bertelsmann Stiftung, p. 36.

⁶⁴⁹ Bertelsmann Stiftung, p. 35.

⁶⁵⁰ Bertelsmann Stiftung, p. 36.

⁶⁵¹ Youssef Boudhal, 2018.

institutions and agencies are corrupt.⁶⁵² Due to the political and economic asymmetry, which is based on interest rather than transparency, corruption has become part of this system, which further disadvantages marginalized classes. Since the issue is caused by the current economic, political, and socioeconomic system, national initiatives and reforms like Morocco's National Authority for Probity Prevention and Fighting Corruption (INPPLC) are ineffective.⁶⁵³ The EU programs too. Corruption is used by the dominant oligarchic system and society to gain leverage and advantage in a context of dominance and marginalization. The current government, led by the king's close friend and billionaire Aziz Akhennouch, lifted the INPPLC law, symbolizing the consolidation of authoritarianism and oligarchic rule to the detriment of the population interest.

4.3.2.10. The Informal State/ Makhzen: The Monarchy' Security Apparatus

According to Maghraoui, the local name for the state in Morocco, "Makhzen," is an important legacy of the reign of King Hassan II. Before the reign of the current King Mohammed the IV, the Makhzen provided the administrative and legal framework for centuries. Importantly, the Makhzen has provided the Sultans of Morocco with the military personnel necessary to extend or enforce their authority when necessary. The Makhzen, which exists as an informal state due to reforms initiated by the King Mohammed the Sixth prior to his accession to the throne, continues to function in conjunction with the formal state and institutions. The Makhzen is especially recognized by interventions by state forces during violent protests and demonstrations. The Makhzen, the oldest mechanism for exercising political power and authority in Morocco, is still in place alongside the state's post-Arab Spring "democratization processes." According to Maghraoui, one of the primary reasons for the ineffectiveness of reforms and the slow pace of progress in civil liberties, press freedoms, and political progress in Morocco is the persistence of the Makhzen power.⁶⁵⁴

The "Makhzen" is the monarchy's security apparatus. The regime uses violence, forced disappearance, and torture to silence dissent through the Makhzen.

⁶⁵² The Arab Barometer, **Arab Barometer V-Morocco Country Report**, The Arab Barometer, 2019, pp.1-13.

⁶⁵³ Drhimeur, p. 17.

⁶⁵⁴ Abdeslam Maghraoui, "Political Authority in Crisis: Mohammed VI's Morocco", **Middle East Research and Information Project, Inc. (MERIP)**: Middle East Report, No.218, 2001, pp. 12-17.

After being moderated by the King Mohammed VI, who has instituted human rights reforms, the Makhzen security apparatus has dominated Moroccan public space post-Arab spring to silence youth Middle-range resistance through protest, demonstrations, and social media. In the post-Arab Spring consolidated centralization of power and authoritarianism, the Makhzen is the most visible. The Makhzen has used coercion to silence youth informal democratic protests to maintain oligarchy rule. These strategies include beating protestors to injury or death, as in the case of Kammal Ammari and the fisher man in the Rif, unjustifiable imprisonment, surveillance, and defamation using "conservative/Islamic principles" to target individual freedoms and the integrity of protesting youth or journalists. Thus, the Makhzen has helped Morocco move toward authoritarianism by securitizing political and social dissent.

In 2017, the rise of social unrest in several regions led by youth, particularly in the conflict-ridden region of the Rif, followed by uprisings by unemployed doctors in the capital city Rabat and by unemployed teachers in the city of Casablanca brought the country back to the beginning of the Arab Spring revolutions. This time, however, the state employed violence, aggression, and imprisonment to quell the protests. Due to the absence of the state in the Rif region and the lack of services for the youth, the region has become a hub for the growth and export of illegal drugs and drug traffickers. The region had the weakest state-society relations in the country, as well as a minimal presence of state services to its citizens in the areas of education, health care, and public administration. These protests, as well as others, were met with severe aggressions from the Makhzen (the informal state), including violence, the arrest of prisoners, the denial of defendants' rights, and a twenty-year prison sentence for the protest leaders. As a result of this coercive power, an unprecedented growth was witnessed in the number of Moroccans illegally entering Europe from Morocco.

The 2017 Hoceima uprisings have raised a number of questions regarding the substantial depth of Morocco's reform and, more importantly, the Moroccan government's intention to reform substantially. The uprisings, also known as the second wave of the Arab Spring in Morocco, occurred after many years of state indifference toward a region where it has provided very limited services to the population in terms of education, health, and public administration. In addition, the state's aggressive response to the protests and long-term imprisonment, which deprived the movement leaders of the right to legal representation for an extended period of time, continues to be a source of uncertainty regarding the democratization process in Morocco. The 2017 protests in Morocco were more intense than those of

the Arab Spring and were also approached differently. Instead of dialogue, negotiation, and reform like in 2011, the state responded with a security-oriented approach that saw the protests as a threat to national peace and security and labeled the protest leaders traitors and foreign-funded.

The 2016 Rif rioters were sentenced to 20 years in prison for protesting the king's "sacredness," the use of religion for political and economic gain, the king and coterie's dominance, and the lack of state services in the region, including education and health. The monarchy used administrative absence and corruption to marginalize the Rif as "punishment" for its known criticism and dissent. As the Rif region was emptied of life and opportunity, state absenteeism and marginalization forced its forced migration to Europe. Most Moroccans in Europe are from the Rif. After the 2016 Rif protests spread to the rest of Morocco and sparked a series of protests, the Makhzen returned to the Moroccan streets, torturing, imprisoning, and disappearing dissenters. The Makhzen has censored and arrested protestors and independent journalists. The Makhzen, independent from other marginalization, has also contributed to the irregular migration of youth who feel more vulnerable to voicing their needs after 2016 protestors were harshly treated. The Makhzen apparatus—the armed forces, the General Directorate of National Security (DGSN), and the world's strongest intelligence service, the General Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DGST)—has become heavily involved in political repression.⁶⁵⁵ The judiciary refers protestors for crimes like insulting the king, threatening peace, and individual freedoms like abortion and extramarital intimacy. The security apparatus threatens to publish compromising sexual footage of protestors and journalists unless they modify their criticism of the monarchy using defamation media. Aboubakar Jama said in an interview that Moroccan authorities are now intimidating journalists by spying on their personal lives. By imprisoning critical journalists like Tawfiq Bouachrine and Soulaïmane Raïssouni, the Makhzen has gained media control. Journalists and protestors also face physical intimidation, family targeting, and close surveillance. Moroccan musicians and artists who dissent are also punished.⁶⁵⁶ Students and youth who criticize the government on blogs and social media are also targeted. The Makhzen's fear and coercion give the Moroccan regime its greatest organizational and veto power.⁶⁵⁷ The Makhzen's security apparatus, like the oligarchy it serves and

⁶⁵⁵ Abdellatif El Hamamouchi, "Human Rights Deteriorating in Morocco: Rabat' Defamation Drive", *Qantara*, 02.02.2023, <https://en.qantara.de/content/human-rights-deteriorating-in-morocco-rabats-defamation-drive>, (03.10.2023).

⁶⁵⁶ El Hamamouchi, 2023.

⁶⁵⁷ Hill, 276.

maintains, is above the law and violates the Moroccan people's basic citizenship right to a voice and a dignified life. According to Hamblin, the Makhzen is: "The place where the power is concentrated and where the resources to exercise it are concentrated".⁶⁵⁸

This coercive power, however, has been successful in containing Moroccan population will for change given that following the 2016 excessive use of force, treatment and imprisonment of protestors, Moroccan youth have engaged in massive irregular migration toward the area of 'peace, justice and security' as a high form of resistance voicing their loss of hope from life and future in their home country.

4.3.2.11. Human Rights and Individual Freedoms

Human rights and individual freedoms in Morocco have declined since the Arab spring due to the Makhzen's coercive power. Morocco's post-Arab spring reality contradicts the 2011 constitution's guarantees of civil rights, torture, and inhumane treatment. As part of the Makhzen' coercive force, Morocco is restricting speech, assembly, and demonstration for social media users, bloggers, journalists, critical artists, and musicians.⁶⁵⁹ Defamation targets dissenters' freedoms. Protesters are imprisoned and denied their constitutional right to a fair public trial, violating the ban on force and degradation. Inmates have also reported torture and forced confessions. Volunteer protestors have trouble getting trial evidence without legal representation. The volunteering lawyers are also subjected to the Makhzen's coercive measures of surveillance, control, and punishment, as shown by the imprisonment of Mohammed Ziane, the president of the Bar Association, defending 2016 Rif rioters, without any judicial explanation but related to his criticism of the regime's mechanisms of crushing citizens since 2016 and calling the National Intelligence Service a "monster."⁶⁶⁰ Youth protesters have been imprisoned more in the past decade. Human Rights Watch's 2022 report "They will get you. No matter what, Morocco's playbook to crush dissent" details the Makhzen's defamation campaign against personal integrity and rights.⁶⁶¹ At least 10 Moroccans have been arrested for king-demeaning social media posts in the past six months, the report states. The regime's repression, which involves the

⁶⁵⁸ Amy Hamblin, **Morocco: The Struggle for Political Legitimacy in Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat**, Athens, Georgia and London: University of Georgia Press, 2015, pp. 184.

⁶⁵⁹ El Hamamouchi, 2023.

⁶⁶⁰ El Hamamouchi, 2023.

⁶⁶¹ Brian Stauffer, **They Will Get You No Matter What: Morocco's Playbook to Crush Dissent**, Human Rights Watch, United States, 2022.

Makhzen, interior, and judiciary ministries, has led to human rights violations.⁶⁶² According to the 2021 AMDH Report, human rights in Morocco have been increasingly worsening since 2015.⁶⁶³ Post 2015 human rights violations include arrest of young journalists, artists and musicians, arrests also include torture, aggression, forced disappearance, violation of women rights and individual freedoms, lack of clarity, independence and transparency in the courts.⁶⁶⁴ Post-Arab Spring human rights violations have witnessed the linking between the judiciary and the interests of the Makhzen. Ordinary citizens, artists and journalists critical of the regime face harassment from the Makhzen and also from the judiciary through legal procedures that fail to provide detainees with due process rights. Security forces also the 2011 constitutional laws and use excessive force against detainees. Several 2015 protestors reported been subject to torture and mistreatment during interrogation.⁶⁶⁵


⁶⁶² Nabeel A. Khoury, "Morocco Despite Progress, Many Challenges Remain", **Arab Center Washington D.C.**, 31.03.2020, <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/morocco-despite-some-progress-many-challenges-remain/> , (04.03.2023).

⁶⁶³ Human Rights Association, **Country Reports On Human Rights Practices for 2021**, United States Department of State: Bureau of Democracy and Human Right and Labor, United States, 2021, pp.1-134.

⁶⁶⁴ Khoury, 2020.

⁶⁶⁵ Bertelsmann Stiftung, p. 40.

Figure 13: Freedom Index in Morocco (2011-2022)



Source: The Freedom House, 2021.

4.3.3. Everyday Life Forms of Resistance to Patterns of Domination

Below forms of resistance to patterns of domination are analyzed.

4.3.3.1. Inequalities and the Youth Socioeconomic Issues

As a result of the Moroccan context of dominance and inequalities, Morocco' everyday life is characterized more by deference and defection rather than by collective cooperation. This comes as a result of the inequalities resulting from the consolidated patterns of power and domination as a result of the nature of the political variable of authoritarian power. The low range forms of resistance consist of everyday life hidden acts that are characterized by defection and deference. These daily resistance to everyday life forms of domination are primarily characterized by acts such as the increase in theft acts especially amongst the youth, the rise in the use of illicit drugs, acts of aggression and violence.

Moroccan youth make up 30% of the population. The youth, however, remains largely marginalized. 49% of Moroccan teens are unemployed.⁶⁶⁶ Modern globalized youth need vibrant economies and opportunities to maximize their potential for their countries and prevent social instability. MENA nations, including Morocco, have been unable to fulfil their youth potentials. The Arab Spring showed youth frustration with their political systems' inability to provide quality living. This situation reflects the societal instability of countries of origin and manifests in unconventional security issues directly affecting the EU, such as irregular migration, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and radicalism. Morocco, according to Oxfam 2019 report is classified as the most socially unjust country in North Africa has a high rate of youth exclusion. According to the report, "While 1.6 million Moroccans live in poverty, three Moroccan Billionaires wealth is estimated to be at 4.5\$ Billion".⁶⁶⁷

Political, educational, and economic exclusion mostly affects youth job market integration. Moroccan youth are excluded by the privatization of education and the "indirectly" French colonized job market that caters to elites under neoliberal policies. Graduate and educated youth unemployment has increased in recent years. Moroccan trade deficit, public debt (80% of GDP), foreign reserves, and economic growth are also related issues.⁶⁶⁸ Additionally, poverty remains high (96% UNDP human poverty index). According to Oxfam 2019, hundreds of Moroccans live in extreme poverty while immense richness is concentrated in the hands of a very small minority.⁶⁶⁹ Multidimensional poverty affects 18% of the population, affecting health, education, and standard of living, according to the UNDP 2019 report.⁶⁷⁰ The monarchy and its coterie's centralization of power hinders Morocco's and its society's progress on many levels. These issues mostly affect youth, who are marginalized from public administration and state institutions, whose workforce is elderly and dominated by cliental patterns.

⁶⁶⁶ Arne Hoel, "The Challenge of Youth Inclusion in Morocco", **The World Bank**, 14.05.2012, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/05/14/challenge-of-youth-inclusion-in-morocco> , 12.12.2022.


⁶⁶⁷ Oxfam France, **Oxfame au Maroc Lance une Campagne Contre les Inégalités 'Un Maroc Egalitaire, une Taxation Juste'**, Oxfam Publication, France, 2019, pp. 1-54.

⁶⁶⁸ Aziz Chahir, " Morocco's Mohammed VI Silence on the Country's Woes Speaks Volumes", **Middle East Eye**, 4.07.2022, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/morocco-king-mohammed-silence-woes-speaks-volumes> , (02.01.2023).

⁶⁶⁹ Oxfam, p. 1.


⁶⁷⁰ The United Nations Development Programme and Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, **Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2019: Illuminating Inequalities**, AGS, The United States, 2019, p. 1-20.

Figure 14: Unemployment Levels in Morocco (2011-2021)



Source: The World Bank, “Unemployment, total (% of total Labor Force) (Modeled ILO Estimate)-Morocco”, **The International Labor Organization**, 25.04.2023, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=MA>, (27.04.2023).

Figure 15: Human Development Rank in Morocco (2011-2022)



Source: The United Nations Development Programmes, **Human Development Reports 2021-2022: Uncertain Times, Unsettled Lives: Shaping our Future in a Transforming World**, UNDP Publication, New York, 2022, pp.1-45.

Due to growing contempt for neoliberalism and privatization, youth socioeconomic exclusion and rising socioeconomic inequalities have increased demonstrations. Instead of addressing these issues, which require genuine political reform, the authorities have used force to suppress and coerce these demonstrations. Since the socioeconomically better off classes have the advantage of migrating through regular ways abroad to improve their chances and opportunities through education, training, or jobs, the average Moroccan youth remains economically and linguistically unqualified to have the same opportunity abroad. This has made irregular migration a youth-only path to life.

As a result, Morocco is experiencing unprecedented social unrest, which is silenced by coercive force but can be seen in society's everyday resistance, especially among youth. Due to their socioeconomic marginalization and exclusion, youth are heavily involved in Morocco's informal economy, which accounts for 14% of GDP.⁶⁷¹

Youth sell cannabis and other drugs in their informal economy. Terrorist networks also target Moroccan youth. The deepening inequalities and social unrest in Morocco considering the dominating patterns of authoritarianism over the political and economic power, the growing coercive power and the securitization of citizens signal a deepening of malaise in the Moroccan society, mostly manifested amongst the youth, which can only be resolved through genuine political reform.

Considering the high level of Morocco's coercive power, the Moroccan's society's malaise has manifested through the everyday life of Moroccan citizens, forms of resistance that range from low range of hidden transcripts, middle range of publicly spoken resistance such as demonstrations, street art, movements and boycotts as well as high range forms of resistance through irregular migration which also carries the potential of radicalization. These forms of resistance of the Moroccan population vary based on the level of the Moroccan state coercive power and violence exercised against the population. The Makhzen's increasing patterns of domination against youth informal and below politics through the use of force and the control over the local actors of change such as political parties, civil society as well as political institutions has further increased the migration flows of the youth despaired from the existing regime's potential to change and intimidated by the Makhzen's forms of aggressions and torture.

⁶⁷¹ Youssef Boudhal, 2018.

4.3.3.2. Low Range Forms of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts and Informal Economy of the Youth.

Due to deepened and increased youth inequalities, 14% of Morocco's economy is informal.⁶⁷² To make money, many people, especially the youth, have turned to informal and illegal economic activity. Youth engage in sex, drug, and money laundering. Morocco, known for cannabis production, consumption, and exportation, now traffics Latin American cocaine, heroin, and synthetic drugs to Europe. All drug categories have seen unprecedented drug seizure since 2013.⁶⁷³ In Casablanca 2.8 tons of cocaine was seized in one year.⁶⁷⁴ The General Direction for the Surveillance of the National Territory (DGST) seized 1.65 tons of cocaine and 1.650.570 hallucinating capsules in 2019 known in Moroccan language as 'Qarqoubi'.⁶⁷⁵ Depressed and unemployed youth use the cheap drug, known as Qarqoubi, which leads to addiction, aggression, violence, and crime. The DGST has seized 52 tons of chira and reported a 43% increase in drug trafficking.⁶⁷⁶

Moroccan youth, marginalized and hopeless, turn to drugs to escape their daily pain. Morocco's National Observatory for Drugs and Addictions found out that 800,000 Moroccans used drugs. 4.5% of these are aged 15 years old and 2.5% of them are addicted.⁶⁷⁷ 600,000 Moroccans are addicted to drugs, 16,000 to hard drugs like cocaine and heroin, according to Morocco World News. The Biochemistry, Nutrition, and Cellular Biology Group at the Casablanca Faculty of Medicine found that 18-28-year-olds are most addicted to hard drugs.⁶⁷⁸

Drug use and the informal economy cause youth to steal and rob in public spaces, causing discrimination and aggression. Morocco's post-Arab spring violence has mostly involved unemployed, marginalized youth. According to the DGST, 13% of Moroccans have experienced discrimination, 40% in public spaces, 30% in schools, 4% in public administration, and 2% in banks. Telquel magazine reported that 22% of

⁶⁷² Youssef Boudhal, 2018.

⁶⁷³ Youssef Boudhal, 2018.

⁶⁷⁴ Youssef Boudhal, 2018.

⁶⁷⁵ Ayoub Lahrache, "Lutte Antidrogue: Les Autorités Marocaines Passent à la Vitesse Supérieure", **Le Matin**, 28.04.2022, <https://lematin.ma/express/2022/autorites-marocaines-passent-vitesse-superieure-lutte-antidrogue/375191.html>, (10.11.2022).

⁶⁷⁶ Morocco' Press Agency, "La DGSN Présente son Bilan 2018 et son Programme D'Action 2019", **MAP: L'Agence Marocaine de Presse**, 25.12.2018, <https://www.mapnews.ma/fr/activites-royales/la-dgsn-presente-son-bilan-de-2018-et-son-programme-daction-2019>, (10.11.2022).

⁶⁷⁷ Wadii Charad, "800,000 Consommateurs de Drogues au Maroc", **Telquel**, 05.02.2015, https://telquel.ma/2015/02/05/800-000-consommateurs-drogues-au-maroc_1433257, (10.11.2022).

⁶⁷⁸ Youssef Igrouane, "600,000 Moroccan Adults and Teenagers Addicted to Drugs", **Morocco World News**, 17.03.2017, <https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2017/03/211319/600000-moroccan-adults-teenagers-addicted-drugs>, (10.11.2022).

Moroccans have survived theft and assault. 554.202 people were arrested for these thefts, most of them drug users. This has caused post-Arab Spring social insecurity in Moroccan streets.⁶⁷⁹

Morocco has more prisoners than prisons can hold. Moroccan prisons hold 72,000 people, including minors, despite a 40,000-person capacity. Morocco has the 6th-highest prison population in Africa and is listed by the International Center for Prison Studies (ICPS) to be among the world top 20 countries with the highest number of prisoners.⁶⁸⁰

4.3.3.3. Middle Range Resistance: Political Abstention, Lack of Trust and Informal politics

Political participation indicates the nature of state-society relations. In Morocco, political participation is low because society, especially youth, distrusts the state and formal politics. Formal political mechanisms have failed to attract Moroccans, especially youth, because they serve elite interests and are controlled by them. Moroccan youth are more educated, less religious, more open to international influences, and more aware of the patriarchal nature of politics in Morocco than their elder generations.⁶⁸¹ For this reason, they distrust the political system, its institutions, and actors. Moroccan youth deprived of self-actualization opportunities prefer change to stability, unlike their elders. European and modern freedom principles influence youth less than the religious symbolism used to maintain power. This does not mean youth political disengagement, but rather disengagement from what they perceive as inefficient political mechanisms and institutions. According to the Delegation of High Planning, 70% of Moroccan youth distrust politics, 5% believe in political work and only 1% of Moroccan youth are politically active.⁶⁸² The lack of real democracy in Morocco is the major reason for the youth lack of interest in formal politics.⁶⁸³ Moroccan youth believe that political engagement does not matter and, elections and

⁶⁷⁹ La Rédaction, "Insécurité: 13% des Marocains Victimes de Discrimination, 22% Victimes de Vols », **Telquel**, 13.12.2022, https://telquel.ma/instant-t/2022/12/13/insecurite-13-des-marocains-victimes-de-discrimination-22-victimes-de-vols_1794858/, (10.11.2022).

⁶⁸⁰ Benjamin Bousquet, "Le Maroc 19^{ème} Pays au Monde en Nombre de Prisonniers », **Telquel**, 09.02.2016, https://telquel.ma/2016/02/09/maroc-19eme-pays-au-monde-en-nombre-prisonniers_1481783, (10.11.2022).

⁶⁸¹ Yousra Kadi Mohammed, "Youth Political Participation and Attitudes in Contemporary Morocco", **Pomeps: Project on Middle East Political Science**, Vol. 36, 2019, pp. 1-90.

⁶⁸² Mohammed Baske Manar, "Evolving Political Participation and Civic Engagement of Moroccan Youth after the 'Arab Spring", **Cordoba Foundation of Geneva**, 2015, pp. 5-35.

⁶⁸³ Manar, p. 18.

political parties are just a facade for monarchy's authoritarian rule. Thus, citizens, especially youth, distrust political parties and mechanisms.

Political parties are patriarchal and marginalize youth, and the royal political and economic elite, the oligarchy, dominates political institutions. Despite the 2011 state discourse of youth inclusion, youth remain politically excluded. Traditional party practices discourage youth political expectations. 16 of Morocco's 39 political parties have youth bodies, which fail to integrate the youth.⁶⁸⁴ Engaging in political parties and forcing patriarchal mechanisms has further limited youth ambitions to join political parties. The political system and political parties are highly dependent on the Moroccan oligarchic regime and they rarely meet the aspirations and expectations of the youth whether at the level of the party level or while in government. Political parties exclude the youth from decision making on the basis that they are "inexperienced".⁶⁸⁵ Moroccan youth also believe that their votes do not matter and that election results have never changed the political system controlled by economic and political power.⁶⁸⁶ Elections result into change of government within the elite without shifting the power. This renders voting pointless. Voting abstention is a way to protest the oligarchy-dominated political system. Another reason for youth non-participation is state repression, control over participation spaces.⁶⁸⁷ The political sphere is perceived by the Moroccan population to lack credibility and inclusiveness.⁶⁸⁸

Moroccan youth considers that their opinions and votes simply do not count nor do they make a difference⁶⁸⁹ in an overwhelmingly controlled context by patterns of power concentrated in the hands of the oligarchic group. Moroccan youth have the popular sentiment both before and after the Arab Spring that the monarchy officials, business, and political elite is an oppressive organization under the king.⁶⁹⁰ The parliament believed to be plagued by corruption practices is considered to still be corrupt after 2011.⁶⁹¹ The elite enjoys the benefits of rich Morocco, clientalism, and spending their free time and education in Europe, mostly France. According to Spencer, Moroccan youth can only afford moving to Europe legally if they come from

⁶⁸⁴ Manar, p. 19.

⁶⁸⁵ Manar, p. 19.

⁶⁸⁶ Saloua Zerhouni, "Explaining Youth Participation and Non-Participation in Morocco", **Power2Youth**, Working Paper, No. 36, 2017, pp. 3-17.

⁶⁸⁷ Zerhouni, p. 5.

⁶⁸⁸ Zerhouni, p. 15.

⁶⁸⁹ Claire Spencer, "Morocco's Missing Youth », **Chatham House**, 13.10.2016, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2016/10/moroccos-missing-youth>, (10.01.2022).

⁶⁹⁰ Spencer, 2016.

⁶⁹¹ Spencer, 2016.

well off families.⁶⁹² The PJD's decision to join this group and not oppose it ended youth political participation in the 2016 elections. The government generally ignores youth demands that are met by power and oppression rather than representation. This has fueled the youth's unprecedented desire to leave Morocco for the "European dream" in unconventional ways.

The National Development Institute (NDI) also stated that Moroccan youth high involvement in informal politics is a witness to their high interest in politics and lack of trust in the political system.⁶⁹³

Moroccan youth, who were crucial to decolonization and post-independence politics through student movements under the patriarchal political system, continue to engage in informal politics through demonstrations, movements, social media organization, blogging, boycott, and resistance through art, music, street painting. Social movement according to Sidney Tarrow are triggered when political constraints change creating new incentives for actors who lack resources to take action on their own. These forms of contention are generally backed by organized social networks, are culturally resonant carry action-oriented symbols, most importantly they serve to create new contention opportunities for people lacking the resources for contention through formal politics.⁶⁹⁴ These movements and organized boycotts and protests generally appeal to the population and spread quickly through social media or echoed "themed" protests in different regions, such as "the teachers' protests,"⁶⁹⁵ "unemployed doctors protest",⁶⁹⁶ and "I am outside the law against Article 490 of the Constitution"⁶⁹⁷ movements organized through social media protests calling for individual freedom and the banning of penalizing sexual life outside marriage, which has become an important tool used by the government. These informal protests target

⁶⁹² Spencer, 2016.

⁶⁹³ National Democratic Institute, **Youth Perceptions in Morocco: Political Parties in the Wake of Legislative Elections: Findings from Qualitative Research in Morocco Conducted in March and April 2012**, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Washington, D.C, 2012, p. 1-27.

⁶⁹⁴ Sidney G. Tarrow, **Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics**, Rev. & updated 3rd eds., Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 6

⁶⁹⁵ Intissar Fakir, "Teachers Strikes in Morocco", **Carnegie Endowment for International Peace**, 08.04.2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/08/teachers-strikes-in-morocco-pub-78805> , (05.04.2023).

⁶⁹⁶ Ahmed El Jechtimi, "Moroccan Medics Protest over Conditions, Staff Shortage as Pandemic Surges", **Reuters**, 14.09.2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-morocco-idUSKBN2652EL> , (03.04.2023).

⁶⁹⁷ Malika El Kettani, "Stop 490: Mobilisations des « Hors-la-Loi » pour depenaliser les Relations Sexuelles Hors Mariage », **Le Courrier de L'Atlas**, 03.02.2021, <https://www.lecourrierdelatlas.com/stop490-mobilisation-des-hors-la-loi-pour-depenaliser-les-relations-sexuelles-hors-mariage/> , (03.04.2023).

both political and economic elites and have been powerful in bringing attention to issues due to the quick mobilization of the population, as was the case with the national boycotts targeting the companies of the current head of government, Aziz Akhennouch, who remains a highly unpopular figure among Moroccans.

The 2016 protests, known as the 2nd Moroccan Arab spring, were fueled by a lack of trust in the reformist model, Moroccan politics, regime, political parties and civil actors. These protests, including the Hirak movement and other boycotts, were met by state repressive security forces, bringing back the old authoritarian Morocco but with the application of democratic mechanisms including the judiciary. The security apparatus tortured, imprisoned, and defamed the youth.

Consequently, Moroccan youth prefer informal politics to ballot politics. Youth hopelessness toward formal politics, human rights, democratization, and political liberalization led them to find alternative ways to express themselves and resist. The first is boycotting formal politics and not voting. Boycotting neoliberalism by boycotting major companies,⁶⁹⁸ Aziz Akhennouch, the current head of government had become an important target of these boycotts by targeting his companies, reflecting his unpopularity amongst the Moroccan population. The boycott movement launched in 2018 and labelled as 'let it spoil' was directed at these companies with the belief that they benefited from their political capital to expand their economic benefit further empowering the existing political economic power entanglements in Morocco to the detriment of the Moroccan citizen's consumption rights. The boycott conducted with rationality has targeted specific companies, carried organization through social media and labeling/hashtags, it earned a large appeal throughout the country and stayed off the street considering the Makhzen's response to the Rif movement upon the death of the fisherman Mohcine Fikri. A study has shown that 93% of the boycott participants were aged between 15 and 24 years old.⁶⁹⁹ This new form of resistance in Morocco has been termed by certain scholars as 'the era of online democracy in Morocco'.⁷⁰⁰

⁶⁹⁸ Mohammed Masbah, "Let it Spoil: Morocco's Boycott and the Empowerment of Regular Citizen", **Al Jazeera Center for Studies**, Report, Doha, 2018, pp.1-17.

Imara Crooms, "Current Moroccan Consumer Boycott is Threatening the Political Status Quo", **International Republican Institute**, 11.07.2018, <https://www.iri.org/news/current-moroccan-consumer-boycott-is-threatening-the-political-status-quo/>, (02.04.2023).

⁶⁹⁹ Nadia Salah, « Enquête L'Economiste-Sunergia/Boycott : C'est Surtout une Affaire de Jeunes », **L'Economiste**, 24.05.2018, <https://www.leconomiste.com/article/1028756-enquete-l-economiste-sunergia-boycott-c-est-surtout-une-affaire-de-jeunes>, (10.12.2022).

⁷⁰⁰ Mohamed Chtatou, "Cyber Democracy Slowly but Surely Arrives to Morocco", **The Washington Institute for Near East Policy**, 3.08.2018, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/cyber-democracy-slowly-surely-arrives-morocco>, (11.12.2022).

Social media, rap music, and religious groups are other ways youth-led politics from below resist the oligarchy-led political system. Youth informal politics is designed to represent population voices and pressure power. However, monarchy-controlled judiciary and informal state/Makhzen security apparatus repress these informal politics, independent journalists and youth's voices.

In addition to this, the persistence of corruption in the context of Morocco is also a form of a low range hidden transcript form of resistance against the patterns of domination. As is shown by the work of Scott, these everyday life transcripts are sparked by the will to generate a stage of operation that is distinct from the one established by the patterns of domination characterized social, political and economic asymmetry and inequality. The stage formed by these transcripts of resistance aim to operate against the parameters of the dominant system. The reason for this is the conviction of this populace of their inability to change the dominant reality by facing the forms of power from fear of punishment. These low and Middle range acts of resistance also demonstrate discontent with the existing social, economic and political order.

The Moroccan society, especially the youth, abstention from formal politics and the rise in unconventional forms of political participation reflects the pertaining issues in the Moroccan context resulting from the political/economic patterns of domination. Resulting from oligarchic domination and post-Arab spring consolidation of authoritarianism through the manipulation of democracy, the increasing political and economic patterns of domination have not only de-legitimized the Moroccan modern political system and related institutions, it also limited international efforts and programs ability to cope with symptomatic domination issues of governance such as corruption, socioeconomic issues and unemployment. The forces of power's maintenance through the coercive force of the informal state of the Makhzen, manipulation of the judiciary, co-optation and convergence of the political, economic elite and political parties as well as control of the civil actors has left the Moroccan society and youth at the margin of citizenship rights and the right to dignified living.

The EU' de-politicized approach toward Morocco under the 'relational power' perspective of the EU' pragmatic and geopolitical turn has led to the strengthening of these forces of power against the local actors of change. The 2011 top-down initiated reforms responding to the 20th February movement came as a result of the regional context of the Arab spring revolution targeting the regimes and the involvement of international actors such as the US, EU and NATO. Regional and international

pressure has led the Moroccan monarch to cross a different path of democratization, reform and negotiation. Far from being a reform process, this was a move to tackle the 2011 pressure that was followed by unprecedented consolidation of the forces of authoritarianism and power centralization in the hands of the king and his coterie. The EU' approach of de-politicization targeting capacity building of local actors of change through 'bottom-up' approach is ineffective considering the actors control-co-optation by the domestic forces of power. In fact, this approach had the paradoxical effect of strengthening the coercive power of Morocco, manifested through the Makhzen, by deviating attention and normative pressure from it. In the context of regional instabilities, insecurities, strengthening authoritarianism and western actors' pragmatic turn of not politically intervening or targeting domestic governments political change, the Moroccan state resilience has taken the form of authoritarian resilience at the expense of societal resilience and well-being resulting instead into forms of societal resistance to the consolidated patterns of domination, one of which is irregular migration.

4.3.3.4. High Range Forms of Resistance: Irregular Migration and Radicalization

Equality is a providential fact... [that] ... possesses all the characteristics of a Divine decree: it is universal, it is durable, it constantly eludes all human interference, and all events as well as all men contribute to its progress. ⁷⁰¹

⁷⁰¹ Alexis De-Tocqueville, **Democracy in America: Volume I: Edited by Edwardo Nolha**, (Translated from French by James T. Schbeifer), Liberty Fund, Inc, Carmel: Indiana, 2010, p. 1373.

Figure 16: Irregular Migration as an Act of Resistance



Source: Created by the author.

Taking the road to death in the sea has become the only way to seek a living for the Moroccan youth who see no future nor dignity for themselves in their own land. According to Ursula Lindsey in the article “Young, educated and Desperate to Migrate”, for the majority of Moroccan youth there exist only two options which is “to either stay and rot to death with no dignity and no opportunities or die on the way out in the death boat.”⁷⁰²


Given the general context of inequalities, the state-society relationship in Morocco is characterized more by defection and deference than by cooperation. Irregular migration as a form of resistance in the case of Morocco comes as a last resort following low range and middle range forms of resistance.

Youth irregular migration is caused by economic needs, lack of educational opportunities, and marginalization. Moroccan youth are politically and economically marginalized. The Arab barometer says Moroccan youth are more likely to migrate in 2019 than in 2011 or 2016. Moroccan youth are increasingly emigrating because 1 in 4 graduates are unemployed. Since the state refuses to address the causes of Moroccan youth irregular migration, it has almost become forced migration. As noted

⁷⁰² Lindsey Ursula, “Young, Educated, Desperate to Emigrate”, **Al-Fanar Media**, 03.10.2018, <https://www.al-fanarmedia.org/2018/10/young-educated-desperate-to-emigrate/>, (03.07.2022).

by the IOM, among 38,000 arrivals by sea, 7000 of them were Moroccan.⁷⁰³ On her latest visit to the country to negotiate immigration, Ylva Johansson (the EU Commissioner) has noted that half of the illegal migrants having arrived to Spanish shores were of Moroccan origin.⁷⁰⁴

Figure 17: Increase in the Irregular Migration Flows to the EU from the Western Mediterranean after 2017.



Source: The Council of the European Union, “Infographic-Irregular Arrivals to the EU 2008-2023”, **The European Council**, 17.04.2023, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/irregular-arrivals-since-2008/>, (03.11.2022).

The youths' migration while putting the youth to uncertain destinies between death and life it does benefit the Moroccan state. The indebted and inefficient Moroccan economy relies on migration remittances, as mentioned in the third chapter. Migrant marginalized youth who are victims of the oligarchic economic and political system are more likely to cause unrest and lead protests. Thus, the Moroccan state

⁷⁰³ The Legatum Institute, p. 27.

⁷⁰⁴ Reuters Staff, “Morocco Rebuffs the EU Request to Re-admit Third Country Migrants”, **Reuters**, 15.12.2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/morocco-eu-migration-int-idUSKBN28P252>, (11.11.2021).

outsources dissent to the EU and avoids responsibility and pressure to reform. The Moroccan state receives regular income from these citizens who send money back to their families. The migration issue and the EU' securitization approach through building frontier, gives Morocco a negotiation leverage to put pressure on the EU and member states on strategic issues, giving it geopolitical leverage that distracts from the real issues and root causes of political power centralization and dominance.

As is illustrated by the Rif example, the Moroccan state has indirectly forced the migration of the critical Rif population of the monarchy through absenteeism from the region. This has marginalized the Rif population economically, politically and deprived it from the basic life needs such as education, jobs and hospitals. The big majority of the Moroccan population living in Europe and choosing to migrate irregularly comes from the excluded Rif. Upon their demands for 'basic needs' and protest against the high levels of corruption and institutional ineffectiveness, Morocco' Makhzen involving the judiciary and the security forces choose to oppress the urpitals through the newly consolidated 'old Morocco' mechanisms. The Makhzen applying same mechanisms to the rest of the country' protests echoing the Rif, led to the youth massive flows of migration toward the EU from 2016 with a peak in 2018. This came as a result of the loss of hope from their ability to ever make a change to the domination patterns of Morocco.

Understanding irregular migration in this context and as a form of resistance to these patterns of domination would better guide the EU policy and benefit mutual peace and security. The coercion of the local actors of change upon their call for change is the reason for their migration. As a result, instead of targeting these youth and local actors, already influenced by the EU principles based on what Europe represents to them; that is justice, equality, opportunity and freedom, the EU shall direct its organization power to influence the Moroccan regime while being supportive of the local actors.

Radicalization, religious extremism and terrorism has become an important element of the EU security agenda at the domestic and foreign affairs level. This issue is highly linked to migration from the South. Radicalization can be approached through several perspectives ranging from cognitive, anthropological, ideological, historical, cultural, political or socioeconomic. It is generally targeted against the status quo and involves familiarity with and the legitimization of the use of violence. Jihadist groups have targeted Europe and the west as a belief system, a force of colonialism and occupation. This ideological view toward the west is fed by a historical line of a

negative Western presence in the MENA that includes events such as Arab-Israeli wars, US military presence in the Gulf, US war in Iraq. The West' selective and unjustifiable military intervention in the MENA has served the legitimization of jihadist violence and radical ideology against the western 'being'. With the end of the Cold war, jihadist ideology and Islamism has rose as an alternative to Marxism and leftism leading to the rise of a Pan-Islamism identity reflecting the failure of consolidating domestic nationalism.⁷⁰⁵ MENA leaders' alliance with Western powers and peace processes with Israel has generally frustrated pro-Palestinian MENA populations that perceived their leaders as inapt to defend the common cause. Jihadism, however, also came to encapsulate the fight against all forms of domination and discrimination including the MENA leaders and forces of Europeanization and modernity.

Everyday life patterns of domination, exclusion and resistance characterize the life of a large segment of the Moroccan diaspora in Europe resulting into the youth socialization through radicalization. Moroccan youth who migrate to Europe to escape marginalization and exclusion from their nation-state face societal marginalization and exclusion, leading them to seek building identity through radical groups. Moroccan youth marginalized in Europe socialize through radicalization as an escape from insignificance.⁷⁰⁶ Fear and prejudice have grown in the EU as emigration rises considering the close interlinkage between migration from the South, terrorism and radicalization. The nexus between terrorism, radicalization and migration from the South that is between insecurity in the South and that in Europe has led to the rise of the political far right movement targeting the EU as an institution and employing migration in their political discourse. While these fears are not unfounded, the EU's pragmatic turn in foreign policy and relations with the South in general ignore the patterns of domination behind the migration issue. Europe has increasingly become a target for MENA Islamist insurgents who both seek refuge in Europe and target it for their terrorist operations, mobilization and ideologies. Studies on Islamic radicalization in Europe show that radicals share certain common traits. They originate from the MENA, mostly from North Africa, come from the lower classes, and have a criminal record of theft, drug, etc. Radicals are known for their social isolation, school leave due to integration issues, and socioeconomic issues.⁷⁰⁷ The Moroccan

⁷⁰⁵ Farhad Khosrokhavar, **Radicalization: Why Some People Choose the Path of Violence**, Translated from French by Todd J.M., New York: New Press, 2017, p. 11-180.

⁷⁰⁶ Lalla Amina Drhimeur, "Escape from Insignificance: How Moroccan Youths Radicalize in Europe", **Istanbul Bilgi University European Institute: Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence**, Working Paper, No. 13, 2021, pp. 1-35, (RADICALIZATION).

⁷⁰⁷ Drhimeur, RADICALIZATION, p. 12.

diaspora, which is prominent in European capitals, has been involved in several terrorist attacks such as the Paris attack of 2015, Belgium attacks of 2016, Spain and Finland in 2017.⁷⁰⁸ Despite Morocco's efforts to fight radicalization through security and educational policies, Moroccan youth show a high tendency to radicalize when in Europe.⁷⁰⁹ The everyday life patterns of domination manifested through othering and exclusion of migrants by local citizens has affected low-class emigrant generations' sense of belonging, schooling and related socioeconomic opportunities and integration.⁷¹⁰ These second and third generation of migrants are unable to fully belong to Europe where they were born and raised nor to their biological homelands where they also do not feel a sense of belonging. This new generation of European citizens of migrant origin has a high level of hostility and lack of trust in European mainstream culture that is founded on their othering and prefers instead to build their own sub-culture based on radical religious ideology.⁷¹¹ Radicalization and attached terrorist attacks by these migrants' citizens target European patterns of domination leading to their exclusion which is believed by them to be fed by Zionism hatred toward Muslims and a persistence notion of European colonial self.⁷¹² These youth also target Europe for its colonial past in the MENA which they blame for corrupt political systems ignored by Europeans.⁷¹³ Their radical ideologies also target the authoritarian regimes of their biological home countries which they perceive as the remnants of European colonialism at the origin of their exclusion and marginalization. According to Higgins, there is a strong malaise within the community of Moroccan origin as a result of acculturation.⁷¹⁴ They are unable to neither be European nor to be Moroccan. Radical groups offer marginalized migrants socialization, belonging, and income. The majority of the Moroccan population in Europe originates from the Rif region that is excluded by the Moroccan nation state and subjected to forces of coercion by the Makhzen as a result of its criticism of the monarchy and its oligarchic system. Most radical groups live in Germany, France, and Belgium, which they attack. The majority of European

⁷⁰⁸ Drhimeur, RADICALIZATION, p. 15.

⁷⁰⁹ Drhimeur, RADICALIZATION, p. 3.

⁷¹⁰ Drhimeur, RADICALIZATION, p.15.

⁷¹¹ Arie Perliger, Daniel Milton, "From Cradle to Crave: The Lifecycle of Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria", **Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point: United States Military Academy**, Report, 2016, pp.1-51.

⁷¹² Mohammed Hafez and Mullins Creighton Mullins, "The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism", **Studies in Conflict and Terrorism**, Vol. 38, No. 11, pp. 958-975.

⁷¹³ Drhimeur, RADICALIZATION, p. 7.

⁷¹⁴ Andrew Higgins, "A Close Look at Brussels Offers a More Nuanced View of Radicalization", **The New York Times**, 19.04.2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/20/world/europe/more-than-islam-origin-is-a-marker-for-terror-among-brussels-immigrants.html> , (06.08.2022).

jihadists (80%) leaving for Syria also come from France, Germany and Belgium which have a high concentration of diaspora from MENA.⁷¹⁵

As "marginalized" citizens flee their own political system and nation states to settle in the "zone of peace and justice," they face dominance, exclusion, and marginalization, including force, which increases the risk of radicalization. Radicalization involving and legitimizing the use of force finds a ready ground for conviction amongst youth in malaise that have a background of violence and resistance such as the use of drugs, theft and discrimination. Radicalization amongst the Moroccan youth population has been defined to be as a result of the failure of the democratization process,⁷¹⁶ a collective grievance toward institutional failure,⁷¹⁷ seeking refuge in religious ideology and violence from regime oppression and also building a political reason to confront the power.

The migration of the youth in malaise through the death boats generally does not end as they imagine of being in a zone of peace and justice. Their inability to integrate, one for their irregular status and also for their inability to integrate in the European socioeconomic system given their lack of the necessary educational and linguistic skills leads to their exclusion in the European context creating a malaise for European nation-states by reproducing the patterns of everyday life insecurity and instability resulting from their resistance as is the case in their home country.

It is for this reason, that beyond tackling migration and terrorism for their security element, the EU needs to tackle the underlying patterns of domination behind the youth malaise in Morocco that requires a genuine political reform rather than de-politicization, securitization or externalization which only serve to exacerbate the underlying patterns of domination and the forces of power related to the Moroccan regime and oligarchy.

Regime change would not serve the security and stability needs of the Moroccan population nor that of the EU, de-politicization neither does not serve the stability objective, only furthers authoritarian resilience which produces the same rent seeking consequences as war torn countries or failed states. Considering the security issues attached to migration such as trafficking, terrorism, radicalization and also issues that affect the sovereignty of the nation states considering the migration'

⁷¹⁵ Hugo Micheron, **Le Jihadisme Français : Quartiers, Syrie, Prisons**, Gallimard : Paris, 2019, pp. 7-416.

⁷¹⁶ Rollie Lal, "The Maghreb", in **The Muslim World After 9/11**, (1st eds. Angel M. Rabasa et. Al.), RAND Corporation, 2004, pp. 147–174.

⁷¹⁷ Anouar Boukhars, "Political Violence in North Africa: The Perils of Incomplete Liberalization", Analysis Paper, **Brookings Doha Center** No. 3, 2011, pp. 8-45.

demographic and identity effects, sovereignty concerns are legitimate for all Westphalia nation states.

The EU' adopted approach to safeguard this sovereignty, however, does not serve the efficient tackling of the problem, instead has the paradoxical effect of exacerbating the underlying causes. This study perceives the issues such as socioeconomic problems and youth unemployment defined by the EUGS as root causes to be symptomatic consequences of the original root cause; that is the political structure and nature of power. The EU' geopolitical turn and pragmatic approach strengthens the domination patterns behind the youth malaise and resistance that extends to the European context through the internal-external nexus effect of migration.


Rather than securitization, externalization, and de-politicization, which only serve to strengthen the dominance patterns and thereby foster the resistance results, the EU's long-term stability and peace would be better served by addressing the issue from its root cause by influencing genuine political reform targeting the regime that is responsible for all "resistance symptoms" through the EU' organizational power combining its economic, normative and relational powers. The Moroccan regime' stakes in the EU are very high in case the EU chooses to foster long term stability rather than short term defined pragmatic self-interests through a narrow definition of security. In the context of Morocco, local actors are too oppressed and controlled to make a change. It is their understanding of this reality that leads to their migration in many cases leading them to becoming a 'fresh meat' for the 'Mediterranean fish' in the Western Mediterranean having become a migrant jaw than reaching their dream of 'peace and justice'.

In Morocco, the EU shall address the domestic forms of dominance that causes irregular migration. To balance strategic and normative interests, the EU shall build its cooperation and bilateral partnership with Morocco based on representativeness and equal consideration of needs, perspectives, and interests. Strategic interests should not be prioritized over normative ones. Besides a social influence on local actors and citizens, the EU also needs to have a political influence on the Moroccan state and actors of power to have a constructive change that would allow for the local actors' capacity to develop and make for a long term change based on everyday life forms of behavior and resilience. To achieve this, the EU needs to adopt a more inclusive approach in bilateral relations that takes into consideration the

Moroccan context needs, perspectives and concerns with the aim to increase the chances for a long-term win-win cooperation in terms of peace and security.


Figure 18: Domestic Analysis





Source: Created by author

Figure 19: The EUGS Paradoxical Circle (Part I)



Source: Created by the author

Figure 20: The EUGS Paradoxical Effect (Part II)





Figure 21: The EUGS Paradoxical Effect (Part III)



4.4. EVALUATION OF THE CHAPTER: THE PARADOXICAL EFFECTS OF THE EU'S APPROACH

This research adopting a poststructuralist approach through critical constructivism, provides a critical assessment of the EU' approach toward the migration issue based on political realism. It highlights the paradoxical effects of the EU' approach to reproducing unconventional security issues studied as forms of resistance by exacerbating the underlying patterns of domination behind them.

The 21st century has been characterized by the rise in unconventional and complex security issues that have connected the global South and global North in unprecedented ways through the movement of people proving the connectedness between democracy and security, that is the dependence of security on peace and development. It has also proven the connectedness between the security of the countries of the South and those of the North. Mainstream approaches to IR and international relations determined through the power variable and lined with notions of western exceptionalism, Eurocentric views on security matters have failed to provide an in-depth understanding, thereby, shape effective policy making on some of the century's key issues such as the irregular movement of people.

Analyzing the issue of irregular migration through the concepts of domination and resistance, this study highlights the paradoxical effects of the EU' political realism and pragmatism toward the issue at three levels of analysis: the epistemological, bilateral and domestic. It also analyzed how the three levels' patterns of domination were related and led to the paradoxical effect of the reproduction of the original root causes behind irregular migration leading to an increase in the migration flows toward the Union's borders.

Patterns of domination at the epistemological level characterized by horizontal and vertical asymmetry that is based on the variable of the EU' power interests and the EU' own context shapes the EU' ineffective policy making on the matter characterized by securitization. The study of the issue of migration and the created epistemic reality of it is based on the interests and perspectives of the European and Western countries linked to the rise of terrorism and related securitization of migration at the onset of globalization.

This level of analysis's finding is that patterns of colonialism guide the knowledge production on issues related to the global South guided by notions of fear and prejudice, Western-European exceptionalism and superiority. Policies affecting

the South sovereignty, peace and security are based on knowledge of the South that is produced by the European, from European perspective and context, through European languages. At the horizontal level, issues related to sovereignty and security in relation to migration overwhelms those of peace and development that are more related to the countries of the South' need for mobility to pursue opportunities as a result of their limited socioeconomic infrastructures. The concepts of national and societal security dominate the study of the issue. At the vertical level, the interests of the countries of the West overwhelm those of the South including those related to security and sovereignty. In fact, countries of the South are expected to compromise their sovereignty and security for the sake of those of the West. Epistemological analysis also shows the creation of the reality of migration from the South as a form of invasion, a crisis that is projected as massive which has been criticized by critical perspectives through data showing the majority of the South migration to be intracontinental rather than intercontinental. Unlike the mainstreamed reality of the West, migration from the South is not always related to conflict, war and instability and is not involuntary by character. It is mainly South-South, and in majority of cases voluntary in the search for opportunity and better living.

The patterns of domination at the epistemological level correlate with the EU's policy making approach that is characterized by securitization as is highlighted by the Maastricht Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, the Council Conclusions as well as the bilateral externalization policy based on Readmission accords, the more for more and mobility partnerships.

Bilateral level analysis through the analysis of Moroccan political elite discourse highlights the patterns of domination in the partnership. It is dominated by Eurocentric myths around the African and African migration as well as continuing patterns of colonialism positing Morocco as less of a nation-state than its European neighbors. Inequality in the responsibility sharing and the use of force based on the frontier approach highlight the EU's Eurocentric perspective domination on the management of the migration issue that is designed in favor of the EU' immediate security and interests. The EU' approach claiming an African invasion is based on fear from the other and notions of superiority.

This approach has had the paradoxical effect of reproducing unconventional security issues related to migration such as trafficking, smuggling activities and humanitarian crises resulting from the migrants' resistance to the EU' raised barbed wires. The EU' externalization policy based on the context needs of the EU posits

Morocco as a potential Buffer zone for the EU' unwanted migrants and the EU' border policeman. It has compromised Morocco's border security having become a site for violence and security issues, also Morocco's peace and development by disregarding Morocco's post-development issues and the youth socioeconomic problems. The bilateral relations between Morocco and the EU on the migration management remain short of achieving the EUGS objectives of equality, shared peace and prosperity. The EU' pragmatism prioritizing own security and interests has compromised Morocco's own national interests related to peace and security such as national integrity and development that are bound to Morocco's South-South cooperation put at stake as a result of the EU positing Morocco at the front of negotiating returns with African partner states. As a result of the EU' policy, the Mediterranean has become a jaw for Moroccan youth and African migrants rather than an area of peace and security.

At the domestic level, the EU pragmatism under the EUGS has shifted the Union's identity and role toward the region from normative power to relational power. This emphasized a shift from political to societal influence and from government to local actors of change. By building the capacity of the local actors of change, the EU through a bottom up approach aims to build state and societal resilience by focusing on the everyday life of the citizens and their behavior.

The study of the Moroccan domestic context shows the EU's pragmatic approach paradoxical effect of consolidating the domestic patterns of domination and authoritarianism through an oligarchic rule combining the monarchy, the political and economic elite. Instead of empowering the local actors of change, the EU has opened space for an unprecedented empowerment of authoritarianism in Morocco. Morocco presents an interesting case where democratic means have been used to empower and consolidate authoritarianism and centralized power in the hands of the king and his coterie.

While the EUGS lists issues such as socioeconomic problems, youth unemployment or corruption as root causes, the in-depth study of the case of Morocco shows that these issues are only symptomatic consequences of the original root cause which is related to political power and the resulting patterns of domination leading to the socioeconomic and political segregation of the average Moroccan citizen and the youth.

The EUGS bottom up approach is conducted through a series of support programs that tackle several areas such as: socioeconomic development and youth integration, good governance and the fight against corruption, human rights and

democracy, support to civil society and local actors, support to political participation, support for the parliament, illiteracy and alphabetization programs, women rights and gender equality. The programs ranging between 2012-to today under the framework of the advanced status have been analyzed in this study between the period of 2012-2020. The programs are characterized by a persistence of limited results and inefficiency throughout the studied time range as well as in all the areas.

The analysis of the Moroccan domestic context shows that Morocco's issues tackled through the EU programs are a result of the consolidation of political and economic power in the hands of the king, monarchy, political and economic elite forming an oligarchy. This oligarchic rule characterized by a convergence of interests dominates the Moroccan political and economic areas and benefit from authoritarian rent seeking advantages that support clientalism and corruption. The convergence between the political and economic elite has led to the rise of a new elite group that controls the Moroccan political scene made up of business figures close to the king. The 2011 constitution has served to legitimize and consolidate the king's supremacy over the political system and his unaccountability. It has also provided means to control freedoms including those of expression and assembly. Having promised the separation of power between the legislative, judicial and executive; that is the monarchy, the constitution has served to consolidate all in the hands of the monarch in unprecedented way. Ruling by royal decrees the king's law remains above the modern political system and law. The top-down induced reforms served the king's purpose of de-legitimizing the political system institutions, mainly the parliament and the political parties.

The parliament remains devoid of executive and legislative power, delegitimized in the eyes of the Moroccan population which perceives it to be plagued in corruption. Elected representatives are unable to govern, they merely execute the king's orders. The modern political process is also part of the king's strategies to maintain power, manipulate the population in the case of rising unrest while gaining further legitimacy as the only leader genuinely interested in the Moroccan common good that intervenes every time to save the population from the inefficient, corrupt and unprofessional elected politicians. Political parties are co-opted and controlled, devoid of legitimization, ideological background and purpose. The king's divide and rule and segment politics including the creation of a variety of parties, playing the parties against each other and in times of strong opposition bringing them to power and delegitimizing them in the eyes of the population has served the king's purpose

to avoid the rise of real politics, competitive political parties, strong opposition or leading political figures. Political parties also remain characterized by clientalism and fail to build dialogue and trust with the population especially the youth who are more aware than their older generations of the reality of political power in Morocco. Civil society actors are limited and controlled through financial and legal constraints. They are contained by the regime, adopt the regime discourses rather than represent the population's genuine interests. In case they deviate from the regime's rules, civil actors are punished and dissolved by the 1958 decree of the constitution. Instead civil actors created by the monarchy serve the purpose of drawing a positive image of the monarchy through associational/charity works for the poor, the children and the youth providing a smokescreen for reality behind the countries' rising inequalities. This has resulted into weak levels of trust in the state institutional levels especially those of the modern political system. The youth, especially, have low levels of trust and show low levels of political participation in the electoral system, the political parties and civil associations.

The elite co-optation and convergence by the king has been achieved and maintained through the adoption of neoliberalism which both centered the elite protection center around the monarch while reducing the burdens on the state for providing social services. Being the most important capitalist in the country, neoliberalism has further provided the monarch with consolidated power by creating a strong circle of converged political and economic elite sharing his interests and benefiting from the system. This has, however, resulted into a deep marginalization and exclusion of the average Morocco at the political and socioeconomic levels. The neoliberal/authoritarian regime policies of privatization of education has created segregation in the Moroccan society between the Middle and Upper classes who get French based education and the rest of the population limited to public educational service which is characterized by a lower quality education in terms of foreign languages. The Arabic based public system leaves the majority of Moroccan youth marginalized in the job market which is dominated by French companies and French language. The interests of the oligarchic elite in parallel consolidate the continuing indirect colonization of Morocco by France which dominates the Moroccan economic system through companies and offshore business. This has not only limited the youth employment opportunities but also their educational skills and opportunities overall given that both the educational system and the job market are designed based on the needs of the local and French elite. Postcolonial development issues resulting from

Spanish and French colonialism also play a major role in the development issues of Morocco and the inclusion of the youth. These issues are further exacerbated by the type of the economic and political power of the elite which has failed to overcome these challenges effectively. Issues related to Spain' old colony Morocco's North region, the western Sahara and today' Spanish occupied Ceuta and Melilla are the Spain colonialism repercussion still affecting Morocco's development plan and migration issues.

The existing oligarchic regime and related interests has served the persistence of the corruption issue serving its network of power and clientalist objectives. It hinders the effective functioning of the state institutions and consumes important resources of the state. The judiciary remains dependent on the interests of the regime and related elite's interests. The Makhzen referring to the informal state and the storehouse of power of Morocco is the security apparatus that has sustained the consolidation of oligarchy and authoritarianism in the post-Arab Spring through the use of force, aggression, violence and torture against Moroccan demonstrators calling for social justice and employment opportunities. The Judiciary and the Makhzen' binding to the oligarchic elite's interests and serving to silence and punish the Moroccan dissent has resulted to unprecedented rise in human rights issues and regression in democracy. Morocco's coercive power has significantly increased and it ranges from surveillance and control, to defamation targeting individual liberties to the use of force, imprisonment, forced disappearances and torture. Free journalists, activists and volunteering lawyers have all been criminalized by the judiciary and punished by the Makhzen. The Makhzen' coercive power has violated human rights, individual rights and women rights. This context inducing fear in the Moroccan citizens has led to the rise of a variety of everyday life forms of resistance. These range from informal economy, use and trafficking of drugs, to theft and violence leading to important rise in the number of prisoners. Also, in reaction to the patterns of domination around Morocco's formal politics, Moroccan youth have resisted the ballot politics and resorted instead to informal politics that consist of boycott, movements organized through social media, street art, blogging, music and art in general. The publicly expressed forms of resistance in the public space through demonstrations in 2016 have been responded to through a high level of coercive force toward the Rif Hirak movement. Since then, Moroccan youth having lost faith and hope in the ability to live with dignity in their country, to be able to live in the first place have resorted to resistance through irregular migration in high numbers. Facing exclusion and lacking

the necessary linguistic skills and education to integrate in the European market in case they survive the Mediterranean deadly sea, Moroccan youth develop trends of radicalization.

As a result of the EU' pragmatic approach choice, Morocco has developed state-society relations that are characterized by deference rather than by cooperation as a result of the exacerbating patterns of domination. Instead of state-societal resilience promised by the EUGS, pragmatism in the case of Morocco resulted into state domination and society's resilience. The EU' pragmatic approach toward the border control as well as toward domestic involvement has left the population, the youth especially vulnerable to the coercive power of the regime and his coterie formed through oligarchy.



CONCLUSION

Adopting a poststructuralist perspective to the analysis of the EUGS approach to tackling irregular migration based on principled pragmatism and political realism in the case of the EU-Morocco relations, this study highlights the paradoxical effects of the EU approach to exacerbating the underlying causes behind the migration issue rather than dealing with the root causes.

This study is based on the two core analytical concepts of domination and resistance. It defines irregular migration as a high range form of resistance to patterns of domination. Bringing to the literature a perspective from the global South on the migration issue through the case study of Morocco, this study aims to highlight the importance of knowledge production around unconventional security issues based on the context variable rather than the power variable determining the mainstream knowledge production. It argues that context informed policy making is inevitable for the successful tackling of strategic issues such as irregular migration considering the complexity and unconventional nature of contemporary security issues that are closely related to issues of democracy, peace and development.

Migration is both a complex and a contested issue. Besides being closely interlinked with issues of sovereignty and security, migration is also closely interlinked with issues of development, democracy and human rights. It is an issue that connects peace to security, security to democracy and most importantly; it connects the peace and security in the global North to that in the global South. Having been linked to terrorism since the 9/11 attacks, migration has in the international relations agenda become narrowly defined and tackled through a domination of a security perspective and a general domination of western perspectives and interests that is focused on building the frontier and concentrating the border control against the South. This approach, however, guiding the EU migration policy making has not only been ineffective, it is as this study's findings shows counterproductive for the EU' own security considering that it has had the paradoxical effect of empowering the forces of domination behind irregular migration rather than tackling the root causes of the issue. This, has resulted into the increase in irregular migration flows and the attached unconventional security issues such as trafficking, smuggling and potential radicalism and terrorism.

In the last decade, international affairs have been characterized by the rise in strategic issues related to international structural changes. Changes in the

international political system with the move from a unipolar to a multipolar and multi-nodal system with the rise of China and Russia has caused a shift in the US and EU foreign policies from liberalist internationalism to political realism. The Arab Spring revolutions failure leading to the failure of states, the fall of regimes and ungoverned areas has brought about the rise of popular criticism to the EU and the US interventionist foreign policies in the MENA. The post-Arab Spring context characterized by insecurity and its attached consequences for the EU and the US led to the turn toward principled pragmatism and resilience in support of stability and security maintenance rather than normative political influence guided by principles of democracy. This carried the risk of both securitization as well as the support of state institutions empowerment against the popular needs for genuine democratization and socioeconomic equality.

Having faced its first domestic crisis in 2016, the EU has adopted the global strategy to tackle the structural challenges for its institutional survival at the regional, domestic and international level. Under the EUGS, the EU has changed its institutional identity from normative power to pragmatism based on relational power which infers societal influence. This approach aiming at achieving state and societal resilience rather than democracy does not target government or the state apparatus influence nor does it include political influence or regime change objectives. Instead, it is targeted at the local actors of change defined as the microphysical actors of power. Building the capacity of the microphysical actors of power through the bottom up approach is the EU' new strategy of selective engagement in the MENA based on structural and geopolitical needs. While aiming for long-term in-built democracy, this approach also carries the potential to empower the local forces of domination, that is the forces of authoritarianism, leading to the disempowerment of the microphysical actors of power for change rather than the opposite. That means indirectly contributing to the oppression of local actors of change and local needs for genuine change for the sake of a masked stability that expresses itself in the form of everyday hidden practices which depending on the level of the coercive power can range from low to middle to a high range forms of resistance as detailed by this study.

Under the EUGS, the EU's two major strategic objectives are domestic unity and continuity as well as international global power. Both strategic objectives, however, are dependent on the EU' effectiveness toward the challenges raising from its neighborhood. The EU' effective handling of the regional structural challenges will determine its ability to maintain its global power in a changing international political

system where the EU lacks the necessary military and defense capabilities. The EU has for decades shaped its global role identity based on its institutional role toward the neighborhood defined through civil or normative power. The EU' institutional credibility at the domestic level is also dependent on its successful engagement in the region proving efficient institutional engagement abroad as well as the priority of safeguarding and maintaining the security and national interests of the European citizen. To meet these various structural objectives, the EU' pragmatic approach is based on selective engagement where the EU claims to be principled where the context provides for democratic change and pragmatic where security and strategic interests are at stake under the principled pragmatism approach. The MENA's strategic challenges for the EU are mainly related to the youth bulges, political and socioeconomic instabilities and the related irregular migration flows with the potential of radicalization and terrorism.

This study puts to test the EU's new foreign policy based on principled pragmatism for successfully handling the structural issues rising from the global South through a focus on the case study of Morocco and irregular migration. Morocco has been an important partner for the EU' South neighborhood relations and has been at the center of its related foreign policy documents and projects as the ENP and the EMP. Under the EUGS, Morocco like Ukraine, which have become strategic points for the EU's regional security to the East and the South, have been replaced by Tunisia and Georgia. Morocco is an especially important case to study for the assessment of the EUGS. Morocco is the country with which the EU has the deepest, most advanced relations in the South with an interlinkage of common interests ranging from politics to trade to security. Morocco is also a country where the EU has had important influence on local actors and the population through Europeanization and modernization. Unlike the majority of the countries of the South, the Moroccan state apparatus has since the decolonization time shown a persistent and special interest in deepening and advancing the relations with the EU. The EU is Morocco's primary foreign policy partner with especially important trade relations. Morocco makes the highest level of trade with the EU than the rest of the world. Morocco has also shown a commitment to policy convergence with the EU on multiple issues despite being an ENP member with no aspirations for membership. Morocco is also of important geostrategic proximity to the EU located only 14 km from Spain making it the only country with direct borders with the EU. Linking the European continent to the African one, Morocco has succeeded in maintaining stability, while also engaging in

democratic transition and adopting the EU' standards for change especially during the Arab Spring. Morocco also shares important historical, cultural and linguistic commonalities with Europe as well as one of the highest diaspora in Europe as a result of the colonial past between Morocco and Western European States. Having become an important transit point for sub-Saharan African migrants and subject to one of the highest irregular migration flows, Morocco also remains an important source of irregular migration flows in relation to the Moroccan youth for the EU. This makes Morocco an important case for testing the EUGS for successfully meeting immediate security needs as well as long term peace objectives. Morocco is also important for testing the EU' ability to achieve the EUGS promised state and societal resilience. Most importantly, Morocco provides an important case to test the EU' ability to deal with irregular migration from its root causes as is claimed under the EUGS through principled pragmatism, the bottom up approach and relational power. The case study of Morocco will, as a result, contribute to understanding the EU' ability to effectively meet its strategic interests related to domestic unity and global power in a solid and long term way.

Under the EUGS, the EU claims to tackle irregular migration from its root causes by framing it through the internal external nexus. Under the internal external nexus, the EU argues that resilience based stability in the neighborhood is key for the Union's own. For this reason, the EU claims to engage through the bottom up approach to solve the underlying issues behind irregular migration from its root for mutual sustainable security. The EU as a result, reshaped the framework of its bilateral partnerships with the South neighborhood to overcome traditional obstacles such as asymmetry and colonial based relations for building partnerships based on equality and shared prosperity.

The migration issue, however, has since the 9/11 events been securitized in the EU domestic and foreign policy making including the council conclusions, the Maastricht Treaty, the Seville agreement, the Readmission Accords, the mobility partnerships and more for more approach guiding the EU's externalization policy.

This thesis has operationalized and analyzed the concept of pragmatism as securitization, externalization and de-politicization. Having adopted a triangular methodological approach, this dissertation has combined between qualitative and quantitative data to achieve both precision and depth in analysis. The study was conducted through a three level of analysis; that is, epistemological, bilateral and domestic.

Having adopted the analytical frameworks of domination and resistance, state and societal relations, and having defined irregular migration as a form of resistance to patterns of domination, this thesis analysis assesses the patterns of domination and the related forms of resistance starting by the epistemological level of knowledge production to policy making, to bilateral level cooperation between the EU and Morocco to domestic state-society relations in Morocco with a focus on political relations and their societal implications.

Through the three level of analysis, this study uncovers the interactions between the forces of colonialism and authoritarianism based on an oligarchic rule, the interactions between the forces of domination and the resulting forms of resistance. It argues that inequalities at the epistemological and bilateral levels feed inequalities at the domestic level at the origin of the rise of the issue of irregular migration and connected unconventional security issues.

This study highlights the role of the EU in empowering the forces of authoritarianism and colonialism for the sake of its institutional survival leading to the Moroccan population and youth marginalization, exclusion and oppression. Empowering the forces of colonialism and authoritarianism, the EU in the case of Morocco is a major factor behind the Moroccan youth resistance through the deadly route of irregular migration in search for life with dignity, equal opportunity and justice. The case of Morocco, however, provides the EU with important potential for seeking a positive and genuine change for mutual and sustainable peace and security shall the EU choose to.

The epistemological analysis assesses the knowledge production around the migration issue in the mainstream literature and evaluates its securitization based on western policy interests. Epistemological analysis is organized through vertical and horizontal asymmetry. This foundational level of analysis also evaluates the correlation between the securitization of the migration issue in the literature with its securitization in the EU policy making. At the bilateral level of analysis, this thesis analyzes the Moroccan state apparatus perspective on the migration issue through a discourse analysis. Through this level of analysis, this study aims to understand the patterns of domination in the EU-Morocco cooperation on the migration management and studies its consequences on the effective management of the migration issue. It highlights the patterns of post-colonialism in the EU-Morocco relations challenging a successful cooperation. While analyzing Morocco's concerns on the migration issue from Morocco's local context and text with a focus on the state apparatus, this level

of analysis also highlights the EU' own institutional limitations and its implication on the exacerbation of the migration issue and related security issues for the sake of outsourcing threats to the EU' unity and continuity. The domestic level of analysis builds upon the epistemological and bilateral level of analysis and assesses the EU' bottom up approach effectiveness as well as the implications of the patterns of domination at the epistemic, bilateral level to the exacerbation of the domestic root causes behind the migration issue in the context of Morocco. Studying the migration issue and designing related policy from the EU' own context, through the EU' language, perspective and text has led to misinformed policy where the domestic root causes tackled by the EU are as this study shows to be symptomatic consequences of the original root cause related to the nature of political power and power relations that correlate with the forces of colonialism. The EU has, in this context, led to the consolidation of the root causes behind irregular migration rather than their successful tackling. At the domestic level, patterns of domination are studied as follows; the consolidation of authoritarianism through democratic means in the post-Arab Spring, the centralization of power in the hands of the monarchy, the de-legitimization of political parties and the political elite, the co-optation and control of civil associations, the co-optation and the convergence of the economic and political elite under an oligarchic regime with the monarchy. Related to this is the consequence of the neoliberal policies maintaining the oligarchic elite rule and leading to an indirect colonization of Morocco by France which leaves the Moroccan youth especially politically and socioeconomically excluded. The informal institution of corruption, the informal state of the Makhzen which along with the judiciary serve as the monarchy' and related elite security apparatus and coercive power against the population is highlighted. The post-colonial nation-state building and development issues of Morocco are also highlighted. Resistance in Morocco is studied as: low range, middle range and high range through the following concepts: informal economy, informal politics and irregular migration with the potential of radicalization. This study focuses on the following actors: the oligarchy which is composed of the monarchy and related political and economic elite and the related coercive apparatus, the forces of colonialism mainly France and Spain, the EU and the Moroccan population with a special focus on the Moroccan youth.

The study of the historical background of the EU-Morocco relations covered on chapter two of the thesis highlighted the major path dependent challenges that guides the cooperation throughout the different historical stages since the

decolonization time. The historical background overview shows that the EU-Morocco relations remain challenged by post-colonial issues of asymmetry. Challenges from both side of the EU and Morocco hamper the development of a successful cooperation that could effectively handle common challenges and interests. The EU' prioritization of own interests over those of Morocco as well as the lack of clarity towards its objectives from the partnership with Morocco remain constant issues. Issues in relation to the EU' institutional limitations in the face of the Western European member states sovereign preferences mainly France and Spain also characterize the EU-Morocco cooperation. The trade relations remain characterized by the domination of Morocco's pre-colonial powers France and Spain to the disadvantage of Morocco's own local needs. The Moroccan agricultural sector, especially, which is the main economic sector for Morocco remains limited by the EU member states protectionist policies and trade relations inequality. The historical overview also highlights the Moroccan development and nation-state building process issues related to the Spanish colonialism mainly the Rif region, the Western Sahara and the Ceuta-Melilla. On the side of Morocco, issues related to reform implementation and the persistence of corruption as well as the centralization of power in the hands of the monarchy remains a challenge for the EU effective involvement in Morocco and overall EU-Morocco cooperation objectives.

The overview of the EU-Morocco relations background over migration policy making and management covered in chapter three also highlighted patterns of colonialism and authoritarianism guiding the development of migration flows and the character of the cooperation on the migration management between the EU and Morocco. Migration flows from Morocco to the EU has developed over time based on selective policies of the EU Western member states to meet their labor and army needs. France, especially, has invaded the Moroccan job market and educational sectors through the introduction and mainstreaming of the French language domination which in the contemporary context consist of the one of the major challenges for the Moroccan youth socioeconomic integration. The Spanish colonization of the Rif and the Western Sahara sparked movement from the regions toward Spain. Spain' colonization introduction of Spanish language in the Northern region of Morocco and France's dominion over the center of Morocco characterize Morocco's contemporary socioeconomic and sociocultural divide reflecting back on its development and nation-building process. The Rif region, the Western Sahara and the French dominated job market are the major reasons behind irregular migration

flows from Morocco to the EU. The EU contemporary migration policy further carries the post-colonial character of the EU-Morocco relations by positioning Morocco as a post-colony that is expected to serve as a buffer zone and a border policeman for the EU. Migration policy with Morocco as a transit state is mainly based on the EU's strategic disregarding Morocco's own context needs and the post-colonial character of the issues behind the irregular migration of the Moroccan youth. Positing Morocco as a post-colony for the EU' buffer zone interests deviates the attention from context related issues behind the Moroccan youth migrations such as the forces of oligarchy and colonialism. Morocco, as an ENP country, has successfully managed to coordinate its policy making on migration management with the EU through consensus and coordination. Morocco, unlike the majority of African states who refuse to take back own citizens, negotiate returns and coordinate on border control, has made proof of commitment to the partnership with the EU. Besides ignoring Morocco's own context needs, the EU' policy approach of outsourcing to Morocco as a transit country created issues for Morocco's African strategy and related national interests of territorial integrity and development related to the South-South cooperation objectives.

The three level analysis findings of this study are as follows;

At the epistemological level, knowledge production around the issue of migration is characterized by both vertical and horizontal asymmetries. Mainstream knowledge production is characterized by a prioritization of perspectives and interests of western and European nation-states over those of the global South. It is also characterized by a domination of the interests of the populations of the West over those of the global South. Horizontally, the issue of migration in mainstream knowledge production is characterized by a dominance of security related issues such as national and societal security issues over issues of peace and development. This reflects the domination of the realist perspective to understanding and tackling the migration issue. Societal and national securities are the dominant analytical concepts around the migration in mainstream knowledge production. There is a focus on the effects of migration rather than the underlying causes. Epistemological securitization of the migration issue restricts academic understanding of the migration issue through the prevalence of the national and societal security related issues as well as the reality and perspectives of security over those of peace. At the vertical level of asymmetry, knowledge production around the migration issue is characterized by a focus on Western nation-states' security and sovereignty while marginalizing the security and

sovereignty needs of the countries of the global South. More importantly, transit countries of the global South are expected to compromise their security and sovereignty for the sake of the security and sovereignty of the western countries mainly the EU and the US. This Western dominated knowledge production around the migration issue feeding policy making leads to the prevalence of the interests of the countries of the West over those of the South. It also limits the in-depth and comprehensive understanding, thereby effective management, of the migration issue for the mutual interests of both countries of the global South as well as the global North. Critical scholars have opposed the reality of migration created by mainstream knowledge production. South-North migration based on factual data is far from being 'massive' and an 'invasion'. Migration from the global South is as reflected by the data 86% intracontinental whereby majority of the Southern migrants move within the South itself rather than toward the European frontier. Migration according to the critical perspectives is also not always related to war, violence nor is it always involuntary and forced. In many cases, migration from the South is related to mobility for emancipation and the search for opportunity. Issues related to migration such as demographic consequences, issues related to border security and increasing potential for ethnic and civil war are also not considered valid in relation to countries of the global South. Global South countries having undergone colonialism and an ongoing process of development and nation-state building are more prone to ethnic and civil conflicts that can result from migration. Global South transit countries are also more limited in terms of socioeconomic and security infrastructures and capabilities in comparison to western countries such as the EU member states and the US. In this sense, mainstream knowledge production marginalizes internal conflict, South-South movement, voluntary and regular mobility, development and developing countries issues and concerns. This epistemological domination reflects the knowledge production around migration to be based on the power variable rather than context variable. The prevalence of the 'reality' that reflects the global powers perspectives and strategic interests around the migration issue inhibits an objective and scientific understanding and explaining of the migration issue. This epistemological domination also guides ineffective policy making based on strategic interests of the dominant western global actors shaping the international relations agenda priorities and approaches. The EU policy making on the migration issue correlates with the epistemological domination characterized by an ontological and epistemic securitization of the migration issue. The EU' policy making based on

outsourcing and the externalization of border control to transit gate states is founded on an epistemic securitization of the migration issue in the knowledge production that is determined by the structural factor of terrorism and domestic politicization of the migration issue by far rights movements. The EU's policy securitization is based on the Maastricht Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, the European Agenda on Migration and the European Agenda on Security guiding the Mobility Partnerships and Readmission Agreements based on conditionality and more for more principles. This EU policy framework lacks an in-depth understanding of the migration issue, is characterized by ethical and practical issues and has been ineffective in solving the migration issue. It also restricts third country national mobility rights and breaches transit country states sovereignty and security rights under the Westphalian treaty and the international law. Most importantly, this approach carries the potential to exacerbate the underlying causes behind the migration issue.

For the sake of contributing to an objective knowledge production around the migration issue that is based on context and text of the marginalized, this thesis conducted a bilateral level analysis based on discourse analysis of the Moroccan state apparatus on the migration management in the EU-Morocco cooperation. The discourse analysis was conducted with the aim to understand the marginalized reality of the migration issue by understanding the Moroccan state apparatus perspectives on migration management. The analyzed discourses led to the following major themes: Unfounded Eurocentric myths and stereotypes around migration, migration between security, development and peace, inequality and asymmetry in responsibility sharing in the externalization policy and the unilateral migration choices of Western European states, Morocco's alternative approach to migration through the royal vision, Morocco's expectations from the EU-Morocco cooperation and Morocco's expectations from the migration management in the relations with the EU.

At the bilateral level of analysis, the migration issue is characterized by horizontal and vertical asymmetries, parallel to the epistemological level. At the horizontal level, security and security-related issues predominate over peace and development issues pertaining to the migration issue. At the vertical level, the security and overall interests of European member states predominate, regardless of the impact of associated policies on the Moroccan context, security, and peace, as well as on migrants. The Moroccan political elite emphasized the prevalence of unsubstantiated Eurocentric myths regarding migration and related policymaking. The relations between the EU and the countries of the South were characterized by binary

oppositions of superiority/inferiority, colonizer/colonized, which fueled Eurocentric myths and stereotypes. Rather than reflecting the objective reality of South-North migration, the perception and framing of migration as an invasion and a crisis reflect European fears and attitudes toward African migrants and Southerners in general. The securitization of the migration issue has connected migration to poverty, instability, and conflict in the collective imagination. Migration having characterized the very nature of human history is, according to the Moroccan political elite, an opportunity concentration if approached pragmatically, handled objectively, and regularized. While irregular migration poses significant security concerns, security is not the only reality of migration. In reality, migration as a security issue and a crisis has more to do with the EU and the US securitized approach to addressing it, which transforms the rights of migrants from third countries to mobility into acts of violence and the search for alternative means to resist the raised borders and barbed wires. In a century of migration, European and western leaders' ideological and xenophobic approach to the migration issue caused migration to become primarily a crisis. Migration, according to the Moroccan sovereign and elite, cannot be viewed as a security issue as it is not a standalone issue. African migration, framed as a crisis, is approached through the outsourcing model, which reflects the knowledge production issues and colonial patterns that continue to shape European and African relations in general. The African is understood and studied through the European context, the European language, and the European point of view, resulting in the creation of a crisis around the migration issue that reflects European perception rather than the reality of African migration and the African. According to the Moroccan political elite, the EU's approach disregards the historical patterns of colonialism and the postcolonial development process of Morocco and Africa. In highlighting the issue of the frontier, the Moroccan monarch emphasized the impact of the European colonists' introduction of the concept of the frontier on Africa's contemporary political, ideological, and socioeconomic insecurities. Being a European concept, the enforcement of the frontier concept in the African context is one of the primary causes of Africa and MENA's problems. Dealing with migration flows through the frontier ignores the postcolonial context of Africa, thereby preventing an in-depth understanding and effective resolution of the migration issue; moreover, it carries the risk of exacerbating the pre-existing problems associated with the youth of transit countries such as Morocco. This strategy based on securitization, outsourcing, and the construction of a border redirects the migration dynamics but does not stop them.

According to the Moroccan political elite, a sustainable and effective solution to the migration issue requires a balance between the needs of the nation-states of the West and those of the South, the needs of the nation-states as a whole, and those of the migrants. The securitization of migration by European policymakers impedes proper comprehension and management of the issue. If demystified, regularized, and objectively addressed for what it is by means of cooperation, coordination, solidarity, and shared responsibility, migration could result in potential economic benefits for both Europe and Africa. The African youth who perish in the western Mediterranean as a result of the EU and member state policies could be an important source of development for both sides, as opposed to a source of danger, fear, and instability. The EU's policy of shifting European and African responsibilities to Morocco is an unfair allocation of responsibility, and it is also a major reason why the Morocco-Spain border has become a site of violence and insecurity that Morocco must manage. Between the laxity of European member states and the irresponsibility of African states unwilling to negotiate the return of their own nationals and cooperate on border control, the EU expects Morocco to serve as a post-colony and act as a border policeman and buffer zone without regard for Morocco's own security or the principles of the bilateral cooperation under the EUGS emphasizing equality and shared prosperity. The dominance of Western European member states' interests, France, Spain, and Italy, and their unilateral decisions in disregard of the principles of cooperation violate Morocco's key national interests in relation to border management, border security, and national integrity, especially in light of Spain's support for the Polisario and irresponsible behavior on the shared borders. According to the Moroccan political elite, proximity entails reciprocal obligations. It should be irrelevant from which side of the border a migrant is viewed as less or more human. Also, the location of a country should not affect whether it is considered less or more sovereign. The Western Mediterranean has become a site of death, violence, and humanitarian crises due to the unilateral decisions of Western European nation-states regarding border controls. The western Mediterranean, which has become the most sought-after route by migrants, has become a site for human trafficking and smuggling. Migration, according to the Moroccan elite, poses greater challenges than financial benefits, which is the objective of the EU's approach to Morocco and other countries of the South that are expected to serve as the Union's border patrol. Migration could also bring about significant mutual benefits if handled properly. The EU's approach, which is guided by security, pragmatism, and outsourcing, has had

the paradoxical effect of inciting migrants to engage in acts of resistance, leading to additional crises, insecurities, and violence. Not only has the EU's approach created problems for Morocco at the national level and in its relations with Africa, but it has also proven ineffective in reducing and managing migration flows. Importantly, it has exacerbated crises and insecurities by compelling migrants to seek alternative routes that are more violent and characterized by smuggling and human trafficking. As a result, Morocco's border has become a site of escalating trafficking and smuggling activities, as well as unorthodox security issues related to migrants' attempts at irregular migration in defiance of the raised barbed wires. This has also led to an increase in humanitarian crises and clashes between migrants and border patrol officers. Despite Morocco's efforts to secure the border, violence and deaths of migrants resulted from the Cassiago and Ceuta-Melilla incidents. In contrast to the EU's approach, Morocco's political elite, under the direction of the monarch, has developed an alternative approach to migration management known as the royal vision, which is intended to create a third way in migration management characterized by consensus, solidarity, and shared responsibility. The alternative approach of Morocco in accordance with the royal vision is framed by the African Agenda of Migration developed by the king Mohammed VI, the leader for African migration. Involving the EU and the AU in bicontinental cooperation between Africa and Europe, it proposes consensus-building through bicontinental cooperation. In addition, the Moroccan monarch established the Observatory for African Migration in order to contribute to the emancipated and objective production of knowledge on the migration issue, taking into account the African context and the factual data on South migration, as opposed to the mystified mainstreaming of reality by European decision-makers. The alternative strategy is guided by the 5+5 axes, as well as the Marrakesh Pact and the Global Pact. It emphasizes multilateralism, cooperation, and equality over xenophobia, social exclusion, and exclusive nationalism. The primary objective of the Moroccan-proposed third path is to demystify the migration issue in order to develop effective, realistic, and sustainable solutions to the migration issue. Instead of seeking a "privileged partnership," Morocco's hopes for the EU-Morocco partnership are aimed at fostering equality within the relationship. Concerning migration management, the elite of Morocco expects the EU to build consensus, seek a qualitative approach, rethink the concept of mobility, and implement a consistent migration policy.

The domestic level analysis puts to test the EUGS pragmatism based on the bottom up approach and relational power. This approach, according to the EUGS, is expected to build the capacity of the local microphysical actors of change. The top-down induced reforms in Morocco in 2011 were determined by two important factors; the regional context and the international actors' engagement. The EU' turn toward pragmatism claiming to focus instead on empowering the local actors of change as shows the study of the Moroccan context has had the paradoxical effect of empowering the forces of domination, authoritarianism through oligarchic rule and the forces of domination through continued colonialism leading to the exclusion of the population and the disempowerment of the microphysical actors of power. More importantly, as shows the analysis of the Moroccan domestic context, the microphysical actors are not only controlled and devoid of power but are also manipulated and used to maintain a façade of democracy serving the consolidation of authoritarianism to the disadvantage of the population. This paradoxical effect of the EU policy is one of the major reasons for the worsening of Morocco domestic issues and the increasing forms of everyday life resistance including irregular migration in response to the rising coercive power of the regime and the forces of domination depriving the average Moroccan and the youth especially from dignified life opportunities. While claiming to focus on influencing the everyday life behaviors of citizens to build everyday life practices and state-societal resilience, the EU' approach has led to developing everyday life practices of resistance by leading to state domination and societal resistance, state-society relations characterized by deference rather than cooperation.

Eliminating the political element from its foreign policy, the EU' bottom up approach is focused on building the capacity of civil actors through support programs that tackle 'root causes' related to the migration of the youth and socioeconomic integration. The EU' support programs analyzed between 2012-2020 remain characterized by a persistence of failure, inefficiency and limited results in all sectors. The EU action plans report considers the issue of informal institution of corruption and institutional obstacles to be the main reason for the EU programs failures. This study focusing on the patterns of domination and taking the political variable at the center of its analysis, it argues that the nature of political power and political relations characterized by oligarchic rule is the main reason behind the issue of corruption as well as the issues related to the youth defined as 'root causes'. This study, as a result, considers that the EU defined root causes are symptomatic consequences of the

original root cause related to the political variable. The EU' pragmatic approach eliminating the political variable contributes to the exacerbation of the domination forces related to political relations in the form of an oligarchic elite that has absolute control over the political and economic forces, sustained through neoliberal policies, the security forces of the informal state of the Makhzen and the control of the Judiciary against the population. Co-opting and controlling the political parties and civil actors, these domestic forces of domination leave the Moroccan population, the youth especially, marginalized deprived of opportunity, the right to emancipation and dignified life. Calls for basic life needs responded to by coercive power has led to the youth resistance in different forms ranging to irregular migration as a high range against a high range of coercive power of the regime and the Makhzen controlled by the forces of the oligarchy.

This study defines the root causes to migration to be related to patterns of domination which are the oligarchic elite and the related patterns of domination namely; neoliberal policies, indirect French colonialism, the informal institution of corruption and the informal state of the Makhzen. Accordingly, this study argues that the EU' approach of pragmatism empowers these patterns of domination leading to increasing forms of resistance manifesting through unconventional security directly affecting the EU such as irregular migration.

Morocco presents an interesting case where authoritarianism was consolidated in the post-Arab Spring through the manipulation of the 2011 reforms by the traditional political system resting upon inheritance and symbolism to de-legitimize and disempower the modern political system. The 2011 constitution as well as the modern political system institutions including the local actors of change such as civil actors and political parties were manipulated by the Moroccan monarch to consolidate and centralize power in unprecedented ways in the post-Arab Spring period. The constitution promising the separation of power above all has guaranteed the king's absolute power with legitimacy without accountability. Enshrining the king's dominance under the 41-59 Article as the protector of the nation, the constitution guaranteed the king absolute executive and legislative power through royal decree and absolute control over the judiciary. The king consolidated absolute power over the state institutions overall, the security forces, the economic and political elite as well as the forces of change. The power centralization and consolidation of the Moroccan monarch was conducted through different strategies. The co-optation and convergence of the political and economic elite forming an oligarchic rule with the

monarchy is the most important of the king's steps to the centralization of power and consolidation of authoritarian rule. Being the most important capitalist actor in Morocco, the king' initiated neoliberal policies has allowed converging the political and economic elite serving him a strong elitist circle of protection against massive unrest. Through segmentation politics, divide and rule, the Moroccan monarch has managed to de-legitimize the already weak political system, political parties and elites. The co-optation, control and penalizing of the civil actors through the Article 29 of the constitution consists of both financial and legal constrains. Civil actors also controlled through direct appointment and convergence strategies of the monarch also face issues of legitimacy and trust and like political parties can barely show good intentions they can never execute unless aligned with the central power will. The co-opted, controlled and de-legitimized political parties have become an important tool for preventing the rise of a real modern political system. The inefficiency characterizing the political parties reflect on the citizens' level of trust toward the political system overall. Devoid of executive power elected politicians and political parties are never allowed to govern, instead they serve as an instrument for the monarch government shifting strategies in the face of popular pressure without shifting power. While shifting the accountability task and attention from the governing and only executive leader, that is the king and his advisers, the elected politicians serve to delegitimize the parliament and the political process overall while increasing the legitimacy of the king in the eyes of the average Moroccan to be as the inevitable and only genuine protector of the Moroccan citizen against the inefficient and irresponsible politicians. The king's counselors have more power than elected politicians. Opposition parties and parties with the potential for strong leadership are brought to government without being given the power to govern; thus, end up being delegitimized and internally divided. The political party system's variety, while serving a façade of democracy, actually serves the purpose of diffusing the political power and avoiding genuine political opposition to the king's absolute power. Devoid of ideology and power, political parties serve the continuity of the traditional political system rather than the modern democratic system. The politicians and the political elite' loyalty to the monarch for gaining advantage and ensuring their political survival further empowers' the monarch absolute power over the executive, legislative and judiciary forces of power. The political elite converged with the economic elite through the increasing trend of king' related business figures entering politics further empowered the monarch's oligarchic circle by creating a powerful minority serving as a strong obstacle for genuine democratization in

Morocco. The neoliberal policies maintaining the power of the oligarchic elite composed of technocrats, politicians and the king's closest loyalist has further increased the exclusion of the Moroccan citizen politically, socioeconomically, linguistically and legally. This exclusion is mainly manifested amongst the Moroccan youth population, which unlike its older generations, is more aware of the reality of the political power in Morocco centered in the hands of the king's and his coterie. The privatization policies, especially in the educational sector, and the strengthening of the forces of indirectly continuing French colonialism serve the oligarchic elite neoliberal policies but leave the average Moroccan on the side of life opportunities. The French language domination over the job market reflecting the French domination over the Moroccan economy, also, the privatization of the education has left the majority of the Moroccan youth accessing the Arabic language based public education deprived of equal opportunity for inclusion in the job market and having quality education. This issue also furthers some of Morocco's postcolonial nation-state building such as the integration of the Amazigh population socioeconomically. The centralization of economic, political and security forces of power in the hands of the monarchy also affect Morocco's postcolonial development process by maintaining the divide between the central Morocco, previously colonized by France, and the rest of the country. The urban-urban divide between the beneficial Morocco linked to the interests of the oligarchic elite and the rest of Morocco known as 'non-beneficial' Morocco further maintains the societal segregation in the Moroccan society in favor of the elites. The regionalization policy designed to promote the development of Morocco remains affected by the centralization of power considering that the regional governors are not elected but appointed by the king who keep absolute control over the three ministries of sovereignty; that is the interior affairs, foreign affairs and the judiciary. Rural and urban divide in Morocco also remains linked to the development process guided by elitist priorities to the disadvantage of the average Moroccan leading to the rise of a double speed polarized society reflecting on irregular migration flows. The consolidated authoritarianism has best manifested during the 2015 events in the marginalized Rif by the monarch for being critical of its power. The Hirak movement being echoed through the nation and sparking protests of the unemployed educated doctors, teachers and youth has brought to the surface the post-Arab spring reality of Morocco which is a more-than ever consolidated authoritarianism using democratic means such as the Judiciary for the oppression of the popular will and the citizens. Post-Arab Spring Morocco is back to the pre-reform Morocco of torture and

oppression through the informal Makhzen state, however, this time it is carried through securitization and the maintenance of democratic façade. The informal institution of corruption being an obstacle to the EU' programs implementation is directly linked to the oligarchic forces and the related economic and political clientalism that maintains the practice and stands in the way of international initiatives against corruption. The informal state of the Makhzen along with the judiciary serve as the security apparatus of the monarchy to maintain its rule through the use of force and coercive power employing legal means and strategies such as defamation for the legitimization of violation of individual freedoms, oppression and torture, of the citizens calling for socioeconomic equality. Since 2015 the Moroccan context has become characterized by increasing coercive measures of surveillance, control and punishment which parallel an important degradation of human rights and individual freedoms. As a result of the consolidation of the patterns of domination and coercion, the Moroccan everyday life has become characterized by a variety of acts of resistance depending on the level of coercion that range from low range, middle range to high range. Morocco's everyday life is characterized by deference rather than cooperation reflecting the nature of the state-society relations that are characterized by state domination and societal resistance rather than state-societal resilience claimed by the EUGS pragmatism and bottom up approach. Inequalities and socioeconomic issues have become important factors behind the Moroccan youth everyday life acts of resilience studied in this thesis as informal economy. The consumption and trafficking of illicit drugs has increased in the post-Arab Spring Morocco and is accompanied by acts of violence, theft, discrimination that reflect the high level of psychological malaise amongst the Moroccan youth resulting from their socioeconomic marginalization.

Being more aware of the reality of the political power in Morocco than their elderly generations and faced by coercive power of the regime, the Moroccan youth while being highly interested in politics chooses to resist the oligarchic forces of power by boycotting formal politics and the ballot box and engaging instead in informal politics. Political participation, the level of trust and engagement in the civil associations are important indicators of the nature of the state society relations and they remain importantly low in the case of Morocco especially after the Arab Spring. Abstaining from engagement in formal politics, the Moroccan youth express their disenchantment through middle range forms of resistance through informal politics. Publicly expressing the demonstrations directed toward the forces of clientalism,

generally targeting the government but in the case of the Rif region it also targets the monarchy, have in the post-Arab spring period been faced by unprecedented level of coercion from the Makhzen. The organization of themed movements through social media, boycotting of the forces of neoliberalism by boycotting major companies, blogging, the use of street painting, music and art have become Moroccan youth forms of political participation through middle range resistance. These middle range forms of resistance are faced by a high level of surveillance, control and punishment by the Moroccan security apparatus and the judiciary. The jailing of social media active youth, independent journalist, activists and lawyers volunteering for defending the Rif movement political prisoners' marks Morocco contemporary politics and state-society relations. The use of fear, defamation attacking the personal integrity of the peacefully resistant youth, criminalization of individual freedoms is some of the strategies used by the regime and the judiciary to punish the youth. The post-Arab Spring period, most importantly post 2015 onwards also known as Morocco's second Arab Spring has shown a clear consolidation of the forces of oligarchy over the political scene with the rise into power of the king' businessman friend Aziz Akhenouch who remains unpopular amongst the Moroccan youth and has been the subject to several boycotting movements. The end of the PJD in 2016 elections and the consolidation of power in the loyal parties to the royalty who consist of converged and co-opted economic and political elites along with the rising coercive power of the Makhzen and the judiciary has brought Moroccan youth hope for a change to an end. The imprisonment of the Hirak movement figures has left an impact on the youth who since 2016 has been attempting irregular migration to Europe in unprecedented ways. Irregular migration coming as a last resort to the youth hopelessness in the face of the forces of domination is Moroccan youth high range form of resistance through 'Exit' reflecting the youth hopelessness from their nation-state. The death in the Mediterranean Sea has become the Moroccan youth favored route to the search for life in the zone of peace, justice and equality. Facing exclusion after arrival to the European shores as a result of the illegal status, the lack of necessary skills for socioeconomic integration, Moroccan youth seek belonging, income and socialization through radicalization increasing the risk of terror for the Union.

Acting as an empire in denial through political realism and pragmatism based on securitization, externalization and de-politicization, the EU has strengthened the forces of domination in Morocco at the origin of the issue of irregular migration and related unconventional security which are in their root forms of resistance to the

patterns of domination. The EU' pragmatic approach claiming to empower the local microphysical actors of power to build state-societal resilience has empowered the forces of oligarchy, clientalism and coercion marginalizing the average Moroccan citizen and youth. Instead of everyday life behaviors of resilience, the case of Morocco shows that the EU' approach led to everyday life forms of resistance. Through pragmatism, the EU is not only contributing to the creation of the 'circle of fire' around it, it is also challenging genuine peace and security and the Mediterranean. More importantly, this approach is also challenging the Union' long term capability for achieving domestic unity and global power.

Morocco has until now managed to remain stable and to progress to a relative extent at several levels. Because of the monarchic system and the EU' influence, Morocco has overcome several challenges plaguing the countries of the MENA. The country has breached the secular/islamist divide; its modern approach to religion has avoided the rise of fanatic ideologies amongst the society. Also, Morocco as a population and a state show a high level of influence by European standards and principles while maintaining its own identity based on Moroccan cultural diversity and history. The identity mosaic, the different influences on the country as a result of its geopolitical position between different continents and its inclusion of African, Arab, European and Jewish identities contribute to a context that is more peaceful and stable which is also highly prompt to a positive influence by the EU. The EU has a high level of relational/social influence on Morocco's associations, activists and civil actors which adopt its standards of democracy and human rights. Moroccan youth also aspire for the European standards of life, the principles of justice, modernity and openness. The Moroccan regime and oligarchic group because of its neoliberal system has high stakes in the relations with the EU, all of which provide the Union with a favorable context for influencing the regime political reform for sustainable peace and security.

While a regime change or a regime fall has not proven to serve the objectives of peace and security in the MENA and Mediterranean, consolidated authoritarianism also produces similar levels of instabilities and insecurities from which the EU cannot be immune. Collective grievances in Morocco translate into forms of resistance increasing based on the level of the regime coercion from low, to middle range to high range taking the form of unconventional security threatening the Union. Morocco's initiation of reform upon the 20th February movement of the Arab Spring does not stem from the power of the local actors, instead from the two variable of the surrounding

regional context and the reaction of the international actors mainly the EU and the US which pressured the king to introduced ambitious but top-induced reforms. The down-turn of the Arab Spring revolution into chaotic results and the rise of insecurity issues resulting from the fall of regime and the subsequent consolidation of authoritarianism in the region has influenced the EU' turn toward political realism to safeguard its credibility and build a new image for legitimacy for its critical structural objectives related to global power in the changing international political system and the domestic unity against political far right. This pragmatic turn of the EU influenced by the US approach toward the MENA based on pragmatism since the Obama administration has opened the space for the regime authoritarian consolidation and the weakening of the microphysical actors of power in the face of high coercive power.

Morocco stands in a critical position where it could either take a turn toward a democratic process starting with constitutional monarchy or it could develop more entrenched authoritarianism that benefits from strategic issues of the border, deepen further inequalities and instabilities that can put the EU's security at stake in the long term. The change toward a genuine political reform, instead of the current democratic façade serving authoritarian legitimacy, can only be pressured for by the EU. Moroccan local actors and citizens are currently considerably weak in the face of the regime's power which is supported by the regional context and the EU/US pragmatism.

Security and stability in Morocco is key for the Union. This, however, cannot be achieved through pragmatism and passivity, instead through informed and proactive engagement for the sake of genuine political transition that would serve mutual peace and security. This thesis advocates for the organizational power of the EU, which combines economic, normative, relational and soft power.

The EU has been an important actor in the democratization process in Morocco. The EU is also the most entitled actor with the ability to influence change in Morocco. Besides the high stakes of the Moroccan regime and oligarchic group in the trade relations with the EU, the EU has considerable relational and soft power influence in Morocco. The Moroccan local actors have adopted the EU' standards and principles for democratization, the Moroccan youth are also highly influenced by the European culture and modernization and perceive Europe as an ideal and a model for quality living. The principles of justice, equality, opportunity and dignified living attracts the Moroccan youth to Europe. Instead of empowering the domestic forces of domination and importing the youth in malaise through irregular movement, the EU

shall work on exporting the principles of Europe that the youth look forward in their country. This, however, cannot be achieved without political change. Adopting an organizational power concept, the EU shall target the Moroccan regime and coterie through economic power for initiating a genuine transition toward constitutional monarchy. Along with the governmental influence for democratization, relational power and capacity building of the local actors can supplement the primary objective of democratization through governmental influence.

Instead of pragmatism and political realism which only serve to exacerbate these issues by exacerbating their underlying causes, the EU' needs to have a more meaningful and informed engagement in the case of Morocco. To do so, the EU shall build an understanding of these issues from their contexts, through local knowledge, build bilateral relations that are characterized by a balance of interests between its own and those of Morocco, peace and security. The EU shall also develop organizational power combining between economic, normative and relational power targeting the oligarchic elite and regime and the local actors.

For a sustainable solution to the issue of irregular migration, in line with the findings of this study, it is recommended that the EU builds and extends its organizational power not only to deal with the migration issue emerging from Morocco but also to effectively handle the transit migration which has become a source of insecurity and breach of sovereignty rights of Morocco. The EU as is highlighted by the Moroccan sovereign and political elite shall work toward having influence on sub-Saharan African nation-states from where the irregular migration flows emerge to have control over their borders and take responsibility for the return of their own nationals. Building a bi-continental cooperation through the involvement of the AU and the EU is one of Morocco's objectives under the royal vision. Morocco, however, cannot achieve the objectives highlighted under its alternative vision to the management of the migration issue in the absence of the will and commitment of both European and African partners to find a mutual solution that involves all concerned parties. The EU' approach of shifting responsibility to transit states such as Morocco, as show the findings of this study, has had counterproductive results for the border security of both the EU and Morocco. It has failed to reduce and cope with the issue. Besides this, this approach has had important consequences on the peace and security of Morocco leading to the exacerbation of irregular migration flows both of transit and origin from Morocco. The responsibility shifting has also had important consequences on Morocco's own national interests and foreign policy stakes in the

African continent as well as South-South cooperation as a result of having to negotiate migrants return on behalf of the EU with sub-Saharan African partners who have so far shown unwillingness to cooperate or negotiate on the matter. Considering that this issue outweighs both Morocco and the EU but also involves and affects both of them and that the migration issue is here to stay, it is necessary that the EU targets the countries of origin for sub-Saharan irregular migration through an organizational power concept and build a comprehensive cooperation that is characterized by shared responsibility and solidarity involving the countries of origin, transit and destination. In this matter, a quota standard can also be applied while sharing responsibility by taking into consideration the socio-economic infrastructure and capabilities of each nation state for a fair responsibility distribution that would also prevent burdening developing transit nation-states from having to take burdens that outweigh their capabilities. This study, highlights the importance of the EU' adoption of a qualitative approach that is guided by long term and sustainable results, rather than quantitative short term goals, for the sake of building sustainable peace and security in the Mediterranean.

Future research can shed light on domestic patterns of domination of the EU, that sustains the Eurocentric approach toward migration from the South feeding the securitization of migration. The forces of domination within the EU benefit from irregular migration. This analysis can focus on the study of the European economic and political elites as well as the forces behind continuing indirect colonialism in the South. Research shall further also analyze the links between the European and Western exceptionalism fed western interventions in the MENA and contemporary issues of the South related to the youth bulge. Further research shall also focus on studying the links between irregular migration, radicalization and terrorism as forms of resistance to patterns of domination. Besides the ideological and religious components to the rise of the issue of terrorism and radicalization, what patterns of domination have fed the rise of terrorism in the MENA region including Western interventionism, occupation and colonialism? Similarly, what patterns of domination might be feeding terrorism in the European continent? What role does the EU member states adopted version of exclusive secularism play in the divide between European citizens of origin and those of migrant origin? Also, what role does the adopted exclusive secularism play in the continuing clashes of civilization between the two shores of the Mediterranean?

Most importantly, in line with the findings and theoretical argument of this thesis, future research shall highlight the EU' foreign policy choices' paradoxical effects on exacerbating security issues related to both the East and the South regions. How do the EU' survivalist policy choices for its continuity as an institution lay the ground for regional contemporary security issues including those related to the East region and Russia' offensive? This analysis shall focus on the issues of the EU policy toward the East region including the enlargement policy; also, to the links between the EU' survivalist policies through enlargement in the East and the issues related to the South region, considering the importance of the European divide in designing policy toward the South such as the externalization and outsourcing approach.



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