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THE STUDY OF DESECURITIZATION: A META-STUDY

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THE STUDY OF DESECURITIZATION: A META-STUDY

A Master's Thesis

by

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To my family

THE STUDY OF DESECURITIZATION: A META-STUDY

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
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by
Çağla Naz AYDOĞAN

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THE STUDY OF DESECURITIZATION: A META-STUDY

By Çağla Naz Aydoğan

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science.

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ABSTRACT

THE STUDY OF DESECURITIZATION: A META-STUDY

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August 2023

Securitization theory has introduced a different outlook to security studies by providing an alternative view to think about and study security. Moving away from the traditional security assumptions that suggest threats exist out there waiting to be addressed, securitization theory argues that security is a speech act that comes into being through utterance. Securitization and desecuritization are two ends of a security continuum in which threats are addressed by extraordinary measures above normal politics or through normal political measures. Even though securitization and desecuritization are formulated together, the literature heavily focuses on securitization and its empirical applications. Therefore, desecuritization remains understudied compared to securitization. This thesis provided a meta-study on desecuritization. It presented the theoretical and empirical work on desecuritization discussed in the literature. The thesis focused on the Copenhagen School framework of desecuritization to illustrate the evolution of the ideas and different empirical applications of desecuritization. Using a meta-study approach that synthesizes

and integrates past research on desecuritization, the thesis reflected on the broader conclusions and identified different patterns within the field of study. It also emphasized the critiques and contributions within and outside of the Copenhagen school to locate the aspects that need additional attention in desecuritization studies.

Key words: Securitization theory, desecuritization, Copenhagen school

ÖZET

GÜVENLİK DIŞINA ÇIKARMA ÇALIŞMALARI: BİR META-ÇALIŞMA

Aydoğan, Çağla N.
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Pınar Bilgin

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Güvenlikleştirme teorisi, güvenlik tanımına alternatif bir görüş sunarak güvenlik çalışmalarına yeni bir bakış açısı kazandırmıştır. Güvenlikleştirme teorisi, güvenlik problemlerinin hali hazırda dışarda ele alınmayı beklediğini öne süren geleneksel güvenlik varsayımlarından uzaklaşarak, güvenliğin ifade yoluyla ortaya çıkan bir söz eylemi olduğunu savunur. Güvenlikleştirme ve güvenlik dışına çıkarma, güvenlik problemlerinin normal siyasetin üzerinde olağanüstü önlemlerle veya normal siyasi önlemlerle ele alındığı bir güvenlik sürekliliğinin iki ucudur. Güvenlikleştirme ve güvenlik dışına çıkarma teorik olarak birlikte formüle edilse de, literatür ağırlıklı olarak güvenlikleştirmeye ve onun ampirik uygulamalarına odaklanmaktadır. Bu nedenle, güvenlik dışına çıkarma, güvenlikleştirmeye kıyasla daha az incelenmemiştir. Bu tez, güvenlik dışına çıkarma üzerine bir meta-çalışma sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Tez, teorinin gelişimini ve güvenlik dışılaştırmanın farklı ampirik uygulamalarını göstermek için Kopenhag Okulu'nun kavramsal çerçevesine odaklanmaktadır. Literatürde tartışılan güvenlik dışılaştırma üzerine teorik ve ampirik çalışmaları sunmaktadır. Güvenlik dışılaştırma üzerine geçmiş araştırmaları sentezleyen ve bütünleştiren

bir meta-çalışma yaklaşımı kullanan tez, çalışma alanındaki farklı kalıpları ve modelleri belirler. Bunlara ek olarak, güvenlik dışına çıkarma çalışmalarında daha fazla çalışma gerektiren yönleri belirlemek için Kopenhag okulu içindeki ve dışındaki eleştiriler ve katkılar üzerinde durur.

Anahtar kelimeler: Güvenlikleştirme teorisi, güvenlik dışına çıkarma, Kopenhag okulu

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CHAPTER 1 –

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to answer the question “How is desecuritization studied within the Copenhagen school framework?” This chapter aims to explain the purpose, methodology, and plan of the thesis. It starts by explaining the theoretical and contextual background of the Security Studies in which securitization theory emerged. Then it moves on to explain the key concepts, main assumptions, and foundations of securitization theory in its original formulation based on the Copenhagen School’s framework. Lastly it explains the methodology of the thesis and lays out the organization of the chapters.

1.1. Historical context

Security Studies as a distinct field emerged after the Second World War (WWII). Before the emergence of Security Studies, the literature was defined as war studies comprising geopolitics, military, and grand strategy (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 1). Later, the literature developed into two strands, strategic studies in the UK and international security studies (ISS) in the US. Even though both ISS and strategic studies focused on military strategy, geopolitics, and war, they had different outlooks. The focus of strategic studies was predominantly interstate strategies. As Nye and Lynn Jones note, despite strategic studies being part of Security Studies, “the name Strategic Studies suggest that the field

is concerned primarily with the choices between alternative strategies for states" (Nye & Lynn-Jones, 1988, p. 7). That said, defining the field as Strategic Studies would mean confining the scope of the field to states' offensive and defensive strategies towards each other and limiting the theoretical question only to focus on states' military security.

On the other hand, ISS was "much more a civilian enterprise than most earlier military and strategic literatures" (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p.2). Following WWII, rather than relying merely on the military expertise of the military personnel, the focus shifted to the civilian experts and began to include them in security discussions. As Buzan and Hansen argue, "strategic bombing and nuclear weapons transcended traditional military warfighting expertise in ways that required, or at least opened the door to, bringing civilian experts ranging from physicist and economists to sociologist and psychologists" (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p.2). Nye and Lynn-Jones also explain the development of ISS through "the twin revolutions in American foreign policy and military technology caused by the emergence of the Cold War and development of atomic weapons" (Nye & Lynn-Jones, 1988, p. 8). Security Studies, in that sense, emerged as an all-encompassing field that includes strategic studies, military studies, and newly emerging security topics like economics that have not been discussed as part of security before. What is distinct in the literature developed after WWII is its conception of security.

Traditional understandings of security heavily focused on military threats and responses to these military threats for state survival. Since WWII, "security has been understood and practiced with reference to the needs and interests of

states" (Bilgin, 2003, p. 203). These national security-oriented understandings of security began to come under question starting in the 1970s with an attempt to broaden the security agenda to include economic and environmental security (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). By the end of the Cold War, new ways to understand and study security has emerged together with an attempt to widen the security agenda encompassing issues other than military threats. In the traditional sense, security was viewed as an existing entity measured by threat or fear.

Broadening the scope of what is considered security, Jonna Nyman argues that "a wide range of issues could be – and have been -– considered issues of security. But not all potential threats are treated as security issues: some are ignored, while some are considered security issues only some of the time" (Nyman, 2018, p. 101). But how come some issues are considered as "security issues" while some remain solely issues? Which issues entail security, and which ones are out of the realm of security?

Buzan and Hansen (2009) argue, "security is always a 'hyphenated concept' and always tied to a particular referent object, to internal/external locations, to one or more sectors and to a particular way of thinking about politics" (p. 10). Until the end of the Cold War, the state remained the mere referent of security until new conceptions of security emerged. Even though alternative ways of thinking about security are thought to emerge after the end of the Cold War, the alternative ways of thinking about security date back to the late 1960s. Pioneered by Johan Galtung (1969), peace researchers' work on violence and peace "shifted the focus away from the state and the military dimension of security to individual and social groups and their needs" (Bilgin,

2003, p. 205). By the 1980s, questions about what constitutes a security issue began to move away from military threats only. As Waever (1995) argues, in the 1980s, the general attempt was to broaden the security agenda to move away from a solely military-focused agenda. These attempts to broaden the security agenda faced various criticisms. One of the key criticisms came from the traditionalists arguing that the progressive widening would endanger the intellectual coherence of security (Buzan et al., 1998; Walt, 1991). Against that criticism, scholars argued that Security Studies should not be confined to the issues related to war, threat and use of force (Booth, 1991). While acknowledging that military threats are still a part of the security agenda, new issues which concern not only states but also individuals could be added to the agenda (Booth, 1991; Krause & Williams, 1996).

The end of the Cold War presented an opportunity for alternative ways of thinking about security to gain momentum. With the alleviation of the Cold War threats, different security problems gained visibility and opened up discussions of different dimensions of security, such as societal security, human security, and food security.

1.2. Emergence of securitization theory

The emergence and development of the securitization theory coincided with the end of the Cold War, where alternative approaches to security found an opportunity to manifest themselves. The development of securitization theory fits in a general debate in Security Studies concerning widening and broadening the

scope of Security Studies. Buzan et al. (1998) argue that they seek to 'find coherence' by exploring the logic of security itself rather than limiting the scope of security to the military sector. On a similar note, Jonna Nyman (2018) argues that "securitization theory responded to changes in the international system that intensified with the end of the Cold War, developing a new framework for security analysis that tried to satisfy both traditionalist and wideners" (Nyman, 2018, p. 102).

Initial theorization of securitization dates back to Ole Waever's early writings starting from the late 1980s, followed by a book chapter in 1995 titled "Securitization and Desecuritization." Later in 1998, Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, and Jaap de Wilde, published their work on security in a book titled *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (*Security* hereinafter). *Security* promised to "set out a new and comprehensive framework of analysis for Security Studies" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. vii). This new framework of analysis for Security Studies and a new way of thinking about security through the work of Buzan and Waever led to the emergence of a new school: the Copenhagen School (CS). The name "Copenhagen School" originated from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) in which scholars worked at the time. Later it was also coined by another critical security studies scholar, Bill McSweeney, in his reviews of Waever and Buzan's work (McSweeney, 1996, p. 81). The Copenhagen School's conception of security revolved around three main ideas. As Waever (2012) explains:

> (1) securitization; (2) sectors (the distinction between political, economic, environmental, military, and societal security); and (3) regional security complexes (an analytical scheme to analyze how security concerns cohere in regional formations) (p. 53).

The first assumption of securitization theory is that security is not "out there" waiting to be addressed. As Buzan et al. explain, security is a "self-referential practice because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue not necessarily because the issue is presented as such a threat" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24). Securitization essentially refers to a choice to deal with particular issues in a particular way that is beyond the normal bounds of politics. Put differently, it refers to the process of making an issue a subject of extraordinary measures instead of a problem that can be addressed by normal political processes. Securitization theory opposes the idea that security exists independent of our conception. Here, Waever argues that security is "a speech act" (Waever, 1995, p. 55). That is, uttering something as a security issue makes it a security issue. As he puts: "the utterance itself is the act" (Waever, 1995, p. 55).

There are three main units that have to work together in order for securitization to occur: the referent object, securitizing actor, and the audience. For the process to start, the securitizing actor points the referent object as existentially threatened by a designated issue. Following this, the relevant audience has to accept this move for successful securitization. The significance of securitizing move being successful is that it provides power to the securitizing actor that it would not have been able to gain otherwise. Here, it is important to

note that audience acceptance can take different forms according to different political settings. It may not always occur in a formal way. Securitization provides urgency, secrecy, and although it is not an automatic response, it may lead to shutting down the political debate.

Desecuritization is the other end of the securitization continuum. In definition, desecuritization refers to “moving issues out of threat-defense sequence and into the ordinary public sphere” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 29). Desecuritizing an issue allows the political debate to take place and lifts the urgency, thereby allowing the issue to be discussed in public. Securitization theory essentially prefers desecuritization over securitization since it views security as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues in normal politics (Buzan et al., 1998; Waever, 2012, p. 53). Desecuritization is also referred to as the “optimal long-range option” that should be aimed at (Buzan et al., 1998). While arguing for desecuritization to be a primary choice, scholars also acknowledge that securitization can be useful in certain circumstances that require focus, attention, and mobilization of resources (Wæver, 2011, p. 469). As Pınar Bilgin argues states “make choices in favor (or against) defining issues as threats. These choices are shaped by and in turn are shape identities and interests which have material and nonmaterial aspects” (Bilgin, 2009, p. 106). Therefore, securitizing a particular subject may be a calculated decision that states make without necessarily facing an existential threat but framing them as such.

Some scholars argue that desecuritization remains to be rather “under-theorized” concept compared to securitization. Aside from the critique of being undertheorized, Hansen also argues that the concept is not consistently

empirically applied (Hansen, 2012, p. 526). The following table illustrates the published work on securitization and desecuritization internationally.

Table 1: Number of published works in the literature on securitization and desecuritization internationally between 1997-2023

Subject	Article	Book Chapter	Review	Book	Editorial	Conference Paper	Other	Total
Securitization	2961	804	220	152	42	40	48	4267
Desecuritization	92	22	4	5	0	0	2	125

Note: The data in the table is retrieved from the Scopus database. The subject areas in the search are limited to Social Sciences and Arts and Humanities. It covers publications in all languages. Search criteria: article title/abstract/keywords include 'securitization' and article title/abstract/keywords includes 'desecuritization'. 'Other' in the document types include note, erratum, letter, retracted and short survey.

As shown in the table above, there is a significant difference between the number of scholarly works on securitization and desecuritization which indicate that desecuritization is also under-utilized in security studies. This thesis seeks to understand how desecuritization is studied in the literature theoretically and empirically and aims to provide an overview of the literature on desecuritization.

1.3. Methodology

This thesis represents a meta-study of desecuritization literature. Shanyang Zhao defines meta-study as "studies about (or of) other studies" (Zhao, 1991, p. 377). According to Zhao's definition, meta-study "not only synthesize the results of the previous studies but also to reflect upon the processes involved in previous studies in terms of "where we are and where we are going" (Fuhrman and Snizek, 1990, as cited in Zhao, 1991, p. 378). Meta-

studies examine different elements of the discipline to understand and advance the discipline instead of conducting a particular project. (Zhao, 1991, p. 379). According to Zhao (1991), there are different factors that deem meta-study particularly important. One involves a fundamental change in the subject matter, which changes the direction of the discipline, while the second involves a failure of a discipline to progress (Zhao, 1991, p. 381). Securitization theory and the study of desecuritization are still progressing with the empirical work. However, the literature lacks a comprehensive study that compiles the securitization theory from its emergence until its recent developments. By looking at both theoretical and empirical studies, this study aims to analyze how desecuritization works, how it is studied in the literature, and what we learn from it.

Meta-study and research synthesis are mostly seen as intertwined methodological concepts in the literature. As Sandelowski & Barroso argues, “meta-studies can be targeted toward the study of findings (meta-data analysis), methods (metamethod), and theories (metatheory) in a designated body of research… they constitute a critical/discursive engagement with them” (Sandelowski & Barroso, 2007, p. 21).

The thesis will utilize research synthesis. Research synthesis can be defined as a scholarly work to summarize and integrate past research in a specific field and to present the existing body of knowledge with the aim of guiding future research (Cooper, 1998, p. 3). Scholars also argue that the “common purpose of a research synthesis study is to sum up the knowledge generated in an area in order to draw conclusions directly relevant to practice or chart directions for future research” (Sandelowski & Barroso, 2007, p. 21).

The thesis discusses the framework of the Copenhagen School and discusses the securitization theory framework as presented by Ole Waever. Since this is a meta-study that aims to examine the existing literature (both theoretical and empirical) on securitization theory and analyze how desecuritization is studied, the focus of the selected studies is primarily on the Copenhagen School scholars and their work on securitization theory. Beginning with the Ole Waever's initial publications on securitization theory I select the theoretical and empirical work that remains in the Copenhagen School framework. I also look at the work of critiques both within and outside the Copenhagen School to understand the limitations of the theory that are addressed in the literature.

1.4. The plan of the thesis

The thesis consists of six chapters. The second chapter engages with the existing theoretical work on desecuritization. It examines the theorization of the Copenhagen School in which the securitization theory originated and developed. The chapter discusses securitization theory, how it originated and developed within the Copenhagen School, and discusses its main components and concepts. The theoretical discussion here provides the framework for the empirical studies discussed in Chapters Three and Four.

The third and fourth chapters focus on the other empirical work on desecuritization, which is analyzed under two categories. The first category looks at the applications of successful desecuritization which is discussed in Chapter 3. The second category comprises the cases of desecuritization

failures. The cases of desecuritization failure are discussed in Chapter 4. These cases of success and failure helps identifying the strategies and the context in which desecuritization succeed or fail. It also facilitates to identify the patterns in the study.

The fifth chapter focuses on critiques and elaborations of the securitization theory. By looking at different critiques, contributions, and elaborations of scholars from both within and outside the Copenhagen School, this chapter provides a broader understanding of the literature in answering how is desecuritization studied in the literature. It also helps identifying the limitations of the securitization theory. The last chapter concludes all of the analyses in the previous chapters and identify how desecuritization is studied within the Security Studies literature, what is lacking in the overall study of desecuritization, how desecuritization works in different parts of the world, and what we learn from it. Since this is a meta-study the thesis is structured to first identify the context in which the theory emerged and developed and explain the theory with its frameworks and premises. Second, it identifies and analyses the empirical studies according to the Copenhagen School framework. Later it broadens to focus to locate the patterns, limitations and underemphasized concepts or topics. Lastly it analyzes the overall findings from the empirical studies as well as the theoretical discussions.

CHAPTER 2 –

SECURITIZATION THEORY

This chapter discusses the theory of securitization within the framework of the Copenhagen School. It explains the securitization theory framework and how it was theorized within security studies. After discussing this new way of understanding security and securitization, it will later move on to talk about desecuritization, its formulation, forms, strategies, and its role within securitization theory. For the scope of this thesis, this chapter will only focus on the Copenhagen School and its theorization of securitization to analyze how it is studied and evolved. The limitations, elaborations, and critique of the theory will be discussed in Chapter 5.

2.1. Securitization theory framework

Securitization theory was developed in the 1990s to provide a new understanding of security and present a different approach and a new way to study security. It is first put forth in Ole Waever's book chapter named "Securitization and Desecuritization" (1995). In this work, Waever (1995) does not only set the framework of securitization theory but also raises discontent with the traditional security understandings for approaching security to have uncontested core meanings determined and measured in terms of threat and

fear. Waever (1995) calls for an alternative way to understand and address security by first fully understanding the concept of 'security' itself.

Ole Waever's critique of established ways of thinking about security has two main points. The first and starting point of the theory is thinking of security as "a reality prior to language" (Waever, 1995, p. 46). The second point is to argue for the expansion of security to encompass many more issues than it already does. Waever argues that "with this approach, one accepts the core meaning of security as uncontested, pushing instead in the direction of securitizing still larger areas of social life" (Waever, 1995, p. 47). Widening the concept of security in different axis has different implications. It is important to note that while Waever (1995) introduces an alternative perspective and a broader way to *study* security, he does not call for a widened security agenda. On the contrary, Waever argues that widening the use of security can be problematic since everything can be included in the security agenda (Waever, 1995).

For Waever (1995), the expanding the security agenda to encompass any issue would eventually empty security out of its content. Waever states that "widening along the referent object axis, that is, saying that "security is not only military defense of the state, it is also x and y and z"— has the unfortunate effect of expanding security realm endlessly until it encompasses the whole social and political agenda" (Waever, 1995, p. 48). Here, Waever elaborates on this by turning to Johan Galtung and Jan Øberg's alternative concepts of security related to human needs. They have identified four sets of positive goals: survival, development, freedom, and identity, and developed their alternative

concept to create a holistic defense policy for each category (Waever, 1995, p. 48). Øberg and Galtung's approach was based on the individual level, which potentially could lead to everything becoming a security problem. Even though Waever (1995) finds the approach legitimate, he criticizes Galtung/Øberg approach to be an "innocent contributor to the reproduction – and even expansion – of securitization" (p. 48). According to Waever (1995), this individual-level approach made the concept of security all-inclusive and is emptied of content (p. 47).

Since security implicitly refers to an existential threat that needs to be addressed, it qualifies various powers to the subject that it has been assigned. A wider concept of security which includes threats other than military threats would provide "urgency, state power claiming the legitimate use of extraordinary means; a threat seen as potentially undercutting sovereignty, thereby preventing the political 'we' from dealing any other questions" (Waever, 1995, p. 51). A security problem would then become something that can undermine political processes in exchange for an urgent response to an existential threat.

Waever (1995) argues that "in naming a certain development a security problem, the "state" can claim a special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites" (p. 54). This would then lead to securitization being an instrument for power holders to gain control of an issue. In a later work, Buzan et al. argue that "the invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally, it has opened the way for the state to mobilize or to take special powers to handle existential threats" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 21). The consequences of naming an issue as a security

issue would then allow blocking of the political processes. In a later work, Buzan et. al (1998) defined security as “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (p. 23). Accordingly, securitization refers to the process where an issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23–24).

Following this critique, Waever provides a different take on security and regards it as a “speech act”(Waever, 1995, p. 55). Regarding security as a speech act takes challenges the conception that security has an uncontested meaning. Security as a speech act essentially argues that security does not exist independent of our utterance. Being or saying something is secure still implies that there is a security problem. Uttering something as a security issue, regardless of its existence, provides the issue to claim “a special right to use whatever means necessary to block it” (Waever, 1995, p. 55). Waever (1995) explains this by arguing “security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act. By saying it, something is done” (p. 55). As Waever (1995) argues, “security and insecurity do not constitute a binary opposition. Security signifies a situation marked by the presence of a security problem and some measures taken in response. Insecurity is a situation with a security problem and no response” (Waever, 1995, p. 57).

Waever’s (1995) book chapter “Securitization and Desecuritization” has set the foundation of the securitization theory. In a later collaborative work,

Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998) (*Security* hereinafter), Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde developed the securitization framework and provided a method for understanding the securitization processes. In *Security*, they discuss the elements, processes, and conditions of securitization.

The speech act definition of security has its roots in the language theory (Waever, 1995). Since security becomes what we make of it, it is almost impossible to apply objective standards for securityness (Buzan et al., 1998). However, there are conditions under which a speech act can be successful. Buzan et al. (1998) define a successful speech act as "a combination of language and society, of both intrinsic features of speech and group that authorizes and recognizes that speech" (p. 32). The most important internal feature of the speech act is that it follows the grammar of security which indicates security form and stress the existential threat with the potential solutions. Buzan et al. (1998) define the facilitating conditions of speech act as follows:

> (1) the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security, (2) the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor- that is, the relationship between speaker and audience, thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt, and (3) features of alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization. (p. 33)

Thus, for a securitizing move to be successful, the audience needs to accept the security speech act by the securitizing actor. Referent objects can be defined as "things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 36). Securitizing actor, on the other

hand, is “actors who securitize issues by declaring something - a referent object- existentially threatened” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 36). Here, the position of the securitizing actor is crucial. Since the speech act is done by the securitizing actor, it should have social capital and be in a position of authority (Buzan et al., 1998).

Securitization can be defined as an extreme form of politicization that either frame the issue in hand to be addressed through a special kind of politics or above politics. Thus, any securitization always rests on a political choice. Security can never be based on the objective reference that something is in and of itself a security problem (Buzan & Wæver, 1997, p. 246). In relation to this argument, the particular character of the referent object is equally important in understanding the existential threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 21). Buzan et al. (1998) note that “in many cases, the securitizing actors will be different from the referent object, but in others – most notably the state- the referent object will, in a sense, speak for itself through its authorized representatives” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 42). They also point out that even states can fail in their securitizing moves, as the example of Britain over the Suez, the United States in Vietnam, and the European regimes in the 1980s (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 42).

Buzan and Waever’s (2009) later work addressed several gaps in the initial theorization. Scholars developed macrosecuritization as a concept in this work, referring to it as “higher order securitizations,” which constitutes larger scales of collectivities with interlinked securitizations (Buzan & Wæver, 2009, p. 256). Securitization, in its initial conceptualization, referred to middle-level referents of states. Macrosecuritization, however, refers to “universal religions or

political ideologies…which aim to incorporate and coordinate multiple lower-level securitizations" (Buzan & Wæver, 2009, p. 257). By definition, macrosecuritization is not different than securitization. The difference between securitization and macrosecuritization is its scale. While securitization affects mainstream collectivities like states and nations, macrosecuritization refers to a larger order of securitization, which constitutes middle-level securitizations (Buzan & Wæver, 2009, p. 257).

Buzan and Waever (2009) provide Cold War as an example of macrosecuritization. Cold War, an overarching conflict that structured international security, constituted a "higher order of securitizations…to incorporate, align and rank the more parochial securitizations beneath it" (Buzan & Wæver, 2009, p. 253). The struggles between different states were not perceived as an individual interstate struggle but were marked by an overarching struggle between East and West. To understand these dynamics, Buzan and Weaver (2009) used 'security constellations,' which was marked previously in their framework book. Security constellations are a "wider concept than security complexes, reflecting as it does the totality of possible interrelationships at all levels" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 201). They suggest that "larger patterns exist in overall structures of securitization" (Buzan & Wæver, 2009, p. 256). Just as securitization, macrosecuritizations have the same three components: "identification of an existential threat to a valued referent object and the call for extraordinary measures" (Buzan & Wæver, 2009, p. 257). However, they constitute a much more complicated structure because they embed different levels of securitization, which interact differently with each other.

Here, Buzan and Waever (2009) point out the US example of the Global War on Terror (GWoT), which they projected as macrosecuritization. However, this attempt was not successful because the existential threat was not sufficiently presented to others. To elaborate more, “others come to think that the GWoT is more to do with particular US goals and interests in the Middle East rather than with some higher concern about a threat to Western civilization” (Buzan & Wæver, 2009, p. 258).

By introducing a new concept, macrosecuritization, Buzan and Wæver (2009) aim to present a wider attempt of securitization in a different level. Opening up the space between middle-level securitizations, they argue, would “expose new ways of thinking about security” (Buzan and Wæver 2009, p. 256). Even though the middle-level formulation is an essential part of the theory, it is not enough to capture the overlapping security concerns and threats. Buzan and Wæver bring forward security constellations that “link across all levels and sectors in which securitizations occur” (Buzan and Wæver 2009, p. 256). Security constellations are essentially useful tools to see concurrent securitizations and avoid a picture of isolated instances of securitization. Macrosecuritizations, according to Buzan and Wæver’s conceptualization, “are on a larger scale than the mainstream collectivities at the middle level (states, nations), and seek to package together securitizations form that level into a higher and larger order” (Buzan and Wæver 2009, p. 257). According to this, macrosecuritizations are defined as other securitizations with a more complicated process than ordinary forms of securitizations. Throughout the

article, Buzan and Wæver (2009) seek to expand the theory with the purpose of adding an enlarged dimension to the relationship between the core concepts of security. Buzan and Wæver (2009) also discuss macrodesecuritization and provide the end of the Cold War as a massive act of macrodesecuritization, which ended two defining features of the Cold War: ideological bipolarization and bipolar power structure.

2.2. Desecuritization

Theorized together with securitization, desecuritization is the process of "shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 4). Security usually is thought of in terms of a positive value which generates an inclination for more security. However, Buzan et al. warn that "security should not be thought of too easily as always a good thing" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 4). Since securitization halts the political discussion, it may lead to other unwanted consequences. For that, desecuritization is argued to be more effective than securitizing problems (Wæver, 1995, p. 57). Waever (1995) originally explained desecuritization by differentiating security and insecurity. According to Waever, "*security* and *insecurity* do not constitute a binary opposition" (Waever, 1995, p. 56). Security refers to an existing security problem and specific measures taken to respond to that problem. However, insecurity is a security problem with no specific measures taken in response. Here, Waever states that "when there is no security problem, we do not conceptualize our situation in terms of security; instead, security is simply an irrelevant concern" (Waever, 1995, p. 56). Both

insecurity and security share the same security problematic. However, when we live in complete security, we do not define it in terms of security. Thus, the process of desecuritization first starts by not talking about issues in terms of security. Waever explains this by arguing “transcending a security problem by politicizing it cannot happen *through* thematization in security terms, only *away* from such terms” (Waever, 1995, p. 56).

Ole Waever (1995) presents the détente period as an example of desecuritization. Waever calls détente as “negotiated desecuritization and limitation of the use of security speech act, contributed to the modification of the Eastern societies and systems that eventually made possible, via sudden desecuritization through a speech act failure” (Waever, 1995, p. 60). What worked in the European détente was what Waever called “logic of change through stabilization” (Waever, 1995, p. 59). Since it was no longer plausible for states to use military power when threatened -due to nuclear condition- “change seemed impossible without some consent by the power holders; it had to take place through a negotiated process of pressure and acceptance, stabilization and destabilization” (Waever, 1995, p. 59). In line with this logic, the desecuritization process in détente period can also be defined as “a progressive marginalization of mutual security concerns in favor of other issues” (Wæver, 1998, p. 69). In the example of détente, desecuritization occurred “by turning threats into challenges and security into politics, the détente-oriented actors of the West tried to get elites in the East to avoid applying the term “security” into issues and to open up domestic space for more open political struggle” (Waever,

1995, p. 60). Here, the emphasis is on the elites because mostly elites are the securitizing actors. As Waever argues, “to explain change we must look within elites, the ways in which the question of legitimacy among elites translated into the capacity to act” (Waever, 1995, p. 60).

The theory presents desecuritization as “the optimal long-range option” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 4). The preference for desecuritization comes from the perspective that “politics should be able to unfold according to normal procedures without this extraordinary elevation of specific “threats” to a pre-political immediacy” (Waever, 2012, p. 53). Waever later explain this by arguing “desecuritization is not always better than securitization” (Wæver, 2011, p. 469). This preference for desecuritization mainly relies on the negative effects of the extraordinary measures caused by securitization (urgency, power, and legitimacy) rather than a political stance (Wæver, 2011). Waever notes that securitization also “allows for the possibility that securitization might help society deal with important challenges through focusing and mobilizing attention and resources” (Wæver, 2011, p. 469). Bilgin (2009) discusses that particular choices of securitization and desecuritization may also be a way of states for positioning themselves in a certain identity. In explaining this through Turkey’s foreign policy, Bilgin argues that in/security and identity has a constitutive relationship (Bilgin, 2009, p. 108).

In the earlier versions of the theory, desecuritization is laid out as always, the better option than securitization. Wæver (2011), in his later work “Politics, security, theory” points out that the theory has a ‘bias’ for desecuritization and

desecuritization is not always better than securitization (p. 469). Wæver (2011) recognizes that desecuritization is still preferable in the abstract, but he also notes that concrete situations might call for securitization. He argues, “a vote for desecuritization comes directly from the theory since key causal mechanisms emphasize the unavoidable negative effects of securitization, but the analytical set-up allows empirical analysis of the possible advantages of handling a particular challenge within the format of both security and non-security” (Wæver, 2011, p. 469). According to this view, desecuritization essentially highlights the cost of securitization while keeping the possibility that securitization might help society to deal with important challenges through securitization.

It is important to note that Wæver (2011) does not denounce desecuritization by saying it is a concept just to highlight the cost of securitization. Instead, Wæver (2011) intends to point out that the theory does not claim that desecuritization is “always” the best but rather would be a better option when there is room for things to be addressed via normal politics.

In his 1995 article, Waever lays out three ways of desecuritization. Later, scholars have developed possible strategies and approaches to desecuritization, which will be discussed in the coming chapters. As previously discussed in the chapter, Waever (2000) has outlined three options for desecuritization: “(1) simply not to talk about issues in terms of security, (2) to keep responses to securitized issues in forms that do not create security dilemmas or other vicious spirals, and (3) to move security issues back into normal politics” (Waever, 2000, p. 253).

As explained in the previous section, détente was one of the examples in which we can apply Waever's (2000) options for securitization. Détente was referred to as "negotiated desecuritization," in which issues were not framed in terms of security. The case of Western Europe was identified as "change through stabilization" (Waever, 1995, p. 59). In line with Waever's (1995) formulation, responses to already securitized in the détente period were responded to without creating security dilemmas.

The concept of asecurity came at the later stages in the development of securitization theory. Ole Waever's book chapter in *Security Communities* develops the concept of asecurity, which was not put forward in his previous work. Waever's (1998) chapter traces Western Europe in its transition from insecurity (the 1940s and 1950s) to over-security (1960s) to desecuritization (1970s to the mid-1980s) and to re-securitization in the 1990s (p. 69). Here, Waever identifies Western Europe as a security community that was achieved through desecuritization. As opposed to many arguments in the literature, this has not been achieved through common security institutions or structures, but it is achieved through a process of desecuritization (Wæver, 1998, p. 69). Asecurity essentially refers to a later stage of desecuritization where an issue is desecuritized, so much so that it is not thought of or spoken of in terms of security anymore. An important aspect of asecurity is the complete withdrawal from security speak. Contrary to desecuritization, where there is an issue that was once framed as a security issue that is now moved out of the security realm, asecurity refers to complete abstinence of a security language, security framing of the issue, or anything security related. As Waever (1998) states, "if

the situation is taken out of the realm of security conceptualization, the situation may inelegantly be described as one of a-security" (p. 81). According to Waever (1998), this can be done in two ways. Asecurity can either happen in a continuum or through very successful desecuritization.

Waever provides Scandinavia as the standard example of an "uncontested security community" (Wæver, 1998, p. 72). Security communities are usually defined by non-war in the literature (Wæver, 1998, p. 69). Waever (1998) points out that this may be problematic. When we look at the Scandinavian case, we see that "it emerged against a historical record of incessant and often ferocious warfare" (Wæver, 1998, p. 72). Since Scandinavian history is marked by wars, the conception that security communities are marked by non-war only can be misleading. "As illustrated by the Nordic case, we should not decide a priori that a security community is closely linked to either formal institutions or self-conscious security efforts" (Wæver, 1998, p. 76). Waever (1998) argues that "Scandinavia is probably a case of unintended peace" (Wæver, 1998, p. 76). All of the structures that they have created were inspired by other intentions rather than creating a security community. In fact, creating a security community was a side effect in the Nordic case. As Waever (1998) argues, "the security community was not intentional, not formulated as a security project, but emerged inadvertently" (p.73). Scandinavia is an example of the state of asecurity taking place in a continuum.

The example of Scandinavia is Waever's (1998) starting point for this argument on Western Europe. Although the Scandinavian state of asecurity was the consequence of an unintended peace, it provides essential insights. Waever

(1998) argues that “since a security community is defined by the *impossibility of imagining* violence, it is at least likely to be built on a-security as on security because, in the case of security, one imagines the violence but also believes one has a countermeasure” (p.81). The desecuritization process in Europe started in the 1960s and took important turns with the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis. These events have provided the insight that military-oriented responses to issues were no longer plausible. “Change had to be a negotiated process of acceptance, stabilization, and destabilization, crystallizing in debates over degrees and forms of détente” (Wæver, 1998, p. 85). These negotiated processes are accompanied by the process of integration which led
“The European states amongst themselves moved towards a state of asecurity, where the very question of what kind of security arrangement one relied on became absurd” (Wæver, 1998, p.86).

Asecurity can be thought of as the later stage of desecuritization, where security seems invisible. In desecuritization, there are issues that are responded to within the realm of normal politics rather than addressing them in a threat-defense sequence. With asecurity, security is an irrelevant concern.

2.3. Conclusion

This chapter focused on security and laid out the framework of securitization theory. Starting from its original formulation, it traced the development of the theory within the framework of the Copenhagen School.

The development of the securitization theory has been one of the radical shifts in security studies. The theory proposed a new framework for understanding and thinking about security and provided a new framework of analysis. Securitization theory essentially points out that there are no pregiven natural security threats out there waiting to be addressed. Rather security problems are constructed as a result of a political decision made by the securitizing actors and relevant audience who accept the securitizing move. Once an issue is successfully securitized, it is out of the realm of normal politics, it gains urgency, and therefore, extraordinary measures are justified in order to address the security threat. Desecuritization, the opposite process of securitization, refers to moving securitized issue back into normal politics.

Waever refer to desecuritization as “the optimal long-range option” (Waever, 2012, p. 53). In some cases, desecuritization preferable to securitization because it does not shut down political debate and is addressed within the normal political rules. Scholars have developed different forms and strategies for desecuritization over the years and applied these forms and strategies to empirical cases to understand how and in which settings desecuritization works. The literature has studied mostly securitization which was one of the main critique of the securitization literature (Aradau, 2004, p. 388; Hansen, 2012). As shown in the previous chapter, desecuritization studies are relatively few. The following two chapters provide an overview of those studies.

CHAPTER 3 –

CASES OF SUCCESSFUL DESECURITIZATION

This chapter focuses on cases of desecuritization success and how they are studied in the literature. First it defines the scope of desecuritization 'success' in the Copenhagen School framework. Then it illustrates Ole Waever's examples that are discussed in the framework article. Later it moves on to the other empirical examples in the literature that fit into the Copenhagen School securitization framework. The cases presented in this chapter are discussed in accordance with their respective publication dates.

3.1. How to define desecuritization success

Securitization success requires a securitizing actor making a securitizing move to be accepted by a relevant audience. Influenced by the theories of speech act, Waever argues that the successful security speech act has 'felicity conditions' in which are (Waever, 2000, p. 252):

> (a) the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security and constructing a plot with existential threat, point of no return and a possible way out; (b) the social capital of the enunciator, the securitizing actor, who has to be in a position of authority, although this should be neither defined as official authority nor taken to guarantee success with the speech act and (c) conditions historically associated with a threat

Satisfaction of these felicity conditions is necessary for a successful speech act but not sufficient for a successful securitization. For the opposite end of the

continuum, desecuritization, the conditions for speech act transforms. For successful desecuritization, the speech act may be invisible in some cases.

According to Waever, (1995, 2000), a securitized issue can be desecuritized in three ways. The first one is to avoid talking about issues in terms of security. This would mean the absence of both a securitizing and a desecuritizing speech act. Since security is constructed through utterance, a desecuritizing speech act may risk reiterating the securitizing move. The second option is to keep responses to securitized issues in forms that do not create security dilemmas or other vicious spirals (Waever, 2000, p. 253). It is important to note that even though 'security dilemma' initially evokes the perception of a military threat, it may not always be the case. Here, Buzan et al. (1998) notes that the process securitization should not be locked in military enmity as a framework. Since the constructed threat may not always be military threat, it is important to keep economic, social and political responses into account. Even though the conception of existential threat is commonly linked to military threats and capabilities, Buzan et al. note that "desecuritization is possible even in the presence of separate military capabilities" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 51).

The third option that Waever presents for desecuritization is to move security issues back into normal politics (Waever, 2000, p. 253). The shift from the extraordinary measures to normal politics can be a complicated process. One complication can be related to the felicity condition for successful securitization that Waever discusses as shared history. According to Buzan et al. (1998), even if there is no objective ground for threat perception, the history

and memory of past conflict may obstruct the process of desecuritization. Providing the aggressions of Japan and Germany in WWII as an example, they argue, “as Japan and Germany have learned, such memories can obstruct the process of desecuritization even when well-established present political and military realities seem to pose no objective grounds for threat perception” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 60).

Even though the process of desecuritization may be impacted by many factors and conditions, the successful desecuritization results in the removal of the securitized issue from the emergency responses by not talking about them in terms of security. Desecuritization does not propose to avoid dealing with the issue. It propounds dealing with the issue outside of security framework and security responses.

3.2. Empirical examples of successful desecuritization

The empirical cases discussed in this section represent the cases of successful desecuritization. The cases are discussed in chronological order of publication dates and sub-sectioned according to their geographical locations.

3.3. Europe

The period between 1960 and 1990, which is marked by the period of change and détente in Europe, provided the framework for Ole Waever to develop the speech act interpretation of security. During this period the possibility of change in the Europe seemed to be in a deadlock. The nuclear condition made it easier for states to fence off the military threats from outside

while tight controlling regimes obstructed the change from within. As Waever argues, “change seemed impossible without some consent by the power-holders; it had to take place through a negotiated process of pressure and acceptance, stabilization and destabilization” (Waever, 1995, p. 59).

The détente period was the realization of this acceptance and stabilization. German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s *Ostpolitik* and *Deutschlandpolitik* during the period was based on “the logic of change through stabilization” which aimed “stabilizing the status quo in order to overcome status quo (Waever, 1995, p.59). The internal stability was not a problem in the West because of internal legitimacy whereas the East was attributed as weak in terms of legitimacy (Buzan, 1983, p. 96). Due to this asymmetry the West focused military threats as security concerns while the East had to broaden its security conception. As Waever also argued “the concept of security became highly militarized in the West, while in the East it was broadened to incorporate economic security and various types of interference in domestic affairs” (Waever, 1995, p. 59).

Waever identifies détente as “negotiated desecuritization and limitation of the use of the security speech act” (Waever, 1995, p. 60). The most noticeable effort during the period was the avoidance of applying security to issues. “By turning threats into challenges and security into politics, the détente-oriented actors of the West tried to get elites in the East to avoid applying the terms security to issues ad to open up domestic space for more open political struggle” (Waever, 1995, p. 60). This transformation in the response to the issues and the

period of détente, as Waever (1995) argues, contributed to the modification of the Eastern societies.

By transforming the relationship definitions between the states from a security order to non-security terms, desecuritization in this period produced a non-expectation of war (Wæver, 1998). In his later work Waever defines Western Europe as a security community that is created through the process of desecuritization which constitutes as one of the stark examples of successful desecuritization (Wæver, 1998, p. 69). Security communities are essentially non-war communities which later evolve to capture non-military aspects of security concerns as well. According to Waever (1998), by excluding military security fear and security action Western Europe has reached a solid basis.

3.4. Asia

Another empirical example of desecuritization success is discussed in Viatcheslav Morozov's (2004) article examining Russia in the Baltic Sea region and how national identity is desecuritized in the Russian political discourse to improve the relations with the Baltic states. Morozov (2004) traces the case by looking at the identity crisis caused by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin's leadership defined Russia as the successor state of Soviet Union. The Baltic states were characterized as the "embodiment of the 'false', anti-Russian Europe" due to resentments after the collapse of the Soviet Union and identity formation during the first years of the Russian Federation (Morozov, 2004, p. 318). Positioning the Baltic states as a

‘false’ Europe was a way for Russia to position itself in Europe as a ‘true’ European nation. This characterization caused the bilateral relations to be heavily strained between 1998-2000. The NATO membership for the three Baltic countries were seen as an existential threat to Russia. As Morozov states “Baltic states were a security threat for Russia in military terms (because of their intention to join NATO), but most importantly their existence was a challenge to Russian national identity as it had been formed by the end of the 1990s” (Morozov, 2004, p. 321). At the time the NATO expansion being seen as a threat by Russia. On top of that, the Russian identity constructed after the collapse of the Soviet Union was anchored to the past Russian state. As Morozov argue, “this re-anchoring of today’s Russian Federation in the 1000-year long history of the Russian state has alleviated the anxiety about Russia’s belonging to Europe and to the ‘civilized world’” (Morozov, 2004, p. 325).

The political discourse towards the Baltic states begin shifting in 2001 with the “desecuritization of relations between Russia and the group of states usually described as the West and accordingly between Russia and the Baltic states” (Morozov, 2004, p. 322). Morozov (2004) argues that the shift in the political discourse towards the Baltic states is an indication of a general socio-political transformation in Russia which he described as desecuritization of Russia’s national identity constructed against the West. He also notes that desecuritization of the national identity has not resulted in abandoning security as a discursive mode (Morozov, 2004, p. 325). After 9/11, with the shared enemy of terrorism with the West, the security discourse was refocused form

other referents than national identity. Even though the security discourse became more powerful after 9/11, it led Russia to desecuritize its national identity and place itself in the world where it is not threatened by the 'false' Europe. This shift and desecuritization has led Russia to mend its relationship with the Baltic countries.

One other empirical example of desecuritization success is demonstrated in Kristian Åtland's (2008) work that examine the Murmansk Initiative of Michael Gorbachev as an attempt to desecuritize the Arctic and ease the interstate relations in the region. Åtland (2008) shows that the initiatives represent two different strategies of desecuritization in one case: desecuritization through transformation and desecuritization through management. Murmansk Initiative, launched in 1987 by Mikhail Gorbachev, was presented as part of the *perestroika* (restructuring) efforts and was framed as an invitation to disarmament and East-West dialog in and on the Arctic (Åtland, 2008, p. 290).

Gorbachev in the late 1980s was seen to be the leader who started a "fundamental process of desecuritization which in less than a decade imploded not only the whole edifice of Cold War confrontation, but also the Soviet Union itself" (Buzan, 1999, p. 5). As part of this fundamental desecuritization process, the Murmansk Initiative played a vital role in redefining not only security policies but also economic and environmental policies of the Soviet Union. Åtland notes that "Gorbachev's Murmansk initiative has many interesting features that may shed light on the mechanisms of desecuritization as well as

on the possibilities and limitations of ‘speech acts’ in security policy-making” (Åtland, 2008, p. 290). Murmansk Initiative, was region specific and was targeted at one of the most heavily militarized part of the world, the Euro-Arctic region (Åtland, 2008). It was also an example of rearticulation which aims to move an issue outside of national security agenda to the realm of ‘normal’ politics.

Desecuritization process started with Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk calling for lowering of military confrontation and the Arctic becoming the zone of peace. By analyzing Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk, Åtland finds that “of eight initiatives listed in the speech three were related to the military sector whereas five were related to non-military sectors” (Åtland, 2008, p. 294). The initiatives related to the military sector largely evolved around restricting the military activity, call for a nuclear weapons-free zone and confidence building measures. The non-military sector initiatives were on resource extraction, scientific exploration, indigenous peoples, environmental protection and marine transportation (Åtland, 2008, p. 300). Gorbachev clearly stated that cooperation on these non-military issues would not threaten the national security which demonstrated desecuritization through transformation. The desecuritization attempts in these sectors has also created spillover effect. “Desecuritization in the non-military (societal, economic, environmental) sectors was, in other words, an important means by which to achieve desecuritization in the military sector” (Åtland, 2008, p. 290). As for the military sector, the arms control proposals and measures were example of desecuritization through management.

Another empirical case is Sung-han Kim and Geun-Lee's (2011) work which focuses on the desecuritization process of the North Korean threat in South Korea. According to Kim and Lee (2011), desecuritization in the case of Korea occurred in three stages. The first stage started with President Kim's attempt to desecuritize North Korea by emphasizing cooperation and reconciliation in his inaugural speech (Kim & Lee, 2011, p. 39). In emphasizing cooperation and reconciliation, President Kim began to "use words like 'constructive engagement policy'" instead of using "unification" in government policy (Kim & Lee, 2011, p. 39). President Kim removed the security language from the government by initiating tourist visits and engaging in economic initiatives to ease inter-Korean relations. The coalitions within South Korea had conflicting opinions on desecuritization of North Korean threats. While the progressive government of President Kim continuously stated that they do not perceive North Korea as a threat, the conservative coalition saw North Korea as continuing existential threat. Kim and Lee argues that the process of desecuritization "was highly 'politicized' process that involved fierce competition between different political coalitions, including the United States" (Kim & Lee, 2011, p. 51).

The competition between two parties prolonged the desecuritization period since conservative coalition was against the desecuritization of North Korean threat. Moreover, as Kim and Lee (2011) stress that North Korea did not always reciprocate these attempts to desecuritize. The process took place over the course of two years starting with the inaugural speech in 1998 to the inter-Korean summit which was the result of continuous desecuritization

attempts. In the summit mutual agreements were made on non-war and no attempts of forced unification. Even though this summit can show the desecuritization success, Kim and Lee (2011) argue that the process of desecuritization was completed with the election of another round of progressive coalition because the re-election showed that public opinion towards North Korea was also desecuritized.

Another empirical case from Russia is examined by Aglaya Snetkov (2017) who focused on Russia's attempt to desecuritize the insurgency threat. In his longitudinal study Snetkov (2017) analyzed the process of desecuritization of the Chechen insurgency over the course of 2000s. He states that desecuritization was framed by the articulation of three different spatially bounded referent objects: Chechnya, the North Caucasus and Russia (Snetkov, 2017, p. 270). The attempts of desecuritizing the insurgency threat unfold concurrently in different levels: local, sub-federal and national.

Starting with the local level, Chechnya which was seen as the epicenter of terrorism by the late 1990s in Russia. Various clashes between Russian and Chechen troops, explosions in military barracks and the apartment bombings in big cities in September 1999 was blamed on Chechen terrorists (Snetkov, 2017, p. 265). As a result of these events, Chechnya was securitized and presented as a threat to Russia and its neighboring countries. As a response, large-scale military operations were conducted between 1999-2000. After 2000, Russia initiated the normalization processes by rearticulating the threat posed by Chechnya. Instead of securitizing Chechnya as a whole, Russian officials only began to securitize insurgencies within Chechnya and started to

normalize political relations. After mid 2000s, “Chechnya had now been rearticulated within official discourse from being represented as a failing entity to a successfully rehabilitated space” (Snetkov, 2017, p. 266).

In the sub-federal level, securitization of Chechnya affected the North Caucasus region as posing a threat to the countries in the region. The invasion of Dagestan in 1999 by the Chechen, Arab and Dagestani fighters and their proclamation to create an independent Islamic State of Dagestan depicted as a regional threat (Snetkov, 2017). Before the normalization processes, the region was seen a victim to the insurgency threat originated from Chechnya. During the normalization process the North Caucasus were moved away from being a victim and shown increasingly as the source of the same insurgency threat “as the Russian authorities sought to explain the increased terrorist and insurgent activity across the North Caucasus, while simultaneously emphasizing the success of their normalization policy in Chechnya” (Snetkov, 2017, p. 267). This was also an example of rearticulation at the sub-federal level.

At the national level desecuritization process began with silencing then was rearticulated. Chechen insurgency was seen as an existential threat to Russia together with other domestic threats across the political, economic and military sectors. “In this way, in 1999/2000 the threat from Chechnya became a symbol of Russia’s weakness and fears about a possible state/national collapse” (Snetkov, 2017, p. 268). Since the insurgency threat was seen existential, the symbolic image of Russia as a political entity in a perilous state was silenced and replaced by other political, social and economic developments in Russia

(Snetkov, 2017). After mid 2000s, with the attempt to desecuritize Chechnya, Chechnya was rearticulated as “symbolic of the rehabilitation of the Russian Federation under Putin” (Snetkov, 2017, p. 269). The developments in Chechnya were presented as the success of the Russian Federation to rebuild a string Russia. The Chechen insurgency threat was rearticulated and deemed no longer existential for the federation.

Sebastian Biba’s (2014) study of China in desecuritizing transboundary rivers examines three different case studies from different regions: the Mekong River in Southeast Asia, the Brahmaputra River in South Asia and the Irtysh and Ili Rivers in Central Asia. Biba (2014) points out that Copenhagen School desecuritization addresses the shortcomings of realist approaches to the understanding of China’s current international hydro-politics. China is the center of the “regional water games” for having the source of major transboundary rivers in the region (Biba, 2014, p. 21). China’s water policies constitute great importance for its neighboring countries to receive sufficient water from the basins. The climate change also effected these transboundary rivers and their basins which are the shared water sources for various countries.

China’s need to desecuritize the transboundary rivers stemmed from two interrelated factors: worsening of the domestic water crisis and the need for a stable periphery to maintain economic growth and social stability (Biba, 2014, p. 30). To ensure the continuity of domestic stability and economic growth China has implemented various desecuritization strategies in different regions to prevent water tensions that might potentially be harmful (Biba, 2014, p. 30).

Biba's (2014) article illustrates that even though a total desecuritization effort is visible, it has not been equal across cases. To illustrate, China's attempts to desecuritize the Mekong River in the Southeast Asia were mainly discursive and put emphasis on sincerity, mutual trust, common development and prosperity while they initiate joint projects with Kazakhstan for Irtysh and Ili Rivers to improve irrigation. For South Asia, mainly with India, China has pursued a different strategy based on interaction which consisted data-sharing and joint emergency management. The difference of the strategies stemmed from China's intention to maximize its own potential energy and clean water resources. However, the response from the concerning parties has also shaped China's desecuritization behavior. As Biba (2014) notes, "India is far more a far more powerful and ambitious country than Mekong downstream countries…this has made it much more difficult for Beijing to solely steer the discourse on bilateral water issues…China has found it necessary to attend to India's concerns as they arise" (Biba, 2014, p. 37). These different cases demonstrate how securitized issues can be desecuritized by addressing them as challenges instead of security problems. In addition to that, different strategies of desecuritization works depending on the context and responses of the particular countries.

Juha Vuori (2018) also works on China and desecuritization attempts that have occurred in Chinese context. Vuori (2018) examines Chinese desecuritization tactics at the international level and looks at "how desecuritization has been used in China in to pre-empt or contest moves

towards presenting its post-Cold war rise as a threat" (Vuori, 2018, p. 119). According to Vuori (2018), China provides desecuritization studies with an empirical case of desecuritization that is engaged in actively, and in order to maintain a non-securitized state of affairs among major powers.

During the Cold War China "became a force multiplier for the macro-moves of the superpowers" (Vuori, 2018, p. 123). The tensions with USSR were still prominent but started to ease starting from 1980. Even though the relations were mended desecuritization in the form of rearticulation only took place after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Vuori, 2018). Vuori (2018) argues that moves towards rearticulating from both sides started with USSR's acknowledgment of China as a socialist state and its promise not to threaten China. China, in return "no longer demanded a common front against the soviet hegemony" (Vuori, 2018, p. 125). After the end of the Cold War China and Russia formed a strategic partnership and shared common threat package consisting terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. According to Vuori, "we can see a rearticulative desecuritization tactic at play on both sides: ever since the early 1980s, China's policy towards the Soviet Union (and later Russia) shifted from antagonism to one of collaboration and negotiation rather than reciprocal securitization" (Vuori, 2018, p. 125).

With the end of the Cold War, China's rise in the international politics has fueled 'China threat theory' in the US which predicts China's economic and military strengthening to be a challenge to the international order. China has reacted to this threat theory by actively publishing rebuttal articles. Vuori (2018)

argues these articles to be viewed as an interactive desecuritization discourse that targets securitization moves that deem China as a threat. China repeatedly put emphasis on multilateral diplomacy and the political leadership directly expressed that China will not threaten any other nation. Vuori (2018) shows that desecuritization as rearticulation has been one of the ways in which China maintains its consistent behavior towards other major powers. The active successful desecuritization allows China to maintain a non-securitized state of affairs among major powers.

3.5. Conclusion

The cases discussed in this chapter demonstrate the cases of successful desecuritization in the literature. Successful desecuritization requires securitized issues to be addressed as challenges instead of security problems that requires extraordinary measures. This can be done either by declaring the problem to be no longer a security issue or by not simply talking about them in terms of security. The following table illustrates the cases discussed in this chapters and shows the options that they have utilized in desecuritizing the issue.

Table 2: Cases of desecuritization success

Case	Security Issue	Desecuritizing Actor(s)	Audience	How to desecuritize			Success/ Failure
				Not to talk about issues in terms of security	Avoid responses that could create security dilemmas or other vicious spirals	Move issues back to normal politics	
Détente (Waever, 1995)	Expectation of war and instability	Western-Eastern Europe	Western-Eastern Europe	✓	✓	✓	Success
Russia in Baltic Sea (Morozov, 2004)	Baltic states and NATO expansion, Russian identity being threatened	Russian government	Baltic states	✓	✓	✓	Success
Murmansk Initiative (Åtland, 2008)	Militarization in the Arctic	Gorbachev	Western states present in the Arctic	✓	✓	✓	Success
South Korea (Kim and Lee, 2011)	North Korean threat in South Korea	Progressive government led by President Kim	South Korean public	✓	✓	✓	Success
Insurgency in Russia (Snetkov, 2017)	Chechen insurgency in Russia	Russian government	National level: Russian public Sub-federal level: North Caucasian countries	x	✓	✓	Success
Transboundary rivers in China (Biba, 2014)	Domestic water crisis and economic growth and social stability	Chinese government	Indian government Kazakh government	✓	✓	✓	Success
China's place in international community (Vuori, 2018)	China being perceived as a threat by major powers 'China threat theory'	Chinese government	International community	✓	✓	✓	Success

The table indicates that the successful cases mostly utilize all of the three options together in a desecuritization process. Waever's (1995) primary example for desecuritization success is the détente period in Europe which later paved the way for Europe to transform into a security community. Successful desecuritization can also lead to asecurity which is a later stage of desecuritization where the issues are not even remembered in terms of security.

Other cases discussed in the chapter are also in line with Waever's (1995) framework for desecuritization success. The next chapter will focus on cases of desecuritization failures and the contexts in which these attempts have failed.

CHAPTER 4 –

CASES OF DESECURITIZATION FAILURE

This chapter focuses on cases of desecuritization failure and how they are studied in the literature. First it defines desecuritization failure according to the Copenhagen School framework. Then it moves on to discuss the empirical cases studied in the literature that are presented as desecuritization failure.

4.1. How to define desecuritization failure

Desecuritization failure can happen in various ways in various circumstances according to the context of the securitized issue (Buzan et al., 1998). As discussed in the previous chapter, successful desecuritization first requires not talking about issues in terms of security. Desecuritization failure can happen in three different ways. First is through a desecuritizing speech act failure. The failure to declare that “we no longer accept (X is an existential threat to Y)” or by not speaking about the issue at all (Vuori, 2011, p. 191). While the speech act failure might be visible in discourse in explicit statements it is possible to not talk about the securitized issues at all.

Desecuritization failure might also occur through the responses to the securitized issue. As Waever (2000) argued successful desecuritization requires keeping responses to securitized issues in forms that do not create security dilemmas. Desecuritization failure, therefore, can occur with responses that

trigger security dilemmas and/or create other vicious spirals. Based on this, in looking at the cases of desecuritization failure, we seek to find failed desecuritizing moves which can be military, diplomatic or societal which either results in further securitization or does not change the securitized dynamic. Lastly, desecuritization failure can occur by failure to move issues back to normal politics. To elaborate, a desecuritization attempt might fail because even though a verbal attempt to desecuritize is there, the responses to that issue are still being kept at an extraordinary level, above normal political discussion and responses.

4.2. Empirical examples of desecuritization failure

The empirical cases discussed in this section represent the cases of desecuritization failure. The cases are discussed in chronological order of publication dates and sub-sectioned according to their geographical locations.

4.3. Africa

The first empirical example from the literature is Megan MacKenzie's (2009) article which focuses on the desecuritization of combatants in post-conflict Sierra Leone. MacKenzie (2009) examines the post-conflict reconstruction process and how female and male combatants are treated in terms of reintegration. The reintegration program in post-conflict Sierra Leone revolved around disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). MacKenzie (2009) argues that the integration of female soldiers to DDR has been problematic due to "gendered assumptions, including the notion that

female soldiers are not a security concern in the same way as male soldiers" (MacKenzie, 2009, p. 243). Even though female soldiers took an active role within the conflict, the reintegration of female soldiers has been seen as a "return to normal" and has thereby been neglected as an important dimension of the transition process (MacKenzie, 2009, p. 253). On the other hand, demobilized male soldiers have been securitized and have received significant attention during the post-conflict reconstruction process in Sierra Leone. As a result, former male combatants have received considerably more attention in peace-building efforts and received funding through programs, while female soldiers have been relatively neglected.

Mac Kenzie (2009) argues that female soldiers in the post-conflict reconstruction process has faced desecuritization as a strategy of exclusion. The silencing of female soldiers is defined by MacKenzie (2018) as desecuritization, and her analysis shows that male combatants are securitized as they are linked to the securitization of the return of conflict. "in patriarchal societies, security threats that typically concern women do not make the cut for securitization because women and gender issues largely remain in the domestic sphere rather than the political, international, or security sphere" (MacKenzie, 2009, p. 260).

It is important to note that MacKenzie's (2009) work was criticized by some scholars for deflecting away from the CS framework of securitization and desecuritization. Even though MacKenzie provides the specific speech act of desecuritizing women as "back to normal", she argued that this desecuritization in effect de-emphasized women in post-conflict policy making. While arguing

securitization of male combatants in the post-conflict setting, MacKenzie (2009) associates securitization with emphasis and desecuritization, returning back to normal politics, as de-emphasis. In the CS framework this would be a case of failed desecuritization because it was not addressed through normal politics but simply not addressed at all.

4.4. Europe

Another empirical example from the literature is on minority populations in Denmark, Sweden and Canada. Kinnvall and Nesbit-Larking's (2010) work focuses on Muslim minority populations in Denmark, Sweden, and Canada and "discuss sociopsychological placemaking as a process of securitization among both majority and minority communities" (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2010, p. 1051). Placemaking is, as they define, "creating an area, a neighborhood, that visibly transforms the previous landscape into one that reflects the tastes and values of a certain community" (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2010, p. 1060). In the article, scholars demonstrate "how both structures and collective agency contribute to patterns of desecuritization" (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2010, p. 1052).

For each case the patterns of desecuritization are different with common will to desecuritize which is not successful yet. Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking (2010) studied this desecuritization attempt through responses to a specific incident, the publication of 'Mohammed cartoons' in a Danish newspaper. In this case, the desecuritization process was examined as desecuritization of religion

in Sweden, Denmark and Canada after the publication of the cartoons. All three countries have large proportions of Muslim minorities which predominantly formed as a result of migration. In that setting, three countries share the increasingly securitized attitudes towards migrant populations. The securitizing arguments were mainly revolving around the political freedom that they want to protect.

Even though the degree of securitization differed between the countries, all countries had a polarized view of the migrants. Compared to Sweden, the discourse in Denmark on migrants were more polarized and harsher. In 2005 several cartoons were published in a Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten depicting Prophet Mohammed. These publications sparked debate as the newspaper claimed that cartoons were part of self-critique and can be explained by freedom of expression. Some of the Muslim minority have protested against the cartoons because not only it depicted the Prophet but it depicted the Prophet with a bomb in his turban, associating Islam and the Prophet himself with terrorism. After the publication of the Mohammed cartoons groups within Danish Muslim minority has initiated talks and discussions with government officials to ease the tension and prevent further securitization. “The crisis was further aggravated by the decision on 19 October 2005 of then Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, not to meet with ambassadors from eleven Islamic countries to discuss the cartoons” (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2010, p. 1062). Both in Sweden and in Canada the cartoons were addressed carefully to avoid violence and backlash from minorities. According to Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking “the Canadian and to some extent Swedish example indicate the importance of

a cosmopolitical approach toward the desecuritization of religion" (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2010, p. 1066). Although in Sweden and Canada this cosmopolitical approach towards the desecuritization of religion helped easing the tension in the society, in Denmark the desecuritization attempts have failed.

As well as the minorities and minority rights, securitization literature has also expanded with a particular focus on migration, especially after the 2015 migration crisis. Dimitris Skleparis's (2018) article focuses on the migration crisis in 2015 in Greece. He examines the Greek governments' desecuritizing move on migration and argues that the policy choices on border controls, migration, and asylum in 2015 were a calculated desecuritization strategy with specific aims. The article focuses on the desecuritization attempt of the newly elected SYRIZA-led coalition government in the issue of migration and migration policies. Before 2015, Greek migration policies were strict with strict border controls, heavily reliance on deportations, and restrictions on asylum. With the election of the SYRIZA-led government in 2015, the new government has conducted "a coordinated bold U-turn from the restrictive border control, migration and asylum policies of the previous government" (Skleparis, 2018, p. 990). According to Skleparis (2018) the desecuritization attempt of SYRIZA-led coalition government was aimed to "reinstate the rule of law in migration and asylum management", liberalize the country's border control…and ultimately liberalize the border control, asylum and migration policies across Europe (Skleparis, 2018, p. 986). Here, the desecuritization attempt has two main objectives. First objective was at the national level: to desecuritize the public

opinion towards migrants in Greece. The second objective was at the regional level: to liberalize the asylum and migration policies across Europe.

Skleparis's (2018) argument follows that even though the desecuritizing move was successful in terms of decriminalizing migrants and improving public opinion towards migrants within Greece at the national level, the government's desecuritizing strategy failed to produce anticipated results and caused further securitization in the region. As Skleparis argues, with Greece's progressive border policies "EU external border controls were further securitized and militarized as the understanding of security that the government's desecuritization strategy encapsulated ended up increasing other member states' insecurity" (Skleparis, 2018, p. 995). This can also be discussed as the unintended consequences of desecuritization which will be discussed in Chapter 5.

Another empirical example in the literature is Zimmermann's (2017) work which focuses on the case of Germany and its commitment to foreign intervention in Afghanistan post 2001 period. The US initiated 'Operation Enduring Freedom' as a part of the Global War on Terror in the aftermath of September 11 attacks. The participation of Germany to this operation was controversial in the German public since it was "Germany's longest and most substantial military operation abroad since World War II" (Zimmermann, 2017, p. 235). The opinion towards sending troops abroad was not favorable until the end of the Cold War. However, the security discourse began to shift after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the discussions opened up on whether to focus on the territorial defense or responding to the threats abroad among the security elites.

The discussions gained momentum with the US demand for Germany to participate in the operations within NATO. However, not only the public opinion and the discussions were unfavorable towards operations abroad but also the German law was interpreted as prohibiting Germany from implementing operations outside of the Bundeswehr (Zimmermann, 2017, p. 235). As a result of a shifting discourse leaning towards the military operations the law was changed allowing Bundestag (the parliament) to authorize the military operations defining its mandate and extension (Zimmermann, 2017).

The main argument in securitizing Afghanistan was “security in Afghanistan is also a contribution to the protection of our country from terrorist attacks by fanatical extremists” (Zimmermann, 2017, p. 236). After hefty debate, the securitization was successful and deployment of German soldiers to Afghanistan was authorized by the Bundestag. The desecuritization attempts in this case were made by different actors for different subjects. After the deployment of the German soldiers, the opponents of the troop commitment attempted to desecuritize the issue mostly by arguing that there are no ‘objective’ threats in Afghanistan that will existentially threaten Germany and this commitment is “pointless, dangerous and/or imperialistic” (Zimmermann, 2017, p. 236). These attempts by the opposition have failed and the mandate for the troops were renewed multiple times. On the other hand, the government tried to desecuritize the subject since the public opinion was strongly against the deployment. Even though the decision-makers conceded the ongoing stability “they emphasized the positive results and tried to desecuritize through rearticulation, stating that Afghanistan had ‘become more open and smiling,

particularly when you talk with children" (Zimmermann, 2017, p. 236). The continuous attempts of the government to desecuritize the public opinion, the troop commitment in Afghanistan remained unpopular and desecuritization attempts failed due to rapidly increasing casualties.

4.5. Asia

Yandry Kurniawan (2018) in his book *The Politics of Securitization in Democratic Indonesia* focuses on different cases of securitization and desecuritization attempts within Indonesia's history. The cases of failed desecuritization that Kurniawan analyzes are the Aceh Separatist Movement and the Maluku Communal Conflict. The Aceh Separatist Movement was the longest separatist movement in the history of independent Indonesia which lasted for forty years (Kurniawan, 2018). Aceh is located in the west of Indonesia, on Sumatra Island which is rich in natural resources (mineral reserves, oil, gas, etc.). The Muslims represent the largest proportion of the population. The conflict is initially rooted in the political status of Aceh within the Indonesian state (Kurniawan, 2018, p. 105). In 1945 Islamic leaders have declared their unified support to the leadership of President Sukarno which divided Acehnese society into two camps. While the first camp pledged to remain supportive of the president the other camp demanded Aceh to become an independent state. The struggle between the two camps resulted in a civil war between 1945 and 1946. The resentments have continued after the war and peaked in 1951 with the government's decision to integrate Aceh into the East

Sumatra province. Kurniawan (2018) states that the reasons for Acehnese resentment stem from historical colonial background and religion. "…The majority of Acehnese believed that they deserved to have their own province as a reward for their fierce struggle against Dutch colonialism" (Kurniawan, 2018, p. 105). In addition to that, the public thought that the integration of a Muslim majority population to a Christian majority region was unfair. In 1953, a local group revolted to declare an autonomous Aceh state which later eventually evolved into a violent conflict.

The failed desecuritization of the Aceh Separatist Movement was an active process with changing actors and audiences. The audience for the desecuritization attempts were mainly the military and the public which have changed during the course of the conflict. The first attempts of desecuritization were initiated by B.J Habibie and his government in 1998 which directly targeted the military as the audience. Consequent governments after Habibie mostly targeted the critics within the public who were against the desecuritization process. The desecuritization process involved peace talks, initiatives in amnesty for political prisoners, and potential policies for Aceh's autonomy status (Kurniawan, 2018, pp. 124–125). Between 1998-2005 numerous and continuous attempts of different governments to desecuritize the Aceh Separatist Movement has failed. Kurniawan (2018) has identified one of the main factors of the failure as "the domination of hardline views in public on how to resolve the Aceh conflict" (p. 145). This shows a clear example of a desecuritizing speech act failure. Other factors were mainly "the lack of common understanding and interpretations on peace agreements from both the Indonesian government and

GAM (Free Aceh Movement)", lack of shared confidence and sincerity between two parties, and mediator failures (Kurniawan, 2018, p. 145). The desecuritization process of Aceh Separatist Movement took place in two phases. The first phase as discussed above resulted in failure. Later with the changing government desecuritization was successful.

Within the same time frame of Aceh Separatist Movement, another failed case of desecuritization within Indonesian context has occurred. The Maluku Communal Conflict was the largest communal violence in the history of independent Indonesia. Maluku is an archipelagic province which is reliant on agriculture. The Dutch presence in the archipelago starting from 1660s had a long-lasting effect. As Kurniawan (2018) argues "with the attempts to monopolize the spice trade on the islands, imperialism and religious missions, the European presence in the Moluccas brought a dramatic shift in the culture and society of the local people" (Kurniawan, 2018, p. 157). The conflict started with small scale fighting in 1998 and lasted until 2005. The essential cause of the conflict is religious politization and polarization of the society along the religious lines. The initial extraordinary measure to the conflict was the creation of new military command and its deployment of troops to conflicting regions. Another response to sprawling violence from the Indonesian government the was to declare state of emergency and to impose martial law in Maluku (Kurniawan, 2018, p. 166). Desecuritizing attempts have initiated from the beginning of the conflict during B.J. Habibie's presidency. The government formed a team to investigate the violence and organized meetings with the conflicting parties at the grassroots level to find a possible solution to the conflict

(Kurniawan, 2018, p. 182). Consequent governments after B.J. Habibie have also attempted to desecuritize the issue by promoting peace talks and mediating dialogue. Despite the efforts the violence kept on spreading and intensifying. “The state officials and Malukan figures played a significant role as desecuritizing actors in the case of the Maluku conflict” (Kurniawan, 2018, p. 184). The audience for desecuritization was rather a mixed group who consisted the critics of peace within the government and in the public, and the groups who were involved in the conflict. Similar to the Aceh conflict the government engaged in various attempts of desecuritization numerous times throughout the conflict because the use of extraordinary measures was not sufficient to end the conflict. Kurniawan (2018) argues that the failed desecuritization attempts during two consecutive governments was due to absence of trust among the warring parties and ‘poorly coordinated efforts of government’ which indicated unsuccessful desecuritization speech act.

The last empirical example is Vuori’s (2018) study on desecuritization in the People’s Republic of China. Vuori (2018) focuses on Falungong, a sectarian organization that emerged in 1990s in China. The context for the formation of Falungong starts with 1980s which was defined as “a decade of a crisis of faith vis-à-vis Chinese socialism.” (Vuori, 2011, p. 193). Increasing dissatisfaction with the economic reforms of Mao’s successor Deng Xiaoping, and growing corruption and nepotism increased the discontent with the party (Vuori, 2011). With the party rule all voluntary organizations were banned and suppressed including traditional groups like qigong (Chang, 2004). Qigong is a form of

energy cultivation that is done by breathing exercises which is “believed to channel the body’s vital energy to enhance health, prolong life and enrich spiritual awareness and insight” (Chang, 2004, p. 3). As Vuori argues, “this crisis of faith and increased cynicism towards the party led many people in China to search for new spirituality from qigong, especially as the party had to an extent loosened its control on religious practice in the 1980s” (Vuori, 2011, p. 193). Come the 1990s, the search for a new spirituality was responded to by the introduction of Falungong, which presented a new way of practicing qigong.

Falungong’s system differed from other practices of qigong because it “contained religious beliefs and an ethical code” (Vuori, 2011, p.193). Since the ethical codes and the religious beliefs that Falungong fostered were not known then, the party also supported the practice for a while. With the unexpected amount of support, the party was threatened by the Falungong and securitized on three arguments: (1) Falungong is a threat to communism, (2) a small group within the Falungong is the source of the evil and (3) practicing Falungong is unpatriotic (Vuori, 2011). According to Vuori “the party labelled FLG as a threat to social stability, and by extension to China’s rise and prosperity. The ‘evil cult’ was branded unpatriotic while the party could rekindle its patriotic struggle against hostile foreign powers that would see China subjugated.” (Vuori, 2011, p. 197).

In attempts to desecuritize the organization Li engaged in identity talk arguing that his practice presents the ‘traditional Chinese values’ and the nature of the organization is entirely individual based which does not have any overall

political goals. As Vuori argues, “in the 1990s, the majority of FLG practitioners’ desecuritization moves were identity framings, which aimed at refuting the securitization moves of the authorities. These acts focused on self-description and criticized the CCP only implicitly” (Vuori, 2011, p. 200). However, the identity framing of Li has failed and Falungong was banned, facing with the hard repression of the government.

4.6. Conclusion

The cases discussed in this chapter present the empirical studies of desecuritization failure. The following table illustrates the cases and options for desecuritization.

Table 3: Cases of Desecuritization Failure

Case	Security Issue	Desecuritizing Actor(s)	Audience	How to desecuritize			Success/ Failure
				Not to talk about issues in terms of security	Avoid responses that could create security dilemmas or other vicious spirals	Move issues back to normal politics	
Placemaking (Kinvall&Nesbit Larking, 2010)	Religion as a threat to political freedom in Sweden Denmark and Canada	Muslim minorities	Danish, Canadian and Swedish government	x	x	x	Failure
Migration in Greece (Skleparis, 2018)	Strict border policy of the Greek government, criminalization of migrants in the society	SYRIZA-led coalition government	National level: Greek public Regional level: European states	✓ x	x	x	Failure
Germany in Afghanistan (Zimmermann, 2017)	German troop commitment to Afghanistan	Troop commitment opposition	German public	x	x	x	Failure

Case	Security Issue	Desecuritizing Actor(s)	Audience	How to desecuritize			Success/ Failure
				Not to talk about issues in terms of security	Avoid responses that could create security dilemmas or other vicious spirals	Move issues back to normal politics	
		and German government					
Aceh Separatist Movement in Indonesia (Kurniawan, 2018)	The political status of Aceh within the Indonesian state	B.J Habibe government	Military and the public	x	x	x	Failure
Maluku Communal Conflict in Indonesia (Kurniawan, 2018)	Polarization of the society along the religious lines	B.J Habibe government and Malukan figures	Military and the public	x	x	x	Failure
Falungong in China (Vuori, 2011)	Falungong, a sectarian organization, as a threat to the regime, and the state	Falungong leader and members	Chinese government	x	x	✓	Failure

Desecuritization failure indicates that at least one of three options for desecuritization that Waever (2000) provided have failed. The first is related to the utterance, which can be the failure to speak issues out of the security realm. The second is about the responses to the issues. As Waever (2002) argues, desecuritization can be done through responding to the threats in a way that may not evoke security dilemmas and other vicious spirals. The third can be discussed as the failure to respond to the issues within the normal politics and resort to the extraordinary measures. The cases presented in this chapter show that the context in which the desecuritization process took place has an impact on the outcome of desecuritization. As Buzan et al. (1998) discussed, like securitization, desecuritization is also an intersubjective process which social factors can alter or determine the success or failure. The success and failure

depend on multiple factors like the success/failure of the speech act, the social capital of the desecuritizing actor, the responses within the process and the relevant audience accepting/rejecting the act.

CHAPTER 5 –

CRITIQUES AND CONTRIBUTIONS / THE LIMITATIONS OF SECURITIZATION THEORY

The literature on securitization theory has expanded in different directions since the original formulation. Scholars within and outside the Copenhagen School have contributed to the theory by critiquing and deliberating on its different aspects. This chapter analyzes the critiques, and contributions to the Copenhagen School framework of desecuritization in the literature. While laying out the critiques and contributions, it also analyses the limitations of the securitization theory as discussed in the literature. In attempts to critique and contribute to the theory, many of the scholarly work speak to each other. Since each critique identifies a limitation but also make a contribution the chapter thematically lists the discussions and within each subsection it chronologically traces them.

5.1 (Im)possibility of desecuritization

The possibility of desecuritization has been a point of discussion in the literature. Paul Roe argues that the desecuritization of minority rights is "logically impossible" (Roe, 2004, p. 280). According to Roe (2004), minority rights are asserted with the distinction of a particular minority from the majority. Because minority rights are asserted on distinction, desecuritizing and moving them back

into normal politics would remove the distinction, causing the eradication of the minority. As Roe states, " the group may necessarily be imbued, both by itself and by others, with a certain 'security-ness' that, if removed, necessarily results in the death of the minority itself" (Roe, 2004, p. 280).

Here, Roe (2004) builds his argument on Waever's (1993) notion of societal security. He argues, "to remove the language of security from the issue of minority rights, to shift from a position of societal security to one societal asecurity, is in essence to stop talking about group distinctiveness" (Roe, 2004, p. 290). Even though, from a minority rights perspective, Roe (2004) maintains that desecuritization is logically impossible, he argues that securitization of minority rights can be 'managed'. In Roe's sense, managing minority rights is to "normalize minority rights in terms of seeking to regulate minority-majority relations through more democratic forms" (Roe, 2004, p. 293). Thus, management of the minority rights would be done through the legislations and mechanisms that address the security concerns of the minority and guarantee its survival while assuring the minority that they will exist within the framework that the state provides.

Matti Jutila (2006) criticizes Paul Roe's (2004) arguments on the desecuritization of minority rights being logically impossible. In response, Jutila argues that "desecuritization of minority rights is always logically possible, though in some cases it might be practically impossible" (Jutila, 2006, p. 169). Jutila (2006) essentially criticizes Roe's (2004) perspective of society as a monolithic structure that consists of one nation seeing minorities as threatening. As she states, "desecuritization of minority rights is impossible only in a society

that is defined in such a way that it includes only one national group, and that group sees all contacts with ethnic others as threatening" (Jutila, 2006, p. 182).

Jutila views desecuritizing minority rights as a process of reconstructing identities (Jutila, 2006, p. 180). By focusing on changing the exclusive narratives of identities, Jutila (2006) argues, desecuritization is possible. Since identity reconstruction is never final, minorities can be reconstructed as part of multicultural policies. As Jutila states, "desecuritizing minority rights thus requires a shift from nationalizing monocultural practices to multicultural practices" (Jutila, 2006, p. 180). Shifting from monocultural practices to multicultural ones would lead to the groups recognizing each other as non-threatening and exclusivist. Therefore, this shift can contribute to desecuritization of minorities and minority rights.

5.2. Strategies and forms of desecuritization

After Ole Waever's original formulation of desecuritization, scholars have developed different strategies and forms of desecuritization. One of the first contributions to the desecuritization framework came in 1995 with Jef Huysmans's work on strategies and possible approaches to desecuritization. Even though Huysmans (1995) only focused on the issue of migration, his contribution provided the grounds for discussion with other scholars (Aradau, 2004; Hansen, 2000; Roe, 2004). Huysmans's (1995) work presents three strategies for desecuritization: objectivist, constructivist, and deconstructivist. According to Huysmans (1995), the objectivist strategy points out the subjective

notions of the threat and aims to convince that the securitized subject may not constitute a real threat. It focuses on the objective-subjective conception of security to point out threats may not constitute a 'real' threat. Therefore, in desecuritizing the issue of migration, the objectivist strategy aims to "teach the natives that the migrant is not dangerous" (Huysmans, 1995, p. 65).

The constructivist strategy focuses on understanding how the securitization process works (Huysmans, 1995). Unlike the objectivist strategy, it focuses on the causal processes that made, in this case, migrants, a security problem. As Huysmans argues, the constructivist strategy "builds on a separation between understanding and handling. One first has to understand the causal processes, and then one can start, with the help of acquired knowledge, try to handle the process" (Huysmans, 1995, p. 66).

The deconstructivist strategy presents a different outlook by looking at how narratives contribute to desecuritization. As Huysmans explains, "this strategy builds on the principle that to tell a story is to handle the world" (Huysmans, 1995, p. 67). Then, desecuritization of migration using the deconstructivist strategy would mean telling the story of the migrant with a focus on their different identities. Not using the security speak on migrants and revealing their different identities as women, men, mothers, fathers etc. breaks the us-them distinction, contributing to desecuritization.

The strategies Huysmans (1995) suggested have different repercussions. The objectivist strategy "runs the risk of strengthening what it seeks to weaken: the securitized migrant and the xenophobic and racist reaction to him/her" (Huysmans, 1995, p. 66). The constructivist strategy does not run a such risk.

However, it may not capture the changing dynamics of the social world. This is because the constructivist strategy has two stages: understanding and handling, the context may already have changed by the time handling starts "so that the understanding becomes in a certain sense wrong" (Huysmans, 1995, p. 66).

Like Huysmans (1995), Hansen (2012) also introduces four forms of desecuritization: stabilization, silencing, replacement, and rearticulation by synthesizing previous empirical studies. The first form Hansen (2012) introduced is stabilization which she refers to as a “slow move out of an explicit security discourse” (Hansen, 2012, p. 539). This strategy is also put forth by Ole Waever (1995) in the original formulation of desecuritization, which was discussed in Chapter 2 at length. Desecuritization by stabilization usually occurs as an eventual change through interaction which facilitates political engagement rather than militaristic interactions. Hansen also notes that stabilization requires conflicting parties to recognize each other as legitimate (Hansen, 2012, p. 539).

Replacement, another form of desecuritization, refers to shifting the security focus to another subject. Moving the security focus to another subject therefore causes the other issue to be securitized while the former is left out from the security focus. Some scholars argue that replacement is an inevitable process in which threats constantly have to be replaced by others. Andreas Behnke, for instance, argues that “certain ‘threats’ might no longer exercise our minds and imaginations sufficiently and are replaced with more powerful and stirring imageries” (Behnke, 2006, p. 64). His argument leads to views that desecuritization can never be achieved because of this constant replacement of securitized subjects.

Another form of desecuritization that Hansen (2012) presents is rearticulation. Rearticulation refers to an active engagement to move the issue out of the security realm. It suggests a “more direct, radical form of political engagement” offering political solutions to the threats and aims to fundamentally transform the public sphere’s friend-enemy distinction (Hansen, 2012, p. 543). As positive as it may sound, due to uncertainty, rearticulation may not be the preferred form of desecuritization in some cases. Thus, “rearticulation may be in need of supporting discursive practices that invoke specific understandings of past conflicts while suppressing -or addressing- the desire for new securitizations” (Hansen, 2012, p. 544).

The final form of desecuritization that Hansen (2012) presents is silencing which refers to the disappearance of a security issue in the security discourse. Due to the nature of the securitization theory – constructed on the notion of the speech act- silencing is the most contested form of desecuritization in the literature. As Hansen argues, “of the four forms of desecuritization, silencing is the one that stretches securitization theory the most” (Hansen, 2012, p. 545). Here, Hansen (2012) criticizes Copenhagen School for not offering a theory or methodology for such silenced securitizations and how to identify these forms of securitization where no explicit speech acts occur. These strategies offered by both Hansen (2012) and Huysmans (1998) provided a methodology to study desecuritization.

5.3. Politics of (de)securitization

According to the Copenhagen School framework, securitization is a political choice in which securitizing actor attempts to move a particular issue from normal politics to a "special kind of politics or as above politics" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 23). Buzan et al. (1998) referred to securitization as an extreme form of politicization. Desecuritization, on the other hand, moves the issue back into normal politics and allows discussion. The definition of desecuritization being "the optimal range option" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 29) stems from the critique of security being a positive phenomenon. (Waever, 1995). Since securitization is the particular choice to deal with the issues outside of normal political responses, and security “signifies a situation marked by the presence of a security problem and some measure taken in response” (Waever, 1995, p. 51) may become a political tool. The responses to those existential threats gain urgency, which is legitimated by the state to use extraordinary measures and prevents any other political discussion since it is seen as existential to the sovereignty.

Huysmans (1998) contends that Buzan et al.'s (1998) argument on securitization is an extreme form of politicization while discussing the context-boundedness of securitization and desecuritization. According to Huysmans (1998), one cannot locate the significance of producing an existential threat in a continuum. He argues that "the political nature of securitization cannot be interpreted in line with the liberal understanding of politics as a mere exceptional politicization, in so far as it aims at the destruction of the liberal concept of the political itself" (Huysmans, 1998, p. 580). Here, Huysmans presents an option

for desecuritization that he names "political aesthetics of everydayness" (Huysmans, 1995, p. 588) which defines and places the problems in a larger problematique. Thus, desecuritization in Huysmans's (1998) sense would mean placing the migrant-related security questions in broader economic, social, and political practices. The placement of issues in normal political practices would break the us-them distinction contributing to the desecuritization of the issue.

Claudia Aradau (2004) also seeks to move away from us/them, friend/enemy distinctions in theory. She argues that "the dynamics of securitization/desecuritization raise questions about the type of politics we want" (Aradau, 2004, p. 388). Aradau's (2004) work focuses on the issue of migration from an emancipatory perspective. According to Aradau, desecuritization has to be "tackled first politically rather than analytically" (Aradau, 2004, p. 388). Here, Aradau criticizes the Copenhagen School for not having a clear definition of the concept of politics and politicization. The critique of the Copenhagen School framework here is the need for a clear definition of politicization and a concept of politics. Aradau (2004) argues that security has an exclusionary and non-democratic logic that could be tackled by the politics of emancipation, which activates formal principles and indiscriminately refer to all community members.

Focusing on migration, Aradau (2004) argues that "desecuritization is a normative project which reclaims a notion of democratic politics where the struggle for emancipation is possible" (Aradau, 2004, p. 406). Aradau (2004) also engages with Huysmans's (1998) concept of political aesthetics of everydayness. Although Aradau finds Huysmans's (1998) exploration of the political aesthetics of everyday life insightful, Aradau challenges the underlying

assertion regarding the "flexibility of subjectivities, the possibility to challenge what is constructed as dangerous" (Aradau, 2004, p. 400). Aradau finds that the appeal to everydayness is risky since "everyday life is also necessarily linked with the reproduction of hegemonic structures," which may lead to securitization finding its legitimization in everyday life practices (Aradau, 2004, p. 400).

Kim and Lee (2011), whose work was discussed in Chapter 3 as a case of desecuritization success, argue for a framework that can capture the political dynamics within the cases. They argue that desecuritization is “a political process involving the ‘authoritative allocation of values (preferences)’ that settle the issues of ‘who gets what, when, and how’ in the face of new or old threats to the values of the people who are involved in the political process” (Kim & Lee, 2011, p. 30). Since the process of desecuritization is highly politicized and involves fierce competition between different political coalitions both inside and outside, they argue that national politics should be taken into account when studying securitization and desecuritization.

5.4. Who and where is the audience?

Audience acceptance is laid out to be a necessary condition for successful securitization in the Copenhagen school framework. It has been one of the key points for the critics since the original formulation. Some scholars criticized the Copenhagen school for undertheorizing and vaguely outlining the audience (Léonard & Kaunert, 2010; McDonald, 2008), while some argued that the audience is not an analytical concept but rather a normative one (Floyd, 2011).

Jonna Nyman contends that the role of the audience is not conceptualized in the original version of the theory, which causes the audience to be a "passive recipients of elite speech acts" (Nyman, 2018, p.110). This conception of the audience being a passive recipient raises the question of the power of the audience. The theory does not recognize the audience to act upon the securitizing move beyond accepting and rejecting it. Here, Balzacq argues that the theory is "audience-centered" yet overlooks the context in which audience acceptance occurs. According to Balzacq, in order to persuade the audience, the securitizing actor needs the "ability to identify with the audience's feelings, needs and interests" (Balzacq, 2005, p.184)

In addition to the context, whom the audience consists of is another point of critique. Vuori (2008), in his study on China, discussed that even though the audience in the Copenhagen school framework mostly correlated with the general public, it may differ in a non-democratic context. In Vuori's (2008) case, elites are the key members of the audience for government to legitimize the emergency measures. Similarly, Adam Côte argues that "outlining a specific definition of 'who' the audience is risks decontextualizing the audience and assigning it in an essential characteristic" (Côté, 2016, p. 548). Assigning a characteristic to the audience would then limit the scope of analysis to the collectivities that carry the essential characteristics. Thus, this limitation in the scope of analysis would risk marginalizing the alternative voices (Hansen, 2000). Building on these arguments in the literature, Côte (2016) argues that the identification of the audience should be case specific rather than having established characteristics.

Côte's (2016) work presents a new characterization of the role of the audience. He argues that the audience must be theorized as active agents who are "capable of having a meaningful effect on the intersubjective construction of security values" (Côté, 2016, p. 542). Cote engages with both empirical and theoretical literature and points out that there is a "problematic relationship between securitization theory and the concept of intersubjectivity, as well as the conflicting portrayal of the securitization audience in empirical and theoretical analysis" (Côte, 2016, p. 554). According to Côte, the theory characterizes the audience as "agents without agency," which has no significant effect on the securitization process, while the empirical literature depicts it as active and engaged in the process. (Côte, 2016, p.543). The speech act and the role of audience is discussed in another outlook by Ido Oren and Ty Solomon which will be discussed later in this chapter.

5.5. Beyond speech act and language

Scholars criticized Waever's (1995) theorization of security as a speech act for overlooking other acts that may contribute to security since "speech is not the only way to communicate" (Nyman, 2018, p.107). For that, some scholars called for broadening the framework of securitization and desecuritization other than speech acts and language.

Frank Möller's (2007) work builds on the critique that securitization theory should encompass visuality in conjunction with speech and language. Möller focuses on three photographic exhibitions that depict the 9/11 attacks in the US:

After September 11: Images from and Memories of Ground Zero, Here Is New York, and Iraqi Faces and Surfaces. He argues that “strategies of de-escalation and desecuritization do not necessarily need language” (Möller, 2007, p. 180). In his perspective, “images cannot be analyzed independent of the huge reservoir of pictures that each person has stored in their memories. It is therefore suggested combining visual analysis with the analysis of pictorial memory” (Möller, 2007, p. 180). The empirical examples Möller (2007) provides represent successful and unsuccessful attempts. US Secretary of State Colin Powell launched an exhibition called After September 11: Images from and Memories of Ground Zero. It intended to produce a particular public memory in line with the official interpretation. Möller argues that the photographs did not offer an alternative view and "a particular interpretation of images is prescribed to the (overseas) viewers that help make the subsequent US security policy appear, legitimate, rightful and without any alternatives" (Möller, 2007, p. 189).

The photographs in this exhibition came from professional and unprofessional photographers and were exhibited without the photographer’s name or any captions. The purpose of anonymity was not to “impose on the viewers a specific political reading of 9/11 and its consequences” (Möller, 2007, p. 190). Similarly, Jan Øberg’s project Iraqi Faces and Surfaces 2002– 2003 represented a different approach by showing the culture, people, and life without the context of terrorism and war. According to Möller, “Øberg’s photographic intervention in the process of securitizing Iraq and the Iraqi people is a desecuritizing move” (Möller, 2007, p. 190). He shows that “the evolution and the deliberate shaping of collective memories do not necessarily have to benefit

securitization but might also result in the desecuritization of social relations by historicizing past violent encounters" (Möller, 2007, p. 184). This would entail the emphasis of the event in the past, and the difference in the surrounding circumstances of that time versus this time. Möller calls this a "rhetorical disconnection of the present from the past" in security community building (Möller, 2007, p. 184). Möller (2007) argues that the evolution of memory can benefit both desecuritization and securitization.

Similar to Möller's (2007) study on visualization Juha Vuori's (2010) work on the Doomsday Clock of the Atomic Scientists examines the "process of securitization in which speech acts have been interwoven with a powerful symbol" (Vuori, 2010, p. 255). The Doomsday Clock, discussed by Vuori (2010), was initially created to raise awareness for possible nuclear annihilation. It appeared on the cover of *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, which began publishing in 1954 onwards. The Clock, as Vuori puts it, "serves as a warning of how imminent global catastrophe is" (Vuori, 2010, p. 256). Vuori's (2010) piece mainly focused on the securitization moves of the Scientists of the Bulletin. However, Vuori also focuses on the resets of the Clock as a stop "in a lengthy process of macrosecuritization that spans seven decades" (Vuori, 2010, p. 257). Here Vuori questions "if the Doomsday Clock can be viewed as an institutionalized 'master signifier' for the anti-nuclear macrosecuritization discourse (Vuori, 2010, p. 269). Can 'setting the minute hand back' (Bulettin of the Atomic Scientists, 1960: 6) constitute some type of a desecuritization move achieved through a visualized symbol?" (Vuori, 2010, p. 269).

Here, Vuori argues that “the backward resets could perhaps be understood as a relaxation of the urgency of the claimed threat: the symbolic Clock acts as like a gauge to indicate the urgency of the ‘continuous danger’ in which mankind lives in the nuclear age…until society adjusts its basic attitudes and institutions” (Vuori, 2010, p. 270). In this vein, he argues that “final desecuritization could be achieved only once the possibility of waging war with these weapons was eliminated- that is when the world would be ‘emancipated’ from nuclear weapons” (Vuori, 2010, p. 271). Therefore, Vuori’s (2010) argument can indicate that although desecuritization may be successful for periods of time there is always a possibility for re-securitization as long as nuclear weapons remain. The work of both Möller (2007) and Vuori (2010) shows that visual symbols can be an influential tool to study desecuritization together with the verbal speech act.

Ido Oren and Ty Solomon (2015) take a different standpoint on the speech act. Instead of moving beyond the speech act, they focus on the dynamic of speech act acceptance. In doing so, they connect the success of securitization to the "oft-repeated utterance" by the securitizing actor (Oren & Solomon, 2015, p. 315) . The speech act in Waever's conceptualization focuses on the instantaneity of saying security. While keeping the utterance, Oren and Solomon (2015) draw attention to the nature of the word and its iteration. They conceptualize the speech act “as consisting not in an *argument* about the priority and urgency of an existential threat’ so much as in repetitive spouting of ambiguous phrases” (Oren & Solomon, 2015, p. 315, emphasis in the original). Using the example of the securitization of Iraq in the United States, they argue

that continuous reiteration of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) become a “ritualistic chant” that people participated in but did not understand the meaning of (Oren & Solomon, 2015, p. 316). This ritualistic chant of WMD constructed and produced a threat of Iraq that led to the securitization of Iraq in the United States.

Here, the audience acceptance is also questioned in terms of its intellectuality and also its participation. Oren and Solomon argue that "the collective incantation of ambiguous phrases by speakers and audiences construct a sense of social oneness eves as (or rather because) the chanters lack consensus about the meaning or policy implications of the phrase" (Oren & Solomon, 2015, p. 316). Joining and actively articulating this collective chanting the audience not only remains in the receiving side of the securitizing act, but it actively participates in it. Oren and Solomon (2015) also conceptualize audience acceptance as 'belief' rather than intellectual persuasion. Since audience acceptance does not occur as a calculated deliberate act, Oren and Solomon relate to the success of the securitization “to the extent that the audience itself comes to participate in the performance in a ritualized chanting and repetition of the securitizing discourses" (Oren & Solomon, 2015, p. 322). Oren and Solomon’s (2015) arguments in this case provide a different outlook of the speech act which was not previously discussed in the literature.

5.6. Limitations of securitization theory

These critiques point out what we can identify as the limitations of the theory. The limitations are discussed in terms of the scope of the theory, the geographies that it captures the dynamics of the ethical perspective and the framework in which the theory was developed.

Michael Williams (2003) argues that securitization theory bases the outlook on friend-enmity distinctions and a particular understanding of security. Scholars have criticized the Copenhagen School's distinction between emergency measures and normal politics, which would bolster the friend-enmity distinctions. Rita Abrahamsen argues, "the process of securitization is thus better understood as gradual and incremental, and importantly an issue can be placed on the security continuum without necessarily ever reaching the category of existential threat" (Abrahamsen, 2005, p. 59). For some scholars, this stance of two extreme ends could limit the normative imagination of security theorists (Nyman, 2018, p. 110).

One of the recurring critiques of the theory was its Western centrism and its focus on democratic settings. Some critiques suggest that non-democratic systems do not need securitization because they do not need audience acceptance for emergency measures. For example, Pınar Bilgin’s (2007) work on Turkey illustrates that active and predominant involvement of military in formulation of national security policies clashes with appropriate democratic practices (p. 563). In addition to that, Bilgin (2007) argues that the role of civil society is equally important in changing the security discussions that shape the security policies. In the Turkish case, “the civil society in Turkey is a product of

the national security project of the state establishment" (Bilgin, 2007, p. 557). Because civil society is a project and a product of the state establishment, they fail to frame the issues outside of the security terms. This somewhat weak civil society that does not challenge the 'securityness' of the issues blocks the room for change in the security subjects.

Vuori's (2008) study on China shows the usefulness of securitization in a non-democratic setting for legitimating policies and deterring threats. Vuori's (2008) study demonstrates that even though legitimacy and authority operate differently, leaders still need audience support. Nyman and Zeng's (2016) study on securitization on Chinese climate and energy politics demonstrates that securitization in non-Western settings occurs in different dynamics. In a setting other than democratic politics, the 'normal' of politics may take various shapes, blurring the line in and out of 'normal' politics. In addition to the nature of politics, as Nyman and Zeng argue, "because of the political system the relationship between the state and society is inevitably going to be different" (Nyman & Zeng, 2016, p. 303). This different relationship may lead to securitizing actors speaking to various audiences for successful securitization. To understand the securitization processes better, Nyman and Zeng (2016) call for a contextual approach to studying securitization in a non-Western context.

Another point of discussion for limitations of the theory is the speech act. It is discussed and criticized from different perspectives. Holger Strizel (2007) argues that the framework defines speech act ambiguously, which points to a single speech act rather than focusing on the "process of articulations" (Stritzel, 2007, p. 377). Taking these processes of articulations into account also captures

the social processes in which securitization occurs. Other scholars point out that speech is not the only way to communicate and convey a particular message (Vuori, 2010; Wilkinson, 2010). Wilkinson calls these "non-verbal expressions of security" (Wilkinson, 2010, p. 94). These non-verbal expressions can take many forms, like visualization, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Nyman also argues that "apart from the problematic effects this has on securitization analyses which ignore non-verbal securitizations and privilege security speech acts, causing a problematic analytical bias, it also creates a power problem for securitization theory" (Nyman, 2013, p. 61). Furthering Nyman's (2013) argument Matt McDonald (2008) argues, the speech act is considered to be the act of the elite which can speak security. This focus on the elites, then "marginalize the experiences and articulations of the powerless in global politics" (McDonald, 2008, p. 574). In a similar outlook, Hansen (2000) points out that gender perspective is missing in the Copenhagen school framework, leading to overlooking silent, gender-based insecurities. She argues, "gender-based security problems requires a more thorough and critical investigation of the speech act than carried out by the Copenhagen School" (Hansen, 2000, p. 306).

Scholars also criticizes the theory from an ethical perspective. The original formulation considers desecuritization the "optimal long-range option" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 29). Later Waever notes that "desecuritization is not always better than securitization" (Waever, 2011, p. 469). Building on that, Rita Floyd (2015) developed 'the theory of just securitization,' arguing that both securitization and desecuritization can be morally defensible in certain circumstances. Floyd argues that the just securitization theory "seeks to enable

scholars to morally evaluate securitizations both before and after they have occurred, and that aims to guide practitioners in relevant situations" (Floyd, 2015). Focusing on desecuritization, she argues that desecuritization must be thought of as a sum of actions instead of an outcome (Floyd, 2015, p. 137). Floyd (2015) notes that just desecuritization does not equal to reverse of securitization. For desecuritization to be just, it requires stability in which actors work together and put restorative measures to undo the effects of securitization (Floyd, 2015).

5.7. Conclusion

This chapter discussed the critiques and contributions to the Copenhagen School framework of securitization theory. It also laid out the limitations of the theory, which are criticized in the literature. When we look at the critiques and contributions discussed in this chapter, we observe three main points. The first point that we observe is scholars have different opinions on possibility of desecuritization. The next chapter will focus on the analysis of the general study of desecuritization and the conclusions of the thesis.

CHAPTER 6 –

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

This concluding chapter aims to bring together the analysis in response to the research question of this thesis: How is desecuritization studied in the literature within the Copenhagen School framework. In response to this question, the thesis focused on the emergence and development of the securitization theory, the empirical applications, critiques, and limitations of the securitization theory.

The introductory chapter in the thesis presented the context in which the theory emerged, defined securitization, and laid out the methodology and outline of the thesis. Chapter Two focused on securitization theory, its foundations, and how securitization and desecuritization are formulated within the Copenhagen School framework. The discussions in Chapter Two provided the base for the empirical applications in Chapters Three and Four. Using the theoretical framework in Chapter Two, Chapter Three focused on the empirical examples of successful desecuritization. Chapter Four used the same theoretical framework to examine the empirical examples of desecuritization failure. Chapter Five broadened the outlook and examined the critiques and contributions to the securitization theory. While doing so, it pinpointed the limitations of the securitization theory. This broadened outlook on the literature, together with the examination of the empirical cases, facilitated the analysis of the literature as to

which geographies desecuritization work and which strategies succeed and which fail.

The emergence of the securitization theory in the late 1990s coincided with the debates on whether to widen the security agenda or remain with the military-based, state-centered framework of security. Securitization theory presented an alternative way to think about and study security without completely moving away from the state while changing the outlook on security. Securitization theory defines securitization as an extreme form of politicization that places the issue above normal politics (Buzan et al., 1998). Securitizing a subject provides urgency and, therefore, allows placing the issue above normal politics, enabling the use of extreme measures. Desecuritization, at the opposite end of the continuum, lifts the emergency status of the issues and places them in the normal haggling of politics.

One of the main critiques in the literature for desecuritization is that it remains undertheorized and is, therefore, less empirically applied in the literature (Aradau, 2004, p. 388; Hansen, 2012). This critique was also the genesis of this thesis. As previously shown in Chapter 2, desecuritization is less empirically studied (see Table 1). Before looking at how desecuritization is studied, it is informative to analyze how the key concepts the securitization theory is studied.

The speech act, the referent object, the securitizing actor and the audience are the key concepts of securitization theory for successful securitization/desecuritization. Ole Waever theorized securitization on the premise that security is a 'speech act' that is 'uttered'. Waever’s

conceptualization of the speech act is built upon language. Therefore, the empirical studies which adopt the Copenhagen School framework focus on the speech acts done by the securitizing/desecuritizing actor. (Morovoz, 2004; Atland, 2008; Biba 2014). These cases demonstrate how desecuritization can be done by using language and declaring that the securitized issue is no longer a threat. Behnke's (2006) study engages with this question by arguing that desecuritization can only happen via lack of speech. According to Behnke, (2006), engaging in speech acts to desecuritize a subject would only affirm its new status.

Recent studies in the desecuritization literature question the specific emphasis on speech as a medium of communication in the speech act. As discussed in the previous chapters, other scholars argue that language and speech are not the only way to communicate (Hansen, 2011; Möller, 2007; Vuori, 2010). Therefore, visual securitization and desecuritization attempts should also be considered as the speech act. There are numerous empirical studies on visual securitization and desecuritization which started with Frank Möller's (2007) study utilizing the images of 9/11 attacks to desecuritize the Iraq War, followed by Juha Vuori's (2010) study on the Doomsday Clock. These studies were later followed by Lene Hansen's (2011) study on the Muhammad Cartoon Crisis, which offered a model for studying visual securitization.

Referent objects, as other key concept of securitization theory refers to the thing that is existentially threatened. With two exceptions, the empirical cases that this thesis examined has the state as the referent object. In some cases, the state, as the referent object, faces a direct existential military threat

(Kim and Lee, 2011; Snetkov, 2017), while in other cases, it is threatened by non-military existential factors such as risks to the regime (Vuori, 2011), challenges to national identity (Morozov, 2004), and economic threats (Biba, 2014). One of the exception cases is Kinvall and Nesbit-Larking's (2010) case of placemaking in Sweden, Denmark and Canada where the political freedom is portrayed to be existentially threatened. The other case is Megan MacKenzie's (2009) case on desecuritization of female ex-combatants in Sierra Leone. Here the referent object is ex-combatant females which are excluded in the post-conflict reconstruction efforts. By looking at these cases we can infer that the state still remains to be a main referent when it comes to securitization and desecuritization.

The securitizing actor is the other unit that entails security analysis in the literature. It is the actor that performs the utterance, the speech act. In the Copenhagen School framework, securitizing actors can range from political leaders and governments to lobbyists and pressure groups (Buzan et al., 1998). Similarly, desecuritizing actors may also range from political leaders to pressure groups. In the studies in the desecuritization literature, some scholars suggest that actors independent from the securitizing actor can be the desecuritizing actor (Vuori, 2011). In his study, Vuori (2011) illustrates that although anyone can attempt to desecuritize a subject, it is the social capital of the actor that determines the success of the desecuritization move. When we look at the cases of desecuritization in, the desecuritizing actors are mostly the governments (Morozov, 2004; Kim and Lee, 2011; Biba, 2014; Vuori, 2018; Skleparis, 2018; Zimmermann, 2017; Kurniawan, 2018). Two cases of

desecuritization failure had different desecuritizing actors. In Vuori's (2011) case on desecuritization of Falungong in China, the desecuritizing actor is the leader and the members of Falungong, which is a sectarian organization. The other case is Kinvall and Nesbit-Larking's (2010) discussion on desecuritization of the religion which was attempted by the Muslim minorities.

The audience is the last and perhaps the most controversial concept of the securitization theory. The empirical cases discussed in Chapters Three and Four demonstrate that the audience of desecuritization is mostly states and governments (Morozov, 2004; Biba, 2014; Kinvall & Nesbit-Larking, 2010). Some empirical studies discuss multiple level desecuritization, which indicates that desecuritization attempts are directed to have two-level outcomes. To illustrate, Skleparis's (2018) case on desecuritization of migration in Greece had two target audiences: the Greek public at the national level and other European states at the regional level.

Waever, originally outlined three options for desecuritization: "(1) not to talk about issues in terms of security, (2) keeping the responses to securitized issues in forms that do not create security dilemmas, and (3) moving security issues back to normal politics" (Waever, 2000, p. 253). Building on Waever's (1995) formulation, first Huysmans (1998), later Hansen (2012) developed different strategies for desecuritization. The development of these strategies opened up the discussion on the possibility of desecuritization in certain subjects. The (im)possibility of desecuritization was questioned by Paul Roe (2004), who argued that desecuritization of minority rights is 'logically impossible'. Roe's (2004) study paved the way to study the practicality of

desecuritization in the literature. Following Roe's (2004) argument Matti Jutila's (2006) study demonstrated that desecuritization is logically possible, but it might be practically impossible.

Here, the empirical cases discussed in Chapters Three and Four can be analyzed through Waever's options for desecuritization. Six out of the total seven successful cases utilized all three options that are discussed by Waever (2000). The only exception was the case of the desecuritization of Chechen insurgency in Russia (Snetkov, 2017) in which the government continued to talk about the insurgency in terms of security but avoided responses that could create security dilemma and moved the insurgency issue back to the normal politics. By framing the insurgency threat as an issue to be dealt with normal politics they managed to desecuritize the subject. Cases of desecuritization failure mostly failed to utilize all three of the options. A case of exception here is the attempted desecuritization of migration in Greece (Skleparis, 2018). Even though the overall attempt has failed, the desecuritization attempt at the national level targeting the Greek public as audience has managed to not to talk about the issue in terms of security. However, the failure of the responses creating security dilemmas and continuation of the extraordinary practices caused the desecuritization attempt to fail.

A different way to analyze how desecuritization is empirically studied in the literature, can be done through looking at the geographies that the studies on desecuritization cover. When the theory emerged, the empirical studies mostly covered Europe as a geography. The case of Europe was also the empirical example that Ole Waever provided in explaining desecuritization. The

emphasis on Europe was later criticized by scholars who argue that securitization theory is essentially Eurocentric and cannot be applied to other parts of the world (Wilkinson, 2007). The empirical focus on Europe in studying desecuritization began to shift and change towards Eastern Europe and Asia in the early 2000s.

The studies that subject other parts of the world gained momentum in the 2010s. As discussed in the previous chapters, these empirical studies covered Russia (Åtland, 2008; Kurowska & Reshetnikov, 2018; Morozov, 2004; Snetkov, 2017), China (Biba, 2014; Vuori, 2018), the Arctic (Åtland, 2008; Jacobsen & Strandsbjerg, 2017) and Indonesia (Kurniawan, 2018). While Europe, Eastern Europe, and Asia are frequently examined in scholarly works, empirical applications focusing on other parts of the world are notably absent in the literature.

Lastly, the methods of studying desecuritization have significance. The most common method to study desecuritization is discourse analysis. Since the processes of securitization and desecuritization are done through speeches, discourse analysis allows scholars to see how the utterance of security is done through speeches and how the process is shaped by it. With the development and different applications of the securitization theory, scholars have begun to utilize other methods. Aglaya Snetkov (2017) is one of the scholars who conducted a study using a different method. Snetkov (2017) used a longitudinal analysis method to capture the evolution of the securitization process in Russia.

This thesis aimed to contribute to the literature by providing a meta-study of the desecuritization literature. Even though the focus is mostly on

securitization, studying desecuritization is imperative in understanding the differences and similarities between securitization and desecuritization, how once securitized issues will or can be reversed, how different audiences respond to different speech acts or the context in which desecuritization works the best.

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