

PERCEIVING THE COMMITTEE OF UNION AND PROGRESS: TWO AUTHORS,

TWO APPROACHES




HÜSNÜ ACER

YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY

JUNE 2020

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TWO APPROACHES



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PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Date : 20.06.2020

Name/Surname: Hüsnü ACER

Signature :

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ÖZET

Süreklilik ve kopuş tezi, Türk siyasi tarih okumasında önemli bir yere sahiptir. İki önemli araştırmacı olan Ahmad ve Zürcher, iki farklı perspektiften Türk toplumunun ve kurumlarının modernleşmesini incelemiştir. Ahmad kopuş tezini savunurken, Zürcher sürekliliğin altını çizmektedir. Bu çalışmada, bu iki yazarın süreklilik ve kopuş algıları üzerinden, kronolojik olarak Türk siyasi, kültürel ve sosyal hayatındaki değişim, dönüşüm ve bugüne aktarılan miras incelenmiştir.

Tanzimat'la birlikte başlayan aydınlanma hareketleri, Türk entelektüelleri öncülüğünde birçok fikrin Batı'dan ithal edilmesiyle birlikte, etkilerinin günümüze kadar devam ettirmiş toplumsal ve siyasal hareketlerin fitilini ateşlemiştir. Genç Osmanlılar ve Jön Türkler gibi, aydınlanmanın, modernleşmenin fikir öncülüğünü yapmış bu topluluklar, hayatımıza bugüne kadar uzanacak dokunuşlar yapmışlardır. 1908'de ilan edilen Meşrutiyet'le birlikte, bu fikir cereyanları, kitle hareketlerine dönüşerek toplumsal tarihimize girmiştir. 19 yüzyıl sonundan, 20. Yüzyıl erken dönemine kadar damgasını vurmuş İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, dönemi anlamakta ve bu çalışmanın şekillenmesinde önemli bir mahiyete sahiptir.

Büyük bir fikir mirası, devlet geleneği ve siyasi kadro üzerine inşa edilmiş olan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, modernleşme sürecini devlet politikasına dönüştürerek devam ettirmiştir. Devrimlerin radikalleşmesi, birçoğu İttihatçı geçmişe sahip olan Cumhuriyet kadrolarının yürüttüğü faaliyetler, Türk toplumunu siyasi, iktisadi ve sosyal hayatta, Batı'ya entegre etmek için büyük çaba göstermiştir. Mustafa Kemal'in tarih sahnesine yükselmesinden, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti erken dönemine kadar olan süreçte, yürüttüğü, tutkulu ve idealist

tutumu, Türk devletinin, Türk toplumunun ve Türk sosyetesinin inşasında nasıl bir inşa süreci geçirdiği bu çalışmada, süreklilik kopuş tezi üzerinden incelenmiştir.

ANAHTAR KELİMELEER: Süreklilik ve Kopuş, Ardılık ve Değişim, Sürelilik ve Dönüşüm, Modernleşme, Modernite, Modernizasyon, İttihat ve Terakki, İttihatçılık, Cumhuriyet, Mustafa Kemal



ABSTRACT

The continuity and discontinuity thesis has a major place in the reading of Turkish political history. Two prominent researchers, Ahmad and Zürcher have analyzed the modernization of Turkish society and institutions from two different perspectives. While Ahmad has advocated the discontinuity thesis, Zürcher has underscored continuity in this process. In this study, the changes, transformations and legacies to Turkish political, cultural and social life are examined chronologically on the basis of the continuity and discontinuity perceptions of these two authors.

The enlightenment movements starting with the Reform era lighted the blue touch paper of social and political movements – the effects of which are still felt today – by importing many ideas from the West under the leadership of Turkish intellectuals. These groups including the New Ottomans and the Young Turks, led the ideology of the enlightenment and modernization movement, while they touched the lives of people in a way that has extended up to today. Along with the Constitutional Monarchy proclaimed in 1908, these streams of thought transformed into mass movements and recorded in our social history. The Committee of Union and Progress left its mark from the end of the 19th century to the early 20th century and is critical in understanding this period comprehensively as a determining factor shaping this study.

Built on a great intellectual legacy, state tradition and political cadre, the Republic of Turkey continued its modernization by turning reform movements into state policies. The Republican cadres, most of whom had a Unionist background, radicalized revolutions and carried out several activities to serve for the integration of Turkish society's political,

economic and social life with the West through great efforts. From the time when Mustafa Kemal rose in the stage of history to the early period of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal's passionate and idealist attitude to build the Turkish state and Turkish society is also elaborated from the perspective of the continuity and discontinuity thesis.

KEY WORDS: Continuity and Discontinuity, Succession and Change, Continuity and Transformation, Modernization, Modernity, Union and Progress, Unionism, Republic, Mustafa Kemal



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1. INTRODUCTION

The 19th century was a critical period for Turkish history in social, cultural, economic, administrative and public terms. In the next centuries, Turks survived many hardships and established the Republic of Turkey in 1923. While explaining Turkish revolutionary processes, Yahya Kemal ranked the New Order movement in the first place. This movement was followed respectively by the Auspicious Incident, the Imperial Edict of Gülhane, the Young Ottoman Movement, the '93 war (Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878), the Young Turks Movement, the Committee of Union and Progress, the National Movement in Turkish and Central Anatolian lands, and finally the Republic (Kemal, *Çocukluğum Gençliğim Sîyâsî Ve Edebî Hatıralarım*, 2008, p. 203). There are undoubtedly many connections between these series of incidents.

Many different names are given to this period marked by afore-mentioned developments: modernization, Westernization, change, transformation, etc. However, many studies point out to stories of deficiencies and distancing from Turkey during this period, as stated by Kayalı in the international congress, "1908-2008: 100th Year of the Young Turks Revolution". Two important authors, or "our national authors" as Kayalı refers to, Feroz Ahmad and J. Zürcher step in the explanation of the process thoroughly (Kayalı K. , *Son Dönem Yerli Sosyal Bilimler Çalışmalarında 1908 Devriminin Tahlili* [Analysis of 1908 Revolution in Recent Local Social Sciences Studies], 2010, p. 629). In this context, continuity is attributed to Zürcher, while discontinuity is attributed to Ahmad. Among Turkish researchers, those who cannot easily share their opinions and fail to criticize the Republic period and the last period of the Ottoman Empire have

attempted to conduct critical studies over these two “national authors”. Nevertheless, this contradiction is very important in understanding the process of modernization in our socio-cultural and public life under any circumstances. This dissertation is designed to elaborate on the historical process of Turkish modernization starting officially with 1839 Imperial Edict of Gülhane together with the conditions providing the basis for this revolution, continuing under the shadow of the Committee of Union and Progress in the last period of the Ottoman and coming to an end with the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey. The different stages of this modernization are explained under different headings in order to read the process in a holistic manner until the early Republic period with several continuities and discontinuities. In this context, historical processes are explicated on the basis of the continuity and discontinuity concepts. In this historical reading, continuity and disintegration methods are used according to the corpuses of Zürcher and Feroz Ahmad. Endeavoring to elucidate both historical processes and incidents as well as many changes and transformations in the socio-economic, cultural and public areas, this study features describes several periods under different headings that are shaped according to the discourses, opinions and analyses of the two authors.

Secondary sources of information, analyses, memories and modernization theories are benefitted in this study. In addition, scientific papers, journal articles, newspaper articles and interviews are also used. In the introduction chapter, the literature on the modernization theory is reviewed. Modernization and social transformation processes are evaluated on the basis of several names recognized in the world literature such as Giddens and Habermas. At the same time, social dynamics of Turkish modernization are examined, and social strata are explained by various researchers including Mardin,

Tekeli, Berkes, Küçükömer and Ahmet Çiğdem. In the second chapter, the historical process of the modernization movement starting in the Ottoman is elucidated by analyzing the relevant cases. The movement starting in the 18th century is explained together with the changes and transformations via historical analysis and background information. During this period, people who directly contributed to the modernization movement as well as several incidents are scrutinized as triggering factors. Furthermore, opinions, attitudes and discourses of important thinkers of the period are evaluated and explained by the help of other scholars' views.

Also in the second chapter, historical processes leading to the Imperial Edict of Gülhane, Edict of Reform and First Constitutional Era movements led by pioneering opinion leaders in the path towards democracy, are evaluated together with various scholars' interpretations. In this context, the formation of constitutional movements and their legitimation are discussed, while the achievements of Turkish society in democratization until 1923 are explored. In addition to Namık Kemal and Mithat Paşa, the opinion leaders of the process, views of other political figures and pioneers are also investigated in the study, synthesizing comments, opinions and memories of several witnesses of the period. İlber Ortaylı's *The Longest Century of the Empire* (Ortaylı, The Longest Century of the Empire, 2018) contributed to the analysis of the process and reform movements starting with chambers of translation. In the second part of the second chapter, thoughts and activities of Young Turks, who are accepted to have formed the string of ideas behind the Committee of Union and Progress are assessed in-depth. In addition, the effects of this idea construction period on the 20th century Turkish ideology, divisions and polarizations developing under the relevant ideas are evaluated. Liberal

views of Prince Sabahaddin are analyzed, while political activities of factions gathering around his ideas are discussed along with the opposition movements. Gathering its strength and continuing its activities uniformly after the Second Young Turks Congress, the Committee of Union and Progress entered in Turkish political history, left its impact and legacy thanks to this unification around liberal thoughts.

The first part of the third chapter of the study points out to the emergence story of the Committee of Union and Progress and its headquarters, *the Central Office*, as the first organized political structure in Turkey. In this context, the organization of the committee, its ethnicity, structural characteristics, criteria for acceptance to the committee, general assessments and the committee's ideology are examined. The research in this area is based on the corpus of Tarık Zafer Tunaya, who as a pioneer in the field, analyzed and promoted the activities of the Committee of Union and Progress as well as its contribution to the legacy of the Republic of Turkey. Additionally, this research is further extended by the works of Erol Şadi Erdiñ, who followed the path of Tunaya, carefully reserved each and every document in the Central Office and knew the officials by name. Furthermore, memories of important Unionists of the period including Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Ahmet Bedevi Kuran and Yahya Kemal are benefited in addition to Talat Pasha, Cemal Pasha and Kazım Karabekir, who were among the founders and members of the Committee. Ideologically formed by Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp, this national movement is elaborated by means of the ideological analyses of contemporary researchers including Niyazi Berkes, İdris Küçükömer, Şerif Mardin, Bernard Lewis, Zürcher and Ahmad, who themselves studied the thoughts of the afore-mentioned prominent names of the period. Masami Arai's work, *Turkish Nationalism in the Young*

Turk Era (Arai, 2014) is one of the most important sources in revealing the contradictory relationship between Nationalization and Westernization. On the other hand, Mardin's study on Young Turks' ideology was accepted as a starting point and a full text to be benefited in this research. The third part of the third chapter of the study elaborates on the process leading to the 1908 revolution, prominent figures of the period and the triggering factors. The mind map in the process leading to the 1908 revolution is explained by the help of Şerif Mardin's study, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*. Transforming from committee to command during that period, the Committee of Union and Progress is extendedly scrutinized in this chapter of the study. The first days of Constitutional Monarchy, on the other hand, are explored by references to several authors including Tunçay, Akşin, Kansu, Zürcher and Ahmad. During the historical analysis of the period, its ideological and social legacy is explained through the analyses of Tunaya, Kansu and Lewis. Moreover, constitutional efforts during the period are explored via the works of Bülent Tanör, an academician in the field of human rights and constitutional law. On the other hand, reactionary rebellions and insurrections with major effect on the formation of political memory in the sense of negative developments are also analyzed within the framework of Turkish political history and preeminent political actors. While the place of these incidents in our political memory is evaluated by Zürcher and Ahmad, their historical background is explained by Doğan Avcıoğlu, Turkish politician and author, based on collective memories. The political factions during this period are brought to light again by Tunaya's works.

The fourth chapter of the study focuses on the political activities of the Committee of Union and Progress, elaborating on its innovations in public and social life.

Ahmad's studies exploring the period after the establishment of the First Parliament are used to explain the developments after the opening of the parliament. Historical responsibility and mentality during the period are examined on the basis of political and bureaucratic analyses of various scholars including Mehmet Ö. Alkan, Sina Akşin, Aykut Kansu and Rıdvan Akın. In this context, a study by Mardin, scanning the intellectual memory of the Committee of Union and Progress (Mardin, 2018) was useful in understanding the mindset of this transitional period. Tunaya's study, *Political Parties in Turkey* (Political Parties in Turkey, 1952) is one of the cornerstones as a source in understanding this period thoroughly. Karpat's *Turkish Political History: Evolution of Political History* (Türk Siyasi Tarihi Siyasal Tarihin Evrimi, 2014), Keyder's *State and Class in Turkey* (State and Class in Turkey, 1989) and Köker's *Modernization, Kemalism and Democracy* (Köker, Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi, 2007) contributed to this study as secondary sources in understanding this transitional period. The historical process in this section is shaped on the axis of Feroz Ahmad's studies. Several public and social structures in transition from the Ottoman to the Republic are explored by Ahmad's analyses, synthesizing with opinions of various researchers such as Bernard Lewis and Andrew Mango in an attempt to shed light on the legacy left to the Republic of Turkey. Ahmad deems the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey as discontinuity from the past and the period before – the foundations of which were laid by the Committee of Union and Progress – is evaluated along with the change and transformation of the national economy, national bourgeoisie, agriculture and traditional accumulations of the society. In the analysis of this period, many academic dissertations, symposiums and sessions

were used, shedding light on parliamentary activities as achievements of the Republic via analyses of prominent political actors.

In the fifth chapter, emphasis is laid on the concept of continuity, propounded by Erik Jan Zürcher, another major figure in this study. Analyzing all studies by Zürcher, this chapter thoroughly peruses the historical developments, actors and institutions from after 1918 until the very first years of the Republic. Zürcher's opinions and arguments, which could be considered radical, are compared with authors with a major place in Turkish historiography in addition to using many scientific articles, journal articles, interviews and newspaper scans. Furthermore, the historical background of the idea of continuity put forth by Zürcher for the period from post-World War I and Lausanne to the proclamation of the Republic in building modern Turkey is assessed along with an analysis of influential figures, groups and institutions, who followed the same idea in their political activities. In this regard, Ottoman political and social institutions, which are seen as the legacy to Atatürk's Turkey by Zürcher, are examined. Zürcher's opinions regarding Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, are compared with the studies of various researches including Akşin, Tunçay, Lewis, Mango, Tunaya, Kansu and Berkes, who produced many studies in this field, and the results are evaluated in detail.

MODERNITY

Focusing on the concepts of modernity, modernism and modernization will undoubtedly contribute to the analysis and outcomes when it comes to researching Westernism and Modernization (Kaynakçaya Dair, 2016). Modernity is, of course, an issue discussed by many thinkers. Indeed, several scholars including Jean-François Lyotard, Roland Barthes, Jean Baudrillard and Jacques Derrida explain the current societal, social and economic system as postmodern order. This understanding suggests that postmodernity is ahead of modernism. However, Anthony Giddens, David Harvey, Jurgen Habermas and many other thinkers argue that the social order, which is referred to as postmodernity, is not a system ahead of modernity, but its extension. Habermas' study, "*Modernity: An Incomplete Project*", Harvey's "*The Condition of Postmodernity*" and Giddens' "*The Consequences of Modernity*" are among many prominent studies in this field.

Derived from the Latin word "modernus", the concept of "modern" means "right now, of recent times". It is a concept used for the first time in the 5th century to differentiate the Christian world from the Roman and Pagan history (Kızılçelik, Postmodernizm; Modernizm Projesine Bir Başkaldırı, 1994, p. 87). Habermas explains that the idea of modernity is built on the basis of Sarup's definition as "objective science, universal morals and law". According to Tekeli, on the other hand, modernity is "the social life and organization form" that emerged in Europe in the 17th century (Tekeli, Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşüncenin Gelişimi Konusunda Bir Üst Anlatı [A Metanarrative About the Development of Political Thought in Turkey], 2002). Referred to as "*the child*

of enlightenment” by Tekeli, modernity points to radical change and it can, in a sense, be seen as transferring the enlightenment theory into practice (Aytekin, 2013).

In reference to Habermas, Harvey suggests that modernity is possible only by liberation of humanity and increasing value of daily life by contribution of individuals who freely flourish in creativity in their world (Harvey, *Postmodernliğin Durumu*, 2003, p. 25). Habermas defines modernity as “consciousness of a new period” described retrospectively according to a certain time period in history. While Çiğdem argues that this interpretation of modernity does not always indicate discontinuity from the past, he also underlines that a future-oriented approach is the desire to differentiate from the past. Analyzing Habermas’ approach towards modernity, Çiğdem further advocates the idea that the sharp contrast between the past and today is in fact an output of aesthetic modernity and at the same time, it is a “tool for comprehension” of rejecting traditions. He argues that a modern composition legitimizes itself not by the authority of traditions, but its own authentic modernity. In this context, Habermas defines modernity as follows: *“Modernity revolts against the normalizing functions of tradition; modernity lives on the experience of rebelling against all that is normative. This revolt is one way to neutralize the standard of both morality and utility. This aesthetic consciousness continuously stages a dialectic play between secrecy and a public scandal; it is addicted to a fascination with that horror which accompanies the act of profaning, and yet is always in flight from the trivial results of profanation”* (as cited in Habermas) (Çiğdem, *Bir İmkan Olarak Modernite: Weber ve Habermas*, 1997, pp. 174-175). According to Hollinger, on the other hand, modernity is the rise of industry, cities, capitalism, the bourgeoisie, growing secularization, democratization and social legislation. Defining the concept of

modernity as the effort to change what is old, Edward Shills deems everything opposing this concept as “traditionality”. Shills endeavors to explain modernity as opposed to traditionality and refers to every obsolete institution in addition to ignorance, church supremacy, existing social order and inequality in income distribution as “traditional” in contrast to what is “modern” (Shills, Gelenek, 2002, p. 149).

Based on the current historical process, it is undoubtedly necessary to read Giddens in order to be able to understand social transformation specifically focused on the concepts of structuration, modernity and globalization. Readdressing history of social thought, Giddens comes to the forefront as a thinker recapitulating the issues in this field. Departing from the idea that social theory is inclusive of social sciences, Giddens considers social theory related not only to sociology, but also economy, anthropology, political science, psychology and all social sciences (Çötök, Giddens Sosyolojisinde Toplumsal Dönüşümün Temel Kavramları ve Bağlantılar: Yapılanma, Modernite ve Küreselleşme, 2017, pp. 191-194). According to Giddens, modernity is the expression of modern society and industrial life in a single word (Aysoy, Yapılaşma Teorisinde Gelenek Fenomeni, 2008, p. 3). As Çiğdem underlines, Habermas states that there is a difference between Modernity and Modernization, which has affected not only Western societies, but also non-Western societies shaping their historical evolution. Briefly stated, modernity is qualified as a project, while modernization points out to the evolution in corporate structure (Çiğdem, "Türk Batılışması'nı Açıklayıcı Bir Kavram: Türk Başkalığı: Batılılaşma, Modernite ve Modernizasyon" ["A Concept Explaining Turkish Westernization: Turkish Dissimilarity: Westernization, Modernity and Modernization"],

2016, p. 68). Beyond doubt, Anthony Giddens is the leading theoretician of modernity today.

MODERNITY AND ITS CORPORATE DIMENSIONS

Divided into four categories by Giddens, modernity theories are: capitalism, industrialization, surveillance and military power (Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, 2004, pp. 74-75). Giddens refers to military power as industrialization of war. Relating the unsettled and dynamic character of modernity to its relations with the capitalist system, Giddens regards modernity as a relationship maturing on the basis of wage labor and commodity production. The second fundamental theory, industrialization, is not only business, but also a factor that affects transportation, communication and daily life. Giddens sees capitalism and industrialization as two different “organizational clusters” (Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, 2012, pp. 15-18). Associating the pre-modernity period with military power, Giddens argues that military was the central power in civilizations before modernity, nevertheless this did not continue by turning into “monopolism”. Giddens evaluates military structure in modern societies on the basis of technology and underlines the discontinuity taking place in the meantime. As a matter of fact, he defends the idea that military technology changes under the impact of modernization, likening armies to machinery. In this vein, Giddens utters that camouflage has become a tool for laying low now that uniforms were used as a way of showing yourself to the enemy in the past (Saygın, *Anthony Giddens'in sosyolojisinde modernliğin boyutları*, 2016) (Giddens & Christopher, *Making Sense of Modernity*, 2001, p. 86).

The most important point in Giddens' analysis of modernity is nation-state. Indeed, Giddens believes that modernity is most evidently shaped in nation-states (Giddens, *Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, 2010, p. 29). Furthermore, he considers nation-states as discontinuity from pre-modern societies. In this regard, Giddens mentions that surveillance apparatus and capitalism revealed as a third institution in addition to many infrastructures brought by industrialization. Consequently, Giddens refers to four main headings within the theoretical framework: surveillance, capitalism, military power and industrialization. While explaining the structure of modern societies, Giddens underscores the difference of nation-states from pre-modern societies, defining nation-state as a corporate set of powers, which becomes legitimate by taking control over laws and internal and external violence instruments within the borders of a region via monopolizing the administrative power (Giddens, *The Nation State and Violence*, 2008, p. 165). Tekeli, on the other hand, draws attention to the contradiction between capitalism's urge to continuously produce and the emphasis on equality of individuals in democratic nation-states (Tekeli, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşüncenin Gelişimi Konusunda Bir Üst Anlatı*, 2016, p. 20). Harvey adds that in capitalist societies money provides dominance by allowing purchase of labor and control of power in the triangle of money, power and labor, suggesting that power relations are indeed economic policies. Referring to Giddens as a macro theoretician, Harvey criticizes him due to ignoring this issue as Giddens separates power allocation from sources affiliated with the authority (Harvey, *Postmodernliğin Durumu*, 2003, p. 124).

Among Giddens' studies, his structuration theory is the one most benefited in the field of international relations (Emre, *Anthony Giddens ve Uluslararası İlişkiler:*

Yapılanma, Modernite ve Küreselleşme, 2015, p. 11). In this context, Giddens explains modernity by using the structuration theory (Aysoy, Yapılaşma Teorisinde Gelenek Fenomeni, 2008, p. 70). which is critical for the topic of this dissertation. According to Giddens' structuration theory, social change cannot be tackled only with a single aspect, since societies must be evaluated through routinization versus change and continuity versus discontinuity. In this theory, where Giddens criticizes traditionality, he strives to reconstruct concepts such as agent, action, system, structure, temporality and power (Şen & Turguter, ANTHONY GIDDENS'İN SOSYOLOJİK TEORİSİNİN EPİSTOMOLOJİK ARKA PLANI, 2014, p. 99). Beyond this effort, the structuration theory is an attempt to purely analyze society without diverging to any approach (Tatlıcan, 2005). When forming the structuration theory, Giddens most often used ethnomethodology. The pioneer of this approach, Garfinkel argued that social structure is continuously reproduced by members of the society, asserting that the formation and existence of social structure depends on the efforts of members of a society to understand their social world (Yıldırım, Anthony Giddens'in Yapılanma Teorisi, 1991, p. 27). Giddens exemplifies the relations between the structure and the agent by propounding that humans both construct the social structure and serve as an instrument of this construction process. In this vein, the structuration theory serves two purposes in social sciences: to increase analytical capacity by revising the traditional theoretical frameworks and question and go beyond the traditional theoretical frameworks (Emre, Anthony Giddens ve Uluslararası İlişkiler: Yapılanma, Modernite ve Küreselleşme, 2015, p. 8; p. 11). From Giddens' perspective, social life is the output of neither the stagnant society nor its individual members; social life results from reproduction of institutions and

various recursive praxis of individuals. Thus, the basic terms are developed on the basis of subjectivity and structure. In consequence, Giddens preferred to base his study on recursive social practices rather than starting from society and individuals. Levi Strauss' account for social relations is the core of models that evidently unveil social structure. According to the author, social structure cannot be reduced under any circumstances to the entirety of social relations observed in a certain society. Thus, he revealed the difference between social structure and social relations.

Çiğdem, on the other hand, analyzes the philosophical origin of constructivism and its affected areas. Accordingly, the four philosophical movements compared to metaphysical origins are: analytical philosophy, phenomenology, Western Marxism and constructivism. Since these approaches symbolize discontinuity not only in “chronological” terms, but also in terms of “breaking off with traditions” with modernizing thought themes, Çiğdem defines these movements as modern (Çiğdem, Bir İmkan Olarak Modernite: Weber ve Habermas, 1997, p. 201). In this study, the theory of constructivism is explained on the basis of Giddens' structuration theory as well as the accumulation, transformation and ramifications of Turkish modernization. While Giddens accentuated the importance of reproduction of social life, he revealed via this reproduction process that discontinuity and continuity are directly interrelated.

In this context, Giddens clarifies his sociological theory reshaping the relevant problems in three phases: First is the revision of past qualities of traditionality. In fact, one of the first initiatives of the Committee of Union and Progress – which Ahmad said that they waged war against traditionality yet failed to save themselves from traditionality – was to revise these traditions that Giddens mentioned. The second phase, on the other

hand, is the structuration approach mentioned above. In this approach, Giddens thinks that continuity and discontinuity in society interdependently evolve into modernization and thus, Giddens builds modernization on top of this structuration theory (Esgin, Anthony Giddens Sosyolojisi, 2008, pp. 323-324). In his analysis of Giddens' modernity perception, on the other hand, Martin O'Brien suggests that the basic requirements of modernity include building a new world instead of the old order and forming a social order freed from the traditions, customs, habits and beliefs of the old social structure. As a matter of fact, Giddens sees ignoring and rejecting the past as a historical prerequisite for modernity and distinction (Saygın, Anthony Giddens'in sosyolojisinde modernliğin boyutları, 2016, p. 71). According to Giddens' elucidation, social life is the whole of relations between production and reproduction of social activities designed by the founding agents (Çötök, Giddens Sosyolojisinde Toplumsal Dönüşümün Temel Kavramları ve Bağlantılar: Yapılanma, Modernite ve Küreselleşme, 2017, p. 193). In this regard, Giddens sets forth the understanding of modernity as social transformation, drawing attention to the fact that the modern period must represent discontinuity. Accordingly, the modern period must be different from the preceding period and it is at the same time discontinuity. Giddens categorizes the discontinuities observed during the transition from traditional to modern society in three groups: pace of change, scope of change, and the intrinsic nature of modern societies (Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 2004, pp. 10-11).

Giddens claims that there has been a particular discontinuity from the agricultural structure, a form of traditional society in the post-Industrial Revolution era (Özer & Baştan, 2012). According to Giddens' first discontinuity theory, traditional civilizations

changed faster than other pre-modern systems and this change rapidly spread in all areas. The second discontinuity theory, on the other hand, is the scope of change. He argues that societies are connected to each other regardless of where they are in the world and the wave of change reaches everywhere. Thirdly, Giddens alleges that the intrinsic nature of modern institutions is a means to discontinuity. Arguing that commodification of wage labor – in other words, the political system of nation-state – was not observed in prior societies and systems, Giddens supports this idea by saying that modern urbanism has a different structure from the principles that separate pre-modern cities from countryside, warning against a specious continuity (Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, 2004, pp. 10-14).

Within this framework, the place of Giddens' nation-state structure in these institutional dimensions is critical in understanding Ottoman Modernization and our nation building in the Republic of Turkey. In addition to his argument that capitalism is intertwined with nation-state, Giddens further brings forward that nation-state forms the basis of capitalism (Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, 2004, p. 59). Habermas, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of the institutions to be developed in order to protect modernity from market forces and bureaucratic structure and warns us that social modernization should not take place through capitalist methods (Anderson, *The Origins of Postmodernity*, 2002, p. 58). According to Emre, it would not be possible for constructivism to become an important theory of international relations if Giddens' structuration theory was not used in social sciences (Emre, *Anthony Giddens ve Uluslararası İlişkiler: Yapılanma, Modernite ve Küreselleşme*, 2015, p. 13). While Giddens draws attention to the close relationship between military power and nation-

state, he also underlines the close connection between military power and industrialization. He argues that this is the result of pre-modern societies' daily lives shaped by environmental factors, i.e. along with modern industry brought by technology, the existence of groups who change natural life rather than natural life changing people. Under these circumstances, the dependent variable, modernity, is determinant in the relations between humanity and nature.

As Giddens, Tekeli also suggests that modernity has risen on the basis of four fundamental concepts: first is the economic dimension; the second concept is the approach towards knowledge, morality and arts – which cannot be reduced to any one of these areas as this is an autonomous system – the third is the emergence of individuals acting via their own rationale as a result of discontinuity from traditional social bonds and finally, the fourth concept is that the developing institutional structure is based on nation-building and democratization process with Western type economic activities. Underlining the need for developing national identities, the author utters that democratization is essential for ensuring equality of individuals, explaining the process of modernization based on four forms by saying, “*Societies that can develop this project have powerful dynamics within their structure*” (Tekeli, Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşüncenin Gelişimi Konusunda Bir Üst Anlatı [A Metanarrative About the Development of Political Thought in Turkey], 2002, pp. 46-47).

MODERNISM

Modernism is a cultural and artistic point of view related with modernity, however, this movement most often depicted modern thought in the late 19th century.

As a matter of fact, Marshall accentuates that modernism is not only related with arts, but technological, political and ideological changes also affect the developments in this area. Harvey, on the other hand, states that modernism has played a leading role in the formation of increasing consumption conditions in the new world order. While explicating modernism, Harvey utters that it is “*the problematic and faltering aesthetic response to modernity conditions formed by a specific modernization process*” pointing out to the obligation of settling accounts between postmodernism and the nature of modernization (Harvey, Postmodernliğin Durumu, 2003, p. 120).

MODERNIZATION

Anthony Giddens defines modernization as social life and organizational forms emerging in Europe in the 17th century and spreading around the whole world (Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 2004, p. 9). On the other hand, Hollinger defines the concept of modernization as evolution from traditional to modern society and social transformation (Hollinger, Postmodernizm ve Sosyal Bilimler Tematik Bir Yaklaşım, 2005, p. 4). In the same vein, Giddens recapitulates that with modernization, societies liberated from traditions, rules and elements of oppression from before the 18th century (Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 2004). Hollinger accepts the beginning of the modernization period as the 17th century with emerging economic and social structures of modern bourgeoisie states via scientific revolutions. Further arguing that the collapse of the old world order under the church hegemony cannot be explained only by the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, Hollinger stresses the importance of

institutional changes that he deems as the consequences of scientific revolutions. According to Beck, on the other hand, modernity is the modernization of traditionality. Hollinger uses modernization to refer to the social transformation brought by industrialization and this, in a sense, confirms Giddens' theory. Thus, modernization refers to all the socio-economic changes emerging with mobilization of masses, population movements and the development of nation-states triggered by scientific and technological innovations in societies dominated by capital with the impact of developing markets.

According to Alkan, who scrutinized Turkish modernization in-depth, modernization is the process of forming an official ideology, official historiography and “invention of traditions”. In this sense, official ideology and history are as old as power and the state institution. However, Alkan argues that the emergence of a systematic official ideology and official history as its integral part in the Ottomans coincided with the modernization period as in other societies (Alkan M. Ö., *Resmi İdeolojinin Doğuşu ve Evrimi Üzerine Bir Deneme*, 2014, p. 378). From another perspective, Köker differentiates Western societies from non-Western societies: the theory of modernization developed to explain the changes in non-Western societies, is, above all, based on comparison of two society types defined as “modern” and “traditional”. This categorization essentially identifies the modern society type, pointing out to traditional society as a type of “non-modern” society. Therefore, it is primarily necessary to analyze how the basic characteristics of the modern society type are defined (Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, 2007, p. 40). In this regard, societies previously based on rural communities and kinship transformed into a new type of society with the

effect of modernization (Hollinger pp:45:2005). While the modernization theory urged dispraise or avoidance from the past, i.e. traditions in Europe after the Enlightenment, it entailed exalting modernity or innovation (Şallı, 2014, p. 79)

Wagner states that the modernity discourse is based on the idea of freedom and autonomy (Wagner, *Modernliğin Sosyolojisi*, 2003, p. 27). Ross Pole, on the other hand, explains the concept of modernity as follows: “[It is] *a social form sprouting in Western Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries, mainly observed in North America, and has since been spreading or imposed on non-Western world*” (Poole, *Ahlak ve Modernlik*, 1993). The term political modernity, on the other hand, is defined as the constitutional, liberal democracy present in Western societies particularly, the US, UK and France (Köker, 2007, p. 47).

TRADITIONALITY AND MODERNITY

Hall explains the transformation of societies from traditional to modern with the existence of societies that have internalized the concepts of sovereignty and legitimacy, brought by nation-state as a new administrative style, accentuating the direct effect of bureaucratic organizations on social life in such states. In addition, he sees gender-based division of labor, emergence of new classes and the patriarchal relationship between men and women as outputs of modernization in capitalist societies. Accordingly, he sets forth that in modern societies, religious institutions lose their importance and are replaced by new institutions that transform societies in light of science into new forms of life with an aim to seek after the truth via the new qualities of secularization and rationalism. According to Huntington, “... *the modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s had little*

or nothing to say about the future of modern societies; the advanced countries of the West, it was assumed, had arrived (where they had been supposed to); their past was of interest not for what it would show about their future but for what it showed about the future of those other societies which still struggles through the transition between tradition and modernity”. As stated by Köker, modernization has a determinist characteristic due to the fact that it consists of prospective, irrevocable and obligatory processes that every society must undergo (Huntington) (Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, 2007, pp. 50-51).

There are seven types of inaccuracies regarding the distinction between modern society and traditional society as Köker cited from Joseph R. Gusfield. Stating that the first inaccuracy is that developing societies in fact are stagnant societies, the author suggests that the concept of traditional society has itself changed many times over time and it is indeed the output of this change. Secondly, Gusfield maintains that traditional culture is a set of consistent norms and values, underlining the alternative diversity of this type which is considered unidimensional when analyzing the interaction between the larger tradition formed by cities and the smaller tradition formed by rural communities. Thirdly, the scholar asserts that the social structure of traditional society is homogeneous, giving Indian society as an example in the sense that it has institutionalized lifestyles in and out of the caste system as in other societies. The fourth inaccuracy is that old traditions are displaced by new developments, and the author alleges that the old is not replaced by the new as an obligation. In that, he argues that a change process resulting from conflict simply cannot happen. Fifthly, it is assumed that the traditional and the modern are in constant conflict. However, Gusfield alleges that the rich content of

traditionality affecting acceptance, rejection or synthesis of modernity is often neglected when it comes to the structure of traditional society. The sixth misconception is that traditionality and modernity are two all-time opposing systems, nevertheless, traditionality and modernity can be systems that strengthen each other rather than always striving in conflict. Finally, the seventh inaccuracy is that modernization processes can weaken traditions, however, the scholar argues that it is often neglected that new institutions and values can integrate with traditions and these may well complete each other in a supportive manner (Gusfield, *Tradition and Modernity: Mislplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change*, 1971, pp. 46-56) (Köker, 2007, pp. 55-56).

TURKISH MODERNIZATION

As Tunçay refers to Tariq ibn Ziyad's ordering that the ships he arrived in Iberia be burnt to prevent returning back and cowardice, Turkish revolutions cover an overlong and arduous process (Tunçay, *İkna (İnandırma) Yerine Tecebbür (Zorlama)*, 2001, s. 92). Turkish modernization has many historical origins. Mert said of the Turkish modernization process leading up to the Republic the following: *“Founded in 1923, the Republic of Turkey was first built on the basis of secularism and nationalism principles as a modern state. We know that the Republic was not born into a historical and intellectual void; in this respect, the way to understand the Republican revolution and its intellectual dimension is to analyze the late Ottoman history and ideational movements. Considering particularly the intellectual movements in the Second Constitutional Era, we can see that the radical transformations following the establishment of the Republic*

known as the 'revolutions' did not, at least in intellectual area, emerge along with the Republic, but they were rather the continuity of various suggestions previously put forward within the framework of certain political discussions. The republican revolution, at first glance, can be defined as the defeat of pan-Islamism – one of the three movements that determined the late Ottoman intellectual life – and Turkism and Westernism – the other two movements – coming to power together” (Mert, Cumhuriyet Türkiye’sinde Laiklik ve Karşı Laikliğin Düşünsel Boyutu, 2001, p. 197).

The Second Constitutional Era, or the long process of modernization that led to historical changes and transformation in Turkey’s social, political, economic and cultural life, has been a rather fertile area of study for many social scientists from different traditions and disciplines. Developing in this process with the Imperial Edict of Gülhane and gaining momentum during the Republic period, continuity and discontinuity in the administrative tradition that determined the basic norms of state-society relations have also gained an important role in these studies (Kaliber, 2016, p. 109). Giddens, on the other hand, notes that the idea that the history of mankind is full of discontinuities and is devoid of order is underlined in many forms of Marxist thoughts, however, he also reveals that his own discontinuity theory is not related to historical materialism, and underscores that he does not aim to depict the history of humanity as a whole. As a consequence, Giddens utters that modernity has unprecedentedly severed our connection with old traditional social order derivatives (Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, 2004, p. 12). From another perspective, Kongar refers to the building process of the Republic of Turkey on an ideological base and argues that the technological backwardness in the Ottoman Empire led to developing a reaction against the West.

Referred to by the author as a transitional period, this process Kongar believes that the naming of this process as a radical discontinuity or break from the past by some was due to Atatürk's negative thoughts about the Ottoman (Kongar, *İmparatorluktan Günümüze* Cilt 1-2, 1992, p. 484). Taner Timur, on the other hand, says that "the Kemalist period is seen as discontinuity from the Ottoman state particularly at the level of ideology", purporting that the transition from Arabic to Latin letters accelerated this process. Underlining many discontinuities in economic, social and political terms, Timur also determines that the Ottoman society prepared the social ground for the transition to the Republic (Timur, 1992). Nevertheless, if this ground was indeed a policy to save the Ottoman state via Westernization, the policies and discourses in 1923 had evolved from projects to save the state against the West to become the primary ideology of the state (Kaliber, 2016, p. 107).

Toker and Tekin, on the other hand, explore the problematique of Turkish modernization via three elements: The first is that rationalism has started to support a positivist-authoritarian administrative ideology shaped by an applicative mindset. Toker and Tekin explain the second element as the fact that political thinking in modern Turkey remained a stranger to the "liberating dimensions of modernity". The third element is the introduction of the Western discontinuity thesis against the continuity thesis of tradition and the war waged by this thesis against traditions by means of a positivist philosophy. Authors who elaborate on the lack of philosophical justification that formed the basis of constitutionalism in the West believe that this philosophical movement was excluded positivist rationalism in Turkey (Toker & Tekin, *Batıcı Siyasi Düşüncenin Karakteristikleri ve Evreleri: "Kamusuz Cumhuriyet'ten Kamusuz Demokrasiye"*, 2016,

p. 84). Tekeli explains the developments until the nation-building process, one of the consequences of the modernity project in Europe, in four stages. The first was to endeavor to solve the problems encountered within the existing political and social system: this period is referred to as the period of quest. Tekeli explains that he does not see the search for a solution during this period as a modernity project, but as a desire to restore the old order. The second stage is also marked by initiating solution quests along with the development of the modernity project and its gradual recognition in European countries. This quest and influence spread rapidly within executive staff and as a result, there had been many changes in the old institutional structures followed by consecutive reforms leading to modern institutions. These transformations paved the way for turning modernity from being merely a political thought into an area of activity that is ingrained in reforms. The third stage was triggered by people and groups who were closely associated with the modernity project, desiring to come into power and engaging in the activities of changing all areas including the public sphere in line with this desire (Tekeli, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşüncenin Gelişimi Konusunda Bir Üst Anlatı*, 2002).

Although the beginning of reforms and transformations in Turkish historiography is often attributed to the establishment of the Republic, it is essential to analyze the late Ottoman period and its cultural, political and traditional heritage left to the building process of the Republic until reaching today's society. Leading the multi-dimensional analysis of Turkish modernization, Şerif Mardin, Niyazi Berkes and Tark Zafer Tunaya prioritize the disciplines of sociology and political science in their studies on the restructuring of state and state-society relations as a result of modernization (Kaliber, 2016, p. 108). Berkes points out to the fact that the Ottomans closely followed the West,

yet failed to complete their modernization process (Berkes, *Modernization in Turkey*, pp.34). Taner Timur is one of the researchers who tried to understand post-Republic Turkey. Focusing on continuous “elements” and “remains” Timur claims that although the 19th century Ottoman society laid the “historical foundations” for the Republic, the Republic represented an ideological discontinuity from the Ottoman Empire. Despite bureaucratic and political changes observed during the state building process, Timur stated that there was not any radical transformation in the society, however, the basic changes experienced after adopting the multi-party system resulted from the Ottoman reforms. Timur also sought an answer to the question how the economic transformations during the Ottoman period continued during and after the nation-building process. In this regard, Feroz Ahmad and Zürcher have provided numerous analyses. Toker and Tekin, on the other hand, argue that publicness and citizenship – individuals’ public expression – are defined by the state in the Republic project. Referring to creating a new society and a holistic transformation, the authors see the demand for a radical change as the desire to leave traditions, underlining that the Republican ideology is a new culture and even a new social morality (Toker & Tekin, *Batıcı Siyasi Düşüncenin Karakteristikleri ve Evreleri: "Kamusuz Cumhuriyet'ten Kamusuz Demokrasiye"*, 2016, p. 92). In his article on “center-periphery” relations, Şerif Mardin defines the period starting with the Imperial Edict of Gülhane as the basis of “cultural distinction” in Turkish politics and reinforces this idea by uttering that the gap between the center and the periphery has been growing by the developing technology as well as the fact that the countryside or the periphery unites under the Islamic side against secularism (Mardin Ş. , *Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?*, 1973). Nevertheless, Mardin also points out to the difference

between the experiences in the West and Turkey on the basis of the centralization concept, which he explains as the sociopolitical structure of public authority. Within this framework, Kaliber suggests that the centralization understanding effective in the process of building the modern state in the West was made a part of the ruling power based on reconciliation by agreeing with the peripheral powers without causing them to lose their autonomy. On the other hand, this encounter in Turkey during the Republic period was marked by a unidimensional conflict between the center and the periphery and Kaliber asserts that this has been the most important social discontinuity in Turkish political history (Kaliber, 2016, p. 109).

There is a dominant opinion that the modernization process continuing since the 19th century in Turkish lands has been shaped with the inclusive effect of the West against traditions and with the impulse to be like Western countries. However, what needs to be underlined is that the modernization process gained momentum along with the Republic. Referred to as a delayed modernization by Culhaoğlu, this process in Turkey was accompanied by many shortcomings when compared to the Western modernization process (Culhaoğlu, 2016, pp. 171-172). On the other hand, Tekeli and Keyder underscore an ideological discontinuity in the transition from empire to state. In this process when nationalism emerged and turned into a founding ideology, Keyder suggests that the Ottoman ideology was left and replaced by homeland nationalism, which was not based on race or ethnicity. In addition, Keyder also confirmed that there was continuity between the Ottoman reformists and the staff who established the Republic of Turkey (Keyder Ç. , Türkiye'de Modernleşmenin Doğrultusu, 1999, s. 29-42; Mardin Ş. , Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?, 1973). However,

Kaliber argues that State of the Republic of Turkey emerged as a political modernity project with continuity and discontinuity relations with the past aiming to bring qualities such as modern nation, national identity and popular will, which have been claimed to be present in the society for quite a long time. The scholar further believes that these thoughts are important in terms of creating a new society (Kaliber, 2016, p. 110).

Undoubtedly, the Union and Progress movement paved the way for many ideologies and institutions in the Kemalist order. The most evident movement of thought in both the Union and Progress and Kemalist ruling periods was Turkism. Nevertheless, it would be useful at this point to draw attention to a fact mentioned by Ünüvar: Rather than continuity between Turkism policies generated to find a solution to the survival issue of the Ottoman State and Turkish nationalism present in the nation-state building process of the Republic, Ünüvar believes that there are many differences (Unvar, 2016, p. 132). According to Üstel, the “continuity elements” transferred from the Second Constitutional Era to the Republic’s citizenship resulted predominantly from the influence of the French Third Republic on educators mentality during the Second Constitutional Era. Alleging that educators in the Second Constitutional Era endeavored to build nation-state citizenship in an environment where there was no nation-state, the author explains the development of citizenship and Turkist ideology as follows: “... *[this] will compel the emphasis on “participatory-civil citizenship” of the Second Constitutional Era towards complete loyalty to nation-state and militant citizenship, which is the expression of belonging, and on the other hand, it will blend the Turkist-Nationalist ideology gaining power after the Balkan War and the organic-ethnic dimension of its nation contemplation with nationalism*” (Üstel, II.Meşrutiyet Vatandaşın İcadı, 2016, p. 179). As stated by

Üstel, the change of many factors and internal dynamics has brought along consecutive changes, transformations and discontinuities in both the citizenship scope and ideology.



2. MODERNIZATION MOVEMENTS

2.1. Modernization Process in the Ottoman Empire

İnalçık accepts 1699 as the starting year of our Westernization history. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire was definitely defeated by Europe in Karlowitz in that year, and this defeat brought along many deep changes. According to Professor İnalçık, the Ottomans definitely accepted the superiority of the European culture after 1699 (İnalçık, 2016). According to Çiğdem, the Ottoman, Japanese, Russian and Iranian societies have always had awareness about differentiating the Western science, technology, industry and mindset as well as worldview at various levels. He states that these Western societies have always had a privileged position in the modernization process due to the sum of their historical experiences (Çiğdem, "Türk Batılılaşması'nı Açıklayıcı Bir Kavram: Türk Başkallığı: Batılılaşma, Modernite ve Modernizasyon, 2016, p. 69). Furthermore, the historical routes, social visions, political institutions and scientific understanding of societies outside the West have always evolved in the orbit of the West. The common feature of non-Western societies or those outside the West is, as stated by Göle, their commitment to Western modernity (Göle, Batı Dışı Modernlik: Kavram Üzerine, 2016, p. 63). For sure, declarations of rights and freedoms in the West have affected many people around the world. Magna Carta Libertatum published in 1215 and the Bill of Rights published in 1688 are among the first examples of such declarations. Aiming at drawing the lines of monarchy, these texts are the founding documents of modern constitutions. Primarily in Europe and many other countries around the world, where the

concepts of freedom and equality started to be discussed, people entered into contracts with states and sometimes there had been conflicts named after wars of independence and freedom, causing large scale of deaths. John Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* written against absolutist regime had undoubtedly served as a compass in the US struggle for independence. Locke stated that the fundamental duty of state is to protect its people, their properties, freedom and right to life. The protests starting in 1770 against British colonialism gradually turned into organized rebellions and in 1774, the colonies claimed their own rights to life. When it came to July 4, 1776, the US promulgated its "Declaration of Independence". Nonetheless, the US Constitution had to wait until 1788 due to meticulous and careful work in drafting.

Tekeli believes that once a modernity project reveals at any place in the world, it has the capacity to transform the entire world with large-scale influence. This project gained momentum in Turkey in the 19th century with the Young Turks movement (Tekeli, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşüncenin Gelişimi Konusunda Bir Üst Anlatı*, 2016, p. 20). On the other hand, France, which had been a guiding light for the Young Turks movement in terms of ideology and activities, witnessed transformations in a much bloodier and harsher struggle. The French Constitution, which had a major effect on the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, was based on the demands of leading figures including Montesquieu and J.J. Rousseau for "equality, freedom and separation of powers" as thoughts triggering revolutions. As a matter of fact, the new classes emerging with the 18th century Industrial Revolution completely changed the social structure. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights declared in 1789 totally removed the king's authority and in 1791, the French Constitution entered into force. The core of the Constitution was

supported by Rousseau's "popular sovereignty" and Montesquieu's "separation of powers" principles. The French Revolution gave rise to large impacts in many geographies; caused wars, mass migrations and undertook the role of pioneering the enlightenment of societies. Primarily Namık Kemal and many other Ottoman intellectuals adopted these aforementioned principles and endeavored to put them into practice (see: (Berkes, Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma, 2017, p. 292). With its "nationalist movements," the French Revolution gave a deep shock to many empires around the world and changed their social, political, cultural and demographic characteristics, while the Ottoman Empire also had its share from this transformation (Engin, 1992).

In light of these developments, the Young Ottomans, a secret society established in 1865 by a group of Ottoman intellectuals, were influenced by several political "classics". They read the works of Rousseau and Montesquieu directly or through secondary sources (Mardin Ş. , Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895-1908, 2017, p. 12). Ahmad explains this period with reminding us of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 in the nation-building process as well as bringing European armies into the interior regions of Islam for the first time since the Crusades. It is a fact that the Ottoman Sultan of the 18th century struggled with the temporary alliances made with European powers and the explosive power of nationalism exported from the French. The first incident bursting out due to this movement was with Serbs and then the Greek independence movements in the 1820s. Undergoing these processes of struggle for independence in the empire, Turks had to deal with suppressing these uprisings, however they eventually adopted nationalism and built a nation-state for themselves (Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, 2017, p. 36). There is no doubt that the developments outside the empire

also affected the Ottoman state deeply and made discontinuity an obligation. Political developments such as the Russo-Turkish Wars, the French Revolution, the Greek War of Independence and the Revolt of Mehmet Ali Pasha had constituted the series of incidents that led the Ottoman society to the Imperial Edict of Gülhane and consecutive reforms (Demirtaş, *Jön Türkler Bağlamında Osmanlı'da Batılılaşma Hareketleri*, 2007, p. 390). In line with these facts, it can fairly be stated that Turkish nationalism and nationalist movements are not a cause, but the effects of certain developments. The bureaucrats and intellectuals of the dissolving empire pursued various ideas and thoughts to save the state from collapse (Kasalak, 2009, p. 69).

While describing the Ottoman Empire, Tekeli underlines that the conditions before the Industrial Revolution were set by the state's institutionalization and organization stages within the limits of production, transportation and communications technology. When defining the state, he referred to a limited central army and order of lands united under military command, and further explained the management of property by the commitment of the rayah (non-Muslim citizens in the Ottoman Empire) to the lands while property was managed by division of labor between the landowner and the rayah under the Sultan (Tekeli, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşüncenin Gelişimi Konusunda Bir Üst Anlatı*, 2016, p. 22). In the 19th century, however, the rulers of the Ottoman State understood that development via the conquering policy was not possible anymore. Therefore, while state reforms were accelerated to once again have the upper hand against the West, the technological supremacy of the West was accepted, trying to bring the "technology" to the homelands (Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, Cilt 1, 1998, p. 6). This transformation was internalized and "initiated" by statesmen, who admired the

West, and was continued via a “Westernization policy”. Zürcher argues that there were two basic purposes of these initiatives. Firstly, it was aimed to adopt Western institutions and administrative methods to make the state administration efficient and the second aim was to make reforms by observing Europe to attract European states to the Ottoman side (Zürcher E. J., *Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık*, 2010, p. 15).

In this process that would last until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Zürcher thinks of the minorities and social movements that particularly “literate” Christian communities in the empire were influenced by the French Revolution. He bases the reason for this on the commercial connections with Greeks and Serbs. It is a fact that these two minority groups in the Ottoman Empire were largely affected by the French Revolution in terms of politics and ideology, yet Zürcher alleges that “freedom” – the propaganda discourse of the French Revolution – did not mean guarantee of “civil rights”, but “national independence” for these minorities. This movement started with the Serbian Revolution in 1808 and riveted with Serbian Independence in 1878 Berlin Congress. In this context, Zürcher shows the nationalist movements in Asia and the Balkans among the reasons for the collapse of the Ottoman State (Zürcher E. J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, 2013, p. 50).

According to Tekeli, there is a need to form a metanarrative in order to understand the social changes, ideas and their interactions taking place between the time of experiencing developments and the time when they are passed into recorded history. *“Such a metanarrative can form the main line to describe the development of the modernity project in the world, its transformation of the Ottoman Empire by collapse and emergence of the Republic of Turkey out of this empire to flourish and continue its*

growth. Formation of such a metanarrative will allow deeper understanding of the change problematique that society encounters and its reflections on political thought” (Tekeli, Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşüncenin Gelişimi Konusunda Bir Üst Anlatı, 2016, p. 19). Starting with modernization, the disintegrations, discontinuities and continuities caused by this transformation can be clearly observed in the transition process from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey. The question to be asked is: Is the Republic project, the foundations of which were laid with the modernization movement, the end point of the overall modernization movements? While Foucault defines the modern type of individual as one who is always engaged in inventions, yet he adds that this individual is also under the effect of discorsal practices and new forms of administration(Foucault, 2005).

Shaw highlights that the Ottoman State gained an autocratic quality together with reformations in addition to the emergence of a new ruling class, pointing out to the fact that the most important target of the Reforms was autocracy and centralization (Shaw, 1968). Göle, on the other hand, states that the Turkish modernization project was top-down and although modernization turned its back on the past and traditions, the civil society reproduced chaos while modernization penetrated into life practices, drawing attention to the paradox between demilitarization and socialization (Göle, Batı Dışı Modernlik: Kavram Üzerine, 2016, p. 66).

So far, many scholars have attempted to analyze the several triggering factors between the French Revolution and the Republic of Turkey. In Köker's comment, Ahmad provides an explanation in reference to the information taken as reference from Esat Bozkurt. Ahmad identifies Kemalists as “autonomous due to all class interests” in

consequence of the lack of a bourgeoisie class as in French bourgeoisie led by Tiers État and argues that the aim of this class was to act with the mission to carry out a revolution in the name of a bourgeoisie class. Ahmad further states that Kemalists were aware that there was a need to produce the political democracy in Turkey as it is necessary to have a bourgeoisie revolution similar to the one in Europe (Ahmad, İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme, 2016).

2.2.Modernization Movements, Selim III

The Ottoman Empire was one of the most developed examples of pre-modernity and pre-industrialization empires. The empire spread to a large geography incorporating different religious beliefs and many ethnic groups with the capacity of keeping them together via its peace policy and organization. Before modernity, the ruler of the state received his legitimacy from the divine power as a representative of the Almighty on earth (Tekeli, Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşüncenin Gelişimi Konusunda Bir Üst Anlatı, 2016, p. 21).

Stanford Shaw refers to the reign of Selim III as “a transitional period between the old and the new”. This period was marked by “developing modernity projects”, starting to get to know Europe and being influenced by Western societies in improving the conditions of the Ottoman society (Aytekin, The Intellectual, Economic and Bureaucratic Codes Of Ottoman - Turkish Modernization, 2013). Since the need for Westernization was realized in the Ottoman State, first it was decided to provide military revision and then issues such as political and administrative centralization and education reforms were brought to agenda (Toker & Tekin, Batıcı Siyasi Düşüncenin

Karakteristikleri ve Evreleri: "Kamusuz Cumhuriyet'ten Kamusuz Demokrasiye", 2016, p. 82).

Koçak believes that the Ottoman modernization, in fact, started only as a military modernization. Finding this situation quite natural, the author alleges that every society acts on filling the deficiencies they see in vital areas. Another analysis of the author reveals that this period was not marked by a modernization process in today's sense; therefore, he underlines that a Westernization and modernization project under today's conditions cannot be attributed to this period (Koçak, Osmanlı/Türk Siyasi Geleneğinde Modern Bir Toplum Yaratma Projesi Olarak Anayasanın Keşfi, 2016, p. 73). In light of this information, it can be stated that Selim III's New Order was a reform in the military area. As a matter of fact, Ahmad also notes that the early period Ottoman modernization was limited to establishing a modern army and catching up with the West by "military reforms", however, he stresses that without modernization in "political, social and economic" structures, it was rather difficult to realize modernization or whatsoever this process is called, drawing attention to the contours of modernization (Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, 2017, pp. 34-36). One of the most important innovations brought by Selim III's New Order efforts to the Ottoman history was "abandoning the *autarchic* principle of seeing yourself superior than European states", says Tunaya, pointing out to the changing "characteristic" structure during Selim the reign of Selim III (Tunaya, Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri, 2016, s. 22). On the other hand, Selim himself was an intellectual and a poet and composer. He invented the *Sûz-i Dilâra* maqam as a combined form in Classical Turkish Music (Akşin, Siyasal Tarih, 1988, s. 73). Nevertheless, this modernization Selim III tried to implement by the state

was stopped by ulema or Muslim scholars by issuing a fetwa ending up with murdering Selim III by Kabakçı Mustafa under the cooperation of the Ulema and Janissaries. “I can be Muscovy, but not a member of the New Order”, claimed the Janissaries and vented their anger by a “reactionary movement” (Tunaya, Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri, 2016, s. 22).

The forerunners of the Young Turk movement can be found in the reforms started by Selim III and continued by his successors (Ahmad, İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme, 2016). With Akşin's detection, it is understood that there are two opinions regarding the New Order reform. Although Karal argues that this was a comprehensive movement affecting every area of life, Bernard Lewis alleges that the reforms were predominantly in the military field. Shaw, on the other hand, regards Selim III as “the continuation of the new traditionalist reform line”, yet, he also suggests there was general effort to modernize the administrative, economic and social sphere of life as well (Akşin, Siyasal Tarih, 1988, s. 78). Young military officials receiving education at military schools established thanks to the military reforms made during Selim III turned their face to the West and questioned the deteriorating course of events against “fundamentalism” and “reactionism” (Demirtaş, Jön Türkler Bağlamında Osmanlı'da Batılılaşma Hareketleri, 2007, p. 390).

Nonetheless, Selim made many enemies due to the politics he implemented. As a result of his effort to form a new army, he fell out with the army institution, while most of the ulema were not fond of the French effect on the palace and young members of the gentry (Zürcher E. J., Turkey: A Modern History, 2013, p. 47). The efforts to take Western army institutions as a model gained momentum particularly during the reign of Selim III (1789-1807), however, they were halted by the “rejection of the traditional

Ottoman culture” and “combined reaction of those who felt under threat” (Mardin Ş. , Türk Modernleşmesi, 2018, s. 11).

2.3.A Reformist Sultan, Mahmud II

At the end of this period, Mahmud II, the murderer of Selim III, appeared on the scene of the history. Known as a “hard case”, Mahmud’s grand vizier was Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. One of Mahmud’s most important actions was to help adoption of “the Charter of Alliance, known as the Ottoman Magna Carta” (Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, 2017, p. 41). Tunaya claims that Mahmud added rationality to his authority by referring to the term “intellectual despotism”, drawing attention to the fact that Mahmud led in many reforms “under the rule of the state” (Tunaya, Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri, 2016, s. 26). For the first time during his reign, the idea that was “explicitly put forward” to create an Ottoman nation aimed to unite various sects within the Ottoman Empire (unity of nations and concord of nations) (Hilav, 2018, s. 283). The Sultan made radical decisions in military and social areas, and most importantly, he abrogated the Janissary Army in 1826, passing into history by the name, the Auspicious Incident. In Tunaya’s criticism of Mahmud II, it draws attention that the effect of the ulama or the religious class on justice and education matters was not lifted (Tunaya, Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri, 2016, s. 24-26). Zürcher underlines that Mahmud’s most important political desire was to consolidate the central authority and for this reason, he established the Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye or the Mansure Army in order to revive the New Order pioneered by Selim III (Zürcher E. J., Turkey: A Modern History, 2013, pp. 43-48). Another innovation starting during Selim III’s period

and continuing during the reign of Mahmud II was the “struggle against the landed proprietors seen as a threat risk” (Demirtaş, Jön Türkler Bağlamında Osmanlı'da Batılılaşma Hareketleri, 2007). This problem continued until the establishment of the Republic.

As is known, the most important action during the reign of Mahmud II was the “centralization of power”. Mahmud is the sultan who took the most radical decision in this regard, since he bravely abolished the Guild of Janissaries. Not only that, he changed the taxation system. This reform reduced the power of feudal families, while advancing transportation and communication activities further curbed their influence. Communication networks continued to develop during the period of Abdulhamid II, serving to further centralize the state. In the next periods, telegrams and newspapers played a major role in national revolts. Another important reform was that the ulema or the religious class was taken under the state control, leading to weakening of many foundations. From that time on, the Sublime Porte had full control. Drawing attention to the importance of this set of developments, Zürcher said that “centralism, one of the fundamental principles of the Republic, was the corner stone of the unitary state and this process started with Mahmud II” (Zürcher E. J., Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık, 2016, p. 17). It is a known fact that these changes and transformations have continued up until today. In the discussions of continuity-discontinuity – the subject of this thesis – centralization has its place as a significant variable. In addition to this, Berkes argues that reformism during the period of Mahmud was in the form of “absolute monarchy” and explains the reason for this under four categories: “a) the Sultan’s absolute right to power continued, b) the ruled were no more the “rayah” but the “subjects” and the “people”, c)

the Sultan's household troops were abolished and instead, a military organization was formed by permuting people to be conscripted without discriminating against class, race or religion, d) continuous assemblies were held with top executives endowed with the right to legislate chosen from ulema members ruling the civil bureaucracy and the army". Arguing that this regime also resembled an "autocracy" rule, Berkes thus underscores the "conflicts in the transitional period" (Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 2017, p. 170).

Zürcher, as well, made important observations regarding the periods of the two sultans. Arguing that Selim III and Mahmud II experienced the same dilemma as the Ottoman reformists, the scholar purports that the source of motivation during the period was the effective bureaucratic structure and reforms shaped by modern education, while he utters that the advantage taken by eliminating foreign interventions in Egypt could not be obtained in our lands during this period. Additionally, Zürcher utters that foreign interventions during that period were at a level that led to negative consequences (Zürcher E. J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, 2013, p. 59). On the other hand, Shaw argues that it is necessary to note that Selim III reached the farthest point of reformations even though the description of Selim III as "traditionalist reformer" is accepted, drawing attention to Selim's radical mindset in reforms (Akşin, *Siyasal Tarih*, 1988, s. 79).

In his analysis of Turkish modernization, Şerif Mardin, on the other hand, suggests that Ottoman ambassadors assigned in Europe in the 18th century learned about the importance of guaranteeing property rights and spreading education, etc. whereby protective measures that would increase the efficiency of people's lives, also referring to intellectual enlightenment. Mardin states that "They aimed to empower the middle class, establish national unity and clear the privileges left from feudalism by establishing

national state”, pointing out to state duties. However, Mardin refers to the fact that this system was later called “intellectual despotism”, claiming that the reformist movements were predominantly inspired from cameralism in Europe and it was supposed that they would create an “Ottoman consciousness” by “administrative, legal and economic measures” in the “dispersed” Ottoman Empire, yet this goal was not achieved in the long term (Mardin Ş. , Türk Modernleşmesi, 2018, s. 12).

During the reign of Mahmud II, in 1824, the first reforms in education started following the edict of “Primary Schools” (Kapıcı, 2010). Besides, Mahmud accepted Western methods without closing madrassahs and started to implement a Western style of education. He made primary education compulsory and took a groundbreaking step for higher education by establishing the Military College and the Medical School by “Western thoughts and methods”. Mahmud also sent 150 students to various cities in Europe for education. Previously implemented by Egyptian Mehmet Ali, this method was initially met with reaction from people, and Mahmud was even accused of “religiousness” due to sending officials from the Palace School to Europe so that they were raised as teachers and civil servants (Ortaylı, The Longest Century of the Empire, 2018). With the Statute of Education published in 1869, primary schools, Ottoman junior high schools, high schools and secondary schools started to be established after 1879. While there were 899,932 students in 29,139 primary schools opened in 1900, there were 109 high schools with around 20,000 students in 1906 (Tekeli & İlkin, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Eğitim ve Bilgi Üretim Sisteminin Oluşumu ve Dönüşümü, 1993, s. 75-76). With these initiatives, Mahmud laid the foundations for the Imperial Edict of Gülhane in 1839 (Yurdaydın, 1988, s. 285).

2.4.The Imperial Edict of Gülhane in 1839

The 19th century, when the Ottoman State took major steps for Westernization, was a period of “institutionalizing” the large-scope “political”, “intellectual” and “economic” changes and transformations experienced for centuries in the West, also regarded as a “peak” for such transformations (Bulut, 2009, s. 152). In the Ottoman lands, the Westernization movements emerged in the Reform era (Demirtaş, Jön Türkler Bağlamında Osmanlı'da Batılılaşma Hareketleri, 2007, p. 390). According to Tanör, although the reform period and the Imperial Edict of Gülhane are “closely related”, they indeed, are different periods (Tanör, Osmanlı - Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri, 2018, s. 75). Ortaylı refers to the Imperial Edict of Gülhane in 1839 as a “constitutional development”. Ortaylı further explains that this constitutional development provided the subjects of the empire with the right to participate in public services and equality in receiving such services, while statutory penalties and proceedings in tax issues became assurance for human life (The Recent History of Turkey, İlber Ortaylı pp:13). One of the most important handicaps of the period of reforms was certainly the “foreign pressure”. As a matter of fact, European states put pressure on the Empire to improve the right of the minorities living within the borders of the Ottoman Empire. As Zürcher phrases, “they put pressure to improve the position of these communities, who were deemed as second class subjects”, which explains the element of foreign pressure (Zürcher E. J., Turkey: A Modern History, 2013, p. 92).

The Ottoman society experienced many changes all of a sudden after the declaration of the Imperial Edict of Gülhane on November 3, 1839, in addition to

numerous other radical changes from 1876 to 1908. During this period, many new groups and institutions emerged, while transformations came one after another under the name of modernization, Westernization and contemporary development. Thus, the period from 1839 – when Mahmud II died – to 1908, was named after the “Reform Era”. In this context, Ortaylı defines the Reform era as a “Westernization movement” to “re-strengthen” the social bonds that had been severed (Kurtaran, 2011). On the other hand, the Imperial Edict of Gülhane is not seen as a Constitution by many researchers. It was a manifesto of rights declared as an edict under the rule of the Sultan and Tanör also confirms this thought by saying that the Sultan limited his rights by his own will for the first time (Tanör, *Osmanlı - Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri*, 2018, s. 91). The changes in the military area, on the other hand, were referred to as the “Regular Army”. Furthermore, the army was equipped with modern European technology during this term. Mahmud II took compulsory military service as an example from Egypt and started to implement it in many places in the empire as of 1845 (Zürcher E. J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, 2013, p. 93).

There were many changes in the legal system, as well. It is known that the Ottoman legal system was run by the ecclesiastics law. However, statesmen of the reform era brought in parallel laws (and courts) in addition to the sharia or religious law. According to Zürcher, this was the first step in secularization: “by this means, public spheres were left outside the scope of the sharia’s and ulema’s authority” (Zürcher E. J., *Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık*, 2016, p. 18). This was, of course, an important step in secularization, nonetheless, as Zürcher underlines, the transformation process in other areas – which demonstrate the importance of the reforms – in the Ottoman state gave the

“administrative, judicial and education systems their permanent shape” although some of the reforms fell short or could not achieve their purpose.

Oğuz advocates the idea that the modernization movements accelerating with the declaration of the Imperial Edict of Gülhane represented “top-down reform” movements (Oğuz, 2013). Zürcher, on the other hand, purports that the period from 1839 to 1876 is known as the Reforms Era, yet he argues that the reforms period ended in 1871. The term Ottoman Sultan’s Decree (the period from 1839 to 1876 featuring many reforms) was, indeed, used before 1839 for example in the edict regarding the establishment of the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances. Here, the most important point is that there was continuity between the period of Mahmud II and his successors. Yet, Zürcher argues that there was a difference in these periods: “the center of power switched from the Sublime Porte to the bureaucracy” (Zürcher E. J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, 2013, p. 83).

From another perspective, past experiences and “traditions” undoubtedly have a large share in the process leading to the reforms era. Yet, as stated by Ortaylı, the period of reforms was a starting point for the “tradition of changing traditions” and this period was marked by pioneering type of people who criticize and seek the truth (Ortaylı, *The Longest Century of the Empire*, 2018, p. 250). In the same vein, the measures taken by reformists against the religious class were noteworthy. Madrassahs, thus, had always been against the reforms. The madrassah institution was not changed after Selim III was murdered as the institution tried to remain impartial, however, alternative schools were opened. While madrassahs undertook the mission to spread theocracy, schools initiated the mission of Westernization (Tunaya, *Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri*, 2016, s. 32).

Saying, “The group known as the reformist intellectuals was largely the output of the chambers of translation”, Ortaylı draws attention to the importance of these institutions during that period. In these chambers, where Western languages were taught and non-Muslim communities as much as Muslims received education, became one of the most important offices of the then-Ministry of Foreign Affairs and even the entire state organization, as underlined by Ortaylı. Indeed, one of the most important private secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chamber of Translation sent its groups of officers to important cities including London and Paris and paved the way for raising a new generation of statesmen who were informed about Europe in the 1840-1850s. One of the most notable factors in this process was the desire of the Chamber of Translation to educate Turks, who were most “biased” against Western languages and culture. Ortaylı says that young people educated at this office during this period learnt European policies and spoke Western languages “excellently”, and this generation left its legacy to a new group, known as New Ottomans, who would continue the modernization ideal (Ortaylı, *The Longest Century of the Empire*, 2018, pp. 246-247). In this regard, Alkan has conducted analyses that predominantly support Ortaylı’s opinions. According to the Ottoman modernization stages, a new executive elite developed, while it is stated in parallel that a new opponent intellectuals’ group emerged in the same period. At the same time, it is uttered that reformist intellectuals and elites were raised by bureaucrats with a master-apprentice relationship particularly after receiving bureaucratic legal assurance at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Alkan M. Ö., *Resmi İdeolojinin Doğuşu ve Evrimi Üzerine Bir Deneme*, 2014, p. 380).

During the Reform Era, ministries were founded as administrative innovations, division of labor was ensured and every problem in the central administration was solved in the assembly. Decisions taken by the assembly were finalized at the Ottoman Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances before submitting them to the Sultan's approval. Providing approval for all reforms, this assembly's duty was to draft laws and statutes. These ministries and assemblies, members of which were assigned by the Sultan, and reforms in the central administration resembled the Western system to some extent (Acun, 2007). Among the changing institutions, the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances was critical. This institutions was revised in 1839 and introduced a kind of parliamentary system. However, Zürcher deems this not as fully a parliament, but the first step of assemblies and councils that would later replace this system. Stating that many bureaucratic institutions were established during the reform era, Zürcher asserts that unnecessary personnel were dismissed in order to develop expertise and ensure efficiency, thus leading to the formation of new ministries, advisory councils and "specialty boards" for public works and commercial issues. Considering this period, one of the most important factors in continuity was certainly the parliamentary system. In this context, Zürcher argues that decisions were taken by majority verdict in 1839 and the Ottoman Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances was a sort of parliament where decisions were finalized before submitting for the Sultan's approval, nevertheless, the scholar also suggests that this and next councils were not the first step of forming a parliament despite the vast similarity. The reason for this, argues Zürcher, is that the council was not formed by elections, but it was only an advisory committee (Zürcher E. J., Turkey: A Modern History, 2013, p. 85).

Ortaylı regards Mustafa Reşit Pasha, A. Cevdet Pasha, Âli and Fuad Pasha as the pioneers of the Reform Era and mentions that they took power from a cadre who seemed “reformist” by appearance but were indeed “conservative”. Nevertheless, the leading names of the period managed to combine this conservativeness with pragmatic reforms and became the representatives of the “new citizen type” in the 19th century Ottoman society, while “deliberatively” continuing the old social lifestyle (Ortaylı, *The Longest Century of the Empire*, 2018, p. 237). One of the leading names in the Sublime Porte’s bureaucracy during the reign of Mahmud II, young Mustafa Reşit Pasha was a statesman who endeavored to leave this legacy to the next generation. As a matter of fact, he took İbrahim Şinasi Efendi, “our first playwright who took the West as a model”, under his protection and later sent him to Paris (Akşin, *Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi (1839-1908)*, 1988, p. 321). In his return from London as the London ambassador, Pasha worked for the adoption of the Imperial Edict of Gülhane and at the same time, he served as grand vizier five times during his life. In this regard, Ortaylı evaluated the criticisms against the statesmen during that period by demonstrating his characteristic humor saying that the reformist statesmen acted realistically considering the “conditions of the empire” and “deliberating their opinions” against the claim that Mustafa Reşit Pasha compelled the declaration of the Reforms since he was influenced by British statesmen when serving as London ambassador (Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 2018, s. 246).

Another important name in the Reform Era, Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, on the other hand, represented “conservativeness” and “moderateness” during that period. Cevdet transferred from the religious class to the civil servants class and later became a vizier. Indeed, he claimed that Islam was such a superior order that it did not require any

reforms (Ortaylı, *The Longest Century of the Empire*, 2018, p. 238). Cevdet Pasha argued that the European civilization spreading from one country to another should have benefited in the field of “science” and especially “physical sciences”. Accordingly, Islam, caliphate and sultanate were parts of an inseparable whole. However, he stated that this situation was different in Europe, pointing out to the existence of two types of states – one “spiritual” and the other “corporeal”. The corporeal government, he stated, consisted of absolutism, constitutionalism and republicanism. In Pasha’s class analysis, on the other hand, it is understood that he purported there was not any class in Islam and the Ottoman Empire, while he argued that Europe was divided into several classes due to undergoing the feudalist experience. Claiming that there was no need for the Ottoman Constitution (of 1876) in places where there was the rule of the Sharia, Cevdet highlighted the importance of Islamic unity. On the other hand, he also claimed that “the main power” of the empire was Turks, and aspired to use the benefits of the reforms accepting the fact that “the wheel was not spinning” in the Ottoman Empire (Akşin, *Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi (1839-1908)*, 1988, p. 332). Ortaylı suggests that the changing information and comments in *Tarih-i Cevdet*, book of Ottoman history written by Ahmet Cevdet, did not result from “favoritism” but from the reformist’s own “wisdom of power” (Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, 2018, s. 239).

Regarding the innovations in the field of education during the Reform Era, it is noteworthy that Ottoman junior high schools and community colleges played an important role in the formation of Western-type secular educational institutions. Compulsory primary education was accepted by an edict published during the period of Mahmud II and this practice started to disseminate after the Law on Public Education was

enacted in 1869 (Üstel, II. Meşrutiyet ve Vatandaşın "İcad"ı, 2014, s. 168). After 1869, the education system taken from the French education system consisting of three levels was adopted in the Ottoman Empire: Junior High Schools, High Schools and Palace Schools. The decision to open girls' schools was also taken in this period. Nonetheless, only two Palace Schools (*Mekteb-i Sultani*) were opened despite all the efforts: The first one was Galatasaray opened in 1869 and the second was the Ottoman Secondary School for Orphans (*Daru'ş-şafaka*) opened in 1873. Although universities were not yet opened in these years, several vocational schools were opened including the Ottoman Military College, Imperial School of Military Engineering, Imperial School of Naval Engineering, Imperial School of Medicine and Imperial School of Political Sciences. These schools, especially Galatasaray, played a major role in raising the executive cadres for the constitutional monarchy and later the Republic, leading in the foundation of Ottoman constitutional movements and proclamation of the Republic (Zürcher E. J., Turkey: A Modern History, 2013, pp. 100-102). According to Üstel, the role of schools and especially primary schools in the development of a new type of citizen during the Second Constitutional era was similar to the French Third Republic. Besides, Üstel argues that the curricula changes after 1908 were made to address the concern over social engineering, therefore, the courses of "Civics", "Knowledge of Civilization and Morality" and "Economics" – which were an indispensable part of the curricula of primary and secondary schools in the Republic period – were immediately started to be taught at schools after the declaration of the Second Constitutional era (Üstel, II. Meşrutiyet ve Vatandaşın "İcad"ı, 2014, s. 168). This movement was an important

indicator of continuity in education as well as the tendency towards creating a new type of citizen between the two periods.

2.5. Ottoman Reform Edict of 1856

With Tunaya's words, "the Reform Era was a staggering period between ideas and institutions that deny each other". Nevertheless, the most important development of the Reforms Era was the Ottoman Reform Edict of 1856, which paved the way for fundamental changes in the Ottoman social life (Tunaya, *Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri*, 2016, s. 18). Mardin accentuates the importance of the Edict of Reform by pointing out to the fact that the privilege of Muslims, who had dominance in the past, was removed in an attempt to form Ottoman citizenship without discrimination against religion (Mardin Ş. , *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 2018, s. 14). In this new form, the empire was divided into provinces. During this period, the regulation of administrative districts and council of state was referred to as "the second phase of the reform era" (Tunaya, *Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri*, 2016, s. 35-36). According to this regulation, in addition to executives appointed from the center, by-elections were used to appoint executive assemblies to provinces, sub-provinces and sanjaks. In sanjaks and provinces, there were two Muslim and two non-Muslim elected members, while there were 3 elected members in litigation assemblies in districts (Shaw, *The Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, pp. 122-125). Named after "the Council of State" under the influence of the French State Council (*Conseil d'Etat*), this assembly represented different classes and non-Muslims (Shaw, *The Central Legislative Councils in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reform Movement before 1876*, 2014, s. 41-42).

Among the institutions reformed in accordance with 1868 Law on Provincial Organization, the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances was very critical. This institution was renovated in 1839, “turning into a sort of parliamentary system”. However, Zürcher does not accept this as a fully-fledged parliament, but as the first step of developing into assemblies and councils in the future (Zürcher E. J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, 2013, p. 95). When referring to this period, Tunaya states that these activities served as a “bridge” until the constitutional monarchy period (Tunaya, *Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri*, 2016, s. 37). The Imperial Criminal Code, the Administrative Law and the Commercial Code were the outputs of this delegation’s work (Tunaya, *Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri*, 2016, s. 31). Ali and Fuat Pashas as well as Mustafa Reşit Pasha were among the most important statesmen of this period. The entire executive power, on the other hand, belonged to the Sultan, similar to the European monarchy system. Besides this, there were also statesmen such as Saffet Pasha, who claimed that the “Westernization movements must be carried out as a whole, rather taking models from the West piece by piece” (Mardin Ş. , *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 2018, s. 14).

Analyzing this particular period on the basis of Şerif Mardin’s famous study on “center-periphery” relations, it can fairly be stated that the period “was one of the most significant developments in Turkish society and politics with a modernization lasting over a century up until the recent times”. In his analysis of the bureaucratic, tradesmen and gentry classes emerging during this period, Mardin demonstrates that “cultural division” in Turkish politics coincided with this period of modernization. Underscoring the growing gap between center and periphery due to developing technology, the author

explains that this situation resulted in “unification of rural residents under Islam against secularism to show their reaction” (Mardin Ş. , Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?, 1973)

2.6.A Pioneering Intellectual Group: New Ottomans

Although the Imperial Edict of Gülhane produced many consequences from different perspectives, one of the major result was the “initiation” of the New Ottomans movement by the bureaucrats who “reacted” against the reforms (Demirtaş, Jön Türk Bağlamında Osmanlı'da Batılılaşma Hareketleri, 2007, s. 391). While reform attempts continued in the Ottoman Empire, opponents raised their voices, criticizing the Imperial Edict and the reformist developments in the Ottoman State. The opponents were indeed representatives of the bureaucracy and this opposition gradually turned into a movement known as the Young Ottomans Movement (Zürcher E. J., Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık, 2016, pp. 20-21). Although there is no consensus on the foundation and activities of the Committee of Young Ottomans, it is known that the concepts of “republic, constitution, assembly and consultancy” were “first propounded” by the group of Young Ottomans (Kasalak, 2009, p. 70). Also referred to as the New or Neo Ottomans, this group was the pioneer of the movement for freedoms in the Western sense.

Tunaya states the following about the foundation and founders of the committee:

1) Alliance of domination, 2) Young Children of Turkistan (Young Turks), 3) The Committee of New Ottomans. This Committee was established in June 1865 in Istanbul. Those who participated in the founding meeting included Namık Kemal, Kayazade Reşat, Menapirzade Nuri, Sagir Beyzade Mehmet, Refik, the owner of Mir'at Journal, and Suphi

Paşazade Ayetullah. The Committee had nearly 145 members and did not have a certain program” (Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1952, s. 91-96) (Kasalak, 2009, p. 71). In this context, the group pioneered by Namık Kemal and Ziya Pasha, who claimed that the former reformists failed to understand the reality of colonialism thoroughly, only acted as a superior group which curbed their own culture, and were following Western developments only superficially while failing to comprehend the parliamentary and libertarian trend, was called the “New Ottomans” (Mardin Ş. , Türk Modernleşmesi, 2018, s. 13). The most important development in this period was the increasing number of bureaucrats and intellectuals who received Western-style education. When it came to the 1860s, on the other hand, a revolutionary group calling itself the New Ottomans promulgated their opinions shaped by their passion for a “constitution” and “parliament”. İbrahim Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ziya Paşa, Ali Suavi and Agah Efendi were among the names leaving their mark in this period (Zürcher E. J., Turkey: A Modern History, 2013, pp. 108-136). Although the Committee of Young Ottomans was first named as the Union of Patriots, they were later referred to as Young or New Ottomans (Kasalak, 2009, p. 71). The aforementioned intellectuals, on the other hand, called their own opposition movement as “*Young Ottomans*” (Tanör, Osmanlı - Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri, 2018, s. 122). Previously experiencing the joy of revolutions in Europe, these intellectuals consolidated the political thought of the Reform Era and commenced the First Young Turks Movement (Tunaya, Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri, 2016, s. 30).

According to Mardin, the Young Ottomans managed to change the society they lived in despite certain shortcomings. He also found about the Young Ottomans that it

was their success in a short time to declare a constitution shaped by opponent opinions in the period when they lived. On the other hand, the scholar argues that the group yielded propagandistic effects in the long term drawing attention to the fact that there was not any major opposition before the Young Ottomans. Mardin further advocates the idea that the opposition movements in 1889 and 1908 resulted from the efforts of the Young Ottomans, indicating continuity in a sense (Mardin Ş. , *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu*, 2012, p. 448). Zürcher, however, defines the New Ottomans as a small community within the elite class. Underlining that they lacked a solid organization and their ideas as well as discourses differed from one member to another, the scholar says, despite this, they were rather successful particularly in laying the groundwork for the 1876 Constitution. He bases this discourse on the literary studies of the intellectuals. It is undoubted that the idea of the New Ottomans influenced a large group of people between 1876 and 1908. Indeed, the New Ottomans affected and shaped Turkish intellectual and political life for quite a long time. A member of this group, Namık Kemal, who tried to synthesize Islamic traditions with liberalism, was taken as a model by the next Muslim generation supporters of innovation. Zürcher deems the New Ottomans as the first modern ideological movement within the Ottoman elites in the Empire. The biggest contribution of this group to Turkish political life was certainly their ideas opening a new pathway, while they are also accepted as the first group to form public opinion with their articles (Zürcher E. J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, 2013, pp. 111-112). While analyzing the policies of Ali and Fuad Pashas, who were among the leading statesmen in this period, Mardin underlines that “their aim was to save the state rather than giving people excessive freedoms”, pointing out to a reading of two important names of the period

(Mardin Ş. , Türk Modernleşmesi, 2018, s. 86). Furthermore, Berkes utters that Namık Kemal, who shared the same surname with Mustafa Kemal, was one of the most influential intellectuals among the Young Ottomans (Berkes, Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma, 2017, p. 299).

As determined by Karpat, the intelligentsia known as the New Ottomans were the first Muslims who put effort to support the newly founded central institutions via a theoretical legitimacy and ideology based on Islamic traditions (Karpat K. , Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Etnik Yapılanma Ve Siyaset, 2010, s. 42-47). Ramsuar, on the other hand, shared in his study that while this early period of Young Turks was a literary movement, it turned into a political movement in a short time (Ernest, 2011, p. 19). According to Mardin, the aim of the New Ottomans was to pave the way for sharing political power and separation of powers by establishing an advisory council (Mardin Ş. , Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895-1908, 2017, p. 33). However, their aim pointed at the Sublime Porte bureaucracy actually taking the “state administration” rather than the Sultan dominating the executive power. In such an unfavorable environment, intellectuals including Namık Kemal, Şinasi and Ziya Pasha strived to introduce concepts such as freedom, democracy and public representation related to liberal democracy to the society, while also trying to disseminate this understanding (Tunçay, 2.Meşrutiyet'in İlk Yılı, 23 Temmuz 1908- 23 Temmuz 1909, 2018, p. 28). Beyond this, this elite group, who started the building process of modernization, was at a different position in economic and social terms, accepting the fact that the modernization movement against traditional values could only be possible via changes in cultural and social life (Ahmad, İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme, 2016, p. 165). The Young Ottomans underscored concepts such as constitutional

monarchy, justice, equality, freedom, motherland and general public (Kasalak, 2009, p. 77). On the other hand, Aydemir is of the opinion that the Ottoman society was a community of different races and peoples, not a national organization. Therefore, he stresses that the Young Ottomans' struggle was solely based on the "form of state" grounding on "constitutionalism" to ensure the continuity of the state. Thus, Aydemir reflects their frame of mind (Aydemir, Makedonya'da Orta Asya'ya Enver Paşa 1860-1908, Cilt.1, 2009, s. 31-32).

Nonetheless, the most efficient view in this regard belongs, again, to Mardin. As stated by Kara, the entrenched structure analyzed and built on the basis of 'reactionism' by Tunaya pertaining to the idea of pan-Islamism was elaborated more in-depth by Şerif Mardin's studies, while the relations between religion and modernization started to be analyzed more cold-bloodedly (Kara, 2014, s. 236). Mardin partially accepts the claim that the Young Ottomans were the intellectual ancestors of today's Republic of Turkey. Even finding the idea that Namık Kemal was Mustafa Kemal's intellectual guide unobjectionable, Mardin underlines that the search for an Islamic political form in the New Ottomans' theories is neglected. Arguing that this source in Young Turks was weaker and completely invisible in Atatürk, Mardin explains the method to establish a connection between the New Ottomans and Atatürk with the weakness of Islamic content (Mardin Ş. , Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu, 2012, p. 450). While this analysis by Mardin serves in a sense to "continuity", it also conveys the points of discontinuity. On the other hand, Kasalak supports this thesis by the "continuity" understanding, stating that the New Ottomans movement resulted from continuity, connection and intellectual legacies in the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, in that, particularly the founding

fathers of the Republic were majorly influenced by the New Ottomans movement and thus, they sustained their ideas for the next period (Kasalak, 2009). Koçak, on the other hand, explains the New Ottoman opposition differently from the Ottoman opposition, however he also suggests that it resembled the Ottoman opposition movement and was among the different fractions of the Ottoman ruling elite in an attempt to clarify this movement as a familiar structure as a variant of royal struggles for power. In this context, he analyzed the relations between the New Ottomans and domestic and foreign tutelars who would give them the opportunity to progress. Stating that the tutelary which was tried to be established by bureaucratic means turned into political tutelary after a while, the author claimed that the Egyptian Dynasty opposition was the base of the New Ottoman opposition although it did not pave the way for the emergence of this opposition (Koçak, *Osmanlı/Türk Siyasi Geleneğinde Modern Bir Toplum Yaratma Projesi Olarak Anayasanın Keşfi*, 2016, p. 78).

One of the most competent names when it comes the New Ottomans, Mardin, however, is against the perception of the New Ottoman idea as continuity of the Reform era giving them momentum in the background. Mardin argues that the main aim of the New Ottomans was to create the Second Reform era since the Second Generation reformist statesmen were too concessive to the West, as stated by Mustafa Fazıl Pasha in his letter. Another important detection by Mardin regarding this pioneering group was that the New Ottomans did not aim to abolish the sultanate; they just demanded justice from the Sultan under the shadow of the norms of constitutional monarchy (Mardin S. , 2016, p. 47).

2.7. Namık Kemal

Kemal was a critical name in Turkish intellectual life. Kemal was born in Tekirdağ province in the mansion of his grandfather who was a deputy governor, and his father, Mustafa Asım was the Chief Astrologer of the Ottoman Sultan, while his great grandfather Topal Osman Pasha was Grand Vizier, his grandfather Ahmet Pasha was Admiral in Chief and his father Şemsettin Bey was the 1st Chief of Sultan's Stable (Akşin, *Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi (1839-1908)*, 1988, p. 323). Even though Namık Kemal's importance in the history of modernization is well-known, Koçak criticizes the lack of studies dwelling upon Namık Kemal's political ideas. According to Koçak, there are only three major studies in this field: The first is Şerif Mardin's "*The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*". The second is Türköne's "*İslamcılığın Doğuşu (Emergence of Islamism)*" and the third study is the compilation named as "*About Namık Kemal*" written and published hurriedly on the occasion of Namık Kemal's 100th birth anniversary. On the other hand, the author draws attention to the critical deficiency in the literature due to the lack of a compilation of Namık Kemal's newspaper articles and states that Mithat Cemal Kuntay's work, *Namık Kemal: Devrin İnsanları ve Olayları Arasında (Namık Kemal: Between the People and Developments of the Era)* written in 1949 is rather old-dated and an agglomerative compilation, criticizing that this work should be updated. The fact that the majority of works on Kemal are literary works limits understanding of his political and social ideas in the field of political and social sciences (Koçak, *Namık Kemal*, 2014, p. 244).

The most important figure from whom the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was inspired in his intellectual life, Namık Kemal was one of the leading names in the Committee of Young Ottomans as well as being the most influential intellectual. Mustafa Kemal said, “The father of my body is Ali Rıza Efendi, the father of my excitement is Namık Kemal and the father of my ideas in Ziya Gökalp” (Turan Ş. , 1982, p. 18). With this historic remark of Mustafa Kemal, the great importance of Namık Kemal for the next generation is understood. Moreover, Ali Fuat Cebesoy and Asım Gündüz uttered that together with Mustafa Kemal, Namık Kemal was one of the heroes that Turkish nation and waited for centuries and mentioned in their memoirs that they read Namık Kemal’s works secretly during the times of turmoil. This also indicates how Namık Kemal was important for them. M. Kemal read Namık Kemal’s works in a small Anatolian town during the war years and among these works, “*Usul-ü Meşveret Hakkında Mektuplar (Letters on the Principle of Consultation)*” and “*Makalat-i Siyasiye ve Edebiyesi (Political and Literary Articles)*” formed an important place in the “formation of his ideas”. Mustafa Kemal brought these ideas and poems to the rostrum of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Turan Ş. , 1982, p. 7) (Kasalak, 2009, pp. 75-76).

Namık Kemal’s political theory was predominantly inspired from Montesquieu’s and Rousseau’s ideas (Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2015, p. 197). Kemal tried to implement Locke’s and Rousseau’s democratic, liberal thoughts by synthesizing them with Islamic political theory. Political rights, parliamentary government and public sovereignty were based on the consultancy wise stated in the holy Quran. Regarding obedience to the ruler as a sort of social contract, Kemal drew certain lines to this social contract. Like Locke, he based natural rights on religious foundations. However, he stood

off the idea of Republic, while arguing that public sovereignty could become the reality, therefore, he saw the first period of Islamic rule also a Republic period. The most influential figure in the 19th and 20th centuries, Namık Kemal marked a new epoch in the Turkish history of thought, serving as a compass for democracy and nationalism in building a contemporary society with his literary works and ideas and leading the founding father of the Second Constitutional Monarchy and the Republic with his outstanding ideas (Akşin, *Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi (1839-1908)*, 1988, pp. 326-327). Lewis, on the other hand, analyzes this important figure and his works from a different perspective: He argues that Namık Kemal was not the first person in Turkey to mention democratic elements such as human rights and parliament, but he was indeed the first person to ponder upon these concepts, trying to forge a link between these elements. According to Kemal, who offered ideas on freedom and democracy based on laws, the first duty of state was to be fair (Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2015, p. 197).

Zürcher explains the intellectual adventure of Namık Kemal as defending liberal ideas with Islamic evidence due to his liberal ideas. Referring to the New Ottomans and Kemal as Muslims as much as Ottoman patriots, Zürcher accentuates that Kemal and his colleagues deemed the Reform regime as “unilateral despotism”. Also referring to Kemal’s rich vocabulary and creativity, Zürcher dwells on the fact that Kemal introduced the words homeland, freedom and nation to the literature via translation from French and Arabic and these were later turned into ideological propaganda words by the next Muslim generations having a large effect on the coming periods in political and social life (Zürcher E. J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, 2013, p. 108). In addition, Koçak confirms

Zürcher's argument by saying, "Namık Kemal sought for a national synthesis of Islamic and modern Western political concepts" (Koçak, Namık Kemal, 2014, p. 245). Mardin, on the other hand, accentuates that Kemal's understanding of patriotism was not Turkish Nationalism as is assumed today. He claims that Kemal's ideas of democracy were deep, however there was no means for expression of opposing views in his understanding of democracy. As he explicitly put forward in his political reform suggestion, Kemal took the path of indirect democracy and made his vision evident by preferring the French constitution of conservative Napoleon III (Mardin S. , 2016, p. 48).

Berkes' analysis of Namık Kemal is based on the assumption that Kemal "depreciated" İbn Khaldun, scholar of Islam, social scientist and historian of the period. While finding Khaldun's history interpretation to be correct, Namık Kemal utters that "the collapse is obvious, yet there is neither the concept nor the way or term to stand upright and move forward [in Khaldun's remarks]", therefore Berkes underlines Kemal's desire to go beyond Khaldun – his philosophy of progress (Berkes, Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma, 2017, p. 299). Mardin observes that Namık Kemal dwelled upon the splendid era of the social history, however he argued that this romanticism occurred only from time to time in the Young Turks (Mardin, Jön Türkler ve Siyasi Fikirleri, pp. 309). As stated before, Zürcher concludes in his studies that Kemal introduced new vocabulary with 19th century liberal terminology to the Ottoman society. Coining several terms including *homeland* from Arabic; *party, liberty and nation* from French later paved the way for the use of these new terms by the next nationalist and libertarian Muslim generations as ideological instruments to promote their ideas (Zürcher E. J., Turkey: A Modern History, 2013, p. 108). On the other hand, Kemal was also the first person to

have a “modern Islamic” approach towards equality of women and men and freedom of women (Ortaylı, *The Longest Century of the Empire*, 2018, p. 256).

In the same vein, it can be fairly uttered that Kemal’s opinions of republic were equally important. “*In case public sovereignty was confirmed, would not we also have the right to the proclamation of the republic?*” asked Kemal, who claimed that this right was “undeniable”, and Islam was also a Republic when it first emerged. Therefore, he sought the roots of republic in Islam, pointing out to his commitment to the idea of forming a republic. Nevertheless, he said, “*Nobody among us would think of forming a republic,*” indicating that he was hopeless in this regard during that time (Kasalak, 2009, pp. 72-73). From this perspective, assumptions of Akşin, Berkes and Mardin will certainly contribute to the continuity thesis in this study.

2.8. 1876 Constitutional Monarchy I

Reformists, who dethroned Sultan Abdulaziz, laid all their hopes on Murad V. Mithat Pasha was the one who organized a revolt in the palace to dethrone Abdulaziz. Among important figures of the Young Turks, Ziya Pasha’s name was also mentioned in this coup against the rulers. However, the Young Turks did not take active role in this incident, since they had not yet adopted the idea of New Ottomanism (Ernest, 2011, p. 23). Since the Sultan’s health was deteriorating, reformist policies were left unfinished. Following the dethronement of Sultan Abdulaziz, Namık Kemal came back to Istanbul along with Nuri and Hakkı who encountered an atmosphere different from the one that they had left. As a matter of fact, the new Sultan was addressing speeches with new concepts such as motherland and freedom, while Istanbul was swept with Anglophilia,

libertarianism and constitutionalism. Yet, as stated by Demirtaş, the New Ottomans could not directly join the constitutional monarchy reforms at the beginning (Demirtaş, *Jön Türkler Bağlamında Osmanlı'da Batılılaşma Hareketleri*, 2007, p. 395). The New Ottomans lived the dream of Sultan Murad for 93 days followed by their next attempt to enthrone Abdulhamid II. Followed by this development, Abdulhamid II assigned a commission of 28 members to prepare the constitution. This commission was, of course, led by Mithat Pasha, who put a lot of effort in drafting the constitution. In addition, members of the commission included Namık Kemal, Ziya Pasha, Securities Commissar Abidin Dino, Galatasaray High School Principal Sava Pasha, member of the Council of State Ohannes Efendi and Undersecretary of Public Works Kirkor Odyan Efendi. After these developments and great struggle, the constitution was declared and in addition to the efforts of the New Ottomans, the opposition of statesmen to Abdulaziz's rule played an important role in the acceptance of this constitution (Tunçay, *2.Meşrutiyet'in İlk Yılı, 23 Temmuz 1908- 23 Temmuz 1909*, 2018, p. 28). Thereby, Mithat Pasha became a legend in Turkish political life as a symbol of constitutional and parliamentary system, which is why there is significantly a need to look into this figure when analyzing the period of reforms. This reformist statesman, who started his bureaucratic life late, improved his foreign language skills at an old age and spent the majority of his life in rural areas serving as governor and in other bureaucratic positions, managed to dethrone Abdulaziz in 1876 and was assigned as the head of the commission formed to draft a constitution. Pasha's political thoughts are based on three pillars: Ottomanism, consultancy/constitutional monarchy and extended decentralization. He was deeply

committed to the Ottomanist politics and the principle of equality: he proved this commitment in numerous activities (Cetinsaya, 2016, pp. 60-65).

Many developments occurred in the path towards the constitution. As of 1860, the idea of having a written constitution was adopted by many Ottoman intellectuals particularly with the impact of the first the Young Turks movement. People also shared the same excitement and desire: As referred to by Tunaya, British Ambassador of the time, Sir Henry Elliot shared that the first Ottoman Constitution was discussed even at coffee shops and people were also expecting a constitution (Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Gelişmeler [1876-1908]*, 2016, pp. 8-10). Oğuz states that the first Turkish parliament, Chamber of Deputies, established with the declaration of the first Ottoman constitution of 1876, was supported by democratic Western values and based on Ottomanism on the purpose of saving the Ottoman State as a result of the struggle for survival. During this period, when an Ottoman supra-identity was tried to be formed, Muslim people remained loyal to this formation, yet non-Muslim communities strived to extend their rights by using the “parliamentary regime” (Oğuz, 2013).

Asserting that the constitutional movement in 1876 was nothing but an attempt to put the absolutist monarchy in order, Kansu believes that this was the sole purpose and nothing more was desired (Kansu, *1908 Devrimi*, 2017, p. 1). Yet, according to Tunaya, the first period of Constitutional Monarchy named as the Reform Era was not parliamentary. This was a constitutional system where the Sultan had the last word (Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, Cilt 1, 1998, p. 24). Tanör, on the other hand, analyzed the characteristics of this constitution on the basis of conservatives and liberals. In this regard, liberal reformists including Mithat Pasha, who was in the commission

assigned by the Sultan personally to prepare the constitutional text, Military Commander Suleyman Pasha, Ziya Pasha and Namık Kemal often faced off against Rustem Pasha and Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, who were in the conservative block. The constitutional text, which brought important gaining to Abdulhamid, was drafted in a prolonged period of time full of many difficulties. Deemed as an edict or order by Tunaya, this constitution is also referred to as an “Edict Constitution” (Tanör, Osmanlı - Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri, 2018, s. 133).

2.9. The General Assembly of the Ottoman Empire

The first Ottoman constitution (*Kanun-ı Esasi*) was declared with great enthusiasm on December 23, 1876. However, the first Ottoman Assembly was not opened until March 20, 1877. The assembly was opened with the oration delivered by Sultan Abdulhamid’s Principal Clerk Mehmet Said Bey (Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Gelişmeler [1876-1908], 2016, p. 15). There were two sub-assemblies under the roof of the first Turkish parliament, the General Assembly of the Ottoman Empire. These sub-assemblies were the Chamber of Deputies elected by people and the Assembly of Notables elected by the Sultan. The Assembly of Notables convened for the first time with 26 members. The authorities of the Chamber of Deputies, on the other hand, were limited. The last word still belonged to the Sultan regarding law making (Acun, 2007, s. 52). According to Tanör, both assemblies represented dominant classes. Reading insensibility and disorganization of people in masses as the deficiencies in the political and feudal structure, Tanör argues that this was, in a sense, consolidation of the power of the dominant and conservative classes. Another point underscored by the author is that the “most distinguishing” feature of the first parliament was the variegation revealing

representation of different ethnic groups (Tanör, Osmanlı - Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri, 2018, s. 155-156).

Tunaya emphasizes that the importance of Constitutional Monarchy was accentuated in the Oration starting with a note on its contribution to the progress of the civilized world. In the elections held in 1877, 80 Muslims and 50 non-Muslims were elected to the Chamber of Deputies, making a total of 130 members. The General Assembly was opened for the first time and continued its activities for three and a half months with 50 meetings (March 19, 1877 – June 28, 1877). When it was opened for the second time, the assembly could serve for two months with 30 meetings in total (December 13, 1877 – February 14, 1878). In this time interval, the two assemblies served for six and a half months in total during the first Constitutional Monarchy period and this parliamentary experience became a turning point in the recent political history of the Ottoman Empire (Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasal Gelişmeler [1876-1908], 2016, p. 15).

Akşin defines the Chamber of Deputies or the Ottoman Senate as “a rostrum where democratic and progressive thoughts were shared, having an important and honorable place in our history of democracy”. It is undoubted that several ideas were advocated during the period: “humor magazines should not be prohibited”, “voting age should be decreased from 24 to 21”, “the right to vote should not be restricted to property owners only”, “there should not be a need to be a taxpayer to eligible for being a parliament member”, “elections should be single degree” and “further democratization is necessary in local administrations”. However, the most important idea was “to promote economic development, build roads while education was often underlined” and secular opinions were put forward from time to time (Akşin, Siyasal Tarih, 1988, s. 160-161).

During the course of this time, Sultan Abdulaziz used the criticism of deputies, who were unwilling to continue the Constitutional Monarchy, against the Russo-Turkish War as an excuse to abrogate the assembly as per Articles 7 and 35 of the first Ottoman constitution granting the Sultan the right to abrogate the assembly whenever he saw necessary. The Sultan always watched for an opportunity to use this right and on February 13, 1878, he found this opportunity. Three ministers were demanded to defend themselves before the assembly as there were charges against them. Against this “pressure”, Abdulhamid adjourned the assembly the next day and demanded the members of parliament to go to their home-districts. The assembly managed to convene only two times in five months and was abrogated in 1878, never convening again for another 31 years (Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2015, p. 231). Some argue that the assembly was “closed” by the Sultan, while others say he only “suspended” the assembly, yet this short term experience with parliament is accepted as the precursor of changes in many fields. Following the closing of the Chamber of Deputies by Abdulhamid, Ottoman intellectuals were dispersed, punished and the emergence of an “intellectual opposition” against the Sultan became unavoidable as a result of these pressures. This opposition did not remain limited to the country but spread to overseas. In light of these developments, the Young Turks movement, seen as the “successor” of the New Ottomans, emerged (Demirtaş, *Jön Türkler Bağlamında Osmanlı'da Batılılaşma Hareketleri*, 2007, p. 397).

Pertaining to the opinions about the assembly, Oğuz claims that the Assembly failed to defend its “institutional identity” in addition to the other institutions. In this regard, Abdulhamid II was contented only with opening the assembly and did not adopt the principle of separation of powers. Thus, the assembly failed to gain an “institutional”

identity. On the other hand, it was notable that the advisory council convened to discuss giving lands to Greece, but only representatives from the assembly were called to this council. Oğuz points out to the important role of even accusing the Sultan in assembly negotiations in the abrogation of this assembly (Oğuz, 2013, s. 113-114). Providing a comment on this issue as well, Zürcher argues that Abdulhamid adopted Western methods, however, he maintained a stance even more decisive than Reform Era politicians to ensure that Western ideas did not enter from the borders of the country. In this context, political opinions and discussions were kept under control by censorship, police and the growing network of spies, constituting the symbols of the period (Zürcher E. J., Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık, 2016, p. 30).

2.10. State Structure after the Adoption of the First Ottoman Constitution (Kanun-ı Esasi)

Analyzing the state structure during this period, it is remarkable that the Ottoman Empire was neither a confederation nor a federation as per Article 1 of the Constitution. From this perspective, this multi-ethnic and multi-national empire was not a nation-state. The form of the state was theocratic monarchy. According to Tunaya, the most evident proof of theocracy was the fact that the Ottoman Sultan was also the caliph of all Muslims. As the monarchs in Europe and other countries of the world, the executive power belonged only to the Sultan in the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan had elective authorities: for instance, he had the right to elect the members of the Council of Ministers, Shaykh al-Islam and members of the Chamber of Notables. In other words, the Sultan was the sole power holder. Beyond this, his rights were under the protection of the Constitution: “*The Sultan is first and foremost is free of liability and his personality is sacred (Article 4). His*

assets, properties, and financial allocations as well as freedom are under general guarantee for his lifetime.” Legislation consisted of two assemblies similar to that of the constitutional monarchy period. Assembly activities were carried out by the notables and members of the Chamber of Deputies for a long time in the Ottoman political life. On the other hand, the absolute ruler of the assembly, the Sultan, also appointed the members of the Supreme Court, Court of Exchequer and the Council of State. The institutions assigned by the Sultan included: the Council of Ministers (grand viziers and ministers), the Chamber of Deputies, Shaykh al-Islam or the chief religious official in the Ottoman Empire, the Assembly of Notables, as well as the justice authorities including the Supreme Court, Court of Exchequer and the Council of State. The Sultan elected, dismissed the members of the Council of State had the right to abolish this council in the system that he managed, in other words, he was explicitly the sole owner of power in this system (Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Gelişmeler [1876-1908]*, 2016, pp. 9-11).

From another perspective, Ahmad defines this regime as the output of the classes who strived to save themselves from free trade and who were under pressure. According to Ahmad, it was still too early to evaluate this constitutional system to assess and prove the power of the “rising classes” or “national bourgeoisie” (Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 2017, p. 41). However, Tunaya argues that the first Ottoman constitution was not a top-down reform despite the lack of popular base and a vast public opinion. At the same time, though, he defines the constitutions as a “grant” by saying that “it was not taken but given” (Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Gelişmeler [1876-1908]*, 2016, p. 35). This structure was not the “doctrine that sovereignty rested with the nation”. Instead, the doctrine that “sovereignty rested with the representative of God on earth” applied in this

system. Therefore, this law – constitution – was regarded only as part of the main law: the Sharia (Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 2017, p. 333).

According to Zürcher, the reform era policies were never based on popular will. In other words, Zürcher interprets this process with top-down reforms. Turkish historiography is in the same line with this thought. Hence, the Imperial Edict of Gülhane in 1839, the Edict of Reform in 1856 and the First Constitutional Monarchy in 1876 were not taken but given rights, as stated by Zürcher. In this context, the only revolution that was not top-down but carried out by popular support is accepted as the Second Constitutional Monarchy in 1908. Zürcher characterizes the period until 1908 as a period when bureaucrats triggered statesmen for certain initiatives. He concluded that this was the reason why there was not popular support behind them (Zürcher E. J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, 2013, p. 107).

In Tunaya's analysis of the first Ottoman Constitution, there is the claim that a second monarchy, i.e. constitutional was established with authoritarian structure in theory. Although the actors set off with the aim of building a ruling power where people would have a say, this dream did not come true and the Sultan again became the head of the constitutional system and had the final word. On the other hand, Akşin assesses that the first constitutional monarchy period was not completely a top-down movement. He argues that there were certain preparations as well as a popular base, yet he adds that this popular base was not strong enough (Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Gelişmeler [1876-1908]*, 2016, pp. 37-38). When defining the Reform Era, Berkes, on the other hand, utters that it was not a law of a modern state, not bringing a regime based on the consent of the ruled. He asserts that in this system, the Sultan's absolutism was replaced by the

absolutism of the Sublime Porte and the emerging system was indeed at a lower status than the former Ottoman system (Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 2017, p. 288).

In short, the Young Turks continued their desire to have an assembly and a constitutional system in the process after the reign of Mahmud II. Furthermore, this desire for a constitution turned into such a passion that Tunaya referred to it as “constitution romanticism”. With this romanticism, the Young Turks used the trial-and-error method to experience adoption of many principles that were far from reality. The idea of the Young Turks that “Contemporary states owe their progress to their parliaments”, was another indicator of their passion (Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Gelişmeler [1876-1908]*, 2016, p. 17).

3. THE FORMATION AND IDEAS OF THE YOUNG TURKS

3.1. The Young Turks

As depicted by Yahya Kemal, the Young Turks constituted an opposition movement with a peculiar political axis against Abdulhamid emerging in Istanbul's colleges after the wounds emerging with the Berlin Treaty closed and this movement was initiated by a group in Paris as a political stream flowing from end to end in the empire during the reign of Abdulhamid II. In the 19th century modernization movement, the Young Turks sought the answer to the same question as the New Ottoman intellectuals, their predecessors, and believed in the necessity to establish a legal order (Tunçay, 2.Meşrutiyet'in İlk Yılı, 23 Temmuz 1908- 23 Temmuz 1909, 2018). Towards the formation of modern Turkey, administrator staff laid the foundations of distinctive thoughts and every person as well as every thought was regarded as certainly very important. Although the Young Turks are perceived as both of the “cadres working for the first and second constitutional monarchy” in Europe, “the Young Turks” are referred to as the cadre struggling for the second constitutional era after 1889 in Turkey (Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 2017, s. 46). Zürcher notes that the ideas of the Young Ottomans formed the basis for the formation of this atmosphere and the Ottoman literary movement starting in 1890 was related to the Young Turk movement, drawing attention to the continuity between the two groups (Zürcher E. J., Turkey: A Modern History, 2013, p. 135) (Mardin Ş. , Türk Modernleşmesi, 2018, s. 96). Within this direction, Tunçay states that a new constitutional opposition movement based on the ideals of the New Ottomans embodied in the formation of the Young Turks, however, this new constitutional monarchy had to wait for 30 years (Tunçay, 2.Meşrutiyet'in İlk Yılı, 23 Temmuz 1908- 23 Temmuz 1909, 2018, p. 20).

According to Bulut, the legacies of the Reform era were readings of “translations” or “original” Bacon, Shakespeare, Montesquieu and Helvetius corpuses followed by Adam Smith, La Fontaine, Schopenhauer, Isnard and Büchner. Indeed, the Young Turks emerged on the basis of these “intellectual legacies” which they later “owned” (Bulut, 2009, s. 160). Nevertheless, while the New Ottomans were the “members of the state institution”, the Young Turks were “professors, lawyers, journalists, junior staff, bureaucrats and second degree incumbents raised in Western war colleges and new state schools” (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, s. 42). So, what was this Young Turk movement? As explained by Yahya Kemal with his eloquent Turkish language skills, this political custom was left by Namık Kemal as legacy, which was defined as “an exile home and a fugitive life abroad”. This custom turned into the name “Young Turk” over time. The Young Turks were shortly called as Con. “Dangerous people outside are called Cons” (Özdemir, 2000, s. 9).

The Young Turks movement is qualified as a middle class (bourgeoisie) movement (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, s. 44). According to Akşin, the ideology of both the New Ottomans and the Young Turks can be defined as “bourgeoisie ideology”. Just like constitutional monarchy and democracy were the desires of the bourgeoisie in Europe, “Turkish intellectual administrators” desired a bourgeoisie order although not specifically a “capitalist” one. The first representatives of this bourgeoisie group were Thessalonians or “the converted” (Akşin, The Young Turks in 100 Questions 70-75). Ahmad says that Young Turks were an executive “elite group” “trained” to order and “govern the state” (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, s. 42). Zürcher divided the Young Turks into subgroups: “1) Founders of the Young Turks movement, 2)

Leaders of 1908 revolution, 3) Politically active officers in the Ottoman army, 4) members of the Committee of Union and Progress, 5) Leaders of the War of Independence after World War I, 6) the Republic's first executive elite (Zürcher E. J., 2015, s. 149). However, Ahmad claims that while the Young Ottomans believed that they could save the state if they were given duties and chances in positions of authority, the Young Turks did not see themselves as talented to do so (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, s. 43).

The Young Turk movement was not an integrated group united around a single program, but groups with different ideas and programs were found in it (Tunçay, 2. Meşrutiyet'in İlk Yılı, 23 Temmuz 1908- 23 Temmuz 1909, 2018, p. 22). From this perspective, Bulut found that Young Turk was a name given to an “idea”. Although this idea cannot be fully explained, he says that it is often defined according to the idea structure and characteristics of opposing groups (Bulut, 2009, s. 160). While explaining the ideology of the Young Turks as an elite group, Tunaya said that they “fill the constitutional institutions with Islamic ideology, yet this ideology remained “rationalist and Western” to some extent, as they could not go out of the scope of the multi-national Ottoman formula. On the other hand, Akşin said that the Young Turks wanted bourgeoisie order instead of feudalism (Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 2017, s. 135).

Ahmad, on the other hand, says that the opposition of the New Ottomans and Young Turks to the Ottoman legitimate protest tradition marked the beginning of “the transformation of a tradition”. In parallel with this development, he adds that Kemalist Turkey “was founded on a constitutional basis” and “power was entrusted to those who

knew this” (Mardin Ş. , Türk Modernleşmesi, 2018, s. 117). In this regard, this can be considered a “continuity” indicator from the Imperial Edict of Gülhane to that day.

However, even though the second generation Young Turks had the same social value with the New Ottomans, their place in the society was not the same. While Ahmad states that the new Ottomans were members of state institutions, the Young Turks were people who graduated from modern and contemporary schools with new professions (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, s. 34).

According to Ramsaur, the Young Turks basically did not find any other way than the solution brought by the New Ottomans in 1860-1870. This was to limit the Sultan’s authority by establishing a constitutional government, grant equality for minorities before law and to fulfill their requests (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, s. 41-42)) Ramsaur, on the other hand, looked from a different perspective, pointing out to the publication of a brochure explaining the Young Turks ideas by Murat Bey in July 1897. Ramsaur’s idea is that none of the articles in these brochures “defined the main problems that the Ottoman Empire faced” (Ernest, 2011, p. 61). Ahmad interprets this situation by saying that the Young Turks “did not care enough about social problems” or even “left them aside”. Arguing that the social conflicts were “hidden under religious and racial symbols”, Ahmad confirms Ramsaur’s claim.

Seeing the Young Turks’ period as a “political vacuum”, Mardin adds that the Young Turks only added their own views to the “popularized” political views of “second degree thinkers, who played an intermediary role between great theoreticians and people” in Europe. In this context, he said, “The Young Turks were idealess and [lost] in an idea gap” (Mardin Ş. , Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895-1908, 2017, p. 26). To Ahmad, the

minority who favored central and oligarchical system in the political environment – assuming themselves as pioneers – underestimated the history and found liberalism as “outdated” and “corrupting”. However, Ahmad claims that they were under the influence of the past, even though they rejected this, perceiving the group as “an unavoidable part of continuous historical development” (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, s. 218).

The Young Turks aspired to take the West as a whole model with a holistic program. It is possible to observe this approach during the Reform era to some extent, nonetheless, the ideological equipment, infrastructure and conditions necessary to actualize this dream matured only during the reign of Abdulhamid II; the movement flourished under the leadership of the Young Turks and the approach came to fruition with the proclamation of the Republic (Toker & Tekin, *Batıcı Siyasi Düşüncenin Karakteristikleri ve Evreleri: "Kamusuz Cumhuriyet'ten Kamusuz Demokrasiye"*, 2016, p. 83). Ahmad further argues that the Young Turks set off with the goal to “bring rationalism to the entire administrative mechanism”, trivialized personal laws, put an end to the traditional Ottoman social form called *millet* and granted the same rights to all Ottomans regardless of “race or religion”. Thus, the Young Turks definitely took a step to change the destiny of a nation (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, s. 50). Representing people, who had lived under the command of an edict without organization or politicization, this group desired to overcome difficulties and hardships rapidly and were thus, ready for any kind of cooperation.

3.2. Prince Sabahaddin

Before mentioning Sabahaddin's biography and intellectual life, it would be useful to look at Kansu's study on Sabahaddin's world of ideas. Within this framework, Kansu is of the opinion that the movements of thought in Turkey are generally insufficient to resolve their genealogies based abroad. By saying, "*In the social sciences literature in Turkey, only one deficient summary of Prince Sabahaddin's world of ideas in the form of analysis is known and his place in the Turkish intellectual history is discussed only on the basis of this deficient summary,*" Kansu complains about the lack of analyses on Sabahaddin as well as in-depth scrutiny of the content of his thoughts (Kansu, Prens Sabahaddin'in Düşünsel Kaynakları ve Aşırı-Muhafazakar Düşüncesinin İthali, 2014). Analyses of Durukan on Sabahaddin also show parallelism to Kansu's claims. As a matter of fact, Durukan criticizes that the literature on Sabahaddin remains limited to the small-scale studies by academicians including Kösmihal, Cahit Tanyol and Cavit Orhan Tütengil. In addition, although Nezahat Nurettin Ege's work, "*Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir? (How can Turkey be Rescued?)*" publish at home and abroad is a rich primary source with personal correspondence in its content, it is stated by Durukan that the analytical value of this work is rather limited (Durukan, 2014, s. 143). Considering this source as well, Kansu believes that Prince Sabahaddin's worldview was predominantly influenced by Demolins' book, "*à quoi tient la supériorité des anglo-saxons*", the first edition of which was published in 1987 (Kansu, Prens Sabahaddin'in Düşünsel Kaynakları ve Aşırı-Muhafazakar Düşüncesinin İthali, 2014, s. 157).

Prince Sabahaddin was the son of Abdulhamid II's sister Seniha Sultan and Damat Mahmut Pasha. During the time when Prince Sabahaddin was born and raised, the Young Turks gathered in foreign centers, especially France, where the political rulers

could not reach them while they strived to create public opinion about the declaration of freedom against Abdulhamid's despotic rule (Cenk Reyhan, *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Mirası, Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi* (Political Thought Heritage, Reform, and Constitutional Monarchy Gains in Modern Turkey), Vol.1, pp. 46). It was an important development when Mahmut Pasha went to Paris with his two sons. Coming to Paris with his sons, Prince Sabahaddin and Lütfullah Bey, Mahmut Pasha caused a glimmer of hope among the Young Turks once again (Mardin Ş. , *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895-1908*, 2017, p. 173). As a matter of fact, there were many opposition groups that failed to come together at the time. After a certain time, Prince Sabahaddin declared his idea of holding a Young Turkish congress (Erdoğan & Ortaylı, *İttihat ve Terakki, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Gizli Örgütlenmeler ve Darbeler*, 2016, s. 49).

Sabahaddin, like the founders of the Committee of Union and Progress, acted to save the Ottoman Empire and ensure its survival, nevertheless, he believed that the real issue that created the weakness of the empire was the “lack of freedom” (Mardin Ş. , *Türk Modernleşmesi*, 2018, s. 99). According to Sabahaddin, the declaration of constitutional monarchy alone was not enough, since Abdulhamid's despotism was “a result of the conditions of society”. If the circumstances did not change, a new despotic period would “inevitably come”, which was why the “inevitable solution” for this would be to ensure “decentralization” at the state level, while putting “private enterprises” into practice at individual level (Akşin, *Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi (1839-1908)*, 1988, p. 336). On the other hand, Sabahaddin divided the Ottoman society into two sections as “peasantry” and “intellectuals”. According to Prince, intellectuals should be leading the way in the progress of society, while the peasantry must “cooperate” with intellectuals

against despotism. On this axis, intellectuals should not turn to civil service but continue their leadership in entrepreneurship. In this way, he argued, “intellectuals – peasantry” cooperation would take place and the perspective of the economically developed society would ultimately change. As a result, Europe would get closer with the Ottoman society with economic development, while the Eastern question would be “resolved automatically” (Demirtaş, Jön Türk Bağlamında Osmanlı'da Batılılaşma Hareketleri, 2007, s. 403).

Besides his impactful thoughts, Sabahaddin carried out many political activities as well. In late 1905 and early 1906, the duty to “gather the Young Turk movement” was given to Prince Sabahaddin, yet the “principle of decentralization” separated him from the Young Turk movement. The reason for this was that the “Ottoman Turks” had opposed any organization with “autonomy” or getting close to “having autonomy”. Indeed, “autonomy” meant “breaking away from the empire” sooner or later for the Ottomans (Akşin, Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi (1839-1908), 1988, p. 336).

The Young Turks began their work against Abdulhamid II by saying that they were saving freedom. Notwithstanding that, there was no concept of “freedom” beyond reenacting the Constitution of 1876 by the Committee of Union and Progress. At this point, Mardin reiterates that there is a need for special focus on Sabahaddin, claiming that Prince Sabahaddin had a degree of freedom theory in his attempts against Abdulhamid II and underlining the subjectivity of Prince’s opinions (Mardin Ş. , Türk Modernleşmesi, 2018, s. 99). Despite this, the most important opposition comes from Kansu. Kansu believes that Prince’s views were disconnected from the reality of time and that they were imaginary. What was meant by decentralization during the period, in fact, was the feudal

order that was claimed to exist in France before the 1789 French Revolution. Kansu describes the system by saying that “*The political, social and economic structure that existed in the feudal order was fragmented and the aristocracy, which had almost all powers of disposition on its territory, was located outside the control mechanism of the traditional state*”. He further underlines that this ideology, which he describes as ultra-conservative, could be called the “revolutionary right”. In this context, Sabahaddin’s “private enterprise” understanding was nothing more than planning to train members of the rich class in Turkey and send them to Anatolia to rule the peasantry, who were not able to do proper agriculture, as “agricultural bosses”. Demolins, also, says the following about this education system: young people must give up from public office and undergo a special training to be raised in ‘individualist families’ and they must be sent to Anatolia to become masters of the peasants. Kansu says, “... [this education model] is diametrically opposed to the enlightenment-based scientific understanding and it is an anti-intellectual tendency...” (Kansu, Prens Sabahaddin'in Düşünsel Kaynakları ve Aşırı-Muhafazakar Düşüncesinin İthali, 2014, s. 159-161).

Concomitantly, Prince Sabahaddin was one of the pioneers who brought sociology to Turkey and also one of the first members of Turkish liberalism. In this line, Durukan underlines that he deserves special attention in this respect (Durukan, 2014, s. 155). Furthermore, Ergenekan’s studies should be analyzed to thoroughly comprehend Sabahaddin’s ideas and activities in the late Ottoman liberalism policy (Aslan, 2015).

3.3. Ahmet Rıza Bey

Ahmet Rıza Bey was the son of British Ali Bey. Rıza Bey, who studied at Galatasaray high school, was later educated in France. After finishing his studies, he came to Konya, where his father was exiled, and after a while he became the director of a high school in Bursa and then the director of education. On the occasion of the centenary of the French revolution, he went to Paris and did not come back until the declaration of the Second Constitutional Monarchy (Kuran A. B., 1945, s. 18). After returning to Turkey, Reza Bey decided to raise awareness in his society through education, speaking of “social change” for the first time in Turkish society instead of “changes in individuals and political regimes” and becoming an extremely important figure in terms of his focus on developing social science (Akşin, *Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi (1839-1908)*, 1988, p. 334). Revealing the contradictions in Ahmet Rıza’s comments on the woman’s place in society and Islam, Korlaelçi purports that Ahmet Rıza repeated Comte’s social statics especially in his first supplemental bill: “Administrative affairs cannot be left to the fortune of the dice like in gambling. The circumstances of truth cannot be known by lucid dreams. The society is a unified body that is bound by the natural laws...” Another example to this explanation is the fact that Rıza applied the calendar invented by Comte in the advisory council (Korlaelçi, 2014, s. 216).

Ramsaur describes Ahmet Rıza, one of the founding fathers of Unionists, as “committed to the positivist doctrine and he rejected the idea of using violence” (Ernest, 2011, p. 56). Noting that the *Meşveret* (consultancy) newspaper began to be published by Ahmet Rıza Bey, underlining that many difficulties were encountered when the newspaper was published. Indeed, Kuran shares that the publications were occasionally intervened by the Sultan Abdulhamid II’s ambassadors in France, Belgium and

Switzerland, which were considered the most democratic countries in Europe, pointing out to the fact that the pressure of the period was manifested even in the international area (Kuran A. B., 1945, s. 20) (Ernest, 2011, p. 42). Meşveret, the newspaper of the period, produced 32 Turkish issues and 275 French issues at that time. Reflecting the ideology of the Committee of Union and Progress, this newspaper later produced a supplement called *Şura-yı Ümmet* or Council of People (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, s. 42). Erol Şadi Erdinç underlines that this was a very important newspaper for the period of the Committee of Union and Progress as its official media organ, however, Ramsaur argues that Meşveret's editorial policy fell peculiarly in line with Ahmet Rıza's personal policies.

In Akşin's analysis, Ahmet Rıza Bey is depicted as one who contradicted with the Young Turks and looked down on them. In the epistle called "Mission and Accountability: Soldier" written by Ahmet Rıza in 1906, changes in his thoughts draw attention. Rıza's axis of thought turned into a propagandist character and it was observed that he offered suggestions in this context. This propagandist attitude was based on the aim to mobilize the soldiers in Macedonia by offering "activist" theories, as well as motivating society to engage in activities such as a fundraising campaigns. On the other hand, Mardin desires to draw attention to the large difference of ideas between the "revolutionary publications" emerging after the last merger of the committee in 1907 and the previous propagandist attitude (Akşin, Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi (1839-1908), 1988, p. 333).

Providing a definition of positivism, Comte accepts society as a living organism and argues that societies always undergo three phases. The first of these three phases

consists of “theocracy in the administrative system, military in sovereignty and theology in the thought system”. Metaphysics is in the second phase, where it is believed that societies are ruled by a secret power and the administrative system is monarchy, while sovereignty belongs to laws. Positivism is the third phase, in which “science dominates thought”. This method is based on the Republic system and the power that dominates public life is the industry (Engin, 1992).

Bringing positivism to the Turkish intellectual life, Ahmet Rıza thought of positivism as a way to “spread the acceptance of Turkey as an equal state to other states and have it engaged with Western movements”, says Mardin explaining positivism as both “a ground to join the Western progress” and “a doctrine to exonerate the Ottomans from barbarism” (Mardin Ş. , *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895-1908*, 2017, pp. 177-224). Following the First Constitutional Monarchy period, positivism was represented by Ahmet Rıza within the Young Turks movement, a continuation of the New Ottomans, as “a philosophy of society” which was settled in cultural life (IŞIN, 1985b). Explaining the reason for Ahmet Rıza’s positivist thought, Akşin utters that positivism was attractive to Rıza because it had nothing to do with Christianity. According to him, other reasons for positivism to be attractive to Rıza were as follows: Rıza and others like him complained about the fact that the Ottoman Empire was ruled officially by the condescension and arbitrariness of the Sultan rather than objective and rational principles. There was a fear that if the state suffered a major tremor, it would fall apart, thus positivism was appropriate in this respect. The positivist idea that experts, i.e. the elite were the ones to guide society was equivalent to Rıza’s idea of class and his “top-down” attitude (Akşin, *Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi (1839-1908)*, 1988, p. 333).

In this context, Ahmet Rıza's "attitude against foreign state intervention" was a legacy to the Committee of Union and Progress, which had a major share in the formation of this committee's nationalistic ideology (Akşin, *Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi (1839-1908)*, 1988, pp. 333-334). Akşin also draws attention to the influence of the "real politic" approach identified by Sharif Mardin. The political movements in the last quarter of the 19th century referred to as "pre-totalitarian" by Mardin were quite popular with the impact of the German real politic understanding with the core assumption that the political preference of positivism was in the direction of an authoritarian order. In summary, he tried to explicate that Ahmet Rıza's elitist and authoritarian preference was a natural phenomenon, departing from the fact that there was a separation between "the rulers" and "the ruled" and education was not widespread (Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 2017, s. 64).

Producing the first study with "an identity of ideology" by means of the *Meşveret* newspaper, Ahmet Rıza played an important role in the Committee of Union and Progress movement with his thoughts and became a "bearer" and "supportive" element during the difficult days of the Committee. Due to his aspirations to "create an indigenous capitalist bourgeoisie" as well as centralist approaches, certain researchers believe that he influenced Atatürk's centralist thoughts and revolutions (Malkoç, 2007, s. 150). Korlaelçi conveys his views on the positivist thought imported into Turkey, saying that there was not any critical approach towards the system. Asserting that not any positivist thinker could go beyond conveying the thoughts of philosophers they had identified as a leader for themselves with eulogies, the author says: "*The criticisms posed in the Western world against positivism at the time and even the criticisms within*

positivists themselves were not taken into account at all”, adding that the criticism of positivism in Turkey was made only by Islamic scholars such as İsmail Fenni and Elmalı Hamdi Yazır (Korlaelçi, 2014, s. 222).

3.4. Mizancı Murat Bey

Murat Bey, who attended a Russian high school in Sevastopol, came to Istanbul in 1873. He taught history classes in the School of Political Sciences and began to publish the weekly *Mizan* newspaper in 1886, however, the newspaper was closed in 1890 and Murat joined the Young Turks who fled the country. He claimed that he replaced Ahmet Rıza as Paris branch president of the Committee of Union and Progress (Akşin, *Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi (1839-1908)*, 1988, p. 340). In addition, Murat uttered that said he was part of the New Ottoman group gathered around Mithat Pasha in 1876. However, according to Mardin’s view, he preferred long-term modernization methods based on cultural activity rather than aspirations even at that time (Mardin Ş. , *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895-1908*, 2017, p. 79). Mura stood out as an academician in the School of Political Sciences for the Ottoman “intelligentsia” and his understanding of constitutional monarchy was based on the desire to establish an assembly only with advisory function which was to be “lower than the first Ottoman constitution of 1876” (Akşin, *Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi (1839-1908)*, 1988, p. 341). In this context, Ottoman intellectuals met for the first time in this period with the Murat’s understanding of history, which was not based only on plain recital of historical developments (pp: 43). After a while, he was appointed to the administrative unit of public debts and then to the School of Political Sciences. Indeed, Murat was very active in the field of literature. His works included six volumes of General History and following this, the book on the Ottoman History and Murat Bey

gained great fame thanks to these works. In addition to these works, he also wrote, his semi-autobiographical novel, translated into English as “*First Fruits or Forbidden Fruits?*” He gained a rich base of supporters from the committee thanks to these outstanding studies (Ernest, 2011, pp. 46-47).

Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, on the other hand, explains Murat’s historical personality as follows: “*In the announcement of the Second Constitutional Monarchy, there was heavy criticism of Murat Bey. Among them are points worth criticism, perhaps like his return. However, it is not possible to render Murat Bey weak by such meaningless slanders and attacks. It would be a clear injustice to neglect him in the matter of the “Young Turk” movement. For one thing, his historical understanding was an entity itself for that era. Young people always learnt about the nations living in the world and their glory, about the administrative forms of governments as well as their changes all from his work; indeed, the historical culture of intellectuals developed thanks to him. His lectures in the School of Political Sciences were among the speeches that matured young people the most. This was such a period that Ziya Pasha and Kemal Bey passed away and their articles and similar works were destroyed. Young people could not find anything to read other than the translations of Julius Vern, Pol dö Kok or Dumalis and the national novels of Ahmet Mithad, Hüseyin Rahmi and Ahmet Rasim Bey. Thus, Murat Bey’s historical speeches filled this gap, guiding in faith and science. For this reason, Murat Bey was a scientist with a place in our history of culture and revolution”* (Kuran A. B., 1945, s. 24).

Ramsaur expresses in his analyses of Mizancı Murat Bey, who published a pamphlet describing the ideas of the Young Turks in July 1897, that the pamphlet did not

give space to any of the “fundamental problems that the Ottoman Empire suffered from”. In accordance with this statement, Mizancı Murat’s intellectuality remained superficial. Akşin, however, suggests that he dreamt of becoming a statesman and that he made contacts with statesmen like Sait Pasha and the Committee of Union and Progress for this, while he was also careful not to get involved in their affairs (Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 2017, s. 66).

3.5. 1902 Young Turks Congress in Paris

Kuran says, “*Prince Sabahaddin used all his efforts after arriving in Paris for a “Young Turk” congress and resorted to a thousand sources for this. The organization of the congress depended on the gathering of all Ottoman liberals in various countries*”. In these words, Kuran describes the process leading to the first Young Turks congress (Kuran A. B., 1945, s. 97). The Young Turks Congress I convened in Paris on February 4-9, 1902. In addition to the Young Turks groups, Armenian organizations participated in the congress, which was held with the participation of about 40 delegates in total at Sabahaddin’s initiative and possibly with “British financial support” (Akşin, *Siyasal Tarih*, 1988, s. 176). The congress focused on two main points: Revolution was not possible by propaganda and publication alone. Military forces were needed to participate in the revolution movement.) Intervention of a foreign state must have been ensured (Avcioğlu, 1998, s. 27).

The purpose of the congress was to unite the opposition factions of the Ottoman Empire, nonetheless, significant differences of opinion emerged during the congress. While Ahmet Rıza Bey’s group adopted an anti-intervention stance, Sabahaddin Bey’s

group was pro-intervention and the Greek, Armenian and Albanian Committees supported Sabahaddin Bey. As a result of the congress, which was mainly held in order to form unity of the opposition, the division within the Young Turkish movement emerged even more sharply. After the congress, Ahmet Rıza Bey changed the name of their group's organizations to Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress. Tunçay argues that Dr. Bahaddin Şakir's recommendations had a significant impact on this attempt of the Committee, underlining that the Committee was heading from a reformist to a revolutionary line with a changing axis (Tunçay, 2. Meşrutiyet'in İlk Yılı, 23 Temmuz 1908- 23 Temmuz 1909, 2018, p. 23).

Moreover, in 1906, two active members of the Young Turks, Bahattin Şakir and Dr. Nazım came to Paris, which strengthened the movement. In this line, the Young Turks reorganized at the beginning of 1906 under the name of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress after Bahattin Şakir scrutinized the programs of Greek committees in Macedonia, Macedonia-Edirne Internal Revolutions Committee and Dashnaktsutyun or the Armenian Revolutionary Committee. The first central delegation of the Committee consisted of Mehmet Ali Halim Pasha, Ahmet Rıza, Bahattin Şakir, Dr. Nazım and Sami Paşazâde Sezâî. The committee established a solid organization in Europe and in every corner of the empire. The most important development in 1906 was the establishment of revolutionary chambers among the unit officers in the Ottoman army for the first time (Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 2017, s. 108) (Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2015, pp. 278-279). Yahya Kemal's depiction of Bahattin Şakir features that Dr. Nazım had a large influence on him. As a matter of fact, Yahya Kemal quotes the process after Şakir met Dr. Nazım as follows: "I saw with my own eyes how

one person changed another... Nazim recognized this man; he shared his ambitions with him; he resembled him with his own nature and then the well-known *Baheaddin Şakir was born*” (Kemal, 2006, s. 95). With this friendship, Baheaddin Şakir started to publish a Turkish newspaper – Şuray-ı Ümmet – that no one could care to do so up to him, following the closing of the Meşveret newspaper. Underlining that Dr. Nazım made an important friend to young Turks, Yahya Kemal reports that the Committee of Union and Progress, which was formed in Thessaloniki in 1908, continued its activities with its faction in Paris extending towards the July Revolution (Kemal, *Siyasî ve Edebî Portreler*, 2006, s. 95).

With the decision of the congress, it was announced that there was no connection between the Abdulhamid administration and the Ottoman peoples (Article 1). Among Ottoman peoples, an agreement would be established that would recognize the rights given in Imperial Decrees and international treaties, allow participation in local administrations, being citizen equality in terms of rights and duties, and inspire a sense of allegiance to the Ottoman dynasty to protect the Ottoman unity (Article 2). Furthermore, three goals were drawn to strive for: the integrity and indivisibility of the Ottoman state, ensuring domestic public order and peace as a requirement for progress and respecting the basic laws of the State, especially the first Ottoman constitution of 1876 (Article 3). Finally, the provisions of international treaties, and in particular the Treaty of Berlin, would be abided by, applying them in all provinces of the country to the extent that they were related to Turkish internal order (Akşin, *100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 1980, s. 35-38).

It seems that Prince Sabahaddin was not contented with opposing to Sultan Abdulhamid. On the contrary, he was always sensitive depending on the situation and despite the indifference of other “Young Turks”, he did not compromise when defending the law of the homeland when needed. All these developments manifest that members of the Congress, divided into two as “interventionists” and “non-interventionists”, were not far from each other in reality in terms of thoughts. However, the self-assertion of some among them caused this separation. This was caused by the failure of war hero Ahmet Rıza Bey to be elected as chief (Kuran A. B., 1945, s. 99-100). According to Akşin, the final result of the First Young Turks congress was the partition of the Young Turks movement, which had not been fully united (Akşin, 100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 1980, s. 38).

3.6. The Young Turks Congress II

The Young Turks Congress II was convened in Paris in December 1907. The congress was attended by the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress, Sabahaddin Bey’s group Private Enterprise, the Decentralization Committee and Armenian as well as Dashnak Committee. The declaration issued as a result of the congress revealed that the Ottoman nations and the opposition were united, and it was required to dethrone Abdulhamid, change the existing administration and establish the constitutional monarchy and consultancy institutions within the administration. At the same time, it was announced that various opposition parties unanimously accepted the means of revolution. The adoption of the revolutionary administration was the result of the Committee’s strong organization in Thessaloniki and its significant position within the army (Tunçay,

2.Meşrutiyet'in İlk Yılı, 23 Temmuz 1908- 23 Temmuz 1909, 2018, p. 25). The declaration of the congress announced that the Ottoman nations would insist on the path of revolution in unity. One of the demands was to establish the parliamentary system. Abdulhamid's administration had been blamed in the most severe manner against the negative developments up to that time. Indeed, this "big, bad" "red Sultan" had been closing schools, hindering education and censoring the press, "taxes of the hungry and miserable people" had been spent in the public works area to keep despotism up, the prohibition of travel and even the lack of passports had disrupted the trade and lack of public security as well as poor agricultural and economic conditions had led to "famine" and "wreck" (Akşin, 100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 1980, s. 55-59). Prince agreed to compromise with Ahmet Rıza and his followers in the Young Turks Congress II in 1907 (Akşin, Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi (1839-1908), 1988, p. 337)

The Paris Center of the Committee of Union and Progress set out the principles of congress as follows: 1) Sultanate and the succession method (not from father to the eldest son, but to the eldest in the family) would not be changed in any circumstance, 2) Committees that were not organized within the Ottoman country were not going to be accepted to the Congress, 3) It would be reported in a joint note that foreign intervention was absolutely rejected and that was to be announced to the press, 4) terrorism would definitely not be allowed as it would invite foreign intervention by fire and fear in the country, 5) action areas would be limited. Akşin believes that when these points are examined, a lot of distrust to non-Turkish organizations and the fear of foreign intervention are evident (Akşin, 100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 1980, s. 58-65).

In 1907, there occurred a new attempt to unite the entire opposition movement at a second congress in Paris (Zürcher E. J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, 2013, p. 140). In this line, Akşin refers to the interesting decisions and principles taken at the Young Turks Congress II on December 27, 1907. For instance, it was accepted that sultanate would pass not from father to son, but to the eldest members of the family, and foreign intervention was strictly rejected. The other striking aspect of this congress was that no Armenians participated in it and this was viewed as a “mistrust” against foreign forces and minorities that were not Turkish. Akşin, on the other hand, adds that the Committee of Union and Progress negotiated with Christian nations on the political program and tried to agree, however, this was a dead end. Nevertheless, the most important purpose of the congress was to remove Abdulhamid from the reign and establish the parliamentary order. On the other side, Abdulhamid did not stand idle, and whenever an atmosphere of chaos and insecurity occurred, he went all the way to intimidate the opposition (Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 2017, s. 115).

In summary, the two committees working around the same purposes under different names contributed to the proclamation of the Constitutional Monarchy to a great extent which helped their consolidation as a committee, while members of the Committee of Union and Progress in Paris introduced themselves as the main actors in triggering revolutions, attempting to govern the country according to their own ideas. Kuran says that when these trivial-seeming incidents are evaluated in depth as the “beginning of a bad ending”, it can be observed that they led to consequences that were of great harm to the country (Kuran A. B., 1945, s. 165).



4. THE COMMITTEE OF UNION AND PROGRESS

4.1. Establishment And Activities Of The Committee Of Union And Progress

4.1.1. The Committee of Ottoman Union

According to Tamo's reference, on September 21, 1889, Gülhane School's medical students thought that "something was not going well" in the sacred homeland during "a break" from class and mentioned dangerous notions such as "committee" and "activity". These students were İbrahim Temo, Abdullah Cevdet, İshak Sukuti and Mehmed Reşit (Temo, 1987). Kuran claims that Hüseyinzade Ali from Baku was also among the founders of the Committee of Ottoman Union (Kuran A. B., 2012, s. 155). The main theme of the discussions of the four medical students was on how to save the country (Erdoğan & Ortaylı, İttihat ve Terakki, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Gizli Örgütlenmeler ve Darbeler, 2016, s. 31). The main objective of this committee, chaired by İbrahim Temo, was to put the 1876 Constitution back into effect. Taking the example of a secret association founded by İbrahim Temo, Ahmet Rıza Bey founded the Committee of Ottoman Union in 1889 in Paris (Kemal H. Karpat. Türk Demokrasi Tarihi, Afa Yayınları. İstanbul. 1996, s. 35-36).

The Committee of Ottoman Union grew rapidly by gaining supporters among military and civilian college students after its establishment. Nonetheless, in those years, Sultan Abdulhamid "was loved by the majority of the Muslim population" of his country although not particularly liked by the Christian subjects. On the other hand, the greatest weakness of Abdulhamid II was that he failed to instill loyalty to students in modern educational institutions he himself developed and increased in number as well as soldiers and civil bureaucrats, i.e. Ottoman intellectuals, who graduated from these schools, not providing any goal for them to achieve (Zürcher E. J., Turkey: A Modern History, 2013, pp. 136-142). The opposition movement was limited to the Ottoman Military Medical

Academy but spread to other schools in Istanbul including the School of Political Science, Military College, Veterinary School, Naval School, Artillery School and Engineering schools. Led by the School of Political Sciences, the intellectual movement was blended with the “decisive” and “brave” stance of the Military Medical Academy (Demirtaş, Jön Türk Bağlamında Osmanlı'da Batılılaşma Hareketleri, 2007, s. 397).

Hanioglu summarizes the organizational characteristics of the Committee under four main observations: 1) The Committee included members from all groups of the empire and collaborated even with the Armenian organizations against Abdulhamid. 2) Emphasizing the inaccuracy of the general observation, the author suggests that despite the revolutionary nature of the Committee, the majority of the members were not from the military and the Committee overall adopted tradition of “democratic discussion” specific to civil organizations. 3) The Committee was very clearly Ottomanist. 4) The intellectual property of the Committee was largely influenced by French references. In another study, Hanioglu tried to explain the Committee’s organizational structure (Hanioglu, 1986, s. 174).

The Committee of Ottoman Union tried to increase the number of members through secret meetings on the one hand, and to establish a solid and effective organizational structure, on the other. In this regard, they took the organizational models of the Italian Carbonari Society and Russian nihilists, organizing students in divisions or “cells” as is referred. Initially, the activities of the Committee was limited to reading regime-opposition newspapers printed abroad and brought to the country by foreign post offices and other channels as well as the distribution of the works of Namık Kemal and

his friends by reproducing them via handwriting (Hanioğlu M. Ş., The Cambridge History Of Modern Turkey, 2008). The period from the establishment of the Committee of Ottoman Union until 1908 is referred to as the period of the Young Turks. More accurately, foreigners called the period by this name (Erdoğan & Ortaylı, İttihat ve Terakki, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Gizli Örgütlenmeler ve Darbeler, 2016, s. 37).

Another claim is that Abdulhamid destroyed the liberty and alliance activities one by one and abolished the first Ottoman Constitution in 1877, which paved the way for establishing secret societies and committees first within the borders of the empire and then in the foreign countries and these societies were known as the Young Turks over time. According to Ahmad's explanation, the Progress and Union was a "secret organization" taking roots in Macedonia and extending to Anatolia and the West. There was no hierarchy in the organization. According to Ahmad, they did not have any party ideology, yet, the liberals within the committee demanded reforms in an empire consisting of Muslim majority and ensure secularization by removing the statement 'the official religion of the state is Islam' in Article 11 of the Constitution (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, s. 54). The New Ottomans – dissolved in 1877 – continued their activities secretly in Europe and formed the basis of the Committee of Union and Progress (Aydın, 2016).

From this perspective, Tunçay explains the purpose of this secret organization, founded by a group of Military Medical School students in the 100th Anniversary of the French Revolution, as follows: "... [they] believed that the lack of a cure for the backwardness of the country was due to the despotism of the sultan and saw salvation in bringing the constitution back" (Tunçay, Siyasal Tarih 1908-1923, s. 28). Ahmad's most

important argument about the Committee of Union and Progress is that the power of the community was exaggerated (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, s. 57). As Dankwart Rustow analyzes, when political elites undergo radical changes, political institutions remains stable in their core qualities; when political institutions are completely reshaped, the social composition of the political elite does not change. In this vein, Rustow says that although the mentality of the political elites changed with the 1908 revolution, the impact of the sultan on the parliament and particularly the Sublime Porte, bureaucracy and political institutions remained the same. Although he drew attention to the fact that there was a large transformation with the republic revolution in the “socio-cultural” sense and in terms of “state-building”, he also underlines the continuity of the form of political institutions in this period (Rustow, 1965, s. 197).

4.1.2. Organization in Union and Progress

The Committee became more or less recognized inside and outside the country as a result of its relations with opposition figures and groups and set off to establish “branches” for organization purposes (Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler, Cilt 1, 1998, p. 20). In this context, as stated before, the “Carbonari Society” became a model for the organization of the Committee of Union and Progress. Carbonari was a society formed by Italian coal dealers. It consisted of several circles of three people, one of whom knew the persons from other circles. Therefore, any damage to one of the circles did not mean the complete destruction of the entire organization. In this line, Carbonari was directly a secret organization (Erdoğan & Ortaylı, İttihat ve Terakki, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Gizli Örgütlenmeler ve Darbeler, 2016, s. 40)

Rather than the Party of Union and Progress, the effect of the Carbonari movement was more evident on the first Young Turks committee, called as Progress and Union. The name of the Progress and Union organization was later turned into Union and Progress. According to Ramsaur, it is assumed that the members of this organization called each other by numerical definitions. The organization was created by enumerating each new unit from its fractions, and each member in those groups was also enumerated. The number of units or branches symbolized the denominator of the fraction and the number of members symbolized its numerator. More clearly, the equivalent of the fifth member of the seventh unit in the list of organizations was expressed as 5/7. The founder of this movement, Ibrahim Temo, on the other hand, called it “1/1” (Ernest, 2011, p. 35). In this context, the importance of cell structuring should not be ignored in this organization, which had an important place on the road to the 1908 revolution. Since the cells did not have any connection with each other and one cell did not recognize the other, it was not possible to reach the next cell by capturing those in one cell. Erdinç purports that it is quite wrong to describe the Union and Progress as an esoteric society; it was not possible to have such completely closed and secret societies even in the 19th and 20th centuries (Erdinç & Ortaylı, İttihat ve Terakki, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Gizli Örgütlenmeler ve Darbeler, 2016, s. 38).

The management of the Party of Union and Progress considered working with those who received “high level of education” or “bureaucrats” who were close to their own political ideas. If there was no such person in a region, they contacted other “professionals”. In case the party management observed that there were not any people from either of these categories, they did not organize in this region; even if they did, they

established the organization under “strict control mechanism” (Turan M. , 2014). Turan supports his analysis on this issue by referring to article 2 of the 1908 regulations cited by Akşin (Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 2017, s. 240).

Ahmad states that politics was “in favor” of the Committee until 1914, but the Committee did not gain “a certain quality” even at this date, explaining the conditions of the period arguing that everything inside and outside went as the Committee wanted and otherwise, it would not be possible for it to survive. Furthermore, Ahmad underscores that the army organization saved the Committee in the counter-revolution of 1909, referring to the fact that the Balkan Wars that soon broke out prevented coming under military rule. He argues that two factors strengthened the Unionists: “Obtaining the power to rule provincial administrations” and “consolidation of their organization” (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, s. 219). Bleda, on the other hand, explicates the organization of the committee during this period in the memories by referring to their movement from Thessaloniki to Anatolia: “*We started to be busy with Anatolia after Rumelia. Regional organizations were established, visits were paid, and the gains of the Constitutional Monarchy were explained to people*”. Nevertheless, Bleda says, “*we could not get the result we wanted*” from these efforts, referring to several incidents “against interests” and “damaging honor” (Bleda, 1979, s. 53-54).

4.1.3. Ethnic Structure of the Committee

When explaining the ethnicity of the Committee of Union and Progress, Yahya Kemal states that it gathered a thousand kinds of creation and a thousand kinds of ambitions getting stronger over time in a structure unseen in the history of Europe and Asia. By

uttering the words, “*Among the Unionist alliance, there were the most irreligious Freemasons, but also the most pious Islamic Unionists, the most humanitarian civilizers, the narrowest-minded nationalists, well-known figures with highest moral quality and those whose immorality was known to everyone, patriots as men of good faith free of financial interests, and profiteers as well as war profiteers, all of whom seemed to be very fond of each other when side by side*”, Kemal asserts that what kept such a committee on its feet was Talat’s character (Kemal, *Çocukluğum Gençliğim Siyâsî Ve Edebî Hatıralarım*, 2008, p. 172).

As can be understood from the above reference, the Committee of Union and Progress was characterized by harboring many different ethnic, religious and cultural groups within its body during its establishment and development. The reason for this diversity coming together was the desire to break down the monarchical order and establish a democratic order instead, and this required acting as a unifying force (Turan M. , 2014, s. 606). From this point of view, it is noteworthy to mention the names of the prominent figures and their ethnic origin of the Committee: Abdullah Cevdet was Kurdish, İbrahim Temo was Albanian, İshak Sukuti was Turkish with Iraqi origin and Mehmed Reşid was Circassian (Erdoğan & Ortaylı, *İttihat ve Terakki, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Gizli Örgütlenmeler ve Darbeler*, 2016, s. 33). According to Zürcher, it is striking that there were no Turks in this group as a Muslim organization. Furthermore, the contributions of immigrants from the Russian Empire should be considered as well. In this regard, “five out of fourteen” members were born in the Russian Empire, Caucasus and Trans-Caucasian provinces. Four were from the Balkans, one from Istanbul and the other from Bursa. However, one of the most important points is

that the first Young Turk group consisted of members from literate and urbanite families. Their fathers' professions were diverse, yet they all had high statuses: "lower and middle level civil servants, merchants, industrialists and members of parliament" (Zürcher E. J., 2015, s. 154).

Within the highly developing organization, a regulation was needed in 1985. Upon enactment of the regulation, several articles stood out: Article 2 of the regulation provided that the Committee would not discriminate against nation, race, gender or sect and would be open to equality, as well as intellectual and individual freedom. Article 3 regulated that the committee would act in accordance with human rights procedures and Article 4 underlined the continuity of the Ottoman reign and caliphate, while assuring that legal sanctions would be imposed on the members of the dynasty in case of any wrongdoing (Birinci, 1988, s. 210).

4.1.4. The Ottoman Freedom Association

In September 1906, 10 people, mostly 3rd Army officers, founded the Ottoman Freedom Association in Thessaloniki. Particularly these 3rd Army officers started to increase in number in the Association after September 1906. Among the officers who joined the community in the first months were: Ahmet Cemal (1872-1922), who was a Major in the 3rd Army (and then Istanbul guard and later minister of the navy), Mustafa Kemal's classmate from the Military College and privileged lieutenant (i.e. graduate of the Military College, whose grades were not high enough to be a military lieutenant by ranking among the most successful third of the class) Halil (Kut) and his nephew Enver, who was a lieutenant in the 3rd Army at the Monastery (and later war minister). Enver

joined the Ottoman Freedom Association in October 1906 after being introduced by Halil (Kut) (Zürcher E. J., *Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık*, 2016, pp. 68-69). On the other hand, Talat, one of the important names of the organization, was seen as the “driving force”.

This organization, which was mentioned by Yahya Kemal in his memories as the Original Progress and Union, flourished gradually after 1908. The real forerunners of the association, on the other hand, were among those who brought the association to the position of ruling party after the reactionary movement of 1909. These were Talat, Enver and Cemal. In fact, these figures passed the most challenging tests in order to come to this position. Yet, the name Kemal more often underlines is Talat. By saying, *“Howbeit, from the first to the last hour of the Union and Progress, the real chief was him [Talat]; he gave the Committee all the qualities of his own disposition like a brand. The fact that the Union and Progress was very compact and flexible was derived from the dispositions of its chief”* Kemal reveals the importance of Talat for the Committee as a witness of the period (Kemal, *Çocukluğum Gençliğim Sîyâsî Ve Edebî Hatıralarım*, 2008, p. 171).

The list of founders given by Tunaya include Tahir Bey from Bursa (District Governor – Lieutenant Colonel) and member number 1 Naki Bey (Yücekök), Major Edip Servet (Tör) (Lieutenant from the Military College), Kazım Nami (Duru) Bey (Lieutenant and Assistant Marshall), Ömer Naci Bey (Lieutenant), İsmail Canbolat Bey (Lieutenant), Hakkı Baha Bey (Lieutenant), Mehmet Talat Bey (First Secretary of the Postal Office and Telegraph Administration) Rahmi Bey and Mithat Şükrü Bey. The Association became influential on the armed forces in a short time and its military and civilian members increased, becoming a secret, revolutionary force. Later, a merger agreement was secretly made with Paris representative Dr. Nazım Bey in Thessaloniki and the name “Ottoman

Freedom Association” was turned into “Progress and Union” (Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler, Cilt 1, 1998, pp. 21-22). The civilian members were Talat Bey, Rahmi Bey and Midhat Şükrü Bleda Bey, while the military members included Tahir Bey, District Governor of Bursa and Military High School Principal, Major Naki (Yücekök) Bey, Lieutenant of the Military College Edip Servet (Tör) Bey, Lieutenant and Assistant Marshall Kazım Nami (Duru) Bey, Lieutenant Ömer Naci Bey and Lieutenant İsmail Canbolat and Hakkı Baha.

In this line, the aim of the committee was to save the homeland from the bad situation it was in and to take the nation out of its captivity so that they could live in humane conditions. The way to achieve this goal was to ensure the enforcement and application of the 1293 founding constitution. However, the difference from first constitution was that all Ottomans, regardless of their race or sect, were expected to accept the provisions as their sacred duties and explicit interests (Article1) (Akşin, 100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 1980, s. 52-56). On the other hand, this organization established in Thessaloniki saw war as a “goal” due to the “despotic regime” and “foreign intervention” (Petrosyan, 1974, s. 252).

In this context, new groups continued to be established, yet, none of them could achieve a countrywide organization; this Committee established in 1906 finally managed to have an organization spreading across the empire, though. The Committee was made up of “young bureaucrats and military officers”. The brain of the Committee was Mehmet Talat, a postal officer from Edirne. Formerly expelled from Edirne to Thessaloniki as the first clerk at Postal-Telegraph Directorate, Talat used his “genius” to rapidly disseminate the influence of the Ottoman Freedom Association (Zürcher E. J., Turkey: A Modern

History, 2013, pp. 141-142). As a matter of fact, the Ottoman Freedom Association started to spread rapidly in cell format by taking advantage of an environment similar to civil war. Indeed, Akşin alleges this form of organization was the way the Bulgarian gang, Macedonia Committee (IMRO, Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) was organized. Recruitment of members of the association was done via a strictly controlled screening process. In the process after the admission to the association, the prospective member was offered to take an oath, provided that it would not be disclosed to anyone; if this was accepted, “the prospective member was brought to the house blindfolded where the oathing ceremony would take place”. A written oration was recited by an oathing board of three members, telling the reasons why “the nation’s lawful rights were extorted and why the motherland was in weakness”. The oath went by saying that the prospective member would “fully serve to the destiny of the committee and in case of any treason, he would consent to the death sentence swearing in the name of his faith, consciousness, and honor and the tenacity of the Almighty”, indicating that any act of treason would result in his death “as necessity” (Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 2017, s. 108-109). According to Kuran, the Committee started to gain importance after 1889 and grew larger. The founders, who saw the committee getting stronger day by day, started to accept military officers and for the first time, an important name, İsmail Hakkı Bey was recruited in the committee. Afterwards, Tahir from Bursa and Colonel Sadık Bey, who were very popular in the army, also joined this committee. Sadık Bey was the head of the Monastery organization and being a Malamatis (a member of a Muslim mystic group) helped the committee to spread with a mystical influence (Kuran A. B., 1945, s. 157-160).

Within this framework, Akşin purports that their organizations in Damascus and Thessaloniki were undoubtedly affected by the 1905 Russian Revolution, the Constitutional Monarchy established in Iran and the European intervention in Rumelia upon the crisis of Macedonia (Akşin *The Young Turks in 100 questions* pp: 50-54). Kuran states that it was possible for this committee, which was established in Thessaloniki, to establish and declare the Constitutional Monarchy by starting communication with the former Amasya member of parliament İsmail Hakkı (Pasha) and thereby, contacting “the Young Turks” in Europe (Kuran A. B., 1945, s. 157-160).

4.1.5. The Merger of the Ottoman Freedom Association and the Committee of Union and Progress

Kuran refers to the important role Dr. Nazım played in the merger of the Ottoman Freedom Association and the Committee of Union and Progress. The leaders of the Ottoman Freedom Association contacted the Greek doctor, whom they often visited, to make sure that Greek gangs would bring Dr. Nazım quietly to Thessaloniki, upon which Dr. Nazım came to Athens and arrived in a Turkish village in Thessaloniki. Hosted in the house of Mithat Şükrü Bey, a hospital manager in Thessaloniki, Dr. Nazım also stayed in the house of Kurfalı Nazif Bey Gendarmerie Major¹ and mediated in the negotiations for the merger of the committees (Kuran A. B., 2012, s. 462).

Established against the despotism of Abdulhamid, the Ottoman Freedom Association merged with the Committee of Union and Progress in September 1907, after which the headquarters were established in Thessaloniki (Erdinç & Ortaylı, *İttihat ve Terakki, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Gizli Örgütlenmeler ve Darbeler*, 2016, s. 51).

¹ Kurfalı is a village near Thessaloniki. Nazif Bey got this name since he was from this village.

(Tunçay, 2.Meşrutiyet'in İlk Yılı, 23 Temmuz 1908- 23 Temmuz 1909, 2018, p. 25).

According to Akşin, the thought that proclamation of the Constitutional Monarchy would soon take place facilitated this merger and reconciliation (Akşin, Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi (1839-1908), 1988, p. 336). However, Kuran alleges that there was a huge difference between the Ottoman Freedom Association merged with the Committee of Union and Progress. The statutes of the two committees were completely different from each other. Indeed, Kuran analyzed the statute of the Committee of Union and Progress published in Egypt in 1323 and argued that it is completely different from that of the Ottoman Freedom Association by means of concrete examples. In this regard, Article 1 of the program of the Committee of Union and Progress state that “[the actions] of the rulers that violate human rights such as justice, equality, liberty against all the Ottomans...”, while Article 1 in the program of the Ottoman Freedom Association regulated that the aim was to establish a permanent Ottoman political committee under the name “Progress and Union) by Ottoman patriots, who wish peace, welfare and happiness in the country” among other differences (Kuran A. B., 1945, s. 164). It is undoubted that the Young Turks movement peaked when the Committee of Union and Progress, as its political organ, obtained the right to have a say in the state administration. According to the Ottoman Committee of Progress and Union Internal Organization Regulation printed secretly and illegally in 1908, the Central Office with five members was at the top as the superior organ and then followed its subordinates Provincial, Sanjak, Town, Borough, and Village Delegations ruled by administrative delegations of three members, who were assigned to assist new members in oath-taking (Article 25-29). In

addition, sub-committees with 3 or 5 members were also constituted (Akşin, 100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 1980, s. 50-55).

Ramsaur, on the other hand, brings a very different approach into the issue. He claims that the secret organization leading the 3rd Army in starting the 1908 “Revolution” was not related to the Young Turks in Europe and even denies that this movement was the legacy of the Young Turks movement (Ernest, 2011, p. 135). According to Küçükkılınç, who analyzes the contradiction in terms of the Young Turks and Unionists, the Young Turks movement included the Ottoman Committee of Union and the Committee of Union and Progress established in Paris, yet, the Ottoman Freedom Association founded under the leadership of Talat Bey “remained insufficient”. In other words, the Young Turks in the footsteps of Prince Sabahaddin did not use the name “the Committee of Union and Progress” after 1902. In addition, as a result of the merger in 1907, the location for the domestic center was chosen as Thessaloniki and the foreign center as Paris. In the disintegration between the Young Turks and Unionists, the group that represented unionism was the Ottoman Freedom Association established in 1906. In this context, it was stated that the Young Turks movement was based on a different tradition and stream of thoughts from the structure of Unionism. Thus, Ramsaur argues that the Young Turks were Western-oriented, secular and positivist, while the Unionists were qualified as “more conservative in cultural terms and more religious” (Küçükkılınç, 2018, s. 26-28).

4.1.6. Structural Characteristics of the Committee of Union and Progress

As pointed out by Aydın, this group of intellectuals was largely influenced by the constitutional movement based on the human rights of the French Revolution and later

adopted a revolutionary feature in order to be able to implement these rights (Aydin, 2016, s. 117). Tunaya asserts that the most important structural problem of the Committee of Union and Progress was the distinction between a party and committee, and the problems arising out of this distinction cannot be denied. Indeed, the question of whether the Committee of Union and Progress was a party, or a society/committee had been a matter that kept busy not only the opponents but also their own members. In the early period, which corresponded to the establishment of the entity, it was tried to be described as both a Committee and a Party. In fact, two contradictory objectives troubled the organization's members for quite a long time: the desire not to give up on the title of Committee granting a sense of sacredness versus the desire to become a "European political party". As a consequence, with the Committee remained a Committee, the members of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Chamber of Deputies or the first Turkish parliament built the political party of Progress and Union. As a matter of fact, it was decided in the Union and Progress Congress held on October 18, 1908 in Thessaloniki that the members of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress in the Chamber of Deputies would work under the title of the Political Party of Union and Progress (Akşin, 100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 1980, s. 132-137). This dichotomy was eventually removed as a result of the 1913 congress and the Union and Progress was declared as a sole political party (Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler, Cilt 1, 1998, pp. 32-33).

Its organizational structure was as follows: a. the General Assembly chaired by the President; b. the Directorate of the Secretary General responsible for non-legislative activities; c. an Executive Council convening under an Assistant Member of Parliament

for legislative affairs; d. The sanjak organization of the headquarters and affiliated regions (a Central Delegation under the chairmanship of a Secretary general); e. Congresses; f. Clubs; g. Istanbul organization due to its pivotal feature (See. Document 18, pp.110) (Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler, Cilt 1, 1998, pp. 32-33)

The headquarters of the Committee was in Istanbul. The head of the organization was the Istanbul Administrative Assembly consisting of a president and four members. Branch Administrative Assemblies were responsible for the organizational branches in provinces with a president and two members. All members of the Committee, including branch members, gathered under five branches led by the presidency of five members of the Istanbul Assembly. Each member knew only three people: 1. The person who appointed him to the committee (senior), 2. His superior, 3. A person that he can appoint to the Committee (his subordinate). Each member had a branch and a sequence number. Members conveyed news upwards, that is, from small numbers to their foremen, while the orders were conveyed downwards from foremen to small-numbered members (Articles 6-10) (Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 2017, s. 58).

In the 1911 regulation, on the other hand, the organization of the Committee of Union and Progress was divided into two was “political” and “social”. In this context, the political sub-organization gave the Committee of Union and Progress a party identity. The political organization consisted of three parts: “1) Electoral college: all Ottomans who adopted the aims of the Committee of Union and Progress and all the people who support and vote for the Committee. 2) Election board: It is the section of the Committee of Union and Progress that was engaged in politics. 3) Elected board: They were the members of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Chamber of Deputies.

Nevertheless, the difficulty in explaining the structure of the Committee of Union and Progress reveals when it comes to the organizational unit referred to as “social” (Akşin, 100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 1980, s. 130-137).

4.1.7. Admission to the Committee of Union and Progress

When Kazım Karabekir discussed the organizational process of the Ottoman Freedom Association with Enver Bey in his house in Thessaloniki on February 7, 1907, he suggested a ceremony with the flag, Qur’an and a revolver for admission to the Committee, while he also provided certain information about Talat Bey (Artuç, 2019, s. 126). In the admission procedure, new members were expected to take an oath and attend the ceremony. They had to take the vow of silence and loyalty on the Qur’an and a revolver and not to break their oath even in death. The new member was brought to a house guided by a member in gown. Italian Carbonari utters that this admission ceremony resembled the ceremonies of the Greek Filiki Eteria (Society of Friends) or Serbian Black Hand Society, while the Unionists stated in their memories that these were “never forgotten experiences” (Zürcher E. J., 2015, s. 181). Putting their right hand on the Qur’an and left hand on a revolver and a dagger, the candidate took the oath for admission to the committee as follows: *“I hereby swear on my religion, consciousness, honor and the Almighty’s name that I will not disclose the secrets of the Committee or any name I learn during my membership even if I was subjected to the most violent tortures, serve to transfer the right to sovereignty to the seniorat within the framework of the Ottoman State (the Ottoman constitution of 1876) and keep it in the Ottoman dynasty, Ali-i Osman, serve for my lifetime for the welfare and freedom of Ottoman society*

without discrimination against race or sect, assist the Committee members and their families who are suffering from calamity, completely abide by the decisions of the Committee and in case I engage in treason, I will consent to death sentence... ” (Akşin, 100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 1980, s. 50-54).

4.1.8. General Overview of the Union and Progress

The intellectual legacy underlying the Union and Progress movement undoubtedly belonged to the New Ottomans (Aydin, 2016, s. 117). In contrast to Zürcher’s sharp modernization claim, Ahmad argues that the movement was in favor of “Europeanization rather than modernization”. It should not be ignored that this movement was a “cosmopolitan” one in addition to being a nationalistic movement surrounded predominantly by Turkish-Islamic nationalism. According to Ahmad, the Committee of Union and Progress was open to all kinds of support and cooperation in the name of Westernization, beneficial initiatives and “modernization”. However, he sees the Union and Progress as “aimless” after overthrowing the despotism of Abdulhamid, defining it as a “heterogeneous” organization. Beyond this, Ahmad argues that the Unionists “lacked an ideology, were stubborn and obstinate” while underlining that their formulas were too simple. At the same time, he suggests that they were pragmatic figures, who “cared more about action than ideology” (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, s. 227).

4.1.9. Leadership in Union and Progress

The Committee of Union and Progress’ “intra-organizational democracy” understanding is a pivotal variable. From this perspective, this organized movement covering the whole country held the General Congress every year and chose the Central Assembly as its

authorized body. For quite a long time, there was not any “presidential position” in the Committee of Union and Progress. There was a Secretary General, yet this was not deemed as a leadership position. In this context, Akşin advocates that leadership is “everything” in today’s political parties, adding that “In the Union and Progress, intra-party democracy was far higher than today’s parties”. The reason for this, he explains, is that the Unionists of that day consisted of “distinguished, educated” members (Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 2017, s. 29-30). On the other hand, Ahmad says that there was no leader in the Committee other than Adjutant Major Niyazi and Major Enver, shedding light on the quality of the Committee. In the following period, on the other hand, Niyazi was not involved in political life, while Enver also chose to stay out of politics claiming that “it was too late” and he “preferred military duties”. He came out as a leader after the Sublime Porte Raid (1913 Ottoman coup d'état) in January 1913, coming to his position with the changing nature of his personality (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, s. 220).

While analyzing the status of the Committee after 1914, Ahmad believes that mentioning only the “triumvir” of Enver, Talat and Cemal would be taking the easy way out. Nonetheless, this does not mean that Talat was not an important political figure in the civil and military administration after 1909, Cemal after 1913 and Enver in the next period. Ahmad’s interpretation is that Talat was the closest person to leadership, yet, even he had done nothing but to head the faction. On the other hand, the more important it was to get provincial administrations, the stronger was Talat. Furthermore, Cemal was also a “hardworking and relentless” Unionist with many supporters. Besides, Talat, Enver, Dr. Bahattin Şakir and Emanuel Karasu came to the forefront as important names after the

declaration of the constitutional monarchy (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, s. 220).

Tunçay states that the Committee of Union and Progress was not able to fully establish the internal control as it did overseas. During the years of 1913-1918, many conflicts arose within the senior management due to “social origin and personality differences”. The first conflict was between soldiers and civilians, as stated by Tunçay: The conflict between Enver Pasha and Talat Pasha was also on the same axis. The second conflict was the competition among the soldiers: The tension between Pasha and Talat Pasha increased also by the effect of this conflict (Tunçay, Siyasal Tarih 1908-1923, s. 52).

4.1.10. Ideology of Union and Progress

This generation, referred to as “weakly cultured and strongly vindictive” by Tunaya, managed to topple Abdulhamid’s despotic regime. However, these people did not have a specific plan for building the future. The movements, described as revolution and innovation, remained the same except for “little retouching”, however, everything was “shaken at the root”. Union and Progress as a political organization united within the framework of Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism (Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Gelişmeler [1876-1908], 2016, pp. 134-135). Yet, Hanioglu underlines that the Committee was very clearly Ottomanist (Hanioglu, 1986, s. 174). Ahmad utters that the Unionists did not care which ideological element dominated, since they thought leadership was in the hands of the Turks no matter the ideology (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, s. 214).

The Committee of Union and Progress tried many reforms for the provincial administrations and thus, adopted the idea of decentralization for a period. According to Kayalı, this policy gaining momentum in 1913 and 1914 contradicted the previous ideas of the Committee of Union and Progress, and decentralization policies were nothing but a move to align with Arabs (Kayalı H. , 1999). Having a centralistic, Turkism-oriented and liberal understanding during the period of the second constitutional monarchy, the Committee of Union and Progress was tried to be suppressed by the opposition through the Ottomanism policy. Upon the Sublime Porte Raid, the demographic change arising from the defeats during wars and constant provocation of non-Muslim elements, the idea of Ottomanism surpassed against the party's centralization policy (Somel, 2016, s. 110-112).

From this perspective, Köker presents the different dimensions of the Young Turk ideology on the basis of prioritizing Kemalism. Arguing that the Young Turks were positivist, rational and ambitious for constitutional regime – which indicates populism – the author suggests that they wished to establish a new order by taking the science and technology of the West as an example in order to ensure progress in society as well as state survival. The aim of a constitutional and parliamentary political organization in this new order was to enlighten people by educated intellectuals to ensure that they can understand what was good and what was bad. Following these explanations, the author utters that the question that needs to be asked at this point is whether this movement had libertarian and democratic content. Furthermore, Köker questions how this continuity took shape with the Republic by asking the question, “*How did the Young Turks' mentality, formerly manifesting a “conservative” feature due to the position of the*

bureaucracy depending on their mission to “save the state”, change with Kemalism?” (Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, 2007, s. 130-132). From the social perspective, on the other hand, the scholar goes back in the history to point out to the impact of Turks abroad, particularly in Russia, in the formation of the Turkism perception in the homeland.

4.2. Movements Of Thought During The Constitutional Monarchy II

The Young Turks gathered around three ideas in the movement of thought starting before 1908: to protect, save and delay the collapse of the Ottoman state. The most important of these ideas was referred in the article *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset/Three Political Styles* written by Yusuf Akçura in 1904. The movements of thought mentioned in this article were Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism, and later Westernism was added. The importance of Akçura’s article on 3 political styles comes from the fact that it presented a type of Turkism resembling today’s pan-Turanism to the attention of Ottoman intellectuals and while doing this, he differentiated and isolated other politics including Ottomanism and Islamism from Turkism (Akşin, *Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi (1839-1908)*, 1988, p. 338). As a thinker who had spent most of his life in Turkey, Akçura used Turkish language and did not speak Russian, as mentioned in his memories referenced by Soysal. In the *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset/Three Political Styles* he wrote in Cairo in 1904, he deemed Turkism as a solution for the Ottoman society (Soysal, *Tatarlar Arasında Türkçülük*, 2014, s. 197). Akçura continued his work in the Turkish intellectual life during and after the Republic’s building process. Immediately after the proclamation of the Republic, Yusuf Akçura said: “Gentlemen, history shows us that all the reforms are conveyed to us by a conscious minority determinate in their goals and patient, renunciative and violent when necessary”

analyzing the defeat and collapse doing his historical duty (Mert, Cumhuriyet Türkiye'si'nde Laiklik ve Karşı Laikliğin Düşünsel Boyutu, 2001, p. 200).

Tunçay, on the other hand, justifies any kind of nationalism as long as there is the hope for saving, maintaining and protecting the general structure in a multi-national empire. Arguing that nationalism can provide a solution under such circumstances, the author underlines that the tendency against Turkism during the period when the Committee of Union and Progress carried out its activities secretly suppressed its own nationalism when the responsibility to run the state emerged, which is easy to deduct from the situation (Tunçay, Siyasal Tarih 1908-1923, s. 37).

Kadioğlu, on the other hand, points out to the fact that Westernism is different from these three ideologies and since Ottomanism, Turkism and Islamism incorporate the Ottoman ethos, underlining the existence of a continuity thesis (Kadioglu, 1996, s. 26). Yet, Toker and Tekin argue that the difference of Westernism is not based on political and social continuity but on discontinuity. Authors often dwelling upon the discontinuity thesis after the proclamation of the Republic argue that this thesis is the output of the “uncompromising” contradiction between reason and tradition (Toker & Tekin, Batıcı Siyasi Düşüncenin Karakteristikleri ve Evreleri: "Kamusuz Cumhuriyet'ten Kamusuz Demokrasiye", 2016). In this context, Çiğdem underlined that no matter how the aforementioned three political styles were disregarded after the proclamation of the Republic, each of them posed a critical and hopeful stance in their times with contributions to the establishment of modern Turkey (Çiğdem, "Türk Batılışmasını Açıklayıcı Bir Kavram: Türk Başkallığı: Batılılaşma, Modernite ve Modernizasyon, 2016, s. 70). Masami Arai, on the other hand, points out to two main movements for Turkish

Nationalism and one of these movements was Ottoman patriotism, which demonstrates continuity (Soysal, *Tatarlar Arasında Türkçülük*, 2014, s. 196).

4.3. Ottomanism

Although the Committee of Union and Progress, known by its opposition to the reign of Abdulhamid II, projected unity under the policy of “Union of All Groups”, the Committee brought a new “Sovereign Nation” understanding. This gave Turks a dominant nation status. This gave Turks a dominant nation status. In that, in an article in Sabah newspaper, Şerif Mardin addressed this issue as follows: “The history of the Committee of Union and Progress is in a sense the history of the ‘sovereign nation’ ideology. While the nationalism developed by the Committee granted the status of ‘sovereign nation’ to Turks as ‘primary component of society’, it also envisaged a hierarchical relationship between the other elements of the empire and this ethnic group” (Palabıyık & Koç, 2015, s. 426). In this context, Ottomanism is defined as the unifying approach accepting different religious and ethnic groups living in the Empire as a united “Ottoman nation” and bringing these groups together under a common empire ideal (Somel, 2016, s. 88). Apart from political parties, Ottomanism, which was the political aim of the whole Constitutionalism movement, had an inclusive feature. In this regard, belonging to only one party as well as an ideology and opinion was to be accepted as satisfactory. In this regard, the idea of ‘union of all elements or groups in society’ adopted by the Committee of Union and Progress was considered as a “official and supra-party” ideology. However, according to Tunaya, the Ottomanism of the Committee of Union and Progress was “a wizened imperialism”, since they failed to compete with

imperialism of great powers (Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasal Gelişmeler [1876-1908], 2016, pp. 135-136).

Somel explains the emergence of the Ottomanist thought in four stages: The first stage was the Sublime Porte's authoritarian centralist politics, which lasted from 1830 to 1875. The second stage was the Ottomanism approach of the New Ottoman group in the pragmatist framework between 1868-1878. The third stage was the understanding of Ottomanism developing in the Young Turks against Abdulhamid II's absolutism. Finally, the fourth stage was the thought of Ottomanism that emerged during the second constitutional period (Somel, 2016, s. 88). On the other hand, Ahmad states that Ottomanism was an opinion that endeavored to hold all the elements of the Ottomans together, regardless of religion, language and race. However, the nationalist movements that developed among the minorities disrupted this policy and caused it to disappear among the Union and Progress policies. In the same vein, Zürcher says that "sovereignty of nationalist ideas", which formed the "basic weakness" of the Prince Sabahaddin movement and were lost together with the excitement of the constitutional monarchy, revealed once again among the "minorities". Underlining that the Committee of Union and Progress was affected by Turkish and Muslim nationalism in their interpretation of Ottomanism, Zürcher further suggests that this policy had been oriented towards "Turkification of non-Turkish elements" since its inception and that he does not find it credible (Zürcher E. J., Turkey: A Modern History, 2013, p. 137).

Masami Arai, on the other hand, draws attention to two trends within Turkish nationalism, underlining continuity with Ottoman patriotism, a branch of Turkish Nationalism (Soysal, Tatarlar Arasında Türkçülük, 2014). Nevertheless, Ahmad

acknowledges that there was Turkish nationalism during the Young Turks period. However, he accentuates that the real ideology of the Committee of Union and Progress was Ottomanism and explains the reason for this situation by saying that they aimed to keep Arabs, Anatolian Greeks, Armenians and other nations together at hand (Ahmad, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Geçmişten Bir Kopuştur*, 2010). In line with the reviews of Hanioglu, one of the best findings related to this issue is included in Hüseyin Cahit's thesis of Sovereign Nation. In this article, it is underlined that there was nothing that other nations of the empire should be afraid of Turks, while it was important for Turks to be sincerely convincing" (Hanioglu Ş. , 2012).

4.3.1. Pan-Islamism

Trying to set new balance in the Middle East, Great Powers aimed to propose a nationalism movement that would provoke Arabs. Tunaya claims that the policy of pan-Islamism aimed at "liberating Arabs from Turks" but at the same time, pushing them to the Western imperialism. Thus, Tunaya evaluates this as an "artificial nationalism" (Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Gelişmeler [1876-1908]*, 2016, p. 136). Ahmad says that Islamism was one of the corner stones of the Ottoman empire ideology and states the reason for this was that Turks were quite committed to their religion (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, s. 214). As another name confirming Ahmad's argument, Masami Arai is one of the political scientists analyzing the nationalist movement. Contrary to the generally accepted idea, Arai purports that the absolute aims of Turkish nationalists were not secularization and Westernization; instead, they were supporting Islamization and modernization seeking a different form of modernization than Westernization (Arai, 2014, s. 180).

After the March 31 movement, the basal transformation of this ideological approach took place. The opposition of the religious class to the Committee paved the way for mergers with other parties. According to Tunaya, the most important feature that differentiated the Committee from the religious class was definitely the “secularization” movement. The Committee of Union and Progress was always dedicated to this movement that meant reforms in religion, and this resulted in restriction of the Shaykh al-Islam’s authorities by the decisions of the Committee of Union and Progress between 1916 and 1917. The Committee also revised judicial bodies under the Ministry of Justice, and regulated the issues of marriage, divorce and polygamy (Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Gelişmeler [1876-1908]*, 2016, pp. 136-137)

According to Tunaya, the Islamist movement was in a sense the continuation of Abdulhamid’s policies. Used directly by the state to increase their effect on the Muslim world and colonies, this movement projected the salvation of the Empire in Muslim solidarity. According to Akçura, “Islam is supposed to accept nationalism; the reason for this is that it is a historical obligation. Religions are also subject to the laws of history and they also evolve”. M. Akif, on the other hand, says the following in this regard: “Muslims! You are neither Kurds nor Circassians. You are members of a single nation, and that is the great Islamic nation. Unless you abandon Islam, you cannot pursue the Nationalism case, and when you pursue the Nationalism case, you will not be a Muslim anymore”. Therefore, he reveals the discontinuity between the two ideas. Akşin criticizes Akçura by saying that the author “avoids a choice between Islamism and Turkism” and “tells that interests and disadvantages as well as ease and difficulty in practice are the same” (Akşin, *Düşünce ve Bilim Tarihi (1839-1908)*, 1988, p. 338). Berkes suggests that

Islamist and Ottomanist policies lost their practicality, therefore, the Committee of Union and Progress adopted the Turkism and Turkish Nationalism policies (Berkes, Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma, 2017, p. 428) (Niyazi Berkes Modernization in Turkey, pp: 428).

In reference to Deringil, Ünvar suggests that the discussion over Islamism continued as of the Reform period. In this process, where it was debated whether Islam was preventing progress or not, Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi emerged as the most important figures. Ünvar also mentions that Abdulhamid was more in an ideological position than the simple thought dimension due his pan-Islamist thought, drawing attention to the fact that Islamism was invented and merged with pre-Nationalism during the reign of Abdulhamid II (Unvar, 2016, p. 132). Göle explains the ideological dimension of Islamism as follows: *“Islamism is the source of political and scientific interest in the West, and it is an example where most of the stereotypes of modern knowledge-based ideologies are reproduced.”* According to Göle, Islamism was reinforcing and challenging the fear, interest and alienation that the West felt for the non-self, the other (Göle, Batı Dışı Modernlik: Kavram Üzerine, 2016, p. 63).

4.3.2. Turkism

Before explaining the Turkist movement, it will be useful to apply to Hüseyin Cahid's information regarding the position of Turks in the empire in order to reflect the state of mind during the period: *“The only group that internalized the homeland and that was ready to faithfully endure any difficulty and sacrifice was Turks. The country was a “homeland” only for Turks. When the word “homeland” (motherland) came out of the mouth, only the heart of the Turkish responded. For Bulgarians, homeland meant*

annexing Macedonia with Sofia; maybe they would want to extend to Istanbul. For Greeks, homeland was Istanbul in addition to adding certain parts of Anatolia. Armenians were considering creating a peculiar land for themselves by breaking Anatolia into pieces. And Arabs? Albanians? They were attached to Istanbul with a vague religious bond. But how could we believe that they would not return to those who pay the most money, who provided the highest benefit? The right to dominate the destiny of the country and take the most fundamental decision should be in the hands of Turks” (Yalçın, 2000, s. 72). Ziya Gökalp’s distinction between culture and civilization is not only a sociological but also a political distinction. Çiğdem attributes the reason why the Turkish nation can exist in harmony with the Islamic Ummah and Western civilizations to the removal of pan-Islamism and assumes that the relations with the West were built on a nationalist basis. Gökalp says, *“When a nation with a strong national culture but with a weak civilization enters into political struggle against a nation with a poor national culture, but with high civilization, the one with a strong national culture always prevails”* explicitly underscoring the importance of national culture and this rhetoric has continued until today particularly as the promise and capital of right-wing powers (Çiğdem, "Türk Batılılaşması'nı Açıklayıcı Bir Kavram: Türk Başkalığı: Batılılaşma, Modernite ve Modernizasyon, 2016, p. 73).

Gökalp explains the formation of nations as the end of a three-stage process under the influence of Durkheim’s sociology. In this context, Gökalp says that in this structure, there is transition from the tribal society based on religious and racial unity to the community where there is no religious unity and from there, to the nation defined with culture and civilization. Akşin says that the movements of pan-Slavism, pan-Hellenism

and pan-Teutonicism in Europe were effective in the formation of pan-Turkism movement by the Unionists (Aydin, 2016, s. 133). Akşin reflects this idea by stating that there ideological approached under the influence of the developments in the West and even that Durkheim's sociology contributed to the formation of the principle of "National Sovereignty" adopted by the Committee of Union and Progress. With the "New Life" doctrine, Ziya Gökalp refers to the social, political and economic aspects of nationalism. Yet, according to Tunaya, the aim was "to protect and maintain the state rather than society". Another factor underlined is that Turkists aspired to a "new Empire" instead of a national state and thus, they turned the nationalist movement into a "distant Turkism" and Turanism. As the reason why the capitalist development emerged visibly under the control of Turks in the Ottoman State, Akşin points out to the policies pf the Committee of Union and Progress. Despite the Committee's Ottomanist and Islamist discourses, they utterly adopted Turkish nationalism in practice, and this is detected to be the output of the aforementioned bourgeoisie mindset (Akşin, 100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 1980, s. 70).

Ahmad, on the other hand, argues that Islamism and Nationalism were brought after the Balkan Wars instead of Ottomanist politics. Although it was suggested that nationalism was not Turkish nationalism, but "Turanist nationalism", the difference between these two was not exactly determined. According to Ahmad, the fact that Turks gained weight in terms of population in the empire was one of the factors affecting the emergence of Turkish Nationalism (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, s. 214).

According to Berkes, the most important thinker of the period was undoubtedly Ziya Gökalp. His best known work is "Turkification-Islamization-Modernization".

According to Gökalp, there was no conflict between Turkish Nationalism and Islam. Thus, he indicated that this non-contradiction was due to the fact that these areas were different from each other. According to Berkes' findings, Gökalp's nationalist ideas came closer to the Westernism view (Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 2017, p. 431). Gökalp argued that the “science and technology” that he advocated to take from the West was not an opposite situation for Islam. Advocating “science based internationalization” instead of “religion based internationalization”, Gökalp argued that the Turkish nation was a society connected to the “Ural-Altai family, Islamic ummah and European internationalization” (Gökalp, 1976) (Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, 1960).

According to Gökalp, the Turkish nation had its own strong culture; this culture remained under the invasion of a medieval civilization, partly belonging to Islam and Arabs and partly to Byzantium (Zürcher E. J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, 2013, p. 199). Gökalp defined culture as follows: “*The essence of all aspects of social life such as religion, morality, law, politics, economy, science and fine arts is language*”. He regarded language as the basis of social life, the texture of morality, the infrastructure of culture and civilization (Parla, Ziya Gökalp, *Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm*, 2006) (Corporatism and Kemalism in Turkey). In his criticism of the Reforms, Gökalp stated that the Reformists were trying to reconcile the Ottoman civilization with the Western Civilization, and that these two civilizations were opposite to each other, and because the systems of the two civilizations were the opposite of each other, they would cause disruption. Therefore, Gökalp pointed out to this duality in the Reformation mindset (Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, 1976). According to Berkes, the revolutionary approach

that distinguished Gökalg from the New Ottomans lied in the fact that he was inspired by “the freedom of nations, the unification of the universal Catholic Church and the unification of peoples as a nation” in the events that took place in the West during 1848-1870. Understanding the fact that the Ottoman society was divided into several nationalities, Gökalg saw Turks, who had grasped the “Jeune/Youth” and “Turkishness” that the New Ottomans could not grasp, as a nation that deserved to develop with the modern world (Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 2017, p. 438). Göle, on the other hand, says that “Turkism was the real place of Islam and Ottomanism against cosmopolitanism”, highlighting that the ideology of the Republic was based on nationalism and anti-cosmopolitanism (Göle, *Batı Dışı Modernlik: Kavram Üzerine*, 2016, p. 62).

According to Zürcher, most of the Young Turks rationally supported the idea of Ottomanism; in addition to their emotional and romantic commitment to pan-Turkist nationalism, they were also devoted Muslims. Zürcher conveys the following views of Hanioglu: “Hanioglu states that the ideology of Union and Progress gradually shifted to Turkish Nationalism in the period of 1902-1906, and thus, the Union and Progress propaganda turned towards the development of Nationalism before 1906.” Hanioglu also mentions that Turkish magazines published in the Balkans united under “Islam and Nationalism are”. The author states that the reason for this inclination was the pressure of groups established against the Greek and Armenian societies in the Empire. According to Hanioglu, the fact that the transition to nationalism was made in these conditions is very important, since he implies that there were other factors of this ideology by saying that he doubted that the nationalism of the Young Turks was really “Turkish” (Zürcher E. J.,

2015, s. 344). On the other hand, Ahmad states that the process after 1908 was a very important period in the formation of Turkish Nationalism and that Turkishness was “rediscovered” and even “reproduced” by being proud of the Anatolian history and traditions. Besides, the progress of Turkism by emphasizing “secularism” and “Turkish Islam” was an act that was contrary to the Islamic world (Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 2017, p. 98).

Tunçay argues that the Committee of Union and Progress abolished politics and established dictatorship after 1913 and added that its new program included certain suitable modernization measures. However, when evaluating these efforts, Tunçay warns us to consider the developments such as the Balkan Wars, Tripoli, the burden of foreign debt and economic problems (Tunçay, *Siyasal Tarih 1908-1923*, s. 38). Tunaya advocates that Ziya Gökalp as an intellectual of the period showed Enver Pasha as a charismatic hero in his works, deeming him as the most adequate candidate for power. According to Tunaya, Gökalp’s heroic theme and idea of Turanism were “buried in the Pamir skirts along with Enver Pasha on the morning of August 4, 1922” (Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Gelişmeler [1876-1908]*, 2016, pp. 139-140).

François Georgeon’s definition of “rootlessness” given in the context of Yusuf Akçura’s studies can also be used for the leaders of the Turkist movement coming from Russia according to Soysal, who asserts that the intellectual core of this leading group, Turkism, was indeed “an effort to find a root” (Soysal, *Tatarlar Arasında Türkçülük*, 2014, s. 197). The painful “religion” element in Ziya Gökalp’s works had been a constant source of discomfort for the intellectuals of the Republic. Gökalp’s interpretation of

positivism as a social phenomenon from the Comte-Durkheim line constituted one of the main pillars of the new identity (Halil Nimetullah Öztürk, 2001, s. 203).

4.4. The Revolution Of 1908 And The Political Process After

4.4.1. The Social and Political Environment

Looking at the world conjuncture in 1908, Lewis utters that there were many developments that “encouraged” the Unionist group. As a far eastern country that had recently declared the Constitutional Monarchy, Japan defeated European Russia, which had been “ruled by despotism”. In the same vein, the soldiers were uncomfortable with their money not being paid. Lewis stated that the soldiers’ attitude towards this situation turned into an uprising, more precisely, a “wave of strikes”, explaining that this rebellion wave spread to Anatolia and Rumelia together with the reasons behind. On the other hand, Europe wanted the “Sick Man” to treat himself as soon as possible, and for this Europe showed the prescription as “Constitutional Monarchy” (Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2015, p. 280).

The Reval Negotiations held on June9-10, 1908, had a great reaction from the Union and Progress front. It is stated that the meeting between Edward VII and Nicholas II on June9-10, 1908 worried the Unionists, to some extent (Ernest, 2011, p. 176). According to Ramsaur, Reval was an excuse and the chaos as well as turmoil during the period made reactions inevitable. However, Zürcher propounds that the Reval Negotiations constituted an important reason for the reactions, while Enver Pasha, Niyazi and Fethi referred to this reason in their memories. Zürcher stated that he could not see a reason not to believe them in this matter. Tunçay also says that the Reval Negotiations

played an important role in the actions of the officers in Rumelia, who saw the integrity of the country' territory in danger (Tunçay, 2.Meşrutiyet'in İlk Yılı, 23 Temmuz 1908- 23 Temmuz 1909, 2018, p. 13).

On June 12, 1908, the British King Edward VII and the Russian Tsar Nicholas II met in Russia's port city Reval to discuss the measures to be taken against Germany. This was reflected by the Unionists as a meeting where it was planned to share the lands of the Ottoman state. With the excitement of this incident, the Committee accelerated its actions. On June 11, 1908, the Community's guards carried out a series of assassinations, which began with the injury of Colonel Ömer Nazım, the Chief of the Thessaloniki Center. The entire Rumelia was in turmoil. Reports began to inform Istanbul administrations about the danger. Research and investigations pointed to a young officer, Major Enver. This young officer was called to Istanbul to "explain the situation and get promoted". Yet, it was too late now. Major Enver went to the Tikves upon order of the Committee instead of going to Istanbul for accountability. This was followed by the Resne National Battalion, led by a young officer, Senior Lieutenant Ahmet Niyazi Efendi, going to the mountains on July 3, 1908. The gauntlet had been thrown and the revolution was initiated. While the Palace sent the Redif (Unit Reserves) Battalions, whom they thought to be committed to the government, from Anatolia to the region of insurgency, they also ordered Şemsi Pasha, who had previously been successful in suppressing the Albanian revolts, to take action against the rebels. Nevertheless, on July 7, 1908, while Şemsi Pasha was leaving the Monastery Telegraph Center, he was shot by a lieutenant under his command in broad daylight and the murderer moved away calmly

without even harm on his hair (Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2015, pp. 280-284).

Tunaya says that “Reval was the event that detonated the bomb” (Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, Cilt 1, 1998, p. 23). Military officers took action against the Mürzsteg Agreement and declared the Constitutional Monarchy a month later. The Committee of Union and Progress knew how to use the conditions brought about by this chaos. Tatar Osman Pasha, who was assigned by the Sultan to suppress the revolt in the Macedonian mounts with a large army, was kidnapped while he was sleeping in his pajamas at midnight by Eyüp Sabri from Ohrid and Niyazi from Resne, which surprised everyone. As a matter of fact, Niyazi from Resne referred to this incident in his memories. Ramsaur suggests that this incidents was an example of “insane courage and recklessness” and Abdulhamid was truly puzzled and horrified against this development as he thought those who could kidnap a Pasha in his pajamas in the midnight could one day raid the Yıldız Palace (Zürcher E. J., *Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık*, 2016, p. 75), accepting this bitter truth on July 24. Another factor that needs to be considered here is the fact that Eyüp Sabri from Ohrid, one of the protagonists of the rebellion process, contributed to the discontinuity-continuity thesis of the civil and military bureaucrats. Eyüp Sabri from Ohrid, who later took the surname of Akgöl, became the suspect of İzmir Assassination against Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the Countrywide Resistance Organization in the Anatolian War, the founder of the Green Army and a deputy of the parliament. He became a deputy again between 1935-1950. On the other hand, Niyazi from Resne drew attention to the triggering factor of the Reval Negotiations in his memories (Niyazi, 2017).

Ortaylı explains that the 1908 revolution “created” new institutions in the constitutional system. In this period when political parties were first introduced to our social life, he noted the emergence of associations to support political parties, meetings, strikes and developments in the press. During this period, the foundations of civil society were laid and “use of political rights” as well as “the emergence of thought movements” played a major role in the history of Turkey (Ortaylı, *Gelenekten Geleceğe*, 2007, p. 64).

According to Ahmad, power was under the monopoly of a “small group” in the Palace. However, it is difficult to mention “stability” and “continuity” during that term due to the arbitrary change of viziers and ministers. The most important criticism for this system is that a “small minority” was allowed to take part in the political life, however, reaction was “unavoidable” due to the growing power of these groups in society. In light of these findings, the opponents united against the palace. As a result of this unification, the Sultan was “isolated” and left in a situation that he could not receive support from “foreign powers”. Thus, the meeting in Reval in June 1908 justified fears in society and caused this revolutionary momentum to “accelerate” (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, pp. 9-10).

4.4.2. Declaration of the Constitutional Monarchy II

Ascending the throne with the promise of an assembly and a constitution in 1876, Abdulhamid II did not keep his promise and resolved the Chamber of Deputies and suspended the constitution by using the movement of Russians to San Stefano as an excuse. However, Tunçay states that the Sultan did not abolish the constitution and even did not violate it, arguing that the Sultan used his constitutional rights (Tunçay, *Siyasal*

Tarih 1908-1923, s. 27). On the other side, many modernization movements continued to occur in the Ottoman society despite the despotic regime as a result of the closure of the first parliament. Many institutions were opened, while “Military College and College of Political Science” were the primary modernized institutions in the field of education. Many innovations were made in the field of “transportation” and “communication” as well as expanding postal and telegraph lines. In short, the society was under pressure, yet it inevitably started to change over time.

Akşin explained that the reason why the Union and Progress demanded legitimacy was to ensure modernity. Accordingly, the Committee of Union and Progress did not only fight for freedom, they also wanted to bring modernity to the Muslim society that was underdeveloped, although the members of the Committee did not explicitly declare this aim. According to Akşin’s analysis, the Committee aimed to move into a bourgeoisie, democratic, capitalist and enlightened order that existed in feudalism (medieval, sheikhdom and princedom). Furthermore, it is stated that in this society where the literacy rate of Muslims was below 5%, sheikhs and princes (caliph sultans) needed to have this feudalism in order to be able to rule (Akşin, Tarık Zafer Tunaya Anısına, *Yadigar-ı Meşrutiyet*, 2010, s. 83).

In the light of these developments, the Constitutional Monarchy was declared on July 23, 1908 by the Committee of Union and Progress as well as the army units which rose up in various cities and towns of Rumelia. The Committee of Union and Progress in the Monastery declared the Constitutional Monarchy with 21 gunshots, accompanied by soldiers and civilians, Muslims and Christians (Tunçay, *2.Meşrutiyet'in İlk Yılı*, 23 Temmuz 1908- 23 Temmuz 1909, 2018, pp. 12-18). On July 21, 1908, the Committee

ordered all its branches to show all efforts to achieve success out of the conflict by July 23, an army of military units and volunteers to march to Istanbul on July 26, if the palace and the government resisted. Meanwhile, the Committee met with Albanian gangs and Bektashi leaders, ensuring that some Albanian armed groups and gangs to joined the movement (Hanioğlu M. Ş., İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, 2001, s. 481).

Declared in a festive atmosphere with celebrations in Rumelia on 23 July, the Constitutional Monarchy was announced in a quietly unofficial publication in Istanbul and was welcomed by Istanbulites with surprise as they were not aware of the developments in Rumelia due to censorship (Tunçay, 2.Meşrutiyet'in İlk Yılı, 23 Temmuz 1908- 23 Temmuz 1909, 2018, p. 12). The official communiqué published in the newspapers dated July 24, 1908 declared that the first constitution of the Ottomans was put into effect again. On the other hand, the rebellion of Albanians, the minority that Abdulhamid trusted the most, drove Sultan into the corner (Zürcher E. J., Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık, 2016, p. 75).

The 1908 Revolution was launched by a group of officers in Macedonia. Moreover, this reformist movement to save the empire was soon supported by high-ranking officers. In this regard, the Young Turks had faith in constitution and reforms. According to Ahmad, the underlying reason for this faith was the inclusion of the state in the power structure, and the Young Turks believed that this would only happen with the adoption of the constitution (Ahmad, İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme, 2016, p. 165). The author did not explain the 1908 movement as a political movement but claimed that the seizure of power in 1909 was due to the incompetence of civilians (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, s. 225).

During the course of this time, although the Committee called itself as the “inventor”, Ahmad claims that they were under the influence of “traditionality” and “history” as an indicator of continuity (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, s. 219). At this point, it would be useful to remember Binder’s explanation about traditionality: *“The past is tradition; although future is the end of history, modernity will continue to exist in the world (future); and today is the past”*. Referring to the transitional process as hope, the author further states that modernity is a synthesis of tradition as a historical formation and the reason for this synthesis going unnoticed is that it does not incorporate a final stage within its body (Binder, 2015) (Köker, 2007, s. 59).

From this perspective, Oktay’s interpretation on the concept of “traditionalism” is also supportive of Ahmad’s arguments. Oktay mentions that in the process starting with the Imperial Edict of Gülhane, there were tradition-specific styles and features, while an ideal for the future was almost “spontaneously syringed” with a change of content in the golden age of the past (Oktay, 2010, s. 185). Another striking interpretation by Ahmad is that the Committee needed to resolve, indeed, after the proclamation of the Second Constitutional Monarchy, ending the despotic regime and opening the Chamber of Deputies. The author suggests that the Committee was successful in “political tactics” until 1914, while maintaining its confidentiality, however, he also puts forward that the Committee’s seeing itself as “the legitimate owner of the government” further provoked the opposition and therefore, the Committee was just counting days to lose the political sovereignty obtain by military in 1909. This revolution was not carried out “against the state but by means of the state” (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, s. 219-227). Kansu qualifies this revolution as one and the last of the last bourgeoisie revolutions in

the less developed countries around Europe (Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, 2017, p. xvi). Briefly, the second constitutional monarchy became a door opening to Western Ideas and institutions (Tunaya, Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri, 2016, s. 44). To sum, Kansu, Kars and Emiroğlu reject Tunaya's claim that this movement was created by the military and assert that in the process of 1904-1905, it became a series of "civil society movements" spreading to Anatolia and Macedonia in 1908, pointing out to a different perspective.

4.4.3. Political Laboratory of the Republic: Constitutional Monarchy II

One of the most accurate analyses of the Constitutional Monarchy II undoubtedly belongs to Tunaya. In this context, Tunaya purports that the development of political life in the Western sense for the first time, emergence of political thoughts and forming political parties as ruling-opposition parties all coincided with this period. According to Tunaya, this period was symbolized with an "Eastern" and "unprepared" society whenever there was an attempt to apply modern ideas and therefore, it was not difficult to legalize Western theories due to the ruling party seizing power and dominating the parliament. In addition to its authoritarian characteristics, "the party obviously wished to achieve a national, laic, and autarchic state formula in the reforms". In line with these developments, decisions that "had not been dared" until that time were taken thanks to the Second Constitutional period (Tunaya, Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri, 2016, s. 45). Mardin, on the other hand, emphasizes that the ideas of the Committee of Union and Progress were deemed equal with the Western term "strength" as much as the dominant political formation with the committee during the Second Constitutional period, thus referring to continuity. However, the thesis asking the

question which of the Western trends would be adopted – as opposed to the committee’s ideology – as advocated by Ziya Gökalp were also maintained. On the other hand, there was also an Islamic view that was against imitating the West and Mehmet Akif was among the leading names suggesting this thesis (Mardin Ş. , Türk Modernleşmesi, 2018, s. 16).

In the next period of the 1908 Revolution, numerous changes occurred in political life. Moreover, the expansion of the public sphere brought many political innovations. Squares witnessed protests and streets were full with crowd. In line with Çetinkaya’s findings, “elections, economic boycotts, strikes, occupations, direct actions, marches, rallies, meetings, demonstrations, activities of committees, collective activities of youth organizations and mass sports movements were seen for the first time in this period and such public movements would never be let go after this period” (Çetinkaya, 2008). In addition, the 1908 “Young Turk Revolution” became one of the turning points in Turkish press history. Facing a “press explosion” that was even more striking than the French society, the Empire witnessed the emergence of the concept of press for the first time and thus, the weight of the press started to be felt in the Ottoman society (Odabaşı, s. 222). Tunçay’s work, *The First year of the Second Constitutional Monarchy* is one of the most important sources that we can refer to in this field. It is possible to observe how masses were mobilized during this period that was under the rule of the Committee of Union and Progress (Tunçay, 2.Meşrutiyet’in İlk Yılı, 23 Temmuz 1908- 23 Temmuz 1909, 2018).

In light of this information, the Second Constitutional Monarchy period, which Tunaya sees as the “political laboratory of the republic”, is a turning point in Turkish political history. In his observations of the period, Zürcher said that the Republican staff,

who were the inheritors of the Young Turks, qualified Abdulhamid as “reactionary and despot” asserting that the Sultan would act to delay or stop the modernization process. In the studies conducted after the 1960s, it was put forward that there were different theses focusing on the benefits Abdulhamid provided for society and at the same time, the reign of the Sultan was perceived as “the continuation of the Reform era”. Zürcher argues that both of the views are true, each focus only on one aspect of the matter (Zürcher E. J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, 2013). According to Lewis, on the other hand, “Sultan Abdulhamid was far away from being blind, uncompromising and completely reactionary figure given in the historical legend, on the contrary, he was the true heir of Sultan Abdulaziz and the Reform era statesmen as an active and willing modernizer”. The most important point in this argument is that Abdulhamid was accepted as the heir of the “Young Turks” ideology (Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2015, p. 243). Üstel suggests that the origin of citizenship during the period of the Second Constitutional Monarchy transferring to the citizenship during the Republic period can be found in the educators of the Second Constitutional era who took the French Republic III as a departing point. He underscores that these educators endeavored to build nation-state citizenship in the absence of a nation-state (Üstel, *II. Meşrutiyet ve Vatandaşın "İcad"ı*, 2014, s. 179). Ortaylı, on the other hand, demonstrates the process of the Second Constitutional Monarchy as a transition to the “secular system” in our social and political life. As a matter of fact, transition to the “secular system” was actualized in education starting from primary schools, while university autonomy that was “partially achieved” opened a new page in the Turkish educational life (Ortaylı, *Gelenekten Geleceğe*, 2007, p. 64).

Köker, on the other hand, tried to explain this period by dividing into several categories with the references of Hanioglu and Tunaya. Along with the Second Constitutional Monarchy, ideas could be disclosed in a relatively freer environment, while there is a need to understand the dichotomy between the Western and non-Western institutions emerging by the impact of modernization movements. From this perspective, it is possible to categorize the opposing ideas during period as follows: On the one hand, there were “harmonizing” views to hold the Western institutions and the traditional Ottoman institutions together in harmony, and on the other hand, there were ideas proposing complete abolishment of the traditional institutions of the Ottoman Empire. These thoughts on the elimination of the conflict between the Western institutions and the non-Western ones show that the way of self-perception existing in the Ottoman Empire by the rulers gradually turned into accepting the “superiority of the West”. This perception change stemmed from the fact that the West was superiors in terms of “science and physics” and the faith in taking the Western science and technology into the Ottoman society to strengthen the Ottoman state, seeking ways to reconcile these positive sciences and technology with Islam (Köker, 2007, s. 126-127) (Tunaya, Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılılaşma Hareketleri, 2016, s. 51) (Hanioglu, 1986, s. 17).

Undoubtedly, the opinions shared by Kansu, who has made one of the most comprehensive analyses of the period, are significant in explaining the period from the perspective of continuity- discontinuity. In this regard, Kansu describes this period as a brand new era in the history of modern Turkey, suggesting that “*Starting with the 1908 revolution and lasting a decade, this period seems like it was stuck between two alike long terms in the last century of Turkey’s political, social and economic history*” (Kansu,

20. Yüzyıl Başı Türk Düşünce Hayatında Liberalizm, 2014). Kansu argues that this period including the ‘Despotic Era’ based predominantly on Abdulhamid II’s personal power before the 1908 Revolution and the ‘Atatürk Era’ continuing for twenty five years after World War I, resembled neither the preceding nor the coming period and was thus, a unique period without an example anywhere in the world (Kansu, 20. Yüzyıl Başı Türk Düşünce Hayatında Liberalizm, 2014, s. 277).

The last stage of the opposition movement continuing since the 19th century was the Connotational Monarchy II, which increased both “constitutional changes” and “participation of masses into politics” granting individual the right to do politics. Moreover, Turan underlines that “the military officials, civilians, bureaucrats and intellectuals” who had experience in “establishing” and “managing” political organizations in this period would later use their experiences in the “National Struggle”. In this line Turan’s this opinions falls in line with one of the main arguments of this dissertation. In this process, which started in 1908 and continued until 1919, 4 general elections were held, while the 1911 elections were held with the participation of citizens. Apart from this participation, holidays gained an important function within the scope of projects such as “new society – new people” (Turan M. , 2014).

In comprehending period of the Second Constitutional Monarchy, Tunaya’s evaluation of the period is critical: *“How can this state be saved? The three-hundred-year question was asked once again. Though not finding the correct answer, constitutionalists excitedly assumed the mission to “diagnose” the ailments of the society. Islamist, Turkist, Western-oriented, socialist and private initiative movements almost always remained inadequate and deficient, yet always presented their own responses sincerely to the*

public with ideological efforts. Only these movements of thought can be considered a positive work of the Constitutional Monarchy. Nevertheless, its balance sheet cannot be closed with this much. Constitutionalism, first and foremost, gave the “Citizen” concept to the Turkish society. The rise of the “subjects” to “citizenship” is as important as the great military victories that will be remembered in our history. Citizen is someone who believes that the state has a peculiar living structure and that there is a tight connection between his own life and the destiny of the state. Constitutional Monarchy is a school that educated and raised this type of people. This is one of the most efficient yields after the wars for freedom lasting nearly two hundred centuries” (Tunaya, Devrim Hareketleri İçinde Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük, 1981, s. 15).

Aydın, on the other hand, divides the emergence period of the Committee of Union and Progress into two and claims that in the first process, several principles such as Freedom, Fraternity and Equality were put into practice, yet the parliamentary regime had a short life; however, the effects of the second formation period are still felt in today’s Turkey. Arguing that the assembly tradition in Turkey is indispensable for legislation and auditing apart from being an indicator of constitutional monarchy in the past, the author suggests that there has always been mechanisms above the state in Turkey. Furthermore, Aydın purports that the understanding of state by the Committee of Union and Progress was inherited from the German tradition, and that the moves of progressive groups independent from the law and parliamentary constitutional monarchy was deemed legitimate since they acted on behalf of the survival of the state as well as high interests for the state (Aydın, 2016, s. 128).

Ahmad's argument on this issue is as follows: small-ranking officers and public officials united under the Union and Progress movement and joined the "anti-Hamid" movement. In this vein, this movement aimed at putting the constitution suspended in 1878 back into force and managed to topple Hamid and proclaim the Second Constitutional Monarchy. However, what differentiated the Young Turks from the small-ranking officials was that these officials wanted more than a constitutional monarchy for ensuring social revolution. Therefore, the Young Turks resemble high bureaucrats in terms of structure (Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 2017, p. 14)

4.4.4. A Reactionary Uprising: March 31

On the night of April 6, 1909, editor-in-chief of *Serbesti/Freedom* newspaper Hasan Fehmi Bey was shot dead on the Galata Bridge. The fact that Hasan Fehmi was the editor-in-chief of the *Serbesti* newspaper, which was known with opposition to the Committee of Union and Progress as well as the failure of capturing the killer caused severe reactions. This incident took place a week before the March 31 incident and caused the tension between the two sides to reach a dangerous level (Tunçay, *2.Meşrutiyet'in İlk Yılı, 23 Temmuz 1908- 23 Temmuz 1909*, 2018, p. 350).

On April 13, 1909 (March 31, 1325), Istanbul was shaken by an anti-Constitutional uprising. In the midnight connecting April 12 to April 13, the Fourth Hunter Battalion in Taşkışla revolted (Tunçay, *2.Meşrutiyet'in İlk Yılı, 23 Temmuz 1908- 23 Temmuz 1909*, 2018, p. 345). Although the government was aware of the coup and took its precautions, it could do nothing but defense. Rebel soldiers tied, imprisoned and killed some of the commanders at midnight, connecting April 12 to April 13. In line

with these incidents, a group known to be led by a Kurdish Hodja, a member of the Committee of Muhammedan Union, marched towards the building of the Chamber of Deputies. This crowd gathered in the Sultanahmet Square and started to spread slogans in favor of Abdulhamid and Sharia. Shouting, “Death to Unionists!”, “Death to Ahmet Rıza!”, “Death to Hüseyin Cahid!”, “Death to Mehmed Cavid!” and “Death to Nazım!”, this crowd included numerous military uniformed officers, who were expelled from the army, and dressed in religious clothing. Uniting under the slogan, “We are Losing the Religion!”, this group did not include even one high ranking commander, which was striking. Dervish Vahdeti was also among the crowd gathering in Sultanahmet. The Deputy Minister of Latakia, Arslan Bey, who was coming to the Parliament at that time, was killed by being mistaken for Hüseyin Cahid. In addition to Arslan Bey, Minister of Justice Nazım Pasha was also among those killed during the incident (Tunçay, 2.Meşrutiyet'in İlk Yılı, 23 Temmuz 1908- 23 Temmuz 1909, 2018). Hüseyin Cahid [Yalçın], one of the Unionists who learned early that the incident would break out, took refuge in the Russian embassy, and Cavid Bey hid in the house of a stockbroker friend (Kansu, İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913, 2016, s. 77-79). Shaykh al-Islam, sent by the Sultan to talk to the soldiers, responded after the talk their “requests were the same” and that the soldiers wished to be forgiven by the Sultan (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, s. 73).

With the Sultan and the government not wanting to use troops against the rebels, the rebels easily dominated Istanbul. Abdulhamid was extremely cautious during the 11-day revolt. While he did not explicitly condemn the military, he never supported their

wishes or attempted to lead the movement. He also ordered not to resist when the operation army arrived (Zürcher E. J., Turkey: A Modern History, 2013, p. 153).

According to Erdinç, an important factor here was the existence of the Committee of Muhammedan Union. While the founder of the Committee was the Cypriot Dervish Vahdeti, the newspaper *Volkan* was the media organ of this association (Erdinç & Ortaylı, *İttihat ve Terakki, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Gizli Örgütlenmeler ve Darbeler*, 2016, s. 57). A small group of leaders, known as the ascetic fanatics, led the rebellion and infiltrated the garrison ranks. They claimed that the religious law of Muslims, sharia was replaced by the constitution and demanded that the sharia be brought back. However, according to Ahmad's comment, "this was not the truth". In fact, ignorant soldiers were manipulated by the propaganda of the organization known as the Committee of Muhammedan Union by means of religious symbols, majorly saying that they "would topple the Godless, atheist Unionists by attacking them and delegate all powers once again to the Sultan" (Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 2017, p. 49). The fanatics also requested the resignation of the President of the Assembly and the Minister of War. With the outbreak of the incidents, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha took the Minister of War and the Minister of Education with him to go the palace and resign, where the Sultan immediately accepted their resignations (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, s. 73).

In light of these developments, troops from Thessaloniki blockaded the capital and the "Operation Army" entered the city at night, connecting April 23 to April 24 (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, s. 78). Due to the timid attitude of the 1st Army under the command of Mahmut Muhtar Pasha, the 3rd Army under the command of

Mahmut Şevket Pasha separated into a different segment called the “Operation Army” and Hüseyin Hüsni Pasha was appointed as the commander of this army, while Adjutant Major Mustafa Kemal was appointed as the Chief of Staff. According to Tunçay’s claim, in this army, which was transferred to Istanbul by railway, there were Turkish, Bulgarian civilians and gangsters (Tunçay, *Siyasal Tarih 1908-1923*, s. 31). In the early hours of April 24, the Operation Army started to occupy the city. To stop the insurgency, the 3rd army troops and volunteering troops from Macedonia marched to Istanbul under the command of Mahmut Şevket Pasha. They entered Istanbul on April 24 without encountering much resistance. Only the resistances in Taksim and Taşkışla barracks were a bit harsh (Zürcher E. J., 2015, s. 121). A week later, while the Operation Army was being deployed in Çatalca, the General Assembly continued its activities in San Stefano, where meetings were held and the ground for reconciliation with the Sultan was sought. Until the Operation Army besieged the city, the fact that the Unionist members of parliament did not fully demonstrate their loyalty turned into a problem that the Committee would have to solve in the future (Tunçay, *Siyasal Tarih 1908-1923*, s. 32).

The battalions, whose duties were to “protect the Constitutional Monarchy”, restored order by besieging Istanbul. During the siege, Staff Captain Mustafa Kemal and Major Enver, who had been a military attaché in Berlin, were also in the Operation Army that besieged Istanbul. However, in line with the information conveyed by Kansu, the army units in Edirne had a hesitation after the news of the coup, and as a result of their negotiations, they decided to support the Committee of Union and Progress. With this decision, monarchists became the enemies of these army units, which did not

immediately stand by the Unionists (Kansu, İttihadcılarının Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913, 2016, s. 102).

According to Avcioğlu, on the other hand, Abdulhamid was regarded as the “abettor and judge” of the uprising. The registry were not satisfying, yet the continuation of sleuthing and financial support to the Volkan newspaper, meeting with the rebels and complimenting them after the uprising, being only a spectator to the killing of Major Ali Bey in front of the palace and ordering a sign be placed in the flag of the rebels all prove that Abdulhamid encouraged and provoked the insurgency on March 31 (Avcioğlu, 1998, s. 76-77). However, Erol Şadi Erdiñç denied this view by referring to Ali Fuat Türkgeldi’s memories (Türkgeldi, 1987, s. 29-31).

Arguing that the March 31 Uprising cannot not be called progressive or reactionary, Ortaylı sees this uprising with a tendency similar to today’s right wing movements. This group does not like the army, and is opposed to modernization, while assuming itself positivist and believing that the understanding “The army is against the religion” (Erdiñç & Ortaylı, İttihat ve Terakki, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Gizli Örgütlenmeler ve Darbeler, 2016, s. 59). Kansu, on the other hand, explains that the coup was well planned by the “palace”, “monarchist pashas” and politicians from the very beginning and finds the argument of many historians saying that this coup was made by reactionary groups of Istanbul untrue (Kansu, İttihadcılarının Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913, 2016, p. 118). Zürcher, on the other hand, conducts an intellectual continuity analysis and shares that this “counter-revolution” was an “unforgettable” and “shocking” experience and a “lesson” for the Unionists and their successors after 1918.

According to the argument of Kansu, there was no doubt that the rebels were paid. As a matter of fact, many of them had spent high amounts of gold and money on the market. On the other hand, Kansu utters that the authors of *Serbesti* and *Mizan* newspapers were well aware of the upcoming insurgency, as could be understood from the issues of the newspapers published on April 13. It is also noteworthy that the army remained silent on these incidents and showed that they were “favoring the monarchist coup” (Kansu, *İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913*, 2016, pp. 85-86).

Akşin lists the five names determined by the Court of War and sentenced to death: These were: 1) Nadiri Fevzi Bey, member of Ministry of Education Inspection and Auditing Board and author of *El Adi* and *Protesto* newspapers, 2) Tayyar Bey, a member of the State Council, 3) Tevfik Bey, Principal Clerk of Tax Office and Statistics, 4) Hacı Mustafa Efendi, Tobacco Department Special Chamberlain 5) Halil Bey, Accountant. Confirming that the first three of these names received money from the Chamberlain, Akşin says that they did not only do this but also tried to infiltrate reports to Abdulhamid in a “provocative” and “terrifying” language in an attempt to bring back despotism (Akşin, *100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 1980, s. 105-107).

With this uprising, Sultan Abdulhamid II was removed from the throne and sent to exile, and he was replaced by Sultan Reşad. In this context, the domination of the Union and Progress became more evident and decisive during the Sultan Reşad period (Erdoğan & Ortaylı, *İttihat ve Terakki, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Gizli Örgütlenmeler ve Darbeler*, 2016, s. 60). One of the problematics of Turkish historiography for the period is whether Abdulhamid had negative or positive effect on the 31 March Incident. Doing this analysis through biographical works, it can be observed that there are sufficient findings

for two different views. For instance, in line with the information that Talat Pasha gave to Ali Fuat Türkgeldi in his memories, he stated: “Talat Pasha had already told me many times that Abdulhamid had no involvement in March 31” implying that Abdulhamid had no direct effect on the uprising (Türkgeldi, 1987, s. 43). Nevertheless, Mithat Şükrü Bleda states that he had no direct effect, yet the Sultan considered applying his own political program and benefit from it upon the outbreak of the incident (Mithat Şükrü Bleda, *The Collapse of the Empire*). The Committee of Union and Progress, on the other hand, regarded the incident as a “reactionary” movement and directly accused the Sultan and the Union of Mohammedans including Dervish Vahdeti, for the religious propaganda (Zürcher E. J., 2015, s. 124). In addition, Kansu underlines that the managers of the Committee of Union and Progress declared that the perpetrators of the incident did not only attempt to destroy the Committee but also took a “reactionary” step to establish the absolute monarchy (Kansu, *İttihadçıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913*, 2016, p. 91).

Zürcher analyzes the concept of “counter revolution” tackled by Kansu in his study on “Revolution-Counter Revolution” within the framework of Kemalist historiography and literature. From this perspective, Zürcher’s finding regarding the intellectual continuity in Turkish political history is of great importance. In this line, the scholar argues that all of the staff that replaced the Unionists after World War I consisted again of the members of the Committee of Union and Progress and underlines that this staff was equal to the Kemalist cadres who pioneered in the establishment of the secular Turkish Republic. Furthermore, he states that the “March 31 Incident” froze in the memory of secularism supporters in Turkey regarding the threat of Islamic reactionism and that even today,

whenever the government system is threatened, this incident is immediately referred (Zürcher E. J., 2015, s. 118).

4.4.5. Reasons for the March 31 Uprising

According to the comments of Erol Şadi Erdiñç, one of the scholars who made a lot of effort with documents, biography and studies on the period, there are 3 main reasons for the 31 March Incident. The first and foremost reason was the group that lost their jobs and were dissatisfied with the trajectory. The second reason was the recruitment of Madrasah (Muslim Theological School) students to the military. Indeed, madrasah students and children of some families from Istanbul did not serve in the military until that time. This was one of the other reasons that has fueled the rebellion. Among other reasons, it was claimed that there was British influence, yet it has not been documented although there are studies on this subject. In other words, this argument is unwarranted. There are, of course, important works on this subject. For instance, the book published by İsmail Hamdi Danişmend based on the documents of Grand Vizier Tevfik Pasha is extremely important for the analysis of the period (Erdiñç, Tarihin Arka Odası, 2010).

Zürcher, on the other hand, cites the “friction” between the academy-trained officials and those uneducated but in high ranks due to their experience for the unrest within the army. In this period, when the uneducated but experienced military officials were “favorite”, the academy-trained officials reacted to the regular salaries and the over-trust to these officials by the government. On the other hand, the uneducated soldiers, who were used to “past loose discipline” and “comfortable atmosphere”, did not want to apply the Prussian model training methods (Zürcher E. J., Turkey: A Modern History ,

2013, pp. 145-154). However, Ahmad draws attention to the fact that this movement was and “anti-Unionist” action rather than being a “religious conservative” action (Eroğlu, 2014, s. 104). In this context, Ahmad emphasizes that the Committee in this period was “incompetent in controlling the situation”, thus, the military had to “confiscate” the power in order to protect the order. At the same time, he considers the fact that what encouraged the army to do in this period was not the Committee of Union and Progress but the necessity by “law and order”. On the other hand, even if a full military dictation was not established, Ahmad sees the importance of the military role for later periods, and considers the military an important stage of the “continuity” of the future political life (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, pp. 78-79).

Kansu states that explaining the movement as a religious reactionary movement started by the “ignorant and conservative people” against the elite group consisting of military and civil bureaucrats trying to bring reforms to Turkey would not help a “serious analysis” of the incident in Turkish historiography. The reason for this is that it would be inappropriate to speak of a counter-revolution since the transformation that started on March 23, 1908 in Turkish historiography is not called a “revolution”. Classical historiography refers to this process the March 31 incident in an attempt to remain as neutral as possible (Kansu, *İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913*, 2016, p. 76). However, Ahmad sees this situation as a “counter-revolution” (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, p. 78). In this regard, Zürcher also refers to this period as “counter-revolution”, purporting that the counter-revolutionaries who wanted sharia had never known how to apply sharia and at the same time, that the Young Turks had never banned sharia. Describing this revolting mass as “counter-revolutionaries acting

recklessly with the desire to return to the old times”, the author stated that this group did not actually demand either “dissolution of the parliament” or “suspension of the constitution”, thus they were “idealess”. In summary, Zürcher shows, even if to some extent that the revolution was not just a reactionary uprising (Zürcher E. J., 2015, s. 126).

5. FERUZ AHMAD’S PERCEPTION OF CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY

It is not possible to ignore the work done by Feroz Ahmad on the discontinuity of the activities of the General Assembly, which was reopened in 1908. Ahmad’s analysis of the Turkish political system, parliamentary traditions, opposing structures, acting together with opposing views, and the military and civil bureaucracy are a kind that will shed light on the period. This chapter is designed to examine Ahmad’s analysis of parliamentary activities according to the historical process. However, the real purpose is not to explain the processes of political history, to analyze thoroughly the spirit of the era, to specify that the period convictions and at the same time that the term "more" is the reflection to investigate the Republic of Turkey. However, the real purpose here is not to describe the political history but to analyze the spirit of the period in-depth, shed light on the comments regarding the period as well as its reflections on the Republic of Turkey as its

“continuation”. In this context, Ahmad has arguments to define the “discontinuity” thesis regarding both periods. In this chapter, many topics of these arguments that can be used as reference to this thesis will be elaborated. The political process developing under the parliamentary tradition, democratic pursuits and transition to the parliamentary system will be examined. In the first part, historical processes are explained and in the second part, the historical perception of the writer about the Republic building process and the early period of the Republic are covered.

5.1. Supervision Power of the Union and Progress

While Tunçay states that the Committee of Union and Progress obtained a great success in the elections held from the Declaration of Freedom until March 31, he is of the opinion that it is more appropriate to deem this as a “transition” period than a period marked by supervision power (Tunçay, *Siyasal Tarih 1908-1923*, s. 32).

Within the scope of the anarchic situation that shook the country and provided that the General Assembly elections would take place as soon as possible, Sait Pasha was appointed the Grand Vizier for the sixth time. Yet, as a result of his scare “from anarchic environment”, Pasha left the government on August 6, 1908 (Akın, *İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları*, 2010, pp. 56-58). Kamil Pasha was asked to set up the cabinet, and the following day, the Committee, which published a statement in *Sabah* newspaper, announced that it would “support” Kamil Pasha with all its strength (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, p. 48). The Chamber of Deputies, almost entirely composed of Unionist candidates, dismissed Kamil Pasha, whom they gave the vote of confidence on January 13, 1909, a month after his admission due to Kamil

Pasha's activities that disdained the Committee and tried to purify the army from politics (Tunçay, *Siyasal Tarih 1908-1923*, s. 30). The Constitutional Monarchy was declared 13 days ago, and in a sense, Kamil Pasha became the first grand vizier of the Second Constitutional Monarchy.

When the policy of the Kamil Pasha's period is summarized, it can be said that it caused a "liberty" explosion that emerged after a long period of despotism in domestic politics and this led to the pioneering of many developments (Akin, *İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları*, 2010, pp. 58-60). Upon the "cooperation" between the Committee and the Sublime Porte during this period, power was grasped by the Sublime Porte, while the Committee play the role of the "guardian of the Constitutional Monarchy" (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, p. 48). Yet, the Committee of Union and Progress continued the struggle for power and the killing of İsmail Mahir Pasha was perceived as a move of power struggle against Abdulhamid. In foreign policy, on the other hand, the separatist movements that emerged after the Berlin peace started to come one after another. Kamil Pasha, who was caught up in a row with the Assembly after these incidents, received 198 votes of no confidence and delivered the "imperial seal" to the Sultan in his dismissal (Akin, *İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları*, 2010). After this incident, which Hüseyin Cahit wrote in Tanin as "a day that will not be easily forgotten," (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, p. 66) Kamil Pasha became the archenemy of the Committee of Union and Progress (Akin, 2010, p. 58).

While Ahmad depicts the relationship between the Committee and Kamil Pasha as based on "mutual interest", he says that Kamil Pasha belittled the power of the

Committee and fell short in reading what the Unionists were capable of (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, p. 55). Kamil Pasha prepared his own end in a sense, thinking that the Committee would never be able to “take the power” (Akin, *İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları*, 2010, p. 56). Nonetheless, the Committee proved its strength in some way with its activities in this period. Starting with the multi-representation ideal, the Constitutional Monarchy featured the 1908 elections with 288 members of parliament in total: “147 Turks, 60 Arabs, 27 Albanians, 26 Greeks, 14 Armenians, 10 Slavs and 4 Jewish”. At the same time, the Committee explicitly pressured the candidate of the Party of Ottoman Liberals Ali Kemal Bey, to succumb to Rifat Pasha as well as the Sultan, who appointed the members of the Assembly of Notables, to dismiss those with “bad reputation” (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, pp. 56-57).

5.2. Constitutional Reform Period

The Tevfik Pasha cabinet, which came to power thanks to the March 31 coup, was not a cabinet supported by the Committee of Union and Progress. To change this cabinet, which would not easily obtain the vote of confidence, The Committee of Union and Progress convened on May 30, knowing that it was necessary to establish a progressive government due to the current political situation and the “opposition movements in the army”, and discussed appointment of Hüseyin Hilmi or İbrahim Hakkı Pasha as the grand vizier and Unionist members to the ministries (Kansu, *İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913*, 2016, pp. 127-128). After the conclusion of the vote of confidence, two Unionists, Ahmet Rıza Bey and Talat Pasha went to the palace and informed the Sultan about the decision taken by the parliament. On February 14, 1909,

Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha became the grand vizier (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, p. 66). A day after the dismissal of Kamil Pasha, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha took over the post and served for about ten months except the March 31 period. Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha was a 53 years-old “young representative of the old school” (Akın, *İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları*, 2010, pp. 59-60).

Some of the activities carried out by Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha caused reaction. As soon as he came to power, he ruled that madrasah students were to be recruited for military service and their privileges would be lifted, which were harsh decisions; therefore, he drew the reaction of many rankles soldiers and acted in a way that would play a role in the outbreak of the March 31 incident (Tunçay, *Siyasal Tarih 1908-1923*, s. 31). The Unionists took their place in the ruling power despite everything and the end of the first grand vizier's service by the “counter-revolutionaries” was among the most important reasons carrying the Committee to the position of ruling. Although the members of the Committee did not fully approve of this power, they were aware that a new cabinet to be established at that time would be “against the parliamentary regime” (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, pp. 84-87). In this context, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha gave some the right to representation in the parliament and tried to establish a “government-parliament” balance. The important development in the Pasha period was certainly the March 31 uprising. Another important development, on the other hand, was the beginning of the political separation within the parliament and as a result of the establishment of the Party of Ottoman Liberals (Akın, *İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları*, 2010, p. 58). On the other hand, the “Political Undersecretariat” model that the Committee planned for its deputies to be

undersecretaries was aimed to providing the opportunity for the people elected from among the administrative staff and those who were elected among the Parliament to become undersecretaries (Kansu, İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913, 2016, pp. 143-144). Following the continuous debates within the Committee, the proposal brought by Ahmet Rıza to “assign the duty of undersecretary to members of parliament” was accepted with 133 positive votes against 74 negative votes. Yet, due to the ongoing disagreements after June 17, Talat Bey had to withdraw the motion on behalf of the Committee of Union and Progress. At the end of this process, though, Cavit Bey, the Minister of Finance, became the “first Unionist” to enter the cabinet (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, pp. 87-89). In fact, it clearly manifests the limited power of the Committee of Union during that period that it failed to implement the proposed law amendment accepted in the assembly by two thirds majority.

In the same line, as can be understood from previous analyses, the most important development of this period was that some members of the Committee united and established the Party of Ottoman Liberals. With Ahmad words, the legend that the Committee was an indivisible whole was destroyed by this movement (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, p. 91). Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha resigned from his post on December 28, 1909 (Akın, İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları, 2010, p. 58). While studying the period, Küçükömer finds that the Committee of Union and Progress won the elections, in which it did not have a serious opponent, and filled the parliament, yet, the scholar points out that a large opposition group appeared in the parliament within a few months adding that it was inevitable in the current circumstances. In this context, Küçükömer offers the following comment that there was an opposition

outside parliament “keeping snowballing”: *“In fact, freedom immediately brought the opposition of the people before the bureaucrats. The ruling power, the Committee of Union and Progress had two options: a) While the policy applied in the name of libertarianism showed that the Unionists could be a minority in a short time (also in the environment where some minorities’ nationalist movements developed), choosing anarchy, which would mean the Unionists’ falling out of power; b) Choosing the option of violence that was more suitable for their organization with a more centralized understanding that would lead to complete detachment from the public. It was normal to choose the second option under the existing circumstances. Then occurred the March 31, 1909 incident. Indeed, Sultan Abdulhamid, who was tired and old, was dethroned and exiled to Thessaloniki”* (Küçükömer, 2007, s. 39).

Ahmad utters that the end of the first Ottoman Assembly period was on August 27, 1909 and divides this period into three: The first period covers the 2-month period from December 17, 1908 Assembly opening to February 13, 1909 to the fall of Kamil Pasha. The second period lasted until when Kamil Pasha was dismissed and Mehmet V replaced Abdulhamid in May 1909. The third was between early May and August 27 (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, p. 94). In Ahmad’s analysis of the Constitutional Reform period – in other words, from the suppression of the March 31 uprising to May 1909 – Akşin says that this is shared as a period of “forming a new order” and leading “legislative activities” (Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 2017, p. 227). In this context, Ahmad called the amendments and changes in the assembly, articles of the constitution and the system from March 31 to August 1909 as the constitutional reform period. In the same vein, there had been many changes in the Turkish society after

March 31. Therefore, Feroz coined the phrase “Constitutional Reform Period” in the literature referring to the changes in the legislature and parliament. With a text prepared in 1876 with revisions, as Akşin finds, the reforms gained the quality of true parliamentary and libertarian character. Thus, this activity was aimed at “establishing the legal infrastructure of a modern state” (Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 2017, p. 369).

Indeed, the amendments made to the laws were sufficient to give this fait accompli a legal character. 21 of the 119 articles of the 1876 Constitution were amended, 1 was removed and 3 new articles were added. On the other hand, Article 28 was only rephrased. Furthermore, the amendments in Articles 3, 7, 27, 77 and 113 show that the authority of the Sultan and the powers granted to him expired. The amended versions of Articles 29., 30., 35., 38., 44., 53., and 54. reveal how the Sublime Porte was in the shadow of the Assembly. In this context, Ahmad shares that there were three purposes of the legislation during this period: First, to integrate the political changes that had occurred since July 1908 to the Constitution; second, to render the Ottoman Empire and its administrative mechanism a modern state and to ensure unity in the empire; and third, to remove the capitulations, which would become unnecessary upon achieving the second goal (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, p. 95).

Numerous developments can be observed when analyzing the first two months of the constitutional reform period. Looking at the political developments, the following picture is encountered: The re-appointment of Tevfik Pasha as the grand vizier on May1, the death sentence by hanging of some of the perpetrators of the 3 May reactionary movement, the Constitutional amendment, May 5, the resignation of the Tevfik Pasha

Cabinet, establishment of the Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha cabinet on May 6, enactment of Law on the Landlopers and the Class Assumed to Be Saints on May 9 and approval of the Bulgarian protocol discussed in the General Assembly with 121 approval votes against 31 dissentive votes. Dervish Vahdeti, owner of Volkan newspaper, who was one of the leading promoters of the 31 March Incident, was caught in Izmir on 31 May and was brought to Istanbul. On June 9, the Law on Internal Affairs was enacted. On June 26, upon the resignation of Rıfat Bey, Unionist Cavid Bey was appointed as the Minister of Finance. On June 30, the Law on Abatement was enacted. On July 12, the working period of the General Assembly was extended until the end of July (Tunçay, 2.Meşrutiyet'in İlk Yılı, 23 Temmuz 1908- 23 Temmuz 1909, 2018, pp. 420-464).

5.3. Opposition Efforts

After Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha's resignation, it was debated who would come to replace him and Hakkı Pasha was chosen as the only candidate that almost everyone would accept (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, p. 107). İbrahim Hakkı Pasha, who was a civil servant in the 1908 revolution, always kept a distance against absolutist bureaucracy, yet, held legal diplomatic duties in the Sublime Porte under the supervision of the Foreign Minister and knew the bureaucracy well due to his duty as Rome ambassador, was regarded as a name that would be accepted by the opponents as well (Kansu, İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913, 2016, p. 165). İbrahim Hakkı Pasha, who would be serving for 9 months a year as grand vizier from December 25, 1910, came to duty with 187 votes against 34 opposition votes (Akın, İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları, 2010, pp. 62-64). Putting forward two basic characteristics of the Hakkı Pasha government, Akşin says that the first

defining feature was that the increasing number of Unionists in the ministries, and the other characteristic was that Mahmud Şevket Pasha became the Minister of War. However, Akşin claims that Hakkı Pasha was “wrong” to assume that Mahmut Şevket would reconcile with him after coming to the post of minister of War as he would be able to convince him via close contact (Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 2017, p. 275). Thus, Hakkı Pasha appointed Mahmud Şevket Pasha as the Minister of War and besides, two Unionists Talat and Cavid Beys took their place in the cabinet as the Minister of Internal Affairs and Finance. On the other hand, the Minister of Finance Cavit Bey planned the “fiscal policies” of the period as one of the leading figures among the Unionists carrying out major activities. Yet, the opposition became increasingly stronger in 1910-1911 (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, p. 116). Observing the political balance of the period, it can be understood that it had been known from the first day of appointment as grand vizier that Hakkı Pasha’s power was limited.

A branch of the Ottoman Party of Constitutional Reforms, the Sleuthing (Detective) Organization established as a result of the opposition movements in this period, opened sub-branches under the leadership of Prince Sabahaddin, Şerif Pasha, Mevlanzade Rifat Bey and Ali Kemal Bey, all exiled in France, in September 1909 and registered almost 80 members. These Monarchist regime supporters, including Colonel Sadık Bey and Sinop member of parliament Rıza Nur, were declared as a secret organization against the constitutional order established for the revenge of Ahmet Samim Bey (Kansu, *İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913*, 2016, pp. 182-184).² As can be understood, this period was rather busy with parliamentary activities with more

² For more information see: Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler* Volume 1 pp. 219-226 2.Edition, Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları

than fifteen motions of censure (Akın, İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları, 2010, pp. 62-64). In the meantime, an “opponent” group appeared in the “New Faction” organization under the leadership of Colonel Sadık Bey. As referred to as a “paradox” by Zürcher, Colonel Sadık criticized loyal officials’ involvement in politics and demanded the Union and Progress to stop operating as a secret society (Zürcher E. J., Turkey: A Modern History , 2013, p. 157). This opposition group demanded resignation of the leading names of the society, Talat and Cavit Bey. In addition, there were demands such as dismissing names such as the head writer of the newspaper Tanin, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Emanuel Carosso and Rahmi [Arslan]. Aspiring to establish a new program like state monopoly, the Committee of Union and Progress brought this aim to the agenda with Cavit Bey’s economic projects and managed to “silence the opposition” even for a short time thanks to this new program, while the cabinet received vote of confidence with 145 approval votes against 45 rejecting votes. Besides this, the opposing figure Colonel Sadık was removed from Istanbul and exiled to Thessaloniki (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, p. 134). According to Mahmut Şevket Pasha, the Committee, which was able to make such an appointment, was endowed with certain level of power although not particularly absolute power. The influence of the party on the military wing is actually an indicator of continuity in Turkish Political life.

With Hakkı Pasha government, there was an impression that it has passed from the Union and Progress’ supervision power to “real power” and important steps were taken after this acquisition of power (Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 2017, p. 289). Alongside this adventure, the Italian Government gave an ultimatum to Turkey on Libya on September 28, giving 24 hours, and declared was after this time. Hakkı Pasha,

who was surrounded by both Italians and “monarchists”, resigned as soon as the war was declared (Kansu, İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913, 2016, pp. 245-247). Akın underlines that the main reason for this resignation was the “deadlock in foreign policy”. However, for İbrahim Hakkı Pasha, political life was not over here. He returned to the Assembly of Notables after 1911 and later, he became the Berlin ambassador followed by his membership of the delegation under the presidency of Talat Pasha during the Brest-Litovsk talks (Akın, İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları, 2010, p. 63).

After this period, Sait Pasha was appointed the grand vizier on September 29, 1911. When he accepted the duty of grand vizier, the Tripoli War was ongoing and at the same time, the Albanian issue erupted. In the cabinet he founded on September 30, 1911, he assigned Mahmut Şevket Pasha to the Minister of War and Emrullah Efendi as the Minister of Education (Akın, İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları, 2010, p. 67). On this occasion, Sait Pasha became the grand vizier for the eighth time. This cabinet, which was not supported by the Unionists, became a “soulless business cabinet” (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, p. 140). However, the monarchists were also against the appointment of Sait Pasha as the grand vizier as they wanted Kamil Pasha instead. If Kamil Pasha and Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha set up a cabinet, a war would be waged against the Unionists, while they knew that the Committee and its branches would not accept management without promising to stop their political activities. Besides this, the Unionists had to support Sait Pasha since the cabinet includes names such as Hayri Bey and Celal Bey. Stating that although the Committee was thought to be strong during this period, but indeed it was not, and encountered a new

crisis every day, Ahmad bases this argument on Cavit Bey's article in Tanin newspaper on October 15, 1911, which described Sait Pasha's "hopes" when he was brought to power (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, p. 143). Akşin, on the other hand, tells that the Unionists would not want a "strong" character as Sait Pasha as the grand vizier if not for the crisis of Tripoli, indicating that the Unionists approved his post only due to the important reason of war (Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 2017, p. 297). In the political conjuncture of the period, the opposition suffered from a major blow with the March 31 uprising leading to the formation of opposition groups such as the Party of Moderate Libertarians, the Ottoman Party of Constitutional Reforms, the Party of Ottoman Liberals and the New Faction while these opposition groups united under the "Freedom and Accord Party" on November 21, 1911. Three weeks after this merger, the opposition group took power by defeating the candidate of the Committee of Union and Progress took a step forward. As Akşin puts it, the Committee "melted like an iceberg descending to the hot seas" (The Young Turks, Page: 193-194). In this context, it was publicly known that the names behind the party's "monarchist" and "anti-parliamentary" feature were Kamil Pasha and Prince Sabahaddin. Among the founders of the party were names such as a member of the Assembly of Notables, Damat Ferit Pasha, leader of New Faction Colonel Sadık Bey and Sinop member of parliament Rıza Nur, who had long influenced Turkish political life (Kansu, *İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913*, 2016, pp. 266-267). The only common feature of the founders of the party was their hostility towards Union and Progress (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, p. 146). Endeavoring to explain the understanding of the whole opposition to power in Turkish political life, Akşin expresses that the Freedom and Accord Party consisted of

very different elements (including socialists, capitalists, feudal thinkers, religionists, Westerners and secularists) and resembled this situation to the DP (Democratic Party) that gathered against the CHP (Republican People's Party) government after 1945. In this context, Akşin also demonstrates a continuity indicator in terms of opposition (Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 2017, p. 300).

For the atmosphere between 1910 and 1911, Lewis states that the Committee of Union and Progress became the prevailing “political force”, first with high-ranking officers and statesmen, and then with supporters in government positions. However, opposition to this power began to emerge, and groups who resigned from the Committee for “political” and “personal” reasons started to show themselves inside and outside the Committee. Nonetheless, the Committee did not witness any significant “threat” and was not “shaken” in 1911 (Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2015, p. 298).

Küçükömer, on the other hand, refers to the period between 1909 and 1911 as martial law and adds: *“The elections of 1911 and those in the upcoming periods were no longer open and honest, i.e. legitimate. The Ottoman state-military unit was re-established with the Union and Progress”* (Küçükömer, 2007, s. 40).

A great majority of the Unionists opposed Sait Pasha's dismissal from duty. In fact, they thought that Sait pasha had the will to resist pressure. They even approved the changing of the Ministers of the Military, Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs. The opposition, on the other hand, was absolutely against Sait Pasha and at the same time, they refused to withdraw Article 35 “authorizing the Sultan to abolish the Chamber of Deputies by the approval of the Assembly of Notables”, which had been discussed for a long time by the Unionists (Kansu, *İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913*,

2016, pp. 279-280). Sait Pasha wanted this article that was amended in 1909 to be restored and given back to the Sultan authorizing him to abolish the chamber of deputies without resorting to the Chamber of Notables and explained this with the necessity of a strong and solid government (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, pp. 148-149). In this regard, Said Pasha expressed his opposition to the martial law implemented in the country, demanded amnesty for prisoners, and stated that the government needed to be strong for reforms, pointing out to the need for a legislative amendment (Kansu, *İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913*, 2016, p. 280). After this speech, Sait Pasha gave his resignation and the Sultan approved the “new cabinet” on January 3, 1912 (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, p. 149). Yet, considering the political deadlock, the Sultan gave Sait Pasha the task of forming the government again. The members of the Freedom and Accord Party saw the amendment of Article 35 by the Pasha as an attempt to pave the way for the Unionists’ coup and visited the Sultan to convince him to change his mind with the decision of Sait Pasha to establish the government, as they saw Sait Pasha as the candidate of the Committee of Union and Progress, which was competing for power and authority. Monarchists, on the other hand, nominated Damat Ferit Pasha, a name that would eventually turn into a propaganda in Turkish Political life, as their candidate for grand vizier. Yet, Sait Pasha remained in office and announced the new cabinet on 3 January. Cavit Bey and Talat Bey were not included in the new cabinet (Kansu, *İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913*, 2016, pp. 284-285). Despite the opposition, talks on Article 35 continued on 9 January. Monarchists were not satisfied, and after Rıza Tevfik, who began to speak on January 10, insulted the Committee, he said, “*I curse such constitutionalism*”. Rıza Nur,

on the other hand, criticized parliamentarism and said that he supported the “constitutional monarchy” where the Sultan was in full power (Kansu, İttihadcılarının Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913, 2016, pp. 289-290). Since the two thirds majority could not be met for changing Article 35, the negotiations continued until January 13. Two days after, the Sultan dismissed the Assembly and this decision was approved by the Chamber of Notables on January 17 (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, pp. 149-150). After that, the Assembly was opened for a new period on April 18, 1912, as agreed. Halil Bey, who was the head of the Committee of Union and Progress, was appointed as the president of the Chamber of Deputies; with the resignation of Finance Minister Nail Bey, Cavit Bey became the Minister of Finance and Halaçyan Efendi was appointed to the position of Minister of Public Works, which was vacated by Cavit Bey. Therefore, it was now possible to say that the cabinet precisely “passed” into the hands of the Unionists (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, p. 152). In the light of these developments, the amendment of Article 7 with two hundred and five against fifteen votes was accepted on June 22, while the amendment of Article 35 was accepted with one hundred and ninety-nine against fifteen votes on June 24 (Kansu, İttihadcılarının Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913, 2016, p. 344).

By May and June 1912, some officers in Istanbul created a group called “Savior Officers’ Team (*Halaskar Zabitan*)” and this group had relations with rebelling troops in Macedonia and the Party of Freedom and Accord (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, p. 154). In this context, the key name in this coup planned by the monarchists, military organization staff Major Kemal [Şenkıl] Bey from Gallipoli connected with Prince Sabahaddin through Greek Georges Cleanthe Scaliere and upon this development,

Prince invited Rıza Nur and several opposition politicians to draw attention to the importance of an insurgency within the army to dismiss the Sait Pasha cabinet. In addition, he provided financial support for printing and distributing the group's communique (Kansu, İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913, 2016, p. 348). On the other hand, the Unionists wanted to protect the Sait Pasha government by appointing Nazım Pasha as the Minister of War, instead of Mahmut Şevket Pasha as a political move, however, Nazım Pasha did not give a definitive answer to this proposition and kept the Committee busy. Mahmut Şevket Pasha resigned on 9 July, yet, no consensus was reached on Nazım Pasha, the name proposed by the Committee (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, pp. 154-155). After the Monarchists proposed Hadi Pasha for the Ministry of War, Sait Pasha temporarily appointed the Minister of Naval Forces, Hurşit Pasha to this post. As a consequence of these developments, the Sait Pasha cabinet received 194 votes against 4 rejection votes from the Chamber of Deputies as vote of confidence. While Unionist leaders such as Cavit and Talat Pasha tried to resist him, yet, even they could not prevent his resignation on July 17 (Kansu, İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913, 2016, pp. 357-360). It should be noted that Sait Pasha, who will be remembered "with his harmony with parliamentarism", was brought to the position of grand vizier seven times in total (Akın, İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları, 2010, p. 67). The distinguishing feature of the Sait Pasha government is that it was "prone" to the Committee of Union and Progress (Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki, 2017, p. 298). Nonetheless, the fact that a cabinet that had received the trust of the parliament had to withdraw is a clear indication of the "military and public pressure" in the country (Tanör, 2018, p. 201).

Panicked by the defeat in the mid-term elections, the Committee had made an election known as the 1912 daunting elections, where its power and oppression were highly felt, and won the elections by overwhelming superiority. This achievement in the daunting elections helped the Committee of Union and Progress amend Articles 7 and 35 by the Assembly and this was consolidated by the Committee's restoring its authority as the executive organ to abolish the legislation as in the past (Tunçay, *Siyasal Tarih 1908-1923*, s. 33). In these elections, the Freedom and Accord Party could only obtain seats, discussions on legitimacy continued. The group called as the Savior Officers led by Colonel Sadık shook the authority by the coup threat and the government got it wanted. Within this framework, "the great cabinet" established on June 21, 1912 under the Grand Vizier of Gazi Muhtar Pasha, was an anti-Unionist cabinet. The Kamil Pasha government, which would come after this cabinet, maintained this opposition as well (Zürcher E. J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, 2013, pp. 154-160).

After these developments, Gazi Müşir Ahmet Muhtar Pasha was appointed as the grand vizier. Known for "not getting involved in politics", Muhtar Pasha and his son Ahmet Muhtar were in the cabinet in addition to two former viziers, therefore, the cabinet was called the "Father-Son cabinet" or the "great cabinet" (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, p. 157). This cabinet was pressured by the Savior Officials Group on July 24 to dissolve the parliament and renew the elections (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, p. 138). Kamil Pasha and the monarchist group behind him constantly demanded to seize the position of grand vizier and saw the government as a "temporary government". Despite being called the "Great Cabinet," Unionists were deeply concerned about the instability of the government and the opposition's "vengeance" statement

(Kansu, İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913, 2016, p. 372). The Unionists were right to worry, since the new government was especially trying to reduce the power of the Unionist officers and worked to dissolve the cabinet and the Colonel Sadık's Assembly (Zürcher E. J., Turkey: A Modern History , 2013, p. 159). On the other hand, the opposing Savior Officials or Halaskar Zabitan group started to use blackmail and threats. They sent a letter to the Principal Clerk and Chamberlain Halit Ziya [Uşaklıgil] and Chief Chamberlain Lütfi Simavi on July 24, and these names were removed from duty on July 29. Not only that, this opposition group "blockaded" the Chamber of Deputies, "terrorized" the Unionists who resisted not to dissolve the Assembly and arrested the military officials who were against them (Kansu, İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913, 2016, pp. 373-378). Upon threatening the Assembly by the Savior Officials, Sait Pasha resigned and he was replaced by Ahmet Muhtar Pasha, who was also taken under pressure, which ended with the abolition of the Assembly on August 4, 1913 (Küçükkılınç, 2018, s. 161).

Indeed, the Pasha also resigned in a short period of four months. The Committee of Union and Progress had to give the vote of confidence to the "undisputed winner" of the 1912 elections. Although the Union and Progress had an "overwhelming majority" in the parliament during this period, there were strong anti-Unionist tendencies within the party. Among the reasons that led the Pasha to resign, the outbreak of the 1912 Balkan War is important. Moreover, the defeat of his son Mahmut Muhtar Pasha against the Bulgarian army was also effective in his resignation (Akın, İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları, 2010, pp. 67-68).

Zürcher analyzes this period under the heading “political conflict between 1909 and 1913” and from these analyses, it can be understood that the first days of the period were under the monopoly of Mahmut Şevket Pasha, who largely retained power after the March 31 uprising. Also in this period, the Union and Progress struggled for power in many areas. On the one hand, they struggled against the opposition and the army, and on the other hand, they had to deal with disagreements within their party. The Committee was disturbed by the pressure imposed by Mahmut Şevket Pasha on Unionist officers and at the same time, decentralists who pursued a liberal policy provoked the army against the Committee with the policies they implemented. Problems also emerged between the headquarters of the Union and the parliament where its political wing was represented. To elaborate, the headquarters did not fully trust the parliamentary group elected from the provincial provinces. Although the Committee of Union and Progress came to the forefront as the party that held the political power after the declaration of the Constitutional Monarchy, they could not prevent the “Freedom and Accord block” from becoming stronger as opposing groups. Nevertheless, the 1909 Constitutional amendments “reinforced the power of the majority party, the parliament and government”. On the other hand, while monarchy started to lose power during the Hüseyin Hilmi and İbrahim Hakkı Pasha governments, the parliament gained more power. Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Pasha, though, regarded this short period as an “interim regime” and “disappointment” and put efforts for the abolition of the Chamber of Deputies from the first day it was opened (Akın, İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları, 2010, pp. 77-78).

From this perspective, Tunçay sheds light on the fact that the Unionists used their constitutional amendments against Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Pasha during his government period, convinced the Sultan to abolish the assembly or the chamber of deputies – as referred to in that period – and ensured that the Assembly did not convene for almost two years. During this long period, the country was ruled by the Temporary Laws and decisions of the Council of Ministers (Tunçay, *Siyasal Tarih 1908-1923*, s. 34). This period continuing until the spring of 1912 is acknowledged as the “first parliament period” and the assigned grand viziers of the period included Kamil, Hüseyin Hilmi and İbrahim Hakkı Pashas. In this line, it can be deduced that the Committee of Union and Progress created its own “anti-thesis” during this period, and the Freedom and Accord Party gained. As a matter of fact, the opposition reached its peak with the Savior Officials (Halaskar Zabitan) memorandum. On the other hand, the amendment of Articles 7, 35 and 43 of the Ottoman constitution stands out as a legal regulation that “facilitated superiority of the executive organ over the legislature as well as the dissolution of the parliament” by minister’s taking the support of the Sultan (Akin, *İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları*, 2010, p. 80).

Both Zürcher and Lewis offer important insights regarding the changing education, law and social dimensions of the period. From this perspective, Lewis suggests that in the newly developing legal order, although family law remained committed to the sharia, Islamic pedestals started to be severely shaken during this period. As a consequence of such developments, a new law of inheritance was introduced in 1913 using the German law. In 1917, a modern family law was created based on the provisions of four sects of Islam as well as non-Muslims. On the other hand, while

women were granted the right to divorce, polygamy could not be banned. In addition, many steps were taken in the field of education: Primary education became compulsory for women in 1913, and the Istanbul University (*Darülfünun*) started to provide many courses. Also during this period when many secular steps were taken, the role of Shaykh al-Islam was removed from the laws in 1916, all his powers were restricted, while sharia courts were attached to judicial courts (Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2015) (Zürcher E. J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, 2013) (Unvar, 2016).

5.4. Single-Party Rule of the Committee of Union and Progress

Tunçay utters that the Ottoman Empire was ruled under the Committee of Union and Progress between 1913-1918. Extending up to World War I, this process was represented by Talat, Enver and Cemal Pashas (Tunçay, *Siyasal Tarih 1908-1923*, s. 36). In this context, it was commonly agreed that this was a provisional government from the day that Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Pasha was appointed as the grand vizier. In a short while, the fears came true with the outbreak of the Balkan Wars and the threat of the monarchist group on the parliamentary system reached its climax when Kamil Pasha became the grand vizier. As soon as Kamil Pasha came to power, he started to hunt the Unionists and the members of the organization for Prosecution of Ottoman War Criminals arrested all parliamentary system supporters, whether they were Unionists or not, without giving any reason. Not being contented with this, they further instilled provocation against the Unionists by creating a perception that the Unionists pursued the goal of destroying the constitutional order and proclaiming a Republic by killing the Sultan (Kansu,

İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913, 2016, p. 478). As a matter of fact, monarchists and Kamil Pasha were not completely wrong even though this perception that they wanted to create was fictitious. The reason for this is that not even a quarter century later, a group emerged under the influence of the intellectual, social and military experience of the Unionists – that the monarchists were struggling against – and this group, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, would build a modern Republic based on “the sovereignty of nation” without the Sultan’s domination.

Ahmad mentions that the Unionists, who took power in 1913, had very different ideas. In this regard, he shares that the Unionists wanted to integrate into the world system ruled by Europe, but they wanted to have a say in this system just like “Japan in the Far East”. In this context, they endeavored to establish the “capitalist society” in Turkey. Ahmad recapitulates that the Unionists understood that it was necessary to establish full control over the state as the “vital” component of the military, before any attempt to social transformation (Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, 2017, p. 15). Evaluating the post-1913 period, Zürcher refers to the absolute domination of the Union and Progress in the “domestic politics” after the 1913 government coup (Zürcher E. J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, 2013, p. 168). Tanör depicts the year 1913 as a “turning point” both for the Constitutional Monarchy and the Committee of Union and Progress, while mentioning three main changes in this period: the committee type of the Unionists evolved from “semi-secret” organization to “openly political” party organization; this party moved towards becoming the “single ruling party” while the members did not want to take place in the multi-party system and they shifted from the Ottomanism program

towards an axis of “Turkism and secularity” (Tanör, Osmanlı - Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri, 2018, p. 202).

Within this framework, after the resignation of Gazi Ahmet Pasha Kamil Pasha became the grand vizier for the second time and he was completely anti-Unionist. The Halaskar group – the savior officials – was also willing to support the pro-junta power of Kamil Pasha, who was also supported by the United Kingdom. In this regard, Gazi Ahmet Pasha, who was appointed as the grand vizier for the fourth time due to his mastery in foreign policy and faith in him in gaining victory in the Balkan Wars, faced an accusation that he would leave Edirne to Balkan allies. In fact, what “legitimized” the Sublime Porte raid was also this approach. The defeat in the Balkan wars and the fact that Bulgarians came to the border of Çatalca and posed a great threat were the reasons that laid the groundwork for the Committee of Union and Progress, whose authority had weakened due to losing power with many exiled members, to come to power through a coup. Under these circumstances, Kamil Pasha was forced to resign after the Sublime Porte raid on January 23, 1913; Minister of War Nazım Pasha was murdered and Mehmet Şevket Pasha was bought to the position of grand vizier. The perpetrators of the raid included Talat, Enver and Yakup Cemil; during the raid, Albanian Nadiz and one of the aides, Cypriot Tefik from among the Halaskar group were shot dead, while the War Minister, Nazım Pasha was killed by Yakup Cemil, who was the musketeer of the Union (Akın, İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları, 2010, p. 68) (Tunçay, Siyasal Tarih 1908-1923, s. 35). In the light of this information, it is wrong to assume the Sublime Porte Raid or the 1913 Ottoman coup d'état only as an operation by the members of the Committee of Union and Progress initiated out of “hopelessness” due

to losing Edirne city. In fact, the coup had been “planned” for quite a long time and the coup was triggered by the assignment of Kamil Pasha as the grand vizier, who was not fond of reconciliation with the Unionists (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, p. 166). At the same time, the Sublime Porte Raid took its place in the history of the Ottoman Empire as “the first “act of overthrowing the government” (Erdoğan & Ortaylı, *İttihat ve Terakki, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Gizli Örgütlenmeler ve Darbeler*, 2016). Zürcher also agrees with Ahmad here and claims that the Committee decided to launch the coup “probably” in the late 1912 (Zürcher E. J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, 2013, p. 165).

After the coup, however, the tension did not disappear. Failing to break the ice between himself and the Committee but increasing his authority with every passing day, the experienced statesman Mahmut Şevket Pasha was assassinated on 11 June 1913 (Akın, *İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları*, 2010, p. 67). Hence, the killing of Mahmut Şevket Pasha was considered a valid reason for the Union to eliminate the elements of “freedom” and “democracy” (Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu*, s. 305). Upon this incident, Enver Pasha, the leading name of the Committee of Union and Progress, confiscated the administration of the Ottoman State on January 23, 1913. After the assassination, the Committee experienced a transition from the supervisory power to the “de facto” rule, i.e. the period when it constituted the ruling power alone. After this date, it was the period of full power by the Committee of Union and Progress (Akın, pp. 67-72). In this context, a new cabinet was established and Mahmut Şevket Pasha became the Grand Vizier and the Minister of War (Zürcher E. J.,

Turkey: A Modern History , 2013, p. 165). Henceforth, the year 1913 was marked by the beginning of the “military dictatorship” by Committee of Union and Progress.

Departing from his examination of Kamil Pasha’s political opinions, articles and speeches, Ahmad expressly advocates the idea that “Kamil Pasha obviously supported the idea of state administration supervised by foreigners”. In this analysis, he criticized the biographies written by K. Bayur and İnal arguing that they were built on “one-sided discourse”. However, Ahmad argues that he was smart enough not to surrender Edirne while it is difficult to say anything for sure regarding the issue of Edirne and just like Zürcher, Ahmad refers to the fact that the Committee of Union and Progress had already decided to topple the government (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, p. 182). A very experienced statesman, Kamil Pasha remained as one of the leading statesmen in the government for quite a long time by being appointed as the grand vizier once by “government coup” and later by the “parliamentary way”. Although Kamil Pasha was observed to come closer with the Committee of Union and Progress as the met the liberal expectations of the committee, he later became the enemy of the Unionists, thus, he was forced to resign by the Unionists in a very short time of a month (Akın, İkinci Meşrutiyet’in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları, 2010, pp. 77-78).

In this line, the candidate of the Unionists for the position of grand vizier was the contradictory” name, Mahmut Şevket Pasha, which surprised many figures of the term. In fact, the ongoing Balkan War forced the Committee of Union and Progress to make such a choice. Although Mahmut Şevket was a soldier, he tried to keep the military away from politics. In this vein, the Mahmut Şevket Pasha period was a process commencing with a coup on January 23, 1913 and ending with an assassination on June 12, 1913. In this

process, some of Mahmut Şevket Pasha's decisions in foreign policy were significant as well. As a matter of fact, his indecisive and reluctant attitude on the Edirne offensive and the **Lynch** privileges were interpreted as the government called the Unionist was no different from other governments. The coup attempt by the opposition following the dismissal of the Kamil Pasha government was supported by Kurdish Şerif Pasha and Damat Salih Pasha and despite the preparation of a plan similar to March 31, the attempt was prevented by the operation under Lieutenant Circassian Kazım that included the killing of Mahmut Şevket Pasha. As a result of this failed coup attempt, Cemal arrested nearly 200 opponents and exiled them to Sinop (Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 2017, pp. 364-367). Therefore, Cemal's rapid intervention prevented the coup (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, p. 184). Seen by Akşin as important as the suppression of the March 31 incident, this attempted coup was allegedly known by the Unionists beforehand. In particular, it is stated that the failure of taking Edirne back was a valid reason for the Unionists to sacrifice Kamil Pasha (Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 2017, pp. 353-369). "Liberals", on the other hand, regarded losing Edirne as loss of prestige by the Unionists and although they killed Mahmut Şevket Pasha, yet failed to take the ruling power. They were not contented with that; therefore, they revealed the "conspiracy" and eliminated the opposition (Ahmad, *Bir Kimlik Peşinde Türkiye*, 2014).

Before dwelling upon the Sait Halim Pasha government, it would be useful to remind the congress, that the Union and Progress strikingly decided to hold not in Thessaloniki but in Istanbul on August 28 and was held on September 2. In this regard, Prince Said Halim Pasha was elected as the new chairman of the Committee of Union and Progress, which gained a "party identity" in line with the decisions taken at the

Congress. It is noteworthy that Pasha's modernist ideas and recognizing Europe very well were important variables in this election (Kansu, *İttihadcıların Rejim ve İktidar Mücadelesi 1908-1913*, 2016, pp. 412-414). Referred to as the "Prince Sabahaddin" of the Committee of Union and Progress by Ahmad, Sait Halim Pasha was appointed as the grand vizier, which was the "continuation of the game" of approving and bringing a figure accepted by the society into power. Replacing Kamil Pasha, Sait Halim Pasha served until February 14, 1917. The grandson on Egyptian Mehmet Ali, Sait Halim Pasha established a cabinet, the majority of which consisted of the Unionists. In this cabinet, there were the leading names of the Committee such as Talat Bey, Halil Bey and Hayri Bey, while the number of Unionists also increased over time (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, pp. 185-197). An intellectual statesman, Sait Halim Pasha studied political regimes, Western and Eastern societies and searched for the causes of eastern despotism (Akin, *İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları*, 2010, p. 71). According to Ahmad's argument, on the other hand, the Pasha was appointed as the grand vizier due to the fact that his name would be accepted "by the entire society" and the Committee of Union and Progress desired to generate a moderate policy during this period in order to be able to win over Arabs thanks to Islamism. At the same time, Turks took Edirne back in this period and the Committee "destroyed the opposition". All of these issues were discussed at length in the 1913 Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, pp. 197-198). Sait Halim Pasha was the grand vizier who remained in this position for the longest time during the Second Constitutional Monarchy period and the Balkan Wars came to an end during his period, while Edirne and Didymoteicho remained in the Ottoman Empire with the Treaty

of Istanbul, with which Bulgaria became or border neighbor. In this regard, Pasha's evaluations about the Ottoman state structure and political processes are very important. In that, Sait Halim Pasha stated that the Ottomans did not have the bourgeoisie and aristocracy like in the West and thus, the sovereign class was the "civil servants" arguing that the European structure would not be successful in the Ottoman Empire (Akin, 2010, p. 73).

The Committee of Union and Progress was the only "organized" political party entering in the 1913-1914 elections held in the period of Sait Halim Pasha (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, p. 202). After the elections in the winter of 1913-1914, the parliament was opened on May 24, 1914 (Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 2017, p. 401). Before the parliamentary elections, the Freedom and Accord Party was officially dissolved and the parliamentary assembly formed after the elections became a "puppet" of the Committee of Union and Progress, as Zürcher phrased (Zürcher E. J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, 2013, p. 169). The new cabinet launched the "administrative reform" program of the Committee of Union and Progress in 1914 and the first step was the Ottoman army, which had lost its power (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, p. 203). While the Minister of Finance was again Cavit, the Minister of War, Enver, went into cleanup and structural changes in the ranks for the purpose of "reforming and rejuvenating the army" (Akşin, *Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki*, 2017, pp. 387-402). On the other hand, the fiscal issue was turning into a vital importance for the future of the country; the "foreign-controlled public debts institution" made the restrictions on the army budget by collecting taxes, while at the same time turning the demand to restrict army expenditures into the sanction (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-*

1914, 2016, p. 205). After the removal of the capitulations in October 1914, the Committee of Union and Progress had the opportunity to “freely” rule for the first time, and in 1913, it used its strength to “force” reform practices (Zürcher E. J., Turkey: A Modern History , 2013, p. 184). Keyder states that the process of the removal of capitulations and national economic policies continued until the Committee’s leaders escaped abroad in 1918. Coming to conclusion over the rate of joint stock companies of that period, Keyder reports that the 3% of Turkish capital reduced to 38% in 1918 (Keyder C. , Türkiye Demokrasisinin Ekonomi Politigi, 1992).

Describing the new structure as a the “triumvirate” of Enver, Cemal and Talat, Zürcher draws attention to the dominance of Enver in the army and Talat in the Committee (Zürcher E. J., Turkey: A Modern History , 2013, p. 169). On the other hand, Armenians, Greeks and Arabs demanded representation in the Assembly in proportion to their number (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, p. 202). Referring to the fact that the Union and Progress was the “de facto” single party after the Sublime Porte Raid or the coup, Tanör reveals two main elements in his examination in terms of Constitutional Law: First is that the Committee ensured acceptance of the fact that the majority of the parliament was “competent” to everything. Secondly, the Committee of Union and Progress, after taking the ruling power, transformed this mechanism in a design that could never be taken by someone else, almost in the forms of an “impenetrable fortress”. In this line, Tanör underlines how these two elements contradict the principles of “competition” and “power” in political life (Tanör, Osmanlı - Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri, 2018, p. 207).

Lewis suggests that leaving the duty of grand vizier to Talat Pasha, among the members of the Committee of Union and Progress in 1917, meant that in fact, this authority was granted to this “triumvirate” of Enver, Cemal and Talat. After this transfer, Pasha was taken as a members of the Assembly of Notables (Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2015, p. 305). Rıdvan Akın’s sociological analysis of the relations between Sait Halim Pasha and the Union and Progress is based on the fact that the Young Turks movement was a “lower-middle class” movement in addition to its “bourgeois democratic” structure. These classes, which constituted the political cadres of the period, encouraged the Young Turks to a “class conflict” with the Ottoman aristocracy. From this perspective, Akın, who defines the Ottoman aristocracy as the ruling class of the Ottoman Empire, states that this class contacted the West before the Imperial Edict of Gülhane and obtained experience in state administration. Akın further explains that this was due to the fact that all Ottoman grand viziers except Talat Pasha came from the Assembly of Notables. In the same line, the resignation of Sait Halim Pasha was interpreted in a way as the “leaving the Young Turks and the Ottoman aristocrats alone with their fate” (Akın, *İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları*, 2010, pp. 72-74). When seeking an answer to the question why none of the reforms were successful, Sait Halim Pasha mentioned the difference between the “social” and “political” life and accordingly, the Second Constitutional Monarchy was a period of vacillation between the Eastern and Western mindsets with deep contradictions (Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Gelişmeler [1876-1908]*, 2016, p. 270).

After Sait Halim Pasha, Talat Pasha, one of the important names of the Committee of Union and Progress, was brought to the position of grand vizier. Taking

over the duty in February 1917, Talat continued to serve until the death of Sultan Reşat. Talat's most important service during this period was to take back Kars, Ardahan and Batum – that were lost in 1878 Berlin Treaty – under “plebiscite condition” with the Brest Litovsk Peace Treaty and annex these cities back to the Ottoman territory with the “imperial decree” of Sultan Vahdettin VI in August 1918. Talat resigned on October 8, 1918 to allow a government to be established to ensure armistice (Akın, İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları, 2010, pp. 74-75). In line with the previous findings, Lewis describes the process from the assassination of Mahmut Şevket Pasha, which took place in June 1913, to 1918 as the “domination of three people” and “military dictatorship”. These three people were surely “Enver, Talat and Cemal Pashas” (Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2015, p. 305).

With the signature of the Armistice of Mudros, this process marks the end of the second constitutional era. The political developments of this period, the managerial staff and political actors, the appointments made to the position of grand vizier and the number of the cabinets established are proofs of this argument as fifteen governments were established in ten years. Küçük Sait, Hüseyin Hilmi and Talat Pasha established more than one cabinet. The intellectual capability, political and critical thoughts of Sait Halim Pasha in the recent Ottoman political life paved the way for the Young Turks to accept him after being appointed as the grand vizier. Indeed, the thesis of “bourgeoisie democratic revolution” and the “smaller group of bourgeoisie intellectuals” put forward by Akın were confirmed by the time of Talat Pasha's serving as grand vizier (Akın, İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları, 2010, pp. 76-79).

On the night of November 1-2, 1918, following the signature of the Armistice of Mudros, the Unionist leaders left the country with the help of Germans (Akın, İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları, 2010, p. 77). Within this scope, Ahmad accentuates for the period between the Young Turks Congress where “absolute power” was mentioned and its 100th year that even if the Committee of Union and Progress won the elections, it did not have any effect on the Assembly of Deputies, they could not make legal regulations as they wished and were unable to control provinces as they wished. Adding liberals to this interpretation, Ahmad explains that ruling power could not be mentioned for the Committee for quite a long time due to the weakness of the state in that time (Ahmad, Closing Session: Last Words, 2008, p. 744).

Yet, thinkers evaluating the period have highlighted issues different from each other. While commenting on the early period of the Constitutional Era, Ahmad states that the Unionists were faced with the question of what they were to do with “the power they achieved in an instant” – which they could not answer – and therefore they left the power to “older statesmen” and only served as “the guard the Constitution” (Ahmad, İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914, 2016, p. 85) (Tunçay, 2.Meşrutiyet'in İlk Yılı, 23 Temmuz 1908- 23 Temmuz 1909, 2018) (Berkes, Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma, 2017) (Ernest, 2011) (Mardin Ş. , Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri 1895-1908, 2017). Akın, on the other hand, believes that the second constitutionalism emerged from the “elites” in the last period of the Ottoman Empire and that they were the administrative and political actors of the Sultan Abdulhamid II period, except for “Talat Pasha”, and there was no change in the social structure of the elites in the aftermath of the proclamation of liberty (Akın, İkinci Meşrutiyet'in Sadrazamları ve Temel Rejim Sorunları, 2010, p. 80). This period, which

Tunçay regarded as a constitutional monarchy, was initiated but it could not be continued (Tunçay, Cumhuriyet Öncesinde Sosyal Düşünce, 2014, p. 296). Karpat, however, states that the defeats in the Balkans led and contributed to the ideology of nationalism, and at the same time, nationalism was started to be seen as the main element of “the foundation of the state” (Karpat K. , Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Asker ve Siyaset, 2010, p. 140).

5.5. Views On Continuity And Discontinuity

It is undoubted that societies are in constant change. Acun explains this change as the differentiation of a phenomenon from the previous situation in the context of social changes. In this context, social changes are explained by two opposing views: 1 – They occur through a series of reforms spread over a long period, 2 – They occur through revolutions that provide sudden transformations. The example of “water” Acun cites from Politzer is important for understanding the change processes: *“The temperature of the water is increased from zero to 1, 2, 3 ... until 98 degrees. Until this temperature, change is continuous. But the change does not go on like this, to an infinite degree. The temperature is increased to 99 degrees, and by 100 degrees, a sudden change occurs. Water at 99 degrees turns into steam when it reaches 100 degrees. If the experiment is done in the opposite direction and the temperature is dropped from 99 degrees to 0 degrees, there will be constant change again. But in this direction too, it does not decrease to an infinite degree. When it reaches 0 degrees, water turns into ice. Water from 1 degree to 99 degrees remains water, only its temperature changes. This is called quantitative change. Qualitative change occurs when water turns into steam or ice”* (Acun, Osmanlı'nın Torunları Cumhuriyet'in Çocukları: Osmanlıdan Cumhuriyet'e

Değişme ve Süreklilik, 2007, pp. 40-41). After this explanation, Acun elaborates on the change in social processes with this example and states that the factor of “continuity” is overlooked. He argues that change and continuity “happen” together, explaining this with the impossibility to transform a society into a completely different one and underscoring the importance of “past” process (Acun, Osmanlı'nın Torunları Cumhuriyet'in Çocukları: Osmanlıdan Cumhuriyet'e Değişme ve Süreklilik, 2007, p. 41). While change has sometimes been an inevitable process for societies, it has also been transferred to societies as an obligation by a leader group. According to Vergin, “change” is the “magical panacea” of all branches of sociology and subsequent social sciences. In this line, there is no society that does not change, and societies are “excused” to change. At the same time, change is the “fate of societies”. Levi Strauss calls unchanging societies as “societies that lack history”. Alkan, on the other hand, finds stereotypes as “immutability of change” and “everything is constantly changing” wrong, while referring to the importance of resorting to Islam for the phenomenon of change. Criticizing the habit of referring to the Westernization concept every time there is a problem, Alkan says that continuity is sort of “resistance” today, also criticizing the daily and academic life we continue on the basis of Western concepts (Alkan A. T., 1993, pp. 8-9).

Yet, it has been observed in the above discussions that every researcher, including our “national author” Ahmad as well as Zürcher, who study continuity-discontinuity advocated both of the theses regarding various topics in different periods. In other words, neither the researchers who advocate the “continuity” thesis say that everything is going on as it is, nor others advocating “discontinuity” refer to a “break” which is the exact opposite of the dominance of an episteme or paradigm (Alpan, Modern Türkiye

Tarihyazımında Süreklilik-Kopuş, 2010, pp. 14-23). Özbudun, on the other hand, explains the “continuity” and “discontinuity” in Turkish modernization as follows:

“There is no doubt that both views are exaggerated. As no society can remain immobile for a long period of time, the most radical and rapid social change processes cannot change all the institutions and rules of the society at once. It is also clear that some institutions of society will resist change more than others and that the change in these areas will take place more slowly than in other areas. It can be said that especially cultural elements will tend to change slowly. From this point of view, it is very natural to find traces of Ottoman political culture in today’s Turkish political life” (Özbudun, Türk Siyasal Sisteminde Değişim ve Süreklilik Unsurları, 1993, p. 14). There are important findings of both Ahmad and Zürcher on the understanding of culture that Özbudun emphasizes. In this context, while Ahmad analyzes this topic through the “women problem”, Zürcher attempts to explain the “cultural process” with the attitude of the “Anatolian peasant” towards revolutions. Among the Republican revolutions, it is known that the “clothing and hat reform” was the one hardest to accept, which confirms Erbudun’s assertion. As a matter of fact, Erbudun describes the “bureaucratic and centralist state tradition” as a legacy and regarded it as a “factor of continuity” since it was continued both in the Ottoman State and the Republic despite the discourses of national sovereignty and populism. At the same time, as Ahmad mentioned in detail, a “state-sponsored” bourgeoisie class emerged at the end of statist economic policies, however, it was not an “autonomous” institution that made political demands against the government like in the West (Özbudun, 1993, pp. 13-15).

Alkan explains the cut lines referred to as a knot as follows: “Modern states and nationalists as the founding ideology of modern nation-states often boast of having a long and rich “history”. From the perspective of Turkey, this issue knots in the question whether there is “continuity and discontinuity” (continuity or discontinuity) between the Ottoman state and the Republic. At this point, the need to analyze the continuity and cut lines thoroughly shows itself” (Alkan M. Ö., Giriş, 2014, p. 20). Evaluating other opinions about continuity – discontinuity, it can be observed that Kansu, as mentioned above, takes discontinuity back to the 1908 “revolution”. Indeed, Kansu criticizes historiography that does not view this popular movement as a revolution. In fact, Kansu leads the way in the construction of modern Turkey back up to 1908 and starts “discontinuity” with this incident in 1908 (Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, 2017). Berkes, however, shares that the modernization process in Turkey was based on religion and secularism and Kemalist reforms were “point shoots” in this regard. On the other hand, Hanioglu explains the Young Turk movement with three main principles while defending continuity: 1) the leaders of the movement were conservative, 2) the movement aimed at improving, saving, as well as revolutionizing, 3) an understanding reminiscent of one-party rule emerged (Berkes, Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma, 2017).

The perception of “continuity” criticized by Zürcher under the title of “Kemalist Historiography” and “Turkish historiography” represents a period accepted without any filtering. Zürcher bases this thesis on the organizational structure of the Union, especially its legacy and ideological approaches in the National Struggle by analyzing the ethnic and social origins of the leaders of the period. Zürcher also states that nationalism, secularism and positivism are elements that constitute continuity for both periods

(Zürcher E. J., *Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları*, 2009, p. 41). In the analysis on the import of positivism into the territory of Turkey, Koraelçi suggests that this process was managed by early Ottoman intellectuals like Mustafa Reşit Paşa, Mithat Paşa and Ahmet Rıza, yet the author confirms Zürcher's thesis that positivism was actually brought to Turkey from the Ottomans under the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress (Koraelçi, *Pozitivist Düşüncenin İthali*, 2014, p. 215). Ahmad's study "The Young Turks" as a PhD dissertation in 1960 has been taken as reference in many studies so far as one of the main sources to apply. Focusing on "secularism" which was put forward and radically implemented by Mustafa Kemal, Ahmad refers to this discontinuity in many issues. At the same time, Ahmad does not deny the heritage left by the Committee of Union and Progress in the Republic.

From this perspective, Ahmad's speech at the 100th anniversary of the Young Turks Congress is very meaningful for this study. Purporting that many of his writings are still valid, Ahmad says, "if it was today, I would write books, not monographies" indicating the monographies are the frame and he fills that frame with many details that he has learnt from that period until today (Ahmad, *Closing Session: Last Words*, 2008, p. 744).

5.5.1. Ahmad's Continuity and Discontinuity Investigations on Turkish Political History and The Republic

In an international article, Ahmad says the following: "*...There is still heated debate among scholars as to whether there was continuity or change in the Republic's political life. Some have argued in favor of continuity, claiming that the architects of the Republic belonged to cadres who had acquired their experience of politics after 1908.*"

That is true, though the transitions from empire to nation-state, from monarchy to republic, from theocracy to a laicist/secular state and society, seem sufficient reasons to strengthen the claims for change, even for revolutionary change” (Ahmad, *Politics and Political Parties in Republican Turkey*, p. 226). It is known by many researchers that Feroz Ahmad names after the Republic as a “discontinuity”. This theory of Ahmad is also seen when analyzing the periodic events, while transferring the primary sources he analyzed to the readers. In this context, he explains this historical process in one newspaper interview with discourses that contribute to this thesis: “... *After the Republic was established, many people from the Progressive Republican Party wanted the Caliph to become President. They believed that the prominence of the Caliph in the Islamic world would provide the New Turkey a great prestige. However, Mustafa Kemal said, ‘No, we have to break with the past, we do not want this continuity’. In case of this continuity, reforms would not be possible, the patriarchal social structure would continue. Change is dominant in the Republic, discontinuity is dominant”* (Ahmad, ‘*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, geçmişten bir kopuştur*’, 2010). These words are undoubtedly sufficient to shape the frame of this research. In this context, Ahmad emphasizes culture as is one of the most important elements of discontinuity, and again, reinforces the discontinuity thesis by referring to the place of women in society as one of the most important problems of modernization.

In his analysis of “the longest century of the Empire”, Ortaylı summarizes Ahmad’s 20th century description as the continuation of the 19th century as follows: Although the Turkish political conjuncture in the 20th century appeared to be a power struggle between the Union and Progress and the Ottoman dynasty, it was a century that

contained many opposing groups. In fact, the power groups forming the political frame included Unionists, Liberals, reactionaries among the Liberals the Young Turks, Westerners among the Young Turks, the Sublime Porte bureaucracy, anti-Unionist pashas supporting the constitutional regime under military tutelage and pro-British pashas.

While the political groups in the country were separated under different divisions due to ideological differences, the Union and Progress had to undergo differences of opinion within itself: these differences of opinion during the period became the movements that would determine the administrative cadre on the path towards the Republic. After the murder of Mahmut Şevket Pasha, prominent names of the Committee including Atıf Kamçıl, Süleyman Askeri and Yakup Cemil were either executed by gunfire or hung in the Izmir assassination case due to the attempt of a government coup in 1916. However, as noted by Tunçay at this point, Enver and Cemal Pashas rose during this period for obtaining power and the decisions taken pointed out to an autocratic modernization “at the expense of democracy”. Furthermore, conflicts were also prevailing in the top management of the Committee of Union and Progress. Also in this period, Fethi Okyar – an important name for both the Union and Progress and Republican Turkey – was appointed as Sofia ambassador and sent away due to his disagreements with the committee members, while Mustafa Kemal was sent along with his as military attaché (Tunçay, *Siyasal Tarih 1908-1923*, p. 40). Zürcher suggests that “within this faction, Mustafa Kemal was particularly close to Ali Fethi Okyar”, however, there is still not any comprehensive study on the process Mustafa Kemal experienced together with Fethi Okyar in Macedonia. Did he have any intellectual, managerial or political contribution to Mustafa Kemal’s personal development during these days? What kind of experiences did

Mustafa Kemal gain during these days to take the society to fulfill its destiny with the Republic project and what did he clearly set in his mind? (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 214). In the socio-cultural life, the Unionists tried to intervene in every area within the limits of their power and in Ahmad's words, they "touched in every area". In this regard, the Unionists aimed to build absolute power over the Palace and the Sublime Porte. Thus, it can fairly be argued that the Committee of Union laid the foundations of the national state established in 1923 (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, p. 54).

Ahmad explains the aim of the Imperial Edict of Gülhane – the first step towards democracy in Turkish history – as creating an entirely new social state that could compensate for the breaking of the state from the economy. Yet, Ahmad also suggests that these reformers were well-cultured and adept at synthesizing Western theories, but they did not see the necessity for the state to play the "guard role" as stipulated by the liberal theory. In the 19th century, when great changes were recorded in history, the state suffered from the deprivation of an economic-political system. The only power of the Ottoman state was the "lands" in the hands of Muslim Turks in this period when the industry were at the peak with the Industrial Revolution in the West. Although at a later period, the steps taken included the 1808 Charter of Alliance, 1839 and 1856 edicts, 1858 Land Law and 1876 Constitution. Their sole purpose of these reforms was to adopt "private property", "land ownership" and secure them by law (Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, 2017, p. 41).

Ahmad purports that the Unionists were aiming at protecting the Empire until the last German attack in July 1918, in addition to the target of taking back Egypt, Arab

regions and Cyprus that were seized by the British (Ahmad, Kapanış Oturumu: Son Sözler, 2008, p. 744). Ahmad's interpretation on the Turkish state building process is that a "national" Turkish state emerged from the Ottoman Empire, which was a "semi-colonial". It can be observed that the founding group of the Republic adopted concepts such as national economy, national bourgeoisie and national production. For the management type in 1938; Ahmad says that it was "more democratic" and this development accelerated with the process that started with the death of Atatürk (218 From Unionism to Kemalism). Describing the transition process from a "person state" to a "popular state", Ahmad does not ignore the struggle of the Kemalists on "continuing problems" (Ahmad, İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme, 2016, p. 235). Ahmad reports the news and analysis of the British paper, *The Times*, analyzing this management structure regarding the developments of the period. Some of the findings of *The Times* are so striking that they described the "democratic regime as autocratic, arguing that the country's control was in the hands of Mustafa Kemal and İnönü and Fevzi Pasha as the third person. After this analysis, it was claimed in the same article that these three names were the "remains of the triumvir" of Enver, Cemal and Talat, framing the issue on the basis of a historical continuity. Published by *The Times* and reported by Ahmad as a document, this article is observed to favor the "continuity" perspective for the problematique in the Turkish political life. Furthermore, administrative explanations indicated an ongoing form of administration in terms of "administrative staff" and "political culture" (Ahmad, İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme, 2016, p. 248).

On the other hand, Ahmad goes beyond this by implications suggesting that the approach that neglects the effect of the "Young Turks" on the developments between

1908 and 1918 – which he assumes as contributions – is “non-historical” or out of the scope of history. In this regard, not the deny the process is the trigger, conscious link between the developments up to that point. Inheriting the duty from the “Young Turks”, “Kemalists” continued the “protectionist policy”, which turned into a government policy over time with the understanding of statism. Defined as a “top-down” movement by Ahmad, this revolution was hardly beatable by the opposing classes’ “weak” power, rendering an oppositional movement impossible. Up to this point, most of the arguments constitute and analysis of discontinuity, however, continuities can be observed from time to time. In that, Ahmad points out to the intellectual accumulation as the driving force of the revolution, while also underlining that it was the Kemalists who “gave momentum” to this movement (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, p. 224).

In fact, the economic system which was explained to be intervened by the government was later taken under the umbrella of “statism” as one of the six principles of the Republic. Ahmad says that this was inspired by the interventionist approach during World War I and “state economy” which had been inspected by the state during the war became the continuation of the republic period as well (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, p. 238). Ahmad’s opinions about the Union and Progress reforms and Kemalist reforms are as follows: *“Modernization was something the Ottomans adopted in the 19th century or even earlier. Hail İnalçık explains how advanced they were in the use of modern weapons, being modern techniques, modern weapons: This is modernization. Some of the most modern states today are in the Gulf Region. However, Sharabi argues that even if they have the best phone systems and the best airports, they still fail to modernize; they are still patriarchal societies. Patriarchal society is primarily and*

largely based on domination over women. Yet, it also contains many elements. The Young Turks, the Unionists tried to destroy some elements of the patriarchal regime but failed to do so, since one of the main elements of the patriarchal regime is dynasty rule... In order to bring modernity, the patriarchal regime must be abolished if the state is not secular in the sense of separating the state from the religion...” (Ahmad, Kapanış Oturumu: Son Sözler, 2008, p. 746). In the path towards the building of the Republic of Turkey, Ahmad has analyzed and referred to the institutions and structures against modernization. This “patriarchal” society problem that the Unionists had tried to solve turned into one of the biggest issues of the Republic period. In this context, the Republic sought a solution to this problem with the construction of a new identity for women. However, the results of this effort do not constitute the subject matter of this thesis.

In summary, Ahmad utters regarding the early period of the Republic that the national movement wanted a radical change in its first years and this desire was fulfilled by Kemalist leaders. Furthermore, Ahmad considers this period as a brand new beginning, confirming his argument of discontinuity, and explains how the French revolutionary tradition directly affected and triggered radical thoughts in Turkey by referring to the Republic seeing the Ottomans as “degenerate” and bringing a “clear and lucent” conceptualization instead. Referred to as “the first national year” by Mustafa Kemal, this period is explained by Ahmad along with reasons and consequences of the obligation to create “a new state and society” (Ahmad, İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme, 2016, pp. 224-225).

5.5.2. Ideological and Class Continuity and Discontinuity from the Young Turks to the Republic

According to Ahmad, the Young Turks of 1908 were the “ideological heirs” of the New Ottomans, the representatives of the generation before them. Referring to the succession between these groups as “liberalism”, Ahmad says that the departing point was the United Kingdom and France. Furthermore, the author suggests that the Young Turks were a “political” movement and underlines that both movements emerged from “within people”. Underscoring the military-civilian distinction here, Ahmad states that soldiers did not have any power to make political decisions, but that they had “actual” contributions to the movement (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, p. 163).

This group, which Ahmad said represented the lower-middle class, was not very much dependent on traditional values, as it had a broad social and economic basis. Hence, when they took power, they did not comply with the traditional institutions and saw the need for cultural and social change as an element of the “modernization” movement. In this line, according to Ahmad, the Young Turks had the ideal of independence at home and abroad and they showed great “maturity” and “patience” in their relations with foreign states. Establishing their relationship with the West on the “love-hate relationship”, the Young Turks were inexperienced but determined. At the same time, they were aware that the “administrative structure” would not improve without the help of the West and they often gave voice to their need for capital investments from the West in financial and economic plans at every opportunity (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, p. 165). Toker and Tekin reached findings in reference to Ahmad in this area and mentioned the conflict between traditional values and new institutions throughout the 19th century as well as the problems caused by this conflict. According to the authors, the attempt of new institutions to keep the old values

satisfactorily was the factor that led Westernization movements until the last quarter of the 19th century (Toker & Tekin, *Batıcı Siyasi Düşüncenin Karakteristikleri ve Evreleri: "Kamusuz Cumhuriyet'ten Kamusuz Demokrasiye"*, 2016, p. 83).

In his statement on continuity – discontinuity, Ahmad shares that a complete discontinuity is rarely seen without overlooking the “turning points”, while emphasizing that the founders of the Republic made great efforts not to break with the past. Here, he accentuates that Atatürk, the founder of the Republic, said that the Ottoman State was decadent and claimed this was a remark of discontinuity (Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, 2017, p. 11).

5.5.3. Continuity and Discontinuity in Forming Economic and National Bourgeoisie Policies from the Committee of Union and Progress to the Republic

According to Tanör, Constitutional Monarchy II was the period when the transformation in the social and class structure of the country started. He believes that a new bourgeoisie class was created by policies generated from 1913 onwards such as the national economy politics, protection of Turkish and Muslim businessmen, abolishment of the capitulations, the policy of favoritism applied during World War I and agricultural products gaining great value (Tanör, *Türkiye'de Kongre İktidarları (1918-1920)*, 2016, p. 285). In the same line, the first steps to create a bourgeoisie class were taken in 1914 with the abolishment of the capitulations, as Ahmad says, and this was facilitated by encouraging and incentivizing local industrial enterprises as well as commerce, while imposing customs duty on foreign goods. On the other hand, it is also stated by the scholar that these “protectionist” policies continued during the Republic period called as the “Kemalist

autarky” when cooperation with foreigners was more attractive and the ruling autonomous elite positively welcomed the requests of this new class (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, p. 46). Suavi, on the other hand, informs that the Young Turks were in the constitutionalist position and took as basis an understanding of controlled economic liberalism in the Ottoman motherland in order to pave the way for the formation of the local bourgeoisie in reference to Mardin and Tanpınar (Aydın, *İki İttihat- Terakki: İki Ayrı Zihniyet, İki Ayrı Siyaset*, 2016, p. 117). Küçükömer criticizes the inadequacy of the policies by saying, “*The Republican bureaucracy really did not bring any meaningful changes in production relations. It was only a continuation of the Progress and Union school under new conditions*” (Küçükömer, 2007, s. 50).

While also criticizing authors such as Ahmad Yakup Kadri, the scholar underlines the fact that Mustafa Kemal had great influence on the last decade of the Ottoman Empire, also stating that this has caused underestimation of the Young Turks movement. Nevertheless, Küçükömer believes that the idea to form a bourgeoisie class was taken from the Young Turks and transformed into a notion of establishing a capitalist economy and society. Besides, Ziya Gökalp’s and Yusuf Akçura’s opinions on this regard were combined with the Kemalist movement to form the ideological infrastructure (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, p. 218) (Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, 2017). When this idea discourse is examined more in-depth, it is seen that Akçura, one of the theoretical leaders of nationalism, underscores the capitalist development and the importance of the bourgeoisie underlying nationalism, while giving examples from Tatar-Azeri model. According to Tanör, Ziya Gökalp further suggested that the new regime

needed to be based on a strong middle class and shared the longing for a rising bourgeois movement (Tanör, *Türkiye'de Kongre İktidarları (1918-1920)*, 2016, p. 288).

Noting that there were numerous legacies, transformations, changes and interventions in the efforts to create an economic infrastructure and a bourgeoisie class – as the main aspirations – in the Republic of Turkey established in 1923, Ahmad draws attention to the fact that the classless society problem left by the Ottomans became one of the largest problems in the Republic as well, denoting “continuity”. On the other hand, the capitulations were the red line of the Independent Republic of Turkey, established by the national struggle and guaranteed by the Treaty of Lausanne. From this perspective, Ahmad suggests that the realist and visionary attitude that would welcome foreign capital belonged the Republican cadre as well and thus, they were well aware of the fact that it was necessary to benefit from foreign capital to ensure that Turkey reached the level of contemporary civilizations. Within this scope, Ahmad reveals the difference between being the economic colony of the West and the need for useful investments for the economic development of Turkey (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, p. 116). He further suggest that the foreign debts in the first years of the Republic, which were seen as burden, prevented such breakthroughs, pointing out to the fact that the problem of domestic capital dated back to the Ottoman Empire.

Zürcher, on the other hand, evaluates the developments in the field of economy during the reforms period as one marked by “integration with the European Capitalist System” (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, pp. 63-66). In contrast, Ahmad reiterates a “synthesis” by stating that the reformers of the period “were well cultured enough to adapt the Western theories to themselves”. Seen as the starting point

of this process, the Treaty of Balta Limanı or the Anglo-Ottoman Treaty paved the way for increasing foreign trade, however, this treaty not only consolidated the capitulations but also rendered the Ottoman state dependent on foreign countries with rising debts. Giving voice to the idea that the reforms aimed to create a completely “new social state” to compensate for the break of the state from the economy, Ahmad informs us that the 1858 Land Law granting the right to transfer property rights by means of inheritance annulled the *timar* (lands granted by the Ottoman Sultans with a tax revenue) and *iltizam* (tax farming) systems and this was for the benefit of the rich families, while the conditions of the farming villagers deteriorated (Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp: 119) (Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, 2017, pp. 39-41).

Ahmad finds “continuity” between the economic policies of the Committee of Union and Progress and the Republic, noting that both tried to implement revolutionary ideas and practices (Eroğlu, 2014). In this regard, the first objective of the Young Turks in the way to create a “national bourgeoisie” was to remove the capitulations, as stated by Ahmad, and despite this economic restriction, they were still zealous to continue modernization. From this perspective, the authors shares that the Unionists took actions in many different areas in order to allow modernization and one of the most important action was to enact a law on the private property and real estate. Under this law, real estates started to be registered with title deeds, while streets and houses were given a number to facilitate transportation in addition to removing the big obstacle of domestic passport (credentials). As mentioned before, the first step to create a bourgeoisie society was taken in 1914 with the abolishment of the capitulations according the Ahmad and facilitated by providing incentives to domestic industrial enterprises and commerce while

imposing tax duties on foreign goods. These protective policies continued during the first years of the Republic. Thus, the Kemalist autarky order ensured that collaboration with foreign enterprises be attractive for the newly emerging class, whose demands were welcomed by the ruling elite (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, p. 46).

Ahmad further puts forward that the Republic regime took over the economic legacy – as sign of continuity – and the main effort in this period was not to prevent the formation of different economic classes but to pave the way for their formation by removing all the obstacles. In this vein, the reform programs in the 1920s and the constitutions of 1921 and 1924 formed the milestones of the Modern Republic, while guaranteeing of legislative supremacy, bureaucracy subject to the executive organ, judicial independence and the rule of law by the constitution consolidated the development of the modern Republic. As a consequence, the Republican revolutions and institutions were guaranteed by constitution and beyond this, the new constitution became both the founder and the auditor of the government regime (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, p. 204).

Köker accents what Ahmad perceives as a concept of priority issue. Within this framework, Köker analyzes the determination to actualize the bourgeoisie revolution built on nationalism and democracy as “the first sources of Kemalist democratic content” (Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, 2007, pp. 216-217). Variously, Ahmad has attempted to explain the process of Westernization, democratization and economic development that are necessary for the bourgeois revolution as follows: *“If formal democracy was not present at all during the presidency of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, can we then mention any democratic tendency in the Kemalist ideology? The*

answer to this question would be a cautious 'yes', if we consider Kemalists as the founders of a transient regime aiming to bring Turkey to the level of contemporary Western civilization, as they themselves identified with this duty. We can define this aim very simply by equalizing it to 'modernization' or 'Westernization'. But if we are even more cautious, we can understand that this meant establishing a capitalist and thus democratic order for Kemalists. During that time and until very recently, there was a prevailing myth that the development of capitalism and the political instability stemming from economic weakness would eventually lead to the establishment of democracy. Hence, democracy was seen as a political organization method specific to capitalism which is competitive by definition, while a competitive parliamentary system was the only political regime compatible with capitalism. This line of thoughts was defended by Western intellectuals like Max Weber and Harold Laski, and Kemalists accepted this equation implicitly in the process of realizing the bourgeoisie revolution" (Ahmad, İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme, 2016).

In the context of economic reforms, Ahmad purports that Kemalist economic policies were inherited from the Young Turks, thus symbolizing "continuity", while both groups approved of useful foreign capital as well as enterprises, yet, they definitely rejected foreign-source dependency and capitulations, persistently accentuating that neither of the groups could tolerate dependence on foreign sources while being open for advantageous investments. Furthermore, it is suggested by the same scholar that the Turkish elite attributed great importance to organization and mobilization in Anatolia, for which they assumed a large-scale cooperation with their cadres; however, Ahmad explains this situation by claiming that obtaining the approval of Europe was only

possible by socio-cultural development of Anatolia. Notwithstanding this argument, Ahmad, who serves to the “discontinuity” thesis of the Republic warns that it should not be forgotten that as much as Kemalists were capitalist in the economic field, they were also anti-imperialist in their program. In sum, both the Young Turks and the Union and Progress pursued a synthesis in economic policies. Although both cadres sometimes applied practices that contradicted with their policies depending on the conditions of the day, social structure and country needs, they always decided on increasing production, industrialization and economic development. Called by Ahmad as “economy politics” that would develop under the shadow of the state, this interventionist economic policy practices would allow the national economy to flourish to a certain extent. After a certain period of time, however, the Kemalist regime would be replaced by the liberal political and economic system as Kemalists had laid the groundwork for its infrastructure, maintaining their “transient regime” character (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, pp. 219-238). Zürcher, on the other hand, accentuates that another overlapping feature of the Unionists and Kemalists was the rejection of the “role of classes” and the “class struggle”, pointing to the removal of obstacles in front of creating a national bourgeoisie. Zürcher argues that policies such as creating a bourgeoisie class and national economy had always been maintained and accordingly, the Republic supported capitalists, while “leaving farmers and villagers to the mercy of the emerging national bourgeoisie” – a point that demonstrates the “continuity” of farmers’ and villagers’ problems from the Ottoman time to the Republic period (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 235). According to Boratov, the years between 1923 and 1929 were marked by developments that may fairly be qualified as

political revolutions and they represent sharp discontinuity from the past. Despite this argument, there did not emerge discontinuity in the economic structure of 1923 similar to the past, since the bureaucratic aristocracy – as Boratov phrases – did not move away from the ruling power; on the contrary, “*we see that the period of 1923-1929 was in an amazing continuity with the period of 1908-1922 in terms of economic policies and official economic views*” (Boratov, 1989, p. 279).

5.5.4. Analysis of Continuity and Discontinuity in the Late Ottoman Period and Early Republic Period Agricultural Policies

Pamuk elaborates on the changing dynamics of Ottoman land ownership from the 18th century onwards. As of the 18th century, large-scale agricultural enterprises remained limited against the increasing power of nobles and the lands started to be cultivated by the peasants engaged in collaboration. Besides small and medium properties, large land ownership was also observed in the 19th century Anatolian agriculture. Nonetheless, they were operated by leasing the properties to villagers, not through capitalist enterprises. While stating that one of the most important reasons for strengthening the central government from the period of Mahmud II onwards was to impose tighter control over rural areas, Pamuk says, “... *In order to seize a larger part of the agricultural surplus, the central state started to limit the actual property right on public lands and confiscate some of the lands owned by the nobles*” to share his observation. On the other hand, the action taken by the state in the 19th century to change elements of land ownership was to adopt the Land Law. Pamuk says that the most important objectives of this law included giving the right to purchase and sell state-owned lands, limiting the power of nobles and other groups and increasing tax revenues, yet, the author notes that the effects of the Land

Law remained limited due to the fact that functional ownership depended on political, social and economic variables (Pamuk, *Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadi Tarihi 1500-1914*, 1988, pp. 215-227).

In the last period of the Ottoman Empire as well as the period when the Unionists held the ruling power, another area that was intervened was agriculture. In commercial transactions, the law obligating using the Turkish language once again showed the importance and validity of Turkish and at the same time, this law brought high tax obligations, which caused debates over new customs criteria for domestic producers. In this context, though, the Unionists did their best to increase agriculture and productivity. New farming methods, farmer loans from Ziraat Bank, technical information, irrigation and reforestation projects were all leaps forward for the modernization of agriculture. Ahmad purports that occasional coercion was witnessed in this process; peasants were forced to work in farms and agricultural areas. This situation turned into a state policy after the outbreak of the war and Ahmad tries to explicate this by saying that villagers were quite disappointed after the great hopes coming with the 1908 revolution. Indeed, villagers lost their great hopes and the formerly common banditry emerged again along with other problems. Nevertheless, Ahmad claims that the Young Turks, in fact, intended to protect villagers and support them against the status quo. As a matter of fact, this problem continued in the parliament with the demand of the nobles consisting of landlords and notables owning large areas to protect and expand their rights. Indeed, the author thinks that this problem “continued” after the proclamation of the Republic as well, although the Young Turks and the founders of the Republic “continued” to strive for protecting villagers and peasants from landlords and seigniors as well as benefiting

from them in building an independent and national economic structure. However, after a while, this turned into almost blackmailing the state. According to Ahmad, the Unionists had never attempted to change the status quo of landlords and seigniors despite all their threats. Ahmad says the reason for this was that the Unionists accepted the need for feudalism as a reality and contemplated the ways how to benefit from feudal lords or seigniors. Yet, it can be uttered that these landlords or seigniors or whatever they can be called in this ambiguous unsystematic order got what they wanted almost every time. On the other hand, Ahmad claims that it is not possible to speak of feudalism in the Ottoman state after the abolishment of the timar system (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, pp. 75-79).

In light of this information, Ahmad's views on the Turkish-Ottoman "feudal system" are striking. Landlords had "social and political" control in the life of peasants. Thus, here again there was the victimization of the peasants. As a matter of fact, this was a troublesome situation for peasants, whose labor and products were confiscated. Landlords performed "illegitimate" activities by hiring power for low costs thanks to getting the support of the period's bureaucratic political men. Considering the evaluation of the Charter of Alliance by historians, it can be observed that comments are rather negative. Halil İnalcık, for instance, argues that while Europe advanced towards centralization, the institutionalization of decentralization in the Charter was a primitive practice, while Berkes alleges that this was a sort of "social degeneration", noting that this order was in no way worth of being identified with feudalism and that feudalism was peculiar to Europe only (Akşin, *Siyasal Tarih*, 1988, p. 90). Zürcher claims that the modernization project was pressuring workers and peasants under the guise of populism

and criticizes the “indifference” of historians in this regard. Indeed, Zürcher thinks that historians who concentrate on the ideological and cultural change that bureaucrats and soldiers made ignore the part that concerns workers and peasants (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 286).

In the process of modernization and bureaucratization that came along with the reforms, Ahmad underlines the seigneurial (de facto) judicial authority and legal administrative powers of the notables in regions. The Unionists noticed that the Constitutional Monarchy, which gave hope to many groups including peasants in the society, could not find a solution to the peasants’ situation, and they even discussed thoroughly at the 1908 Thessaloniki Congress, as Ahmad said. The Unionists had thought about distributing land to peasants, provided that land ownership was not intervened. However, the reason for this problem that showed “continuity” in the Republic of Turkey was that landlords avoided mechanization which required capital and continued to rely on old methods that necessitated high amount of labor. In their conversations, landlords were arguing that it was foolish to allocate capital for agriculture, which weakened tremendously with capitulations that regressed after 1860. The Committee of Union and Progress, however, wanted to encourage them with modern machinery and methods with a revisionist attitude to take advantage of them instead of confiscating lands from their hands. Despite this positive attitude, landlords played games over the Union and Progress, prevented development in the regions where they were politically and economically superior, and obstructed all formations in the Parliament except those that served their own interests by using their power. The “single-party power” period of the Committee of Union and Progress, which was mentioned above, did not achieve any

result regarding this issue even in 1913 despite their extensive efforts. In 1914, the government operationalized Ziraat Bank as another trial for solution aiming to provide capital support with this national bank opened in Aydın, also supporting this move by purchasing a share of half of 50 TL. With a slight amendment the law was related not only with agriculture, but also with the agricultural industry – the processing and packaging of products such as figs, tobacco, and olive oil. However, an opposition emerged against the bank being a shareholder when necessary, and this crisis was overcome to some extent with the promises given that the bank would be closed after doing its share following the establishment phase (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, pp. 84-93).

Ahmad determines here that the continuity of capital formation, in addition to its change and transformation, was an “early application” of the statist Kemalist policy with economic principles declared in the 1930s, manifesting continuity between these two periods. On the other hand, the attitude of the Sultan towards landlords was “pragmatic” based on a “policy of non-interference”, thus, Ahmad says that the Sultan and the Unionists were on the same page regarding this issue. Such an unreasoned, hardly changeable situation that was away from competition, made the Unionists leave agriculture aside and focus on industry and commerce (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, pp. 79-84).

In this context, Ahmad puts forward that this powerful and rich farmers’ class, which he argues that they were “aware of their interests and mastered political battle”, “continued” their existence in the Republic period. On the other hand, there were two different views for agriculture, landlords and peasants within the Committee of Union

and Progress. One view supported peasants, the other supported landlords and the functionality of production. This view, which disregarded the small farmers and left them alone with their own destiny, “strengthened its victory with the 1916 Ziraat Bank Law and the 1917 decree”. With this law, bank loans were given to agricultural companies and farmers with machinery (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, pp. 89-99). However, in another book of Ahmad, it is mentioned that in this period the banking and credit system was just beginning to form, thus, lending facilities were surprisingly granted while peasants could not access these loans as they were abused. Despite the existence of an institution such as Ziraat Bank, peasants faced blackmails and decisions under the disposition of landlords and statesmen as they could not access any loans. Many from within the Committee also were aware of this situation. As a matter of fact, the governor of Aleppo, Hüseyin Kazım, emphasized the need to save the peasantry from the oppression of the gentry and landlords, and he received many congratulatory letters after this statement (Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, 2017, p. 57).

In Ahmad's early period analysis, the term “alienation of peasants from the state” is used in order to provide a thorough insight of this period followed by certain steps to solve this issue such as the appointment of İsmail Canbulat as the Minister of Interior by Sait Halim Pasha and Talat Pasha, yet, he resigned on September 30, causing the problem to become even more severe. Upon this development, the Party of Union and Progress established the “Towards People Committee” to support “material and moral development” of villagers in İzmir city. In this committee, there would be libraries, reading rooms for education and training, books would be published in a short time and printing houses would be established. This situation, unfortunately, was not changing in the Republic of

Turkey and in the system, where local powers exploited peasants and villagers, the state was not protecting them either although peasants saw the state as the only way of salvation. For this reason, the peasants' reproach and anger was towards the state rather than the gentry (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, pp. 101-229).

Therefore, Ahmad claims that it was too late to take measures against these oppressions and the reflection of late measures on the "Kemalist movement" was that Mustafa Kemal said, "Turkey's true master is the peasant". Nonetheless, Ahmad alleges that the Republicans also saw the problems in village areas and sought ways to solve these problems just like the Young Turks did, but they ended up following up reconciliatory policies accepting the status quo as their predecessors. Under these circumstances, the group that managed to emerge as a social class – although partially – was farmers and landlords as they rid themselves of the triangle of Turkish peasantry, agriculture and landlords by benefitting from the circumstances of the period. This problematique continued systematically and the reformists movements, which started in 1876 and gained momentum in 1908 and 1923 after the proclamation of the Republic, could not have enough power to interfere in this issue despite occasional courage to reduce unfairness in this field and reformists always preferred to sustain the existing order by contributing to it since they lacked the necessary means to implement a different policy from scratch due to the conditions of the period and economic sanctions (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, p. 102). In contrast, Berkes brings a totally different perspective to this issue and argues that the agricultural reform must be understood outside the scope of the statism program and that the agricultural reform was made to develop the peasantry, however the thesis of a classes society deepened the gap between urban-rural areas in this case, which

was due to the fact that changes and transformations were related to coincidences as they were unplanned (Berkes, *Türk Düşününde Batı Sorunu*, 1975, pp. 127-133). Keyder sheds light on the fact that the bureaucracy resisted production activities of the peasant while merchants class was engaged with small meta production, referring to the similarities with the French transition to capitalism. Keyder further finds that the central authority resisted dispossession of the peasant and tried to sustain small property, and at the same time, that the central authority was successful in protecting small property as long as it was powerful, which was related to the development of capitalist production relations outside the agricultural structure and doing business with surplus from small meta production in France. Besides this, Keyder explains the economic evaluation of the peasantry as follows: “... *the support provided to the independent peasantry would prevent the capitalist sector from growing rapidly and would instead enable capitalism to develop and mature more complexly through bureaucracy*” (Keyder Ç. , *State and Class in Turkey*, 1989, pp. 65-66). Koçak, however, utters that the statist policy would have a special place in the separation between Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü in the future: “*Atatürk had been skeptical of the success of the statist economic policy from the very beginning. As a matter of fact, İnönü made it clear that Atatürk always taken private enterprises as a basis and that he was in favor of the liberal economy*” (Koçak, *Siyasal Tarih (1923-1950)*, p. 158).

Ahmad conveys his analysis on the Turkish peasant through the writings of Ahmet Şerif. Saying that the 1908 revolution created great hopes both in urban and rural areas, Ahmad conveys the despair of the villagers, complaining that nothing changed, based on the writings of Ahmet Şerif, who went on an Anatolian trip a year later:

“Freedom of the peasant was a word we only started to hear recently ... However, we thought everything would be fair; taxes would be collected fairly and peacefully, murderers and thieves in the village would be rehabilitated, officers would not be able to act on impulse and everything would get better. However, none of these happened. Some things worked better in the past; today everything is in complete chaos...”

Many of these things that the villagers hoped are among the basic duties of the state today, however, it was very difficult to provide this order at that time. On the other hand, another issue that fed feudalism was land ownership, cultivation and use.

“Various people hold the deed of a particular piece of land and we do not know whether the land, on which we are working, belongs to us. Therefore, there are conflicts every day and sometimes people die. We go to the state office and court, but they do not understand our troubles. The only thing they are interested in is collecting taxes...”

As can be understood from the above citation, tax was also a huge burden on the peasant under the circumstances of the period. The land ownership and tax problems of the peasantry, who complained about high number of taxes as well as unfair taxes at every opportunity, were among the chronic symptoms transferred to the Republic of Turkey.

“We work throughout the year and pay our taxes; we even sell our pottery and kitchenware as they collect taxes by force. So, we are always in debt. Many villagers have not found seeds to plant in the past few years. Since there is no help from anyone, we buy a bushel of the seed from the gentry for 100-125 kuruş and return it to three bushels in exchange for one bushel. These landlords are threatening us; they can make

their men beat the peasant, put them in prison or make them confront with civil servants' (Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, 2017, pp. 56-57).

At the time of World War I, there was nothing left to do by the state, the army and the bureaucracy, whose needs increased, and as a result, a national, powerful and rich farmer class, who knew how to fight in the political and local area, was born. Ahmad underlines that the conflicts of interest of the farmers' class continued during the years of the National Struggle and the Republic as an indicative of the continuity of the problems in this field. Also saying that the Turkish peasants were the most repressed in the 19th century, (Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, 2016, pp. 89-110) he accentuates that the peasants were suppressed at the highest level in this period by the state via exploitation and prevention of development as well as confiscation of their products to increase the state revenues without increasing customs tariffs and trading taxes.

The finding put forward by Zürcher on the Turkish peasants, on the other hand, is very striking. The representatives of the Kemalist revolution in the towns were bureaucrats, officers, teachers, doctors, lawyers and entrepreneurs of large commercial enterprises. However, artists and small business owners were the backbone of the suppressed traditional culture, as propounded by the author to clarify the positivist attitude of the revolutions. Furthermore, Zürcher's observation about the peasants' daily life, traditions and socio-cultural structures is invaluable. According to Zürcher, the peasants were not affected by these revolutions at all. A shepherd never wore fez, and his wife did not wear a veil, at the same time, changing letters were insignificant because they were illiterate. Despite the 1934 Surname Law, they continued to use their first names. While polygamy was prevented by the civil law, they got married more than once

if they had money and registered their children from the second and third women in the genealogy of their official wife. Therefore, prohibitions and changes did not make any sense to them. In fact, Turkish workers and peasants were ignored in this revolution and were crushed under reforms imposed from above (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, pp. 10-283).

Ahmad's thought of continuity is that there is a continuous line in the history of every nation, and therefore discontinuity from the past is "rarely" seen. However, underlining what he calls as "turning points", the author states that the founders of the Republic made great efforts not to break with the past. From this perspective, Ahmad identifies the determination for the Westernization movements that started in the 19th century as "continuity" and that the Turks, after a while, realized that they could not resist the West only by establishing a modern army, thus, they attempted to change the political, social and economic structure (Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, 2017, p. 12).

6. ERIK JAN ZÜRCHER'S CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY PERCEPTION

6.1. The Great War

According to the Treaty of Sevres signed on August 10, 1920, the Ottoman Empire was left only as a small state in Northern Anatolia, the capital of which was Istanbul. The Ottoman lands, which were seen as a shared booty by the Great Powers, turned into a chess game during the period. Called the Eastern question, this project was nothing but about taking the highest share and privilege from the Ottoman lands (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 220).

According to Zürcher, the activities of the Unionists stood out in this period. The first of these activities was the defense of national rights, namely the Countrywide Resistance Organizations, also known as the Associations for Defense of National Rights, which were deployed at strategic points in Anatolia. The Unionists were aware of the importance of the Anatolian regions, which could be lost to Greeks and Armenians.

These organizations, which were established in Edirne and Western Thrace in November 1918 and later in İzmir, Kars, Trabzon and Erzurum, were followed by the organization established in Urfa in December 1919. According to Zürcher, the most important quality of these organizations was that they consisted of Unionists, spreading the national discourses of these Unionists. These organizations received the highest support in Anatolia from Muslim landowners and merchants. These organizations that supported national resistance were seen in all parts of Anatolia and Thrace between 1918 and 1919. It is known that these organizations were supported by the Young Turk officers in unity via preventing soldiers from leaving arms and being discharged in Anatolia, and secretly delivering weapons and ammunition to the regional resistance movements, yet these were not seen sufficient. According to Zürcher, it is a fact that regular army troops were very weak during this period and therefore, regular army troops had to rely on the Turkish and Circassian gangs until 1921 (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 223).

The fourteen principles and the right of nations to determine their own future declared by the American President Wilson on In January 1918 disturbed the United Kingdom and France. With the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution in 1919, Russia's leaving the negotiation table, and beyond that, withdrawing from all imperialist activities by disclosing secret agreements once again unmasked the Great Powers. In this context, Zürcher mentioned three important problems that required urgent solutions in Anatolia: The Armenian question, the conflicting claims of Greece and Italy on the West and Istanbul straits question (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 217).

On September 4-11, the group called Association for Defense of National Rights in Anatolia and Rumelia, convened with the participation of 31 provincial representatives. On April 23, 1920, they gathered under the name of the Grand National Assembly with the participation of 232 deputies. The Turkish army, under the command of Colonel İsmet İnönü, who successfully stopped the first advance of the Greek army from Bursa to Eskişehir, achieved its first victory as a regular army on January 10, 1921. In the period until April 7, 1921, when the Greek army attacked for the second time, diplomatic contacts were tried by Ankara's Deputy to Foreign Minister Bekir Sami (Kunduh) on behalf of the Nationalists who were invited to London, yet, reconciliation could not be achieved. After this process, Bekir Sami, who was thought to deviate from the National Pact, had to resign. The fact that the army had to retreat to the Sakarya river following the Greek attack led to the declaration of a mobilization. From Afyonkarahisar to Eskişehir, Western Anatolia was under the control of Greece. In this one-year period, the Entente States or Allied Powers made a statement of impartiality, on the other hand, Venizelos' supporters and the disputes between pro-monarchy officers were changing the political situation in favor of the Turks. The army under the command of Mustafa Kemal, who was ordered to attack the south of Afyonkarahisar on August 26, defeated the enemy, captured many officers and chief commanders. After winning the war on August 30, the Turkish cavalry chasing the Greek army entered İzmir on September 9, and thus, the Greek left the Turkish territory (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 225).

With the appointment of Ferit Pasha as the grand vizier in 1920, the gap between the nationalists in Anatolia and the Istanbul government grew larger. An indication of this

was the death sentence decision for Mustafa Kemal and some nationalist officers in their absence that Shaykh al-Islam published at the request of the government. On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal attached great importance to the support of Sunni religious leaders and Alawite community leaders in Anatolia. The increasing influence of the Greek army in the Western Anatolia and Thrace regions in the summer of 1920 left the Turkish Nationalists in a difficult situation, therefore, they had to resort to gang leaders such as Ethem in the Northwest and Demirci Mehmet in the Southwest. As Ahmad explains, the activities of gangs and banditry of the period were overlooked in many studies and they appear as another issue worthy of examination (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, pp. 227-233).

While Zürcher asserts that the regional resistance movements were successful thanks to the Outpost Committee organizing these movements, he observes that the Unionist cadres were not fully loyal to Mustafa Kemal, and they even considered Karabekir Pasha as potential leader since he was more docile than Mustafa Kemal. Nonetheless, the incident that disrupted the desire for competition and conflict in the Committee was the exile of its prominent members to Malta. Another important reason for this was the avoidance of a conflict environment until the occupation of Istanbul, 1922, the date of definitive victory. Threats on Mustafa Kemal were not limited to the above-mentioned factors. On the one hand, Mustafa Kemal, was trying to restore the rights of the nation usurped by the Western imperialist powers referred to as the Great Powers, and on the other hand, he had to face internal threats. Throughout 1921, the Bolsheviks intended to use Enver as an implicit threat against Ankara, and Enver had a considerable number of supporters at home. He even met Trabzon's leading Nationalist

organizations in Batumi. However, the final victory on September 13 further strengthened Mustafa Kemal in his leadership position, resulting Enver's departure for good; he died in June 1922 while fighting the Red Army (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 235).

Mustafa Kemal struggled for military leadership, against important figures who were loved and supported, such as Karabekir and Enver. Although these threats seemed to disappear for a while, the political threats continued. Although the invasion of the Great Powers, especially the Greek threat as an unacceptable situation prevented the opposition from propaganda, the opposition groups began their activities immediately after the war ended. In this regard, the Unionists who returned from the exile of Malta also joined the Second group, which was established in July 1922 against Mustafa Kemal's absolutism. Zürcher explains the ideology of this group only as opposition to fundamentalism of Mustafa Kemal (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 237). However, with the Turkish army entering İzmir, the balance factors changed, and with the atmosphere of trust provided by victory, Mustafa Kemal first introduced the idea of turning the Countrywide Resistance Organization into a political party. For this reason, Ankara came out of the war – which they entered in a poor condition – by gaining an identity. However, in Istanbul, the Committee of Union and Progress held a congress with Kara Kemal, who was alleged to be the founder of the Outpost. Zürcher's claim is that after this congress, the leadership of the Union and Progress was proposed to Mustafa Kemal, which he refused (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 238).

As Tanör points out, a total of 28 congresses were held between November 5, 1918 and October 8, 1920. Among these, Erzurum and Sivas Congresses, where crucial decisions were taken regarding the building process of the Republic of Turkey, have been referred to as most consequential congresses up to today. Tanör shares two important points here: The first is that all congresses were made outside the local initiative, except for the Sivas Congress and Afyon-Pozantı Congress. The second point is that 15 congresses based on local initiatives were held before the Sivas Congress, and this means that organization started before the date Mustafa Kemal Pasha set off to Samsun (Tanör, *Türkiye'de Kongre İktidarları (1918-1920)*, 2016, p. 99). Without dwelling much upon this thesis, Zürcher tries to explain the process beginning with M. Kemal's assuming the role of leader of the Turkish national resistance movement with human relations and leader charisma. Within this framework, the Turkish national resistance movement shaped by local congresses between 1918 and 1919 until the victory in 1922 was riveted by Mustafa Kemal's coming to leadership once and for all, while the author suggests that the most important reason for this was the loyalty of leading commanders to M. Kemal (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 233). Belge says, "The fact that Mustafa Kemal was initially kept away from power as well as his activities after assuming the leadership of the movement was not "fortune" or coincidence. Besides, those who followed him understood he had a different 'quality' from what they knew until then. To the extent that they understood this, they were more attached to their leaders" sharing his different perspective from Zürcher (Belge, *Mustafa Kemal ve Kemalizm*, 2009, p. 36).

6.1.1. Lausanne Peace Treaty

After the War of Independence, the Entente States agreed to meet with the Turkish side. For this meeting, a congress was to be held in London. It was hoped that the representatives from both Ankara and Istanbul governments would be attending the congress after the invitation, however, the request of a joint committee by the Istanbul government angered Ankara. Thereupon, on November 1, 1922, this reaction resulted in the abolition of the Sultanate. Subsequently, Tevfik Pasha handed over the stamp of the Grand Vizier to the Ankara government, Refet Pasha, who represented the Ankara government in Istanbul, and conduces toward the closing of an era (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 239).

Against the imposition of Sevres by the Entente States, Ankara did not make concessions from the National Pact and this attitude continued Lausanne. İsmet İnönü, one of the most trusted names for Mustafa Kemal, became the head of the delegation in Lausanne and embarked on a difficult mission to claim rights for İskenderun, Syria, Mosul, Aegean coasts and Western Thrace against different delegations by means of masterful acts recorded in the history of diplomacy. At the meetings that proceeded at a snail's pace, while the Entente States were trying to impose their wishes, the Ankara government got off the table and the conference was abandoned. Indeed, they were insisting on the capitulations against the Turkish government, who fought against imperialism by carrying ammunition to the fronts with oxen and ox-driven carts; however, Turks refused any thought, desire or action that would overshadow their sovereignty and independence. On July 17, 1923, the necessary decisions were taken and signed on July 23, 1924 with the approval of Mustafa Kemal. While the parliament ratified the peace treaty on August 21, the last British soldier left Istanbul on October 1,

1923 (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 242). Karpaz recapitulates the importance of the War of Independence for the Turks as follows: *“For the Turks, the War of Independence was both a life and death struggle and a radical political change process. While fighting for liberation, they also laid the foundations of the modern national Turkish State. This is how a nation, detached from its past with violence and conflict, took its place on the world stage as a new entity with a new identity and new aspirations”* (Karpaz K. H., *Türk Siyasi Tarihi Siyasal Tarihin Evrimi*, 2014, s. 14).

6.1.2. Unionist Mustafa Kemal

In this period, Zürcher states that although the leaders of the Unionists were gone, they still dominated the parliament, military, police, postal and telegraph services. Noting that the real resistance took place in Anatolia, which was away from the political games in the capital city, the author claims that the proper environment for this was provided before the Unionist leaders left the country. In addition, he informs that this resistance was prepared during the defense of the Dardanelles in March 1915. Reminding that Talat gave orders to the Special Organization or the Ottoman Imperial Government Special Forces to establish many secret weapons and ammunition depots in Anatolia, the author says that guerrilla gangs began to be formed within the country. The Outpost Station, which Zürcher says was the most important step before the war, was founded by Talat and Enver Pashas (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, pp. 202-206).

Despite the hostile attitude of the British, Zürcher claims that the Italians started to get closer to the national resistance after 1920 and the French after 1921. Furthermore, the committees that are often highlighted by the author for this period were the Unionist

underground organizations. In this line, Zürcher indicates that many weapons were provided to the Anatolian resistance movement from the Ottoman ammunition depots, and that it was the outpost station that managed to kidnap these ammunition from the counter-forces. With the reference to author Dağtekin, he provides information about such ammunition provided to the national resistant front as follows: 56,000 fire sets, 320 machine guns, 1,500 rifles, 2,000 boxes of ammunition and 10,000 uniforms (Dağtekin, *İstiklal Savaşında Anadolu'ya Kaçırılan Mühimmat ve Askeri Eşya Hakkında Tanzim Edilmiş Mühim Bir Vesika*, 1955, pp. 9-15). Underlining the great roles of tradesmen, boatmen, porters and telegraphists under Kara Kemal's control and the importance of the agents of the Special Organization, the author furthermore shares that Orbay sent former cavalry Çerkez Ethem, whom he knew from the Special Organization, to Kuşçubaşı Eşref's brother's farm in Salihli to start the armed struggle in Anatolia and establish the headquarters there as well as getting the necessary supplies and money from the headquarters. Yet, the main strong claim was that Mustafa Kemal has relations with these underground organizations. Zürcher shares that with the start of the 1919 resistance movements, the first leadership proposal was presented to the former commander-in-chief and grand vizier Ahmet İzzet Pasha, however, he does not provide any reason for why, regarding it sufficient to say there was no agreement. The main claim is that after this rejection, the Union and Progress applied to Mustafa Kemal to offer leadership.

Zürcher argues that Mustafa Kemal was "a member of the Committee of Union and Progress from the beginning" and draws attention to the closeness of Mustafa Kemal with Cemal Pasha and Fethi Okyar within the Committee. In 1909, Mustafa Kemal was appointed to the Operation Army under the command of Mahmut Şevket Pasha as the

Chief of Staff to suppress the reactionary uprising in Istanbul, then he took office in Libya in 1911 and this task brought him closer with Cemal Pasha and Fethi Okyar. Beyond that, Zürcher claims that Fethi was the rival of Enver, and that, after the Sublime Porte Raid – the coup – in 1913, the fact that Enver was the symbol of power in the army and politics caused Mustafa Kemal to be kept away from the center of power. Was Mustafa Kemal's complex of Enver, mentioned by Zürcher, valid also for Enver, or was Mustafa Kemal seen as a rival by Enver even in those years? These questions are worth investigating (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013). Akşin claims that after the convergence of Vahdettin with Mustafa Kemal after becoming Sultan, disturbed the Union and Progress, which mediated to ensure that Mustafa Kemal was sent to the Syrian front and removed from the center. The scholar also remarks that those who did this were the group that had been pushed out of the Committee, which had influence on the opposition in the army. They took this as a measure against Mustafa Kemal as those who opposed him. Akşin reminds us of the fact that “Von Falkenhayn tried to convince Mustafa Kemal with many chests of gold coins in order to prevent an opposition from the army through Mustafa Kemal”. Beyond that, Mustafa Kemal, who was not willing to be “convinced by gold”, was wanted to be killed by Enver's uncle Halil Kut Pasha. Akşin argues that those responsible for this intention was the Committee of Union and Progress, yet, the name behind this was definitely Enver Pasha himself (Akşin, *İstanbul Hükümleri ve Milli Mücadele*, 1998, p. 72). As mentioned in Aydemir's “The Single Man”, Mustafa Kemal was one of the names most affected by the ideas spread by the Young Turks. Again, according to Aydemir, after Mustafa Kemal was appointed to Damascus in 1905, he gave several speeches at the home of Mustafa from the Medical

School, noting the emphasis of Mustafa Kemal on revolution in his discourse. That day, Mustafa Kemal said: “The issue is not dying; it is to create, actualize and place our ideal before dying” giving hints about the 20-year period of Turkish history (Aydemir, Tek Adam Mustafa Kemal 1881- 1919; Cilt I., 2009, p. 88). Belge, on the other hand, mentions that many of the ideas and thoughts that developed with the Republic had been built by the Unionists before the period of Republic. With the proclamation of the Republic, this Unionist cadre adapted to new conditions blended pre-Republican intellectual experience with the Republic and in a way, “reconciled”. On the other hand, Belge said, “*The person that had maximum effect in the entire intellectual life of the Republic – more than any generation or the sum of all of them – was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk*”, highlighting Mustafa Kemal’s revolutionary attitude in the relations with the intellectual structure of the Union and Progress as well as building the Republic of Turkey (Belge, Mustafa Kemal ve Kemalizm, 2009, p. 26). Tunçay, on the other hand, refers to Republicans as more “unflinching” than the forerunners of the Reforms and the Constitutional Monarchy when it came to faith in reason and science. In the same line, Tunçay explains this cadre as follows: “*The ruling elites of the Early Republic were very sure of their own right. To make them accepted by society, they did not intend to compromise with traditions, they aimed to “show the true way” to the masses of people and “persuade” them through secular education*” arguing that this cadre had a different attitude from the Ottoman reconciliation tendency, while there was a need for this reconciling tendency for ensuring liberal democracy (Tunçay, İkna (İnandırma) Yerine Tecebbür (Zorlama), 2001, p. 96).

Zürcher believes that Mustafa Kemal's great reputation in the army and being "unsullied" in the political sense formed the reason for his being shown as the ideal candidate for the leadership of resistance. However, this discourse can also be understood as the leadership being bestowed on Mustafa Kemal. Making an objective analysis in his history, this perception might lead to ignore the struggle Mustafa Kemal against his rivals in order to take the lead. In this sense, the passion, perseverance and determination of Mustafa Kemal, one of the most important continuities of our political life, for leadership had been at the same level from the very beginning. Engaged in very difficult struggles, he had to "endure a struggle for leadership" against many leading Unionists such as Kazım Karabekir and Rauf Orbay. Was this struggle equal and fair between all the sides? When looking at the conditions of this period to answer this question, it can be seen that Kazım Karabekir was at least as famous and successful soldier as Mustafa Kemal during the resistance years. He was appointed to the 15th Army Corps in 1919 and went to Erzurum, one of the centers of the resistance, and served as commander of the eastern fronts in 1920. Karabekir is called by Zürcher as "the key man" in Anatolia, yet, he also suggests that his jealousy towards M. Kemal is quite meaningful in arguing that Karabekir was not a capable rival against M. Kemal (Zürcher E. J., *Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık*, 2010) (Zürcher, *National Struggle and Unionism*). Eraslan, on the other hand, analyzes the nature of this leadership with its qualification as well as reflection on the construction of the Republic and the reforms: *"Atatürk, the one who proposed change, especially emphasized the defining factor of the organization or group (Change Agent) in the society. If people with great influence and prestige in society also have the ruling power, their propositions are easily accepted. Atatürk proposed political, administrative and*

cultural exchange that would normally cause great reactions, yet, these propositions were easily and effectively accepted thanks to his career, which started in Tripoli, developed with the Dardanelles War and crowned with the leadership of the National Struggle. The continuation of his leadership broke the resistances with counter-ideologies and paved the way for his reforms to be implement in the society without falling into danger of only being in the intellectual plan” (Eraslan, 2002, s. 131).

6.2. Building The Republican State

6.2.1. Political Memory from Reform Era to the Republic

By reminding us Montesquieu’s analysis that in the eastern societies that there was no institution between the ruler and the public, Zürcher similarly defends the idea that there was no institution in Ottoman between the Sultan and the subjects. Along with the idea of the central state supported by Mahmud II, the Sublime Porte bureaucracy, which emerged independently from the Palace – particularly the civil servants class – took over the bureaucratic activities. Arguing that the reform programs that took place after 1839 covered the same areas as Mahmut II’s policies, the author especially underlines the continuity of military, central bureaucracy, provincial administration, taxation, education and communication in addition to the importance given to the judicial reforms and solidarity projects. On the other hand, Öztürk emphasizes that the Turkish social structure was incompatible with both classical and feudal Western-European tradition. He purports that the difference for this was that the rulers were never outside the dynasty due to the theocratic structure of the administrative power formed by the combination of caliphate and sultanate, which served the system to gain a despotic

appearance. In the definition of Eastern societies, Berkes says that traditionalism was dominant rather than religiousness. According to Berkes, this tradition is a concept that includes both sultanate and despotism (Öztürk, 2016).

Arguing that the Reform period was not in any way based on popular will, Zürcher opposes Tunaya, who claimed that some of the reforms were demanded and supported by people. According to Zürcher, elite bureaucrats made the public accept the reforms they deemed necessary (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 107). Keyder, on the other hand, argues that this process had been a top-down initiative to change the society starting with the Young Turks and proceeding in continuity: *“Thus, the state structure would remain as capitalist autonomy until the bureaucracy was conquered internally by interest groups, which the bureaucrats wanted to develop under guardianship”* (Keyder Ç. , *State and Class in Turkey*, 1989, p. 65). On the other hand, Berkes refers to the radicalness of the period by uttering the following words: *“The Turkish system had acted on the principle that in order to adopt a civilization program, a wide audience could be opposed. Thus, an imperative movement of cultural change was initiated”* (Berkes, *Batıcılık, Ulusçuluk ve Toplumsal Devrimler*, 2002, p. 77). Göle points out that the modernization project followed a top-down trend, and although it incorporated traditions and the history, there emerged a kind of chaos in the reproduction of civil society (Göle, *Batı Dışı Modernlik: Kavramı Üzerine*, 2016, p. 66). Tunaya’s response to this interpretation of Zürcher about the Turkish revolutions is as follows: *“The Turkish system had acted on the principle that in order to adopt a civilization program, a wide audience could be opposed. Thus, an imperative movement of cultural change was initiated. However, what was the aim of coercion when necessary in politics?”*

The result obtained from the analysis of the public opinion mechanism was that when a group wanted something, this was, in fact, making that group want that thing. In a revolutionary country doing reforms, the execution of a certain program against people's will means the effort to save people from the pressure and domination of conservative forces” (Tunaya, Türkiye'nin Siyasi Hayatında Batılışama Hareketleri, 2016, pp. 99-100).

Zürcher considers the process after the Second Constitutional Monarchy and the process after the Republic as homogeneous, parallel processes. The process that began with the demand for a constitution in the period of Second Constitutional Monarchy was shaped by an obligation to share power with others until 1913. Yet, Zürcher suggests that between 1913 and 1918, the trajectory was used to force secularizing and modernizing reforms. More importantly, the author argues that the same pattern continued in the period of building the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, Zürcher sees a similar process as the national struggle movement triumphed in 1922 in the establishment of the authoritarian system until 1925. As can be inferred from previous analyses, the author states that the periods described under the name of the modernization process were marked by top-down reforms. This second period is called as the 2nd Young Turk movement by the author, who draws attention to the continuity of the intellectual and political activities of the two periods and argues that the most important element for this intellectual process was the strengthening and survival of the state. On the other hand, he claims that democracy was formed as a result of the Young Turks movement while both of the movements were tools for a goal and the goal itself. While emphasizing the succession of this idea, Zürcher states that the Kemalist reforms continued in the axis of secularism and modernization, just like the reforms that were forced and rapid in 1913-

1918 (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, pp. 256-275). Ünder is of the opinion that the revision of the institutions that started with the Reform era became radical with the Republic. Ünder: *“As is known, the Atatürk era, starting with the Reform era was the most radical phase of Turkey’s Westernization process. Between 1923 and 1928, Mustafa Kemal set up a Western state by destroying the traditional institutions – that had been deemed indestructible – and the mindset that supported them with the great charisma he gained as the Savior”*, purporting that in the building phase of the Republic of Turkey, many radical movements came one after other thanks to the advent of Mustafa Kemal’s charisma in addition to many other continuities (Ünder, *Atatürk İmgesinin Siyasal Yaşamdaki Rolü*, 2001, p. 150). Mert underlines that secularism, in form, valued Westernization and Westerners also attached importance to the form as much as the Republicans during that period. Another point that Mert draws attention to is about the position of Islam in the formation of nation and national identity. Mert says: *“Secularism was an integral part of the design of a modern nation and national identity. The political identity targeted by the republic became a hesitant national identity, although Islam unavoidably continued to be the primary factor of this identity. In the theoretical plan, the founders of the republic went on to define the national identity within the framework of the secularism. This was a conception of national identity that differed from the understanding of Turkism, whose religious content prevailed in the Second Constitutional Era* (Mert, *Cumhuriyet Türkiye’si’nde Laiklik ve Karşı Laikliğin Düşünsel Boyutu*, 2001, p. 204). Berkes evaluates the proclamation of the Republic as the “first wave” marked by the abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate, while also suggesting that the main transformation was the reforms in the field of law and education and that these

modernization moves were an extension of the Reform era and Unionist reforms. Berkes regards the new Republic as a revolutionary movement, i.e. discontinuity and all these revolutionary movements gained momentum in the post-Republic era in as institutional channels differently from the movements during the Reform Era with the edit and the Constitutional Monarchy, demonstrating the strength of the revolutionary characteristics of the Republic (Berkes, *Türk Düşününde Batı Sorunu*, 1975, p. 228). Keyder, on the other hand, explains the continuity between the Young Turks and Republicans with awareness. In this regard, Keyder suggest that these two groups were aware of the fact that the religious rules were not to be integrated into a constitutional base and beyond this, they knew the concepts of sovereignty and nation, which were the doctrines of the French Revolution. This cadre believed in the advancement of the 19th century European statesmen's principles including national sovereignty, positivism and secularism (Keyder Ç. , *State and Class in Turkey*, 1989, p. 73).

6.2.2. The Ottoman Legact in Atatürk's Turkey

Zürcher touches upon the necessity to carefully examine the last years of the Ottoman Empire in order to comprehend the state structure, political traditions, bureaucratic formation and institutions of the Republic. While the author sees the roots of the ideological foundations of the Republic in the period between 1908, 1912 and 1922, he underlines the change initiated by these developments in the state tradition. Undoubtedly, these historical periods are certain turning points in the way to the Republic. One of Zürcher's theses emphasizing the perception of continuity is that in addition to the state-centered views of the Young Turks, they regarded themselves as the engine of the state mechanism and this tradition is still maintained today. This claim is

another indication of continuity (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, pp. 183-214). On the other hand Toprak's ideas regarding the continuity of the state tradition and experiences gained after the Constitutional Monarchy are based on the fact that the state traditions were shaped by the concepts and classes emerging during this period of Constitutional Monarchy. In this context, Constitutional Monarchy brought the concepts of "solidarity, people and nation" to the Ottoman society and they were later perceived as populism and nationalism. These movements are claimed by Toprak to build a bridge between the Republic of Turkey and the intellectuals of the period of Constitutional Monarchy. Moreover, the author points out to the most important assumption that serves our thesis here: the Republic of Turkey disconnected its ties with the political history yet sustained its continuity in the intellectual life with social practices. Beyond this, it is argued that the Monarchist society's effects are still felt today as it was an effective period reproducing ideological rhetoric (Toprak, *Osmanlı'da Toplumbiliminin Doğuşu*, 2014, p. 311). On the other hand, Karpat also underscores the continuity of the state administration tradition of the bureaucratic cadres shown by Zürcher. According to Karpat, the state depends on authority, and the continuity of the bureaucracy that runs this authority is also the continuity of the state. Karpat says in this regard that although there had been many changes in the state structure, regime and functions with the revolutions carried out by the bureaucracy, they did not prevent the continuity of the state (Karpat K. H., *Ziya Gökalp'in korporatifçilik, Millet-i Milliyetçilik ve Çağdaş Medeniyet Kavramları Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler*, 2014, p. 329).

Alkan argues that Ottoman modernization was adopted not only by the state, but also by the political opposition, and claims that modernization went through three phases: The first was the modernization of the bureaucratic and civil servant class that the Reform Era pashas were trying to carry out with the bureaucracy, while the second was the monarchic modernization including the change of Abdulhamid's sultanate and finally, the third one was the Constitutional modernization project in which the Young Turks tried to execute with the constitution and parliament (Alkan M. Ö., *Resmi İdeolojinin Doğuşu ve Evrimi Üzerine Bir Deneme*, 2014, p. 380).

Of course, Turkey was not a state shaped by a "sudden decision". As stated by Bernard Lewis, this modernization did not happen suddenly. The new regime inherited the military and civil bureaucracy of the state, those with political experience. Arguing that the Republic was built on the basis of a Muslim majority almost in the entire country, Zürcher points out to the population exchange as the most important indicator of this fact. The balance taken from the civil bureaucracy and civil population was evidently determined by the population exchange, which was centered upon "religion" as the core factor. Furthermore, the author suggest that the Karaman Turks were not included in this population exchange due to their religion, which confirms the assumption. For more information on this subject, Evangalia Balta's compilation of academic studies can be examined (Balta, 2012). According to Zürcher, it was a much more difficult process to define the "identity" of the new state, while the Republican staff, who saw that it was necessary to reconstruct this Muslim subject as a Turkish nation, started with this mission all their "engineers" (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 222).

Democratization and secularism have continued to exist as important elements in historical processes, in the parliament and in the state administration, as a quality desired to be gained since the Constitutional Monarchy. In the enlightenment process that started with the New Ottomans, many activities were interrupted due to the conditions of the period despite certain developments. As a matter of fact, the abolition of the Parliament by Abdulhamid in 1877 on the excuse of the Russo-Turkish War was one of the cases that intervened the development and continuity in this period. From another perspective, Zürcher says that when the Young Turks had to choose between “modernization” and “democracy” in the Republic, they always preferred “modernization”, evaluating another problematic of continuity on the basis of democratization (Reconstruction of a Nation, p: 339). About secularism, which Berkes deems as the most important factor in terms of Turkish revolution, Zürcher explains this initiative with Mustafa Kemal’s achievements reducing it to individual gain. According to Zürcher, the fact that the revolution made by Mustafa Kemal was not opposed by the high level clergy indicates that the Ottoman religious structure had already become bureaucratic and the religion was under state control. The point that draws attention here is, of course, the Sublime Porte bureaucracy that had an important place in the last period of the Ottoman State (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 228).

Also mentioning the legal system in the Ottomans, the author informs that the legal system was based on sharia law, while the Reform Era statesmen brought laws and (courts) in parallel to the sharia law. According to Zürcher, this was the first step in secularization and elaborates as follows: “In this way, public spaces were officially

excluded from the jurisdiction of sharia and ulama”. The author says that this can be seen as one of the secularization steps yet criticizes the failure to permanently transform the “administrative, judicial and educational system” of the Ottoman State due to the fact that the reforms often remained insufficient and failed to achieve their purpose despite the way for transformation was opened (Zürcher E. J., *Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık*, 2010, p. 18).

6.2.3. Turkey in 1923

Although an independent country was established above the Ottoman state by determining its borders with Lausanne, poverty, sparse population, immigration, deaths and diseases brought many problems for the new state. In the analysis of the author, it can be found that there was enormous human loss in Caucasus, Gallipoli, Palestine and Mesopotamia wars: the death toll was largely made up of the educated class scholar class made up a large portion of the human loss (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 242).

On October 29, 1923 the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed and Mustafa Kemal became the first president, while İsmet İnönü was the first prime minister. Zürcher declares that the essential nature of the emerging Turkish state was uncertain at this time (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 247). Although many people saw the caliphate as a symbol, a religious service, there was a group demanding the caliph to be at the head of the state. In contrast to Mustafa Kemal’s idea of the Republic, opposing groups gathered around the idea of caliphate with adherence to the Ottoman dynasty and embracing the old institutions against the idea of Mustafa Kemal’s new state

system. In the process that followed, on March 1, the caliphate was abolished, and members of the Ottoman dynasty left the country. According to Zürcher, the last caliph Abdülmecit Efendi had at least as much power as Vahdettin. In this context, the most important reason for the abolishment of the caliphate was that the sultans were strongly committed to the dynasty that their ancestors served (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 223).

Zürcher points out the fact that the 1908 revolution and 1923 Republic revolution were made by a group who were strongly committed to each other with their individual past as well as many other similar characteristics. Referring to the fact that the leading members of the Committee of Union and Progress and the executive elite of the Republic drew a common Young Turk profile, the author draws attention that these two groups were from educated families living in cities (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 171). In this regard, the author claims that the political leaders of 1918-1922 and the political leaders that came to the fore after 1923 were composed of a group of people with common features. He states that the intellectual accumulation of this group was successful in Ottoman modern educational institutions and owed this success to the reform era (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 224). On the other hand, Zürcher sees the Kemalist experience in the 1920s and 1930s as an example of building a classic nation and a courageous modernization project (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 213). So, what were the things mentioned as common features? According to Zürcher, they were all members of the Union and Progress without exception and they all took role

in the politics of the Second Constitutional era. The author thinks that these were also the military offices in the Operation Army in the counter-revolution of April 1909, resistance organizers in the Bedouin deserts against the Italian invasion in 1911, the Balkan Wars in 1913, World War I and the consequent resistance process. In this analysis by the author, it can be observed that the common approved features of the Kemalist politicians in the 1920s were shaped by the series of political developments and the experiences they gained as a result (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 225). In this context, Ahmad's ideas are supportive of discontinuity again: *"The policies pursued by Atatürk in the Republican era emphasized that political transformations would eventually end after fulfilling the aim of the political power to ensure social and economic transformation. The Unionists had failed completely in this confirmation, but Atatürk was committed to implement radical solutions in order to guarantee the establishment of new Turkey and its survival"* (Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, 2017, p. 91).

For the Republic's reforms, Zürcher shares that there was an interesting parallelism with the Second Constitutional period. As a matter of fact, the move to bring the constitution back starting in 1908 in a pluralist and free environment continued until 1913, and a radical secularization and modernization movement was approved between the years 1913 and 1918. This time, the national sovereignty movement triumphed in 1922, as stated by the author, and after attempting to establish an authoritarian form of government as of 1925 by a pluralist experience, a similar process resulted. The topic of this dissertation, continuity, thus is underscored by Zürcher. Nevertheless, the author says that the two periods were not singular but in continuity of political tradition that emerged

at every opportunity. The authoritarian system was preferred to radically implement the reforms in the second important process of the Young Turks movement rather than continuing with the democratization of society which would slow down the reform process (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 256).

Zürcher describes that new Turkey was created by the dominant ethnic and cultural elements of the former empire and that it inherited not only the body of the Ottoman but also mentality, heart and all social and administrative mechanisms (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 222). In this context, Kemalist reforms aimed to ensure secularization and modernization in society as in 1913 and 1918. Furthermore, the dervish lodges and *zawiyas* were closed in 1925. Traditional *fez* that had continued as of the period of Mahmut II was prohibited and replaced by Western style hat, but these developments met reaction by people. In order to prevent any damage to the state by these reactions and possible repetition, 600 people were sentenced to death by the Independence Tribunals according to Law on the Maintenance of Order. While analyzing this period, Zürcher explains that the abolition of the sultanate and caliphate was the first wave of Kemalist reforms. Furthermore, the author suggests that the secularization of the legal and educational system was as an extension of the Imperial and Unionist reforms and that the state had already been largely secularized, with the Sultan-Caliph turning into only a symbol and removing the *Shaykh al-Islam* from the cabinet (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, pp. 256-257). In essence, the secular thought, which was tried to be established by facing many challenges, was threatened by the anti-progress opposition group with developments including the March 31 case, the *Sheikh Said*

rebellion of 1925, and the events of Menemen in 1930. Zürcher says that the March 31 Incident was the most traumatic event that every Young Turk encountered in his life. The trauma created by the reactionary in the mind of the Young Turks was not limited to this incident. After the establishment of the Republic, the reactionary groups, which were thought not to appear again, mobilized and threatened the regime. In addition to the trauma caused by the 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion and the 1930 Menemen Incident, the former Unionists in the Republican elite remembered the April 1909 experience taking place no long before a quarter century, according to Zürcher. This radical organism continued its life as a motive that threatened the regime, which has also passed into today's society (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 182).

Reiterating that Turkish modernization both has a long history and is a delayed modernization experience, Uygur purports that the real problem was how to synthesize the local and the modern, as well as reconciling 'us' and 'them' (Kocabaşoğlu, Sunuş, 2014, p. 14). Zürcher underlines that Kemalists prioritized state interests over everything and that this strong commitment was inherited from the statist tradition of the Young Turks (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 184). Also according to Zürcher, Anatolia was the last mainstay of Turks and therefore, the new state was built on this region. In this line, the strong commitment to protect the homeland at all costs started with the Unionists and passed on to Kemalists, both of whom used all their strength to homogenize the population and make Anatolia Turkish land (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 188).

6.2.4. Leadership and the State Apparatus

According to Zürcher, the Turkish state, founded in October 1923, was definitely a new state, but it was also one of the many new states created by breaking out from the Ottoman Empire. Turkey was built on ethnic and cultural elements of the empire. Besides inheriting the cultural and administrative center of the Ottoman Empire, the country took the military and civil bureaucracy and the people of political experience, to a large extent (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 222).

Zürcher explicates the period between February 1921 and April 1924 gradual as legal transformation. At the same time, he states that in the period between the abolition of the sultanate and the proclamation of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal literally represented neither a monarchy nor a Republic. Although Mustafa Kemal declared himself a “sui generis”, the author is of the opinion that the newly formed state had a nationalist discourse (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 224).

It is a fact that the bureaucratic and military apparatus remained the most important and unchanging element in many staff cleaning movements since 1840. Zürcher claims that this does not mean that the Kemalists took power, as the Young Turks did, without performing some cleansing movements. As stated by the author, as a result of the 1908 Revolution, the cleaning of the Young Turks included the removal of civil servants involved in corruption, the placement of the school officers who grew up in modern schools instead of uneducated military officers by Enver Pasha in 1913-1914. On the same axis, Law No. 347 was enacted on September 25, 1923 to certify the dismissal of officers who did not participate in the National Struggle, and three years later, in May

1926, a law with similar content was also enforced for civil servants; however, Zürcher claims that these laws very limited in practice (Zürcher E. J., Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası, 2015, p. 226).

On the other hand, the nationalists dismissed provincial administrators that they thought were unreliable by observing their connection with the Istanbul government during the National Struggle period (Zürcher E. J., Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası, 2015, p. 227). According to Zürcher, religious institutions had the biggest changes in the Republican era. The unification of education in 1924 and the introduction of the Civil Code in 1926 were the precursors of the secular state would take over the control mechanism and the religious structure would shrink. The substitution of the Shaykh al-Islam by the Presidency of Religious Affairs was one of the actions that undermined the authority of the upper level of the religious structure. However, Zürcher also presents a continuity analysis in the transition process. Stating that Shaykh al-Islam had already lost the majority of his authorities over Sharia courts, foundations and religious schools with the reforms of 1916, the author interprets the fact that Mustafa Kemal Pasha's reforms were accepted by high-level clergy with almost no serious opposition to demonstrate that the Ottoman religious structure was already bureaucratized and transferred to state control in the last period of the Ottoman Empire (Zürcher E. J., Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası, 2015, p. 228).

Zürcher further advocates that the Republic did not only inherit these key units of the state, but also used the same tools to fill the staff of these units. As a matter of fact, schools established in accordance with the French *grandes ecoles* model to raise military

officials and statesmen of the Reform era, continued in the Republic period as well (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 228). While the military schools of the period, such as Ankara Political Sciences Faculty, which was the continuation of the Political Science College raising government officials, governors, district governors, diplomats and administrators, continued their activities in the post-Republic period, they also maintained their activities to teach nationalism, republicanism and secularism by doctrine. While these continuity elements in the field of education are remarkable, the madrasahs that the Unionists tried to transform by including science in their curriculum was completely closed by Kemalists in 1924 (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 229).

6.2.5. Party and Ideology

Excluding the two-party period, which lasted for three months in 1930, the People's Party became one of the new tools of the Republic regime. The existence of political parties was not new, of course, but according to Zürcher, this experience of reform had ramifications that were slightly different from the others. In the Second Constitutional period, power was in the hands of a secret circle that dominated the cabinet and the parliament. In the Republican era, on the other hand, the People's Party, which was built by Mustafa Kemal Pasha with the former members of the parliament, functioned as an institution of the state (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, pp. 229-230). From this perspective, Koçak also supports this idea by saying: "*The closeness between the party*

and the state-government reached such a point that after a point this party was not seen as an independent entity since the Republican People's Party and the state-government apparatus were actually combined" (Koçak, Osmanlı/Türk Siyasi Geleneğinde Modern Bir Toplum Yaratma Projesi Olarak Anayasanın Keşfi, 2016, p. 156). Karpaz utters that the Republican People's Party or the CHP was subject to change during this period as well and explains the continuity here by referring to the fact that the same situation was experienced during the reigns of Selim III and Mahmut II. Karpaz uses the following statement for the transformation process of the CHP: *"The ruling power, which imposed change from above, had undergone a much greater transformation compared to the society it was trying to change, with the social foundation it created to implement and support reforms. Initially, the CHP tried to break this chain and to wriggle out of the Ottoman Empire's worldview. For this purpose, the party first tried to create a broad social base for the reform program. Secondly, it adopted the Western way of thinking and organization style that appealed only to some groups in the society. The primary purpose of the CHP was to build political and civilian institutions that would initiate a continuous process of change in society"* (Karpaz K. H., Türk Siyasi Tarihi Siyasal Tarihin Evrimi, 2014, p. 27). Berkes' approach in this regard is that the People's Party lost the Kemalist doctrine after a while and received support from reactionary forces and interest groups, pointing out to the fact that there were deviations in the party's principles due to these external impacts (Berkes, Türk Düşününde Batı Sorunu, 1975, p. 140). Hilav also mentions that the single party and the single ideology of the Republic replaced various movements of the Constitutional Period as well as a process when a single type of

ideology had dominant power (Hilav, *Düşünce Tarihi (1908-1980)*, 2018, p. 409). Güneş, on the other hand, summarizes Atatürk's People's Party vision and mission as follows:

- 1- *To continue the success in the War of Independence in the field of politics, administration and economy and to complete it with necessary breakthroughs and revolutions,*
- 2- *To base new regulations on a long-term program,*
- 3- *To free such a program from individuality and to receive the support of the majority of citizens,*
- 4- *To set up the party on the basis of the populism principle (Güneş, *Türk Parlamento Tarihi TBMM V. Dönem (1935-1939) I.CİLT*, p. 685).*

While Zürcher easily explains the party content and its historical opinion, he states that the ideological part is a little more complicated. Taking the ideological polarization back to the discussions within the Young Turks in 1912, Zürcher states that there are two main questions about the liberation of the Ottoman state: How could Turkish culture and Islamic civilization be associated with Western science and technology? And secondly, was it necessary for the Ottoman state to rely on a voluntary union in the national and religious sense? The second questing is related to the community base of the Ottoman Empire (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 231).

Parla's *Party Ideology, On Atatürk and Kemalism* as a study supported by documents guides us in this regard. The 3rd Volume of Parla's study, *CHP's One-Party Ideology and Six Arrows*, thoroughly examines many issues related to the party. Stating

that Kemalism is a political ideology with continuity and integrity, the author has found that the party always remained loyal to Kemalism. Thus, it is underlined that this institutional ideology adopted by the CHP was the views of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The important point that Parla underlines is that Atatürkism and Kemalism are inseparable disciplines. According to Özlem, on the other hand, the Ottoman positivism continued in the Republican period in many aspects (Parla, *Türkiyede Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları, Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku*, 1992, pp. 20-23). Ünder believes that it would not be wrong to interpret Kemalism as the civil religion of Turkey and Mustafa Kemal as the prophet of this religion. Saying, “*Due to the sacralization of Mustafa Kemal, devotion to his thoughts and works, respecting him with ceremonies, and identifying Atatürk with the Republic, loyalty to the regime means to love the regime*”, the author is of the opinion that Atatürk and the Republic are an inseparable whole (Ünder, *Atatürk İmgisinin Siyasal Yaşamdaki Rolü*, 2001, p. 152). The views of Özlem about the positivist attitude mentioned by Zürcher also point to a continuity. Özlem states that Kemalist positivists and Ottoman positivists had no difference in mentality but had difference only in political interests and purposes. The author finds that there was more continuity between the Young Turks intellectual and the positivism of the Republic than discontinuity (Özlem, *Türkiye'de Pozitivizm ve Siyaset*, 2016, pp. 460-461). Parla's views on positivism, on the other hand, demonstrate that there were the slogans of the Union and Progress in principles such as “freedom, unity, order and progress” (Parla, *Türkiyede Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları, Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku*, 1992, p. 24).

In reference to Hanioglu, Zürcher finds that the ideological orientation in the country changed after 1922 with the winning of the war. As the national emergency was no more there, people's need for mobilization was less needed and this paved the way for the discussions before 1912 to come to the forefront once again. At this point, the author suggests that Mustafa Kemal and his followers, who controlled the Republican regime, wanted to take the Western civilization as a whole indivisible model. In his continuity thesis, Zürcher claims that this movement was associated with the Young Turks' Westernist positions (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 234) (Hanioglu M. Ş., *Garbcılar: Their attitudes toward religion and their impact on the official ideology of the Turkish Republic*, 1997/2, pp. 134-158).

Zürcher explains the civilization problem of the Kemalist revolution as follows: *“In reality, Kemalists envisioned a cultural revolution that was not only limited to the replacement of “high” Islamic civilization with that of Europe, but also the transformation of “low” or popular culture”*. While the author states that, like the writers of the Young Turk ideology, Mustafa Kemal thought that Islam was a rational religion and could be adapted to the modern world, while also underlining that he did not attempt to make a purified Islam as the main component of the Republican ideology (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 234). Deren, on the other hand, states that since the Reform era with the edict, the Turkish intellectuals, who had followed the West, regarded Islam as “the essence of Easternness” and put it as an obstacle in front of innovation. Due to this situation, the author utters that the principle of secularism was ahead of other principles and that it was

an effort to bring a Western worldview to the society, not an effort to adapt certain institutions and technologies like in the Ottoman Empire. In short, we understand that Westernization with the Republican era represents many discontinuities from the institutions to the cultural level (Deren, Kültürel Batılılaşma, 2016, p. 382). Zürcher, in another article, suggests that many steps for secularization were shaped by the intellectual heritage of the Young Turks and explains the balance mechanism of Turks between religion and state affairs with the analysis of the political structures of the former Turkish states. In this context, Zürcher states that the secularization movements continued for more than a century in the Ottoman and that the early modern empire dated back to Seljukians, who defined religion and state as different but inter-dependent areas. Zürcher says: “*Obviously, the foundations of Kemalist secularism was laid by the basic Young Turk ideologies in this area. All of the Kemalist reforms in 1924 (abolition of Caliphate and Shaykh al-Islam, unification of education under a secular ministry, establishing directorates for religious affairs and foundations) can be seen as the logical consequences of the Ottoman secularization process*” to elaborate on the continuity and discontinuity in this process (Zürcher E. J., *Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları*, 2009, pp. 45-48).

From ideological perspective, Zürcher argues that the ideas of Akçura and Ağaoğlu have been rejected, and Gökalp’s suggestion of a Turkified Islam and Saidi Nursi’s Islamic morality are ignored. Instead, the author states that secularism, scientific approach, biological materialism and social Darwinism gained more importance in the Kemalist thought than the Unionists, while there was an effort to build a nation-state to form a national identity – “Turkish nation” (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan*

Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası, 2015, p. 234). On the other hand, Toker and Tekin explain the ideal of creating a new society identified with the Republic as follows: “[this ideal] traps the traditions into a ‘past’ that is rotten and must be destroyed; and popular sovereignty as a new legitimate source is postponed to a ‘future’ that does not yet exist...” (Toker & Tekin, *Batıcı Siyasi Düşüncenin Karakteristikleri ve Evreleri: "Kamusuz Cumhuriyet'ten Kamusuz Demokrasiye"*, 2016, p. 87). Yüksel refers to the findings of Yalçın as follows: “He does not see any contradiction between Mustafa Kemal’s principles, which Hüseyin Cahid called “Kemalism”, and the principles of the Union and Progress, and that Mustafa Kemal wanted to remain neutral by not engaging in a political movement”. Saying that “Kemalism is not a professional political trend”, Yalçın also adds that “Today, you cannot imagine one Turk who is not Kemalist”. Furthermore, the scholar sees the separation of the caliphate and sultanate from each other as “... the decisive step to modernize the state and base it on civilization and European ideas...” Yalçın’s article in Tanin is as follows: “*I can say that the biggest victory of the government is not Sakarya, not Dumlupınar, but this step. Now the flag of a genuine party is waving in the country. The party of civilization and culture, the party of essential and serious reform, the party of a worldly state*” (Yüksel, 2017, p. 6).

Zürcher’s other continuity finding on ideology is that the Unionists and Kemalists refused the role and struggle of classes. The two groups can be observed to have advocated statics when it came to creating a national bourgeoisie and private property. Sharing that corporatism was popular among the group that emerged as a political elite between 1913 and 1918 until the first years of the Republic, the author recapitulates that the structure that Gökalp wanted to offer as the base of the political system was rejected.

Under the notion of populism and national solidarity, which Zürcher argues is not very well defined, the Republicans supported the capitalists in practice, while leaving the peasants, farmers, ruling officers, bureaucrats and large landowners to the mercy of the national bourgeoisie coalition (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 236). Stressing continuity in his analysis of the populism discourse, Çelik elaborates on positivism, which he argues has been the historical and sociological base of populism: *“Populism, one of the first thought systems of Turkish intellectuals, had been the founding element of community projects based on the idea of positivist scientific progress since the Young Turks. It can be said that popularist modernization theories lie in the source of the reforms on the road to modernization and Westernization, and popularism is the basic discourse of Turkish and Westernist policies”* (Çelik, *Kemalizm: Hegomonik Bir Söylem*, 2001, p. 76). Çiğdem advocates the development of Westernization as a normative analysis that brings the ruling power and the opposition in confrontation in certain societies – especially the dominant classes and the rest of the society. Stating that this situation did not occur in the Ottoman Empire, the author states that the Republic was not trying to change this picture, and that the mobilization starting after the 1970s served a horizontal and vicious politicization process, not the state (Çiğdem, *“Türk Batılılaşması'nı Açıklayıcı Bir Kavram: Türk Başkallığı: Batılılaşma, Moderniye ve Modernizasyon*, 2016, p. 72). Berkes argues that *“the Turkish society cannot exist as a nation in the modern age unless it adapts the aspects of the Western civilization that will lead the Turkish society's development with the purpose of repairing its own social structure in a way that will fit to a modern nation – not by the coercion of the West but according to the requirements of*

its independence” shedding light on the need to incorporate many aspects of the West under the circumstances of an absolute reality of Turkish nationalism and reformism. In this context, Boratov also suggests opinions in this regard: 20th century economic history of Turkey is also the history of the development of capitalism in Turkey. Mainly, Boratov indicates a bourgeoisie revolution surrounded by political power and superstructure as a prerequisite for the settlement of a capitalist social system although he believes that this started in Turkey after 1908. In the 15-year period between 1908 and 1923, the removal of bureaucratic aristocracy from power is seen as the first step in the establishment of the modern bourgeoisie state. Referring to the stages in the establishment of the capitalist mode of production as the secondary waves of the revolutionary movement of the following years, the author thinks that the Kemalist revolution was a second wave that completed the 1908 revolution (Boratov, *İktisat Tarihi (1908-1980)*, 1989, p. 346).

6.2.6. Continuity and Discontinuity of the Assembly and Political Staff

Zürcher’s determination in terms of intellectual continuity of Turkish political history is critical. In this line, Zürcher argues that the cadre which replaced the Unionists after World War I was again consisting of the members of the Committee of Union and Progress and that this cadre was equivalent to the Kemalists who led the process of building the secular Republic of Turkey and contributed to the nation building development (Zürcher E. J., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Atatürk Türkiye'sine Bir Ulusun Yeniden İnşası*, 2015, p. 118). On the other hand, the opinions of Küçükömer, who expressed important views on Turkish history, regarding the cadre issue are as follows: “As a matter of fact, there were civilian and military bureaucrats in the Committee of Union and Progress, the National Assembly the Countrywide Resistance

Organization and the Second Group. In fact, the former Unionists had a relationship with this group. Four famous Pashas – Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat, Refet, Cafer Tayyar – in addition to Rauf Bey and Dr. Adnan Bey who were in the First Group of Mustafa Kemal, were among the founders or executives of the Party of Union and Progress. It can be observed that there was a relationship with this party and the Party of Union and Progress. There were similar features in the establishment of the Liberal Republican Party as well (Küçükömer, "Batılılaşma" Düzenin Yabancılaşması, 2007, pp. 45-46). In the examinations on the cadres, many scholars reach consensus on continuity. Yıldız shares that in the process of transition from the Ottoman to the Republic, the concept of nationalism, which was presented as a prescription for salvation by the Union and Progress, was maintained by the Kemalist elites and shaped the official identity in the formation of the nation-state identity (Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene*, 2004, p. 140). As a matter of fact, Zürcher cites from Tunaya that Mustafa Kemal said, “*We were all its (İTC-EJZ) members*” in his interview with the newspaper *Severing Nation* in 1923. When analyzing the biographical backgrounds of former CHP members after 1923, Zürcher said, “*Even a superficial look at the leading staff of the Kemalist ruling party confirms the claim that this party included as many former Unionists as in the Progressive Republican Party*” reporting that the Unionists were doing politics effectively after the proclamation of the Republic. The Unionist politicians at the top of the regime shared by Zürcher included: Mustafa Kemal, İsmet İnönü, Ali Çetinkaya, Celal Bayar, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Cemil Ubaydın, Ali Fethi Okyar, Kazım Özalp, Recep Peker and Şükrü Kaya. Other Unionist politicians of the regime were: Kazım Dirik, Mazhar Müfit Kansu, Hilmi Uran, Yunus Nadi, Falih Rıfkı Atay and Abdullah Cevdet.

Those Mustafa Kemal was in close friendship with, on the other hand, were Nuri Conker, Kılıç Ali, Salih Bozok, Cevat Abbas Gürer, Ahmet Fuat Bulca and Müfit Özdeş as highlighted by Zürcher (Zürcher E. J., *Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık*, 2016, pp. 236-239).

Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that with the Sivas congress, it was decided that the national struggle did not belong to any party and that it would never be the continuation of especially the Union and Progress, and therefore, the term Committee was preferred instead of Party for the future. During that period, the Assembly included various groups such as the Solidarity Group, the Freedom Group, the Group for Defense of National Rights, People's Group and Reformists Group. Mustafa Kemal founded the Group for Defense of National Rights in May 1921. This group started to be called as the first group after a while and the second group formed the opposition. The important finding by Frey shows that the first group consisted of 197, the second group 118 members, while there were 122 independent members. As for the 1923 elections, 58 of the First Group members won seats in the parliament, while only 3 members from the Second group managed to enter the parliament (Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, 1965, p. 307). Many of the names Zürcher mentioned above were Unionists, who had been trying to make politics in the late Ottoman period and assembly. On the other hand, Kendirci examined the cadres from the first Chamber of Deputies to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in-depth. According to this work of Kendirci, there were 173 people who were elected from among the Ottoman Deputies to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) in different periods. In the first Turkish Grand National Assembly, 53 out of 103 members of the former Chamber of Deputies were former Unionists. The author says, *“The continuity between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Republican*

People's Party, the two organizations that played a key role in the creation of modern Turkey, facilitated the entrance of those coming from the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies – the majority of which were Unionists – to the single party assemblies of the Republic period?. As a matter of fact, 78 members of the Second Turkish Grand National Assembly, who were coming from the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies and were majorly Unionists, continued their policy-making activities in the CHP as well. For instance, Mithat Şükrü Bleda, one of the famous Unionists, served in the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies for three terms, and in the Turkish Grand National Assembly for four terms. Thus, the Unionists continued to be in Turkish politics despite their old age. The Unionists serving in the Turkish Grand National Assembly were not only from the CHP, but also from other parties such as the Free Republican Party and the Freedom and Accord Party, where Rıza Nur was involved in policy-making. Furthermore, the Unionists who served in the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies or the Ottoman Parliament in the period of the first and second groups took their place in these two groups as well. The Unionists were mostly in the First Group. The founders of the Free Republican Party included Tahsin Uzer, Mehmet Emin Yurdakul, Nakiyettin Yücekök, Süreyya İlmen and Ahmet Ağaoğlu, while the President of the Party was Fethi Okyar and the Secretary General Nuri Conker. At the same time, upon the request of Mustafa Kemal himself, 15 deputies passed from the CHP to the Free Republican Party (Koçak, *Siyasal Tarih (1923-1950)*, 2018, p. 138). Unionist Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk, who was 30 years old when he was elected as a deputy for the first time in 1908, was 65 years old when he was elected a member of the TGNA's seventh term for ninth time. Ali Mehmet Münir, who was elected three times from the Ottoman Parliament and seven times from the CHP, was 76 years

old when he was elected a member from CHP for the seventh time. In addition, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, who was the eighth time deputy since the Constitutional Monarchy, was 75 years old in 1950 when the majority of the parliament consisted of members from the Democratic Party (Kendirici, Meclis-i Mebusan'dan Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'ne Kopuş ve Süreklilikler, 2009, pp. 23-100). Regarding the continuity in terms of cadres, Kongar utters the following words: “*The bad traditions of the Unionist period can be traced even in the 1950s. In these years, the President of the Democratic Party, Celal Bayar, provided an organic connection between the Menderes period and the Union and Progress period as a former Unionist. In fact, when this situation is evaluated from a social perspective, it can be seen that the single-party order that dominated the time frame between 1923 and 1946 was the bridge between the Union and Progress and the Menderes period*”, advocating the idea that the effects of the political cadres still continued and that Menderes carried the characteristics of the former single-party period, while the single party was unavoidable influenced by the Union and Progress (Kongar, İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı, 1994, p. 148).



7. CONCLUSION

Societies are always changing along with the time they live in. Development and change became a destiny for the Turkish society undergoing transformation with the pre-Reform Era. There are numerous continuity and discontinuity elements that need to be examined in this period, where many traditions were maintained, but also ties to traditionalism were severed. The changes in administrative apparatus, constitutions, parliaments, bureaucracy, military, civil, social and economic life have been built on fundamental changes and deep past accumulations that have shaped even today's Turkey. The subject of this dissertation was to analyze the continuities and discontinuities from the beginning of Turkish modernization to the early period of the Republic of Turkey through Feroz Ahmad and Zürcher's findings in the discipline of social sciences based on historical chronology.

The sparks from the 1789 French Revolution also ignited the geography of Turkey. Although many assumptions have been made on the start date of the modernization process, Turkey has always lived a life intertwined with the West with its executive and administrative staff. The process from 1839 to 1876 is called a period of reforms (Zürcher E. J., *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 2013, p. 83). The Edict of Reform, declared in 1856, was described as the “Ottoman Magna Carta” (Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, 2017, p. 41). With the declaration of the Constitutional Monarchy in 1876, a new door was opened for Turkish society. The first Ottoman Constitution was declared and the first Turkish parliament, the Chamber of Deputies, began its activities during this period. Following the Constitutional Monarchy, the Young Turks emerged by inheriting the intellectual legacy of the Reform era intellectuals. The Young Turks movement is described as a middle class (bourgeoisie) movement (Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki 1908-1914*, 2016, p. 44). Prince Sabahaddin, Ahmed Reza Bey and Mizancı Murad were important thinkers of this period. In this context, this period and its intellectuals became the guiding light to every movement that followed. Above all, it is an issue that is notable and needs to be thoroughly examined that the ideas of the important figures of the period gathered supporters in the Committee of Union and Progress and defended in many places ranging from underground organizations to the parliament, and to the bureaucracy. Every ideology and intellectual of the period was influenced by each other and somehow crossed paths.

With the Constitutional Monarchy movement in 1908, the foundations for many political, social and cultural changes were laid. During this period, which was called a “Political Laboratory”, Western constitutions, positive sciences and political parties of

the West came into our lives for the first time. Although the life of the parliament was interrupted from time to time, it lent a new impetus to both political cadres and bureaucratic life. Ideas such as Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, Nationalism and Socialism, which were vigorously defended outside, were carried to the parliament and gathered political supporters there as well. Despite Abdulhamid's repressive and authoritarian attitude, developments in the field of education also gained momentum during this period. However, Abdulhamid II's oppression did not have an impact on science, property and the military. The officers, who grew up in modern schools designed by Abdulhamid, adopted the idea of the Westernization, first declared the Constitutional Monarchy and then established the Republic of Turkey. It is a fact that the movements of change that began during this period, led to many effects – positive and negative – until the proclamation of the Republic and made sure that transformation entered into our lives as an indispensable element. The March 31 uprising left deep traces, especially in the Turkish executive class, and even today it is immediately remembered in case of any revolt of reactionaryism threat. Many of the political developments of the period are a passport of the political problems we have today.

According to Ahmad, culture is one of the most important elements of the break or discontinuity from the past. One of Ahmad's discontinuity theses is Mustafa Kemal's step to ensure discontinuity from the patriarchal society structure and enhance the position of women in society. The Young Turks and the Unionists failed to destroy the patriarchal society since the most important element that serves the patriarchal system is dynastic rule. The aim of the Young Turks and the Unionists was to prevent the fall of the Ottoman Empire and to ensure the continuation of the dynasty. Mustafa Kemal broke this

chain while establishing the Republic of Turkey and grasped the most important key to modernization. In the period after the establishment of the Republic, many people from the Progressive Republican Party wanted the Caliph to be President, and this was rejected by Mustafa Kemal, which can be evaluated as a case where the continuity of patriarchy was rejected serving to the discontinuity thesis. Ahmad described the ideology of the Committee of Union and Progress as Ottomanism, noting that nationalism in the Young Turkish period was not today's nationalism, and therefore the concept of nationalism today is an ideology of discontinuity from the past. Language reform was one of the other signs of discontinuity. The emergence of a national Turkish state from the former semi-colonial Ottoman, and the transition from the individual state to the people's state are again the arguments of the author's discontinuity thesis.

Ahmad also has analysis and sampling on continuity. According to the author, economic policy during the period was the result of a plan that had been ongoing since the Young Turks. With the takeover of the flag from the Young Turks, it became an element of continuity for Kemalists to continue the protective policies of the state like them and turn it into government policy with a sense of statism. Ahmad, who added the national industrial and trade incentive movements to this list, argues according to a passage from *The Times*, the British newspaper, that the trio of Mustafa Kemal, Ismet Inonu and Fevzi Çakmak was the remnant of the Enver, Cemal and Talat triumvir in terms of administrative structure. Here, Ahmad underlines the continuity of both the administrative staff and the political culture. The efforts of both the Committee of Union and Progress and the Kemalists to get rid of the capitulations and create a national bourgeoisie class were again an element of continuity. In the same vein, the use of

foreign capital in the economic field and the opposition to economic colony were also ongoing projects between the two terms. On the other hand, although the common goal of both the Young Turks and Kemalists was to protect the peasant and adopt the policy of national economics, neither was able to achieve this goal and both accepted the status quo, which were added to the list of continuous problems that cannot be solved.

Zürcher, on the other hand, states that Mustafa Kemal had been a member of the Committee of Union and Progress from the very beginning. Claiming that the resistance in Anatolia was prepared during the 1915 Dardanelles war, the author states that the Anatolian uprising that began in the East was organized by the Unionists before they left the country. In addition, Zürcher shares that many heavy weapons and ammunition were smuggled to Anatolia by the Outpost Committee established by Enver and Talat Pasha and emphasizes that the Committee of Union and Progress was quite in the forefront in this incident. Zürcher states that the reformist secularization modernization after 1908 continued at the same pace after the Republic. The common demand of the rulers of both terms was the strengthening and the survival of the state. He also states that the centralist views of the Young Turks and the tradition of seeing themselves as the engine of the state mechanism continue even today.

One of Zürcher's discontinuity discourses confirms Ahmad, who described the ideology of the Committee of Union and Progress as Ottomanism. According to Zürcher, the Republic's cadre initiated the process of building the Muslim subjects as a Turkish nation: the identity of the new state. Gökalp's proposal for A Turkified Islam and Saidi Nursi's Islamic morality were ignored. This was replaced by secularism, science and biological materialism, and social Darwinism gained more importance in Kemalist

thinking than the Committee of Union and Progress. The complete closure of the madrasahs, which the Unionists tried to transform by incorporating science into their curriculum, by the Kemalists in 1924, and thus the complete removal of these institutions from Turkish political life is an example of a discontinuity in the inter-institutional transition process.

Zürcher points out that the new Turkey was created by the dominant ethnic and cultural elements of the empire, and that the Republic in its first years inherited not only the intellectual legacy, but also the heart and all social and administrative mechanisms of the Ottoman Empire. Again, democratization and secularism as an element of continuity have been a quality that has been desired to be gained since the Constitutional Monarchy period. Zürcher says that the leaders of the Young Turks and the Republic always preferred modernization when they needed to choose between modernization and democracy. With the Reform era, public spaces were excluded from the authority of the sharia and ulema, and this was also a step in the field of secularism, according to the author. In addition, he states that the parliamentary life between 1913 and 1918, dominated by the Union and Progress, and the effort to establish an authoritarian style of governance between 1922 and 1925 appeared to be a character of continuity. Noting that the profile of the Committee of Union and Progress and the Republican elite was the same profile as the Young Turks, the author draws attention to the fact in terms of social class, both groups came from urban and educated families. Zürcher claims that all those who founded the Republic were members of the Committee of Union and Progress. He suggests that these were also the military officers in the Operation Army in the counter-revolution of April 1909, resistance organizers in the Bedouin deserts against the Italian

invasion in 1911, the Balkan Wars in 1913, World War I and the consequent resistance process. Moreover, the common features of the Kemalist politicians in the 1920s were shaped by the series of political developments and the experiences they gained as a result.

According to Zürcher, the Turkish state, founded in October 1923, was built on the ethnic and cultural elements of the empire. In addition to inheriting the cultural and administrative structures of the Ottoman Empire, the Republic also largely inherited the military and civilian bureaucracy and people with political experience. In addition, the schools of the Reform era, which trained officers and civil servants and were established according to the French *grandes ecoles* model, continued to exist during the Republic period as well. Military schools of the period, such as the Ankara Faculty of Political Sciences, which is a continuation of the Political Science College, raising civil servants, governors, district administrators, diplomats and executives, continued to teach nationalism, republicanism and secularism as the main doctrine, while continuing its activities in the post-Republican period. In this line, Zürcher says the cadre that controlled the Republican regime advocated that Western civilization were to be taken as an indivisible whole. In his continuity thesis here, the author emphasizes the parallel features of the movement with the Westernist position of the Young Turks

In summary, Zürcher argues that the modernization movements of Turkish Political History from the day they began to become a state policy to the Republic period were dominated by the continuity factor. The author says continuity was so effective on events that the institutions abolished with the Republic were tried to be revised or modernized during the Young Turkish in their period. The intellectual life of the Young

Turks are the products of the same crop as the Republic cadre, organizational understandings and developments.

Ahmad, on the other hand, thinks that the Republic represents a discontinuity from the past. However, there were also situations that showed continuity. The author dwelled upon these two concepts and came to the conclusion that no matter how much political, political, economic and social change reached a certain stage of development in previous periods, it is believed that the sharpest, fundamental and idealistic transformations began in one place with the Republic. Although this culture renaissance was built on a certain accumulation of experience, the most important element, unlike the past, had been radicalism and insistence of revolutions.

The views of both authors are very valuable. As a result of the research, we see that using the terms of continuity and discontinuity sharply is an extremely ambitious attitude in the discipline of social sciences. As can be understood from the work put forward by the two authors on the given periods, there had been continuity in many areas, in addition to discontinuities. However, when the importance of changes in the social, political and bureaucratic field is evaluated, the thesis of continuity and discontinuity varies according to the authors. Documents, research and biographies of the period serve both views.

The mastery of the Young Turks in the field of sciences and humanities should not be underestimated under the so-called authoritarian discourse of the Abdulhamid period. Among the dogmas of the Young Turks and the Committee of Union and Progress, imposing the authoritarian attitude of Abdulhamid II to the historiography

would be taking the easy way out. Internal and external factors and historical processes should not be ignored in the analysis of these ideas. Abdulhamid II's fear and the report paranoia he created on people forced the intellectuals of the period, soldiers, civil servants and officials' organizations to go underground. The Committee of Union and Progress were elevated on the shoulders of the legacy of the New Ottomans, the previous culturally and scientifically active group. The main discontinuity theme that was different from the Republic was that all of these groups had a common purpose to save the state from destruction or delay this destruction. The difference of the Republic was that many events manifest in the past were synthesized and turned into an investment in ideas for the future. A new state, a new regime, a new quality (democracy), a new identity, a new society, new institutions, new constitution, new economic practices and new relations with the outside world were the products of the Republic after a two-century of steamy and half-minded developments, where the driving force was the constitution. Even today, this period, which is seen as the reason for the conservative and modern distinction in Turkish society, is of great importance in terms of the introduction of two opposite cultural phenomena into our lives. It should be noted that the Committee of Union and Progress failed to address the shortcomings and problems of society and got stuck in the committee guise by the rush to prevent the state from extinction and had to take action by establishing the Committee of Union and Progress. The other notable situation is that when Enver Pasha took back Edirne in July 1913, he gained the same prestige and trust in the army and society as did Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who led the War of Independence. Just as the taking back Edirne prepared the absolute power of Committee of Union and Progress, the War of Independence won by Mustafa Kemal gave him a great credit for the

changes he wanted to make in the construction of the Republic of Turkey. For the cadres of the two periods, the reason for the cultural contrast and intolerance that is not resolved even today in the social structure can be shown as the fact that they presented themselves as a leader and mentor, not a companion to individuals of the society. The reason for the revolutions and reforms of the Republic period to be so profound and rapid can be based on the dilatory and loose modernization efforts in the previous periods. Of course, Republican cadres were more capable of organizing than any of them, and they had shown it at every opportunity.

Finally, in the process that began with Reform era to this day, political and social life has been coded in such a way that every event has a similar one in our history archive. There is parallelism in everything from the attitude of political power to the opposition wing, to the activities in parliament, to the underground movements and turning ideas into mass movements. What should be underlined is that the radicalization of idealistic and revolutionary reforms, the insistence of transformation and the guarantee of revolutions by law all occurred during the Republic period. This characteristic of the Republic is entirely the projection of Mustafa Kemal's revolutionary, idealistic and passionate mission.

8. REFERENCES

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