

UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX
DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT

**THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON CANDIDATE STATES
FOREIGN POLICY PREFERENCES: A CASE OF TURKEY**

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Colchester, Essex

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Submitted by

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ABBREVIATIONS

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EU	European Union
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
IR	International Relations
TFP	Turkish Foreign Policy
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
USA	United States of America

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ABSTRACT

The focus of this dissertation is the transformation of Turkish foreign policy preferences after the Helsinki summit in 1999 when the European Union promulgated Turkey as a candidate state for full membership. This study aims to scrutinize the effects of the European Union on this transformation. Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to provide a key for understanding the reasons behind Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy. In this regard, Europeanization is understood as the change in preferences of Turkey. Pertaining to this assumption, this study puts forward two arguments that explain the European Union impact on the change in preferences, namely European Union conditionality principle, and institutionalization of European foreign policy. Instead of an issue-based and region-oriented research design, this study analyzes the voting behaviour of Turkey in the United Nations General Assembly, ratification of major international and European treaties by Turkey and Turkish alignment with the Common Foreign and Security Policy statements in order to measure the impact of the European Union. The conclusion drawn by this study is that the impact of the European Union on a candidate state is higher if a viable membership perspective based on the conditions to be fulfilled during the negotiation process is underpinned by sound institutionalization on the part of the Union with regard to foreign policy issues. However, the results also show that Turkey is still hesitant to align with the European Union if the issues are vital for Turkey's security and national interests.

Key words: Turkish foreign policy, European Union, conditionality, institutionalization, Europeanization.

1. INTRODUCTION

Inasmuch as international politics has been in flux for the last two decades, Turkey has also been preoccupied with rapid and multidimensional changes abroad as well as domestically. The disintegration of the Eastern bloc, the two Gulf wars, the conflicts in the Caucasus and in the Balkans, the rise of international terrorism and the advancement of the European Union (EU) in range and scope all happened or is still taking place nearby Turkey. Not surprisingly, these changes have forced her to adjust the parameters of her foreign policy. This thesis argues that for almost ten years Turkish foreign policy (TFP) has undergone a considerable transformation that has entered a new phase by the end of the 1990s. Then, the question is, what determines the pace and scope of this significant transformation? It is widely contended that this transformation has been happening due to the changes either in the international system or in domestic politics of Turkey. Those approaches are explanatory to a certain point; nonetheless, they are inadequate to apprehend the direction of the change.

Throughout this study, it will be discussed that the EU, after the Helsinki summit in 1999, has been exercising a substantial influence on contemporary TFP. This assumption not only grasps the pace and scope of the transformation but also shows us its direction. This study aims to scrutinize the effects of the EU on this transformation. Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to provide a key for understanding the reasons behind the change in preferences of TFP, or rather, Europeanization of TFP. Europeanization is understood as the change in preferences. Pertaining to this assumption, this study puts forward two arguments that explain the EU impact on the change in preferences, namely EU conditionality principle, and institutionalization of European foreign policy. The EU influences the preferences of candidate states through these ways which will be discussed in chapter four. Firstly, this study will present how three different schools of international relations explain the change in state behaviours with regard to Europeanization of national foreign policies. Secondly, a picture will be presented of literature on the change in Turkish foreign policy. Finally, the rest of the study will elaborate on the main two arguments through empirical findings.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND MAIN ARGUMENTS

There is a growing literature on the Europeanization of foreign policies of member and non-member states (For example, see Tonra 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Grabbe 2006; Dover 2007). The literature abounds with different approaches that aim to explain the change in foreign policy behaviours of European states. Some authors emphasize the change in perceptions of elites who solely enjoy a great power in foreign policymaking processes, whereas some others draw attention to the domestic bargaining within a society that has been pioneering Europeanization of foreign policies. Moreover, from a different level of analysis some researchers ask whether the characteristics of the international system that imposes certain kinds of policy choices or whether the dramatic institutionalization of European foreign policy for the last decade, has provided favourable conditions and setting for the convergence of foreign policies of member states. In other words, is it simply the cost-benefit calculations done by states with regard to the distribution of capabilities in the international system in general, and particularly within European structures or is it the cultural similarities or normative commonality or value convergence that has been paving the way for a common European foreign policy?

2.1 Three Schools of International Relations

All of the questions highlight different approaches towards the interactions between foreign policies at the national level as well as at the European level. On a theoretical level, the answers for all those questions posed above can be found in a discussion between three major theories of International Relations (IR). Therefore, this section initially explores the arguments of three different theories of IR in general, namely realism/neorealism¹, liberalism/neoliberalism,² and social constructivism. Afterwards, the section advances on the propositions of each with regard to the Europeanization of TFP.

¹In this paper, realism refers to classical realism as well as neorealism unless otherwise mentioned.

²In this paper, classical liberalism, neofunctionalism, neoliberal institutionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are all considered as different branches of liberal school.

Aiming to find out what affects state behaviour in international relations, classical realists draw a conclusion based on the logic of bad nature of humans and domination of individual interests. This presumption on human nature entails a desire to maximize power (Morgenthau 2006[1948]). Other realists give more emphasis on the characteristics of the international system which drive states into maximizing their security by seeking balance of power (Waltz 1979). For realists, no authority can exert power on states to regulate interstate relations. In fact, states are primary as well as unitary actors that cannot be compelled to act contrary to their national interests neither by the domestic structures and actors and nor by the international society.

From this perspective, it is widely argued that states act according to their strategic calculations of capability distribution, since the national interests and power maximization per se generate the motivation and aims of foreign policies of any state. If someone wants to find rational explanations for the behaviours of a state, she should look at the role of national interest, distribution of capabilities, and the character of the regional and international systems.

On the other hand, liberals tend to believe in the possibility of cooperation between states. For liberalism, humans are good in nature and they are prone to cooperation since war is costly. Liberals argue that war emanates from authoritarian and war-loving regimes. Therefore, the main reasons behind state's behaviour are domestic structures and political regimes. It is widely believed that the more democratic a state becomes, the more it refrains from taking part in a conflict with other democracies (see Doyle 1986; Russett 1993). Moreover, liberal thinkers mention the moderating role of increasing interdependence among states in not only economical terms but also political, military, and societal terms. To them, new challenges and problems that states have to encounter deepen the interdependence and lead states to view politics as a win-win game rather than a zero-sum game.

Besides, according to liberalism, the state is not the only actor. If one considers the increasing role of domestic interest groups as well as transnational actors in world

politics (Keohane and Nye 1989), state's role and power in foreign policy affairs is subject to decline. In contrast to realism, liberal theory underlines the change in domestic politics as the main reason behind foreign policies. Liberal experts emphasize the enhanced role of economic interests which are articulated by domestic interest groups such as business associations (see Haas 1958; Moravcsik 1998). On the other hand, some other thinkers affiliated to new institutionalism respond to realist arguments by praising the role of institutions in providing favourable circumstances for the cooperation between states through reducing uncertainty and possibility of cheating by their institutional, technocratic, and normative mechanisms (Keohane 1998). In this sense, international institutions can be influential on states' policies as long as they help states to eliminate problems of coordination and collaboration, and consequently to enhance their mutual gains (Axelrod and Keohane 1985).

The third school, social constructivism, argues that material structures coexist with social ideas and beliefs. Social meanings attributed to material structures, which are derived from shared knowledge generated by social interactions, can alter state's reaction to a particular issue (Wendt 1995:73). For constructivists, ideas and material factors interact with each other and this interaction constructs our world. Therefore, behaviour of a particular actor cannot be understood without elucidating her ideas and identity. Constructivism, contrary to realism, argues that actors do not always behave according to the 'logic of expected consequences', which means that actors calculate outcomes and choose the most rational one (March and Olsen 1998). Instead, actors choose the most appropriate one among their options so that their behaviour is consistent with their ideas and identity. Thus, constructivists contend that actors' behaviours are the result of 'logic of appropriateness' (ibid). Furthermore, social constructivists differ from the rationalists in that they perceive interests as endogenous and inter-subjective which are shaped by common understandings and ideas between actors (Wendt 1995:73). Therefore, it is mostly concluded that how the actors construct their identities and how they see their environment defines their interests and behaviours. With regard to foreign policy, identifying oneself with a specific identity and within a security community shapes the foreign policy outcomes of a state (see Adler and Barnett 1998).

To sum up, three different theories explain the foreign policy behaviours of states by looking at either the role of interests and the international system, or international institutions and domestic factors, or identities and cultures. The next section will discuss the explanations of these three approaches on the Europeanization of TFP.

2.2 Literature Review

Turning to Turkey, one can ask which of those theories can give a more precise and convincing explanation about the change in TFP after the 1999 Helsinki summit. Is it the national interests, systemic dynamics, change in the role of domestic actors or reconstruction of foreign policy discourses and national identity?

From a realist perspective, it is widely argued that *realpolitik* still dominates the TFP. In this regard, national interests and strategic calculations made by elites according to geopolitical concerns shape the behaviour of Turkey. The changing environment of Turkey and the new security challenges led Turkish elites to revise their policies. Since the end of the Cold War, “Ankara’s principal objectives have been to maintain its geo-strategic importance in global politics, ensure regional stability, prevent ethnic conflicts from spilling over into its territory and gain new markets to fuel its strategy of export-based economic growth” (Sayari 2000:180). Therefore, the revisions in Turkish strategic calculations ended up overlapping with the foreign policies of Turkey and the EU in some matters. Nevertheless, for realists it is hard to say that TFP has been approximating to the EU in the expense of Turkish national interests. If there is any approximation, it is most probably due to strategic calculations on the Turkish side. Turkish elites might make strategic calculations in two different ways. First, the benefits of aligning policies with the EU outweigh the costs as long as a prospect of full membership to the EU remains on the table. One can also read the balance sheet by focusing on the cost side. Put it differently, the cost of non-alignment with the EU is high for Turkey. The cost can appear in the form of domestic instability such as upheaval in the political regime and in the form of loss of regional role and power.

On the other hand, some other authors underline the role of change in the international system that has altered Turkish relations with her steadfast ally, the USA (Oğuzlu 2004a). Especially, since September 11, 2001, the US has been pursuing a heavy-handed and arrogant foreign policy which is at odds with the Turkish interests in the regions that Turkey has high concerns. Thus, this contradiction with US policies has impelled Turkey to behave in a balancing manner by approximating her policies to the EU.³ Turkish elites are aware of the fact that if Turkey wants steady and sensible relations with the USA in the long run, it is inevitable to balance the US with the EU since the latter has also been on the rise as a global power (ibid, p.100). In this regard, the unilateral policies of a great power impose certain kinds of revisions on the TFP, which in the end approximate Turkish policies to the European ones.

From a liberal perspective, some authors point out the change within Turkish domestic political structures. Liberals tend to argue that the more democratic Turkey becomes, the more Europeanization of TFP can be observed (Oguzlu 2004b:97). Democratization not only increases the institutional constraints on the policymakers but also changes the political culture as well as brings new actors onto the political stage. As Nathalie Tocci (2005:79) states “change occurred and is occurring not simply because it is imposed from outside, but also because it interacts with domestic developments on the inside.” Turkish domestic politics has been in a transition for the last two decades, thereby, Turkey has become a more democratic country where political actors - the intellectuals of statecraft - who securitize issues and promulgate them as existential threats, and perceptions of those actors, and the perceptions of the audience - the grassroots - have all been influenced by this transformation. From the actors aspect, it is widely contended that the empowerment of new actors such as business groups and civil society and their support for the full membership of the EU (Öniş and Türem 2002; Öniş 2003:19) opened the foreign

³ However, this assumption can work other way around. It can be claimed that Turkey’s relations with the EU has been jeopardized since Turkey has to take a more military stance instead of a civilian one when it comes to security issues emerged as the by-product of the US policies in her neighbourhood. (See Oğuzlu and Kibaroglu ‘Incompatibilities in Turkish and European Security Cultures Diminish Turkey’s Prospects for EU Membership’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, forthcoming 2008. Retrieved on July 30, 2008 from http://mustafakibaroglu.com/db1/00032/mustafakibaroglu.com/_download/TarikOguzluMustafaKibarogluP aperTurkeyEU-16October2007.pdf)

policymaking process to the influence of low politics issues driven by economical, social or environmental problems.

The declining role of some actors who used to hold sway over foreign policy issues has also been contributing to the approximation of TFP to the EU. The reforms adopted after the Helsinki summit increased the civilian control of military which has resulted somewhat in the relegation of the military influence in Turkish politics (Karaosmanoğlu 2000:216; Müftüler-Baç 2005:27). That has paved the way for a civilian influence, or rather ‘civilianisation’ of foreign policymaking (Kirişci 2006:49). Nevertheless, having considered the retreat of military from the politics from another angle, some other authors contend that the military has begun to favour the Europeanization process in principle as long as it is not a threat to the secular and unitary character of the Turkish state (for example see Tank 2001; Heper 2005; Aydınli et.al 2006).

Besides, the governments prefer to align their policies with the EU so that they can gain leverage in domestic politics or take advantage of economic gains provided by the EU directly or indirectly. As some authors argue, approximation of policies is a reflection of turf battle between domestic actors rather than a change in the foreign policy (Celenk 2007:349). This usually happens when accession to the EU is one of the high political priorities of the ruling party even if the motivation is either ideological or instrumental (Dogan 2005:421; Robins 2007:292). Europeanization in that sense is the only chance that a ruling party has to “gain and hold onto office” (Cizre 2003:228).⁴ Briefly, the pace and scope of Europeanization of foreign policy is more or less determined by the divergent influence of different domestic actors.

When someone takes identity as an explanatory variable, she usually draws a conclusion that TFP has changed and come closer to the policies of the EU because of the national identity of Turkey which has been under the influence of the Westernization process

⁴ See also, Ronald H. Linden (1997), ‘Liberalization and Foreign Policy in East Europe’ cited in Elisabeth Johansson-Nogues, ‘*The Fifteen and the Accession States in the UN General Assembly: What Future for European Foreign Policy in the Coming Together of the ‘Old’ and the ‘New’ Europe?*’, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 9:67-92, 2004.

starting in the early 19th century. The Ottoman Empire had pursued a modernization through Westernization of its political, military, and social structures. This adherence to the Westernization process on the Turkish side remains one of the pillars of Turkish identity. The implication of this kind of national identity on foreign policy is that Turkish elites identify Turkey as a European state, which should be considered a member of European civilization. In this line of argument, acceptance as one of the European states would be at stake if Turkey did not Europeanize her domestic and foreign policies (Oğuzlu 2005:91). For this reason, Europeanization is inevitable if Turkey wants to be considered European.

On the other hand, influence of identity on the Europeanization of TFP can be read the other way around, as such:

Ironically, when the EU started to emphasize the cultural and political aspects of the organization in the 1980s, Turkey's western credentials were seriously questioned. Being European required opening up to the west politically and economically, but doing so also revealed the aspects of Turkish culture, which were not suitable to Europe (Bozdağlıoğlu 2003:164).

Therefore, identity related issues and Turkish security culture could be a hurdle in the way of further Europeanization of TFP (Oğuzlu and Kibaroğlu 2008). One can claim that Turkey has been aligning her foreign policies with the EU in order to overcome this identity difference. Turkish policymakers might think proving that Turkey can enhance harmonization and cooperation with the EU in foreign policy matters is a smart way of overcoming the cultural differences. To them, provided that Turkey continues to align her policies with the EU, the cultural differences will not be an insurmountable obstacle on the way towards accession.

Furthermore, some writers indicate the change in the discourses of Turkish political elite concerning security and foreign policy during the last decade (Bilgin 2005). The main parameters of traditional Turkish foreign policy discourse, namely 'the fear of abandonment' and 'fear of loss of territory' as well as 'geographical determinism' have

been altered because of a debate between traditional security discourse and post-modern security discourse which is embodied in Eurosceptics on the one side and pro-Europeans on the other (Bilgin 2005:183). Therefore, it is argued that the change in Turkish foreign policy discourses has converged with the foreign policy discourse of the EU, which paves the way for Europeanization of TFP.

To sum up, all of these approaches draw different conclusions concerning the approximation of TFP to the EU. For realists, change is executed by the elites in the shadow of national interests, whereas for liberals, change in domestic politics through democratization or through new economic concerns due to the globalisation are the main determinants, and for constructivists, change in official Turkish identity or discourses lead the transformation. However, realism cannot explain the maintenance of transformation even when it is in contradiction with the national interests. Besides, liberalism and constructivism cannot provide a clear picture of who is the object or subject matter of ongoing transformation. For instance, democratization of politics or liberalization of the economy cannot be explained without taking into account the EU's influence. Lastly, all the arguments are short of giving adequate answers to the questions of to what extent and how the EU exercises a power on the transformation of TFP since Turkey gained a candidacy status in 1999.

2.3 Main Arguments

To what extent and towards which direction has TFP been changing since the EU recognized Turkey as a candidate state for full membership? Different perspectives give different answers to this question as reviewed in the previous section. In this study, the change is considered as Europeanization of TFP. Therefore, Europeanization is the dependent variable which is understood as approximation or alignment of policies as a result of the EU impact on preferences of Turkey.

Europeanization is a contested concept that can denote different meanings such as integration, harmonisation, homogenization, or convergence. This controversy is

amplified when someone applies Europeanization in foreign policy which can cause overestimation of Europeanization (Major 2005). Bearing this in mind this study borrows the definition of Tonra (2000) on Europeanization of foreign policy as the:

transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making (p.229, quoted in Aydın and Acikmese 2007:265).

Europeanization can be divided into four different processes going on at the same time. These are a) national adaptation to the EU level structures by changing policy, polity and politics; b) uploading of national preferences to the EU level; c) utilization of the EU as a foreign policy tool; and d) penetration of European style of life, government, production and belief into the third countries (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008:142). Some others consider Europeanization as a transfer of power to the European level (Lawton 1999 cited in Radaelli, 2003:29) which means that states renounce their sovereignty and accept the authority of the EU in some areas. However, this definition is not applicable to the foreign policy issues as they are highly related to the sovereignty of states.

In this study, Europeanization is understood as approximation of foreign policies and cooperation between the two instead of an integration or rule adoption. In my opinion, there is an ongoing process of Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy due to the accession process. National alignment with the EU structures and rules are the outcome of reform efforts made under the name of accession negotiations. However, it is hard to talk about a genuine national adaptation to the EU level structures since the rule adoption that pertains to the foreign policy issues is rare, hence Europeanization as a national adoption of the EU level rules on foreign policymaking cannot be fully observed in the Turkish case. For this reason, the approximation of foreign policies means that the foreign policy of Turkey has been reoriented and aligned with the EU foreign policy since the 1999 Helsinki summit. In this regard, the EU has been altering the preferences of Turkey. Thus, Europeanization in foreign policy implies a change in preferences of a

candidate state. More identical preferences result in more approximation. On the other hand, approximation also implies that foreign policies of both are not exactly the same but they possess similarities and they tend to cooperate. Moreover, Europeanization implies a top-down approach since the main concern of this study is alignment with the EU *acquis* and uploading of policy preferences to the EU level is hardly possible in the case of a non-member state. In this context, this study puts forward two hypotheses on the approximation of TFP to the EU.

First, the likelihood of approximation increases if the credibility of the EU conditionality increases.⁵ The credibility of the EU conditionality rests upon two factors: the first factor is having a coherent and consistent policy about the future of Turkish membership. A lucid, uniform, and stable approach will enhance the reliability of the EU in the eyes of Turkish policymakers as well as of the public. The second factor is related to the nature of conditionality principle which entails the existence of sound and fast rewards as well as fines. Without possessing the capability to fulfil the promises or to force Turkey to comply with the EU policies, it is less likely that the EU can influence TFP in a favourable way.

Second, the likelihood of approximation increases if the institutionalization in the CFSP enhances. In this sense, not only the establishment of new European structures but also the emergence of the EU as a global and regional actor will increase approximation of Turkey. Thus, the likelihood of approximation increases if the EU becomes more engaged in the regional and world politics. In fact, this argument does not provide a linear explanation. In other words, if the institutionalization is exclusive and introvert, the likelihood of approximation decreases and vice versa.

⁵ This argument is taken from Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005), 'Introduction' in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier (eds.), *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press pp.1-28. The authors use determinacy of conditions, size and speed of rewards, credibility of conditionality, and veto players and adoption costs as the main explanatory variables in their model which explains the case of rule adoption in central and eastern European countries (p.13). However, in this study, those factors are combined into one (conditionality of the EU) and another factor (institutionalization) is added into the model.

The remainder of the study will elaborate on these arguments. The section four will interpret the empirical findings in order to test the main arguments. That section will also discuss the causal mechanisms between two arguments and the transformation of the TFP.

3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

This study in essence is a qualitative single-case study, which will contribute to the literature on Turkey by exposing the transformation of its foreign policy from 1999 onwards as well as to the literature on Europeanization of foreign policies by explaining how the impact of the EU on non-member states can be analyzed. Turkey is chosen as a single case because she is the only candidate state, which is still in a negotiation process despite the fact that she acquired the candidacy status in 1999. First, this makes the Turkish case unique and to some degree an outlier, that needs a deeper analysis. Second, this feature of the Turkish case enhances the depth of analysis in time and gives a more precise understanding of the effects of accession process on the Europeanization of foreign policies of a candidate state.

The literature on Turkish foreign policy abounds with many studies that have examined different aspects of TFP by looking at quite limited issues or regions such as the Cyprus issue, the Greek-Turkish relations, the Iranian nuclear proliferation, and the Iraqi war. However, most of those studies do not distinguish the effect of the EU from the role of governing elites, the pressure from domestic actors, or the effects of change in identity or elite discourses. The common conclusion drawn in those studies is that there is an EU effect but for the sake of a coherent explanation, it is better to take into consideration domestic and international factors as well (see Aydın and Acikmese 2007:264).

To some extent, this conclusion holds true if one aims to provide a more in depth analysis of a specific issue. However, this in turn brings about some shortcomings that every case study suffers from, such as ineffectiveness for providing generalizable arguments and lack of degrees of freedom, since such kinds of studies are short of diversified

observations that are commensurate with explanatory variables. Therefore, the main criticism of the case study method is that it is not a reliable and valid method to test hypotheses. Instead of testing hypotheses, it generates new hypotheses (for a discussion see Flybjerg 2006). Those shortcomings can be seen in most of the studies on the Europeanization of TFP done so far, as they cannot identify the EU impact and distinguish it from other factors, and they confine their observations to interstate relations, which consequently weakens the power of generalizability and determinacy of their conclusions.

This study tries to overcome those problems by increasing observations. This is made possible by looking at the voting behaviour of Turkey in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) for the period 1999-2007, examining Turkey's alignment with the EU foreign policy statements for the period 1999-2007, and Turkey's signature of major international and European treaties until 2008.⁶ These issues constitute much of the EU *acquis* on foreign policy matters. Second, those issues help us to measure the affinity between the EU and Turkey by examining the change in the preferences of Turkey.⁷ The time frame is limited to 1999-2007, because 1999 is the point when the Turkish-EU relations entered into a very different phase than before. Moreover, up to that time one can definitely observe the traces of other possible causes of change but not the outcome,

⁶ Even though this research is based on a single-case study, within four issues the total sum of observations are more than 2000, which make the results more determinate and reliable. The total number of resolutions voted in the UNGA between 1999 and 2007 is 769. This includes votes on preambular and operative paragraphs but does not include resolutions adopted with consensus. The total number of EU foreign policy statements that invite Turkey to align its policies with is 1117; the total number of major international treaties, conventions, and protocols is 43; the total number of European treaties is 203.

⁷ The IR scholars apply different methods to measure the preferences affinity between two states. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita measures the similarity of preferences in dyads by calculating the number of common partners between two states (see Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992 cited in Gartzke 2006). Gartzke takes the research to a next level and develops a new index called 'The Affinity of Nations 1946-2002', by looking at the votes in the UN General Assembly (see Gartzke 2006). According to Gartzke, the votes in the UNGA give us more information about the states preferences. In addition, the information is less distorted. Inspired by Gartzke's new index, this study contributes to the research in measuring the preferences of states by adding the signature of major international treaties. Besides, signature of European treaties as well as the alignment with the CFSP statements are also employed since the main focus of this study is the EU impact on the change in Turkish preferences. This new data gives us more comprehensive information on the state preferences. It reveals not only the preferences of states with regard to military issues as done by Bueno de Mesquita, but also the preferences on low politics issues such as human rights, environment, organized crime and human trafficking. I suppose this kind of data will contribute to the research on measuring state preferences in a globalized world.

which is namely Europeanization of TFP. Put differently, the question of what made Turkey come closer to the EU after 1999 cannot be thoroughly answered by the other factors since most of them can also be found in the pre-1999 period. This will be explained in chapter four in detail.

For these reasons, the research design of this study enables us to distinguish the EU impact from other factors since the pressure from domestic factors or the influence of international system or national interests or the changing discourses or identity of Turkish elites is little and insignificant in most of the observations. Therefore, this kind of research design not only increases the number of observations but also clarifies the EU impact and distinguishes it from others and more importantly gives us the trend in TFP, which makes the findings of this study more generalizable and determinate than the previous research. However, it is worth noting that due to its qualitative nature, the purpose of this study is not to measure the magnitude of EU impact.⁸ In addition, the study refrains from generalizing the empirical findings to other candidate countries since such kinds of effort need a comprehensive comparative analysis.

Data used in this study is mostly compiled by the author from the websites of the EU and the UN, except for the data on voting behaviours in the UNGA for the years between 1990 and 2002, which is borrowed from Erik Voeten's dataset 'Documenting Votes in the UN General Assembly 1946-2002'. Moreover, the study benefits from some EU reports on Turkey and presidency conclusions. Other resources are mainly secondary resources composed of journal articles, reports, and books written by mostly Turkish scholars in English.

⁸ For a quantitative analysis on the effects of EU conditionality on democracy promotion in the neighbouring countries, see Schimmelfennig, F. and Scholtz, H. (2008), 'EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange', *European Union Politics*, 9 (2): 187-215. In that study the dependent variable is democracy promotion whereas the independent variable is EU political conditionality.

4. THE EFFECT OF THE EU ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY

How does the EU influence the foreign policy of candidate states? The arguments in this chapter are built upon two mechanisms of the EU impact on TFP, namely the conditionality principle and institutionalization of the EU foreign policy. In this regard, this chapter proceeds in two steps. Initially, those two mechanisms of Europeanization are explained in more detail. Then, the rest of the chapter is devoted to testing the hypotheses about Europeanization of TFP through the empirical findings.

4.1 Europeanization through Conditionality and Institutionalization

As mentioned in the second chapter, Europeanization is understood as the change in preferences of candidate states. Therefore, the measurement of similar preferences shows us the Europeanization of a candidate state's foreign policy. However, finding where the preferences come from is a difficult job since so many factors can determine the preferences. Keeping this in mind, this study focuses on the outcomes of preferences. The voting behaviour in the UNGA as well as signature of major international and European treaties and alignment with the CFSP statements are scrutinized in order to measure the change in preferences. Those issues provide more information about the preferences of states. Moreover, they give us a more obvious impact of the EU on the change in preferences since the impact of other factors are negligible. The empirical findings on those issues enable us to identify the EU impact better than any other study done so far.

One can contend that the empirical findings do not provide a causal relationship between the EU impact and the change in preferences of Turkey since having similar preferences can be the result of other factors as well. At first glance, this criticism seems true and valid. However, in those four issues the EU impact can be observed in most of the observations, whereas, other factors such as domestic pressure, change in discourses of Turkish elites or influence of national interests are seldom observed. Therefore, the lack of distinguishing the EU impact from other factors which is a common flaw of most of

the studies done so far, is overcome to a certain extent by looking at the voting behaviours in the UNGA, signature of treaties and alignment with the CFSP statements.

The question is what is the causal mechanism through which the EU exerts power on the candidate state's policies? The literature on Europeanization puts forward two ways that the EU exerts transformative power on the policies of member states as well as candidates. The first way is instrumental, which stems from the conditionality principle. This is often explained in terms of obligatory implementation of EU policies (Major 2005:180). The EU explicitly asks for states to Europeanize, which in this case means adopting the EU *acquis* and aligning with the EU policies. On the other hand, the second way is an indirect and voluntary one in which the diffusion of EU policies and ideas causes transformation (ibid, pp.180-181). This normative Europeanization is the result of socialisation or social learning. However, in this study this normative mechanism is taken as institutionalization. There are two main assumptions behind this reasoning. First, only ideas and policies that are 'embedded in political institutions' (Goldstein and Keohane 1993:3) can provide a causal mechanism to explain the transformation of candidate states' foreign policies. Second, socialisation in a broader sense can only be realized through institutionalized mechanisms. The more the EU becomes institutionalized in the field of foreign policy, the more its policies and ideas spread and the more power it enjoys over the candidate states.

According to Aydın and Acıkmese (2007:268), the EU transforms the foreign policies of candidate states by requesting the adoption of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) *acquis*, the adherence to the political criteria and the commitment to solve any bilateral disputes, especially border conflicts. This study only deals with the first one, since the second way is more related to the democratization process, in particular to the reform efforts in domestic politics such as enhancement of civilian control over military⁹,

⁹ For some researches done in that field, see Heper, M. and Guney, A. (2000). 'The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience', *Armed Forces and Society* 26 (4): 635-657; Misrahi, F. (2004). 'The EU and the Civil Democratic Control of Armed Forces: An Analysis of Recent Developments in Turkey', *Perspectives* 22: 22-42; Guney, A. and Karatekelioglu, P. (2005). 'Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects', *Armed Forces and Society*, 31 (3):

whereas the third one is limited to the bilateral disputes¹⁰ such as the Greek-Turkish dispute on the Aegean sea and the Cyprus question.

Even if someone contends that in the domain of foreign policy it is hard to see a genuine effect of the EU due to the sensitive nature of the issues, the EU treaties and documents are full of explicit or implicit references to the conditionality principle concerning the foreign policy matters. In the Helsinki Presidency Conclusion (1999), it says that candidate states “must share the values and objectives of the EU as set out in the treaties.” In addition, the Negotiation Framework, which was promulgated in 2005, stipulates the conditions that Turkey has to fulfil during the negotiation process.

According to the framework, first and foremost, Turkey has to improve its relationships with its neighbourhood which asserts the elimination of “border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN Charter” (Negotiation Framework 2005). Moreover, the EU demands continuity of sincere Turkish support to the settlement of the Cyprus issue and establishment of a good bilateral relationship with the Republic of Cyprus, which means that Turkey has to refrain from using its veto against the membership of Cyprus in international organizations (ibid).

Last but not least, Turkey has to align itself with the EU policies and implement the *acquis* which includes not only the Treaties and other legislations but also the Union policies and acts within the CFSP as well as the Justice and Home Affairs alongside the international agreements concluded by the member states and the Communities (ibid). The European Commission, on its website under the title of CFSP, overtly expresses that “applicant countries are required to progressively align with EU statements and to apply sanctions and restrictive measures when and where required” (European Commission 2008).

439-462; Heper, M. (2005). ‘The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy’, *South European Society and Politics* 10 (1): 33-44.

¹⁰ For recent studies done on the EU impact on border conflicts, see Tocci, N. (2007). *The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard*. London and New York: Routledge; Diez, T., Albert, M. and Stetter, S. (eds.) (2008). *The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Power of Integration and Association*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

On the other hand, the EU conditionality principle possesses some intrinsic flaws due to its evolving nature and highly politicized characteristics. Grabbe (2002) defines those shortcomings as a 'moving target problem' and the Union's double role as being a 'referee' and a 'player' at the same time (pp.251-252). Moreover, the ambiguity about particular tasks and their benefits as well as the uncertainty about the priority of conditions reduce the effectiveness of the conditionality principle (Grabbe 2006:92-94). The conditionality principle can be more effective if the EU commitment is not vague. Ollie Rehn draws attention to this commitment problem in one of his speeches: "There often seems to be an assumption that there is no cost to questioning the commitments that the EU has made. Unfortunately, this is not true. Every time that countries gain an impression that the process may not lead to membership, it diminishes the power of our conditionality" (Quoted in Muftuler Bac 2008:67).

Lastly, in order to have an effective conditionality principle there needs to be a tension between the prospect of the membership at the end of the negotiation process and the probability of being rejected owing to the failure of adoption of the EU *acquis* (Grabbe 2006:53). In a similar vein, some authors contend that "the effectiveness of conditionality is eroded the moment the EU announces the date of accession" (Steunenberg and Dimitrova 2007). To sum up, the power of conditionality stems not only from the offer of a membership perspective but also the withdrawal of the benefits when required.

Another way the EU exerts power on the foreign policies of states is related to the extent of its institutionalization in this field. The impact of the EU basically pertains to what extent the EU foreign policy is institutionalized, which entails not only formation of well-functioning institutions but also the existence of a collective action among members in foreign policy matters as well as an international role of the Union in world politics. The European foreign policy has undergone considerable transformation after the signature of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Since then, the EU foreign policy has evolved to a more institutionalized and fully-fledged policy. Moreover, the member states began to align their policies with the EU and tended to cooperate more in many issues.

The institutionalization brings along an EU influence into the regional and world politics through the diffusion of ideas and policies of the EU. The more EU institutionalization the more attention paid by the third states. Moreover, institutionalization would solve the problem of whom the candidate states should satisfy in order to be considered Europeanized. Who is the counterpart? Is it the European Commission or member states or the European Parliament? In the absence of institutionalization, a candidate state has to take into account each member states individually. Therefore, the EU speaking with a single voice can exert much power by eliminating the confusion and uncertainty generated by diverging preferences of each member state.


At first glance, institutionalization can create a desire on the side of non-member states to participate in those structures and policies and eventually it can more or less push a state to harmonize its policies with the EU. The likelihood of approximation increases if the EU becomes more engaged in the regional and world politics. Nonetheless, if the institutionalization is exclusive and introvert, the likelihood of approximation decreases and vice versa.

In the Turkish case, the rapid development within the CFSP turned Turkey's face to the EU. Turkish ruling elites, who always have a fear of alienation from the European structures and a fear of grouping of states against Turkey, might have calculated that Turkish regional interests lay in alignment of policies with the EU. Not aligning with the EU can result in edging out of the regional politics. In addition, the EU has developed policies for the regions and countries that are in the neighbourhood of Turkey, such as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the Middle East Peace Process, and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Those are the issues and regions which Turkey does not have a luxury of not participating in. This, ultimately, leads to more approximation towards the EU policies.¹¹

¹¹ At this point, the Turkish announcement of withdrawal from the future ESDP operations due to the secondary role given to the Turkish troops exemplifies the non-linear nature of the institutionalization if it is exclusionary and biased (see Müftüler Bac 2008: 74).

To sum up, the EU changes the preferences of candidate states via conditionality and institutionalization. The empirical findings on four issues not only illustrate the preference similarity between the EU and Turkey, but also measure the EU impact on the change in TFP. The figure 1 illustrates the two ways of the EU impact.

Figure 1 The ways of the EU impact



4.2 Empirical Findings

The empirical findings are divided into two groups for the sake of simplicity. The first group consists of the data on voting behaviours of Turkey and the EU member states in the UNGA, and the data on signatures of major international treaties by Turkey as of August 2008. The second group of data includes the EU statements which fall into the CFSP pillar as well as the data on European treaties signed by the members of the Council of Europe. These treaties and statements constitute much of the EU *acquis* related to the foreign policy issues. Despite that fact, those statements, and treaties have not been scrutinized thoroughly in the literature on Europeanization, especially with regard to the adoption of them by the candidate states. The empirical findings of this study aim to fill that gap in the literature on Europeanization in general and Europeanization of TFP in particular.

4.2.1 The EU and Turkish Voting Records in the UNGA and Ratification of Major International Treaties

The voting behaviours of states in the UNGA have been widely analysed and many researchers draw conclusions about the cohesiveness within the EU member states and between the EU and the candidate states.¹² There are some advantages and disadvantages of studying the voting behaviours in the UNGA. First of all, the data is easy to access and reliable. Second, the data enables the researcher to have a long time period starting with 1946 until the present day, which makes a time-series statistical analysis possible. Last, a researcher can identify the issues in which the states' votes differ (Kissack 2007:7-8).

On the other hand, this data has some disadvantages emanate from its nature and its application. First, the existence of identical votes does not give a causal relationship on whether states act together or not. The identical votes can be a result of coincidence instead of a sign of cooperation. Second, it is hard to distinguish the political significance of voting 'for' from voting 'against' or being absent. Some countries abstain from voting in order to be impartial or to hide their real intentions. Last, the voting behaviour data does not show the negotiation/deliberation process going among states before the voting (ibid, pp.8-10).

The data on how all of the members of the EU vote in the UNGA is not efficient enough to comprehend the EU effect on the candidate states. By looking at the strength of cohesiveness between member states' voting behaviours in the UNGA, the question of operationalising the EU impact can be overcome. For this purpose, this study takes the identical votes that 1) all EU member states cast the same voting behaviour, and 2) more than half of the EU members cast the same voting behaviour no matter if it is for, against

¹² For some examples, see Luif, P. (2003). *EU Cohesion in the UN General Assembly*. Occasional papers 49, Paris: Institute for Security Studies. Johansson-Nogues, E. (2004). 'The Fifteen and the Accession States in the UN General Assembly: What Future for European Foreign Policy in the Coming Together of the Old and the New Europe?', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 9:67-92; Young, H. and Rees, N. (2005). 'EU Voting Behaviour in the UN General Assembly, 1990-2002: The EU's Europeanising Tendencies', *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 16: 193-207.

or to abstain. In other words, this study differs from most of the studies by considering the EU vote in two groupings.

This is done in order to understand whether Turkey takes into account the EU as a whole or not. Moreover, a two-dimensional approach helps to grasp the impact of the EU institutionalization. In this case, the question is to what extent the EU influence on Turkish voting behaviour is commensurate with the coherence between the EU members. Does Turkey vote similarly with the EU when the EU has a single voice on the issue? Higher cohesion implies more institutionalization of the EU voting behaviour. Therefore, the expectation is that Turkey aligns its voting behaviour with the EU if the cohesion between the EU members is high. In addition, this grouping of the EU vote clarifies whether the similar voting records between Turkey and the EU is coincidence or not. The less the difference between two groups of the EU voting record the less the identical votes between Turkey and the EU occur by coincidence.

The results of Turkish and the EU voting behaviours in the UNGA are illustrated in the tables below.

Table 1 Mismatch between the EU voting and Turkish voting in the UNGA for 1999-2007

Mismatch ratio %	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
EU- all members	12.72	16.98	22.64	16	17.40	15.06	10.52	9.30	8.95
EU-absolute majority	19.11	17.91	20.89	18.05	14.74	12.08	12.50	11.32	11.22
Mismatch ratio % excluding abstentions	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
EU- all members	13.46	12	14.28	14	14.92	10.14	8.10	7.22	6.34
EU-absolute majority	15.38	14.06	13.11	16.90	12.90	8.04	8.08	7.84	6.45

Source: Erik Voeten, 'Documenting Votes in the UN General Assembly 1946-2002' dataset for the years 1999-2002, and author's data on the period 2003-2007

This table exhibits that the Turkish vote in the UNGA is more than 80 percent identical with the EU vote even if one considers the votes of all EU members or the votes of the

absolute majority of the EU members.¹³ The second part of the table shows that when the votes that Turkey or the EU abstain from are excluded, more cohesion can be observed between Turkey and the EU. Since Turkey was accepted as a candidate state, the mismatch ratio tends to decline. In Table 2, the rising trend in cohesion is more clearly highlighted. Whereas the mismatch ratio excluding abstentions used to be more than 15 percent for the periods 1990-1994 and 1995-1999, it turns out that for the period 2004-2007 in which Turkey has started negotiations the mismatch ratio is under 10 percent.

Table 2 Trends in Turkish and the EU voting behaviours in the UNGA 1990-2007

Average mismatch ratio for four periods	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2003	2004-2007
EU- all members	17.16%	22.05%	18.25%	10.24%
EU-absolute majority	28.45%	21.69%	17.89%	11.78%
Average mismatch ratio for four periods excluding abstentions	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2003	2004-2007
EU- all members	15.92%	19.75%	13.80%	6.92%
EU-absolute majority	28%	19.62%	14.24%	6.88%

Source: Erik Voeten, 'Documenting Votes in the UN General Assembly 1946-2002' dataset for the years 1990-2002, and author's data on the period 2003-2007

It is more insightful to look at the issues that the EU and Turkey differ on than the issues where they have the same votes (see Appendix A). Most of the issues where Turkey cast a different vote pertain to the Palestinian issue, the human rights issue in Iran, environmental issues, defamation of religions, and the resolution on the Law of Sea. However, if the abstentions and abstain votes are omitted from the analysis, there remains four resolutions that Turkey voted in opposite of the EU. Those resolutions are about the oceans and the Law of Sea, the human rights, and terrorism, combating defamation of religions, and global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. Moreover, Turkey always votes in contrary to the EU with regard to the resolution on Law of Sea. This is due to its dispute with Greece on the Aegean Sea.

¹³ Absolute majority means that more than half of the members cast the same vote. For example, for the 2000-2003 period absolute majority is 8 members, whereas for 2004-2006 period it is 13 and for 2007 it is 14.

One can contend that the empirical findings do not give us a causal relationship between the EU impact and Turkish voting behaviour in the UNGA since correlation does not always indicate a causal relationship. At first glance, this criticism seems true and valid. However, the question that can be posed is which factor accounts for that cohesion trend between the voting behaviours of Turkey and the EU. First, other factors, such as domestic pressure, national interests, or change in discourses of Turkish elites, cannot adequately explain the change in voting behaviour of Turkey in the post-1999 period. In most of the observations, it is hard to claim that there is a pressure from domestic actors or a strategic calculation in accordance with the national interests or the impact of new discourses in Turkish politics and Turkish identity so that Turkey votes similar with the EU. Therefore, there is a lack of continuity and consistency of the impact of those factors. Second, the traces of such factors did exist in the pre-1999 period as well; nonetheless, their impact could not be observed in that period. For these reasons, those factors cannot explain why Turkish voting behaviour has been becoming identical to the EU voting behaviour since 1999, but not before then. Therefore, the findings are significant since the impact of other factors is minimal and the EU factor is more profound than the others are. Most probably, regarding the resolutions that Turkey votes different from the EU, a domestic pressure or national interests can be observed. However, understanding why Turkey diverges from the EU concerning those resolutions necessitates a deeper analysis.

As for the second hypothesis, it is better to figure out the institutionalization of the EU voting behaviour. This is done by calculating the ratio between the number of total resolutions and the number of total observation for the resolutions where all of the EU members vote identically. In this regard, Table 3 shows the institutionalization ratio for the period between 1990 and 2007. As the results show there is an institutionalization process of the EU voting behaviour beginning with the 2000-2003 period. Most of the member states cast similar votes at that period. This result also corresponds to the efforts of the members to form a common foreign policy at that time beginning with the Saint Malo agreement in 1998.

Table 3 Institutionalization ratio

Total observations	1990-1994	1995-1999	2000-2003	2004-2007
EU-all members	204	220	225	301
EU-absolute majority	355	352	301	399
Total resolutions	368	355	302	400
Institutionalization ratio	55.0%	62.0%	74.5%	75.2%

Source: Erik Voeten, 'Documenting Votes in the UN General Assembly 1946-2002' dataset for the years 1990-2002, and author's data on the period 2003-2007

Some researchers argue that in order to clarify whether the ratios on institutionalization are reliable, one should also look at the negotiation process between states before the voting. This will help us to identify the coordination among states which will give more reliable results about the extent of the EU institutionalization (Kissack 2006). Therefore, a more comprehensive analysis should be undertaken in order to find out the coordination between Turkey and the EU with regard to the voting behaviours in the UNGA. However, this can be a subject of further research in this field.

A comparison of tables 2 and 3 supports the argument that more institutionalization also results in more cohesion between Turkey and the EU. Ultimately, the EU impact via conditionality and institutionalization is significant and it persuades Turkey to cast identical votes with the EU members.

Turning to the findings on the ratification of major international treaties, one can find that 23 treaties are ratified and 18 treaties are signed by Turkey after 1999. Sixteen treaties were already opened to signature before 1999, whereas 13 out of 43 treaties were opened to signature after 1999. Turkey signed ten of them. There are seven treaties that have not been signed or ratified by Turkey and four treaties have been signed but not been ratified yet by Turkey as of 2008 (see Appendix B). Except for the EU impact on Turkey, no other factor can give an answer to the question of why Turkey signed or ratified 23 out of 43 major treaties after 1999. Moreover, 16 of them were already opened to signature before 1999. These findings obviously indicate the EU impact on Turkish foreign policy with regard to the signature of major international treaties.

Table 4 Major international treaties that Turkey has not signed

Title	Date of Convention	Ratification by EU members
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	11 Dec 1997	Ratified
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	17 Jul 1998	Ratified
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court	9 Sep 2002	Not signed by all members
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea	10 Dec 1982	Ratified
Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982	28 Jul 1994	Ratified
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks	4 Aug 1995	Ratified
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties	23 May 1969	Ratified (except for France and Malta)

Source: United Nations (2000). *World Leaders invited to Sign Key Treaties at United Nations Millennium Summit* available at <http://www.un.org/millennium/media/treaties.htm> and United Nations (2005). *Leaders invited to Sign or Ratify Key Treaties at 2005 World Summit* available at http://www.un.org/summit2005/presskit/Treaty_en.pdf

Table 4 includes the treaties that Turkey has not yet signed. Even though most of them are ratified by all of the EU member states, which implies that there is kind of a single voice or rather institutionalization of the EU, Turkey insists on not signing those treaties. Appendix C clarifies that there is not any condition with regard to the Convention on the Law of Treaties, and Convention on the Law of the Sea in the progress reports published since 1999. However, there are references to the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change as well as the Statute of the International Criminal Court in the progress reports on Turkey. Therefore, these two treaties are outliers of the empirical findings. Despite the fact that the EU conditionality and institutionalization with regard to those treaties exist, the question of why Turkey has not signed the Kyoto Protocol and Rome Statute is subject to further analysis.¹⁴

¹⁴ At this point, it should be noted that Turkey has implemented some reforms in order to facilitate the adoption of the statute. Moreover, Turkey has announced that she intends to be part of the statute of the International Criminal Court if a reference to terrorism is included. European Commission (2007), 'Turkey 2007 Progress Report', COM (2007) 663 Final. Retrieved on August 15, 2008 from http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/Turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf

4.2.2 Turkish Alignment with the CFSP Statements and Ratification of European Treaties

The EU announces its policies and opinions related to the foreign policy issues through the CFSP statements. Apart from being a statement or a press release, those documents show the cohesion among member states as well as the alignment of candidate states with the EU policies. Those statements are also useful due to their wide range of concerns from human rights to civil wars and from the Balkans to Asia. An analysis of those statements does not only shed light on the alignment of candidate states with the EU but also reveals the change in the candidate state's foreign policy concerns.

Table 5 exhibits the alignment ratio of Turkey since 1999. Needless to say, before the EU declared Turkish candidacy to full membership, Turkey did not show any intention to join any of the statements even if the statement was in line with Turkish policy. At that time, this was the result of a strategy of Turkish governing elites more than a hesitation. Turkey minimized every relationship with the EU as retaliation to the decision of the EU to exclude Turkey from the next enlargement in the 1997 Luxembourg summit. The results for 1999 reflect the outcome of this strategy. Turkey refrained from aligning itself with any CFSP statements before the Helsinki summit. The only statement that Turkey aligned itself to in 1999 was just after the Helsinki summit. The statement was on the restoration of democracy in Niger. One cannot explain why Turkey suddenly became so interested in the democratization of an African country unless the EU impact is taken into account.

Table 5 Turkish alignment ratio with the CFSP statements 1999-2007

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
1,42%	83,70%	92,48%	84,77%	83,70%	82,45%	83,81%	92,90%	86,90%

Source: Author's compilation from the website of the Council of the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?lang=en&id=248&mode=g&name=>

Moreover, the results indicate that Turkish alignment with the EU fluctuates in a range of above 80 percent and below 90 percent. Only for the years 2002 and 2006 did the

alignment ratio slightly pass the threshold of 90 percent. However, it has never gone below the 80 percent level since 1999. These upper and lower thresholds are the indicators of to what degree the EU impact can be observed on the TFP. Appendix D illustrates the issues that Turkey refrained from aligning with. Turkey is sometimes reluctant to align itself with the EU positions on issues touching its relations with the Muslim countries such as Sudan, its neighbours such as Russia and Iran, and its staunch allies such as Azerbaijan and Pakistan. In comparison with the other candidate states, the Turkish alignment ratio is below the expected limits. This selective nature of Turkish alignment with the EU is also mentioned in some of the progress reports. (Progress Reports 2004 and 2005).

According to the website of the Council of Europe (2008), Turkey has signed 97 European treaties as of 2008. Ten of them were signed after 1999 whereas 24 treaties were ratified, and 23 of them entered into force in the same period (see Appendix E). There are five treaties opened to signature and nine out of 97 entered into force after 1999. The number of treaties that Turkey has not signed yet is 65 of which eleven were open to signature after 1999.

Table 6 European treaties opened to signature after 1999, but not signed or ratified by Turkey as of August 2008

Title of The Treaty	Opening of the treaty	Enter into force	Ratification by EU all members
European Convention on the Legal Protection of Services based on, or consisting of, Conditional Access	24.01.2001	01.07.2003	No
Convention on Information and Legal Co-operation concerning "Information Society Services"	04.10.2001		No
Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters	08.11.2001	01.02.2004	No
Convention on Cyber crime	23.11.2001	01.07.2004	Yes
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin	24.01.2002	01.05.2006	No
Additional Protocol to the Anti-Doping Convention	12.09.2002	01.04.2004	No
Additional Protocol to the Convention on cyber crime, concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems	28.01.2003	01.03.2006	No
Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption	15.05.2003	01.02.2005	No
Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings	16.05.2005	01.02.2008	No

Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society	27.10.2005		No
Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State succession	19.05.2006		No

Source: Council of Europe

<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?CM=8&CL=ENG>

Table 6 presents the treaties that were opened to signature after 1999. Except for the Convention on Cyber Crime, which entered into force in 2004, none of the treaties has been signed by every EU member state. Therefore, the table indicates that in the near future the Convention on Cyber Crime can be a condition for Turkey to fulfil. The next table also shows the treaties that are not signed by Turkey but signed by most of the EU members. In this table, the Convention on Cyber Crime is again the only treaty signed by all of the members. Moreover, in the progress reports of 2004 and 2006, signature of cyber crime, trafficking in human beings and mutual assistance in criminal matters were put forward as a condition. Turkey has to sign those agreements during the negotiations.

In this regard, the power of the EU impact on Turkey can be measured by looking at the difference between the date when Turkey would sign those treaties and the date when the EU posits them as conditions.¹⁵ Measuring the magnitude of the EU impact is beyond of the scope of this study. Estimating the time when Turkey will sign those treaties is not the purpose of this study, whose main research questions are why and how it happens or can happen rather than when it happens or will happen. This study can only argue that effective conditionality and more institutionalization of the EU will compel Turkey to sign them during the negotiations.

¹⁵ For research in a similar vein, see Plümper, T. Schneider, C. and Troeger, V. (2003). 'Regulatory Conditionality and Membership Accession in the EU: Evidence from a Heckman Selection Model', Konstanz: University of Konstanz. Mimeo. Cited in Steunenberg and Dimitrova (2007).

Table 7 European treaties not signed by Turkey, but signed most of the EU members as of August 2008

Title of the treaty	EU members not signed	Opening of the treaty	Enter into force
Protocol No. 10 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	Bul, Lat, Lith, Spn	25.03.1992	
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities	Frn.	01.02.1995	01.02.1998
Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons	Slo, Slv, Spn, UK	18.12.1997	01.06.2000
Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters	Aus, Ita, Spa.	08.11.2001	01.02.2004
Convention on Cyber crime	Ratified by all members	23.11.2001	01.07.2004
Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings	Czr, Est.	16.05.2005	01.02.2008

Abbreviations: Aus: Austria, Bul: Bulgaria, Czr: Czech Republic, Est: Estonia, Frn: France, Ita: Italy, Lat: Latvia, Lith: Lithuania, Slo: Slovakia, Slv: Slovenia, Spn: Spain, UK: United Kingdom

Source: Council of Europe

<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?CM=8&CL=ENG>

The results underline the selective nature of Turkey and its tough stance on the matter of national minorities. Even though this convention has been mentioned in all of the progress reports published since 1999, Turkey opts out of signing that treaty. This can be the result of lack of full institutionalization of the EU since a major member, France, has not signed the treaty either. However, with regard to the treaty it is better to take into consideration the Turkish concerns about internal solidarity and territorial integrity whose impact is stronger than the impact of the EU factor.

To sum up, the results clarify and identify the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy with regard to alignment with the CFSP *acquis* of the EU. Moreover, even though the results do not gauge the impact of the EU on Turkey, they reveal that the EU exerts a power on the transformation of TFP through its conditionality principle as well as institutionalization in the field of foreign policy. However, the EU impact is limited to the issues that Turkey deems vital for its national interests and security.

5. CONCLUSION

Having become the candidate state for the full membership in the EU, Turkey has become a subject matter of many studies in IR. The literature on foreign policy is full of

research done to elaborate on the effect of the EU concerning the issues that Turkey has long been sensitive to any changes. Instead of this issue-based and region-oriented research design, this study has analyzed the voting behaviour of Turkey in the UNGA, ratification of major international and European treaties by Turkey and Turkish alignment with the CFSP statements. Even if one can claim that the issues voted in the UN and the treaties and the statements adopted are not at the top of the Turkish foreign policy agenda, those statements and treaties are also important since they constitute much of the EU foreign policy *acquis* which Turkey has to adopt during the negotiation process.

This study has tried to shed light on the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy by examining those issues that have been neglected so far. Overall, the results of this research support the arguments on the EU effect on the change in preferences of candidate states through conditionality and institutionalization. The impact of the EU on a candidate state is higher if a viable membership perspective based on the conditions to be fulfilled during the negotiation process is underpinned by sound institutionalization on the part of the EU with regard to foreign policy issues. However, the results also show that Turkey is still hesitant to align with the EU if the issues are vital for Turkey's security and national interests. Even though Turkey can be considered as most likely case, Europeanization is limited and the EU impact is constrained. Despite the fact that the EU conditionality and institutionalization is strong in some observations, Turkey has not changed its preferences on some issues. Moreover, the cohesion in the UNGA as well as alignment with CFSP statements seems to have reached a plateau of around 80 percent in recent years. That is why, I think that until Turkey is given a clear vision of full membership, the EU impact on the further Europeanization of Turkey will be limited. It can even decrease if the EU loses its credibility in the eyes of the Turkish elites and public.

Even though this study has tried to fill a gap in the Europeanization literature in general and in the analysis of change in Turkish foreign policy in particular, further research should be undertaken on two topics. First, whether Turkey defends the EU statements and policies in the international arena as it aligns itself to them. Such kind of research will not

only clarify the Europeanization process in the Turkish foreign policy but also elucidate the prospect of cooperation between the EU and Turkey in the foreign policy matters. Second, a comparative study that includes every candidate country as well as the prospective ones should be undertaken in order to find out whether the conclusions drawn in this study are generalizable to other states in the sphere of EU influence. That kind of research can contribute to the literature on state preferences in IR by using a more comprehensive, cross-sectional data.

Appendix A

The resolutions which Turkey vote different from the EU for the 2004-2007 period

Year	Description of the Resolution	Turkish vote	EU-all members vote	EU-absolute majority vote
2004	The draft resolution on oceans and the law of the sea	3	1	1
2004	The draft resolution on the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People	1	2	2
2004	The draft resolution on the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat	1	2	2
2004	The draft resolution on the Syrian Golan	1	2	2
2004	The draft resolution on the work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories	1	2	2
2004	Draft resolution I on assistance to Palestinian children	1	2	2
2004	Draft resolution XIII on human rights and terrorism	1	3	3
2004	Draft resolution II on the situation of human rights in Iran	8	1	1
2004	The motion for no action on draft resolution III concerning the human rights situation in Turkmenistan	8	3	3
2004	Draft resolution III on the human rights situation in Turkmenistan	8	1	1
2004	Operative paragraph 9 of the draft resolution on the rights of the child	8	1	1
2005	The United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning	2	0	3
2005	The draft resolution on oceans and the law of the sea	3	1	1
2005	The draft resolution on the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People	1	2	2
2005	The draft resolution on the Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat	1	2	2
2005	The draft resolution on the Syrian Golan	1	2	2
2005	The draft resolution on the work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories	1	2	2
2005	The draft resolution on combating the defamation of religions	1	3	3
2005	The draft resolution on human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	8	1	1
2005	The draft resolution on human rights in Turkmenistan	8	1	1
2005	Preambular paragraph 7 of the draft resolution on the International Year of Deserts and Desertification, 2006	8	0	1
2005	Draft resolution I on the International Year of Deserts and Desertification, 2006	8	0	2
2005	The draft resolution on the future operations of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW)	1	0	2
2006	The draft resolution on the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People	1	0	2
2006	The draft resolution on the Division for Palestinian Rights	1	0	2
2006	The draft resolution on the Syrian Golan	1	2	2
2006	The draft resolution on the work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories	1	2	2
2006	The draft resolution on the question of Western Sahara	8	0	1
2006	The draft resolution on dissemination of information on decolonization	8	0	1

2006	Draft resolution I on the human rights situation arising from Israeli military operations in Lebanon	1	2	2
2006	Draft resolution XI on combating the defamation of religions	1	3	3
2006	The no-action motion concerning draft resolution IV on the situation of human rights in Iran	8	3	3
2006	Draft resolution IV on the human rights situation in Iran	8	1	1
2006	The draft resolution on oceans and the Law of the Sea	3	1	1
2007	The draft resolution on the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People	1	0	2
2007	The draft resolution on the Division for Palestinian Rights	1	0	2
2007	Operative paragraph 11 of the draft resolution on the protection of the global climate for present and future generations	8	0	1
2007	The draft resolution on combating defamation of religions	1	3	3
2007	The no action motion on the draft resolution on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran	8	3	3
2007	The amendment to operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran	8	3	3
2007	The draft resolution on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran	8	1	1
2007	The draft resolution on oceans and the Law of the Sea	3	1	1
2007	The draft resolution on global efforts for the total elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action	1	3	3

Note: 1: Accept, 2: Abstain, 3: Reject, 8: Absent, 0: No vote

Source: The United Nations Documentation <http://www.un.org/documents/>

Appendix B

Major International Treaties:

Title	Date	Date of Signature by Turkey	Date of Ratification by Turkey	Ratification by EU members
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide	9 Dec 1948		31 Jul 1950 a	Ratified (except for Malta)
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination	07 Mar 1966	13 Oct 1972	16 Sep 2002	Ratified
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	16 Dec 1966	15 Aug 2000	23 Sep 2003	Ratified
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	16 Dec 1966	15 Aug 2000	23 Sep 2003	Ratified
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	16 Dec 1966	3 Feb 2004	24 Nov 2006	Ratified (except for the UK)
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty	15 Dec 1989	6 Apr 2004	02 Mar 2006	Ratified (except for Latvia)
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	18 Dec 1979		20 Dec 1985 a	Ratified
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	6 Oct 1999	8 Sep 2000	29 Oct 2002	Ratified (except for Estonia, Malta and Latvia)
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	10 Dec 1984	25 Jan 1988	2 Aug 1988	Ratified
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families	18 Dec 1990	13 Jan 1999	27 Sep 2004	Not ratified
Convention on the Rights of the Child	20 Nov 1989	14 Sep 1990	4 Apr 1995	Ratified
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict	25 May 2000	8 Sep 2000	4 May 2004	Ratified (except for Cyprus)
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography	25 May 2000	8 Sep 2000	19 Aug 2002	Signed but not ratified by all members
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel	9 Dec 1994		9 Aug 2004 a	Ratified (except for Malta)
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings	15 Dec 1997	20 May 1999	30 May 2002	Ratified
*Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (with Protocols I, II and III)	10 Oct 1980	26 Mar 1982	2 Mar 2005	Ratified
Convention on the Prohibition of the	18 Sep 1997		25 Sep 2003 a	Ratified

Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction				(except for Finland and Poland)
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996	03 May 1996		02 May 2005	Ratified
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction	3 Sep 1992	14 Jan 1993	12 May 1997	Ratified
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	10 Sep 1996	24 Sep 1996	16 Feb 2000	Ratified
Convention on biological diversity	5 Jun 1992	11 Jun 1992	14 Feb 1997	Ratified
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa	14 Oct 1994	14 Oct 1994	31 Mar 1998	Ratified
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees	28 Jul 1951	24 Aug 1951	30 Mar 1962	Ratified
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees	31 Jan 1967		31 Jul 1968 a	Ratified
Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	18 Dec 2002	14 Sep 2005		Signed but not ratified
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism	9 Dec 1999	27 Sep 2001	28 Jun 2002	Ratified
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime	15 Nov 2000	13 Dec 2000	25 Mar 2003	Ratified (except for Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg)
United Nations Convention against Corruption	31 Oct 2003	10 Dec 2003	9 Nov 2006	Signed but not ratified by all members
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	13 Apr 2005	14 Sep 2005		Signed but not ratified by all members
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime	15 Nov 2000	13 Dec 2000	25 Mar 2003	Ratified (except for Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime	15 Nov 2000	13 Dec 2000	25 Mar 2003	Ratified (except for Austria, Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations	31 May 2001	28 Jun 2002	04 May 2004	Signed but not ratified by all members

Convention against Transnational Organized Crime				
Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade	10 Sep 1998	11 Sep 1998		Ratified (except for Malta)
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants	22 May 2001	23 May 2001		Ratified (except for Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Poland)
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity	29 Jan 2000	24 May 2000	24 Oct 2003	Ratified
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control	21 May 2003	28 Apr 2004	31 Dec 2004	Ratified (except for Czech Republic, Italy)
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	11 Dec 1997			Ratified
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	17 Jul 1998			Ratified
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court	9 Sep 2002			Not signed by all members
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea	10 Dec 1982			Ratified
Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982	28 Jul 1994			Ratified
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks	4 Aug 1995			Ratified
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties	23 May 1969			Ratified (except for France and Malta)

Notes:

- 1) a: accession
- 2) *: Turkey participates only in protocol I.

Sources: This list is a compilation of treaties taken from Secretary General's letter to all heads of state or government at Millennium Summit in 2000 and World Summit in 2005. (Data current as of 20 August 2008). United Nations (2000). *World Leaders invited to Sign Key Treaties at United Nations Millennium Summit* available at <http://www.un.org/millennium/media/treaties.htm> and United Nations (2005). *Leaders invited to Sign or Ratify Key Treaties at 2005 World Summit* available at http://www.un.org/summit2005/presskit/Treaty_en.pdf

Appendix C

Foreign policy conditions mentioned in the progress reports 1999-2007

EU conditions	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Engage in political dialogue with the EU	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Improve relations with Greece	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Engage in a political dialogue with regard to territorial dispute in the Aegean	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Commit to a settlement of Cyprus issue under the auspices of the UN	1	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3
Align with the CFSP positions	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Orient the foreign policy in line with the EU	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2
Contribute to the EU-led military operations	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Support ESDP developments	1	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	2
Improve relations with Iraq (particularly operations in Northern Iraq)	1	1	2	2	3	3	3	2	2
Improve relations with Syria	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Open the border with Armenia	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Improve bilateral relations with Armenia	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2
Improve relations with Iran	2	2	0	2	3	3	0	0	0
Support the EU statements with regard to Iranian nuclear programme	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	3
Comply with the ECHR decision on property rights in Cyprus	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2
Solve the issues concerning the vessels on the Cyprus register	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sign the Kyoto Protocol	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sign the Statute of International Criminal Court	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Conclude of a free trade agreement between Turkey and Cyprus	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Fulfil the obligation of full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Approve Cyprus' membership to international organizations	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Approve of Cyprus' participation in the Wassenaar Agreement on the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and on Dual-Use goods	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Align with the Wassenaar Agreement on the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and on Dual-Use good	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1

Note: 1: no fulfilment of condition, 2: partial fulfilment of condition, 3: total fulfilment of condition, 0: no condition

Sources: European Commission progress reports on Turkey between 1999 and 2007.

Appendix D

CFSP Statements which Turkey did not align with for the years 2006-2007

Statements	Year
Declaration by EU on the situation of the freedom of the media in Azerbaijan	2006
Entry into force of the CCW Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War	2006
Declaration on political prisoners in Eritrea	2006
Council Common Position 2006/362/CFSP	2006
Council Common Position 2006/318/CFSP renewing restrictive measures against Burma/Myanmar	2006
Restrictive measures against certain officials of Belarus	2006
Declaration on access for humanitarian operations in Darfur	2006
Kosovo - Changes within Kosovo's leadership	2006
Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU on Georgia	2006
Declaration from the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Belarus Helsinki Committee	2006
Lifting of the state of emergency on Pakistan	2007
Declaration on the elections for the Russian State Duma	2007
Council Common Position 2007/750/CFSP renewing restrictive measures against Burma/Myanmar	2007
Imposition of emergency rule in Pakistan	2007
Freedom of expression in the Islamic Republic of Iran	2007
Arrests of democracy activists in Burma/Myanmar	2007
Death Sentences in Iran	2007
Declaration - Pakistan	2007
Restrictive measures against Burma/Myanmar	2007
Constitutional reform process in Egypt	2007
Declaration on the arrest of British Naval personnel by Iran	2007

Source: Author's compilation from the website of the Council of the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?lang=en&id=248&mode=g&name=>

Appendix E

European Treaties signed and ratified by Turkey after 1999

Title of the treaty	Signature by Turkey	Ratification by Turkey	Enter into force in Turkey	Opening of the treaty	Enter into force
European Convention on Compulsory Insurance against Civil Liability in respect of Motor Vehicles	26.06.1974	26.04.2000	25.07.2000	20.04.1959	22.09.1969
European Agreement on the Exchange of Tissue-Typing Reagents	13.10.1980	01.12.2004	02.01.2005	17.09.1974	23.04.1977
Additional Protocol to the European Agreement on the Exchange of Tissue-Typing Reagents	13.10.1980	01.12.2004	02.01.2005	24.06.1976	23.04.1977
Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Information on Foreign Law	01.09.1980	01.12.2004	2.03.2005	15.03.1978	31.08.1979
European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions concerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children	20.10.1997	8.02.2000	1.06.2000	20.05.1980	01.09.1983
European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities	4.02.1998	11.07.2001	12.10.2001	21.05.1980	22.12.1981
Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty	15.01.2003	12.11.2003	01.12.2003	28.04.1983	01.03.1985
European Convention for the Protection of Pet Animals	18.11.1999	28.11.2003	01.06.2004	13.11.1987	01.05.1992
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime	27.09.2001	06.10.2004	1.02.2005	08.11.1990	01.09.1993
European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage (Revised)	16.01.1992	29.11.1999	30.05.2000	16.01.1992	25.05.1995
European Convention on Cinematographic Co-Production	10.01.1997	9.03.2005	1.07.2005	2.10.1992	1.04.1994
Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or	10.05.1995	17.09.1997	1.03.2002	4.11.1993	1.03.2002

Punishment					
Protocol No. 2 to the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	10.05.1995	17.09.1997	01.03.2002	4.11.1993	1.03.2002
Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established thereby	11.05.1994	11.07.1997	01.11.1998	11.05.1994	1.11.1998
European Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights	9.06.1999	10.06.2002	01.10.2002	25.01.1996	1.07.2000
European Agreement relating to persons participating in proceedings of the European Court of Human Rights	3.07.2002	6.10.2004	01.12.2004	5.03.1996	1.01.1999
Sixth Protocol to the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe	15.02.1999	17.09.2003	18.10.2003	5.03.1996	1.11.1998
European Social Charter (revised)	6.10.2004	27.06.2007	01.08.2007	3.5.1996	1.07.1999
Convention for the protection of Human Rights and dignity of the human being with regard to the application of biology and medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine	04.04.1997	02.07.2004	01.11.2004	04.04.1997	1.12.1999
Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the European Region	01.12.2004	08.01.2007	01.03.2007	11.4.1997	1.02.1999
Protocol amending the European Convention on Transfrontier Television		01.10.2000	01.03.2002	01.10.1998	1.03.2002
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption	27.09.2001	29.03.2004	01.07.2004	27.01.1999	1.07.2002
Civil Law Convention on Corruption	27.09.2001	17.09.2003	01.01.2004	4.11.1999	1.11.2003
European Landscape Convention	20.10.2000	13.10.2003	01.03.2004	20.10.2000	1.03.2004

Additional Protocol to the European Agreement on the Transmission of Applications for Legal Aid	4.10.2001	31.03.2005	01.07.2005	4.10.2001	1.09.2002
Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances	9.01.2004	20.02.2006	01.06.2006	3.05.2002	1.07.2003
Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism	15.07.2003	20.05.2005		15.05.2003	
Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention	6.10.2004	2.10.2006		13.05.2004	

Source: Council of Europe

<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?CM=8&CL=ENG>

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